FEDERAL TRUST
TEPSA

CONFERENCE

"THE NEW AGENDA AND INSTITUTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE WEU THE EC AND NATO"

LONDON, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1991

PAPER ON "THE FUTURE OF NATO"

THE NEW AGENDA AND INSTITUTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE WEU, THE EC AND NATO

Trans European Policy Studies Association
Federal Trust
London, 4-5/XI/1991

a. Programme
b. List of participants
1. "European security: a British view"/ Nigel Broomfield
2. "The new role of WEU"/ Horst Holthoff
3. "The Western European Union and the search for a new European security policy"/ Panos Tsakaloyannis
4. "The changing role of the European Community"/ Reinhardt Rummel
5. "Between the Gulf War and European political union"/ Alfred Pijpers
6. "The future of NATO: towards the post-Helsinki world"/ John Barrett
7. "The future of NATO"/ Hugh Beach
8. "L'avenir de la sécurité: France, Europe, Etats Unis: vers quelles relations?" and "Le probleme des alliances"/ François Fillon
9. "NATO reborn"/ James Eberle
10. "To a wider NATO"/ J.H.F.E.
11. "Security- and defense policy within the European Union"/ R. Panis

Federal Trust

The New Agenda and Institutions of European Security Policy: The changing roles of the WEU, the EC and NATO

PROGRAMME

Day one

14.00 Opening Session: **A British view of recent developments**

Chairman: **Sir Leslie Fielding**
Vice-Chancellor, Sussex University;
formerly Director-General, EC Commission

Main Address: **Nigel Broomfield**
Deputy Under-Secretary responsible
for Defence and Security Policy,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15:00 Tea

15.30 2nd Session: **The New Role of the WEU**

Chairman: **Sir Bernard Burrows**
Council member, Federal Trust

Contributors: **H.E. Mr Horst Holthoff**
Deputy Secretary-General,
Western European Union

Edward Mortimer
Financial Times

Dr Panos Tsakaloyannis
University of Giessen, Germany

17.00 End of first day

Day Two

09.30 3rd Session: **The Changing Role of the European Community**

Chairman: **Sir Donald Maitland**
President, Federal Trust

Contributors: **Gunter Burghardt**
General Secretariat, EC Commission

H.E. Mr Pierre Champenois
Head of Secretariat, EPC

Dr Reinhard Rummel
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Germany

Prof. Alfred Pijpers
Europa Instituut, University of Amsterdam

11.00 Coffee

Programme: Contd.

11.30 4th Session: **The future of NATO**

Chairman: **The Hon. James Elles MEP**

Contributors: **Dr John Barrett**
Political Affairs Division, NATO Secretariat

General Sir Hugh Beach

Prof. Gianni Bonvicini
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Francois Fillon
Assemblee Nationale, Paris

13.00 Lunch

14.00 5th Session: **Out of Area Security: lessons of recent crises**

Chairman: **Admiral Sir James Eberle** former Chairman, Royal Institute of International Affairs

Contributors: **Michael Gapes**
Senior International Officer,
The Labour Party

Major-General Tony Hollants van Loocke
Director, Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels

Dr Geoffrey Edwards
University of Cambridge

15.30 Tea

15.45 Final Session:

Chairman: **John Pinder**
Chairman, Federal Trust

Concluding Address of the Conference:

A Future Security Organisation for Europe

Field Marshall Lord Carver
former Chief of Defence Staff

16:45 Reception given by EC Commission Office

Conference ends

N.B. The Federal Trust reserves the right to vary the above programme. While we will make every effort to stick to the publicised programme, many of our speakers may be called away elsewhere by their superiors at a moment's notice. You will appreciate that the Federal Trust has no control over such unforeseen circumstances.

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The New Agenda and Institutions of European Security Policy:

The changing roles of the WEU, the EC and NATO

Two-day Conference
4th - 5th November 1991

London Office of the EC Commission
Jean Monnet House · 8 Storey's Gate · London SW1

THE CONFERENCE DINNER
will be served in the

MARLBOROUGH ROOM

St. Ermin's Hotel, Caxton Street,
London SW1

at 6.30 for 7.00 pm
Monday, 4th November

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Gunter Burghardt	General Secretariat	EC Commission
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Prof. J. Vandamme	Chairman	Trans-European Policy Studies Association
Diarmid Williams	Head of Council Secretariat	Western European Union
John Williams	Representative	European Nuclear Disarmament

EUROPEAN SECURITY: A BRITISH VIEW

SPEECH BY N H R A BROOMFIELD CMG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TO FEDERAL TRUST CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: MONDAY 4 NOVEMBER

DRAFT

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

1. This conference comes at the very best of times; and at the very worst of times. It could hardly be better - or worse - timed.

2. On the one hand, European security - what is to be done about it, and by whom - could not be more topical. Even before the extraordinary events of the week of the 19th of August, discussion about the future security architecture of Europe was flowing at full spate. Since then, however, the accelerating dissolution of the Soviet Union, the deepening crisis in Yugoslavia, and the pace and pattern of developments within Western Europe, have all helped turn the debate into a torrent. A torrent - to change metaphors in mid-stream - at the top of the European agenda. When Gary Miller chose the dates for this conference, I assume that he knew that it would fall about a week after the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union, about a week before the NATO Summit in Rome, and about a month before the European Council in Maastricht. But even as prescient a student of European affairs as Gary could not have foreseen just how topical the conference would turn out to be.

3. On the other hand, the conference, or at least this speech, is a victim of its very topicality. That is why you have me, instead of Mr Douglas Hogg. The Minister of State had very much hoped to be here in person, but the pressure of business over these few weeks has been such that he simply could not take on another major engagement of this kind. So I am here, to represent him.

4. Another reason why the timing of this conference is less than perfect may emerge in the course of our discussions. In what some see as the long march of European construction, the pace has recently picked up. In the present - intense - phase of negotiation and discussion, it will be more difficult than ever to define with certitude - and perhaps candour - where we have been, and where we are going. But I shall try, and give you a snapshop of the British Government's view of developments in the field of defence and security.

Process

5. A moment ago I mentioned the sequence of meetings which lies at the heart of this autumn's debate on European security. The timetable is tight, but clear:

- the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union met on 29 October, and will meet again on 18 November. The WEU's best contribution to the European security debate would be to agree on a declaration on that organisation's future role, and its links with the European Political Union and with the North Atlantic Alliance;

- the North Atlantic Council, meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, will gather in Rome on Thursday and Friday this week to complete the review of the Alliance's role and strategy launched at NATO's London Summit in July 1990; and

- the European Council will meet in Maastricht on 9-10 December to consider the results of the Inter-Governmental Conferences on Political, and Economic and Monetary, Union.

6. As far as European security is concerned, the British Government has one overriding objective for the parallel, but closely connected, discussion in what the cognoscenti know as the WEU, the NAC and the IGC(P): that together they should by the end of the year produce a coherent structure for European defence, refurbished to reflect the new realities. But, as the Foreign

Secretary has made clear, not at any price. Taking the organisations in the order of their meetings, I shall explain what price the British Government would be prepared to pay, and what we would expect to get for our money. First, however, some general principles.

Principles

7. The fundamentals of the British approach should be clear and familiar:

- we believe that the best and most effective way to organise the defence of Western Europe is through NATO and in close alliance with the United States;

- we believe that the Europeans can and should be doing more for their own defence;

- we therefore strongly support moves to reinforce the European security and defence identity; and

- that identity must, if it is to serve our security, be compatible with the policies and structures for European defence which we already have in the Atlantic Alliance.

8. For us, therefore, the trick is to achieve a sensible - and practical - synthesis between the European and transatlantic dimensions to the security of Europe. We see the Western European Union - Western Europe's existing home-grown defence organisation, linked to both the Alliance and the Union - as the best means of achieving that. Let me turn first to the WEU.

The Western European Union

9. As you will know, the Western European Union in its original form antedates NATO by a little more than a year. But the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 makes clear that, for all practical purposes, the members of the WEU have agreed to pool their efforts for the defence of Western Europe through NATO. That organic link

with NATO makes the WEU - with organic links developed also to the Community - the natural vehicle for expressing - and reinforcing as necessary - the European defence identity. Some of our ideas on how that might best be done were set out in the Anglo-Italian Declaration of 4 October.

10. Thus, we see the WEU developing its role in two complementary directions: as the defence component of the Union, and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. To do this, we would like the WEU Secretariat, and thus the seat of its Ministerial Council, moved from London to Brussels. We should like to see links established between the WEU Secretary General and his staff, and the NATO Secretary General and his staff, and between the two parliamentary assemblies. We are also in favour of a special relationship of association for those partners and allies who do not belong to the WEU.

11. We would like to see the WEU develop as the forum in which its members are able to discuss all defence issues, without taboos. Some European caucusing within the Alliance may be not only inevitable, but desirable, if it results in the Europeans adopting a more coherent approach to defence issues. But this must not lead to the Europeans presenting their fellow Allies with formal or inflexible positions on matters for which NATO is responsible. Bloc-to-bloc negotiation has no part in the letter or the spirit of Allied consultation and decision-making under the Washington Treaty. The better the arrangements for Europeans to discuss their own defence, the greater the responsibility on them to respect the principles of openness and complementarity of decision-making, emphasised in the Anglo-Itlaian Declaration. We want to see as much openness as possible between the WEU and its sister bodies.

12. As far as the WEU's operational role is concerned, we are on course to establish a WEU centre for the interpretation of satellite data next year - the site and director should be chosen later this month - and are carrying forward studies of how European capabilities might be reinforced in a number of fields, notably strategic lift and logistics.

13. But a revitalised WEU should in our view do more than reinforce the European contribution through the Alliance to the defence of European soil. It should develop its potential for out-of-area operations, thus giving the European defence identity an early practical content. The Anglo-Italian Declaration proposes that the WEU should develop a European Reaction Force, capable of fulfilling flexibly a variety of roles outside the NATO area.

14. Such a force would be independent of NATO structures, although it would inevitably draw largely on forces assigned to NATO for the defence of Europe. We should like the force to have its own peacetime planning cell, which would develop contingency plans and organise exercises. The successful co-ordination by the WEU of naval deployments in the Gulf in 1987 and in 1990-1 was a modest beginning in this direction.

15. So much for what a revitalised WEU might do. But how will it know what to do? What about its links with the Alliance and the Union? On this, the well-chosen words of the Anglo-Italian Declaration are hard to improve upon:

> "the WEU will take account in its activities of the decisions of the European Council in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and of postiions adopted in the context of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with each body".

16. Thus, in our view, the WEU should have balanced, but not identical, links with both the Union and the Alliance. As an autonomous international organisation, it should take orders from neither. Equally, however, the fact that all its members belong both to the Union and to the Alliance means that they are bound to take account of decisions made in the other main bodies to which they belong: in the Alliance and in the Union.

17. But, however clear the guidelines that govern the WEU's relations with the Union and the Alliance, there will be scope for theological argument, especially as the new arrangements bed down.

A large dose of pragmatism, coupled with two basic principles, should help:

- decisions on all matters involving possible action under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty must be reserved to the Alliance as a whole; and

- decisions on non-Alliance defence questions should be taken by the WEU, consulting with the other Allies so that they have an opportunity to support our efforts.

18. The task now is to turn these ideas into a document on which the WEU can base its future development and operations. The British Government had hoped that the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council on 29 October would, have taken decisions on just such a document. We think it desirable that the regular Ministerial meeting on 18 November should agree such a declaration, which could then be annexed to any Union Treaty agreed at Maastricht. Such a device - the annexing of a declaration to the Treaty - would thus to some extent replicate for the WEU and the Union the organic link which the WEU and the Alliance enjoy through the Washington and modified Brussels Treaties.

19. Architectural analogies for European security are much in vogue. Let me choose two for the WEU. Without the underpinning of a practical declaration on the WEU's role, and its links with both the Union and the Alliance, it is difficult to see how we will achieve a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations now in train. In our view, the WEU is the keystone of the European security identity - the point at which the European pillar of the Alliance, and the defence component of the Union, meet, and merge.

The Alliance

20. Once we are clear about the WEU, it will be much easier to be clear about how the Alliance and the Union will relate to the European defence identity. For the British Government, the development through the WEU of a genuine European defence identity is a means of reinforcing the Atlantic Alliance. After all, we

already have a common defence policy within the Alliance. But we believe that a rebalanced Alliance, in which the Europeans play a greater role, is not only desirable, but also essential if NATO is to adapt to changing circumstances. We hope and expect that through the WEU, the Europeans will be able to make a valuable contribution to collective security. When it comes to defence, "made in Europe" may well sell better with some European electorates than "made in NATO" or a purely national label.

21. What can the Alliance as a whole do to help bring about a distinctive European contribution to the defence of Europe? The first step will be a strong and positive passage on the European security identity in the declaration issued by the NATO Summit later this week. Thereafter, the onus will be on all Allies, both those who belong to the WEU and those who do not, to work in an open-minded spirit to maximise the contribution that the WEU can make to collective security. That will involve continuing adaptation: not easy for a 40 year old international body. But NATO's success has been due to its adaptablility. I am confident that it can respond to the challenge.

The Union

22. Much the same applies to the Union: in defining the WEU's relationship with the Union, the ball is still in the WEU's court. When we have a clearer agreed view of the WEU's links to the Union, we will be better placed to finalise what the Union Treaty might say about defence. In the meantime, our approach will be governed by a number of essential - and largely familiar - principles, embodied in the Anglo-Italian Declaration:

- any reference in a Union Treaty to a common defence policy must make clear both that it is a long term goal and that it must be compatible with the Alliance;

- European defence co-operation should not present our non-EC Allies with faits accomplis or marginalise them;

- that the WEU, while closely linked to the Union (as well as the Alliance), is separate from, and not subordinate to, it.

Conclusion

23. To the uninitiated, a conference on European security architecture may sound as though one were spending an agreeable afternoon comparing the ramparts of Carcassone with those of Caernarvon Castle. For an audience such as this, however, I hope that European defence structures, for all their familiarity, are no less fascinating, even if the British Government seems concerned more with practical realities than institutional fantasies. I hope too that those of you who have been observing the scene over the last, say, five years will have noticed that there has been a significant evolution in the British Government's approach to European security. We now accept, for example, the perspective of a common defence policy, albeit compatible with that of the Alliance, and we have been in the forefront of moves to give practical expression, through the WEU, to the European defence identity, notably in the establishment of a European Reaction Force. We are working hard for agrement at Maastricht on the Union Treaty as a whole, including its coverage of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. But not at any price. It must be part of a coherent European security structure, that is compatible with the arrangements which, through NATO, give all of us the cheapest and most secure Alliance any of us has ever enjoyed.

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FEDERAL TRUST

THE NEW AGENDA AND INSTITUTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY:
THE CHANGING ROLES OF WEU, THE EC AND NATO
London
4-5 November 1991

"THE NEW ROLE OF WEU"

Ambassador
Horst HOLTHOFF
Deputy Secretary-General
Western European Union
London

4 November 1991

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY!
(FEDTRU3/311091CBcb)

Today, European and global affairs remain very much in a state of flux. Faced with the growing complexity of Europe's geopolitical situation, our understanding of security is rapidly changing: clear-cut threats have been replaced by diffuse and unpredictable risks. Deterrence remains essential, but cooperative dimensions of security are increasing in importance. The strengthening of the new democracies, requiring huge investments in economic assistance and massive efforts in transfer of know-how, is the main guarantee of stability in Europe.

