NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND
MARITIME SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Istituto affari internazionali
Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Rome, 7-8/V/1992

a. "Conference programme"
b. "Participants"
1. "Maritime security and arms control in an altered strategic situation"/ (Richard Hill)
2. "Rethinking naval arms control"/ Robert Dalsjo, Johan Tunberger, Lars Wedin
3. "Naval arms control and maritime security in the Mediterranean : a perspective from the U.S. vantage point"/ Bradford Dismukes
4. "Naval arms control and maritime security in the Mediterranean : a British perspective"/ (Gordon Wilson)
5. "Naval arms control in the Mediterranean : military aspects"/ Marco Carnovale
6. "Naval arms control in the Mediterranean : Egyptian point of view"/ Mourad Ebrahiem Al-Dessouke
7. "Naval arms control and maritime security in the Mediterranean : a Turkish perspective"/ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu
8. "The problem of naval arms control in the Mediterranean: law of the sea and legal policies involved"/ Natalino Ronzitti
9. "The Soviet naval arms control overtures for the Mediterranean: will Russia accept this heritage?"/ Georgi M. Sturua
10. "Politics of Mediterranean security and prospects for naval arms control"/ Laura Guazzone

Istituto Affari Internazionali

IAI

RESEARCH PROJECT ON

Naval Arms Control and Maritime Security in the Mediterranean

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Sponsored by the **Ford Foundation**

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Rome, 7-8 May 1992

Center for Higher Defense Studies
Piazza della Rovere, 83

<u>Conference Program</u>

7 MAY 1992

9:30 - 10:00   Welcome and opening Remarks by Gen. Giuseppe Degli Innocenti, President of the Center for Higher Defense Studies, and by Cesare Merlini, President of IAI. Introduction to the research project by Marco Carnovale, Project Director.

<u>First Session</u>

Chair: Giuseppe Degli Innocenti

10:00 - 10:30   **Military Aspects**
by Marco Carnovale (IAI)

10:30 - 11:00   **Political Aspects**
by Laura Guazzone (IAI)

11:00 - 11:15   Coffee Break

11:15 - 11:45   Respondents (Schmähling, Prawitz)

11:45 - 13:00   Discussion

13:00 - 14:30   Lunch

Second Session

Chair: John Roper

14:30 - 15:00	**An ex-Soviet Perspective**	by Georgi Sturua (Russia)
15:00 - 15:30	**A Turkish Perspective**	by Ali Karaosmanoglu (Turkey)
15:30 - 16:00	**Legal Aspects**	by Natalino Ronzitti (IAI)
16:00 - 16:20	Coffee Break	
16:20 - 16:50	Respondents (Zoppo, Simic, Cremasco)	
16:50 - 18:00	Discussion	

8 MAY 1992

Third Session

Chair: Bo Huldt

9:30 - 10:00	**An American Perspective**	by Bradford Dismukes (USA)
10:00 - 10:30	**A British perspective**	by Gordon Wilson (UK)
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee break	
11:00 - 11:30	Respondents (Politi; Dimitracopoulos)	
11:30 - 13:00	Discussion	
13:00 - 14:30	Lunch	

Fourth Session

Chair: Gianni Bonvicini

14:30 - 15:00	**A French perspective** by Hervé Couteau-Begarie (France)
15:00 - 15:30	**An Egyptian Perspective** by Mourad El-Dessouky (Egypt)
15:30 - 15:45	Coffee break
15:45 - 16:15	Respondents (Zadra, Feldman)
16:15 - 17:30	Discussion
17:30 - 17:45	Closing Remarks by Gen. Degli Innocenti, Gianni Bonvicini, Director of IAI.
17:45 - 18:15	Restricted session for paper writers to discuss publication plans. (Carnovale, Guazzone, Ronzitti, Wilson, Dismukes, El-Dessouky, Couteau-Begarie, Karaosmanoglu, Sturua)

Istituto Affari Internazionali

IAI

Conference
«Naval Arms Control and Maritime Security in the Mediterranean»

Rome 7-8 May 1992

Participants

IAI
Dr. Gianni BONVICINI-Dr. Marco CARNOVALE-Dr. Maurizio CREMASCO-Dr.ssa Laura GUAZZONE-Prof. Cesare MERLINI-Dr. Alessandro POLITI- Dr. Stefano SILVESTRI

Dr. Rafael BARDAJI- Director, Strategic Studies Group, Madrid - Spain

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Dr. Marco DE ANDREIS- CESPI, Rome - Italy

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Dr. Nicola DE SANTIS- NATO, Brussels - Belgium

Dr. Gianluca DEVOTO- Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, CESPI (Centre for Studies of International Politics, Rome - Italy

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Amm. Guido VENTURONI- Navy's Chief of Staff, Rome - Italy

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Dr. Lars WEDIN- The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm - Sweden

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Prof. Ciro ZOPPO- University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science - USA

MARITIME SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL IN AN ALTERED STRATEGIC SITUATION

Introduction

While the remainder of this Conference will address Mediterranean

issues, this initial talk will consider the broader situation, for two

reasons. First, the Mediterranean although a virtually landlocked sea

cannot be divorced from the wider strategic scene. It has never been so

throughout history and it is plain even from quite recent events that it

cannot be so now. Secondly, the flexibility of naval forces means that

Mediterranean nations cannot ignore the existence of major outside

powers, whether they have forces actually in the Mediterranean or not.

It is proposed in this paper to discuss first the broad issues of

maritime security, including what states think they should have naval

forces for, in the new strategic situation; and then to move on to the

part that arms control could play in enhancing security in the maritime

field. 'Arms Control' will be used in a broad sense, to include both

unilateral and treaty arrangements, and structural and operational

measures.

The Altered Strategic Situation

The most significant strategic statement of the 1980s was not, to the

writer's knowledge, ever made explicitly, yet it was plain by about mid-

1988. It was that if the peoples of Eastern European states decided by

whatever means to change from a Communist to some other form of

government, the Soviet Union (as it then was) would not intervene to
prevent it.

It took some time for this to sink in - nowhere more than in the
erstwhile Eastern European Bloc itself. But once it was realised, the
result was an inevitable crumbling of the Soviet glacis. The rapidity
of subsequent developments, particularly the reunification of Germany,
must have taken many by surprise; their direction should not have done.

These developments have had profound effects on the strategic
situation in NATO in particular, and in the world in general. To take
NATO first, the simplicities of NATO's genesis and fundamental
philosophy may begin to look like an aberration. Was it ever right to
think of the Warsaw Pact as a monolithic, fundamentally opposed,
militarily orientated alliance that was awaiting the opportunity to
sweep across Western Europe? In fact, I believe it probably was right,
so long as the Soviet Union held the hegemony of Eastern Europe; for
armies generally march in the direction they are told to march, and
fight in the way they have been trained to fight. And by that measure
the Warsaw Pact as a whole was a credible threat.

But that view cannot hold now. It is not just a question of warning
time; we all know that that has been greatly extended. It is a matter
much more of both capability and intention, the two basic components of
threat. In neither can it easily be perceived that Russia, or any other
part of the CIS either in concert or separately, is in a position, or
disposed, to assault the West. Of course precaution is still necessary.

The situation to the east is unstable, and there is always the possibility of a desperate throw of some description or other. But straightforward scenarios, of the sort with which NATO played so adeptly from one WINTEX to another, are not on the agenda.

The effect on the world outside the NATO area has been, to all appearances, less profound. Yet one wonders whether that is too facile a view. States in the Indian Ocean and the Far East, in spite of protestations of non-alignment on the part of many of them, were fairly comfortable with a bipolar world. If you fell out with one superpower you might well cultivate the other, and for many of them it was possible to play the China card as well. Now all that has become very fluid. Even the states that hitched themselves firmly to the American star are uneasy. At a recent conference in the Far East the most abiding memory I have is of the passionate desire of the Japanese establishment that a strong American presence should be maintained in the theatre.

Again, the underlying feeling is of the breaking of old certainties, and inability to match them with new ones. South America talks geopolitics; the Far East talks international law and regional power groupings, but is concerned above all with economic factors; the Middle East is as ever riven by religious differences and deep ethnic divisions; and in many parts of the world populations are on the move, a development that in history has always been marked by the more extreme examples of man's inhumanity to man.

The conclusion must be that the old Staff College short cut of
Starting With the Threat simply will not do any more. Even starting
with a multiplicity of threats, supposing some super computer could be
programmed to do so, would not do, for turbulence is bound to throw up
some situation that wasn't on the programme. It will be necessary for
states to examine their interests and build their force structures on
the basis of protecting those interests that to them are vital; and I
would predict that it is national, rather than alliance, interests that
in the first instance will drive the calculations of most medium powers.

Maritime Security

How then are states likely to view the role of maritime forces in this
new, uncertain, interest-based situation? They are likely, it is
suggested, to consider first their vital interests, which in the case of
all states are territorial integrity and political independence, and in
the case of major trading states free access to routes and markets
overseas; they will then consider the nature and level of the most
likely threats to those interests; they will assess the possible
involvement of allies in the defence of those interests and how that
engagement may be secured; and they will consider how arms control can
contribute to their security in the maritime field.

Since this paper is mainly about arms control, the other parts of a
state's assessment as described abovecan only be briefly analysed. So
far as the maritime aspect of defence of vital interests is concerned,
it needs only to be said that it falls into two categories: defence of
interests at sea (commercial shipping, fisheries, installations in the

economic zone, freedom of passage for shipping generally and naval forces in particular, the integrity of the coastline) and by sea (deterrence, upholding stability and the rule of international law, meeting treaty commitments, support of friendly states).

Action in defence of vital interests takes place at four broad levels of conflict: normal conditions, where deterrence is operating as designed and change in the international scene occurs through the normal traffic of diplomacy and commerce, and Naval forces train, visit, exercise the art of Being There, do deterrent patrols and perform constabulary tasks; low intensity operations, limited in aim, scope and area and containing only sporadic acts of violence (if at all) under strict rules of engagement; higher level operations, more military in their objectives and involving the organised use of major weapon systems; and general war. Each level of operations tends to demand different types of force structure, and this is something of an embarrassment for defence planners.

Plans will have to make a judgment on the Reach - the distance from the home base - at which such levels and types of operation can be carried out. Providing the reach necessary to carry out higher levels of operation at great distances from base is an expensive business. It is here, more than in any other aspect of naval planning, that the alliance situation - and the price that one may have to pay for an alliance, in terms of diminished sovereignty, provision of bases, and possible distortion of one's own force structures - has to be taken into account.

The Objectives of Arms Control

Reduced to its ultimate simplicity, the objective of Arms Control is
Improved Mutual Security. Any attempt to add to or put glosses on that
objective may well qualify it unduly or prejudge the issue. For
example, if one adds 'at a lower level of armament', then one is
presupposing means; if one adds 'to reduce the risk of war', then one is
into problems of defining war, threat, aggression, all those highly-
charged questions that have so long exercised the United Nations. But
'improved', 'mutual', and 'security' are all words that are relatively
simple, unambiguous and non-prejudicial.

Perhaps some brief analysis of 'mutual' is however necessary. The
general theory is that arms control measures which satisfy a particular
need for security, as between a limited number of parties, will also
benefit the general security; the rest of the world should be able to
hope they will have that effect. This can equally be a test for less
formal arms control measures, declarations and unilateral limitations.

In the maritime field of arms control there are some special
factors. First and most obviously, maritime activity both civil and
military is not confined to national territory. Following from that,
the use of maritime forces to safeguard the national economic or
strategic interest is an activity of long pedigree. So is the use of
maritime forces to exercise suasion in situations where other national
or allied interests are involved. Such activities have been touched
upon in the previous section; they are one of the principal reasons why
countries have navies, and arms control must take them into account.

Categories of Maritime Arms Control

There are two basic kinds of maritime arms control measure: structural
and operational. Structural measures include the limitation of numbers,
types, tonnages, weaponry, manpower, and budgets. Operational measures
include the limitation of activity by area, by scope and by nature. The
exchange of information relevant to any arms control measure is an
important, often an essential, adjunct to it.

Often agreements are suggested that cover both kinds of measure, or
blur the edges between them. There is nothing basically wrong in such
synergy, but care has to be taken in working it out and if one is going
for simplicities it may be better to keep the two separate. This
blurring is most apparent in the confusion that surrounds the phrase
'confidence building measures'. It has been very widely applied,
particularly by the USSR in the late 1980s, to cover both structural and
operational measures and combinations of the two. In what follows it
will be applied to operational measures only, and further to improve
definition, anything based upon the model of the Stockholm Accords of
1986 will be called - as it is there - a Confidence and Security
Building Measure (CSBM).

Structural Arms Control

No doubt any government, if asked, would say its naval forces were at or
below the absolute minimum level required for its security. More to the
point, most governments would actually believe that within their own
councils. Even those which, by a combination of Reach and Higher Level
fighting abilities, have the capacity to project power to significant

levels well beyond their zones of national jurisdiction, consider they do so in order to protect vital interests, at and by sea, in the manner described in a previous section.

Nor can this perception of bare sufficiency (or indeed of insufficiency) be readily eliminated by the removal or reduction of a single or specific threat. That might have been a course of action appropriate to certain periods post-1945, as it was indeed thought to have been in the 1920s. But in the current situation, where as we have seen threats are diverse and unpredictable, any such basis for large-scale naval reductions is difficult to sustain - with one exception which we shall come to in a moment.

What is clear, when current levels of maritime forces are looked at in overall terms - say by a study of the current IISS Military Balance, compared with issues of five, ten or fifteen years ago - is that there is no sign of a quantitative arms race at sea. Indeed, numbers of units in the major and medium powers are on the whole reducing. Smaller and emerging powers are to be sure somewhat building up their numbers, but in most cases from a very low base indeed. What has been building up is firepower, in particular in the field of surface-to-surface missiles both in their anti-ship and cruise-missile land-attack modes.

It is quite hard to say, with the War to Liberate Kuwait only one year past, that any of these qualitative enhancements of capability are candidates for elimination or radical reduction. It can be argued that seaborne power projection was not a critical element of the coalition

effort, and that therefore any beneficial effects it had in this case
can be discounted, while its threat potential to smaller nations in the
future must tell in favour of its elimination. However the counter-
argument, that the sea is often the only medium by which a crisis
situation can be approached and that the capacity to subdue aggression
by power projection of this kind is an essential component of
stabilising force, seems to this writer to be much the stronger.

The same arguments apply to amphibious forces, which are another
element of power projection and certainly one that has been perceived as
a serious threat by many states. The chief exponents, the United
States, are quick to suggest that such fears are grossly exaggerated.
However alarming the memory of Grenada may be - and it is right for
major powers to try to imagine the reactions of small states to such
operations - the US contention is more correct than not. There is
certainly no justification for pressing for the elimination of long-
reach amphibious forces: that would be throwing out the baby with the
bathwater.

Bilateral, agreed structural reductions in platforms between the
United States and Russia have never been a near prospect. They possibly
came nearest in the late 1980s, in unofficial Russian suggestions of
'some of your carriers for some of our submarines' and equally
unofficial Western ideas of mutual reductions in nuclear-powered
submarines. But even at that time the official US Navy line was 'Hell,
no!' and it would have taken a major policy reversal to deviate from it.

Unilateral measures are, however, another matter, and in one important field in particular. The announcements in late September 1991 of massive cuts in the American nuclear arsenal, followed after a few days by complementary Soviet proposals, greatly changed the maritime scene. But the surrounding political scenery has of course changed greatly since then, and it is not at all clear what the present situation is regarding non-strategic maritime nuclear weapons. The writer may have missed something, but it looks as though information is very scanty indeed, and there are many questions to be asked. For example, how many nuclear heads for such weapons will continue to be stored ashore? Will that help or undermine deterrence? (It has been argued that a few such weapons in reserve could dissuade the other side from thinking it had a decisive advantage). Will there be any verification measures? (It is on the face of it astonishing that the INF Treaty was accompanied by the most complex and stringent verification machinery ever, while unilateral nuclear cuts seem to be subject to no verification at all). And what is the situation about nuclear-tipped air-to-surface missiles held by the Russian (and, who knows, the future Ukrainian) Naval Air Force? No doubt many other questions await answers.

To sum up, the scope for structural measures in the field of maritime arms control is extremely limited. When tested against the yardstick of Improved Mutual Security, neither reductions in force levels generally nor in particular types of platform are at all attractive. There is no headlong quantitative arms race. States have maritime forces to meet their perceived security needs, and properly

used these probably help rather than undermine stability. This applies even to the superpower and the ex-superpower, who are likely to reduce their forces far more for budgetary rather than pure arms control reasons. However, in the single but important field of sub-strategic nuclear weapons for maritime use, the proposals for removal are radical and welcome and should be backed by other states, particularly those of nuclear or near-nuclear capability.

Operational Measures

Perhaps one should begin this part of the survey in the broadest area of all, that of multilateral treaties and declarations. Not the least is the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which, although arms control was specifically excluded from its terms of reference, does nevertheless contain some relevant hortatory elements. Notable among these is Article 88 which says the High Seas 'shall be reserved for peaceful purposes'. That Article has been the subject of extended debate in arms control fora, but I suggest it has no more and no less prescriptive force than Article 2(4) of the UN Charter itself. If that is so, then it cannot restrict naval activities per se, but only when they constitute a use or threat of force. Article 88 then does not seem to be any kind of basis for operational arms control.

We therefore turn to measures based upon coastal states' jurisdiction under the Convention. This is in some cases well-defined, in others open to varying interpretations. In the well-defined areas (for example, most of Parts II, III and VII) there seems to be no need to enter into further arrangements on grounds of confidence building,

although lingering difficulties of long standing exist concerning the notification of passage of warships through the territorial sea. In the areas subject to interpretation (most notably, perhaps, jurisdiction concerning Part V on the Economic Zone), the rival interpretations are themselves subjects of dispute, and to try to base operational arms control on this shifting sand would surely lead to disaster.

It follows that basing a confidence building regime on specific provisions of the 1982 Convention would lead to great difficulties both legal and, in the word's broadest sense, strategic. That is not to say that, in the well-judged words of Ove Bring, the Convention should not give 'a general indication to the international community of the points of departure which will be relevant to future negotiations'.

It may be as well to deal at this point with the notion of nuclear-free zones or zones of peace as operational arms control measures. Experience of the former is limited to the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, and of the latter to the abortive Indian Ocean negotiations and the South East Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). There does not seem to be much evidence so far that confidence has been increased by either of these means. Yet they may, like the Law of the Sea Convention, be a starting-point for co-operation between states within, and with interests in, a given geographical area, at a time when superpower confrontation is weakened but regional tensions persist.

However, these are not properly speaking arms control measures. Nor indeed are unilateral declarations aimed at improving confidence by the voluntary limitation of military intention. These include the Soviet declaration of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons - taken over, one supposes, by Russia on the breakup of the Union - and the socalled Negative Security Assurances, pledging (with certain caveats) non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, given by all the then nuclear weapon states at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. It is not known how much comfort these give to the intended beneficiaries; if the general tone of debate at subsequent conferences on nuclear matters is anything to go by, the answer is 'not much'.

To move now to measures seeking specifically to limit or regulate maritime activity, which may be regarded as the core of any operational arms control regime, we return to the three categories of limitation: area, scope and nature.

Limitation by area has in the past been a constant theme of Soviet proposals and vehement US rejection. The reason is rooted deep in geostrategy and indeed in the American consciousness, with its passionate belief in the freedom of the seas, buttressed by its leadership of an oceanic alliance. Thus Soviet proposals for limitation of activities in or near sealanes, for the banning of ASW activity in certain areas, and for restricting the geographical scope of aircraft carriers' and cruise missile fitted ships' activity, have all been particularly strongly rebutted by the USA.

Apart from the general point about the freedom of naval forces to do their deterrent job, which is a fundamental one, there were other flaws in the Soviet proposals. To take for example the question of ASW-free zones, which is the same in the US/Russia context as SSBN sanctuaries: quite apart from the planning difficulties (how big a zone - too small gives opportunity for barrage fire, too large is impossible to police; what units to exclude; how to aviod its becoming a Total Exclusion Zone from which all craft, including civilian, are banned) there is a massive problem concerning false alarms, which as all practitioners know are not unusual in ASW. What happens when a violation is suspected, and a solemn treaty at the heart of deterrent stability is thought to have been broken? By the test of Improved Mutual Security, ASW free zones are about as counter-productive as they come.

The conclusion must be that area limitations are much better dealt with by the ordinary machinery of international law, in spite of its imperfections and ambiguities.

The scope and size of naval activities are a more fruitful field for operational arms control and particularly for Confidence Building Measures and even Confidence and Security Building Measures. There is no doubt that large scale naval exercises and movements do cause alarm in states that are close to them or think they may be affected by them.

In 1988 and 1989, indeed, it did appear from unofficial and informal discussions in USSR and UK that some progress was possible towards agreement on maritime CSBMs on the model of the Stockholm Accords.

These might have covered, in brief, declaration of exercises of similar
scale to those already laid down for armies (13,000 men), for limitation
on the frequency of very large exercises of the 'Teamwork' type, for
exchange of exercise and roulement calendars and possibly for exercise
observers. Unfortunately the Soviet Union put forward in Vienna in
March 1989 proposals which would have made the limitations very much
tighter - for example, declaration of exercises by no more than five
ships if one was cruise-missile-armed - and this was immediately met by
a response of 'You cannot be Serious'. Perhaps they were not. In any
event it was the end of any possibility of negotiation, to which the US
Navy was in any case opposed.

Formulae on the Stockholm model are suitable mainly for cases and in
areas where large forces, which may become opposed to each other, are in
being. Elsewhere the disparate sizes of the navies concerned, and their
independence of command and operation, make a highly structured and
formal CSBM regime inappropriate. However something can be done in a
more modest way.

First, the exchange of exercise calendars is itself a quite potent
CBM. Few events are more unsettling than an unheralded naval exercise
on one's doorstep, and forewarning prevents much misunderstanding.
There is no reason either why for certain exercises observers should not
be invited, either in a shore headquarters or in a non-combatant
accompanying vessel. If, of course, joint exercises between the navies
of potential opponents can be scheduled - even if they are no more than

occasional line manoeuvres - confidence at grass roots level can be
further improved.

It is suggested that there is much to be said for formalising such
procedures in agreements between the states concerned. But there is
little to be gained by making the geographical scope too wide, at least
to start with. Even within the NATO sea area there may be two or three
sub-areas where such agreements might be started.

It can no doubt be claimed that such transparency takes away one of
the principal advantages of naval forces, their ability to be poised in
a time of tension or crisis and to deter by their presence and readiness
for action. But this argument is based on a false premise. The
presence of naval forces in such a situation cannot be concealed these
days, and probably the owner does not want it to be concealed. On the
contrary, he wishes to send a signal that his forces are in the area of
concern. If they are not part of a scheduled exercise, the signal is
well sent. His intention as to what to do next is something he may well
want to conceal; but that is not jeopardised by a CBM such as has been
described.

Finally, operational arms control can mean limitation of the nature
of naval activity. This is best illustrated by the well-known
Agreements for the Prevention of Incidents at Sea, following the highly
successful precedent of the US/USSR agreement of 1972. Proposals have
been made for a comprehensive treaty to which all navies could
subscribe. The time for that may not be right yet; there is a danger

that the procedures could become bogged down and politicised if they were multilateral, and they would moreover be a great srain on the staff resources of small navies. But a start might be made on regional arrangements in this field.

One type of operations has so far defied the Incidents at Sea regime, and that is underwater. Submerged submarines are not covered, and it is a fact that some of the most dangerous incidents occurring between US and Soviet units have been under water. It has been suggested that groudrules could be evolved which would make life safer; for example, specification of a safety course for submarines to steer if they thought themselves in danger of collision; the obligation to transmit on active sonar if they thought a close-quarter situation was developing; and agreed frequencies for underwater telephones (though these are well known in all navies as 'the Say Again machine'.

Finally, though it is not srictly an operational arms control measure, one ought to make a plea for the simplest kind of confidence-building of all: the exchange of information and ideas. Professional contacts are at least as important as diplomatic ones; port visits give excellent opportunity for seeing the other side; combined politico-military staff talks may be the most fruitful of all. An understanding of one anothers' preoccupations, concepts, strategies and fears should surely not be beyond the capacity of officials and politicians alike in this age of communication. If it can be done it will give a powerful twist to the virtuous spiral in the direction of co-operation and away from confrontation.

Richard Hin

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RETHINKING NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

— Robert Dalsjö, Johan Tunberger, Lars Wedin [*] —

Introduction

We are conducting a study on naval arms control, part of a larger project of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and supported by the Ford Foundation. When the project was first conceived the Berlin wall was still standing, the Soviet Union still existed and the Gulf war had not been fought. Naval arms control was not on the real arms control agenda, but there was a considerable effort under way in academic and political circles to get it there.

In the first part of our study, we attempted to evaluate a number of proposed or conceivable naval arms control measures, as to their practical feasibility and strategic consequences. Some of the results were laid out in a paper presented here in Rome at IAI in October 1991.

Since then, we have become even more convinced that the "classic" approach to naval arms control — including obligatory CSBMs — is sterile or counterproductive, especially in the light of recent fundamental changes in world affairs. For once, the much misused term "new era" is appropriate.

In this presentation, we attempt to provide some food for thought concerning what rôle, if any, naval arms control, — in a wide sense — could and should play in the future.

First, a hard-nosed reminder and a statement on our perspective: States do not acquire naval forces, nor military forces, primarily to dismantle them through arms control, but to meet perceived security needs. These needs are, however, not constant.

What has changed?

With the Western victory in the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union the defining political factors of the post-war world has ceased to exist. Naturally, this must have fundamental repercussions for maritime strategy. The US Navy is now the single, unchallenged blue water navy with global reach. It is being reconfigured for a combination of forward presence and a

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[*] Paper presented at a symposium at The Swedish Embassy in Rome, May 6 1992 organized in conjunction with the IAI-conference on naval arms control May 7 —8.

capability for reinforcement and intervention, in support of a new national strategy.

The risk of global, high intensity war has all but vanished in threat perceptions, although it could reappear should political circumstances change.

Especially, major threats to SLOCs and to Western freedom of operations, in the northern Atlantic and northern Pacific are perceived as almost non-existent.

Everyday naval confrontation between great powers is less likely than before and carries much less risk of inadvertent escalation, should it take place.

The so-called naval arms race has ceased to be a political concern, indeed we witness a process of unilateral cuts, with navies struggling to retain capability.

This sea-change is symbolized by the unilateral but politically coordinated withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from ships by the US, USSR/CIS and the United Kingdom.

A further consequence of the demise of the Soviet Union is that the disintegration process itself has become the focus of international security attention. The area concerned is largely continental, and little attention is presently given to maritime power — the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet being an exception of sorts. Maritime aspects could however become more important should Russia's again strive to secure its access to the Sea — all the more important as land communications to the west are now controlled by former republics of the Soviet Union. Also the disintegration of Yugoslavia has obvious maritime aspects.

The end of the cold war also means that conflicts in the so called third-world might become more numerous and intense, as local leaders gain greater freedom of action. However, third-world conflicts are no longer automatically relevant from a Western strategic standpoint, unless Western interests are directly involved.

Thus, the strategic map is being redrawn: much of Africa and other very poor parts of the world are fading into the background while other parts of the third world become more relevant. Among these are Newly Industrialized Countries and regional great powers, such as India.

In the longer run exploding populations among the very poor might lead to further strategic changes. In the more immediate perspective Arab states and Islam have taken on renewed importance. This is because of their instability, exploding populations, proximity to Europe or to vital SLOCs, and possession

of oil. There is also a increasing western fear that radical Islam might replace communism as an adversarial value-system uniting a hostile bloc.

In this context proliferation of advanced weapons and technology, especially NBC-weapons and ballistic missiles, is a special cause of concern.

These, briefly sketched, developments are bound to affect the roles and missions of navies.

Some missions will become markedly less significant, such as surveillance, presence, ASW and strategic nuclear deterrence in what remains of an east-west context.

Other roles and missions might not be new *per se* but will acquire new and increased importance. Roles and missions will be geared more to presence, crises, limited objective or low intensity operations, and power projection in other waters than the northern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Virtually new missions, at least in this century, include interdiction of drug trafficking, anti-piracy operations and proliferation control. These mission often require international cooperation to succeed.

At the same time, funding for naval purposes is dwindling among the great powers and their allies, which will affect not only the size of navies, but also their tempo of operations

Simple arithmetic indicates that the CIS/ Russian retreat from the oceans and the naval repositioning in defence of SSN-bastions and coastal defence zones will continue. Western navies will be smaller and relatively more often be deployed in, as it were, out of area operations. Fewer warships will cruise in the northern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

(An important part of our research project is to study the consequences of these shifts in deployments.)

The new strategic environment will in all likelihood affect not only the size of navies. There will also be a need to deploy and employ naval power differently. In the end this is likely to influence the structure of navies as well as the characteristics of individual ships.

Ships specially designed for ASW and SLOC-protection on the oceans might not be ideal for presence-missions or power projection fairly close to the shores of third world states.

This could lead to the construction of specialized presence-ships, conceptually similar to the French Floréal-class of surveillance frigates. To

operate effectively in crisis and low intensity conflict such ships should have the capability to employ weapons gradually and discriminatingly.

The proliferation of advanced weaponry is, however, a complicating factor, as is a more uninhibited use of low-tech systems, such as contact mines. Today, littoral states with limited economic means can deploy sophisticated SSMs from the shore, from FACs and aircraft. Such missiles and other systems constitute a serious threat to the forces of the mightiest naval power. The difference in intensity between "low intensity conflict" and central war might appear insignificant when a missile is closing in.

The size of ships no longer constitute the defining parameter of naval fire power, aircraft carriers being the most notable exception. The size of ships, however, still largely defines their reach and endurance.

This suggest that naval powers with global strategic interests must be prepared to operate in a widening zone were littoral states could pose a serious threat. Therefore states with global commitments must opt for retaining a substantial core force of potent combatants, capable of suppressing increasingly effective power-projection-defences. Such combatants must be supplemented by specialized ships for MCM, supply and possibly for forced landings.

Cost constraints might preclude having such ships in sufficient numbers to cover perceived needs. Therefore a high-low mix might be deemed rational — the low end consisting of specialized presence-ships with limited fighting capabilities, but with a great deal of strategic reach and endurance on station.

Cost constraints may also reinforce the budding trend towards international naval cooperation outside traditional alliance structures. The new-found viability of the UN and the ambitions of the CSCE raises the issue of multinational naval operations ranging from monitoring to peace enforcement. Also, naval forces could serve as support for forces engaged in crisis management- and peace keeping operations on land.

All in all, indications are that cumulative strategic trends seem to put a greater premium on naval operations in the littoral zone — and less on blue water operations. And the littoral zone is the zone where coastal states increasingly can pose a military threat to sea-faring nations.

Whither Naval Arms Control?

One might argue that the new international climate should provide a golden opportunity for reaching naval arms control accord. On the other hand,

it could also be argued that the end of the cold war has made any type of arms control superfluous.

In our view both perspectives are too simplistic.

Arms control in the cold war setting had several objectives . Often listed on the open agenda were:

- to increase crisis stability,

- to inhibit arms races by fostering predictability,

- to save money,

- to reduce damage should war break out.

There has also been a hidden agenda. The objective of proposals for arms control has often been to gain one-sided advantage, to fondle well-meaning segments of the public and to block unilateral cuts by turning threatened forces into bargaining chips.

Let us look at the objectives on the open agenda in reverse order:

The damage limitation objective focused on nuclear weapons. Here unilateral but coordinated actions on the part of the nuclear powers indicate a quantum leap for arms control objectives. A pertinent question is whether these results could have been achieved should states have entered formal negotiations.

The money saving objective for arms control is amply taken care of by governments eager to cash in on the so called peace dividend. This objective might however resurface in the future.

Thus only the first two objectives merit continued attention, in our view.

Fiscal austerity presently appears to rule out naval arms races, and formal negotiations could serve to block the ongoing spontaneous process. However, the future may hold renewed tension, although not necessarily between the traditional US-Soviet/Russian adversaries. Thus some type of "hedging agreement" might be useful, if possible. Practical experience as well as the conclusions drawn in our present research project (paper presented at IAI, October 1991)) has shown the limited utility and practical unfeasibility of agreements on structural ceilings. Such agreements presuppose an unlikely combination of a clear axis of competition and — still — some shared interests as well as a bone fide application. A possible exception was Jim Lacy's proposal for a US-Soviet cap on the number of nuclear attack submarines (SSN). The

relevance of his proposal has, however, been overtaken by projected unilateral cuts.

Furthermore, all-important qualitative factors are virtually impossible to capture in a formal agreement.

Nonetheless, increased transparency and predictability could perhaps stymie a return to a competitive buildup. Exchange of information on naval budgets, building programs, military contacts and cooperation could help to prevent such misinterpretation of actions and intentions which might fuel worst case analysis.

The first objective on the open agenda, to increase crisis stability, is still very much valid, but the very concept of crisis stability must be adopted to a dramatically changed setting.

One concern pertains to crisis stability in the classic sense. There is still need to strengthen and improve existing régimes for avoiding inadvertent friction, dangerous incidents *et cetera* at sea. Such endeavors could build on what has already been achieved in the Incidents at Sea-agreements and the Prevention of Dangerous Military Accidents-agreement. In addition military contacts, exchange programs, and joint operations could help to foster a common *ethos* among sailors.

A special aspect of crisis stability emerges from recent unilateral nuclear withdrawals. Tactical nuclear weapons have been taken ashore, but the option of taking them on board again has been retained. Such action during a crisis could have significant escalatory effects. Fears or uncertainty concerning covert renuclearization of naval forces could lead to worst case analysis and a vicious spiral. This is a problem that needs to be addressed.

In dealing with the issue of crisis stability it should be born in mind that the primary mission of navies is not to avoid conflict, but to serve the national — and hopefully international — interest. Crisis stability in this context means the management of crises, which might imply not only presence but also the explicit threat of the use of force.

The unique role of naval forces is that they are the primary non-nuclear means by which global military security becomes truly global. In many cases they serve as equalizers. States with mighty and possibly hostile neighbours have an implicit drawing right on the countervailing influence of friendly navies.

We have observed that cumulative strategic trends seem to put a greater premium on naval operations in the littoral zone. Some would then argue that

this reinforces reasons for some sort of naval arms control-régime regulating operations of flag states and littoral states — cf. "reasonable seaboard security". One does not have to be a sailor to realize that efforts to regulate such asymmetrical relationships would meet exceedingly difficult conceptual and practical problems. Existing proposals seem to overlook the increased feasibility of "reverse power projection" by littoral states — and littoral states are not necessarily benign because they are littoral.

Also, such measures could serve to impede the role of navies as equalizers and globalizers of security at a time when this role — possibly in international cooperation — seems more called for than hitherto.

Numerous proposals have been made for enhancing security at sea through formalized Confidence and Security-Building Measures agreements modeled on agreements on land forces made within the CSCE, such as compulsory notification of and constraints on activities, verified by on-site inspection.

We have studied this issue intensely. Our conclusion is that measures tailored to a land environment cannot be transplanted to the naval realm without defeating their purpose or creating greater harm than good. A well-known but weighty objection to such measures is that they would infringe on traditional freedom of navigation, i a impeding crisis management, and entail territorialization of the sea.

Neither sailors nor analysts taking part in the discussions on naval arms control seem to have noticed a second obstacle, namely the full implications of obligatory undertakings. As binding undertakings , to be meaningful, must be valid also in times of crisis, key concepts such as "activity" must be defined in an unambiguous and verifiable manner. If they are not, compliance disputes and suspicion would be the likely result, defeating the very purpose of confidence- and security building.

Why obligatory measures are non-starters follows from simple facts: Naval ships are their own garrison and routinely steam far away from home port. There is no definable fire-break between being fairly idle and operating. Furthermore, interaction with other ships as well as subordination is continually shifting. This makes it well-nigh impossible to define "naval activities" in a meaningful way — meaningful in the sense that a compliance dispute could be raised if need be, and be supported with data readily accessible. The only way out would be to use crude and unacceptable measures such as number of ships within a given, geographically defined sea area.

The fact that naval CSBMs can not be made binding does not rule out "softer", more humble approaches to enhancing confidence and cooperation at sea.

In the CSCE-context arms control has a new and wider meaning. Adversarial AC is increasingly replaced by cooperative approaches. Security cooperation is high on the agenda at the Helsinki II follow-up-meeting.

As naval forces play a vital part in security there must be also be a case for naval security cooperation. This can take place within the UN, the CSCE as well as other cooperative régimes.

Furthermore, dwindling naval resources means that existing forces will be spread thinner. New technologies cannot cope with this as a ship only can be at one place at a time. This provides incentives for the seafaring nations to cooperate. The newly announced Franco-German naval force is a step in this direction, as is the new standing NATO naval force in the Mediterranean.

In sum. The new strategic situation has made many, not to say most, of the traditional concepts of Naval Arms Control irrelevant. There are however requirements for new approaches highlighting cooperative strategies.

Naval Arms Control and Maritime Security in the
Mediterranean
A Perspective from the U.S. Vantage Point*

Bradford Dismukes

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CITATION

* The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, of any other part of the U.S.
government, or of the Center for Naval Analyses.

INTRODUCTION

In its current form, naval arms control is by and large a creature of the Cold War. The revolution in world security affairs produced by the end of that conflict logically demands today's assessment of it be sketched on a *tabula rasa..* In particular, one is obliged to determine its advantages, costs and limitations in the security order of the region where it may be applied. For a region as complex as the Mediterranean, this dictates a fundamental review of its military and political geography, including its present and emerging sources of order -- essentially its level of interstate cooperation -- balanced against potential risks to its peaceful evolution toward democracy and economic progress[1] -- essentially the theater's sources of intra- and interstate instability.

In the post-Cold War era, the nations of the Mediterranean, and those with important interests, there may or may not hold distinctive views on these matters. Arguably, because of the variation in their national situations, historical traditions, and current security policies, differences on specifics in a cooperative venture like naval arms control can be expected. But that is an empirical question -- one of particular interest in the current period of flux in world politics. This paper attempts to give the author's interpretation of the perspective of the United States.[2] Its focus is mainly on conventional naval forces and on arms control possibilities associated with limitations on their deployments and operations. Its temporal field of view is short, perhaps a few years, beyond which time enough ephemera is already at hand.

Because the security strategy of the U.S. itself continues to evolve, the paper attempts first to identify the principles on

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[1]As will be detailed below, these are the broad objectives sought by U.S. national security strategy. See "National Security Strategy of the United States." the While House, August 1991 (hereafter, NSS).

[2] The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, of any other part of the U.S. Government, or of the Center for Naval Analyses.

which it is now grounded. Employing these principles, it then addresses the interests that the U.S. has in the Mediterranean region, the perceived risks to those interests, and the potential for cooperation with other states in a strategy to secure those interests. It devotes particular attention to the role of naval forces in that strategy. The paper concludes with a review of post-Cold War U.S. attitudes toward naval arms control and a brief review of their implications for potential agreements that affect the Mediterranean. It evaluates these in light of the degree to which they are consistent with U.S security strategy. It aims to identify the distinctively Mediterranean aspects (if any at this point) from the more general views held by the U.S. -- by virtue of its position as a power with global interests and capabilities.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The debate on the shape of America's engagement with the world, currently under way within the U.S., means that today's reading of U.S. national security strategy, its military elements in particular, must remain tentative. This essay selects as a reasonable departure point for understanding that strategy its official articulation in the "National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS),"signed by Mr. Bush and published by the White House in August 1991, and in the "National Military Strategy (NMS)," issued by General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1992. The applicability of this choice to the future obviously depends on at least two provisos: (1) that the strategic assessments and policy preferences of the Bush administration will prevail for, say, the remainder of the decade (independent of election outcomes); and (2) that the Congress is willing to fund a military establishment of sufficient size and appropriate shape to implement the strategy.As both provisos are open to serious doubt. the essay from time to time examines the implications of one or both failing to hold true.

In formal terms, the security strategy of the U.S. in the 1990s is one of deep engagement with the world within a framework of cooperation with allies and coalition partners. The writer acknowledges that the level of generality at which these documents are necessarily written allows for alternative interpretations. For example, the NSS also contains a secondary

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theme of unilateralism. This theme is expressed more explicitly in the National Military Strategy. In it, the last sentence of the section labeled "Collective Defense" reads "We must also retain the capability to operate independently, as our interests dictate.[3]

It remains to be seen how such tension as may exist between unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. security policy will be resolved. It may yet develop that the American electorate, perhaps preoccupied with internal problems will reject a policy of engagement, as occurred after World War I. (If this occurs, U.S. views on naval arms control may well become of less interest.) Another possibility is that a resolution will be determined not by the conscious choice of the electorate or the makers of strategic policy that they choose, but rather by the shape of the armed forces that the country determines to acquire and the operating policies it adopts for their use. Forces that are too small to support a policy of forward engagement will lead to the failure of such a policy if it should nonetheless continue to be pursued. Alternatively, forces and systems may be acquired that are based or operate primarily in or near U.S. territory. These would logically encourage (though would not necessarily determine) a unilateralist approach.[4]

Whatever the case, today, engagement is the central theme. Its opposite, "isolationism," would be even more dangerous for the U.S. today than it was in the inter-war years. In addition, engagement permits the U.S. to promote political goals and moral values -- human rights, democracy, and the potential for economic growth of capitalist free enterprise --that reflect its own philosophical foundations, which are shared with a growing number of other countries, particularly the industrialized democracies. These values are linked frequently throughout the NSS, the growth of each contributing to the fortunes of the other two.

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[3] NMS, p. 9. I

[4] Another possibility that would change the content, though perhaps not the nomenclature, of the strategy is that the military-strategic leadership of the U.S. might adopt deployment or operating practices for existing forces that proved to be inconsistent with the broader strategy.

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Most distinctive in light of this linkage, the NSS describes <u>world</u>
economic growth as a U.S. security objective.[5] To this writer,
the addition of the security dimension to the moral-political-
economic trinity provides the necessary ingredients for a
rationale for U.S. foreign policy to replace containment.
(Indeed, such a rationale could serve a larger group of nations
that make common cause with the U.S., like the G7.) It remains
to be seen whether a future NSS will bring the present threads
together and make this rationale explicit. The current
formulation clearly recognizes, in effect, that a growing world
product is prerequisite for a stable international security
order.[6]

The document does not explicate this connection between
growth and security in a single argument, but a close reading
reveals a number of observations and an implicit logic that
constitute the supporting rationale: Economic growth favors
the development of democracy; economic stagnation or
retrenchment encourages non-democratic governments; and
non-democratic governments are less inclined toward peaceful
settlement of disputes -- if they are not openly aggressive. A
world of democratic states would not only be one in which
America's ideological aspirations would be fulfilled, it would be
a world in which the U.S. would be more secure.

The explicit linkage of world economic growth to U.S. security
strikes this writer as a development in U.S. security strategy of
far-reaching significance. That this linkage has been received
relatively little comment thus far is probably the result of its
being intertwined in the NSS with parallel arguments that U.S.

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[5] One should note that the linkage between world economic growth and
U.S. security appeared, in the NSS well before the Cold War ended, in the
first edition of the NSS in 1988; the NSS was not published in 1989
because of the unsettled state of world affairs; the language of the 1991
document repeats that found in the version published in 1990: The
initial list, labeled "Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s," includes
"promote and open and expanding international economic system..." p.3,
emphasis supplied.

[6] The document is silent on the issue of how the global economic
product, is distributed, though this is obviously a factor of great
importance for security. Future versions may well address the
distribution of the world's output as a factor in international security, at
a minimum.

security depends on <u>U.S.</u> economic growth among other reasons, because U.S. growth is obviously necessary to pay for U.S. military forces. This concern with purely U.S. economic growth (already salient in the U.S. debate about the degree to which the U.S. remains competitive in the global marketplace) may well have diverted attention from the more internationalist objective of world economic growth.

In its essence, the economic growth-security connection is a practical recognition of the profound interdependence of nations at the end of the twentieth century. It casts the U.S. national interest in broad internationalist terms; it clearly identifies an interest of the U.S. that is particularly shared with other industrialized democracies; and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, it provides a logic for setting geographic priorities in the allocation of U.S. attention and resources by U.S. security planners.

The geographic priorities reflected in U.S security planning may seem obvious to any informed observer, but it is important to identify the principles on which those priorities are based. The identification of principles permits logical assessment of U.S. attitudes toward a particular region, like the Mediterranean, on a particular issue, like naval arms control. Were U.S. security policy only the episodic result of the whims of its leadership or the vagaries of its domestic politics, then rational assessment would be impossible.[7]

In light of the world economic growth objective (the NSS names others), the primary focus of U.S. security attention should logically be directed toward the regions of the world that are critical to the operation of the world economy. That is in fact what Mr. Bush seems to have done. General Powell describes the NSS as a "regionally oriented strategy," aimed at promoting regional stability, but without saying whether any regions are more important than others.[8] He asserts. however, that the

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[7] Or at least essays like this one would be better written by specialists on U.S. internal politics. The writer acknowledges that such "episodic factors" can play a role in the formation of U.S. security policy at any particular point.

[8] "To accomplish this the President articulated a new regionally oriented national defense strategy in his Aspen, Colorado, speech on

origins of the NMS could be found in President Bush's speech at
Aspen, Colorado, in August 1990. In that speech, Mr. Bush
named four regions as especially important to the United
States: "Europe and the Pacific, and the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf...."[9]

It is reasonable to observe that stability in these regions is a
necessary condition for world economic growth because these
are the centers of world economic power. Obviously, stability
is not the only condition. The world economy could slide into
stagnation or even depression for a variety of reasons
unrelated to security. However, given the inherent tendency
toward disorder in an international system of sovereign states,
forces that promote order are critical to stability. The U.S. is
only one of several forces that encourage stability, including
other major powers, regional groupings (e.g.,the European
Community) and the United Nations. The roles of each of these
and their interrelationships are, obviously, in a state of flux.

