THE PERSIAN GULF, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND MIDDLE EAST SECURITY
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Istanbul, 7-10/VI/1992

a. "Agenda"
1. "The West and Gulf security"/ Steven Simon
2. "Iran and collective security in the Gulf"/ Shahram Chubin
3. "The GCC collective defence and Iraq"/ Charles Tripp
4. "Border issues"/ Richard Murphy
5. "Security arrangements linked to the emerging status of the West Bank and Gaza"/ Joseph Alpher
6. "Regional arms control, CBM and peacekeeping requirements"/ Nabil Fahmy
7. "Regional security dimensions of peace settlement"/ Yezid Sayigh, Efraim Karsh
8. "Resources, demography and Middle East security"/ Jawad Anani
9. "Democratisation, self determination and strategic stability"/ Bahgat Korany

International Institute for Strategic Studies
London

The 1992 Regional Security Conference

Istanbul, Turkey
7-10 June 1992

The Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israel Conflict, and Middle East Security

Agenda

Sunday

19:00 **Evening Reception** in foyer of Genève Room on 7th Floor

20:00 **Dinner** in Genève Room on 7th Floor

Words of welcome by the Director of the IISS

Keynote speech by H.E. Mr Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey

In the presence also of H.E. Mr Hikmet Çetin, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey

Monday

Breakfast in Café Suisse

The Conference will be held in Genève Room on 7th Floor

Theme One Security in the Persian Gulf

9:00-11:00
Session I **The West and Gulf Security**

Speaker Steven Simon

Commentator Ali Dessouki

11:30-13:30
Session II **Iran and Collective Security in the Gulf**

Speaker Shahram Chubin

Commentator Abbas Maleki

13:45 Lunch in Edelweiss Room in Suite Tower

17:30-19:30
Session III **The GCC Collective Defence and Iraq**

Speaker Charles Tripp

Commentator Ghanim Al-Najjar

Tuesday

Breakfast in Café Suisse

Theme Two Security Aspects of a Settlement of the Arab-Israel Conflict

9:00-10:30
Session IV **Border Issues**

Speaker Richard Murphy

Commentator Mahdi Abdul-Hadi

11:00-12:30
Session V **Security Arrangements Linked to the Emerging Status of the West Bank and Gaza**

Speaker Joseph Alpher

Commentator Ahmed Khalidi

12:30-13:30 Lunch in Café Suisse

16:00-17:30
Session VI **Regional Arms Control, CBM and Peacekeeping Requirements**

Speaker Nabil Fahmy

Commentator Ze'ev Schiff

18:00-19:30
Session VII **Regional Security Dimensions of Peace Settlement**

Speakers Yezid Sayigh and Efraim Karsch

Commentator Abdallah Toukan

Wednesday

Breakfast in Café Suisse

Theme Three **Transregional Security Issues**

9:00-11:00
Session VIII **Resources, Demography and Middle East Security**

Speaker Jawad Anani

Commentator Natasha Beschorner

11:30-13:30
Session IX **Democratisation, Self Determination and Strategic Stability**

Speaker Bahgat Korany

Commentator Souad Al-Sabah

13:45 Lunch in Edelweiss Room in Suite Tower

17:30-19:00
Policy Recommendations

Panel Discussion with Senior Policy-makers

Panel Osama El-Baz
Faisal Husseini
Joseph Alpher

19:00-19:30
Summing up by the Director of the IISS, François Heisbourg

20:30 Bus departs for the Çiragan Palace

20:45 Reception followed by gala dinner at the Çiragan Palace

THE WEST AND GULF SECURITY

[Theme One: Session I]

by Steven Simon

Paper presented to the ninth Regional Security Conference

held in

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The Persian Gulf and Western Security

Introduction

The Gulf war has left the West with the problem of protecting its security interests in the Persian Gulf over the long term.[1] In the past, a variety of strategies have been used to accomplish this objective: reliance on the British presence in the region until 1971; support for Iran under the Shah until 1979; and a measure of support for Iraq during its war with Iran. The latter strategy could not stave off the collapse of the regional order in 1990 when the balance of power shifted from Iran to Iraq and the peninsular states could not pose a credible deterrent to Iraqi aggression.

There is a widely shared view that the best way to restore an equilibrium to the Gulf would be to establish a system of collective defense involving both Iran and Iraq.[2] Advocates of this goal realize, however, that for the foreseeable future the political dynamics of the region make this infeasible.

As an interim measure, the U.S. has put forward a range of steps that, taken together, could help ensure stability until a collective defense involving Iran and Iraq can be established.[3] Under this strategy, the GCC states would improve their overall defensive capabilities and accelerate the integration of their plans and programs for the defense of their territory. At the same time, the U.S. would strengthen its defense ties with the GCC states and maintain a limited military presence on the peninsula. This presence would take the form of prepositioned equipment, training missions, periodic deployments of air and naval units for joint exercises, and the continued deployment of the Navy's Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. In addition, the U.S. would work with the GCC toward a greater role for regional and extra-regional actors, principally Egypt, Britain, and France. The broader context of these efforts would be shaped by a continued U.S. commitment to the peace process[4] and regional progress toward democratization. This paper describes the

assumptions underlying U.S. strategy and the practical steps required to implement it, and assesses its prospects for success.

Sources of Instability

It was A.J.P. Taylor who drew the distinction between fundamental causes and proximate causes in his well-known example of a road accident.[5] The fundamental causes of a road accident are the invention of the internal combustion engine and the human desire to get from one place to another quickly. The proximate causes are the condition of the road at the time of the accident, the mental condition of the drivers, and so forth. Likewise, the two Gulf wars of the past decade have been characterized by fundamental and proximate causes of this kind.[6] On the level of the proximate, both wars erupted as a result of border disputes. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq attempted to reverse the Algiers Accord of 1975. In the Gulf war, it attempted to redraw in radical fashion the Iraq-Kuwait border established at Uqair by the British. In the latter case, the decision to go to war had a proximate economic cause as well: the competing demands of Iraq's military procurement program, debt service, reconstruction, and high levels of civilian consumption in a period of falling oil prices.

At the level of the fundamental, more deepseated forces were at work: confessional differences; ideological conflict; maldistribution of resources within the region; and the authoritarian style of the Iraqi government, which permitted major decisions, such as whether or not to go to war, to be made by an insular, self-interested clique. Two other factors have also impeded stability at this level. The fragile nature of states whose boundaries were drawn without regard to established settlement patterns of ethnic or religious groups and the related condition of the Arab interstate political order in which interference in the internal affairs of one state by another is, to a large degree, regarded as legitimate.[7]

Beyond this, it may be that the very structure of states in the Persian Gulf region is a source, perhaps the most important source, of instability. From this systemic perspective, Iran and Iraq constitute an

unstable bipolarity in which an enduring balance is difficult to maintain. As the distribution of power shifts in favor of the one country and away from the other, the structure of the system must change to reflect the new distribution of power.[8] The peninsular states carry too little weight to restore a balance by swinging to the side of the weaker power. As a result, during the past 25 years, periodic disequilibrium between Iran and Iraq has been resolved by war or by the submission of one state to the other under threat of war. According to this view, even if the first and second order causes of conflict discussed earlier were ameliorated, there would remain the danger of an Iraqi or Iranian drive for hegemony that would threaten the security and independence of the peninsular states and jeopardize western security interests. As yet, there is no strong consensus as to the likely trajectory of change in the structure of domestic political institutions in regional states[9] or in the international order and, correlatedly, whether these changes will favor the ability of the West to secure its interests in the Gulf.

But, for all the emphasis on sources of friction in the region, we would do well to remember that Iran and Iraq have coexisted peacefully for long periods in the past. Conflict was not constant during the years of Ottoman and Safavid competition. Moreover during much of the 19th and 20th centuries they experienced relative harmony, although admittedly this harmony may have been the result of a balance of weakness.[10] It needs to be noted, too, that the question of whether the international structure does in fact determine behavior is the subject of a continuing academic debate.

Despite these qualifying considerations regarding the history of Arab-Persian coexistence and the uncertain relationship between the structure of state systems and decisions taken by individual regimes in specific situations, the U.S. has made it clear that it believes an unstable balance of power in the area to be an important source of conflict. The significant differences in strategic potential between Iran and Iraq on the one hand, and the peninsular states on the other, mean that only the presence of an outside power can bring the system into balance. By virtue of its vital interest in the area, longstanding ties to

the GCC states, clear disinclination to interfere in the domestic politics of regional states, and preponderance of military power, the West, perhaps with the U.S. in the lead, is the only entity that can play the role of balancer.

Whether the West can succeed in holding the line will depend on a range of political and military developments: 1) the ability of the GCC to improve and coordinate its own defense capability; 2) the degree of defense cooperation that can be established on a bilateral basis between the GCC states and U.S.; 3) the involvement of other regional states, such as Egypt--as well as those from outside the region, such as Britain and France--in security arrangements; and 4) regional progress in the areas of human rights and political participation.

Three of these conditions--improvements in GCC defenses, a continuing U.S. role, and the involvement of other powers--provide the credibility and capability that must underpin any strategy of extended deterrence. The key to credibility is the clear political will to respond to a challenge to one's interests; the keys to capability are alliance cohesion and military effectiveness. The following section of the paper identifies six important elements of credibility and capability.

Requirements for Deterrence

Requirement One: GCC Coordination. Greater self-sufficiency on the part of the GCC states themselves is essential to deterrence. It is clear that however capable they may become, they cannot be the arbiters of their own security. Nevertheless, greater self sufficiency might reduce the need for outside intervention in lesser contingencies and provide valuable time for the mobilization of outside assistance in more extreme situations.

The GCC states hold this view and have made a considerable effort to put it into practice.[11] As early as 1982 the GCC approved a $1 billion aid program for Bahrain to subsidize modernization of its airbase. A year later, $1.8 billion was allocated to a 12 year program for Oman to improve its ability to monitor the Strait of Hormuz.

Although these programs could not be fully funded, in part because of a drop in oil revenues, they did show an awareness on the part of the GCC of the importance of cooperative programming and multilateral funding. Peninsula Shield exercises, which began in the same year and involved 10,000 personnel, 3,500 vehicles, and a variety of combat aircraft, also showed an appreciation for the importance of military coordination.

During the mid- and late-1980s, Saudi Arabia and Oman conducted joint naval exercises, while (even) Bahrain and Qatar coordinated some training under Peninsula Shield auspices. Also during this period there was a GCC effort toward an integrated air defense based on Saudi AWACS, but the plan foundered on the lack of compatibility in communications equipment, the insufficient number of fully trained Saudi crews, and the inability of the GCC to afford an alternative surveillance platform. In the post-Gulf war period, Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have been working with the U.S. Central Command on an exercise schedule that will include bilateral and trilateral training. In addition, the Saudis and Kuwaitis have discussed exercises involving their ground forces.

Despite this long, if intermittent, record of military cooperation, several factors have stood, and continue to stand, in the way of greater military integration.[12] Among these factors are territorial disputes, one of the legacies of tribal and clan rivalry on the peninsula, differences in wealth among GCC states, and differences in geopolitical concerns. The territorial dispute that has generated the greatest friction in the past is between Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands. This dispute has recently resurfaced and will probably reduce the prospects for renewed defense cooperation involving Qatar and Bahrain, at least in the near term.

GCC cooperation is also limited by sharp differences in wealth which make it difficult for all states to invest equally in the infrastructure improvements and weapons procurement which would facilitate meaningful coordination and interoperability. As a result, an enhanced defense role for the poorer states necessarily entails the

financial support of Saudi Arabia or the UAE. The Saudis, in particular, who emerged from the war in a greatly reduced cash position, and have since been borrowing in the capital markets, are not inclined to undertake additional expenditures that do not carry an immediate, tangible benefit for their security. This pattern of burden-sharing within the GCC as a whole can be seen on a smaller scale within the UAE, where the wealthiest emirate, Abu Dhabi, is called on to contribute to defense expenditures on behalf of the other less wealthy emirates.

GCC cooperation has also been impeded by differences over strategic objectives, especially between the countries of the lower and upper Gulf. These differences have revolved mainly around perceptions of the likely Iranian reaction to intensified GCC military cooperation. Saudi Arabia objected to Omani participation in the annual Bright Star exercise in 1981 on the grounds that open cooperation with U.S. forces would invite the criticism of Iran.[13] As the Iran-Iraq war progressed, positions switched as Oman and the UAE declined to participate in GCC exercises, ostensibly because the exercise schedule would interfere with plans for military modernization. Their underlying concern, however, was about the effect their participation would have on their relations with Iran.[14]

Requirement Two: Arms Transfers. Another requirement for deterrence is a well armed, well trained force in a high state of readiness. The importance of GCC efforts to improve and coordinate its military capabilities cannot, therefore, be separated from a discussion of arms transfers. Strengthening the capabilities of the GCC necessarily entails the sale of military equipment. Neither the U.S. nor the individual recipients of new weapons are under the illusion that these transfers will transform the GCC overnight into a military power capable of deterring Iran or Iraq on its own. It is clear, however, that stability would scarcely be enhanced if the regional military balance shifts even more in the direction of the two bigger states.

Despite the involvement of Iraq and Iran in a long war of attrition and the subsequent losses suffered by Iraqi forces in the Gulf war, they

each remain far stronger than the peninsular states. Iraq probably retains the equivalent of 41 divisions[15] and, according to the CIA, has the capacity to reconstitute its forces rapidly.[16] Iran has been rebuilding its forces, especially the Navy, which has acquired amphibious vessels--and possibly submarines. It is also working toward a ballistic missile capability.[17] From the perspective of the U.S. and GCC, rapid acquisition of an armor and anti-armor capability and better air defenses is necessary for the long term stability of the Gulf, given the lengthy time it takes to train crews, incorporate equipment into the force structure, and learn the tactics associated with use of the systems.

The quantity of imported weapons systems the GCC states--and their suppliers--believe necessary to enhance the credibility of deterrence is large enough to merit description.[18] The Saudis, who were vulnerable to Iraqi ground assault for most of August 1990, are seeking to double the size of their ground forces within 5-7 years. In 1991, they took delivery of 150 M60A3 main battle tanks (MBTs), and 46 Astros rocket launchers, as well as eight Tornado aircraft and additional 24 F-15C/Ds. The Administrations notified to the Congress its intention to sell 150 M1A2 MBTs, 200 more Bradley fighting vehicles, nine MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems), 150 TOW anti-tank missiles, 20 Patriot fire units (48 launchers), and 12 Apache AH-64 attack helicopters. The Administration is now considering whether to notify the sale of F-15 aircraft which possess a ground attack capability. Bahrain, which received an additional 55 M60 MBTs, may receive 6 Apaches and the UAE 20. Kuwait, whose air force survived the war mostly intact, has taken delivery of 40 F-18 fighter aircraft and is interested in additional aircraft to complement its current inventory of A-4s and French F-1s.

The large transfers of relatively sophisticated weapons systems has been especially controversial because of its juxtaposition with the announcement of a U.S. arms control initiative for the Middle East.[19] Although most elements of this initiative were directed at the reduction or elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, one provision called for a series of meetings of the five largest suppliers of

arms to the Middle East (i.e., the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council) for the purpose of harmonizing controls on the export of conventional weapons to the Middle East. Critics of the transfers observed that they appeared to be inconsistent with the thrust of the U.S. arms control objectives for the region.[20] Such transfers, critics alleged, would be necessarily self-defeating because they would undercut the Administration's credibility, while contributing to another round of a Middle Eastern arms race. These views were pressed by Israel, which advocated a freeze on all weapons transfers to the region.

The Administration responded that arms transfers were not intrinsically destabilizing; what counted were the choices made as to the recipient and the nature of the weapons system. Thus, the transfer of Patriot batteries to Israel in response to Iraqi Scud attacks was in the interests of both Israel and regional stability because it saved Israeli lives and preserved the cohesiveness of the coalition.

Arms transfers, it was emphasized, were not an end in themselves. Rather, they were a tool to achieve specific objectives. They would: 1) reinforce deterrence by demonstrating the close links between the recipient and the U.S.; 2) provide recipients the means to increase the cost of aggression; 3) foster the integration of the smaller GCC militaries by achieving economies of scale, especially in terms of logistics support; 4) raise the threshold for outside intervention by providing the means to GCC states to stage an initial defense; 5) improve the ability of Western forces to operate efficiently with local forces, as Saudi and U.S. F-15s and AWACS did in Desert Storm; and 6) expose the military establishments of local states to Western military personnel with the aim of building closer relations.

The arms transfers were defended on three other grounds: first, the systems supplied to regional states incorporated no radically new technologies which might be destabilizing; second, arms acquired from the U.S. and U.K. have not been used to launch wars of aggression; and third, large scale arms transfers had been instrumental in achieving an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement in 1979.[21]

Requirement Three: A Role for Egypt and Syria. As discussed earlier, the presence of large, capable forces on the peninsula would enhance deterrence by balancing the large ground forces available to potential aggressors, especially Iraq. Thus, in the wake of the Gulf war, a permanent presence of Arab ground forces was viewed as a key to longer term stability. This view was reflected in the "Damascus Declaration on Coordination and Cooperation Among Arab States," issued in March 1991 by the foreign ministers of the GCC, Egypt and Syria.[22] The declaration called for Syrian and Egyptian forces to be the nucleus of an Arab peacekeeping force for the Persian Gulf. The reasons for the focus on Egypt and Syria were clear.[23] The two countries: 1) possessed the manpower and firepower to augment GCC forces facing larger states with great advantages in both categories; 2) provided vital diplomatic support during the war in the form of their military contributions; and 3) needed the capital that the Saudis and Kuwaitis could provide in compensation for an extended deployment of ground troops. The involvement of Syria, which was prepared to double its Desert Storm contingent in the wake of the Damascus Declaration to 40,000 troops,[24] would also have provided a measure of reassurance for Iran. Egypt, which had 36,000 troops on the peninsula, had another powerful incentive to keep a division there. It was in the process of modernizing its ground forces and the opportunity to forward deploy a large unit would have freed scarce resources for new procurement.

To date, no action has been taken to implement the Damascus Declaration. President Mubarak ordered the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the theater on May 8 1991, (after General Norman Schwarzkopf's April 20 request that Egyptian forces begin to relieve U.S. troops). Egypt had not received an invitation from the Saudi or Kuwaiti governments to extend the deployment of its forces.[25] One month later, Kuwait postponed talks on implementation of the Damascus Declaration indefinitely. At this time, the nature and scope of the Egyptian and Syrian role in maintaining the security of the peninsula is unresolved. The U.S. continues to view such a role as

important for deterrence and will continue to encourage the GCC in this direction.

Requirement Four: A U.S. Presence and the Need for Access. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf composed of prepositioned materiel, periodic deployments of military forces, and training missions will be crucial. The main objective of a continuing presence is to enable the U.S. to insert its forces into the region quickly and, once there, work efficiently with GCC forces. This cannot be done without access to military facilities on the peninsula and permission to store equipment and other materiel. The U.S. is now engaged in a series of negotiations with GCC states on the access and prepositioning agreements necessary to sustain a continuing military presence.

In reviewing the purpose and nature of these agreements, it is useful to recall that the desire of the U.S. to maintain a presence on the peninsula is nothing new. The idea that the U.S. might have to defend its interests using its own forces--with the assistance of friendly states in the region--emerged in the last year of the Carter administration following the collapse of the "twin pillars" strategy. It is implicit in the Carter Doctrine, the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (and its rapid transformation into a unified command) and stems from the realization that the U.S. could not rely on a regional state to protect western security interests by proxy. The invasion of Afghanistan and revival of fears of Soviet expansionism spurred this change in policy and were used by the Carter and Reagan administrations to justify the necessary spending to Congress. The more important motivations for the policy change, however, were the fall of the Shah, Iraq's hostility toward the West and close relationship with the Soviet Union, and Saudi military weakness. The primary reason for the creation of a new command was to plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of the Gulf against a regional threat.

It was clear to military planners, however, that without assured en-route access to facilitate the movement and logistical support of

U.S. forces and access to forward staging areas from which to fight, there was little hope of defending the region against determined attack. At this time (1979/1980), before construction to accommodate U.S. aircraft and prepositioned equipment was completed on the British administered island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. had virtually no military access in the area.[26] The use of British facilities in Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Maldives was no longer available. Access to facilities in Ethiopia and, of course, Bandar Abbas, had been lost. Apart from the use of Bahrain for port visits, access to the French base then existing in Madagascar, and open ocean anti-submarine surveillance flights by P-3s staged through Oman and Kenya, the U.S. Navy had to conduct all its Indian Ocean operations out of Subic Bay in the Philippines. (This installation is, of course, no longer available.)

Despite the completion of construction on Diego Garcia, the significant distances between the base and the Persian Gulf and the unimpressive capacity of U.S. air and sea lift spurred a search, beginning in 1979, for access in the region and en-route to it. Agreements were reached with Somalia, Kenya and Oman which yielded secure access for U.S. ships and aircraft and prepositioning for Air Force and Navy materiel. Arrangements were also made with Egypt. Despite subsequent efforts in 1983 and 1985, the U.S. made little progress in persuading GCC states--apart from Oman and Bahrain--to grant access to its facilities to U.S. Central Command. A number of considerations motivated the states on the Arab side of the Gulf to insist that the U.S. remain "over-the-horizon": fear of provoking Iran, or pushing it towards the Soviet Union; the isolation of Egypt; the ascendance of radical forces in the region; the anti-Americanism of the Islamic fundamentalist movement; and Iraqi and Iranian assertions of their own intention to be the arbiter of events in the Gulf and guarantors of regional security. This attitude did not begin to dissipate until Kuwait requested the reflagging of eleven merchant vessels in 1987.

Thus, the new round of negotiations for access to GCC military facilities announced by U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in May 1991[27] was motivated by concerns about the need for expanded access

for U.S. ships and aircraft and storage for equipment. These concerns included: a shortage of sea and air lift; the large amounts of equipment, spare parts, ammunition, fuel, food and water required to sustain high intensity warfare; the long distances between ports in the U.S. and the Gulf; the uncertainty of overflight rights and en-route access; and the need to move quickly should a sudden threat emerge.

As the press has reported, the agreement of the GCC states to enter into formal arrangements to host U.S. forces and equipment has not been automatic.[28] (The exceptions are Kuwait,[29] which signed an agreement in September 1991, and Oman, with which the U.S. has a longstanding agreement.) Indications of Saudi reluctance to agree to store the equipment for a U.S. armored division emerged almost immediately when Prince Khalid bin Sultan, the commander of Arab forces in the coalition and son of the defense minister openly questioned the need for a continued U.S. military presence, asking the American reporter, "Where is your threat?"[30] Despite this initial Saudi ambivalence, agreements were concluded soon thereafter with Kuwait and Bahrain and appropriate adjustments were made to the existing U.S.-Oman access agreement. There are informal agreements in train with the other three GCC states. These will be formalized over time.

The reasons why agreements come slowly, even where mutual interest in coming to terms is strong, as it is in the Gulf, are complex. Experience has shown that a variety of considerations will tend to figure in the positions taken by actual or potential host countries, among which the most important are:

• Desire for a Security Guarantee. A host country may take the view that the storage of U.S. military equipment in depots on its territory will increase the likelihood that it will be attacked in a crisis. This view may sit side-by-side with a recognition that the purpose of any access and prepositioning is to enable the U.S. to intervene rapidly and effectively when the mutual interests of the U.S. and the host country come under threat. The host may seek to offset this increased risk by having a U.S. security commitment built into the agreement. On the American side, however, there are constitutional barriers to the

advance commitment of U.S. military forces to the defense of another country. An agreement incorporating such a provision is likely to be regarded as a defense treaty, which would require the advice and consent of the Senate. Surely, no administration would or could usurp the powers of Congress in this way.

• Reluctance to Enter into a Signed Agreement. Some host countries have argued that written agreements are unnecessary given the nature and fixity of their shared interests with the U.S. Pointing to the existence of the necessary facilities and a history of cooperation in the areas of logistics or operational support, they may ask why it is that these activities need to be made the subject of a signed agreement. These attitudes present two problems for the U.S., which prevent it from prepositioning equipment where the host country's consent cannot be obtained in the form of a written agreement. On a military level, planners assert that they cannot incorporate into operational plans the availability of prepositioned stocks and the ability of U.S. forces to stage from certain bases unless the U.S. has been guaranteed secure access to these things. In the absence of such a guarantee, as would be provided by a written agreement, planners cannot count on the materiel and services being available and must therefore assume it will not be. In this case, the agreement will simply have lost its point. On the political level, Congress will not appropriate funds for military construction (normally required at the prepositioning site to store U.S. equipment at established standards of safety and reliability) in the absence of a signed agreement. Since military construction--and the contracts that go with it--are often advantageous to the host country, the desire for an unwritten agreement can involve unwelcome tradeoffs for the country's leaders and therefore discourage an uncompromising stance against a formal arrangement.

• Limitations on Operational Flexibility. The guarantee of secure access is an essential part of any agreement for both planning purposes (i.e., the need to be able to count on the availability of prepositioned equipment), and legal reasons, (i.e., the need to ensure that the U.S. retains all the attributes of ownership of the stored materiel). A guarantee of this kind is difficult for a host country to make because it

appears to imply a diminution of sovereignty. Host countries may seek to assert this authority by asking for elaborate advance notification procedures before U.S. military personnel can enter to inspect, withdraw, maintain, or use stockpiled equipment. The same requirements might be applied to the transit of U.S. aircraft or vessels. The more advance the notification required, the less the flexibility the U.S. military has to deviate from previously established schedules. The authority of the host country might also be exercised by requesting that notifications be provided at relatively high levels of government, thus reducing operational flexibility by transforming relatively insignificant military movements of aircraft, ships, or people into matters of complex political coordination.

• Restrictions on How Equipment May Be Used. The attempt to impose formal restrictions on the redeployment of prepositioned equipment may reflect a concern that the U.S. will use equipment stored in the host country for purposes that are incompatible with the host country's own objectives. Even though this situation is unlikely to arise, as a purely practical matter, any attempt to impose restrictions on the use of stockpiled materiel are highly unlikely to be acceptable to the U.S.

• Restrictions on the Nature of the Prepositioned Materiel. Where this restriction appears, it usually reflects a distinction between lethal and non-lethal equipment. Because such large quantities of "non-lethal" equipment are required to support a forward deployment--"bare base" kits for aircraft, desalination units, food, water and fuel bladders, fuel and oil, pumps, hospitals, spare parts, vehicles--the restrictions on storage of "lethal" stocks would not necessarily impede the completion of a prepositioning agreement. To a certain extent space on transport aircraft and cargo ships is fungible; if it does not have to be allocated to "non-lethal" items, it can be used to transport armored vehicles and ammunition. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the distinction made was between equipment for ground forces and air and naval equipment, rather than lethal and non-lethal.

• Attempts to Subject U.S. Personnel to Local Jurisdiction. Another way in which host countries may seek to avoid erosion of sovereignty is to ensure, to the extent possible, that criminal violations of local law by U.S. personnel are adjudicated by the host country's legal system. The U.S., on the other hand, has a longstanding commitment to maintaining exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel accused of criminal violations in foreign countries where they are carrying out the purposes of a bilateral agreement. The Department of Defense, whose personnel would be the ones exposed to local jurisdiction, regards the recognition of this principle by the host country as a *sine qua non* for a formal agreement.

When the six issues reviewed above do arise, they tend to reflect overlapping differences in foreign policy objectives, strategic cultures, negotiating styles, and approaches to sovereignty. For example, the desire to restrict U.S. flexibility by demanding advance notification or insisting on high level requests for permission to enter the host country stems from the fear of having its sovereignty undermined. This sensitivity is especially strong in countries that experienced foreign military occupation during the colonial period. Among the GCC states, only Bahrain was a major site for British troops in the post-World War II period. Nonetheless, the experience of the region as a whole has carried over to the peninsula and intensified the desire to exercise the maximum control over foreign forces.

This concern is intertwined with a reluctance to be seen to be cooperating too closely with the U.S. Although this concern has been diminished over the past five years, it has not disappeared. In geopolitical terms, it stems from concerns regarding Iran's response to bilateral programs of military cooperation with the U.S. and Iran's ability to exploit a U.S. military presence to attack the competence and legitimacy of the leaderships on the Arab side of the Gulf. The closeness of the U.S.-Israeli relationship also makes it difficult for some GCC leaderships to appear to be too dependent on the U.S., or too solicitous of its interests. These leaderships do not want to be depicted as the "Arab reaction" cooperating with "imperialism."

The willingness of countries in the region to trade off the military benefits of its agreements with the U.S. for political benefits can be said to reflect a distinctive strategic culture.[31] This strategic culture, incorporates an implicit approach to deterrence which resembles--to a degree--Western European attitudes towards deterrence during the Cold War.

In the NATO case, the U.S. consistently pressed for fully funded defense budgets, fully stocked war reserves, an elaborate infrastructure of hardened facilities for ammunition, equipment, aircraft, interoperability of equipment and communications, and the forward deployment of theater nuclear weapons. It argued that the Alliance could not mount a credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression unless it was clear that NATO could deny any advantage to the attacker. Lesser capabilities would undercut the potency of the deterrent and might even invite aggression. The European perspective emphasized that the political commitment of the U.S. to Alliance security and the capabilities of the existing NATO military posture would be sufficient to deter a Warsaw Pact attack. In this view, a measure of uncertainty regarding the outcome of a conflict would be enough to persuade the Soviets that the risks of aggression outweighed any possible benefit. Some Allies also argued that economic growth and domestic political support for membership in the Alliance and for its goals were as important for deterrence as a high standard of military capability.

Just as there were differing perceptions of deterrence within the Alliance, so too there are differences between the U.S. and Saudi perceptions of deterrence. These differences may account, in part, for the snags the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have encountered in their negotiations on access and prepositioning. In the U.S. view, the deterrent effect of U.S. prepositioning would be weakened if it could not facilitate the effective intervention of U.S. forces in a contingency. The rapid deployment of Iraqi forces to the Kuwaiti border in 1990, their instantaneous advance into Kuwait, and the threat they posed to Saudi Arabia--whose political and economic center is situated within easy reach of Kuwait--underscore this concern.

From within the Saudi strategic culture, deterrence appears to be more "existential" in nature. The fact of the U.S. commitment to Gulf security, demonstrated by Desert Storm, and the continuing presence of a small amount of materiel combine to introduce sufficient uncertainty into the calculations of a potential aggressor to deter attack. From this perspective, the Saudis might be expected to see the military benefits of a full scale prepositioning program to be less than the political benefits of minimizing the presence of foreign military equipment on their territory. The stunning success of Desert Storm has no doubt reinforced this view, despite the fact that this success was due to a host of factors that are unlikely to come into play in a hypothetical future contingency. (In this sense, the war may have gone too well.)

Requirement Five: The U.S. Capability to Intervene. There remains the question of whether the U.S. will have the military capability to intervene again in a future contingency. To execute its part in Desert Storm, the U.S. deployed ten Army and Marine divisions, 11 Air Force wings, and six carrier battle groups and still retained a large residual force that could have been been used in a simultaneous contingency elsewhere. As a proportion of the total active component of the armed services, the deployment required less than half of all available Army divisions, tactical air wings, and carriers.

This force is going to be cut by a very large margin over the next five years.[32] The so-called "base force" put forward by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and incorporated into the President's budget request for fiscal year 1993, is one third smaller than the current force, which has been decreasing in real terms since the end of the Reagan Administration. (This is the amount by which Bill Clinton, the likely Democratic candidate for President, has said he would cut the defense budget, although he has not been specific on the nature of the cuts or the speed with which they would be made.[33]) The base force will include 12 active duty Army divisions, 15 tactical aircraft wings (out of a total of 26 Air Force wings), 450 ships, including 12 carrier battle groups, and 1.6 million troops. The budget

increases funds for procurement of strategic lift by $1.2 billion, for a total of $5.9 billion. This will pay for an additional 8 C-17s and fast sea lift and other cargo vessels.

This force could still execute a Desert Storm scale operation, although according to General Carl Vuono, the former Army Chief of Staff, operations would take longer to mount and would have less of a margin for error. They would also require a much larger percentage of total active U.S. forces: two-thirds of all Army divisions, Marine divisions, and tactical air wings, and half of the aircraft carriers in the Navy. Under these circumstances, once the U.S. had committed itself to such a large-scale operation, there would be few reserves to handle a simultaneous contingency. The decision to intervene in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, which would in any case be difficult, will be complicated by this consideration.

Several plans put forward by Democratic members of Congress would sharply reduce the resources available for defense over the same period covered by the White House plan. Some of these proposals go as low as $160-$180 billion (in constant dollars) in 1997. Although cuts this severe are unlikely to be enacted, the figures do give an idea of the desire for a peace dividend. A more sober alternative developed by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin would reduce the number of active Army divisions to nine and tactical air wings to ten.[34] A budget of this size, which would make a large scale deployment very risky, reflects the view of congressional staff that the likelihood of another such operation, "really strains credulity."[35]

For the time being, large cuts are not being pursued by the Congress because it is an election year, recovery from the recession is going slowly, and the effects of deep cuts in procurement on employment have become painfully clear to members of Congress. The Administration will need to work hard, however, to slow the momentum for deeper cuts after the elections.

Requirement Six: A Role for Britain and France.[36] On a political level, the active participation of European countries in the

defense of Western interests in the Gulf is valuable for two reasons: multilateral efforts can often have an intrinsic legitimacy that unilateral actions cannot acquire; and the cooperation of other states dependent on the resources of the Gulf can help the U.S. leadership to justify continuing American involvement.[37]

On a military level, the U.K. made a powerful contribution to Desert Storm including a two brigade armored division with corps level assets. However, this deployment "effectively destroyed British Forces Germany operational capability and its ability to meet peacetime commitments"[38] and seriously depleted its stocks of ammunition and spare parts.[39] The operation required virtually all U.K. amphibious forces, all RAF support helicopters in Germany, the bulk of RAF mobile support units, half of the Army's fuel supply corps, and 95 percent of the Royal Corps of Transport.[40] It seems unlikely that the U.K. will be able to repeat this performance in similar circumstances. By 1995, the end of the current planning cycle, the U.K. will have one armored division and an airmobile brigade of about 23,000 troops in Germany and one division in the UK. Army manpower will have been reduced by one-third from the levels of the 1980s.[41] Thus, a large-scale deployment would require far greater dependence on reserve forces, which must be trained before they can be deployed, and the acquiescence of the Allies in the nearly total withdrawal of British forces from Europe. Growing constraints on public sector borrowing--British debt is now £28 billion--the unpredictability of internal defense cost growth and the volatile public mood in Britain regarding budget priorities may well combine to drive down military spending even further. These reductions would have a corresponding effect on Britain's ability to sustain large scale, intensive operations in the Gulf.

French forces, as presently constituted, also will not be in a position to contribute to another coalition effort.[42] In Desert Storm, the French army, which is one-third larger than that of the British army, was able to deploy only one brigade-size armored and an air cavalry unit lacking up-to-date equipment. This force required substantial augmentation in the form of a U.S. army airborne infantry brigade and a field artillery brigade.

There will be significant constraints on the ability of France to go beyond its contribution to Desert Storm, including: the need to modernize its nuclear forces; the unpredictability of events in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; a growing public demand for a peace dividend; and the continuing effects of procurement decisions taken over the past twenty years on the development of its force structure.

In terms of cooperation in crises short of war, Britain and France can make a substantial contribution to Gulf security by engaging in military planning, exercises, and training programs with GCC states. Both countries will retain light forces for rapid deployment in lesser contingencies. Arms sales by Britain and France to the GCC states serve the same purposes as those of the U.S. by providing the means for these countries to stage a minimal defense of their territory and by creating opportunities for training GCC forces and greater interoperability. Indications are that neither Britain nor France are seeking greatly expanded agreements on security cooperation or prepositioning, but both countries have longstanding ties to some GCC states, especially the British in Oman and French in Qatar, which will continue to involve them deeply in the militaries of these countries.[43]

It is too soon to say what sort of a European military force might emerge from the quest for a European Security and Defense Identity and what kind of contribution it might make to Gulf security. Whether it is a dual-hatted NATO force, a WEU force with a well defined boundary between it and the EC, or an EC force which might coalesce around the Franco-German corps (initiated on May 21), it is difficult at this point to envisage a European force being deployed to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, economic pressures across Europe will deprive governments of the funds necessary to provide any such force with a power projection capability. NATO air forces are conspicuously lacking in long range cargo aircraft and surveillance capabilities, while its ground forces are not sufficiently capable of operating effectively together in mixed units for such actions to be feasible.

In Germany, constitutional barriers to the deployment of its forces are strongly supported by the public. A change in the constitution would require a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Bundestag. Despite Chancellor Helmut Kohl's claim that "no one will take us seriously if we are only content to take part in United Nations "Blue Helmet" missions,"[44] SDP opposition to such a change will be difficult to overcome. In any case, it is unlikely that the current government would be prepared to focus on this issue for the foreseeable future.

In political terms, the diverse responses of EC members to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait suggests that no "unity of analysis" has yet emerged in Europe "on what constitutes acceptable international behavior and the means to enforce it." [45]Until such a consensus emerges, a European military force is unlikely to constitute a reliable instrument for ensuring Western security interests in the Gulf, especially when future threats are unlikely to be as unambiguous as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Conclusion

It is clear that nothing can guarantee Western security interests in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the ultimate success of the strategy described in this paper depends on factors over which the West has little or no control. On the military side, there remains the question of whether the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the region can be slowed or stopped, and how long the international community will continue to support sanctions against Iraq. On the political side, continuing failure to meet rising expectations for "mass participation and political empowerment"[46] and a more equitable distribution of wealth in pockets of volatility within the regional states could erode the conditions required for the defense of Western interests. In the West itself, particularly in the U.S. where the Senate vote authorizing the President to use force in January 1990 was so close, an accelerated trend toward isolationism and rise in "declinism"[47] could yet deprive even the most internationalist

leaderships of the instruments needed to maintain an active role in the region.

Yet, the West can minimize the risk to its security interests in the coming years. Despite such intra-GCC tensions as may occasionally arise, the overall trend has been toward greater political cooperation and military integration. With arms purchased from the U.S., Britain, and France, and continued exposure to western military organization, doctrine, and tactics, and continued encouragement for their efforts toward military coordination, GCC states will be better able to contribute to deterrence. The failure to implement the terms of the Damascus Declaration did not erase Egyptian or Syrian incentives to provide diplomatic and military support to the GCC in the future, although Syrian support in the event of Iranian aggression would be doubtful under current circumstances. Nor did the apparent fate of the Damascus Declaration signify the collapse of GCC incentives to draw on Egyptian and Syrian support.

Support from elsewhere in the region is unlikely to be available. Pakistan's energies will be absorbed in containing its own centrifugal tendencies, managing its border with Afghanistan, stabilizing its relations with India, and coping with the foreign policy implications of its nuclear program. Turkey, whose involvement in the Desert Storm coalition was due largely to President Ozal's strategic vision for the country, will be absorbed by the Kurdish problem, relations to the emerging Central Asian states, and its campaign for recognition as a member of the western European community. In the post-Ozal period, Turkey is also likely to return to the studied neutrality towards interstate conflict in the Middle East enshrined in Kemalist doctrine.[48]

The U.S., however, will have completed agreements with all the GCC states under which it will be able to store military equipment, stage aircraft, bunker ships, and exercise with GCC military forces. In their final form these agreements will represent a mutually acceptable mix of military utility and political discretion. They will certainly enhance the ability of the U.S. to deploy its forces rapidly. Although the British and French will not have heavy forces to spare, not every

conceivable contingency in which their assistance might be called upon would require heavy forces. The continuing presence of the U.S., Britain, and France embodied in various agreements, arms transfers, and training missions should succeed in restoring a balance to the Gulf that will protect Western security interests and the Gulf states themselves.

