

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT (IPPRP)  
CONCLUDING CONFERENCE

The Harry S. Truman research institute  
for the advancement of peace  
Arab studies society  
Ariccia (Roma), 7-10/II/1992

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° inv. 11417  
12 FEB. 1992

BIBLIOTECA

- a. (Programma)
- b. "List of participants"
1. "The future of Palestinian-Arab and Israeli economic relations" / Ephraim Kleiman
2. "The future of Palestinian and Israeli economic relations: a Palestinian perspective" / Hisham Awartani
3. "Industrialization in the Occupied Territories" / Elias H. Tuma
4. "Strategy for the development of industry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: a general framework" / Ephraim Ahirom
5. "Targetting peace : the Palestinian economy in transition" / Samir Huleileh
6. "Federal/confederal solution to the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian conflict: concepts and feasibility" / Daniel Elazar
7. "Modalities of Palestinian independence: exploring the possibilities" / Emile Nakhleh
8. "Framework for a public peace process: toward a peaceful Israeli-Palestinian relationship"
9. "The image of the Arab in Israeli textbooks" / Dan Bitan
10. "The relevance of the democratization process to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" / Shukri B. Abed, Edy Kaufman
11. "The democratization process in the PLO: ideology, structure and strategy" / Manuel S. Hassassian (paper non presentato)
12. "State, territory and boundaries: attitudes and positions in the Palestinian national movement : a historical perspective" / Manuel S. Hassassian
13. "A Palestinian settlement: towards a Palestinian doctrine of national security" / A.S. Khalidi
14. "Palestinian settlement: the security issues" / Joseph Alpher
15. "Events in the Middle East : minutes of evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee : 24 April 1991"
16. "Jerusalem : resolving the unresolvable" / Moshe Amirav, Hanna Siniora
17. "The Israeli immigration and colonial settlements: a zero-sum situation?" / Muhammad Ishteyyeh
18. "Colonias in suburbia: reflections on 25 years of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza" / David Newman
19. "Options for solving the Palestinian water problem in the context of regional peace" / Elisha Kally
20. "Water: a factor for conflict or peace in the Middle East" / Abdel-Rahman Tamimi
21. "A solution to the Palestinian national question and the future of the Arabs in Israel" / Adel Manna
22. "Israel's Arab community in the context of the peace process" / Avraham Sela, Ifrach Zilberman



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## *Istituto Affari Internazionali*

### ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT (IPPRP) CONCLUDING CONFERENCE

ARICCIA (ROME) FEBRUARY 7-10, 1992  
Centro Studi CGIL

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7

#### Morning

9:30 - 10:30

#### OPENING REMARKS

Stefano Silvestri, Vice-President,  
Istituto Affari Internazionali

Muhammed Ishteyyeh, Arab Studies  
Society IPPRP, Academic Director

Moshe Ma'oz, Truman Institute IPPRP  
Academic Director

11:00 - 13:30

Session: 1

#### POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PEACE

Federal/Confederal Solutions:  
Concepts and Feasibility - Daniel  
Elazar

Modalities of Palestinian  
Independence: Exploring the  
Possibilities - Emile Nakhleh

#### Afternoon

16:00 - 19:30

Session: 2

#### SECURITY DIMENSIONS AND PEACE

Palestinian Settlement: the Security  
Issues - Joseph Alpher

Palestinian Settlement: Security  
Considerations - Ahmad Khalidi  
Discussant: Stefano Silvestri

#### Evening

FREE TIME

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 8Morning

9:00 - 12:30

Session: 3

THE ROLE OF THE SETTLEMENT IN THE  
FORMATION OF A POLITICAL LANDSCAPEThe Israeli Immigration and Colonial  
Settlements: A Zero-Sum Situation? -  
Muhammad IshteyyehColonia in Suburbia: Reflections on  
25 years of Jewish Settlements in the  
West Bank and Gaza - David NewmanAfternoon

14:30 - 18:00

Session: 4

JERUSALEM

An Undivided City as Dual Capital -  
Moshe Amirav and Hanna Siniora  
Discussant: Silvio FerrariEvening

20:00-22:00

Session: 5

EDUCATION FOR COEXISTENCE

The Image of the Arab in Israeli  
Textbooks - Dan Bitan  
??SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9Morning

9:00 - 12:30

Session: 6

DEMOCRACY AND PEACE

The Relevance of the Democratization  
Process to the Resolution of the  
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict -  
Shukri B. Abed and Edy Kaufman  
Discussant: Laura GuazzoneAfternoon

14:30 - 16:30

Session: 7

PEACE AND THE ARABS OF ISRAEL

A solution to the Palestinian  
National Question and the Future of  
the Arabs in Israel - Adel 'Manna'

17:00 - 20:30

Israel's Arab Community in the  
Context of the Peace Process -  
Avraham Sela  
Session: 8  
**SHARING AND DEVELOPING WATER  
RESOURCES**

Options for Solving the Palestinian  
Water Problem within the Context of a  
Regional Peace - Elisha Kally

The Water Conflict: Present Crisis,  
Future Possibilities - Abdul Rahman  
Tamimi Al-Amara

Evening

I.A.I. Dinner

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10

Morning

9:00 - 13:30

Session: 9  
**PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

The Future of Palestinian and Israeli  
Economic Relations: A Palestinian  
Perspective - Hisham Awartani

The Future of Palestinian-Arab and  
Israeli Economic Relations: An  
Israeli Perspective - Ephraim  
Kleiman

Targeting Peace: The Palestinian  
Economy in Transition - Samir  
Huleileh

Strategy for the Development of  
Industry in the West Bank and  
Gaza Strip: A General Framework -  
Ephraim Ahirom

Industrialization in the Occupied  
Territories - Elias H. Tuma  
Discussant: Franco Zallio

Afternoon

15:00 - 18:30

Session: 10  
**PERSPECTIVE ON TERRITORY AND  
BOUNDARIES**

Territories and Boundaries: Decision  
Crossroads in the Zionist Movement -  
Yitzhak Galnoor



State, Territory and Boundaries:  
Attitudes and Positions in the  
Palestinian National Movement (A  
Historical Perspective) - Manuel  
Hassassian  
Discussant: Philip Robins

Evening:  
20:00 - 23:00

Session: 11  
SUMMATION OF CONFERENCE AND CLOSING  
STATEMENTS

Naomi Chazan, Chairperson of the  
Truman Institute

Faysal Hussein, President of the  
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n°	REV. 11417 12 FEB. 1992
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**THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM**

الجامعة العبرية في اورشليم القدس

THE HARRY S. TRUMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE

معهد هاري س. ترومان  
للابحاث وخدمة السلام

המכון למחקר ע"ש הרי ס. טרומן  
למען קידום השלום



**Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project**  
**WORKING PAPER SERIES**

No. 1

**The Future of Palestinian-Arab  
and Israeli Economic Relations**

**Ephraim Kleiman**

Summer 1991

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.



THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT is a cooperative venture between the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Arab Studies Society, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The research project seeks to analyze, from the perspectives of Israeli and Palestinian scholars, some of the key elements of an eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab conflict. Its purpose is to promote better understanding of each side's interests in order to define areas of convergence and search for alternative solutions that could form the practical basis for peaceful coexistence.

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PEACE AND THE ARABS OF ISRAEL

DEMOCRACY AND PEACE,

EDUCATION FOR COEXISTENCE

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**THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN-ARAB AND  
ISRAELI ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS**

Ephraim Kleiman

Department of Economics

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Prepared for the Truman Institute seminar on the Future of  
Palestinian-Arab and Israeli Economic Relationships, the  
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., June 25th, 1990.

## THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN-ARAB AND ISRAELI ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

The purpose of this paper is to identify the main economic problems of the relationships which may be expected to evolve between any future Palestinian-Arab entity and Israel. It may be convenient to start our discussion from a brief description of the present interrelationship between the economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the one hand, and that of Israel on the other one. From this we shall project backwards and forwards, to understand both how the present situation came into being and how it may change, or be changed, in the future. For reasons of data reliability, the 'present' referred to here is the 1986 one; but the *intifada*, whatever its other effects, did not basically change this present's most salient economic features — a fact which, by itself, underscores the main findings of our investigation.

### 1. The Asymmetry of the Present Economic Relationships

Table 1 presents data on some of the basic economic variables affecting the current relationships between the three economies of erstwhile Mandatory Palestine. Italicized figures express the data as per cents of the total for the whole region. These data demonstrate the relatively small size, insofar as economic magnitudes are concerned, of the West Bank and Gaza as compared to Israel. Even though the total population of the former two areas is almost one-third that of Israel, the size of their economically active population is less than one-fifth the Israeli one; and the combined value added in production there (i.e., their Gross Domestic Product) amounts to no more than *one-twentieth* that produced in Israel.

The data of Table 1 are subject to a number of statistical and definitional biases. Some of these operate in opposite directions, thus tending to cancel each other out (e.g., the probable underreporting of female participation in the labour

Table 1. Relative Economic Size in 1986

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	W. Bank & Gaza	Israel	Total
Population ('000)	827 15	536 9	1,363 24	4,299 76	5,662 100
Labour force ('000)	172 10	95 5	267 15	1,472 85	1,739 100
GDP (NIS millions)	1,826 4	495 1	2,321 5	43,711 95	46,032 100
GNP (NIS millions)	2,211 5	836 2	3,047 7	42,070 93	45,117 100
GNP per head (\$)	1,780 34	1,040 20	1,490 28	6,520 123	5,311 100

Notes: All data are for 1986. Population – average population in 1986. Civilian labour force, aged 15+. East Jerusalem included in Israel. GNP per capita – GNP figures in current, 1986 NIS, divided by average population, translated into U.S.\$ at 1.5 NIS per dollar.

Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (C.B.S.), *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, Tables XXVII/1 and II/1, Table XXVII/18 and XII/1, and Tables XXVII/7 and VI/1.

force of the traditional agricultural sector in the 'territories', and the exclusion of armed forces' personnel from the civilian labour force data in Israel). The only correction which could have any significant effect is the counting of East Jerusalem within the West Bank rather than in Israel. Even this, however, would not have changed the overall impression of Table 1: Assuming, for sake of argument and lack of separate data, per capita GDP in East Jerusalem to be three or four times that in the West Bank, its inclusion in the latter would raise the West Bank's per capita

product by nearly a third. But even then, the combined GDP of the territories thus defined would amount to only one-fourteenth that of Israel.

Economic relationships between different geographic or political regions express themselves in flows of goods, services, and factors of production. They may also express themselves in externalities — the benefits (or, if negative, burdens) which economic activity in one of them generates in the other. Such externalities need not be mutual or symmetrical: the increase, say, in the number of tourists visiting Israel, due to the possibility of visiting the West Bank at the same time, could be larger than the increase in the number of those visiting the West Bank, due to the possibility of visiting Israel. In any case, externality effects, besides not being easily quantified, can be expected to be negligible relative to the flows across-borders representing specialization in production and exchange. The absolute values of such flows do not depend, of course, on their direction. But their relative importance to the participating economies can vary considerably.

The main flows of exchange between the West Bank and Gaza on the one hand, and Israel on the other hand, are summarized in Table 2. They are expressed there both in absolute terms and (in italicized figures) relative to the totals for the corresponding economies. The reliability of the data and, consequently, of the relative dependence measures derived from them, is far from uniform. Because of the long land borders, especially between the West Bank and Israel, the movement of goods across them is difficult to monitor. Thus, the figures on merchandise trade between them, as well as between Israel and Gaza, are, on the evidence of their own compilers, only "gross evaluation[s] based on a sample enumeration of transfers of goods through the official transit points."<sup>1</sup> Little can be said of the direction of the resultant bias except, perhaps, that in view of the restriction imposed by the Israeli authorities on the exportation of agricultural produce to Israel (and the difficulty in

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<sup>1</sup> Nor do they include purchases made by individuals, as opposed to commercial consignments. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (C.B.S.), *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, p. 101.

Table 2. Main Interregional Flows in 1986

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	W. Bank & Gaza	Israel
Exports to Israel (\$ mil.) <sup>a</sup>	156	119	275	275
Total exports (imports) <sup>b</sup>	240	140	380	9,560
Percent of total	65	85	72	3
Imports from Israel (\$ mil.) <sup>a</sup>	451	347	798	798
Total imports (exports) <sup>c</sup>	512	378	890	7,731
Percent of total	88	92	90	10
Employment in Israel ('000)	51	43	94	94
Total employment	166	94	260	1,368
Percent of total	31	46	36	7
Factor incomes from Israel (NIS millions) <sup>d</sup>	385	341	726	726
Percent of GNP	17	41	24	2

**Notes:**

<sup>a</sup> Goods only, exclusive of trade in services.

<sup>b</sup> Total exports of goods from the territories, and total imports of goods (net of returned imports) to Israel from all the world, respectively.

<sup>c</sup> Total imports of goods to the territories, and total exports (net of returned exports) of goods from Israel, respectively.

<sup>d</sup> We have assumed here that all "payments from abroad to factors of production" reported in National Accounts data are wages earned in Israel. But Balance of Payments figures (Table XXVII/11), give total gross income from wages from abroad as \$292.3 (NIS 438.5) and \$233.6 (NIS 350.5) for the West Bank and Gaza, respectively.

**Sources:** C.B.S., *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, Tables XXVII/12 and VIII/1, Tables XXVII/22, and XII/10, and Tables XXVII/7 and VI/1, and XXVII/21.

identifying it), the figures on exports to Israel may be expected to underestimate their true level.

Paradoxically enough, the overwhelming share of Israel in the trade of the other two territories means that this share's magnitude will be only little affected by revisions of the trade figures. Thus, for example, an upward adjustment of the figures on its imports from Israel by one-third (assuming the data on trade with other countries to be unaffected by such a revision), would have raised their share in the West Bank's total imports by as little as three percentage points, from 88 to 91 per cent. On the other hand, some of the imports reported as originating in Israel are most probably imports from other countries, purchased through Israeli importers, who serve as the (often exclusive, authorized) representatives of foreign producers. (From the Israeli point of view, these should be regarded as transit trade, not as exports.) At the same time, trade in services other than labour may have been underreported. Similarly, the payments from Israel to factors of production in the West Bank and Gaza consist of the wage earnings imputed to their residents employed in Israel, and are subject to the errors and biases of both the employment and the wage figures from which they were derived.

Whatever their statistical shortcomings, the data of Table 2 vividly illustrate the basic asymmetry of the economic relationship between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Israel: because of the disparity in their sizes, the exchanges between them play completely different roles in their respective economies. Even if Israel were to be the sole market for all the exports of the former two territories, it would depend on them for no more than four per cent of its imports. Similarly, if all the imports to the West Bank and Gaza attributed to Israel do, indeed, originate in it, these territories provide a market for as much as one-tenth of all Israeli exports of merchandise. But this share of theirs in its export markets, though not negligible, is a far cry from Israel's near monopoly in *their* import markets. The same is true also of the labour market. As can be seen from the third panel of Table 2, nearly two out of five of all

gainfully employed residents of the West Bank and Gaza worked in Israel, though their share of all employment there did not exceed seven percent.

Missing from Table 2 are the flows of capital usually associated with international and interregional exchange relationships. No data are available on such flows, and we have to limit ourselves to some rough guesswork. Whatever private business investment has taken place, can be assumed to have trickled from Israel to the West Bank and Gaza, rather than the other way round. This would also hold true of short-run credit, on the net, given the disparity in the magnitudes of their trade flows: assuming average commercial credit of one-month's duration, the net credit extended by Israel would have amounted in 1986 to 44 million dollars. This is one-twelfth of its trade surplus with the West Bank and Gaza — but much of that may have been offset by wages owed to their residents by Israeli employers, by holdings of Israeli currency and by deposits held in Israeli banks.<sup>2</sup> In any case, the year-to-year *changes* in the sum outstanding of such credits, i.e., the short-term capital movements, are most probably small enough to be ignored.

Institutional capital flows, on the other hand, seem to have gone in the opposite direction. Long-run investments, mainly in the infrastructure, by the Israeli Administration were on the whole financed out of tax revenues collected in the West Bank and Gaza themselves; while investment in Israeli settlements there should be viewed, for almost all practical purposes, as investment in Israel proper. But the levy-equivalent of social security payments, withheld from the earnings of the nearly half of the West Bank and Gaza workers employed in Israel under work permits, net of pensions and compensations paid out of them, constitutes a long-term investment in Israel. This flow must have amounted in 1986 to at least 15 to 20 million dollars per

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<sup>2</sup> The accepted National Accounting practices ignore the debt to *gustarbeiter*, which accrues when wages are paid other than on a daily basis. Given the present magnitudes, this debt may deserve some explicit attention.



annum, and deserves some further study.<sup>3</sup>

It should be emphasized that the basic asymmetry observed in Table 2 is inherent in the very sizes of the corresponding economies. It cannot be rectified through any policy measure, whether mutually agreed-upon or unilateral, so long as the disparity in sizes persists. This asymmetry also means that the mutual vulnerability of the economies, the macro-economic importance of the relationships between them, the social significance of these relationships, and the strength of the pressure groups lobbying for their continuation or cessation, can all be expected to be felt more strongly in the economy of any future Palestinian-Arab entity than in Israel.

## 2. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion

Although neither policy nor autonomous developments can vitiate the asymmetry pointed out in the preceding section, they can change the absolute magnitudes of the flows surveyed there, thus reducing (or enhancing) in both economies the degree to which each depends on the other. We may, therefore, wish to know what are the changes that can be expected to occur following the cessation of the present state of occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to what extent they are they sensitive to the character of the political solution (or, to put it differently, of the political entity to be established there).

A partial answer to these questions is implicit in the explanation of how the present economic relationships came into being. Before June 1967 the West Bank was part of the Jordanian economy and Gaza was associated with the Egyptian one; neither region had any economic relationship whatsoever with Israel. From the point of view of international trade, the Six-Day War imposed on these territories a custom

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<sup>3</sup> Calculated assuming Social Insurance equivalent payments, net of pensions etc., of 20 per cent on nearly half of the wage-bill, equally divided between a levy on employers and a withholding tax on employees. For an enumeration of the various components of these payments, see Arie Bregman, *Economic Growth in the Administered Areas, 1968-1973*, Jerusalem, Bank of Israel Research Department, 1975, Table III-7.

union with Israel, in place of their previous respective customs unions with Jordan and with Egypt. As all custom unions, this one also resulted in both trade creation and trade diversion. Negligible transportation costs, and the absence of any domestic custom duties, were the positive factors behind the growth of imports from Israel into the 'territories'. To the extent that these factors represented increased specialization and exchange, they created new trade. The rest of the growth of imports from Israel was trade diversion, due to the substitution of more cheaply acquired or transported israeli goods for those hitherto imported from the rest of the world. Further trade diversion was caused by a negative factor — the application of the Israeli custom duties to imports from the rest of the world. On manufactured goods these duties averaged nearly 80 per cent in 1967, considerably exceeding the average 17 per cent Jordanian tariff prevailing in 1966.<sup>4</sup> They may have been expected, therefore, to encourage the substitution of Israeli (and, in theory, also of domestic) goods for imports from other sources. These considerations applied to a somewhat lesser extent to exports, where administrative quotas were imposed to protect Israeli agriculture, and where the West Bank continued to enjoy preferential treatment on some of its sales to Jordan.

Tables 3 and 4 provide some idea of the effects of these developments. The first of these shows that Israel has almost completely crowded out both Jordan and the rest of the world as a supplier of the West Bank's imports. On the export side, however, Israel seems to have taken over the role of the rest of the world, as a market for the West Bank's products, but only marginally the role of Jordan. This differential effect on the West Bank's imports and exports was due only in part to the fact that while the latter continued to enter Jordan duty free, its imports from Jordan were now subject to Israeli custom duties. On the main, it reflected the low availabi-

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<sup>4</sup> See Michael Michaely, *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Israel*, N.B.E.R. Special Conference Series on Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, Vol. III, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975, Table 3-4; Israel Economic Planning Authority, *An Economic Survey of the West Bank*, Jerusalem, July 1967 (in Hebrew), p. C-28.

lity of potential importables in the East Bank part of Jordan — which explains also why the share of Jordan in the West Bank's imports was already so much lower in 1966 than in its exports.

Table 4 shows that the West Bank's imports grew only slightly more rapidly than its GDP between 1966 and 1986. This suggests that the growth of Israel's share in these imports does, indeed, represent a demand for imports which in the absence of trade with Israel, and given the West Bank's economic growth, would have been satisfied by other suppliers. (As pointed out in the preceding section, some of these imports probably still originate abroad, being purchased *via*, rather than *from*, Israel.) The sharp rise in the ratio of exports to GDP, on the other hand, suggests that the

Table 3. Distribution of Merchandise Trade

		Imports			Exports		
		West Bank		Gaza	West Bank		Gaza
		1966	1986	1986	1966	1986	1986
From/to:	Jordan	18	2	--	46	35	13
	Israel	--	88	92	--	65	85
	Others	82	10	8	54	--	2
Total		100	100	<u>100</u>	100	100	<u>100</u>

Sources: 1966 — Israel Economic Planning Authority, *An Economic Survey of the West Bank*, July 1967, chapter C. (Based on official Jordanian and U.N. statistics.) 1986 — Israel C.B.S., *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, Table XXVII/12. East Jerusalem included in Israel.

Table 4. Selected Trade Indicators

	West Bank		Gaza
	1966	1986	1986
Imports as % of GDP	40	44	121
Exports as % of GDP	7	21	45
Exports as % of imports	18	47	37
Export of labour services as per cent of imports	29	57	62

Source: 1966 – as for Table 3. 1986 – C.B.S., *Abstract*, Tables XXVII/10 and XXVII/12. East Jerusalem included in Israel.

growth of Israel's share in them represents, to a considerable extent, trade creation — i.e., an increase in specialization and exchange due to the access, however circumscribed, to Israeli markets.

Developments of the exports of labour services are seen in Table 4 to have paralleled those in the exports of goods, having grown about twice as rapidly as imports. As some of the payments to factors of production from countries other than Israel are probably recorded as transfers from abroad, the existing data may underestimate the true volume of labour exports from the West Bank. While physical proximity to work in Israel has obviously resulted in the diversion to it of much of the labour previously offered abroad, it has resulted also in tremendous 'trade creation'. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4 below.

Lack of data on the pre-1967 situation makes it impossible to analyze in a similar manner trade developments in the Gaza Strip. The high ratios there of trade to domestic economic activity reflect the Strip's small size and lack of resources other

than labour. For this reason and because of its initial physical and political isolation, the trade-creating effects in Gaza may be expected to have been relatively greater than in the West Bank. This is certainly true of the export of labour services, to be discussed later.

### 3. The Future of Trade Relationships

The trade relationships with Israel of any future entity that may evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will depend on a number of (interrelated) factors. The most obvious of these factors are both the trade policies it adopts *vis-à-vis* the world at large, and those adopted towards, and reciprocated by, Israel and other close neighbours, such as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Consider first, at one end of the spectrum, the pursuit of a perfect free trade policy — i.e., the total abstention from the imposition of any protective tariff whatsoever. Today, domestic production in the territories is completely exposed to competition from Israel, but is sheltered from competition from the rest of the world by high Israeli customs as well as non-tariff barriers. Its release from the latter, in principle, should result in some trade-creation, as imports are substituted for expensive domestic production. In view of the present size and character of industrial production in the West Bank and Gaza, however, this effect might be expected to be negligible. On the other hand, the relatively highly protected (and therefore, on the whole, expensive) Israeli products would then have to compete in the markets of these territories with free imports from the rest of the world, left only with the advantage of low transportation costs. This could result in considerable trade-diversion, that would greatly reduce the West Bank's and Gaza's dependence on Israel as a supplier of imports. But given the physical proximity of Israel, as well as the physical characteristics of much of their imports from it, it would most probably continue to be the main single source of the West Bank's and Gaza's imports.

The trade policies of Jordan will be probably of little account in this context.

Given that the (East Bank) economy of Jordan competes with, rather than complements the economies of the West Bank and Gaza, there is little scope for trade with it. The expected situation *vis-à-vis* Israel would, however, change if the latter was to subsidize its exports to the West Bank and Gaza (both directly and indirectly), as it subsidizes its exports to other countries. Such a step would reduce the trade diverting effects on the share of West Bank and Gaza imports originating in Israel.

The other extreme alternative is that of the new entity pursuing a highly protective tariff policy both *vis-à-vis* Israel and *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. Making imports more expensive would encourage their substitution by domestic production, leading to a general contraction of trade and causing the ratio of imports to GDP to fall below the two-fifths level of Table 4. But the imposition of the same tariff on imports from Israel would affect their *relative* competitiveness in precisely the same manner as the abolition of tariffs on all the other imports. Consequently, except for the effect that the general trade contraction would have on them, the effect on trade relations with Israel would be similar to that expected under a free trade policy, and its share of all imports would remain unaffected.

The potential for import substitution on a large scale in the West Bank and Gaza is, probably, fairly limited, so that their present dependence on Israel for their imports may be expected to change significantly only as a result of the establishment of a tariff discriminating against Israel. Thus, the imposition, in an otherwise free trade context, of a protective custom duty on imports from Israel, would further promote their substitution by imports from the rest of the world. (To have an effect of the same magnitude under a general protective tariff policy, the tariff on Israeli goods would have to exceed both that on imports from other sources and that required to obtain the same effect under an open doors policy towards the rest of the world.) It should be pointed out, however, that if the present dependence of the West Bank and Gaza on employment in Israel continues, the diversion of the import trade away from it may have an adverse effect on their residents' opportunities to work in Israel.

The development of the future entity's exports — unlike that of its imports — will depend to a great extent not on its own trade policies, but on those of its potential trade partners, its close neighbours in particular. Thus, the removal of the present administrative restrictions on imports of West Bank and Gaza manufactured goods into Jordan would most probably be mainly trade-creating. By encouraging the production of such goods for exportation, it would raise the ratio of exports to GDP in the two territories, and also raise Jordan's share of them. On the other hand, a similar removal of administrative restrictions by Israel would probably serve mainly to divert trade: Insofar as these restrictions apply mainly to agricultural produce, which is subject to soil and water limitations, removing them can be expected to result not so much in an expansion of production, as in the shifting of sales from across the Jordan to the more lucrative Israeli market. Finally, increased access to other markets — such as would result from being granted a preferential status by the European Economic Community and, to a lesser extent, also from the removal of the restrictions imposed by the Israeli administration on exports to third parties — could both boost the export trade in general and decrease the share of it conducted with Israel.

Other factors which may affect future trade relationships are the development of domestic demand in the West Bank and Gaza, the availability of investment funds there, and the tendency of their residents to seek employment in Israel.

#### **4. Labour Exports and Population Growth**

The high proportion of West Bank and Gaza residents employed in Israel represents a flow of labour services from relatively labour-abundant, capital-scarce economies to a relatively labour-scarce, capital-abundant one. The gravitation of labour from low-wage to high-wage markets can take the form either of a recurrent sale of such services to employers abroad, or of the transplantation of the very labour force producing them. In the extreme form of the latter case, whole family units emigrate to settle permanently in another country, their incomes accruing, and being

consumed, wholly in their new place of residence. The transplantation may also be temporary, as in the case of 'guest workers', with dependent family members left behind, and much of the income earned in the host country being sent back to provide for them. At the other extreme, workers living on one side of an international or interregional border, may be working on its other side, earning their income entirely in one country and spending it entirely in another. The exports of labour services from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over the years ran the whole gamut of these possibilities.

In its nearly two decades under Jordanian rule, the West Bank experienced a considerable outflow of population. A development policy favouring the East Bank of the Kingdom, resulted both in prosperity there and in stagnation in the West Bank. This generated both 'push' and 'pull' migratory effects, the latter strengthened further by the growing demand for skilled labour in some of the oil-producing Arab countries, Kuwait in particular. To judge by the numerical preponderance of females in the 1961 population census, about fifty thousand male residents were employed outside the West Bank at the time.<sup>5</sup> In the usual pattern of economically motivated emigration, such temporary, or even seasonal, employment abroad of a male breadwinner was often followed, after some time lag, by the emigration of his dependents as well. It has been estimated that emigration offset about 70 per cent of the natural population increase in the West Bank in the years 1952-1967.<sup>6</sup> Altogether, at least a quarter million of the West Bank's inhabitants left it in this period. Were it not for

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<sup>5</sup> Estimate based on the differences, by decennial age groups, between the West Bank and the Israeli Arab female-male population ratios, as observed in the respective Jordanian and Israeli 1961 population census. [To be recalculated, as actual Israeli figures used were for 1967.]

<sup>6</sup> See Gabriel, S.A., and E.F. Sabatello, "Palestinian Migration from the West Bank and Gaza: Economic and Demographic Analyses", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1986, Vol. 34, pp. 245-262. Also, Economic Planning Authority, *The West-Bank: An Economic Survey*, Jerusalem, July 1967 (in Hebrew). An even higher emigration figure is implied in Antoine Mansour, "The West Bank Economy 1948-1984," in George T. Abed (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy*, Routledge, London, 1988, pp. 71-100. A serious difficulty with West Bank population data is the availability of only two benchmark sets of figures, those of the Jordanian Population and Housing Census of 1961, and those of the Israeli census of September 1967.



emigration, and taking into consideration also the migrants' own natural increase, the population of the West Bank would have amounted to close to 1.25 millions in 1967, rather than 845,000 estimated to have resided there on the eve of the Six-Day War.

Lack of pre-1967 benchmark data makes it impossible to estimate the extent of emigration from the Gaza Strip in this period. The inferior political status of its residents and the lack of immediate labour-scarce neighbours, can be expected to have restricted their emigration opportunities, relative to those of the West Bankers. This is suggested also by the relative number of household members living abroad at the time of the 1967 census being significantly lower in Gaza. Even so, at least one-third of its natural population increase was probably offset by emigration. Had emigration there proceeded at the rate observed in the West Bank, the Strip's population by 1967 would have been only 80 percent of its actual level. Given the heavy pressure of population on resources in Gaza, the poorer emigration opportunities reflected themselves perforce in lower standards of living.

The 1967 war was accompanied by a mass exodus from the West Bank, and to a lesser extent also from the Gaza Strip. This continued also in the following year. The population of both regions reached its nadir by the end of 1968, with 583,000 resident in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), and 357,000 in Gaza. Since then, however, the emigration rates were much reduced, averaging no more than 1.0 and 0.7 per cent, respectively, in the two territories in the subsequent eighteen years. As a result, emigration no longer offset most of the natural population increase. Thus, the population of the West Bank (exclusive of East Jerusalem) was more than one-fifth larger at the end of 1986 than it would have been had the pre-1967 emigration rates prevailed after 1968. Indeed, had emigration at these rates continued, then even without the 1967-68 mass exodus, the population of the West Bank (Jerusalem included) in 1986 would have barely exceeded its actual present level!

What checked the outflow of population from these two regions, were the employment opportunities offered by the Israel labour market. Table 5 provides figures

Table 5. Labour Force and Employment

(Thousands)

	West Bank				Gaza Strip			
	Total labor force	Of which:			Total labor force	Of which:		
		Employed		Unem- ployed		Employed		Unem- ployed
		Domes- tically	In Israel			Domes- tically	In Israel	
1969	114.6	101.2	8.7	4.7	58.2	51.7	1.2	5.3
1970	118.4	99.8	14.7	3.8	62.4	52.9	5.9	3.7
1975	133.9	91.9	40.4	1.6	72.7	46.7	25.9	0.3
1980	137.2	94.3	40.6	2.4	81.3	46.3	34.5	0.4
1987	182.3	114.7	62.9	4.6	101.7	54.1	46.0	1.6
"1968"— 1987 <sup>a</sup>	67.7	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	62.9	--	43.5	-4.1 <sup>a</sup>	46.0	--

<sup>a</sup> Calculated assuming 'normal' number of persons employed domestically in 1968 to have been equal to actual number of persons participating in the labour force in 1969. Sum of columns does not always add up to totals because of rounding.

Source: C.B.S., *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, Tables XXVII/18 and XXVII/22, and *Monthly Statistics of the Administered Territories*, Vol II, No. 2, February 1972, Table E/4 (for figures on employment in Israel in 1969). West Bank exclusive of East Jerusalem.

on the employment of their residents in some selected years, and its distribution between the domestic and the Israeli market.

To correct for the abnormally low labour participation rates, and the high unemployment of the immediate post-war period, the figure for the total labour force in 1969 has been taken to represent the normal domestic employment level before access to the Israeli market was first gained. A comparison of the current figures with

these 'normal' ones for 1968, presented in the last row of the table, shows the total increase in the labour force since then to more or less equal employment in Israel in 1987. Taken together, the labour force in the two regions grew by 111,000, of which employment in Israel accounted for 109,000. In fact, compared with our initial 'normal' figures, the number of persons employed in the West Bank has remained constant, while in Gaza it even fell. In other words, the Israeli labour market accommodated all the labour force increment in the West Bank in the two decades after 1967, and absorbed even more than that in Gaza.

As in the case of merchandise trade, so also in the export of labour services, the opening up of the Israel labour market may have been expected to result both in the diversion of such exports from their traditional markets, and in a general rise in their level. Table 6 presents estimates of the development of the labour force in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, under two alternative sets of assumptions regarding the emigration of workers. Row 1 of the table shows what size the labour force would have been in 1987, had emigration ceased altogether. Row 2, on the other hand, shows the size it would have attained, had emigration persisted at its pre-1967 levels. The difference between these two figures, shown in row 4, provides an estimate of the labour outflow which would have occurred under the *ante-bellum* conditions. On the other hand, the difference between the figures in row 1 and the actual labour force data of row 3, estimates the labour outflow which actually took place. The difference between the hypothetical and the actual outflow, shown in row 6, provides an estimate of the labour exports diverted from other outside markets to the Israeli one. Because access to this market does not necessitate change of residence, the diversion to it of labour exports represents also a saving in emigration. As can be seen from the last three rows of Table 6, labour thus diverted accounted for just over one-half and one-quarter, respectively, of the West Bank and Gaza labour force employed in Israel in 1987. The rest — amounting altogether to 64,000 jobs — constitutes a net increase in the export of labour services. It should be emphasized,

Table 6. The Diversion of Labour Migration (in thousands)

		West Bank		Gaza Strip
(1) 1987 labour force without emigration		216.6		113.9
(2) Same at pre-1967 emigration rates		149.8		89.2
(3) Actual 1987 labour force		182.3		101.7
(4) Potential emigration		66.8		24.7
<i>Of which:</i>				
(5) Actual emigration		34.3		12.2
(6) Emigration saved (diverted)		32.5		12.5
(7) Employment in Israel in 1987	<u>100%</u>	62.9	<u>100%</u>	46.0
<i>Of which:</i>				
(6) Emigration saved	52	32.5	27	12.5
(8) Net outside job addition	48	30.4	73	33.5

Row (1): Assuming labour emigration to have been prevented, at a rate equal to that for the population as a whole since 1969. (As labour force actually grew more quickly than population, the resultant potential labour force growth rates, 3.6 and 3.8 per cent, respectively, exceed the corresponding natural increase rates of 3.1 and 3.6.)

Row (2): Calculated by deducting from the potential growth rates underlying row (1) the 1952-1966 emigration rates for the population as a whole, assuming the rate for Gaza to have been 2/3 of the 2.1 per cent per annum one observed in the West Bank.

Row (4): [(1)-(2)] = [(5)+(6)].

Row (5): [(1)-(3)].

Row (6): [(3)-(2)].

Row (8): [(7)-(6)].

however, that, as in the case of exports diverted from other labour markets, these take here the form of daily commuting, rather than of permanent migration.

For Israel, all labour services purchased from the West Bank and Gaza represent 'trade creation', there having been virtually no imports of such services there

before 1968. Because of the basic size disparity, pointed out earlier, they play an incomparably smaller role in the Israeli economy than in the economies of the two regions from which they emanate. But this role, though marginal, is not negligible. Given the average Israeli labour force participation rate of 34 per cent, the addition of 109,000 workers — the number of West Bank and Gaza residents actually employed in Israel in 1987 — would have required a population increment, i.e., net immigration, of about 300,000 persons. This should be compared with an actual gross immigration of 400,000 in the fifteen-year period 1972-1987, and a net one about half this size. Insofar as the labour supply is concerned, the import of labour services from the territories overcompensated emigration from Israel by more than fifty per cent.<sup>7</sup>

### **5. The Future of Labour Flows**

The choice of policies regulating the labour exports from any future Palestinian-Arab entity to Israel may be expected to depend to a great extent on the effect they will have on each of the respective economies. Because they are easier to trace there, we examine first the manner in which the Israel economy will be affected by such alternative policies.

As can be seen in Table 7, the dependence of Israel on labour from the West Bank and Gaza varies considerably from one industrial sector to another. Altogether, this labour amounted in recent years to no more than 6 to 7 percent of all civilian employment in Israel. But nearly half of it was concentrated in the construction industry, accounting for over two-fifths of all employment there, and another 16 per cent in agriculture, where their share was close to one-fifth. At the other end of the scale, since non-citizens are barred from employment in the Israel civil service, we have assumed the share of workers from the territories in public and communal services (and financial ones and public utilities as well) to be negligible. Generally

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<sup>7</sup> There seems to be some political irony in that it was Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which prevented their gradual depopulation, while the lowering of emigration rates there compensated the Israel economy for the drying-up of Jewish immigration.

Table 7. West Bank and Gaza Workers in the Israel Labour Market, 1986

	(Percent)		
	Share of WB and G workers in total <sup>a</sup>	Industry share in WB & G workers <sup>b</sup>	Total industry share in Israel <sup>c</sup>
Construction	42.4	48.1	7.3
Agriculture	17.4	15.6	5.8
Manufacturing	4.9	17.5	23.2
Commerce & services <sup>d</sup>	4.8	18.8	25.3
Public services etc. <sup>e</sup>	--	--	38.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>6.5</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>

<sup>a</sup> West Bank and Gaza workers employed in Israel as per cent of all persons employed in the industry.

<sup>b</sup> West Bank and Gaza workers employed in the industry, as per cent of total employed in Israel.

<sup>c</sup> All persons employed in industry as per cent of total employment in Israel.

<sup>d</sup> Commerce, transportation and communication, and personal and associated services.

<sup>e</sup> Public, community, and financial and business services, and public utilities such as electricity and water. Presumably not employing workers from the territories in any significant numbers.

Sources: C.B.S., *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1989*, Tables XII/9 and XXVII/21.

speaking, it may be expected that these differences will be greater, the more narrow the industry definition. The available data distinguish only between four main industry groups (lumping all service and public utility industries together). But given the occupational structure of West Bank and Gaza workers in Israel, we can expect their share to be negligible in electronics, but relatively high in textiles and food-processing or, say, in motor vehicle repairshops.

Considered from the Israeli point of view, the data of Table 7 show that nearly two-fifths of the Israeli economy does not depend at all on labour from the territories, and would not be directly affected if it were withdrawn. In another half of the economy, as measured by employment, this dependence is on the average very low, and is probably highly localized in certain narrowly defined sub-industries or geographic regions, such as the industrial estate at the Erez checkpoint, just to the north of the Gaza Strip. A complete withdrawal from Israel of all labour from the West Bank and Gaza could be expected to cause the failure of firms which rely almost exclusively on this labour, due to their inability to remain competitive in its absence. But it will have no significant effect on total activity in this sector. If, at the same time, trade relationships continue uninterrupted, some of the production no longer taking place in Israel may be expected to shift to the territories themselves.

The sector most dependent on the supply of labour from the territories is relatively small, accounting for only about one-eighth of all employment in the economy. Of the two industries comprising it, agriculture is probably less vulnerable in the longer run. In the absence of the labour now supplied by workers from the West Bank and Gaza, the present agricultural product-mix would not be sustainable, and would have to change, away from the more labour-intensive crops. To an even greater degree than in manufacturing, some of the demand for agricultural produce now satisfied with the help of this labour, could then be expected to turn to producers inside the territories.

On the other hand construction, the other industry in this sector, is both much more dependent on imported labour services and, having strong backward linkages into manufacturing, has been historically a leading sector in the Israeli economy. The withdrawal there of all labour from the West Bank and Gaza could possibly, in the short run, bring the industry to a standstill. After an initial adjustment period, the following changes could be expected to occur, probably in this order: (a) a sharp rise in wage rates in construction, in an attempt to attract Israeli workers; (b) some

importation of foreign labour from other countries (to be further discussed below); (c) increased use of mechanical equipment and of prefabricated components; and (d) standardization of the industry's output, as the higher cost of customized residential housing, as well as offices, reduces the quantity demanded.

The demand for pre-fabricated elements can be expected to increase imports of the labour-intensive carpentry and smithery products from the West Bank and Gaza. But this would be at least partly offset by a decline in the imports of building stone from the West Bank — the use of which is highly labour intensive (and is complementary to the employment of specialized West Bank workers).

To what extent could 'guest workers' from other countries substitute for labour from the West Bank and Gaza? Recent years have witnessed increased worldwide labour mobility. Israel is no exception, both in losing highly skilled workers to richer countries, such as the U.S., and in attracting relatively less skilled ones from, in addition to the territories, some Third-World countries and, more recently, also South and East European ones. However, unlike workers from the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom commute daily to their work, labour from more distant countries would have to be provided with housing, thereby raising its costs to employers.<sup>8</sup> As the presence of such non-commuting 'guest workers' could be expected to raise all the social problems resulting from their long separation from their families, their importation on a large scale would probably have been opposed also on non-economic grounds. Thus, while some substitution of workers from the territories by those from other countries could certainly take place, the scope for it seems to be fairly restricted.

Finally, it must be asked whether large-scale Jewish immigration into Israel would not substitute for labour from the territories. The effects of immigration on the

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<sup>8</sup> The only exception is southern Lebanon, some two-thousands of whose residents currently commute to work in Israel. But the scope for further expansion in commuter labour from this source is limited, both by the size of the labour force available there and by its geographic distance from the main centres of economic activity in Israel.



labour market have been the subject of a number of studies in Israel.<sup>9</sup> Their main conclusion is that, because it creates demand for housing, the immigration of whole families, unlike that of unaccompanied breadwinners, initially increases the demand for labour much more than its supply. Whatever the effect of large-scale immigration in other industries, its impact on construction would be to greatly *increase* the demand for labour from the territories.

## 6. The Political Economy of Labour Flows

To be economically viable, any political entity which may evolve in the West Bank and Gaza will have to be able to provide its citizens with high enough standards of living to prevent them from emigrating. If it will wish to completely withhold its labour from the Israeli market for political reasons, or if it finds its workforce barred from it by Israel, it will be faced with the problem of providing jobs for all those presently employed there. To provide some idea of the magnitude of this task, we should consider that today it would require the creation of nearly two new jobs for each three existing presently in these territories. Taking also in consideration the future growth of the labour force, employment opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza would have to no less than double by 1995, if the labour flows were to cease completely.

As has been shown in the preceding section, the cessation of labour flows from the territories to Israel can be expected, on purely economic grounds, to be accompanied by some increase in their exports to it. If goods, whether final or intermediate, now produced in Israel by labour from the territories are instead produced in the territories themselves, their production there may be expected to be more labour-intensive, thereby providing more jobs than are lost through their no longer being produced in Israel. Given the present state of industries in the West Bank and Gaza,

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<sup>9</sup> See Meir Merhav, "Some Economic Consequences of the Renewal of Mass Immigration", *Bulletin of the Bank of Israel* [now *Bank of Israel Economic Review*], 17, August 1962, 3-30. And, more recently, Bank of Israel Research Department, *Economic Policy in Times of Immigration*, Jerusalem, May 1990.

however, the scope for such substitution is extremely limited.

Even if the capital required for absorbing all the labour now employed in Israel were to become instantly available, the planning and gestation period of investment would entail a lag of a few years before the ensuing jobs become available. Some immediate employment opportunities could be created through the much needed expansion of infrastructure and, provided the financing is forthcoming, the construction of housing for the residents of the refugee camps, especially in Gaza.

Thus, in the short and intermediate run, at least, the West Bank and Gaza will continue to depend to a great extent on the export of labour services to Israel. The behaviour of the flow of these services over the last couple of years provide some indication of its independence of political attitudes and decisions. Though the *intifada* was initially accompanied by at least localized attempts to withhold labour from Israel, the number of West Bank and Gaza residents employed in Israel did not decline, and in fact even rose slightly between 1987 and 1988.<sup>10</sup> While political and social considerations may make it desirable for the territories to ultimately discontinue their dependence on work in Israel, economic pressures will make it necessary for them to uphold it in the short run.

As we have seen in the preceding section, Israel's economic interest in letting the labour flow continue undisturbed is not a compelling one. It may, however, be in its political interest to do so, in order to prevent the radicalization and instability, to which economic deterioration would give rise in the West Bank and Gaza, whatever their political status. In the longer run, however, Israel may wish to restrict this flow in order to reduce the tensions resulting from the day-to-day friction in which ethnic and class conflicts overlap, and which seem to have provided some of the background

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<sup>10</sup> See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1989*, Table XXVII/21. The dislocation of economic activity, due to the uprising and to the countermeasures adopted by the Israeli authorities, expressed itself in a decrease in the number of hours worked per employee. This decline, however, was, if at all, somewhat larger for those residents of the West Bank and Gaza employed in these territories than for those employed in Israel. See *ibid.*, Tables XXVII/26 and XXVII/27.

to the outbreak of the *intifada*.


This correspondence between the short-term economic interests of the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel's short-term political ones, and between the social and political interests of both in the long run, provides some scope for cooperation or — what amounts really to the same thing — for mutual exploitation. On the immediate agenda for such cooperation would be, first, the regulation of the status of workers commuting to work in Israel, most of whom do not enjoy the protection either of Israel's labour legislation or of its trade unions. Ways would also have to be suggested for the phasing out of the labour flows or, at least, for their restriction to magnitudes acceptable to both parties. Unless precluded on political grounds, such phasing out could be achieved through 'exporting' labour-intensive industries from Israel to the West Bank and Gaza, bringing capital to the workers, rather than the other way round. And, as trade can substitute for factor movements, agreements on labour flows should ultimately be supplemented by agreements on trade as well.

## APPENDIX

Growth of Per Capita Product  
(percent per annum)

	GNP			GDP		
	West Bank and Gaza (1)	Israel (2)	Differ- ential (3)	West Bank and Gaza (4)	Israel (5)	Differ- ential (6)
1969-72	19.2	7.9	11.3	11.6	7.9	3.7
1973-76	5.4	0.8	4.4	5.6	1.2	4.4
1977-80	5.1	1.0	4.1	4.6	1.1	3.5
1981-84	-0.4	0.6	-0.9	-1.4	0.6	-2.0
1985-86	1.6	2.6	-1.0	5.0	2.0	3.0


**Sources:** GDP rates of growth for the West Bank and Gaza, at constant 1986 prices, from Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (C.B.S), "National Accounts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area," *Special Publications No. 818*, Table 1; GNP growth rates derived by adjusting the GDP rate according to the change in the GNP/GDP ratio at current prices, obtained from the same table. Population growth rates calculated from midyear population figures, C.B.S, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989*, Table XXVII/1.



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Summer 1991

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
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# **THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

**A Palestinian Perspective**

**By**

**Hisham Awartani**  
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## **The Future of Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: A Palestinian Perspective**

### Introduction

The question of future economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian people has attracted considerable attention during the past few years, not only from the two feuding sides, but also from large segments of the international community. Local interest is clearly demonstrated by the prominent role that economics plays at the present time in the ongoing confrontation between the occupation authorities and rebellious Palestinians in the occupied territories. International interest in the economic aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the other hand, is shown by the amazingly large number of conferences and studies sponsored on this topic, especially during the past three years.

The reasons for the increasingly prominent role played by economic relations are not difficult to identify. Such questions as those relating to land, water resources, food "security", the labor market, and population shifts have never been perceived in purely economic terms, either by Israelis or by Palestinians. The interaction of economics with the more salient aspects of the conflict, namely, political confrontation and military hostilities, has been in fact so complex and deep-rooted that it is often difficult to differentiate between cause and effect in the case of particular issues. A stark example of the potential complexity of this relationship was expressed by the former Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin, who noted that "Israel's economic problems with the Palestinians may take longer to settle than those relating to political and security issues."\*

This paper aims to present a Palestinian perspective on future economic relations between Israel and the Arab world, with a focus on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is important to emphasize, at this point, that the views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Palestine Liberation Organization or of any other Arab government or organization. I would venture to say, however, that these views are nevertheless probably shared by a majority of those Palestinian economists and business leaders who are closely connected to the issues in question.

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\* The remark was made during a 1988 meeting with a UN Development Program delegation in the Ministry of Defence in Tel Aviv.



### Perceptions of economic relations

For nearly two decades the economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians were viewed mainly in the context of the media race between the sides concerned and their supporters. The main thrust on the Israeli side was directed at trying to score points on the strength of "phenomenal" growth achieved while the Territories had been under Israeli rule, whereas experts on the other side provided a much gloomier picture of economic development under Israeli rule. Because of the unusual complexity of the situation, and the difficulty of ascertaining reliable data, it was possible for either side to postulate and substantiate the conclusions which conformed best to its pre-defined stand.

Future economic relations between Israel and a forthcoming Palestinian state have always attracted interest, especially among politicians and academics. A state comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and co-existing peacefully alongside Israel, is apparently perceived by the Palestinians and by a great majority of world public opinion as the only basis for a stable settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The main questions to which researchers have addressed themselves in this connection are focused on demonstrating the "viability" of the forthcoming state, and also on showing that both sides stand to achieve net economic gains from such an outcome to the political conflict.

Directing interest almost exclusively to the economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories within the framework of an independent Palestinian state seems to have blurred some fundamental realities. For the great many Palestinians who have been suffering the agonies of occupation for the last 23 years, to talk about a rosy future before terminating their suffering is merely fantasizing. They see the most sensible starting point for a discussion on economic relations with Israel as anchored in the present, and not one pertaining to a future the timing of whose advent no one can foresee.

It is abundantly clear that the ultimate shape of Palestinian-Israeli economic relations will be heavily influenced by whatever realities bearing on economics are created before Palestinians restore their sovereignty and achieve independence. It would be dangerously naive to overlook or underestimate the devastating long-term consequences on the economies of the Territories resulting from those Israeli colonial policies and punitive

measures which have been practiced systematically for more than two decades. It is overly optimistic to expect that injustices of many years can be handily corrected, after the opponent has come to consider his colonial gains as *de facto* rights. Of course, the Palestinians should spare no effort in their struggle to restore their lost rights, but they will do themselves a great service by trying hard not to lose more of those rights along their long march to independence.

A view of economic relations with Israel emanating from the present should also be targeted at halting further escalation in the anxieties and high emotions which have come to characterize relations between the two feuding nations. The cause of peace is certainly not served by permitting those relations to sink to new depths, as they have done during the past four years.

#### Which political scenarios?

A fundamental determinant of the final shape of Palestinian-Israeli economic relations will of course be the nature of the geo-political outcome of the conflict. It is difficult to foresee any tangible progress in the direction of economic cooperation between Israelis and their Arab neighbors before a just political settlement to the Palestinian problem is reached. As testimony to this conclusion, witness the staggering failure of Egypt and Israel to develop effective cooperation, economic or otherwise, despite the great many agreements concluded between them since the signing of the Camp David Accords some thirteen years ago.

In any case, given the present surge of the Right in Israel on the one hand, and the reluctance of the United States government to exert tangible pressure on Israel on the other hand, one can hardly expect sudden shifts from one state of political affairs to another. The Palestinian side, which has more to lose as time goes by, is therefore bound to formulate economic strategies that are sufficiently flexible and resilient to cope with political realities as they emerge, whether or not they are ideal. It is therefore necessary to investigate economic relations under political scenarios ranging from total occupation, through "partial" occupation, and leading in the end to a scenario of complete independence.

## Objectives of Israel's economic policies

Israel's invasion of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was not motivated by economic aspirations. In fact, at no time during the occupation does any Israeli government seem to have formulated a premeditated economic policy in relation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But having discovered the critical role of economics in achieving some of Israel's vital ambitions in the area, whether economic or otherwise, occupation authorities developed a keen interest in shaping and directing the economies of the Territories, obviously in directions giving priority to Israeli interests. Based on the track record of the past two decades, it is possible to identify the following objectives as having provided the most important guidelines for Israeli policies bearing on the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

1. The corner-stone of Israel's economic policies in the Territories until 1987 had an overly colonial orientation. The thrust of these policies was directed at trying to exploit to the furthest limit all abundant resources and trade opportunities resulting from gaining full control over the economies of the Territories. There are numerous indicators of the extent to which Israel has gone in that direction, some of which are identified later in this paper (see section on trade and water).

2. In addition to direct exploitative objectives, Israeli authorities launched vigorous efforts aimed at stifling the indigenous productive base of the occupied Palestinian territories. At the same time, every effort was made to annex the economic sectors of those territories and gradually consolidate their peripheral subordination to the Israeli economy. The motives were not purely economical; it is clear that Israeli leaders were attempting to pre-empt the economic grounds for an independent Palestinian state.

3. Israel's economic policies in the occupied territories were geared to help in restructuring the demographic balance in the region in Israel's favor. Israeli occupation authorities undoubtedly cherished hopes of creating a number of "push" factors which would ultimately lead to the stimulation of emigration from the Territories on a massive scale. The premeditated sharp decline in the labor absorptive capacity of the local economy was expected to serve that tacit motive.

4. The objectives of Israel in regard to its administrative policies in the occupied territories, including those related to economics, were re-aligned in accordance with new priorities in the aftermath of the intifada.

As a consequence of the embarrassing failure to quell what was initially perceived as a transitory flare-up of rioting, Israeli authorities have quickly escalated their sanctions into other areas, notably economics. In recent years, the area of economics has become one of the main arenas of confrontation between rebellious Palestinians and their Israeli occupiers. In the meantime, Israel's desire to abort the intifada has certainly superseded all other objectives.

### The economic strategies of the Palestinians

As is the case with the Israelis, profound political ramifications underlie the Palestinians' perception of their economic objectives and this perception is heavily influenced by a thick heritage of unpleasant memories. Taking these sensitivities into account, the strategic objectives of the Palestinians' economic policies during the interim occupation period can be identified as follows:

1. The fundamental objective for the Palestinians at the present time is clearly to sustain the intifada until it leads to its proclaimed objective of a just settlement to the conflict with Israel. As this will be the outcome of a slow and painstaking process, the Palestinians will have to do all they can to bolster their steadfastness for as long as it takes to embark on a course leading to such a just settlement.

2. In line with their undeterred pursuit of a peace based on justice and not coercion, the Palestinians and all other peace-loving powers are encouraged to join forces in pressuring Israel to stop using economic sanctions in its unholy war against the intifada. Israeli authorities should be made to understand that rather than quelling the intifada, economic sanctions have intensified bitterness and deepened hatred. It goes without saying that inculcating hatred in the minds and souls of the Palestinians serves neither Israeli interests nor the cause of peace.

3. Expanding the absorptive capacity of the local labor market is a fundamental prerequisite to sustaining the Palestinians' steadfastness during the pre-independence stage. This objective is perceived as one of utmost priority in view of the soaring levels of emigration seen since the start of the occupation, and in the light of the appalling level of unemployment which has plagued the Territories during the last few years.

4. Minimizing dependency on Israel for food and basic goods and for employment is another integral component of a resistive economic policy.

The events of the intifada have clearly demonstrated that Israeli occupation forces will not hesitate to use the excessive dependency of the Territories on Israel in any way which may serve what they conceive to be their better interests.

The economic policies of the Palestinians will of course have a more stable and less confrontational orientation once a peaceful settlement to their conflict with Israel is arrived at. The economic policies of the Palestinians during and after the negotiations leading to independence will be guided by the way they perceive, and plan to interact with, some fundamental issues bearing on the economy of a forthcoming state. A brief exposition of those guidelines follows.

### Sovereignty and Economics

One of the central issues which will impinge heavily on economic negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians throughout the stages of this process is the degree of sovereignty enjoyed by the Palestinians in economic matters. Obviously, the basic stand of the Palestinians on this question is insistence on restoring their inalienable right to exercise sovereignty over their economy. In addition to its direct and profound impact on the performance of their economy, sovereignty is viewed by the Palestinians as a vital manifestation of their basic human right to self-determination as a free people.

The question of sovereignty is likely to involve strong reservations and fears, most of which are precipitated by abuses of the past. Many Israelis perceive conceding to the Palestinians' demand for sovereignty as an imminent threat to some of their basic interests, such as those relating to water and trade. The Palestinians, on the other hand, are appalled and gravely concerned by the great damage which has accrued due to the dispossession of their right to sovereignty for the past 23 years. They argue that Israel's usurpation of all power over economic (and non-economic) decisions was not prompted merely by the desire to preserve Israel's legitimate interests. On the contrary, they point to ample evidence suggesting that Israel has used its sweeping authority in the Territories as a tool for exploiting the resources of another nation, and subordinating its economy to that of its own. The entire decision-making process in the area of economics has been systematically conducted for more than two decades

by weighing the interests of Israel against those of the Palestinians before any decision is made.

Aspiring for equal status in the economic relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis may appear too optimistic, or even deceptive, when viewed against the background of the long record of antagonistic interests of the two nations. But this need not necessarily be the case, unless one of the sides is only able to view its own interests at the cost of those of the other. Admittedly, there are many on both sides who subscribe to such a dichotomic approach, and they can all support their claims with evidence derived from the dismal record of the past two decades. Fortunately, however, most professional economists and businessmen on both sides firmly believe that Israeli and Palestinian economic relations could be complementary, serving mutual interests. But transforming the relations between the two sides to a point where they will reap the benefits of complementary cooperation instead of colonial exploitation or destructive confrontation can only be attempted once political leaders have established the political framework necessary for conducting economic negotiations on professional and equal grounds.

Achieving parity in forthcoming negotiations on economics between the Palestinians and Israelis is more difficult than it looks on the surface. After many years of oppression and colonial domination, a great many Israelis will find it painful and difficult to recognize the Palestinians as a people whose yearning for independence should be respected and taken as a benchmark for bilateral relations between the two peoples. The Palestinians, on the other hand, will for a long time remain haunted by the memories of occupation. Relaxing psychological inhibitions on both sides is therefore a vital pre-requisite to achieving equal and businesslike status for negotiators on economic issues.

### The viability constraint

The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and sovereignty over their land is sometimes undermined by doubts about the economic viability of their cherished state. Low viability is attributed to numerous factors, most importantly the small size of the domestic market and a meager resource base.

The Palestinians are well aware of the implications resulting from the constraints on the growth of their economy after a restoration of

sovereignty and attaining independence. But during the process of building their homeland, the Palestinians will no more be deterred by those constraints than many other peoples who have had to cope with similar problems; for example, the peoples of South Korea, Singapore, and Israel itself. The Palestinians look forward to providing one more example of Chaim Weizmann's famous assertion that "the economic absorptive capacity of a country is what its population makes of it".<sup>1</sup> The argument about the economic viability of the Palestinian state is thus rechannelled into a practical issue of how to manage the country's economy, rather than a challenge to the right of the Palestinian people to independence.

#### Living standards and income distribution policies

Irrespective of its political or ideological imperatives, a forthcoming Palestinian state is bound to give very high priority to attaining and sustaining a fairly high level of living standards for its people. It is true that the Palestinians will have to bear the social and economic costs of building and safeguarding their state, but it is also realistic to assume that the provision of an acceptable living standard is a fundamental prerequisite for attracting diaspora Palestinians and for forestalling emigration. Obviously, such an assignment has enormous economic implications.

The objective of attaining high living standards is intertwined with another sensitive issue, namely, income distribution. The emergent Palestinian authority will have to exert conscious efforts aimed at attaining and maintaining social justice in the Palestinian society. Disparities in income levels of the magnitude common in most Arab countries are not compatible with the values of the Palestinian people, especially in the aftermath of the intifada.

Achieving an acceptable living standard and reducing socio-economic disparities are heavily contingent on attaining a marked rate of growth in the indigenous productive sectors. This requires the implementation of appropriate income distribution policies. Although the Palestinians have already opted for a free market economy, this commitment must not obscure the need for bringing about social justice.

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<sup>1</sup> The Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Jewish Case Before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1947.

### Potential areas of cooperation

The scope and nature of economic relations between the Palestinians and Israel are influenced more heavily by the degree of complementarity in their economies, actual or potential, than by arbitrary political decisions. It is true that identifying areas of complementarity has become more difficult in the wake of the sharply escalated conflict of interests which has characterized the relations of the past two decades. Nevertheless, it is still possible to call attention to many areas of potential cooperation, to the mutual advantage of the two sides.

Aspects of complementarity between the Israeli and Palestinian economies are more pervasive and subtle than can be fully delineated in this paper. Furthermore, some aspects are so closely connected with major political issues that cooperation in those areas will have to be postponed until an advanced degree of normalization is brought about. Irrespective of the time-frame factor, however, complementarity in the Israeli and Palestinian economies can take advantage of the following factors:

1. The geographical proximity of the occupied territories (to comprise later the State of Palestine) and Israel provides enormous opportunities for expanded trade, not only between the two countries but also with other Arab neighbors. At a time of cut-throat competition in world markets, reduced transportation costs will give rise to tangible comparative advantages to producers and consumers on both sides. When the time is ripe for relaxing restrictions on Israeli trade in the Arab world, the Palestinians will be qualified to play a vital catalytic role, to the benefit of all sides.

2. The employment of Palestinian workers in Israel offers a classic example of complementarity between a labor-abundant economy and one that is considerably more capital-intensive and more industrialized. As we shall see in a later section on labor, this relation already constitutes a major area of cooperation between the occupied territories and Israel.

3. In addition to the direct transfer of excess workers to the Israeli labor market, many more jobs could be generated locally through greater expansion in sub-contracting industries. Expansion in this sector should attempt to increase the locally added value in these industries and to delve into new areas of production, such as diamonds and electronics.

4. Tourism is one of the economic sectors most sensitive to political and military tensions. It is therefore expected that a climate of peace will



give a strong impetus to this sector: And in the event of peace, tourism offers numerous opportunities for joint economic cooperation to all countries in the region, including Israel and Palestine.

5. Israel and its neighbors can go a long way towards better exploitation of common natural resources. But in order to project a convincing attitude to potential Arab partners, Israel will have to demonstrate its willingness to reach a fair formula of cooperation with its Palestinian neighbors on common resources, especially water and Dead Sea mineral deposits.

6. The prospects of joint ventures in Palestine and the Arab world constitute an advanced degree of cooperation. This has been demonstrated by numerous Israeli studies. A Tel Aviv University research project has already identified fifteen projects which it is believed could be implemented in the wake of peace in the region.<sup>2</sup>

7. Not only is cooperation in infrastructures inevitable, but it can become an integral pillar for the continuity of peace in the region. Although it is likely that the Palestinians will avoid becoming excessively dependent on Israel for vital infrastructural services, much could nevertheless be accomplished to the advantage of both sides in the areas of power, communications, and air and sea transport. Establishing land and air communication links between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, can only be implemented within a framework of cooperation between Israel and Palestine.

8. A unique form of cooperation between Palestine, Israel, and many other Arab and foreign governments is that relating to the problem of Palestinian refugees. This process should start out by redressing the injustices inflicted on refugees for more than four decades. Any settlement to this endemic problem will entail huge rehabilitation schemes in which Israel can be effectively involved.

It is clear from the aforesaid list of potential areas of cooperation between the Palestinians and Arabs on the one hand and Israel on the other hand that there are a great number of issues to be discussed once the sides enter into economic negotiations. In the remaining part of this paper, the writer investigates three issues that he believes to be among the most

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<sup>2</sup> Haim Ben-Shahar, et al., *The Research Project for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East: An Overview*, Tel Aviv University, 1986.

significant on the agenda of economic relations, namely, trade, labor, and water.

## I. Labor

### The record

The Palestinians have always expressed considerable concern about transformations in the labor market, and they will continue to do so after they attain their independence. Underlying this concern are the strategic objectives of securing relatively high living standards on the one hand, and coping with a noticeably high demand for jobs on the other hand.

Projecting the scale of anticipated growth in the size of the labor force is greatly complicated by the magnitude of changes in the net balance of emigration and immigration. The magnitude of these two population flows is dependent on a number of political and economic factors which are difficult to quantify at the present time. It is clear, however, that in the interim period of occupation, Israeli authorities are not likely to permit the return of a significant number of diaspora Palestinians. In the meantime, the Palestinians will attach very high priority to avoiding the predisposing factors for emigration, which has proceeded at an alarming rate during the past 23 years. Assuming a zero balance in external population flows, and an unchanged rate of population growth, the labor market in the Territories (including East Jerusalem) is likely to grow at the rate of around 11,000 workers per annum.<sup>3</sup>

Generating employment opportunities on the scale required and under the enormous overriding constraints is a formidable challenge which must be addressed with a great amount of determination and ingenuity in planning. The rate of unemployment rose steadily upon the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, and then soared sharply after the imposition of rigid restrictions on the flow of Palestinian workers across the "green line." The fact that the unemployment rate has hit the unprecedented record of over 30 percent should be a source of grave concern for both Palestinians and Israelis, if for different reasons.

Initiating a pronounced and sustained growth in the domestic labor market requires vigorous action at the following levels:

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<sup>3</sup> Computed from the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1988, p. 722.

- a. Expanding local productive sectors, especially those with a high degree of intersectoral linkage.
- b. Introducing far-reaching structural changes in the educational and vocational training systems, especially as relates to the institutions of higher education.
- c. Establishing a greater degree of cooperation between the Palestinians and Israelis in regard to workers commuting to Israel.

Introducing and promoting positive developments along these lines is of course contingent on a great many factors. Yet it is quite clear that cooperation or lack of it between the Palestinians and Israelis will play a central role in directing the process of change in nearly all the areas mentioned above. Some aspects of this intrinsic relationship are identified and evaluated in the section of this paper on potential areas of cooperation; here, special attention is focused on the question of the Palestinians' employment in Israel.

### Employment in Israel

The employment of Palestinians in Israel has played a particularly significant role in the relations between Palestinians and Israelis for the past two decades. The number of those from the Territories employed in Israel (including those from East Jerusalem) has remained in the range of 100,000 - 120,000 workers for the past decade. In relative terms, those workers comprise approximately 40 percent of the labor force in both areas, whereas they add up to only 6-7 percent of the Israeli work force.<sup>4</sup>

The relative significance of employment in Israel to the Palestinian economy is obviously substantial. In addition to alleviating acute unemployment hazards, this form of employment accounted for some 25-30 percent of the Territories' gross national product,<sup>5</sup> and it constituted a primary source of consumers' disposable income.

The impact of Palestinian employment on the Israeli economy is not as profound as its impact on the economy of the Territories, but it is certainly more significant than is indicated by its aggregate ration. Palestinian workers are concentrated in two vital sectors, namely

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<sup>4</sup> *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1990, p. 729.

<sup>5</sup> *National Accounts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area, 1968-1986*, Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, No. 818, 1988, p. 126.

construction (46 percent) and agriculture (15 percent).<sup>6</sup> A major reduction in the number of workers in these sectors would entail serious consequences which could not be easily dealt with, even allowing for a reasonable degree of further mechanization.

On the whole, the employment in Israel of Palestinians from the Territories has entailed such profound positive consequences for both sides that it could be viewed as one of the major areas of cooperation between the two neighbors. Yet, there is still ample room for developing this relationship in directions which may better serve the interests of both sides.

The main problem which from a Palestinian perspective impedes a more equitable relationship in regard to employment in Israel, is the strikingly weak bargaining power of Palestinian workers vis-à-vis their Israeli employers. Predictably, this disadvantage is reflected in a variety of ways. For instance, the level of wages paid to Palestinian workers is considerably lower than those paid to Israelis in similar jobs (by around 50 percent in late 1990), and the obligation to provide fringe benefits is much weaker.<sup>7</sup> This situation has given rise to enormous gains for Israeli employers, especially since Palestinian workers are denied any form of organizational structure.

#### Future prospects

The Palestinians are likely to take a basically positive stand in regard to the continued flow of their workers into Israel, both before and after the establishment of their state. Employment in Israel has significant impact on their economy today and in the light of the anticipated sharp rise in the size of the domestic labor force in the wake of a peaceful settlement, significance as a means of alleviating unemployment problems. The Palestinian authority will have enough problems trying to generate adequate employment opportunities for returnees and for the natural growth in the labor force. The last thing they need, either at the present time or during the early years of post-independence, is to sever their labor relations with Israel.

Israeli authorities will have their own interests to preserve in regard to the employment of Palestinians in Israel. Fearing the perils of free trade

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<sup>6</sup> *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1988, p. 727.

<sup>7</sup> From a field study conducted in the northern West Bank by the Human Rights Center in Jerusalem.

with EC countries, especially after 1992, Israeli economic authorities display considerable concern about the competitiveness of their growers and manufacturers in both the home and export markets. Furthermore, Israeli production firms will have to adjust their scale of operation to cope with the sharp rise in trade with Arab countries anticipated when the latter agree to open their markets to Israeli goods in the wake of peace. The continued flow of Palestinian workers to Israel will be an imperative prerequisite for achieving both of these strategic objectives.

All this leads us to the conclusion that both Palestinians and Israelis are likely to admit that massive and multi-faceted contact between the two peoples, as manifested by the daily flow of some 110,000 Palestinians across the border, will likely play a key role in sustaining peace and building confidence between the two neighbors. It is therefore in the interest of both sides to lay down the basis for this form of cooperation on mutually acceptable grounds. One of the most basic demands on the Palestinian agenda is to permit workers employed in Israel to establish their own organizational structure(s).

## II. Trade

### The record

Because of their relatively small areas and populations, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have for a long time relied heavily for economic growth on vigorous external trade, both in commodities and in services. External trade flourished tangibly prior to the onset of Israeli occupation, despite being severely restricted in scope by rigid capitalization and technological constraints. But the two territories had not suffered until then from deliberate regulatory manipulation aimed at destroying or impeding their economies and external trade relations.

The Territories' terms of trade have been drastically restructured in the wake of Israeli occupation. Admittedly, this process has been influenced by a number of factors, such as new regulations promulgated by Jordanian authorities and the Arab Boycott Office.<sup>8</sup> But the major determinant of the direction and size of the Territories' foreign trade is certainly that

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<sup>8</sup> *Palestinian External Trade Under Israeli Occupation* (Geneva: UN Conference on Trade and Development, 1989).

emanating from Israeli policies and regulations.<sup>9</sup> Such policies have had a profound impact on all forms of foreign trade, namely, that with Israel, that with Arab countries, and that with all other countries. As a consequence of their debilitating nature, distorted terms of trade have developed and aggravated a crippling form of dependency on Israel, and have forced the reorientation of the Palestinian economy towards Israel, pulling it away from traditional markets in the Arab world.

The terms of bilateral trade between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories have been structured since the early years of occupation on a grossly colonial basis. Local markets in the Territories have been opened to Israeli products unconditionally, whereas the flow of produce from the Territories to Israel has been permitted on a selective basis only.

Trade between Israel and the Territories is governed by stiff regulations laid down in the interest of the former. Industrial goods from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are in principle permitted entry, although manufacturers are sometimes burdened with overly rigid labelling and hygiene regulations. Competition with Israeli manufacturers is also controlled by a highly selective policy of licensing which is determined solely in the light of Israeli interests.

Unlike industrial goods, the entry of Palestinian farm produce to Israel is possible only after obtaining special permits from relevant (Israeli) marketing boards. In an effort to safeguard their delicate price stabilization schemes, marketing boards permit the entry of Palestinian produce only at the lowest price scale, and then only when needed to alleviate occasional shortages in local supply. Under no circumstances is this form of trade permitted to undermine the interests of Israeli growers.

Inequitable bilateral terms of trade between Israel and the occupied territories have given rise to a typically colonial subjugation of their economy to that of Israel. The Territories procure 90 percent of their imported goods from Israel.<sup>10</sup> The value of Israeli goods channelled in 1987 to the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, amounted to \$1.1 billion,<sup>11</sup> which makes the Territories the second largest importer from Israel, after the United States. At a time when Israeli exporters have to face

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Five year average (1982-86). Computed from the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1987, p. 711 (estimate includes trade with East Jerusalem).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 1990.

fierce competition in foreign markets and suffer from a substantial trading deficit, Israel has managed to transform the West Bank and Gaza Strip into a backyard market with which it enjoys a steady and lucrative surplus.

The consequences on the Palestinian side, on the other hand, have been disastrous. Competition with Israeli businesses is extremely difficult, because Palestinian entrepreneurs are categorically denied all the incentives which are lavishly accorded to Israeli firms. The reason for this, as explained by Israeli officials, is that Palestinian businessmen from the West Bank and Gaza are not Israeli citizens, and therefore are not eligible for the same rights. The adverse impact of this anomalous policy on local industries has been overwhelming. But it has been especially disastrous for infant industries; Palestinians are unable to provide any form of protection to firms badly in need of it during the critical initial stages of their growth. The emergence of pioneering industries is rendered more difficult by the need to cope with rigid licensing regulations and by the total lack of institutional sources of credit.

The impact of differential terms of trade is even more serious than mentioned above. Local producers are obliged to compete in their own market with Israeli producers who enjoy massive support, ranging from subsidized production inputs and credit facilities to generous subsidization schemes.<sup>12</sup> This has led to a drastic setback in some major farming patterns. Local production of dairy and poultry products, for instance, amounted to only 35 percent of domestic consumption,<sup>13</sup> the rest being imported from Israel.

The consequences of the lopsided terms of trade to Palestinian productive sectors have been overwhelming, and include the following:

- a. They have inhibited the emergence of a vigorous local industrial base, and have fostered instead a form of integration which subordinates the local economy to that of Israel.
- b. They have undermined local employment potential, and consequently initiated a massive drain of workers to Israeli and external labor markets.

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<sup>12</sup> Irrigation water, for instance, was for a long time heavily subsidized and prices of farm produce were subject to massive stabilization schemes. Direct subsidies for agricultural produce and irrigation water amounted in 1981 to \$1.5 billion. (David Kahan, *Agriculture and Water Resources in the West Bank*, Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Project, 1988).

<sup>13</sup> *Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area Statistics*, 1986 (3), p. 110.

c. They have resulted in a severe setback to some farming patterns and have led to a tangible decline in the area of farming.

### Trade with other countries

Because of the strikingly small size of their local markets, the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are heavily dependent on a narrow range of exported goods which include, most importantly, citrus, vegetables, olive oil, samneh (margarine), and building stones. In an effort to pursue its own interests, Israel has consistently manipulated the Territories' external trade. Direct access to markets in Western European countries was stubbornly denied, until only a year or two ago. This has been one of the principal factors in the severe marketing crisis which afflicted Gaza's citrus industry and caused its steady decline. The area of citrus groves dropped by 27 percent in 1988 as compared with 1979.<sup>14</sup> A similar situation has also developed in recent years in regard to vegetables, of which the two territories have sizeable surpluses. Israeli authorities have insisted on restricting vegetable exports to Europe to those going through Agrexco, Israel's agricultural export corporation, which understandably gives priority to serving Israeli farmers' interests.

The Israeli "Civil Administration" has also implemented a wide range of measures bearing on the Territories' trade with Arab countries across the bridges. The following are conspicuous examples:

a. Imposing very high fees on traffic, amounting to a total of about \$140 per truckload as of May 1990.<sup>15</sup>

b. The number of trucks permitted to cross the bridges has been restricted, thereby resulting in a further undue rise in transportation costs. Because of the limited number of such trucks, and due to exorbitant fees imposed on traffic across the bridges, trucking costs to traditional Arab export markets have risen to prohibitive levels. A truckload of 12 tons transported from Nablus to Amman (70 miles) entails a cost outlay of approximately \$700. Obviously, this has severely undermined the competitiveness of Palestinian exporters.

c. Controlling the exit of Palestinians and their goods across the bridges has been extensively used by security authorities in the context of

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<sup>14</sup> The Department of Agriculture, Gaza.

<sup>15</sup> Calculated from tariff rates available at local post offices.



their carrot and stick policy of administering the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This has been most clear during the past two years, when many villages and whole districts have been denied exit permits as a form of collective punishment, presumably because of their support for the intifada. Such bans were often timed to coincide with peak production seasons.

Israeli restrictions on external trade do not apply only to exports, but also to imports. Direct importation from all firms which have local agents in Israel is prohibited, although these firms do not have a legal basis to claim agency rights in the occupied territories. This barrier has severely undermined the volume of foreign trade, and has denied local consumers the benefits of reduced prices.

### Future prospects

Palestinians hold a deep-rooted conviction that external trade will play a fundamental role in their economy, if they are keen on attaining and maintaining a reasonable standard of living for their community. It is through trade that they reap the benefits of greater specialization and overcome inherent constraints related to the small size of the domestic market and the scarcity of natural resources. A vigorous export trade, whether in goods or services, will make it possible to curb anticipated deficits in the balance of payments, especially in the post-independence stage when the Palestinians will have to pay the soaring bill for food and capital purchases. Furthermore, free trade is an integral component of the free market economy which Palestinians look forward to building for themselves when sovereignty over their economy and resources is restored. All of which leads to the conclusion that Palestinians will be anxious to conduct their external trade, including that with Israel, on a free border basis, with only minimal regulatory restrictions and custom tariffs.

There is ample room for complementarity between the Palestinian and Israeli economies should the two sides agree on one form or another of free trade. But that objective is obstructed by significant obstacles, especially on the Israeli side. Liberalization of trade in Israel is likely to be fiercely resisted by numerous interest groups which are eager to go on reaping the benefits of liberal production subsidies and highly protective custom tariffs. This is especially true of the powerful agricultural lobby, the Manufacturers' Association, and the National Israeli Labor Union (the Histadrut).

Trade liberalization on the Palestinian side is likely to be impeded by the strong case that can be made for assisting infant industries. Learning from Israel's experience with the European Community, some degree of regulatory tariff and/or export subsidy may have to be tolerated by Israel on its imports from the Territories. Assymetry in trade with Palestine, however, will be subject to the consent of both parties, and in all likelihood would have to be restricted to a limited number of goods and maintained on a temporary basis only.

As advocated earlier in this paper, correcting bilateral terms of trade between the Palestinians and Israel should be attempted as soon as permitted by the leadership on both sides, even before a political settlement to the conflict is arrived at. And because of a long heritage of mistrust and anticipated pressure from interest groups, it is suggested that the proposed negotiations on trade be conducted under the aegis of a specialized and mutually acceptable international body. When negotiations on trade commence, the agenda will cover many of the issues raised earlier in this paper.

### III. Water

#### The present record

Water resources and policies have always occupied a significant position on the agenda of all countries in the Middle East. All of these countries, except perhaps Lebanon, border on deserts which threaten to encroach on the limited supply of arable land. Shortage of water and emerging conflicts about the distribution of limited available resources have already caused some serious disputes in the region. This is particularly true in the case of the conflict over water between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors.

The Zionist movement attributed considerable significance to controlling and exploiting the largest possible proportion of water resources in mandatory Palestine, both before and after the creation of Israel. By the time of the 1967 war, Israel had already expanded its water consumption from approximately 300 million cubic meters in 1949 to 1418 million in 1966.<sup>16</sup> This phenomenal expansion was achieved by extending Israeli control to all major resources inside and bordering Israel, and by remarkable

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<sup>16</sup> *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1967, p. 359.

progress in resource development techniques and irrigation technology. During the same period, the volume of water consumed by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained at about 230 million cubic meters per annum.

Israel took further strides in its effort to expand and secure usable water reserves after the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in June 1967. By the late 1980s, water consumption in Israel had jumped to approximately 1800 million cubic meters, whereas that of the occupied territories has remained for the last decade at a constant level of around 230 million cubic meters. In relative terms, therefore, Israel obtains about 89 percent of all usable water reserves west of the Jordan river, as compared to 11 percent for Palestinian residents in the occupied territories.

The lopsided distribution of water resources has led to far-reaching consequences for the economy and quality of life of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. The area under irrigated cultivation in both territories amounted in 1989 to only 215,000 dunams,<sup>17</sup> as compared to 2,142,000 dunams in Israel.<sup>18</sup> Because of the rigid ceiling on usable water in the Territories, no expansion is foreseen in commercial patterns of farming, which in principle constitute the backbone of Palestinian agriculture. Scarcity of water for irrigation and the deterioration of its quality has even caused a pronounced drop in the productivity of certain farming patterns and a decline in the quality of produce.

In addition to the adverse consequences to the Territories' balance of trade and to the food "security" status of their Palestinian residents, the stunting of agriculture has already resulted in a sharp drop in the labor absorptive capacity of the domestic labor market. The impact on living conditions is no less deleterious. The per capita consumption for domestic purposes is restricted to some 14 cubic meters in the Territories, as compared to 100 for Israelis (1988).

### Future prospects

The situation in regard to water relations between Israel and the Palestinians represents an extreme case of colonial oppression as opposed to mutual cooperation between equal partners. Over the past 23 years Israeli

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<sup>17</sup> H. Awartani and S. Joudeh, *Irrigated Agriculture in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, Nablus: An-Najah University, 1991, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1990, p. 7.

authorities have imposed a wide range of policies and measures gravely affecting the vital interests of the Palestinians, without any consultation, let alone cooperation, with the Palestinians. The measures promulgated for this purpose were of a notoriously arbitrary and coercive nature.

Many Israeli economists, politicians, and journalists have already expressed profound interest in establishing some form of cooperation with the Palestinians on the question of water. But the version of cooperation advocated by most Israelis, including some with presumably moderate views, is strangely unfair and arbitrary. Most Israeli experts argue rather bluntly that despite whatever injustices have been inflicted on the Palestinians in regard to water, the Israelis have acquired de facto rights which are no longer subject to change. The only suggestion which they have to offer the Palestinians on this question is to "import" water from their Arab neighbors.

Regional cooperation in regard to water policies is certainly of the utmost importance, and at some point it may involve drawing water from sources outside the Palestinian state. But this is no alternative to giving the Palestinians their fair share of the water resources they share with others. It is therefore, unavoidable that the Israelis brace themselves for profound "concessions" on the issue of distributing common water resources. The redressing of current injustices could be phased so that it does not undermine Israeli interests, but there is no way that the Israelis can escape the hard reality of having to give the Palestinians the quantity of water they deserve.

#### How ready are the sides for cooperation?

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated, albeit on paper, that economic cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors can serve the better interests of all sides, if relations are structured on equity and not unilateral exploitation. But the main challenge is how to transfer the process of talking about economic cooperation from academic forums to practical realities. Judging by the tortoise-like pace of the peace process, this may prove to be much more difficult than academics think. The main question in this connection is how motivated are both sides, the Israeli and the Palestinian, to initiate the process of economic cooperation?

The Palestinians can respond with a clearly positive answer to this question. The reasons are simple and straight forward. Firstly, they are

eager to put an end to their grave economic grievances, and subsequently reap the gains of equitable cooperation. Secondly, the Palestinians do look forward to seeing economic cooperation help both sides to overcome their deep-rooted inhibitions against a political settlement. Clearly, none of these benefits of cooperation is at the cost of the Israelis.

On the Israeli side, short-term economic returns accruing to peace may not be appealing enough when measured on a strictly monetary basis to convince Israel to forego its colonial control of the Palestinian economy. But the long-term gains accruing to Israel in the wake of mutually negotiated economic relations with the Palestinians are certainly attractive.

One of the most significant consequences of economic relations negotiated in the context of a peaceful settlement would derive as a result of Israel's anticipated decreasing military expenditure, which jumped from 9 percent of GNP prior to 1967 to an average of 25 percent during the post-1967 years. Reducing expenditure on defence, even by modest ratios, will help direct greater resources to investment, research and development, and civilian economic sectors. This would set the course for higher growth rates and for a greater potential to generate employment.

Another substantial gain accruing to Israel, mostly towards the later stages of a peaceful settlement, is that related to economic cooperation with Arab countries other than Palestine. Although such gains are very difficult to quantify, they are likely to be enormous if Israel is indeed accepted as a genuine partner. The only way this is likely to happen is if the Israelis reconcile their conflict with the Palestinian people. It is hoped that such a conditionality will induce the Israelis to accepting a fair deal with the Palestinians.

A third form of indirect gain is that which would ensue from the improvement in the investment climate in the region. Israel and a Palestinian state are likely to receive considerable investment resources from the more developed countries, on account of their proximity to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East.

The above-mentioned lucrative gains may induce Israel to seek cooperation as the fruit of a comprehensive political settlement. But what about changes in the short run, when gains to Israel do not look so tempting? During this period, the Israeli leadership will be motivated to enter into equitable negotiations with the Palestinians only if it appears that the cost for not doing so is likely to exceed the present gains.

It is probably unrealistic to expect the imposition of sanctions on Israel for its wrongdoings in the area of economics, but there are many other measures that can be taken with an essentially similar impact. The firm stand assumed by the EC on trade negotiations with Israel in recent years is a vivid example of the latter's vulnerability, the verbal rhetoric of Israeli leaders notwithstanding. The impact of such pressure will be considerably greater if a similar stand is taken by the US government and by international economic organizations (e.g., the IMF, World Bank, GATT, UNCTAD, and FAO). It is hoped that conferences such as today's will stimulate all such governments and organizations to play a more vigorous role in that direction.

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
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Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project  
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No. 3

Industrialization in the Occupied Territories

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Summer 1991

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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# INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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## I. *Introduction*

The Occupied Territories (OT) of Palestine as of June 1967 form the geographical boundaries of the economy under study in this paper. The political scenario assumed here is one of peace, with an independent state of Palestine on good or at least peaceful terms with its neighbors. The West Bank and Gaza would be united by a land corridor through Israel which would also serve as a security link between Israel and Palestine, creating "mutual hostage status" for each state. The State of Palestine would be open to all dislocated Palestinians interested in returning to settle in the country. In addition, other resettlement options should be made available so that individuals will be able to make a choice.

The implications of this scenario include the following: the state would have full control over all its natural resources; the economy would primarily be an open market one, with relatively free trade relations within the region and outside of it; a period of transition would be planned for reconstruction and resettlement of the dislocated, as well as for rebuilding the physical infrastructure: roads, communication systems, health, sanitation, and housing; as a peace economy, its defense expenditure would be kept at a minimum.

Industrialization of the Palestinian economy is predicated upon the need for production sectors alternative to agriculture, which is limited by sparse land and water resources. Industrialization would, therefore, be considered the primary productive sector in the fully developed economy. It is also desirable due to its positive impact historically on income level, productivity, technological development, and labor absorption capacity in developed countries. Without industrialization, the economy of Palestine will be unable to develop and prosper on the basis of domestic production.

The process of industrialization implies changing the structure of the economy. The greater the value added to the input, the better identified with industry the product will be, and the greater the quantity of such products available, the more industrialized the economy will become. However, in order to be industrialized and competitive in the modern world, processing should be based on comparably advanced technology, increasing labor productivity and decreasing costs of production.

Industrialization entails certain prerequisites. Historically, it has been dependent upon access to resources, including raw material, investment capital, skill and technical knowledge, managerial and entrepreneurial ability, access to a market, and a source of incentives, such as financial profit or

ideology. Also important is a national sense of purpose which prioritizes industrialization and renders government policy favorable to it. Other prerequisites include a favorable infrastructure, which alternatively may be considered as part of the actual process of industrialization. Each of these prerequisites may be considered as necessary but not sufficient for industrialization. In this sense, the lack of any prerequisite may be detrimental enough to cripple the entire industrialization process.

The question arises, however, as to how much of each prerequisite is required in order that industrialization not be stifled. Since industrialization and development are dynamic processes, if each prerequisite is not sufficiently available at each stage of industrialization, serious or chronic bottlenecks in supply and production are likely to result. While a short-term bottleneck may simply indicate a need to adjust supply factors, failure to make the adjustment could evolve into a chronic problem. Without radical steps to remove the cause and eliminate the bottleneck when this happens, industrialization will be doomed to failure.

The following section will briefly explore the history of industry in the OT. Section III surveys the factors facilitating industrialization and the obstacles that have stood in the way, as well as what has been done to prevent them, and what still remains to be done. Section IV explores prospects for the future. Sections III and IV are heavily dependent on field surveys, some of which have been conducted specifically for this study. Section V contains concluding remarks.

## *II. An Overview of Industry*

The issue of industrialization raises at least two major conceptual problems: what it is and how it can be measured. The definition presented above reduces the problem to measurement and the availability of data. Due to the underdeveloped level of industry and the political-military complications of occupation, reliable and accurate data are hard to come by. The most available and comprehensive data are collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel. Therefore, in spite of the disclaimers regarding these data by the Bureau's staff, its statistics are my primary source for a quantitative review of industrial development in the last two decades.

Prior to Israeli occupation, the West Bank was ruled by Jordan and Gaza was ruled by Egypt. Neither region displayed rapid growth in industry during this period or had the opportunity to do so. Though Palestinian industry had made certain advances during the British Mandate period (1918-1948), the majority of the labor force and more than half of the income was still dependent on agriculture between 1948 and 1967. This remained true in 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, the West Bank was still comparatively more industrialized than the East Bank forming the Kingdom of Jordan. It possessed 56.2 percent of the working establishments and employed a higher percentage of the workers than the East Bank. For example, in 1965 there were 2,336 industrial establishments employing fewer than five workers in the East Bank and 2,927 such establishments in the West Bank; 374 establishments employing five to nine workers in the East Bank

and 605 establishments in the West Bank; and 286 employing 10 or more workers in the East Bank and 310 in the West Bank.<sup>1</sup> However, in comparison to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza remained underdeveloped and underindustrialized. Though the gap still remains wide, there have been major changes. Table 1 summarizes these changes for the period 1968 to 1986.

Population has increased in both subregions of the OT. It rose by approximately 31 percent during the period, in spite of emigration. The gross disposable private income per capita had risen from 1,013 to 2,592 New Israel Shekels (NIS) in the West Bank and from 669 to 1586 NIS in Gaza by 1986. If population and income growth are indicators of an expanding economy, then the OT economy grew during this period in spite of the occupation and the war. However, the question as to whether industrial production has expanded is debatable due to conflicting indicators. On one hand, there were more people employed in industry in 1986 than in 1968, but on the other hand, domestic employment in industry or manufacturing has decreased. By way of illustration, the number of workers employed in manufacturing in the West Bank increased from 14,600 in 1970 to 18,200 in 1986 and from 6,500 to 9,000 in Gaza, during the same period. However, the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing decreased from 12.7 percent to 10.9 percent in the West Bank and from 11.1 percent to 9.5 percent in Gaza during the same period. Furthermore, employment in manufacturing in the OT includes those engaged in subcontracting for Israeli industries, and the full impact of this on economy and industrialization is felt more in Israel than in the OT.

Other conflicting indicators are those showing an increase in the gross fixed private capital formation coupled with stasis or even a decline in the relative labor productivity in manufacturing. For example, the gross fixed private capital formation rose from 25 million NIS in 1968 to 100.4 million NIS in the West Bank and from 6.3 to 23.4 million NIS in the same period in Gaza (all in 1986 terms). On the other hand, the average wage in manufacturing has barely exceeded that of agriculture in the West Bank and has lagged behind agricultural wages in Gaza. If wages may be used as indicators of productivity and level of technology, then manufacturing has not developed noticeably during the period under study. It should be noted, however, that the average wage in manufacturing lagged behind that in agriculture in the West Bank in the 1970s, and it has caught up and stayed above it continuously since 1980.

These observations of limited industrialization are corroborated by the findings of a field study of industries by Samir Abdallah covering the period 1970 to 1983.<sup>2</sup> The sample included all industrial enterprises employing 20 workers or more, according to the 1984 census data, totalling 67 enterprises, 49 of which completed and returned the questionnaires; it also included a random selection of others that could be reached. Of these, 90 responses were received from enterprises that employed 5-9 workers and 41 from those employing 10-19 workers; thus, a total of 180 questionnaires were received and analyzed. Some of the relevant findings follow:

Table 1: Industry Profile

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	
Year WB	Aver Pop 000	Gross DPY/Ca	Lab. Force000	Empl. dom.00	Empl Man 000	Empl Isr 000	1	Av. Wage Man	Av. Wage Agr	GFCFPr M/T/	GFCFPr B/C	GFCFPr Tot
1968	578	1013.2	98.3	87.7			2			25	20	43.7
69	590.5	1191.2	114.7	110			3			62.4	32.4	85.4
70	602.9	1312.8	118.6	114.8	14.6	14.8	4	9.71	5.85	68.1	38.2	97
71	615.2	1530.7	120	117.1	13.4	25.7	5	8.37	7.1	72.8	61.5	129.4
72	628	1901.8	126.9	125.5	13.2	34.9	6	9.86	9.33	85.8	124.2	213.2
73	642.9	1700.5	128.2	126.9	14.4	38.9	7	9.46	10.96	63.7	174.3	246
74	661.1	1991.1	139.7	138.3	14.2	43	8	9.72	11.09	65.2	230.6	301.9
75	672.5	1948.6	134.7	133.1	14.6	40.8	9	9.56	10.72	60.4	269.5	333.2
76	769.3	2142.6	132.2	130.5	13.9	37.4	10	9.84	11.35	52.8	330.8	381
77	689.5	2039.3	129.8	128.2	14	35.8	11	10.03	11.19	61.8	361.2	421.3
78	701.8	2408.8	133.9	132.6	14.4	37.2	12	10.07	11.79	77.2	391.1	469.8
79	713.3	2301	135.4	134	14.8	40.2	13	10.39	11.2	81.8	455	536.1
80	721.5	2401.9	138.6	136.1	14.4	41	14	10.72	10.45	70.8	426.9	495.6
81	728.1	2301.6	136.8	134.8	14.8	40.4	15	11.12	9.75	62.2	428.1	486.5
82	740.6	2545.6	144.5	142.5	15.6	43.6	16	12.72	11.7	67.4	419.8	484.3
83	760.6	2321.8	148.6	145.6	15.8	47.5	17	12.25	12.22	75.6	391.5	466.1
84	782.6	2234.3	158.3	152.4	16.4	49.5	18	12.3	10.36	68.5	372.8	440
85	804.5	2068.8	159.2	151.2	16.7	47.5	19	13.1	11.45	78.1	400.4	477.6
86	826	2592.2	173.5	167	18.2	51.3	20	14.41	13.64	100.4	442.3	542.7
Year Gaza							21					
1968	359.9	668.7	57.3	47.3			22					
69	360.4	763.1	58.4	52.9			23			6.3	9.4	21.1
70	367	990.8	62.8	58.8	6.5	5.8	24			10.4	7.5	23.8
71	374.4	1067	62.4	59.9	6.4	8.3	25	5.21	6.23	8.7	9.4	23.8
72	382.9	1333.9	65.3	63.8	5.9	17.7	26	5.34	6.97	11.2	13.2	31.7
73	394.3	1456.1	69.7	68.4	5.9	22.6	27	9.23	9.14	17.3	41.4	68.7
74	407.8	1425.1	74.8	73.3	5.9	26.4	28	10.37	12.57	17.3	61.3	84.9
75	419.8	1444.4	74.4	72.9	5.8	26.1	29	10.09	10.61	18.8	63.4	89.4
76	431.5	1560.2	78.1	76.5	6.8	28.1	30	9.81	9.1	18.4	69.9	94.8
77	444.1	1571.2	79.3	77.6	6.5	27.8	31	9.89	10.34	17.7	109	128.8
78	456.9	1664	83.2	80.9	7.9	31.8	32	9.4	9.78	21.4	110.3	136
79	453.9	1861	82.4	80.2	8.9	34.8	33	9.96	9.74	17.7	127.3	145.2
80	450.6	1767.9	84.1	81.5	9.1	35	34	11.59	10.71	14.8	163	173.8
81	462.7	1883.7	85.9	83.2	8.2	36.5	35	10.44	10.53	13.5	145.8	155.8
82	473.1	1891.7	85.8	82.7	7.3	36.7	36	8.67	9.53	15.5	166	177.6
83	485.9	1878.5	86.9	86.1	7.1	39.3	37	10.66	10.7	15	140.3	160.2
84	502.2	1722.6	89.2	88.1	8.2	39.8	38	10.85	11.23	15.6	143.6	156.6
85	518.5	1477.7	92	90.9	7.9	41.9	39	10.75	9.61	16.7	133.7	148.7
86	536.1	1586	95.6	94.2	9	43.4	40	10.2	11.3	20.7	123.6	143.8
							41	13.15	14.23	23.8	123.9	147.7
							42					
		1986 prices					43	1986 prices	1986 prices	NIS million	NIS million	NIS million
		NIS					44	NIS/ Manuf	NIA/ Agr			

1. Industrial production is relatively small, relative to industrial consumption, 36-41 percent, implying that there is a domestic market for industrial products far beyond the present level of production. At present, the demand is satisfied by imports, primarily from Israel (p. 8).
2. Industrial employment in the OT declined from 12.5 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1984. However, the percentage of industrial employment was higher throughout this period in Gaza than it was in the West Bank (p. 7). Other workers, engaged in industry in Israel, are not included since their impact on domestic industrialization is rather limited.
3. Industrial output, in total and per capita, increased during this period. Industrial expansion, at current prices, rose at an annual rate of 11.8 percent in 1978, 24.4 percent in 1980, 12.6 percent in 1981, 7 percent in 1982, and 9.2 percent in 1983, according to official statistics (p. 13). These statistics indicate increases in labor productivity and per capita industrial output, though the productivity in industry remains lower than in agriculture, which is contrary to the changes expected during periods of industrialization and economic development.
4. Despite all obstacles blocking development and industrialization during Israeli occupation, there has been some advance both in quantity and quality. Expansion has been observed especially in metal works, electrodes, sharp tools, solar panels, chemicals, plastics, house equipment, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and sanitation supplies.
5. Much of the industrial output is dependent on imported supplies, especially from Israel. In other words, the domestic industrial base has been rather weak.
6. Most of the industry is labor intensive rather than capital intensive. It is estimated that the capital labor ratio, or the capital investment per job, is roughly 4,990 Jordanian dinars (JD); however, had there been full employment in the industrial enterprises, the investment capital would be 2,480 JD, or less than half the existing ratio (p. 31). Only 10.5 percent of the enterprises employ more than 90 percent of their capacity; 24 percent employ more than 70 percent and only about 60 percent employ half of their capacity or more (p. 38). The same observation is corroborated by the level of automation observed in industry. The enterprises that use fully automated machinery are 29.3 percent of the total, while 22.1 percent use semi-automated machinery, and 23.8 percent use machinery that is not automated at all. (The remaining 24.8 percent use a combination of the above.) The highest level of automation appears in the food processing industry (p. 33). Finally, the unfulfilled capacity is demonstrated by the low number of days worked by those employed in industry. It is estimated that industry

operates for only 57.1 percent of the possible work time. The reasons for this are not clear from the survey.

7. The under-utilization of resources would no doubt have been even higher had employment in Israel not been available to the OT labor forces. As shown in Table 1, employment in Israel increased steadily, with minor fluctuations, during this period, reaching over 29 percent of the West Bank labor force and about 45 percent in Gaza in 1986. In other words, industrial expansion did not even come close to absorption of the natural increment to the labor force, as would be expected in a developing industrializing economy.

### III. *Facilitators and Obstacles to Industrialization*

Given the prerequisites for industrialization specified above, it should be possible to identify those preconditions that were realized (facilitators) and those that were not (obstacles). The OT did have an industrial base, albeit a weak one, in 1970, the beginning of the period that Abdallah studied. A few enterprises had expanded sufficiently to employ 100 workers or more. This suggests that awareness of the potential for industrialization was already beginning to crystallize among the local entrepreneurs. This awareness could only have been reinforced through exposure to Israeli industry, both in production and the labor market. Consumption of Israeli products, producing subcontracted Israeli products, and working within Israel all exposed the residents of the OT to the potentials of industrialization and economic development.

The awareness generated by contact with Israeli industry has been accompanied by exposure to more advanced technology and production systems. This provides practice by experience and eventual assimilation of new ideas into the technological side of the domestic production system. While this impact remains unquantified, it cannot be denied that both producers and consumers in the OT have become acquainted with higher levels of technology since their economic interaction with Israel began.

Despite the present conflict and the Arab boycott of Israeli products, the producers in the OT have had access to raw material sources, from or via Israel, and there is no reason to believe that they paid higher prices for their raw materials than they would have from any other sources. It is even possible that they obtained them at less expense by paying in Israeli rather than in hard currency. In addition, the OT merchants had access beyond the OT market to the Israeli market and to a limited extent, to the Arab market, via the two bridges to Jordan. Though markets are usually closed to antagonists, the OT had access to both the input and output markets in Israel, as well as to employment there, although transaction costs may have been abnormally high, especially in the nonpecuniary sense. Whether Israeli capital was accessible remains debatable since few attempts by OT entrepreneurs to take advantage of it are known. Despite the fact that Israeli branch banks



established in the OT early in the occupation period were boycotted almost totally, there is little evidence that OT entrepreneurs were unable to patronize financial institutions in Israel, and there is equally little evidence that OT entrepreneurs could not buy and sell on the Israeli stock market. And, the industrialists of the OT have had formal access to sources of capital in Jordan and could most probably borrow and lend in that market for business purposes.

Thus, the industrial entrepreneurs of the OT did not lack incentives to expand industry, either in terms of profit expectations or national pride. There are no formal prohibitions on profit-making or on establishing Palestinian industry, although informal, procedural, and unwritten restrictions can be found in abundance. Yet in spite of all these apparent factors enabling industrialization, industry has remained limited and in some ways has diminished. The obvious reason is that the obstacles outweighed the facilitating elements to the extent that little of the potential for industrialization could be realized.

This conclusion opens the way for discussion of the obstacles to industrialization and development. Though much has been written about them, with the implication that in their absence development and industrialization would have followed, there is little quantitative evidence to support this conclusion, or to indicate how much industrialization would have taken place. Comparisons with neighboring Arab countries also throw such a conclusion into doubt since industrialization in Jordan, for example, has not noticeably advanced. And yet, the perceptions of the people of the OT and their reactions to the existing obstacles suggest that had such obstacles been removed, or were they to be, the results would in fact be quite positive and industrialization and economic development would follow. Therefore, these reactions warrant further scrutiny and analysis.

According to Abdallah's survey, the major obstacle in the way of industrialization has been the Israeli occupation. It has deprived the residents of the OT of the ability to plan for higher growth rates, or to protect their infant industries, or to sell on the international market independent of Israeli marketing channels. A national sense of purpose has, as a motivator, been emasculated by preventing the Palestinian economy from pursuing its own objectives. Similarly, access to the Israeli market has been undermined by severe competition from the monopoly of Israeli industry, as well as by administrative measures handicapping trade. To illustrate, 72.7 percent of the food, beverage, and tobacco producers considered administrative regulations a major obstacle, and 58.8 percent of the manufacturers of chemicals and animal feed expressed the same view. Israeli competition was also considered an obstacle by the majority of manufacturers of all products, including textiles, shoes, metal works, furniture and construction material. And one-fourth of the manufacturers consider prejudice by Jews in Israel against Palestinian products as a limitation to industrialization (pp. 42-44).

Some obstacles derive from restrictions by Jordan and other Arab countries that extend the Arab boycott of Israeli products to the products of the OT as well, since the raw materials may have come from Israel. Even when permits are given for export via the bridges to Jordan, transportation

and passage through at the checkpoints form a major obstacle due to bureaucratic procedures, raising the costs of production to the producer-exporter. Administrative restrictions by the Israeli authorities also take the form of delayed permits, denial of applications, or both, to the extent of discouraging the establishment of new industries and the expansion of existing ones. Finally, according to the survey, 49.4 percent of respondents complained about the lack of financial sources for credit and 82.2 percent complained about the tax policy of the occupation (pp. 36-47). Apparently Israeli sources of capital are not considered acceptable or accessible and establishing Palestinian financial institutions is not allowed.

All these obstacles have been noted in various studies, including "Industrialization in the Occupied Territories: A Local Perspective," by Elias H. Tuma and Samir Hazboun, the main source for the remainder of this section (unpublished). The Tuma-Hazboun survey was conducted in 1987, immediately preceding the beginning of the intifada. A sample of 73 interviewees was selected in consultation with the interviewers. The sample represents the majority of the cities and large towns in the OT. It includes 20 proprietors (27%), 21 managers (29%), and 16 owner-managers (22%). It also includes eight journalists (11%), three technicians, two academicians, one business consultant, and two unspecified. The businesses include 38 commodity producers (52%), 32 service providers (44%) and three unspecified. Twenty-seven (37%) of the businesses are family-owned, 13 (18%) are private companies, 12 (16%) are incorporated, seven (10%) are partnerships, five (7%) are public corporations, one (1%) is a cooperative, and eight (11%) are other or unspecified. The results relate both to the present and the future, although the following summation relates only to the present situation.

The findings illustrate the fact that the majority of the businesses are young, established during the Israeli occupation, despite obstacles. Seventeen (23%) were established 1-5 years ago, 23 (32%) 6-10 years ago, 11 (15%) 11-15 years ago, and five (7%) 16-20 years ago. Only 17 (23%) were established more than 21 years before, preceding the Israeli occupation. These businesses are relatively small, with 36 (49%) employing fewer than 20 workers and only six (8%) employing more than one hundred workers. The responses corroborate the overall perception that the occupation has obstructed economic growth. As Table 2 illustrates, absence of capital and financial institutions, lack of information on profit prospects, inability to visit and learn from other projects and the complexity of bureaucratic rules were considered obstacles. However, contrary to popular opinion, poor infrastructure did not seem to be a major obstacle, as far as the availability and costs of services are concerned; electricity, water, transport, and communications were available. These industries also found little difficulty in recruiting qualified personnel, although management appears to be the most scarce among the five categories indicated.

Another observation contradictory to popular impression is that only five percent consider Israel to be the major market for their products; 22 percent consider the domestic market to be most

Table 2: Perceived Obstacles to Industrialization

Considered an Obstacle by		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<b>Capital</b>			
Lack of capital		18	(25%)
High interest rates		21	(29%)
Lack of financial institutions		11	(15%)
Difficulty in acquiring loans		19	(26%)
Other		4	(5%)
<b>Information</b>			
		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Lack of knowledge of anticipated profits		18 (25%)	55 (75%)
Lack of feasibility studies		6 (8%)	67 (92%)
Difficulty of implementation		7 (10%)	68 (93%)
Engineering problems		7 (10%)	65 (89%)
Failing to visit other projects		16 (22%)	57 (78%)
Bureaucratic rules and regulations:			
Clear		25 (34%)	48 (66%)
Easy to follow		19 (26%)	54 (74%)
Help to implement projects		14 (19%)	58 (79%)
Obstruct implementation		46 (63%)	26 (36%)
<b>Infrastructure</b>			
		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Considered available			
Electricity		70 (96%)	3 (4%)
Water		70 (96%)	3 (4%)
Transport		71 (97%)	2 (3%)
Communication		66 (90%)	7 (10%)
<b>Costs</b>			
	<u>Reasonable</u>	<u>Not Reasonable</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
Electricity	47 (64%)	23 (32%)	3 (4%)
Water	61 (84%)	8 (11%)	4 (5%)
Transport	61 (84%)	8 (11%)	4 (5%)
Communication	42 (58%)	26 (36%)	5 (7%)
<b>Technical Qualifications</b>			
	<u>Available</u>	<u>Not Available</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
Engineer	71 (97%)	1 (1%)	1 (1%)
Managers	54 (74%)	18 (25%)	1 (1%)
Accountants	72 (99%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Skilled workers	65 (89%)	8 (11%)	1 (1%)
Semiskilled	68 (93%)	3 (4%)	2 (4%)

Table 3 Recommended Steps:

	Answered 46 (63%)		No Answer 27 (37%)	
To be taken	Yes	No	No Answer	
By Local Authorities:				
Improve infrastructure	29 (40%)	41 (56%)	3 (4%)	
Simplify bylaws	44 (60%)	26 (36%)	3 (4%)	
Introduce new regulations (bylaws)	39 (53%)	31 (42%)	3 (4%)	
Reduce taxes	70 (96%)	0 (0%)	3 (4%)	
Protect domestic products	46 (63%)	24 (33%)	3 (4%)	
By the Israeli Government:				
Improve services	55 (75%)	16 (22%)	2 (3%)	
Reduce taxes	67 (92%)	4 (5%)	2 (3%)	
Give subsidies	11 (15%)	60 (82%)	2 (3%)	
Promote markets	42 (58%)	29 (40%)	2 (3%)	
Improve technical & vocational education	33 (45%)	38 (52%)	2 (3%)	
By Jordanian Government:				
Improve services	10 (14%)	61 (84%)	2 (3%)	
Reduce taxes	2 (3%)	69 (95%)	2 (3%)	
Provide subsidies	50 (68%)	21 (29%)	2 (3%)	
Promote markets	49 (67%)	22 (30%)	2 (3%)	
Improve technical & vocational education	44 (60%)	27 (37%)	2 (3%)	
By the PLO:				
Improve services	4 (5%)	67 (92%)	2 (3%)	
Reduce taxes	2 (3%)	69 (95%)	2 (3%)	
Provide subsidies	61 (84%)	10 (14%)	2 (3%)	
Promote markets	23 (32%)	48 (66%)	2 (3%)	
Improve technical & vocational education	24 (33%)	47 (64%)	2 (3%)	
By Mercantile & Industrial Groups:				
Establish associations	53 (73%)	10 (14%)	10 (14%)	
Establish cooperation	50 (68%)	5 (7%)	18 (25%)	
Create joint ventures with Jordanians	34 (47%)	28 (38%)	11 (15%)	
Create joint ventures with Israelis	1 (1%)	62 (85%)	10 (14%)	
Undertake exploratory studies	49 (67%)	2 (3%)	22 (30%)	
Promote Group Advertising	59 (81%)	1 (1%)	13 (18%)	
By Entrepreneurs:				
Increase initiative & creativity	61 (84%)	1 (1%)	11 (15%)	
Increase saving & capital formation	10 (14%)	44 (60%)	19 (26%)	
By international agencies:				
Increase investment	50 (68%)	3 (4%)	20 (27%)	
Provide technical assistance	52 (71%)	2 (3%)	19 (26%)	
Undertake joint ventures	31 (42%)	17 (23%)	25 (34%)	

important, and one percent considers the Arab market as most important, with the majority looking to any available market, depending on economic conditions and demand.

The interviewees were also asked to identify the factors leading to success or failure in their industries or others. High quality products, technical efficiency, and good management were the most common explanations of success. In contrast, poor management, lack of feasibility studies and good planning, high taxes, and administrative restrictions were the dominant explanations of failure.

Interestingly enough, almost no one mentioned poverty of resources as an obstacle. Neither did anyone point to the difficulties encountered by competing in the international market with low levels of technology and labor productivity. The fact that the market, in the Arab world and elsewhere, may not be easily accessible on economic grounds does not feature in these responses. The impression given is that most of the responses are based on political attitudes with little economic analysis of existing realities.

#### *IV. Prospects for the Future*

A look at the future was attempted, through the eyes of two groups, those surveyed in the Tuma-Hazboun 1987 survey, and a sample of Palestinian business people living outside the OT. The diaspora group survey was conducted especially for this study. The questions asked of each group differ in a number of ways, because of their different circumstances. The former group was posed questions regarding the present and the future, with no suggestion of political changes in the OT. The latter group was questioned regarding industrialization in peacetime, after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The responses have many common elements and are quite telling with regard to what these Palestinians think about the economic future of the OT.

Food processing, plastics, and chemicals were considered the most promising industries in terms of potential profit by a substantial number of respondents, though not by a majority (37%, 22%, and 30% for the three industries respectively). Textiles, metal works, agricultural equipment, electronics and electrical equipment and handicrafts were also frequently cited as potentially profitable.

The interviewees were asked to suggest what steps should be taken toward the future, and by whom. The results are shown in Table 3. The dominant recommendations, short of ending the occupation, concentrate on reduction of taxes, simplification of rules and regulations, protection of domestic products to guarantee markets and improvement of technical education. The majority consider subsidies necessary. A majority also suggests that mercantile and industrial groups establish associations and cooperatives, as well as undertake feasibility studies and promote advertising. Entrepreneurs are expected to increase initiative and creativity. Another significant observation is that differentiated roles are expected of Israel, Jordan, and the PLO. Subsidy is expected from Jordan and the PLO but not from Israel, while improvement of the services and the reduction of taxes are expected from Israel.

A subsequent question was, who might be the entrepreneurs promoting new industries? Secondly, would they themselves become investors in new industry? Twenty-five answered yes and more than half gave no answer. Asked if they would prefer to have a partner, 20 said yes and 13 said no, and again more than half gave no answer to the question. Lastly, they were asked: if they were to take on a partner who would that partner be? Almost half preferred a local business person (Table 5).

We tried to have our interviewees elaborate on their responses regarding the future of industrialization in the Occupied Territories. The following are selected comments in descending order of frequency.

1. Israel will not permit the development of domestic industry.
2. Jordan restricts exports and there are political obstacles related to this. (These interviews were conducted before the intifada began and Jordan subsequently restricted its involvement in the affairs of the occupied territories.)
3. The PLO has shown little interest in regard to this matter.
4. Israeli competition will not allow our industry to develop.
5. Our dependence on foreign industry hinders our own industrial development.
6. There is no cause for optimism regarding our economic future because of Israeli occupation.
7. There will be no industrial development under occupation.
8. Industry will develop if export markets become available and long-term loans become accessible.
9. Future industrial development is difficult because of uncertainty and the high risk to capital investment in view of economic and political instability.
10. There are too many obstacles and difficulties and therefore no prospects as long as the occupation lasts.
11. The occupation has no future.
12. The future is contingent upon the political situation.
13. The future is not clear.

The survey of the diaspora Palestinians was based on a questionnaire mailed to 52 business people, whose names were suggested by two friends who are themselves businessmen. The people surveyed reside in the United States, Europe, and different countries of the Middle East. Twenty-one questionnaires were returned. Though the sample is small and biased in terms of composition and selection, the views expressed are quite informative. All the respondents are over 50 years old and 43 percent are over 60. One-third hold Jordanian citizenship, 90 percent have at least a baccalaureate

Table 4: Prospective Entrepreneurs

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
Previously successful entrepreneurs	48 (66%)	21 (29%)	4 ( 5%)
New entrepreneurs	35 (48%)	25 (34%)	13 (18%)
Young entrepreneurs	19 (26%)	48 (66%)	6 ( 8%)
Graduates of business schools	21 (29%)	39 (53%)	13 (18%)

Table 5: Prospective Partners

	<u>Yes</u>
A local business person	33 (45%)
An Israeli business person	0 ( 0%)
An Arab business person	11 (15%)
A business person from a developed country	2 ( 3%)
A person with capital regardless of nationality	3 ( 4%)
A person with technical knowledge regardless of nationality	0 ( 0%)
A person with administrative qualification regardless of nationality	0 ( 0%)
Other	21 (29%)
No answer	3 ( 4%)

or bachelor of science degree, and all have been in their present businesses more than 20 years, divided about equally between professional consultation, commodity production, and services. Over one-third of them employ more than 500 persons, 30 percent employ between 51 and 100 people, and 35 percent have 50 employees or fewer. The gross sales or transactions of one-third of these businesses exceed \$100 million a year, 17 percent conduct transactions of between \$51-100m, 11 percent, of \$11-50m, and 39 percent gross \$1-10m a year. Not surprisingly, over half of them consider themselves adequately informed about the political situation in the Middle East. A large majority depend on newspapers, academic sources and popular magazines, and while over one-third get their information from PLO sources, some obtain it from Israeli sources.

