


IMAGES OF EUROPE  
Eleni Nakou Foundation  
The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies  
Crete, 13-17/IV/1992

- a. "Programme"
- b. "List of participants"
- c. "Speakers and conveners"
- 1. "Crete, the first vision of Europe"/ Yannis A. Sakellarakis
- 2. "Being "European" in the Sixteenth century"/ John Hale
- 3. "Communities, nations and tribes in Europe"/ Ernest Gellner
- 4. "Formation and transmission of identities in intellectual and everyday life"/ Ilkka Heiskanen
- 5. "Les visages mythiques de l'Europe"/ Hélène Ahrweiler
- 6. "A spiritual future for Europe?"/ René Girard
- 7. "Voices of a Northern tribe"/ Gillian Clarke
- 8. "Voices from the Southern tribes"/ Alexander Shurbanov
- 9. "Identités nationales et identité européenne: l'antithèse franco-allemande"/ Robert Picht
- 10. "Changing perceptions of democracy and citizenship rights"/ Giovanna Zincone
- 11. "Language and cultural links between European societies: the role of the European Community"/ Bruno De Witte
- 12. "Communication and media in a changing Europe"/ Philip Crookes
- 13. "Convergence of social and cultural values in Europe's public opinion?"/ Karlheinz Reif
- 14. "Images of Europe"/ Soledad Garcia
- 15. "Babel and common languages in the Renaissance"/ John Hale
- 16. "Images of Europe"/ Erik Holm



## IMAGES OF EUROPE

### Programme

#### Monday 13 April

Arrival and registration

#### Tuesday 14 April

9.30                      Opening of Symposium

Dr Erik Holm: Introductory remarks

Session 1              THE MATERIAL LEGACY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE  
GENESIS OF EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS

10.00-12.30            Yannis Sakellarakis:  
Crete: First Vision of Europe

John Hale:  
Being "European" in the Sixteenth Century

13.00                    Lunch

16.30                    Visit to archaeological site

(Details to be confirmed)

Wednesday 15 April

Session 2      MEANINGFUL COMMUNITIES: NATIONS AND TRIBES

10.00-12.30      Ernest Gellner: Communities, Nations and Tribes  
in Europe

Ilkka Heinskanen: Formation and Transmission of  
Identities in Intellectual and Every day Life

13.00              Lunch

Session 3      SYMBOLS, VALUES AND INVENTED TRADITIONS

16.00-18.30      Hélène Ahrweiler: Les Visages Mythiques de  
L'Europe

René Girard: A Spiritual Future for Europe?

Session 4      VOICES FROM THE TRIBES

19.30-21.30      Gillian Clark: Voices from the Northern Tribes

Alexander Shurbanov: Voices from the Southern  
Tribes

Thursday 16 April

Session 5      EUROPEAN COMMON CULTURE AND ROADS TO MODERNITY

10.00-12.30      Robert Picht: Identités Nationales et Identité Européenne: l'antithèse franco-allemande

Giovanna Zincone: Citizenship in Europe: Models and Perceptions

13.00              Lunch

Session 6      TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

16.30-20.00      Bruno De Witte: Language and European Links between European Societies

Philip Crook: Communication and the Media in a Changing Europe

Karlheinz Reif: Convergence of Social and Cultural Values in Europe's Public Opinion?

Friday 17 April

Session 7	ROUND TABLE AND CONCLUSIONS
10.00-12.30	Gaetano La Pira: Messages to Europa  Loukas Tsoukalis and Helen Wallace: Lessons for European policy
13.00	Farewell Lunch

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BIBLIOTECA	

## IMAGES OF EUROPE

### List of Participants

Dr. Roberto Aliboni  
Director of Studies  
Istituto Affari Internazionali  
Rome (Italy)

Dr Hélène Ahrweiler  
Recteur d'Academie  
President de l'Universite de l'Europe  
Paris (France)

Dr Fernand Auberjonois  
Writer  
Centre Europeen de la Culture  
Geneva (Switzerland)/London (UK)

Dr Sergio Bertelli  
Professor of History  
University of Florence  
Florence (Italy)

Mrs Françoise Castal  
Director  
Graduate School of Business  
Paris (France)

Mrs Gillian Clark  
Poet and Writer  
Dyfed (Wales)

Mr Philip Crook  
Deputy Director  
European Institute for the Media  
Manchester and Düsseldorf

Dr Bruno De Witte  
Professor of European Community Law  
University of Rijksuniversitet Limburg  
Maastricht (Netherlands)

Dr Nikiforos Diamandouros  
Professor of Political Science  
University of Athens  
Athens (Greece)

Dr Soren Dietz  
Director  
Danish Institute in Athens  
Athens (Greece)

Dr Soledad Garcia  
Research Fellow  
European Programme  
The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
London (UK)

Dr Ernest Gellner  
Professor of Social Anthropology  
Central European University  
Praha (Czechoslovakia)

Dr René Girard  
Professor of French Language, Literature and Civilization  
Stanford University  
Stanford, California (USA)

Sir John Hale  
Professor Emeritus of History  
University College  
London (UK)

Dr Ilkka Heiskanen  
Professor of Political Science  
University of Helsinki  
Helsinki (Finland)

Dr Erik Holm  
Director  
Eleni Nakou Foundation  
London (UK)/Copenhagen (Denmark)

Mr Adam Hopkins  
Writer  
London (UK)

Mr Knud W Jensen  
Director  
Louisiana Museum  
Humlebaek (Denmark)

Mr Arve Johnsen  
Consultant  
Oslo (Norway)

Dr George Kolankiewicz  
Department of Sociology  
Essex University  
Colchester (UK)

Mrs Vera Kornicker  
Journalist  
Le Figaro  
Paris (France)

Dr Gaetano La Pira  
Adviser to the President  
Commission of the European Community  
Brussels (Belgium)

Dr Josep Llobera  
Senior Lecturer in Sociology and Anthropology  
Goldsmith College  
London (UK)

Mr Michael Maclay  
Associate Editor  
The European  
London (UK)

Mr Davide Masini  
Musicologist  
Milan (Italy)

Dr Richard Mayne  
Writer  
Council, The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
London (UK)

Dr Wolfgang Michalski  
Head of Advisory Unit of the Secretary General  
OECD  
Paris (France)

Mr Hans Møller  
Ambassador  
Paris (France)

Mr Douglas Morrison  
Editor  
European Guardian  
London (UK)

Professor Victor Perez Díaz  
Director  
Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones  
Madrid (Spain)

Dr João de Piña Cabral  
Professor of Anthropology  
ISCTE  
Lisbon (Portugal)

Dr Robert Picht  
Director of Deutsch-Französisches Institut  
Ludwigsburg (Germany)

Dr Vladimir Razuvaev  
Institute for European Studies  
Moscow (Russia)

Dr Karlheinz Reif  
Head of the Surveys, Research, Analysis Unit  
Commission of the European Community  
Brussels (Belgium)

Mr Michael Rice  
Writer and Consultant  
London (UK)

Dr Yannis A Sakellarakis  
Professor of Archaeology  
Second Director of the National Archaeological Museum in  
Athens  
Athens (Greece)

Mr Pedro Sorela  
Journalist  
El País  
Madrid (Spain)

Dr Xavier Rubert de Ventos MEP  
Professor of Philosophy  
University of Barcelona  
Barcelona (Spain)

Mr Fritz Videbech  
Director  
Jyke Bank  
Malaga

Dr Anastasia Strati  
Research Associate  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies  
Athens (Greece)

Dr Alexander Shurbanov  
Professor of English Literature  
University of Sofia  
Sofia (Bulgaria)

Dr Loukas Tsoukalis  
Director  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies  
Athens (Greece)

Mr Daniel Vernet  
Journalist  
Le Monde  
Paris (France)

Dr Helen Wallace  
Director, European Programme  
The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
London (UK)

Dr William Wallace  
St Antony's College  
Oxford (UK)

Mr Hans Erik Wallin  
Curator  
Louisiana Museum  
Humlebaek (Denmark)

Dr Anita Wolf  
Research Fellow  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft  
Mainz (Germany)

Dr Giovanna Zincone  
Professor of Politics  
University of Turin  
Turin (Italy)

Secretariat

Ms Zoe Harris  
European Programme  
RIIA (London)

Ms Beatrice Vlassopoulou  
Ms Kleio Zacharliadis  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies (Athens)

Interpreters

Mme Claudine Caliste (Paris)  
Mme Melanie Roe (Lausanne)  
Mr William Worsdale (Strasbourg)

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° inv. M648

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BIBLIOTECA

Mme Helene Ahrweiler  
28 rue Guynemer  
Paris  
75006 France  
Tel:010 331 42 22 98 47  
Fax:010 331 45 44 46 49

M Roberto Aliboni  
Director of Studies  
Istituto Affari  
Internazionali  
Via Angelo Brunetti 9  
Palazzo Rondinini  
Roma  
00186 Italy  
Tel:06 3224360  
Fax:06 3224363

Mr Fernand Auberjonois  
41a Elsworthy Road  
London  
NW3 3BT England  
Tel:071 722 6834  
Fax:

Prof Sergio Bertelli  
Universita degli Studi  
Dipartimento di Storia  
Via S Gallo 10  
Firenze  
50129 Italy  
Tel:010 39 55 2757 902/3/4  
Fax:010 39 55 219 173

Mlle Claudine Caliste  
163 rue de Rennes  
Paris  
75006 France  
Tel:  
Fax:

Dr Francoise Castel  
Rouen Graduate School  
of Management  
Boulevard Andre Siegfried  
BP 188  
Mont-Sain-Aignan Cedex  
76136 France  
Tel:010 33 32 82 74 12  
Fax:010 33 35 76 06 62

Mrs Gillian Clark  
Pen Cwrt  
Llŷdgarreg  
Llandysul Dyfed  
SA44 4EU Wales  
Tel:054 555 311  
Fax:

Mr Philip Crookes  
Deputy Director  
European Institute a  
for the Media  
University of Manchester  
Manchester  
M13 3PL England  
Tel:061 273 2754  
Fax:

Dr N Diamandouros  
University of Athens  
7 Grigoriou E' Str  
22 Maroussi  
Athens  
GR-151 Greece  
Tel:805 4732  
Fax:721 8819

Dr Soledad Garcia  
RIIA  
Tel:071-957 5700  
Fax:071-957 5710

Prof Ernest Gellner  
Central European University  
Taboritska 23  
PO Box 114  
Praha 3  
13087 Czechoslovakia  
Tel:0223 334 599 (Cambridge)  
Fax:0223 334 748 (Cam)

Prof Rene Girard  
Stanford University  
Department of French/Italian  
Wilbur Mods C34  
Stanford University  
Stanford Ca  
94305 USA  
Tel:415 723 1356  
Fax:

Prof John Hale  
26 Montpelier Row  
Twickenham Middlesex  
TW1 2NQ England  
Tel:081 891 6778  
Fax:081 892 9636

Prof Ilkka Heinskanen  
University of Helsinki  
Department of Political Scie  
Helsinki  
00100 Finland  
Tel:3580 191 2527  
Fax:3580 191 2068

Mr Erik Holm  
Lylografensvej 4  
Risvilde  
DK-3220 Denmark  
Tel:45 4230 9715/45 3142 0362  
Fax:

Mr Adam Hopkins  
4 Chaldon Way  
Coulston  
SURREY  
CR5 1DB England\  
Tel:0737 556728  
Fax:

Mr Knud Jensen  
Louisiana Museum  
of Modern Art  
Humleback  
DK-3050 Denmark  
Tel:010 45 42 19 0719  
Fax:010 45 42 19 35 05

Mr Arve Johnsen  
Drammensveien 78  
Oslo 2  
0271 Norway  
Tel:010 47 255 7006  
Fax:010 47 255 7004

Dr George Kolanciewicz  
University of Essex  
Department of Sociology  
Wivenhoe Park  
Colchester Essex  
CO4 3SQ England  
Tel:0206 873333  
Fax:

Mme Vera Kornicker  
Le Figaro  
Cultural Services  
37 rue du Louvre  
Paris  
75002 France  
Tel:010 331 42 21 68 15  
Fax:010 331 42 21 64 05

Mr G La Pira  
Commission of the EC  
200 rue de la Loi  
Brussels  
B-1049 Belgium  
Tel:010 322 235 0940  
Fax:010 322 235 2305

Dr Josep R Llobera  
149 Thanet House  
Thanet Street  
London  
WC1H 9QD England  
Tel:081 692 7171  
Fax:081 691 4765

Mr Michael Maclay  
Associate Editor  
The European  
Orbit House  
5 New Fetter Lane  
London  
EC4A 1AR England  
Tel:071 822 2300  
Fax:071 377 4773

Dr Richard Mayne  
Albany Cottage  
24 Park Village East  
Regents Park  
LONDON  
NW1 7PZ England  
Tel:071 434 3063  
Fax:

Wolfgang Michalski  
Head  
OECD  
Advisory Unit to Sec. Gen.  
2 rue Andre-Pascal  
75775  
PARIS Cedex 16  
France  
Tel:010 33 1 45 24 80 46  
Fax:010 33 1 45 24 85 00

Mr Hans Moller  
7 rue du Forez  
Les Ulis  
91940 France  
Tel:  
Fax:

Mr Douglas Morrison  
Deputy Editor  
The Guardian  
Guardian Europe  
119 Farringdon Road  
London  
EC1R 3ER England  
Tel:071 278 2332  
Fax:071 239 9933

Mr David Mosconi  
Via Dell'Orso 16  
Milan  
Italy  
Tel:2 8646 1323  
Fax:

Prof Victor Perez Diaz  
Complutense University Madrid  
Comandante Fortea 3  
Madrid  
28008 Spain  
Tel:010 341 435 4240  
Fax:010 341 576 3420

Prof D Robert Picht  
Deutsches-Franzosisches  
Institut  
Asperger Strasse 34/38  
Ludwigsburg  
D-7140 Germany  
Tel:010 49 7141 90 2433  
Fax:010-49 7141 92 4118

Dr Vladimir Razuvaev  
Institute of European Studies  
18-3 Prospect Marksa  
Moscow  
103873 Russia  
Tel:7 95 203 4187  
Fax:7 95 200 4298

Mr Karlheinz Reif  
Eurobarometer  
Commission of the EC  
200 rue de la Loi  
Brussels  
1049 Belgium  
Tel:322 299 9441/9439  
Fax:322 299 9205

Mr Michael Rice  
Odsey House, Baldock Road  
Odsey  
Baldock Herts  
SG76 England  
Tel:046274 2706  
Fax:046274 2395

Mlle Malanie Roe  
Rue Caroline 10  
Lausanne  
CH-1003 Switzerland  
Tel:  
Fax:

Prof Yannis Sakellarakis  
Rodon 1  
Ekali Drosia  
Athens  
14656 Greece  
Tel:010 301 823 8174  
Fax:

Prof Alexander Shurbanov  
Head  
English Department  
University of Sofia  
Boulevard Rouski 15  
Sofia  
1000 Bulgaria  
Tel:010 35 928 581  
Fax:010 35 924 935 89

Mr Pedro Sorela  
El Pais  
Miguel Yuste 40  
Madrid  
28037 Spain  
Tel:91 337 8200  
Fax:

Dr A Strati  
EKEM  
1 G Prassa & Didotou Street  
Athens  
10680 Greece  
Tel:301 363 6880  
Fax:301 363 1133

Dr Loukas Tsoukalis  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies  
EKEM  
1 G Prassa & Didotou Street  
106 80 ATHENS  
Greece  
Tel:010 301 363 6880/6963/3272  
Fax:010 301 3631133

M Daniel Vernet  
Le Monde  
15 rue Falguire  
Paris  
75015 France  
Tel:010 331 40 65 25 20  
Fax:010 331 40 65 25 99

Dr Helen Wallace  
RIIA  
10 St James's Square  
LONDON SW1Y 4LE  
England  
t)  
Tel:  
Fax:

Dr William Wallace  
St Antony's College  
Oxford  
England  
Tel:0865 274467 (59651 at s  
Fax:0865 310518

Mr Hans Erik Wallin  
Louisiana Museum  
of Modern Art  
Humleback  
t  
DK-3050 Denmark  
Tel:45 42 19 07 19  
Fax:

Dr Anita Wolf  
Johannes Guttenberg -  
Universitat Mainz  
Institut fur Politikwissens  
Saar Strasse 21  
Mainz  
D-6500 Germany  
Tel:010 49 61 31 39 21 50  
Fax:010 49 61 31 39 2992

Mr William Worsdale  
Council of Europe  
Division de l'Interpretation  
PO Box 431 R6  
Strasbourg  
F-67006 France  
Tel:010 33 88 41 25 34  
Fax:010 33 88 41 27 81/2

Dr Giovanna Zincone  
Via Academia Albertina 10  
Turin  
10123 Italy  
Tel:010 39 3125275/3125137  
Fax:010 39 11 6502777

Prof Joao de Pina-Cabral  
Editor  
ISCTE  
Avenida das Forcas Armadas  
Lisboa  
1600 Portugal  
Tel:793 2272  
Fax:351 1764 953

Mr Bruno de Witte  
Rijks Universiteit  
Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerd  
Postbus 616  
Maastricht  
NL-6200 Nederland  
Tel:010 314 388 7777  
Fax:010 314 325 7818

## IMAGES OF EUROPE

### Speakers and Conveners

**Hélène Ahrweiler.** Born in 1926 in Athens (Greece). Doctor in History. Doctor "honoris causa" in the universities of London, Belgrade, New York, Lima and School of Social and Political Science in Athens. Professor of History in the Sorbonne, Paris since 1967. President of the University of Paris (1982-1989) and of the Centre George Pompidou (from 1989). President of the University of Europe (Paris). Among the several decoration she has received is the "Officier de la Legion d'honneur". Among her books are, Byzance et la Mer (1966), Etudes sur les structures administratives et sociales de Byzance (1971), L'Ideologie politique de l'empire Byzantin (1971), Les pays et les peritoires (1976).

**Gillian Clark.** Born in 1937 in Cardiff (Wales). Poet, free-lance writer. Honorary Fellow of University College, Cardiff. She is Chairman of Ty Newydd, the writers centre which she helped to establish in Llanystumdwy in Gwynedd, and of the English Language section of Yr Academi Gymreig/The Welsh Academy. Editor of the Anglo-Welsh Review from 1974-1984. Creative Writing Fellow at St. David's University College (1984-1985). In 1990 wrote and presented a television film on the poetic imagination call Imagine This for BBC2 Wales. Her collections of poems include The Sundial, Letter From a Far Country, Selected Poems, and Letting in the Rumour.

**Bruno De Witte.** Born in 1955 in Kortrijk (Belgium). Law graduate of the University of Leuven (1978); Diploma of European Studies of the College of Europe, Bruges (1979); PhD. of the European University Institute in Florence (1985). Assistant professor of Law at the European University Institute (1985-1988); Associate professor at the E.U.I. (1988-1989); presently Professor of European Community Law ("Jean Monnet Chair") at the Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, Maastricht. Among his publications are, "Building Europe's Image and Identity" in VV.AA. Europe from a Cultural Perspective (1987), European Community Law of Education (1989), "Cultural Linkages" in W.Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration, (1990).

**Soledad Garcia.** Born in 1953 in Palencia (Spain). Ph.D. in Sociology and Anthropology at Hull University (1984) and University of Barcelona (1984). Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Barcelona since 1985. Has taught at the University of Hull, and given seminars at the City University of New York, Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik. Spanish Visiting Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford (1990-1991). Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1991-1992). Among her publications are, "Collective Consumption and Urban protest in Barcelona During the Franco Regime" in J. Llobera (ed), Family, Class and Nation in Catalonia (1990). Urban Economic Policies and Local Autonomy" in Sociologie du Travail, 1991.

**Ernest Gellner.** Born in 1925 in Prague (Czechoslovakia) PhD. London and Professor of Social Anthropology and Prof. Fellow at King's College. Cambridge (1984-1992). Hon. For. Member of the American Academy of Arts and Scientist (1988). Hon. DLit QUB (1989). He has been a Visiting Fellow at the universities of Harvard, Berkeley, Aix-en-Provence among others. He has delivered several distinguished Memorial Lectures. He is also member of the editorial boards of a considerable number of the most prestigious publications in Sociology and Anthropology. Among his books are, Patrons and Clients (1977), Nations and Nationalism (1983), Culture, identity and Politics (1987) and State and Society in Soviet Thought (1988).

**René Girard.** Born in 1923 in Avignon (Vaucluse). PhD. Indiana University (US). Doctor "honoris causa" in the universities of Amsterdam and Innsbruck. Professor of French Language, Literature and Civilization at the University of Stanford. He has also taught at the universities of Indiana, John Hopkins, State University of New York. He is member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is also "Chevalier de l'ordre national de la Légion d'honneur". Among his books are, La Violence et le Sacre (1972), Le Bouc émissaire (1982), La Route antique des hommes pervers (1985), Shakespeare, les feux de l'envie (1990)

**John Hale.** Born in 1923. B. Litt. (Oxford). Professor of History at the University of Warwick and Prof. of Italian History at University College, London of which he is Professor Emeritus. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and the Society of Antiquaries. He has taught at Cornell, Berkeley and Los Angeles. He is a Trustee of the British Museum and member of the Museums and Galleries Commission. He was knighted in 1984 and is a Commendatore of the Ordine al Merito della Repubblica Italiana. Among his books are, Renaissance Europe (1971), War and Society in Renaissance Europe (1984), Artist and Warfare in the Renaissance (1990). His Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance will be published in 1993.

**Ilkka Heiskanen.** Born in 1935. Ph.D. at the University of Helsinki. Professor of Political Science since 1974 (Helsinki). Also doing consulting for international organizations such as UNESCO, OECD, Council of Europe. He has done research and published works on culture industries, communication policies, problems of nationalism, regional cultures and collective identities. Among his more recent publications are, Exploring the Basis of Politics (1983), "On the Local Media, Regionalism and International Economic Integration" in Nordicom Review, 2, (1988) and International and European Orientation of Finish Intellectuals (1992) forthcoming.

**Erik Holm.** Born in 1933 in Hobro (Denmark). Economist. Ph.D. in Political Science (University of Copenhagen). Ministry of Economic Affairs, Copenhagen (1961-65 and 1969-72), International Monetary Fund, Washington DC (1965-69). Adviser in European Affairs to the Danish Prime Minister (1972-1982). Chief Adviser, Commission of the European Community (1982-1987). Visiting Scholar, University of California at Berkeley (1987-1989). Director of the Eleni Nakou Foundation since 1989. Has published books and articles on the international monetary and political affairs. His latest book is Money and International Politics (1991).

**Gaetano La Pira.** Born in 1949 in Milan (Italy). Ph.D. in Psychology and Philology at the University of Milan (1974). Professor of International Relations (1972-1980). Journalist and Translator of about 50 books from English, French and Spanish into Italian. Among them are the translations of Henry James and Isaac Asimov. Speech-writer. Adviser on European Affairs for the Italian Foreign Ministry (1979-1984). Adviser to the vice-president of the European Community (1985-1989). Since 1989 Serge du Mission de la Cellule de Prospective, European Commission.

**Robert Picht.** Born in 1937 in Berlin (Germany). Doctor in Sociology and Professor and Director of the Deutsch-Französisches Institut since 1972. Vice President of the **European Cultural Foundation**. He has taught at the universities of Paris-Asnières, Bologna, de Hagen and the College of Europe in Bruges. "Médaille d'or de Strasbourg" of the F.V.S. Foundation and Official of the "l'Ordre national du Mérite". Among his books are Frankeich-Deutschland-Europa (1978), Espirit/Geist. 100 Schlüssellbegriffe für Deutsche und Franzosen (1989), Au jardin des malentendus. Le commerce franco-allemand des idées (1990) and De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa (1991).

**Karlheinz Reif.** Born in 1943. M.A. Stanford University (1966). Doctor in Political Science and Sociology (1974). Head of the "Survey, Research, Analyses" (EUROBAROMETER) Unit of the EC Commission in Brussels since 1987. Member of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim. He has been Visiting Professor in the Universities of Edinburgh, Florence, Disburg and Bamberg. He has published books and articles on Comparative Political Sociology, European Integration, European Parliament Elections, Public Opinion in the European Community, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan and USA. He edited with Ronald Inglehart, Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of Public Opinion in Europe-Essays in Honour of Jacques-Rene Rabier. (1991).

**Yannis A. Sakellarakis.** Born in 1936 in Athens (Greece). PhD of the University of Heidelberg (1969). Professor of Archaeology at the University of Athens (1981-1987). Has been a Visiting Professor at the universities of Hamburg and Heidelberg and has lectured in several universities around the world. Curator of the Prehistoric Collection of the National Archaeological Museum at Athens (1970-1980). Second Director of National Archaeological Museum in Athens the since 1987. Member of the Editing Committee of Kretika Chronika. President of the Psycha Foundation. Patron of the Michael Ventris Award of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London. Among his books are, Erakleion Museum, Illustrated Guide (1978). Corpus of Mycenaean Inscription from Knossos, (1986). The Mycenaean Pictorial Style of the National Archaeological Museum at Athens (1992).

**Alexander Shurbanov.** Born in 1941 in Sofia (Bulgaria). Doctor of Philology (Univ. of Sofia) and Literature "honoris causa" (Univ. of Kent). Professor of English literature. Dean of the Faculty of Classical and Modern Philology at the University of Sofia (1983-1987). He is also Chairman of the Bulgarian Society for British Studies since 1990. Among his major publications are Renaissance Humanism and Shakespeare's Sonnets (1980), The Land of Living Eternity (1990) and Christopher Marlowe and the Genesis of Renaissance Drama (1992). He is also the author of three books of poems.

**Loukas Tsoukalis.** Born in 1950 in Athens (Greece). Ph.D in Economics and International Relations (Oxford). Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1980-1983). Research Fellow in European Studies, St. Catherine's, Oxford (1976-1982). University Lecturer and Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford (1984-1990). Jean Monnet Professor of European Organisation, University of Athens. Director of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies. Director of Economic Studies, College of Europe, Bruges. He has also taught at the London School of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University and many other universities. Among his books are, The Political Economy of International Money (1985), Europe, America and the World Economy (1986) and The New European Economy (1991).

**Helen Wallace.** Born in 1946 in Manchester (England). MA (Hons) Classics (Oxford) PhD (University of Manchester). Lecturer and Senior Lecturer, Civil Service College (1978-85). Seconded to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1979-80). Chair, UK Selection Committee for the College of Europe. Director of the European Programme (RIIA) since 1985. Responsible for a range of research projects on Western Europe, 1992 and its impact on the rest of the world. Among her recent publications are, Europe: the Challenge of Diversity (1985), Widening and Deepening: the European Community and the New European Agenda (with Mark Wilke) (1989), Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the EC (1990), The Wider Western Europe (1991) ??

**Giovanna Zincone.** Born in 1944 in Rome (Italy). Doctor in Political Science and Professor at the University of Turin. She has also taught at the universities of Alessandria and Rome. Director of the quarterly review Biblioteca della liberta (1979-1988). Member of the Equal Opportunity Committee, an advisory body to the President of the Council. She has directed several comparative research projects for national and international institutions, including the European Commission and workshops. Among her most recent publication are, "Opportunities for Women to Enter Decision-making Arenas" in M. Buckley & M. Anderson (ed) Women, Equality and Europe (1987). "Donne, cittadinanza, differenza" in Il Mulino, XL (1991). Da sudditi a cittadini (1992)

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
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
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**"CRETE, THE FIRST VISION OF EUROPE"**

**by T A Sakellarakis**



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SYMPOSIUM  
MINOS BEACH HOTEL, CRETE  
13-17 APRIL 1992  
Eleni Nakou Foundation  
The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies

Symposium on "Images of Europe"

Crete, April 13-17, 1992

## **CRETE - THE FIRST VISION OF EUROPE**

by J A Sakellarakis

As the first speaker of the symposium "Images of Europe" held by happy coincidence in Crete, and of its first section entitled "The Material Legacy from Antiquity to the Genesis of European Consciousness", I must, having specialized in Archaeology and History, discuss the theme "Crete, the First Vision of Europe". In considering the present need to "find a common European identity in the mosaic of different points of view", the example of Crete, as the most southeastern part of the continent which is our subject, may provide, in the third and second millennia the core of the problem in its simplest form.

It was on this island that the idea of Europe was conceived of for the first time. at lease as something different from Asia or Africa. As usually happened in antiquity, this idea was given mythological expression. In the 8th century BC Homer was already familiar with the Rape of Europe by Zeus.

According to the myth, Europa was the daughter of Aginor, King of Phoenicia, and she was so beautiful that even Zeus became infatuated with her. In order to win her, he worked out a very craft and rash plan. One beautiful day, as Europa was picking flowers with her friends by the sea, Zeus appeared in the shape of a tame, wild bull and lay down before her. Delighted and fearless, the girls observed it with admiration. After awhile, Europa, laughing and joyful, mounted the bull. Suddenly the animal reared up and rush into the sea. Holding tightly to the back of the bull, she shouted in despair, but her friends had already scattered in panic. At the command of the god, the seas calmed, dolphins frolicked around the divine bull, Nereids dances, Tritons blew their conch shells, and from the deep Poseidon emerged to congratulate his brother. So Europa came to the coast of Crete, the place above all others that belonged to Zeus because it was the place of his birth and upbringing. In the city of Gortys, Zeus united with Europa, in a "sacred marriage" which took place under a plane tree which never from then on lost its leaves. One of the gifts mentioned as having been offered by the god to his beloved is Talos, a giant of bronze who traversed the island daily to protect it. Europa conceived three sons by Zeus: Minos, Rhadamanthys and Sarpedon, the mythical kings of Crete. Later, Zeus betrothed Europa to the king of Crete, Asterios.

A few brief notes on this myth may be apt, Europa carried the same name as some of her ancestors, the daughters of Ocean, Poseidon and Nile.

Considering that these, as well as the heroine of the Cretan myth, all belong to parallel myths of the creation of the Gods, the world and mankind, it is not difficult for us to assume that they point back to a proto-figure, the daughter of Ocean, whose name had been given to the mainland extending from the Isthmus of the Peloponnese to Thrace, and later to the whole continent stretching geographically beyond it. In the Theogony of Hesios, written in the 7th century BC, Europe and Asia are Oceanids. The idea running as a model through all these creation myths is simple. From the depths of the primitive ocean, continents merged. This same prototype functions in the myth of the Rape of Europa. The bull carrying the girl on his back is no less than Ocean carrying the continents on his shoulders.

Especially pertinent, however, is the union of Europe with Crete. Europe means "many-faced" and maybe this epithet refers to the moon, as do so many other names in the Europa cycles of legends. The lunar aspect of Europa is related to other narrative elements of the myth. The heroine is married to Asterios (or Asterion), king of the sky, of celestial space. Talos is god of the sun, another example of Cretan star-worship, the hardy plan tree of Gortys is again an element of the ancient Cretan tree cult. The unique metamorphosis of Zeus into a bull, the animal which has played the leading role in all the great myths of Crete (that of Minos, his wife Pasiphae, and his daughter Ariadne, as well as the myth of Daedalus, the Minotaur and the Labyrinth) is a mythical expression of the great cult of the bull-god in Crete. The fundamental element of the myth is that Europa, originating in Africa

and Asia, lands for the first European civilization was already born in the third and second millennia BC. This is of particular importance to our theme.

According to what we have learned up to now, around 2800 BC a new people came to Crete who mixed with the existent, neolithic inhabitants of the island. These are the conventionally termed Minorans, named after Minos, mythical king of Crete. The Minoans had travelled extensively not only over the Aegean Sea but beyond the Middle East and Egypt, bringing back raw materials such as ivory, copper in particular, and most of all, the technological know-how for working it. They also brought back new ideas and skills. Soon they learned the use of writing. The most ancient inhabitants of the island exhibit for the first time an exceptional characteristic which continues down through its history: the ability to assimilate new ideas without slavishly imitating them.

By the end of the third millennium BC, the Minoans had already set the foundation for the final organization of the island-state, based on its physical features which insured material self-sufficiency in its heartland, Crete and the sea around it over which it held sway. As happened later in another island at the opposite edge of Europe, England, the sea provided the isolation which protected it from invaders, while stimulating its commercial shipping activities. This period was remembered by Thucydides

when he historically recalled Minos extending his domination of the seaways after exterminating the pirates.

The zenith of Cretan civilization was reached in the second millennium BC. The infrastructure developed during the previous millennium had led to the evolution of power concentrated in the hands of royal families. An extremely important event was the foundation of the first palaces, about 1900 BC. These palaces had been occupied for almost 300 years when they were totally destroyed by an earthquake. The infrastructure and organization of palace were rebuilt on an even grander scale. From 1600 to 1450 BC the acme of Cretan civilization was reached. Then another physical disaster struck. The eruption of the volcano at Thera so devastated the island that they Mycenaeans--another great power in the Aegean--seized Crete and destroyed the state.

My intention, however, has not been to follow this historical evolution of Crete, but to detect the fundamental elements of its earliest civilisation. It is not an easy task, certainly, for even though the archaeological finds brought to light after a century of excavations haven been numerous, written sources are still unavailable since the Minoan script has yet to be deciphered. I will, however, attempt to give a brief description of life in Minoan Crete, based on the materials that have been preserved and by deciphering the ideas which have arisen.

The core of social life in Minoan Crete is the palace. Not only is it the seat of the kings but the priesthood, as well as the centre of commerce and the arts. We must recall there was not only one palace, but five, at Knossos, Phaistos, Malia, Zakros and most probably at Archanes. The suzerainty of Knossos, however, is generally agreed on. Peaceful relations among these centres, governed according to myth by brothers, appear to be certain.

The Minoan palaces were huge, labyrinthine buildings, usually of three storeys, consisting in many luxurious apartments, vast storage areas, along with sanctuaries and workshops. Solidly built, with abundant use of wood and stone and polychrome decoration, these complexes reveal advanced architectural knowledge. Even the uniquely placed orientation of all these palaces attest to mastery in other sciences such as mathematics and astronomy. The impressive palatial hydraulic systems and even the appliances for sanitation show a grasp of physical laws.

In spite of the great extent of the palaces, the layout of the apartments around the courtyard and the many interior light-wells reveal harmony with the environment. It has been noted as a characteristic of Minoan architecture, the so-called polythyra, that is, the breaking up of expanses of walls into a series of openings (thyrai) united the interior rooms with the outside by doors; that is, with nature. Besides the furnishing of these premises, utilitarian or decorative, to which I will refer when I speak of the arts, even the fresco decoration of the palaces with scenes drawn from nature, had

this same aesthetic purpose of uniting interior living with the natural environment.

Before discussing central issues regarding Minoan art and life, I wish to emphasize that these architectural elements found in the palaces also existed in less elaborate dwellings elsewhere. Many of the so-called Minoan villas, Gournia, presents on the other hand a general plan similar to many contemporary Cretan mountain villages, suggesting such an evenness and breadth of prosperity that the researcher today has difficulty differentiating between social orders and a general, overall way of life.

A similar conclusion regarding the even distribution of well-being can be drawn from objects made of non-perishable materials have survived. Most of these are works of art. Yet again, these are not found only in palaces, but in country houses and common graves as well as in royal ones.

Technology had been mastered in Crete in the second millennium BC, as we can see for example in the technique of beading in the goldsmith's art. But the most important Minoan outcome in the history of art in that era was not in this technique. It is particularly to be admired for its production of vast number of vessels from polychromatic stone, domestic or imported. The stoneworkers not only created complex designs but brought out the natural veins in every stone. They produced elaborate jewellery from semi-precious stones as well as from silver and gold. These were not simple cut beads but

compositions that took into account the natural elements of the material, as in the famous jewel of Malia with bees circling a honeycomb.

The humble art of pottery produced masterpieces of the Kamares type, one of the most decorative styles of prehistory. Even the most utilitarian pottery, such as jars, are transformed into superb art works by the liveliness and variety of their decoration. Ivory was not only employed for inlays and finishings on furniture, and bronze for vessels; both were used in the production of male and female statuettes, but no longer static as they were in other contemporary civilizations. On the contrary, these sculptures are animated, their poses have emotional content, giving them the impression of movement and a vitality which emerges from the material not only by the portrayal of muscle but by the delineation of veins.

There are also compositions that give plasticity to bronze, gold and wood, such as the famous bull-leaper of Knossos, and the celebrated snake goddess with her elaborate garments. These superb pieces of art are exhibited in the Herakleion Museum.

Perhaps even more compelling are the pictorial scenes of Minoan Crete which have been preserved on the surfaces of sculptured stone pots and in frescoes. These scenes usually depict only parts of scenes, especially on engraved seals, but they are precious sources for the study of Minoan life and cult.

We must also point out an important characteristic of Minoan art: it is essentially small, often miniature, scale. When we consider the preference of the civilizations of Egypt, and the Middle East for the monumental, how sympathetic the Minoan preference for the small-scaled! Even in fresco--an art calling for the monumental--there is a category, the so-called miniature frescoes in which groups of human figures are usually represented with concision on limited surfaces. This characteristic Minoan attitude needs explanation. It is obvious that the Minoan rejected the vanity of outward display and found in the smaller scale of the inner self a deeper truth. It is probably the first time in the history of art that the ego of the artist-- and of the spectator--was not directly appealed to.

Similar things can be said for the pictorial representations that have come down to us. Unlike other contemporary civilizations, there are no displays of military victories or vainglory or the submission of adversaries. Their chiefs are not represented, as if they did not exist. Even conflicts shown in boxing or wrestling scenes have an aesthetic character of fair competition. Group scenes tend to be of a religious character, with processions accompanied by music, acts of ritual, dances before spectators, with both men and women watching or participating. Most scenes, however, are of nature, especially delineations of animals and plants, sea creatures, fish, shellfish, molluscs, abundantly and precisely observed. The simplest scenes, of a cow sucking its calf, of dogs sitting down, reveal not only a deep study of nature in general, but an overall anthropomorphic feeling of care,

nurture or sense of expectancy. In all cases, nature is present, if only suggested by a branch or leaf, in every Minoan scene.

There is only one fresco that may have a different context, the so called Captain of the Blacks from Knossos. A pale-skinned man standing before a black one is armed with two spears, yet the scene is so fragmentary its meaning is uncertain. The absence of weapons in Minoan Crete, generally is remarkable. The swords that have been found have had only ritualistic use. It should be mentioned, however, that a set of bronze weapons has come to light in a cave devoted to cult at Arkalokhori.

If I had to characterize Minoan life in a phrase, I would say that it had the innocence of a child, as there is no trace of tiring routine efforts, no forced labour, no need for training. Everyday life in work and exercise seems part of a rhythm whose other aspects have been lost to us.

Perhaps I give the impression of idealizing unsubstantiated situations. To deny this, I appeal back to three generations of scholars, starting with Sir Arthur Evans, all of whom seems to have been awestruck by this amazing enigma in the culture of Minoan Crete. Often I have felt awkward at conferences held in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe when I have been asked if there were slaves in Minoan Crete. It seems to me there should have been. All these colossal palaces could not have been built by kings and their courts alone. Besides, in Linear B script found in Knossos

the word 'do-e-ro' (slave) appears in both masculine and feminine forms. In fact efforts to find slavishness, such as imitation in Minoan art, have led to an opposite opinion. In contrast to the infinity of human figures, similarly and lifelessly repeated in Egyptian frescoes, each one of the hundreds of Minoan seals is individual, a unique master piece, an unforced creation. This is what I shall call the irrational in Minoan Crete. I am quite aware of the fact that I seem to describe a cloud-cuckooland, a dream world where there are no metaphysical fears.

For example, a clear difference with contemporary Egyptians is that Minoans did not spend their lives preparing their tombs in hopes of a better life after death. They did not gather objects to be crammed into their tombs, but were only buried in the garments which they wore, along with some objects useful in the world of death. Their gods were not terrifying but anthropomorphic. Even the few examples of mythical creatures in Minoan Crete, such as some sphinxes, griffins and some demons, have human characteristics, too. The only examples of a true monster-like creatures are represented on seals found at Zakro and are reminiscent of Hieronymus Bosch. But only these have been found, which makes it seem likely to be the imaginary creation of a nonconformist.

Minoans placed simple statuettes of themselves or their domestic animals in natural locations of cult, such as peak-sanctuaries, by springs or in caves. Like Minoan chiefs, their gods do not appear in glory on monumental pieces of

plastic art, but in some pictorial scenes are hinted at as being present among ordinary people. Having lived out the cycle of vegetation. Minoans seems to have worshipped a god that came to life and died each year. The tree cult probably held the same sacred meaning, as well as the adoration of that powerful animal, the bull, for its fertilizing power. the lessons of excellence may have led them to this sense of freedom which they clearly display. It is very characteristic of them, too, that they exercised this idea of freedom in their contacts with neighbouring people.

As we have already observed, the Minoans were not isolated by their material self-sufficiency, but travelled widely in their ships. Many Egyptian and Middle Eastern objects have been found in Crete, along with others that have come to light beyond the island. We usually think these to be articles of trade in that era, and it is possible that Minoans played a considerable role not only in commerce, but with the foundation of commercial stations far beyond the island.

There are relevant references to the Minoans in Egyptian and Middle Eastern records, and it is noteworthy that in time of disturbance in these regions, the references carry no mention of rivalry with Crete or its inhabitants. Minoans seems to have had peaceful relations with others, and contented themselves with commercial activities, and there is even evidence of their giving freely of medical advice in an Egyptian papyrus.

The relations that Minoans had with their neighbours seems to have been determined by the degree to which they were able to penetrate those worlds. Evans termed their cultural domination over other Aegean people the Pax Minoica. With the establishment of considerable colonies at strategic points, the Minoans have strengthened their dominion over the seas to such a degree that the Egyptians recognized their suzerainty over other islands, such as the Cyclades. The cultural minoanization of the Cyclades is a typical example of their expansion, but their relationship with the Mycenaean Greeks of the mainland is much more noteworthy and of greater immediate interest because the Greeks later became the decisive factor in the genesis of European civilization.

The Minoan influence on the beginnings of Mycenaean culture, which is the first Greek civilization, is of such importance that scholars often combine the two cultures under the term "Creto-mycenaean". So extensive has this influence been felt, that some believe that 16th century BC shaft graves, brought to light by Schliemann at Mycenae, are totally Minoan. This is surely not true, yet the examples of Minoan influence are pervasive. So attracted were the Mycenaeans to the Minoan way of life that they went as far as to adopt their way of dress. Even in the conservative sector of cult, symbols and cult models are similar.

At the beginning of the first Greek civilization, the contribution of Minoan Crete is exceptional, most of all because it introduced Minoan irrationality

into the world of early, Greek logic, thus leading to the Greek sense of holistic balance on the razor's edge. Thenceforth, the irrational exists inside the culture. How else can we explain the cult of nature which is interwoven in the search for truth as exercised by the Presocratic philosophers? How else can we explain that magnificent piece of art, the Parthenon on the Acropolis at Athens, as a combination of curved, not of straight, lines? Besides, Pericles, who dedicated the temple to the goddess Athena, was, at the same time, a contemporary of the atheist Anaxagoras as well as his friend.

Greeks of antiquity of course did not know what we have learned from the archaeology of Minoan Crete. That is probably the reason why they were not ignorant to the face of Minoan reality, as we are, and could appeal once again to the old myths. These myths described the wise organization and god-given laws of Crete, the power and expression it exerted in all the islands around it, the richness of its technical development, and even some of the personalities who inspired these institutions, performed incomparable acts, and protected the island and its inhabitants against every kind of enemy.

The three sons whom Europa conceived by Zeus: Minos, Radamthys and Sarpedon were kings of Crete. Zeus himself gave the sceptre of authority to Minos and, most important of all, gave him the laws, and every nine years he communicated with him on the mountain in the Idaian Cave. Minoan

laws have divine provenance and perhaps that is why Plato took council from the. The belief that Crete was a land of wise legislation reserved in myth an exceptional position for the kings of the island. Minos and Radamanthys are the fair judges of the kingdom of death. The idea that Crete in its greatest antiquity was a true paradise is also found in the myth of the Elysian Fields, and even more characteristically, in the Island of the Belst of which Radamthys ruled.

Today, myths are distant, and in today's search for our identity, it is impossible to detect scientifically any contribution of Minoan Crete to contemporary European civilization, even the most indirectly. But I have often wondered why Mozart composed an opera on the subject of Idomeneo, the last king of Crete. Was not only because the libretto had been prepared for him? Any why did Picasso paint the Minotaur so often, even mortally wounded? Was it because his Spanish book led him back to another Mediterranean cult of the bull? Where is the continuity? Where is the discontinuity in all this? Can the vision of a peaceful Minoan Crete, peaceful within itself and with others, be only a dream?

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
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
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**BEING "EUROPEAN" IN THE  
SIXTEENTH CENTURY**

**By John Hale**



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## **BEING 'EUROPEAN' IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY**

by John Hale

In spite of the image of Europa and Queen Europe described in the Annexe to this paper, it was another form of image, the map, that helped more to disseminate the idea that those who lived in Europe were Europeans.

From the early sixteenth century, thanks to a new mathematical interest in cartographical projections, maps began to enable Europeans to imagine, believably, the geographical space in which they lived. Cartography became, indeed, something of a craze. The number of professional surveyor-mapmakers grew, and was joined by amateurs fired by an interest in recording topographical facts in a graphic form recognizable to and usable by others. Landlords wanted estate maps, governments administrative maps for purposes of tax and toll control and the plotting of roads and canals, defensive fortifications and troop assembly points. Statesmen used them for strategic purposes. Monarchs commissioned them as symbols of power. All over Europe they became part of the mental furniture of educated men: indeed, of their actual furniture; framed and hung, painted on walls, woven into tapestries, whole collections rolled or folded in chests and on shelves.

In 1511 Martin Waldseemüller produced the first map of Europe that was independent of the Jerusalem-centred and Ptolomaic traditions. Others led to the magisterial five-foot engraved Europe of Gerardus Mercator in 1554. These maps and their successors presented a unitary image of the continent. Because political frontiers were themselves uncertain cartographers omitted them. When maps of Europe were coloured subsequent to publication, the washes applied were for decorative, not political purposes. And the dense spread of town names across the maps did not suggest that western had any greater weight of economic vitality than eastern Europe. This even-handed appearance of uniformity owed something to cartographers' horror vacui, but more to their places of work and the networks of correspondents and regional map-makers radiating from them. The earlier maps of Europe were produced at Basel and Strasbourg in the upper Rhineland, and Ingolstadt on the Bavarian Danube. Then, from the mid-sixteenth century, the production of maps and atlases of Europe moved down the Rhine to Cologne and to the establishments of Mercator and Ortelius in, respectively, Louvain and Antwerp. Though these centres took increasing note of the local maps that were now being produced in France, England and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Portugal, they were still within the traditional boundaries of the Empire, with its political slant towards Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and Lithuania in the east, and its economic interests in the Baltic, and their atlases thickened with updated maps of these areas. In spite of the dramatic power games among the countries of the west, cartographic Europe retained an even deployment of information across the continental board.

The exception was where the maps came to cope with the problem of Russia. Information about place names was scant. It was generally accepted that classical geographers had been right when they made the River Don the boundary between Europe and Asia. But northwards of the main current of the Don antiquity had fallen silent and contemporary cartographers were confused. Above all: was Moscow in Europe? For some, who drew a fairly straight line from where the Don entered the Black Sea at Rostov and up through Nijni Novgorod (Gorky) to Muskovy's access to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean at Archangel, the answer was yes. To others, as bewildered as were the cartographers themselves by the problem of plotting northern distances as their longitudinal lines rushed narrowingly towards the North Pole, it was no. Richard Eden, the mid-sixteenth century English collector, translator and publisher of travel accounts, was adamant: 'if a right (i.e. straight) line be drawn from the mouthes of Tanais (the Don) to the sprynges of the same, Moscovia shall be found in Asia, and not in Europe'. Even the great cartographic entrepreneur Ortelius was rattled by this problem. His map of Russia, based on amateur evidence (for Russia had no trained map-makers and visitors were allowed only restricted freedom of movement), had its bias summed up by an inserted representation of the Tsar as a nomadic Asian potentate.

Nonetheless, for map-literate Europeans, maps became for the first time the spur to a rationally grasped personal location within a clearly-defined continental expanse. And this source of self-orientation on a flat surface was given depth by the parallel development of chorography: the description in

words of the topography and customs of the diverse regions of which Europe was composed. The chorographic movement nourished the production of regional maps; these improved the country maps collected in atlases like Ortelius's Theatrum Orbis Terrarum of 1570, and the country maps in turn fed greater accuracy into maps of Europe as a whole.

Ortelius himself explained that one of the reasons for publishing his atlas was that every European wants to see a map of his own country 'for the love that he beareth to his native soile'. Dedicating his prose description of England, the Itinerary, to Henry VIII in 1546, the antiquarian topographer John Leland had made a similar point. Having soaked himself in the chronicle literature, 'I was totally inflamed with a love to see thoroughly all those parts of this your opulent realm that I had read of'; as a result 'I have travelled in your dominions both by the sea coasts and the middle parts, sparing neither labour nor costs, by the space of these six years past, (so) that there is almost neither cape nor bay, haven, creek or pier, river or confluence of rivers, beaches, washes, lakes, meres, fenny waters, mountains, valleys, moors, heaths, forests, woods, cities, boroughs, castles, principal manor places, monasteries and colleges, but I have seen them, and noted in so doing a whole world of things very memorable'.

Leland wonderfully conveys the mood of fascination and determination that underlay the European chorographic movement; from Spain to Lithuania its exponents contributed their tesserae of regional knowledge to an image of Europe not merely cartographic but historical and anthropological. The Discovery of Europe exerted a wider grip on the imagination of its inhabitants

than did the contemporaneous and subsequently more glamorized Discovery of the World.

National histories began to include a European dimension. 'The historical events of our times', wrote Francesco Vettori in the dedication of his Brief Account of Italian History from 1511 to 1527, 'are so closely bound together that you cannot speak of those of Italy alone and omit all the others'. The much more voluminous and thoughtful History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, another Florentine, but one more closely connected with international affairs as a high-ranking papal administrator, reached far into Europe, indeed, to the New World, to explain the humiliating effects of foreign intervention in the peninsula. Written in the late 1530s, it was not published until 1561 but rapidly found a European market through translations into Latin, French, German, Dutch, Spanish and English. And in the early seventeenth century Niccolò Contarini, confronting the task of writing a history of Venice during his own politically perturbed lifetime, said that he could not do this without bringing in 'many things that happened in Europe' because 'the narration of what happened to men in a single place, without a knowledge of what was happening in others, will always remain unshaded and full of perplexities. But when they are linked to distant events they will be easier to understand and more useful to those who are concerned with such issues'.

'Europe' itself began to appear on the title-pages of historical works. There was a cluster from the mid-sixteenth century: Ludovico Guicciardini's Commentary on the most notable Events in Europe (1565), Pier Francesco Giambullari's

History of Europe (1566), Alfonso Ulloa's The History of Europe (1570). It is true that for all of these, 'Europe' was merely a catchword: the first concentrated on the Netherlands, the second ran out in the tenth century, the third could have been more accurately entitled Some Outstanding recent Military and Political Events within Europe. There was no integrated history of Europe as it appeared on the map. Still, the acknowledgement that a single country's history was bound up with that of others became more common. The material in the Italian Paolo Giovio's History of his Times (1550-2), ranged from Spain and England to Poland and Russia. As one updated edition followed another, the Frenchman Jacques Auguste de Thou's History of his Time (1604) was considered to be as near to a considered coverage of the political and religious links and woes of Europe as could be looked for. There was a modest proliferation of books purporting to describe the cities and the governments of Europe as a whole. They were most of them learned bins into which the author shovelled spadeful of miscellaneous reading, but as part of the discovery of Europe they have some significance. A few were written by strikingly original minds and were seen as classics over many generations: in 1576 came Jean Bodin's reflections on the nature of governments (Les Six Livres de la République), Giovanni Botero's On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities was published in 1588. There were also thrown-together but useful compilations of leaked ambassadorial reports on countries from England to Sweden like the Political Treasury. First published in Italy in 1589 its subsequent editions and translations made it into a textbook for those interested in the background to international affairs.

Good, vapid, or downright bad, all these books constituted a radically changed attitude to the continent. From myth and map, chorography, history and survey, Europe passed into the mind; into an awareness that was at the same time being focused by thinking in terms of 'us' as opposed to a non-European 'them'.

Squeezed in physically by the alien Turkish lodgement in the south-east, extended imaginatively by increasing contacts with the other 'old' continents, Africa and Asia, and above all by the heady confidence inspired by the discovery of America, Europeans thought harder about their own identity, especially when mere curiosity about the men and manners of other continents came to be accompanied by comparisons - not always comforting - between us and them.

To those who saw the Ottoman Empire from the outside, the Turks were, above all, cruel. What European monarch would have all his brothers strangled - as Mahommed III had all nineteen of his - to prevent any subsequent challenge to his succession? Europeans burned, tortured and maimed: but only the Turks impaled, ramming a pointed stake up the anus and out between the collar-bones regardless of age or sex, and leaving it stuck in the ground with its skewered victim as a warning. Views by German artists of the 1529 siege of Vienna and later Imperial-Turkish wars, peppered the landscape with such writhing figures. Whenever a Turk featured in an English or French play of the later sixteenth century, he appeared laden with dread associations, however facetiously they were deployed.

To those who actually travelled in Turkey, however, this indifference to human suffering, while noticed, was diffused among more positive observations. Unlike the Russians-in-Europe, the Turks appreciated learning, the arts, and civilized comforts. The learning may have been Islamic, the arts unrepresentational, the comforts rejecting chairs and wine, but the style of life was sympathetically sophisticated. More than this, the Turks had lessons to teach Christians. In spite of their tolerance of the views of others, they took the faith and rituals of their own religion with a seriousness that was a reproach to all too many Christians. The Protestant radical Thomas Müntzer went so far in the 1520s as to say that if a devout Turk came to worship in Catholic Europe in search of added grace 'he would gain about as much as a midge could carry on its tail'. The discipline and patient endurance of hardship of Turkish soldiers was often cited in contrast to the behaviour of Christian troops. Their streets were filthy but the spotlessness within Turkish houses, the emphasis on personal hygiene, and the cleanliness of their clothes and turbans (which provided so many highlights in Carpaccio's narrative paintings) put smelly and infrequently laundered Europeans to shame. A tiny observation made by an Italian visitor to Constantinople in 1614, Pietro della Valle, contrasts the fidgety, self-preening behaviour of Europeans at a grand reception with the decorous stillness that prevailed in Turkey. He notes that 'it seems to them very strange that we should be hurrying about like that, as if on important business, walking from one end of the rooms to another, and then returning, and then going back yet again, either alone or accompanied, with nothing else to do'.

A similar comparative frame of mind developed far further east. From St. Francis Xavier's first mission to Japan in 1549, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian Jesuits learned the language and tried to grasp the nature of the nine religious sects they identified in order to argue the Christian case against them. Constantly, in their letters and reports, they compared European with Japanese customs. When defaecating, one noticed, 'we sit, they crouch'. 'I am sending you' wrote St. Francis to his superiors at home, 'a copy of the Japanese alphabet; their way of writing is very different from ours because they write their lines from the top of the page down to the bottom. I asked Paul (a convert) why they did not write in their way? He explained that as the head of a man is at the top and his feet are at the bottom, so too a man should write from top to bottom'. And as the acquaintanceship deepened, so, along with surprise, did admiration. Writing of Japan later in the century, Alessandro Valignano recorded that the politeness of all classes makes them in this respect 'superior not only to other Eastern peoples but also to Europeans as well'. Their children learn more quickly than ours, 'nor do they fight or hit one another like European boys'.

Summing up his impressions, Valignano wrote that 'it may truly be said that Japan is a world the reverse of Europe; everything is so different and opposite that they are like us in practically nothing. So great is the difference in their food, clothing, honours, ceremonies, language, management of the household, in their way of negotiating, sitting, building, curing the wounded and sick, teaching and bringing up children, and in everything else, that it can be neither described nor understood. Now all this would not be surprising', he continues

in a telling passage, 'if they were like so many barbarians, but what astonishes me is that they behave as very prudent and refined people in all these matters. To see how everything is the reverse of Europe, despite the fact that their ceremonies and customs are so cultivated and founded on reason, causes no little surprise to anyone who understands such things'.

Meanwhile, Europeans had had to come to terms not only with a new continent but with new men and women. Here in America was an enormous land-mass, unsuspected by ancient geographers, filled with societies covering a great range of organizational sophistication from the Aztecs and the Incas to the Caribs and the Tupinamba.

When the Spaniards struck at the city-building empires of Mexico and Peru they saw them as weaker versions of the empires of Alexander and Augustus, problematic enough in logistic and diplomatic terms, but, because of this analogy, not a radical challenge to rethinking the nature of political societies. It was the greater number of apparently more primitive peoples in central and southern America that aroused a crisis of conscience, public debate, and an element of self-scrutiny. Missionaries' consciences were initially troubled by two questions. The first was: do people living in a state of nature have property rights? If they do, do we have the right to dispossess and enslave them? The second was: do these people, who seem to live the instinctive lives of animals, have souls? If they do, should we not convert and protect rather than exploit them? This, the first pertinent and passionate discussion of abstract human rights, went on for a generation and more between settlers' needs for labour

and priests' concern for potential converts. It was at last resolved in the mid-century in favour of the view that the Amerindian masses were, like their better armed and more single-minded masters, men with legal rights and souls to save.

Then followed, however, what amounted to a rediscovery of the Amerindians as peoples with conventions, 'ceremonies and customs', of their own. With the Dominicans and Franciscans in America, as with the Jesuits in Japan, ethnographic inquiry was in the interest of conversion. But now it was more patient, less polemical. Instead of bullying converts, through a halting use of their language eked out by gestures, into acknowledging beliefs as weird as their own - a god who was tri-partite and could be eaten and drunk by specially garbed intermediaries languages were learned and native religions explored.

As with the earlier struggle to obtain justice for the natives, the new effort to understand the nature of the Amerindian societies was so single-minded that it did not throw off comparisons with European ones. That was left to the third, the intellectually weakest, most 'romantic' reaction: the wish to see them not as representatives of a New World but of the oldest world of all, that of the pre-civilized state of all mankind, unselfconscious, spontaneous and peaceful. While missionary ethnographers were realizing that to be primitive was not to be simple, and that underneath an apparently 'natural' way of life were complex religious beliefs, laws and codes of behaviour, enough reports of peaceable, unhierarchical and unmaterialistic ways of life had been passed back to prompt comparisons with European ways of life.

Michel de Montaigne caught the tone perfectly. In one of the most concentrated of his Essays, 'Of Coaches', he noted, with French voyages to Canada particularly in mind, that 'our world hath of late discovered another ... no lesse-large, fully-peopled, all-things-yeelding, and mighty in strength, than ours ... It is not yet full fifty yeeres that he knew neither letters, nor waight, nor measures, nor apparell, nor corne, nor vines, but was all naked, simply-pure, in Nature's lapp, and lived with such meanes and food as his mother-nurse afforded him'. But since then, he went on, 'I feere that by our contagion, we shall have directly furthered his declination, and hastened his ruine; and that we shall too dearely have sold him our opinions, our new-fangles and our arts'. Broadening his target, he summed up the extinction of a Golden Age society by the imposition on it of the Iron Age values of his profit-crazed, land-hungry and war-loving fellow Europeans. 'So many goodly citties ransacked and razed; so many nations destroyed and made desolate; so infinite millions of harmlesse people of all sexes, states and ages, massacred, ravaged and put to the sword; and the richest, the fairest and the best part of the world topsiturvied, ruined and defaced for the traffick of pearles and pepper. Oh mechanicall victories, oh base conquest'. And in another essay, 'Of the Caniballes', he commented 'I finde (as farre as I have been informed) there is nothing in that nation that is either barbarous or savage, unlesse men call that barbarisme which is not common to them'.

Behind all these comparisons was a concept which reached its maturity in the later sixteenth century: that of a shared European civility. Secular and urban in its bias, limited to those with the education to attain it and the position to

display it, 'civility' was accepted as a standard of demeanour from London to Prague. In whatever language - civilis, civile, civilisé, civil the sections of society which could be described by this adjective formed a common civility against which other classes, notably peasants and labourers, men of other countries, notably the Irish and the Russians, and other, non-European, races could be measured. The qualities of civility were literacy and education; personal self-discipline; the rational exploitation of human labour and natural productivity; an intelligent manipulation of money; an emphasis on domestic comfort and decorum; skill in the arts both of war and peace; the rewarding of legitimate ambition; above all an emphasis on firm government and respect for the law. Much ink and discussion had been expended on the topic before in 1611 the Dutchman Johann Althusen spelled out a generally acceptable definition in his Two Books of Civil Conversation. 'Civility', he wrote, 'may be defined as the art of applying appropriate behaviour, or as the art of making behaviour conform to propriety and right reason'. It was consciousness of this triumph of nurture over nature that enabled Europeans to respect or disparage 'others' with such confidence.

That 'we Europeans' (the term Francis Bacon used with such confidence) were at the same time bitterly divided in religion from the Reformation split between Protestants and Catholics and at all times by inter-regional war calls for no elaboration here. It is a familiar story. And it is still all-too recognizable from our own century. For the purposes of this paper it is more interesting to look at uniting ideas making for peace in Europe. Unity of religion by the 1540s was realized by both camps, Catholic, and Lutheran, Zwinglian and Calvinist, as a

lost cause. The recognition of credal stalemate and mounting horror at the scale of persecution and the exacerbation of political rivalries by religious fervour, did produce an eirenist movement throughout Europe that saw in tolerance and a lack of emphasis on hardened doctrine a chance to encourage political harmony as well. But this did little more than play upon the increasing disillusion with the plans for international peace that were inadequately enshrined in treaties like of those of London (1518) and Cateau Cambrésis (1559).