[1]This is not to suggest that a consensus exists on whether the West needs to take military measures to secure its interests in the Persian Gulf. Views differ particularly on whether it matters to these interests who controls Persian Gulf oil. For the U.S., Iraqi control over the resources of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia posed unacceptable risks to regional stability. See Roland Dannreuther, "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis," Adelphi Paper 264, London:IISS, 1992, p.24. For a marketed oriented analysis that downplays the importance of the political source of control over oil, see Richard Herrman, "Middle East Policy after the Gulf War," International Security, 16/2, Fall 1991, pp. 42-75.

[2]Thomas Friedman, "Baker Sketches Future Gulf Role," New York Times, (hereafter NYT), February 7, 1991, p.1.

[3]The basis for the initiative was outlined in President George Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991. See Washington Post, March 7, 1991, p.1. For a brief analysis, Youssef Ibrahim, "Gulf States said to be Committed to U.S. Alliance," NYT, October 25, 1991, p.9.

[4]See Secretary of State James A. Baker's testimony to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Middle East Peace Process, May 22, 1991. Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, 1990-91, pp 181-182.

[5]This use of Taylor's analogy is borrowed from Walid Khalidi.

[6]For a comprehensive discussion of the causes of the Iran-Iraq War see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, London:Tauris, 1988.

[7]These phenomena are discussed in Yezid Sayegh, "The Gulf Crisis:Why the Regional Arab Order Failed," International Affairs, 67/3, 1991, pp. 487-507.

[8]This dynamic is described in Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York:Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 197.

[9]For a cautiously optimistic view on Iraq, see Laurie Mylroie, "After the War:Domestic Politics in Iraq and the Arab States in the Gulf," Testimony before a Hearing of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, House Appropriations Committee, February 27, 1991.

[10]See Efraim Karsh, "Iran-Iraq," Middle East Journal,44/2, Spring 1990, pp. 260-268 for a detailed history of the Iraqi-Iranian balance.

[11]The following review of GCC coordination until the Gulf War draws on the thorough treatment of the subject in Anthony H. Cordesman, The Persian Gulf and the West:Strategic Relations and Military Realities, Boulder:Westview, 1988.

[12]An old, but still relevant overview of these factors can be found in Thomas L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil, Washington, DC:Brookings Institution, 1985.

[13]See the essay by Shireen Hunter in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifadeh, Syracuse:Syracuse University Press, 1991.

[14]Cordesman, ibid.

[15]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992, London:Brassey's, 1992, p. 100. The equipment, manning levels, and readiness of these divisions is, of course, open to question.

[16]Elaine Sciolino, NYT, January 16, 1992, p. 9. In his statement, Robert Gates emphasized Iraq's non-conventional capabilities, while noting its ability to mobilize its conventional forces.

[17]International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992, p. 101.

[18]The following data were drawn from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992, p. 100 and discussions with U.S. officials familiar with the subject.

[19]The occasion was President Bush's commencement day address at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 29, 1991. See Washington Post, May 31, 1991.

[20]Washington Post, May 31, 1991.

[21]For the full exposition of these views, see Statement of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State before the Subcommittees on Arms

Control, International Security and Science, and the Europe and Middle East Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 27, 1992.

[22]For the full text, see Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, 1990-1991, pp. 161-162.

[23]See the essay by Nadav Safran in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall, 8th ed.,1992, pp. 357-404.

[24]Judith Miller, "Syria Plans to Double Gulf Force," NYT, March 27, 1991, p. 9.

[25]Patrick Tyler, "After the War:U.S. Efforts for Alliance Suffer Setbacks," NYT, May 11, 1991, p.1.

[26]The following summary of the U.S. search for access in the Indian Ocean draws on the excellent analysis in Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases:The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy, New York:Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 214-220.

[27]Patrick Tyler, "Cheney in Riyadh Appeals for Right to Store Arms," NYT, May 7, 1991, p. 16.

[28]Patrick Tyler, "Gulf Security Talks Stall over Plan for Saudi Army," NYT, October 13, 1991, conveys a sense of the situation as it involved Saudi Arabia.

[29]Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and Kuwait Sign Pact on Troops," NYT, October 20, 1991, p. 10.

[30]Judith Miller, "Saudi General Sees No Need for Big American Presence," NYT, April 29, 1991, p.9.

[31]I am indebted to John Tritak, U.S. Department of State, on this point.

[32]See Eric Schmitt, "House Panel Backs Shift of $15 Billion from Military," NYT, February 28, 1992, p. 12 for details.

[33]David E. Rosenbaum, "The 1992 Campaign:Difference Among the Democratic Candidates," NYT, February 16, 1992, p. 28.

[34]Patrick Tyler, "Top Congressmen Seeks Deeper Cuts ," NYT, February 23, 1991, p. 1.

[35]Patrick Tyler, "War in the 1990s:New Doubts; Pentagon Plans Evoke Skepticism in Congress," NYT, February 18, 1992, p. 1.

[36]For an assessment of Europe's role in a wider Middle Eastern context, see Ellen Laipson, "Europe's Role in the Middle East:Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities," Middle East Journal, 44/1, Winter 1990, pp. 7-17.

[37]See Michael Brenner, "The Alliance:A Gulf Post-Mortem," International Affairs, 67/4, 1991, pp. 665-678.

[38]See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, (HC 287/I), London:HMSO, July 17, 1991, pp. v-ix.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]See Defence Committee, Statement on Defence Estimates 1991, (HC 394), London:HMSO, July 24, 1991, pp. 70-71.

[42]The following review of French defense capabilities draws on Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "French Strategic Options for the 1990s," Adelphi Paper 260, International Institute for Strategic Studies:London, Summer 1991.

[43]Former British Defence Secretary Tom King made the delphic statement in Commons on March 6, 1991 that "There is a possibility that [prepositioning] will be considered carefully." See Defence Committee, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby, p. 6. Interviews with British officials suggest no activities along these lines have yet been undertaken. French activity has focussed on arms sales.

[44]International Herald Tribune, May 13, 1992, p. 2. In the same article, Defense Minister Volker Ruhe states that the Bundeswehr will not be ready for deployment for at least ten years.

[45]Michael Brenner, "The Alliance:A Gulf Post-Mortem," pp. 677-678. Brenner emphasizes that Japan's reluctance to involve itself in Gulf security could also complicate U.S. efforts to sustain domestic political support for intervention in a future contingency.

[46]Richard Herrman, "Middle East Policy after the Gulf War," pp. 73-75.

[47]Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States:Decline or Renewal?" Adelphi Paper 235, International Institute for Strategic Studies:London, pp. 63-80.

[48]I am endebted to Eric Goldstein, St Antony's College, Oxford on this point.

IRAN AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE GULF

[Theme One: Session II]

by Shahram Chubin

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Iran and Collective Security in the Persian Gulf

Introduction.

The second Gulf war 1990-91 reversed some of the results of the first.By rehabilitating Iran and weakening Iraq it ushered in a period in which, with Iraq absent or preoccupied,Tehran would assume a greater weight in Persian Gulf security.Since mid-1988 Iran had vainly sought a reconcilation with the Arab Gulf states.These attempts had been rebuffed at the insistence of Saudi Arabia and relations had remained strained.After Desert Storm Iran's overtures were harder to resist.Iran was now seen by some as pragmatic and moderate, concerned to open up to the West due to economic reasons. Some also saw Iran's position in the first Gulf war(on the need to replace Saddam Hussein)as retroactively validated by Iraq's aggression in Kuwait.

Questions about the security of the Persian Gulf are longstanding. What is new is interest in buttressing regional states' defence in a collective security arrangement including Iran.Previous efforts at regional cooperation have failed in part due to local imbalances in power and mutual suspicions and rivalries.These are by no means less relevant today.However a critical question at this juncture is the attitude of Iran toward collective defence and cooperation with its Arab neighbours.In this paper I discuss Iran's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf today,in the context of its development over the past decade and within its overall foreign policy.It must be situated in history and in context, if it is to be reliably interpreted or properly understood.

Foreign Policy

Iran is not part of the Arab world or the Sunni majority in Islam.Iran was not an Ottoman province or a British colony, but neither did it wholly escape imperial rivalries.It was pressed by Britain in the south and Russia in the north. Only in the past two decades have these pressures ended: with Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 and now with the collapse of the USSR.The result has been greater freedom of manoeuvre for Iran, but also--as has been seen in the Gulf--greater latitude for instability.(The same applies in the north where the reduction of a

military threat from a strong neighbour has been replaced by the threat of border wars and balkanisation).The sense of opportunity provided by these events has been underscored by the weakening and marginalisation of Iraq. Iran in 1991 could contemplate its immediate neighbourhood serenely;potential threats reduced, courted by its neighbours and facing a new setting promising fresh avenues for Iranian influence.

Iran,under the revolution as under the monarchy, remains a state ambitious in foreign affairs and keen to gain influence and to count on the international scene.If the impulse to seek influence and weight is evident,the direction is less so, for ambitions remain inchoate. This is not because they are not articulated but because they remain vague.Iran is not territorially revisionist.It has no claims on its neighbours.Yet it appears frustrated and dissatisfied.In part this is due to its position between two areas. Not part of the Arab world, its links to the non-Arab Muslim state--Turkey and Pakistan-- are insubstantial and tenuous.It has no obvious constituency.This in part explains its enthusiasm for the opening to Central Asia, an area where non-Arab Muslims may be receptive to Iran.

With the Arab states Iran is under a double handicap.Relations with the Persian Gulf states were limited by Britain's presence (or channelled through Britain).There is little experience of interaction which might have initiated a "learning process"or inculcated mutual tolerance.More significant is the sectarian split between the two shores of the Persian Gulf.Iran is the only state based on Shi'ism.Shi'ism is a distinctive national expression of Islam.Bernard Lewis has suggested that a major distinction between Shi'i and Sunni is that: "Sunnism is associated with status quo; Shi'ism with a rejection of status quo..."[1] While Shi'ites(Twelvers) constitute a minority in Islam of perhaps 10-12%, they are found in significant numbers in the Persian Gulf region.In Iraq they are 57%, in Bahrain 60%,in Kuwait 15%,Lebanon 32%,and Syria [Alawi]12%.[2]

Most Shi'ite communities find themselves disadvantaged and marginalised by their Sunni co-religionists,and denied their rights even in countries where they constitute a majority.Iran's revolutionary example, quite apart from any purposeful foreign policy, naturally would find receptivity among these resentful groups as it would--equally-- appear as a

threat to Iran's neighbours.However reliance on Shi'ia elements also limits Iran's potential reach, and fractures its potential constituency as well as the world of Islam.Thus while Iran has sought to play down the sectarian issue others, notably Saudi Arabia, have emphasised it to underline the alien nature of Iran's claims.National and sectarian differences are thus reinforced blocking or limiting Iran's potential appeal.

Iran has denied that its appeal is exclusively limited to Shi'ites, emphasising that the oppressed everywhere but especially in Islam, are in need of support and encouragement.In no place where Iran has become involved,Lebanon,Afghanistan and perhaps latterly Sudan and Algeria, has Iran been the "prime cause" of instability.In each case it has reacted to existing conditions.Competition with Saudi Arabia in the Persian gulf, Afghanistan (and now Central Asia) has persisted.While Tehran would deny it officially,there is little doubt that Iran remains willing to fish around opportunistically to find allies and clients to promote its goals and vision of the world.

To understand what Iran wants in the Persian Gulf it is necessary to understand how Iran sees itself, what values or objectives it seeks to promote,(including its definition of security), and the role/function of foreign policy in the Islamic republic.I have suggested that foreign policy is not minimalist, it is animated by inchoate (rather than concrete or territorial) ambition; it is reactive and opportunist.Most crucially it is still an important legitimating factor in the politics of the revolution.While it can be flexible in application (witness the debate about supporting Iraq or the allies in the Kuwait episode)it cannot--yet-- be ditched in favour of a sort of Shi'ite quietism or withdrawal.

Extreme revolutionary voices have been steered out of official positions within Iran.The tenor of debate is less ideological.Priorities have been more readily identified and the avoidance of gratuitous offense is now seen as worthwhile.The IRI is by no means a hostage to all its revolutionary rhetoric, it can even --witness the resumption of ties with Saudi Arabia in 1991- quietly overide Ayatollah Khomeini's instructions (expressed in his will and testimony.)

Yet there is a persistent element of ambiguity about Iran's foreign

policy aims.This stems from the dualism within the revolution, where moderates not extremists are fearful; where in the name of freedom of debate the more radical elements are tolerated and where the regime appears to pander to the most implacable foes of human rights,democracy,and normalisation with the West.Unwillingness to put down the radicals has as its counterpart periodic purges and toleration of acts of terrorism within the country and without.If this reflected a simple reluctance to crack down on hardliners, if it was a question of timing or prudence, it might be understandable.There are questions whether this unusual tolerance is not part of a dual strategy, to have things both ways--moderation and extremism-- to plausibly deny the extreme while exploiting it; to allay suspicions with soft words, international conferences and smiles, while covertly persisting with a hidden agenda.Some have suggested that this constitutes a division of labour consciously orchestrated by Tehran.[3]

Whatever the truth,there have been several much-heralded "open door" chapters in Iran's foreign relations over the past dozen years (the first in 1984 with high-level visits to Saudi Arabia)the fact is that while Iran's policies are more forthcoming toward her neighbour, her aims remain ambiguous at best.Does Iran for example accept the distinction between Islamic unity and national frontiers?Does it accept non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states?Does it accept that Islamic principles admit a wide diversity of interpretation and the right of states to fashion their politics and friendships accordingly? Since 1990 officially Iran appears to have accepted these propositions.But given the ambiguities noted it is unclear whether this is a tactical or real conversion, whether successor goverments would accept it, and whether,consequently, there exists a sufficiently common understanding of security to provide the basis for cooperation on collective security.

Some of these issues may be clarified by the important elections to the Majlis in April.If this tends to strengthen the more moderate tendency(as is expected) foreign policy incoherence many be reduced.Even then however, there is the question how much and how quickly aims can be altered, and the minimum goals of the revolution internationally and its compatibility with its neighbours' security.

The Background in the Persian Gulf

An understanding of Iran's current policies in the Persian Gulf is enhanced by recognition of the salient features of its interaction with its Arab neighbours there over the past few years.This highlights the continuities and departures in current policy and also underscores the background and bases of the reactions of the Arab states to that policy.

Iran's relations with its Gulf neighbours has suffered from a number of handicaps of which the Shi'a/Sunni and Persian/Arab splits,which broadly reinforce each other, has been mentioned..A further -- structural-- handicap has been the prevalence of inter-Arab differences, which make it difficult for Iran to have good relations simultaneously with all the Arab states(eg.Iraq and Syria and also Iraq and Saudi Arabia).Another is the proprietary attitude that Iran has customarily exhibited toward the region stemming from a sense of special status or primacy(geographic, demographic and at times military) that has ignited,or is at least paralleled, by similar pretensions in Saudi Arabia.This has led to the tendency of the Saudis, Iraqis and others to "Arabise" issues as if no non-Arab state existed in the region.It is most evident in the attempt to change the name of the Persian Gulf, a symbolic issue but one that shows a tendency to "exclude" Iran where it can be done.

In the 1960's and 1970's the obstacles between Iran and the Arabs were not less real for being less evident.Cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia against Abdul Nasir did not translate into friendship.Even between monarchies the religious chasm was not absent as a factor in relations.[4] Iran and Saudi Arabia were unable to agree on a regional security arrangement to replace Britain, due to mutual rivalry for primacy in the region.When revolutionary Islamic Iran replaced the secular monarchy,problems were compounded.Now the traditional regimes faced two apparently revisonist states--Iran and Iraq.Their response was to bury their differences , accept Saudi leadership and form the Gulf Cooperation Council(May 1981) while Iran and Iraq were proccupied by war.The birth of the GCC thus was testimony to divisions,not unity, in the area.

It struck the smaller Arab states early on that Islamic Iran constituted a greater threat to their regimes and regional security than even Ba'thist

Iraq.Apart from the threat of a response in their own restive Shi'i communities, there was Iran's revolutionary message declaring monarchy and Islam incompatible and criticising their friendly ties (of "dependency") with the West.Saudi Arabia may have acted pre-emptively in "tacitly condoning" or encouraging Iraq to contain Iran's potentially dis-ruptive influence in the region by means of invasion and a rapid victory.[5]

There was also the risk of Iranian subversion.Disturbances in Saudi Arabia's eastern province (Hasa)in 1979/80, a coup plot in Bahrain in December 1981,disturbances at the Hadj in 1981 and 1982,agitation among Kuwait's Shi'a community in March 1983, bombings of foreign embassies in Kuwait in December 1983, an attempt on the Emir's life in mid-1985 , all of these appeared to have been planned and run from Tehran.It was this perception that turned the GCC into an instrument to "contain" Iran.[6]

As the war continued it was evident that apart from subversion and sponsorship of political agitation,Iran constituted a military threat, for the defeat of Saddam Hussein would see the Ba'th replaced by a Shi'a state actively proselytising in Bahrain and Kuwait and probably under the control of Tehran.The fear of Iran was thus the catalyst for increased cooperation among the GCC.[7] Joint war games were started in 1983 and a joint force announced in 1984.

As the tanker war widened from 1984,the GCC found itself unable to cope, finally in 1987 resulting in the decision to call for the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers by the superpowers and a more active role by the UN.Despite the stalemate on land, Iran's apparent inability to launch a decisive offensive, and the flagging zeal of its volunteers,the war was seen as a continuing and intolerable threat by the littoral states, who buried their differences in following Saudi Arabia to Iraq's side. It had been clear from the outset that no regional state had the power or influence to halt the war, that this was a matter for the superpowers.[8]

Iraq apart,Saudi Arabia felt the most threatened by Iran.The Saudis were referred to as the "Saudi clan" as "practitioners of American Islam" as "anti-Islamic".Iran ignored and protested the restrictions on political agitation during the Hadj,criticised Saudi subventions to Iraq;its dependency on the US; its treatment of its Shi'a minority; and its administration,indeed

its credentials for looking after,the Holy Places.Iran argued that Islam and monarchy were incompatible and that the Saudi state 'ulema were "political tools".The effect of Iran's actions and threats was this:

"It took the Royal family but a short time to realise that the Islamic Revolution constituted probably the most severe challenge to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in the twentieth century---a challenge to its very existence and security, to its social and religious cohesiveness,and most of all to its Islamic legitimacy."[9]

After major disturbances and loss of life in 1987 Saudi Arabia cut-off relations with Iran (April 1988)and set criteria making it difficult for Iranians to join the Hadj.

As a result on the eve of Iraq's attack on Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia were still engaged in vituperative mutual criticism.

Compared to Iran, Iraq was still seen as the lesser threat and Iran's attempts to rebuild bridges to the Gulf states was blocked by Riyadh 1988-1991.The aggression ended this,discussions were started,relations restored and a compromise reached allowing for larger numbers of Iranian pilgrims (114,000)participating albeit without political demonstrations.

In light of subsequent events and a changed ethos in Iran and elsewhere, the events of the 1980's may appear distant, remote and subject to revisionism.Was Iran truly a threat to the Gulf states on the scale they claimed?What were its aims?Was it perhaps misunderstood?Did it serve others' purposes to exaggerate its threat?

At the most critical juncture of the war Hashemi Rafsanjani(Majles Speaker)pointed out Iran's different view of security. " The Western countries scream that 'the security of the Persian Gulf is in danger.'In fact the security and stability of the region are endangered so long as the reactionary regimes of the region continue their subservience to the United States and [their] contempt for their own peoples, since this will lead to their being overthrown by their people." [10] President Khamenei was equally reassuring when he said that Iran's victories would cut short the access of the superpowers and guarantee the independence of the regions' countries: "For we seriously believe--and are in favour of-the independence of countries, and we shall not allow enemies and aggressors to enter the

region."[11]

While Iran insisted on the exclusion of outside powers in the interests of regional security it was also clear that this would tend to magnify its own superior power, leaving it unmatched and unchecked. Iranian leaders tried to assuage any fears about Iran's territorial ambitions.Rafsanjani:

> The small Arab countries should know that Kuwait,Bahrain,Qatar, Dubai and the rest of the amirates together are not as large as our Khuzestan[province]...We have no need of you, your money or your oil...Don't get up to any mischief.
> Of course, you should treat your own people properly...[12]

Even at this relatively early stage when Iran's chances of victory looked good Rafsanjani made it clear that:

> The concept of exporting the revolution is not one of resorting to force to impose the revolution on others;it is to spread and communicate thoughts and a thesis of action so as to establish Islam in Muslim countries.[13]

The Islamic republic showed continuity with its monarchical predecessor in its claims to be the region's paramount power, even to the extent of similarity of language.Rafsanjani's comment:

> We would like to say to the Persian Gulf shaykhs:you no longer need guardians; the Islamic republic exists here and you can live in peace of mind.[14]

Substituting Iran for "Islamic republic" this recalls similar comments by the Shah.Unlike its predecessor though the IRI put much more emphasis on the reactionary nature of the regimes on the opposite coast,casting doubts simultaneously on their legitimacy and their longevity.More emphasis too was put on Shi'ite communities sprinkled throughout the region.As one contemporary report put it:

> All Shia communities outside Iran are regarded as potential fifth columns by their governments.The mullahs have started to train hundreds of agents for their new Shi'a International .These agents, recruited from Shia communities in a score of countries are sent forth not simply as missionaries but as politico-military subversives.[15]

Sometimes Iranian leaders did little to disabuse their neighbours of this.P.M. Hussein Musavi would boast:

We are beginning to gain the upper hand over the levers that the Islamic Republic has abroad, the most important of which is none other than the world oppressed's interest in and enthusiasm for our revolution.In fact, we are beginning to learn how to make use of this lever in the region to organise our foreign relations.[16]

Some Delphic statements from Ayatollah Khomeini apart, there were few open or direct threats by Iran.At the end of the war Tehran could point to its relative restraint in the war despite the virtual alliance between the Gulf states and Iraq, including the subsidies("loans");the use of their ports for the transfer of goods including military materiel; the mistreatment of Shi'i in their countries; the victimisation of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca in 1987;the repeated use of chemical weapons by Iraq,and finally the invitation by Kuwait of outside powers into the region in tacit support for Iraq. The Gulf states in turn could point to Iranian threats and "warnings";to subversion and the disruption of the Hadj;to Iran's attacks against Kuwait during the war, and the continued use of propaganda to destabilise them domestically.In this view the very prolongation of the war was testimony to Iran's immoderate ambitions, while the goal of changing another state's government might serve as a precedent that could be repeated elsewhere in the region.

Whatever the position taken between these two views, Iran emerged from the war with a sense of grievance against its neighbours, apparently oblivious of(or at any rate unwilling to admit) the extent to which its own exertions had united these states under Saudi Arabia and behind Iraq.

In the 1970's Iran and Saudi Arabia had been unable to agree on a regional security arrangement.Pride and *amour propre* had made this impossible, even though definitions of security remained broadly similar.In this ideal setting suspicions made cooperation impossible. Later the Iran-Iraq reconcilation in 1975 was greeted by a deafening silence in the Persian Gulf and criticised by other Arabs(Syria,Libya).Again suspicions made it difficult to concert policies among the three principal states in the region.This was due to Saudi Arabia's aim to establish itself in a leadership role with the smaller gulf states and to look to outside powers for support. When Iran became the primary threat to the region replacing Iraq, Saudi

Arabia again preferred an informal arrangement,subsidising Iraq but not tying itself down.The Kingdom shifted again after 1990/1 this time welcoming Iran back but with reserve and caution.

In theory regional security can be safeguarded when at least two of the three major Gulf states are in accord.In the 1970's a considerable similarity of interest between Iran,Saudi Arabia and later Iraq, was not enough to lead to cooperation on security matters. Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the 1980's showed that even cooperation between two of three principal states was not enough to ensure balance or stability without foreign involvement.Between 1988-1990 a fixation on the threat from Iran saw the gamekeeper (Iraq) turning poacher;again this could not be righted without external assistance.The question is whether in the coming decade the conditions for collective security are any better; and whether Iran has an interest in *status quo,* and will coordinate its security policies with Saudi Arabia towards the achievement of collective security.[17]

Desert Storm as Catalyst?

Even before Iraq's aggression Iran was trying to convince its neighbours of the need to turn a new page in relations and to demonstrate its own moderation.Although criticism of Saudi Arabia continued unabated,the other states were increasingly cultivated. In June 1990 President Rafsanjani told an international press conference:

> We are in principle against one government interfering in [the affairs of] another government, in another country; and we are against playing the role of policeman in the region.We want to cooperate with the countries of the region on the basis of good, reciprocal relations.[18]

Relations with Kuwait improved after Foreign Minister Velayati's visit there in July, and ties with Oman and the UAE remained amicable.The principal obstacle to complete normalisation of relations with the Arab Gulf states remained tension between Tehran and Riyadh.

Iran felt that Saudi Arabia discriminated against the Shi'i, sought to exclude Iran from a role in the Persian Gulf and misused its position controlling the Holy Places to put restrictions on the numbers and the nature of the activities of Iranian pilgrims.Riyadh in turn did not trust revolutionary Iran which appeared to question its legitimacy and promote

agitation on the Arabian littoral and remained skeptical of the scope for, and benefits of, cooperation with such a regime.

These considerable objections were weakened by Iraq's aggression and Iran's formal neutrality, observance of sanctions and adoption of a more conciliatory tone in relations with its neighbours.The Iranian Foreign Minister increased the pace of his visits to the emirates and met the GCC states Foreign Ministers collectively in New York. Tehran showed a will to end the dispute over the numbers and status of pilgrims, to achieve a compromise solution culminating in the re-establishment of relations between Tehran and Riyadh(March 1991) and the resumption of the Hadj after a three year hiatus.Foreign Ministers exchanged visits in April and May set the seal for an improved relationship.Iran's appeal to pilgrims to observe their host's guidelines testified to Tehran's newly solicitious regard for Saudi sensibilities.

Iran's efforts to convince its neighbours that it has entered a new phase, that its war with Iraq is history and that the new era holds challenges for cooperation throughout the region,have only been partly successful.Oman,Qatar and the UAE are the most receptive to these overtures; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait the least.[19] In part this reflects historical divisions (in which the northern Gulf states have felt more vulnerable to Iran than those further south), but it also testifies to the continuing legacy of Iran's policies in the 1980's and sense of vulnerability of the latter states in relations to Iran's acts promoting subversion.

How far has Iran's attitude towards Gulf security changed and how does it view collective security?

On the level of official pronouncement much has changed.The principal spokesmen of the new policy President Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati have articulated a view of collective security that is gradualist and functionalist.In this view,broad "all-round" cultural, social, economic, and practical(ecological etc.)"sincere cooperation" will stimulate ties, improve trust, and hence create the conditions for security.In this approach the question of some states' continued ties with foreign governments for arms, advisers or even the provision of bases,should not be an obstacle to cooperation among the littoral states.As Rafsanjani put it:"real

security rests on sincere cooperation among regional states"; they should not be concerned by Iran's size and strength and Iran should not concern itself about their foreign links.

Minister Velayati has observed that "sound regional cooperation" is a "long-term task which needs time and extensive all-round effort."This would encompass cultural ties which provides the "common ground" for building trust.Over time trust will foster cooperation after which "security will come automatically to the region."Both officials have argued for flexibility, that neither a states foreign alignments nor its "ruling system" should serve as obstacles to regional cooperation.[20] The same moderation has been extended to foreign bases:

Their presence is not useful,but they do not constitute a threat.we are not afraid of them because we do not wage a war against the United States.They have always had bases in Bahrain and Qatar.We have never liked that and always criticised it, and we will continue to do so in the future.[21]

In reviewing the causes of the Iraqi aggression the Iranian President observed that internal disputes and "lack of coordination between regional states" based on a failure to use the "fundamental axis for all of us"--namely Islam-- was a contributing factor.He concluded that regional peace was the prime condition for excluding outside powers, without it there would always be an incentive for threatened local states to invite outsiders in for support and assistance.[22]

This line of argument is new.It has long been conventional wisdom in the IRI that all the problems of the region arose from the superpowers.[23] By emphasising the need for regional cooperation in order to damp down local disputes that give outside powers the pretext for intervention,Iran's leaders are seeking to circumvent the considerable opposition to cooperating with the Persian Gulf states.It is worth summarising this opposition because it reflects many of the regime's own erstwhile arguments that the government now appears to have jettisoned.They also reflect "a revolutionary line"that appeals to the revolution's militant conscience and which could be revived by this or another regime at any time.

The revolutionary (or militant) critique of the Arab Persian Gulf states starts from their "reactionary nature"which together with their "subservience" to

foreign interests, makes them vulnerable at any time to overthrow.In this view Iran's willingness to cooperate with these states is not only a"strategic blunder" but a device which will entangle the revolution in a situation against its principles.Furthermore any security arrangement with such partners would entrap Iran, "contain"the revolution and make Iran a pawn of Western interests: The correct name for a security arrangement with such partners should be,(in the view of one newspaper):"The Persian Gulf Royalty Protection Council." [24]

The current government in Tehran does not disguise its aim to promote cooperation with the Persian Gulf states in order to create the conditions for security cooperation and to block external intervention.As Hashemi Rafsanjani put it such cooperation would:"deprive arrogance of its pretext for hegemony over the region and thus prepare the ground for the expectations of Islam." Min. Velayati echoed this: "One of the strategic reasons why the Islamic republic emphasises cooperation with the GCC members is to weaken the grounds for any foreign presence."[25] Regional cooperation thus becomes a means not an end; a tactical way of creating conditions for excluding powers that might challenge, offset,or complicate Iran's primacy.Pres.Rafsanjani gave a forthright expression of Iran's thinking about security:

We have no doubt that the security we want is different from the security that America and others want.They want a situation where the region is secure and tame so they can come and take away the wealth of the region.That is the kind of security they need.The security we are after is the one that prepares the grounds here for the rights of the people of the region and the rights of Muslims to be restored.This security is very different from that security.When we say the security of the region should be maintained by the peoples of the region that means that we should cooperate with one another, have no conflicts to let others come and take away our wealth and dignity.When they say the region should be secure, they say you should rest so that we choose the price of oil and what we want is to enforce the world energy policy here.That is different and even though we say the same words,we both know we have conflicting views on the provision of security.

Those who are America's agents in the region want a sort of American security.What we want is for the people, for the region and the whole world.We do not want to see adventurism in the region...We must pursue security, but the kind of security which takes account of the region's interests.[26]

A critical question is whether Iran accepts the regimes on the Arab shore as legitimate rulers of their peoples, with which it can do business.As noted, formal statements suggest that this is not an obstacle.In reality it clearly influences the nature of the cooperation that can be envisaged.In analysing the causes of crisis unleashed by Iraq, Pres.Rafsanjani observed that one cause was "the lack of reliance of the governments on their peoples.If these[Gulf]governments in the region really relied on their people,the people would have considered them their own."He went on to say that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait thought they "did not possess this popular support."[27] Lest this view be considered provocative or unjust,consider a similar comment by an ally:

It is not brotherhood that prevented the Arab states from uniting against Saddam before he sent his troops into Kuwait or why they kissed him for the cameras.This is the knowledge that eats at their leaders:They are too weak in the esteem of their people to take any risks with confidence.[28]

Iran's postion is thus one of ambivalence and pragmatism, unwilling to make cooperation conditional on the severance of ties with outside allies or to be inhibited from cooperation by the nature of the regimes(which it finds ideologically distasteful),it is also clear about the differences in conceptions and definitions of security between itself and its southern neighbours.In addition from the other side,the "structural" problems noted earlier persist: suspicions about Iran if only because of its intimidating size; Saudi jealousy and aspirations for primacy and the Shi'i Sunni split.While Arab states and particularly Saudi Arabia try to "Arabise" issues to block Iran, the latter tries to appeal to the "common axis" of Islam and to play down sectarian differences.Iran has thus sought since August 1990 to fashion a policy that would bring it back into the region and in a position to influence any future decisions made on the shape or orientation of a security arrangement for that region.In the process, with the proviso that this time it must be included ,it has played down differences,shown flexibility and pragmatism about the form,eschewed any temptation to lay down preconditions and been phlegmatic about the speed with which an appropriate grouping can created.

The memory of the 1980's lingers in the Arab states of the Persian

Gulf. Kuwait and Bahrain for example would like to encourage Iran but need strong assurances that they are letting a reformed candidate rather than a wolf into any putative common security structure.They would like to be reassured too of the acceptance by Tehran of the principle of non-interference, a primary principle for any regional arrangement in their view.The Saudi government is cautious and believes that the onus is on Iran to prove its bona fides."Iran must prove that is emerging as a power for peace and stability rather than agitation."[29] As Riyadh's lack of enthusiasm about the Damascus Declaration (March 1991)demonstrates,the Kingdom is in no mood to become dependent on the goodwill of regional states-- even Arab ones.This mood which complicates Iran's attempts at wooing the Arab littoral states is well caught by the Secretary General of the GCC.The conservative Arab states learned two things he says:"First, we never trust anybody.No matter how much his intimacy with us is.And second...we have to rely on ourselves."[30]

Desert Storm for all its shock, has not transformed the politics of the region enough to render its participants amnesiac or to change the basic structure of relations and interactions.It may only have confirmed the dangerous currents in the region and the need for taking out insurance with outside powers.

Towards Collective Security?

In theory there are several possible ways in which security in the region could be organised.Hegemony by one power is one model.Another is virtual anarchy which exists where a balance of power is neither a habit nor automatic.A third model is a functioning balance-of-power system, consciously sought by states and achieved more or less purposefully.This system which is loose and informal leads to *ad hoc* alignments and shifts based on the particular threat at the time..It is intended to (re-)establish equilibrium and to minimise or over-ride ideological divisions.A fourth model with which we are concerned here is that of collective security.

In finished or highly evolved form, collective security is predicated on the existence of a community that shares a common interest in dealing with aggression/threats from whatever quarter.Besides this joint perception of

the interdependence of security, collective security requires: 1/some definition/ criteria and consensus of what constitutes a threat; and 2/some mechanism or institution for a (quasi-)automatic response. To deter aggression there must be an advance commitment to respond to aggression from whatever quarter.

This implies that in the case of aggression from a major regional power, other regional powers are automatically committed to reversing it.(Necessarily this would require that the lead be taken by the other major regional power(s)-- a recipe for a wider war,(something that has blocked its utilisation in the UN since its foundation.)Equally problematic is the idea that "threats" will come conveniently in the appropriate guise and clearly labelled.Saddam Hussein's aggression was the exceptional case of a clear and egregious threat to the entire region; future threats will be less blatant and correspondingly less easy to react to.

In the Persian Gulf the preconditions for the development of collective security as a means of assuring regional order, have not yet been met.Defined more loosely, collective security however can be visualised as one route to the achievement of regional security. For this there is the initial need for the littoral states to coordinate and harmonise their policies on a range of issues.These can start with "low politics",fishing and environment and encompass water resources and eventually(more controversially) even oil and gas policies.

Issues of common security which concern the region(eg.the Hadj)could in theory be coordinated or discussed in a regional forum.In some form of expanded GCC which included Iran,(leaving open the possibility of including Iraq)littoral states could establish and pledge themselves to norms of conduct, which if breached would serve as a catalyst for collective measures.Three obvious areas would be:

1/ the principle of <u>non-intervention</u>(defined to include instigation of minorities, subversion,the propaganda etc.);

2/<u>pledge of non--recourse</u> to force to change borders or implement any territorial claim, and a parallel pledge to bring frontier or resource disputes to the attention of the regional organisation;

3/guarantees of the establishment of a basic minimum (or floor) of <u>rights of</u>

minorities and immigrants,whose observance would be subject to inquiry by the regional organisation.

Together with these the littoral states could undertake measures to increase trust and build confidence in the military/security area.There is a greater need for this among the three largest states than among the rest.Transparency, advance notification of exercises and the like have to penetrate not just the cult of secrecy but the habits of centralising and controlling information as if they constituted power-- indeed as if they were a substitute for public support.

Despite many press allusions to the need for"collective security" since Desert Storm,[31] Iran has not pronounced in any detail on the kind of security role it would like a regional organisation to undertake--probably because it considers it premature before its own position and relationship with the erstwhile GCC or successor is clarified.Hence it has not indicated its preference,for example between Oman's suggestion for an integrated standing force of 100,000 men(first proposed in 1983 and revived in 1991)and Saudi Arabia's preference for national forces earmarked to the regional organisation but under strict national control.

For now,Iran's thinking is less ambitious.It emphasises the potential scope of mediation and conflict resolution of local disputes(perhaps thinking of the recent flare-up of the longstanding Bahrain/Qatar dispute).Hence Pres.Rafsanjani:"If some countries have border differences with each other,let us sit down and talk and somehow mediate and resolve the problem.We should not substitute mediation with weapons and bombs."[32]

Three areas of regional politics will test the potential for regional cooperation in the immediate future; the future of Iraq, arms puchases and oil policies.The latter two are clearly areas which could benefit from regional cooperation,and stimulate it if tried successfully.

Iran has many reasons to be concerned about the future of Iraq, not least its long frontier and the fact that that state has a majority Shi'i population,traditionally denied an equitable share of the country's resources let alone reasonable political representation.Ideally Iran would like to set up a vassal state, a puppet or dependent government which looked to Tehran for guidance and inspiration.In practice besides setting up a "government in

exile" (SAIRI)during the Iraq-Iran war, Tehran has been wary of deep involvement.Its response to the civil war in March/April 1991 --sanctuary and the facilitating of passage by volunteers --was the minimal consistent with its role and claims.Since then Iran has not chosen to promote only its own candidates for future Iraqi leadership and has been open to discussions among all opposition groups.

Saudi Arabia distrustful of Iran's intentions in Iraq, and the possible domino-effects on the rest of the Peninsula, was a key state in seeking to maintain the current regime in Iraq in power, lest the alternatives (especially an Iran-dominated regime) be worse.It has approached all discussion of assisting in the removal of Saddam Hussein with a wary eye on Tehran.Extremely distrustful of Iran and firmmly opposed to Shi'ism(which most Wahhabis consider heretical),Saudi Arabia is likely to view any activism here by Iran very seriously.At the same time Tehran, which may not instigate movement within Iraq, may seek to benefit from it, or at least channel it toward the liberation of the oppressed Shi' majority.The minimal requirements of the revolution would make indifference to the plight of fellow Shi'ites difficult, while giving Saudi Arabia a veto on their destiny would appear unacceptable.

There remains nonetheless scope for some coordination of policies and a reduction of mutual suspicions.Saudi Arabia has shown a willingness to host a meeting of a coalition of Saddam Hussein's foes, including Tehran's protege SAIRI, suggesting greater flex-ibility.[33]Successful cooperation here could help reduce some of the distrust between Riyadh and Tehran.