Instability in other regions obviously can affect the world
economy (essentially because of its current level of
interdependence) but nowhere else to the degree that would be
true of these. The U.S. clearly has important interests in other
areas. But Europe, East Asia, the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf are the regions (outside its own hemisphere) to
which, in the author's opinion, the U.S. gives top security
priority. The Mediterranean holds a top priority in its own
right, but it is also critical to the stability and balance of power
in adjacent areas, particularly in the Persian Gulf and the Black
Sea regions. The Mediterranean provides strategic access to
those regions, and the attitudes of the states of the eastern
Mediterranean, especially Egypt and Turkey, can have a
decisive influence in the balance of power in the Gulf.[10]

August 2, 1990." NMS p. 6. The NSS gives no single name to the national
strategy

[9] New York Times, August 3, 1990, p. 6.

[10] Over the long run, the attitudes of the former-Soviet Muslim states of
central Asia could have an important influence on the Gulf. The
possibility that they may turn to religious extremism and add their
weight to that of Iran or even to religiously-based successor states to the
those that currently make up the GCC, deserves attention. Turkey
presents an alternative model for the development of these states, and,
without much help thus far from its friends in the West, has set about to
encourage them in the direction of a modern secular state, which

They contain interests that can properly be designated as vital. This judgment reflects the further observation that throughout the postwar period the U.S. has deployed significant military forces to these regions. In addition, it has been and, by all signs, remains prepared to fight to secure those interests, as it quite obviously did in a major way in the case of the Persian Gulf only last year.

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

Given that the U.S. regards the Mediterranean as an area of vital interests, what specific strategy motivates its military activities there? This question needs to be addressed at a general level -- that is, what military strategy does the U.S. see as appropriate for a national security strategy of engagement? -- and at a level specific to the Mediterranean -- that is, how should that general military strategy be applied to the specific geography and politics of the theater? Each aspect has important implications for naval arms control. The narrative will take them up in sequence.

The military strategy of the United States, based on the broader national security strategy, has been outlined by General Powell. While it will undoubtedly continue to evolve and important details will be made explicit, its general shape results in four assignments for the U.S. military. The U.S. intends to operate invulnerable strategic nuclear forces and will add some degree of strategic defense on behalf of this deterrent force but especially for a direct defense of the U.S. that could be extended to allies through GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes).[11] Its conventional forces are committed to two tasks: "forward presence" and "crisis response."[12] A fourth task, called "reconstitution," is concerned less with strategies for use of current forces than with maintaining military-industrial and other capabilities to

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nonetheless is compatible with Islamic ideals. Thus, the Black Sea, one of the few natural avenues into the heart of central Asia, continues to retain its historic importance in the relationship between Europe and Asia.

[11] NSS, p. 27 and NMS, pp. 6-7.

[12] NMS, p. 7 and pp 14-15.

produce, mobilize and deploy much larger armed forces should events require.

Given the focus of this paper, Forward Presence and Crisis Response (hereafter capitalized when referring to the missions) are of central concern.[13] Specifying the objectives and mechanisms of effect for these two missions is problematical. Both forward presence and crisis response have long been in the lexicon of American security planners, both official and unofficial. Official spokesmen for the U.S Navy, in particular, have asserted for over two decades that forward presence was an important function that naval forces performed on behalf of the nation's security.[14] However, such benefits were always secondary in priority to the main Cold War tasks of containment, deterrence and preparation for conventional and nuclear operations against the Soviet Union and its allies.

Then, as now, Presence has meant deriving from the forward deployment of military forces a deterrent effect on adversaries, a reassuring effect on allies, and a strengthened basis for participation in alliances and coalitions. The presence of forces expresses the seriousness of commitment to one's interests and underlines the legitimacy with which (it is hoped) observers will regard those interests and one's efforts to secure them.

Crisis Response is the form Presence takes during periods of extreme political tension, as the probability of violence rises accordingly. When the quantity of forces deployed in response to crisis exceeds a certain level, one experiences a qualitative

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[13] It is recognized that strategic nuclear forces could operate in the Mediterranean and thus arms control concerned with them could be relevant. While the narrative will touch on the question of naval tactical nuclear weapons, it will not address strategic nuclear issues. Similarly, the size and structure of U.S. naval forces and the nation's capacity to produce more of them, which are important aspects of the reconstitution mission, are legitimate arms control concerns. These, however, also lie beyond the bounds of this essay.

[14] See, for example, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo], *On Watch* .(New York: Quadrangle and New York Times Books, 1976), p.60ff. At the same time civilian analysts like Edward Luttwak investigated,from a theoretical perspective,.the phenomenon of "latent suasion." the term applied to the mechanism through which political goals might be achieved by maintaining forces forward. See his *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974).

change in the situation --that is, the objective becomes less to influence the behavior of the adversary than to achieve a decisive result, perhaps his disarmament or even his removal from power. This was clearly the case in the recent Gulf crisis and war. When General Powell speaks of crisis response, his emphasis is on Army heavy divisions and large-scale, land-based tactical air power, presumably with an adversary like Saddam Hussein in mind.[15] Deployment of such forces necessarily requires access to infrastructure en route and at the points of reception, which will be addressed below.

In 1992, attention to semantics is critical. The words, presence and crisis response, remain the same, but they designate a situation that has changed in its fundamentals. The Cold War is an historical term, and Presence and Crisis Response have become the raison d'être of U.S. conventional forces. (And it is exactly here that the question of the authoritativeness of the NSS and NMS arises. While there has not yet been time for a clearly focused debate on the validity of these concepts as the basis for U.S defense planning, there is evidence that alternative views are strongly held.) [16]

The reasons for this development are implied in both the President's and General Powell's statements, from which this author infers the following: A national strategy of engagement requires a supporting military strategy of Forward Presence. But the purposes served by Presence vary with the situation in the regions of interest. This point deserves explication because it is highly relevant to understanding of U.S. military strategy as it has evolved in response to the end of the Cold War.

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15   NMS, pp.21-22.

16   One clear articulation of a security strategy for the U.S., the collection of six papers by Congressman Les Aspin, January - March 1992, ignores the "presence" mission. The initial paper in the series. "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," presented to the U.S. Atlantic Committee, Washington, D.C.. January 6, 1992. It provides a rationale for the acquisition of U.S. military capabilities that appears to place a low value on (or even to reject) Presence as a justification for forces. "The primary reason that Americans want to have military forces is to have the option of fighting when other means fail." p. 6. This characterization would seem to leave little room in the nation's rationale for military forces for conventional deterrence or other ways "to use" forces short of combat. These latter are the essence of Presence.

The broader aim of U.S security strategy is maintenance of stability in the key regions. Ideally, this aim would be best met if the regions themselves were self-balancing, if regional cooperation deepened to the point that instability became rare and interstate war was out of the question. This is clearly not the case in regions like the Balkans, the lands of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. The objective of presence in such areas is familiar: to promote stability. In other regions, like Western Europe, stability is the rule, and the purpose of presence is to underwrite U.S. participation in the region's security structure. In the Mediterranean, lying, as it does, in zones of both stability and instability, presence has a dual motivation. Attention turns first to the stability-promoting function.

The Presence of Forces to Promote Stability

The world remains a disorderly place. Regions whose fate the U.S. regards as important enough to justify war face instability. If the interest at stake justifies ultimate resort to combat, it surely justifies deployment of forces to underwrite the diplomacy that can make combat unnecessary. However, the fact that military forces are needed should not be interpreted as any indication of their possible preeminence in policy. Indeed. in these regions military forces are not the leading instruments of policy. In all cases. the political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions are the only ones that can resolve the basic problems that lie at the roots of instability.

Cooperation is always preferable to conflict. The most that might be hoped of the military instrument is that it can parry the use of force by adversaries by rendering incredible threats to attack or by actually defeating an aggressive action. Thus. military forces can promote conditions that are necessary for the other instruments of policy to be effective. In areas of the world that are unstable and highly militarized, military forces are the only means of bringing about such conditions.

Moreover, deployment of forces for Presence allows response to crisis to be immediate. Given that one of the defining

characteristics of crisis is the swiftness of the pace of events[17], rapidity of response is of the essence for effectiveness. Indeed, typically, the earlier the response, the smaller the forces required.

In unstable regions, where events tend to unfold unpredictably, Forward Presence is essential for effectiveness in crisis. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided a number of instructive -- if still somewhat contradictory -- lessons in this regard. First, despite all the signs of impending trouble, no one outside or (apparently) inside government (U.S. or otherwise) predicted that Saddam would invade. Yet Iraq suffered from essentially every problem that leads to instability in the world today -- i.e., unsettled border disputes with neighbors, massive military power that was substantially unbalanced by the surrounding states, long range weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which it had shown itself quite willing to use, internal discontent suppressed by a ruthlessly authoritarian government, resource problems, particularly a potential water shortage, and, despite its oil wealth, major foreign debts and a shortage of current cash.

Second, some have rightly observed that the presence of U.S. forces afloat in the region did not deter Saddam Hussein from his initial aggression.[18] On the other hand, the U.S. did then respond by enlarging its naval presence in the Gulf and the Red Sea, expressing forcefully U.S. opposition to Iraq and in the process providing military protection for U.S ground forces and land-based tactical air forces that began to deploy to Saudi Arabia. If Saddam had had designs on that nation, which lay essentially defenseless before him, arguably the forces the U.S., and subsequently that other nations, deployed deflected him

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[17] The theoretical literature on crisis in world politics has a long heritage. For defining the characteristics of crisis see, for example, Charles Hermann (ed.), *International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

[18] Les Aspin, *op. cit.*, p. 8. Mr. Aspin does note that, in the build-up to the invasion, "the Bush Administration was sending mixed signals," raising the question, in the abstract, of whether clearer signals -- including, for example, the movement of the U.S. Marine Maritime Prepositioning Force Number One from Diego Garcia to the Gulf in late June or early July -- might not have deterred Saddam. In actual fact, no U.S. carrier was present in the Eastern Mediterranean or northern Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf at the time Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait.

from a further move south. Short of an unexpected commitment by Saddam to truth-telling, one will never know the degree to which (if any) he was deterred. Nonetheless, the availability of forward deployed U.S. military forces clearly did underline the seriousness with which the U.S. viewed events. The language of action is generally more convincing than words alone.

In the Gulf, the presence of U.S. military forces was an essential ingredient of the panoply of policies with which the U.S. responded to the situation. And it is an essential ingredient in U.S. policy toward the Mediterranean, also a region of vital interest. But if military forces are required in general, what kinds of military forces are needed in particular?   The answer to this question can be found in history and to an important degree in the naval policies of the nations of the Mediterranean today.

The Mediterranean, has accounted for nearly one half of the cases of the world total in the period since 1980 in which a U.S. president has dispatched naval forces in response to international crisis.[19] The reasons that naval, rather than ground, forces have been used by the U.S. reflect the maritime nature of the theater. While land-based forces clearly have a role, experience indicates that naval forces are best suited to the region's military geography. The shape of the Mediterranean means that it is both necessary and possible for forces ashore and at sea to provide each other a strong degree of mutual support. But for the U.S., sea-based air power been the leading instrument. Aircraft carriers have been used in the vast majority of these cases of crisis response, including all those of major significance.[20]   Because of the relevance and utility of the platform, the U.S. has continued to maintain an aircraft carrier and its escorts in the Mediterranean most of the time since the Cold War has ended.

But the U.S. is not alone in this preference. To a degree unmatched elsewhere in the world, the nations of the

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[19]   Adam Siegel, "The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990," Alexandria, Virginia, Center for Naval Analyses, February 1991, pp. 10-11.
[20] *Ibid.*

Mediterranean that can afford to do so have made a deep commitment to the aircraft carrier. Spain currently operates short take-off and vertical landing Harrier aircraft from its carrier, *Príncipe de Asturias*, which first entered service in 1989. Italy, with a similar small carrier, *Garibaldi*, is in the process of acquiring Harrier aircraft from the United States, breaking a 50-year old prohibition against operating sea-based aircraft. Italy and Spain may well buy additional carriers, even in a period of declining overall defense spending. France, the possessor of two conventionally- powered carriers today, is building a nuclear-powered successor, *Charles DeGaulle*, on which it intends to deploy a sea-based version of the Rafale tactical aircraft. The consensus seems to be that conditions in the Mediterranean favor air power at sea.[21]

It is important to recognize, however, that, while aircraft carriers are the centerpiece, they are not the "be all and end all" of Presence. To deal effectively with the region's complexities, the U.S. has found that Marine amphibious forces provide important options. For example, they were highly useful in the security-cum-humanitarian relief operation to rescue the Kurds of northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein's depredations.[22] Forces from the other branches of the armed services of the nations involved deployed subsequently, after which the majority of marines were withdrawn for other duties.

The current situation in the Mediterranean and adjacent Black Sea involves six or seven wars or near wars,[23] where people, including American citizens (some of whom may be representatives of the U.S. government), face privation or imminent threat. Moreover, population dislocations triggered by these conflicts produce instabilities on the territories of

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[21] Military planners in the U.S., Spain, France, and Italy could, of course, be in error -- that is, the military requirements of the theater might be met as effectively by forces based ashore. In any case, the Mediterranean's size and shape make possible and mandatory close cooperation between forces on land and those at sea.

[22] U.S. Marines joined U.S. Army Special Forces and marines/commandos from Britain, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Italy in a largely successful multinational operation.

[23] The Yugoslav civil wars, Moldova-Russia, Georgia's civil war, the Azeri-Armenian war, Turkey's suppression of the PKK, Iraq's war against its Kurdish and Shiite minorities, etc.

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neighbors who are otherwise at peace. Clearly, the flexible and self-sustaining capabilities of Marine amphibious forces are highly relevant to these situations.

Similarly, the submarines that the U.S. has maintained in the Mediterranean are also highly useful. They provide an unmatched ability to observe events at sea and along coastlines without themselves being observed. For example, terrorists or drug-smugglers can never be sure that their movements at sea remain covert. In addition, the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine is highly capable in anti-submarine warfare, which, despite the disappearance of the Soviet fleet from the Mediterranean, remains a concern. The nations of the Mediterranean possess roughly 70 submarines. The Black Sea contains roughly 20 more.[24] The unpredictability of the region, plus a reasonable degree of prudence, dictate the requirement to maintain antisubmarine warfare capabilities in readiness for possible use. The submarine in the U.S. Navy is an essential element of the Fleet.[25]

Finally, the U.S. Presence in the Mediterranean involves a certain level of forward deployed ground and land-based tactical air forces (which will not be addressed further here) and for naval forces a certain degree of access to infrastructure ashore. This infrastructure, which forms one of the bonds between the U.S. and the host nation, is needed to make operations more efficient under routine conditions and more effective in crisis, as the possibility of combat becomes more imminent or even a reality.

Access to infrastructure in the Mediterranean is mandatory if the U.S. is to remain capable of deploying major ground and land-based tactical air forces to the region and to the Persian Gulf beyond. Given the continued dependence of the world economy on the Gulf's petroleum and given the instability that continues to mark that region, U.S. access to Mediterranean

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[24] International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1991-1992.*

[25] For example, Iran is said to be in the process of acquiring the highly capable conventionally powered Kilo-class submarine from the former Soviet Union.Algeria already operates two submarines of this class. Libya possesses six of the older Foxtrot class, although the number actually operational is unclear. *Ibid.*

infrastructure remains of capital importance. As the writer has noted elsewhere, the security of U.S. and European interests in the Gulf begins in the Mediterranean.[26]

Beyond logistics support for current operations and access to infrastructure for the deployment of major forces, which are mandatory, a key function of infrastructure is its role in the provision of command, control, communications and intelligence. These comprise headquarters, communications facilities, land-based patrol aircraft and access to the airfields and support they require, and facilities for the people involved in these diverse activites. Such prosaic things lack the glamourous aura of modern hi-tech warships, but they are crucially important to the successful employment of the latter. C3I, "Information," in the vernacular of its devotees,[27] is as important as weapons in modern war. In the post-Cold War peace, information retains this extraordinary degree of importance. It is more than the sine qua non of any military answer to an adversary. C3I makes possible common action with allies. From the point of view of the U.S. presence mission, it allows the U.S. to participate effectively in Europe's cooperative efforts on behalf of security, to which attention now turns.

Presence of Forces to Promote U.S. Participation

As noted above, this second purpose for the forward deployment of U.S. forces is a response to the changes in world security brought on by the end of the Cold War. That event has not only brought about the end of the Soviet empire and of the Soviet Union itself, it has led to the emergence of an incipient European security identity and a concerted effort to transcend Europe's disastrous experience with purely national armies and defense policies of the past. Because of Europe's size, economic potential, and level of its technological development, the outcome of this effort - in either direction. that is, toward a cohesive, near supra-national security policy or toward the rightly feared "re-nationalization" of defense --will prove to be

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[26]Bradford Dismukes and Bradd B. Hayes, "The Mediterranean Remains Vital," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* XXXXXXXX
[27] C3I essay XXXXX.

even more important for global security than was the demise of the USSR.

Given this importance and given the global interests of the United States, it is natural that the U.S. wishes to participate in this process. This desire reflects more than merely the lessons the U.S. learned from its isolation from European affairs between the two world wars. It also reflects a deepening appreciation of the mechanisms of interdependence at work in the world today. Europe, it is said, is moving toward political cooperation because political cooperation is dictated by the degree to which Europe has already achieved economic integration -- which will deepen further at the end of 1992. Confining political cooperation to purely "internal" affairs, even on a continental scale, is no longer possible, because the distinction between foreign and internal matters can only be made at the cost of an unacceptable degree of economic inefficiency -- that is, by forgoing the advantages of economies of scale and the efficiencies of specialization. Cooperation on external policy necessarily entails cooperation on security policy exactly because the world remains an unsettled place, and arms continue to play a major role in the behavior of nations.

The logic of economic-to-political-to-security cooperation provides a powerful incentive for movement in the direction of the last. This seems so even in the face of lingering concerns about threats to national identity and fears that a resulting European defense entity may lack needed military capabilities or be unusable because of an insufficient political consensus on the desirability of (or specific terms for) its employment.

For the United States (or any other state external to Europe) the possibility exists that this same logic leading to cooperation within Europe could demand a U.S. military presence to keep the U.S. engaged in the "new Europe." In particular, if the U.S. remains a significant participant in the structure of European cooperation at its highest -- that is, at its security -- level, there is a much better chance that it will also participate at the lower levels of political and economic cooperation. Conversely, a withdrawal by the U.S. from European security affairs would have an undesirable effect on its degree of political and economic cooperation with Europe.

The connection between transatlantic economic cooperation and security cooperation has already been broached by U.S congressional leaders in a more direct form -- that Europe must accede to U.S requests for lowering of trade barriers and an end to Western Europe's subsidies to its agricultural sector lest the U.S withdraw its commitment to Europe's security.[28] That characterization of the relationship can only be pernicious in its effects on cooperation between North America and Europe. The logic leading to U.S. inclusion or exclusion, presented above, reflects a deeper level of interdependence between the two continents and between the three strands of interaction -- economic, political, and security.

Transatlantic security cooperation faces multiple challenges. To this writer, however, one stands out as among the most dangerous and at the same time among those with the least well-developed framework for cooperation -- the well-known "out-of-area" problem. For the foreseeable future, the focus of concern must be the Persian Gulf. Cooperation is needed on behalf of stability in the Gulf because it is an open question whether either the U.S. or Europe acting alone can act as an effective stabilizing influence there. Europe may lack the military wherewithal for some time yet to come to project and substain substantial military power there. America may lack either the financial power or the political will to act alone. The latter may be particularly likely if its electorate concludes that Europe (and others) are unwilling to bare an equitable share of the burdens and risks.

Naval forces are particularly well suited for fostering security cooperation between nations because of the long traditions of professional cooperation among navies at sea. In addition, it is relatively easy to assemble multinational naval formations and mount effective operations, certainly when compared to comparable efforts with forces ashore. Integration of the latter is always problematical, and the achievement of high levels of

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[28]*The Financial Times*, February 9, 1992, p. 1; *Sunday Times*, February 16, 1992, p. 16.

military effectiveness -- the "bottom line" for military forces, after all -- is an illusive goal.[29]

Today, the degree of cohesiveness that is to mark European security cooperation remains yet to be worked out. And the role of the U.S. is seen as a crucial ingredient determining the options. At this point, there is a transatlantic consensus that the NATO alliance continues to be an indispensable mechanism in Europe's security scheme, even while efforts to define and solidify the European pillar continues apace.

This reality reflects much more than the traditionally conservative urges of military planners. While it is true that the NATO of today represents an achievement of cooperation of which its members can be justly proud, the current endorsement of NATO[30] is also a reflection, at least in part (some would say mainly) of the absence of any clear alternative to the alliance. This fact in turn reflects an understandable reluctance on the part of European security planners (or the electorates to whom they are ultimately responsible) to envision the expenditure of scarce defense funds for capabilities that duplicate existing NATO capabilities -- in particular, those provided to the Alliance uniquely by the United States.

This is especially true in the area of C3I, where U.S. capabilities are a crucial factor in observing and interpreting events and also in providing the communications links that make collective military action possible. (This also true of other areas, including strategic mobility, which will not be addressed here. C3I is a worthy focus to assess the potential for complementarity between the U.S. and the "new Europe" that is emerging because it is an area in which the disparity between the capabilities of the two parties is marked, in which advanced technology with commercial application is the

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[29] This problem becomes steadily more acute as the complexity of the operations envisioned increases. Thus, even for naval forces highly complex operations like those of amphibious assault are much more difficult to approach by multinational forces than simpler activities like screening, or even blockade.

[30] The most recent was at the Rome Summit in November 1991. Allen Cowell, "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO Over Role of the U.S.," *New York Times* , November 8, 1992, p. 1.

hallmark, and in which major investment and experience are necessary to reach minimal capabilities.)

U.S. C3I capabilities, purchased at great expense in response to the demands of the Cold War, make the U.S. a natural partner in common undertakings, whether within the NATO political framework or outside it. A telling example of this phenomenon was seen in the Mediterranean during the war in the Persian Gulf. A variety of operations to secure its sea and air lines of communication and to provide a layer of air and missile defense (or at least the potential to warn of missile attack) was mounted throughout its 2,500-mile length.[31] NATO called these Operation MedNet, but the reality is that much of the military activity involved was not under formal NATO auspices. For example, the aircraft carriers of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, which were central to the level of effectiveness achieved (because the larger U.S. carriers had been sent to the war zone), remained under strictly national control. This was also true of all submarines involved.

What made the entire operation possible was the presence of U.S. C3I. Much of this U.S. capability remained under national control while intelligence information was shared under bilateral arrangements with governments and navies involved. Much was placed under NATO auspices, through special arrangements and through the fact that NATO's commanders of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean were, in fact, U.S. flag officers who were subordinates of the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander. While the Sixth Fleet itself remained under U.S. national control -- it would have taken a declaration of NATO alert in order for it to shift to NATO control -- the ships and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet played a crucial role in the MedNet operation, [32] particularly through their C3I contributions. They remained closely tied to the U.S. C3I

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[31] Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII. No. 3 (May-June, 1991), pp. 246-59.

[32] The writer has become aware that relatively few know of MedNet's extent, in part, perhaps because the operation was not challenged directly by any of the multiple threats that were recognized as possibilities as a result of Saddam Hussein's threats to spread conflict to regions adjacent to the Gulf. (For example, a number of Iraqi merchant ships were outside the Persian Gulf, including several in the Mediterranean during the Gulf War.)

system and were able to pass on information from that system to the ships and aircraft of other nations.

This gave the U.S. admiral who occupied the position of Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in NATO's Southern Region effective sway over a much larger force than that formally designated as his military subordinates. Thus coordination, if not complete unity, of effort over a large and complex undertaking was effectively achieved. The point is not at all that it was a U.S. official that played this role but, rather, that adequate C3I (of U.S. origin) was available to make these actions possible.[33]

It will be helpful at this point to summarize U.S. military strategy in the Mediterranean before addressing its implications for naval arms control. Within a larger national strategy of cooperative engagement in the world's key regions, U.S. military strategy dictates two missions for U.S naval (and other) forces: Presence and Crisis Response. Presence is undertaken on behalf of two political goals: the promotion of stability and effective U.S. participation in the emerging European security structure. Presence is also necessary as a military precursor to response in crisis. The means of Presence include the physical presence of forces in the theater, access to infrastructure ashore, and adequate C3I capabilities, especially to underwrite military cooperation with friends and allies.

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[33] In future coalition undertakings, independent of their political framework, the logic of ensuring an authoritative voice in coalition councils for the parties possessing the highest degree of "situational awareness" will remain powerful. This term can be defined as comprising an awareness of the strategic situation, of the operational and tactical situation with one's own forces and those of allies, and of the forces and intentions of adversaries, and also of being in instantaneous or near-instantaneous, secure communications with all concerned. As a general rule, the less formal and centralized the political framework and thus the military command structure, the more flexible and diverse will be requirements for C3I. The writer is indebted to Stefano Silvestri for this last observation.

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND THE U.S. PRESENCE AND CRISIS RESPONSE MISSIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

What do these strategies and missions mean for the U.S. view on naval arms control in the Mediterranean? The question can be addressed by first examining unilateral measures the U.S. has taken, then the general U.S. position on cooperative arms control, its naval aspects in particular, and concluding with a review of the Mediterranean per se.

As has long been recognized, arms control can be pursued unilaterally, as well as in concert with other nations. Recently the U.S. took unilateral steps of enormous magnitude in the field of naval arms control: It said, in the words of General Powell: "We will also withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft carriers, surface ships, attack submarines, and those associated with land-based naval aircraft."[44] At a stroke, the U.S. has, de facto, removed a whole category of weapons as an arms control concern.

General Powell, of course, was following President Bush's initial announcement of the previous September, to which then-President Gorbachev promised a reciprocal "Soviet" response.[44] The world does not yet know the degree to which either party has implemented the intentions expressed. There is no reason not to take General Powell at his word, if only because the U.S. is such an open society that large-scale actions to the contrary would soon become public knowledge. Nonetheless, the United States continues to maintain the long-established policy that it will "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons aboard its ships and submarines. Presumably, this

[34] NMS. p. 9. This step must surely have been gratifying to the many who had urged it for a number of years, including specifically in the Mediterranean. See, for example, Paul C. Warnke, "Naval Arms Control and the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 1990); pp. 36-46.

[44] "Soviet" commentators used the occasion to distinguish between arms control initiatives like that in 1986 at Reykjavik which were an unprecedented step by a "totalitarian superpower" and the current situation, which "is not evidence of a breakthrough but confirmation of the collapse of a totalitarianism based on superarmament." Yevgeniy Shashkov, Moscow *Pravda* ,October 8, 1992.(FBIS-SOV-91-197, 10 October 1991, p. 2.)

policy will be modified or rescinded entirely at some point in the future, perhaps after the process of removing the weapons is complete.

In the ex-Soviet case. little is certain about implementation, but various reports suggest that it is under way. In an interview in Moscow on April 2 with Floyd Kennedy of the Center for Naval Analyses, Vladimir Kozin, an advisor to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the Navy had assured the Foreign Ministry that nuclear weapons had been removed from the Black Sea Fleet, but the Ministry had not yet independently verified that such was the case.[45]

In the field multilateral arms control, the pace of change in European security affairs has been so rapid that many, though scarcely all, of Mr. Bush's words on arms control in the "National Security Strategy," published only last August, are directed at the "Soviet Union" and have been overtaken by events.[34] With full knowledge that the present assessment may be doomed to the same swift fate, what follows is drawn from a recent speech, delivered in The Hague, by Ronald Lehman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[35]

For the U.S., the roles of arms control in the post-Cold War world now focus on "strengthening nonproliferation norms," "promoting confidence-building transparency and stability in regions of tension," and "continuing our efforts to reduce the burden of arms."[36] While Mr. Lehman's focus was clearly on Europe, he noted "that the problems which confront us now affect us globally." He admonished that "arms control efforts...serve as a means to an end, not as an end in themselves." In keeping with the NSS. that "end" encompasses

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[45] Private correspondence from Kennedy, April 22. Kennedy plans to publish a short paper on this and other interviews with Russian naval and other defense officials, carried out in late March and early April.

[34] NSS, p. 14.

[35] To the Seventh International Round table Conference in The Hague, Netherlands, sponsored by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 10. 1992. Text from United States Information Agency, London, "European Wireless File," No. 74/92, April 16, 1992. pp. 4-10.

[36] p. 5.

"the growth of democracies, free market economies, and the rule of law...."[37]

Mr. Lehman touched on Mediterranean security was only once, in the context of Mr. Bush's Middle East Arms control initiative, which includes the effort by the U.S., Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom to develop guidelines and restraints on the export of conventional arms to the region. The initial focus of the five is on proposals for exchanging on arms transfers, and guidelines for transfers of equipment and technology related to weapons of mass destruction.[38]

Mr. Lehman did not mention naval arms control. In the writer's view, there are three reasons for its absence. First, naval arms control is not currently under negotiation nor proposed for negotiation. It remains to be seen whether the new mandate to be issued by the Forum for Security in Europe will include a naval component. Second, at a somewhat deeper level, naval arms control is not seen as relevant to the three key roles of arms control in current U.S. policy, named above. Nothing that is going on at sea today commands attention to it - - especially when it is compared to the concerns like proliferation. Among potential dangers that can be foreseen at sea, none seems to have the combination of probabilty of occurrence and seriousness of consequences that dictate prudent attention in the future.

The third cause has deeper origins yet: In the post-Cold War era, the United States continues to see little in naval arms control possibilities that promote its basic security interests: as will be discussed below in light of the new U.S. security strategy, much the contrary is the case. In the NSS, Mr. Bush is quite categorical regarding naval arms control:

> As a maritime nation, with our dependence on the sea to preserve legitimate security and commercial ties, freedom of the seas is and will remain a vital interest. We will not agree to measures that would limit the ability of our Navy to protect that interest, nor will we permit a false equation to be drawn between our Navy and

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[37] p. 6.
[38] p. 10.

regional ground force imbalances that are inherently destabilizing.[39]

While one notes that the inclusion of the last reference to "regional ground imbalances" suggests a residual preoccupation with Cold War arms control concerns, a fundamental hostility toward limitations on U.S. freedom of action in the naval sphere is evident.

In terms of current U.S. military strategy, it seems clear that naval arms control measures that limit Presence and Crisis Response are simply incompatible. The ability of the U.S. to meet Presence requirements is already strained by current and planned reductions in the Navy's inventory of ships; as noted, naval forces play a leading role in both Presence and Crisis Response. When one recalls that the post-Cold War Presence mission includes the objective of promoting U.S. participation in the security structures of the regions it regards as vital -- quite obviously including Europe -- one gains an appreciation of the major stakes that the U.S. sees potentially at jeopardy in the more stringent of naval arms control possibilities.

At a minimum, that concern leads the U.S. to rule out acceptance of geographic limitations on deployments to the regions to whose security and stability it has long been materially committed. That position, in turn, reinforces a long-standing, broader opposition to the principle that geographic limitation of deployments is legitimate -- When Mr. Bush says that "freedom of the seas" is a "vital interest" he has reasons to mean it that go beyond traditional and still valid concerns with sea lines of communication[40]

What yet remains to be seen is the degree to which the American commitment to freedom of the seas may lead it to oppose confidence-building and security measures (CSBMs) at sea in the future. Thus far, of course, naval activities not explicitly connected with activities ashore (essentially

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[39] NSS, p. 15.

[40] Similarly, the U.S. would oppose agreements that would limit its access to facilities ashore in the regions of its interest -- access is in any case being a function of agreement between the U.S. and the host nation.

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amphibious exercises) have been excluded from negotiations in this area, not least because of U.S. skepticism. But proposals for several such CSBMs may well be in the offing for Europe as a whole. Whether these are confined to further extension of CSBMs related to amphibious operations, or whether they include further expansion of the bilateral incidents-at-sea regimes remains unknown.[41]

As for the U.S. perspective on naval arms control in the Mediterranean in particular, comment is difficult. Today, to the writer's knowledge, no Mediterranean-specific arms control proposals are extant. At a minimum, it appears that insufficient time has elapsed since the revolutionary end of the Cold War for such "regionally"-specific proposals to emerge. While it is utterly hypothetical to entertain the idea, it would be surprising if in due course they do not. States in the Maghreb and Levant who desire to constrain the U.S. naval presence and freedom of action will naturally turn toward it. European states who accept or, perhaps, welcome the U.S presence may feel inclined, on behalf of interests in cooperative relations with the first group, not to reject such proposals.

While one cannot evaluate non-existent proposals, there are a few things that can be said about the Mediterranean in this context. First, while, the Mediterranean was clearly as bound up in the Cold War as any other part of the globe, it was not a focus of naval competition between East and West to the degree experienced in the Norwegian Sea or the Northwestern Pacific. Second, regardless of the ups and downs of relations between the states of the northern and southern sides of the Mediterranean, relations have never been marked by naval competition. On the contrary, relations between the navies of the two sides of the Mediterranean are in fact quite cooperative, often times better than those between their respective governments.

This combination, historically and contemporaneously, has made the Mediterranean a region of relative naval calm, at least as far as the kind of undesirable naval interactions that

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[41] See Marco Carnovale's conference paper for details.

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traditional naval arms control proposals might ameliorate.[46] For the U.S. the principal conflictual "naval" interactions in the Mediterranean in recent years have arisen from disagreements about freedom of navigation, reaction to terrorism, and concern with U.S. and other Western hostages. While it is surely not beyond the power of man to conceive of ways in which naval arms control might ameliorate conflict connected with these problems, the writer is simply unaware of any proposals that do.

CONCLUSION

It would be more satisfying to bring a paper of this kind to a focused conclusion. But the available facts simply do not permit that. The situation is uncomfortably fluid on all counts: U.S. national security policy and military strategy continue to evolve; the European security identity is only just emerging; and the role of naval arms control in Europe, and in the Mediterranean in particular, remains ill-defined. The best that might be hoped from an assessment of this kind is that it has touched upon a few of the more enduring features in each of these major dimensions. In particular, it is hoped that the illumination of current U.S. security strategy in the Mediterranean can help shed light on the likely future of naval arms control in this vital region.

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[46] A recent study of naval arms control focused on reducing naval incidents that could be sources of international friction, determined that the main regions needing attention were in fact the Nordic area and the Northwestern Pacific. While the study's perspective was unavoidably that of the Cold War era, it is instructive that its data base showed a lower level incidents in the Mediterranean than in the two areas mentioned, to the point that arms control attention was focused on those areas and not on the Mediterranean. Barry M. Blechman, et al., *Naval Arms Control, A Strategic Assessment* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. See particularly chapter 3, William J. Durch, "Things That Go Bump in the Bight: Assessing Maritime Incidents, 1972-1989."

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN - A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

Gordon Wilson

An assessment of the Mediterranean Region underlines the significance of this maritime area in a much broader context than its geographical limits and its relationship to what we call the Near and Middle East, as well, of course, to Europe and this has always played an important part in British strategic thinking.

From a British viewpoint the Mediterranean has always been significant as the meeting point between East and West, even before the opening of the Suez Canal, and has had a major significance in coalition wars. The Napoleonic Wars provide an excellent example even to the extent of the claim by Russia to have played an important part in the defeat of Napoleon's forces in the area by its actions in the Mediterranean as part of the Second Coalition (it is worth noting that in 1799 Nelson refused to allow Ushakov to take Malta, but the Russians do of course have a more obviously justifiable claim to a major role in the downfall of Napoleon!) The significant battle of Navarino in 1827 was fought between Britain, Russia and France on one hand against an alliance of Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia on the other. The Crimean war started because Russia aimed to acquire the Turkish Straits and Constantinople and thus control eastern access to the Mediterranean.

The eminent British historian Corelli Barnett in his book Engage the Enemy More Closely, a history of the Royal Navy in the Second World War, suggests that it was wrong for Britain to allocate so many strategic resources to the Mediterranean and thought it better to have abandoned the area completely in favour of the Far East theatre of war. This is a very interesting argument, but I think this view questionable because of the undoubted strategic significance of the area and the fact that, had we given up the Mediterranean and its vital adjunct the Suez Canal, we would never have recovered it, with all that involved for the then British perspective of its Empire. Also to a beleaguered nation who is to say that the impact of the victory at El Alamein was not worth such a disproportionate effort in terms of support for the boost to morale that it gave.

I want to address the NATO view first because this is still very much a keystone of British policy in the area. With the exception of the last decade and a half, Britain always kept significant permanently based forces in the region and still makes a substantial contribution in the form of personnel in the various headquarters. Maritime force levels are significantly augmented for major exercises and the UK has had a regular presence in the NAVOCFORMED activations and will now be a member of the STANAVFORMED, which is seen as a most welcome innovation. I would also like to point out that contribution to this force is seen by the United Kingdom as a redirection of national operating and training patterns and we are certain that full time participation in standing naval forces provides considerably better training opportunities than those obtained from on call forces. Whenever the real world strategic situation has demanded force levels have been enhanced and for an example one only has to go back some sixteen months or so and note the large British force centred around the carrier Ark Royal operating in the Eastern Mediterranean in addition to the substantial presence

in the forward areas of the Persian Gulf participating in Desert Storm.

Since the formation of NATO the Mediterranean has been fundamental to alliance strategic thought, with the Southern Region centred around this sea and its headquarters at the heart of the area, first at Malta and subsequently at Naples. Thus we had as one of the five major sea campaigns postulated in the NATO document Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS), the battle for control of the Mediterranean on a par with that for the North Norwegian Sea. Whereas the latter has until recently been seen by strategists to have been the more important, who is to say that the emphasis has not now been reversed, albeit in a different strategic environment? We have also seen over the years the premium placed on maritime strike operations in the area by both the United States and NATO, such that it has been one of the prime areas for responsive sea borne strikes against the USSR should they be needed. The Soviets for their part were very much aware of this and, prior to the new order in Eastern Europe, countered the NATO fleets with large surface and subsurface forces of their own.

Subsequently in the Gorbachev years of arms control the Soviets adopted a different tack and made many proposals that the Mediterranean should be a sea of peace with all military forces withdrawn or alternatively that naval forces, which include those of the Soviets, should only operate in the region as a combined force under the auspices of the United Nations. These were resisted by NATO and subsequently such has been the change in the world balance of power, let alone the diversity of opinion coming out of the former Soviet Union, that one heard, for example, proposals that supported the strength of the NATO commitment to the Mediterranean in the interests of the security of the region1 or that NATO and USSR forces should operate together with the same aim in mind. 2 This was a far cry from an ocean of peace and reflects the reality of world affairs.

NATO's approach in this changing strategic environment needs to be looked at in the light of the revised Alliance Strategic Concept published late last year. In the discussions on a new alliance strategic concept we read about a "strengthening European pillar of the alliance" and "the preparedness of the European allies to take a greater share of responsibility for their own security", although under this changing balance it states that the "European security environment cannot be addressed without recognition of the broader global context. Substantial military power, including ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction, already exists in the hands of states outside the CSCE process that may be hostile toward Alliance members. If such states either border on Alliance territory, or have weapons with sufficient range to reach NATO nations, they could put Alliance populations and territory at serious risk. These potential threats on the Alliance's periphery are clearly covered by articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty." Later it goes on to discuss the

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1 Georgi Sturua, Dalhousie University June 1990

2 UK/US/USSR discussions Adderbury series, Brown University, R.I. November 1990

implications for the Southern Region which must not only address Soviet capabilities, but " a different order of potential risks must also be considered, stemming from the substantial military capabilities of states outside the CSCE process or from other regional instabilities."

Manfred Worner addressing the North Atlantic Assembly at the end of November 1990 was very imaginative in his vision of the future, speaking of "variable geometry" in his concept of the limitations imposed by NATO's boundaries and, after all, this is a very important consideration in considering the response to such threats.   He said that the Gulf Crisis demonstrated that "risks can arise from new and unexpected quarters" with the result that "threats to NATO's territorial integrity from beyond Europe cannot be downplayed as out-of-area threats".   He believed that as a result "increasingly [the] Alliance must factor these risks into its defence planning" for they all required "a collective response and renewed focus on long term crisis protection".3   This approach will have the inevitable effect of pulling the centre of NATO's gravity south towards the Mediterranean and, I suggest, that without a more realistic and pragmatic approach it is going to be very difficult to deal with the threats that do exist to NATO's Southern Flank in an effective way.

The previous Commander of NATO's Southern Region, CINCSOUTH, Admiral Jonathan Howe, spoke illuminatingly on these matters to the IISS in January last year.   He said that NATO is in transition and would have to adjust quite rapidly to major political and strategic change and, looking beyond the traditional threat, the Balkans were an area of increasing instability, as has subsequently been proved. Looking further afield it was getting very difficult for NATO to maintain a firm distinction between in area and out of area(OOA) in view of the growing sophistication of weapons and the increasing number of OOA interests of the member nations - and here of course he impinged on the debate on Europe's future defence posture, which I feel is the fundamental strategic question that has to be addressed by us Europeans and which is very high on the British agenda.   Post 1992 Europe, with economic strength greater than that of the US, must be seen to be doing more to protect its obvious interests and this will be as much on the US agenda as on that of the European nations themselves.

Taking Worner's inference further, Howe vividly described this new emphasis as NATO's centre of gravity sliding down to the Southern Region.   From this new perspective there were three major concerns.   The then USSR; the Balkans and particularly the ethnic effects on the Italians and the Greeks (very prophetic in view of the impact last year of Albanian migration on the Italians); the south and south-east areas. With regard to the last, a combination of acute economic and demographic problems, irrational leaders, improved air to air refuelling techniques and ballistic missile proliferation gave rise to major concerns.

The traditional OOA zones had changed to direct, such as

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3 Manfred Worner, Address by Secretary General   of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council to thirty sixth annual session London 29 November 1990

Iraq, Syria and Libya, which bordered NATO's territories, albeit Libya lay across the Mediterranean, and those a little further afield, no longer OOA, but now, he suggested, near area because they were able to impact directly on NATO's own territory.   In any case NATO's interests extended beyond the direct geographical area, as illustrated by the then current Iraq crisis.   I suggest that in reality they have always extended that far, if only for the middle east oil, but have never been properly addressed.   It is only that the perceived greater threat of the USSR reduced the impact of this dependence.

The experience of the British and Americans in moving forces to the Gulf region underlined the enduring significance of the Mediterranean as a highway for sea movements between east and west.   According to the testimony of Vice Admiral Donovan, the commander US Military Sealift Command, to the House Armed Services Committee on 19 February 1991, the United States moved 94% of its total cargo to support DESERT SHIELD/STORM by strategic sealift. Of this 75% went through the Mediterranean. From the UK perspective it took 72 ships to move 4 Brigade, the reinforcing brigade to 7th Armoured Brigade in order to make up 1st Armoured Division, from Germany to the Gulf and by 25 February last year a total of 146 vessels had been chartered for the movement of military equipment in support of Operation GRANBY (the UK name for DESERT STORM).

It is well worth bearing in mind that, under the concept of the new United States Strategic Structure, the Atlantic, which is to be one of the four major commands, encompasses not only the Mediterranean but also the western Indian Ocean, which emphasises the link of the Mediterranean between the two areas of interest, hitherto regarded as separate, into one homogeneous region by the force of new strategic realities.

I hope I have shown that this has always been a region of significance to Great Britain, both as an individual country and subsequently as a major actor of the NATO Alliance for sound historical and strategic reasons and it is now one of growing importance, not only to the Alliance, but to Europe as a whole as, from all perspectives, the centre of gravity shifts southwards. This perception can only have been heightened by the Gulf war.

Europeans, therefore, within and without NATO, see the Mediterranean as an area of great significance to their security interests.   New threats in a changing world include demographic pressures from the Maghreb as it looks across the sea to an affluent and relatively underpopulated southern Europe. Migration pressures are not only a threat from the south but also from the east and north east, as illustrated by the Albanians, and note that the Italians used their navy to respond to the problem.   Drugs, ballistic missiles and chemical warfare are all growing threats from a southerly direction to add to the established, if now somewhat less immediate concerns to the east. New organisations such as the Pentagonal reflect the concerns of regional nations to respond to such pressures.   Manfred Worner has described the area to the south and south east of Europe from

the Maghreb to the Middle East as an "arc of tension" 4.   In his
view NATO has to improve its crisis response and management
attitudes to such threats and in tackling them in a wider area.
His use of the term "variable geometry", mentioned earlier, is
very much a call not to be hidebound by artificially restricting
boundaries.

     Central to this debate is that of the US presence in Europe.
While there may be conjecture over the number of troops or
aircraft to support them in Germany, I do not see the US drawing
down too greatly its significant maritime contribution to the
Mediterranean and this may therefore well become the residual
American commitment of substance to the defence of Europe, albeit
it will doubtless be reduced somewhat from the force levels of
the last few decades.   However that is a subject that is more
appropriately addressed by our American speaker.

     The Italians announced in 1990 that they are to divert more
of their defence budget to the navy because of the perceived
threat from the south.   Demographic problems concern them
greatly and these can only have been accentuated by the Albanian
migrations, but also remember that it was at the Italian island
of Lampedusa that Gaddifi fired Scud missiles shortly after the
US Libyan air raids.