As international relations worsened, it was realized by a few visionary spirits that what was needed was an imposed balance of forces that were not the product of changeable axes of alliances, and a permanent organization with power to maintain the peace, if necessary by force.

One such project was worked out in the 1620s by Maximilien de Béthune, formerly the omniscient, most trusted minister of King Henri IV, assassinated in 1611. Though the project's underlying motive was to ease Spanish pressure on France, its clear-cut development, which reflects his fascination with cartography and strategic planning, was the private diversion of a supremely tidy mind in enforced detachment from affairs.

Excluding 'Asiatic' Muscovy from his calculations, Sully divides the existing governments of Europe into fifteen units. Six are elective: the Papacy, the crowns of the Empire, Hungary, Bohemia and Poland and Venice. Six (the crowns of England and Scotland now being joined in James I) are hereditary monarchies: France, Spain, Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Savoy. Three he

characterizes as mixed: Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy, by which he means a federation comprising Tuscany, Mantua, Parma and Piacenza, Modena and Reggio, Genoa and Lucca. He proposed that Naples should be transferred from Spanish to Papal rule. This is one of a number of transfers of territory envisaged as a way of making the power of each unit more equal. Thus Sicily was to go to Venice, Austria and the duchies south of it (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola) to Hungary, Milan and Montferrat to Savoy-Piedmont, the Tyrol, Franche Comté and Alsace to the Swiss. Spain's authority was to be limited to the peninsula, Sardinia and the Balearic and Azorean islands, and its overseas possessions would be re-vested in the Spanish monarchy at the discretion of the confederate units as a whole.

Thus adjusted, boundaries were to become true, fixed and permanent frontiers. There was to be no eirenist day-dreaming. The frontiers allowed for religious blocs, Lutheran, Catholic and Calvinist, to remain separate and these frontiers were to be guaranteed by a general assembly of representatives from all the newly shaped units, meeting turn by turn in different countries. As the meetings of this body would for logistic reasons have to be occasional, six permanent regional councils were to be responsible: in Danzig for Scandinavian and Polish affairs, in Nuremberg for German, in Vienna for Bohemian and Hungarian, in Constance for Milanese, Mantuan and Swiss, in Bologna for papal and Italian. A seventh mobile council would alternate its meetings between the Netherlands, Britain, France and Spain.

The function of Sully's proposed federal organization was to ensure freedom of trade by land and sea (with nothing being said about protectionist tariffs) and, above all, to prevent war. Each unit was to maintain a peace-keeping force to be used where necessary. War between units was only to be allowed by the assent of the Assembly and on condition that all spoils were to be shared with the noncombatant units. Sully added dutifully that a third advantage might follow: a united European opposition to the Ottoman Empire.

The hair-raising impracticality of this plan was paralleled by the proposal for a federal peace-keeping organization by Emeric de Crucé. Crucé claimed in The New Cyneas (1623) that his project met Europe's needs in a practical manner. The needs were social harmony, amicable and organized international relations, and religious tolerance. And with the resulting peace would come reduced taxes and tariffs and an end to the debasement of coinages. With peace, communication between countries could be improved, especially by the international linking of seas and river systems by means of canals. 'What a pleasure it would be', he remarked, 'to see men go here and there freely, and mix together without any hindrance of country, ceremonies, or other suchlike differences, as if the earth were really as it is, a city common to all'.

As for the basic requirement, peace: 'under the Emperor Augustus all the nations were pacified. And after the reign of Francis I (i.e. after Cateau Cambrésis) peace was seen to flourish for a few years throughout all Europe'. So it was a realizable aim. All the governments (and he includes Muscovy) should swear to abjure war and to cut their armed forces back to police size. All

should agree to abide by the arbitration of difficulties by a general assembly of their representatives and support majority decisions with arms if need arose. The European Council should have a fixed headquarters. Crucé chose Venice, partly because of its position between east and west and its good communications with the northern nations, and partly 'because it is practically neutral and indifferent towards all princes'. Partly too, one may guess, because of the famed social harmony between government and subjects which was part of the 'Myth' of Venice, as well as the good standing of its monetary unit, the ducat, and the city's pronounced cosmopolitanism. For Crucé could not resist responding to eirenic universalism. He included the Sultan's representative in the Council (going so far, in his table of precedence, as to place him between the Pope and the Emperor). He even left the doors open to the invitation of emissaries from Morocco, Japan and the 'Great Mogul ... and other monarchs as well from India and Africa'.

In 1603 Sully had written to Henri IV from London to remind him that 'the English hate us, and with hatred so strong and widespread that one is tempted to number it among the natural disposition of this people'. For while the frame within which men could think of themselves as Europeans became more clearly defined, and while those of one country learned more of those of others through increased travel and reading, there was a counter-tendency at work: to know was not necessarily to like. Information opened minds. It also fed prejudices. Superimposed on the objective map of Europe was a subjective one of stereotyped national characteristics, a kerbside psychoportraiture that came from a vein so deep that it continued to emerge in the writings of well-educated

men, whether in the knock-about mood (1517) of Ulrich von Hutten's 'I send you more salutations than there are thieves in Poland, heretics in Bohemia, boors in Switzerland ... pimps in Spain, drunkards in Saxony, harlots in Bamberg, children of Sodom in Florence' and so on, or in Louis le Roy's 1576 summary declaration that 'on the whole the Spanish are haughty ... the English and Scots proud, the Greeks cautious and subtle, the Italians wary, the French bold'.

Even Erasmus, widely travelled and a propagandist for peace between nations, could not resist observing that the Germans were crude, the French violent under a veneer of refinement, the Italians duplicitous. Though Spaniards had the unfortunate custom of brushing their teeth with their urine, Charon did not mind ferrying them across the Styx because they were abstemious, whereas the English were so crammed with food that they nearly sank the boat. Given Erasmus's friendships with like-minded scholars in all these countries, the potency of the stereotypes is clear. They could be used in fun or as political, religious and economic rivalries became more rancid - in hate. Catholic and entrepreneurial Italians became more unpopular than ever. Roger Ascham's 'Inglese italianato è un diavolo incarnato' was echoed in Germany as 'Tedesco italianato è un diavolo incarnato'. They were accused of introducing effeminacy to Poland and Lesbianism to France. Similarly, to the old accusation that Spaniards were haughty, their genocide in the West Indies and scorched earth policy in the Netherlands generated the 'Black Legend' of their innate cruelty.

Again, in 1590 the Italian art theorist Paolo Lomazzo advised painters how to portray a German: 'strutting stride, extravagant gesture, wild expression, clothing all anyhow, manner hard and stern', and to take account of the fact that they were 'filthy eaters, boring conversationalists, crude lovers but careful workers'. On the other hand, King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, seeking colonists to stabilize his east Baltic conquests in 1617 called for men of 'honest German habits' rather than immigrants who would bring their 'swinish Russian customs'.

When Sully and Crucé put forward their proposals for a perpetual and inviolated peace, Europe was becoming progressively more embroiled in the international conflict of the Thirty Years War. It would be facile to see the stereotypes as actively contributing to the divisions within the continent, but they were, and they remain, among the most stubbornly persistent Images of Europe.

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
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
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**COMMUNITIES, NATIONS  
AND TRIBES IN EUROPE**

**by Ernest Gellner**



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## COMMUNITIES, NATIONS AND TRIBES IN EUROPE by Ernest Gellner

The dramatic intrusion of ethnicity into politics known as 'nationalism', has passed through five stages.

The first of these could be called the Age of Dynastic religious legitimization of political units. It could also be called the pre-national period. It seems to me ingeant in the social organisation of technologically fairly stable agricultural societies, that culture is used, above all, to indicate and externalise social status of individuals, rather than delimit the boundaries of a political unit as a whole. Agrarian societies with stable, stagnant productive powers, tend to be hierarchical, authoritarian, and committed to a separation of a High and a Low culture. The absence of sustained innovation and the high valuation of offspring (at any rate, male offspring), required for their labour and military potential, forces such societies into a Malthusian position. When hunger strikes, it strikes not at random but in accordance with rank. Status is generally ascribed and made manifest by cultural nuance. Cultural homogeneity is neither feasible nor desired, and so is unlikely to form the basis of political cohesion and loyalty.

During the millennium preceding the coming of nationalism around the time of the French Revolution, Europe was not in fact a stable, stagnant society, it grew a lot. Nevertheless, it was stable enough to perpetuate this relationship between culture and structure: culture continued to express the system of social roles. The re-imposition of the old order in 1815 did not provoke any opposition. It was still possible to define political units without reference to ethnicity, to similarity of culture. The whole of eastern Europe was divided between three empires, each with its dynastic and religious foundation, and each of them markedly poly-ethnic.

(2) But fairly soon, this condition was replaced by a new stage, that of ethnic irredentism. Industrial society, or even the shadow it casts ahead of itself, engenders a wholly new relationship between culture and social structure. Economic growth requires an unstable occupational structure, so as to accommodate the new activities. Pervasive instability engenders and egalitarian ethos, going counter to the old secular trend towards increasing inequality which had previously accompanied greater social complexity. Deploy internalised, ascribed status differences are simply incompatible with a rapidly mobile occupational structure: divergences between ascribed and professional statuses would lead to too much friction. Better far to subscribe to an ideology of a kind of universal baseline equality, compatible with a mostly temporary inequality based on contingent roles, and assumed like a coat, but separable from the ultimate human essence.

Moreover, the nature of work changes. It ceases to be physical and becomes semantic. "Work" becomes the interchange of messages with anonymous interlocutors. Hence messages must convey their meaning in a context-free manner. This requires a standardised culture: this skill is a standardised culture. But this can only be acquired by a sustained, prolonged educational process, and presupposes universal or near universal literacy.

It is when this condition prevails, or is imminent, that men realise that their most important investment, their precondition of effective employability and moral participation, is their command of and entry into a high, educationally transmitted, formalised culture. If the political unit they inhabit functions in one culture, and they function in another, they are reduced to second-class citizenship, and risk a life of sustained humiliation. It is this simple syllogism, however obscurely perceived, which turns them into nationalists. Men must either assimilate to the culture which dominates the political unit which they inhabit, or change the borders of political units so that the culture which they do employ comes to define that unit...

This situation engenders the nationalist irredentism which pervades the 19th century.

Curiously enough, despite all the agitation and activism, the irredentism achieved relatively little by the time the 19th century ended in 1914, so to speak. It produced five or six buffer states in the Balkans (the ambiguity in the enumeration arises from the fact that it is not clear whether Albania in 1912 was a state or a black hole left between Greece, Serbia and Montenegro with the departure of the Turks).

However, irredentism did triumph in 1918. The three empires, notwithstanding the fact that they had been on different sides in the war, were all consigned to the dustheap of history. Their subsequent history diverges: we shall first of all consider what seems to be the 'normal' trajectory, that of the Western and the Southern empires.

In the third age, which might be called Irredentism Triumphant and Self-defeating, they were replaced by successor states, no longer invoking dynasty and faith, but proudly based on the principle of nationality. The Prison-houses of nations had been stormed, their gates thrown open, and free nations could set up their own separate and independent homes.

But alas, all was not well. The new, nationality-invoking political units were just as haunted by minorities, as their imperial predecessors had been. On top of that, they were smaller and hence weaker, and on top of that, the new minorities included members of the erstwhile dominant linguistic or cultural groups, specially resentful of their reduced and humiliating status, unaccustomed to it, and with links to outside support and encouragement. The resulting international structure was fragile, and it crumbled under the impact of Hitler and Stalin with very little resistance.

The Poles fought for some weeks, the Yugoslavs and Greeks for days, the Czechs, Magyars, Rumanians and Bulgarians not at all.

There followed stage Four, which can perhaps best be designated by an expression the Nazis used in connection with some of their activities bei Nacht und Nebel. Under the cover of wartime secrecy, the old benign method of tidying up the ethnic map (assimilation) could be, and was, supplemented by less benign methods - mass murder and forcible transplantation. Armenians had experienced this much earlier, and Greeks and Turks experienced it in the early 1920s, but the really classical time for these methods were the 1940s - wartime and the immediate post-war retaliation.

There is also stage five, the time of Attenuation of Ethnic Hatres. Is this mere wish-fulfilment, or at least in past, a genuine reality? There is at least an element of the latter. Extreme sensitivity to ethnicity was produced not merely by the new conditions in which a man's culture becomes the passport to dignity, membership and employability; it was also connected with the fact that during the early stages of industrialisation, there is an enormous economic gap between those already enjoying some of the fruits of the new wealth, and those entering the new world on the worst possible terms, as impecunious migrants from villages to the slums of the new industrial cities, with nothing but their labour to sell, and in no position to bargain. During the later stages of industrialisation, the proportion of those found in this painful condition diminishes, and affluence softens the struggle for shares in the new wealth. Also, there is at least an element of truth in the Convergence theory: at least as far as cultures which were not too distant initially are concerned, affluent industrialism produces a condition which differences become phonetic rather than semantic; different sounds are used for similar concepts. Men resemble each other more and hate each other less. ?

These then are the five stages, inherent, it seems to me, in the logic of the situation. But only two of the three empires (or rather, their territories) passed through all five of them. The territories bequeathed by the third of the empires enjoyed a different fate after the first two steps. Following a turbulent civil war or Time of Troubles, the third empire was re-established, under new management and under a new, formally non-religious but on the contrary secular messianism, which for a considerable time inspired the leaders, and in great measure also the subjects, with a new and very powerful faith. This faith promised a secular salvation, to be rooted in the economic life of mankind, which was for it a kind of sacrament. After seventy years, this faith faced a major crisis, when it was seen to fail by the criteria which it had itself proposed; economic success.

In the resulting reconstruction, whose success or failure deeply concerns us all, the constraints which had prevented the region of this empire from passing through stages 3, 4 and 5, were removed. Economic success was now to be sought by a general liberalisation rather than by a determined implementation of a firmly collectivist and hence centralist creed. Economic success however was alas not forthcoming, at any rate during the first five years of the great experiment. By contrast, the force of nationalism made itself felt with great speed. It was evidently capable of filling the vacuum left behind by the abandonment of the secular messianism.

The question which now obviously arises is - will the Soviet Union join the development of the other two regions at stage 3, 4, or 5? No one yet knows the answer. There is some evidence for each of the three possibilities. The rapid

affirmation of national sovereignty clearly exemplifies a trend towards Irredentism Self-defeating, with new units haunted by new minorities. There is alas some evidence for the coming of stage 4, with a certain number of massacres and pogroms - fortunately not on a very large scale, at any rate so far - and with extensive semi-voluntary migrations and mass flights. And there is happily also some evidence for a restraint and moderation and willingness to seek a negotiated compromise, in working out the mutually incompatible claims of demography, history and economy.

It would be foolish for an outsider to make confident predictions, and impertinent to sermonise. But one cannot but feel a passionate hope that the lands of Europe's easternmost empire, undergoing the secularisation of its secular messianism, will proceed directly to stage 5, and avoid the fragility of stage 3 and the horrors of stage 4. This must be our fervent wish.

Ernest Gellner

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
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
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**FORMATION AND TRANSMISSION  
OF IDENTITIES IN INTELLECTUAL  
AND EVERYDAY LIFE**

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## FORMATION AND TRANSMISSION OF IDENTITIES IN INTELLECTUAL AND EVERYDAY LIFE

by *Ilkka Heiskanen*

### 1. Introduction

Present contrasting trends of development in Europe seem to offer new inspiring material for the study of collective identities. In Western Europe we encounter the decline of nationalism and attempts to invigorate non-ethnic regional cultural identities (the "Europe of regions"). In Eastern Europe the fall of the superimposed coercive territorial nationalism seemed first to promise the return of old regional unities (Mitteleuropa, the Hanseatic unity, the Donau regions); but this was soon overshadowed practically in all post-socialist countries by emergence of aggressive, even belligerent ethnic nationalism.

All these European trends are globally framed by the rise of new competing economic blocs due to transnational economic integration; and they are cut across by more diffuse but pervasive trends of accelerated growth in the number of refugees and migrant workers from within and outside Europe. The latter trends in turn seem to have unearthed in Europe hidden roots of ethnocentrism, racism and authoritarianism which all cannot always be traced back to those preceding and causing the Holocaust. Even within communities of refugees and migrants we can detect tensions and conflicts between secularized multi-culturalism and new cultural Puritanism (c.f. the fate of Salman Rushdie).

Changes in the international matrix of collective identities have also affected the formation and maintenance of more basic types of collective identity. Such are e.g. kinship and family identities class identity, professional and occupational identity and identification with regions/localities ("Heimat"). A second generation French physician working now in the Arab quarters of Marseilles can scarcely maintain the same professional local and family identity as his father had acquired and maintained in the 1950s and 1960s; and an officer of the ex-Red Army is forced to establish a new professional identity e.g. by returning to the roots of pre-revolution military tradition. (Russian, Ukrainian etc.)

The above trends and changes can be conceived as test cases for the human sciences and their ability to analyze and interpret the formation and

transmission of collective identities. Although research interests seem to have somewhat waned during the period, when the contention between the two world superpowers effectively concealed most of the national and ethnic tensions, social historians, sociologists, political scientist, psychologists and even philosophers cannot be blamed for neglecting this research area and its problems. Yet, from the vantage point of the post-1989 Europe, we can better than ever assess the value of both major theoretical approaches and empirical research results.

This paper tries to assess from the present vantage point the value of some of the theories and historical interpretations concerning the formation and transmission of collective identities in Europe. This "test" has two different perspective. We ask first after the scientific validity of these theories; and then what is their "practical value", how they influence people's everyday life and/or how they can help in understanding and solving problems of collective identities.

The paper uses two types of "data". It first presents and discusses some well-known interpretations ("theories") of modernization and modernity and discusses their validity and value. The second set of data consists of theme interviews focusing on the conceptions of Finnish intellectuals and civil servants of their national and European identity. Before presenting and interpreting the interview data some recent research on collective identities is examined to bridge the "grand" theories and the rather mundane interview data.

## **2. Theories of modernity and transformation of identities in Europe**

The historical test provided by the post-1989 events seems to have undermined some broad historical interpretations of the relationship between modernization and collective identities in Europe. These interpretations argue - or at least imply - that the modernization of European societies, (or, alternatively, the intellectual "project" of modernity), has radically altered the nature of collective identities on our continent. The main gist of the alleged long-term change is the rise of nationalism (or, alternatively cosmopolitanism) and the parallel decline of particularistic collective identities (e.g. ethnic, regional, crafts-/guild-based).

There are (at least) two main lines of these interpretations/theories. The first is that of social history, and the changes in collective identities are explained mainly by political and economic factors. The second is philosophical-culturalist and its proponents relate the transformations of collective identities to the internal dynamics of Western intellectual and cultural development. We can first recapitulate the main features of these two lines of thought and then return to examine their validity and effects.

The overall tenor of the first line of interpretations is that economic development in Europe has progressed via several stages and they - especially the first one leading from agrarian society to industrial society of mass production - have led to homogenization, rise of nationalism and decline of limited particularistic collective identities. Modern large scale industry required mobile, interchangeable, well-educated labor force, and this in turn presupposed literacy, universal education, means of communication and at least potential access to "high culture". All this could be provided only by the state, its authoritative organization arching territorially over specific collectivities and their interest. The legitimacy of the state could rest only on *nationalism*, which provided a diffuse universal culture linking the atomized individuals to its territory. Particularistic collectivities and groups wishing to reap benefits from the modern and modernizing state were ready to embrace the basic tenets of this culture - the nationalistic ideologies. (Cf. Gellner 1983, see also alternative explanations offered by Anderson, 1983, Mann, 1992.)

These themes of economic and political determination have an important complementary theme, that of the related parallel (and chronologically even preceding) civilization process, which has also radically altered the nature of collective identities. In his "State Formation and Civilization" Norbert Elias (1982/1939) gives a lucid interpretation of how the centralization of state-formation in Europe transformed open conflicts into interdependencies between social classes, forced upon citizens constraints and "civility" in their mutual interactions and decreased particularistic features of each class. Centralized state and new interdependencies altered first war-like feudal nobility into a courtly officialdom, and then forged an uneasy cultural alliance between this new upper-class and rising bourgeoisie. Their impact was also felt on the level of lower strata and even globally beyond Western societies.

"What gives Western development its special character is the fact that in its course the dependencies of all on all become more evenly balanced. To an increasing degree, the complex functioning of Western societies, with their high division of labour, depends on the lower agrarian and urban strata controlling their conduct increasingly through insights into its more long-term and more remote connections. ... Thereby their behavior is forced increasingly in a direction originally confined to upper strata. ... In this way civilizing structures are constantly expanding within Western society; both upper and lower strata are tending to become a kind of upper stratum and the centre of network of interdependencies spreading over further and further areas, both populated and unpopulated, of the rest of the world" (Elias 1982/1939, 249-250).

The philosophical-culturalist line of interpretations is less unilinear, although it also assumes -at least by implication - the decline of traditional collective identities in Europe (and, as a colonial consequence, in the whole world). It focuses on modernity as an intellectual project, which, from the 18th century on, started to unite European culture .

Agnes Heller has characterized this project by two major traits: universality and an incessant strive for innovations (Heller, 1988, 148-149; 151-152). Universality pertains to "ethnocentrist anti-ethnocentrism" of the modernist European culture. It accepts the idea of one and whole "humankind" where all people live in their own respective cultures; but European culture differs from the other for its pluralism and its ability to accept and understand (in a relativist fashion) the other cultures - and at the same time to undermine them. The strive for innovations is reflected in the restless spirit of the European modernist project: everything must be new and newer, what has been achieved today becomes old-fashioned to-morrow.

Heller suggests that the main sources of the relentless energy of the European culture (*alias* west, *alias* modernity) stems from the combination of cultural diversity, the utopian dream of freedom and the accumulation of scientific knowledge/technology. All this also guaranteed its world-wide expansion. But Heller points out that the energy of European culture carried forward in time and geographical space only the form of modernity, its technology-based strive for "progress". The content of European culture (its art, architecture philosophy, conception of history) remained bound to its different European nationalistic or linguistic traditions - and as a creative unity it never surpassed its prime time, the 19th century.

Heller also points out that different sectors of European culture have shown a different capacity for renewal and cumulation in intellectual endeavours. Thus science and technology have been able both to maintain the innovative gist and build steadily a new reservoir of knowledge upon the foundations of the old. The same is the case with economy, mainly because it rests its efforts on the successes of science and technology. Politics has developed within the modernist project into a social technology and as such has been both innovative and cumulative - at least in respect to its own institutional arrangements. In principle morals cannot be cumulative, but ethical attitudes at least in the realm of politics have shown this trait. Only the arts and philosophy are bound to deal with a limited number of potential forms, and within their spheres innovations are bound to be exhausted in the incessant strive of the Western culture for the new and unexpected. Heller seems to suggest that the stagnation in these spheres also indicates that major categories of the modernist project have been finalized, that the project is no longer revolutionary, but settling-in. In that sense, having achieved the modernity to the degree it has been able to define it, European culture has

reached a postmodern - and even *post-histoire* - stage of its development (Heller 1988, 152)

Heller perceives the dynamics of European culture in terms of the modernist project and its ability and possibilities to define and deal with the different components of culture. As the result of this dynamics, the ethnic pluralist past is homogenized and the world conquered - at least until other cultures have become modernized and start to create their own cultural contents. Heller, however, does not pay attention to the encounter of different cultures and its impact on intellectual dynamics of Western culture. Julia Kristeva does this in her recent book (1988) in a fascinating manner - from the perspective of how the ideas of "strange cultures" and "being a stranger" have shaped this dynamics.

Kristeva gives a historical account of how the idea of cosmopolitanism and parallel "intellectual" definitions of nationalism has evolved in Europe since the days of early Enlightenment. Starting from the anti-Hobbesian premise of human sociability the ideas of one humanity and cosmopolitanism were constructed by the Enlightenment (or more precisely by Montesquieu) as wider implications of the political doctrine of "appropriately" controlled political freedom. In practice this project of "humanity" and "cosmopolitanism" was first enforced by the French Revolution (Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, and the Constitution of 1791); and then interrupted by the military patriotism of post-revolution wars. Nationalism rose to the counterpart of these ideas already in the writings of the Enlightenment; and the contrast became more blaring as the German linguistic-cultural romanticism became politicized.

Cosmopolitanism - and also romantic nationalism - introduced a new perspective, that of a stranger or a foreign culture, into European intellectual discussion. Taking the role of a stranger, a writer or a philosopher could alienate himself from his own cultural environment and assess it critically; or, as a committed nationalist, he/she could refine the "purity" of his/her own culture in reference to other cultures.

Kristeva also relates the emergence of this approach to a more general Hegelian dynamics of the modernist project. The viewpoint of a stranger or the perspective of a foreign culture helps to alienate the culture from itself, from its "dishonest self"; and this finally forces it to accept this dishonesty even in its own "critical" reflective analysis (the Hegelian "perversity" of culture). In terms of our theme, Kristeva's interpretation implies the release of modern European man from traditional collective identity via the use of the "imaginary" collective identity of a stranger - which also implies the acceptance of an own strangeness within oneself.

As the above outlines indicate, all these interpretations make sweeping generalizations about the general nature and dynamics of European culture and civilization. Actually only the formation and transformations of nationalism are discussed in greater detail; the other forms of collective identities play secondary role. Yet, in this respect, they all have the same general tenor: the modernization process of European society and culture has been one of homogenization and creation of new functional interdependencies. The nation-state has had a central role in this development; and as a result - to paraphrase Elias - occupational and professional differentiation and cultural *variety have increased*, but the *contrasts*, that is, cultural differences and autonomy of particularistic collectivities *have diminished*. (Elias 1982/1939, 251)

Although the above broad-scale interpretations of the modernization and modernity seldom deal explicitly with sub-national collective identities, we can infer the importance they are assigned (or not assigned) by examining their assumptions about the individual psychological and cultural consequences of the development they have posited. These are often presented as a "package", a complex set of syndromes with contrasting bipolar dimensions. A prototype of such a package was offered by Max Weber in his idea of the rationalization of the Western world. Society in this world was transformation into an Iron Cage of industrial division of labor and bureaucratic organizations, and individuals and culture were deprived of all enchanted meanings (*Entzauberung der Welt*). It is indicative that Weber himself personally searched for meaning in life by embracing the nationalism of his own country. Thus at least by implication, Weber perceived nationalism as a substitute for traditional collective identities which were unavoidably lost in the process of modernization. Gellner, although also considering the modern world rational and disenchanting (impersonal, cold, indifferent to values) perceived it yet, in contrast to Weber, as more of a Rubber Cage, (Anderson, 1992, 202), where the achieved prosperity and lack of restraining collective ties allowed people to be involved in varied (sometimes even frivolous) activities of re-enchanting their life, that is, mystifying and making it more exciting.

Some of the major theorists of modernization have been criticized of having been insensitive to the problems of collective identity - even when they appear in the most blaring modes. Perry Anderson, for instance, points out that Gellner in his "single-minded economic functionalism" turned a blind eye to "...the really spectacular manifestations of twentieth century nationalism ....World War and Nazism..." (Anderson, 1992, 207). On the other hand, Gellner paid detailed attention to ethnic, cultural and religious factors in the formation of nations and nationality; and he is also aware of the destructive energy of these factors both in respect to national unity and peaceful relations among nations. But Anderson is probably right in pointing out that too little attention is paid to the individual psychological importance

"....the overpowering dimension of collective meaning that modern nationalism has always involved: that is, not its functionality for industry, but its fulfilment of identity" (Anderson, 1992, 208)

If Gellner neglected the psychological dimension in the analysis of modern nationalism and in the analysis of collective identities, some other theorists have used it as a major intervening factor in explaining the effects of the nation-state on the behaviors of its individuals and particularistic groups. Thus Elias emphasizes that in a state-proctored industrial society social interdependencies substitute coercion. In psychological (or social-psychological) terms this means that external compulsion is transformed into individual self-restraints. The tensions between this new "super-ego" and "aboriginal" (now tamed) libidinal desires of individuals provide the basic energy for the European modernist project - and also its global expansion. By implication Elias seems to suggest that particularistic collective identities cannot provide a similar long-term reservoir of energy, because tensions are lower and/or there are channels for piecemeal and/or abrupt discharging of individual libidinal batteries.

As indicated above, Heller argues that the modernist project was unable to create an overall syncretist culture, a real "European" culture over and above its incessant strive for the new. However, the modernist project was able to level off cultural differences, change old collective identities and penetrate effectively other cultures at least at two stages of its development. First, towards the end of the 19th century it generated "Bohemia", splinter groups of intellectuals and artists who rejected their own dominant high culture and, through borrowing and lending ideas, elements and motifs established ties to other similarly oriented European sub-cultures and to so-called alien cultures. A similar phenomenon ensued in the post-World-War-Two Europe when the youth initiated new cultural and political movements. These appeared as three consecutive waves, those of existentialism, alienation and postmodernism; and they also cut across both cultural-linguistic borders and class divisions. (Heller, 1988, 134-141). Although they fought rather successfully against nationalism and invigorated both high and popular cultures, they also helped to abolish class-based particularistic culture and made room for the culture of consumerism.

Heller suggests that the separation of form and content, the exhaustion of artistic and philosophical resources and the advent of extreme consumerism have finally petrified creativity and undermined the cultural plurality, the energy source of European culture. Cultural contents are rehashed, mass produced or put into museums. In Heller's own words:

"....there are unmistakable symptoms of an impoverished creative fantasy, of mass production of a confectioned imagination, of learned stupidity and professional narrow-mindedness when compared to the

past. If imagination centers on mass production, the mass production of imagination is unavoidable. ...In addition, Europe embarked on a crash course of relativizing its own culture so much that it arrived at a stage of advanced cultural masochism .....Grand narratives of another, better, future are no longer forged ...Redemption is deemed undesirable, and socio-political progress ridiculed. Old cities are rebuilt, ancient castles are refurbished, old artefacts are exhibited, old books are republished - Europeans tiptoe in their cities as museums, because they are museums. Culture, as Europeans understand it, is a way of life and if they search for it in the past amidst growing nostalgia, then culture is as a whole attached to the past....Viewed from this perspective, European culture can legitimately be considered the cadaver of its own self-image". (Heller, 1988, 155)

Yet Heller believes (or believed yet in 1988) that irrespective of the end of one of its époques, Europe was at the brink of starting to develop a real culture of its own. This optimism is based on the pacification of the continent, the fact that ".....the tradition of the Other became attractive rather than repulsive" to the nations of Europe (Heller, 1988, 159).

Kristeva seems to suggest a medicine to prevent the malaise which might endanger this future. In her analysis she lets the historical interwoven threads of cosmopolitanism and nationalism lead to the individual - and psychoanalysis. Our fascination with strangers and foreign worlds can appear both as search and fear, as attraction and repulsion. It is not due to properties of its object (stranger, nation, race), but its basis is in our own psychic make-up, the strangeness within ourselves, which we have projected there from outside, which we repress and which appears as attraction or repulsion in our interaction with our familiar or less familiar human environment. Without understanding this strangeness within ourselves we cannot cope systematically with our own collective identity - or respect collective identities of the others.

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What can we say, from the perspective of the post-1989 Europe, about the above interpretations of modernity and the transformations of collective identities? Does the recent upsurge of ethnic and militant nationalistic collective identities jeopardize the validity of these interpretations as a whole, or does it only suggest that they were incomplete or deficient in this particular respect?

We can assess separately first the philosophical-culturalist interpretations focusing on the "modernist project" and then more empiricist socio-historical interpretations of modernization.

The former type of theories seem to respond to the first question themselves. As Heller say in the quotation above the project of modernity and a certain period of European history are now over, they have worked out their own destiny. Consequently we can transfer them now into the archive - and with them all grand theories they generated about themselves and which can be consider as part of the "invented tradition" of the period and the project.

This solution is not a totally happy one. In doing that we first turn theories, which seemingly speak about the real world, into tautologies or ideologies of an époque. Secondly, as Lyotard (1989) has indicated, while relativizing the project of modernity we at the same time are forced to give up the idea of universal human history and the related principle of cosmopolitanism which it generated. This implies that we must give up the use of the word "we" in the sense we are used to, because it no longer pertains to the striving of "I" and "you" (of the emancipating avant-garde) to make a third party (e.g. lower strata, underprivileged, Third World) a member of "us" (Lyotard, 1989, 315-317). Consequently (and also according to the principles of democracy and cosmopolitanism we still may adhere to) we should let the third party (thatcherites, migrant workers, neo-fascists, new ethnic groups, fundamentalist religious groups etc.) define their own "I's" and "you's" and only wait and see if they can develop (with us or alone) another common "we".

Even if we may not wish to attach ourselves to any trendy analyses of postmodernity, we must not reject the potential the philosophical-culturalist approach can offer for the analysis intellectual dynamics of European culture and the related development of individual and collective identities. Kristeva's analysis of "foreignity" and "strangeness" gives one potential model for concrete non-philosophical analysis. In a systematic manner she carries out a dual analysis of this theme both on the level of historical cultural dynamics, and on the level of the development of our understanding of human psychic processes. In his analysis of "Universal History and Cultural Differences" Jean-François Lyotard (1989, see also his "The Differend", 1988/1983) offers another more philosophical approach, where the "world", such as it is presented in different narratives, is put to exacting logical quasi-legal trial. This is, e.g. his approach in his analysis of the end of the modernist project referred to above.

In the case of socio-economic theories or explanations we do not need to assume their end even if we accept the postulate that modernization processes have come to a halt or to an end. They offer us general frames (or better, the history as a "well-ordered context") without which we could not carry out meaningful, detail analyses. These general frames, are necessarily single-minded in some respects, and they must be re-worked for any more detailed analysis. This is, of course, the task of actual empirical research, but we can here look at certain problems researchers may have while specifying them

into more detailed use. There seems to be three major types of problems: first, they may see modernization processes as too comprehensive, second, they may consider them too "pure" (e.g. assume similarities that do not exist); and third, assume them unidirectional and/or irreversible.

A major problem of the first type is reflected in the assumption that the modernization processes observed in the core countries of Europe also took place in the similar form and for the same reasons in more peripheral European countries. Thus it has been, e.g., suggested that discursive literacy was the main factor in promoting industrialization and modernization in all European countries (Mann, 1992). Yet, e.g. in all Nordic countries the discursive literacy of the lower strata became prevalent at about the same time, but industrialization and modernization took place at considerably different times (with e.g. Finland being a definite latecomer). Similarly, the project of modernity was a creative enterprise only in the core countries; and its results spread out to the periphery often only as fads, fashions or ideologies.

Analyses of nationalism and "particularistic interests" provide good examples for the second type of problems. As our review above already indicated, there are several types of nationalism: rational nationalism of industrializing societies, intellectual "romantic" nationalism emphasizing e.g. linguistic, cultural and/or racial purity, and coercive geographical nationalism aspiring to dominate other peoples and areas. Similarly, even the purest types of particularistic collective identities (e.g. ethnic) can differ crucially from each other. This is clearly the case of ethnic collective identities in the Europe of today. Some of them have been lost, some live in their glorious past harboring ideas of recreating it, and some have survived under political repression maintained their strength and turned into a source of strong belligerent or even paranoiac energy. If combined into typologies, these kinds of specific classifications can lead us to better explanations of the development of European collective identities than more comprehensive interpretations.

We find another type of striving for purity when we look at the interaction between different types of theories. Theories of modernization which emphasize the role of economic and social factors in modernization often underestimate the role of intellectual ("cultural") development; and theories which focus on intellectual factors and cultural dynamics usually underestimate the role of economic and social factors. More important is, however, that there is a tendency to give certain cultural and individualistic factors a kind of privileged position and separate them from joint determination in the development. Thus science, technological innovations or artistic creativity are seen as *primus motors*, which release new trends of large scale development, for instance large scale industrial production or new forms of consumerism. Yet scientists, technologists, artists and intellectuals

are themselves seldom seen as actors among other actors in the development they have released: there are few analyses of, how "frivolous" mass phenomena (mass communication, advertisement, tourism, etc.) may redirect and determine their activities.

The assumption of a steady and unidirectional disappearance of particularistic collective interests and related atomization of modernizing collectivities is an example of the third type of problems. We know too well that also modernization processes produce new particularistic groups (e.g. new officially accredited professions) which might offer their members strong particularistic collective identities .

These problems of socio-economic theories of modernization have been repeatedly pointed out in critical discussion. It has been pointed out that their presence in actual concrete analysis undermines the informative value of the results (f. e.g. Macfarlane, 1992). Yet, there is also another more "practical" problem involved. Straight-forward simple theories and interpretations are conceptually appealing, i.e., they can be easily used as conceptual frames of reference in everyday discourse and discussions. Our subsequent case study data will hopefully prove this point.

### **3. On the Need and Transformations of Modern Collective Identities**

Irrespective of these problems the reviewed interpretations of modernization and the nature of the project of modernity are valuable for all analyses of formation and transmission of collective identities in Europe. To recapitulate: they offer overall conceptual schemes which allow a sufficiently broad perspective to the varied modernization process in Europe during the two last centuries. On the empirical level they also map rather comprehensively major trends and events which condition (and in turn are conditioned) by the development of collective identities. Yet, in any analysis of collective identities in Europe we must ask some more specific questions about their psychological and cultural basis and its transformations in modern (or should we say: "postmodern"?) society . Recent research, which partly builds upon the above broader interpretations, provides some pertinent questions and also gives some interesting answers.

We can first look some answers of recent research on the need of collective identity by the individual in modern society.

In a recent analysis Alessandro Pizzorno (1991) contrasts two different types of reasons for people to maintain collective identities: rational and socio-psychological . Among the former he counts the Hobbesian need for survival, and more general need for material benefits. The latter category includes one major reason: the individual's need to create his/her own personal identity

and to maintain his/her self-esteem through the mutual recognition that the members of a collectivity can give to each other.

Pizzorno points out convincingly that the need for *collective identities cannot be explained solely by rational reasons*. He also indicates that more limited (e.g. local or regional) collectivities necessarily provide a better basis for this recognition than the state. The latter can, however, enhance its attraction as a collectivity by two means. It can convince its citizens of the importance of maintaining its borders (even if need be by generating wars); and it can generate new loyal local and regional "partisan" identities through financial support and representational arrangements.

Pizzorno seems to suggest a kind of quantum theory of collective identity. All people need to develop their personal identity and maintain their self-esteem. Only recognition by other members of a collectivity can guarantee that, *ergo* the need of collective identities and memberships remains constant in wider populations of the same size. Yet, Pizzorno probably underestimates the role of familial and cultural factors in shaping the need of collective identity. E.g., generation studies suggest that the need for collective affiliation probably varies considerably from generation to generation (see. e.g. Lasch 1980); and since the days of de Tocqueville it has been well-known that interest in collective affiliation varies from one nation to another. The observations of Blau and Swartz (1984) seems to go counter Pizzorno's analysis. On the basis of American data they suggest that there is a reverse relationship between the number of individuals' overall cross-cutting organizational ties and the density and intensity of their in-group relations within specific sub-population (e.g. a local community.)

Calhoun in turn suggest that the possibility in modern society to more easily establish indirect ties to other persons alters the nature of direct collective ties and collective identities. Large-scale markets, organizational networks and organizational communication and new information technologies allow individuals to become involved in nexuses of indirect relations with each other - and even to establish "*imagined communities*" (users of soap X, "avant-garde" in art Y, owners of credit card Z, gun owners of the U.S., fan club of Madonna, etc.). Calhoun suggest that indirect relations and imagined communities do not decrease the attractiveness of direct relationships. Yet they may alter their nature and functions. Direct collective ties and shared identities among other things lose their instrumental value, (e.g. as basis of political friendship and cooperation).

Calhoun's idea of the "imagined community" does not, however, cover another important collective "artefact" of modern societies, the creation of new collectivities through new conceptualizations, categorizations and comparison processes. Robertson (1990) points out first that modernization implies continuous processes of universalization of particularism. People are

no longer committed to a given local unit, cultural region or nation-state, but to a "universal" idea or a type of community, which has become globally "brand-marked". Such are, e.g., "metropolitan centers", "welfare state" or "modern municipality". Robertson suggests further that modernization also produces a reversed trend: particularization of certain global and universal phenomena. Thus e.g. the insitutionalization of World Time produced the time-zoning of the world, scientific research breaks steadily into new disciplines, new occupations and "closed shops" of professions are being organized and accredited.

Robertson's observation lead to more serious theoretical issue. Historians and social scientist have been long aware of the fact that their own endeavours (or actually the endeavours of their predecessors) have either directly or indirectly participated in the creation of new collectivities and collective identities. Since the late nineteenth century historians, artists, architects and social theorists have participated in invention of traditions by their accounts of the past events, construction of buildings and statues glorifying nations and rules, etc. Also such divisions of societies as *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* have altered our conceptions of communities and created either nostalgia for the past or actual activities to create "true communities" into "modern atomized society". And, as we indicated above, even "modernity" and "European culture" can be conceived as artefacts of historians, social scientists and social theorists.

In recent literature there is surprisingly few pertinent analyses of the transformations of class-based collective identities. Even such classic categorizations as Mary Douglas's group and grid are used mainly as tools for analyzing the historical past, not the apparent presence or emerging future (Douglas 1982). Philip Wexler's recent (1990) analysis of the new class dynamics in Europe offers, however, a new relevant perspective.

Wexler knowingly simplifies the class situation of postmodern, post-industrialized societies by focusing only on two classes which display extreme polar oppositions in their basic cultural orientations. The first of them is the so-called new middle which displays the dominant cultural orientation of the society; the second class is labelled by Wexler simply the "other" class, which comprises the marginal groups of society: youth, poor and unemployed people, minorities, housewives and the aged.

Wexler suggests that neither class has any longer a real motivation, real "libidinal" desire to act (Wexler, 1990, 171). The members of both class are mainly involved in identity maintenance, the former in terms of ego boosting, the latter through ego binding. More specifically, the members of the new middle class are involved in "....drawing cultural resources from the environment in the service of their restorative activity of constructing an orderly life, a life as a secure sequence or even, as a work of art" (Wexler

1990, 172). The members of the "other" class in turn search for a group solidarity. In modern "semiotic society" this is not done by generating intra-group interaction and collective consciousness, but by retreating into the "imaginary world" created by audiovisual media, especially by television. This solidarity is partly "silent solidarity" of atomized participation in the ritual of television watching, partly sharing of a "group stimulant" that produces feelings of energy and inspiration. This does not lead to action, although it stills "internally elaborated desires" (Wexler 1990, 172)

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The analyses and studies reviewed in this section come closer to "empirical reality" and concrete phenomena and events of today than the grand interpretations of the previous section. There are certain intertwining themes which characterize them.

First, all these studies emphasize the importance of direct primary collective identities - or striving for such identities - even in the world of today. Second, they emphasize that the nature of collective ties and collective identities is altered by modern types of inter-personal interaction and new means of communication. Third, they point out that collective identities are susceptible to (a more or less conscious) symbolic and cognitive manipulation: to the definition and categorization of interpersonal interaction and types of collective ties.

The following case study will illustrate these themes to a certain extent. It also helps to tie them to the themes of modernization presented in the previous section

#### **4. Case Study: The National and European Culture of Finnish Intellectuals and Civil Servants**

The case study data presented here to illustrate the above discussion was gathered in spring 1990 as part of a larger comparative European research project. The project attempted to analyze from a comparative perspective the European orientations of intellectuals of participating countries.

The Finnish study was designed to focus on the conceptions of Finnishness and its European cultural components of relatively young "free-floating" marginal intellectuals (mainly free lance researchers and journalists) with weak ties or no ties at all to major established institutions and organizations. The sample included representatives from two generations of intellectuals born in 1941-1950 and 1951-1964. A group of senior civil servants (born in 1941-1950) was included as a comparison group. Each group consisted of twenty persons and the data was gathered with semi-structured theme interviews which lasted about 45 minutes on an average.

The respondents were led to assess to what extent the Finnish people, their cultural traits and social practices were "indigenously" Finnish or could be compared with those of some other European countries, regions or cultures. The questions were formulated in a more general manner asking only about resemblance between Finns, Finnish culture and Finnish practices and those of any other country. It was expected that "indigenous" Finnishness and a European dimension would automatically be brought into replies by the respondents - as actually happened. In actual interview discussions the respondents easily gave up the formal idea of "resemblances" and spoke rather freely about "being" Nordic, German, Russian etc. in this and that respect. Similarly, national characteristics were regarded as results of "influences" by or "exported" from other countries, regions or cultures.

The questions were structured to pertain only to few areas of Finnishness and its assumed European components. On the basis of relevant literature and some pilot interviews the following areas were chosen to structure the questions and answers: a) work morale, b) logic of argumenting and thinking, c) religion, religiousness, d) the arts and literature, e) political culture, f) social life and sociability, g) habitus (overall appearance: external behavioral patterns, gestures, dressing), h) preferences for cuisine, i) preferences for drinks, drinking patterns, j) patterns of flirting/sexual behavior.

In each of these areas the respondents were first asked both of their conception of the national Finnish "stereotypes", and their "self-identification" with other countries, regions and cultures. The interview was started with questions: "What other country, region or culture most resembles Finland/Finns in respect to work morale (religion/religiousness the arts and culture etc.)"?/"In what country, region or culture does work morale (religion/religiousness, preference in the arts and culture etc.) most resemble that of your own?" A standard set of references were used to help answering (e.g. in the case of work morale: punctuality, industriousness, working hours, sense of responsibility). After the initial question the respondents were asked to give grounds for their answers and elaborate them. All answers were recorded and transcribed. In addition to the tables presented here, the following interpretations are based on these transcriptions. Data have been presented in greater detail in an earlier report (Heiskanen, Mitchell, Saukkonen, 1991).

Table 1, 2 and 3 summarize the answers of the three groups of respondents to the initial question concerning their self-identification. Although they give only sheer frequencies of the respondents' reference to other countries, regions and cultures, interesting converging and diverging patterns can be detected. It seems first that all groups of respondents divided their self-identification into four major categories: 1) basic value patterns (work morale and logic), 2) "deeply personal" practices (habitus, social relations,

**Table 1.** Comparative International Self-Identification of Senior Finnish Civil Servants (Office heads, age 40-49, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Religion	(3) Logic	(4) Habit	(5) Sociality	(6) Sexuality	(7) Cuisine	(8) Drinking	(9) Politics	(10) Arts, liter.	
Genuine Finnish	3	5	-	4	6	10	3	6	3	3	43
Swedish	4	7	3	4	5	2	-	-	2	-	27
Norwegian	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	5
Islandic - Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nordic*	4	1	7	5	2	2	2	1	4	1	29
Danish	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
German	7	-	7	2	-	-	3	-	2	4	25
Dutch	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
Swiss	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7
Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Central European*	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	3	1	-	9
Hungarian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czech	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baltic*	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Russian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	6
Eastern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
French	-	1	-	-	4	2	9	9	2	3	30
Italian	-	-	-	1	3	-	2	3	-	1	10
Spanish	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	4
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western European*	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
British	1	1	1	3	1	1	-	2	7	1	18
American	-	1	-	2	2	1	2	-	-	2	10
Canadian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-American	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	4
Irish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-European*	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Japanese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*=respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

**Table 2.** Comparative International Self-Identification of Middle-Aged Finnish Intellectuals (Free lance researchers, journalists etc., age 40-49, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Religion	(3) Logic	(4) Habit	(5) Sociality	(6) Sexuality	(7) Cuisine	(8) Drinking	(9) Politics	(10) Arts, liter.	
Genuine Finnish	-	5	7	6	5	2	4	3	1	-	34
Swedish	-	6	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	12
Norwegian	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
Islandic	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nordix*	3	-	1	2	1	3	-	-	3	1	19
Danish	1	-	1	2	1	3	-	1	2	-	11
German	8	1	2	-	2	-	1	3	1	5	23
Dutch	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2
Swiss	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Central European*	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	3
Hungarian	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	5
Czech	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	5
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	4
Baltic*	-	-	3	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	7
Russian	4	2	3	2	-	-	-	1	-	6	18
Eastern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
French	1	2	1	1	-	3	4	9	6	6	33
Italian	1	1	1	2	2	2	5	6	2	1	23
Spanish	-	1	1	1	-	1	3	5	1	2	15
Portuguese	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Southern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
British	-	-	4	2	2	1	-	1	2	2	14
American	3	1	3	1	2	1	3	1	-	2	17
Canadian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-American*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Irish	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	4
Non-European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japanese	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Others	-	1	-	-	1	2	3	-	-	1	8

\*respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

**Table 3.** Comparative International Self-Identification of Young Finnish Intellectuals (Free lance researchers, journalists etc., age 26-39, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Religion	(3) Logic	(4) Habit	(5) Sociality	(6) Sexuality	(7) Cuisine	(8) Drinking	(9) Politics	(10) Arts, liter	
Genuine Finnish	2	3	-	4	4	4	-	-	4	2	23
Swedish	1	1	1	1	2	1	-	-	2	-	9
Norwegian	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Islandic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nordic*	2	-	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	8
Danish	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3
German	3	-	3	1	1	-	-	-	3	1	12
Dutch	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	3	1	3
Swiss	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Central European*	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	1	2	9
Hungarian	-	-	1	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	6
Czech	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baltic*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Russian	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	5
Eastern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
French	2	-	4	1	5	5	3	11	6	2	39
Italian	1	-	1	1	3	3	4	7	1	1	22
Spanish	-	-	1	1	3	2	1	7	1	1	17
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western European*	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
British	2	3	8	4	3	3	-	-	1	3	27
American	6	5	3	3	3	3	3	1	-	2	29
Canadian	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Anglo-American*	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	5	3	10
Irish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-European*	1	1	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	12
Japanese	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	6
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

flirting/sex), 3) potentially creative practices (religion, politics, arts and literature), and 4) hedonistic sector (cuisine, drinking).

In all groups respondents considered their "deeply personal" practices often "indigenously Finnish", that is, they could not or did not wish to compare them with the "foreign" practices. Basic value patterns are considered "imported", although the country of origin vary somewhat from group to group. Protestant ethics and logic rule supreme among the older groups, Anglo-American ethics and logic among the younger. The Latin countries provide preference cultures for hedonistic activities, the reference cultures of creative practices shows no steady invariances. Yet in the latter sector the eastern (Russian) influences, which otherwise are less often admitted, are referred to rather frequently. Analyses of interview transcripts indicate, that the East (and also the Baltic area) are considered positive reference countries in the arts, religion and literature, negative in politics ("Finnish politics is intriguing Byzantine politics", "there is a nomenclature", etc.).

The respondents' assessment of the other Finns (the nation as whole, its "stereotype"), differs rather distinctly from their self-assessment (Tables 4, 5 and 6). First of all, the nation as a whole is considered more Finnish - and also more Nordic - than the respondents themselves. Especially the "hedonistic sector" is considered more indigenously Finnish. At the same time the "deeply personal sector" and the "creative practices" are perceived to be more under Eastern (Russian) influence. It is also interesting to notice that respondents consider their country and people rather thoroughly permeated by German Protestant ethics and working morale.

The difference between the three groups shows also rather distinct general patterns. It seems that civil servants have a very definite "professional" international self-identification: they are obviously formally rather Nordic in respect to their professional identity (work morale, logic), indigenous Finnish and Nordic in private life, and South-Western European in their hedonistic activities. The two groups of intellectuals differ from each other in two respects: the younger group is distinctly more Anglo-American and less "Germanic" in general and especially in their basic value patterns; and the middle-aged intellectuals consider themselves considerably more often Eastern (use of Russia as a reference culture).

The results confirm the rather commonplace observation that in the modern world national characteristics are both in theoretical discussion and everyday life continuously honed comparatively against those of other nations and cultures. The reference points in comparison processes are usually taken from close geographical cultural environment, where comparison are more relevant and can be made in rather concrete terms. In our case study very few "choices" went beyond European continent (if North America is counted "basically European"); and "values" and their differences in personal self-

**Table 4.**

Comparative Stereotypes of Finland: Senior Civil Servants (Office heads, age 40-49, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF ASSESSMENT										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Religion	(3) Logic	(4) Habit	(5) Sociality	(6) Sexuality	(7) Cuisine	(8) Drinking	(9) Politics	(10) Arts, liter.	
Genuine Finnish	1	1	2	2	3	6	9	5	9	8	46
Swedish	6	6	5	5	7	3	5	7	1	2	47
Norwegian	1	4	2	4	3	1	-	4	-	-	19
Islandic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nordic*	4	9	3	5	7	7	6	3	8	3	54
Danish	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
German	9	2	6	1	-	4	2	-	2	5	31
Dutch	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Swiss	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central European*	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	2	6
Hungarian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
Czech	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baltic*	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Russian	-	-	3	5	2	1	6	4	1	8	30
Eastern European*	-	-	2	5	-	1	-	-	4	1	13
French	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
Italian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Southern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
British	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	7
American	1	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	1	7
Canadian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anglo-American*	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Irish	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2
Non-European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japanese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

**Table 5.** Comparative Stereotypes of Finland: Middle-Aged Intellectuals age 40-49, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF ASSESSMENT										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Religion	(3) Logic	(4) Habit	(5) Sociality	(6) Sexuality	(7) Cuisine	(8) Drinking	(9) Politics	(10) Arts, liter	
Genuine Finnish	1	1	3	5	4	2	3	2	7	9	37
Swedish	5	3	3	-	9	1	6	4	1	3	35
Norwegian	4	7	3	-	7	3	1	3	2	2	32
Islandic	-	-	-	2	1	3	-	10	-	-	16
Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Nordic*	5	5	2	2	5	2	2	1	4	1	29
Danish	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	3
German	8	7	9	-	1	6	3	-	2	9	45
Dutch	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Swiss	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	3
Hungarian	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
Czech	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2
Polish	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	4	1	-	8
Baltic*	1	-	3	5	-	1	3	2	1	-	16
Russian	1	1	5	4	1	2	6	11	9	13	53
Eastern European*	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
French	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	4
Italian	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
Spanish	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Southern European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
British	-	1	1	1	-	-	4	-	-	2	9
American	2	-	3	-	1	-	4	-	-	3	13
Canadian	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Anglo-American*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Irish	1	-	1	3	1	3	-	5	-	-	14
Non-European	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japanese	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

**Table 6.** Comparative Stereotypes of Finland: Young Finnish Intellectuals  
(Free lance researchers, journalists, etc. age 26-39, N=20)

CULTURES IDENTIFIED WITH:	AREAS OF ASSESSMENT										Total
	(1) Work morale	(2) Reli- gion	(3) Logic	(4) Habi- tus	(5) Socia- bility	(6) Sex- uality	(7) Cui- sine	(8) Drink- ing	(9) Poli- tics	(10) Arts, liter	
Genuine											
Finnish	1	1	6	7	7	6	5	7	8		52
Swedish	-	5	5	4	2	3	3	3	4	2	31
Norwegian	1	3	2	2	1	4	2	3	-	1	19
Islandic	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
Greenlandish	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	3
Nordic*	6	9	-	5	8	7	8	3	1	4	51
Danish	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
German	8	2	3	1	1	2	2	-	1	2	22
Dutch	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Swiss	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Austrian	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	4
Central											
European*	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2
Hungarian	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	3
Czech	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
Polish	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	3
Baltic	-	1	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	1	7
Russian	1	1	5	6	1	-	5	5	6	7	37
Eastern											
European*	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	1	6
French	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Italian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portuguese	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Southern											
European*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western											
European*	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
British	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	5
American	-	2	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	2	8
Canadian	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	6
Anglo-Ame- rican	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	7
Irish	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3
Non-Euro- pean*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japanese	3	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	8
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*respondents referred to whole regions, not to specific linguistic or national cultures

identification and national stereotypes structured a rather systematic "cultural landscape" around the Baltic sea. Only the two sources of "strong" external communication, first political and cultural communication (Russia) and second commercial and cultural communication (the USA) made additional inroads into this landscape.

These results can, of course, be interpreted, on the one hand, as an empirical proof for the "indigenous" nature of people's conception of their nationality, and, on the other hand, they also support the idea of international "polyvalence" of the conceptions of nationalism. Yet, from the perspective of the present paper, we can make some of even more relevant theoretical "indirect" inferences.

The first indirect inference relates unavoidably to our "informants" (the respondents of the case study) and the nature of the picture they could provide us with. Having an academic background (often in social sciences) the respondents were better than average "theoreticians" in the problems of self-identification and Finnish "national character". This is reflected in their use of such concepts as "Lutheran ethics", "Byzantine politics" and "German authoritarianism".

The second indirect inference relates to the issue of modernization. As indicated above, the interview scheme implied a definite idea of what constitutes a national identity. In their answers the respondents reacted to this idea and confirmed it by turning it into a kind of "modernization story" of Finland. In this story the geographical context of Finland is delineated in the manner reported above. The basic force which initiated and maintained the process of modernization is also clearly designated. It is the Protestant work morale and related mode of thinking (logic, way of argumenting). Certain indigenously Finnish features are, however, often seen to operate together with these "imported" basic values. Yet, many of the indigenous Finnish features (especially in work morale and politics) are seen to have functioned (and still functioning) against the grain of modernization.

The respondents' story of modernization is also that of developmental stages. This stage division has, however, a certain moral undertone. The process of modernization is divided into two parts. The first half includes the toilsome periods of pre-war nation-building and post-war reconstruction and industrialization. The second period, which all the respondents had personally experienced, is seen as a period of fast-rising affluence and consumption. The respondents confirm the perception of the latter part in their responses to life-style (habitus, cuisine, drinking), i.e., by mentioning how they have recently learned or are learning new more affluent consumption patterns. There are also many indications that the respondents had the feeling of decay and were expecting a reversal in the present favorable development. Direct references to potential negative economic

consequences were not, however, made ; negative anticipations were expressed mainly in moralist terms (decline of work morale, drinking problems, problems of corrupt politics and lack of political leadership). In cultural sectors (art and literature) no references were made to *Götterdämmerung* of modernity (à la Heller), in critical comments these sectors were seen as stagnant, formal or bureaucratized.

The third indirect inference concerns the type of familial social and collective relationships within the depicted national stereotype. The Finnish inability to communicate and relate more intimately to other persons was bemoaned, the disappearance of old type extended family relations and closeness was often mentioned, and the formalization and bureaucratization of collective units - voluntary organizations, political parties, state and municipalities included - were complained. This was, of course, done in comparison with the similar units in other countries and regions. Thus Dutch and Italian familial and friendship ties, Swedish organizations and administration and British politics were mentioned as better or desirable alternatives.

The fourth indirect inference pertains to psychological aspects of international comparison processes. Due to respondents' high educational background very few comments were made which could be interpreted as ethnocentrist or aggressive towards other nations or cultures. Another type of aggression was, however, frequently expressed: severe criticism was often directed against the own nation: Finns, Finnishness, and Finnish institutions. Often this criticism also included personal self-criticism, which was sometimes humorously joking, sometimes even rather aggressive. It was as if the comparison process allowed (and sometimes even forced) the respondents to see their nation, fellow-citizens and themselves as if in a mirror or through the eyes of a foreigner. Yet there were very few indications of real "internal" strangeness, psychological alienation of the type Kristeva suggests in her analysis. Through careful reading of replies one could detect such syndromes in some responses to themes concerning Finnish sociability and sexual mores/attitude. It should be noted that they were found in the replies of female responses; and they were seldom present in responses to questions concerning self-identification, but hidden in descriptions of Finnish stereotypes.

\* \* \*

What does our interpretations of case study data and above indirect inferences actually mean, can they be interpreted in general terms from the perspective of our earlier discussion of the modernity and the role of collective identities in the present world? We can try to synthesize the results by starting with some astute observations by Octavio Paz. We can then

continue to a more detailed analysis by elaborating and applying the ideas of "imagined communities" and class-based cognitive and cultural orientations presented earlier in the previous section.

In his well-known essay "The Verbal Contract" (1987/1980) Paz first criticizes the structuralist conception of society as a language or a system of communication. This conception neglects the basic idea of language as a generator and a source of culture-bound systems of signification. Instead Paz suggests that society is actually structured by the media: the modes of establishing, transmitting and receiving messages. He even states that ".....the media are the society." (Paz, 1987, 163). The media are not systems of signification, yet they define the nature of society, impart meaning upon it.

Paz draws probably too sharp a line between media and language as a composite system of signification. As Paz himself notes, different systems of signification (the arts, science, religion etc.), whatever their own means of producing it (written, visual etc.), have their own relations to modern media; and in order to maintain their access to media, they change their orientation and alter (simplify, stabilize) their mode of presentation. In the case of science this of course, is most intentionally done through processes of popularization. Easily understandable modes of presenting research results become themselves a kind of "medium within media".

The phenomenon of "becoming a medium" does not, however, appear only in the case of popularization of research results. Concepts, theories, and modes of expression used by social sciences can become a kind of open forum or "media" even via general diffusion; and they can be used by anybody who has certain skills and an appropriate topic/subject to be analyzed and presented. Mass media often precipitate the formation and "automation" of certain conceptual ideas as such frames or "media within media" by choosing its own experts, panel discussants and performers. Media presence is not always needed, and conceptual schemes and theories themselves can be used as "media".