A second sensitive area is military programmes.Saudi Arabia has announced plans to triple the size of its armed forces,increase its purchases of hi-tech equipment from the West (including modern aircraft,tanks, helicopters, and Patriot missiles).It is being followed in this by Kuwait and the smaller emirates.The result is another large infusion of modern arms into the region.On the other shore Iran too is engaged in an arms build-up.Here the causes are different: bloc obsolescence, replacement of equipment lost through attrition and the need to standardise equipment bought over several years from different suppliers during the years of strict arms embargo.The limiting factor in Iran is not manpower but money and

the willingness of some suppliers to provide arms.In general Iran is being equipped with former East bloc arms directly(Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and Czechoslvakia) and from North Korea and China.

In this region despite the different needs of the states due to varying size and strategic location,it has rarely been possible to convince the local parties that an arms build-up by one did not(automatically) have implications for the other(s).Hence Saudi insecurity and jumpiness at Iran's arms build-up in the 1970's. Even at that time,when relations should have been excellent, the Saudis saw the Shah as a potential aggressor.The situation,to put it mildly ,has not improved since.A concerted arms build-up of Saudi Arabia by the West will be seen for what it is in Iran--a challenge to its role in the Persian Gulf.Similarly Iran's current programme of restocking and modernising is seen as justifying the Kingdom's need for arms.The result is an "arms race" in the sense that each is aware of the other's purchases and to some extent plans its progammes based on them.

A third key area is oil policy.The longevity and vitality of Iran's revolution will be determined by its economic performance.So far the indicators are not good.Tehran is in a race berween its exploding population --an economic burden at best-- and a revival of its moribund economy,in which despite slogans and promises, oil remains the principal component.How much and at what price oil will be sold are questions crucial to Iran's future economic and hence political well-being.To a considerable extent, these questions are in the hands of Saudi Arabia,which, with an expanded production capacity reaching 11mn barrels/day, can more or less determine the level/price that oil will attain.So far Saudi Arabia has opted to keep prices stable at around $18/barrel, but it has refused to act as the "swing producer" to cut back on its own production, and has argued that any cuts should be based on production capacity rather than traditional quotas.The issue could become more pressing if demand declines and/or as Kuwait and Iraq re-enter the market as producers.

Arms purchases and oil are cases where regional discussions could act as a safety-valve,clarify areas of potential cooperation,create a sense of interdependence and lead to the harmonisation of policies.Because these are issue-areas of obvious high politics in a region where states are sensitive

about sovereignty,they are unlikely to be items to be put on the agenda in "kicking-off" a regional arrangement.In the meantime they,together with the future of Iraq, will test Iran-Saudi relations and hence the potential for regional cooperation.

What is Iran's strategy in the area and is it likely to lead to,or accomodate,collective security?[34] It can be reduced to a few principles:
1/Get in on the ground floor of any structure;by being involved steer the organisation away from too close a Western alliance and pre-empt the possibility that it will be configured as an alliance against Iran.
2/Emphasise the littoral states as the appropriate unit; gently encourage the exclusion of other regional powers(such as Syria and Egypt) who might dilute Iran's power;build up a claim as a party with a legitimate concern in all regional issues.
3/Build up the image of Iran as the regions'most stable power which has had its revolution and period of immoderation.
4/ Convert the regional organisation into an interest group for influence for asserting its rights in Middle East/Islamic,oil and world politics and assisting other states/areas in their liberation.
5/Attenuate,erode and eliminate the US link as the balancer in a regional security arrangement.
6/Build up leverage over Saudi Arabia so as to influence oil questions.
7/Await the revolutions that will come on the Arabian peninsula.[35]

In the Persian Gulf after two wars and two interventions by external states, there is still no consensus on "threats", whether external or internal.In the past two decades both Iran and Iraq have been threats.Other states including Oman and Kuwait have traditionally felt the need to keep their distance from Saudi Arabia.Saudi Arabia considers both Iran and Iraq as rivals.It feels much the same way about Egypt and Syria with whom it is unwilling to contemplate serious security cooperation.If this is the case with former allies and Arab brothers ,consider the risks with Iran. A regional security organisation with any teeth would risk bringing in and legitimising an Iranian say (and involvement)in any and all issues affecting the Arabian peninsula.It would undermine any Saudi claim to primacy among the smaller

states.It might also deprive the Kingdom of the autonomy it needs to develop its oil policies in its own national interests (as opposed to policies in the interests of labour-rich and cash- hungry Iran and Iraq.)It might also bring into formal cooperation a state whose intentions- --from the Saudi view - are not clear, whose policies are ambiguous and whose politics are volatile enough to be undependable.

Iran's current "good intentions" are not the issue--although there is room for debate about how genuine and durable these are.What is most evident is that Iranian-Arab relations in the Persian Gulf carry a heavy burden, in part a legacy of the distrust sown by relations with the IRI in the past decade.But there are the other intrinsic problems noted earlier which have acted as obstacles at the best of times: disparities in size, sectarian cleavages, conflicting ambitions, jealousies, ideological animosity, historical feuds and rivalries and regime differences.As the Iraq-Iran war,Mecca episode of 1987 and the Kuwait episode of 1990/1 all showed, the "axis of Islam" is an inadequate organising principle when Islam itself is divided.

What then is the outlook for collective security? At the very least this requires similar views of security predicated on a common view of 'threats'and the need for a joint response.The risks of relying on local states for security instead of outside powers (which have proven themselves) would appear to be too high for the Arab states.Regional cooperation as the primary or exclusive means of assuring security always carries the risk that one of the region's more powerful states will "break out".Engaging in regional cooperation as a means of alleviating suspicions and discord would appear prudent.Perhaps this might contribute to the prevention or management of regional disputes.But too close an embrace of the uncertain would be reckless, without a powerful extra-regional backstop nearby. Regional cooperation thus cannot yet be considered an alternative to security relations with outside powers.

In brief, the trust required for meaningful security cooperation regionally simply does not exist and will not be established soon.The Arab states and especially Saudi Arabia may make all the right and polite noises to avoid offending Iran(and others)but they have no intention of taking meaningful steps.

No longer outwardly hostile or openly contemptuous,Iran cannot imagine that a shift to a "diplomacy of smiles"is enough to engender trust with its neighbours.If Tehran truly wants a indigenous,collective, approach to Persian Gulf security it will have to recognise that its policies in that region are not autonomous.The incoherence of its statements, its interest in supporting Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan and Algeria, its competition with Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan and now Central Asia,and its criticisms of the peace process launched at Madrid, all suggest an overall policy that is at variance with the interests of the conservative Arab states.[36] A modification of these policies,indicating a real shift in goals, would be a true confidence-building step vis a vis the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.It would make Iran's rhetorical peace campaign towards its neighbours more credible and establish one of the pre-conditions for regional cooperation.

[1] Bernard Lewis "The Shi'a in Islami c History" Chapter 1 in Martin Kramer (ed)Shi'ism,Resistance and Revolution" Boulder Colo.:Westview 1987p.30 (For the Dayan Center, The Shiloah Institute,Tel Aviv University.)

[2] Martin Kramer, Introduction in Kramer (ed). op cit. p.10.

[3] Adherents of the "new page" in Iran's policies would point to the release of the hostages,ties with Europe, the GCC and especially Saudi Arabia,restraint in the Hadj pilgrimage and a new more open face internationally. Skeptics would point to Iran's interest in missiles and nuclear technology,.opposition to the Arab-Israel.talks,control over the Hezbollah,involvement in Sudan and Algeria,persistence of the threat to Rushdie, continued human rightrs violations and the campaign of terrorism internationally in assassinating enemies in France, Switzerland, Austria among other places.Finally they would not find reassurance in the pattern of Iran's alliances with Syria Pakistan, China and North Korea .

[4] A participant at the visit of the Shah to Saudi Arabia has recalled the strain between "the Wahhabi ulema and the Iranian Shi'a mullahs" which he argues "still has pertinence today" and which "could in years ahead have a profound influence on the security of the area." See Herman Eilts"The Dilemma in the Persian Gulf" Washington: AEI 1980pp10-11.(original emphasis)

[5] Then Crown Prince Fahd once intimated that while he saw no reason why there should be conflcit between Shia and Sunni Moslems, the situation would change if the Iranians were to try to "impose their Shi belief upon the other Moslem countries in the area." Sunday Times 3 February 1980 quoted in Adeed Dawisha " Iraq and the Arab world:TheGulf war and After." The World Today May 1981 p.193 (fn14)

[6] Joe Kechichian""The Gulf Cooperation Council:Containing the Iranian Revolution" in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Fall/Winter (Vol.XIII No.1&2) pp.146-165

[7] See especially International Herald Tribune (David Ottoway)"Gulf states seek joint security against Iran" 2February 1982 and The Economist 9 January 1982p.45.

[8] See for example The Economist 5 June 1982. p.53.

[9] Jacob Goldberg "Saudi Arabia and the Iranian Revolution" in David Menashrie (ed)The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 1990(Special Studies on the Middle East). p.161.

[10] IRNA dispatch in English 15 July in BBC Me/7080/A/11. 17 July 1982.

[11] Tehran home service,26 July in Me/7090/A/1, 29 July 1982.

[12] Friday Sermon,Tehran 30 July in Me/7093/A/2,m 2 August1982. This is reminiscent of the Shah's comment that Iran did not covet any Arab land, it had enough desert of its own.

[13] Friday Sermon, Tehran in Arabic 4 February in Me/7251/A/6, 7February 1983.

[14] Friday Sermon,25 February, Tehran home service, in Me/7270/A/2, 1March 1983.

[15] The Economist 22May 1982,p.53.

[16] Tehran home service,5August in Me/7098/A/2, 7 August 1982.

[17] The related question of the latter's receptivity is beyond the immediate concerns of this paper..

[18] Vision of the IRI 6June in Me/0786/A/2 9 June 1990.He made similar comments to Iranian diplomats in July, see Voice of the IRI 18July in Me/0821/A/2 , 20July 1990.

[19] For an ambivalent GCC communique toward Iran see Le Monde (Jean Gueyras)27December 1991.

[20] Of a very large number of possible sources note especially: Rafsanjani in Ettela'at22 April, IRNA 22 April in Me/1054/A/4-5,24April 1991;Velayati interview by Vision ofIRI ,3October in Me/1195/A/1-4,5October 1991;see also Political Roundtable,Deputy Minister Vaezi,Vsion of IRI 28 February in Me/1011/A/30, 8March 1991;Radio Commentary,Voice of IRI 28September in Me/1190/1/13, 30 September1991 and ibid. 28October in Me/1216/A/10,30October 1991. See also a commentary suggesting that "practical" areas like cooperation in conserving or sharing water as is envisaged between Iran and Qatar might be extended to other states.Voice of IRI 10November in Me/1227/A/6, 12 November 1991.

[21] Rafsanjani interview in Der Speigel 25 March in FBIS-NES-91-058,28March 1991 p.64.

[22] Friday Sermon 8March, Tehran Domestic Service, FBIS-NES-91-048, 12March 1991, pp.42-3.

[23] See for example Jomhuri-ye Eslami 6March in FBIS-NES-91-053, 19 March 1991 pp.50-51.

[24] These criticisms reflecting the harder line elements like Mohtashemi are also echoed in some ways at times by Leader Khameini's comments.For a sample of this criticism see:Kayhan International (edit.) "[P]GCC is a Misnomer" 22December 1990 in FBIS-NES-91-002, 3 January 1991, p.58;M.Firuzi commentary"TheProblems of the Hadj and Saudi Arabia" Tehran Times 22 December 1990 in FBIS-NES-91-001,2January 1191 pp.62-3.Bayan 22 December-20January(1990-91) in FBIS-NES-91-031, 14February 1991, p.59;Kayhan,IRNA 24 December in Me/0957/A/17,29December 1990;Kayhan (air edition)7 November 1990;Kayhan 10 March, IRNA 10 March in FBIS-NES-91-049,13 March 1991 p.52.

[25] See Rafsanjani Ettela'at22April IRNA in Me/1054/A/5, 24April 1991;Velayati Voiceof IRI30September in Me/1193/A/3-4, 3October 1991.

[26] Sermon 8 March,Voice of IRI 8March in Me/1017/A/11, 11 March 1991.

[27] Sermon 8 March,Tehran Domestic service,FBIS-NES-91-048, 12 March 1991 pp.42-43.

[28] LesAspin ,International Herald Tribune 13August 1990.

[29] A Saudi diplomat quoted in The FinancialTtimes 26April 1991.

[30] Kim Murphy quoting Abdullah Bishara, Los Angeles Times 6 November 1990 quoted in Joe Kechichian "Iraq and theArab World" Conflict Vol.11 (1991) .p.12

[31] For one example seeTehran radio Commentary, on the lessons of the aggression: "Is it not about time that regional governments sought without depending on foreign powers,to set out to establish collective security in the Persian Gulf and really cooperate and collaborate with each other for the sake of the future?" 9August in FBIS-NES-90-155, 10August 1990.p.68

[32] Rafsanjani, sermon 8 March, Tehran domestic service, in FBIS-NES-91-048, 12 March 1991 p.44.

[33] For a report on a meeting between the Chairman of SAIRI,Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim and King Fahd,see SPA 28February in Me/1318/A/9-11, 2 March 1992.

[34] One can only infer aims from statements, patterns of past behaviour,and a sense of current thinking, trends and constraints and not from any "grand strategy" found in any public document.

[35] A recent Iranian radio commentary alluded to Saudi Arabia's decision to start a Consutlative Assembly by noting that with the crisis activated by Iraq "the [Gulf] rulers realised their link with their people was very weak" requiring politcal reform if they were to be strong enough to "confront similar invasions."
It concluded that these reforms do not go far enough.Voice of the IRI, 2 March in Me/1320/A/8-9,4March 1992.

[36] The latter feel uneasy about being encircled and frustrated by the inhibitions imposed on them by Tehran's charm campaign.Without provoking Tehran deliberately they are unlikely to move substantively or quickly toward meaningful measures for collective security

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THE GCC COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND IRAQ

[Theme One: Session III]

by Charles Tripp

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The GCC Collective Defence and Iraq

1. Introduction

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent crisis and the war which followed were dramatic developments from which various parties drew any number of "lessons". As in any other sequence of historical events, the lessons in question have tended to reflect the pre-existing beliefs and preferences of the parties concerned and may, in retrospect, prove to have been entirely erroneous. Nevertheless, for the time being - and until a new set of unexpected events exposes the errors of judgment involved - these "lessons" will be taken to heart by those who must shape policy in the countries most immediately affected by the events of 1990/91.

For the governments of the GCC, therefore, the resulting defence and security policies have been marked by a mixture of already existing concerns, efforts to deal with the immediate effects of the war itself and attempts to make the necessary adjustments to ensure that their countries do not have to face the same situation again. In the first place, the old question of the degree of military cooperation and coordination they are prepared to put into operation amongst themselves has yet to be resolved. Equally persistent has been the caution they have shown regarding the amount of say they will allow other regional states in collective security arrangements. At the same time, in an echo of past concerns, the GCC states have sought in public to pay lip service to the principle of self-reliance, whilst seeking and accepting security assistance of one kind or another from outside sources.

The experience of the invasion of Kuwait has not changed these concerns in any fundamental way. It has, however, made it easier to acknowledge and to exploit in a more systematic way the military assistance available from the

Western powers. Indeed, for the Kuwaiti government, in particular, the speed, scale and reliability of that assistance during 1990/91 has made it the most sure guarantee of the Emirate's security, at least in the short term. The nature of the conflict itself, as well as the problems of manpower facing many of the small GCC states, have also impressed upon their governments the desirability, perhaps necessity of acquiring technologically advanced weaponry.

As far as the future defence of the GCC states is concerned, the prevailing opinion among their governments seems to be that deterrence of future military aggression must rest both on systems of advanced military technology and a system of agreements with major powers which would discourage any potential aggressor. In the event that such deterrence might break down, the armed forces of the GCC states would be expected to hold back or delay the opposing forces until such time as international reinforcements could arrive in strength. In addition, the GCC states are seeking to neutralise the only two conceivable sources of such an attack in the Gulf: a new cordiality has entered into official relations with Iran, even if it seems unlikely that Iran will be incorporated into any formal collective security arrangement; meanwhile, visible encouragement of the Iraqi opposition has increased, possibly in the hope that this will weaken the hold of Saddam Hussein and bring down the regime which the GCC governments regard as the major threat to their security.

The Iraqi regime has long been animated by a spirit of *revanchisme*. Iran bore the full brunt of this in the 1980s. It has now been joined by the rulers of the GCC states, especially the al-Sabah and the Al Sa'ud. The events of the past year or so have done nothing to dampen this spirit and Saddam Hussein has made no secret of his desire to see their overthrow. In a regime where the wish of the leader is equivalent to the policy of the state, this raises fears for the

pattern of Iraq's relations with its neighbours. Despite the obvious military defeat of Iraq, the fear of what Iraq might attempt in the region in the future, should the present regime endure, underlies much of the concern of Iraq's neighbouring states.

2. The Damascus Declaration

It was hoped by some that the military defeat of Iraq, the liberation of Kuwait and the cooperation of the armed forces of a number of Arab states in this joint endeavour would provide both the incentive and the opportunity for the establishment of an effective regional security organisation. In particular, there was an idea that the military weight of such Arab countries as Egypt and Syria might be lent to the already existing Gulf Cooperation Council states in order to boost their defence capabilities and discourage a repeat of the sequence of events which had led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. These hopes were expressed in President Bush's speech to the joint session of Congress on 6 March 1991 and the idea seemed to be taking on deceptively concrete form in the Damascus Declaration of the same day, issued jointly by the foreign ministers of the six GCC states, as well as those of Egypt and Syria.

President Bush talked of shared regional security arrangements and the need for the responsibility for regional security lying with the Middle Eastern states themselves. For its part, the Damascus Declaration, among other things, stated that its signatories: "consider the presence of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf region to be in response to the desire of these states' governments and to have the objective of defending their territories and as constituting a nucleus for an Arab peace force to be prepared to guarantee the security and safety of the Arab states in the Gulf region and an example that would guarantee the effectiveness of the comprehensive Arab defence order".[1] It appeared to some, therefore,

that this agreement was laying down the framework for a collective security agreement, as well as for a joint military force and command which would give that agreement some real weight in the region.

The inconclusive rounds of discussions which followed during the ensuing year demonstrated that it was going to be considerably more difficult to construct such a security pact than may have been imagined in the heady days following the liberation of Kuwait. In May, President Mubarak ordered the withdrawal of Egypt's 38,000 troops from the Gulf, realising that, in the absence of any kind of follow-up to the Damascus Declaration, these were not apparently going to constitute the projected "nucleus for an Arab peace force". Their continued presence in the region, therefore, represented a drain on Egyptian military and financial resources to no very useful end. The meeting of the foreign ministers of the eight signatories of the Damascus Declaration in Cairo in mid-May did nothing to resolve these questions, but merely prepared the ground for a further meeting in Kuwait in July at which the foreign ministers were to discuss the reports of experts on aspects of the declaration and, it was promised optimistically, where they would "arrive at a final formula".[2]

In June, Syria began to withdraw its troops from the Gulf states. In the same month, however, President Mubarak stated during his visit to Kuwait that Egyptian forces would be prepared to join an Arab peace keeping force and it was rumoured that proposals were being floated for a 26,000 strong pan-Arab force to be stationed in Kuwait. However, the meeting of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria and the GCC states in Kuwait in July failed to reach agreement on the formation of such a force. At the time, this was said to have been in part due to the rather different conception of Gulf security entertained by Egypt, as opposed to the GCC states themselves, especially insofar as the future role of

Iran was concerned.[3] More importantly, it was clear by then that the thinking of the governments of the GCC states about their future security was taking other directions.

The continued absence of any plan for collective security in the Gulf was underlined by the September meeting of the Damascus Declaration signatories' foreign ministers in Cairo at which everything - and nothing - appears to have been discussed.[4] The same pattern was followed in the November meeting of foreign ministers in Cairo. As the final communiqué indicated, the Damascus Declaration meeting provided yet another forum in which a grouping of Arab states, on more or less friendly terms, could voice joint concern about matters of immediate interest in the wider region. Thus, the first third of the statement dealt with their views of the Israeli-Palestinian question, while the rest spoke of referring experts' reports to their governments for further discussion, of the general solidarity existing among the signatories, of the need for Iraq to release the remaining Kuwaiti detainees and of the need to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. Nothing was said about security cooperation, collective security arrangements or the formation of a joint security force, although there was a report that the idea of forming a pan-Arab Rapid Deployment Force had been floated by some of the experts' committees.[5] However, an Egyptian publication at the time, went so far as say that the Damascus Declaration signatories had abandoned the idea of forming an Arab force to be deployed in the Gulf, that they saw the Gulf crisis as "a thing of the past" and that they would now be turning their attention to "spontaneous cooperation".[6] In effect, this meant that the great majority of the Egyptian and Syrian forces had left the region by the autumn of 1991.

Whatever else the Damascus Declaration was, or is likely to become, it appears to be an unpromising beginning for a collective security order in the Gulf. It

has fulfilled certain political purposes, in the sense of seeking to maintain the alliance forced upon its signatories by the actions of Iraq in 1990. It also gave them an opportunity to reiterate the kinds of general principles on which the Arab League itself is supposed to be founded. This might seem somewhat redundant, but clearly, in the wake of the events of 1990/1991, the Arab League was in disarray and it required the prior reaffirmation of its principles by some of its key members to set the scene for the "new start" of the League in its relocation to Cairo in September 1991. It has also, perhaps, encouraged a greater degree of investment in or aid to Egypt and Syria by the GCC states and has given this the semblance of economic cooperation, rather than the more galling character of hand-outs from the rich to the poor.

However, on the security question, it seems to mean little more than the natural bilateral consultation and limited cooperation which might take place between any group of friendly Arab states. The Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdallah Bishara, appeared to suggest as much in February 1992 when he stated that the Damascus Declaration's "security aspect provides for cooperation within the framework of the joint defence pact [of the Arab League] and consultations and cooperation with Egypt and Syria to assist the Gulf countries, should they wish, in achieving security and stability".[7]

It is still not clear whether the Syrian and the Egyptian governments would, in fact, wish to make more of the security aspects of the agreement. For instance, it was noticeable that when President Assad made his tour of the GCC states in April 1992, the Syrian press made scarcely any reference to the Damascus Declaration, concentrating instead on the tried and tested themes of pan-Arab solidarity, the hostility of Israel and the need to confront Zionism through Arab unity.[8] This would certainly suggest that Syria's attention had, understandably, returned to security questions nearer home. As far as Egypt is

concerned, the foreign minister, Amr Moussa, has said that "certain differences exist" among the signatories and has suggested that it was better to admit this and "to seek to solve them honestly". Yet he has been reticent about the areas in which such differences do exist and, when pressed, lapsed back into stressing the spirit of cooperation, solidarity etc. which is said to prevail.[9]

However cordial the attitude of the GCC states towards Egypt and Syria may be in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, this cordiality has clearly been insufficient to bind them to a formal collective security arrangement. It is scarcely surprising that this should be the case. As Bishara said in the interview cited above: "Trust is the most important element in cooperation among states, that is, our relations must be based on trust and confidence", and furthermore, "There is no such thing as free Arab money or open borders. We do not accept this. We are countries in every sense of the word".[10] In these phrases, one can hear Bishara's faithful echoing of the prime concerns of his masters, the rulers of the six GCC states. These are firstly, that any cooperation must be founded on trust in one's partner and that the degree and shape of that cooperation will naturally depend upon the degree to which one can have confidence that one's partner will share the same concerns and priorities. In a word, it depends upon the belief that their interests will be sufficiently similar to make cooperation meaningful, useful and non-threatening. Secondly, there exists the not unreasonable conviction that the resources at the disposal of the governments of the six states are theirs to dispose of as they see fit. No-one should therefore have any prior claim on those resources, or decide on how they should be exploited.

These are enduring concerns of the rulers of the six members of the GCC and could be said to have been embodied in its formation. There were sufficient elements in the common culture of the rulers and the ruling systems of the six

states to allow for the degree of cooperation which gave rise to the GCC. By the same token, the absence of such common interests and attitudes had always excluded Iraq. At the same time, as the ten years following the GCC's foundation made plain, elements within that very culture had made it extraordinarily difficult for the rulers to bind themselves to any collective institutional arrangement, whether in the field of security or economic affairs. Instead, the GCC provided a forum for periodic consultation and for declarations of solidarity, as well as a framework for bilateral internal security cooperation agreements.

It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Damascus Declaration failed to bring collective institutional cooperation closer. For the rulers of the GCC states, unwilling in any case to commit themselves to arrangements which might limit their ability to control their own resources, the concerns of Egypt and Syria could not be sufficiently similar to those of the GCC to allow for anything other than arms length cooperation. Bilateral agreements and individually negotiated contractual arrangements have long been the favoured ways of proceeding in any areas where the vital interests of the state and its ruling regime have been concerned. The Gulf crisis has done nothing to change this. Indeed, it is well exemplified in the other theme visible in the GCC states' thinking about collective security during the past year: the possible formation of a joint, independent GCC force to maintain regional peace and stability.

3. The Joint Gulf Defence Force

In the 1980s the GCC had established a modest force - "Peninsula Shield" - made up of units from the various member states. Its chief purpose had seemingly been to deter and deal with possible threats to the internal security of the member states. In this respect, it could be said to have given added teeth to the bilateral internal security cooperation agreements reached chiefly between Saudi Arabia and a number of its fellow GCC states. At the same time, it provided a collective, GCC cover to any possible cross-border activity that might be required to deal with such threats. This was perhaps a necessary precaution in view of suspicions in some of the GCC states about overbearing Saudi influence. Whatever its origins, "Peninsula Shield" was obviously inadequate when faced by a threat on the scale of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. However, it did seem to some in the GCC that it represented the germ of an idea that might combine collective military security with the autonomy or self-reliance of which so many of the GCC officials spoke.

It was natural, therefore, that during 1991, as the idea of incorporating Egyptian and Syrian forces in a combined Gulf security force faded, so the possibility of establishing a purely GCC-based force began to be explored. In August, at their meeting in Muscat, the Chiefs of Staff of all the GCC states reiterated the need for self-reliance in maintaining regional security and appeared to endorse the idea of forming such a force. The idea itself appears to have emerged from the GCC Security Committee, chaired by Sultan Qabus of Oman. He had floated a similar idea in the 1980s and evidently considered the time to be propitious to resuscitate it in 1991.[11] The details of the Omani proposal became clearer at the subsequent meeting of the GCC Chiefs of Staff in Muscat in October. The envisaged force should be independent, presumably of non-GCC powers. It should have an independent command - presumably, this meant that the

command should be independent of any member government and answerable to the GCC collectively. The command should rotate among the GCC states and the force should consist of no less than 100,000 men.[12]

The suggestion was referred eventually to the 12th GCC Summit, due to take place in December 1991. However, even before that meeting it seems clear that its originator, Sultan Qabus, was encountering the same kinds of misgivings among his fellow GCC rulers as had surfaced when he first proposed the plan in the 1980s. In November, he stated that the GCC had asked Oman to draw up a strategic security plan for the region's states and that the joint security force was the result. However, he added that "the region's states have to define the framework that better suits their capabilities".[13] There is an indication here that some of the other GCC states had already made it clear that the Omani plan was not quite what they had in mind, although they had remained rather unforthcoming about what exactly they did want. This was confirmed by the GCC Summit, held in Kuwait in December 1991.

The so-called "Kuwait Declaration" issued by the Summit was conspicuous in failing to make any mention of defence or security issues. In the final communiqué of the Summit an ambiguity similar to that encountered by Sultan Qabus was evident. It reiterated the determination of the GCC governments to "continue coordination and cooperation in the military and security fields, and to promote defence capabilities within the framework of a unified strategic concept that meets the requirements of security...achieves stability and guarantees the nonrecurrence of such [i.e., Iraq's] aggression". Yet, beyond thanking Sultan Qabus for his efforts, it made no further mention of the plan which he had drawn up. Instead, it went on to talk of the need for greater economic cooperation.[14] When questioned about this omission, the Secretary-General of the GCC was later to say that the Summit had decided to

put the plan to its member states' various Ministries of Defence and Defence Committees, in order to put the report to the 13th GCC Summit in December 1992 for a final decision.[15] At the very least, this procedure would seem to indicate a marked lack of urgency, if not of enthusiasm.

Given the nature of the GCC, it was not surprising that the plan for a collective security force, if seriously rather than cosmetically intended, was not greeted with great enthusiasm by the rulers of these states. In regional, as in domestic politics they have displayed a marked reluctance to commit themselves to any form of institutional arrangement which might seem useful at present, but might in the future tell them what they can and cannot do. It is this which has always given the GCC itself a ghost-like quality. This has also contributed to their reluctance to become bound to a collective arrangement which might oblige them to accept Syrian or Egyptian concerns. In the case of Oman's plan, the proposed collaborators may be better known and more trusted, but this would not make the implied loss of individual autonomy more acceptable. Even in the absence of severe disagreements, the very idea of handing control over some of their resources to their fellow rulers would be a difficult one for most of the GCC rulers to accept.

4. Unilateral defence: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

As a consequence, the main trend evident in the security and defence policies of the GCC states has been the determination displayed by those most directly affected by the war against Iraq - Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - to build up unilaterally their own defence capabilities. Of course, as far as Kuwait is concerned, the destruction and upheavals following the Iraqi occupation necessitated the reconstruction of its entire defence establishment, whether in terms of infrastructure or in terms of the personnel of the armed forces. Regardless of his reservations about the political implications of the proposed

joint Gulf defence force, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence, Shaykh Ali Sabah al-Salim, could justifiably point to Kuwait's particular difficulty when he stated in February 1992 that "we cannot contribute to the proposed Gulf army before building our own army".[16]

During 1991, it had become clear that Kuwait was to rely on two principal methods of building up its armed forces and enhancing its security. The first involved the determination to acquire advanced military technology and equipment. This seemed to be one of the first lessons of a war in which advanced military technology had apparently been used to such telling effect.[17] It was also thought to be a policy which accorded more closely with Kuwait's own capabilities. As the Kuwaiti deputy Chief of Staff, Maj-Gen. Jabir al-Khalid al-Sabah, said in an interview in January 1992, "We now have a new theory for defence security and armament. It is based on acquiring equipment which is technologically the best; easy to maintain, understand and operate; and offers the greatest firepower for the smallest human effort". However, because of the destruction of so much of Kuwait's military infrastructure and the need to prepare the ground, as well as train the personnel for the acquisition of such weapons systems, he added that Kuwait had deliberately "not rushed to purchase weapons and make deals. We have, in fact, been preparing the facilities first, so that we can accommodate the advanced weapons which will arrive later", as well as preparing "our national manpower resources to receive, operate and maintain the weapons and equipment".[18]

The second policy pursued unilaterally by Kuwait during this period was the negotiation of military cooperation agreements with Western powers, most notably with the United States, but also with the United Kingdom and France. These were the countries from which the advanced military technology was most likely to come. More importantly, in view of Kuwait's experiences

during the preceding year, the United States in particular was the only country able to mobilise on a scale sufficient to deter future aggression against Kuwait. Thus, although the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence was keen to assert that the agreement reached with the United States was an agreement on security cooperation, rather than protection, it was evidently the deterrent value of the arrangement which weighed most heavily with the Kuwaiti government. When the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers adopted the agreement on defence cooperation with the United States in September 1991 it declared that it was intended "to maintain the country's security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of its borders against the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime".[19]

On 19 September 1991, therefore, Kuwait and the United States formally signed the defence cooperation agreement. It is intended to last for ten years, initially, and provides for the upgrading of Kuwait's air and port facilities, the storage of weapons and military equipment and the organisation of joint manoeuvres between Kuwaiti and American land, sea and air forces. In marked contrast to the procrastination and prolonged discussions which had attended both the Damascus Declaration and the joint GCC ideas of regional security cooperation, not only was this agreement reached within a few months after the liberation of Kuwait, but also joint manoeuvres with United States forces took place less than two months after the signing of the accord. By the end of 1991, three such joint exercises had been organised.[20]

Meanwhile Kuwait had been extending the scope of its military cooperation with other Western powers. In October, it was revealed that discussions were taking place between the Kuwaiti and the British and French governments, respectively, for the conclusion of similar, if more modest, security cooperation agreements.[21] By 11 February 1992, the negotiations with the United Kingdom had come to fruition and the two countries signed a memorandum on security

cooperation which involved the U.K. in mutual consultation and cooperation with the Kuwaiti armed forces in the defence of Kuwait, as well as in the provision for training and the arrangement of joint exercises. Like the US-Kuwait agreement, it was to run initially for ten years, but unlike the other agreement there was no provision for the storage or prepositioning of military equipment.[22]

In view of Kuwait's situation, and of the choices before it, the conclusion of such agreements appeared to be the most efficacious means of guaranteeing the security of Kuwait in the short term. As the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence rather wistfully remarked: "Most regrettably, our circumstances do not allow Kuwait to be in a position similar to that of Switzerland...This situation, as bitter experience has taught us, is one where force has the final word. The law of the jungle still exists".[23] Kuwait was consequently looking for the wherewithal to survive in a world which was demonstrably predatory. It is a world in which, as the Minister of Defence said, the principle of Arab solidarity and respect for each other's sovereignty had been torn up by Iraq. In the face of such behaviour, the military assistance of the friendly Arab states, whether in the GCC or beyond, could only have symbolic value. More central to the Kuwaiti government's vision of the future security of the state are the agreements it can reach with those who are able to muster effective counterforce on Kuwait's behalf.[24]

In the case of Saudi Arabia a similar "unilateralism" has been in evidence, pursued in broadly similar ways, but with more emphasis on the building up of the Saudi armed forces. As early as May 1991, Prince Khalid bin Sultan stated that Saudi Arabia would concentrate on its own "ambitious military development plan", rather than rely on foreign military support, whether allied or Arab, at least insofar as ground forces were concerned."[25] The lesson

which Saudi Arabia seemed to derive from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the need for it to greatly expand the size of its ground forces, reportedly with the intention of creating and maintaining a 200,000 strong army. This was to be accompanied by a massive arms acquisitions programme. In fact, the outlines of the latter had become evident soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when a US-Saudi arms package of some $ 20 billion had been proposed. The political unease which this caused in the US Congress led to the separation of the deal into two phases, the first of which was worth roughly $ 7.3 billion and involved chiefly matériel designed to enhance Saudi ground forces.[26]

In November 1991 Saudi Arabia submitted a formal request to the United States to purchase 72 F-15s, at c. $4 billion, although it was reported that the US administration was unwilling to permit this sale "for several months". It did, however, decide to sell Saudi Arabia fourteen batteries of Patriot missiles at c. $ 3.3 billion.[27] Evidently, the very scale of the proposed Saudi arms purchases proved to be something of a quandary for the United States. On the one hand, the sums involved and the enhancement of Saudi Arabia's security which they were intended to promote could only work in the interests of the United States. On the other hand, the nature and size of the arms purchases might be thought to have altered the regional balance of power, at least insofar as Israel's perception of its security was involved.

Sensitivity on this issue, especially at a time when the US administration was seeking to draw Israel into a wider Middle East peace process, appears to have led to some second thoughts in Washington about the timetable, if not the general wisdom, of the Saudi approach to the enhancement of its defence capability. In the autumn of 1991 it was reported that this was causing some problems in the negotiation of a more wide-ranging US-Saudi defence cooperation agreement, although this was promptly denied by Saudi sources.[28]

Whatever the truth behind this, it seems clear that Saudi Arabia intends to pursue its own policies for ensuring its defence and security. These may involve, eventually, defence cooperation agreements, joint exercises and training accords both with fellow Arab states and with Western states. However, these will be concluded on Saudi Arabia's terms and will be bilateral, contractual agreements over which the Saudi government has control. For the reasons outlined above, institutionalised collective security arrangements which might take some of that control out of the hands of the Saudi government would appear to be an unlikely option, as much for the Saudi government as for those of the other GCC states.

5. Internal Security

The foregoing has outlined in some measure the enduring concerns of the GCC rulers and the lessons which they have derived from the recent Gulf war. The questions that remain to be asked, therefore, concern their views of the most likely direction of the threats to their security in the future. In the first place, there is the enduring issue of internal security and the challenge which any form of opposition may pose in unrepresentative political systems. Concern about this possibility seems to have led to the decisions in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman to allow some limited forms of public expression, even if these are still a long way from the establishment of systematic governmental answerability. Presumably the hope is that this will prevent the more radical opponents of these regimes from gaining support among the generally discontented or frustrated. As far as the radical opponents themselves are concerned, as well as those suspected, rightly or wrongly, of sympathising with them, the systems of internal security, surveillance and intelligence cooperation continue to function within all the states of the GCC. Precisely because so much is thought to be at stake, this seems to have been the area of

the most developed and effective forms of security cooperation within the GCC.

Although there exist within all the states of the GCC people who espouse the idea of the violent overthrow of their ruling families, the experience of these rulers during the past few decades has tended to show that they are at their most dangerous when they receive encouragement from a hostile regional power. Simple logistical help in carrying out their plans, or else the hope that their regional ally might intervene to support them actively should their coup even half succeed, have been powerful incentives for opposition groupings of varying ideological shades to act. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Arab nationalists and socialists, inspired by Iraq, appeared to pose the greatest threat. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, Islamic protest groups inspired by revolutionary Iran seemed to represent the chief danger to internal security. In the 1990s, the fear of Iraq's capacity to exploit existing opposition elements is clearly to the fore.

6. Relations with Iran

The GCC states have two kinds of policy option, when faced by such threats. The first, discussed above, is to reinforce internal security and surveillance. The second is to address directly the regional powers which might represent a threat to their domestic and military security. To this end, the GCC states have been as assiduous in the cultivation of Iran as Iran appears to have been in the cultivation of the GCC states. This is continuing a trend which had been in evidence since the ending of the Iran-Iraq war and particularly since Rafsanjani's election to the presidency of the Iranian republic. Nevertheless, it was noticeable that an Iranian embassy was opened in Riyadh just over a month after the liberation of Kuwait and that, less than a month after that, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs arrived in Saudi Arabia for the hajj.[29]

Throughout 1991/1992, any gathering of GCC foreign ministers could be guaranteed to make some positive references to increasing cooperation with Iran, to the need for strengthened ties and for the common interests of Iran and the GCC in the security and stability of the Gulf. Indeed a number of reports concerning the growing difficulty of the GCC states in seeing eye to eye with its co-signatories of the Damascus Declaration focused on the differences between them and Egypt, in particular, over the role which Iran should play in any regional security order.[30] Whatever reservations Egypt may have had about Iran, it was clearly important for the GCC states that they should ensure that Iran was informed of, even if not integrated into any security arrangement in the Gulf. The meeting of the Iranian foreign minister with those of the GCC in New York in September 1991, produced a statement of amity and intention to cooperate. In view of the past history of relations between these states, as well as with an eye on any future order in the Gulf, it was significant that the statement after the meeting emphasised the desire of all parties to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other, to resolve any differences by peaceful means, to avoid the use of force and to pledge non-interference in each other's internal affairs.[31]

Despite rather premature reports prior to the Gulf Summit of December 1991 that Iran would be invited to participate in regional security arrangements outlined by the GCC, the relationship had clearly not gone that far. The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs stated explicitly that the GCC states had ruled out military cooperation with Iran, but said they would be willing to consult Tehran on the region's security. Insofar as practical cooperation was concerned, this seemed to mean helping to safeguard the waters of the Gulf and to ensure freedom of navigation.[32]

It would have been difficult for the GCC states to incorporate Iran in any more systematic way into its own security arrangements. In the first place, these tended to be unilateral in nature and, insofar as they involved security cooperation with Western states, came in for severe criticism from Iran. Secondly, it seemed to be more important for the GCC states to keep channels open to Iran, to encourage trade and economic links, to cooperate on questions of the environment and possibly also to consult with one another in the framework of OPEC. These appeared to be the means by which the GCC states have at least attempted to put their relations with Iran on an equable footing. It is unlikely that they will come to trust Iran - quite apart from the populist rhetoric of the regime, as well as its claims to have a better sense of Islamic obligation than others in the region, the very size and weight of Iran will keep alive fears of a constant ambition to establish Iranian hegemony in the Gulf.