A future institutional arrangement for European security has to function both in relation to internal European security risks and to outside challenges. The outcome of NATO's strategy review, the results of the Intergovernmental Conference's work on European Political Union and, finally, WEU's own transformation into an increasingly operational organization, contributing to a more distinct European role in a revamped Atlantic Alliance, will be of crucial importance. They will decide Europe's contribution to the stability of the continent and Europe's capability to react adequately to future challenges.

Since its reactivation, WEU has indeed been placed at the crossroads of the process of European integration, aiming ultimately at a fully-fledged Political Union on the one hand, and at strengthening the vitally important transatlantic security solidarity on the other.

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In the future European security architecture, the tasks of defence and deterrence will continue to be shouldered by NATO, with Europe carrying increased responsibilities, however. With its effective defence arrangements, proven mechanisms and continuous consultation on politico-military issues of importance to Europe and North America, NATO remains a key feature of European security structures and provides an indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe.

The European Community will in all probability be the cornerstone of the future pan-European order based on cooperation. Only a European Community, evolving towards a Political Union, can ensure that a Europe, formerly divided into blocs, is not replaced by a disrupted Europe characterized by balance of power politics and changing alliances.

During the Gulf crises of 1987/88 and 1990/91, WEU coordination of the naval presence of member countries clearly showed the capability of WEU to assume operational military roles. WEU has fulfilled this task because it is not hampered by the traditional obstacles to NATO being involved "out-of-area". WEU can base the defence of vital European security interests on Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. WEU's competence is of real advantage to the Atlantic Alliance since it offers the potential for concerted action among Europeans or ad hoc cooperation between Europeans and their American allies.

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WEU, whose nine member States are all party to the Brussels Treaty, the Washington Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, now occupies the central position in the debate on the emergence of a European security and defence personality. It will continue to do so until a final agreement is reached as to how security matters are to be organized within the framework of European integration, a framework which will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

In the triple context of the EC Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, NATO Review and internal WEU debates, it has become obvious that the relationship of WEU to both NATO and the Political Union will be of crucial importance for the future of European security. Intense discussions are taking place in WEU and in other forums, particularly as regards the precise definition of this relationship and the implementation of practical measures which would govern it.

At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27 June 1991, WEU Ministers agreed that "European Political Union implies a genuine European security and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters". They also agreed that WEU "should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component."

There is no contradiction between developing a European security and defence identity and the strengthening of solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. Most Allies now realize that a genuine European pillar will contribute to the vitality of NATO.

Such a synergetic interaction requires however that, at each stage, appropriate practical arrangements are worked out to ensure transparency and complementarity.

This will of course call for appropriate procedures for cooperation with these Allies, which are not members of WEU. The European and Atlantic debates will therefore have to proceed in parallel.

In the perspective of a full incorporation of security and defence into a European Union, WEU could be regarded as a transitional organization. Until such time, WEU will remain an autonomous organization able to fulfil two missions:

- First, WEU could make inputs in both the directions of the Alliance and European Political Union.

- Second, WEU should develop as the security and defence component through which the European Union can act.

Such action is conceivable only on the basis of political compatibility and operational complementarity with the relevant Alliance mechanisms.

The precise definition of the relations which WEU will develop with the European Union and with NATO continues to be at the top of the organization's agenda. The Königswinter Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting on WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture on 29 October helped focus the debate on the essential questions which, however, will require further work before the European Summit in Maastricht at the beginning of December.

Recent initiatives by member States - such as the Anglo-Italian Declaration of 4 October and the Franco-German proposal of 14 October - have also highlighted the political will of member States to enhance WEU's operational role.

Indeed, without an adequate operational base, WEU could neither be considered as an effective "channel" for cooperation between the Political Union and NATO, nor would it be capable of playing a credible role as defence component of the Political Union and as an element for the strengthening of the European pillar.

The Gulf War and the conflict in Yugoslavia have stressed the urgent need to make WEU more operational. Already at their June meeting in Luxembourg, WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers mandated the WEU Defence Representatives Group "to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make cooperation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for coordination and planning structures." The results of this work will be submitted to Ministers at their meeting in November.

The crucial importance of intelligence in the Gulf conflict has clearly demonstrated the value to European countries of acquiring a satellite observation system of its own for the purpose of crisis monitoring. A significant first step in that direction was the Ministerial decision of 27 June 1991 to set up a satellite data interpretation Centre with the immediate task of training European experts in photo-interpretation.

In the field of arms control verification, Ministers decided in Luxembourg to step up programmes of cooperation among member States on the verification of arms control agreements. They agreed on practical arrangements for cooperation within WEU concerning the implementation of the verification regime of the CFE Treaty. Cooperation in the field of verification should enable member States to achieve a high efficiency and to reduce their costs.

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While WEU has recently acquired an enhanced profile mainly by virtue of its role in coordinating the military presence of member countries in the Gulf, it has certainly not been idle in the field of relations and dialogue with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the new environment, especially after the failed coup in the Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries are seeking links with the West in the field of security. WEU will respond to its pan-European responsibility and enhance its relations with those countries. This will be done without duplicating similar efforts undertaken in the NATO framework.

The conflict in Yugoslavia has highlighted the question of the extent to which a European defence identity can be developed which has not only a role outside Europe but also within our continent. WEU cannot be relegated to a "out-of-Europe" role only. It is obvious that Europe needs to develop its own capabilities to act when and where the need arises and Europe's political will exists. Future European multinational forces should be structured in such a way that they can be used by NATO in collective defence scenarios and by WEU in European as well as out-of-Europe contingencies.
Such a dual assignment does not only take account of budget constraints but also ensures that action "made in Europe" will be subject to consultation with the Alliance.

In the context of the Yugoslav crisis, WEU member States have examined possible support for the EC monitoring mission, though only at the stage of pre-contingency planning. However, before WEU could become active in the Yugoslav crisis, an explicit mandate would be needed.

Other indispensable political preconditions are the existence of an effective ceasefire agreement and the consent of all parties involved.

At present, there exists the opportunity to adapt WEU to the new situation in Europe and to enhance its contribution to the emerging new European security architecture. We need both a European pillar for NATO and a defence dimension for the European Union. As the multitude of proposals in the run-up to the Maastricht summit shows, the process of uniting Europe still remains difficult. At the same time, they show that there is the political determination to make the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union a success.

FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

by

Dr Panos Tsakaloyannis, Volkswagen Stiftung

PAPER GIVEN AT A CONFERENCE ON

The New Agenda and Institutions of European Security Policy:
The changing roles of the WEU, the EC and NATO

on 4-5 November 1991 in London

Organised by the Federal Trust for Education and Research
in collaboration with the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)

In the late 1970s, A.W. De Porte, Director of the office for Research for Western Europe at the US department of State, contended that the existing balance in Europe was to persist well into the 21st century because it served well 'most of the interests of most of the participants most of the time' and even more important, because it reflected accurately 'the facts of power as between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and between them and the states of Europe on the other'. Those facts of power meant that neither of the superpowers were prepared to build or allow others to build a new system that would diminish their preponderant role in Europe; nor, even less were they willing 'to tolerate a systemless state of confusion as an alternative to the status quo. They have had the means and the will to enforce their preferences.'

Evidently the point of departure in the debate on a European security policy in the 1990s in general and the role of the Western European Union in particular should be that the demise of one of the superpowers has shattered such confident assumptions and it has introduced an unprecedented degree of uncertainty and confusion. Its corollary is that the prime objective of a European security policy in the 1990s should be to device institutions capable of preventing precisely what the superpowers had successfully done for four decades.

The debate on the subject has so far oscillated between two

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extreme poles; either reliance on the existing structures of NATO to preserve security on the continent under new circumstances; or the upgrading of Europe's security institution in order to fill the vacuum and assume greater responsibilities. In the latter case the ideal forum for that purpose should have been the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as it represents all European nations. Yet its large membership and the principle of unanimity in its decision-taking as well as the absence of instruments of enforcement reduce drastically its effectiveness. Moreover, as the number of European states increases, the effectiveness of pan-European security structures like the CSCE should be further eroded and render it even more ineffectual to fulfil the above-mentioned objective. In all probability, therefore, the CSCE will remain in the foreseeable future 'a skeleton with little flesh and almost no muscle' or 'a tarpoulin without a roof' to borrow Dr Van Eekelen's metaphor. That the CSCE is inadequate to provide security is also attested by the eagerness of Central and Eastern European countries to develop closer links with NATO and the WEU.

A more realistic alternative appears to be the Western European Union which since the events in Eastern Europe and the Gulf has been catapulted to the centre stage in the debate on how to improve European security in the post cold war period. The WEU by virtue of its greater homogeneity, its Treaty based status, and the considerable economic and technological assets of its Nine members mark it as the most promising candidate. Yet, its capacity to play this role depends at least as much on the

ongoing debate in NATO and the European Community as on its own intrinsic capabilities. There are obvious advantages but also disadvantages stemming from the WEU's rather ambivalent position between NATO and the EC. The most obvious advantage is that it can act as a bridge builder or an interface, in President Delors' term, between NATO and the EC. Such a view presupposes, however, that the WEU can play the role of an 'honest broker' in easing the rather tangled state of transatlantic relations. The two main reasons for claiming such role are first its dual membership -in that all its members belong to NATO- as well as to the fact that as a security organization the WEU is better placed to promote harmony with NATO than the EC whose trade and economic character often puts it on the opposite side to the United States in the GATT and other economic and trade fora.

In the 1980s, before the sea-changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the WEU's development was moulded by two main factors: by developments in the European Community and by the state of superpowers' relations. Thus its reactivation in 1984 stemmed by the EC's poor shape in the early 1980s, particularly EPC's inability to cope with the new challenges, as well as by the superpowers' drift to confrontation which exposed Western Europe's vulnerability. Similarly the adoption of a security 'Platform' in the Hague, in October 1987, was prompted by the need to respond to the challenges of Reykjavik and the INF Treaty, as well as by a desire to establish a parallelism with the EC whose Single European Act and its '1992' blueprint had put it on a different footing. Indicative of the latter is the evolving close contacts in the late 1980s between the former

Secretariat General of the WEU not only with President Delors, but also with the Vice-President of the Commission in charge of industrial questions, especially regarding a possible European market for military equipment, which might have facilitated 'a historic extension of Community competence to cover European defense industry' as an EC official put it in 1988.

In short, prior to the political change in Europe, the WEU's role was viewed in terms of raising awareness on security issues among public opinion as part of the EC's development whose main thrust was on economic-trade issues.

The WEU was propelled into action in late April 1990 following the Kohl-Mitterand letter to their EC partners calling for the transfer of 'the whole relationship between the (EC) Member States into European Union and give it the necessary means to act' and by the European Council meeting of April 1990 in Dublin, which endorsed this proposal. It was also a response to the opening debate on NATO's review and to the study of Europe's future defence requirements. Significantly, in the light of subsequent developments, one of the first initiatives by the WEU Secretariat General was a proposal to the WEU Council, in April 1990, for the creation of multilateral units formed by German, British and Dutch forces at divisional strength, each participating country contributing one brigade. Such units would have been stationed in Germany on the Polish border. Evidently such units were viewed useful in stabilizing the situation in Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to the WEU's Secretary General they could have solved the problem of stationed forces in Germany by making the issue irrelevant as

European forces would have been at home everywhere in Europe. A parallel objective would have been to hammer out a common position among the Nine in relation to the United States as well as to raise public awareness of Western Europe's security requirements.

The Council's lukewarm response to this proposal indicated that the formation of multilateral units was a bridge too far for the WEU members to cross in April 1990. It meant that the Nine in the WEU were not prepared to reopen the debate on European multilateral units which had caused such controversy in the early 1950s. It also meant that the WEU could not elaborate its own strategy independently from developments in the EC and NATO. With regard to the former, prior to the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, it was unclear how the Twelve's commitments to Political Union could be translated in concrete terms. Therefore, till the early autumn of 1990, the WEU did not figure prominently in the debate on Political Union. The Gulf crisis had had a twin effect on the WEU. First, the crisis helped the Twelve to solve their ambiguity in what they meant by Political Union. As late as July 1990 it had been an open question whether security could have been built into deeper foreign policy cooperation in the proposed Political Union. With the Gulf crisis, however, the problem was solved and what it remained, in the words of the Italian Foreign Minister in the chair of the EC Presidency was 'to discuss the legal aspects, institutions and powers'.

Second, the Gulf crisis offered the opportunity for the WEU to play an active role and coordinate the Nine's naval operations. While its role was a supportive one to that of the United States'

led forces in operation desert storm, nonetheless it was not negligible. Moreover, on a political plane, the WEU's performance compared favourably to that of the Twelve in EPC which was sidelined and appeared virtually irrelevant. These developments in the autumn of 1990 encouraged the 'maximalists' in the EC to view the WEU as the linchpin upon which a European security pillar, with its own distinct structures, could be constructed. To this end, they have favoured the gradual merger of the WEU to the EC after a transition period of four years. As with the EC at large, the WEU will become answerable to the European Council and to the Council of the EC which will decide which issues should be referred to the WEU.

To this end since the autumn of 1990 proposals have been submitted by some Member States like Italy to the IGC as well as by the Commission itself which in March 1991 submitted a long detailed document with specific and far-reaching proposals on security and foreign policy which amounted to a new Treaty designed to overcome the constraints on security stipulated in the Treaty of Rome and to fully integrate the WEU into the Community's structures.

Advocates of this strategy seem to assume that once the right structures and institutional arrangements are put together, they would have a vortex effect and provide the stimulus for bridging the differences among the Twelve on security issues which, if anything have becoming more glaring since the autumn of 1989. On the one hand the collapse of the Soviet Union has widened the rift between so-called 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeanists' as the current Anglo-Italian and Franco-German proposals suggest. On the

other hand, the crisis in Yugoslavia and its potential spill-over effects to other parts of Europe, including Western Europe, has played havoc with the EC's or the WEU's ambitions to assume a greater security role. Above all, the Yugoslav crisis has underscored the fact that the Twelve or the Nine have no answers to pressing present questions.

This is perhaps one of the reasons why most proposals, including the Franco-German initiative on Foreign Security and Defence Policy submitted last month, while they provide long lists of subjects to be considered for common action, they assiduously avoid to refer to specific situations where such units could be employed, like Yugoslavia, for example. This makes them vulnerable to criticisms that they try to put the cart before the horse and that they try to short-circuit political problems by institutional tampering.

A reluctance to address seriously the long-term political implications of such far-reaching proposals, evidently undermines their credibility and it raises a question mark on whether a viable European security pillar can be sustained on such shaky grounds. A good example is the latest Franco-German proposal on CFSP submitted last month to the EC partners to be discussed in the IGC. In it, novel and far-reaching ideas like 'the setting up of military units under the WEU' fashioned on the reinforced Franco-German units, are mingled with long lists of rather vague and tedious cases of 'priority areas' which they have one thing in common: they make one wonder why a security pillar is necessary, with all its implications and potential dislocating effects on existing structures, to address issues like 'the

political and economic relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union; political and economic relations and cooperation ... with Central and Eastern European countries; the CSCE process; relations with the US and Canada; political and economic relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle East; policy and cooperation within the UN and participating in humanitarian measures'. Similarly it is unclear what the role of such units under the WEU could be in disarmament policy and arms control in Europe, nuclear non-proliferation or the cooperation regarding arms exports and the control of arms exports. Virtually all these subjects can be easily addressed in the framework of EPC, which since 1987 is empowered to tackle the economic and political aspects of security, or in the WEU in its present form. Even the article stating the participation in peace keeping measures within the framework of the UN is vague enough to warrant the kind of institutional changes proposed in the document.