Over 80 percent expressed their intention to return to a future independent Palestinian state, but only 48 percent would do so on a permanent basis; the rest would return for business or just to visit. Fully 81 percent of all respondents would be involved in business in the new state, and 62 percent would start new businesses, while the others would expand their existing enterprises. The prospective industries, in order of frequency of selection are: construction, hotels and tourism, food processing, handicrafts, textiles, electronics, transportation, leather goods, and other. Heavy industry, metal works, farm equipment, plastics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals are not high on the list, in contrast to the selection made by the respondents in the OT. The majority would aim their products at the markets in the Arab world; about half would look toward the domestic market, and 38 percent would approach the European Economic Community. Interestingly enough, 29 percent consider Israel as important for prospective marketing as Jordan, the Third World countries, and the United States. Apparently there is confidence that the economy of Palestine would be competitive enough to enter the larger international market.

Domestic capital would play a major role, but more important would be international capital. Public sources would also be important. Only 19 percent believe that over half of their acquaintances in business would invest in the new state directly (not portfolio investment). Thirty-eight percent believe that between 20 percent and 50 percent of their acquaintances would invest, while 43 percent believe that no more than 20 percent would invest. According to the findings, investment will depend on a number of factors. In descending order of significance, these factors are political freedom, economic freedom, a healthy infrastructure, freedom from government intervention, favorable profit expectations, availability of partners, tax holidays and subsidies. Investment would also be greatly enhanced by provision of reliable business information, the ability to identify viable industries and markets, and formation of business corporations.

All respondents said they would play a role in the new economy, about half of them in technical or consultative capacity, and a third in fund-raising. Given the centrality of "network" and family to the organizational structure of business among the successful diaspora Palestinians, these responses are likely to be highly representative of the attitudes of Palestinian business people at large.



For example, they reflect a general feeling of optimism shared by others regarding the future of the economy of an independent Palestine, despite the various problems that remain unexplored.

### ***V. Concluding Remarks***

Among the outstanding problems are the following:

1. A potential conflict may arise between industrialization, which depends on saving and investment, and increased consumption in the new state, due to the returning refugees and dislocated Palestinians waiting to be resettled. Dependent and long deprived, this group would likely be more keen on increasing consumption than on saving for years to come. The question arises, therefore, as to whether international capital supply will be large enough to compensate for the potentially low rate of saving, so that industrialization will be supported.
2. Unless domestic industry can be protected and concentrated on import substitution, it is not certain that technology transfer will be as rapid as is necessary to allow industry to advance in quality and productivity, in order to enter the markets that the respondents targeted. Even entry into the Arab markets may be difficult since all the Arab countries are attempting to industrialize and most produce competitive rather than complementary products.
3. Another question is whether, given poor resource endowment, Palestinian industry will be able to achieve a high enough level of technology to enjoy comparative advantage producing certain industrial products, in order to enter highly competitive markets. To excel in industry, the Palestinians will have to depend largely on human capital, both in terms of low cost labor and high productivity and technical advantage. The frequent Palestinian complaints against Israeli competition may be indicative of a serious problem of inefficiency. However, the Israeli competitive advantage is only in part a function of benefits arising from the occupation; the technological superiority of Israeli industry is widely admitted to be a major factor.
4. Lastly, human resources, even with technical training and skill, may or may not be disciplined enough to apply rational methods of business management in order to achieve competitive levels of efficiency in production and marketing. Business success by the Palestinians, especially in the Middle East, has been largely centered around construction and services and in markets that are protected or monopolized by state agencies. Furthermore, contracts with state agencies in the Middle East, and most other places, tend to hide inefficiencies and failures to compete internationally. Given that the Arab countries and most of the Third World countries have not been able to develop the necessary levels of discipline and efficiency for

industrial labor forces, what evidence is there to prove that the Palestinians will be able to break out of the mold and build a strong and competitive industry within a reasonable period of time after independence?

These are some of the questions that still need to be explored. The answers may come only when the Palestinians are actually faced with the challenge of building a successful industry in an independent state of Palestine.

### Notes

I am grateful to the people who have helped me with the field survey, and to Chris Kim who processed the survey data.

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**The Hebrew University of Jerusalem**

**Summer 1991**

**A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
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STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP:  
A GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Ephraim Ahiram

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Place of Industrial Development within the Strategy of General Development of the Palestinian Economy

The strategy for industrial development in the West Bank and Gaza must be derived from an overall strategy of economic development incorporating specific goals. The two primary economic goals for a Palestinian entity can be identified as follows:

a. Sustained economic growth, which should lead to a radical improvement of the derelict infrastructure and to a gradual increase in the standard of living of the population, from the rather low 1987 (pre-intifada) annual per capita GNP of \$2,130 in the West Bank and \$1,470 in Gaza.

b. Absorption in the domestic economy of a large proportion of the 105,000 workers from the territories presently employed in Israel, as well as most of the net annual addition to the labor force of 10,000 workers. To these may be added, in the wake of modernization, many more thousands expelled annually from economic branches (in particular agriculture) in which disguised unemployment still prevails.

Further need to absorb workers in the economy may result from the immigration of returnees from the Palestinian diaspora.

These goals of growth and worker absorption may be effectively achieved mainly by a large-scale process of industrialization. Agricultural production may expand, even considerably, if additional water resources can be made available, but such a process is inevitably linked to modernization of agriculture, resulting in a decline in the number of workers engaged in this sector.

Construction, housing in particular, will most probably employ an increasing part of the labor force. But this will, necessarily, be a passing phenomenon, and its impact on the balance of payments may be wholly negative: increasing imports while contributing little, if anything, to exports.

In a self-governing entity it is also reasonable to expect that the public sector and welfare services will expand considerably. Experience in newly established countries -- including Israel and many other countries in the Middle East -- provides evidence that there is grave danger in overexpanding and overmanning these services, which then become a heavy and lasting burden on the government budget and thereby on the whole economy. The temptation for Palestine to tread the same line will be very great because the public sector appears the easiest and the cheapest in which to establish jobs in the short run. This trend may be even more tempting in the Palestinian case because of the large number of unskilled high school graduates within the society. The proportion of the population with this kind of education is much larger in the West Bank and Gaza than in other countries that have the same range of income per capita. While public sector employment could be an easy way to achieve the second goal, domestic employment of the labor force, it would inhibit or even prevent economic development.

Besides industry, tourism is the only economic branch which could make an important contribution to the economic development of Palestine. As Palestine would likely feature a considerable number of places holy to the three monotheistic religions, enjoy a climate attractive to Arabs from many countries in the Middle East, and be regarded by many in the Palestinian diaspora as their homeland, tourism could become, in peacetime, a major pillar of the Palestinian economy. While the major generator of sustained economic development in Palestine will have to be the industrial sector, many industries could be established to cater for the anticipated large influx of tourists.

## 2. The Present State of Industry in the West Bank and Gaza and Problems in its Development since Occupation in 1967

### 2.1 The State of Industry in the West Bank and Gaza.

The state of industry is poor by any standard. (For detailed data, see appendix). In the West Bank, the industrial branch comprises about 8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and in Gaza, 14 percent (mining and industry). (In Gaza this probably includes some Israel industries.) Most of the industrial establishments in the West Bank and Gaza are small

by any standard: the number of workers, capital investment per worker, production. Most are actually workshops rather than factories, employing fewer than five workers; only some 5 percent of all laborers in industry in the West Bank are employed by the half dozen relatively large establishments employing more than one hundred workers. While efficiency in the West Bank is very low; the 17 percent of the working population employed there produce only 8 percent of GDP: in Gaza ~~the 18 percent of the employed produce 14 percent of GDP.~~ The industrial branch is mainly based on traditional industries such as processing foods, soap-making, textiles, handicrafts and quarrying.

Despite this generally sorry picture of the industrial branch, a few islands of efficiency and modernization exist. For instance, the main food processing industry, olive oil production, is also one of the two main industrial branches which has undergone a thorough modernization process in the past fifteen years, including major capital investment in "state-of-the-art" equipment. The other branch that has modernized its production process and made large capital investments, is quarrying. Both of these industrial branches are also large exporters of their products to the east of the Jordan river: large quantities of cut quarry stone are also exported to Israel.

In the traditional food processing branch of industry there are two relatively large, long-establish firms, one producing samneh (a kind of margarine), and another producing chocolates and sweets. Both export much of their product to Jordan and east of it.

The other traditional industries have made, at the best, slow progress in modernizing their production processes. There are, however, relatively new firms, especially in the plastic industry, pharmaceuticals, paper products (which have made probably the largest inroad of all Palestinian products into the Israeli market), detergents, agricultural appliances and soft drinks. A few of these firms have been established since the Israeli occupation. Some use reasonably modern and effective equipment. To the best of my knowledge, none of the firms are engaged in research and development activities.

While most of the industries are in the West Bank, in Gaza there are several firms engaged in assembling electronic and electrical appliances.

## 2.2 Problems in the Development of the Industry since the Israeli Occupation.

During the Israeli occupation, the industrial branch has scarcely developed. Except for those cases already mentioned, there have not been any technological breakthroughs, as were seen in the agricultural branch. The explanation for this stagnation of the industrial branch is twofold: the determination of certain circles in Israel to prevent industrial development in the territories; and Jordan's determination to prevent West Bank competition with its own industrial products. Both the Israeli and the Jordanian policies have been enacted in a rather ruthless manner.

### 2.2.1 Israeli Policy Measures.

The most effective and simple measures taken by the Israeli authorities to prevent the establishment of new industries have been administrative: in particular, denial of various licenses (such as import licenses for equipment). The denials have often been "justified" by the argument that "there is saturation of the planned product on the Israeli market." In many cases, no reply was given, with the expectation being that, eventually, the entrepreneur would simply give up.

Other measures include prevention of competition on equal footing with the Israeli producers. This category includes the de facto suspension of the Jordanian law for the encouragement of investment in the West Bank. A parallel Israeli law has never been introduced. The considerable subsidization of industry enjoyed in Israel has thereby been denied to the West Bank producers.

In addition, the direct subsidies that Israeli producers receive have been denied to the Palestinians. As a result, several branches of industry in the territories shrank considerably, in particular the dairy and poultry branches. (Since the proclamations of a boycott on Israeli products by the intifada leadership early in the uprising, and the almost simultaneous drastic reduction of subsidies to Israeli producers of dairy and poultry products, these two branches have recovered quickly and extremely well in the West Bank.

For a period of time, Israel did introduce easy terms for investment loans and grants for industry, but on a small scale. Except in the Bethlehem region, most domestic investors were not interested in taking such capital support.

Another obstacle to the development of industry under the occupation has been the barring of industrial exports from the territories to Israel on the grounds that they do not stand up to official Israeli standards. It should be stressed, however, that legislation of standards in the West Bank was rather backward during Jordanian rule and even less developed in Gaza during Egypt's rule there. This kind of legislation has not been introduced in Israel specifically as a means of keeping out products from the territories, but as a measure of protection against imports from all countries, and in particular European ones.

Following the occupation, Israel unilaterally established something like a customs union with the territories. This relationship has, in many respects, the characteristics of a wider economic union -- not only in the free movement of goods, but also in respect to labor and the existence of a common legal tender: the Israeli currency (though the Jordanian dinar also remains legal tender in the territories). These unilateral arrangements have been able to prevent unwanted competition from Palestinian products, the Palestinians lacking economic self-rule, were unable to retaliate effectively (at least until the onset of the intifada).

In addition to the direct obstacles imposed by Israel on industrial development in the territories, there also exist policy omissions which, intentionally or unintentionally, raise further barriers to industrial development. These have been mainly of three kinds:

The first is the inadequate development of physical infrastructure (electricity and water supply, telecommunications, and sewage disposal), albeit that more was done during Israeli occupation than under Jordanian or British mandatory rule over similar periods of time. Second is the lack of financial institutions that encourage saving and provide investment funds in general, and to industry in particular. The last obstacle is the inadequate vocational education and post-high school education in technical and natural science professions. While Israel introduced some vocational education, it has been on too small a scale.

### 2.2.2 Jordanian Policy Measures.

As we have seen, it was not only Israel that intentionally prevented the development of industry in the territories. Jordan continued its policy of 1948 to 1967, when it encouraged industrialization on the East Bank of Jordan, while suppressing it on the West Bank. Jordan implements this policy under the pretext of enforcing the Arab economic boycott against Israel. While Israel made possible the continuation of the trade between the West Bank and Jordan and established trade with Gaza -- the "open bridge" policy -- the Jordanian authorities severely restricted the import of goods produced in the West Bank and Gaza. Although some Jordanian restrictions were changed from time to time, the main ones can be summarized as follows:

- a. Industrial firms established in the territories after 1967 are not allowed to export their products to or through Jordan.
- b. The same rule applies to goods produced from raw materials or by means of equipment brought from Israel or imported through it.
- c. Even in the case of products which do not fall within these restrictive categories, no more than 50 percent of their output is permitted to enter.

This third restriction is clear evidence that the entire exercise of import restrictions from the territories is meant to protect Jordanian industry, while the Arab economic boycott of Israel is simply used as a welcome pretext. In addition to these restrictions, Jordan had also been actively discouraging industrialists from establishing or enlarging factories in the territories. For this purpose, the Jordanian authorities would threaten Palestinian industrialists who did not establish their factories in Jordan. Simultaneously, they offered all kinds of "carrots," such as generous grants and easy loans. By these means they succeeded in persuading Palestinians to establish, for example, a plastics and a match factory in Jordan rather than in the West Bank. The Jordanians thereby made it almost impossible to increase Palestinian exports to Jordan (a notable exception is the export of quarry stone) and beyond Jordan to the Gulf states and to other Arab countries. As a result, the Jordanians not only succeeded in effectively preventing trade in industrial goods with the

territories, but also in suffocating much of the potential industrial development in the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, the policies exercised by Israel and Jordan effectively prevented industrial development in the territories. An important implication of this government interference is that the stagnation of industry in the West Bank and Gaza does not stem necessarily from insurmountable inherent characteristics of the territories' economy or society, but is to a large extent the result of calculated repression of the industry by the Palestinians' "friendly" neighbors.

## II. A STRATEGY OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

### 3.1 Export Orientation versus Import Substitution Strategy.

There are many constraints to the future development of industry in the West Bank and Gaza. The major constraint will be the minute size of the domestic market, and its aggregate purchasing power. The West Bank and Gaza are small entities in every respect: geographically, demographically and economically. A change in these realities in the foreseeable future is improbable, even if economic growth is extremely successful. Only discovery of large exploitable petroleum resources could change this appraisal.

A small domestic market cannot provide the necessary economic environment for the production of a large variety of goods. Even goods for which domestic demand may be large enough to justify relatively large-scale efficient production would require no more than one single firm or factory in a specific industrial branch to enjoy economies of scale. The monopoly or oligopoly thus created may nullify, to say the least, any gain resulting from large-scale production processes. Therefore a small economy has usually to import large quantities of goods. To finance this, it must in the long run develop exports that will enable it to pay for the imports. If the economy concentrates on production for the domestic market, most probably by preventing competition from abroad with the help of tariff and non-tariff measures, the country's production will become qualitatively inferior and therefore unable to compete in international markets.

The almost inevitable conclusion is that in order to grow and develop economically and raise the standards of living, the main anchor for a

strategy of industrial development of a Palestinian entity in the long run. will be the development of export goods. In this case, the ongoing debate on import substitution versus export promotion as a long-term strategy is simply not relevant. The case for making the Palestinian economy export-oriented seems obvious -- at least, to the economists in our midst. I chose, however, to dwell on this subject because of the tendencies developing among Palestinians since the outset of the intifada, and to a degree, even before. "Self-sufficiency" (which is used as a synonym for autarchy) has become practically official dogma of the intifada. Though this dogma advances immediate political goals, it may in the long run prove fatal to the economic development of the Palestinian entity in times of peace. The reason is that in the interim, economic interest groups may become entrenched in economic advantages that they acquire and will therefore work as pressure groups to prevent changes in the status quo, to the detriment of the Palestinian economy. This process could also lead to dangerous social unrest. Such pressure groups are usually very effective because they have the means to endear themselves to the political leadership and thus acquire considerable wealth and privileges as a result of economic legislation which supposedly furthers the self-sufficiency of the economy.

Although, if such legislation is passed due to the pressure of interest groups, it may also generate adverse interest groups which agitate in the opposite direction. once legislation has been passed in order to further nationalistic, religious or other ideologies, it becomes extremely difficult to repeal; the whole debate moves into the realm of the irrational.

For all these reasons, despite the international evidence that in order for small countries to prosper, their strategy must be export oriented, it must be recognized that there are numerous difficulties in the path of developing such an economy. This will be especially true for an entity with so little industrial experience, and in particular, scant experience in relatively large and technologically advanced enterprises. It is very difficult to develop an export-oriented industry without having previous experience in industrial production for domestic use through which



the elementary handling of the industrial production process and management can be acquired.

In addition, export markets, especially in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are notoriously "spoiled": the standards of quality and consistency that they require are very high; delivery times must be adhered to; marketing methods are very different from those prevailing domestically; and information about the competitors' capabilities and intentions is difficult to come by. Thus, there exists an apparent paradox in the approach to development in general, and industry in particular, of an export-oriented strategy: an import substitution strategy is feasible as a start towards economic growth, but leads to a cul-de-sac; the export-oriented strategy is not feasible at the start (in particular, if exportable natural resources are scarce), but is the best long-term strategy if a critical industrial mass and experience already exist. Therefore the challenge is to achieve a reasonable dovetailing of the two strategies: import substitution and export orientation, while striving to avoid the pitfalls inherent in each approach. A brief outline of such a "dovetailing strategy" for development, as applied to the case of the West Bank and Gaza, follows.

### 3.2 The Rehabilitation of Refugees to Generate General and Industrial Development.

As is well known, a large number of Palestinian refugees live in the territories, particularly in Gaza, where refugees constitute 44 percent of the Palestinian population. In the West Bank, the 95,000 refugees are 10 percent of the population. Most live in extremely primitive conditions, unworthy of human beings. One of the first tasks of a sovereign Palestinian entity will be the rehabilitation of these refugees. This is first of all a grave humanitarian issue, which may also have far-reaching political consequences. If no major effort is made for the rehabilitation of these unfortunate people, they will continue to be the powder keg of the Middle East, and out of their misery will spread terrorism and unrest throughout this area and far beyond. (It may turn out that the numbers of the refugees will be increased by returnees from Lebanon and from elsewhere, but by how many it is impossible to estimate. We shall refrain

from taking them into account because of the difficulty in estimating their numbers, and also because they will not change the principles of our analysis, but only the magnitude of the problem).

In the interest of promoting stability, it is likely that the international community -- the OECD countries and the rich Arab oil states, as well as international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund -- will be willing to contribute generously to this cause. Very rough estimates put the capital needed for housing, establishment of work places and construction of infrastructure at 10-15 billion dollars to be spent over a period of about ten years, or between 1-1.5 billion dollars per annum. Part of this investment, in particular the establishment of work places and infrastructure, may be expected to be made on a purely commercial basis by the private sector in the above mentioned countries and in the territories themselves. Such a magnitude of investment, and in particular, in infrastructure -- electricity and water supply, telecommunications, industrial parks, roads, schools, hospitals and clinics and public buildings -- will benefit not only the refugees but also the population at large. If the capital becomes available on reasonable terms, the refugees will not constitute an economic burden on the Palestinian entity at all, rather, they will become its greatest economic asset.

Such an influx of capital will enable -- in the first years -- almost a doubling of aggregate demand. Not only the magnitude of the increased demand will be of significance, but also its compositions, which will include an exceptionally high component of capital goods. In the territories it will be economically possible to produce only some of the goods demanded; the rest will have to be imported. It is not within the scope of this paper to detail which products can be produced in the territories, but we shall point out as examples, prospective candidates for domestic production. These products are chosen based on two criteria, the magnitude of anticipated domestic demand and the exportability of the goods in the future, in particular to Arab countries. While eventual profitability should be the main criterion, this cannot even be assessed at this stage.

Candidates for domestic production could probably be found within the following areas of activity:

Housing and construction will be the area first affected dramatically, through the building of homes for refugees and large infrastructure construction, such as the deep sea port in Gaza, road and rail connections between the West Bank and Gaza and probably Jordan, and industrial parks. For such purposes alone, hundreds of workshops and small-to-medium-size enterprises (measured by the territories' standards) can be established. For example:

- 1) One or two cement factories.
- 2) Prefabricated-house factories to supply housing to the poor and lower middle classes and for industrial parks and schools.
- 3) Factories to produce bathroom and kitchen accessories, such as bathtubs, showers, sinks, toilets, faucets, water and sewage pipes.
- 4) Factories and workshops for furniture for homes, schools, offices, hotels.

Manufacture will also be required of various components for infrastructure, such as:

- 1) Electricity and telephone poles.
- 2) Pipes for water and sewage conductors.
- 3) Various small-scale transformers and generators.
- 4) All kinds of small tools.
- 5) Numerous metal and plastic products connected with the infrastructure construction.
- 6) Various spare parts for machines.

These are only a very few examples of the kind of products whose profitability would merit examination.

In order to prevent some of the pitfalls of import substitution projects mentioned above, a few suggestions follow on how to go about the establishment of such enterprises. Contractors of large projects, such as the Gaza port or telephone exchanges, should be required in their contracts to help establish some of the relevant factories in the territories and buy their products if they are competitive in terms of quality and cost. Likewise, such contractors should be asked to provide vocational training

for local workers who will administer and maintain the project upon completion. Thereby the quality of products could improve to export standard.

In this way refugee rehabilitation can become the generator of industrial development. In fact, the rehabilitation will provide a unique opportunity -- which is unlikely to recur -- for the establishment of a sound foundation for sustained industrial development and economic growth in the territories.

### 3.3 The Establishment of an Almost Exclusive Export Industry.

So far these suggestions envisage an export industry, developing on the basis of an industry created in response to domestic demand. However, this domestic demand and therefore also the industry based on it, will be, in part, of a temporary nature though it will be an excellent training ground for further industrial development. Such further development will, of necessity, be mainly export-oriented, as domestic demand will become of marginal importance.

The main imponderables in the problem of what kind of industry has a chance to succeed in the export market, are twofold: which markets present the best prospects for absorbing products produced in the territories, and secondly, which products may the territories be expected to produce almost exclusively for export?

Both of these questions are dependent on the time horizon. In the long run, it may be expected that more markets will open up to Palestinian products and, as a function of time, the range of products and the extent of value added in the Palestinian products, will increase.

#### 3.3.1 Prospective Export Markets for Palestinian Products

In principle there are six major prospective markets for Palestinian goods: the rich Arab oil countries, other Arab countries, Israel, the less developed countries (LDCs), Eastern Europe, and Western Europe.

The rich Arab countries are a natural major target for the supply of industrial products and services. Their proximity should be regarded as a considerable advantage for the supply to their markets of many goods and industrial services. Although the competition for the oil-rich Arab market

is fierce and the market has shrunk considerably in the second half of the 1980s. it still amounts to about \$30-40 billion. Thus capturing even 2-3 percent of this market (constituting 40-60 percent of the territories' present GDP) could mean a breakthrough for the Palestinian economy. Furthermore, cooperation in the production of industrial and agricultural products between the West Bank/Gaza and Israel could very much expand the range of exportable products from Palestine to the Arab countries. The knowledge of the Arab language, culture, style of living, and especially the very special traditions of doing business and the many contacts which the Palestinians have acquired through their diaspora and otherwise, should give them a competitive edge over other, non-Arab competitors.

The second potential export market, the poor Arab countries, appears much less promising because they are already producing much of what the Palestinians may be expected to produce, and the labor costs there may be lower. Again, cooperation with Israel could provide the Palestinians with an extension of the export range in products in which they would not have to face competition with local Arab products in these countries.

The recent developments in Eastern European countries may raise justifiable hopes of their becoming an important market for the Palestinian exports. This statement rests on several a priori considerations: the East European market is less particular in regard to product quality than are the Western markets, and is even less particular than the rich Arab countries and Israel. Therefore, in the beginning stages of industrial and agricultural exports it may be easier for the Palestinian goods to satisfy the East European markets. It is also well known that the East Europeans have great difficulties in paying in convertible currencies for their imports. This may work in favor of the Palestinians because they could make barter deals much more easily than the Western countries or Israel: for example, by importing heavy electrical equipment in return for their exports.

The Western European market may prove very difficult for Palestinian industrial exports to penetrate because of the high demand for quality and the high levels of standardization. This market may become even more impenetrable after full European economic union is established in 1992. The

primary exception may be the traditional Palestinian cottage industry products.

With the development of industrial and agricultural know-how and appropriate marketing methods and with the establishment of more sophisticated industries, the Palestinians may also become competent competitors in the Western markets. But this is a process which takes time. The oft-cited successes of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea (and to some extent also Israel) were not achieved overnight; rather, they were the results of efforts over a protracted period of time.

The last, but not least important prospective market for Palestinian exports is Israel. Although the occupied territories achieved a considerable success in their exports to Israel (about 300 million dollars in 1987) it would certainly have been much greater if the economic system had not been rigged against the Palestinians, as already mentioned.

The considerable quantity of exports to Israel, in spite of the lengths to which Israel went in order to prevent this, are the best witnesses that exports to Israel may be increased considerably if the artificial barriers are removed. Such exports to Israel may also generate additional exports from Israel to Palestine. Furthermore, in the present situation, the territories do not enjoy the privileges usually permitted to LDCs of tolerating "infant industry protection" measures. Any further economic agreement between Israel and the Palestinians should include clauses on this issue, granting a temporary discrimination in favor of the Palestinians. Many countries, such as Greece, Portugal, African countries and Israel itself, have been granted such privileges by the EEC. Israel also enjoys them within the framework of the U.S.-Israel Trade Market <sup>EEC</sup> agreement.

For their own benefit, Israelis and Palestinians will have to find ways to cooperate in spite of deep-seated resentments. Both parties will have to consider not only the losses they may suffer due to deeds of the other side, but also consider the gains which cooperation may offer. Israel will have to discover that opening its markets to Palestinian food, textiles, footwear, metalworks and other products, may meet with compensation in the export to the Palestinians of equipment and know-how

for these very industries and in the establishment of joint ventures for marketing a variety of jointly produced goods in the large Arab markets.

Some industries have been proven inefficient in the latest economic upheavals in Israel. In general, the Israeli economy has outgrown them and may be better off without them. At the same time, these industries can provide an important stage in the development of an industrial structure for the Palestinians. As long as Israel maintains its ability to innovate and to keep pace with technological advances, it should not fear Palestinian competition. By way of parallel, Japan may feel uncomfortable with South Korean competition, and is even gradually losing to it some of its more prestigious industries. In spite of this, Japan has been successful by introducing new ventures and by breaking new horizons. Israel should be more worried about being flooded by cheap imports dumped through the West Bank and Gaza by third-party countries than by Palestinian competition. This problem can only be efficiently prevented by coordination of economic policies with the Palestinian entity.

The Palestinians should be aware that quick industrial development may be achieved to a large extent through cooperation with Israel. The very proximity of Israel and the similar experiences which Israel has had in industrialization may be more relevant to the Palestinian needs than the alternatives: assistance by far-away countries with less relevant experience than Israel has, or the import of almost all products from abroad. Therefore it may be argued that the most important determinant for economic cooperation between Israel and Palestine will be the development of awareness by both parties that there is much more to be gained than lost through cooperation. This realization will create a modicum of interdependence, but that is the road which many countries, and most of the developed ones, successfully took after World War II. For its part, Israel will have to learn to think of the territories as a state and not as a corner shop in competition with the one on the next street. Foolish expressions which have been made by Israeli politicians in the highest ranks, such as "no Israeli factory should be closed because of competition from residents of the territories" should be discarded and forgotten. The main factor in advancing economic cooperation between Israel and Palestine will be their willingness to pursue the cooperation.

### 3.3.2 Prospective Industrial Exports to Prospective Markets.

It should be stressed again that it is not within the scope of this paper to make specific recommendations on which goods can be produced and exported by the Palestinians. This section, like section 3.2.1, should be viewed primarily as an illustration to point out possible avenues of action which it may be worthwhile to explore further. This is done, in spite of the obviously superficial approach, because whenever the question of exports by Palestinians is raised, the immediate reaction is: what can "they" (the Palestinians) or "we" (the Palestinians) export?

#### 3.3.2.1 Illustrations of Feasible Exports to the Oil-Rich Arab Countries.

It would seem *prima facie*, that almost all of the goods mentioned in section 3.2 as exportable to the rich Arab countries will also be temporarily in high demand in the territories themselves. Possible additional candidates for export to these countries could include:

- a) Leisure goods, such as garden furniture, swimming pools, swimming pool accessories, and small recreational boats.
- b) Processed foods, such as citrus juice or concentrates, citrus segments and jams; other preserved fruits and sweets, especially Palestinian and Oriental delicacies.
- c) Haute couture of Arab-style dress and footwear.
- d) Computer software in Arabic.
- e) Industrial services, such as maintenance of some of the huge infrastructure in the Gulf countries.

#### 3.3.2.2 Probable Exports to Eastern Europe.

To Eastern Europe it should be possible to export:

- a) Processed food: fruits, vegetables, dairy and poultry products, and soft drinks.
- b) Textiles and footwear, including special items for the large Muslim population in the USSR.
- c) Korans and other Islamic religious books, including Russian translations.



- d) Cassettes of Muslim prayers and ancestral songs, and Christian religious handicrafts (made from olive wood and other local materials, as well as of mother of pearl).
- e) Plastic furniture, and kitchen and bathroom accessories.
- f) Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.

#### 3.3.2.3 Exports to Israel

It will be possible, first of all, to export to Israel goods for which cheap labor is an important cost component. It can be expected that some of these labor intensive industries will move from Israel to the territories and then export their products to Israel. Of course, this migration will only take place for a limited time, until the wages in the territories also rise and the Palestinian industrial production becomes more sophisticated.

#### 4. Conclusions

The main conclusion of this paper is that for the development of the Palestinian economy a strategy of dove-tailing should be applied: first establishing industries producing goods for the domestic market, the aggregate domestic demand for which will be increased by a large capital inflow. Most of these industries should be established with the intention of their eventually producing goods which it will be possible to export, and not only use domestically. This dual purpose -- for domestic and export markets -- will facilitate the dove-tailing strategy, as the Palestinian entrepreneurs and laborers will be able, under the umbrella of the domestic market, to gain experience in producing export quality products and marketing them in foreign countries. The second stage will be the establishment of almost purely export-oriented industries.

The beginning stage of this strategy carries with it certain dangers, in particular that the domestic production will be "quarantined" -- that is, cut off the world outside it, by heavy subsidization, establishment of monopolies, tariff and non-tariff protection, and similar measures. This should be prevented and arrangements with friendly prospective markets should be made, such as time-limited reduction in tariffs, exemption from

non-tariff and similar measures, which the importing country will also be allowed to abolish.

Of major interest should be the attempt to lure foreign companies to invest, on a commercial basis, in the industrial development of Palestine. This could be most helpful in establishing profit-seeking industries, keeping product quality standards high and facilitating the marketing of products in markets other than the domestic market. To achieve this goal, the large Palestinian and Arab diasporas should be recruited.

Cooperation with Israel may enlarge the range of exportable goods and facilitate the development process.

## STATISTICAL APPENDIX

The data in the appendix are taken from, or based on, those published by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel in its Statistical Abstract of 1989 for the year 1987 (if not otherwise indicated).

	<u>West Bank</u>	<u>Gaza</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. <u>Population</u>			
1.1 Size, thousands	868	566	1,434
1.2 Annual growth, %	3.6	3.8	3.7

2. <u>Labor Force</u>			
2.1 Total, thousands	160	97	257
2.2 Employed, thousands	156	96	252
2.3 Employed in territories, thousands	96	51	147
2.4 Employed in Israel, thousands	60	45	105
2.5 Employed in Israel, %	38%	47%	42%

3. Structure of Employed  
and GDP in Territories

	<u>West Bank</u>		<u>Gaza</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Employed GDP</u>		<u>Employed GDP</u>		<u>Employed GDP</u>	
3.1 Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100
3.2 thereof: industry						
(incl. mining)	17	8	18	14	17	9
Agriculture	26	23	16	19	23	23
Construction	12	17	8	21	11	18
Other branches	45	50	58	46	49	50
Percentage of industry in Israel in total Israeli NDP -						21.7%
Percentage of Israelis employed in industry in total employed -						23.6%

3.3 Productivity per employed

	<u>West Bank</u>		<u>Gaza</u>		<u>Total</u>		<u>Israel</u>	
	<u>\$GDP</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>\$GDP</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>\$GDP</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>\$NDP</u>	<u>Index</u>
All branches	10,800	100	8,000	100	9,900	100	18,400	100
Industry	5,050	47	6,300	79	5,450	55	16,750	91
Agriculture	10,050	93	9,450	118	9,950	101	15,200	83
Construction	15,050	139	20,350	254	16,350	165	28,500	155
Other branches	12,150	113	6,580	81	10,000	101	18,500	101

#### 4. Structure of Industry in the West Bank\*

##### 4.1 Structure of Industry by Major Branch and Number of Employed

Major Branches	All Industries	Food and Beverages	Textiles and Clothing	Leather and Products	Wood and Products	Rubber and Plastics	Non-Metallic Minerals	Basic Metals	Other
	Branches	Tobacco				Chemicals		Products	Branches
No of Establishments	2,462	249	483	199	485	68	207	619	153
No. of Employed	11,983	1,921	2,974	971	1,183	1,254	1,147	1,799	736
Revenue (\$1,000)	19,777	8,041	1,947	799	1,003	2,987	1,844	1,377	1,777
No. of Establishing Employees	1,361	125	284	136	193	50	182	311	81

#### 4.2 Structure of Industry by Size of Establishment\*

Number of Employed	Number of Establishments
1	656
2-3	944
4-7	606
8-10	82
11-20	106
21+	68
Total	2,462

- \* It is widely accepted that the number of establishments is heavily underreported. However, in most cases, the unreported establishments employ one person only and almost all of the rest employ between two and seven workers. The number of establishments having 50 and more employed is about 27. (This information was not obtained from the CBS of Israel).

## 5. Structure of Industry in Gaza

### 5.1 Structure of Industry by Major Branch and Number of Employed

Major Branches	All	Food	Textiles		Basic Metal	Non-	
	Indus-	Beve-	Clothes	Wood	Products	Metalic	Other
	trial	rages	Leather &	and	Electrical	Mineral	Branches
	Branches	Tobacco	Products	Products	& transport	Products	
No. of Establishments	1794	116	595	358	399	282	44
No. of Employed	7286	518	3124	1141	1269	1017	217
Revenue (\$1,000)	7005	1083	2050	958	1440	971	503
No. of Establishments							
engaging employees	1070	49	387	160	186	258	30

### 5.2 Structure of Industry by Size of Establishment

Number of employed	Number of Establishments
1	413
2-3	762
4-7	443
8-10	76
11-20	84
21+	17
Total	1794

9. Foreign Trade of the Occupied Territories in 1986 in millions of \$

**WEST BANK**

<u>Exports to:</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Jordan</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	155.9	81.8	0.9	238.6
thereof: Industry	139.3	58.0	0.9	198.2
Industry as % of total	89.%	71.%	100.%	83.%

<u>Imports from:</u>				
Total	451.0	10.9	50.1	512.0
thereof: Industry	381.3	10.7	43.0	435.0
Industry as % of total	84.%	98.%	86.%	85.%

**G A Z A**

<u>Exports to:</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Jordan</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	118.7	18.8	2.2	139.7
thereof: Industry	104.9	0	0	104.9
Industry as % of total	88.%	0%	0%	75.%

<u>Imports from:</u>				
Total	364.8	0	31.2	378.0
thereof: Industry	302.1	0	22.7	324.8
Industry as % of total	87.%	-	73.%	86.%

**WEST BANK & GAZA**

<u>Exports to:</u>	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Jordan</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	274.6	100.6	3.1	378.3
thereof: Industry	244.2	58.0	0.9	303.1
Industry as % of total	89.%	6.%	29.%	80.%

<u>Imports from:</u>				
Total	797.8	10.9	81.3	890.0
thereof: Industry	683.4	10.7	65.7	759.8
Industry as % of total	86.%	98.%	81.%	85.%



Ephraim Ahiham received his doctorate from the London School of Economics. Specializing in the economics of Middle Eastern countries, and in particular, the occupied territories, he has presented papers on the subject at international symposia at Harvard, Nijmegen and Milano universities and at the Brookings Institution.

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12 FEB. 1992

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**Targetting Peace**  
**The Palestinian Economy in Transition**

**Samir Huleileh**  
**Economic Development Group**

## **Targetting Peace: The Palestinian Economy in Transition**

**By: Samir Huleileh**

*The focus of this position paper will be the economic possibilities and needs for the Occupied Territories for the phase beginning now (the peace talks) until the Palestinians assume full control over their economic resources. On the political level this phase is defined by 5 years of transitional period in addition to the current year of bi-lateral negotiations. This inevitably highlights the need for a local economic vision that can elucidate and simultaneously respond to actual needs.*

*Apart from and parallel to the political negotiations there is a lot that the Palestinians, the foreign countries and their NGOs, the Israeli government or the Israeli people and their different parties and organizations can do to assist us during this difficult phase.*

*For this purpose, this proposal is not maintained by the necessity to adopt a comprehensive plan since there seems to be no space for plans at a time when more than one power controls the economy (Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians) none of which has the power to force the other parties to adopt its plan. However, there are a number of practical programmes which, I believe, will be of invaluable help to the Palestinians and will in themselves exert pressure over the other parties to adopt them or if not then at least withhold any strong rejections of them. In this sense, there is always a Palestinian option whether under occupation, during the transitional period, or within the framework of an independent state. The only difference is in its mechanisms and short-term goals in each of these stages.*

*This position paper will attempt to provide a practical vision for the interim transition phase and explain the rationale for its adoption and the objectives to be achieved during this phase.*

*To begin with I must express my belief that in this phase we are not talking about the normalization in Palestinian-Israeli or Arab-Israeli relations, and neither are we referring to a natural economic growth or the end of the elimination of the risk factor in investment in the area, even though tangible measures in this direction might be taken by all parties. The recommendations that will spring out from this presentation are not only based on the probability of the continuation of the peace*

*process as planned and the surfacing of new realities on both the economic and political fields, but also on the possibility of the persistence of the status quo (i.e. the occupation), the failure or interruption of the negotiations or even the possible delay in their time-table for various reasons.*

### **Definition: The Transition Phase**

*The transition economic programme does not necessarily correspond chronologically to the political definition of the transition period understood as an outcome of the current negotiations. The transitional economic programme is a programme which qualifies the Palestinian economy to make the transition from its conditions and restrictions of occupation to the breakthrough towards taking hold of its provisions and authorities within a framework enabling it to control the mechanisms of its economy. In other words this programme assumes the existence of a wide margin for manoeuvre permitting the Palestinians, in light of the new International and local realities, to reach a high level of independence in the economic sphere that is not conditioned by reaching a political agreement, even though the latter will bring on a qualitative improvement on the former's conditions.*

*TO further explain this, what is meant here is that we can reach an agreement with Israel concerning the authorities of the interim period (self-governing authority) which includes the economic sphere. This presses us to immediately begin with a specific economic programme which is uncancellable even if political agreement is not reached. Rather, its objectives would be altered and restricted, and the achievement of these objectives would become perhaps more difficult. Preparing the Palestinian economy for a coming phase of independence utilizes the same mechanisms whether under occupation or in the framework of a transitional authority. These are summarized in increased independence in outlining the economic relations with the other countries and in finding common Israeli-Palestinian-Arab-and international objectives in this field.*

*Furthermore, there is a practical implication to the transitional period since the objectives of this phase transcend even the agreements that the Palestinian political leadership might be forced to hold with Israel during the current negotiations. For a various number of yet unforeseen reasons the Palestinians might be pressured into signing an*

agreement on the interim phase (self governing authority) which does not guarantee them sufficient freedom to develop their resources and their economy. Furthermore, Israel might attempt to limit the objectives and possibilities of the post-interim period phase. At that point it becomes imperative to override Israeli objectives and signed agreements by creating new realities in the Occupied Territories and in international economic relations which will allow for the totally independent Palestinian decision in this field.

The concepts discussed here relate directly to the following forces that are, for varying reasons, concerned with economic growth in the region. They are:

**1. The Palestinian side:** The importance of the conviction of this party with the necessity of taking initiative in the economic spheres with utmost certainty of the possibility of changing the status quo cannot be overemphasized. To start on this track, this party has to begin by discarding of the idealistic conviction which ascertained for the past 20 years that "there is no development under occupation." It is true that there is no space for a comprehensive development plan and that it might be difficult in the context of the great risks on investment caused by the instability in the area to discuss development in its comprehensive sense. Nevertheless, this should not prevent us from initiating a number of partial, regional, and sectoral programmes and plans, in addition to alternative plans that will target not only Palestinian perseverance on the land but also economic growth of the Occupied Territories and their people even under the difficult conditions. On another level, it becomes of special importance at this phase to form Palestinian developmental frames and bodies on the executive and planning levels. This is ultimately necessary since the Palestinian conviction in development requires local experiences and efficient means, and their existence in itself is a tangible improvement in this field.

**2. The Israeli side:** I would like to discuss the policy of the Israeli defence ministry which is responsible for the welfare and development of the Occupied Territories whereby during the past two years, for a number of reasons, it was forced to reduce economic restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people for the following reasons:

- a. security: getting rid of the arab workers
- b. Soviet immigration: giving priority to the immigrant over the arabs.

- c. *Israeli popular pressure against arab existence among them.*
- d. *The gulf crisis and the end of the gulf countries as a source of job opportunities for the Palestinians.*

*Therefore, and for purely security reasons, the economic pressures had to be released and a gradual and limited breakthrough had to be allowed, especially following the Gulf crisis and its consequences, in addition to the absence of the safety valve of emigration east of the Jordan River.*

*On the popular level, there are a number of sources concerned with developing the Occupied Territories, especially in the political field. For the large number of parties and Knesset members and their related professional, syndicate, and economic organizations concerned with the Palestinian people's rights, their future, and their life as neighbors, the chance now presents itself to them to substitute the verbal toll os support they have been paying with courageous moves to support the economy of the Occupied Territories not as a rival of the Israeli economy but as complementary to it, and that its support is both a humanitarian and political necessity at this stage . If the Likud and the Israeli right-wing parties on the one hand save no chance at expressing, in practical terms, their position in regard to the Palestinians, the latter have experienced only words from the left wing and the demopcratic movement in Israel.*

**3. Jordan and the Arab Countries:** *despite the differences in positions between the Palestinians and Jordan and the Arab Gulf and the rest of the arab countries particularly following the Gulf crisis, there is a growing movement amongst these countries towards participating in the current peace process and normalizing their relations with Israel. Putting aside the Palestinian political position of this direction, there always remains a chance to benefit from reducing the restrictions of the arab boycott of West Bank and Gaza products, especially the Jordanian restrictions. Considering that we are partners in peace-making, there are possibilities for reaching new agreements concerning Palestinian exports to and imports from Jordan and other countries.*

#### **4. The International community:**

*a. The launching of the peace process in the bi-lateral and multi-lateral talks created new political and psychological realities on the international level in terms of their outlook on this region. International interest in this area increased, manifesting itself in*

increased support for the area to assist it in overcoming its economic difficulties. It is evident that the past year has witnessed increased financial support for the Palestinian people in various fields- the EEC and Japan for example. This support came not only from the NGOs level but from the official level as well. This increased interest must be welcomed on our part and be planned for in order to create channels for implementation and credible partners. This opportunity must not be wasted even if no peaceful settlement is reached for the time being.

b. International organizations: various international organizations which have kept quiet over the past 20 years in the field of support for the Palestinian people due to the absence of a Palestinian government with which they can negotiate and sign agreements (e.g. the World Bank, FAO, WHO, etc...) might spot the opportunity now in light of the recognition by the International community and Israel of a self-governing authority in the Occupied Territories and a negotiating team of a credible umbrella with whom negotiations can be held and agreements signed. This fact is in itself an important precedent and a realistic basis for these organizations to add weight to its role in the peace-making process and the welfare of the area.

With all of these forces combined the Palestinian people can cross important stages in the development of its social and economic structures on the condition that its objectives are clearly defined and are given a practical framework and the necessary mechanisms and channels of implementation. To begin with we can generalize by outlining the following primary objectives:

1. The gradual control, or joint control, over part of or all of the land, the natural resources, and the water in the Occupied Palestinian territories. This can be achieved either through official political agreements or through partial Israeli unilateral arrangements according to the terms of the current peace process and the odds against its continuation.
2. The alteration, substitution, or creation of economic legislations according to the interests and needs of the Palestinian people and its community development. This will come in effect through assuming full or partial control over the right to issue such legislations and their implementation and to pressurize the Israeli authorities to alter them or work at overstepping regulations in some cases in order to create a mechanism of change through a de facto policy.



3. Retrieving balance to the Palestinian economy particularly in relation to its trade deficit with Israel, and to move seriously towards strengthening trade exchange relations with Jordan and the Arab countries as a natural market for Palestinian products. In addition, there is the search for possible markets in Eastern Europe and amongst minorities in Europe and the United States. Attempting to decrease dependency on Israel is based on the knowledge that this dependence is not inevitable or an inescapable destiny, but rather one of the economic options that have to be looked into on the basis of free competition and other available options for the Palestinians.

4. Working at mobilizing and attracting international and Arab efforts to contribute to the rebuilding of the infra-structure of the Palestinian economy in all fields possible, and to prepare for the coming phase which comprises the re-housing and habilitation of refugees living in the Occupied Territories and the ones returning from abroad according to whichever agreement is reached in this concern and the number of refugees agreed upon.

5. To take the necessary measures to ensure job opportunities for thousands of unemployed which is one of the causes of political and social instability in a region of great political importance.

To achieve these aims, we must naturally insist, confidently and persistently, on continuing with the current peace process as the best framework for the achievement of a major part of these objectives. However, and as was said earlier, a lot can be done outside of this peace process, regardless of its success or failure, inside the Occupied Territories. This mainly requires Palestinian internal decision-making. Some of these moves and mechanisms are:

a. Establishing organizational structures and bodies in the economic field that are able to plan, train, and implement in the various sectors, in addition to activating and coordinating their efforts. This includes setting up planning and coordination committees in the economic sector as a whole and then in the various fields of production (export, industry, agriculture, tourism, etc.) in addition to research centers and specialized data banks, training centers and institutions, chambers of commerce and industry, quality control centers, agricultural and industrial exports, etc.

b. Develop and create financial institutions capable of providing various financial services, whether commercial banks or specialized industrial, agricultural, or housing banks, etc.... This is coupled by establishing a financial authority to monitor and control activities in this sphere. This, in addition to encouraging savings and investments in these banks and inviting contributions from international organizations concerned.

c. Continue to boycott competing Israeli products until an agreement with Israel is reached with regard to conditions and regulations of trade between us. This policy is a form of protection for infant industries and is necessary though temporary and applies only to some industries. A number of countries, including Israel, have received this kind of protection in their trade agreements based on the free trade principle.

d. Launch a comprehensive and varied training programme to prepare qualified Palestinians and augment their level of proficiency in their respective fields, enabling them to assume the responsibility of the coming phase. The process of transfer of experience also involves the transfer of technology in the different industrial fields from various countries, including Israel. This training and rehabilitation programme is one of the possible and necessary mechanisms regardless of the political situation in the area.

e. Hold as many trade agreements as possible with Jordan and Israel. In Israel, semi-official agreements can be signed with agricultural or other boards. Other trade exchange and cooperation agreements can be signed with other countries or with specialized international organizations that will contribute to the current building process. The opening of new markets for the products of the Occupied Territories is an incentive for the development of production and service sectors connected to it and does not contradict with the protectionist policy over some basic products referred to earlier.

f. Concentrate on development programmes for various production sectors, most important of which are industry and tourism which carry great potential for development, and sectors dependent on intensive labour (e.g. clothes, shoes), and the construction industries which are vital for the future phase which will witness large investment in this sector.

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No. 6

**Federal/Confederal Solutions to the  
Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Conflict:  
Concepts and Feasibility**

**Daniel Elazar**

**Bar-Ilan University**

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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**FEDERAL/CONFEDERAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN  
CONFLICT: CONCEPTS AND FEASIBILITY**

Daniel J. Elazar

For the Truman Institute, Hebrew University  
Conference in Rome, Italy  
January 1992-Shevat 5752

FEDERAL/CONFEDERAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN  
CONFLICT: CONCEPTS AND FEASIBILITY

Daniel J. Elazar

Since the Six Day War in June 1967, Israel has been struggling to find its appropriate role in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip -- areas historically part of the Land of Israel yet claimed and heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs. The outbreak of the intifada on December 9, 1987 showed that the status quo could not hold and that a solution sufficiently satisfying Israel's security concerns and burgeoning Palestinian national identification must be found.

The Middle East is rich in history and in historical conflicts. Many of the battles being fought there are not new -- only the definitions placed on them make them appear that way. History has shown that the most permanent elements in the region are not the territorial entities of political states but the continuous existence of the specific peoples and ethno-religious communities tied together by common kinship and creed. The Jews have had a continuous recorded presence in the region for over 3500 years while the Arabs, the Copts, the Armenians, the Kurds, and the Maronites have histories of 1500 to 2000 years. In contrast, there is not a single boundary in the Middle East today that is more than 100 years old.

The Middle East is a mosaic of peoples not easily divided into nation-states, and certainly not ethno-religiously homogeneous ones as anticipated by modern European models of the state, considering the complexity of the historical interplay between peoples and territories. We cannot automatically translate European models of conflict resolution and political sovereignty to the region. The stalemate of the past 23 or 42 or 73 years testifies to the result. Because of this we must seek to find new and innovative solutions, unique political inventions meeting contemporary democratic and nationalistic standards that reinforce flexible arrangements to accommodate the peoples of Eretz Israel/Palestine. The people of the region must work out special status arrangements for each other across national boundaries without eliminating either the boundaries or the peoples.

Any successful solution depends upon how it combines the governance of people and territories, for there cannot be governance of one without the other. Even if the emphasis will be on peoples, it will be necessary to govern these peoples in their territories.

There are over 100 models of diversity of interjurisdictional arrangements: mixed governments, power-sharing and the like, presently in operation around the world. These arrangements can be used to guide the development of appropriate mechanisms for autonomy. With twelve years of experience in de facto autonomy already passed, the seemingly unsurmountable problems can be overcome. In the twentieth century, government by the consent of the governed for identifiable peoples has been associated with self-determination. Yet many times self-determination has been used as a cover for internal tyranny, not for the advancement of democratic principles. Also, the concept of self-determination does not necessarily require the establishment of a totally independent and politically sovereign state.

The Palestinians as individuals and as a group need to be governed with their consent, something which is not presently the case. They, too, have claims to the land which they believe to be as legitimate as the Jewish claims. All will have to concede something somewhere.

According to studies made by Ivo Duchacek, of the 160 plus sovereign states in the world today, only 10 or 11 are ethnically homogeneous. The other 150 ethnically heterogeneous states must reach some kind of intergroup accommodation within themselves. The choices range from extermination of ethnic minorities, to forcible assimilation into the majority culture, to serious and innovative efforts to foster and encourage the formation of multi-ethnic societies. All of these options have been tried in the Middle East and all have been considered by various parties as possible solutions to the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict; none have brought peace.

Since 1976, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, through its Institute for Federal Studies, has tried to formulate constructive federal arrangements for the parties of the region that will recognize Eretz Israel/Palestine's pluralist and multi-ethnic character and the national aspirations of its peoples. We have developed eleven options designed to accommodate the interests of the involved parties, specifically Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan, by building new political arrangements based on federalist principles.

A solution based on federal principles is one that combines self-rule (or self-government) and shared rule (or federal government) over the territories in dispute between the Jewish and Arab states and in connection with the Palestinians, who represent the nub of the problem. However difficult this is to achieve, it is the only possible outcome which has a chance of success. A move in this direction, we would suggest, requires a recognition by all parties of the failure of the exclusive sovereignty model to provide the basis for an acceptable solution to the problem of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.



Any accommodation based on power-sharing and limited autonomy for certain groups must be carefully balanced to at least minimally accommodate the security, nationalist and political interests of the participating parties -- without at least minimal satisfaction of vital interests, even the best laid plan is doomed to fail. While Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan are the parties directly involved in any settlements, the interest of the Great Powers (particularly the United States), Egypt and the other Arab states must also be taken into account.

For the three principal parties involved, security and national integrity provide the major impetus for their minimal interests:

For Israel:

1. Peace secured by formal treaty.
2. Security arrangements on its eastern border providing strategic depth, early warning against any possible enemy attack, protected airspace, control of vital roads for defense purposes; and minimum exposure to terrorist infiltration from the east.
3. Maintenance of governance over a united Jerusalem as its capital.
4. The continued right of Jews to reside in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

For the Palestinians:

1. Recognition of their national identity and practical political expression of that identity.
2. Continuation of the special links with Jordan and the Arab world.
3. Continuation of economic links with Israel.

For Jordan:

1. Survival of Hashemite Jordan, including protection against possible extremist Palestinian factions.
2. Formal and practical expression of the bonds between the Palestinians involved and the Hashemite Kingdom.
3. Official status, duties and responsibilities in connection with the holy sites of the three religions.

In addition, both the United States and the Soviet Union have long-term strategic interests in the Middle East. The USSR has a direct security interest in that the region abuts its southern border. It also has a long-standing interest in gaining or maintaining access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. Most of all, though, the Soviet Union has a strong interest in gaining hegemony in the region to impede Western access to its major supply of oil or, at the very least, to prevent American hegemony in the region.

The United States strategic interest is based on the fact that the majority of its imported oil and the oil supplying western Europe and Japan comes from this region. American hegemony in the region also serves its strategic interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and continued stability in the region serves those strategic interests as well. Because of this, the United States is particularly interested in finding a satisfactory settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to affirm Israel's right to exist while solidifying U.S.-Arab relations.

Finally, Egypt and the Arab rejectionist states have a direct interest in the resolution of this conflict as well. Through signing its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt obligated itself to take the lead in negotiating a political solution for the Palestinian Arabs. In actual fact, Egypt's role has been reduced to one supporting the efforts of Jordan and some appropriate Palestinian Arab leadership and because of this it has become an involved party (like the United States) rather than a direct player. The rejectionist states oppose recognition of Israel and any solutions to the conflict which entail such recognition. The other Arab states operate on two principles: 1) a willingness to accept a solution acceptable to Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs and 2) a deep commitment not to formally surrender sovereignty over "Arab lands."

Common interests among participants create temporary alliances among the groups (especially the Great Powers and the Arab States) as in the case of the Gulf crisis. These alliances can help to support or impede a given settlement proposal. What must be acknowledged, however, is that above all, a settlement must be first reached by the three parties directly involved.

The following four approaches are commonly viewed as possibilities for solving the conflict in the territories:

- 1) Israel's withdrawal to pre-1967 borders (either fully or with the most minor territorial adjustments) and the establishment of a Palestinian state either separate or linked with Jordan.
- 2) The extension of Israeli sovereignty (annexation) of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.
- 3) Repartition of the territories to accommodate Israel's security needs (e.g., the Allon Plan) and allow separate political space for the Palestinians.
- 4) Development of a form of shared rule over the territories by Israel and an Arab partner.

The first two options, involving total withdrawal or total absorption, run completely contrary to the non-negotiable interests of one, another, or all of the concerned parties. The third

option, repartition of the territories on terms more favorable for Israel, has been firmly rejected by the Arab states, although it is acceptable to many Israelis. This leaves shared rule as the only potentially viable alternative.

The strength of federalism lies in its flexibility and adaptability -- while a particular federal system may be inflexible, the federal principle is, at all times, malleable. The model focuses on people, not states, as the repositories of political sovereignty and legitimacy, thus shifting the issue of sovereignty to a different plane. Moreover, proper use of federalism requires the provision of adequate guarantees to each entity through a constitutionalized commitment to shared self-rule. The flexibility inherent in such a process gives federalism its unique appeal especially in solving complex situations such as this conflict.

Federalism -- self-rule/shared rule -- involves both structure and process. A federal process must be combined with a federal structure to create a viable federal system or arrangement. A successful federalist process hinges on a sense of partnership among the participating parties based on a commitment to negotiated cooperation on issues and programs. There must be a commitment to open bargaining among all parties to achieve consensus or, at the very least, an accommodation which protects the fundamental integrity of all parties.


Federalism seeks to encourage unity and diversity together -- not to address them as opposites because homogeneity does not, in fact, promote unity. Federal unity seeks to accommodate diversity as a legitimate element of the polity as it is manifested through nationality, ethnic, religious, ideological, social and interest factors which may or may not gain political expression. This is exemplified in the pluralist manifestations in Switzerland. In contrast to this, some states attempt to foster consolidated unity (as in France) to depoliticize or carefully limit manifestations of diversity in the political sphere. Contrary to some widely held opinions, federalism is more than modern federation. There are a number of different federal structures successfully functioning in the world today. In that sense, federalism can be understood as the genus and its various forms, species of the genus.

Figure 1 presents the various forms of federalism extant today. The various structures can accommodate a wide number of political arrangements to help entities overcome multi-ethnic conflicts. These structures are not only political but also can be translated into the economic and religious realms.

FIGURE 1

### *Forms of Federal Arrangements*

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Modern Federation is the dominant federal arrangement in the world today because it can be easily harmonized with the modern nation-state. A federation is based on a constitutional division of powers within a single political entity between a federal (sometimes called national or general) government, and the governments of the constituent entities (states, provinces, cantons, etc.) with both having direct contact with the individual citizen. The federation requires a strong general government operating directly on all citizens who, in return, are entitled to equal political status and rights.

Confederation combines elements of shared governance with a strong and permanent commitment to the maintenance of primordial divisions through its constituent states. The constituent states retain the better part of their political independence, and they band together to form a joint government for quite specific and limited purposes (usually defense and foreign affairs). In a confederation, each constituent/partner maintains a comprehensive set of governmental institutions. The confederative authorities work through the government of the constituent polities rather than directly with the citizenry. Today's successful confederations, like the European Community, have been constructed from joint and overlapping functional authorities established by the constituent entities to handle specific tasks. The principal advantages of such an arrangement is that in multi-ethnic, multi-racial situations, the constituent polities are linked only insofar as they see the necessity to do so; otherwise they are separate. Issues of political status and political rights are handled on two levels: with primary relations among the states within the confederation; while individuals are citizens of their respective states.

Federacy is a constitutional extension of the principle of self-rule in that it provides adequate guarantees to the weaker entity while eliminating the necessity to deal with the sovereignty question (a preoccupation characteristic of modern European nation-states and conveniently exported from Europe to the rest of the world). The major benefit of such a structure is that it allows both political entities involved to preserve their independent institutional structures undiluted, while maintaining a common framework in areas of mutual agreement. As an arrangement, it can only be dissolved by mutual consent. Associated States have greater freedom to withdraw from similar arrangements since the decision to withdraw can be a unilateral one under terms set out in the initial agreement. The main drawback is that often this sort of arrangement is only transitional.

Consociation guarantees religious, ideological, and cultural differences, and autonomy, through a distribution of power among presumably permanent inter-generational groupings (religious, ideological or linguistic). While sharing in the governance of the whole state, these groups are able to ensure their particular ways

of life through resources allocated from the state for self-maintenance.

Unions require the constituent polities to surrender their separate political character and institutions in return for a guaranteed share in the governance of the new whole. The constituent groups are guaranteed continued existence as sub-political or administrative entities with regional or municipal powers. This is distinct from a Constitutionally Decentralized State in that the state is formed from the subsidiary units. In a constitutionally decentralized state the state pre-exists the regions and constitutionally devolves some of its power to them.

Unitary States with Federal Arrangements consist of formerly unitary polities which make limited use of federal arrangements to accommodate ethnic, religious, linguistic or ideological differences within an existing population. Usually, this is articulated through autonomy arrangements for particular territories or groups.

Leagues and Partial Unions are also formed to provide for intergovernmental cooperation on a variety of issues without completely restructuring preexisting fundamental political arrangements. Economic unions provide two or more politically sovereign states with the opportunity to unite to form a common economy for mutual benefit. This may be done in specific spheres without formal linkages to any other sphere (e.g., Benelux). A league provides for less integration in a single sphere, but provides for intergovernmental sharing on a quasi-voluntary basis across several spheres (e.g., ASEAN or the Nordic Council).

Many polities are combinations of more than one arrangement and many of these structures can be designed to accommodate a multiplicity of needs. Where there is a will to federate, it is more than likely that a plan can be developed. What is crucial, however, is that there really is a will to achieve a solution utilizing federal principles. The will to federate need not be based on a commitment to federalism per se, but can evolve from an interest-oriented end.

It is far from certain that the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian conflict have the will to federate. Nevertheless, there is no reason to presuppose that they could not develop the will under the proper circumstances. The objective conditions for federal solutions prevail and the historical experience of the peoples involved does not preclude the development of a will to federate, although the events of this century make it difficult to achieve. There is another question, however: is there a sufficient cultural basis for making federalism work among these peoples?

In order for successful integration of federalism into a given polity, a federal political culture must exist, or be developed, within the constituent population. Among the factors which must be developed are a commitment to democratic government, a willingness to accept pluralism and power-sharing, an agreement to resolve conflict through negotiation, and finally, a sense of self-restraint in pursuing political goals and in the exercise of power which reaches beyond the other tenets of democratic government to include a commitment to power-sharing.

Israeli Jews come from a long Jewish political tradition of federalism and a deeply federal political culture. There exists a deep relationship between Jews and federalism which can be traced back to the Bible where the first manifestation of God's covenant with Israel was the confederation/federation of the twelve tribes. Their federalism is reflected in the tribal federation and covenants of the Bible and through the federal political structures developed in most diaspora communities. Study of this dimension of the Jewish political tradition indicates how this federalist infrastructure has given a predisposition among the Jews toward constitutionalized power-sharing.

For the Arab world it is difficult to generalize. Different parts of the Arab world have had different historical and cultural experiences which have molded their individual political cultures. For example, Egyptian national existence has been based on a strong hierarchy and there is very little historical precedent for a predisposition toward power-sharing. The Palestinian experience, on the other hand, historically has been based on a strong village and familial structure which has provided for a large degree of institutionalized decentralization. At the same time, the Bedouin experience has been very open to federalism due to the confederal links which exist among clans and tribes.

Modern political thought among Arab states has included nothing which resembles a theory of federalism. With the exception of the United Arab Emirates (which is essentially a Bedouin confederation in modern dress), all twentieth century experiments with federalism in the Arab world have failed. Islam is also a vital force in influencing modern Arab political thought. Muslim political theory emphasizes hierarchical and often personalized rule which considers how hierarchical rulers can be brought to be just, rather than how ruling hierarchies can be constitutionally limited.

Furthermore, Islamic doctrine seems to almost prevent anything other than a superior-subordinate relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Jews and other non-Muslims lived in Muslim society as dhimmi (protected inferior peoples). They were able to live in these societies because they were respected as "peoples of the book," and yet they were not considered to be equals or potential partners for governance. In Islam, covenants such as there are

hierarchical, regulating and regularizing the relationships between superior and subordinate.

Some recent Muslim thinkers have come to believe that the Arabs might, in fact, be predisposed toward some form of federalism because they are perforce a federal nation divided into peoples and states. This is reflected by their state names (i.e., the Egyptian Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic) and also by their belief that, like the Bedouin, Arab states war with one another without losing their sense of common nationhood (umma), even as they preserve their separate peoplehoods (wataniya).

There is also room for some optimism by examination of the historical experience of the Palestinians. Traditionally, Palestinian society has been highly decentralized -- each village has been self-contained within the context of whatever external rule was imposed. Rule was shared among the various dominant clans (hamulot) and the leadership came from the heads of notable families. Adult males were able to participate in the governance of the village through their activity in the village militia. This system of governance prevailed through 1948 but it was replaced by more formal local government when these villages came under Jordanian, Israeli or Egyptian rule.

The Arabs as a whole (including the Palestinians and the Hashemite Jordanians) do not appear to be readily open to federal arrangements -- with non-Arabs, and especially with non-Muslims. But the Palestinians, at least, have a history of informal power-sharing between the village and the state and, in view of the range of options and flexibility inherent in the various federalist options, it may be possible to construct an arrangement not in contradiction with Arab political culture, and, more so, to adapt the Arab political heritage to a federalist solution.

#### Why No Palestinian State

Why must there be a federal solution as opposed to the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state? Late in 1988, the PLO and PLO-related spokesmen made a series of statements which made it seem that they had retreated from the maximalist position which called for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state in all of western Palestine. At this writing, there is not yet any reason to simply take the PLO statements to the Western world at face value since many of their statements have differed markedly when rearticulated to the Arab world. Their statements (and their actions) are far too ambiguous to be treated as more than a softening of the PLO position. Such a softening, taken as the official position of the Palestinian people (as shown by the overwhelming support shown the PLO in the territories) may leave more room for negotiation, but does not make it wise for Israel to consent to a separate state west of the Jordan river. The PLO decision to side with Saddam



Hussein in the Gulf crisis further frightened Israelis with regard to the likely consequences of a separate Palestinian state minutes from Israel's major population centers.

Supporters of such a state argue on several levels. They say that Israeli military power is easily deployable against terrorist attacks or peace treaty violations that might come from such a Palestinian state. Yet, it is impossible to invade a neighboring state for what could be perceived in world public opinion as "trifling reasons." Even a military reaction to major violations may be impeded by objections from superpower friends (again, look at U.S. demands on Israel in the Gulf crisis) and, while military intervention may be called for, such operations cost precious lives and continual loss of life is unacceptable. Opportunity for retaliation is severely constrained by world public opinion and also by the fact that retaliation often provokes counterattack. While a state cannot go to war over every individual terrorist incident, each incident can bring about injury and often death.

Supporters of such a state argue that "unless we try, we will never know." The establishment of a Palestinian state would require Israel to withdraw from essentially all the territories it captured in 1967 on the grounds that no truncated West Bank Palestinian state could possibly satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. The ramifications of such a state would mean:

- Israel would give up all strategic depth.
- The IDF would give up even minimum defensive positions.
- Questions exist as to whether there would be room for positioning troops to secure main population centers.

Furthermore, once a state is established, widely recognized and admitted to the United Nations (as a Palestinian state is sure to be), even if Israel were provoked into a war where the land were occupied, Israel would have to withdraw because states themselves, as political entities, are sacrosanct, leaving a continuing threat intact and able to regroup. If, on the other hand, the Palestinians were permanently linked to Jordan, if a military confrontation were called for, borders could be altered without threatening the existence of the state itself.

Supporters of a Palestinian state argue that the pleasures and responsibilities of statehood would deter the Palestinians from risking what they have gained in a state. Yet there are many and varied examples of peoples for whom statehood has not brought moderation, but rather increased radicalism. For example, when Pol Pot took over in Cambodia he embarked on a genocide of his own people, and Hitler, whose election was viewed as a reaction to the creeping power of the Bolsheviks, clearly did not become more moderate as a result of his acquisition of power. To suggest that moderation would occur among the Palestinians is nothing more than a pious hope at this point.

Finally, Israeli supporters of a Palestinian state argue that the formation of such a state would provoke internal troubles for the Palestinians as local leaders confront diaspora PLO leadership, thereby preoccupying them. Rather than being a compelling argument for the formation of such a state, this argument works quite the other way. Such internal disputes on the part of the Palestinian leadership could, in fact, lead to increased terrorist action against the Israeli people since such actions could serve to unite the disparate elements behind a common goal. This activity would be even more appealing as their right to statehood would be constantly upheld by the international community. Even if the Palestinian government were not committed to such a policy of violence, they would have a difficult time (and one might wonder if they would even have the inclination towards) controlling those factions among the population who were discontented with an agreement with Israel and wanted to continue "the struggle."

From a strategic point of view, these "irreconcilables" would have the ability to shoot missiles at airplanes at Ben-Gurion Airport (only 3 miles from the former Green Line) or into the heart of Tel Aviv. Beyond that, all Israeli coastal areas and the Jerusalem area (areas where six out of seven Israelis live) would be in the gunsights of individual terrorists. If the Palestinian leadership were preoccupied with an internal power struggle, it is even less likely that the Palestinian government would have the will or the wherewithal to control these "irreconcilables."

On another side, the lack of economic viability and the limited opportunity for independent development is also an impediment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and it could provoke further radicalization of certain elements of the Palestinian population. Allowing the Palestinians to continue working in Israel is now unlikely in the wake of the events of Fall 1990. Even if it were to continue, it would mean establishing other links as well (such as trade arrangements, currency controls, worker benefits, etc.) and, by adding such needs (as well as strict security guarantees and border controls), the fully sovereign Palestinian state would be less than independent and move toward de facto confederation anyway.

There is no doubt that the Palestinians do need some kind of territorial political entity to satisfy their legitimate group aspirations. There is also no doubt that it is also better for Israel to separate the Palestinian minority who will always be unhappy as a minority in the Jewish state and who may, in time, demographically overtake the Jews and potentially threaten the Jewish character of Israel. The mass immigration of Jews from the USSR will delay that possibility for a generation or two but it is still a real one. But what is obvious is that with well over 200,000 Palestinians now living in what is defined by the world as the West Bank (half of them in the new Jerusalem neighborhoods built since 1967, and the other half scattered in the Judean and

Samarian highlands and along the western border of Samaria), it is highly unlikely that these neighborhoods and settlements would be evacuated under any circumstances. It seems that the Palestinians will not give up their claims to these territories and the Israelis will not leave them (for good reason). This, too, suggests that some other solution must be sought, even by those who want to provide the maximum possible self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs.

No decision based on two states can be made without considering the Palestinian character of Jordan. The population of Jordan is more than 70 percent Palestinian. More Palestinians live in Jordan than in the West Bank and Gaza combined and Palestinians dominate the key economic and political positions outside of the army. Israel need not acquiesce to two Palestinian states, one east and another west of the Jordan river, in each a small land, especially since the PLO makes no secret of its grand ambition to take over the existing states on both banks of the Jordan and to consolidate them into one Palestinian whole.

#### Realities of Today

Over twenty years after the end of the Six Day War there are new realities which must be taken into account in the search for a viable solution to the problem of the land beyond the former Green Line. These new realities include:

- the growth of the Jewish settlements
- the web of economic integration and integration of public services (i.e., roads, water, electricity)
- the growing sense of "Palestinian-ness" and the influence of the PLO and Hamas on the Arab population

#### Growth of Jewish Settlements:

Since 1977, with the Likud's rise to power, the administered territories have become crucial to the government's settlement policy. The fact that these new settlements have been established in empty territory on lands purchased locally (without displacing local residents) reflects that there was, and is, space for both peoples in this territory.

Since settlement of the territories began shortly after the end of the Six Day War, there has been a marked change in the character of the settlers, reflective of the increased integration of the territories into Israel proper. In the beginning only the hardy ideologists settled the land. These were the young pioneers of the Jordan Valley, the Gush Emunim settlers in the Judean and Samarian heartland, or the sons and daughters of the Etzion Bloc "returning home" to land first settled by their families before the 1948 war. These settlers came to assert the right of the Jews to the whole of Eretz Israel.

Toward the end of the 1970s, less militant supporters of the government's policy to absorb the territories joined in the settlement movement. These were not ideological crusaders but people who saw personal benefit in moving to the settlements as well as an opportunity "to be of service to their people."

A third group of people moved into the territories in the 1980s; settling principally along the western edge of Samaria "ten minutes from Kfar Saba." They wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to have better housing than they could afford elsewhere. It is this group (vastly outnumbering the first two) which has provided the most settlers.

In the late 1980s, the pace of settlement slowed due in large part to lack of funding, lack of Jews and the influence of the intifada. But the reality of this creeping integration still exists and, even if at a slower pace, settlement still continues.

#### Economic Interdependence and Public Service Delivery:

The present economic interaction between Israel and the territories takes the form of a common market incorporating industrial growth and agricultural development. The unusually high economic growth rate that was a feature in the territories until overwhelmed by political events was paralleled by substantial gains in economic welfare, reflecting a steep rise in the disposable income of the Palestinians and a shift in their occupational structure toward that of a more developed economy. Between 1972 and 1987, the percentage of Palestinians in Gaza owning a gas or electric cooking appliance rose from 6.5 percent to 87.1 percent. There was also a dramatic rise in people owning refrigerators (from 8.7 percent to 78 percent).

Since the mid-1980s the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians have made efforts to foster independent economic activity but they have proven disastrous. Citrus, their primary potential export, is a case in point. After winning the political battle to sell citrus directly to the European Community, the shipments did not arrive on time, the European agents hired by the Palestinians were incompetent, and the prices were far too high. Needless to say, the effort failed.

The integration of the public service systems including roads, electricity, water sources and communications lines is well-nigh complete. While political realities make almost anything possible in changing these systems -- including the governmental equivalent of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face -- separation would inflict great costs on the population. In sum, under any future political arrangement, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District should, for their own benefit, maintain close economic relations with both Israel and Jordan.

### Growing "Palestinian-ness" and the Influence of the PLO and Hamas

At this writing, the PLO is in perhaps its strongest position ever in the territories. This is not the result of a steady growth in influence, but an upswing in the ongoing peaks and valleys of continued PLO influence -- and a peak which is not guaranteed to last. For one thing, the PLO is being challenged by more extremist elements, particularly Hamas.

Between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War the indigenous Palestinian residents of the territories were unwilling to extend serious credibility to the PLO. But the difficulties that Israel encountered in winning the Yom Kippur War led to a resurgent nationalism in the territories with increased support for the PLO. This support peaked with Arafat's address to the United Nations in November 1975, and with the sweep of PLO-backed candidates in the 1976 municipal elections in Judea and Samaria.

There was a marked decline in PLO influence in the late 1970s as a result of an Israeli crackdown in the territories. PLO-backed mayors were removed from office and the flow of PLO funds from Jordan was disrupted. Early in the 1980s, PLO strength was resurgent with the increase in PLO strength in the southern Lebanese "Fatahland," but again, the expulsion of the PLO from the territory by Israeli forces in 1982 and 1983 led to another decline in PLO influence, hitting rock bottom at the Amman Arab summit in the fall of 1987.

With the start of the intifada in December 1987 PLO forces were reinvigorated and their influence skyrocketed as they capitalized on the potential of the popularly led intifada. Now, it is clearly apparent that in order to maintain this hard-won influence in the territories, the PLO is under great pressure to show some real progress to the inhabitants of the territories or their fortunes may, once again, take a down-turn.

Meanwhile, in the early 1980s, Hamas emerged as an organization of growing influence, reflecting a fundamentalist Muslim view of the situation totally opposed to any solution to the conflict other than the destruction of the State of Israel and the expulsion of most if not all of the Jews. Hamas built itself on the wave of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping the Arab world and on the more radical stands of Palestinian Arab extremists. First surfacing in the universities, it has increasingly become an alternative leadership to the PLO in the guidance of the intifada.

### The Rise and Fall of De Facto Shared Rule

De facto shared rule existed among Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians in the territories between 1967 and 1987. During that period the Palestinians had almost complete internal

self-government under the umbrella of the Israeli and Jordanian governments.

Under this arrangement, Israel controlled security and the economy and Jordan facilitated relationships between Judea and Samaria and the Arab world. Jordan also provided most Palestinians with citizenship and the Jordanian curriculum was used in Palestinian schools. Finally, Jordan provided the Palestinians with their second largest outlet for exports (after Israel) and facilitated trade relations with the rest of the Arab world.

The current legal system developed during that time from Jordanian legal foundations to incorporate substantial elements of Israeli law (both for Palestinians and for Jews). In recent years Israeli law has become especially binding on Israeli citizen settlers due to the institution of local and regional councils for Israeli citizens instituted beginning in March 1978.

The arrangement between Israel and Jordan was formalized in August 1986. It was disrupted at first by internal Israeli politics as Shimon Peres sought to regain the premiership just as Jordan and Israel had begun to take steps to give the arrangement a more permanent character. It was ended de facto a year later by the intifada.

#### Impediments to Success

What are the possible impediments to the adoption and implementation of a successful federal solution to the current conflict? They are: symbolic and emotional demands; timing; the problem of a federal political culture; the will to act; demographic concerns; fear and mistrust between Jordan and the Palestinians; and the problem of drawing borders.

One of the major obstacles to a federal solution is the potential failure to meet the symbolic and emotional demands of one or more parties (here, especially, the Palestinians). The Palestinians seek maximum symbolic satisfaction to the point where the symbols may even play more of a role than the reality. For a long time, Palestinian leaders rejected any solution that promised less than their dream of removing Israel and taking over all of Palestine. Now, some of those leaders have come to modify their views and to realize that a federal solution is, at the very least, the first step towards the establishment of Palestinian self-determination in a homeland of their own.

While some leaders view this as "selling-out," others perceive the federal plan as an opportunity to start the process of building toward an independent Palestinian state. It is this view that keeps the Israeli government from agreeing to negotiation with the PLO. They believe (as on some level the Palestinians hope), that the federal framework would be at most cosmetic and it would pose

an intolerable risk for Israel. They are not willing to risk Israeli security and a cut off from part of historic Eretz Israel, for a federated Palestinian state, even under the most controlled circumstances.

Timing is also a major issue for the successful resolution of the conflict. Even the best idea presented at the wrong time is doomed to fail. Historically, this has been the case. When the Jews were ready for partition, between 1937 and 1947, the Arabs were not. When the Jews were reconciled to acceptance of the 1949 armistice lines, the Arabs were not, leading them to launch the Six Day War. Now, the Palestinians are finally ready for a repartition or a return to the pre-1967 boundaries but for the Israelis it is too late. In the period from 1986 to 1988, the signs were strong that all parties were converging on some sort of federal solution as the other options expired. Then the countries of the European Community and elements of the Israeli left publicly came out in support of a two-state solution. At that point, there was no reason for the Palestinians to ask for less, again destroying the momentum toward peace.

The political cultures of those involved and their adaptability to federal solutions is very important in the implementation and maintenance of any federal arrangement. Although some cultures might seem opposed, even antithetical to a federal system, culture, as everything, changes, and just as it molds laws and institutions, it is also molded by them and by circumstances.

The European Community provides a good example of a confederation where no member has a deeply rooted, clearly federal political culture. France has a political culture antithetical to federalism. Germany is an example of a country where there is a mixture of cultures but where the anti-federalist elements have been dominant. Spain has tendencies toward both centralization and anarchism just as Belgium has tendencies toward ethnic exclusivism. Both Britain and the Netherlands, while the most predisposed toward federal arrangements, have rejected federalism for mild decentralization. Denmark has never contemplated any federal arrangement. Greece and Portugal are even more alienated from any federal political culture. And yet, in spite of this, the European Community is developing well and expanding its ties, from its start as a league, to a loose confederation and, soon, to an ever more united confederation or even a federation.

Leadership is another variable which must be taken into account when looking for a viable solution. There must be leaders bold enough to take the necessary steps at the right time. Often, an unsure public can be guided by persuasive leadership and bold actions of good faith and negotiation at the right time can often make the difference between a successful solution and a stalemate. One of the most critical questions will be whether there will be the right leadership in Israel, Jordan and among the Palestinians

all at the same time. Currently, no bold steps have been taken by any of the three participating parties, all of whose leaders are first of all survivors, not risk-takers, but such action is not inconceivable in the future.

The will to act or not takes precedence over all of the other possible impediments to a successful outcome. The success of a federalist program is fully dependent on the will to succeed. There have been dozens of federal solutions suggested for this conflict at least since 1917 (federations, confederations, binational consociations, cantons, plus those suggested by this writer and his colleagues), yet all have fallen flat because there has been no will toward any combination of self-rule and shared rule. In fact, historically there has been a strong will to the contrary on the part of all parties, especially among the Arabs.

The demographic problem is another aspect of the conflict which cannot be overlooked because it very clearly impacts the situation both within the Green Line and in the territories outside. In the mid-1980s, in all of western Eretz Israel, Jews accounted for 65 percent of the population while non-Jews made up 35 percent. The latter, however, accounted for 55 percent of the natural increase while the Jews made up only 45 percent. But the book is not closed. It seems that recently the fertility level of the non-Jews has dropped markedly as a result of increasing prosperity (a phenomenon evident in all of the world, as people prosper they tend to have fewer children). Even more crucial to the demographic problem, then, is the level of immigration and emigration of Jews and non-Jews.

Following the Six Day War there was a continuous and substantial emigration of young Palestinians from the territories as they went to the Arab oil states for economic and career opportunities. As oil prices declined and production slowed, fewer workers were needed and, at the same time, Palestinians were acquiring a reputation as potential troublemakers and so the Gulf states preferred to import workers from India. Because of this, Palestinian emigration slowed and more and more Palestinians returned to the territories as their opportunities outside waned. The Gulf War has made the position of the Palestinians in the Gulf emirates even more precarious. As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, some 200,000 out of an estimated 350,000 Palestinians in the Emirate left and the remaining 150,000 are in a difficult position since Kuwait's liberation, subject to harassment as Iraqi collaborators.

Among the Jews, from after the 1973 war there was a substantial slowing of aliya (immigration), while yerida (emigration) increased. Moreover, yerida, which earlier consisted primarily of immigrants returning to their countries of origin or leaving Israel to go to other places, came to involve more native-born Israelis leaving the country. Estimates show that if all of the yordim had



stayed with their children, the present Jewish population would be 15-20 percent higher. In some years emigration from Israel exceeded immigration. Then the gates of the USSR opened and hundreds of thousands of Jews sought to leave the Soviet Union for Israel. In addition, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews and thousands of Argentinean and Bulgarian Jews took the same step. Israel can now expect an aliya of several hundred thousand Jews a year for the next decade.

While a considerable drop in the Arab population and demographic statistics west of the Jordan river is highly unlikely, an absolute Arab majority west of the Jordan as predicted for the future a few years ago is equally unlikely. Yet it is certain that if most or all of the Palestinians became citizens (under annexation) they would certainly hold the balance of power. Israel would become a binational state, demographically if not constitutionally. This, more than anything, should encourage Israel to find a satisfactory alternative.

The demographics of a federal solution could become problematic for Israel as well, if it is not properly worked out. If not properly designed, it could link Israel with an Arab population larger than the Jewish population, especially if Jordan was to be included and the Palestinian refugees were to settle in the Arab state. Yet, without Jordan's participation, as has been mentioned previously, most Israelis believe that too much would have to be conceded to a separate Palestinian state and Israeli security would be jeopardized.

Both the Hashemite rulers of Jordan and the Palestinians have a great fear and mistrust of one another. This obviously will have a great impact on the success of any federated agreement. The Palestinians have often called themselves "the Jews of the Arab world" because of their grave mistreatment at the hands of their brethren. Their separate Palestinian identity was forged partly as a response to the other Arabs' lack of a willingness to absorb them, to treat them well, or even to support their cause beyond the bare minimum. The Palestinians have been periodically attacked and persecuted at the hands of other Arab states (including Jordan) because they have been viewed as a subversive force. Jordan is especially responsive to such agitation since the King realizes that Jordan is still viewed by most Palestinians as Eastern Falastin. Israel's interest is to link a settlement with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian agreement. Although the Palestinians are not happy with the prospect, it seems that they would accept it if there was no other choice.

Finally, the redrawing of borders could potentially prove to be a very large problem. Although the borders would be expected to remain open under a federal arrangement, borders still must be agreed to. In drawing the borders, someone wins and someone loses, yet under a federal arrangement, rights beyond the borders are

designed to compensate for actual territorial loss. Who will have access to what? Under what conditions? The Jewish settlers living in the midst of the Arabs are a problem for both Jews and Palestinians as are the Arabs in pre-1967 Israel. Here, amidst the complexity of the territorial situation, a win-lose situation is not constructive. What must be found is a win-win scenario.

#### Federal Solutions: Eleven Options

Option 1: Israel-Palestine Federation: Palestinian constituent state federated with Israel creating bi-state federation creates a new primary political entity with one general government uniting two constituent or federated states each with its own political institutions plus substantive powers reserved for them and other powers assigned to the federal government. Both states share in the federal government with Jews and Arabs having equal opportunity to reach and hold key federal office.

#### Implications:

a) The current State of Israel would belong to a larger body (the federation). This involves a drastic change in Israel's political system and status.

b) Palestinians who agree will be alienated from other Moslem Arab states -- it must be "worth" this alienation.

c) Federation must allow both peoples to retain links to diaspora communities.

d) The solution must be mutually satisfying to each group in the context of conflicting ideologies of Zionism and Palestinian-Arab nationalism.

e) A two-state federation must be based on the full equality of each state -- this does not address the various imbalances between them.

f) Jerusalem could be a federal district and the seat of federal government. It could also serve as the seat of the individual state governments.

#### Problems to be Overcome:

Both sides must want such a federation; a problem, especially since implicit in the creation of a new political entity of this kind is a common sense of nationhood.

The inequalities between the two constituent states must be balanced or dispersed. A two-state federation in which one state is strong and one weak can lead to frustration, repression, rebellion, and civil war.

This plan does not provide for symbolic satisfaction for either side. Israeli Jews will not compromise the sovereign integrity of their present state and the Palestinians want more than would be offered them under this arrangement.

#### Option 2: Israel-Palestine Confederation

The constituent entities remain the primary political units and the general authority has only limited federal delegated powers.

Many postmodern confederations are linked through specialized functional authorities rather than a single general authority to assure that full or substantial powers are transferred to specific areas. The transfer does not offer the possibility of extending the powers of the confederal body. An Israel-Palestinian confederation could include two states with permanent boundaries within one general authority or encompassing several joint functional authorities addressing issues common to both states dealing with economic relations and land and water resources. Even foreign affairs or defense could be handled in that way.

#### Implications:

- a) Each state would design and operate its own political institutions.
- b) The establishment of a Palestinian-Arab state would be irrevocable no matter what happens to the confederation.
- c) The confederation could resolve symbolic demands and demographic problems since each state would have appropriate forms of symbolic expression -- flag, coinage, stamps, etc.
- d) Jerusalem could be the seat of both capitals and of confederative institutions, possibly as a separate federal district.
- e) A confederation provides greater autonomy for its constituent units.

#### Problems to be Overcome:

There would have to be clear limits to the authority assigned to the confederal institutions.

In a confederation it is relatively easy for each constituent state to secede unless there are provisions to prevent that.

#### Option 3: Federation of Multiple Jewish and Arab Cantons

Eretz Israel/Palestine and the Golan would be divided into between 6 and 12 separate cantons to be united under a common federal

government. Each canton would have a Jewish or Arab majority and will be more or less autonomous. Two-thirds would be Jewish and one-third Arab, reflecting the country's overall population balance.

#### Examples:

A six-canton arrangement with Jewish cantons in the Galilee, the central coast, the Jewish settled portions of the central interior, and the Negev, and Arab cantons in the West Bank and Gaza.

A nine-canton system with Jewish cantons in the six existing administrative districts of the Ministry of Interior plus the Golan and Arab cantons in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

A twelve-canton system which would establish an Arab canton in central Galilee and eight Jewish cantons based on population, geography and territorial considerations.

#### Implications:

This solution would require drastic internal political changes in Israel.

It would provide substantial local autonomy for each canton, especially in the educational, cultural, religious, and social spheres under a clearly-defined constitution.

The arrangement would be fully federal as in Switzerland where the cantons are the basic units of domestic government.

Alternatively, it could be constructed as a decentralized system based on federal principles but still a union, similar to the Netherlands where there are eleven provinces to which the national government delegates most domestic functions according to national standards.

#### Problems to be Overcome:

In the latter case, the Palestinians will not believe that they have been given enough self-government to join; while the former is too fragmented an arrangement for the Jews to accept.

The general government must allow for substantial Arab participation and become less clearly Jewish.

There must be a general division of responsibilities and offices in the general government as well and freedom for independent functions within the cantons. Cultural and religious matters, including special rights for the dominant majority, will be determined by the canton within a general framework of protection for individual and group rights. The cantons will be able to

develop relations with other cantons of their community and diaspora communities outside the state. For example, the Jewish Agency could increase its power to coordinate stronger ties between the Jewish cantons (Israel) and the Jewish people.

This plan can be implemented unilaterally by Israel within whatever borders chosen with less than full agreement on the part of the Arabs involved as long as there is sufficient Arab tacit consent; it cannot be imposed.

Jerusalem would be divided among Jewish/Arab cantons or become a federal district and seat of the federal government.

Opposition from the Jewish community over fragmentation is to be expected.

At the very least, there is a symbolic problem of division/fragmentation.

Such an arrangement would create an additional layer of officialdom for a society already burdened by bureaucracy, although it also would provide an opportunity for streamlining and reorganization.

The extra level of policy-makers including elected cantonal officials may be too much for a small state.

The division of responsibility/authority between the general authority and the cantons, especially with regard to taxes and debt management (including pre-existing debts), may be difficult.

With regard to demographics, the geographical division based on population would secure the predominantly Jewish character of the federation, even if Palestinian refugees settle in Arab cantons, through the 2:1 cantonal division. But preservation of Jewish dominance in the federal government will become untenable if the demographic balance is shifted.

The general government will have to protect both group rights and the civil rights of individuals.

The legislature will have to be bicameral with equal representation in one house and by population in the other.

Emphasis should be placed on decentralized administration. Cantons would have their own legislative and administrative organs.

The judicial system would be based on a supreme court to deal with jurisdictional and rights problems.

The greatest advantage of this model is the possibility of implementing it without waiting for the agreement of all parties. It could start with the Israeli Arabs, for example. Since it would

be entirely confined to territories under Israeli rule, minimum recourse to outside Arab states (Jordan, Egypt, Syria) is needed. Still Palestinian Arabs themselves must agree. The plan would give Arabs meaningful citizenship and real self-government but it almost completely lacks symbolic satisfaction -- no international status (or image) of an independent Palestinian state. Many Israelis fear the danger of radical decentralization or leaving religious issues to be handled by individual cantons. Consequently, while it might have been implemented between 1967 and 1973, it is almost impossible to think that it would work now.

#### Option 4: Palestinian Arab State (or entity) Associated with Israel

Israel would annex territories needed for its security and in the area not directly annexed by Israel, one or more self-governing entities would be established with all requisite internal institutions but constitutionally linked/associated with Israel in specific and binding ways.

#### Implications:

At the very least associated statehood provides an opportunity for flexibility in a transitional phase toward permanent association, full incorporation, or full separation. This option recognizes the necessity for autonomy based on cultural differences within an overall political situation where both full separation and full federation of equals is precluded.

It provides for immediate institutionalization of a mutually beneficial arrangement without closing the door to future developments in several possible directions. Israel retains intact and unchanged its control over foreign affairs, defense and security for the entire territory.

The Palestinian federated state gains internal autonomy in all domestic political, administrative, social and cultural matters under very limited general oversight of the Israeli government (primarily judicial).

The Palestinians could send non-voting delegates to the Knesset but would not vote for MKs since they would have their own legislature.

Jerusalem would need special status.

This option can be implemented whenever the Palestinians were ready.

This option brings the least change to the Israeli status quo, especially with regard to the security and the Jewish character of Israel.

#### Problems to be Overcome:

The difficulty of obtaining Arab cooperation.

The necessity for concessions from Israel -- the creation of any Palestinian Arab entity is new and permanent (irrevocable).

The size and proximity of the entity. While there are precedents for such an arrangement, they never have been tried between two polities so close in population at such close geographical proximity. There remains the possibility of the Palestinians transforming this arrangement into a platform for more radical demands.

#### Option 5: Israel-Jordan Confederation with Palestinian Arabs incorporated in Jordan

Under this option, the confederation itself would be weaker than the Israeli and Jordanian constituent states but would have some common political institutions with some substantive powers.

#### Problems to be Solved:

The constitutional linkage of a pluralistic, competitive and frequently contentious democracy with an absolute monarchy is not possible. Jordan would have to change its regime. There is a lack of precedent for successful confederation among such different cultural, religious, and political institutions.

The option would require the permanent linkage of Israel with an even larger number of Arabs, virtually assuring an Arab majority in the confederation as a whole.

The status of Jerusalem would remain a problem although it could become the seat of the confederation.

The appeal of this option is that a confederation with free territorial access to all the citizens of its constituent states would lessen the problems of defining precise boundaries within the confederation as a whole. It also could avoid a distinct Palestinian entity although that would be objectionable to the Palestinians unless Jordan were to become a Palestinian state. Another version of this option would establish binding arrangements linking the two states, less comprehensive than a full confederation but equally binding in a more limited sphere; e.g., a common market, security arrangements, and certain technical functions.

#### Option 6: Israel-Jordan Confederation with Palestinian Entity Federated with One or the Other

#### Implications:

Similar to Option 5 (with same problems) plus:

- additional border problems with 3 rather than 2 constituent entities
- additional layer of institutions
- creation of an explicitly Palestinian entity.

This option would diffuse the demographic problem and fulfill Palestinian aspirations for their own entity, yet would allow redrawing of the border west of the river for Israel's security needs. Jordan would become a Palestinian state, at least de facto, with or without a Hashemite ruler.

Jerusalem could become the seat of the confederation. If the Palestinians chose federation with Israel, it could be the federal capital for both.

#### Option 7: Israel Incorporation of the Territories with an Internal Consociational Arrangement on a Constitutional Basis

#### Option 8: Totally Non-Territorial Consociational Federation within the Entire Area

Both of these options involve incorporation of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan on the basis that would give either the Arabs thus incorporated (#7) or all the Arabs on both sides of the Green Line, including those already Israeli citizens (#8), self-government for certain purposes on a non-territorial basis, what has been termed consociationalism in contemporary political science.

#### Implications:

There are several broad variations in consociational forms either involving sharp separations of functions or shared administration or some combination.

The population of Israel would have to be divided into communities: e.g., Jewish, Muslim, Christian or Druse and small communities, each having authority over religion, culture, education, with appropriate institutions to carry them out and to raise revenues to supplement general funding.

The general government would have to be organized to provide for representation and participation of each community in the overall government. The principal offices of government would be divided among the communities and rearranged internally for community representation.

Jerusalem would be the capital of the whole state and the seat of the consociational authority.

#### Problems to be Solved:



Such an arrangement may require different classes of citizenship, generally viewed as unequal/undemocratic. Different classes of citizens allow differing relations between people and territory.

Such an arrangement would allow Israel to maintain clear control over the Land of Israel (all territories) while still allowing Arab self-government. At the same time, the absorbed Arabs would have equality, thus raising questions about preserving the Jewish character of the state.

The option would preserve Palestinian national aspirations without giving them an independent state. This could pose problems for both sides. \*\*\*\*\*

Some way must be found to make the arrangement appealing to all parties.

There are problems of design and implementation -- no historical precedent for such an arrangement in this region other than Lebanon.

The centralized nature of the Israeli welfare state would have to be modified.

The absorption of a large, potentially restless minority with the potential of becoming a majority in an untested model is problematic.

This option depends on a delicate balance among the partners (demographically and ideologically). Changes in demography, ideological commitment, new elements introduced can cause the collapse of this system.

#### Option 9: Condominium -- Joint Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Rule over Territories with Local Authorities Attached to One or the Other for Civil Purposes

This plan would keep the administered territories within Israel's security orbit, while recognizing the Palestinian Arabs' right to political status there. The economic links with the East Bank would be formalized, local affairs would be left to the residents of the territories, Israeli and the Arab state (Jordanian) civil jurisdiction would be divided along municipal boundaries with the residents of each municipality choosing the state with which to affiliate.

#### Implications:

It is assumed that all the Arab cities/towns would choose to remain municipalities of the Arab state with substantial internal autonomy. Gaza would affiliate with the Arab state, giving it a sea outlet to the west.

The Jewish cities and settlements in the Etzion Bloc, Judea, the Samarian hills, the Jordan Valley, the Samarian foothills and the Gaza region would choose to be linked to Israel, probably through their regional councils.

A variant on this arrangement would be that groups of contiguous municipalities form regions to be attached to Israel or Jordan. This would give more visibility to the Palestinians and also would give more security to Israeli settlements.

Governance would be by municipal authority and agents of the mother state. Each state would apply its own laws, administrative arrangements, and standard of service.

Vacant state lands would pass to Israel (for protection). In exchange, the Arab state would be given a formal presence/rights in Jerusalem, especially at the Muslim holy places. Other territory not included within or otherwise separated from the boundaries of existing towns/villages would be administered by the condominium authority and open to settlement by Jews or Arabs according to agreed upon procedures.

The state affiliation of new settlements would be by jointly established procedures including the choice of citizenship. This option would allow Palestinians to preserve their national identity and pan-Arab ties and would not jeopardize Israel's security or identity.

There would be a condominium council, principally as a coordinative body but also to enact ordinances for condominium areas under conditions established by the two states. Funds would come from the budgets of the two states and local taxes. Residents of the territories will pay taxes to their state of citizenship and to the municipality in which they reside.

The territories will be demilitarized with safeguards for Israel. Military control ultimately will be joint, at the beginning with a symbolic Arab military presence that in time will develop into a joint command.

There will be substantially free movement of Jews and Arabs into and out of the territories.

The right of all residents to freely choose citizenship affiliation and to live within a communal framework giving that citizenship meaning will be protected.

There will be substantial economic integration of Israel, Jordan, and the territories.

There will be provision for solving the refugee problem in part by opening territories for resettlement.

Problems to be Solved:

This plan requires the participation of Jordan as such or as a Palestinian state.

The Palestinians will have to find their symbolic satisfaction in the Arab state.

Both sides must surrender rights to exclusive rule over any part of the territories in return for a share in the whole.

Features of the plan:

This option has maximum flexibility.

It provides for variable levels of Israel/Palestinian/Jordanian control or joint authority control. Joint authorities can vary in make-up.

The implementation of this option can be by stages and the details do not have to be settled at once.

There are possibilities for different arrangements for Arab and Jewish local areas.

Outside of the territories there is a minimum of mutual involvement.

Option 10: Various Partial or Sectoral Federal Arrangements such as a Customs Union, Common Market or Joint Special Purpose Authorities Serving Both States

Implications:

This option has the greatest flexibility. It could incorporate substantial parts of most preceding options.

It may invite widened participation, for example, with part or all of Lebanon, Jordan and the territories in a common market or various special authorities.

The arena of shared decision-making can be wide or narrow.

It is a vehicle for joint development of water resources, economic development or religious sites, common efforts to promote tourism.

It could provide joint administration of segments of Jerusalem.

It could include provisions for a general authority with varying functions as in #9.

Limited joint projects have special appeal in early stages of formalized cooperation and can deliver benefits without foreclosing options on overall boundaries, political institutions, or division of critical functional areas.

Problems to be Solved:

- Symbolic satisfaction
- Boundaries between the states
- Role of the Palestinians

Option 11: Bilateral Federal Arrangements with Different Kinds of Links between Israel and the Territories or Jordan

Israel could formulate different bilateral arrangements with any of the partners within the area to be served, e.g., one boundary for water resources development, a different one for economic development, another for control of communicable diseases, and another for security. The institutional mechanisms can vary also.

The Best Alternative?

Is there a best solution? There is no single best solution under all circumstances. What is proposed here is what we believe to be at this time the most viable and pragmatic solution with a chance of successful implementation and sufficient fail-safe mechanisms to minimize the risks that must be taken by the parties in question if there is to be any solution.

From Israel's point of view, as has been articulated previously, a proper federal solution would provide the Jewish state with peace, appropriate security guarantees, provide protection for the Jewish settlements in the territories, and a share in the land's common resources (particularly water resources). These are three absolute necessities in the minds of virtually all Israelis, however they interpret the way to achieve them.

For Hussein and his Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a federalist solution offers an opportunity to regain a foothold west of the river including a presence in Jerusalem at least (having some connection with the holy sites located there). The advantages of obtaining access to a port directly on the Mediterranean (which would come with Gaza) would also hold great appeal to Jordan.

For the Palestinians, there remains a strong interest in being linked in some way with their brethren east of the Jordan river, located in territory which, according to the original League of Nations mandate and the PLO platform, should be part of any Palestinian state. When the PNC recognized Israel's right to exist in its statement in Algiers, it made no concessions whatsoever with regard to Jordan's right to exist independently of the proposed Palestinian state. In spite of that, Arafat is reluctant to accept

Jordan's offer of federation because the Palestinians know that by accepting even a simple confederation with Jordan they will remain at the mercy of the Hashemite rulers and the Jordan army which has crushed them before and has promised to do so again if necessary. Despite recent developments in Jordan, Hussein has little or no commitment to republican, not to speak of democratic, ideals. Jordan, indeed, should be even more Palestinian than it is.

In the interim, the only way in which a Palestinian link with Jordan would protect the Palestinians is if Israel were involved as a third party. An Israeli counterbalance to the Hashemite ruler would be a powerful guarantee of Palestinian self-government. The Palestinians, to gain a reasonable measure of self-determination, must accept a federal solution and find the appropriate partner or partners for it. Since neither Israel nor Jordan is acceptable alone, perhaps the Palestinians can be brought to realize that what is good for them is a combination of both -- just as Israel has come to realize that since it will not be allowed simply to absorb the territories, such an arrangement would be the lesser of two evils for it. Since Jordan has no other option, it will have to come to the same conclusion.

It seems that given the considerations of the minimal absolute needs of each of the parties involved, at this juncture the best solution possible would encompass a Palestinian-Jordanian federation in new boundaries that reflect Israel's security needs, overlaid by a confederation with Israel.

A Palestinian-Jordanian federation would mean one overarching general government for all of the Arab-governed territories on the east and west banks of the Jordan river, divided into two or more constituent states at least one of which would be controlled by the Palestinian Arabs west of the Jordan river. Israel's role would be primarily to act as a guarantor that both sides live up to their federal obligations as determined by the peace settlement and the constitutional negotiations between King Hussein and the Palestinians which would parallel it. The integrity of the federation will be important because the federation will be viewed as one Arab state (albeit with two or more constituent entities) in the realm of international affairs.

While the Jordanian-Palestinian federation takes hold, Israel (territorially adjusted to include the State of Israel and segments of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza needed for security purposes or so extensively settled as to be appropriately part of the Jewish state) would be integrated into the arrangement through a confederal arrangement with the Jordanian-Palestinian federation. In a confederation, the states that come together can preserve their full political and juridical personalities while establishing certain permanent joint bodies to serve their common needs (as opposed to a federation where one overarching general government rules a single polity).

This arrangement would guarantee Israelis access to the territories they give up and will also give them a share in critical decisions concerning water rights and other common concerns. Among the tasks that could be entrusted to the confederal administration would be security in the former administered territories (other than the local police), control and distribution of water resources, economic and fiscal coordination including the maintenance of an open labor market and the promotion of economic development. The functions of the confederation could be conducted by the confederal governing institutions directly, or they could be assigned temporarily (or permanently) to one state or the other. For example, Israel could be made solely (or principally) responsible for security matters for a set period, after which, if things worked well, security could become a shared function.

Such a confederative structure could be governed through a council whose members would be appointed by the parties involved, either through the two states or, perhaps more effectively, by Israel and each of the federated states of Palestine/Jordan. If the former, voting could be on the basis of parity. In the case of the latter, voting would have to be weighted so that the Israeli vote would equal that of the Arabs. The capital of this confederation would be located in Jerusalem and the Arab presence in Jerusalem could be acknowledged in an appropriate manner. Moreover, any territorial concessions which might be made would be based on an allocation of jurisdiction rather than decisions on ultimate sovereignty, either indefinitely or for an interim period.

Such a federation-confederation combination as proposed here would fulfill all of the fundamental concerns of the involved parties. The Palestinians would get their state, albeit a federal state rather than an independent sovereign one, but they will also be guaranteed a share in the governance of the shared Arab state. Jordan would have a continued standing west of the river. Israel would get secure borders, recognition by its Arab neighbors, and a continuing constitutional relationship with those parts of the historic Land of Israel not within its full political jurisdiction. Most of all there would be peace, a concept which by now the vast majority of the people involved seriously want.

#### A Possible Governmental Structure

The confederation would comprise two spheres of government: political and administrative. The principal organ of the political sphere would be the Confederation Joint Council (CJC), which should be composed of an equal number of Israeli and Jordanian/Palestinian representatives. Each state -- Israel and Jordan/Palestine -- would select its own representatives (although at least half of the Palestinian/Jordanian delegation should be composed of Palestinian residents of the territories). The representatives on the council would serve at the pleasure of their appointing governments. The council would appoint a secretariat and, for day-to-day business it

would be linked to Israel through the Prime Minister's office and to Jordan/Palestine through an appropriate counterpart. The council would be the only body whose jurisdiction would be simultaneously territorial, functional, and personal. It would be directly responsible for four functions within its sphere of competence: enactment of ordinances and by-laws, budget and fiscal management, planning, and legal coordination.

In the administrative sphere, as many mixed authorities as necessary would be established to administer those functions in the territories best shared by Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians on a trilateral or bilateral basis. Included among such functions would be security, immigration and naturalization, holy places, foreign trade and tourism, refugee rehabilitation, land and water resources and development, banking and currency, and posts and telecommunications. The management of each of these authorities should be vested in a board composed of representatives of the parties constituting each. Since each functional authority serves different constituencies, each should have jurisdiction over all people and territories served by its particular function.

Security needs for the confederation should move gradually from Israeli dominance toward parity among the parties. The movement toward parity of responsibility should be a gradual one, contingent on the stability of and relations between the governments. Gradually, these areas could become free of heavy artillery and tank units. In the final stage, both sides could maintain specially trained joint or mixed units to keep order. Local order should be maintained by the police force of the Palestinian federated state (with the possible assistance of a joint force developed by the confederative government).

Economically, the integration of the territories with Israel and Palestine/Jordan should be maintained and even strengthened. This process would be economically beneficial to all parties and would also increase the interdependence of the constituting states within the confederation. Economic development could be used as a tool to strengthen common interests among the parties involved and it would maintain the mutual interest in maintaining the status quo.

#### How Do We Get There from Here?

Any of the three participating parties could initiate discussion of such a plan, or even Egypt or the United States could offer their good offices to present such a plan, but the most essential component of moving toward this negotiated solution is a recognition of the parties involved and a willingness to sit down at the table to hammer out a solution.

Israel and the Palestinians must sit down in direct, face-to-face negotiations. The role of the Palestine Liberation Organization will have to be resolved. While most of the center-right majority

in the Israeli government have rejected their direct participation, so too has much of the center-left. The Palestinians, for their part, unswervingly declare the PLO to be their sole legitimate representative. Somehow this problem will have to be finessed, possibly by utilizing Palestinian representatives from the territories for the first stage of talks without questioning their possible PLO connections.

The end result of the negotiations should be a covenant between the parties which: 1) states and recognizes the claims of each; 2) agrees on how those claims will be exercised; 3) establishes appropriate authorities for the governance and adjudication in the territories and between the parties; 4) fixes the new boundaries of the Palestinian entity to be formed. Accompanying this covenant should be an agreement regarding the stages of implementation of Palestinian self-rule within the shared rule framework and the procedures for moving from stage to stage. This covenant should be the cornerstone of the evolving constitutional relationship among Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan, and in due course could become the source of sovereignty over the territories.

Following the negotiation of a suitable agreement, the implementation of the shared-rule arrangement must be carefully handled. I would propose that the development process should involve three stages beginning with administrative autonomy, moving into condominium and ultimately evolving into a complete shared-rule arrangement. The principle of a staged arrangement could be agreed to at the outset but the actual move from one stage to the next would be contingent on the agreement of all parties that suitable progress has been made to warrant such a move.

In the first stage, a representative administrative council could be established in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region and the military government would be withdrawn. The Palestinians, at that time, would obtain internal autonomy within the framework of Israeli rule. They would then formulate their own instrumentalities of government and develop an indigenous political leadership.

To manage the territories, a council would be elected by the Palestinian Arab residents of the area (or if this stage were to be implemented in different areas at different times, regional councils would be elected to administer the territories under their jurisdiction). This council would control such functional departments as education, construction and housing, agriculture, health, labor and social welfare. The heads of the departments would be nominated from among the members of the council and jurisdiction would be limited to the Palestinian Arabs or to the municipalities they control, since the primary purpose is to give the Palestinians a scope for self-rule.



At some point during the first stage, Jordan could be invited to join with Israel in establishing a condominium council. This council could assume supreme responsibility for overall legislative, planning, budgeting, and judicial functions for Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. It would have equal Israeli and Jordanian representation, with the Palestinians guaranteed full representation within the Jordanian delegation. This would become the supreme authority for the home rule council. At that point, certain joint functional authorities could be established on a bilateral (Israel/Jordan or Israel/Palestinian) or trilateral (Israel/Jordan/Palestinian) basis to give the Arabs a larger governing role.

For the Palestinian Arabs, this condominium arrangement would be a further step in taking on an equal role in determining their own future. For the Israelis, it would involve relinquishing exclusive control over certain powers in return for great legitimation of its authority in the territories on a shared-rule basis. For Jordan it would formally restore a political role west of the Jordan river. Successful implementation of the condominium would fully establish power-sharing as the authoritative basis for a long-term solution and also begin to develop the mechanism and techniques necessary to translate principle into practice. When all are agreed, they can move on to a more permanent solution.

The nature of the final stage, while under a shared-rule confederated framework, would be purposely be left open to provide flexibility for the development of a model that would accommodate the realities of the times. Most likely this model would encompass a broad shared-rule arrangement with a confederation of two or three states or, more narrowly, there could be an agreement to continue the condominium or a federal arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, with functional cooperation with the third party. Time, events, and the relationships involved will no doubt point to the appropriate model.

#### Hope for the Future

There has never been a better opportunity for doing this than now. The U.S.-led Allied victory in the Gulf, the clear signal that Israel has sent regarding its rejection of an international conference or simple separation of the West Bank and Gaza from its domain, and the new spirit of compromise, however murky it may be, to be found among the Palestinians, offer previously unparalleled opportunities for moving ahead. Let us hope that there will be sufficiently imaginative statesmanship among all of the parties to do so.

Finally, if, under this plan, the Palestinian Arabs may have to accept an "entity" less symbolically satisfying than a politically sovereign state, they will still have taken a giant step toward self-rule so that their chances for full partnership will grow as

the federative elements are strengthened or as their power grows in the Arab state. While Israel may have a historical right to the territories which has a certain status in international law, still the Palestinians have a right of occupancy which has another, strongly supported position in international politics. The peoples of the Middle East have never depended upon territory to legitimize or to maintain their existence; they only use it as a form of accommodation. They can enjoy self-rule as peoples at the same time that they share rule with other peoples over the territory in which they all have vested rights. Let us hope that now, in this time of opportunity, the parties involved will recognize their goals and also their limitations, and will come to the table ready to seek a shared solution, amenable to all of the peoples involved.

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
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Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project  
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No. 7

Modalities of Palestinian Independence:  
Exploring the Possibilities

Emile Nakhleh

Mount St. Mary's College

Summer 1991

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT is a cooperative venture between the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Arab Studies Society, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The research project seeks to analyze, from the perspectives of Israeli and Palestinian scholars, some of the key elements of an eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab conflict. Its purpose is to promote better understanding of each side's interests in order to define areas of convergence and search for alternative solutions that could form the practical basis for peaceful coexistence.

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**MODALITIES OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE:  
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES**

**[A Paper Presented at the Truman Institute,  
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, as Part  
of a Research Project on Israeli-Palestinian  
Peace, Under a Grant from the John D.  
and Catherine T. McArthur Foundation]**

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**Revised: April 24, 1991**



## **CONTENTS**

	<b>Page</b>
<b>AN OVERVIEW</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHANGING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES</b>	<b>2</b>
1967-1973: June War-October War	2
1974-1977: Disengagement Agreements-Sadat's Initiative	3
1978-1982: Camp David-U.S. Peace Initiative	4
1983-1987: PLO Dispersal-Special Arab Summit	5
1987-1990: Intifada-Invasion of Kuwait	7
1991-: Since the Gulf War	8
<b>MODALITIES OF INDEPENDENCE</b>	<b>9</b>
An Independent State in the West Bank and Gaza	9
A Palestinian-Jordanian Federation	10
A Binational State in Palestine	12
A Palestinian-Israeli Federative State	14
<b>CONCLUDING REMARKS</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>NOTES</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</b>	

## AN OVERVIEW

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, considerable international interest has been expressed in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. President Bush's address to Congress calling on the parties to seek a solution to the conflict in the context of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 received worldwide support. The increasing Palestinian violence and the harsh Israeli measures in the occupied territories make the search for peace more urgent. The deteriorating economic conditions of the Palestinians, both in the occupied territories and in Jordan, and the negative financial impact of the Gulf crisis on the Palestinians add to the urgency of their situation. Secretary Baker's trips to the region in the spring of 1991 reflect Washington's commitment to resolve the conflict and to effect peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Much attention has recently focused on potential participants in the peace process and on the modalities of negotiations. However, the Palestinians' two basic demands in the West Bank and Gaza--termination of the Israeli occupation and political independence--have yet to be fully addressed.

The Palestinian intifada, now well into its fourth year, has created new political, economic, and social conditions, which will have far-reaching effects on the eventual peace between Israel and the Palestinians and on the future existence of the Palestinians as an independent or autonomous political community. The defeat of Saddam Husayn at the hands of the United States-led international coalition and the weakened position of the PLO because of its support for Iraq have also created favorable conditions for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Washington's active interest in resolving the conflicts has given added impetus to the search for peace.

The convergence of conditions, interests, and pressures has generated unprecedented challenges for all the parties involved in the conflict: Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, the Arab states, and, of course, the United States. The challenges are now more pressing than ever:

- Although since the Gulf war the Arab states have adopted a more active posture on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the two primary protagonists of the conflict remain Israel and the Palestinians.
- Any solution, if it is expected to succeed, will most likely have to consider the Palestinians' right to self determination and ultimately their independent existence in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories are becoming more prominent in the search for peace; however, they probably will not act independently of the PLO, no matter how weakened it is as a result of its pro-Saddam position during the Gulf crisis.
- Israelis and Palestinians accept the principle of negotiation as the only route to peace. They and a majority of the Arab states also agree that Washington is the primary catalyst for any movement on the peace front.

Another and perhaps a more practical challenge is how to allow the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as a political community, to exercise their self-determination and in what context. That is, what kind of political entity will satisfy their desire for self-determination and under what conditions? Will it be accepted by the Palestinians--West Bankers and PLO--and by Israel and Jordan? Options for such an entity include:

- An independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.
- A Palestinian-Jordanian Federation.
- A Binational State in Palestine.
- A Palestinian-Israeli Federative State.

In assessing the different options and their feasibility and acceptability to the parties involved, focus will be on the following specific aspects:

- The economic factors affecting each entity, the availability of resources, and the need for economic assistance.
- The foreign relations and national security policy of each entity and its ability and willingness to conclude agreements and treaties in the international field.
- The entity's security arrangements with its neighboring states and the impact of these arrangements on the short-term and the long-term survival of the entity.
- The political, economic, and military prospects for the internal stability of each entity and the potential threats to such stability.
- The likely political character of each entity--structure, leadership, participation, competition for power--and the implications of the entity's political system for neighboring states.