     Therefore I see the region as one of increasing NATO
interest and concern in which it is seen to be necessary to have
the potential to respond to any crisis, rather as the Inner
German Border has been viewed in the past and this would reflect
the official British line.   Certainly, as there is no question
over limits of operational areas in the Mediterranean itself, I
would expect any potential response to be robust.   Whether
Manfred Worner's vision of NATO's defence of firm interests
somewhat beyond but associated with this vital area is viable is
much more questionable.   The inertia of the NATO system and the
reluctance of several nations to move from the cosy assurance
provided by the old form of NATO and address difficult questions
hampers the introduction of imaginative ideas to address the
changing world.   Nevertheless the Mediterranean needs more than
ever to remain a direct area of NATO interest - as long, of
course, as NATO lasts - and the US will certainly demand that, in
tandem with the US efforts, Europeans contribute substantially to
the security of the area and still the only effective means by
which they can do so in concert is through the infrastructure of
NATO.

     I have addressed the NATO perspective at length because it
is very important to the region and certainly to the British
approach to strategic issues of the area.   I also think I would
be right in saying that the British have a very good Alliance
reputation in the Mediterranean.   Now I want to turn to current
arms control issues in the maritime sphere as I see them.
Maritime measures were very firmly excluded from the mandate of
the formal CFE arms control processes.   This has been a strong
Western principle, certainly at the official level, but is also
reflected in the views of many independent commentators and
academics, although certainly not all, for there are some who

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4 Manfred Worner: address to North Atlantic Assembly,
London, 29 November 1990

considered at the time of the CFE process that by this approach
the West missed a major opportunity for change and exhibited a
marked degree of inflexibility in retaining its entrenched
position.   Nevertheless there is strong consensus on this line
among the major maritime nations of the West and in retrospect
this position has been vindicated.

On the other hand the erstwhile Soviet Union pressed very
strongly for maritime forces to be included in the formal arms
control negotiations.   This approach really achieved significant
status and a high profile after Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in
October 1987, which was followed up by further high level
speeches on closely related issues in 1988 by Gorbachev himself
at Krasnoyarsk in September and earlier that year by the then
Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in Oslo in January.   There were
two reasons for this high profile Soviet response.   One was a
reaction to the US "Maritime Strategy", a concept of US naval
operations for the first time published in an unclassified form,
which was put to the world in 1986.   This spoke in fairly strong
terms of the need to adopt an active and forceful forward
presence in the event of potential conflict and certainly gave
the Soviets cause for concern.   At the same time the CFE
negotiations were taking place and the Soviets were about to make
marked concessions in the land environment.   With their
continental perspective they felt that the West, with what
appeared to them to be a marked superiority at sea, should make
reductions in this area of perceived superiority commensurate
with those being made by the Soviets on land.   Their then Chief
of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev never lost an
opportunity to point this out, even as the dialogue between the
two blocs brought a significant thaw in relations.

The philosophy of those who wished to avoid the arms control
process was founded on the perspective of an alliance and
strategy held together by sea links and this can be traced back
to the theories of such eminent writers on maritime affairs as
Mahan, Corbett, Coulomb and Richmond, hardened by Allied
experience during the Second World War, particularly in the
Atlantic.   In short, to preserve the integrity of the Alliance,
there could be no restrictions on the passage of military and
merchant ships outside territorial waters under Grotius'
principle of 'mare liberum' and in simplistic terms it was
generally agreed that to conduct a defence at sea (as opposed to
an attack on land) a ratio of 3:1 superiority was needed.   Both
strategically and economically the Western Allies relied to a
much greater extent than the USSR on free use of the oceans.

Behind these formal positions there was some dialogue, not
least being the Adderbury series of conversations in which views
on matters of naval policy and strategy were exchanged on an
unattributable and unactionable basis.   It was by such means
that both sides in the argument began to develop a better
understanding of the concerns of the other and the rationale
behind their national strategies.   The benefit from such
discussions may be gauged from the fact that Ambassador Vladimir
Kulagin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking in
Copenhagen in early 1991 said that at last he understood the
western preoccupation with the sea lines of communications
(SLOCs).   A major international conference held in Moscow in
February 1990 brought into the open many of these views and
subsequently it has become apparent that by and large the Soviets

did not want structural arms control any more than did the Western navies.5   Other conferences have identified this outlook, although Admiral Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the then Soviet Navy, in the United States last November did say that he still felt there was a place for some form of structural arms reductions.

There is a widespread feeling among some that while there might be little to be gained from attempting structural maritime arms control, not much would be lost by either side in having some form of dialogue and introduction of confidence building measures. However, there was a fear that these might prove a slippery slope to further substantial arms control measures, although in the current climate of cooperation it remains to be seen whether such an outlook will prevail.

In a time of reducing defence expenditure among the major military powers of the world, driven, if nothing else, by financial imperatives, structural arms control is actually unrealistic and counterproductive. For a start it leads nations to hold on to ships and weapons they might otherwise put up for disposal, because they could be used as bargaining chips, even though they might be militarily worthless.

Perhaps a more important result of this financial pressure is the unilateral reductions that occur as a consequence and these seem to be much more significant and speedy than any that might be brought about by more formal measures and is a most interesting observation when compared to the inter-war years arms control process of the Washington and London treaties. This most commentators consider to have been a failure which created more problems, such as insecurity, suspicion and resentment, than it solved and ultimately failed to prevent conflict.

Richard Hill has pointed out with regard to the European process that, although unilateral measures clearly do not fall within the Madrid Mandate, since they are not politically binding in international terms, they nevertheless have a place in confidence building and are definitely a CBM. Thus the US decision in 1990 to remove several varieties of tactical nuclear weapons 6 from their ships did have a significant effect and cut a considerable amount of ground from under the Soviets' feet. In reality these weapon systems were getting obsolescent and difficult to maintain and in due course there would have been nothing to stop their being replaced, although that would have been a very disadvantageous decision to have made in the public forum of world opinion. Nevertheless the step did have a

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5   In this context it is most interesting to read the Greenpeace reports of the visits made by their officials to the Severodvinsk and Vladivostock areas in the latter part of 1991. They appreciated that because the enrichment of the fuel was much lower than the commonly accepted norms of the Western navies, the submarines required refuelling and repair work much more often than their western counterparts, with the consequence that they needed more of them to maintain the numbers considered necessary for operations and to counter their perceived threat. Reduction in submarine numbers would certainly not have met their aims.

6   ASROC, SUBROC and Terrier

confidence boosting factor, albeit many professional naval
officers had serious doubts about the utility of nuclear weapons
at sea, on the basis that they would probably create more
problems than they would solve.   For example, a nuclear depth
bomb dropped on a submarine would make the water unusable as a
medium for detection, for which it is virtually the only
effective means, for several hours.

One of the three major fears of the Soviets in the maritime
sphere has been the capability of sea launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs) and they worked very hard to achieve a limitation on
their numbers, tacked on to the START treaty as a politically
binding agreement.   This concern must have been markedly
accentuated by the effectiveness of this weapon during DESERT
STORM.   Thus the unilateral announcement by President Bush in
September 1991 that all tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), including
nuclear armed SLCM, would be removed from ships at sea must have
been a major surprise but a great confidence boost to the
dialogue between East and West.   It also has a significant
impact on the hitherto sacrosanct "neither confirm nor deny"
(NCND) policy.   For the first time in recent years the West had
seized the initiative and the Soviets were certainly caught off
guard such that their response, when it came, was in a rather
staccato fashion, although in general it matched that of the
West, since the US had now been joined by the UK in the intention
of removing TNW from ships at sea.   There is one loophole in the
exchange.   The US regards SLCM as a tactical weapon, whereas
from the Soviet, and now presumably Russian, perception it is a
strategic system and therefore probably not covered by the Soviet
declaration, which did not specify weapon systems.

The general improvement in the atmosphere generated over the
last eighteen months is such that weapon systems and potential
confrontation at sea between the world's major navies is fast
slipping of the agenda as the one major naval issue to be
replaced by that of multinational cooperation.   For that one can
credit unilateral disarmament moves and not formal arms control
treaties, albeit unilateral measures are driven by self interest.
We have to wait and see what happens in due course, but these
measures could well prove more productive than the naval arms
control steps of the inter-war years.

Thus the British position on maritime arms control in the
Mediterranean or elsewhere remains very much what it has been
over the past decade.   This is that force levels or weapon
systems are not a matter for negotiation, nor should the freedom
of the seas be constrained by limitations to the movements of
warships outside territorial waters and this includes proposals
that constrain movements in international straits and traffic
zones.   There have been suggestions that there might be merit in
having a regional arms control regime in the Eastern
Mediterranean because of considerable problem with instabilities
on the flanks, particularly as the old order of Europe breaks up.
There is certainly pressure for land and air agreements and this
could lead to similar approaches in the maritime sphere.   There
could be merit in constraining these emerging forces from
developing a capability that would have application for anything
more than protection of their own exclusive economic zones, but
definitely not at the expense of having some reciprocal restraint
on those traditional navies of the region.   In the longer run it
might be possible to have a dialogue on maritime issues on a

confidence building basis and most independent commentators advocate such exchanges.   What is without doubt is that Russia is now speaking openly about arms control at sea being a subject whose time has passed and the matter for immediate attention is cooperation in the maritime sphere to develop more effective procedures to stabilise the new world order.

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Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean:

Military Aspects

by

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General	reduce threat to SLOCs detente may change	limit defense of sea lines verification may be difficult unilateral reductions better limit unilateral options	selective
Asymmetrical measures	address unequal needs	complicate calculus	Examples: * land-attack for anti-ship *
Regional Accords	politically manageable militarily more relevant	circumvention by outsiders	multilateral, best way to bring regional powers to any negotiation
Structural Arms Control			
Tonnage limits	easy verification could start A/C in M.East	less relevant parameter	NATO freeze for non-NATO ceilings
SLBM	make SS "fair game"	US and Russian already in START	install PALs move SSBN out of Mediterranean
Cruise - Nuclear	preempt Russian option	foreclose strategic option	include ex-Soviet range < 600km
Cruise - Conventional	prevent surprise attack	verification difficult ·	NATO freeze for non-NATO ban (include ALCM?)
Destroy Tactical Nukes	prevent post-Soviet chaos reduce future threat to carriers	foreclose marginal options	abolish NCND policy

Summary table of naval arms control hypotheses			
Proposed Measure	**Pros**	**Cons**	**Feasibility in the Mediterranean**
Attack Submarines	reduce threat to SLOC environmental protection	reduce land-attack options reduce sea-control	offer freeze and ceilings multilateral verification deployment transparency
Anti-submarine warfare	stabilize SSBN	difficult verification offensive SS use easier	ban nuclear ASW only
Restrict Foreign Bases	increase pre-positioning easy verification	political role impeded	only if threat to SLOCs eliminated
Bases for UN use	reduce costs increase political role	reduce unilateral options	commit to Security Council
Anti-ship PGMs	reduce threats to ships and navies	reduce unilateral options difficult verification	ceilings leading to ban ban on trade
Operational Measures (CSBMs)			
General	less constraining easily rescindable good experience exists	can not prevent violations slippery slope to reductions	should be pursued selectively
Exclusion zones	reduce offensive potential	zones of peace unworkable weak precedents, expensive	unlikely to find useful options
Maneuvers Limitations	limit provocative behavior	difficult to define, verify hamper training reveal employment options	safety zones around ships designated firing zones

Summary table of naval arms control hypotheses

Proposed Measure	Pros	Cons	Feasibility in the Mediterranean
Maneuvers Notification	limit surprise good precedents in Europe	difficult to define, verify limit flexibility	flexible scheme: tonnage/days ratio voluntary "courtesy" notification
Maneuvers Observation	reduce suspicion knowledge to small states	difficult to do for big navies hamper fast crisis response	multilateral, good for smaller states

Information exchange
    procurement
    operations
	reduce action-reaction race
	reduce suspicion
		may limit flexibility
		may be too intrusive
			procurement publicity
			regional peacetime cool-lines

Naval Communication	limit overreactions		naval crisis prevention center
Doctrine - R. of Engag.	prevent overreactions build political goodwill		naval NFU harmonization of Rules of Engag.
Bilateral INCSEA	good precedents to copy	could create confusion	useful before multilateral
Multilateral INCSEA	politically more feasible	mechanism more complex	highly auspicable
Self-destruct devices	reduce accidental launches inexpensive	may harm positive control	auspicable for dangerous systems (nuclear and missiles)
PALs	reduce danger of both accidents and proliferation	expensive politically low priority today	install
Environment protection (from nuc. propulsion)	reduce danger of radiation	peacetime nuisance	redeploy nuclear vessels

I.Introduction

After the successful completion of the INF, CFE and START treaties, naval weapons are the only ones not to be the object of arms control negotiations. The reason for this is that the West, and principally the United States, has been adamantly opposed to even consider negotiating naval arms. The main general argument for this position is that naval weapons do not justify *ad hoc* negotiations because of their inability to conquer and hold territory makes them unsuitable for aggressive purposes and therefore innocuous. This is a rather simplistic generalization: naval forces can be instrumental in the conquest of territory, and in any case the conquest of territory is not the only type of military offense to guard against. This was shown, for instance, by the action of naval forces at Pearl Harbour. Subsequently, naval forces have been indispensable in the conquest of the territory, as in Cyprus and in the Falkland. Fear of damage, rather than of territorial conquest, seemed to be the traditional motive behind Soviet interest in naval arms control.

In addition, naval forces can be a threat to maritime trade. As the Cold War drew to an end, the Mediterranean and Middle East region witnessed an escalation of dangers to merchant marines. Naval forces, on the other hand, have been used to protect maritime trade. To engage in an abstract debate about whether naval forces are inherently offensive or defensive, stabilizing or destabilizing, is probably a sterile exercise. They can be both offensive or

defensive, stabilizing or destabilizing, as can most other weapons, depending on many factors such as political circumstances, the structure of combined arms operations, the regional correlation of forces in a given geographical area, etc.

This paper will address the military aspects of naval arms control in the Mediterranean sea in order to assess whether or not it might be in the interest of the West to engage in naval negotiations in this region. After the fall of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of ex-Soviet naval forces from the Mediterranean, are there reasons to pursue naval arms control? The answer that emerges from this paper is a cautious yes. While the traditional threat from the Eskadra is no longer there, it may be the right time to take advantage of lower tensions and strong Western negotiating leverage to push through agreements that may come in useful in future times of tension.

A. Historical background

The historical experience in naval arms control is one of mixed results. The Washington treaty of 1922 and the 1930 and 1936 London naval treaties, over all, were a failure in that they prevented neither an expensive naval arms race nor the development of a destabilizing mix of naval forces that were instrumental in the unleashing and waging of World War II. In the Mediterranean, the crude quantitative limitations failed to provide any contribution to stability—but then, neither were they expected to. In the interwar period, perhaps only the Treaty of Montreux has served the useful purpose of regulating the acrimonious question

of access to the Turkish straits, but it can be considered naval arms control only in the broader sense.[1]

In the post-war era as a whole, the Soviet Union was the most active proponent of naval arms control initiatives. It put forward numerous proposals in the pre-Gorbachev era. Most of these centered in the European naval theaters, both in the North and in the Mediterranean. In 1963, after the deployment of US Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, the USSR proposed the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean. At the 24th Congress of the Communist Party in 1971, Brezhnev put forward a proposal to transform the Mediterranean in a "sea of peace", but only after the permanent members of the Security Council had cooperated in settling the Middle East conflict. Later he specified that the US and Soviet navies should be on equal footing. This initial proposals is indicative of the fact that the Soviets saw Mediterranean security as a part of their Middle East, and not European, security theater. In 1974, Brezhnev, in a speech to the Polish parliament, called for the withdrawal of Soviet and American nuclear-weapons-carrying vessels from the Mediterranean. This appeal was later repeated by Brezhnev himself and other Soviet leaders on several occasions.[2]

More recently, however, naval arms control initiatives have been successful

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[1] This and other legal aspects of naval arms control are dealt in the chapter by Natalino Ronzitti in this project.

[2] This and other Soviet proposals are discussed in Zoppo, Ciro: *Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean* (Los Angeles: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1975) p.12-13.

in the realm of confidence-building measures (CSBMs). A series of Agreements for

the Prevention of Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) has been concluded, and agreements

with a naval content have been included in the process of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The relevance of these agreements

for the Mediterranean is addressed below.

B. The terms of the current debate

Soviet proposals in the naval sphere were very forceful in the late eighties,

perhaps because this was the only area in which the West and the US were clearly

superior and thus could make concessions that could counterbalance the

asymmetrical cuts that the Soviets had to incur as a result of their superiority in

all other weapon system categories. Repeated calls for naval disarmament in the

Mediterranean were put forward in speeches at Murmansk in 1987 and, as for the

Mediterranean, in Belgrade in March 1988. Former Chief of the General Staff, and

later personal advisor for security affairs to Gorbachev (and failed putschist),

Marshal Sergej Akhromeyev, gave a testimony to the US House Armed Services

Committee in July 1989 in which he stated that the Soviets feared the US wanted

to restrain land forces in order to pursue naval superiority and then dictate its

policy to the USSR. He explicitly threatened to interrupt all superpowers arms

control if they did not include naval weapons.[3]

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[3] Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress, 21 July 1989.

All of these, and other, proposals met with resolute Western, and especially US, opposition, for many reasons.[4] First, the US has argued that NATO's dependence on freedom of navigation, because the allies are separated by an ocean, requires that its naval forces not be restrained by arms control. While the original premise is undisputable, the conclusion drawn from it is a *non sequitur*, as one could argue that precisely because of this dependence on sea-lines NATO needs to reduce naval threats to navigation through arms control.

Second, there is a general presumption that naval verification problems are either too intrusive or too difficult to implement. This paper will show how this is true in some, but not all, possible negotiating scenarios.

Third, it has been widely argued that naval weapons must be considered in their broader military context. But that is true for land and air forces as well, as none exists in a vacuum. Moreover, precisely because the context has now been moving (and all in the West agree to want it to accelerate further, both in Europe and especially in the Middle East) one should at least argue why naval should not follow suit.

Fourth, some argue that naval reductions are taking place anyway, for budgetary and other reasons, and there is no need to have complicated negotiations. But precisely for this reason this is precisely a good time to establish an arms control regime that could come in handy should the international

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[4] Ironically, it was the US that in 1817 promoted the first naval arms control treaty ever signed (and still in force) to limit British naval forces in the North American Great Lakes!

situation deteriorate in the future.

Finally, the US argues that the end of the East-West cold war, but the permanence of military threats from several widely separated regions of the world, require more naval power, that is flexible and can be redeployed as fit; does not need political negotiations with host countries; and is best suited for reinforcement after the US reduces its military presence in Europe, assuming there might be a future need for heavy reinforcement.[5] This view was also reflected in Defense Department document leaked to the press in March 1992, which sought to portray the US as the only power with global responsibility and power projection requirements. The problem here is that such a unilateral approach is probably inconsistent with the need for international political cooperation with stabilizing powers for new world order; and with the need to discourage proliferations of various kinds precisely in those regions where this naval power should be applied.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the issue of naval arms control has moved to the back-burner, but under changing political circumstances may resurface in the future. Uncertainty regarding the political control of the ex-Soviet naval assets makes it imperative to address the issue in a constructive way now that conditions are optimal and before they may again worsen in the future. The West can not simply continue to refuse discussing naval arms control; it needs to argue why it may or may not agree to specific measures, and why. The penalties

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[5] Eberle, James: "Global Security and Naval Arms Control", in *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 July-August 1990, p.329.

for not doing so may be a combination of political ill will, various kinds of proliferations, and possibly military risks deriving especially from uncontrolled management of naval forces belonging to the former Soviet Union.

C. Regional Negotiations?

An additional difficulty about naval arms control concerns the geographical scope of possible talks. Geographical limitations have been useful in certain types of arms control (e.g. in the CFE) because it has made it possible to include countries from outside the area. On the other hand, it has created problems, such as Soviet elusion and the possibility of future build-ups outside of the treaty area. Geographical limitation has not even been considered in other types of arms control agreements such as START, which were inherently global in character.

One author has argued against regional accords because such agreements could be disrupted by countries from outside the region concerned.[6] Other opponents of regional agreements argue that because of the mobility and flexibility of naval systems, negotiations would have to be global to be feasible. Moreover, as shown by Soviet Union in CFE, treaty-covered systems can be moved out of regional treaty areas in time to make a regional treaty less effective. Yet, that did not deter the US or NATO from engaging in regional arms control in Europe. The specificity of naval flexibility is also arguable: multi-role capabilities are today a

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[6] Holst, Johan J.: "Changing Northern European Views on Northern Security and Arms Control", *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1990, p.100.

common feature of many land and especially aircraft systems.

Another advantage of regional negotiations is that they are politically more manageable, especially for smaller powers, because it makes it easier to address specific problems which may be irrelevant for other regions of the world. In the Mediterranean, regional naval negotiations would be better conducted on a multilateral level because it would be easier to bring together otherwise politically unreconcilable countries.Regional agreements would also be militarily more relevant, particularly for smaller powers, because they would address specific reciprocal security problems.

This paper purports to address this question by highlighting whether sufficient military rationales exist to make regional naval arms control options in the Mediterranean desirable and, if so, feasible. To make the analysis of various options more comparable, I will evaluate the missions, negotiability and verifiability of possible alternatives in turn.

D.Off-setting asymmetrical reductions

Already in the UN Expert Study on naval arms control of 1984 it was acknowledged that the goal of arms control should not be equal cuts but equal security. Therefore, naval agreements in the Mediterranean would have to consider different geographical situations.[7] Hence the necessity to consider unequal measures for the various participants. These may consist of unequal cuts

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[7] United Nations Document A/40/535, paragraph 285.

of similar weapon-systems, or of off-setting reductions of dissimilar systems.

One example that has been debated in the past was to eliminate attack submarines of the former USSR in exchange for the elimination of US nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The US unilateral declaration of denuclearizing its fleet (SSBNs excepted) and the current absence of ex-Soviet submarines from the mediterranean go some way in this direction in a unilateral way. UK and France are the only two other powers with these kinds of systems today and, as discussed below, there may well be some merit in suggesting their accession to the current *de-facto* US-CIS regime.

The principle of asymmetrical obligations may be used in other cases as well. For example, major naval powers in the Mediterranean may offer to reduce their land attack capabilities in exchange for coastal powers reducing their anti-ship capabilities. Any such negotiations is likely to be premature until naval arms control reaches a firmer ground, however

II.Possible categories of structural arms control

A. Tonnage limitations

This type of naval arms control was already tried before World War II, but was circumvented by Germany. A similar quantitative approach was adopted in the SALT/START process, when throw-weight was one of the parameters used to establish arms limitations.[8] With modern technologies, naval tonnage limitations could be circumvented again, perhaps even more easily than in the thirties: the size of ships is less and less important with respect to other considerations such as advanced weaponry.

With the fall of the USSR, it is hard to conceive of tonnage ratios that could make strategic sense between the US fleet and any other except, possibly, that of Russia. All other major fleets are of NATO members and their navies are far smaller. If anything, budget cuts and inter-allied debate on burden-sharing would make many countries less than eager on being allocated a larger share of responsibility.

On the other hand, the principle of tonnage limitations could be usefully applied among non-NATO Mediterranean navies particularly in North Africa and in the Middle East. Most of these are of comparable magnitudes and comparable technological levels. Such an agreement would be easily verifiable and would provide a useful starting point for further arms control measures in the regions. Because it is less controversial and less sensitive for domestic establishments, this kind of rudimentary naval arms control could be a workable starting point for

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[8] I am indebted to Johan Holst for this comparison.

regional arms control measures in the Middle East.

On a sea-wide basis, NATO Mediterranean countries could offer a freeze in total deployed tonnage in exchange for a ceiling on the part of non-NATO riparian states. Such an agreement would also have to address the issue of non-naval threats to NATO SLOCS, e.g. those coming from shore-based systems, and particularly from missiles. NATO navies could offer to reduce their land-attack capabilities in exchange for non-NATO countries limiting their land-based anti-ship capabilities.

B. Naval "strategic" nuclear weapons

Missions American, French and British SLBMs have been thought of as "strategic" non-naval mission oriented systems (though it seems that the Soviets/Russians target their SLBMs also against US naval forces). Otherwise, one could argue (as the Russians do) that restrictions on SSBN logically call for restrictions on other naval forces as well.[9] But this would not be logic: there is no reason to reduce the number of potential "targets" just because one reduces the offensive capabilities against them.

Negotiability Because of the character of their mission, there is virtually none outside of the bilateral START process. This is even more true today that Bush's plan removes the problem of the co-location of SLBM and other weapons

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[9] Admiral Gorshkov according to Petersen and Robinson cited in Tangredi, Sam J.: "Naval Strategy and Arms Control" in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Summer 1991, p.202.

such as nuclear SLCM. SLBMs however remain relevant to non-structural agreements, particularly concerning negative control procedures—see below. French and British SLBMs are likely to join the START process if they are to become objects of arms control negotiations at all.

However, France and Britain may join the US and Russia in an agreement to keep the Mediterranean SSBN-free. This would have some value as a bargaining chip to offer other non-nuclear states in exchange for limitations in other kinds of armaments, and it would remove any inhibitions against attack-submarines, one of the most threatening systems for Mediterranean SLOCs that it would be advisable to control through negotiated agreements—see below.

Verifiability It is by all accounts adequate in the START process. It would not be different from that of SSN as far as the platform is concerned, and therefore it would not be possible to establish separate detection systems for the two types of submarines, though it is definitely possible to distinguish between, for example, the sonar signatures of the two types. This would allow for an adequate verification potential.

C. Sea-launched Cruise Missiles

Missions Aside from SLBM, naval nuclear weapons include the so-called "tactical" weapons, though many, such as the SLCMs, are actually strategic from a European point of view, and have little to do with the naval correlation of forces. Their strategic character derives from their missions, which was to strike deep

into enemy territory. This capability made it possible for SLCMs to be designated as "strategic reserve" by the US itself. The role of SLCMs for deterrence increased after the INF treaty and NATO reductions of TNF in the late eighties: they are pin-point accurate land-attack weapons capable of reaching targets in a way that, after the INF treaty, few other systems in Europe could.

Their withdrawal according to the Bush plan of 1991 makes the subject less urgent from the point of view of arms control (though it does not completely resolve the issue as these systems will not be destroyed).

The Soviets (and today the CIS) also have a lot of SLCM below the 600 km range, which they refused to include in the Declaration of Policy Concerning Nuclear SLCMs in START. These SLCM could do "strategic" missions against European targets from Mediterranean waters or even from the Black sea[10]. The new SS-N-21 are particularly concerning, and it remains to be seen whether they will also eliminate as a response to US initiative.

A future redeployment of a nuclear version of the SLCM is likely to happen only under politically and/or militarily tense circumstances. For this reason, it would be advisable to ensure that if such a redeployment takes place it should happen under the safest and most secure circumstances possible. In this respect, it would be advisable to install use control devices on SLCMs now (see section on this measure below). In addition, it would be highly auspicable that such devices

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[10] US Department of Defense, *Naval Arms Control Report to Congress*, February 1991, p.11.

be installed, in cases where they are not, on all naval nuclear systems of the ex-Soviet Union. This would provide additional security in light of the current uncertainty with respect to the chain of command and political control over parts of the ex-Soviet navy.

SLCM also have a conventional missions. The ex-USSR has nuclear anti-ship SLCM but no conventional land-attack version at present, though it soon may. US has plans for about 100 subs and 100 surface ships with conventional SLCM (both land-attack and anti-ship), and their conventional mission was evident during the Gulf war of 1991 against Iraq.

It is more likely that rudimentary versions of conventional SLCMs will spread to other countries. In the Mediterranean, this would pose a problem for Southern European and insular states.   **Negotiability** For the nuclear version, the point is mute after the Bush plan, though these weapons are not to be destroyed. However, there will remain the conventional version. After the INF treaty, NATO countries have *de facto* renounced land-based cruise missiles. NATO could propose to freeze (with a later build-down option) its conventional SLCM in exchange for a renunciation of land-based conventional cruise missiles regionwide.

If such an offer were made, non-NATO Mediterranean countries would be likely to request a ban of all cruise missiles capable of reaching their territory from the Mediterranean, including the air-launched variant, in exchange for their foregoing this category of weapons for the future. A ban on all cruise missiles would not be achievable in the immediate future, but possessors of such systems

may offer to start pulling them out of the Mediterranean after all countries of the region had agreed to give up new acquisitions of their own.

Verifiability The unilateral US moves on nuclear SLCMs requires no verification regime, but should that be desired in the future (it may be requested by the Russians or other inheritors of Soviet naval systems in case of negotiated agreements), it will not be a problem to tell whether warhead is nuclear or conventional,[11] but little additional verification will be possible without unacceptable intrusiveness. In addition, there could even be problem to detect the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard nuclear-propelled vessels.

There would be serious problems of verification with respect to many other issues that might come up in the future, such as range, deployed numbers, non-deployed inventory, covert production, dual-capable launchers.[12]

Conventional cruise missiles, wherever based, would be even more difficult to verify. This seems to be a major obstacle toward their inclusion in a limitation treaty.

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[11] An experiment to this effect was carried out in the Crimea in 1989 by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the US Natural Resources Defense Council. It measured radiation emitted by nuclear anti-ship cruise missiles with passive sensors. See NRDC "News Release", 12 July 1989.

[12] This is well explained in *Report to Congress*, op. cit., p.12

D.Other tactical naval nuclear weapons

Missions Remaining naval nuclear weapons can be of two broad categories: land-attack and ship-to-ship. In the first case, they would be marginal for attack against another nuclear power, and, as the Gulf war of 1991 demonstrated, irrelevant against non-nuclear powers. As for the second type of mission, the US Navy had already begun the process of denuclearization in 1987, with the plan to withdraw ship- and submarine-launched ASW missiles (SUBROC, ASROC) and anti-air (Terrier); according to this plan, the US navy was already withdrawing over 1,000 weapons.

The Bush plan of 1991 calls for the withdrawal of airborne weapons as well, and thus makes the issue of tactical naval weapons a secondary one for the time being, though these weapons will not be completely eliminated and may be redeployed aboard in the future (perhaps without public announcement). The same could be true of the Russian navy.

Negotiability Until Bush's speech, the US argued that "tactical" nuclear weapons enhance stability:[13] they can not be the target of a first strike (as they are dispersed on over 200 vessels); and can not perform a first strike of their own (as there are insufficient numbers to accomplish a preemptive attack). This argument, by which naval tactical nuclear weapons are defined according to what they are *not* able to do, is a *non sequitur*.

Bush's plan apparently changed the US outlook on this matter. Perhaps it

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[13] *Report to Congress*, p.8.

would be the easier today than in the past to ban their deployment in a binding agreement with challenge inspections provisions. This would require the US Navy to officially abolish its Neither-confirm-nor-deny (NCND) policy. It would therefore entail no actual limitation in the foreseeable future, but would insure against future surreptitious redeployments by possible inheritors of the ex-Soviet navy. It would also make it easier to monitor environmental worries and rebut threat-inflationary concerns.

The abolishment of the NCND policy, of course, would not bar future nuclear re-deployments. But it would require the distinction between nuclear-carrying or -capable vessels and others, The former would have to be declared and/or marked with special flags or other observables. Recognition of nuclear capability is an accepted principle in land for air forces, and there is no obvious reason why this should not be the case for naval forces. Nuclear designated ships could suffer from greater specified restrictions in some cases. On the other hand, they might also enjoy special immunities and privileges.[14]

Verifiability It is easy to detect the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board vessels, though it would be more difficult to find out what kind of weapons: the radiation from nuclear propulsion engines would complicate matters a bit. It might be more difficult to keep track of numerous routine replenishment, including those at sea. An agreement to designate nuclear-capable

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[14] Prawitz, Jan: "Applications of CBMs to a Naval Nuclear Environment", in Uited Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Naval Confidence-building Measures*, (New York: United Nations, 1990), p.122.

vessels might need several inspectors on board each vessel to be verified, either permanently or on a random basis.[15] In any case, the importance of verifiability would depends on one's view on whether these weapons are militarily useful: if they are, and incentives to cheat are thus greater, verifiability is important. If not, there would be few, if any, incentives to cheat and thus the verification of small violations would be less important.[16]

E. Attack submarines

Missions This is a very versatile system. In order to assess the feasibility of arms control measures, one must distinguish according to its various armaments and relevant missions: surveillance and reconnaissance, strike warfare (land-attack), mine warfare, naval blockades, ASW, escort to battle-groups, delivery/recovery of special operations troops, coastal and barrier defense. Reductions agreements would affect all of these missions indiscriminately.

The nuclear land-attack role of attack submarines was important for NATO as a means of extended deterrence, but Bush's plan takes this mission away. For NATO, SLOC protection, sea-control mission is now the main raison d'etre for attack submarines. The conventional anti-ship/ASW mission however is not favorable to NATO, which has the most valuable assets at sea. In the Mediterranean it is not easy to deal with the submarine threat to high-value

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[15] Lin, Herbert: "Verification of Nuclear Weapons at Sea", in Fieldhouse, Richard (Ed.): *Security at Sea*, (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1990), p.108.
[16] Lin, op. cit. p.111.

vessels and SLOC, as ASW suffers from serious problems because of the characteristics of the water.

Negotiability It is interesting to note that a proposal for a complete ban on submarines came at the Washington conference of 1922 and was put forward by US and the UK even though at the time they had more submarines than others. Today, a problem with equal ceilings of SSNs would be that the Russians have many SS which they could use to bypass, while the US has no SS. Therefore, an agreement would have to include SSs in an overall ceiling. Alternatively, they could be excluded from a regional treaty and would gradually fade away as they are incrementally decommissioned. The current trend toward major reductions in the former Soviet navy may facilitate a *da facto* agreement to this effect. Until recently, the Soviets were less eager to reduce their submarines than any other naval weapon, perhaps because it is their best maritime asset, and perhaps because their threat to NATO SLOCs was one of the few truly impressive conventional military capabilities left to them. Russia could be more amenable now that have less of a stake in maintaining a submarine presence in the Mediterranean.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the consequent concern by Russia about the Ukraine taking over part of its fleet, may provide an opportunity to tackle an otherwise difficult issue. It may be auspicable to formalize the withdrawal of the ex-Soviet submarines from the Mediterranean in an agreement, and NATO powers could offer some quantitative limitations in exchange. This

would also serve the purpose of facilitating the inclusion into an agreement of submarines from other riparian states.

One scholar has proposed to reduce conventionally-armed submarines to ceilings sufficient for defense but not for offense.[17] One problem here would be to define such a threshold. Another might be that some countries will fear their qualitative inferiority and will probably insist on a complete ban, though they could probably be temporarily persuaded into a partial agreement. Ceilings would allow major powers to retain a capability for SLOC protection, while at the same time moderate increases of non-NATO submarine fleets.

Verifiability The Mediterranean is a rather advantageous milieu for attack submarines. Physical conditions (the water is warm, salty and shallow) make them difficult to detect. However, in case of an agreement on submarine reductions, their numbers would be easy to verify at the stage of production, or as they enter or exit the Mediterranean, but not as easily afterward. It would be easier to detect diesel submarines because they must emerge, but even this would not be easy for countries non endowed with satellite and/or advanced sonar intelligence.

Mediterranean naval powers could agree upon a multilateral verification arrangement, whereby entry and exit to and from the sea and intended mission would be notified by non-riparian states. In exchange, coastal states would commit themselves to a strictly non-offensive mission of coastal and SLOC defense.

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[17] Lacy, Jim: *Regional Approaches to Naval Arms Control*, paper presented to the IAI-Rand Corporation conference, Rome, September 1990, p.10.

F. Anti-submarine capabilities

Missions It has been argued that ASW should be reduced because, just as strategic defenses against ICBMs, it is destabilizing against the SSBN deterrent.[18] The counter-argument is that ASW is meant especially against SSNs, which threaten SLOCs. Moreover, a first strike against SSBN is practically impossible to realize; therefore, overall, ASW is stabilizing because contributes to reduce threat of surprise attack against SLOC by attack submarines. Some tried to differentiate between anti-SSN and anti-SSBN, but in vain. also, Soviet SSBN bastion approach made differentiation moot: today, ASW against Russia is mostly an anti-SSN mission.[19]

As for other powers in the Mediterranean, submarines may perform both offensive and defensive roles. However, as noted above, they constitute the major offensive threat to SLOCs, while their defensive role might more easily be picked up by surface and land-based systems.

Negotiability Nuclear ASW is being withdrawn by the US. There are no other nuclear ASW in the Mediterranean. Therefore, NATO could offer a formal ban on nuclear ASW as a part of the submarine ceiling offer outlined above.

It would be more difficult to envisage negotiations for non-nuclear ASW, which would require extremely intrusive verification procedures and probably could not be made reasonably reliable. In any case, if one accepts the premise that

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[18] See chapters 5-8 in Tsipis, Kosta, Anne Cahn and Bernard Feld: *The Future of the Sea-based Deterrent*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973).

[19] Tangredi, op. cit., p.203

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attack submarines are mainly an offensive system, there would be, as a principle, less need to limit ASW.

Verifiability A satisfactory scheme could be devised for nuclear ASW and for on-board or trailed detection systems, but it would be more difficult for submerged sonar buoys. One could conceivably set up a mechanism to keep track of transmission cables but this would make the system hostage to anybody who knew in a crisis.

G.Naval Basing

Missions Only the US has permanent naval bases on foreign land in the Mediterranean. The Soviets no longer did after their ejection from Valona and Egypt; today, the Russian navy might only find a support facility at Tartus, in Syria, and even that is far from certain. In the spring of 1992, NATO created a new permanent naval force for the Mediterranean, until now only don on an *ad-hoc* basis. This will be based in Naples and consist initially of six vessels (frigates and destroyers) from Greece, Italy and Turkey. The US and the UK would exercise jointly with the force on a regular basis, while German and Dutch less frequently. This force will require some foreign (and possibly permanent) basing on the part of the countries involved.[20]

This new NATO flotilla demonstrates that today naval basing has acquired an eminently political role. It also, of course, has a military role, as shown during

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[20] *International Herald Tribune*, 10 April 1992, p.2.

various unilateral and multinational operations during the eighties and particularly during the Gulf War. Non-NATO Mediterranean countries have a tendency to see the permanent presence as an intrusion by foreign powers

In the long run, one option would be to restrict this in the way it has been restricted in the Northern flank, with no permanent US bases but only depots of matériel and plans for wartime or crisis-time redeployment.

Another possibility would be to put foreign bases in the Mediterranean at the disposal of the United Nations whenever required by the Security Council. This would not constitute any obligation either for the host country or for the forces that are routinely based in such bases, but may facilitate their employment for peace-keeping and other UN-mandated missions should the countries concerned agree to do so.

Negotiability The negotiability of any base agreement is at the moment rather low. In the past, the Soviets always had weak arguments, as is was clear that their main aim (the Sixth fleet's pull-out) would have the primarily political consequence of yet further de-coupling the US from NATO Europe, with limited military consequences for the Soviets' security.

Today, the US naval presence is seen by most allies as one of the last remaining outposts of the US military commitment to European security, and it is unlikely that NATO countries will push for any reduction. This is the case, for example, of the Sixth Fleet's political role in Italy.

As for the possible use of naval bases for UN purposes, that is indeed an

auspicable target to aim for, but it will likely take the shape of voluntary *ad hoc* operations rather than of a formalized treaty. The danger of such a treaty would be that the UN may again be unfriendly to the West in the future as it was sometimes in the past. On the other hand, such a turn for the worse would likely be a long term trend and any commitment could be withdrawn in time. Moreover, the US is a member of the UN Security Council and could thus prevent any unwanted use of its Mediterranean bases through it power of veto.

Verifiability It is obviously easy to verify whether a naval base is operational and hosts foreign ships. Surreptitious storage facilities could be used to pre-position spare parts and weapons. However, this would hardly constitute a fatal flaw for this kind of agreement.

H.Anti-ship PGM

Missions These systems are highly destabilizing because they put premium on hasty action by ship commanders (as was the case with both the Stark and Iranian Airbus incidents.) They are now widespread, will be even more so in the future. In particular, in the Third World, and in the Mediterranean, there is an on-going proliferation of missile armed patrol boats: there was only 1 country in the world that possessed these systems in 1960; by 1965, there were 7; in 1970, there were 17; by 1974, the total had risen to 31; today, more than 60 countries operate missile-armed boats, and the number is probably bound to increase

further.[21]

Negotiability It is difficult to envisage negotiations on PGMs in the near term, at a time when Western nations are aggressively pursuing the development of PGMs. It will hardly be more so after the de-nuclearization of the US fleet, which will place even more emphasis on PGMs. Yet, major naval powers have more to lose than minor powers from a proliferation of PGMs. In the long run, major navies could benefit from a ban on anti-ship PGM. In the Mediterranean, this ban should probably include shore-based anti-ship missiles such as *Silkworms*.

in any case, any such negotiations would probably have to take into account air-launched PGMs, both land and carrier-based. NATO navies could offer a ban on land-attack and anti-ship PGMs. This would address the Western navies main concerns while at the same time offering other riparian states a reduction in NATO's land attack options.

Verifiability Any arrangement to verify PGM limitations would be intuitively difficult, as these systems are small and not detectable by remote sensing devices. A total ban, a rather distant prospect, would be easier to verify—for example if all possession and testing of guided missiles were proscribed from the Mediterranean. More partial measures would be more complex to verify.

Technology and systems export controls will be difficult to enforce in an airtight manner, and many countries have shown an outstanding ability to

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[21] *Third World Navies*, p.

assimilate the relevant technologies quickly and efficiently. These systems are expensive but they are still cost effective against high-value targets such as major surface ships.

III. Operational arms control (CSBMs)

Unlike for structural arms control, the purpose of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) is not to reduce incentives to go to war, but to avoid accidental war arising from unwanted or unauthorized provocation or misperceptions. CSBMs do not restrict purposeful access by a state to its military instrument. Some have proposed that CSBMs should also aim at avoiding escalation from conventional to nuclear war.[22] This proposition however would lead one into the dangerous field of damage limitation and preparation for limited war, and therefore should be rejected.

In the naval sphere, most experts and practitioners see CSBMs as a precursor to structural arms control. For this reason, opponents of naval arms control fear them as leading to the slippery slope which would eventually bring about structural arms control as well. For the same reason, proponents of naval arms control push them as the path of least resistance towards reductions, as a necessary first step toward more challenging goals. Both sides agree, however, that CSBMs could not be the finish line of naval arms control, but only a new beginning. This preconception may or may not be true, but it is certainly a

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[22] Radoslav Deyanov, "The Role of Security Objectives of Confidence-building Measures at Sea" in UN Disarmament Department, op. cit., p.17.

problem inasmuch as it hardens the position of the skeptics.

Also, CSBMs are seen as easier to conclude because they are less politically controversial and require neither force reductions (and consequent unpalatable—for navies—budget cuts) nor even ceilings, though they might require constraints on the principle of freedom of the seas. Such constraints would have to be evaluated against possible benefits. So far, naval CSBMs have been formally excluded from the Vienna CSBM negotiations because they were not included in Madrid mandate from which such negotiations originated. Whether they may be addressed at future stages of the CSCE arms control process remains to be seen, pending the general restructuring of that process after the collapse of the Eastern European bloc and the USSR.

What follows are criteria which could be applied to evaluate possible naval CSBMs. In any case, one should keep in mind that it is objectively difficult to measure "confidence", and in any case such measures could never be absolute.[23] Positive effects of useful CSBMs should: i) reduce capability to use naval forces for political pressure; ii) help avoid incidents; iii) limit the probability of incidents escalating into crises; iv) improve the crisis-management use of naval forces; v) reduce the possibility of surprise attack; and finally, vi) obtain positive political spin-off.

Negative side-effects, which contribute to making possible CSBMs

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[23] Norwegian Defense Research Establishment: *Confidence-building at Sea*, (Oslo, 1988), p.22-27.

counterproductive, include: i) reduction of unilateral ability for effective use of naval forces; ii) limitation of national crisis management capability; iii) complicate preparation for defense during a crisis; iv) influence correlation of forces asymmetrically; v) negative political effects.

A. The Mediterranean and Existing CSBMs at Sea

In assessing possible CSBM proposals, it is useful to start from an evaluation of what agreements have already been concluded and how new ones could improve on them. Several agreements with a confidence-building potential for naval forces have in fact already been concluded, and most do bear directly on the situation in the Mediterranean. Many did in fact originate from incidents between the superpowers' fleets in the Mediterranean or the Black Sea. Perhaps the most accepted worldwide is the "International Regulations for Preventing Incidents at Sea", usually referred to as the "Rules of the Road" agreement, which is designed to regulate maritime traffic and avoid collisions at sea. It has undoubtedly provided for an effective instrument for the prevention of unwanted confrontation.

The US-USSR Agreement for the Prevention of Incidents at Sea (hereinafter INCSEA), signed in 1972, goes further than the "Rules of the Road" in that it specifically forbids provocative or dangerous activities such as attack simulations. Allegedly, the agreement originated from the filming by the US Navy of close contact episodes with the Soviet Eskadra in the Mediterranean. The US-Soviet

agreement has been imitated by the UK (in 1986); Germany (in 1988); France, Italy, Norway and Canada (in 1989). As of 1991, Turkey, the Netherlands and Spain were negotiating their own INCSEA agreements, but the future of these negotiations is unclear following the disappearance of the USSR. These agreements have a direct bearing on the Mediterranean, because all the major navies which are present in that sea are parties to them.

The US-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement requires at least a 24 hours advance notice for SLBM tests. Information must be passed through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center which was established in 1987. This agreement is not directly related to the Mediterranean, which is not a usual patrolling area for SSBNs.

The US-Soviet agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities was signed in Moscow in 1989, and it applies also to naval forces.[24] It establishes procedures to deal with the entry of each party's forces in the territorial waters or air-space of other. As in the case of the INCSEA, it was prompted by several incidents, the most publicized of which was perhaps that involving several near collisions in the Black Sea in 1988 when US ships entered Soviet territorial waters. It prohibits the harmful or dangerous use of lasers, electronic interference in command and control, disruptive use of illumination, etc. It provides for direct communication procedures among ships and aircraft in case of problems arising in its implementation.