Such considerations and the apparent absence of political will to implement Grand Designs on a European security reinforce the critics' contention that such ill-defined and hasty prepared plans are 'the mere verbal accomplishments of a tactical retreat' as the former head of planning at the German Ministry of Defence has described them, and 'a figment of political imaginations not properly thought out in terms of requirements, costs and consequences, doing more political damage than military good -a hare brained strategic notion'. An additional objection is that such proposals to Europeanize security without a clear assessment of the international situation or the current state of European integration might create more problems and make the existing

confusion in Europe even more perplexing.

In this respect the role of the WEU has become the captive of these ambiguities and of the manifest inability of the West Europeans to overcome their security dilemmas. For while the idea of the WEU as a bridge or an interface in a system of interlocking institutions is attractive, the fact remains that as long as the political problems remain unresolved, the WEU will remain a security hybrid, sitting uncomfortably between two stools and unable to provide the missing link between an elusive European security pillar on the one side and the Atlantic Alliance on the other which in the absence of realistic alternatives appears to be the sole ultimate security guarantee for Europe.

Arguably the more these proposals for a European security pillar like the Franco-German one, emphasize the need for symmetry, convergence and eventually total fusion between the WEU and the EC, the slimmer will be the prospects for a qualitative step forward. For example in the Franco-German proposal on a CFSP, the following objectives are mentioned for the WEU which are in conformity with its Treaty, 'the Hague Platform of 1986 (sic), and the Vianden communique of 27 June 1991':

-strengthening the role of the WEU which is a full partner on the process of European integration and whose goal is union.

-the necessity to develop a genuine European defence and security identity and to assume increasing responsibility in the area of defence;

-the subsequent step-by-step building-up of the WEU as a component of the Union's defence.

The next article is an invitation to Greece and Denmark to join the WEU and to Ireland to acquire an observer status. This proposal stems from a desire to rationalize the institutional patchwork and to facilitate the establishment of an organic link between the WEU and the Union.

What is not clear, however, in the Franco-German proposal is whether future members of the EC will automatically be granted full membership of the WEU as well in order to preserve this organic link. If that is not the case then the problem of 'variable geometry' will reappear again in the not so distant future as the EC enlarges to the North, East and South. If the opposite is the case, that is if a twin membership of the EC and the WEU is a condition for accepting new members, then there will be another complex and torturous process of harmonization and adjustment on security. Moreover, the sheer number and the considerably greater degree of political diversity of an enlarged Community will make the realization of an effective European security pillar an even more daunting task to accomplish than what it is at present. After all the WEU was reactivated in 1984 because the EC's Ten members were hopelessly unable to make any progress in EPC on issues which hardly went beyond the harmonization of their foreign policies. The WEU's main merit by contrast, was its exclusivity and in its high degree of homogeneity, political, economic, even geographical. This aspect will be diluted if the WEU were to enlarge to 24 or more members, along with the EC, and it may become something akin to a glorified CSCE, minus the superpowers.

Moreover, this desire for an organic link between the WEU and the Union is bound to clash with the second major objective of the Franco-German proposal, namely the strengthening of Atlantic relations, as it will most likely lead to the marginalization from the Europeanization process of staunch NATO allies like Norway and Turkey. Indeed since last year, Washington has been making strong representations for the inclusion of all European members of NATO to the economic and security structures of Western Europe. Yet, given Norway's reluctance to join the EC and Turkey's difficult relations with Brussels, it is hard to see how this demand can be met. A similar idea, put forward by the Assembly of the WEU, that the EC should give priority for membership to NATO members appears equally unrealistic for the same reasons.

The above example suffices, I think, to illustrate the complexity of the problems involved in the current effort to construct a European security pillar by institutional feat. In this respect, the WEU is a victim of the rash decision in the spring of 1990 to move to political and security union within a very tight time schedule without due attention paid to the immensity of the problems involved and to the adverse effects on European security in case of a setback. Since then repeated failures to break the mould and move forward have led to a frustrating situation whereby unresolved issues are passed on in a rather circular manner from the IGC to WEU to NATO. The latest and hopefully the last acts of this drama are to take place in Rome and in Maastricht later this year, but it is highly unlikely that these meetings will produce the desired solutions to the

pressing question if how to cope with the new security agenda in the post-cold war era. The question remains whether a likely setback would provide the opportunity for a new start from new premises or whether it will lead to apathy and resignation.

For Federal Trust, London, 4-5 November 1991, The New Agenda...

The Changing Role of the European Community

Reinhardt Rummel

Introduction: the year of institutional competition

In 1991 West European security cooperation has become a prime topic among transatlantic and all-European policy analysts as well as policy makers. While a war against an aggressor was going on in Iraq with Western allies involved, while a civil war took place in Yugoslavia with the European Community trying to mediate and while the desintegration of the Soviet empire continued with the West watching, all the relevant security institutions and actors were busy with discussing proposals for the future organization of Europe's security and defense structures:

(1) The EC's Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on European Political Union has been elaborating the blueprints for the December 1991 Maastricht treaty specifying the goals, competences and procedures of Community decision-making in foreign policy and security affairs. Relations to the Western European Union (WEU) were also on the agenda, not so with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The conclusion of the Community - European Free Trade Area (EFTA) agreement in October 1991 to create a large European Economic Area (EEA) and the parallel negotiation of association contracts with East European countries were steps to shape the eastern environment of the Community.

(2) With its November 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome NATO has almost completed a two year review process of its future role, strategy and force structure. Beyond embryonic interinstitutional contacts, NATO has started to think of links with WEU, the Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

(3) In February and June of 1991 the Presidency of WEU published statements on the future role of this organization as a bridge between NATO and the Community. In the fall of 1991 the United Kingdom and Italy as well as France and Germany presented their respective proposals designed to give military substance to WEU and link it to the Community and /or to NATO.

(4) In preparation of the 1992 Helsinki II CSCE meeting, a further institutionalization of its agencies in Warsaw, Prague and Vienna was discussed while several Experts Meetings, the first Annual Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Berlin in June, and a Special Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow in October 1991 advanced the common all-European norms of cohabitation and cooperation in the CSCE area. Secretary James Baker and

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in October 1991 proposed the creation of a security-oriented Cooperation Council for the CSCE space.

All of these efforts are designed to (re)organize the security structures in Europe. 1991 may well be called the year of institutional competition. So far, none of the major conceptual problems has been settled by this rivalry and no master plan has emerged except that NATO, WEU and the Community are likely to be interlocked in one way or the other. These three Western organizations will then have to be connected with any of the future all-European structures of security, especially the CSCE. The following reflections deal with regional security by analyzing both the new dangers in and for Europe and the old security-related institutions which are now in the process of desperately catching up with a brand new environment.

1. Main Challenges for the Post-Cold War Europe

A large part of the debate on West European security cooperation is focusing almost entirely on institutional questions. This is particularly the case in the Community context, partly also in WEU and NATO. While institutional preconditions and arrangements do matter, it seems indispensible at a juncture of fundamental change in terms of international relations and security demands to start all deliberations of defense cooperation in Western Europe with a careful assessment of the nature and the scope of challenge to cope with in a new security setup. What is the specific task which we want a particular institution to cover? Function should drive institution building, not the other way round.

How to prevent military conflict between former Soviet republics? What are the security requirements in the unsettled Balkan conflicts? What is the most relevant risk feature with regard to the post-Cold War and the post-Iraq War era worldwide? It seems that it is the nature of security shifts from the clearly definable defense issue to the much less definable political issue. Certainly, we will have to continue to cope with military machineries, be it in the former Soviet Union or in the Middle East, but "military solutions" of conflicts are much less an end in itself than they used to be. Stability in today's Europe is not achievable anymore by military balances. Other assets come into play such as economic performance and freedom of communication. Likewise, the instability caused by Saddam Hussein in the Middle East is not neutralized by fighting a war. Additional, more longterm measures, such as change of the political culture of the region (see the Madrid International Peace Conference) and a new technology transfer policy from North to South and, indeed, within the South, have to come into play to control regional conflict. This means that the security policy of the new era will be much more political, and will deal with a large range of

policies beyond the military one. The conclusion to draw from this observation is that at the heart of the security policy of the future must be increasingly more policy coordination than defense coordination. Hence, the importance of a politicization of NATO, a much wider role to play for the European Community, and an obvious need for the two organizations to develop a joint approach to security.[1]

A second important feature of security challenges in the future is the differentiation of dangers. It would be wrong to aggregate various dangers in an effort to generalize them. Western nations are not in an unspecified situation of a defense *tous azimuts*. Just to introduce one differentiation: The NATO allies have two kinds of neighbors: the East Europeans and the people beyond the southern rim of the Mediterranean.[2] Both groups of neighbors do not have much in common in terms of dangers they might cause or in terms of responses the Western allies might consider. Any war of significance in Eastern Europe could involve parts of the former Soviet military and could ultimately lead to the destruction of Western societies. By contrast, wars at NATO's southern periphery could be very costly but do not have the potential of destroying Western societies. The conclusion here is that in the first category of challenge (involvement of the former Soviet military)[3] NATO has to be in the forefront of any Western response, while in the second category of challenges (only Southern neighbors are involved) WEU could be developed to deal with some of the dangers. Whether in these cases WEU could or should go it alone or rather needs to be backed by NATO or the United States is a question to be seriously debated.

A third feature of the present and future security environment of the West is the change of challenges over time. Thus, the NATO allies are in an uncertain situation as long as the Soviets still remain militarily present in Germany and East European countries while the further course of the Soviet Union and its republics remains unpredictable and NATO

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1 The vast agenda of redefinition of security and institutional reform is analyzed in the volume of Jeffrey Simon (Ed.), *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington, DC: National Defense University 1991).

2 Roberto Aliboni, *European Security across the Mediterranean*, Chaillot Papers No. 2 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies 1991). Maurizio Cremasco, The Southern Region of Europe, Problems and Perspectives, in: Armand Clesse and Lothar Rühl (Eds.), *Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1990), p. 332-341.

3 In November 1991 the Ukraine's parliament accepted central Soviet control over nuclear weapons on its territory but demanded the right to veto their use.

member countries have already shifted gears.[4] A premature anticipation of complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe can be very costly. The transition period from now to the end of 1994 holds a set of dangers which is quite different from a post-withdrawal constellation. Western institutional response will have to be prepared for military reconstitution while keeping in mind that at the end of a successful transformation the former Soviet republics could even become NATO members. NATO is absolutely indispensible and should be strengthened during this transition period, but - because of continuous Soviet sensitivity - cannot provide much of a direct help to East European countries (see the Liaison Concept as a maximum). Here is a slot for West European organizations, especially Community and WEU, even if their response to East European demands for security cooperation remains a modest one. After the final Soviet withdrawal NATO is likely to be in a position to meet some of the security needs of East European countries while West European security bodies might well become less relevant in this respect.

(4) A fourth feature is characterized by the new international awareness of the importance of international norms and regimes in a new world order which is not structured in blocs anymore.[5] Just as Saddam Hussein was not allowed to break a vital international rule the aggressors in Yugoslavia will be denied to have it their way. The United Nations (UN) are in a strengthened role in this regard. International regimes and their enforcement will be extended in critical fields such as proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction and ecological/cultural damage to mankind. Development of the European code of conduct and its enforcement is on the agenda of the CSCE countries. Some traditional principles have to be qualified such as sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, selfdetermination, minority rights, respect of borders, veto rights. All of these are at the heart of a new security system in Europe. The demand here is to find a common basis among European countries and societies which come from differing political experiences and civilizations.

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4 Ronald D. Asmus, J. F. Brown, Keith Crane, *Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe* (Santa Monoca: RAND 1991).

5 Alan K. Henrikson, *Defining a New World Order*, A discussion paper for The Fletcher Round Table, May 2 and 3, 1991 (Medford: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1991). According to Henrikson the vision of a new world order can be realized by strengthening regional peace- and security efforts, extending the rule of law to permit internal intervention and creating peace-enforcement and permanent peacekeeping capabilities for future use by the UN.

A fifth feature of the future security situation in Europe is determined by the domestic environment of CSCE member countries. To take the example of Germany. If Bonn's NATO allies are interested in a military German contribution to out of area contingencies (and both Eastern Europe and the Middle East are out of the NATO area), it can only be assured via the European avenue. As long as NATO remains limited to its borders Community and/or WEU would have to establish forces of their own to allow the *Bundeswehr* to join multilateral actions beyond the NATO treaty area. Moreover, Germany has accepted a number of military restraints in the Two-plus-Four Agreement such as no nuclear weapons on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. As a consequence, the Federal Republic as a whole is likely to refuse the stationing of any future nuclear arsenal on its soil. Domestic dilemmas in Germany or almost any other European country could thus determine the institutional options for West European, transatlantic and all-European security cooperation. [6]

Thus, at the national, regional and global level the main structural problem seems to be identical: the incongruency of dangers and security provisions. Gone are the days were a conflict could be defined instituionally. NATO, even the reformed Alliance, is not *the* solution to all security problems in Europe. CSCE is a help for some security requirements in Europe, by far not all of them. WEU, too, was reactivated ten years ago for a different security environment as today's. Even in the case of the Community one has to redefine its security mission in an ideologically changed international context.

To determine security-oriented functions before developing institutions is only one of the guiding priciples for the establishment of the future Atlantic-European security structure. A second principle is to examine carefully the stage of evolution of the present integration process before assigning security functions to West European institutions. The reverse process but with similar objectives takes place right now in the former Soviet Union where the centrally commanded armed forces are about to be sorted out between the union and the republics as well as among the republics. In Western Europe specific preconditions have to be fulfilled before transfering security and defense missions to either the Community or WEU. To set preconditioned objectives is a wellknown pattern for both the Economic and the Monetary Union, it should be a guiedeline for the Security Union as well. A third principle to observe is to look at the given institutions in the security field as a complementary set rather than as competitive or mutually exclusive bodies. This demands skillful orchestration of institutional evolution.

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6 See Stephen F. Szabo, *The Changing Politics of German Security* (St. Martins Press 1990)

2. EPU as an actor in an all-European security structure: the Art of multi-institutional cooperation

EPU could, as of 1993, strengthen the Community internally and externally. Its decision-making capacity could grow and its democratic foundations could be enhanced. This does not lead to a clarification regarding the type of a union or state which would finally emerge from the overall integration process. The principal of subsidiarity is likely to play a more important role, though, than in the past.[7] Taken together the Maastricht results of the IGCs on EMU and EPU are likely to restructure the West European entity significantly. The Community reaches a state of development where the appropriate distribution of power and authority between the center and the member states has to be raised in a fundamental, maybe final, way.

Member countries are confronted with irreversible decisions concerning the authority in foreign, security and defense policy. National prerogatives in these sensitive areas are at stake and the main ideological orientation of the Community as an international power is still an open question. The nation-state in West Europe could undergo considerable reform via more elaborate sub-national as well as supra-national competences and structures. Yet, the EPU of 1993 is not likely to include the decision for a constituent assembly which would be asked to elaborate the constitution of the European Union. In Maastricht, the European Parliament's aspirations in this respect have again been turned down. Regarding the statehood of the European Union the Community remains in many ways open to the wider Europe.