## CHANGING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

An assessment of the different options of Palestinian independence must of course consider the impact of the Gulf crisis on the Palestinian leadership and the effect of the intifada on the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Furthermore, current Palestinian political thinking on the different options has evolved significantly since the start of the Israeli occupation in the 1967.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, in the last quarter century, the changing political attitudes of the Palestinians toward Israel and their own political aspirations have passed through several distinct stages.

### 1967-1973: June War-October War

The massive Arab defeat in the June war resulted in a total Israeli control of the whole of traditional Palestine. The Zionist movement struggled for fifty years (1897-1947) to establish only a foothold in Palestine. But in six fateful days in 1967, Israel conquered all of Palestine. The 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) partitioned Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, and established an international regime for Jerusalem. The Palestinians rejected the resolution, and Israel came into being less than six months later. As displaced refugees and defeated people, the Palestinians defined their goal at the time as the liberation of Palestine.

The 1967 defeat discredited Arab military power and lent credence to the Palestinian resistance movement, both as a liberation movement and as an ideology. The movement was primarily the Arafat-led PLO, and the ideology was that of Fatah, also led by Yasir Arafat. Thus, the PLO, Fatah, and Arafat from the very beginning were at the core of Palestinian ideology in an Arab-Israeli equation involving a victorious Israel and a

vanquished Arab state system.

West Bank and Gaza Palestinians viewed their own occupation as part of a larger Israeli occupation covering Arab lands in Palestine and outside it. They believed that the end of occupation would be effected by an Arab solution, not Palestinian per se. Furthermore, they perceived the occupation as a temporary phenomenon that would not require major adjustments in their community life. In the first three years of the occupation, Israel was in the process of institutionalizing its military presence in the territories, and the PLO was expanding its ranks and involvement in the domestic politics of Jordan and Lebanon. A revolutionary Palestinian ideology for coexistence with the Jews in Palestine was emerging, and the PLO called for the establishment of a secular democratic state for Jews and Arabs in Palestine. West Bank and Gaza Palestinians waited for liberation, to be delivered somewhere by someone from the outside. For a few days during the October 1973 war, Egypt's crossing of the Suez Canal was perceived as the route to liberation.

#### 1974-1977: Disengagement Agreements-Sadat's Initiative

The October war and the military performance of Egypt in the first couple of days of the war produced euphoria among Palestinians under occupation. Although the euphoria did not last, the Palestinians continued to view their situation in the first decade of the occupation from a macro-Arab perspective. The PLO won several political and diplomatic successes in the mid 1970s and was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the United Nations, the League of Arab states, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the nonaligned movement. This recognition gave West Bank and Gaza Palestinians another reason to cling to the PLO. They saw it as an extension of their own political legitimacy and psychological identity. This linkage has been a constant in the relationship between Palestinians under occupation and the PLO throughout the last two decades.

By 1974 the PLO began to alter its ideological position toward Israel. In its 1974 session, the Palestine National Council (PNC) adopted a ten-point resolution indicating, among other things, that the road to liberation is not singularly limited to armed struggle. The so-called "diplomatic route" emerged as a viable course of action.<sup>2</sup> The 1974 resolution heralded a three-pronged shift, albeit inferentially, in PLO ideology:

- A transition from a democratic, secular state for Jews and Arabs to an independent Palestinian state on a part of Palestine.
- A move toward the possibility of negotiation with Israel.
- A tendency toward moderation and probably realism.

The PLO had previously rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242 because it did not mention the "Palestinian" issue. The resolution defined the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a problem of refugees.<sup>3</sup>

For Palestinians under occupation, the PLO shift was welcome news because, at least indirectly, it focused on the removal of the occupation as a prerequisite to eventual peace. By the mid-1970s, West Bankers began to exhibit a feeling of hope and rising expectations regarding the possibility of resolving the conflict. This feeling was prompted by three specific developments: the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements; the congressional testimony in the fall of 1975 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs underscoring the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.<sup>4</sup>

Palestinians in the occupied territories watched the late President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in the fall of 1977 with optimistic anticipation. Their hopes soared at the possibility of negotiations, especially following President Jimmy Carter's call in March 1977 for a Palestinian "homeland" and his statement on Palestinian rights in January 1978.<sup>5</sup> The latter statement sent the Palestinians two very important signals: that the Palestinian problem should be resolved "in all its aspects," and that they should "participate in the determination of their own future."<sup>6</sup>

However, by the end of the decade the West Bankers' hopes of the mid-1970s were dashed, and their rising expectations went flat. They discovered that the Palestinian autonomy which Cairo and Washington envisioned in the Camp David accords was different from the one that Jerusalem had perceived--the latter being much more restrictive. Israel continued to build more settlements, and the world's attention began to shift from the Palestinian issue to the Persian Gulf.

#### 1978-1982: Camp David-U.S. Peace Initiative

With the advent of the 1980s, a mood of hopelessness permeated the occupied territories.

- The Camp David system produced a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace, which resulted in denouncing Egypt by the Arab states as a pariah state.<sup>7</sup>
- The fall of the Shah of Iran, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism under the Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the holding of United States diplomats as hostage, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq-Iran war redirected the international community's attention to the Persian Gulf. The Palestinian issue was placed on the back burner.
- Israel began to introduce new policies in the occupied territories to liquidate pro-PLO leadership. A "civil administrator" was appointed and all the popularly elected Palestinian municipal leaders were dismissed. Occupation authorities--unsuccessfully--began to promote the "Village Leagues" as an alternate leadership to PLO.<sup>8</sup>

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, presumably to establish a Christian-Maronite order in that country, resulted in the dispersal of the PLO from Beirut. However, operation "peace for Galilee" failed to undermine Arafat's leadership in the Palestinian movement. In fact, his support among Palestinians--in the diaspora and in the occupied territories--became stronger than ever. The departure of Arafat and his organization from Beirut forced the PLO to redirect its attention to the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, by the end of the decade, the Palestinians in the occupied territories became the primary constituency of the PLO.

The Christian order did not materialize in Lebanon, Hafiz al-Asad of Syria emerged as the most influential player in Lebanon, the Israeli public renounced the Begin war policy and Ariel Sharon was censured for his role in the Sabra-Shatila massacres. A broken man, Begin withdrew from politics.<sup>9</sup> The occupation became more entrenched, more settlements were built, and no real movement occurred on the peace front between Israel and the Palestinians.

Washington did not support the establishment of a Palestinian state, and on September 1, 1982 President Reagan called for the establishment of a Palestinian self-government "in association with Jordan." Palestinians in the occupied territories reacted with guarded optimism to the U.S. peace initiative. They saw in it several positive indicators.<sup>10</sup>

- U.S. support for Palestinian self-government.
- U.S. opposition to Israeli annexation or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.
- U.S. acceptance of the principle of exchanging territory for peace.
- U.S. agreement with the Palestinians that "their cause is more than a question of refugees."
- U.S. statement that the withdrawal clause of UN Security Council Resolution 242, in return for peace, "applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza."<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately for Palestinians, their optimism faded fast when it became clear to them that the Lebanese quagmire of late 1982 and 1983 had derailed the September 1 peace initiative. The PLO found itself at the time caught between the moderate Arab states, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, and Iraq and the rejectionist front, including Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and radical Palestinian elements. Arafat became enmeshed in inter- and intra-Arab politics. No new peace initiatives were offered, and the occupation continued.

#### **1983-1987: PLO Dispersal-Special Arab Summit**

This period was not smooth sailing for Arafat. He had serious disagreements with Syria's Hafiz al-Asad who tried, and is still trying, to unseat him as chairman of the PLO. Asad had also encouraged Fatah dissidents including Abu Musa to topple Arafat.

Arafat also had his differences with King Hussein of Jordan. Although the Arab League in 1974 recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, King Hussein continued to play an active role in the West Bank. The king was, and continues to be, perceived by Washington and Jerusalem as a critical component in any Arab-Israeli peace. To Washington, he was a central figure in the Reagan peace initiative; to Israel, he was the focus of the so-called "Jordanian option."

Regional and international developments and efforts toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace in the early 1980s had far-reaching implications for the occupied territories. Two attitudes emerged among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza: hopelessness regarding the prospects of a macro-Arab solution to the occupation question, and determination to redefine, albeit somewhat vaguely, their steadfastness (sumud) in terms of their continued presence on the land.

A more optimistic development was the official Arab move toward moderation. Indicators of that moderation included the Fahd Plan of August 1981, which stated, albeit indirectly, that Arab recognition of Israel would follow its withdrawal from the occupied territories,<sup>12</sup> and the Fez Plan of September 1982, which called for negotiations.<sup>13</sup> Another indicator was the 1985 agreement between the PLO and Jordan on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating delegation. The failure of the rejectionist front became final when Syria was unable to stop the Palestine National Council from holding its meeting in Amman, Jordan in November 1984.<sup>14</sup>

On the negative side, from a Palestinian perspective, several developments occurred in that period which heightened the mood of pessimism in the occupied territories. The economic situation worsened due in part to the recession in the Gulf oil countries. The occupation's iron-fist policy continued unabated due in part to the inconclusive Israeli

Knesset elections of 1984. Because of the rise in international terrorism, Palestinians everywhere became viewed with suspicion. Israel was declared a "strategic ally" of the United States, and relations between Washington and Jerusalem became stronger than ever. Finally, the Arab world's attention turned to the Gulf, and many Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq, turned to the United States for arms. Consequently, by the middle of the decade, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians began to search for a new approach to end the occupation.

In reacting to the positive and negative factors, Palestinians in the occupied territories by 1985-1986 came to the conclusion that for their new concept of sumud to produce results, it must be linked to realism and self-reliance.<sup>15</sup>

- The experience of the Palestinians under occupation and their physical contact with Israel were neither shared nor understood by the Arab world at large or even by the Palestinians in the diaspora.
- Arab diplomacy had failed to improve the lot of the Palestinians under occupation. The Arab states could not force Israel to withdraw or pressure Washington to persuade Israel to withdraw, or commit adequate resources to help Palestinians attain self-determination.
- The necessity of dealing with the Israeli occupation on a daily basis required West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to create a new cadre of local leaders to speak on their behalf, whether in journalism, municipal politics, education, commerce, or health and welfare services. These "on-the-ground" leaders began to address "on-the-ground" issues fundamental to the daily survival of their Palestinian community.
- Since the pan-Arab notion of steadfastness was rapidly losing touch with the realities of the Israeli occupation and the Palestinians' experience under it, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians found it necessary to adopt a new concept of sumud--one less wealth-oriented, more indigenous, and locale-specific--whose center piece was the strategy of "staying on the land." This was the essence of the emerging Palestinian pragmatism and realism.

The 1985-1987 period was crucial for the West Bank and Gaza Palestinian leadership. The three underpinnings of Palestinian political action in this period were determination, realism, and pragmatism. Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories began to speak out in this period urging Arab moderation toward Israel, and calling on the PLO to recognize Israel.<sup>16</sup>

Palestinian moderation in 1985 was also voiced by Hanna Siniora, a West Bank journalist, and Fayez Abu Rahmeh, a Gaza lawyer and a member of the PNC. In an interview with the Journal of Palestine Studies in July 1985, they both urged the Palestinians and the PLO to recognize the reality of Israel, and stated that since "armed struggle" had run its course, the Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO, should sit down and negotiate with Israel.<sup>17</sup>

By late 1986 a modern urban leadership had emerged in the territories whose aim was to address the living conditions of the Palestinians under occupation but also to pursue diplomatic formulas -- any formulas -- to end the occupation. This cadre of leaders included such people as Hanna Siniora, Fayez Abu Rahmeh, Faisal al-Husseini, Sari Nusseibah, Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, Mahmud Abu Zuluf, Ziad Abu Zayyad, Ibrahim Dakkak, Radwan Abn 'Ayyash, Nabil Ja'abari, Haidar Abdul Shafi, Ibrahim Kara'een, Mustafa al-Natshe, Zuhair al-Rayyes, Zafir al-Masri, Bassam al-Shak'a, Rashad al-Shawwa, and others.<sup>18</sup>

By 1987 the new leadership under occupation was convinced that its primary goal was to end the occupation. The leaders' immediate strategy was to bring the issue of the occupation to the forefront of the consciousness of the average Israeli--either as a moral burden or as a physical, economic, or security one.<sup>19</sup>

The special Arab summit held in Amman, Jordan in November 1987 convinced the Palestinians of the Arab states' marginal preoccupation with their cause because of the Gulf war.<sup>20</sup> They got the Arab message loud and clear: they were on their own. Less than a month later the intifada broke out.

#### **1987-1990: Intifada-Invasion of Kuwait**

The intifada refocused the world's attention on the Palestinian question and more specifically on the occupied territories. Beyond the immediate car incident of December 7, 1987 in Gaza which sparked the uprising, several factors contributed to the outbreak of the intifada: frustration with Israeli occupation policies, with Arab and international indifference toward the Palestinians under occupation, and with perceived official U.S. one-sided support for Israel; consistent refusal of the Israeli government to engage the Palestinians in any serious dialogue for peace; the increasing social and economic misery in the overcrowded refugee camps in Gaza; the nurturing of Palestinian nationalism under the occupation; and apprehension of perceived Israeli right-wing plans of mass transfers of population out of the occupied territories.

In the early months of the intifada the leadership addressed four sets of objectives: establish the intifada as a popular resistance movement; articulate specific political objectives; establish a working relationship with the PLO; and institutionalize the intifada as a mass movement and a builder of a self-reliant Palestinian society. The political demands were detailed in a 14-point manifesto issued by the intifada's leadership on January 14, 1988. Some of the demands include the following:

- Withdrawal of Israeli forces from population centers and deployment of UN peace-keeping forces for an interim period.
- Lifting of martial law, releasing of prisoners, allowing the deportees to return, and compensation to families for death and injuries.
- Holding free elections in the territories and allowing the PNC members from the West Bank and Gaza to attend PNC sessions.
- Halting the building of settlements.

The political program of the intifada included two fundamental points: the acceptance of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories.

The PLO was surprised by the intifada, and it took the PLO leadership in Tunis several weeks to assess the intifada and to "catch up" with it. However, it did not take the PLO long to accept the political program of the intifada and to change its ideological slogan from "liberation of the whole of Palestine" to "independence on a part of Palestine."

By the end of the first year, the intifada scored major political and diplomatic successes: the PLO's declaration of independence in November 1988; Yasir Arafat's press conference statement recognizing Israel, UN Security Council Resolution 242, and renouncing terrorism; and the opening of the US-PLO dialogue. A feeling of euphoria followed those developments which, in spite of the mounting casualties, maintained the



pace of the intifada into 1989. However, by the spring of 1990, frustration began to set in. Intifada-related hardships--economic dislocations, injuries, deaths, rising unemployment, school closings, arrests, strikes, curfews, etc.--continued to mount, and the US-PLO dialogue did not produce tangible political results. Basically, the 1988 declaration of independence remained a paper initiative.

Many Palestinians by mid-1990 had concluded that moderation had brought them no tangible benefits. The suspension of the US-PLO dialogue in June 1990 after Arafat failed to discipline the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and its leader Abu Abbas for staging a seaborne raid on Israel enhanced the Palestinian perception that the hardliners' opposition to talks with the United States had been vindicated. Arafat's closer cooperation with Iraq in the summer of 1990 was perhaps intended to demonstrate toughness against Israel and the United States.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the PLO's attempts--largely unsuccessful--to adopt a "neutral" posture toward the Iraq-Kuwait crisis increased Arafat's support among Palestinians but cost him and the PLO dearly among Gulf states. Regardless of Arafat's position, the invasion of Kuwait and the international community's preoccupation with that crisis in the final months of 1990 shifted the world's attention away from the Palestinian intifada and inadvertently gave the Israeli occupation the freedom to apply even harsher measures in the occupied territories. Politically, economically, and psychologically, the intifada was adversely affected by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

#### 1991-: Since the Gulf War

The international coalition's successful military effort against Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait weakened the PLO because of its support for Iraq during the war and isolated it from other key players in the peace process. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strongly supported the invasion of Kuwait, and they admired Saddam for championing the Palestinian cause. As a result, Israeli measures against the intifada became tougher, and the economic situation of Palestinians worsened. Many Gulf Palestinians lost their livelihood, others were expelled or fled, and remittances to the West Bank and Gaza dried up. Gulf financial assistance to the occupied territories was largely cut off.

By early 1991 the intifada leadership found itself in disarray, with the hardliners--secular nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists--becoming more prominent. Violence became more random and more severe: stones were replaced with knives. Curfews became more widespread and were kept for longer periods, economic hardships increased, and the quality of life in the occupied territories deteriorated significantly.

However, Washington's active involvement in the peace process, as expressed in Secretary Baker's visits to the region, the worsening conditions in the occupied territories, and the diminished status of the PLO have given Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza the opportunity to become more actively engaged in the peace process. These leaders' meetings with Secretary Baker and their recognition by Washington as Palestinian interlocutors have enhanced their status, both in the occupied territories and with the PLO. Although such leaders as Faisal al-Husseini, Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, and Radwan Abu 'Ayyash have frequently stated that they act on behalf of the PLO, they tend to be more realistic regarding their situation under occupation than diaspora Palestinians, including the leadership in Tunis, and are more determined not to lose the postwar "window of opportunity" for peace. In talking to them, one gets the impression that they would seriously consider participating in or accepting any interim arrangements which Secretary Baker might propose. Such arrangements--self-government, autonomy, or any other modality which is "more than autonomy and less than a state"--would have ultimately to be

lined to the "land for peace" formula under UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Such linkage must be promised and guaranteed by Washington.

## MODALITIES OF INDEPENDENCE

In light of recent developments in the region, the Palestinians' assertion of their political identity, and the almost universal acceptance of the legitimacy of their struggle for national self-determination, any proposed modalities for Palestinian political independence must recognize the reality of the Palestinians as a political community. No proposal will work or endure unless cognizance is taken of this community's right to chart its future freely. Of course, such freedom will in all probability be subject to constraints and ironclad guarantees imposed by other participants in the peace process. Four different modalities of Palestinian independence may be envisioned: 1) an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza; 2) a Palestinian-Jordanian federation; 3) a binational Palestinian-Israeli state in traditional Palestine; and 4) a Palestinian-Israeli federative state.<sup>21</sup>

### An Independent State in the West Bank and Gaza

The PLO's declaration of independence of November 15, 1988 clearly stated that the organization as well as a majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories support the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside Israel. This is the heart of what has come to be known as the "two-state" solution. Most observers, including many high-level officials in the US government, have come to believe that an independent Palestinian state is the only viable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The "inevitability" of the Palestinian state was presented to the U.S. government in a study prepared for the US Department of Defense by Graham E. Fuller, a Rand Corporation consultant and a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the summary of the report, the author states that the intifada and the ensuing regional and international response "have now made the ultimate emergence of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza inevitable. Such a process will be long, painful, and complex. But no other solution any longer seems viable."<sup>22</sup>

For such a state to come into being, it must receive the support of Israel and the United States. However, in order for these two central actors to endorse the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, certain constraints must be placed on the sovereignty and behavior of such a state. Incidentally, many of these constraints have already been accepted, at least tacitly, by the Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories. The constraints include the following:

1. The state must sign a collective security and a non-aggression pact with its two most immediate neighbors, Israel and Jordan.
2. The state must sign an economic and trade agreement with Israel and Jordan and should commit itself in advance to work for regional economic integration and political stability.
3. The state must be demilitarized for at least ten years; that is, it should be prohibited from establishing a military force that in any way could be used for offensive purposes. This ban should be subject to verification on location by a joint Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian committee. The committee should also be kept informed of all purchases, acquisitions, transfers, or production of arms, weapons systems, and military equipment by the state of Palestine. In return for demilitarization, the state of Palestine's neutrality should be guaranteed by treaty, the signatories to which would include, among others, Israel, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. Such a treaty should also be deposited with the United

## Nations.

4. The state should enter into immediate talks with Israel regarding the settlement of the refugee problem and the Palestinian claims to other parts of Palestine that are part of pre-1967 Israel. Such negotiations should also address the presence of Jewish settlers in the territories assigned to the state of Palestine.
5. The state should sign an official declaration identifying the West Bank and Gaza as constituting the entire territory of the Palestinian state. Claims to other parts of Palestine should be renounced unequivocally.
6. The state should refrain from entering into any aggressive regional or international alliances or any other bilateral or multilateral arrangements which might threaten or undermine the security of the region or individual states within the region. Furthermore, the state should refrain from any war-like activities against its neighbors.
7. The state should agree during the first five years of its existence to participate with Israel and Jordan in setting up security observation posts (electronic and human) for the purpose of obtaining data about potential terrorist activities across state boundaries.
8. The security of the state should be protected by a police force whose other responsibilities would include law enforcement, crime prevention, and domestic order. The police force would be trained in a national police academy according to an internationally recognized curriculum in law enforcement and crime prevention. This force would also receive training in emergency management for the purpose of dealing with natural and human disasters.
9. The state should commit itself in advance to free elections and to a participatory system of government.

The above-stated constraints clearly indicate that a state in the occupied territories, though independent, will not enjoy sovereignty as defined under traditional international law. At best, sovereignty will be shared directly by the state's two most immediate neighbors and indirectly by other regional and international actors. On the other hand, the state's neutrality will also be guaranteed by the international community. Such a state will almost have to prove over a period of time, perhaps up to ten years, that it is peace-loving, that it is willing to live with its neighbors in peace and harmony, that it is a responsible regional actor, that it can maintain law and order internally, and that in all of its regional and international relations, it is committed to the rule of law and to the pacific settlement of disputes. Furthermore, these constraints will also serve the interests of the Palestinians themselves and will allow the fledgling Palestinian state to direct its energy and resources to build a prosperous and peaceful Palestinian community. These constraints seem to be a prerequisite for Israeli and American acquiescence to Palestinian statehood. Whether such acquiescence is forthcoming remains to be seen.

## A Palestinian-Jordanian Federation

Several proposals have been made over the years regarding Palestinian-Jordanian federation. One of the early suggestions was offered by Jordan's King Hussein on March 15, 1972. The king's proposal to establish a "United Arab Kingdom" consisted, inter alia, of the following five primary points:

1. The Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom and shall bear this name.
2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:
  - a. The Palestine region which will consist of the West Bank and any other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants desire to join it.
  - b. The Jordan region which will consist of the East Bank.
3. Amman shall be the central capital of the kingdom as well as the capital of the Jordan region.
4. Jerusalem shall be the capital of the Palestine region.
5. The head of the state shall be the king, who will assume the central executive authority with the help of a central cabinet.<sup>23</sup>

Another official proposal presented along the lines of the so-called "Jordanian Option" was President Ronald Reagan's peace initiative of September 1982. In that proposal, the President discussed the need to resolve the Palestine conflict while recognizing two central points: that no Palestinian state should come into being in the occupied territories; and that no Israeli sovereignty shall be established in the territories. Following are some excerpts from President Reagan's proposal:

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achieved on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza....

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.<sup>24</sup>

Several variations on Palestinian-Jordanian federation have been offered over the years especially by Israeli spokesmen. Briefly, prior to the intifada, Israel's Labor Party advocated a Palestinian-Jordanian federation in what came to be called the "Allon Plan."<sup>25</sup> Likud has also made numerous statements, before and during the intifada, reiterating the claim that "Jordan is Palestine." Ariel Sharon and other right-wing spokesmen within Likud have not really called for a Jordanian-Palestinian federation. Instead, they have in essence advocated the forced transfer of the Palestinian people from the occupied territories to Jordan. The Likud party has also rejected any Israeli withdrawal from the territories and opposed any form of Palestinian sovereignty, shared or otherwise, in the West Bank and Gaza.

King Hussein's proposed federation of 1972 was rejected by Israel, the PLO, a majority of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and many Arab states. At best, the plan suffered from the wrong timing.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the diminishing influence of the Jordanian monarchy and the rising prominence of the PLO in the territories prior to the intifada resulted in a diminution of any Jordanian role in the peace process. Unfortunately, however, both Israel and the United States continued to cling to the "Jordanian option" mirage as a substitute for reality, though of course, the intifada put an

end to this "option" once and for all.

In recognition of the marginality of the Jordanian role regarding the West Bank and Gaza, King Hussein announced on July 31, 1988 that Jordan was disengaging from the territories and that the responsibility of addressing the territories' problems and of steering the Palestinian people toward peace with Israel lay squarely on the shoulders of the PLO. King Hussein's speech included several critical statements:

1. We respect the wish of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from us in an independent Palestinian state....
2. Jordan is not Palestine; and the independent Palestinian state will be established on the occupied Palestinian land after its liberation....
3. Jordan will not give up its commitment to take part in the peace process... Jordan... is a principal party to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to the peace process. It shoulders its national responsibilities on that basis...<sup>27</sup>

Jordan's disengagement from Palestine is not an entirely negative development. Indeed, King Hussein continues to express interest in the peace process, and he is expected to play an important role once Israeli-Palestinian talks commence and once the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza embark on the road of political independence. It is possible to argue from a positive perspective that a Jordanian-Palestinian federation is more probable at this juncture now that the king has come to recognize Palestinian national identity and to view the Palestinian leadership on equal footing. It is a truism that a federation between two political entities will succeed if these entities enter the federation on a basis of political equality rather than from a basis of subservience of one to the other. The federation between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961 is an example of how not to federate, while the United Arab Emirates (since 1971) and to some extent, the Gulf Cooperation Council (since 1981) offer examples of successful federative arrangements.

One of the thorniest obstacles facing a potential federation between the Palestinians and Jordan, assuming the political environment is ripe for such a step, is the disparity in the political systems between the two entities. By political experience and ideological temperament, the Palestinians will not opt for a monarchy. Numerous statements have already been made by the Palestinian leadership to the effect that their future state would be a republic--presidential or parliamentary--and a democracy based on free elections. On the other hand, the *raison d'être* of Jordan is the Hashimite monarchy. The possibility that King Hussein will change the monarchy into a republic or even into a constitutional monarchy along the lines of the British model is remote indeed.

A federal arrangement involving two such vastly different sectors as the East Bank and the West Bank will most likely lead to conflict. Furthermore, it is no longer clear whether the Hashimite monarchy is still interested in federating with the Palestinian community which has experienced Israeli occupation for over two decades and which, despite its disempowerment, has been able to rise up against this occupation and to force the world to take notice of its plight. When King Hussein proposed his federation scheme in 1972 he had in mind a more quiescent Palestinian community than the one from which he disengaged in 1988. Unless the Jordanian monarchy undergoes significant transformation toward power sharing with the populace, a Jordanian-Palestinian federation will be a sure formula for instability.

#### **A Binational State in Palestine**

Unlike the first two possibilities of federation, a binational state in Palestine will

require serious adjustments on the part of both the Israelis and the Palestinians. To some degree, Israeli leaders will have to review the nature of Israel with an eye toward reconstituting it as a secular, pluralistic, democratic republic with room for both Palestinians and Israelis. Essentially, this proposal calls for one state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan river with Jerusalem as the only capital.

A binational state in Palestine will have the following important attributes:

1. A system of participatory government based on one voter, one vote.
2. A recognized autonomy for each of the two communities, especially in terms of culture, language, religion, and heritage.
3. Freedom of movement, travel, and residence for citizens of the state everywhere in the state.
4. A guaranteed right for each of the two communities to establish local and regional governmental structures reflecting their own heritages but in accordance with national policy.
5. A national political system which must be based on the interests and numerical strengths of each of the two communities.
6. A national system of education open to all in all available fields.
7. A national bill of rights prohibiting discrimination in all of its forms and on all grounds.
8. A national constitution and a national flag which would express the political/cultural identity of both communities.
9. A national political system based on the separation of powers and a nationally elected parliament and a prime minister. Proportional representation should be replaced by a single-district system of delegates, thereby giving rise to two or three national parties instead of the multiplicity of small parties that presently exist in Israel.

In addition to the above attributes, the state should sign a collective regional security and nonbelligerence treaty with its neighbors. Such a treaty would have a two-fold purpose: a) to establish a relationship of peace between this state and its Arab neighbors; and b) to set the stage for regional economic and political cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Gulf. Furthermore, the binational state should enter into negotiations with its Arab neighbors over the question of Palestinian refugees focusing on the two specific issues of compensation and settlement. These negotiations shall also deal with the right of Palestinians and Jews to return to the state.

It might seem somewhat idealistic to propose an Israeli-Palestinian binational state in traditional Palestine. However, Arabs and Jews have lived in that land for centuries. It is also true that neither group has controlled the other throughout the centuries, a situation that of course changed first in 1948 and more dramatically since 1967. When a binational state was originally proposed by the PLO in 1968, in its call for a secular, democratic state in Palestine, Israel rejected the proposal outright, contending that some provisions in the Palestinian "National Covenant" (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*) were designed to undo the Zionist nature of Israel. It is of course unfortunate that specific statements as to which Jews can rightfully live in Palestine were included in this document.

In light of the negative response to the proposed secular, democratic state ideology,

the PLO decided by the mid-1970s to discard the binational approach in favor of a two-state solution. Beginning in 1974, the Palestine National Council, under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, began to call for, however obliquely, two states in Palestine, a Palestinian state and an Israeli state, which would live side by side between the Mediterranean and the Jordan. The Palestinian state would comprise the West Bank and Gaza. As was pointed out above, this ideology was finally and clearly enunciated by the PLO in November and December 1988.

In light of the fact that no tangible progress has been made on the road to independence and no negotiations have even started between Israel and Palestinian representatives, some Palestinians have begun to think out loud, as it were, of a return to a binational solution. In a recent article titled "If Not the Two-State Solution, Then One Democratic Secular State," Muhammad Hallaj, the editor of Palestine Perspectives, a Washington, D.C. publication, has argued that

perhaps the time has come for the Palestinians to reconsider their political strategy. The reconstitution of Palestine as a democratic, nonsectarian state, a sort of binational republic, which was proposed by the PLO in the late 1960s, is rapidly becoming the only sensible solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine.<sup>28</sup>

If more and more Palestinians become convinced, as Hallaj maintains, that Israel is bent on undermining the two-state solution, they will begin to search for other alternatives. Such a process might result in the binational state solution gaining more credence. Consequently, the Israeli leadership, regardless of which party is in power, will come under new pressures to search for a solution which might be directly linked to Israel's very nature as a Zionist state.

#### **A Palestinian-Israeli Federative State**

A fourth modality of federation would consist of a one-state federation in traditional Palestine based on a system of autonomous cantons. The country would be divided into numerous cantons with a consideration for geography and demography. With a total population of almost six million, of which over 45 percent is Palestinian Arab (in Galilee, the Triangle, northern West Bank, Jerusalem, southern West Bank, Gaza and the Gaza Strip), the country may be divided into twelve cantons of approximately half a million people each.

These cantons would have local taxation and police powers and yet they would be part of a national federal system. The national government would be responsible for the foreign and defense policy of the state and the general welfare of the population. Certain policies in these broad areas would be reserved for the federal government; others would be delegated to the cantons. The cantons would be free to promote their own culture, customs, language, and traditions. However, the federal government would have two official languages: Arabic and Hebrew.

The national political structure would consist of a bicameral legislative body, a ceremonial president elected by both houses of the legislature, and a nationally elected prime minister. One of the two houses of the bicameral legislature would have equal representation from the cantons; representation in the other house would be based on population (a census would be taken every ten years).

The national budget (allocated according to population) would support both the federal government and the cantons. The cantons could also collect their own revenues (taxes, fees, etc.). Canton boundary lines are essentially administrative and cultural. Populations from the different cantons would move freely throughout the country.

The canton system is essentially one of "shared rule" based on "peoples" or "publics." In advocating a "self-rule/shared-rule" system several years ago, Professor Daniel J. Elazar has argued that 1) in the history of the Middle East peoples are more enduring than states; 2) political boundaries have been highly transitory; 3) homogenous states have rarely been attainable; and 4) peace in the region has for the most part been preserved through autonomy of different groups and peoples rather than through conventional sovereignty of states.<sup>29</sup>

The proposed Arab-Jewish canton federative modality will depend on the two peoples accepting to live together as communities rather than as sovereign political national groupings. Being presently disempowered, the Palestinians might find such an arrangement more palatable than the Israelis. Israel, on the other hand, in order to enter into such an arrangement, must reexamine the Zionist *raison d'être* of the state. Indeed, both federative arrangements comprising Palestinians and Israelis must be based on the principle of symmetry. While asymmetries do in fact exist, the decision to enter into any federative arrangement can neither emanate from or perpetuate a system of control or dominance of one group by the other. The different groups, peoples, publics, or communities must at least perceive that they are connected to each other in a symmetrical relationship which would allow them to develop and express themselves--politically, culturally, psychologically, and economically--freely and without coercion by a dominant group. The proposed canton system is particularly sensitive to the principle of symmetry.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Research for this study has indicated that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has undergone many dramatic changes since the Zionist movement began settlement in Palestine a century ago. Six major changes stand out. They are 1) the establishment of Zionist community institutions in Palestine by the 1920s and 1930s; 2) the creation of the state of Israel on a part of Palestine and the dispersal of the Palestinians as refugees; 3) the Arab defeat in 1967, the ensuing Zionist control of all of Palestine, and the establishment of the Israeli military occupation in the heavily Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza; 4) the Palestinianization of the conflict; 5) the Palestinian intifada against Israeli occupation and the ensuing Palestinian political moderation toward Israel; and 6) the defeat of Saddam Husayn and the emergence of an American-Arab coalition. What started initially as the "Arab-Israeli" conflict has now become the "Palestinian-Israeli" conflict. What this means, of course, is that the two primary protagonists in this ongoing conflict are Israel and the Palestinians, and that no solution to the conflict will succeed or endure without the participation and acquiescence of both protagonists.

Yet, despite these developments, the conflict continues, and the confrontation in the occupied territories remains bloody. In spite of the fact that the Palestinian leadership has accepted the reality of Israel and has expressed readiness to negotiate with Israel and to live side by side with it, peace between the two peoples is as illusive as ever.

Numerous proposals and regimes have been presented over the years to allow both peoples a place in the sun, as two political communities in Palestine. None has worked. The conditions were perhaps not conducive to such proposals, nor were the parties willing to make serious compromises for peace. Perhaps the peace proposals themselves did not exhibit sufficient realism and creativity to help them survive the initial scrutiny of critics.

The four modalities proposed in this study are squarely based on the realities on the ground, yet they are also imaginative. They are designed to succeed both in the short-run and the long-run. It would be much easier, of course, to propose one or more solutions under traditional international law, such as an independent state with full, unhindered sovereignty. Israel would reject such a proposal and would refuse to participate in any



talks with the Palestinians with sovereign statehood as an a priori objective. This is the reason why the proposed state in this presentation would be governed by numerous constraints, at least for the first decade of its existence. The purpose of these constraints is basically to allow the state to build itself economically and politically and to develop in peace without conflict or tension. Secondly, the constraints will provide the state's two most immediate neighbors the opportunity for confidence building and for regional collaboration. Functional regional arrangements--political, economic, social -- are perhaps the best guarantee for peace. It is no longer sufficient to keep states apart through peace treaties, especially in that volatile region. It is more important to bring peoples and communities together in peace through joint projects and programs. Since the ideological approach to conflict resolution has failed in the past, utilitarian, functional peace seems to be the wave of the future.

The three proposed federative arrangements are also based on the principle of regional cooperation and the durability of peoples rather than specific political structures. What makes these proposals more difficult to attain, at least initially, is the need for major adjustments on the part of both Jordan and Israel. While it is to be hoped that such adjustments could be made several years down the road, it is unrealistic to expect Jordan to democratize its monarchy or Israel to pluralize its Zionism so precipitously.

In light of this discussion, while each of the four modalities is appealing for different reasons, the first modality, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, seems to be the most workable and the least disruptive of the current status quo. In spite of the serious constraints placed on the proposed political entity, the envisioned state goes a long way toward fulfilling the national political aspirations of the Palestinian community. Its creation will also further the cause of peace and regional stability. The hundred-year war might at last come to an end.

## NOTES

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3. *ibid.*, p. 93.

4. *ibid.*, p. 93.

5. *ibid.*, p. 311.

6. *ibid.*, p. 316.

7. *ibid.*, p. 278.

8. Emile A. Nakhleh, "The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later," The Middle East Journal 42 (Spring 1988): 221.

9. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1989), pp. 126-155.

10. Emile A. Nakhleh, "A 'Fresh Start' Toward Peace," American-Arab Affairs 2 (Fall 1982): 6-10. A special issue on President Reagan's peace initiative.

11. The Middle East, 7th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), p. 306.

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14. Journal of Palestine Studies 54 (Winter 1985): 257-258.

15. The data for these conclusions were gathered in a series of interviews which the author conducted in the West Bank and Gaza in summer 1987, when he was a resident Fulbright fellow at the Hebrew University's Truman Institute in Jerusalem.

16. "Fahd Qawasmeh: A Final Assessment," Journal of Palestine Studies 55 (Spring 1985): 64-72.

17. "Hanna Siniora and Fayez Abu Rahmeh: The Palestinian Joint Delegation," Journal of Palestine Studies 57 (Autumn 1985): 3-18.

18. Emile Sahliyah, "The West Bank Pragmatic Elite: The Uncertain Future," Journal of Palestine Studies 60 (Summer 1986): 34-45.

19. Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Palestinians and the future: Peace Through Realism," Journal of Palestine Studies 18 (Winter 1989): 4-7.

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21. Several different options have been proposed over the years. For illustrative examples in the literature see Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Governing Peoples and Territories (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982); Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and the Future (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); Emile A. Nakhleh, The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979); Emile A. Nakhleh, ed., A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980); Don Peretz, The West Bank: History, Politics, Society, and Economy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986); and

Jerome M. Segal, Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace (Chicago, Illinois: Lawrence Hill Books, 1989).

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## FRAMEWORK FOR A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS

### Toward a Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Relationship

#### Preamble

Ten Israelis and Palestinians actively involved in the search for peace, and a ranking member of the Palestine National Council met July 15-19, 1991, at the Sequoia Seminar in Ben Lomond, California, in a dialogue on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. They met under the co-sponsorship of the Stanford University Center on Conflict and Negotiation and the Beyond War Foundation with the assistance of Dr. Harold Saunders (former Assistant Secretary of State) and members of the Stanford Center and Beyond War's Task Force on the Middle East. Achievements of the conference include:

- An unequivocal commitment by both Palestinians and Israelis to a just and lasting peace for two nations enjoying full self-determination, mutual recognition, and security.
- A convincing demonstration of the capacity of Israelis and Palestinians to reach agreement about plans for a common future, and for the first time, to express that agreement in a comprehensive document endorsed not only by the Israeli and Palestinian participants but also by the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- Compelling testimony about the human suffering of the Palestinians under the occupation and the terrible costs and risks of the status quo to both sides.
- Concrete measures the participants and other citizens can undertake to broaden political consensus for the peace process and to overcome mutual distrust and dehumanization.
- Valuable insights about the preparation and conduct of a "public peace process."

The participants now want to share the fruits of their dialogue with their fellow citizens and with concerned citizens of other interested countries.

## **FRAMEWORK FOR A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS**

### **Toward a Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Relationship**

#### **Purposes**

We offer this Framework for a Public Peace Process as a vehicle for drawing together in common cause and mutually supportive activity all who are working for a peaceful Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

Specifically, we will use this paper as both an educational and a political instrument. By inviting Israelis and Palestinians to sign this document, we seek to enlarge the number of those who understand and support the ideas expressed here. In public debate the document will demonstrate the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to reach agreement on concrete issues critical to a peaceful settlement of the conflict between them.

We invite all who work toward this end to consider themselves as working together within this Framework to give coherence and momentum to a public peace process.

In doing so, we as concerned Palestinians and Israelis complement, support, and encourage the active efforts of political authorities toward peace.

#### **Premises**

Moving the Israeli-Palestinian and the Arab-Israeli conflicts towards resolution will give impetus to a broader peace in the Middle East.

The Israeli-Palestinian relationship stands at a moment of danger and opportunity. Ironically, as prospects for advancing the peace process increase, danger and human suffering become more acute.

Human suffering increases daily in the West Bank and Gaza. Human rights violations under the occupation, the closure of educational institutions, and the various types of collective punishment contribute daily to this suffering. The environment of violence and confrontation leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence which undermines advancement of the peace process.

The West Bank and Gaza are heading toward economic catastrophe, due to sharply increased unemployment and lack of industry. Punitive measures by the Israeli authorities aggravate the problem. The economic and political conditions of the Palestinians outside the occupied territories have deteriorated. Palestinians living in the Gulf states, many of whom are now homeless and stateless, can no longer provide the economic cushion that previously helped reduce the economic frustrations of those living under Israeli occupation.

Every day there is tangible evidence of more Israeli settlements, enlargement of existing settlements, and extensive and growing land confiscations. This increases Palestinian desperation and complicates and undermines efforts to seek a settlement.

As despair and bitterness grow in the occupied territories, the intifada may become more violent. The possibility mounts that there will be a movement from stone to knife to gun. With no remedy forthcoming, this sharp increase in violence could even trigger another war.

The ongoing occupation is taking its heavy toll on Israeli society. It causes the brutalization of the people and the erosion of Israeli morale and traditional Jewish values. Israelis have been attacked and killed by Palestinians in Israel's city streets. The continuing debate over the territories is tearing the fabric of Israeli society. It affects the Israeli army's preparedness. It requires Israelis to spend long periods of frustrating military service in the territories. The cost of the occupation is high, and the heavy investments in infrastructure and in settlements are at the expense of Israel's infrastructure and of the disadvantaged members of society. It also endangers international financial aid vital for the national effort to absorb the Russian Jewish immigrants.

The internal violence in Palestinian society has raised fears for the peace process in Israeli society.

We feel that a substantial number of people in both our communities are ready to say: "Enough! It is time to move beyond war to peace." The deteriorating situation jeopardizes their efforts to move toward peace.



## **Principles and Provisions of a Palestinian-Israeli Agreement**

The objective of the peace process is to establish a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians as part and parcel of a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arab states.

This peace is to be achieved through the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in 1967, allowing the Palestinian people the exercise of their right to self-determination in those territories. This includes the right to establish an independent state or other confederative solution of their choice. At the same time, the State of Israel is to be guaranteed recognition, security and territorial integrity by both the State of Palestine and other Arab States. This can take place through mutually agreed steps, by means of negotiations involving the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, whom the Palestinians consider to be the Palestine Liberation Organization; the government of Israel; and other concerned parties; based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

The following provisions will govern a Palestinian-Israeli agreement:

**End of the state of war and all hostile activities in the region.**

**Mutual Recognition.** The State of Palestine, the State of Israel, and the Arab States shall mutually recognize each other.

**Borders.** 1967 borders with minimum necessary modifications *for both sides*.

**Stages.** To achieve this historic compromise between the two peoples, there are barriers that have to be overcome on the principles of equality, mutuality, and reciprocity. *Implementation in stages* will help build mutual confidence and trust, leading to the attainment of the above mentioned objectives.

The agreement of the peace settlement will be implemented in stages within a time frame of a maximum of five years, starting from the date of signing the agreement. This time frame is needed for the gradual buildup of mutual confidence and trust, to assess the compliance on the part of both parties, and for the building of the infrastructure and institutions of the envisaged Palestinian state.

In this interim period, all acts of violence will be stopped in Israel, in the territories, and on the borders. At the same time, the government of Israel will

stop all settlement drives including the expansion of existing settlements, confiscation of land, and emergency regulations. During this interim period, Israel will minimize the presence of Israeli military troops in the Palestinian-populated areas. In the interim period, the full *de jure* application of the Geneva Convention will be provided to help protect the safety of the Palestinian population.

Any non-compliance with the above conditions will lead to dispute resolution measures agreed upon by the parties.

### **General Security Principles**

- The peace agreement by itself will reduce motivation for war and hostility in the region.
- Political stability in the region, resulting from a comprehensive peace settlement, will reinforce security in the region.
- Economic prosperity and interdependence will ensure the common interest in maintaining a lasting peace.
- General and specific security provisions in the military sense for each state as laid out below.

### **General Security Provisions for Both States**

- Guarantee of security in the Middle East depends upon the reduction of arsenals of arms in the whole region, including weapons of mass destruction.
- Security is seen as including the State of Israel, the State of Palestine, and all Arab States.

### **Israeli Security Provisions—Principles for Security:**

- Israeli security based primarily on Israel's own ability to defend itself.
- Limited militarization of the Palestinian State.
- Regional arrangements preventing deployment of foreign troops in Jordan, Palestine and Israel, other than those agreed upon by the parties.
- Financial and technical support to Israel from third parties as compensation for loss of territory.
- Specific security arrangements on the ground and in the air space following the aforementioned principles to be agreed upon by the parties in the peace treaty.

### **Palestinian Security Provisions—Principles for Security:**

- Long-term: International economic and financial investment to build an infrastructure, industrial development, and housing to help ensure the stability and security of the State of Palestine.
- Short-term:
  - International guarantees for the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Palestine.
  - An agreed-upon Palestinian defense force to maintain internal order and to safeguard the borders.

### **Jerusalem**

- Jerusalem is the holy city for three faiths and is important historically, nationally, and culturally for the two peoples. It can and should be the city of peace.
- The political solution for Jerusalem should not lead again to its physical division. It is agreed that the city shall remain physically united.
- After the peace treaty and the five-year interim period, the Palestinian part of Jerusalem will be the capital of the State of Palestine. The Israeli part of Jerusalem will be the capital of the State of Israel.
- Each part of Jerusalem will have its own municipality, each with equal representation on an umbrella municipal council for metropolitan Jerusalem.
- Freedom of access and worship at all holy sites, and free movement through the city will be guaranteed to all citizens and visitors.

### **Right of Return**

- The State of Palestine is the state of all Palestinians wherever they live. They can return whenever they want.
- The State of Palestine will regulate the return of Palestinians according to its long-term plans of absorption.
- The procedures for Palestinians who wish to return to their homes in Israel or receive compensation will be subject to negotiations in the peace process. No collective return of Palestinians to their homes is envisioned. The procedures to receive compensation for their properties for Jews who left Arab countries shall be subject to similar negotiations.

**Refugees.** Significant economic assistance will be acquired to rehabilitate, retrain, and resettle Palestinian refugees and to provide them with opportunities to live as citizens in permanent residence in the State of Palestine or in agreement with Arab States where they live at present.

## Settlements

- Settlers who wish to stay in the State of Palestine after the peace treaty should obtain consent from the State of Palestine and should undertake to accept Palestinian jurisdiction.
- Settlements obtained by land expropriation during the occupation should be returned to the State of Palestine.
- Settlements obtained by individual legal purchase remain as the legal property of the owners, and owners should be compensated if they choose to leave.

**Gaza.** Arrangements will be made for a free passageway through Israel between the West Bank and Gaza.

**Water.** An agreement should be concluded regarding sharing water resources. Under such an agreement there would be a regional system covering the countries of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine. The system could draw on water resources of other Middle East countries.

## Normalization

- Arrangements and goals will be defined for the normalization of relations between the two states.
- Normalization includes diplomatic relations, the exchange of ambassadors, and other representatives.
- The economic relationship between Israel and Palestine should include joint projects in agriculture, tourism, commerce, industry, energy, and transportation. Labor mobility across the borders of the two states should be regulated by mutual agreement between them. Civil aviation agreements covering the mutual use of airspace by the two countries will be part of the peace treaty.
- Economic relations in the region could ultimately be modeled after the European Community concept with cooperation and coordination in all areas and without interference with the character and sovereignty of each state.

## **A Public Peace Process**

Present suffering, misperceptions, fear, and mistrust make it difficult even to take the first steps toward a peaceful relationship. While political leaders seek new relationships among governing institutions, citizens on both sides must pave the way by imagining steps to help those in the other community fear less, change perceptions, and risk trust. The aim is to enable Israelis and Palestinians to think and work together towards a growing relationship of peace.

To accelerate constructive change in the present relationship between our communities, we have identified the following areas where we are prepared to encourage citizens in both communities to work together in building new relationships.

**To broaden consensus on a new relationship**, we will encourage steps such as the following which do not depend on government authorities:

- stimulate public debate on specific components of a peaceful Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
- emphasize the need for peace and clarify the fruits of peace, notably greater access to water, oil, tourism, and other aspects of economic prosperity and cultural enrichment.
- broaden public opinion polling on security and a two-state solution to include significant elements of the Palestinian as well as the Israeli community.
- dramatize the human and economic costs of continuing occupation for both sides.

**To humanize the other side and increase trust**, we will work to expand direct contacts and joint activities between Israelis and Palestinians to overcome stereotypes and distorted perceptions and to promote thinking and acting together. For instance, we will:

- invite Palestinians and Israelis where we can to write regularly in each other's publications and encourage joint publication.
- encourage supportive activities by professional organizations of lawyers, psychologists, medical doctors, and other professions.
- provide training and educational programs for Israeli and Palestinian teachers and students.

- promote student visiting between Israeli and Palestinian schools, exchange lecturers between universities, establish an Israeli-Palestinian school, develop common curricula.
- establish a joint conflict resolution center.
- provide and distribute video interviews that promote mutual understanding and empathy.
- demonstrate concern for human rights by practical steps to support those harmed by violations, to press respect by authorities for the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories, to campaign for the rights of prisoners through legal challenges and media campaigns.
- try to establish twinning relationships between Israeli and Palestinian communities.
- help Palestinian family reunions.

**To broaden participation in the public peace process, we will:**

- encourage joint political activities, including Israelis and Palestinians of all three religions.
- expand the activities of women's organizations on both sides to expose the consequences of human rights violations, especially for families and children.
- more fully integrate Sephardic-Oriental Israelis into the peace process. Their unique historical and cultural experience of Jewish-Arab co-existence and their particular struggle for social justice and equality make them a natural bridge to the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular.
- dramatize the costs of continuing conflict for the large segments of both societies.

These activities are illustrative and represent only those areas where we can have influence. As other individuals and organizations add their activities to the list, we will experience the breadth, depth, and momentum of a public peace process.

### **Call to Join in a Public Peace Process**

Many other Israelis and Palestinians have engaged in dialogues such as ours. Many are engaged in activities such as those mentioned above. We encourage all of them to step forward and to join hands with us openly and explicitly. We call on them and others—individuals and organizations—to help expand this framework and the public peace process through practical actions of their own.

We encourage and support all efforts of political leaders on both sides to reconstitute an active peace process among constituted governmental authorities.

At the same time, we believe that official negotiations can produce a genuinely peaceful relationship between Israelis and Palestinians only if they are embedded in a larger political process involving the peoples of both communities. That political process is what we call a "public peace process." In democratic bodies politic, a public peace process has the potential to generate, support, and intensify the governmental peace process. Our purpose is to make that public peace process a compelling political fact for all to see and feel.

Concerned citizens of other concerned countries have contributed much to our dialogue. We encourage them to join us in increasing numbers in this public peace process.

To produce a political environment in which our two peoples can move toward a peaceful relationship, we call on fellow citizens and organizations throughout our communities to add their own course of action until the public peace process constitutes an irresistible movement toward a peaceful Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

### Invited Israeli Participants

**Moshe Amirav:** Member, Jerusalem City Council; Chairman, City Committee for East Jerusalem; Former member of the Likud Central Committee.

**Shlomo Elbaz:** Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Co-founder and Chairman, East for Peace.

**Giora Ram Furman:** Brigadier General, (Res.); Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force; General Secretary, Kibbutz Haartzi Movement; Chairman, Council for Peace and Security in Israel.

**Galit Hasan-Rokem:** Professor of Hebrew Literature and Jewish Folklore, Hebrew University; Founding Member, Women's Network for Peace in Israel.

**Moshe Ma'oz:** Professor, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University; Advisor on Arab Affairs to Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

**Oded Megiddo:** Lieutenant-Colonel, IDF (Res.); Owner and Director of a firm dealing with land development in rural Israel; Member, Council of the Shinui Party; Member, Council for Peace in Stages.

### Invited Palestinian Participants

**Mamdouh al-Aker:** Urological Surgeon; Founding Member, Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners; Board of Trustees of Friends School, Ramallah; Member, Israeli and Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights.

**Rihab Essawi:** Professor of Education, Hebron University; Former Director of the Union of Charitable Societies in Jerusalem. Former Director of the American Friends Service Committee Legal Aid Office in Jerusalem.

**Bernard Sabella:** Professor of Sociology, Bethlehem University; Member of the Board of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs.

**Hanna Siniora:** Editor, *Al Fajr* newspaper of East Jerusalem; President of the European-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem; Nominated by the PLO as a member of a Palestinian delegation to peace talks in July 1985.

### Invited Representative of the Palestine National Council

**Nabeel Shaath:** Chair, Political Committee of the Palestine National Council; Advisor to President Yasser Arafat on International Relations.



### **Moderator**

**Harold Saunders:** Director of International Programs, The Kettering Foundation;  
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

### **Cosponsors**

**Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation**


**The Beyond War Foundation**

## STATEMENT OF AFFIRMATION


We, the participants, cosponsors, and moderator in this conference subscribe to the "Framework for a Public Peace Process" as an accurate reflection of the outcome of our dialogue. The purpose of the conference was not to produce a formal agreement, which can be negotiated only by duly-constituted authorities. The purpose was to demonstrate that Israelis and Palestinians could find common ground in the search for peace. We regard this document as the basis for continuing dialogue between the two communities and commend it to others as the basis for a similar dialogue. Nabeel Shaath, an official of the Palestine National Council, has stated in a letter to us that he is authorized by the Palestine Liberation Organization to endorse and support this document as a basis for future dialogue in the search for peace.


### Invited Participants

  
Mamdouh al-Aker


  
Moshe Amirav

  
Shlomo Elbaz

  
Rihab Essawi


  
Giora Ram Furman


### Cosponsors

  
Judith H. Kramer  
Beyond War Foundation

### Moderator


  
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
  
Galit Hasan-Rokem

  
Moshe Ma'oz

  
Oded Megiddo

  
Bernard Sabella

  
Hanna Siniora

  
Lee Ross  
Stanford Center on Conflict and  
Negotiation

Palo Alto, California  
July 19, 1991

July 19, 1991

Dr. Harold H. Saunders,  
The Beyond War Foundation  
The Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation

Dear Friends:

I have had great pleasure participating in the proceedings of the conference, "Building a Common Future." The discussions were most fruitful, involving a spirit of give and take and a commitment to work towards a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

I have received a copy of the Framework for a Public Peace Process, the valuable document that was produced by the participants, moderator and cosponsors of the conference. It gives me pleasure to say that I am authorized by the Palestine Liberation Organization to endorse and support this document as a valuable basis for future dialogue in the search for peace. I hope that it will be equally endorsed by a wider constituency of the Israeli public, seeing it as a real attempt to start a dialogue leading to peace and security for all Israelis and Palestinians as a key step toward peace in the Middle East.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all of you for making this conference a success and for producing such a fine document.

Sincerely yours,



Nabeel Shaath  
Chairman, Political Committee  
Palestine National Council

## BEYOND WAR FOUNDATION, PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA

The Beyond War Foundation is dedicated to ending war and building a sustainable future. As a nonprofit, grassroots educational foundation, it has several thousand participants active in the United States and six other countries. It is built on the premise that all humanity, the earth, and the biosystem are a diverse but unified system.

Since its founding in 1982, Beyond War has sponsored a variety of projects at the local, national, and international levels and has produced many educational and inspirational materials, including written curricula, audiotapes, and videotapes. An early joint US-Soviet endeavor was the production of an influential book, *Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking*. Written by Soviet and American scientists and published in both countries in both languages in January 1988, it sold over 100,000 copies.

Other activities have included pioneering the use of international satellite link-ups as part of the annual Beyond War Award presentation and an educational campaign in support of a negotiated settlement in Central America.

Current educational projects include initiatives in partnership with people from Afghanistan and the Middle East and an appeal regarding demilitarization and reinvestment in human needs to be presented at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in Moscow in September 1991.

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**Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project  
WORKING PAPER SERIES**

**No. 9**

**The Image of the Arab in Israeli Textbooks**

**Dan Bitan**

**Truman Institute  
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem**

Paper Presented at the  
TPPRP CONCLUDING CONFERENCE  
Ariccia (Rome, Italy) 7-10 February 1992  
organized by the  
ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI of Rome

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**A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
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## The Image of the Arab in Israeli Textbooks

### Introduction

The focus of this paper is the image of Arabs, Palestinians, and Islam as reflected in textbooks for primary and secondary school levels published in Israel since the mid-80s and intended for use by Jewish pupils, and relevant textbooks written in the late seventies but not discussed in previous studies. Previous studies have shown that Israeli textbooks aided in the creation of prejudices against Arabs and negative stereotypes of Arabs. Therefore, my main question will be: have there been changes in widely distributed textbooks since the seventies and early eighties, when the problem of negative treatment and stereotyping of Arabs in general and Israeli Arabs in particular, current in Israel and among Israeli youth, became a matter of concern amongst the more enlightened sectors of Israeli society as well as within a large section of the educational establishment. I will discuss second through sixth-grade readers in state schools, two Geography textbooks for grades 4–6 in state schools, a reader for grade 6 in religious state schools, a History book dealing with the Middle Ages for the eighth grade, History and Civics textbooks for eleventh and twelfth grades.

Before analysis of the textbooks themselves, it is worth raising several introductory points.

#### 1. The Israeli education system

The Israeli education system for Jews grew out of the education system of the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine. The pre-state educational system was both public and private and divided into various streams: a Socialist Workers Stream which was run by the General Workers Union (the *Histadrut*); the "General" stream which was run by the Education Department of the National Committee of the Jewish Community; and the various Orthodox-religious schools – more or less stringent in matters of Jewish Law. Schools in these three streams which wished to grant their pupils matriculation certificates recognized by the two Jewish institutions of higher learning in the country, and by comparable institutions in other countries, needed examinations held by the Education Department of the National Committee of the Jewish Community and recognized by the British mandatory government. With the establishment of the state and in the early fifties, a centralized educational system crystallized; it was operated from an administrative, budgetary and content point of view by the Ministry of Education and Culture (hereinafter: "the Ministry"). Two streams in elementary education were set up: (a) the general state stream, which included the "general" stream schools from the pre-state period and the Histadrut

schools (giving partial autonomy to Kibbutz schools), and (b) the religious state schools which were also granted partial autonomy. Secondary schools are not state-affiliated, but private schools as well as those affiliated with municipal authorities are divided with respect to curriculum into the two above-mentioned streams. It is important to note that the religious institutions divide into further streams — more and less Orthodox and, since the Six-Day War in 1967, more and less nationalistic as well.

In the early 1950s it was determined by law that education would be free and compulsory from the age of 5 (state Kindergarten) until the eighth grade (age 14), and in the seventies compulsory education was extended up to the tenth grade (age 16), and free education until twelfth grade (age 18). As a result of this development, study proportions in the eleventh and twelfth grades, after compulsory education, reach 85 %. The percentage of pupils in secondary academic (Gymnasium-like) schools reaches 55 % while the percentage of pupils in vocational schools is 45 %. About 30 % of the 18 years old age group pass matriculation examinations and are eligible for study in a variety of institutions of higher learning — universities and colleges of vocational training (including teachers colleges).

## 2. Education towards national values

Since the establishment of Jewish schools of a nationalist-Zionist nature in Palestine, as early as the 1890s, and until essentially the present day, they have been characterized by a nationalist slant — that is, the inculcation of nationalist-Zionist values meant to enlist the pupils in carrying out national missions, or at least to contribute towards their loyalty to these values. With this it is worth noting that, at times, and especially in the 1940s during the fierce national struggles just before the establishment of the state of Israel, there existed a tension between certain other goals of the secondary schools, e.g. the completion of studies with a certificate on the one hand, and the pressures of youth movements and other militant groups upon youth to enlist and carry out the national missions even before completing their studies on the other hand. Indeed, during the thirties and forties, and to a lesser extent during the fifties as well, a major part of national education took place within youth movements which reflected the contemporary ideological currents in the Jewish community in Palestine.

Broadly speaking, one can say that education towards nationalist-Zionist values was founded on the following principles:

(a) The right of the Jewish people over the Land of Israel, at times over the Land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan (present day Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Kingdom of Jordan). It was concurrently explained that the Arabs of these areas have either a lesser right to these areas or no right at all. One of the obvious signs of this is the Jews name for the disputed area — *Eretz-Yisrael* (the Land of Israel) — and the opposition to the use of the term *Palestine*, the name used by the Arabs, the British and the League of Nations.

(b) The pride of the Jews in their cultural and historical heritage. This often emphasized national-heroic struggles for national freedom in the Land of Israel

before the Exile, and devaluated Jewish life and religious-cultural creativity of Jews in the Disapora. Simultaneously, there was a relative decline in the study and appraisal of other civilizations and cultures.

(c) The love of the Land — the history of Jews in it, its landscape, its native flora and fauna — and a zealous desire for its development and for “making the desert bloom”. There is a parallel striking ambivalence towards the history of Arabs and Palestinians and their roots, to the extent that they were blamed for the land’s economic and technological backwardness.

(d) The right of the Jewish people to independence and to self-determination. On the other hand, the Palestinian Arab residents of the land were not regarded as a nation, or at least not as a people with national rights.

(e) The persecution of Jews throughout Jewish history, antisemitism and, after World War II, the Holocaust attest to the rights of Jews and Israelis, to Zionist ideology, and to the justification of their struggles of the last hundred years. At the same time, the world, the super powers, non-Jews and Arabs are conceived of as hostile in a basic and on-going manner.

(f) Zionism is a movement of national liberation and of cultural revival which will revolutionize and revitalize the lives of Jews and lead to their redemption. At the same time, anyone who does not accept Zionist ideology, or opposes it, is considered hostile to the Jewish people.

(g) The Jewish-Arab or Israeli-Arab conflict was generally conceived of as a conflict between Jews defending their national enterprise, and Arab aggression aimed to destroy it. As we shall see, a certain sense of balance in this area has been in evidence.

(h) A “new Jew” will evolve (or is evolving or has already evolved) in the Land of Israel — healthy, strong and heroic.

(i) With this it is important to note that, in the past, socialist circles as well as other groups have been distinguished by values of social equality, cooperation, work, physical labour and productivity. At the same time it was also emphasized that Arab society, including Arab Palestinian society, was reactionary in essence.

It seems that an attempt to integrate universal and particular values characterizes educational policy in the pre-state period as well as since the state’s establishment. This policy finds expression in essential ideological documents. It can be found in the Declaration of Independence, as well as in the main section of the State Education Law of 1953 which speaks of “the values of the culture of Israel, scientific achievements, the love of homeland, loyalty to the state and people of Israel, training in agricultural work, pioneer training . . . and a society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual help and love of one’s fellow man.”<sup>1</sup> A sympathetic appraisal of educational policy and practice in Israel will indeed confirm that such an integration of universalism and particularism has

<sup>1</sup> This appraisal is confirmed by a study by SHEVACH EDEN: *The Goals of Education in Israel* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv 1987. based on a survey conducted in 1972 among curriculum experts, teachers, members of the educational administration and the public. See pp. 22–55.

been realized. A skeptical, critical or negative approach will be expressed by saying that Israeli education contains double messages. Often particular values are emphasized when dealing with nationalist-Zionist education, while universal values are emphasized when interpersonal relationships or societal and governmental structures are being dealt with.

The few studies conducted on the history of pre-state and Israeli education confirm this picture though they emphasize, of course, varieties and sub-varieties, which develop and change in accordance with circumstances. Of particular importance is Ruth Firer's study of Zionist history textbooks from 1900 to 1984.<sup>2</sup> Her conclusion is that Zionist Nationalist militancy is pronounced in textbooks during the years 1930 to 1948, and it even increases from 1948 to 1967. After 1967, a certain moderation took place and was expressed in the proffering of source material representing a variety of views. Still, Jewish views are more heavily represented than Arab views and one can notice a tendency to select one-sided source material. Moreover, there is a hidden inclination towards the historic model which confirms what Firer calls "the law of redemption".<sup>3</sup>

### 3. Israeli Jews and the image of the Arab

Since the mid-sixties several studies have touched upon this issue. The emerging picture is that over the years there is a slightly growing tendency of differentiation when Jews relate to the image of the Arab. Prejudices and negative stereotypes are less pronounced. Still, the image of the Arab — Palestinians and those of other Arab states alike — is correlated, and perhaps even derived from a deep distrust of them, against the backdrop of what is conceived by Israeli Jews as their essentially precarious military situation: an island of Jews surrounded by a sea of hating Arabs. Very often this distrust, heavily tainted by anxiety and fear, which in their turn are burdened by historical memories of persecutions and extermination, brings about a dehumanizing attitude towards Arabs.

It seems that since the *Intifada* (December 1987) an additional polarisation has taken place in Jewish views towards the Palestinians: those who would either deny or recognize their national rights have grown in power at the expense of the mainstream, and have become more radical. Parliamentary elections, which were conducted in November 1988, were distinguished by this trend.

### 4. The image of the Arab in Hebrew children's literature

The few studies of Hebrew children's literature published since the late sixties, as well as a study concluded in 1990 reviewing books published in the last few years, arrive at similarly gloomy conclusions. I will refer here only to the last two studies. Professor Adir Cohen of the University of Haifa's School of Education, investi-

<sup>2</sup> RUTH FIRER: *Agents of Zionist Education* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv 1985.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

gated 1700 children's books written in Hebrew since the 1967 war.<sup>4</sup> A treatment of the Arab was found in 520 of the books. In 79 % of these, the image of the Arab is negative or undefined. Only in 21 % is it positive. In 71 %, negative stereotypes appear in physical traits (scars, scab-filled faces, a crooked nose (!), vulture-like faces, yellowed and rotting teeth, threatening eyes — p. 66); 63,5 % of all identifying characteristics noted were negative (for instance: hypocrite, arrogant, sycophant, coward, savage, flatterer, liar, traitor — p. 72); approximately 73 % of the Arabs are depicted as negative in their attitude towards Jews (bandits, terrorists, members of gangs, spies, thieves, arsonists of fields and forests, snipers, hijackers, indistinguishable merciless enemy — p. 74); the negative stereotypes and prejudices are consistent with this and include other topics such as lifestyle, occupation, education and social status. It is sad to see that even the descriptions of some of the "good Arabs" are questionable: "good Arabs" are those who bring benefit to Jews — for instance, rescue of Jews from various types of danger, at times at the price of betraying their brothers. Positive depiction is at times nostalgic, and the positive image of the Arab is not at all realistic, but rather the wishful thinking of the author: "a cardboard figure", lacking in depth. It seems that no more than approximately 10 % of the 520 relevant books contain descriptions in which Jews and Arabs are presented as full-blooded, multi-dimensional human beings, who are endowed with both human virtues and human vices.

Ms. Snait Gissis, of the Tel Aviv University Institute of Philosophy and History of Science and Ideas, employed Professor Cohen's method in her examination of Hebrew children's literature published since 1984–85 and found that approximately 60 books touch on the subject. She presumes to risk a couple of generalizations regarding the major trends in children's literature during the 1980s.<sup>5</sup>

Most conspicuous has been its reflection of a politically polarized society. The Adventure-Story genre, in which the heroes triumph over devious, malevolent schemes of Arab individuals or states, has become more prevalent and brutal, creeping into the once more sober plots through the use of Israeli heroism as the plot and permanent Arab evil as the stereotypical background. Moreover, there has been a pronounced tendency to write in this vein about the history of Zionism in general and the history of Jewish settlement of the land in particular. Yet one finds in that "historical" genre pieces, the authors of which had perhaps wished to evade the issue. This has been accomplished through the employment of "the category of absence" in which the Arabs simply do not exist, being an abstract enemy or close to a state of "thinghood". There has also been an increased number of books for the general public written by *Gush Emunim* (Block of the Faithful) settlers and their supporters. Their message is more sophisticated: on the one hand — a "good neighbour" policy, made possible by the self-evident benevolent

<sup>4</sup> His findings have been published in a book whose title reflects its content. ADIR COHEN: *The Ugly Face in the Mirror — Reflections of the Arab-Jewish Conflict in Children's Hebrew Literature* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv 1985.

<sup>5</sup> SNAIT GISSIS: *Haaretz Literary Supplement* (in Hebrew), 18. 6. 1990.

superiority of Israeli (Orthodox) Jews; on the other hand — that land belongs to the Jews in an absolute sense through divine promise, and the Palestinians would be wise to draw the necessary, though perhaps painful, conclusions. To this end some authors have sought support from the Biblical story of Joshua's conquest of Canaan.

In spite of the above, there has been a marked increase in the involvement of many of Israel's foremost children's authors in the writing of stories and novels which consciously attempt the opposite: they decompose stereotypes of outward appearance, or civilizational inferiority, of characteristics and beliefs often attributed to Arabs, as well as stereotypes of Israeli heroes, as absolutely right and sole proprietors of human suffering. Instead, these literary texts construct either full-blooded and varied individuals, emanating a strong sense of empathy and respect for a different culture, or they suggest varied, unconventional points of view on the collective histories of the last hundred years, drawing from non-mythic historiography.

Peace appears as an intangible, abstract vision, an empty concept in most children's literature. Very few items endow it with a sense of reality, though the last-mentioned group of authors describe concrete situations conducive to the achievement of a different mode of life. Very few relate directly to the peace agreement with Egypt, and to the possibility of actual contact with a former enemy.

### The Image of the Arab in Textbooks: Readers and Textbooks for Elementary Schools

Jewish curriculum and textbooks before 1948 and since the establishment of the state of Israel have not been widely researched. A comprehensive study of their goals and content which directly and indirectly touch upon the areas relevant to this study would need relate to a substantial number and variety of subjects: History, Bible, Talmud, Hebrew and World Literature, Reading and Writing in primary schools, Geography (in grades 2—4 called "Homeland Studies"), Nature in primary schools, Pre-Army Education, Civics, Class Excursions and in earlier periods, Gym, Music, Agricultural Work and Crafts as well. These subjects all contain elements of Zionist-nationalist education.

I shall open my survey with primary school readers. These readers integrate prose and poetry for the teaching of literature, as well as interpersonal and national values. The readers are used as a sort of yearly calendar, and in most of them stories, poems and texts about Jewish holidays and the seasons are accorded a prominent place. They are taught in the framework of a subject called "Hebrew", whose curriculum and syllabus are flexible and leave the editors of the readers ample space for definition.

## 1. Readers until 1985

Before I commence with my survey, I shall sum up one of the few significant studies done on the readers, concluded in 1987 by Mr. Shmuel Zoltak under the supervision of Professors Bar-Tal and Raviv of Tel Aviv University.<sup>6</sup>

The purpose of this study was to examine how the image of the Arab is represented in Israeli elementary school readers published and authorized by the Ministry up to 1985.

The results indicate the following:

(a) The Arab is mentioned in only 7.5 % of the items studied.

(b) Jewish-Arab relations are mentioned in 75 % of the relevant items, but appear as the central theme in only 31 %.

(c) Jewish-Arab relations, described mainly as the relationship between two nations (72 %), and less often as an interpersonal relationship (20 %), is represented in the majority of works (78 %) in connection with war and conflict, while only 22 % describe Arabs and Jews in the context of peace. Arab-Jewish relationships are characterized as hostile in 55 % of the items and friendly in only 16 %. A significant relationship was found between the characterization of Arab-Jewish relations, type of text and grade for which the text is intended.

(d) The image of the Arab emerging from the text as a whole is negative in half (50.7 %) the items, neutral in 29.1 % and positive in 20.2 %. The behavioural element of the image of the Arab was characterized mainly as negative – aggressive and violent (60 % of the items), with a minimal amount of positive description (12.5 %). A similar profile emerged with regard to Arab-associated adjectives in the text: 60 % of the items applied negative adjectives to the image of the Arab, while in 19 % of the items, positive adjectives were used. The characterization of Arab occupations and professions revealed similar trend, with 50 % of the items classifying Arab occupations as military.

(e) In 54.4 % of the texts, the image of the Arab is represented in the context of the pre-state period of Jewish settlement in Palestine and the 1948 War of Independence. None of the texts deal with the Arab set in a historical background after 1973. With regard to place of residence, half the texts make no mention of the subject; and of the remaining texts, 28 % place the Arab in a village environment. A significant relationship was found between the image of the Arab and historical background and residence.

(f) The tendency to present the Arab negatively was more noticeable in the texts intended for religious schools (61.7 %) than in those intended for secular schools (46.5 %).

<sup>6</sup> SHMUEL ZOLTAK: *The Image of the Arab in Israeli Elementary School Literature Texts* (in Hebrew), M. A. Thesis, Tel Aviv University 1987. Three types of textbooks authorized by the Ministry by 1985 were analyzed: a) the series *Mikraot Yisrael* (Israeli Reader) for grades 1–8 in secular state schools; b) the series *Halichot Yisrael* (The Ways of Israel) for grades 2–6 in religious state schools; c) booklets published by the Ministry of Education Curriculum Department for both secular and religious public schools. The basic items for analysis were complete literary texts (stories, poems, descriptive excerpts) taken from the three series.

Similarly, the tendency to characterize the Arab positively was greater in the texts of secular schools (40.3 %) than in those of the religious schools (20.1 %).

In discussing his findings, Zoltak emphasizes the disregard of the issue of Arab-Jewish relations — whether the Arab-Israeli conflict, the existence of an Arab-Palestinian minority within the state of Israel (approximately 17 % of the entire population), or the reality of Palestinians under Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories. For the pupil who is exposed to the influence of other socializing agents the message is that school neither deals with nor wishes to deal with the problem.

Secondly, Zoltak emphasizes that the impersonal representation of the Arab in the context of conflict among nations, added to the high proportion of items in which the Arab has no defined living space, creates an image lacking in individual identity. Such representation contributes to the building of a negative stereotype of “the Arab as enemy”.

This point seems especially important after the Egyptian-Israeli peace which in fact opened up the possibilities of an alternate depiction of the relationship. The majority of the readers discussed in the study appeared after the signing of the peace agreement; not only do these readers fail to relate to the peace agreement or contribute to the diminution of prejudice, they even strengthen and reinforce prejudices.

## 2. Readers and textbooks since 1985

I have chosen to concentrate on three readers published in the mid-80s — two series for grades 3–6 and a six-grade reader for religious state schools.<sup>7</sup> Unable to conduct a quantitative analysis as detailed as the readers study summarized above, I did, however, conduct a partial quantitative analysis. As a result, it may be unequivocally concluded that the relative frequency of direct explicit treatment of Arab-Jewish relations, and, consequently, of the image of the Arab, decreases significantly in the readers that I have analyzed as compared to those studied by Zoltak. The following table clearly points to this conclusion:

<sup>7</sup> GERSHON BERGSON: *Sayings and Conversations*, Readers for grades 3–6 (in Hebrew: *Be'omer U'vesiach*), Tel Aviv 1985. Mr. Bergson is a former Senior Official of the Ministry of Education.

ADIR COHEN: *Encounters*, Readers for grades 1–6 (in Hebrew: *Mifgashim*), Tel Aviv 1985–1988. Professor Cohen's study of the image of the Arab in Hebrew children's literature is summarized above.

Ministry of Education and Culture, Curriculum Department: *Open the Gate*, Reader for grade 6 in State-Religious Schools (in Hebrew: *Pitchu et Ha-sha'ar*), Jerusalem 1989.



	Explicit treatment	Positive treatment	Negative treatment
Bergson 5th–6th	7.4 %	2.5 %	5.0 %
Bergson 4th–5th	4.1 %	1.6 %	2.5 %
Bergson 3rd–4th	1.5 %	—	1.5 %
Cohen 6th	3.4 %	1.6 %	1.8 %
Cohen 5th	8.3 %	6.5 %	1.8 %
Cohen 4th	3.5 %	2.2 %	1.3 %
Cohen 3rd	3.8 %	3.3 %	— (0.5 % neutral)
State Religious 6th	3.0 %	1.66 %	1.0 % (+ 0.33 % neutral)

An analysis of the items shows that the authors of the later readers have made an effort to improve the image of the Arab — including the Palestinian Arab. Most items treat interpersonal relationships, especially among Jewish and Arab children, or relations between Jews and Arabs in Arab countries, and all are short stories or folk tales. Most of the negative items refer to events such as the War of Independence, the conquest of Jerusalem during the Six-Day War and the Tel Chai episode of 1920 (which became a central Zionist myth of heroism of the few against the many among other motifs, despite the fact that a research published in 1973 has shown the episode to have in fact been a misunderstanding, and not an attempt by an Arab horde to capture a settlement of thirty people). Most items relating to interpersonal relationships are positive. Moreover, the negative expressions in the majority of the negative items are relatively moderate as compared to the readers of the previous period. Expressions such as “gangs”, “murderers” and “bandits” almost totally disappeared. The more neutral, more realistic and less antagonistic expression “enemy” is more widespread.

In some of the positive items there is a deliberate tendency to utilize the stories to educate against prejudice, through explicit reference to children’s fear of Arabs before they met, as opposed to friendship developed after the meeting. The editors — especially Adir Cohen — clearly assume that Jewish pupils do have stereotypes of Arabs and prejudices against them.

It seems that the new readers need to be examined in light of developments which have occurred in Israel since Sadat’s visit in 1977. In spite of the peace with Egypt, the opposition of the Israeli radical right to Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular has increased. Movements arose explicitly and openly expressing racist and anti-democratic opinions; one of them — under the leadership of Meir Kahane — even succeeded in gaining election to the Parliament in 1985. Though his party won less than 2 % of the vote, its views won considerable support

in public opinion surveys among youth: approximately 25 % expressed a general opposition to democracy and 50 % expressed racist and anti-democratic opinions when answering questions specific to the rights of Israeli Arabs to equality and the right to vote for Parliament, or to freedom of expression of those (Arabs and Jews alike) favouring a Palestinian state, and so forth.<sup>8</sup> These findings shocked liberal Israeli public opinion, as well as many educators, and no doubt influenced the editors of the new readers, especially Adir Cohen (who was undoubtedly also influenced by the findings of his own research of children's literature), and the curriculum staff of the Ministry who prepared the reader for religious state-schools.

Given this, it appears to me that the improvement which took place in the readers is merely a partial one.

(a) The general character of Bergson's readers — the most negative in its explicit treatment of Arabs — is ethnocentrism. It largely deals with traditional Jewish holidays, ancient wars of the Jews, the life of Jews in exile, antisemitism and persecution of Jews, the Holocaust, Memorial Day, Independence Day. This picture is further emphasized in the sixth-grade religious school reader which contains even less material dealing with nature, wildlife, landscape and general situations relating to childhood than do the Bergson's readers. This is especially pronounced in the pictorial material and in the fact that 50 % of the items are meant for the inculcation of religious values — to inspire admiration of exemplary religious figures, to deepen religious feelings and encourage religious observance. Adir Cohen, on the other hand, shows a considerable effort to diminish and minimize the ethnocentric messages and to deal more with feelings, age-related problems, moral and aesthetic issues. In this context, it is worth noting the careful attention and good taste directing the choice of illustrations and pictures, which are not only a means of embellishing and clarifying the text, but an end in and of themselves.

(b) But even in Adir Cohen's reader, only few of the items — a mere 5 % — are translations from other languages and few are poems, songs, fables and stories dealing with the lives of other peoples or children of other nations.

The above remarks bear directly and indirectly on my topic. The indirect significance is clear: the greater the ethnocentrism, the more rooted the opposition, prejudices and stereotypes of non-Jews in general and Arabs in particular. An explicitly negative treatment is not even needed as long as items in the readers deal with the wars of Israel, ancient and recent, remembrance of war dead, or war orphans — they are anti-Arab even if Arabs are not at all mentioned. It is understandably impossible to ignore wars or the remembrance of war dead. These are an integral part of the experience of both adult and child in Israel, yet one must recognize that in the absence of any serious attempt to *understand* the Arab or Palestinian point of view, the readers are joining the rest of the negative socializing agents in the inculcation of one-sided views, and even in the cultivation of hatred towards Arabs and Palestinians.

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<sup>8</sup> MINA ZEMACH and RUTH TZIN: *Attitudes of Teenagers towards Democratic Values* (in Hebrew), Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem 1984.

(c) As in the older readers, there is no treatment of the peace with Egypt in the new readers. This is both amazing and unjustifiable. Especially because it is neither possible nor necessary to ignore the conflict and animosity between Israel and some Arab states and between many Israeli and Palestinians (although it is appropriate, as stated, to show additional views and not only the Israeli side), it is important to discuss the peace with Egypt. Sadat's visit could have been described, as could the overnight changes in Israeli views towards Egypt and vice-versa, or the visit of Israeli children (and their families) in Egypt; or lifestyles of various sectors in Egypt, and so forth. There are several items in Adir Cohen's reader as well as occasional instances in the others, of principled opposition to war, but to invite the pupil to consider the opinion that war is non-essential and peace possible would demand a concrete and realistic depiction of the end of a particular war.

(d) There is no treatment of other religions — neither Christianity, or Islam nor religions of the Far East.

(e) In as much as historical stories do appear in the readers, they are generally based on mythic or out-of-date versions. New research in the history of Zionism, Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Jewish-Palestinian conflict has not found its way to the readers.

(f) The Arab minority in Israel, its lifestyle, problems or even its heartaches are not represented at all in the readers. The Arabs that do appear — in the positive items as well — are generally good-natured, well-meaning but technologically backward peasants. Occasionally, they are, as individuals, supporters of Jews against surrounding hostility, that is, a kind of collaborators. These appear to be the surviving elements of a patronizing attitude of superiority which abounded in the readers and children's literature of the 1960s, 1950s and even the 1940s.

### 3. The Van Leer Institute's textbooks and readers for primary schools

In light of these comments, it is worth noting the considerable effort that has been invested for nearly ten years by the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem in the development of curricular materials, educational experimentation of these materials and in-service training for teachers who show willingness to stick their necks out and treat prejudices and stereotypes. Towards the mid-80's, the Institute began to work jointly with the Ministry and some of its material was jointly rewritten and became official material of the Ministry. In this way, for example, the anthology of stories *Sabras* (1986) was published, some written by Jews and some by Arabs. In the Arab stories, the strong attachment of the Arab to his land and landscape was emphasized. The intention is clear: to bring to the consciousness of Jewish children that they are not alone in their attachment and love for their land and its landscape, themes so obvious and pronounced in Hebrew poetry and prose and, naturally, in the school readers. The Jewish stories generally describe friendships woven between Jewish and Arab children in various situations, friendships that leave their imprint even into adulthood, in spite of the dividing border, or in spite of the displacement which uprooted Arabs from their homes during the 1948

War. This seems to be the first instance of felt and expressed empathy towards the situation of the Palestinian refugees in official Israeli material.

The Van Leer Institute anthology constitutes an important contribution to a more balanced education, but as long as stories such as these are not integrated into the popular readers, it is doubtful whether many teachers will use them.

Further examples of joint Van Leer Institute/Ministry publications are two short textbooks. The first — *Our Neighbours and Ourselves* (1989) — is intended for grades 4–5 and prepares pupils for meetings with Arab pupils through exercises in moderation and reduction of prejudices, an initial familiarization with the neighbouring people, its language, as well as its hospitality customs. The last part of the booklet contains suggested educational activities for after the meetings.

The second — *Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel* — is intended for the sixth grade and is incorporated in the Geography curriculum. This textbook is more informative, and deals with the following subjects: the various modes of settlement in Israel (of Jews and Arabs); sources of income and employment; the three religions of Israel — Judaism, Islam and Christianity; lifestyles of the various communities; common interests of the residents of each region (including examples from the fields of health and transportation). Here, too, it is suggested that the pupils implement the knowledge acquired, through visiting Arab communities, or by planning a town with both Arab and Jewish inhabitants. Teams of pupils must plan the town according to different principles: absolute cooperation in every area, absolute separation, and a combination which maintains uniqueness. It is explicitly stated that the first view is undemocratic, the second leads to discrimination; the third is recommended, despite its higher cost.

In the 1980s, and even more so in the second half of the decade, there has been a significant overall improvement in the attitudes towards Arabs and Palestinians in the new readers for primary schools which I have reviewed. To the reasons for this change one should, I presume, add the impact of the peace process with Egypt and then of the Peace Treaty itself. But as I have shown, this improvement is only partial and a major effort would be needed in the 1990s if enlightened Humanism is to score more points in its struggle against Particularism and Chauvinism.

### The Image of the Arab in Textbooks: History and Civics for Secondary Schools

Only a few studies conducted thus far have dealt with history textbooks. I have already mentioned Ruth Firer's study which dealt with history textbooks written since the beginning of the century. In general, claims Firer, their authors ignored Arab-Palestinian nationalism and attributed Arab opposition to Zionism to violence stemming from their negative traits (bandits, bloodthirsty wild men, vandals, primitives, instigators, etc.). When relating to their nationalism, they use de-legitimizing mechanisms, thus attributing their behaviour to the influence of

anti-semitism and fascist ideology. "The Arabs, when mentioned, are included in the list of natural afflictions and other obstacles that stood against the renewal of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel."<sup>9</sup>

### 1. History textbooks until 1985

Herzl Binyamin studied nine history textbooks.<sup>10</sup> Some were already in use in the 60s and others were written and began to be used during the 70's. All were still authorized by the Ministry in 1985, and most are still in use today, though some were rewritten and have appeared in new editions. Three books are intended for grades 7–9 and six for grades 11–12, but the study considered all nine books as a whole and did not relate to the differences between them. It also failed to differentiate between those written by the Curriculum Department of the Ministry (5) and those written by independent authors (4). The study focuses solely on descriptions of events and/or historical processes connected to Jewish-Arab relations in the twentieth century:

- 13.9 % of the items deal with Jewish-Arab relations, though 42.6 % of the material relating to the history of Zionism deals with this relationship.

- 46.4 % of the items considered describe relationships during conflict, an additional 14.8 % describe full-scale wars.

- In 69.5 % of the items considered hostility prevails between the two peoples, and in 63.7 % the Arab is depicted negatively, through the use of negative stereotypical images of behaviour and traits.<sup>11</sup>

- 14.8 % of the relevant items exhibit de-legitimization procedures. Of those, the majority describe the Arabs as a deviant group. Binyamin concludes that negative stereotypes and de-legitimization are not widely used in History textbooks and do not include dimensions such as external appearance, occupation, place of residence, and the like. On the other hand he emphasizes that due to the great epistemic authority of history books, these items are accorded great "factual" weight, above and beyond their relative quantitative importance, and contribute to a hardening of the negative stand towards Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular.

- The Arab is depicted in quite a neutral manner in the items describing events up to 1917 (the Balfour Declaration). On the other hand, he is depicted most negatively in the items dealing with events between the War of Independence and 1974. Yet the percentage of items discussed from this period is a mere 5.3 % and 3.5 % are from the years 1949–1956. There is not a single item dealing with Jewish-Arab relations or Israeli-Arab state relations after 1974. The author emphasizes this point, denounces the authors and vigorously adds that against the backdrop of pronounced hostility in so many of the items, it is regrettable that the peace process with Egypt is not apparent, and that the opportunity

<sup>9</sup> FIRER: Agents, p. 128.

<sup>10</sup> BINYAMIN HERZL: *The Image of the Arab in History Textbooks* (in Hebrew), M. A. Thesis, Tel Aviv University 1987.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

to soften a harsh picture is lost.<sup>12</sup> It appears to me that Binyamin forgets that the issues discussed in the History textbooks parallel material required for the matriculation examinations and that he should direct his critique towards those determining the curriculum. I will return to this issue when discussing Civics textbooks dealing with the Israeli-Arab conflict.

— Most of the items relate to Arabs as a whole, not differentially. The explanation is that a large number of the items depict the years of the struggle for independence and the War of Independence itself when, according to the books analyzed, an Arab coalition united against the Jews.<sup>13</sup>

— History textbooks do not attempt to shy away from the “Jew/Israeli = Good” formula by recalling unpraiseworthy Jewish deeds, nor do they attempt to alter the “Arab = Bad” formula by recalling events or processes which might contribute to such an alteration. Consequently, in the opinion of Binyamin, the textbooks analyzed reflect the manner in which the conflict itself is conceived by many policy-makers and a majority of the Israeli public.

Although “the history books do not contribute to a strengthening of de-legitimization, they fail to constitute a force for change . . . they ignore important historical processes which are happening and have happened in our region . . . and thus may be counted among those socializing agents which curb change.”

## 2. History and Civics textbooks since 1985

I myself have chosen to discuss the most recent History and Civics textbooks written by the staff of the Curriculum Department and the Van Leer Institute. In this part of my survey, I did not conduct a quantitative analysis, and I prefer to discuss each book separately because of their differing themes.

2.1 *The Arabs in Islam, in: Lessons in History*, Vol. 2, Ministry of Education, 1987, pp. 175–219.\*

The chapter contains a lucid, matter-of-fact account of the rise of Islam and the history of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. One passage carries, however, a disparaging undertone: “Arabic became in the meantime the language of science and culture throughout the Arab-ruled part of the Mediterranean. Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims, Christians and Jews adopted the Arabic language and began to talk and write in it. *This was the main contribution of the Arabs to Islamic culture*, because most Muslim men of science were not of Arab origin; they belonged to the local nations, especially the Persians” (p. 214, emphasis added, D. B.).

2.2 *The Zionist Idea and the Establishment of the State of Israel*, 2 vol., 540 pp., Ministry of Education, 1985

This textbook was a major undertaking of the Curriculum Department in the seventies. It was designed and written by a very experienced team of History

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

\* I wish to thank Prof. B. Z. Kedar from the Dept. of History of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for this analysis, as well as his useful advice throughout my work on this survey.

teachers who received constant advice from several of Israel's major historians, but it also touched on many sensitivities and therefore incurred criticism and debate. After years of experimentation it underwent significant revision, mainly didactic. Approximately half of the compulsory matriculation examinees in Modern Jewish History are tested according to it. The other half are tested according to another syllabus and several other authorized textbooks written independently.

The book's title hints at its emphasis: Zionist ideology on the one hand and on the other hand the historical processes which led to the establishment of the state of Israel. Appropriately it is of a dynamic nature: Zionist ideology is depicted as developing, changing with circumstances, and variegated. Indeed, significant attention and space are devoted to differences of opinion among the various streams of Zionism, whether it be in the ideological sphere or in strategic goals and tactical maneuvering. This is a first advantage of this textbook from our point of view. Exposure of the pupil to a variety of opinions towards the "Arab question" and thus to alternative attitudes towards Arabs and Palestinians, is likely to weaken the tendency to develop stereotypes and prejudices.

There are, of course, prejudices and negative stereotyping in many of the sources included in the book. This matter seems to be virtually unavoidable given the fact that the sources often reflect the mentality and opinions of those involved in the events of the period. But it is regrettable that in only a few instances do the authors complement these sources with their own qualifying notes, or with subsequent historic analyses.

A second significant advantage of the book lies in its authors' attempt to incorporate some of the new findings of Zionist historiography, which has been developing rapidly, especially since the seventies.

An important example is the authors' shying away from a presentation of the conflict between Jews and Arabs as a David and Goliath struggle, though contemporaries to the events tended to thus represent it in their propaganda. We now know that the Palestinians did not succeed in realizing their numerical advantage, nor did the Arab states; as early as the thirties, the Jews had superior military and economic power in Palestine. But, in my opinion, the authors do not sufficiently emphasize this data (for example: In detailing the numbers of Jewish fighters and their weaponry on the eve of the 1948 War of Independence, they do not provide parallel numerical estimates for the Arabs and suffice with the statement that "the Arab population had large amounts of arms at their disposal . . ." II, 284-5), but neither do they do the contrary. The authors are correct in their claim that by the fall of 1947 at the latest, when the UN voted for the Partition Plan, Arab states had expropriated the question of Palestine from the Palestinians, with the intention of gaining territory, or at least preventing other Arab states from doing so. But the authors should have further emphasized Jordan's (then, the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan) role in this expropriation, not only with the blessing of the British, but also with a partial or full agreement of some of the Jewish leaders of the time, first and foremost, Ben-Gurion. If they had done so they would have presented revisionist Zionist history in the

fullest sense of the term, and in this, contradicted several accepted conventions. They would also have entered into the thick of some of the more interesting and most significant controversies among historians, controversies which may have implications for an understanding of some Israeli leaders' positive orientation towards Jordan until today.

The discussion of Palestinians is also far better than in other History textbooks authorized by the Ministry of Education for upper secondary school grades. The improvement is evidenced in two main areas. Firstly, Palestinians are no longer represented as "baddies" and simple ingrates, whose only goal is to wipe out Jews returning to their land, in spite of the progress and prosperity that the Jews bring about. The Palestinians appear afraid that Zionism will take away their lands and their right to self-determination, and they act in the framework of a national movement to prevent such a development, at times through means of violence and terror. Secondly, and accordingly, the book's descriptions and analyses contain nearly no emotional expressions or explicit degradations of Arab behaviour. It follows that there are fewer negative stereotypes in the authors' direct treatment of Arabs and Palestinians.

My main criticism relates to two issues.

(a) The treatment of the Palestinian national movement seems insufficient to me. After a discussion of its inception in the twenties and thirties, the description is quite laconic and the pupil gains only a weak conception of the factions and forces at play in it at the end of the thirties and of its development during the forties, until the beginning of the 1948 War of Independence.

The authors may have assumed that pupils study concurrently, or shortly after, the Israeli-Arab conflict from the textbook which I will discuss further, but that is not the case for many or even most of the pupils, since *The conflict* is not a compulsory subject in matriculation examinations while *The Zionist Idea* is.

(b) A more concrete and detailed description of the growth of the Arab population in Palestine, its religious communities, lifestyle changes, and variation of social strata and economic development is also missing. This lack is even more pronounced in view of the ample space devoted to these topics in the developing Jewish society, accompanied by many tables of economic, social and cultural data. Two examples are cases in point:

— Though the authors do devote a few lines to the fact that the Jews who arrived in Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century found a population that was undergoing changes related not to Jewish immigration, but to the entry of colonial powers into the Middle East — mutual relations between the Jewish immigrants and the Arabs are barely mentioned. In my opinion, it should have been discussed, or at least the questions it begs: Were there relations of this sort? What was their nature? Were they tainted by national consciousness or were they solely economic? In the absence of such a topical discussion, the pupil is likely to get the impression that there were no such relations from the start. When Arab labourers working for Jews are mentioned in another context — the



struggle between Jewish peasants and unemployed Jewish workers — their views or feelings are not considered.

— Several maps present the development of Jewish settlements — urban and rural. Yet there is a complete absence of Arab settlements from all maps, except for five cities. The pupil is likely to get the impression that the land was almost empty, just as several Zionist groups have often claimed. Even tables of Jewish population growth blur reality. In these there is indeed a comparison between Jews and Arabs; but Arabs are merely mentioned as “non-Jews”.

Recognition of the other side is a first and essential step in a realistic grappling with the problem. This is an essential condition to the prevention of dehumanization and stereotyping and it is regrettable that such a good-intentioned book does fail from time to time to meet this condition.

The last two books to be examined here are Civics textbooks. They deal with two of the five topics, out of which matriculation examinees are meant to choose two, besides “The Regime of the State of Israel” which is compulsory; these constitute the Civics matriculation examination.

2.3 *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, experimental edition — 1976; commercial edition — 1979, 300 pp.; supplementary booklets — 1989, 82 pp.\*

The authors state that the book “attempts to offer a historical and ideological perspective on the Arab-Jewish conflict in Eretz-Yisrael and to present various views, by Jews as well as by Arabs, on the possibilities of solving this protracted conflict” (p. VII). The book consists largely of texts, from the Balfour Declaration to the decisions adopted in 1987 by the Palestinian National Council. There are relatively few statements by the authors themselves, and these are largely formulated in a neutral way. The one exception is the Appendix (pp. 271–277) which contains bibliographical data about some of the personalities mentioned in the texts. Here one can read that Haj Amin al-Husayni “challenged in 1928 the status of the Jews at the Wailing Wall and this brought about the riots of 1929 . . .”

There is one case in which the authors overtly disclose their bias. In their instructions for preparing Home Work No. 1, they tell the students to sum up various views (Zionist, Arab, Soviet, etc.) and then go on to invite them to rebut the Arab arguments! (p. XII). Elsewhere, bias is expressed by the choice of texts. First, there is a disproportion between Zionist and Arab texts — for instance, pre-1948 Zionist views take up 26 pages, while pre-1948 Arab views are accorded just seven pages. Secondly, the Arab view of the origins of the refugee problem is not presented at all; there are only statistics about the refugees, some photographs, and a 1955 speech by Abba Eban which presents the official Israeli position. Thirdly, the book contains several learned articles about the conflict, all of which were written either by Israeli scholars or by sympathizers of the Israeli cause. These are presented by the authors as “research by researchers about the conflict” (p. VII). Assertions made by Shimon Shamir, author of c

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\* I wish to thank again Prof. B. Z. Kedar, who contributed most of this analysis.

of these articles, are expected to be taken by the students as statements of fact — e. g. on p. XVI the pupils are asked, on the basis of Professor Shamir's article, to answer the question: "In which situations was Israel required to take the initiative in the course of the conflict?"

The pictorial material is rather loaded: on p. 40 there is a photograph of the Jerusalem Mufti visiting with a Muslim unit which fought on the side of the Nazis; on p. 94 there is a photograph of an Arabic translation of "Mein Kampf" captured during the Six-Day War of 1967.

Last but not least, it is hardly understandable why the peace with Egypt had to wait until the supplementary booklet of 1989, to be included in the textbook. It seems that such an historic event should have justified a special supplement already in 1979, when the peace treaty was signed.

2.4 *The Arabs — Citizens of Israel: Mutual Relations Among Jews and Arabs*, 266 pp., experimental edition — 1982; commercial edition — 1989

This book, like previously mentioned primary school texts, was written jointly by the staffs of the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem and of the Curriculum Department of the Ministry. Approximately 30 school hours should be devoted to it, and 45 % of all matriculation examinees elect to be tested on it. However, according to the Civics staff coordinator in the Curriculum Department, the reason why some of the teachers prefer this topic to others, is its relative simplicity (as compared to Economics or labour relations, for instance).

In my opinion this book should serve as an example of how civil servants in a democratic country could tackle loaded issues with open-mindedness, despite the fact that a considerable portion of their audience are burdened with prejudices and stereotypes. Incidentally, members of that self-same government, indirectly in charge of these civil servants, may be tainted by prejudices themselves.

In the brief introduction (written by Aluf Har-Even of the Van Leer Institute) the following objective is stated: "To consider the issues from both points of view (of the majority and of the minority). Let us ask ourselves, what does the Arab citizen born in Israel feel? What are his expectations, when he discovers that the Declaration of Independence and the founding principles of the government determine that he has equal rights? Does he have equal rights only in theory, or in practice as well? Does he feel equal? If we were in his place, what would we think and feel? . . . How do we the majority — who were and still are a minority in the Diaspora — behave towards a minority in our country? Will we behave according to those standards that we demand of other nations in their behaviour towards the Jewish minority in their countries? Or will we behave according to whatever standards are comfortable for us, because we have the power and the authority to do what we want in our country?"

The book's contents and style make good on most of this promise. The book contains expressions of feelings of Palestinian Arabs; a short (relatively — 11 pp.) survey of Arab society in the Middle East and of Arabs in Palestine during British rule; relatively detailed material on "The Arab society in Israel in the midst of change", on the "civil status of Arabs", and on their problems of ident-

ity — as Palestinians on the one hand and Israelis on the other. The book also contains supplementary material — “Jewish (13 pp.) and Arab (8 pp.) views on the status of the Arab minority in Israel”, various opinions on the “the status of Arabs in Israel according to Jewish Law” (so that the book will be taught in religious schools as well), explanations and definitions of “prejudice” and “stereotypes”, views of Israeli-Arab writers on problems in Arab society (19 pp.), selections from international conventions, laws relevant to the status of Arabs in Israel and the Occupied Territories; numerous charts and diagrams.

Information is usually presented comparatively, e.g. highlighting the gaps between Jews and Arabs, those stemming from the Jews’ earlier entrance into processes of modernization, and those stemming from the government’s discriminatory policies. Though the book does not use explicit language in these cases, the relevant facts generally speak for themselves. Occasionally, the book draws the attention of pupils and teachers to the mistreatment of the Arab minority. An example of this is the presentation of Land Laws which allowed the state of Israel to expropriate a considerable percentage of Arab lands — belonging to the 1948 War refugees and (to a lesser extent) to Israeli Arabs. The authors suggest holding a discussion around this information in which the pupil is asked to summarize the position of the state of Israel and Arab claims against it. It is nearly impossible to fail to comprehend that these laws discriminated and continue to discriminate against Arabs.

As opposed to *The Zionist Idea and the Establishment of the State of Israel* settlement maps include both Jews and Arabs, and in the majority of the cases explicitly mark the identity of the various populations. Still, the settlement maps describe solely the post-1948 period, and the pupil is unable to make comparisons between that time and the pre-state period because Arab settlement maps from the British period are to be found neither here nor in other texts — not even in the *Arab-Israeli Conflict*. The reason for this omission may be the enormous gap which would be evidenced between the two periods, due to the destruction of Arab towns and villages, or their resettlement by Jewish new immigrants after their inhabitants left on their own initiative (apparently 50 %) or were driven away (apparently 50 %) during the 1948 War of Independence. The authors, or those who authorized the book, could not, it seems, go so far as to present in visual form such a drastic change in the country’s landscape.

Despite this flaw, the book’s approach can be commended; its essence is, indeed, consideration of the problem from “both points of view”. If all the books reviewed in this paper had adopted such an approach, textbooks for Israeli Jewish students would have made a greater contribution towards positive changes in the negative image of Arabs and Palestinians, prevailing among many Israeli Jews, and perhaps even contributed to the strengthening of positive attitudes towards a peaceful solution of the conflict.

# DAN BITAN

## ABSTRACT

Since the 1930's and until the 1980's, following Sadat's visit and the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, Arabs and Palestinians had been perceived by most Zionist Jews and then by most Israeli Jews, as deeply, permanently and aggressively opposed to a well-intentioned, enlightened, moral, humanistic and peace loving Zionism. Zionist education and textbooks reflected this negative attitude.

Prolonged occupation since the 1967 war resulted in a gradual polarisation: on the one hand a growing antagonism towards Arabs and Palestinians, politically aiming at keeping the conquered territories; on the other hand a "peace now" kind of attitude, with a recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination. Research of popular Readers for primary schools and History textbooks showed that until 1985 only few items related directly or even indirectly to Arabs and Palestinians. Those that did, both reflected and encouraged one sided views of the conflict as well as negative prejudiced stereotypes. Since then there has been a constant improvement in several of the popular textbooks, i.e. in those which reflect the mainstream Ministry of Education curriculum writing and the more liberal authors, who were perplexed by clear indications of undemocratic, prejudiced and stereotyped attitude of a large proportion of Israeli youth. In items relating directly to Arabs and Palestinians as individuals, negative attitudes have disappeared almost completely and there are instances of a conscious effort to present the views and the feelings of the other side. At times findings of revisionist Israeli Historiography are used, which tend to shake myths and formulas of Goodies versus Baddies. Yet, most of the Readers for primary-schools still evade the issue and even some of the better History and Civics textbooks, which deal with the History of Zionism and the conflict, are biased; most strikingly the peace with Egypt is neither mentioned nor discussed before 1989.

A major effort is needed: to exert a constant pressure on the Ministry of Education for a more extensive use of better instructional materials and teachers training; to initiate joint Israeli and Palestinian guidelines for textbook authors; to write jointly experimental textbooks on the conflict.

## Concluding remarks

It seems, then, that during the 1980s, and especially in the second half of the decade, there has been a significant improvement in the approach of some editors and authors of textbooks and readers; another improvement is the involvement of several non-governmental organizations (of which the Van Leer Institute is only one) in the preparation of curricular and extra-curricular material, and various workshops for pupils and teachers, geared specifically to changing the attitudes of Jewish pupils towards Arabs in general, and in particular towards the Arab minority in Israel. In 1986 a special unit for Education for Democracy and Coexistence was established within the Ministry of Education and Culture. The legitimacy given to these efforts by the Ministry during the 1980s, with Mr. Yizhak Navon as Minister of Education, is important and provided room for hope that these materials would indeed be well received in the educational system. Nonetheless, surveys conducted among pupils in 1987, on the eve of the Intifada, indicated that improvement was still minimal. In fact, it seems that in the wake of the Intifada, in spite of PLO policy change and the prospects of the peace process, additional polarization has developed. As this paper goes to press in June 1991, a survey is being completed on the extent of the use of materials and workshops which promote coexistence between Jews and the Arab citizens of Israel. Results indicate that in 1989/1990 only 24% of the Jewish schools in Israel took advantage of such materials and activities: 28% of the non-religious schools and 13% of the religious schools. In grades 10-12, 52% of the comprehensive schools held such activities, as compared to 41% of the academic schools and only 25% of the vocational schools. There is more than one way to interpret this proportion, but it clearly indicates that there is room for additional efforts.

There is still an urgent need to develop appropriate materials and suitable in-service training for teachers. But it is also high time for Israelis and Palestinians to combine efforts and find ways and means for specific and concrete cooperation in furthering education for peace. Joint committees should start examining the issues without delay, and joint textbooks (on the history of the conflict, for example) could be a fascinating challenge for historians and educators from both sides — as well as for third-party experts from the Georg Eckert Institute. Historians and educators should have no illusions about the possibility of overcoming adverse political circumstances, but neither should they underestimate their capacities to make positive contributions towards the diffusion of prejudices and stereotypes. At any rate, it is a responsibility which, I feel, cannot be delegated to others.

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**Winter 1991/92**

**A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
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# **The Relevance of Democracy to Israeli-Palestinian Peace**

Edy Kaufman and Shukri Abed

## ***Introduction***

Machiavellian realists have often said that there is no such thing as eternal enemies, although such protracted struggles as that between the Palestinians and the Israelis seem to belie such a theory. Yet history has seen far more virulent and long-lived enmities eventually transformed into productive and mutually beneficial relationships. Turning conflict into cooperation and moving from enmity to friendship requires concerted effort and constant attention to common interests, needs and characteristics. Israelis and Palestinians, though they seem not to realize it, do have a common interest in ending their century-old conflict. This chapter aims to show that pursuit of democracy and the adherence to democratic values may provide a means for effecting significant and positive change in the relationship between the semitic cousins.

It seems at times as if every idea about peace between Palestinians and Israelis has already been formulated. So wide is the gap between the Israelis and the Palestinians that no new avenues seem open for the resolution of a state of conflict that has persisted, with more or less vehemence, for more than four decades. The stakes are astronomically high and the penalty for failure extremely grave, as this "local" conflict continually threatens to spill over into ever broader conflicts between the nations of the region, and the nations of the world.

Today, more than three years after the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation began, it seems more evident than ever that no future agreements between Israel and surrounding Arab states can lead to a lasting peace unless the demands and aspirations of the Palestinians as well as the Israelis are addressed. Even the "cold peace" with Egypt may be jeopardized if the lack of visible progress in the peace process persists.

Because of the strategic importance of the Middle East and its oil reserves, regional confrontations like the Gulf War escalate rapidly and loom as formidable obstacles to moderate thinking on the Palestinian question. The implications for Palestinians and Israelis of Saddam Hussein's entry into the foreground of the Middle East picture, for example, are as yet unknown. The war may have served as a catalyst accelerating processes already in motion. Yet whether the ultimate outcome of the crisis will be further bloodshed or a move toward peace and democratization in the region<sup>1</sup>—or perhaps some of both—it is simply too soon to tell.

In situations of conflict, each side tends to fixate on the negative and to assume that concessions to the opponent are detrimental to its own interests. Palestinians and Israelis are no exception. Current research and political statements by leaders of both communities often reflect mutual frustration, suspicion, and even apathy—only serving to further protract the political stalemate.

What are the basic parameters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? For Palestinians, the foremost concern appears to be the pursuit of statehood; for Israelis, the maintenance of their security. And given that for most Israelis an autonomous Palestinian state is viewed as antithetical to Israeli security, we must proceed to ask how these two seemingly contradictory concerns can be reconciled.

In other words, how can we achieve a solution that simultaneously satisfies the fundamental needs of both communities? What type of future solution can best guarantee Israel a lasting peace and secure borders, while addressing the basic Palestinian aspirations of statehood and autonomy?

Overcoming such a deadlock as exists between Palestinians and Israelis today clearly requires huge leaps of imagination, continual re-examination of the problem from ever new and different angles. Until now, the political and academic leadership of both communities have explored few creative avenues in their search for a resolution of the protracted state of conflict. Instead leaders employ oversimplified, legalistic solutions, usually premised on the popularly accepted zero-sum principle that one side's victory signals the other side's defeat. For example, while an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied after the 1967 war would likely have mutually beneficial consequences, the concept is often dismissed without closer examination because it is broadly perceived as a security threat to Israel. And this despite the fact that Israel's military strength is not only far superior to that of the Palestinians, but also equal—or superior to that of the combined forces of the surrounding Arab states.

What is needed today is a move beyond the boundaries of our present grim and patently unacceptable reality. Transcendence of the current paradigms of inquiry necessitates what Edward de Bono refers to as "lateral thinking." De Bono explains: "Instead of proceeding step by step in the usual vertical manner, you take up a new and quite arbitrary position. You then work backwards and try to construct a logical path between this new position and the starting point. Should such a path prove possible, it may eventually be tested with the full rigors of logic. If the path is sound, you are then in a useful position which may never have been reached by ordinary vertical thinking."<sup>2</sup>

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are there future options, are there points of convergence, once we reject the zero-sum premise? Thinking laterally, for example, we can ask ourselves: Are there possible safeguards against war other than the occupation of the territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

Let us assume that for most citizens of the Jewish state there is no single issue more important than security. No country faced with the actual and potential threats of both conventional and guerrilla warfare to which Israel feels itself vulnerable, could deny the importance of geographical considerations, among them in Israel's case, the question of who controls the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the so-called occupied territories. Yet, in light of the meteoric proliferation of deadly arms in the region, there can be no doubt about the decreasing importance of conventional topographic obstacles (so often mentioned as a justification for retaining the territories). Powerful missiles can be launched from Syria, Saudi Arabia, or even Iraq and reach Jerusalem in a matter of minutes.

Lateral thinking encourages consideration of non-military aspects of security, new dimensions of foreign policy that should be considered in the region's search for formulas promoting peace. In addition to formal treaties and agreements offering guarantees—such as demilitarization, the presence of international peace forces, early warning stations and satellite monitoring—emphasis should be placed on de facto common interests which could strongly motivate both sides to seek and maintain peace.

### *The Relationship of Democracy to Peace*

Following De Bono's lead, the following hypothesis is an intuitive formulation for a basic tenet in world politics: In general, democratic states tend to avoid war as a tool for settling disputes. An important security priority for Israel, then, is to ensure that the Palestinian state-to-be is a democratic one. By the same token, the Palestinians have a legitimate interest in seeing Israel as neighbor remain democratic.

In fact, the history of international conflict allows a single extraordinary generalization: *Democratic regimes do not wage war.* Since the creation of nation-states and the establishment of Western-style, liberal regimes, democratic regimes have tended to resort to means other than formally declared warfare to solve their conflicts.

In one comprehensive study, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Winkenfied found conclusive support for the generalization that democratic regimes do not declare war against one another.<sup>3</sup> Brecher and Winkenfied studied international conflicts between 1929 and 1985; so rare and so marginal are those instances of warring democratic regimes in their carefully tabulated data, that they may be worth enumerating.

*Israel-Lebanon, 1948-1949.* In the Israel-Arab conflict during 1948-1949, Lebanon's involvement in the war against the newly independent state of Israel consisted essentially of a declaratory position in solidarity with other, non-democratic countries.

*Guatemala-United States, 1954.* In the Guatemala-United States confrontation, an expeditionary force, armed by the United Fruit Company and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, but composed of and led by Guatemalan exiles, invaded from Honduran territory and took control of Guatemala a few days later.

*Israel-Lebanon, 1982.* Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was originally aimed at the semi-autonomous" Palestinian zone in the south of Lebanon. It was coordinated, to a certain extent, with the help (and the blessing) of the late Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayl.

Reaching back still further in time, a second study entitled *Resort to Arms* (1982) provides chronological table of international wars over the past 200 years that illustrates the apparent absence of war between liberal states. The study concludes that liberal states exercise peaceful restraint and that peace exists among them.<sup>4</sup>

Other scholars and statesmen have offered their support to this hypothesis. In the appendices of his article "Liberalism and World Politics," Michael W. Doyle provides a table of "liberal regimes" (based on Kant's four characteristics: market and private economies, polities that are externally sovereign, citizens who possess juridical rights, and republican representative government). These have grown in number from only three in the eighteenth century to fifty during the period between 1945 and 1982.<sup>5</sup>

Since 1982, many countries (such as the Philippines, Poland, Argentina, and Hungary) provide further illustrations of democratizations. For example, in a 1986 address delivered in Oslo, Norway, Costa Rica's president and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oscar Arias expressly linked the development of formal solutions to the conflicts in Central America to parallel efforts to democratize the regimes in the area:

In Central America we are not seeking peace alone, nor only the peace that will follow some day from political progress, but rather peace and democracy together, indivisible, the end of the shedding of human blood, which is inseparable from the end of the repression of human rights. We do not judge, much less condemn the political or ideological system of any other nations, freely chosen and not exported. We cannot assume that sovereign states will accept types of government that they do not themselves choose. But we can insist that every government respect the universal rights of man, whose value transcends national boundaries and ideological labels. We believe that justice and peace can prosper only together, never separately. A nation that mistreats its own citizens is more likely to maltreat its neighbors.

#### *Democracy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

The theory of peaceful coexistence between democratic neighbors remains to be tested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the uncertain future of democracy in the region is not based solely on the deep-rooted religious, ethnic and national differences between Palestinians and Israelis. Perhaps the most significant stumbling block to peace is mutual doubt regarding the wavering commitment to democratic ideals by the involved parties.

While Israelis, for example, might be willing to concede that a democratic Palestinian state could be a desirable future neighbor, many disbelieve absolutely that the Palestinians (or any Arabs for that matter) are capable of establishing and maintaining a democracy. The fact that there has never been an Arab democracy (with the exception of Lebanon—hardly an encouraging example!) is considered as proof that there never will be one. The Arab people are often viewed by Israelis and other Westerners as inherently incapable of self-government through democratic means.

To be sure, an analysis of the surrounding Arab regimes does not provide much encouragement, with authoritarianism and human rights violations a regular feature of the region's political landscape.<sup>6</sup> The political traditions in the Arab world certainly do not support or provide role models for any fledgling efforts at democratization. Such negativism, however, can be countered by the following observations:

Firstly, nothing in world politics is etched in stone. It has been widely documented that the commitment to developing democratic forms of government—once an exclusive province of the "West"—has spread in the past two decades into southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In Africa, too, the strengthening of democratic institutions at a grassroots level seems to be an emerging and consistent pattern.<sup>7</sup> Even as "latecomers" to the democratization processes, Middle Eastern nations are beginning to initiate small-scale yet significant democratic reforms. And the dizzying pace at which certain Eastern European states have plunged into democratization in recent months, as well as the more plodding efforts of the Soviet Union, demonstrate how quickly a political landscape can change once a commitment to change exists.