7. The problem of Iraq

When answering a question about Iran's possible objection to the kinds of security relationships which various GCC states have established with Western powers, the GCC Secretary-General said that "If they [the Iranians] have fears, we are trying to dispel them and tell them that it is in the Gulf and Iran's interest for Gulf security arrangements to be clear and unconcealed, particularly since the Iraqi regime is still there and remains a threat, although it is an anachronism. As long as this regime exists, we must stress our regional security."[33] Clearly, in the light of their experiences during 1990/1991, the GCC states continue to fear the determination, as well as the capacity of the Iraqi government to threaten them both militarily and, possibly, by means of subversion.

On the military side, the arms procurement programmes and the defence cooperation agreements appear largely to be aimed at deterring Iraq from trying

to use force once more to achieve its regime's objectives. That these remain hostile, as long as Saddam Hussein remains the president of Iraq, none of the GCC states seems to have much doubt. Certainly, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which suffered for their proximity to Iraq, cannot afford to entertain any doubts and have felt the urgent need to make dispositions accordingly. Together with most of the other members of the UN, the members of the GCC have endorsed the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missile capability. However, they are only too aware of the fact that a very substantial amount of Iraq's convential armaments remains intact and that even the presently reduced Iraqi armed forces outnumber their own by about three to one. It might seem improbable to them that the Iraqi regime should try to use its military forces in exactly the same manner as before. Nevertheless, if they are honest with themselves, they will admit that it was their belief in that very element of improbability which found them so ill-prepared in the summer of 1990. Consequently, they have concentrated on the immediate defensive measures outlined above, in the hope that these will not only deter the Iraqi regime, but will also outlast it.

However, there remains the question of internal subversion and Iraq's capacity, as well as willingness to encourage it. The propaganda output of the Iraqi regime, whether in the press or in the broadcast media, can leave the listener in little doubt that the Iraqi regime would happily engineer the overthrow of the al-Sabah or the Al Saud, in particular. For Saddam Hussein, this would be a sweet revenge on those who thwarted his will and contributed to the present prostration of his country - "the hypocrites and Croesuses...the companions of evil and the eaters of the bitter tree of hell", as Saddam Hussein put it in his inimitable way.[34] Whether the Iraqi regime in fact retains the capacity to act in this way, remains a moot point. It seems almost certain that the Kuwaiti and Saudi internal security services must treat all threats, however rhetorical or

flamboyant they may seem, with the utmost seriousness. Naturally, this is not an area in which it is possible to glean much information.

The Kuwaiti authorities' more publicly visible measures against those non-Kuwaiti nationals whom they consider to be insufficiently trustworthy have done little to enhance the international reputation of the Kuwaiti government. Nevertheless, they appear to have been motivated in large part by the fear of a potential fifth column which a more subtle Iraqi strategy might cultivate in its bid to destabilize or to seize control of the Emirate. Equally, the periodic references by the Kuwaiti authorities to attempted "infiltration" by Iraq may be exaggerated, but underlying them there is obviously a fear for the demographic and geographic vulnerability of the state.[35] As the Kuwaiti deputy Chief of Staff asserted, the security fence which may be constructed along the Iraq-Kuwait border would not be a military obstacle, but "a security fence designed to limit Iraqi infiltration operations into Kuwaiti territory".[36] Once constructed, it might also give tangible form to the newly demarcated Iraq-Kuwait border - a necessary move perhaps, since the UN Committee on the border adjudication has ruled that the border be shifted 600 metres in Kuwait's favour for a distance of 200 kms.[37]

The continued existence of a hostile regime in Baghdad would appear to raise the spectre of internal insecurity for some, at least, of the GCC rulers and has thus led to a series of defensive measures. However, the beleaguered nature of that regime has also suggested to some in the GCC that a more offensive policy might be possible. In other words, the Iraqi regime is not the only one which can play the game of internal subversion. The lead in this strategy among the GCC states has been taken, not unnaturally, by Saudi Arabia. During much of the Gulf crisis and war, it was reported that the Saudis had favoured Lt. Gen. Ibrahim al-Dawud with their support. Given his record and his influence

within Iraq, this was not a particularly auspicious choice, despite the fact that he may have fitted some of the Saudis' "ideal type" of a prospective Iraqi leader.[38] Nevertheless, the fragmented nature of the Iraqi opposition and its relative ineffectiveness in the face of the kind of forces which Saddam Hussein has been able to control even at his lowest ebb, has made sponsorship of the Iraqi opposition a difficult and uncertain undertaking.

However, the realisation by the states of the GCC that they will never feel secure as long Saddam Hussein's regime survives in Iraq has led to a more vigorous effort to cultivate opposition forces. The hope is undoubtedly that some day, one of them might succeed and, furthermore, that it would be no bad thing for the GCC to have given assistance to those who might one day rule Iraq. The most dramatic expression of this trend in the policies of Saudi Arabia was the convening in late February 1992 of a meeting of fifteen Iraqi opposition groups in Riyadh. Conspicuously included amongst them was the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), a grouping of a number of Shi'i based Islamic radical groups, led by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. His cordial reception by senior figures in the Saudi government, including King Fahd, seemed to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia had decided that the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime must override all previous reservations about SAIRI's sectarian base and relations with Iran.[39] The Saudi Minister of Defence, Prince Sultan, reportedly urged unity upon the assembled opposition parties, and told them to reject sectarian differences and to place Iraq's interests above their own agendas. In which case, he is reported to have promised, "the Kingdom will not hold back on any assistance needed by the Iraqi people and their national opposition forces to bring down the unjust and repressive regime and to return Iraq to its people".[40] The crucial security question facing the GCC regimes in the immediate future, therefore, is

whether Saddam Hussein's regime can survive long enough, and with sufficient capabilities, to threaten them anew.

Given the record of the violent and unexpected ends of most Iraqi regimes since the overthrow of the Monarchy, it would unwise to make any predictions about the length of time Saddam Hussein has yet to run as President of Iraq. Nevertheless, the very fact that he and his circle of associates have survived this long and have re-established their power under the circumstances of the past eighteen months, would suggest that, as the GCC Secretary-General said, the GCC must "be realistic and take into account that this regime is staying".[41] It is also clear that as long as the regime does remain in power, it will not change its character or its methods to any significant degree. Since its strategies will be geared, as always, to the primary goal of enhancing the power of Saddam Hussein and extending his reach, there may well be considerable flexibility in the methods used. However, there may also occur the kinds of strategic miscalculation which have been so marked a feature of Saddam Hussein's conduct of Iraqi policy. It is for these reasons that Iraq's neighbours would be ill advised to drop their guard.

During the months following the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was preoccupied with the task of crushing the rebellions in south and north, steadying the nerve of his inner circle of kinsmen and associates, and ensuring that his hold on the main sinews of power in Iraq - the intelligence services, the internal security forces and the armed forces - remained unchallenged. With his characteristic mixture-of ruthlessness towards his enemies and skill in knowing whom to trust among his potential allies, he succeeded in all these tasks.

He used the special units of the Republican Guard to isolate and destroy the rebels in the southern regions of Iraq, inflicting heavy casualties and causing thousands to flee into the zone occupied by the allies, into the marshes and across the border to Iran. He then turned his forces northward and moved to crush the insurrection in Kurdistan and was prevented from carrying this out to the bitter end only by the threat of further allied military action. By early April, the RCC could boast of having crushed "the acts of sedition, sabotage and rioting in all towns of Iraq", of having defeated the plotting of the "U.S.-Atlantic-Zionist aggression" or "30-state aggression" which had "sought to turn this unified, secure and lofty country into another Lebanon, to be enmeshed and crushed by sectarian, religious and racial conflicts".[42]

It is quite conceivable that many Iraqis, for all their misgivings about the competence, let alone the legitimacy of Saddam Hussein and his regime, were ready to believe their government's thesis that Iraq had been singled out for severe treatment. It was certainly a theme which the Iraqi authorities and media returned to again and again in the year following the defeat in Kuwait, harking back not only to the "Mother of Battles", but also pointing to the continued disabilities under which Iraq suffered: the UN imposed economic blockade; the UN supervised destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons facilities, as well as its missiles; and the effective autonomy of much of Kurdistan under allied supervision. Regardless of whether Iraqis cared much about the last two aspects of Iraq's predicament, all were affected by its economic plight and were as likely to blame the international community as the government which had provoked these measures in the first place.

However, even in the cases where people identified the Iraqi regime as the main culprit, there did not seem to be a great deal they could do about it. Saddam Hussein had re-established the security and intelligence network

which has always constituted the final underpinning of his regime, ensuring that his kinsmen play a prominent and vital part therein. By the end of 1991, one half-brother, Wathban Ibrahim al-Hassan, had been appointed Minister of the Interior, whilst another, Sabawi Ibrahim, was given overall responsibility for the domestic intelligence services. Reportedly, one of Saddam Hussein's sons, Qusay, was placed in charge of a newly created, tribally based, Special Force, trained to counter the growing number of attacks on police and army posts in the towns of the southern provinces.[43]

These attacks were evidence of the continued activity of the groups associated with SAIRI, mainly based in the Shi'i communities of southern Iraq. They may also have been responsible for the rioting reported to have broken out in the largely Shi'i suburbs of Baghdad in the autumn, as well as for the explosion in central Baghdad later in the year.[44] However, these were sporadic incidents and the forces at the disposal of Saddam Hussein appeared well able to suppress these disorders, even they could not guard against every eventuality. As the Director of the Special Security Organisation proclaimed to Saddam Hussein on the occasion of the Id al-Fitr in April 1992: "We pledge...to remain the mujahidin soldiers to achieve the rights and be faithful to our principles. We will remain brandished swords in your hand to exterminate all agents and spies who accepted to embrace the foreigners".[45] Despite the bravado and intended ruthlessness of this claim, it is obviously the hope of the active opposition that one day they will get close enough to Saddam Hussein to kill him. There have been a number of reports during the past year of failed attempts to assassinate the Iraqi leader, none of which has it been possible to verify and all of which have visibly failed.

Some of the most detailed accounts of assassination attempts which misfired have involved members of the Iraqi armed forces. This certainly appears to be

the direction from which any successful coup or assassination is most likely to come - a consideration which is not, of course, lost on Saddam Hussein himself. During the year since the defeat in Kuwait, there have been a series of unverifiable reports of purges, executions and arrests within the Iraqi officer corps. Clearly, in the wake of a strategic miscalculation and military humiliation of the kind witnessed in the Iraqi invasion of and withdrawal from Kuwait, there is likely to be a good deal of mutual suspicion, hostility and recrimination between the political leadership and the officer corps.

The dismissal of Saddam Hussein's clansman, Lt-Gen. Hussein Rashid al-Takriti, as Chief of Staff in June 1991, soon after the dismissal of Maj-Gen. Wafiq Jassim al-Samarrai as Chief of Military Intelligence, may have been due to the uncovering of conspiracies in the armed forces which they had been unable to prevent. In any event, they were replaced by two people close to Saddam Hussein: Lt-Gen. Iyad Fathi al-Rawi, formerly commander of the Presidential Guard, was promoted to Chief of Staff and Brig-Gen. Abd al-Qadir Salman Khamis al-Takriti, married to a cousin of Saddam Hussein, was made Chief of Military Intelligence.[46] The same motive may have been behind Saddam Hussein's decision to replace his son-in-law, Hussein Kamil Hassan, as Minister of Defence in November 1991 with his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid. The latter, who had gained a fearsome reputation in Kurdistan during 1988, was chiefly known for his ruthless control of the internal security and intelligence services. Faced by the unknown currents of dissent and mutiny in his armed forces, these appear to be the qualities which Saddam Hussein is currently looking for in his Minister of Defence.

It appears, therefore, that Saddam Hussein's strategy of consolidating the centre, re-establishing the networks of patronage and kinship control and challenging the international community, but not risking open defiance, has

largely succeeded. It is in the nature of such strategies, of course, that they do not guarantee long-term survival, but Saddam Hussein has always acted upon the principle that if he can make the necessary dispositions to survive in the short-term, the longer term will look after itself. The question which must concern Iraq's neighbours, however, is whether this preoccupation with the political survival of his regime will lead him, as in the past, to turn his attention to those in the region who appear to threaten that survival and, furthermore, if that should happen, whether he will have the wherewithal to do anything about it.

As far as Iraq's Gulf neighbours are concerned, whether Arab or Iranian, there is an uneasy sense of unfinished business with the regime in Baghdad. For Iran, there is the still unresolved aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and the status and location of the boundary between the two states, particularly as regards the Shatt al-Arab. For Kuwait, there is the question of Iraq's acceptance of the newly demarcated boundary between the two states, as well as the question of debt repayment and war reparations which also involves Saudi Arabia.[47] In previous years - 1980 and 1990 - these issues, combined with the reluctance of Iran and Kuwait, respectively, to cede to Iraq's demands, convinced Saddam Hussein of the need to use force to wring from them the moral and material concessions he deemed necessary to his political survival. He was also convinced, in both cases, of the utility of force as a means of gaining such concessions. In present conditions, however much Saddam Hussein might chafe at the attitudes of Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and however much he might long for revenge against their rulers, it seems unlikely that he would think that he could safely get away with the use of force. This does not mean, of course, that he is not equally desperate to escape from his predicament, even if his options are presently limited. It is precisely to maintain the limits on

those options that the GCC states have taken the measures they have in the defence and security fields.

8. Conclusion

The provisions which the rulers of the GCC states have made for their future security and defence reflect not simply their views on the nature of the most pressing threats, but also their recent experiences, as well as their capabilities. The latter includes the security forces and the military technology at their disposal. Importantly, however, it also includes the political priorities of the rulers in question - their styles of governance, their attitudes to those with whom they might cooperate, their preferred ways of dealing with their regional relationships. In most respects, these priorities preclude submission to an arrangement which would take some of the power of decision away from them as rulers and vest it in an impersonal institution. Consequently, a collective security arrangement with the power to coopt its members and oblige them, in an open ended way, to commit themselves and their resources automatically to its ends, is something which the Gulf rulers would clearly prefer to avoid. The eleven year history of the GCC itself is, in large measure, a testimony to this reluctance, whatever formal reality the organisation appears to possess.

It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that the experience of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait should have failed to convince them otherwise. In the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, it is true that the rulers of the GCC states appeared to examine in a preliminary way, the possibility of establishing a wider Arab security pact. As their enthusiasm for that idea waned, the older one, of a joint Gulf security force to give the GCC institional teeth, was raised. It too, however, failed to awaken much enthusiasm, except perhaps from Sultan Qabus, who had originally suggested it. Both ideas were played down by officials of the GCC states at various times: it was said that, since Egypt and

Syria had demonstrated that they could deploy forces to the Gulf region in the past, they could easily do so again, if the Gulf states were to make such a request; as for the joint Gulf defence force, it was claimed that this would be more symbolic than effective.

For effectiveness, the rulers of the Gulf states looked to the methods which appeared to have served them well in the recent, as in the more distant past. On the one hand, the series of bilateral internal security cooperation agreements between the states continued to be one of the more noteworthy aspects of GCC cooperation below head of state level. On the other hand, a number of the GCC states either concluded, or began negotiations aimed at concluding a series of security cooperation agreements with the Western powers which had been so instrumental in defeating Iraq and liberating Kuwait. These agreements were supplemented by moves to upgrade their armed forces through acquiring more sophisticated military equipment, generally from the same Western powers. The aim of these accords was primarily the deterrence of Iraq, but they were also intended to send a signal that, vulnerable as these states might seem, any potential aggressor contemplating military action should take into account the possibility of Western military intervention. In addition, the unilateral and contractual nature of the agreements better suited the Gulf rulers' ideas of proper practice.

The immediate fear of the consequences for their own security of the continued survival of Saddam Hussein's regime has only been partially answered by these accords. The rulers of the GCC are well aware of the danger of subversion and assassination, as well as the rancour felt towards many of them by Saddam Hussein. Their own internal security arrangements and their encouragement, in turn, of the Iraqi opposition forces, can only be a limited form of consolation.

In the short term, the more troubling notion is that they can have no idea how long they will have to coexist in the Gulf with the present regime in Iraq.

In the longer term, after the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the burden of reparations and debt repayment, as well as resentment at what it might regard as the forced ceding of territory to Kuwait, will be difficult for a future Iraqi government to tolerate. Indeed, precisely because Saddam Husein and his regime would be blamed for these disabilities, they would be regarded as even less legitimate. More disturbing still for the Gulf states, is the thought that any Iraqi government which seemed to acquiesce in this regard to these "imposed terms" might make itself vulnerable. The terms themselves would become the focus of an opposition determined to wipe the slate clean and, as Saddam Hussein said when tearing up the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran, "to restore the lost honour of Great Iraq".

Charles Tripp

London, May 1992

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1 Damascus Domestic Service 6 March 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) NES-91-045 7 March 1991 (2)

2 Middle East News Agency (MENA) 15 May 1991, in FBIS NES-91-095 16 May 1991 (7)

3 Financial Times 15 July 1991

4 MENA 10 September 1991, in FBIS NES-91-176 11 September 1991 (5)

5 MENA 11 November 1991, in FBIS NES-91-218 12 November 1991 (2-4); Financial Times 12 November 1991

6 Al-Musawwar 15 November 1991, cited by MENA 13 November 1991, in FBIS NES-91-220 14 November 1991 (1)

7 Interview with Al-Musawwar 28 February 1992 pp 82-83, in FBIS NES-92-042 3 March 1992 (10)

8 See the selection from the Syrian press and broadcasting services in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/1362 A/1-2 23 April 1992

9 Agence France Presse (AFP) 25 April 1992, in SWB ME/1365 A/4-5 27 April 1992; MENA 26 April 1992, in SWB ME/1367 A/5-6 29 April 1992

10 Interview with Al-Musawwar 28 February 1992 pp 82-83, in FBIS NES-92-042 3 March 1992 (10-11)

11 Gulf News Agency (WAKH) 28 August 1991, in FBIS NES-91-168 29 August 1991 (1); **Al-Bayan** (Dubai) 29 August 1991, in FBIS NES-91-170 3 September 1991 (1-2)

12 WAKH 21 and 22 October 1991, in FBIS NES-91-205 23 October 1991 (1)

13 Muscat Radio Oman Network 18 November 1991, in FBIS NES-91-226 22 November 1991 (12-13)

14 WAKH 25 December 1991 and KUNA 25 December 1991, in FBIS NES-91-248 26 December 1991 (3-6)

15 Interview with **Al-Musawwar** 28 February 1992 pp 82-83, in FBIS NES-92-042 3 March 1992 (8-9)

16 Interview with **Sawt al-Kuwait al-Duwali** 12 February 1992 p. 3, in FBIS NES-92-031 14 February 1992 (20)

17 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) 27 April 1992, in FBIS NES-91-083 30 April 1991 (13-14)

18 Interview with **Al-Hayat** 9 January 1992, p. 3, in FBIS NES-92-009 14 January 1992 (22)

19 KUNA 4 September 1991, in FBIS NES-91-172 5 September 1991 (21)

20 KUNA 5 November 1991, in FBIS NES-91-215 6 November 1991 (26); **Sawt al-Kuwait al-Duwali** 8 December 1991, in FBIS NES-91-240 13 December 1991 (32)

21 KUNA 2 October 1991, in FBIS NES-91-193 4 October 1991 (9); KUNA 12 October 1991, in FBIS NES-91-199 15 October 1991 (13)

22 KUNA 6-8 February 1992, in FBIS NES-92-029 12 February 1992 (12-14)

23 Interview with **Sawt al-Kuwait al-Duwali** 12 February 1992 p. 3, in FBIS NES-92-031 14 February 1992 (20-21)

24 This strategy appears to have been followed to some degree by a number other GCC states during 1991: on 22 October 1991 Bahrain concluded a defence agreement with the United States; on 10 September 1991 the UAE signed a framework agreement with France, providing for training and joint manoeuvres. Discussions towards the same ends are said to be under way between the United States and the UAE and Qatar, respectively

25 **Financial Times** 31 May 1991

26 Muhammad Ziarati The Defence of Arabia after the Gulf War, **Middle East International** No. 418 7 February 1992 pp 19-20

27 **Financial Times** 6 November 1991; **The Times** 8 December 1991; **International Herald Tribune** (I.H.T.) 7 December 1991

28 I.H.T. 14 October 1991

29 FBIS NES-91-064 3 April 1991 (11); FBIS NES-91-081 26 April 1991 (8)

30 **Al-Wafd** 24 May 1991, in FBIS NES-91-106 3 June 1991 (1); ARE Radio 15 July 1991, in FBIS NES-91-136 16 July 1991 (1); **Financial Times** 15 July 1991

31 Saudi TV, in FBIS NES-91-189 30 September 1991 (1)

[32] AFP 22 December 1991 and KUNA 22 December 1991, in FBIS NES-91-246 23 December 1991 (5-6)

[33] Interview with **Al-Musawwar** 28 February 1992 pp 82-83, in FBIS NES-92-042 3 March 1992 (10)

[34] Saddam Husseins Army Day speech of 6 January 1992, Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network 6 January 1992, in FBIS NES-92-005 8 January 1992 (18)

[35] The most dramatic of these episodes took place on Bubiyan Island in September 1991. It is not clear exactly what occurred: the Kuwaiti authorities suggested an armed probe by the Iraqi military which was seen off by timely action on the part of the Kuwaiti coastguard and air force; more disinterested observers seemed to believe that the Kuwaiti forces had in fact seen off a group of smugglers who were collecting up and dealing in the many abandoned weapons in the area

[36] Interview with Al-**Hayat** 9 January 1992, p. 3, in FBIS NES-92-009 14 January 1992 (23)

[37] MENA 23 April 1992, in SWB ME/1364 A/4 25 April 1992

[38] As a disgruntled officer of President Arefs Republican Guard in July 1968 he had helped to initiate the coup which brought the Bathist regime to power. He had hoped to benefit from this personally, but had been Minister of Defence for a mere twelve days before he was, in turn, arrested and sent into exile by the better organised Bathist conspirators. As a Sunni Arab army officer, and a member of a tribal grouping of central Iraq, he conforms with the stereotype of many of those who have ruled Iraq since the overthrow of the Monarchy.

[39] Mushahid Hussein Sponsoring Saddams Opponents, **Middle East International** No. 422 3 April 1992 (8)

[40] Voice of the Iraqi People 26 February 1992, in FBIS NES-92-039 27 February 1992 (30)

[41] AFP 7 September 1991, in FBIS NES-91-174 9 September 1991 (1)

[42] RCC statement of 5 April 1991, Iraqi News Agency (INA) 5 April 1991, in FBIS NES-91-066 5 April 1991 (13-14)

[43] **The Guardian** 30 January 1992; INA 8 December 1991, in FBIS NES-91-236 9 December 1991 (47)

[44] **The Observer** 3 November 1991

[45] Republic of Iraq Radio 2 April 1992, in SWB ME/1347 A/13 4 April 1992

[46] **Alif Ba** 19 June 1991, in FBIS NES-91-118 19 June 1991 (14); I.H.T. 21 June 1991 and 8 July 1991

[47] See the comments by Tariq Aziz on the Kuwait-Iraq border issue, Radio Monte Carlo 27 April 1992, in SWB ME/1367 A/7 29 April 1992

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IX

BORDER ISSUES

[Theme Two: Session IV]

by Richard Murphy

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Security Aspects of a Settlement of the Arab-Israel Conflict: Border Issues Related to West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights.

by Richard W. Murphy, Senior Fellow Middle East,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

Prepared for

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International Institute for Strategic Studies

Our opening session today focuses on the relationship between border and security issues on the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. The most obvious distinction between today's program and the Persian Gulf security problems discussed yesterday is the lack of agreed borders in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Gulf region had and continues to have several border disputes, the only major Gulf crisis over the legitimacy of a state was that created by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Let me admit at the outset that I have found it difficult to come to terms with the assigned topic. It is relatively easy to construct a formula to deal with the relationship between the security and border aspects of a Syrian-Israeli border agreement. But the West Bank/Gaza situation does not lend itself to comparably straightforward analysis.

For example, when trying to outline possible West Bank-Gazan border arrangements one immediately confronts the following range of questions:

1. What does "border" mean where there has been no internationally recognized boundary?

2. Should not priority be given to political arrangements that will pertain in those territories before focussing on the border issue?

3. How firm is the Palestinian demand for an independent state? Might this demand, dating from the early years of this century and sharpened by a generation of Israeli occupation, weaken after the Palestinians have exercised substantial autonomy? If so, will the prospect of a political link up with Jordan receive sufficient

58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10021 ■ TEL (212) 734-0400 ■ TELEX 239852 CFR UR ■ FAX (212) 861-1916

support from Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and abroad?

4. What Arab states might accept a settlement that does not provide for an independent Palestinian state enjoying all aspects of sovereignty which they exercise?

5. What are the prospects that Jordan will accept responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, to include granting them Jordanian citizenship with full voting rights?

6. How to approach the issue of Israel's eastern border if Jerusalem refuses to negotiate creation of either a Palestinian entity linked to Jordan or a state located west of the Jordan River?

7. Assuming some sort of cross-river Palestinian entity is accepted in principle by Israel but it still proves impossible to negotiate a single line marking Israel's eastern border, how fruitful is the concept of negotiating multiple lines on the map to delineate distinct political, security, economic borders for Israel? How likely is it that either Arab or Israeli public opinion will accept so sophisticated an approach?

8. To what degree is the Arab world ready to come to grips with the permanent existence of Israel?

Some of these questions are easier to answer than others. None can be answered definitively. How each is answered will have a bearing on the security aspects of border issues. The questions were not framed in order to downplay the importance of security aspects to the various possible border solutions. The fact that Israel and the front line states possess such formidable arsenals illustrates the reality and depth of their mutual suspicions. But clearly the weight given to security will depend on the nature of the political relationships which negotiations may develop.

Much of the debate about Israel's borders over the years has been premised on the continuation of a hostile relationship with its neighbors. The view of Robert Frost, the American poet, who in writing about the relations between New England farmers noted that "Good fences make good neighbors," does not apply to the Middle Eastern scene.

If the eight questions above are relevant to our subject, then some general observations about the present mind set of the players can be made.

First, none of Israel's three neighbors is ready or able to ignore either its neighbor's border problem or the Palestinian problem by signing a separate peace accord with Israel. The failure of the 1983 agreement between Lebanon and Israel was a sharp reminder that, unlike Egypt, a separate peace with Israel will not be

possible for Lebanon, Syria or Jordan.

Past attempts to solve separately each of the remaining Arab-Israel border problems suggest that there are limits on how far negotiators can go in working for solutions on a single front without agreement on how to tackle the entire set of border problems. This was the wisdom behind the decision to create three subcommittees at the Madrid Summit last October: Lebanon-Israel, Syria-Israel and Jordan-Palestinian-Israel.

It is not a question of relative military, political or economic strength between the Arab parties. Some might argue that Lebanon is too weak to negotiate freely with Israel given the presence of Syrian troops and the weight of Syrian political involvement in Lebanese affairs. But neither could Syria sign a separate peace without abandoning a main pillar of its foreign policy, namely that peace with Israel will only be possible through coordinated Arab efforts for a general settlement. Even the future of Gaza, a territory which given the enormity of its demographic problems has many right wing Israelis offering to relinquish control, cannot be settled in isolation. Gaza's future status is inextricably tied to that of the West Bank.

Second, it is also true that, as the Arabs view the issues, there are no tradeoffs between possible agreements on their individual borders. Each Arab state has its own separate demands, based on its own interests and objectives.

LEBANON-SYRIA BORDERS WITH ISRAEL.

Lebanon. While the border problems are interrelated, they differ in magnitude. Israel's borders with Lebanon, although not formally ratified, are not in legal dispute. Israeli leaders of both parties have made it clear that they have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. They accept the border defined by the Treaty of Versailles between Lebanon under French mandate and Palestine under British mandate as that between Lebanon and modern Israel. At the same time, Israelis have no confidence that Beirut will at any early date be able to maintain the degree of border security which the IDF has imposed in its self-styled "security zone" within southern Lebanon. Israel has yet to show interest in testing Lebanese capabilities, or more importantly in Syrian intentions, by offering a date for its own withdrawal in exchange, for example, for disarmament of the remaining armed militias in Southern Lebanon.

Syria. History and religious convictions have placed far lighter burdens on finding a solution to the problem of the Syrian-Israeli border, in comparison to the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian borders. There is a clear Israeli consensus that security is the main, indeed the only, reason for Israel remaining on the Golan. In 1981, Jerusalem extended Israeli law to the occupied Golan Heights in a move equivalent to annexation. This move has won no international recognition.

WEST BANK-GAZA BORDER ISSUES. By far the most complex border question for Israel is to define its eastern border with the Jordanians and Palestinians. It wants to address demarcation of that border only after it has reached agreement on a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza and when that regime is in its third of a five year period of implementation. Serious negotiation concerning that transitional regime has yet to be started much less inaugurated.

Present Position of the parties.

I. Israel.
A. Likud Government.
B. Labor Party.
C. Israeli public opinion.

No Israeli politician will accept the Armistice Lines of 1949 as the final borders of the State of Israel. The Armistice lines marked simply where the fighting had stopped and since its foundation Israel has considered them "insecure." Three examples from the 1950s and 60s illustrate the deep roots of this Israeli view.

In northern Galilee, during the 1950s Israel gradually absorbed the demilitarized zones (DMZs) created below the Golan Heights by the Armistice Commission. This was primarily driven by its security concerns and secondarily by Israel's intent to assert sovereignty over all the territory in that sector which formed part of the British Mandate.

The results of the Six Day War gave Israel the sudden chance to enhance its security and it reacted quickly. Where the physical threat of a hostile presence had been viewed as particularly acute, Israel swiftly blocked any effort to restore the status quo ante. Only days after the guns fell silent in June 1967 it bulldozed two small Palestinian villages at the tip of the Latrun Salient. To those who expressed surprise at this move, Israelis pointed to the presence in that area of Palestinian guerrillas who had frequently been able to cause incidents in major Israeli population centers.

By the end of June 1967 Israel had redrawn the boundaries of Jerusalem. In doing so it annexed the pre-war Municipality of East Jerusalem administered by the Jordanian mayor at the same time expanding that area twelve fold. Simultaneously Israel began construction of housing developments ringing East Jerusalem. It built these not only to satisfy security driven concerns--to deny the high ground to the enemy in any future conflict--but also to affirm the Israeli consensus that Jerusalem had been restored as their "eternal, indivisible capital."

A.LIKUD's POSITION ON BOUNDARIES. The Likud Party has never hidden its intent to gain control and eventual sovereignty over the entire

"Land of Israel," i.e. all territory west of the Jordan River. (Only reluctantly did some members of Herut surrender their claim to the East Bank, the area which in 1922 London severed from its mandate to create the Kingdom of Trans Jordan.)

Since 1967, Likud has opposed both creation of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories and any return of West Bank land to Jordanian sovereignty. It would apparently agree to grant a sizeable degree of local autonomy to West Bank Palestinian Arabs. The people themselves would become citizens of Jordan. Autonomy would exclude, among other matters, control of land and water.

B.LABOR PARTY POSITION. The Likud is not alone in rejecting the concept of an independent Palestinian state. Since 1967 the Labor Party has also opposed this but has consistently affirmed its readiness to return some of the lands occupied in the Six Day War to Jordan in exchange for a "real peace." It never had to define what such a peace might involve since it found no readiness on the part of its neighbors, except periodically in Jordan, to discuss the matter. The Allon Plan of 1967 aimed at establishing Israel's eastern security border on the Jordan River and would have returned to Jordanian sovereignty about two-thirds of the area Amman ruled prior to the June War. Labor has viewed retention of major centers of West Bank Arab population and Gaza as constituting a major security problem for Israel's future.

C.ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION. In polling since 1967, 50-60% of the Israeli people have expressed themselves in favor of returning some land occupied for real peace. Pollsters continued to record comparable percentages after the return of Sinai to Egypt in 1979. Many observers consider it significant that these percentages were recorded years before any other Arab state was prepared to negotiate with Israel. They assume this indicates that the percentage of those in Israel ready to swap land for peace would increase in the course of a serious peace negotiation.

II. ARAB POSITIONS. There has been no sign that any Arab state contemplates signing a general peace agreement with Israel without gaining a return of at least some of the lands on every front lost in 1967.

A. Jordan ruled over the West Bank from 1953 until the Six Day War although its sovereignty was formally recognized only by the United Kingdom and Pakistan. In the summer of 1988 King Hussein announced Jordan's disengagement from its West Bank responsibilities. The King would probably reverse that 1988 position given: a.) a clear expression of Palestinian opinion that they would welcome some type of association between Jordan and whatever Palestinian entity might be established and b.) a reasonable degree of confidence that this association would not undermine the stability of the Hashemite regime.

For several years prior to 1988, Jordan's strategy was to be ready to negotiate directly with Israel but to come to a peace agreement only if Israel agreed to relinquish all of the West Bank territory it occupied in 1967. Otherwise, the PLO would have to be Jordan's partner in negotiations since Jordan could not by itself sign away "Palestinian rights." Since the 1974 Rabat Summit, the King, in company with all Arab leaders, has acknowledged the claim of the PLO to be the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. (In reaching the so-called "London Agreement" of 1987 Jordan in fact did negotiate without the PLO but that agreement was never implemented.)

The Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations agreed at Madrid in October 1991 to a two stage negotiation whose first stage would see the ending of the Israeli occupation, with Palestinians exercising some degree of autonomy during a five year transitional regime. They further agreed that the second stage, negotiating "final status issues" which would include the drawing of borders, would begin not later than the end of third year of the transitional regime.

B. The PLO position on borders has undergone many changes over the years. Even though the current negotiations do not directly involve the PLO leadership, delegates from the West Bank and Gaza delegates assert that their guidance comes from the PLO leadership in Tunis.

Today most of its many "spokesmen" agree that the PLO accepts a two state solution, recognizing the right of Israel to exist as part of a package deal which would recognize the Palestinians' right to a state of their own.

C. Syria's position on borders is clear as far as the Golan Heights are concerned: it expects to regain the entire occupied area of the Golan Heights as a matter of principle. Syria sees the Heights as important to its strategic defense. Regaining that territory is equally important to Syria's view of its political stature in the Arab World. After Egypt secured the return of all of Sinai in its peace treaty with Israel, it became critical for the Syrian leadership to regain all of the Heights should they subsequently agree to negotiations.

Syria asserts it will pay no "price" for the return of its territory, even though it entered the present negotiations knowing the end game to be achievement of a peace treaty and normalization of relations with Israel. Damascus could easily decide to drop the negotiations and go on living with the Israeli occupation if Israel does not find a formula which postulates total return of the Golan.

Damascus has spoken out consistently for "Palestinian rights" but has been more ambiguous than some other Arab states about the need for creation of an independent Palestinian state. Its outlook is perhaps influenced by its Baathi doctrine that there should be one

Arab nation.

Damascus will not easily agree to a Palestinian affiliation with Jordan because of inter-Arab rivalries. Predictably it will vigorously oppose such affiliation should it see no prospect of an acceptable settlement of its Golan claim.

The positions on borders of states outside the region have altered over time. The Security Council in Res. 242 of 1967 spoke of "return of lands occupied," deliberately omitting the definite article sought by the Arabs who wanted the resolution to read: "return of the lands occupied", a formulation supporting the Arab position that all of the lands had to be returned.

American pronouncements have long been carefully monitored by both Arabs and Israelis who recognized that, whether they liked it or not, Washington was the only likely contender for the role of "honest broker" of a peace settlement. In 1967, and for a few years thereafter, Washington stressed the probability that a settlement would involve "minor rectifications" of the 1949 Armistice lines. This American position in earlier years seemed to some Arabs to convey a worrisome hint of generosity toward Israel. Today this formulation reads as pro-Arab, underlining that mere passage of time has not helped open minds in the region to proposals for achievement of a generally acceptable solution.

Possible ways of monitoring and controlling solutions on security related border solutions.

It is probable that Syria, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians will be capable of addressing border issues only after
1.) both sides come to accept there is no military solution to their problems;
2.) Israelis see the end of the need for a perpetual "Fortress Israel" and
3.) there have been prolonged negotiations of regional issues, including sharing of water resources and arms control. That said, it is possible to make a few observations about ways to proceed on each front once greater mutual confidence has developed.

Golan Heights. Damascus has stated ever since reaching its first and only Disengagement Agreement with Israel in 1974 that the next step should be a negotiated return of all of the remaining occupied portion of the Heights. President Asad has maintained that the remaining area is too small to offer possibilities for a further small disengagement.

Israelis express grudging respect for the way Syria since 1974 has kept the Golan front free of terrorist infiltration. Given Israeli convictions about Syria's basic hostility toward the existence of Israel, however, Israelis in general are comfortable with the status quo. Neither the Labor Party leadership nor Likud has

evinced any interest in total withdrawal from the Heights. Some suggest that Labor may in fact hesitate more than Likud in contemplating withdrawal from the Heights.

Syria would probably accept a solution that required demilitarization of the whole area extending from its present positions to the edge of the Heights, provided the whole of the Heights was described as "returned to Syrian sovereignty". Asad has acknowledged over the years the possibility of demilitarizing the Heights, provided Israel demilitarized to an equivalent depth. This should not be viewed as its final position and Israel should look creatively at some way to match such a Syrian "concession."

It should be possible, if Israeli concerns on security and access to the Banias Springs are guaranteed, to develop a formula for return of the Golan Heights to Syria. The simplest would be to build on the existing mechanism of UN monitoring. The demilitarized area under United Nations' administration could be expanded in stages. There are various geographic points to make a start. One is the Druze village of Majdal ash-Shams whose population has reportedly indicated it would prefer Syrian to Israeli administration. The U.N. could supervise expansion westward of the present zone for which it is responsible to include Majdal ash - Shams. Israel could then permit the return of Syrian civil authority to that area. This could be negotiated without explicitly stating that it is the prelude to returning all of the Heights to Syrian sovereignty but rather as a test of Syrian good will and its capability of assuring no use of that village for hostile activity against Israel.

Why should Israel make such a gesture? Presumably only if it is both seriously interested in a settlement with Syria and accepts that eventual return of the Heights to Syrian sovereignty will be prerequisite to reaching a general peace settlement.

Israel is unlikely to agree to a move toward returning the Heights to Syrian sovereignty until Syria has given proofs of its long term intention to live in peace with it. For Syria merely to mute its anti-Israel propaganda or even to take what it would consider a major confidence building step such as closing the Damascus headquarters of the Arab Boycott office would not have much impact.