Perceived from the outside in 1993 the most visible sign of the Community with an established EPU might be the practical performance of its new executive branch in foreign and security policy. It is likely to be based on the instruments of the new EMU rather than on combined national military forces. The Community could push a large part of the individual member states' external policies to the background and, thus, emerge as a more unified international actor which presumably shows some attitudes of a political giant in international relations, particularly in the United Nations, in the trans-European network, in the trans-Atlantic partnership and in connection with specific regions in the world.[8] When it

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7 For the concept of "subsidiarity" which has become a guiding principal of integration since Maastricht see Marc Wilk and Ellen Wallace: *Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-sharing in the EC* (London: Pinter 1990)

8 For future alternative internal constellations of the EC see Philippe C. Schmitter, Possible Political Configurations of the European Community After 1992, in Armand Clesse and Raymond Vernon

comes to projection of military power the Community will probably remain in the background. NATO member countries will, all things considered, continue to form the appropriate grouping for major military challenges. It is also needed as the supportive military infrastructure for Community/WEU lead military missions (peace keeping operations). This would tie in with the view of NATO's Secretary General, Manfred Wörner:

> "The Atlantic Alliance of the future will continue to be first and foremost an institution that provides its members with the most cost-effective security insurance on the market. Yet more and more it will address the concerns of non-members as well. It will do this by interlocking with other institutions which will contribute to security in Europe, like the CSCE, Community, WEU and even possibly the UN."[9]

Concerning the all-European order, the European Political Union will help to develop it as well as form a constituent part of it. These two functions remain to be specified using the Charter of Paris for a New Europe[10] as a framework of orientation. As far as the EPU is regarded as a constituent element of a transeuropean order reference should be made to the last forty years of integration policy in Western Europe. During this period a Community was built up which can be regarded as a security system per se. The evolution of interdependencies in almost all policy areas among formerly hostile nation states and the quality of their transnational cooperation have reached a point of no return. The system has a number of remarkable characteristcs as it has coped fairly well with all those types of conflict (socio-economic asymmetries, cultural clashes, mass migration, border disputes, territorial claims, differing size and status) which are also to be found on the present crisis agenda of Eastern Europe. Could this model of "security-via-integration" be a solution for the East European problems as well? The Community can either export its particular security concept or include East European states in the system by enlargement. Either way, East European countries would have to comply with the highly elaborate rules of the integration game in Western Europe which is not easy. The Community and its member states have decided to continue their integration efforts despite the restructuring of the postwar order in Europe. Trends toward renationalization are rather weak to date. The Twelve seem determined to intensify their cooperation and to contribute an element of stability to the all-European order.

(Eds.), *The European Community After 1992: A New Role in World Politics?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1991), p. 98-110.

9 Manfred Wörner, Address to the North Atlantic Assembly in Madrid on 21 October 1991 (Brussels: *NATO Press Service*), p. 10.

10 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is reprinted in *Agence Europe* (Documents), No. 1672 (14 December 1990), pp. 1-8.

The policy of security-via-integration produces security inside the Community but is no guarantee against risks and dangers outside of it. The Twelve alone can not control events on the Continent and in critical regions of the world but they can add to a stabilization of their external environment. With the successful inception of EPU (and its future CFSP including WEU) the Community is likely to contribute particularly to stable structures in Europe. It will do so with a variety of instruments each endowed with its specific mode of opperation:

(a) Common Foreign and Security Policy

Conflict management. Once the Maastricht Documents are ratified by the twelve parliaments this type of external policy needs to be turned into practice. The first issues for a test of the new CFSP will most likely be conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Concepts to deal with them effectively will be in demand and CFSP will do both mobilize relavant co-actors and set the agendas for successful conflict management. It will also be the driving force for extending the Council of Europe to host all European states and in adapting CSCE norms and instruments to the new imperatives in Europe.

Economic diplomacy. The European Community will extend its traditional trade and cooperation agreements as well as the new associations with East European countries (European Agreements). This network of economic contracts with post-socialist countries on the Continent is supplemented by short term measures of an emergency help (Phare Program, Tempus) and will have to be balanced with the demand of the old Community associates in the Mediterranean. Brussels will reenforce its leading role in channeling help and investment for Eastern Europe either in the OECD's G-24 or the London-based Bank for European Reconstruction and Development. It will also participate in decisions of the GATT and the IMF and Worldbank which affect the economic future of the former Comecon countries. The most important but also the most difficult partner to be hired will be Japan.[11]

European Political Cooperation. EPC is likely to extend its network of bilateral dialogues with the former Soviet Union as well as with East European countries.[12] Will the EFTA

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11 Eric Grove (Ed.), *Global Security. North America, European and Japanese Interdependence in the 1990s* (London: Brassey's 1991).

12 EPC has held calendar meetings with the Soviet Foreign Minister twice a year as well as adhoc meetings such as the Kremlin visit of the Troika on the Iraq war (February 18, 1991). Since their turn to

and Community countries contemplate the creation of a common "Political European Space" in addition to the EEA? If this is the case the EU would be the center of a diplomatic cobweb cast over all of Europe. The EU will use this system to strengthen democracy and human rights in all countries of the Continent and to develop the code of conduct between its nations.

Development policy. Foreign aid policy has not yet been connected with all-European relations but will certainly become part of the contemplations on new ways of supporting reform and liberal economy in the East, especially for countries which do not qualify for an association agreement with the Community. Would a Stabex system be helpful and achievable for some East European and former Soviet republics? The Community will have to find a balance between the new clients in the East and the traditional partners in the South (Mediterranian rim and ACP countries).

(b) Security and defense policy

Arms control. The EPU to come is likely to represent the West Europeans' view in negotiations on arms reductions, in talks on ceilings and, even more important, on bottem lines of national and regional armed forces. This will become particularly relevant at the start of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) II round of disarmament talks after the Helsinki 1992 CSCE meeting. Until then, NATO remains the main forum of West European consensus building on arms control. Afterwards EPU will be used to reach consensus between Western Europe and Northamerica.

Military technology. The EPU may develop rules for virtually all major issues connected with military technology: production, cooperation, transfer, export, export control, proliferation, conversion. Particularly important might be questions of how to control the export of military knowhow and the technological capacity for military reconstitution. Is the creation of a West European agency (i.e. modeled after Euratom) a solution to the problem or should such an agency be designed for transatlantic countries or for Europe as a

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autonomy several former Soviet republics have asked for a regular political dialogue with EPC. The Twelve will have to mulilateralize their formerly unilateral relations with Moscow. All of the association agreements with East European countries include a "political dialogue" section alongside the economic and financial parts of the agreement.

whole.[13] No such agency has been developed yet and it must remain an open question whether the size of the CSCE is the best framework for the development of control regimes or whether it should rather be the Western Economic Summit or a new Northern hemisphere grouping if not the UN or a combination of all of these bodies.[14]

Peace keeping. Here, too, a body on the European level is missing as the new Conflict Information Center in Vienna does not have the quality of a conflict management agency with a strong authority and instruments for sanctions as suggested by a minority of CSCE delegations. Any conflict management capacity in Europe will have to be connected in one way or the other to the UN Security Council for reasons of division of labor. Four of the five Security Council members are part of the CSCE area. EPU's eventual peace keeping forces could base its missions on a mandate of either the CSCE or the UN or both.

Defense relations. With the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) dissolved in 1991 East European countries are in need of bilateral and multilateral connections to fill an obvious vacuum for both software and hardware military assistance. EPU will not provide military operational support nor defense guarantees, but it can establish a defense dialogue that helps to overcome some isolation problems of East European countries or helps them to balance their continued dependence on the former Soviet Union in terms of military equipment. Moreover, the close connection between EPU (CFSP and WEU) and NATO will constitute the main counterweight to the remaining Soviet military power and will assure the central strategic axis of stability in Europe.

The central conclusion of these reflections is that the Community is inevitably on the way to become a superpower (Delors), however, neither a superpower in the sense of a civilian nor a hegemonic power. Rather the Community is likely to evolve as a cooptive power which is forceful enough to insert its contribution into the international network of contributors and to organize collaboration among principal international actors. The Community could be a driving force to set agendas for both the prevention and the management of conflict. Its main innovation would be to coopte partners for the muli-institutional response to the new set of foreign and security policy problems which have emerged since the tumbling of the Cold-war order.

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13 The Single Market in 1993 will press for a clarification of relations between the Community and NATO with respect to defense acquisitions. See Simon Webb, *NATO and 1992* (Santa Monica: RAND 1989).

14 In the fall of 1991 the five permanent members of the UN Security Council started talks on a regime for weapons exports.

FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

BETWEEN THE GULF WAR AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION

by

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PAPER GIVEN AT A CONFERENCE ON

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The changing roles of the WEU, the EC and NATO**

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by Alfred Pijpers

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Paper presented at the Conference "The New Agenda and Institutions of European Security: The changing roles of the WEU, the EC and NATO", organized by the Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 4 - 5 November 1991.

Holding the EC Presidency is highly appreciated by all member states. Admittedly, it puts a substantial burden on the national civil and diplomatic services (particularly of the smaller members), and for six months it circumscribes the promotion of specific national interests to a certain extent (although this is sometimes interpreted very broadly by some member states). But the positive spin-offs are predominant. The Presidency of one of the most prominent clubs of the world puts a member state in the spotlight of international publicity and constitutes a source of authority and prestige. From a public relations perspective alone 'Europe 1992' has turned out to be an unqualified success, and part of it is reflected on the EC President. The chairing of dozens of Council meetings, and hundreds of Commission and Working Group sessions on a wide range of Community and EPC subjects, generates an enormous amount of political information and is an ideal school for the mastering of EC dossiers and of international negotiating skills. Besides, the EC Presidency is a pivot point around a gradually expanding network of international economic and diplomatic contacts, and the heads of government (again, particularly those of the somewhat smaller countries) indulge in a rendezvous with the great of the earth, often for domestic political reasons as well. Bush or Kaifu traditionally pay their respects to the capitals of Britain, Germany, or Italy, but today their visits to The Hague or Lisbon are equally common. Discord within a cabinet and rivalry between coalition partners tend to be shelved with a view to the (coming) EC Presidency. The imminent collapse of the Lubbers-III cabinet, for example, (on issues relating to social security) in August 1991, was partly obviated by the consideration that the EC Presidency cannot be properly fulfilled under an outgoing administration.

Moreover, over the past few years the EC Presidency has gained further (international) political momentum stemming from a number of reasons. First and foremost because of the *relance* of European integration since the mid-1980s. The White Paper and the SEA have accelerated the legislation process and have led to a higher workload for, and an increasing number of meetings of, the Council and its subsidiary bodies, not only in the field of the internal market, but also with respect to associated policy areas like the environment, social affairs, research, energy, education, health, justice, etcetera. The tasks of the presiding country expanded accordingly, both in terms of substance and numbers. Particularly at the ministerial level the number of session days of the Council in its different roles has shown a significant increase since the mid-1980s, as may be illustrated by Table 1.

Table 1

Development of the number of Council session days and of the preparatory organs

Period	At the level of ministers	At the level of ambassadors and representatives of the minister	At the level of committees and working groups
	EEC/EAEC/ECSC	EEC/EAEC/ECSC	EEC/EAEC/ECSC
1958	21	39	302
1959	21	71	325
1960	44	97	505
1961	46	108	655
1962	80	128	783
1963	63.5	146.5	744.5
1964	102.5	229.5	1002.5
1965	35	105.5	760.5
1966	70.5	112.5	952.5
1967	75.5	134	1233
1968	61	132	1253
1969	69	129	1412.5
1970	81	154	1403
1971	75.5	127.5	1439
1972	73	159	2135
1973	79.5	148	1820
1974	66	114.5	1999.5
1975	67.5	118	2079.5
1976	65.5	108.5	2130
1977	71	122	2108.5
1978	76.5	104.5	2090
1979	59	107.5	2000
1980	83	106.5	2078.5
1981	83	110	1976
1982	86	107	1885
1983	121.5	105.5	1912.5
1984	133	86	1868.5
1985	118	117	1892
1986	107	118.5	1842.5
1987	123	120.5	1828
1988	117.5	104	2000.5
1989	119.5	100	1932

Source:

London Report hardly deserves the qualification 'crisis management'. For the problem is not so much to direct twelve political directors or their ministers to The Hague or Lisbon within a few days (although this is sometimes easier said than done), but to make sure that they will stay there for a while, thus ensuring that consultations take place on a more continuous basis in case of the outbreak of an international crisis.

Furthermore it is common knowledge, that the EC and its President have to react without the most essential elements of credible international crisis management, i.e. the (threat of the) use of military instruments, although the Twelve have somewhat increased their military options of late, considering, for example, the decision to send a team of EC observers to Yugoslavia to monitor the compliance with the armistice agreements, or the discussions on calling in the WEU in case of crises inside and outside Europe. However, UN-like instruments such as observers or peace keeping forces tend to be more useful *after* a crisis than during the crisis itself, and decision-making *à Neuf* implies of course a partial duplication of the discord and frustrations around the consultations *à Douze*. Given these circumstances concerted action is far from easy, let alone that the variety of political and military options, and their ultimate consequences, could be properly assessed at the European level. What is left for the time being are mainly the sticks and carrots of sanctions and aid. These measures may eventually have some effects, but in the (very) short term of a crisis they are usually insufficient to function as convincing pressure instruments. This is particularly true when strong national or other political sentiments are paramount, as on the Balkan or in the Middle East. Moreover, during a 'Summer Presidency' (starting as of 1 July) it is not always an easy task either to notify the European institutions in Brussels in time, which may be illustrated by the embarrassing experience of the Italian Presidency shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in early August 1990. It took a couple of days before the Italians managed to mobilize the required official support to impose the agreed Community sanctions.[6]

The smaller EC countries are plagued by additional handicaps. They usually lack

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political leaders with enough international reputation to act as authoritative EC representatives. Their government departments and staffs are often insufficiently equipped and not very familiar with developing geo-political views, scenarios or military options. Security experts or the relevant area specialists are not always available. The Netherlands, for example,

has a long-standing overseas policy tradition, but has never developed an integrated policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Two-third of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of development officials, while the Dutch diplomatic service probably accommodates more Tanzania-experts than Yugoslavia-experts. When the diplomatic recognition of the Baltic states suddenly became a topic after the aborted coup in Moscow (August 1991), Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek could declare little else than that he deemed the opening of Dutch embassies in the new capitals inopportune for financial reasons. In their capacity as EC President countries like Luxembourg or Ireland regularly have to fall back on the diplomatic logistics of other member states.[7] And when it so happens that the troika consists of smaller countries only (like, for example, in the case of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal), it is quite obvious that the international role of the EC is far from effective. Whereas in Yugoslavia the violent outbreak of the civil war took place in the summer of 1991, European foreign policy was incorporated, *inter alia*, by the Dutch-Luxembourg-Portuguese troika

(accompanied by the President of the European Commission), by Van den Broek solely, by the special EC envoy Wijnaendts (in normal life the Dutch ambassador in Paris), and subsequently also by Lord Carrington acting as President of the Peace Conference. Not to mention the painstaking efforts by Genscher and Dumas in particular. It was certainly a lucky coincidence that next to the Yugoslav *imbroglio* and the Russian coup no additional troubles (in, for example, the Middle East) demanded the Presidency's attention.

Given these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the European activities leave a rather amateurish impression, and that particularly the larger member states can hardly

[7]

resist the tendency to develop their own initiatives. Paris, London or Bonn, have each better crisis management resources than the EC, and the specific 'geo-political' interests of, for example, Germany *vis-à-vis* Croatia, Italy in Albania, or Denmark with regard to the Baltic states, may readily persuade them not to pay too much attention to the desiderata of The Hague or Lisbon. When massive numbers of Albanese refugees resort to Bari, it is not entirely incomprehensible why the Italian political director tends to stay in Rome to assist there with effective countermeasures, rather than to support The Hague in drawing up just another fine EPC declaration. This centrifugal tendency is also reinforced by the fact that next to the EC other (Western) international organizations as well claim some kind of mediating role during crises and conflicts. Sometimes an EC member state functions as President of these 'competitors'. This was quite distinct too during the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidency. In its capacity as WEU President, France convened an extraordinary WEU meeting on the eve of the European Council in Luxembourg (June 1991), in an apparent attempt to express its own views on the desired EC-WEU relationship in a concrete way. Genscher felt that, as acting President of the CSCE in early July, he had to depart for Vienna for consultations on Yugoslavia, although the EC troika was simultaneously dispatched. In August, a few days after the coup attempts in Moscow, John Major convened a special meeting of G-7 officials to examine whether additional emergency aid by the rich industrialized countries was needed to stabilize the fragile Soviet system. Within the framework of the Nordic Council, Denmark has contributed to adopt a far-reaching stance on the independence of the Baltic Republics. NATO and the UN Security Council as well contribute their bit. It is true that the EC may increasingly fulfil an international (security) role, yet one should bear in mind that it does not have a monopoly position in this field.