In the second place, the Palestinians do not "equal" the Arabs. Their experiences are unique in the Arab world and, in fact, render them likely candidates to spearhead democratization reforms in the Middle East. Certain developments in the Palestinian community—within Israel, in the occupied territories, and at large—definitely justify optimism regarding the prospects for a future democratic Palestinian state. For example, the PLO itself has recently stressed the importance of democratic procedures, with majority-supported resolutions replacing consensual decision-making and more radical groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine stating their willingness to play the role of loyal opposition for a limited period of time. Second, the language of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence—in many ways resembling Israel's own text of 1948—reflects a philosophical commitment to the development of democratic institutions.<sup>8</sup> Third, the dispersion of the Palestinians around the world—in many ways similar to the Jewish diaspora—can be seen as a further guarantee for decentralized decision-making. The diffusion of power is an important precondition for pluralism. Only democracy can encompass the cultural diversity and the varying points of view that are a result of the conditions of exile suffered by the Palestinians over the past forty years.

Fourth, a Palestinian state will most likely be dependent to some degree on the economic and even political support of Western countries (including the United States and the Western European countries, particularly those of the Common Market), as Palestinians have recognized that they cannot afford to alienate Western countries by creating a non-democratic state. Finally, the issue of freedom is fundamental to the outlook of many in the present Palestinian professional and political elites in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Almost exclusively Western-educated, the elite strata of the occupied territories is Western-oriented and will most likely play a major role in formulating the nature of the regime in the future Palestinian state. In fact, should the Palestinian entity not be a democratic one, many of the social, political, and cultural leaders of the community today would be censured, replaced, and possibly exiled, something they would certainly choose to forestall.

A democratic Palestinian state, then, could be a point of convergence, an issue that does not involve a zero-sum gain, serving the interests of Israelis and Palestinians alike. Palestinians must realize that their best chance for an independent state lies in their genuine espousal of democratic principles and their immediate implementation of these principles in whatever functioning political bodies that they

currently have. For their part, Israelis must realize that they have good reason to support the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state that would not only guarantee the rights of its own citizens, but also preserve cooperative and productive relationships with its neighbors, as democratic states are wont to do.

### *Contradiction and Convergence*

De facto arrangements based on common norms and values have been implicitly adopted by the two warring parties since the Six-Day War and earlier. Armistice lines, "red lines" restricting military presence, and the often limited nature of wars have been frequently based on tacit understandings by both sides. The reciprocal treatment of prisoners of war serves as a graphic illustration of this phenomenon. Both sides usually refrain from executing prisoners of war and are willing to exchange prisoners. Other areas of convergence include the "open bridges" policy by which Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians benefit from the passage of merchandise and people over the Jordan River. The use of water from the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers, once seen as a source of friction, is now understood to work toward the mutual benefit of Israel and certain Arab countries.

The most perceptive leaders on both sides understand that war and continued civil strife exact their toll on the warring parties and are of no lasting benefit to either side. The late Israeli defense minister, Moshe Dayan, for example, stressed the importance of rebuilding the cities on the Suez Canal, thus increasing the economic costs of a new war with Egypt. In a similar vein, one retired Israeli general emphasized the damaging psychological consequences of repression. He argued that abstaining from excessive harshness and repressive behavior should reduce the intensity of Palestinians' hostility toward Israelis, thereby mitigating (even if only mildly) the motivation of individual Palestinians to seek revenge against their oppressors.<sup>9</sup> Pursuing this logic implies that avoiding forms of collective punishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which generate retaliatory antagonism manifold, should be considered a high priority for promoting Israel's security concerns.

Questions once considered unnegotiable are now becoming the subject of political discussions and are increasing the possibility of pragmatism winning out over dogmatic, ideological positions. For example, a prominent member of the PLO has admitted the possibility of Jewish settlers remaining in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after an Israeli withdrawal: "The right of Israelis to live in the state of Palestine and the right of Palestinians to live in the State of Israel should be subject of negotiations."<sup>10</sup> Other discussions revolve around the unilateral preference of many Palestinians to restrict their security forces in a future state to a well-trained police guard rather than a full-scale militia. The question of military balance with Israel cannot be realistically considered, given the lack of sufficient air space for the effective operationalizing of combat planes. Saving the high expenditure of a full defense budget would complement the widely shared Israeli aspiration for demilitarization in a future Palestinian state.

The aforementioned examples illustrate that the Israelis, the Palestinians and their Arab supporters have already adopted certain mutually beneficial, informal "rules of the game"—despite the unresolved, indeed conflict-riddled, political situation. All of these examples demonstrate some of the existing areas of convergence, and offer insight into other possible areas of mutual benefit, such as the development of democratic norms in the region.

The strengthening of democratic institutions and practices among both the occupier and the occupied is an important priority for promoting a peaceful relationship between Palestinians and the state of Israel. If the present Israeli government were to acknowledge and pursue multidimensional aspects of security maintenance (for example, economic, political and cultural areas of convergence), rather than propagating historical or mythical commitments to promote purely military security, a rational strategy could be developed to encourage democratization in both communities. However, if such options are unavailable, then it may be important for pragmatic Palestinians to agree to the short-term measures proposed by the Israeli establishment which by design or default will encourage future democratic reforms. The first of such measures is already under discussion: the holding of elections in the Israeli-occupied territories.

According to most observers, the chances of concluding a peace agreement between the Israeli political leadership and the representative Palestinian organization remain slim at best. Hence, mediators from the outside and moderates on both sides have tried to develop formulas detailing the necessary components for initiating constructive steps toward the peaceful resolution of the century-old conflict. The most popular plans for the "peace process" in the last few years have involved two themes. First, some statesmen have proposed an international peace conference which would be convened by the major powers and would pressure the Arabs and the Jews into a compromise. Second, many favor the idea of holding elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for representatives to implement the idea of interim Palestinian autonomy as suggested in the Camp David agreement. The former plan appears to be the preference of the PLO, while the latter came to be embraced by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and former Israeli defence minister Yitzhak Rabin, as well as by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in his "Ten Point" document.

While, admittedly, the Israeli government is only promising municipal elections within the framework of the Camp David agreement, even such limited steps could further democratic processes. As a matter of fact, judging from the experience of elections held by non-representative regimes in other areas of the world (including Philippines, Chile and Nicaragua), problems of control by the authorities have been bypassed by the strong presence of an international component. Representatives of international organizations—parliamentarians, journalists, and other formal or informal observers—currently play a crucial role in insuring that the procedures before and during the elections are conducted in a way in which the state authorities cannot control the results. The international community should encourage Israeli authorities to conduct the West Bank and Gaza elections in adherence to the democratic standards

for elections within Israel. Active foreign monitoring could provide the Palestinian leadership with the necessary and reasonable protection of their interests in the elections without unduly infringing on the sovereignty of Israel. Cooperation among the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian leaders regarding the electoral procedures might serve as yet another incremental step toward addressing each other's needs and interests and form an additional area of political convergence.

There will definitely be a need for Israel to reach an accommodation with the leadership of the Palestinians, which has become increasingly identified with the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, the past positions and actual behavior of the PLO have generated among many Israelis a lack of trust in its present leadership. Hence, the more specific question to be considered is: what type of leadership can better answer Israel's concern for lasting peace and security, while at the same time meeting the basic aspirations of the Palestinians?

Once municipal leadership is elected, there should be no reason why the entire group of mayors could not become the temporary representative body and a partner for negotiations regarding the subsequent steps in the peace process. In fact, this would not be the first time that the elected mayors played a major role in the political life of the occupied territories. Following the sweeping 1976 victory of the nationalist candidates in most towns and cities of the West Bank, the mayors "...within the first few months in office...performed impressively in municipal affairs, and demonstrated a remarkable cooperation and coordination among themselves in political issues....Despite...different approaches and personal-regional rivalries, most, if not all, West Bank mayors endeavored to sustain a united front toward the Israeli government and other external forces."<sup>11</sup>

In other words, there is a historical precedent for the elected mayors becoming the temporary representative body for the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza. To be sure, according to Moshe Ma'oz, this earlier elected body was subjected to measures undertaken by the Israelis "to counter...independent tendencies of the mayors. While upholding its own financial allocations and supervising the registration of external monies, [the military government] tried to confine the activities of the mayors to merely municipal issues, and, accordingly, reduce their powers and hold them on a short leash."<sup>12</sup> However, the military government's efforts "to curb the political activities of the mayors" were not successful at the time, and today—given the *intifada* and the emergence of a new post-cold war world—it would be even more difficult, if not impossible, to implement such a suppressive strategy.

With respect to the PLO leadership in Tunis, it may be in the Palestinian community's interest not to elect alternative Palestinian representatives from the West Bank and Gaza at the national level, because of the possible antagonism—whether real or merely perceived—caused by competing, rival leaderships in the territories and in exile. The PLO can make very clear that any representatives legitimately elected in the territories will automatically be accepted as PLO representatives—thereby coopting them into its structure. It is highly likely that the local elected representatives will identify themselves with the majority groups within the PLO organizations and particularly with its mainstream.



Hence, election of municipal representatives in the Territories might actually preserve the delicate leadership balance within the Palestinian community, not threatening the external PLO leadership, while simultaneously providing a legitimized, temporary negotiating partner for Israel that is not stigmatized by an unfortunate past history.

Following this line of reasoning—turning disadvantages into advantages—we can see that the Israeli government, whether consciously or not, can facilitate the development of a Palestinian leadership compatible with both the PLO aims and with the implementation of democratic processes. These first steps are most likely to endure and evolve if begun from below rather than from above. In a well-known article on "developmental democracy," Richard Sklar has advocated the formation of local government or an autonomous judiciary as a stage in democracy-building in developing countries.<sup>13</sup> From this point of view—and given the fact that the Palestinians have had no previous experience in independent statehood and truly representative institutions—to begin from the grassroots and work upward may be a more prudent and systematic way of establishing permanent pluralistic institutions.

All of this analysis is an attempt to illustrate the means by which the Israeli government might facilitate the development of a Palestinian leadership that is compatible with the PLO aims and yet committed to strengthening the democratic norms within both communities.

It is necessary to recall that the democratic nature of Israel—or of any other state for that matter—is not axiomatic. In fact, some of the democratic standards of the Jewish state have significantly deteriorated since 1967. Striking examples of institutional problems can be found in the rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice in relation to the population of the occupied territories and in the rulings of lower courts concerning Arabs in Israel.<sup>14</sup> No less troublesome is the lack of popular support for some basic principles of civil and political rights, particularly among the youngest age groups. In one recent public opinion poll, 40 percent of the Israeli youth interviewed indicated that they "hate all Arabs."<sup>15</sup>

Prior to the Palestinian uprising, many analysts contended that Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was a model of "benign occupation." Proponents claimed that even if standards of rule in the territories were not comparable to democratic standards within Israel proper, Palestinians nevertheless enjoyed relatively greater freedom than under Arab occupation or in Arab countries. Freedom of the press, academic freedom, and other civil liberties were relatively greater under occupation than under other authoritarian regimes in the region.

However, the concept of "benign occupation" and its alleged relative benefits have been sharply repudiated by the events of the last years since the uprising began in earnest. One paradox of the Israeli occupation—by definition an undemocratic political activity—is that it is being carried out by a society committed to preserving a democratic system for itself. Equally paradoxical is the fact that, as the military rule of law threatens the rights of Arab citizens in the territories, it has also unwittingly promoted the stirrings of democratization among them. Repression of Palestinian leaders during the *intifada* has accelerated the dispersion of decision-making power to the grassroots level and to the younger generation.

There is a broad consensus among those politically active on both sides that a democratic form of government is the preferred option in any type of future solution.<sup>16</sup> Without even defining the specific terms of which existing democratic model would be selected, many analysts now believe that the Palestinians' political agenda is grounded in a Western-style democracy, and that they seek respect for civil and political rights within a state providing for the basic needs and promoting the welfare of the entire population.

The Palestinian uprising represents a landmark in terms of Palestinian self-assertion. For the first time since the 1967 war and the beginning of the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians have taken the initiative and established new patterns of collective behavior, including different forms of grassroots organizing. For twenty years, from 1968 to 1987, the local population reacted to the directives of the Israeli authorities. Now the trend has been reversed. It is the local population which has the initiative and which has by its dominant strategy forced the military and civilian administration into primarily reactive measures.

The focused striving for "empowerment," coupled with increasingly pragmatic views (such as the acceptance of territorial compromise with Israel) has been persuasive in advancing the Palestinian point of view. Yet, frustration with the dearth of political achievements has strengthened the hand of extremist factions, intensifying the number of political assassinations of alleged "collaborators" as a form of struggle, for example. Similarly, there exists a clear and present danger that democracy within Israel proper will begin to disintegrate as extreme chauvinist, militarist and fundamentalist forces seek to silence those with opinions that differ from their own.

Both Palestinians and Israelis must recognize this dangerous trend which threatens to blight their chances for a political life without intimidation. And both sides must recognize that the surest way to guard against such dangers is to proceed with haste to resolve their mutual differences. The implementation of democratization should not be made contingent upon the outcome of either the *intifada* or the Israeli election initiatives. Rather, the long-term commitment to Israeli and Palestinian democratization should prove a powerful impetus toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

### **Conclusion**

For the Jewish people the highest priority has been and continues to be assuring security in a complex, and currently hostile Middle East landscape. However, with powerful missiles that can now be launched from Saudi Arabia or Syria, the traditional approach to Israeli security—focusing on the maintenance of a strong military force and the seeking of diplomatic cease-fires and treaties—is no longer adequate. More creative approaches must be pursued in addressing security questions. Indeed, a simple rephrasing of the question often allows for broader insight into the problem than do traditional modes of analyzing security. That is, beyond conventional military strategies—often detrimental to both sides—what areas of mutual benefit may be discovered to promote Israeli security? Beyond continued militarization

and formal, conventional legalistic diplomacy, can emphasis be placed on de facto, common interests that will strongly impel both sides to promote their respective security and identity needs?

It is interesting to consider in this connection what processes have occurred when occupying powers have withdrawn from territories where democracy eventually prevailed (Austria, West Germany, Japan). In cases where the occupying power perceived its presence as a result of an unprovoked attack by a non-democratic regime, it has regarded it as a right to not evacuate the conquered lands without leaving behind a democratically elected government. Not only that, but restrictions have been enforced on the vanquished, such as the outlawing of irredentist parties which advocated revanche or territorial expansion. When the defeated countries became independent, some elements within them originally perceived such stipulations as limiting their freedom, but in retrospect they may not be unhappy with the outcome. A key example is post-World War II Japan.

The strengthening of democratic institutions and practices among the Palestinians should be a high priority in the search for a peaceful relationship between Israel and the future Palestinian state. We believe that if Israel's present government were truly concerned with security rather than with historical or mythical commitments to the "liberated territories," a rational strategy could be developed in order to encourage democratic trends. In the past, however, the preferred Israeli strategy has been to encourage the traditional, authoritarian, uneducated and corrupt elites (the Village League concept), under the assumption that it was easier to induce such elements of the occupied population to acquiesce to Israeli rule. This practice was clearly not designed to encourage future cooperation on an equal footing between the two nations.

Unfortunately, since a tendency to support indigenous democratic leadership among the Palestinians—as a reflection of enlightened self-interest—does not seem to prevail among the Israeli establishment, it may be necessary for pragmatic Palestinians to examine how best to take advantage of those limited measures proposed by the occupation government. Namely: unilateral elections; for example, if the Shamir-Baker-Mubarak plans fail to lead anywhere, the Palestinians can declare their intention to proceed with the election plans on their own.

Are there, after all, any areas of agreement based on a commonality of interest by both the Israelis and the Palestinians? In the words of Bassam Abu Sharif, a noted Palestinian leader who has stressed the urgency of moving from points of conflict to issues of convergence, "No one can understand the Jewish people's centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it is to be stateless and the object of fear and prejudice of the nations."<sup>17</sup> The search for democracy in the Middle East at this moment in history is in the clear interests of both peoples.

1. Paradoxically, democratization has begun to seem possible in Kuwait and even in Saudi Arabia, as a direct result of the conflict in the Gulf. See the analysis by Thomas Friedman in his article "Curiously a Dictator Forces the Middle East to Ponder Democracy," in the New York Times (Sunday, Sept. 2, 1990, section 4, pp. 1-2).
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3. Michael Brecher, Jonathan Winkelfeld and Sheila Moser, Crises in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford; New York: Permagon Press, 1988.)
4. Melvin Small and David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1890 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).
5. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, Dec. 1986, pp. 1151-1169. An analysis of the argument that democracies do not fight other democracies is offered by Robert L. Rothstein in an unpublished speech, "Weak Democracy and the Prospects for Peace and Prosperity in the Third World," delivered at the United States Institute for Peace conference, "Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Third World," Oct. 3-5, 1990.
6. Interestingly enough, Egypt, the only Arab country to have thus far concluded a peace treaty with Israel, has a regime which appears to be more open and free than those of its Arab neighbors. But even there, much remains to be desired.
7. See Richard L. Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 29, no. 4 (Oct. 1987), pp. 686-714.
8. Sari Nusseibeh, Ha'aretz supplement, Sept. 7, 1989. See also Jonathan Kuttub, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 10, 1989.
9. Reuven Gal (ed.), The Seventh War: The Effects of the Intifada on Israeli Society (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1990), in Hebrew.
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13. Richard Sklar, op. cit.
14. Darwish Nasser, Ha'aretz, March 9, 1988.
15. Ha'aretz, August 8, 1989.
16. See, for example, Mark Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) and Jerome Segal, Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace (Chicago: L. Hill Books, 1989).
17. Bassam Abu Sharif, New York Times, June 22, 1988.

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THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS  
IN THE PLO:  
IDEOLOGY, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY

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(Unedited First Draft)  
January 29, 1992

## INTRODUCTION

The quest for democracy is emerging to be a global phenomenon, and since the post-World War II era it has developed into a universal political norm.(1) In fact, the philosophical aspects of democracy presented in its universality, led to the rise of nationalism, a prelude to independence and a prime factor for "the democratization of the peripheralized societies".(2) For democracy to be entrenched in one's society, it has to be deepened not only on the institutional level but on the socio-political structures and processes.(3) Further, a recognized principle of national self-determination has been a culmination to the globalization of democracy, a principle that most of the Third World Countries are struggling to achieve and the Palestinians are no exception.

The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) as a non-state actor in world politics could not evade the new global trends of democratization, hence it incorporated these trends in its ideology, structure and strategy. This new way of thinking by the PLO has transcended into political realism, pragmatism and political accommodation, in dealing with the conflict with Israel and inter-Arab politics.

The PLO like any other Third World revolutionary movements, defines its political and military struggle according to the four elements discussed by S. Neil MacFarlane in his idea of national liberation, which is comprised of: a- political independence; b- freedom from external economic control; c- social revolution; and d- "Cultural regeneration".(4) However, for democracy to succeed, it has to be institutionalized along a process that could mediate plural and conflicting interests emerging once statehood is declared. This transition is not an easy one, for developing societies lack the experience in dealing with such methods which will often hamper its legitimacy and performance.(5) Nevertheless, these concepts will be elucidated further when describing the evolution of Palestinian politics and its quest for the democratization of its civil and institutional infrastructure.

Pluralism in Palestinian politics will be discussed in the context of Arab politics that has been profoundly eroding from fragmentations, repressive conditions, economic disparities, and lack of political legitimacy and credibility. In fact, the tenets of democracy - political participation, power sharing and public accountability are non-existent in the prevailing



Arab States. Furthermore, the lack of self-sustaining institutions embedded in consolidated communities, constitute a serious impediment towards the emergence of democracy.(6) Consequently, the Arab Middle East is suffering from a pervasive industrial growth, centralized government, heavily militarized and bureaucratized.(7) Nevertheless, the Middle East should be perceived beyond its geopolitical boundaries, because its people are striving to achieve political freedom, fair justice and decent life.

Of course, Palestinian nationalism an offshoot of pan-Arabism, had developed along the years due to its specificity, a secular ideology based largely on territorial determination. As such, it seeks to encompass members of different faiths, Christians, as well as Muslims, and the history of mandatory Palestine attests to the secular tendencies within the movement, when in the early 1920's, the first political organizations that developed in Palestine were the Muslim-Christian Associations. In fact, the socio-political and religious tolerance in Palestinian politics manifested clear distinctiveness in comparison with that of Arab politics. In the ensuing years when the PLO was founded, a senior political organization -Fatah- emphasized the non-religious and pluralistic character of Palestinian Nationalism.

Ideologically, the Palestinian national movement has been committed to democracy and almost all Palestinians embrace this objective. Of course, this has been facilitated by the high level of education achieved among Palestinians and the existence of Palestinian institutions and professional societies. As such, the PLO -an umbrella organization- has been portrayed as "the institutional expression of Palestinian nationalism". (8)

It is the organizational framework within which all Palestinian cultural, social, educational, political and military activities are highly integrated.(9) Moreover, the PLO provides complex services to the Palestinians who in turn, give it legitimacy and accountability. An added burden on the PLO, is the integration of the various attitudes and positions of a complex people consisting of refugees living in camps, intellectuals, middle-class merchants and resistance fighters. Another feature of Palestinian politics is the high degree of political consciousness and participation among Palestinian. One could draw an immediate conclusion, that Palestinians are substantially more secular in their political institutions and processes than are most Arab Peoples.(10)

In recent years, the PLO has emphasized in its political programs the need for democratization and pragmatism. Undoubtedly, the Intifada has been a catalyst in providing change to perceptions, attitudes and even political strategy, and the principle of negotiations as a tool for political settlement and accommodation. These factors are important cornerstones of democratic behavior that characterize the PLO as a quasi-governmental agency.

It is the aim of this paper to analyze the nature of democratic behavior and trends in the PLO politics and infrastructure, along with the changes in its political strategies. Further, a serious look at the PNC (Palestinian National Council) resolutions could assist us in detecting democratic trends and pluralist thinking among the Palestinian decision-makers. Finally, there will be emphasis on the PLO political institutions, the shift from consensus-building into majority politics, combined with the extensive civilian institutional infrastructure that would provide the basis for a democratic government and state.

#### THE ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB REGIMES

To understand the pluralistic thinking in Palestinian politics, it has to be evaluated within the context of the Arab world, that has failed for several decades to institute any sort of a meaningful, and workable democratic system. Albeit, most Arab States' constitutions boast of democratic ideals, nevertheless, the situation on the ground remained the same: no separation of powers, no checks and balances and no genuinely representative governments. The entire nation-state in the Arab World is at the mercy of its chief executive, who manipulates both the legislature and the judiciary. However, students of the Middle East constantly attempt to fathom and rationalize the causal factors that lead to Arab failure in practicing democracy in their system of governments. Needless to say, socio-economic, political, historical and cultural factors lie at the heart of this state of affairs.

Regardless of Pan-Arabism -a proclaimed norm- among the ruling classes and a widely shared sentiment by the Arab masses; Arab society is highly heterogeneous in its structure and is suffering from factionalism, parochialism, tribalism and regionalism. Furthermore, Arab countries suffer

from foreign control, economic subservience, the power of traditional loyalties (religious, kinship and ethnic), and socio-economic and political repressive conditions. And above all, according to Eqbal Ahmad, a Middle Eastern scholar, "The arab world is fragmented because it lacks any genuine link between political power and civil society." Consequently, this leads to a crisis in the leadership's legitimacy which cannot survive except through oppression and authoritarianism. No wonder then, the central problems of Arab governments today are political accountability and legitimacy. However, this lack of legitimacy accounts to the unstable character of Arab regimes which makes it autocratic and volatile in its political behavior. According to Dankwart Rostaw, "...the ideas of freedom, democracy, and socialism are today inextricable criteria for legitimate political order in the Arab World, as in most of the Third World, and unfortunately, far from being achieved."

One of the explanations that have been advanced for the shortcomings of Middle Eastern democracies, is the suffering of the Arab World from the vestige of imperialist rule, that aims at fragmenting the Arab World and establishing ruling classes to act as proxy regimes, as well as creating economically and socially dependent entities that would perpetually be subjugated to the imperialist powers.(11) One must acknowledge, that not all of the impediments to Arab progress have been created by external forces. The prevalence in Arab countries of traditional loyalties, high illiteracy rates, value orientations, have been significant factors in slowing the democratization pace in the Arab World, which ultimately, falls prey to the whims of the ruling elites. Furthermore, the discordance between Arab Heritage and Western values, have made it difficult for the Arabs to permeate into their societal fabrics, democratic values that culminated from a long process of development in the West. Therefore, the lack of an Arab substructural system responding to the westernization and modernization process, created a gap between reality and dream.(12)

There is no doubt, that the absence of democracy in the Arab world is an outcome of the successive failures by the nationalists in self-transformation, and in changing the fundamental social structures that promote tribalism and traditional loyalties. Consequently, the opposition to the ruling political system is oppressed and the imposition of policies by the ruling elite is the common standards in the Arab world. Unfortunately, the crisis of Arab intellectuals also exacerbated the status quo and have played a negative role

in bridging the gaps in society. Most of the intellectuals are being coopted by the political systems in the Arab world, and those who reneged suffer from alienation and hence emigrate to the West. This is a good example why there is a brain drain in the Middle East.(13)

By and large, democracy has been a historical product of modern Western societies that entailed the establishment of democratic political systems. The Middle East however, lacks the structural institutional framework for democratic participation, not to mention, the preclusion of a traditional value system which is discordant with that of the West makes it more difficult to enmesh the idea of democracy in an alien soil.(14)

Almost thirty five years ago, a distinguished Arab scholar, Charles Issawi, published a brilliant analysis of the "economic and social foundations of democracy in the Middle East." He pointed out that democracy does not thrive in the contemporary Middle East, "...because the economic and social basis which it requires is as yet non-existent."(15) However, what is required is a socio-economic transformation that could respond to the modern state, and could lay down the principles of democracy.(16) It is worth mentioning that Issawi's arguments were published in International Affairs in 1956. An immediate question is asked, what has happened in the Middle East since then?" One answer could be, that the Middle East had witnessed a social change that lacked structural transformation. Again to quote Issawi,\* "In the Middle East the economic and social soil is still not deep enough to enable political democracy to strike root and flourish. What is needed is not merely constitutional or administrative reforms, not just a change in government machinery or personnel."(17) Bassam Tibi, a Middle Eastern scholar bolsters Issawi's arguments and says: "Arabs have witnessed numerous changes of Governments and changes of political personnel carrying an abundance of different labels."(18) He further adds, "...Arabs continue to experience one and the same pattern of political culture, i.e. political oppression and the lack of political freedom."(19)

One could simply infer, that Arab States dominate all aspects of life and society in the Middle East, and respect for the individual citizen in Arab polity is non-existent.

Arab liberal thought had failed in defining democracy as a structure or as a system of social transformation, nevertheless, it ostensibly portrayed democracy as an idea imported from the West and a panacea towards the solution

of Arab socio-political malaise. One of the major pitfalls of Arab liberal thought, was the lack of understanding to the dynamics of production relations and how it could generate a social system that would be responsive to this change on the superstructural level. Therefore, value systems cannot be ventured without a viable and a corresponding structural roots.(20) In fact, the rationale given by Middle East scholars on the failure of the democratic processes in the Arab World, was due to the inadequacy of an economic substructure that would facilitate the incorporation of the democratic ideals not as ideological frills, but as part of an institutional-structural framework. As a result, the concepts of democracy were not concretized by the ruling elites, irrespective of the slogans of secularism, nationalism and freedom, that were espoused in their defiance to colonialism. However once the Arab World was independent from the vestiges of colonialism, the ruling elites were jockeying to establish dependent societies on the West. This in essence is the crux of the problem facing Arab societies today, and the pertinent question asked, how could a society be democratic when an integral part to democracy, i.e. freedom, is non-existent. The current political systems in the Arab World use liberal and democratic concepts i.e. "(pluralism) as instruments aimed at containing the street, rather than unleashing it."(21) According to Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, a noted Arab scholar and an Islamist,

"People must be ready and equipped to actively take part in public life. Outbursts of popular participation due to frustration, alienation, and repression need not necessarily lead to genuine democratic conduct but can, on the contrary, breed populism, demagoguery, and fascism."(22)

He further adds that "democracy needs a certain level of social maturity to be genuinely implemented. Democracy is always a conquest, not a grant. It is implemented through a process."(23) However, the populist socialists who came after the liberals, emphasized the freedom of the state in shaping society and denied political freedom to the individual citizens. In fact, it was short-lived and doomed to failure like the liberals. Among the vibrant actors on the political scene, are the propounders of political Islam, who categorically oppose the notion of freedom and democracy, for such concepts to them are considered "Hulul Mustaurada" (imported solutions).(24) For the Muslim fundamentalists, Islam is the only viable option for the resolution of Arab

problems, be it on the socio-economic or political levels, and 'in Islam there is "Shura" and "Ijma" and no democracy. Democracy is an alien concept stigmatized by the Western hegemons and their imperialist motives in recolonizing the Muslim Arab World. Furthermore, they accuse the present Arab regimes as being stooges to the West and hence should be fought and put down.\* In fact, Muslim fundamentalists in the Arab world had never been successful in controlling any Arab political system, however, the recent Algerian elections to the Parliament has been a good indication, that there is a mood of despair among the Arabs and in particular, after the Gulf war. This ebb and flow of Islamic resurgence in the Middle East is related to the degree of success or failure by secular Arab regimes in responding to the aspirations of the Arab masses. As a matter of fact, there are still hopeful signs, among which is the appearance of a generation that is highly educated than its predecessors, more trained professionally, more humane and socially conscious. The Arab nationalist movement must induce pressures on the Arab regimes to liberalize through modernization, industrialization, institutionalization and improved communication systems in the Arab countries. Above all, there should be a protection to basic human rights and freedom of expression.

\* Democracy is not an absolute concept, it is intertwined organically with freedom to reach an ideal state. Substantively, democracy strives to create parity between the individual and society, and formally, it strives towards political participation and representative government. Unfortunately, the Arab World is still suffering from divisiveness, fractionalization, social incohesiveness, parochialism, patriarchal relations, authoritarianism and glaring inequalities of income and opportunity. Of course, democracy in the Arab World is a far-fetched objective because it is still suffering from a disorganic development ( artificial growth ), that produces two conditions: a- demoralization, b-and dependency. However, what we are witnessing in the Arab World today is a stalemate that is sitting on a powder keg. If Arab secularists fail to change the present status quo, what will emerge is a strong fundamentalist tide that would be hard to contain. The Arab World is at decision crossroads and with the global transformation it would be imperative to initiate radical changes by the Arab leaders in their respective countries. The required changes should be substantive and instrumental, aiming at the grassroot level and ending with a genuine social change that would lead to economic parity, political participation and a representative

government. This is democracy it entails doing and not expounding.

It is in the light of this socio-political Arab setting, that I will discuss the democratization trends in the Palestinian national movement. However, it will be intellectually erratic to compare the democratic trends among Palestinians with that of the Western liberal societies. Therefore, pluralism in the PLO is relatively assessed in the context of Arab politics.

### ORIGINS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLO

The Palestine Liberation Organization is the organizational framework which embraces commando groups, trade unions, professional associations as well as leading national figures -meet to work for the achievement of Palestinian aspirations and goals.(25) Furthermore, it entails political aims of military action to demonstrate its international presence, mobilize the scattered Palestinian people and actively wear down the Israelis.(26) However, it will be important to shed some lights on the historic evolution of the Palestinian nationalism. to understand better the sense of historic continuum and to justify the actions and deeds of the present Palestinian leadership.

The awakening of Arab consciousness in modern times and the consequent rise of Arab nationalism can be attributed, inter alia, to the activities of the Zionists, to the rise of Turkish nationalism replacing Ottomanism and the impact of the First World War. The Palestinians were part of the Arab World sharing with it many of its internal developments as well as some of its external influences. Zionism was particularly influential in shaping their current politics and in determining their political destiny.

Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. For centuries, Arabs and Jews have developed deep roots and emotional attachments to it. In time, the roots and the attachments became important in the development of two separate, but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and Zionism. Both nationalisms strove to ultimately gain control of Palestine.

Historically, the Palestinian question can be related to the problem of Western intervention- cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism

and political penetrations in the form of colonial rule. However, while Jewish nationalism -political Zionism- originated in the intellectual and emotional responses to the Pogroms of East Europe and Russia, the nationalism of the Arabs was a direct reaction to Ottoman oppression and European colonialism.

One should keep in mind that the two nationalisms appeared around the same time, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and reached the peak of their political strength later in the twentieth century. In the meantime, they were tied to the outcome of political decisions made in Europe. Although their aspirations were to be realized in Palestine, far away from Europe, their fortunes and misfortunes depended heavily on the politics of Europe, particularly those of the big powers.

The awakening interest of Arabs in their cultural heritage and traditions gave birth to Arab nationalism in the key cities of the Fertile Crescent. The nascent Arab national movement had its political organization and strength in Syria, particularly in Damascus. However, due to the traumatized experience of the Arab political elites in defying Western colonial rule and the threat of Zionism -Jewish settler movement- Arab nationalism lost its universalism, which induced the political elites of Syria, Iraq and Palestine towards local nationalism and priorities and concerns. In Particular, the Palestinian "a'yan" who were disenchanted with the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement, were forced to encounter specific objective conditions that were in contradiction with their aspiration of national self-determination and hence political independence. According to Mohammad Muslih, a noted historian on the origins of Palestinian nationalism,

"...there were three threads in the Palestinian opposition to Zionism in Ottoman times: Ottoman loyalism, Palestinian patriotism, and Arab nationalism. Ottoman loyalism dictated the rejection of Zionism because it was bent upon separating Palestine from the Ottoman State; Palestinian patriotism dictated its rejection on the ground that it was a deadly threat to the Palestinians; and Arab nationalism called for its rejection because it would wrest Palestine from Arab hands and thwart the cherished goal of Arab unity."(27)

In fact, Palestinian nationalism had its specificity in developing its own ideology and institutional framework, and that was due to two important developments after the war, according to Muslih: "one, internal, pertained to the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement, and the other, external,



pertained to the dismemberment of Syria at the hands of ' Britain and France.'(28) One could draw an immediate conclusion, that Zionism was a catalyst in developing Palestinian nationalism but it never contributed to its creation. Zionism provided the Palestinians with a centralized focus for their national struggle.(29) Regardless of its unique characteristic, Palestinian nationalism incorporated the ideals of pan-Arabism revolving around Arab unity and independence.

It is impossible to understand the Palestinian national movement without the constant reminder that the movement was profoundly influenced, and, to a certain degree, shaped by its long and difficult struggle with the Zionists. One would expect that the ferocity of the struggle between the Palestinian Arabs on the one hand and the Zionists and their British ally on the other would unite the Palestinian Arab movement and would consolidate its forces to make it a more formidable force. Yet unfortunately, the Palestinian Arabs could not escape their traditional rivalries. The Palestinian national movement fell victim to internal divisions and political fragmentations. At times, Arabs fought Arabs while their Zionist enemy confronted them with unusual stubbornness and determination to succeed in their ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

In fact, the British policy of "divide and rule", succeeded and the rivalry between the two leading Palestinian families, the Husseinis and Nashashibis (A'yan class of Jerusalem), took a sharp turn during the first decade of British mandate. These families manipulated all the ties of kin, class and patronage to win over new supporters. Unfortunately, the traditional leadership did not realize in the 1930's that the future did not belong to it for the Arabs would lose Palestine partly in 1948. A Jewish state would be established in most of the country and the rest would go under Jordanian and Egyptian rules. Worse yet, down this pipeline the future looked gloomier. The whole of Palestine would go under Jewish rule and there would be no assurances that stability in the region or peace might one day prevail.(30)

Of course, the history of Palestine did not end with the downfall of the traditional leadership in the 1930's, it took on several other courses to lead us to the present intricate situation. In spite of the permanency of the actors to the conflict, the world objective conditions created new facts and realities to deal with and the Palestinian national movement with a new

leadership in the early sixties, took on the challenge in pursuing the Palestinians aspiration towards the fulfillment of their goal -an independent Palestinian state. This heavy burden was shouldered by the PLO which was officially created in 1964, by a decision from the Arab League. Of course, Nasser's Egypt backed the idea in order to coopt the new organization within the League under his control.(31) This in turn would preclude any Palestinian action against Israel that might draw Egypt into a confrontation with it.(32) The PLO was headed by Ahmad al-Shugayri, known for his affiliation with Nasser, and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was directly under the Arab unified command headed by an Egyptian. The first inaugural conference of the PLO was held in May 1964, and its head started immediately rousing for material and public support from the various Arab capitals and in particular from the Arab Gulf States.

Since its inception the PLO was embroiled in factional bickering because its existence and decision-making process was at the behest of inter-Arab rivalries, especially Syria and Egypt and to a certain degree Jordan. Fatah, a leading organization within the PLO had been explicit in transforming its ideology of national liberation to best serve the Palestinian cause, by emphasizing military action against Israel and exonerating itself from inter-Arab feud. According to Helena Cobban,

"But it was in the collapse of the previously existing system of inter-State relations in the Arab World, its checks, balances and interrelated ideologies, that Fatah's most explosively dynamic chance for growth arose, the chance that was to catapult Fatah into the leadership of the PLO."(33)

Irrespective of Fatah's predominance in the PLO, the June 1967 war was a disaster for the Arab states as well as to the Palestinians in large. Another exodus of Palestinian refugees to Jordan and to other Arab States, Syria and Lebanon, were denied return to their homes, while the rest of the Palestinians were destined to stay on their soil and suffer from Israeli occupation. In spite of this cataclysmic effect on the Palestinians plight, new orientations to advocate Palestinian nationalism were put to the fore by the political organizations. The Arab military might was shattered and the leadership disoriented and disarrayed, and the International community was more sympathetic with Israel than Arab intransigent regimes, as they were presented in the international press and world public opinion. Consequently,

Palestinian leaders became disenchanted by the Arab regimes, albeit they were supportive to them, began to call for Palestinian organizations independent of Arab control. Here again, we see Palestinians diverting from the cause of Pan-Arabism and Arab unity to Palestinian nationalism and struggle for independence.

After the 1967 "Naksa", there appeared a crushing need for the reconstruction of Palestinian life. The building of an organizational infrastructure became a top priority for responding to the growing needs and sentiments of the Palestinians. This objective was imperative, however, other activities and goals became subservient. Ideology, armed struggle and diplomatic posture were secondary to the building of an organization that could claim and act on behalf of all Palestinians. In other words, the Palestinian leadership concerted its efforts to gain legitimacy and credibility not only from Palestinians but also from the international community. The task pursued entailed mundane organizational activities of purchasing arms, raising funds and developing a territorial base that could assist them in being in close touch with the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, as well as to launch military activities against Israel.

Of course, the building of such an organizational structure was a difficult task and required strenuous efforts to accomplish. Therefore, in 1967-1968, the Palestinian organizations struggling to consolidate their power, could not afford open confrontations with small organizations that proliferated during that time. However, the larger commando groups contrived not by sheer force but by persuasion to coopt those small groups under their domain. This tolerance of division and diversity characterized the Palestinian nationalist movement, regardless of its rationale in doing so, with a sense of pluralism that thrived to become almost a tradition. In spite of the efforts induced in building a unified nationalist movement, the Palestinians could not evade the social divisions and the fragmented authority in Palestinian society. Actually, it was in February 1969, when Fatah (The Palestinian national liberation movement) succeeded in controlling the PLO and in uniting to a certain degree the fragmented commando movements.(34)

Since the aim of this study is to highlight the democratic trends in the PLO, less emphasis will be put on the early historic politics of the PLO, except when dealing with strategy through the PNC (Palestinian National Council) resolutions. However, in order to understand the nature of

Palestinian politics, it is imperative to discuss the PLO's structure and how decisions are made. This could be reflective in the electoral process within the PNC and the various other organs of the PLO.

## THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE PLO

Definitely, the PLO succeeded in reconstituting a shattered Palestinian society, this it accomplished under severe conditions and difficult environment. The PLO managed to operate a remarkable infrastructure against all odds, thus catering to the political and existential needs of the dispersed Palestinians.(35)

According to Cheryl Rubenberg,

"The PLO's role goes beyond the traditional roles of national liberation movements, for it not only struggles for the attainment of the national political rights of the Palestinian people, but it is the only instrument for the reconstitution of Palestinian shattered society... The PLO has to rehabilitate a nation as well as to struggle for its liberation."(36)

Despite the militant elements in the organizational structure of the PLO, it succeeded in building a civilian-institutional infrastructure that tended to the needs of the Palestinian nation in exile. In fact, the myriad of social institutions culminated in the political implications of institutionalization, which in turn, was crucial in the development of a framework dealing with the internal political process and strategy formulations.(37) The viability of this infrastructure provided the PLO with the means and mechanisms in containing factionalism and divisiveness among the resistance groups, and in representing the Palestinians abroad, not to mention the rendering of medicare and social care to the refugee communities in Lebanon and elsewhere.(38) It is important to note, that Fatah being the largest group within the PLO is the wealthiest and most influential, yet it cannot arbitrarily set PLO policies without the coordination with the other smaller groups. This is because, Fatah fears fragmentation and cannot afford losing the representative and democratic image, and above all, the influence of Arab States which prompts it to accommodate to the smaller group a political leverage far beyond their proportions and capabilities.(39) Consequently, the PLO's leadership has always struggled to portray a democratic image at the expense of managing

conflicting interests within the factions and the Palestinian Community. In spite of occasional abrasive relationship with the smaller groups within the PLO, Fatah has ostensibly buttressed national unity within the organization, a concept that is imperative in building democratic relations. However, in terms of tactics the smaller groups differ from the mainstream, but Fatah always manages in setting commonalities abound, helped by the institutions that are geared to promote unity and avoid fractionalization.(40) This uniqueness of the PLO transcends its traditional concept of a national liberation struggle and makes it unique in comparison with other national liberation movements. In the fall of 1981 Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, explained this uniqueness when he said:

"Many people think that the cause of Palestine resembles that of Vietnam, Algeria, or even South Africa. But although there is a resemblance in some aspects, there is something entirely unique about our cause. What we have been, and still are, confronted with is not merely foreign invasion, occupation, and even settlement. All this has been experienced by other countries. But no other country has been confronted with a plan to liquidate its national identity, as has happened in the case of Palestine, nor confronted a plan to empty a country of its people as has happened in the case of the Palestinian people. It goes beyond anything previously recorded in modern history."(41)

The institutionalization process by the PLO reflects political maturity of the Palestinian people and its historic leadership, thus legitimizing its quest for nationhood and ultimately for statehood.

## THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PLO

The most important political institutions of the PLO are the Palestinian National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee, according to the Fundamental Law. The PLO has a state infrastructure because it has three branches of government, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.(42)

### A- THE NATIONAL COUNCIL:

The National Council is an equivalent of a parliament, it is the supreme authority formulating policies and programs for the PLO. Its term of office is

two years, however, it meets regularly in ordinary sessions upon the request of the Executive Committee or a quarter of its members. Between 1964-67, the ordinary session was annual, but the fourth ordinary session of July 1968 resolved that ordinary session be held twice a year. (43) The Council is comprised of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, and a secretary, all elected by the Council. Its membership is nominated by a committee of the preceding institutions and organizations of the Palestinian communities. The objective is to secure a fair representation of all Palestinian individuals in all walks of life.

It is important to note, that the members of the PNC should be directly elected by the Palestinian people, but in practice this was not possible, for participation has always been the culmination of lengthy debates and hot arguments between the various factions of the PLO prior to each PNC session. (44) During its regular sessions the Council considers the report of the Executive Committee on the accomplishments of the various organs of the PLO, the report of the Palestinian National Fund, the budget of the PLO; the recommendations of various Council committees, and any other issues submitted for considerations. Two thirds of its membership form the quorum; and decisions are taken by simple majority.

#### B- THE CENTRAL COUNCIL:

The National Council in its eleventh session, in January 1973 created a Central Council from its own membership to follow up and implement its resolutions. The Council serves Consultative functions to the PLO leadership. It is intermediate in level between itself and a fully-fledged session of the PNC, and ensures the various factions within the PLO continued effective participation in PLO affairs and in the PLO's constituency. (46) Its membership is comprised of the executive committee, along with at least an equivalent number of other members directly elected from the PNC. (47) It meets at least once every three months and serves a combined legislative-executive function. (48)

#### C- THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

According to the Fundamental Law, the second most important organization within the PLO is the Executive Committee "Cabinet", which functions as the Executive branch of the organization. The PNC selects its members and in turn

the members elect the Chairman. The Executive Committee is in permanent session and its members work on a full-time basis.(49) It is responsible to the National Council Collectively and individually for the execution of the policies, plans, programs drawn up by the National Council. The number of Executive Committee members was set by the Fundamental Law at a maximum of fifteen, including the Chairman.(50)

The Executive Committee carries out four major functions:

- 1- It officially represents the Palestinian people.
- 2- It supervises the various organs of the PLO.
- 3- It draws up programs and issues directives, and takes decisions on the organization of the PLO, provided they don't contradict the National Charter.
- 4- It executes the financial policy of the PLO and prepares its budget. In short, it directs all the activities of the PLO, in accordance with the general plans and resolutions passed by the National Council. However, within the Executive Committee, two thirds of the members form a necessary quorum and decisions are taken by a simple majority.(52) Since the Executive committee is elected by and from the National Council, it is usually fairly representative of the power structure of the various Commando Organizations in the Council.(53)

#### D- THE PALESTINE NATIONAL FUND:

Another major institution of the PLO stipulated in the Fundamental Law is the Palestine National Fund. Revenues of the Fund were to come from the following sources: 1- A fixed tax of 5 to 7 percent of wages earned, on all Palestinians and collected by the Arab governments of the states in which they reside. 2- Financial contributions by the Arab governments and people. 3- Loans and contributions from Arab governments and friendly nations. 4- Any additional sources approved by the PNC.(54)

The Chairman of the board of directors to the Fund is elected by the National Council, who automatically becomes member of the Executive Committee. The other eleven members of the board are appointed by the Executive Committee for a three-year term. One of the major functions of the Fund, is its supervision of the expenditures of the PLO and its institutions.(55)

#### E- THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT:

The PLO's diplomatic activities are carried out through the Political

Department. The head of the department, compared to a foreign minister, (Mr. Qaddumi) represents the PLO at Arab summits and conferences and at special United Nations sessions, and performs other diplomatic duties. The department oversees the offices of the PLO in foreign countries.(56)

F- THE INFORMATION BUREAU:

The PLO has an Information Bureau which performs both informational and public relations functions. The Office deals with newspeople, and has its own newspaper, Filastin al-Thawra (Palestine Revolution), its own news Agency, WAFA, and it publishes a bimonthly Journal in French and English, entitled Palestine.(57)

In addition to its political organs, the PLO was able to develop its own regular army and an active military police in Lebanon. However, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the military and civilian infrastructure of the Palestinians were almost shattered. A closer look at the formal structure of the major political organs of the PLO, prompts one draw several inferences about the nature of the political process in the PLO and to what extent sharing of power and collective decision making is applicable. The basic premise is that the PLO along the years, had established a quasi-state form of organizations that functioned in a democratic way and therefore could not have practiced authoritarianism since there is no finite territorial state and the Palestinians are dispersed. It is valid to say then, that the legitimacy of the PLO is derived from the Palestinian people, because "The PLO as an umbrella organization subsumes all the various elements of the Palestinian nationalist movement [which] makes authoritarianism an unlikely modus operandi".(58) Furthermore, the PLO has succeeded in maintaining its legitimacy by integrating the various and complex positions and attitudes of the Palestinian social strata, which by and large, has been one of the strongest elements in the PLO. Of course, the high level of literacy among Palestinians, and their political consciousness which is deep due to dispersion, occupation and repression by Israel as well as by authoritarian Arab regimes, gives the Palestinians a unique flavor not exhibited in any of Arab states.

In terms of decision-making, the PLO strives towards consensus although constitutionally, a simple majority could do. Unlike other Arab states, the chief executive in the PLO cannot solely make arbitrations or unilateral



decisions, he could use the tools of persuasion and bargaining in order to arrive at balance among the diverse political trends in the PLO. It is fairly clear, then, that authoritarianism could exacerbate factionalism and divisiveness, a trend that could dismantle the PLO and deprive it from its legitimacy. Moreover, the non-centralization of PLO authority in a finite territorial state, could not help in developing authoritarianism that could crush the opposition. As a matter of fact, the PLO leadership has always resorted to the use of functional pragmatism in accommodating to the issue of factionalism. Therefore, negotiations and bargaining along with persuasion, have been considered plausible tactics by the PLO, based not only on tactics but along ideological lines, and since Fatah is the predominant faction, it can call the shots without deep confrontations and outright contradictions. Chairman Arafat has been a master of diplomacy in containing Palestinian factionalism, and had contrived successfully, in using the PLO's political structure in promoting his ideas and achieving his pragmatic trends. Of course, he could not have survived all the debacles and especially within Fatah, when a group of commando leaders reneged on him and joined forces with the Syrians back in 1983, if he lacked a popular mass-based support in particular, from the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. This could lead one to a fair inference, that regardless of factionalism within the PLO, democratic practices are embedded in the pragmatic politics of the PLO which would be hard for authoritarianism to gain grounds, once an independent Palestinian state is established. One of the key elements for the survival of the PLO in exile, is the translation of Palestinian nationalism into a concrete structural-functional organization that served best Palestinian needs. Moreover, the PLO's survival has heavily deepened on the full synchronization between the "exterior" and "interior" Palestinians, and the Intifada could illustrate best this phenomenon. In fact, an indepth analysis of the pragmatic trends in the PLO would be dealt with, when discussing the PNC resolutions and in particular the 19th PNC and the declaration of Independence. Thus, according to Rubenberg, "...the efforts at institution building (or "state building") have served the dual purpose of pragmatic functionalism and political nation-building."(59) Equally important in bolstering Palestinian nationalism, is the Palestinian civil infrastructure that ranges from the areas of culture, education, welfare and health, to a system of information, communication, socio-economic development and mass

organizations at the grass root level.

To illustrate this point, a quick look at the civilian infrastructure that sought to tie the PLO with the Palestinian people and their daily life is imperative. In fact, for the purpose of this study, it will be sufficient if only mentioned: (60)

1- Palestinian Red Crescent Society.

2- SAMED: The Sons of Martyrs Society.

3- The PLO's Planning Centre, which sponsors social research.

4- The Palestinian Research Centre, which sponsors political and historical research on Palestine.

5- Social Welfare Organization, which manages a network of social welfare schemes.

6- Department of Mass Organizations, which subsumes all Palestinian unions.

In sum, the major themes of Palestinian social Institutions emphasize the strong commitment to meet the functional needs of the Palestinian people: health care, rehabilitation, employment has instilled among Palestinians self-reliance and national identity, not to mention the value of education. Above all, a major theme found in all PLO institutions, the dire need for International recognition and acceptance, Definitely, the PLO has represented itself as the national expression of the Palestinians, and the degree of sophistication portrayed in the PLO political institutions along with its policy of consensus building based on bargaining and negotiations, provide the basis of a democratic government and a state. (61)

Indeed the accommodation by the PLO to a wide range of exigencies have put the military activities at a subservient level, (62) and prompted the PLO to behave responsibly as a non-state actor in International politics and in the context of Middle East politics as well as in its conflict with Israel. Regardless of pluralism within the PLO, all the factions were well integrated in its political structure, thus dismissing fragmentation and obviating authoritarian rule. This real nature of the PLO has equipped the latter with a sense of fortitude in representing the Palestinian nation, and its quest for national and political rights, not to mention the PLO's effective control of the organization, exonerated from direct Arab rule at least since 1969.

Undoubtedly, for the past several years the PLO has incorporated a pragmatic stream of thought, which enhanced its image as a flexible organization making choices in the context of constraints. This perception by

the PLO had abandoned pipe dreams and had entrenched political realism that caters to short range objectives and provides a signpost leading to the final objective.(63) According to Khalid al-Hasan, a PLO senior official, "political struggle cannot be seen in terms of black and white... Without a proper understanding of a political reality, it is impossible to understand the implications of any decision and to attain the proper picture...".(64) He further adds:

"... However, from the intellectual standpoint, the Palestinians realize that, given the present balance of forces, the attainment of this goal (i.e. Palestinian armed might) is not possible for now: the international situation does not offer any favorable conditions, while the Arab World is in a state of collapse and lacks any real strength or determination to press onward; thus the intellect of the Palestinian indicates that the only real option is to formulate a step-by-step program...".(65)

The practical approach initiated by the PLO is designed to win over the United States and hence Israel, for a negotiated settlement to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The U.S. in the past years, had created stumbling blocks in allowing the PNC resolutions to be implemented as part of its Middle Eastern strategy. Therefore, pragmatism as making choices within constraints, has been a principle element in Palestinian politics, when the military option has been ruled out and when perceptions for interim objectives are clearly spelled out. Political option for the Palestinians has been at least since the Intifada, a pursued goal to achieve their national aspirations. Again to quote Kalid al-hasan:

"Pragmatism which is an effort to adjust to changing realities without surrendering one's principles, is a product not of altered value systems but rather the recognition that a wide gap exists between sacred values and the options available for their realization.(66)

It is evident when one surveys the decisions made by the PNC's along the years, that there had been concrete changes in Palestinian political attitudes and especially, since the 12th PNC in 1974. However, the stages of Palestinian politics assessed through the PNC meetings, will shed more lights on the deliberations of the substantive issues as well as the evolution of the Palestinian political strategy that ultimately, led to the incorporation of the two-state solution in November 1988, at the 19th PNC, as the official position of the PLO. Since then, the PLO has been hammering on a peaceful solution to the conflict through a negotiated settlement and political

accommodation. The United States as a third party has played a crucial role in bridging the gap between the Arabs and Israel on one hand and between Israel and the Palestinians on the other, especially after the Gulf war. Irrespective of the official positions of the parties to the conflict, Secretary James Baker has been instrumental in bringing the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table. However, one would anticipate a process of negotiations to be tormentuous, hard, frustrating and slow. Yet, certain convictions have been developed among the mainstream of the PLO and a sizeable majority of Palestinians who support the peace process, that it is a matter of time, for the enigma of peace in the Middle East to be permanently solved. This requires patience, endurance and stamina in not being pushed and provoked towards unilateral concessions without achieving the optimum confined in the parameters of a defined set of principles, that had always been the Palestinians frame of national reference.

One should bear in mind that for the PLO to arrive at a decision through its political process, it has to deal with the constraints imposed on it by the dispersal of the Palestinian people and the absence of a territorially based national authority, which leaves no other alternative except the PNC, through which the "politics of consensus on a pluralistic basis prevail".(67) As mentioned earlier, the PNC resolutions are considered to be the culmination of the PLO's dialogue as well as an "important barometer of the actual thinking of the Palestinian movement".(68) Thus, once these resolutions are adopted, they become "a legitimizing instrument for policies pursued by the PLO leadership".(69) This is best illustrated when Arafat referred to the 19th PNC as the basis for his declarations in Geneva in December 1988.(70)

#### TOWARDS PRAGMATISM AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE PNC

A serious analysis of PNC resolutions could shed lights on Palestinian democratic trends and pluralist thinking that had been developing along the years and in particular, from the twelfth PNC in 1974 onwards. In fact, since 1974, the Palestinians had been moving steadily towards accommodation and compromise. By the eighteenth PNC convened in Algiers in April 1987, most of the elements that embraced the peaceful strategy and the acceptance of the

two-state solution on the basis of United Nations resolutions were in place.

To understand better the transitions of Palestinian political thought, the PNC sessions since the inception of the PLO, will be divided into three distinctive phases. Each phase is exclusively described to highlight the major turning points in the Palestinian decision-making process.

#### I- LIBERATION AND RETURN: FIRST PHASE (The First Four PNC's: 1964-1968)

Since the destruction of Palestine in 1948, Palestinians have suffered homelessness and exile, and therefore sought to redress these injustices through the liberation of their occupied homeland and the repatriation of their exiled community.(71) However, the National Palestinian Charter of 1964 and the amended National Charter of 1968 drawn up in the Fourth PNC, as well as in the resolutions of the Second and Third PNCs, emphasized the total liberation of Palestine.(72) The Fourth PNC exhibits a dramatic shift, for it not only centers on total liberation through armed struggle but it shifts the agent of liberation from the Arab political scene to that of the Palestinians.(73) Self-reliance along with the armed struggle were stipulated in Article 9 of the 1968 National Charter. Moreover, the concept of national unity had been reiterated to coordinate the different commando groups within the PLO infrastructure. The newly emerged PLO as a result of the Fourth PNC, stressed vigorously the building of socio-political and economic institutions that could cater to the needs of a shattered society.(74)

#### II- THE SECULAR DEMOCRATIC STATE: SECOND PHASE (Fifth through Eleventh PNCs (1969-1974))

Palestinians during this phase encountered a problematic situation of how to reconcile their legitimate national political rights, with the political and demographic realities that have been created after the destruction of Palestine and subsequent events.(75) This phase was characterized by a dramatic shift in Palestinian objectives, from total liberation to a democratic secular state in which Christians, Jews and Muslims could harmoniously live together. One important concession should be made by the Israelis, the renouncing of Zionism and the messianic vision of Eretz Israel. Thus the Fifth PNC in 1969 introduced the idea of establishing a "free democratic society in Palestine". However, in the sixth PNC the same concept had been reiterated with a stipulation changing the word society with

that of a state.(76) In fact, in the Eleventh PNC, the establishment of a "democratic society where all citizens can live in equality, justice, and fraternity", and which would be "opposed to all forms of prejudice on the basis of race, creed and color" was emphasized. Of course this proposal represented a dramatic and historic compromise in which a framework for peace was presented and Zero-sum claims were renounced by the Palestinians. This official policy of the PLO remained the basic objective until 1974, when the organization made the first gesture of two-state solution at the Twelfth PNC.(77)

### III- THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION: THIRD PHASE (Twelfth PNC - Nineteenth PNC: 1974-1988)

It was in July of 1974 after the October war, that new realities evolved in the Middle East and hopes for a comprehensive settlement was high, which in turn, induced the PLO to embark on a road to political settlement through pragmatism that culminated in the declaration of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories and the ultimate acceptance of a two-state solution. Of course, this historic decision was not made in a vacuum, it was a response to accumulated important events like the Lebanese Civil War, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David accords, the Egyptian-Israeli peace Treaty, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the current Intifada in the Occupied Territories, that led to a bold decision of peaceful coexistence with Israel. Moreover, along these crucial years, the PLO witnessed internal changes and dramatic events, such as the temporary withdrawal of the PFLP from the PLO's Executive Committee, the dissension of Abu Mousa faction from Fatah in 1983, the controversial trip of Arafat to Cairo after the PLO's dismantlement from Lebanon. All these incidents were crucial to the existence of the Palestinian national movement, however, the Palestinians survived them and the PLO managed to stabilize its objective and profound commitment to the concept of two-state solution. One could safely assert that the Twelfth PNC was the turning point in Palestinian historic and political decision-making which could be considered the prelude towards peaceful coexistence and political accommodation. It was in this council where the "Ten point" program was drafted, calling for the establishment of the "peoples national, independent, and fighting authority on every part of liberated Palestinian land".(78)

Subsequent PNCs the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth, emphasized

methodically and systematically, the Palestinians rights to establish their independent state under the leadership of the PLO, in any parts of Palestine.(79) During the Fifteenth PNC, the Brezhnev initiative was welcomed, the dialogue with Jordan resumed, the European initiative was considered and much attention was paid to the organizational structure of the PLO.(80) During this period, a broadly-based international consensus emerged for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in parts of Palestine as the basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is worth mentioning, that the PLO endorsed the resolutions of the Fez conference convened in Morocco in 1982, that laid down a practical vision for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.(81)

However, the Sixteenth PNC indicated another shift in PLO policy that was directed towards accommodation and open dialogue with Jordan and the formation of Confederation. At all events the Confederation plan was continuously reiterated in subsequent PNCs, despite the abrogation of the February accords in 1986.(82)

Since the Twelfth PNC, the concept of "armed struggle" became subservient to political diplomacy but was never ruled out as an option. The strategy set was a political course towards peaceful resolution to the conflict, through mediation, conciliation, mutual reciprocity and parity.

It was in the Seventeenth PNC (Amman Conference 1984) that consensus in PLO politics shifted to majority politics, since the Damascus-based opposition to the mainstream within the PLO, had a small base.

Explicitly the Amman PNC consecrated the paramountcy of the Palestinian aspirations and wishes in the Occupied Territories, and certainly assumed a forefront position and consideration. Rashid Khalidi sums up best the Palestinian desiderata in the following five points:(83)

- 1- That there is a Palestinian people living on its historic land.
- 2- It has the right to self-determination.
- 3- It is represented by the PLO.
- 4- It has the right to an independent state.
- 5- Negotiations in the context of an International Conference.

A point of inference should be made here, while the Palestinian national movement transforming from a liberation movement into a national independence movement accepting U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and lately the Baker plan 1989-1990, along a well-defined peaceful strategy culminating in consensus on

coexistence with Israel, we see a shift towards the extreme by the present Likud government espousing maximalist policies.(84)

However, the Eighteenth PNC convened in Algiers, April 20-25, 1989, symbolizes a major PLO triumph over a threat to its unity, national cohesion and legitimacy: According to an analysis presented by Muhammad Hallaj a noted Palestinian scholar, the Eighteenth PNC witnessed:

"The return of the opposition to the Parliamentary and constitutional structures of the PLO was an admission of the failure of extra-constitutional confrontation and the triumph of democratic dissent within the Palestinian political process. The importance of the reinforcement of the PLO's democratic traditions by the PNC cannot be overestimated"(85)

Further he adds"

"The re-election of Yasir Arafat to the chairmanship of the Executive Committee happened with the consent of the formerly rebellious opposition enhanced the importance of legality and constitutionalism and the principle of the consent of the governed as the basis for legitimacy."(86)

The strategy of the Palestinian leadership during this third phase, was comprised of three substantial elements, mobilizing and politicizing the Palestinian people behind an organization representing them, maintaining the unity of the Palestinian movement through very difficult times and achieving a political program based on consensus.(87)

In November 1988, the nineteenth PNC met in Algiers to adopt a Declaration of Independence and a political statement, in these documents a clear and concise peace strategy was laid down, along with explicit acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and the recognition of Israel, and the issue of terrorism an impediment towards U.S. precondition for opening a dialogue with the PLO. This PNC constituted the most explicit formulation of the Palestinian objectives, couched in an unambiguous language, towards a comprehensive, peaceful two-state solution of the Palestinian Israel conflict.(88) Undoubtedly, the nineteenth PNC has irrevocably changed the course of the PLO, from former claims for a state in all Palestine to a limited one on the West Bank and Gaza. Regardless of the PFLP and DFLP's opposition to the mainstream Fatah in the PLO, George Habash reiterated: "The PFLP and I will remain in the PLO and in all its institutions forever". (89)

Current Palestinian thinking rests on a clear and unequivocal position calling for the need to develop a flexible strategy that rejects past



tendencies to adopt the familiar all-or-nothing position. As we have seen, the "no" which the Palestinians have been known to choose with regard to negotiations with Israel and the restoration of their rights in Palestine has been affected by two important developments:

- 1- The PLO's acceptance of a two-state solution and the relevant United Nations resolutions.
- 2- The willingness of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to be part of a negotiating team whose task would be to implement a two-state solution.(90)

Substantively, the Declaration of Independence reflects two things: It grounds Palestinian independence in International Law and sets forth the principles and guidelines of the constitution of the new state. It spelled out principles of equality, mutuality and social justice. These principles and guidelines are quite explicit in the declaration:

"The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. In it they shall develop their national and cultural identity and enjoy full equality in rights. Their religious and political beliefs and their human dignity shall be safeguarded under a democratic parliamentary system of government built on the freedom of opinion; and on the freedom to form parties; and on the protection of the rights of the minority by the majority and respect of the decisions of the majority by the minority; and on social justice and equal rights, free of ethnic, religious, racial or sexual discrimination; and on a constitution that guarantees the rule of law and the independence of the Judiciary..."(91)

Further, there was absolute clarity about a peaceful settlement to the conflict, and concepts of "armed struggle" never appeared in the text. The declaration emphasizes further that:

"The State of Palestine, declaring itself a peace-loving state committed to the principles of peaceful coexistence, shall strive with all states and peoples to attain a permanent peace built on justice and respects of rights..."(92)

Moreover, the declaration emphasizes the settling of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations; and rejects the use of force and violence in conflict resolution unless attacked. The rejection of terrorism as spelled out in the declaration, makes an emphatic distinction between resistance to occupation and indiscriminate violence meant to terrorize civilians. In sum, there are ample evidence to portray Palestinians' willingness to negotiate peace

directly.(93) Some Palestinian groups continue to call for unswerving commitment to the National Charter, but these groups as peripheral to the locus of power and decision-making. It is common that no political community -least of all Israel- is without socioeconomic discrepancies and rejectionism within its ranks. Palestinian sense of democracy is not also ideal, it suffers from loopholes because it is not directly practiced within a centralized polity. However, with the Palestinian Intifada, the ball game for the Palestinians have changed and PLO's concentration and efforts have diverted towards the bolstering of the civil infrastructure and institution-building in the Occupied Territories. This process germinated the "quota system" in representing the various factions competing to achieve their self-interests. Basically, the political maladies of the PLO's bureaucratic infrastructure outside had permeated the socio-institutional fabric in the Occupied Territories. That's why many voices among "Independent" Palestinians have been vociferous towards democratic reforms.(94)

#### THE PLO AND THE INTIFADA: TOWARDS A PEACEFUL STRATEGY

The Palestinian politics in exile has always been manifested microcosmically in the Occupied Territories, therefore continuous debate among Palestinians takes place in their pursuit of their national interests. Palestinian national identity and the process of nation-building as we have seen, have become a concrete reality. It was between 1982 and 1987 that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, started building a challenging infrastructure to Israeli occupation. Thanks to the Intifada that played an imperative role in the institutionalization process that led to a synchronized effort with the Palestinian diaspora, to discover the potentials of their new empowerment.(95)

It is important to note, that<sup>on</sup> the eve of the Palestinian uprising the public debate within the Palestinian national movement, according to Salim Tamari, a noted Palestinian sociologist, focused on two trends of political thinking: a- "the first stressed steadfastness, a development strategy of survival and communal preservation until political conditions allowed for an external intervention. b- The second, seeing the conditions of transformation

to be irreversible, concluded the search for sovereignty had to be traded for equality within the Israeli polity".(96) One could simply assert that the concept of steadfastness had been buttressed by "Sumud" funds which exacerbated the reinforcement of "A'yan" political hierarchies characterized with traditionalism and a facade of moderation. These urban notables were often manipulated by the Israeli civil administration to diffuse potential threats immanating from populist reactions. This trend of populism posed a direct challenge to the traditional leadership inside and outside the Occupied Territories.(97) However, the main traits of this "radical populism", was manifested at the institutional level of rejecting the traditional mode of thinking, be it in women's associations and charitable societies, and student movement criticizing the formal university curriculum.(98) Furthermore, this trend of populism had concentrated on the role of the labor force to be a genuine component of the labor and trade unions in the Occupied Territories. Ideologically, however, this movement could not avoid the trend of factionalism -a typified trait- of Palestinian politics.(99) In spite of this factionalism, the already existing institutional infrastructure was the determining power in boosting the uprising and sustaining it to a point of no return. Furthermore, the mass organizations and the grass root networks along with the popular committees had formed the organizational nucleus to the uprising.(100)

The Intifada has managed to create a national debate among the various political groups within the PLO, between the "interior" and the "exterior", and between the "nationalist" and "religious" camps. This debate is reflective of the democratic trend within the Palestinian national movement inside the Occupied Territories and outside in the Diaspora. Albeit, there are differences in the national camp as to the strategy of peace and how to pursue it, but it is not detrimental and yet could be categorized as "loyal opposition". However, the religious groups spearheaded by "Hamas" (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya: Islamic Resistance Movement), rejects the Palestinian State and the convening of an International conference. It espouses the establishment of an Islamic State in the entire area of Palestine. One should not undermine the power and influence of "Hamas" on the Palestinian street, for since 1982, it developed potentially to challenge the PLO in the Occupied Territories. In sum, the two camps are irreconcilable.(101)

However, with the peace Process going on, the "Nationalist camp" has been divided between two positions polarized; one being introduced by Fatah, advocating a political initiative that starts with transitional period of self-government and a Palestinian state in the final stage, and the other view introduced by the PFLP and to a certain degree hardliners in Fatah and "Independents", advocating the end of Israeli occupation and the immediate establishment of a state. The second view encourages the escalation of the uprising, believing that neither the U.S. nor Israel would change their positions vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. They believe that the peace process would diffuse the inner potentials of the uprising and would succumb to unilateral concessions that would ultimately lead to the acceptance by the Palestinians an "autonomy plan" over the people and not the land.(102)

#### THE ASSESSMENT OF THE INTIFADA AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since its eruption on 8 december 1987, the Intifada in the Occupied Territories, had defied the status quo and opened new avenues for both peace and conflict in the region. In fact, it has come to the fore as the most urgent and complex part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, contriving to score a pyrrhic victory by influencing international, and to a lesser degree Israeli, public opinion. The dramatic impact of the Intifada has been the creation of universal awareness of the unsustainability of the statu quo (i.e., the Israeli occupation) coupled with the Intifada's own remarkable unanimity and staying power. However, neither this awareness nor the Intifada's persistence could have been accomplished without the actual translation of potential politicization into political action through a mobilization of the Palestinians of every age, sex, place of residence and social background. Grass-roots action, self-reliance, communal solidarity and sense of responsibility have been important factors in mobilizing the Palestinians and in giving the leadership of the PLO the self-confidence to consider what was once a political suicide: negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. In fact, this change of political mood is attributable to the ongoing Intifada, which portrays itself as an authentic manifestation, of creative power and a legitimate expression of Palestinian nationalism, embedded in the culture,

81

community and the power of resistance. However, Israeli reaction to the uprising has consistently been characterized by an unprecedented degree of brutality and confusion. Further, Israel, has failed to counteract the Palestinian diplomatic offensive.

The Intifada has been remarkable in pushing Israel towards political accommodation with the Palestinians, in spite of Israel's resistance to a negotiated settlement that will jeopardize the relinquishing of its control over the West Bank and Gaza. What the Likud Government is willing to afford a limited autonomy for the Palestinians. On the other hand, Palestinian moderation (a democratic behavior) could be reflected in those attitudes:

- a- Ready to negotiate peace with Israel on the West Bank and Gaza.
- b- Ready to accept interim period with U.N. supervision.
- c- Ready to accept a form of confederation with Jordan and even with Israel in the future.
- d- Ready to accept U.S. mediation (as they have already did) for a negotiated peaceful settlement.
- e- Not ready to accept Shamir's self-autonomy.(103)

In sum, this study has portrayed the basic trends of democratic behavior by Palestinians in their political structure as well as in their institutional infrastructure. However, elections a cornerstone in democratic behavior, has been practiced by the Palestinians in their mass organization, Universities and at the grass roots level. Ideologically, the Palestinian national movement has been committed to democracy as it was spelled out in the Declaration of Independence.

The high level of education and political consciousness, and the existence of numerous independent Palestinian institutions and professional societies would support a democratic government. In fact, Palestinian society has significant experience with democratic forms on the local level; some of its most respected leaders are the elected mayors of Palestinian villages and cities, many of who were deposed by the Israelis.(104) Palestinian emphasis on majority rule in decision making and the diffusion of power is a precondition for pluralist thinking and collective behavior.(105)

All These factors are good indicators to gauge Palestinian readiness to establish a genuine democratic government and hence a state on twenty two per cent of its historic land. So far the PLO's decision to recognize Israel represents a partial victory for the pragmatic wing of the organization, but

if the PLO and the Palestinian moderates fail to reap the benefits of their positions, they will be condemned and ostracized and the radicals may gain strength, especially the Islamic block.

Such a situation would procrastinate the peace process and would deepen the contradictions which might lead for renewed vicious cycle of extremism among the Palestinians and Israel. The actual reality is that Palestinians and Israelis have been coexisting as neighbors and will continue to do so, and cannot be altered. Nonetheless, making peace with the Palestinians is very low on Israel's list of priorities, and it is in the interest of all actors in the region, including Israel's, that the Palestinians be freed through a process of mediation, negotiation and conciliation before they are freed through confrontation. There is no doubt that, sooner or later, it is the Palestinians and Israelis that must make peace with each other. Peace, however, is not a 'non-belligerency agreement or military disengagement, it is a resolution of conflict on the basis of co-existence, reconciliation and cooperative relations between two peoples'.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE PLO  
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
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State, Territory and Boundaries:  
Attitudes and Positions in the Palestinian  
National Movement (A Historical Perspective)

Manuel S. Hassassian

Bethlehem University  
and the Truman Institute

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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STATE, TERRITORY AND BOUNDARIES:  
ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS  
IN THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT  
(A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)

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February 6, 1992



## INTRODUCTION

History attests that territorial conflicts pose a great threat to peace, harmony and world interdependence. In spite of the global transformations on the technological, economic and political levels, regional conflicts based on territoriality have noted their presence and assumed priority in the international arena. Concerns about mutual reciprocity on the economic, socio-political and cultural levels, are challenged immediately when territorial issues jettisoned between sovereign states. However, with the democratization trends sweeping the world, other avenues have been opened to settle territorial disputes besides wars, i.e. the use of bargaining and negotiations as tools of cool diplomacy. Similarly, policy choices and decision-making based on perceptions, beliefs and cognitions, are considered vital factors in the pursuance of national claims, be it territorial, ethnic, civil and basic human rights. Pragmatism, "making choices within constraints", a basic feature of democracy is highly considered by western decision-makers in their policy choices and formulations. Therefore, decision matrix could develop to analyze certain parameters of the choices confronting delegates in a negotiation process, and the Palestinian Israeli delegations to the peace process are no exceptions.

The aim of this study is to describe and analyze beliefs, positions and policy choices in the Palestinian nationalist movement since its inception. However, emphasis will be made on the internal decision-making process within the Palestinian leadership in the 1930's and in present times. To illustrate best the internal decisions made by the Palestinian leadership at specific historical junctions, several decision crossroads will provide the historic framework through which those made choices are analyzed. Factionalism in the Palestinian nationalist movement, had always been a primary factor that molded its uniqueness and affected its policy choices. Irrespective of factionalism however, there always have appeared a mainstream within the Palestinians nationalist movement, that espoused ideologically and instrumentally, the aspirations and objectives of the Palestinian people along its historic continuum. It is worth mentioning, that the fluctuations in the Palestinian decision-making process along history, was probed to internal divisions that culminated on many occasions in inconsistency and non-systematic policies and

decisions. This study will highlight also the transformation of Palestinian politics from traditional thinking and strategy to pragmatism and coexistence. Further more, the evolution of the formal structures of Palestinian politics will be discussed in order to portray the decision-making behavior and the selective perceptions made within given objective conditions.

The essential stakes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the core value-system by which nation-states and peoples define their existence, sovereignty and territory and above all, their security. For Israel, a basic dilemma is the relationship of territory to security and survival, and the question of "secure boundaries" has run through its history as a modern state.(1) Ironically, the more substantial reason is that Israel's intransigence in acquiring more territory after the 1967 war, has run directly counter to Palestinian claims and the territorial integrity of neighboring Arab states.

On the other hand, the Palestinians have been deprived of territory and denied status as a sovereign state, two important factors that mold their political identity. The Palestinian conception of how much territory is required for a viable sovereign state has changed over time.(2) From an early policy laying claim to all Palestine, the Palestinians today are settling for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, that comprises twenty two percent of historic Palestine. Even with this change, however, it is clear that Palestinian-Israeli positions collide over the same contested territory.

This study will focus upon Palestinian attitudes, positions and decisions taken in different historical junctions, like the Peel Commission of 1937, the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, the destruction of Palestine 1948, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, the June 1967 war and its implications, the Camp David Accord 1978, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian Intifada on the West Bank and Gaza, and the two-state solution put forward by the Resolutions of the Nineteenth PNC (Palestinian National Council), in November 1988. This historical framework will provide the basis for the analysis of the policy-making process within the Palestinian leadership, thus highlighting the internal factionalism within the Palestinian nationalist movement and to what extent it had been affected by it. Further, a serious look at the PNCS resolutions since the inception of the PLO, will provide us with ample

evidence about the natures of Palestinian politics and the decision-making process.

## THE ORIGINS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

This study examines the internal struggle among the leading Palestinian families in the 1920's and 1930's, as well as its present leadership for the attainment of power, and leadership of the Arab national movement in Palestine. From the first years of the British mandate in Palestine, the traditional leadership of Arabs was split between two leading families the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The divisive nature of Arab leadership had its effect on the whole of the Arab national movement. In essence, that movement was never united or strong enough to confront its British and Zionist adversaries. However, part of this problem was the outcome of the existing social structure which was unproductive as well as rigid.

Nevertheless, western influence in the form of secularism and modern development did have effect on the demography of Palestine many years before the British created it as a separate political entity. A new urban elite had come to being towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the mandate, this elite became politically influential, causing the traditional elites in the villages to feel resentful and insecure. Not until the 1930's was the urban (A'yan) elite able to dominate the politics of both the rural and urban populations and become in effect the national leadership of Arab Palestine.

The British, who naturally wanted to control the country, exploited almost every aspect of the demographic and social cleavages existing in Palestine. They encouraged the establishment of "peasant" type of political parties hoping such political organizations would prevent the union of urban and rural elites into what might become a viable and genuine national movement. However, the rivalries between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis remained the British best hope for a weak and ineffective national movement. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Arabs could not escape their traditional rivalries. The Palestinian national movement fell victim to internal divisions and political fragmentation. In fact, the traditional leadership

did not realize in the 1930's that the future did not belong to it for the Arabs would lose Palestine partly in 1948, and the whole of Palestine in 1967.

The awakening of Arab consciousness in modern times and the consequent rise of Arab nationalism can be attributed, inter alia, to the activities of the Zionists, to the rise of Turkish nationalism replacing Ottomanism and to the impact of First World War. The Palestinians were part of the Arab World sharing with it many of its internal developments as well as some of its external influences. Zionism was particularly influential in shaping their current politics and in determining their political destiny.

Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. For centuries, Arabs and Jews have developed deep roots and emotional attachments to it. In time, the roots and the attachments became important in the development of two separate, but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and Zionism. Both nationalisms strove to ultimately gain control of Palestine.

Historically, the Palestinian question can be related to the problem of Western intervention -cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism and political penetration in the form of colonial rule. However, while Jewish nationalism -Political Zionism- originated in the intellectual and emotional responses to the pogroms of East Europe and Russia, the nationalism of the Arabs was a direct reaction to Ottoman oppression and European colonialism. One should keep in mind that the two nationalisms appeared around the same time, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and reached the peak of their political strength later in the twentieth century. In the meantime, they were tied to the outcome of political decisions made in Europe. Although their aspirations were to be realized in Palestine, far away from Europe, their fortunes and misfortunes depended heavily of the politics on Europe, particularly those of the big powers.

The awakening interest of Arabs in their cultural heritage and traditions gave birth to Arab nationalism in the key cities of the Fertile Crescent. The nascent Arab national movement had its political organization and strength in Syria, particularly in Damascus. However, due to the traumatized experience of the Arab political elites in defying Western colonial rule and the threat of Zionism -Jewish settler movement- Arab nationalism lost its universalism, which induced the political elites of

Syria, Iraq and Palestine towards local nationalisms and priorities and concerns. In particular, the Palestinian Notables who were disenchanted with the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist movement, were forced to encounter specific objective conditions that were in contradiction with their aspiration of national self-determination and hence political independence. According to Mohammad Muslih, a noted historian on the origins of Palestinian nationalism,

"...there were three threads in the Palestinian opposition to Zionism in Ottoman times: Ottoman loyalism, Palestinian patriotism and Arab nationalism. Ottoman loyalism dictated the rejection of Zionism because it was bent upon separating Palestine from the Ottoman state; Palestinian patriotism dictated its rejection on the ground that it was a deadly threat to the Palestinians; and Arab nationalism called for its rejection because it would wrest Palestine from Arab hands and thwart the cherished goal of Arab unity."(3)

In fact, Palestinian nationalism had its specificity in developing its own ideology and institutional framework, and that was due to two important developments after the war, according to Muslih: "One, internal, pertained to the fragmentation of Arab nationalist movement, and the other, external, pertained to the dismemberment of Syria at the hands of Britain and France".(4) One could draw an immediate conclusion, that Zionism was a catalyst in developing Palestinian nationalism but it never contributed to its creation. Zionism provided the Palestinians with a centralized focus for their national struggle.(5) Regardless of its unique experience, Palestinian nationalism incorporated the ideals of pan-Arabism revolving around Arab unity and independence.

It is impossible to understand the Palestinian national movement without the constant reminder that the movement was profoundly influenced, and to a certain degree, shaped by its long and difficult struggle with the Zionists. One would expect that the ferocity of the struggle between the Palestinian Arabs on the one hand and the Zionists and their British ally on the other would unite the Palestinian Arab movement and would consolidate its forces to make it a more formidable force. Yet, unfortunately, the Palestinian Arabs could not escape their traditional rivalries. At times, Arabs fought Arabs while their Zionist enemy confronted them with unusual stubbornness and determination to succeed in their ultimate goal of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.

In fact, the British policy of "divide and rule", succeeded and the rivalry between the two leading Palestinian families, the Husseinis and Nashashibi's (A'yan class of Jerusalem), took a sharp turn during the first decade of British mandate. These families manipulated all the ties of kin, class and patronage to win over new supporters. Unfortunately, the Zionists succeeded in establishing a Jewish state not only in part of Palestine but the whole of Palestine in 1967, and the Palestinian national movement was almost shattered.

Of course, the period of the 1930's is very important in Palestinian history for it witnessed a rebellion that had been quashed severely by the British and the downfall of the traditional leadership. However, to analyze the Palestinian decision-making process in that period, the 1937 Peel Commission that came to Palestine to inquire about the rebellion, would be considered a decision crossroad in Palestinian history, for the first time the concept of partition came to the fore.

FIRST DECISION CROSSROAD:  
TERRITORIAL PARTITION OF PALESTINE:  
THE 1937 DECISION (PEEL COMMISSION)

It is important to describe the historical background that led to the Peel Commission of inquiry in 1937, in order to better assess the choices made by the Palestinian leadership and the internal divisions within its ranks over the recommendations put forward by the commission.

The Arabs in Palestine were frustrated many a times by the British for not developing self-government entity in Palestine. Several projects of Legislative Council were put forward by the British and were sharply criticized by both Palestinians and Jews. However, the 1936 Revolt was the apex of Palestinian frustrations and mood of despair, that prompted them to an outright rebellion against the British mandate and the Zionist movement. Violence broke out while the British Parliament was discussing the Legislative proposal and no doubt the killing of the proposal was a contributing factor in the widening of riot incidents and in the spread of violence. Arab hope for self-government was dashed by the belief that Zionist influence on the British

political elite guaranteed the failure of Arab quest and hope for justice. However, the root causes of the rebellion were all connected with the issue of the Jewish National Home which became a threatening matter to the Arab population of Palestine. They included a marked increase in Jewish immigration, which in 1935 went up to 65,000, a comparable increase in Jewish purchase of Arab Land, which in the same year was estimated at 72,905 dunums, severe economic distress and high unemployment.(6)

National Committees were formed in cities and towns almost everywhere in the country to combat Zionist-British policies and to bring about civil disobedience by the general public. The first such national committee was established in the city of Nablus on April 20, 1936. Although, the first call for a general strike came from the Jaffa Committee, the Nablus committee was very active in encouraging other cities and towns to join the strike against the British.(7) Also, the Arab Higher Committee, which had become the leadership body of the national movement, headed by Haj Amin al-Husseini -the Grand Mufti of Palestine- called for civil disobedience, the non-payment of taxes, and a halt to municipal government operations. Virtually all private business, transportation, and municipal services came to a halt, and the general strike was in effect throughout the country for a period of almost six months. Violent confrontations with the British army occurred frequently and open rebellion was in effect for almost three years. The purpose of the strike, according to the Arab Higher Committee was to "Obtain the prohibition of Jewish immigration, the forbiddance of land transfers to Jews, and the replacement of the Mandate by a national government responsible to a representative council."(8)

It is important to note, that the history of Palestine's Arab nationalism in the 1920's and 1930's is the history of the Husseinis and Nashashibis, the two main families of Jerusalem. Although their differences were partly personal and partly related to policy,(9) there were institutional forms and terminologies involved in the competition for power and influence. The Husseinis became identified with the Supreme Moslem Council (SMC) and their political supporters became known as the Majlesiyoun, meaning those who support the SMC as the focal point of Palestinian leadership. Like the Majlesiyoun (the pro-Husseinis), the Mu'arada (the opposition) were anti-Husseini, consisted of some of the big families of Palestine championed by the

Nashashibis.

It would seem the Mu'arada was not enthused about an all-out rebellion against the British. Partial measures would have been sufficient for it. In essence, the Mu'arada saw the rebellion as something that would strengthen Haj Amin and the Majlesiyoun. Its position was very difficult. If it went against the rebellion openly it would alienate the people and lose any hope of even capturing the leadership of the national movement. If it did not, the rebellion would increase Haj Amin's influence. So it did a little bit of both.

Unfortunately for the Arabs, the general strike was bad for them economically and they were unable to continue with it beyond the six month period.(10) Consequently, the leaders of the rebellion wanted to end the strike, and the AHC, through the local national committees, issued a manifesto to that effect.(11) The end of the strike signaled some action on the part of the British government which had announced that a Royal Commission would come to Palestine to investigate the reason for the disturbances but that such a committee would not leave London for Palestine until hostilities had ceased. The commission was organized in August 1936, when the strike was still going on. However, the commission left for Palestine on November 5, 1936 without any governmental gesture to the Arabs and without any sign of good faith towards the Arabs. In fact, as the commission was departing to Palestine, the Colonial Secretary told the House of Commons that there would be no suspension of Jewish immigration while the commission did its work.(12)

Under such circumstances, the AHC decided to boycott the Commission. Apparently, the British were in no mood to compromise with the Arabs and wanted to show them that they meant business and that they were determined to quell the rebellion. Military reinforcement was dispatched from Malta to assist British forces in Palestine.

Nevertheless, soon after the Peel Commission arrived in Palestine the AHC changed its mind and decided to rescind its earlier decision of total boycott of the commission. Now it wanted to cooperate, albeit reluctantly. There were two reasons for the change in its attitude and policy. First, it wished to avoid internal dissention which threatened its dissolution. The Mu'arada wanted to cooperate with the commission and this would have violated the policies of the other parties represented on the AHC. Secondly, outside



pressure was strong and this was induced mainly By Amir 'Abdallah of Trans-Jordan and the Saudi monarch. At any rate, the decision to boycott the commission was rescinded on January 6, 1937 and the AHC proceeded to represent the Arab Case.

Ironically, the unity of the AHC was not spared by its decision to testify before the Commission. The old rivalries between Husseinis and Nashashibis surfaced again in the form of political issues and principles. The Mu'arada objected to the arguments and issues to be presented to the Commission and charged that Haj Amin was not consulting the AHC while dealing with the commission.(13) It also accused Haj Amin of trying to intimidate people who supported them in order to destroy the influence of the National Democratic Party (NDP), the party of the Mu'arada.

Inter-family feuds were behind the NDP's decision to boycott the British Commission.(14) It seems inconsistent, that the usually moderate Mu'arada ended up boycotting the commission while the extremist Majlesiyoun cooperated with it. This was not all: the irony did not end up here because the Mu'arada decided to withdraw from the (AHC).

At any rate, the Peel Commission's recommendation was that:

"the mandate should be abolished and replaced with a treaty relationship, such as had just been accomplished in Syria and, earlier in Iraq, and the territory of Palestine should be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Holy places in and around Jerusalem should form a mandatory enclave administered by the British government."(16)

However, family feuds were obvious because of the inconsistency in the position of the Mu'arada.(17) This inconsistency became even more obvious when, later, the NDP became equivocal about the Commission's commendation to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. While the Majlesiyoun, who cooperated with the Commission, ended up clearly rejecting its recommendations, Ragheb al-Nashashibi -head of Mu'arada- was suspected to have favored them. At any rate, the NDP rejected the royal commission's partition recommendations in July 21, 1937.

In this rejection statement, the NDP demanded recognition of Arab right to independence in Palestine, a stoppage to the Jewish National Home, the termination of the Mandate and the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and land purchases.(18) The statement of the NDP further "stipulated that the

ratio existing between the Arab and Jewish populations should not be altered..."(19) Furthermore, the NDP rejected partition "because the most fertile and developed part of the country was to be awarded to the Jews; a substantial proportion of Arabs was to be subjected to Jewish rule.(20) And as an alternative to partition the NDP proposed:

"... that the Palestine Mandate should be replaced by a sovereign, democratic state, in which minority rights would be fully and constitutionally guaranteed', the existing ratio between the two sections of the population would be maintained, and Jewish purchases would be prohibited only in those allocated to Arabs under the Royal Commission Plan."(21)

The Arab Higher Committee rejected the "Partition plan" categorically, and did not hesitate to escalate the revolt in Palestine. However, the 20th Zionist Congress, which met at Zurich from August 3-17, debated the Royal Commission's Report, together with the accompanying British Statement of Policy which had included as an interim measure the restriction of Jewish immigration in Palestine. Although, there was a division in opinion in the Congress, there was an acceptance of the Peel Recommendations partition in principle, but there was objection mainly to the narrow confines of the proposed Jewish State.(22)

On the other hand, there was an Arab and Muslim reaction to the Recommendations of the Royal Commission, that is illustrated best in the following:

"...such partition would be, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government, an injustice to the people of that country which could not be viewed without the gravest alarm... and the hope of a permanent settlement depended upon the recognition of an integral independent Palestine in which the Jews accepted once and for all the position of a minority...(23)

Furthermore, in India, the All-India Muslim League condemned the Royal Commission's Report and a committee of defense for Palestine was set up.(24)

The failure of the Partition concept induced the British to take severe measures against the Arabs. The assassination in October 1937, of Lewis Andrews, the Acting District Commissioner of Galilee convinced them that the Arab Revolt was becoming more daring in its attacks and more determined in its political demands. Consequently, it outlawed the AHC as well as all existing national committees throughout Palestine, as to Haj Amin, who by now had become the sole and most popular leader of Palestine, the British decided to

oust him as SMC president and head of the Waqf Committee. The repression extended to every level of the political leadership. Realizing what was happening Haj Amin took refuge in the Haram al-Sharif, a religious sanctuary of great importance to Muslims. A few days later, during October 1937, he escaped and left the country for Lebanon where he stayed for some time, while his revolution was being mercilessly quelled by the British.

Obviously, the Mu'arada took an anti-rebellion policy throughout its three year duration. While the British thought the Mu'arada was moderate in its political posturing, many Arabs felt it betrayed the revolution and some of them were willing to retaliate even after the revolution had come to an end. Thus a leader of the Mu'arada Fakhri al-Nashashibi was assassinated in 1941 in Baghdad, and about two years later former rebel commander Fakhri Abdul Hadi met a similar fate at the hands of a relative in his village while celebrating his daughter's wedding.(25)

Ironically, in 1939 the British government changed its pro-Zionist policy and became clearly pro-Arab. It looked like the Arab rebellion, which the British had severely crushed, did win. However, the reason for the change in the British policy had nothing to do with the rebellion. It had something to do with the international situation and the coming of World War II, the British government, daring a wider war with Hitler's Germany, they issued the White Paper of 1939 to conciliate them.

This paper severely limited Jewish immigration, restricted Jewish purchase of land and held out hope for an independent Palestine in which the Arabs would still have a majority. The most striking feature of the White Paper policy was its clear pronouncement that the British government never promised the Jews a state in Palestine.

Ironically, the AHC rejected the paper because it did not meet Arab demand for immediate and full independence. Obviously, the Majlesiyoun had lost confidence in the British believing that they made too many promises in the past and did not live up to them. For obvious reasons, the Zionists also rejected the White Paper and promised to get it reversed as soon as the war was over. On the other-hand, the NDP accepted the new policy. On many 30, 1939, Ragheb al-Nashashibi, head of the party sent a letter to the High Commissioner expressing his pleasure and gratitude for the government's new and daring policy. He said that the new policy would help the country

"flourish and progress".(26) The NDP passed a resolution promising cooperation with the British government but hoped the period of transition to independence which the White Paper stated would be ten years, would be shortened. The resolution also denounced terrorism and indirectly condemned the Majlesiyoun as a self-centered movement that existed to promote the private interests of its leaders.

After 1939 the world was busy with the war. The Zionists kept somewhat quiet believing correctly, that Hitler was more threatening than the White Paper. They would later stage their own rebellion and succeed in getting the British out of Palestine, something the Arabs could not do when they had their rebellion. As to the Arab national movement, 1939 was its last year. Its leadership was no longer in the country. The people had got tired of fighting and they were now quiet and resigned to accepting their fate.

Definitely, the 1937 partition plan put forward by the Royal Peel Commission could be considered a decision crossroad for the Palestinian nationalist movement; despite its rejection of the plan, the inside politics between the Majlesiyoun and the Mu'aridoun was imperative in the final outcome of the decision. Factionalism within the national movement left its marks on this period, however, the Palestinians were convinced of their decision back in 1937, regardless of their basic differences. At any rate, the Mu'arada's position was receptive to the partition plan, albeit it could not express it in public for loss of credibility among the Palestinians whose attitudes were jettisoned with anger and frustration, against the British and Zionist adversaries. For reasons that were explained, the Mu'arada thought of striking a deal with the Amir Abdullah for a share in power in the future government of Jordan, when parts of Palestine would become under Jordan's hegemony in 1950.

## SECOND DECISION CROSSROAD

### THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN, 1947

The outbreak of war in Europe coincided with political repression of Palestinians by the British government, which banned all forms of political activity and utterly refused to allow the leaders of the nationalist movement

to return from exile. British officials took over direct control of the awqaf funds and issued severe administrative laws and tribunals in dealing with the Palestinians. Consequently, homes were searched, suspects were seized and detained without due process of law for unlimited periods.

Before the end of the war, Britain had signalled its intention to renege on the promises made in the 1939 White Paper -a habit that was familiar to Arabs- due to the pressures of the Zionists lobby, the Conservative and Labor parties as well as the Western public opinion outraged by the Holocaust; it had rejuvenated the idea of the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one for the Arabs and one for the Jews. One should not underestimate the U.S. Congressional pressure put on the British government, to open refuge to the survivors of the Holocaust wishing to immigrate to Palestine. In fact, president Harry S. Truman was instrumental in affecting British policies towards Jewish immigration to Palestine.(28)

In November, Ernest Bevin the British Foreign Minister announced the formation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 to look at the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The recommendations of this committee called for the immediate granting of 100,000 immigration certificates to refugees in Europe to settle in Palestine, along the lifting of restrictions on land sales and transfers to Jews.(29) Arabs hopes for an independent Palestine was shattered, and Partition was inevitable. The British could not meet both pressures of the Arabs and the Jews decided to transfer the matter into the hands of the United Nations. In November the UN General Assembly met and called for the termination of the British Mandate, and put forward the Partition plan for Palestine, a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem placed under an International administration. The Arabs were shocked and dismayed and for the Jews it was a historic achievement.

It is in the light of this historic background, that one would analyze the options and strategy formation by the Palestinians who were prone to internal divisions on the question of Partition. At any rate, the Arabs had introduced several proposals concerning the end of British Mandate and the establishment of a unified Palestinian state.(30) To no avail, the British were determined to Partition Palestine, and the Arabs reacted severely, and in a meeting held by the Arab League in December 1946, it reiterated the following.

"...Determination of the Arab states in defending the rights of the Palestinian Arabs until justice is restored...and the Council of the Arab League will adamantly reject any proposal that would lead to the partition of Palestine and will do its utmost to preserve the Arab cultural heritage in Palestine, for it is a vital past of the Arab World..."(31)

This attitude of the Palestinians was portrayed explicitly when it boycotted the United Nations Special Committee On Palestine (UNSCOP) in June 1947, where it presented to the U.N. Secretary General a memorandum justifying its boycott on the grounds, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians were denied and this was considered by the Arabs an outright breach to the U.N. Charter.(32) However, there were many attempts by the Arabs to put forward several other schemes to Partition, one of them a federal state based on Arab and Jewish Cantons.(33) Of course, the proposal was shot down in the United Nations General Assembly, and on November 29, 1947, the partition plan was voted upon in the General Assembly, and Resolution 181 was registered in the annals of U.N. history.

It is important to note, as the Palestinian problem entered the United Nations, Arab leadership was confined in the traditional urban notables led by the Husseinis and opposed by the Nashashibis.

To recapitulate the Arab position concerning the U.N. partition plan, it is evident that irrespective of the outright rejection of the plan by the AHC and the Arab League, there were other Arab conciliatory voices that pushed for a compromise and introduced the concept of federation, which implicitly recognized the political and administrative entity of the Jewish people in Palestine. Regardless of the final outcome, there were internal divisions concerning the partition but ultimately, the radical nationalists gained the upper hand and started beating the drums for another show down with the Mandatory Power and the Zionist movement in 1948.

On the other hand, the National Liberation League and the Palestinian Communist party, accepted the partition plan as the lesser of the two evils, to prevent bloodshed between Palestinians and Jews. However, their rationale in accepting the Plan was based on the following: a- That the Plan would terminate the British mandate in Palestine. b- That it will grant the Palestinians their right to self-determination. c- And it will remove any guardianship over the Palestinian people.(34) Furthermore, the Mu'arada

accepted the Partition Plan on the condition that the independent Palestinian entity will be federated with Trans-Jordan. However, two explanations were given by the Mu'arada to justify its position: a- That this federation will be a prelude to Arab unity and b- That Jordan has the military capabilities to defend the Palestinian entity.(35) Definitely, this Palestinian position was bolstered by the regime in Jordan which was frustrated at the Arab decision of rejecting the plan.

Therefore, one could conclude that there was no consensus neither in the Arab position nor in the Palestinian position, however a decision was ultimately made which culminated in war in 1948. This war was devastating for the Palestinians for they suffered a forced exodus, destined to live for years as refugees and stateless human beings at the mercy of Arab regimes. Those who stayed on the land had to suffer from the Israeli occupation and had to accept the new political realities. Since 1948 the West Bank inhabited by the Palestinians, was officially annexed by Abdullah "to create the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, deliberately expunging the word Palestine from all sources referring to it".(36) However, Abdullah set about cementing ties with West Bank notables namely the Mu'arada, who had opposed Haj Amin, and rewarded them with government positions and administrative powers to deal with the West Bank affairs. Those families known to be anti-Husseini, were the Nashashibis, Abdul Hadis and Touqans.

With the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt in 1950, a new phase in Palestinian history emerged that was manipulated by Arab regimes until the 1967 June war. However it is important to note, that Palestinian nationalism re-emerged in the early 1960s with the formation of the PLO, which was described as the "institutional expression of Palestinian nationalism". The PLO is considered to be the organizational framework within which all Palestinian cultural, social, educational, political and military activities are highly integrated.(37)

#### THE FORMATION OF THE PLO: A NEW PHASE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

The history of Arab Palestine did not end with the downfall of the

traditional leadership in the 1930s and 1940s, it took on several other courses to re-emerge however. At any rate, since 1945, the one conflict that has stood out amongst problems of the Arab World is the Palestinian question; and the crux of the problem remained the refusal of Arab nationalist states to recognize the Zionist state in the Middle East. This conflict has exacerbated instability in the Arab world and shattered all hope for unity and cooperation.(38)

In spite of the changing world conditions, the actors to the Arab Israeli conflict remained the same, except for the re-emergence of Palestinian nationalism with new thinking, approach and strategy, towards the realization of its goals -i.e. the establishment of an independent Palestine State. This task was to be accomplished by the leadership of the Palestinian people i.e. the PLO.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was officially created in 1964, by a decision from the Arab League. Of course, at that time President Nasser of Egypt was the Champion of the Arab cause, backed the idea in order to coopt the new organization within the League under his wings.(39) A justifiable reason to preclude any Palestinian action against Israel that might draw Egypt into a confrontation with it.(40) The PLO was headed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, known for his close relationship with President Nasser, and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was directly under the Arab unified Command headed by an Egyptian. However, the first inaugural conference of the PLO was held in May 1964, and its chairman spared no effort in rousing for material and public support from the various Arab Capitals and especially, from the Arab Gulf states.

Since its inception the PLO was embroiled in factional bickering because its existence and decision-making process was at the behest of inter-Arab rivalries, especially Syria and Egypt and to a certain degree Jordan. Fatah, a leading organization within the PLO had been explicit in transforming its ideology of national liberation to best serve the Palestinian cause, by emphasizing military action against Israel and exonerating itself from inter-Arab feud. According to Helena Cobban,

"But it was in the collapse of the previously existing system of inter-state relations in the Arab World, its checks, balances any interrelated ideologies, that Fatah's most explosively dynamic chance for growth arose, the chance that was



to catapult Fatah into the leadership of the PLO."

Irrespective of Fatah's predominance in the PLO, the June 1967 war was a disaster for the Arab States as well as to the Palestinians in large. Another exodus of Palestinian refugees to Jordan and to other Arab States, Syria and Lebanon, were denied return to their homes, while the rest of the Palestinians were destined to stay on their soil and suffer from Israeli occupation. In spite of this cataclysmic effect on the Palestinians plight, new orientations to advocate Palestinian nationalism were put to the fore by the political organizations. The Arab Military might was shattered and the leadership disoriented and destroyed, and the International community was more sympathetic with Israel than Arab intransigent regimes as they were presented in the international press and world public opinion. Consequently, Palestinian leaders became disenchanted by the Arab regimes, albeit, they were supportive to them, began to call for Palestinian organizations to be independent of Arab control.

The Palestinians diverted from the cause of Pan-Arabism and Arab unity to Palestinian nationalism and the struggle for independence as their main concern.

After the 1967 "Naksa", there appeared a crushing need for the reconstruction of Palestinian life. The building of an organizational infrastructure became a top priority for responding to the growing needs and sentiments of the Palestinians. This objective was imperative, however, other activities and goals became subservient. Ideology, armed struggle and diplomatic posture were secondary to the building of an organization that could claim and act on behalf of all Palestinians. In other words, the Palestinian leadership concerted its efforts to gain legitimacy and credibility not only from Palestinians but also from the international community. The task pursued entailed mundane organizational activities of purchasing arms, raising funds and developing a territorial base that could assist them in being in close touch with the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, as well as to launch military activities against Israel.

Of course, the building of such an organizational structure was a difficult task and required strenuous efforts to accomplish. Therefore, in 1967-1968, the Palestinian organizations struggling to consolidate their power, could not afford open confrontation with small organizations that

proliferated during that time. However, the larger commando groups contrived not by sheer force but by persuasion to coopt those small groups under their domain. This tolerance of division and diversity characterized the Palestinian nationalist movement, regardless of its rationale in doing so, with a sense of pluralism that thrived to become almost a tradition. In spite of the efforts induced in building a unified national movement, the Palestinians could not evade the social divisions and the fragmented authority in Palestinian society. Actually, it was in February 1969, when Fatah (The Palestinian national liberation movement) succeeded in controlling the PLO and in uniting to a certain degree the fragmented commando movement.(42)

### THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE PLO

Definitely, the PLO succeeded in reconstituting a shattered Palestinian society, this it accomplished under severe conditions and difficult environment. The Plo managed to operate a remarkable infrastructure against all odds, thus catering to a political and existential needs of the dispersed Palestinians.(43) According to Cheryl Rubenberg,

"The PLO's role goes beyond the traditional roles of national liberation movements, for it not only struggles for the attainment of the national political rights of the Palestinian people, but it is the only instrument for the reconstitution of Palestinian shattered society... The PLO, has to rehabilitate a nation as well as to struggle for its liberation."(44)

Despite the militant elements in the organizational structure of the PLO, it succeeded in building a civilian-institutional infrastructure that tended to the needs of the Palestinian nation in exile. In fact, the myriad of social institutions culminated in the political implications of institutionalization, which in turn, was crucial in the development of a framework dealing with the internal political processes and strategy formulations.(45) The viability of this infrastructure provided the PLO with the means and mechanisms in containing factionalism and divisiveness among the resistance groups, and in representing the Palestinians abroad, not to mention the rendering of medicare and social care to the refugee communities in Lebanon and elsewhere.(46) It is important to note, that Fatah being the

largest group within the PLO is the wealthiest and most influential, yet it cannot arbitrarily set PLO policies without the coordination with the other smaller groups. This is because, Fatah fears fragmentation and cannot afford losing the representative and democratic image, and above all, the influence of Arab States which prompts it to accommodate to the smaller groups a political leverage far beyond their proportions and capabilities.(47) Consequently, the PLO's leadership had always struggled to portray a democratic image at the expense of managing conflicting interests within the factions and the Palestinian Community. In spite of occasional abrasive relationship with the smaller groups within the PLO, Fatah has ostensibly buttressed national unity within the organization, a concept that is imperative in building democratic relations. However, in terms of tactics the smaller groups differ from the mainstream, but Fatah always manages in setting commonalities abound, helped by the institutions that are geared to promote unity and avoid fractionalization.(48) This uniqueness of the PLO transcends its traditional concept of a national liberation struggle and makes it unique in comparison with other national liberation movements. In the fall of 1981 Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, explained this uniqueness when he said:

"Many people think that the cause of Palestine resembles that of Vietnam, Algeria, or even South Africa. But although there is a resemblance in some aspects, there is something entirely unique about our cause. What we have been, and still are, confronted with is not merely foreign invasion, occupation, and even settlement. All this has been experienced by other countries. But no other country has been confronted with a plan to liquidate its national identity, as has happened in the case of Palestine, nor confronted a plan to empty a country of its people as has happened in the case of the Palestinian people. It goes beyond anything previously recorded in modern history".(49)

The institutionalization process by the PLO reflects political maturity of the Palestinian people and its historic leadership, thus legitimizing its quest for nationhood and ultimately, for statehood.

## THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PLO

The most important political institutions of the PLO are the Palestinian National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee, according to the Fundamental Law. The PLO has a state infrastructure because it has three branches of government, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.(50)

### A- THE NATIONAL COUNCIL:

The National Council is an equivalent of a parliament, it is the supreme authority formulating policies and programs for the PLO. Its term of office is two years, however, it meets regularly in ordinary sessions upon the request of the Executive Committee or a quarter of its members. Between 1964-67, the ordinary session was annual, but the fourth ordinary session of July 1968 resolved that ordinary session be held twice a year. (51) The Council is comprised of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, and a secretary, all elected by the Council. Its membership is nominated by a committee of the preceding institutions and organizations of the Palestinian communities. The objective is to secure a fair representation of all Palestinian individuals in all walks of life.

It is important to note, that the members of the PNC should be directly elected by the Palestinian people, but in practice this was not possible, for participation has always been the culmination of lengthy debates and hot arguments between the various factions of the PLO prior to each PNC session.(52) During its regular sessions the Council considers the report of the Executive Committee on the accomplishments of the various organs of the PLO, the report of the Palestinian National Fund, the budget of the PLO; the recommendations of various Council committees, and any other issues submitted for considerations. Two thirds of its membership form the quorum; and decisions are taken by simple majority.(53)

### B- THE CENTRAL COUNCIL:

The National Council in its eleventh session, in January 1973 created a Central Council from its own membership to follow up and implement its

resolutions. The Council serves Consultative functions to the PLO leadership. It is intermediate in level between itself and a fully-fledged session of the PNC, and ensures the various factions within the PLO continued effective participation in PLO affairs and in the PLO's constituency.(54) Its membership is comprised of the executive committee, along with at least an equivalent number of other members directly elected from the PNC.(55) It meets at least once every three months and serves a combined legislative-executive function.(56)

#### C- THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

According to the Fundamental Law, the second most important organization within the PLO is the Executive Committee "Cabinet", which functions as the Executive branch of the organization. The PNC selects its members and in turn the members elect the Chairman. The Executive Committee is in permanent session and its members work on a full-time basis.(57) It is responsible to the National Council collectively and individually for the execution of the policies, plans, programs drawn up by the National Council. The number of Executive Committee members was set by the Fundamental Law at a maximum of fifteen, including the Chairman.(58)

The Executive Committee carries out four major functions:

- 1- It officially represents the Palestinian people.
- 2- It supervises the various organs of the PLO.
- 3- It draws up programs and issues directives, and takes decisions on the organization of the PLO, provided they don't contradict the National Charter.
- 4- It executes the financial policy of the PLO and prepares its budget.(59) In short, it directs all the activities of the PLO, in accordance with the general plans and resolutions passed by the National Council. However, within the Executive Committee, two thirds of the members form a necessary quorum and decisions are taken by a simple majority.(60) Since the Executive committee is elected by and from the National Council, it is usually fairly representative of the power structure of the various Commando Organizations in the Council.(61)

#### D- THE PALESTINE NATIONAL FUND:

Another major institution of the PLO stipulated in the Fundamental Law

is the Palestine National Fund. Revenues of the Fund were to come from the following sources: 1- A fixed tax of 5 to 7 percent of wages earned, on all Palestinians and collected by the Arab governments of the states in which they reside. 2- Financial contributions by the Arab governments and people. 3- Loans and contributions from Arab governments and friendly nations. 4- Any additional sources approved by the PNC.(62)

The Chairman of the board of directors to the Fund is elected by the National Council, who automatically becomes member of the Executive Committee. The other eleven members of the board are appointed by the Executive Committee for a three-year term. One of the major functions of the Fund, is its supervision of the expenditures of the PLO and its institutions.(63)

#### E- THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT:

The PLO's diplomatic activities are carried out through the Political Department. The head of the department, compared to a foreign minister, (Mr. Qaddumi) represents the PLO at Arab summits and conferences and at special United Nations sessions, and performs other diplomatic duties. The department oversees the offices of the PLO in foreign countries.(64)

#### F- THE INFORMATION BUREAU:

The PLO has an Information Bureau which performs both informational and public relations functions. The Office deals with newsmen, and has its own newspaper, Filastin al-Thawra (Palestine Revolution), its own news Agency, WAFA, and it publishes a bimonthly Journal in French and English, entitled Palestine.(65)

In addition to its political organs, the PLO was able to develop its own regular army and an active military police in Lebanon. However, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the military and civilian infrastructures of the Palestinians were almost shattered. A closer look at the formal structure of the major political organs of the PLO, prompts one draw several inferences about the nature of the political process in the PLO and to what extent sharing of power and collective decision-making is applicable. The basic premise made is that the PLO along the years, had established a quasi-state form of organization that functioned in a democratic way and therefore could not have practiced authoritarianism since it lacked a finite territorial

state and a dispersed Palestinian constituency. It is valid to say then, that the legitimacy of the PLO is derived from the Palestinian people, because "the PLO as an umbrella organization subsumes all the various elements of the Palestinian nationalist movement [which] makes authoritarianism an unlikely modus operandi." (66) Further, the PLO has succeeded in maintaining its legitimacy by integrating the various and complex positions and attitudes of the Palestinian social strata, which by and large, has been one of the strongest elements in the PLO. Of course, the high level of literacy among Palestinians, and their political consciousness which is deep due to dispersion, occupation and repression by Israel as well as by authoritarian Arab regimes, gives the Palestinians a unique flavor unfound in any of the Arab states.

In terms of decision-making, the PLO strives towards consensus although constitutionally, a simple majority could do. Unlike other Arab states, the chief executive in the PLO cannot solely make arbitrations or unilateral decisions, he could use the tools of persuasion and bargaining in order to arrive at balance among the diverse political trends in the PLO. It is fairly clear, then, that authoritarianism could exacerbate factionalism and divisiveness, a trend that could dismantle the PLO and deprive it from its legitimacy. Obviously, the non-centralization of PLO authority in a finite territorial state could not help in developing authoritarianism that could crush the opposition. As a matter of fact, the PLO leadership had always resorted to the use of functional pragmatism in accommodating to the issue of factionalism. Therefore, negotiations and bargaining along with persuasion, have been considered plausible tactics by the PLO in overcoming the barriers of splintering and dissent. However, one cannot overlook the elements of factionalism in the PLO, based not only on tactics but along ideological lines, and since Fatah is the predominant faction it can act unilaterally without deep confrontations and outright contradictions. Chairman Arafat has been a master of diplomacy in containing Palestinian factionalism, and had contrived successfully in using the PLO's political structure in promoting his ideas and achieving his pragmatic gestures. Of course, he could not have survived all the debacles and especially within Fatah, when a group of commando leaders reneged on him and joined forces with the Syrians back in 1983, if he backed a popular mass-based support, in particular from the

Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. This could lead one to a fair inference that regardless of factionalism within the PLO, democratic practices are embedded in the pragmatic politics of the PLO that would be unjustifiable for authoritarianism to gain grounds, once an independent Palestinian state is established. In fact, one of the key elements for the survival of the PLO in exile, is the translation of Palestinian nationalism into a concrete structural-functional organization that served best Palestinian needs. Definitely, the PLO's survival has heavily depended on the full synchronization between the "exterior" and "interior" Palestinians, and the Intifada illustrates best this phenomenon.(67)

#### CAMP DAVID AND THE AUTONOMY PLAN: PALESTINIAN REACTIONS AND DECISION

As mentioned earlier, the PLO has managed to build an institutional infrastructure that is necessary for a State. The PLO in the diaspora has built its organs, be it political, educational, health, economic, and mass organizations that could be transformed into governing and administrative organs.

Similarly, the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza have built their institutional framework against all odds and have laid down the nucleus for an independent Palestinian State. However, in comparing it with the Palestinian institutions in the diaspora, I believe that there are some disparities, on the economic and political levels. Regardless of the difficult positions the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are locked in, the process of institution-building is irreversible. The Intifada has bolstered the concept of self-reliance and has activated the process of institution-building. Furthermore, the Palestinians articulate a clear consensus as to their political aspirations: 1- End of Israeli military occupation, 2- Self-determination, 3- Independent Palestinian State. In the light of this background, the autonomy proposals in Camp David will be discussed, and the Palestinians reactions to it. However, a closer look on the various attitudes among the Palestinians in regard to autonomy plan, will shed more lights on the decision-making process.



There is no doubt, that the institutional structure of the PLO was the Locus of a diaspora center, in addition to other factors that were contributive to its emergence as a potential center for the Palestinians. It is worth mentioning some of the factors: 1- The recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the Rabat Conference 1974, 2- The Conferring of observer status to the organization at the United Nations General Assembly, 3- The admittance of the PLO to the non-aligned group in August 1975, 4- The acceptance of the PLO as a member by the "group of 77" developing nations, 5- PLO's full membership in the Arab League and 6- PLO's full membership in the Economic Commission for West Asia (ECOSOC). (68)

By mid 1978, the PLO managed to locate representatives in more than sixty countries. Furthermore, the PLO was instrumental in cementing the relations between the diaspora Palestinians and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This was accomplished by the PLO's coordination on the institutional and political levels with the mass organizations and higher institutes of learning in the West Bank and Gaza. No wonder then, when the 1976 municipal elections were carried out, those elected mayors were considered by Israel as surrogates of the PLO, which led to their ousting and even deportation.