As mentioned in the above analysis of case study data, use of conceptual schemes and theories as "media" took already place in the process of collecting data. The themes of questions were outlined within a certain type of generally accepted social science conceptual "frame" ("types of values", "areas of social activities", "social practices"), and the respondents confirmed this frame by using (as a "latent" group, several in unison) some congruent "social theories" (modernization, theory of "Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism") as their media of answering.

In the previous section we discussed Robertson's idea of "universalized" imagined communities (the welfare state, a metropolis etc.). Our case study data indicate that different nationalities and even sub-national collectivities

can function as imagined communities. As such this is nothing new: people have always dreamt about better conditions or utopias prevailing in other countries or on different continents. But here, in respect to the case study, we can notice a difference. The respondents used national stereotypes very much in the same manner as they used social science concepts and theories. They did not use them as "real" stereotypes to label but to suggest and explore potential alternatives for their own way of life. This exceeds Robertson's idea of imagined communities. It can be better seen, as cognitive means to "... draw cultural resources from the environment in the service ... (for) ... restorative activities of constructing an orderly life, a life as a secure sequence or even, as a work of 'art'" (Wexler 1990, 172)

This comment leads us automatically to the issue of the social class. According to Wexler the ability to this kind of cognitive activity is a characteristic of the "new middle class". The respondents of our case study belong to this new rising class; and the results of the study reflect prevailing national loyalties and international search for new collective identities by this class in Finland. As free lance social scientists journalists and intellectual workers the respondents are also an avant-garde group which defines and renews the ideology and cultural orientation of the new middle class - and influences social and cultural orientations of the other classes of society. If we assume that the new middle class is also the rising class of Finnish society, we have also gained, via the case study data, some insight into the present direction in the Finnish cultural "modernization processes".

The last lesson which can be drawn from the case study pertains to the validity of theories of modernization and modernity. The results indicate that, when compared with the intellectually more trendy philosophical-cultural theories of modernity, the socio-economic theories of modernization can probably function better as "medium" of intellectual everyday discussion (the theme interviews can be considered such); and they probably also offer best cognitive basis for the new middle class's mapping of their international social and cultural environment. Of course the themes of the interviews were designed in a manner which re-enforced the use of socio-economic theories. Yet the respondents could have also used more complex philosophical analysis and arguments and many of the respondents would have been intellectually able to do that. They, however, considered socio-economic theories a better medium than philosophical-culturalist theories and used them to create the narrative of Finland's modernization.

The fact that conceptual schemes or theories are used as a medium of (more or less intellectual) everyday discussion is by no means a proof of their validity. When this happens they actually obtain a kind of non-informative tautological validity: they are taken for granted, not scientifically true or useful. In contrast, such conceptual schemes and theories which cannot be adopted as media for discussion maintain their informative value by

presenting something new and surprising - which, of course, must also be true in some sense of the word.

The above discussion has also some implications for the philosophical-cultural theories of modernity - and for the trendy discussions of post-modernity and *post-histoire*. In contrast to "practical" socio-economic theories they belong to the realm of "high culture"; and, if we expand Wexler's rather limited class division, their proponents can be expected to belong with high probability to upper class with high cultural capital - or are at least aspiring for candidacy to that class. The proponents of these theories also have a better social control over their theories. They can even "turn them out" like some proponents of post-modernity and post-histoire have been willing to do - although results can be intellectually rather puzzling as Lyotard has indicated (see the review of Lyotard's comments above).

### **In Lieu of Conclusions .....**

we can return to the opening sections of this paper and to the problems of changing European matrix of collective identities. What does our long foray into the world of theories and interpretations of modernity and collective identities imply from its perspective? It does not suffice to say only that theories and intellectual discussions are alive and kicking irrespective of all changes and new events they may not be able to explain.

We can first return to the analyses suggested in the studies by Robertson, Wexler and the essay by Paz. They spell out the importance of three interrelated factors: the media, cognitive capacity and the class. The media and cognitive capacity define our imagined communities; and they also spell out alternatives to consciously develop our ideas of human communities (and humanity as a whole). Class position in turn set the limits to our ability to choose from among these alternatives and to relate to other (national and/or international) communities. In other words class division and people's anchorage to given class positions restrain them from availing of but only one or few of these alternatives.

The analyses of Elise and Kristeva bring additional social-psychological and psychoanalytical dimensions to complement the cognitive factor. We know that if we are able to control the interdependencies between nations and groups in modern expanding and integrating world (cf. Elias), we can also control e.g. the energies which drive business enterprises to compete for profit and different ethnic and cultural groups to feud against each other. We also know that the analysis and understanding of strangeness within ourselves may help us to understand different groups and cultures and to accept and choose new collective identities. But unfortunately we also know that it is difficult to diffuse and apply complex theories (Elias's social-psychology) or

theories with very specific accredited modes of application (Kristeva and psychoanalysis).

These assessment above are still made from the Western perspective, or at least from the perspective of populations, groups and classes located within the social and communication matrix of a Western advanced industrialized nation-state. Of course these societies have their own rebelling ethnic and cultural minorities. Within these societies it is, however, possible either to contain ethnic and cultural minorities as some kind of autonomous units or induce most of their members to join Wexler's marginal "other" class, where urban poverty and media will keep them pacified. The situation is much more problematic in the nation-states of the Second and Third Worlds, where ethnic and cultural groups adhere to their collectivities and secede from their old unities with such a fury that it seems to separate them even from the humankind. Research which could help us to understand the forces forging such strong collective identities has scarcely yet started.

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
# IMAGES OF EUROPE

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
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## LES VISAGES MYTHIQUES DE L'EUROPE

par Hélène Ahrweiler



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## **LES VISAGES MYTHIQUES DE L'EUROPE**

par Hélène Ahrweiler

Les visages multiples de l'Europe composent le mythe unificateur d'une civilisation européenne. On le sait, la réalité est tout autre, plus complexe; notre sujet 'l'Europe mythique' (à ne pas confondre avec 'mythologique'), risque de ce fait de rester toujours actuel. Pour les Européens, c'est-à-dire pour ceux qui se reconnaissent dans le message gréco-romain et la spiritualité judéo-chrétienne, pour reprendre la définition de Paul Valéry, l'Europe et ses prolongements naturels (le monde occidentalisé) représentent l'investissement du passé dans l'avenir (c'est cela l'idée de progrès, d'une culture de ceux qui ont par leur labeur, leur gloire ou leurs erreurs forgé notre patrimoine commun: la civilisation que nous désignons comme européenne.

Héritiers d'une fortune composée de biens divers, que nous voulons maintenir indivis, nous cherchons les modes de sa fructification. Sommes-nous en passe de concevoir l'Europe actuelle comme une Association d'intérêt commun qui, dans le préambule de sa charte (de ses statuts), se serait donné comme but la réalisation de ce mythe culturel qu'est l'Europe.

Le thème "l'Europe, patrimoine culturel" conduit à interroger à travers une histoire pleine de conflits et de déchirures, la persistance d'un espoir démesuré pour la quête effrénée d'une Europe une et solidaire: c'est-à-dire la permanence d'un rêve appuyé sur des faits mythiques, telle par exemple l'identité culturelle de l'Europe.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'unité culturelle considérée comme le seul fondement du mythe unificateur de l'Europe doit répondre par ses voies plurielles à la question de savoir si l'Europe constitue, a constitué ou peut et va constituer une entité vivante, une 'personne', comme on le disait jadis ('personne mystique') d'une nation, d'un pays. C'est-à-dire une unité dont l'existence mérite des sacrifices, qui entraîne les convictions qui s'érige en idéal et qui forme un 'orbis', un ordre de justice et de protection, comme on le disait jadis de 'l'ordre romain'. Faut-il rappeler que dans l'histoire, ces entités mystiques se concrétisent par la construction de cérémonies - sources d'émotion qui donnent à voir au peuple illettré, averti ou non - et par des symboles qui résument et exaltent l'unité dans l'espace d'espoir et de mémoire.

Monuments aux morts et autres panthéons, drapeaux et oriflammes, hymnes officiels, cultes de saints-patrons et de héros fondateurs servent à des recueils et à des rassemblements qui lient les participants par le sentiment d'appartenance partagée. Mais appartenance à quoi? à un espace (même imaginaire)? à une histoire commune malgré les schismes et les blessures qui font, chaque fois, voler en éclats les minces progrès de la solidarité européenne? Arrêtons-nous un instant à cette douloureuse

constatation. Les schismes de la chrétienté d'abord (orthodoxes-catholiques-protestants) suivis des guerres fratricides (entre autre les Croisades - les Guerres de religions) et plus près de nous, l'idéologie totalitaire et sanguinaire qui ensanglanta l'Europe de notre temps, illustrent l'impossible entente: c'est avec ces conflits, avec eux et contre eux qu'il faudra forger l'Europe pour qu'elle cesse d'être mythique.

Pour le moment, l'histoire nous enseigne qu'il est préférable de parler des Europes que de l'Europe: et ceci non seulement à cause des particularités des Euorpeéens mais aussi et surtout à cause de leurs divisions. En dernier lieu, l'Europe se présente comme une et solidaire vue du dehors: ce sont les non-Européens qui ont doté notre continent d'une âme, encore mieux, des vertus d'une personne, d'une civilisation.

Ainsi, il faut le souligner, la construction de l'Europe, l'appartenance à une Europe unie, suppose avant tout une Europe pacifiée. Le mythe de l'Europe unie s'appuie sur le mythe de la 'paix perpétuelle' prêchée déjà par Emanuel Kant et l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre. La 'Pax Europeana' peut être seule garante d'un 'ordre' librement consenti et respecté parce que fondement d'une communauté d'intérêt commun d'une **Respublica** qui, face à l'avenir devient une communauté de destin. Cette communauté-là trouve son origine dans une multitude d'attitudes communes et dans des valeurs justement appréciées; l'on peut dire qu'elle trouve ses certitudes dans le passé pour nourrir son avenir. Résumons en quelques mots, les valeurs fondatrices de cette communauté d'être: je pense au goût immodéré de justice, aux libertés sur lesquelles se

fonde la dignité de l'homme, justement les droits de l'homme et l'Etat de droit qui porte le nom mythique de Démocratie. Ces conquêtes de l'esprit européen, diversement appréciées et pratiquées par ceux qui se réfèrent à l'Europe, constituent dans leur ensemble, le corps vivant de l'Europe; elles sont à l'origine de ce que nous désignons comme culture européenne.

Cette culture synthétique, (elle a les dimensions d'une véritable civilisation), se laisse saisir par la manière qu'elle inventa pour scruter Dieu, la nature et l'homme: c'est cette culture qui élaborait la problématique fondée sur l'esprit scientifique, sur la grâce et l'amour, inventions du monothéisme anthropomorphe, et sur l'humanisme qui fait de l'homme la mesure de toute chose et, du respect de l'autre, le fondement de la dignité de soi. C'est grâce aux réponses à ces questions majeures qu'elle formula, que l'Europe est devenue exemplaire et comme telle, largement imitée par l'ensemble des mondes civilisés et occidentalisés. Mais il est aussi évident que ces réponses lient l'Europe de nos jours à son passé, celui qui lui confère justement des dimensions mythiques. Je pense à l'apport de ce que Paul Valéry a désigné comme les éléments constitutifs de l'Europe, c'est-à-dire la pensée grecque antique, l'esprit romain d'organisation et la spiritualité judéo-chrétienne.

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La raison, le respect et l'amour fondent à travers cet héritage l'éthique européenne de toujours. Faut-il rappeler que l'histoire a maintes fois montré combien peuvent rester inopérantes les vertus même les plus fidèlement pratiquées. Jetons un regard sur l'histoire, celle mythique d'hier, celle pleine

d'espoir d'aujourd'hui; elle est assumée par des individus et par des formations qui oeuvrent ensemble pour préparer des lendemains meilleurs.

Les instances qui expriment, chacune à leur manière l'unité de l'Europe (Conseil, Communauté, Parlement européen) cherchent toutes à s'inscrire dans le devenir européen. L'act unique qui guide aujourd'hui la CEE marque sans doute un pas décisif. Toutefois, on le sait, les premiers pas de la Communauté Européenne, chancelant et indécis, se sont faits devant la parfaite indifférence des peuples intéressés.

La terme économique qualifiant cette Europe-là aiguïsa la sagacité des technocrates mais provoqua, presque inconsciemment, la déception et même le courroux des intellectuels; ils y ont vu la déformation de leur idée de l'Europe, sans pour autant abandonner leur idéal.

C'est en vain que l'Occident se cherche une forme d'agonie digne de son passé' écrit Cioran; dans les années 1975-1980, les intellectuels européens, dans le sillon du Déclin de l'Occident de Spengler, lancèrent des livres amers aux titres provocateurs: 'Trahison de l'Occident' (Ellui), 'Plaidoyer pour une Europe décadente' (R Aron), 'Pavane pour une Europe défunte' (J M Benoit), 'Europe truquée' (C Bourdet) pour finir avec le livre de Le Prince-Ringuet 'Le Grand merdier ou l'espoir pour demain'. Constatation générale de ceux qui vivaient alors l'Europe comme un regret historique, le mal a sa racine, en l'absence de racines de cette Europe technocratique, en son mutisme culturel. L'Europe-

liberté, l'Europe-justice, l'Europe-démocratie, l'Europe-progrès, acquis majeur des peuples qui la composent, avait besoin de se ressourcer pour devenir espoir; elle avait besoin d'un dessein culturel capable de mouvoir et d'émouvoir pour entreprendre de nouveaux départs. Disons qu'elle avait besoin d'une dimension mythique.

C'est dans ce contexte d'interrogation et de manque que la Grèce fit son entrée dans la Communauté Européenne. L'événement, (sauf bien entendu pour les Grecs), fut ressenti comme un fait de portée culturelle et ceci masqua son aspect économique. Par la seule évocation de son nom, la Grèce lança, quasi involontairement, le débat sur l'enracinement culturel, comme fondement de l'avenir de l'Europe économique.

Départ et aboutissement de l'Europe dans l'imaginaire collectif, la Grèce restaura, par sa diachronie, la continuité du tissu historique européen, et restitua à l'homme de notre monde la mémoire de son expérience significative et civilisatrice. En d'autres termes, avec l'adhésion de la Grèce, l'Europe récupère la totalité de son passé historique et mythique; il est composé de deux rameaux: d'un côté l'Europe occidentale, carolingienne et vaticane, de l'autre l'Europe orientale, byzantine et orthodoxe; avec le temps se greffent sur ces branches, en Occident, les pays protestants, l'Angleterre réformiste, insulaire et atlantique, et en Orient, la Russie asiatique et mystique, nourrie du rêve impérialiste de la troisième Rome. En fait, les deux rameaux et leurs ramifications, dans la conscience de leurs élites, plongent leurs racines dans l'antiquité. Le couple Athènes-Rome constitue la base du mythe unitaire de

l'Europe: on y reconnaît les éléments d'une communauté culturelle (Kulturgemeinschaft) qui se forgea face à l'altérité, face aux Barbares du dehors.

L'empire alexandrin fondé sur l'idée panhellénique, et l'empire romain fondé sur l'idée de Rome universelle, sont l'expression politique de cette communauté; le grec et le latin sont des instruments linguistiques qui soudent un monde ethniquement hétéroclite. Les langues grecque et latine sont le véhicule de la propagation de la nouvelle religion, du christianisme, qui donnera l'âme à l'*oecumène*, la communauté du monde civilisé - ce terme englobant à l'époque l'Europe romanisée. Par la force de son message et par la cohésion de son éthique, le christianisme sera le levain pour une nouvelle étape de l'élaboration de l'idée européenne. C'est grâce à l'évangile que les peuples extérieurs au monde antique, les 'gentes', les Barbares, rallieront l'Europe qu'ils avaient auparavant envahie et détruite; c'est grâce à l'identité de la foi qu'une alliance nouvelle se crée - elle est une 'Kultgemeinschaft' (communauté de culte): elle remonte à Constantin le Grand, l'empereur qui donne droit de cité au christianisme; elle se réfère à la révélation de Jérusalem; au couple Rome-Athènes s'ajoute ainsi le couple Jérusalem-Constantinople.

Capitale de Byzance, du premier empire chrétien, Constantinople désignée vite comme 'Nouvelle Rome' et 'Nouvelle Sion', revendiqua pour elle seule - ses noms le prouvent - l'universalité politique romaine et la spiritualité oecuménique chrétienne; enracinée en outre dans la tradition hellénophone, Byzance se présentera, et pour un long moment, comme la synthèse des éléments qui

fondent l'Europe: à savoir l'idée gréco-romaine enrichie par la leçon chrétienne. Toutefois dans le concert des métropoles qui ont, ne fût-ce que pour un moment contenu l'Europe, le IXe siècle ajoutera la capitale carolingienne: le triple nom d'Aix-la-Chapelle, Aquisgranum, Aachen, souligne l'origine romaine, franco-germanique de cet autre Empire chrétien qui porta les Barbares de jadis face aux héritiers naturels de l'antiquité. L'Empire de Charlemagne se réfère néanmoins spirituellement à la Rome pontificale, tandis que politiquement il se désigne, tout comme l'Empire de Constantinople, comme Empire romain.

L'année 800, date du couronnement de Charlemagne par le pape, marque, bien avant le schisme des églises, la déchirure dans le corps de la chrétienté et de l'Europe, les deux termes étant à l'époque identiques. L'antagonisme entre les deux empires choisit l'Italie byzantine comme champ de ses manifestations: les états-tampons d'Italie, Venise et les autres villes maritimes, profiteront de cette situation pour asseoir leur fortune. De même, Rome, sise entre les deux concurrents, profitera, elle aussi de sa situation pour affermir l'état pontifical, et elle saura exploiter les possibilités que lui offrait le vaste empire carolingien pour évangéliser les peuples qui gravitaient dans ses confins; tout comme le patriarcat oecuménique de Constantinople avait profité du rayonnement byzantin pour christianiser les Russes, les Bulgares et les peuples de la mer Noire, dès le IXe siècle.

Ainsi, parallèlement à l'Empire carolingien, un empire pontifical se crée; ils seront solidaires face à l'Empire constantinopolitain et orthodoxe. La quatrième croisade aboutissant, non pas à la prise de Jérusalem, mais à la prise de Constantinople (1204), réputée en Occident pour renfermer dans ses murailles les 2/3 des richesses du monde, marque l'affrontement décisif entre les deux parties de la Chrétienté dont les destinées divergeront pour longtemps; elle inaugure à l'aube du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle la fin de l'Empire chrétien d'Orient, mais elle marque aussi le divorce définitif entre la catholicité et l'orthodoxie.

Devant le dilemme de se soumettre à ses frères profanateurs de Constantinople ou de se révolter contre la catholicité, le monde byzantin choisit naturellement la seconde solution. Les passions entre l'Orient et l'Occident chrétiens atteignent leur paroxysme à Constantinople, recouvrée par les Byzantins (en 1261) se trouveront des esprits chagrins qui aimeront mieux voir dans leur ville le turban turc que la tiare latine; en Occident, on se mobilise volontiers pour la croisade contre les Grecs prêchée par le pape et par Charles d'Anjou; des qualificatifs désobligeants - grigou, koutofragos - voient le jour: celui de schismatique-hérétique, lancé des deux côtés, marque le point de non-retour dans le divorce des deux parties de la chrétienté. C'est le moment où la Grèce entre sous la domination ottomane, tandis que l'Europe s'éveille sous ou contre l'étoile de Rome, non sans profiter de l'apport intellectuel des Byzantins qui avaient quitté leur pays après 1453, date de la chute de Constantinople entre les mains des Turcs.

Dans son effort pour établir l'histoire de l'Humanité, l'UNESCO recommande aux auteurs de ne retenir que les événements et les phénomènes de portée universelle; c'est-à-dire les faits que leur teneur ou leur message rendent partie intégrante du patrimoine mondial. Dans le monde des idées et de la pensée politique, telle est incontestablement la place de Rome, devenue aujourd'hui notion culturelle, concept de la science juridique et politique, principe spirituel, enfin fondement intellectuel des solidarités supranationales étayées par les valeurs humanistes. On le sait, c'est l'idée romaine qui sous-tend l'Europe jusqu'à nos jours, c'est l'idée romaine dans son amplitude, c'est-à-dire dans la dimension qui englobe les Romes (au pluriel) après Rome (je pense à Constantinople, à Moscou mais aussi à la Rome vaticane); c'est cette Rome, maintes fois dédoublée qui dessine par son rayonnement les frontières naturelles de l'Europe, frontières qui, on le sait, ne sont par seulement géographiques. L'Europe carolingienne, l'Europe germanique ou latine, l'Europe catholique, tout comme l'Europe gréco-orthodoxe et l'Europe slave, regardent Rome comme leur ancêtre, en revendiquant chacune pour elle seule la totalité de l'héritage: héritage qui, soit dit en passant, ne laisse point indifférent le monde anglo-saxon et protestant. Ainsi Constantinople, en tant qu'empire romain continué, Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) en tant qu'empire romain dérivé, Moscou en tant qu'empire romain dérivé, Moscou en tant qu'empire romain épigone et le Vatican enfin en tant qu'empire romain spirituel, se réfèrent tous à Rome, à son idée, à son image, comme à leur archétype, réalisé par leurs soins, dans un lieu déterminé, à un moment donné, mais pour l'éternité. En effet, toutes ces nouvelles Romes chrétiennes sont chacune à leurs heures, l'expression d'un "*dominium mundi*", oeuvrant pour le salut universel. On le

voit, nous n'avons pas encore fini avec les prophéties et autres croyances populaires qui lient la fin de l'empire romain à la fin de l'histoire; ni avec la théorie de l'alliance de Rome avec Dieu. Ainsi, aboutissement et expression vivante des théories du salut et de la fin de l'histoire (eschatologiques et sotériologiques), les Romes christianisées complètent la leçon d'universalité de la Rome antique impériale; Rome, siège de l'autorité spirituelle incontestée et lieu mythique du pouvoir universel, se situe normalement au centre du monde civilisé et place son histoire sous le signe de l'éternité de l'histoire: son empire vit et vivra - ne fût-ce que dans les esprits-jusqu'à la fin des temps; telle est la conviction populaire qui alimente, sans discontinuer, l'imaginaire collectif et pas seulement de ceux qui ont vécu sous une autorité romanogène (qu'il me soit permis d'utiliser ce néologisme).

Cette Rome éternelle, dans tous ses aspects et dans toutes ses dimensions, à travers toutes ses métamorphoses, se trouve bien entendu au coeur de toutes les interrogations: réalité historique vivante, devenue notion idéologique mais aussi, concept et principe de la science politique et juridique, elle offre les clés du symbolisme qui entoure le pouvoir en tant qu'*imperium*" et en tant que "sacerdoce" et acquiert de ce fait une importance quasi mystique, qui hante encore aujourd'hui la conscience des peuples qui ont connu son rayonnement autant dire l'Europe dans sa totalité. L'idée et l'image de Rome reste en dernière analyse la référence suprême des gloires de jadis, et se présente comme le recours ultime pendant les époques des désarrois historiques que nourrit la détresse des temps. C'est de ce point de vue que l'on peut dire que Rome est mythique, elle est partout et depuis toujours. Imperceptiblement, on

lui attribue ainsi les qualités des principes fondamentaux de l'histoire, tel la pérennité de l'espace et du temps. L'infinité spatio-temporelle de la notion, ou plutôt de l'idée de Rome, reste le fondement majeur de la mystique de tout pouvoir.

L'Europe de la "Repubblica", magistrature garante de l'intérêt commun, est issue de Rome et de sa tradition républicaine. L'Europe des Citoyens, tellement appelée des vœux de tous, se réfère implicitement à l'exemple romain: rappelons à ce propos le caractère expressément universel de la citoyenneté romaine à l'époque impériale. Bref, l'Europe de droit est d'origine juridique romaine comme on pourrait dire que l'Europe des libertés et de l'humanisme trouve ses attaches dans la pensée grecque.

En tout cas, c'est sur le mythe d'affiliation directe de l'Europe avec Rome et ses multiples transformations historiques (Constantinople, Moscou, Vatican) que l'on essaie de fonder non seulement une conscience mais aussi une identité et même plus, une idéologie européenne (voire paneuropéenne). La "république chrétienne" et dans une moindre mesure la "république des lettres" qui lui succéda, y trouvent leur compte. Toutefois, il faut, comme à l'accoutumée, tempérer la portée d'explications globalisantes et par là réductrices du fait européen, dont la richesse et la pertinence sont justement sa variété, sa diversité et sa pluralité.

En tout cas, on lira partout aujourd'hui que la base de l'unité européenne fut la notion de "République chrétienne". En effet, la *Respublica Christiana* fut l'idéal

unitaire du moyen age occidental, latin et pontifical: disons que cette république qui sera destituée par une autre république mythique, celle des Lettrés, a pris naissance sur les ruines de l'*Imperium Christianum* de Byzance. Elle n'a pu instaurer l'idéal auquel aspira la *pax christiana*. Les secousses que les réformes ont provoquées à l'intérieur même du monde chrétien en Occident, dès la fin du XIIème siècle, ont conduit le monde européen à s'interroger sur le bien-fondé de la construction religieuse de l'Etat. Machiavel met en doute le rôle de l'Eglise dans la vie politique; l'idée de l'Etat profane (ancêtre lointain de notre République laïque) apparaît comme un impératif, c'est sa réalisation qui marque l'effondrement du mythe de l'Etat unitaire chrétien.

En effet, l'Europe stupéfaite de la Barbarie interne que lui révèlent les massacres accompagnant les conflits religieux, devient une idée douloureuse pour protestants et catholiques comme elle le fut auparavant, pour les orthodoxes pendant les Croisades: un pluralisme culturel voit alors le jour, c'est par l'équilibre entre les éléments qui le composent et par le recours à l'esprit fort de raison que l'Europe, à partir du XVIème siècle, créera les bases pour de nouveaux départs. C'est dans ce climat d'interrogation, que l'on part à la rencontre du monde antique, notamment de la Grèce, patrie de l'idéal démocratique dont la mesure reste l'homme ( ). L'exaltation mystique du moyen âge chrétien, cède le pas à la contemplation philosophique et esthétique, l'homme redécouvre son corps, dont le salut est maintenant aussi important que celui de son âme. La Grèce antique fournira l'image, le symbole, la chose et le mot pour ce nouveau *modus vivendi*. Un exemple: tout ce qui concerne l'amour (de toute sorte et de toute nature) porte, dans les langues

européennes, un nom grec (Eros, pédérastie, Cythère, Lesbos, Aphrodisiaque, etc...) et quasiment tout ce qui touche à l'éveil scientifique propre au monde moderne (les noms des disciplines nouvelles et leurs outils) est désigné par un terme qui se réfère aux Grecs anciens et à leur science. L'archéophilie, l'archéomanie, l'archéognosie dominent les esprits: Ronsard n'hésitera pas à écrire que, garçon du peuple "français", il a appris les vers, le style, l'ordre des mots, chez les Latins et les Grecs. La connaissance du latin, normale chez les peuples pour qui, comme dit Montaigne, "il suffit de baragouiner les mots en terminaisons latines de leur langue pour se faire comprendre", est concurrencée par celle du grec. C'est assurément le grec qui devient pour l'Occident, l'instrument d'émancipation face à l'emprise de l'Eglise. C'est le grec qui devient le fondement de la nouvelle unité européenne, de la "République des Lettrés."

Arrêtons-nous un instant pour souligner que l'Europe de la Renaissance et du Siècle des Lumières récupère la Grèce sans les Grecs d'alors tandis que ses meilleurs esprits ignoraient tout de la Grèce de leur époque. Racine écrivant Phèdre, se renseigne sur la Grèce, pays oublié et inexploré, auprès de l'Ambassadeur de France: une Grèce mythique, "made in Europe", circule à travers le monde et sera exportée en Grèce même, dont les enfants, pourtant, dans la nuit de la domination ottomane, renouaient inlassablement les fils qui les rattachaient à leur historicité millénaire, vivante dans les traditions et surtout dans la langue du peuple. La Grèce et les Grecs de l'époque regardent leur visage dans ce miroir européen importé et essaient de lui ressembler. Un purisme et un archaïsme dominant alors la Grèce qui a, au début, le visage

d'un humanisme libérateur et qui deviendra avec le temps conservateur et rétrograde. De même en Europe, la Grèce et les études qui s'y rattachent, les attitudes et les pensées qui s'y réfèrent, connaissent les vicissitudes dues à des desseins qui ne sont pas obligatoirement d'origine spirituelle.

Ainsi chacun a, en Europe, la Grèce qu'il mérite: dionysiaque ou apollinienne, platonicienne ou aristotélicienne, démocratique ou royale et alexandrine; Grèce d'Ulysse ou de l'Olympe, c'est une Grèce légendaire qui se superpose à la Grèce réelle et qui devient le patrimoine du monde entier comme l'Acropole devient le symbole de la démocratie universelle, de toute culture. De petits Anglais de l'époque victorienne considèrent que la trilogie militaire Marathon-Salamine-Thermopyles, fait partie de l'histoire du British Empire, tandis que Senghor dira que seule l'Afrique peut reprendre à son compte la phrase d'Anaxagore: "Tout ce qui se montre est une vision de l'invisible." Chacun de nous en Europe puisera dans la réalité grecque le mythe qui illustrera ses peines et ses espoirs. Ainsi l'Europe apporte à la Grèce d'aujourd'hui l'excellence de la Grèce antique. comme Rome, puisse la Grèce à son tour apporter à l'Europe d'aujourd'hui le ferment pour l'excellence de l'Europe de demain. Le surréaliste André Breton qui avait rompu avec toute idée de classicisme, refusant de visiter la Grèce, parce'que, disait-il, "on ne va pas chez l'occupant", reconnaissait implicitement la continuité de l'histoire grecque. C'est la leçon de cette continuité, fondée sur les choses de l'esprit et du coeur qui peut, sans doute, donner une âme à un "marché" dont les membres récupèrent à travers la Grèce un passé commun d'humanisme.

Mais ne jouons pas avec le mots. L'Europe de la fin du XXème siècle ne pouvait qu'être d'abord économique et technologique: vaincre ensemble, pour soi et pour les autres, les fléaux qui menacent le monde, la maladie, l'ignorance, l'injustice et la faim, tel est le propre de l'humanisme moderne qui aura pour arme la science et les technique et qui sera le résultat d'une démarche que l'Europe trouvera dans son passé imbibé des valeurs antiques et toujours présentes. Ainsi en se rapprochant de la Grèce, l'Europe récupère le peuple qui a su puiser sa force dans le refus devant toute attitude dégradante pour la condition humaine.

A ce propos, rappelons la méditation de Malraux sur l'Acropole: elle complète celle de Renan et elle est significative du rôle que la leçon grecque pourrait jouer à l'intérieur de l'Europe de demain: "le peuple qui aime la vie jusque dans la souffrance, c'est à la fois celui qui chantait à Sainte-Sophie et qui s'exultait au pied de cette colline en entendant le cri d'Oedipe qui allait traverser les siècles; c'est le seul peuple qui célèbre la fête du "NON". Ce NON d'hier fut celui de Missolonghi. Le monde n'a pas oublié qu'il avait été d'abord celui d'Antigone et celui de Prométhée. Lorsque le dernier tué de la Résistance grecque s'est collé au sol sur lequel il allait passer sa première nuit de mort, il est tombé sur la terre où est né le plus noble et le plus ancien des refus humains; sous les mêmes étoiles qui avaient veillé les morts de Salamine..."

Ainsi, c'est l'histoire de l'Europe qui est mythique. Puisque l'Europe réelle est composée de divers mythes depuis longtemps ancrés dans le subconscient ou dans l'imaginaire collectif des européens.

- Le mythe de la "paix perpétuelle" comme résultat du fonctionnement de démocratie reste une composante de l'Europe mythique, fondée, elle résolument sur la démocratie active et l'exercice des libertés.
  
- De même, le mythe de l'Europe ouverte et accueillante trouve son fondement dans l'amour-charité, élément majeur de la vie chrétienne, mais aussi dans le principe universel des droits de l'homme, cette conquête fondamentale de l'esprit européen, imprégné par les leçons de l'humanisme grec.
  
- Faut-il ajouter que le mythe de l'identité culturelle européenne trouve sa justification dans la naissance d'une conscience européenne élaborée (j'entends par là les créateurs de toute sorte). Elle est devenue avec le temps l'apanage de tous ceux qui oeuvrent dans les instances européennes, politiques, économiques, sociales et, bien entendu, culturelles. C'est peut-être cette conscience européenne (elle anime actuellement les jeunes de tous les pays) qui pourra enlever à l'Europe son aspect mythique pour la rendre expérience vivante.
  
- L'Europe englobe les réalisations de tous ses peuples; où qu'ils se trouvent; c'est grâce à leur succès que l'Europe reste une référence universelle permanente.
  
- "Europe Universelle", elle cesse de ce fait d'être charnelle et d'être circonscrite dans un espace, elle est abstraite, peut-être introuvable, mais

évidente; de ce point de vue, elle est objet de désir inaccessible, depuis toujours fuyante et présente. Cette Europe-là restera sans doute toujours mythique.

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
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
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**A SPIRITUAL FUTURE FOR EUROPE?**

**by René Girard**



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## A SPIRITUAL FUTURE FOR EUROPE?

Rene Girard

As long as international politics remained a purely European game, limited to what French speaking diplomats used to call "le concert europeen," as long as the global supremacy of Europe could not be challenged from outside, the idea of a unified Europe remained the vague and idle dream of utopian thinkers and poetic souls.

When European technology and European style politics spread to non-European nations, the international stage widened and new players with enormous territories joined the game, veritable giants whose role grew more important with each population increase, with each new phase of modern technical development. For European nations, there were corresponding decreases in relative power, compounded by the growing destructiveness of the European conflicts that culminated in the two great world wars, so disastrous that they still dominate our historical imagination.

At the close of WWI, Alexis de Tocqueville's famous prophecy about the future predominance of the United States and Russia on the international scene was already fulfilled. At the close of WW II, with the partial exception of Great Britain, all purely European nations had become satellites of either one or the other superpower, with the terrifying prospect of providing the battlefields for a third world war even more disastrous than the first two since it would be fought with nuclear weapons.

Compared to 1945, the situation of Europe today is almost unbelievably favorable. In order to understand the achievement that the European Economic Community, represents, and the pros-

pects opened by the recent Maastrich agreements, it is useful to compare the European predicament at the end of World War II with historical situations in our past history that can be regarded as roughly comparable.

There have been at least two previous moments in Western History when a group of political entities that had been dominant for a long time, more or less suddenly lost its preeminence because of a change of scale in the game of international politics. A new type of political entity had emerged so much more powerful than the older ones that it made them unable to compete effectively and it absorbed them or made them irrelevant.

The first instance of such a change in scale occurred when the city states of ancient Greece were dwarfed by the bigness and power of Philip's Macedonian kingdom, and then, of course, by Alexander's Empire. As Demosthenes lucidly perceived, the city states were too small to defend themselves individually and they had to unite, or perish as independent states. They did not heed this warning and they perished.

The second example is the city states of Renaissance Italy. They were the most civilized or, as we say, advanced countries of their time but, when the much larger nation states of Western Europe appeared upon the international scene, Spain, France and the Habsburg Empire, they, too, were too small to compete and either they disappeared or their role was greatly diminished.

What the Greeks never achieved, what it took four centuries for the Italians to achieve, in less than half a century, the Europeans have achieved, or may be may be about to achieve. If

it really comes to pass, this political development will be the first of its kind in history, a political achievement of such magnitude that in comparison with it, most political events pale into insignificance.

The real question: why is this integration that has never been possible in the past possible now?

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First: the standard answer, the common culture. ....In all their speeches and papers, politicians and scholars never fail to allude to the great cultural tradition that binds Europeans together. .

A sense of shared cultural and spiritual tradition was indispensable, no doubt, to what has already been achieved and the same will be true in the future. We all know, however, that during the long history of conflict between the principal nations of the EC. this spiritual and cultural tradition was just as alive and probably more alive than it is today,

The common culture cannot be the whole story. In order to give a more complete and perhaps less superficial answer, we must realize that the parallel with the Greek and the Italian city states is less accurate than it seems.

I just said that there are moments in history when the very scale of the international game is changing and the 20th century is one of those moments, similar in some respects to my examples of the city states but in other respects different and quite unique.

This time around, the type of political entity that became

too small for the new scale was larger and more powerful to start with than at any previous time in history. And at the other end of the process, which is now, the scale is such that there is no prospect of its ever getting larger. The political process encompasses the entire planet. At the same time, our forever increasing technical power makes this small world of ours even smaller and increasingly fragile. As the Americans say, there is no frontier left on this earth. That is why many people dream of outer space, but this dream is science fiction pure and simple which means a lot of fiction and no science at all. It is an idle dream.

There is no empty space left that could provide a larger and safer stage for the constantly riskier games that human beings have been playing with each other since the beginning of history. Our planet has become terribly finite not only in terms of space, but of material resources and ecological possibilities. Although many politicians are still trying to look elsewhere, even they feel the pressure and must react to it. Not only the scale of the political process has been changing this time but its very nature.

This pressure was also felt by the most dominant of the two extra-European powers that dominated the world at the end of WW II, the United States. Historically, it is most remarkable that, far from playing the policy of divide and conquer that in former times the dominant nation would have played in parallel circumstances, the United States strongly encouraged, at least in the crucial stage, the economic and even the political unity of

Europe. We see something similar once again today in the case of the former Soviet Union. Given its long history of rivalry with the Soviet Union, the United States might have been expected to encourage its dismembering, but the very opposite is happening and it is contrary to the European political tradition, not merely because the United States is a different kind of power but because the present circumstances demand it. The situation is judged too dangerous for fragmentation. The United States does not act the way they do for especially altruistic reasons but because politics as usual may be outmoded in the present world.

This is something which is deeply felt at the level of the common man. Beginning with the enormous losses of WW I in Europe, and then WW II, and then continuing with the anguish of the Cold War, more and more people have begun to regard armed conflict not only as the supreme scandal but as a danger so great to our common survival that everything must be done to prevent future wars. This is widely felt to be the only rational goal of world politics in general and, more specifically, of European politics.

After the war, and even now, after fifty years of peace, there has been a general feeling in Europe, even a deep conviction in many people, that the frightful phenomenon of modern war, or total war, having always started in Europe was primarily a European phenomenon, almost a European curse and that it was imperative to do something about it. Because the illness was European the cure had to be European as well and the only possible cure was European unity.

The movement in favor of European integration was a rejection of everything that might lead to further conflict, beginning

with the competitive spirit that has always dominated inter-European affairs, then identical with international affairs. It was felt that the competitive spirit, sooner or later, leads to war and that it should be replaced by a more peaceful, a co-operative spirit. War may well be the ultimate step in the escalation that even the most apparently innocuous forms of competition frequently trigger.

On the one hand, therefore, behind the drive toward European unity there was an anti-nationalistic, anti-competitive feeling reinforced by a consciousness of the mounting perils due to technical progress. a tendency to view the old international game as a perilous form of self-indulgence.

Most recent developments, including the Yougoslavian civil war, tend to make people more hostile than ever to intra-European rivalries, but the type of integration to which they aspire is not quite the type which is being achieved.

The Europe which is being built is not quite the Europe Europeans dreamed about and it cannot be. It is the work of politicians who are used to think in the realistic terms of existing situations and normal expectations. Political life has always been based on the complex interplay of many forms of individual and collective competitiveness and the elaboration of Europe is not the exception that many people expected it would be. It is not and cannot be a total break with the past.

The purpose of politicians was always to make Europe politically and economically competitive once again in the new world that has been generated by the recent change in the scale of the

political power game.

The architects of the new Europe decided that the first target should be economic, both because after the destructions of the war, it was the most urgent problem, and because it was the easiest one to solve, since it seemed less directly involved in the most sensitive questions of national sovereignty. They wanted to duplicate in Europe the vast internal market that had existed in the United States for a long time and that had insured not only more prosperity than in Europe but also the political and military superiority that enabled the US to win WW II.

In the course of that effort, it became clear that there were two attitudes toward European integration that corresponded to entirely different aims.

For some people, economic integration was and is primarily a means to provide the old national states that had dominated Europe for centuries with the economic base that would perpetuate and even reinforce their power, enabling them to compete with the superpowers without transforming Europe into one more superpower, or a kind of superstate.

The politicians with the most powerful personalities and the greatest personal power, such as de Gaulle or a Mrs Thatcher have often but not always been ardent defenders of their own country's political sovereignty, and therefore minimalists in their approach to European problems.

In opposition to the minimalists, the most ardent integrationists are willing to infringe upon national sovereignty, perhaps even dissolve the national states, for the sake of competing successfully with actual and potential superpowers in the

world of today and to-morrow. They may be called maximalists.

These ardent integrationists are radical thinkers of a sort, They place the principle of political competition ahead of the existing political entities, the national states, for the sake of which Europeans made such huge sacrifices in the past, especially in the recent past. During the last two world wars, millions of lives were sacrificed to the various national states that compose the EC.

Ardent integrationists eagerly look forward to a decisive transfer of allegiance from the national to the European level. This scenario is criticized by others as artificial and unnatural. It may well be, but that does not make it an impossibility. Cultural processes, by definition, are never really natural. The old idea that group allegiance should depend on centuries of cohabitation inside the same political entities is probably inapplicable to the present situation.

Indications are that there already exists something like a European competitive spirit, at least in some key areas. Whenever a controversy flares up between the EC and an outside power, usually the United States, if it involves a common European project rather than the product of one nation only, most Europeans, tend to adopt the EC position; they are beginning to "think European."

This is the case, no doubt, in the debate between Airbus and the US aviation industry. When the Americans complain of unfair competition, on the grounds that government subsidies are largely responsible for the commercial success of the European plane,

most Europeans, as a man, leap to the defense of Airbus and mention the hidden subsidies from which American industry, too, is supposed to benefit.

From a business and financial standpoint, this controversy is rarely informed enough to be interesting. From a political viewpoint, however, its significance is enormous. It means the birth of a common European spirit.

If this competitive spirit on a European scale continues to develop, it will be a most powerful force, a genuinely popular force, on the side of European integration and many people welcome the appearance of this spirit but not everybody agrees that it is entirely positive. Some <sup>see</sup> it as a dangerous force that could lead to the perpetuation of old style conflict on a larger scale than ever before.

Should one speak of an incipient European supernationalism or even patriotism? Since there is no precedent for this in the European past, since this attitude has no real roots in the history of the countries involved, it can be criticized as a rootless ambition cooked up by some technocrats in Brussels, more interested in increasing their own power than in promoting the "real values" of the people they are supposed to serve.

The word "rootless" may well be justified but one cannot conclude that the appearance of this competitive reaction is insignificant, or that the expectation of a European supernationalism is unrealistic in such a world as ours, a world that has been losing its roots more and more rapidly in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The human animal is innately competitive. Once awakened, the

urge to compete tends to fasten upon all available objects and to feed upon itself through a circular process of mutual imitation, magnifying more and more the value of the disputed objects. Rivalry is really a process of conflictual imitation. I believe that such processes play a much larger role in politics, in war, and in human relations generally than most people realize. I have been writing on this and associated subjects for many years.

If the circumstances are right, the feeling of collective competitiveness does not have to be deeply rooted to become intense and durable. When it fastens onto the right object, it may gather huge numbers of previously dispersed people into symmetrically antagonistic units. It may turn a heterogeneous collection of individuals and subgroups into permanent forms of association.

In the days of Voltaire and Jonathan Swift, enlightened people believed that the European propensity to armed conflict was entirely due to absurd theological or philosophical beliefs on the one hand and to the personal pride of kings and princes on the other hand. Was this aristocratic pride really different from the way in which the French and the Germans felt about Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, or from what democratic citizens feel when one of their fellow citizens wins a Nobel Prize, or an Olympic medal? Was it very different from the way they also react when the economic and financial statistics of the OECD reveal that Europe is surpassing the United States in the race for the highest standard of living?

If you object that, unlike theological quarrels, these

statistics have concrete repercussions upon the lives of average people, I will agree, of course, but this aspect of the question in my view, had nothing to do with the pride that accompanies the reading of these statistics. Pride never has anything to do with the material well-being of anybody. It is a purely spiritual emotion.

With the right propaganda, the statistics of the OECD could be turned almost instantly into a permanent Olympic game so gripping in the eyes of the populace that horse-racing might be abandoned and we might see average citizens gladly sacrificing their material well-being to the rather abstract pleasure of watching their country, or the EC, rise to the top in some statistical contest.

The people with a strong sense of national tradition rebel against the idea of a brand new European loyalty that would spring out of nothing, and they deny that enough time has elapsed since WW II for such a sentiment to be generated.

The real question is: what are we talking about at this point? In a period of social and geopolitical stability, the traditionalists would be right but we are going through a period of accelerated institutional decomposition, a veritable crisis of the differences that structure both individual and collective identities. In such situations, a reverse relationship frequently obtains between the intensity of the competitive urge and the depth at which it is rooted. The more intense the competition, in other words, the less solid the underpinnings that it demands, of a religious, cultural, historical and even existential nature. The more uprooted and undifferentiated human beings become, if

you will, the more competitive they become, on a floating basis so to speak, and the consequences may be as far-reaching as they are unexpected..

In a cultural crisis, people are likely to shift group allegiances at the slightest provocation, if only the prospective shift promises the psychic rewards craved by the competitive urge, an identification with a community of winners, a sense of being a winner oneself.

Professional sports provide a good illustration. The same people who root fiercely for their local team during the quarter finals will be rooting just as fiercely for their regional team during the semi-finals, for the very team, in other words, whose defeat was devoutly to be wished only a moment before. Far from being diluted when it shifts to a larger community, the competitive zeal rises to new heights. And if the regional team, and then the national team, are also defeated, there still remains, perhaps, a continental team, a pan-European team for which everybody will root even more fiercely than one did at the lower levels.

For all this rootless cheering and uprooted boosting, the use in American English of the verb: to root, is curious to say the least. I feel tempted to interpret this linguistic peculiarity as a sign that, in a rootless world, the exasperation of the competitive urge must compensate somewhat for all the roots we are missing, and sports fans may well be conducting a noisy but still generally peaceful search for new roots.... According to the dictionaries, this use of the word "root" originally refers

to a pig digging the ground with its snout, digging for roots, I assume, working very hard at appropriating some roots, in other words.

If you object that my metaphor is not pertinent and that the construction of Europe has nothing to do with sports and even less with a pig digging for roots, I will answer that your point is well taken but it could be decisive only if the world in which we live were a normal one in terms of cultural and social differentiation but that it is not. We are going through a cultural crisis that is not necessarily tragic, but it weakens our collective and even our personal identities and it makes many things possible that are impossible in more normal circumstances.

If our world were tranquil and stable enough to guarantee the permanence of traditional identifications, a transfer of allegiance to Europe would be impossible but our time is even more out of joint than when Shakespeare coined this formula, and in such times, even the most commonsensical principles do not apply.

An indication that my competitive or mimetic view of European integration might not be completely groundless is that it seems to throw some light on the attitudes of some European statesmen and of their countries vis-a-vis the whole question of political integration.

Great Britain is bound to be the chief minimalist power for the obvious reason that, of all European nations, it has always been historically the most successful, the most consistent winner in international competition. The countries that have been the least successful in the past, especially the recent past, or

those that have never been able even to join the game in the past, tend to be maximalists.

If France for a while had a minimalist policy and, to this day, retains minimalist tendencies, this is due in part to the enormous self-confidence of Charles de Gaulle, who so completely identified with the French nation state that he could see a grandiose future for it invisible to most of his fellow citizens. The political personality of Charles de Gaulle was unique, of course, but in a manner determined, at least in part, by the French tradition of a strongly centralized government and this tradition is reasserting itself at this very moment in the resistance to the Maastrich accords.

When de Gaulle was in power Great Britain was outside the Common Market, of course. It is useless to ask what would have happened had he come two decades later and his tenure as President of France had coincided with Mrs. Thatcher tenure's as Prime Minister of Great Britain. It is difficult to conceive that they could have agreed on any really important subject. One of the two would have converted the other to the cause of European integration. An idiotic question no doubt, but endlessly fascinating....

I do not want to define patriotism merely through competitiveness. I am aware, of course, that unless this sentiment has deep roots in the past, it does not really deserve the name.. I want to point out, however, that the disastrous exasperation of patriotism that led to the two world wars, its nationalistic transmutation is a paradoxical phenomenon. It is often interpret-

ed as a reinforcement of national roots, especially by the nationalist but, in reality, it is due to their weakening, to a generalized uprooting.

Let me try to summarize the various points I have made. I have described three attitudes . First, the refusal of war and of the competition that leads to war as the original force behind European integration. Second, I also see the very reverse: the perpetuation of national competition and third, especially in the last few years, the first stirrings of a pan-European competitiveness. On the one hand a refusal of politics as usual, on the other hand their continuation or their transference to the European level.

There is a contradiction, here. Is it the sign of some confusion, of some impossibility? Not necessarily. I think these contradictory tendencies are all present among Europeans. According to their various temperaments, according to their political leanings, according to the circumstances in their respective countries, people may incline more in one of these three directions.

But, up to a point, all three tendencies are present in most Europeans. Most Europeans feel some degree of attachment to their national states, some pride or shame when this national state is doing well or badly in the competition with other states. Most Europeans are simultaneously beginning to feel somewhat competitive in a superpower frame of reference, when European achievements are criticized by extra-European powers. And simultaneously, once again, many Europeans have second thoughts about the two kinds of competitive feelings I have just defined.

People are divided against themselves.

There is no contradiction in the sense that these three attitudes are present among the Europeans themselves and, even though in most nations a majority of the citizens incline either to one side or to the other, the other two are present in these people as well. It is probably no exaggeration to say that, at least to some extent, all three are present inside each and every citizen of all these nations.

If we could look inside all these Europeans, in other words, we would discover that, even though they may be officially committed to one of these attitudes only, there is some part of them that secretly sympathizes with the other two.

All Western Europeans are beginning to feel competitive at the European level. But that does not prevent many of them, even most of them, from remaining deeply attached to the national state, and from feeling extremely competitive at that level when they feel their own country does not get its due in European negotiations or does not get the international recognition and respect that it deserves. As I said before, people are innately competitive and they can be competitive at several levels simultaneously.

At the same time, these same people remember the past and they can see the dangers triggered by the constantly increasing power of technology to interfere with the lives of all of us and even with the natural equilibriums that make life possible on this earth.

As a result, even though we all know that competition is

necessary to economic development and to our constantly increasing standard of living we are also distrustful of competition at the international level, more and more willing, therefore, to accept measures that would discourage it in order to strengthen peace and security.

The spirit of competition is all the more easily aroused that it can flare up at several levels, the national level and the new European level.

Irresistible forces tend to remove the barriers between the members of the EC. But this is true as well of the nations that do not belong to the EC. They are all world wide forces. Their action is not limited to Europe but is felt everywhere. Not one of them seems to be specifically European, specific enough to be identified as the real positive force behind European integration.

Take the linguistic situation. Twenty-five years ago, the multiplicity of European languages was still a real obstacle to European unity. No longer so. Everybody now is learning English and communication inside Europe has become easier. The problem has lost its acuity. Regardless of what the diplomats may decide, English will be the common language of Europe. English is a factor of European integration, therefore, but a weak one, not because England is reticent toward political integration, but because the role of the English language in Europe is not different from its role in the rest of the world. There is nothing specifically European about the rise of English as the first genuinely international language since Greek and Latin.

The barriers created by cultural differences are going down.

But they are going down everywhere and the forces that bring them down do not come from inside Europe. For the first time, all Europeans share the same popular culture, the same "life styles" and the same computers, but all of this comes from America and not from Europe. Only at the most rarefied and elitist level, it seems, is Europe still able to influence itself in cultural matters.

The same situation prevails at the spiritual and religious level. Almost everywhere, the old catholic protestant opposition is so attenuated or marginalized that it poses no serious problem to European integration. Most religious conflicts are on the wane and so is the conflict between clericalism and secularism.

All these factors facilitate integration but they are weak factors once again.

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All this explains why people are generally for Europe without the enthusiasm one might expect given the enormous magnitude of the achievement.

Many people are deeply disturbed by the "politics as usual" attitude that they vaguely sense behind the apparent revolution of European integration.

This anti-political tendency is hostile both to the old national states and to the prospect of a European superstate. It implicitly, if not always explicitly, challenges what political opponents inside the higher spheres of the EC have in common, the continuation of the old international politics which may be

defined in the same words but not in the same spirit as Carl Schmitt in his Der Begriff des Politischen: it is the power to designate the enemy and to enforce this designation.

Not only is military competition unthinkable, at least among the most "advanced" nations, but unbridled economic competition may have to be abandoned as well, in a not too distant future..

If the entire world reached the stage of technical development that North America and Western Europe have reached, industrial pollution and the greenhouse effect might rise to levels so threatening that global measures would become imperative. The question of the ozone layer in the higher atmosphere may be a preview of things to come.

the politics as usual of both the minimalist and the maximalist school of thought in these matters. What is being questioned, really, is the unspoken premise of both attitudes, the inevitability of international rivalry, either on the old national basis, or on the new superpower basis.

This hostility manifests itself in a desire for a reduction in the scale of everything, a refusal of the supernational as well as of the national level, a nostalgia for the purely local and regional life of the past.

Their revulsion against war, if it facilitates certain aspects of European integration, discourages others. Once again, then, there is nothing specifically European in this attitude and it cannot be viewed as a force either for or against Europe.

The problem of Europe at this point is that the major trends of the time simultaneously point toward both extremes, the uni-

versal and the purely local. Many people seem able to worry only about the planet as a whole on the one hand, and their own little neighborhood on the other. The European level in-between seems forgotten. It does not seem to concern the more and more numerous people who vote for the ecologists or for the extreme right and the extreme left because they resent politics as usual.

When I ask myself which of these two forces is going to win in the long run, the incipient European spirit or its opposite, the anti-political attitude, the spreading feeling that all types of competitiveness, at the expense of human beings and even of nature, are a luxury that the world of to-morrow will not be able to afford, I find it impossible to answer. Are we going to see the rise of a European supernationalism, or will it be checked by the revolt against politics as usual?

Most observers will attribute this situation to a loss of spiritual energy for which consumerism and the dominance of American popular culture are generally blamed.

Even if justified in some respects, in other respects this evaluation may be deceptive. The prestige and power that organized religion has lost does not necessarily entail the spiritual void and the triumphant nihilism that many observers diagnose not only in Europe but in the entire developed world.

There is a strong spiritual force in our world, I believe. It eludes many observers because it frequently manifests itself outside our traditional religious and humanistic frames of reference. When I must define this force in a single phrase, I call it a concern for victims so universal, it seems to me, that it

disregards national, ethnic and religious boundaries.

When I use this expression, I am trying to give it some of the force that the existentialists wanted to give to the word Sorge in German, in French souci, but it is not the same thing. There is a historical dimension to existentialist philosophers have ignored. I define this concern as a fruit, the main fruit of our Judeo-Christian heritage. It is something that comes from the West but is unique to our civilization and that should not be merely embraced from a moralistic standpoint, or condemned because of the perversions to which it is subject, but it should be analyzed from an anthropological standpoint.

Political fanaticism and single issue lobbies are always trying to exploit this concern to their own advantage and they often succeed to some extent, at least partially, but only for a brief period of time.

We can verify this ephemeral quality of the movements that paraside this spiritual force from the collapse of the most durable and powerful of them all, soviet marxism. The present rejection of ideologies tends to reveal this concern for victims in its pure form. It often assumes caricatural forms, especially, at this time, in the United States, but behind the many caricatures, it is not difficult to perceive the judeo-christian original that plays a much greater role in our history than most academic thinkers are willing to acknowledge..

This concern for victims is an attitude that a majority of Europeans share to some degree. It is a force in favor of integration, I repeat, , but a weak one once again, another weak force, for the simple reason that, like everything else, it is

not, or it is no longer, a specifically "European" value. It is universal because it is an absolute refusal of exclusion and exclusivism, in all their forms. It counteracts, therefore, the efforts politicians might make to structure European institutions on the basis of exclusion.

We can predict that a clash between the European idea and this value will become inevitable if the European idea is used too much as a means for the wealthier nations to defend themselves against the threat posed by the poorer ones.

If Europe chooses a prudently selfish course it may come to resemble a club for wealthy old people and perish of spiritual inanition. There seems no prospect of this at the present time and I do not intend to suggest that the EC should open its borders to an immigration so massive that its ability to help those in need might be endangered.

It is certain, however, that Europe will become spiritually meaningful only if it thinks in terms of the entire world community and of the huge educational as well as economic needs that will have to be satisfied if the world of to-morrow is not to be engulfed by forces of chaos.

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
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
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**VOICES OF A NORTHERN TRIBE**

**by Gillian Clarke**



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## **VOICES OF A NORTHERN TRIBE**

by Gillian Clarke

In a poem I wish I had written myself, the American poet Richard Wilbur addresses six lines to the poets of ancient Etruria, a people and their language wiped out by the Romans.

### To the Etruscan Poets

Dream fluently, still brothers, who when young  
Took with your mothers' milk the mother tongue,

In which pure matrix, joining world with mind,  
You strove to leave a line of verse behind

Like a fresh track across a field of snow,  
Not reckoning that all could melt and go.' (1)

To lose a language is to lose a culture. To let a European language die is to rub out a message from our common past, to lose an ancestral journal, in some cases to burn a priceless library.

One day, when I had been working without stint for eight hours on this very paper, the electricity failed. The words on the screen of my word processor vanished and were replaced by a silvery blankness. A day's thought was gone and the screen looked back at me, blind as an old dog's eye.

Technology provides us with new images for a lost language: a memory wiped clean, as if the body of Europe had suffered a stroke. Indeed, for half an hour, as I struggled to recall and summarise in order to retrieve the ideas I had lost along with the words, I could imagine what it would mean to be old and stricken, and to feel memory's terrible failure. I could imagine a whole people deleted from the world's memory.

Europe's cultural subtleties and strengths lie in its multilingualism. In a paper I delivered in Germany in 1990 I was asked to address the issue of being a writer who belongs to a minority culture, writing in a small and dependent bilingual country. I noted there how, although English abounds with idiom to express the ache of wordlessness, its native speakers are, on the whole, too confirmed in monolingualism fully to understand what those English words are saying. 'There are no words for it'. 'It is too sad for words'. 'We are speechless' 'dumbstruck'. To speak two languages is 'to be in two minds', to see both sides. 'Welsh' means 'them', the strangers; 'Cymru' means 'us', we who belong.

To be bilingual in Wales is to hear two drums beating, old wardrums to be sure, troubling and confusing sometimes, but together providing two ways of hearing.

two points of view, a double legacy of literature for a writer to plunder, and enough tension to 'hurt' us into poetry, as W. B. Yeats put it for Ireland.

On the occasion of the paper's delivery, alone of all those present, two out of the three Englishmen there, both of them civilised men of letters, failed to understand my point. In the debate that followed, the English university academic declared himself offended by 'nationalism', and compared the possible future death of the Welsh language to the 'corruption' of English through recent Americanization and the 'atrocious way young people speak today', whereas the English poet compared it to the loss of a quaint dialect of English spoken in his native Lincolnshire. A Canadian expert on Irish literature sitting next to me leaned over and whispered: 'They have missed the point completely.' They had, of course, as the ensuing discussion proved, provided me with evidence in support of my argument in the minds of everyone else present.

Words travel easily. I was going to say they travel light, but this would not be true. Words carry a great burden, the whole weight and legend of the human journey, though they seem to be doing it effortlessly.

Not all art travels well. Once we turn pigment, cloth, metal, wood, stone or marble into art we 'join world with mind' and make something that can be bought and sold. Such an artefact can be stolen or broken or bought as an investment. Forces will be found massing at the frontiers to seize it or tax it, brigands will lie by the way to steal it.

Of all artists it is the writer, especially the poet, who is odd-one-out. No-one need kill or pay gold to possess a poem, though these means have sometimes been used to silence one. A poem is free to anyone who knows language, and it is notable that small, poor countries, lacking the rich patrons necessary for great architecture and large scale fine art, usually invest their creative genius in the less expensive arts of music and literature: the sagas of Iceland, the music of Hungary, the literature of Wales.

The powerful have always understood that poetry's quest for truth, as well as the poet's eloquence and persuasive magic, can be dangerous forces. The dictator prefers to have the poet on his side. Not for nothing did the rulers of some ancient civilisations ensure that the poet was given a place at court and that poetry was harnessed to the recording of brave deeds and the praise of princes. Even in recent times writers have been imprisoned or even killed to silence the power of their language where it tried to serve truth and art rather than propaganda. Think of Irina Ratashinskaya engraving her words on soap in her prison cell before committing them to memory. Think of the diaries of Anne Frank. Think of Lorca. Of Salman Rushdie.

Oppressors are toppled but while a language lives its poetry survives.

Ozymandias, king of kings, is remembered, not for what he himself describes as his 'mighty works', but for Shelley's powerfully beautiful sonnet noting his sorry demise. By the time the poet met the 'traveller from an antique land', nothing was left of the despot but for 'Two vast and trunkless legs of stone'. Shelley records the inscription on the pedestal:

"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:  
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!"  
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay  
of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,  
The lone and level sands stretch far away.' (2)

The image remains a powerful one. We have seen Ozymandias and his henchmen fall again in Moscow, old gods toppled by a people at last in possession of the truth. It is satisfying to note from Shelley's sonnet that Ozymandias's sculptor was an honest artist, and that in carving the cruel face he 'well those passions read', but was it the court poet who, at the dictator's behest, composed the inscription carved in the stone? Such toadying to the despot failed to immortalise either the flatterer or the 'king of kings'. It is Shelley's sonnet which immortalises them, though not as they wanted, and his words may return to our minds when the latest desert dictator has fallen.