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[24] See the text in Fieldhouse, Richard (Ed.) *Security at Sea* op. cit.

The Stockholm agreement of 1986, as confirmed by the Paris agreement of 1990, also covers naval activity, but only if it is "functionally related" to other military activities on land. Specifically, it requires notification 42 days in advance of amphibious landings in excess of 3,000 men, and the invitation of observers for those over 5,000.

B. Geographic Constraints (Exclusion zones)

There are enormous asymmetries of power and interests among Mediterranean states. Proposal for the constraint of naval activities are based on the assumption that either the military presence interferes with civilian activity (such as fishing, etc.) or the mere military presence is source of tension. This assumption is far from clear. There are no obvious cases of military activities that impair civilian activities in a way that could be avoided only by preventing naval forces from accessing a certain area at certain times.

If taken to its logical extreme (banning of fleets from certain areas, or creation of the so-called "zones of peace"), such measures would conflict with each state's right to free navigation. Another problem could arise if navies of non-riparian states were prevented from entering semi-enclosed seas: this would interfere with riparian states' right to enter into alliances with other states and host the forces of the latter; such proposals would therefore hardly be acceptable. [25]

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[25] For a further discussion of multilateral limitations to fleet mobility and of

More limited options would entail the establishment of partial exclusion zones for certain types of naval armaments only. For example, hypotheses about several types of nuclear-related exclusion zones have been floated in the past. These have included, among others, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ), Anti Submarine Warfare free zones, and secure bastions for naval strategic nuclear assets (mainly SSBN). In previous paragraphs I have discussed the merits of banning nuclear ASW from the Mediterranean.

Three regional precedents in this respect provide for rather weak examples. In the Tlatelolco Treaty, denuclearization includes large ocean regions in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, but this provision is partly ineffective because of reservations by the nuclear powers for areas beyond the 12-mile territorial waters limit. The Antarctic treaty also prohibits the stationing of nuclear forces in adjacent waters, but this is a strategically and politically irrelevant provision. Finally, the Rarotonga treaty provides for large denuclearized ocean areas, but does not limit access to high seas by nuclear armed or propelled vessels.

One way to make exclusion zones in the Mediterranean more negotiable might be to allow for a "surge clause" to be applied in case of crises deriving from hostile action against one of the contracting parties. There would be difficult issues to decide, however, including questions such as 1) how long a surge could last; 2) how often it should be allowed to happen; 3) who would have the authority to determine whether or not the "surge clause" were triggered by a given event; 4)

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zones of peace, see chapter by Natalino Ronzitti in this study.

what could be allowed to happen if the surge clause were triggered by a state which were not party to the treaty.

Exclusion-zones have been considered for weapons other than nuclear, e.g. for submarines with land-attack SLCM. It has been suggested that in order not to be provocative these weapon-systems and their platforms should be kept farther from the coast of potential target countries than their range. Such a measure would be difficult to negotiate in the Mediterranean because quite a few states (both riparian and not) now have long-range weapons (notably guided missiles) on board their ships, even light vessels. Thus, keeping them farther away from other parties to a range-based treaty could easily block off the whole Mediterranean. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the depth of exclusion zones cold be linked to the 200-mile EEZ band: in the Mediterranean, the effect would be equivalent to a total ban and the creation of a zone of peace.

Verifiability The degree of verifiability of Mediterranean naval exclusion-zones would depend on the control of entry into the sea through its access straits. This would be easy for surface ships, but less so for submarines (which however must navigate on the surface and show their flag if the UNCLOS were to apply). In practice, verification of entry would be most relevant for the US (and perhaps in the future the successors to the Soviet Union) which may hold by far the greatest share of non-riparian naval forces. A problem might be that it is precisely those two countries which possess the advanced sensor technology which is necessary to closely monitor submarines underwater.

In case of agreements proscribing specific weapons categories (such as nuclear weapons) one could envisage reciprocal observation at port facilities or aboard replenishment ships.[26] This would allow parties to the agreement to check on what armament is loaded on what ships and then see whether ships or specific armaments proscribed in the Mediterranean enter the area. This system, to be effective, would be dauntingly complex, and probably not very cost-effective compared to the significance of the violations it could detect.

Alternatively, one could envisage the emplacement of a system of radio transponders aboard individual proscribed weapon systems to transmit their location at given intervals. The owner of the weapon could be allowed to switch them off in case of crisis to keep the location secret, but would be held accountable if it switched it off unjustifiably in peacetime. If it did, other parties would know the owner party was preparing for something unusual, a fact that in itself would sound alarm for all those monitoring the transponders' signals. Evidently, this would be a complex and expensive system.[27]

C.Limitations of maneuvers

A variation on the above could be to limit naval maneuvers *per se*, as a distinct activity compared to others, such as transfers, permanent stationing or actual force employment. This could help distinguish peaceful training operations

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[26] Prins, Gwyn: "The United Nations and Naval Power in the post-Cold War World", in United Nations Disarmament Department, op. cit., p.226.
[27] ref.

from offensive or provocative ones. However, to make this distinction could be difficult in practice. In addition, it could pose a problem if one state wanted to use naval power for actual operations, and not for exercises.

In principle, an agreement to limit maneuvers should not affect such operations, but the state concerned would have to declare that a particular naval activity was not a maneuver, and thus imply that it was about to use naval power; this may not be feasible, because it would eliminate the surprise factor for the target of the operation itself. Also, these limitations would constrain the US more than any other power because it does more large exercises away from home ports. All other Mediterranean naval powers do fewer and smaller exercises, and they are considerably closer to home. This measure would likely be feasible only if all movements of naval vessels were considered as maneuvers and were therefore subjected to limitations of some kind.

With these caveats, limits on maneuvers would have to specify the number of participating units which would constitute a "maneuver". This number could not be too low or it would be too cumbersome to manage the agreement and might actually make it irrelevant because it would confuse noise with signal. Also it would be unacceptably bothersome because it would impede even the smallest crisis-time preparation, lest wrong escalatory signals are sent to the other side. On the other hand, the numerical limit must not be too high as to be meaningless. Considering that 10 ships usually form a battle group, that figure could perhaps be used as a basis for negotiations.

Again there would be a special problem for submarines, whose maneuvering could be detected only by the US and perhaps by Russia (in the Black sea, less easily in the Mediterranean), and only to some extent by France and UK, but probably not everywhere in potential maneuvering areas in the Mediterranean.

Maneuvers could be limited according to several parameters besides the number of units involved. For example, categories of participating units could be given a different weight in the calculation of limit thresholds. Another parameter could be the number of participating states, though in the Mediterranean this would only apply to NATO. The length of maneuvers could be considered, and a total threshold of ship-days, which could take into consideration the relative weight of each unit category. Also the frequency of exercises could be limited, with either a given maximum number of exercises in a given time period, or a fixed minimum interval between exercises. The surface area covered by a given exercise could be restricted, so as to prevent massive deployments which could be seen as preparations for offensive action.

Alternatively, an agreement could restrict certain specified activities which could be of an unnecessarily provocative character from certain specified areas. For example, the US could limit areas of carrier patrol away from striking range of Russia. The Russians (or the Ukrainians, as the case may be) may reciprocate by limiting deployment of land-based naval aviation from potential naval targets such as ports. Similarly, the Arabs could keep their navies at given distances from Israel, and vice versa, though this agreement would be militarily much less

significant.

Another possibility would be to establish safety-zones around ships, at least as big as range of potential striking weapons of the other side. This can not be practical in the Mediterranean because the range of even shorter range weapons would easily cover the whole sea. But even a partial measure could be useful, keeping naval vessels apart even if within striking distance, particularly among the smaller navies.

An agreement could be envisaged to establish live ammunition firing zones, with aim of avoiding dangers to civilian activities; this, too, would not be militarily very significant, however, and could encounter political opposition from the locals of designated firing-zones.

D.Notification of maneuvers

Following the pattern of the Stockholm agreements of 1986, numerical thresholds could be agreed beyond which states or groups of states would be required to notify naval maneuvers. Many of the issues discussed in the previous section with respect to limits on maneuvers would apply also in the case of notification requirements. Briefly, an agreement would need to establish thresholds in terms of ships and aircraft involved; submarines would be difficult to verify; if thresholds were too small they would result in a flood of meaningless notifications.

In order to be workable, an agreement on notification could leave a small

margin of flexibility in case unforeseen circumstances force last-minute changes in the composition and structure of the maneuver. Because of the difficulty in identifying whether ships that may be physically far apart are in fact participating in the same maneuver, several small maneuvers conducted simultaneously by the same state or its allies would have to be counted as one.

A notification regime would have to include provisions for the timing of exercises; thus it would need to define when an "exercise" starts and when it ends, and how long before that moment it would have to be notified. That time span must not be too wide to interfere with operational planning, but not too short as to be meaningless. A basis for negotiation could be the CSCE 42 days rule. Several INCSEA agreements provide 3-5 days for specific activities which may pose a special danger to shipping or aircraft.

It could perhaps be possible to devise moving thresholds in terms of ships and advance days: the more ships participate, the earlier notification. In this case, it would be necessary to establish a maximum number of notifications allowed in order to prevent phantom notifications from flooding the system and making it useless. This would be particularly true in the case of a multilateral agreement in the Mediterranean with many states involved.

As a variant on traditional schemes of notification, one could envisage a system of "courtesy" notifications, whereby states conducting maneuvers in a given area would routinely notify their activities to other states in the region. This might contribute to assuage the concern of some littoral states without infringing

at all on the principle of freedom of the seas.[28] A problem with this option would be, however, that it might be broken precisely when it would be most needed, i.e. in case of offensive preparation by one party. Or a party might choose not to notify an exercise in order to prompt (and thus test) the reaction of others. However, if the voluntary notification regime were widely accepted and became routine, a state could break away from only at a political cost, and would therefore likely not do so but in grave circumstances.

Any of these notification regimes would dampen the ability by those states to use naval forces promptly for the purpose of exercising political pressure.

E. Observation of maneuvers

Closely linked to notification is the idea of maneuver observation. An agreement on observation of exercises at sea would probably be less useful than on land, because there already is a lot of observation that can be and is done at sea on a unilateral basis. Mutual shadowing at sea continues to be routine between the US and Russia. Satellite information can reveal much about ship movements. On-board observers would not be very useful unless they were give detailed information on command and control procedures for the naval group concerned.

These conditions however do not apply to other states in the Mediterranean,

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[28] Grove, Eric: "Confidence and security-building and Law of the Sea Disputes", in United Nations Disarmament Depatment, op. cit., p.141.

which have more limited capabilities for unilateral observation through national technical means. For them, an agreement on observation of maneuvers would entail utilizing the services of third parties, such as, perhaps, commercial satellite photography. This they may not be able to afford. Alternatively, an international organization such as the UN (or the CSCE) could provide the service on a multilateral basis.

F. Exchange of information

Exchange of information that should help each party to better understand what others do and thus avoid misperceptions and overreaction. In this case, problems can be very different depending on what kind of information is to be exchanged. At a general level, even the US favors exchanges of information on such matters as procurement plans and increased military-to-military contacts. These could prevent the dangers of threat inflation, be it a voluntary one or not.

In addition, publicity about procurement plans may deter plans by a country to acquire weapons systems on the international market surreptitiously. The potential embarrassment of actual procurement actions that were to be concluded outside of such an agreement might deter both sellers and buyers from dubious dealings in the international arms markets.

A possible instrument for the routine exchange of information on naval operations could be what has sometimes been referred to as "cool lines" (as opposed to "hotlines" which are employed for emergencies). These could be

developed in a variety of ways. While existing military-to-military contacts could be expanded, the most efficient way to handle routine exchanges of naval information would be a regional information clearing house, where all parties to the agreement would convey all information that could then be redirected to all others.

G. Communication

At the ship-to-ship level, there already exist an accepted form of communication in the international agreements on radio signals. These are probably sufficient, though they could work even better in combination with other CSBMs, such as the standardization of rules of engagement and the designation of firing-exercise areas.

At the regional level, the creation of a naval crisis prevention center could also be envisaged; a small international staff should monitor all naval activities in the Mediterranean and signal alarm every time that a potentially ambiguous or dangerous situation may develop. This, too, would likely be better done in combination with other CSBMs so that it would have specific bench-marks against which to measure the development of potential dangerous situations.

H.Doctrine and Strategies

Again, similarities can be drawn with the process which was usefully followed for land forces in Europe in the CSCE context. Naval strategies could be discussed to eliminate their potentially provocative aspects. However, it is difficult to think of an equivalent of land principles as "sufficiency" or "non-offensive defense" for world-wide protection of interests by blue-water navies.[29] On the other hand, more limited measures of defensive sufficiency for regional navies could be devised around the idea of coastal and SLOC protection, to be opposed to offensive power projection.

One way to begin tackling the problem could be to proceed to a partial standardization of Rules of Engagement, or at least the criteria around which they are formulated. These are now classified and are known to be different from country to country, even within NATO. Their harmonization could help avoid misperceptions about what each side would be about to do under unusual circumstances or in a crisis.

This would have to follow an exchange of information on existing rules (as discussed in the previous section) and could not be done fully because this would imply the revelation to a potential enemy of vital tactics which must of course remain strictly secret. But it probably could be done at a fairly general level, though in that case the challenge would be to make these principles vague enough

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[29] Macintosh, James "Extending CBM to the Maritime Environment", ibid., p. 188.

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to be acceptable but not too vague as to be meaningless.

For example, there could be a declaration of No-First Use of naval nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons against targets at sea. This could be acceptable to the US because it is going in that direction in any case, particularly after the Bush naval denuclearization plan, and it could create a positive political climate for other measures that may otherwise be less acceptable for the Southern rim countries.

I.Additional Incidents At Sea Agreements

Previous paragraphs have outlined the merits of current bilateral INCSEA agreements. More could no doubt be concluded, particularly among countries rom the Southern rim of the Mediterranean, and existing ones could provide a solid legislative base to build upon. However, with more and more agreements being concluded, a multilateral option seems to be worth serious consideration in a multipolar naval environment such as the Mediterranean.

In the late eighties Sweden proposed to multilateralize the INCSEA agreement between the then Soviet Union and various Western powers. The USSR, however, showed a preference for multiple bilateral agreements in Europe rather than multilateralization of existing ones.[30] The US too, opposes a multilateral INCSEA, both because it would require discussion of sensitive

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[30] Granovsky, Andrei: "Necessity to Include Naval Armaments in Disarmament Negotiations", ibid., p.80.

operations in a multilateral forum; and because it would compromise atmosphere of intimacy and even informality that was developed on a bilateral basis over the years.

The Swedish idea, however, has undoubtedly several advantages: first of all, it would make it easier for more parties to accede, especially those who would not otherwise sign bilateral treaty with certain individual states (such as Israel) for political reasons. Second, it would avoid confusion if more agreement are concluded which do not include the successor states to Russia; the current star-like structure perpetuates the Cold-War paradigm and is increasingly inadequate in the Mediterranean where threats are multidirectional and recognized as such. Finally, a multilateral INCSEA could more easily be integrated with disengagement provisions in case of incidents actually taking place.

J. Locks on Nuclear Weapons

Another useful measure that has been discussed in the past, would be to minimize danger of accidental (unauthorized or involuntary) nuclear use. Measure to this effect were usually considered to involve a cost in terms of a trade-off between safety on the one hand and readiness and reliability on the other. With the end of the Cold War, this cost can be considered to be lower than in the past.

The Soviet position with respect to use control mechanisms on board submarines always seemed to be more forthcoming. One Soviet source stated to this writer in 1989 that Soviet submarines do have negative control mechanisms

similar to US PALs, i.e. electronic locks whose release require codes which are physically held separately from the possessors of the weapon.[31] The US, as is well known, does not have such devices on its naval weapons. France is, unsurprisingly, very secretive, while the UK seems to have an arrangement similar to that of the US.

Unlike all land-based US nuclear weapons in Europe, naval weapons (except for *land-based* naval ASW warheads in Europe, now being withdrawn) *can* be fired without any outside authorization or intervention, whether or not they receive the proper authorization to do so. Naval officers are of course under strict instructions not to proceed with any nuclear launch without authorization under *any* circumstances, even if all communication between a particular vessel and either the NCA or other superior commanders were disrupted. The US Navy has resisted the idea of installing either physical or informational controls on its nuclear weapons with a variety of arguments, the main of which can be summarized as follows.[32]

The first argument against use-control devices in that sailors have traditionally detested "rudder orders from the beach", and PALs would be just that, as the actions of the personnel at sea would be subject to veto from

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[31] Interview of General Chervov with the author, Moscow, May 1989.

[32] The material regarding the Navy arguments against physical control of its nuclear weapons has been drawn from interviews as well as from Ball, Desmond: "Nuclear War at Sea", op. cit., pp.10 and 28; Lawrence Meyer in *Washington Post Magazine*, 30 September 1984, pp.7ff; and Stein and Feaver: *Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: ...*, op. cit., pp.70ff.

authorities ashore. This is admittedly a psychological argument which has (strictly speaking) no logic whatsoever to it.

Second, physical control is unnecessary because the highly *selected navy personnel* would in no case act without proper authority, and in any case, naval *procedural* controls ensue that no one in a naval vessel could execute an unauthorized launch. Yet, it is difficult to understand why, if Navy commanders are reliable enough to guarantee that they would wait for authorization messages to arrive before launching their forces, it should be unreasonable to wait for enabling codes.[33]

Third, use controls would constitute a complex mechanism which may fail in an emergency, and could therefore *impair the reliability* of naval weapons: electronic equipment will fail more often than people. Yet, modern naval weapon systems already rely on a panoply of gadgetry which is much more complex than electronic locks: the added "complexity" which the latter would add at the margin would be negligible. In any case, the malfunctions of a small percentage of the locks would hardly compromise the missions of a force several thousand of

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[33] Admittedly, the EAM would be lengthened somewhat if enabling codes were added to authorization codes; this would mean a somewhat longer processing time for VLF or ELF transmission to the SSBNs, but the amount of extra time needed would be measured in very few minutes at most: most likely an insignificant loss considering the fact that the SSBN would be highly invulnerable and not under time pressure to act. In any case, this argument does not apply to weapons on surface vessels, which do not rely on VLF/ELF communication, and transmission of enabling codes in addition to authorization codes would cost essentially no time loss. See Carter, Ashton B.: "Communications Technologies and Vulnerabilities" in Carter, Steinbruner and Zraket (eds.): *Managing Nuclear Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p.223.

weapons strong.

Fourth, naval commanders would be less prone to hasty action because, thanks to their low vulnerability, in an emergency they would *not be under the same time pressure* as their Army or Air Force peers would likely be, especially if located near the battle area. By the same token, however, they could afford to wait the few extra minutes which might be necessary for an EAM lengthened by enabling codes to be copied.

The final, and most powerful argument for the lack of use control devices in the Navy, is that *the danger of host-country take-over, which was the most important rationale for installing PALs in Europe, does not exist for most Navy weapons*—except for ASW warheads based on land in Europe, which *are* equipped with PALs. If indeed the main purpose of use control devices was to insure against the dangers of potentially unstable allied political leaders or overly entrepreneurial allied military commanders, then there is no need for such devices on Navy weapons, which would be extremely difficult to seize for allied forces—and virtually impossible, of course, for terrorists or psychotics.

K.Post-launch control devices

In additions to electronic locks, or as an alternative to them, self-destruct mechanisms could be installed on non-recallable weapons (such as missiles). Their purpose would be to prevent accidental launches from producing unwanted damage. They have usually been thought of as a tool for nuclear weapons, but they

could be applied to selected conventionally armed systems as well.

These would be a variant of the PALs currently installed on US nuclear weapons in Europe. A radio receiver could be installed on board the weapons system, and it would be connected to a device that would disarm or self-destruct the weapon. Such devices would be similar to those which have always been in operation on space rockets. To prevent accidental or adversarial activation of the self-destruct device, another signal might be used to turn-off the radio receiver itself. This would prevent an enemy from aborting properly authorized launches.[34]

Such devices could provide some additional decision time to redress the problem of an accidental launch. In a situation like the accidental downing of the Iranian airbus by the US Navy, it might have provided a few additional and potentially decisive seconds for the US crew to avoid the consequences of their action, or perhaps for the Iranian pilot to comply with the identification requests.

L.Measures to protect the environment

Nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsors pose a security problem even if no war or accidental launch takes place; that is the nuclear risk, as one author put it, of nuclear reactors travelling at speeds of up to 30 knots.[35] That there have

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[34] University of Pennsylvania Professor Sherman Frankel, *The Economist*, 15 february 1992, p.85. See also "Post-launch Control Systems", paper presented by the same author to the conference on "Nuclear Weapons............" Pärnu, Estonia, 22-26 April 1992.

[35] Eberle, Jim, op. cit., p.330.

not been major accidents yet does not mean that the risk is not there.

The environmental dangers of nuclear contamination from nuclear propulsion must be addressed, of course, through improvements in reactor design, and the record to date seems to be largely satisfactory for Western submarines, though far less so for those of the former Soviet Union. However, the only way to foreclose the possibility of a maritime Chernobyl would be to give up nuclear propulsion.

While this would be more properly done globally, it is possible that a meaningful agreement could be negotiated regionally on semi-enclosed sea like the Mediterranean. This sea is intensely utilized by civilian traffic and surrounded by densely populated regions; therefore, the consequences of an accident would be potential greater.

Admiral Eberle has suggested that major powers switch to a fleet of diesel submarines only. This would largely eliminate the environmental problem, while at the same time confine submarines to a role of eminently defensive coastal defense.

A less extreme option could be to keep nuclear propelled submarines and their bases (the danger for nuclear propelled surface ships is lower) out of heavily populated areas during peacetime. Such restrictions could be waived upon advance notice by the submarines' commander in a crisis.

IV.Conclusions

Naval arms control has traditionally suffered from a sort of presumption of guilt which is not justified. Several measures could contribute to the stabilization of the Mediterranean maritime milieu, and should be addressed on their own merits.

Naval arms control is perhaps less urgent today between the major navies, and particularly between the US and the ex-Soviet navy, in light of the improved political climate and of the pull-out of the former Soviet Eskadra from the Mediterranean. However, this may just be the right time to produce binding agreements that might turn out to be useful in the future, should the successors to the Soviet Union become again more powerful and/or less friendly. In particular, the West may now have a one-time opportunity to ensure that ex-Soviet nuclear weapons do not contribute to proliferation in the Mediterranean.

In addition, the increased capabilities of naval forces belonging to countries of the Mediterranean Southern shores, and of the Middle Eastern region in general, make it auspicable that a regional agreement be reached to prevent these capabilities from contributing to create a less stable military environment in the future. This paper has discussed how selected measures of naval arms control would contribute to a safer maritime environment in the Mediterranean. In particular, this paper has argued that multilateral measures would in most cases be more desirable tha bilateral ones, for political as well as military reasons.

One final consideration is in order: Several of the measures discussed here

have profound political and legal implications. Therefore, their military value should be assessed in the broader political and legal contexts in which any relevant negotiations would take place; these non-military aspects are dealt with in the two following chapters of this volume.

Naval Arms Control in the

Mediterranean

Egyptian Point of View*

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Introduction

Many expert in disarmament and arms control affairs considered
that the peace accord between Egypt and Israel, which followed
after an intensive peace process, is the best base to launch a
similar effort to reach some kind of arms control or arms limita-
tion in the Mediterranean. Before the Egyptian - Israeli peace
accord all the world was deeply convinced that it is impossible to
reach such a peace accord. But by the efforts of loyal, peacelove-
rs and brave people, either from Egypt or from Israel we - togeth-
er - will be able to make the Mediterranean - the most famous sea
in modern and old history - as a peaceful sea in spite of all the
difficulties.

The difficulties that could face any naval arms limitation
agreements in the Mediterranean Sea are numerous for example: the
sophisticated nature of the international relations in the
Mediterranean, the contradiction of strategic political and
economical interests of the World powers in it, and the traditional
Arab - Israel conflict which makes the Northern and Eastern showers
of the Mediterranean Sea a possible arena for war. But inspite of
all these disadvantages I will try to be one of those optimistics
that the Mediterranean will be - sooner or later an international
peacfull sea for the welfare of all its peoples and for the
security and stability of the World.

The Strategic Importance of the Middle East and

the Mediterranean Region:-

The Middle East and North Africa are region of vital importance because of the following:

1. Their countries dominate southern and eastern Mediterranean.

2. This dominance gives them the ability to control access to the Suez Canal and the Black Sea.

3. The Middle East contains the Gulf which is one of the most important sources of crude oil needed by the West for energy.

Until the fall and decline of the Soviet Empire, the naval situation in the Mediterranean as controlled by fleets from both superpowers, as well as form those European countries which are particularly dependent on oil supplies coming from the Gulf.

During the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq, the importance of naval process belonging to the Gulf states, as well as the naval forces of Iraq and Iran. (... was reinstated.

The second Gulf war the war for liberation of Kuwait - proved the importance of the following:-

• The Egyptian navy, especially the maritime transporting fleet.

- The Suez Canal

- The existence of the American fleets (in the Mediter-
  ranean and in the Gul).

Ironically, the arms control community expected 30 years ago the outbreak of the next war to follow the pattern of world war [1]. But the end of the Cold War between the Superpowers, and the changing situation in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw pacts opened new possibilities for the de-escalation of military confrontation and enhancing arms control.

The current developments have had several consequences such as:-

* East-West detente, conflict settlement and arms reduction
  Europe resulting in a new security doctrine in the
  continent. That will reflect upon the maritime situation
  in the Mediterranean.

* The United States is rying to prepare for the expected
  struggle with Europe bout Gulf oil. The Mediterranean
  could be the arena f r such a struggle.

* The likely worsening relationship between the United
  States and Israel made the later try to strengthen and
  reshape its older tra .tional relations with France. Both

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[1] Emanuel Alder: The past and future of Negotiations, Dia
     logue, 4-1991; P. 66.

countries (Israel and France) are Mediterranean members;
the U.S. is not. This could make the situation in the
Mediterranean get worse.

Most of the Mediterranean Arab countries have lost their
fundamental source of naval armament (I.e. the ex-Soviet Union).
Since all of them are not manufacturing weapons, in less than two
decads most of their naval equipment will need to be retrofitted
or renewed. This will be hard unless some Western countries or the
U.S provide help.

Israel is a naval equipment manufacturing country, its
relations with the West are good an open. The Israeli military
industry hardware and software, could gain the know how, the
material and the finance to design, develop, build and produce
advanced and sophisticated maritime equipment including surface to
surface missile (SSM), vessels ... etc.

Each of the consequences mentioned above affect the Mediter-
ranean basin on naval arms control and security in one way or
another.

My concern in this paper is to generate a discussion on what
are the needs of arms prolifisation in the Mediterranean.

Dose the supper powers res onsible for such a case, and what should it do?

Is it disarmament or arms control or arms limitation or confidence building measures which can solve the case of arms proliferation in the Mediterranean?

To what extent are the different parties ready to accept any of the above - mentioned catoga ies?

Before going into discussions, we should notice that the official statements and positions of the countries of the Mediterranean - especially in its S-ithern and Eastern parts-are rather different from their actual ar practical ones.

Fortunately, the time is now suitable to launch a major international effort to reach some multilateral arms control agreements either on land or a sea.

Before analysing how present and near past international development affects arms control, we should mention that the relation between maritime arms control and other kinds of arms control can not be but linked

Naval Arms Control Characteristics:-

Naval arms control efforts need more work, because of its difficulty and complexity especially in the Mediterranean basin and because of its contradictory nature in the region.

The number of maritime states regarding navies as useful and flexible instruments of national power are increasing in the Mediterranean basin. While the navies are moving in several cases into quasi-military roles, which further complicates constraints.

The Mediterranean basin is actually crowded, and the interference of interests is the common case, it will take a much longer period of time to change this.

The Egyptian Position on Naval Arms control in the Mediterranean:-

We can consider Egypt as a maritime country since it has an extended coats line on the Mediterranean reaching to about 995 km.

The Egyptian least on the Red Sea gives the naval power more importance; the two seas coasts are sources of great natural wealth, in the form of fish and energy resources. Sea bourne trade contributes significantly to Egypt's national income (64% of Egyptian exported goods are transported by sea while 76% of its imports are brought in by sea.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian extended coasts lines on the

Mediterranean - and the Red Se - acts as a source of continued danger to Egypt since most of it is suitable for maritime amphilions operations.

With the existence of the Suez Canal and the possibility of large scale and extended maritime operations, the naval power became of vital importance to Egypt's national security.

If military invasions over the years becomes regarded as a reasonably high order threat to Egypt, the potential threat will exist for other countries in the Mediterranian basin which share Egypt's vigorous trade record. Should such an invasion take place, it is likely to cause disruptions in Egypt's sea lines of communication and ports through anti-shipping attacks, the mining of harbors and sea lanes, besides maritime siege and the launching of amphibious attacks to control one or more Egyptian Mediterranean harbors or to assist another main military activity in another strategic
direction.

Most of Egypt's Mediterranean coast line which extended to more than 995 k.m, is suitable for maritime operations, this imposes greater responsibilities upon the Egyptian armed forces and makes the priorities of Egypt;s mritime forces to be surveillance, early warning, presence and control of on, over and under the waves in areas under Egypt's domain.

The solution - at this stage at least - is not to eliminate the moritime defence aspect of Egypt's security, but to seek to complement it using the diplomatic instrument of naval arms control and mastotomy confidence building measures (CSBMs).

Developments in the Middle East, relations between Rabs countries and Israel particularly after the Camp David accords, make it possible to expect some progress in the field of arms control in general as well as in the filed of maritime arms limitation. But the (Running) peace process needs us to cautiously treat the whole matter.

With regard to the Issue of <u>Naval Arms Limitation in the Mediterranean</u> we had better start asking some questions:

- Do naval CSBMs run counter to a fundamental aspect of maritime policy for member states of the Arab World (i.e. Egypt, Syria, ... etc), Mediterranean NATO countries (I.e. Turkey, Italy, Greek ... etc) and Israel?
- Will the sitecation in the Mediterranean continue to be as it was before the decline and fall of the Soviet Empire, or are there prospects for change?
- How does the experience gained through establishing peace between Egypt and Israel (1974-82) help in setting similar maritime arms control issues.
- What is better: to start with establishing maritime arms control in the Mediterranean, or arms limitation or arms

proliferation, or confidence building measures, or
perhaps there are other options ?

. What will be the situation of the Israeli nuclear
capabilities in a maritime arms control system in the
Mediterranean ?

When answering these questions, we should notice that about
seven Arab countries on the Mediterranean depend to some extent on
the free use of that sea for what we can call their collective
defence.

In the meantime, Israel is working hard to prevent the
Mediterranean - at least on its Southern part - from becoming some
kind of an Arab Sea. While its strategic security depends upon the
durable existence of the American sixth flect in the Mediterranean.

The contradation of interests traditional arousing between the
different countries of the Mediterranean makes the naval (CSBMs) -
as regarded by Israel - as a limiting factor which eliminated its
capability to ensure national security

On the other hand, Israel enjoys somekind of very special
position in the mid of Western decision makers. Before the end of
the cold war, some of them considered Israel an advanced strong and
permanent naval base to work out or to counter the Soviet Union
fleets coming out of Dardanelles and posporus straits in case of

confrontation between NATO and x-WTO.

After the cold war, Israel :orked hard to convince the West in
general and the U.S. in particular that a strong, powerful and
well-equipped Israel-especially in the maritime field - was far
more important to the security of the West than ever.

Egypt's National Security and the Mediterranean:-

The Egyptian National secu~ity policy is shaped by three major
factors:

- Egypt's membership in the Arab League and in the Arab
  World.
- Egypt's potential po~ar (politically, economically and
  militarily), plus th: help and aids of it's allies and
  friends in the worlc.
- The countries geopol.tical position.

Egypt lies in the eastern asin of the Mediterranean which is
considered more fragmented, con'lict - ridden, and less stable, not
only because of the Arab Isra:li conflict but also due to latent
Greek-Turkish tensions.

On the other hand, Egypt lies next to Libya which is consid-
ered by the west as a major trouble maker in the Mediterranean. But
formost, the existence of the Suez Canal in Egypt, makes Egyptian

policies a synthesis of complementary and, at the same time, potentially conflicting elements.

First   There is a contrast between the regional and the Mediterranean dimensions of Egyptian security policy. On the one hand, Egypt represents the heart of the Arab World and its main defender inspite of the Egyptian, Israeli peace accord.

Second   Egypt can in the long run co-ordinate the efforts of naval CSBMs with Israel and the other Arab countries, either in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean (i.e Syria, Lebanon), or in the southern part (i.e Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morroco).

Third   Egypt has good and stable relations with Turkey, Greek, France, Spain and Italy. This paves way for Egypt to work as a catalyst to help make the Mediterranean as safe and quiet basin as it should be.

Due to the unstable circumstances imposed upon a number of the Mediterranean countries-including Egypt, it is important to reach a clear answer for the following:-

.   Would provisions for naval CSBMs have an equitable effect on security? and as we consider CSBMs as a primary step for a broader naval arms control procedures; should it be considered as an experimental field to develop a well defined maritime arms control programme in the Mediterranean?

.   Are naval CSBMs appropriate for peace efforts in the Middle

East between Israel and the Arabs ?

. Are naval CSBMs practical for example, how we can define a "Naval manoeuver"? Naval forces are constantly manoeuvering as a part of routine daily operations, and how we can verify; for example, a distinction between "activities" and routine "manoeuvers"?.

The Opponents and Proponents of Possible Naval arms Control Hypotheses:-

The opinions of opponents and proponents of various possible naval arms control hypotheses depend upon a number of conciderations:-

. The naval forces is an intagrated part of the armed forces of any country.

. Any arrangements for maritime arms control should be as part of a compelete settelment in the middle east and not as a separated or followed part to it.

. The charachteristics of naval power and its political, diplomatic and security roles, make it important to maintain the ability of maritime movement to maintain the national intrest, international rights in the territorial sea, and in the exclusive economic Zone (EEZ) as well as the maritime existance.

. The maritime power unique maneuverability makes it the major armed forces tool for the threshold of deterence against any non-regional agression.

. The effective part of the maritime armament is that part which
is able to affect-either directly or indirectly- the ground
fight (i.e more than 76 m. caliber naval guns, missiles able
to hit ground torget (such as the HARBOON missile), the sea
launched cruise missile, marions or sea porn troops and the
related naval protection troops.

. The launching of these weapons of sea based launchers is the
better future development to improve the possibilities of
opsecuration and hidden away of opposing forces surillance and
detection.

. The maritime powers in the Mediterranean either regional or
international played a preminent role in mangaging all of the
Mediterranean crises.

The Opponents of Possible Nav. Arms Control Hypotheses,
Point of Views:-

The naval armament of the Mediterranean countries is effective
but not decisive due to the continental military strategic nature
of those countries, thus the results of any naval armed control
agrements will not be as stron enough to reduce tension.

Most of the naval armament of the Mediterranean Arab countries
is at its minimum level to maintain their national security, any
suggested reduction would not be acceptable by them.

The naval armanient spending within the defense budjet of

those countries is quit limite , this make any reduction in naval
armament economically non-beneficial.

The estimation of naval power is far more difficult than
estimating the ground military equpments, in the meantime the naval
units could be used in several mission in peace and war, which most
of them are of security nature (minesweeper for example), but they
can be transfered in a short time to be as effective as fighting
naval units by adding missile launcher or naval guns.

The stratigic cooperation agreement between Israel and the
United States. The existance of American fleet in the Mediterranean
and the unorganized, weak, or vague existance of the ex Soviet
fleet, make Israel the superic power in the Mediterranean.

The shorter Israeli coast line in comparision with the extend
coast lines of the Mediteranean Arab countries should be considered
when discussing any future naval control agreement.

In such a recent unstable and transitional period of inter-
national relations, it will be difficult to convience the Medi-
terranean countries to accept any kind of naval arms control
agreements.

Development of the Egyptian Position Towards Arms Limitations Since
the end of World War Two:-

There are two levels by which one can easily distinguish the Egyptian position towards arms limitation after world war two:-

1. On the international level, the Egyptian position was supportive of all views, thoughts and principles pertaining to banning arms, arms control and arms non-proliferation.

2. But on the regional level, previaling circumstances in the area caused Egypt's view towards arms limitation to become mottled with conservatism and at many times suspicion.

3. In 1963, during the United Nations 17th session of the first committe for disarmament (*), Egypt set down a number of conditions (nine conditions) for a nuclear-free zone.

That seemed to reflect Egyptianfears of foreign control or foreign intervention in Egypt's internal affairs at a time sensitivity reached its peak over "sovereignty" issues.

4. In view of Israeli aggres ions against Arab lands which was embodied in the creation of Israel in 1948, and later followed by the Israeli occupation of Arab territory after the 1967 Middle East War, any Egyptian acceptance for arms limitation meant an acceptance of a situation which was not based on justice in any way.

That is why efforts for arms limitation did not make any

progress worth mentioing.

Continuous Western support for Israel also had its effect.
Egypt became worried that any arrangements for arms limitation in
the Middle East would naturally hamper and convulse its armament
capbilities, particularlyy in the nuclear field while Israel would
have a free reign to develop its traditional and nuclear weapons
and continue its occupation of Arab territory and territorial
expansion of arms limitation issues and measures to control
armament in the Middle East during that peirod of time revolved
around three principles:-

- Solving the palestinian question or giving palestinians at
  least the right to self-dertermmination.

- Ensuring the right of legitimate defence of own's national
  security.

- Requesting that Israeli nuclear reactors be put under inter-
  national supervision and halting the export of nuclear
  meterials to Israel.

The Egyptian Position on Arms Control Issues Under President Anwar Sadat:-

During Sadat's period, there was some change in the Egyptian
stand on arms control as a result of developments in Egypt's
strategic position followig the 1973 October war and Sadat's

personal view on the issue.

Sadat belived that settlir the Arab-Israeli conflict was the cornerstone to achieving growth and progress in Egypt.

Sadat worked at pushing the peace process with Israel forward, strengthening Egyptian-America. ties while seeking to change domestic, regional and surrounding international acceptance of peace. At the same time, he sought to midify Egyptian views towars arms control to provide an inc ntive for peace with Israel.

In 1974, Egypt and Iran presented a draft resolution to the United Nations 29th session to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Some 138 states voted in favour of it while Israel and Burma abstained.

The vote reflected Egyp s full support for a nuclear-free zone and verification arrange nts, Confidence-Building Measures whether through the United Na ons or the non-aligned movement.

The peace process between Egypt and Israel that began its first steps with talks at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, resulted in the first disengac ment agreement between Egyptian and Iseaeli forces.

Egypt agreed to put restrictions on the size of its armed

forces in certian areas in Sinai and on its air defences west of the Suez Canal while accepting the presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces between it and Iseael.

In the second disengagement agreement signed in 1975, Egypt extended its acceptance of arms limitation measures and agreed on confidence building measures whichh included building an early warning station, electronic sensors and an early warning system for the United Nations of any military movements in Sinai.

The year 1979 wittnessed the biggest development in the Egyptian position towards arms control when Egypt and Israel signed their treaty dividing Sinai into three parts; A, B, and C so that each area was a specific size, containing certian troops.

There was a fourth part, area C on the Israeli side where a limited size of troops existed. Multinational forces, equipped with an early warning system, were to oversee the treaty.

For the first time in the hisroty of the Arab-Israeli confilict, rules of an agreement or pact extended to the naval sphere.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace tearty included articles on arms control in territorial waters, mostly in the Mediterranean Sea.

'Article 4 in the first annex of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty stipulated putting the basis for naval military activity for both sides based on the following:-

* Both Egypt and Israel have the right to place and work naval units on the shores of Area A and D.

* Egyptian coast gurad vessels armed with light weapons cna be placed and be operational in territorial waters of Area B to help coast gurad pattrols in their duties in this area.

* Egyptiina civil polic forces may be equipped with light boats fitted with light weapon to perform the regular duties of civil police in territorial waters of Area C.

* Setting up civilian ports with their needs are possible in those areas only.

* Without touching upon th articles of this treaty, specific naval activities are only allowed as specified in this annex and within the boundaries referred to and in territorial waters.

In addition to what the peace treaty achieved in terms of shrinking the possibilities of a surprise offensive whether by Egypt ot Israel, it also achieved precedence in asymmetrical balance between the forces.

Egypt used that means to dispel Israeli security suspicions and to achieve Isreal's withdrawal from occpied Egyptian Lands. It

also minimised possibilities c unintentional clashes whether on
land or by sea.

The Israeli Position on Arms Co trol Issues:-

The creation of Israel in 1948 with support from the West in
general and Great Britain forme? a great threat to Egypt and Arab
states. Its creation led to a chain of armed confrontations, wars
and tremors which flung this region out of the calm it previously
knew.

Israel considered Egypt its main enemy in all its rounds of
wars against Arab states (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973).

Israel refused to establish disarmament areas in areas
overlooking Arab lands it occupied in line with truce pacts of
1948 and 1949 where as Arabs accepted.

Israel also refused to accept the presence of peacekeeping
forces fromed through U.N agreements after the tripatite aggression
on Egypt ended in 1956 while Cairo approved.
Israel has been keen to confirm since its creation is armament
superiority in both quantity and quality. It managed gradually to
have an advanced air force, far superior to Arab forces combined.

A sensational development in armament was in 1955 when Israel
bulit its first nuclear reactor, catapulting it in less than 20

years into being the only stat. in the Middle East with nuclear capabilities.

Israel, having secured its frontiers of attacks by Egypt after signing its 1979 peace treaty withh Sadat, went ahead and bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 to prevent by force the existence of any rivalling Arab nuclear power.

In 1982, Israeli fighters destroyed syria's anti-aircraft defences in the Beqaa and followed it with a land thrust into south Lebanon where it occupied and continuos to occupy an area it calls its security zone (20 k.m. In depth).

Israel pursued its armament project, giving special attention to surfac-to surface ballistic missiles. It has developed several types like Jericho I, II and III which can carry nuclear warheads, reaching areas beyond Algeria in the east and Iraq in the west.

Its cooperation with the United States in military industries made Israel leap ahead into a new area particularly with its project of ATBMs (anti tactica ballistic missiles missile), like arrow.

Israel's efforts to doubl. its armament capablities aborted any efforts for amrs limitati..., arms control or even confidence building in the Middle East.

By pursuing and increasing its armament capabilities particualry after it made peace with Egypt in 1979, Israel has proved that it has not and will not change its aim to dwart Arabs and gain superiority over them.

Israel's behaviour after 1979 gave rise to a new stage in the arms race between Arabs and Israel which began in 1948. Arab states headed by Iraq, Syria and Libya began seeking to own non-conventional mass-destruction weapons.[2]

Saudi Arabia joined that category, importing and developing its anti-missile ballistic missiles.

All developmets have proven that Israel's insistence to develop it nuclear capabilities is not for defensive reasons as it says but to "impose its will by force" so that there is no scope for Arab states to get back their occupied lands or even talk about it.

Israel has taken advantage of Egyptian hesitation towards possessing a strategic nuclear power. Egypt's hesitation arose after the point of view that owning nuclear weapons would have no strategic value because if Egypt used them in any confrontation with Israel, they would hit palestinians and could possibly affect

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[2]   By saying non-conventional weapons one means chemical and biological weapons

neighnouring Arab countries.

The time element, and Western financial support, played a big role in helping Israel, backed with nuclear capablities, to confront the Arab position,

The Western American interests look to Israel. That is why the United States seees that Israel's possession of nuclear capabilities does not constitute a threat to peace in the Middle East. After all, the Israeli government was a stable one. It could not accept that any Arab country equal or surpass Israel in the nuclear field because it is not only threatens Israle's interests, but also jeopardises U.S. and Western interests in the region.

The End of the Cold War and it's Impact upon establishing a successful Naval Arms Control System in the Mediterranean:-

The Mediterranian basin was still and may continous to be a site of struggle between the west headed by the U.S. and the East led by Russia who inherited the ex-Soviet Unions global position.

After the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, it is essential for the peace in the Mediterranean as well as peace on the whole World to recorrect and reshape the situation created or emerged form and developed during the Cold War

era, not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East including the Mediterranean.

The recorrection of the situation may include:-

. Revaluating the position of Israel and its claimed stratgic importance to the west's struggle against the east.

. Reconsidering the parctical need for the NATO alliance, which in its search for an enery, could create some kind of enemy that never existed before in the Mediterranean.

. Remembering Europe after the second world war, how it was destroyed, and to remeber that importing problems to the Mediterranean and the Middle east causes its destruction every now and then.

The recent past is characterized by a general improvment in international relations, unfortunalty the seriouus problems in the Middle East still exist, and instead of having a steady advance towards speace and security, the area of the Mediterranean is facing a mystaious future as well.

In the meantime, the dynamic process of disarmament between the East and the West is maintained; while the middle east is still receiving larger and more sophisticated quanities of weapons and military equipment.

The_Situation_of_the_Mediterranean_in_the_Modern_World_Politics:-

Since the mid fifties the ıediterranean began to be the new
stage for tension between the Vest and East; the tension that
emerged several years ago. By ıat time, the U.S and the Soviet
naval presence in the Mediterraı an became permanent. The American
sixth fleet was turning in to be ɔming the strongest maritime power
in the area [3]. The fleet was reluring for maintenance facilities on
a number of ports belonging to N ɔO member Mediterranean countries.
Meanwhile the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was depending upon base
ıocilities in the region. The Soviet fleet enjoyed access to a
prime base[4] in Egypt unitll 197ɔ when the Soviet Union was forced
to seek alternative facilities with some other Arab countries in
the region. By provisions of arms and new equpment to the navies of
Algeria, Libya and Syria the Soviet Union had gone a long way in
strengthening both its own nav . position in the region and the
navies of the countries involv .