Anyhow, during the initial weeks of the Dutch Presidency it occurred more than once that individual member states aired their own viewpoints or developed initiatives contrary to the letter and spirit of Art. 30 2b of the SEA ('Consultations shall take place before the High Contracting Parties decide on their final position'). Genscher's threat to recognize Croatia and Slovenia if the assaults of the federal army were not stopped, or the Danisch recognition of the Balitic Republics, two days before the EC

ministers met in Brussels, are only some clear examples. The Twelve's ambition 'to endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy' (Art. 30, 1 SEA), and the rush for Political Union, take on a quite puzzling aspect when at a critical moment in the Yugoslav crisis, Hans van den Broek as acting EC President issues a statement at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while simultaneously in the same building but only one floor below, Hans-Dietrich Genscher discloses a diverging viewpoint in his own press conference.[8]

Movement or integration?

It would be a misunderstanding, however, to attribute the weaknesses of the Community to the shortcomings of the Presidency. There is little doubt that the degree of European political unification itself determines the possibilities of concerted and decisive action, both internally and externally. Is the EC making progress in this respect? At first sight, Western European integration seems to be well under way. Many authors note a predominant pattern of transnational mergers and linkages, increasing 'informal integration', intensifying political interdependence - in short, more dynamics.[9] Changes in one policy sector spill over to numerous other ones. Monetary integration requires budgetary assistance for the weaker countries and regions and has a substantial impact on the size and instruments of Structural Funds. German unification and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain have significant consequences for the transaction patterns in Central Europe and make new demands for a Common Transport Policy. A protectionist attitude towards the import of agricultural products from Eastern Europe may impede economic progress and stable development, and thwart certain European security objectives. Europe is a big widely tightened net. Pulling at one corner inevitably leads to distortions of the netting

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virtually everywhere.

Thus, there is no point in denying that the European Community is on the move. It is much more difficult, though, to provide an answer to the question in what direction this polymorphic movement is leading us. Is it a gradual process of closer political integration? Is the EC heading for a real Political Union indeed? At first sight, the signs bode well in this respect too. The achievements of the Single European Act include the resuscitation of the majority rule in decison-making as a political principle, relatively greater legislative powers for the European Parliament through the concertation procedure, and the codification of EPC. 'Europe 1992' induced a significant rule expansion at the European level (entailing countless implications for the national legislator), and formed the incentive to two Intergovernmental Conferences, each provided with a high federal voltage, at least in theory. Stage one of EMU took effect on 1 July 1990; preparations for stage two (scheduled to start in 1994) are well under way (draft statutes for a European System of Central Banks have been drawn up by now), and the perspective of one single European market with one single European currency and a common macro-economic policy is no longer an illusion to date. At the same time the plans for EPU seem to prosper equally. Both the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies submitted elaborated draft proposals in respectively April and September on European Union, including proposals to extend Community powers and majority decision-making to other policy areas (like energy, development cooperation, economic and social cohesion), and to enhance the right of co-decision of the European Parliament.[10] Gradually the EC has obtained greater powers in the fields of security and defence as well, clearly beyond the regarding provisions laid down in the SEA. It is true that the military core functions remain the prerogative of NATO (and the national capitals), but issues like arms control, disarmament, the coordination of arms exports policies, CSCE matters, or UN peacekeeping forces, have already been on the Twelve's political agenda for quite some time (since Rome-II in December 1990 also officially), whereas the formation of a European rapid deployment force today is openly discussed. The tailpiece of a

10

genuine European federal order, a Community defence, seems to have entered the realm of serious options.

However, some doubt is justified here.

For example, progress in the field of EMU is not exactly very unitary. Germany has proceeded much more cautiously with respect to furthergoing steps after the costly monetary lessons of the unification process. The United Kingdom is opposed to the transfer of powers to a European System of Central Banks; Italy and Greece still have a long way to go before they can meet the strict demands which an EMU puts to inflation control and the cutback in excessive spending deficits. As far as this latter issue is concerned, The Netherlands and Belgium have no clean record either. Enlargement and association of Central, North and East European states will create further complications. The Apeldoorn agreement (21-22 September 1991) made by the twelve Finance Ministers was from a tactical viewpoint a fine negotiating result (also for the Dutch Presidency), apparently suggesting uniform progress, but actually leaving open the real possibility of a two speed formula in stage three of EMU.

In that respect the agreement is - intentionally - rather ambiguous.[11] The realization of a System of Central Banks is still in its infancy; a European Monetary Institution without having any significant powers will perform as a stand-in for the time being. So, is the *relance* of the EMU since Hanover (June 1988) further proof of the correctness of the federal argument, or does it rather amount to a modest functional incrementalism, whereby the member states, being prompted to closer economic and monetary cooperation by the imperatives of the internal market, are seeking nevertheless to resist a transfer of national powers as long as possible? That progress is uneasy becomes furthermore clear if one recalls that the EMU project was actually launched already twenty years ago (Werner Plan), and that even the most optimistic observers do not expect realization before the turn of the century.

Similar comments may be made on other federal indicators. The EC's budget still

11

is extremely moderate (compared with the national-federal budgets of, for example, Germany, the United States or even the Soviet Union ...), and the ceiling of February 1988 much too low. As instruments for various macro-economic policy functions (re-allocation, stabilization, anti-inflation) the budget of the EC or of its Structural Funds (despite the fact that these were doubled) are inadequate. The progress made in this respect is modelled on piecemeal incrementalism rather than on planned federal engineering. This applies to the powers of European Parliament as well, and *a fortiori* to what is always referred to as the cornerstone of a well-founded federal order: a common foreign and defence policy.

The functions of Political Union

Will the IGC-EPU succeed in completing these federal deficits in a substantial way? To find an answer to this question it would be a good thing

to have once again a closer look at the origins of the functions of the IGC-EPU.

The political origins of the negotiations, which started after the decision of the Rome European Council of 14th/15th December 1990 were twofold: (1) Firstly, the dynamics of 'Europe 1992' apparently created the right momentum for the Twelve to advance into areas where progress has been long overdue: Economic and Monetary Union, and Political Union. The successful implementation of the "1992"-programme; its far-reaching effects on national decision-making and national legislation; its magnetic influence on the EC's North,- Central-, and South-European neighbours (triggering, among many other reactions, a new wave of association and membership requests); its world wide repercussions on trade politics, all have revitalized, in combination with a wave of new policy initiatives by the European Commission, the old European dream of an economic, monetary, and political union, both for pressing internal as for external purposes.

(2) This in itself already quite impressive drive got an additional urgency by the tremendous changes taking place in the EC's most sensitive adjacent regions: Eastern

Europe and the Middle East. The uncertainties created by the end of the Cold War, the very sudden German reunification process, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation of NATO's military and political functions, led to several attempts to create 'order' in the New World Order (by means of, for instance, the Charter of Paris or the Transatlantic Declaration - a similar Declaration between the EC and Japan was signed in The Hague, July 1991), but it also led to a natural reaction among the Twelve to herd closer together on their 'sheltered island of peace amidst violence and turmoil'.[12] The Gulf War, putting Europe's capacity for security cooperation and crisis management against a background of a massive redeployment of American troops, seriously to the test, could only could reinforce those feelings.[13]

The IGC-EPU, therefore, served, in addition to the IGC-EMU a number of important functions:

(1) Firstly, to further amend the Community Treaties to the necessity of more effective decision-making in the EC, of a better balance between her institutions, and of more democratic control. To these ends many proposals have been tabled by all the national delegations, the most sophisticated so far being the voluminous 'non-paper' presented by the Luxembourg Presidency, and the draft of the Dutch government. Both give in a nutshell a comprehensive impression of the wide range of issues negotiated by the Twelve under the heading of a 'Political Union'.

(2) The second major function of the IGC-EPU was to enhance the foreign policy and security profile of the EC. This issue has dominated the union debate from the outset, and caused considerable political discord among the participants, with France and the Netherlands being among the more outspoken antagonists. Particularly in March and September 1991 the waves went high.

The controversy goes back to an Italian proposal, presented during the Italian EC Presidency in the autumn of 1990, to give the Community more responsibilities in the

12

13

fields of security and defence, by transferring the tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) to the prospective European Political Union. The European Commission aired similar views, but he majority of the member states, meeting in Asolo on 6th/7th October (foreign ministers) and in Rome on 27th/28th October (European Council - Rome-I), had a number of reservations on the Italian proposals. Though at Rome-II, as we have seen, the security profile of the EC was upgraded somewhat, at least two important points remained unsettled: the exact scope of the Union's competence on security and defence, and the organization of these functions.

A Franco-German proposal on these points, presented on the eve of Rome-II (a second draft followed in February 1991), encountered considerable resistance from several member states, in particular from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark, and for different reasons, Ireland. Mitterrand and Kohl suggested to provide the Union with a common defence policy, and to create to this end a close link between the EPU and the WEU, under the common roof of the European Council. The controversy was and is not about the desirability to preserve NATO's corefunctions, nor about the necessity of creating a stronger European pillar inside the Atlantic Alliance, and not even about the idea that a European Union in the end (*'finalité politique'*) should have a common defence identity. On these points all member states more or less agree. Sharply divergent viewpoints, however, existed as to the point how independent the EC's security arrangements should be on the short- and medium term. The Netherlands proposed only a 'complementing' task for the EC in this regard (i.e. in addition to the responsibilities of NATO and WEU), while France and Germany were in favour of linking the WEU closely to the European Union, under the supervision of the European Council. The discussions on Europe's security role and its corresponding institutional provisions sometimes take a very vehement character, but the controversies should not be exaggerated. Whether the WEU functions as a bridge between the EC and NATO or between NATO and the EC is not a matter of life or death for European security. As may be deduced from the final communiqué of the NATO Council in Copenhagen, European security remains primarily an Atlantic affair, although it is true that European elements are increasingly added. The EC's destiny is still determined by the fact that the

cornerstone of a European federal order, a common defence, is not primarily shaped by a supranational European structure, but by an Atlantic-intergovernmental construction. The reluctance to discuss security and defence matters in the EC context may have diminished over the past few years, and the WEU may have gained some importance, yet it is surprising that the basic structure of security cooperation - despite the transformation of the East-West order - still follows a rather traditional (Atlantic and national) pattern. In this respect, there still is some truth in the words of Deporte with respect to the institutional set-up of post-war Western European defence: 'many changes but little change'.[14]

It seems that despite all turbulence some kind of ossification of Western European security arrangements has occurred. The factors which are responsible for this development are threefold: (a) Despite radical changes in the nature and scope of the Russian military threat, the risks of instability and crises in the former Warsaw Pact have only intensified after the collapse of the Soviet imperium. The dangers have not disappeared, but taken on a different form, to such an extent that it may have become even more complicated to avert them due to their volatility and unpredictability. Developments in the field of nuclear and conventional arms control between East and West are moving with such a speed that they prompt West European governments to wait and see first rather than to embark on a quick transformation of the existing security and negotiating structures, which, in the end were at the basis of the East-West reconciliation. A well established organization as NATO succeeds in maintaining much of its legitimacy under such swiftly fluctuating circumstances, even though functions and doctrines may be adjusted to the new situation. WEU, CSCE, or the EC have never been really put to the test to prove what they are worth, and as yet they present therefore too big a risk to function independently as credible security alternatives. Add to this that in defiance of all speculations on the decline of American economic and military power in the world, American leadership under President Bush has been quite impressive, particularly after the Gulf War.

The current mixture of Atlantic, European, bilateral and national security

14

arrangements often makes a hybrid and laborious impression, but so far it turned out to be fairly capable of coping with the upheavals in Germany, the Soviet Union or the Gulf. The problems of dealing with security and defence outside the Atlantic framework may just be illustrated by the EC's efforts towards Yugoslavia. Admittedly, in this "Lebanon of Europe", the superpowers would not be able to do much more either. But it remains to be seen whether the new geographical division of labour between the United States and Europe - where Washington tries to get the political and military jobs done in the Middle East, and the EC in Europe - will turn out to be more fruitful than the traditional functional division in which Washington took care of the military tasks, and the Twelve mainly for economic-political support.

(3) So, it may be true that the objective of EPU was to concretize the powers of the EC in the field of security, but a major federal leap forward is not to be expected, and as a constitutional gathering for the EC's security powers the IGC-EPU is less significant than all good intentions could pretend. The true IGC-EPU functions were probably of a somewhat subtler nature. Right after the 'European Revolution', and in the wake of the Gulf War, it served, in addition to mechanisms like the CSCE-process and the debates in NATO or the WEU, as a kind of 'Concert of Europe', in order to redefine the positions of the member states *vis-à-vis* each other, and *vis-à-vis* the Community institutions, in a transformed international environment.
France in particular could use some reassurance in order to offset two serious inroads on her international position: (a) Due to the disappearance of the immediate Soviet threat, the progress in East-West arms control, and the transformation of the military and political role of NATO, the use of France's 'exclusiveness' in NATO has become less evident, and so did the function of one of the great symbols of French power: the *force nucléaire*. (b) German reunification has pre-empted to a large degree the possibility to use Germany's post-war 'inferiority' in political-psychological and military respect, as a leverage to gain easy German support for French European projects. The sudden merger of the two Germanies has changed the rules of this French game. Germany has gained full political sovereignty (with self-imposed military restrictions), its economic and political weight in Europe has been further

increased (despite the heavy financial and political burdens of unification), and it surely is also in 'moral' respect on the same par with the rest of the EC, after nearly half a century of outstanding democratic performance. It was not by chance that French diplomacy went through a deep crisis in the months following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
France, therefore, got on the look-out for alternative sources of power, 'Europe' being, not for the first time, one of the most suitable platforms. Paris could use the idea of coupling the WEU more closely to the EC/EPC for two purposes: (a) Granting the European Council a clear authority over (certain) security matters would further legitimize the role of this body as the 'directory' of a booming and prosperous Community, and through it, improve the position of the larger member states in general, and that of a presidential political system like the French Republic in particular. (b) At the same time it provides Paris with an excuse to remain aloof from NATO's integrated structure. The WEU is very useful in this respect, because on the one hand it signals a true French commitment to Europe's security, while on the other hand cooperation would largely take place at an intergovernmental level, to a considerable degree independent from direct American interference, and weakening the Bonn-Washington axis on top of that.

The Dutch objections against the proposed WEU-EPU link during the spring of 1991 were not only concerned with security considerations as such or with the 'intergovernmental' set-up of the proposed structure (NATO, after all, is a very intergovernmental organization as well), but also with the hidden French motive to create a directorate of the larger countries in the new European Union. As a 'smaller medium-large' power the Netherlands always is very sensitive about its exact place around the table, and very much on the guard when the larger member states try to introduce elements into the Community which might easily impair the influence of the smaller ones.