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In this paper I will concentrate on the art of the poet, above all on the poetic voices of one ancient tribe still surviving achievement and art of the word-spinners, especially the poets, of that ancient group of people, and to show how important a repository of a European culture are the voices of that tribe.

Archaeologists and linguists find the first certain traces of these people eight centuries BC, in Hallstatt in Austria. Mobile and creative, they left their material and linguistic tracks behind in their long journey north, and we can deduce much from these clues. Their use of iron made them rich and dominant. They traded with Etruria and Greece and China. War took them to Rome in the fourth century BC. They colonised Ankara. They made beautiful artifacts out of beaten and cast gold, silver, bronze, iron, glass, ceramics, enamel and wood. Their craft had an especially imaginative quality which has remained influential on 20th century art. Their language has been traced to the fourth century BC in Ancient Gaul, Celtiberia, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia Minor. Their descendants live today in Brittany, in Ireland, in Scotland and in Wales. These people were the Celts.

In 1978 I travelled to Yugoslavia with a group of Welsh writers. We were guests in the city of Zagreb, riding one morning up a steep hill in a funicular railway car, talking to each other mainly in Welsh, and occasionally, for the benefit of one member of our party, in English. A young Croatian woman stared at us. As we disembarked she challenged us in English. 'What language are you speaking?' 'Welsh.' 'Welsh? The Celts! Do they still live? Do people still speak Welsh?' Of course, and the Danube, we reminded her, into which Zagreb's River Sava flows, is a Celtic word.

She was an archaeologist, and our encounter was a moment of great rediscovery for her, one which opened a fresh field of linguistic archaeology which, she expected, would cast light on all she had discovered in her material

research. The meeting set me thinking that the marginalisation of the Welsh is a serious distortion of European history and that it works to the disadvantage of all art and scholarship, creating a cultural imbalance and a sense of loss that is good for no-one.

Celtic tribes once covered much of Europe, France, Germany west of the Rhine, central and southern Spain, Switzerland, northern Italy, the Adriatic coast, the valley of the Danube, Bohemia and the Black Sea. The Celts arrived in Britain in waves of invasion in the first millenium BC. Apart from the tantalising traces they left in place-names scattered across Europe, the language they spoke rests in the literature. In particular, it lives in Welsh literature.

What survives is a beautiful, complex mythology, some of which rests in the great masterpiece, the four branches of The Mabinogion (3), as well as a rich store of stories, and the oldest known poetry of Britain. The English writer Adam Hopkins once memorably remarked to me, after discovering The Oxford Book of Welsh Verse (4) in translation, 'Such poetry in all that mud!' Only Greek (and possibly Irish) has a longer continuous literary tradition than Welsh. Welsh has never been spoken by more than a million people at any one time, and today there are fewer than a million speakers in Wales, though many more are scattered in the diaspora. Anthony Conran, poet, scholar and translator, in his Introduction to Welsh Verse (5), argues that, after the seven great languages of Europe, those spoken by many millions of people, there is no modern European language that can rival the literary wealth of Welsh, 'one of the great carriers of Western civilisation'. Of the Celtic languages that still

survive, it is the only one still in with a chance of survival, still a living language widely spoken by the majority among all classes and agegroups across what is geographically the greater part of Wales, though by a minority of the whole population. The figure today is one in five of the total, which of course includes the many English and other people living in Wales, and omits the Welsh diaspora.

Welsh supports a lively literary scene, with publishing houses, newspapers, journals, schools, a television channel, a small film industry, and national institutions developed from, though funded by the centralised British government in London. I believe that the 'troubles' in Ireland have influenced the cause of Welsh, as British governments, fearing that Wales may turn to violence, have gradually grown more liberal in their response to the demands of Welsh speakers. The Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, the most cultured and most pro-European premier of recent decades, was particularly generous in his treatment of the Welsh language.

Since 1936, and the broadcasting on BBC Welsh radio of a passionate speech by poet and playwright Saunders Lewis, considered during his lifetime to have been the Welsh writer with the best chance of bringing the Nobel Prize for Literature to Wales, there has been a strong and organised movement to save Welsh. Many have been imprisoned in Britain, and are in prison today, for acts of civil disobedience and non-violent action, since Saunders Lewis, and two other men of letters, set fire in 1936 to building materials assembled for the construction of a Royal Air Force bombing school that was to be established in

North Wales, against the fierce opposition of local people. After this token act, the men gave themselves up to a bewildered local policeman, were tried twice (the jury refused to find them guilty the first time), imprisoned, and sacked from their academic posts. This symbolic act set in train a powerful Welsh Language movement that is more active than ever today. Most of this activity is a peaceful protest and lobbying, but the wilder fringe of the movement contains a shadowy group of people who call themselves 'Meibion Glyndwr', the sons of Glyndwr, (Owain Glyndwr was a Prince of Wales at the turn of the 15th century, and a great national hero). This group still uses the weapon of fire, burning empty holiday homes owned by English people, about which there is ferocious local resentment. The number of homeless families in North Wales, for instance, exactly coincides with the number of second homes in that area. The arson campaign has continued for years but to date not one arrest has led to a conviction. The movement is widely condemned in Wales, popularly and officially, but one hears also a tacit understanding of the reasons why the wilder young have lost patience with the law.

I believe that ensuring the survival of Welsh is Europe's best hope of keeping a Celtic language alive, thus saving for itself a great treasure. I believe also that Europe is Wales's best future hope of protection against the fate of Ancient Etruria, and the tragedy of seeing that our poets have written their verse on snow.

The first Welsh voices hint at ancient, established traditions of poetry and of oral literature. Indeed the stories known as the Four Branches of the Mabinogi,

more popularly called The Mabinogion, are by now embellished by so many retellings that they truly are the cumulative voice of people, and often sound as if they are being told by many voices interrupting each other. They contain that strange mixture of verifiable history and mythological happenings and creatures that characterises ancient cultures. The British King Llyr, mentioned by the earliest historians, is there, (Lir in Irish and Lear in Shakespeare's King Lear, but his son Bran, also known as Bendigeidfran, is a giant who waded through the Irish Sea towing his fleet of warships behind him. The poet Taliesin, with texts to prove he existed, is born after many shape-shifts from servant boy to hare, salmon, bird, a grain of wheat. He is swallowed by a hen who is really the goddess Ceridwen, and is born in the form of a beautiful child with a shining brow (tal-iesin). Ceridwen casts him out to sea in his cradle, where he is found by a prince and taken to the court. There he reveals his gift and is recognised as a great poet. In a 13th century manuscript there is an anonymous poem whose author boasts, 'I am Taliesin. I sing perfect metre', and later, 'I have been a blue salmon,/I have been a hound, a star, a stag on the mountain,'

a hen swallowed me.

For nine nights I was in her crop.

I have been dead. I have been alive.

I am Taliesin.' (6)

It seems that the real poet Taliesin had become legendary in the succeeding centuries, and Taliesin's Boast is one of many in the boasting tradition that may have been a poetic version of storytelling.

Some time in the middle decades of the 6th century the ancient, original British language turned into Welsh. We have no British or Primitive Welsh texts, so we must trace this linguistic revolution through place-names, the Latin texts of the earlier Roman occupiers, and words and place-names that the new invaders, the Anglo-Saxons, borrowed from British.

By the late 6th century, when we have evidence that Taliesin, and the other great early poet, Aneirin, were making their word alchemy, the linguistic revolution was complete and modern Welsh had arrived. The work of these poets was handed down, and enough of it survives in the earliest extant manuscripts to provide us with evidence that they were part of an established poetic tradition, suggesting that poets had long enjoyed status and influence among the British Celts. By the eighth century Welsh had become a written language.

One of the most important roles of the poet was, and to an extent still is today in Celtic countries, that of remembrancer, voice of the tribe, the one who puts into words a common experience. The poet sang the world into being, was charged with remembering, elegising, lamenting and praising. Praise poetry held the tribe together. It was no doubt out of fear, as well as out of a sincere reverence for the ancient art of poetry, that a place was reserved for the poet at the king's side in every Welsh court from earliest times to the Middle Ages, the golden age of Welsh poetry, and the court poet was a man of influence in Celtic lands. Poetry was rooted in the ancient pagan religion of druidism, (from 'derwen', Welsh for oak tree, the sacred tree of the druids), and the court bard

who served the early princes had inherited much from the all-powerful priestly role of the druid. To this day, in Wales, the poet is given a measure of respect that is quite absent in England. The unofficial 'poet laureate' of Wales in the English language is the 79 year old clergyman, R. S. Thomas. When he makes a public speech on issues about which he feels strongly, issues such as the survival of the Welsh language, the poisoning of the planet, and world peace, he so rouses public feeling that the words of this otherwise reclusive man make headlines in the Western Mail, Wales's national newspaper. His public readings and speeches draw crowds of young people and make politicians nervous. Few take notice of a poet's opinion in England, and England's Laureate, Ted Hughes, is mainly treated by the British press with indifference.

Poetry is read surprisingly widely among the Welsh-speaking Welsh, regardless of education. I once shared poetry with a lengthman working on a remote country road. I had stopped for a picnic at the roadside, on my way to read my poetry in a nearby school. The roadman greeted me, and soon he was asking me the usual Welsh questions. Who are you? Where do you come from? Where are you going? On hearing I was a poet he sat down beside me and pulled a bundle of poems from his pocket. They were englynion, poems written in an old traditional form, and they were good. He liked my poems too, though his were in Welsh and mine in English. The English poet Robert Graves once wrote of meeting a shepherd poet in the mountains of north Wales before the first world war. Almost certainly this was the poet Hedd Wyn, now known as the Poet of the Black Chair, or Bardd y Gadair Ddu. In 1917 his anonymously submitted poem was awarded the bardic chair, or first prize, in the National Eisteddfod,

(Wales's national poetry festival and an annual event of major importance in the Welsh language). As the poet's identity was discovered news arrived that he had been killed in France. The chair that should have enthroned him was draped in black, an image that has been central in the Welsh imagination ever since.

The Welsh began to write poetry in English centuries ago, though not until the twentieth century was there a real flowering of literature in Wales' second language. In 1470 Ieuan ap Swrdwal, a student at the University of Oxford, made the earliest recorded attempt by a Welshman at writing poetry in English. (7) The poem is mainly interesting because, while written in English, it is spelt phonetically in Welsh, and therefore casts light on the way Middle English was pronounced. It was written in the traditional form later adopted by the lengthman, and in the spirit of praise that began with the early court bards and continues to this day as the predominant mood of the Welsh poet in both of the nation's languages. Dylan Thomas captured that mood in many of his poems: 'it was all/Shining, it was Adam and maiden,' he says, remembering Fern Hill, the farm of his childhood, where his Welsh-speaking maternal grandparents lived, though he did not own up to any Welsh himself.

'So it must have been after the birth of the simple light

In the first, spinning place, the spellbound horses walking warm                      Out of  
the whinnying green stable

On to the fields of praise.' (8)

There has always been and there is still a Celtic tendency to name, list and remember, to 'write it out in a verse' (9), which may arise out of the two 6th century bardic duties as court genealogist and praise-poet. Places are as often named as people, and the naming of people is likely to be familiar these days, though in its function as remembrancer, the naming is still doing the job it always did: keeping history, keeping tribal memory, so helping to hold the tribe, the family, together. Sheenagh Pugh, a young contemporary poet who frequently names and praises all manner of people, decides here to restore justice to the neglected.

'I like to think of a day for all those  
who have been unloved in legend: the crooked man  
who married Morfudd, the mocked Menelaus,  
Conchubhar, Mark of Cornwall'(10)

Places are often most tenderly recorded by Welsh poets. When the Oxford Companion to the Literatures of Wales was compiled, the editor's original plan to include all places named in Welsh literature had to be abandoned. Every mountain, river and village, every hamlet and virtually every field, hill and stream in Wales has been mentioned in its literature. Several volumes would have been required to hold them all.

Here it is worth considering two poems: a 6th century poem written in Welsh by Aneirin, and a twentieth century poem written in English by Anthony Conran. I believe the comparison shows a remarkable continuity of a poetic tradition

evidently at least 13 centuries old, and the ease with which Anthony Conran makes a modern poem out of that old cloth. The first is an extract from Aneirin's lament after the Battle of the Gododdin, a Celtic tribe living in what is now Southern Scotland. It is said that the tribe prepared for the battle by feasting and drinking for a year and a day, that they drank too much liquor and were defeated, and all but three were killed. One of the survivors was the poet Aneirin. Catraeth is the old Celtic name for Catterick, in the North of England, where today there is still a military camp.

Men went to Catraeth, keen was their company.  
They were fed on fresh mead, and it proved poison-  
Three hundred warriors ordered for warfare,  
And after the revelling, there was silence.  
Although they might go to shrines to do penance,  
This much is certain, death would transfix them.

Men went to Catraeth with the dawn.  
Their fine spirit shortened their lives,  
Mead they drank, yellow, sweet and ensnaring:  
For that year, many a minstrel was glad.

Red their swords - may the blades not be cleaned!  
White shields, and quadribarbed spearheads,  
In front of the host of Mynyddawg Mwynfawr.' (11)

Anthony Conran uses both the ancient form and the mood of this poem of lamentation in his powerful 'Elegy for the Welsh Dead in the Falkland Islands, 1982', (12) which I quote in full. Conran prefaces his poem with the first two lines in Welsh of the translated extract quoted above.

'Gwyr a aeth Gatraeth oedd ffraeth eu lli.

'Glasfedd eu hancwyn, a gwenwyn fu.'

'Men went to Catraeth, keen was their company.

They were fed on fresh mead, and it proved poison.'

'Men went to Catraeth. The luxury liner

For three weeks feasted them.

They remembered easy ovations,

Our boys, splendid in courage.

For three weeks the albatross roads,

Passwords of dolphin and petrel,

Practised their obedience

Where the killer whales gathered,

Where the monotonous seas yelped.

Though they went to church with their standards

Raw death has them garnished.

Men went to Catraeth. The Malvinas

Of their destiny greeted them strangely.

Instead of affection there was coldness,  
Splintering iron and the icy sea,  
Mud and the wind's malevolent satire.  
They stood nonplussed in the bomb's indictment.

Malcolm Wigley of Connah's Quay. Did his helm  
Ride high in the war-line?  
Did he drink enough mead for that journey?  
The desolated shores of Tegeingl,  
Did they pig this steel that destroyed him?  
The Dee runs silent beside empty foundries.  
The way of the wind and the rain is adamant.

Clifford Elley of Pontypridd. Doubtless he feasted.  
He went to Catraeth with a bold heart.  
He was used to valleys. The shadow held him.  
The staff and the faces of tribunes betrayed him.  
With the oil of our virtue we have anointed  
His head, in the presence of foes.

A lad in Tredegar or Maerdy. Was he shy before girls?  
He exposes himself now to the hags, the glance  
of the loose-fleshed whores, the deaths  
That congregate like gulls on garbage.  
His sword flared in the wastes of nightmare.

Russell Carlisle of Rhuthun. Men of the North  
Mourn Rheged's son in the castellated Vale.  
His nodding charger neighed for the battle.  
Uplifted hooves pawed at the lightning.  
Now he lies down. Under the air he is dead.

Men went to Catraeth. Of the forty-three  
Certainly Tony Jones of Carmarthen was brave.  
What did it matter, steel in the heart?  
Shrapnel is faithful now. His shroud is frost.

With the dawn men went. Those forty-three,  
Gentlemen all, from the streets and byways of Wales,  
Dragons of Aberdare, Denbigh and Neath -  
Figment of Empire, whore's honour, held them.  
Forty-three at Catraeth died for our dregs.' (12)

The reception of this poem was extraordinary. I included it when I edited and presented a programme on BBC radio soon after the Falklands war, at a time when the atmosphere in Britain created by the press and the government of the day scarcely allowed doubts to be expressed about the war and the way it was carried out. Even the Archbishop of Canterbury got into trouble for praying for Argentinian widows. Audience reaction, however, proved the value of the poet's role as the voice of a society's grief: only those who needed a voice for their

feelings of remorse and pity responded. The rest, I assume, did not care what a poet said.

In the 14th century, Welsh poetry reached its golden age, and of all poets who flourished in that era, Dafydd ap Gwilym has the strongest claim to rank among the great poets of Europe, though others, including a woman called Gwerful Mechain, born in 1462 and writing in the late 15th century, would certainly be known to all who study European literature of the period had they written in a language spoken by an independent country. Our own embarrassed Welsh academics suppressed Gwerful Mechain, and ensured that she was almost entirely left out of the anthologies before 1991. It was the spirit and habit of Welsh non-Conformist religion that silenced her, since her poetry is almost entirely erotic and bawdy, and it could not have been printed in translation in Britain until the way had been cleared by the famous Lady Chatterley's Lover trial of 1963, when Penguin Books first published D. H. Lawrence's banned novel.

It is a great loss to Europe that Dafydd ap Gwilym is not better known. A near contemporary of England's Geoffrey Chaucer and just as fine a poet, Dafydd wrote poems that seem more immediate than Chaucer's, more modern, and, because Welsh had been established as a literary language much longer than English, his poems can be read by modern readers without difficulty. His work is popular, appears on bright posters in people's houses, and has even been set to music and sung by Welsh rock musicians. Dafydd was a poet of love and nature, and was known all over Wales in his day as a brilliant performer. While

it could be said that Chaucer helped to save the English language at a time when Norman French was the dominant tongue of the English court, Dafydd was plundering Norman French for words like a magpie after gold. He and his contemporaries considerably enriched Welsh with these borrowings, and they carried the new words all over Wales in their role as travelling bard, or troubadour. The poets reached the whole population, and Dafydd's poems, written down, helped Welsh to become a language fit for the modern age. The intricacies of sound-pattern, wit and double-entendre in Dafydd ap Gwilym's poetry do not survive translation, though the beauty of his imagery does. A glimpse of a few lines from a long poem called 'Y Gwynt' in the original Welsh, and a snatch of its translation, 'The Wind', may demonstrate why.

'Ni'th lladd mab mam, gam gymwyll,  
Ni'ith lysg tan, ni'th lesga twyll.  
Ni'th wyl drem, noethwal dramawr,  
Neu'th glyw mil, nyth y glaw mawr;  
Noter wybr natur ebrwydd,  
Neitiwr gwiw dros nawtir gwydd.' (13)

'You nor king nor troop can cage,  
Nor mother's son foully kill,  
Fire burn, nor trick enfeeble.  
Though none see you in your den,  
Nest of rains, thousands harken,  
Cloude-calligrapher, vaulter

Over nine lands wild and bare.' (14)

The appearance alone of the Welsh version will display something of the intricate sound. It has been convincingly argued that the plaited patterns of Celtic strapwork, carved, enamelled, engraved or painted on their artifacts, are turned into sound in the echoing consonantal tangles of the poetry.

Not meaning alone but rhythm and stress and what we call accent make a language fit for poetry, and render it untranslatable. Not only does Welsh stress the penultimate syllable of a word, but, in the final syllable it takes a semi-tonal step up the scale to end on a note that rises so slightly that most English ears cannot hear or imitate it. Personal names like Branwen, Owain, Dylan, (the last two my own sons' names), place-names like Machynlleth, Llanystumdwy, Llanrhaadr-ym-mochnant use consonantal sounds unknown in English, and the placing of the stress and the rise and fall of the note are difficult for a stranger's ear to hear or imitate. It is these beautiful characteristics that colour the tone and give what is called the lilt in every Welsh voice using English. Voices such as that of Dylan Thomas, or the actor Richard Burton provide famous examples. Accent, voice, tradition, history, all contribute to a contemporary poetry in the English language that is distinctly Welsh, while the latest generation of poets in the Welsh language is young, vital and talented.

Most Welsh writers whose mother tongue is English know some Welsh, all sympathise with the need to help it survive, and many have learned to speak it fluently and use it as readily as English. Primary Schools now fall into one of

three categories: (a) Welsh the main language of all teaching, (b) bilingual, (c) English the main language, with Welsh taught as a second language. This has transformed the position of Welsh in schools. Most of us adults went to schools where no Welsh was taught. The revolution was achieved by the Welsh Language movement, and that movement is strongly supported by writers, who know better than most the value of language.

That support is more than the tacit approval of liberals towards the liberty of the individual to speak his or her own tongue. It has been implicit in much of the writing of our English language poets. The ancient store of verse and myth, the intimacy of belonging to a relatively small group, have had their effect. Even Dylan Thomas, - born, incidentally, the same year as R. S. Thomas, - who grumbled, 'Land of my fathers, you can keep it', (the first four words translated from the Welsh national anthem), is a characteristically Welsh poet. He inherited, whether he liked to admit it or no, assonant and alliterative sound patterns from Welsh poet. He inherited, whether he liked to admit it or no, assonant and alliterative sound patterns from Welsh, which he enjoyed booming like a bishop in a cathedral, as well as certain attitudes towards the role of poet arising from ancient tradition. His fame as well as his notoriety had made him the voice of his tribe by the time he died of alcohol poisoning in America in 1953. His was the first book of contemporary poetry I bought as a teenager.

It is not to America but to Europe that most Welsh writers turn for their tribal history. A Welsh sense of Europe is ancient and traditional. Welsh belongs

within the Celtic family group of tongues, it is true, but it has been profoundly influenced by the Romance languages, first by Roman Latin, later by Norman French. Today, Welsh sheep farmers, with no chance to grow anything but grass on mountain pastures, are hurt that French farmers highjack their lorry-loads of lamb in the villages of Normandy, but I have detected no anti-French feeling in Wales, despite the fact that it is rife in the British press. The Welsh are, after all, Gauls, first cousins to the Bretons, and they share the French farmers' fears about the threat to rural communities and the livelihood of small farmers.

When BBC World Service commissioned a poem on the theme of 'Neighbours', I thought of Wales within Europe, the local habitation and the larger culture to which we all belong. My poem about the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, considers the poisoned grasslands of the mountains of Snowdonia in North Wales,

This spring, a lamb sips caesium on a Welsh hill.

A child, lifting her face to drink the rain,

takes into her blood the poisoned arrow.' (15)

as well as 'the burnt fireman, the child on the Moscow train.'

As a child, born just before the second world war, my first travelling was by radio. At that time it seemed to me that the names on the dials of the radios that proliferated in our house my father was the BBC's outside broadcasting

engineer for Wales names like Berlin, Paris, Athlone, Luxembourg, and the strange tongues I could listen to simply by turning the knob, were quite as seductive as my book-world of Grimm, and the Avalon and Tirna-nog of myth and fairy story. They were journeys without luggage, without frontier.

Retrospectively, it seems that radio has played a crucial role in twentieth century Europe, and the BBC's World Service has given many of us a sense of Europe as nothing else has since the troubadours. When I make a programme for the World Service I am aware that among my audience are political prisoners, exiles, hostages, some of them in chains for their faith, opinions or nationality.

The art that influenced us was European: Beethoven, Mozart, Leonardo, Picasso, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Homer, Dante, Shakespeare. Our own stories belonged there too. The legends of the ancient Celtic world of King Arthur, of Tristan and Esyllt, the old stories of The Mabinogion that had been absorbed and transformed by composers and artists. More and more it seemed that there was a great common cloth of gold on which we could all find room to embroider our small story.

When I was a small child my father told me the story of Branwen, the beautiful daughter of Llyr, from the second branch of The Mabinogion. She married the King of Ireland, who ill-treated her. In her despair she taught a starling to say her name sent it across the Irish Sea to Wales bearing a message to her brother, the giant Bendigeidfran, or Bran. Receiving her message he crossed the sea with his fleet of ships to rescue her. My father told me that a pool

shaped like a footprint in a rock on the beach of the grandmother's farm in West Wales, had been stamped there by Bran when he set off in his rage, and that a huge and ancient stone on the cliff was a pebble from his pocket.

These stories are part of the Welsh imagination, and are often associated with particular, familiar places. Welsh children are frequently named after characters in the stories - both Branwen and Llyr are common names in Wales. Poets, novelists and playwrights plunder these stories for theme. In my own most recent work I have returned to the footprint on the beach and the boulder on the cliff, to a rural childhood in a world where myth seemed alive within a real Europe where, my parents told me, there was a war going on. The several levels of reality that writing about childhood make possible have allowed me to explore the themes of a private life lived in a beloved and beautiful place within the wider horizon of Europe, where history was happening at an audible distance, an exciting and incomprehensible continent that called in a strange tongues on the radio, where children like me, I was told, were hungry and suffering. Inevitably mythological war and real war became tangled, a protective giant with a loving father, messages by starling with the foreign tongues of radio, the roar of enemy bombers with storms and with giant-rage, windowsill with horizon. The giant Bran became a metaphor through which to view the world afresh. The exercise casts light on how myths such as those of The Mabinogion were made from the stuff of history as well as the personal lives and the imagination of a people, how such stories helped people to explain to themselves the phenomena they perceived about them and what they felt and

experienced, how superstition and nature enamelled the tales until they became the art of a tribe.

Before peace could come again to the two Celtic lands, the Irish king and all his soldiers were slaughtered, and all his people died except for 'five pregnant women in a cave in the Irish wilderness', and Bran and all but seven of his men died. Branwen and the seven men returned to Wales where she died of a broken heart, and was buried on the banks of the river Alaw. There is a place beside that river which people still call Branwen's grave. The Mabinoqi then tells me this:

'And at the close of the seventh year they went forth to Gwaloes in Penfro. And there they found a fair and regal spot overlooking the ocean: and a spacious hall was therein.' (16)

Gwales is Wales, and Penfro is Pembrokeshire, and I like to think that the fair and regal spot was our farm.

The story concludes:

'And thus ends this portion of the Mabinogi, concerning the blow given to Branwen, which was the third unhappy blow of this island; and concerning the entertainment of Bran, when the hosts of sevenscore countries and ten went over to Ireland to revenge the blow given to Branwen; and concerning the seven years' banquet in Harlech, and the

singing of the birds of Rhiannon, and the sojourning of the head of  
Bendigeidfran for the space of fourteen years.' (17)

And my own poem-sequence on the theme ends with this:

When I took you there,  
a pebble of basalt in my pocket,  
I showed you the white farm, the black beach,  
the empty headland where the stone  
balanced its mass so delicately,  
four thousand years withstanding weather  
like a dozing horse.

Walking the beach  
we felt the black grains give  
and the sun stood  
one moment on the sea  
before it fell.' (18)

And the task of linking them, of writing my part of the myth, and of writing this  
paper, has made European culture seem infinite and intimate, dizzyingly vast  
and possessable.

\* \* \*

## Notes

- (1) 'To the Etruscan Poets': Richard Wilbur, (Faber)
- (2) 'Ozymandias': Percy Bysshe Shelley
- (3) The Mabinoqion: translated by Gwyn Jones and Thomas Jones
- (4) The Oxford Book of Welsh Verse edited by Gwyn Jones
- (5) Welsh Verse: translated by Ifor Williams, The Oxford Book of Welsh Verse
- (6) 'Taliesin's Boast' translated by Ifor Williams, The Oxford Book of Welsh Verse
- (7) 'The Hymn to the Virgin': Ieuan ap Hywel Swardwal, (Anglo-Welsh Poetry 1480-1980)
- (8) 'Fern Hill': Dylan Thomas, (J. M. Dent)
- (9) 'Easter 1916': W. B. Yeats
- (10) 'Coming into their Own': Sheenagh Pugh, (Seren Books) Morfudd was the mistress of the Medieval Welsh poet, Dafydd ap Gwilym.
- (11) From The Gododdin by Aneirin, translated by Anthony Conran. (Welsh Verse)
- (12) 'Elegy to the Welsh Dead in the Falklands Islands' from Blodeuwedd: Anthony Conran, (Poetry Wales Press)
- (13) Daffydd ap Gwilym: Poems, a bilingual publication edited by Rachel Bromwich, (Gomer Press)
- (14) 'The Wind' translated by Anthony Conran, Welsh Verse, (Poetry Wales Press)
- (15) 'Neighbours' from Letting in the Rumour by Gillian Clarke, (Carcenet)

- (16) The Mabinogion. I have used the 19th
- (17) The Mabinogion translated by Lady Charlotte Guest.
- (18) From an unpublished sequence of 30 poems called 'The Rocking Stone',  
Gillian Clarke.

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
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
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**VOICES FROM THE SOUTHERN TRIBES**

**by Alexander Shurbanov**



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SYMPOSIUM  
MINOS BEACH HOTEL, CRETE  
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Symposium on "Images of Europe"

Crete, April 13-17, 1992

**EUROPEANS THOUGH NOT QUITE:**

**EUROPE AND BULGARIAN LITERATURE**

by Alexander Shurbanov

"We are Europeans, but not quite!" These are the concluding words of one of the greatest and most self-probing works in modern Bulgarian literature! They put in a nutshell the age-old cultural schizophrenia of a national consciousness on the fringe of the Continent. The relationship between the whole and its part in this case has been strained and uncertain from time immemorial. It has been one of belonging, but also of opposition, of sameness and of otherness.

The problem seems to have been institutionalised, and thus perpetuated in the ninth century, when Bulgaria decided that it would be politically more advantageous for her to receive the new, Christian faith from Constantinople rather than Rome. The contacts between Europe and its South-Eastern outposts during the Middle Ages were not very different from those between Christendom and the saracens, though in theory both regions belonged to Christ's fold. As soon as they entered the "sylvas Bulgarorum", the crusaders, whom the North-West regarded as the

champions of a great spiritual cause, were transformed into mere imperialistic invaders or brigands who were to be hooked and pulled down from their high-bred coursers and hacked to death by the local unenlightened savages. Bulgarian inroads into Europe were similarly unappreciated there. The most important and far-going of these were not of a military but of a religious character. The Bulgarians adopted and developed some of the dualistic heresies of Asia Minor and then spread them all over Europe as a subversive popular creed providing an alternative to the doctrine of the official Church. Consequently, the very name of the Bulgarians became a word of abuse among the righteous in France and England.

Two long occupations of the country. one by Byzantium and the other by the Ottoman Empire, between the eleventh and the nineteenth centuries, deepened its isolation. The Turkish overlords were especially jealous of anybody's attempt to forge links between the Christian population on their Balkan territories and the free European nations. The notion of differentness was deliberately cultivated throughout the vast Empire. This is the telling comment of one of the occasional Western travellers among the Turks in the early seventeenth century:

This haughtie disposition of theirs, makes the fashions of other Countreys rather despised, then imitated, so that in all the Inland

Turky, where Christians Merchants use not, if I appeared in the least part clothed like a Christian, I was tufted like an Owle among other birds: at first I imputed it to Barbarisme; but afterward lamenting thereof to one of the better sort, to note how they understood it; he told me, they would have no novelties, and therefore would disgrace all new examples; then I perceived it to be a piece rather of institution, when incivilitie; for they desiring perpetual hostilitie with the Christians, must estrange the People from their Customs as utterly as may be...2

The conquered were hardly of the same mind as their Asian masters, yet there is nothing in the travellers' reports to suggest that there was any warmer feeling for the visitors on their part. The conservatism and the xenophobia of the Ottomans must have exerted some influence over their slaves too only to harden the latter's traditional animosity towards the Pope's flock. It is in fact the above-quoted report again that contains the following revealing statement:

... the hatred of the Greeke Church to the Romish was the losse of Belgrado in Hungary, and is at this day so implacable, as he who in any Christian war upon the Turke, should expect the least good wish

from the Christians in those parts, would finde himselfe against the malice of their Christians...3

Other contemporary authors of travelogues are of the same opinion. There are frequent complaints of unfriendly treatment of foreigners in the Balkans. 4 Gaping at them, cursing and spitting seem to have been the customary form of welcome for the traveller dressed in the European way, and even priests were not much meeker in their attitude. 5

It must be made clear that encounters of this kind were very rare and they are mostly confined to the bigger towns on the route from London and Paris to Istanbul, which include Sofia and Plovdiv in Bulgaria. The rest of the country was fairly innocent as far as Europe was concerned and so the continent was for its inhabitants the Great Unknown. The stereotype of the different and the unpredictable was the natural result of this forced isolation. Even in the nineteenth century, it is only the Bulgarian merchant that has the opportunity of meeting foreigners on his business trips to the centre of the Empire and, less often, to some Central European places. These contacts are still very cursory and unenlightening. "I have seen the english in Istanbul, says one of the characters in Lyuben Karavelov's novel Bulgarian of the Olden Times (1867), and I can tell you that they are such fools as the world has not produced. If the Englishman hoes to a shop to buy bread or cheese, you won't even understand him. He says one thing,

and you give him another. And you know what, most of the English are born as dumb as the Germans." 6 It is true that another personage in the same book, the most learned though less travelled man in the same Central Bulgarian town, is aware of the great technical advancement of England, but that knowledge is purely abstract and there is little material proof of its validity in the everyday life of the Balkan community.

\* \* \* \*

The period after the middle of the nineteenth century, however, is characterised by a considerable expansion of economic and cultural intercourse between Europe and a new Bulgaria getting ready for its independence and increasingly aware of its European lineage. It is during this period of national self-determination, however, that Bulgarian literature becomes concerned about the destructive effect that the newly-awakened interest in Europe can have on the traditional principles on which the life of the community is based. A satirical poem by Raiko Zhinzifov, published in 1862, is entitled "Europeanism in Shoumen".7 It ironises the recent fashion among the young people in a North Bulgarian city, which makes them ape the ways of the French and the Germans above all in their clothing 8, but also in their manners, their speech and their dances. Those superficial borrowing are absurdly considered to be the rudiments of advanced

European education. The poet's tone is condescending and playfully-ironical.

One of the first bulgarian plays, Dobri Voinikov's Misconstrued Civilisation (1871) deals with the same problem at greater length and in some depth.

"With the young nations, the author argues in his preface, almost everything is occasioned by imitation rather than by a systematic investigation. Many a time the best and the most moral principles are misconstrued and adopted in a converse form. That is why instead of morality and decency you find in them depravity and corruption; instead of sincerity, brotherly affection a attachment - pride, scorn and hatred; instead of good fellowship and mutual consent - discord and division; consequently instead of development - sottishness and delusion. And it is delusion that impedes the progress of spiritual evolution and edification. Fashion is taken for civilisation."9

Voinikov goes on to complain that this shallow and perverted interpretation of the European model can easily turn the new nations into mere consumers of continental goods, incapable of producing anything on their own. What is even more worrying, he continues, "on the spiritual plane, this misconstrued civilisation has other merits, other consequences: respect for the religious rites is often replaced with derisive gibes; veneration for the old, with scorn; politeness to the fair sex, with impudence; shyness, with unbridled effrontery." 10

All this is amply shown in the play, in which a wicked Greek, Mr. Margaridi, succeeds in working his way into a good patriarchal Bulgarian family only to contaminate it with the germ of the pseudo-civilisation whose apostle he claims to be. Margaridi's strategy is simple yet efficacious. He speaks scornfully of boorish local traditions and teaches everybody how to imitate the elegant European manners. Thus he manages to win over to his side practically all except the father who is an inveterate believer in the old values. A Frenchified brother plays the pander and is therefore especially obnoxious. By and by it becomes clear that Magaridi's true purpose is to make a laughing-stock of the naive Bulgarians and to dishonour their daughter, who is led to believe that the Greek will marry her and take her to Europe to turn her into a bona fide mademoiselle. When she elopes with him only to find out that he has no honest intentions, everybody is sobered up, the villain is surrounded by the enraged community, and the skirmish at the close of the play ends with his death. All survivors gather to sing the epilogue, which spells out the moral of the story, to wit: it behoves the young to cherish their forefathers' national name; those of them who succumb to the lures of glossy civilisation are shallow and ludicrous; every lad and every lass should find their mates within their kin; we ought to remain faithful to our people's customs; anything that is of the others is alien, for it has not been tailored for us.

The play is overtly didactic. Its characters are divided into two categories: the ill-advised admirers and followers of European fashions and the

upholders of the national tradition. A duel to the latter is a new-fangled affectation - a cudgel would do the trick in more natural and straightforward way. Our old folk-dances are much better than the modish European ones. And it is wiser to speak normal Bulgarian than to twist one's tongue every which way trying to produce French words, as the womenfolk of the family do, ending up invariably with ridiculous malapropisms. One of the central points is that young girls should be obedient and marry according to their fathers' will rather than playing the emancipated lady in order to fall into the snare of an impostor and repent when it is too late.

The moral is obviously traditional and patriarchal and can be seen as the outcome of the long isolation imposed on the Bulgarians by their fate. However, if we examine the periods of change in European history, we shall see that the same opposition between the sanctity of customary morality and the corruption of new-fangled fashions appears again and again in literature. What makes the opposition interesting in this case is the fact that it once more sets Bulgaria against Europe as the pure chaste virgin and the vile seducer. "Sir, this here is not Europe!", proudly exclaims one of the champions of the national cause in the play, fighting against Margaridi's propaganda. Of course, it is conceded that European civilisation is not all a sham, and yet what is usually offered to us are not its true values, and we had better shun these enticements and adhere to our good old ways.

The choice of a wily Greek as the villain of the piece is very apposite, since Bulgarian society had just won the battle against the assimilatory aspirations of the Church in Constantinople. Incidentally, it underlines the fact that the anti-European sentiments are not the fruit of some deep-rooted xenophobia but rather of the apprehensions of a new national eager to retain its identity.

Another, very similar play of the same period opts for a Romanian in the role of the moral subverter of pristine Bulgaria. Fudulescu, Hadji Stefania:s Adroit Son-in-law was written by Todor Peev in 1876. 11 The action takes place in Romania, where the family of a well-to-do Bulgarian is infiltrated by a local charlatan determined to rob it of all its property. Fudulescu is a more sinister figure than Margaridi, and Peev's play as a whole is further removed from the comedy than Voinikov's. The fraudulent Romanian has managed to draw to his side the mistress of the house, a simple matron of his kin. He has married one of the daughters of the family and has corrupted their young son. The father has died of grief. Fudulsecu's new design is to make the youngest daughter his concubine, and he gradually succeeds in this. Their liaison has a ruinous effect on the girl's later marriage to a decent Bulgarian. Like its predecessor, Peev's play ends with the murder of the villain, though this act does not resolve the problem in the same naive way.

While Margaridi was a mere fop, Fudulescu is a dangerous villain. He plays the role of an apostle of the European ways only to ensnare the simple-minded Bulgarians and use them as tools for his self enrichment and sensual gratification. The lesson that he tries to teach everybody is that the fashions of Europe are the only sign of true civilisation and those who prefer to stick to their patriarchal morality are country bumpkins. It is perhaps significant that Fudulescu is surrounded by a few other Rumanians acting in conspiracy with him against the interests of the Bulgarians. They are, of course, all as corrupt as himself. Some of this corruption has been infused by them into various members of the mixed-blood family. The pure Bulgarians in the play, however, are invariable good and honest. They believe in the national tradition and are suspicious of the outlandish fashions recommended by Fudulescu.

If a certain xenophobic tendency can be detected in these early plays, the association of Europe with moral turpitude seems to be borne out by some newspaper publications of those years. Bulgaria's greatest poet, Hristo Botev, was also one of our first journalists. 12 Two of his reports in Zname, the paper of the Bulgarian political emigration from 1875, deal with actual stories, which almost seem to be moulded on the fictional plots of the plays discussed above. One of them takes place in Shoumen again. 13 According to Botev, the Turkish rags had twisted the story to give it an anti-Bulgarian slant. They had said that a certain French engineer from the local railways wanted to marry the most eligible young lady in the city, but the Bulgarian

lads were reluctant to give her away to a foreigner, so they besieged the girl's house on the day of the engagement and gave the fiance and his European retinue a sound beating, which left one of them dead on the spot. Botev maintains that the actual story was quite different. Here is his version accompanied by a characteristic commentary:

Anyone who has lived in Turkey ought to know that foreigners here enjoy such rights, privileges and liberties as they cannot find either in London or in Paris or in Vienna. The Turks are afraid of them and dare not touch them; the government lets them do anything they choose, and their consuls take their side in the most heinous deeds and offenses they inflict on the oppressed and defenceless rayah. And so, imagine how these educated gentlemen who have previously spent the nights under the bridges of the Seine and the Thames and have been brought up in the brothels of Paris or London, having come to our country and found a few extra francs or shillings in their pockets, begin to look at us as if we were slaves, whom they can treat the way their civilised passions prompt them. Thus, for instance, they would not let a single woman or a girl pass by in the street without giving her a pinch; they get as drunk as swine in the hotels and the taverns and they get out into the streets - with lamps during the day and without at night - to molest and disgrace anyone they happen to run into; they take off their trousers and present their nudity in front of any window where they have seen a young and pretty woman; they

look for and rent lodgings with such families that can appeal to none for protection if those ravish the mother or the daughter infecting them with the syphilis of their civilisation; in a word, they commit such filthy and abhorrent deeds for which at home they would have been put in the madhouse and chained too. Such are the Shoumen French engineers, and Monsieur Simon is one of that number. This rake, as the chieftain of a whole gang of swashbucklers, has, directly or obliquely, caused such shames, offenses and dishonours to both the Bulgarian and the Turkish population in Shoumen that the rayah as well as those of the right faith have complained to the administration several times asking it somewhat tighten the rein on its people, but the administration has turned a deaf ear to these pleas and the said swashbucklers have continued to practise around town. Simon, being better educated than his comrades, i.e. being a clerk whose monthly wages are something like one thousand francs (and it is known that education and silver are synonymous in this country), succeeded in obtaining admission into one of the foremost Bulgarian families and in presently introducing the Parisian civilisation into it. It was through the son of the family, a Francophile who was even ashamed to speak Bulgarian, that the Frenchman or, which amounts to the same, the one thousand francs entered into such an intimate relationship with his sister, that shortly our pretty Vasilka Konstantinova arrived at a rather interesting state or, to put it more simply, she gained a couple of pounds beneath her stomach. This

fact could not escape the perceptive eyes of the people and of Vasilka's admirers, and Mr Volov as the people's teacher and therefore the guardian of the young lady's morals, thought it necessary to ward off the evil and to advise the Bulgarians to refuse the hospitality of their homes to such rakes for whom there is no honour or morality, or purity of conduct. He made a speech in the church saying that, if we did not want to corrupt ourselves and lose the best traits of our character, we ought not to enter into family relations with foreigners and, more particularly, with such immoral personalities as, for instance, our engineers. Whether Mr. Volov's speech had any impact at all on what happened thereafter cannot be proved by anyone. The teacher only wanted to warn his fellow-citizens of the evil spreading together with civilisation and could never guess that his words would make the drunk Frenchmen issue out of the Bulgarian fattened mademoiselle's house and themselves challenge the barbarians to a fight.

The matter was as follows. The French had gathered in the belle's family not for an engagement or a wedding but for the simple purpose of getting drunk and making fun of the most sacred objects of Bulgarian family life. They were singing, dancing, making merry, jesting with the girl in the most repulsive cynical manner and sending her brother together with Robert the vagabond to fetch some priest by force so that he might marry Simon to the object of his love. At this

point, i.e. when "the carousing and raving" sons of Bacchus had reached the highest degree of inanity and when Robert and the man who was his sister's pimp had left to drag the priest who should wed the long-married lovers - across the street to marvel at the European wedding-party. Robert approached the young men and started swearing and chasing them away until at last he raised a leg the way a dog would to sprinkle them a little. This proved too much for the thick-headed, so they took hold of the vagabond, gave him a good thrashing and turned his head into a tambourine. The orgy spilled out to help the wedding guest, but a few more lads leapt out of the cafe and the party ended with a great hullabaloo...14

The story ends with the detention of some fifty Bulgarian "trouble-makers" by the Turkish authorities. Botev is furious at the injustice.

The exact factual truth of the account is not our main concern. What does matter is the recurrence of the pattern in which a pseudo-civilised representative of Europe sneaks into a Bulgarian family in order to corrupt and dishonour it. An apostate in the house helps the villain to accomplish his design, a daughter is disgraced and the name of the family is ruined. The moral is drawn that the wily foreigner with his false civilisation should not be admitted into Bulgarian homes.

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Botev's other report is from the city of Rouse. Two employees of the British Consulate there played a practical joke on the German and the Belgian consuls, whose daughters they had been courting. In their complaint to the Turkish authorities the victims implicated two Bulgarian lads, who were promptly detained in spite of their innocence. The author of the report gives vent to his indignation:

You German devils! The very ones who have been sent to fend the Christians in Turkey. In fact, you are quite ght to do evil and to persecute the Bulgarian element, once you are the worthy representatives of that proud and conceited government that has carried out the assimilation of so many Slavs and now licks its chops at the Slovak Danube. 15

Here Botev touches upon a second aspect of the unfriendly image of Europe that is going to be even more central in the years to come, i.e. the political unreliability and deviousness of the Great Powers. It is towards the end of the same report that he reminds us again of the outcome of the Shoumen scandal, the imprisonment of the patriotic Bulgarians who would not yield to foreign arrogance and impudence. These are his concluding words:

Why and wherefore did those innocent souls get sentenced? Wasn't it done to please the foreign exploiters, who are only to enslave, rob and

dishonour us? Ah, civilised European wolves! Sooner or later mankind will repay you in kind. Yes, it will repay when the time comes for the people's awesome and just judgment over all parasites, blood-suckers and tormentors in the world. I believe in it and I say Amen! 16

As one of the earliest and most ardent exponents of the socialist idea in Bulgaria, Botev first introduces a trait in the stereotype image of Europe which is going to be elaborated on again and again by his followers. The rulers of the advanced nations on the Continent are the exploiters of all the poor and the feeble in the world, including those in their own countries. The dividing line, therefore, passes not between the peoples but between the classes. It is the overlords of Europe who are the arch-enemy of the Bulgarian national cause as well as of the national aspirations of all new nations, for their political orientations is motivated solely by heartless self-interest. They are certainly not the only representatives of Europe, for the majority of the Europeans are their slaves too, but as they are in possession of all political power, they shape the course of the entire Continent. Thus, they can be identified with Europe, making it even more repulsive and inimical to Bulgaria.

This attitude is not confined to the socialist writers only. It is almost universal during the endless struggle for national independence and,

subsequently, for national unification. Botev's attacks against the financially motivated collusion between Europe and the disintegrating Ottoman Empire are especially vehement. This is a typical passage from one of his articles in the Nova Bulgaria paper published shortly before the author's heroic death in 1876:

We know only too well that in Europe, which prides itself on all sorts of "pious" and "humane" establishments, and which has even organised societies of compassion for the animals - in that same Europe there has been and there still is a conspiracy against the liberation of the South Slavs and against the freedom of all humanity.

17

Thus, the spuriousness of European civilisation is once again unmasked - this time in the political hypocrisy of the Great Powers.

Another figure of paramount importance in the age of the National Revival, the patriarch of modern Bulgarian literature, Ivan Vazov<sup>18</sup> takes much the same view of the stance of Europe vis-à-vis the Bulgarian question. A young idealist, like most of the country's intelligentsia during the period of the freedom struggle, he was deeply disappointed by Europe's failure to react more resolutely to the Turkish atrocities in the wake of the great Bulgarian April Uprising in 1876. This bitterness is expressed in a series of early poems, one of which is especially articulate:

What is this Europe, renowned for humaneness  
And yet a calm spectator of this ferocious sight,  
Unwilling to raise her voice and speak without fear:  
"Go away, you savages! We'll have no more of you!"  
Oh no! This wouldn't do! In this she wouldn't meddle,  
For it is all against her vested interests,  
And she would rather stand by this old and rotten throne  
That always has troubled the Eastern firmament.  
To her the slave's a creature much lower than the cattle,  
That's looded after and loved, for it will draw the yoke.  
It's all the same to her whether we die or live,  
As if we don't form a part of her own living body!" 19

Europe's indifference to Bulgaria's agony is for the poet an indication that  
"this civilisation, this Christianity/ Are but an imposture, a lie, a  
charlatanry" 20, and already familiar accusation.

Vazov is also aware of the existence of true European democrats and  
liberals, who have raised their voices in defence of the snowtrodden, yet the  
overall image of the Continent is gravely tarnished by its political  
obscurantism. The later works of the poet carry on the same theme in  
connection with the Great Powers' aversion to Bulgaria's  
national unification after the Liberation of 1878 and their hostility to her  
aspirations in the First World War. In a powerfully ironical poem, "Yes, We

Are the Barbarians!", provoked by slanderous writings in the French press, he returns the stigma to its authors:

The French ports were destroyed with grenades by us,  
By us the English villages were looted and burned down,  
By us the children and the old massacred, women  
dishonoured,  
By us the old chains forged anew, which other hands had broken.  
So great is our shame that even the ocean cannot wash it.  
Yes, we are the barbarians!  
It was we who sent our fleets across the stormy seas  
To help the filthy despots with cannons and with guns,  
It was we who machine-gunned all idealistic fighters  
And killed the Bengal tigers with bullets that explode.  
Under an angel's mask the beast lurks deep in us.  
Yes, we are the barbarians! 21

Thus, once again, Europe's ruthless hypocritical imperialism is opposed to Bulgaria's helpless suffering.

A similar attitude to the unseemly role of the Great Powers in the First World War is expressed by one of the earliest and most gifted communist poets, Hristo Smirnensky burlesques the diplomatic games of the West, exposing the double-dealing of its politicians, the viciously selfish nature of

their activities behind the thin cover of charitable humanism. The class motivation of their policies is now made absolutely clear. Later leftist writers follow in Smirnenesky's footsteps. The crowning work in this vein is probably Alexander Voutismsky's long poem. "Europe the Vulture", completed shortly before its author's premature death in 1943. 23 It draws a repugnant picture of the Old Continent overrun by the Nazis, staggering through the last phase of its horrible history of exploitation of the working people both at home and abroad. The poet predicts that the great monster will die at the hands of those who have created its power through their incessant labour. His vision, however, is apocalyptic rather than revolutionary. The attitude to Europe has reached the point of total rejection as something irredeemably evil and doomed.

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A third strain in the literary image of the Continent is based on the experience of Bulgarians travelling abroad and almost invariably finding it inhospitable and alien. This note is perhaps first sounded in the writings of the national political emigration during the age of the freedom struggle after the middle of the nineteenth century. In one of his most popular poems, "On Parting" (1968), written on the eve of his crossing the Danube to enter Bulgaria with a guerrilla detachment, Botev entreats his mother:

But curse, oh mother, curse

This black Turkish banishment  
That sent us away so young  
To lead this hard life abroad  
Ranging and roaming about  
Wretched, unloved and unwanted.<sup>24</sup>

Fifteen years later, shortly after Bulgaria's Liberation, Vazov paraphrased the last line of this quotation for the title of a short novel, Unloved and Unwanted, based on the life of our revolutionary exiles. And he sums up their experience in the following bitter words:

Bulgaria was locked up for them. Romania offered them the hospitality offered by the barren sea-coast to the mariners cast on it by the storms, all broken and crushed. They were in the midst of a society, yet they were in a desert. The houses, the shops, the purses, the hearts, everything was shut to them. They were sustained only by the alms of others nearly as poor as themselves.<sup>25</sup>

And a little later, there is the passionate exclamation of a writer who himself has experienced the plight of the exile more than once:

How close we are and yet how far away! Ah Bulgaria, you are never so dear to us as when we are away from you. You are never so much needed as when we have lost you beyond all hope.<sup>26</sup>

The two poles of the opposition are well established: the foreign parts are a forbidding desert, while the home-country is an unreachable dream. And here again we come across a meaningful detail that has already been noticed: if a Bulgarian can find any sympathy abroad, it will be only among those who are as poor and unwanted among their own people as he is. Thus the social note of the theme is sounded once again.

The nostalgic attachment of the emigré to his motherland first appears in Vazov's poetry in the mid-seventies. "Far from Home" (1875) is the heavy sigh of a young man who has exchanged "his native place for a cold country"<sup>27</sup> and now is sunk in grief. the coldness of the North is again turned into a symbol of the Continent's foreignness in his "Sentimental Journey across Europe" (1880), a poem whose central concern is the familiar political mercantilism of the Great Powers.<sup>28</sup> Bulgaria, on the other hand, is not infrequently identified with the image of the gentle and caring mother left behind both in Vazov's and in Botve's poetry.

The coldness of the North is later established as the hallmark of alien Europe in the works of Bulgarian symbolism. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, Theodore Trayanov, a poet who spent long years in Austria, first as a student and then as a diplomat, and who was imbued with the literary and cultural traditions of the Continent, continues to feel the powerful attraction of his homeland from afar. "Northern Song" is a characteristic poem, in which the author sends his "pale spring" back to his

native regions in the South, where "the skies are many-coloured, the day bursts into joyous leaves, and the night, into bliss and dew". The North, he complains, has blighted it with its "attentive quiet".<sup>29</sup> The opposition between Bulgaria and Europe is thus formalised in the sensuously evocative contrasts of the warm, colourful and lively South versus the cold, pale and dead-still North.

Our most prominent woman-poet, Elisaveta Bagryana,<sup>30</sup> is an unusually emancipated spirit fighting against the narrow confines of the conservative patriarchal world in which she was born. She frequently identifies herself with the free boundless elements. And yet some of her most successful poems, written in the twenties and the thirties, show how in the midst of her travels she is overwhelmed by the image of her abandoned country. The modern mechanical civilisation of Europe is enormously exciting, but the romantic vision of far-away Bulgaria suddenly takes hold of her and she is drastically estranged from her environment. She likens herself to the canary in the restaurant, which waits for the pauses in the loud music of the band to resume its simple old tune.<sup>31</sup>

Another major poet, Athanas Daltchev,<sup>32</sup> who spent some time in Paris and other European cities during the same period, is less prone to visualise nostalgically his native land. Yet, in many of his poems, we can sense a weary resentment for modern urban ways and a yearning for a half-forgotten pastoral repose reminiscent of the atmosphere of rural Bulgaria.

Both "44 Avenue du Maine", and "The Journey Back"<sup>33</sup> express the poet's feeling of not belonging. Being in Europe makes him a traveller who can never stop and relax, never settle down and feel at home at least for a minute:

Trains keep whistling and leaving,  
The rails never stop humming  
Like strings - and it seems to me  
I have been on the road for months.

In the laconic "Departure"<sup>34</sup> Daltchev confesses that he has no regrets in leaving the foreign city of his sojourn, for he has not made a single acquaintance in it:

I kept going, taking off my hat to no-one  
But the winds in this city.

This is the familiar inability of the Bulgarian to overcome the "otherness" of Europe and start a normal life far from home.

Daltchev's poetry is not overtly social, and yet, even here, in poems like "Snow" and, especially, "The Sandwich Men"<sup>35</sup> he points at the indifference of the modern megalopolis to the plight of the poor and the reduction of the latter to inanimate things drawn into the inhuman machine of a mercantile

society. The habitual identification of the Bulgarian poet with the victims rather than the captains of Europe, i.e. with its destitute, is thus passed on from one generation of writers to another.

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With the communist take-over in Eastern Europe during the mid-forties and the subsequent outbreak of the Cold War, Bulgarian literature was taken under the wing of an ever more centralised totalitarian regime, which imposed on it the function of systematic ideological propaganda. The inherited stereotype image of Europe had to be further elaborated and used for political purposes. All three aspects of this image discussed above came in handy. Capitalist Europe had to be presented as: a) the hotbed of moral infection trying to invade the healthy but young and therefore susceptible socialist society by means of its glossy fashions; b) the ruthless exploiter of the masses both at home and abroad, the incorrigible tyrant and aggressor; c) the inhospitable scorner of the unfortunate traveller, who is at once put in mind of his beautiful and kind homeland and is irresistibly drawn back to it. Travelling in that direction was anyway reduced to a bare minimum, but there was no harm in continuing to harp on the old theme.

A Paris poem is now characteristically included in a cycle entitled "A Distant World"<sup>36</sup>. It draws on the well-established convention of representing the European capitals as dirty, smoky and generally uncomfortable. The poet,

Bogomil Rainov, one of the few privileged travellers of that age, knows well that this is the picture he is expected to reproduce. But it has to be done in a more subtle way. He spots two lovers "embracing each other like children" on the embankment of the Seine and watching the empty tins and bottles floating on the polluted river. They are both poor and hungry, but the inner weather of their love is much lovelier than the miserable outer spring. So we have found our people in Paris again.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, they have no more control over the environment than we do. Another poem of the same collection shows the persona entering a shabby hotel in an unspecified country and being saddened at the prospect of impending typical experiences: "the porter spying on me from behind his paper and those dinners with sullen foreigners".<sup>37</sup> Exasperated, the poet exclaims:

Ah that unfriendliness, it's everywhere -  
In the town and in the room, in the field and in the woods,  
It blows with the wind and it comes down with the rains  
From the dull foreign sky.

And it's all the same whether you roam around  
For a day or a year, with or without a purpose.  
Even if you spend a century abroad,  
You'll be still a stranger staying at a hotel.

In his Scandinavian travelogue, A Little Northern Saga (1980)<sup>38</sup> the most brilliant Bulgarian prose-writer of the contemporary period, Yordan Raditchkov presents the Swedish winter as still, barren and lifeless, and yearns to populate it with the memories of a boisterous and colourful Bulgarian rustic winter from his childhood.<sup>39</sup> The contrast is quite striking. An interesting detail in the book shows how, in the new age, the received notion of European inhospitality is expanded to cover the new social phenomenon of alienation, which is part of capitalism and adds to the overall coldness of the North.<sup>40</sup>

It is curious, by the way, that Raditchkov sees the extreme North and the extreme South of the Continent as equally excluded from Europe and opposed to it on the basis of their being unencumbered by its imperialistic history.<sup>41</sup> This suggestion widens the initial opposition without underplaying it.

Lyubomir Levchev, the foremost figure in Bulgarian poetry during the Khrushchev and the post-Khrushchev era,<sup>42</sup> has written a lot of political lyrics, some of which synthesise brilliantly various facets of the image of Europe in the context of the new ideological requirements. A 1978 long poem entitled "The Road from the Levant and the Road to the Levant"<sup>43</sup> is the monologue of one of the many Turkish workers temporarily employed in the industrialised countries and crowding the Bulgarian motorways every summer, hurrying back home for the vacation and then in the opposite

direction again in their cheap second-hand western cars. Levitchev's character dies in a road-accident during one of these trips due to overtiredness. He keeps repeating "I'm a worker...I work in an utterly foreign land...I work in an underground factory...My house is so far away...My only wish is to go back home. I am going back to my Levant..." And he asks: "Do you know how cruel it is/ To be so poor in such a rich country/ That can even import/ The poor from the Levant?.." The two traditional oppositions - inhospitable Europe versus the dream of home sweet home and Europe the exploiter versus the exploited weaker nations - are deftly fused in a single image, and the poet has identified with the victim of this opposition to such an extent that the latter speaks through the mouth of the former. It should also be noticed that the regional pull proved stronger than the continental when it comes to taking sides. At this point one is reminded of the early travellers' reports.

Another Levitchev poem, "A Letter from Paris"<sup>44</sup>, dedicated to a comrade and colleague, sets a contrast between the Eifel Tower in the French capital and the visually similar power-line pylons in the Balkan mountains only to affirm the superiority of the latter which are the former's "distant relatives/ Of workers' descent,/ Just as this poem/ Is a relative of the wolf's howl". If the Eifel Tower is forever foreign, the pylons are truly ours and they are the symbol of a new, better society that is also our own. The two usual oppositions are fused again, but the political one is updated to become: capitalist/imperialist Europe versus socialist Bulgaria, or: Europe of the

exploiters versus Bulgaria of the working lads. The end-result is, of course, the familiar opposition: Bulgaria the Good and the Virtuous versus Europe the Evil and the Vicious.

And now there is not even a hint that a hateful middleman, a Margaridi or a Fudulescu - might be responsible for misrepresenting the true nature of Europe's civilisation. Depravity is obviously the very essence of its being.

The opening quotation of this paper was taken from a book which is undoubtedly among the most impressive achievements of Bulgarian literature and also among the loftiest flights of the national spirit. It is now almost a hundred years old but has not dated in the least. Bai Ganiu<sup>45</sup> was first published in 1895 and its author, Aleko Konstantinov, set himself the superhuman task in an exceptionally mature and dispassionate way, producing a literary mirror for the Bulgarians in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and, unfortunately, as has become clear, for a much longer period too.

The title character is, of course, the representative of a particular social class rather than of the entire nation, but that class, the newly sprung bourgeoisie, impatient to establish itself economically and politically, certainly leaves its stamp on every aspect of national life as its most active and determined component. We are introduced to the rose-perfume merchant, Bai Ganiu, on the eve of his departure for Europe. He has just

exchanged his Balkan-style shepherd's cloak for a trendy Belgian one and, as the author observes, everybody agrees that the fellow has become an out-and-out ~European.<sup>46</sup> Yet, as we are soon convinced, that is exactly what he is not. Even his rustic attire under the new cloak singles him out in the European environment and brands him as the boorish intruder. A humorous scene in the Vienna Opera House, where the merchant finds himself unexpectedly, makes the contrast painfully conspicuous.<sup>47</sup>

However insensitive he may appear at first sight, Bai Ganiu is well aware of the cultural barrier dividing him from the Continent. He tries to overcome it in a variety of equally inefficient naive ways. One of them is to create for himself a stereotype image of the European as greedy and wily, all the time with an eye on your money, though actually not much cleverer than yourself. On the face of it, he is always well-behaved and polite, yet his only motive is profit. His morals in general are suspect. Therefore, the only adequate way of dallying with the Europeans is to try and beat them at their own game, mostly by managing to get from them something for nothing.<sup>48</sup> The old notion of Europe as the hypocritical exploiter of the weak is seen as an excuse for moral lassitude of the Balkan type. Bai Ganiu's strategy, of course can hardly help to improve his own image on the Continent.