While the navies of the Mexiterranean Arab countries involved
with the Soviet Union became prɔminent, they were usless due to the
inability of those countries to ıse them effectively, specially in

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3   The sixth fleet consults of 40 vessels, including two
     aircraft carriers with (app.) 185 airplanes, 20 surface
     vessels, 5 amphious ships, and a number of submorines.

4   The Alexandria inaval base pocilities for the Soviet
     fellt was including: shore - based head quarter, a
     dockyard and a refitting base.

Algeria, Libya and some extent Syria.

In the meantime, the Soviet Navy access to the Syrian bases of
Tratus, Baniyas, Al-Ladhiqiyah and Al-Mina was very valuable to the
Soviets. the NATO naval base at Al-Iskandarun[5]. Lies just 180 K.M.
to the north of Al-Ladhiqiyah, while the Israeli border is an equal
distance from tartus to the Sovith. While the syrian navy was
receiving some renforcement from the Soviet Union, Israel was
worrying about the future of its navy although it had a full
guarantee of protection from the U.S by means of the American sixth
fleet in the Mediterranean. To feel safe, Israel directed more
attention to its navy, and re-armed it's PFM (Saar 3 class) with
Phalanx[6] and introduced the new missile boot (CHETZ)[7]
and developed its maritime doctorine by extending independence upon
small, fast and well equiped naval pieces co-operating with
helicopter and fighter, fighter - bombers warplans. The Israeli new
maritime doctorine emerged from the October war and the fact that
the navies of the Arab countries theatening Israel depend in
general on the large and non fast naval pieces and the lack of the
least co-operation between them and their airforce.

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[5]   Al Iskandarum naval base lies in district which has the
same name right next to the Syrian borders, Sysia has
claims in this area.

[6]   Phalanx is an advanced CIWS system.

[7]   CHETZ = is NIRIT class or imporved saar PFM armed with
HAR POON and Galriel SSM.

Over the years, both the United States and the ex-Soviet Union have repeatedly made their naval presence felt in the Arab - Israeli conflict. The ex-Soviet Union has had to secure its supply of equipment to its allis of Arab countries in the Mediterranean, the most not worthy being Syria and Libya, the United States on the contary, in order to protect its interests in the Mediterranean and, in porticular, to shield Israel, has ensured that its naval presence in the region is frequent and capable enough to work against any maritime development.

Before the fall and decline of the Soviet empire, the U.S naval concerns in the eastern Medierranean increased from monitoring Soviet naval support for its own allies in the region to a more active co-operation agreement reached on November 29th, 1983. the U.S . and Israel - by that time - had agreed to give "priority attention to the threat to mutual interests by increased Soviet involvment in the Middle East" and to set up a "Joint political - military group" (JPMG).

The two parties of the group (Israel and the U.S) made several joint naval exercises, that involved simulated transfer of casulaties to Israel[8]. The ex-Soviet Union maintained a naval

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[8]   The first of these joint naval exercises conducted at
       20th of June 1984, during the Gulf War Israel received
       a number of the American wounded as part of this
       "JPMG".

presence in the Mediterranean Sea. This presence was essentially, with the naval presence in the Indian ocean, Arabin Sea, a function of globol considerations, hence it had implications for the naval balance in the Middle East proper. The ex-Soviet Union Mediterranean task force[9] has been in operation since 1964. This task force consisted of about 40 vessels, 10-12 submarines, 10-15 surface vessels, three landing craft and five intellignence and research ships.

To what Exent can a system of arms limitation succeed in the Mediterranean:-

The Mediterranean Sea is one of the most unstable regions in the world and that characteristc - instability - is the one which makes it distinctive since olden times when it was the site and cause of many conflicts.

Of those are the Greek - Turkish conflict over fishing rights and navigation in the Aegean Sea, the British - Spanish over Gibraltar strait, the Spanish-Moroccan dispute over Ceuta and Melilla and three islands on the Moroccan coast. All these confilicts heat up at times and calm down at others.

A relatively recent conflict is the Libya-Malta dispute over the depth of Cntinental shelf for each as is the conflict between

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9   Part of the Black Sea Fleet

the United States and Libya over navigational rights in the Gulf of Sirte.

There was is the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus which led to the establishment in 1974 of a Turkish-Cyrpiot state in the north and eastern part of the island which overlooks the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey.

But the moore dangerous and more important conflict than any of the above is the Arab-Israel' conflict which coincided with the Cold War between the West, represented in NATO headed by the U.S., and the East represented in the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union.

When the U.S. put its sixth fleet in the Mediterrannean Sea in 1947, the then- Soviet Union was preparing to achieve the dream of its life - maintaining a permanent footing in the warm seas.

But two decades marking the arrival of the sixth fleet passed until the Soviet navy in 1964 finally enjoyed a naval presence in the Mediterranean equal to the American one.

And from there, the Middle East region including the Mediterranean was transformed into a bottlefield of the Cold War rivals. Israel's existence as an entity with expansionist and regional aspirations and each partty of the Cold War trying to

lure support from countries in the area, the region lost its stability.

As the situation became more and more complicated, Israel cashed in on it. As the East and West struggled on with their Cold War in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Israel was able to achieve its goals on the Arab front.

Arabs wer then unable to realise the dimensions of the situation, the danger of sticking to one superpower without having strong and clear principles.

The two sides to the Middle East conflict started to the transformed into tools for the Cold War rivlas but with a twist.

Israel, though used as a tool, was supported by the West and managed to always be the winning party, victorious, achieving its aims.

But Arab states on the contrary, with their support for the East block, were always the losing side, retreating, unable to achieve thier goals and not even being able to define them.

The West considered Israel with its distinctive position on

the Mediterranean Sea as an ideal site for a permanent aircraft carrier and an advanced air base ready for battle against the East.

But the Soviet Union strengthened its ties with Arab states annd particularly those overlooking the Mediterranean Sea with the aim to guarantee a permanent air base for itself.

It began its presence in Alexandria base until 1976, moved to Syria where it took up the Syrian ports of Tartous, Banias, Latakia. It upheld a distinctive naval presence in sea ports overlooking the Mediterranean in Libya and Algeria without ensuring that Arab states maintained or developed a naval presence to balance Israel's naval superiority.

And so, Arab states which supported the Soviet Union inherited all its flaws at a time Israel gained the West's virtues, and worked on developing and advancing its military industry.

Experience gained in its wars with Arab states spurred Israel's miliitary industry especially in the navy.

This widended the gap between Israel and Arab states in naval armament and also inevitably led to more instability in the Middle East.

Egypt looked at Israel's naval development with extreme

concern for the following reasons:-

. Israle 's possession of surface-to surface missiles which could be used off small naval vessels constituted a serious threat to Egyptian shores and Egypt's commercial sea routes.

. Israel became an extentior of the old occupation forces and the overpowering forces in the world in their new form.

. Israel's military sea and land capabilities advanced in such an exaggerated way that it was not only cause for concern to Egypt and the Arab states but also an obstacle towards any efforts for arms control in the Mediterranean.

. Israel would get nothing in return to give up such capabilities except more of Arab rights and the West would use Israeli superiority to its own advantage to quash the aims and desires of Arab states.

. Despite the change in the Egyptian position towards the Soviet Union- the first sign of which was present Anwar Sadat's dispensation of Soviet experts in 1072- Soviet naaval vessels were removed from Alexandria in 1976.

The anti-Soviet Egyptian position reached its peak when senior Egyptian officials in 1980 warned that "the main and terrible threat in the whole region was the threat of communism.

The following year, Egypt's position became clear when the chief of staff of Egypt's armed forces in Novermber 1981, Mohamed Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala who shortly afterwards became defence

minister, declared "Egypt's preparation to provide help to the United States of America gainst the Soviet Union if they meddled in the region."

Despite all of that, the West and the U.S did not at any stage show Egypt appreciation or support as that given to Israel.

Egypt tried to increase cooperation with the United States on the military level from 1980. It held land, air and sea maneouvers known as Bright Star and Sea ind with U.S. Rapied Deployment Forces. Co-ordination continued during the first Gulf war and reached its highest peak in the war to liberate Kuwait when Egypt joined forces with the U.S - led coalition and provided the U.S with air and naval facilities.

But the Egyptian - U.S. agreement was confined to the Gulf region and did not extend to the Mediterranean Sea and in matters concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, the feeling was that agreements were forged in the interest of the United States alone.

While Egypt was providing military assistance towards ensuring Guld security, it kept its eye on Israel's fast-growing military capabilities and the disorder in the military balance which was in Israel's favour.

Because Egypt wanted to prevent a conflict of interest in its

security, it adopted new directives towards arms limitation issues in the Mediterranean which consisted of :-

*   Egypt'sview towards arms control in the Mediterranean was no longer confined to the necessity of removing foreign fleets as much as the presence of these fleets acting as an aiding factor to resolve this issue. Countries owing these fleets would need to adopt balanced positions based on justice and truth.

*   Egypt encouraged the call to deepen and strengthen cooperation between the multilateral parties of Mediterranean states to increase changes of peace.

That would be done through expanding "Cooperation and Security in Europe" to the Mediterranean basin on the basis of the 1975 Helsinki convention which called on participating countries to work on deepening reciprocal confidence to encourage security and stability in the whole of the Mediterranean.

It also called on cooperation between north and south Mediterranean countries in various economic and envireonmental issues. During a meeting of non-aligned Mediterranean countries in Malta in 1984, Egypt made a call for a "nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranena". The proposal was supported by seven participating Arab states, the PLO, Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia.

Egypt and Syria also supported a proposal by Italy and Spain

in 1990 to hold a conference on security an cooperation in the Mediterranean to discuss arms control in the basin.

One can say that Egypt's previous stands towards arms limitation issues confirms a clear Egyptian readiness to take it forward through more positive steps starting with Confidence Building Measures and acts of good will and avoiding unintentional accidents.

That is tightly linked with a necessity to realise that any one of these measures is not an aim in itself but must be an insperable link in the general political framework which aims to solve all suspended questions in the Mediterranean basin.

Conclusions an Recommendations:-

The evolving change in the relationship between the United States and the ex-Soviet Union from one of armed confrontation to friendly co-existance and then to deep need of American and Western economic assistance, has aroused hopes in many areas of international relations. This could be reflected upon the naval arms control in the Meditreeanean Sea.

There is an immediat relatiohship between confidence bulding measures (CSBMs) and disarmament. CSBMs are co-operative measures which accompany and ensure the implementation of agreed disarmament measures.

The basic purpose of CSPVs is <u>to dispel mistrust</u> through openness and co-operation, the methods which can be used to enhance CSBMs role include:-

- Exchange of information
- Mutual inspection
- Communication and consultant.

CSBMs are a process and thus open up prospects of higher levels of arms control. They stabilize a level of security already achived without perpetuating it.

Maritime CSBMs will only prove durable via dialogue and co-operation. Simpler froms of co-operation, too, can through habit and subsequent notification set standards for mutual relations which aloow confidence to grow and open up prospects for more intensive co-operation.

In maritime arms control affairs the situation of global powers is different than the regional powers or powers of specific importance at the Mediterranea.

The maritime power is the keystone to that power's global positiion, there is a strong interchangable relation between the interior position and the maritime power and vice versa.

The regional power in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean

(Turkey, Israel, Syria) or the countries of vital geostrategic
position (Egypt, Lybia ... etc) depend mainly on the ground and air
powers as decisive looks while the naval power works as a support-
ing element.

The regional powers and countries of vital geostrategic
position depend upon their own naval power on the tactical level,
which they depend upon the existance of global naval powers fleets
in the Mediterranean.

The break down of the Soviet Union could lead the Mediterra-
nean Arab countries who depending upon the ex-Soviet naval support
to either have a less harded situation towards naval arms
limitation case or completly ignore the whole situation.

The quailitative an quanititve advantages given to the Istaeli
navy which creat some kind of naval imbalance, and make Israel
superior to the other Arab countries plus the American naval
support to Israel could be the greatest obesticals to any future
naval arms control efforts.

The current change in the international climate from
deterence to co-operation and from arms race to arms control and
arms limitation will generate new orientation towards the regional
powers security naval role in the future.

The Iraqi invosion to Kuwait enhanced the regional naval powers role depending new bases to use maritime capabilities in a frame of suggested collective defense.

New low intensity conflict threatens could be generated due to the latest developments in the Middle East and the Meditrranean. The regional powers will work hard to support their naval powers unless we reach a general frame for a suggested naval arms control the naval situation could turned worse in the near future.

Unless the naval arms control or naval arms limitation is a part of general peace frame, it is hard to reach a positive results.

The naval arms control efforts should be introduced and accompained by naval confidenc building measures, in this context gradual steps could be very helpful to eliminate the negative results.

Considering the experince of the Camp Davied accord, any naval arms ocntrol efforts should granted, supervised and escorted by a World Power through the United Nation.

The aftermothe of naval arms contorl efforts should be benifical to all the parites involved. Any suggested naval arms control conditions should not either change or harm the naval

balance in the Mediterraenean.

The best suggested measures[10], to establish a successful, naval confidence Bulding Measures in the Mediterranean:-

- To use the international naval wireless net (i.e. S.O.S net ..) arganjed by the internationl naval establishements to exhange information between naval units of different Mediterranean countries in peace time when needed.

- The pre-naval maneuers and training notification, especially if it is necessary to clos teritorial waters through the internationl assests (Notice to Mariners).

- To stop any naval or air reconnaissane Sorties to less than 100 n.m. off the coost of other Mediterranean countries.

- To stop all weaponary tests and naval maneuvers in the high seas (especially the Ballestic Missiles and Anti Tactical Ballestic issile Missiles Tests) in the Mediterranean Sea to intain sea lanes and right of way.

Suggested applied procedus for establishing Naval Confidence building Measures in the Mediterranean sea:-

- To announce the east Meditreeanean area a free zone of nuclear weapons.

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10 All these measures do not need any special agreements.

. All the regional countries and the World Powers should stop using or possessingg any nuclear powerd or nuclear armed submmarines, aircraft carriers or ships. A pre existance announcement is necessary when such naval units existance is essential.

. To sign a Memorandum of understanding through a frame of accord, agreemment or treaty that includs some or all of the following:-

   . An agreement of naval accedent prevention.

   . An agreement to prevent naval pollution, crimes against naval protectiories and economical interests.

   . An agreement to exchange naval search and resceu operations capablities.

   . An agreement to free the area of naval born nonconventional weapons.

   . An agreement that prohibit the use of sea bed in military purposes, or the use of environment control technology.

   . An agreement that prohibit the development of counter values weapons.

   . An agreement to exchange observers to attend naval maneuvers of specific level (for example those maneuvers in which more than 25-35% of the maritime power of the country takes part.).

Such procedures could be used as a bas to creat a new look for the naval armament in the Mediterranean sea and in the Middle east.

All what I mentioned in my paper is just a modest step and unless it is followed and encouraged in an atmosphere of good intentions and good will nothing realy could happen.

While Egypt proved in more than one occasion that it is ready to reduce tension by eliminating its military spending and shrinking the size of its naval and ground forces I hope that this could encourage some ather parties to prove their good intentions by means of some of the measures mentioned in this paper.

Thank you

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IAI

MARITIME SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

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MARITIME SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

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The Mediterranean, together with its surrounding lands and sub-seas, constitutes a "geopolitical system"[1], although it is far from being a politically and culturally homogenous region. It is a semi-enclosed sea with three principal choke points: The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal. Through these bottlenecks the Mediterranean connects the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The Eastern Mediterranean opens into the Middle East and Persian Gulf area, and through the Aegean and the Black Sea, into the Don Basin, the Ukrainian Steppes, the Caucasus and the Lower Danube Basin, which are considered as highly critical and unstable[2] regions.

Moreover, the Mediterranean continues to be one of the principal sea routes linking Western Europe to the Far East, Southeast Asia, East Africa and the Persian Gulf. It is still the main route for Gulf oil. It is also a major outlet for the hinterlands of the Black Sea and the Aegean. Nearly 60 % of the CIS seaborne trade is carried out through the Mediterranean. It is a very busy sea, and "at any given time it is being traversed by about 1.500 large cargo ships and 5000 coasters"[3].

The Mediterranean has served as a link between geographically separated NATO theaters. The Sixth Fleet and the

navies of other NATO countries have always maintained an
effective control of the sea. The introduction of the SOVMEDRON
after 1967, whose primary mission was sea denial had only a
marginal influence on the naval balance because of the lack of
Soviet base facilities in the Mediterranean and the control of
the Turkish Straits by a NATO member.

The main purposes of NATO's strategy of sea control can be
summarized as follows:^{4} to assure timely reinforcement and
resupply; to support amphibious operations in the Southern
region; to maintain SLCOs; to protect NATO territory from attack
from the sea; and to support allied ground operations in the
Southern region.

Turkish naval forces have contributed to NATO's balance of
power and conventional deterrence functions.   Their wartime
mission would primarily be to maintain the control of the Straits
especially by preventing the Soviet/Pact amphibious operations
against the area. The Turkish Navy would also harass the larger
and stronger enemy units by employing hit-and-run tactics, and
would defend the SLOCs and the ports.

However, with the collapse of communism and the demise of
the Warsaw Pact, NATO's Cold War strategic posture and force
structure have been called into question. While it is argued that
NATO's new strategy needs improved flexibility and mobility, it
has become clear that its military posture should rest upon lower
levels of forces. This situation has brought about a renewal of
interest in naval arms control as well as other arms control
measures.

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In the Cold War period, the inclusion of naval forces and their activities in the CFE and CSCE negotiations was a concentious issue. While the USSR proposed talks on naval arms control, the West declined these calls. Moscow felt that the Western naval strategy was "aggressive" because it clearly threatened the Soviet homeland. The West's counter-argument was based on the notion of geograpnical asymmetry. NATO depended on exterior sea lines of communication, whereas the Soviets benefited from the advantage of shorter and more secure interior lines. Consequently NATO had to maintain adequate naval forces to deny the Soviet Union an effective sea denial strategy and to keep Western SLOCs open.

To what extent ha·-e these conditions changed ? What are the prospects for struct   and operational naval arms control arrangements in the Meu.   nean ? My answer to these questions from Turkey's standpoint depends on Turkish perception of naval missions in a changing strategic environment. Turkey considers the problem both from the NATO perspective and from the perspective of its own particular security interests.

NATO Missions

Recent changes in the Soviet Union have not only alleviated the Soviet pressure upon the region, but also encouraged the vision of regional cooperation with the former Soviet republics. All the political parties and the public opinion in Turkey think that the Soviet Union's transformation into the Commonwealth of Independent States together with the efforts of democratization and transition to market economy have substantially diminished

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the threat originating from the North, and have prepared the ground for improved economic relations. As a matter of fact, Turkish efforts to rapidly develop economic and cultural cooperation with the former Soviet republics and the idea of creating a Black Sea Cooperation Region are emblematic of this new state of mind. Despite these changes, however, in Turkey as well as in the West in general, there has remained a certain apprehension over the possibility of reversion. Consequently most NATO members regard their armed forces as well the Atlantic Alliance itself as a long-term insurance against such an eventuality. Although the North Atlantic Council, in its Rome meeting on 7-8 November 1991, recognizes the need to adopt a "New Strategic Concept" reflecting the changed conditions in Europe, it at the same time emphasizes the residual threat originating from a combination of lingering uncertainties and remaining formidable Soviet capabilities. The North Atlantic Council points out:

"In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its onventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved."[5]

The New Strategic Concept also points out risks of a wider nature, emanating from regional conflicts, prolifiration of non conventional weapons, disruption of the flow of vital resources

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and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Moreover, the Rome documents underlines the growing significance of crisis management in the new international environment. Accordingly, the function of maritime forces is described as follows:

"Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operation, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent."[6]

From this assessment, various trends can be extrapolated:

- Reduction of conventional forces as a result of the CFE will increase reliance by NATO on reserve forces, and will emphasize the continuing importance of the transatlantic and Mediterranean links for seaborne reinforcements.[7]

- The Southern region is adjacent to the most critical areas of instability. An adequate deling with regional conflicts requires mobility, flexibility and force projection capabilities. This implies a somewhat greater accent on maritime forces in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Turkish experts view the Sixth Fleet as a factor contributing to regional stability, and they believe its presence "will continue to play a key role in times of tension and crisis".[8]

- During regional conflicts potential threats to SLOCs may be a major concern to the Alliance. In fact this was the case during the recent Gulf crisis and war. To cope with this challenge NATO took a variety of measures in the Mediterranean.

Allied naval operations, which consisted of surveillance and
patrolling the choke points, were untertaken against no specific
adversary. Their purpose was to protect shipping against probable
mining of the sea routes and terroristic activities.[9] Turkish
naval forces participated in these operations. Moreover, NATO has
formed a new Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean
(STANAFORMED) which will be on constant patrol through the
Mediterranean. Admiral Mike Boorda, Commander Allied Forces
Southern Europe, says that it is "an instantly available rapid
reaction force for SACEUR".[10] Countries providing vessels (mainly
destroyers and frigates) will include Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States.

Other Security Needs

Beside the NATO missions, Turkey maintains a navy to fulfil
its wn particular security needs. First of all, Turkey is a
peninsular country and the total length of its coasts is 7000
kilometers. 85 per cent of its foreign trade is dependent on free
and safe navigation in the neighbouring seas. Turkey also
requires open SLOCs to transport crude oil to its refineries
which are situated on the Aegean and Marmara coasts.

The regional geography renders the sea control vital to
permit amphibious operations for the purpose of supporting
defensive land forces and to prevent amphibious landings of the
invading enemy forces. This is viewed as particularly important
for an adequate defense of the Thrace-Straits area. For instance,
as the Thracian peninsula narrows towards the esat, the last

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defensive position before reaching Istanbul and the Bosphorus is

the Çatalca line, which extends between the shores of Marmara and

the Black Sea. The defensibility of this position depends on the

command of the coastal waters of both seas. In the Balkan War,

Turkey's naval capability to control those coastal waters was the

major reason for the failure of the final offensive of the

Bulgarian army in November 1992.[11]

The navy is a flexible tool of crisis management. Compared

with the land and air forces, it is more easily controllable by

the political and military decision-makers. This quality stems

from two characteristics of the navies: their escalatory

capabilities on the one hand and their withdrawability on the

other.[12]   The sea power operates relatively slowly providing the

conflicting parties with more time to diffuse crisis. The use of

force may be more easily and clearly graduated at sea. Navies can

effectively operate in order to demonstrate the political will to

maintain the claims without causing undue escalation of the

dispute.[13]   Furthermore, since they do not involve an invading

force, they do not provoke the parties in crisis to hasty

decisions of preemption. In such volatile regions as the eastern

Mediterranean, navies might act as a factor of stability by

facilitating the graduated use of force in times of regional

crisis and tension. For example, in a crisis that might occur

over the Aegean Sea, if Greece and Turkey give priority to the

use of their naval forces rather than their air and land forces,

they would certainly have a better chance to solve the crisis

before its escalation to allout war.

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Although   terrorism   at   sea   is   rare,   terrorists   (or
                                                              14
guerrillas)   may   use   the   sea   to   inflitrate   a   target   country.
Recent   examples   of   such   attempts   of   infiltration   suggest   that
naval   forces   may   be   useful   in   counter-terrorist   operation.   A
conspicuous   example   is   provided   by   the   Israeli   naval   patrols   to
counter   PLO   infiltrators.   Turkey,   as   a   country   which   has   long
been   a   major   target   of   terrorism   supported   from   abroad,   may   also
be   subject   to   seaborne   terrorist   infiltrations   and   may   have   to
take   naval   counter-measures   to   stop   them.

In   the   post-Cold   War   era,   Turkey   continues   to   face   serious
security   challenges   emanating   from   the   residual   uncertainties   of
systemic   transformation   and   inherent   instabilities   of   the   regions
surrounding   the   country.   Its   southern   neighbours   and   its   disputes
with   Greece   over   the   Aegean   and   Cyprus   also   create   concrete
security   problems.   Moreover,   although   the   threat   stemming   from
Moscow   has   lessened   considerably,   Russia   will   remain   very
powerful,   and   Ankara   will   have   to   continue   to   consider   Russian
military   capabilities   in   formulating   foreign   and   security
policies.   These   factors   indicate   that   modernization   of   Turkey's
armed   forces   should   continue.   Consequently,   contrary   to   most   of
the   other   NATO   allies,   Turkey's   military   expenditures   will   not
decreases   in   the   short   run.   Similarly,   maritime   operational
requirements   will   not   be   diminished   in   the   post-Cold   War   era.   On
the   contrary,   new   missions   such   as   crisis management   and   counter-
terrorism   will   emerge,   and   the   budget   allocation   to   maritime
forces   will   have   to   follow   this   trend.

To   increase   their   survivability   and   their   peacetime   and
crisis   time   capabilities,   Turkish   naval   forces   particularly   need:

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To improve command and control communications and information systems;

To furnish ships with electronic warfare capabilities and smart precision weapons;

To add adequate mine stocks, modern minelayers, and minesweepers;

To increase logistical capabilities; and

To continue with the successful programmes of building fast patrol boats, frigates and submarines.

The Straits and the Black Sea

One major concern of Turkey's strategic planners is the defense of the Straits.

"The defense of the Turkish Straits is vital for both Turkey and the Alliance. Therefore, given the lack of strategic depth, Turkey has to maintain in Thrace a level of force which would be able to defend the region against attacks coming from land, amphibious and airborne units far superior in strength and structure."[15]

On the other hand, Ankara is extremely sensitive about the security concerns of the other Black Sea riparian states, especially those of Russia. The Turkish decision-makers are acutely aware that the Straits and the Black Sea are very important strategic approaches to the Russian homeland. therefore they believe that any non-Black Sea naval power concentration in the Black Sea during peacetime would create apprehensions and dangerously disturb regional stability.

The Montreux convention of 1936 continues to serve these interests. One of its principal purposes is to allow Turkey to militarize the Straits, something which was prohibited under the 1923 Lausanne Convention. Secondly, by virtue of the Montreux Convention, "should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war", the passage of warships through the Straits "shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government".

The Montreux Convention clearly favors the Black Sea countries. While it imposes heavy restrictions upon the non-Black Sea powers, it recognizes a much greater freedom of movement to the Black Sea navies. In practice, however, this freedom of movement has been increased even further as regards the passage of Soviet aircraft carriers. Neither Turkey nor the other signatories have challenged the Soviet classification of these ships and their transit rights. So it may well be argued in the absence of any objection over the years the practice has been based on an extensive interpretation of the Montreux Convention in order to provide for the transit of the Soviet _Kiev_ class
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aircraft carriers.

Mutually agreed-upon naval force reductions in the Black Sea would contribute to security and stability in the region. But Moscow would like to limit naval reductions to the Mediterranean, excluding the Black Sea which is of crucial importance for the security of Russian homeland and where Moscow maintains a significant naval presence. Strategic conditions of the Black Sea, however, have radically changed after the disintegration of

the Soviet Union. The control of the Black Sea Fleet,with 28
submarines, 46 major surface ships, 150 combat aircraft and a
ship-building industry at Nikolayev,[17] is being disputed between
Russia and Ukraine which wants to establish its own armed forces.
This dispute threatens to split the new and fragile Commonwealth
of Independent States. If, in demanding to take control of some
of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine's purpose is to
balance the Russian naval power in the region, then Moscow's
acceptance of substantial naval force reductions or the creation
of a demilitarized zone in the Black Sea might facilitate the
settlement of the dispute over the Fleet.

Reduction of Armaments and Confidence and Security - Building Measures

There is today a general consensus that arms control
measures in general are quite useful to create global and
regional stability. There is also a growing tendency to include
naval forces in future arms control negotiations. At the regional
level, the Italian-Spanish proposal for initiating a Conference
on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean refers to the
importance of confidence-building "through increased transparency
and information exchange".[18] It is equally true that "the
ultimate objective of arms control should not be merely military
stability, but political stability".[19] This last point is
particularly relevant in such an unstable region as the
Mediterranean. For instance, will the withdrawal of the Sixth
Fleet not encourage the radical political elements (states or
non-state entities) in the region by affecting their perceptions

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of balance of power ? Will a mutual reduction of Turkish and

Greek naval forces not create a highly unstable and unpredictable

security environment in the Aegean by depriving both states of a

flexible crisis-management instrument and by inducing them to

rely upon the damage-inflicting capability of their air forces

and invasion capability of their land forces ?

As far as the CSBMs are concerned within the framework of

the Davos process, Greece and Turkey decided to apply certain

measures of restraint in the Aegean. These measures included, for

example, to avoid maritime exercises during the tourist peak

periods and main national and religious holidays, and to carry

out maritime exercises in such a way to avoid the isolation of

certain areas for long periods of time and to avoid interference

with shiping and air traffic. Although these measures are not

comprehensive and are violated from time to time,   their

improvement and gradual extension to the region deserve

consideration. Greece and Turkey may be engaged in a dialogue to

improve such measures. Certain transparency measures such as the

exchange of observers during major naval exercises might be

considered. The adoption of this kind measures would be a

significant step in regional arms control, and would contribute

to regional stability. It is also noteworthy that a successful

process of confidence and security building, consisting of

exchange of military observers and information has begun between

Turkey and Bulgaria.

Beyond such modest measures of arms control applied on a

bilateral basis, the delimitation of the geographical area of

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naval arms control may prove to be extremely difficult. The
former Soviet maritime power has global dimensions and as such,
it is not amenable to regional structural arms control if the
attempts is confined to the Mediterranean. Any reduction in the
Mediterranean may create new security problems in the Black Sea,
the Baltic and further north. Under the present circumstances it
would be more useful to consider the improvement and extension of
the CSBMs and to make efforts to increase mutual confidence
through economic cooperation.

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THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:

LAW OF THE SEA ASPECTS AND LEGAL POLICIES INVOLVED

by

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DRAFT-NOT FOR QUOTATION
April 1992

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2

1. Introduction

The legal aspect of naval arms control and naval CSBMs is a subject little explored by international lawyers, even though any proposal aiming at naval arms control involves legal issues which must not be underestimated. Besides the law of the sea, which clearly provides the bulk of provisions, one has to take into account the Charter of the United Nations and institutions, such as permanent neutrality, which may have a naval feature.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first is a brief description of the law of the sea provisions which have a bearing upon naval arms control. The second contains an overview of the Mediterranean naval issues. Territorial statuses which are deemed relevant for our topic are also taken into account, such as the neutralization of territories. The same is true for naval bases, which play an important role for the Mediterranean outside users. The Black Sea is also considered, because of its strategic importance and because it counts the (former) Soviet Union among its riparian States. The third part identifies the institutional conditions upon which an arms control system can be set up and suggests a number of CSBMs, the only ones that in the opinion of this author are deemed compatible with the present situation.

I

GENERAL BACKGROUND: FLEETS MOBILITY AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

2. The status of foreign warships in zones under national jurisdiction (the territorial sea; the contiguous zone; the exclusive economic zone)

The three zones under consideration have a different status and this bears upon the navigational regime of foreign warships. While the territorial sea (stretching up to 12 miles from the coastal baselines) is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State, the other two zones (respectively the contiguous zone up to 24 miles and the EEZ covering the sea-bed and the superadjacent waters up to 200 miles) are subject only to functional rights of the coastal State. It must be added that the existence of these last two zones is conditional upon an explicit proclamation by the coastal State.

In the territorial sea, foreign warships enjoy only a right of innocent passage. According to both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, passage need not be notified and is not subject to the consent of the coastal State. It is difficult to say whether on this point the two conventions are a codification of customary international law. It is the view of many third world countries that the passage of foreign warships requires the previous consent of the coastal State. Until recently, this was also the view of the Soviet Union. A joint statement of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State, dated 23 September 1989 and laying down uniform interpretation

of the rules on innocent passage, states that all categories of ships, including vessels of war, enjoy a right of innocent passage, without notification or previous authorization. Ships in innocent passage cannot exert any action prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. For instance, as stated in Article 19 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, they cannot be engaged in naval exercises. Aircarriers enjoy a right of innocent passage. However, aircraft must stay on the deck during the passage, since landing or taking on board of aircraft is forbidden.

In the contiguous zone foreign warships are incumbent of complete navigational rights and the same holds true for the exclusive economic zone. The main problem is connected with the right to conduct military exercises in the EEZ of a foreign country. During the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea a number of States proposed that the carrying out of military maneuvers in foreign EEZs should be authorized by the coastal State. This proposal was not accepted. The right to conduct military exercises is to be seen as a manifestation of the freedom of high seas retained by Article 58 of the Law of the Sea Convention. On the other hand the prohibition to carry out military maneuvers within the EEZ cannot be derived from Article 301 of the Law of the Sea Convention, since the peaceful purpose clause there embodied only means that the States are obliged not to pursue aggressive policies inconsistent with the UN Charter. However a number of States, when signing the 1982 Convention, restated their understanding and made clear that military exercises should be considered as forbidden within foreign EEZs. This was not, for instance, the view of Italy which, on the contrary, made a declaration according to which it was its understanding that the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention did not rule out the lawfulness of conducting military exercises in a foreign EEZ without the consent of the coastal State.

3. The regime of international straits

According to a customary international law, warships are entitled to navigate through straits used for international navigation joining two parts of the high sea (international straits). This freedom, which was restated by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case, has been extended to those straits joining a territorial sea with the open sea by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea has clearly innovated the previous regime. The new rules are considered as belonging to customary law by a considerable number of writers. According to the 1982 codification, international straits are subject to the regime of transit passage, which entails much more freedom since it gives: a right of unimpeded passage to all categories of ships; the right of overflight; and the right of submarines to a submerged passage. These freedoms are not in force for those straits formed by an island of the State bordering the strait and its mainland, provided that an alternative route of similar convenience exists; in this case

only the unimpeded passage applies. The 1982 Convention does not supplant regimes established long ago, such as that in force for the Turkish Straits.

4. Military uses of foreign continental shelves and sea-bed subsoil

The continental shelf is considered a promising area not only for its economic exploitation, but also for military uses. For instance, dormant mines can be left on it and activated by remote control when needed; special weapons for antisubmarine warfare - like the Captor system - can be emplaced on the sea-bed and submarine listening posts have become common devices for tracing the routes of this category of ships. Obviously a State can use its continental shelf for military purposes, with the single exception of emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction at least 12 miles beyond its coastal baselines. The problem arises in so far as the use of a foreign country continental shelf is concerned. The point of view widely accepted is that under the regime of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf military installations can be emplaced on the sea bed adjacent to the coast of a foreign State, provided that they do not interfere with the right of the coastal State to explore and exploit its natural resources. Since the conclusion of the 1958 Convention, however, the trend has been to limit the possibility of using another State's continental shelf for military purposes. India and Mexico made a declaration stating that foreign continental shelves cannot be used for military purposes when acceding to the 1971 sea-bed treaty and reiterated their view at the time of the 1977 sea-bed Treaty review conference.At the Caracas session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Mexico and Kenya tabled a proposal along the same lines. Some 37 States concurred with it, even if the proposal was rejected. Even though the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention does not contain any explicit provision on military installation, the cumulative effect of Articles 60 and 80 renders the possibility of emplacing military installations on another State's continental shelf very small indeed. According to one interpretation, military devices might be emplaced on the continental shelf of another State, provided that they: (a) do not amount to artificial islands; (b) are not capable of being used for economic purposes; (c) do not interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State; (d) can be considered as a manifestation of the freedom which third States retain in another State's continental shelf. It goes without saying, however, that this interpretation is not shared by those countries which signed the Law of the Sea Convention with the understanding that any kind of installation or structure must be authorized by the coastal State.

5. The status of air space over territorial waters and the establishment of air identification zones

Foreign aircraft do not enjoy a right of overflying territorial waters, unless the consent of the coastal State is

given. The only exception is represented by the space over the waters lying between a strait governed by the regime of transit passage. Aerial navigation is free over the waters lying beyond the territorial sea. However a number of States have instituted aerial identification zones, which stretch for miles. A military aircraft venturing into such zones is requested to identify itself and to follow predetermined aerial routes. The lawfulness of AIZs is a moot point. According to one opinion an AIZ, stretching beyond the territorial sea outer limit, is legitimate in so far its purpose is that of identifying aircraft which head for the coastal State; aircraft in lateral passage, on the contrary, should not be obliged to give their identification and destination.

6. Preservation of the marine environment and the issue of naval pollution

Preservation of the marine environment is subject to detailed provisions in part XII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Two kinds of pollution are particularly relevant here: deliberate pollution from vessels (pollution by dumping) and pollution arising from maritime casualties. The latter can be very dangerous, particularly in the case of casualties involving nuclearly propelled vessels. In addition to the Law of the Sea Convention there other treaties relevant to the preservation of the marine environment in the Mediterranean, i.e. the 1973 IMO International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) and the 1976 Barcelona Convention and its related Protocols. The Law of the Sea Convention obliges States to prevent marine pollution and to cooperate to this end. Article 221 also empowers States to take forceful measures, beyond their territorial sea, in order to take action following serious sea accidents. The measures envisaged by the Law of the Sea Convention, however, do not apply to pollution arising from navigation of warships. These are generally immune from the stringent provisions dictated by the Convention, as demonstrated by Article 236 which states:

> The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and the preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.

This provision contains only a very mild obligation in that it continues by saying:

> However, each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention.

7. Navigational rights on the high seas

Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention state that the high seas are open to all States,

whether coastal or land-locked and that the freedom of the high seas embodies the freedom of navigation as well as the freedom of overflight. The main question is not only the precise definition of the body of waters to be considered as high seas, but also the limits which might curtail the above freedom. Article 87 para. 2 of the Law of the Sea Convention states that those freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas; Article 88 of the same Convention says that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. While the former provision is a self-explanatory limit to the freedom of one State in order to allow for the freedom of the others, the latter is open to question. The correct interpretation of the peaceful purposes clause is that not all military activity is prohibited, but only of those which are tantamount to aggressive policies, running counter Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter. It follows that naval exercises are permitted. The only duty which States are obliged to fulfill consists in giving adequate notification to the other sea users so as not to endanger peaceful navigation. The same is true for weapon testing, unless conventionally prohibited as in the case of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 5, 1963, which obliges the parties not to carry out any underwater nuclear weapon test explosion on high seas.

8. The notion of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea and its relevance for the Mediterranean

The notion of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas is an innovation of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention. According to Article 122 of this Convention, there are two definitions. The first takes into account geographical factors and defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea a "a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet". The second definition given by Article 122 takes into account legal elements, since it defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea as "a gulf, basin or sea consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states". The Mediterranean falls under the first definition and it encompasses subregional semi-enclosed seas, such the Black Sea or the Adriatic. The Law of the Sea Convention refers to economic cooperation as a field of action of the littoral States and lists such items as living resources, marine environment and scientific research. The list is merely illustrative; however, arms control and military problems in general are not necessary ingredients of the generic duty of cooperation which littoral States are obliged to fulfill under Article 123 of the 1982 Convention.

9. Zones of Peace over Marine Areas

The formal endorsement of the notion of zone of peace was a result of the UNGA resolution 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Almost every year the UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on this subject, the

most recent being that of 27 December 1991 (Res 46/49). Zones of peace over marine areas are a typical non-aligned concept, the setting up of which has been proposed not only for the Indian Ocean but also for the Mediterranean at the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Though there is not only one notion of a zone of peace, its implementation would entail the prohibition of granting military facilities and the exclusion of fleets not belonging to the littoral States, or their limitation in number. As a rule, a zone of peace should also be a nuclear weapon-free zone. The proposal of instituting zones of peace has been always opposed by major naval powers, since its enforcement would curtail the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and that of collective self-defence. For non-littoral States, freedom of the high seas would be limited to non military navigation. This is why France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which have naval interests in the Indian Ocean, voted against GA resolution 46/49 mentioned above, while the positive vote of the Soviet Union was nothing but lip service paid to the idea of zones of peace.

II

THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

10. Claims over territorial sea in the Mediterranean: a) the 12 mile criterion; b) the claims by Italy and Libya over historic bays (respectively the Gulf of Taranto and the Gulf of Sidra); c) the controversy between Greece and Turkey over the extension of the territorial sea in the Aegean

Since the territorial sea is subject to sovereignty of the coastal State, its extension is of utmost importance. The mobility of foreign fleets is limited by territorial seas: freedom of navigation is severely curtailed, naval maneuvers are not allowed and overflight is not permitted. In a narrow sea, such as the Mediterranean, the extension of territorial waters is of critical importance. The majority of States adopt the 12-mile criterion for calculating the breadth of their territorial sea. This is the case of Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Spain, Cyprus, Malta and the Principality of Monaco. Of the remaining littoral States, three adopt the 6-mile criterion (Israel, Greece and Turkey), while two (Syria and Albania) have claims not consistent with customary international law. Syria claims a territorial sea up to 35 miles and Albania to 15 miles. It is worth noting that Turkey applies the 6-mile criterion in the Mediterranean and the 12 mile criterion in the Black Sea.

In fixing the limit of the territorial sea, the point from which the breadth is calculated (baseline) is extremely important. Only a few States follow the low tide mark criterion: Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, the Principality of Monaco. Other States use a combination of the low tide mark and the straight baseline criteria: Tunisia, Syria, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and Spain. A system of

straight baselines is followed by Albania and Malta, which has defined the sea lying between Malta, Fifla and Gozo as internal waters.

A number of the States mentioned above have claims to bays, about which third States have protested. Egypt qualifies as bays inlets which do not meet the test of the Geneva Convention on the territorial sea. Since this State has not yet published the geographical coordinates of its territorial sea, however, crucial problems have not yet arisen. The Tunisian claim to the Gulf of Gabes is opposed by Libya. Italy claims the Gulf of Taranto as a historical bay. This claim has not been formally protested, with the single exception of Malta. However, it is not considered consistent with international law by the United Kingdom or by the United States. Libya asserts its sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra, which it regards as a historic bay. This claim has raised the protests of a number of countries (for instance, Italy, U.K., France) and has been overtly challenged by the United States. Since it considers the Sidra waters as high sea, naval exercises were carried out both in 1981 and 1986. This led to serious incidents. In 1981, two Libyan jet fighters were downed while attempting to hit US airplanes; in 1986 the US attacked military facilities on the Libyan coast and sunk three Libyan warships in response to a Libyan missile attack.

The enclosure of bays is not the only hot point. Also the breadth of a territorial sea can raise concern, as demonstrated by the controversy between Greece and Turkey. Turkey has made it clear that an extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean would be regarded as a casus belli. In effect, if Greece extended its territorial waters up to 12 miles, almost the entire Aegean would become subject to Greek sovereignty. Greek territorial waters would cover 71.53% of the Aegean sea and only 19.71% of these waters would still be regarded as high sea. Consequently, there would no longer be a high sea corridor in the central Aegean. In effect, Turkey does not consider the 12-mile rule as opposable to it and claims that the extension of territorial waters in the Aegean up to 12 miles is to be considered an abuse of right (Article 300 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention).

11. The geography of international straits in the Mediterranean. Special cases: a) the Strait of Gibraltar; b) the Strait of Messina; c) the Turkish Straits

The Mediterranean is not a sea which can be easily reached from outside waters. It has three narrow entrance points: the Gibraltar Strait, the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits. Navigation through the Mediterranean entails passage through numerous chokepoints--many of them straits in juridical terms--particularly now that almost all the Mediterranean States have extended their territorial waters. The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway and will be dealt with separately. Leaving aside the Straits of Gibraltar, Messina, and Bosphorous and Dardanelles, which will be considered later, the straits of the Western Mediterranean do not cause particular problems. The Strait of Minorca is an international strait, connecting two

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parts of high seas. It is thus subject to the transit passage. The same is true for Boniface, which is a narrow outlet between Corsica and Sardinia. The Corsica Canal, between Corsica and the Tuscan Archipelago has become an international strait, subject to the transit passage. The Sicily Canal is not a strait in legal terms, since its waters are not completely under the jurisdiction of Italy and Tunisia. The same is true for the Malta strait. The entrance to the Adriatic Sea is made possible by the Otranto Canal. The distance between Albania and Italy is about 41 miles. Therefore, the Otranto Canal is not a strait in juridical term. However Yugoslavia, which is obviously interested in keeping that waterway open, insisted on having a provision in the Law of the Sea Convention stipulating that all freedoms of navigation and overflight apply to a strait used for international navigation where a route of high sea exists.

The main straits of the Ionian Sea are represented by the Corfu Strait and by that of Cerigo, between Crete and the Peloponnesus. Both are international straits subject to the rule of transit passage. Albania, the guardian of the Corfu strait which led to a "cause celebre" in 1949, has not signed the Law of the Sea Convention. The Cerigo Strait is important because it is a chokepoint entrance to the Aegean Sea. The other entrance points of the Aegean, such as the Kasos Strait, are not straits in juridical terms in so far as Greece maintains a territorial sea of 6 miles. Should Greece extend its territorial sea to 12 miles, all the entrance points of the Aegean would become international straits. The passage through the Aegean Islands is a point of contention between Greece and Turkey. This passage is made possible though a number of chokepoints which are straits in juridical terms, even with a Greek territorial sea of 6 miles. Greece asserts the right to indicate the strait which is to be used for international navigation. To this end, it signed the Law of the Sea Convention with the following understanding: " In areas where there are numerous spread out islands that form a great number of alternative straits which serve in fact one and the same route of international navigation, it is the understanding of Greece that the coastal State concerned has the responsibility to designate the route or routes, in the said alternative strait, through which ships and aircrafts of third countries could pass under transit passage regime, in such way as on the one hand the requirements of international navigation and overflight are satisfied, and on the other hand the minimum security requirements of both the ships and aircrafts in transit as well as those of the coastal State are fulfilled". It goes without saying that this stance has met with the Turkish opposition.