But the other member states as well have their specific intentions *vis-à-vis* EPU, each less related to the sincere wish for closer European cooperation than for protecting certain national interests and positions. The idea of political union launched in May 1990 by Kohl together with Mitterrand was meant by Kohl as a sedative to

ease the French diplomatic crisis and to remedy the postnatal depression which the leaders in Bonn experienced themselves after the sudden birth of the new political an economic entity. By using the traditional formula of European brotherhood around a Franco-German axis, Bonn sought to eliminate the grave concerns in Paris over the consequences of German unification. For presumably the new Germany would be part of an integrated European Union both in a political and economic sense. To bind Germany is almost an openly declared objective of EPU, but the fact that Germany itself too seems to be fairly accommodating on this point may be a fateful sign. For is it likely that the most powerful state in Western Europe would let itself be tied up in a European structure without exacting a high price as to nature of this structure?

For the British government the political union negotiations were useful, despite all uneasy feelings aroused by the process, to recover in Brussels British ground lost during the Thatcher era. Margaret Thatcher hoped by her vehement anti-European disposition to stem the federal tide, but reached exactly the opposite result, because due to British aloofness, the European Commission could grow stronger than ever. John Major seems better to understand the use of Europarlance: by creating a "political union" and reinforcing the position of the European Council one can curbe the expansionist role of Commission and Parliament more effectively. For Italy the EMU and EPU constitute the last resort for a bel[illegible] political system, which is also true of Belgium. The perspective of becoming part of a European Political Union, irrespective of the vagueness of the idea, is perhaps the sole lifebuoy left for the virtually disintegrating Flemish-Walloon construction.

The EC countries often tend to evade concrete action in case of major challenges and crises through taking refuge in elaborate proposals for institutional reform. Rather than a concerted application of existing instruments and resources, ingenious blueprints are conceived during lengthy sessions in the backrooms of the Community, of which the exact surplus for the external or internal political capacity of the Twelve is not always evident. This applies, for example, to the Dutch attempts to give the Union a 'unitary' structure, instead of the 'temple structure' of three or four pillars under the common roof of the European Council, as preferred by the French, and more or less

incorporated in the Luxembourg draft proposals. Such differences in structure may be of interest to constitutional designers, but they are not always relevant to the practice of, for instance, European crisis management. Either under a "unitary" or "temple" structure the formation or deployment of European forces remains a purely intergovernmental matter. The wearisome debate whether the WEU should be conceived as an extension of NATO or rather of the EPU shows some doctrinaire traits too. It seems an act of bravery and decisiveness to embark on ambitious union projects time and again, but if these reforms do not add essentially new elements to the Community's decision-making powers, such operations might as well become detrimental to the credibility and legitimacy of the EC. In some circles 'political union' is too much conceived as a panacea for any European ailment; insufficient attention is paid to the concrete definition of European objectives, interests and instruments. And especially the nice blueprints for a "European foreign policy" or a "European army" tend to eclipse the more demanding tasks of creating better legal and financial provisions for down-to-earth policy areas like social security, cohesion, or consumer affairs.

The awareness that a European Political Union has its high price, particularly when it comes to military involvement in crises theatres, is not very well developed. This is a major difference compared with the IGC-EMU. The cost and benefits of monetary and economic integration are fairly easy to calculate. Controlled interest rates, price stability, a single currency, an ESCB - these are concrete targets to be reached with concrete instruments, and the logic of the EMU is consequently more imperative than the logic of the EPU (i.e. in the fields of foreign policy and defence). The civil war in Yugoslavia proves that the dream of a European mission in the world, combined with only a dim concept of political union, but without a sophisticated security doctrine and without a logistically supported contingency planning, may lead to embarrassing situations for the Twelve. And the country which happens to hold the Presidency at the time is certainly not the only to blame. If the magic of a political union is invoked too often, the concept stands to loose credibility for the time when there is room indeed for a big leap forward.

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The Future of NATO: Towards the Post-Helsinki World

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Introduction

Talk about the future of NATO is strewn with vocabulary more suited to a building site or architect's office. There are fundamental pillars, concrete security structures, interlocking institutions and, of course, the grand-daddy of them all - the new European common security architecture. These materials must have cornerstones of course and rest on stable foundations. I propose to discuss the latter. As an alternative to such overworked metaphors, we must also think in terms of historical transformation and internal contradiction. As Hegel said, the Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the gathering of dusk. Perhaps this metaphor might be more appropriate to a discussion on the future of NATO.

We are *emerging from* a period in which political expression on both sides of the Iron Curtain was frozen by ideology and adversarial contest, particularly in the area of security and military policy. This political expression has been released. Security relations in Europe are entering a phase of intense political discussion, development and change. The landscape of political discourse has been transformed throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including the great military leviathan itself, the Soviet Union. The question facing NATO, in a nutshell, is whether the Alliance is itself destined to wither away because the nourishment for its existence has largely been dissolved. Or will it continue to act as the agent of change, and, paradoxically, as the anchor of stability during periods of change ? Will NATO, in the Hegelian metaphor, bring about through its very success the conditions for its own historical demise, an internal contradiction whose significance is grasped

only when the transformation has ineluctably and irrevocably begun ?

NATO and the New Political Landscape

Calling for a new partnership with the Central and East European countries has proven less intractable for NATO than finding its expression through concrete measures. A difficulty here is that the basis does not really exist for a true negotiation of interests. Leaders of the so-called "Troika" of former Warsaw Pact countries - Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary - have left no doubt as to their common objective. If not full membership in NATO, then a "contractual" arrangement or associate membership will do - anything that would promote a NATO droit de regard in security affairs over their territories. As the Hungarian Prime Minister Antall said the other day in his address to NATO, it was the duty of NATO member states to assure the inviolability of Eastern Europe's frontiers. These countries and others look avidly at our commitment, expressed in the London Declaration and in the Copenhagen Statement on Partnership with Central and East European Countries, to create a European security architecture of interlocking institutions. The C+EE states have but one institution: the CSCE. But the CSCE is not a collective security institution, nor is it a body designed to bring about the end of conflict, as we are painfully aware in the case of Yugoslavia.

NATO, as we are constantly reminded, is an alliance capable simultaneously of wielding military coercion and offering the hand of partnership; of defence and détente, the original two-track approach of the Harmel Report. What we see today is NATO's first real encounter with the famous Article 2 of the Washington Treaty - the so-called "political" clause. To some, this "political" clause has always given NATO the claim to be

something more than a "deterrence first" organization, dealing with an undifferentiated large-scale threat through military means alone. Now the strategic balancer from the East, the great monolith, is no longer prominent nor pugnacious. It is therefore not entirely surprising that NATO is still feeling its way in these new strategic and political circumstances.

Having spoken in favour of a new partnership with Central and East European countries (including the Soviet Union), and having recognized, rightly, the need for a new articulation of the alliance's core functions and basic strategic concept, NATO has sought over the past year to give these intentions a semblance of reality, as well as bringing them in line with reality. The Gulf War and the conflict in Yugoslavia have given even greater impetus to this undertaking. As yet, however, the limitations, defining parameters, and related resource constraints of pursuing this course have not fully been faced. They are now. The drafting of the Rome Summit Declaration has not been an easy task. In my view, this has had less to do with divergences over, say, the relationship of the WEU to NATO and the European security and defence identity than it does over:

(a) Defining deterrence in defensive terms while (i) reducing, but still maintaining, a role for nuclear weapons based in Europe; and (ii) developing rapid reaction forces in a period when the concept of justified intervention beyond the frontiers of NATO member states seems to be more than just a whisper in some corridors;

(b) Speaking politically of partnership with former adversaries and building common security structures, while holding back on committing any military muscle;

(c) The potential irony that, as CSCE fora are sought as the desired backdrop for a whole range of security issues, the solidarity which has underwritten NATO's effectiveness may come under increasing pressure.

The Cornerstones of Cooperative Security in Europe

The era of cooperative security began in September 1986, when Soviet authorities accepted the principle as well as the practice of short-notice, on-site inspection, albeit in a political document, the Stockholm Accord, and with some significant operational limitations. To many, this right to inspect, this undertaking to accept measures and practices leading to greater transparency, is a cornerstone of cooperative security. Another cornerstone is the understanding, finally grasped by Soviet political authorities under Gorbachev, that large-scale, offensive military capabilities with high-readiness units tend to produce anxiety in one's neighbours. They can give rise to counter-deployments which, given the advanced technological base of Western defence industries, could result in a less advantageous situation than before. (The history of the ill-fated Soviet SS-20 deployments should confirm this.) A third cornerstone of cooperative security is arms control. The political process of negotiating arms control can have a reinforcing effect on the climate of security relations by actually removing the capacity to generate in short order large-scale, immediately effective offensive capabilities.

NATO is now beginning to move beyond the confidence and security-building efforts of 1984-1990 and the essential

conventional arms control achievement of that period, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Of particular interest will be the way in which European security objectives and institutions develop as we approach the 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. The concerns are likely to be more parochial, more driven by contingency, by regional power imbalances, by newly emergent threats of an origin different than before (ie. migration, militant nationalism, civil war, ethnic strife). The cement holding the Alliance's chief arms control objectives may be loosening. If so, then the race is now truly on. On the one hand, the arms control process may successfully transmute itself to a different, more demonstrably political, level of the new security order, one featuring dialogue, greater transparency, conflict prevention and so on. It would continue to be a cornerstone, but one of many, and not necessarily the central supporting one. We could see member states of the Alliance developing different positions in any of these new areas of discussion and negotiation in the larger security-related fora of the 38.

On the other hand, the potential break-up of the Soviet Union, the events of Yugoslavia, these and other developments keep us aware of the precarious nature of the new world of common security in Europe. The CFE Treaty is not ratified by all as yet, and therefore has not been implemented. CFE 1A - the follow-on negotiations on manpower limitations - will not have any verification per se. Neither will the nuclear arms withdrawals from Europe recently announced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev; we will thus not have the benefit of negotiated rights and obligations - essential if compliance, the hugely desired political outcome of any agreement, is to be assessed by all. Surely it is more confidence- and security- building to have in place a nationally ratified and legally binding instrument

whereby significant categories of military hardware are declared in their numbers, verified, some taken off for destruction, others restricted in location, and all the time a right under international law to conduct inspections in support of compliance verification.

Assuming that the arms control cornerstone of cooperative security can be preserved and the other two stay intact, then the rest of the building can begin to rise. The building process could involve: further reducing and regulating numbers (quantitative arms control); operational constraints and limitations (behavioural); realignment and conversion of military forces posture (structural); restricting new deployments of high-tech equipment (qualitative); or restricting production and transfer of military equipment (arms production and export control). But before stepping forward into the new security politics of post-Helsinki Europe, we should look at the foundations supporting this transition. Are they immobile - concretized, as the Germans might say ? Have the roots been sunk deeply enough to resist the tremors that have been felt since November 1990, when the CFE Treaty and the Charter of Paris were both signed ? A highly political era of declarations, dialogue and liaison with the former Warsaw Pact member states, including the former 15-republic USSR and the new emergent republics, is now before NATO.

New Tremors in the New Landscape

Let us look for a moment at the CFE Treaty. A hitch has emerged regarding the status of Soviet Treaty Limited Elements (TLE) stationed in the now-independent Baltic republics. Because the Baltic states have rejected the legitimacy and legality of the Soviet presence on their territories, they have also sought to distance themselves from the CFE Treaty because they believe

it presupposes this legitimacy. As a result, the Baltics have refused to become "successor" parties to the Treaty, originally signed by the USSR last November when it was a 15-republic entity. Negotiators from the NATO countries have sought - successfully it seems with respect to the Soviet Union - to maintain the application of the Treaty's provisions to cover the declaration, reduction and inspection of Soviet TLE in the Baltic states until the Soviet forces are fully withdrawn.

Turning to CFE 1A, the goal of the negotiations is to seek agreed limits to manpower, though likely without any agreed verification provisions. National levels will simply be declared, a recognition that the era of budget restrictions and shifting demographics would probably render immediately out-of-date any agreed numerical limits and distribution along "group lines" (as found in CFE I stabilizing measures). The chief aim of negotiation would be to find agreed mechanisms and suitable formulae by which numbers could be revised upwards or further downwards, and whether temporary exceptions could be tolerated if Desert *Storm*-type staging and airlifting to out-of-area regions from European bases were to be required in the future.

While NATO will continue to propose measures aimed at the goal of restricting, where possible, large-scale force generation, there will remain nonetheless a not-inconsiderable general military capability in Europe. The actual numbers and details need not be delved into here. Rather, what is of concern is the continued political relevance of a treaty whose implementation over a 40-month period and beyond relies on groupings of states which no longer exist; on Soviet military districts whose geographical dimensions may be forced to undergo change due to emergent republics; on numbers and categories of military equipment nominally limited by the Treaty but in the

hands of new republics which possibly regard themselves as not being legally subject to its provisions.

The shock of the break-up of the Soviet Union may disturb the foundations of the common security architecture in different ways. In the nuclear realm, President Bush's initiative will result in the withdrawal and elimination of all ground-based short-range nuclear sytems and their warheads. President Gorbachev has been invited to reciprocate and rid the Soviet Union of similar categories of short-range nuclear forces. Gorbachev has indicated his intention to do so. Notice that the word used here is "intention". There are an estimated 10-12,000 tactical nuclear warheads in the Soviet inventory, deployed or stored at a variety of sites, some known, others not, in the republics of Byelorussia, Ukraine and Russia. Without negotiations, NATO cannot obtain legally sanctioned access to such bases and destruction sides to confirm the withdrawal and elimination of these sites. Granted, a move to zero enhances the likelihood of detecting an anomaly or divergence from the stated intentions. But, unlike the conventional forces captured by the CFE Treaty, there will be no established political forum such as the Joint Consultative Group in which parties to a treaty can voice their concerns and resolve potential difficulties if and when necessary. (However, it may be possible to seek politically binding confidence and transparency measures to help allay concerns over the full implementation of unilateral disarmament initiatives.)

Legally established "compliance assessment" fora are invaluable during the teething troubles that arms control treaties of CFE magnitude are expected to encounter. However, none will exist for the elimination of land-based theatre nuclear forces. Complicating this by an order of magnitude are the mixed and somewhat disturbing messages coming out of the Russian,

Ukrainian and now Kazakhstan republics about their nuclear intentions. Will they genuinely leave control over the possession and disposition of Soviet nuclear forces to the central authorities ? Will they seek a dual-key system which would allow the central authorities to maintain physical possession and security of the nuclear arsenal, with joint control established on decisions regarding disposition and use ? In many ways, these questions are reminders of the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) debate, which beleaguered the NATO Alliance in the early-to-mid 1960s, a controversy finally resolved by the two-key system and accession by all to the newly negotiated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A similar arrangement with former Soviet republics over Soviet theatre nuclear forces (air-delivered) might be acceptable to NATO member countries, bearing in mind that the two-key system has, on the NATO side, applied exclusively to theatre nuclear forces under US possession and physical control. This arrangement has not been extended to strategic forces. By contrast, any drive by the Ukraine, Russia, Bielorussia or Kazakhstan republics to gain joint (or exclusive) control over disposition/use of the present Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal would presumably also include strategic nuclear weapons. In this event, accession to the START Treaty would presumably be regarded as mandatory by NATO member states.

Post-Helsinki Arms Control

Despite some uncertainty over CFE Treaty ratification, the post-Helsinki world is nonetheless situated squarely on the absence, or severe restriction, of the capability to mount large-scale offensive actions in Europe. Consolidation of this happy state of affairs could further be pursued through lower limits for the five major equipment categories; lower thresholds of notification of military activities, from call-ups of reservists to annual exercises; greater constraints on the

deployment of certain kinds of equipment pertinent to rapid large-scale force re-generation for offensive actions; greater scope and detail for information exchanges; improvements to inspection modalities and to the verification regime in general; and so forth. Whether these can or should be grouped separately as limitations/reductions, stabilizing measures or/and confidence building measures is not the point. Rather, one may begin to encounter what the economists would call diminishing returns. Additional improvements to the arms control and disarmament regime in Europe may reach a stage where the costs of negotiating and implementing continual enhancements to the regime begin to outweigh the perceived marginal benefits to security gained therewith. Put another way, if the people at SHAPE believe that the warning time before a credible large-scale attack from the East could be mustered and launched is in the area of 30-40 days, is it that important to expend intensive effort to make this 35-45 days ?