The hero's awareness of the scorn or, at least, the condescension with which he is treated by the Europeans makes him react by putting on shows of superiority. Thus, he splashes almost all the water out of the pool in an

Austrian public bath by first leaping into it and then demonstrating all sorts of exotic swimming styles to the amazed natives. Finally, misinterpreting the effect of his act on the spectators, Bai Ganiu proceeds to thump his hairy chest with his fists and announce in a thundering voice: "Bulgar! Bulgar!" The author surmises that what the character would have said had he had more German would have been a proud apology for the national genius: "You see what miracles he can work! And there are things greater than these too. You think the Bulgarians are dumb, eh? You filthy Jews!"<sup>49</sup>

Another kind of overreaction to the disrespect with which Bai Ganiu is treated abroad is his inflated idea of traditional national virtues as opposed to their disgraceful scarcity in Europe. One particular merit of Bulgarian culture that the hero loves to harp on is hospitality. And it is exactly this that is sadly lacking in the so called civilised world.<sup>50</sup> (One remembers at this point the major theme of European coldness in Bulgarian literature.) Bai Ganiu's true grievance is again that the Europeans do not accept him as a desired friend and partner. His patriotic effusion, however, is dampened by the counter-arguments of a Bulgarian student in Prague, who questions the right of his uncultured compatriots to expect better treatment in a world which they often shock with their deplorable lack of both manners and morals.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, the doors of Europe are slammed in the faces of Bai Ganiu and his like. This attitude makes them encapsulate themselves in their own narrow

regional circle wherever they happen to be. A network of hotels and cafes filled with a characteristic odour and a no less characteristic noise draw the Bulgarian traveller into his familiar milieu populated by Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, Albanians, etc., all the peoples whom he knows from home and whose languages, unlike the Western ones, he can understand and speak.<sup>52</sup> The smaller sphere of his past, which is really nothing else than the former Ottoman Empire, is difficult to break and fuse into the greater, European one. Consequently, he is cut off from the beneficial influence of Europe and "surrounds himself with a wall against the invasion of civilisation".<sup>53</sup> At the bottom of the old Bulgarian suspicion of European "fashions", Konstantinov has discovered the inferiority complex of the historically isolated South-East, thus turning his character into the representative of the entire region. Moreover, he has pointed out the sad repercussions of this self-perpetuating isolation.

In the second half of the book we see Bai Ganiu as he has returned to Bulgaria after his extended trip. Like Voinikov's old fashionmongers, the well-travelled merchant has now put on the entire set of European clothes and, with them, the pretence that he is superior to his less fortunate fellow-countrymen because he has been to Europe. But, as the author makes it clear, deep down Bai Ganiu has not changed in the least.<sup>54</sup> And the knowledge of Europe he has brought back is not of its bright but of its dark side, which he suspects is the only real one. This is now our own native version of the former cultural sub-vergers, Margaridi and Fudulescu, worse

than both. His inability to enter Europe in actual fact coupled with his claim to have done so leave Bai Ganiu in a strange schizophrenic situation, in which he is equally estranged from both his own people and from Europe. As a result, he vacillates between scornful negations of the one or the other, which betray a lack of inner confidence.<sup>55</sup>

It is time for Bai Ganiu at this point to turn to politics. A character in The Misconstrued Civilisation had said that a true follower of the European fashions ought to talk often about political matters until he gets elected in some public office in order not so much to work for the common good as to fill his own purse.<sup>56</sup> In the first part of Konstantinov's book, Bai Ganiu himself expressed the opinion that he would like to become either a member of Parliament or a mayor. "These things are a real racket. There are people who have made lots of money out of them, mark my word!"<sup>57</sup> Now that he is back, he plunges into pernicious partisan activity and at the peak of an election campaign of the most barbaric kind climbs up a high staircase to shout triumphantly at his battered opponents:

We have ourselves seen a bit of Europe, and those election things are no news to us! I have been to Belgium, you know.<sup>58</sup>

The situation in the Vienna public bath seems to be repeated in the reverse. There Bai Ganiu misrepresented his own nation - now he represents Europe at home with the same false assurance. The net result is a deepened chasm

between Bulgaria and the Continent, a vicious circle of mutual distrust, due to some cultural differences and prejudices on both sides, no doubt, but above all, to inappropriate yet historically irrevocable ambassadors.

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The mutual rejection syndrome has hampered the cultural dialogue between the two poles of the opposition we deal with. And while the import of European aesthetic values in Bulgaria has been prestigious enough not to be greatly impeded, the reverse is, unfortunately, less true. The problem is again rooted in the cloistered development of the country. The unpropitious circumstances of the protracted Ottoman occupation confined most of the people's cultural activities to collective forms. Literature, as well as music and the visual arts, remained largely within the boundaries of folklore well into the nineteenth century. Even so, some of its achievements were quite striking, but they could only be appreciated within the more or less impenetrable semiotic system of thematic formulae, myths, symbols, etc. The most ambitious attempt to introduce the European reader to the wealth of Bulgarian folk-poetry, it seems, is The Shade of the Balkans anthology (1904)<sup>59</sup> compiled and translated into English by Henry Bernard (or Henry Baerlein) in collaboration with our eminent poet Pencho Slaveikov. In spite of the enthusiasm and the competence of the two, the overall effect of the publication was hardly adequate. The oblique method of translation (from the Bulgarian original through Slaveikov's German paraphrase into

Bernard's English) could only result in vague and flat approximations.

Slaveikov's eloquent essay on the nature of Bulgarian folk-song<sup>60</sup> is hardly a sufficient introduction for the uninitiated foreign reader.

The early modern Bulgarian literature produced during the period of the National Revival was based on the powerful and vital folklore tradition and relied on it for its themes, sentiments and imagery as well as for the rudiments of its prosodic organisation. The lasting attachment of the new authors to the received patriarchal ideals of kin, mother, hearth, native land is quite striking. It perpetuates the understandable customary reliance of the enslaved on the narrow circle of the nearest and dearest as the only source of security in an alien world. The boundaries of the universe are often those of the local community and it is populated with concrete forms, colours and sounds. The great existential problems are never exposed in their abstract purity. They can only shine through the thick clothing of local detail, which at times seems to become an end in itself, almost an ethnographic preoccupation, thus putting off the foreign reader. The wood-nymphs as a traditional element of Bulgarian folk-poetry contribute considerably to the impact of Botev's "Hadji Dimitar" ballad, one of the highest achievements of our poetic genius.<sup>61</sup> Yet it will take a very sensitive and skilful translator to render their image into any West-European language without making the poem sound naive or even humorous. Genre-scene material and legendary paraphernalia seem to weigh rather heavily on the otherwise fine writings of Petko Todorov<sup>62</sup> and even those of

Raditchkov,<sup>63</sup> whose healthy distance from his folk-lore matter is quite obvious.

Maybe it is again due to the relative youth of modern Bulgarian literature that its early works at least still have for us the status of national epics, and we are incapable of appraising their artistic worth separately from their relation with the country's history. Hence the frequent disappointing failures in our attempts to secure an enthusiastic foreign readership for what we regard as our literary masterpieces, e.g. Ivan Vazov's great patriotic novels and poems, Zahari Stoyanov's truly epic Notes on the Bulgarian Uprisings, some of Yavorov's lyrical gems, etc.<sup>64</sup>

The late Europeanisation of Bulgarian literature has created another formidable problem: the necessity of an accelerated and therefore mongrelised development, which baffles the European sense of strict periodisation and makes its products difficult to appreciate on their own terms.

All these factors have brought about an offensive unconcern for Bulgarian literature, which has driven it into a further whorl of self-isolation. The national tradition has been stressed again and again as the absolute value that cannot be questioned. Any attempt to smuggle in an outside influence has been seen as subversive or immature and marginalised as the imitation of alien fashions, a "misconstrued civilisation." This attitude became

particularly strong during the recent totalitarian age, when all foreign influence was viewed as ideologically evil. The older tendency towards concentration on the local rather than the universal as nationally significant was now coupled with the new requirement of presenting reality not in a naturalistic but in a romantically heightened way. This norm of the art of "Socialist Realism" made most of our literature tongue-tied or dishonest and thus even less appealing to the Europeans.

The general lack of interest has, of course, resulted in a dire scarcity of qualified translators from Bulgarian. Faute de mieux, the job of popularising Bulgarian literature abroad has often been taken by our own nationals or by the followers of Henry Bernard's example, and the end-products have understandably failed to do justice to the original. Some of the finest lyrical poets like Debelyanov, Yavorov, Trayanov, Liliev, for instance,<sup>65</sup> may have to wait another century before they are presented to the international public in the true complexity of their rhythmic, melodic, stanzaic and euphonic accomplishments. The vicious circle is unbroken.

To end on a less gloomy note, I would like to point out that, side by side with the isolationists in Bulgarian literature, there have always been the tireless bridge-builders, artists with an undaunted European consciousness, such as Pencho Slaveikov, Geo Milev, Svetoslav Minkov<sup>66</sup> and a host of younger people who have become particularly vocal in the post-totalitarian period.<sup>67</sup> It is hoped that now that Bulgaria is finally ready

to enter Europe as an autonomous democratic country, she will cease to look at the continent as something different and unreliable. It is hoped that Bulgarian literature will be able to contribute meaningfully to this process. But stereotypes have been known to die hard.

## NOTES

- 1 Bai Ganiu, in: Aleko Konstantinov (1863-97), Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1957, I, p.190
- 2 Henry Blount, A Voyage into the Levant (etc.), London, 1636, p.99
- 3 *ibid.*, p.111
- 4 Reports of this kind are collected in British Travellers' Accounts on the Balkans (End of the 16th Century until 1830), ed. Maria N. Todorova, Sofia, 1987. See for instance, Henry Cavendish's or Edward Brown's material, pp.45 and 190
- 5 H. Cavendish relates an unpleasant episode involving an unfriendly priest in Plovdiv (British Travellers' Accounts on the Balkans, p.45
- 6 Lyuben Karavelov (1834-79), Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works) Sofia, 1984, I p.160
- 7 Raiko Zhinzifov (1839-77), Satchineniya (Works), 1969, p.71

- 8 In his above-quoted account H. Blount argues that "...there is no innovation draws in foreign manners faster, than that of Apparell: Besides that, it seems honourable for the Turkish Nation, to retain their ancient habit of clothing; for as the French Court gives this side of the world pattern of apparell, so does the Turkish to the Levant...(British Travellers' Accounts on the Balkans, pp.99-100)
- 9 Dobri Voinikov (1833-78), Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1983, II, p.57
- 10 *ibid.*, p.58
- 11 Todor Peev (1842-1904), Satchineniyua (Works), Sofia, 1976
- 12 Hristo Botev (1848-76), Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works), Sofia, 1976
- 13 Hristo Botev, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 234-238
- 14 *ibid.*, pp. 235-237
- 15 *ibid.*, p. 290
- 16 *ibid.*, p. 291

- 17 ... ibid., p. 340
- 18 Ivan Vazov (1850-1921), Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works), Sofia, 1955-57
- 19 "Vekat" (The Century), 1876, in: Ivan Vazov, op.cit., I, p.137
- 20 ibid.
- 21 Ivan Vazov, op.cit. III, p. 483 ("Varvari sme", 1915)
- 22 Hristo Smirnensky (1898-1923) Izbrani Satchineniya (Selected Works), Sofia, 1951
- 23 Alexander Boutimsky (1919-43), "Europa-Hishtnitsa", in: Izbrani Proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Sofia, 1970, pp. 227-230
- 24 "Na Proshtavane", in: Hristo Botev, op.cit., I, p. 26
- 25 "Nemili-Nedragi", in: Hristo Botev, op.cit., V, p. 108
- 26 ibid., p. 109
- 27 "Na Tchuzhbina", in: Ivan Vazov, op.cit., I, p. 403


- 28 "Santimentalna Razhodka po Europa", *ibid.*, pp. 274-280
- 29 Theodore Trayanov (1882-1945), "Severna Pesen", in: Izbrani Stihotvoreniya (Selected Poems), Sofia, 1966, p. 247
- 30 Elisaveta Bagryana (1893-1990), Izbrani Proizvedeniya (Selected Works), Sofia, 1957
- 31 "SOS", in: Elisaveta Bagryana, *op.cit.*, p. 89; see also: "Moyata Pesen" (p. 78) and "Parizh" (p. 118)
- 32 Athanas Daltchev, Balkon, Sofia, 1972
- 33 Athanas Daltchev, *op.cit.*, "44 Avenue du Maine" (p. 55), and "Zavrashtane" (p. 68)
- 34 "Na Zaminavane", *ibid.*, p. 70
- 35 "Snyag" and "Nosatchi na Reklama", *ibid.*, pp. 60 and 62
- 36 "Kray Sena", in: Bogomil Rainov, Stihove (Poems), Sofia, 1962, p. 264 (B. Rainov was born in 1919)
- 37 "Hotel", in: Bogomil Rainov, *op.cit.*, p. 266

- 38 Yordan Raditchkov (b. 1929), Malka Severna Saga, Sofia, 1980
- 39 *ibid.*, pp. 113-114
- 40 *ibid.*, p. 182
- 41 *ibid.*, 14 and 167
- 42 Lyubomir Levchev (b. 1935), Poeziya (Poetry), Sofia, 1985
- 43 "Patyat ot Orienta i Patyat za Orienta", in: Lyubomir Lebtchev, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 235-244
- 44 "Pismo ot Parizh", *ibid.*, 322-324
- 45 See note 1 above
- 46 Aleko Konstantinov, *op.cit.*, p. 53
- 47 *ibid.*, pp. 58-60
- 48 *ibid.*, pp. 55, 56, 58, 128
- 49 *ibid.*, p. 65

- 50    *ibid.*, pp. 90, 98, 99
- 51    *ibid.*, pp. 100-101
- 52    *ibid.*, pp. 104, 109, 120, 121
- 53    *ibid.*, p. 110
- 54    *ibid.*, p. 140
- 55    *ibid.*, pp. 140-141
- 56    Dobri Boinikov, *op.cit.*, p. 110
- 57    Aleko Konstantinov, *op.cit.*, p. 110
- 58    *ibid.*, 175
- 59    The Shade of the Balkans: Being a collection of Bulgarian folk-songs and proverbs, here for the first time rendered into English, together with an essay in Bulgarian popular poetry, and another on the origin of the Bulgars. Published by David Nutt at the sign of the Phoenix, Long Acre, London, 1904. The editor is Henry Bernard (pseudonym of

- Henry Baerlein, 1875-1960). His collaborator is Pencho Slaveikov (1866-1912), out-standing Bulgarian poet and translator.
- 60 "The Fold-Song of the Bulgars", in: The Shade of the Balkans, pp. 23-87
- 61 Hristo Botev, op.cit., I, p. 53
- 62 Petko Todorov (1879-1916), Sabrani Proizvedeniya (Collected Words), Sofia, 1957-58
- 63 Yordan Raditchkov: see note 38 above
- 64 Ivan Vazov: see note 18 above; Zahari Stoyanov (1850-89), Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1965-66, a major revolutionary, politician and writer; Peyo K. Yavorov (1878-1914), Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works), Sofia, 1959-60, one of the first great poets after the Liberation in 1878.
- 65 Dimtcho Debelyanov (1887-1916), Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1969; Peyo K. Yavorov: see note 64 above; Theodore Trayanov: see note 29 above; Nikolay Liliev (1885-1960), Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works), Sofia, 1964.

- 66 Pencho Slaveikov: see note 59 above, Sabrani Satchineniya (Collected Works), Sofia, 1958-59; Geo Milev (1895-1925), prominent poet, translator, critic and publisher, Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1975-76; Svetoslav Minkov (1902-66), distinguished prose-writer, Satchineniya (Works), Sofia, 1972.
- 67 e.g. poets Nikolay Kantchev and Ekaterina Yosifova, novelists Biktor Paskov, Dimiter Korudjiev, Ivailo Ditchev, dramatists Stanislav Stratiev and Georgi Danailov, most of them in their thirties, forties or early fifties, as well as older writers like poets and dramatists Ivan Radoev, Alexander Gerov, Konstantin Pavlov. Such lists are, of course, tentative and they can be extended.



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
# IMAGES OF EUROPE

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
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**IDENTITES NATIONALES  
ET IDENTITE EUROPEENE:  
L'ANTITHESE FRANCO-ALLEMANDE**

**par Robert Picht**




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## **A LA RECHERCHE DE L'IDENTITE EUROPEENNE**

par Robert Picht

### **Introduction**

A l'époque de la stabilité relative des blocs, l'interrogation sur l'identité européenne pouvait être considérée comme un exercice académique. Pour les uns, il s'agissait de donner un supplément d'âme à la recherche d'une puissance mondiale perdue, l'identité européenne servait surtout de terme symbolique pour l'effort jamais réussi de faire de l'Europe un acteur indépendant et énergique de la politique internationale. Les choses sérieuses cependant se passaient autre part: dans l'accomplissement du Marché Commun et dans les grandes négociations économiques internationales; dans le cadre de l'OTAN et des négociations américano-soviétiques pour la maintien précaire de l'équilibre de la terreur. Dans un monde marqué par l'antagonisme Est-Ouest, la politique extérieure des Etats européens et leur concertation très relative dans le cadre d'une coopération politique fragilement institutionnalisée ne constituaient qu'un supplément qui permettait parfois quelques gestes communs mais laissait surtout une marge considérable pour des

manifestations d'indépendance nationale souvent plus spectaculaires que réelles.

Dans un monde qui paraissait tellement figé qu'en été 1989 un 'egghead' américano-japonais Fukuyama pouvait susciter un débat international avec sa thèse surréaliste de la 'fin de l'histoire', les peuples de l'Europe occidentale pouvaient en toute tranquillité s'adonner au perfectionnement de leur bien-être pendant qu'on ne trouvait qu'à l'Est quelques visionnaires marginalisés qui pouvaient s'imaginer autre chose que l'espoir d'une lente réforme du système communiste considéré comme inébranlable. Penser au-delà d'un statut quo peut-être légèrement amélioré était un exercice ludique auquel les gens sérieux ne s'adonnaient que dans leurs discours du dimanche.

Aujourd'hui, la situation se trouve totalement bouleversée. Les Européens commencent à se rendre compte que l'écroulement des systèmes communistes ne constitue pas seulement une surprise heureuse permettant de fêter la nouvelle liberté de nos frères à l'Est et de réduire les efforts militaires mais qu'elle pose l'Europe entière devant problèmes économiques et sociaux dans les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, l'irruption des réfugiés albanais en Italie et le flux permanent de migrants plus ou moins clandestins en provenance du Sud ne sont qu'un premier signe: l'Europe ne pourra plus compter sur l'intervention stabilisatrice de puissances extérieures pour maîtriser des problèmes auxquels elle est mal préparée et qui dépassent largement la capacité des Etats nationaux et de leur coopération traditionnelle. Ces perspectives nécessitent non seulement une capacité d'intervention rapide et

énergique mais elles ne manqueront pas d'entraîner une transformation profonde de la structure et de la nature même de l'Europe. Confrontée à son élargissement inévitable, l'Europe communautaire ne pourra avancer sans une idée plus précise de ce qu'elle est et de ce qu'elle pourra devenir dans un environnement international qui n'est pas caractérisé par la 'fin de l'histoire' mais par son accélération vertigineuse. 'Qui sommes-nous? D'où venons-nous? Où allons-nous? Qu'attendons-nous? Qu'est-ce-qui nous attend?', c'est ainsi que le philosophe allemand Ernst Bloch pose le problème de l'identité dans son livre phare 'Le principe de l'espoir'<sup>1</sup>. A l'heure actuelle, ces questions se posent à l'Europe d'une manière urgente.

Les questions d'identité sont à la fois d'ordre historique, politique, psychologique et d'ordre théorique. En effet, de mauvais usages du concept d'identité et surtout du concept d'identité collective ou nationale sont à l'origine des plus grands malheurs et crimes de l'histoire. Son usage moins offensif mais fréquemment trop naïf a endommagé la crédibilité de l'idée européenne. Tout en posant les questions d'identité sans lesquelles aucune mobilisation démocratique ne paraît possible, il faut donc procéder avec un maximum de prudence: éviter la démagogie mais aussi une pusillanimité frileuse qui ferme les yeux devant les grandes mutations de l'histoire.

Le présent rapport, produit du dialogue et de la coopération d'hommes d'origines nationales, disciplinaires et professionnelles différentes ne prétend pas donner des réponses définitives à ces interrogations. Tout en établissant une synthèse de plus de quarante ans de réalisations européennes et d'une

multiplicité de travaux de recherche, il poursuit une finalité pratique. Il essaie en effet de dégager des critères et des priorités pour un renforcement de la cohésion d'une Europe confrontée à une multiplicité de défis conjoints. Il se situe consciemment à un niveau préopérationnel en indiquant des axes d'interventions possibles sans établir un catalogue détaillé de projets futurs et une évaluation détaillée de la multiplicité de programmes en cours. Il essaie donc d'établir un cadre de réflexion qui pourrait servir d'orientation pour les propositions plus sectorielles qui ne manquent pas de surgir de toutes parts mais qui risquent de tomber dans le vide si elles ne tiennent pas compte du contexte historique, politique, sociologique et culturel du tournant dans lequel l'Europe se trouve dans les années 1990. Les différentes dimensions de l'identité européenne: un ensemble indissociable.

Dans cette optique, nous avons choisi de ne pas procéder selon la répartition habituelle des thèmes qui sépare le domaine institutionnel, politique et juridique des préoccupations économiques, sociales et culturelles. Une telle séparation des domaines permet certes une répartition du travail où chacun peut procéder selon les voies tracées de sa compétence particulière. Nous la retrouvons dans les attributions des différents services nationaux et européens, dans les lignes budgétaires, les programmes réalisés et dans l'ordre du jour de toutes ces réunions qui remettent les problèmes culturels au dessert.

Une telle répartition thématique a pour conséquence que toutes les questions qui ne relèvent pas d'intérêts politiques immédiats sont condamnées à une position de faiblesse due au fait que leur véritable portée se trouve amputée par

les divisions institutionnelles de travail. C'est ainsi que trop de propositions pour le renforcement des institutions européennes, leur meilleur fonctionnement démocratique, pour l'approfondissement des droits de l'homme et du citoyen et pour le renforcement du tissu culturel entre les nations et régions européennes se trouvent recalés au chapitre des vœux pieux. Trop souvent, certaines d'entre elles sont seulement prises en considération en fonction d'une certaine démagogie politique qui compte sur les effets d'annonce et les spectacles prestigieux, peut-être symboliques mais de courte haleine.

Notre étude procède selon une autre logique. Elle essaie d'identifier les défis politiques, sociaux et spirituels auxquels l'Europe se voit confrontée au tournant du siècle dans leur contexte historique et sociologique, d'évaluer l'état des choses et les évolutions prévisibles et d'indiquer des champs d'intervention prioritaires.

En effet, l'Europe, telle que nous l'avons construite depuis la guerre se voit remise en question non seulement par le bouleversement du contexte international mais par son évolution interne. Par la force conjointe du développement technologique, de l'ouverture des frontières et de l'internationalisation des marchés, nos sociétés et nos systèmes politiques ont subi une telle mutation que les anciennes autorités, valeurs et habitudes se trouvent de plus en plus en porte-à-faux sans que de nouveaux cadres de référence aient pu s'étaler d'une manière cohérente. L'interrogation sur l'avenir de l'Europe doit donc porter à la fois sur son rôle international et sur la cohésion interne de ses sociétés. Les deux aspects sont étroitement

interdépendants, car ni la Communauté Européenne, ni ses Etats nationaux ne sauront capables d'assumer leurs tâches si leurs structures politiques et sociales continuent à se désagréger d'une manière incontrôlable. L'Europe communautaire et avec elle les autres Etats hautement industrialisés du continent se trouvent ainsi confrontés aux conséquences de la réussite de leur intégration partielle. Que faut-il faire pour que cette Europe sans rivages ne devienne pas une Europe ingouvernable menacée elle aussi d'implosion?

Cohésion politique, cohésion sociale: dans une communauté qui se veut démocratique, elles ne peuvent être atteintes que par l'évolution des consciences et des comportements, c'est-à-dire par la voie culturelle. Il faut que les hommes puissent découvrir et développer eux-mêmes leur solidarité au-delà des frontières régionales et nationales mais aussi au-delà des barrages sociaux et idéologiques. Un tel besoin d'un sursaut culturel est d'autant plus sensible dans les sociétés post-communistes de l'Europe centrale et orientale dont l'avenir dépend de la constitution d'une société civile capable de s'orienter sous des conditions d'une détresse économique, sociale et écologique qui ne pourra pas être surmontée par des recettes technocratiques rapides.

C'est en Europe centrale et orientale qu'apparaît au grand jour le problème qui guette également des sociétés opulantes de l'ouest: la question de l'avenir de nos sociétés est avant tout spirituelle, c'est-à-dire une question concernant les valeurs et l'orientation de l'homme dans son intimité sans qu'aucun puisse songer à vouloir imposer ses doctrines religieuses, philosophiques ou morales.

L'Europe en mutation est donc privée de certitudes. Confrontée au grand doute, elle ne peut trouver une nouvelle raison d'être, donc une nouvelle rationalité que dans un dialogue qui permette de confronter la multiplicité de ses expériences historiques souvent douloureuses, de ses traditions et de ses interrogations. Etablir ce dialogue, lui donner la continuité et la profondeur nécessaires constituent donc la tâche prioritaire de toute action culturelle et politique au niveau national et régional ainsi qu'au niveau européen. De même l'organisation des institutions, des formes de coopération européenne et internationale et de gestion économique et scientifique doit être considérée comme un apport essentiel à une telle prise de conscience sans laquelle l'Europe risque de rater sa chance historique inespérée.

**Ambivalences et pièges du concept d'identité: entre la référence aux origines et la recherche d'un projet commun.**

Depuis les philosophes grecs le concept d'identité se trouve au coeur même de la pensée européenne. Il exerce donc une grande fascination mais ne devrait être utilisé à la légère étant donné que son mauvais usage peut conduire aux pires aberrations. Avant de lancer des propositions et des programmes destinés à renforcer une soi-disante identité européenne, il convient donc de se rendre compte de quoi on parle en faisant appel à ce concept. Est-ce-qu'il peut s'appliquer de la même façon à la logique, à l'individu, à des groupements sociaux, politiques ou idéologiques, à des tribus, des régions, des nations ou à l'Europe toute entière?

Les philosophes nous ont appris que tout postulat d'une identité contient en lui-même sa négation, le non-identique, dont l'affirmation d'identité tente à se délimiter tout en se trouvant dans un rapport dialectique continu avec cet autre rejeté. Celui-ci fait ainsi partie de la constitution de l'identité elle-même. Hegel et ses successeurs ont essayé d'expliquer le cours même de l'histoire par ce processus continu d'affirmation et de remise en question des identités qui se constituent, se défont et se transforment sous la pression d'une évolution permanente. L'Ecole de Francfort et dans une autre manière Heidegger et l'existentialisme vont pousser plus loin cette interrogation en se voyant contraints par l'expérience de l'histoire, telle qu'elle s'est manifestée au XXIème siècle, de remplacer l'optimisme de Hegel et Marx par une dialectique négative, remise en question encore plus fondamentale de toute certitude affirmative.

Un projet destiné à développer des propositions pratiques pour le renforcement de la cohésion politique, culturelle et sociale de l'Europe ne devrait pas ignorer cette évolution de la pensée européenne. La grande incertitude, le vertige qui hantait un penseur-poète comme Nietzsche est un élément incontournable de la réalité européenne même pour ceux qui ne se sont jamais préoccupés de l'histoire des idées. Personne ne pourrait oser afficher des identités immuables sans que ces fausses certitudes ne se trouvent tôt ou tard remises en question. La confusion et le nihilisme ambiante qui à l'Est comme à l'Ouest constituent certainement le plus grand danger pour la cohésion des sociétés européennes ne pourront être surmontés en décrétant une quelconque identité européenne comme idéologie de rechange.

Il faut donc procéder avec prudence et vérifier attentivement en quoi consistent dans les différents domaines les éléments qui constituent l'appartenance et l'adhésion des hommes à certains groupes sociaux, systèmes de valeurs et modes de comportement et quelles sont les forces qui risquent de les modifier ou de les mettre radicalement en question. Dans cet effort, il faudrait tenir compte du fait, maintes fois confirmé par l'histoire et par des sciences comme la sociologie ou la psychanalyse, que les identités consciemment affichées par des hommes à la recherche d'orientation et de justification ne constituent qu'une partie de leur existence véritable dont les expériences et les pulsions les plus profondes sont souvent reniées ou refoulées. L'identité affichée relève donc souvent de l'idéologie, elle sert d'instrument de propagande pour se constituer une légitimité par exclusion.

La manière la plus courante de ce procédé, utilisée surtout par le nationalisme et le racisme - spectres que nous croyions avoir chassés de l'Europe mais qui relèvent leur tête à l'Est comme à l'Ouest - consiste à se réclamer d'origines plus ou moins mythologiques. Cet appel aux ancêtres peut prendre des formes proprement magiques ou hautement intellectuelles. Son efficacité idéologique est d'autant plus grande que les rapports concrets entre le passé glorieux et la réalité contemporaine restent dans l'obscurité. Destiné à se délimiter d'autres et à chercher protection, force et justification dans une spécificité souvent imaginaire ou artificielle, cet appel à des identités plus ou moins fictives peut prendre le caractère d'une véritable régression à l'agressivité. En pleine modernité, nous pouvons observer cette tendance ancestrale dans les nationalismes, régionalisme et tribalismes de l'Europe contemporaine. La

tentation d'un tel repli identitaire est d'autant plus forte que des individus ou des groupes se sentent menacés. La proclamation trop bruyante d'une identité affichée peut souvent être considérée comme symptôme de déstabilisation sous-jacente.

Ce n'est qu'un paradoxe apparent que la tendance contraire qui reste majoritaire dans la partie aisée de l'Europe c'est-à-dire le rejet de tout lien historique est lui aussi signe de déstabilisation. Dans la mesure où nous ne sommes pas prêts à affronter les deux premières questions d'Ernst Bloch 'Qui sommes-nous? D'où venons-nous?' nous ne serons pas capables de trouver des réponses aux questions d'avenir: 'Où allons-nous? Qu'attendons-nous? Qu'est-ce qui nous attend?'. La négation de l'histoire et de ses déterminations est elle aussi une idéologie identitaire dont la fausse conscience correspond à des intérêts et des besoins psychologiques sous-jacents.

Nous ne pourrions donc découvrir et faire découvrir les bases et conditions réelles de notre existence et la marge de manoeuvre qu'elles mettent à notre disposition qu'à travers le travail patient et parfois douloureux d'une prise de conscience de notre véritable histoire dans toute sa complexité. C'est par une réflexion sur nos origines et notre parcours que nous pourrions rendre compte des choix que nous avons été amenés à faire à la suite de nos expériences antérieures. C'est ainsi que se dégagent les véritables valeurs et orientations qui déterminent notre comportement et nos projets futurs. Dans la vie individuelle comme dans nos appartenances sociales, régionales, nationales et finalement européennes, c'est ainsi l'histoire qui constitue le pont entre

l'identité déterminée par nos origines et cet autre concept d'identité plus volontariste mais non moins soumis à des motivations et des contraintes multiples: l'identité qui nous est conférée par les défis auxquels nous nous voyons confrontés et les projets d'avenir par lesquels nous essayons d'y répondre.

Dans notre étude destinée à clarifier des perspectives pour l'Europe en voie de construction, nous nous voyons donc confrontés à ces trois types d'identité: aux mythes fondateurs, à la prise de conscience d'une histoire pas toujours glorieuse et à une constellation de défis et de projets qui sont loin de faire l'unanimité. Nous rencontrons ainsi la pluralité de l'Europe dans toutes ses dimensions qui ne sont pas seulement linguistiques, régionales et nationales, mais également sociales, politiques, religieuses, et idéologiques sans que les différentes dimensions se recoupent clairement. Nous avons donc choisi de ne pas procéder d'une manière théorique,<sup>2</sup> mais de poser d'une façon consciemment pragmatique les questions d'identité telles qu'elles apparaissent à travers les différents chapitres de ce rapport.

Leurs résultats sont en effet complémentaires. Qu'il s'agisse du rôle international de l'Europe, de la structure et de la cohésion de ses institutions, de l'articulation entre les instances européennes, nationales et régionales ou de l'évolution interne de nos sociétés, une chose paraît évidente: l'Europe telle qu'elle se dessine ne correspondra pas à des modèles éprouvés d'identité sociales et politique. Dans sa haute complexité, elle ne pourra réussir que si elle s'avère capable d'assumer à la fois la multiplicité des origines dont les

Européens se réclament et qui les ont marqués au-delà de leur propre conscience et le caractère nouveau des défis auxquels ils se voient confrontés sans toujours en réaliser la portée.

La question qui se pose aux Européens est donc à la fois immense et claire: Est-ce-qu'ils seront dans le respect de leur pluralité historique et idéologique capables de développer une idée suffisamment cohérente de leur situation et de leur avenir pour pouvoir agir ensemble là où les tentatives particulières, seraient-elles nationales ou le fait de groupes sociaux isolés, sont vouées à l'échec? Cette question est la question culturelle par excellence.

### **L'identité européenne: un problème de communication**

Dans une Europe pluraliste, cette prise de conscience de sa communauté de destin sans laquelle rien ne pourra être accompli passe par une meilleure connaissance et compréhension des partenaires et une perception comme des défis à affronter, donc, dans une certaine mesure, une perception commune du monde. Si l'Europe veut essayer de se constituer d'une manière plus efficace en tant qu'unité politique capable de réagir aux défis de notre temps, il faut qu'elle puisse acquérir un minimum d'orientations commune. Comme le disait déjà Aristote, l'identité politique d'une société dépend d'un accord fondamental sur les valeurs qui déterminent ce qui est considéré comme just ou injuste, comme favorable ou défavorable, sur un minimum de solidarité et sur des orientations psychologiques, intellectuelles et spirituelles communes: la

'koinonia', la 'philia' et la 'homónoia'. Le sociologue américain Talcott Parsons ne dit pas autre chose quand il définit les conditions pour la cohésion sociale et politique d'une société par l'existence d'un 'core system of shared meanings'.<sup>3</sup>

Cet accord fondamental toujours difficile à atteindre et éternellement remis en question même dans des sociétés les plus restreintes s'avère comme le problème crucial de la coopération européenne. Il dépend en effet de la qualité d'une communication interculturelle toujours menacée par les obstacles linguistiques, par les malentendus, les préjugés et - ne l'oublions pas - par la simple paresse. N'est-il pas beaucoup plus rassurant de se reposer sur ses certitudes et ses habitudes au lieu de les laisser ébranler par des exigences et des modes de penser étrangères et souvent irritante? Devant le besoin urgent d'une communication intense et mobilisatrice entre un grand nombre de reponsables de tous bords, la pluralité des langues et des cultures telle que nous la rencontrons en Europe ne peut qu'apparaître comme un obstacle. Comme on peut l'observer dans la pratique quotidienne de la coopération économique et politique, même les Européens les plus rôdés au travail international sont souvent loin d'une telle compréhension approfondie de leurs partenaires. Des 'murs culturels' continuent à s'ériger même entre les partenaires les plus étroits.<sup>4</sup>

### **Comment valoriser la pluralité des cultures?**

La réaction rituelle à ce dilemme est la formule incantatoire qui consiste à déclarer que la pluralité des cultures représente une des plus grandes richesses de l'Europe. A la suite de son histoire, l'Europe constitue en effet un laboratoire

unique de modèles concurrents et fraternels de modes de penser, d'organiser les sociétés et d'expression artistique qui se prolongent en plus dans son rayonnement international. En même temps, les spécificités culturelles des langues, des régions et des nations d'Europe constituent l'ambiance affective sans laquelle aucune légitimité démocratique ne saurait être atteinte: la condition historique et psychologique pour toute rationalité nationale ou transnationale. Dans l'état d'interdépendance internationale et d'intégration européenne déjà atteint, il est cependant évident que ces spécificités culturelles ne pourront survivre et déployer toutes leurs potentialités que si nous arrivons à les valoriser et à les amener à des nouvelles formes de synergies. Nous n'y parviendrons pas en agitant vaguement des symboles et des déclarations rassurantes, mais en poussant plus loin notre réflexion sur la nature même de la culture européenne contemporaine.

Confrontés aux concepts de 'culture', nous nous retrouvons donc avec la même duplicité que nous avons rencontrée dans notre réflexion sur l'identité . Dans tant de discours et de politiques culturelles courantes nous constatons, en effet, le repli analogue sur les mythes fondateurs qui peut tourner à la régression si des individus ou des groupes se sentent menacés. Depuis toujours en effet la culture est l'instrument privilégié de l'affirmation identitaire. Mythe fondateur de la spécificité linguistique dans la tradition herderienne considérée comme l'expression d'une âme nationale et d'une vision du monde toute particulière et immuable. Mythe fondateur des grands classiques de la littérature, de la philosophie et de l'art, dans le style 'Descartes, c'est la France' ou 'Comment le pays de Goethe a-t-il pu produire Hitler?'. Dans la même

logique, nous nous réclamons du patrimoine culturel régional et national et essayons de doter l'Europe d'un mythe fondateur analogue en la déclarant fille de Jérusalem, d'Athènes et de Rome. Reste cependant à savoir avec précision dans quelle mesure la tradition judéo-greco-chrétienne continue à marquer l'esprit et le comportement de nos contemporains.

En complément à cette culture au grand C, nous proposons aux masses les mythes fondateurs de la culture dite populaire: fragments de folklore que les télévisions dans leurs 'jeux sans frontières' transforment dans l'imagerie stéréotypée d'un Disneyland à l'échelle européenne. Une chose est certaine, de telles juxtapositions nationales de cultures nobles ou populaires peuvent éventuellement flatter la fierté identitaire ou même susciter un vague sentiment de sympathie internationale, mais dans la mesure où elles coupent les mythes fondateurs des réalités contemporaines, elles stérilisent les traditions et sont d'autant plus éloignées d'une approche où leur pluralité contrastée et complémentaire pourrait véritablement constituer une richesse.

### **La laboratoire culturel des échanges**

En effet, la créativité et le dynamisme particulier de l'Europe au cours de son histoire étaient dûs à l'interaction entre ses différentes composantes, à leur réceptivité aux influences extérieures, à leur capacité d'innovation.

Culturellement, l'Europe n'était jamais une terre des certitudes et des identités figées mais un laboratoire polycentrique d'idées et de créations en compétition permanente. Culturellement, elle n'était jamais une forteresse protégée mais grande ouverte vers le monde extérieur. Ce n'est pas un hasard qu'Ulysse soit

depuis Homère, Dante et James Joyce un des grands symboles de l'homme européen. L'identité et la pluralité culturelle de l'Europe ne pourront se fonder sur un esprit protectionniste de repli sur soi-même qui serait contraire à ses traditions comme à ses intérêts. Sa capacité au libre échange des idées est au moins aussi importante que l'ouverture des marchés à l'échange des marchandises et des technologies.

Echanges signifie transformation et nous assistons en effet depuis la création du Marché Commun et de l'internationalisation toujours croissante de nos économies et de nos modes de consommation à une mutation profonde des sociétés européennes dont nous ne commençons qu'à percevoir la portée. Ce ne sont pas nos mythes fondateurs qui nous protégeront de l'uniformisation par la standardisation des modes de consommer et de produire, mais la capacité de nos cultures d'y réagir avec créativité. Pour définir une politique culturelle active de l'Europe, il ne faudra donc pas se figer dans un concept de la culture qui la considère comme un patrimoine immuable qui comporte la tentation de la régression identitaire - psychologiquement compréhensible dans le vestige qui nous prend devant l'accélération de l'histoire et des changements technologiques et sociaux. Il faut tout au contraire assumer ces transformations, réaliser et faire connaître la multiplicité des réponses qu'y trouvent les différentes nations et régions d'Europe à la base de leurs traditions spécifiques qui s'expriment avec une variété considérable.

L'Europe reste en effet un grand laboratoire de créativité culturelle. Pour en apercevoir la portée et pour le rendre fructueux, il ne faut donc pas seulement

'penser l'Europe' dans toutes ses contradictions, comme l'a fait admirablement Edgar Morin, mais arriver à comprendre l'homme européen dans sa réalité socioculturelle. Il faudra donc développer un concept de la culture qui ne s'arrête pas aux mythes fondateurs et aux réalisations plus ou moins grandes de la production artistique et intellectuelle. Il ne convient pas de s'enfermer dans la tradition qui oppose culture et civilisation mais de concevoir l'ensemble de notre mode de vie comme création culturelle permanente. C'est le concept de l'anthropologie culturelle que le sociologue américain Kluckhohn résume de la façon suivante: 'Prise dans son acceptation anthropologique, la culture désigne le milieu humain total, matériel et non matériel, tel qu'il a été façonné par les hommes. Une culture se réfère à un genre de vie défini, propre à un groupe d'individus déterminé et, si l'on préfère, à l'ensemble de leur projet de vie'.<sup>5</sup>

L'Europe des régions, des nations et des communautés multiples avec leur interpénétration croissante et leurs relations avec le monde extérieur constitue en effet une configuration de tels projets de vie, une création culturelle permanente. Ces projets se définissent et se transforment en fonction de choix et de valeurs généralement plutôt implicites qu'explicites, plutôt inconscientes que volontaires. A côté d'analyses et de propositions institutionnelles, politiques et juridiques, notre étude comporte donc des chapitres qui essaient d'analyser l'évolution des sociétés européennes dans leurs conditions matérielles, dans leurs valeurs et dans leurs orientations idéologiques et spirituelles.

Dans une telle optique, la recherche de l'identité européenne passe surtout par un approfondissement de la communication entre Européens pour développer leur compréhension mutuelle et leur capacité de synergie. L'éducation, l'information et la formation permanente à la coopération internationale jouent donc un rôle clé pour notre capacité de définir et de réaliser nos 'projets de vie'

à l'échelle européenne. C'est dans leur capacité au dialogue que la pluralité des cultures fera ses preuves.

Nous remercions tous ceux qui ont permis de réaliser cette tâche complexe: la Fondation Européenne de la Culture, la Commission des Communautés Européennes et nos fidèle collaborateurs et collaboratrices qui ont assumé avec précision et patience toutes les tâches sans lesquelles cette publication n'aurait pas pu voir le jour.

## Remarques

- 1 Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, Francfort: Suhrkamp, 1959, Vol. 1, p. 1.
- 2 Comme l'avait fait d'une manière exemplaire le colloque 'Identité et différences dans l'Europe démocratique. Approches théoriques et pratiques institutionnelles.' organisé par la Cellule de Prospective de la Commission des Communautés Européennes et le Centre de Philosophie du Droit de L'Université Catholique de Louvain en mai 1991 à Bruxelles.
- 3 Nous devons ces références à la conférence de Heinrich Schneider 'The dimensions of the historical and cultural core of a european identity' tenue à l'occasion du colloque du Collège d'Europe 'The European Community in the 1990s: widening versus deepening?' à Bruges en juillet 1991, publié en allemand sous le titre *Europäische Identität: Historische, kulturelle und politische Dimensionen*, *Integration* 4/91, pp. 160-176.
- 4 Robert Picht: *Die 'Kulturmauer' durchbrechen. Kulturelle Dimensionen politischer und wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit in Europe*, *Europa-Archiv*, 42 (10), 25 Mai 1987, s. 279-286.
- 5 A.L Kroeber/ C. Kluckhohn: *Culture. A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, New York, 1963, p. 253.

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
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**CHANGING PERCEPTIONS  
OF DEMOCRACY AND  
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS**

**by Giovanna Zincone**



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**IMAGES OF DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP:  
CONVERGENCIES AND DIVERGENCIES**

by Giovanna Zincone

What we call political systems, and once used to be known as regimes, have always been considered perfectible objects. The simplest way scholars and politicians have found to improve them was and is to bring the less perfect ones closer to the least imperfect.

This means identifying the regime or the set of regimes which are comparatively richer in virtues. The search, for a long time, led to the Anglo-Saxon countries, specifically to Great Britain and to the United States.

In the course of this lecture I shall illustrate how this 'landing' in a certain region of the world has produced a one-sided image of democracy which has outlived its time. The time in which democracy used to prosper only in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

In time, the search for virtues has changed place of reference reaching other lands, although the quest for a single view point- from which to observe democracy more clearly- did not come to an end. I am going to suggest that there is a case for abandoning the search of a single best view point and for looking at democracy as a plural entity, where many regimes can co-exists, each one with its own specific kind of virtues.

To reach this conclusion I shall also be using some surveys on the perception of democracy in different countries. Comparing citizens' and scholars' views I shall

show how citizens too tend to prize the traditional virtues of their own democratic systems more than those of the others. By showing their own specific national preferences, these citizens will help us in understanding and evaluating the virtues (and faults) pertaining each democratic system, and the positive and negative contents of each national citizenship status.

Furthermore, this analysis will allow us to draw some hypotheses on convergencies and divergencies in the perception of what democracy is like and of what it ought to be like in some European and non European countries .

### **1. Democracy as a British Artifact**

In the beginning it was Anglo-Saxon. Montesquieu's recipe of dividing and balancing powers came from an albeit superficial observation of the British Constitutional system. Tocqueville's suggestion to assign the defence and promotion of political liberties to a self-organised civil society was triggered by his analysis of the budding American Democracy. I am not in any way suggesting that the "fonction civilisatrice" of the Code Napoleon, or the rationality of the Rechtsstaat lacked followers. However, the authoritarian features or the recurrent failures of the Continental regimes prevented these scholars from being consistent as followers or as democratic thinkers.

These are the same reasons why the generation that witnessed the rise of Fascism and Communism, that is scholars like Hayek (1973, 1979) or Germani (1978) seemed to prize what might otherwise appear to be peculiar and idiosyncratic features of Anglo-Saxon public culture, and despise the cultural bases of Continental democracy. Hayek, for instance, admired the adaptiveness and the traditional roots of the British legal system: a constitution derived from custom and case law compared to the prevailing of the statutory legal system in the continent. Germani (1985) highlighted the risks in breaking out of conventional internalised rules. Traditional values, the sense of belonging to a community, a set patterns of behaviour are lost, due to mass secularisation, and replaced by a strong perception of one's self as an individual as well by a trust in the innovative and elective nature of social and political actions. Germani believes these factors favoured the rise of

revolutionary authoritarian regimes. In fact, the history of Continental Europe is strung with delusions of dangerous projects aimed at re-shaping civil society by using the State, as happened for the first time during the French Revolution. However the notion of democracy - resulting from these delusions - that is democracy as the outcome of a spontaneous process - in fact undermines any role of the State as reformer, i.e. the feasibility of political projects, so dear to Continental Europe's thinkers and reformers.

Like Germani and Hayek, Eisenstadt rejects the 'Continental path' to democracy. In his attempt to identify the causes that may shift a revolutionary process towards or away from democracy, he identifies the following as the ones that favour transition towards democracy: i) low level of discontinuity with the past, and ii) permeability of the old ruling class. Accordingly, the author identifies the 'Glorious Revolution' as the best example of continuity and permeability.

If one were to select this criterion in evaluating the German, Italian, Austrian and Japanese modern democracies what would the result be? These countries are democracies based on a written constitution, set up with the precise intention of breaking away from the past.

We had to wait quite a while before political scientists re-appraise the Continental models. In fact, the stability of the Anglo-Saxon liberal-democratic regimes and the role these same countries played in defending democratic principles during the First and Second World Wars reinforced the perception of these democratic systems as The Democratic System.

As a result the very tenets of democratic theory were built through the sympathetic observation of the British regime, initially, and of the American case after World war II. Democracy was defined consistently with the features of these political systems. As a result, the interplay among interest groups as a decision-making mechanism was legitimated along with the role assigned to the elites belonging to the civil society as opposed to the political ones. These tenets characterize liberal thought which has a longer history in Anglo-Saxon societies and has proved able to shape their institutions more than the Continental ones. In accordance with the liberal

doctrine, the legitimization of interest groups as autonomous political actors is comparatively stronger, in the Anglo-Saxon systems, and the State is seen, here, as a mere geometrical projection - a 'mirror' in Madison's words of a composite civil society.

Bentley (1908), first, and Truman (1951), later, advocated a democratic system as a set of regulated relations among interest groups.

David Easton (1953, 1965a, b) and Gabriel Almond (1966) tried to apply the general systems analysis to politics, conceptualising the political system as a process in which demands from civil society are met by public decision-making arenas. According to this approach the State, in the form of public decision-making arenas, passively re-acts to civil society and it is not supposed to act autonomously.

Even this century's most innovative theory of democracy put forward by Schumpeter (1942) identifies competition among elites - a liberal rather than a democratic feature - as the single most important ingredient of a democratic system. An oligopolistic market where the citizen-buyer can choose among several political offers is considered a good substitute to full participation. Dahl's (1956) and Sartori's (1957) definitions of democracy are very close to Schumpeter's, and again are strongly related to the liberal, Anglo-Saxon tradition. These three authors (Zolo, 1992) maintain they give a descriptive version of democracy: necessarily a minimalist one albeit fulfilling moral criteria.

According to their theory the complexity of the modern state prevents it from using direct democracy. Furthermore complexity discourages the misuse of incompetent participation. It is better suited to a democratic system for citizens to take part in the decision-making process just as consumers: the authors assume a minimalist requirement for the exercise of citizenship rights. The citizen of democracy is seen as the sovereign of the political market, just as the consumer is the sovereign of the economic one.

The aim of this statement is to fill in the gap between descriptive and prescriptive theories of democracy. This descriptive theory of democracy is not only based on

the description of a single set of cases, as I have tried to argue up to this point; moreover, it does not assign sufficient importance to the active role of political elites, for instance, in modifying voters' attitudes.

Political elites have a certain number of devices to select and re-shape their own constituencies. They may do so through adequate political tools, such as voting systems, competences and powers assigned to non elective bodies. Furthermore they may influence public opinion through the media (Zolo, 1992) and by using the state educational system as a means of transmitting favourable values. They can dispense other social rights as private favours in order to acquire electoral consents. Thus political and social rights may become currency of patronage, rights of subjects rather than of citizens.

However, even the modernized version of Continental elitist thought (Luhmann, 1975; Zolo, 1992) forgets those rights are also valid tools to protect the weaker strata and to convey public opinion and preferences. If one considers them totally manipulative and ineffective it becomes impossible to identify democratic regimes and to tell the more from the less democratic ones (Zincone, 1992).

The irenic version of democratic systems supplied by the pluralistic Anglo-Saxon school can not be merely replaced by the hypercritical elitist Continental version.

That notwithstanding, I agree with Continental critics who argue that the competitive theory of democracy does not successfully underscore the reduced political differentiation of political options (Zolo, 1992). Legal devices may be used to reduce the political spectrum: i.e. outlawing certain political parties, introducing electoral systems that keep some parties outside the political market or drastically reduce their chances of being faithfully represented.

Illegal and unlawful means may also be used, as in denying an anti-system opposition access to political resources or physically restricting its activities. The competitive pluralistic theory has dealt with all these issues, although none were thought to invalidate the theory -itself. Even critical scholars (Dahl, 1966, 1971,

1989) who noted some polyarchies are not sufficiently democratic, underlined they did not enjoy a high enough level of participation rather than suggesting their level of competition was not high enough. They did not highlight the limits of liberalism in these polyarchies, such as the insufficient respect for the opposition and the weakness of a free public opinion. The political dimension of what Dahrendorf would call **Life Chances** (1979) - the substantial variety of opportunities and choices - is missing.

The perception of the Anglo-Saxon regimes has been extremely sympathetic and this attitude has been used to support a so called 'descriptive' liberal version of democracy.

Thus Robert Dahl, while maintaining to be a liberal critic of the US political system, gave a definition of democracy that enshrined the competitive dimension (1956) that is supposed to characterize the American system. And, in his text **Polyarchy** (1971), a classic, he re-traced the winning path to democracy back to the Anglo-Saxon model as the one which guarantees stable and free institutions.

'Contestation'- that is the acceptance of the opposition is introduced first in the winning path - followed by 'inclusion', that is manhood or at least largely extended suffrage. The above described is the sequence followed by both the UK and the US. Possibly because of his Swedish roots, Dahl adds Sweden to the series too. However, he neither focused on the substantial difference between political products (the real competition/ differentiation), nor on the problem of the imperfect consumer knowledge of the political market, or of the manipulation of such knowledge (Zolo, 1992).

In conclusion, a good democracy is characterised by a low conflict level (low degree of differentiation) among products, by a low level of State intervention - (low degree of regulation of the political market from above), by low citizenship standards (low participation and entitlements).

If we are now to move on to more radical scholar such as Barrington Moore Jnr (1966) we can still see the influence of the Anglo-Saxon model on the interpretation

of the rise and consolidation of democratic regimes in the UK and in the US. The absence of democracy in Russia and in Germany can be traced back to the middle-class leadership and to the autonomy of the process of industrialisation in the former two, and the a small fraction of land-owners leadership and to the State action, in the latter. An active role of the State in promoting economic development is seen as an obstacle to democracy.

T. H. Marshall (1949) - to whom we owe the sociological notion of citizenship (as a set of entitlements which a citizen has a right to)- also refers to the British model when describing the evolutionary pattern: first come civil rights, then political rights and thirdly social rights. The sequence infers that rights are requested by those who will use them, once again something that springs unaided from civil society.

The scholar who 'discovered' the crucial role played by social rights seems to ignore the fact that the Welfare State provisions were introduced for the first time ever in an illiberal regime, Bismarck's Germany, not as an answer to demands from the working class, but rather as a means to weaken working class organisation (Flora and Albert, 1981).

I am suggesting that at the beginning, also the theory of social rights - that can be considered as a theory of democracy from below - was unable to appreciate the manipulatory side of citizen rights . Nor was it able to discriminate among different models, which led to the traditional misunderstanding, whereby the description of Anglo-saxon citizenship was confused with that of plain citizenship.

Allow me to over-simplify this concept in order to make the point: democracy has been perceived through the eyes of a conventional observer of Anglo-Saxon cases. Although this observer was not altogether sympathetic, he accepted the minimum requisites of liberal regimes as if they were real and effective. This is why democracy was perceived as one and liberal.

Anglo-Saxon cases perceived through Anglo-Saxon spectacles produced a peculiar perception of the main features of a democratic system:

- i) the pre-eminent role of civil society over the State;
- ii) civil society seen as a federation of interest groups all equally entitled to political representation, which means that the business sphere is allowed to be over-represented;
- iii) diversification is prized more than standardisation, liberty over equality; competition over the protection of the weaker strata;
- iv) the spontaneous generation through the hidden hand of the best social order prevailing over the need for public intervention;
- v) a definition of citizenship as mere consumption of political products.

## **2. Abandoning the Anglo-Saxon Model**

The situation changed, and there are several reasons behind this change:

- a) The concept of citizenship was one of the factors that made it possible to develop a critical view of Anglo-Saxon democracy. However, there were other factors too, which fostered the departure of scholars from the Anglo-Saxon land.
- b) The emigration of European scholars. During the Fascism and immediately after World War Two they left as refugees. During the Fifties and Sixties they left as 'scientific refugees' because of the gap between the American and the European academic facilities.
- c) Later, the growth of the European scientific community and the increasing interactions with the American one as well as
- d) the consolidation and performances of the democratic systems in Continental Europe contributed to a more 'Continental European-centred' perception of democratic models.

Karl Deutsch (1963), a German refugee, adopted a cybernetic approach in the interpretation of political systems: he represented the decision-making process as 'target hitting'. Goals are singled out and then reaching them becomes the main purpose of political action. At that point public will, that is the intervention of the

State, is justified in a democratic framework.

Stein Rokkan (1970) studied the nation building process and party formation in Continental Europe, taking small countries, like his native Norway, as cases for comparative research and he reached the conclusion that they shared some virtues with Great Britain, like early state-building and consolidation, because they shared certain historical conditions. For instance, their distance from Rome and the Empire, and their being off the main communication lines of the city-states system, gave Scandinavian countries early independence from the central powers, and State control over religious agencies, as had happened to Britain.

In his comparative research, Rokkan also identifies virtues in places other than the Anglo-Saxon context, virtues which in fact the latter may lack: strong social rights and a standardised legal system. Furthermore, by prizing standardisation and rationalisation as superior forms of public organisation, Rokkan proves to be a good pupil of Max Weber's, the main theoretical reference of the Continental 'vindication of home-made democracy'.

In his comparative analysis of party systems, Sartori (1976) disproves the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model. I am referring to the idea that only a two-party system fits democracy and that the alternating of parties in Government, and not just the presence of a free opposition, is a must for a liberal regime. In fact - as Sartori points out democracy can co-exist with a multi-party system and with a long permanence of the same party in Government: Sweden is a clear instance of that.

In a similar way, Lijphart's (1969), Daalder's (1966) and Lorwijn's (1971) studies on small European democracies, like Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland proved the viability of consensual democracy, that is large coalitions including all the main parties and communities in segmented multicultural societies. The syndrome was subsequently recognised the other side of the Atlantic, in Canada (McRae, 1974). More recently Lijphart (1984) built up a typology of democratic systems based on the consensual type and on the Westminster type. The first one

appears more suited to multi-cultural societies, since it foresees more guarantees for minorities, even their presence in the executive power. The second one appears more suitable for a one-dimensional political culture since it foresees the concentration of power in the hands of the majority, the balance of power being here guaranteed by the alternating of different majorities in Government.

Up to then, European scholars had tried to re-establish Continental models without questioning the quality of the Anglo-Saxon ones. They had not been concerned with the problem of understanding the specific virtues of the specific models and even less with a primacy of the Continental model over the Anglo-Saxon one: their models were in a way neutral. On the contrary, the present situation is characterised by an attempt to establish a sort of superiority of the Continental models and of the Continental way of conceptualising democracy. This means that not only do they highlight the virtues of the Continental cases: they have also tried to convince their American colleagues that the Continental models are normal, and even preferable to the Anglo-Saxon ones. Their suggestion is that the very way of looking at the Anglo-Saxon model as the prototype of democracy has been wrong. Not only are the Anglo-Saxon models less rich in virtues, but if you wear American spectacles you understand little.

Raymond Aron often maintained the superiority of non alternating majorities, and gave the better results of the Italian and Japanese economies as an example.

However, up to this point, the tendency to suggest a primacy of the continental model was still tentative. It is only when they leave the field of traditional objects of political research - like forms of Government, parties and political systems- and move to the observation of social rights, welfare and economic performances that Continental scholars make a 'strong' claim.

This is why the concept of citizenship can be considered a turning point, a crucial weapon in the Continental rescue. Korpi (1978) and Esping Andersen (1985) stress the higher redistributive effect, the more universalistic attitude, the greater effectiveness of the Scandinavian model. Flora and Alber (1981) describe the UK as a late-comer in the European welfare building process.

As I have said, in the past Continental scholars used to agree with the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Likewise, now British scholars criticize the Anglo-Saxon model, as happens with Titmuss who studies the Welfare State and Social Security.

The recent Dahl (1989) is another example: in analysing instances of industrial democracy he treats Sweden sympathetically, and even Yugoslavia gets a better treatment than the US.

Lindblom's (1977) general criticism of contemporary democracy is comparatively less harsh against Northern Europe than towards the US.

Sen (1981, 1985), Glotz (1986) and Dahrendorf (1988) stressed the role played by social rights and by entitlements in protecting the weaker strata of the population. In fact, in doing this they are advocating the role of public action as opposed to unrestricted markets. When Hirschman (1970) introduces the concept of voice (to protest against his/her preferred party or preferred product without switching to another) and of loyalty (to accept anything and keep on buying the same product or voting the same party) as possible types of economic and political behaviour, he is disproving the hypothesis whereby the exit (to change product or party when another option is more convenient) is the only possible response. In doing so he is also querying Schumpeter's description of the political market based on exit.

When Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1989) suggest **Bringing the State back in** as a valid analytical tool in understanding political phenomena, they are displaying a great knowledge of the European cases and of the European acceptance of a strong role for the State. The same is true for Badie and Birnbaum (1979, 1982) when they classify political systems according to their degree of "Stateness".

Summing up, since the late Sixties-early Seventies the Anglo-Saxon paradigm, that is the liberal version of democracy, has been criticised even by those who did not want to abandon it. Furthermore new paradigms were introduced, which is an even more innovative step forward.

The neo-corporative school is the one that has made the strongest attempt to introduce new paradigms.

Schmitter (1974) describes the various assumptions on political systems made by the pluralist approach based on an idealist view of the Anglo-Saxon regimes, while contrasting it with the neo-corporatist views. I will try to introduce an even more symmetrical comparison, here and there revising Schmitter's original statements, to further illustrate his point, hopefully without misinterpreting his thoughts too much.

Pluralistic thinkers believe:

- i) in competition within the main organised interests not only between or among them. Consequently in responsive leadership as well;
- ii) in cross-cutting pressures and consequently in moderate demands;
- iii) in competition among the main organised interests leading to compromises and spontaneous incremental solutions;
- iv) in a low level of party discipline and ideological profiles leading to large political aggregations;
- v) in the irrelevance of notions of class and elite as tools of interpretation, in view of a high level of political and social mobility;
- vi) in the importance of pressure groups, and Parliament as the arena where such pressures are exerted;
- vii) in political initiative from below as important;
- viii) in a passive Public Administration (cf vi);
- ix) in the dispersion of resources. This leads to the absence of veto groups, plurality of interests and of associations with spontaneous and changing balance.