Syria could convey its peaceful intentions by reversing its decision to boycott the regional talks initiated last January in Moscow, in particular those committees dedicated to arms control, refugees and regional water sharing. Damascus chose to see its participation in such talks as a "reward" to Israel. Those negotiations deal with the essence of peace. By joining in, Syria could directly start to persuade Israel that it not only accepts its existence but is preparing for normal relations and, not incidentally, would fully cooperate with an expanded UN administration of the Heights.

WEST BANK-GAZA. The effort to match up security arrangements with possible future borders between Israel, Jordan and a Palestinian entity is too complex to address at the moment. The variables involved are countless. The analyses of how much security will be needed to justify a given boundary proposal are as much rooted in psychology and political rivalries, both domestic and regional, as they are in objective military judgement. Many senior Israeli military officers, both active and retired, readily acknowledge that Israel's future security in a condition of peace does not require anything like the present number of its forces and the spread of its deployments on the Golan or even on the West Bank.

The problem of relating borders to security arrangements have plagued many observers. In its 1989 study "The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace" the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv concluded that of the six options it studied: status quo, autonomy, annexation, a Palestinian state, Gaza withdrawal or a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, "none...seems to offer a reasonable avenue for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza." The authors found advantages in each of the six options but called for further study to develop a course of action which might be acceptable to all of the players. Two developments particularly complicate finding an acceptable solution: settlements and missiles.

Settlements. Israel has thus far built and populated settlements on the Golan, West Bank and Gaza as follows:

Golan	29	settlements with population of	13,000.
West Bank	142	" " " "	108,000.
Gaza	17	" " " "	3,300.

(Source: Associated Press, January 1992.)

Both Labor and Likud have sponsored these settlements. Here the passage of time has definitely complicated the prospects for peace. These "facts on the ground" pose the vexing problem of how to protect and administer a sizeable Jewish settler population should achievement of peace require the drawing of a border which will put their settlements under Arab sovereignty. The fact that many settlers on the West Bank may be there in order to get more and cheaper living space than they could afford within the "Green Line," and not for the ideological reason of populating the "Land of Israel," does not simplify the problem. These "economic settlers" will want to preserve their present living standards and will resist being uprooted.

Missile Threat. Iraq's launch of Scud missiles against Israel during "Desert Storm" served to confirm long held and utterly contradictory prejudices about just how valuable the West Bank is to Israeli security. Those who for years had argued that retention of all of the territory occupied in 1967 west of the Jordan was vital to Israeli security clashed once again with those who held

that its retention was meaningless in security terms and even created further dangers for the state.

INDEPENDENCE. Former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in the course of his 1988 Middle East shuttle trips argued for acceptance of a new view of sovereignty. He did not advocate an independent Palestinian state but cogently made the point that when considering various solutions to the Palestinian problem we are too prone to think in terms of the nineteenth century nation state with its supposedly unfettered authority. The modern reality is that nations limit their sovereignty extensively, and voluntarily, through treaty arrangements.

I doubt that a definition of Palestinian independence, mutually acceptable to Arabs and Israelis will be found anytime soon if at all. The authority of such a state would have to be so circumscribed to win approval in Israel that the Palestinians would reject it, except as a way station to something better. Palestinians are unimpressed by the argument that their nation deserves less independence than those already existing in the area.

It might be relatively easy to reach agreement that the Palestinian state would never have its own armed forces and never invite into its territory the forces of any Arab state. But Israeli negotiators would balk at the many uncertainties inherent in a Palestinian state even if it were only nominally independent.

Israelis today applaud the vision of the early Zionist leaders who accepted the limitations on their plans for a Jewish State inherent in the Balfour Declaration and later the UN Partition Plan. They are probably correct in suspecting that, if independence is on the agenda, the Palestinians would try to emulate their example and negotiate for a limited state now in the hope of developing a full blown version later.

FEDERATION-CONFEDERATION. Years ago a superficial debate started in Palestinian and Jordanian circles about whether either "federal" or "confederal" relations would be possible between a Palestinian entity and Jordan. These discussions have not been seriously pursued although the PLO as recently as late March did signal its readiness for a federal tie.

For the foreseeable future, negotiations on the status of West Bank/Gaza should focus on framing a relationship between Israel, Jordan and a Palestinian entity, without simultaneously trying to define this entity on the map. As a general proposition, it will be far easier to bring about an Israeli consensus that Jordan rather than the Palestinians should wield overall responsibility for the area over which Jerusalem may be prepared to relinquish full control. The Allon Plan trimming one-third off the area ruled by Amman before the Six Day War was an early attempt to find such a solution and still exerts its appeal. However, if a revised version

of the Allon Plan is to be acceptable to Jordanians and Palestinians, Israel will have to go beyond its present offer of limited autonomy and negotiate the establishment of Jordanian-Palestinian civil authority and Palestinian land ownership.

Amman would probably welcome some type of association provided it remained the dominant partner and if it did not arouse strong Syrian opposition by entering such a relationship. The best way to limit the prospect of Syria playing a spoiling role is for Israel to pursue its dialogue with Damascus with the same intensity it appears ready to invest in its talks with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. To delay its talks with Damascus until it has reached an agreement with Jordanians and Palestinians is to invite Syrian disruption of the process.

Even if a dovish Israeli government were to be elected, it would probably not volunteer to return to Arab sovereignty anything approaching the amount of West Bank land Israel has occupied for the past twenty-five years. It is equally unlikely that outsiders such as the U.N. or the U.S. would be adventurous enough to propose a new border. The tendency will be to let the parties attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable border. It is only when a framework of Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian ties begins to take shape that security concerns of both Arabs and Israelis will find their proper place. Taken out of context they will prove unnegotiable.

There seems little likelihood that a UN role on West Bank/Gaza comparable to that suggested above for the Golan will be acceptable to Israel. Jerusalem will vigorously oppose any attempt to find a short cut by bringing in U.N. peace keeping forces to preside over the Occupied Territory during these negotiations. For its part, the United States has shown no sympathy for the idea of a transitional UN administration. This rules out the prospect of Security Council agreement on such an arrangement.

These are several of the reasons why the parties would be well advised not to tackle the border issue head on and certainly not until a better climate of understanding has been developed. This could take several years. All hands have agreed to a two stage negotiation concerning the West Bank and Gaza. What will satisfy Israel's need for security will depend on how that first transitional period plays out.

That said, in order to sustain faith in the diplomatic process, it would be highly desirable if the parties could agree to a declaratory position that "they not only intend to live together in peace but share the goal of a return of substantial portions of the West Bank and all of Gaza to Arab sovereignty." Such a statement would go far to encourage the Arab parties to persevere with negotiations and give Israel time to work out with Jordan and the Palestinians the nature of their future political association. It would, perhaps most importantly, help to ease the suspicions of

both sides which continue to trap them into trying to calculate a sound tradeoff between security and borders.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS LINKED TO THE EMERGING STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

[Theme Two: Session V]

by Joseph Alpher

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A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

by Joseph Alpher

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Joseph Alpher is Deputy Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Before joining JCSS in 1981, he held senior positions in the Mossad (Israeli civilian intelligence). The views expressed in this paper are his alone, and do not necessarily reflect any specific position of the Jaffee Center, its researchers or trustees.

Introductory Remarks

This paper attempts to delineate Israel's security considerations with regard to a Palestinian settlement, and to suggest parameters and guidelines for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian security regime, as a key component of the overall Arab-Israel peace process. Our approach assumes that security arrangements are put into place as part and parcel of a political peace process, and that they are integrated into a broad spectrum of confidence-building measures that reinforce all sides' sense of security. At the same time, our approach seeks to remain "apolitical," in the sense that the security concept presented here is intended, at least in its early stages, to be applicable to a variety of interim political arrangements intended to lead toward autonomy, Palestinian independence, and/or forms of condominium, federation and confederation. Particular attention is paid to the initial security arrangements prescribed by the Camp David Framework for Peace, insofar as these may be considered a minimal point of departure from the Israeli standpoint.

While we shall refer briefly to a number of broad security-related issues that encompass Israel and many of its Arab neighbors, the thrust of our inquiry will be to suggest a security regime for the core region of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem insofar as it is integrated into a political settlement, and Jordan. In

particular, we shall suggest innovative approaches with regard to two key areas of security: formalizing Jordan's emerging role as Israel's strategic depth toward the east, thereby reducing security pressures on the West Bank; and delineating transition arrangements for ensuring local-tactical (i.e., anti-terrorism and anti-subversion) security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[1]

Threat Perceptions

To be successful, a security regime for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be designed to deal with the security dangers to which each of the participant parties is exposed. Here there are two key difficulties. First, the dangers are indeed immense; secondly, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the threat perceptions of the various actors' populations, and the objective reality or gravity of specific threats. For example, a number of opinion surveys, and the experience of election campaigning, point to Israelis' fear of cross-border terrorism as a major consideration in opposing withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Yet terrorism of this nature hardly constitutes an existential threat to Israel. Indeed, as Schiff notes, Israel has lost 15 times as many people in wars than as victims of terrorism: "The problem is that terrorism cannot be solved with traditional military remedies and therefore taps a sensitive nerve in Israelis."[2] On the Palestinian and Jordanian side, fears of "transfer" and major population dislocations as a result of Soviet Jewish immigration

to Israel seem, to many Israelis, to grossly exaggerate the influence and capabilities of the extreme Right in Israeli politics.

These remarks bespeak the primary and unique aspect of the parties' threat perceptions. All three--Israel, the Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan--perceive threats at some sort of an existential level. Yet the scope and nature of the threats are far from symmetrical. Israel perceives among the Arabs a rejection of its very right to exist; this is expressed in Arab state military preparations (e.g., most recently by Saddam Hussein), in Palestinian rejectionists' refusal to countenance Israel's existence even within the 1948 boundaries, and in lingering or ambiguous references to the Palestinian "right of return" to pre-1967 Israel. On a more abstract level, instances of military aggression and terrorist violence against Israelis and Jews in general, trigger among Israelis a recall mechanism of the Holocaust and earlier (throughout 3,000 years of Jewish history) attempts to physically destroy the Jewish people or part of it.

If Israelis' perception is of a comprehensive existential threat to their lives both as a people and as individuals, Palestinians perceive an attitude on the part of Israel, and to a lesser extent on the part of Arab states as well, of denial of their right to exist as a sovereign people in general, and in their historic homeland in particular. On an individual, day-to-day basis, Palestinians in the Territories, and in some Arab

countries, feel physically threatened and frequently humiliated. One senior Palestinian source who was interviewed, when asked about possible long-term security measures as part of a settlement, blurted out: "how can I even think about such things when I don't know whether I'll make it home through the IDF roadblocks tonight?"

As for the Hashemite Kingdom, it recognizes that it is viewed by many in the region as an artificial entity. From 'Jordan-is-Palestine' enthusiasts in Israel, to the enmity of the Saud dynasty in Riyadh and Greater Syria enthusiasts in Damascus and the designs of the local Palestinian majority and fundamentalist movement, the Hashemite Kingdom is threatened as a polity.

While additional Middle East states (e.g., Lebanon, Kuwait) might also view their threat environment in existential terms, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique in that all three key sides share some variety of this perception. Clearly, security arrangements can do only so much to remedy this impasse; a combination of good will, time and political stability is at least equally critical. And in the case of the Hashemite Kingdom, regime stability and identity cannot in any case be made a condition of peace and security arrangements.

What dangers, then, should Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements seek to neutralize if they are to be acceptable to the various parties? Here too, the situation is asymmetrical. From Israel's standpoint, the best standard would appear to be

that suggested by the success of the security provisions of the Israel-Egypt peace: that, as a consequence of territorial withdrawal and peace and security arrangements, security for both sides is enhanced when compared with the status quo ante, and violation of these arrangements by one side gives the other a definitive advantage in seeking to rectify matters, whether by diplomacy or by force. This is what made, and still makes, the Egyptian-Israeli security regime desirable to both sides. Any provisions that do not satisfy these requirements must be seen as offering doubtful compensation to Israel for territorial withdrawal, unless they can be classified as 'calculated risks' by virtue of political compensation or constraint.

In the Israeli perception, then, security arrangements in the framework of a Palestinian settlement should, optimally:

1. improve deterrence against, and early warning of, attack from the east;

2. enhance Israel's capacity to defend itself against attack from the east;

3. reduce the threat of terrorism against Israelis throughout the Land of Israel (i.e., including inside the Palestinian entity as well as in the diaspora); and

4. contribute to an overall reduction in the likelihood of a new Arab-Israel, or Muslim-Israel war breaking out; it should also contribute to Israel's capacity to defend itself in such an instance.

As for the Palestinians, security arrangements as part of an overall political settlement should help secure them some form of independent political rights for the first time, and particularly, a form of national security inside Palestine. This means security for individuals against terrorism and arbitrary use of force, as well as guarantees of non-intervention in their national life. Palestinians should be able to feel confident that outside forces--Israeli or Arab--will not arbitrarily take over their political entity.

For the Hashemite Kingdom to enter into a security regime embracing a Palestinian solution, it would presumably wish to receive assurances regarding its territorial integrity and inviolability vis-a-vis all its neighbors: Israel and the Palestinians, as well as Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It would, in particular, expect to improve its security against attempts--by Israelis or Palestinians--to "Palestinize" Jordan.

Camp David

The Camp David "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," signed on September 17, 1978 by Israel, Egypt and the United States, is the only existing detailed framework proposal for initiating interim arrangements toward a Palestinian settlement. It has been consistently adopted by Israeli governments, including those on the moderate political Right, as an acceptable starting point. (On the other hand it was never adopted by Palestinians or Jordan; they were not consulted by the framers of

Camp David, nor did they participate in the autonomy talks of the early 1980s.) In view of its wide degree of acceptability in Israel, its security provisions are worthy of brief examination:

> Security [states the Camp David Framework for Peace] is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful. . . .
>
> A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces [from the West Bank and Gaza] will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The [autonomy] agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders. . . .
>
> All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be

constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.[3]

Camp David, then, assigns responsibility for the external security of the Territories, during the transition, to Israel and Jordan. As for internal security, it mandates partial Israeli military withdrawal to undefined "security locations," and provides for a "strong local police force" that develops close liaison arrangements with neighboring security forces. Ultimately, it talks in the abstract of peace treaties accompanied by all the trappings of security arrangements that, in fact, have been put in place between Egypt and Israel.

During the Camp David autonomy talks themselves (between Egypt and Israel, with American mediation) discussion of security issues was postponed repeatedly, in the hope that agreement on less sensitive issues would pave the way for a security discussion based on a degree of confidence. Moreover Egypt was reluctant to represent Palestinian interests on local security issues. In the single Israeli presentation made on the subject, Israel demanded to retain exclusive control over external as well as internal security issues; it allowed that there could be a joint coordinating committee with the self-governing authority to discuss issues of public security, but ultimate authority over the local police force would rest with Israel, and Israeli

security forces would retain access throughout the Territories and deal with security issues at will. The IDF would withdraw to security zones from which it could quickly reinforce units that patrolled the Jordan River border in close coordination with Jordanian forces (similar arrangements were made for the Gaza-Egypt border within the framework of Israeli-Egyptian peace).

American ideas (that were never broached) and thinking among some Israeli planners, took a somewhat more liberal view, envisioning an Israeli readiness to "sit on the master spigot but not run after every leaking faucet," i.e., to allow and encourage the Palestinian police force, with Egyptian and Jordanian help, to take responsibility for local security, while retaining the right to intervene in extreme cases. According to this view, responsibility for courts and jails might also gradually be shared. This plan could be executed in phases of about one year's duration. Jewish settlements in the Territories would remain Israeli security zones. These ideas were never debated at the autonomy discussions.

Israel, as noted, remains officially committed to the Camp David security provisions for a Palestinian autonomy regime. However in the course of the opening rounds of peace negotiations in late 1991-early 1992, several leading Israeli government spokespersons noted that the commitment to withdraw the IDF to "specified security locations" was no longer feasible, as the spread of Israeli settlement activity during the past decade rendered it imperative for the IDF to remain deployed throughout

the Territories.[4] This approach was reflected specifically in Israel's opening proposal in the negotiations, which states that "The sole responsibility for security in all its aspects--external, internal and public order--will be that of Israel."[5]

Insofar as Camp David offers security ideas that remain workable, its importance lies in the legitimacy it bestows upon these ideas as a key point of reference, despite the absence of Palestinian and Jordanian adherence to the framework agreement.[6] It incorporates the notion of Palestinian responsibility for local security in the interim stage, and a Jordanian role in regional security. It also predicates an Egyptian and Jordanian role in forming a Palestinian security regime, and in fortifying it with liaison activities. As we shall see, these appear to be vital elements in any successful security regime built around a Palestinian settlement.

Three Dimensions of Security

We turn now to a discussion of the nature and functioning of such a security regime--one that comes as close as possible to meeting the threat perceptions and security needs of the parties involved. From an Israeli standpoint, the security issues involved may be analyzed along three interlocking dimensions, or tracks.

The first involves a Palestinian military threat to Israel. The notion that a Palestinian political entity located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could raise an army, and recruit

friendly military assistance and support, so as to pose a strategic military threat to Israel, is sometimes presented by opponents of territorial compromise as a consideration mitigating against withdrawal by Israel. This issue can be disposed of fairly straightforwardly. Israel can and must insist upon the effective strategic demilitarization of territories evacuated by its forces; only an enhanced Palestinian police force or gendarmerie with limited tactical capabilities should be permitted. Such a status would also guarantee Jordan against any Palestinian military initiative. Palestinian compliance could be verified initially by Israeli, Jordanian and perhaps American or other international security forces assisting in establishing an effective anti-terrorist security regime (see below), and by Israeli and eventually American naval patrols off Gaza, and overflights.

Notably, numerous spokespersons representing the PLO mainstream have indicated their acceptance of this proviso, frequently citing the Palestinians' need to devote all their resources to socio-economic rehabilitation. Indeed, in many ways the Palestinians are better off with no army, rather than a small army: the latter could always provoke a disastrous retaliatory attack by far superior neighboring forces; whereas the former status would fortify the Palestinians' claim to international guarantees for their neutrality and territorial inviolability. In this regard, Costa Rica offers an interesting precedent. In any event, the military security of the Palestinian entity

against unjustified incursion or invasion by its neighbors will be guaranteed by those neighbors, Israel and Jordan, and by the international community, within the framework of peace and security agreements.

A second dimension is the (non-Palestinian) Arab military threat to Israel. It is generally accepted that, to the extent Israel relinquishes overall rule and an extensive military presence along the Jordan Valley and the mountain ridge that runs north-south the length of the West Bank, and withdraws its forces westward within the Green Line, it is exposing itself to heightened danger of attack from the east. Jordanian and other Arab forces (Iraqi, Saudi, Syrian) deployed in the East Bank could quickly cross the Jordan River and take up offensive positions along the mountain ridge, thereby threatening Israel's narrow heartland, before Israel's primarily reserve army could be called up. Opponents of territorial compromise cite this threat as the most crucial security consideration mitigating against withdrawal.

One common reply to these arguments is to grant Israel's need for a package of early warning and minimal defense provisions in the territory of the West Bank, even after a Palestinian self-governing authority has been established. Here too, mainstream Palestinian spokespersons tend to accept this need. There is a broad consensus in favor of granting Israel early-warning radar, electronic and observation stations on the eastern escarpment of the mountain ridge, looking eastward toward

possible approaching military threats, as well as several concentrations of ground forces in positions overlooking the Jordan River bridges and fords, and even air force overflight rights for intelligence purposes. All this, at least throughout an extended transition period.

Here we note that even among Israeli hawks, it is accepted that the Gaza Strip does not conform to this military model. It has no high ground, offers no advantages for warfighting, and it is bordered on its "Arab" side by a 200 km wide demilitarized buffer separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. Hence Israel has no early warning or defensive force requirements in Gaza (beyond, perhaps, the naval dimension), which is already effectively integrated into a security regime with Israel and Egypt, similar to that described below regarding the West Bank, Jordan and Israel.

The difficulty with the early-warning/defense package outlined above is that even <u>it</u> does not hold up against the kind of worst-case scenario that Israelis must contemplate in "testing" potential security arrangements--a scenario whereby Jordan allows into its territory large Arab expeditionary forces from Iraq and elsewhere, until a sufficient military buildup has been completed to launch a major invasion of the West Bank, or Jordan itself launches a surprise attack into the West Bank. Even if Israel called up its reserves in good time, on the basis of solid intelligence, it might find itself reoccupying the West Bank or even attacking the East Bank--with all the political and

security risks involved--perhaps even without being able to prove evident provocation of an actual Arab invasion. Alternatively, if the two sides commenced a waiting period similar to that which preceded the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel's reserve army would eventually have to be demobilized to avoid economic catastrophe, while the Arab armies aligned along the east bank of the Jordan River could bide their time before attacking. Clearly this would be an intolerable state of affairs for Israel.

This dilemma reflects the key differences between the Sinai buffer and the West Bank as buffer. The Sinai arrangements allowed Israel to withdraw its forces, knowing that it could, if necessary, take up defensive positions in good time inside the extensive and relatively unpopulated Sinai Desert, but that the danger of such a contingency was sharply reduced by the presence, on the far side of the buffer, of a single, stable Arab state at peace with Israel. None of these conditions holds for the West Bank, and we must ask what additional arrangements could be made to improve Israel's security in the event of its withdrawal from the West Bank.

Here we must look again at Jordan. Since 1970 there have been no foreign forces on Jordanian soil, and it has become almost axiomatic for Israeli security officials to talk about 'red lines' along Jordan's borders with Iraq and even Syria--lines which, if crossed by foreign forces entering Jordan, would constitute a casus belli for Israel. Nor has Jordan gone to war against Israel during this period, including the October 1973 Yom

Kippur War. At one juncture, in September 1970, Israel actually tacitly threatened, in coordination with the United States, to violate Jordanian territory in order to repulse invading Syrian forces, unless they withdrew. Thus, over the years, Jordan, whose own small (four division) army could never threaten Israel alone, has developed a kind of buffer status.

This development has been radically amplified by the behavior of Iraq and Jordan, and the resulting interaction between Israel and Jordan, since late 1989. These events appear to have constituted an extreme test of Jordan's capacity to collaborate with Israel in a security regime. Hence the logic of recounting them here.

Hashemite Jordan as Israel's Strategic Depth

By late 1989 it was apparent in both Jerusalem and Amman that Saddam Hussein's regime had recovered from its war with Iran (which ended in summer 1988), and that Saddam was seeking to project a new strategic role for his country as far afield as Lebanon and Israel. Of particular concern was Saddam's new championing of the Palestinian cause, which included the relocation to Baghdad of many Palestinian organizations and their headquarters, reconnaissance missions carried out along the Jordan River by Iraqi aircraft and officers, and additional instances of nascent military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq. By early 1990 Saddam was threatening to "burn half of

Israel," and new revelations regarding his nonconventional weaponry and missile development plans surfaced almost daily.

It was at this point that the attitude toward Jordan of Prime Minister Shamir and other leading Likud ministers in Israel's government underwent radical change. From a policy embodied in the slogan "Jordan is Palestine"--that called for the Palestinization of the ruling regime in Amman as a means of establishing a Palestinian state with which Israel could negotiate minimalistic autonomy arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza--Israel's political leadership now adopted an overtly pro-Hashemite policy. One key catalyst appears to have been the fear lest a Palestinian regime in Amman, or a disaffected Hashemite regime, make common cause with Saddam Hussein against Israel, and allow the Iraqi Army to deploy along the Jordan River. In contrast King Hussein, if reassured of Israel's intentions, could, it was believed, be relied upon to resist such an adventure.

An additional consideration may have been the accumulated effect of the intifada on assessments regarding the viability of a purely Palestinian autonomy arrangement. Then too the King's own decision, in July 1988, to renounce any sovereign claim to the West Bank, rendered him an ideal partner with whom the Likud (whose platform rejects the introduction of any foreign sovereignty into the Territories) could negotiate autonomy issues. In the event, in the spring of 1990, as Baghdad's threats increased, Defense Minister Arens initiated a series of

Israeli warnings that the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan constituted a casus belli. The King, by now less fearful of Likud intentions toward his regime, and evidently recognizing the dangers of going too far with Saddam, responded with his own warnings to all foreign forces to keep out of Jordan.

As the drama of the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and war unfolded, and the danger increased of an Iraqi attack on Israel, it became increasingly clear that Jordan's buffer status constituted for Israel the difference between a possible major land war with Iraq, and the relatively minor Iraqi missile attacks that it suffered. Israeli messages of support for the sanctity of Jordanian territory helped King Hussein weather the storm. As the war ended and the United States set about organizing a new Arab-Israel peace process, Israel's Likud government insisted on intensive Jordanian involvement in the form of a combined Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and a Jordanian presence in negotiations for an interim settlement in the West Bank and Gaza.[7]

Yet the Likud leadership has elected to ignore the implications of Jordan's wartime role for Israel's long-term security. If the Hashemite Kingdom could keep the Iraqi Army at arm's length from Israel, and weather the surrounding political storm, it had in effect demonstrated that it is the East Bank, and not the minuscule West Bank, that constitutes Israel's real strategic depth to the east. Israel indeed cannot afford to rely solely on the West Bank for early warning and war preparations,

even now, when it occupies that small territory. But if Jordan can be persuaded to render de jure, in treaty form, its long-term de facto recognition that the entry of foreign forces into its territory constitutes a legitimate casus belli for Israel--then the makings of an effective security regime are in place:

1. Israel and Jordan will guarantee the borders and inviolability of an essentially demilitarized Palestinian political entity in the West Bank and Gaza.

2. Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity will all three undertake not to allow foreign forces onto their territory, with the exception of small Israeli early-warning and alert forces on the West Bank, Israel's and Jordan's right to seek outside aid if attacked, and Israel's right to intervene in the Territories if the interim process goes awry. All three will be linked by a non-aggression pact. Arms control CBMs, such as prenotification of maneuvers, will be instituted among them.

3. Any other entry of foreign forces onto the soil of one of the three signatories will be a casus belli. In Israel's case, if foreign forces enter Jordan without coordination with Israel and the Palestinians, Israel will be entitled to reoccupy the West Bank and even occupy parts of the East Bank if necessary, to defend itself. These provisions will be guaranteed by the international community, including neighboring Arab states.

4. Finally, Jordan will agree to deploy the bulk of its own army at a distance to the east of the Jordan River (corresponding to Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank). This, to reduce the danger of a surprise attack by Jordan alone into the West Bank--one that, presumably, would be coordinated with a surprise attack by Syria on the Golan, and followed immediately by the entry of Iraqi forces into the battle, via Jordanian and/or Syrian territory.

5. All these provisions will be of indefinite duration, and can be changed only by consensus among the three parties.

The formalization of Jordan's role as strategic depth for Israel appears, then, to satisfy Israel's legitimate fear that its withdrawal from the West Bank might be exploited by a military buildup on the East Bank that would place Israel at a strategic disadvantage. Moreover it appears to be acceptable to the Hashemite Kingdom. There are, however, at least four disadvantages that must be taken into account.

First, many Israelis will tend to doubt the reliability of the international guarantee for Israel's right to reoccupy the West Bank if the Palestinians begin to build up a military capacity, and/or if foreign forces enter Jordan for aggressive purposes, or Jordan attacks. To them it should be pointed out that Israel has accepted similar guarantees with regard to Sinai. But, it is argued, the West Bank is much closer to the Israeli heartland than Sinai, and its population could become very hostile under circumstances of war. In order to relieve these

anxieties, at least in the initial stages of implementation, the mechanism for deciding upon Israeli intervention (assessing the intent and extent of foreign penetration into Jordan, etc.) must be exclusively Israeli, with American guarantees to back Israel's judgement. Moreover, to Israeli doubters it must be pointed out that, precisely because this is a truly existential issue, no Israeli government will countenance outside interference with its decision.

Secondly, the security regime must be binding in the event of a change in the Jordanian regime. The refusal of a new regime in Amman to ratify the treaty immediately could also be just cause for Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank.

Third, there is good reason to suspect that the implementation of such a regime would be viewed negatively by the Asad regime in Damascus. Even if Syria had given its blessing to earlier stages of the process, such as Palestinian autonomy, it is liable to view the permanent constraints placed upon Jordan and the Palestinians by virtue of the security regime as an attempt to impose Israeli hegemony, and as an infringement upon territories that it seeks to bring under its own hegemony within the framework of its Greater Syria concept.[8] This potential complicating factor must be accounted for and, ideally, resolved with Syria within the context of its own peace arrangements with Israel.

Finally, assuming that this formula does in fact lay the foundations for the withdrawal of most Israeli forces from the

West Bank, it must be recognized that Israel will continue to rely on these forces for its security, and that their redeployment inside Israel will be an extremely complex and expensive operation. This of course is not the problem of the Palestinians and Jordan. But unless billions of dollars in funds are made available, Israel will be unable to carry out a withdrawal without damage to its security.

Such a security regime is envisioned as permanent--part of an overall structure of economic and perhaps political cooperation between the three parties. Clearly, the more successful it proves to be over time in reducing Israel's threat assessment looking to the east, and to the extent that it is complemented by additional peace and arms control arrangements between Israel and Arab countries like Syria and Iraq, the less Israel will have to rely on additional security measures. In the short and medium term (at least 10-15 years), however, these "traditional" provisions will remain necessary:

- demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza, except for a Palestinian gendarmerie force for internal-tactical security and for ceremonial functions;
- Israel Air Force overflights, giving Israel virtual control of the air above the Territories;
- Israeli early warning stations in the West Bank, and small alert/delaying forces capable of blocking the Jordan River crossings and/or impeding an advance toward the mountain ridge;

- a total absence of fortifications in the West Bank and Gaza that might impede an Israeli reoccupation;
- an international element, with a strong American component, to patrol both banks of the Jordan and the sea off Gaza, as well as the Territories themselves, in order to ensure compliance with the demilitarization measures; and
- staged implementation of collaborative tactical (anti-terrorist, anti-subversion) security measures, as detailed below.

Finally, the security vulnerabilities of Israeli geography make some territorial adjustments desirable. Because there are additional compelling (non-security) justifications for such border rectifications, they are taken up in the final section of this paper.

Tactical Security

This is the third security dimension from the Israeli standpoint. Here we are dealing primarily with the issue of controlling terrorism during the transition to a political entity ruled by Palestinians. To place this issue in perspective, we need only contemplate the effect of a single terrorist atrocity--say, the firebombing and murder of a busload of Israeli children in the West Bank--carried out at a crucial juncture in time. Such an act alone could derail a negotiation process. Were it to set in motion a chain of vigilante retaliation and counter-

terrorism, the results could be catastrophic for the peace process.

As long as tactical security affairs remain exclusively under Israeli authority, Israel is presumably charged with doing everything possible to prevent terrorism, Arab or Jewish. If it fails, it cannot blame the Palestinian political leadership for a security slip. Yet clearly, no political process that envisages the evolution of a Palestinian entity can succeed, unless responsibility for internal security within that entity is transferred at least in large part to the Palestinians. As we have seen, the Camp David agreements prescribe precisely such a process.

Because this is such a volatile issue; because it is within the power of mere individuals or small groups to carry out terrorist acts that have a devastating effect on the public support needed by an Israeli government or a Palestinian governing authority to proceed with a peace process; and because solutions will inevitably require close Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on sensitive matters--the tactical security issue is seen by most researchers and commentators as the most difficult of all aspects of a security regime. Yet few have dealt with it in depth.[9] Moreover we have already noted the understandable inclination of Israeli security officials to avoid planning for such security contingencies until and unless appropriate political directives are given, as well as the lack of familiarity with the issues among Palestinians. Little wonder

this category was left for last (and never dealt with) in the Camp David autonomy talks. . .

The importance of the tactical security issue lies not only in preventing efforts to torpedo the peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian anti-terrorist collaboration that will inevitably be entailed is a valid test of the good intentions, and ability to "deliver," of both sides, and can serve as a standard for deciding upon further concessions. Palestinian success in preventing terrorism is almost certainly the best confidence-builder possible for the Israeli man-on-the-street, who suspects that any concession will lead to more violence. Finally, cooperation against terrorism is mandated under any form of political process: autonomy, independence, confederation, or condominium.

What are the preconditions for the implementation of a successful tactical security regime? First and foremost, the desire and determination of both sides, Israel and Palestinians, as well as the neighboring countries, Egypt and Jordan, to make the interim settlement work, by preventing all forms of terrorism and subversion. Secondly, readiness on the part of the Palestinian administration to be seen to be cooperating ("collaborating") with Israel--although both sides would have an interest in maintaining a low profile of coordination. Third, Israeli settlements throughout the Territories must not have reached such a 'critical mass,' in terms of numbers and dispersion, that this precludes any rational effort to effect a

political settlement. Finally, the government of Israel must be prepared, and able, to restrain extremist elements among the settlers.

What, then, are the essential characteristics of any successful transition stage security regime? First, a phased transition from stage to stage, as progress is registered, within the framework of a comprehensive plan that predicates the gradual transfer of authority over intelligence and anti-terrorist activity, jails, courts and border crossings. This means, secondly, a critical apprenticeship stage for the nascent Palestinian police/gendarmerie intelligence and anti-terrorist units. Third, in addition to Israeli involvement in training and liaison, a role for interested third parties, such as Jordan, Egypt and the international community. Fourth, a key border control role for Jordan and Egypt. Finally, a readiness by all parties, incorporated in treaty provisions, to grant Israel discretion, in specific instances, to continue its own intelligence collection activities vis-a-vis the Territories, to intervene directly in thwarting or apprehending perpetrators of terrorism, and to delay key transition phases if it can show that no progress has been made by the Palestinian side toward reducing terrorism.

A Transition-Stage Tactical Security Regime

There are two approaches to describing the process of establishing the tactical security regime required during the transition stage: functional, and chronological. In an effort to provide as comprehensive a description as possible, we shall adopt the functional approach, integrate into it aspects of sequentiality, and then address the question of overall time span.

- Borders. Initially, the Israel Defense Forces will continue to control border crossing points between the West Bank and Jordan, and the Gaza Strip and Egypt--of course, in coordination with Jordanian and Egyptian authorities on the other side. Gradually Israel will integrate Palestinian authorities into a three-sided relationship. Eventually the IDF role will be phased out. A similar sequence will take place with regard to patrolling the West Bank-Jordan and Gaza-Egypt land and sea borders, to prevent and intercept terrorist incursions. As for the borders between the Territories and Israel, they must remain open, as it is only through the daily movement back and forth of large numbers of Palestinian workers that, in the long term, Israeli intelligence can remain in close contact with the current of events and attitudes among the Palestinians. Over time, Palestinian economic development efforts will hopefully succeed to such an extent that the flow of laborers decreases radically; this development should of course be encouraged from a security

standpoint, too, as prosperity is the best safeguard against large-scale disaffection.

- The Palestinian police force will include elements that deal with criminal activity, and others that deal with terrorism. Only the latter interest us here. Intelligence and anti-terrorist units must first be recruited and trained. If pro-peace Tunis-based elements that have gained expertise can be integrated, this would be helpful, but not mandatory, given Israeli sensitivities. An international or American-led 'roof' mechanism would enable Palestinians to deny large-scale overt collaboration with Israel, but, in fact, it is Israel that should form and train the initial Palestinian cadres, as the two forces will inevitably have to work together, and Israel will at certain stages have to transfer key data to the Palestinians. After a formative stage, the Palestinian force would commence independent work, initially within a limited scope and perhaps in a limited geographical zone. Gradually, as it proved successful (and only if it proved successful), additional authority would be transferred to it. Liaison with Israel might take place under the international or American umbrella--but it would be direct liaison.

- Jails and courts. During the initial stage, Israel would continue to apprehend, judge and jail terrorist offenders; no large scale release of detainees would take place. This would be followed by the negotiated (between Israel and the Palestinian authorities) release of detainees judged to be affiliated with

Palestinian political currents that support the peace process (e.g., not Hamas Islamic fundamentalists), and the phased transfer of judicial authority over terrorist offenders, beginning, again, with relatively minor offenses and/or a limited geographic zone. Ultimately all jails and detainees would be turned over to the Palestinian authority. As for Jewish terrorist offenders, they would remain under Israeli legal jurisdiction until a late phase of the process.

- The Israeli settlers would, even after the initial phase (as Israeli intelligence and enforcement elements gradually withdrew), be allowed to bear light arms for self-protection, in their settlements and while traveling. If they engaged in terrorist activity they could be apprehended by Palestinian or Israeli forces, but would, at least until a later stage, be tried, as noted above, by Israeli courts, and jailed in Israel. (For additional discussion of the settlements and security, see below.)

- Independent Palestinian and Israeli activity. Clearly, the object of the process is to move from the current situation, in which all security activity is carried out independently by Israel, to one in which the Palestinians replace Israel in every way possible. During the transition period, the key standard of progress would be the degree to which Palestinian security forces demonstrate their authority over their people--for example, by resisting political and physical pressures to insist on the early release by Israel of terrorist offenders who continue to oppose

the peace process. (Meanwhile, Israeli security authorities might have to "refuse" to coordinate such issues with the Palestinians, in order to enable them to withstand such pressures.) Israel would also be able to exercise, selectively, the right of pursuit of offenders into Palestinian territory, the right of independent collection of tactical early-warning intelligence, and discretion in deciding when to pass on that intelligence to the Palestinians via the liaison apparatus. And, of course, any attempt by Palestinian extremists to grasp power, declare total and immediate sovereignty over security affairs, or otherwise "create facts" in violation of the interim agreement, would be met by restoration of Israeli authority, with the backing of all third parties.

- Peripheral security issues. A mechanism for the phased transfer of authority would have to be established with regard to security aspects of diverse licensing arrangements within the autonomous entity, such as foreign enterprises and factories. For example, would Libyan "technical advisors" be permitted? Who would control the production capacity of a chemical plant capable of making ammunition?
- Additional Egyptian and Jordanian roles might be possible and desirable in training the Palestinian forces and establishing their security courts--but only in coordination with Israel.

The question of the length of each phase is a complex one. The Palestinians would presumably seek a rapid telescoping of phases that have fixed time limits, although thoughtful

Palestinian leaders do recognize that too rapid a transition is liable to confront them with insurmountable security problems that are liable to unravel the entire process. Israeli security authorities would, understandably, reject the Palestinian demand for a fixed timetable, and demand that proof of performance (with Israel the judge) be the criterion as to whether Palestinian security authorities are sufficiently in control so as to move on to the next phase. Perhaps a mixed mechanism can be developed. Selective geographic execution of new phases, say, beginning in areas far from the Green Line, might provide another answer. A five to seven year target date for completing most of the process seems realistic. Meanwhile it should be borne in mind that other phases of security--strategic military security--would presumably extend over a longer time span.

To conclude this section, we cannot overemphasize the need for patience and civil courage by the populations and authorities on both sides, and for strong leadership, if a successful transfer of tactical security authority is to take place. Atrocities on both sides are virtually inevitable. Only strong leaders enjoying broad popular support will be able to maintain the process under these circumstances.

Friction with the third party or parties comprising the umbrella mechanism is also inevitable. Here Israel will wish to consider whether it prefers an American umbrella--which appears to assure efficiency and close liaison, but also to presage potential damage to the Israeli-American relationship due to

inevitable misunderstandings and contradictory priorities--or a more international composition.

We have, then, outlined the main aspects of a security regime to accompany a Palestinian settlement. It remains to note a selection of key security aspects of additional components of such a settlement. Because these categories primarily involve overriding political and economic, rather than security, considerations, they are mentioned here only briefly.