The strategic relevance of the Gibraltar Strait does not need to be underscored. Undoubtedly this strait is submitted to the regime of transit passage which allows unimpeded surface transit, submerged passage for submarines and overflight both for civil and military aircraft. Spain, as a controlling coastal State, has never been happy with this interpretation of the right of transit passage and it deposited a statement when signing the Law of the Sea Convention, which implies that overflight is subject to the regulations dictated by the coastal State.

The Strait of Messina falls under the category of straits disciplined by Article 38 para. 1 because there is an alternative route of similar convenience seaward of Sicily. It is thus subject to an unimpeded right of innocent passage. However, following a serious collision between two tankers,the Italian government has forbidden passage by tankers of more than 50,000 tons.

The Turkish Straits continue to be regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention and do not fall under the regime of the Law of the Sea Convention (Article 35). The Convention makes a distinction between passage in time of peace and in time of war. In the former time case, commercial shipping enjoys the freedom of navigation, subject to the sanitary regulations of Turkey and to the payment of charges and taxes which can be levied by the Turkish government. The same freedom is not enjoyed by warships. Non Black Sea States are allowed to transit, provided that: they envoy light surface vessels (therefore submarine passage is forbidden), the passage is previously notified to the Turkish authorities, the maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign warships in transit does not exceed 15,000 tons and the number of such warships does not comprise more than nine vessels. Black Sea Powers have a more privileged treatment. They can envoy capital ships exceeding 15.000 tons, provided that they pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers. The transit of submarines is also permitted for the following purposes: if a submarine is constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, it has the right to rejoin its base; those willing to reach the waters of the Mediterranean have the right to pass only to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea. The passage of aircarriers is a moot point. The Montreux Convention does not contain a specific provision allowing or forbidding the passage of this kind of vessel. The Soviet Union argues that transit is implicitly allowed by Article 15 which forbids warships in transit to " make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying". Therefore it asked and obtained permission from the Turkish government for the passage of the aircarrier Kiev, qualified by the Soviet Union as a "cruiser". The official Western position is that a systematic interpretation of the provisions of the Montreux Convention leads to the conclusion that the transit of aircarriers is forbidden.

In time of war, transit is severely curtailed. If Turkey is a belligerent, the passage of warships falls entirely within the discretion of Turkey. If Turkey is neutral, the transit of warships of belligerent powers is forbidden, except for rendering assistance to the victim of aggression or pursuant to a deliberation of the League of Nations or for those vessels which find themselves separated from their bases.

It is worth noting that Turkey has the right to apply measures forbidding the passage not only when it is a belligerent State, but also when it finds itself threatened with an imminent danger of war. These measures, however, should be applied under the scrutiny of the League of Nations, which could oblige Turkey to discontinue them.

12. Navigable Waterways: the Regime of Suez Canal

Artificial navigable waterways cannot be equated to international straits. Therefore they cannot be subject to transit in passage or to unimpeded innocent passage. Since they are situated within a State territory, an international treaty is needed in order to open the waterway to international navigation. This is the case of the Suez Canal, stretching for 160 km from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, the regime of which is disciplined by the Convention of Constantinople stipulated in 1888. Under this Convention, the territorial sovereign (i.e. Egypt as the successor of the Ottoman Empire) is obliged to keep open the Suez Canal " in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag". The Suez Canal cannot be blockaded and no belligerent action can be exerted in the Canal, its ports or their immediate vicinity, even if Egypt is a belligerent. It is not clear whether these restrictions apply in their entirety to Egypt, since Article X of the Constantinople Convention allows the territorial sovereign to take the necessary measures to secure its own defence and the maintenance of public order. Be that as it may, the Canal regime has been violated several times and Egypt has restricted the passage of Israeli vessels (bound to or coming from Israeli ports) until the stipulation of the 1979 Peace Treaty, which entitles Israeli shipping to use of the Canal and restates the validity of the Constantinople Convention. It is worth noting that Egypt had declared that it would abide by the Constantinople Convention through a declaration issued in 1957 and duly registered with the UN Secretariat.

13. Disputes over seabed and sea resources as potential threats to peace: a) the apportionment of continental shelf in the Mediterranean; b) the controversy over fishing rights (the case of the Mamellone).

Marine frontiers are an ideal line delimiting an area or dividing opposite or adjacent zones over which two or more States claim exclusive rights. The delimitations of such zones are particularly important in the Mediterranean, where the distance between opposite coasts, and thus between opposite sovereignties, is less than 400 miles. The apportionment of the continental shelf in the Mediterranean would require the stipulation of almost 30 treaties. Bilateral treaties have been stipulated by Italy, which has divided its seabed frontiers with Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Greece. Two ICJ judgments have paved the way to the apportionment of the continental shelf between Malta and Libya and between Tunisia and Libya. The undivided continental shelf in the Aegean sea is a source of potential conflict between Greece and Turkey. Greece's official stance is that the Aegean continental shelf should be apportioned according to the criterion of equidistance between the coasts of the two States. However the starting point for calculating the equidistance, far from being the Greek mainland, would be an ideal line linking the outermost points of the Greek islands. This solution is opposed by Turkey, which claims an

apportionment having the two mainlands as starting points. Turkey states that a circle should be drawn around the Greek islands in order to delimit their continental shelf.

Disputed territories and colonial remnants are another potential source of conflict, since the rights to the continental shelf are a projection of rights to land territory. These territories include: the northern part of Cyprus, which has proclaimed its independence; the sovereign UK bases on Cyprus (Dhekelia and Akrotiri); the Gaza strip; the Spanish possessions on the Moroccan coast (Ceuta, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, Penon de Alhucemas, Islas Chafarinas, Melilla); Gibraltar.

Fisheries are an additional source of potential conflict, as demonstrated by the fact that States police their adjacent waters in order to prevent unauthorized fishing. Navies of fishing States are also often present in disputed waters in order to protect their fishermen. A number of States, such as Italy, have regulated their fishing rights with neighbouring States by stipulating ad hoc agreements. Such agreements have now come to an end, with the single exception, as far as Italy is concerned, of the 1987 agreement with Yugoslavia for fishing rights in the Gulf of Trieste. Fishing policy is within the competence of the EEC and thus the EEC Mediterranean States are not allowed to stipulate agreements with their neighbours. The EEC, however, has not yet stipulated fisheries agreements, aside from the 1988 agreement with Morocco, which enables duly licensed EEC fishermen to fish in Moroccan waters. A potential instrument for preventing fishing disputes is the General Council for Mediterranean Fisheries; however it has not proven to be very effective to date.

The issue of apportionment of fishing rights between Italy and Tunisia has become particularly serious. Since the sixties, numerous incidents have taken place: Italian trawlers have been confiscated and Tunisian coast guards have often made use of firearms. The Tunisian fishing zone has been delimited with a batimetric criterion and extends, in some points, beyond the median line between Italy and Tunisia. Since 1979, Italy has forbidden Italian citizens to fish in the Mamellone, a sea area in the Sicily Canal. The rationale for the prohibition is to allow the optimal conservation of biological resources. The zone is patrolled by the Italian navy and is regarded by Italy as belonging to the high seas.

14. The 1971 Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and its application to the Mediterranean

The Seabed Treaty is a true treaty of disarmament in so far as it prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor. For the purposes of the Treaty, the inner limit of the seabed and ocean floor begins 12 miles from the baseline used for calculating the territorial sea. This means that within 12 miles States are free to place the devices forbidden by the Seabed Treaty. This liberty also pertains to those States which adopt

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the 6-mile criterion for calculating the territorial sea, as Greece and Turkey. On this point, the application of the Seabed Treaty does not raise particular problems; it does, however, bear upon the baseline. Since the 12 miles extend from the baseline used for the calculation of the territorial sea, it is obvious that those States which have drawn straight baselines, or which claim historic bays "gain" space for emplanting nuclear devices in comparison to those States which adopt the criterion of normal baseline. The Seabed Treaty has not yet been ratified by all Mediterranean States; Egypt, France, Libya and Syria are not parties to it.

15. The extension of the contiguous zone and the practical irrelevance of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean.

Many littoral Mediterranean States had a territorial sea of 6 miles and a contiguous zone of 12. With the extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, the contiguous zone has disappeared. This is the case of Italy, for instance. A few States have, however, extended their contiguous zones to 24 miles, in accordance with Article 33 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. These States are: Egypt, France, Malta and Morocco. Syria claims a contiguous zone of 41 nautical miles; however, its claim is inconsistent with the limits established by international law. Because of the narrow limits between its opposite coasts, the Mediterranean is not an ideal environment for establishing EEZs. In fact, at the III Law of the Sea Conference, Algeria, Turkey and Israel opposed the establishment of such zones. This is also the position of Italy. Egypt and Morocco declared their intention to establish an EEZ; such a zone, however, has never been delimited (as far as Morocco is concerned this holds true for its Mediterranean coast, but not for the Atlantic). Malta claims a fishing zone of 25 miles and Tunisia claims a fishing zone that includes the area of Mamellone.

16. The special case of the Black Sea

Any control of naval armaments in the Mediterranean cannot but involve the Black Sea, which is of utmost importance for the Soviet fleet. The Black Sea offers an example of early naval control. The Treaty of March 30, 1856 established limits on the naval forces of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Russia tried to abolish this treaty but was not successful and only obtained an annex to the Treaty of London of March 13, 1871. Modern Soviet policy has been to limit the presence of foreign fleets in the Black Sea and to obtain free access to the Mediterranean for Black Sea powers. In part, the Montreux Convention meets, in part, the Soviet concern, in so far as it gives Black Sea States a more favourable treatment through the Turkish Straits and limits the presence of the non Black Sea powers in that sea. The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea powers are allowed to navigate in the Black Sea is limited to 30,000 tons by Article 18 of the Montreux Convention. This figure may be increased to 45,000 and the tonnage which any one of non Black Sea power may

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have in the Black Sea is limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea powers are allowed to navigate. A further limitation is the exclusion of a permanent presence of non-Black Sea powers. Article 18 para. 2 of the Montreux Convention states that " vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there".

Aside from the above limits, the Black Sea does not present any special features if compared to other sea areas. Bulgaria, Romania, the Ukraine and the Soviet Union claim a 12-mile territorial sea. Turkey and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty on their territorial sea boundaries in 1973, on the basis of a 12-mile territorial sea. The two States have also delimited their continental shelf and EEZ in 1978 and 1987, respectively. The Soviet Union has adopted a system of straight baselines and considers the Azov Sea as internal waters. Varna and Burgas are claimed by Bulgaria as historic bays. In the Black Sea, there are no islands distant from the coast which can add significant maritime jurisdiction to the coastal States. The only case is that of Ostrov Zmeinyy, an island which is under Soviet rule, but which is claimed by Romania.

17. The Soviet proposal for transforming the Mediterranean Sea into a zone of peace

From time to time proposals aimed at the demilitarization of the Mediterranean or, at least, the limitation of its military uses are put forward. On 21 May 1961, the Soviet Union proposed the denuclearization of the Mediterranean. At the time of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1973), the Non-Aligned countries proposed the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. In effect, the transformation of the Mediterranean into such a zone has been listed among the aims of the Non-Aligned Movement ever since the Algiers summit (1973). The Non-Aligned reiterated their proposal during the meeting held at Valletta on 10-11 September 1984. The Final Declaration affirms the following:

The Ministers also considered that the freedom of the high seas in a closed sea like the Mediterranean should be exercised scrupulously and exclusively for the purposes of peace, and that naval deployment, particularly by States outside the region, that directly or indirectly threatened the interests of non-aligned Mediterranean members, should be excluded.

However, all these proposals have been rejected. The idea of the Mediterranean as a zone of peace was again touched upon in GA Res 36/102 (1981). In voting on this resolution - which is devoted to the more general problems of international security - there were 20 abstentions, four Mediterranean States among them (Israel, Italy, Spain and Turkey). A consensus resolution on co-operation and security in the Mediterranean adopted two years later (38/189) does not make any reference to the creation of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. This resolution is of

the kind of those which the General Assembly has adopted by consensus since 1981 (36/102-1981; 37/118-1982; 38/189-1983;39/153-184; 40/157-1985; 41/89-1986; 42/90-1987; 43/84-1988; 43/84-1989), under the item " Strengthening of Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region". Problems of arms control at sea are not touched upon.

18. The current status of the historic demilitarizations and of those established by the Peace Treaty of 1947

The most ancient demilitarizations in the Mediterranean date from the beginning of the century. Others were contracted within the framework of the Peace treaties concluding World War I or World War II.

The most ancient demilitarization which comes into consideration is that of the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. At the beginning of this century, the Moroccan coast of the Strait of Gibraltar between Melilla and the right bank of the Sebou River was the object of a stipulation, made in 1904 between France and UK, under which that coastline was not to become the object of any fortification or strategic installation. The demilitarization was deemed instrumental to the right of free passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. This stipulation was reiterated in the Treaty of 12 November 1912, between France and Spain, a few months after Morocco had become a French protectorate. This is because the Moroccan shore affected by the duty of demilitarization was within the Spanish sphere of influence. Even if it is a moot point, it may be argued that the clauses of the 1912 Treaty cannot be considered as having been transmitted to Morocco by the principle of state succession. In fact, Morocco does not feel legally bound to observe them. However, in a declaration before the General Assembly in 1973 Morocco stated that it would have maintained the demilitarization ex gratia.

In the West Mediterranean the duties of demilitarization imposed by the 1947 Peace treaty to Italy were more important. Article 49 of this treaty required Italy to demilitarize the following islands: Pantelleria, the Pelagian Islands (Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa) and Pianosa (in the Adriatic). Furthermore, the Peace Treaty imposed strict limitations on military installations in the larger islands of Sicily and Sardinia (Articles 50 and 51). Article 50 (4) prohibited Italy from constructing naval, military or airforce installations or fortifications in Sicily or Sardinia. These demilitarizations, however, together with other military clauses of the 1947 Peace Treaty, may now be deemed as abrogated by virtue of a process started by Italy in 1951. Exchanges of notes were stipulated with 15 of the 21 States parties to the Peace Treaty, under which Italy was freed by the duty of the demilitarization. The remaining 6 States (four Eastern bloc countries plus Ethiopia and Yugoslavia) appear to have acquiesced to the Italian 1951 initiative; consequently those clauses are no longer in force.

Article 11(2) of the 1947 peace Treaty stipulated the cession of the Italian Island of Pelagosa and the adjacent islets to Yugoslavia, with the obligation to keep them demilitarized. This obligation has not been questioned by

Yugoslavia.

The Aegean demilitarizations are the object of a harsh contention between Greece and Turkey. The duties of Greece as far as demilitarization is concerned apply to most of the Aegean islands adjacent to Turkey. They do not always have the same content, and stem from different instruments; therefore it is useful to consider the Greek islands in separate groupings.

1) Lemnos and the Adjacent Islands. The origin of these demilitarizations is a note, dated 13 February 1914, addressed by 6 European States to Greece. This note has not been formally abrogated. Greece, however, maintains that the origin of the demilitarization was Article 4 of the 24 July Lausanne Convention on the Straits. Given that the Lausanne Convention on Straits has been abrogated by the Montreux Convention, Greece asserts that the demilitarization of Lemnos and adjacent islands is no longer in force.

2) The Central Aegean Islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria). Also in this case, the demilitarization was established by the London declaration of 13 February 1914. The demilitarization was later restated by Article 13 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923, which spells out its terms. The current point of disagreement between Greece and Turkey on these islands centres not so much on the duty of demilitarization as on its content and scope.

3) The Dodecanese Islands. The duty to keep the Archipelago demilitarized stems from Article 14 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between Italy and Allied and Associated Powers. The islands were transferred to Greece with the obligation of keeping them demilitarized. After Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus, the Dodecannese islands were the object of a programme of massive militarization. In order to respond to the Turkish protest, Greece did not question the permanent validity of the obligations stemming from Article 14 of the 1947 Peace Treaty, but limited itself to stating that no Greek Island had any means of attacking the Turkish territory.

19. The Permanent Neutrality of Malta

The source of Maltese neutrality is to be found in an exchange of notes with Italy which entered into force in 1981. Malta's permanent neutrality, which is based on non-alignment, is guaranteed by Italy. This means that Italy is obliged to intervene militarily to aid Malta, whenever the Island is the object of an armed attack, according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The guarantee of Malta is open to other neighbouring Mediterranean States. In fact, Libya and Tunisia, in addition to Italy, should have guaranteed Malta's security. France and Tunisia, however, did not find it opportune to subscribe to the guarantee mechanism. In 1984, however, Libya concluded a Treaty of friendship and co-operation with Malta, by which it pledged to " assist Malta whenever the Government of the Republic of Malta explicitly requests so in case of threats or acts of aggression against Malta's territorial integrity and sovereignty".

Obviously a permanent neutral State cannot enter a military alliance. Therefore it can be militarily guaranteed by another

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State or a group of States, but it cannot stipulate military pacts of a reciprocal nature. In other words it cannot enter a military alliance. Nor is a permanent neutral State permitted to host foreign military bases on its soil.

Malta's permanent neutrality also has a naval dimension. The exchange of notes with Italy contains two clauses which affect the policy of naval Powers present in the Mediterranean. There is a general clause which forbids the use of Malta's facilities in such manner or extent as to amount to the presence a concentration of foreign forces in Malta. This means that, apart from cases of collective self-defence or of execution of measures decided by the UN Security Council, use of port facilities, such as the refuelling of foreign naval vessels is permitted, but the stationing of a naval squadron is not. The second clause regulates the use of shipyards, which has long been the Island's main source of wealth. In principle, the shipyards have to be used "for civil commercial purposes" only. However, their use for military purposes is also allowed, in the following manner. Maltese shipyards are permitted to repair foreign military vessels, provided they are "in a state of non-combat". The shipyards may also be used for shipbuilding. Since the construction of military ships is not excluded, it may be supposed that Malta can build ships of this kind. However, the activity of shipyards used for military purposes must be kept, according to the language of the instrument establishing Maltese neutrality, "within reasonable limits of time and quantity". Military vessels (including auxiliary ships) of the two superpowers (i.e. the USA and the Soviet Union) cannot use Maltese shipyards. For such ships, use is absolutely forbidden, even though Malta interprets this clause in the sense that the prohibition encompasses only the repair of military vessels and not their construction.

20. The status of coastal States hosting foreign bases in case of armed conflict involving the basing State

Many Mediterranean States, mainly those belonging to NATO, have foreign military bases on their soil. Sometimes these bases are part of the integrated structure of NATO. In other cases they are used only by one State, even if their use can also serve the purposes of the Alliance. This is the case of a number of bases under US jurisdiction.

The first question to be answered is whether a State which has a foreign base on its soil can abide by a policy of neutrality if an armed conflict arises between the basing State and a third State. In time of war or armed conflict, a neutral State is obliged to abide by the duties stemming from both the 1907 Hague Convention V on neutrality in land warfare and the 1907 Convention XIII on neutrality in naval war. The neutrality status entails three fundamental duties: abstention, prevention and impartiality. Consequently, in land warfare, the neutral State is obliged not to permit the transit of belligerent armies, convoys or ammunition,through its territory. The use of radiotelegraphic stations is also forbidden. The duties of neutral States in naval war are even more stringent. Belligerent warships are not allowed to remain in a neutral port for more

than 24 hours, unless a delay is necessary because of bad weather in order to make repairs. The duty of impartiality obliges the neutral State to give the belligerents the same treatment.

Neutral ports and waters cannot be used by belligerents as a base for hostile operations and cannot host devices which may be used as a means of communication for belligerents.

The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the presence of foreign military bases is at variance with the status of neutrality, unless the basing State uses the base in a manner consistent with the duties of neutrality of the hosting State. This policy is very difficult to maintain when the base hosts air and naval forces of the basing State.

In case of an armed conflict between the basing State and a third State, the hosting State is obliged to choose a policy of non-belligerency. This kind of attitude, which according to some authorities is now recognized in international law, entails an attenuation of the duties of impartiality connected with the status of neutrality. A non-belligerent State would be allowed to support one warring party, even with logistic aid. Only direct intervention in support of a belligerent would be forbidden.

The next question to be answered is whether a belligerent State can react with armed force against a neutral State hosting an enemy base. We have to distinguish various hypotheses.

i) It might happen that the hosting State does not permit any military use of the base. In this case an attack against the neutral State would be an act of aggression.

ii) It might happen that the hosting State allows the use of the base within the limits of a policy of non-belligerency (e.g. the basing State warships are entitled to use naval base facilities for repairing and refuelling well beyond the limits stated by the Hague Convention No.XIII). Even in such a case the enemy base cannot be attacked. However, this line of reasoning is correct in so far as the doctrine of non-belligerency is considered consistent with present-day international law.

iii) It might happen that the foreign base is used as a place from which to attack enemy territory. In this case Article 51 of the United Nations Charter entitles the aggrieved belligerent to react against the territory on which the base is located.

iv) It must be conceded that a belligerent is entitled to react against the territory on which the base is located even if the attack has not been launched therefrom. This is the case in which the foreign base is totally under the control of the basing State and the hosting State retains only nominal sovereignty (nudum jus) over it. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not forbid an attack on military objectives different from those from which an act of aggression has been launched, provided that this reaction is justified in terms of necessity and proportionality--particularly when the base is under the complete sovereignty of the basing State, as in the case of the British bases in Cyprus(Akrotiri and Dhekelia).

21. Agreements concluded in order to prevent incidents on the high seas

The first of these agreements was negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union on 25 May 1972 and is still valid even though a decade has passed since then. The 1972 Agreement is a classical example of a CBM since it is not aimed at arms reduction. It is, in part, a military adaptation of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea concluded within the framework of the IMO, which dictate International Rules of Road for vessels. The content of the 1972 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is well-illustrated in the US Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Its main points are the following seven rules:

1. Ships will observe strictly the letter and the spirit of the International Rules of the Road.

2. Ships will remain well clear of one another to avoid risk of collision and, when engaged in surveillance activities, will exercise good seamanship so as not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

3. Ships will utilize special signals for signalling their operation and intentions.

4. Ships of one country will not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, or other weapons at the ships of the other country, and will not launch any object in the direction of passing ships nor illuminate their navigation bridges.

5. Ships conducting exercises with submerged submarines will show the appropriate signals to warn of submarines in the area.

6. Ships, when approaching ships of the other party, particularly those engaged in replenishment or fight operations, will take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and will remain well clear.

7. Aircraft will use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party, in particular ships engaged in launching and landing aircraft, and will not simulate attacks by the simulated use of weapons or perform aerobatics over ships of the other party nor drops objects near them".

A Protocol stipulated on May 22, 1973 obliges the two Superpowers not to launch simulated attacks against non-military vessels of the other party. These agreements do not contain any geographical limitations and thus include the Mediterranean. On June 12, 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union stipulated an agreement (which entered into force on January 1, 1990) which is aimed at preventing dangerous military activities when their armed forces operate in proximity of each other. Though this agreement is not devoted to sea activities in particular, they

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are not excluded. It covers instances in which the territorial sea of the other State is entered because of error or force majeure; the use of laser, which might hamper the other State personnel; and the interference with the command network, which could cause damage.

The 1972 USA-USSR agreement is a model which has only recently been adopted by other naval powers. An agreement of this kind was entered into by the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union on July 15, 1986. France and the Soviet Union stipulated such an agreement on July 4, 1989 and the subsequent year Italy concluded its naval agreement with the Soviet Union. It is worth noting that the Franco-Soviet agreement, by explicitly admitting the liberty to conduct military operations beyond the territorial sea, implicitly recognizes the lawfulness of conducting military exercises within areas which are subject to the economic rights of the coastal State (such as the EEZ).

22. The Mediterranean and Black Sea newly independent States and the problem of succession

The collapse of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has given rise to new States, thus creating a problem of devolution of rights and obligation of the predecessor State. As far as the subject of this paper is concerned, attention is to be devoted to the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and Georgia on the one hand and to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other. The relationship between the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation has been dealt with as a case of identity by the international community: therefore the Russian Federation continues to be party to the treaties stipulated by the Soviet Union. A problem of devolution arises for the Ukraine and Georgia. The Ukraine, however, is a party to the Sea Bed Treaty, since it had treaty-making power under the Soviet constitution. Georgia may become party to that treaty either by adherence or by a declaration of succession. The real problem is represented by bilateral treaties stipulated by the Soviet Union for the apportionment of the continental shelf and the delimitation of the EEZ in the Black Sea. There is a need to divide the marine zones among the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Georgia, on one hand, and between these three countries and Turkey, on the other. The Russia Federation can now be considered a party to the Montreux Convention. It is not clear, however, whether the other two new States can become party to it by virtue of a declaration of succession. An additional source of conflict is represented by the apportionment, between the Russian Federation (rectius between the CIS) and the Ukraine of the Soviet Black Sea fleet.

The Yugoslavian question is even more complicated from the viewpoint of international law. It is not clear whether Yugoslavia continues to exist as subject of international law after the independence of so many parts of its territory. Even if one assumes that the Yugoslavian State is still in existence, there is still a question of devolution of the treaty delimiting the continental shelf between Yugoslavia and Italy, since a portion of the former Yugoslavian continental shelf now belongs to Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the change of

circumstances, the fate of a number of multilateral treaties (e.g. instance the 1987 Treaty over fishing rights in the Gulf of Trieste) is also in question because the eastern waters of the Gulf are now under the Slovenian and Croatian jurisdiction and no longer under Yugoslavian authority.

It is worth noting that Croatia, Slovenia, the Ukraine and Georgia have become members of the CSCE, with the consequence that the relevant CSCE mechanisms and procedures apply to them.

III

THE MARINE AND NAVAL DIMENSION OF A LEGAL PROCESS FOR SETTING UP A SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION SYSTEM FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

23. Premiss: the linkage between a CSCM process and naval arms control in the Mediterranean

The CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) is an Italian goal which has been pursued since the first years of the CSCE. It is not appropriate in this paper to discuss the feasibility of a transfer of the CSCE experience to the Mediterranean. Suffice if to say that a possible CSCM is a Conference in which the participation of all Mediterranean and Black Sea States should be envisaged. A moot point is the participation of non-littoral States. It is undisputed that the US should take part in the process. The problem concerns the participation of other non-littoral States, such as Germany or Canada. CLearly the CSCM would encompass a military/security basket, as has been the case of the CSCE. It is also evident that the CSCM would embody a naval track within the military/security basket. It would be very difficult indeed to exclude naval issues from the CSCM.

The real problem lies in the fact that the idea of the CSCM has not yet gained enough currency. The question is therefore whether it is possible to set out a system of naval arms control in the Mediterranean without a CSCM. The answer is no, since it is difficult to conceive of the birth of such a system without a multilateral forum. This is not to say that bilateral initiatives cannot be started on the model of bilateral treaties stipulated between the Soviet Union on one side and, respectively, France and Italy on the other. It must be pointed out, however, that bilateralism has many drawbacks, such as the fact that it is generally pursued by virtue of binding instruments, while more flexible instruments (e.g. as those adopted within the CSCE process) may be built mainly on a multilateral structure. This is particularly true for CSBMs, even though there may be common understandings at the bilateral level, which is more flexible than a treaty.

It goes without saying that bilateral treaties, common understandings and whatever CSBMs States are able to agree upon might be included a multilateral process, be it the CSCM or a comparable initiative. It is therefore worth pursuing limited policies aiming at ameliorating naval relations, including, whenever possible, regional treaties. If a CSCM were ever to be convened, the instruments previously agreed upon would become part of the "acquis". This cannot be annulled by the Conference;

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on the contrary, a multilateral process would serve as a driving force for adding new measures to it.

24. The need for a mechanism aimed at facilitating the settlement of disputes: is the Valletta procedure an appropriate method?

The UN Charter states the obligation to settle international disputes peacefully. This obligation, which is embodied in Article 2 para. 3 is complementary to the cardinal duty, stated in the subsequent paragraph, which obliges States to abstain from threatening or using armed coercion. The international community already provides instruments for the settlement of disputes. For instance, the Hague Convention of 1907 for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Court of Justice and the 1957 European Convention for peaceful settlement of disputes. The main problem is that the above instruments do not contain any obligatory third party involvement and they can be set in motion on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, States are often exempt from adjudication of those disputes which bear upon their vital interests. A well-structured system for marine disputes is provided for by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention; however, it has not yet entered into force and its procedures are not yet available. The Mediterranean States have proved their interest in such methods of dispute-settling as jurisdiction, as is implied by the submission to the ICJ of disputes on the apportionment of the continental shelf (Libya/Tunisia and Libya/Malta). The Aegean dispute, however, demonstrates that not all States are willing to submit their disputes to international adjudication. Hence the interest in creating mechanisms which can coexist with those already in force.

The CSCE States, after a number of unsuccessful attempts, have been able to set up a method which includes the possibility of an obligatory third party involvement. The CSCE procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes, elaborated in Valletta in 1991, is an example of a flexible method provided for by a CSCE document. The Valletta procedure - which is not embodied in a treaty - is based on the CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The Mechanism consists of one or more independent persons nominated by common agreement by the parties to the dispute. If an agreement is not reached, the CSCE Centre for Conflict Prevention functions as a nominating institution. The Mechanism helps the parties determine a suitable dispute settling method (for instance, conciliation, arbitration, referral to the ICJ). If the parties do not agree on selecting an appropriate method, the Mechanism provides comments and advice to the parties on how to settle their disputes. If within a reasonable time the dispute is still pending, any party may bring it to the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials. The Valletta procedure shall not apply to disputes that any party considers as falling under the following issues: territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas. These exclusions render the Valletta procedure unsuitable for settling disputes over marine areas, and the effectiveness of the whole procedure

is very low. Suffice it to note that the Mechanism is prevented from addressing recommendations to the parties. The Valletta procedure is an instrument which may, however, be revised by the appropriate CSCE organs. It therefore constitutes a first step for approaching an issue which is difficult to solve, as the history of the CSCE negotiations for the peaceful settlement of dispute demonstrate. It is difficult to say, however, whether an instrument like the one drafted at Valletta constitutes a valid precedent. The Valletta procedure is linked to an institutional framework - such as the Committee of Senior Officials or the CPC - within which it can function. Therefore, a proposal aiming at setting up a flexible procedure for the Mediterranean countries would not be credible without the support of an institutional framework which can guarantee its functioning.

25. The legitimacy of military alliances according to the Charter of the United Nations and their bearing on naval policies

Article 51 of the UN Charter gives the right of individual and collective self-defence to States. This means that a State, once it has been the object of an armed attack, may react in self-defence and that third States may assist it in repelling the aggression. The right of collective self-defence is the basis of the legitimacy of military alliances. States are allowed to organize their collective self-defence in time of peace, in order to be ready to respond immediately, should an act of aggression occur. The UN Charter does not confine military alliances to any geographic limits. Consequently, an alliance, such as NATO, may group members belonging to different continents. Maritime communications are therefore vital for the effectiveness of the alliances and the implementation of the duty to help the aggrieved State, should it be attacked. Any proposal of arms control in the Mediterranean aimed at undermining the NATO maritime capability would therefore not be in keeping with current practice since it would curtail the principle of collective self-defence.

26. The problem of reconciling the unilateral dimension of the delimitation of marine areas with the superior need to avoid unnecessary confrontations

The delimitation of marine areas (territorial waters, continental shelf, EEZ) falls within the jurisdiction of the coastal State. However such delimitation must be consistent with international law, as has been stated by the ICJ in the 1951 Fisheries case involving Norway and the United Kingdom. The right of the coastal State to delimit marine areas adjacent to its coast can lead to claims by other States that the delimitation is not in keeping with international law. There can be either a paper protest or a showing of the flag by third States, in order to contest the claim by the coastal State and to prevent acquiescence. Mere diplomatic protests are not dangerous activities. The same does not always hold true for those activities consisting in showing the flag. To do this, States exercise their navigational rights or other high seas

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freedoms, such as engaging in naval exercises in the disputed area. Disputes also arise in connection with the fishery zones adjacent to territorial waters, and States often dispatch military vessels in order to protect their trawlers. As the two Gulf of Sidra incidents mentioned in section II show, such disputes can degenerate into open armed conflict between the coastal and the protesting State.

In order to prevent acquiescence, the protest must be effective. Effective protest does not necessarily mean that States are obliged to show their flag. Acquiescence is prevented if the protest is reiterated. On the other hand, the exercise of navigational rights in disputed waters is not an unlawful activity, particularly when the claim of the coastal State is unreasonable and manifestly ill-founded. A possible way-out might consist in reducing the necessity of flag-showing by enhancing the role of diplomatic protest; this, however is not enough. Rules obliging States to exercise restraint need to be coupled with a system of dispute settling. States are traditionally unwilling to submit disputes over delimitation of marine areas to a third party compulsory settlement, or at least they avoid entering treaties with compromissory clauses, obliging them to accept arbitration should a dispute arise. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the Law of the Sea Convention which sets out a sophisticated system for dispute settling and allows States to declare that disputes related to sea boundary delimitations, including claims related to historic titles, are not eligible for the compulsory procedures entailing a binding decision (article 298, para. 1). For instance, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and Tunisia have made such a declaration. In this case, a non-binding procedure, such as conciliation, is available.

In order to avoid the negative consequences arising from unilateralism originating from both claims of coastal States and counterclaims of those protesting, a regional system for dispute settling is desirable. Such a system is compatible with the Law of the Sea Convention, as stated in Article 282. The real problem lies in the political feasibility of such a system, since it cannot be easily set up, as the history of CSCE has demonstrated.

27. The regime of Turkish Straits, the demilitarization of Greek islands and the naval provisions of Malta's neutrality as possible instances of naval arms control

Neutrality and neutralizations are usually not considered modern measures of arms control. This is partly because these institutions flourished during the past century. The end of blocs, the fragmentation of power and the intensification of rivalries might lead to a reconsideration of institutions which reached their peak in the XIX Century. It is open to question whether new measures of this kind might play a role. It is certain however that keeping alive neutralizations that are still in force does not endanger international security, unless they are clearly obsolete. This holds true for instance for the regime which limits the navigation of warships through a given

waterway.

If this assumption holds true there is no need to abolish the regime of demilitarization to which the Greek islands are submitted, provided that it is still in force.

The Montreux Convention and the balance it strikes between Black Sea Powers and outside users constitutes an additional problem. This Convention limits the passage of warships and the class of armaments which they can have on board when entering the Black Sea. From the point of view of navigational rights, the Convention may be considered a measure of structural arms control, since one class of ships (submarines) cannot enter the Black Sea and possibility for a Black Sea Power to send its submarines to the Mediterranean is severely curtailed. There is no doubt that the Montreux regime is to be maintained and cannot be substituted by a regime of transit passage similar to that in force in international straits. The real question is whether the Montreux Convention needs to be revised.

There are four issues which are to be taken into account :
- the reference made by the Convention to the League of Nations and to its organs;
- the generation of weapons which did not exist when the Convention was drafted and that now are on board of ships;
- the class of ships - such as aircarriers - which are not mentioned in the Convention and the generation of nuclear propelled ships which are a postwar phenomenon;
- the reference, in the Convention, to such notions as "war" or "peace", which have become blurred.

There have been no initiatives to revise the Convention to date. The fear that the Soviet Union may take advantage of the revision to alter the status of Black Sea and transform it into a lake closed to non riparian States has prevented any move in that sense. However, the Convention is aging and it is difficult to bring it up to date if one relies only on an evolutionary interpretation. While interpretation and adaptation may help solve certain issues - such as the substitution of the United Nations for the League of Nations - others cannot be so easily solved: for instance the problem of whether warships entering the Turkish Straits are allowed to carry on board the new generation of weapons. Furthermore, the Convention does not address the powers of Turkey, as the guardian of Straits, as far as visit and search is concerned. Nothing is mentioned about marine pollution, and a system of dispute settling is lacking.

The Convention contains clauses on amendments. However, if its revision were to be confined to the States parties, a further political complication arises in o far as the United States is not party to it. The Soviet Union is party to it and a problem of participation for the Russian Federation does not arise, given that the international community considers the Russian Federation as identical to the USSR. A problem does arise, however, for the riparian republics generated by the Soviet diaspora, i.e. the Ukraine, whose ambitions to become a naval power are well known, and Georgia.

As has been seen, the Declaration on Malta's neutrality contains a number of naval clauses. They may continue to serve a useful purpose, and there is no need for a revision. The only questionable point is the textual reference in the Declaration

to the warships of two "superpowers", Is this clause, which refers both to the United States and the Soviet Union, still valid for the Russian Federation?

28. The prohibition to use the continental shelf of a foreign country for military purposes

Measures of genuine arms control are generally not proposed for the Mediterranean, at least by the West. They are considered politically unfeasible, even though their application is relatively easy to verify, given the small dimension of the Mediterranean and the possibility to control any incoming warship. This is not to say that any measure of naval arms control is to be avoided. Attention is to be devoted to areas which are deemed suitable for military activities, in particular, the continental shelf of foreign countries. We have seen that foreign States are still allowed to engage in a number of military activities on it, even though the continental shelf falls under the functional jurisdiction of the coastal State. An agreement among Mediterranean countries, open to the outside users, might prohibit the emplacement of those devices which are clearly aggressive, such as dormant mines. The scope of a possible agreement could vary and encompass all military devices, or only those which have a clear aggressive use. This does not mean that the continental shelf should be demilitarized. The coastal State should be allowed to use its continental shelf for military purposes, provided that the provisions of the 1971 sea-bed treaty are not violated.

29. Instruments for naval CSBMs and elements of an organizational structure helping to control naval policies in the Mediterranean

Unlike arms control, Confidence and Security Building Measures are more easily achievable, particularly if they are embodied in a flexible instrument and not in a formal treaty. The following CSBMs are worth discussing here, since they have a bearing on naval legal policies of the Mediterranean States.

a) A common interpretation of provisions regulating the military uses of the sea: Different and opposite interpretations of rules governing military activities in marine areas often give rise to tension, which may degenerate into open confrontation. This is true, for instance, for innocent passage through the territorial sea, which many States still consider subject to the consent of the coastal State, particularly when the passage is exercised by warships. A common understanding, such as that concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union on the passage of their warships through the territorial waters of each country, would help prevent incidents, since the passage of a foreign warship would no longer be perceived as a threat but as a routine naval activity permitted by international law. On this point, a common understanding might be concluded involving all the Mediterranean States and its main users. The scope of the understanding could be subsequently expanded in order to restate the lawfulness of other military activities, such as naval maneuvers in the areas adjacent to the territorial

sea. The purpose of these rules, far from limiting military activities in time of peace, would consist in making the coastal State confident that its security is not threatened.

b) A regional agreement or a range thereof aiming at preventing incidents on high seas: The 1972 agreement for preventing incidents on high seas has paved the way to a number of similar bilateral instruments, for instance between the USSR, on one part, and respectively the United kingdom, France and Italy on the other. Is there any need to conclude a multilateral agreement? Opinions are divided on this point. A multilateral agreement on prevention of naval incidents is seen as a useful CSBM by some; others, on the contrary, see it as a cumbersome exercise. The fact is that bilateral agreements are stipulated between countries with comparable navies (from a worldwide or a regional point of view). Furthermore, bilateral agreements involve competing navies, often watching each other during naval games, and set out appropriate rules of the road in order to avoid incidents. One can question whether there is a need for such agreements between friendly nations or between navies which are not comparable. If the answer is yes, the possibility of a regional agreement valid for the Mediterranean countries and outside users is worth being explored. One may even conclude at the conclusion that the existing bilateral agreements can coexist with a regional agreement. This is not to say that a Mediterranean agreement on preventing naval incidents should entail a derogation from the law of the sea in force in the oceans. However a regional agreement might better take into account the special features of the Mediterranean. For instance, naval pollution caused by an incident in the Mediterranean is an event which any Mediterranean user should be obliged to deal with.

c) As State practice shows, disputes originating from overlapping claims over the exploitation of mineral and marine resources give rise to confrontation between the concerned countries. This is particularly true when disputed areas involve oil drilling rights or competing claims over fisheries. The Mediterranean States should adopt a set of rules aimed at exercising restraint in order to prevent unnecessary confrontations. For instance, pending a final agreement with the adjacent or opposite State, the coastal State should not exploit its continental shelf beyond its territorial sea limit, unless a "bona fide" median line can be drawn. This is in order to prevent any forceful affirmation of maritime claims.

d) Measures of co-operation for crime prevention can help in increase trust and confidence between neighbouring countries. For example, cooperation among coast guards could be started, or enhanced if already in existence, in order to police the sea and combat drug trafficking or illegal exploitation of submarine archaeological treasures.

The above are only examples of possible CSBMs. A different issue is whether an organizational structure is desirable in order to administer them. This is a highly political problem and a structure - such as a sort of CPC (Conflict Prevention Center)- might only envisaged if the idea of a CSCM gains currency. It is likely that elementary CSBMs do not need to be administered by a Center.

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30. Summary and conclusions

The evaluation of the Mediterranean region and its maritime environment has shown that a number of disputes are in existence and there is the risk that they may be resolved by resorting to armed force. Hence the need to set out a range of methods aimed at a peaceful solution of disputes. The analysis has proven that such disputes mainly involve the delimitation of marine areas, in particular the apportionment of the continental shelf and the delimitation of territorial waters (e.g. the Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sidra). A mechanism for dispute settling is therefore needed. The Valletta procedure - as we have seen - has many drawbacks. It applies only to the Mediterranean States which are CSCE members and embodies a very weak method, which is rendered almost unsuitable for marine disputes, since it does not cover controversies related to territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas. Consequently, the Valletta method is not of much help even for solving disputes which may originate from the devolution of rights and obligations to the new independent Mediterranean and Black Sea States.

The goal of CSBMs should consist, first of all, in finding out rules aimed at preventing the aggravation of disputes to which the Mediterranean States are party. In this connection, one can conceive of the expansion at bilateral level of treaties aimed at preventing naval incidents or even a regional treaty of this kind. New areas might be explored and the prevention of naval pollution seems to be a promising field for a regional instrument.

Revision of aging treaties, such as the Montreux Convention, might also be a suitable area of action. On the contrary the Constantinople Convention on the Suez Canal needs only a reaffirmation and an expansion of its membership.

Malta's neutrality should be preserved. The same holds true for the existing neutralization of territories, provided that the relevant treaty provisions are still in force and they play a role in maintaining the strategic balance.

It is likely not yet the right time for negotiating real measures of naval arms control. The only area could for instance be the continental shelf in order to explore an expansion, at the regional level, of the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty.

More ambitious measures, be they CSBMs or arms control instruments, need to be negotiated within an institutional framework, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation for the Mediterranean.

THE SOVIET NAVAL ARMS CONTROL OVERTURES FOR

THE MEDITERRANEAN: WILL RUSSIA ACCEPT THIS HERITAGE?

Dr. Georgi M. Sturua

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The Soviet fascination with security threats originating on
the Mediterranean-Black Sea flank is deep rooted in history.
Transformation of closed and insecure Russia into the Great
Russian Empire took place when Peter the First successfully
fought battles on the southern borders, secured sea ports on the
Black Sea and eventually created the first Russian fleet. With
the situation more or less stabilized in the Black Sea area,
Russia quite naturally turned to expand its outreach to the
Mediterranean. However strange it may sound, the design was
inherently defensive in nature. Neither in the late 17th century
nor in the late 20th century Russian rulers ranging from Peter
the Great and Nicholas II to Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev had any
substantial capabilities enabling them to add the Mediterranean
to the Russian sphere of influence. And, not surprisingly, they

displayed not many illusions as to the role Russia might play in the region. Moscow's imperial ambitions in the region never went beyond plans to establish control over the Turkish Straits -"gaits" leading into rather than from the Black Sea. The stability of the geostrategic position of Russia was perpetually undermined by its striking inability to tame the threats from the Mediterranean area (not that those threats seemed to be very acute since the times Turkey had left the great powers club). Neverending military-political tickling in the Mediterranean region produced constant anxieties and frustration. At the same time, Russia's concerns over "what is boiling in the Med pot?" appeared to be a rather thin disguise for its far reaching imperial policy.

The developments brought about by the World War II radically changed the Mediterranean strategic environment. At last Russia did not actually have to be present in the region to make its pressure felt. But that did not stop Russia from making a naval thrust into the Mediterranean only to feebly counteract a more effective US presence. In terms of the superpower and, more generally, East-West confrontation the region lost its strategic autonomy and became just a "flank" relatively low in importance in comparison with the Central and Northern flanks.

This assessment of the significance of the Southern flank was shared by the Soviets regardless of the fact that for the first time since the Crimean War Russia faced not just a direct

military challenge from the Mediterranean but was gravely imperilled by the deployment of US nuclear-carrying aircraft in the region. One of the earlier US nuclear-war plan "Pincher"(1946) required to make preparations for land and air offensive operations against the Soviet Union from the Mediterranean and Middle East beach-heads. The threat to the Soviet Union grew larger, when the United States armed its aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean with nuclear weapons and later sent there the Polaris submarines.

Since 1966 the Soviets began to deploy its fighting ships in the Mediterranean on a regular basis to prevent the use of the US sea-based nuclear forces. One can come across numerous Western commentaries amplifying the Mediterranean Squadron strengths to the point of ascribing to the latter an ability to wipe out the 6th Fleet (recall, for instance, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt's alarmist evaluations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli crisis). The reality very well understood by the Joint Chiefs and Soviet General Staff was quite different. The Mediterranean Squadron lacking sea-based air power and forward bases has always been a poor match for the 6th Fleet.