Nevertheless, as long as the foundations are strong and the cornerstones securely in place, there is always room for insulating and strengthening the load-bearing walls.
A post-Helsinki cooperative security forum would, for example, allow NATO to address the security concerns arising from a world truly and increasingly interdependent in all its major aspects (economic, political, environment, demographic) and not, as before, regarded as interdependent exclusively from a strategic nuclear or conventional balance perspective. This would allow the Alliance to examine issues related to the proliferation of weapons to areas outside of Europe; to look at the possibility of regional measures and confidence-building regimes on a smaller, more parochial or geographically limited scale, depending on local conditions. Mutually agreed border disengagement or limited armaments zones would be technically feasible, if one marries the

present range of arms control verification techniques with the on-site presence of third-party peace-keepers or, if you will, international compliance monitors. These sorts of arms control-related measures may be more required over the next years in preventing conflicts in Europe from spilling into outright hostilities. Down-sizing the scale of arms control undertakings may also be required, with mini-regimes tailored to fit the issues at hand. NATO forces, expertise and personnel could be used to support these regimes, both in their negotiation and implementation.

Problems of the Transformed Landscape

There could be some drawbacks to this transformation of the political/security landscape in Europe. Preserving Alliance coordination may become more difficult, as individual member states might be tempted more than ever before to proceed on a national basis into the CSCE-based institutions of the post-Helsinki security world. Harmonization, of course, will be sought to bring the other, non-CFE European parties into greater alignment with the objectives and undertakings concerning limits on conventional forces in Europe. However, the Alliance might lose some of its negotiating power if its members choose to forego the achievement of Alliance-wide positions that have in the past brought the consensus of the 16 into play with formidable negotiating strength. It seems as if the catch-words of the new security architecture in Europe will be dialogue and cooperation on the higher political levels; conflict prevention and security-building on the negotiating and operational levels.

There is little doubt as we move towards the Rome Summit and beyond to the NAC Ministerial in December, the transformation of NATO is already being addressed and sought at the high political levels through words, words, and more words. It will

of course be important to show consensus as to political intentions. But there will also have to be consensus on how we proceed operationally and what sort of institutions should be built in order to house the various conflict prevention and security-building activities, discussions and negotiations now foreseen at 38. Can we afford to dispense with the determination and strength of common purpose that allowed the Alliance to construct the deep foundations to our security which we have achieved through the CFE Treaty ? If the political pursuit of security outruns at this historical moment the defence- and deterrence-driven calculations that were earlier so paramount, then this may be so. The question is whether NATO then should embrace this development wholeheartedly.

This last consideration leads me, finally back to the metaphors of transformation and future development of cooperation- and security-building endeavours in Europe. Perhaps, with Hegel, we shall understand that the very success of NATO over the past forty years brings with it the seeds of its own transcendence and, indeed, perhaps even the dénouement of its much-vaunted solidarity and internal cohesion. NATO would continue, transformed, but not entirely as the same organization as before. The deterioration of the primordial security threat once posed by the Soviet Union's undeniable capability to undertake or threaten large-scale conventional (and nuclear) offensive military actions in Europe would demand as much.

Or, let us use the other, more prosaic metaphor. We are building a new house in Europe. It will be constructed on foundations of transformed, cooperative security among all parties. These foundations have been encased in a special preservative - the legally binding CFE Treaty and its related political CSBM undertakings. The walls are going up on these foundations, they are being painted and decorated; the doors

between the rooms are unlocked and open. Nevertheless, while the house-warming party is going on upstairs, celebrating the new European common security architecture, the foundations begin to settle a bit, the ground moves slightly due to new post-Cold War pressures and tremors. At that point, those upstairs may ask themselves how good is the preservative.

FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

THE FUTURE OF NATO

by

General Sir Hugh Beach

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4

THE FUTURE OF NATO

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By August 21 of this year the "threat" against which NATO strategy was devised and for which the size and shape of national contributions were calibrated, had magically and finally disappeared. The far-sighted aims set out for NATO by Harmel in 1967: "effective detente with the East", "an end to the division of Germany", "balanced force reductions" and "a just and stable order in Europe" were by now *faits accomplis* at least in the sense that treaties had been signed which, once they had been ratified and implemented, would surely bring them to pass. We now await a new Harmel.

The British White Paper on Defence this summer offered one interpretation, albeit brief, of what NATO is now about:

> "The Soviet Union remains an unstable military superpower, whose capabilities need to be counterbalanced if stability is to be preserved in Europe. These capabilities still present the most serious, if not the most immediate, threat to Western security. Instability in Eastern Europe or elsewhere could give rise to crises which could spill over into NATO countries and jeopardise European peace. Events outside Europe, including the proliferation of sophisticated and destructive weaponry, could threaten Alliance territory and security". [1]

In a 3 month period (August - October 1991) which has seen the Moscow *putsch*, the war in Croatia, and the final unmasking of Saddam's nuclear ambitions it is hard to quarrel with this

analysis, nor with the deduction that NATO needs to adopt a broad and flexible strategy with forces designed to deter, to respond in timely fashion and to mount an effective defence if any attack should happen.

All this is predicated on the ex-Soviet Union honouring its Treaty commitments - albeit not yet ratified - to withdraw and to reduce its forces. Few now doubt that this will happen, regardless of the outcome of the epic struggles still in progress. There have been suggestions from the new leadership that withdrawals might be speeded up and reductions become even more far-reaching; but one cannot be sure. So it is fair to ask what exactly is meant by "counterbalancing" Soviet capabilities. Under the CFE treaty Soviet residual strengths of Treaty-limited equipments in Europe would amount to about one third of all such equipment in the hands of signatories. By contrast German and American holdings would each amount to 10% or less. The countries of Eastern Europe cannot feel wholly comfortable with this imbalance. They recognize that at this stage NATO may well remain unable to offer either membership or a security guarantee. But NATO foreign ministers affirmed in Copenhagen in June 1991 that the consolidation and preservation of the new democracies of Eastern Europe was of "direct and material concern" to the alliance, and there has been some discussion of offering associate member status. It is far from clear what force levels (if any) might be appropriate to give substance and backing to this concern.

Against this broadly sketched assessment of threat the new

NATO force structure is more logical than some of the criticism allows. Forces are to be re-organised into three echelons: reaction forces, main defence and augmentation. Reaction forces are themselves sub-divided. The immediate reaction force (IRF) is nothing new, being the existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) mobile force brigade-size multinational formation able to deploy anywhere within the NATO area in 72 hours to show the flag. The rapid reaction force (RRF) is completely novel. In addition to air and sea components it will consist of a rapid reaction corps (RRC) about 100,000 strong under a Corps Headquarters commanded by the British. It will include a strong British armoured division stationed in Germany; an air-mobile division composed of German, Dutch, Belgian and British air-mobile brigades stationed in their own countries; a further more lightly armoured and mobile British division in England, including a parachute brigade and with a commando brigade on call; and a fourth division based in the Southern Region, probably led by Italy with contributions from Greece and Turkey. The Americans have offered the equivalent of a US Army heavy division based in the USA, and other offers are being considered. The main defensive forces will consist of what is left in Germany: six corps in all. Two will be under German command, one with a US division; one under Belgian command with a pending offer of a US brigade; one under US command with a German division; one under Dutch command and one joint German-Danish corps. There will be a seventh German national corps in Eastern Germany. In the Bundeswehr NATO-assigned corps and national territorial commands are to be merged into a unitary

structure. The French have given notice of withdrawing their forces stationed in Germany completely, saving only their contribution to the existing non-NATO Franco-German brigade, which is of little consequence. The Canadians are also largely withdrawing. Augmentation forces (the third principal category) will be largely drawn from the United States.

The HCDC have criticised a lack of clarity as to the principal role and function of the RRC, and it is true that official explanations tell little more than is implicit in that force's name and make-up. It is to provide an early military response to a crisis and contribute to defence where necessary. It will afford a range of capabilities, elements or all of which could be deployed as appropriate in the Allied Command Europe area. And it could be separately tasked, in part or in whole, under the aegis of WEU. In this case it could form part of a European Reaction Force (ERF), directed towards roles complementary to those of NATO, not least in the defence of international security outside the NATO area building on the Gulf experience. Even by official standards this is not particularly informative.

The Reaction Force clearly owes more to opportunism than to the processes of classical force planning. Its building bricks are pre-existent. There is a British Corps Headquarters in Germany, which will have only one British division to command, looking for a role. The strong armoured division had been chosen by the British as early as July 1990 as their future contribution to stationed forces. Until the Gulf no-one had

remotely imagined that this could play an important part outside the Central front; now we know better. There has for 20 years been a British strategic reserve division in the south of England. There have been trials in NATO for some years of an experimental multi-national airmobile division. The WEU is longing to plan *something*. Only the composite division from the Southern Region appears in any way novel - and its conception remains tentative. Nevertheless these pieces fit together quite well. Even if given no clearer steer it would not be difficult for the staffs to devise suitable contingency plans: for the flanks of NATO, North and South; for Eastern Europe, which is not in itself a NATO commitment (save in the unlikely event that Poland or Czechoslovakia were to attack Germany, or Yugoslavia Italy); and the Middle East, where lightning invariably strikes twice. In fact it is possible to stand the HCDC argument on its head and say that the Reaction Force concept earns high marks for doing what it is always wise to do but treasuries abominate and seldom countenance: that is, in the absence of a clearly analysed and defined threat, deliberately to plan for the unforeseen.

Much more problematical is the future of the main defensive forces. These are clearly designed to give substance to well-tried principles: the continuing validity of collective defence, the crucial role of the North American presence, the value of an integrated command structure. All this is sensible enough, but leaves many unanswered questions. *A quels azimuts?* In which direction should these forces face now that the ability to defend against a massive Russian offensive is no longer the main focus

of our concern? The answer is far from obvious. Much emphasis is placed upon the principle of multi-nationality; that is to say deliberately mixing formations at a level lower than is dictated by availability. (If a country contributes only one division then that *must* form part of a multi-national corps or be left swinging). An example is the proposed switch whereby one German corps contains an American division and *vice versa*. This is held to be militarily useful in promoting greater interoperability, and politically valuable because it may make a continued foreign presence more acceptable to the public in the host country. But it is improbable that this reorganization will persuade, for example, the British to adopt a NATO standard tank gun when they have just decided to do exactly the opposite. And why should an American unit become any less objectionable to locals (presumably on grounds of noise and damage and competition for young females) by being subordinated to a German rather than a US Corps headquarters? The arguments for pursuing multinationality as an end in itself are unconvincing. But an even larger question mark hangs over the issue of cross-stationing. It has been suggested that objections to stationed forces could be mitigated by basing, for example, German aircraft and ships in the UK, thus sharing the burden of acting as host nation. Again the reasoning is far-fetched and not much more has been heard. But a more important question still is the most fundamental. Given that Germany, once it has shaken down in its new form, will be one of the wealthiest, most populous, stable and least territorially threatened countries on earth, why should any foreign troops be

stationed there at all? Is there no more durable way of preserving collective defence, an integrated structure and the guarantee of American commitment? It is at this point that a return to the classical principles of force planning might shed more daylight. If the "threat" for the future lies increasingly in the area of "Balkan-type" wars and the need to "counterbalance" an increasingly fragmented Russian confederation then the military instrument for political leverage may not be so dependent on ground forces. A solution might be found along the lines of national defence on the ground; power projection by air?

The nuclear question

The nuclear question is a separate one. The London Declaration said that nuclear weapons were to be "truly of last resort", but in a sense they always have been. The process of axeing redundant or dangerous American nuclear delivery systems began over 20 years ago with Davy Crockett (a nuclear mortar round) and continued in the 1970s and 80s with nuclear land-mines and air-defence missiles. There is to be no replacement for Lance, and President Bush has now proposed its early elimination together with the removal and destruction of its warheads and of all artillery delivered nuclear munitions. He has also proposed the removal of all nuclear cruise missiles from ships and submarines and of nuclear bombs from aircraft carriers, thus for the first time recognizing a measure of arms control at sea.

Clearly there is no place for a nuclear component in the Reaction Force, but the concept of sub-strategic nuclear forces remains. The British will still have air- (and sea-) borne

weapons: bombs for delivery by Tornado and Sea Harrier: depth bombs for anti-submarine helicopters. For Tornado there are plans to replace the existing free-fall bomb with a collaborative Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM), based upon an American or French design, equipped with a new British warhead. Meanwhile the French cling quite absurdly to their own land based system *Hadès* based in France and able to reach no further east than Potsdam or Prague.

It is not clear how sub-strategic weapons relate to possible operations of the main defence forces nor the extent to which NATO partners will wish to harbour American weapons under two-key control for their aircraft. The truth is that sub-strategic nuclear systems in NATO have been something of an Anglo-American obsession, for which the other members (apart from France) can see little utility in the new circumstances. Talks on the future of shorter range nuclear forces have been on the arms control agenda for some time. When the future of the ex-Soviet Union and its responses to the Bush proposals become clearer it may well turn out that further progress can be made towards the total elimination of these systems. This would be a great advance towards realism and simplicity.

What follows after? I can only offer a personal view. I believe that the stage will slowly shift away from NATO to the CSCE group of 38 states (as it now is, with Albania and the Baltics), plus successor states from the Soviet Union. The Paris Summit in November last year did much to institutionalize the CSCE providing for a permanent secretariat; a parliamentary

body: regular meetings of ministers and officials; review conferences every two years; a mechanism for monitoring elections; and more to the immediate point a Centre for the Prevention of Conflict (CPC) in Vienna providing exchanges of military information, discussion of unusual activities and the conciliation of disputes - what Douglas Hurd called a diplomatic ACAS.

I think we could go further. I think CSCE should be given the status of a treaty, with some form of mutual security guarantee among members. I think that members should undertake, within the Charter of the United Nations, responsibility for peace-keeping or even interposition within Europe under certain circumstances. CSCE will, of course continue to be the forum for further CSBM negotiations. I think it should also take over the verification aspects of CFE and, next time round, the conventional arms reduction process itself. The bloc system and the concept of parity are now devoid of meaning. We need a more flexible process to get us out of the hideously complex wrangles about definitions, numbers and areas that have characterised CFE: (months of arguing whether the weight of a tank means laden or unladen!) Nor do I have any confidence in approaches based on formulae: whether related to a country's population, GDP, surface area, length of frontier or such like; nor on arbitrary proportional cuts. The essential principle is that each country should determine the size and shape of its own armed forces to meet its own peculiar circumstances, (including international peace keeping), having regard to its need for stability and

security at lower force levels and in a way not seen as threatening by others.