Schmitter sees the case of the neo-corporatists, who believe:

- i) in the encapsulation of the main interests in monopolistic organisations and leadership growth through co-opting;
- ii) in goals set from above;
- iii) in dealing with conflicting interests being with through special courts,

- public administration specific boards and committees;
- iv) in a high level of party and organisational discipline, resulting in a rigid organisations;
- v) in the importance of notions of class and of elites, as a result of low levels of political and social mobility;
- vi) in a high profile Public Administration and in the State choosing the arenas and the actors of collective bargaining;
- vii) in political initiative from above;
- viii) in an active role of Public Administration (cf. vi)
- ix) in concentrating and sheltering resources, in the presence of veto groups and decisions taken through formal bargaining procedures.

Schmitter adds "physical repression and anticipatory intimidation", thus tinting corporativism of an authoritarian shade. Fortunately he distinguishes between statist and societal corporativisms, the former being a result of State coercion, the latter as the outcome of a process of spontaneous aggregation.

Lembruch pinpoints the distinction between liberal and authoritarian corporatism by adopting the idea of a continuum between corporatism and pluralism. He then uses this idea to classify democratic systems: Austria, Germany and the UK score the highest in corporatism.

Granted that corporatist regimes are the most apt to solve industrial conflicts, the question that follows, **Why No Corporatism in America?** (Salisbury, 1979), seems to entail a less positive judgement than the one underlying Sombart's famous point: **Why There is No Socialism in the United States** (1976, 1 ed. 1906).

When Lowi describes the US as a corporate state, the definition takes on a derogatory connotation: he stresses the power of private corporations and the consequent **End of Liberalism** (1969), as a system able to represent individuals and opinions instead of interests.

When Continental regimes were observed through Anglo-Saxon spectacles, as happened in the past, the result was desolate. If we now were to look at Anglo-Saxon regimes spectacles, the result will be as bad. This is partly due to the good

and bad guys suddenly switching roles, but also to the idea of one type of democracy being better than others is still there. Furthermore, there is an inaccurate inference from a set of case-descriptions to the essential functioning of a democracy. In conclusion, a case or set or series of cases is once again offered as a paragon of virtues and theoretical framework erga omnes.

### **3. Towards a Pluralistic View of Democracy or 'A lesson of common sense'**

Is there more than one democracy? If so, do the national or regional well rooted traditions, that can be traced back to each country's past, persist into the present? What convergences and divergences among different systems? It would take me another lecture to illustrate this point alone, even if I were merely to refer to the research carried out on this topic. I will just briefly define each model and I will show how citizens attitudes converge or diverge from the two models.

Let me assume some features as typical of the traditional Anglo-Saxon model:

- i) Trust in spontaneous equilibria generated by civil society, specifically in the market. Justice is seen as equal opportunities.
- ii) Late manhood suffrage and early pluralism, legitimization of the political role of social elites, specifically of business.
- iii) Late comer welfare States. Limited duties assigned to the State.
- iv) High social mobility and confidence in individualistic achievements.
- v) Sense of political belonging and effectiveness, pride of national regimes.

The characteristics of the Continental model can thus be summarised:

- i) Trust in public action as a necessary corrective of civil society's inevitable faults, especially the market related ones. Justice is seen as the redistribution of assets and resources.
- ii) Early manhood suffrage and late pluralism, legitimization of the role of political elites.
- iii) Early comer welfare States and a wider range of duties assigned to the State.

- iv) High social mobility and low trust in individualistic achievement.
- v) Sense of political alienation and low effectiveness, coupled with mistrust towards national regimes.

In giving this definition, I am aware I have altogether ignored the tradition of the Left in Anglo-Saxon countries, and have dramatically reduced divergences among Continental democracies. Netherlands, Belgium and in some way Sweden were, initially, closer to the British model than to the French and German ones. However, this temporary simplification is necessary to my argument. As we know in time all democracies converged and accepted the main points of the Welfare State (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981). However, in the Anglo-Saxon group, convergency was high for Great Britain, low for the United States, Australia falling in-between.

By the end of World War Two, the UK had overtaken continental countries by introducing a national social security system before others. More generally, convergencies became more evident in the UK compared to the US, where the process is more recent. Probably in the UK an important role was played by the presence of a working class party in Government and by their long lost ancient primacy in the international economy. Modern Germany and Austria, on the other hand, have so far kept welfare system entitlements linked to paid work rather than to citizenship. This means that their public action -if not their political culture - reward the efforts and merits of groups and individuals. This idea is more consistent with the Anglo-Saxon model.

Social mobility seems quite similar all over the industrialized world (Lipset and Zettemberg, 1959; Featherman, Jones, Hauser, 1975; Domanski and Sawinski 1987); even though relative social mobility appears higher in Scandinavian countries (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985, 1987) and lower in United States (Parkin 1972; Giddens, 1973). So public action seems to play an important role in fostering social mobility.

I am now going to move back from the lower land of facts to the lighter land of opinions. My brief description of the characterising features of Anglo-Saxon and Continental models was aimed at proving how both our beliefs about ideal

democracy and our assessment of the actual performance of democracies are related to the context we live in. Our opinions about democracy, be they judgements on the theory (ideal models) or on the practice (performance) reflect our political systems and not just the traditional values of our countries. However, there are strong and persistent divergencies which can not exclusively be explained in terms of actual structures and capabilities. This enables us to identify different national perceptions of democracy and eventually to evaluate national values.

I shall now argue the above in relation to specific cases, with special reference the United States and Italy, the most distant and polarised cases on an hypothetical continuum of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental models. This focus will support the following two hypotheses:

- i) divergencies among European countries, albeit belonging to separate traditions, are not so deep as the ones between European nations compared as a whole to the United States.
- ii) anyway, divergencies among European countries are still strong but they are also mutable. Considering the European nations, the UK is moving away from the US towards the Continental nations, while Germany is shifting the other way and Italy is preserving its most statist version of democracy.

I am now going to demonstrate that if (i) is true, this could mean a more optimistic view of the future of the European Community. In fact if European citizens share similar opinions on democracy and citizenship rights, there is hope for an EC based on common values rather than merely on common interests. Furthermore, presuming even just a slight possibility of influencing national values, first we would need to identify a point of convergency around some 'median' European values. This will then enable us to see whether European countries are actually converging to the said 'meeting point'. It would also be interesting to see which countries are abandoning the Anglo-Saxon model and which are getting closer to it.

The final question is what would both the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental models gain or loose from this eventual convergency.

I shall be using data from the International Social Survey program "The Role of the Government" (1985), from "Civic Culture" (1963) and from "Eurobarometer" (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990), and compare them with the set of characteristics which enable us to discriminate between the two models.

i) Trust in spontaneous equilibria generated by civil society and specifically trust in the market as opposed to public action- seen as a necessary corrective to market faults and justice as equal opportunity as opposed to justice as the redistribution of assets and resources.

I am going to adopt the refusal of the Government's role as a resource re-distributor as an indicator of trust in the market. This measures the effectiveness of the spontaneous outcome of the civil society-market interactions. Vice-versa a positive judgement on distributive public policy will be considered as an indicator of mistrust in the equity of the market.

Tables 1a and 1b add up strong and slight disagreements to highlight differences more clearly. For instance on the question "Should the Government redistribute wealth?" (table 1a) there is a clear convergency between the UK and all other European countries, as well as a divergency between all of Europe and Australia, or even more so the US. Table 1b ("Should the Government reduce income differences?") gives the same results. Although less obvious, the same can be said about table 1c ("People with high income should pay more /far more vs. Less/far less").

Again, the questions aimed at the free market (against it) and at the welfare provisions ("Should the Government provide for unemployment?"- Table 2). Austria's relatively low level of agreement can be explained by the level of their government debt due to the unemployment provisions at the time of the survey.

The answers I have just illustrated also act as a distributive-equal outcomes versus merit based equal opportunity justice.

Trust/mistrust in the market and merit may be identified in the questions pertaining to the need to finance education and the best means to intervene in that

sphere. The US appears to be the only country with a preference for loans instead of grants (under 50% even when poor or low income students are concerned). Germany has a small pro-grant majority. These results can be explained by the fact that at the time of the survey the Bill of a student loan system was being discussed in Parliament. However, one ought not to forget that in giving these answers, the Germans were reacting favourably to the Bill. Their stated preference for a market-based tool is even clearer when achievers or average students in the medium income brackets are concerned. Whereas a relatively high 11.6% of the Italian respondents refused to give any incentive even to brilliant students, an even higher 36.5% were against any sort of funding to average achievers; an overwhelming majority were in favour of grants to the lower income bracket students).

In other words, while the Germans are displaying signs of convergency towards the liberal model, the Italians appear static on the statist model (low appreciation of equal opportunities given by education, low appreciation of merits, low appreciation of paying back public funding for deserving students).

ii) Presence or lack of legitimation of the role and status of the business sphere: the gap between Italy's and America's democratic cultures appears more clearly if we look at diagram 4. In fact we know that the actual role of business and corporations in the Italian decision-making process is far less relevant than in the American one, whereas citizens' perceptions are the exact opposite. This means that Italians are less prepared to accept the intrusion of the business world into the political sphere than the Americans.

iii) Late and less generous social security, more or less generous Welfare States, and a varying range of duties attributed to the state.

The history of the evolution of Welfare State sees Germany and Austria as early comers and the UK as a late comer, although Great Britain is known to have filled the gap some programmes are still means tested (typical of a liberal system and aimed at the 'deserving poor'). However, the percentage of the public spending for Social security is now comparable to other European countries, even if it does not score very high (Rose, 1991). The same is not true for the US: they came in even later in spite of the great leap forward in the Thirties, and during the Democratic

Administrations of the Sixties and Seventies: they still spend relatively less for Social Security than the average European country.

Table 5a answers the question "What problems should the Government take care of?". This table highlights once more the divergency between Europe and the United States, while placing Britons and Britons abroad in the middle.

Table 5b is in some way more surprising: it answers the question "Agreement or disagreement on increasing spending" in several areas. In this instance Austria's and Germany's aversion to deficit spending means they overtake the US. Britain shifts towards Continental Europe and two of the traditionally most statist-oriented countries (Zincone, 1992) shift towards the Anglo-Saxon model. This suggests there are European countries which are satisfied with the important role played by the State in their political systems, but do not want it to expand any further. They would like to see more merit-based criteria and more market-oriented devices.

Now as in the past, the liberal tendencies characterise successful self-reliant economies. Table 5b tells us that in the US there is a consistent minority that would appreciate a wider and more generous action by the State. Does this imply the US still have a self-assured economy, although doubts are starting to creep in?

iv) Confidence in social mobility and in an individual's power to succeed. "The Role of Government" detects a widespread agreement on the fact that people who are born into rich and educated families have a better chance of becoming rich ('People born from rich people get more chances of becoming rich?'; 'Does the child of a professional have more chances of having a successful career than the child of a manual worker?'). However, when the questionnaire refers directly to the 'country' (i.e., how civil society and political system are organised in the respondents' countries) the Americans appear to be far more optimistic than any others. What is not surprising or no longer surprising, is that the Germans are closer to the US than the UK. The new fact is that Austria is more pessimistic than the UK. Italy as usual scores the highest in all cases. (Table 6)

v) Sense of political belonging and effectiveness, pride in one's regime.

Table 7a tells us that people do not believe in Democracy: i.e. in their capacity of influencing the State and its decisions. However, also on this issue the Americans show the least and the Italians the most pessimistic views. The Italy vs. US polarisation has always been very clear also on the pride in one's regime issue, right from the first 'Civic Culture' survey (1959-60) ("What are the things about your country you are more proud of?"). Respondents quoting 'political or legal systems, freedom, democracy, justice and political stability' were as follows (all out of a sample of 1,000): 823 in the US; 446 in the UK; 389 in Mexico and 33 in Italy.

"Eurobarometer" data (table 7b) confirm Italy's peculiar attitudes.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that all the countries with a negative score on the appreciation of their national regimes are Roman Catholic. Furthermore, the positive scores in the remaining Roman Catholic countries are low. Does this suggest that masses still have to undergo here a process of nationalisation? Germany's position is closer to the liberal syndrome and Denmark too has shifted in the same direction (liberal and societal) in spite of its statist tradition.

I am not going to evaluate values, I would simply conclude raising some doubts: I would like to suggest that not just citizens and politicians swing with the pendulum of the best democratic systems (first the Anglo-Saxon, then the Continental, now the Anglo-Saxon again and then what), but so do scholars.

We should probably stop the pendulum for a moment, so that we could try and understand the virtues and faults of both models, a part from political fashions.

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Table 1.a - GOVERNMENT SHOULD REDISTRIBUTE WEALTH (%)

	AGREE	DISAGREE	DIFFERENCE	DON'T KNOW
United States	29.5	50.1	- 20.6	20.5
Australia	42.9	40.8	+ 2.1	16.3
Great Britain	52.2	23.7	+ 28.5	24.0
Germany	56.4	20.1	+ 36.3	23.5
Austria	66.3	12.2	+ 54.1	21.4
Italy	47.1	14.9	+ 32.2	18.3

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1985

Table 1.b - GOVERNMENT SHOULD REDUCE INCOME DIFFERENCES (%)

	AGREE	DISAGREE	DIFFERENCE
United States	35.8	61.5*	- 25.7
Australia	53.8	46.3	+ 7.5
Great Britain	74.6	25.4	+ 49.2
Germany	67.4	32.6	+ 34.8
Austria	78.0	22.1	+ 55.9
Italy	84.1	15.8	+ 68.3

(\*) 34,9 strong disagree

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1985

Table 1.c - PEOPLE WITH HIGH INCOME SHOULD PAY (%)

	MORE AND FAR MORE	LIKE NOW + LESS AND FAR LESS	DIFFERENCE
United States	57.6*	42.4	15.2
Australia	65.0	35.1	29.9
United Kingdom	76.4	23.7	52.7
Germany	89.7	10.2	79.5
Italy	85.7	14.3	71.4

(\*) only 18.5 far more

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 2 - THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT (%)

	CERTAINLY OR PROBABLY YES	CERTAINLY OR PROBABLY NOT	DIFFERENCE
United States	50.3	49.7	+ 0.6
Australia	59.9*	41.1	+ 18.8
United Kingdom	85.9	14.5	+ 71.4
Germany	85.4	14.6	+ 70.8
Austria	68.4	31.7	+ 36.7
Italy	84.8	15.3	+ 69.7

(\*) only 15.1 certainly yes

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 3.a - GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP STUDENTS WITH LOW INCOME WITH: (%)

	SCHOLARSHIP	LOANS	DIFFERENCE	NOTHING
United States	42.2	53.1	- 10.9	4.7
Australia	69.2	28.2	+ 41.0	2.5
United Kingdom	82.6	16.5	+ 66.4	0.9
Germany	52.7	46.0	+ 6.7	1.3
Italy	78.5	18.3	+ 60.2	3.2

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 3.b - GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP STUDENTS WITH HIGH STANDARDS WITH: (%)

	SCHOLARSHIP	LOANS	DIFFERENCE	NOTHING
United States	35.0	56.3		8.7
Australia	56.8	36.5		6.7
United Kingdom	69.3	28.2		2.6
Germany	44.1	53.6		2.3
Italy	66.5	21.9		11.6


Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 3.c - GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP STUDENTS WITH MEDIUM INCOME AND MEDIUM STANDARDS WITH: (%)

	SCHOLARSHIP	LOANS	DIFFERENCE	NOTHING
United States	15.5	67.3	- 51.8	17.2
Australia	27.1	56.6	- 29.5	16.3
United Kingdom	45.6	46.7	- 1.1	7.7
Germany	10.7	72.6	- 61.9	16.7
Italy	24.2	39.2	- 15.0	36.6

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Diagr.4 - Power of some social institutions, Europe and United States



Source: I.S.S.P. The Role of Government, 1985

Table 5.a - GOVERNMENT POLICIES (% OF ANSWERS INDICATING THAT THE FOLLOWING POLICIES "SHOULD ABSOLUTELY" OR "PROBABLY SHOULD" BE CARRIED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT)

	Aus*	A	Ger	GB	Ita	USA
To get a job for anyone who wants it	52.8	80.6	80.1	68.8	87.5	33.2
To keep prices under examination	87.9	90.1	74.3	91.3	96.6	73.5
To secure assistance for ill people	93.3	96.0	97.0	98.8	98.8	81.3
To secure a satisfactory standard of living for elderly people	96.1	97.3	95.9	97.8	98.5	86.5
To support industry with aids To development	87.1	67.3	50.7	92.9	80.9	59.4
To secure a satisfactory standard of living for unemployed people	59.0	62.7	82.9	82.1	82.0	47.4
To decrease income differences	53.8	71.6	63.0	69.9	80.3	35.0
average	75.7	80.8	77.7	85.9	89.2	59.4

(\*) Aus = Australia; A = Austria

Source: *Governo e cittadini*, 1989 (*The Role of Government*, 1985)

Table 5.b - SECTORS OF PUBLIC EXPENSE (% OF ANSWERS INDICATING "MORE PUBLIC EXPENSE" AND "FAR MORE PUBLIC EXPENSE" ON THE TOTAL)

	Aus*	A	Ger	GB	Ita	USA	average
Health	62.5	58.6	51.4	87.3	77.7	57.1	68.4
Pensions	55.0	48.8	45.7	74.3	73.2	41.9	59.6
Education	64.0	34.3	39.4	73.7	61.7	63.2	58.0
Environment	31.9	69.0	81.1	35.1	59.8	42.0	51.8
Justice	67.4	20.9	29.0	39.2	46.5	51.0	43.7
Unemployment doles	12.6	14.2	33.6	40.1	53.3	25.6	31.6
Defence	45.8	12.3	5.9	17.4	11.4	19.1	19.7
Arts and culture	9.6	10.6	13.0	9.6	33.6	14.2	15.9
average	43.6	33.5	37.4	47.0	52.1	39.2	

(\*) Aus = Australia; A = Austria

Source: *Governo e cittadini*, 1989 (The Role of Government, 1985)

Table 6 - IN YOUR COUNTRY, WHAT YOU CAN ACHIEVE IN YOUR LIFE DEPENDS ON THE FAMILY YOU ARE BORN IN?

	YES strong/slight agreement	NOT strong/slight disagreement	DIFFERENCE	DON'T KNOW
United States	30.6	50.7	+ 20.2	18.6
Australia	35.8	44.5	+ 8.7	19.7
Great Britain	52.6	30.1	- 22.5	17.3
Germany	34.9	35.7	+ 0.8	29.4
Austria	51.3	21.7	- 29.6	27.0
Italy	62.9	15.3	- 47.6	21.8

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 7.a - PEOPLE LIKE ME

- A) HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER POLITICS
- B) ARE WORTH TALKING POLITICS
- C) HAVE MUCH TO SAY
- D) CAN INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS
- E) GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIVE TO

(%) DIFFERENCE :	SOME CONTROL	WORTH TALKING	MUCH TO SAY	INFLUENCE	...
United States	- 22.6	+ 9.4	- 15.2	- 57.8	+ 1.4
Australia	- 60.4	- 30.2	- 25.2	- 78.0	- 0.8
United Kingdom	- 72.6	- 28.6	- 16.8	- 83.2	- 41.0
Germany	- 29.4	+ 16.3	- 86.8	- 81.2	+ 7
Austria	- 66.0	+ 13.8	-----	-----	-----
Italy	- 76.2	- 42.6	- 46.6	- 80.4	- 43.8

Source: *The Role of Government*, 1985

Table 7.b - SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IS WORKING IN ONE'S OWN COUNTRY (%)

	SATISFIED (very - enough)				UNSATISFIED (very - enough)				DIFFERENCE				DON'T KNOW			
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990
Great Britain	51	51	52	55	43	43	44	40	+ 8	+ 8	+ 8	+ 15	6	6	4	5
Denmark	55	60	72	61	43	35	21	37	+ 12	+ 25	+ 51	+ 24	2	5	7	2
West Germany	79	73	69	78	19	21	26	20	+ 60	+ 52	+ 43	+ 58	2	6	5	2
Luxemburg	54	77	67	77	29	22	27	15	+ 25	+ 55	+ 40	+ 62	17	1	6	8
Holland	67	51	58	73	32	45	37	24	+ 35	+ 6	+ 21	+ 49	1	4	5	3
Belgium	53	34	58	63	32	51	36	34	+ 21	- 17	+ 22	+ 29	15	15	6	3
Ireland	59	48	46	59	35	46	47	33	+ 24	+ 2	- 1	+ 26	6	6	7	8
France	42	36	39	54	46	50	51	40	- 4	- 14	- 12	- 14	12	12	10	6
Spain	--	--	51	60	--	--	39	34	----	----	+ 12	+ 26	--	--	10	6
Greece	--	53	51	48	--	55	42	48	----	- 2	+ 9	0	--	2	7	4
Portugal	--	--	34	60	--	--	53	32	----	----	- 19	+ 28	--	--	13	8
Italy	14	21	28	29	83	77	69	67	- 69	- 56	- 41	- 38	3	2	3	4

Source: EUROBAROMETER

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
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
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**LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL LINKS  
BETWEEN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES**

**by Bruno De Witte**



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SYMPOSIUM  
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The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies

Symposium on "Images of Europe"

Crete, April 13-17, 1992

**LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL LINKS BETWEEN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES:  
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

by Bruno de Witte

Professor of Law, Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, Maastricht

**INTRODUCTION**

Cultural links between European societies: this is a vast subject, much too vast for proper consideration in a short conference paper. I therefore propose to deal with some aspects of this subject that can be compressed more easily within the bounds of this report and yet allow, I hope, for a meaningful discussion of the substance of the underlying argument. I propose to concentrate on language which, although it is only one element of culture, is undoubtedly an important one. If it is possible to say that the countries of Europe have their own "cultural identity" that is, a coherent cultural pattern of thought and behaviour which distinguishes their population from others, then language surely is a crucial element of that identity. While the degree of

diversity or homogeneity of other cultural features is open to controversy, language differences are incontrovertible. Language differences also acquire, because of their immediate visibility and audibility, a highly symbolic value.

I do not propose however to offer a panorama of linguistic interactions that develop in an informal way between European societies, but, instead, to approach this phenomenon from a regulatory perspective. I want to examine formal regulations aimed at influencing those linguistic interactions between European societies.<sup>1</sup> Language use is, indeed, regulated by State in many countries and in many situations. The role of the European Community in eliminating national language regulations, or in adopting regulations of its own, will be at the centre of attention.

## **I. SEPARATION:**

### **ECONOMIC UNIFICATION v CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC AUTONOMY**

One important dimension of European unification, until now, has been a change of the scale of production and trade which merges various national markets into "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured."<sup>2</sup> This internal market can only function in an optimal way if the transaction costs between the market participants are minimal, and, more specifically, if for instance, for a standardisation of the technical specifications of certain products, or the need for telecommunication networks in the various countries to be compatible with one another. One could say that, in a metaphorical sense, it is a truly internal

market requires Europe to speak a common language. But the question may also be raised in the literal sense: does successful economic integration require linguistic unification?

The same question has been the object of historical analysis in relation to the development of the European nation-states. In his influential socio-historical work Nations and Nationalism,<sup>3</sup> Ernst Gellner, for one, argues that cultural and linguistic nationalism in the 19th century ("one state, one nation, one language") has to be explained in terms of the social and economic evolution of that time. The structural change taking place in the economies of all European countries from the late 18th century onwards, more particularly the shift to an industrial economy, led to a new division of labour and hitherto unknown occupational mobility. Now, the capacity "to move between diverse jobs, and incidentally to communicate and cooperate with numerous individuals in other social positions" requires "that members of such a society be able to communicate in speech and writing, in a formal, precise, context-free manner - in other words they must be educated, literate and capable of orderly, standardised presentation of messages (...) Men cooperating on complex tasks involving high technology must be able to read the same idiom".<sup>4</sup>

This is, of course an analysis of the historical evolution which took place during an earlier century. As such it had met with both support and criticism among historians. The chain of events leading from the industrial revolution to educational mobilisation, and, hence, to linguistic standardisation, has not always been linear. In the case of France, rather aggressive linguistic

assimilation policies under the French revolution preceded full-scale industrialisation, and seem to have been inspired more by the need for political mobilisation of the citizenry against the foreign enemy. In the case of Switzerland, linguistic diversity was deliberately preserved for reasons of national cohesion without any apparent harm to the country's economic development. On the other hand, the disruption of large multilingual empires (Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Russia) does not disprove Gellner's thesis: they gave birth to nation-states that generally proved keen to stamp out all cultural differences remaining within their newly won borders.

The broad lines of Gellner's theory, if not its fine details, are fairly widely accepted. The theory is interesting for the light it may shed on the new enlargement of economic scale taking place in the second half of this century under the flag of European integration. One may wonder whether this new operation will, in the long run, produce the same effect on cultural and linguistic diversity as the earlier one arguably did. Do we witness a similar process of linguistic standardisation, by which some of the smaller "national" languages (such as Dutch or Danish) will be reduced to the status of quasi-dialects and one or a few "national" European language(s) will emerge?

The first thing to notice, in trying to answer that question, is that the institutional condition now are very different from what they were in the nineteenth century. Unlike then, the creation of a larger economic space has not been accompanied by the transfer of cultural and linguistic policy decision-making to the higher level of government. Indeed on a first legal view, the

European Community would seem to have no reason or means to interfere with the linguistic policies of its Member States.

The fundamental legal starting point is that the European Community was created by an international treaty containing specific rules binding the contracting States and attributing specific powers to the Community institutions. All the remainder was left within the jurisdiction of the Member States. And as the EEC Treaty does not contain any rules relating to language use (except for the functioning of the European institutions themselves, but this aspect will be left aside here), nor provides the Community institutions with powers to adopt such rules, the logical conclusions would seem to be that EEC rules cannot affect the linguistic policies of the Member States.

Market integration was undertaken in order to increase the economic welfare of the participant States, but also, undoubtedly, in order to achieve political objectives, like the preservation of peace and the encapsulation of Germany.<sup>5</sup> But cultural considerations do not seem to have played a mobilising role. None of the founding States harboured thoughts of cultural expansionism by means of economic integration. One may even go further and say that the Community system, as it was established, it is marked by a clear but unexpressed resolution to separate the economic and the cultural spheres, and to launch a process of economic unification which would not affect national cultural identities. In this context, as in many other, European unification can be seen as a break with earlier traditions: political or economic unification were no

longer thought to require simultaneous cultural homogenisation. The guiding image for Europe was - and still is for many - that of a (confederation respecting existing cultural patterns rather than that of a new nation-state following the 19th century model.

## **II. CONFLICT : LANGUAGE AS A MARKET BARRIER**

There are more intensive cultural contacts in Europe now than ever before. People move across national and cultural barriers more frequently, and images, ideas and objects also cross cultural boundaries. As a consequences, established cultural models are challenged and may converge, individuals have increased opportunities for creating their own lifestyles and their own "cultural mix". Yet, as reaction, there may also be more political insistence on the preservation of existing cultural identity patterns.

Language has a special role in this cultural interaction. The effect of linguistic diversity, by and large, is to make communication across national boundaries more difficult. Language differences act as an obstacle to the movement of persons and ideas, but the diffusion of linguistically neutral images and objects is also hampered by linguistic diversity, if only because linguistic messages accompany them (e.g. in the case of television images) or precede them (advertisements for products). Linguistic diversity creates additional transaction costs which would not arise within a linguistically homogeneous

area. Those costs are arithmetically higher than the "objective" obstacle constituted by the unfamiliar language, because those barriers also favour intr-group accumulation of "social capital", which in turn tends to reinforce existing intercultural barriers.

Those "natural" costs of linguistic diversity are further increased by the intervention of governments that impose the use of a particular language (in the public service media, or in public administration) or promote the use of a language (through the educational system or by subsidies to stimulate the use of that language in literature cinema or other activities).

This governmental "distortion" of the linguistic pattern that would result from the informal and unregulated interaction between persons may come into conflict with the core principle and image of economic integration that was mentioned before: the common or internal market.

Roughly speaking, the general consequence of the creation of a common market for the linguistic policies of the Member States is as follows. The EEC treaty aims at guaranteeing free and unhindered economic activity across intr-Community borders. Because language is the medium of practically all economic activity, the rules of the EEC treaty also, implicitly, establish the principle of free language use in transnational economic activity. When this linguistic freedom is limited by national rules on language use, a conflict may arise, which, due to the principle of supremacy of Community Law, is to be decided in favour of the EEC rules, unless Community Law itself recognises a

valid reason in favour of the EEC rules, unless Community law itself recognises a valid reason for maintaining the restrictions.

In the following pages, I will try to illustrate and specify this broad statement by examining the interplay between informal linguistic integration, State regulation and European Community standard-setting in a number of contexts; cross-border migration, transfrontier television, product trade, and public subsidies to private linguistic activities.

## Linguistic Diversity and Migration in Europe

There is a complex migratory system within the European Community which includes many different categories of persons; frontier workers, seasonal workers, temporary worker, permanent workers, students, tourists, pensioners. The size of those population movements is increasing and constitutes an important instrument of integration, of confrontation and assimilation of cultural values. The movement is not reciprocal: typically, the North of Europe has been exporting tourists and pensioners to the South, and the South has been exporting workers.<sup>6</sup> Yet, the number of workers migrating from one Community country to another is decreasing.<sup>7</sup> The explanation for this is primarily economic: income inequalities between the Member States have dramatically decreased in the last decades. It might also be argued that cultural and linguistic barriers to migration have become relatively more important in recent years, as many more jobs now require extensive cultural and linguistic skills (although, on the other hand, the level of foreign language proficiency has also increased).

Whatever the macro-economic effect of language diversity on cross-border movement, linguistic job requirements may be a serious handicap for individual Community citizens moving to another EC country, and may thereby limit the free movement of workers, one of the central principles of the common market. This fact is reflected in a European Community Regulation of 1968,<sup>8</sup> which is the basic Community text consecrating the principle of equal treatment of workers originating from other Community countries.<sup>9</sup> In addition to direct

discriminations against Community citizens, indirect discrimination is also prohibited by this Regulation, in the following words:

"provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action or administrative practices of a Member State shall not apply; (...) where, though applicable irrespective of nationality, their exclusive or principal aim or effect is to keep nationals of other Member States away from the employment offered." But it is immediately added that "(t)his provision shall not apply to conditions relating to linguistic knowledge required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled."

In other words, when a Member State makes access to employment dependent on linguistic proficiency, there is a presumption of an indirect discrimination against foreign workers, unless it can be shown that such proficiency is needed for that particular job. This is theoretically a far-reaching limit on the Member State's linguistic policies, but its practical scope may have seemed very limited at the time of adoption in 1968. Indeed, the working of the Regulation only relates to the public regulation of private employment relations, and language rules of this kind hardly existed at that time.<sup>10</sup> Outside the scope of the Regulation remained linguistic requirements imposed by the employer on his own initiative, and also, or at least it seemed so, linguistic requirements in public service employment. Indeed, the EEC Treaty has an exception clause, article 48(4), which states that the free movement of workers does not apply to 'employment in the public service', for which nationality conditions, and *a fortiori* linguistic conditions seemed perfectly legitimate to the drafters of the Treaty.

On this last point, a major change has taken place since 1968, through a series of judgments of the European Court of Justice limiting drastically the exception clause of article 48(4). Now, the legal situation is that workers from other Community countries can only be excluded from public sector jobs related to the exercise of state authority (justice, police, central ministerial departments) but not from the (more numerous) jobs in other public service sectors such as health care, education or transport.<sup>11</sup> In the latter category of services, the principle of free movement fully applies, including the language provision of Regulation 1612/68.

The role of this provision becomes then much more important, because linguistic requirements are very often made for access to public sector jobs. One can even say that, as a rule, all plurilingual countries have more or less formal rules of this kind, either at the central level (Belgium) or at the regional level (in Italy and Spain).

The question of whether such requirements are compatible with EEC law was squarely raised in the Groener case decided by the European Court of Justice in 1989. The facts of this case were the following. Anita Groener is a Dutch national who acted as a part-time teacher of painting at the College of Marketing and Design in Dublin. In order to be appointed on a permanent basis, she had to show that she possessed an adequate knowledge of the Irish language. For that purpose, she took a two-weeks crash course, but failed in the subsequent examination. This was not a direct discrimination against

foreigners; Irish citizens also have to show the same basic knowledge of Irish for access to teaching functions and other public service jobs.

But Anita Groener claimed, with some plausibility, that the requirements of Irish did not serve any practical purpose (she would never be required actually to use Irish in her job) and, instead, was a measure of indirect discrimination, resulting in the exclusion of foreigners, and therefore prohibited by the EEC Regulation of 1968.

It would seem, indeed, that there was no functional need to know Irish for teaching the art of painting in Dublin. But before the European Court, the Irish and French government used a different sort of argument and pointed to the cultural and political need that all teachers in Ireland should be able to understand and speak a certain amount of Irish. The Irish Constitution proclaims that Irish is the first national language, and that Irish and English are both official languages of the country. This means that all Irish citizens should have the possibility to use that language and that the government may take measures to promote the use of Irish, for instance by imposing a duty to know that language on teachers in the public education system.

The Court of Justice accepted this point of view to a large extent and held:

The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national language and the first official language. (...) The importance of education for the implementation of such a policy must be recognized.

Teachers have an essential role to play, not only through the teaching which they provide but also by their participation in the daily life of the school and the privileged relationship which they have with their pupils. In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable to require them to have some knowledge of the first national language.'

Yet this is not an absolute recognition of the validity of national language regulations. The Court set limits to the autonomy of the Member States:

'(T)he implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free movement of workers. Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures intended to implement such a policy must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against nationals of other Member States'. The court rejects the view of the French government that linguistic policy is entirely beyond the scope of Community law and confirms its well-established doctrine, namely that any national policy standing in the way of one of the Common market freedoms is to be carefully scrutinised.

The consequences of Groener appear rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the Irish regulation (and, indirectly, similar regulations elsewhere in the Community) is allowed to stand, and this corrects somewhat the impression

that, from the point of view of market integration, linguistic diversity is not so much a cultural asset as an obstacle to efficient communication.<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, the Court has clearly confirmed that language policy is not beyond the pale of Community law, and that it has power to decide whether language regulations do not impinge on the exercise of Community rights. Moreover, its holding is limited to official languages, and may not necessarily save similar rules imposing knowledge of a regional or minority language.

A somewhat comparable controversy arose in the Italian province of Bolzano (South Tyrol). The province has a legally prescribed system by which public service jobs in South Tyrol are divided over members of the three local linguistic communities (German, Italian, Ladin) in proportion to their numerical importance. One side aspect of the system is that nationals of other Community countries are excluded from the apportionment and cannot take up any employment in the public service within the territory of the province. There is a debate on whether this system can be reconciled with EEC treaty provisions on the free movement of workers.<sup>13</sup>

### Language and Transnational Mass Communication

There are important flows of television programmes between countries.<sup>14</sup> They have led to general controversies about cultural imperialism and cultural protectionism which deal more with the content of those programmes than with

their language. In fact, those programmes are adapted by the importing broadcasting corporation to the linguistic characteristics of its own audience by two different means: dubbing, the device used mainly in the bigger European countries, effectively eliminates contact with a foreign language; while subtitling, which is used more often in the smaller countries, allows for exposure to the original language of the programme.

If the production of television programmes increasingly takes place in a transnational context, the same cannot be said about their diffusion. National systems of broadcasting have traditionally been run as domestic services. Even now, with cable and satellite technology allowing for a wider transnational diffusion of television programmes, there is not really an international market for broadcasting; cultural and linguistic differences account, to a large extent, for this fragmentation. A pan-European broadcasting has not come into being. Some more modest transnational initiatives have been launched, and have attracted varying, but always rather limited, audiences.<sup>15</sup> A number of thematic channels (news, music and sports channels) are using the lingua franca language English, but there are also some multilingual channels in which the same images are transmitted in several language versions to their public. The latter model effectively overcomes language barriers, but is expensive and limited to programmes of a particular kind.

The main impact of European Community law in the area of transnational television is that it has allowed business interests to by-pass national regulations, by setting up commercial channels in neighbouring Community

countries and penetrating the national market from there. The best example of this is provided by the broadcasting multinational CLT, a business company with a protected monopoly position in Luxembourg, which has launched, from Luxembourg, new channels in German, French and Dutch in direct competition with the established public broadcasters of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.

This activity is protected by the European Community freedom to provide services; transfrontier broadcasting, the European Court of Justice held in a number of cases, has to be considered as a "service" in the sense of the EEC Treaty, at least when the channel or the single programmes have a commercial character.<sup>16</sup> This means that the States are not allowed to impede, within their own territory, the reception or cable retransmission of television programmes transmitted from other Community countries. The purpose of those transnational commercial broadcasters is not to change existing cultural and linguistic patterns in the target countries. They intend to promote the marketing of products, not of culture, and try to adapt their programmes to the cultural values and linguistic characteristics of their audience.

This explains that one of the attempts of the Dutch government to stave off this foreign-based threat to the national broadcasting system involved a prohibition on the cable transmission of advertisements on foreign channels using the Dutch language.<sup>17</sup> On the initiative of some advertising agencies and cable companies, the European Court of Justice found this prohibition to be a breach of the freedom to provide services as defined by the EEC Treaty. The reverse of

this, namely the imposition on national broadcasters of a duty to use the national language or (more commonly) to broadcast a certain amount of programmes produced in that language, has also restrictive effects on the trade in broadcasting services. But this restriction was declared to be acceptable in the recently adopted EEC Directive on transfrontier television.<sup>18</sup>

### Language Barriers and Trade within the Internal Market

The free movement of goods implies a prohibition of all national laws and regulations that, directly or indirectly, hinder intra-Community trade in goods. This rule is directed against economic protectionism in the member States and is not meant to affect cultural differences. For instance, Italian law requiring pasta to be made from durum wheat cannot prevent the importation of pasta containing soft wheat from other Community countries,<sup>19</sup> but that does not prevent the Italian consumers from continuing to eat their own domestically produced pasta made from durum wheat. Similarly, and closer to our theme, Germans may continue to read "Bild Zeitung" rather than "Le Monde", but there should be no rules in Germany limiting the sale of French-language newspapers.

There exist many official rules on language use that may constitute barriers to the trade of goods. One very common example is that of requirements concerning the language to be used in the labelling of products or in documentation accompanying those products. If those requirements are

different from one country to another (and they are bound to be ), there are extra costs for those producers who want to market their goods in several countries and have to comply with the (different) linguistic requirements of each of those. Therefore, such linguistic rules may be analyzed as a potential restriction on trade.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, those rules may be justified by the need to provide adequate information to the consumer of the product. The Community has recognised the need to balance free movement and consumer protection and has enacted a Directive harmonising the national rules relating to the labelling of foodstuffs.<sup>21</sup> Among many other provisions, the Directive holds that the member States may (and must) prescribe that labelling should be in a language which the consumer can easily understand, unless the consumer is sufficiently informed otherwise about the nature of the product.

Does this allow national regulations that prescribe the use of the national language in all cases and for all products? This problem was raised in 1991 before the European Court of Justice in the Piageme case. The Belgian rules implementing the EEC food labelling directive imposed the use of the regional language of the area in which the product was marketed, that is, either Dutch (in Flanders) or French (in Wallonia) or German (in the easternmost part of the country) or both Dutch and French (in the bilingual area of Brussels.) This rule is a reflection of the overall policy of territorial unilingualism which prevails in Belgium and meant, in the Piageme case, that bottles of French mineral water could not be sold in Flanders without being appropriately labelled in Dutch. The European Court, however, held<sup>22</sup> that such a rule was incompatible with

article 14 of the directive. By imposing the use of the regional language in all cases, even when consumers were in fact sufficiently informed either through indications in another language or through other marketing circumstances (a well-known brand, for instance), the Belgian rule unduly hampered the free movement of goods.

Apart from labelling requirements, there are other linguistic restrictions of trade. Recently, the Commission informed the Spanish government that, in its opinion, the requirement that all typewriters and keyboards sold in Spain should carry the letter "ñ" constituted an undue restriction of intra-Community trade. The news created an uproar in Spain, where the Commission was accused of wanting to abolish the Spanish language.

The most far-reaching piece of trade-related language legislation is certainly the French "Loi sur l'emploi de la langue française" of 1975, which in practice imposes the use of the French language for all commercial transactions taking place on the French territory, even if one or all of the participants are foreigners.<sup>23</sup>

### State Support for Culture as a Distortion of Competition?

The removal of linguistic barriers to transfrontier activities leads to what could be called a 'market' for languages in which they compete with each other in analogy to what happens on the markets for goods or services. Such an open

border situation enhances the value of language skills in the major European languages and correspondingly reduces the incentive to invest time and resources into smaller languages. The question is then whether it is legitimate, under Community law, to correct this market mechanism by preferential politics (e.g. public subsidies) in favour of specific, national or regional, languages.

This is still a rather doubtful question. The EEC Treaty contains a special chapter whose essential purpose is to ensure that the common market, during and after its establishment, should function according to the rules of economic competition so as to maximise economic welfare. The Treaty contains two sets of rules, directed on the one hand at the market behaviour of private (or public) enterprises, and on the other hand at state financial intervention affecting the position of (private or public) enterprises. By subsidising their own companies, States can improve their market position to the detriment of foreign competitors, and the functioning of the internal market is thereby distorted.

The articles 92 and following of the EEC Treaty accordingly organise the control, by the Commission of the European Communities, of "state aids" to enterprises. In order to protect competition in the common market, all forms of state aid (both direct subsidies and indirect advantages such as fiscal rebates) are subject to the preventative control of the Commission and will be accepted only on specific conditions.

There is no explicit rule in the Treaty which allows State subsidies based on linguistic criteria and/or inspired by reasons of linguistic policy. Yet, in reality, subsidies of this kind are very frequent all over Europe; suffice it to give a few examples.

France has an active policy of favouring the use of the national language which takes not only the form of restrictions against the use of other languages (see above) but also that of positive incentives to French language expression. The government subsidises the translation of French publications into foreign languages; it subsidises French libraries abroad and the foreign distribution of French publications; it offers special aid to theatre or film productions in French; French language "world" radio and satellite television as well as the "chanson française" receive official financial support. It should be added that this policy is not fundamentally different from that pursued by most other European states, only perhaps more systematic.

Similar schemes can also be found at the sub-state level. The Autonomous Communities of Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia have instituted ambitious policies of "language normalisation" which attempt to restore the current and normal use of the Catalan, Basque and Galician language.<sup>24</sup> In order to promote the use of those languages in all areas of social life, all three regional governments have instituted selective subsidy schemes for cultural activities in which the regional language is used in speech or writing: publishing (both books and periodicals), theatre, film production.

The compatibility of these, and many similar, schemes with the EEC Treaty is open to doubt. Until now, the Commission has not taken action against any one of them. But, on the other hand, it has resolved itself, in the framework of its internal market programme, to take stronger action against all forms of State aid distorting competition. Articles 92 and following are thus hanging a sword of Damocles over all those subsidy schemes; it does not even matter whether they were granted by national or by regional or local governments. The member States of the Community are responsible for the action of all public authorities in the country, even if in some cases the central government is not entitled to control the activities of the regions.

There is, however, one criterion for the application of the EEC rules which seems reassuring, especially for the schemes favouring regional or minority languages. In order to be caught by the Treaty, state aids should "affect trade between Member States" (art. 92). It may be argued that governmental subsidies to, say, the Catalan language book production, will hardly improve the European market share of books produced in Spain or prejudice the import of books from other EEC countries into Spain.

Beyond this formal argument, a substantive case can also be made for public support of minority languages (and smaller national languages like Danish, Greek or Dutch) which runs parallel to the arguments usually made, and accepted, about less-developed regions within the Community. The EEC Treaty accepts the view that open borders and free competition are not sufficient to ensure the development of peripheral or declining regions, and that they can be

made valid participants in the European market only on the basis of a deliberate policy for developing their economic structure. This attitude of the Community has two sides: the negative side is the non-application of the usual strict standards for the control of national subsidies if they form part of a regional development programme.<sup>26</sup> The positive side is the regional development policy of the Community itself, which essentially takes the form of grants from the EC budget to regional development plans proposed by Member States or regional and local authorities. The European Regional Development Fund instituted for that purpose is the second largest item of Community expenditure, after the common agricultural policy.

The argument in favour of positive incentives to less-developed regions may be extended to minority languages, and to smaller European languages in general. Incentives are needed to give those languages a fair chance on the "cultural market" and to effectively preserve linguistic diversity. Such a policy could also take two forms: accepting national systems of subsidy to smaller (national or regional) languages as legitimate under article 92, and offering some support from the Community budget to those same languages.

The first change was accepted, in principle, by the Maastricht summit of December 1991. The governments of the member States agreed to insert a new provision into article 92 of the EEC Treaty, which would make acceptable "aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest". It remains to be seen, first, whether, the

Maastricht Treaty will be ratified, and, second, how the Commission will interpret this sibylline provision in the course of its policy on state aids.

As for the second change, the creation of a European Fund for the promotion of smaller European languages and cultures, it has not yet reached the Community agenda. It might be difficult to accept for many member States if, as can be expected, the Community budget will rocket in order to cope with other, politically more pressing, demands.<sup>25</sup>

### **III. INTEGRATION: EUROPEAN UNION WITH LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY?**

This, then, is broadly speaking the legal state of affairs in the European Community: linguistic choices should be left to the market. By letting employers, consumers, users of professional services decide themselves on the allocation of linguistic resources, the supply and demand of linguistic goods or skills will meet in the most beneficial way for all. At the same time, it is recognised that national governments have a special duty of care, both for the protection of consumers against the exploitation of their (linguistic) ignorance and for the maintenance of the cultural identity of the country. All this, it may be repeated, is court-based doctrine, derived from a few individual cases, and without any explicit guidelines in the EC Treaties, the "constitution" of the European Community. All this, also, is viewed from a primarily economic perspective: linguistic values are seen mainly as obstacles to economically relevant activities, in need of special justification. Language planning is not,

within the Community system, a policy objective with equivalent weight to economic integration. While the original distinction between the economic and the cultural sphere is breaking down, the Community does not offer the constitutional resources for striking a considered balance between the needs of both spheres of activity.

This situation may lead to political conflicts. The constitutions of several European states declare that the preservation of the national language and/or the protection of linguistic diversity is one of the duties of government. The Irish Constitution has been mentioned already. In Spain, public authorities have a constitutional duty to protect the various "linguistic forms" existing within the country (article 3). In Italy, the State has a constitutional duty to protect linguistic minorities (article 6); in Germany, the Basic Law is silent about language, but legal authors have argued that it implicitly imposes a duty on public authorities to guarantee the position of the German language.<sup>26</sup>

Even in countries in which there is no formal constitutional rule, the preservation of cultural and linguistic patterns is a broadly shared political priority. French governments of every denomination are adamant about the affirmation of the position of the French language in the face of the advance of English. A country like the Netherlands seemed to have chosen a strategy of adjustment to internationalising trends, but even there, the Parliament recently considered the enactment of regulation protecting the position of the Dutch language in the countries universities. Only Britain would seem to have a vested interest in a free market for languages, in which it can exploit the

advantage of possessing the leading international language and further specialise in "linguistic industries" like publishing, music, radio and television, and education.<sup>27</sup>

Given the nature of the European Community system, one would expect those national policy preferences to be reflected in decision-making by the Council. This is so, but only to a limited extent. Respect for, and promotion of, cultural and linguistic diversity is the official formula of the European Community. The formula has appeared in a number of (non-binding) resolutions of the Council, but is now also written in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. One of the opening articles of the Treaty generally holds that the European Union "shall respect the national identities of its Member States". The proposed new article 126 of the EEC Treaty allows for Community action in the field of education "while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity." The proposed new article 128, dealing with culture, directs the Community to "contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."

Respect for linguistic diversity means that the most practical way of overcoming the language obstacle - the promotion of a single common language for all Europeans - is ruled out. Other means therefore have to be sought for reducing linguistic transaction costs. One of them is the use of new technologies: the

Eurotra project on automatic translation of technical and scientific terms is one example of this approach, which is, however, expensive and limited in its scope.

The other possible instrument is to help improving the linguistic skills of Community citizens. The educational system is the appropriate locus for such an action. Because education is a policy area in which the Community can venture only very cautiously, for constitutional and political reasons, the responsibility for improving foreign language learning in schools basically remains with the member States. Some States have been more innovative than others in this respect.

Yet, the European Community has made a modest inroad on this area as early as in 1977, when it adopted a Directive on the education of children of migrant workers.<sup>28</sup> On the basis of this binding legal instrument, Member States have a duty to organise special language education for the children of migrant workers from the Community. In order to promote the mobility of Community workers, it was felt that "appropriate measures" had to be taken in order to facilitate the integration of those children by teaching the official language (or one of the official languages) of the host State. Article 3 of the same Directive adds that the States also should promote teaching of the (official) language and culture of the country of origin. This would seem like a recognition of the idea that movement of people should not go to the detriment of linguistic diversity. In fact, the underlying view may be slightly different; as the preamble of the Directive candidly admits, this was included "with a view principally to facilitating their possible reintegration into the Member States of origin".

Therefore, both the provision on the teaching of the language of the host State as the one on the teaching of the mother tongue, seem to be inspired by the same goal: improving the linguistic skills of migrant children in order to facilitate the intra-Community mobility of their parents.

The same link between the improvement of linguistic skills and labour mobility is present, though in a more attenuated form, in the Lingua programme adopted by the EC in 1989. This is a multiannual scheme of Community mobility grants to promote training in foreign languages; an Erasmus-type of construction which is limited to one particular area of education, that of foreign language education.<sup>29</sup> The link between this initiative and the basic Community objective of market integration is clearly indicated in the preamble of the Decision: "the establishment of the Internal Market would be facilitated by the quantitative improvement of foreign language training within the Community to enable the Community's citizens to communicate with each other and to overcome linguistic difficulties which impede the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital."

Lingua money is reserved for the so-called Community languages; article 3 of the Decision provides that "foreign language teaching in the context of the Lingua programme shall refer only to the teaching as foreign languages of Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Letzebuergesch, Portuguese and Spanish." This rule seems to be at odds with the objective of the programme as quoted above. If the intention of this programme really is to enable the Community's citizens to reap the benefits of a completed internal

market and to enhance understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the Community<sup>30</sup>, there seems to be no valid reason to include languages like Irish and Letzebuergesch, that are spoken by a few hundred thousand persons, while leaving out Catalan, which is spoken by more than six million persons within the European Community.

This would seem to indicate that the Community's professed commitment to linguistic diversity is selective, and does not extend all along the line. It is a commitment to the protection of the national or official languages of the member States of the Community, and not the many regional and minority languages spoken within the Community.

It is true, on the other hand, that the European Community is offering some financial support to action in favour of regional and minority languages, which is channelled through the "European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages" established in Dublin in 1982. The importance of this initiative should not be overrated. First, the legal basis for the expenditure is a resolution of the European Parliament which, unlike a Council regulation, directive or decision, lacks binding force. This subsidy is rather the precarious result of a political agreement between the various budgetary authorities of the EC (Council, Parliament and Commission) which can be revoked at each yearly occasion. Moreover, the size of this financial contribution to minority language activities is quite modest, even compared to the not so affluent Lingua programme.<sup>31</sup> A true policy of linguistic pluralism on the part of the Community would imply a reversal of its present tendency to neglect the traditional regional and minority

languages. As for the languages of immigrants from non-EEC countries, they have not even appeared on the Community agenda.

## Notes

- 1 The notions of "informal integration" and "formal integration" are defined as follows by William Wallace, "Introduction: the dynamics of European integration", in Wallace (ed), The Dynamics of European Integration, London: Pinter Publishers, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, 1-24, p.9;

"Informal integration consists of those intense patterns of interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks, and social change. Formal integration consists of those changes in the framework of rules and regulations which encourage - or inhibit, or redirect - informal flows."

- 2 This is the definition of the "internal market" given by article 8A of the EEC Treaty.
- 3 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

A later and briefer presentation of those views can be found in Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion in complex societies", in Culture, Identity and Politics, (Cambridge: University Press, 1987), pp.6-28.

- 4 Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics, op.cit., p.15.
- 5 The preambles of both the 1950 Coal and Steel Treaty and the 1957 EEC Treaty are quite outspoken about the broader political objectives of the founding fathers.
- 6 See the general survey by Federico Romero, "Cross-border population movements", in W. Wallace (ed), The Dynamics of European Integration, London: Pinter, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, 171-191.
- 7 See Gildas Simon, "Une Europe communautaire de moins en moins mobile?", in Revue européenne des migrations internationales 1991, vol. 7, nr 2, 40-59.
- 8 Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968, Official Journal of the European Communities 1968, L 257.
- 9 Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968, Official Journal 1968, L 257.
- 10 Since then, Belgium has seen the adoption of (regional) legislation on language use in private employment, but this imposes the use of a particular language during employment rather than the knowledge of that language at the time of access (Decree of the Flemish Community of 19 July 1973; Decree of the French Community of 29 June 1982). According to the French 'Loi sur l'emploi de la langue française' of 1975, labour contracts must be made in French, but knowledge of the French language

- is not required from the employee (article 4 of the 'loi' even entitles the foreign worker to a translation of the contract in his own language).
- 11 For an analysis of the case-law of the Court on this question, see John Handoll, 'Article 48(4) EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment', European Law Review 1988, 223-241. See also the Communication of the Commission published in Official Journal 1988, C 72/2.
  - 12 Cf. the statement by Lord Cockfield in the European Parliament, when he was vice-president of the Commission with the main responsibility for the internal market programme: 'linguistic diversity is one of the richest elements in our common European heritage but (...) it should not act as an obstacle to competition, innovation and growth.' (Debates of the European Parliament, No. 2-370/243, 28 October 1988).
  - 13 See Bonell & Winkler, "Sudtirol und die Europäische Gemeinschaft: EG-Recht doch keine Gefahr für Autonomie?", Juristische Blätter 1989, 83-87; and various contributions in Pan (Hrsg.), Der Sudtiroler Arbeitsmarkt im EG-Binnenmarkt 1992. Bozen: Sudtiroler Wirtschafts und Sozialinstitut, 1989.
  - 14 See P. Larsen (ed), Import/Export: International Flow Television Fiction, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication 104, Paris: UNESCO, 1990.
  - 15 See the survey by R. Negrine and S. Papathanassopoulos, "The Internationalization of Television", European Journal of Communication 1991, 9-32.
  - 16 The European Court's approach has been developed in four cases which all dealt with commercial television programmes transmitted by cable in

another country than the country in which the programme originated:  
 case 155/73, Sacchi, [1974] European Court Reports 490; case 52/79,  
Procureur du Roi v Debauve, [1980] European Court Reports 833; case  
 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders et al. v the Netherlands, judgement of  
 26 April 1988, [1988] European Court Reports 2085.

- 17 One would expect a government to impose rather than prohibit the use of  
 the national language, but the prohibition in this case was intended to  
 shield the Dutch advertising market from foreign commercials specially  
 directed at the Dutch public.
- 18 EEC Directive of 3 October 1989 "on the coordination of certain  
 provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in  
 Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities", Official  
 Journal 1989, L 298/23, article 8.
- 19 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case 90/86, Zoni, [1988]  
 European Court Reports 4285.
- 20 See Alfonso Mattera, Le Marché unique européen - ses regles, son  
 fonctionnement, (Paris: Jupiter, 1988), p.417.
- 21 Directive 79/112 of 18 December 1978, Official Journal 1979, L33/1.
- 22 Case C-369/89, Piageme v Peeters, judgment of 18 June 1991 (not yet  
 reported).
- 23 Loi No. 75-1349 du 31 decembre 1975 relative a l'emploi de langue  
 francaise, Journal officiel 4-1-1976, p.189. See the following  
 commentaries: Vincent Delaporte, "La loi relative a l'emploi de la langue  
 francaise", Revue critique de droit international prive 1976, 447-476;  
 Thomas E. Carbonneau, "Linguistic Legislation and Transnational

- Commercial Activity: France and Belgium, American Journal of Comparative Law 1981, 393-412
- 24 For the concept of "language normalization" and a short description of the Catalan and Basque policies, see Juan Cobarrubias, "The Protection of Linguistic Minorities in the Autonomous Communities of Spain", Language and Law 399 (P.Pupier and J. Woehrling, eds.), 1989.
- 25 See the so-called "Delors II package", From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond - The Means to Match our Ambitions "Europe" Documents, No.1762/63, 19 February 1992. This policy statement by the Commission lists a number of Community policy objectives that call for the urgent allocation of new funds; the areas of culture and language are briefly mentioned, but clearly do not have priority status.
- 26 Paul Kirchhof, "Deutsche Sprache", in Isensee & Kirchhof (editors), Handbüch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol.1, Heidelberg: C.F.Muller, 1985, 745-771, at 761 ff.
- 27 Yet, it has been argued that cultural influence may, paradoxically, weaken the overall trade performance of a country. Culture importers obtain a detailed knowledge of the exporting country's culture; they can adapt their market strategies accordingly and start a successful economic counter-penetration (Rene Jean Ravault, "Défense de l'identité culturelle par les réseaux traditionnels de coerseduction", International Political Science Review vol.7, 1986, pp.251-80, at p.264 ff.)
- 28 EEC Directive 77/486 of 26 July 1977, Official Journal 1977, L 199/32.
- 29 Decision nr 89/489 of 28 July 1989, Official Journal L 239 of 16 August 1989.

- 30 See also the Preamble of the Lingua Decision, eighth recital.
- 31 In the budget for 1991, 21,892,000 ECU are attributed to the Lingua programme (budget line B3-105) and 2,000,000 ECU to support for minority languages and cultures (budget line B3-106) (Official Journal of the European Communities, 4 February 1991, L 30/658).

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
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**"COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA  
IN A CHANGING EUROPE"**

**by Philip Crookes**



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SYMPOSIUM  
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Hellenic Centre for European Studies

Philip Crookes has worked as a journalist and foreign correspondent in radio and television in the South Pacific, the Americas and Europe. He has written or contributed to books and studies on media politics and politics, and has participated in a number of media related projects designed to assist Third World, and particularly African countries. He is editor of the quarterly Media Bulletin, a frequent writer on computer and communications questions, and was the project coordinator for the successful Channel 4 educational television experiment under the DELTA programme of the European Commission.

He is currently deputy Director General of the European Institute for the Media and Manchester University.

## Media and Communication in a changing Europe

Summary of speech by Philip Crookes  
Deputy Director General  
The European Institute for the Media

Communication - the art of conveying our meaning one to another. A difficult art, and one not well understood nor well executed in the Europe in which we live.

At its simplest, it is misunderstanding and mistranslation. The failure to understand the difference between, eventually meaning later, and eventually meaning now. Between English and American 'fast' foods, and German fast, meaning not quite, almost, food. Or is there a difference there?

Cynically we could imagine that our culture and our communication have been homogenised, macdonalded, disneyed and touristified until we no longer know or care if we are governed by a burgermeister or a Burger King.

And yet, is Europe 1992 really so reduced? Should the French mean no more than fries or letters? The English no more than overcoats? The Dutch nothing other than caps?

I suggest not. Our differences define us as well as our similarities. We revel in being unlike our neighbours, in being downright hostile to our neighbours. And that is not always a breakdown of communication: many times it is that we understand our neighbours all too well! Do unto others, runs the old saying, before they do unto you.

We remain then spiky, suspicious, misunderstanding of each other, and quite right too. And now we have modern communications to allow us to misunderstand more clearly, and faster, and in colour and wide screen as well.

So to communications which have imposed their own discipline, and their won language, on Europe. The post services that led to the Universal Postal Union, so that we could write letters directly to the enemy for the price of a single stamp; the telephones and the broadcast systems that let us share our hopes and dreams and fears. Or at any rate, thrust them in front of the uncomprehending eyes and ears of the people next door.

If there is one common thread throughout our late twentieth century European civilisation it is the television.

Pervasive, present, ubiquitous.

Look around at the shepherd's hut, the banker's mansion. Each sprouts a television aerial or three, and as often as not in these days also a satellite dish, cupped like an ear to pick up the whisperings from space.

Those televisions, and it is television that we now mostly mean when we talk about communication in a changing Europe, have much to answer for. They have to answer for the spread of the idea of freedom in the former totalitarian states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Not that the peoples of these countries had not thought about freedom for themselves, of course they had, and still do. What the television did was bring home to them the pictures that revealed that others were thinking the same way. That if you pushed a rotten system hard enough, it fell over. That the world on the other side of the border, the tv screen - the wall - was and is reachable. Somehow...

There's a simplicity about that idea that is of course attractive. The idea that the television is all pervasive, and that its impact is generally for good, is one that most broadcasters, and perhaps some media researchers, would like to believe. It reinforces what they do and validates their lives.

Of course it isn't true, any more than the contrary view - that the influence of the television is all bad - is true either.

The real role of television in the events of 1989 was to spread some crucial words. The very first of these were the words spoken by Gorbachev when he rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine and repudiated the role of the Red Army in enforcing loyalty to Moscow.