Additional Security Aspects

Settlements and territorial adjustments

The future of Israeli settlements on territory destined to constitute the Palestinian entity is essentially a political, rather than a security question. We have already noted, however, that beyond a certain critical mass it becomes impossible to put into place an effective mechanism for transferring security authority to Palestinians, and that Israeli authorities have already begun to backtrack on the Camp David provision regarding withdrawal of Israeli forces, citing the settlement spread as justification.

One way to lessen the negative impact of the settlements might be for a successful phased peace process to take place over time; this would give the settlers time to adjust to a new situation, and to the decisions they must make regarding their

future. Of course a long process also affords time for settlers to organize to disrupt it.

A second means could be territorial adjustment. We have already cited the security need for border rectifications. Such alterations would have the objective of expanding Israel's narrow waist in the Hadera-Netanya region, widening the Jerusalem corridor, and improving Jerusalem's defenses on the east (the Ma'aleh Adummim area). Not accidentally, the areas to be attached to Israel through such rectifications also hold the majority of the settler population (Labor governments originally advocated settling them primarily for security reasons). Their Arab population is not large, and in some cases is already a minority alongside Israeli settlers. This, then, would alleviate a considerable portion of the problem.

Notably, too, the part of Samaria adjoining Israel's narrow waist also sits astride Israel's primary source of ground water, the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer. Israel might be justified under accepted international practice in insisting on securing permanent access to this and additional water sources whose exploitation it nearly monopolized even between 1948 and 1967, although it nevertheless would be obliged to share those resources equitably with West Bank Palestinians. Possible ways of compensating the Palestinians without generating new security problems for Israel include ceding to the Palestinian entity Arab-populated lands in Israel that border on the entity (Wadi 'Ara, the Triangle), creating an extraterritorial Gaza-Judea land

corridor, and the provision of extraterritorial facilities at Israel's international airport and ports.

While the Camp David Framework structure implies that any such territorial adjustments would be made, if at all, only after an initial three to five year period of autonomy, it must be noted that an early repartition/territorial adjustment would have the decided benefit, in terms of the welfare of the process, of removing uncertainty among the Israeli settlers as to their final status. This would assure the cooperation of the majority, as they live on land that would be attached to Israel.

As for settlers who remain on land destined for the Palestinian entity after border adjustments, the transition period would see many leaving of their own volition. A package of positive economic incentives to leave (the reverse of the current situation) might encourage others to depart. A few might opt to live peaceably under ultimate Palestinian authority. But as many as 10,000 might forcibly resist the entire peace process. Their challenge would constitute a major test of Israeli intentions and capabilities.

Jerusalem

The eventual status of Jerusalem within the framework of a peace settlement with the Palestinians is also primarily a political problem. Some of the security arrangements outlined above might be applicable; others would have to be tailored to

the unique status of Jerusalem, once the outlines of a political solution for its status are known.

Open borders

We have already noted the security advantages of free passage of Palestinians between the Palestinian entity and Israel. In essence, fences alone cannot defend Israelis against Palestinian hostility if it exists, and the very concept of restoring the Green Line or any other security border is anathema to most Israelis. Moreover, Israelis should be able to cross into the Palestinian entity, to maintain access to historic sites, to tour, and to trade; these, too, are ultimately security confidence-builders. Then too, beyond the obvious capacity it gives Israel to gather intelligence, an open border will encourage economic prosperity and an atmosphere of normalization among Palestinians--both of which ultimately build the best security.

The right of return and refugee rehabilitation

In order to instill confidence among Israelis that, over the long term, the Palestinian national movement has abandoned any further quest to return to, and Palestinize, the State of Israel (as Israel's permanent borders are constituted and recognized in accordance with a peace settlement), Israel must insist that the peace process encompass a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation of all the Palestinian refugees from 1948 and

1967. Rehabilitation could include resettlement in place, or anywhere else beyond the bounds of Israel. Financing can and should be provided by the Arab states, against the compensation they owe Jewish refugees that Israel has absorbed. Any Israeli approach to peace (such as the government's peace plan of May 1989) that calls for rehabilitation only among Palestinian refugees living inside the Land of Israel (Western Palestine), is liable to perpetuate the refugee problem in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere as a potential source of destabilization.

Israeli Arabs

A successful peace process with the Palestinians must be followed by a concerted Israeli effort to afford its Arab citizens truly equal rights and obligations. Otherwise, political groups that advocate autonomy for Israeli Arabs--currently in a minority--may achieve greater influence, and interact with Palestinian extremists, to the detriment of the overall process.

Arms control and deterrence

Beyond the narrow confines of security in the West Bank and Gaza, and even beyond the broader bounds of an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian security regime, Palestinians in particular have an interest in seeing Israel feel secure against long-term Arab and even Muslim (e.g., Iran) existential security threats. As the Middle East hovers at the brink of the nuclear age, these

considerations are particularly salient. It is not unusual of late for Palestinian scholars and politicians to tell their Israeli counterparts, "As far as we're concerned, you can have nuclear weapons if it makes you feel secure enough to give up territory." This appears to reflect a positive understanding of Israel's threat perception--indeed, of the threat itself.

An in-depth analysis of the Middle East arms race, nonconventional issues, the arms control process, and problems of Israeli deterrence is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we note that, for Israelis to feel at ease with the notion of territorial concessions in the West Bank and Gaza, they must sense that Israel continues to retain a qualitative advantage over its adversaries--one that will enable it to deter conventional as well as nonconventional attack, and to win a war if necessary.

Conclusion

We have outlined a security regime for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement that appears to offer the possibility of enhancing all sides' security in comparison with the status quo ante:

- Israel would have improved, treaty-bound strategic depth and early-warning capacity toward the east and, consequently, an enhanced capability to defend itself against enemies from the east;

- terrorism emanating from the West Bank and Gaza would, over a period of time, be reduced;
- Palestinians would have enhanced personal security and, for the first time, national security in a national home;
- Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians would reinforce one another's security, with broad international backing; and
- the overall likelihood of further Arab-Israeli or Muslim-Israeli wars would be reduced.

Such a security regime suggests a better understanding of the link between territory and security. By compromising on territory in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel will not necessarily damage its security. On the contrary, by denoting Jordan as its true strategic depth and locating its vital tripwire arrangements 500 kms. from its borders, Israel can withdraw from territory, yet enhance its security.

Notes

[1] For additional discussion of security arrangements related to a Palestinian settlement, see for example Ze'ev Schiff, Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians, Policy Paper no. 15, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989; Aryeh Shalev, The Autonomy--Problems and Possible Solutions (Tel Aviv University, CSS Paper no. 8, January 1980); Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defense (New York: Praeger, 1984); Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets No Drums (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991); Joseph Alpher, coordinator and coeditor, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace and Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Study Group Reports, 1989; Valerie Yorke, "Imagining a Palestinian State: an International Security Plan," International Affairs 66, 1 (1990), pp. 115-136; Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1990); Middle East Security: Two Views, Ahmad S. Khalidi and Yair Evron, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper no. 3, May 1990. For two of the earliest treatments of the issues, see Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," Foreign Affairs Vol. 56, no. 4, July 1978, and Abraham Becker and Steven Rosen, Preliminary Research on Alternative Security Arrangements for West Bank Autonomy (Los Angeles: The Rand Corporation, July 1979).

[2] Schiff, p. 69.

[3] Shalev, The Autonomy, Appendix B, p. 198.

[4] See for example Ha'aretz January 15, 1992, p.1, statement by Israel Foreign Ministry Director General Yosef Hadas. Prime Minister Shamir, in a February 7, 1992 press conference, noted that Israel did not feel "tied to every clause" of the Camp David autonomy agreements. Le Monde, Feb. 9-10, 1992. Israel's "Informal Draft Agenda for the Negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation" makes no mention of security issues. Near East Report, Feb. 3, 1992.

[5] The Israeli proposal is entitled "Ideas for Peaceful coexistence in the territories during the interim period," dated February 20, 1992. It was delivered to the Palestinian delegation head, Dr. H. Abdul Shafi, by Israeli delegation head E. Rubinstein, with a cover letter dated Feb. 21. The document is not on official Israeli delegation paper, and is not signed, and one may infer that its informal nature renders it relatively negotiable.

[6] Indeed, the Palestinian opening proposal in negotiations, an official document entitled "Outline of model of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority," which was presented in mid-January 1992, calls for Israeli security withdrawal and transfer of internal security authority to the Palestinians, in ways that

go far beyond the Camp David provisions.

[7] For details see Joseph Alpher, "Implications of the War on the Arab-Israel Peace Process," in J. Alpher, ed., War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel, Report of a JCSS Study Group (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1991, Hebrew; English edition forthcoming). The lack of political realism in an Israeli approach that seeks to neutralize Palestinian national aspirations by reliance on Jordan, is not explored here, nor is it relevant to the security role projected here for Jordan.

[8] Conversation with Patrick Seale, November 1991.

[9] Schiff is the main exception. Of recent note also is Abu Iyad's reference in his interview in Foreign Policy no. 78, Spring 1990, p. 109. Curiously, Israeli-Palestinian anti-terrorist collaboration ("A Palestinian and an Israeli agent hunt for the devil called Abu Nidal") has already become the subject of a thriller. Howard Kaplan, Bullets of Palestine (Toronto: Gold Eagle Book, 1987).

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REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, CBM AND PEACEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS

[Theme Two Session VI]

by Nabil Fahmy

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ON

THE PERSIAN GULF,

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT,

AND

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

"REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATION, CBM AND PEACE KEEPING REQUIREMENTS"

NABIL FAHMY,
POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE
FOREIGN MINISTER,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 ON NOVEMBER 22,1967 IS IN THE MIDST OF A PEACE PROCESS WHICH INVOLVES ALL THE REGIONAL PARTIES. THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS NOW MAY EVEN BE GREATER THAN THOSE THAT PREVAILED AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE THE ONGOING PROCESS HAS SEVERAL ADDED ADVANTAGES;

FIRST OF ALL;-

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, WHETHER POLITICAL OR MORAL IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT. OCCUPATION, AGGRESSION OR UNILATERAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION BY FORCE ARE NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE PRACTICES NOR CONDONABLE, EVEN ON A TEMPORARY BASIS. HUMAN RIGHTS, WHETHER THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, OR THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION ARE AT THE FOREFRONT OF ALL OUR CONCERNS.

SECONDLY :

THE PALESTINIANS AS A NATION ARE EXPLICITLY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS, CONSEQUENTLY THE CORE OF THE ISSUE IS BEING ADDRESSED NOT ONLY THE IMMINENT CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT.

THIRDLY :

ALL THE INTERESTED EXTRAREGIONAL PARTIES ARE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS IN A COOPERATIVE MANNER, NOT LEAST OF ALL THE

COSPONSORS OF THE MADRID CONFERENCE. WHILE THEIR OBJECTIVES MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL, TO SAY THE LEAST THEY PRESUME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SITUATION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FOURTHLY :

TO CULMINATE THEIR ENDEAVORS, THE PARTICIPANTS, REGIONAL OR OTHERWISE, ARE ATTEMPTING TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS AND MODALITIES FOR MULTILATERAL, INTRASTATE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A UNIQUE OBJECTIVE WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN ATTEMPTED BEFORE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONGOING CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEGOTIATIONS.

REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATION :

THIS MULTILATERAL STAGE, IS THE PART OF THE PROCESS THAT SUBSTANTIVELY COMMENCED IN MAY OF THIS YEAR AND WITHIN WHICH AREGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION WORKING GROUP IS BEING CONVENED. THE BASIC PARAMETERS FOR THE WORKING GROUP, WHICH EMANATE FROM THE LETTER OF INVITATION ISSUED ON OCTOBER 18th, 1991 BY THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS COSPONSORS OF THE PEACE TALKS, AS WELL AS THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS IN MOSCOW DURING THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1991, CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:-

1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROCESS IS TO ACHIEVE A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT, I.E. REAL PEACE BETWEEN ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

2. THE PROCESS SHALL BE PURSUED ON TWO TRACKS, AND BE BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. I MUST EMPHASIZE IN THIS REGARD, THAT RESOLUTION 242 IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LAND FOR PEACE, AND THAT THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE SHOULD ALWAYS BE AT THE FOREFRONT OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS.

3. THE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION WORKING GROUP, MEETING IN WASHINGTON WOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP IN " A DETERMINED, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS WHICH SETS AMBITIOUS GOALS AND PROCEEDS TOWARDS THEM IN A REALISTIC WAY."

THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE UNDERLINING THE PROCESS, AND A CONDITION FOR ITS SUCCESS IS THAT THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED TO A GENUINE REAL PEACE WHERE ALL THE REGIONAL PARTIES, ARABS - INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS - AND ISRAELIS, WILL LIVE IN HARMONY. FOR THIS TO EVOLVE THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST SUCCEED, BOTH IN ITS BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASPECTS.

REALISM AND A DESIRE TO SAFEGUARD AGAINST UNDUE FRUSTRATION, SHOULD COMPEL ALL THOSE CONCERNED TO RECOGNIZE THAT WHILE THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS MAY COMMENCE, AND ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS, IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO FLOURISH TO ITS FULL POTENTIAL IF THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN STAGNANT OR LACKING IN DIRECTION. PROGRESS IN THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE

MULTILATERAL PROCESS TO SUCCEED. YET IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE ARMS LIMITATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY DELIBERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP CAN EFFECTIVELY INFLUENCE THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL, EVEN IF IT IS DIFFICULT TO EXPECT REACHING OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE BEFORE PEACE IS AT HAND. A LARGE DEGREE OF COMMONALITY OF VIEWS AMONGST THE STATES OF THE REGION ON REGIONAL SECURITY PARAMETERS AND ARMS LIMITATION MEASURES, WHICH WOULD SAFEGUARD THE REGION AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD, I BELIEVE, PROVIDE A BETTER POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

WITH THIS IN MIND, WE MUST PURSUE THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS, ESPECIALLY THE ARMS LIMITATION ISSUES AND MOVE FORWARD IN A STEP-BY-STEP MANNER. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE USEFUL THAT THE PARTIES INVOLVED FIRST EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK THEY ARE WORKING WITHIN. WE MUST, AS WE AGREED IN MOSCOW, SET AMBITIOUS GOALS, AND THEN CHART OUR PATH REALISTICALLY AND GRADUALLY. IN OTHER WORDS, WE SHOULD AGREE ON, OR AT THE VERY LEAST UNDERSTAND OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES, AND FROM THAT POINT OF DEPARTURE EMBARK ON CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS THEIR FULFILLMENT. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE THE FOLLOWING APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES COULD FACILITATE WHAT NO DOUBT WILL BE A VERY COMPLEX AND COMPLICATED PROCESS:

(I) ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES.

(II) MAKING POLITICAL COMMITMENTS TOWARDS THEIR CONCLUSION.

(III) DEVELOPING A PROGRAM OF ACTION OF CONCRETE SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION MEASURES.

THE BASIC POSITION OF EGYPT WITH RESPECT TO THE OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES OF THE REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS :

OVERALL OBJECTIVES :

(A) INCREASED SECURITY FOR THE NATIONS OF THE REGION WHILE MAINTAINING LOWER QUANTITIES OF ARMAMENTS, BEARING IN MIND THAT SECURITY CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH PEACEFUL RELATIONS, DIALOGUE AND POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, ESCHEWING THE LOGIC OF FORCE;

(B) A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE BALANCE BETWEEN THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION, BECAUSE A CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE IN A REGION WHICH IS STRIVING FOR A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE;

(C) THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS ON ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT WHICH MAY BE APPLIED TO ALL STATES OF THE REGION

AND BE COMPLEMENTED BY EFFECTIVE MONITORING MEASURES. SECURING EQUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THOSE NATIONS. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE NATIONS OF THE REGION TO COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN ESTABLISHING GLOBAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT;

THE SHORT TERM PRIORITY OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCESS SHOULD BE:-

- RIDDING THE MIDDLE EAST OF ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

- PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY, IN THE ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES AND IN THE MILITARY USES OF OUTER-SPACE.

- ACHIEVING A LARGE DEGREE OF MILITARY TRANSPARENCY IN ALL WEAPONS SYSTEMS PARTICULARLY IN THE PRIORITY AREAS MENTIONED WHICH WOULD FACILITATE SUBSTANTIAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN DIFFERENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

DIFFERENT REGIONAL PARTIES, ARAB-ISRAELI OR OTHERWISE MAY HAVE DIFFERENT SHORT TERM PRIORITIES. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT ISRAEL HAS ITS OWN SET OF SHORT TERM PRIORITIES WHICH ACCORD PARTICULAR PROMINENCE TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. NATURALLY THESE

AS WELL AS OTHERS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN DUE TIME DURING THE PROCESS, HOWEVER THERE ARE CERTAIN TANGIBLE FACTORS THAT MITIGATE IN FAVOUR OF THE PRIORITIES SUGGESTED BY EGYPT AND AGAINST DEALING WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AT AN EARLY STAGE IN THE PROCESS.

IT HAS AND WILL BE ARGUED THAT SINCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AVAILABLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH FIRST. ACTUALLY, IT IS FOR THAT VERY REASON THAT IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT ANY PROGRESS IN THE ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS IF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARE GIVEN PRIORITY, BECAUSE AS LONG AS ARABS AND ISRAELI'S REMAIN EFFECTIVELY ADVERSARIES, AND IN CONFLICT, THEY ARE NOT BOUND TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THEIR ARSENALS.

THE THREATS POSED BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION LOOM OMINOUSLY OVER THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT IS ENOUGH REASON TO MOVE ON THEM WITH DISPATCH. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE WEAPONS REMAIN COMPLEMENTARY OPTIONS IN THE MILITARY STRATEGIES OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, CONSEQUENTLY THEY ARE NOT A NECESSARY ELEMENT IN TERMS OF IMMINENT RISKS TO SECURITY, AND CAN BE FOREGONE IN A NEW POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT WHICH THE AREA SHOULD LIVE IN IF PEACE PREVAILS. IT IS BECAUSE OF THESE REASONS THAT WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND FOR CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS, WHICH WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE A DESIRE TO LIVE IN A NON-ADVERSEVIAL POSTURE AND LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR FURTHER MEASURES IN ALL WEAPONS AREAS.

THE SITUATION WITH REGARDS TO THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND LEAVES MUCH LESS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AND NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE REGIONAL PARTIES AGREE ON THE SUGGESTED OBJECTIVES. ANY EQUIVOCATION OR HESITATION WILL BE CONSIDERED BY ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER THAT THEIR REMAIN DESIRES TO PRESERVE SECURITY THROUGH MILITARY FORCE OR SUPERIORITY, WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE WHOLE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING PEACE AND HARMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND EXTRAREGIONAL EXPERIENCES :

AGREEING UPON REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION MEASURES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE A COMPLICATED AND HIGHLY SENSITIVE PROCESS. THE REGIONAL PARTIES CAN AND SHOULD IN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER REGIONS IN NEGOTIATING ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS. THE CSCE AND LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE ERRONEOUS TO IGNORE THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST BETWEEN THESE SITUATIONS AND THAT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SUSPICIONS AND ANIMOSITY THAT HAVE PREVAILED IN THE REGION OVER THE YEARS SURPASS THOSE THAT EXIST IN OTHER REGIONS. THE ISSUES INVOLVED ARE ONE OF EXISTENCE AND IDENTITY RATHER THAN

IDEOLOGY. FURTHERMORE, THE ARMS LIMITATION AND SECURITY PROCESS IS HERE BEING ATTEMPTED IN PARALLEL WITH ONGOING CONFLICT RESOLUTION NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT ANY GRACE OR COOLING DOWN PERIOD.

THE SINGULAR NATURE OF THE PROCESS WE ARE EMBARKING ON, AND THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE THAT, THE REGIONAL NATIONS MAKE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS THAT CLEARLY REFLECT AN UNWAVERING COMMITMENT TO LIVE AS MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION, AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. THESE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS IN ESSENCE WOULD AIM AT PROVIDING THE REQUISITE CONFIDENCE AMONGST THE REGIONAL PARTIES, AND WOULD ALLOW THIS WORKING GROUP TO MOVE ON AND DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SAID, AND RIGHTLY SO, THAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ARE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE IN FACILITATING AGREEMENTS ON ARMS LIMITATION OR DISARMAMENT MEASURES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ITS LONG-STANDING CONFLICT. IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE DEEP-ROOTED SUSPICIONS AND ANIMOSITIES, AND DEVELOP TRUST AMONGST THE REGIONAL PARTIES A CREATIVE APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IS IMPERATIVE. THE VARIOUS PROGRESS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SHOULD BE OF A DECLARATORY POLITICAL, LEGALLY BINDING DISARMAMENT, AND TECHNICAL CHARACTER. ALL OF THESE MEASURES SHOULD AIM AT ENSURING

EACH AND EVERY REGIONAL PARTY THAT THE OTHERS ARE ABLE AND WILLING TO LIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS EQUALS, ON THE BASIS OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE, THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WE PURSUE SHOULD BE WIDE RANGING ENOUGH IN SCOPE COMMENSURATE WITH THE LONG TERM OBJECTIVES OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES. THEY SHOULD BE AMBITIOUS ENOUGH TO CONVEY THAT THE PARTIES ARE READY TO TAKE FUNDAMENTAL CONCRETE STEPS IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. THEY SHOULD BE OF A LEGALLY BINDING CHARACTER IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY. TECHNICALLY, THEY SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO PROVIDE FOR PHYSICAL ASSURANCE THAT THE POLITICAL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES ADOPTED ARE BEING EFFECTIVELY AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER TO LEAD THE WAY TO MORE SUBSTANTIAL AND MORE INTRUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS DOWN THE ROAD.

THE <u>POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES</u>, WHICH WOULD BE OF A GENERAL DECLARATORY NATURE, SHOULD ENTAIL COMMITMENTS THAT THE STATES OF THE REGION ARE READY TO BE BOUND BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:-

(A) ALL STATES WITHOUT EXCEPTION SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

(B) THAT THE REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION DO NOT EXCLUDE ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM.

OTHER DECLARATORY POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES OF A MORE SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT NATURE, WHICH CAN ALSO BE TAKEN AT THIS EARLY STAGE ARE THE FOLLOWING:-

(C) THE MAJOR ARMS-PRODUCING STATES AND PARTICULARLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL - AS WELL AS ISRAEL, IRAN AND THE ARAB STATES SHOULD DEPOSIT INDIVIDUAL UNDERTAKINGS WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN WHICH THEY CLEARLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY ENDORSE THE DECLARATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS A REGION FREE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO TAKE ANY STEPS OR MEASURES WHICH WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OR IMPEDE THE ATTAINMENT OF THAT OBJECTIVE.

(D) THE ARMS-PRODUCING STATES AND THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL MIDDLE EAST NATIONS WHICH HAVE NOT YET DONE SO ADHERE TO THE TREATY IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS A STEP OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY.

(E) THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION WHICH, HAVE NOT YET DONE SO, SHOULD DECLARE THEIR COMMITMENT:

(i) NOT TO USE NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS;

(ii) NOT TO PRODUCE OR ACQUIRE ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

(iii) NOT TO PRODUCE OR ACQUIRE ANY NUCLEAR MATERIALS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MILITARY USE AND TO DISPOSE OF ANY EXISTING STOCKS OF SUCH MATERIALS;

(iv) TO ACCEPT THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHEREBY ALL THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES BECOME SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.

(F) THOSE NATIONS OF THE REGION WHICH HAVE NOT YET DONE SO SHOULD DECLARE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS WELL AS TO THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS OF 1972, NO LATER THAN THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEING CONDUCTED BY THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA.

(G) THE MIDDLE EAST STATES SHOULD DECLARE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ACTIVELY AND FAIRLY ADDRESS MEASURES RELATING TO ALL FORMS OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

(H) THE NATIONS OF THE REGION SHOULD APPROVE THE ASSIGNMENT TO AN ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION A ROLE IN THE VERIFICATION OF THOSE NATIONS' COMPLIANCE WITH SUCH AGREEMENTS ON ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT AS MAY BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM.

ALL OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SUGGESTIONS ARE OF POLITICAL AND DECLARATORY NATURE, AND ARE ESSENTIAL IN PROVIDING A WIDE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRUE INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF EACH OF THE REGIONAL AS WELL AS EXTRAREGIONAL PARTIES. ALONE HOWEVER THEY SHALL NOT SUFFICE, AND <u>CONCRETE LEGALLY BINDING DISARMAMENT COMMITMENTS</u> ARE NECESSARY FOR PROVIDING THE QUINTESSENTIAL THRESHOLD UPON WHICH TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ACTION, FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS. SUCH LEGALLY BINDING DISARMAMENT COMMITMENTS SHOULD INCLUDE:-

A. STATES IN THE REGION, THAT HAVE NOT DONE SO, SHOULD IMMEDIATELY UNILATERALLY SUBMIT ALL THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, AND CONCLUDE A FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE AGENCY.

B. STATES OF THE REGION THAT HAVE NOT YET JOINED THE NPT SHOULD URGENTLY BECOME A PARTY AND CONCLUDE THE RELEVANT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

C. EXPORTING STATES BEYOND THE REGION SHOULD MAKE FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS A CONDITION FOR THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS,

IN THIS REGARD SAFEGUARDS COMMITTMENT SHOULD BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THESE MEASURES, TECHNICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SHOULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED. ALL THE CONCERNED PARTIES NEED TO BE ASSURED IN TANGIBLE TERMS THAT COMMITMENTS ARE BEING MET AND THAT THEIR SECURITY IS NOT BEING IMPAIRED EVEN IF THESE COMMITMENTS ARE OF A LIMITED NATURE. EXAMPLES OF SUCH MEASURES ARE:-

I. **REGIONAL DATA RELATED MEASURES** :

A. STATES IN THE REGION SHOULD PROVIDE THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IAEA WITH FULL INFORMATION AND DATA ON THEIR SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

B. STATES BEYOND THE REGION SHOULD PROVIDE THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE IAEA WITH A LIST OF SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR COMPONENTS EXPORTED TO PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION.

C. STATES WITHIN THE REGION SHOULD ENTER INTO CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, ITS ASSOCIATED AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES TO DEVELOP MODALITIES FOR CONFIRMING THAT ARMS LIMITATION DATA PROVIDED IS ACCURATE AND COMMITMENTS MADE BY THEM ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED. A ROLE FOR THE COSPONSORS OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL EXTRAREGIONAL STATES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING GROUP COULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED, ESPECIALLY IN THE INTERIM PERIOD.

II. BILATERAL OPERATIONAL PEACE KEEPING MEASURES :

THE OBJECTIVE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THROUGH OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS RELATING IN PARTICULAR TO FORCE AND WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT, AND THESE COULD INCLUDE:

A. DEMILITARIZED AND BUFFER ZONES.

B. EARLY WARNING STATIONS.

C. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.

D. LIAISON COMMITTEES.

ALL OF THESE MEASURES HAVE BEEN ALREADY APPLIED, IN DIFFERENT DEGREES AND FORMATS, ON SEVERAL OF THE COMMON ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTIERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS OR PEACE TREATIES.

THE MOST EXTENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH OPERATIONAL MEASURES, HAS BEEN ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI FRONT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE OPERATIONAL MEASURES AGREED UPON BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL COME AND THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON THERE COULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS ON OTHER FRONTS, ALTHOUGH THE TOPOGRAPHICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WILL NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO STATES HAVE CONCLUDED A PEACE TREATY WHICH ALLOWED FOR ENLARGEMENT OF THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF

THESE MEASURES, AS WELL AS THE DEGREE OF CONTACT AND COOPERATION AMONGST THE TWO PARTIES.

A QUICK REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THESE MEASURES - ONE WHICH I WILL NOT GET INTO HERE - WILL ALLOW US TO DRAW SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE PERTINENT IN DEVELOPING SIMILAR MEASURES FOR THE OTHER BORDER AREAS, AND THESE ARE:

A. THE OPERATIONAL MEASURES WERE CONTINGENT ON THE POLITICAL WILL AND CONSENT OF THE DIRECTLY CONCERNED PARTIES.

B. THE MEASURES WERE DEVELOPED THROUGH A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.

C. THE MEASURES REFLECTED, AND WERE GOVERNED BY THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY SITUATION THAT PREVAILED ON EACH OF THE FRONTIERS.

D. A THIRD PARTY WAS ALWAYS NECESSARY IN DEVELOPING THESE MEASURES AND IN THEIR APPLICATION.

E. DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONAL PARTIES WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED TOWARDS THE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM.

WHILE THESE CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED INDIVIDUALLY THEY ARE ACTUALLY INTEGRALLY RELATED. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE ANY MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING WITHOUT THE REQUISITE POLITICAL WILL. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPECT WIDE RANGING AND EXTENSIVE EARLY WARNING OR COOPERATIVE MEASURES IN THE ABSENCE OF REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS THAT PEACE TREATIES SHALL BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED.

AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ARE OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE, AND, THE APPROACH TO THESE MEASURES SHALL HAVE TO BE NOVEL AND CREATIVE. AT THE SAME TIME I CANNOT OVER EMPHASIZE THAT THE SUSPICIONS PREVAILING IN THE REGION ARE SO GREAT AND THE INHERENT TENSION SO ACUTE THAT FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGES SHALL HAVE TO BE MADE BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES FOR THE ARMS LIMITATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY MEASURES TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. THE CARDINAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE OF A POLITICAL RATHER THAN TECHNICAL NATURE, AND THEIR RESOLUTION REQUIRES NEW POLITICAL POSITIONS BY ALL. WHILE IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGE SHOULD TAKE TIME. THESE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE PARTIES FROM THE VERY OUTSET OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE INDICATIVE OF AN EVOLUTION IN THEIR THINKING AND POSTURE. ONLY THIS, WILL ALLOW US TO LAY DOWN A SOLID BASIS OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES UPON WHICH TO DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF ACTION TOWARDS EFFECTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL REGIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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REGIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT

[Theme Two: Session VII]

by Yezid Sayigh and Efraim Karsh

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REGIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE*

Ephraim Karsh and Yezid Sayigh

However tempting it may be to attribute the endemic malaise of the modern Middle East to one sweeping cause, be it the legacy of Western colonialism or the Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the sources of insecurity in the region are both varied and complex. Its manifold problems range from ethnic and national feuds, through religious fundamentalism, to political or territorial disputes; from social and economic divides, through the lack of free political participation, to the questionable legitimacy of many governments and, indeed, of the very system of nation-states in the region itself.

Examples of the consequences of this unhappy state of affairs abound. Besides the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the region has been riven by the Iran-Iraq rivalry and war, inter-state war and secessionism in the Horn of Africa, Algerian-Moroccan rivalry and the struggle over the Western Sahara, the Libya-Chad border war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. Internal strife has been just as prevalent: from the Lebanese and Sudanese civil wars, through dissension in the Yemen and incipient violence in Algeria, to armed Muslim opposition in Syria and Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings in Iraq. Further afield, confused security relations between the former Soviet republics, infighting in Afghanistan, and potential Turkish-Iranian rivalry in Central Asia may impinge increasingly on the level of tension and instability in the Middle East.

As most of these examples suggest, the complexity of sources of conflict within the region and the multiplicity of players have rendered the Middle East highly permeable to external influences. This is especially so given the relative proximity of southern Europe, the former USSR and South Asia (Pakistan and India) and, additionally, the global role and Cold War heritage that have introduced the USA as a key player in regional affairs. The same factors have also created numerous linkages throughout the region, exposing the strategic balance in any of its parts to new threats and pressures whenever changes take place elsewhere in the system.

The violent nature of these various conflicts has led to the militarization of societies and economies throughout the Middle East, and to the acquisition of large conventional arsenals. In

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* Parts of this paper are based on Ephraim Karsh, "Neutralization: The Key to an Arab-Israeli Peace", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1991; and Yezid Sayigh, "Middle East Stability: The Impact of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", in Ephraim Karsh, Martin Navias, and Philip Sabin (eds.), Non-Conventional Proliferation in the Middle East (OXford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

several, critical cases, the quest for strategic superiority has encouraged attempts to produce, or otherwise obtain, non-conventional weapons. The regional arms race has in turn developed its own momentum, propelled by domestic, regional and technical factors.

This inherent complexity, together with the close inter-relatedness between the various components of the Middle East regional system, vividly illustrated during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict, make it necessary to consolidate any resolution of the Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts by stabilizing the wider regional context. This paper starts by examining the nature of the system and its complexity, and the linkages operating within it. It then proposes the formation of two regional organizations -- a "roof" body modelled along the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and a smaller, Arab-Israeli "security community" -- to manage the wider military, political and strategic dimensions of an Arab-Israeli peace. A final section discusses the practicability of this proposal and ways of relating it to ongoing Middle East peace talks.

COMPLEXITY AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The Middle East is defined for the purposes of this discussion as a "strategic system" that includes the Arab states and several non-Arab ones -- Israel, Iran and Turkey (some might add Afghanistan and Ethiopia).[1] It may be divided into secondary "security complexes" (or "sub-complexes") -- such as the Gulf, Arab-Israeli theatre, Nile Valley-Horn of Africa, and Maghreb.[2] But, for reasons of geography, history, society and culture, the degree of political permeability and strategic impact across the (notional) boundaries between these zones is high. It is more useful, therefore, to think of the region as a single, broad system, albeit a loosely-structured one.

Intrinsic causes of insecurity

This horizontal complexity is a basic feature of the Middle East strategic system, the security effects of which are severely

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[1] The notion of the Arab states as a strategic system is developed in Paul Noble, "The Arab state system: Pressures, constraints and opportunities", in Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press and Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1991 (revised edition).

[2] The notion of the "security complex" is developed by Barry Buzan in "The future of the South Asian security complex", in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi (et al.), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, London: Macmillan, 1986.

compounded by a number of intrinsic factors. In the first case, efforts by specific regimes to remain in power, leadership perceptions of domestic prestige and regional status, and vested interests have combined to fuel the continued drive for conventional and nonconventional capabilities. This is obvious in such distinct cases as Syria and Iraq or Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE: there may be real defence needs, but the pattern of acquisitions reveals the strong influence of other priorities such as regime survival, the "prestige factor" and the opportunity to earn commissions on arms contracts and to protect jobs and budgets.

Secondly, the buildup of military capabilities in one country inevitably alarms its neighbours and alters the regional balance. This spurs efforts by the neighbours to "catch up", and rekindles the sense of vulnerability (real or perceived) in the first country. Thus attempts to achieve national security through assured defence may ultimately lead to the opposite outcome, of undermining security and weakening defence.[3] The action-reaction buildup of weapons arsenals in the Gulf -- Iraq, Iran and GCC states -- since 1974 is a case in point. Conversely, the regional arms race may be driven by the attempts of some states to back their refusal to resolve or concede political and territorial claims, the Arab-Israeli pattern of denial and counter-denial being a prime example.

In the third instance, the arms race is driven by factors intrinsic to the nature of modern military technology. Cyclical obsolescence, for example, constantly compels modern armies to acquire new generations of weaponry. Not only must each country prevent its military infrastructure and preparedness from dropping below a certain level, but it has also to allow an additional margin to allow for the leadtime between identification of new needs and technologies and subsequent acquisition of the requisite armaments.

The other side of the technological coin is that the constant appearance of state-of-the-art weapon systems and munitions -- with increased lethality, range and survivability -- in local inventories destabilizes the regional military balance and prompts counter-moves. This is due to the magnified capability that such new technologies impart to their owners, even if overall force levels on the various sides of the regional balance are low to start with.[4] This is especially true of the

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[3] Point made in Abdul-Monem al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, Boulder CO: Westview, 1985, p. 13.

[4] The power of advanced conventional weapons is discussed in various places in Henry Rowen, Intelligent Weapons: Implications for Offense and Defense, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

emergent generation of advanced conventional weapons, which can be as devastating as nonconventional weapons if used against carefully selected targets, especially those necessary for the sustenance of life;[5] the same effect also applies, to some degree, to the advantages conferred by possessing an indigenous arms R&D and production capability.

This, in turn, leads to the vertical dimension of Middle East complexity, namely the gradation of nonconventional weapons -- chemical, biological and nuclear -- and to those categories of conventional military technology that have a special impact on the strategic balance -- ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missile missiles, and certain advanced conventional munitions. Furthermore, there is a distinct gradation of capabilities even within the conventional weapons category, while indigenous R&D and production capabilities add a further dimension of complexity. The proliferation of the various nonconventional weapons categories is inter-related, and is further tied to developments in the conventional weapons and political spheres.[6]

Acknowledging the linkages

What makes the Middle East strategic system particularly unstable is the combination of its horizontal and vertical complexity. Despite the enormous expanse of some countries, the critical "conflict areas" are relatively small and tend to comprise the borders of several states. As importantly, the vital concentrations of population, and therefore of administration, economic activity and infrastructure, in rival states are often in close proximity. With the proliferation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and mid-air refuelling for combat aircraft, most of the major military powers in the region possess the means to threaten the other key states, even those considered traditionally to lie in other security complexes. The advent of nonconventional weaponry and long-range delivery means may have given individual states greater strategic reach, but by the same token it has also reinforced linkages across the Middle East.

Factors of geography and technology dictate that the strategic impact of nonconventional weapons proliferation cannot be contained within a specific "sub-complex", let alone within a particular pair of states. A primary example of this is Iraq, which by 1990-91 was effectively extending its strategic reach

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[5] Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, London: Brassey's, 1991, p. 167.

[6] This is suggested in a UN report, "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East," Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly Document A/45/435, 10 October 1990, pp. 40-41 (Hereafter referred to as the UN Experts' Report).

into the Gulf and Arab-Israeli theatres. It apparently started its nuclear weapons programme in response to the steep buildup of Iranian conventional and non-conventional capabilities under the Shah, but was ultimately seen as a direct threat by Israel. Israel itself offers another example, having demonstrated its reach both through ballistic missile and satellite launches (into the Mediterranean Sea opposite Benghazi, Libya, on one occasion) and by bombing targets as far apart as Baghdad and Tunis.

Finally, it is easy to see that Iranian nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programmes will affect the strategic posture and security not only of Iraq and the Gulf but also of Syria and Israel (and ultimately Egypt).

The strategic and, ironically, the political linkages between various sub-complexes and regional issues were further driven home by the US-led coalition effort against Iraq: first when the USA secured the active involvement of Egypt and Syria (and Arab states as far away as Morocco) and deployed allied forces to Turkey as well as the Gulf; and second when the USA moved in the post-war period to promote regional arms controls and achieve an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Middle East states have certainly built on these linkages in the past, with reported Israeli offers of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to Iran in the 1970s and Iraqi-Egyptian collaboration on ballistic missile development in the 1980s.[7]

Further destabilizing the Middle East strategic system is the marked asymmetry of military capabilities in individual states. Vertical complexity has not been replicated across the horizontal spectrum of countries. A majority do not possess weapons of mass destruction and have little prospect of acquiring or developing them or their means of delivery, even assuming they have the interest in doing so (which is not the case for most). Of the minority of Middle East states that can field non-conventional weapons, only Israel actually possesses all categories or the means to produce them, although Iraq was well on its way to acquiring similar capabilities prior to the Gulf War and the subsequent UN inspections. The probability that ATBMs and advanced conventional weapons and munitions will enter a growing number of arsenals in the region (or in its periphery) in the foreseeable future, indicates that additional areas of asymmetry will arise.