By mid seventies, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, managed to form a national political community characterized by its cohesiveness, persistence and insistence on building an infrastructure that would ultimately lead to a Palestinian State. This process was articulated by the leadership of the mayors on the West Bank and Gaza, along with prominent Palestinian political figures guided by the PLO. To execute the plan for a Palestinian entity, there emerged the "Palestinians National Front" (PNF), which was comprised of various PLO supported organizations, the communist party and other national figures. (69) However, led by Shaka'a and Khalaf (two mayors who were ousted later), the PNF was outlawed by Israel in October 1979, to be replaced by the National Guidance Committee.

#### THE AUTONOMY PROPOSALS:

In December 1977, the Israeli government announced a "Self rule" plan for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, which served later as the

basis for the Israeli position on the question of autonomy. According to Ann Lesch, a scholar on Palestinian National Politics:

"The self-rule plan proposed that a Council be elected on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (With its seat in Bethlehem) that would administer, but not legislate, on such matters as education, health and social welfare. The Council would not have the authority to limit Israeli land purchases or settlements, and Israel would continue to control both internal and external security. Although the question of sovereignty would remain open for review after five years, the proposal emphasized that Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to these territories".(70)

Further, the Arab administrative council was restricted in terms of legislation, levying taxes, issuing postage stamps and currency, control imports and exports and hold elections according to platforms and tickets.(71) However, the Israelis would still control the issuance of identity cards, would still supervise the Health and Education departments and would still control the Land.

This was the framework that Israel set in the Camp David autonomy plan, or at least that was its vision of autonomy for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. However, the basic features of the camp David Agreement on the autonomy plan was best analyzed by Fayez A. Sayegh, a Palestinian scholar:

"According to the agreement reached by the United States, Israel and Egypt, a "self governing" authority will be set up in the West Bank and Gaza to replace the Israeli military government in those areas. The modalities for establishing that authority, as well as its powers and responsibilities, will be determined by Israel, Egypt and Jordan. The "self-governing" authority will exercise the powers conferred upon it for a five-year period of transition. Approximately half-way through that period, negotiations on the future status of the West Bank and Gaza will start. In addition to Israel, Egypt and Jordan, representatives of the "self-governing" authority will participate in those negotiations"(72).

Before discussing the various positions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and the official PLO position, it is important to highlight the observations on the Camp David Palestine formula. To start with, Palestinian representation to the Camp David Accords was absent and without consideration to the known wishes of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the Camp David Framework divides the Palestinian people into two categories, the inhabitants

of the West Bank and Gaza, and those Palestinian refugees displaced in 1967, and it imprecisely refers to the "refugee problem".(73) Similarly, the Camp David Palestine formula, according to F. Sayegh:

"...excludes the three basic rights of the Palesinian people which have been recognized and affirmed by the United Nations as the foundations of a just and lasting solution of the Palestinian problem: The right of Palestinian people to self-determination and independence in Palestine. Its right to designate its own national representative and to participate through the Palestine Liberation Organization -its sole legitimate representative- in all efforts aimed at achieving a settlement of the problems in which it is involved; and the right of displaced and dispossessed Palestinians to return to their homes and property".(74)

Definitely, the Camp David Accords was an outright negation of Palestinian national and political rights, however, it is considered a decision-crossroad in Palestinian history.(75)

To begin with, it is important to describe the PLO's executive Committee's reaction to the Camp David Accords, that was delivered in a statement issued in Beirut, September 18, 1978 by the Palestinian news agency Wafa. Excerpts from this statement will suffice to portray the official position of the Palestinian leadership at the time. However, it went as follows:

"...The agreement provides clear evidence of Sadat's total connivance at Zionism's goals of ignoring all Palstinian national rights...By signing this agreement Sadat's regime is giving his sanction to the well-known goal of imperialism and Zionism -that of completely isolating Egypt from the Arab national struggle and striking at all the Arab resolutions issue by the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences, the resolutions of the international community as declared by the General Asembly of the United Nations...Sadat's plan for self-government [on the West Bank and Gaza Strip] gives sanction to the Zionist enemy's aim of turning the West Bank and Gaza Strip into a colony subject to perpetual occupation...(76)

The PLO affirmed its position of rejection to the "autonomy plan" and called on the masses of the Palestinian people to express their indignation and outrage by demonstrations and strikes. The National Guidance Committee which replaced the PNF in the Occupied Territories, was comprised of twenty four members. It covered a wide range of membership that included nationalist mayors, representatives of Labor Unions, Women's societies, Students' organizations as well as local newspapers along with delegates from the Gaza

Strip.(77) Nevertheless, the political affiliations in the NGC ranged from communists to pro-Jordanians as well as to the PLO organizations.(78) The NGC took upon itself to conduct the political struggle against the "autonomy plan", the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and Israel's settlement policy. On September 30, 1978, a national conference was convened in Beit-Hanina (occupied Jerusalem), by the NGC set out to consolidate the Palestinian national struggle against Israeli Occupation. The Conference was attended by mayors of the various West Bank towns and cities, delegates from unions, Organizations, clubs and national figures.(79) However, similar conferences were held throughout this period, one in Nablus at (Al-Najah University), On Nov. 11, 1979, and another one in Ramallah in Oct. 1979, and in Jerusalem during the same month.(80) In general, most of these conferences came out with similar resolutions, condemning autonomy as "legitimization of the occupation, the continuation of oppression of the Palestinian people and the stealing of their legitimate rights, and an open plot to curb the hopes of our people to have our right to our land and our self-determination..."(81) Many petitions were signed in the months of September and October, 1978, rejecting the "autonomy plan", however, the essence of all these petitions was"

a- The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

b- The unity of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and in the diaspora.

c- The "autonomy plan" legitimizes occupation and impedes the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

d- The end of military occupation and the establishment of an Independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem being the Capital.

e- The fear of Jordan's role in controlling the West Bank and Gaza, because the PLO was excluded from the Camp David framework.

During this period of time, there were tensions among the Palestinians, especially when the NGC became increasingly defiant to Fatah's decisions concerning the conduct of the political struggle against Israeli occupation.(82) Consequently, Fatah started coordinating its policies with the Pro-Jordanian elements and the "moderate Palestinians", and eventually, noted its presence in the joint Jordanian-PLO committee. Fatah activated itself through the Joint Committee by financing elections on the West Bank, be it union elections or students elections in order to control the Palestinian

street and curb the influence of the NGC (predominantly leftist in orientation). Of course, this led to the decrease in the influence of the NGC in making decisions and in affecting the course of the struggle inside the Occupied Territories. The Israeli decision in March 1982, to dissolve the NGC following the dismissal of seven West Bank mayors was a coup de grace for Fatah because it narrowed the radical left menace to its power in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Of course, the Israeli action against the NGC was directed against the PLO's influence in the Occupied Territories.(83)

According to Shaul Mishal, an Israeli scholar:

"The increasing attention devoted by the PLO to the West Bank as a result of President Sadat's peace initiative intensified the dispute between Fatah and the radical factions over the status and role of Palestinian leadership in the Occupied Territories. This dispute was exploited by the PNF, the NGC, and later the Village Leagues to undertake political activity beyond the municipal level and to seek leadership at an all-West Bank level..."(84)

Regardless of the differences, the PNF and the NGC emphasized cooperation with the PLO, while the village leagues (created and backed by Israel) sought to become an alternative leadership to the PLO. The village leagues cooperated with the Israeli occupation authorities in creating a wedge between the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the PLO. It went further, to recognize publicly Israel and to strike a deal with it, independent of the PLO. The village leagues were outrightly for the Camp David framework and the "autonomy plan" for the Palestinians. However they were rendered impotent by the challenge of Fatah and the radical Palestinians to their existence. Hence, the members of the village Leagues were banned, ostracized and condemned by the Palestinians.

The Camp David Syndrome could be considered another Palestinian decision crossroad, albeit it was rejected by the Palestinian nationalist movement, however, there were certain voices among the Palestinians and Arabs who were for the "autonomy plan", believing that this interim period will eventually lead to an independent entity.

## THE TRANSFORMATION OF PLO POLITICS SINCE THE LEBANON WAR 1982

Given present political realities, one detects a clear transformation in Palestinian politics especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is evident that three major internal changes within the Palestinian national movement have been a major catalyst in changing the strategy of the PLO in its political struggle against Israel. One of the major changes, had been the changing role and status of the formal political organizations i.e. the commando groups that compose the PLO. A second major shift, was the concentration of power in Arafat's hands to be the undisputed leader of the PLO. A third major shift, was the focus of the national struggle from the periphery to the central i.e., the Occupied Territories.(85)

Naturally, the dramatic shifts in PLO politics were not made in vacuum, for it had been a culmination to the PLO inter-Arab politics in particular, with Jordan and Syria. This action prompted Arafat to have a free diplomatic ploy-with his opponents being marginalized- thus succeeded in increasing his political stature especially in the Occupied Territories. Consequently, the focus of the political struggle shifted to the West Bank and Gaza, because as we know, the PLO's formal institutions and infrastructure had been partially shattered. Therefore, the only trump card left for Arafat is to play the West Bank card, and he succeeded ingeniously in achieving that objective. Furthermore, Arafat's trip to Egypt after the PLO's expulsion from Beirut added a major component to the success of PLO diplomacy. However, on the internal political scene of the PLO, there was a clear demarcation between the mainstream of Arafat and the "rejectionist" opposition, composed of the PFLP - general command (PFLP-GC) and the Vanguard of Popular Liberation War- Asa'iqa Forces and the splinter group from Fatah which seceded in Spring 1983, known as Fatah-Provisional Command, and the pro-Syrian wing of the Palestine Liberation Front.(86) All these factions formed together the Palestine National Salvation Front in March 1985. It is worth mentioning, that the National Salvation Front was not successful in building a popular base in the Occupied Territories, consequently, its impact was marginal because it failed to advocate a viable solution to the diplomatic posture advocated by Arafat and Fatah.

On the other hand, since the Fatah split in 1983, the PFLP and the DFLP have formed a "Loyal" opposition camp, critical of Arafat, yet loyal to the PLO framework. Unlike the National Salvation Front, the two groups were successful in mobilizing support through the building of organizational structures in the Occupied Territories and in exile. The opposition to Arafat hammered on political issues mainly the diplomatic strategy of Fatah and the redefined relations with Jordan and Egypt. It was until the Nineteenth PNC, that the traditional veto power held by the smaller factions were undermined in the decision-making process. Consequently, Fatah has dominated the PLO and confirmed a central role in the PLO's decision-making process(87)

According to Emile Sahliyah, an authority on the PLO politics;

"Although Fatah's moderate leadership demonstrated some willingness to give the floating peace plans a chance, it simultaneously continued to pay lip service to the relevance of the strategy of military struggle. The moderate leadership was unwilling to gamble with too many odds working against it. With such mixed feelings and sentiments, the leadership of the PLO moderates approached the Reagan initiative, coordination with Jordan and contact with Egypt, Syria and Israeli peace groups.(88)

The moderates inside the PLO realized that U.S. participation for a Middle East settlement is indispensable in view of its massive assistance in all realms to Israel.(89) Consequently, the moderates tried to rally for U.S. appeasement and by 1988, with the Nineteenth PNC, a U.S.-PLO dialogue was initiated to be ruptured at a later stage as a result the aborted Abu al-Abbas Tel-Aviv beach attack. To highlight the evolution of the PLO politics since its inception, a closer look at the PNC resolutions is imperative, to indicate the transformation from "Armed Struggle" to "Peaceful coexistence".

#### FOURTH DECISION CROSSROAD THE TWO STATE-SOLUTION AN ANALYSIS OF THE PNC RESOLUTIONS

A serious analysis of PNC resolutions could shed lights on Palestinian democratic trends and pluralist thinking that had been developing along the years and in particular, from the twelfth PNC in 1974 onwards. In fact, since 1974, the Palestinians had been moving steadily towards accommodation and

compromise. By the eighteenth PNC convened in Algiers in April 1987, most of the elements that embraced the peaceful strategy and the acceptance of the two-state solution on the basis of United Nations resolutions were in place.

To understand better the transitions of Palestinian political thought, the PNC sessions since the inception of the PLO will be divided into three distinctive phases. Each phase is exclusively described to highlight the major turning points in the Palestinian decision-making process.

#### I- LIBERATION AND RETURN: FIRST PHASE (The First Four PNC's: 1964-1968)

Since the destruction of Palestine in 1948, Palestinians have suffered homelessness and exile, and therefore sought to redress these injustices through the liberation of their occupied homeland and the repatriation of their exiled community.(90) However, the National Palestinian Charter of 1964 and the amended National Charter of 1968 drawn up in the Fourth PNC, as well as in the resolutions of the Second and Third PNCs, emphasized the total liberation of Palestine.(91) The Fourth PNC exhibits a dramatic shift, for it not only centers on total liberation through armed struggle but it shifts the agent of liberation from the Arab political scene to that of the Palestinians.(92) Self-reliance along with the armed struggle were stipulated in Article 9 of the 1968 National Charter. Moreover, the concept of national unity had been reiterated to coordinate the different commando groups within the PLO infrastructure. The newly emerged PLO as a result of the Fourth PNC, stressed vigorously the building of socio-political and economic institutions that could cater to the needs of a shattered society.(93)

#### II- THE SECULAR DEMOCRATIC STATE: SECOND PHASE (Fifth through Eleventh PNCs (1969-1974))

Palestinians during this phase encountered a problematic situation of how to reconcile their legitimate national political rights, with the political and demographic realities that have been created after the destruction of Palestine and subsequent events.(94) This phase was characterized by a dramatic shift in Palestinian objectives, from total liberation to a democratic secular state in which Christians, Jews and Muslims could harmoniously live together. One important concession should be made by the Israelis, the renouncing of Zionism and the messianic vision of Eretz



Israel. Thus the Fifth PNC in 1969 introduced the idea of establishing a "free democratic society in Palestine". However, in the sixth PNC the same concept had been reiterated with a stipulation changing the word society with that of a state.(95) In fact, in the Eleventh PNC, the establishment of a "democratic society where all citizens can live in equality, justice, and fraternity", and which would be "opposed to all forms of prejudice on the basis of race, creed and color" was emphasized. Of course this proposal represented a dramatic and historic compromise in which a framework for peace was presented and Zero-sum claims were renounced by the Palestinians. This official policy of the PLO remained the basic objective until 1974, when the organization made the first gesture of two-state solution at the Twelfth PNC.(96)

### III- THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION: THIRD PHASE (Twelfth PNC - Nineteenth PNC: 1974-1988)

It was in July of 1974 after the October war, that new realities evolved in the Middle East and hopes for a comprehensive settlement was high, which in turn, induced the PLO to embark on a road to political settlement through pragmatism that culminated in the declaration of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories and the ultimate acceptance of a two-state solution. Of course, this historic decision was not made in a vacuum, it was a response to accumulated important events like the Lebanese Civil War, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David accords, the Egyptian-Israeli peace Treaty, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the current Intifada in the Occupied Territories, that led to a bold decision of peaceful coexistence with Israel. Moreover, along these crucial years, the PLO witnessed internal changes and dramatic events, such as the temporary withdrawal of the PFLP from the PLO's Executive Committee, the dissension of Abu Mousa faction from Fatah in 1983, the controversial trip of Arafat to Cairo after the PLO's dismantlement from Lebanon. All these incidents were crucial to the existence of the Palestinian national movement, however, the Palestinians survived them and the PLO managed to stabilize its objective and profound commitment to the concept of two-state solution. One could safely assert that the Twelfth PNC was the turning point in Palestinian historic and political decision-making which could be considered the prelude towards peaceful coexistence and political

accommodation. It was in this council where the "Ten point" program was drafted, calling for the establishment of the "peoples national, independent, and fighting authority on every part of liberated Palestinian land".(97)

Subsequent PNCs the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth, emphasized methodically and systematically, the Palestinians rights to establish their independent state under the leadership of the PLO, in any parts of Palestine.(98) During the Fifteenth PNC, the Brezhnev initiative was welcomed, the dialogue with Jordan resumed, the European initiative was considered and much attention was paid to the organizational structure of the PLO.(99) During this period, a broadly-based international consensus emerged for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in parts of Palestine as the basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is worth mentioning, that the PLO endorsed the resolutions of the Fez conference convened in Morocco in 1982, that laid down a practical vision for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.(100)

However, the Sixteenth PNC indicated another shift in PLO policy that was directed towards accommodation and open dialogue with Jordan and the formation of Confederation. AT all events the Confederation plan was continuously reiterated in subsequent PNCs, despite the abrogation of the February accords in 1986.(101)

Since the Twelfth PNC, the concept of "armed struggle" became subservient to political diplomacy but was never ruled out as an option. The strategy set was a political course towards peaceful resolution to the conflict, through mediation, conciliation, mutual reciprocity and parity.

It was in the Seventeenth PNC (Amman Conference 1984) that consensus in PLO politics shifted to majority politics, since the Damascus-based opposition to the mainstream within the PLO, had a small base.

Explicitly the Amman PNC consecrated the paramountcy of the Palestinian aspirations and wishes in the Occupied Territories, and certainly assumed a forefront position and consideration. Rashid Khalidi sums up best the Palestinian desiderata in the following five points:(102)

- 1- That there is a Palestinian people living on its historic land.
- 2- It has the right to self-determination.
- 3- It is represented by the PLO.
- 4- It has the right to an independent state.

##### 5- Negotiations in the context of an International Conference.

A point of inference should be made here, while the Palestinian national movement transforming from a liberation movement into a national independence movement accepting U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and lately the Baker plan 1989-1990, along a well-defined peaceful strategy culminating in consensus on coexistence with Israel, we see a shift towards the extreme by the present Likud government espousing maximalist policies.(103)

However, the Eighteenth PNC convened in Algiers, April 20-25, 1989, symbolizes a major PLO triumph over a threat to its unity, national cohesion and legitimacy: According to an analysis presented by Muhammad Hallaj a noted Palestinian scholar, the Eighteenth PNC witnessed:

"The return of the opposition to the Parliamentary and constitutional structures of the PLO was an admission of the failure of extra-constitutional confrontation and the triumph of democratic dissent within the Palestinian political process. The importance of the reinforcement of the PLO's democratic traditions by the PNC cannot be overestimated"(104)

He Further adds:

"The re-election of Yasir Arafat to the chairmanship of the Executive Committee happened with the consent of the formerly rebellious opposition enhanced the importance of legality and constitutionalism and the principle of the consent of the governed as the basis for legitimacy."(105)

The strategy of the Palestinian leadership during this third phase, was comprised of three substantial elements, mobilizing and politicizing the Palestinian people behind an organization representing them, maintaining the unity of the Palestinian movement through very difficult times and achieving a political program based on consensus.(106)

In November 1988, the nineteenth PNC met in Algiers to adopt a Declaration of Independence and a political statement, in these documents a clear and concise peace strategy was laid down, along with explicit acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and the recognition of Israel, and the issue of terrorism an impediment towards U.S. precondition for opening a dialogue with the PLO. This PNC constituted the most explicit formulation of the Palestinian objectives, couched in an unambiguous language, towards a comprehensive, peaceful two-state solution of the Palestinian Israel conflict.(107) Undoubtedly, the nineteenth PNC has irrevocably changed the

course of the PLO, from former claims for a state in all Palestine to a limited one on the West Bank and Gaza. Regardless of the PFLP and DFLP's opposition to the mainstream Fatah in the PLO, George Habash reiterated: "The PFLP and I will remain in the PLO and in all its institutions forever". (108)

Current Palestinian thinking rests on a clear and unequivocal position calling for the need to develop a flexible strategy that rejects past tendencies to adopt the familiar all-or-nothing position. As we have seen, the "no" which the Palestinians have been known to choose with regard to negotiations with Israel and the restoration of their rights in Palestine has been affected by two important developments:

- 1- The PLO's acceptance of a two-state solution and the relevant United Nations resolutions.
- 2- The willingness of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to be part of a negotiating team whose task would be to implement a two-state solution.(109)

#### THE PLO AND THE INTIFADA: TOWARDS A PEACEFUL STRATEGY

The Palestinian politics in exile has always been manifested microcosmically in the Occupied Territories, therefore continuous debate among Palestinians takes place in their pursuit of their national interests. Palestinian national identity and the process of nation-building as we have seen, have become a concrete reality. It was between 1982 and 1987 that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, started building a challenging infrastructure to Israeli occupation. Thanks to the Intifada that played an imperative role in the institutionalization process that led to a synchronized effort with the Palestinian diaspora, to discover the potentials of their new empowerment.(110)

It is important to note, that the eve of the Palestinian uprising the public debate within the Palestinian national movement, according to Salim Tamari, a noted Palestinian sociologist, focused on two trends of political thinking: a- "the first stressed steadfastness, a development strategy of survival and communal preservation until political conditions allowed for an

external intervention. b- The second, seeing the conditions of transformation to be irreversible, concluded the search for sovereignty had to be traded for equality within the Israeli polity".(111) One could simply assert that the concept of steadfastness had been buttressed by "Sumud" funds which exacerbated the reinforcement of "A'yan" political hierarchies characterized with traditionalism and a facade of moderation. These urban notables were often manipulated by the Israeli civil administration to diffuse potential threats immanating from populist reactions. This trend of populism posed a direct challenge to the traditional leadership inside and outside the Occupied Territories.(112) However, the main traits of this "radical populism", was manifested at the institutional level of rejecting the traditional mode of thinking, be it in women's associations and charitable societies, and student movement criticizing the formal university curriculum.(113) Furthermore, this trend of populism had concentrated on the role of the labor force to be a genuine component of the labor and trade unions in the Occupied Territories. Ideologically, however, this movement could not avoid the trend of factionalism -a typified trait- of Palestinian politics.(114) In spite of this factionalism, the already existing institutional infrastructure was the determining power in boosting the uprising and sustaining it to a point of no return. Furthermore, the mass organizations and the grass root networks along with the popular committees had formed the organizational nucleus to the uprising.(115)

The Intifada has managed to create a national debate among the various political groups within the PLO, between the "interior" and the "exterior", and between the "nationalist" and "religious" camps. This debate is reflective of the democratic trend within the Palestinian national movement inside the Occupied Territories and outside in the Diaspora. Albeit, there are differences in the national camp as to the strategy of peace and how to pursue it, but it is not detrimental and yet could be categorized as "loyal opposition". However, the religious groups spearheaded by "Hamas" (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya: Islamic Resistance Movement), rejects the Palestinian State and the convening of an International conference. It espouses the establishment of an Islamic State in the entire area of Palestine. One should not undermine the power and influence of "Hamas" on the Palestinian street, for since 1982, it developed potentially to challenge the

PLO in the Occupied Territories. In sum, the two camps are irreconcilable.(116)

However, with the peace Process going on, the "Nationalist camp" has been divided between two positions that are polarized; one being introduced by Fatah, advocating a political initiative that starts with transitional period of self-government and a Palestinian state in the final stage, and the other view introduced by the PFLP and to a certain degree hardliners in Fatah and "Independents", advocating the end of Israeli occupation and the immediate establishment of a state. The second view encourages the escalation of the uprising, believing that neither the U.S. nor Israel would change their positions vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. They believe that the peace process would diffuse the inner potentials of the uprising and would succumb to unilateral concessions that would ultimately lead to the acceptance by the Palestinians an "autonomy plan" over the people and not over the land.(117)

#### THE ASSESSMENT OF THE INTIFADA AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since its eruption on 8 december 1987, the Intifada in the Occupied Territories, had defied the status quo and opened new avenues for both peace and conflict in the region. In fact, it has come to the fore as the most urgent and complex part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, contriving to score a pyrrhic victory by influencing international, and to a lesser degree Israeli, public opinion. The dramatic impact of the Intifada has been the creation of universal awareness of the unsustainability of the statu quo (i.e., the Israeli occupation) coupled with the Intifada's own remarkable unanimity and staying power. However, neither this awareness nor the Intifada's persistence could have been accomplished without the actual translation of potential politicization into political action through a mobilization of the Palestinians of every age, sex, place of residence and social background. Grass-roots action, self-reliance, communal solidarity and sense of responsibility have been important factors in mobilizing the Palestinians and in giving the leadership of the PLO the self-confidence to consider what was once a political suicide: negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. In fact,

this change of political mood is attributable to the ongoing Intifada, which portrays itself as an authentic manifestation, of creative power and a legitimate expression of Palestinian nationalism, embedded in the culture, community and the power of resistance. However, Israeli reaction to the uprising has consistently been characterized by an unprecedented degree of brutality and confusion. Further, Israel has failed to counteract the Palestinian diplomatic offensive.

The Intifada has been remarkable in pushing Israel towards political accommodation with the Palestinians, in spite of Israel's resistance to a negotiated settlement that will jeopardize the relinquishing of its control over the West Bank and Gaza. What the Likud Government is willing to afford a limited autonomy for the Palestinians. On the other hand, Palestinian moderation (a democratic behavior) could be reflected in these attitudes:

- a- Ready to negotiate peace with Israel on the West Bank and Gaza.
- b- Ready to accept interim period with U.N. supervision.
- c- Ready to accept a form of confederation with Jordan and even with Israel in the future.
- d- Ready to accept U.S. mediation (as they have already did) for a negotiated peaceful settlement.
- e- Not ready to accept Shamir's self-autonomy.(118)

In sum, this study has portrayed the basic trends of democratic behavior by Palestinians in their political structure as well as in their institutional infrastructure. However, elections a cornerstone in democratic behavior, has been practiced by the Palestinians in their mass organization, Universities and at the grass roots level. Ideologically, the Palestinian national movement has been committed to democracy as it was spelled out in the Declaration of Independence.

The high level of education and political consciousness, and the existence of numerous independent Palestinian institutions and professional societies would support a democratic government. In fact, Palestinian society has significant experience with democratic forms on the local level; some of its most respected leaders are the elected mayors of Palestinian villages and cities, many of who were deposed by the Israelis.(119) Palestinian emphasis on majority rule in decision making and the diffusion of power is a precondition for pluralist thinking and collective behavior.(120)

All These factors are good indicators to gauge Palestinian readiness to establish a genuine democratic government and hence a state on twenty two per cent of its historic land. So far the PLO's decision to recognize Israel represents a partial victory for the pragmatic wing of the organization, but if the PLO and the Palestinian moderates fail to reap the benefits of their positions, they will be condemned and ostracized and the radicals may gain strength, especially the Islamic block.

Such a situation would procrastinate the peace process and would deepen the contradictions which might lead for a renewed vicious cycle of extremism among the Palestinians and Israelis. The actual reality is that Palestinians and Israelis have been coexisting as neighbors and will continue to do so, and this situation cannot be altered. Nonetheless, making peace with the Palestinians is very low on Israel's list of priorities, and it is in the interest of all actors in the region, including Israel's, that the Palestinians be freed through a process of meditation, negotiation and conciliation before they are freed through confrontation. There is no doubt that, sooner or later, it is the Palestinians and Israelis that must make peace with each other. Peace, however, is not a 'non-belligerency agreement or military disengagement, it is a resolution of conflict on the basis of co-existence, reconciliation and cooperative relations between two peoples'.



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
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Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project  
WORKING PAPER SERIES

**A Palestinian Settlement:  
Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of  
National Security**

**A S Khalidi**

January 1992

Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem  
Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace,  
Hebrew University, Jerusalem  
Institute for International Affairs, Rome

### Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security

Palestinian security has long been one of the least visible items on the register of issues pertaining to a Middle East settlement. The widespread acknowledgment of Israel's security needs has contrasted sharply with the marginalisation of the Palestinians' similar fears and concerns, and consequently their degradation by comparison. Whereas Israel's right to secure borders has been enshrined in international diplomatic parlance, the Palestinians' right to security has been given little or no credence, an omission all the more glaring in view of the long-standing preponderance of power in Israel's favour.

Regardless of the political and historical reasons underlying the apparent reluctance of the outside world to address Israeli and Palestinian security concerns on an equal footing, it is incumbent upon the two "core" protagonists to reconcile their disparate views on security, both as a vital step towards the consolidation of the current peace process and as a necessary condition for its ultimate success. This entails recognition by both parties that each has legitimate concerns and that neither should seek to fulfil their perceived security needs at the expense of the other. At one level any fair resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli security problem must be predicated on the mutual acceptance of each other as equal partners, thereby revoking any notion of domination or imposition. At another level there is the severely practical problem of implementation; of the need to translate notional parity into concrete, choreographed arrangements on the ground within the constraints of time and the boundaries of political reality.'

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' These and other issues are addressed at fuller length in this author's "Arab Threat Perceptions, Peace and Stability", in Middle East Security: Two Views, by A S Khalidi and Yair Evron, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper No 3, May 1990. For a rare attempt at transcending ethnocentrism see also Mark Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets No Drums, IB Tauris, London 1991.

### Palestinian Security: Asymmetry and Insecurity

Israeli strategic analysts are wont to ground their exposition of Israel's security requirements in what they perceive to be the asymmetries obtaining in the overall balance between Israel and its Arab neighbours. But from a purely Palestinian perspective the most salient asymmetry is that between Israel and Palestinians themselves. This is not to dismiss Israel's broader non-Palestinian security concerns, but merely to state the obvious: In the context of bi-lateral Israeli-Palestinian relations, the overwhelming balance of forces has been to Israel's advantage since 1948 and before, and will almost certainly remain so for the indefinite future.

This asymmetry has bred a profound and pervasive Palestinian feeling of insecurity based on both historical experience and future outlook. Of all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is the Palestinians who have lost the most in national, territorial, human and material terms. Furthermore the prospects of even a partial redress (eg, a minimally "secure" homeland) remain far from certain given the structural imbalance of power, and the ongoing process of politico-demographic transformation of what remains of Palestinian patrimony.

Thus what is at stake in the current peace process for the Palestinians is not merely the provision of "better" security conditions for the Palestinian people as a whole, but more vitally, the creation of a new regime that will suspend the existential threat that has been their dominant experience for almost a century, and will ultimately provide for their future security in the most basic of senses: Freedom from external encroachment, aggrandizement or aggression.

That such notions can be seen as a curious mirror-image of Israeli/Zionist preoccupations, does nothing to detract from their significance or bearing on the prospects for peace, but

rather the contrary. If Israel can be portrayed as the embodiment of "security" for the Jewish people, then the Palestinian impulse towards statehood must surely be understood in similar terms.<sup>2</sup>

For the Palestinians therefore, the fundamentals of "security" comprise the alleviation of past fears and ongoing threats, and the neutralisation, albeit partial, of the asymmetry in their relationship with their primary adversary. This would require above all an end to occupation and colonisation and the establishment of a national entity on Palestinian soil as an irreversible reality. In addition, given that two-thirds of the Palestinian people live in the diaspora, national security (ie, of the Palestinian people as a whole) requires the provision of some measure of personal security to those who may remain outside the boundaries of direct national authority.

These goals might appear at first glance to be both ambitious and perhaps even unrealistic in light of the continuing uncertainties governing the current peace process, and the as yet very limited sympathy within Israel for a settlement on such terms. Nonetheless it will be argued here that without due consideration for Palestinian security concerns a truly stable settlement will remain elusive, as will security for Israel itself. In other words the principle of reciprocity is not only a politico-psychological prerequisite for peace, but a guarantor of its durability. Furthermore the programmatic execution of a new Palestinian security regime will of necessity be constrained by

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<sup>2</sup> It was both poignant and ironical from a Palestinian point of view to hear Prime Minister Shamir address the opening session of the Madrid Peace Conference with the assertion that "a people without a homeland, is a people defenceless." Unfortunately this irony is likely to be entirely lost on Shamir and his associates in the Israeli government.

both the factor of time (ie, phasing) and the broader dynamic affecting the regional dimensions of the conflict, as well as the role and objectives of outside parties. Whether the cumulative effect of such constraints is sufficient to bridge the gap between the Palestinian and Israeli visions of security will also clearly depend on the operational details envisaged by each side, some of which will be addressed below.

### Palestinian National Security: Three Basic Elements.

To the best of this author's knowledge, there is no comprehensive doctrine of Palestinian national security comparable to that developed by Israel over the past decades. This may not be entirely surprising given the absence of a Palestinian state or national entity with its own security rationale. Notions such as "revolutionary armed struggle" and "protracted people's war" which once dominated Palestinian politico-strategic thought have become largely defunct under the twin pressures of operational failure and sea-change within both the Palestinian and Arab body-politics. While "armed struggle" has not been officially renounced as an arm of Palestinian (PLO) policy, its role and purpose have been progressively downgraded to an admixture of symbolism and micro-tactics. Indeed one of the most significant changes in Palestinian outlook has been the gradual realisation that the resort to force is both counter productive and ineffective as a strategic option vis a vis Israel. To a large extent therefore, militarisation (and concomitantly mobilisation for war/military operations) is no longer a Palestinian grand strategic objective.\*

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\* Worthy of note is the singular absence of any reference to "armed struggle" in the political statement issued by the last two consecutive sessions (19 and 20) of the Palestinian National Council held in Algiers in 1988 and 1991. For a broader look at the development of Palestinian political thought and the retreat

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

As Palestinian political aspirations have narrowed down to the establishment of national authority on part of Palestinian soil within the overall framework of peace and coexistence with Israel, the need for the development of a cohesive doctrine of national security has become more pressing and relevant for two reasons: First, as a vital adjunct to the process of informal dialogue and formal negotiations with the opposing side, and second, as an integral part of the process of elucidation and refinement of the Palestinians' own goals and objectives. What follows is offered, hopefully, as a modest contribution to both processes.

Three elements can be identified as central to any Palestinian doctrine of National Security: Self-Defence, External Reinforcement, and Regional Linkage. Each of these elements will be further developed, taking into account the relevant time-frame (i.e., interim phase/final phase arrangements) as well as their likely compatibility with Israeli security concerns.

1. Self-Defence: The first element of Palestinian National Security has to be self-defence. Assuming that any Palestinian entity will not be motivated to use force offensively (nor will it be able to acquire the means to do so in any realistic scenario for a settlement), it will nonetheless require some means for defence against external aggression and/or internal subversion. It follows that total demilitarisation is not an acceptable option from a Palestinian point of view, indeed it could be argued that it is not in Israel's own interest to have

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in the status of armed struggle, see M. Muslih, Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 1990, pp 30-32 and Rashid Khalidi, "The 19th PNC Resolutions and American Policy", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol XIX, No 2, Issue 74, Winter 1990.

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

such a weak and vulnerable entity on its borders.

The need for self-defence springs from several imperatives: First, the Palestinian entity's right to ensure its survivability, as no national authority can rely totally or exclusively on the good will of its neighbours or the non-violent intentions of hostile internal elements. Second, the right to maintain some element of a defence force is an attribute of control and authority not denied even to a totally subjugated Germany and Japan after the Second World War and by extension cannot be denied to a Palestinian entity. Third, perceived vulnerability or weakness is a recipe for instability and a potential threat to the long-term viability of any peace agreement.

However self-defence does not require the acquisition of anything beyond the minimal necessary for raising the cost of external aggression and/or preventing a takeover by subversive armed elements. Self-defence can therefore be translated as the need for a "minimal deterrent capability" which can lend itself to a cap on the total number of personnel, and an agreed prohibition on the acquisition of certain "destabilising" weapons systems by the Palestinian authorities. In addition, both totally Demilitarised Zones, and Limited-force Zones could be designated in areas contiguous to Israeli-Palestinian borders on a reciprocal but not necessarily symmetrical basis, thus minimising the prospects for any sudden or forward deployment of Palestinian forces or equipment to the detriment of Israel's security.

The requirement for self-defence can be seen in the context of a phased, gradual build-up of Palestinian forces and capabilities linked to both the interim and final-phase agreements with

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*



specific agreed targets that may go beyond the time-frame imposed by the political process alone. Given the "strong local police force" posited in the Camp David Accords, the Palestinians cannot be reasonably expected to settle for anything less as an initial point of departure, the Shamir Government's apparent dissatisfaction with even this formulation notwithstanding. It is unlikely however that the Palestinians will be satisfied with only such a force as their final guardian of national security once a comprehensive settlement has been reached. Residual Israeli concerns regarding the development of a Palestinian Self-Defence (PSDF) could be met by further regulatory mechanisms as part of an agreed post-settlement security regime. These could include provisions for bi-lateral verification and observation measures, the establishment of a permanent Joint Military Commission, and mutually binding commitments on non-belligerency and/or the inviolability of borders.

Israeli resistance to any degree of Palestinian "militarisation" is likely to be strong regardless of the safeguards suggested above. Yet, Israeli insistence on denying the Palestinians the right to a minimally effective self-defence force over time cannot be credibly sustained, especially as no other party to the conflict is likely to forgo this right, or accede to external demands for its unilateral disarmament. A limited, constrained PSDF will do little to enhance the perceived threat to Israel, and will do much to serve post-settlement stability, especially as a truly comprehensive peace (eg, with other Arab parties) will go far in meeting central Israeli security concerns.

2. External Reinforcement: In addition to the requirement for self-defence, our proposed doctrine of Palestinian national security encompasses the notion of "external reinforcement". This has two separate components: First, enhancing Palestinian

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

security by an external (third-party) military presence; and second, external (third-party) guarantees of the post-settlement regime:

(i) An External Military Presence: Under any foreseeable conditions, a PSDF alone will not compensate for the overall asymmetry in power with Israel. Yet an agreed external military presence can alleviate Palestinian security concerns while serving Israeli requirements at the same time.

The basic Israeli security argument concerning withdrawal from the occupied territories centres on the risk this would incur should an Arab "war coalition" comprising Jordan, Syria and an Iraqi expeditionary force (plus possible contingents from other Arab parties such as Saudi Arabia) launch a short-warning or surprise attack westwards across the West Bank with the object of severing Israel at its narrow central waist.

Some Israeli analysts have argued that this potential danger cannot be met simply by relying on the mitigating circumstances created by a comprehensive peaceful settlement, as "any weakening of Israel's defensive capability might make [an Arab] military attack less dangerous, hence more tempting, hence more likely."<sup>4</sup> From this a general consensus in favour of the retention of a permanent or long term Israeli presence along the Jordan River valley has emerged even amongst those who otherwise call for withdrawal or territorial concessions on the West Bank. This presence it is argued will provide a vital trip-wire/early warning function, sufficient to allow time for full Israeli mobilisation, given that the putative war coalition could be put into effect quite rapidly based on Arab standing regular-forces

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<sup>4</sup> Heller and Nusseibeh, op cit, p.61.

which significantly outnumber Israel's own relatively small regular army.<sup>5</sup>

But regardless of the plausibility of the worst-case scenario of an Arab war-coalition (of which more below), this trip-wire/early warning function need not be delegated to Israeli troops and could in principle be tasked to a third-party international or multinational force. Israel's long-standing objections to any third-party supervision of its security has decreasing legitimacy in view of the experience of the Multinational Forces stationed in Sinai, and the dispatch of US Patriot batteries plus personnel to defend Israeli airspace during the war with Iraq. In addition, Israel's traditional resistance to a United Nations peacekeeping or enforcement role is less and less credible as a result of the profound changes in the UN's structure and its newly perceived value as an instrument of international policy by the most stalwart of Israel's allies including the US itself.

From a Palestinian point of view therefore, not only is the deployment of a UN or Multinational Force in sensitive areas such as the Jordan valley, clearly preferable to that of maintaining an Israeli force in such locations, but the extension of a similar "external reinforcement" for Palestinian security to other areas along the Israeli-Palestinian border would be of great value in stabilising a peaceful settlement. Whereas this would curtail Israeli options such as a attempt to reoccupy the

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<sup>5</sup> The "war coalition scenario" is expounded at length in almost all Israeli writings on security and a peaceful settlement. See in particular, A Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defence, Praeger, New York 1984, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1989 and Z Schiff, Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians, Washington Institute Policy Papers No 15, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989.

West Bank and/or Gaza Strip, it would also form a formidable politico-military barrier to any future Arab military adventurism or attempt to use Palestinian territory as a spring board against Israel. In effect, an international military presence along the Jordan valley and other Israeli-Palestinian borders would help to neutralise the military importance of Palestinian territory for all parties. This could only be to Israel's detriment, if Israeli intentions towards a Palestinian national entity were intrinsically hostile.

Agreement on the composition of this "external reinforcement" would clearly be a precondition of its deployment. As is the case with the PSDF, an external military presence can be phased-in as Israeli forces redeploy and eventually withdraw from occupied Palestinian territory. The deployment of unarmed UN/international observers to oversee elections to a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority and/or the redeployment of Israeli troops during the interim phase, could be a useful first step in creating the trust needed for a broader mandated international force. Israeli observers could remain attached to any international force, and the often-stated Israeli requirement for access to early-warning stations along the spine of the West Bank could be maintained if such stations were to be placed under international supervision. In short, no autonomous Israeli forces need to be deployed on Palestinian soil after the final stages of the Israeli-Palestinian security regime are implemented.

(ii) External Guarantees: The mere presence of an international force would in itself suggest a strong external commitment to the new Israeli-Palestinian security regime and the political settlement from which it is derived. But the prospects for long-term post-settlement stability would be significantly enhanced if

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

this force were to be accompanied by iron-clad external guarantees from the international parties concerned. Israeli misgivings about the durability of such means of "external reinforcement" could be met by a multi-layered system of agreements and treaties between the Israeli and Palestinian components and the relevant outside parties separately, as well as common assurances and guarantees issued to all. Thus, no unilateral actions to disrupt the new regime or change the status quo after a settlement would be allowed (as was the case with UN forces in Sinai prior to 1967) and the Palestinians should find no difficulty in acceding to any bi-lateral assurances sought by Israel from the US for instance on this basis (or vice versa). Indeed, a prominent US role in all aspects of "external reinforcement" of the new regime would seem to be a necessary condition for assuaging both Israeli and Palestinian security fears. Equally, endorsement by the UN Security Council (given its likely expanded international role and credibility) of all security and political provisions of a settlement would add extra weight to the comprehensive structure envisaged above.

External guarantees are most often seen as the culminating point in a settlement once the local parties have bridged their differences themselves. However such guarantees could also be useful in facilitating movement towards a settlement and may be sought on an "interim" basis as the process unfolds. If international forces are to be phased in as Israeli troops withdraw, then this may require some provisional guarantees to be consolidated once final agreement has been reached. Equally, declarative statements by the US, the co-sponsors and/or the UN regarding the illegitimacy of the use of force by local parties during the interim phase, may be a useful confidence building measure and precursor of the wider guarantees that would cap a comprehensive settlement.

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

From an Israeli point of view, "external reinforcement" may appear to imply severe constraints on Israeli freedom of action, and arguments as to the "worthlessness" of such an outside role are likely to remain a standard Israeli riposte. But for the Palestinians the purpose of "external reinforcement" is to establish a lock-in mechanism that precludes Israeli revisionism on the one hand, yet does not, in principle, challenge Israeli basic security on the other. In addition, "external reinforcement" plays a vital corrective role in the Israeli-Palestinian imbalance, and as such is an essential requirement of Palestinian national security. In so far as it similarly restrains Palestinian "revanchism" and Arab military "adventurism", it would be difficult to argue that the net effect of external reinforcement is to Israel's disadvantage.

3. Regional Linkage: The prospects for any Israeli-Palestinian security agreement will remain dim if decoupled from the broader issue of regional security. Not only is a separate Palestinian-Israeli settlement (including Israeli withdrawal) unlikely in the absence of significant progress towards a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, but the other prerequisites of Palestinian security such as effective external reinforcement may be unattainable or substantially diluted if no real steps are taken to resolve Israel's security problems with its Arab neighbours.

From the perspective of a Palestinian national security doctrine a number of pertinent observations can be made:

(i) If Israeli reservations regarding a withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory are primarily directed towards the danger of a putative Arab "war coalition" and do not centre on the threat posed by a Palestinian state per se, then clearly anything that obviates this primary Israeli threat perception is in the

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

Palestinian interest.

(ii) It follows that Palestinian national security is to a large extent contingent on the emergence of a new regional security order over which the Palestinians themselves have but limited direct leverage (eg, an Israeli-Syrian agreement on the Golan) and yet from which they stand to be either prime beneficiaries or losers as the case may be.

(iii) Palestinian national security therefore is intimately linked with regional security not only because of the difficulty of political decoupling between the Palestinian and Arab dimensions, but because Palestinian aspirations cannot be truly fulfilled otherwise, despite what would appear to many Palestinians as the sufficient safeguards for Israel proposed under the first two elements of our proposed doctrine of national security alone.

(iv) Regional linkage is hence a Palestinian national security imperative. The greater the scope and provisions of a regional security regime, the less onerous Israeli demands on Palestinian territory are likely to be and vice versa. But equally significantly, the more extensive and stable a new regional security order, the greater the chances that a Palestinian national authority can be entrenched as an irreversible reality. Regional security (linkage) thus becomes an essential third element in the provision of overall security for the Palestinian people, on Palestinian soil and in the diaspora.

And yet, none of this is to imply that the "war coalition" scenario is necessarily valid. For this scenario is predicated on assumptions that appear dubious as best: First is the assumption that an Israeli withdrawal will take place outside the

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

context of an overall settlement, or in the context of a separate Palestinian-Israeli agreement that is not endorsed by the other major Arab parties. Neither contingency is likely to arise not least in view of Israel's own lack of interest in such an arrangement. To that extent, the Israeli argument is both confused and confusing: It starts by saying "we cannot withdraw because of the possibility of an Arab war coalition", then it posits the danger of an Arab coalition after a settlement as an argument against withdrawal. The interposition of peace here appears as if it were redundant and irrelevant, and the dangers of an Arab war coalition are made a permanent fixture regardless. But clearly, a situation of war or no war/no peace is radically different from that of a comprehensive settlement which presupposes the resolution of the issues that led to the conflict in the first place. However, even assuming that the Arab incentive to war would not be affected by an equitable resolution of the causes of conflict, nor deterred by the price any unmitigated aggression would incur in the new world environment, nor influenced by the absence of any significant external strategic ally (eg, the Soviet Union), nor restrained by the complex machinery of peace-keeping likely to be in place, nor chastised by the fate of Saddam's Iraq, nor yet affected by Israel's own preemptive and punitive capabilities, how would the threat of an Arab war coalition materialize? Would it be (a) politically plausible in view of the history of discordant relations between its supposed partners, (b) operationally practical in terms of command and control and logistics, etc, (c) implementable as a strategic/tactical enterprise with the requisite element of surprise, and finally (d) confrontable solely by Israel's retention of the West Bank?

For the "war coalition" to be a serious threat the answer to all the above would have to be affirmative. Furthermore, one would

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*



have to assume total failure on the part of Israel to detect any long-term political changes leading to the emergence of this unprecedented coalition (such as a complete reversal of Jordanian policy), the failure of the US or other interested international or local parties to do the same or to obtain any other means of early-warning, the reemergence of Iraq as a significant military power in the area, and total collapse of Israel's deterrent (including nuclear) posture. In short the "Arab war coalition" scenario presupposes extreme collective Arab foolhardiness coupled with a historically aberrant determination and efficiency and driven by with an overriding immunity to any rational calculus of cost and benefit.

Still a "worst case" is a "worst case" and remains so by definition, all arguments from historical antecedent, political logic and strategic rationale notwithstanding. Hence the need for a regional security regime which confronts this "worst case" along with other "worst cases" that preoccupy the Arab parties to the conflict. These include future Israeli attempts to challenge or undo the terms of a settlement through direct military action or compellence. This is a palpably real threat from the Palestinian point of view, but other Arab parties could equally feel threatened by the emergence of a newly assertive and dominant Israel. One such "worst case" would be the arrival in power of a radical right-wing government in Israel driven by an ideological impulse (buttressed perhaps by disaffected or displaced settlers) and bent on the reclamation of "Judea and Samaria" and the extinguishing of any Palestinian national entity. Similarly, and under the guise of preemption or self-defence, an over-confident Israel (whether radical or not) may seek at some future point to redraw the politico-strategic

regional map through military adventurism or even miscalculation.<sup>6</sup> The examples of Sinai in 1956 and Lebanon in 1982 confirm in Arab eyes at least that such actions are not outside the realm of possibility.

The point here is not to belabour the case for Arab versions of the "worst case scenario", but rather to emphasise the need for reciprocity. "Worst cases" apply to both sides and should be factored into the new regional security system accordingly. It is beyond the scope of this paper to draw up a complete blueprint for a new regional security regime.<sup>7</sup> Some basic principles may however be adduced:

(i) The prerequisite for a regional security regime is progress on the resolution of the political aspects of the conflict. Attempts to push for the former outside the context of the latter will meet with strong resistance from the Arab side, given its concern that "arms control" will turn to its disadvantage if the current politico-territorial status-quo remains unchanged. The sine qua non for progress on security and all other bi- and multi-lateral issues remains an Israeli commitment in principle to withdraw from Palestinian and other Arab lands occupied in 1967. If such a commitment were to be forthcoming, a gradual development towards regional security could become a réal possibility.

(ii) A regional security regime would have to include inter alia,

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<sup>6</sup> For a more comprehensive list of Palestinian worst-case scenarios, see A S Khalidi, "Arab Threat Perceptions....." pp 4 - 6.

<sup>7</sup> For the most recent contribution to the growing literature on this subject see G> Kemp's The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 1991.

limits on external arms transfers and indigenous production; constraints on the flow of military and dual-use technologies; agreements on the non-introduction of new destabilising systems; changes in doctrine, most particularly Israel's offensive doctrine and a common move toward self-sufficient defence and deterrence; the redeployment and restructuring of armed forces; demilitarised and limited force zones, etc. None of these measures are likely to be accepted by the Arab side unilaterally, although certain asymmetrical trade-offs may be possible. The ultimate purpose of a new regional security regime should be the denial of the first (offensive)-use of force to all parties after a final political settlement has been reached. This should go far in catering for both sides' worst-case scenarios, especially if paired with a strong element of "external reinforcement". While the Israeli side cannot expect to retain a free option regarding the use of force and at the same time deny this to the Arab side, certain provisions such as the transitional retention of Israel's nuclear deterrent may be possible. Eventually however, the stability of the new politico-strategic order will require the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all non-conventional weapons in the Middle East.

(iii) Extensive and intrusive observation and verification measures will be necessary to maintain the integrity of the new security regime. Most of these are well known and need not be recounted in detail here (on-site inspections, short-warning access, military hot-lines, cooperation on national technical means of corroboration, etc.).<sup>9</sup> Both sides will have to accede

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<sup>9</sup> For a useful analysis of the range, virtues and pitfalls of verification as practised in the context of CSCE, see L A Dunn "Arms Control Verification - Living with Uncertainty", International Security, Vol 14, No 4, Spring 1990. A very interesting and recent addition to the material on this subject is M Krepon and P D Constable's Confidence Building, Peace-Making

to unprecedented scrutiny of their military capabilities which may arouse significant internal opposition, and will in any case require far reaching changes in political outlook and adversarial perception. Some measures may however be implemented gradually tandem with overall progress towards a comprehensive settlement. Nonetheless, the principle of mutuality will remain the key in this field as in all others.

From the perspective of Palestinian national security the emergence of such a regional security regime should be sufficient to essentially undercut the Israeli territorial argument regarding security as it applies to Palestinian occupied territory. Given such a complex structure, and the "external reinforcement" needed to sustain it, Israel's military withdrawal from Palestinian and Arab soil should be in the end final and total. Whether such a regime is attainable may largely be up to Israel itself and whether it is ready to acknowledge that peace means exactly that, ie no more war. Israeli good faith and its readiness to overcome its territorial fixation with security (eg, to trade land for peace) is as much at issue here, as is the Arab readiness to end the conflict once and for all, although it must be said that there are significantly clearer indications of the latter as compared with the former. Ultimately, what differentiates our proposed doctrine of Palestinian national security from its Israeli counterpart is that it is grounded in the promise of a final settlement that renders war both unnecessary and unimplementable as an instrument of policy.

#### Other Outstanding Issues:

Finally two other outstanding bi-lateral Israeli-Palestinian

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and Aerial Inspections in the Middle East, Occasional Paper 6,  
Henry L Stimson Centre, Washington DC, January 1992.

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

security issues may be worth addressing here in brief:

(i) Palestinian Internal Security: Israel is likely to insist on the retention of a wide range of powers to confront "terrorist" activities, particularly in the interim-phase but possibly in the post-settlement phase as well. This stems more from psycho-political reasons that any real perceived threat to Israeli basic security as a result of Palestinian "terrorist" activity.<sup>7</sup> However intrusive unilateral powers such as the right of "hot pursuit" or the maintenance of an extensive intelligence network on Palestinian soil is likely to be strongly resisted by the Palestinians. From the Palestinian point of view the issue of internal security must be the primary responsibility of the Palestinian authorities themselves both in the interim and later phases. The reason for this is quite simply that allowing Israel a virtual free hand in determining the nature and quality of internal opposition and in dealing with it is a sure-fire recipe for granting this opposition - should it exist - the popular legitimacy it needs to become a significant threat to security and stability. In other words, such an Israeli requirement is most likely to create and sustain precisely that which it seeks to prevent (assuming this requirement is made in good faith). The most effective answer to the potential problem of internal security therefore is to grant the Palestinian authorities greater not lesser powers, and to curtail as far as possible all aspects of Israeli intervention rather than the contrary. In addition, Israeli accession to some form of international supervision of the interim phase should be a supplementary form of insurance against "terrorism" and one that is more politically palatable to the Palestinians, although even this may not be

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<sup>7</sup> See, Schiff "Israel's Minimal Security Requirements...." pp 69-81 for this point and a more extensive discussion of the problem of internal security.

problem free. In the longer-term, an Israeli-Palestinian security regime that includes Joint Military Commissions and international force deployments should lessen the prospects for cross-border infiltrations, a problem that cuts equally both ways given Palestinian concerns about "Jewish terrorism" after a settlement.

Internal security also touches on the vital issue of Israeli settlements and settlers. From the perspective of Palestinian national security, the maintenance of armed, organised, territorial, regular, or semi-regular armed settlers in quasi-autonomous enclaves deep within Palestinian territory is patently unacceptable. Such a presence would not only challenge the very basis of Palestinian national security, but would be a guarantee of permanent friction and instability within the boundaries of Palestinian national authority. While it is possible that certain safeguards could be extended to the settlements/settlers during the interim phase, whatever residual Jewish residential presence there is after a political settlement should be fully subject to Palestinian law as with all other native residents. To a large extent the issue of settlements and settlers is a political one, and one that should be determined by an Israeli decision to withdraw. This in itself is likely to transform the nature and dimensions of this problem and by extension reduce its security implications.

(ii) Diaspora Security: A comprehensive doctrine of Palestinian national security must address the security of Palestinians in the diaspora. The eventual extension of all the privileges of statehood (a passport, diplomatic protection, etc) to diaspora Palestinians would constitute a significant first step in normalising their existence and in proffering a minimal degree of stability in their daily life. Equally, a Palestinian "Law of

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

Return" to the areas under national authority would provide for diaspora security in its basic sense of a potential haven in case of dire necessity. In light of the trauma faced by Palestinian communities in Lebanon, Kuwait and elsewhere, this is a primary security need that should be established in principle, even though its implementation may remain subject to economic and other absorptive constraints. Furthermore, the "right of return"/or compensation for pre-1948 refugees has a significant security dimension, in so far as the perpetuation of their predicament could lead to their alienation from the peace process, and hence their emergence as a dangerous source of post settlement instability. Along with everyone else, these elements of the Palestinian people should have a clear stake in the resolution of the conflict, not least because they have been its prime victims.

A S Khalidi is a Palestinian writer on Middle East security issues based in London. He is currently editor-in-chief of the Arabic quarterly Majalat ad-Dirasat al-Filastiniya (Journal of Palestine Studies) and his most recent publication in English (Co-authored with H J Agha) is "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Balance" in The Middle East in Global Perspective, eds. H Saunders and J Kipper, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1991.

*A S Khalidi: Towards a Palestinian Doctrine of National Security*

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**Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project**  
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No. 14

**Palestinian Settlement:  
The Security Issues**

**Joseph Alpher**

**Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies  
Tel Aviv University**

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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A PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT: THE SECURITY ISSUES

by Joseph Alpher

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### Introductory Remarks

The purpose of this paper is to delineate Israel's security considerations with regard to a Palestinian settlement, and to suggest parameters and guidelines for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian security regime, as a complement to the overall Arab-Israel peace process. Our approach assumes that security arrangements are put into place as part and parcel of a political peace process, and that they are integrated into a broad spectrum of confidence-building measures that reinforce all sides' sense of security. At the same time, our approach seeks to remain "apolitical," in the sense that the security concept presented here is intended to be applicable to a variety of political arrangements, interim and/or final: autonomy, Palestinian independence, and forms of federation and confederation. Particular attention is paid to the initial security arrangements prescribed by the Camp David Framework for Peace, insofar as these may be considered a minimal point of departure from the Israeli standpoint.

While we shall refer briefly to a number of broad security-related issues that encompass Israel and many of its Arab neighbors, the thrust of our inquiry will be to suggest a security regime for the core region of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, East Jerusalem insofar as it is integrated into a political settlement, and Jordan. In particular, we shall seek to suggest innovative approaches with regard to two key areas of security: formalizing Jordan's emerging role as Israel's strategic depth toward the east, thereby reducing security pressures on the West Bank; and

delineating transition arrangements for ensuring tactical (i.e., anti-terrorism and anti-subversion) security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

#### Methodology and Sources

Beyond the author's own thinking on the issues, the analyses and ideas set forth herein are drawn from two categories of sources: the existing literature that deals with security aspects of a Palestinian settlement; and the author's interviews with a broad spectrum of Israelis, Palestinians and Americans. The literature, including, with few exceptions, books and articles written by Israelis and Palestinians, tends to focus on the broad military-strategic threats to Israel implied by withdrawal from the Territories, and ways to deal with them.<sup>1</sup> Insofar as there appears to be a consensus among those who advocate a territories-for-peace settlement on the West Bank, with regard to the strategic security measures required by a settlement, some of these issues (e.g., early-warning stations) will be treated here relatively briefly.

The ideas presented here on tactical security measures for the transition period are based to a considerable extent on the author's conversations with prominent Palestinians, with Americans who were intimately involved in the Camp David autonomy talks of the early 1980s, and particularly with Israelis who have dealt, and/or are dealing, with security issues in the West Bank and Gaza. Most of the persons interviewed preferred to remain anonymous. Hence, in order to avoid presenting a skewed impression as to the relative input of

sources, none of them will be cited. Needless to say, all of them have my heartfelt thanks for their cooperation.

A second characteristic of these interviews warrants mention, as it impacts directly (and, unfortunately, negatively) on the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to solve their mutual tactical security problems in the short term. The Palestinians interviewed, many of them intimately involved in the current struggle against Israeli rule by the Palestinian community of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, confessed a near total lack of expertise on security issues. They have had no opportunity to conceptualize about their future security needs against low-level violence; nor have they been trained in security affairs. As for Palestinians in the PLO security apparatus based in Tunis--who presumably have accumulated considerable experience in field security, liaison with friendly security forces, and the like<sup>2</sup>--for obvious reasons the author was unable to converse with them. Certainly it seems fair to speculate that during any early and crucial security transition stage, such 'external' Palestinians would either not be present, or would lack the intimate knowledge of the land and the population necessary for successful security work.

In conversations with Israeli sources, on the other hand, it emerged that little detailed contingency planning has been done by the security authorities with regard to the modalities of an orderly transfer of responsibility for internal security affairs from Israeli to Palestinian (or alternative, third party) security authorities. Here the problem appears to be political; to delineate such plans means to contemplate aspects of withdrawal from territories that

presumably have not been entertained by recent Israeli governments, or that they cannot afford to be associated with, at least until an acceptable political settlement is on the horizon. One area in which conversations with Israelis and others were particularly helpful was in reconstructing the thinking on tactical security issues that prevailed at the time of the Camp David autonomy talks, when some contingency planning did in fact take place.

Finally, the author searched, in vain, for relevant precedents in recent history that might be helpful in understanding the problems involved in security arrangements for a Palestinian settlement--particularly on the tactical level. Have there been, in this century, instances wherein an occupying power withdraws its forces back across a common border with the occupied region, while at the same time strong irredentist forces remain in place on both sides, the occupied region sets about establishing sovereign or semi-sovereign security institutions for the first time in its history, and the former occupying power remains locked in a broad existential struggle with at least parts of the surrounding state environment?

Conversations with historians, as well as an extensive inquiry by the foreign ministry of one former colonial power, produced no relevant precedents. In view of claims by the PLO leadership that the recent South African withdrawal from Namibia constitutes a workable model for emulation in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the author examined the Namibian experience as well. The differences are far greater than the similarities. The South African government turned over all security responsibility to the SWAPO-dominated government



without recourse to any transition phases; SWAPO, having no internal black extremist opposition, actually left in place the former regime's white-dominated security and intelligence apparatus. No significant attempts--by white or black irredentist elements--to destabilize South African-Namibian relations have taken place. The 80,000 whites who remained in Namibia asked for, and received, Namibian citizenship; the regime was genuinely pleased that they stayed, as they constituted a desired economic infrastructure. Nor, by the time all this took place, was South Africa locked in any sort of conflict with its other neighbors. On the other hand, the democratization of domestic life in South Africa was just beginning.

#### Threat Perceptions

To be successful, a security regime for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be designed to deal with the security dangers to which each of the participant parties is exposed. Here there are two key difficulties. First, the dangers are indeed immense; secondly, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the threat perceptions of the various actors' populations, and the objective reality or gravity of specific threats. For example, a number of opinion surveys, and the experience of election campaigning, point to Israelis' fear of cross-border terrorism as a major consideration in opposing withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Yet terrorism of this nature hardly constitutes an existential threat to Israel. Indeed, as Schiff notes, Israel has lost 15 times as many people in wars than as victims of terrorism: "The problem is that

terrorism cannot be solved with traditional military remedies and therefore taps a sensitive nerve in Israelis."<sup>3</sup> On the Palestinian and Jordanian side, fears of "transfer" and major population dislocations as a result of Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel seem, to many Israelis, to grossly exaggerate the influence and capabilities of the extreme Right in Israeli politics.

These remarks bespeak the primary and unique aspect of the parties' threat perceptions. All three--Israel, the Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan--perceive threats at an existential level. Israel perceives among the Arabs a rejection of its very right to exist; this is expressed in Arab state military preparations (e.g., most recently by Saddam Hussein), in Palestinian rejectionists' refusal to countenance territorial compromise, and in lingering references to the Palestinian "right of return" to pre-1967 Israel. On a more abstract level, instances of military aggression and terrorist violence against Israelis and Jews in general, trigger among Israelis a recall mechanism of the Holocaust and earlier (throughout 3,000 years of Jewish history) attempts to physically destroy the Jewish people or part of it.

Palestinians perceive an attitude on the part of Israel, and to a lesser extent on the part of Arab states as well, of denial of their right to exist as a sovereign people in general, and in their historic homeland in particular. On a day-to-day basis, Palestinians in the Territories, and in some Arab countries, feel physically threatened and frequently humiliated. One senior Palestinian source who was interviewed, when asked about possible long-term security measures as

part of a settlement, blurted out: "how can I even think about such things when I don't know whether I'll make it home through the IDF roadblocks tonight?"

As for the Hashemite Kingdom, it recognizes that it is viewed by many in the region as an artificial entity. From 'Jordan-is-Palestine' enthusiasts in Israel, to the enmity of the Saud dynasty in Riyadh and the designs of the local Palestinian majority and fundamentalist movement, the Hashemite Kingdom is threatened as a polity.

While additional Middle East states (e.g., Lebanon, Kuwait) might also view their threat environment in existential terms, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unique in that all three key sides share this perception. Clearly, security arrangements can do only so much to remedy this impasse; a combination of good will, time and political stability is at least equally critical. And in the case of the Hashemite Kingdom, regime stability and identity cannot in any case be made a condition of peace and security arrangements.

What dangers, then, should Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements seek to neutralize if they are to be acceptable to the various parties? From Israel's standpoint, the best standard would appear to be that suggested by the success of the security provisions of the Israel-Egypt peace: that, as a consequence of territorial withdrawal and peace and security arrangements, security for both sides is enhanced when compared with the status quo ante, and violation of these arrangements by one side gives the other a definitive advantage in seeking to rectify matters, whether by

diplomacy or by force. This is what made, and still makes, the Egyptian-Israeli security regime desirable to both sides. Any provisions that do not satisfy these requirements must be seen as offering doubtful compensation to Israel for territorial withdrawal, unless they can be classified as 'calculated risks' by virtue of political compensation or constraint.

In the Israeli perception, then, security arrangements in the framework of a Palestinian settlement should, optimally:

1. improve early warning of attack from the east;
2. enhance Israel's capacity to defend itself against attack from the east;
3. reduce the threat of terrorism against Israelis throughout the Land of Israel (i.e., including inside the Palestinian entity); and
4. contribute to an overall reduction in the likelihood of a new Arab-Israeli, or Muslim-Israeli war breaking out, and to

Israel's capacity to defend itself in such an instance.

As for the Palestinians, security arrangements as part of an overall political settlement should secure them some form of independent political rights for the first time, and particularly, a form of national security inside Palestine. This means security for individuals against terrorism and arbitrary use of force, as well as guarantees of non-intervention in their national life.

For the Hashemite Kingdom to enter into a security regime embracing a Palestinian solution, it would presumably wish to

receive assurances regarding its territorial integrity and inviolability vis-a-vis all its neighbors: Israel and the Palestinians, as well as Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It would, in particular, expect to improve its security against attempts--by Israelis or Palestinians--to "Palestinize" Jordan.

#### Camp David

The Camp David "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," signed on September 17, 1978 by Israel, Egypt and the United States, is the only existing detailed framework proposal for initiating interim arrangements toward a Palestinian settlement. It has been consistently adopted by Israeli governments, including those on the moderate political Right, as an acceptable starting point. (On the other hand it was never adopted by Palestinians or Jordan; they were not consulted by the framers of Camp David, nor did they participate in the autonomy talks of the early 1980s.) In view of its wide degree of acceptability in Israel, its security provisions are worthy of brief examination:

Security [states the Camp David Framework for Peace] is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces,

liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful. . . .

A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces [from the West Bank and Gaza] will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The [autonomy] agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders. . . .

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.<sup>4</sup>

Camp David, then, assigns responsibility for the external security of the Territories, during the transition, to Israel and Jordan. As for internal security, it mandates partial Israeli military withdrawal to undefined "security locations," and provides for a "strong local police force" that develops close

liaison arrangements with neighboring security forces. Ultimately, it talks in the abstract of peace treaties accompanied by all the trappings of security arrangements that, in fact, have been put in place between Egypt and Israel.

During the Camp David autonomy talks themselves (between Egypt and Israel, with American mediation) discussion of security issues was postponed repeatedly, in the hope that agreement on less sensitive issues would pave the way for a security discussion based on a degree of confidence. Moreover Egypt was reluctant to represent Palestinian interests on local security issues. In the single Israeli presentation made on the subject, Israel demanded to retain exclusive control over external as well as internal security issues; it allowed that there could be a joint coordinating committee with the self-governing authority to discuss issues of public security, but ultimate authority over the local police force would rest with Israel, and Israeli security forces would retain access throughout the Territories and deal with security issues at will. The IDF would withdraw to security zones from which it could quickly reinforce units that patrolled the Jordan River border in close coordination with Jordanian forces (similar arrangements were made for the Gaza-Egypt border within the framework of Israeli-Egyptian peace).

American ideas (that were never broached) and thinking among some Israeli planners, took a somewhat more liberal view, envisioning an Israeli readiness to "sit on the master spigot but not run after every leaking faucet," i.e., to allow and

encourage the Palestinian police force, with Egyptian and Jordanian help, to take responsibility for local security, while retaining the right to intervene in extreme cases. According to this view, responsibility for courts and jails might also gradually be shared. This plan could be executed in phases of about one year's duration. Jewish settlements in the Territories would remain Israeli security zones. These ideas were never debated at the autonomy discussions.

Israel, as noted, remains officially committed to the Camp David security provisions for a Palestinian transition regime. However in the course of the opening rounds of peace negotiations in late 1991-early 1992, several spokespersons for the Israeli delegations noted that the commitment to withdraw the IDF to "specified security locations" was no longer feasible, as the spread of Israeli settlement activity during the past decade rendered it imperative for the IDF to remain deployed throughout the Territories.<sup>5</sup>

Insofar as Camp David offers security ideas that remain workable, its importance lies in the legitimacy it bestows upon these ideas, despite the absence of Palestinian and Jordanian adherence to the framework agreement. It incorporates the notion of Palestinian responsibility for local security in the interim stage, and a Jordanian role in regional security. It also predicates an Egyptian and Jordanian role in forming a Palestinian security regime, and in fortifying it with liaison activities. As we shall see, these appear to be vital elements



in any successful security regime built around a Palestinian settlement.

### Three Dimensions of Security

We turn now to a discussion of the nature and functioning of such a security regime--one that comes as close as possible to meeting the threat perceptions and security needs of the parties involved. From an Israeli standpoint, the security issues involved may be analyzed along three interlocking dimensions, or tracks.

The first involves a Palestinian military threat to Israel. The notion that a Palestinian political entity located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could raise an army, and recruit friendly military assistance and support, so as to pose a strategic military threat to Israel, is sometimes presented by opponents of territorial compromise as a consideration mitigating against withdrawal by Israel. This issue can be disposed of fairly straightforwardly. Israel can and must insist upon the effective strategic demilitarization of territories evacuated by its forces; only an enhanced Palestinian police force or gendarmerie with limited tactical capabilities should be permitted. Such a status would also guarantee Jordan against any Palestinian military initiative. Palestinian compliance could be verified initially by Israeli, Jordanian and perhaps American security forces assisting in establishing an effective anti-

terrorist security regime (see below), and by Israeli and eventually American naval patrols off Gaza, and overflights.

Notably, numerous spokespersons representing the PLO mainstream have indicated their acceptance of this proviso, frequently citing the Palestinians' need to devote all their resources to socio-economic rehabilitation. As for the military security of the Palestinian entity against unjustified incursion or invasion by its neighbors--this will be guaranteed by those neighbors, Israel and Jordan, and by the international community, within the framework of peace and security agreements.

A second dimension is the (non-Palestinian) Arab military threat to Israel. Most strategic experts agree that, to the extent Israel relinquishes overall rule and an extensive military presence along the Jordan Valley and the mountain ridge that runs north-south the length of the West Bank, and withdraws its forces westward within the Green Line, it is exposing itself to heightened danger of attack from the east. Jordanian and other Arab forces (Iraqi, Saudi, Syrian) deployed in the East Bank could quickly cross the Jordan River and take up offensive positions along the mountain ridge, thereby threatening Israel's narrow heartland, before Israel's primary reserve army could be called up.

Opponents of territorial compromise cite this threat as the most crucial security consideration mitigating against withdrawal. One recent and eloquent presentation of this reasoning is by Likud MK Benjamin Zeev Begin:

Even after the Arab missile attacks on Israel's population centers it must be understood that the source of the threat to Israel's existence is a ground attack, and a missile attack only exacerbates this threat.

We are faced here with the common military problem of calculating time and space. Israel will always be protected by a small standing army, dependent on its reserves, and will always require a process to mobilize them. the mobilization will always take a few days. It can be executed only after careful assessment and deliberation by Israel's democratic government. This is the practical timetable that should be compared with the observation that a few hours are sufficient for a large Arab land force to be deployed at a zero distance from Israel's major metropolitan area, the strategic center of the Israeli state. The significance of the Golan, of Judea and Samaria is not derived from the 20 miles (Golan) or 30 miles (Judea and Samaria) that they add to Israel, but rather comes from their rugged topography. Israel will always need reasonably defensive positions there to hold back a massive ground attack with a small standing army, while the Israeli reserve call-up is underway.<sup>6</sup>

One common reply to these arguments is to grant Israel's need for a package of early warning and minimal defense provisions in the territory of the West Bank, even after a Palestinian self-governing authority has been established. Here

too, mainstream Palestinian spokespersons tend to accept this need. There is a broad consensus in favor of granting Israel early-warning radar, electronic and observation stations on the eastern escarpment of the mountain ridge, looking eastward toward possible approaching military threats, as well as several concentrations of ground forces in positions overlooking the Jordan River bridges and fords, and even air force overflight rights for intelligence purposes. All this, at least throughout an extended transition period.

Here we note that even among Israeli hawks, it is accepted that the Gaza Strip does not conform to this military model. It has no high ground, offers no advantages for warfighting, and it is bordered on its "Arab" side by a 200 km wide demilitarized buffer separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. Hence Israel has no early warning or defensive force requirements in Gaza, which is already effectively integrated into a security regime with Israel and Egypt, similar to that described below regarding the West Bank, Jordan and Israel.

The difficulty with the early-warning/defense package outlined above is that even it does not hold up against the kind of worst-case scenario that Israelis must contemplate in "testing" potential security arrangements--a scenario whereby Jordan allows into its territory large Arab expeditionary forces from Iraq and elsewhere, until a sufficient military buildup has been completed to launch a major invasion of the West Bank. Even if Israel called up its reserves in good time, it might find

itself reoccupying the West Bank or even attacking the East Bank--with all the political and security risks involved--without evident provocation of an actual Arab invasion. Alternatively, if the two sides commenced a waiting period similar to that which preceded the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel's reserve army would eventually have to be demobilized to avoid economic catastrophe, while the Arab armies aligned along the east bank of the Jordan River could bide their time before attacking. Clearly this would be an intolerable state of affairs for Israel.

This dilemma reflects the key differences between the Sinai buffer and the West Bank as buffer. The Sinai arrangements allowed Israel to withdraw its forces, knowing that it could, if necessary, take up defensive positions in good time inside the extensive and relatively unpopulated Sinai Desert, but that the danger of such a contingency was sharply reduced by the presence, on the far side of the buffer, of a single, stable Arab state at peace with Israel. None of these conditions holds for the West Bank, and we must ask what additional arrangements could be made to improve Israel's security in the event of its withdrawal from the West Bank.

Here we must look again at Jordan. Since 1971 there have been no foreign forces on Jordanian soil, and it has become almost axiomatic for Israeli security officials to talk about 'red lines' along Jordan's borders with Iraq and even Syria--lines which, if crossed by foreign forces entering Jordan, would constitute a casus belli for Israel. Nor has Jordan gone to war

against Israel during this period, including the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. At one juncture, in September 1970, Israel actually tacitly threatened, in coordination with the United States, to violate Jordanian territory in order to repulse invading Syrian forces, unless they withdrew. Thus, over the years, Jordan, whose own small (four division) army could never threaten Israel alone, has developed a kind of buffer status.

This development has been radically amplified by the behavior of Iraq and Jordan, and the resulting interaction between Israel and Jordan, since late 1989. These events appear to have constituted an extreme test of Jordan's capacity to collaborate with Israel in a security regime. Hence the logic of recounting them here.

#### Hashemite Jordan as Israel's Strategic Depth

By late 1989 it was apparent in both Jerusalem and Amman that Saddam Hussein's regime had recovered from its war with Iran (which ended in summer 1988), and that Saddam was seeking to project a new strategic role for his country as far afield as Lebanon and Israel. Of particular concern was Saddam's new championing of the Palestinian cause, which included the transfer to Baghdad of many Palestinian organizations and their headquarters, reconnaissance missions carried out along the Jordan River by Iraqi aircraft and officers, and additional instances of nascent military cooperation between Jordan and Iraq. By early 1990 Saddam was threatening to "burn half of

Israel," and new revelations regarding his nonconventional weaponry and missile development plans surfaced almost daily.

It was at this point that the attitude toward Jordan of Prime Minister Shamir and other leading Likud ministers in Israel's government underwent radical change. From a policy embodied in the slogan "Jordan is Palestine"--that called for the Palestinization of the ruling regime in Amman as a means of establishing a Palestinian state with which Israel could negotiate minimalistic autonomy arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza--Israel's political leadership now adopted an overtly pro-Hashemite policy. One catalyst appears to have been the fear lest a Palestinian regime in Amman, or a disaffected Hashemite regime, make common cause with Saddam Hussein against Israel, and allow the Iraqi Army to deploy along the Jordan River. In contrast King Hussein, if reassured of Israel's intentions, could be relied upon to resist such an adventure.

Additional considerations may have been the accumulated effect of the intifada on assessments regarding the viability of a purely Palestinian autonomy arrangement, coupled with the King's own decision, in July 1988, to renounce any sovereign claim to the West Bank, thereby rendering him an ideal partner with whom the Likud (whose platform rejects the introduction of any foreign sovereignty into the Territories) could negotiate autonomy issues. In the spring of 1990 Defense Minister Arens initiated a series of Israeli warnings that the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan constituted a casus belli. The King, now less

fearful of Likud intentions toward his regime, and evidently recognizing the dangers of going too far with Saddam, responded with his own warnings to all foreign forces to keep out of Jordan.

As the drama of the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and war unfolded, and the danger increased of an Iraqi attack on Israel, it became increasingly clear that Jordan's buffer status constituted for Israel the difference between a possible major land war with Iraq, and the relatively minor Iraqi missile attacks that it suffered. Israeli messages of support for the sanctity of Jordanian territory helped King Hussein weather the storm. As the war ended and the United States set about organizing a new Arab-Israel peace process, Israel's Likud government insisted on intensive Jordanian involvement in the form of a combined Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and a Jordanian presence in negotiations for an interim settlement in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>7</sup>

Not surprisingly, however, the Likud leadership has ignored the implications of Jordan's wartime role for Israel's long-term security. If the Hashemite Kingdom could keep the Iraqi Army at arm's length from Israel, and weather the surrounding political storm, it had in effect demonstrated that it is the East Bank, and not the miniscule West Bank, that constitutes Israel's real strategic depth to the east. Israel indeed cannot afford to rely solely on the West Bank for early warning and war preparations, even now, when it occupies that small territory. But if Jordan



can be persuaded to render de jure, in treaty form, its long-term de facto recognition that the entry of foreign forces into its territory constitutes a legitimate casus belli for Israel--then the makings of an effective security regime are in place:

1. Israel and Jordan will guarantee the borders and inviolability of an essentially demilitarized Palestinian political entity in the West Bank and Gaza.
2. Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity will all three undertake not to allow foreign forces onto their territory, with the exception of small Israeli early-warning and alert forces on the West Bank, Israel's and Jordan's right to seek outside aid if attacked, and Israel's right to intervene in the Territories if the interim process goes awry. All three will be linked by a non-aggression pact.
3. Any other entry of foreign forces onto the soil of one of the three signatories will be a casus belli. In Israel's case, if foreign forces enter Jordan without coordination with Israel and the Palestinians, Israel will be entitled to reoccupy the West Bank and even occupy parts of the East Bank if necessary, to defend itself. These provisions will be guaranteed by the international community, including neighboring Arab states.

Interestingly, the core idea of such a security regime is advocated by Israelis who oppose territorial compromise, even as they profess to ignore the real strategic implication. Thus MK Begin in his aforementioned treatise:

It was understood at Camp David that an agreement between Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan River cannot stand alone. An integral part of the package must be, as agreed, the signing of a peace treaty with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by the end of the transitional period. This wide scope of the peace process is essential to a successful long-term outcome of the negotiations, and it would prevent a future use of Jordan as a platform for Iraqi tanks moving toward Israel.<sup>8</sup>

The formalization of Jordan's role as strategic depth for Israel appears, then, to satisfy Israel's legitimate fear that its withdrawal from the West Bank might be exploited by a military buildup on the East Bank that would place Israel at a strategic disadvantage. There are, however, at least four disadvantages that must be taken into account.

First, many Israelis will tend to doubt the reliability of the international guarantee for Israel's right to reoccupy the West Bank if foreign forces enter Jordan for aggressive purposes. To them it should be pointed out that Israel has accepted similar guarantees with regard to Sinai. But the West Bank is much closer to the Israeli heartland than Sinai, and its population could become very hostile under circumstances of war. In order to relieve these anxieties, at least in the initial stages of implementation, the mechanism for deciding upon Israeli intervention (assessing the intent and extent of foreign

penetration into Jordan, etc.) must be exclusively Israeli, with American guarantees to back Israel's judgement.

Secondly, the security regime must be binding in the event of a change in the Jordanian regime. The refusal of a new regime in Amman to ratify the treaty immediately could also be just cause for Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank.

Third, there is good reason to suspect that the implementation of such a regime would be viewed negatively by the Asad regime in Damascus. Even if Syria had given its blessing to earlier stages of the process, such as Palestinian autonomy, it is liable to view the permanent constraints placed upon Jordan and the Palestinians by virtue of the security regime, as infringements upon territories that it seeks to bring under its own hegemony, within the framework of its Greater Syria concept, and, indeed, as an attempt to impose Israeli hegemony.<sup>9</sup> This potential complicating factor must be accounted for and, ideally, resolved with Syria within the context of its own peace arrangements with Israel.

Finally, assuming that this formula does in fact lay the foundations for the withdrawal of most Israeli forces from the West Bank, it must be recognized that the redeployment of these forces inside Israel will be an extremely complex and expensive operation. This of course is not the problem of the Palestinians and Jordan. But unless billions of dollars in funds are made available, Israel will be unable to carry out a withdrawal without damage to its security.

Such a security regime is envisioned as permanent--part of an overall structure of economic and perhaps political cooperation between the three parties. Clearly, the more successful it proves to be over time in reducing Israel's threat assessment looking to the east, and to the extent that it is complemented by additional peace and arms control arrangements between Israel and Arab countries like Syria and Iraq, the less Israel will have to rely on additional security measures. In the short and medium term (at least 10-15 years), however, these "traditional" provisions will remain necessary:

- demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza, except for a Palestinian ground gendarmerie force for tactical security;
- Israel Air Force overflights, giving Israel virtual control of the air above the Territories;
- Israeli early warning stations in the West Bank, and small alert forces capable of blocking the Jordan River crossings;
- a total absence of fortifications in the West Bank and Gaza that might impede an Israeli reoccupation;
- an international element, with a strong American component, to patrol both banks of the Jordan and the sea off Gaza, as well as the Territories themselves, in order to ensure compliance with the demilitarization measures; and
- staged implementation of collaborative tactical (anti-terrorist, anti-subversion) security measures, as detailed below.

Finally, the security vulnerabilities of Israeli geography make some territorial adjustments desirable. Because there are additional compelling (non-security) justifications for such border rectifications, they are taken up in the final section of this paper.

### Tactical Security

This is the third security dimension from the Israeli standpoint. To place in perspective the issue of controlling terrorism during the transition to a political entity ruled by Palestinians, we need only contemplate the effect of a single terrorist atrocity--say, the firebombing and murder of a busload of Israeli children in the West Bank--carried out at a crucial juncture in time. Such an act alone could derail a negotiation process. Were it to set in motion a chain of vigilante retaliation and counter-terrorism, the results could be catastrophic for the peace process.

As long as tactical security affairs remain exclusively under Israeli authority, Israel is presumably charged with doing everything possible to prevent terrorism, Arab or Jewish. If it fails, it cannot blame the Palestinian political leadership for a security slip. Yet clearly, no political process that envisages the evolution of a Palestinian entity can succeed, unless responsibility for internal security within that entity is transferred at least in large part to the Palestinians. As we

have seen, even the Camp David agreements prescribe such a process.

Because this is such a volatile issue; because it is within the power of mere individuals or small groups to carry out terrorist acts that have a devastating effect on the public support needed by an Israeli government or a Palestinian governing authority to proceed with a peace process; and because solutions will inevitably require close Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on sensitive matters--the tactical security issue is seen by most researchers and commentators as the most difficult of all aspects of a security regime. Yet few have dealt with it in depth.<sup>10</sup> Moreover we have already noted the lack of motivation of Israeli security officials to plan for such security contingencies, and the lack of familiarity with the issues among Palestinians. Little wonder this category was left for last (and never dealt with) in the Camp David autonomy talks...

The importance of the tactical security issue lies not only in preventing efforts to torpedo the peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian anti-terrorist collaboration that will inevitably be entailed is a valid test of the good intentions, and ability to "deliver," of both sides, and can serve as a standard for deciding upon further concessions. Success in preventing terrorism is almost certainly the best confidence-builder possible for the Israeli man-on-the-street, who suspects that any concession will lead to more violence. Finally, cooperation

against terrorism is mandated under any form of political process: autonomy, independence, or confederation.

What are the preconditions for the implementation of a successful tactical security regime? First and foremost, the desire and determination of both sides, Israel and Palestinians, as well as Egypt and Jordan, to make the interim settlement work, by preventing all forms of terrorism and subversion. Secondly, readiness on the part of the Palestinian administration to be seen to be collaborating with Israel--although both sides would have an interest in maintaining a low profile of coordination. Third, Israeli settlements throughout the Territories must not have reached such a 'critical mass,' in terms of numbers and dispersion, that this neutralizes any rational effort to prevent friction. Finally, the government of Israel must be prepared, and able, to restrain extremist elements among the settlers.

What, then, are the essential characteristics of any successful transition stage security regime? First, a phased transition from stage to stage, as progress is registered, within the framework of a comprehensive plan that predicates the gradual transfer of authority over intelligence and anti-terrorist activity, jails, courts and border crossings. This means, secondly, a critical apprenticeship stage for the nascent Palestinian police/gendarmerie intelligence and anti-terrorist units. Third, in addition to Israeli involvement in training and liaison, a role for third parties, such as Jordan, Egypt and the United States. Fourth, a key border control role for Jordan and

Egypt. Finally, a readiness by all parties, incorporated in treaty provisions, to grant Israel discretion, in specific instances, to continue its own intelligence collection activities vis-a-vis the Territories, to intervene directly in thwarting or apprehending perpetrators of terrorism, and to delay key transition phases if it can show that no progress has been made by the Palestinian side toward reducing terrorism.

#### A Transition-Stage Tactical Security Regime

There are two approaches to describing the kind of tactical security regime required during the transition stage: functional, and chronological. In an effort to provide as comprehensive a description as possible, we shall adopt the functional approach, integrate into it aspects of sequentiality, and then address the question of overall time span.

- Borders. Initially, the Israel Defense Forces will continue to control border crossing points between the West Bank and Jordan, and the Gaza Strip and Egypt--of course, in coordination with Jordanian and Egyptian authorities on the other side. Gradually Israel will integrate Palestinian authorities into a three-sided relationship. Eventually the IDF role will be phased out. A similar sequence will take place with regard to patrolling the West Bank-Jordan and Gaza-Egypt land and sea borders, to prevent and intercept terrorist incursions. As for the borders between the Territories and Israel, they must remain open, as it is only through the daily movement back and forth of



large numbers of Palestinian workers that, in the long term, Israeli intelligence can remain in close contact with the current of events and attitudes among the Palestinians. Over time, Palestinian economic development efforts will hopefully succeed to such an extent that the flow of laborers decreases radically; this development should of course be encouraged from a security standpoint, too, as prosperity is the best safeguard against large-scale disaffection.

- The Palestinian police force will include elements that deal with criminal activity, and others that deal with terrorism. Only the latter interest us here. Intelligence and anti-terrorist units must first be recruited and trained. If pro-peace Tunis-based elements that have gained expertise can be integrated, this would be helpful, but not mandatory, given Israeli sensitivities. An American-led 'roof' mechanism would enable Palestinians to deny large-scale overt collaboration with Israel, but, in fact, it is Israel that should form and train the initial Palestinian cadres, as the two forces will inevitably have to work together, and Israel will at certain stages have to transfer key data to the Palestinians. After a formative stage, the Palestinian force would commence independent work, initially within a limited scope and perhaps in a limited geographical zone. Gradually, as it proved successful (and only if it proved successful), additional authority would be transferred to it. Liaison with Israel would take place under the American umbrella-but it would be direct liaison.

- Jails and courts. During the initial stage, Israel would continue to apprehend, judge and jail terrorist offenders; no large scale release of detainees would take place. This would be followed by the negotiated (between Israel and the Palestinian authorities) release of detainees judged to be affiliated with Palestinian political currents that support the peace process (e.g., not Hamas Islamic fundamentalists), and the phased transfer of judicial authority over terrorist offenders, beginning, again, with relatively minor offenses and/or a limited geographic zone. Ultimately all jails and detainees would be turned over to the Palestinian authority. As for Jewish terrorist offenders, they would remain under Israeli legal jurisdiction until a late phase of the process.

- The Israeli settlers would, even after the initial phase (as Israeli intelligence and enforcement elements gradually withdrew), be allowed to bear light arms for self-protection, in their settlements and while traveling. If they engaged in terrorist activity they could be apprehended by Palestinian or Israeli forces, but would, at least until a later stage, be tried, as noted above, by Israeli courts, and jailed in Israel. (For additional discussion of the settlements and security, see below.)

- Independent Palestinian and Israeli activity. Clearly, the object of the process is to move from the current situation, in which all security activity is carried out independently by Israel, to one in which the Palestinians replace Israel in every

way. During the transition period, the key standard of progress would be the degree to which Palestinian security forces demonstrate their authority over their people--for example, by resisting political and physical pressures to insist on the early release by Israel of terrorist offenders who continue to oppose the peace process. (Meanwhile, Israeli security authorities might have to "refuse" to coordinate such issues with the Palestinians, in order to enable them to withstand such pressures.) Israel would also be able to exercise, selectively, the right of pursuit of offenders into Palestinian territory, the right of independent collection of tactical early-warning intelligence, and discretion in deciding when to pass on that intelligence to the Palestinians via the liaison apparatus. And, of course, any attempt by Palestinian extremists to grasp power, declare total and immediate sovereignty over security affairs, or otherwise "create facts" in violation of the interim agreement, would be met by restoration of Israeli authority, with the backing of all third parties.

- Peripheral security issues. A mechanism for the phased transfer of authority would have to be established with regard to security aspects of diverse licensing arrangements within the autonomous entity, such as foreign enterprises and factories. For example, would Libyan "technical advisors" be permitted? Who would control the production capacity of a chemical plant capable of making ammunition?

- Additional Egyptian and Jordanian roles might be possible and desirable in training the Palestinian forces and establishing their security courts--but only in coordination with Israel, under the American umbrella.

The question of the length of each phase is a complex one. The Palestinians would presumably seek a rapid telescoping of phases that have fixed time limits, although thoughtful Palestinian leaders do recognize that too rapid a transition is liable to confront them with insurmountable security problems that are liable to unravel the entire process. Israeli security authorities would presumably reject the Palestinian demand for a fixed timetable, and demand that proof of performance be the criterion as to whether Palestinian security authorities are sufficiently in control so as to move on to the next phase. Perhaps a mixed mechanism can be developed. Selective geographic execution of new phases, say, beginning in areas far from the Green Line, might provide another answer. A five to seven year target date for completing most of the process seems realistic. Meanwhile it should be borne in mind that other phases of security--strategic military security--would presumably extend over a longer time span.

To conclude this section, we cannot overemphasize the need for patience and civil courage by the populations and authorities on both sides, if a successful transfer of tactical security authority is to take place. Atrocities on both sides are virtually inevitable. Only strong leaders enjoying broad popular

support will be able to maintain the process under these circumstances.

We have, then, outlined the main aspects of a security regime to accompany a Palestinian settlement. It remains to note a selection of key security aspects of additional components of such a settlement.

#### Additional Security Aspects

##### Settlements and territorial adjustments

The future of Israeli settlements on territory destined to constitute the Palestinian entity is essentially a political, rather than a security question. We have already noted, however, that beyond a certain critical mass it becomes impossible to put into place an effective mechanism for transferring security authority to Palestinians, and that Israeli authorities have already begun to backtrack on the Camp David provision regarding withdrawal of Israeli forces, citing the settlement spread as justification.

One way to lessen the negative impact of the settlements might be for a successful phased peace process to take place over time; this would give the settlers time to adjust to a new situation, and to the decisions they must make regarding their future. Of course a long process also affords time for settlers to organize to disrupt it.

A second means could be territorial adjustment. We have already cited the security need for border rectifications. Such alterations would have the objective of expanding Israel's narrow waist in the Hadera-Netanya region, widening the Jerusalem corridor, and improving Jerusalem's defenses on the east (the Ma'aleh Adummim area). Not accidentally, the areas to be attached to Israel through such rectifications also hold the majority of the settler population (Labor governments originally advocated settling them primarily for security reasons). This, then, would alleviate a considerable portion of the problem. Notably, the part of Samaria adjoining Israel's narrow waist also sits astride Israel's primary source of ground water, the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer. Israel would be justified in insisting on securing permanent access to this and additional water sources whose exploitation it nearly monopolized even between 1948 and 1967. Possible ways of compensating the Palestinians without generating new security problems for Israel include a Gaza-Judea land corridor, and the provision of extraterritorial facilities at Israel's international airport and ports.

As for settlers who remain on land destined for the Palestinian entity after border adjustments, the transition period would see many leaving of their own volition. A few might opt to live peaceably under ultimate Palestinian authority. As many as 10,000 might forcibly resist the entire peace process. Their challenge would constitute a major test of Israeli intentions and capabilities.

### Jerusalem

The eventual status of Jerusalem within the framework of a peace settlement with the Palestinians is also primarily a political problem. Some of the security arrangements outlined above might be applicable; others would have to be tailored to the unique status of Jerusalem, once the outlines of a political solution for its status are known.

### Open borders

We have already noted the security advantages of free passage of Palestinians between the Palestinian entity and Israel. In essence, fences alone cannot defend Israelis against Palestinian hostility if it exists, and the very concept of restoring the Green Line as a security border is anathema to most Israelis. Moreover, Israelis should be able to cross the Green Line into the Palestinian entity, to maintain access to historic sites, to tour, and to trade; these, too, are ultimately security confidence-builders. Then too, beyond the obvious capacity it gives Israel to gather intelligence, an open border will encourage economic prosperity and an atmosphere of normalization among Palestinians--both of which ultimately build the best security.

### The right of return and refugee rehabilitation

In order to instill confidence among Israelis that, over the long term, the Palestinian national movement has abandoned any

further quest to return to, and Palestinize, the State of Israel (as Israel's borders are constituted in accordance with a peace settlement), Israel must insist that the peace process encompass a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation of all the Palestinian refugees from 1948 and 1967. Rehabilitation could include resettlement in place, or anywhere else beyond the bounds of Israel. Financing can and should be provided by the Arab states, against the compensation they owe Jewish refugees that Israel has absorbed. Any Israeli approach to peace (such as the government's peace plan of May 1989) that calls for rehabilitation only among Palestinian refugees living inside the Land of Israel (Western Palestine), is liable to perpetuate the refugee problem in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere as a potential source of destabilization.

#### Israeli Arabs

A successful peace process with the Palestinians must be followed by a concerted Israeli effort to afford its Arab citizens truly equal rights and obligations. Otherwise, political groups that advocate autonomy for Israeli Arabs--currently in a minority--may achieve greater influence, and interact with Palestinian extremists, to the detriment of the overall process.



### Arms control and deterrence

Beyond the narrow confines of security in the West Bank and Gaza, and even beyond the broader bounds of an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian security regime, Palestinians in particular have an interest in seeing Israel feel secure against long-term Arab and even Muslim (e.g., Iran) existential security threats. As the Middle East hovers at the brink of the nuclear age, these considerations are particularly salient. It is not unusual of late for Palestinian scholars and politicians to tell their Israeli counterparts, "As far as we're concerned, you can have nuclear weapons if it makes you feel secure enough to give up territory." This appears to reflect a positive understanding of Israel's threat perception--indeed, of the threat itself.

An in-depth analysis of the Middle East arms race, the arms control process, and problems of Israeli deterrence is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we note that, for Israelis to feel at ease with the notion of territorial concessions in the West Bank and Gaza, they must sense that Israel continues to retain a qualitative advantage over its adversaries--one that will enable it to deter conventional as well as nonconventional attack, and to win a war if necessary.

### Conclusion

We have outlined a security regime for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement that appears to offer the possibility of

enhancing all sides' security in comparison with the status quo ante:

- Israel would have improved, treaty-bound strategic depth and early-warning capacity toward the east and, consequently, an enhanced capability to defend itself against enemies from the east;
- terrorism emanating from the West Bank and Gaza would, over a period of time, be reduced;
- Palestinians would have enhanced personal security and, for the first time, national security in a national home;
- Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians would reinforce one another's security, with broad international backing; and
- the overall likelihood of further Arab-Israeli or Muslim-Israeli wars would be reduced.

## Notes

1. See for example Ze'ev Schiff, Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians, Policy Paper no. 15, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989; Aryeh Shalev, The Autonomy--Problems and Possible Solutions (Tel Aviv University, CSS Paper no. 8, January 1980); Shalev, The West Bank: Line of Defense (New York: Praeger, 1984); Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, No Trumpets No Drums (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991); Joseph Alpher, coordinator and coeditor, The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace and Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Study Group Reports, 1989; Valerie Yorke, "Imagining a Palestinian State: an International Security Plan," International Affairs 66, 1 (1990), pp. 115-136; Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1990); Middle East Security: Two Views, Ahmad S. Khalidi and Yair Evron, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper no. 3, May 1990. For two of the earliest treatments of the issues, see Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," Foreign Affairs Vol. 56, no. 4, July 1978, and Abraham Becker and Steven Rosen, Preliminary Research on Alternative Security Arrangements for West Bank Autonomy (Los Angeles: The Rand Corporation, July 1979).
2. Note, for example, descriptions of PLO/Fatah success in policing diverse ceasefire arrangements in Southern Lebanon during the period 1978-1982--descriptions that appear to reflect considerable liaison and enforcement capabilities. Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 37; and Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 96-97.
3. Schiff, p. 69.
4. Shalev, The Autonomy, Appendix B, p. 198.
5. See for example Ha'aretz January 15, 1992, p.1, statement by Israel Foreign Ministry Director General Yosef Hadas.
6. Ze'ev B. Begin, "The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace," Foreign Affairs Fall 1991.
7. For details see Joseph Alpher, "Implications of the War on the Arab-Israel Peace Process," in J. Alpher, ed., War in the Gulf: Implications for Israel, Report of a JCSS Study Group (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1991, Hebrew; English edition forthcoming). The lack of political realism in an Israeli approach that seeks to neutralize Palestinian national aspirations by reliance on Jordan, is not explored here, nor is it relevant to the security role projected here for Jordan.
8. Begin, "The Likud Vision."

9. Conversation with Patrick Seale, November 1991.

10. Schiff is the main exception. Of recent note also is Abu Iyad's reference in his interview in Foreign Policy no. 78, Spring 1990, p. 109. Curiously, Israeli-Palestinian anti-terrorist collaboration ("A Palestinian and an Israeli agent hunt for the devil called Abu Nidal") has already become the subject of a thriller. Howard Kaplan, Bullets of Palestine (Toronto: Gold Eagle Book, 1987).

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

SESSION 1990-91

FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE

EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

Wednesday 24 April 1991

*Mr Afif Safieh*

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*Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed  
24 April 1991*

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LONDON: HMSO

£4.50 net

WEDNESDAY 24 APRIL 1991

Members present:

Mr David Howell, in the Chair

Mr David Harris  
Mr Micheal Jopling  
Mr Ivan Lawrence  
Mr Ted Rowlands

Mr Peter Shore  
Mr Bowen Wells  
Mr Michael Welsh

Examination of witnesses

MR AFIF SAFIEH. Head of the London Office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, examined.

Chairman

540. Mr Safieh, on behalf of the Committee I would like to thank you very much indeed for agreeing to come before us this afternoon. You are the head of the PLO London Office?

(Mr Safieh) Yes.

541. We are extremely grateful to you for agreeing to our invitation and for coming here to help us with our continuing inquiry into the events in the Middle East. This Committee, as you know, has been looking at the impact first of the invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath, then at the prospects for resolving both the disputes in the region and, indeed, the hideous atrocities and violence that have taken place in several parts of the region, very much in the news recently in the mountains of Iraq. Meanwhile, Secretary Baker, the American Secretary of State, has been undertaking a series of visits to the region and we would like to discuss your review of his initiative in a moment. First, perhaps as you have done us the courtesy of agreeing to come and see us, we could do you the courtesy of asking if you would like to set the scene for us?

(Mr Safieh) I would like you to know I consider it a great privilege for me to have this opportunity of addressing your distinguished Committee, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. As you can expect I was given specific instructions by President Yasser Arafat and Mr Kaddoumi to establish the best possible working relationship with all organs of the UK state and society, to reach and promote the best possible understanding of our respective position and a mutual understanding of our interest. As you might know my people have some serious and legitimate grievances concerning British diplomacy in the 20th Century. I am not here to speak about the grievances but about the great expectations we have for the British role in an assertive quest, a decisive and serious quest for peacemaking in the Middle East. We believe that for four different reasons the UK is extremely well equipped to play a dynamic role and we hope it will. The four reasons are as follows: first, the UK has been the former mandatory power in Palestine and was present at the creation of the problem. In the late 1970s—and we witnessed it with great

the decisive British role to help move fascination from the unacceptably racist Rhodesia to a majority rule in independent Zimbabwe. We have been jealous of that role hoping we will, one day, witness the same endeavour. Second: the UK is a permanent member of the Security Council and we probably have a shared opinion that the UN Security Council should be the acceptable forum for pledging a resolution since it can reconcile ethics and politics.

Three: the UK is a major player in the E.E.C. framework itself and we are happy about it emerging powerfully as an important element in our international system and in a shared opinion we hope to live in a multipolar international system rather than a monopolar international system. The last reason is the privileged relationship between London and Washington. We have witnessed with great fascination the complex relation and the sort of mother/daughter relationship between the UK and USA and hope in the future Washington will listen to London as London listens to Washington, and the sort of Athens/Rome relationship we have witnessed in the past of conquering Rome, sometimes listening and often plagiarising, Athens. We hope London will be the inspiring Athens of the contemporary Rome. Two months after the beginning of the Gulf crisis I received a visit from a Palestinian student, a girl of 22, and she said the situation had inspired her a poster showing the Palestinians carrying an olive branch to symbolise the quest for peace. It is a Mediterranean Palestinian tree and she said: "I see a motto on that poster saying 'We too have oil; olive oil'". I looked at her with great melancholy because I believe this motto is extremely painful because if one reads between the words and listens between the syllables, what it really means, we too have rights even though we happen not to have oil." Another friend of mine told me that in the Japanese language—and you know anything Japanese cannot be ignored lightly—the same word means "crisis" and "opportunity" and since we live in a tremendous moment of crisis it means we are also on the verge of an enormous window of opportunity. Sir, we believe we have become, in a way, the Jews of the Israelis in the Middle East, yet we have moved beyond demanding absolute justice, we are just asking for possible justice. We believe the two-state solution will help us to move away from the winner/loser



24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Chairman Contd]

situation, the zero sum game, to a winner/winner situation. I want to end by quoting three of my favourite authors. The first is Isaac Deutscher, a Jewish Polish historian and philosopher who summarised his views in a parable of his own. He said: "It is a conflict between a person who had to jump from a building on fire and landed on another person whose back he broke, and unfortunately every time that second person tries to stand up he receives a beating." I thought this parable by Isaac Deutscher summarised the Israeli Palestinian dilemma.

The other author was Hegel who wrote "A Pessimistic Diagnosis of the Trajectory of Mankind" that: "From history we learn we have not learned from history". The third author is another Jew for whom I have great respect and affection, Nahum Goldmann, who was the leader of the World Jewish Organisation for four decades, who was commenting critically on Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the middle 1970s, and who said: "Sometimes diplomacy in the Middle East is the art of delaying the inevitable as long as possible". For Nahum Goldmann already in the middle of the 1970s the inevitable was addressing the Palestinian dimension, the Palestinian factor and the Palestinian actor. So, the two quotations were: "From history we learn we have not learned from history" and the second quotation was: "Sometimes diplomacy in the Middle East is the art of delaying the inevitable as long as possible." Sir, I would like you to help history which is now hesitant and undecided to make the right choice, and to help us prove those two authors were wrong, and I do not think they would mind.

542. Thank you for those eloquent opening words setting out your feelings on these crucial issues so clearly. I am going to begin by asking you a question which I recognise is difficult, but it puzzles many of us and we need to get it out of the way. It relates to some of the events that have been going on in other areas of the Gulf region. You have spoken both now, and indeed the PLO have spoken, about the rejection of the acquisition of territories by force, the territory where Palestinians live and which I think you believe ought to be a home free state for the Palestinian people. You have always rejected that very clearly and yet when it came to the acquisition of Kuwait, the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, by the most monstrous and open force, we felt we saw in the PLO a failure to condemn that outright. Were we seeing right or could you explain to us whether there is a contradiction there?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, I am very happy that you have raised this issue. I think it is very relevant and it was very legitimate that you raised that issue and it offers me the possibility of clarifying the PLO's attitude and the Palestinian position on this question. I happen to believe that we in the PLO have been in a way a sort of casualty of what I have called six months ago a constant exercise in deliberate misunderstanding. I believe, sir, we could have made a better performance in explaining our feelings and our position, so here I am being self-critical. We could have done a better

job on the level of explaining our attitudes. Yet, sir, everybody who should know, knows that since Moment M, Day One, Yasser Arafat activated himself with discreet diplomacy from 2 August onwards in trying to obtain the Iraqi withdrawal out of all Kuwait, and in fact we have always stipulated that any solution should incorporate Iraqi withdrawal out of Kuwait. I can recall that on 3 August Arafat was with President Gadaffi in Libya and then visited President Mubarak in Alexandria and then went to Baghdad and then to Riyadh to meet King Fahd, and in all the ideas that he was floating, Iraqi withdrawal out of Kuwait was the first, because, as you very rightly said, we having been victims of occupation, could not endorse other people's occupation. Yet, sir, on the day that the Arab summit meeting met in Cairo, which was 9 August, Arafat had one suggestion which, unfortunately, was not carried away and was not voted upon. That suggestion was the following: on the basis of President Mubarak's inaugural speech—as you know, President Mubarak was extremely critical of Saddam's entry into Kuwait—he suggested that six heads of state from the Arab world, monarchs and presidents, would go to Baghdad to convince Saddam to withdraw. We believed that there was room for giving diplomacy a chance. We believed that the two issues which were controversial then between Kuwait and Iraq, the issues of finances and frontiers, could have been solved through diplomacy, sparing the area and the world the agonies of a war, and we have conveyed to the Kuwaiti people that we cared about them probably much more than others who favoured a military option. I am sure sir, that you are tormented as much as we are by seeing what happens now in both Kuwait and Iraq, where the state and the society are really torn apart and the casualties are enormous, maybe going beyond several years to repair. We believed, sir, maybe naively, that there was room for a diplomatic endeavour and Arafat has activated himself, not only in the Arab world but also with some European interlocutors. I think you know, sir, that Arafat has been instrumental in the early phases of the crisis in obtaining freedom of movement for the foreign citizens that were trapped in the regional dilemma. I am not asking that we should be thanked for that. It was our duty, because we feel that our people in the occupied territories are held hostage and we are against hostage-taking. I have often said, sir, that people on television have seen Yasser Arafat kiss the cheeks of Saddam but they have never bothered to know or to enquire what he was whispering in his ear. And believe you me, sir, we were always lobbying, in Baghdad and elsewhere, for a diplomatic outcome. We have at one moment believed that the linkage idea carried potential. We thought that linkage would solve two unacceptable situations—and I insist, two unacceptable situations—in one shot, one peaceful shot. We believed that flexibility on UN resolution 242 might obtain flexibility and implementation of 660, and we thought that it was either linkage or war. Yet unfortunately, we all know what

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Chairman Contd]

happened two months ago. War took place. Diplomacy was the wrong horse to bet upon, but believe you me, sir, diplomacy was the only horse we had made a bet on and I do not think we should be asked in a way to regret or apologise for having made that bet on diplomacy rather than on military warfare. Having asked me this question, I still remember the very interesting interview I had with Brian Hayes, one of the knowledgeable journalists on television. He asked me about this question and I told him we, the Palestinians, are in favour of Arab unity yet we are in favour of Arab unity by consent, not through coercion, and we prefer the Jean Monet approach to the Bismarck approach. I do not know how many of my audience on television understood that allusion, but speaking to your distinguished audience I know you are all familiar, maybe with the person but surely with the results of that person, Jean Monet, integration by consent through consultations rather than by occupation and coercion. That was our position from Moment M onwards. The blur or the confusion in perception I think emanated from the two overlapping problems. There was on the one hand the problem of Iraq in Kuwait, which we disapproved of, but there was also overlapping the other problem which we thought was also distinct, not only resulting but also distinct of the rapid deployment of foreign troops in the Peninsula. We were against the Iraqi presence in Kuwait but we were not in favour of the deployment of foreign troops, for understandable reasons. I do not think you would expect a national liberation movement in the Third World to endorse or approve the rapid deployment of super-power troops in a recently decolonised area, etc. We were against the rapid deployment of troops. We thought it was an unnecessary complication that we could have done without if ever the Arab machinery of the Arab League was given a chance to deploy its endeavours. Things went wrong. I believe that all actors, regional and international, involved in that crisis came out damaged, not only the PLO, and when I say "not only the PLO" I admit and confess that the PLO came out damaged and needs some damage reparation. But I believe, and you might agree, that the UN came out also discredited because there were certain manipulations or trespassing of the mandate of the UN. Super-power relationships came out damaged because of the condescending attitude of Bush at a certain moment when the Gorbachev initiative was there. Europe was another casualty. It did not emerge as a cohesive, independent player in the game. East-West relations, the Occident and the Orient: you have seen the uproar from Morocco to Malaysia, perceiving the event as being a sort of new version of a crusading exercise. I am not endorsing those perceptions but, as you know, a perception of reality, even if it is a false perception, is part of that reality. I believe that we all have to work in damage control, we, the Palestinians, yes, of course, but others, too, and again I believe that Palestine offers us the possibility for damage control. Just as in the Gulf crisis Palestine could have been the solution for once and not the problem through the linkage approach, again

Palestine can be a moment for the reconciliation of the West and the East. Do not, sir, be under the illusion that you have excellent relations with the Arab world and the Third World and the Islamic world. Maybe good relations with rulers do not necessarily mean good relations with the people concerned or to a concept of Western terminology with the civil society. I believe that Palestine is an area where the authentic, genuine reconciliation between the Christian world and Islam, the West and the East, can take place. Having seen the West go into a war to discipline a misbehaving regional actor, Iraq—and I am clear in my words, calling it misbehaving. The Arab world, the Islamic world will not understand if there is still tomorrow patience which resembles indulgence, which resembles and borders on complacency towards that other misbehaving regional actor that has been tormenting the area for so long, with so many UN resolutions accumulated and unimplemented. So we believe that Palestine is again a solution for a sort of cross-fertilisation in the dialogue of civilisations, the new world order that we dream about, and we are ready to be extremely co-operative in any quest for a better world.

Mr Lawrence

543. You were actually asked, Mr Safieh, if you could explain the apparent contradiction between the PLO's insistence on the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force and the PLO's failure to condemn Saddam Hussein, and I think you have explained that Mr Arafat behaved impeccably in his relationship to Saddam Hussein. Would we, therefore, be right in supposing that at the PLO Central Committee now being held in Tunis they will be commending Mr Arafat for the position that he adopted towards Saddam Hussein?

(Mr Safieh) First of all, you have put words in my mouth that I have not used. I started by answering the Chairman, by saying maybe there was room for improvement in our performance, and I was being self-critical as I was never accustomed to be. I think Yasser Arafat's leadership is very comfortable within the Palestinian people as a whole, mainly among the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and there is no challenge, to my knowledge, in the meeting taking place in Tunis by Central Council members, which, as you know, is the miniature of our Parliament in Exile. Sir, I would like you to understand how we see it. Maybe we do not see eye to eye. Arafat is our de Gaulle. He incarnates our national dignity as being the architect of our collective resurrection. He has struggled against foes and friends so as to keep the rank of Palestine and of the Palestinians undiminished. Sir, you probably know that Churchill speaking of the other de Gaulle, the first one, the real one, he said: "Of all the crosses I have had to carry the Cross of Lorraine was the heaviest" and the Cross of Lorraine was the symbol of the French Resistance. So I guess many actors in the game sometimes find us and find Yasser Arafat difficult to deal with, yet he is like the other de Gaulle, one of the heavy crosses to bear. I believe Arafat has a historical role and is a

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Mr Lawrence Contd]

historical necessity for the peacemaking endeavour that we are now undertaking. He is the protector of the pragmatic tendency outside and inside Palestine, the pragmatic tendency would be orphaned if Arafat was no longer the leader of the PLO. I believe that Arafat is truly committed to those statements he made in 1988 in Geneva and before that in Stockholm, and that should be music to your ears, sir. The challenge today is the following: when you hear that we the Palestinians are ready to respect our commitments stated in front of the international community, the challenge is to see whether the international community is ready to respect its commitments to us. I told you, sir, we have tried to move beyond historical revenge. We became the Jews of Israelis yet we do not want them to become the Palestinians of the Palestinians. We are no longer asking for absolute justice but to produce a solution which will be a winner/winner solution. We expect that Jews should be the most supportive for our quest for statehood and sovereignty. Let me be frank, and I always try to be glasnostically transparent, I am making a display of my emotions. With great fascination I have seen in recent contemporary history Germany rightly so—and I emphasise rightly so—apologising and re-apologising to Jews for atrocities perpetrated, then two years ago with fascination I saw Vaclav Havel, the President of Czechoslovakia, apologise to the Germans for the maltreatment by Czechoslovakia of its German minority after the Second World War, and then I heard with fascination Mrs Margaret Thatcher apologising to Czechoslovakia because of the policy of appeasement that left Czechoslovakia to the territorial appetite of Hitler. Those were fascinating moments. I want to ask you, and you in particular, Mr Lawrence, do you not think, hopefully soon, somebody owes us—we the Palestinians—historical apologies? Do you not think the Israelis today, instead of insulting us or denying our existence, rights and sufferings, should be telling us: "Sorry, please, and thank you"? You know, much more than I do, that Israel could not have been created without us paying a heavy collective human price. Israel was created, we have paid the price, we are not asking for revenge. We have become unreasonably reasonable; encourage us. The pro-Israelis and the Jewish communities in the Diaspora should be the first to be the most supportive because of this factor of historical responsibility. I am avoiding the concept of guilt because I do not believe in guilt, individual, or collective, hereditary or non-hereditary. It is the moment today, Mr Chairman, to have these soul searching exercises. We are doing soul searching exercises in Tunis, amongst others, also in London and elsewhere; others should do it too. You should encourage it.

Chairman: If you ask Mr Lawrence too many questions none of us will get a word in. Just a brief question, Mr Lawrence.

Mr Lawrence

544. As part of your soul searching exercise, consistent with your peaceful inclinations, can you explain to us why Mr Arafat and the PLO still

stand behind the covenant upon which your movement is based which calls for the arms struggle in Article 7, aimed at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine, Article 15, and arms struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine? Are those still the aims of the PLO or are you renouncing the covenant which up to this moment President Arafat and everybody else, as you have called him, has upheld? Will you do some soul searching?

(Mr Safieh) If we do it together I am ready to constantly and continuously do it. Mr Chairman, I am very happy that the ball came back to Mr Lawrence because he has raised very important issues that I want to clarify in front of you.