The information encouraged the peoples of Hungary, of Poland, of Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and eventually the Soviet Union itself to do what they probably would have done sooner or later in any case. Their systems had failed them. Television didn't bring about the failure, all it did was tell the people concerned, and the concerned world outside, about what was happening.

But that's another myth that broadcasters, and perhaps media researchers too, like to spread.

When I was a foreign correspondent back in the late Sixties, I was assigned to the Democratic nomination convention in Chicago. The convention that was to launch Hubert Humphrey into international obscurity and decline. As anarchists rioted in the park opposite the convention hall, the television cameras mounted on the marquee of the Hilton Hotel recorded and relayed the chant of the demonstrators: the whole

world is watching, they called out, in what was perhaps one of the first public recognitions of the inter-relationship of the news media and the news.

The whole world wasn't really watching, of course, any more than it was watching as the Berlin Wall came down, or Saddam Hussein stayed in power in Iraq in the face of the combined armies, or the people of Yugoslavia fought out their terrible historic destiny.

In our Europe of today, we like to think that we are civilized and that we are too far advanced along the road of the informed and informatised society to engaged in anything as crude as war. Propaganda, we like to say, is beneath us in the developed Western countries. We can spot a demagogue at fifty metres, and reject him - or her - on sight.

Can't we?

If our communication is as instant and strong and informative and impartial as we believe it to be, why are some of the young in half a dozen countries looking to an older evil to answer their question? Where did the media fail us, their parents, in not teaching them that totalitarianism was wrong?

I think we have at least some reason to suppose that by its ubiquity, its presence and news events, its obsessive reporting of trifling detail to the exclusion of the real argument, television produces an empty shell of news and information. Like the pervasive musak, the droning sound of music played in elevators by musicians who aren't there in front of the ears of people that aren't listening, we have created Newak, the twenty four hour flow of trivia, with a spicy obbligate of blood and broken lives, and always the faint hope that something really appalling will happen safely inside the big glass bottle that we view our world through.

A few years ago we made an experiment at our Institute. On the opening night of the European summit in Luxembourg, we collected together the main evening newscast from the national television service in each European Community state.

It happened that someone threw a thunderflash - a kind of large firework - across the fence into the grounds of the villa where the meeting was being held, and that the Luxembourg police brought in a tracker dog to see if any more explosives could be found.

Throughout Europe that night, the average time devoted to the dog (he was a rather nice alsatian by the way) was seventy three

seconds. The average amount of time given in the same newscasts to explaining what the summit was about and what it was going to mean to the European citizen was sixty seconds.

And as the media researcher, I remember all about the dog, and

nothing of the explanation.

So far all our instant communication, we remain actually fairly patchily informed.

First of all is the phenomenon that is the reverse of what happened that August night on Michigan Boulevard in Chicago. Events tend to exist because the media arrive and validate them by showing them. It is an old undergraduate argument to debate whether a Beethoven symphony really exists when it is not being played. Or does the light really go out when you close the refrigerator door? Or does a news event, or a country, really exist if it is not on television?

I once got a phone call, in my office at the BBC, from an enraged citizen who wanted to know why the BBC had not sent a team to report on a demonstration in front of Parliament in favour of more money for old age pension.

Several misconception were present: that the event only existed if it appeared on television; that the television was all-powerful and all-knowing - because the organisers had quite omitted to inform the tv stations or anyone else of what they planned to do - and finally and perhaps most crucially the mistaken belief that being seen to protest on television actually might have the slightest impact at all on the course of events in the real world that is not projected onto the blunt end of a bottle.

But if the dream of an informed European democracy by way of television has failed us, what about other programmes and services?

What of the dream that we should sit in our homes and be able to connect instantly to the stages of the greatest opera houses and theatres of Europe? Well, yes and no.

The technology exists that would allow us to do just that.

But sadly, most people don't care enough for opera to make it pay, and the Arts Channel went broke years ago, and cultural programmes like live operas relays look good in the corporate annual report but make a real impact on the lives of only a tiny minority of Europeans.

So what are the whispering that Europe has to offer to the intricate whorls and delicate membranes of the collective European ear?

Our television tell, across our habitual borders of language custom and tradition, the merry message of sex, of violence and of covetousness.

Buy this, yearn for that, go to bed with this denatured girl whose life is no more than the flashing of nipple in front of a silent, heavy-breathing, audience of socio-economic A and B

and C income producing units.

A gloomy view?

Perhaps.

And yet...

Television came early to Europe. We were, mostly, ahead of the Japanese and the Americans and the Indians. Not a lot ahead, but we did get there first.

We learned a thing or two about what we were about and what we expected from the television.

I actually find it encouraging that other countries' television is usually pretty impenetrable to anyone from outside the society. Have you ever, if you aren't British, tried to watch and understand what is going on in a programme called 'Last night of the Proms'? If you are not German have you ever tried to follow a German game show? Particularly the one with the hamster? Or comprehend the wonderfully French breadth of taste and sheer style that allows their music channel MCM to schedule Performances by Fats Waller, Bruce Springsteen and a headbanging heavy metal band side by side.

Because what all this means is that Europe's national televisions systems are reflecting their own societies, and are perhaps rather less homogenised than might be imagined by those of us that specialise in examining how many angels might gather on a satellite dish.

Putting aside the issue of language, and that's a whole problem for communications in a changing Europe unless we all agree to speak English, change our writing so as to lose all the accent characters, I see it is a success of Europe that each national television has some distinctive national qualities of its own.

What is proving rather more difficult to achieve is a common European communication, whether by television or by other means.

A few years ago, the idea was put forward of a European radio system, in which all the European broadcasters would devote an hour or so a day to the presentation of European programming on their second or third radio show.

The scheme was brought as far as a pilot, but nothing really came of it, which is probably just as well, because I am afraid it would have suffered the fate of the Europe television channel, which was undoubtedly tremendously well-meaning but was conceived, executed and eventually allowed to collapse in a welter of miscomprehensions about Europe, about broadcasting, about satellites and crucially about how much money was left after the electricity bill was paid.

Now we have CNN, and MTV, and Sky News, and shortly Airness, and in a small way our own Channel e for educational programmes, and a growing range of television services that address the disparate communities of people that make up Europe in the 1990s.

One small example from our Channel e experience. We broadcast two half hours a week to Turkish viewers: one of them is formal education, the other is, at present, a cookery series.

The programmes can be seen by three million Turkish people living outside their own country who could not be reached in any other way than by satellite television. Even if we wanted to, we could not get a licence as a regular broadcaster from the governments of some of the countries in which they are living..... nor would that be a remotely sensible or economical thing to do.

The same considerations apply to broadcasting for Japanese, for Asians, for Greeks, for people interested in popular music, for fanatic followers of football or hockey or hurling.

Our communications, in other words, are helping us to live, not in McLuhan's global village, even though events, and the mere existence, of CNN and Sky News and Westschein and La Sept and Super Channel are daily reminders that McLuhan's vision was right. Not in McLuhan's global village, but rather in a series of global villages where we can share the experience of another person in another country without even noticing the distance and difference.

And that's what I find actually hopeful. Our young people who watch the much reviled videoclips on MTV and MCM television, who share the same taste in music, who wear the same T shirts, as young people in other countries, are just that much less willing to see the foreigner as beastly.

Just a little less willing to believe that because they speak a foreign language they eat babies.

Just a bit more ready to open a discussion rather than a hand grenade.

Our European communications, this late in the twentieth century, are far less from perfect. We have been down a lot of blind alleys, and we have yet some empty byways to explore. But we are building a communications and communicative ethos. It has its faults, too many commercials, perhaps too much American money (although I am not really sure about this).

It also has vitality, style, vigour, freshness, novelty and yet respect for the long tradition in Europe of regard for knowledge and thirst to know.

War, we are told, is diplomacy carried out by other means. Perhaps we are learning, in the age of instant information,

when our politicians cannot so easily deceive us because we have seen for ourselves, that television is government carried on by other means, and that in our interlinked system of European villages of interest, we have no choice any longer but to learn to live with our sameness and our differences.

Our cultures will not, I believe, disappear: are the French really less French than they were a hundred years ago? the Germans? The Italians? The Greeks? The British? All of us are better informed - all of us believe that the others may have changed..but ourselves? Never!

My conclusion, then is one of hope. Hope that the media, and communications, in this changing Europe will be at the very least neutral - for we no longer are ready to accept information monopolies nor government control of what is seen and heard.

And at best, a force for good, educating and entertaining Europeans to prepare all of us to live in the third millennium.

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI  
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

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17 APR. 1992

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
# IMAGES OF EUROPE

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
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**CONVERGENCE OF SOCIAL AND  
CULTURAL VALUES IN EUROPE'S  
PUBLIC OPINION?**

**by Karlheinz Reif**



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SYMPOSIUM  
MINOS BEACH HOTEL, CRETE  
13-17 APRIL 1992  
Eleni Nakou Foundation  
The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
Hellenic Centre for European Studies

**Table 1: Wishes for the Future in 1970**  
(percent\*)

WISHES FOR THE FUTURE	FRANCE			BELGIUM			NETHERLANDS			GERMANY			ITALY		
	YES	INDIFF.	NO	YES	INDIFF.	NO	YES	INDIFF.	NO	YES	INDIFF.	NO	YES	INDIFF.	NO
a strong army	45	27	28	22	30	48	31	22	48	46	28	26	36	30	34
no more wars	98	1	1	97	1	2	97	0	2	97	0	3	98	1	1
freedom of speech	97	2	1	96	3	1	96	3	2	98	2	0	96	4	1
free traveling	82	13	5	91	8	1	84	10	6	90	10	0	89	10	2
country 's political role	63	33	4	55	39	6	46	44	11	58	30	12	63	34	3
good financial situation	88	10	1	91	8	0	85	13	2	91	8	1	95	5	1
scientific discoveries	89	10	1	69	29	2	70	28	2	75	24	1	82	17	1

\* Those who do not respond are excluded. Missing data range from 2% to 7%.

#### Question-Wording:

I am going to a list of certain number of things which might be desirable to you. Will you tell me (for each one of these) whether you actively wish for it to come about, whether you are indifferent, or whether you are mostly opposed.

- 1) For (nation) to have a strong army;
- 2) To have no more world wars
- 3) To live in a free country where everybody can say freely what he thinks
- 4) To be able to go freely to all countries without passports
- 5) For (nation) to play an important role in world politics
- 6) Not to have any financial difficulties - in buying a car or a house for example
- 7) For (nation) to make great scientific discoveries

**Table 2: Importance of Political Goals in 1970**  
(percent\*)

IMPORTANT ISSUES	FRANCE		BELGIUM		NETHERLANDS		GERMANY		ITALY	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
job security	97	3	96	4	97	3	92	8	97	3
humane society	89	11	93	7	93	7	69	31	93	7
workers' participation	64	36	76	24	67	33	65	35	65	35
Third World aid	50	50	64	36	72	28	34	66	65	35
raise salaries	75	25	78	22	62	38	59	41	72	38
stop atomic bombs	86	14	90	10	88	12	85	15	93	7
abandon capitalism	46	54	49	51	47	53	34	66	45	55
reform education	71	29	67	33	79	21	77	23	85	15
fight communism	37	63	59	61	61	39	55	45	56	64
freedom of speech	90	10	92	8	92	8	87	13	92	8
law and order	91	9	93	7	88	12	88	12	91	9
private initiative	73	27	82	18	70	30	48	52	76	24
work for young people	99	1	98	2	91	9	87	13	98	2
ensure pensions	99	1	99	1	98	2	94	6	98	2

\* Those who do not respond are excluded. Missing data range from 2% to 7%. Percentages 'absolute priority' and 'important objective' are combined into 'yes'; 'secondary objective' and 'not important' are combined into 'no'.

#### QUESTION-WORDING:

I will propose again a certain number of concrete political objectives. I would like to ask you to tell me for each objective if you consider it as an objective which should have absolute priority, an important objective, a secondary objective, or not important at all?

- 1) Guarantee greater job security
- 2) Make our society more humane
- 3) Guarantee the participation of the workers in the management of business
- 4) Help underdeveloped countries
- 5) Raise salaries
- 6) Stop making atomic bombs
- 7) Do away with capitalism
- 8) Reform education
- 9) Fight communism
- 10) Guarantee freedom of speech
- 11) Encourage private initiative in the economic sphere
- 12) Guarantee work to young people
- 13) Guarantee a suitable pension to all the aged

**TABLE 4: RELIGIOSITY 1973 and 1991\***

(% without religious affiliation)

WITHOUT RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS	F	B	NL	D-W	I	L	DK	IR	GB	EC9
1973	11	14	38	5	0	6	16	1	24	11
1991	30	28	51	23	10	6	21	4	35	22
%91 -%73	+19	+14	+13	+18	+10	0	+5	+3	+9	+11

\* Entries are percentages of interviewees who consider themselves as not belonging to a particular religion.

Sources: European Community Study 1973; EUROBAROMETER 36, autumn 1991

## QUESTION-WORDING:

Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular religion? (If yes, which one?)

TABLE 5: CHURCH ATTENDANCE 1973 and 1991\*

(% regular attending religious services)

REGULARY CHURCH ATTENDANCE	F	B	NL	D-W	I	L	DK	IR	GB	EC9
1973	22	46	54	23	50	53	6	94	21	30
1991	12	25	36	20	47	31	5	80	25	28
%91 -%73	-9	-21	-18	-3	-3	-18	-1	-14	+4	-2

\* Entries are combined percentages of those attending religious services '*several times a week*' or '*once a week*'. Question has only been asked to those who consider themselves as belonging to a particular religion.

Sources: European Community Study 1973; EUROBAROMETER 36, autumn 1991

## QUESTION-WORDING:

Do you attend religious services several times a week, once a week, a few times a week or never?

**TABLE 6: Equal Rights for Women 1975 and 1987\***  
(percent agree)

POLITICS SHOULD BE LEFT TO MEN		F	B	NL	D	I	L	DK	IR	GB	EC9
AGREE	1973	32	53	41	49	36	58	19	30	27	37
	1991	18	28	16	35	22	34	7	24	14	23
	%91 -%73	-14	-25	-25	-14	-14	-24	-12	-6	-13	-14

\* Entries are percentages of those who 'agree a lot' or 'agree a little'.

Sources: EUROBAROMETER 3, spring 1975 and EUROBAROMETER 27, spring 1987

#### QUESTION-WORDING:


It is sometimes said, that "politics should be left to men". How far would you agree with this? Agree a lot, agree a little, disagree a little, or disagree a lot.

The comments and especially the graphical presentation concentrate on the results of the EC9(-1) average for which an analysis over the entire time period is possible. The figures displayed in the graphs are taken from Tables A2 to A4 in the appendix, which also include the results for the EC10(-1) and EC12(-1) averages.<sup>12</sup> As it was the case in the most recent survey in spring 1990, the peoples of the four small Northern countries were most trusted throughout the entire time period and the level of trust in these peoples was high and stable over time (see Graph 7-1). Between 1976 and 1986, trust in Belgians was somewhat lower than trust in Luxemburgers, Danes or Dutch. It was, however, always higher than trust in the peoples of the four big countries and trust in the Irish, which is displayed in Graph 7-2.

On the one hand, graphs 7-1 to 7-2 provide information for the development of trust from 1976 to 1990 by comparing the bars for each people from left to right. On the other hand, they display the levels of Community-wide (EC9-1) trust in different peoples at each time point, thus indicating the trust rank order.

### Community-wide LEVEL OF TRUST in EC Peoples 1976 to 1990

(EC9(-1) average; means; 0=low; 3=high)




Source: Eurobarometers 6, 14, 25, 33

Graph 7-1

<sup>12</sup> The figures for EC10(-1) and EC12(-1) document the effects of including the judgements of the peoples of the new member states into the results for the EC average, i.e. the Community composition effects.

## Community-wide LEVEL OF TRUST in EC Peoples 1976 to 1990

(EC9(-1) average; means; 0=low; 3=high)




Source: Eurobarometers 6, 14, 25, 33

Graph 7-2


## Community-wide LEVEL OF TRUST in the Peoples of New Member States 1980-1990

(EC9 average; means; 0 = low, 3 = high)







Source: Eurobarometers 14, 26, 33

Graph 7-3



EUROBAROMETER FIGURE 1.5a: SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND THE EC  
(% positive answers by country, trend)





Table/Tableau 26 : NATIONAL OR JOINT COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING ? / Décisions nationales ou en commun avec la Communauté ? (% by country, par pays) (\*)

QUESTION : Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community ? / Il y a des personnes qui pensent que certains domaines d'action politique devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) pendant que d'autres domaines devraient être décidés en commun au sein de la Communauté Européenne. Parmi les domaines d'action politique suivants, quels sont ceux, selon vous, qui devraient être décidés par le gouvernement (NATIONAL) et ceux où les décisions devraient être prises en commun au sein de la Communauté Européenne ?

1st column: % National 2nd column: % EC	B		DK		D				GR		E		F	
					WEST				EAST					
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC
Security and defence	36	59	54	44	42	54	41	55	35	62	47	45	52	44
Environment	32	63	42	57	28	68	27	70	22	77	26	70	29	68
Currency	35	57	39	54	44	51	44	51	46	51	37	52	29	66
Cooperation with Third World	16	74	31	65	20	75	20	75	19	77	16	77	14	80
Health and social welfare	70	24	85	13	62	33	64	32	72	26	43	50	71	26
Education	69	24	76	23	64	31	67	29	78	19	50	43	61	36
Basic rules for broadcasting	49	42	72	23	47	46	51	43	64	32	43	45	47	46
Scientific & tech. research	18	74	25	71	28	66	27	68	21	76	16	73	19	76
Rates of Value Added Tax	29	60	51	43	49	44	50	43	53	40	44	39	23	69
Foreign policy towards non-EC countries	17	71	42	54	27	67	27	67	27	67	19	67	19	72
Participation of workers' reps. on company boards	52	30	76	14	53	37	56	35	66	26	49	35	52	37
Protection of computer-based information on individuals	47	36	76	21	47	45	49	44	55	40	44	37	54	33

1ère colonne: % National 2e colonne: % EC	IRL		I		L		NL		P		UK		EC 12		EC12+	
	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC	NA	EC
Sécurité et défense	65	30	41	56	44	50	27	71	49	41	59	39	47	48	47	49
La protection de l'Environnement	44	52	26	71	43	55	15	83	33	58	31	67	28	68	28	69
La Monnaie	39	54	22	69	46	47	36	58	38	44	63	31	39	54	39	54
Coopération avec les P.V.D.	19	73	9	84	20	74	22	75	16	71	16	79	16	78	16	78
Santé et sécurité sociale	67	28	46	50	69	26	63	34	47	43	68	29	61	35	61	35
Enseignement	69	27	50	46	66	29	64	33	51	38	75	23	61	35	62	34
Règles de base radio/TV/presse	50	39	48	42	54	37	47	48	47	37	63	31	50	42	51	41
Recherche scientifique et technique	17	72	14	79	17	76	15	81	16	69	23	72	20	73	20	73
Taux de TVA	39	53	34	51	63	28	23	70	41	36	61	32	40	49	41	49
Politique étrangère à l'égard des pays non-CE	24	64	13	77	24	63	18	77	21	61	30	64	22	69	23	69
Particip.représ.travailleurs à direction entreprises	43	39	41	41	66	20	58	30	51	32	53	32	50	36	51	35
Protection des informations personnelles mises sur fichier informatique	59	30	37	36	68	21	58	39	50	28	62	30	50	36	50	36

(\*) The difference between "+" and "-" is the percentage of "don't know" (not shown) / La différence entre la somme des "+" et des "-" et 100 représente le pourcentage des "ne sait pas" (pas indiqué).

Note : EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats CE12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats CE12+ l'incluent.


Table/Tableau 63 : FEELING ATTACHED TO A PLACE / Sentiment d'attachement à divers endroits (% , by country, par pays).

QUESTION : People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, to the EC or to Europe as a whole. Please tell me how attached you feel to ...?/Les gens peuvent se sentir attachés à des degrés divers à leur ville/village, à leur région, à leur pays, à la CE ou à l'Europe entière. Veuillez me dire dans quelle mesure vous vous sentez attaché à ...?

Town/Village Ville/Village	B	DK	D		GR	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12	EC12 +
			West	East											
Very attached	49	56	60	60	56	81	73	40	60	59	48	28	75	42	54
Fairly attached	33	28	27	29	33	12	20	41	29	29	33	36	19	38	31
Not very attached	10	11	10	10	8	5	5	10	8	7	11	27	4	14	10
Not at all attached	5	2	1	1	1	2	1	8	1	4	5	8	1	6	4
Don't know	3	3	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	4	1	2	0	1
TOTAL	100	100	99	101	99	100	101	100	99	99	101	100	101	100	100
Region/Région															
Très attaché	41	67	62	62	62	87	71	41	62	50	52	34	69	54	55
Plutôt attaché	40	25	32	31	31	10	23	40	27	36	28	39	22	32	32
Plutôt pas attaché	11	4	4	4	4	2	4	6	7	7	5	19	4	10	7
Pas du tout attaché	5	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	3	3	5	1	3	2
Ne sait pas	3	2	2	2	3	0	1	11	3	3	13	3	3	2	4
TOTAL	100	99	100	99	101	100	100	101	100	99	101	101	99	101	100
(OUR COUNTRY) (NOTRE PAYS)															
Very attached	30	84	47	47	45	86	62	46	72	55	60	40	70	58	53
Fairly attached	44	14	40	40	40	11	27	44	23	34	32	41	24	31	35
Not very attached	17	2	10	10	11	3	6	5	4	7	4	14	4	8	8
Not at all attached	7	0	1	1	2	0	3	3	0	3	2	4	0	2	2
Don't know	2	1	3	3	2	0	3	2	1	1	3	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	100	101	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	101	99	100	100	100
The EC/La CE															
Très attaché	13	9	9	9	8	15	18	12	9	18	16	4	11	6	12
Plutôt attaché	34	33	35	33	27	34	40	42	27	43	39	24	36	29	36
Plutôt pas attaché	28	36	37	38	42	28	26	24	34	17	26	50	36	35	30
Pas du tout attaché	19	19	14	14	15	19	10	14	27	13	12	19	11	27	16
Ne sait pas	7	2	6	7	8	5	5	9	3	10	7	3	7	2	7
TOTAL	101	101	101	101	100	101	101	100	100	100	101	99	100	99	100
Europe as a whole L'Europe entière															
Very attached	11	15	11	11	11	16	18	10	8	19	15	5	8	8	12
Fairly attached	36	46	35	35	31	36	34	40	26	40	37	26	33	29	35
Not very attached	27	27	34	34	36	25	28	24	32	16	25	46	31	32	28
Not at all attached	20	10	13	13	15	20	13	16	28	14	15	20	22	29	18
Don't know	6	2	6	7	8	4	7	11	6	10	8	3	6	3	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	101	101	100	101	100	99	100	100	100	101	100

Note : EC12 results exclude former DDR; EC12+ results include former DDR / Les résultats EC12 excluent l'ex-RDA; les résultats EC12+ l'incluent.

## HOW FREQUENTLY DOES ONE FEEL EUROPEAN ?



EUROBAROMETER FIGURE 1.10

**TABLE 7. Attitudes Towards Foreign Residents in 1970 and 1988\***  
(percent)

TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS		F	B	NL	D-W	I	L	DK	IR	GB	GR	E	P	EC10
AGREE	1970	65	73	66	59	21	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	57 <sup>1</sup>
	1988	45	43	30	48	34	30	36	7	45	19	17	14	33

\* 1970: percentages of interviewees who agree completely or somewhat  
1988: percentages saying 'too many'.

Results within the countries cannot be compared due to different wording of the question.

<sup>1</sup> unweighted average of five countries

Source: European Community Survey 1970 and EUROBAROMETER 30, autumn 1988

#### QUESTION-WORDING:

##### 1970

"In general, I have nothing against foreign workers but there really are too many of them in our country.  
(Agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree completely.

##### 1988

"Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of people of another nationality, living in our country: are they too many, a lot but not too many or not many?

**TABLE 3b. European Unification Threatens National Identity 1989\***  
(percent)

UNIFICATION THREATENS NATIONAL IDENTITY	F	B	NL	D	I	L	DK	IR	GB	GR	E	P	EC12
AGREE	21	18	21	23	14	27	46	28	33	15	19	22	23
INDIFFERENT.	16	21	23	14	12	21	22	17	20	9	14	21	16
DISAGREE	63	64	56	63	76	52	32	55	47	76	67	57	61

\* The scale-points 1 to 3 are combined into 'agree', 4 into 'indifferent' and 5 to 7 into 'disagree'.  
Source: EUROBAROMETER 32, autumn 1989.

#### QUESTION-WORDING:

There is a lot of talk about what the countries in the European Community have in common and what distinguishes them from one another.

Some say (A): *If one day the countries of Europe were truly united, this would mark the end of our national, historic, cultural identity and our national economic interest would be sacrificed.*

Others say (B): *The only way of protecting our national, historic, cultural identities and our national economic interests against challenges posed by the great world powers is for the countries of Europe to become truly united.*

Do you feel closer to the first or the second of these opinions?

Choosing 1 means that you fully agree with A, choosing 7 means that you fully agree with B. The bars in between allow you to say how close you are to the one or the other opinion.

**TABLE 3a. European Unification Threatens National Identity  
1973 and 1978\***

(percentage of valid responses)

UNIFICATION THREATENS NATIONAL IDENTITY		F	B	NL	D	I	L	DK	IR	GB	EC9
AGREE	1973	32	38	52	32	30	30	47	52	64	40
	1978II	24	33	36	32	19	52	69	65	64	36
DISAGREE	1973	68	62	48	68	70	70	53	48	36	60
	1978II	76	67	64	68	81	48	31	35	36	64

\* Entries for 1973 and 1978 combines those who 'agree a lot (completely)' and 'agree a little (to some extent)' into 'agree', those who 'disagree a little (to some extent)' or 'disagree a lot (completely)' into 'disagree'.

Sources: European Community Study 1973; EUROBAROMETER 10, spring 1978

#### QUESTION-WORDING:



##### ECS73



Some people say that in a united Europe, the various nations might lose their culture and their individuality. Do you agree or disagree with this view? a lot or a little?



##### EB10

Here are some things that are sometimes said about the membership of <country> in the European Community (the Common Market). Could you tell me, in each case, if you personally agree completely, agree to some extent, disagree to some extent or disagree completely with the statement?



In the European Community (the Common Market), a country like ours runs a risk of losing its own culture and individuality.







p11 + p12



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
# IMAGES OF EUROPE

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
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**IMAGES OF EUROPE**

**by Soledad Garcia**



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SYMPOSIUM  
MINOS BEACH HOTEL, CRETE  
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The Royal Institute of International Affairs  
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# **IMAGES OF EUROPE**

Soledad Garcia

## **Introduction**

Momentous changes are occurring in contemporary Europe, prompting a new European consciousness among citizens and particularly within elites. The concept of a new Europe is, however, seen as a threat by some, burdened as they are with a history of national defensiveness, and with the myths as well as the realities of economic and cultural differences. Thus, whenever the prospect of a community of European citizens comes under discussion, people tend to lay emphasis on distinctive national and regional traditions. Other European divisions, of a more abstract nature, such as the distinctions established between Northern Europe and Southern Europe, are also frequently referred to. Contrasts of this kind are often constructed on the basis of geography, religious affiliation or generalisations about patterns of behaviour, identified as cultures. How these various cultures are going to be integrated in a common European culture, or shall we say civilisation, and whether it is possible, or even desirable, to undertake this, and under what conditions, are questions to be confronted in the 1990s. Indeed the reawakening of nationalistic fervour in many corners of the sub-continent, with a strong emphasis on cultural or ethnic identities and the pursuit of cultural rights, proves how important it is to meet the challenge.

The objective of this introduction is to present themes which put the debate into the context of certain very important issues relating to both historical and current European images and cultures. I am aware of the diversity and complexity of the questions that are going to emerge from the particular cultural perspective that each one of us has. In fact, one of the aims of this symposium is to take the opportunity to build bridges between conceptualisations about cultures and societies, however distant they may appear. Therefore, our special concern is the extent to which the barriers between European societies that have created mental maps are fading away.

There are arguments in Western Europe both supporting and challenging the idea of building up a European political community with compatible values and a shared identity, a

Europe capable of creating a sense of community among its citizens. First, this desired sense of community is perhaps becoming too strongly identified with the European Community, so that non-member countries tend to feel that they are somehow outside Europe. Second, these arguments face questions such as, Is there a common ground in respect of identity, citizenship and cultural boundaries ? And it poses the question of who "we" are and who "we" want to be. Are we becoming more homogeneous in respect of social and cultural values and beliefs ? Or are we aiming at Voltaire's "grande famille réunie après ses différences" ? To what extent are democratic institutions, civil societies and citizenship important in building up a sense of identity and developing loyalty to political communities ? What difference would it make to live in Europe for a person born elsewhere ? Can we envisage there ever being a European notion of cultural goals ? Or is it more realistic to work for a common political culture while acknowledging national and local traditions of art and literature as well as historiography and customs ? In what respect are all these questions relevant to decision-making bodies ? For example, on what aspects of citizens' rights should the European Parliament be concentrating as a democratic representative body ? In trying to answer these questions, we must be careful, first to distinguish between reality and rhetoric, and then to bring both into the discussion. For an analysis of reality provides us with tools to establish who and where we are, while an examination of the existing rhetoric, and of possible alternatives, can help us to design who "we" as Europeans want to be.

No doubt many of these questions are going to be debated in a variety of forums throughout the 1990s. In the majority of the current discussions, the focus of the debate is on the need to integrate Eastern Europe into the new Europe, thereby tackling the concept of the widening of the European Community. However, little attention is given to a distinction that crosses Eastern and Western Europe, and that European analysts often take for granted: namely, the North/South distinction based on the unevenness of modern development as well as on traditional divides of religious and secular kind. This distinction is, nevertheless, maintained and reinforced by the way in which North Europeans see their Southern neighbours and, to some extent, vice versa, whether located in the East or in the West of Europe. In the case of Central-East European countries, there is a clear sympathy within Western Europe for developing paths

of integration to countries such as Poland or even Hungary, but Bulgaria is seldom mentioned. Are the Bulgarians less European ? and if so why ? Are the Northern elites aware of keeping a historical North/South distinction based on different paths and speeds of modernisation and different belief systems ? In contemporary Western Europe the South European countries are often patronised, and not fully trusted. Old images of Southern imperial religious and secular domination have been replaced by such derogatory labels as "basket cases", referring to poor economic performance. This is partly because these countries have joined the EC recently as the poor relatives, but not solely for this reason. Whether estrangement comes from confrontation, economic performance, traditions or customs, elements of convergence and divergence between North and South ought to be examined. Attention ought to be given to relevant mythical constructions in the light of current knowledge of social, economic and political changes that have occurred in Europe (mainly Western Europe). It is important, then, to gauge whether these changes discredit or justify the survival of old myths. That is, whether values, ways of life and social structures have become more alike in Europe. The images of North/South polarities such as modern/backward and Protestant/Catholic need to be modified after examining the heterogeneous realities that exist within each area and within countries. Thus often a North/South divide appears within nation- states in which uneven development has also occurred. These processes are creating a new mapping of Europe in which old stereotypes can hardly survive. For example, today Barcelona appears to be a much more modern city than Liverpool, and the strongest Catholic tradition and observance is found in Ireland and Poland rather than in Italy. Examples like these could encourage us to think of the North/South divide not so much in geographical terms as in economic and social terms, or it could be that the distinction is no longer appropriate.

We aim to integrate these questions into a wider analysis by including different perspectives and different approaches to the question of cultural unity versus cultural diversity in Europe. Ideas such as "European consciousness" and "convergence and diversity" will be explored, alongside concepts such as "social cohesion", "cultural citizenship" and "national identities". This ambitious enterprise requires a substantive empirical knowledge as well as theoretical penetration, to which the symposium will contribute a great deal. Therefore, the

intention in this introduction is to focus the debate rather than to anticipate answers. For this reason, I have made no attempt at definition of terms; greater clarity will be achieved during the course of our discussions. I have, however, thrown some of my own ideas into the melting-pot, since this seemed to me potentially more useful than maintaining a distant neutrality.

The introduction falls into five sections: "European traditions: myths and realities"; "National identities and European consciousness"; "New frontiers of citizenship" "cultural citizenship and cultural linkages"; and "Northern/Southern Europe: convergence or diversity ?"

### **European traditions: myths and realities**

Traditions are often invented, and the construction and re-creation of myths is part of the making of a collective consciousness. Europe has a long history of changing traditions and thus has modified its identity. To enter into a discussion of which are the core European traditions risks being guilty of selectivity, since traditions have themselves exercised choice in selecting information and myths from the past to be reformulated through images. We usually select as decisive influences in Europe: Hellenism, with the search for discipline, rationality, perfection, beauty and justice; Roman law and institutions, which created "a model of organised and stable power"; and Christianity (with elements of the Judaic tradition), which has contributed so powerfully to the universalisation of spiritual, moral and human principles as well as deeds. The Renaissance unveiled a secularisation process in which not only the Hellenistic and classical values were revived but also new important philosophical questions concerning the place of man in the world and his complex relation to God were introduced by means of humanist thought. Other contributions, such as cartography and chorography, provided alternative ways of creating new images of Europe, as well as giving tools for self-location and for expanding knowledge about other Europeans. As John Hale points out, a European awareness developed from them as well as from history and myth. In the following century, with the scientific revolution, a clearer separation took place between science and theology, while the Enlightenment provided a movement of thought with more widespread debates concerning knowledge, reason and liberty and the establishment of the social contract. The first attacks on the inhumanity of Europe's

administration of law can be traced within the humanitarian tradition as part of the Enlightenment movement. Thus humanism and the Romantic movement of the 19th Century were to become part of European civilisation. Ideologies were later converted into important social movements. Some of these movements, notably, liberalism, fascism and socialism, have left a distinctive stamp on contemporary Europe.

In European mythology, the myth of the birth of **Europa**, in which Zeus turns himself into a bull, and takes **Europa** by force from Asia Minor to Crete, where she becomes the queen of the Minos dynasty, has been interpreted as a symbol of a Europe that projects beyond itself, discovers and colonises<sup>1</sup>. Ulysses' journeys have similar symbolic meaning and he, as the prototype European, is portrayed as adventurous, faithful to his kindred and temperate in conduct as well as capable of taming nature by means of technology. His character is more appealing to some cultivated minds, who compare him favourably with the power seeking Roman who establishes hegemony through well-organised bureaucracies<sup>2</sup>. Many Europeans today like to cherish, as the Greeks did, a commitment to "a more embracing human community", <sup>3</sup> while others seek hegemony in the world.

As Europeans, we also inherited from Greek philosophy the dilemma of choosing between the practice of moral life and civic virtue within our political communities and a more extensive loyalty to humanity. This moral concern, reinforced by the Christian tradition, forged for centuries the spirit of Europe with a certain social glue of community consciousness (communion). The Christian faith inspired Erasmus to state that "place, local distance, separates the persons of men but not their minds"<sup>4</sup>. However, faith has not solved the dilemma between loyalty to fellow citizens and loyalty to mankind, a dilemma that continues to be important to the political experience of modern states and their international relations<sup>5</sup>. In Western Europe this dilemma has become overshadowed with the rise of nationalism since the French Revolution's challenge to the idea of the world community<sup>6</sup>. Today it is present in a new form in the concern about establishing the external and internal frontiers in which European citizenship will prevail. This is a very thorny issue, in which the European Community is playing a central role in defining European citizenship. On the one hand, the EC has to make the status of citizenship meaningful

for those to whom it has already made commitments, providing the economic and political tools for participation in the European political community. On the other hand, by setting up barriers of inclusion it is turning the non-EC members into second-class citizens in Europe. Moreover, this internal preoccupation within Europe overshadows a more general an utopian concern for universal citizenship.

It can be argued that this reorientation of an old dilemma into a question of social and geographical "inclusion" and "exclusion" is not new. In fact it can be associated with the increasing importance given to rationality and the universality of science after the Renaissance in which a division between science and ethics took place. Rationalisation meant seeing the "other" as excluded from humanity and regarding other cultures as illiterate and not really culture, thereby imprinting on non-European societies images of backwardness and estrangements. The strength of these images became a reality in 19th century international relations as a distinction was made between "the civilized nations" (Christian, European, white) and the uncivilized (the exception was Japan, its population becoming "honorary Europeans")<sup>7</sup>. In some cultural centres of Europe, the Enlightenment also reinforced the importance of cosmopolitan and rational thinking among the elites while political events were encouraging the development of patriotism among the lower ranks of the social structure. Contrary to the assertions of universalistic philosophies, in modern times workers of European nations have fought under the flags of their countries, betraying hopes of transnational solidarity in the labour movement. In today's Europe we are witnessing the emergence of new transnational social movements, such as the peace or green movements, which, although they have little impact on national politics, are impinging values on quality of life, liberty and human dignity. In the field of moral philosophy there is a continuing debate on the most appropriate path to reconcile the tension between liberty and equality. One of the main concerns of these groups is that a certain level of consensus about social justice is required within Europe in order to avoid marginalising segments of the population, whether on the basis of class or for cultural reasons.

However, there are certain traditions of which Europeans are justly proud: the progress achieved in the fields of science, civil, political and social rights, autonomy of cities and

parliamentary democracy, civil society and political culture. Most of these principles, achievements and movements have been assimilated and developed in other parts of the world, which does not mean that they are universal, but it makes the analysis of European civic and political culture from outside more relevant if we want to identify what is peculiarly European.

It was in Europe that civil societies developed, through the vehicle of bourgeois culture, carrying the values of privacy and pluralism and organising society around the market and social class. The European liberal and democratic tradition cannot be dissociated from the crucial role cities have had in the progress of European civilisation. First the Greco-Roman city-states were the locus of the philosophical thinking and institutional organisation (mainly the law and bureaucracy) which constitutes a legacy and a sign of identity. Later on, autonomous cities became a feature of the European landscape during the twelfth century, from the Baltic to the Iberian Peninsula, although they varied in size. Rome, and Cicero in particular, provided the fifteenth century with a political model of the kind usually associated with "civic humanism". However, with the process of national integration and state administrations developing from the 17th century onwards in Europe, most cities lost their autonomy and civic pride. Then, in modern times urban civic life underwent severe strain in those cities which experienced the industrial revolution and; and now, in today's world, it has been severely threatened by unemployment and housing deterioration. However, European cities are also demonstrating a strong revitalising capacity. Thus civic pride can be found again in many cities like Glasgow after severe industrial decline.

The development of civil societies as a common trait in Europe has to be considered in the context of the different relations between state and society within nations. Whereas in France the state has been strong and has conferred on itself the role of citizens' guardian against the power of the Church and the *ancien régime*, the role of the British state has been more discreet and in Italy the state's weakness has acted as an architectural frame within which civil society has built consensus over important matters. Moreover, different models of welfare states have emerged in this century, not all equally committed to social citizenship and individual autonomy. From the more conservative and corporatist Austrian model to the Scandinavian social democratic example, with the French model, the German "social partnership" model and the British case falling in

between. The term conservative is here used to mean pattern moulded by the Church and privileged status groups. A welfare model shaped by these forces often means that family benefits encourage motherhood, since family services are underdeveloped while other services are not aiming at full participation of all citizens in the level of rights enjoyed by the better off. On the contrary, there is an emphasis on keeping status differences, and the recipient of benefits can easily suffer from stigma (specially those who received unemployment benefits). As a contrasting example, the Scandinavian model is labelled 'social democratic', since social democracy was the dominant force behind social reform<sup>8</sup>.

Despite differences, the ideal and realisation of a welfare society which adopted a universalisation of civic, political and social rights may still be counted as one of the identifying features of Europe when compared with the rest of the world (although the US, Australia and Canada have developed welfare systems of a more liberal type, that is with less commitment to social equality). No doubt the principles of a welfare society have implied a dialectic between the state organisation and civil societies. Even if models have varied following previous social traditions, they have forged a process of convergence between European societies by designing levels of quality of life and human dignity. However, it remains very difficult to define a model of "European society" into which all national societies in Europe fit while none outside do. Debates continue to take place throughout Europe, both political and academic, on how far the state should enter the field of civil society. One of the main aspects discussed in relation to this point is the extent to which welfare citizenship ought to be implemented as a policy of social inclusion, and whether such a policy would have negative effects in business circles and more specifically on the desired levels of economic efficiency.

However, it is this capacity for dialogue, both within societies and between societies with different cultural perspectives, this "the cross-fertilisation between diversity, opposites, competing forces, complementarities, ... which lies at the heart of the European cultural identity, perhaps more than any of its elements or phases"<sup>9</sup>. However, differences in language and religion within a territory with very high social density have been in the background of major power conflicts. Imperial aspirations within the sub-continent failed throughout history, as did any attempts at

homogenising cultures. European history has been a "dialectic of affection and rejection" between peoples and nations, a dialectic that involves combining "closeness and distance" among the members of the different European cultural families<sup>10</sup>. In more recent times efforts to offset those differences have involved what Kant already envisaged as a greater "unanimity in principle" and a "mutual understanding of the conditions of peace even in view of these differences".

### **National identities and European consciousness**

Identities are the product of collective social fabrication over time. They are forged from traditions and aspirations as well as from exchange and reciprocity. The wider the definitions, the more appropriate it is to explain the differences in expression at the local, regional, nation-state and European levels as well as at the individual level (i.e. male/female). Current debates on European and national identities seem to convey two main lines of thought. The first emphasises  
✕ the strength of national identities as opposed to a European identity; the second stresses the  
✕ unifying processes taking place in modern industrial societies. These two strands do not necessarily conflict, but rather run parallel.

According to the first line of thought, national identities have developed within "multinational states". The concept of nation is far from simple. Its almost sacred character can be considered to derive from religion<sup>11</sup>. However, while in Western Europe it is rooted in "culturally defined communities", with emphasis on law, association and territoriality, in Eastern Europe it has generally been based on "ethnic" conceptions, with emphasis on custom and community of birth.

Thus in Western Europe the symbolic value of modernity attached to the nation is associated with the development of states and their complex and effective administrations which helped national integration (often by coercion). The introduction of citizenship, and the pursuit of programmes of political socialisation, provide a reason why nation-states have remained prevalent<sup>12</sup>. Within them, people share **continuity** and **memories** as well as a common **destiny**, which has often involved a binding political process by which one ethno-nation has become hegemonic vis-à-vis the rest. Thus, the Castilians were hegemonic in Spain and the English in

Britain. However, memories and traditions of a more local nature have continued to exist in Western Europe alongside these national identities, the re-sited homogenisation proving to be compatible with these nation-state identities.

In more recent times there has been a political will to allow multinational cultural expression in many Western societies (Britain and more recently Spain are clear examples), partly because this was the way to establish state legitimacy and political consensus. A similar process may be required at the level of the wider Europe, where "our" common destiny as Europeans can be accepted at a very general and abstract level, but where our memories will remain particular and locally based for the majority of the population<sup>13</sup>. Thus the farther away we move from the immediate community the more loose and less organic will be the identity. This means, for example, that even if a European civilisation is acknowledged, cultural and creative activity will continue to have a distinctive national or local stamp, for no matter how cosmopolitan artists may be, their identity is nationally bounded.

In speculating about what kind of common European identity is going to come to the fore and how this is going to be conveyed to the people, we must further ask ourselves, first, what manner of European political community do we envisage; and second, how far-reaching will this community be, a question that, although very important, is beyond the scope of this paper. In addressing the first question, it is important to distinguish between the impact of learned doctrines and invented traditions, and the impact of popular consciousness: that is, the existing social behaviour of everyday life, which includes local and national customs, civic and meritocratic presuppositions. Today's national peculiarities are a product of both doctrine and custom. We could modify nationally designed doctrines and manufacture new traditions by projecting them through formal education, but what about changing values and customs? If everyday life experience (custom) can be seen partly as the result of the interaction of group sentiment and environment, then the variety of climatic, geographical features and belief systems that have forged a plurality of customs and sentiments from North to South and East to West, will become equally substantial on the European map. Thus, it is argued not only that customs and local ways of life could not easily be changed, but also that it would not be desirable to attempt to do so.

In questioning this line of interpretation it is possible to argue that as the urban European environment has become more socially homogeneous it has also become better adapted to shaping custom to modern urbanisation processes. Around 75% of Europeans live in cities that barely differ between Northern and Southern countries, although some contrasting examples remain: for example, the urban population varies from 97% of total population in Belgium, to 60% in Finland and Greece, and 33% in Portugal. Also, in Western Europe, traditional customs are becoming more and more ritualised, and are being given only a limited space in the calendar as the special occasions when the collective consciousness can rejuvenate itself in popular festivals. It is important, however, that this form of regeneration should not be allowed to disappear, for this particular civil religion can exist in harmony with more global urban behaviour and relatively homogeneous consumption patterns. Moreover, the development of local civic pride, which incidentally is less visible today in countries like England where early urbanisation and economic and political centralism have undermined local differentiation, can be directed in such a way that local attachments need not conflict with the development of a European consciousness and identity. A shared identity, however, also involves sharing loyalties with different political communities. As we have seen historically in Western Europe, the concept of identity and sense of belonging to a political community have increasingly referred to social relations based on association, some of which have been essential in the construction of democratic identities, while relations based on kinship or neighbourhood have diminished in their capability to structure modern industrial societies. In this sense, the concept of political community is closer to that of civic society than to an ethnic. Thus modern national consciousness in Europe often involves fragmented collective consciousness as well as fragmented societies.

The concept of political community is a vehicle for the discussion of the important issue of identity in its different manifestations. A political community involves a shared understanding of identities and loyalty to the specific institutional arrangements on which that community relies. "A population may be said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions when it habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of their authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expectations"<sup>14</sup>. Membership of a political community implies duties,

but it also offers rights such as protection from external threat. Concepts such as protection and danger are thus engrained within the construction of sense of a belonging. One of the ways a society defines itself is by stressing what is dangerous for its survival. Mary Douglas has pointed out the effective homogenising process involved in the use of agreed concepts of danger which is reinforced by using the word risk (significant danger). Not only does the vocabulary of what is dangerous become unified but it is also more extensively used in decision-making processes.

The concept of risk also modifies custom as "the signs say that certain kinds of behaviour are very dangerous. That means that the community has reached some consensus in condemning the behaviour"<sup>15</sup>. Thus, apart from the traditional elements that constitute collective identities, such as religion, education, literature, arts and local myths, newly invented national mythologies, technological advances and new definitions of security have created qualitative changes over time. For example, technology or security can modify people's ascription to a wider cultural area by changing their patterns of thinking and acting.

It can be argued that the increasing consensus on what is considered dangerous in Western Europe (terrorism, pollution, drugs consumption, urban crime, on one side, and Islamic fundamentalism, uncontrolled immigration from certain parts of the world, on the other), constitutes a substantial common ground for sharing perceptions of what we need to be protected from, not only as individuals but also as Europeans. If that is the case, and the tendency spreads towards Central and some Eastern parts of Europe, there will be reason to believe that we are building a cultural element that is qualitatively different from any in the past, when the concept of danger also involved neighbours within the sub-continent. However, whether this view is correct or even politically desirable is a question for discussion. At present, an increasing proportion of West Europeans appear to be more conscious of sharing common environmental risks (although different levels of consciousness exist between countries and within them between people) as well as having a growing concern (in some cases a negative feeling) towards the "other" (i.e. a non-European, non-white possible migrant).

By emphasising the difficulties in building up a European identity, some authors have based their argument on the power of traditions and symbols which cannot be extended to other

localities and/or countries. They maintain that the unifying process is and will be slow, and that mental maps will not fade easily. On the contrary, new diversification can take place in Western Europe, where the "nation-state" has already given part of its sovereignty to the European Community, where transnational corporations have increased weight in the functioning of the economy, and where nations within the existing states are envisaging a future self-determination under the umbrella of the European Community. The manifesto of the Scottish Nationalist Party for the 1992 general election in Britain is a clear example of this kind of argument. The principle of subsidiarity is helping to encourage both views among EC members, while at the same time it is, perhaps, creating false expectations for the new political communities emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, others have voiced a less radical view on the matter, arguing that of all disputes and claims of sovereign statehood the new Europe can arrange choices about allocation of resources at different levels of political authority<sup>16</sup>. No doubt, the idea of concentric identities is extremely appealing, since it predicts an optimistic outcome in which people could share loyalties to different political communities, starting from the most immediate to the most distant European Community. This idea will in any case challenge the enforcement of homogenising policies and indoctrination of the kind used in the past to legitimise the nation-state.

We now come to the second line of thought, which stresses the unifying processes taking place in modern industrial societies. These societies have generated a peculiar relationship between culture and social structure. Today's greater social complexity, the result in part of a mobile occupational structure, requires a standardised culture and a near-universalisation of literacy<sup>17</sup>. The increasing urbanisation and technological expansion applied to the transport and communication systems have facilitated the process, while education and, more recently the media, have had a unifying effect in the shaping of formalised cultures. To be part of these cultures, men, and to a less extent women, have to become skilled and/or educated in order to be employable or to have a role in society. These elements have helped the development of modern nationalism and have reinforced political communities within Europe, although at a different speed in each case. England became a model of industrial society, and other models followed behind. National

integration may not have been totally successful in some European countries, and has resulted in open social and political conflict at different times (Britain, Germany, Spain) but it is still less problematic in societies in which formal national institutions have acquired legitimacy and where the identity of the citizen, as a member of a political community, could develop within a democratic political arena. Thus, civic liberties and freedom to form economic societies allowed civil society to play an important part in the consolidation of political communities. The Spanish case is a recent example, which incidentally has to be treated with great caution if it is to be used as a model for transitional political communities in Central and Eastern Europe, since organised economic interest of civil society and the market were operating throughout the dictatorship.

In modern times, the nationalism of post French Revolution France has been less concerned with community identity - **natio** (people) - than with "fostering people's identification with a role which demanded a high degree of personal commitment" - **civitas** (organised political association). According to this view, "Nationalism is a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that has been filtered through historiography and spreads only via the channels of modern mass communication"<sup>18</sup>. Thus "the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights". Here **ethnos** is replaced by **demos**. The difference between "nation" and "politically organised people" has been fading since the middle of the 18th century, first in the northwest of Europe and later in some Central and Southern countries. It has been argued that, since then, constitutional democracy has lent expression to a formal consensus and that the formality of democracy has clearly contributed to its endurance in Western Europe<sup>19</sup>. On the other hand, in some parts of Eastern Europe people do not have models of political organisation, the institutional architecture is formed by ethnic or religious movements, and they turn to communal and religious forms of solidarity. If this line of argument holds, an imaginative and wider construction of European citizenship will be highly influential in providing the legal underpinning to the development not only of a European identity based on social welfare and political stability, but also of a civic and political democratic culture.

## New frontiers of citizenship

The great complexity of the concept, principles and realities of citizenship is highlighted in the present debates in academic and political circles in Europe. Which rights and duties are incorporated in the principle and how are they going to evolve ? To what extent is citizenship going to be universalised in Europe and to what extent are people going to be excluded ? That is, where are the frontiers going to be drawn ? In the European context there are old and new frontiers of citizenship. These frontiers are associated with (a) the "retrenchment" of welfare policies and the effects of this on the social structures of the more advanced societies of Western Europe; (b) the difficulty of developing social citizenship in the less economically advanced societies of the South; (c) the division between European Community members and non-members, which will increase if the "deepening" of the Community takes place (Fortress Europe); and (d) frontiers within Central and East European countries erected on the basis of ethnicity. In (a) and (b), frontiers are of a social kind, although cultural frontiers exist to a lesser degree between the majority of the population and cultural minorities; in (c), social and political frontiers are evident; and, in (d), civic, social and cultural frontiers can easily explode in violent conflict, as recently witnessed in Yugoslavia and in some ex-Soviet republics.

In Western Europe - where the concept of citizenship evolved historically from the city to the nation-state, widening the circles of social inclusion - there are signs of a reversal of this process. The high concentration of population in large cities, combined with increasing social inequalities experienced by immigrants and their descendants concentrated in areas with high levels of unemployment and relatively poor housing conditions, is a cause of considerable anxiety in certain sectors of the host societies. There are already clear signs of xenophobic behaviour, leading to social and racial tensions (some French and German cities are cases in point). Moreover, shortages of housing, services and infrastructure in the lowest rung of the social structure are putting the issue of entitlements back on the agenda. Given that, despite immigration regulations and external border controls, larger numbers of immigrants are likely to arrive both from North Africa and from Eastern Europe to work in informal labour markets, aggravating housing needs and reinforcing social marginality, problems of governability can be expected to

arise in some cities. Will local governments in these cities have the political muscle and the economic resources to solve the problems of social integration and social order? Will the principle of subsidiarity be extended to city level so as to keep urban racial conflict a local issue? Or will these problems pervade national politics, as recent debates on migration in French politics are suggesting?

There are several definitions and ways of understanding citizenship, but a basic distinction can be made between its formal and its substantive meanings. Formally, citizenship is associated with membership of a political community (state), that is with "nationality"; substantively, it relates to the possession of specific rights and the obligation to comply with certain duties within the state or political community<sup>20</sup>. Decisions about who becomes a citizen are taken by the state itself, but the quality of citizenship (rights and duties) is often the result of conflict and negotiation between the social and political structural forces in a country. In Western Europe, decisions on both formal and substantive citizenship within the European Community have been widened after Maastricht. Thus the introduction of citizenship of the Union in the treaty gives to those naturalised in any of the member states the following rights: to move and reside freely within the territory of the Community; to vote and be eligible in local and European Parliament elections, to formulate a petition to the European Parliament; and to apply to a Union Ombudsman. Moreover, other social and economic rights (for all but the UK) and cultural rights will be introduced.

Within the EC countries the imminent abolition of internal frontiers has encouraged states to strengthen external controls; in the near future a common and more coordinated policy is expected to develop to regulate migration, although some problems may arise from the fact that the definition of who is a citizen varies according to the immigration laws of each country since "each sovereign state has the right to regulate the entrance of foreign citizens"<sup>21</sup>. At present there are several statuses for immigrants in EC countries.

Tomas Hammer has differentiated between: (a) foreigners (temporary workers, political refugees), (b) denizens and (c) citizens. At the end of the 1980s there were about 13 million non-citizens in Western Europe (without the UK), of which 60% were denizens: that is, permanent

residents without full citizenship. Denizens enjoy civic and social rights but do not have political rights, except in a few cases (e.g. the right to vote at local and regional elections in Sweden). Thus there is a category of European residents who, although they pay taxes, benefit from welfare services and can form associations, cannot participate in political decisions. This group could acquire the right to participate in local elections under the Maastricht treaty only if its members become naturalised in the host country, which is a discriminatory decision, forced by some EC members in view of the difficulty of naturalisation in countries such as Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. In Germany, for example, people considered ethnic Germans from Eastern countries, whose parents may have left Germany centuries ago, can easily become citizens, whereas for a person of Turkish descent, born and bred in the country, it is virtually impossible.

But the fact that citizenship, unlike cultural values, does not travel with people, means that in order to have citizens' rights immigrants have to find legal ways to participate in social and economic institutions. However, this very seldom means naturalisation. Indeed naturalisation of foreigners has been a factor of little significance in Western Europe, from under 1% in Germany to over 5% in Sweden (the social democratic government liberalised citizen' laws in the 1970s)<sup>22</sup>. An important aspect of naturalisation is the associated meaning of membership of a nation, which involves sharing a language, a sense of history, cultural values and often but not always religion. This involves considerable difficulties for first-generation migrants, difficulties which may linger on to some degree in the second and third generations.

From the perspective of the host states, naturalisation is seen as a matter of national identity and national security, and therefore the procedures to become a citizen have been made difficult and unattractive. On the other hand, a large proportion of these long-term residents have shown themselves to be very reluctant to give up their previous citizenship (as is demanded of them) and to become naturalised - thereby indicating their hesitation to lose their citizenship, national identity and original "social and economic ligatures" (which could mean inheritance of property). Migrants often dream of returning to their countries of origin. This attitude was reported among Southern Europeans (including Yugoslavs) and Turks in Germany as well as many North Africans in France. In contrast, up to 1989, East Europeans in Western Europe have been more

eager to change nationality in order to acquire citizens' rights. In this case there was neither a plan to return nor a dramatic difference in cultural values. On the contrary, a common history, similar religious backgrounds and closer identity favoured a wish to acquire citizenship on the part of the immigrants and prompted acceptance on the part of the host society (Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovaks). The British case is again an exception, given that most immigrants were already British subjects and eligible as such to citizenship rights. Moreover, the UK allows double formal citizenship. However, recent trends have been to restrict immigration considerably and to make British citizenship more difficult. These policies may facilitate the assimilation of those who are already citizens, since the fear of a further influx of migrants has been assuaged.

In Europe, nation-building took place without the presence of a large body of immigrants from external ethnic and religious communities, as was the case in the US, and therefore the signs of identity which form cultural citizenship are less pluralistic. Only a handful of European cities became the sort of cultural mosaic that marked out North American industrial cities at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus Europeans have created a self-image during modern times, which is increasingly coming into conflict with reality, of being Christian and white, making naturalisation for non-whites or Muslims, for example, very difficult. As noted earlier, a process of homogenisation through education facilitated the formation of more "homogeneous" societies within each nation-state; thus a fear of more heterogeneous citizenship remains. Indeed, a sense of political citizenship is very feeble among resident immigrants in Europe today (with the exception of the UK). If we maintain that citizenship entails legal membership of a political community based on universal suffrage, all those living in Europe who cannot participate in political decision-making cannot be considered citizens. The number of non-citizens or denizens in Europe is bound to increase, not only in the North but also in Southern countries and there is a danger that many of them will become alienated and disaffected. Without the political voice of resident immigrants, any definition of European citizenship will be ethnocentric and not only will perpetuate the barriers to assimilation, but will also challenge one of Western Europe's most important identifying features - representative democracy.

Thus, there are several important issues to be considered within the general theme of citizenship, such as civic and political rights as well as the levels of protection the state offers to the population at different moments in time - that is, social rights. However, other aspects, such as obligations from the individual to society, may be included. It is becoming clear from the current debates on citizenship that more attention ought to be paid to the way civic, political and social rights are defined by the state's laws and the extent to which the translation of these rights in the real world affects people's lives and changes the relation between citizens and the state's institutions. It will also be crucial to face the issues of citizenship from a cultural perspective. Assuming European cultural heterogeneity (whether based on religion or ethnicity) will involve changing images of cultural expression and challenging the traditional views of European civilisation - or would a muslim European be a contradiction in terms ? Are the fault-lines - North/South- (or for that matter East/West) in Europe so deep that citizenship must be limited at European level to human and civic rights, while social rights (and to a large extent political) rights remain largely defined within the state ? Do the fault-lines reflect and sustain cultural diversity?

### **Cultural citizenship and cultural linkages**

Cultural citizenship is a loose concept which lacks an agreed meaning in Europe. We can venture the following initial definition: a meaningful set of rights which ought to enable the development of more flexible and pluralistic ways of expression and communication circuits. If we accept pluriformity and polycentrism as hallmarks of European civilisation, the question of how to make communicative pluralism feasible, and which formal and informal networks are most likely to promote the participation of citizens in the European political and social community, will have to be addressed.

One of the arguments stressed in Western Europe today is the existence of a democratic deficit, which is likely to increase with the competing systems of communication networks with Eastern Europe. The mystification of the market in these countries as a new integrating system can create very dramatic unevenness between multinational corporations and the precarious technology and organisational capabilities of newcomers into the economic and media-cultural

arena. As a result, dangers can be envisaged for the individual citizen or for minority cultures in the future. First, the European citizen can become a mere consumer or a passive client of EC national and local administrative bodies, with little projection of his own creations. Second, cultural minorities may be left without a voice in the new Europe. One example of the unequal market conditions is that cultural productions tend to be more costly for minority cultures, since they need to be translated into a majority language in order to reach a wide audience. Popular voices from these communities can easily be silenced by such obstacles as well as by the implicit arrogance of the unidirectional flow of information. It is this kind of analysis, which emphasises the preservation of cultural diversity, that has prompted the call for a European Cultural Charter, in addition to the Social Charter,<sup>23</sup>. The aims of a Cultural Charter would be to arrange a legal order through a system of quotas to protect minority cultures, and to encourage a well-balanced network of European cultural relations, which would mellow the increasingly radical character of cultural conflicts, especially in socially unstable parts of Europe. This kind of thinking is in line with that of institutions such as Unesco and the Council of Europe.

The increasing concern for a kind of cultural citizenship has been paralleled by mounting fervour for regional consciousness and the strengthening of regional ties in order to reinforce European unity and stability. The argument in this case is that in the face of the centrifugal ethnic forces operating in Eastern Europe today under the diverse nationalistic flags, which could threaten the construction of civic democratic institutions, the regional dimension can provide a new means of integration parallel to that of the national and supranational organisations. Thus the regional level of integration is functional to the aspirations for more autonomy and can appease aspirations for independence. Regional consciousness ought not to be seen as a step back into a pathological expression of national consciousness but, on the contrary, as a move forward to a more dynamic form of economic and cultural integration.