The growing proliferation of nonconventional capabilities is highly destabilizing. Unlike Cold War Europe, where the strategic balance was upheld between only two blocs, led by the two superpowers and accounting between them for almost all the

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[7] The alleged Israeli offer is cited in Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb, London: Faber & Faber, 1991, p. 274.

states in the northern hemisphere, the Middle East has a multitude of regional actors with divergent aims and policies, and lacks any lasting semblance of stable balance. It suffers additionally from the active involvement of peripheral countries and out-of-area powers. Indeed, the only prospect of similarity with the Central European experience is that of a new regional strategic balance, imposed by the unipolar projection of US influence in the 1990s and backed by a tenuous international consensus concerning the sanctity of internationally-recognized borders. Paradoxically, though, if this prospect comes to pass, then it is likely to lead not to a new status quo based on weapons of mass destruction but to more active efforts to achieve nonconventional arms controls.

REORGANIZING FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CSCME

How then, in view of the immense complexity of the Middle East strategic system and the impact on regional security, to provide a stable context for Arab-Israeli peace? This paper suggests the formation of two types of regional organization, each operating at a different level and providing a specific layer of security management, albeit designed to do so in complementary fashion.

The first regional organization proposed here is a "roof" or "umbrella" body, broadly similar to the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe (CSCE). The Conference on Security and Confidence in the Middle East (CSCME) would include all members of the Leagues of Arab States (including Palestine), as well as Israel, Iran, and Turkey. It could be further expanded to bring in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and -- given its proximity and special security problems, arising from its partition and the presence of Turkish and British forces -- Cyprus. The Central Asian republics of the former USSR might also participate, as full members or observers, depending on their status in collective agencies that might emerge in the future under Russian, Turkish or Iranian auspices.

In general, the fundamental criteria for inclusion would be geographical location and patterns of security relations, as well as shared concerns such as water, oil, or access. Given their global role and close security relations with countries in the Middle East, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would also be granted observer status in the CSCME. This would have the added advantage of involving the United Nations directly in the work of the CSCME, which role could then be replicated in the various committees and agencies to be formed within the latter.

The CSCME would act as a multilateral forum covering the entire region, to discuss and agree shared guidelines on several "baskets" of issues, principally security, economic development, water and other natural resources, environment, political

liberalization, and human rights.[8] Membership would depend on acceptance of certain basic principles such as the non-resolution of disputes by violence, respect for internationally-recognized borders and the territorial integrity of states, inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, and recognition of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.[9]

Formal diplomatic recognition between members would not be a prerequisite for joining the CSCME, thus making it more acceptable to protagonists.[10] Nonetheless, all members should be willing to endorse the preamble, based in part on such international documents as the UN Charter and Declaration of Universal Human Rights, and on specific UN resolutions related directly to the region, such as Security Conucil Resolutions 242 and 338. In both cases, regarding mutual recognition and the preamble, the CSCME would diverge from the European example to adapt to local circumstances.

The broad agenda

Initially, the purpose of CSCME members would be to identify and agree the distinct categories -- baskets -- into which the main threats and concerns affecting the region can be divided. Each basket could then be discussed in greater detail by special committees, backed by technical sub-committees and specialized agencies as appropriate, composed of delegates representing those full members most interested. This structure would have the added advantage of allowing CSCME observers or even non-members to take active part, by including them in the debate on specific issues of concern to them within each committee or technical sub-committee. In adopting a more flexible notion of participation, the CSCME would again diverge from its European type-model and

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[8]. Another view on the formation of a CSCE-type body in the Middle East is in Tim Niblock, "The Realms within which Regional Co-operation and Integration Culd be Fostered", in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: an Integrated Communities Approach (London: Federal Trust, 1992), pp. 45-49.

[9]. Taken from the Helsinki Final Act, Helsinki, August 1, 1975. Department of State Publication No. 8826 (General Foreign Service No. 298), brought in R. Falk, B. Weston, A. D'Avanto, Basic Documents in International Law and World Order (St. Paul Minnesota: West Publishing Co., American Casebook Series, 1990), 2nd edition, pp. 114-20.

[10] Mutual recognition between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon), though, would be achieved in the framework of bilateral peace treaties and the security community.

so adapt better to the greater diversity of countries, concerns and cultures in the extended Middle East.

Indeed, the ability of the proposed CSCME framework to accommodate, and adapt to, the immense diversity of the region would be an important reason for establishing it. The varied nature of local conflicts might normally have made it difficult to engage a majority of the regional players, but the radical changes in the international balance of power since 1989 and ongoing US-led peace efforts in the Middle East have created new opportunities that need to be seized without delay. Bringing two clearly-demarcated blocs into the Helsinki process and agreeing a common agenda might appear simpler, in retrospect, but the CSCE was largely paralyzed until the revolution of 1989-90 in East Europe has transformed the strategic landscape. In the Middle East, however, the need for a CSCME is more urgent precisely because there are several active, ongoing conflicts and impending crises over access and resources in the region.

Diversity could prove beneficial in the Middle East, in further contrast to the European experience, partly by pre-empting the emergence of monolithic blocs with single-track agendas.[11] At the very least, the cumulative contribution that was made over two decades by the protracted, incremental debate within the CSCE may be replicated in the Middle East. More hopefully still, the CSCME could prove instrumental in providing the very region-wide forum for common debate and even conflict resolution that has been so lacking in the past.

The other main advantage of the CSCME is that it would develop those dimensions that underlie (or undermine) security, in the deeper, broader sense of the word. Security, whether domestic or external, national or regional, is an integral concept based on political, economic and social components; scarcity of resources, such as water, or environmental problems, can be as threatening to real security as military challenges.[12] There can be little doubt that resolution of the Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts depends on a combination of political and territorial concessions and military arrangements, but addressing the other causes of instability in the region would weaken the agents of renewed conflict and offer incentives for growing

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[11]. The similarities and contrasts between the CSCE and the proposed CSCME are obvious when comparing some of the basic principles and mechanisms. For a detailed study of the CSCE see, for example, V. Mastny (ed.), Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, Duke University Press, 1986.

[12]. For a fuller discussion of this definition of security, see Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.

regional co-operation.

The strategic dimension

In terms of securing an Arab-Israeli peace, the CSCME basket dealing with security would gain special importance. It would provide a valuable forum for discussing military issues with a regional impact, foremost of which is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Rather than deal with the problem solely in global terms -- at the United Nations or through talks on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and on an updated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- or as a sticking point in face-to-face negotiations, the various Middle East parties could be additionally use the CSCME to formulate general guidelines and approaches.

This would of special value in reinforcing agreements concluded in the Arab-Israeli context regarding nonconventional weapons, the conventional arms race, indigenous military R&D and production, and the use of space. Once peace agreements have been concluded there, there will be a real need to provide the means to absorb and counter the destabilizing effect that changes in military capability or strategic posture elsewhere in the Middle East may have on the Arab-Israeli "complex". A case in point is that Iranian conventional rearmament and nonconventional weapons programs would prompt Iraqi and Saudi Arabian counter-buildups, in turn threatening Israel.

The CSCME would therefore fulfil two functions in this respect. On the one hand, it would allow individual states or sub-regional blocs to engage parties in other "security complexes" in the Middle East, with which they might not normally be in contact, in order to discuss issues of common concern. The size of the group would be smaller than international bodies such as the UN Disarmament Agency, making the discussion more manageable and allowing better focus on practical solutions. This, in turn, would conceivably allow CSCME members to make a more meaningful, and effective, contribution to global negotiations on the same issues. It would also enable them to discuss policy directions with extra-regional powers -- primarily the members of the London Club, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and so on -- in a way that places the concerns and priorities of Middle East parties more firmly on the international agenda.

On the other hand, once measures had been agreed or an Arab-Israeli peace concluded, the CSCME framework would provide for joint supervision and subsequent revision (when made necessary by technological or political developments) of regional security agreements. In particular, it could oversee creation of a Middle East NBC-weapons-free-zone, organize inspection and verification modalities, and establish information collection and distribution

centres. The same forum could adopt general guidelines on the uses of space, both for monitoring and for non-military purposes, and present a local counterpart in the interpretation and implementation of measures designed to curb the conventional arms race, such as the UN international register. In fact, this monitoring role would be one of the chief functions of the CSCME (in any basket), and is a principal aspect of the European body on which it is modelled.

It is true that recent European events have exposed some of the shortcomings of the CSCE-framework. In particular, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the bloody civil strife attending this process have shown the limited ability of the CSCE to intervene, in both conflict-resolution and peacekeeping. It would probably be even more difficult to achieve these aims in the case of the CSCME, given the greater disparity of regional actors and, more pertinently, the existence of ongoing, active conflicts. However, the lack of a mandate for enforcement is in itself one of the basic attractions of the CSCME model for potential member-states, since it builds their confidence that the forum will not be used as a means of compelling them, a priori, to relinquish their claims or make concessions. Moreover, the CSCME could provide a valuable vehicle for tabling sanctions, diplomatic and economic, and restraining unilateral action by members or extra-regional powers. It might also play an active peacekeeping role, complementing politically and materially any effort undertaken by the UN or other multi-national grouping. This would involve regional parties more directly in the process, giving it political legitimacy, and ensure their greater commitment to its success.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT: THE SECURITY COMMUNITY

To translate the general guidelines of the CSCME into practical measures that can be implemented locally, this paper proposes the establishment of a second, smaller body: an Arab-Israeli security community, consisting of Israel and its immediate neighbours -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and a Palestinian state to be established in the Occupied Territories of 1967. Preferably, this grouping would take the shape of a formal pact organization; alternatively, it might simply involve signing on to a common treaty and shared security policy guidelines. However, in either case it would be guaranteed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The security community, along with other sub-regional agencies such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), could form the "building blocks" on which the CSCME is based, and its guarantors would enjoy observer status in the CSCME.

The security community would be anchored to the bilateral or multilateral peace agreements concluded between Israel and its

Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians.[13] These must be based on mutual recognition of each other's legitimate rights and interests, namely the Arab right to regain the territories lost in 1967 and the Palestinian right to self-determination, on the one hand, and Israel's right to regional acceptance and secure existence, on the other.

In practical terms, this means an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, with minimal, mutually-agreed territorial adjustments in strategic areas, and the establishment of an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[14] (Jerusalem would be governed by a special agreement that, through shared or split sovereignty, ensures its unity and its role as capital for each state and guarantees full, free access to both Palestinian and Israeli citizens.)[15] The Palestinian state, in turn, might be confederated with Jordan or fit in any other confederal or multilateral arrangement, including a trilateral one with both Jordan and Israel, along the lines of Benelux or the Nordic zone.[16] In return, the Palestinians and former Arab "frontline"

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[13]. The argument that resolution of the root political causes of conflict must form the basis for arms controls or other security arrangements is made in Yezid Sayigh, "Arab regional security: between mechanics and politics", RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 2, Summer 1991.

[14]. A substantial body of literature has built up in recent years to deal with the security and other issues arising out of the establishment of a Palestinian state. See, for example, Mark Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel, Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1983; Ze'ev Schiff, Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians, Washington DC: The Washington Institute, Policy Papers No. 15, 1989; The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's options for Peace, Tel Aviv, 1989; Mohammed Rabie, Vision for Peace, Washington D.C., 1991.

[15]. The question of Jerusalem is obviously one of the more difficult ones to resolve. For proposals of possible solutions, see Adnan Abu Odeh, "Jerusalem: Two Flags, One Undivided City," Foreign Affairs, 1992; Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, New York: Hill & Wang, 1991, pp. 114-124; and Yezid Sayigh, "The Palestinian Perspective", interview with Oxford International Review, Spring 1992, pp. 10-12.

[16]. Among the studies dealing with the security dimensions of such arrangements, see, Ahmad Khalidi, "A Palestinian Settlement: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security", Cambridge MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Occasional Paper No. 3, May 1990, and Joseph Alpher, "Palestinian

states would commit themselves to a genuine and contractual peace with Israel, which includes unequivocal de jure recognition, full diplomatic relations, unrestricted freedom of movement, and economic ties.

In addition, both the regional actors and the external powers would have to reconcile themselves with the prospect of substantial international involvement in attaining and preserving any peace settlement. However much Middle Easterners may abhor "foreign domination", theirs is "the most penetrated international system" and will so remain for the foreseeable future. All of them owe much of their basic security and economic well-being to the support of the global powers, and no solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict will be durable unless those powers commit themselves to it fully.

For their part, the global powers must realize that they cannot shirk their role in attaining Middle East stability. Not that this is a self-evident or preordained right on their part, but that they bear a responsibility commensurate with their self-defined interests and actual involvement, for better or worse, in the political, military, economic and commercial affairs of the region.

Fundamentals of the security community

Apart from the specific obligations contained in the Arab-Israeli peace treaties, the members of the security community would have to adopt a policy of permanent neutrality among themselves and to maintain and defend this policy with all the means at their disposal. Concretely, they would have to:

a) Renounce war as an instrument of foreign policy and resort to armed force only in cases of self-defence. This would also exclude preventive or preemptive wars;
b) Remain neutral in case of war among other members of the community;
c) Avoid any military alliances or collective security arrangements, and renounce such commitments still in existence at the time of signing the security community treaty;
d) Prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on their soil. Exceptions would be international forces conducting supervisory or peacekeeping functions, and the receipt of military support in the event of subjection to external armed aggression;
e) Refrain from intervening in civil conflicts in community member-states and from inviting external military intervention in such conflicts, except for peacekeeping

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Settlement: The Security Issues", Jerusalem and Rome: Arab Studies Society, Truman Institute, and Institute for International Relations, 1992.

purposes and by mutual agreement within the community.

In addition, the community members would have to carry out the following security arrangements (among others):

a) Maintain the current demilitarization arrangement in the Sinai Peninsula;
b) Ensure complete demilitarization of the Golan Heights, which revert to Syrian sovereignty, and station an international supervisory force there;
c) Restrict deployment of the Lebanese Army in the southern border zone, in conjunction with international supervision;
d) Restrict standing Palestinian armed forces to agreed personnel levels and armament numbers and types, for the purpose of basic defence only. Adherence to the limitations would be supervised by international forces based in the newly-established Palestinian state;
e) Restrict deployment of the Jordanian Army along the Jordan River, in conjunction with international supervision.
f) Implement agreed arrangements for the establishment of the NBC-weapons-free-zone and place all related facilities under international/and or CSCME safeguard.

The guarantor states, for their part, would undertake to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab-Israeli security community as a whole against external attack, as well as to protect any community member against an attack by external powers or by other members of the community itself. These defensive measures could be taken either jointly by all guarantor states, or severally or singly, if joint action could not be agreed upon.

The guarantor states would also undertake not to deploy their forces or military personnel in the security community member-states, or to establish military installations of any kind there. They will also remove the community from the sphere of potential great power rivalry; this should include the reduction and regulation of their transfers of arms and military technology to the region. This is especially important because, although some restraints have already been implemented or proposed following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, the future course of the "new world order" is still uncertain and the commitment of the main arms producers and exporters must be ensured beforehand.

By way of safeguarding the Arab-Israeli security community, the guarantor states would also deploy international supervisory forces in the area, as follows:

a) Deployment of at least four brigades (including, as a minimum, an American and a Russian brigade) on the Golan Heights and in the newly-established Palestinian state;
b) The international force in the Palestinian state would be deployed, among other places, at the Jordan River crossing points, in order to ensure that no prohibited major

weapon systems cross the river;
c) The international forces might be supplemented by units from the CSCME member-states, subject to mutual agreement within the community.

The international supervisory forces could operate under the auspices of the United Nations or even of the CSCME, and its costs would be incurred by CSCME members (including the guarantor great powers). In either case, these forces would be subordinated to an International Commission comprising representatives of the guaranteed and the guarantor states, who would supervise implementation of agreed security measures and arbitrate in disputes that might arise. The removal or reduction of the international supervisory forces would require general consent within the Commission, and each of its members would hold veto power over such a move.

The security community in operation

The proposed Arab-Israeli security community would provide the member-states with a practical structure for managing their immediate security environment. By enhancing overall stability, it would also underpin the political (and territorial), economic and social components of the Arab-Israeli peace agreements. In such a situation, the community's member-states could afford to reduce their force levels and curtail defence spending, further enhancing collective security and channelling greater resources into development and infrastructural projects. Because any such measures would be endorsed collectively, threatening external developments outside the community would have less of an adverse impact on the security of each member-state.

Besides providing this general "buffer" effect, the security community would also enable its members to address specific military challenges. Especially prominent, and worrisome, is the need to prevent proliferation of nonconventional weapons within the community area itself and further afield in the Middle East. Relevant arms controls would presumably have already been implemented in accordance with the Arab-Israeli peace agreements, but the community could play a special role in maintaining its NBC-weapons-free-zone and in organizing inspection and verification procedures between its member-states. It would also provide a necessary forum to discuss ways and means of responding to nonconventional proliferation outside its area, in Central Asia or Iran for example, and could act on behalf of its combined membership in presenting such issues to the CSCME or UN (or other international agencies).

Of additional importance would be the need to anticipate political developments or technological advances that might affect military capabilities and the strategic balance within the community. The community should be able to adapt the joint treaty

or the appropriate clauses in the Arab-Israeli peace agreements, in order to counter the impact and maintain regional stability. This applies to radical changes in government or policy of neighbouring states, especially changes that spur the conventional arms race, and to the appearance of advanced conventional munitions or other new weapons systems that act as force-multipliers.

At another level, the community would need to devise agreed ways that allow individual member-states to cope with bilateral challenges that do not affect other member-states, yet without threatening them. An example is the Syrian need to maintain a strong defensive posture along its border with Turkey, but adhere to limitations on force levels and deployment set by the agreements with Israel. Special circumstances might also arise that require collective consultation and agreement, for instance a request for the deployment of Egyptian troops to the Gulf as part of a GCC security arrangement.

In all these instances, the Arab-Israeli security community would evidently need to establish its own permanent commission or secretariat, along with a variety of subordinate technical committees and specialized agencies. Their functions would include undertaking inspection, verification, and other forms of monitoring, creating joint data banks (including the use of satellite information). They would also oversee adherence to set limits on indigenous R&D and production, especially in the nonconventional sphere, and control dual-purpose materials and technologies and the use of nuclear power generation. At a higher level, special committees would assess the impact of developments in military technology, and make recommendations to an arbitration body in the case of disputes involving interpretation or implementation of agreements. There would be a high degree of complementarity between these committees and their counterparts within the CSCME, to the extent of merging those that are redundant.

Mutual advantages

Due to its comprehensive nature, the security community would be far more stable than any partial, or bilateral, arrangement that Israel could obtain with each of its Arab neighbours. By taking into account the legitimate interests of all regional (and major external) parties to the conflict, and by intertwining them in a network of commitments and reciprocal interests, the community would turn its member-states into status quo powers and curb any tendency to revisionism. All would have little to gain, and much to lose, by violating the joint treaty. Moreover, the inclusion of the global powers as guarantors would raise the costs of violation dramatically. Aggression or irredentism by any community member would trigger immediate sanctions by the other signatories, who would provide the lead for a wider international reaction.

The guarantor system would be reinforced by the individual interests of the local parties. Israel would gain the tangible assurance of having a militarily-constrained Palestinian state, demilitarized Golan Heights, buffers and limited deployment zones on the Lebanese and Egyptian borders, and international supervision throughout, in return for territorial withdrawal and acceptance of Palestinian statehood. The Palestinian state would have a vested, indeed an existential, interest in maintaining the balance, since the community would provide the context for its exercise of independence and sovereignty. With a collective arrangement in place, it would no longer need to suffer obtrusive Israeli military presence, and its own security would be better protected by the constraints imposed on its neighbours as well as on itself.

For its part, Jordan would finally be able to resolve its dichotomous relationship with the Palestinians, both as citizens and as a separate entity. The community would reduce its exposure to external threats and allow it to cut defence spending, while providing an acceptable framework for pursuing the convergence of interests within the Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli triangle. Lebanon would regain control over its southern portion and could safely revert to its pre-1975 policy of "in weakness lies strength", assured of an end to external intervention and subversion. Syria would regain the Golan Heights, and, more importantly still, at last enjoy the benefits of normalized relations with the global powers in the evolving "new world order". The security community might appear to offer Egypt the least immediate advantages, but it would in fact reassert itself as a major member of the Arab-Israeli "complex" and achieve a longstanding aim, namely regional nonconventional disarmament.

CONCLUSION: TURNING VISION INTO REALITY

An oft-repeated objection to conceptual models for conflict-resolution and regional security management is that they are just that: conceptual models. This is a valid criticism, but there is tangible evidence of the feasibility of the two-tiered, structural approach proposed in this paper.

The Middle East multilateral peace talks launched in Moscow in January 1992, under American-Russian co-sponsorship, already involve a majority of the regional and extra-regional parties that would become members of the CSCME, and have already divided their deliberations into distinct "baskets" of issues. They focus, moreover, to a significant degree on confidence building, which is at the heart of the CSCME process. The bilateral talks that were initiated by the co-sponsors in Madrid two months earlier -- between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians -- are building towards an ultimate comprehensive peace that is specific to the Arab-Israeli security "complex",

closely paralleling the security community suggested here.

This is by no means to argue for the establishment of yet another two regional structures, unrelated to the onging negotiations processes. Rather, what is required is to allow the peace process to benefit from the proposed model in ways that reinforce it and give it a clearer direction.

In the first place, while both the CSCME and the Arab-Israeli security community are designed to operate most effectively once a peace settlement has been reached, defining them in the pre-settlement stage sets a more coherent context for the negotiations and allows better correlation of means and aims. Current experience shows, moreover, that institutionalization of the multilateral talks is both possible and desirable, in order to create an inbuilt momentum and establish the mechanism by which the local parties can themselves develop shared principles and supervise implementation of agreements. It also stresses the need to expand the brief of the existing multilateral working groups to include human rights and issues of political liberalization, in order to develop the necessary underpinnings of long-term stability.

Secondly, by setting the Arab-Israeli negotiations in wider scope and offering a vision of what the final settlement might look like, it becomes easier to persuade the protagonists to make necessary concessions and to accept certain asymmetries, because they are assured of an exchange and that their core claims and concerns will still be addressed. Indeed, this elaboration of a final "package deal" forms the link that is missing between the agendas for the multilateral and bilateral peace talks as initially structured by the co-sponsors, without which a real breakthrough is unlikely. Trade-offs are the key to a successful outcome of negotiations, but without a sense of the wider context or its linkages and an assurance of mutuality and reciprocity, willing compromise becomes impossible and lasting peace unattainable.[17]

In this way, the proposed models for the CSCME and Arab-Israeli security community can be woven into the pre-settlement phase of negotiations. In turn, the negotiations can be deliberately structured so as to lead to the formation of the two bodies in the post-settlement phase. A historic "window of opportunity" to establish peace and security for all in the region exists, opened by the dramatic changes in the USSR and East Europe since 1989 and the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. It must be siezed in order to achieve a comprehensive compromise and

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[17]. For a discussion of this approach, see Yezid Sayigh, "Constructing Arab-Israeli Peace and Security", paper presented at the United Nations NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, Nicosia, 20-24 January 1992.

create collective agencies, or else the Middle East will emerge from the momentous transition that the international system is undergoing to suffer further bloodshed and impoverishment.

Ephraim Karsh is Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He has held teaching or research posts at Columbia University, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. His most recent books include Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1991); Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991, with Inari Rautsi), and, with Lawrence Freedman, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton University Press, forthcoming in January 1993). His articles have been published in academic journals including, International Security, Survival, Orbis, Middle East Journal, and International Affairs. He is currently working on a comprehensive history of the Middle East since the rise of the Eastern Question.

Yezid Sayigh is MacArthur Scholar and Research Fellow at St Antony's College Oxford, working on the international relations of the developing countries and Third World security. He is also an adviser to the Palestinian delegation in the bilateral peace talks and coordinator of the Palestinian team for arms control and regional security within the multilateral talks. His most recent publications include Arab Military Industry (Brassey's London: 1992), Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries (London: IISS, 1990), and The Palestinian Armed Struggle since 1949 (forthcoming in 1993). His articles have appeared in academic journals including International Affairs, Middle East Journal, Third World Quarterly, RUSI Journal, and Journal of Palestine Studies. He is currently working on issues of NBC/ballistic proliferation, the arms trade, and defence spending and policies in the Middle East.

(8)

RESOURCES, DEMOGRAPHY AND MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

[Theme Three: Session VIII]

by Jawad Anani

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Resources, Demography and Middle East Security

Jawad Anani

The population in the Arab world is estimated around 212 million in the year 1991 and is expected to rise up to 290 million in the year 2000. Out of this population 43.4 percent are of ages (14) and below and 3.4 %. are (65) or above. Life expectancy ranges between 59.3 years for males and 60.7 years for females. More than 47% still live in rural areas where agriculture constitutes the predominent source of livelihood. In a wider Middle East definition, the current population including (Turkey and Israel) would jump up to 286 million and is expected to rise up to 385 in the year 2000.

In a population whose composition will be skewed toward the non-production age cohorts and occupation of 25-30% of which is agriculture, demand for water would continue to rise and the need to engage in transnational more expensive water sources would rise. Moreover, the increase in consumption, particularly field crops would push agricultural production into more marginal water-intensive lands. At the current rates of rainfall and underground replenishment , the shortage could grow more acute in the future , and nature stripping elements such as desertification, deforestation and soil erosion will afflict more terrain. Thus, and in a very simple direct manner, water, environment and population are interlinked and the expected patterns, ceteris paribus, would reinforce each other.

Such reinforcement trends are going to be boosted by the prevailing production methods, by the absence of peace and by the gradual but continual process of urbanization. the current modus operandi of production favors the high rate of natural wealth exploitation, the replacement of agriculture by manufacturing and the dependence in consumption on energy-intensive production techniques. Such trends would also be accentuated by international division of labour regime where energy-intensive and high-waste industries are moving southward to either highly-populated areas (cheap labour) or to energy -rich areas. The Middle East, being one of the fastest growing markets in the world is poised to capture a good deal of those polluting migrant (or nomad) industries.

the absence of peace is frustrating the resource base, whether human, financial or national, away from the optimal distribution. It is inhibiting sound planning efforts and accentuating positive entroply in them. The stamina for war would be further fueled by water shortages whose coverage requires deep commitment to regional efforts which are rendered impractical in the current state of tension. There is hardly a country in the Middle East whose borders are not hot or potentially so. The threat of further Yogoslavization of the Middle East is a real one and it

would expand the number of enclaves , ethnic or otherwise, to the further deteriment of any serious regional cooperation. The recent Gulf-war had demonstrated beyond doubt that the Middle East, a vital area for the rest of the world as well, could be the stage of destructive wars whose negative environmental impact recognizes no limits. It is estimated that 25-30% of the Middle East GDP (estimated at $ 400 billion) is directed towards war. Allocations for both education and health barely capture 11% of this GDP total.

The rise in consumption is prompted by both the rise in population and the rising consumption expectations among the Middle East population. The rise in education, urbanication, and the spread of public utilities in rural areas are, inter alia, the main forces behind this soaring consumption profile. There is a rapidly growing market for modern consumer goods whose production at home is gradually substituting imports. Thus on both production and waste treatment, there is a commensurate rise in the demand for polluting energy. It is estimated that the average expenditure on consumption in the Arab World, both public and private, exceeds GDP figures which makes domestic savings and capital accumulation subject to gradual decrease. Thus, the size of indebtedness is on the rise due to the expanding financial resources gap. It goes without saying that arms purchases (considered as consumption) are practically responsible for this foreign debt problem. It is estimated that Arab foreign debt exceeds $ 150 billion taking the debt forgiveness enjoyed by some of the large borrowers whose position on the Gulf war was appreciated in debt-sinking terms.

As a result, and with the exception of the Gulf States, all Middle Eastern countries are engaged in painful adjustment and restructuring programmes. The public at large does not view such schemes with confidence. Adjustment and restructuring are viewed as unavoidable evils at best because their aim is to tax people to pay foreign debts and collect dear funds which are simulataneously needed at home. It is paradoxical to many Arabs to understand how the days of plenty (aid decade) only led to a period of scarcity where debts accruing from the good days have to be paid in the bad days. While they were promised distribution of wealth and gains now they are only forwarned of sacrifices and pains. Both fast riches and quick poverty are enemies to environment.

The Arab world is as complex and diverse as the world at large. It is often viewed by the world as one entity, while Arabs like to think of themselves as such potentially, but not in reality. The recent Gulf War caused long festering problems to surface. Arabs can engage against each other in an interntional war. Some pessimistic analysts view what happened in 1990 and 1991 as a permanent divorce, a gap that cannot be bridged. While the optimistic analysts see that as an occasion to rebuild inter-

Arab relations on more rational and mutual interest bases rather than historical and emotional motives. Analysts who are fond of futuristic scenarios differ on the future. Extermist theologian thinkers carry the torch of "Islam is in the solution" and mundane thinkers blieve that Arabs must learn to internationalize and integrate in the world order . Neither side is right. While we cannot ignore the presence of religion as a dynamic force, we need a more enlightened and down-to earth vision. Shunning history and religoin in the name of modernity and universality does not, in its abstract form, weigh with the overall moods prevalent in the region. The two schools of religion and mundane adherences will continue to clash under the facade of tradition versus, modernity, democracy versus Khalifah, adaptive systems versus the Book and Djihad versus peace negotiations.

Such modalities have always pervailed in the Arab World, but without polarization . There was always a minimum consensus. The differences between a Baathist or Moslem Brother on these issues was not on the objective but to the means. Islam was a majority denominator, but categorization of other Moslems was not a common practice. Now we live in an era of what economists label as "empty boxes" with labels. The reasons behind this polarization along the two sides of religion are multiple. They were invoked during the Gulf War; and once the War was technically over they became even steamier.

The Arab public at large was often dismayed by the inability to turn the oil boom into a real building effort. Although many countries who were oil producers or benefitted from oil engaged in large-scale development projects, the final outcome was not a happy one. By 1988, the problem of external debt became so acute, the size of publcy admitted foriegn debt was $ 136 billion. On the other hand, with the exeption of the GCC region, all other Arab economies suffered from lack of foreign reserves to meet their immediate requirements and to service the foreign debt. The discovery of this fact by the public compounded their frustration, especially that the IMF was asking them to tighten their belts even further. To the public, their own govenments were no longer in control, and were turned into instruments for applying externally imposed regulations.

Moreover, the Arab world began to watch with dismay the news of famine in Sub-Saharan Africa including Sudan and Somalia. At home, most of them felt the pinch of the economic crisis. In 1988 and beyond, those who lived on the margin of oil and big govenment spending were not ready for the reverse tide. Profits dwindled, capital equities depreciated and currencies were promptly devalued. Those countries which held to their plans and refused to acknowledge the ipso facto devaluation could not cover the budding and flourishing black market. As a result, capital accumulation declined, external savings (capital flight) was increased and unemployment widened particularly among the new

market entrants. Gloomy expectations replaced the uphoria of the oil decade (1974-1983). When seeking government support, the public was told to reconsider its bad consumption habits. They were only told that pains and sacrifices would be evenly distributed. The issue of equitable distribution meant equitable suffering. Accordingly, the expectations gap reached an unprecedented level, and its expression had to be a mixture of anger and apathy. Searching for a solution, a model to salvage the situation proved to be futile and time-consuming. The existing models of pan-Arabism, communism, socialism and other mundane off-shoots stood watching dumb-muted . Islam which gave the Arabs their glory is the remedy. Thus many young people, frustrated and pained by defeats on all fronts, found in Islam and its untested teory the abode they were searching for.

Another phenomenon which erupted was the anger at other rich Arab countries. While the poorer countries were yearning for foreign exchange , employment opportunities, and capital investments, the richer countries were tightening their grip, especially that oil revenues were declining, freezing or decreasing wages and looking for cheaper labor costs outside the Arab region and their aid sources were squeezed. The issue of inequitable wealth among Arabs was gradually building into a hot emotional one. A quick look at the GDP of the six GCC countries shows that they constituted 38 per cent of total GDP in 1989 while their exaggerated population estimates indicated the relative share of GCC population to the total was only 9 percent. Moreover, GCC exports in 1989 were 66% of the Arab total and their imports 56%. The average per capita income in the Gulf States was $ 7500, while it was less than $ 400 in the poorest six countries. Their emotionality, inadvertently encouraged by poor Arab governments, revealed itself in inter-Arab meetings, the press and other mass media. When the Gulf War took place, the divergence among Arabs was widened to irreversible limits. The remainder of Arab money and wealth was squandered on wars and was tied for many generations to come. The spirit of Islam which does not allow a Moslem to sleep easy when his neighbor is hungry had to be the refuge. It has that tantalizing appeal. The State-sponsored brand of Islam, the passive and the apolitical, was rejected by the masses on the grounds that this was not the real Islam.

There are many other reasons to explain the re-emergence of religious zeal. The most important of which is the protracted and humiliating Palestinian issue. The masses which watched Palestinian kids chased by armed-to-teeth Israeli soldiers harbored deep humilation for not doing anything. The Hamas "or Zeal" movement was gaining gradually at the expense of PLO. These are nurturned by the socio-political set-backs which beset the Arab world at large, and by the religious extremism displayed in Israel by the Likud Party and its ultra religious partners in government.

The call for democratization in the Arab world which came at the end of the Gulf War in stronger overtones had to produce unexpected results, but in may corners the Islamists had the upper hand. The success of what is called "fundamentalists" in Jordan and Algeria, and their threat in Tunis, Egypt, Sudan and the occupied territories in Palestine had created mixed reactions. If democracy is allowed to express itself freely it would produce undesirable results. The Europeans and Americans in particular were politically dismayed by the outcome of elections in Algeria and lent a deaf ear to the democratization which followed. As a result, the Islamists found a new means to appeal to the public and to point the finger at what they call the "hypocritic democracy" and to shed accusations pointed at them for being undemocratic.

Not even Islam has a solution for the festering problems in the Arab world. There are many dilemmas that have to be met and resolved. Education for instance is going to be one of the burdens. For one thing it requires complete rejuvenation in terms of quality. The hands-on approach and continuous education are essential ingredients to meet the division of labor and the changing production techniques. Efficiency of labor is a paramount importance and its low level is written in block letter on the wall. Only 40-50% of the existing capacity of machinery is utilized. White collar workers, particularly in the government sector, rarely put in one hour of real work a day on average, while they complain of low wages and salaries. Overall, the labor participation rate is low, and it averages less than 25% in the Arab world due to the demographic attributes of high birth rates and large family sizes. I made a comparison over ten-years (1980-1989) between the per capita productive hours in six arab countries (Jordan , Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia) and in Israel. I found on average Israel enjoys a 5-6 times higher average per capita productive labor than these 6 countries. Education and labour performance are extremely linked. Yet, the sheer number of students (currently 66 million in the Arab world) is perplexing. In the year 2000, the number of students is expected to reach 90 million. The Arab labor force would also increase from 58 million to about 80 million in 2000, which means that more than 22 million new job opportunities are needed. The funds to meet education and job creation requirements exceed 300 billion dollars, or 30 billion a year. Such costs exclude the requirements of settling foreign debts and rebuilding the infrastructure demolished by wars in Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan, Palestine and other places. The estimates for such rebuilding put a figure of $ 150-200 billion dollars. Therefore, Arabs are in for a very difficult financial task. To secure a minimum of 650-700 billion dollars other than current expenditures is a task that could prove to be too heavy to shoulder.

Therefore, expenditure on peace must replace expenditure on arms. Peace is needed to provide electricity, water, health care, transportation systems and other amenities where they are either inadequate or in chronic deficit. While food exports constitute 3% of total Arab Exports, food imports constitute more than 15 per cent. The agricultural sector can easily deal with this challenge. yet such a deficit would continue as long as Arabs with money cultivate marginal desert areas and ignore fertile lands. Where there is fertile land there are objective and political circumstances which render these lands uncultivable. Arabs need peace more than anybody else in the world. The examples I cited above would hopefully drive this point home.

The experimentation with regionalism has been so far a failure. The attemps to integrate economically have been reduced to mere neighborly exchanges. Inter Arab trade is 6.3 of the total Arab exports and if oil is excluded this share would drop to 3 per cent. Yet, the world at large no longer has room for small entities. Geographical proximity seems to be the most outstanding common denominator in determining the shape of economic regimes. In 1988, the number of declared and politically motivated regions in the Arab World were 3: The Arab Maghreb Union, the Arab Co-operation Council and the Gulf Co-operation Council. While the GCC has the promise of continuation, its sheer size may not meet the minimum critical mass. The recent affinities displayed between GCC and both Egypt and Syria (6+2) was spurred by the Gulf War and it may not continue.

The Arab Co-operation Council is de facto cancelled while the AMU is struggling with the problems of Libya and Algeria. Yet for all practical purposes, it has the ingredients of potential success.

However, and again, it must be emphasized that the trends toward stronger private sector and democratization could bear the seeds of a better common understanding. If these trends are buttressed by peace, especially with the Israelis, the peace dividend could transcend the immediate gains of resource reallocation to the wider horizons of regionalism and better understanding with the new world order. If social and economic problems can be contained and eventually alleviated, the deep-rooted causes of extremism will diminish to a great deal. Otherwise, the gates to hell would be wide open. The world at large has, thanks to oil and strategic considerations, a big stake in the Middle East. Unless there is a world collective will to improve future prospecfts, total world economic and military stability would be in jeopardy.

Accordingly, the peace negotiations that are currently taking place between the Arabs and Israel is as much an international concern as they are regional. So far, these negotiations have not made tangible progress on the substantive issues. After

five rounds of bilateral and one round of multilateral talks, the parties are not far from where they had started. However, it is too early to anticipate the outcome or make any prejudgments on when these talks would culminate in real peace.

In pure apolitical terms, peace is as good for the Arabs as it is for the Israelis. The latter, i.e. Israel, cannot expand into populated areas, nor can it continue to derive massive foreign aid (7-10 billion dolalrs annually) without utility to its donors. Such utility has been curtailed by the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. It cannot claim that Arabs do not want to make peace with it. It is the absence of such peace which would nourish extremism the Israel claims it wants to fight right now. As for the Arabs, governments and a large percentage of the population believe that unless peace is instituted, the Arab region would continue to be targeted for offensive action. The war with Israel over the years has been extremely costly in men and money. The most important factor is the conviction among the Palestinians that their affair has been utilized at their own expense. This is a vague term fraght with rationalization. Anyway, as long as the Palestinians, particularly those under occupation, have accepted to make peace, then the other Arabs who have been asking the Palestinians to take charge, have to accept as well.

Down the road, should peace be established, certain studies, in the United States in particular, have been published on a regional configuration with Jordan, Palestine and Israel as its core, and it can be expanded to include Lebanon, Syria and Iraq in the future. All of these studies build the rationale of such economic regions on complementarities and scale. Moreover, such an arrangement would make it possible to solve peace-threatening issues such as could look far-fetched at this moment, but if peace is arrived at, anything is possible.

the notion of regionalism in the Middle East is not yet settled geographically. While Iran wants to have friendly relations with GCC and other Arab countries, Egypt objects to that vehemently. Egypt thinks of itself as a pivotal power which must maintain a balance between its roles as an Arab, African and Mediterrranean country. Turkey, where the economy benefitted from the Iraq/Iran War, wants to have acces to the Arab markets and fuel, in exchange for water. This fast-moving concept of regionalism and the intent by the potential big players to have to cake and eat it too may not allow at this juncture credible predictability as to where things may go in the future.