Anyway, by the late 1960's the Soviet Navy forward deployment in the Mediterranean was a too late response to the danger presented by the US nuclear forces. Sophistication of means of delivery of nuclear weapons reduced the Mediterranean War Theater to being simply an option in diversification of

possible strategic strikes against the Soviet Union.
Consequently, despite a continued build-up of the Black Sea Fleet
it started to lose a competition for more attention and resources
to the Northern Fleet.

Another factor that shaped Soviet approach to the
Mediterranean security challenges was a perception of
anti-Israeli and anti-US drive of the Arab countries as a major
strategic contribution to containing US expansionist impulses.
The goal was to ensure as hostile environment as possible for the
US regional forces and thus limit their flexibility. The
Mediterranean Squadron was assigned a new task of engaging in
naval diplomacy. In public eyes naval diplomacy became a salient
feature of its operations, but the Soviets were too cautious to
play high-stake poker games at sea.

To make up for the lack of combat efficiency and boldness in
naval diplomacy the Soviets turned to propaganda instruments of
their foreign policy. The resort to these instruments was to be
expected not only because of pragmatic reasoning. Paradoxically
enough, the Soviets' attitude toward achieving the status of the
first-rate military power was not that clear-cut. An attentive
observer of the Soviet affairs could always sense certain
uneasiness and apologetic overtones in the way Moscow treated its
tremendous military efforts. The Soviets' sometimes bizarre
overindulgence in putting together various peace proposals
packages to the point when nobody could even keep track of them

may be explained by a sincere and hopelessly naive desire to
constantly remind the world that they were a peaceful nation.
General Soviet tendency to avoid details and put emphasize on
abstract ideas inevitably led to the announcement of
"half-baked", poorly thought through and unbalanced peace
initiatives one can never know how to apply to practice. Very
rare they were to serve any other purpose than to show who was
really in a vanguard of a struggle for universal peace. Usually
peace initiatives were proclaimed by Soviet party and state
leaders at major propaganda shows or during their visits abroad.
Imitation of intensive peace-fighting activities eventually
assumed ritualistic importance.

The enduring Soviet campaign for naval arms control in the
Mediterranean was a typical exercise in futility so
characteristic for Moscow's foreign policy maneuvers in areas
where it played the role of an underdog. It started in 1963 as an
obvious reaction to the Polaris submarine deployments. The Soviet
proposal was to declare the Mediterranean a nuclear missile-free
zone. The campaign continued in 1971 with a more general idea to
declare the Mediterranean a zone of peace and cooperation, a
fuzzy notion never fully elaborated in any Soviet pronouncement.
The proposal was a part of a collection of foreign policy
platitudes ambitiously called the Peace Program which was adopted
with a lot of fanfare at the 24th Party Congress. The wrangling
with the United States within the SALT context over medium-ranged
nuclear weapons rebounded in a 1974 Soviet offer to Washington to

jointly withdraw all nuclear armed ships from the Mediterranean. The Final Document of the 1976 European Communist Parties meeting written largely in Moscow repeated the idea of the Mediterranean zone of peace. But this time it was more realistically indicated that elimination of foreign military bases and withdrawal of foreign armed forces and warships from the area could be achieved "in the process of overcoming division of Europe into military blocks". At the 1977 Belgrade meeting of the CSCE countries the Soviet Union put forward the idea of expanding the agreed area covered by CBMs to include the Mediterranean. The 1980 Soviet Disarmament Memorandum unveiled at the UN session added two new elements. It contained an appeal to reduce armed forces in the region and not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean non-nuclear states. Finally, the 1981 Party Congress formulated a goal of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Mediterranean.

Now all elements of the Soviet arms control program for the Mediterranean were in place. The program which forwent even a pretence of being balanced immediately revealed not too hidden intentions of its authors to gain advantages over the USA and other Western states in a fierce war of the two propaganda machines. The Soviet side did produce some of the intended effect to the annoyance of the West. But these awkward movements in the arms control area as such resulted only in spring blooming of US

idiosyncrasy toward any form of reduction of tensions at sea (for
the singular exclusion of the incidents at sea type of
regulation).

Initially, the program was perceived by Moscow not within a
framework of naval arms control but as a contribution to regional
security and nuclear disarmament. The focus changed by the early
1980's, when it became evident that the United States together
with its allies would like to stay away from naval arms control.
The subsequent reshuffling of the priorities underscored the
program's value for advancing the goals of arms control at sea.
At that time more pragmatic concerns started to dominate in the
Soviet approach toward the Mediterranean security problems. It
was recognized that measures more acceptable to the West had to
be pressed for. Naval CBMs appeared to be a perfect alternative
to the all-or-nothing package of proposals.

The Gorbachev revolution in foreign policy did not bring a
demise of Soviet naval arms control hopes. On the contrary,
Moscow's attempts to introduce naval arms control issues into an
agenda of East-West negotiations intensified. They were driven by
the fact that powerful Western navies were artificially excluded
from a balance contemplated under future arms reduction
agreements. The offensively oriented US Maritime Strategy was an
additional proof that naval factor had to be accounted for.

However, old habits do die hard. 1986 witnessed another
ill-advised exercise in a propaganda version of naval arms
control. Gorbachev offered to the United States to withdraw the
Squadron and 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean on a mutual basis.
Glastnost was still maturing then so no public criticism of that
move was evident in the Soviet press. But internal assessments of
Soviet experts pointed out with all due respect at
non-constructive aspects of the initiative. It was also
elaborated that withdrawal of US warships from the Mediterranean
would have provided Washington with ample opportunity to increase
its naval pressure in regions more vital to the Soviet national
interests.

Rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left Russia as
its most natural successor to wonder what to do with the
unfinished business in the national security domain and how to
adapt it to Russia's still very loosely defined foreign policy
needs. No conclusive decisions as to where to go from here with
naval arms control have been made yet. A number of considerations
may influence formulation of Russia's policy regarding methods of
enhancing security at sea, including in the Mediterranean.

On the one hand, incentives to explore what can be done to
redress the naval balance through negotiations appear to be more
stronger. The former Soviet Navy is shrinking at an impressive
pace. Its strength was cut by 224 surface combatants and 178
submarines from 1986 to 1991. The Navy leadership announced plans

to reduce the fleet's size by 20% to 25% within the next decade. The number of ships requiring overhaul came up to 250 by the beginning of 1991. The Navy fails to find funds and a shipyard to overhaul even the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Minsk" which now rusts in a Pacific port. The fabled aircraft carrier building program is practically discarded, and the decision was taken to scrap the unfinished "Ulianovsk" which was to become the first Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier. The appropriations for the Navy are constantly scaled down, and there are not enough of them to maintain forward presence or conduct exercises. On top of all, Russia may lose a sizable portion of the former Soviet Navy to the former Soviet republics that now declared independence. The most striking case is, of course, the Russian-Ukrainian rivalry over the Black Sea Fleet.

The former Soviet republics leaders met in late December, 1991 to create the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS). Among other decisions adopted at that meeting they defined the Strategic Forces of the CIS to include naval forces. This decision was hoped to put rest a dispute that arose earlier that December after the Ukraine had announced that it was taking command over troops of the three military districts of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Black Sea Fleet. In reality, the accord on the Strategic Forces of the CIS proved to be illusory and only pushed the Ukraine to accelerate the process of gaining control over the Fleet. On December 3, 1991 Kiev declared that the Black Sea Fleet personnel would have to take a pledge of allegiance to

the Ukraine. The next day Chief Commander of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal Evgeni Shaposhnikov reacted with his own order to swear in the Black Sea Fleet personnel. On January 9 President Eltsin reaffirmed in a mounting battle of words that "the Black Sea Fleet was, is and will be Russian".

The conflict just flared until April, when Ukrainian President Kravchuk issued a decree proclaiming establishment of the Ukrainian Navy on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet ships based in the Ukrainian ports. Since just a minor number of small combatants is based in non-Ukrainian ports, the decree essentially meant that the Black Sea Fleet would belong to the Ukraine. One of the decree's provision also stipulated that some warships would be transferred under temporary operational control of the CIS Armed Forces Command. President Eltsin immediately fired back with a decree that declared the Black Sea Fleet to be under Russian jurisdiction and placed under control of the CIS Armed Forces Command. Several days later both states agreed to suspend their decrees on the Fleet and start negotiations.

The first round of negotiations took place in the end of April and was inconclusive. The delegations exchanged lists of warships that in their opinion should be transferred to the Ukraine. In spite of existing serious disparities in their positions both sides sighed with relief that the negotiations had finally started.

One can not trace any naval roots in this conflict. The Ukraine does not aspire to step into the Soviet shoes in terms of maintaining a super-Navy. The first Commander of the Ukrainian Navy Rear Admiral Boris Kojinov defined his Navy's missions as maintaining favorable operational regime in the Black Sea and defending sea lines of communications. Rear Admiral Kojinov also stated that the aim was not to develop a "strategic Navy", apparently meaning a Navy with global responsibilities. Most observers doubt that the Ukraine has enough resources to support the Black Sea Fleet in its present strength and would either scrap a large number of warships or sell them abroad.

If Russia retains control over the Fleet, the latter's chances for survival will not fare better. Overtaken by nationalistic passion both sides are unable to acknowledge that they actually quarrel over who is going to preside at a funeral of the Red Flag Black Sea Fleet. No matter in whose hands it will be, the former Soviet Navy posture in the Mediterranean can be proclaimed dead.

No wonder that under the current circumstances Admiral Vladimir Chernavin went on the record to support an idea of starting a naval arms control dialogue. He propounded a slightly updated list of naval arms control measures putting CBMs at the head of it.

While the reasons for trying to engage the West in arms control at sea were quite clear in the 1980's, they are less evident now. For instance, could anyone in the Kremlin hope to achieve with arms control what is being done unilaterally by the United States? After a frantic naval build-up of the 1980's Washington is cutting its naval forces to the level of the late 1970's. Granted that the 1990's Navy will be more effective than its 1970's version, but Washington would not have ever dared to think of major reductions in the Navy strength if not for the radical changes that occurred in the former Soviet Union and East-West relations.

The profound nature of the changes, their magnitude pull the rug from under proponents of CBMs at sea, especially in the Mediterranean context. The whole notion of CBMs was designed to suit specific conditions similar to the ones of East-West military confrontation. It was hoped that adversaries through some degree of openness were to reduce mistrust and tensions in their relations, decrease a possibility of an accidental conflict as well as inhibit opportunities for surprise attack. CBMs were essentially to serve as a substitute to fundamental restructuring of security relationship between opposing sides. Now Russia and the United States call themselves friends and partners. Together with European countries they are gradually moving towards establishing a completely revamped security regime which will derive its strength from the fact that former mortal enemies share beliefs in democratic values and free market economy and

despite all differences are in one boat. It is obvious that a new alliance system which will include Russia and the West is bound to emerge. And within this system the requirement will be, say, not for notification of military exercises but for coordination of military activities on strategic and operational levels.

One may raise an objection to this line of reasoning. Whatever one expects to happen in the future Russia's and NATO's nuclear forces still target objectives on each other's territory. Though it can not be denied that Russia and the West have passed the Cold War phase and entered a transitional period, only God knows when and how it will end. If so, adoption of some classical CBMs would not hurt.

US warships on intelligence mission were involved in a number of unpleasant incidents in or near contested territorial waters of Russia in the first months of 1992. The Russian public was surprised to learn that tricks from the by-gone era were still practiced. Significantly, the general mood was not to attach to those incidents more than they deserved. However, one is inclined to assume that they provided a dose of fuel to the arguments heard on the Russian side that, after all, naval CBMs would not be out of place even today.

Russia has just started to create its own Armed Forces that will be controlled by a civilian Defence Minister. This post is now formally held by the President himself because intransigence

of the military prevents from naming any other civilian to
oversee the defense establishment. The Russian Foreign Affairs
Ministry is being reorganized and run by a younger generation of
diplomats. A foreign policy component of the Presidential
Administration is still virtually non-existent in organizational
terms. What this amounts to is that the Russian Government which
above all focused on domestic affairs is painstakingly putting
its national security apparatus into order. When this process
ends, the Government will be able to avoid embarrassing
situations such as the one developed after the President's
apparently impromptu offer to stop targeting the United States
by nuclear missiles. But before then temptation to turn, for
instance, to the old technique of naval CBMs advocacy may be
irresistible.

Nevertheless, there are grounds to believe that pragmatism
will prevail and more subtle diplomatic tactics will be used to
alleviate concerns over Western naval activity. These tactics
seem to be more appropriate and effective since current
reordering of national security priorities by Western countries
will tend to curb the elements of Western naval posture deemed to
be alarming provocative from the Russian point of view. Of
course, such Russian-Western interaction may fall under the
category of confidence-building, but only if to expand definition
of CBMs beyond any reasonable limits.

Stating that naval CBMs have outlived their usefulness, one may also add that from a Russian perspective the Mediterranean is a much less attractive area for their initiation than North Atlantic or Pacific where naval threats are more salient. As to the United States, reorientation of its military strategy towards meeting regional challenges makes the Mediterranean area, the southern part of which continues to be too volatile, not a very suitable choice for measures constraining naval activity or reducing the Navy's flexibility.

Logically enough, Russia's new military doctrine also stresses preparation for the most probable form of hostilities, that is, regional conflicts in the Southern hemisphere. The Soviet timid participation in the Persian Gulf War opened a period of East-West strategic partnership in dealing with the Third World instabilities. Besides, the Soviets' entrance into the anti-Iraqi coalition confirmed their psychological willingness to resurrect comrade-in-arms spirit of the World War II. If to build on that experience now, the Mediterranean appears to be a perfect testing ground for developing methods and mechanisms of military effort coordination.

The defense communities on both sides of the dismantled Berlin Wall tend to cling to the past and consider the notion of

coordination as impractical or far-fetched at best. To bridge the existing gap between the present day realities and war planning, they ought to try truly innovative approaches and at last do start preparing for future contingencies.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

IAI

POLITICS OF MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AND PROSPECTS FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

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Foreword

The aim of this paper is to consider whether political conditions in the Mediterranean region favor, hinder or oppose naval arms control in the region. To this end, the paper analyzes first region-wide cooperative and conflictual trends, and then specific political dynamics at work in the various subregions. In both perspectives -corresponding to Part One and Two of this paper- a general political overview is followed by an assessment of the deriving incentives and disincentives for naval arms control.

Unless otherwise specified, throughout this paper the term 'naval arms control' is considered in its broad meaning[1], encompassing measures as different as structural reductions and information exchange. The main reason for this choice, that may sometime confuse or irritate military experts, is that from a political point of view the existence or absence of an arms control process is as important as its actual content.

Moreover, since at the time of writing no proposals for naval arms control are concretely under discussion, a political analysis can only be construed in the general terms described at beginning of this foreword.

Nevertheless, the potential political implications of different categories of naval arms control in Mediterranean are analyzed in Part Three of this paper.

A summary of the conclusions reached in the various sections is presented in the conclusions.

1. Region-wide interests and tensions and naval arms control

1.1 East-West

The politico-military confrontation between NATO and the WPT has dominated for decades international security. The end of this confrontation materialized between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 has removed its worldwide effects. As a consequence, the strategic and military picture of the Mediterranean has also changed.

In the Mediterranean region however changes have been somehow less dramatic than in Central Europe, since a plurality of interests and conflicts other the East-West had emerged long before the end of the Cold War.

As it is argued in the following section, the strategic significance and the political realities of the Mediterranean have been strongly affected, but no fundamentally altered by the end of the East-West competition.

The disappearance of the USSR, has nevertheless completely changed the military correlation of forces in the region. In the

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[1] A working definition of naval arms control and its categories is offered by Fieldhouse, in Fieldhause, 1990, pp. 4-8.

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naval field, while the Soviet presence was never a real counterbalance to the West, its existence and correlation to ground and air forces has always been the focus of all Western reasoning on the prospects for naval arms control.

The evaporation of the East-West frame of reference, brought about by the dissolution first of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union, seem to make nil and void most of the speculations about supposed advantages and disadvantages for the US and NATO if they were to engage in some form of structural naval arms control.

However, there are reasons to argue in favor of some measures of naval arms control exactly because of the new East-West security environment. Indeed, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the harsh competition aroused between Russia and Ukraine for the control of the ex-Soviet fleet could evolve in the sense of a less secure maritime environment.

Politically, it would therefore make much sense to integrate Russia and the Black Sea states in the negotiation of a regime of naval CBMs, possibly in the CSCE or CSCM framework, covering the sea areas 'adjoining' to Europe.

While it could be difficult or premature for the West, given the present political uncertainties, to engage in new arms control initiatives with the successor states of the Soviet Union, such a multilateral approach would take stock of the new Mediterranean strategic picture, in which 'traditional' Southern and new Eastern instabilities present the West with increasingly common features.

This approach would permit the inclusion of the new Balkans states as well, thus recognizing the security continuum now emerged between the Northern and Southern parts of eastern Mediterranean.

1.2 Intra-West

As of mid 1992, uncertainty continues to characterize most of the new Western security agenda and institutions, and provides a strong, although generic, psychological disincentive for any new arms control initiative likely to constrain Western military assets, which -it is widely believed- are and will be increasingly needed to manage the transition. In the maritime field, this adds a new powerful rationale to the traditional Western hostility to naval arms control, global and regional alike[2].

In fact, the new strategic environment does not seem to decrease the global importance of some broad Western maritime interests: to maintain the freedom of navigation in the high seas in peace time and the ability to achieve and maintain sea control in a crisis or war situation.

Some argue that the new post Cold War and post-nuclear Western security environment does increase the strategic value

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[2] For the history and rationales of US and NATO opposition to naval arms control see Carnovale, 1992.

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of naval missions[3]. Indeed, it seems to reinforce the US drive for global defence planning and NATO as well as US restructuring towards mobile force projection, shifting away for political as well economic reasons from the traditional forward basing strategy.

As for the Europeans, while in the future they could be interested in developing a global role and reach, they are from now interested in maintaining NATO ability to perform and protect transatlantic seaborne reinforcement as well as national and multinational force projection capabilities in what are likely to remain the out-of-area regions.

Looking from a global Western strategic perspective, the rationale for naval arms control seem therefore weak or non existent. Does this analysis change substantially when the question is approached from a Mediterranean regional perspective? The answer requires some elaboration.

First of all, what is the Mediterranean strategic significance in the 1990s?

In the Eighties, with the attenuation of the traditional Soviet threat in Europe, the Mediterranean lost its role as Southern Flank of NATO and became the borderline between the Euro-American Alliance and the security risks, still perceived mainly in East-West terms, emanating from the "arc of crises" extending from Afghanistan across the Horn of Africa to Morocco.

In 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf war completed the process of transformation of the strategic significance of Mediterranean region, making clear that if the arc of crises has extended northward to include the Balkans and the territories of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East retains its centrality in Western security policies because of its command of oil.

Therefore, in the new Western security agenda the Mediterranean is today the 'rear' to two areas of global concern, the former-USSR and the Arab-Persian Gulf. A role was clearly performed during the Gulf war when the vast majority of coalition forces passed through the Mediterranean, which also provided the backbone of the Western intelligence gathering system[4].

While the global, although ancillary, strategic 'rear' role of the Mediterranean is not under discussion, it is far from clear which Western security institution will manage this role and how. In fact the Mediterranean is only an element of the wide ranging intra-West discussion about the instruments needed for security management in the new, enlarged arc of crises; this debate is in turn only a part of the global reassessment of the Western global security agenda and of the resulting new roles for global and regional security institutions: the UN, NATO, CSCE, EC and WEU.

[3] Eberle, 1990, pp. 327-329; Grove, 1990, p. 15 and 87.

[4] NATO Airborne Early-Warning aircraft began operating from Trapani (Sicily, Italy) and Preveza (Ionian Sea, Greece) (Howe, 1991, p. 250).

One of the difficulties of this Euro-American debate lies in the fact that these institutions, as well as the Mediterranean region itself, have a dual significance: global and regional. Various formulas have been suggested through catchwords like "interlocking institutions" or "concentrating circles", to conceptualize the need for institutional flexibility in the new Western security environment. However, from a political as well operational point of view, there are limits to the interchangeability of the different institutional frameworks managing security in the Mediterranean region; the main limit being the persisting differences in Euro-American and intra-European security concerns in the Mediterranean.

These differences are the result of a reality[5]: if the new arc of crises constitute a continuum in broad security terms because of some important common characters in the sources and modalities of Eastern as well Southern instability, nevertheless the 'arc' covers different realities that have autonomous roots and dynamics and, more importantly, affect to different degrees the interests of the various Western partners.

In the Mediterranean context, only the crises affecting the former USSR -and, to a lesser extent Central Europe- or the Middle East have a global impact on Western security, while those of the Balkans, the Maghreb or the Horn of Africa remain of purely regional or local concern.

With an oversimplification, it can be said that the US have no interest in being involved purely regional crisis in the Mediterranean (as shown, for instance, by the different reactions in the Yugoslav and Libyan cases); Balkan crises are of pan-European concern only insofar they affect Central Europe (and therefore Albania or Macedonia do not attract much European interest); finally, the Maghreb is of primary concern only for the Southern members of the EC.

It follows from all the above arguments that, in spite of sweeping international changes, the Mediterranean maintains some of its traditional strategic features: homogeneous from a global perspective, it is highly fragmented from a regional and subregional point of view.

The fragmentation and hierarchization of the political interests as well as institutional frameworks that coexist in the Mediterranean, would seem to militate against new regional arms control initiatives: there is no single negotiating framework nor clear counterpart to the West, and it is unclear whether measures that could be beneficial in some context would not hinder other global or local Western security interests.

There is however an important element that 'glues' together the entire Mediterranean area as well as its global and regional strategic significance. As hinted above, the new arc of crises constitutes a security continuum because the sources of instability are of a predominantly politico-economic nature: everywhere from Western Sahara to Azerbaijan nationalism, confessionalism, poor economic performances and weakness of the state are the fuel of local conflicts.

This requires Western security policies to be based mainly

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[5] This concept is developed in Aliboni, 1992.

on non military means: in a broader security perspective, Western economic as well political cooperation have much more bearing than power projections capabilities in preventing risks emanating form the new arc of crisis from becoming threats and conflicts.

However, in spite of all internal debates and limitations, the military instrument is in the Mediterranean the only crisis management instrument which is ready to use, posses a clear governing body (NATO or national) and can be used as a pan-Western instrument.

This is of relative importance vis-à-vis crises and instability emanating from the former Communist world, since pan-Western cooperative policies towards those regions have already been developed and are managed by various 'civilian' Western institutions that are integrating the former Communist countries: the G-Seven Group, CSCE, EC, NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Instead, no institution integrate Northern and Southern countries of in the Mediterranean and cooperative policies are left with the EC that has no authority or means in the security field.

As a consequence, NATO is by default the only pan-Western institution in charge of security in the Mediterranean and the military component is over represented in the Western security policies towards the Mediterranean arc of crises.

This state of affairs is already having negative effects towards the South, whose instability and anti-Western suspicions would be greatly alleviated if Western preparations for military management of crisis in the South were counterbalanced and integrated with the strengthening of all kind of Western cooperative policies, including military confidence building measures in the maritime field.

Apart from incentives deriving from the North-South context, there is yet another reason why regional naval arms control could serve Western security interests.

If the post-nuclear strategy revision increases the importance of naval roles, the reduction of US forces in Europe decrease the Alliance's ability to perform these roles in the Mediterranean. This new situation calls for the development of European naval capabilities, hopefully in cooperation with the US, that would serve NATO, European and national interests alike.

The strengthening of European naval capabilities is already in the making as a part of the global post-cold war restructuring of Western forces, in particular as a result of the increased attention to the Southern dimension of European security. However, the modernization and development programs of European navies are generally contrasted by the overall growing constrains over national defense budgets, a reality stressing the point that the modernization of European military forces can be done only on a pan-European scale to be cost effective[6].

At the operational level, Southern European navies, namely those of Italy, France and Spain, are already coordinating

[6] For an analysis of requirements and existing efforts see Grove, 1990, pp. 55-56.

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through a network of 'multi-bilateral' cooperation schemes that include joint exercises, joint procurement and exchanges of satellite information[7]. The political meaning of this developments is ambivalent: increased European readiness and cooperation at sea strengthen NATO capabilities in the Mediterranean, but could also be used for action outside the Alliance framework independently from the American ally.

Meanwhile the US are pursuing their traditional policy of trying to keep the growth of European military capabilities within NATO and after the Gulf work have supported the creation of a NATO standing naval force finally realized in April 1992. Confirming the potential for contradictions between the European and US attitude, France and Spain are not contributing to the new NATO force.

The solution to the present intra-West contradictions towards security and namely naval policy in the Mediterranean depends to a great extent from broader political developments in the Euro-American alliance. However, it can be argued that the rationality and transparency of the present development of Western naval policies in the Mediterranean would be enhanced by the establishment of some measures of common maritime security in the Mediterranean that would rationalize in a cooperative direction the maritime regional environment. Politically, the task of negotiating these measures with their Southern counterparts in the Mediterranean would help the Western allies to contain their own divergences.

Seen in this perspective, naval arms control in the Mediterranean would not contradict Western interest in maintaining and increasing naval capabilities, while contemporarily contribute to defuse looming North-South confrontations.

1.3. The North-South Divide

The existence of a North-South divide cutting across the Mediterranean region is confirmed by all economic and socio-cultural indicators. Because of the multiple economic, political, strategic and cultural problems it poses, the North-South divide is definitely the most serious and pervasive factor of fragmentation and instability of the entire Mediterranean region.

This section does not deal with specific North-South open or potential conflicts in the Mediterranean; it tries instead to describe the general background to Northern and Southern political attitudes to security in the Mediterranean and its potential consequences for naval arms control.

1.3.1 The South

When thinking of the South or Third World in the Mediterranean context, one has to keep in mind that it is almost entirely represented by Arab countries. In fact, Malta, Cyprus

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[7] For more details see Aliboni, 1992 (2) and the sources cited there; Greco, 1991.

and Turkey are more often than not considered part of Europe (most noticeably in the CSCE framework), making Israel the only non Arab country of the group.

Even enlarging the scope of the definition to include the adjoining seas (the Red Sea and the Gulf) the member countries remain mostly Arab, with the only exception of Iran and Ethiopia. It is therefore largely justified that, speaking of the South of the Mediterranean in general terms, one considers Arab attitudes as representative of the of the South in the Mediterranean.

In recent history, confrontation and cooperation have always coexisted in the attitudes of the countries of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean vis-à-vis the developed North of the world in general and the West and Western Europe in particular.

After decades dominated by nonalignment, 'positive neutralism', the search for a 'New International Economic Order', and all out opportunistic manipulation of bipolarism, the cooperative mode now seems to prevail in the Southern perspective.

In the Mediterranean context the weakening of 'Third Worldism' preceded the decline of Communism and coincided with an accentuation of the politico-economic crisis of the Southern Mediterranean countries, which reinforced the traditional drive for closer economic and political integration with Western Europe[8].

At the same time, suspicion and resentment against Western economic, political and cultural dominance remain an important streak in the political culture of the countries of the South. Condemnation of the evils of 'neo-colonialism' or 'Western corruption' can still be heard. On the part of governments, however, this is usually a leverage to obtain better terms of integration with the West, not to confront it.

Nevertheless, the anti-Western bias of (radical) Islamic opposition is a reality, though it should be kept in mind that the terrain of maneuver of Islamic oppositions is domestic politics: once in power their international outlook may change dramatically. In any case, the limits of the residual anti-Western attitudes of the Southern countries became evident during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.

Eager to attract political attention and economic aid, the South feels increasingly marginalized by the collapse of bipolarism and by the concentration of the political and economic energies of the industrialized world on the reconstruction of Europe. The only exception to this perception of marginalization is a negative one: the Islamic South feels that it is being shifted into the role of enemy number one of Western security as a substitute for the vanished Soviet threat.

In fact, most Arab intellectuals believe that Western concern with arms proliferation in the South is an all out distortion of reality: arsenals in the South have been developed

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[8] For a review of cooperative relations between the European Community and the Southern Mediterranenan countries see Guazzone, 1990, pp. 301-309.

because of South-South conflicts and are not targeted against the North, moreover -they argue- why should the overpowering military capabilities of the North not be perceived as threat to the South?

After all, threat is by definition a highly subjective concept: when the Libyan leader, Qaddafi, claimed in 1981 that the INFs installed at the base in Comiso, Italy, were a direct threat against Libya, he expressed a perception that was exactly opposite of the Italian one, which saw the "Euromissiles" in a purely East-West perspective.

The foregoing provides the necessary background against which the evolution of the Southern attitude towards security in the Mediterranean can be understood and the prospects for naval arms control can be understood.

Since the mid-sixties the nonaligned riparian states expressed the general desire to strengthen peaceful coexistence in the Mediterranean. However, the request to transform the Mediterranean into a "lake of peace", as the proposal for a Mediterranean Zone of Peace was poetically dubbed, meant different things to the different proponents: for some -for instance Algeria and, later on, Qaddafis's Libya- it was mainly an act of positive neutralism, backing the proposals for the Mediterranean put forward by the USSR ever since 1961[9]. Indeed, although there is no single legal definition of such zones, the creation of a Zone of Peace could have excluded US and British naval bases and naval military activities, as well as nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean[10].

For other countries, like Morocco, Tunisia and Malta, the proposal had a less legalistic meaning, and was an attempt to defuse tensions, defend against spill overs of the East-West confrontation and try to create a network of North-South cooperation in the region independent, or at least distinct, from the East-West axis.

In fact, in the same years that the proposal to make the Mediterranean a Zone of Peace was put forward at the UN[11], there was also was a suggestion of establishing a North-South political dialogue that would have some sort of security dimension. Among the Southern countries, those of the Maghreb

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[9] In 1961 the USSR put forward for the first time at the UN a proposal for the denuclearization of the Mediterranean (for a detailed account of the content and evolution of URSS proposals for naval desarmament in the Mediterranean see Carnovale, 1992 and Ronzitti, 1992, pp. 29-30).

[10] On the leagal meaning and precedents, see Ronzitti, 1992, pp. 13-14.

[11] Listed among Non-Aligned aims in the Mediterranean ever since the Algiers 1973 summit, the proposal for the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Mediterranean was first put out forward by the NA in the UN General Assembly Special Session on Desarmament (1973).

were the most active supporters of the dialogue[12], while the countries of the Near East saw the Mediterranean dimension only as a function of the Arab-Israeli conflict[13].

In the seventies and eighties proposals for a Mediterranean Zone of Peace continued to be pursued ritually by the nonaligned in the UN General Assembly, but attention shifted to the CSCE process since its inception. In the CSCE process the eight Southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria) acquired the status of 'Non participant Mediterranean Countries', which allows for more limited rights than does observer status, and were able to advocate the development of a Mediterranean dimension in the CSCE only through the good offices of the nonaligned participants[14].

A Mediterranean dimension was indeed developed in the CSCE, but only for the basket on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation; in spite of the insistence of the Mediterranean nonaligned countries (Malta, Yugoslavia and Cyprus) and of some non-participant Mediterranean countries (most noticeably Algeria), the security basket, although included in the Mediterranean chapter of the Helsinki Act, was not extended to the Mediterranean[15].

The very limited development of the Mediterranean dimension of CSCE was the result of the opposition of Western countries and of the Soviet Union alike (at least until 1984); in fact, both blocks feared that the development of the Mediterranean dimension could block or complicate East-West negotiations, and had specific reasons to leave their naval forces unrestrained.

The Southern countries have never ceased to argue the indivisibility of European and Mediterranean security and to ask for full participation in the CSCE process[16]. Nevertheless, even after the end of the East-West confrontation, the Mediterranean continues to lack a forum in which North-South security concerns can be approached cooperatively.

[12] For the Tunisian and Algerian proposals see Toumi, 1975.

[13] Emblematic in this sense is the answer of the Syrian president Asad to a journalist asking his opinion on the issue of the demilitarization of the Mediterranean: "That America leaves the Mediterranean does not interest us; what really interests us is that it leaves Palestine, then the Mediterranean.."(from the Syrian nespaper al-Ba'th, 16 august, 1972).

[14] On the difficult history of the CSCE Mediterranean dimension see Ghebali, 1989, chapter VI.

[15] See Ghebali, 1989, p. 371, 377, 380.

[16] Requests for a full status continue to present and are pursued by the Group of Mediterranean Non-Aligned countries (Malte, Chyprus, Yugoslavia plus the seven Arab riverains) established in 1984 (see Mediterranean Non-aligned Countries, 1990 and Ghebali, 1991, pp. 65-66).

While the proposals for a Mediterranean forum on security and cooperation were reiterated under various labels during the Eighties, they have been given some substance only in 1990, when the the Western Mediterranean Group was established and Italy and Spain proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean-CSCM[17].

As for the general prospects for regional arms control, it must be noted that the Southern Mediterranean countries have never been engaged in any regional arms control process. They are of course part of all main global arms control regimes, but they have not proved to share the 'culture' -if one may say so- of arms control that the countries of the two former blocs have developed over the years. The main specific reason seem to be the Arab strategic environment, where multiple threats encourage zero-sum thinking [18].

Until very recently the Arab countries maintained a highly ideological approach to arms control[19], as shown by the positions adopted at the 1989 Paris conference on CW, by the mostly political language of the repeated proposals to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and by the Arab League's reaction to Iraq posturing immediately before the 1991 Gulf war [20].

Positions are evolving quickly however, especially after the Second Gulf war. Indeed Israel objected more than the Arab countries to the Bush Middle East arms control initiative of May 1991 (that includes North Africa)[21].

As regards naval arms control in particular, no country of the South has ever put forward directly any specific proposal in

[17] The proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was launched by the Spanish-Italian Non Paper on CSCM on September 17, 1991 (for the text see Ministero degli affari Esteri, 1991). The Western Mediterranean Group was created on October 19, 1990 in Rome between Italy, France, Portugal, Spain and Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya; in Oct. 1991 Malta joined the group while Egypt and Greece applied for membership (for the founding platform see Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1990).

[18] This conclusion has been reached by various authors, see for example Wiberg, 1991, pp. 4-8; Feldman, 1991, p.19.

[19] Even the most moderate and informed Arab analysts followed this trend until recently (see for example Dessouki, 1989 and 1990, Ezz, 1989).

[20] For a review of Arab positions at the 1989 Paris conference see Arms Control Reporter (ACR) 1989, section 704.B, pp. 331-338; for extracts from Arab proposals for a Middle East NFZ up to 1990 see ACR, various years . For Arab defence of the Iraqi's (and Arab) right to arms proliferation see the final declaration of the Arab League Summit in Baghdad, May 1990.

[21] see "Bush's Mideast Plan Gets Muted Praise" International Herald Tribune, 31/5/1991.

this direction, although in 1984 they have collectively
subscribed to a declaration claiming that

> Naval deployment, particularly by States outside the
> region, that directly or indirectly threaten the
> interests of non-aligned Mediterranean members, should
> be excluded.[22]

However, interviews conducted by this author in 1991-92
with some officials of the Southern countries concerned suggest
they may be interested in considering measures of naval arms
control, especially CBMs, possibly in the framework of a global
forum on security in the region such as the CSCE, or a CSCM.

The reasons for this potential interest in naval arms
control are manyfold. Politically, it would be a small price to
pay for getting the closer integration with Western Europe that
they are now seeking more than ever to support their efforts for
political and economic development. Moreover, the opening of a
North-South forum entitled to deal with concrete aspects of
military security in the Mediterranean would be in keeping with
(and a vindication of) the traditional claims of the Southern
countries about the indivisibility of Mediterranean and European
security.

Militarly, the Southern navies would not be very concerned
by the kind of structural restrictions that were suggested for
the US-USSR and CFE II frameworks, simply because they do not
possess most of the systems envisaged there and in most cases
are not considering acquiring them; therefore, structural arms
control would not limit their present and future capabilities
also because none of the open or potential South-South conflicts
do not have a significant naval dimension.

Naval arms control could also ease a broader dilemma posed
to the Southern countries by the ambivalent significance of the
strong naval presence of NATO countries in the Mediterranean. In
fact, this presence has positive as well negative political and
military implications for the Southern countries and naval arms
control could help to keep the balance in the positive side.

In peace time, naval military cooperation existing
bilaterally between most Northern and Southern Mediterranean
navies and ranging from port calls to joint maneuvers
contributes, sometime significantly, to the development of the
operational capabilities of the South.

At times of crisis NATO navies, acting on a national basis,
have exercised gunboat diplomacy to protect Southern countries
vis-à-vis bellicose neighbors; in 1980, for instance, the French
sent their warships in the Tunisian Gulf of Gabes after the
Libyan-backed attack in Gafsa, while in 1984 a Western
multinational minesweeping force was sent to the Red Sea at the
request of Egypt.

Nevertheless, Western military supremacy in the
Mediterranean can also work to the detriment of Southern
countries. The clearest example in this sense is the US
exploitation of the unlegitimate Libyan claims over the Gulf of
Sydra to put pressure on Qaddafi's regime. Another example is

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[22] Mediterranean Non Aligned Countries, 1984.

the lack of any Western warning to Tunisia on the occasion of the Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985[23]. The presence in the Mediterranean of naval nuclear weapons and nuclear powered vessels is yet another source of concern for the Southern countries[24].

Therefore, naval arms control could be pursued by the Southern Mediterranean countries as a 'low cost' CSBM vis-à-vis their regional enemies, as well as an insurance against the most threatening activities of the overpowerful Northern navies.

Summing up, naval arms control in the Mediterranean, possibly in the form of enlarged CSCE negotiations on limited measures of maritime security, could be in line with present perceptions and policies of the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

1.3.2. The North

The denunciation of 'new threats' arising from the regions lying South of the European landmass surfaced after the 1978 Iranian revolution and, since the early eighties, has became a stable item on the Western security agenda.

Meanwhile the international security environment has drastically changed and the strategic significance of the Mediterranean region has changed accordingly (see section 1.2). However, repeated involvements of Western forces in regional conflicts arising in this area -from the 1982 multinational force in Lebanon to the 1991 Gulf war- have kept perceptions of 'a threat from the South' alive in spite of all the changes and made them gain increasing prominence in Western security discourse.

At a time when NATO is struggling to redefine its purpose, and its parlance is full of uncertainties between 'threats', 'risks' and 'challenges', there is a definite danger that the main new justification for Western and European security arrangements may became that of thwarting a military threat form the South. However tempting at a time of shrinking defence budgets, such a formulation of purpose risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In any case, there is a widespread perception of 'a threat from the South,' possibly not as lethal as one just vanished in the East but more difficult to face because of its diffuse and unpredictable nature.

This perception is supported by frequent references in the Western security discourse to three important factors that

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[23] On the morning of 1 October 1985, four Israeli F-16 brought a surprise attack against the PLO headquarters near Tunis leaving 73 dead.

[24] For instance, Egypt prohibits transit in the Suez Canal to warships carrying nuclear weapons; in the absence of verification mechanisms, this remains, however, only a declaration of intent (some believe that during the second Gulf war some US warships did carry nuclear weapons through the Canal).

characterize the political environment of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: political instability, fundamentalist Islam and arms proliferation. However, reference often is usually made by juxtapposition, i.e. without interrelating these factor, or pointing out their specific impact on regional relations, namely their eventual military implications. This leaves the notion of 'threat from the South' conceptually and politically shaky and risks delegitimizing military preparations made on this basis.

In fact, a closer analysis of the security environment South of Western Europe <u>does not</u> support the existence of a serious military threat from the South.

First of all, the 'South' does not constitute a unified entity from a political or military point of view, nor does it share a common, institutionalized ideological hostility against the West. In fact, the limited expressions of political and cultural solidarity among the peoples and the governments of the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean have come in recent years as a reaction to what were perceived as Western intrusions and double standards (from the war against Iraq to the Israel's virtual impunity in its suppression of Palestinian rights).

Secondly, the Southern countries are indeed plagued by socio-political and economic deficits that feed chronic instability and recurrent conflicts. However, the security effect of these problems -which can be eased and, possibly, solved by an appropriate mix of domestic and international policies- is not a North-South confrontation with a significant military component: their primary effect is instead the proliferation of South-South domestic and interstate tensions and conflicts.

Finally, arms proliferation is indeed a problem: first of all because it escalates the level of devastation of local conflicts, then because it erodes the Western overwhelming military supremacy, thus making Western interventions more costly and unpredictable, and only finally because it gives some Southern countries an enhanced capacity of military nuisance against vital Western interests including the defence of European territory.

The case for Western military preparations for contingencies in the South would be much better served by a clear analysis of the mainly non-military nature of the sources of insecurity in the Mediterranean-Middle East region, as well as by a clear formulation of the legitimate Western security interests in the region[25]. The most evident of these interests are: 1) the maintainance of conditions necessary for the free production and commercialization of strategic energy resources concentrated in the area; 2) the protection of conditions needed to maintain the present high level of integration of the Southern countries in the international economy. The protection of both interests requires, among other things, the protection of shipping and environment in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and the Gulf.

[25] A detailed analysis is developed in Aliboni, 1991.

These interests are shared by the US, the Europeans and the governments of the Southern countries and could provide the basis for a common, non provocative military doctrine in the Mediterranean. Of course, this approach would not eliminate the existence of sometime widely different interpretations of the means and actions best suited to serve these shared interests.

The difficulty of finding a common ground reconciling the different views of North and Southern Europeans, of the US and of Southern partners as different as Israel and Iran should not be minimized and has often be raised to object to concrete political initiatives like the Spanish-Italian proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean-CSCM.

But the dangers inherent in the present approach should not be overlooked either. What is happening at present is that in the absence of a common European security identity and a clear definition of the respective roles of the various institutions in charge of European security, the management of security in the Mediterranean - Middle East is left to the initiatives of national actors, whose interests only partially serve the common interests described above.

In particular, the reorientation of US and Europeans national defence policies to meet an ill defined 'threat from the South', together with the establishment of specific multilateral mechanisms, like NATO Stanavformed, and the maintenance of extraordinary measures of international pressure against Iraq and Libya, risk to be unduly provocative towards the Southern countries. In the absence of counterbalancing measures of confidence building, these developments in Western security policies, that have their logic in the broader new Western security and political environment, risk to provoke exactly what they aim to prevent: a diffuse perception of North-South confrontation with an increasingly military dimension.

Insofar as perceptions are fundamental in determining crisis behavior and arm race dynamics, it would in Western interests to rationalize its own discourse on 'the threat from the South' and initiate a dialogue on common security interests with the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

It is argued throughout this paper why common maritime security could provide the best place to start this dialogue.

1.4 Offshore political geography[26]

Offshore resources, environment management , and commercial shipping make control of the maritime extensions of national territory an attribute of national sovereignty as well as an important component of economic security. In recent years, the Mediterranean states have become increasingly aware of this offshore dimension because of the growing rentability of offshore resources (especially fishing and seabed minerals like

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[26] For this concept see Gerald Blake "Offshore Political Geogpraphy: The Partitioning of the Oceans", in Drysdale, 1985, from which many of the ideas and information of this section are taken.

oil and gas) and because of the aggravation of the pollution problem in the region.

Quite apart from economic and military interests, delimitation and control of a country's maritime dimension also relate to national security through 'public services' in the area of civilian security: the fight against smuggling, illegal immigration, pollution and dumping clearly fall in this category. Also in the Mediterranean, increasing awareness of national interest offshore has led to a higher attention to all questions related to maritime boundaries delimitation: internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, continental shelves, and Exclusive Economic Zones.

Competing economic interests, political animosities and strategic considerations highly complicate the process of partitioning of seas that has also intensified in the Mediterranean following to the conclusion of the United Nations Treaty on the Law of the Sea in 1982.

Some cases of interplay between economic, political and strategic interests in the process of delimitation of maritime boundaries are considered in another chapter of this study[27]. However, some general considerations can be introduced here.

While the implementation of the Law of the Sea could solve some of the pending maritime disputes and therefore prevent their exploitation in crisis situations, some of the resistances that the delimitations process encounters are actually due to considerations linked to military security at sea.

Mediterranean maritime powers have long feared that the extension of territorial seas into what are now international waters will increase the discretionality of control of costal states, especially over strategic waterways[28]. On the other hand, costal states tend to give restrictive interpretations of the Law of the Sea, also because they are not guaranteed otherwise against threatening military activity at sea.

Both types of concerns would be approached in their own merit in the framework of a process of regional naval arms control, which would specifically address local competing requirements between civilian and military security.

This is particularly important since extended offshore interests and expanded rights acquired as a result of the introduction of the Convention on the Law of the Sea will require increased naval activities by all riparian countries.

Clearly, increased responsibility in policing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) can represent an excessive burden for less developed countries with large zones. Their inability to implement their jurisdiction effectively can be perceived as a

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[27] see Ronzitti, 1992.

[28] Together with the objections to its provision for an International Seabed Authority, this is one of the reasons for US hostility towards the UN Law of the Sea Treaty. For instance, the refusal to recognize the 12-mile territorial sea rule allowed the US to carry on its 1973 airlift to Israel over the Gibraltar Straits without the consent of Spain and Morocco (see Drysdale, 1985, chapter 5, notes 1 and 17).

gap in national security and may prompt them to call for unilateral measures in critical areas, more restrictive than those envisaged in the Law of the Sea Convention.

In this sense, even a limited regime of naval CBMs would be beneficial and prevent claims such as a total ban of military maneuvers in EEZ; further measures, like the sharing of satellite information regulated by a regional or subregional cooperation agreement would be of great importance[29].

The need to preserve the legitimate 'public service' role of navies may indeed conflict with military security requirements since potentially offensive systems may be employed to this end. Naval units most likely to be employed for extended patrolling activity at sea include systems like missile armed fast attack craft, the quickest growing item in Third World navies.