Both traditional and new cultural flows within Europe, based on cooperation in education, the arts and the media, are being developed. Existing channels of cultural communication, such as the Nordic Council, are being formalised; and new initiatives, such as "communication strategies in marketing", are reinforcing regional identities and expressing people's interests as

well as presenting their distinctiveness to the world. A regions's cultural heritage in the arts and architecture is combined with prospective modernising images in order to attract economic investment as well as tourism. The extent to which the European Community's regional policies are contributing to reinforce the increasing regional networks may be considerable. Indirectly, the goal of subsidiarity can be very effective in encouraging regional alliances. However, regional identity can also act to reinforce linguistic barriers to interaction. These barriers cannot always be easily crossed merely by means of such informal links as tourism and short student visits. Both formal and informal links will be aided by the increasing impact of transnational mass communication, but are we again going to face a double standard, in which cosmopolitanism spreads within the elites and some sectors of the middle classes while localist fervour permeates the other layers of societies ?

#### **Northern Europe/ Southern Europe: convergence or diversity ?**

The cultural edifice built by the Reformation in Northern Europe supporting industrial capitalist expansion was paralleled in the South by tensions between the sacred and the secular, the liberal progressive forces and the backward-looking ruling classes. A resulting uneven industrial development, in which much of the Southern area was left behind, fostered an image among Northerners of Southerners as the "other" Europeans. In the 18th, but mainly in the 19th, century Latins and Southerners, Catholic and Greek Orthodox alike, were seen as inferior to Anglo-Saxons by reputable thinkers in both Germany and Britain. Their "inferiority" was also part of the conventional wisdom among the military and in elite groups. In the 20th century, this image was reinforced by events as well as by the power of the imaginary. Far from coming to an end, confrontation between clerical and anti-clerical forces exploded on occasion with extreme virulence (as in the Spanish civil war). However, during brief periods, liberal and reformist forces managed to introduce a degree of modernization while the local bourgeoisie continued to further capitalism, which advanced slowly but surely, with different levels of support from corporatist states and with the help of foreign investment.

After World War II the high rates of growth experienced in most West European countries increased the economic gap between North and South. While the Western democracies embarked on developing liberal welfare societies, the Southern countries (Italy soon became an exception) promoted "liberal" economies within illiberal policies. Thus urbanisation, secularisation and the rise of the middle classes continued, while the civil societies of the Southern countries remained weakened by the absence of democratic arenas. However, the economies of these countries did not parallel the expansion of the Northern economies helped by the Marshall plan. Workers from Southern Europe were recruited to work in the factories of the booming economies of North and West-Central Europe, located on a temporary basis as manual workers at the margins of the social structure. With only a small presence of liberal elite members or political dissidents (most of whom were concentrated in Paris), Southerners became the reservoir of labour for the North, reinforcing earlier images. Moreover, the relatively late ascription to parliamentary democracy in the Southern countries reinforced alienation from Northern citizens. Thus while the democracies of Europe developed their welfare societies on the basis of social and political consensus, Southern European countries were, with the exception of North Italy, highly polarised politically and in their social structures until the 1970s.

From a cultural perspective the power of the imaginary affected relations between Northerners and Southerners. It can be argued that the effects of the Cold War, which cut off part of the continent, made the North/South divide even more prominent. Often images of the Southern countries were distorted or simply romanticised. In the academic world, the anthropology of the Mediterranean has operated on the assumption that Southern Europe belongs to the same cultural category as North Africa. In specialist literature, Mediterranean values and structures, such as "honour" and "latifundism", have been used without locating them in time and space, and therefore upholding generalisations. Romantic and travel writers have emphasised what they saw as Southern peculiarities, "passion" and "violence" being the most frequently mentioned<sup>24</sup>. These and other signs of identity given to the Southerners accorded with economic backwardness, traditional kinship structures and the authoritarian features of the Catholic religion. Partly for this reason, but also because writers and travellers were looking for a mystical experience far removed

from the "Northern" and "cold" industrial world, they neither recognised the complexity of these societies nor noticed that modernisation was taking place.

However, while Southern Europeans were struggling to overcome economic backwardness and political despotism, the Northern Scandinavian identity "was based on its 'distinction' from Europe". In a way these countries had a self-image of being "better" than Europe, an opinion based partly on their choice to remain outside the Cold War conflict, but mainly because their welfare societies had achieved higher levels of social justice. They cherished a self-image of having greater solidarity, more concern for social justice and, until 1989, a lower level of tension than the rest of Europe. Indeed, "Norden was dependent for its identity on Europe remaining divided, highly armed, and marked by a certain level of tension"<sup>25</sup>. In the British case the self-image reflected detachment towards continental Europe.

Thus we can see from the door of modernity a widening frontier between the Northern and Southern peripheries while a core centre was to take the initiative in the challenge of bringing together the two "worlds". However, in the 1970s and 1980s a process of convergence between these two worlds became apparent. During the 1970s the three South European countries with authoritarian modes of governance - Greece, Portugal and Spain - experienced a transition to parliamentary democracy. Consolidation of democratic principles in these countries has meant, as in West European countries, a weakening of political polarisation, with social democratic parties acquiring increasing importance as structuring political forces. Nevertheless, to some Northern Europeans the Southern democracies are not to be fully trusted. Historical democratic theory and practice have travelled in the direction North/South, producing what Giovanna Zincone calls a one-sided image of democracy. Politically, there is the view that even if political culture and social temper have experienced positive changes in the "new democracies", democratic consolidation requires a longer process of internalisation<sup>26</sup>. Organisational strengthening and identity formation in political parties and relationships between intermediate structures and civil society may still be problematic. Even if political parties succeed in taking a prominent position and controlling the political system, stable relations between the party and society will not necessarily be established. Thus, it is argued that in all these countries, but especially in Greece, the power of a charismatic

personality has been highly influential in maintaining political loyalty. Moreover, the relics of weak but corporatist state structures correlate with a relative weakness of civil society in these countries. But no doubt one could also cite contrasting situations within Southern countries, where large cities and regions have been characterised by relatively strong and influential civil societies.

From a social and economic angle, social and geographical mobility, improved educational facilities and the increasing importance of the middle class have also helped to homogenise Northerners and Southerners. Consumption patterns and values tend to be very similar, especially among the upper and middle classes, although some ways of life (such as the use of private and public space) maintain certain peculiarities. As René Girard points out, the secularisation process that these societies have recently experienced means that the influence of religion in shaping cultural values has diminished. Social interaction has also been changing in recent years, partly as a result of the integration of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the European Community. On one side Southern migrant workers have returned to their countries in Western Europe; on the other side, millions of citizens travel between these areas as tourists and thousands as professionals or students. Networking activities among cities and regions are also increasingly involving cooperation and therefore more understanding.

Although peoples living in the North and South of Western Europe have the same economic culture, problems of economic convergence will not easily be eradicated. Variations in GDP, industrial and service structures, education and training capabilities, female participation in the labour market and environmental protection are still important elements of differentiation. Indeed the problems associated with the uneven development of the past risks being reinforced in the future if political action to diminish existing economic imbalances is not taken. The result will be to condemn some regions permanently to the periphery. However, not all of them will be in the South of Europe, since de-industrialisation in some areas of the North is causing similar problems.

As regards the North/South cultural and political gap, the important question is whether sufficient trust has been developed to acknowledge convergence and to facilitate further bridging. The revolutionary events that have occurred between 1989 and 1992 in Europe are modifying not

only the geopolitical arena but also the cultural dimension. Northern Scandinavians are going through a process of reformulation of their identity, opening doors to Central and Northeastern influences as a result of increasing trade cooperation with the Baltic countries. Southern Europeans have, finally, embraced with considerable enthusiasm the civic and political values which define modern Europe. Trust, throughout Europe, can develop further if people see their local cultures and interests respected while a common European citizenship develops. Citizenship is basically about providing options and opening paths to participation as well as to fulfilling obligations. It should not come as a surprise that the most enthusiastic support for European citizenship is coming from the leaders of countries located in the South.

## Notes

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
# IMAGES OF EUROPE

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
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BABEL AND COMMON LANGUAGES IN THE RENAISSANCE

By John Hale



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Babel and Common Languages in the Renaissance.

God's confusion of languages - a punishment for the presumption of the builders of the heaven-invading Tower of Babel - was a check to any easy sentiment of unity among the peoples of Europe, just as

dialects cut down the sense of common citizenship within an individual nation. Commenting on the story as it was recounted in Genesis Luther broke off to give it a contemporary application: 'The Frenchman has only hatred and scorn for the German, the Italians have only hatred and scorn for all others. So we can see that this division of languages has led to divisions of habits, ways of thought and priorities that have put barriers between the very essence of peoples; it can justly be called the source of all misfortunes'.

Latin was the antidote to the divisions of Babel: but as a lingua franca it had always been a learned patina on the intarsia of vernaculars and this was wearing thinner than ever. In theory nearly anyone who went to school got some tincture of Latin. It remained the most prestigious language for authors who sought a European audience. Publishers saw its market advantages. Though Castiglione's Courtier was translated from the Italian fairly soon after its appearance in 1528 into English, French and Spanish, it was the Latin translation that sold the most copies. Latin enabled scholars to trail their expertise from one European university to another. It was Latin that enabled the English, through the writings of such men as Bacon, Camden, the anatomist William Harvey and the physician - and metaphysician - Robert Fludd, to re-enter as intellectuals a continent which had rejected them - with the loss of Calais in 1558 - as a political power. It was the passport which made it possible for a multilingual English poetess, Elizabeth Weston, to be lauded in Prague, where she was commemorated in a portrait of c.1610. But the gap between

its written respectability and its practicality widened with every decade. In an Italian treatise on precautions against the plague written in 1522 the author explained that while the first part was in Latin for the benefit of his fellow physicians the second was in the vernacular 'for those who have no understanding of a classical language'. It was a tongue, as Morison, who could in fact speak it fluently, noted, 'living only in writing, not in practise'.

Latin was to some extent the victim of its own propagandists, those humanists who wanted to deliver it from bastard importations and restore it to the purity of Ciceronian and Virgilian times. This was inhibiting to those whose workaday Latin was supplemented as they went along with words and phrases adjusted from their own native languages. Records of Luther's conversation show him switching from Latin when dealing with theological matters to German when applying them to the dilemmas of ordinary, domestic life - at times the spectacle of Latin and German words clambering over one another to convey the rapidity of his thought makes - now, but not then - his meaning obscure. As diplomatic contacts increased, and as fewer agents were latinate clerics, ambassadorial Latin at least from the 1520s became restricted in the main to polite formulae of greeting and farewell, though from the 1550s even these came to be dispersed<sup>with</sup>; interpreting between vernaculars became a new profession. No diplomat, apart from papal ones, used Latin regularly for correspondence with his government, and those - there were always some - who could speak Latin found negotiation confusing because local ways

of pronouncing it made it difficult to catch shades of meaning. Writings on the diplomatic function, such as Ottaviano Maggi's The Ambaddador of 1566, came to stress the importance of living languages. Beneath the even written Latin surface of international agreements were native tongues translated by interpreters and formulated by secretaries.

Few men, apart from Erasmus, had a greater love of Latin or nimbleness in manipulating it to absorb topics and nomenclatures unanticipated by its Augustan users than Aenea Silvius Piccolomini. Writing to advise the young King Ladislav of Bohemia and Hungary in 1450, however, he said that Latin, though a knowledge of it should be taken for granted, was not enough. 'Love, no less than the sword, guards kingdoms ... Intercourse of language is a promoter of love ... You must strive to be able by yourself to hear your subjects, to understand them and to speak with them. Frequently some things occur which your subjects may wish to refer to you alone and which they would not entrust to an interpreter'. Maximilian I proudly recorded his qualifications for his multi-lingual imperial role. He had been brought up as a child to speak German, he gained Latin at school, Saxon and Bohemian from his subjects, French from his wife Mary of Burgundy, Flemish from the officials in the Netherlandish parts of his inheritance, Spanish from diplomatic correspondents who were flattered by his use of their own tongue, Italian from the captains and English from the archers he enlisted into his armies. He made a point of having one of his artists depict him resolving a mutiny among his multi-lingual

troops by understanding what they were all saying. This, like other of Maximilian's claims for his prowess in all departments of a ruler's life, has to be taken with a pinch of salt. But it is indicative. His successors in eastern Europe, Ferdinand, Maximilian II and Rudolf II also learned some at least of the languages of their scattered subjects. Rudolf's Latin was supplemented by German and Czech and at least a reading acquaintance with Spanish, French and Italian. Other monarchs, of monoglot realms, accepted the withering away of Latin. Francis I spoke an Italian that was at least comprehensible. His sons all had Italian tutors. Elizabeth I was competent in Italian and French. Philip II of Spain was unusual in sticking to his native language, as was Henri IV in an active chauvinism which made him castigate his son for learning Spanish.

School Latin was recognized as having little lasting effect. Machiavelli (who used only the odd etiam in his habitually vernacular writings) made fun of the lawyer in his 1518 comedy Mandragola for being taken in by the Latin paraded by the pseudo-doctor who was planning to seduce his wife. In 1594 Shakespeare could rely on understanding titters from the audience when his pedant Holofernes in Love's Labours Lost introduced the juvenile playing the infant Hercules in the court entertainment he had devised:

'Great Hercules is presented by this imp,  
Whose club killed Cerberus, that three-headed canis;  
And when he was a babe, a child, a shrimp,  
Thus did he strangle serpents in his manus.  
Quoniam he seemeth in minority,  
Ergo I come with this apology'.

Five years after this, Thomas Platter, needing to use his Latin as a means of communication, commented on the difficulty he experienced in persuading either the young men at Eton or their seniors at Oxford to use it. Though Paracelsus caused a scandal by lecturing in German on medicine at his native university of Basel in 1526, some of the law lectures at the London Inns of Court were already delivered in English, and according to the statutes setting up Sir Thomas Gresham's College in 1596, the Monday lecture on medicine was to be given in Latin in the morning and repeated in English in the afternoon because 'the greatest part of the auditory is like to be of such citizens and others as have small knowledge or none at all of the Latin tongue'. While universities remained faithful to formal instruction in Latin, an increasing number of institutions grew up in France, Germany and Italy for young men who wanted to equip themselves for court, diplomatic or military careers. Around universities themselves grew fringes of 'finishing' activities; in his early teaching days at Padua Galileo doubled as a university lecturer and the holder of extra-mural classes for those eager to learn the new applications of mathematics to brigading and fortification. To prepare young men of good birth 'for the service of their countrie', Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1570 proposed an academy which would maintain teachers of French, Italian, Spanish and Dutch. By 1615, when Sir George Buck represented London as England's 'third university', of more use to the state than the conservative Oxford and Cambridge, he cited the

availability of teachers of these and 'divers other Languages fit for Embassadors and Orators, and Agents for Marchants, and for Travaylors'.

For the upper levels of non-professional society the bias was not so much against Latin as such, as away from its weight within educational curricula. The library in Rabelais' imaginary ideal of a devout educational establishment, his 1532 portrait of the Abbey of Thélème in Gargantua, catered for the languages needed for bible study, Latin, Greek and Hebrew, but also had books in French, Italian and Spanish lest the real world be forgotten and the timbre of God's omnipresent voice muffled. The Reformation emphasis on personal religious experience, which touched Rabelais without converting him, had been expressed by Luther in 1518: 'I thank God that I hear and find my God in the German language in a way which I have not found Him up to now in the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew tongues'. Sermons had commonly been delivered in parishioners' own language, but the use of the vernacular for the liturgy in Protestant countries reduced the number of those in Europe who had at least been used to hearing Latin on Sundays and saints' days.

For a number of reasons, then, the age that saw the revival of the true form of the universal language of imperial Rome also connived in its decline. A dying language could still nourish living faith. The book that had perhaps the most influence on Europe's faith and politics was Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion; it was first published in 1536, in Latin, albeit quickly translated and paraphrased

for the benefit of native congregations from Scotland to Bohemia. Latin remained a medium of international exchange in matters of scholarly concern. There was a thriving neo-Latin literature whose poetry was living enough to arouse the enthusiasm of Pierre de Ronsard and his fellow poets of the mid-sixteenth-century Pléiade group. It was as a means of general communication that it lost ground.

This ground had, indeed, never - outside the most highly educated circles - been firm. For the great majority of those on the move it had in any case never been a substitute for gesture, the display of a coin, the rapport of conviviality. Before the Reformation there was, in theory, a source of information for travellers in the person of the parish priest. In 1507 a Florentine, lost on a diplomatic mission to Munich, was relieved to meet in Überlingen a priest with 'a feeble grasp of Latin'. To reduce the scandal of priests who did not even understand their own liturgy was one of the aims of the Counter-Reformation, but when the indulgence-selling priest in the 1554 anonymous Spanish picaresque novel Lazarillo of Tormes met a colleague who greeted him in Latin, 'he never said a word in that language so as not to put his foot in it'. On the other hand Montaigne, during his Italian journey, found priests whose Latin was more fluent than his own book-based Italian. It was a time of hit and miss. No wonder that travellers who could afford it hired interpreters en route and nestled among their compatriots' communities whenever they could.

The issue of language becomes urgent only within the context of a demand for practical communication wider than that of basic needs. With the recognition that the practical

lingua franca could not be Latin, Babel stood revealed. The interpreter now had more to offer than the humanistically educated secretary or tutor. He was employed by governments. He offered his linguistic wares in market places, quaysides, in the portico of a bourse. He was not necessarily to be trusted. When Busbecq inquired why an old Turk was howling as he held a glass of wine, he was told that 'he is warning his soul to withdraw into a remote part of his body so that it will be contaminated as little as possible by the crime he is committing'. Merchants sent their sons to learn the ropes of a foreign market with a new emphasis on obtaining language skills. And some leaped at the opportunity. The sixteen-year-old Michael Behaim, while serving an apprenticeship in Breslau in 1527 was offered a place with a firm in Cracow 'so that I can learn the language'. He wrote home to say 'I would prefer Bohemia to Poland, Germans almost outnumber Poles in Cracow now ... I will learn more if I am among non-Germans'. Governments detached young men of promise from chancery chores to join foreign embassies with the same intent. Polylingualism began to be noticed and praised: a French friend of Ortelius praised his fluency in Dutch, German, French and Spanish, Marcus Perez, an emigré Marano merchant in Antwerp in the 1560s was commended by his colleagues for his enviable command of Flemish, German, French, Spanish and Italian. The international success of the Netherlandish portrait painter Antonis Mor from the 1550s owed more than a little to his ability to speak to his subjects and their agents in French, Spanish and Italian.

From the 1480s travellers had begun to include glossaries of useful foreign words as appendices to their narratives. Polyglot vocabularies were published with increasing frequency from 1477; François Garon's Vocabulary of five Languages: Latin, Italian, French, Spanish and German proved so popular after its publication in Venice in 1526 that by the 1546 edition it had been extended to cover eight languages. Jacopo Strada, a scholarly collector and dealer in antiquities whose portrait was painted by Titian, died in 1588 while working on an eleven-language dictionary. From the early sixteenth century multi-lingual conversation and phrase-books started to appear as simple aids for merchants abroad; from the mid-century they broadened to satisfy those who wished to learn a foreign language in some depth. The title of Claudius Hollyband's 1573 The French Schoolemaister suggests the new self-culture: wherein is most plainelie shewed the true and most perfect way of pronouncinge of the French tongue, without any helpe of Maister or Teacher: set foorth for the furtherance of all those whiche doo studie privately in their own study or houses. The tone of some of these teach-yourself books could be reassuringly unpedantic. Going through the parts of speech in the parallel English and Italian dialogue columns of his Florio, his firste Fruites published in 1578, John Florio wrote:

'Nowe let us come to the Articles.

I pray you doo so sir, if you be not weery.

To tel you the truth, I am almost weery,

but nevertheless we wyl follow'.

And the learning declensions were cheered up, as in:

'Fayre mayde, wyll you that I love you?

I cannot hold you that you love not

if you wyl love.

I have loved you, I love you, and will love you ...

I will brake my fast with you:

We will have a pair of sa<sup>h</sup>sages'.

While this interest in learning foreign languages was intended to fill the gap left by Latin, it accompanied an interest in the structure and range of the vernacular language of a man's own country. Against the reproaches levelled by German humanists at their countrymen's neglect of classical latinity, Luther claimed that there was nothing worth saying in everyday converse that could not be perfectly well expressed in German. Why waste time reviving Latin, asked Ronsard in 1589 - writing well after the publication of his fellow-poet Joachim de Bellay's 1549 Defence and Illustration of the French Language - when French is so copious and flourishing? Towards the end of Elizabeth's reign Samuel Daniel prophetically asked:

'And who, in time, knowes whether we may

vent /export/

The treasure of our tongue, to what strange shores

This gaine of our best glory shall be sent

T'inrich unknowing Nations with our stores?

What worlds in th'yet unform'd Occident

May come refin'd with th'accents that are ours?'

But leaving this particular dream aside, the conscious cultivation of vernaculars was the produce<sup>+</sup> of cultural pride and administrative convenience. Save for the stimulus it gave to translators it had no intentional bearing on the problem of intercommunication. In border towns like

Trent, Trieste or Ragusa bilingualism was in any case common. Spanish was a second language for the educated French of Navarre. Traditional political and military contacts between Scotland and France, Tuscany and Germany, Rome and Switzerland, Spain and the Netherlands produced pidgin forms of speech that served for practical purposes. Polish merchants travelling up the Vistula to sell their goods in Danzig could bargain in general terms using German and some Latin - retained in eastern Europe longer than in the west because of the plethora of local languages. But for native German speakers, and the Dutch, Swedes and Norwegians who traded with Danzig and the other Baltic ports, there was an adequate lingua franca of common commercial and nautical terms, just as there was throughout the trading world of Mediterranean ports. In addition, from Persia to the Moluccas Europeans made their wants known and clinched their deals in forms of communication comprising a few nouns, verbs in the infinitive, gestures and the finger language of price bargaining.

It was, nonetheless, the mounting volume of diplomatic exchanges that led during the sixteenth century to the beginning of the process whereby one vernacular rather than another became preferred as an internationally shared common language. In spite of the range of Portugal's empire and the importance of its trade with Antwerp its language, to judge from the manuals, was not one that anyone sought to learn. An old Russia hand of the English Muscovy Company could declare that that country's tongue was 'the most copious and elegant in the world'. But his praise fell on

a respectful silence. Elizabeth's interest in the value of Russian contacts caused her to ask the Earl of Essex to learn it, which led, on the Earl's part, to no more than a dutiful humming and hawing. English itself, in spite of Daniel's crystal ball, Florio's revelation that it contained A Worlde of Wordes (the title of his English-Italian dictionary of 1598) and the example of a Shakespeare, was no competitor in the common language stakes. As Florio himself remarked in another work, English is 'a language that will do you good in England, but pass Dover it is worth nothing'.

Neither was German a competitor, in spite of the wide penetration of some of its words and phrases into the inter-glossa of northern commerce. Between its southern High and northern Low varieties it was later than other European languages to attain a reasonable uniformity and there was some shrinking from its very sound; for Moryson, a tolerant multi-linguist, its grating peremptoriness had the effect of 'sounding better in the mouth of Tamberlin [the ferocious tyrant of Marlowe's Tamberlane the Great] than of a civill man'. The same internal confusions and (to others) harshness prevented the 'Dutch' of the northern Netherlanders from becoming an international tongue in spite of their being so long a focus of political and commercial interest. For their own part, Netherlanders were chiefly concerned to learn the languages of their visitors and to publish handbooks to them.

The field was chiefly open to languages which like Italian, Spanish and French had a latinate, therefore fairly readily learnable base, and by the mid-sixteenth century

the most commonly understood was probably Italian, chiefly in its Tuscan form. The Italian commercial network had long been the widest in Europe, and it continued to draw foreign merchants into the peninsula. Late in the century a Nuremberg merchant in Lucca described how he was trying to transform a colleague's idle and prankish son into a steady young man of business: 'he fears and respects me', he reported to his wife, 'but a certain number of years must pass for a mind to mature. I have begun to dictate my Italian letters to him, a task which he gives himself readily to and performs well; it will also help him in writing and speaking Italian'. The business schools for would-be merchant apprentices in Antwerp taught the rudiments of commercial Italian. The lure of the new, humanistic, more broadly based and relevantly pitched classical learning and the reputation of princely courts had peppered Europe from England to Poland with young men who had attended the universities of Pavia, Bologna and Padua or visited Milan, Mantua and Ferrara.

In the sixteenth century Italian literature came to replace the international appeal of French - or French-based - chivalrous romances. Italian authors acquired a significant foreign readership, encouraging aspirant poets in Spain, England and France to read the works of Petrarch and Ariosto in the original. The poet Queen of Navarre, Marguerite d'Angoulême, wrote in Italian to her fellow-poet Vittoria Colonna. A number of the Frenchmen to whom 'the Prince of Beggars', Pietro Aretino, wrote his cajoling and bullying letters flattered him with responses in his own tongue. A glimpse of how chic Italian had become by

c.1550 is offered by the lines in that language which the feeble French poet Mellin de Saint-Gelais claimed to have scratched with a diamond on a young woman's looking-glass:

'If beauties you display excell all others,  
How true t'will be of those that you conceal'.

Montaigne learned to speak Italian, as had his father, as a matter of course, and on crossing the Alps on his travels he changed the language of his journal from French to Italian. Returning across the Mont Cenis pass he noted with relief that 'here French is spoken, so I leave this foreign language in which I feel facile but ill-grounded'. And in an essay he explains this facility in terms which underline the convenience of a romance language as a passe-partout for wide stretches of southern and western Europe. You go full tilt, he explains, using whatever words -

French, Gascon, Spanish, Latin - come to mind, but giving them Italian terminations.

Familiarity with the language was also encouraged by the general preoccupation of the western powers with Italy during the wars of 1494 to 1530 and, though less generally, up to 1559. It was not, after all, poets or merchants who determined the choice of a high-level common form of speech. Sir Thomas More, who achieved fame from his quirkily energetic translation of Castiglione's The Courtier, had been to Italy to learn the language because, like his ambassador brother, he wanted to equip himself for a diplomatic career. And in 1559, at Cateau-Cambrésis, the French, Spanish and English chief negotiators were all fluent in Italian. Even so, in the informal discussions below the Latin surface of official deliberations on the wording of the Peace, French (also spoken by the English and Spanish parties) appears to have been employed more frequently.

It was in fact from 1559 that French began its long career towards becoming the politician's second language. For a while there was some competition from Spanish. Spanish costume, sub-fusc but elegant, was widely copied. The great range of Spanish power was deferred to. But language did not, as Nebrija had anticipated, march with Empire; in the southern Netherlands more French than Spanish was spoken, Franche-Comté was an exclusively French-speaking area, even in vice-regal circles Spanish had little impact in Milan and Naples; in Germany, Austria and beyond, the Habsburg cousinhood balked at the importation of a language so at odds with the Teutonic and Slavonic roots of their subjects' tongues.

In England, though Norman French had been dropped from upper class speech by the fourteenth century, memories of it lingered in legal terminology (and the nuns of Lacock Abbey in Wiltshire were still speaking it in the 1530s); the Crown's territorial link with France, moreover, only snapped with the loss of Calais in 1558. When the Italian states had slipped from the urgent diplomatic agenda after 1559 and with the German ones largely quiescent in international affairs, France's large population, its political weight (in spite of the deadlocked confusions of its intermittent civil wars) and its geographical position all gave stature to its language in its administrative, Paris-based form. For Protestants and moderate Catholics elsewhere French universities attracted growing numbers of those who might formerly have gone to Italian ones. By 1600 the momentum that led to the international primacy of French during the country's leading role in Europe under Louis XIV was well under way. It had become the inner-circle language of cultivated German courts. By 1600 Spanish diplomats had accepted the need to use it in the many negotiations with Catholic factions during the civil wars and the preliminaries of the Peace of Vervins.

Far more widely indicative of the situation than any negotiating table, however, were the rows of confessionals, with their signs for the many different languages spoken, noticed at the end of the century by a visitor to the pilgrim church of Our Lady of Montserrat. And languages remained fissured by dialects. It is doubtful whether more than five per cent of Italians spoke the Tuscan which educated foreigners learned at 'Italian'. But the energies

promoting the movement within Europe of people and  
products were proof against the curse of Babel.

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
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and liberty" (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The Economic Community was intended to be a bulwark against the threat from the East, created by strengthening the economies of the West.

Both these aims have been more than fulfilled. War between the nation-states of the Community has become unthinkable, and the economic success of the member countries has served not only as an efficient ideological defense, but was in itself a strong catalyst for the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe.

Since the early 1970s conditions have changed significantly as a result of increasing international economic interdependence, the retreat of the United States as guardian for the international economic system and the spectacular rise of the Japanese economy. More than before it now seems that Europe must unite in order to become an equal participant in the game of economic superpowers. The framework of the national economy has become too narrow given such strong interdependence. The competitive spirit must be detached from the nation and installed in Europe. That at any rate is the message from several quarters.

It may be true that we are witnessing a grand change in the scale of politics comparable to what happened in the Renaissance when the city-states of the cosmopolitan community of medieval Christendom lost their position and were succeeded by larger political organizations with the consolidation of national or multinational monarchies. Rousseau's ideal of the small city-state as political community could not withstand the march of history. The Wilsonian ideal of making state frontiers coincide with frontiers of nationality proved impossible to implement as early as 1918 and seems now to be abandoned in principle. Is history going into a third phase where the nation-states will be dissolved into a European state?

The relevance of that question is obvious, not only due to the current political debate on the future of the European Community, but also because the term Europe has often been used as synonymous with the Economic Community, which was meant to become "the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". But does "Europeanism" reflect a romantic image of the kind that nationalism was? Can the process of nation-building be transposed to the European level, and if so will it be with similar means and results as the construction of the nation-state?

The economic pressures now driving towards the formation of a European state seem as forceful as those behind the industrialization of the nation-state in the 19th century. Many of the arguments for the creation of the customs union, the agricultural policy and the internal market are strikingly similar to those which promoted the idea of a strong "national" economy in the first half of this century. On these grounds the economic (and political) uniting of Europe is just a logical extension of the process of modernization.

But can the inertia of economic Europe, having fulfilled its political purposes of reconciling the nation-states and outdoing the Communist empire, carry that process any further? Or is Europe running up against the general problems of modernization, the loss of identities and common values, the alienation of the individual from society because advanced technology, complex organization and distant institutions remove him from reality and make it impossible for him to choose and govern his own life? The fact that we passed 1984 without our world becoming an Orwellian nightmare does not mean that such problems can be neglected. The fate of the Maastricht Treaty, when it was exposed to referenda, shows that fears of a distant and inhuman bureaucracy still persist. We

are in fact brought back to the conflict between the social philosophies of Locke and Hegel, the conflict between the individual and the state.

The removal of the cleavage of Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic raises question of a similar if not larger size and seriousness. Many of the countries and peoples now released from bondage feel themselves to be fully legitimated Europeans, having contributed their share to Europe's history and civilization. But they have been cut off from the process of modernization for half a century and need to be "re-europeanized", to have their links to a common European culture restored, in order to safeguard their new-won freedom. They are afraid of becoming second class citizens in the new Europe when they are told that admission to first class depends on an economy able to keep up with the best performer. The European image of the post-war years was shaped by our search for escape from the immediate past. But can we continue to live within our unhappy memories? Or can we strike out anew like emigrants to a promised land?

### Europe, a political culture

In 1882 the French historian Ernest Renan gave a famous lecture at the Sorbonne, "*Qu'est ce que c'est une nation?*". Now we have likewise to ask: What is Europe?

The answer cannot be given by the cartographers. It is not geography which determines our image of Europe. We can draw the borders to the north and the west, but in the south the Mediterranean forms a divide no broader than the Rio Grande between Mexico and the United States. To the east our present image of Europe dissolves somewhere on the other side of St. Petersburg and Kiev.

nation therefore has in some places been based mainly on ethnicity with emphasis on community of birth and religion; modern citizenship is still viewed as a distant goal. In other countries the process of developing social rights has come under stress, because people have reacted against the high tax burdens of an overgrown welfare state - sometimes called the transfer state - which tended to develop during the years of fast economic growth. However, the concept of social rights as such has nowhere been challenged.

### Europeanization

In the early 1950s a process of Europeanization was set in train by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community followed in 1957 by the European Economic Community. The story of the European Community and its growth from the original Six to Twelve, with four to ten more countries now lining up for membership, is well-known. Less often appreciated, it seems, is the fact that the Community already has more than achieved its primary goals.

The mentor for the founding fathers of this new Europe was the economist, Jean Monnet, who had been *Commissaire du Plan*, head of the National Planning Board, in France after the war. His genius was that he found a way in which to reconcile the two arch enemies of Europe, France and Germany, by convincing the political élite of these countries of the need to interlink and merge the traditional sources of armament, coal and steel, under a common supranational authority thus making war between them impossible. When the Economic Community was established later it was partly to make up for the failure in 1954 of a planned treaty for a European Defense Community, but also with the aim of "pooling their [economic] resources to preserve and strengthen peace

mainly from two sources. On the one hand, it was caused by the pressure from the lower classes having achieved political rights and access to power, and, on the other, by the wish of the élite (from Bismarck to Beveridge) to nurture the political loyalty of the masses to the established nation-state.

A right must be limited, otherwise it is no right. Only "human rights" are global, but still limited to "humans". The rights of a political culture, a political entity, must stop at the political border. They are the privilege of the citizen, his citizenship, and are only extended to "others" under exceptional circumstances. But they are logically complemented by duties, the duty to obey the law of the state and the duty to show loyalty towards the nation. In the course of expanding the rights of citizenship, each step in the process was taken as the result of a demand from the powerless masses and conceived as a threat to the dominating class and, thus, the state. Therefore it had to be assured that law-abidingness was impressed upon the citizen by sanctions and his loyalty sprang from national sentiment.

The introduction over time of civil, political and social rights may have made the nation-state the ultimate unit in European politics, so far, at least. These rights (and duties) form a structure which can largely contain or resolve the conflicts necessarily arising in a process of continuous and rapid change. The institution of the democratic nation-state has become a means of formulating and maintaining a core of shared values, a common identity, replacing the loyalties of tribal bonds, social class and religious tradition.

The development has been neither smooth nor in unison, and the process has not by any means come to a final conclusion. In parts of Europe it was held back by dictatorship for decades. The concept of

It is the political culture developed over the last three to four centuries which now more than anything else forms our mental map of Europe. It is a culture which echoes the triad of Athens, Jerusalem and Rome, turning it into a concept of citizenship including civil, political and social rights. In those offshoots of European civilization, the Americas, the development of the political culture has progressed on a somewhat divergent path. The development of political rights was for long constrained by the socio-cultural barriers in a multiracial society, and social rights have been seen as less imperative due to the image of the "open frontier" and its unlimited opportunities, which became part of American political mythology.

However, Europe itself is far from being united by a common and final concretization of these rights. While the concept of social rights is rather weak in some places and some of its aspects are being curtailed elsewhere, it is at the same time being further developed in other dimensions as it becomes obvious that the economic processes of modernization cannot be left to market forces but must be brought under control. If not, the global environment, the ecology of the planet Earth, will come under threat and thus make the guarantee of health and security meaningless. This is just one example of how the social rights associated with modern citizenship tie in closely with the economic system and place market forces squarely within the realm of the political culture.

Discussions about the political culture often get stuck on the surface, with the procedures of decision-making and the distribution of political power. This is what always seems to happen in discussions about a "democratic deficit" in the European process. European democracy is

many-faced and cannot be reduced to a single formula because it must reflect the spectrum of social values.

Another surface discussion concerns European lifestyles, which may seem to be dominated by American popular culture from cowboy jeans and rock music to Disneyland and tv-dinners. These imprints, however, are only a thin coating on the surface which over time becomes absorbed into existing patterns, as the drugstores of Paris have been absorbed. To find an adequate answer to the question of what is Europe, one must go below such layers and reach below the surface of the socio-political culture.

Europe may be able to establish its own political system, a common set of political principles and social norms, characterized by a combination of liberal democracy and social markets. But the forces of secularization have become strengthened under the modernization process and are now threatening the crucial balance between faith and reason, between moral values and questions of expediency. The problems of post-modernity cannot be fended off by assuming that they are caused by nostalgic feelings for an image of what we left behind. We will have to recognize the need to respect the individual more within the political system and so endorse a core value of European civilization.

If we were to specify the principles and norms of the political culture, we would, therefore, have to further develop the concept of citizenship. One of the most striking images we have of Europe is a cultural mosaic. Europe is not a melting pot, but a patchwork of peoples, languages, life patterns, traditions, styles of building, modes of cities and diversity of landscapes. For many, this is probably what distinguishes Europe most from other parts of the world. Therefore, if Europe is to remain more than a myth, this mosaic must be protected, which means

channels. Germany in the eighteenth century was a cultural and not a political entity. Although nationalist feelings had been aroused during the Napoleonic wars, the building of the nation-state out of a multitude of kingdoms and principalities was not initiated on political grounds, but was preceded by the *Zollverein* (Customs Union), when the industrialists of Prussia and Hesse wanted their products protected against outside competition.

The politico-economic doctrine of free trade may have been bred by the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment, but it never took root in the nineteenth century. The national economy was seen as a logical complement to the political unit, the nation-state, and was therefore fostered by protectionism. That meant, however, that the principle of nationality could only be applied to nations of a certain size if they were to be economically viable. Beyond this, the argument that access to economic resources was imperative for the nation played into the hands of builders of large states. The nation should not only be unified. It should also expand. It followed that smaller nationalities and languages were doomed to disappear.

The delayed political process in Germany may be the reason why this new nation-state felt more vulnerable to the threat of socialist internationalism and began to introduce social legislation intended to attach the industrial workers to the state. The gradual introduction of *social rights* became the hallmark of the democratic, industrialized nation-state in the 20th century. It reflected to some extent, of course, deep-seated humanitarian elements in European culture which had already been apparent in the early phases of industrialism. But legislation, which guaranteed the citizen a minimum standard of education, health and social security, was a result of the process of nation-building. It sprang

period of the great revolutions, the English (1688), American (1776) and French (1789). At the time no country was characterized by sufficient homogeneity in ethnicity, language, religion and history to form a core of shared values, a nation. Therefore, the introduction of civil rights established a pluralistic principle which necessarily involved a potential threat to the power of the new political class, the land owners and the urban bourgeoisie. The reaction was to instigate a process of nation-building, whereby a single high culture of the economic, political and intellectual élite of the centre became imposed on the provincial periphery and the lower classes, the peasants and labourers. The creation of a common, national identity was a precondition for extending *political rights* to groups outside the hegemonic culture.

Industrialization was another integrative force which worked in conjunction with the political forces already mentioned to create a national identity. Industrial society, or even the shadow it cast ahead of itself, broke down the cultural hierarchy of agrarian society. The economic growth and mobile occupational structure characteristic of modernization introduced a new relationship between culture and social status. The division of labour and the continuous change of industrial society require if not universal literacy then a widespread educational process. General education meant participation in the high culture and thus became a common lever for the creation both of national identity and of economic growth.

In western Europe this process was promoted mainly by the bourgeoisie who assumed power within the existing political units. In central and eastern Europe, where the political structures were weaker due to the withdrawal and waning of the multinational empires, Habsburg and Ottoman, the process tended to run through more purely economic

that the evolution of the political culture must be extended to include cultural rights in our concept of European citizenship.

### Cultural rights

The nation-state became established not on common history and culture. On the contrary. "*L'oubli et je dirai même l'erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la formation d'une nation*", said Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture. Its foundation was laid by the development of political and social rights, which is also the reason why the nation-state cannot be removed. But it did not respect cultural rights, except those of the dominating class, the imperial culture. In fact, minority cultures have always been seen as a disturbance, a contradiction to the image of the nation-state. Even in the most established nation-states of western Europe, from the North Cape to the Strait of Gibraltar, cultural rights are weak and minorities cause problems for the state.

The extension of citizenship to include cultural rights cannot be left in the hands of the nation-state. Its records from the past are too bleak. The nation-state will tend to protect only its own people's rights, because this is what legitimizes it. Only a European constitution will be able to guarantee general cultural rights. This is where Europe can find its legitimacy as a political entity.

The present Community and its institutions lack any kind of capacity to safeguard cultural rights. They fall completely outside its competence. It was not until the revised treaty of 1986 (the Single Act) and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that there was any kind of vague reference to human rights in the preamble. The attempt to include provisions for

political rights for non-nationals in connection with local elections has met strong opposition, and so has the allusion to social rights brought up by the social charter. These rights may best be left within the realm of the nation-state, because that is where they have been developed and because they have direct economic links and consequences in taxation and expenditure. It is different when we come to cultural rights, because the nation-state tends to have a tunnel-visioned reading of them.

Cultural rights would involve the right to a form of local government, "home rule", for cultural groups or regions defined after certain criteria. Such groups would have the right and receive support to preserve and nurture their language of identity while at the same time they would be obliged to acquire one or two European languages of convenience. Freedom of religious and political conscience may already be guaranteed, but educational liberty less so, especially when it comes to the financing of the exercise of such liberties.

If Europe could become the guarantor of cultural rights, it would be true to a major source of its civilization. It is a paradox that we have attempted to create the *homogenous* nation-state as foundation for liberal democracy, while the ideal conception we have of democracy should make it possible to establish a *heterogeneous* state. The paradox is explained by the anarchic ingredient in democracy, the fear of the barbarian forces of ethnicity which restricts community to the tribe and directs enmity towards "the others".

Even a heterogeneous community, however, must have borders. We cannot draw the boundaries by religious, linguistic, racial or any other ethnic criteria: Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims; Latins,

The key fact, however, was the acceptance by the dominating class in European civilization of the compatibility of reason and faith. This provided a myth forceful enough to form the base for a modern, political culture, centered on the individual. Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Newton and others revolutionized the classical concept of the natural world, and their ideas were complemented by social and political philosophers like Locke, Kant, Rousseau and Montesquieu. Masterless Man began to form society from conceptions that might be referred to in French as the four D's, *le Développement, le Dialogue, les Droits de l'homme et la Démocratie*. Europe embarked on a course of modernization where reason and faith were kept in unstable balance in a process of continuous change.

### The modernization of Europe

The two major strands in the modernization of Europe are the evolution of democracy and of industrialism. Both meant a break with spiritual values and traditional structures and thus tended to erode the social core and hierarchy of society. But the process of secularization, democratization and industrialization had the social consequence that the polity became based on the principle of nationality. The nation-state became both the catalyst and the result of profound social changes.

The fact that it was the state which made the "nation" had profound consequences for the cultural picture of Europe, positive as well as negative. Where it was attempted to reverse this process and to impose the principle of nationality as an ideology for the state, nationalism also became the scourge of European civilization.

Modern liberal democracy begins with the establishment of *civil rights*, the rights to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness", in the

know, however, is that there is little more than myth, a dream based on scattered finds and weak traces, to link our civilization to this distant past -- an ancient Crete where the cult of nature was interwoven with the search for knowledge creating a holistic balance on the razor's edge.

The trinity of Athens, Jerusalem and Rome is more firmly based on historical evidence, but nevertheless it is no less of a myth, if it is meant to express a collective European identity in modern terms. It may have been more true four hundred years ago when a shared European civility, a *Kulturgemeinschaft*, existed among an urban, secularized élite for whom Latin still was the lingua franca. A strong interest in cartography had developed in the early 16th century making educated men aware of the geographical space in which they lived and thus adding a graphic dimension to the idea of Europe as something different from non-Europe. But this common identity was shared only by those who were literate and educated, had commercial and artistic skills, and respected law and government. It was a common consciousness among an élite, a triumph of nurture over nature, and it was set against not only men of other countries and races, but also against the non-educated classes, peasants and labourers. Also, it did not exclude prejudiced, stereotyped ideas of national characteristics. Even Erasmus, himself the prototype of the educated European preaching peace among nations, could observe that the Germans were crude, the French violent under a veneer of refinement, the Italians duplicitous and the Spaniards haughty.

As a force of unification, the concept of a common European identity is a myth of the élite created by the élite for the consumption of everyone. It has never reached and thus could never be accepted by the people at large.

Anglo-saxons, Slavs, Finns and Greeks; Blacks, Whites, Yellows, Greens, Reds and the rest of the spectrum; all are to be found and have their home within modern Europe. The boundaries must be drawn between those nations which adhere to the European political culture and concept of citizenship including civil, political, social and cultural rights, and those which do not. To draw them along economic cleavages, between rich and poor, would be to refute the cultural core of European civilization.

### Internal order

Europe as a political community committed to the maintenance of cultural rights would be faced with serious problems and may remain an image, an utopia, a no-place. These problems arise from the necessity of establishing internal order and maintaining external security.

Any political system, a society based on common political principles and social norms, must be maintained by an order, defined as rules and procedures, which regulates and settles conflicts. "Newcomers" to Europe must accept this order, which will not be a simple task, since it is not done by issuing high-flown statements of good intentions. But established European nations could also find it difficult because it involves the acceptance of *European* authorities as responsible for the maintenance of order. This demand strikes at the very core of national sovereignty, the state's monopoly of legitimate power.

Even those who consider themselves to be at the very heart of Europe could get into difficulties if asked whether they had been able to defend the rights of citizenship, let alone the cultural rights not yet

directly inscribed in their constitutions. One just has to think of the circumstances behind situations like the killings of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in Palermo or the release of the Birmingham Six in England. Such circumstances might fall within the jurisdiction of the authorities of a European internal order, and it is perfectly possible that many in Palermo and Birmingham would feel comfortable about that.

Such authorities would be equipped with judicial and executive powers to safeguard the constitutional rights of the citizen. The European Court in Strasbourg might be the embryo of a counterpart to the US Supreme Court. Armed forces should be immediately available for ensuring order. It could be helpful to re-read the 1952 draft treaty for a European Defense Community where it was said that the European Army as one of its functions should maintain constitutional order and democratic institutions in the territories of the member countries. "One has a vision of French soldiers marching over the Alps to counter a Neo-Fascist march on Rome!" wrote Andrew Shonfield in 1972. The image should not be as frightening today when Europe has squabbled for months over sending troops to what was Yugoslavia to protect the most fundamental human rights.

### External security

If the boundaries of Europe can be drawn, they must also be maintained. Otherwise they are meaningless. But that involves the problem of protecting Europe against the surrounding world, the maintenance of external security.

sown around 1250 by Thomas Aquinas' synthesis of reason and faith appeared also in the arts with Dante's *Divine Comedy* and Giotto's frescos. The ideas were nurtured during the 14th century at the universities set up in Bologna, Paris, Oxford and other centres, furthered by the arts and crafts of Gutenberg in the late 15th century and came into full bloom in 16th century with men like Machiavelli and Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus, Thomas More and Martin Luther.

What appeared during the Renaissance was a tendency to reach back to the classical roots of Europe, to the Greek philosopher's injunction "know thyself", to the Christian tidings of the direct relationship between God and the individual, and to Roman law's emphasis on personal property and responsibility. This triad of Athens, Jerusalem and Rome remains the basis of European civilization. However, whether it can be said to provide an identity appropriate for all Europeans, is another matter.

### The myth of Europe

The idea of Europe as something different from Asia and Africa, although a child of their river cultures, goes back to antiquity. It is expressed in the myth of the rape of Europa, daughter of Aginor, King of Phoenicia, taken to the shores of Crete by Zeus, in the form of a bull. This island became the birthplace of the first European civilization, the so-called Minoan culture, named after King Minos, son of Zeus and Europa.

Minoan Crete may have been an Elysian fields where arts and science were treasured, writing and technology developed, and peaceful relations and general well-being maintained among men. The archeological evidence is suggestive, but in the end we do not know. What we do

settled and the ensuing euphoria of freedom and joy died down, Europe was overtaken with angst. The new world turned out to be a cold, Hobbesian place where "war of every one against every one" threatened from all corners. Structures, which only a few years ago seemed to respond strongly and constructively to the challenges of modernization and interdependence, now seemed unable to provide a framework for action. With the Great Revolution of 1989, Europe emerged into a reality which will test whatever images of "Europe" we may have in our minds.

### **The roots of Europe**

Europe is in search of its identity. Questions are being asked: What is Europe? What were we and who are we? Is it possible to conceive of a "we"? Is there a collective European identity?

These are multidimensional questions which must be seen in the context of history, politics, economics and sociology. Any attempt to answer must take account of the complexity of Europe. The fault-lines dividing us are many. But if Europe is to become master in its own house, regain a role in history and meet the responsibilities imposed by its legacy, then we must search for our roots in European culture.

Plants have roots, men have legs and they can move, it has been said. Yes, but men also have minds, and the human mind cannot be uprooted. It can, however, be broadened.

In the Middle Ages the concept of "Europe" was seldom used. "Christendom" covered it as the Christian church for centuries had had a cultural monopoly of the "cultivated" world. But in the 13th century this mould was broken, and a European civilization, where man, the individual, not God, was at centre stage, slowly began to emerge in the development of human society. The seeds of philosophy and dialectics

Leave the military aspects of that aside. They have dominated the problem for half a century and they will still have to be settled in a wider context than Europe. But it is urgently necessary to consider Europe's border policy in a narrower context. In the eastern and southern periphery of Europe, from the Gulf of Finland through central Europe, the Adriatic and the Aegean, along the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean from the Bosphorus to Gibraltar there is a wide and unbroken border of smouldering and already burning ethnic and nationalistic unrest. Europe must in one way or another sort out a common policy towards these disturbances if they are not to turn into serious threats.

An important part of the problem, but far from all of it, is the lack of a clear and outgoing policy towards the Arab world. There remains a deep-seated tendency in European culture to take a distrustful, if not directly hostile attitude, with racist and religious undertones, towards these peoples. It is an undercurrent which is about to raise Islam as the new enemy after Communism. This irrational reaction equates Muslims with "Fundamentalists" without recognizing that Islam is an integral part of Europe's cultural heritage and that millions of Muslims have their homes in Europe. If that hostile tendency is not curtailed, terrible consequences may follow and Europe's civilisation will negate itself.

A more general and probably lasting aspect of the border problem springs from the strength of what has been called "the European Dream".

The European Dream is similar in character to the American Dream which drew hundreds of thousands of Europeans from Scandinavia, Ireland, Poland, Germany, Italy etc. 100-150 years ago, in flight from

hunger, suppression and poverty, to the country which in its constitution guaranteed its citizens the right to Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. The American Dream still exists, but probably more strongly in Asia and central America.

The European Dream is now alive among the peoples towards the south and east. It may not in itself be caused by the unrest and instability in these areas, rather it is the cause itself of these circumstances. Its power is difficult to overestimate. It was this dream which more than anything else broke the Berlin Wall and tore down the Iron Curtain. It stretches down into Africa and far over the plains and mountains of the Asian continent. It presents a challenge to Europe, as it raises questions which our political system is unable to answer. The immediate pressure of refugees from what was Yugoslavia has revealed a perplexity giving the shameful impression Europe will remain a myth.

No ocean divides us from these peoples. The Mediterranean is no wider than the Rio Grande, as already mentioned, and the world has now got means of transportation which reduce any distance to a matter of hours in a jumbo jet. And what is worse, Europe is not in a position where we, like the US in 1862, can pass a Homestead Act, which assures any head of family and any person over 21 years of age, who is or has the intention of becoming a citizen, the free right to a tract of land, provided that he will live on it for five years and cultivate it.

On the other hand, it is possible, if the recession can be brought to an end, that the low European birth rate will make immigration of young

## Images of Europe

When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, it was not only the image we had of Berlin or of Germany which was being redrawn. Suddenly a new, promising Europe reappeared in our minds and, indeed, our lives.

Until almost half a century ago Europe consisted of Berlin and Vienna, Prague and Budapest, as well as of London, Paris, Rome, Zurich, Copenhagen and Dublin. The forests of Slovakia and the marches of Transylvania were as European as the dunes of Holland and the banks of the Rhine for someone like the British writer Patrick Leigh Fermor who as a young man in the early 1930s walked from the Hook of Holland to Constantinople. The tragedy of the 1940s shattered that image, and only survivors of the generation born in the first two decades of the century still retained it in their minds. For the rest of us, Europe had been cut in two in 1945, a division reinforced by the fall of the iron curtain in 1946 and the establishment of the two military blocks in 1949. The old concept of Europe was repressed, and "Europe" became the truncated peninsula west of Vienna, Berlin and the Baltic, stretching to the shores of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea.

During the Forty Years Cold War, Europe, having been the master of History for centuries, was unable to control its own destiny. West Europeans lived an increasingly comfortable life in an incubator provided by American nuclear protection, forgetting to a greater or lesser degree about their cousins in the East, enclosed by the dark forces of communist dictatorship. Politically, and indeed also culturally, the two parts of Europe had come under American and Russian dominance, respectively.

The sudden and profound change of 1989 caught Europe, its peoples and its leaders, unprepared. When the dust from the fall of the Wall

and cheap labour desirable, if for nothing else then to take care of the sick and elderly whom we already have difficulties in looking after.

A restrictive, but humanitarian European immigration policy is needed. The problem is too serious and too big to be left to be solved by brutal military or market forces. If it is not tackled constructively by the political élite, it will become dominated by the populists and extremists among the politicians, and Europe will be in danger of losing one of the most precious qualities of its culture, the concern for victims which disregards national, ethnic and religious boundaries.

### **The power of myth**

Our images of Europe are manifold and vague in outline. Perhaps Europe is only a myth, and politics cannot be based on myths. But the power of myth is strong. It is a spiritual force which sustains civilizations. May the myth of Europe be strong enough to brace us for the reality in which Europe now finds herself.

Excerpts of press reviews of the symposium, *Images of Europe*, Minos Beach, Crete, April 13-17, 1992

"At present there is a very strong sense that, as well as creating an economic and political union, a community with a shared cultural identity is also possible, and even necessary. ....

The debate has been going on for some time. Last month, the Eleni Nakou Foundation -- a relative newcomer in the business of promoting greater European understanding -- ..... gathered some of the continent's most eminent academics and thinkers for a symposium in Crete.

.... What became clear was that nothing is clear. The discussions began to resemble an archaeological dig -- painstakingly brushing away the layers of accumulated perceptions and beliefs, sometimes striking hopeful sparks from buried treasures, sometimes throwing up clouds of dust. ... each new stratum presented new questions about those dug out before, .... (but) the confusion ... was on a higher level and therefore represented progress.

In this sense the symposium came to seem a microcosm of what Europe needs to do. ... it must recognise and embrace the differences rather than shut them out because they seem too demanding of effort and resources."

*The Guardian, May 8, 1992*

".... there was something utterly appropriate about gathering ... close to the origin of the very first myth of Europe, to ask what this myth is going to mean in the 1990s. .... Europe might yet turn out to have been an awful misunderstanding, a mistake.

But, for the group of European intellectuals, officials and commentators, brought together by the Eleni Nakou foundation for this meeting, this was the right time and the right place to ask some fundamental questions about the meaning of Europe post Maastricht.

.... Certainly the Maastricht treaties do not begin to address what many of the participants saw as the greatest challenge of all for the EC. Who belongs?

.... our Europe might seem rather unconvincing as a political, economic or even cultural myth ...(but) what is a myth (if not) a lie that tells the truth?"

*The European, 23-26 April 1992*

## Preface

This pamphlet is an essay based on the discussions at a symposium organized by *The Eleni Nakou Foundation* in April 1992. The aim of the symposium was to examine the deep-rooted images that Europeans have constructed of each other within their own communities, with special emphasis on the mental frontiers which separate Northern and Southern Europe, based on elements of authority and religion, patterns of tradition and beliefs, and the socialization of family, community and nation. The relevance of these frontiers was to be set in the context of the challenges to European culture and society as they arise from the current redrawing of the mental maps we have of Europe. Naturally, the opening of Eastern Europe also entered forcefully into the debate

The paper is not an account of the proceedings, and no statement is ascribed to individual participants although it may have been lifted verbally out of the discussions. It is a subjective condensation of the thoughts and ideas expressed, an attempt to set out the material as a coherent whole with links supplied and tentative conclusions added. Responsibility for the result lies fully with me as director of the foundation.

*The Eleni Nakou Foundation* as such takes no stand on the issues discussed here. It is a charitable company based in London and set up in 1990 under the terms of the will of the late Eleni Nakou, who was an enthusiastic promoter of cross-cultural contacts and who left a lasting imprint on quality tourism, especially in Crete. The aims of the foundation are to establish a forum for wider appreciation of the dimensions and depths of European culture, primarily by organizing a series of symposia, where a number of participants representing a wide spectrum of disciplines will be invited to join in deliberations inspired by papers and lectures which highlight Northern and Mediterranean approaches to a particular theme. *Images of Europe* was the first such event. Excerpts of some of the press reviews are to be found on pp.26/27.

The symposium was organized in close collaboration with *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, and *The Hellenic Centre for European Studies*, Athens, and was held at Minos Beach, Aghios Nikolaos, Crete. A list of participants is given on p. 28.

Under the editorship of Dr Soledad Garcia, for *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, a book containing some of the most important contributions to the symposium will be published by Pinter Publishers, London, in 1993.

*London, September 1992*

Dr ERIK HOLM  
director  
*The Eleni Nakou Foundation*

Donations given by *The Eleni Nakou Foundation*, 1990-1992.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

£100,000 to organize the 1992 symposium on *Images of Europe*.

Accademia di Danimarca, Rome

£30,000 to organize with the Scandinavian institutes in Rome the exhibition *Il paesaggio culturale* of modern Scandinavian painting at the *Festival Nordico 92*

The Municipality of Heraklion, Crete

£8,500 to the 450 anniversary exhibition of El Greco

The Municipality of Archanes, Crete


£9,100 for restauration and completion of an archeological museum

The Danish Institute in Athens

£7,000 for scholarly research on a Greek-Danish dictionary

Student grants for cross-cultural studies, £31,000

Grants to authors for research on books on European culture, £20,000



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*Europe en son miroir -- un symposium organisé en Crête par la Fondation Eleni Nakou.*

"Qui sommes-nous? Que voulons-nous? Où allons-nous? L'Europe est à la recherche de son identité, de sa définition, de ses frontières. Elle ne se confond pas avec la Communauté du même nom, mais elle ne sait pas où elle s'arrête, ni à l'est ni au sud. ....

L'Europe a toujours été faite de multiplicités, et c'est dans des héritages divers qu'elle puise sa substance. .... l'histoire européenne est une chronique de ruptures et d'affrontements, dans laquelle il est difficile d'isoler le noyau irréductible constitutif de la 'civilisation européenne'. .... La formation d'une identité nationale plonge ses racines dans l'histoire, les coutumes les sacrifices consentis et les succès remportés en commun,, mais la pérennité de cette construction vaut surtout en période de stabilité. Dans un temps d'instabilité, 'de décomposition institutionnelle accélérée, d'une véritable crise de différences' on assiste ... à une restructuration des identités individuelles et collectives."

*Le Monde, 5 mai, 1992*

"Es el asunto de *la otredad* que se debate hoy de un extremo a otro del continente. Europa ya no es sólo blanca y cristiana, fue uno de los escasos postulados que parecieron reunir cierto consenso en la reunión de Creta. ....

La conferencia fue convocado por la Eleni Nakou Foundation, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, de Londres, y el Hellenic Centre for European Studies, de Atenas. Se pretendía que el eje del simposio fuera el diálogo Nord-Sur. Participaron expertos de toda Europa ex occidental, Bulgaria y Rusia ....

Así las cosas, a ocho años del final del siglo, Europa se plantea una serie de preguntas de las que dependerá su futuro: ¿Existe la necesidad de sustituir la identidad europea? ¿Existe la posibilidad de hacerlo? ¿Existe la posibilidad de crear una supraentidad en la que podamos creer? En tal caso, ¿a quién admitiremos? ¿A quién no? Y ante todo: ¿sobre qué valores?"

*El Pais, 25 de Abril de 1992.*

## Participants in the symposium

Professor Hélène Ahrweiler,  
France/Greece  
Roberto Aliboni, Italy  
Fernand Auberjonois,  
UK/USA/Switzerland  
Professor Sergio Bertelli, Italy  
Claudine Caliste, France  
Dr Françoise Castal, France  
Gillian Clarke, Wales  
Philip Crookes, UK  
Dr N Diamandouros, Greece  
Dr Soledad García, Spain  
Professor Ernest Gellner,  
UK/Czechoslovakia  
Professor René Girard,  
USA/France  
Professor Sir John Hale, UK  
Professor Ilkka Heiskanen,  
Finland  
Dr Erik Holm, UK/Denmark  
Adam Hopkins, UK  
Knud W Jensen, Denmark  
Arve Johnsen, Norway  
Dr George Kolanciewicz, UK  
Vera Kornicker, France  
Gaetano La Pira, Belgium/Italy  
Dr Joseph Llobera, UK/Spain  
Michael Maclay, UK  
Dr Richard Mayne, UK  
Wolfgang Michalski,  
France/Germany

Hans S. Møller, France/Denmark  
Douglas Morrison, UK  
David Mosconi, Italy  
Professor Victor Perez Díaz,  
Spain  
Professor Robert Picht, Germany  
Dr Joao de Pina Cabral, Portugal  
Dr Vladimir Razuvayev, Russia  
Dr Karlheinz Reif,  
Belgium/Germany  
Michael Rice, UK  
Melanie Rose, Switzerland  
Professor Yannis Sakellarakis,  
Greece  
Professor Alexander Shurbanov,  
Bulgaria  
Pedro Sorela, Spain  
Dr A Strati, Greece  
Professor Loukas Tsoukalis,  
Greece  
Daniel Vernet, France  
Fritz Videbech, Spain/Denmark  
Professor Helen Wallace, UK  
Dr William Wallace, UK  
Hans Erik Wallin, Denmark  
Professor Bruno de Witte,  
Netherlands  
Dr Anita Wolf, Germany  
William Worsdale, France/UK  
Dr Giovanna Zincone, Italy

# IMAGES OF EUROPE



*The Eleni Nakou Foundation*