Ideas for Water Cooperation

The discrete strategy of the current peace negotiations seem to rest, inter alia, on a gradual parcellation of the Arab Israeli conflict into managable and negotiable issues. Water is no exception . It is divided into the bilateral and the multilateral streams, and it has been the topic of one of the five working multilateral groups . However, it has the special feature of being least politically loaded. Its resolution however is of great importance in terms of future security, potential regional economic cooperation and stabilization programs. It may be presumptuous to assume that water could be a less ticklish issue in the peace context, but preliminary readings into the way negotiations have proceeded thus far seem to substantiate this assumption.

According to the most recent data, water resources all over the Arab World seem to be in a critical situation. Available water resources in the Arab World estimate them at 337568 million metric meters. Of those 295728 (87.6%) are surface water and the rest (12.4%) are ground waters. Total water utilized add up to 172129 million cubic meters (MCM) of which surface waters constitute (81.2%), ground water (13.1%) and the rest is either desalinated or brackish water. A reliable study carried out by the World Bank expects the aggregate demand for water to increase from 212277 MCM in 1985 up to 301501 MCM in the year 2030. A deficit of around 100000 MCM will continue even if we assume that water sources will increase to match the commensurate increase in supply.

Naturally, it goes without saying that agriculture is and will continue to be the largest water guzzler. Demand for water in agriculture constituted (97.7%), drinking water (1.8%) and industry a mere (0.5%). This picture would change in the year 2030 where agriculture's share is expected to drop to (88.2%), drinking waters' share will increase to (7.5%) and that for industry would also increase up to (4.3%).

Thus, the way to contain this problem and to address its rudimentary causes requires a great deal of imagination and courage. The following ideas are introduced for consideration :

1. Regional and corporate water action is needed in the area under consideration. To do that in the long-run, confidence building measures are required in both the short and long-terms. Thus, it is imperative that internationally agreed principles and justice over water sharing rights should be installed. Without this step, apriori, it is difficult to see how future regional cooperation can develop. None of the Middle East countries, regardless of how much water is currently available under their disposal, is immune from future chronic shortages. Thus, a time preferential approach to

this all-encompassing water problem requires solid base of mutual trust in the long-run. Short-term sacrifices need to be made for the advantage of all in the future.

2. In the long-run, it is obvious that the need for food, which in turn is dependent on population, is the main determinant of demand for water. If all countries pursue individual food security programmes, demand for water would rise to dangerous limits. A regional agricultural plan is highly needed. The countries should engage vehemently in an agricultural plan based on comparative advantage among them and a competitive edge of them all vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

3. Although donors to the economic cooperation are keen about the introduction of water management and price-rationing in order to decrease the need for expensive water projects, such a scheme may not be politically feasible in the short-run. All parties to peace negotiations are engaged in an uphill fight with their constituencies over the advantages of peace. Each party is expected to accept a peace package that needs to be sold to the competent constituencies. Should that peace bear little dividends and more economic sacrifices, its palatability by the public would be rendered more difficult. Thus, emphasis in the short and medium runs should focus on both water management and enhancing water supply.

4. Within the countries concerned, a possible scheme of water pooling and sharing may be required on a mutually beneficial and equally profitable bases. The variation in seasonal demand and varying needs according to crops will make it possible for such water pooling schemes to be a thinkable idea. This can be done on a profit-sharing bases or on a fair quantity exchange over time . This proposal needs rigorous and detailed research.

5. Water enhancing schemes such as recycling of waste water requires intensive cooperation . Industrial water waste and sewage systems water surplus should be collectively harressed and used in agriculture.

6. Another cooperation area is required to build dams (Magarin dam on the Yarmouk) and water desalination projects (the Red-Dead canal).

7. Since cooperation is mandatory in the future a well documented and a thoroughly binding "code of conduct" is required. Without an agreement on such a conduct, confidence would never be created to do the synergetic water action required.

8. For future water schemes, the M.E countries should think in the long-run of including Iraq into their network. It is the most feasible partner. Iraq adds vast field crop potential, water sources and the needed energy to build large water schemes. Although in a short-term perspective, such a suggestion is fraught with political no no's , in the long-run where everything is assumed variable, Iraq presents an ideal solution to the regional profile of cooperation on water and agriculture. From there on, other countries can be included particularly Turkey. The piece pipe project could eventually be a feasible project politically as well as economically.

Jawad Anani

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DEMOCRATISATION, SELF-DETERMINATION AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

[Theme Three: Session IX]

by Bahgat Korany

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ST ANTONY'S COLLEGE
ST ANTONY'S COLLEGE, OXFORD OX2 6JF · TELEPHONE: (0865) ~~59651~~ · FAX: (0865) ~~310518~~ 311475 (direct
~~SENIOR MEMBER [illegible] (0865) 703866~~
→ direct 274471

HOW DOES DEMOCRATIZATION INFLUENCE STRATEGIC STABILITY?

AN IJTIHAD PAPER

Bahgat Korany
Department of Political Science;
University Program Of Arab Studies,
Université de Montreal.
(May 1992)

Paper presented to the IISS conference on Regional Security ,held in Istanbul,June,1992 .

This paper was prepared when I was for 1991-92 a Senior Associate Member of St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. I profited immensely from the stimulating and warm atmosphere of the College's Middle East Centre.

Ijtihad in Islamic jurisprudence denotes the use of independent judgement when holy scriptures or authoritative texts are either silent about the advisable social behaviour, or they are too general to be applicable to the concrete situation at hand. Though there is in the standard social science literature much mention of democratization and (much less) of strategic stability, their definitions are woolly and the linkage, despite its importance, is virtually absent from the analysis. To make the meeting's discussion as specific and, hopefully, as useful as possible, the assigned topic has been reformulated in a more operational way: what is the relationship between democratization (the independent variable or the determinant) and strategic stability (the dependent variable or outcome). In principle, nothing in scientific cannons could prevent participants from starting by questioning the existence of such a linkage.

INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with two ambiguities, democratisation and strategic stability, and their assumed linkage. The word "assumed" to qualify linkage should not be taken as derogatory; quite the contrary. The linkage between type of domestic system and type of international behaviour is mandatory and especially welcome in a field of strategic studies that has conventionally blackboxed internal state-society dynamics. But the linkage is also elusive. To invistigate such a linkage,an expensive research industry based on computers and various quantitative studies prospered in North America in the 1960's and 1970's until the funds finally dried up without the research leaving unambiguous conclusions (Rummel1963; Zinnes1966;Welkenfield1973). In the 1990's, the assumed linkage is turning up again and seems hard to resist. The speedy collapse of the erstwhile eastern bloc leaves the impression of a historical inevitability: that of progress-as-democracy.And for many both inside and outside Iraq, the disastrous miscalculations of Saddam Hussein prove the inherent benefit of "democracy". As an Arab newspaper put it:

> "the imperative at present is how to prevent a despotic leader from destroying his neighbours and his own country without any member of his entourage daring to say 'no'" (El-Hayat: 13/3/91).

In discussing this assumed linkage, we must first consider democratisation and then try to specify the meaning of strategic

stability, before finally reflecting on the possibility and type of linkage between these two political phenomena.

DEMOCRATIZATION

The two big world projects on democratization of the late 1980's, with their eight volumes already published (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986- , Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour M. Lipset 1989-) did not include any Arab case study. This is why the discussion is centred here on the Arab core of the Middle East region(Hilal-Dessouki1977&1982), and especially since the other three countries of the area (Turkey, Iran and Israel) seem to have opted for their own version of political system.

In these Arab countries the emphasis on democratization could not be more exaggerated. The last six months have seen the initiation of two periodicals devoted to this issue ("Democracy" since December, and "Civil Society: Democratic Transformation in the Arab World", January 1992), and a well-established periodical, El-Moustaqhal, published by the center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, has specified in its April issue that its documentary part, usually focused on international events data, will now have a distinct section under the heading "Arab Civil Society" (El-Moustaqhal No.158, p.159, 165-66). In January 1992 the same centre convened more than 90 Arab scholars from the Maghreb, the Mashreq and expatriates to discuss precisely this same issue: Arab Civil Society and Democratization. Clearly then, the issue of democracy is high on the region's agenda. The months and years to come are bound to witness, both inside and outside the region, big debates

on the subject. Indeed they seem to have begun already (e.g.Brynen 1992 ; Esposito and Piscatori,1991, Hudson1991).

One of the first tasks that this growing literature will have to face up to is to define operationally what it means by democracy. As used now, it is limited to political pluralism, especially a multiparty system and elections(ta'adiddiya). Important though these characteristics are of a "democratic" political system, they are of a purely formal nature, limited to the tip of the iceberg. A majority of the population sometimes does not bother to vote, and when they do, the ballots are often rigged.

Building on this conventional concept of liberal democracy and the work of several writers in the field (Small and Singer 1976, Doyle 1983, Weede 1884, Rummel 1987, Schweller 1992), the characteristics of democracy as defined here are:

1) scheduled elections held periodically with free participation of opposition parties

2) at least 30% of the adult population is able to vote

3) a parliament that controls or enjoys parity with the executive branch

4) a system of government that is stable (in existence for at least three years)

5)private property and a free enterprise economy

6)citizens who possess effective juridical rights.

Even before the upsurge of talk about democratization following the Gulf Crisis, the process itself was already well under way in many of the countries of the region (e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen ..) , and some timid measures of economic liberalisation had

been initiated in many others, including Syria and Iraq itself. But the upsurge following the crisis was logical, for in both international history and the history of the region itself, the democratisation process has often been associated with "big bang" or "threshold" events. We know that the popularisation of the suffragette in many Western countries followed hard on the First World war, and Huntington chronicles a second wave of democratisation with the end of the Second World War, a wave which reached its peak by 1962 when the number of "democratic" countries amounted to 36 ("Democracy's Third Wave" Journal of Democracy 2, Spring 1991; also Huntington and Watanuki, 1975; and Huntington 1984).

Though the democratization process is not necessarily irreversible, and "downs" may well follow "ups" (Sudan is a notable example that comes to mind), we are now in the third wave that started in Southern Europe in the mid seventies (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and continues now in Eastern Europe.

For the Arab countries the big bang that influenced the present democratization process goes back to 1967, a consequence of the so-called Six-Day War. The Arab defeat went beyond its purely military dimension to put in question the social contract then existing between activist populist regimes (Nasserist, Baathist) and their masses. This social contract was based on a trade-off between, on the one hand, the primacy of political independence, social justice and the defence of Pan-Arab ideals (including Palestine as a core issue) and, on the other, the subordination of liberal democracy and the defence of individual political rights.

The defeat affected the credibility of these populist activist regimes, and social groups both old and new started a process of putting this trade-off into question. At the Pan-Arab level, the defeat sowed the seeds of what would become in the following decade the victory of Raison d'Etat, the go-it-alone diplomacy of the territorial state at the expense of Pan-Arab coordination, or raison de la nation. But more of this later.

Whereas the rise of raison d'Etat was a uniform phenomenon in the various Arab territorial states, the democratization process is a function of the characteristics of the different political systems and the social dynamics at ~~its~~ their basis. Thus growth of the process could be uneven, depending on the particular dominant political culture (tribal, religious or based on the secularising middle class); or societal homogeneity (mosaic societies like Lebanon or the Sudan versus relatively homogeneous ones like Egypt); or previous democratic experience (Kuwait versus Saudi Arabia).

THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE ... WORSENING EVEN WITHIN THE "ARAB" CORE

The Middle East has traditionally been described as a dangerous neighbourhood (Kemp, 1991), that is one whose threats are not only multiple but especially multidimensional, leading not only to numerous but especially protracted conflicts. (On protracted social conflicts in this context see notably Azar,1970,1987) The two main violent conflicts that dominated the region until 1990 (Arab-Israeli and Iraq-Iran) were not merely territorial, but involved communal, religious and "identity" issues. These protracted

conflicts seemed to be associated with Arab/non-Arab demarcation lines. For even if for the majority of analysts the Middle East is an exotic mixture, a mosaic of religious fundamentalists, natural resources, raw military power and a myriad of criss-crossing political and social tensions, it is still perceived as a mosaic with an Arab core.

This core is not only a group of sovereign states, but is characterized by the intensity of links (material, political and especially societal). Linguistic and cultural homogeneity created a sense of kinship and larger Arab identity that transcended individual nationalities. As a result, this Arab core came to resemble a vast sound chamber in which currents of thought, as well as information, circulated widely and enjoyed considerable resonance across state frontiers. Cross-frontier alliances were created, and associations between the government of one Arab state and individuals or groups in others. Moreover, scientists in sensitive national security sectors such as nuclear research and development worked in the service of another state without being considered mercenaries.There has been a high level of interconnectedness and permeability among Arab states and societies.

In the collctive psychology, state frontiers have been less important as barriers than the distinction Arab/non-Arab. Briefly, the Arab core has resembled less the traditional group of states as billiard balls that come into contact only at their hard outer shells, rather more a large-scale domestic system divided into components of varying degrees of permeability (Korany 1990;Noble

1991).

As a result, an important characteristic of the Middle East strategic landscape is a certain duality, if not ambiguity, of the idea of national security. It is the oscillation between raison d'etat or a (territorial) state's conventional security (in Arabic amn qutri or watani) and raison de la nation, or threats to the Pan-Arab ideal (amn qawmi).

In this respect the Gulf crisis is a watershed and its first victims are the possibility of Arab collective action and the credibility of the Pan-Arab ideal itself. Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait exploited both of them to death. Not long before Saddam ordered the invasion, Iraqi foreign minister, Tareq Aziz, declared that iraq considered the Arabs "over and above national boundaries to be one nation, that what belonged to them should belong to all and benefit all ... Despite its division into states, the Arab world nevertheless remained one country, every inch of which must be considered in accordance with a nationalistic vision ...and the demands of a common Arab identity." (Middle East Magazine,March 1992).

But even though Baghdad insisted on some collective issues to arouse mass appeal (war as a Jihad against non-Moslems and their collaborators contaminating the holy places; the necessity of redistributing Arab oil wealth between petro-dollar-surplus countries and demographic-surplus ones), there was an element of scepticism about Iraq's policy amongst observers, and suspicion of bad faith. Firstly, Saddam and the Baath generally had waged war

against Islamic Iran in the name of secular nationalism. Secondly, Iraq was also an Arab oil power, second only to Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, its G.N.P. per capita was 9 times that of Somalia, 5 times that of the Sudan, and just less than 4 times that of Egypt. More importantly, Iraq had not implemented any redistribution plan for pan-Arab wealth before its invasion of Kuwait.

This is why Baghdad's move resembled a crude way of harnessing the pan-Arab ideal to the service of realpolitik, thereby downgrading the ideal. Baghdad's inconsistency in accounting for the conflict with Kuwait made the invasion look like a conventional move of territorial aggrandizement, with a huge economic and financial tag - an inter-state hold-up for about 150 to 200 billion dollars of Kuwait's financial reserves and the possibility of controlling half the world's oil production and two thirds of its known reserves. Thus the watani or qutri level of state security came to be primary as opposed to the collective or gawmi level.

It must be said, of course, that territorial national interest -watani security- has not been absent from inter-Arab politics. The Arab League Charter is state-oriented. Moreover, military conflicts have existed between Morocco and Algeria, North and South Yemen, Egypt and Sudan,Egypt and Libya, not to mention 12 potential border conflicts among Gulf countries. But in inter-Arab politics nothing had equalled Iraq's action in its explicit negation of another state's raison d'etre. The day after the invasion, top Iraqi officials were despatched by Saddam Hussein to Arab League headquarters (Saadun Hamadi) and to Riyad (Azza Ibrahim) to reiterate in categorical terms Iraq's historical rights

over Kuwait. For instance, Azza Ibrahim said to King Fahd, "Kuwait is part of iraq that has come back to the motherland". Fahd had to retort "If this were the case, what were we mediating during the last few months, and why did Baghdad treat Kuwait like an independent state since 1963 and receive its emir as head of an independent state?" (Heikal 1992: 386) On the 8th of August,1991, Taha Ramadan repeated the same idea to Mubarak, that Kuwait's integration into Iraq as its 19th province was not only final, but was a domestic decision that could not be discussed by other countries, even by Arab brothers (ibid. 418).

As a result there emerged in the psychology of the Gulf countries a fear that traditional threats to their state survival could increasingly come from within the Arab family. A. Bichara, Secretary General of the G.C.C. went as far as to say that the basic threat to the Gulf States was not Israel, but rather some Arab states (ibid. 592). Arab politics have thus become "routinised" with the rise of the national security state where defence against traditional military and external threats from immediate neighbors are primary.

Some consequences automatically follow this shift in basic norms in inter-Arab politics, consequences which are not necessarily conducive to strategic stability, and which lead to the cult of what might be termed a statist security (amn qutri or watani).

1. The emphasis would be narrowed to state or even regime security.
2. This focus of statist security on territorial survival would necessarily subordinate Arab core issues or regional projects.

Security policies would be extremely pragmatic and based on shifting alliances -alliances with non-Arabs against Arabs if need be. Inter-Arab relations could well be based on the traditional balance of power which could evolve into a balance of weaknesses.

3. The means of national security defence would be the traditional ones of military build-up, even though arms flows could be of limited effect. In 1988, for instance,arms flows to the Middle East were 66% of all arms flows to the Third World, but such a military build-up could not deter threats to state security. For instance, in the 20-year period 1971-91 Kuwait spent just over 20 billion dollars on its air-force alone, yet the country was over-run within a few hours.

Since the invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has spent about 10 billion dollars on new arms supplies from the U.S., including one of the biggest arms deals (7.3 billion) to expand land capability. According to Gen. Khaled Bin Sultan there are plans to triple the size of the Saudi army to 200, 000 men. But given Saudi limited personnl in the short term, such plans have to be based on close coordination with U.S. forces and their return en masse in case of crisis.(M.E.I. Feb. 1992).

4. The rise of statist militarised security would not stop or even reduce the prevalence of regional conflict.

a) Since such a highly militarised state would be too obsessed with its survival and defence against "all threats", it could well be a repressive state suffering from an increasing legitimacy deficit.

b) Because of its subordination to foreign allies, it could not

solve the problem of national identity in the face of pan-Islamic groups or otherwise.

c) It could be on the defensive if its external allies are perceived as exercising double standards between Arabs and non-Arabs or abusing their hegemonic position.

The problems of this Gulfian statist security complicate and are complicated by the prevalence of conflict and security threats in the region itself. For if the forces that supported the Iraqi leader are partially discredited by the scope of his failure, the basic aspects of regional disorder (wealth disparities, foreign predominance, Palestinian issue) remain strong beneath the surface. They could reemerge in violent form later. This latent conflict and the prevalence of threats could increase if the immediate future witnesses a reduction in the transfer of labour, of remittances and of petro-dollar foreign aid.

IN SEARCH OF STRATEGIC STABILITY: CAN DEMOCRATIZATION HELP?

If democratisaztion has been incompletely or ambiguously defined, a definition of strategic stability is to all intents and purposes non-existent. The nearest to a definition comes from arms control specialists and equates arms parity with the possibility of reducing wars - wars of either opportunity or of vulnerability. It is not that the history of arms control schemes in the region has been successful in its results (Kemp[redacted],1991, for the most recent analysis), but arms parity is too thin a phenomenon to be equated with strategic stability. The combing of the relevant strategic literature reveals the dominance of a certain conception of

strategic stability (conception one) that could serve as a basis for adaptation to the present Middle East context (conception two), especially with the onset of democratization (conception three).

I - The dominant conception (one) bases strategic stability on the prevalence of a balance of power system that, minimally, deters the different parties from breaking out into war and, maximally, encourages them toward the creation of a system of mutual or common national security. Both history and theory have confirmed three principal rules of this balancing system.

1. The defining element of the international arena is the absence of central government and hence the prevalence of anarchy and self-help.

2. Sovereign states -not empires or societies- are at the basis of this anarchical system. They are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority, obsessed with their "national" security.

3. Since the state is the system's basis and norm, its survival (even if it is defeated like Iraq) is cherished. Moreover, the creation of a new one could be accommodated provided -and this is an important condition- it does not jeopardize the existence of participating state members.

In one of its most categorical articles, the O.A.U. Charter - while admitting the artificiality and injustice of border-demarcation by colonial authorities- pledges <u>non-</u>support for any secessionist movement and the preservation of member states as presently constituted. The bloody civil war in Nigeria and the ultimate death of the Biafra state shows that the pledge has been

respected. In the Middle East context this would explain why the creation of a Palestinian state could be accommodated but not, for instance, a Kurdish one. What might favour a potential Palestinian state -according to the logic of this system- are such factors as the relative historical newness of the modern state of Israel, Palestine's historical legacy, and a supportive view by the majority of system members for its creation.

For the creation of a Kurdish state, however, the odds are quite the opposite, if only because four major members of the regional system could claim that their own stability is greatly jeopardized by the creation of such a state. An independent Kurdistan would absorb a sizeable chunk of south-eastern Turkey, meander west into syria and occupy lands under the control of Iran and Iraq. This potential country, with a population of 17 million, would control much of the water supply of the Middle East, plus strategic reserves of copper and coal. It would also gain Iraq's oilfields. An underdeveloped and fragmented community would become a regional superpower almost overnight (J. Bullock and Harvey Morris, 1992). But is not the principle of self-determination violated in this case? Certainly it is, but the balance of power system has valued inter-state solidarity over democracy. It purports to be a pragmatic, amoral system.

Fetishism for the existing state is very much in keeping with the basic tenets of the balancing system whose functioning is based not on domestic politics, but on the relationship between soveriegn states viewed as billiard balls or black boxes. And since the principal explanation for war's occurence (or breakdown of

stability) is the anarchic international structure, the goodwill of participating states is mandatory to the working of the system. As Kenneth Waltz expressed it more than thirty years ago:

> "with many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire - conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur." (Waltz 1959: 159)

Even some quantitatively oriented researchers (Mc Gowan and Shapiro, 1973; Zinnes 1980) seemed to agree with Waltz in slighting the importance of regime type in its relation to international outcomes.

Why then is the debate on democratization linked to the objective of strategic stability? This brings us to conception two of strategic stability.

II - In fact in the post-Gulf War Middle East we are not in a self-regulating balance of power system, but rather in a regional power system with an external hegemon holding the balance. It is thus a system of hegemonic stability. For the Gulf War ended with some major regional winners (e.g. the non-Arab states of Iran, Turkey and Israel, followed by the Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition). But above and beyond these regional winners, there is the hegemon who actually decided the issue of war/peace as well as the shaping of both configurations. If the so-called new world order is a unipolar one in the military-diplomatic sphere, it is even more so in the Middle East. At a time when various regions are

increasing their autonomy, the U.S. in the Middle East comes out of the Gulf War with the decisive word concerning the future of Iraq, the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional restructuring generally. Both the war-time experience and the consolidation of the militarised "national security" state are increasing U.S. military dominance and regional dependence. Dependence is increasing not only because of increased military purchases but also because of the developemnt of externally-induced command infrastructure, joint exercises or prepositioning of material. Since the mass media has emphasised the technological nature of this war, there is bound to be more demand by the region's armed forces for U.S. military supplies. The Middle East region has become the epitome of a unipolar international system

Since this hegemon or external balancer is also the leader of the camp of liberal democracies, there is _consciously or unconsciously _ resurgence of the belief that democracies are much more peaceful than dictatorships which are conceived to be war-prone and adventurous. The literature on this assumed linkage is at present growing and witnissing a heated debate (Chan 1984;Rummel 1983&1985 ;Small&Singer 1976 ;Schweller 1992 ;Weede 1984) It should be emphasised at the outset that the linkage democratic states/peaceful system is not a contemporary innovation. Kant wrote that despots -for whom war did not require the least sacrifice- may " resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition. But where the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether there would be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who would have to decide to

undergo all the deprivations of war will very much hesitate to start such an evil game" (Kant as in Waltz 1962). In 1949 George Kennan declared that "a democratic society cannot plan a preventive war. Democracy leaves no room for conspiracy in the great matters of state" (as quoted in Gaddis 1982: 49). Almost thirty years later he repeated the same idea in insisting that the sharp divisions of powers characteristic of democratic political systems rules out "the privacy, the flexibility, and the promptness and incisiveness of decision and action which have marked the great imperial powers of the past and which are generally considered necessary to the conduct of an effective world policy by the rulers of a great state" (Kennan 1977:4). Samuel Huntington was equally categorical: "Liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function" (Huntington 1967:144). And liberal political systems seem to transfer to the international arena their own political culture based on individual liberties to attenuate the harshness of international anarchy.

The most recent data seem to be supportive of this linkage democratic system/less warlike international conduct. The analysis of twenty great-powers preventive wars since 1665 (Schweller 1992) indicates that

"1. only non-democratic regimes have waged preventive wars, and they have done so regardless of the nature of the opponent;

2. declining democratic leaders have accommodated (rather than fought) democratic challenges; and

3. declining democratic leaders have attempted to counterbalance rising authoritarian challenges through the formation of defensive

alliance systems"

What about Israel, then? The Jewish state has been readily accepted as the only real democracy in the region and yet it has practised almost all types of war -from skirmishes to large-scale invasions, defensive as well as preventive. Rather than attaining the desired status of welfare state it approached that of the warfare state. In the years 1966-75, Israel's military expenditure averaged 49.8% of the national budget (Leitenberg and Ball 1980)

The explanation given hinges on Israel as the exception that confirms the rule, given the history of the Jewish people and the sustained hostility of the regional environment. Whatever the reason, Israel's war-prone behaviour reflected a domestic political structure that offset factors deterring wars by democracies: liberal moral values, party politics, pacifist public opinion and liberal complaisance (Schweller, 1992). And if Israel's war-prone behaviour is an exception, what about the case of the "largest democracy" of this contemporary world: India? India has engaged in a few wars against its neighbors and maintained a hegemonic policy in its South Asian regional system.

It is not that the presumed linkage should be merely brushed aside and we return to conception one of strategic stability : the balance of power system with its blackboxing of regime type and state-society dynamics. It is rather that we should move toward conception three of strategic stability, the stability emerging from the networking of the participants, not only of their "sovereign" states but especially of their societies. This s strategic stability based on interdependence leading finally to the

emergence of what was called about 35 years ago "security community", (Deutsch & al.1957) where war is increasingly excluded as a means of statecraft.

111-What has been absent from the discussion of the linkage democratic regime/war aversion as enunciated in conception two of strategic stability is a basic concept for all regimes, but especially for democratic ones: the concept of cost. Even Kant talked about the public's expectation of the costs of war as an important factor. Democracies are based on the freedom of expression that could generate a complex of factors lessening the motivation to initiate war by expressing a strong opposition to pay its cost. We know now that Saddam Hussein counted too much on the lengthy debates in the U.S., especially those between the Administration and the Congress, about the expected numbers of casualties to prevent the allies' attack.

It is this cost element that is at the basis of conception three of strategic stability and which has not figured largely in the conventional strategic literature. This stability-through-interdependence emphasizes the multiplicity and the density of interactions and hence the costliness of breakdowns, not only among states but especially among societies. Consequently, because more people are involved, more people are interested in maintaining the stability. Moreover, the costs of its breakdown trickle down to issues other than the military-diplomatic emphasised by conception one which is based on balance of power, sovereign states and territorial issues - the conventional high politics. This

conception three is much more reflective of the "global village" - especially economically and ideationally- that characterises both regional and international politics at present.

How does this conception three relate to the Middle East's strategic stability? To start with, interdependence does not preclude conflict. On the contrary, by putting more people in contact, and increasing the issues whereby they are linked, it can increase rather than reduce conflict. But because the bonds of interdependence are multiple and societal, and mutual vulnerabilities are strong, mobilizable social armies are present to resist the breakdown of networks especially through the use of force. Moreover, interdependence

"...gives states an expanded repertoire of instruments with which they can influence each other's behaviour... . Force is best used to determine control of territory, but in an interdependent and technologically sophisticated world, control of territory is not as attractive a solution as it once was to a wide range of problems. Armed force is a poorly tuned instrument for many interdependence issues." (Buzan 1991 ;Koehane and Nye,1977,1988).

It is this conception three of strategic stability that is closely linked to a society's rate of democratization. Interdependence favours the emergence and formation of non-state recruits and their involvement in varied international transactions. But interdependence is also reinforced by their presence and strength. They become the new social recruits to stand against the state's war-proneness and the disruption of networks. In other words stability through interdependence develops and is

maintained by civil society, the sine qua non of a democratic political system.

This elastic term "civil society" is used here to distinguish a societal sphere from the state sphere, as the state was distinguished from the Church in seventeenth century Europe. Moreover, it attracts attention to how social groups influence -if not shape- state policies. Civil society is thus constituted of these organised groups - business , educational or even recreational - that are situated between, on the one hand, the state elite or official decision-makers and, on the other, primordial organisations based on ascriptive, inherited or given criteria of membership (e.g.tribal origin or religious identity). In its institutional form, civil society is the network of voluntary associations based on the defence of their members' individual interests -e.g. interest or pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, clubs. Membership in civil society institutions is thus -contrary to both state or primordial associations- based on choice, the essence of a democratic political culture. The presence and development of civil society is not only the basis of a democratic political system, but also its promotional agents. It socialises people into basic democratic norms: free debate, acceptance of interest and opinion diversity, tolerance of others' views, information gathering and procesing, competition for election and hence accountability. Civil society incarnates -as De Tocqueville said more than a century ago - inspection and control of state officials so that they base their decisions on the interests of those concerned. By its autonomy,

civil societyies is supposed to counter-balance state-hegemony and check its dictat in policy-making, in going to war or otherwise.

Contrary to many misconceptions, the different histories of the Arab countries show that voluntary associations existed long before the emergence of independent states, either to defend local culture against a foreign invading one, or to work for education and social issues such as the status of women, for economic growth (Egypt's Talat Harb Scheme),or in the form of literary clubs.

An example can help in clarifiying this interpendence of civil societies . The problem of increasing water shortage in the region shows that civil societies are involved whether state officials want it or not. Historically, the availability of water resources has been linked to the development of settled communities, the rise and demise of empires and civilisations. In a region of over-use, under-supply and charges of outright theft, water is literally a factor of survival and must be at the basis of any programme of food security as well as daily functioning. When Turkey, for instance, stopped the flow of the Euphrates for a month in Jan.-Feb. 1990, this not only affected agriculture in both Syria and Iraq, but also provoked frequent electricity cuts in both countries.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: ON THE LONG MARCH TO DEMOCRATIZATION AND STRATEGIC STABILITY.

In the discussion of the assumed linkage, I might have convinced you that in the first two conceptions of strategic stability, the relationship with democratization is a dubious one,

whereas conception three both reinforces and is reinforced by democratization. But the above discussion also shows that the type of strategic stability and its accompanying democratization process might well be a long-term one. Consequently, it is more probable than not that the process will hit some landmines on the way and relapse into occasional political reversal or even decay.

The understanding of democratisation used here makes of it certainly a much longer process that goes much deeper than the easy way out associated with the establishment of a Majlis, so ardently debated in many Gulf countries. Whether or not such a Majlis is based on Shura, it by itself cannot be equated with the realisation of democracy. This cult of 'shurocracy' might well be, in a tribal, atavistic system, a step forward, but it does not substantially alter the present structure of state/society relations in these countries. Hence, it would not have much effect -negative or positive- on strategic stability.

Moreover, though elections are an important indicator of the democratization process, even they as a part of the Ta'aduddiya political process cannot be equated with the achievement of democracy. For instance, in Egypt only a third of the population of voting age was registered, and in the 1990 elections only 44% of the registered voters cast ballots. Some journalistic reports did not rate participation in some Cairo districts at more than 6% (Rodenbeck, 1990). And though not the case here, we know too well how easily elections can be rigged.

Deep democratization goes beyond this "decor" democracy and involves the multiplication of autonomous civil society

associations and socialisation into a 'democratic political culture' (i.e. democratic values and orientations at the basis of political action). For instance, a characteristic of a democratic political culture is tolerance and even encouragement of the expression of differences of opinion. Such an encouragement could be particularly welcome in the region to offset the negative effects of a built-in collective psychology of automatic obedience -submission to authority (for details, Hilal-Dessouki et al 1981; Galiun, 1992; Ibrahim 1991; Labib 1992; Sharabi 1989).

Far from being utopian, there are common factors in the region favouring this trend toward deep democratization. There is, firstly, the demonstration effect, internationally of course, but also increasingly within some countries of the region. There is, secondly, in many countries the legitimacy deficit (Korany 1991) and the institutional malaise felt among members of the governing elite itself. There is, thirdly, the economic distress in the region which pushes many countries to reconsider their previous statist policies and to establish more liberalised ones. Liberalisation, economic as well as political, is a fertile soil for the formation of voluntary associations and the consolidation of civil society to counterbalance the irresistible drive toward a Mukhabarat state. For instance, Algeria's democratization process, and its troubles, cannot be divorced from the country's economic distress. Because of collapsing gas and oil prices, by 1985-86 Algeria's real revenues had fallen, according to its former Prime Minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, by 80%.

"With a population growth rate of 2.8% and 60% of that

population under 25, the revolution's commitment to popular welfare, full employment and development simply could not be sustained. Worse, the quality of life sharply declined: household income fell sharply, and the U.S. embassy estimated a 10% decline in private consumption in 1987. Factories were operating at only 30-40 % of capacity. As unemployment approached 22% in 1988, the government estimated it needed to create at least 90,000 new jobs a year, but investment spending was shrinking drastically." (Hudson 1991)

But there are landmines on the way to deep democratisation:

1. I have already mentioned how the achievement of this process could be long-term, and is thus liable to setbacks and reverses.
2. The process could be lengthened even further because of the tendency of many governing elites who perceive democratization and civic liberties as grants from authorities rather than people's rights. For instance, in 1984 a conference convened by Arab scholars to discuss problems of democracy in the region had finally to meet in Limasol in Cyprus because no Arab government would give the necessary authorisation for its convening (Democracy in the Arab World 1984). In November 1991, a relatively liberal-minded leader like King Hussein qualified the country's government in his throne speech as 'my government' 25 times. Before him President Sadat used to talk of 'my army', 'my government' and of Egypt as a big family of whom he was the head. This ownership ethos of the governing elite is the

epitome of what Max Weber qualified in the 1920's as a patrimonial political system. The defining characteristic of such a system is the lack of distinction between public and private property.

3. Such neo-patrimonial governing elites are helped by the lingering ascriptive bases of social structure, based on inherited social status and blood relationships rather than achievement. The case of the tribally-based Gulf countries is too clear to be mentioned here. But the case of Lebanon - once considered by democracy theorists (Lijphart 1968, 1972) a bright success story of consociational democracy - is depressingly revealing in this respect. This country's parliaments between 1920 and 1972 have been dominated by a few families on purely ascriptive bases. During this 52-year period 425 deputies occupied 965 seats, but the deputies belonged to no more than 200 families. Of these deputies only 30% did not have a direct family relationship with other deputies, whereas 10% were sons of deputies, 7% brothers of deputies and 8% cousins of deputies. In the 1968 elections, for instance, 42% of the 99 deputies were either cousins, nephews or in-laws of other deputies and over a fifth (21 deputies) inherited the position from their fathers (Salama 1987: 71 ;Tawfik-Ibrahim 1992). Given Lebanon's persistent social structure, a new parliament in the post-civil war era would not radically change this situation, at least in the short run.

These handicaps raise the crucial question of the socio-economic bases of democratization and, whether liberal democracy - based as it is on Western evolutionary experiences and Judeo-Christian culture - could easily be exported to other lands. This issue is of course basic to the debate on the linkage democratization/strategic stability in at least three ways.

1. The trade-off between political democracy and social democracy. Can hungry and poor people in abject economic distress afford to stick up endlessly for their political rights? How could they, for instance, afford the increasing sacrifice of being marginalised in the opposition? Evidence from local elections in the 1960's and 1970's in both Egypt and Morocco showed that voters were influenced more by primordial loyalties and expectations of the material benefits they would receive from certain candidates than by the way power is exercised. The trend in Morocco's elections between 1976 and 1988 showed a diminishing support for major opposition parties (Al-Sayyid, 1991). Would not the rejection of bribery be simply too costly and irresistible? At present there is an increasing feeling that the 'stability' of the rentier state is mainly due to its largesse, becoming almost a 'bakshish state'.

2. If liberal democracy smacks of imported democracy and thus misses its mobilisation potential, would not 'islamic democracy' seem to be a better alternative, more attuned to the satisfaction of basic needs, including identity needs? But if historically worldwide patterns of democratization have been associated with secularisation, how can we fit into the new democratic process slogans such as "The Qur'an is our constitution" and "Islam is the

Solution"? Would we need to devise, for instance, a new definition of the concept of citizenship, historically the bedrock of the democratization process?

3. If promotion for the secular concept of citizenship means standing up against religious fundamentalism, should not such a stand be extended to all types of fundamentalism, Jewish as well as christian? And in the case of Islam, if fundamentalism is qualified as "undemocratic", would such condemnation be limited to opposition or "people's" Islam, or be extended to official government islam? For if well-established Western democracies are perceived as practising double or triple standards, how can the credibility of democracy and "democrats" as a symbol be maintained? How can some people be prevented from perceiving that democratisation is the new ideological gimmick of neo-crusaders, and that in fact the ultimate hidden agenda is realpolitik and the status quo (i.e.stability almost at any price)?

These, as we have said, are not "academic" or "ivory tower" issues, but dilemnas of moral choice in daily political and social behaviour. It is these deep ambiguities and moral dilemnas that explain some of the most intriguing results of recent social surveys. In one of the rare public opinion surveys in 1980 in 10 Arab countries about important public demands, the demand for democracy came as the penultimate on a list of 7 demands. These were in descending order: putting an end to Arab divisions, settling the arab-Israeli conflict, facing up to the problems of economic and social development, putting an end to foreign domination in the region and improving the flagrant social gap

between classes. Democracy was mentioned as a demand by only 5.4%. Ten years later another sample, this time from 18 Arab countries, was asked about the most important challenges facing the Arab world. The insistence on democracy had almost doubled, scoring 11%. But it is still quite a low figure. It was ranked number 6 on a list of 8 challenges, and was preceded by worries about the technological-economic challenge, the demographic-environmental one, social problems, continuation of Arab fragmentation, foreign threats (Israeli as well as others). It is important to add that the sample included mainly highly-educated people with 75% of the respomdents having a Ph.D. (Ibrahim 1991)

While pondering on the results of these two surveys (and the conceptual-methodological pitfalls of conducting surveys in the "non-Western", "non-democratic" world), we might well be realising that the irresistible march toward democracy could well be long indeed, and associated, at least in the short-run , with instability.

But is not instability the basis of social transformation and the antithesis of stagnation? For instance ; Algeria's liberalisation policies resulted in the constitution of as many as 13,000 civic societies and Yemen's in the establishment of 39 political parties! Have we forgotten the debates of the 1970's about how modernisation could lead to instability in the transition phase? Is not "a bit of instability on the way" a risk worth taking to attain the objective of ending one-man or one-family rule and give "power to the people"? In this case the ultimate meaning of strategic stability could well be societal transformation based on social engineering.