545. Can you answer it?

(Mr Safieh) Yes, sure. The peaceful inclination of Arafat, which I doubt not, having worked with him from 1978–81 as a member of his cabinet in charge of European affairs and UN institutions and having accompanied him between 1988–90 on several of his trips, including his trip to Strasbourg where he addressed the Euro Parliamentarians, and I still remember him telling the press and the Euro Parliamentarians: "I extend my hand in peace hoping that an Israeli de Gaulle will seize it" and today with regret we have to confess not only did no Israeli de Gaulle emerge but not even an Israeli de Klerk. A de Klerk would have been good enough to start this snowball process. Concerning the covenant, sir, the covenant was written in 1964 and amended once, and that was it, in 1968. It is a reflection of our political culture and political thinking of the 1960s, yet as you know, sir, in law when the same authoritative body adopts at different moments equally important documents the most recent abrogates the one that was adopted prior to that. The most recent document which we have adopted, which for us is the most important, is our proclamation of independence which we adopted, sir, in 1988. In that proclamation of independence in 1988 we speak of the two-state solution, so in a way every item in our charter which contradicts the proclamation of independence should be considered by you and me as being abrogated.

546. Why do you not renounce it?

(Mr Safieh) That is the legal interpretation, sir, and any a legal expert can tell you. I happened to be with Arafat when he visited Mitterand in the Elysee a year and a half ago when he said that those specific items are *Caduc*, which is another legal term of Latin origin to say abrogation. Believe you me. I do not think that any legal document is an obstacle to peace because as you probably know the Herout Party, which is the major component of Likud, which is the governing party in Israel, has a party anthem, Mr Chairman, which says the following—so whenever they are assembled the Herout Party' anywhere like here, they sing the following song:—"The Jordan River has two banks, the West Bank is ours, so is the East Bank". It means King Hussein's East Bank, yet I do not remember neither us nor King Hussein asking Mr Shamir and Mr Sharon to abandon and

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Mr Lawrence Contd]

declare *Caduc*, their party anthem, to become acceptable interlocutors and acceptable negotiating partners. Number two, sir, concerning the armed struggle, you well know, sir, that in our strategic thinking we aspired for one moment to become a military actor so that we could aspire to become a diplomatic factor. The more you have of diplomatic interaction and transaction the less you will have violence and military struggle. I hope that today we will move as far as possible, Mr Chairman, from the era of the gladiators to the era of the negotiators. We invite the other side, sir, to abandon like us the dialogue by arms and to adopt the arms of dialogue; we are ready. I would like to be on record, sir, in this distinguished gathering. I want to be on record as saying that we the Palestinian people, we the PLO, are ready for negotiations now, we are ready for peace now, and those who do not yet trust us can test us.

**Chairman:** I want to get on to the specific strategies and the way the PLO sees the present situation. I know Mr Shore has some questions. Mr Jopling, did you want another question on this general theme?

Mr Jopling

547. I want to come back, if we can, to one sentence replies and I think my question will encourage that. Could you tell me, very simply, did the PLO condemn the invasion of Kuwait and if it did would you be kind enough to send us chapter and verse of that condemnation?

(Mr Safieh) In the Arab Summit Meeting which took place on the 9 August in Cairo, that is a week exactly after the beginning of the crisis and the invasion of Kuwait, Yasser Arafat expressed reservations on the resolution submitted. Apparently the Arab League's voting behaviour is yes, no, abstention and reservation. <sup>there is a fourth category</sup> reservation. He explained his vote by saying: "it is because this resolution at the same time condemns Iraq and endorses the deployment of foreign forces, this is why I feel incapable of voting on it." Sir, I will send you all relevant documents. In all the proposals, written and verbal proposals we have submitted, Iraqi withdrawal out of Kuwait was always item number one, we are on record on that. The one point or proposal we addressed where we addressed the territorial issue—again the acquisition of territory—we spoke of a way out through the process of leasing, renting, the Island of Bubiyan, which would remain under Kuwaiti sovereignty. So you can see implicitly, Mr Chairman, when you say, "We would like the Iraqi withdrawal out of Kuwait and as a possible solution the sort of renting, leasing, of the island so that Iraq can have the access it wants to the open sea," that island in our proposal would have remained under Kuwaiti sovereignty, and I think it is sufficiently convincing that at no moment did we endorse the Iraqi presence and occupation of Kuwait. As I told you, there are two overlapping problems that blurred perceptions and created the confusion that we are all now familiar with.

548. Can I please return to my question, which was: did the PLO condemn it? I take it from your answer that it is really no?

(Mr Safieh) I think that is a very partial perception and understanding of what I said.

549. You said you had reservations about it. I asked you whether it had been condemned and I take it from your answer that you did not condemn it?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, if I am allowed to answer in three sentences: we did not endorse it. All our endeavours tended to obtain the Iraqi withdrawal out of Kuwait peacefully, and I believe that the war that took place was, in our opinion—and I do not think we are mistaken—unwise, having left Iraq and Kuwait in very unlivable situations. We believe that we were not sufficiently helped in our diplomatic endeavours to explore every possible avenue to obtain an equitable solution on the basis of UN resolutions without going into warfare. So we never endorsed; we always wanted to obtain the reversal of the situation.

**Chairman:** I have a feeling we are not going to get much further on this particular point, so I will ask Mr Shore to pursue different aspects, particularly how other Palestinians have reacted to the outcome of all this, which did not turn out the way I think Yasser Arafat wanted in the first place.

Mr Shore

550. I would like to come to that a little bit later but I think many people have felt that at least one casualty of the Gulf war was the credibility of the PLO as an international actor and I would like to put to you two or three points on this to have your response. Of course, Iraq did not just invade Kuwait; it did its utmost to wreak damage on the State of Israel. Indeed, both in propaganda and in actual weapons and blows, it aimed its attack at the State of Israel as well. The perception of the PLO leadership in the face of these actions by Saddam Hussein was one of approval of what Saddam Hussein was doing in relation to the State of Israel. This would seem to me to have been a total reverse of the attitude that the PLO had taken up during the past two years, in which they had said they had accepted the existence of Israel and were seeking a peaceful solution to the disagreements between themselves and the Palestinians. What do you say to that point, first?

(Mr Safieh) I will try to answer you, sir, by saying that apparently you are unaware of the endeavours deployed by the PLO so that no outside military operations take place in the European theatre and elsewhere. I am just telling you that for the record, sir. No. 2, sir, test us and let us analyse the PLO's behaviour on matters where we were directly involved, and I would like to quote the Israeli author, the specialist, Zeev Chieff, on military affairs of the newspapers *El Haaretz*, who made a whole book on the Israeli/Palestinian wars in Lebanon or on the Lebanese theatre and mainly on the ceasefire agreement that was concluded in 1981 between Israel and the Palestinians through the good auspices of Philip

24 April 1991]

MR AFI SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Mr Shore Contd]

Habib, the special envoy of President Reagan and the UN. There Zeev Chieff will tell you that for a long 11 months the PLO totally and scrupulously respected its commitment and no violation of the ceasefire took place. There were Israeli attacks to violate the ceasefire agreement, and you remember General Sharon took the incident of London, which was perpetrated by Abu Nidall, to consider it as a *casus belli* and invade Lebanon. Sir, I think that this period of 1981, the ceasefire agreement which we consented to and the scrupulous respect that we had for that ceasefire agreement because of our voluntary volition and agreement around it, is the test to see PLO credibility for now and the future. We respect commitments we take. We are not responsible for the behaviour or misbehaviour of others. We are not responsible for others. We are responsible for our behaviour and in our bipolar Israeli/Palestinian relationships you have to admit with me that we are the occupied and not the occupiers. It is Palestinian blood irrigating Palestinian soil.

551. I understand that, but you would say that it was unfair for international observers to say that the Palestinian movement was greatly tempted by the possible prospect of an Iraqi military success and Iraq fulfilling their own ambitions to lead to the liberation of Palestine?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, I think it is very unrealistic that anyone in the Arab world would have thought of Iraqi military success. A non-defeat would have been a very superb scenario for those who supported whatever. Please allow me to explain the relationship between Palestine and Cairo and Palestine and Baghdad. For two decisive years, 1988 and 1990, we strategically co-operated with Egypt—and I happen to belong to the Egyptophile wing of the PLO—yet Egypt, because of its vulnerabilities, economic vulnerabilities and demographic vulnerabilities, treated us the way it treated itself ten years ago during the Camp David agreement; that is, each time there was a blockage in the negotiating process it turned to us to offer the concession needed to lubricate the process of diplomatic transaction. It treated us the way it had treated itself ten years ago. So at one moment at the beginning of 1990 we thought, that is, the Palestinian political community, that the rapprochement also with Iraq, but keeping the relationship with Egypt, would be successful, so that the Israelis will see that we are looking for peace not from a position of weakness but from a position of relative strength, having other options available. We wanted to invest Iraqi capabilities peacefully to improve the bargaining position on the negotiating table, and I give you a proof. In May 1990—and do not trust me, please; send one of your researchers to look at that—there was an Arab summit meeting in Baghdad after a horrible massacre in Palestine. You remember the nine workers shot by a pseudo-mentally deranged person. In that summit meeting and in Baghdad Yasser Arafat again convinced his colleagues, the Arab heads of state and monarchs, to endorse the two-state solution for Palestine. That is my proof,

to you that we wanted in a way to create a new strategic diplomatic situation where Iraqi capabilities would be invested as a bargaining chip on the negotiating table. We were not the ones that inspired the occupation of Kuwait. We were not in favour of that. We thought it was a total diversion and wanted to go to the negotiating table and wanted strategically to co-operate with Cairo and Baghdad at the same time, but apparently at moments such equidistance is difficult to achieve.

552. Could I ask one more question on the general attitude of the PLO and, indeed, its attitude to Saddam Hussein. All right, Mr Arafat kissed him on both cheeks but also whispered in his ear. At the recent conference now going on in Tunis, do you know whether there has been any mention at all of the plight of the Kurds? Does the PLO have sympathy for the Kurds as a suppressed people who seek autonomy and self-government, and they have made that concern articulate? They have articulated it and made it public.

(Mr Safieh) Sir, I want you to know that just as for Kuwait I care about the Kurds much more than any of those in the outside world who pretend to and I want you to know that on Arafat's specific initiative the decision was taken for the Palestinian Red Crescent, which has enormous experience of working in disaster areas, to go immediately to Kurdistan to try to help the international endeavours to alleviate the plight of the Kurdish populations in the mountains. So two days ago, on the initiative of Arafat, the Palestinian Red Crescent was instructed to move directly to send its medical personnel—and they have enormous experience in disaster areas—to try and alleviate the situation of the plight of the Kurdish populations. And, sir, we are in favour of democracy and decentralisation in Iraq. We are in favour, and we would like to see a situation where the Kurdish people has the full expression of its cultural identity within the framework of the territorial integrity of Iraq. I believe they have often been victims of external manipulations and I believe that negotiations taking place now in Iraq will hopefully bring to fruition a more livable situation, a better interaction between the Arab population of Iraq and the Kurdish population of Iraq within the framework of a unitary state, but decentralised with autonomy and cultural expression for all communities. Yes, of course.

553. I am very grateful for that information and if you have got any actual statement by Mr Arafat on the problems of the Kurds and the sympathy the PLO has for them I would be very grateful if you could send that to the Committee. I have now just one further question to put to you and it is really in relation to the effect of the Gulf crisis on the Palestinians in territories other than the West Bank, ie territories in the Middle East generally. What has been the effect on Palestinians of the Gulf War in Jordan and Lebanon, for example?

(Mr Safieh) Again, sir, extremely negative. As I told the other distinguished audiences, the Palestinians have been a major casualty of that crisis in

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued

[Mr Shore Contd]

the Gulf from moment M. day one, 2 August 1990. Just to take the Palestinian community in Kuwait which numbered on that day 400,000, we now have around 140,000 still in Kuwait, the remnants have already migrated seeking more hospitable shores. Some of them are now unemployed in Jordan and many have left to go to Canada, Australia and the USA. They were a hard working community that contributed enormously to the state building and the institution building of the Gulf and Kuwait. They took part in all areas of work, from education to medication, from culture to agriculture, they were there in the banking system and the university, the state bureaucracy and the state apparatus. 240,000 of them have left Kuwait and are elsewhere, either unemployed or still seeking jobs. They used to send remittances to the Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon which are the poorest social classes the Palestinians have and today you are not without knowledge, sir, even though I am not talking in details about it, Amnesty International issued a report and some excesses, which I hope will be terminated soon, have taken place. It is painful for me to speak about it but I am sure you are familiar with the Amnesty report. So, sir, many institutions also in the Occupied Territories which used to receive subsidies either from the Palestinian Diaspora communities in the Gulf or from government or non-government Gulf institutions, up to now have been deprived of the financial aid they used to receive. You will no doubt know that we live in a situation of deteriorating economic situations under occupation which is totally unfavourable to the process of peace that we both would like to see being triggered. Let me tell you, sir, I believe that our relationships with the Arab world will be improved and much faster than many would have expected. Let me tell you that our relations with Egypt have already tremendously improved. There have been several executive committee members on our side who visited Egypt recently and had meetings with Ismat Abdul Magid, the Foreign Minister, and Ossam Al Baz, the Diplomatic Adviser to President Mubarak. We are supporting the Egyptian candidate for the Arab League's Secretary General and we think that an Egyptian now at the head of the Arab League will work seriously to heal the rift that took place in the Arab League machinery. You are not without knowing that six plus two makes only eight and that the Arab state system is made of 21, so we are not as isolated as some would like to project the image. Six plus two makes eight out of 21, the others we have kept excellent relations with and even with the six plus two relations, sir, were never interrupted. I think with Cairo relations will be healed within a month and that will pave the way back to Riyadh and access to Riyadh means the entire Gulf system.

Chairman

554. If the Palestinians feel sympathy for the Kurds and if, as a result of Saddam Hussein's direct action, such great suffering has been imposed on Palestinians are some of them not a bit

critical of Mr Arafat for having tried to deal with Saddam Hussein in a more gentle manner, and are people not now saying to your leadership: "For goodness sake let us have a firmer line against Saddam Hussein"? Are they not saying that?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, we are now re-Palestinising our thinking, our endeavour, our planning and our interaction and I think you should advise us in that direction. Our concern, sir, is how to find an acceptable, durable, equitable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma. To us the entire Gulf crisis was a diversion that made us lose time, you say credibility, and now pushes us into the process of damage control and damage reparation. You should help us, sir, to refocus again on the Israeli-Palestinian dimension. We have to work on how to improve the economic conditions of the Palestinians under occupation, how to help trigger a peace process for which, as I told you, we are totally available to be extremely co-operative to bring it to fruition. That we hope to put behind us, sir; help us in that. Let us go beyond the war in the Gulf towards the quest for peace in the Middle East.

Mr Wells

555. In view of that statement, in retrospect would you not have thought it best for the leadership of the PLO not to take sides in the dispute between Baghdad and other Arab countries, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular? Do you not think it was a mistake to side, or appear to side, with Saddam Hussein?

(Mr Safieh) I think all actors in the area had very little room for manoeuvre. We live, sir, in an era of shrinking options. I might have certain suggestions maybe of a cosmetic nature how our performance could have been better projected and better understood but it took place. We are now almost at the end of April 1991, let us face the challenge of the 1990s now in the Middle East. I think a more livable Middle East needs and necessitates a resolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict which Mr Hurd has called the "unfinished business". Let us, sir, try to explore how we can address that unfinished business of Israel and Palestine. As long as that solution is not found there will be the seeds for future frictions, tensions, instabilities and destabilisation. Sir, let us put this behind us; it took place. I think we are not the only ones that should be blushing, sir, and I mean it, many other actors should have longer beards than Yasser Arafat to hide their blushing cheeks for what took place in that area. Let me not enter into details.

Chairman: I do not think the Committee will dispute that last remark at all. Now, we have heard as a result of questions by Mr Lawrence earlier what the PLO's current position is on the right of Israel to exist and so on, let us now turn to your strategies and then finally to the current policies and the reaction of Secretary Baker.

Mr Rowlands

556. If I may just ask as a preliminary: it is now quite clear that PLO supports at least an Israeli state on pre-1967 boundaries, the question that

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued

[Mr Rowlands *Contd*]

arises is what further security assurances can be given to that state? That also is much coloured by PLO attitudes in the way it now conducts its affairs from here on, in particular its belief in Intifada and bringing pressure to bear on the Israeli government and, as previous questions have indicated, the whole question of whether in fact its sincerity and integrity in the security of an Israeli state can be confirmed in the strongest possible way. First of all, do you think if there was a PLO state or homeland established on the West Bank of the Gaza it itself could be demilitarised, or with minimum military presence, and what security arrangements would you suggest and offer in any international settlement to the 1967 boundary Israeli state?

(Mr Safieh) Thank you very much, sir, for this set of questions. I believe, sir, that once the Palestinian people obtain statehood and sovereignty and independence we will all become a *status quo* actor in the area because we will have an interest and our enlightened national interest will dictate that Palestine becomes the *status quo* actor that we would like to become. Any military provocation in the future will be a re-invitation for Israel to re-occupy the Occupied Territories.

557. Give us some practical thoughts on that.

(Mr Safieh) Yes, Sir, concerning the militarisation of the state I think we would accept as a sovereign decision to have a minimum of military capability because we do not believe any more in military options in the area. We would like to have what is needed for that state to ensure the law and order within it and not beyond. No. 2, sir, we are ready to accept the stationing of UN forces on our Palestinian territory if the other side does not want them to be also on theirs, and we will accept—so as not to fall into the trap which led to the 1967 war—that the removal of those UN troops stationed on our territory does not necessitate the demand only of the host country but the unanimous consent of the Security Council. You know to what I am alluding. I am alluding to the 1967 period when Abdul Nasser asked U Thant to remove the UN troops from the Sinai, hoping to get no for an answer, got yes as an answer and this snowballed into triggering the 1967 war. So to avoid that trajectory, that vicious circle, the departure of those troops would need more than the individual demand of the host country but the unanimous consent of the Security Council. Sir, we believe that those two countries will have to interact on the economic and cultural level enormously and I believe that those two states will have in the future to opt for what I call vertical expansion instead of horizontal expansion, and I usually add that since both communities believe they belong to the chosen ones, maybe God will be more tolerant of our trespassing on His field! So I think the two-state solution is a wonderful idea for mutual containment. As you know, both our societies have shown extreme dynamism and sometimes excessive vitality, and the two-state solution is a formula of mutual containment. We are ready to accept any other proposal for tranquillising and

securing the area that does not imply territorial acquisition. Anyway the Scud missiles showed, that territorial rectification or territorial acquisition gives added security by giving added strategic depth. We believe that security for Israel comes not from territorial aggrandizement but from regional acceptance, and we are the key to regional acceptance. The Israelis know that they can either be in the West Bank or in the Middle East. As long as they are obstinately wanting to remain in the West Bank they are not yet in the Middle East. Once they withdraw from the West Bank they can be incorporated in the Middle East. I believe, sir, that also in the future we can explore formulae taken from the EEC experience or the Benelux experience for regional cooperation and economic integration in the area, and I think to our mutual advantage we will be also aiming for that, an Israel/Palestine/Jordan confederal link or economic cooperation as a desirable outcome. We say it proudly with self-confidence. We do not think we are destined and condemned to remain the eternal Luxembourg of the triangle, even though Luxembourg is in a very enviable situation. But we believe that having a minority in Israel and a numerical majority in Jordan we are not condemned to remain the junior partner of any triangular exercise.

558. So if I can get a summary of your response, you are saying, first of all, that an Israeli state at 1967 boundaries is accepted by the PLO, and in addition to that, that there are a variety of other confidence-building measures, if you like, that could be built upon into the agreement to ensure the security of that Israeli state, including minimum militarisation of the Palestinian homeland, a major presence which could not be removed unilaterally and other possible measures on which you would welcome suggestions? In the light of this moderate position that you offer, should not the conduct now of the PLO, as we are entering this phase of important diplomacy by Mr Baker and others now seeking to try to end the deadlock and the logjam on the PLO attitudes on the West Bank and in the Gaza, be shoring up this moderation, and violence in language or, indeed, in action at this moment in time could be totally counter-productive? Has the PLO thought through the tactics and its strategy from now on in this respect?

(Mr Safieh) First of all, thank you for calling me a moderate. I personally prefer the word "pragmatist" or "realist" or "idealistic realist", and I believe that peace should also be concluded one day between the immoderates on both sides. I do not believe that we are being these days vehement or vociferous. I am really surprised as an external observer also of the realities of the Middle East by the Palestinian self-restraint, knowing the tragic, unacceptable, inadmissible situation in which the Palestinians live, either in Palestine or in Lebanon. I am surprised by the degree of self-restraint they have exercised upon themselves and I have not noticed either vociferation or vehemence in the literature we are producing nor in the behaviour



24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Mr Rowlands *Contd*]

we are having. Yet I agree there is a need to rework on the phraseology and I believe that in the Arab world as a whole we need to rethink our discourse, and the phraseology of the 1950s is no more adequate to cope with the challenges and the opportunities of the 1990s. Sir, you mentioned that we recognise the State of Israel in its pre-1967 borders and I am happy to emphasise this and we do that on the basis of mutual recognition and not unilateral recognition, as I am sure you are aware. Yasser Arafat speaking in Geneva spoke also on behalf of the state we proclaimed in Algeria. So, sir, it was not only the PLO recognising the State of Israel; it was the State of Palestine, Arafat on behalf of the State of Palestine, that was recognising the State of Israel, and we are in favour of mutual recognition between the two states. It is not the national liberation movement recognising Israel, it is the State of Palestine which we proclaimed. Some say, "You dream. The state does not in reality exist." I know the specificity of the PLO. We are not, like others, an authority on a demography and on a geography. The authority is dispersed, the demography is scattered; and the geography is occupied. This is one of the reasons for our specific situation. Yet I believe that Palestine is resurrecting today and I always say to my audience we in the Holy Land have had some previous experience in Resurrection!

559. Finally, one of the additional assurances of security to Israel would be the underpinning of this whole arrangement, particularly by the United States and possibly by the European Community, but I think the United States would be the primary reinforcement of that assurance. We have talked about the UN role in any such arrangement. Would the active involvement and underwriting, even the occasional physical presence, of a US force of some kind as exists—and we have forgotten about it—in the Sinai Desert at this moment in time as a result of the Jewish settlement of Egypt—would the PLO accept that as a further underpinning and reinforcement of any security arrangement?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, if this can pave the way to an acceptable peace with a Palestinian state emerging beside Israel, this would be welcomed. Let me tell you there was a debate in the middle of the 1970s in American political science magazines on the need for a formal military alliance between the United States and Israel as a tranquillising factor concerning Israeli security. I do not know if you know that those who torpedoed that idea of a formal alliance between the United States and Israel were the Israelis themselves because, as Peres mentioned one day, both had an advantage in Israel remaining the undisciplined ally. I would welcome such a formula of an American guarantee and, if need be, an American presence as a tranquillising factor if this can bring us, the Palestinians, a two-state solution in previously mandated Palestine. Why not? If that is the necessary prerequisite for peace, why not?

Chairman: Now let us turn to where we are now, which is the Baker initiative and the attempt to

tackle at the same time both the Palestine issue which we are discussing and, more broadly, Arab/Israeli relations, all within a regional conference network, hopefully with the Soviet Union and United States presiding at the top. We would like to ask some detailed questions on how you react to all that?

Mr Harris

560. First of all, on the Baker initiative, what is the PLO's attitude to the twin-track proposals and also to the idea of a regional peace conference?

(Mr Safieh) Sir, we have enormously facilitated the Baker endeavour of 1989. If you remember, then there were the ten points of President Mubarak and the five points of Secretary of State Baker, and if you remember well, then it was the Israeli side that torpedoed them and they had a governmental crisis and the National Coalition Government made by Likud and Labour crumbled. Labour was incapable of making the coalition building and Shamir came back to power in Israel with the indispensable coalition partners recruited from the extreme right wing. Now again we are favourably inclined and are facilitating the quest for peace triggered by the Baker shuttle diplomacy. You are not without knowing that he has already met three times Mr Faisal Husseini and his colleagues in East Jerusalem and each time Faisal Husseini and his colleagues consulted with President Yasser Arafat in Tunis and approval was given for the principle of the meeting, instructions were given for the agenda of the meeting and for the composition of the Palestinian delegation—all this with the knowledge of Mr Baker. I have always said that the key to peace and war in the Middle East resides in Washington and I have always said that the best American President for us would be one that combines the following prerequisites: he would have the ethics of a Carter, the popularity of a Reagan and the strategic audacity of a Nixon. From the very beginning we had a very favourable prejudice concerning Bush and Baker. First of all, they are an excellent team who work harmoniously, unlike previous administrations; secondly, they do not owe their election to a certain lobby in Washington; thirdly, their popularity today, whatever the nature and reason of that popularity, allows them to confront a lobby that would like to obstruct their endeavour. You are not without knowing that we in the Arab world believe that Capitol Hill is ~~that other sort of~~ Israeli Occupied Territory that needs to be liberated. We believe that a President Bush, secure on the level of his popularity and his electorate, could be a decisive factor. Sir, we are favourably inclined, yet we have certain reservations. The Regional Conference now proposed is well beneath the International Conference that the UK and us have always thought as desirable. Three differences, if you allow me, between the Regional Conference and the International Conference



24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

[Mr Harris Contd]

.. The first one is that the UN is out, the second is that Europe is uninvolved and the third is that the PLO is not incorporated in the exercise. We believe that those three actors, their input and their presence, is of historical importance. Now, apparently Mr Baker is talking to Mr Faisal Husseini and they are starting to speak of a conference instead of a Regional Conference to have a sort of constructive ambiguity, they are no longer saying it is an International Conference or a Regional Conference, they are calling it a conference. I believe that Mr Baker is trying, in a way, to incorporate the European involvement, which we welcome and favour. The principle of the necessity of having the Palestinian delegation representing the Palestinian Diaspora and the Palestinians under occupation is becoming increasingly accepted by the Americans. We believe, sir, that the indivisibility of the Palestinian people is something sacred and for Israel the window of opportunity is not the fact that there are Palestinians ready to talk peace with them, but the entire Palestinian national movement. Palestinian nationalism as a whole, is ready to move towards historical compromise. For us Palestinians the presence of a delegation representing the occupied Palestinians and the Diaspora Palestinians is an historical necessity. Historically, symbolically, it is extremely important for Israel too. I do not believe that he has concluded his consultations. He has already accepted the principle that the Palestinians consult with the PLO leadership since it is their political address. In a way that Mr Baker is accepting that the political authority and legitimacy stems from the inner workings of the PLO machine. Mr Chairman, I have often said the PLO is at the same time an institution and an idea. In the institution 10,000 persons work but the 5 million Palestinians are the powerful vehicles of the idea, which is extremely simple. It is our sense of identity and our ceaseless quest for self determination and sovereignty. Sir, let me move to another point. I believe that if the local actors are left to themselves we will never achieve an acceptable compromise, we need external prodding. Here again allow me, Mr Chairman, to quote Nahum Goldmann who speaks in one of his books of a discussion he had with General Moshe Dayan and he tells Moshe: "The Americans give you much aid and some advice, you take all the aid and you leave the advice aside, what will happen if America was to tell you you can have the aid only if you take also the advice?" and apparently Moshe with resignation told him: "Then we will have also to take their advice". This is why I believe that the Americans have not been more decisive and assertive than they have been up to now. If ever they were to link—and you see linkage again has potential—aid and advice I think we would move faster towards peace. You know, sir, it was said by political scientists that democracies have difficulties waging war and they have difficulties also

undertaking peace. Israel today has an internal blockage, it is a 50/50 society composed by half which is unwilling and the other half which is incapable of moving towards peace. We need external encouragement which can come from Europe and the USA. I believe that when the Americans decide to couple and to link aid and advice we will move forward much faster. I believe, sir, that Europe has a role. You know what Dean Acheson once said after the Second World War, speaking of the UK, but it is also relevant to Europe: "The UK or Europe has lost an empire, but is still looking for a role", we believe, sir, that we in the Middle East have a role but are still looking for an actor. Without external intervention the local actors will not move towards peace. If you allow me to add one sentence to Mr Rowlands' question: we are ready to offer all confidence building measures that are being asked of us reasonably. Like I said, the other side today, sir, should offer us some confidence building measures. Allow me to mention a few which will help facilitate the process. I believe, sir, that the stoppage and cessation of settlement building should occur as an encouragement and inducement for peace; there should be an immediate opening of universities that have been closed for the last three years leaving 20,000 students out of the university campuses; I believe the thousands of Palestinian detainees sentenced in court, or administratively detained without a trial, should also be released. Sir, there is another problem that no-one asked me about and that is the problem of Soviet Jewish migration. Mr Chairman, we the Palestinians are very committed to the principles of the freedom of movement of ideas and individuals. We are totally committed to the principle of freedom of movement of individuals and ideas. We believe that this should be double-way traffic also one day, hopefully, applying also to us. We believe, sir, that the massive arrival of Soviet Jews and the installation of many of them in the Occupied Territories is damaging and harming the prospects for peace. Let me tell you, sir, that I have confidential information that a very significant proportion of those Soviet Jews are of Christian belief. It is easy today in Moscow, with 50 roubles, because of the economic shortages and the economic uncertainties and political upheavals, to falsify forged papers showing Jewish ascendancy. Today, sir, Palestine is receiving, and when I speak of Palestine I mean Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, thousands of Soviet Jews settling in settlements that have been illegally created contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention. I believe that those three or four suggestions I have made would be extremely helpful as confidence building measures, as signals coming to us from the other side.

Chairman: Those are very interesting charges and you have described the PLO's attitude both to the Baker initiative and the form of representation you would like. Do you want to pursue that, Mr Harris?

Mr Harris

561. Very quickly. Coming back to the PLO Peace Conference I take it from what you said that

24 April 1991]

MR AFIK SAFIEH

[Continued]

**[Mr Harris Contd]**

the PLO would insist on Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories? How would the members of the Palestinian delegation be selected?

(*Mr Safieh*) I personally believe, as I said earlier, the opportunity for peace in Israel is that Palestinian nationalism is ready for a historical compromise; you make peace with your enemy, not with your friend. I believe that diplomacy is like football, no one single side can be authorised to pick and choose the members of the competing delegation. We believe, sir, that this is a Palestinian matter which should be decided by the PLO. Will the PLO in the beginning of those negotiations insist that Mr Arafat is personally involved? Surely not. Will we have top level PLO officials involved in the first stage of that peace process? Not necessarily. Much depends on the composition of the other side. What we insist upon, and I think it is an opportunity for the other side, is that the entire Palestinian people feel represented in this diplomatic interaction—the diaspora and the occupied Palestinians, and then it does not become problematic once that principle is adopted. The choice of the persons is not at all problematic as long as it is a Palestinian matter. All those personalities that your colleagues who visit Jerusalem meet will be very serious candidates on our negotiating team. They are all authentic, genuine, respectable Palestinian spokespersons of the Palestinian idea, and I am happy that Mrs Saida Nuslibeh is here. She happens to be the sister of Professor Sari Nuslibeh, my friend and neighbour who is now detained in gaol and who is the most prominent Palestinian Professor of Philosophy, who is detained now for three months but will be released in a matter of a week, and he is one of our most articulate spokespersons from East Jerusalem. You are not unaware, sir, that also that negotiating team should incorporate individuals from East Jerusalem, East Jerusalem which has been occupied and illegally annexed by a unilateral decision which even the United Kingdom and the United States never recognised. You know that the Israeli position would like to see East Jerusalem inhabitants excluded because of its symbolical meaning, and I believe that the fact that we have been in a way indulged in talks about talks about talks that never took place, and we have been indulged in a way in negotiating pre-negotiations instead of pre-negotiating negotiations, means that the forum in which we meet, the nature of the participants and the number of the participants determine and dictate in a way the possible outcome. You know that, sir, and this is why I believe there is so much diplomatic guerilla action now taking place because of the fact that the nature of the forum, the nature of the participants and the number of the participants dictate the possible diplomatic outcome. And believe you me, sir, I have several Israeli academics as personal friends and I would like to invoke one of them. Mark Heller, a brilliant strategic thinker, who in 1982/83 produced a book in Harvard University called "The Palestinian State: Implications for Israel", where he studied six possible competing alternatives to come to the conclusion that the

Palestinian state is in the best Israeli enlightened interests. That line of argument, which is extremely clinical, is fascinating. So I believe tomorrow the Palestinian state is in our enlightened interest and in the enlightened interest of those who have chosen to be our enemies.

**Chairman:** Thank you. We have one more question to ask you about who might speak for the PLO and who represent them. Mr Jopling?

**Mr Jopling**

562. In any of these negotiations which take place I wonder if you could tell us what role the PLO would see for Jordan in that process, and to what extent Jordan might have a mediating role or a prominent role of one sort or another?

(*Mr Safieh*) You know that we have adopted resolutions from 1983 onwards in our Parliament in Exile calling for a sort of confederal link between Palestine and Jordan, and I have always said this is a very desirable outcome that will become suspicious if ever external actors try to impose it on us as a pre-condition. It has to be the emanation of our voluntary volition and not the result of a prior pre-condition. I think that history, geography, demography, family inter-parental relationship dictate that Palestine and Jordan will have very intimate relations in the future and it is a desirable outcome. Yet I believe that in the interests of peace and the future we should move towards Palestinian statehood first as a sovereign decision and towards equal partnership between the two entities, and move then towards the confederal link. I believe that Jordan has a very important regional role to play and we the Palestinians are willing to enter, as a sovereign decision, into a confederal partnership, an equal partnership with Jordan in the future. This is the dictates of geography, demography and history and we consider it desirable. Yet it should be the emanation of our voluntary volition and not the result of a previous or prior pre-condition.

**Mr Rowlands**

563. Do you see any part of Jordan belonging to the Palestine homeland or state?

(*Mr Safieh*) Sir, you know that Israel was supposed to be an answer to the Jewish question and now we are the question awaiting a convenient, satisfactory answer.

564. So you do not?

(*Mr Safieh*) So we should not now seek to solve our problem at the expense of the trans-Jordanians because then in the year 2001 we will have a session with the spokesperson of the trans-Jordanians in his quest for a homeland for himself. As I told you earlier, we do not want the Israelis to become the Palestinians of the Palestinians.

565. So the answer is no?

(*Mr Safieh*) So we do not want it also for the trans-Jordanians, no. So the theory, sir, of "Jordan is Palestine" is really a nightmare for the area and it is only caressed by a certain General Sharon.

24 April 1991]

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued

**Chairman**

566. But there are tens, indeed hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Jordan and in many other places in the Middle East who would find there simply was not room for them in the new Palestinian state?

(*Mr Safieh*) I agree with you, sir, that one of the strategic major issues of the area is, whose demography on whose geography, and I believe—and this is why I mentioned it earlier without being asked about it—I am in favour of vertical expansion in the future instead of horizontal expansion. Believe you me, sir, Palestine and Israel can incorporate many more individuals and citizens than they now hold. Not all Palestinians would like to return to Palestine. Some have settled very comfortably wherever they are, but they would like to visit, they would like to send their children to schools, they would like sometimes to retire in Palestine, they would come very frequently, and, as I told you, vertical expansion is going to solve the problem. A Dutch friend of mine, an expert in hydraulic resources, told me that in the future Israel and Palestine will have to opt for non-reliance on agriculture because of the limited nature of the hydraulic resources. So all the hydraulic resources available in Israel and Palestine will have to be used for domestic purposes and so if we adopt this line of action of having an economy that does not rely heavily on agriculture, that land can incorporate many more Palestinians coming to the Palestinian state and some Jews coming additionally to the Israeli state.

**Chairman:** Mr Safieh, time is running out and you have given us very many thoughts. Mr Jopling has another question and Mr Lawrence has another question and then I am going to close the proceedings.

**Mr Jopling**

567. I wonder whether you believe that in the negotiations there are any problems which are insurmountable, such as the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories or the position of East Jerusalem?

**Chairman:** I think you did mention these things earlier, so perhaps we do not need a long answer.

(*Mr Safieh*) I come from Jerusalem and I happen to be the son of the Member of Parliament in the Jordanian Parliament for the Christian community of Jerusalem. My father was a founding member of the Palestinian Parliament in Exile. Jerusalem is something unique for us and for others, too, and I believe it will have a very unique status in the future. I think it will be two cities in one, two capitals for two sovereign entities, yet the city can remain undivided, and I deliberately used the concept of undivided and not united because united was perverted by the Israeli annexationists. I believe we can explore the possibility of joint municipal committees, with each religious community managing the religious shrine to which it belongs. So the status, I believe, of Jerusalem can be, as I said, two cities in one, two capitals for two sovereign entities, undivided, with joint municipal committees and the religious places managed by

the relevant religious communities. That would be the status for Jerusalem and it will be a remarkable place to live in or to visit, and I believe that not one single religious community or ethnic community can have a monopoly on Jerusalem. Concerning the settlements, sir, I believe that they were created as an accomplished fact, knowing that it was contrary to international law. No. 2, sir: those who chose to settle in those settlements are not recruited from or do not represent the most adorable segment of Israeli public opinion. They are usually people who adhere, who vote for the most fundamentalist wing and the most extreme right wing of the Israeli political spectrum. Tomorrow they have a sort of reflex of the OAS in Algeria trying to provoke tensions and frictions, hoping to invite the Israeli army back. I do not think it advisable, sir, that we should be asked to keep those settlements and settlers. It is a recipe for friction and tension, yet I think it should be a point on the diplomatic table. Yet there are UN resolutions and Geneva conventions that regulate those types of relationships because it was done contrary to international law, and the way they are recruited and what they represent in political terms does not make them the bridge for future harmonious relations between Israel and Palestine. I think it is a recipe for disaster.

**Mr Lawrence**

568. You mentioned just now Soviet immigration, Mr Safieh, and Yasser Arafat was reported as addressing senior Fatah military personnel in Baghdad on 6 April last year, saying: "Open fire on the new Jewish immigrants, be they from the Soviet Union, Ethiopia or anywhere else. I want you to shoot on the ground or in the air at every immigrant who thinks our land is a playground. It makes no difference whether they live in Jaffa or in Jericho. I give you explicit instructions to open fire. Do everything to stop the flow of immigration," and he said: "My decision and the decision of the Fatah to use violence must be carried out in real terms." Is that how the PLO would intend to deal with the Soviet immigration problem, and if not, will you, as a spokesman for the PLO today, take this opportunity to renounce unconditionally terrorism and the armed struggle?

(*Mr Safieh*) First of all, sir, I believe that this statement attributed to Arafat was published in a magazine published in Paris called *Al Mouharar*, the credibility and plausibility of which is equal to the book "Protocols of Zion". I believe that Arafat never said that and we have already, by the way, denied the accuracy of that report. It is a magazine that resembles "*Le Canard Enchaîné*" which is a very adorable magazine to read but it does not live up to its expectations. As I told you, the plausibility of that statement is equal to the book "Protocols of Zion", and you know what I mean.

569. Yes.

(*Mr Safieh*) Having had this problem of the Soviet Jewish migration into Palestine for the last three years, and having not seen any such butchery or massacre to which you are alluding, I would

24 April 1991/

MR AFIF SAFIEH

[Continued]

**[Mr Lawrence Contd]**

refer you to my previous answer about the Palestinian self-restraint on that issue. I promise you that there will not be such undesirable events taking place. Concerning, sir, armed struggle —

570. And terrorism.

(*Mr Safieh*) You know that we have criticised and denounced terrorism, be it undertaken by individuals, organisations or states, and that incorporates the whole of such states. You know that the UN charter authorises—authorises—armed struggle in the situation of alien occupation yet, sir, I happen to belong to the Arafat school that has given instructions to the Intifada not to use weaponry in the Intifada. We believe that the genius of our Intifada is mainly its non-violent aspects. If you will allow me sir, in my concluding remarks to say that our Intifada should be defined in political terms: our Intifada is our gradual process of the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty even under occupation: our Intifada is the proliferation of popular Committees that even deal with all social needs: it is a message of peace and not of war; it is not only stone throwing, it is that process of the gradual exercise of sovereignty even under occupation. I well remember what Faisal Husseini told me six months ago. He told me: "Afif, we have to keep it non-violent because if ever Tyson comes and challenges you"—and you know Tyson is the heavy weight boxing champion,—"you do not invite him into the boxing ring, he will win, you invite him to the chess board and you might have a chance to win". This is why we believe, sir, the non-violent feature of our Intifada is its brilliance, it is what brought us international sympathy which we have been deprived of and we are hoping to keep it. Believe you me, if there is now a diplomatic process that will be behind us. Sir, I hope you do not belong to the selective school that has selective sensitivities. You know that violence was accomplished by both sides and you know that according to Israeli statistics four days of Israeli violence have created many more victims on our side than 40 years of Palestinian violence against Israeli targets. I think every casualty is one casualty too many.

571. If you are rejecting violence and terrorism and terrorism and violence are taking place in the name of the PLO, does that mean that you—the PLO Central Organisation—do not have control over those factions of the PLO that are committing violence against your wishes? If that is so, how could you guarantee to the Israelis that you could deliver peace in any bargain struck with them?

(*Mr Safieh*) Sir, this is why I mentioned earlier, without being solicited, the model of the 1981 ceasefire agreement on the Lebanese theatre where we had a semblance of control. Once we had concluded that agreement over eleven long and challenging months everybody was asked and everybody scrupulously respected that ceasefire agreement. I believe, sir, when you have control of a territory, and as you know, sir, the definition of a state is an authority on demography and geography, once we have statehood in a normal manner where we have control of the territory, geography and demography, I think we will scrupulously respect any commitment we take. I ask all those who have influence on the Arab-Israeli question not to be selectively sensitive, there is violence on both sides and there is also asymmetrical violence and disproportionate violence and to be believable and credible one should show indignation at violence whoever the perpetrator and sympathy whoever the victim. I want you, sir, to believe me. I think any casualty falling from now onwards in the Israeli-Palestinian arena is one casualty too many. I believe what is happening today in the area shows us that we either have one people too many—this time, we the Palestinians—or that there is a state which is missing, the state of Palestine. I told you earlier, sir, we believe in resurrection; we did it once and we can do it again. Sir, thank you for the possibility of addressing you.

**Chairman:** Well, Mr Safieh, whether you have been at the chess board or in the boxing ring you have performed with great energy and comprehensive detail and we are very grateful for your time spent here. Next week this Committee will be holding a hearing with representatives of the State of Israel so we will be looking at different things, maybe we will hear some common views. In the meantime we want to thank you very much for appearing before the Committee this afternoon.

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

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Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project  
WORKING PAPER SERIES

No. 16

Jerusalem  
Resolving the Unresolvable

Moshe Amirav  
Jerusalem City Council

Hanna Siniora  
*Al-Fajr*

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.



THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT is a cooperative venture between the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Arab Studies Society, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The research project seeks to analyze, from the perspectives of Israeli and Palestinian scholars, some of the key elements of an eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its purpose is to promote better understanding of each side's interests in order to define areas of convergence and search for alternative solutions that could form the practical basis for peaceful coexistence.

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**JERUSALEM**  
**RESOLVING THE UNRESOLVABLE**

*BY*

*MOSHE AMIRAV · HANNA SINIORA*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### A) JERUSALEM TODAY

- I. Introduction
- II. Israeli Policy in Jerusalem
- III. Is This A United City?

### B) THE FUTURE JERUSALEM

- IV. Concept - Parity As A Precondition for Unity
- V. The Model
  - ...Joint Israeli-Palestinian Metropolitan Assembly
  - ...Twenty Municipalities in the Metropolitan Area
  - ...Open City
  - ...The Holy City
  - ...The Flag of Jerusalem
  - ...Jerusalem Day
  - ...Jerusalem Fund
- VI. Gains For Both Parties

### C) THE PROCESS

- VII. Step By Step
  - ...Steps Taken By Palestinians
  - ...Steps Taken By Israelis
  - ...Steps Taken Jointly
  - ...Steps Taken by the International Community

### D) THE CONCLUSION

## JERUSALEM: RESOLVING THE UNRESOLVABLE

### INTRODUCTION

In most divided cities conflict over sovereignty and territory takes place between two resident parties with a barely intrigued world looking on. The fight over Jerusalem, however, takes place on a larger stage. Half of the world's population look to the city as a spiritual center and feel their involvement personally in the conflict over Jerusalem.

We, the authors of this chapter, are indeed personally affected by the outcome. As lifelong residents of the holy city, from opposing sides of the struggle, we have seen life in the city go from real division to forced unity back to practical division again. We have remained throughout these changes active in the life of our Jerusalem and, even more importantly, active in the movement for peace between our two peoples. We are currently partners in the dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians and we consider ourselves, unlike many others, pragmatists rather than ideologues. It is impossible for us not to be emotional about the subject of Jerusalem for we share a feeling that this is more than a city. It symbolizes for us not only our place of birth, but the national capital of our respective nations and even the very center of our religious faiths.

For nearly two thousand years, Jews have prayed "Next year in

Jerusalem," not "Next year in Israel." Jerusalem is then the emotional as well as spiritual center for world Jewry, and for Israelis has always been their national capital. Muslims revere Jerusalem almost as much as Mecca and Medina. An Islamic proverb says that when God goes to sleep at night and awakens in the morning, His first and last thought is of Jerusalem. For Christians Jerusalem is crucial. Earthly Jerusalem is the crucible of the Christian faith - the site of the Crucifixion and, more importantly, the Resurrection. Our reward as believers is life eternal in the final Jerusalem - the New Jerusalem, a symbol of eternal perfection in spiritual and political terms.

Yet, this holy city desired above all others is perhaps the farthest from perfection of all. It is a city where only the dead slumbering in its 22 cemeteries find rest. It is a city where the pace of the living has always been dictated by the spirit of the dead and where the past has always been more important than the future. Jerusalem, for whose peace millions have been taught to pray, is instead a city where more wars have been fought than on any other site on earth. Jerusalem - conquered by Canaanites, Israelites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, Saracins, Mamluks, Ottomans, Jordanians and now Israelis - is much more difficult to rule than it is to take in times of conquest.

Difficult is indeed an apt description of life in Jerusalem. The city and life in it is complex. All the more so, any solution to the problem of Jerusalem is also complex. Because of this

complexity, well-meaning peacemakers have often suggested that the issue of Jerusalem be disconnected from a solution to the conflict as a whole and dealt with only after enough goodwill has been generated among the various parties through a peace process that they can risk the tackling of the city conflict. We, as authors of this model, begin from an entirely different premise. It is true that Jerusalem is perhaps the most complex issue in the broader conflict, but we believe that is precisely the reason why the question of Jerusalem must be tackled first.

If peacemakers envision the peace process as a pyramid they see Jerusalem as the pinnacle and approach peacemaking by working away at the base. Although we can accept their vision of the peace process as a pyramid we disagree, however, on the belief that work begins at the base. Our premise is that we invert the pyramid and start with the most difficult question on our plate - namely, the question of Jerusalem. Each and every one of those involved in the conflict knows instinctively that the issue is not going to go away and will only fester and worsen the longer it is left unattended. Indeed, the argument that a process must begin and progress in order for enough goodwill to be generated that we can afford to approach Jerusalem is, we feel, unrealistic for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the only logical place to generate goodwill between the opponents is in Jerusalem where the two live side by side and have a unique opportunity, legally and practically speaking, to work together in mutually beneficial projects. In the

second place, the issue of Jerusalem haunts the peace process as a whole with Israelis seeing Jerusalem as non-negotiable and Palestinians certain that any peace process without it is useless. This very point is being proven even now as the United States and the former Soviet Union seek to broker a peace in which Palestinians are entirely uncomfortable without residents of East Jerusalem and Israelis refuse to sit at a table with anyone except those not living in the city. The issue of Jerusalem has thus proven to have the power to kill the entire process from the beginning. Why then, we ask, should it be left to the end?

In the third place, the policy of the current Israeli government regarding Jerusalem is such that the longer the issue of the city is not dealt with the more difficult it will be to solve and the more difficult the peace process as a whole is to maintain.

#### ISRAELI POLICY IN JERUSALEM

Israeli government policy from the June War of 1967 onwards can be characterized as three-fold: 1) to enlarge the Jewish majority in the city; 2) to strengthen the economic infrastructure of the city; and 3) to maintain calm in the city by pacifying the Palestinian residents. The government uses the tools of demography and geography to achieve its aims, but fails on all accounts.

The creation of a ring of Jewish neighborhoods around the city in order to enlarge the Jewish majority actually had the opposite result. The city became a metropolis stretching from Ramallah in

the north to Bethlehem in the south, and in this metropolitan area the Jewish majority shrunk to 55 percent. The majority of Jews living inside the inner city went down from 73 percent in 1967 to 70 percent today. The government may be building more apartments slated for Jews but the Jews are moving out of the city for cheaper apartments at the fringe of the municipal borders or even out into the Occupied Territories themselves.

The government has created incentives for city residents to leave in favor of the settlements in the West Bank. This is a phenomenon unknown in history - a government encouraging those who live in the country's capital to leave and emigrate beyond the borders of the sovereign state, to an area which the government itself, in a declaration to the district courts, has defined as "temporary settlements." The result: nearly 70 percent of settlers in the area around Jerusalem are former Jerusalem residents who abandoned the city at the government's initiative.

The government goal of strengthening the economic infrastructure of the city has also not been achieved. The level of government participation in the budgets of Jerusalem is currently lower than at any period during the past 20 years. Government budgetary participation in the past had risen to 30-40 percent, but has now decreased to less than 10 percent. Despite recommendations, even that amount is steadily decreasing.

This has the effect of causing both populations - Jew and Arab - to leave the city in search of greener pastures. In terms of services to the population, residents find decreasing budgets



wherever they turn. The policy of equality in services for both populations has been eroded and replaced by a policy of "only necessary services." The fiscal meaning of this is that, for every NIS 10 invested in services for the Jewish sector, there is NIS 1 spent for the Arabs.

In terms of strengthening of the private sector, the government has done next to nothing. There are increased factory closures and we are witnessing a general economic recession that affects both sides of the city. In terms of income per capita, Jerusalem today is one of the poorest cities in Israel. This means that the Israeli policy of improving the standard of living in Jerusalem has failed, both for Israelis and Palestinians, but especially for Palestinians.

The third government goal of keeping calm in the city was a fair success until 1988. Since then what we see is actually a turbulent city in which according to a recent poll conducted by the Jerusalem Municipality the majority of the Israeli residents of Jerusalem feel unsafe. In the city vernacular, there is even a reference to a "border of fear" which Israelis no longer cross.

### IS THIS A UNITED CITY?

The question of whether or not Jerusalem is a united city can be answered by looking at three characteristics of today's Jerusalem. First, we have confrontation. We don't need Teddy

Kollek's confession two years ago that the city is no longer the haven for coexistence he believed it to be in order to see that confrontation is the best description of relations between the two communities. Both are full of hatred and suspicion of the other.

A second characteristic of Jerusalem is segregation. From the War of 1967 until the latter part of the last decade, Jerusalem was a segregated city. Studies done by the Jerusalem Institute prove that even before the Intifada Jerusalem by all criteria was in the 1970s and 1980s one of the most segregated cities in the world. Arabs and Jews had their own neighborhoods, theaters, commercial centers, transportation centers and even separate blood banks - one with Palestinian blood and one with Israeli blood.

The Israeli government ironically over the years added to trends of separation by granting religious, cultural, and economic autonomy to the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. The government even encouraged their contacts with the West Bank and Jordan. In a series of decisions from 1967 on, the government actually referred to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem as "a part of the West Bank." The outcome was then an intensified process of Palestinization and segregation, rather than the declared process of integration and "Israelization".

The third characteristic is discrimination. The declared government policy was one of equal services and equal rights for the Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem. The actual policy was clearly the opposite. In the infamous Burqan case, the Israeli

High Court ruled that an Arab does not have the right to live in the Jewish quarter. Some years later, in fact in recent months, the same court decided that Jews do have the right to live in totally Arab neighborhoods like Silwan. This clearly belies the notion that there are equal rights.

Discrimination is also expressed in the distribution of resources and in the granting of permission to build houses. Palestinians make up 30 percent of the population, yet only 5 percent of the city's development budget is allocated to the Arab part of Jerusalem. Urban renovation projects are initiated for Jews only. Of the 5 million square meters of housing built in the city in the last 10 years, only 470,000 square meters have been for Arabs. In fact, the government has refused to answer the needs of the Palestinian residents, as defined by the municipality. The municipality asked in 1981 for the licensing of some 20,000 apartment units in the north of the city for Palestinians. After 10 years of negotiations in which the municipality agreed to lower the request to a mere 7,500, there is still no government approval.

The result is that only one of three Palestinians who needs a home will be able to find one in the city. This policy of quotas for Palestinians building in north (Arabic) Jerusalem is being implemented at a time when their housing needs in the city are much greater than the needs of Israelis. The average housing congestion for Palestinians is six occupants per room; in the Israeli sector it is half that. With such discrimination, one cannot expect that the Palestinians will feel part of a united city. In fact, a city

full of confrontation, segregation and discrimination is far from being united.

The forcing out into the open of the real and actual division in Jerusalem is important because we, as authors of this model, are proposing a Jerusalem which can be truly united where it should be and divided where it wants to be. Our model proposes a status of Jerusalem neither formal nor imposed by force. It is a model which we believe will conclusively settle the status of the holy city.

#### CONCEPT - PARITY AS A PRECONDITION FOR UNITY

The very conceptual basis of our model differs from the three other proposals normally considered. These three are: 1) an internationalization of the city as proposed in the United Nations resolution calling for a corpus separatum as suggested in November 1947, by which everyone has a share in the city; 2) rule over Jerusalem by one sovereign party, which has been the situation in the city historically for the last 5,000 years; and 3) a simple re-division of Jerusalem as seen in many theoretical proposals.

Our concept is three-fold. We seek, on the one hand, parity in all areas of civil, political and religious life in the city between Jews and Arabs. Second, we base our concept not on geographic and demographic division, but on a system of functional division of power within a united city. Third, we see each side sharing rule over an enlarged pie.

Central to our concept is the principle of parity between the two sides - between their national, religious, cultural and emotional claims and needs in Jerusalem. In the political history of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is indeed a revolutionary idea. The vast majority of Palestinians and Israelis still view the other more as a group of foreigners or guests than as a group of natives whose claim to Jerusalem is equivalent in value to their own. A Palestinian says "this is my city." An Israeli says "but this is my city." We introduce the concept that "this is our city." This plan asks both communities to make that emotional leap and accept the other's right to live and share in the rule of Jerusalem on an equal basis.

Functional division of power means, practically speaking, that the various areas of life in the city, whether civil or national, will be divided up into a number of functional divisions; and, that the two peoples will in some cases share power within these functions and in some cases rule separately. Jerusalem will thus operate within a system combining some "unity" and some "division" between Israelis and Palestinians in a physically undivided city allowing for power-sharing.

The model is based on the assumption of two sovereign states - Israel and Palestine - each with their capital in Jerusalem. In most areas, including political rule, the model provides for partial unity and partial division: the same element of sovereignty is often vested in both separate Israeli and Palestinian, as well as joint, institutions. At the same time, the model leaves open

the option of greater integration in the future.

This question of sovereignty, central to the conflict, is rendered manageable by breaking it down into its various components and the tackling of each one. The model takes each one of the following areas of sovereignty - security, foreign relations, currency, flags, religious worship, courts, schools, etc. - which are actually functions of sovereignty, and creates institutions in which both peoples can exercise functional authority - in some cases sharing it and in other cases dividing it.

Thirdly, this plan relies on an expansion of existing and creation of new resources in Jerusalem open to both communities which will enable both sides to gain. Previous plans have focused on what one or the other had to "give up" in Jerusalem. This plan when it takes anything from one or the other side, gives them something even more useful in return.

How will such an expansion take place? There will be an enlargement of the boundaries of Jerusalem to take in areas which already function actually as outlying areas of greater metropolitan Jerusalem. In this way the pie is enlarged allowing for a bigger piece to share rather than a smaller piece to monopolize.

The model is based on a general concept of Jerusalem and interests within it as described in terms of "circles". The innermost circle stands for the importance of Jerusalem and the concerns of its residents at the local level; i.e. questions of personal safety, freedom of movement, employment, public services and other aspects of daily life in the city. The second circle

symbolizes the national significance of Jerusalem to both Israelis and Palestinians, and the high value they attach to exercising political control in the city. The third circle represents Jerusalem as a religious and spiritual center for Muslims, Jews and Christians worldwide. Within this circle are concerns about the protection and maintenance of the holy sites, and complete freedom of access to and worship at these sacred places. The fourth and largest circle illustrates the potential of Jerusalem to grow further in important ways. For example, in the context of peace, Jerusalem could become the capital of a regional free trade association as well as security organization, consisting of Middle Eastern countries. In the context of a peace agreement which expands resources in Jerusalem, the city could even become a political, financial and cultural center of primary international importance.

#### THE MODEL

The first thing the model seeks to do is establish a bigger piece for both states to share and over which to rule. This makes it less painful for both sides when asked to compromise in one area or another. The boundaries of Jerusalem are historically in a state of flux anyway, and since the time of King David have moved over whole mountains. Our model makes use of this flexibility to propose an expansion of borders which can mean an equalizing of the situation of both communities in Jerusalem which would allow for

gains to be had by both.

The proposal is for the boundaries of Jerusalem to be quadrupled. Currently standing at 109 square kilometers, they will be enlarged to 461 square kilometers. This will entail an addition to the metropolis of 165 sq. km. from Israel and 187 sq. km. from the West Bank. This goes along with the concept of parity, meaning that the area to be taken from both sides is nearly equivalent. The areas to be added to Jerusalem, already municipalities in their own right, will continue to be municipalities and the metropolis as a whole will be about equally divided between the number of Israeli municipalities and the number of Palestinian municipalities. Greater Jerusalem will thus include Ramallah in the north, Ma'aleh Adumim in the east, several Arab villages such as Abu Dis, Beit Sahour, and Bethlehem in the south, and Jewish neighborhoods of pre-1967 like Mevo Betar and Mevasseret in the west.

There are a number of reasons why such an expansion is necessary. First, it has been clear for several years now, based on research both by the Israeli government and politically independent researchers, that the current municipal borders established in 1967 have from an urban point of view become obsolete. Jerusalem is no longer an inner city, but is in fact a metropolis, and our model simply seeks to make that official. This is not only our idea but is an idea that has developed over time among Israeli experts. The Israeli government took a secret decision in 1983 to plan Jerusalem as a metropolitan area very close to our suggested borders rather than as a closed city. In



1989, research by the Jerusalem Institute looking into alternatives for the future in fact recommended an expansion of the borders and the turning of the city into a metropolis above all other alternatives.

Second, clinging to the old borders would mean hampering the city's development potential in almost every area. The city currently does not even have enough land for much needed cemeteries, much less for needed housing and new industry. An expansion would provide for this. Today, attempts to come to terms with the city's weak economy and relatively poor living conditions are greatly frustrated by the lack of open land. New land would provide for new industries and new organizations to either be created in or relocate to Jerusalem. This would mean new jobs for the city's residents and an economic boost to the populations as a whole of both sovereign states. The expansion would mean room for new housing, enough to satisfy the needs of both communities. This would help to close the wide gap in living conditions which exists in the city today.

Third, the expansion would mean a very big boost politically speaking. The new borders would even out demographics thus ending the race to achieve a majority. The city could include approximately 400,000 Arabs and 400,000 Jews. Such a balance would be maintained by regulations on immigration and growth amounting to an annual increase of either side by no more than 3 percent. Thus, the historical Jewish-Arab struggle to gain political control by establishing and enhancing demographic domination at the expense of

the other side would in effect be ended.

Fourth, the expansion would allow for a just and equitable solution to the Palestinian community's needs for compensation of land and property taken over the years by Israel. This is in reference to land and property in the city lost as a result of war or Israeli developments beyond the Green Line.

The national governments of Israel and Palestine will still handle most matters normally vested in national authorities. Some of the authority they hold today, however, will be given over to two different institutions: 1) the Assembly of Metropolitan Jerusalem and 2) the Municipalities themselves. The areas of authority and decision-making functions allocated to each of these institutions, and the relations between them, are as follows:

The Israeli and Palestinian states will remain in charge of most of the functions. They will handle all matters concerning national security and foreign affairs. They will collect income taxes. They will remain in charge of issuing and regulating their respective national currencies with both currencies acceptable interchangeably in any part of metropolitan Jerusalem.

The two states will keep their respective national jurisdictions. Their national courts will deal with more serious crimes, e.g. those involving threats to state security or to human life. The area of the city in which serious crimes are committed - not the nationality of the person committing the crime - will determine what jurisdiction will apply. For example, an Israeli who robs a bank in a Palestinian part of Jerusalem will be tried by

a Palestinian national court. The two states will also retain their full legislative powers. Israeli residents of Jerusalem will vote for the Knesset and Palestinian residents for the Palestinian parliament, irrespective of where they live in the city.

The citizenship of residents of Jerusalem will be determined by their own wishes rather than by the area of the city in which they happen to live. Thus, a person who considers himself an Israeli and wishes to obtain or keep Israeli citizenship can do so while living in a Palestinian section of the city, subject to the approval of the municipality in question.

The source of authority in Jerusalem will ultimately lie in a Charter of Jerusalem. Its preamble will express the goal of having Israelis and Palestinians work together, for the benefit of both peoples and the international community, to bring Jerusalem from a city of confrontation and poverty to a city of peace and prosperity. The main text will set forth the features of the model here described including the enlargement of the metropolitan area of Jerusalem, the division of authority between various institutions, the guarantees of free access to and worship at Jerusalem's holy sites, Palestinian rights to compensation, the role of a Jerusalem Fund, and regulations regarding immigration into and residence within Metropolitan Jerusalem. The charter is to be adopted by the Israeli and Palestinian parliaments, and only they may pass amendments to it. The Charter of Jerusalem will be part of a general peace treaty.

## JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY

The most important joint Israeli-Palestinian institution will be the Assembly of Metropolitan Jerusalem. It will run the affairs of the entire (enlarged) municipal area. The Assembly will be made up of representatives of each of the two states, to be nominated by their respective governments, and a delegate from each municipality within the metropolis of Jerusalem. The municipal delegates will be selected by each city council and each municipality irrespective of its size will have one delegate on the Assembly. This will mean an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis in the Assembly. The actual members of the Assembly will elect a chairperson, a position that will rotate between Arab and Jew. The chairperson can serve a full four or five-year term, or it can be split into two half-terms - one half a Palestinian, the other half an Israeli.

All decisions of the Assembly will be taken on a majority basis. Only the representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian national governments will have the right to a veto. The Assembly will function as an umbrella for the 20-odd municipalities in Jerusalem. It will have total authority in the area of central planning and development in Jerusalem, including roads and transportation, water, energy, housing, waste disposal, and issues affecting the environment. It will clear decisions made at the local municipal level. It will also provide funds for projects at the local municipal level and will establish new neighborhoods with a view to reaching a balance in number and size between Israeli and

Palestinian neighborhoods. The Assembly will be responsible for the creation of a unified system of transport throughout the entire metropolitan area. It will develop special sites for international institutions and organizations which undertake to relocate in Jerusalem, much like the sites which exist today for governmental agencies and religious institutions.

The Assembly will be in charge of creating and maintaining a police force in Jerusalem that will consist of both Israelis and Palestinians. The Chief of Police and other authoritative positions will be shared between the two communities on an equal basis. Other functions of the Assembly include collecting property tax and a V.A.T. This will serve as the main income of the Assembly and it will be supplemented by revenue from the two national governments and by a special Jerusalem Fund.

The Assembly will be responsible for many social services like the running of city schools and city hospitals. It will maintain a municipal court system for crimes of a less serious nature, e.g. traffic violations and illegal construction work.

#### TWENTY MUNICIPALITIES IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA

The metropolitan area of Jerusalem will consist of approximately 10 Israeli municipalities and 10 Palestinian municipalities. Each is run by an elected city council. The exact boundaries of these will be determined by Israeli and Palestinian city planners and will respect as far as possible current

population patterns in Jerusalem. In other words, areas populated predominantly by Jews (e.g. Gilo, Ramot, West Jerusalem, Ma'aleh Adumim) will become part of Israeli municipalities. The same holds true for Palestinian municipalities (e.g. Abu Dis, Azzariya, Ar-Ram, Dahiyat al-Barid). The inhabitants of each area will elect their own mayor for a five-year term.

The municipalities in metropolitan Jerusalem will run their own local affairs in very much the same way as they do today. However, this will be done in contact and coordination with their respective national governments as well as the Metropolitan Assembly. The municipalities' sources of revenue will be local municipal taxes and contributions from their national government.

#### OPEN CITY

The metropolitan area of Jerusalem will be one physically open area with no checkpoints or physical barriers to prevent the free movement of people and goods.

#### THE HOLY CITY

The Old Walled City of Jerusalem will form its own municipality like the other municipalities. It will be run by a city council and have representatives in the Metropolitan Assembly. Decisions regarding physical planning and development must be approved unanimously by the members of the city. Each faith will

have full administrative power over its holy sites.

#### THE FLAG OF JERUSALEM

Three kinds of flags will wave in Jerusalem: the Palestinian flag, the Israeli flag, and the Jerusalem flag. The Jerusalem flag will incorporate symbols of peace, possibly a golden dove and colors associated with both national flags. Anyone will be able to wave any of the three flags anywhere in the city. No flags will be displayed at the holy sites.

#### JERUSALEM DAY

The current Jerusalem Day, now celebrated by Israelis each year to commemorate the unification of the city, will be replaced by an Israeli-Palestinian Jerusalem Day in which the peace will be celebrated. The holiday will fall on the day that the peace treaty is signed, including the signing of the Charter of Jerusalem.

#### JERUSALEM FUND

A special international fund for Jerusalem will be established. Unlike the existing Jerusalem Fund established by Teddy Kollek in 1967 and since then active primarily in the Jewish sector, this fund's resources will be devoted to supporting the objectives and policies of peace and coexistence in the city. The

fund will support projects like efforts to improve and equate the standards of living in the two communities; projects which enhance Jerusalem's position as an international center of culture, education and tourism; and projects which are aimed at raising the economic level of the city.

#### GAINS FOR BOTH PARTIES

A solution to the problem of Jerusalem would obviously benefit the world at large, not only the parties to the conflict. In place of a city united in name only and fused by the force of arms would be a city united by peace and cooperation. This would lead to an unparalleled improvement in the quality of life and in economic, social and cultural opportunities. The international legitimacy so long withheld from the city would be a reality, and the path would be permanently paved for an overall Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

Israel, specifically, would finally win international recognition for Jerusalem as her capital. Today, try as she may, she cannot force such recognition.

Although it seems as if Israelis would lose 50 percent of their rule, they would actually gain rule over more land because of the expanded borders as well as many other advantages over the current situation. One of the most important advantages is security in the city. The city right now is insecure in many parts for Israelis to walk around. In a peaceful situation the city will be safe for Israelis, Palestinians and visitors. The most



important gain for Israel through a settlement in Jerusalem is peace between her and the Palestinians and between her and the Arab countries. For it is clear that without a solution in Jerusalem Israel will not be able to achieve peace in the region.

The Palestinians will finally win international recognition of Jerusalem as their capital. Specifically, this model gives them equality over more than they dare to dream and gives them compensation for many things they have lost. It will mean an end to the state of perpetual fear in which they live - the fear of a loss of the Arab character of Jerusalem, a loss of the holy places, and a loss of personal property or personal security.

#### STEP BY STEP

The model has no intrinsic value in and of itself. Its value is in its implementation and it cannot be realized unless steps are taken by all the parties to build an atmosphere for peace. These steps must first be taken by the Palestinians and Israelis who live in Jerusalem and then the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships and government. In addition certain steps must be taken by the international community, particularly the United Nations.

This process of step-taking must be seen as pre-conditional to the model itself. These steps are built on three things: 1) to keep options open and to take no actions that will be perceived as creating an irreversible situation; 2) to build an infrastructure for the model; and 3) to build a sense of trust between the two

communities. These steps must not only be seen as pre-conditions to the implementation of the model, but must also be seen as necessary for an improvement of the general situation. They must also be understood to be part and parcel of the overall struggle for a just peace through national sovereignty. They must not be seen as substitutes to that process. They are meant to build a middle ground which will be useful in the future when the model is realized, and to stand as bulwarks against the destructive process of creating facts on the ground intended to keep the model from being implemented.

Perhaps the most important point for all parties to realize about this step-taking process is that each and every step must be taken only if it is judged to be within that party's particular set of interests. There must be clear gains from the step, not only for the party taking the step but also for the other side. Otherwise no step will be taken.

In the early years of the Zionist movement a classic debate occurred between the Revisionists led by Jabotinsky and the Labor Movement led by Ben Gurion. Jabotinsky argued that he would undertake no step, lay no brick for building a wall unless he was assured of the final outcome, unless he was assured of eventual statehood and sovereignty, unless he was assured of the result of the wall. Ben Gurion argued that the wall would eventually be built anyway and that one could never be assured of the final result and had to begin the process knowing he was taking a calculated risk. Ben Gurion won and the early Zionists took a

number of steps for which they had no guarantee, but the final result was indeed statehood.

The Palestinians face a similar situation today. Many declare that they will take no steps unless they are assured of the outcome. They will not go into the dark unless they can see the light at the end of the tunnel. For those who feel this way, step-taking will be difficult and the model will not be realized. But for those who are willing to take a calculated risk that the end result of such steps will indeed lead to justice and peace in Jerusalem in the form of this or an amended model, the following suggested steps are just the beginning of what it is possible to do.

It will be clear to those studying the list of suggested steps that the Palestinians have more to do than the Israelis, and even more to do than both communities have to do jointly. The reason for this is simple - the Palestinians clearly have the most to gain, their interest is greater. We believe in the principle that someone must first help themselves before they ask for help from others. This, too, we believe, is in the true spirit of the Intifada - a spirit of taking the struggle into one's own hands and fighting in one's own strength. This may mean that the Palestinians take steps at first that are not matched by steps from the Israelis. The process should begin nonetheless. Steps can and should be taken unilaterally. In time, however, even after a series of unilateral steps, the atmosphere will be so changed that real progress on the model may begin.

This step-by-step process also needs to include a process which does not touch at first directly on the issue of sovereignty so as to appear non-threatening to Israelis. In addition it must promise Palestinians political gains. It must address the factors that fuel inter-communal hatred such as further settlement building and violence in the city related to the Intifada. Finally, it must consist of a number of steps which can be taken immediately and do not need the agreement or cooperation of either sides' official leadership or government.

#### STEPS TAKEN BY PALESTINIANS

The Palestinians can move on two levels - one is on the level of steps that would give them greater ability to run their own lives, and two is on the level of steps that would help them gain political power through the Israeli system. Both are to be clearly understood as steps taken only in the interim, only until the model is realized.

Efforts that will lead to greater control over their own lives are many, but they fall into three separate areas: education, economy, and health and social services. Palestinians already have some autonomy in the city with regards to their education sector. They could do more, however, to take over greater responsibility from the Jerusalem municipality for running the public schools in East Jerusalem, including determination of the schools' curricula.

There are currently very few, if any, activities in the

economic sector designed to give the Palestinians more autonomy. One step would be the creation of a development company similar to the one in West Jerusalem. This development company would collect funds from all kinds of international sources and used to fund development projects in East Jerusalem. Today the private sector is too weak to take on such a monumental task, but a special development company could do it. In this way the public and private sectors could come together and build whatever was deemed suitable from city parks to a swimming pool to apartment complexes.

In terms of health care and social services, the Palestinians take over from the municipality in running their own hospitals and health clinics. They could also take control of the several social services sections, like the counseling services for residents abusing illegal drugs that are currently run by the Jerusalem municipality.

The second goal of step-taking is to gain political power. There are three ways in which this can be done. The first is the creation of neighborhood committees like the minhalot system. This could be done immediately and would not need the approval of anyone including the Jerusalem municipality. It is guaranteed to lead to an improvement in the current situation.

The second is Palestinian participation in the 1994 municipal elections. The argument is that it would give them greater control over their own affairs and ultimately serve their national aspirations in the city. They would form the largest party in the

municipality and thus wield power. They could have an important voice in areas of housing and services like never before and it could serve to paint a picture for Israelis of their Palestinian neighbors as responsible citizens, not as troublemakers in a city in which they do not belong.

The ultra-orthodox Jewish residents of Jerusalem, who are a distinct minority in the city, have nevertheless gained considerable power by running in the municipal elections and wield disproportionate power when it comes to budget allocations.

The problem with this suggestion is that it has been proposed before. Most Palestinians opposed it because they felt it implied de facto recognition of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. Many Israelis from the right-wing opposed it because they feared where it could lead.

The third suggestion as an alternative to or following the aforementioned steps is that the Palestinians create their own shadow municipality. This suggestion stands a good chance of being accepted by the Palestinian community. It would be selected to represent a cross-section of the population, in a way determined by the Palestinians themselves. Each Arab neighborhood would have representatives roughly in proportion to the number of its inhabitants.

Another suggestion is to create committees corresponding to those needed in a municipality. They would consist of committees for planning, zoning, education, health issues, etc. There is a good chance that the Jerusalem municipality would be willing to

'recognize' these committees and cooperate with them.

Recently, two small steps have been taken that serve as good examples of such exercise of power. One has to do with the new library in East Jerusalem built by the Jerusalem municipality to be run and staffed by the Palestinians themselves. Two is the taking over of the running of the Central Bus Station in East Jerusalem by Palestinians from the Jerusalem municipality.

In the past we have had numerous examples of what happens when Palestinians do not take advantage of their rights to involvement in Jerusalem decision-making. One of the examples involved a Shu'fat-Beit Hanina development plan suggested and approved by the Municipal Council. The proposal was to turn this poverty-stricken area into a prosperous location for new businesses and much-needed Palestinian housing. It would have entailed cooperation and coordination between Palestinian activists and the Jerusalem municipality which agreed to the proposal and even provided, along with some international sources, necessary funding. East Jerusalem political activists rejected the idea, however, because they said such coordination would be tantamount to collaboration and because of the undertones of 'resettling' of the refugee population in the Shu'fat refugee camp, an issue that can only be resolved within the greater confines of an overall political settlement. Thus the project did not start. Not long afterwards, hawkish Israeli minister Ariel Sharon acquired part of this land and started work on a Jewish settlement. The Palestinians not only lost the much-needed project but they lost part of the land as well.

### STEPS TAKEN BY ISRAELIS

The Israelis can also take steps on two levels - on the official municipal level and on the unofficial level of the peace camp. On the municipal level, Israeli councilmen can work with the Palestinian community as partners and help with budgets and the like. Committees can be created which focus solely on upgrading services to the Palestinians and bringing them up to the level of the Israelis; on exchanging information about things going on in the city with the Palestinians; and on helping create the Palestinian infrastructure. For years the Palestinians have not made use of the possibilities available through their municipal contacts because of the political boycott. Now they can make use of the expertise of individuals already on the city council or of Israeli individuals who work through the city council.

The Israeli peace activists in Jerusalem can take a number of steps, many of which have probably already been considered. One of the suggestions is to prevent the creation of facts on the ground aimed at forestalling a peace by organizing an Israeli committee of experts on land and the judiciary. This committee would give the Palestinians professional advice in the event that the government or settler groups tried to take their land, or there were attempts to hold up the approval of a master plan or the zoning of an area. In addition, the peace camp could organize a number of committees teaming Palestinians and Israelis on the basis of their shared professions such as committees of doctors, of lawyers, of



journalists, etc. Members of the profession would look out for the other.

#### STEPS TAKEN JOINTLY

The premise behind joint action is that not only is it useful in and of itself but that it is also a powerful symbol and produces political power. We are not proposing steps of the kind that merely encourage friendly relations between the two communities, i.e. one Israeli family entertaining a Palestinian family and vice versa. We are interested in a political solution and that requires political demonstrations, or meetings, statements, and acts made by both that work to build a political reality in which both sides understand this is a city in which things have to be done together.

Up until now, nothing in this city is done together. There is total separation in the activities of the city. This leaves the door wide open for possible joint maneuvers, e.g. an article written jointly in an Israeli or Palestinian newspaper. One suggestion is the creation of a joint research institute in which everything is done on the basis of total parity. This would be different than the situation which currently exists in which Palestinian academics must work through Israeli institutions like Hebrew University.

The ideology behind such joint actions is not that we are trying to make friends but that we are creating new political power

and a common interest which necessitates shared goals. If we can build a company or a research institute together we prove something to both communities - that it is not only possible but worthwhile. Then, when the model is proposed the possibilities will not seem so remote nor the idea so far-fetched.

Joint action should be undertaken on three levels - political, economical and educational. Suggestions for political activity are legion and many have already been tried such as joint demonstrations, rallies, meetings, newsletters, etc. To this we could include the notion of a symbolic, yet political gesture in which we capitalize on the idea of Jerusalem as the city of peace. For years the golden lion has been used as the symbol of Jerusalem found even today on municipality stationery. What we suggest is the designing of a small golden dove to be worn as a pin by Palestinians and Israelis resident in Jerusalem who are working towards our common goal.

The Old City of Jerusalem could be proclaimed by representatives of the two sides a neutral 'peace zone' in which all acts of violence and provocation are suspended for an agreed upon time period. This would include stabbings, stone throwings, moves by members of one ethnic group into the quarters of another, attempts by Jews to pray at Muslim sites or take over the buildings of Christian churches, and the early closings and strikes by businesses in the Old City which are politically motivated.

Activities in the realm of the economy are crucial. Again the point behind them is that the venture be 50-50 from the beginning.

Any company created should have an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis on the board and either operate with international and thus neutral capital or operate with an equal amount from both communities. Once both sides see that they can both trust the other side as a business partner and profit in the wake they will be that much closer to accepting the model. One possible venture would be the creation of a cable television company similar to those in the USA and operated jointly. The operation would have to be on a very business-like basis and the programming would be geared to both communities on an equal basis.

Education is one of the most important aspects of joint activity and also has the most effective results in the long run. In addition to the many possibilities for small projects in which each side would teach the other its language, there is the proposal to open a joint school. This school would need to have administration and teachers also on the basis of complete parity. The school, an open school similar to experimental educational systems like those in the USA which follow the Montessori technique, would have all the regular accepted curricula but would add to that classes on the subject of Jerusalem itself and on the subject of peace.

#### STEPS TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Even before the time comes for implementation of the model, there is a need for international community help. What is needed

now is active solicitation of funds from the US, the EEC, Japan, the UN, etc. which will go towards projects aimed at improving the standard of living in both communities. Funds would have to be tied to joint development projects.

The benefit of such action is two-fold: 1) for the improvement of the situation of the Palestinians and 2) for the psychological impact on the Israelis. Once the Israelis see that it is indeed profitable for actions to be taken jointly their opposition will significantly weaken. After this a new Jerusalem Fund made up of business people, and politicians, on an equal basis from both communities will be created. This Fund will apply to the international community for monies to fund special, peacemaking projects.

#### CONCLUSION

The contribution of this concept to the issue of Jerusalem is that it dares to tackle the question of whose Jerusalem is it. It answers this question by presenting a new formula that is unprecedented, having been tested in no other city on earth. The solution is unique as is the problem unique. The approach that guides us in this model is based on the very essence of what Jerusalem means not only for us Israelis and Palestinians but for Jews, Muslims and Christians worldwide, even to all of humanity.

In the Bible, two universal elements are consistently associated with Jerusalem - justice and peace. The first king of

Jerusalem is Melchizedek, king of justice, and the city name in Hebrew includes the word "shalom" or "peace". In the book of Psalms, Jerusalem is connected to justice and peace. The prophet Isaiah speaks of the future ruler of the city who will govern in a spirit of justice and peace.

One of the most revered passages of the New Testament is what has become known as The Beatitudes. In this section, Christ addresses the issue of peace when He says: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." In the same passage there is a suggestion that it is those who treat their fellow humans justly and do not seek to devour and conquer that will be rewarded. The most common translation is: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."

The connection between justice and peace is unmistakable in Islam. Stories are told of the wise caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab who ruled over Jerusalem with a just and fair hand. He refused to pray in the area of the Holy Sepulchre for fear that overzealous followers would then tear down the Christian site and build a mosque in its place. When he entered the holy city, he found the Wailing Wall, a holy Jewish site, obscured by a wall of garbage that had collected over the centuries. He, himself, began to clean it and later his army of 30,000 soldiers worked for days until the area around the Wall was clean.

These two things - justice and peace - are connected and must be the cornerstones of any future solution. Without justice there is no peace. With this model we believe we can bring Jerusalem

back to its human dimension and turn it into a city where the future is more important than the past and the living more important than the dead.

One can even see a solution to the problem of Jerusalem in the larger context of a solution for the Israeli-Arab conflict as a whole. If a solution to the conflict is based on the ability of Jews and Arabs to live together, then Jerusalem is the prototypical place which can serve as a model for this type of coexistence. If a solution to the conflict is based on acknowledgement of the other's legitimacy, then Jerusalem is the best place to test it. Once we solve the problem of Jerusalem we are ready psychologically to solve the problem between Jews and Arabs in this part of the world.

We can see this solution to Jerusalem in an even larger context. It can stand as an example of successful conflict resolution for human beings wherever there is turmoil and strife. Solving the problem in Jerusalem can give hope to people in Cyprus, South Africa, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia. The unresolvable can be resolved.

For the two of us, working on this model - formulating it and agreeing on it - was a personal, intellectual voyage beyond the borders of conventional thinking. In this voyage we may have passed also the borders of national consensus in our own communities. For us the importance of this voyage is not so much in the real political gains that can be achieved here and now with the model, nor in the intellectual quality of its provisions or

structure, but rather in the demonstration of two rivals - a Palestinian and an Israeli, an Arab and a Jew - succeeding in finding a resolution. For the two of us and for our children and descendants, who will remain forever in this city, Jerusalem, it gives some kind of comfort and hope.

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
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No. 17

The Israeli Immigration and  
Colonial Settlements: A Zero-Sum Situation?

Muhammad Ishteyyeh

Bir Zeit University

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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
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## **The Israeli Immigration and Colonial Settlements: A Zero-Sum Situation?**

Dr. Muhammad Ishteyyeh

In 1967 Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip which had been part of Mandatory Palestine. From this point, the Israelis embarked on what is surely best described as a colonizing programme whose main instruments were the confiscation and expropriation of Palestinian land, the building of Jewish colonial settlements and the movement and immigration of Jewish settlers to these areas. This paper deals with the ideological and political significance of Israel's immigration and colonial policies and with the consequent outcome of these policies on the Palestinian territoriality and collective identity. The struggle for land which involves expansion and immigration from the Israeli settler's side, means expulsion and/or subjugation and segregation for the Palestinian side. The systematic acquisition of land by the Israelis enables them to secure a geographical base for their political goals. These acquisitions and confiscations are promulgated through state laws in a way that presents itself as a "legal" process. Accompanying land confiscation is the immigration of new settlers who strengthen the settler society and make use of the land. Thereafter, whilst newly confiscated land needs more settlers, more settlers need more land. In both cases the Palestinians pay the price — because the land is their land.

The ideological debate in Israel was not focused on whether to colonize the Palestinian territories or not, but to what extent Jewish colonization and expansion should reach. One side of the debate has been characterized by the "collective symbols" and the stress it lays on the call for the establishment of a "Greater Israel" based on religious sentiments of the

biblical Hebrew kingdom. On the other side of the debate stood those who called for the consolidation of the Jewish State on land it already fully controlled, and warned of the demographic danger of the annexation of the Occupied Territories.

Yigal Allon (minister without portfolio 1967), who stood at the center of this debate, wanted to "preserve the Jewish character of the State and to extend absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population" (a reference to the Jordan Valley). Allon saw colonization as the only way of anchoring the security zone, saying:

A security border that is not a state border is not a security border . . . a state border that is not settled along its length by Jews is not a state border.<sup>1</sup>

Allon's plan was the guideline for the Labour government settlement programme. The plan was considered by some Israelis who opposed settlement as having elements of moderation by calling for "*territorial compromise*", which was supposed to attract the Arabs and bring them to the negotiating table. But what was intended at the heart of the plan was that Israel should maximise territories and minimize the Palestinian population under its control, leading to the "Unity of the Land" from a geo-strategic point of view, and the Jewish State from a demographic point of view.<sup>2</sup>

This demographic-security approach of Allon involved the Jordan Valley, the least populated area of the West Bank and bordering Jordan from the West. Therefore, it appears from the above discussion that Labor's settlement policy had two different, but not contradictory aspects; a political dimension and a security one. On the one hand, settlements were established to achieve a political goal to expand the borders of the State of Israel and to use it for any future territorial compromise or to "*trade land for peace*". On the other hand, settlements were meant to have a security

dimension with two aspects. A military-security rationale considered any Jewish presence as being part of the security arrangements if external pressure did not allow the presence of military forces. Secondly, the demographic-security rationale was meant to break the continuity of the Palestinian communities on both sides of the (borders) "Green Line". The settlements that were established under Labour followed the same line of Labour Zionism and were agricultural settlements of kibbutz and moshav types.

The land confiscation policies were designed to overcome administrative, political and legal constraints. During the Labour period the method most frequently used to acquire land was its requisition for military purposes. Other methods were also employed, such as the Absentee Property Law of 1950, the 'closing off' of land, and the expropriation for 'public purposes'.

The establishment of colonial settlements, and the process of land confiscation which accompanied it, were and are powerful manifestations of Israeli expansionism, but they were not isolated initiatives. A battery of other policies operated both to support the life of settlement, and in their own right, to create new ties with Israel. The range of measures taken against the Palestinian economy and water were to support the new imposed relationship on the Palestinian land and people. These measures included the control over water resources and imposed restrictions on water consumption; the restrictions on land use and on marketing of agricultural products. All were meant and designed to push the Palestinians away from their land and as a result to facilitate its colonization.

Under the Likud Party, which came to power for the first time in 1977, things appeared to be different and there was a change in the priorities of the colonial programme. The shift in settlement policy and implementation is related to the ideology and politics of the Likud. Herut

(freedom), the largest party in the coalition of Likud, developed from the Zionist Revisionist Movement. The revisionist movement was founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky, who considered the River Jordan to flow through the center of Palestine and not along its eastern frontiers. Herut, along with the Liberals, came to represent the interest of private capital. This has direct influence on settlement planning. Both Labour and Herut adhere to the ideology of Zionism, but the latter emphasizes nationalism as an end in itself, as well as the historical rights of the Jews in Palestine.

Days after the Likud election victory of 1977, the issue of settlement was brought to the forefront when Prime Minister Begin visited Kaddumim settlement (previously known as Elon Moreh and authorized under Labour) and said to the settlers:

"there will be more Elon Morehs . . . we are standing on liberated Israeli land . . . since May of this year [1977] the name of these areas has been changed from Occupied to Liberated Territories. We call on young volunteers in the country and the diaspora to come and settle here.<sup>3</sup>

The ideological response to Begin's call to settle in the West Bank seemed not to have been enough to accelerate the pace of settlement. Therefore, through sufficient economic inducements, the Likud motivated large numbers of Israelis to establish roots in the West Bank settlements that were within commuting distance of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In addition to the cheap price of apartments in the settlements, settlers were offered financial support as well as loans without interest. The aim of the Likud is to create internal-demographic facts rather than geo-strategic facts. According to Meron Benvenisti, its members believe that the domestic political struggle, not the external military or political struggle, will determine the future of the Occupied Territories.<sup>4</sup>



This demographically oriented approach is another practical departure from the Allon Plan and Labour Party's policy, especially evident in establishment of colonial settlements in the densely populated areas of the West Bank as a major step towards incorporating these areas into Israel. The ultimate goal of this policy is to make politically impractical or impossible any future Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.

Under Likud rule there has been an acceleration of settlement trends, and the annual average increase of settlers rose from 300 under Labour to 4,400 under Likud.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the Likud introduced private capital into the settlement scheme when the Government in 1979 allowed the private purchase of land in the West Bank. Later the Government contracted private companies to implement the construction of settlements, in order to accelerate the process.

Furthermore, there has been a tendency towards urban settlements, as opposed to the rural colonial settlements of the Labour. The new settlement drive has emphasized 'dormitory' like settlements, where the settlers commute daily to their work. Most of these urban settlements were built on the western slopes of the West Bank bordering the "Green Line" and the metropolitan areas to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In 1985 72% of the settlers in the West Bank lived in urban settlements. Another form of the tendency towards urban settlements was the pattern of settling in and around the main Palestinian cities and towns as happened in Hebron, Nablus and Jerusalem.

The Likud colonial settlements policy was guided by different plans. The plan called for the establishment of 46 colonial settlements to accommodate 16,000 families. The intention was to change the demographic structure of the West Bank by transferring Jewish settlers from the Tel Aviv and Haifa regions to the newly established settlements.

"It must be borne in mind", wrote Drobles, "that it may be too late tomorrow to do what is not done today!" He added ". . . we should encourage and direct . . . the dispersion of the population from the densely populated urban strip of the coastal plain eastward to the areas of Judea and Samaria".<sup>6</sup>

Drobles, who chaired the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization, referred to the Palestinians as "minority Arabs" at a time when they constituted more than 99% of the population of the West Bank. In his plan, Drobles straightforwardly suggested that Palestinians should be fragmented, ghettoized, and cut off from each other in such a way that would make even the self-administration principle proposed in the Camp David Accords impractical to impose.

The shift in the Likud's colonial policies affected Labour's techniques of land confiscation. From 1967 to 1979, the most frequently used method of acquiring land was requisition for military purposes. When this method was challenged in the High Court, the Israeli Government adopted a method by which a chosen tract of land could be declared "State Land" by replacing the existing judicial system under which

"the burden of proof of land ownership fell not upon the Government exercising its claim, but upon the Palestinian owner trying to defend against it."<sup>7</sup>

After the Elon Moreh case near Rajeib,<sup>8</sup> Sharon was appointed head of a committee with a brief to investigate suitable land for settlements in the West Bank. The committee surveyed land records and found that the majority of land in the West Bank was not registered since it was of *miri* and *matrukah* type. The Government accepted the committee's recommendations and declared that all unregistered *miri* and *matrukah* land was state land. The outcome of this was that two-thirds of the land in the West Bank now came under Israeli control. This method of land

confiscation by declaring state land replaced the security method and now is the most commonly used to acquire land in the West Bank.

There has also been a change in the road system in the West Bank under Likud. An East-West system was constructed in the West Bank connecting the coastal plain to the newly built settlements in the Jordan Valley and the rest of the West bank. These roads would also enable the dissection of the West Bank into easily controlled sectors by splitting up the whole of the West Bank as happened after the Gulf War. It seems however, that the overall strategy of the new road system is the integration of the West Bank and Israeli road systems.

Estimates of the magnitude of the Israeli colonial settlements in the Occupied Territories vary according to the sources dealing with the issue. The difficulty of arriving at an accurate total stems from the large numbers of bodies and organization involved in settlements; from the different criteria and definitions employed (e.g., sometimes a settlement was established in a military camp); and from changes in settlement names.

Jordanian sources estimate that in 1982 there were 184 settlements in the Occupied Territories and that this rose to about 222 in 1986, including the settlements in and around Jerusalem.<sup>9</sup> Israeli sources estimate the number to be 98 in 1982.<sup>10</sup> Our 1986 field and map survey shows 151 settlements, of which 11 were in Gaza and 140 in the West Bank (including Jerusalem), and a further 32 planned settlements were to be established.

The U.S. State Department report of 19 March 1991 stated that while the number of new settlements has fallen off substantially since 1984, the rate of construction of new housing units has increased. Focus has been on the expansion of existing settlements, particularly in expanded East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Population figures appear to demonstrate that the expansion of Israeli presence continues to grow at a faster rate than the number of settlements. This is due to the international condemnation

of building new settlements, while the increase in population is due to the new waves of Jewish immigration from the USSR and Ethiopia. There are 220,000 Israel settlers living in the Occupied Territories, of whom 120,000 are in Jerusalem.

In relation to the question of the overall spread and extent of settlements, it is interesting to compare what happened during the period of the Likud and Labour parties. It is clear that, whilst the geographical spread of the settlements established under Likud was wider, the amount of land settled was greater under Labour. It is also clear that the debate on settlements among Israelis had ideological dimensions tackling the essence of the Zionist State and its democratic nature. It brought into sharp focus the confrontation of two conceptions of Zionism: on the one hand, an absolutist, metaphysically-rooted Zionism, and on the other hand, a more liberal understanding of the nature of the Jewish state, which sees Jewish independence as a pragmatic challenge.

The notion of territorial integrity was expressed through arguments including: security which stressed defensible borders and strategic depth; the historical arguments of the Likud; and the religious argument, which accepts the above views and adds to them the idea of the sanctity of the land and its settlement as a correlate of religious belief.

The colonizing settlement programme is not to be judged in terms of its demographic representation, but also in relation to the size of land at its disposal. Since 1967 Israel has taken possession of 2,919,620 dunams of land (291,962 hectares) which amounts to about 53.1% of the total area of the West Bank.

From this perspective it is clear that Israel was faced with three strategic possibilities in relation to the question of the land-population trade-off:

- a. It could preserve the Jewish majority and relinquish most of the Occupied Territories;
- b. It could keep the Occupied Territories, i.e., annex them officially, thereby losing the Jewish identity;
- c. It could keep the Occupied Territories, but also keep the Jewish majority, by expelling all the refugees in the West Bank and Gaza as well as some others.

In terms of the three options specified above, the Likud policy came nearest to the third. Expulsion does not necessarily mean by force; it can be implemented by economic stagnation, physical harassment, and the closure of schools, universities and the labour market. All these actions have been undertaken by the Israelis, especially after the Gulf War. While Soviet and Ethiopian Jews are allowed to migrate to Israel and settle in Occupied Territories, Palestinians who originally come from Palestine are not.

Therefore, while the colonizing settlement programme is a nation-building mechanism for Israel, it is meant to destroy the collective identity of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the extensiveness of the colonizing programme shifts the struggle from being for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza to a struggle for the whole of Palestine since the Green Line is no longer in existence.

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THE HARRY S. TRUMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE

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## Reflections on 25 Years of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza

WORKS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

ALTERNATIVES ON TERRITORY AND BOUNDARIES

David Newman

SECURITY DIMENSIONS

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Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

JERUSALEM

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Dear Mr. Newman

WATER IN JERUSALEM

Paper Presented at the  
IPPRP CONCLUDING CONFERENCE

Ariccia (Rome, Italy) 7-10 February 1992  
organized by the

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI of Rome  
PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

EDUCATION FOR COEXISTENCE

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

January 1992

## **Contents:**

- I Introduction: Processes of Settlement Colonisation.**
- II An Overview of the West Bank Colonisation Process:**
  - 1. A temporal analysis: Phases of settlement activity.
  - 2. Micro-Regional Diversity.
  - 3. Settlement type.
  - 4. Population characteristics.
- III Settlement Dynamics:**
  - 1. The Migration process.
  - 2. Defining the Suburban Area.
- IV Patterns of Political and Territorial Control.**
  - 1. Settlement as an Agent of Control.
  - 2. Municipal Administration.
- V Reflections on 25 Years of the Settlement Process.**
  - 1. The Formation of Dual Space.
  - 2. Hityashvut or Hitnachalut - What is in a Name?
  - 3. Frontier Theory and the Wild West (Bank).
  - 4. The "green line": Reemerging or vanishing boundary?
  - 5. Settlement and the Peace Process: Alternatives on the Reversibility Theme.

**Conclusion**

**Notes.**

**References.**

**Appendices.**



## I. INTRODUCTION

The presence of over 100,000 Jewish settlers in a variety of urban and rural communities throughout the West Bank and Gaza has resulted from a process of planned settlement colonisation on the part of all Israeli governments since 1967 (Abbu Ayyash, 1976; 1981; Abu Laghod, 1982; Benveniste, 1984; Foucher, 1987; Harris, 1978; 1980; Lesch, 1977; Newman, 1984b; 1985a; Portugali, 1991; Saleh, 1990). Settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza has changed over time, both in its intensity and in its micro-regional dispersion throughout the West Bank and Gaza. This paper sets out to review and analyse the implications of 25 years of Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition to the direct political implications of this policy, it is important to understand the internal dynamics of the settlement process. Not only do differences in settlement policy reflect the changes in government policy throughout the period under study, but the means by which settlement policy has been implemented shed light on the way in which planning has manipulated social, economic and geographical processes in its attempt to meet political objectives.

Studies of settlement colonisation elsewhere in the world point to a number of common themes. In the first place, we are generally concerned with peripheral regions, more often than not lacking territorial contiguity with the "power base" at the political center. Secondly, settlement colonisation tends to take place as a means of transforming military forms of control into a more lasting form of residential presence on the part of the controlling power. This may also involve attempts at changing the ethnic demographic balance in favour of the controller - or, at least, in establishing a clear ethnic residential concentration of inhabitants identifying with the political center. In most traditional cases of colonisation, settlement has been carried out through a process of spatial dispersion of agricultural colonies throughout the territory in question, thus expanding the spatial extent of the controlled territory. Finally, it should be noted that the introduction of an alien civilian element into the landscape invariably fails to attain the long-term political objectives by which political control is legitimised. Even after generations of settlement, conflict between two (or more) populations remains. French villages in North

Africa, Turkish colonies in Cyprus and the presence of a large Protestant population in Northern Ireland are just a few examples from recent history.

The paper is divided into three major parts. The first of these provides a descriptive overview and update of the settlement process for the period under study, focussing on both temporal and spatial diversity. The second part (in three sub-sections) deals with the dynamics of settlement, analysing the migration decision-making process, the way in which West Bank settlement has resulted in the expansion of the Israeli metropolitan center, and the resulting patterns of political and administrative control. The third part offers a commentary on the settlement process, emphasising a series of dilemmas which have resulted - from the Israeli perspective - as a result of conflicting images concerning the ultimate purpose of settlement. Finally, some specific comments will be made concerning the role of the settlements in the peace process.

## II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WEST BANK COLONISATION PROCESS

As of December 1991, some 120,000 Israeli/Jewish settlers resided in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (excluding East Jerusalem). Of these, some 4,300 resided in the Gaza Strip. Allowing for both natural growth amongst the existing settler population, together with the expected intensification of the settlement process during the coming year, this figure is expected to increase to approximately 140,000 (a growth of 40%) by the end of 1995<sup>1</sup>.

### 1. A temporal analysis: Phases of settlement activity

The settlement process is not uniform in its spatial coverage or in its population composition. Both the overall pace and specific locations of the individual settlements have been a function of the changing political climate and government policies towards the region. At the same time, it is important to remember that (with the possible exception of the first two Gush Emunim settlements pre-1977) all settlement activity has been government sponsored. Labour and Likud governments may have different policies regarding settlement policy, but each have lent support - either directly through sponsoring and

subsidising settler groups, or indirectly through the construction of infrastructure and the releasing of lands for purposes of settlement - to their own settlement policies.

Four major phases of colonisation have been identified (Table 1), while the onset of a fifth phase has begun to emerge since 1990:

**Table 1: Jewish Settler Population Growth 1967-1991.**

Settlement Phase	Year	No. of Settlers	Absolute Growth	% Growth (per annum)
Phase 1	1977	5,023		
Phase 2	1981	16,119	11,096	34.05
Phase 3	1984	44,146	28,027	40.6
Phase 4	1989	81,200	37,054	12.98
Phase 5	1991	112,000	42,000	17.41

Source: See Appendix 1.

1. The period between 1967-1977 was characterised by minimalist settlement policies carried out by the Labour government and along the lines of the Allon Plan (Allon, 1976; Harris, 1978; 1980; Cohen, 1986; Newman, 1989; 1991). The implementation of this policy ensured a line of settlements along the Jordan valley border with the State of Jordan. The idea behind this policy was to ensure defensible borders on the one hand while at the same time leaving the interior of the West Bank empty of Jewish settlements, to become eventually an autonomous Palestinian region with both territorial (by means of a narrow corridor cutting through the Israeli held territory) and functional links to the State of Jordan (Fig 1).


2. Following the rise to power of the Likud government in 1977, a major change in settlement orientation took place. The new government promoted widespread settlement throughout the region as a means by which to ensure ultimate control

of the territory. In the period between 1977-1981, the majority of settlement activity was initiated and implemented by the religious-nationalist movement, Gush Emunim (Newman, 1985b). They pursued a policy of establishing a widespread network of small settlements throughout the region, particularly in the mountain interior. Many of these settlements were founded in close proximity to Palestinian population centers.

3. The second Likud Government (1981-1984) took advantage of economic - rather than ideological - benefits in order to spur the settlement process. Particular emphasis was put on the Western Samaria micro-region, the area nearest to the old "green line" boundary and the Israeli metropolitan centres, in an attempt to attract as many people as possible in as short a time as possible. This marked the beginning of the "suburban" colonisation process. This period also witnessed the preparation of the 100,000 Plan with the stated objective of reaching 100,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank (excl: Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) by the year 1987.

4. The fourth period, between 1984-1988, was characterised by the consolidation of the existing colonisation network, with only few additional settlements being established. This situation arose out of the paralysis over West Bank policy resulting from the creation of a National Unity Government, in which both the right-wing Likud and left-wing Labour parties were the major partners. While the groups favouring further colonisation protested the virtual cessation of new settlement activity, in retrospect it enabled them to consolidate and strengthen the existing framework - much of which had been previously characterised by small, relatively unstable communities, lacking the minimum threshold size required for efficient functioning of a residential community.

5. A fifth phase of re-intensification of the settlement process - despite the onset of the Intifadeh - has begun to emerge since 1990. This has resulted, indirectly, from the mass immigration experienced by Israel during 1990-1991. While it is estimated that little more than one percent of the Russian immigrants themselves have actually moved into the West Bank, their arrival has led to significant turbulence within the Israeli housing market as a result of a



**Fig 1. The Allon Plan - "minimalist" settlement policy**

"knockdown" effect. Residential units in Israeli towns suddenly became a scarce resource and their market price rose dramatically. This enabled many Israeli families, who were previously unable, to raise the finance capital necessary for the purchase of detached housing units within many of the West Bank settlements. In 1991 alone, some 16,000 Jewish settlers moved to the West Bank. A further 12,000 housing units were in the process of construction at the end of the same year (see Appendix 1).


It had originally been argued that the Intifadeh has led to a considerable slow-down in the pace of colonisation, especially regarding the influx of new and potential settlers. This is a difficult point to clarify. Initial evidence indicates that, in effect, the period 1987-1989 has not witnessed any slow-down in the number of new families coming to reside in the region. This may be attributed to two major factors: In the first place, it must be remembered that the time period involved in the settlement process takes anything between 1-3 years between the initial purchase of a plot of land, the construction of a house and the eventual move. Thus, most of the settlers to have arrived between 1987-1989 were already committed to their move prior to the onset of the Intifadeh. The real test of the effect of the Intifadeh concerns the extent to which the purchase of land plots or new housing units continued to take place beyond the 1990 period (thus indicating an initial interest arising after the beginning of the Intifadeh). But it was precisely in this latter period that the "knockdown" effect of the mass Russian immigration began to be felt, thus largely neutralising the "slowing-down" process brought about by the Intifadeh. This was evidenced by the fact that nearly all of the housing units constructed during 1991 - as well as those under construction to be completed during 1992 - have been purchased by potential settlers.

## 2. Micro-Regional Diversity

Owing to the diverse history of settlement colonisation in the West Bank, it is important to distinguish between a number of sub-regions within the study area. The distinctive socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the

settlements in each sub-area result both from their relative geographical proximity to the Israeli metropolitan centres, as well as the period in which colonisation commenced. In effect, we are able to identify at least six clear geographical micro-regions of the West Bank within which settlement has taken place. Of these, five were sampled in a 1985 survey, carried out by Portugali & Newman<sup>2</sup> (Fig 2; Table 2):

1. **Etzion** - a group of settlements to the south of Jerusalem, the first of which were founded immediately following the Six Day War. Since this region had Jewish settlements even prior to 1948, there is wider agreement within Israel concerning its' future retention.
2. **Jordan Valley** - the settlements in the Jordan Valley were founded as part of the Allon Plan aimed at securing the new eastern boundary along the Jordan River. The settlements are mostly small, agricultural villages, many of which were founded between 1967-1977 by the Labour governments.
3. **Western Samaria** - most of the settlements in this region were founded during the 1980-1984 period, following the opening up of the West Bank to private market initiatives. This region is the closest to the Tel Aviv metropolis and contains the largest number of Jewish settlements.
4. **Mountain heartland** - the region to the north and north-west of Jerusalem. Settled by the religious-nationalist Gush Emunim movement following the rise to power of the Likud Government in 1977. The settlements here are principally commuting villages.
5. **North Samaria** - here, too, the existing villages were all founded in the post-1977 period. However, this region is not accessible to either of the two major cities (Jerusalem or Tel Aviv) and has been less attractive as a settlement proposition.
6. **Southern Hebron mountains** - the region lying between Hebron in the north and the southern extremity of the West Bank. Settlement here is concentrated in the Yattir region. The settlements are populated by relatively highly ideologically committed Gush Emunim - in contrast to the North Samaria periphery. This region was not sampled in the Portugali & Newman survey.



**Fig 2. Micro Regional Divisions of Sampled Settler Population in the West Bank (after Portugali & Newman, 1987).**



Table 2. Percentage of Sample in West Bank Micro-Regions.

REGION	No. of Settlements	No. of Respondents	Respondents as % of Total
Total Survey	31	776	100.0
Etzion	3	50	6.5
Jordan Valley	3	72	9.3
W.Samaria	10	298	38.6
Mountain heartland	6	152	19.6
N.Samaria	5	74	9.5

Source: Portugali & Newman, 1987.

During the period 1990-1992, there has been a significant change in the relative weight of each of these micro-regions in the overall settlement process. By 1986, approximately 80-85% of the settler population resided in the metropolitan hinterlands of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem - that is, the Western Samaria, Etzion and the western part of the mountain region (Benveniste, 1986; Portugali & Newman, 1987; Portugali, 1991). By 1991, this figure had decreased to approximately 60% of the settler population. This relative change in patterns of residential dispersion is of major significance when discussing variations on the theme of partial territorial withdrawal (see last section of this paper) which would take into account the areas of strong Jewish settler presence.

### 3. Settlement type:

The Israeli settlements are characterized by their differentiation from the Palestinian villages and towns on the one hand, and their internal diversity on the other. The stark physical contrast between western homes with their red roofs, with that of the Palestinian residences blending into the local landscape is striking. This impressionistic perspective is strengthened by the fact that the Israeli settlements have been constructed in an extremely short time-span,

resulting in major environmental change on the localized landscape. Israeli settlements are highly planned around centralized "top-down" models, taking into account most infrastructural needs - such as access, communications, electricity, water etc; - from the outset. By contrast, most of the Palestinian settlements have undergone a long, spontaneous, process of village expansion, not always in tandem with the parallel growth of infrastructural networks.

Israeli settlement colonization in the West Bank can be divided into five main categories:

**a) Agricultural villages;**

The earliest settlements to have been founded by Israel, along the lines of the Allon Plan, were mostly agricultural collective communities - kibbutzim and moshavim. These communities are to be found in an north-south line along the floor of the Jordan Valley (as well as throughout the Golan Heights). In addition, four of the Etzion region settlements are kibbutzim, basing much of their economy on agricultural production - in some cases cultivating fields at great distance from the communities themselves within the pre-1967 boundaries. The later development of the Hebron mountain region and the Gaza Strip also consisted - in part - of small agricultural communities. As a general rule, the agricultural villages (kibbutzim or moshavim) are small in size, consisting of no more than tens of families in each.

**b) Rurban (dormitory) communities;**

In numerical terms, the majority of West Bank settlements are rurban communities. By rurban is meant a community which is located within a rural spatial "setting" but whose functional (socio-economic) characteristics are urban - hence a mixture of rural and urban features - rurban (Newman, 1984b; Applebaum & Newman, 1989). These communities are located throughout the West Bank and Gaza, with the exception of the Jordan Valley. Functionally, these settlements are "commuting" or "dormitory" communities, wherein the majority of the adult population commute daily to their places of work within metropolitan Israel (Newman, 1984a). These communities vary in size. In general, there is a

classic distance decay effect, by which the closer the settlement is to the urban centers, the larger the community. The peripheral communities (in Northern Samaria, Hebron mountains and the Gaza Strip) are relatively small, while the area closest to the "green line" boasts communities numbering 3-400 families each.

**c) Townships:**

Within the West Bank, there are a number of settlements which were constructed with the intention of becoming fully fledged townships. Approximately 67,000 (60%) of the settler population resided in only 13 (out of a total of 142) urban settlements by the end of 1991 (see Appendix 1). The most notable of these are Ariel in the northern part of the Western Samaria region and Kiryat Arba in close proximity to Hebron in the south. In addition, the ultra-religious township of Emanuel and the urban center of the Etzion region - Efrat - have also undergone rapid growth. Of completely different proportions are the townships built in close proximity to Jerusalem but afforded separate municipal status, such as Ma'aleh Adumim to the east of Jerusalem and Giv'at Ze'ev to the north. In all of these townships, the population ranges from a few thousand inhabitants to over 15,000 (Ma'aleh Adumim), thus comprising the bulk of the West Bank settler population.

**d) Colonization within Arab towns:**

While beyond the confines of this paper, mention must also be made of Jewish colonization which has taken place in the heart of Arab cities - leading to much direct conflict and tension. The two clear examples of this phenomenon have been the settling of parts of Arab East Jerusalem and the construction of a Jewish neighbourhood in the center of Hebron (Falah, 1985; Romann, 1985). While the total numbers of settlers are insignificant with respect to the total settler population, these small communities are often composed of the most ideologically committed, and hence fanatical, of the Jewish settlers.

**e) East Jerusalem suburbs:**

In addition to the independent townships mentioned in c) above, Israel has made a concerted effort at constructing Jewish neighbourhoods throughout the expanded municipal area of Jerusalem. Of particular note are the Ramot, East Talpiot, Giloh and Ramat Eshkol neighbourhoods. These surround the city in such a way as to enclose the Arab neighbourhoods, thus making any future re-partition of the city extremely difficult to implement. While this paper does not deal with the East Jerusalem Jewish neighbourhoods, it is important to note that these areas contain a further 130,000 residents - in addition to the 112,000 dispersed throughout the remaining West Bank settlements.

**4. Population Characteristics:**

A number of surveys were undertaken during the 1980's, enabling us to arrive at a general picture of the settler population (Reichmann, 1981; Benveniste, 1984; 1986; Jewish Agency Settlement Department, 1986; Portugali & Newman, 1987; Applebaum & Newman, 1989; Hoshen, 1989). In many respects, the West Bank settler population is not characteristic of the Israeli Jewish population as a whole (Table 3). Among the West Bank settlers are more middle-class families and a higher percentage of people with advanced education than the average for the total Israeli population. The settlers are also, on average, younger and have larger families than the nation-wide Israeli average.

Concerning the age structure of the population, the Portugali & Newman (1987) survey showed that 86% of the male population and over 90% of the female population surveyed were aged 40 or below, as compared to 74% of the overall Israeli population below age 45 (including children) and 56% of the adult population of Israel (over age 25) between ages 25-44 (IBS, 1985). At the same time, there was little evidence of the youngest adult age group (around 24) in either of the surveys. The majority of the settlements are of the community (kehillati) type, settlements in which settlers build their own home and have gainful employment. These units cater to established family units rather than young couples (or singles) who have not yet entered the job market and who have not yet established families.

Table 3. Population Characteristics of Settler Population \*

	National Average (1984)	Portugali & Newman survey (1985)	Applebaum & Newman survey (1986)
<b>AGE</b>			
20-34 (%)	38.2	64.0 **	53.4
35-44 (%)	18.5	31.0 **	39.9
45 + (%)	43.4	2.0 **	6.1
<b>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</b>			
Israel (%)	37.1	35.0	59.4
Europe-America (%)	34.5	50.0	30.6
Asia-Africa (%)	28.4	14.0	10.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>			
High school (%)	73.3	14.0	20.4
Further educ (%)	25.5	48.0	33.1
Academic (%)		38.0	46.4

Source: Portugali & Newman, 1987; Applebaum & Newman, 1989, p.64.

\* Discrepancies between survey data are explained in Note 3.

\*\* The age groups in the Portugali & Newman survey are: 20-32; 33-48; 48+.

The average family is large by western standards. Some 63% of the settler families have three children or more as compared with only 15% in Israel as a whole (the national mean is 2.26 children per family). The young age of the parents would also suggest that many of these families have not yet reached the end of the childbearing cycle and that the family size will continue to grow. This is particularly true of the religious settlements wherein the average family size is larger. The latter correlation was born out by the fact that in the two micro-regions in which the settlements are mostly composed of

non-religious inhabitants - the Jordan Valley and Northern Samaria - 80% of the families had three or less children, compared to an average of three or more children per family in the other regions.

The occupational structure of the settler population was found to be highly diverse. The fact that the settlements are largely dormitory communities means that the settlers are able to continue work in a large variety of town jobs, although there was a clear predominance of the "professional" category amongst the respondents. Of particular interest is the fact that the settlement network has created its own jobs, most notably within education (nearly every settlement has its own school) and a variety of clerical and administrative jobs concerned with the daily functioning of the communities.

There are clear inter-regional variations in the socio-economic structure of the settler population. The Jordan Valley and Northern Samaria - despite the difference in both the period of settlement and the settlement types (the former are agricultural cooperatives, the latter are small community villages) - are both characterised by lower educational levels, less skilled jobs and smaller families. In the Etzion, Western Samaria and Mountain heartland regions, there are higher average educational levels, more skilled and academic professions and larger families. This raises some interesting questions concerning the formation of a localised core-periphery structure amongst the Jewish settler population.

### III SETTLEMENT DYNAMICS:

#### 1. The Migration Process

Classic migration theory emphasises the nature of "push" and "pull" factors as influencing the decision to move (Jones, 1990). Push factors are those circumstances at the place of origin causing a person to leave his present residence. Pull factors at the place of destination are influential in attracting the migrant to a specific region, or settlement. In the Portugali & Newman (1987) survey, West Bank settlers were asked to explain their decision to move to the region, by recourse to three explanatory factors.

1. Ideology: By this is meant the belief in the inherent need to settle in the West Bank, either for political reasons of demonstrating territorial control or because the act is perceived as essentially a religious duty. In both cases, settlement is designed to prevent any future territorial compromise taking place which would result in non-Israeli sovereignty over the region. However, while those groups believing in the Divine right to the land are unlikely to ever change their mind concerning the retention of Israeli control, other groups making the strategic argument are unlikely to be as dogmatically rigid in their views. In recent years, the spatial and territorial implications of both the Intifadeh and the Iraqi missiles have resulted in much new thinking concerning the ultimate "strategic" role of the West Bank.

2. Low House Price (LHP) This factor reflects the economic incentives offered by the Israeli governments since 1977 in order to attract settlers who were otherwise not overtly smitten by the ideological call to the flag. The cheap land prices, relative to those to be found in the Israeli cities, and the generous mortgage arrangements, are designed to offer potential settlers the chance to build a house at a cost unattainable by most in the city.

3. Quality of Life (QOL) is closely linked to the LHP factor, although the former may be more perceived than real. QOL reflects the desire by many urban families to leave the city for the countryside, to live in a small, low-density rural settlement with a high level of local service facilities. As in the case of LHP, both "pull" and "push" elements are in operation here. While settlers influenced by LHP and QOL factors make their decision to move as a result of the economic carrot, they will obviously not be politically opposed to settling in the West Bank. They are not sufficiently motivated by the ideological considerations alone, and it is the perceived material gains which has resulted in the final decision to move. People opposed to the colonisation altogether will not agree to reside in the West Bank under any conditions, whatever the economic carrot offered to them.