However, besides the fact that nature of naval systems and tasks does not allow to distinguish meaningfully between offensive and defensive systems, it is encouraging to note that in Mediterranean most jurisdiction disputes at sea have been solved peacefully. When violent clashes did occur, as in the US - Libya dispute over the Gulf of Sydra, or in the Greek-Turkish case, there were usually broader political incentives for conflict.

Therefore, neither structural nor operational naval arms control should interfere with the exercise of legitimate control of coastal security. In any case, the naval systems that could be banned or restricted under any conceivable agreement should not be those used for the 'civilian' needs of coastal security (e.g. anti-smuggling control); in fact, most of these missions are performed in many countries by a separate paramilitary Coast Guard.

Also the forces most appropriate for the protection of economic interests lying beyond territorial seas (e.g. offshore oil-fields or fisheries) should not be unduly restricted by arms control measures; on the contrary, naval arms control should favor civilian security at sea[30].

Summing up, it can be argued that some measures of naval arms control, and particularly CBMs, could be beneficial in defusing the most destabilizing effects of 'offshore politics', in that they would more clearly define restricted areas or activities, contribute to the prevention of accidents at sea and help avoiding the exploitation of pending maritime disputes for broader political aims. More in general, naval arms control measures can complement and facilitate the ongoing process of definition of maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean in several ways, this in turn will have a positive effect on the

[29]This suggestion has been put forward by Gudmundur Eriksson, a legal advisor to the Iceland Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see United Nations, 1990, p. 127).

[30] An example could be the inclusion in naval CBMs of the type of cross-national rights of inspection for national costal guards in international waters existing bilaterally between some Mediterranean countries (e.g. Spanish-Italian agreement).

negotiation or implementation of naval arm control.

2. Sub-regional conflicts

2.1 The Arab-Israeli conflict and security in the South-Eastern Mediterranean.

In the spite of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 and of the recurring efforts to resolve it by diplomatic means, the Arab-Israeli conflict is still conditioning the security and political environment of the entire Middle East region.

Therefore, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a fundamental prerequisite -although not necessarily a precondition- for any real progress in regional arms control[31].

Nevertheless, the maritime military dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is significantly different from its other conventional and unconventional dimensions. This difference - briefly examined below- could play in favor of naval arms control initiatives in the Mediterranean.

However, for all its objective and symbolic importance, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only local factor that determines the maritime security environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. Like others Mediterranean countries, the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict have also to take into consideration threats arising from other potential conflicts, sometime originating from the adjoining maritime theaters (the Gulf and the Red Sea).

Israel's geopolitical features -its size, location and manpower inferiority- dictate that all Arab-Israeli wars are decided by the Arab ability to bring a decisive ground attack as well as by Israel's ability to deter, pre-empt or quickly repel it. In this strategic context, naval missions are seen as marginal.

Indeed, the main naval missions in the framework of past and potential Arab-Israeli wars are: 1) the blockade or harassment of vital sealines; 2) coastal attacks. While a total or partial naval blockade lasting more than two-three weeks would hurt Israel much more than any of its likely Arab opponents because of Israel's lack of economic and military arrears in the region, this could occur only in the context of a prolonged conflict that would be disastrous for Israel regardless of the blockade.

As for the strategic value of coastal attacks, while they can hardly be decisive, the present and foreseeable naval

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[31] This conclusion is reached by most global analysis of the prospect for arms control in the Middle East (see for example Kemp, 1991, Chapter 8 "Arms Control and Conflict Resolution"); interestingly enough, also Palestinian analyses seem to agree on the "prerequisite not precondition" approach (cf Khalidi, 1992, pp. 17-18.)

balance of forces between Israel and its likely Arab opponents is such that "a situation of mutual neutralization could come about"[32].

One of the results of the marginality of the maritime dimension in the context of Arab-Israeli conflict, is that navies are the 'Cinderella' of all concerned armed forces. In spite of the relative growth experienced since the 1973 war[33], the qualitative and quantitative force building efforts devoted to the Israeli, Syrian and Egyptian navies are much smaller than those attracted by their sister ground and air forces (a fact that may lead to corporative resistance against naval arms control).

What are the effects of this situation on the prospects for naval arms control?

As hinted before, it can be argued that the strategic marginality of the naval dimension can be an incentive to (all types of) arms control in this field; in the words of an Israeli analyst: "parties might be less concerned about making mistakes"[34].

One can add to this several other incentives favoring naval arms control in the Arab-Israeli context: 1) in the naval sphere structural arms control agreements (at least those concerning platforms) would be much easier to verify than corresponding accords for ground or air systems; 2) restraint on the supplier side would be much more decisive and easier to verify, since local production is almost non-existent (only Israel has to date a limited autonomous capacity); 3) finally, the success of negotiations in the naval field would be greater for all of the above reasons and could facilitate regional arms control negotiations in other fields as well.

On the other hand, it can be argued that exactly because of its marginal strategic importance, no political energies will be invested in naval arms control because it cannot deliver the limitation of the opponents more threatening capabilities. This specific disincentive is to be added to the many global political as well as military obstacles to arms control in the Arab-Israeli and wider Middle East context.

The same arguments and counter-arguments seem to apply, although on a lesser scale, to the prospect for negotiating

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[32] Levran, 1988, p. 163.

[33] Looking at the prospects for the 1990's, Michael Vlahos states that "the fleets of the region seem tired and impoverished...we are witnessing a kind of historical pause...we will see again a flurry of naval bidding...at century's turn"(Vlahos, 1991, p.122); for an analysis of the recent evolution of the Arab and Israeli navies see Levran, 1988; Bonsignore, 1988; on the Israeli and Egyptian navies see also Leshem, 1990 and Defense & Foreign Affairs , 1989, respectively.

[34] The quotation is from Feldman, 1992, p. 4; several of the points presented here are from the same source: I am indebted to Shai Feldman also for earlier exchanges of views on the subject.

naval CSBMs -like rules for operational restrain- and measures to enhance transparency or avoid miscalculations. Although some authors argue that the very concept of 'confidence building measure' is difficult to apply in the Arab-Israeli context, in that it requires that the negotiating parties share a basic interest in avoiding exaggerated perceptions[35], it is this author's opinion that this may be a somehow extreme view, especially in light of the interest expressed in the wake of the Gulf war by all concerned countries in some form of regional arms control.

Finally, several factors militate against pursuing structural naval arms control in a purely Arab-Israeli framework. First of all, the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict perceive other sources of threats within the Mediterranean, as in the case of the recurring tensions between Libya and Egypt, as well in the adjoining maritime areas of the Red Sea and the Gulf.

Secondly, regional countries need their naval strength to defend national -and sometime international, as in the case of Egypt sovereignty over Suez- security at sea against unconventional threats like terrorism or drug and arms smuggling.

Lastly, in spite of the likely disengagement of the former Soviet fleet from the Mediterranean region, the presence and mighty of the other regional and extra-regional naval powers is growing. Although there is no direct link at present between the naval structure of the local and other powers, their interests and activities are intertwined to say the least. Political and military considerations would therefore hinder agreements limiting local navies, while leaving other fleets' activities unconstrained.

Therefore, measures to increase maritime security at sea could be started in the Arab-Israeli framework, but in order to achieve significant results they would have to be linked to wider regional or international agreements. Conversely, Mediterranean-wide naval arms control initiative are likely to be resisted by the countries involved as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved.

Nevertheless, given the marginality of the naval dimension in the Arab-Israeli strategic context, in case naval arms control is discussed a wider regional framework, political objections would be more prominent than military considerations and therefore more likely to be overcomed provided that Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations are in progress.

Finally, the maritime dimension should be part of the security provisions that will accompany a political settlement; in this context it could be agreed upon a package of naval CMBs that would deal with the specific preoccupations about maritime security of the involved countries (for instance, guaranteeing Israeli rights of passage in Arab national waters and controlled straits, and preventing Israeli harassment of Arab maritime communications). This set of local and sub-regional NCBMs would

[35] Khalidi and Evron, 1990.

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complement whose stipulated through regional and international agreements.

2.2 The Greek-Turkish disputes and the changing security picture in North-Eastern Mediterranean

The dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea is perhaps the most serious maritime dispute of the entire Mediterranean region. The Aegean dispute is about the territorial waters, airspace and continental shelf jurisdiction of the over 3000 islands and islets assigned to Greece by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

With regard to both the continental shelf and the territorial waters, Turkey argues that the Aegean is a special case and claim a median line maritime boundary regardless of the islands. Indeed, the normal application of the Law of the Sea would give Greece control over most of the Aegean continental shelf and waters, and hence over the seabed resources (oil) and the approaches to the Turkish Straits[36].

Over the years, the Aegean dispute has become politically intertwined with the dispute over Cyprus[37], and both disputes have fuelled perceptions of mutual threats, exacerbating relations between these two NATO members and complicating NATO planning and operations in the .

What is noticeable is that the most recent (1988) attempt to solve the bilateral Aegean dispute, the so called Davos Process[38], has introduced a set of naval CBMs which seem to date to have well served their aims, to the point that some are considering their extension in the Balkan framework [39].

Bilateral Turkish-Greek naval CSBMs agreed by the Foreign ministers of the two countries in September 1988 mix some of the provisions embodied in the Prevention of the accidents at sea treaties, modalities restricting naval exercises mutuated from the CSCE experience and crisis management mechanisms modelled on

[36] For more details see Wilson, 1979.

[37] For a full analysis of the issue see Mc Donald, 1989.

[38] The Davos process was started in January 1988, after Greece and Turkey had nearly engaged in open conflict over the Aegen territorial waters in March 1987 (for details see Robert McDonald, 1989, pp. 63-64).

[39] A Turkish author, Ali Karaosmanoglu, argues that:
Although this measures are not comprehensive and are violated from time to time, they may regarded as a first step forward in the Balkan CSBM experience. Their improvement and gradual extention to the land froces and other states in the region deserve consideration (Karaosmanoglu, 1991, p. 8).

the US-USSR experience [40].

Quite apart from the Greek-Turkish disputes, the security parameters of the North-Eastern Mediterranean are being revolutioned by the changes underway in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and the relationship between Turkey and the Middle East region [41].

The potential effects of these epochal changes on the maritime dimension is difficult to assess, but it is already possible to stress that instability in the Balkans, and possibly in the Black Sea region, will only increase the economic and military importance of Central-Eastern Mediterranean SLOCs [42].

Some see these developments as reinforcing the traditional local arguments contrary to East-West naval arms control, that would:1) accentuate the isolation of Greece and Turkey at the extremity of NATO logistical line, 2) limit the capacity to carry out amphibious operations in the area; and 3) devoid the regional states of the flexible and low provocative naval tool for crisis management [43].

To the contrary, on the basis the new security picture, others envisage measures, such as the creation of a European "Mediterranean Coast Guard", that could in fact benefit from global and regional naval arms control[44].

2.3 Security in the Western Mediterranean

No major open conflict affects the Western Mediterranean which represents the closest point of contact between the Norther and Southern shores of the sea. Two main sets of relations determine the strategic environment in this subregion: North/South multilateral and bilateral relations between the EC, and the Arab Maghreb Union (UAM)[45] countries; 'horizontal' relations between these same countries and the non littoral Mediterranean countries (mainly the US and Great Britain).

North-South multilateral relations in the Western Mediterranean context are remarkably cooperative, as confirmed by the establishment in 1990 of a specific forum for subregional

[40] The Greek-Turkish Aegean CSBMs agreement is summarized in some detail in Karaosmanoglu, 1991, pp. 7-8.

[41] See Larrabee (1991) and Protonotarios (1991).

[42] For instance, in summer 1991 part of the traditional commercial road traffic was rerouted by sea because of the war in Yugoslavia.

[43] See Karaosmanoglu, 1991, pp. 9-10.

[44] Valinakis, 1991.

[45] The Arab Maghreb Union was established in February 1989 between Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya with the aim to further and implement economic, social and political integration.

cooperation, the Western Mediterranean Group-WMG (also known as the Five plus Five or Group of Ten).

The rationale for the Group is explicitly phrased in security terms by its founding declaration, which recognizes "the indivisibility of Mediterranean security" and individuate the ultimate source of regional instability in the North-South development gap.[46].

However, North-South relations in the Western Mediterranean are not exempt from tensions and problems. Tensions are due to mutual negative perceptions as well as to more immediate spill overs from bilateral disputes[47]. In the long term, more serious challenges to the survival of the WMG may derive from the difficulty encountered by the Southern European participants to convince their EC partners to back up with more adequate economic and political means the development of the Maghreb.

Therefore, while at present all partners to the WMG remain convinced and willing to cooperate, the actual implementation of their cooperation programs remain weak. As for the more specifically security related aspects of the political dialogue, discussed until now only unofficially in the cooperation framework, their development is linked to the overall political climate and, technically, to activation of the Political Committee of the Group established in the October 1991 Summit.

The intense bilateral North-South relations in Western Mediterranean are strongly influenced by colonial heritage and territorial proximity, but economic ties are strong also with the main non littoral Mediterranean powers: Germany and the US.

The US have developed a close security cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia, the two more Western oriented Maghreb countries. Thus Rabat and Washington signed in May 1982 an agreement for the use of Moroccan facilities by US forces[48] and

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[46] "Les ministres ...ont exprimé l'attachement de leurs pays aux principes de la globalité et de la indivisibilité de la sécurité en Méditerranée..[et] ont consideré que les grands écarts actuels dans le niveau de développement entre le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée, y compris la Méditerranée Occidentale, introduisaint des désequilibres generateurs de graves dangers pour la stabilité et le bien-être de toute la region" (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1990, p.1-2).

[47] For instance, a summit of the Western Mediterranean Group, due to take place at the beginning of 1992, had to be repeatedly postponed because of the renewed growth of tension between Libya and the US, Great Britain and France over the Lockerbie affair.

[48] According to the Middle East Military Balance (see Levran, 1990) facilities provided to the US include: use of Sidi Slimane, Ben Guerir (Marrakesh) and Casablanca airfields in emergencies; permission for space shuttle to land at Ben Guerir; use of communications center at Kenitra; storage and use of naval facilities at Mohammedia (south of Rabat). The use of these facilities was meant to support operations of the US Rapid Deployment Force (see Marquina, 1988, p.32).

Tunisia has traditionally received US assistance in time of crisis, at least until the Second Gulf war[49]. As for the European countries, bilateral military cooperation, often in the form of Defence and Cooperation agreements, exists between all of Spain, France, Italy and Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

However, even at the bilateral level relations are not exempt from tensions ranging from disputes over fishing rights to territorial claims. The dispute between Morocco and Spain over the two Spanish enclaves on Moroccan territory of Ceuta and Melilla, is possibly the most serious source of North-South bilateral tension within the WMG, the second being the recurring tensions between Italy and Libya.

Regardless of its legal and historical background and its bearing on bilateral relations, the territorial dispute between Spain and Morocco has one important political implication since it creates a direct link between NATO and Maghreb security concerns. Morocco has in fact frequently stated his intention to revamp its claims to soveraignity on the enclaves as soon as Spain recover Gibraltar from Great Britain, also in order to prevent Spanish territorial waters to command the entirety of the Eastern approaches to the Strait.

The tensions between Italy and Libya have been ritually flaring up whenever Colonel Qaddafi has reiterated his claims to war compensations from Italy. In fact, tensions are sustained by Italy's uneasy proximity to a country that in the last decades has been the promoter of endless attempts to export its antimperialistic struggle through terrorism and subversion, as well as by the fact that the US have repeatedly singled out Libya as one of its favorite scapegoats in its struggle against world terrorism and arms proliferation.

As for 'horizontal' relations, those of the Norther shore are well known and deserve mention only to say that Spain, Italy and France have intensified in recent years a web of 'multibilateral' military cooperation schemes that includes naval and aeronaval activities. Joint maneuvers and exchange of information are routinely performed to strengthen the European pillar in NATO but also to provide independent European or Western Mediterranean capabilities in case of need[50].

As regarding the UAM countries, their relations have traditionally been a mix of cooperation -due to their common Arab, Islamic and Third World culture- and conflict -due to profound differences in their international orientation and political systems, as well as to conflict of interests. Since the late Eighties differences were attenuated by deep changes in the domestic as well as international scene, and the cooperative trend reemerged vigorously bringing to the establishment of the UAM in 1989.

However, the Maghreb as a whole as well as the individual countries remain in the mid of a crucial transition: political and economic reforms have been started since the late 1980s, but

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[49] Driss, 1991, pp 147-48.

[50] For more details see Aliboni, 1992(2), pp. 8-9 and the sources quoted there.

their pace is to slow to alleviate the plights of a predominantly young and booming population to whom migration abroad and Islam appear as the only viable options.

Islamic fundamentalism is a real threat to the incumbent regimes and cooperation for internal security is an important chapter in the UAM Treaty. To the contrary, military policies and external security are not the object of any real cooperation between the UAM countries, in spite of the existence of a mutual defence provision in the Marrakesh Treaty; nevertheless, the Defence Council established in the UAM framework in 1990 could provide a frame of reference for future intra-Maghreb or North-South security cooperation.[51]

In the strategic context of Western Mediterranean, naval CBMs, possibly including measures of operational restraint, would have the general positive effects described for the South as a whole balancing negative mutual North-South security perceptions, and helping to rationalize the behavior and pattern of development of Southern navies.

Besides these reasons, the existence of a North-South forum -the WMG- provides here an additional incentive. Indeed, the negotiation, and eventually implementation of naval CMBs, could favor the development of a 'space of common security' within the framework of the WMG. This space could include military security through a center for the prevention of crises and/or the settlement of disputes, as well as cooperation against low-intensity threats like terrorism, drug and arms smuggling, and illegal immigration[52].

3. Alternative approaches to naval arms control in the Mediterranean: political implications

As underlined at the beginning of this paper, the concept of naval arms control adopted here encompass a multiplicity of potential measures or 'categories', as well different possible areas of implementation or 'frameworks'.

An overview of the potential field of naval arms control produces the following breakdown:

Alternative Categories

1) **Structural limitations** on naval forces by number, types or weaponry of units;

2) **Operational limitations** on naval forces by deployment or 'behavioral' measures;

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[51] See Sehimi, 1991, pp.7-16.

[52] Suggestions in this direction have repeatedly been put forward (see Bonnefous, 1991, p. 47; Sehimi, 1992, p. 20-21); bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of low-intensity threats exist already between most state of the Western Mediterranea (Morocco is also member of the EC Group for antiterrorist cooperation, the so called Trevi Group).

3) **Information Obligations** on force structures, doctrines, maneuvers; consultation in crisis contingency.

Alternative frameworks

1) **Global, Regional, Subregional or local;**

2) **Multilateral, Bilateral, Unilateral.**

In analyzing the political implications of these alternative potential approaches to naval arms control in the Mediterranean region, different categories will be considered before the different frameworks.

3.1 Alternative categories

3.1.1 Structural limitations

The potential for structural naval arms control has been analyzed to a considerable extent in recent years, although almost exclusively in an East-West perspective. The evaporation of the East-West frame of reference, brought about by the dissolution first of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union, seems to make nul and void most of the speculations about supposed advantages and disadvantages for the US and NATO if they were to engage in some form of structural naval arms control.

Although there are reasons to argue in favor of some measures of naval structural arms control even in the (and possibly, because of) the new East-West security environment[53], the global incentives in this direction seem, at present, weak or non existent. It remains to be seen what could be the incentives, if any, looking instead from a North-South perspective.

As argued in section 1.3.2, Western perceptions about the existence of new and growing security risks from the South do include preoccupations arising from the qualitative and quantitative growth of Third World countries armaments.
However, the expansion of Third World navies focusses coastal defence, territorial waters control and resource protection. In line with this essentially defensive missions, missile armed patrol boats have been the fastest growing item in the naval inventories of the Southern Mediterranean.

Especially when armed with anti-ship precision guided munitions, Fast Attack Crafts do enhance the sea denial capabilities of Third world states, thus increasing the cost of Western power projections (as shown by the 1987-88 Gulf experience); moreover, these systems may have a destabilizing

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[53] see Carnovale, 1992 and section 1.1

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effect since they put a premium on hasty action by ship commanders.

However, the reduction of these systems is hardly a conceivable item for structural arms control negotiations: politically it would be hard to convince Third World countries to constrain one of their few effective naval assets while the major naval powers retain a panoply of other more powerful systems, while technically it would pose verification as well as correlation problems (for instance, it would be difficult to restrain naval PGMs without tackling their airborne equivalents).

The case of attack submarines is somehow different, since constraining these systems could make sense for the West in economic, East-West as well as North-South terms (submarines are of little utility for out of area force projection)[54]. However, structural reductions in the form of agreed, asymmetrical ceilings would be hardly palatable to the few Southern countries that possess (often outdated) attack submarines for the same broad political reasons mentioned above.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that if a provision for ceilings on submarines were to be included in a broader package of non-structural naval arms control measures, it could become acceptable since the wider goal of increased maritime security and transparency could make it politically viable. This case would be enhanced by the economic benefits that a submarine 'freeze' could entail also for the Southern Mediterranean countries.

On the whole, however, in a North-South perspective structural limitations on naval forces could be more the unilateral consequence of an indirect approach, through operational measures and CMBs, than the result of direct negotiations. Reducing threat perceptions in the naval sphere and providing the Southern Mediterranean countries with a cooperative environment supporting their ability to answer peacefully to the growing demand for the civilian control of territorial waters, would probably contribute more to a 'healthy' development of their naval inventories than structural arms control.

3.1.2 Feasibility of operational measures

The list of potential operational measures of naval arms control include a number of items, following in the two broad categories of behavioral measures (such as avoidance of harassment activities) and deployment limitations (ranging from geographical to equipment limitations).

Assuming that the most significant behavioral measures will enshrined in a global extension of the US-USSR incidents at sea agreement, other agreements could only deal with the deployment type of measures.

From a political point of view what is relevant about

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[54] see Carnovale 1992; Lacy, 1990, pp. 8-10; Eberle, 1990, pp. 329-330.

deployment limitations is not so much the technical content of the different measures, as their broad implication of providing a constraint on the actual deployment and deportment of military forces. Although a distinction can be made between more or less constraining measures, it is easy to argue that "there is a real limit, however, to the extent that maritime forces can be constrained without fundamentally limiting their ability to do anything useful"[55].

To put it bluntly, since in the Mediterranean naval exercises outside territorial waters are presently performed mostly by NATO and namely US forces, any operational limitation would be a largely asymmetrical measure, hardly acceptable to the West now that the Mediterranean enjoys the increased strategic significance described in Section 1.2[56].

This reality has been recognized also by the Mediterranean Neutral and Non Aligned countries that have dropped the operational limitations proposals they had previously submitted[57] in the CSCE framework.

However, it has to be noticed that some operational limitations are included in only example of local naval CMBS existing in the Mediterranean: those agreed between Greece and Turkey in 1988 in the framework of the so called Davos process[58]. It may argued from this example that the only politically viable operational limitations in the Mediterranean framework would be those agreed bilaterally and implemented locally.

3.1.3 Confidence Building Measures

The first point to be considered here is that some global agreements aiming at reducing risks arising from naval activities already exist or are being pursued. The more relevant and far reaching agreements of this kind are the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1989

[55] Macintosh, 1990, p, 188.

[56] Arguments for and against operational limitations are analyzed in Carnovale, 1992.

[57] While Malta had submitted in 1984 a wide ranging proposal on naval CBMs including deployment limitations, the N-NNA document submitted in Vienna on July 1989 did not call for these measures anymore (see CSCE/WV.5, 12.7.89).

[58] The agreement provides that:
> The planning and conduct of national
> military exercises in the high seas and the
> international airspace should be carried out
> in such a way as to avoid the isolation of
> certain areas, the blocking of the exercise
> area for long periods the tourist peak
> season and the main national and religious
> holidays.
(As quoted by Karaosmanoglu, 1991, p. 8).

proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea submitted by Sweden at the UN Disarmament Commission. Also a number of other international agreements already in force have a bearing on security at sea: the 1972 Seabed Treaty, 1958 Antarctic Treaty, the International Laws on Sea Warfare, the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation [59].

The very existence of these international agreements is a great contribution to the prevention and settlements of disputes and conflicts at sea, greatly enhancing mutual confidence and security at the global as well as local level.

However UNCLOS, the most important of these agreements, has not entered into force yet, because of important remaining differences; even when it does come into force[60], some of the provisions of the Convention regulating military activities will remain contentious.

It is well known that the modalities of exercising the right of 'innocent passage' in territorial waters are controversial, as it is the right to conduct military maneuvers in the Contiguous and Exclusive Economic Zone of another country. Other concepts enshrined in UNCLOS are too vague to provide concrete rules for specific regions; for example, how should the principle of excluding naval military exercises from areas of "intensive shipping and fishing" (UNCLOS art. 87) be considered in the Mediterranean context? An extensive interpretation of such a principle could lead to banning military activities from most of Mediterranean waters.

It is sometime argued that there is no need for new regimes of naval CMBs, given the existence of relevant global international agreements and the overall transparency of naval military activities. To be politically acceptable, this position should require strengthening and clarifying the existing agreements so as to work as effective naval CBMs; as for transparency, this notion should take into account the limited access to national means of verification of smaller or less developed countries.

In fact, it would probably be diplomatically less cumbersome, technically more effective and politically more useful to complement the existing network of global agreements and the quantum of maritime security they provide with regional CMBs regimes tailored on local realities.

It must be notice however that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive: the harmonization of interpretations of global agreements such as the UNCLOS could proceed in parallel and be eased by the establishment of regional regimes.

If the above arguments are assumed, it follows that there global political incentives to the establishment of regional naval CBM regimes. As for the need arising form a regional perspective, it has been argued throughout this paper that there

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[59] For text and commentaries of the Rome Convention see Ronzitti, 1990.

[60] The Convention will come into force 12 months after 60 ratifications or accessions.

are indeed strong political incentives for the establishment of such a regime in the Mediterranean region.

It remains to be seen what should be the content of such a regime[61]. From a political point of view, all sorts of information and communications measures would be of great relevance to the North-South Mediterranean dimension, because they would constitute a first attempt to comprehensive military cooperation between the two sides that could have an impact on mutual security perceptions much more important of their intrinsic value for increased maritime security.

In this perspective, measures like mandatory exchange of defence information (force levels and location, structure of naval facilities, development programs, defence budgets), joint seminars on military doctrines and standing consultative commissions, would already constitute a great step forward.

Further steps like notification, crisis communication and maneuver observation measures, should of course be part of the CBMs regime, but could be implemented in an agreed phased manner. The inclusion of more constraining information measures, like inspection and verification (on-site or through sensing devices) measures should also be included, but possibly left as the last stage of the implementation calendar of the regime.

In any case, the latter more constraining measures, geared towards the prevention of surprise attack, would be necessary to Western information especially to verify compliance on the part of the more sophisticated naval units of the successor states of the Soviet Union. This would be important not so much to defuse traditional fears of East-West conflict, now superceded by political realities, but as yet another instrument of prevention of crisis among the former communist states or between them and their Southern neighbors.

The preceding examination of potential categories for naval arms control in the Mediterranean region, resulting from global or regional agreements, indicates that form a political point of view the most useful and feasible measures would be:
1) operational limitations deriving from:

- global agreements (e.g. exclusion or restriction of naval military exercises in the contiguous or exclusive economic zone, derived from a consensus interpretation of UNCLOS provisions; ban on dangerous deportment deriving from a multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents at sea);
- or from bilateral subregional agreements (e.g. the 1988 Greek-Turkish agreement).

2) A confidence building measures regime (information, notification, crisis communication, inspection) to be negotiated at the regional level.

3.2 Alternative Frameworks

[61] On alternative frameworks for negotiating and monitoring a NCBMs regime in the Mediterranean see the following section.

The conclusions reached in the preceding section show that global, regional and bilateral/local frameworks could all have their specific merit for the negotiation and monitoring of the measures of naval arms control (operational and CBMs) politically most useful in the Mediterranean context. These various frameworks differ one from another in geographical scope but are by no means mutually exclusive.

To the contrary, it can be argued that in the real world global, regional as well as multilateral and bilateral (naval) arms control regimes already coexist; therefore, the often raised dilemma about the competing merits of regional vs. global frameworks is to some extent an artificial issue, often kept alive as yet another argument against naval arms control.

In fact, it can be positively argued that the best system to increase maritime security through confidence building measures should be multilayered; James Macintosh has recently suggested a 'three-tier system' based on: 1) a global, not-too-demanding regime; 2) a more rigorous regional regime; 3) a local-specific sub-regional regime[62].

If this approach is correct, it remains to be seen what form the regional and sub-regional frameworks could take in the specific Mediterranean context. To this end, the first question arising is whether the same regional goals could not be reached through unilateral or bilateral (possibly multi-bilateral) initiatives or if a naval CBMs regime can be managed only through a (specific) multilateral framework.

As for unilateral initiatives, there is no doubt that they can be beneficial: unilateral structural or operational limitations or transparency initiatives, especially on the part of the major Mediterranean powers, could stimulate reciprocal (although possibly asymmetrical) concessions and enhance mutual confidence. However, if the political interest for such developments exists, it would much more effectively invested in launching a multilateral process.

As for bilateral CBMs agreements, it is true that, as in the case of the Incidents-at-Sea, they can eventually be transformed into a multilateral treaty without affording the diplomatic costs of multilateral negotiations. However, as repeatedly pointed out in this paper, the political value of a NCSBM regime in the Mediterranean lies exactly in providing of comprehensive forum, something that bilateral or multi-bilateral agreements would offer. Also, a bilateral approach would have no room for crisis prevention and disputes settling mechanisms[63].

However, a bilateral or subregional approach would be useful and sometime necessary to regulate maritime concerns in specific conflict situations. In addition to the already mentioned Turkish-Greek case, the Arab-Israeli context could be another case, whereas in parallel and/or following a diplomatic solution, and in connection to other regional arms control

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[62] Macintosh, 1990, p. 186.

[63] This aspect is fully developed in Ronzitti, 1992, pp. 44 and 46-47.

initiatives specific measures of maritime security could be negotiated to between Israel and the Arab coastal states. Once again, specific local NCBMs could complement region-wide agreements.

3.2.1 CSCE or CSCM?

Both the CSCE or the proposed CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) could provide an appropriate framework for the negotiation and monitoring of a Mediterranean naval CSBMs regime, which, as argued in the preceding sections, is the most promising form of regional naval arms control.

The CSCE is the only pan-European security institution and has developed a method as well as mechanisms for complex arms control negotiations. The CSCM envisages to tackle the specific requirements of Mediterranean security building on the CSCE success story and has, in principle, already rallied the support of most concerned countries (with the notable exception of the United States).

However, neither of the two frameworks is ready to act in this direction: the CSCE has repeatedly resisted the development of its Mediterranean security dimension (see section 1.3.1), while the CSCM is yet non existent.

This simple statement reveals the extent of the political obstacles to be surmounted if a multilateral naval CBMs regime is to be established in the Mediterranean. However, assuming that such a regime is indeed desirable to the end of increasing global and regional maritime security, the present situation can be altered.

The main political reason behind the underdevelopment of the CSCE Mediterranean dimension has historically been to separate East-West security concerns and negotiations from the specific dynamics of South-South (eg. Arab-Israeli) and North-South conflict and tensions.

It was also on this basis that the proponents of the CSCM, as recently as early 1990, deemed it necessary to propose a negotiating mechanisms that, while adopting the conceptual and methodological model of CSCE and including all of its members with a significant naval presence in the Mediterranean, would be kept nevertheless completely separate from the CSCE.

It may be argued that even today that the East-West confrontation has disappeared, giving full membership to the Southern Mediterraneans would highly complicate the functioning of CSCE and give a voice to unpredictable actors like Qaddafi's Libya in European security.

However, this argument loses some of its weight in the light of two simple considerations: first, why is it feasible to integrate in the CSCE the Muslim Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union and not Egypt or Morocco? Secondly, the CSCE has already developed mechanisms (namely in CDE and CFE) to shield arms control negotiations from the 'dilution' risks of the general rules of consensus and 'one country-one' vote systems: why would it be impossible to develop and appropriate mechanism to bring the negotiation of a naval CBM regime for the Mediterranean in the CSCE framework?

As for the merits of the CSCM proposal, it must be noticed that although its conceptual and political rationale remain valid, it remains politically weak because it is a European initiative taken at a time when the European political and security identity is both unresolved and contrasted by the US, insofar it can constitute an obstacle or an alternative to the Euro-American alliance in NATO.   In addition to that, it must be noted that the core concept of CSCM, a strategic deal between economic and security cooperation, has been captured in the multilateral track of the Arab-Israeli peace process thatinvolves Israel and the Arab countries together with the US, EC, Canada and Japan. Although geared towards a different US regional strategy, these multilateral negotiations reduce the appeal of the CSCM to some Southern countries.

Moreover, the European supporters of the CSCM differ among themselves about the scope and content of the proposal because of their different positions and interest within the Western system (i.e. French positions differ from the Italian ones)[64].

These political difficulties are reflected in the formulation of the security chapter of the CSCM proposal where it refers to the importance of "gradually increasing confidence, through increased transparency and information of each other's intentions", and states that "confidence building...is a prerequisite for disarmament" but concludes that "arms control in the CSCM is not for today"[65].

In any case, if they were to be the framework for Mediterranean naval arms control negotiations both the CSCM and the CSCE would pose a problem of membership, since the former exclude North European countries[66] and the latter all Southern Mediterranean countries; both membership exclude most riparian countries of the sea areas adjoining to the Mediterranean: the Nordic and Baltic seas to the North and the Red sea and the Gulf to the South.

The CSCE concept of 'adjoining sea area' to Europe seems to provide a useful guideline for the geographical scope of naval arms control negotiations including the Mediterranean. Indeed, while it has been argued throughout this paper that the negotiation of a Mediterranean naval CBMs regime, possibly including its southern adjoining sea areas, would make political sense from the point of view of North-South relations; disconnecting the Northen Euroepan regions from the process would not make much sense politically or militarly.

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[64] For more details see Aliboni, 1992.

[65] see Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1991.

[66] The CSCM tentative list of participants includes: the EC countries, the Mediterranean countries (Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Romania, USSR, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia), the Gulf countries (GCC members plus Iran, Iraq and Yemen), other CSCE countries (Canada and United States), UN-recognized entities (Palestine). (see Ministero del Esteri, 1991, p. 146).

Conclusions

The post Cold war strategic environment does not seem to decrease the global importance of some broad maritime interests: to maintain the freedom of navigation in the high seas in peace time and the ability to achieve and maintain sea control in a crisis or war situation.

In fact, it can be argued that the new 'post-nuclear' Western security environment does enhance the strategic value of naval missions and the role of navies as the most flexible military instrument of national power, while growing off-shore interests increase non-military naval missions.

Therefore, from a global Western strategic perspective the rationale for naval arms control seem at first weak or non existent. Does this analysis change substantially when the question is approached from a Mediterranean regional perspective?

Today the Mediterranean is the 'rear' to two areas of global concern, the former-USSR and the Arab-Persian Gulf. Towards the Middle East, the 'strategic rear' role was clearly performed during the Gulf war, when the vast majority of coalition forces passed through the Mediterranean.

This global role set a first set of political implications for regional naval arms control in the Mediterranean. Many in the West believe that regional naval arms control would obstacle the projection of naval forces from the Mediterranean to its Southern approaches, restricting the freedom of quickly redeploying naval forces.

However, it can be argued that, by providing increased North-South confidence and a set of common rules agreed upon by all Mediterranean navies, regional naval arms control can in fact facilitate power projection.

On the other hand, there are reasons to argue in favor of some measures of naval arms control exactly because of the new East-West security environment. Indeed, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the harsh competition aroused between Russia and Ukraine for the control of the ex-Soviet fleet could evolve in the sense of a less secure maritime environment.

Politically, it would therefore make much sense to integrate Russia and the Black Sea states in the negotiation of a regime of naval CBMs, possibly in the CSCE or CSCM framework, covering the sea areas 'adjoining' to Europe.

While the global role of the Mediterranean as Europe strategic rear towards the new arc of crisis is not controversial, it is far from clear which Western security institution will manage this role and how.

One of the difficulties of the Euro-American debate in this regard lies in the fact that Western security institutions, as well as the Mediterranean region itself, have a dual significance: global and regional. While the global interests of the Western partners towards the former Ussr and the Gulf coincide, they diverge, sometime significantly, in their regional implications.

In the Mediterranean context, only the crises affecting the

former USSR or the Middle East have a global impact on Western security, while those of the Balkans, the Maghreb or the Horn of Africa remain of purely regional or local concern.

The fragmentation and hierarchization of the political interests as well as institutional frameworks that coexist in the Mediterranean, would seem to militate against new regional arms control initiatives: there is no single negotiating framework nor clear counterpart to the West, and it is unclear whether measures that could be beneficial in some context would not hinder other global or local Western security interests.

Nevertheless, regional political realities do provide some incentives for naval arms control in the Mediterranean.

The first of these incentives derives from a purely Western perspective. In fact, if the post-nuclear strategy revision increases the importance of naval roles, the reduction of US forces in Europe decrease the Alliance's ability to perform these roles in the Mediterranean and calls for the development of European naval capabilities.

The strengthening of European naval capabilities is already in the making through national and multilateral programs, which may serve NATO, European and national interests alike. At the same time the US are pursuing their traditional policy of keeping the growth of European military capabilities within NATO; therefore, after the Gulf war they have supported the creation of a NATO standing naval force (finally realized on April 30, 1992).

These developments confirm the renewed interes for naval missions, but also stress that the potential intra-West contradictions, arising from different US and European appreciations of the global and regional strategic significance of the Mediterranean region, are already translating in the naval field.

As a consequence, there is a need to increase the rationality and transparency of the present development of Western naval policies in the Mediterranean. This could be helped by the establishment of some measures of common maritime security in the Mediterranean, which would rationalize in a cooperative direction the maritime regional environment. Moreover, the task of negotiating these measures with Southern and Eastern counterparts in the Mediterranean would help the Western allies to contain and solve their own potential divergences.

Another, possibly more powerful, political incentive for regional naval arms control derives from the North-South context. Eager to attract political attention and economic aid, the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean feel increasingly marginalized by the collapse of bipolarism and by the concentration of political and economic energies of the industrialized world on the reconstruction of Europe.

The only exception to this perception of marginalization is a negative one: the Islamic South feels shifted into the role of enemy number one to Western security and substitute for the vanished Soviet threat. At the same time, suspicion and resentment against Western economic, political and cultural dominance remain an important streak in the political culture common to Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists alike.

Although the Southern countries have never ceased to argue the indivisibility of European and Mediterranean security and to ask for full participation in the CSCE process, even after the end of the East-West confrontation, the Mediterranean continues to lack a forum in which North-South security concerns can be approached cooperatively.

Besides overall political considerations, there are concrete reasons to start this dialogue in the maritime field. For instance, increased responsibilities in policing territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones can represent an excessive burden for less developed countries with large zones. The inability to implement their jurisdiction effectively is perceived as a gap in national security and prompt these countries to call for unilateral measures in critical areas, more restrictive than those envisaged in the Law of the Sea Convention.

Even a limited regime of naval CBMs would be beneficial in this sense and prevent claims such as a total ban of military maneuvers in EEZ; further measures, like the sharing of satellite information regulated by a regional or subregional cooperation agreement would be of great importance

Until very recently the Arab countries maintained a highly ideological approach to arms control, positions are evolving quickly however, especially after the second Gulf war. Therefore, an enlarged CSCE negotiations on limited measures of maritime security, could provide a concrete way to open a North-South dialogue on military security, in line with present perceptions and policies of the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, insofar as perceptions are fundamental in determining crisis behavior and arm race dynamics, it would in Western interests to rationalize its own discourse on 'the threat from the South' and initiate a dialogue on common security interests with the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.

In fact, the reorientation of US and Europeans national defence policies to meet an ill defined 'threat from the South', together with the establishment of specific multilateral mechanisms, like NATO Stanavformed, and the maintenance of extraordinary measures of international pressure against Iraq and Libya, risk to be unduly provocative towards the Southern countries. In the absence of counterbalancing measures of confidence building, these developments in Western security policies, that have their logic in the broader new Western security and political environment, risk to provoke exactly what they aim to prevent: a diffuse perception of North-South confrontation with an increasingly military dimension.

The case for Western military preparations for contingencies in the South would be much better served by a clear analysis of the mainly non-military nature of the sources of insecurity in the Mediterranean-Middle East region as well as by a clear formulation of the legitimate Western security interests in the region. These interests are shared by the US, the Europeans and the governments of the Southern countries and could provide the basis for a common, non provocative naval military doctrine in the Mediterranean.

Given the asymmetries the characterizes the North-South context, structural limitations on naval forces could be more the unilateral consequence of an indirect approach, through operational measures and CMBs, than the result of direct negotiations. Reducing threat perceptions in the naval sphere and providing the Southern Mediterranean countries with a cooperative environment supporting their ability to answer peacefully to the growing demand for the civilian control of territorial waters, would probably contribute more to a 'healthy' development of their naval inventories than would structural arms control.

As for operational limitations, since in the Mediterranean naval exercises outside territorial waters are presently performed mostly by NATO and namely US forces, any operational limitation would be a largely asymmetrical measure, hardly acceptable to the West now that the Mediterranean enjoys a renewed strategic significance.

However, it has to be noted that some operational limitations are included in only example of local naval CMBS existing in the Mediterranean: those agreed between Greece and Turkey in 1988 in the framework of the so called Davos process. It may argued from this example that in the Mediterranean context, viable operational limitations would be those agreed bilaterally and implemented locally.

It is sometime argued that there is no need for new regimes of naval CMBs, given the existence of relevant global agreements and the overall transparency of naval military activities. To be politically acceptable, this position should require the strengthening and clarifying the existing agreements that would enable them to work as effective naval CBMs; as for transparency, this notion should take into account the limited access to national means of verification of smaller or less developed countries.

From a political point of view, all sorts of information and communications CBMs would be of great relevance to the North-South Mediterranean dimension, because they would constitute a first attempt to comprehensive military cooperation between the two sides. This cooperation could have an impact on mutual security perceptions much more important of its technical value for increased maritime security.

Further steps like notification, crisis communication and maneuver observation CBMs, should be part of the regime, but could be implemented in an agreed phased manner. The inclusion of more constraining information measures, like inspection and verification (on-site or through sensing devices) measures should also be included, but possibly left as the last stage of the implementation calendar of the regime.

In any case, the latter more constraining measures, geared towards the prevention of surprise attack, would be especially important to verify compliance on the part of the more sophisticated naval units of the successor states of the Soviet Union. This would be relevante not so much to defuse traditional fears of East-West conflict, now superceded by political realities, but as yet another instrument of prevention of crisis among the former communist states or between them and their Southern neighbors.

The conclusions reached in the preceding sections show that the categories of naval arms control politically most useful in the Mediterranean context would include:

1) operational limitations deriving from:

- global agreements (e.g. exclusion or restriction of naval military exercises in the contiguous or exclusive economic zone, derived from a consensus interpretation of UNCLOS provisions; ban on dangerous deportment deriving from a multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents at sea);
- bilateral/subregional agreements (e.g. the 1988 Greek-Turkish agreement).

2) A confidence building measures regime (information, notification, crisis communication, inspection) to be negotiated multilaterally at the regional level.

As for the most suitable negotiating frameworks, there is no doubt that unilateral initiatives can be beneficial: however, if the political interest for such initiatives exists, it would much more effectively invested in launching a multilateral process.

It is often argued that a multilateral process could be usefully substituted by a network of bilateral agreements. Indeed, it is true that bilateral agreements, as in the case of the Incidents-at-Sea, can eventually be transformed into a multilateral treaty without affording the diplomatic costs of multilateral negotiations. However, as repeatedly pointed out in this paper, the political value of a naval CSBM regime in the Mediterranean lies exactly in providing of comprehensive forum, something that bilateral or multi-bilateral agreements would not offer. Also, a bilateral approach would have no room for crisis prevention and disputes settling mechanisms.

However, a bilateral or subregional approach would be useful and sometime necessary to regulate maritime concerns in specific conflict situations. In addition to the already mentioned Turkish-Greek case, the Arab-Israeli context could be another case in point, whereas in parallel and/or following a diplomatic solution, and in connection to other regional arms control initiatives, specific measures of maritime security could be negotiated to between Israel and the Arab coastal states.

As a consequence, it can be positively argued that the best system to increase maritime security through confidence building measures should be multilayered and a 'three-tier system' can be envisaged.

It would be based on:

1) a global, not-too-demanding regime deriving from international multilateral agreements;
2) a more rigorous regional regime regulating information and communication CBMs;
3) a local-specific sub-regional regime, stipulating operational

limitations suitable to specific conflict situations.

Both the CSCE or the proposed CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) could provide an appropriate framework for the negotiation and monitoring of a Mediterranean naval CSBMs regime, which, as argued in the preceding sections, is the most promising form of regional naval arms control.
However, neither of the two frameworks is ready to act in this direction: the CSCE has repeatedly resisted the development of its Mediterranean security dimension, while the CSCM is yet non existent.
In any case, if they were to be the framework for Mediterranean naval arms control negotiations, both the CSCM and the CSCE would pose a problem of membership, since the former excludes North European countries and the latter all Southern Mediterranean countries; both membership excludes most riparian countries of the Southern sea areas adjoining to the Mediterranean: the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
The CSCE concept of 'adjoining sea area' to Europe seems to provide a useful guideline for the geographical scope of naval arms control negotiations including the Mediterranean. Indeed, while it has been argued throughout this paper that, politically, the negotiation of a Mediterranean naval CBMs regime, possibly including its southern adjoining sea areas, would make sense from the point of view of North-South relations; disconnecting the Northen European regions from this process would not make much sense politically or militarly.

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