Nearly half of the total respondents claimed that their decision to move was due to the ideological imperative of settling the West Bank. This figure was

much higher in the smaller settlements than in the urban. At the micro-regional level of analysis, the figure was lowest in the Jordan Valley where settlers arrived as part of the Labour Government Allon Plan and not as a result of the raised political consciousness concerning the territories in the post-Likud period. A third of the respondents stated that the QOL consideration influenced them to move to the small, rural settlements. This varies from nearly half of the urban respondents to only 20% in some of the Gush Emunim ideologically orientated settlements. Only 12% of the respondents replied that the financial incentive of a cheap house influenced their decision to migrate. This figure was higher (19%) in the urban settlements than in the smaller villages<sup>3</sup>.

The overall picture to emerge is of a higher ideological component in the rural settlements and particularly in the Gush Emunim units in Western Samaria and the Mountain heartland region. This is borne out by the fact that of those giving an ideological motivation, 60% defined themselves as religious - viewing the ultimate retention of the region as a divine imperative - as compared to 23% of the non-religious population. The reverse is true of the LHP and QOL motivations. This reflects the close correlation between West Bank settlement, religious motivation and Gush Emunim in particular. This conclusion is backed up by an earlier analysis of over 500 settlers in 22 settlements affiliated to the Gush Emunim movement. The settlers were asked to state which of six possible motivations could be considered as "predominant" in their decision to move. Of the six motivations, four are categorised as "altruistic" (ideological) and two as "self interest" (parallel to QOL or LHP). The data displayed disproportionately high responses for "altruistic" motivations, as contrasted with much lower responses for the "self interest" categories (Weisburd, 1989; Weisburd & Waring, 1985).

From Table 4, the relationships between period of migration and motivation can be seen. The important point to note is the swing away from an ideological dominance in the periods 1974-77 and 1978-81 to more materialist motivations in the 1982-1985 period. The relatively small number of respondents from the earliest period (1967-1973) - 26 in all - make it difficult to read any significance into the figures for these dates. It must also be remembered that



the vast majority of the West Bank settlers moved to the region in the post-1981 period, the period in which government began to openly manipulate the economic carrot as a means of attracting settlers to relatively accessible locations within the Western Samaria region.

**Table 4: Stated Reason for Migration by Period of Migration (%).**

REASON PERIOD OF MIGRATION	IDEOLOGY	QUALITY OF LIFE	LOW HOUSE PRICE	TOTAL
1967-73	53.8	23.1	23.1	100.0
1974-77	65.2	26.1	8.7	100.0
1978-81	68.3	25.4	6.3	100.0
1982-85	34.3	45.1	20.6	100.0
Total	48.6	36.3	15.1	100.0

Source: Portugali & Newman, 1987.

This data compares well with the Applebaum & Newman (1989) survey data for urban communities, collected in 1985. Out of 361 respondents in dormitory settlements throughout Israel (including both the West Bank and the Galilee regions), 27.2 per cent stated that they had moved for "ideological" reasons, as compared to 38 per cent who stated that they wanted to "escape from the city". Taking the West Bank respondents alone, the "ideological" reason increased marginally to 29.3 per cent, while only 31.6 per cent noted their desire to leave the city. In the Galilee settlements surveyed, these percentages were different, with only 18 per cent of the respondents giving an "ideological" motivation for their move, as compared with 46.2 per cent who stated that they wanted to "escape from the city" (Applebaum & Newman, 1989, p.64, Table 14).

## 2. Defining the suburban area: Distance decay and the land market:

The LHP and QOL factors were best expressed during the early part of the 1980's by a popular advertisement slogan to be found in most daily newspapers, promoting the concept of living "five minutes from Kefar Sava". The latter town, located in the outer zone of the Tel Aviv metropolitan region, is located in close proximity to the previous "green line" boundary separating Israel from the West Bank. Land prices in Kefar Sava were - and remain - at a premium. The average Israeli family cannot afford to build a detached dwelling in Kefar Sava owing to the prohibitive price of land. But five minutes away, land could be attained for a fraction of the price, while accessibility to the Tel Aviv core was not affected. All that it entailed was crossing the green line and thus becoming a West Bank settler.

The "five minutes from Kefar Sava" syndrome reflected the overall migration process at operation during this period of relatively large-scale colonisation. Migration patterns and distances show a marked movement from the metropolitan centres to their adjacent hinterlands, that is suburban movement into the surrounding countryside. Classic suburbanisation theory focuses on the competition for land as a major factor determining the segregated pattern of residences, industry and commerce in the metropolitan region. As land becomes more expensive, householders are unable to compete with business and commercial interests for valuable land close to the city centre (Carter, 1975). Householders also seek to leave the congested, high density urban environment and purchase (or build) a home in quiet, "rural" surroundings. Land on the urban fringe is cheaper than land in the city centre, as well as being available in greater quantities. Thus, the average householder is depicted as weighing up the relative costs (distance from employment and service centres as measured in time and monetary cost) and benefits (cheaper land available in greater quantities) in arriving at a decision concerning residential location.

This decision-making process assumes that we are dealing with a perfect urban space, and that land is available in equal quantities at equal distances throughout the urban area. But this is rarely the case. Institutional, political, and even topographical, obstacles favour certain directions over


others in the residential expansion process. Both the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem urban regions were severely limited in the direction in which expansion could take place prior to 1967. In both cases, the political boundary between Israel and Jordan constituted an important limiting factor. In the case of Tel Aviv, the metropolitan area was unable to expand to the east owing to the "green line" boundary separating the coastal plain from the West Bank. Thus, most of the expansion took place to the north and south of the city, creating a ribbon-like metropolitan region along the coast, with development being limited to 20 kms. from the urban centre in the east. In the case of Jerusalem, urban expansion was limited to one direction only - the west - with the immediate north, south and east of the city lying beyond the political boundary.

The geographic conditions governing the urban land market in Israel changed in the post-1967 era. The implications of this were only made clear following 1977 and the implementation of the Likud Government policy of settling throughout the West Bank. The "natural" urban hinterland became the new focus for much of the colonisation activity. The creation of bedroom, dormitory, settlements in these areas attracted potential settlers who would not have to completely break off their links with their previous place of employment or social activities. They were simply moving out to the suburbs, purchasing a plot of land (or house) at the price of an apartment in town, and commuting daily (within 45 minutes journey time) to their place of employment. For their part, the government were not required to invest large sums of money in the creation of new employment opportunities. A study of the relative accessibility of urban communities carried out by Applebaum & Newman (1989) clearly show the propensity for settlement location within the more accessible fringes of the metropolitan hinterland (Fig 3).

In planning terms, Portugali (1991) has shown that - paradoxically - this process of suburban colonisation has strengthened the geographical center of the country (by expanding the metropolitan hinterland) at the expense of the peripheral regions such as the Galilee and the Negev. For a variety of socio-economic and political reasons, it has always been Israeli government policy to promote policies aimed at population dispersal from the center into

the periphery, mostly by means of offering cheap land for housing, tax benefits for householders and industrialists, and so on. Similar economic incentives were offered to West Bank settlers, despite the fact that much of this region in no way constitutes part of the country's periphery. Settling in this region, therefore, does not contribute significantly to population dispersal at the national scale. When crossing the "green line", settlers then chose the most convenient - i.e. accessible - location, at which the cost (in terms of distance, travel time etc) would be minimal. As a result, the vast majority of settlers opted for the locations closest to the urban centres, beyond the "green line" boundary. Reichmann (1986) has termed this process one of "discontinued suburbanisation", in which the crossing of the old "green line" boundary causes a sudden discontinuity in the land market, characterised by an extremely sharp (rather than gradual) fall in land prices. The proximity of this region to the urban core, coupled with land prices and economic incentives usually only to be found in more remote regions resulted in this micro-region becoming transformed into an attractive proposition for the potential home buyer.

Within the West Bank, the Government attempted to equalise the distance decay effect by introducing a policy of differential assistance for new settlers. The West Bank was divided into three zones, running from west to east. In the zone nearest to the metropolitan centres (that is, the outer limit of the urban hinterland), public assistance in terms of mortgages and cheap land was limited. In the least accessible region, public assistance in the form of additional grants and loans were greatly expanded. However, even this differential assistance was insufficient to counterweight the geographical effect of distance. The incentives to be obtained in the more accessible areas were still of sufficient magnitude for them to outweigh the relative costs of the move. Few settlers were prepared to pay the cost of moving to a relatively remote region, even in return for a free house and plot of land. Thus, the Western Samaria region became the optimal region for relocation. On the one hand, it benefitted from conditions which were not to be obtained inside the "green line", but at the same time was not too distant from the urban centres. The promotion of new suburban settlement concepts by the government thus enabled, and even encouraged, the move to the new settlements. In this way, the government



**Fig 3. Suburbanization of West Bank Jewish Settlement - Accessibility Level (after Applebaum & Newman, 1989).**

partially succeeded in implementing a political objective (settling the West Bank) by exploiting the socio-economic and geographical conditions through which the settlers were enabled to realize other individual and family aspirations.

In the most recent phase of the colonization process, there is evidence that the relative demographic weight of the different micro-regions is evening out, with a greater percentage of the new settlers moving the more "remote" areas. This is partially due to intensive construction activity on the part of government in these regions during the period 1991-1992. In addition, the development of transportation infrastructure, linking the more inaccessible areas to the Israeli metropolitan centers, has resulted in areas which were previously considered as relatively "remote" being gradually drawn into the metropolitan functional area. This is best evidenced by the fact that plots of land within some of the Western Samaria settlements now fetch prices of \$30-40,000 (still much cheaper than "five minutes away" in Kefar Sava, but significantly more expensive [ten times as much] as the same location eight years ago) while the cheaper land plots are now to be found in settlements located twenty kilometers further east.

A study of the commuting patterns of the settler population (Portugali & Newman, 1987) only serve to strengthen the argument concerning the dependence of the Jewish settlements on the Israeli urban core for their day-to-day functioning. Both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have expanded their "spatial catchment area" in terms of their functioning as metropolitan foci for both consumption and production activities. A particularly attractive location is the area of the "spatial margin", including the outer hinterland of both urban centers. Settlers here are able to choose between the respective benefits to be obtained by working and/or consuming in either one of the two major cities, while households are less dependent on a single activity foci.

This overall reliance on commuting in all spheres of daily activity only serves to further strengthen the impression that the location of the West Bank relative to the major Israeli cities has been the major factor enabling the relatively large scale colonisation of the region. It is inconceivable that a

peripheral region, with no urban employment opportunities within reasonable commuting distance, could have attracted even a percentage of the 100,000 plus settlers that now reside in the West Bank. This rather unique mixture of colonisation in a region which is territorially continuous to the economic and political centre of the controlling country has enabled the manipulation of socio-economic processes as a means to attain political objectives.

## V PATTERNS OF TERRITORIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

### 1. Settlement as an Agent of Control

Settlement has an important control function. Within the Israeli context, colonisation has often been perceived as constituting a civilian function which complements, and even strengthens, the military control system (Newman, 1989). The settling of civilians in an occupied territory is assumed to provide a form of "legitimacy" which military presence alone cannot provide. The "sinking of roots" into a region is assumed to create a growing sense of linkage between the individual (and the group) and his/her immediate environment. These links grow stronger over time, while second and third generation settlers, born in the occupied territory, come to see their birthplace as their natural "home region", no less than the other indigenous populations.

Within the Israeli context, settlement play a dual control function. In the first place, settlement has always constituted an integral part of the nation-building process, through which territory is brought into the collective domain (Kimmerling, 1979; 1983; Hasson & Gosenfeld, 1980). The founding of agricultural communities had important political control significance. Agriculture denoted a form of presence in which the landscape was not simply a place for constructing one's home, but provided the focus for strengthening the link between the settler and the land. Moreover, agricultural activities enabled far more extensive territorial tracts to be brought under control than simply a residential community. Extensive areas could be fenced off and thus declared as

"private domain", thus enabling widespread control to be effectively implemented - regardless of whether a demographic majority (or even equity) is achieved.

A second, more direct, control function of settlement is the short-term function. Contextually, the founding of settlements in outlying, remote, regions has been perceived as fulfilling a direct defensive function. This idea stems from the role played by individual settlements during Israel's War of Independence. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, new settlements were founded in locations which were considered to have strategic significance and this policy was continued by the post-1967 Labour government in founding settlements along the new eastern boundary in both the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley (Allon, 1976; Harris, 1980).

From this perspective, settlement throughout the occupied territories can be divided into two groups, depending on the functional nature of the community - agricultural or simply residential. The Golan Heights, Jordan Valley and - to a certain extent - some of the Gaza Strip and Hebron mountain settlements are agricultural communities. This enables the settlers to demarcate relatively large land tracts to be fenced off and brought under control. In the case of the Golan Heights, most settlements have also fenced off land designated for pasture - despite the fact that little pasture activity is actually carried out. In all of these areas, the actual demographic mass of the settlers is relatively small.

But the large bulk of settlement activity - the suburban dormitory communities of the metropolitan fringe - occupy no more than the area on which their houses are built. Not only are the settlers not agriculturalists - nor do they have any intention of becoming agriculturalists as there is no agricultural land available for cultivation in this upland, terraced region. While a clear settlement landscape - and hence feeling of control - has developed along major east-west transportation arteries from Israel into the West Bank, there is no "sinking of roots" (in the literal sense) into the surrounding land. Settlers of the dormitory settlements view their immediate environment from their car windows while travelling between home and workplace, but do not become intimately acquainted with the area over which they desire ultimate control. At



the same time, their territorial presence throughout the region is meant to ensure that it will become increasingly difficult for any Israeli government to withdraw from the region. To this purpose, some Israeli settlers set about raising funds to purchase privately owned lands in the West Bank during the mid-1980's and thus obtain legal rights of land ownership. Such activity came to an abrupt stop with the onset of the Intifadeh.

The defensive and "security" posture of the West Bank settlements is also in question. This applies not only to the dormitory communities but also to the agricultural communities located along the borders. The latter were initially founded as part of a regional defensive strategy, aimed at providing a line which - should the situation arise - could temporarily hold up the advance of any invading army. While this may, indeed, have been the case in 1948, the advance in warfare technology meant that small civilian settlements were unable to provide this role thirty and forty years later. Nowhere was this more apparent than during the October 1973 (Yom Kippur) War when some of the Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights were overrun by the Syrian army (Newman, 1989). Again, the Iraqi missiles have brought into question the strategic benefits to be gained from holding on to what is perceived as a relatively small buffer zone.

The "security" aspect of the suburban dormitory communities is even more suspect. Many Israeli settlements are purposely built on hilltops, visible for miles around, in order to demonstrate - superficially - their presence in the region and their self-perceived role as agents of landscape control. But rather than the settlements taking over the role of the defense forces, they are immediately allocated with military personnel to provide a continuous guard at the entrance of the new settlement in case of terrorist activity. From this perspective, they provide a "security" hazard rather than functioning as "the" controlling agent. This has become all the more clear since the onset of the Intifadeh, as a result of which the West Bank roads have become relatively unsafe for Israeli travellers. While visitors to the region have the alternative of not travelling through the West Bank (and the vast majority of Israelis no longer drive through the region), the Israeli settlers have no such option. If

they desire to reach their workplaces in the morning and return home at night, they have to travel along the local roads. But the amount of non-essential travelling has been vastly reduced leading to a situation in which the settlers are confined to their settlements, despite the fact that they are meant to be the "controlling" population.

In response, the Israeli authorities have speeded up the process of constructing new roads which will by-pass the major Arab settlements, most notably the western fringe of the Trans-Samaritan route linking the West Bank to the Israeli metropolitan centres, and an improved route from the Etzion settlements to Jerusalem. As a result, the "controlling" population completely avoid the major population centers they set out to control. Thus the improvement of the transportation infrastructure serves to further isolate the two populations from each other, lending itself to the strengthening of duality within the West Bank and thus, paradoxically, weakening Israeli control over the region.

Another important aspect of territorial control concerns the extent to which demographic balances change in favour of the "controller" population. The 100,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank, while representing a considerable feat on the part of the Israeli settlement authorities during a relatively short time-period, is less than a tenth of the West Bank Palestinian population, while in the Gaza Strip the figure is completely insignificant when compared to a further 500,000 Palestinians. But while Israeli governments have never openly declared a policy of achieving demographic parity for the West Bank as a whole, this is different with respect to the case of Jerusalem. The prominence of Jerusalem as a source of migrants for the West Bank settlements has, paradoxically resulted in a conflict of interests between two political objectives - settling the West Bank and increasing the Jewish population of Jerusalem. The establishment of suburban settlements and small townships within a short distance from Jerusalem has drawn migrants from the city itself. Jerusalem Mayor, Teddy Kollek, has often gone on record as claiming that the expansion of the urban periphery has led to the political weakening (as far as Israel is concerned) of the city itself.

## 2. Municipal Organization:

Patterns of settler control are also exercised through the gradual extension of civilian patterns of administration into the occupied territories. While the patterns of civilian administration in operation for the West Bank and Gaza Jewish settler population is the same as that applying within the pre-1967 boundaries, the authority is formally derived from the Military Government rather than directly from the Israeli Ministry of Interior (Levi, 1982). Only in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem - those areas which have been annexed by laws passed in the Knesset and hence subject to direct Israeli civilian administration (at least as far as Israel is concerned) - does the administrative/municipal authority derive directly from the Ministry of Interior.

In practical terms, this legalistic differentiation between the civilian status of those areas formally annexed to those which have not been annexed (the whole of the West Bank and Gaza excluding east Jerusalem) is irrelevant. Local and regional Jewish municipal authorities receive central government funding from the same source, with access to the same municipal and central government hierarchy.

Of the three forms of municipal government operating in Israel, two of them - the regional council and the local council - are to be found in the West Bank and Gaza (Fig 4). The majority of the Jewish rural and suburban communities in these regions have been affiliated to newly created regional councils, enabling the delivery of municipal services to many small settlements, none of which are sufficiently large enough to justify independent municipal functioning (Benveniste & Khayat, 1988). Regional councils operate according to the principle of obtaining minimum size thresholds for efficient and reasonably priced service delivery through the aggregation of a number of small settlements into one municipal entity.

There is, however, one significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip regional councils to those operating elsewhere in Israel. Throughout the




Fig 4. Dual Administrative Systems in the West Bank (after Benvenisti, 1984)

rest of the country, the jurisdiction area of the regional council encompasses all of the land within and between the scattered communities, excluding only those areas which are incorporated into urban municipalities (local councils or cities). The regional Council is obliged to draw up statutory plans for the future zoning and development of the whole jurisdiction area. Within the West Bank and Gaza Strip however, the regional councils only encompass the actual land areas of the settlements themselves, with no authority or control over the intervening land.

Alltogether, the West Bank is divided into six Jewish regional councils, while the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip settlements comprise single regional municipal units respectively. The remainder of the West Bank Jewish settlements all have local council status. This latter municipal status is normally granted to communities which have passed a minimum size threshold justifying independent municipal functioning (Applebaum & Newman, 1991). As such, they can function independently of any regional or supra-municipal authority. However, small communities are sometimes granted independent municipal status, despite the fact that they do not meet minimum size criteria. This is often the case in regions - such as the West Bank - where government has an interest in promoting the cause of settlement. Communities such as Elqana, Alfei Menashe and Efrat, were all granted local council status long before they had reached size thresholds which would have normally justified such status (See Appendix 2).

Municipal budgets are made up of numerous components, the two most important of which are local taxation and central government grants. The latter is aimed at compensating poorer municipalities who are unable to raise sufficient local taxation to meet expenditure on public sector services. Government also uses its discretionary grants as a means of favouring settlements in regions of political priority - thus enabling a wider range of service provision than would normally be possible and/or lower levels of local taxation for each household. From Table 5, we are able to compare the central government monetary transfers to all West Bank and Gaza Jewish municipalities, as compared to the national average. It is clear that the West Bank and Gaza settlements receive a higher public subsidy per capita than most settlements (or regional councils) of a similar size

elsewhere in Israel. At the political level, this differential budgetary policy is highly problematic, not simply because it favours one region over others - but also because middle-class communities are, in some cases, being given priority over development towns and lower status communities within Israel.

Table 5. Municipal Budgets for West Bank Settlements (1987/88 budgets)<sup>#</sup>:

TYPE OF AUTHORITY	POPULATION SIZE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GRANT	
		Per Capita (shekels)	as % of total income
<u>Regional Councils</u>			
All Regional Councils *	383,800	322.4	26.7
West Bank Regional Councils **	38,500	746.0	36.2
<u>Local Councils</u>			
All Local Councils +	867,600	172.0	28.6
West Bank Local Councils ++	31,100	314.0	36.0

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Local Authorities in Israel 1987/88: Financial Data. Special Series No. 887. Government Printer, Jerusalem. Table 15.

<sup>#</sup> For more detailed breakdown of the West Bank municipalities, see Appendix 2.

<sup>\*</sup> 54 regional councils.

<sup>\*\*</sup> 8 regional councils - for detail, see Appendix 2.

<sup>+</sup> 134 local councils (Jewish and Arab; large and small)

<sup>++</sup> 6 local councils - for detail, see Appendix 2.

## VI. REFLECTIONS ON 25 YEARS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS.

It is unlikely that in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 War, and following the initial founding of the first settler communities in the Etzion region - that many observers at the time would have envisaged the mass colonisation process which was to take place during the subsequent quarter of a century. At most, there was a generally accepted consensus within Israel concerning the future of Gush Etzion and a United Jerusalem under future Israeli rule. The remainder of the West Bank and the whole of the Gaza Strip were clearly up for negotiation. This was best reflected in the clear geographical delimitations of the Allon Plan which was pursued until the onset of Gush Emunim in 1974 and the fall of the Labour party government some three years later. The subsequent drive for widespread settlement spearheaded by the Likud governments has meant that the human geography of the region has been radically altered and a political landscape of colonisation has emerged.

In reflecting on the implications of this process, a number of major themes may be delineated. Each of these presents a specific dilemma or paradox with respect to the Israeli (governmental) perspective concerning the ultimate role of settlement as an agent of control and spatial integration/annexation, with that of the functional realities which are currently being experienced by these same settlements. The final point to be discussed concerns the role of these settlements as a tangible factor in the evolving peace process.

### 1. Neighbours without Neighbourliness: The Formation of Dual Space.

Nothing emphasizes the basic political contradiction inherent in Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank than does the dual landscape which has emerged during the past twenty years. This is reflected in all aspects of daily living, at both the formal and informal levels. At the formal level, two parallel systems of civic administration (see above) operate within the same territory, while different legal systems apply to the Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants of the region. At the informal level, Israelis and Palestinians do

not use the services offered by the other, nor do they purchase goods in shops located in each others' village. The spatial awareness displayed by each group for the other is totally lacking and each lives within an artificial form of sectoral space, often divorced from much of the surrounding physical landscape (Portugali & Newman, 1987).

Such duality is contrary to all normal models relating to planning theory. Classic, idealised, regional settlement patterns emphasise some form of geometric hierarchy at operation, in which many small, scattered, villages feed on regional centers for higher order services, the latter in turn focussing their activities on a regional capital or metropolitan center. In this way, patterns of production and consumption are maximised within a given regional unit, fully exploiting spatial economies of scale. In the case of a dual landscape, each ethnic group relates to the surrounding space in complete disregard for the existence of the other group. Thus, economies of scale for basic services rely on minimum thresholds being attained by each of the two populations separately, giving rise either to an absence of services which could otherwise be provided, or alternatively, two parallel service systems operating inefficiently and at great cost for both residents and central government.

Moreover, the basic spatial orientation of each of the two populations differ with respect to the region within which they reside. For Israeli/Jewish settlers, the West Bank (and to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip) constitutes the suburban periphery of the Tel Aviv or Jerusalem metropolitan center. Most settlers commute daily to work within the metropolitan center and view the latter as constituting the "natural" urban focus for satisfying most production and consumption activities. For their part, the Palestinians see their own local towns (Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem and Hebron) as constituting the "natural" urban centers for their daily activities. Their own commuting to menial jobs within the Israeli metropolitan core is brought about through necessity rather than choice. Were sufficient job opportunities to exist within their own residential surroundings, these would probably be preferred. For Palestinians therefore, their spatial orientations are internal, within the region, corresponding to the classic models of spontaneous growth of settlement



patterns. For Israeli settlers, their spatial orientation is external, with the region comprising no more than an additional feeder zone to a distant urban center.

The mix of economic-functional and political duality only serves to strengthen the separateness of the two populations. For patterns of control to be successfully implemented, it would require a far greater degree of integration of the settler population within the local and regional functional frameworks. Instead, ethnic sectoral processes emphasize the dependence of the settler population on an external political and economic center, while at the same time enabling the Palestinian population to internalize their own activity foci. Duality therefore is a major factor aiding the slow evolution of an identifiable separate Palestinian territorial center, which may serve as the basis for the functional components of a future state.

The implications for the immediate aftermath of a political solution would be that both the West Bank (Palestinian) and Israeli entities would continue to be reliant on each other - at least in the immediate short-term - for economic complementarity. Lacking a local industrial and employment infrastructure, the Palestinian residents of the West Bank state would probably continue to commute into the Israeli employment centers. For their part, Israeli manufacturers would probably attempt to maintain a steady flow of cheap labour, either through the retention of the existing spatio-economic links, or by means of investing in factories within the West Bank. The latter process could result in some form of localized neo-colonial relationship between Israel on the one hand and the West Bank and Gaza on the other. While such a situation would be highly undesirable politically for the Palestinians, the alternative - sealing the boundary with Israel, cutting off all labour and fiscal movement and reorientating the space economy towards Jordan - is likely to bring about even greater economic dislocation, and hence political instability.

## 2. Hityashvut or Hitnachalut - What is in a Name?

The West Bank settlement process is generally known in Israel by the Hebrew term "hitnachalut" (lit: squat). This is in direct contrast to the general settlement process which has taken place throughout Palestine during the twentieth century and which is termed "hityashvut". The use of the former term, especially by those groups opposed to the West Bank settlement process, has come to denote a negative form of action. While "hityashvut" denotes the formation of rural, agricultural, self-sustaining village communities, the "hitnachalut" has come to denote a political, non-consensual form of settlement activity, carried out for short-term gains (Tzur, 1980). It is mostly the Gush Emunim settlements which are termed "hitnachalut", while the agricultural communities of the Jordan valley and the Golan Heights - initially established by the Labour Governments prior to 1977 - are not always included within this category.

For the proponents of West Bank and Gaza settlement, the use of the term "hitnachalut" has both negative and positive connotations. Gush Emunim have always viewed themselves as the "natural" pioneering continuers of the pre-State settlement enterprise. Just as the socialist Zionists of the 1930's and 1940's established agricultural colonies against the background of opposition by the then British mandatory authorities, in order to strengthen their claim for territorial control over the future State of Israel, so they (Gush Emunim) too view themselves as performing the same function in the modern era. Criticism of the suburban lifestyles and large detached houses commonly to be found in the West Bank communities as compared to the hardships of the pre-State settlement pioneers, is dismissed by the settlers as being irrelevant. Settlement, they argue, has a political objective, and should be implemented using the speediest technological and available resources. Moreover, many of the original Gush Emunim settlements were founded in relatively difficult conditions, with the inhabitants spending up to five years in caravans and prefabricated huts. This is proof of the ideological commitment of the settlers and their willingness to undergo difficult conditions, should the situation necessitate such sacrifice. Thus, the distinction between "hityashvut" and "hitnachalut" is negated by the settler community.

The term "hitnachalut" also has positive connotations as far as the settlers are concerned. The term itself is taken from the Scriptures in describing the original conquests of the Land of Israel in ancient times by the Hebrew people under the leadership of Joshua, following the forty year sojourn in the Wilderness. It was the conquest under Joshua and the subsequent division of the Land between the twelve tribes which form part of the historical basis to the present national-religious claims to the "whole" of the land of Israel (beyond the political boundaries of the "State" of Israel and clearly including the West Bank). The settlers thus view their activity as constituting the modern counterpart of the Joshuan conquest in reestablishing a physical foothold in the "land of the fathers" and thus ensuring future Jewish control, and even sovereignty, over the whole region.

While the literal translations of the terms "hityashvut" and "hitnachalut" do not entirely conform, it is argued that the distinction between the two is largely parallel to the distinction between the terms "settlement" and "colonisation". The former is considered to be an essentially positive, nation-building process, focussing on the gradual development of economic and social structures. The latter term is essentially negative, depicting as it does the political nature of extending control over an, as yet, unconquered territory, which may even be inhabited by other national and ethnic groups. Many Israelis have difficulty in accepting the notion that all Zionist settlement activity throughout the twentieth century has essentially been one of colonisation, with all which that implies for the rights of indigenous populations. Notwithstanding, there is general consensus amongst most (if not all) Israelis concerning the "right" to settle (both past and present) throughout the territory lying within the pre-1967 boundaries, regardless of the political implications (in the Galilee for example where a process of "Judaisation" has been implemented by Israeli governments since the mid-1970's) (Falah, 1989; Yiftachel, 1991; Yiftachel & Rumley, 1991). This internal Israeli (Jewish) consensus clearly does not exist with regard to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and hence the political injustice of such a process is brought to the fore.

### 3. Frontier Theory and the Wild West (Bank).

Shafir (1984) has argued that Jewish settler behaviour in the West Bank may be analysed using frontier theory, as developed by Turner (1962) on the basis of the American experience of the nineteenth century. Frontier theory basically argues that settlers arriving in the undeveloped frontier behave according to norms which are different to those operating in the settled "center". This applies particularly with respect to matters appertaining to law and order. Only with the later arrival of state institutions, does the region become fully incorporated into the political center of the country, losing its frontier characteristics - the frontier having moved even further westwards.

Contextually, there is much to be said for the operation of frontier theory with respect to settler behaviour in the West Bank, despite the geographical proximity - and territorial contiguity - of the area in question with the political center of the country. Much has been written concerning the vigilanteism of part of the settlement movement (Weisburd, 1989; Sprinzak, 1986). At both the individual and group level, many of the Jewish settlers have been responsible for acts of violence aimed at the local Palestinian population. This came to a height with the discovery of the Jewish underground in 1984 and again, later, with the formation of loosely organised local militias in response to Intifadeh violence.

Israeli courts clearly operate different sets of rules for Jewish settler violence. Sentences handed down to settlers are of a relatively light nature when compared to those given to Palestinians found guilty of violence. While leaders of the Jewish underground were committed to twenty years imprisonment, none remained incarcerated six years later. Other settler leaders received light punishments, despite having been found guilty of illegal use of firearms and even having caused the death of local Palestinians<sup>4</sup>. Similar acts by Israelis within the "green line" would have met with much heavier punishments. In this sense, the West Bank and Gaza act as a clear frontier, in which the often unacceptable behaviour of the Jewish settlers are indirectly backed up by the dominant political and legal system.

Not only are these patterns of behaviour not condemned by a large part of the settler population, but in many cases they are even applauded. The settlers argue that they are operating no differently to many of the early Zionist pioneer settlers who founded communities in peripheral, inaccessible, frontiers of the early twentieth century. What, they argue, was the "Hashomer" organisation, if not a private, para-military, organisation whose objective was to secure the rights of the Jewish settlers in the face of what was perceived as Arab marauders. Such "leeway" outside the acceptable norms of an orderly system of law and order is, so they argue, a necessary component of the long process aimed at ensuring ultimate Israeli/Jewish control over the region.

But "frontierism" is not limited to the behaviour of individuals and groups deciding to take the law into their own hands. In one important respect - the case of land ownership - the Israeli government itself has acted with dubious legal authority. In the period immediately following the rise of the Likud to power in 1977, the founding of many new Gush Emunim settlements were authorised by the new administration. In a number of cases, this took place on land which was clearly under private ownership of local Palestinians. The latter appealed against this illegal land confiscation before the Israeli High Court. While the Court did not reject the illegality of confiscation of private land for civilian purposes, they nevertheless ruled in favour of the settlements on the grounds that settlement in this instance served bona fide defensive purposes - and that this was permitted under international law (Gerson, 1978).

Subsequently, the Israeli governments undertook a greater effort to found new settlements only on land which was classified as public or state land and thus avoid the possibility of future judicial appeals. But here too, the definition of what constituted "state" land was largely an Israeli legal definition<sup>5</sup> and not necessarily in accordance with accepted patterns of landownership amongst the Palestinian residents of the region. Such patterns of control and administration clearly could not have taken place within the pre-1967 boundaries, within which priority is given to the supremacy of an ordered system of land registration and ownership.

To a great extent, then, a form of "frontierism" has been carried out with respect to patterns of control displayed by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. Paradoxically, the lack of formal annexation of the region by Israel has been a major factor enabling this process to develop. Had Israel annexed the region - and extended full civilian control to the region - then both the government and the settlers would have had to operate within much more stringent legal and formal restrictions.

#### 4. The "green line": Reemerging or vanishing boundary?

The territorial extent - and hence the area over which sovereignty applies - of the modern state is defined by its boundaries. An international boundary enables the state apparatus to effectively "close" or "open" its lines of communications and contacts with neighbouring states. The patterns of development which take place throughout the frontier regions largely reflects the nature of the boundary and government policy towards the boundary region (Prescott, 1987). Some states choose to allocate fewer resources to political frontier regions, owing to their fears that this may become (or perhaps already is) a region of conflict. Other states choose to consciously divert additional resources to such frontier regions, in order to demonstrate their effective territorial control and presence throughout the state territory, with no distinction to be made between the periphery and the center. Despite the dangers inherent in future cross-frontier conflict, it is considered an essential step in demonstrating State sovereignty to promote civilian settlement and colonisation alongside, or at least in close proximity, to the boundary.

Israel has always adopted the latter policy with regards to its boundaries. In the immediate post-1948 era, during the period of mass settlement throughout the new State, special emphasis was given to the border regions, such as the northern boundary with Lebanon and the "green line" boundary with Jordan/the West Bank. The presence of the "green line" boundary took on all of the classic characteristics of a "sealed" frontier, with differential developmental policies and spatial orientations taking place on both sides of the boundary. In his

post-1967 studies, Brawer (1984; 1990) has clearly depicted the impact of this nineteen year boundary on patterns of development, especially with regard to the local Arab populations.

The outcome of the 1967 War was to effectively remove the the presence of the "green line" boundary. Israeli governments have continuously stated that the "green line" is an artificial geographical phenomenon belonging to the past. One of the most blatant policies designed to emphasise this point was the removal of the "green line" from all official maps used within Israel, including school textbooks. Israeli children born into the post-1967 geo-political reality have largely been ignorant of the presence of the "green line" boundary and would be hard put to locate such a boundary on a map of the country.

And yet the "green line" remains a strongly inscribed image amongst both Israelis and Palestinians. For the former, it depicts a line beyond which a different set of laws apply and around which the Arab-Israel conflict is brought into sharp geographical focus. For Palestinians, the "green line" represents the boundary of any future autonomous or sovereign territory, to be separated from Israel as was the case prior to 1967. In recent years, the "green line" boundary has come into even sharper focus than was probably the case throughout the first twenty years of Israeli occupation. This has resulted from a number of processes:

a) Israeli governments have continuously been aware of the fact that they have not formally annexed the West Bank and hence the "green line" still has important administrative significance. Beyond the "green line", all civilian matters appertaining to the Jewish population are formally transferred through the framework of the military administration rather than through directives issued by the government ministries in charge of such affairs (although, in practice the outcome is exactly the same - it is no more than a formality). While the Arab residents of pre-1967 Israel are part and parcel of the regional administrative authorities responsible for both Jews and Arabs, beyond the "green line" Israelis and Palestinians are governed according to separate administrations. The delimitation of the Israeli local government regional

councils within the West Bank correspond exactly with the "green line", thus emphasising, rather than belittling, the existence of a boundary, be it only of administrative importance.

b) Settlement policy has on the one hand served to emphasise the distinction between "within the green line" to "beyond the green line", while at the same time attempts have been made to eliminate the past boundary through the establishment of settlements in close proximity to the "green line" and, in some cases, with sections of the settlement actually extending on both sides of the boundary. The major focus of suburban dormitory communities in the West bank are those locations lying closest to the previous boundary. The fact that Jewish settlers cross this line in their daily commute to and from their workplaces is largely unnoticed, especially following the construction and improvement of east-west transportation arteries linking metropolitan Israel to the West Bank. Yet these same settlers, by virtue of their residing in the West bank, are classified as living within "development areas" and are thus able to benefit from tax concessions and other advantages which their fellow Israelis, residing a few kilometres to the west (inside the "green line") do not receive.

More recently (1990) a blueprint for the establishment of seven "cluster" townships was formally announced by the Ministry of Housing as a means of providing housing for the Israeli population during the coming decade. These "clusters" are to be located along the route of the "green line", to be linked by the construction of a new north-south national highway. The government publically perceives this, and other similar developments, as being indicative of the final demise of the "green line". Yet it could equally be argued that such a policy only goes to emphasise the lines' existence, by virtue of the fact that each of the proposed settlements closely hug the previous boundary without extending into the West Bank itself.

c) Probably nothing has done more for the cause of the "green line" than the Intifadeh. Most Israelis, non-resident in the West Bank, no longer travel freely beyond the former boundary. During the period 1988-1991, it became generally accepted that travelling in the West Bank was dangerous for Israelis, owing to



the threat of being stoned or even fire-bombed. As a result, many Israelis became aware, for the first time, of the existence of this invisible line of separation. For their part, this awareness is even stronger amongst the Palestinians. On many instances, the Israeli authorities have announced regional curfews throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, denying access to Palestinian residents coming into Israel. As a result of incidents of violence, even within Israel proper, only Palestinians possessing a work licence are now permitted to "cross into" Israel. Thus, the "non-existent" boundary has taken on clearer boundary functions than has probably been the case throughout the previous twenty years.

It is, of course, paradoxical that no group has done more for the re-emerging awareness of the green line boundary than those who have the greatest interest in proving its demise. Following incidents of Intifadeh violence, it has been the right-wing annexationist politicians who have led demands for the imposition of stricter restrictions on the free movement of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians inside Israel, while there have even been calls for the total banning of Palestinians from crossing the "non-existent" boundary. While the "green line" boundary does not necessarily have to be the precise international boundary agreed upon under any future repartition, it clearly provides the point of departure for detailed negotiations. It may well be that the reimposition of a "good fence" will be the first step towards the formation of "good neighbors".

##### 5. Settlement and the Peace Process: Alternatives on the Reversibility Theme.

When Gush Emunim set out on the road to widespread settlement colonisation in the mid-1970's, their manifestos stated quite categorically that their main objective was to create settlement facts which would become an irreversible part of the West Bank landscape. The settling of civilians would ensure that future Israeli governments would be unable to withdraw from any part of the region. This was perceived as being consistent with some of the major tenets of Zionist settlement policy throughout the twentieth century - namely, that wherever

settlements were founded this was an indication that the site in question would become part of the Jewish collective territory, never to be ceded.

Despite a few setbacks - most notably the surrender of the Gush Etzion settlements to the Jordanian Legion in 1948 - this policy did, indeed, become an integral part of Zionist thinking. Even the Allon Plan - linking the concept of defensible borders with the presence of civilian settlement - was rooted in the apparent "irreversibility" of settlement facts. For their part, Gush Emunim realised that the mere presence of a few small scattered communities would not necessarily ensure irreversibility. Hence, they set out to promote widespread colonisation throughout the region in as large numbers as possible. Clearly, the greater the mass, the more difficult to completely reverse the trend.

An indication of the ultimate purpose of this settlement activity is to be gleaned from a further look at the Portugali & Newman (1987) data with respect to the settlers' views concerning the future of the territories. Of the six options presented to them<sup>6</sup>, the majority of the settlers opted for one of two clear preferences - either full annexation of the territory and the declaration of Israeli sovereignty, or leaving the situation as it is (no change). The large percentage who opted for the latter of these two options fully understood that any formal annexation (on the part of Israel) would only focus world attention even more clearly on the settlement issue. The continuation of the present situation would enable the settlement process to go on regardless, thus bringing about a situation of de facto rather than de jure annexation (Lustick, 1981). Five years on from this survey, the ongoing process of de facto annexation has not ceased. It provides a formidable - although by no means impossible - obstacle to be surmounted in the implementation of any peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.

The change in settlement orientation to the metropolitan fringe during the early 1980's set in motion the arrival of a settler "mass" which began to substantiate the claims for irreversibility of the settlement process. The presence of over 100,000 Jewish settlers (excluding east Jerusalem) is clearly of major significance in determining future options. The fact that both the

United States Government and all of the Arab states (including the PLO) single out the settlement process as the major obstacle in all peace negotiations only serves to further strengthen this awareness of the settlement roots which have slowly been sunk. By 1992, there were second generation Israelis who had been born into the West Bank, grown up entirely within this region and were now setting their own domestic roots in a region which they perceived as their "natural" home territory. A major promotion for the cause of "irreversibility" came with the well publicised series of articles by the West Bank analyst, Meron Benveniste<sup>7</sup> who argued that the process of settlement had now passed the stage of "reversibility".

In terms of technological capability, clearly any settlement process - however massive - is reversible. The removal, and subsequent destruction, by Israel of its complete regional settlement network in Northern Sinai following the Camp David Peace Accords was a clear indication to this effect (Kliot, 1984; Cohen, 1987). Similarly, the financial cost involved in "repatriation" of settlers to inside the "green line", while clearly of major dimensions, would not be allowed (certainly not by external powers such as the USA, the EEC, Saudi Arabia and possibly even Japan) to be the stumbling block to the implementation of a mutually acceptable agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

It is not difficult to make a geographical argument for a new demarcation of a political boundary between an Israeli and Palestinian politico-spatial entity, taking into account the major concentrations of Jewish settlement in the West Bank vis a vis major concentrations of Arab settlement within Israel (Fig 5). Three areas of Jewish settlement, each of which is located in close proximity to the prior "green line" boundary could, theoretically, remain within a Jewish State, while two key areas of Israeli Arab settlement could alternately lie within a Palestinian autonomous/sovereign area. The Jewish areas consist of the Western Samaria region (the outer suburban belt of the Tel Aviv metropolitan region - the "5 minutes from Kefar Sava" settlements); the Etzion bloc of settlements to the south of Bethlehem, and possibly some of the immediate suburban colonies of Jerusalem. For their part, the large Arab concentrations of the "Triangle" region (the towns of Tayibe and Tir'a) along the western margins

## CONCLUSION

withdrawal have been discussed by Efrat (1982), Cohen (1986) and Alper & Feldman (1989). These various studies present a number of territorial options. But while some of their options include the possibility of Israel retaining even small territorial parcels (exclaves?), nowhere is there the recognition that such retention of territory may equally require the granting of other lands in local exchange. Yet a further option facing the Jewish settlers is a solution based on autonomy or power sharing (Alper & Feldman, 1989; Newman, 1991). Under such conditions, settlers would probably be allowed to remain in their settlements. In this respect, functional autonomy would be preferable from the settler point of view than any form of territorial autonomy. What we would be talking about is, in the Israeli reality, a form of bi-national unit within the West Bank, with residents able to opt for alternative administrative, judicial and political systems (for example: Jewish residents of the West Bank would be Israeli citizens within a Palestinian territory, while Israeli Arabs would be Palestinian citizens within an Israeli territory) although on the basis of equals rather than the current set of asymmetric dominant-subordinate relations. Again, this is highly speculative. Evidence from other conflicts in the region (such as Cyprus and Lebanon) would suggest that ethnic mixing under political dominance of one group does not work. There is a clear tendency for migration to take place following territorial partition, resulting in a spontaneous process of ethnic territorial segregation whereby each group feels safer residing within its own homogeneous territory.

Full territorial autonomy would necessitate the registration of any Jewish settlers deciding to remain within this area as a minority ethnic group. We may assume that this would be an unacceptable scenario as far as the settlers are concerned. More critically, what would be the fate of the settlers within a Palestinian sovereign State? Assuming that the eventual borders of such a State would take in most (if not all) of the present West Bank and Gaza regions, then it is likely that the Jewish settlements would be evacuated along the Yamit model.

### Notes

1. The figure of 140,000 is taken from a recent Government Plan (published in November 1991) examining the future settlement absorption of mass Russian Jewish immigration. However, according to a recent article which appeared in Ha'aretz (27.12.91), it is argued that this figure of 140,000 will be reached by the end of 1992, rising to 185,000 by the end of 1993.
2. The data for the socio-economic and demographic characteristics are based on a survey carried out during the summer of 1985 in 32 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, covering over 720 respondents (Portugali & Newman, 1987). The survey also included questions concerning the reasons for moving to the West Bank; family characteristics, production and consumption patterns; and political attitudes.
3. The discrepancies in the results of the two surveys are due to the fact that they were not initially aimed at the same target population. While the Portugali & Newman survey sampled West Bank settlers in all settlement types, the Applebaum & Newman survey sampled a limited number of urban communities in the West Bank as part of a national survey of similar settlement types. The important point to note is the overall difference between the two surveyed populations with that of the national average.
4. When analyzing these figures it must be remembered that many settlers gave the "ideology" response when, in fact, they may have been influenced by the more material benefits of LHP or QOL. The "ideology" response would have been considered, by many, as being more politically correct. Thus the true ratio between "ideological" and "material" responses would probably favour the latter.
5. According to a report issued by the Batzelem (human rights) organization (reported in the Ha'aretz supplement, 27.12.91, p.7), out of 42 incidents in which police suspected Jewish settlers of having been involved in the deaths of

local Palestinians, in only three cases was legal action actually brought before the courts. In two of these cases, settlement leaders Rabbi Moshe Levinger and Pinchas Wallerstein were both found guilty of serious firearm offences (the latter having caused the death of a local Palestinian), but were sentenced to a short (a few weeks) prison sentence (1989) and compulsory social work respectively (1991). Out of eight similar charges brought against Palestinians suspected of having caused Jewish deaths, seven received life imprisonment sentences (the eighth received twenty years) and their houses were destroyed.

6. The "formal" patterns of landownership in the West Bank as recognised by the Israeli government are based on a land survey carried out by the Ministry of Justice in the mid-1980's. This survey, carried out by State Attorney Pliah Albeck, has been criticised by many for being strongly biased in favour of the Israeli authorities and in some cases refusing to recognise claims made by local Palestinian inhabitants.

7. The six options were: annexation; maintenance of existing situation; autonomy; Allon Plan; partition; expulsion of Palestinians.

8. At the time, Benvenisti's thesis received prominent media attention, not least because he himself closely identifies with the Israeli left, supporting territorial withdrawal.

#### Acknowledgement

The author is grateful to Mr. Jilbert Vaknin of the Department of Geography, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, for the preparation of the figures.

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Appendix 2:

Budgetary data for West Bank Jewish Municipalities - 1987/88.

TYPE OF AUTHORITY	POPULATION SIZE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GRANT	
		Per Capita (shekels)	as % of total income
<u>Regional Councils</u>			
All Regional Councils	383,800	322.4	26.7
West Bank Regional Councils	38,500	746.0	36.2
Mateh Binyamin	9,800	604.9	46.1
Shomron	11,200	560.4	44.0
Gush Etzion	4,000	924.9	54.7
Jordan Valley	2,600	990.5	50.4
Hebron Mountains	900	2643.0	69.0
Megilot	600	996.2	47.0
Gaza Strip	2,700	1347.2	55.4
Golan	6,700	542.0	37.2
<u>Local Councils</u>			
All Local Councils	867,600	172.0	28.6
West Bank Local Councils	31,100	314.0	36.0
Qiryat Arba	3,700	619.4	54.3
Ariel	6,200	283.6	43.0
Ma'aleh Adumim	11,800	185.0	22.3
Giv'at Ze'ev	3,800	298.4	37.5
Efrat	1,800	513.4	54.6
Alfei Menashe	2,100	347.0	36.3
Elqana	1,700	445.2	35.1

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Local Authorities in Israel 1987/88: Financial Data. Special Series No. 887. Government Printer, Jerusalem. Table 15.

## **The Specter of Time and The Building Mania**

Nadav Shragai, Ha'aretz, December 27, 1991, translated by Rami Armon

-- The Leaders of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories (OT) are acting like the demon of Palestinian autonomy is pursuing them and they fear an impending settlement and building freeze.

-- During the past 30 months the rate of building in the OT has risen by 1300%.

Time is now the settlers number one enemy, and even though this term has been overused, this is precisely how the settlers' Council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is reacting to the present situation. Almost all the Jewish building and settlement that is being done now, is being spurred on by the specter of the present political process (which they perceive as a threat), and with a feeling that their time to act is running out. In May, 1989, there were 900 Jewish housing units under construction. Today, 30 months later, there are approximately 12,000 Jewish housing units under construction in the West Bank and Gaza, a 1300% increase in the rate of building. Despite this enormous increase, the settler leaders are acting as if the "autonomy demon," as some of them have described it, is pursuing them, and they fear a building and settlement freeze.

Even now, the settlers are trying to figure out how to decrease their dependence on the Housing Ministry and on private builders, and instead begin building their own housing for settlements. A first hint of this new direction is already discernible in the area. For a half year now, a small plant for manufacturing houses has been operating in Mechmash (in the Benjamin region). The Benjamin regional council set up this facility and it is producing houses built from wooden materials. In Ma'aleh L'vonah the plant is finishing construction of its first 30 houses. Nachliel and Talmon have also used houses built by the plant. In Ali they are trying out another method for accelerating the pace of Jewish building in the OT. A pair of English workers finished building a British-manufactured model house in two weeks. The walls of the model house are made of two layers of styrofoam (synthetics) and three layers of concrete. A network of compacted metal surrounds the styrofoam boards and does not use any heavy iron compounds.

These are some small signs of an apparently new direction taken in settlement activity. However, the depth of the change which has already taken place during Ariel Sharon's tenure at the Ministry of Housing (one and a half years), can only be understood by a precise analysis of the maps, charts, statistics, and of course, by seeing the situation on the ground. I

will present an initial and cursory analysis of the data which will point to some conclusions on Jewish settlement in the OT.

**Population:** Ten months prior to the elections for the 13th Knesset, there are 112,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The upswing in Jewish settlement in the OT since Ariel Sharon has been Housing Minister will translate into increased population only in 1992 and 1993. By September 1992, 6000 of the 12,000 housing units presently being built will be occupied by 27,000 people (assuming 4.5 people per unit). Add to this another 2000 residents through natural population growth, and the number of settlers by the end of this government's term (assuming a September election) will stand at about 141,000 people, a 40% increase in only two and a half years.

**The 200,000 Threshold:** Despite the claims of a number of settlement leaders, the data do not support the prediction of 200,000 Jewish settlers by the end of 1992. Only at the end of 1993, two years from now, will the other 6000 units, which the Housing Ministry is presently building, and the 3000 units being built privately (without government assistance), be occupied. Assuming that all units will be purchased in 1993 as they were for 1991-1992, another 40,000 Jews will be added to the settler population of the West Bank and Gaza in 1993. When 3000 additional residents (through natural population growth) are added, the number of Jewish settlers will reach about 185,000 by the end of 1993, an 85% increase over three years.

**The areas of concentrated building:** Most of the new housing, about two thirds of it, is being built in the metropolitan (suburban) areas of Jerusalem and the coastal plain, and most of this is concentrated in the larger municipalities. Only about a third of the building is being done in the "heartland" of the OT. There are many requests for housing in the two main areas of settlement. However, there are some settlements in "the heartland" where the building being done is deemed "reserve" building, and will be inhabited only in future years. Examples of this are Ali and Ma'aleh L'veonah, where some of the houses which have already been built, have not been purchased.

**Population increases by region:** Despite the figures that only one third of the building is being done in the heartland, 46% of all new (1991) settlers, live in the heartland. One possible explanation of this is that the small settlements, mostly ideologically-motivated settlements, made the "extra effort" (and are willing to make material sacrifices) and absorbed part of the new population in temporary housing (such as caravans and prefabricated units). Many of the settlements made conscious decisions to cancel, and go far beyond, the absorption ceilings which they had set for themselves only a few years ago. During 1991, 16,000 Jews moved into the OT. 7700 of these moved into settlements in the heartland (in the areas of

the municipal regions of Shomron, Benjamin, Kiryat Arba, Hebron, Har Hebron, or the Gaza Strip). About 8300 moved into settlements like Ma'aleh Adumin, Gush Etzion, Efrat, or Ariel, Alfei Menashe, Oranit, and Elkanah (on the periphery of Gush Dan).

**Changes in the Population Dispersion:** There has thus been a relative increase in the proportion of Jews living in the more distant (from the metropolitan centers) settlements. The fact that a large minority, over 45%, is now moving into heartland settlements, is causing a dramatic shift in the regional demographics. At the end of 1986, Meron Benvenisti found that about 85% of Jewish settlers lived in the metropolitan areas around Jerusalem and in Gush Dan. Today, only 60% of all settlers live in these same areas. In absolute figures: Today there are 65,000 settlers in these same two centers, and 47,000 settlers in the heartland settlements.

**Growth of the Settlements:** There are presently 66,850 Jewish settlers living today in the 13 largest urban centers in the OT and 44,000 Jews living in 129 small, mostly communal, settlements. The heartland populations, about 47,000 people, live in 113 settlements (with an average of 415 people per settlement) and the 65,000 "metropolitan" settlers live in 29 settlements (with an average of 2240 people per settlement). The four largest settlements are: Ma'aleh Adumim -- 15,750, Ariel -- 11,150, Givat Ze'ev -- 6850, and Kiryat Arba -- 6150. 40,000 people, more than one third of the entire Jewish settler population, live in these four towns.

**Jews as a percentage of the entire population in the OT:**

Assuming that the number of Arabs in the West Bank is about 1,000,000 people (data confirmed by some official sources), Jews comprise only 11% of the entire population in Judea and Samaria. In the Gaza Strip, where about 750,000 Arabs reside, Jews comprise a mere 1/2% of the population.

**Towards 2005:** According to an internal civil administration document, the Arab population in the West Bank will reach 1,424,000 people within thirteen years. There is no estimate on the expected increase in the Jewish population. Having said this, it is already apparent that the rough figure of 250,000 Jews in the West Bank and Gaza in 2010 (which is being used by those who plan for the absorption of the Aliyah), is not appropriate in light of the present rate of building. An average increase of only 10% in the number of Jews in the West Bank through the year 2005, (in the past three years alone (combined) the rate of increase is over 85%), would bring the number of Jews in the West Bank to half a million.

This rate of increase jibes with the Housing Ministry's multi-year plans for another 106,000 housing units in the West Bank on an area of over 90,000 dunams, at a cost of over 14 billion dollars. This plan was prepared by the Planning and Building Administration of Judea and Samaria, headed by Dan Steve, an urban architect and planner by training, who had served as the head of the infrastructure and planning department (in the national security



unit) during Ariel Sharon's tenure as Defense Minister. Steve's plan includes 110 sites, almost all involve expansion of existing settlements. Though 500,000 Jews in the West Bank is only a theoretical figure at present, they would comprise nearly one third of the overall population

**Roads:** The accelerated pace of paving roads throughout the West Bank is one of the main tools which bring Jewish settlers to these regions. Near Talmon, a road has already been paved that by bypasses Ras Karikar, and another road links Talmon, Talmon B, and Nachliel. A new road has been paved to Ali, and part of the new Jerusalem-Gush Etzion road is already open to traffic. The story is similar in other regions. It has occurred on a number of occasions that a road was planned based on alleged military needs when, in fact, the real purpose was expanding the infrastructure for the civilian settlers. This is how the permits and regulations which are usually required for work on civilian infrastructure, can be circumvented.

**Mortgages and Benefits:** According to a calculation made by MKs Chaim Oron (Mapam) and Dedi Zucker (Ratz), the average mortgage granted by the government to prospective property owners in the OT during the 90-91 fiscal year was about 50% higher than the average mortgage in development towns (according to government figures), and 76% higher than the average mortgage granted in the center of the country. The average for the past fiscal year is 84,500 NIS in the OT, 56,500 NIS in development towns, and 48,000 NIS in the center of the country. The Housing Ministry's calculations differ slightly, yet they still provide an explanation for some of the findings. They claim that the level of assistance to those eligible for government-term mortgages is determined according to the distance of the apartment from the country's center. Another bonus arranged by the Housing Ministry is freeing the builders of joint housing units in the territories from infrastructure expenditures, resulting in a subsidy of 17,000 NIS for the building of a four room apartment.

**Land Status:** In a fit of haste, tens of thousands of dunams of land are being set aside through various means in anticipation of their being proclaimed "state lands." Between Dolev, Chalamish, and Atarah, there is a stretch of land that was declared state land just a few months ago. Similar action is being taken adjacent to Dolev itself, in the area in which Yair Mendelsohn's killers hid. According to data put out by Palestinian sources, in one month alone during this past year, over 70,000 dunams of land were expropriated for expanding roads or settlements. A partial list reads: In Dir Abu Mishal (Ram'alah) 2500 dunams. In Luvan A-Sharkiah (Shechem) 10,000 dunams. In the village of A-Zaviah (Shechem) 880 dunams. In Mesoa (Chevron) 1000 dunams. In Abud (Ram'alah) 1500 dunams. In Raafaat (Kalkilyah) 4500 dunams. In the village of Artas (Beit Lechem) 1400 dunams that apparently will be used for expanding Efrat, the municipal center of the Gush Etzion region.

Part of the roughly 8000 dunams which were declared state lands near the villages of Sugah and Kriyot will be used to expand the settlement of Ali. At the end of this process about 40% of the West Bank will be categorized as state lands. At least that's the plan. Likud government policy is that no Jewish settlements are built on private lands. In anticipation of the autonomy talks, the process of declaring lands as state lands has been accelerated. The government will argue for a special status for these areas within the autonomy framework.

**New Settlements:** Rachelim, though it has no permanent housing yet, is already an established fact. Pliah Albeck of the Justice Ministry has already appropriated a suitable tract of land, 200 dunams, for a settlement, and at the proper time the Defense Ministry and the Council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will formally and publicly make an announcement. There are 11 planned settlements that have already received permission to build, mostly from the council of the early 1980s headed by Tachiyah's Yuval Ne'eman. "Seeds" of settlers (the first people who will move into a settlement) have already been prepared through Amnah, the Gush Emunim settlement group, for each of the locations that have been approved for settlements. Nevertheless, there is no intention to reenact the (problems in the) establishment of Rachelim in each of these places. The head of Amnah, Ze'ev Chaver, recently wrote about this: "To our friends who advocate establishing 10-12 'seeds' (settlements) in one day, I don't think it's an appropriate course of action to take at the present time. The result will be a brutal expulsion of settlers and a demonstration to the whole world that this government is against settlement ... we must struggle against this government in every way possible so long it results in successful action. We cannot absorb a failure." Given this (more cautious) tactical approach, the seeds of the settlements of Manoach, an area near Kiryat Arba, and Ginat in the Shomron, are being given a high priority.

### The Jewish Population in the Occupied Territories

	<u>Year</u>	<u># of settlers</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
<u>End of Labor Govt:</u>	1976	3176	---	---
<u>Likud Govt:</u>	1977	5023	1847	58.1
	1978	7361	2338	46.5
	1979	10,000	2639	35.8
	1980	12,424	2424	24.2
<u>2nd Begin Govt:</u>	1981	16,119	3695	29.7
	1982	21,000	4881	30.3
<u>Shamir Govt:</u>	1983	27,000	6500	30.9
<u>Natl. Unity Govt:</u>	1984	44,146	16,646	60.5
	1985	52,960	8814	20.0
<u>Shamir returns as PM:</u>	1986	60,500	7540	14.2
	1987	70,000	10,500	15.0
<u>2nd Natl. Unity Govt:</u>	1988	75,000	5000	7.5
	1989	81,200	6200	8.2
<u>Likud Govt. with Sharon</u>				
<u>as Housing Minister:</u>	1990	96,000	14,800	18.23
	1991	112,000	16,000	16.6
<u>Estimated:</u>	9/1992	141,000	29,000	26.0
<u>Estimated:</u>	9/1993	185,000	43,000	30.5

The data through 1986 are from Meron Benvenisti. From 1987 through the present, they come from the Council of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The 92-93 estimates are based on the present rate of housing purchases.

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המכון למחקר ע"ש הרי"ס. טרומן  
למען קידום השלום

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# **Options for Solving the Palestinian Water Problem within the Context of a Regional Peace**

**Elisha Kally**

## **1. Introduction:**

This paper deals with water issues as one component of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which will need to be resolved within the framework of a regional peace.

At the time this paper was written, during December 1991, the prospects for a regional peace arrangement -- and within this an Israeli-Palestinian peace (possibly in the form of an Israeli-Palestinian/Jordanian settlement) -- were changing from a dim hope to a clear and attainable goal. Thus, this study has taken on the character of a needed and even an urgent basis for actual negotiations and future arrangements. The author of this paper is a water engineer who has elaborated much of the material presented in this study (the data, analysis, and proposals) with the support of the Armand Hammer Fund of the University of Tel Aviv. However, the paper reflects the author's personal and professional opinions. In no way does it represent the positions or opinions of any establishment or institution.

It is hoped that the following proposals, as an independent initiative, will attract the attention of the government agencies and other bodies which are in a position to further their implementation. The following story highlights the need for such cooperation. In the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of 1979, there was a provision which, at the time, was seen by Israel as an achievement: Egypt was required to sell to Israel the same quantity of oil that Israel previously produced in the Sinai. A few years later, the author witnessed a conversation in which an Israeli economist (from the University of Tel Aviv) asked Egyptian and Israeli diplomats, who had worked on the peace negotiations, why Israel had not demanded that Egypt should purchase an equal value of Israeli products each year. The Egyptian's answer was that "no one even made such a request of us." The Israeli's answer was that "at the time we were so satisfied at having negotiated the oil agreement, we didn't even think about it." The

economist responded, "But I suggested such an arrangement during the negotiations!"

The lesson to be drawn from this story is that the politicians conducting the negotiations do not always have the time to consider each step taken, nor do they always have the time to listen to those who have the time to work through a proposal in detail. What is presented here is written in the hope that it will enjoy a better fate than that of the advice rendered in the above-mentioned example.

The present-day water problems of the Palestinians are of two types:

- A. Problems which stem from the geographic, demographic, and hydrological characteristics of the areas with which we are concerned.
- B. Problems which stem from the Israeli occupation and control over these areas.

This paper focuses solely upon the first category. Though the second category of problems, including injustices and discriminatory practices regarding water resources, greatly concern the residents of the Territories (sometimes more than the first category of problems at present), the primary difficulties with which an independent or autonomous Palestinian population will have to grapple will be those presented as being within the first category.

This paper deals with the Occupied Territories (OT) as delineated by the "green line," and does not, with respect to water needs, distinguish between Jews and Arabs in these territories.

## **2. General Background:**

### **2.1 The Region:**

Like other infrastructure issues such as transportation, communications, and energy, and in contrast to certain economic and social questions that are relevant to the OT alone, we cannot analyze water problems in the Territories without addressing the region as a whole and



surveying the overall context of the water situation. We will conduct this survey from a number of perspectives:

A. The Geographic and Physical Data:

The area of the eastern Mediterranean, between Lebanon and Egypt, is an area which links a region that enjoys rainy winters (rain of up to one meter, and even up to one and a half meters annually as in Lebanon), to a region that suffers from an overall lack of rain. The region's location (bordering an extremely arid area) is reflected in the completely dry summers even within the areas that receive winter rains. The category of net moisture (rainfall minus evaporation), divides the area into two types of regions:

- Those in which there is a negative balance (the evapotranspiration is greater than the precipitation) only during the summer (as in the north of Israel, portions of northern Jordan, and all of Lebanon).
- Those, which are utterly dry, in which there is a negative balance both during the summer and usually in the winter as well (southern Israel, most of Jordan, and almost all of Egypt).

The Nile area is a dry environment, but exceptional in that it is not dependent upon water sources within the region. It is an unusual water source first and foremost, because of the amount of water it supplies. The flow of the Nile's waters from southern Egypt (about  $55 \times 10^9$  cubic meters each year) is some 15 times greater than the total potential amount of water available within the areas of Israel (including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), Jordan, and Lebanon combined (which have a total population of about one quarter that of Egypt's).

These facts determine several principal characteristics of the demand for irrigation water by the agricultural sector, which is the primary determinant of the region's water requirements.

- Every region in the area needs irrigation during the summer for the agricultural production of deep-rooted vegetation. In the southern areas, irrigation is needed all year for all types of vegetation. The typical annual

quantity of water needed in the "rainy" areas is about a half meter where modern irrigation methods are used, and about a meter of water used in primitive irrigation methods. In the dry areas the amount is roughly doubled.

- The seasonal water surpluses in the north can be transferred to the south and used to help satisfy the regular needs in the south (excluding the Nile area).
- The irrigation of the Nile is an entirely separate issue. The relatively large size of the irrigated Nile area distinguishes it from the other regional areas in that any surpluses in the Nile area, even if they are small for it would be significant for the northern areas. However, the opposite does not hold true: The relatively small seasonal and other surpluses of northern areas are not significant to the Nile area.

#### B. Economic Factors:

In terms of factors which determine the overall water demands in the region, the following economic ones play a significant role:

- Generally speaking, water (rather than land or other necessary inputs) limits the region's agricultural production capacity. It is the availability of water that determines the magnitude of agricultural production.
- A massive and comprehensive exploitation of the region's main water sources demands government or public initiative and involvement due to the magnitude and cost of such an undertaking. Since most of the water sources are surface ones (and not underground sources which could be exploited with a few solitary drilling sites), they require costly seasonal storage. They are also frequently far from the consumption areas and therefore high costs in transporting the water are incurred.
- The utilization of water in the Nile basin and in the primitive agricultural areas to its north is extensive and wasteful (relative to the existing technological possibilities). Accordingly, the product value of the water (the water's contribution to the agricultural output) is relatively low: about 4-6 cents per cubic meter. In contrast, the utilization of water in the north (in Israel, the OT, Jordan, and Lebanon), is intensive and more

efficient. There, the product value of the water varies between roughly 10 cents per cubic meter (in Jordan and Lebanon) to 20 cents or more per cubic meter (in Israel). These low scale values do not justify the transporting of water to distant or high altitude areas. Transporting water horizontally through pipelines costs some 2 cents per 10 kilometers, while transporting water vertically to higher altitudes costs about 3 cents per 100 meters. Such transportation costs (which are typical for development zones in the region), can only be justified by the higher scales of the water's product values.

Until this point, we have been looking at water use by the agricultural sector, as the primary consumer of water in the region. However, it is not the only consumer. In addition to agriculture, the domestic, municipal, and industrial sectors, as well as hydroelectric plants, have significant water requirements. The municipal and industrial requirements (which comprise a small percentage of Egypt's overall water usage and between 10% - 20% of the other countries totals) are given a higher priority than the agricultural sector's needs. Non-agricultural water usage is assumed to have higher value than agricultural use. It follows that their exploitation costs are higher mainly due to the quality of water required.

Significant hydroelectric utilization is possible in Egypt (because of the magnitude of the Nile's flow) and in Lebanon (because of the appropriate topographical conditions there). The use of water for hydroelectric power in Egypt does not preclude using the same water for irrigation purposes as well. In Lebanon, such usage of water for dual purposes is implemented only seldom and on a piecemeal basis at present.

### C. Ideological Factors

Up to this point, we have considered natural and economic factors which affect water consumption in the region. However, factors of another type -- we'll call them "ideological factors" -- also have a significant influence on regional water consumption. This influence stems from the fact that social and other values, beyond the economic ones, are attributed in the region (as in many other places in the world) to irrigated agriculture. Two examples follow:

- Former President of Egypt Anwar Sadat intended to sell Nile waters to Israel (after the conclusion of the Camp David Accords).<sup>1</sup> However, this initiative was criticized by the opposition in Egypt. It claimed that "the holy waters of the Nile should not be transferred to foreigners," even in exchange for appropriate financial compensation.<sup>2</sup>

- In the early 1960s the Arab League decided to prevent the flow of the Jordan River's water from the Golan Heights and Lebanon to Israel by building a canal to divert the water to the Yarmuk River. The Arab League had even begun to implement the diversion plans. Israel's prime minister at the time, Levi Eshkol, announced that such a diversion would be a *causus belli* since "the water is like the blood in our veins." This proclamation must be understood within the Israeli approach to obtaining social goals through irrigation and agriculture as seen in the dispersion of the population within the state of Israel, populating border areas, and the realization of the ideological commitment to 'working the land' and the agricultural way of life.

In summation, the development and exploitation of regional water sources is, first and foremost, allocated to supplying domestic and municipal<sup>3</sup> needs, though most of the water is used for agricultural needs. The demand for irrigation water is influenced by the fact that the scarcity of water is generally the factor that limits agricultural output. Ultimately, agriculture is an economically worthwhile undertaking that has benefits in addition to the economic ones. Among these benefits are "food independence" and the ideological affirmation of "the agricultural way of life."

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<sup>1</sup> This intention was made clear, among other times, during the Begin-Sadat meeting at El-Arish in 1979.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Ibrahim Shukri, head of the opposition Labor party, criticized this proposal on 7.12.80.

<sup>3</sup> "Municipal" here means non-agricultural uses (domestic, industrial, etc.).

### 3. Developing Water Resources to Satisfy Future Regional Needs:

#### 3.1 The Political Context of the Development of National Water Supplies:

In the region under consideration and in the surrounding areas, the development of national water supply systems has occurred largely in conjunction with major political developments. It is not a coincidence that all the region's states inaugurated their main national water supply systems at about the same time: Israel's National Water Carrier, Jordan's Gohr enterprise, Egypt's Aswan Dam, Lebanon's Litani River plant, and the main dams along the Tigris-Euphrates. That all of these projects were completed during the 1960s is related to the timing of these countries' independence: at roughly the same time in the wake of global developments which stemmed from World War II. The time required, once independence was in place, to decide on, plan, and construct a national water system, resulted in the simultaneous construction of national water supply systems in the region.


The political development of a regional peace settlement could influence the national water supplies of all the states in the region in two ways:

- A. It would enable states to improve their water supplies by taking advantage of opportunities which can not be exploited during the present state of war. These would include international projects which, because they necessitate cross-border implementation and cooperation, can not be pursued at the present time.
- B. A peace settlement would also facilitate and encompass the resolution of present-day water problems such as water shortages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

#### 3.2 The region's states and peoples threatened by water shortages

Let us now go from a general overview of the regional situation to a more focused analysis of the forecasted water shortages in particular countries. (See Map 1)

Map 1: Regional Main Rivers and Water Conduites



source: Kally 1986

In the western Levant, water shortages will be experienced in the Gaza Strip, Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan. These shortages are based on the forecasted water demands. The areas will differ in terms of the prices they will be willing to pay for the water, and the amounts of water they will need to satisfy municipal (including domestic and industrial use) and agricultural needs.

The factors which presently determine, and will continue to determine, the magnitude of the water shortages (for both municipal and agricultural use) in these areas are as follows:

A. Each of these four areas: the Gaza Strip, Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan, *has sufficient water supplies from local sources to satisfy the present non-agricultural needs.* In terms of the future (meaning here the first two decades of the next century), this will still hold true for Jordan and Israel, *but not for the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The local and natural water sources in these two areas will not be able to satisfy their municipal demand.*

B. None of these areas has enough water at the present time to satisfy the agricultural demands (and all will have even less in the future). These demands are determined by one or more of the following factors:

- The potential size economic of agricultural production as determined by the availability of arable land, and by the size of the potential working force and export market.
- The present size of the irrigated land.
- The tendency to expand the irrigated agriculture for whatever reason (economic, strategic, or ideological).

The concept of a water shortage as referring to existing agricultural input should raise criticism from an economic perspective. The water shortage as a productive input, can be understood by an economist if it is related to a temporary shortage in the existing system of production. However, when the shortage is defined in relation to theoretical productive capacities on a scale which has never existed, it raises the question of what comprises a "water shortage." Why don't we also speak about the diamond,

gold, and iron "shortages," since these too, were they to be found, could create new areas of production, no less than water?

The answer to this lies in the fact that agricultural activity in this region has values beyond the economic ones as mentioned in the previous section. These values lie in the realms of the aesthetic, ecological, independence in food supply, among others. In any case, a policy by any of the region's states to expand the scope of the agricultural sector so that there is a further strain on the existing water resources, is a realistic scenario that demands consideration, even if it is not based on normal economic considerations.

C. Water used in the municipal sectors has a higher marginal product value than that used in the agricultural sectors. This fact indicates that in times of municipal water shortages, irrigation waters will be reallocated to municipal needs through a reduction of agricultural output. On the other hand, we also forecast situations in which there will be no reduction in the supply of irrigation water, despite municipal water shortages. This stems from the fact that diverting water from agricultural use to municipalities will be delayed for non-economic reasons (social, ideological, and strategic reasons). In any event, such a diversion cannot be *quickly* implemented, even on the basis of considerations of economic efficiency.

Tables 1 and 2 present concrete figures in connection with the anticipated supplies, use of, and shortages of water.



Table 1  
Background data on the emerging water shortages in the western Levant<sup>(a)</sup>

Area/State	Israel	Jordan	West Bank <sup>(f)</sup>	Gaza <sup>(f)</sup>
Data				
Population in millions, 1991 estimates	5.0	3.0	1.0 <sup>(g)</sup>	0.65 <sup>(g)</sup>
"Future" population <sup>(b)</sup> in millions, assuming 1 million immigrants	7.5	4.3	1.9	1.1
Present Municipal Water Demand in million cubic meters/year	550	110	30	20
Estimated "Future" Municipal Water Demand in million cubic meters/year	950	550	150	70
Present Irrigation Demands in million cubic meters/year	1100 <sup>(d)</sup>	400	100	130
Expected Irrigation Demand in million cubic meters/year according to 3.2B criteria	1400	900	180 <sup>(e)</sup>	130 <sup>(e)</sup>
Potential Suitable Water from Local Resources in million cubic meters/year	1500	1000 <sup>(c)</sup>	120	60

Source: Tahal 1986; updated 1991.

- a. According to Kally (1989c), Schwarz (1982) and Tahal (1986).
- b. "Future" means 2010 at the earliest.
- c. Including 250 million cubic meters of stored Yarmuk winter floods.
- d. Before the restrictions of 1991, when the allotment was reduced to 850 million cubic meters per year.
- e. Details and source of these demands are presented in chart 3.
- f. In the water usage data, no distinction is made between Jewish and Arab needs.
- g. According to the 1991 yearbook of the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 1990 the population in the West Bank stood at .96 million and in Gaza at .64 million people.

The water shortages that can be anticipated on the basis of the data in Table 1 are detailed in Table 2.

Table 2:  
The Expected Water Shortages in the Region  
in Million Cubic Meters per Year

Formula/Source		Israel	Jordan	West Bank	Gaza Strip
(1) Estimated Municipal Water Demand	Table 1	950	550	150	70
(2) Ind. Resources of Suitable Water	Table 1	1500	1000*	120	60
(3) Available for Agr. Use after Satisfying Municipal Needs	2-1	550	450	-30	-10
(4) Expected Demand for Irrigation	Table 1	1400	900	180	130
(5) Possible Supply for Irrigation from reclaimed Drainage	50% of 1	475	275	75	35
(6) Expected Water Shortage	(4) -(3) - (5)	375	175	135	105
(7) Expected Municipal Water Shortage	(2)-(1) if <0	—	—	30	10

\* Assuming that Jordan fully utilizes its share of the Yarmuk River waters (which necessitates the storing of winter floods).

As was presented in the previous table, all four geographical areas under consideration can expect water shortages. However, the most serious shortages, which are characterized by municipal as well as agricultural deficits, are expected only in the West Bank and Gaza.

Those who see the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (henceforth the "Territories") as independent geo-political units, and not as part of Jordan or Israel, will discern there the threat of significant potential water shortage. All the countries in the region, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, are partly arid. However they all have control over sufficient water resources to satisfy all their non-agricultural water demands and a significant part of the agricultural needs for the foreseeable future. The Territories differ in that their natural water sources cannot satisfy even these non-agricultural needs.

The potential water shortage in the Gaza Strip results from the population density and the agricultural uses, while the shortage in the West Bank is caused by the fact that most of the water resources which they could have been physically utilized have already been exploited (the aquifers supplying Israel and the southern Jordan River are used by Israel and Jordan). This situation has been caused mainly by natural factors. These aquifers that are located in the West Bank drain for the most part into Israeli regions, such as the Yarkon, Tanninim, and Charod Rivers, and the Beit Sha'an Springs.

These sources have already been completely exploited by Israel since the 1950s, and therefore any Palestinian claim regarding them will be dismissed, both by the water users, and according to the precepts of international law. International law, regarding water rights, gives priority to those who are presently using and have historically used the resources, over new claims. Therefore, the rights of the residents of the West Bank regarding the Yarkon-Tanninim aquifer has no more standing in international law than, for example, the rights of Ethiopians on the waters of the Egyptian Nile. The claim that the rain which supplies the aforementioned Israeli and Egyptian sources falls elsewhere (in the West Bank and Ethiopia, respectively) has no validity in international law on water rights.

#### 4. Possible solutions:

##### 4.1 General

Solutions based on regional water resources are to be considered in the following. These solutions are divided into 2 categories:

- A. Local solutions (within the boundaries of Israel and the Territories)
  - A.1 The status quo regarding control over water sources
  - A.2 Transporting or selling Israeli water to the Territories
- B. Importing solutions
  - B.1 Desalination of sea water and transporting it to the Territories
  - B.2 Importing water from neighboring countries

These solutions are to be considered below in the context of the relevant engineering, economic, and political facts.

##### 4.2 Status Quo

This alternative initially satisfies municipal and agricultural needs in the short run, but will obviously be unable to satisfy even municipal needs in the future. This situation is completely unstable and will create immediate tensions and demands regarding the regions water sources (particularly Israel's "Yarkon-Tanninim" aquifer). These claims have no hope of being satisfactorily addressed, as explained in the previous section. This "solution" is defective, though politically and functionally feasible.

##### 4.3 Transferring Israeli Waters to the Territories

In light of the water problems in Israel and the need to severely curtail the amounts of water used for agriculture (both to adapt to the present potentials and to meet the increasing municipal needs), this will not be a practical solution.

#### 4.4 Importing Solutions vs. Local Solutions

In contrast to the inability of the local resources to provide a solution for the water shortage problems, importing schemes provide viable alternatives. The relevant factors which will ensure the effectiveness of such a solution follow:

A. These solutions can provide a supply sufficient to satisfy the present and future water demands, and can thereby help to attenuate the severity of the conflict. (The implementation of such a solution is impossible with regard to land resources, another essential component of the conflict.) This approach is similar to the one adopted in the Indian-Pakistani conflict over the Hindus waters. A joint plant produced in the 1950s more water than the total amount of water that was under dispute and thereby resolved the conflict.

B. Importing schemes entail a significant initial investment which is high for the states involved. However, the international interest in a regional peace settlement, should guarantee that this type of investment will be forthcoming from the international community. There are precedents for such international contributions both in the region and for water projects in general. The aforementioned Indian-Pakistani example is instructive, as the construction of the plant was financed on favorable financial terms by many states which shared an interest in peaceful relations between the two states.

Another precedent is, the transfer of Israeli airfields from the Sinai to the Negev (as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement), and the clearing of the Suez Canal were both financed internationally in order to facilitate the successful implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

#### 4.5 Man-Made Water Supplies

Within this category, a sea water desalination plant located in the Gaza Strip is a possible option. This plant could also supply water to the West Bank and more efficiently if done through an exchange: Supplying water to the Negev from the Gaza plant in return for the supply of Israeli

water to the West Bank from the northern part of the national water carrier system. Or an agreement could be reached so that the residents of the West Bank could draw water from shared sources. In such a scenario, the Gaza desalination plant would be credited for the transporting costs saved by the Israelis (from the north to the Negev). It will also be possible to add a processing unit for the desalination of brackish ground water (which is a cheaper process than desalinating sea water).

It will also be possible to establish a dual purpose plant which will produce electricity and fresh water through a "multiple stage flush (MSF) desalination process. (The optimal output proportion for such a plant is about 8 megawatts per million cubic meter per year, which may be too much for the electricity demands of the Territories.) However, we should assume that a single purpose reverse osmosis plant will be constructed (see section 7).

The main advantage of this solution is that the plant would be controlled exclusively by the residents of the Territories, freeing them from any dependence on foreign water sources. The basic drawback to this plan is the substantial initial investment required and the cost of the water. The anticipated water cost is about 45 to 60<sup>1</sup> cents per cubic meter, assuming that the initial capital investment is 6% to 12%, respectively. This results in a fixed subsidy for the plant's operation costs (in addition to the initial investment subsidies).

#### 4.6 Importing the Water from Foreign Sources

Such a solution could utilize the Nile, Yarmuk, and perhaps the Litani rivers (if Lebanon shows a willingness to sell water to the Territories or to Jordan). This solution is based upon the following technical and political considerations:

A. It is feasible, both economically and technically, to extend Egypt's supply system in the Sinai (which was designed to bring Nile water to the Sinai), and thus satisfy the Gaza Strip's water needs from the Nile. Such a

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<sup>1</sup> After the added benefit resulting from the "Exchange Supply" (see section 7).

solution will probably not encounter any political difficulties which cannot be overcome.

B. According to Jordanian plans, water supply for the West Bank was designated to be provided by the Yarmuk River by means of the Western Branch of the Gohr water supply system. This plan can certainly be revived today within a comprehensive plan for the full exploitation of the Yarmuk river. Implementation of such a comprehensive utilization of this water is feasible provided the Yarmouk winter floods are stored.

C. The purchase and transport of Litani waters (by means of diversion to the water shed of Lake Tiberias through the Hasbani River or Ayun River) to the West Bank is economically and technically feasible (not taking into account political considerations).<sup>2</sup> The advantage of this solution lies in the fact that there is no costly initial investment and no need to permanently subsidize the plant's operation costs. Its drawback is that it involves more regional participation and entails a permanent dependence on foreign sources. The regional nature of this solution necessitates regional conditions only possible under a region-wide peace.

It may also be possible to transport Nile waters to the West Bank (in addition to Gaza). However, supplying the West Bank with Nile waters is economically efficient only if it is done in conjunction with the Israeli national water carrier. For example, the Nile waters intended for the West Bank would not actually supply the West Bank, but instead the Negev. In exchange the Israeli national water carrier would supply the West Bank. This type of exchange obviates the need to transport water through the national water carrier to the Negev. There would thus be significant savings, though it is more complicated from a political standpoint.

## **5. Importation Schemes to Supply the West Bank and Gaza Strip**

### **5.1 General**

The following are the main background details that will influence the nature of the water supply to the Territories:

A. A foreign/Israeli enterprise to supply the Territories with water can only be realized within the framework of a regional settlement. One of the components of such a settlement would be the independence or autonomy of some type for the Territories. One of the expected results in the demographic sphere will be, particularly in the West Bank, a reduction or cessation of the net emigration which exists today. Instead, there will be a net immigration and a rise in the present rate of population growth (until a saturation point is reached because of natural and economic factors).

B. The population growth in the Territories cannot be based on agriculture, but, particularly because of the water and land constraints, must be based on industry and services (like the tourist industry). Still there will be a strong demand for irrigation water because of the traditional agrarian lifestyle of the Territories. The available suitable land will allow for the expansion of agriculture up to a level of self-sufficiency in growing fruits and vegetables for the local population and also some export to the Gulf states, Iran, and Europe.

C. The West Bank has agricultural areas at altitudes of 200 meters to 700+ meters. Transporting waters to these regions for irrigation is economically inefficient when one takes into account the sources altitudes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a plan for irrigating only the low-lying areas is preferable.

D. The Nile is the preferred foreign source for supplying the Gaza Strip with water because of physical and political reasons. It is, however, a less obvious choice for supplying the West Bank. For the West Bank, the Yarmuk, and perhaps the Litani, are preferable sources. These sources should first be diverted to Lake Tiberias, and from there would meet the needs of the West Bank's populace (Kally, 1989 a and b).

E. The total amount of irrigated land in the Territories is ten thousand hectares in the West Bank and fifteen thousand in the Gaza Strip. The total suitable area for irrigation (not including small plots under a hundred hectares) is about fifty-three thousand hectares in the West Bank (including the high altitude areas which have little chance of being irrigated) and about twenty thousand hectares in the Gaza Strip.



## 5.2 Expected Water Demand in the Territories

The water demands here refer to the planning time horizon of the first decades of the next century. For the purposes of this paper, the Territories are divided into water supply districts (see Map 2):

- Gaza Strip
- Samaria (Jenin district and Nablus)
- Judea (Ramallah district and Bethlehem)
- Hebron district
- Jericho district

Future water demands, both agricultural and non-agricultural in the Territories are based on updated figures (Kally, 1989 a).

## 5.3 Non-Agricultural Demand

The population in the territories, which stood at 1.7 million at the end of 1991, should reach between 2 and 3 million people early in the next century<sup>1</sup> (one-third of this in the Gaza Strip).<sup>2</sup>

The non-agricultural water demands will be about 80 cubic meters annually per person in the West Bank, and about 65 in the Gaza Strip. (Presently, the figure is about 30 cubic meters annually per person in the territories and about 110 in Israel).

## 5.4 Water Demand for Irrigation


The estimated water demand for the agricultural sector is based on the following figures and assumptions:

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<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, figures which appear in the text and are not footnoted are taken from Tahal, 1986.

<sup>2</sup> According to Bahiri (1983), in the beginning of the next century the population will be some 2 million if the existing political situation continues and about 3 million in the event of political independence, which will bring about immigration into the territories.






Map 2: Water Supply Districts on Ecological Areas Background



Water Supply Districts

1. Jericho District
2. Samaria - Jenin District
3. Samaria - Nablus District
4. Samaria - Tul Karem District
5. Judea - Ramallah District
6. Judea - Bethlehem District
7. Hebron District
8. Gaza Strip

LEGEND: Ecological Areas

Jenin Area	-	
Jordan Valley	-	
Eastern Foothills	-	
Upland	-	
Costal Plain (Gasa area only)	-	

source: Kally 1986.

- A. In the West Bank there is a total of fifty thousand hectares suitable for irrigation (out of which ten thousand hectares presently being irrigated).
- B. In the Gaza Strip there is approximately twenty thousand hectares suitable for irrigation (not including small plots under a hundred hectares). There is presently fifteen thousand hectares being irrigated and only about eight thousand hectares which can be irrigated without overpumping non-renewable water.
- C. The proportion of agricultural crops will be similar to that in Israel today: one-third perennial crops and two-thirds annual crops, such as vegetables. This does not include the Jordan Valley and Gaza Strip, where the ratio will be fifty-fifty.
- D. The efficiency of the irrigation will be similar to that in Israel, though not in Gaza which has a deep-rooted tradition of over irrigating. As is detailed in chart 3, water requirements will range between 500 cubic millimeters per year in the mountain range, to 1050 cubic millimeters per year in the valley. The difference is caused mainly by the perennial crops. The water needs of the annual crops is uniformly between 400 and 500 cubic millimeters per year (since in the dry areas they will concentrate their crops in the winter and in rainy areas, during the summer). The different ecological areas which determine the differing water needs in the region are presented in Map 1.
- E. The demand of agricultural production will not limit the full exploitation of the land suitable for irrigation. The supply of fruits and vegetables in the Territories will exceed the local demand (assuming that the yields reach the Israeli levels, which should happen rather quickly). The demand for the agricultural produce in the Gulf states, Iran and other foreign countries, would absorb the expected surplus.

Details of the agricultural demand for water are presented in Table 3.

Table 3:  
Division of Potential Water Demand for Irrigation According to  
Ecological Regions and Water Supply Districts

	Ecological Region	South Coastal Strip	North Coastal Plain	West Bank Heights	Eastern Slopes	Jordan Valley	Total	Without West Bank Heights & Eastern Slopes
Water Supply District	Av. Water Demand mm/Dunam	650	600	500	700	1050	--	--
Gaza	Area <sup>a</sup>	200	--	--	--	--	200	200
	Water Dmnd	130	--	--	--	--	130	130
Samaria Region <sup>b</sup>	Area	--	100	128	61	18	307	118
	Water Dmnd	--	60	64	42	19	185	79
Judea Region <sup>c</sup>	Area	--	--	52	4	--	56	15 <sup>(*)</sup>
	Water Dmnd	--	--	26	3	--	29	8
Hebron Region	Area	--	--	100	--	--	100	24 <sup>(*)</sup>
	Water Dmnd	--	--	50	--	--	50	12
Jericho Region	Area	--	--	--	--	77	77	77
	Water Dmnd	--	--	--	--	81	81	81
Total	Area	200	100	280	65	95	740	434
	Water Dmnd	130	60	140	45	100	475	310

a In thousands of Dunams = Hundreds of Hectars and million cubic meters per year.

b Including the Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem districts.

c Including the Ramallah and Bethlehem districts.

(\*) Because of this region's altitude, it will not be economical to import water. The figures given are those of the amount of water it can get from local reclaimed sewage water.

The agricultural (table 3) and the non-agricultural demands (table 2) will result in the shortages listed in table 2 (135 cubic meters per year in the West Bank and 105 million cubic meters per year in the Gaza Strip). They are detailed again in the following table.

Table 4:  
Water Demands and Their Sources (million cubic meters per year)

District	Present Usage	Projected Demand	Local Natural Source	Reclaimed Sewage	To be supplied by imported water
Gaza	150	200	60	35	105
West Bank	130	330	120	75	135
Total	280	530	180	110	240

## 6. Importing Water to the Territories

### 6.1 General

The Nile, Yarmuk, and Litani rivers are feasible water sources for a local plant from both an economic and a technical standpoint. A regional peace settlement would provide the necessary political environment for the implementation of such plans. Any plan of this type entails sacrifice of a portion of water, a national resource, by the supplying country. As such, these proposals may be opposed by the exporter because of principled opposition to the removal of a natural resource, and because of the fear of the importer that the "tap will be shut off." The methods of transporting water from these sources is surveyed in Kally, 1989 a and Kally, 1989 b.

## 6.2 Political Background

The use of any of these water sources has political implications which are to be surveyed below.

### A. The Nile

The use of the Nile water to supply the Territories entails sacrificing a small amount of water (the quantity needed by the Gaza Strip amounts to roughly 0.2% of the Nile's waters) in exchange for financial compensation and political benefits.

Supplying Israel with Nile water has already been considered by Egypt. During the Egyptian-Israeli honeymoon in the wake of the Camp David Accords, Anwar Sadat had committed himself to supplying Israel with Nile waters. However, this initiative was bitterly criticized in the Egyptian press and denounced publicly (particularly by opposition groups). It is clear that the public opposition to such a plan may be a factor even in the face of a government decision which approves of such a proposal.

On the other hand, supplying the Territories with Nile waters has not yet been considered in Egypt. The nature of the opposition to supplying Israel with water (which was based more upon emotional opposition than on a desire to keep the water) does not preclude the possibility of public consensus to supplying the Territories. In any case, it seems that for such a plan to be supported in Egypt, the Egyptians must see it as helping the Palestinians, it must be in the framework of a regional peace (which serves Egyptian interests), and Egypt must benefit from appropriate material compensation.

### B. The Yarmuk

The diversion of the Yarmuk (see material presented in publication 7) could serve as a suitable water supply from a technical standpoint. Under conditions of peace, there are also social and political factors which would bolster the viability of this alternative. Some of the relevant facts include:

1. Prior to the Six-Day War, plans were drawn up to supply the western part of the Jordan valley in the West Bank (which was part of Jordan at the time) with Yarmuk waters. More recent Jordanian plans do not contain such provisions.
2. As there is no other feasible long-range solution to Jordan's own water shortage problems, Jordan has considerable economic and social incentives to implement a plan to store Yarmuk water in Lake Tiberias. In the context of a regional peace, these incentives could convince Jordan to implement such a scheme.


#### C. Supplying Litani Water to the Territories

1. Agreement by the Lebanese government to sell Litani water would likely encounter opposition by local vested interests (such as those in the electrical and agricultural sectors).
2. In Lebanon, as in Egypt, there may well be a public outcry against the export of water, a natural resource. However, both payment for the water and the potential for a greater supply of electricity than Lebanon could produce on its own (since the flow down into the Lake Tiberias generates greater hydroelectric output than the flow into the Mediterranean) would be significant incentives for the Lebanese.
3. There have been previous plans to sell Lebanese/Syrian water to Jordan. For instance, the Syrian Diversion Canal Plan calls for transporting water from the sources of the Jordan river to the kingdom of Jordan by way of the Golan Heights. Though this plan could not be implemented since it was based primarily on using Israeli water, the essence of the plan (with Lebanese water) could be revived in the context of a regional peace.

#### 6.3 The Components of the Project

The components of the different projects, based on the different possible water sources (see map 3), are as follows:

Map 3: Imported Water Supply - Sources and Destinations



source: Kally 1986.



#### A. Supplying the Gaza Strip from the Nile

1. Expansion of Egypt's Delta-Sinai system and its adaptation to transfer a larger amount of water.
2. Extension of Egypt's Delta-Sinai System and construction of a conveyance system (canal) that would pass through the Gaza Strip. This plan would ensure a direct supply during the summer and would artificially replenish of the aquifers during the winter months.

It is also technically possible to supply Nile waters to the West Bank. However, this is economically feasible only through an exchange system with the Israeli water system in which Israel supplies the West Bank and the Nile supplies the Negev. Despite the plan's economic viability, since the costs of transporting the water are reduced by cutting the distances from the sources to the distribution areas, the political complications make it a less reliable option.

#### B. Exchange Supply from the Nile

The implementation of this plan would entail:

3. Extending the Delta-Sinai system (as in section 1).
4. Implementation of a system of distribution from the Delta-Sinai system to central storage/reservoir points in the Negev's supply system. This plan would include installations to improve the quality of the Nile waters to levels suitable for irrigation (though not drinking) in Israel.
5. Distribution of water from the Israeli supply system to the central reservoirs in the West Bank.
6. Subterranean storage facilities (wells and well attachments) that will be used to store winter waters drawn from Lake Tiberias to supply the West Bank during the summer.

#### C. The Yarmuk

The plan for supplying Yarmuk water to the West Bank includes the following components:

7. Proportional cost-sharing (between the involved users) of building a system for diverting the Yarmuk waters to Lake Tiberias (Kinneret).
8. Pumping water from Lake Tiberias to the Israeli water system (including joint participation in pumping installations and use of power supply)
9. Distribution from the Israeli system to targeted areas in the West Bank.
10. The establishment of a transport system from Lake Tiberias southward through the western Jordan Valley. (It is possible that the Gohr Canal could be used to transport water southward.)
11. Distribution from this system to various consumption points in the Jericho subdistrict.

#### D. The Litani River

In case of Lebanese agreement to sell Litani water to the West Bank, this system could serve as a partial substitute for the Yarmuk scheme. Components of this plan include:

12. Diversion from the Litani to the Ayun river
13. Pumping from Lake Tiberias (as in 8).
14. A conveyance system from Lake Tiberias southward (as in 10).
15. Subsystems to supply the major consumption points in the Jericho subdistrict (as in 11).

The capacity of the various installations will be determined by the supply needs of the peak month (August) which accounts for 15% of the total annual supply.

Of the four plans presented, we will now consider the two most feasible ones: supplying Nile water to the Gaza Strip and supplying Yarmuk water to the West Bank. (The sale of Litani or Nile water to the West Bank will not be considered).

#### 6.4 Project Investment and Water Cost

The investment in the various components of the project (detailed in Kally, 1989 a and updated here to 1991 prices) would total about \$366 million (based on irrigating only the lower areas in the West Bank). The cost of the water was calculated to take into account, in addition to the return of the initial capital investment, the following:

##### Water Cost at the Source

The water imported from Egypt and Lebanon have a cost component of the value of the water at the source. The estimated source value of the Lebanese water is much higher than the Egyptian one, due to the higher value of Lebanese water's marginal product. This cost component is accounted for despite the fact that both countries will have some water surplus for a few years to come (during which time the marginal product value of the transferred water is zero).

##### Energy

This has been estimated at 7 cents per kilowatt hour. The economic figures for the enterprise are detailed in tables 5 and 6.

Table 5:

Project's Supply (in million cubic meters per year) and Investment  
Costs (in millions of dollars)

Source	Gaza Strip	West Bank
Nile	Supply 105	--
	Investment 142	--
Yarmuk	--	Supply 135
	--	Investment 224

Table 6:  
Water Cost Broken Down by Component (in cents per cubic meter)

Source	Cost at Source	Operation	Energy	Investment		Total	
				6% interest	12% interest	6% interest	12% interest
Nile	4.5	3.5	5.2	8.5	16.2	21.7	29.4
Yarmuk	—	1.6	10.7	10.5	19.9	22.8	32.2

While these costs are quite high, the operational costs, which are not connected to investment, are in line with those in the region. In the event of a significant investment subsidy, the whole enterprise would be feasible.

## 7. Supplying Desalinated Water

### 7.1 The supply of desalinated seawater as an alternative to water importation.

Water desalination schemes have already been considered both as a regional supply and exclusively for the Gaza Strip as well. In the beginning of 1966 a "multiple stage flash" (msf) installation was planned (see 7.2, Desalination Techniques) by an American-Israeli team, with the goal of finding a solution for the water shortages in Israel and in the Territories. The plan was updated and worked out in detail in 1968 as a dual purpose facility for supplying energy (300 MW) and water, supplying about 150,00 cubic meters a day.

This plan was shelved primarily because of the high cost of the water. With a capital cost of 11.7 percent and a power cost of 4.5 cents per kwh in 1988 prices, the cost of the water reached about 70 cents per cubic meter, while the agricultural sector's marginal product value was only 15 to 30 cents per cubic meter.

There were expectations of a technological breakthrough in water desalination technology during the seventies and eighties. This did not

happen in the MSF technology. The updated study of this plan (see Tahal, 1986) concluded that water costs today would be the same as the costs estimated in the sixties (using fixed prices and the same estimates). There were, however, signs of technological advances with the reverse osmosis method (see section 7.2).

There are a number of options with regard to certain elements of a desalination plant:

- The location of the plant
- Desalination technique
- The annual amount supplied
- The role of such a plant in supplying the Territories
- The method of supply: Directly to the consumers or through an exchange with the Israeli supply system

The option presented here is based on the following:

- A. Locating the water desalination plant in the Gaza Strip.
- B. The annual supply will be the same as that specified in the aforementioned project: 240 million cubic meters per year.
- C. The water will be supplied directly to the Gaza Strip and through an exchange with the Israeli supply system to the West Bank.
- D. The installation will use the reverse osmosis method (detailed in the next section).

## 7.2 Desalination Techniques

There are two relatively low-cost and established desalination alternatives which are technologically suitable for the purposes.

- A. A Multiple Stage Flash installation which serves the dual purpose of supplying water and electricity.
- B. Reverse Osmosis, which pressures the water through a salt-impermeable membrane. The basic technical and economic data of the two methods are presented in table 7 (see also Tahal, 1986 and Kally, 1989 a).

Table 7:  
Features of Water Desalination Systems for a Plant Treating 40,000  
Cubic Meters per Hour

<u>Method</u>	<u>Dual Purpose MSF*</u>		<u>Reverse Osmosis</u>	
	Existing Technology	Outlook for 2000	Existing Technology	Outlook for 2000
<u>Feature</u>				
<u>Time span between decision and operation</u>	8 years		6 years	
<u>Potential for Improvement</u>	Limited		Exists, particularly with the membranes	
<u># of operating hours in year</u>	~5000 (depending on electricity demand)		~8000 optimally <sup>(3)</sup>	
<u>Area Needed for the Plant (hectares)</u>	~20		~2	
<u>Chances of Staged Construction</u>	Low		High	
<u>Initial Investment<sup>(b)</sup></u>	620	515	570	420
<u>Energy Needs (in kwh per cubic meter)</u>	7.0	5.8	4.2	3.8
<u>Resulting Salinity<sup>(c)</sup></u>	50	50	500	500

\* Water purification and electrical plant.

(a) But because of agricultural consumption, demand may drop to about 6000.

(b) In Millions of Dollars per Year (1991 prices).

(c) In parts per million of total dissolved solids.

The basis for deciding which of the methods is preferable includes consideration of the following issues:

- Cost of the water
- The possibility of staged investment.
- Flexibility regarding power production.
- The resulting salinity

The advantages of reverse osmosis in regard to the first three issues and the fact that the resulting salinity, though higher than MSF, is not problematic, make it the preferred option.

### 7.3. Cost of Supplied Water

Considering the ways the desalinated water is to be incorporated in the supply system (see section 7.1), the necessary investment will be:

• Investment in the desalination facility	\$420 million
• Investment in storing and conveyance costs	<u>\$130 million</u>
• Total	\$550 million

The cost of the water in cents per cubic meter will be:

Interest rate	6% interest	12% interest
Initial investment	14.5	27.5
Energy Cost (4.5 KW/cubic meter)	31.5	31.5

#### Saving on Pumping in the Israeli conveyance system

(see section 4.6)	-9.0	-9.0
Operation Cost	<u>9.0</u>	<u>9.0</u>
Total	59.0	46.0

#### 7.4 Appraisal of the Desalination Option

The evaluation of this alternative is based on the following considerations:

- A. A desalination facility which will supply a significant amount of water satisfying the relevant demand (240 million cubic meters per year in the previous example; however, a "significant amount" would also be 150 or even 100 million cubic meters per year), would be very large in any scale and consequently subject to risks regarding the construction of the plant, as well as the final cost.
- B. Water from the water plant will be more expensive than imported water by about 25 to 30 cents per cubic meter. Even the operational costs will result in water that is too expensive for irrigation and will need a permanent subsidy.
- C. This plan has the advantage of not being dependent upon the good will of any foreign country.

In view of the data presented the importation option appears preferable.

#### 8. **Conclusions**

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip will, most likely, experience water shortages of some one-quarter billion cubic meters per year by the beginning of the next century. If the water demand is not supplied by external sources, the shortages will probably cause the following problems:

- A. A freeze and subsequent reduction of irrigation (from the present usage of one hundred million cubic meters per year) will have to be imposed in the West Bank to provide water for the higher priority non-agricultural (domestic, industrial, and municipal) needs.
- B. In the Gaza Strip, similar shortages will materialize even faster unless the current over-pumping of underground aquifers is curtailed and stopped.



C. These problems could create more friction and political conflicts between the residents in the Territories and the state of Israel. In the West Bank the problems will stem from the fact that the local residents have direct access to the aquifers which supply the Israeli water system. In the Gaza Strip, conflicts could emerge because Israel will be using water sources (Wadi Bsor) which could also supply water to Gaza.

Palestinian claims to water presently under Israeli control – particularly the Yarkon-Tanninim aquifer – will not be practical because of Israel's own water shortages and because they will not have any standing in international law (due to the legal preference for existing and historical consumption over new claims). The resolution of the Palestinian water problem must therefore be based on an importation scheme which would be facilitated by a regional peace agreement. Thus such a project is contingent upon, and can also strengthen, a comprehensive peace.

It is technically possible to supply water to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from external sources such as the Nile, Litani, and Yarmuk rivers, or by means of a water desalination plan.

While the desalination alternative has the advantage of not depending on the good will of any foreign government (which controls the water sources), any such scheme will necessitate reliance on a substantial permanent subsidy to cover the operating costs (since these costs are higher than the marginal product value of irrigation water. Moreover, these alternatives entail risks which stem from the complexity of this technology, in view of the large quantities of water which will be needed.

Each external water source proposed is subject to certain drawbacks and constraints regarding availability, cost, and political feasibility. The supply destinations are also limited by the topographical features of the consumption areas in question. Transporting water to high altitude areas (in the Nablus, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Hebron districts) will be too costly for agricultural purposes. However, transporting water for agricultural uses in the low-lying areas (in the Gaza Strip, the lower West Bank, and in the Jericho region) will probably be cost-effective.


In light of all these considerations, I propose the project features that follow as a solution to the Palestinian water problem, in the context of peace.

- Irrigation water will only be supplied to low-lying areas in the Jordan Valley, the Gaza Strip, and in the Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus districts. The supply will be 240 million cubic meters per year at an investment cost of \$366 million.
- Nile water will supply the Gaza Strip, and Yarmuk water (whose supply depends upon the storage of the river's winter floods) will supply the West Bank.
- If this importation scheme encounters difficulties and cannot supply all the needed water, a desalination scheme will have to be implemented to make up the shortfall.
- Since the demand for the project's water supply will develop gradually, it will be preferable to stage the investment and implementation of the project.

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


Elisha Kally, a founder of Kibbutz Nirim in the northern Negev, holds a doctorate in Water Resources Management. He was head of the Long-Range Planning Group of TAHAL, the Israeli water planning agency, between 1964 and 1976, serving as water consultant in Nigeria, South Korea, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Colombia, Italy and Brazil. He is author of two books published in Israel, The Struggle for Water (1966; 2nd ed. 1978) and Water in Peace (1989).

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in the Middle East

Abdel-Rahman Tamimi

Palestine Hydrology Group  
Jerusalem

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
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
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**WATER : A FACTOR FOR CONFLICT OR PEACE IN THE**  
**MIDDLE EAST**

**BY**

**Mr. Abdel-Rahman Tamimi, Engineer**  
**Director of the Palestine Hydrology Group**

**Jerusalem, 1991**



## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

If the decade of the seventies was the decade of petroleum and the decade of the eighties was the decade of the war (by proxy); then this decade will be the decade of the conflict over the limited water resources in the Middle East.

The origins of the struggle which this paper discusses and sheds light on are obvious from the Euphrates to the Nile; it is most clear in the Occupied Arab Territories (OAT). Based on this, water experts agreed in April of 1989 that the water security in the Arab world is not of less significance than the national or military security. Results derived from research conducted by American research centers in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) and Washington D.C. indicate that with the increase in the population rate (about 4% in the Middle East) and the decrease in the average amount of water generated in the region; it will be impossible in the decade of the nineties to provide for the water needs of the next generation. The result of this depletion, which Israel has deepened in the Arab world, has intensified due to Israel's stealing whatever it could from rivers and groundwaters to hit the Arab depth. Since we realize that the upcoming war between the two parties will be a civilized war where the struggle over water in the Middle East will become an inevitable struggle where conventional and non-conventional weapons will be used irrespectively.

In 1989, a report by the Strategic Studies Center in Washington D.C. appeared to confirm from anew that a war over the control of water will appear side by side to the Arab-Israeli conflict. And the struggle over who acquires more portions of water shares will be the main characteristic of this struggle. Perhaps this explains the secret to the intricate coordination academically and politically between the United States and Israel in the area of water politics or hydropolitics. Something that attracts attention is that Israel, and it is one of the countries that suffer the most from the water shortage, sees in the sources of Arab rivers and Arab surface and ground water a salvation to their problems in the area. Based on this, Israel pays special attention to the Arab basin countries, especially those in which rivers originate.. It foresees itself, for many reasons, as a main player in the water politics of the region. Therefore, Israel may attempt to blackmail the arab position throughout the negotiations in order to achieve water gains. However, Israel safeguards against over emphasizing this for fear of exposing it's own vulnerability and sometimes appears with the facade of cooperation, calling for stability and that is for many reasons particular to Israel, such as:

- \* Israel participates both directly and indirectly in some of the basins of the arab rivers and she is, in actuality, still in a state of war with these countries.

\* The arab capacity to intervene is still effective in the area of water security and therefore it is difficult to use this "card" to threaten the arabs.

\* The non-arab basin countries (Turkey and the African countries); their ties with the arab countries are stronger than their ties to Israel.

\* Israel's unlimited ambition to become the agricultural, industrial, and tourist country in the region. This is extremely difficult given the limited water resources.

Since the emergence of modern Zionism in the 19<sup>th</sup>, in particular the 1880's, and the development of it's ideas after the Basille conference of 1897; it started to execute it's policies earnestly to find a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. A few years hadn't passed before the Jews in Palestine reached 85,000 and owned 418,000 dunums of the most fertile land in Palestine distributed among 44 agricultural settlements of which 24 in the Galilee and the coastal plains, 4 around Al-Aoga river and 16 along the Yaffa-Jerusalem railroad track. The Zionist movement did not suffice with just building settlements but worked to control the water resources in Palestine in reality in cooperation with the British colonial powers. Britain and France's role was obvious in realizing the ambitions of the Zionist's masterplan in laying out the northern and eastern borders of Palestine by encroaching upon adjoining arab land. The objective being to incorporate some of the more important water resources within the borders such as the origins of the Jordan river, Lake Tiberias, and the eastern Jordanian course of the Yarmouk river. And Palestine with these refined borders was placed under British mandate rule as a stepping stone towards implementing the Belfour declaration and the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews.

Among the executive measures that the British mandate government offered the Zionist movement was it's approval in 1927 to open a company founded by the Russian jew, Mr. Benhas Rotenberg, named the Palestine electric company and granting it exclusive privileges to exploit the waters of both the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers at their meeting point - the Al-Majame' Bridge to generate electric power. Among the company's "conditions for commitment" was the ensurance of it's control over the waters of both rivers and the danger of using this water without the company's approval. These conditions were approved and the company established it's facilities and operated till the end of 1948.

Succeeding this privilege was another one allowing for the drying-up of the Al-Hawleh. The beginning of this project started when the Ottoman government granted privileges to a number of Lebanese. By doing this, they revealed the preliminary work and the high costs of this project, estimated at 50,000 Palestinian liras at the time per dunum. The Lebanese had a financial deficit

thus providing the Zionist movement with the opportunity to pressure the government of the British Mandate to transfer the privileges to the founder of the Jewish company, Hakhshart Hayshoob, in 1934. Despite the fact that it obtained the privilege, work on the project didn't start till after the establishment of the state in 1948.

The interest of the Zionist movement in the water resources focused on determining the quantity of water necessary to absorb and settle Jewish immigrants. It was for this purpose that the Jewish agency in 1937 established Mikaraot company to perform all functions regarding water. This company is the facilitator of the Israeli exploitation of Arab water. The study that is put forward, even before the establishment of the state, was conducted in such a manner as to ensure control over water resources and its exploitation in a well-researched scientific manner. This company still operates within occupied Palestine. As for Israel, control over the water resources remains a significant economic gain acquired through the land it occupied in 1967 and the actual depletion of southern Lebanon. Presently, with the exception of the Litani river, more than half of the overall Israeli consumption is composed of water which was diverted by force from water resources which lie outside the 1967 Israeli borders.

The first water resources which were overtaken by Israel in 1967 were those deriving from the underground water basins in the West Bank. Most of the rainwater which precipitates in the West Bank ends up as groundwater which nurtures land within Israel proper. The Israeli exploitation of these resources began in the early 50's. These underground reservoirs have become an indivisible part of the system devised to extract water then to restore it in wells again along the Ashqelon-Haifa coast.

Israel's unending desire to become a distinguished state (as previously mentioned), the increase in population due to natural growth rates, and the influx of Jewish immigrants has resulted in a situation that Israel can not fulfil the demand even with what it takes from the West Bank and South Lebanon. Therefore it started to propose the idea of taking advantage of waters outside its borders after exhausting the waters of the Jordan river. The idea started with attempting to convince Egypt to divert 1% of the Nile river under the name "Water Peace Project" to Israel vis-a-vis the Occupied Territories. Mr. Elisha Kally, former head of the long range planning division in Tahal (Israeli company) proposed this idea and after outlining this idea it will become evident that it no more than an attempt to revive an old Zionist plan which was submitted to the British Mandate authorities in 1922.

A study of the water resources in Palestine is considered to be the best example which reveals the strong bond between the political and water conditions in the region. In particular, between military expansionism and Israeli strategies and the

water resources. The primary goal behind Israeli expansion in Palestine, the Sinai, Golan, and South Lebanon is to take control of water resources. These resources represent the weak link in the Israeli geo-political composition on the one hand and between it being a source of ideological animosity on the other hand.

#### American Water Plans After 1948

The confrontation between Israel and the Arab countries occurred after the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. This was succeeded by numerous water projects aimed at solving the water problem. The more significant projects are:

##### 1. The McDonald Plan of 1951

This plan was formulated by Mr. Murdoch McDonald and embodied four stages in order to utilize the Jordan River and its tributaries. The Arabs' had reservations about this project for many reasons. One of which their rejection of the idea of using Lake Tiberias as a storage reservoir which Israel had control over. In addition to the fact that surface evaporation would result in the loss of a large portion of water.

##### 2. The Banger Plan of 1952

Mr. Miles Banger, an American expert, devised this plan. This plan came to compliment the McDonald plan and emphasized the necessity of incorporating the Jordan River. The more important points in this plan are:

- a. Construct two dams on the Yarmouk River
- b. Divert water from the two dams to irrigate the eastern and western Ghor valley

Israel refused this plan and the American government pressured UNRWA and the fourth point (military post) was withdrawn and the plan ended in failure.

##### 3. The Baker and Herza Plan of 1955

The two companies of Baker and Herza conducted a study to utilize the Jordan River which lasted for eighteen months. The findings of the study came to reconfirm Banger's proposal to build the dams.

##### 4. The Johnston Plan of 1953 - 1955

The American president Eisenhower's representative in the region tried to bring together between the Arab and Israeli stands concerning the Jordan River. The political conditions at the time were favorable, allowing for agreement. America also aimed from this agreement of joint use of the natural resources to lead to the

recognition of Israel by the Arab side.

#### 5. The Meen Plan of 1953

This project relied on the results of the formerly mentioned projects. This project relied on the projects which agree with the Israeli point of view such as:

- a. Converting Lake Tiberias into the main water storage reservoir of the Yarmouk River.
- b. Utilizing the water of the Jordan River Basin
- c. Establishing a dam on the Hasbani River (lebanon) and diverting the excess to Israel.

This plan was rejected by the Arab side.

#### 6. The Kuton Plan of 1954-1955

This plan was merely an Israeli response to the Meen plan and the Johnston plan. The Israeli's clearly expressed in their response their water ambitions and revealed the basis on which their water policies was founded such as:

- a. Lake Tiberias is to be the main water storage reservoir of the Yarmouk River
- b. Developing of all water resources in the region jointly
- c. Connecting the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean Sea vis-a-vis a channel
- d. Projects will be conducted under Israeli supervision
- e. Coordination between the countries to utilize the water basins.

These are but a few of the water thoughts through which the United States aimed to execute it's policies in the region. History is repeating itself and the United States is trying to play the primary role to simultaneously solve the water and political crisis. But, what in actuality is the problem and it's ramifications after an occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip of about a quarter of century?

#### DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL and NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Each of these will be examined separately.

#### The WEST BANK

In light of the geographic importance of this area in resolving a fraction of the political and military struggle, concentration here will only be on the hydrological context. Especially since the political and scientific Israeli circles

consider this area an indivisible part of their water security and this is for numerous reasons.

Israel obtains approximately 40% of its water needs from the waters of the Occupied Arab Territories (OAT) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition to another 40% to serve the Israeli settlements within the OAT. Thomas Naff, an expert in Middle East water issues, affirmed in an article in the Washington Post based on his famous research study that Israel can no longer continue to deny that the waters of the West Bank are an indivisible part of their overall water consumption. The Military Authorities has placed strict rule for the use of water by Arabs. On 15/8/1967 the military authority issued military order number 92 "Order Concerning Powers for the Purpose of the Water Provisions" under which the military governor was granted unlimited power to regulate Arab water consumption in addition to inflict punishment or fines on those who he views as violators. In 1982 the water resources of the West Bank were completely incorporated into the Israeli water company, Mikarot.

As an outcome of these Orders, Arabs were prohibited from drilling new wells without a license from the military governor. Throughout the past 22 years, the occupation authorities have not permitted the drilling of any wells for agricultural purposes and only a few for drinking purposes. Generally speaking, Arab wells can not exceed a depth of 140 meters whereas the Israeli wells reach a depth of over 800 meters. Due to these policies, a number of Palestinian wells have gone dry and/or the percentage of salinity increased. In the West Bank there is not a single settlement or military post without a water network system, whereas 51% of the Palestinian villages lack this facility. The following table shows the number of villages in the West Bank which have an internal water network suitable for drinking.

Table 1 : Village Water Networks<sup>1</sup>

AREA	VILLAGES OR TOWNS WITH WATER NETWORKS	TOTAL NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND TOWNS
Jenin & Toubass	20	95
Tulkarm & Qalquilia	19	47
Nablus	54	99
Ramallah	65	72
Jerusalem	32	35
Bethlehem	27	31
Jericho & Hebron		

<sup>1</sup> Data gathered up to 1989

The Arabs are subjected to a harsh form of discriminatory measures concerning water use in the OAT. The Israeli settlements consumes more than five times the amount of Arab consumption. In addition, the arab consumer pays two times what the settler pays for the same quantity of water.

#### Water Budget in the West Bank in Terms of the Hydrological Context:

The average annual rainfall in the West Bank ranges between 500 - 600 millimeters. The average number of days in which rain falls is 50 and the daily evaporation loss is 7 millimeters.

Groundwater movement in the West bank has two primary directions, eastward and westward separated by a line. It starts in the south at Dahiriya passing through the hills of Ramallah and ending up in the Jenin area (north).

The basins and their direction : As can be seen in Figure ?, there are small water basins in the West Bank divided according to the movement of water in it. The Western basins includes the Al-Timsah basin and the Hebron- Beer Sheva basin. The Northern basins include the Nablus-Jenin-Jalboa Basin. The Eastern Basins include Bardala, Al-Farqa, Al-Maleh, Al-Baqua'a, Fasaiyel, Al-Aoja, Ramallah, Jerusalem, South Jerusalem basins.

#### The Water Budget :

Average Rainfall =  $500 \text{ mm} \times 5572 \text{ km}^2 \times 1000$   
 $= 2,800 \text{ million cubic meters (mcm)}$   
 Evaporation Amount =  $7 \text{ mm} \times 50 \times 5572 \times 1000$   
 $= 1,900 \text{ mcm}$   
 Surface and valley waters = 176 mcm/year  
 Groundwater = 724 mcm

As for the consumption budget, they are only estimated quantities but nevertheless reveal the negligence towards the Palestinian Arab rights. The following tables show how the Israeli's are benefitting from the waters of the West Bank both directly and indirectly.

Table 2 : Water Usage

Table 2.A. Arab Consumption

SECTOR	CONSUMPTION, MCM/year
Agriculture	95 - 100
Industry & Drinking	15 - 20
Total	110 - 120

Table 2.B. Israeli, direct and indirect, consumption of West Bank

## Water

SECTOR	CONSUMPTION, MCM/YEAR
Water Flowing Westward	470
Settlements	
Irrigation	53
Drinking & Services	12
Total	535

The overall Arab and Israeli consumption ranges between 645 - 655 mcm. The water excess in the West Bank (total available - consumption) is about 200 mcm under ideal circumstances. Therefore talk of there being a water storage in the West Bank is not accurate and is fabricated for political purposes and to draw attention away from the Israeli theft of this water. In addition to securing this water reserve as part of the Israeli water reserve. Under the worst conditions, there is a surplus of 140 mcm of West Bank reserve.

### The GAZA STRIP

The Gaza Strip is inhabited by approximately 900,000 people living on an area of estimated at 360 km<sup>2</sup>; the Strip has a length of 41 km and a width of about 8 km. The demographic and economic crisis of the Strip increased in 1967 due to the imposition of occupation, because this occupation led to the fleeing of thousands. This was further complicated by the fact that thousands of dunums were seized by the settlers (look at the attached table) which resulted in a demographic and geographic disorder in the Strip.

The Gaza Strip suffers from numerous water problems in terms of both quantity and quality simultaneously. There are salinity problems, caused by the upper layers and sea water intrusion (between zero to 30 meters). There is also saline water in the lower layers (20 to 50 meters) the source of which is geographically the desert lands. Salinity encroachment from the south and east. In addition, there is a lowering of the water table by about 12 mm/year due to the high pumping levels. However, the primary cause of the Strip's water problem is the diverting of the Strip's fresh water which feeds the Strip by extension dams along the length of the Gaza valley.

The average rainfall varies according to the geography and fluctuates yearly. The following table shows the average rainfall quantities in the Gaza Strip.

Table 3 : Average Rainfall



REGION	AREA, Km <sup>2</sup>	RAINWATER, mm
North Gaza	67.6	400
Gaza City	61.6	378
Gaza Center	67.9	300
Khan Younis	82.7	250
Rafah	80.0	200

As for the estimates of the water needs for drinking purposes in the Gaza Strip. The following table shows the required quantities for this purpose.

Table 4 : Water Quantities\*

YEAR	POPULATION <sup>a</sup> (thousands)			TOTAL	WATER NEEDS MCM/YEAR <sup>1</sup>		
	Arab	Refugee	Settler		75	100	125
1922	29	-	-	29	1	1	1
1931	50	-	-	50	1	2	2
1946	75	-	-	75	2	3	3
1947	85	-	-	85	2	3	4
1948	170	90	-	260	7	9	12
1967	125	200	-	325	8	12	15
1979	-	-	-	405	11	15	18
1987	260	370	2	630	17	23	29
1990	265	485	3	750	21	27	34
2000	275	685	20	980	27	36	45

\* Source: UNRWA 1988 - DGIS 1990

<sup>1</sup> Consumption litre/individual/ day

<sup>a</sup> Average growth rate is 2.5% for the period between 1990-2000

As for the agricultural consumption, it is as follows based on agricultural product consumption:

Citruses	1000 m <sup>3</sup> /dunum/year
Strawberry	1000 m <sup>3</sup> /dunum/year
Vegetables	700 m <sup>3</sup> /dunum/year
Olives &	300 m <sup>3</sup> /dunum/year

## Almonds

The following table shows acreage according to usage in the Strip.

Table 5 : Land Usage

Type of Usage	Area, dunum 1000 x dunum	Area, dunum 1000 x dunum
Housing Land	-	56.5
Settlements	-	37.0
Agricultural Land		168
Irrigated Land	110	
Non-Irrigated	58	
Sand Dunes	-	103
Total		365

The land distribution for agriculture is as follows:

Table 6: Agricultural Land Distribution

TYPE	AREA*	IRRIGATED LAND*	CONSUMPTION, MCM
Citrus	65	65	65
Vegetables	48	28	20
Grains	36	15.5	11
Fruit Trees	45	-	-
Other	24	-	-
Total	225.5	108.5	96

\* IN THOUSANDS OF DUNUMS

## JORDAN

In mid-1985, the consumption in Jordan reached 870 mcm and it is estimated by Prof. Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania to reach one milliard by the year 2000. This implies an annual water deficit ranging between 170 to 200 mcm. As for the Jordan River which begins in the Syrian and Lebanese heights contains 1,287 mcm and its main tributary is the Yarmouk river. The Jordan river is the natural divider between Syria and Jordan and also divides between Jordan and Israel. Currently only three countries benefit from the waters of the Jordan River; whereas the rights of the Palestinian people continue to be neglected.

Evidence gathered by the West's research centers indicates that the Jordan River basin faces a severe crisis by the year 2000. Israel's needs will have increased by 30% from what it is now whereas Jordan will face a shortage of up to 20%. This is at a time when the upper portion of the river is being used to it's limit. Hence, if the "Unity Dam" between Syria and Jordan is constructed on the Yarmouk river it too will be used to the limit. Most water politics experts agree that by the year 1994, both Israel and Jordan would have exhausted their water resources and truly found themselves in a crisis if both parties don't agree on how to regulate usage. This crisis can only escalate if Syria persists with her developmental projects on the upper Yarmouk. All this will lead to an increase in the salinity in the lower Yarmouk river, Jordan River and Dead Sea. Thus in its part will lead to lower production levels in Jordan and in lower quantities reaching Israel from this water which will lead to more tension between these countries.

#### SYRIA

Syria will face a water crisis by the year 2000 estimated at one billion mcm if the consumption level stays as it is. This shortage is accumulating due to the low levels of the Euphrates River and the increase in contamination of the river by industrial by-products. Due to this some Syrian towns, such as Damascus and Halab, suffer from severe water shortages in the summer. The Syrian government since 1988 has focused on establishing water projects and dams, consuming 43% of the Government's investments in the budget.

The following table shows the development in water use between 1979 and 1983

Table 7 : Syrian Water Development

CATEGORY	1979	1981	1983
Agriculture	5394	5668	5798
Industry	70	85	85
Drinking	284	359	358
Others	26	31	36
Total	5774	6143	6277

The Euphrates River constitutes the major sources of water for Syria. The entrapment of this water in 1990 in Turkey caused a severe problem to the Syrian agricultural economy. Based on this Syria realized the importance of reaching an international

agreement which will ensure sources of water unaffected by political fluctuations. Syria realizes that preventing water from reaching her will result in a catastrophe. Therefore, water stability in the region is the cornerstone for political security in the region. Hence talk of the "Peace Pipes" project is of great interest to Turkey and Syria.

## **EGYPT**

The drought which affected the Ethiopian stream of the Nile river for many continuous years, resulting in a reduction in the quantity of water reaching the Aswan Dam from 1979/80 to 1986/87, had a great effect on the Nile. Egypt heavily depends on the Nile River. In fact some authors in geographic politics relate between the type of government in Egypt and the fact that it is a basin state which requires a strong, central authority. Among these authors is the German Karl Wood Fogel. The problems which may occur at the head of the River ultimately leads to similar problems at its outlet which affects the increasing internal needs in Egypt for water to generate electricity at the Aswan reservoir.

The American expert in Egyptian affairs, Mr. John Waterbury, estimated Egypt's need of water at 73 billion cubic meters by the year 2000. Given that Egypt has an average yearly supply of water of 69 billion cubic meters, then it will face a water deficit by the end of the century due to rise in unmonitored consumption and contamination of the available water resources.

Egypt has the ambition of reclaiming 2.8 million fadan by the year 2000. As the Egyptian researcher, Mr. Zuhra, stated that these ambition requires 17 billion cubic meters. Hence, Egypt is in need of every drop and aims at increasing it's share of the Nile River; therefore, it is in favor of a regional water solution. This will effect the future mode of cooperation as we will explain later concerning the alternatives to the water crisis. Especially since Egypt does have exclusive rights to the Nile and it is bound by the 1959 Agreement signed by the Nile basin countries.

## **The Development of the Israeli and Palestinian Water Needs in Light of the Current Needs and Political Changes**

### **A. Israel**

Research of the Israeli water consumption faces difficulty, similar to those which face the water resources themselves. That is because the researcher has to rely primarily on Israeli statistics, or information disseminated by the Ministry of Agriculture or the Water Department. There are no other information centers, not even on the West Bank and Gaza Strip where there is no up to date statistics except that which was collected by PHG.

Before discussing water consumption in the various economic

sectors, we want to outline in the following table the water consumption trend within Israel since 1948 to 1989.

Table 9 : Israeli Water Trend

YEAR	1948/ 49	1953/ 54	1963/ 64	1973/ 74	1981/ 82	1985/ 86	1988/ 89
TOTAL, MCM	230	850	1288	1565	1770	1951	2500

As can be deduced from the Table, since 1948 till 1989 there has been an average yearly increase in consumption of 56 mcm.

With the commencing of the implementation of the seven year plan 1953/1960, the amount of water consumption within Israel had reached 850 mcm, or an increase of 269.5% since 1948/49. Water consumption since 1980 has been relatively stable (in comparison to the increase in previous years). This means that there have been no new water sources to utilize and this contradicts the evidence which indicates that Israel has been using the Litani river. Therefore, Israel has deliberately issued inaccurate statistics concerning water consumption so as to mislead public opinion.

Agriculture constitutes the major water consumption sector, using about 75% of the overall total. Where 400 agricultural settlements were established between the period 1949-1955, and the area of agricultural land increased from 1.65 million dunums to 3.6 million dunums. In addition, between 1965-1972 the number of agricultural settlements increased in the following manner; 228 Kibbutz, 349 Moshavs (cooperatives), and 104 agricultural towns.

Comparison between the increase in water consumption for agriculture and the growth in irrigated agricultural land, we note that the latter decreased (irrigated land) with respect to the former. Hence, irrigated land increased by a percentage of 321% between 1949 and 1979, as compared to 590% increase in water consumption for the same period. This clearly indicates that the increase in agricultural water consumption did not result in the horizontal expansion in agriculture only but also in the direction of cultivating plants which require greater amounts of water such as cotton and sugar cane.

It remains to be said that the Kibbutz's and other collectives are the major users of this water. The cooperatives consume around 44% of the agricultural water whereas the arab villages within Israel use only 2.2% of the water allocated for all sectors. This is despite the fact that the arabs constitute about 15% of the population within Israel (arabs within the Greenline).

Domestic water use within Israel increases by a percentage

comparable to the population growth rate which ranges between 2.1 to 3% between the period 1948 and 1984. Israeli domestic use is about 160 cubic meters (as compared to 15 cubic meters for the arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip).

It can be said that the domestic and industrial use is about 20 - 22% of the total Israeli water consumption.

Generally speaking, the Israeli circles believe that the upcoming period will experience a large water demand by the cities which will result in a reduction of allocated water to agriculture and industry. This will result in a change in the social and economic structure, especially in the Kibbutz. In addition, it could affect the population distribution. The Israeli expert, Shuval Hillel from the Hebrew University, expects that the deficit will reach 350-400 mcm. Another expert, Meir Kotler, in an article in the Ha'artz newspaper 5/6/1978 estimated the deficit at 200 mcm.

Since the water sources within Israel are limited and completely utilized, it will have to pursue different policies and techniques either from within or outside Israel or to think of regional solutions.

#### **B. The Occupied Arab Territories (OAT)**

Estimation of the water consumption within the O.A.T. is very difficult due to the dependence of the inhabitants on numerous sources for water such as springs, wells, collection tanks, and valleys and the dependence of these on the rainfall. The Jordanian Authorities estimated the West Bank consumption in 1967 at 81.5 mcm annually and the Israeli authorities estimated it at 110 mcm annually. However, Israeli estimates did not cite that the cause of this increase is due to the presence of Israeli settlements. The data gathered by members of PHG indicate that the average Palestinian consumption is 100 mcm for all purposes. This implies that the average individual portion is around 142 cubic meters for all purposes as compared to 537 cubic meters for the Israeli individual.

Generally speaking, the percent of irrigated land in the West Bank is only about 3.9% of the total cultivated land, whereas this percentage reaches 48% within Israel.

As for domestic use, the number of drinking water wells in the West Bank is around 32 with a total production of 20 mcm. Some drinking water is available from the collection wells.

The agricultural and domestic consumption in the Gaza Strip is estimated at 100 mcm for agriculture and 13 mcm for drinking purposes, under optimal conditions.

#### **Future Water Consumption Estimates**

As previously noted, present and future water estimates is part of the overall political struggle. However, scientific data indicates that Israel will unquestionably face a true water crisis in the near future. And will this crisis be at the expense of arab waters (in the O.A.T. or neighboring countries)? The proposed solution to this crisis depends directly on the type of upcoming solution where water will serve as the spinal cord.

The following table shows that the West bank, Gaza Strip and Israel will face a severe and dangerous crisis. However, the West Bank and Gaza Strip face this problem due to the Israeli water policies whereas Israel faces this due to its extreme, unlimited ambition. The numbers show that the West Bank and Gaza Strip will suffer from a deficit of about 120 mcm for agriculture. In addition the inhabitants of the Strip will suffer from a 70 mcm deficit in drinking water. It will be shown later that both these areas will not face a crisis if the Israeli authorities withdrew it's control over the water resources, especially in the West Bank.

Table 10 : Data on Population and Water

ITEM	ISRAEL	WEST BANK	GAZA
1989 population in millions <sup>1</sup>	4.5	0.9	0.6
Future population forecast as of 2005 in millions	6.8 <sup>2</sup>	1.9 <sup>3</sup>	1.1 <sup>3</sup>
Present non-agricultural consumption, mcm/year	500	25	15
Future non-agricultural consumption, mcm/year	1040	190	110
Present irrigation water consumption, mcm/year	1300	100	135
Future irrigation water demand, mcm/year <sup>4</sup>	2500	350	140
Local fresh water resources, mcm/year	1800	120	60*
Fresh water available for irrigation(#7-#4), mcm/year	760	-70	-50
Possible irrigation supply by reclaimed sewage water (half of #4)	520	95	55
Possible water shortage (#6-#8-#9) mcm/year <sup>5</sup>	1220	325	135

Possible shortage of non-agricultural water (#7-#4, if negative <sup>6</sup>	- 70
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<sup>1</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Data

<sup>2</sup> CBS data and net immigration of one million

<sup>3</sup> Following S. Bahiri, "Alternative Economic Scenarios for the West Bank and Gaza Strip

<sup>4</sup> By arable land

<sup>5</sup> May be regarded as upper limit of importation demand

<sup>6</sup> May be regarded as lower limit of importation demand

<sup>7</sup> E. Kally, March 1990

<sup>8</sup> Tamimi, A., July 1990 - Palestinian estimates

\* Water Resources under occupation

## Future Prospects for the Solution of the Water Crisis in the Middle East

It is difficult to discuss a fundamental solution to the water crisis in the Middle East without discussion of a comprehensive political solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle. Issues of water and land have to be included within such a framework. Prior to discussing future alternatives, we must first mention the Israeli ambitions and their approach towards arab water and the present Palestinian perspective of this problem.

### A. Israeli Stand

Israel pursues an unusual approach with her surrounding arab countries with respect to water. On one hand, it aims at forcing the arab countries to recognize it at the bi-lateral negotiation tables on the issue of water. Proposal after proposal is submitted in order to utilize Arab water. Due to the limited budget to conduct studies on the larger rivers; most research is conducted on Israel's behalf by Western, especially American, research centers. Examples of this are numerous, such as the Johnston plan (previously mentioned) and studies by the Strategic Studies Center in Washington D.C. As a result of the cold war between America and Egypt in 1964, the United States concluded a study about the waters of the Nile River which it provided to Ethiopia in order to reclaim 400,000 hectares of the land falling on the border between Sudan and Ethiopia and generate energy. Realization of such a project would result in both Sudan and Egypt loosing at least five milliard cubic meters.

Israel has ambitions in the Nile river since the beginning of the century. With the increase of it's sensitivity of the inevitability of a water crisis, Israel accelerated to cooperate and coordinate with the United States in the area of water research. And for reasons still unknown, the Israeli research departments view the waters of the Nile river as the key to the water problem within Israel. It is for this reason that it pays special attention to both Egypt and Ethiopia. Israel sees in itself as playing a major role in this area due to it's possession of advanced technology which others do not have.



Numerous articles appeared in the Israeli media proposing the diversion of water from the Nile to the Negev. In Ma'arev newspaper 27/9/1978 there was an article calling for this. The Israeli expert, Elisha Kally who headed the long term planning division in Tahal, examined this project and backed it up with numbers and costs and named it the "Peace project". [It is known that Tahal is scrutinizing the costs of this project in detail]. Discussion of this project will be given later.

A similar project was submitted by an Israeli researcher at the Armond Hammer conference in 1987 held at the Tel-Aviv university. It was proposed that water be transferred from the Nile via Sinai to the Gaza Strip and Negev.

The Israeli ambitions in the Litani River have been in existence since a very long time. The Zionist movement tried to persuade the Allied forces to modify the borders of Palestine so as to include the Litani River. In 1941, the Jewish company submitted to the Lebanese president, Alfred Nakash, a proposal requesting the privilege to utilize the waters of Lebanon including the Litani by providing Lebanon with the water and electricity and to transport the excess to Israeli settlements. In 1954/1955 the Litani river was interjected into the Kuton plan which proposed the transfer of some of it's water to the Jordan valley. When Israel occupied the south of Lebanon, several studies indicate, that Israel started diverting water at the Khardaly bridge via four pumps in a pipe to the Jordan valley via Al-Hasbani. There is also evidence which indicates that Israel is working on diverting the Litani river by constructing a 17 kilometer underground tunnel from a point that lies on the south of the Khardaly bridge at an elevation of 239 meters to a location in the Houleh plain at an elevation of 200 meters where it hooks up with a channel which transports water from the Wazani springs and from there the water is transported to an elevation of 44 meters in an area overlooking Lake Tiberias without passing through it to the National Water Carrier (regional project).

As for the Israeli perspective towards the Jordan river, it is no longer a mere idea but has become a reality because Israel is utilizing most of it's water and prevents arab inhabitants of using any portion of it under the pretext of security. Israel removes water from the river to the western areas through the national water carrier. In addition to this, Israel obtains around 100 mcm from the waters of the Yarmouk river. The total Israeli consumption from the Jordan river and it's tributaries is about 600 mcm.

## **B. The Palestinian Perspective**

The water problem in Palestine (occupied territories) arises from two equally significant sources which can be summarized in; (1) the geography and geology of the O.A.T., where Israel shares in

portions of these water basins on the western side of the West Bank and ; (2) the Israeli water policies implemented on the O.A.T since 1967 and which relays fundamentally on the first source. As previously mentioned Israeli water policies also incorporated control and supervision of water consumption. This policy of control is especially blatant in the practice of regulating the quantities of water allocated to Palestinians. We must keep in mind that while Israel claims that it has exhausted the water reserve and that the water reserve in the O.A.T. is threatened by depletion and uses this excuse to justify it's refusal to grant permits to drill wells, Israel continues to drill wells to serve the Israeli settlements within the West Bank.

The Palestinians perceive the deep wells that Israel bored along the extension of the Greenline as accelerating the flow of water towards the water basins within Israel in addition to natural gravitational flow. This is all at the expense of the groundwater supply of the northern West Bank. With respect to the Gaza Strip, there are a number of dams erected right outside the Strip which aid in intensifying the Strip's water problems and results in insufficient recharge of the underground water of the Strip's water basins.

These issues and facts are what compose the Palestinian solution alternative (which will be discussed later).

#### **Alternatives to Solve the Water Crisis in the Occupied Arab Territories, Israel and Neighboring Countries**

Talk of possible solutions to the water crisis in the region focuses on three main tracks which will be presented in detail. Then there is the last alternative which is the continuation of the occupation and its dangers.

#### **TRACK 1 : Resolution of crisis between two countries, Israel and Palestine with no regional cooperation**

Of the outstanding characteristics of the water crisis in the Middle East, is the use of water as an element of pressure to solve other problems. In the event of negotiations, the following must be concentrated on:

1. The strategical water confrontation between Israel and Palestine depends on the nature of the overall peaceful solution given that water is an indivisible aspect of the legitimate Palestinian rights.

2. The status of the exploitation of the Jordan river is illegal whereby Israel continues to deplete the Rivers water through illegal ways.

3. Consideration of the Johnston plan as a starting point for any negotiations is unacceptable because this plan negates the Occupied Territories of its independent political identity.

4. Consultations must be conducted with the Arab parties and Israel to affirm the Palestinian rights in the Yarmouk river since it is a tributary of the Jordan river. This right has been neglected in all projects which benefit from this river.

5. In the case of groundwater, all countries have the right to pump water from the ground which falls within its territory on the condition that this pumping does not affect the surrounding countries. This is the opinion under general international law. In addition, this is an issue which has to be organized by international agreements which specify the amount of water which any country is entitled to pump. This principle must be applicable to the shared Palestinian basins.

Based on the above, the Palestinian-Israeli solution to the problem must focus on the following:

1. That all parties recognize that the future Palestinian state has the right to negotiate, on the same footing, and to reach regional agreements about the sharing of the Jordan river and its tributaries.

2. That the Palestinian entity has the right to demand its water portion and to reach an agreement with the Israeli side about compensation for the water the Palestinians have been deprived of or stolen since 1967.

3. The necessity to require the Israeli side to reveal the numbers and scientific facts relating to water in the O.A.T. and about the artesian wells bored along the extension of the Greenline on the Israeli side.

We must make sure that based on the Helsinki Agreements of 1966 and United Nations agreement of 1972, water portions are divided according to population taking into account the historical rights.

After ensuring the above mentioned Palestinian rights, the Palestinian political leadership may find it appropriate to pursue regional cooperation between the countries of the region on water issues. Thus the problem will be faced by a larger group characterized by joint projects. However, the Palestinian side must realize that the West Bank, in particular, is among the least geographic regions in need of such projects and to emphasize that Israel is the number one country which is in need of finding a way out of this problem. It is inevitable that there has to be some type of regional cooperation, but only after establishing the Palestinian rights.

## TRACK 2 : Limited Regional Cooperation to Solve the Crisis

In the beginning we must mention that by regional cooperation it does not, in any way or manner, imply projects of political or economic integration. It means conducting joint water projects where water percentages and benefits are determined by agreements. Limited regional cooperation implies cooperation between Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Palestine to divide the waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers on the one hand; and, between Israel and Palestine to solve the problem of the joint aquifers on the other hand. In the area of limited regional cooperation, we must mention the Johnston plan.

The Johnston plan was not merely a water project but was also a part of the American policy in the region. Despite the fact that the Johnston plan may provide wide guidelines to share the Jordan river and its limited portions for each party (excluding the Palestinians); its primary objective was to encourage cooperation to confront the surge of socialism and the development of nationalistic sentiments at that time in addition to establishing some minor projects to "soothe" the Palestinian refugees. Johnston suggested the following percentages:

Jordan	49.6%
Israel	38.9%
Syria	9.1%
Lebanon	2.4%

The Palestinian portion was not clearly stated at the time. Therefore, in light of this limited cooperation these percentages will be re-examined after which other water projects can be established such as:

1. Dams on the Yarmouk river with the ensurance of all party's rights
2. Technological projects funded by international cooperation such as Desalination projects and solar energy projects in water projects
3. Establishing a Jordan river committee composed of all projects to oversee and manage joint projects. There are numerous examples of such bodies such as the "Organization for the Management and Development of the Ka'gera basin river (Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) and the "Gambia River Organization" (Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bisaw) and the "Mano River Union" (Sierra Leone, Liberia, New Guinea).

## TRACK 3 : Extended Regional Cooperation with International Support for Large Projects

Prior to discussing an extended regional cooperation, we must reaffirm that solving the water crisis is the ambition and goal of all parties regardless of the extent to which they suffer.

The area that arouses much debate about the Middle East water crisis is which comes first the economic or political factors and which is the independent variable and which is the dependant variable. Some opinions state that the political problems which have evolved are a result of the economic dimensions represented by irrigation, agricultural, and energy projects. While others see that the political problems in the region have resulted in fears that one party will threaten the water resources of another. This has led to parties constructing dams to protect their waters.

The truth of the matter is that we lean towards the point of view that states that the water problem is not a technical one but has economic and political dimensions. The truth of the economic aspect to the water crisis can be seen by looking at the struggle between riparian countries. The best example of this is the status of the Nile basin where Ethiopia and Upper riparian countries continue to establish projects which affect Egypt and Sudan. As for the political dimension, it is the Israeli exploitation of the West Bank waters in an attempt to evacuate the land and because it is easy to take control over. Water experts state that the major cause of this water crisis is the population explosion which has exhausted the available resources. If joint projects are not implemented and the political and regional situation is not resolved; there can not be a comprehensive solution to the water crisis.

As for the future, experts warn from the lack of any comprehensive solution in dealing with the water crisis. Desalination of sea water for large scale irrigation is a very expensive alternative. As for other technological alternatives such as agriculture that requires less water; this is feasible but they do not agree with our nutritional demand.

The overriding probability is that the conflicts over water will serve to feed the regional tension. This is for three main reasons which are:

1. Fifteen countries are fighting over the region's diminishing water supply.
2. The fact that none of the basins are subjects of comprehensive agreements.
3. International law has not provided a clear basis for solving the water crisis.

Owing to the fact that economic and political factors have entered into the water problem in the Middle East in light of there not being a legal framework binding the parties, the severity of this problem increased. Therefore, examination of means to combat this problem must take into account the following criteria:

The strategical approach for confronting this crisis depends on the nature of the applicable scenario to the crisis. These

can be classified in two categories, one of which is of a confrontational nature and the other is of a cooperative nature. The latter implies establishing joint projects to prepare for the forthcoming problem which will effect all countries of the region. The emphasis here will be on this latter approach. In what follows is a presentation of such joint projects.

#### **A. The Egyptian Alternative**

There was a proposal for taking a fraction of the Nile river water to Israel and the West Bank vis-a-vis the Sinai, in return the West Bank would take water from Lake Tiberias. This project was referred to by the Israeli media towards the end of the seventies and was published in a book by Dr. Elisha Kally, former long range planner in Tahal.

However the present situation in Egypt does not allow for the implementation of this project. This is because the total water sources in Egypt are 61.5 milliard cubic meters, of which 55.5 milliard cubic meters is from the Nile. Egypt has a plan to reclaim 2.8 million fadan by the year 2000. Therefore, the deficit in the amount of water required to reclaim this land is 14 milliard cubic meters. Despite these facts, Egypt needs every drop of water. In addition, there is official and popular objection to this project as well as the fact that Egypt can not unilaterally decide on the Nile River. This project, however, may succeed under the following conditions:

1. Realizing a just peace in the region which would create trust in establishing large projects
2. Ensuring international financial support for this project thereby using all parties in one way or another
3. That this project be within the framework of an overall political resolution in the region.

#### **B. The Jordanian Alternative**

This alternative has deep seeded historical roots and has been a political problem from the beginning. This has been a source of conflict in international councils between Israel and Jordan, in addition to being a source of interest for the American administration. In 1953 there was a project by the representative of President Eisenhower to the Middle East to propose a regional solution. And in 1966, the technical committee of the Arab League concluded it plan to utilize the waters of the Jordan river tributaries for the benefit of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

As with Egypt, Jordan suffers from a severe water deficit and land reclamation requires alot of water which will make Jordan hold onto any portion of water. Therefore, nothing will benefit Jordan except for international cooperation and joint projects. One of the feasible projects from a technical point of view for regional

cooperation and international financial support is to construct a channel between the Yarmouk river (which constitutes the border between Syria and Jordan, and Israel and Jordan) and the Houleh lake (the geographic location for this lake). During the winter months, this channel will transport water which will otherwise go unutilized to the lake and some this water can feed the water layers in Israel and the West Bank. During the dry seasons, this water can be re-pumped through the Yarmouk river to the Ghor canal which irrigates the Jordanian side of the Jordan river. This solution could be an example of possible regional cooperation; however, it needs international funding and regional cooperation under an international umbrella.

#### C. The Lebanese Alternative

The Litani River has been an Israeli strategic objective for a very long time and one the Israeli's feel that they can take over. From the Israeli perspective, this river adds at least 800 mcm annually to the Israeli water resources or about 50% of this vital resource. The closest point from the origin of the Litani falls at a point two to three kilometers from the Mattaleh on the Israeli northern border. Israel sees that it can, in practice, divert the waters of the Litani through a two to three kilometer tunnel connecting the Litani to the higher portion of the Jordan river and from there to the National Water Carrier. The ideal place to obtain the water is from a location which falls on the existing Al-Haly Dam at the Karoun Lake; this implies total control over half of the southern Bika'a valley.

This project requires pre-requirements, such as :

1. Compensate Lebanon for the loss of a great portion of it's fertile land which falls in the Bika'a valley.
2. Ensure the safety and security of southern Lebanon from Israeli greed.
3. Realize the greatest benefit which the Lebanese determine.
4. Necessity of the O.A.T. to benefit from this water.

There was another project prepared by the American representative in 1968, in addition to one prepared by 16 Israeli scientists after conducting a field survey.

Israel's demand in reaching an agreement on the quantities of water from the Litani river must be taken as a pressure card on Israel to force Israel to realize other Lebanese and Arab demands in other areas.

#### D. The Turkish Alternative

It is known that high level technical experts are participating in water projects in Turkey. In the Center for Strategic and International Studies conference, the high level Turkish

representative revealed the "Peace Pipe" project. The project, as presented by the Turkish representative, entails two large pipelines emerging from the Turkish land. One in the direction of Kuwait, Eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, The Arab Emirates, known as the "Eastern Pipeline". The "Western Pipeline" will serve some Turkish towns, Syria, Jordan, O.A.T., Israel and Western Saudi Arabia.

The cost of this project is estimated at 20 milliard dollars which will require the Turkish government to request funding from banks and international organizations. As was mentioned in the Report by the International Center; the main obstacle in the way of this project lies in the benefitting countries and in their participating in it. The report states that the countries must be convinced that the project's economic benefits are far greater than any political compromises which any party would have to make. And that the overall objective is to reduce the conflicts and revive the developmental plans.

The presence of an international umbrella whose role would not just be funding but also in devising long term plans and financing these plans to prevent any side effects from becoming obstacles which will prevent the best utilization of these projects.

In summary, if talk about a war over water or the water crisis which envelops the region of the Middle East and other areas of the world sheds a dismal light on mankind future, then the current technological advancements provide an array of solutions. Among these solutions are the construction of dams to store water and construction of de-salination plants.

Despite this, the region has not been able to reach a unanimous decision to solve the water problems and that is because of Israeli's insistence on benefitting from Arab waters unilaterally. It will be impossible to obtain international financial support or support from the super powers until after not only stability but also realizing a comprehensive and just peace for all people in the region.

### General Discussion

The present situation must impose on the researcher to find means to administer these conflicts. Despite the fact that this is a topic for another study, it's realization is a question of great importance. From the scientific perspective, there are but two alternatives which are:

1. Confrontational : This is based on the premise that national water security is indivisible and therefore the Arab countries and the Palestinians must exhaust all international arenas and international balance in favor of terminating the exploitation by



other countries participating in the shared arab waters.

2. Cooperative : This is based on the premise of mutual benefit between strategically located countries or basin countries. This derives from the belief of the existence of shared interests or reciprocal interests without injuring or going beyond the limit. Taking into account the true nature of every riparian needs and it's best utilization. This alternative is the more applicable one because it incorporates shared interests, among others.

The importance of water is escalating due to it's use as a tool in international struggles because of it's political and strategical implications. These implications may result in competition between the countries interested in water. This is especially true since most countries depend in developing their water sources on large scale equipment and structures such as dams. These structures can be, under a state of animosity, easily targeted and destroyed. The case of the Jordan River is a prime example where Israel prevents both Syria and Jordan from implementing it's projects on it and on the Yarmouk river.

At the present time, estimates indicate an increased need for water in Israel, Jordan, and the O.A.T. By the year 1995, the population within Israel, Jordan, and the O.A.T. will reach 5 million, 4 million, and almost 2 million respectively. If we add to these estimates the side effects that the Israeli plan of absorbing 2 million immigrants and providing for their needs will have. Then it becomes obvious that the issue of water distribution and controlling of the water resources will be a decisive factor in navigating the negotiations particular to the establishment of a Palestinian state and returning the Golan heights to Syria.

It remains to be said that Israel will resort to compromises and reviving old projects such as the Johnston plan if negotiations commence. In addition, it will also give and take on alot of projects proposed in the fifties. Therefore the arab side, especially the Palestinians, must tie the solving of the water crisis with the realization of the Arab and Palestinian aspirations. Because Israel suffers the most from the water crisis and it will be the number one benefittor from joint water projects since it will achieve both peace and water simultaneously.

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Listed below is an example of how Israeli orders are issued and one of the first orders is given here as an example of a series of such orders. This Israeli order issued in 1967 in the West Bank reads as follows: -

#### ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES

##### ORDER NO. ( 92 )

In accordance with the mandatory power that I have as the Commander of the Israeli Defense Forces in the area of the West Bank , I give the following order :

##### Definitions:

1- In this order :

The designated day: June 7, 1967

Water Rules: All rules which comprise the regulations, systems, orders, ordinance, leaflets and instructions that were followed on the designated day concerning water conveyance, issuing laws and limiting water shares, establishing water projects, measuring water, preventing water pollution, making studies and testings in all aspects regarding water, drilling wells, listening to objections and arguments and all regulations concerning that, limiting areas for the work of institutes and committees for water, giving required licenses that are requested for the above mentioned regulations, limiting and collecting fees, taxes and profits related to the previous rules.

The Area: The West Bank

Person in Charge: Whom I assign for this order .

Jordanian Government: The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan .

##### 2- Responsibilities of the Person in Charge:

The person in charge (right after he is assigned) will get all the power he needs related to water regulations. This person could be anyone and he could currently be employed anywhere.

##### 3- Responsibility:

The person in charge could do the work himself or assign other people (temporary or permanent) to be in charge of some responsibilities that he himself has.

##### 4- Employment:

The person in charge is allowed to employ any person in the designated area to do any kind of work stated in the water regulations.

##### 5- Establishing and employment of water institutes:

The person in charge can assure the continuity of any institute, organization, governmental committee or institute that works or is permitted to work in accordance with the water regulations. He could also stop the work of water committees and establish new ones whether it was established before the designated day or not. He could also renew the license of the organization's membership and assign a director including himself.

##### 6- Cancellation of employment and authorities:

Any employment or authority will be cancelled unless it was given a new renewal by the person in charge.

7- Validity (applicability):

The regulations of this order will be applicable on any modification or amendment that might occur on water regulations.

8- Continuity:

Any work executed from the above mentioned that is included in water regulations that was worked on between the period starting on the designated day and ending at the starting of this order will be considered in accordance with the regulations of this order.

9- Validity Date:

This order will be in effect August 22, 1967.

10-Order Name:

This order will be called " Order about Authorities regarding Water Rules in the West Bank ", Order No. 92 for the year 1967.

( Dated and signed on ) ..... August 15, 1967 .

Supposedly, in accordance with international law and custom, Jordanian law remains in effect in the West Bank. The relevant Jordanian legislation consists of the Natural Resources Regulation Law No. 37 of 1966 and the Ground Water Supervision Regulations No. 88 of 1966. This legislation empowers the Israeli staff officers responsible for water policy in the West Bank to require the installation of water meters on water sources and to restrict the output from them so as to prevent over-pumping and damage to "the water of the Kingdom". During the period of Jordanian rule over the West Bank, no restrictions were placed on the amount of water pumped from any well. Even if the Jordanian government had implemented this legislation, the water authority would at the same time have helped the farmers in obtaining additional water resources and allowed them to drill other wells at different suitable sites and also easily permitted the maintenance of their wells including cleaning and deepening and repair of well pumps, etc. These taken for granted events are hardly approved by the Israeli military and, when they do, it takes months or years to get the approval.

Water meters were installed in 1976 on all West Bank and Gaza Strip wells and monthly records were kept of the quantities of water pumped by each well owner for a period of at least one full year . Licenses for the drawing of water were then issued to well owners in 1977. Anyone exceeding their licensed water limit is called before the "military court" where the well owner is either fined or the amount of water overdrawn is deducted from the next year's allotted amount.

Furthermore, the Israelis actually took for themselves the water rights of the Palestinian citizens of the West Bank who happened to be absent in 1967 - the "designated day". The farmers who had water rights to a certain spring water lost their rights by mere absence and the Israeli government claimed these rights instead of transferring these water rights to the adjacent farmers or even relatives of the absent farmer(s) as it may occur in other countries of the world.

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n° Inv. 11417  
12 FEB. 1992

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Friedrich-Alexander-Universität  
Erlangen*

*Winter 1991/92*

*A cooperative research project supported by the  
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.*

## *A Solution to the Palestinian National Question and the future of the Arabs in Israel*

### Introduction:

Four years after the beginning of the Intifada and several months since the end of the Gulf War, a Palestinian delegation from the Occupied Territories is negotiating a peace settlement face to face with Israel. Though the Palestinians accepted most of the Israeli conditions in order to make the meetings in Madrid and Washington possible, they hope it will bring the end to occupation and the beginning of independent Palestinian self-rule. It is already clear that the making of concrete agreements between the Arab and Israeli delegations could take months and years. As far as the Palestinian question is concerned, both sides agree that autonomy, or a kind of self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is the main issue on the agenda. Bridging the gaps between the different understandings and interpretations of this autonomy would be the crux of the peace-making process.

Many issues cloud the Arab-Israeli negotiations and make the conclusion, of a peace agreement doubtful without international, particularly American intervention and mediation. However, the future of the Arab minority in Israel is not an issue in dispute. Indeed, this question does not appear on the agenda of the Palestinian delegation. It seems, that all parties concerned have accepted the Israeli stand that the future of Arabs within the Green Line is an internal Israeli question. A group of about forty leading Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip were asked during the months of May - June 1991 to spell out their vision of the settlement.<sup>1</sup> The core issues for negotiation according to this group of interviewees included security, settlements, status of Jerusalem, the issue of water resources and the right of Palestinian refugees to return.<sup>2</sup>



So far, the repercussions of a peace settlement on the future status of the Arab minority in Israel has not been discussed even by the political and intellectual leadership of this community. Naturally, all sides concerned in making peace give top priority to the hot issue of "Intifadaland" and try to reach a "disengagement agreement" before it becomes too late. It is not my intention to disagree with the wisdom of this approach. Neither shall I argue that the issue of the Palestinian minority in the Jewish state should be raised by the Arab delegations at this stage of the negotiations. However, it is my belief that Arab-Jewish relations in Israel are not merely an internal question such as the Ashkenazi-Sepharadic question. Hence, it should be tackled by the negotiating teams, preferably, in a later stage together along with other complicated issues in dispute like Jerusalem, the settlements and the right of return. Although not an urgent issue for the negotiating teams, it is, however, a crucial question for the normalization of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and the Middle East. Moreover, a discussion of Israel's attitude towards its Arab citizens is desperately needed, whether a progress is achieved in the peace-making process or not.<sup>3</sup>

Many issues cast a shadow on majority-minority relations in Israel. However, it is possible to point out two major disputes to which all other questions or disagreements could be attached. While the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinian question as its crux, is the first and most obvious one, the nature and character of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state is a more crucial issue for the long run. A conclusion of a peace settlement with the Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians, will most likely accelerate the Arab minority demands to tackle the second issue which, has been a taboo in Israeli political discourse so far. To which extent shall a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict affect the prospects of reaching an acceptable and tolerable compromise concerning the nature of Israel? In other words, shall the Jewish majority become self-confident, liberal and generous to accept the Arabs as partners with equal citizen rights and opportunities? Concerning the Arabs in Israel, the question is

what repercussions a Palestinian homeland in the West-Bank and Gaza will have upon them. Shall the new realities decrease or increase tension over the delicate issue of identity and national loyalty? Lastly, which role can the Arabs in Israel play as far as Jewish-Arab regional relations are concerned, in the post conflict era?

#### A. Historical Background

A quarter of a century of Israeli military rule over the territories occupied in 1967 did not produce similar results to the irreversible integration of Galilee and the little Triangle. The Arab population in Israel acquiesced to their fate because the state had offered them a carrot of citizenship alongside the stick of the military rule. They became Israeli citizens during a period in which they were left alone as an isolated minority in the Jewish state. Cut off from the neighbouring Arab World and their Palestinian brethren, they had no choice but to accomodate to their new status and hope for salvation from outside. The final abolition of military rule in 1966 and the subsequent shock of the 1967 Arab defeat cleared the way for acceptance of the fait accompli, and to some extent, appreciation for the advantages of Israeli citizenship.<sup>4</sup>

After 1967, Israel has implemented in the newly occupied Palestinian territories, a policy which resembles its attitude toward the Arabs in Galilee and the Triangle until 1966 (Military rule, tremendous land confiscation and Jewish settlements). However, the carrot of Israeli citizenship was not offered by the Labor or the Likud governments, and the latter did not annex the West-Bank and Gaza after seizing power in 1977. Moreover, Israel signed the Camp-David agreement with Egypt which includes the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" and offers them a "full autonomy" in the West-Bank and Gaza as an interim settlement.

The Palestinians for their part resisted occupation and struggled for liberation and independence. Four years of sustained Intifada is a mighty demonstration of their rejection of a fate similar to that of the Blacks of South Africa. Twenty-five years of Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza did not incorporate these territories notwithstanding the tremendous confiscation of lands and colonization.<sup>5</sup> So far fifteen years of Likud Greater Israel policies have increased obstacles on the path to peace but have not made Israeli control irreversible. Proponents of Greater Israel failed to establish Jewish political consensus on this issue. The Palestinians who enjoy Arab and international moral, political and economic support could not acquiesce to continuous occupation. Hence, there is a difference between the Palestinian struggle for freedom and separation in the West-Bank and Gaza Strip and the quest for equality and real integration inside the Green Line. The Intifada did not erase the political border between the Palestinian communities over the Green Line but rather highlighted it.

The Arabs in Israel who acquiesce to their irreversible incorporation into the Jewish state, are still poles apart from the Israeli political consensus on two major issues. Contrary to the Jewish majority, they support self-determination for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and demand full equality for themselves at the expense of Israel's character as Jewish and Zionist state. This stand articulated for a long time by the Communist Party is widely accepted nowadays in Arab political discourse. It is spelled out with some nuances by the Progressive List, the Arab Democratic Party and many independent political activists. Even Arab members of the Labor Party could not afford to challenge this consensus and express public and official support for it. Even the other extreme Islamic or ultra-nationalist activists do not challenge these widely accepted demands. Peace and equality are the alternative "Hatikva" emblem of the Palestinian Arabs inside Israel.

Liberal Zionists tend to believe that ending the Israeli control over the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories will

strengthen democracy in Israel and will make it possible to meet justified Arab demands for equality. Moreover, they argue that citizen equality and mutuality will be possible to achieve without compromising Israel's Jewish and Zionist identity. Underlying such beliefs is the assumption that 1967 was a turning point not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also in Jewish-Arab relations inside the Green Line. Some social scientists and orientalist who have studied the Arab minority in Israel, adhere to similar ideas and highlight 1967 as a turning point in the political transformation of this community. The renewed contact with nationally conscious and organized Palestinians in the West-Bank and Gaza is outlined as the main factor in the process of Palestinization and radicalization of the Israeli Arabs.<sup>6</sup> One Israeli social scientist went too far to define the delicate position of this community since 1967 as occupiers (Israeli citizens) and occupied (Palestinian nationalists).<sup>7</sup> Needless to say, that such dramatization does not accurately reflect Arab feelings and affiliation.

Prof. Smooha has already pointed out convincingly that contrary to the modernization and radicalization theories, the political transformation of the Arabs in Israel is multidimensional and more complicated than the black and white pictures drawn.<sup>8</sup> Instead he argues, the Arabs in Israel are witnessing a continuous process of politicization which makes them more conscious Palestinians and Israelis simultaneously. Keeping the balance between these two conflicting parts of this double identity becomes next to impossible whenever the fire of the conflict is heated. Nonetheless, the vast majority do succeed to keep a delicate balance between Palestinian nationality and Israeli civility.

The Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly since 1967, has played an important role in shaping the politicization process, but only as an auxiliary and acceleratory factor. The main factor, in my view, has more to do with their particular experience: i. e. being Palestinian Arabs, citizens in a Jewish-Zionist state by definition and practice. The contradiction inherent to expecting

full equality of citizen rights and opportunities in a Jewish state which by definition could not meet these demands without a painful metamorphosis is the crux and kernel of the tragic situation. Politicians, orientalists and social scientists who scrutinize the political attitude and transformation of the Arabs in Israel outside of the above mentioned Israeli context are consciously or unconsciously misleading. They adhere to a fading notorious tradition of blaming the victim. Obviously equal attention to the Jewish majority perceptions and attitudes is a prerequisite for a balanced understanding of the minority position and Arab-Jewish-Relations.

#### B. Arabs in Israel: Current Realities and Expectations

"One out of every six Israelis" as Hareven and others have labeled them already a decade ago Arabs number about 750.000, and are expected to become one million by the end of the century.<sup>6</sup> Contrary to previous indications and predictions their percentage of the state population did not increase lately as a result of the coming of about 400,000 new Jewish immigrants since 1989. This state of demographic balance may hold for the next few years if the flow of massive Jewish immigration from ex-Soviet republics continues. In any case it is important to point out briefly the quantitative and qualitative transformation of the Arab minority in Israel. With a marginal immigration factor this small Palestinian community succeeded to become almost five times its size four decades ago. Obviously, we deal with a young population which was born or educated since the establishment of Israel with very little personal experience of the pre-1948 era.

In addition to the quantitative demographic increase, the Arabs in Israel have witnessed a qualitative transformation from a secluded, mostly peasant and politically handicapped minority into a proletarian, self confident, highly politicized and pragmatic community. Contrary to their poorly educated and mostly illiterate parents the new generation of Arabs born into the state have acquired at least elementary schooling. Many of the second-

ry school graduates continue their study in the universities and colleges.<sup>10</sup> They are motivated by high aspiration and expectations and compete for social mobilization in the Israeli society as individuals and collective. Faced with difficulties in seizing a seat in the prestigious faculties in Israel, hundreds of them try their chances in East and West European universities. However, the Arab student's first choice is Israeli universities and today about six thousand of them share seats with Jewish students in Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Beer-Sheba.<sup>11</sup> The young Arab graduates are bi-lingual and well informed of Israeli politics and society. They are committed to democracy and equality and thus sensitive and articulated when they face discrimination and inequality.

The young educated Arabs in Israel are neither docile collaborators nor unrealistic rejectionists. They are pragmatic and well informed of the political realities in Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries. They have accepted their status as a permanent minority in Israel and look for equal rights and opportunities as Israeli citizens. Most of the Arabs in Israel define themselves proudly as an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people, but limit their national aspirations into a legal and non-violent struggle for peace and equality. They are free from an inferiority or guilt complex concerning 1948 war and agree that the time has come for the Jewish majority to deal with them as loyal and equal fellow citizens. The needs of the transformed Arab minority (quantitatively and qualitatively) are growing and thus their relative deprivation in the absence of equalization policies by Israeli governments and institutions. The Arabs in Israel have been very patient in their demands for equality because they still hope it is achievable within the political system. A settlement for the Palestinian national problem, they believe, will enhance their chances of equal rights and opportunities tremendously.

While the peace making negotiations are a great source of hope and relief for the Arab minority in Israel, the Jewish massive immigration causes a great deal of anxiety.<sup>12</sup> The Israeli govern-

ment on the other side continues reluctantly to take part in the peace negotiations while enthusiastically allocate billions of dollars to absorb hundreds of thousands of new immigrants. Among the new comers are dozens of thousands of engineers, physicians, scientists and other academics. Israeli society is already facing increasing problem of unemployment which will sharply intensify with additional immigrants entering the vocational market. In such realities more and more Arabs will find themselves pushed out of their jobs to make room for "hebrew work". Indeed, this is already a part of present experience for many Arabs during the last couple of years. Particularly critical is the lot of Arab engineers, physicians and other university graduates. Arab academics in Israel face enormous difficulties in finding a job which suits their profession. Some of them settle in mixed or even Jewish cities in the absence of vocational chances in their Arab localities. Others compromise for teaching jobs or turn to construction and other unskilled manual work. Even Ph.D. Arab graduates discover that their high diploma is not sufficient for socio-economic mobility in the Israeli society.<sup>13</sup> Only about a dozen of them so far have succeeded to make a career in all the Israeli universities. With this background of closed gates, about eighty of them joined the faculty of Palestinian West Bank universities and colleges. But this path has been blocked lately as a result of the continuous closure of these teaching institutions by Israely military orders, and shortage of financial funds. Thus, more and more Arab scholars from Israel immigrate to the U.S.A. and Europe, or simply extend their stay after graduation. This brain drain in the absence of an Arab university and other economic infrastructure in Arab localities makes prospects of bridging the gaps between Arabs and Jews very slim under the present realities and policies. Without a substantial change in the attitude of the Israeli government and institutions toward the Arabs they will be condemned to stay in the lowest steps of the socio-economic ladder. Before proceeding to deal with future prospects, a quick look on the obstacles preventing equality and social mobility for Arabs in Israel is due.

Israel is perceived, particularly in the western media and public as a democratic state because of its political and judicial systems. Many proponents of this perception are aware of Israel's discriminatory attitudes toward the Arab citizens as individuals and as a community. However, they belittle these inequalities by attributing them to "security reasons" or merely the absence of actual equal opportunities like many other minorities in the world. Thus the inherent origins of discrimination in the Israeli legal and political systems are not exposed or discussed.

True, unlike the Apartheid system in South Africa there is no official legal framework for systematical laws of seclusion and overt discrimination against the Arabs in Israel as such. Formally, they are equal citizens who take part in parliamentary and municipal elections as full members of the Israeli society. However, this and other technical features of equal citizenship are contained by serious shortcomings in Israel's democracy, legal system and most importantly the Zionist nature and character of the state and its institutions. It is beyond the scope and intention of this paper to dwell into a detailed discussion of legal and institutionalized discrimination against the Arab citizens.<sup>14</sup> Suffice it for our purposes to point out the major limits and shortcomings of the Israeli legal and political systems in order to understand the root source for the discrepancy between the formal democracy for all and the actual inherent inequality.

It should be said in the outset that since the abolition of the military rule in 1966, the Arabs suffer less from daily repression and overt discrimination. Since the termination of military control over the Arab areas, coercion, police monitoring and punishment of political activists have decreased partially because the authorities focus shifted to the newly occupied territories after 1967. However, little progress could be monitored in equalizing the Arabs with Jewish citizens in the last couple of decades. Labor and Likud governments subsequently, are aware of sustained inequalities, but except for promises on the



eve of election campaigns, very little is done. It is obvious that no remarkable change could be expected without a revision in the legal and political systems which allow the inferior status of the Arab minority.

To start with, Israel still does not have a constitution. Its absence makes individual and collective rights of the Arab minority vulnerable and dependent on the goodwill of the Jewish majority and its representatives. The words of Israel's proclamation of independence could not make up for a binding constitution or laws of equal human and citizens rights. The Emergency (Administrative) Regulations established and implemented against Jews and Arabs by the British Mandate authorities since 1945 are still in force. The "Yishuv" struggled fiercely for the abolition of these notorious regulations and few of its leaders labeled them as Nazi like laws.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless the new born state of Israel adopted the emergency regulations and implemented them heavily against Arabs in Israel until 1967 and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza subsequently. Lately, Israeli authorities make little use of these colonial regulations against Arab citizens inside the Green Line. However, they were not abolished and they are used from time to time to infringe on citizen rights.

Arab equal rights are denied in Israel on the pretext of not serving in the army, and thus not fulfilling equal citizen obligations. On these grounds Arab citizens are discriminated against in social security and child benefits, loans for housing, returned citizen benefits and the like. Needless to say, Arab families and children are punished by the authorities for no crime committed. Israel's authorities decided not to recruit Arab youth (except for Druzes and some Bedouins) on the grounds of dubious loyalty to the Jewish state. However, those Arabs who make compulsory or voluntary military service are still far from gaining equal citizens rights and opportunities. Meanwhile, Anti-zionists and ultra-orthodox, non-zionist Jews who exempt themselves from army service do get the benefits denied to the Arabs. Obviously, army obligation is used as a cover and pretext for depriving the Arab population from some socio-economic equal benefits and

opportunities. Moreover, while many Jews pay lower income taxes and social insurance as residents of "Development Settlements", Arab localities are "too developed" to be included in this category for tax reductions.

The last point leads us to the most important source of discrimination against "non-Jews" in Israel which is inherent in the nature of the state as Jewish-Zionist by definition, and the large role of Zionist organizations and institutions in development projects and Welfare activities.<sup>16</sup> Israel is Jewish and Zionist not only in its symbols, holidays and official institutions but also in its ideology and goals. By definition, it is the homeland of all Jews in the world and not a state for all its citizens. As a result the Arab minority is marginalized and excluded from national goals and condemned to the inferior status of second class citizens. When Jewish new immigrants, Jewish settlements in the Arab Occupied Territories or special allocations for Jewish Religious Parties are concerned, billions and hundreds of millions of dollars are found easily. It is a different story when fifty million dollars are badly needed for enabling Arab municipalities to sustain elementary services in their localities.<sup>17</sup> Israel's democracy, as far as its Arab citizens are concerned is a formal and partial one which resembles South Africa's democracy for the Whites. Equality for the Arab minority could materialize only through a gradual process of transforming the present Zionist democracy into an Israeli one for all the state's citizens.

Israeli liberals, including leading politicians are aware of inequalities and argue that tackling this issue of equalizing the Arab citizens is possible irrespective of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the nature and character of Israel as a Jewish state. To illustrate such beliefs, the words of Moshe Arens, present defense minister and a leading Likud politician are recalled. In January 1981, he spelled out in the Van Leer Institute, some promising ideas concerning the status of Arab citizens in Israel.<sup>18</sup>

"I refer to the Palestinian problem as one who believes that the Arabs living within the state of Israel are also Palestinian Arabs. It seems to me that they have a problem. When we ask ourselves whether they are equal citizens - with equal rights, equal obligations and equal opportunities - in the state of Israel we find it difficult to answer in the affirmative."

Mr. Arens confessed that equalizing the Arab minority status to the Jewish majority is a Jewish problem too. Then he added "the road towards the creation of the pluralistic society that we must forge in the state of Israel is a very long one, and it seems to me that we have barely embarked on it". He concluded his presentation saying: "If we make progress in dealing with that problem, we will find that the Palestinian problem across the Green Line will also one day seem far more amenable to solution than it appears to be today".<sup>19</sup>

#### c. Prospects of Peace and Equality:

At Camp David, Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt which recognized "the legitimate rights of the Palestinians". Israel also agreed to "full" autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the Madrid Conference, the chances for peace which includes a solution to the Palestinian question has increased remarkably. Much of this progress is due to a great deal of realism and pragmatism on the Palestinian side and American active involvement in the peace making process. The Israeli government, so far, is playing a double game of negotiating peace (reluctantly) while establishing obstacles on the disputed land by doubling Jewish settlements (enthusiastically).<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile massive immigration of Jews into Israel from the ex-Soviet republics continues and about a million of them are expected to leave their homeland. Israel has been asked by the American Administration not to block the road to peace by a policy of rapid colonization as a pre-condition for getting loans of 10 billion dollars. With this linkage in mind it is still difficult

to tell which route Israeli society will choose, that of peace and cooperation or Greater Israel and confrontation.

The Arab side, including the Palestinians, agrees that Israel faces real and undeniable problems of security which should be addressed. The P.L.O. has come a long way since the Algier resolutions in 1988 to meet Israeli demands and make peace possible. So far the policies of the Likud government does not seem to be enthusiastic in seizing the opportunity of peace with its neighbours. Such a policy contributes significantly in the long run to what may prove a national and regional catastrophe. However, the end of the Cold War and the leading American solo role in the peace making process (similar to Camp David) keeps hopes alive in concluding a peace settlement. A materialization of these hopes into near future reality makes the question of equality for Arabs in Israel actual and realistic.

As far as the Arabs in Israel are concerned, it is conceivable that a peace settlement would remarkably reduce national tension in the Israeli society. A new atmosphere of peace between Israel and its neighbours, including the Palestinians, would have positive results on Jewish-Arab relations. The Jewish majority would be more self-confident and relaxed and thus more attentive to Arab demands for equal citizen rights and opportunities. "Security reasons" will be less useful as a cover and pretext for discrimination, and thus boosting the chances of democracy and equality. These assumptions and beliefs underly the Arab political consensus in Israel supporting peace and equality as have been already pointed out. A Palestinian homeland alongside Israel would be a national and personal relief from the continuous conflict with its heavy psychological and socio-political price. Even if their hopes for comprehensive peace and full equality will not materialize immediately, an interim settlement could pave the way for improvement of the Arab citizens status in Israel.

Alongside the majority political consensus, which believes that a peace settlement could only improve their status as equal

Israeli citizens, there exists a different minority opinion. Radical Nationalist and Islamist groups portray Israel and Zionism as colonial and expansionist which leaves no alternative for Palestinians and Arabs but confrontation and resistance. According to this view there is no ground for compromise or conciliation between Israel's Zionist ideology and aims on the one hand and the Palestinian quest for freedom and equality on the other.<sup>21</sup> Less deterministic but not a more promising future for the Arabs in Israel was spelled out a decade ago by Antoun Shammās. For Arabs to become a normal minority, the definition of the state as it appears in Israel's proclamation of independence should be revised. But even then and after the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, "the Arab citizens are condemned to be eternal wanderers in the desert (Meti Hamedhar)".<sup>22</sup>

A similar gloomy future of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel whether a peaceful settlement will be reached or not, is predicted by Lustick in his study of the Arabs in the Jewish state. Ironically he concludes "the implications for Israeli Arabs of the opposite scenario, the crystallization of a comprehensive peace settlement including the emergence of some sort of Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, are much the same".<sup>23</sup> He argues that in the aftermath of a peace settlement, Arabs in Israel, will most likely intensify their struggle to gain power, status and autonomy. The Jewish majority on the other hand would be less attentive to such demands on the background of the painful territorial concessions for making a Palestinian homeland possible. Rather than meeting Arab minority demands for equality, efforts would be redoubled for consolidating Israel's Jewish-Zionist character in order to create more room for potential Jewish immigrants.<sup>24</sup>

Smoocha, a social scientist and well-known authority as far as Arab-Jewish relations are concerned, portrays a more optimistic and balanced account of majority-minority coexistence.<sup>25</sup> Instead of Arab radicalization and Jewish intransigence perspectives which dominate the literature, he argues that his research suggests an alternative Arab politicization and Jewish accessibili-

ty perspectives. The Arab-Israeli-conflict and particularly the current belligerency between Israel and the Palestinians blocks the chances of progress in the majority-minority relations inside the Green Line. Hence, a settlement of the national dispute would have positive results on the internal issue of reshaping the character of the Jewish-Zionist state. In such a case, contradictions and tensions between Arabs and Jews in Israel would be reduced or even eliminated.<sup>26</sup>

As neither a futurelogist nor a social scientist, the author has no intention in the following concluding remarks to dwell into a discussion of the different theories concerning the future character of Arab-Jewish relations inside Israel. A discussion of this topic cannot be scientific because of its nature and character, it is more a matter of estimation and belief. Much of the controversy on future prospects for peace and equality in the Israeli internal arena is due to different assumptions and understandings of the undefined new realities in the post-conflict era. The specific details of the peace agreements and the different dimensions of the new atmosphere and relations, particularly between Israel and the Palestinian homeland, are crucial. Rather than adding another deterministic theory to those reviewed in this paper, my conclusions would focus on an estimation of realistic and viable alternatives. The nature and character of the future repercussions of peace on the Arabs in Israel allow the scholar a little more than an informed guess.

#### Conclusions:

Since 1948, Jews in Israel enjoy sovereignty and full citizen rights in a democratic political system. The Arabs are not partners to sovereignty and enjoy no national rights. However, they are officially equal citizens and as such enjoy some advantages of the democratic political and judicial systems. They do suffer from some overt discrimination in addition to practical inequality which is derived mainly from the Zionist nature and character of the state and the socio-economic role of Zionist organizations. Hence, they acquire an inferior status, in comparison to the Jews, as second class citizens. As far as the Palestinians in

the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip are concerned, they have been deprived since 1967 of any citizen rights and suffer from the continuous repression of military rule. Thus the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel enjoy a preferable political and socio-economic status in comparison to their brethren, the Palestinians under military administration.

It is conceivable that, at the end of the peace making process, when the Palestinians in the West-Bank and Gaza have some sort of statehood, the scale of relative deprivation would change remarkably. In addition to national independence, the Palestinians would have much more opportunities for socio-economic and political mobility. The Arabs in Israel, particularly the intelligentsia, would look with envy on their colleagues, friends and relatives across the border who administer the highest economic, military and political positions in the new born homeland. The psychological repercussions of such new realities could be assessed only together with the final results of equalization policies of Israel towards its Arab citizens. It is safe to argue that the realities of relative deprivation would push a few national Arab circles into radical and ultimative demands of full equality or even irredenta. However, in my mind the majority would realistically seize the legal non-violent possibilities to struggle for civil equality as they have done so far. However, it is vital for a lasting peace in the region that the Arab minority in Israel not be left as a main loser of the peace settlement. Since 1948, they calculated their political attitude with a great deal of patience, realism and optimism. They would acquiesce to a lasting status of Arab minority in a Jewish state as long as they realize a progress in equalizing policies. Full equal citizenship may take a long time to materialize. However, equal citizen rights and opportunities are a necessity. Some Arab demands could be recognized and delayed, but not ignored infinitely.

For the sake of building up confidence between the adversaries, current discriminatory policies should be abolished in Israel simultaneously with the peace process and normalization of relations with Arab neighbours. No less important than tackling the

question of equal citizen rights is the practice of equal socio-economic opportunities, particularly for the young generation of post-high-school graduates. Arabs in Israel should not be denied the opportunity of building up their own independent cultural and economic institutions. Without liberating the minority from total dependency on Jewish economy the present division of labor would handicap even the best intentions of equalizing policies. Israel's policy towards its Arab citizens would become an important test case for the Jewish State's serious intentions to live peacefully with its Arab neighbours. The words of the first president of Israel, Chaim Weizmann, that the world would judge the state of Israel by how it treats its Arab citizens would be even more relevant in the post-conflict era.

A peaceful settlement which terminates Israeli control over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, is of vital interest for all parties, including the Arabs in Israel. If the present efforts for peace agreements are not nipped in the bud, Israelis and Palestinians could look forward to reshaping their national life and inter-communal relations. Painful as it is, the accommodation to new realities which request concessions and reshaping national aims by all sides concerned, is the most realistic choice. As Prof. Harkabi likes to put it, Israelis and Palestinians should choose between the bad and the worse, because idealistic bad and good alternatives are only an illusion.<sup>27</sup> The peace could not be ideal for either side, but it should be tolerable for all. As far as the Arabs in Israel are concerned they have adopted this realistic approach long ago, and struggle together with the Jewish peace camp for its materialization. Caught in the middle of the conflict battle ground, the growing consciousness of their Israeli handicapped citizenship and Palestinian national feelings is next to unbearable. The end of Israeli rule over the West Bank and Gaza and the birth of a Palestinian homeland is a pre-requisite for any viable progress in normalization of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel proper. It is not difficult to agree with those who argue that a solution to the Palestinian national problem does not ensure automatic progress in the field of equality for Arabs in the Jewish state. However, in the long run,



prospects for such progress would remarkably increase when Israel lives in peace with its neighbours.

#### N o t e s

1. Among the interviewees were leading members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace-making negotiations such like Haidar 'Abd-al-Shafi, Hanan 'Ashrawi, Sari Nussaibah and Zakariya al-Agha.
2. Fouad Moughrabi (et al.) "Palestinians on the peace process" Journal of Palestine Studies, no.81 (Autum 1991) pp. 47-49.
3. A decade ago the Van Leer institute in Jerusalem has initiated several conferences on the Arabs in Israel, The Palestinian question and related issues. A. Hareven has edited some of the conferences'papers and published them in several books. For example see his Every Sixth Israeli (1983) and Can the Palestinian Problem be Solved? (1983).
4. S. Smoocha has discussed this issue in his book Arabs and Jews in Israel, Boulder: Westview, 1989. I do agree to most of the points that he makes concerning the political behavior of the Arabs in Israel.
5. On the irreversibility theory see Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Base Project 1987 Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Development in the West Bank. Jerusalem and New York: The Jerusalem Post, 1987.
6. Two of the leading representatives of this theory are the political scientist Jacob Landau and the orientalist Eli Rekhes.

7. Dan Horowitz "Israel and Occupation" The Jerusalem Quarterly, 43 (Summer 1987) p. 23.
8. Smoocha, pp. 9 - 17.
9. Contrary to Hareven, the 140-150 thousand Palestinians residents of East Jerusalem were not counted since they are not Israeli citizens. They constitute a particular category and should not be mixed with the Arab citizens in Israel since 1948.
10. For more details on Arab education see Sami Mar'i, Arab Education in Israel, Syracuse, N. Y: Syracuse University Press and Saad Sarsour "Arab Education in a Jewish State - Major Dilemmas" in A. Hareven (ed.) Every sixth Israeli (Jerusalem, 1983) 113-132.
11. The main increase in the numbers of Arab students in the Israeli universities was during the seventies and early eighties. However Arab students constitute currently only about 7 % of the total Israeli students.
12. This anxiety was spelled out particularly by radical Nationalists and Islamists such like Abna al-Balad and the mayor of Umm al-Fahm in spring 1990.
13. The numbers of Arab Ph.D. graduates is increasing in the last decade. Their number today is already about two hundreds.
14. This subject is discussed in detail by Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, New York and London: Mounthly Review Press, 1976. Usama Halabi "The Impact of the Jewish Character of the State on the Rights and Status of the Arab Citizens in Israel." (Arabic), A paper delivered to a conference in Nazareth, May 1990. D. Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel. International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1987.

15. On the Emergency Regulations and military use of them see Jiryis, pp. 9-35.
16. The J.N.F is a prominent example for this in addition to the other institutions of the world and local Zionist Organizations.
17. During the years 1990-1991 Arab municipalities desperately needed the fifty million dollars promised by the interior ministry.
18. Moshe Arens "The Palestinian Problem as a Jewish Problem" in A. Hareven (ed.) Can the Palestinian Problem be Solved? pp. 181-186.
19. Ibid, p. 186.
20. According to the latest reports of Peace Now movement, Knesset members from the left wing and other sources.
21. Khalil Nakhleh and Elia Zureik (ed.) The Sociology of the Palestinians New-York, 1980. Elia Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A study in Internal Colonialism, London, 1979.
22. Shammass, p. 69.
23. Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State. Texas, 1980 p. 266
24. Ibid, p. 268.
25. Smoocha in the conclusions, pp. 218-225.
26. Ibid, p. 219.
27. See for example Y. Harkabi "Striving to Attain the Possible" in A. Hareven (ed.) Can the Palestinian Problem be Solved (Jerusalem, 1983) p.197. —

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THE HARRY S. TRUMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE. معبد هاري س. טروמן המכון למחקר ע"ש הרי ס. טרומן  
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE للابحات وخدمة السلام למען קידום השלום

**Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project**  
**WORKING PAPER SERIES**

No. 22

**Israel's Arab Community**  
**in the Context of the Peace Process**

**Avraham Sela**

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**Ifrach Zilberman**

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Winter 1991/92

A cooperative research project supported by the John D.  
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE RESEARCH PROJECT is a cooperative venture between the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Arab Studies Society, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The research project seeks to analyze, from the perspectives of Israeli and Palestinian scholars, some of the key elements of an eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab conflict. Its purpose is to promote better understanding of each side's interests in order to define areas of convergence and search for alternative solutions that could form the practical basis for peaceful coexistence.

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## Israel's Arab Community in the Context of Peace in the Middle East

### Introduction

This paper undertakes to discuss possible implications of an Israeli-Palestinian peace on the Arab citizens of Israel. Although the Arab community in Israel is not a direct or essential party in the Middle East peace process, the implications of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians can be hardly ignored or underestimated. The majority of the Arabs of Israel perceive themselves as part of the Palestinian people and the PLO as its national leadership. While most Israeli Arabs share a common conviction that they are bound to remain citizens of the state of Israel, they strongly advocate a peace settlement between their state and their national movement led by the PLO on the basis of a two-states solution with an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Since the establishment of the Jewish state the Arabs of Israel have lived in an uneasy ideological and political situation which resulted in severe inherent socio-economic weaknesses. Hence, an end to hostility between Arabs and Jews in historic Palestine raises a series of questions as to the implications of such a development on:

- a. the Israeli government's policy towards its Arab citizens in terms of equalizing the social and economic opportunities available for them in the official and public sectors and lifting security limitations and control over their various spheres of life;
- b. Israeli Arabs' attitudes and political behavior in both Israeli and Palestinian contexts; would they accept their status as citizens of the state of Israel as permanent or develop irredentist approach towards the Palestinian state? under what circumstances each of these possibilities would be more likely?
- c. What role can Israeli Arabs play in improving peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinian state/autonomy socially, economically and politically?



### A. The Socio-Political and Economic Background

Since the emergence of the State of Israel, the Arab minority has undergone noticeable changes in various spheres of life, particularly in political organization and social structure. A sharp change in Arab political activity came about with the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and with the subsequent renewed contact between the Arabs of Israel and those of the territories occupied by Israel during the war. This connection was further strengthened during the 1973 war. However, since the early 1970s, there has been a rapid process of political, economical and social changes among the Israeli Arabs. In particular, there was a growth of a stratum of young academics and intellectuals. There was also political mobilization leading to the emergence of countrywide organizations of academics, students, local council heads, and new small political parties. Thus, there was a move from diffused protest toward an institutionalized one.<sup>1</sup>

This change is accompanied by a parallel political and ideological transformation in the Israeli Arab society. This is also visible in the emergence of an ideological-political consensus in the Arab community, the thrust of which is a strong sense of national Palestinian identity and a growing ideological and political identification with Palestinian nationalism; be it of the national - secular kind or of the national - Islamic one. Such attitudes are primarily expressed in literary and political writings. Nonetheless, the Israeli Arabs took care to remain in the boundries of legitimate democratic activity and mostly to retain their acceptance of the legitimacy of the state of Israel.

Yet from the mid-1970s, the Arabs of Israel have shown an increased tendency to protest their situation, based on their deep and continuing sense of political and socio-economic disenfranchisement and discrimination. The feelings of frustration and bitterness prevailing among Israeli Arabs are challenging their current status in the state and society as a religious and ethno-political minority, and they are demanding a change in their status. Nevertheless, the growing political awareness of the Arabs in Israel exposed an essential contradiction between the definition of Israel as secular nation state, and its

being the state of the Jewish people. A growing segment among the Israeli Arabs is demanding to change Israel into a state only of its citizens, and thus to make it more suitable to their needs.<sup>2</sup>

Israel's Arabs form a unique component among the Palestinians, having gone through the process of building a collective identity as citizens of the State of Israel, and gaining a certain amount of political and cultural socialization in it. The Intifada, just across the Green Line, has raised dormant and new questions for Israeli Arabs, questions of identity and solidarity. The democratic nature of Israel allows freedom of expression, but has not yet found the means to extend full and equal rights of citizenship to its Arab minority, historically part of Palestinian people. Israeli Jews and Arabs are aware of the changing patterns within the Israeli Arab community, and of the need for Israel's structural framework for socializing its Arab minority to become more flexible, expansive and inclusive. Facing future Palestinian home rule / autonomy / state, Israeli Arabs and Jews must face the roots of their common problems.

#### 1. Tensions between the Arab community and the State of Israel

Some of the roots of the socio-economic and political problems of the Israeli Arabs can be found in the meeting between the traditional nature of rural Palestinian society and modern Israel. The vast majority of Israeli Arabs live in villages some of which became semi-urban townships, with a slower process of development, and less investments than that of the nearby Jewish towns and cities. Since the Israeli Arabs belong to the greater Arab world, with which Israel has been at war since 1948, the Israeli system of governing the Arab population has been both controlling and limiting, and has increased the difficulties in development within Israeli Arab society (Lustick, 1980). Even the peace with Egypt did not counter balance the inbuilt Israeli tendency to control its minorities.

Although there are over 750,000 Arabs in Israel (they were 17 percent of the population before the start of the Russian Jews migration), they have little influence on the decision-making processes within the state; they are severely underrepresented politically (in 1991 6 Knesset members out of 120); despite the increase in higher

education among them, they are poorly represented in high level governmental positions and in public institutions; Arab industrialists and businessmen do not play a major role at the organizational level, nor within the lobbying groups for improved business conditions, often at the expense of representation of Arab interests; the Israeli industrial sector boasts no large Arab-owned industry.

Central issues concerning the Arabs of Israel, including the form and content of the Arab education system, are decided primarily by Jews, who direct the departments responsible for Arab affairs in the government, the Histadrut (General Trade Union), and the political parties. In the last few years, the problem of unemployment among academics within the Arab sector has increased, with no solution in the foreseeable future. More and more academics are forced to take menial jobs, and the growing dissatisfaction among the highly educated is heard ever more frequently. Unemployment is not, however, limited to the academics. The unemployment rate among Arabs is higher than among Jews, and the influx of thousands of Soviet immigrants is bound to exacerbate this already egregious situation.<sup>2</sup>

Israel's ongoing economic difficulties over the past decade, placed a particular burden on Israeli Arabs. Their dependence on Jewish majority emphasized the weakness of their own economic structure as well as their inferiority within the Israeli economy. The total dependence of Israeli Arabs on the Jewish economical establishment and on the resources apportioned them by the government intensified feelings of frustration and discrimination. It also strengthened the determination of the Israeli Arabs to find a political solution which will give them an appropriate allocation of resources.

The cumulative effect of the ongoing economic crisis was compound by the perceived threat posed by the massive wave of immigration from the Soviet Union, beginning at the end of 1989. Among Arabs this immigration raises deep existential fears that touch almost all aspects of their social and economic life. Except for the additional burden that this immigration puts on Israel's economy, it involves a growing unemployment among Arabs in general and highly-educated professionals in particular. Also a threat of renewed official policy of expropriation of land held or cultivated by Arabs for settling the newcomers.

The socio-economic implications of the new wave of immigration are apparent in the response of the Israeli Arab leadership whose main concern is lest this immigration will bring about further reduction of the economic resource available for them and severe their own difficulties. At the same time, however, except for an extreme group such as Abna' al-Balad, they tend to refrain from expressing objection to the Soviet Jews' immigration to Israel and their immediate nationalization, based on the Law of Return. For other radical spokesmen, the wave of Soviet immigration serves as a pretext that justifies a revision of the nature of the State of Israel especially in terms of the status of its Arab citizens. Indeed, regardless of their principle rejection of such fundamental idea that lays in the heart of Zionism and the Jewish State, the majority of Israeli Arab leadership is conscious of the Jewish-Israeli society's extreme sensitivity to this issue. (Ossatzki-Lazar, 1991)

The Israeli Arabs' response to the Soviet immigration should be viewed also against the backdrop of change during the 1980's in the attitudes within the Jewish society towards the Arab population. This change contributes to the deterioration of relations between Arabs and Jews and to the sense of stress among Israeli Arabs. Signs of tension include increasing social and economic polarization, and the appearance of fringe groups with Arab-hating ideology. Even if public support for these fringe groups has not significantly increased in recent years, their attitudes have taken root and even attained certain level of legitimacy. The ability of the central government to stand up to pressure from such groups has been impaired.

The uneasy relationship between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens notwithstanding, ever since the advent of the state, both parties have shown a discerned measure of restraint and capability to adjust to new realities and needs. It is due to the state's capability of adjustment, on the one hand, and the restrained struggle of the Arabs that both sides materialized an incremental change in their relations, and hence, in the posture and life conditions of the Arabs in Israel.

Despite the growing demographic and economic weight of the Arabs in Israel, they are saturated with growing bitterness and a deep sense of discrimination regarding the treatment of their problems and needs

by the Israeli establishment. This is particularly true concerning the governmental allocations to the Arab Local Councils, which are perceived to be minimal and discriminatory. The underdeveloped infrastructure within the Arab sector is testimony to the lack of governmental planning and training to assist Israeli Arabs in integrating themselves into Israeli society. The lack of long-term development planning capable of meeting the growing need for housing, services and employment in Israeli Arab villages and towns has created poor living conditions. (Al-Haj & Rosenfeld, 1990, 103-128)

However, some problems facing the Arab community are embedded in their own society. There is, for example, the socio-political fragmentation of the society, resulting in the failure to gain proportionate representation in the Knesset. Traditional allegiances are on the local, family and village levels, preventing the emergence of a broad-based and united leadership. (Nakhleh, 1975) The lack of a political center and a strong, central leadership has left the Arabs of Israel with splintered and diverse political attitudes and voting patterns. Although there are important signs that this is changing from within, under current circumstances the Arab of Israel have difficulties in presenting their demands for equal rights as citizens of Israel. Moreover, the growing intellectual stratum is following the rest of Palestinian society by developing inner political dividing lines. In particular, the national-secular movement is drifting apart from the national-Islamic one. In addition, small parties dominate the political scene amongst the Israeli Arabs. The ideological-political situation among them seem to be fluid, yet it had an inner logic of its own which should be explored. (Rekhess, 1985, Mayer, 1989, 18-19)

## 2. Changing Patterns of political and ideological Life.

Beginning on Day of the Land in 1976, a new stage in the relations of the Israeli Arabs and the State of Israel started. This stage had been initially instigated by the Government's intention of Arab land confiscations resulting in the first Arab mass protest on a national level. The demonstrations were, on the Arab population's part, a message of willingness to struggle for equal civil rights, for the most part within the boundaries of law and order. The 1976 Day of the Land

was a catalyst for a rapid change of the Israeli Arabs' self-image as well as their perception and posture among the Palestinians in the Territories and the diaspora. Not only that these Arabs proved themselves now as capable of participating in the national Palestinian struggle after many years of isolation and passivity, the fact that they were citizens of the State of Israel lent the PLO new opportunities of establishing its authority and influence within this group of Arab Palestinians. It led Israeli Arabs to relate a growing importance to incorporating the Israeli Arabs into the national Palestinian identity and ideology as well as committing them to the PLO as the sole national leadership of the Palestinian community. (Tessler, 1977. Haidar, 1990, 27, Arab.)

In spite of their national-ideological consensus, the Arabs of Israel have proven themselves to be flexible enough to adjust their political behavior to the constraints confronting them by the Israeli reality. This process can be discerned in the separation from previous political organizations, most of which were integral parts of the Jewish establishment, and allegiance to new organizations which emphasize the unique characteristics and problems of the Arab population. Thus, since its foundation in 1974, the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils (NCHALC) - the national representative body of Israeli Arabs - has focused on the demands for "Daily Rights", that is to say abolition of discrimination on all levels, and establishment of equal rights. (Al-Haj & Rosenfeld, 1989)

The Lebanon War (1982) gave an additional push to the process of politicization, including increased support for the PLO. The leadership of the community embodied in the NCHALC began to demand a status of national and ethnic minority and to support the idea of a Palestinian State alongside Israel. Nevertheless, the majority of the Israeli Arab community continues to accept their status as Israeli citizens, and do not manifest intentions to become part of a future Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These tendencies reached a peak against the background of the Intifada (erupted in 1987), which sparked protest among the Arabs of Israel and increased identification with the struggle of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Until now, most of their activities in support of the Intifada have remained within the boundaries of Israeli law. These activities reached

the peak during the first year of the Intifada but declined in the last one. A new leadership, which had been in the process of emerging for the last decade, and had been partially responsible for the newly politicized behavior, gained support and popularity with the outbreak of the Intifada. (Rouhana, 1990. Ghanem & Ossatzki-Lazar, 1990)

Due to the difficulty of political and socio-economic mobility, Israeli Arabs are increasingly aware of the dilemma which faces them: loyalty to the state versus allegiance to their Palestinian identity. This is particularly true among intellectuals, who experience their inability to move upwards socially and economically most forcefully. However, this dilemma of identity does not seem to be acute as long as there is no significant attempt to articulate separation from the state. In this context the last decade has witnessed the emergence of a new middle class, with industrial and commercial initiative, and a highly educated stratum which has demonstrated awareness of social issues and a willingness to become involved in improving the quality of life for the community as a whole. This trend strives to achieve its goals through accommodation with the Israeli system, and in some ways it contradicts other trends.

Another important change is in patterns of residence. Israeli Arabs have begun to leave the villages and move into areas previously populated solely by Jews, primarily into the major urban centers. The close residential proximity to Jewish society brought on by the urbanization process raises as yet unexplored questions such as the type of a future urban interaction between the two groups, and the implications of rapid urbanization on Israeli Arab society. An important result of this migration is the emergence of a sense of uprootedness, also a process of papurization. Therefore it brings about political radicalization, and new forms of political organization. For instance, Islamic radical organizations. However, the Russian Jewish immigration during 1990-91 has slowed this process of migration.

The rise of popularity of radical Islam among Israeli Arabs is a part of the trend towards increased politization of religion throughout the region and increased penetration of the domain of the state by religious movements. However, as the state of Israel is basically Jewish and Zionist, the possibilities open for radical Islam to subvert it are rather limited. Beyond the significance of this phenomena for the

relations between Arabs and Jews in Israeli society lie far-reaching repercussions for patterns of political organization and ideology of the Arabs in Israel. Thus the recent increased support among Israeli Arabs for both the Palestinian-nationalist-secular stream and for the Islamic-radical stream eroded the power base of the Communist Party, traditionally the main avenue for Israeli Arab political activity. This Communist party has been identified with a pragmatic approach to the existence of the State of Israel, and has moderated the type of behavior Arab society was willing to undertake in its struggle for equal rights.

Another result of the growth of radical Islam may deepen the cleavage between Christian and Muslim Arabs, and may create a political struggle between the two sub-communities; thus bringing about more extremist attitudes in general, and towards the State in particular. The Islamic movements in Israel find sources of ideological authority, as well as financial and military, among similar movements in the occupied areas and neighboring Arab countries. The devout ideological orientation of the Islamic movement, and its call for the liberation of historic Palestine in its entirety marks it as the most influential socio-political power in Israel that challenges the very idea of the State of Israel. A sharp increase in the influence of the Islamic movement may lead the Arabs of Israel into direct confrontation with the State.

The Israeli Arab community is at a crucial crossroads in its history; one which encompasses political and socio-economic problems and possibilities for change, with a new leadership and changing alliances. It remains to be seen what direction will be chosen, in terms of the internal life of the Israeli Arab community, its political direction, and possible changes in official Israeli policy regarding the Arab community. In the next chapters we will explore the challenges facing it, and what sort of answers it can use in order to counter these challenges.

## **B. Political-Ideological Crisis: In Search of Alternatives**

The problems facing the Israeli Arabs within the Israeli system forced them during the 1980s to search for political solution.



And yet, they face a political watershed. The Palestinian Intifada that erupted in the territories in December 1987 intensified the ideological-political crisis of Israeli Arabs. Particularly during its first intense year the Intifada boosted Palestinian national sentiments and identification with its goals among Arabs in Israel. As such, the Intifada expedited a process which had been in formation long before, emphasizing the significance of the PLO and the Palestinian population of the territories for Israeli Arabs as the moral and ideological center of Palestinian nationalism. The Intifada's political achievements on both the regional and international levels and the renewed prestige it bestowed on the PLO turned to be a major source of legitimacy. This resulted in the growing tendency among politicians and political movements in Israel's Arab sector to express more than any time before their identification with the goal of establishing an independent Palestinian state, under the PLO's leadership, in the West Bank and Gaza alongside with Israel. Yet, despite declarative intentions this trend was not capable of bringing about a party-realignment according national lines, leaving the fragmented Israeli Arab political arena as it was. (Zureik & Haider, 1991. Klein, 1991, 16-18, 40-41)

Illustrative of this fragmentation is the constant effort of the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), and the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) to erode the electoral basis of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) although the three parties virtually share the same political program. Indeed, the struggle over the legacy of the communist party "Rakah" reflects Israeli Arab political dilemma and search for a new political strategy that will best serve their delicate situation as a Palestinian-Arab community whose members enjoy formal status as citizens of the State of Israel.

For many years, "Rakah" led a significant segment of Israeli Arabs, serving as a vehicle for establishing the institutional infrastructure in the Israeli Arab society, regulating internal tensions, protest movements and feelings of frustration. Despite its being an Arab-Jewish party, "Rakah", by virtue of its secular nature and the priority it has been giving to social and economic equity between Arabs and Jews in Israel, managed to attract both Muslims and Christians and become the leading political instrument of the Arab

community in Israel. But "Rakah's" hold on the Arab public has recently been challenged leading to a discerned erosion of its constituency. The party is undergoing internal crisis, in part due to the dramatic changes in the Eastern Bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and in part due to changes in the attitudes of the Israeli Arabs towards further identification with Islamic and Palestinian nationalist values. This crisis corresponds with the expanding power and influence of the Islamic movement which stands in diametric ideological opposition to "Rakah," on the one hand, and the strengthening trend of Palestinian nationalism (represented by the Progressive List for Peace and the Arab Democratic Party) on the other. Both the Islamic and national streams strive to expedite the erosion of "Rakah's" political power and take over its declining leadership.

"Rakah's" decline creates a political vacuum and crystalizes the processes of change and the formation of new political patterns. Once "Rakah" could readily absorb influences and directives from its political patron - the Soviet Communist Party - today this patron no more exists. "Rakah's" decline paradoxically allows more freedom from outside non-Arabic interference for the Arab political community as it develops in Israel, clearing the way for parties that better represent the particular problems and needs of Israeli Arabs. The decline of "Rakah" reflects the change in the political climate among Israeli Arabs and, in so far as "Rakah" worked within its mainstream of Israeli politics, it reduces the possibility of breaking the pace of change and to speed up the move towards a separate identity for Israeli Arabs. However, "Rakah" still has considerable assets and will remain a significant political factor to reckon with.

This has been best reflected by the growing tendency of "Rakah's" rivals to try consolidate their power into one party with the aim of preventing the division and losses of Arab electoral power. The leading consideration behind this idea is that in view of the Israeli political two-bloc system, an Arab party that would command the support of most Arab voters might gain a substantial bargaining power due to its indispensability for establishing a coalition government. The proponents of this tendency, the most prominent of which is Knesset member Darawsha of the ADP, insist upon purely Arab composition of the desired party, thus rejecting the idea of cooperating with Jews in a

political party or joining an existent one whether this is Zionist, such as Mapam or the Labor or even a non-Zionist party, such as "Rakah". Darawsha and other adherents of the pure Arab party are willing to gather forces with the Islamic movement but not with the Communist party. Darawsha's political stance reflects his tightening relations with Fatah and the PLO. This poses not only a challenge to the idea of Jewish-Arab cooperation within the same political framework, threatens the Christians among Israeli Arabs who look with a growing anxiety at the spreading influence and power of the Islamic movement. It is not by coincidence that the growing nationalist and Islamic trends in the Israeli-Arab society corresponds with an opposite tendency among Christian individuals and groups who manifest allegiance to the state on the expense of their allegiance to the Arab political community.

The above mentioned ideological trends are best reflected in the tendency of consolidation of the Palestinian-nationalist identity among Israeli Arabs. Whereas in past years the term Israeli Arabs (one which we prefer to use in this article) was used and accepted by the Arabs themselves, during the last few years the term "Palestinian-Israeli" became fashionable amongst the young generation, particularly the highly educated Israeli Arab circles.

This shift from the general pan-Arab identity to the particular national Palestinian identity is linked to a disillusionment and disappointment from the role played by the Arab states in support of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It expressed the crystallisation of a separate Palestinian identity. But this shift reflected also the growing of a particular Israeli component in the Israeli-Arab complex collective identity. It became evident that the Israeli-Arabs were transformed into a distinct branch of the Palestinian people, with their own unique blend of Israeli-Arab and Palestinian traits. (Haidar, 1988) However, the shift to the term "Palestinian-Israelis" expresses more than just a way to distinguish between branches of the same people. It reflects also a deep discontent with the prevailing political order in Israel, and with the status of the Israeli-Arabs in it.

### C. The Israeli Arabs and the Peace Process

The current political crisis among Israeli Arabs raises a question as to the future political developments and orientation of this community, particularly in the context of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The discussion of this question will refer to three main levels: the Arab community itself, the state-community relations, and interaction with Palestinian and Arab regional actors.

#### 1. Community level: The Nationalist-Secular Stream

The 1988 general elections to the Knesset showed a decline in the proportion of votes for the Zionist parties (40%) compared to the 1984 elections (50%). (Landau, 1989) This decline notwithstanding, the Arab electoral power remains enormously fragmented resulting in a low number of Arab Knesset members (6) which represents less than half the total electoral power. And though the assumption is that the Arab vote for the Zionist parties may continue to decline, it is observed that about a quarter of the Arab electoral power will preserve its traditional voting pattern. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the Islamic-Nationalist trend cannot be perceived as an attractive choice for rather a significant portion of the Arab community in Israel on grounds of religious, ethnic and social cleavages. This includes the Christians who for obvious reasons cannot identify with the Islamic movement, the Druze, whose main stream undergoes a process of asserting their unique and separate communal identity, and certain Beduin groups traditionally incorporated into the Israeli system. The secular communist party with its social contents traditionally provided the Christians with a comfortable political framework to belong to and is expected to remain as such in the future, particularly in view of its decline in the Arab sector. Ostensibly, the secular nationalist groups operating in the Arab sector could provide the Christians with an alternative to "Rakah". In effect, however, the Palestinian nationalist movement has been traditionally saturated with Islamic contents and symbols. This can be witnessed in the mainstream of the Palestinian national movement represented by Fatah and in its Islamic-affiliated groups. Furthermore, the social affiliation of most of the Arab Christians in Israel to the highly educated middle class

seems to constitute another obstacle for them in joining the nationalist stream that represents to a large extent lower social strata exercising a lower degree of modernization.

This paper tends to foresee a continuity rather than change in the voting patterns of the Druze as well as the majority of the Christians and the Beduins, especially under the circumstances of a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. This estimate is mainly based on the assumption that the existing political alternatives in the Arab sector do not appeal to these groups.

It is worth noting that the nationalist stream among Israeli Arabs is characterized by deep fragmentation along local, personal and ideological lines. The various groups manifest strong affiliation to parallel organizations within the PLO. Thus, the PLP and the ADP identify themselves with Fatah while the Sons of the Village are identified with the PFLP. Recent changes in the Israeli election law raising the minimum percentage for gaining a seat in the Knesset would obligate the Arab parties to join forces if they are to secure their representation in the Israeli legislative. Such a strategy is more likely to be adopted between the nationalist-secular PLP and the ADP rather than between them and "Rakah" or the Islamic movement. Despite its nationalist character the Islamic movement might perceive its power as sufficient for gaining a representation in the Knesset without sharing with other secular parties.

The conclusion of this analysis is that despite the growing indications to the effect that the Arab community in Israel has improved its capability of exerting more pressures on the Israeli political system, it would, to a large extent, remain relatively ineffective due to its political and ideological fragmentation, the desire to incorporate into the Israeli social and economic standards, and no less important, due to the government's capability to manipulate large segments of the Arab population through financial allocations, administrative preference in providing official services etc.

## **2. Community level: The Islamic Movement**

The Intifada in the territories intensified the ideological-political crisis of Israeli Arabs. Particularly during its first

intense year the Intifada, taking place just across the "Green Line", as well as its regional and international implications, boosted Palestinian national sentiments. At the same time, however, it posed new challenges for the Israeli Arabs to which they had to prepare effective response.

In recent years several such responses came to the fore, and became a focus of debate and even for implementation. However, the implementation of these solutions is probably dependent upon the extent to which the Israeli Arabs succeed in attaining a fair and appropriate share of the Israeli economic and political resources. The ability of the Israeli Arabs to attain such fair treatment could be linked to the creation of their own political community, as well as to changes in Israeli Jewish perceptions and to a successful peace process. The first answer to the Israeli Arab basic political problem, namely the dilemma between their obligation to the state as its citizens and their separate Palestinian identity, was cooperation with the state. This was the answer of the older "traditional" leadership of the 1950's and 1960's which believed in political and economic integration within the state of Israel, and accepted the patronage of parties within the political establishment. It may well be that this answer was correct and useful under the conditions prevailing after the 1947/48 war.

In the 1980s the young generation's leadership, composed mostly of educated elites, has strove for fully equal rights with Jews in Israel. Yet this leadership was partly frustrated in its attempts to realize its aspirations for appropriate status through social and economic upward mobility. Some components amongst the Israeli Arab young leadership adopted a coherent, yet extreme solutions.

The most radical of these solutions is conveyed by the slogan "Islam is the solution". Since the 1970's radical Islamic organizations gained momentum among the Israeli Arabs. The most important of these organizations is the Muslim Brotherhood which operates among the Israeli Muslims in a semi-underground fashion. [note: see in Mayer]. The Muslim Brotherhood is a pan-Islamic movement, its Arab-Israeli branch is linked to sister Palestinian movements in the occupied territories and Jordan. (Mayer, 1988. Mi'ari, 1991. Paz, 1990) The Israeli Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood faces an inherent contradictions and dilemmas. On the one hand, it cannot accept Jewish and secular

domination over what it consider as the Palestinian Muslim Holy Land and especially over Jerusalem. On the other hand, because the Muslims are a minority in Israel, they cannot hope to take over the state. Therefore, for the time being instead of fighting the state, the radical Muslims have adopted a strategy of developing inner autonomy, which means that the state encapsulating them rather than penetrating them. According to this notion, The believers and followers of the Muslim organizations should organize themselves into self-contained community, and then they will create self-regulating community of islam (Umma). This community will take care of Muslim education and everyday needs on the municipal level and so will make the next generation less corrupted by secularism and western ideology and so better than the previous one. A plethora of local institutions, such as volunteer groups, and alms collecting committees give the local community an organized basis and lessen the need to ask for state's support or intervention. According to this model of self-regulation and governing the Muslim community will enforce the Islamic Law, locally punish and expelle wrongdoers and strengthen its social and political boundries. Accordingly, other Israeli Arab political parties, mostly belonging to the national secular creed, will be subjugated inside the villages and towns under the domain of Islam. We term such Islamic strategy, aimed to slowly creat self-contained Muslim communities inside an infidel or secular state, enclaving.

Indeed one can observe such radical Muslim enclaves, for example, in Gaza Strip. However, amonge the Israeli Arabs this process has just started in recent years when Muslim candidates won some municipal elections. Nevertheless, one can assume that in Israel the enclaving process will be less apparent and not necessarily violent, as in the case of the occupied areas. It seems as if the municipalities under control of Islamic radicals would not be totally Islamized. At the same time the dynamics of enclaving will influence the shape of the Israeli Arab society following a possible peace process.

The process of Islamization is coupled with the fenomenon of purization, 'anomie' in traditional society and the process of migration. The creation of a dispossed stratum in a society which is infested with crime and drugs abusing is strongly linked amongst Israeli Arabs with the growth of radical Islam. Hence the process of

enclaving will be slowed or accelerated according to the prevailing economic situation.

It is worth scrutinizing the main political tendencies within the Islamic movement amongst Israeli Arabs inasmuch as they influence the peace process. The first tendency is political inclusiveness, which is the notion that the Islamic movement was ordained by the Divine Law to rule Palestinian society. Such inclusiveness could in theory prevent any alliances with the Palestinian national and secular political movements. Yet in practical terms the leaders of the Islamic movement, mainly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, do maintain political relationships with their ideological antagonists. Thus, for instance, the heads of Arab Israeli municipalities, belonging to the Islamic movement, are members of the Committee of the Heads of Arab Councils and of the Supreme Follow-up Committee. Moreover, the Islamic radical political position does not prevent the leaders of the Islamic movement from maintaining cordial relationships with the Israeli state's organs, and from using resources allocated by the Israeli state to municipalities. Nevertheless, the Islamic movement singled the Israeli Communist Party to be its political and ideological enemy. In order to politically contain the Communists, the Islamic movement is ready to work with other secular movements, such as the Sons of the Villages. This political behaviour is parallel to the political behaviour of the Hamas (a code-name for the Muslim Brotherhood's military branch) movement in the occupied territories. Just before the Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991, the Hamas published leaflets together with the radical leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In what may be termed as Weimarian politics, the extreme left and right in Palestinian society joined forces in order to defeat the center, namely the PLO's mainstream which, together with the leadership in the territories, sponsor the current phase of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

The Israeli Arab Muslim movement, is strongly linked to the Islamic movement in the occupied territories. Hence, it is expected that the former will follow suit the Islamic movement in the territories in opposing the peace process on grounds of principle as well as its prospective results. Indeed, from radical Islamic point of view any form of settlement that the peace talks may bring about, be it



a Palestinian home rule, autonomy, or state, is bound to be essentially secular. In practical terms the political outlook of the Muslim radical movements will be conditional on their hold over the Palestinian population. If they will control a majority of it, they will not accept a reconciliation with Israel. It is expected that in a future Palestinian political entity the rift between the national-secular movement and the national-Muslim one will be reflected in the relations between the parallel political factions among the Israeli Arabs.

Another political characteristic of the Islamic radical movement is fragmentation, indicated by its inherent inability to maintain unity. The charismatic, rather than institutional, character of leadership within this movement gives way to the emergence of schism in the ranks of the members. This is indicated by the appearance of splinter groups, which are more extreme than the main body. This situation will make it more difficult for the Islamic movement to be integrated into a coherent effort towards co-existence and political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

### 3. Regional Implications and Community-State Interaction

The history of Israel's Arabs indicates that their political behavior and ideological tendencies have been determined, to a large extent, by Arab regional ideological and political trends. Since the mid-1970s Israeli Arabs' political-ideological development has been increasingly influenced by the national Palestinian movement embodied in the PLO. It is believed that this pattern would not change substantially. On the contrary, the establishment of a secular Palestinian political entity in the West Bank and Gaza would serve as a center of gravity for the Arabs of Israel, morally and culturally as well as politically.

On the moral-cultural level it is assumed that the new Palestinian entity would constitute for the Israeli Arabs a focus for identification and a core of national aspirations and pride, the same as the State of Israel has long been constituted for world Jewry. This might be expressed in a variety of ways and means the common characteristic of which is believed to be an intensified accessibility of Israel's Arabs to their compatriots in the territories in the fields

of society, culture, education, finance, economy, and politics. It is worth noting that such tendency has already existed since the early 1970s, when highly educated and professional Israeli Arabs moved into East Jerusalem to fill the gap of certain skills and capabilities stemming from the reality of a new Arab population under Israeli rule, such as teachers, advocates, bi-lingual clerks, etc. This group of Israeli Arabs has served as an intermediary group between the Israeli authorities and society and the Palestinian population. In the late 1980s the social group of Israeli Arabs residing in East Jerusalem became apparent in its growing participation in the Palestinian "national" institutions and centers of activity in the city and the territories, such as the press, universities and research institutions. This is by no mean a one-way flow of influence. On the contrary, the group of Israeli Arabs is small (few thousands) representing a lower status in the ladder of Palestinian national values, thus they seem to be in need of legitimacy in order to be accepted by their colleagues and compatriots. Indeed, much of the political activity of the Israeli Arab leadership regarding East Jerusalem and the territories is motivated by the quest for legitimacy achieved through identification with the PLO and the goal of establishing a state in the territories. Moreover, the flow of financial aid from external Palestinian sources sponsored by the PLO for advancing social services, such as education, among Israeli Arabs served as an incentive for the educated elite to tighten its relations with the PLO's establishment in East Jerusalem and the territories.

The possibility of establishing a Palestinian autonomy or state, then, seems to be encouraging the tendency of Israeli Arabs serving as an intermediary group between the State of Israel and the Palestinian entity. Yet, this intermediation is bound to bring more influence from the center of Palestinian society and politics into the Israeli Arab community than the other way around. Although much would be dependent on the nature of relations between these two parties, it seems likely that the national-secular stream among Israeli Arabs will face a dilemma in shaping its relations with the Palestinian entity and the State of Israel. This dilemma would stem predominantly from the contradiction between the need to keep faith to the State of Israel, and the temptation to mobilize the Palestinian entity's support for

improving the Israeli Arabs status and conditions of life, thus bringing about an intervention in Israel's domestic affairs.

The dilemma of Israel's Arabs would be eased by the extent of cooperation and cross-border activities between the State of Israel and the Palestinian political center in the territories. Open borders, an exchange of merchandise, money and technology and continued flow of labor power from the territories into Israel might create new economic opportunities for Israel's Arabs, as the Palestinian autonomy or state can open new markets for Israel's export/import in the Arab neighboring countries.

In the last 15 years Israeli Arabs expressed their national-ideological consensus to the effect of full support of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and in establishing a Palestinian state in the occupied territories in accordance with the PLO's definition of such a state. Particularly since the beginning of the Intifada, Israeli Arab leadership strive to contribute to the advancement of the peace process between the state, of which they are citizens, and their Palestinian compatriots in the diaspora as well as in the territories. Yet, despite the efforts made by some of the Israeli Arab leaders, such as Darawsha, to play an intermediary role between the PLO and the Israeli government, Israeli Arabs remained marginal in the process, with both main partners refraining from using their services.

In the last few years numerous Israeli Arab spokesmen tend to assure their Jewish audience, that if and when a Palestinian state is established in the 1967 occupied territories, they will remain faithful citizens of the State of Israel and refrain from claiming annexation to the Palestinian state. (Ossatzki-Lazar & Ghanem, 1990) This attitude is presented as a sacrifice that they would be willing to submit for achieving the Palestinian state, implying that in principle irredentist claim on their part is self-evident. These Arab assurances reflect awareness of the fears among Israelis lest a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza intensify national Palestinian sentiments within the Arab minority in Israel and lead to the development of irredentist tendencies on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian border. The fact that most Israeli Arabs reside in traditional areas some of where they constitute a majority (in Wadi 'Ara) or equal the Jewish population

(in the Galilee), stands in the back of the mind of those Israeli Arabs manifesting sensitivity to Israeli fears of a Palestinian state. Indeed, ever since its establishment, Israel's governments have expressed their concern over this reality and took measures to change the demographic balance between Arabs and Jews especially in the Galilee, with partial success only.

While a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem through establishing a state in the occupied territories might satisfy Israeli Arabs' national wishes, such a settlement can hardly rectify their anguishes as citizens of the Jewish state. Indeed, with a sovereign Palestinian state just behind the corner, Israeli Arabs' political reaction and pattern of protest concerning their day-to-day problems are likely to intensify deriving moral encouragement and political support from their Palestinian brethren. This is bound to bring about a close political cooperation across the Israeli-Palestinian border in the form of two-fold action, with the Israeli Arabs acting inside while the authorities of the Palestinian state focusing on the diplomatic international and regional arenas. Such pattern of political cooperation might aggravate Israeli suspicion of its Arab citizens' faithfulness to the state, thus stiffening the authorities' stance with regard to meeting their needs and resolve some difficulties that they are confronted with. Moreover, the newly established Palestinian national center might boost Jewish fears from irredentist tendencies among Israeli Arabs in view of a continued protest on the Israeli Arabs' part over their being discriminated against and hence, their strong demand to redefine the nature of the state as one which belongs to its citizens rather than to the Jewish people.

The Madrid Conference in October 1991 illuminated the ongoing fundamental changes in the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. It also reflected possible future political development of these relations inside Israel. Though during this conference the main issues on the political arena were the occupied territories and the future of their population, the issue of the Israeli Palestinian Arabs was evident behind the scene. (Ossatzki-Lazar & Kabha, 1991)

This point was highlighted in the opening speech of the Head of the Palestinian delegation, Haidar Abd al-Shafi when he mentioned Mahmoud Darwish as the Palestinian national poet. Darwish, a member of

the PLO's executive committee and close advisor of Yasser Arafat, was born and educated in Israel. As a poet, his frame of mind was shaped by the dialectic tension between the Israeli-Jewish and the Israeli-Palestinian components of the political-cultural Israeli ethos. Thus at a moment of truth for the Palestinians, stepping on the way towards fulfilment of national aspirations, an Israeli-Arab was used as a symbol of national awakening and cultural identity. Darwish is one of a handful of Palestinian figures of an ex-Israeli origin, such as Sabri Jiryis, 'Imad Shakour and Habib Qahwaji who, after leaving or being expelled out of Israel, became active in the close circle of Chairman Arafat's aids. This provided Arafat with some access to the Israeli Arab community and, what is no less important, brought leading Israeli Arabs into the heart of the decision-making circles of the PLO's main stream giving way to exerting some influence on the national Palestinian leadership.

The peace process and the prospect of Palestinian nationhood is a catalyst for consolidating the general dissatisfaction on the part of Israeli Arabs and translating it into a political agenda. Nevertheless, among limited elite circles there is an ongoing debate about the possible future agenda, through which several possibilities are discussed. (Ossatzki-Lazar & Ghanem, 1990)

Basically, these possibilities can be placed on a continuum which grows from integration within the State of Israel, to irredentism and assimilation into Palestinian state. Discussions of these possibilities are currently going only in elitist intellectual circles amongst the Israeli-Arabs, and is firmly rejected by the rest of this community. Moreover the Israeli Arabs are facing the Israeli centralised powerful state, which is motivated by ideology defining it as a Jewish state and not a state of its citizens. They are facing also problems as relatively high unemployment and an economical crisis. Thus the scope of these elites and their influence is rather limited. However, such elitist circles are extremely important because it is within this group that notions and ideas emerge, crystalize and kept alive, and could burst forward to reshape the whole society. In times of crisis wider circles and interest groups might translate these notions into political agenda. As Israel and the Palestinians face a period of political reordering and crises some of these notions are worth being

discussed.

The creation of a Palestinian autonomy\ home rule\ state is bound to lead to a crisis, or at least to a major turning-point towards a specific direction in the development of the Israeli Arab community's politico-ideological orientation. We tend to perceive these orientations as a range of possibilities from integration to irredenta and separatism.

a. Integration - The Israeli Arabs have the status of citizens in the state. Yet full integration could be achieved in two complementary ways, both which seem unrealistic in the foreseeable future: a) a gradual abolition of discriminatory laws and the creation of safety valves for equal rights, such as constitution, or, b) A state-sponsored rapid social and economic development of the Israeli Arab sector through large investments.

The first option involves a fundamental change in the perception of the state by its Jewish majority from Jewish state (or rather, the state of the Jewish people) to a state of its residents in order to accomodate its Arab citizens. Such a change is perceived by Israeli Arab intellectuals as the panacea to the problematic status of their community in the Jewish state, yet it is unacceptable for the majority of Israel's Jewish citizens let alone the organized Zionist-Jewry in the world.

b. Cultural Autonomy - Among Israeli Arabs the notion of creating cultural autonomy is related to the processes of creating an ethnic and national identity and boundaries. These processes are achieved mainly through developing political and ideological infra-structure. However, these processes are controlled and limited by the state. This kind of autonomy has to do mainly with manipulation of symbols, the elaboration of ethnic and national myths, and by the invention of traditions. It is embodied in communal institutions, in the educational system and in a nationally motivated journalism and academic activity. The ideological focus of this cultural activity is the articulation of national, Islamic and ethnic identity. However, this activity has brought about the shaping of cultural institutions. Among the Israeli Arabs nowadays, cultural autonomy means independence from the state for their

educational system, regaining control over Islamic endowments and local sacred sites, and the use of Arabic as an autonomous cultural zone. But it denotes also the idea that the Israeli Arabs could establish political community without the need to define geographical boundaries between themselves and the Jewish citizens of Israel. Palestinian state will, naturally, extend its cultural core towards the Israeli Arabs and therefore will enhance their own cultural autonomy. It will also be involved with the official Islamic establishment inside Israel on the same pattern of involvement of the East Jerusalem Waqf institution in the Muslim affairs of Israel's Arabs in the last 10 years. (Reiter, 1991, 13-24) Yet, such developments neither means that political autonomy for Israel's Arabs is or should be their, or the Palestinian state's goal.

c. Geographical Autonomy - Geographical autonomy means that certain regions in Israel in which the Israeli Arabs constitute a majority will enjoy a special status and in terms of limited local political autonomy. In practical terms there are several such regions: the "Triangal", the Wadi A'ra area, parts of the Galilee and the Beduin localities in the Negev. The Jewish overall majority perceives such an idea as a serious danger and attempts to preempt it by establishing new Jewish settlements in homogeneous Arab areas. The establishment of a Palestinian political entity will make this situation worse as it will suggest two possibilities. The first is that the geographical autonomy will be the precursor for Palestinian demand to redraw the 1947 partition lines. The second is that Palestinian state might demand annexation of the Israeli Arabs autonomous areas.

d. Irredenta - Irredenta or irredentism can be defined as: "attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people inhabit them..." (Chazan, 1991; 139). Another definition of irredenta is: "a movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders" (Horowitz, in Chazan, 1991). Irredenta rises when nationality invokes claims based upon national heritage, common cultural idiom and symbols, communal sentiments and sacred ideologies. It is the outcome of times of transition, of changes in regional and international political systems,

and of restructuring of political order (Chazan, 1991; 143). Thus it is clear that irredentism is at the backdrop of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as a major source of Israeli anxiety and a major source of opposition to the idea of establishing a Palestinian state. The affinity between the elites of the Israeli Arabs and that of the occupied territories intensifies this tension.

Although irredentism was discussed among radical Muslim and nationalist circles, there are no indications that it is an active political issue amongst the Israeli Arabs' main political movements. However, the tendency of the Israeli Arabs for irredentism will be dependent upon the inner conditions prevailing in Israel and future Palestinian political entity.

### Conclusions

The political history of the relations between the Israeli Arab minority and the Israeli Jewish majority is characterized by the tension between adjustment and opposition. The current peace process is no exception to it. While they disagree with the Israeli government's policy on the Palestinian issue in general and in the peace process in particular, the Arabs of Israel identify with the Palestinian national movement and strive for a settlement between the Palestinians and the State of Israel, to which they belong as citizens. Yet they find ways and means to adjust themselves to the reality of having their state in a conflict with their people.

A future Palestinian state/autonomy will create a new situation for the Israeli Arabs. Such a Palestinian polity is bound to become partly a patron for them, trying to influence or protest Israeli policies towards them. At the same time, Israel's Arabs might constitute a pressure group to influence Israeli policies towards the new Palestinian political entity. This interaction across the "green line", holds a potential for boosting the Israeli Arabs' demand for redefinition of their status in the State of Israel and assure for themselves a proper role in the political system, getting a fair share of the state's resources, and adequately developing their infrastructure. A settlement between Israel and the Palestinians would enable Israel's Arabs to play the role of a mediating group between the two



sides of the border advancing economical and cultural links between the Israeli and Palestinian zones.

However, this vision might not be easy of characterize the whole political scene of Israeli Arabs. Such a pragmatic approach can be fulfilled by the mainstream, identified with Fatah of the PLO, but not necessarily by the extreme right and left which are likely to act differently. For instance, the P.F.L.P could influence its affiliated groups among the Israeli Arabs to support irridenta. The Islamic movement (the Muslim Brotherhood) could encourage the creation of autonomous inclaves leading the way to separatism and possible Jihad. The reaction of the Israeli polity towards even the beginings of such tendencies are predictable.

The way which the majority of the Israeli Arabs will chose is not dependent upon external or internal Islamic radical and irredentist agitation. It is rather dependent upon their belief in a possible equality for them as citizens within Israel. Equality for them can be delayed but not refused, postponed but not denied. However, politically moderate and stable Palestinian entity besides Israel is essential to the successful adjustement of the Israeli Arabs to their position besides a palestinian state.

#### Notes

1.Changes among the Israeli Arabs are discussed in: Rouhana (1989), Lustick (1980).

2.The debate about the political character of Israel as a Zionist state or as a state of its citizens is discussed in: Smoocha (1989), Peres (1970), Lustick (1980), Zurreik (1979).

3.See, for example, about the educational system in: Meri' S. (1976), Sarsour (1991).

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