An excellent model was provided by the Seminar on Military Doctrine held under CSCE auspices in Vienna in January 1990. It provided the 35 nations, at Chiefs of Staff level, with the opportunity to explain and to exchange views on national positions concerning the posture and structure of armed forces, military activities and training, and budgeting and planning. It went well and a repeat has just taken place in Vienna. These could be formalised and placed on an annual footing. The process would then be rather like the NATO annual review process stood on its head. NATO has never had other than a very weak analytic and costing capability, and nations, not NATO, initiate new weapons programmes. Moreover nations agree in the NATO force planning process to do things that they know they never will. It is exactly this sort of soft indicative process, translated into the 38, which will be needed in the aftermath of CFE. Its strength and effectiveness would lie in recognizing the primacy of national policies and plans. It would work through consensus, the exchange of information, peer group pressure and the influence of public opinion. Under the rubric of a new (say) 2 percent goal, this time downwards, nations would be required to explain their forward plans on a 5-year rolling basis and to justify any provisions seen by the CSCE staffs or by other nations in multilateral examination as destabilizing, potentially offensive or out of key with the goals of the CSCE which include democracy, human rights and the inviolability of frontiers.

FEDERAL TRUST FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

L'AVENIR DE LA SECURITE: FRANCE, EUROPE, ETATS UNIS: vers quelles relations ?

and

LE PROBLEME DES ALLIANCES

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L'AVENIR DE LA SECURITE
FRANCE, EUROPE, ETATS-UNIS: vers quelles relations ?

Nous sommes en train d'assister à une véritable révolution stratégique en Europe. L'agonie de l'Empire soviétique donne naissance à une situation totalement inédite depuis près de cinquante ans: la menace massive, caractérisée, proche de nos frontières s'évanouie sous nos yeux. Cela ne signifie naturellement pas qu'il faille sous-estimer les risques d'émergence de nouvelles tensions et violences. L'exemple Yougoslave est à ce titre malheureusement éloquent.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la situation de détente qui prévaut actuellement en Europe, conduit à nous interroger sur l'avenir des relations euro-atlantique dans le domaine de la Sécurité et de la Défense.

Il est probable que nous assistions dans les années à venir à une compétition - pacifique - entre deux institutions: l'OTAN et la Communauté Européenne.

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La disparition de l'adversaire soviétique, induit elle celle de l'OTAN ? Notons que la question s'était déjà timidement posée lors de la dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie; elle se pose aujourd'hui avec plus d'acuité. En fait, la réponse dépend de la volonté plus ou moins grande des Etats-Unis de garder un pied en Europe, et parallèlement, de l'ambition plus ou moins élevée des Douze de se doter d'un système de sécurité et de défense propre.

Personnellement, je ne doute pas que du coté des responsables américains, cette volonté soit plus forte que jamais, même si elle peut-être, éventuellement et passagèrement, contrariée par l'opinion publique américaine qui exige de son Gouvernement qu'il concentre son action sur les problèmes intérieurs au pays.

Le tout est de savoir si l'OTAN - instrument privilégié de la présence américaine en Europe - a les capacités de se rénover et d'épouser la nouvelle donne Européenne et, par la même, de court-circuiter le projet des Douze.

Ces derniers mois, les américains jouent à l'adresse des européens sur deux tableaux complémentaires: - le tableau de l'admonestation et des avertissements (on ses souvient ici du télégramme du 19 Avril dernier de James Baker au Premier Ministre Luxembourgeois alors Président de la Communauté), et le tableau de la séduction, avec la perspective d'une "rénovation" de l'OTAN.

Cette dernière perspective est désormais engagée et concurrence l'entreprise européenne des Douze. Avec quelles chances de l'emporter ? Il semble trop tôt pour le dire.

Voyons ce qu'il en est:

En premier lieu, les Etats-Unis, conformément à l'attente de certain européens et notamment de l'Allemagne, s'apprêtent à renoncer à leurs armes nucléaires à courte portée basées à terre (les USA alignent notamment en Europe, 88 missiles Lance et près de 2000 obus d'artillerie nucléaire), mais également sur mer. L'Union soviétique, répondant au plan Bush, à pour sa part proposée d'aller plus loin encore, en proposant d'étendre ces mesures aux bombes et missiles nucléaires tactiques aéroportées.

Une telle proposition, si elle était acceptée par l'Administration américaine, annoncerait pour les européens la fin de la couverture nucléaire américaine.

Dans la mesure ou l'arme nucléaire est appelée à jouer un rôle moins significatif qu'autrefois sur notre continent, le retrait nucléaire américain ne devrait pas être cruellement ressentit par les européens. En revanche, ces mêmes européens dans l'espoir de voir compenser ce retrait nucléaire, ne manqueront pas de réclamer des garanties américaines dans le domaine des forces conventionnelles et peut-être un jour dans le domaine de l'espace militaire, supposé nous immuniser de tout dérapage nucléaire. L'instrument du leadership américain à venir est sans doute là! L'arme spatiale, annoncerait la dissolution du concept de dissuasion nucléaire et annoncerait le retour du conventionnel, paré de l'aura que lui confère les armes de nouvelle technologie.

Inutile de dire que l'essentiel de la stratégie militaire de la France en serait rudement affecté.

Le retour du conventionnel, lié à la maîtrise de l'espace, ferait pour sa part le jeu des américains.

Ces derniers, depuis la démonstration de la guerre du Golfe, disposent de quelques atouts propres à séduire certains des européens. Certes les Etats-Unis ont décidé de réduire considérablement leurs effectifs stationnés sur notre continent (ils pourraient atteindre dans une dizaine d'années environ 50.000 à 60.000 hommes). Cependant, le départ de ces troupes est compensé par la capacité des Etats-Unis de projeter avec rapidité une force d'intervention interarmes, basée sur leur sol, à l'image de ce qui s'est fait dans le Golfe.

Cette capacité de projection, et par là même, de protection, de nature conventionnelle et éventuellement spatiale, devrait conférer à la notion de couplage transatlantique un nouveau sens qui est en mesure d'être perçu par les européens attachés à l'OTAN, comme, militairement crédible en cas de crise et, politiquement gérable aux yeux de leur opinion publique, puisque suffisamment léger en temps de paix pour ne pas heurter leur susceptibilité nationale.

Ajoutons à cela, que les Etats-Unis ont l'intention d'offrir davantage de responsabilités aux européens membres de la structure intégrée de l'Alliance: commandement confié aux britanniques, mise sous contrôle opérationnel allemand d'éléments américains... Plus encore, le nouveau dispositif de l'OTAN devrait compter une Force de Réaction Rapide composée essentiellement d'européens. Les Douze seraient autorisés à placer de façon temporaire cette Force sous la bannière de l'UEO, pour éventuellement intervenir en dehors de la zone de compétence de l'Alliance. Il s'agit clairement ici, de saper toute initiative personnelle des Douze en faisant de l'UEO un pont entre la Communauté et l'OTAN.

Cette "européanisation" partielle de l'OTAN (partielle car le leadership américain subsisterait néanmoins) est-elle à même de séduire nos alliés européens ? Cette hypothèse - favorable aux Etats-Unis - ne peut-être écartée.

Cependant, ce plan d'"européanisation" de l'OTAN, entériné par les ministres de la défense de l'OTAN au mois de Mai, parait à certains égards quelque peu anachronique au regard des récents événements survenus en URSS, mais également anachronique au regard des besoins que requiert la situation de "vide" stratégique qui caractérise la région Centre-Europe.

En effet, l'Alliance, dans l'état actuel de ses compétences géostratégiques, n'a pas vocation à intervenir sur ces théâtres. L'affaire Yougoslave le démontre aisément. Les Douze pourraient donc profiter de cette paralysie géostratégique de l'OTAN pour faire aboutir leur projet de défense commune.

Pourtant, trois questions se posent: - les Britanniques accepteront-ils un projet indépendant de l'OTAN, les Allemands réviseront-ils leur loi fondamentale, les Américains se résoudront-ils à l'émergence d'un véritable pôle européen ?

Enfin, nous pourrions ajouter une quatrième question: - quels atouts militaires, la France - qui semble être le pays le plus engagé dans le processus communautaire dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense - est elle disposée à mettre sur la table des Douze pour convaincre ses alliés ?

Constatons ici que le Gouvernement français:

1) réduit l'effort financier en matière de défense et renonce par là même à moderniser comme il le faudrait notre outil militaire.

2) en se prononcant pour le maintien de la conscription, perpétue l'organisation actuelle de nos Armées. Cette organisation, qui se caractérise par une composition binaire appelés/engagés des effectifs, handicape notre outil militaire, puisque les conscrits ne peuvent être dépêchés en cas d'affrontement sur les théâtres périphériques. Or, ce qui intéresse éventuellement nos alliés européens, ce sont nos capacités et nos moyens de projection de forces, seules garanties à leurs yeux, de notre solidarité à leur égard.

Ainsi, nous ne convaincrons nos amis européens ni en vertu de nos capacités nucléaires (que nous n'entendons d'ailleurs pas partager), ni en offrant à leur jugement, le spectacle d'une Armée de Terre

composée à plus de 60% de conscrits, utilisables pour la seule défense des abords du Rhin. A certains égards, la conscription est à la France ce que la loi fondamentale est à l'Allemagne: une institution paralysante. Etrange paradoxe, deux des principales puissances continentale, par ailleurs les plus engagées dans la construction communautaire, sont en réalité, hors de leurs frontières, militairement impuissantes.

Fort de ce constat, je ne puis que douter de notre propension à entraîner, dans l'immédiat, les membres hésitants de la Communauté dans un projet de sécurité et de défense crédible, propre aux Douze.

Cependant, deux scénarios sont envisageables. Soit nous assistons à une coexistence multifonctionnelle des institutions; ce qui signifierait que l'OTAN entrerait dans une période de sommeil, tandis que les Douze réaliseraient, pas à pas, leur projet de sécurité et de défense commune.

Soit, l'OTAN, prenant de vitesse les Douze, non seulement persévère et engage la réforme décrite plus haut, mais également, étende ses responsabilités géostratégiques aux pays de Centre-Europe, répondant en cela à la demande de certains d'entre-eux, comme, par exemple, la Hongrie effrayée par son grand voisin Roumain fort du rattachement prévisible de la Moldavie ou encore inquiétée par la Serbie, ou encore la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie. Les Douze ne pourront dissuader une telle demande qu'en instaurant un système de sécurité collective propre à satisfaire les pays de l'Est européen. Ici, la gestion de la crise Yougoslave doit, impérativement, leur permettre de créer un précédent positif.

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Enfin, dans le climat de détente qui prévaut actuellement en Europe, la stabilité du continent européen devrait dépendre principalement des relations politiques et économiques nouées avec l'Est Européen.

La CEE dispose ici de formidables atouts qu'elle se doit d'exploiter en visant son élargissement. Les Etats-Unis, pour leur part, ne manqueront pas d'établir leur influence dans la région en instaurant, notamment avec l'URSS, un dialogue bilatéral en tête à tête, mais également en exprimant ses vues au travers des divers organes - G7, FMI, Banque Mondiale - intéressés par le redressement économique de l'Est Européen.

Par ailleurs, la CSCE, après avoir été quelque peu sous-estimée, pourrait devenir aux yeux des américains, l'instrument privilégié de leur présence en Europe.

Source de coopération, mais également peut-être, source de prochaines inimitiés, le dialogue euro-atlantique est donc dans une période charnière ou chacun des acteurs internationaux cherche ses marques et définit ses intérêts. Pour l'instant, les Douze avance pas à pas, tandis, que, d'un côté, les Etats-Unis s'imposent sur la scène internationale comme l'acteur incontournable, et de l'autre, l'Est européen attend, jugeant des Douze ou des Etats Unis, lequel est le plus crédible.

FRANÇOIS FILLON

LE PROBLEME DES ALLIANCES

La guerre du golfe terminée, un constat a été rapidement fait: celui de l'absence de l'Europe de la défense. Depuis, on s'ingénie à réfléchir aux moyens de créer cette Europe de la Défense qui a fait cruellement défaut; on évoque notamment la création d'une FAR européenne, on parle d'une convergence institutionnelle entre l'UEO et la CEE...

Sans faire preuve d'europessimisme, ayons le courage de regarder les choses telles qu'elles sont.

Il faut tout d'abord savoir que nos alliés européens ne tirent absolument pas les mêmes leçons de ce conflit que nous. Au regard de cette expérience, seuls les Français croient réellement au projet d'une défense propre aux européens. La réalisation d'un tel projet n'intéresse, ni les Anglais, ni les Allemands, ni les Hollandais, ni les Belges. Quant aux Italiens et aux Espagnols ils attendent de voir. Par ailleurs, aux yeux de ces pays, la France, au delà de son discours, n'apparait pas réellement décidée à rompre avec la singularité de sa politique de défense.

En fait, il semble que personne ne souhaite voir l'OTAN dépassée et doublée par une nouvelle structure de défense. Les Français eux-mêmes et surtout les plus engagés d'entre nous dans leur profession européenne, le souhaitent-ils réellement? Qu'offrent-ils concrètement pour rendre crédible une autre alternative ?

Chacun parle donc de l'Europe de la Défense avec une idée différente derrière la tête. En réalité, les européens sont coincés entre deux problèmes: le problème soviétique et le problème américain.

Le problème soviétique n'est pas encore réglé et continue de susciter de sérieuses inquiétudes. C'est encore en partie en fonction de celui-ci que se pense l'organisation de notre défense en Europe. Cependant, les troupes russes ne sont plus à portée de vue. Elles se situent à plus de 700 kilomètres des frontières de l'Allemagne. Ceci constitue un changement considérable. La menace - si menace il y avait à nouveau - n'est plus pesante et immédiate.

Se pose le problème américain. L'Alliance est travaillée par un mouvement contradictoire: elle est à la fois l'objet d'une réforme qui pourrait être considérable, marquée notamment par un désengagement militaire des Etats-Unis, mais de l'autre, reste sous influence américaine.

La situation actuelle se caractérise donc par l'ambigüité et, chez un grand nombre d'européens, par la crainte de voir les Etats-Unis prendre une part moins grande à la défense de notre continent. Dans cet esprit, si le projet d'une défense propre aux européens est écarté car jugé illusoire et dangereux, le projet de réforme de l'OTAN, pour sa part, s'en trouve singulièrement limité puisqu'il n'aboutit pas à une remise en cause du leadership américain.

Sur les deux tableaux, les européens sont passifs; le statu-quo est donc total. L'UEO n'avance pas pour cause d'OTAN, l'OTAN se réforme mais sous conditions américaines.

Voyons la situation de plus près.

La réforme de l'OTAN, par la force des choses, est en marche. L'implosion du Pacte de Varsovie, les divers accords de désarmement, la dissolution de la stratégie de la riposte graduée - qui annonce de façon plus profonde la mise en veilleuse de l'armement nucléaire à moyenne et courte portée - modifient radicalement la stratégie otanienne. De façon plus concrète, les Etats-Unis ont déjà considérablement réduit leurs effectifs stationnés sur le continent européen et il est probable que son nombre atteigne dans une dizaine d'années moins de 100.000 hommes.

Il est désormais flagrant que l'Europe ne constitue plus, à leurs yeux, une priorité; elle est un théâtre d'intervention parmi d'autres.

Ainsi que la guerre du golfe l'a démontré, les américains disposent - comme le préconisait Brzezinski - des moyens de projeter avec rapidité une force d'intervention interarmes, basée sur leur sol, adaptée aux différents scénario. Son concept d'emploi correspond à une perception mondiale de leurs intérêts et donne au contenu du couplage euro-atlantique un nouveau sens.

Les Etats-Unis devant la portée de ces changements, suggèrent une nouvelle approche. Dans la mesure où ils craignent de voir l'Europe séparer son destin politique et militaire du leur, ils proposent de rénover l'OTAN. Cette "rénovation", dans l'état actuel des choses, promet d'être artificielle. La maîtrise stratégique devrait continuer à appartenir aux Etats-Unis.

Cependant cette option "intermédiaire" est à même de séduire nos alliés européens, qui voient de moins en moins, dans ces conditions, l'utilité de créer "ex nihilo", un système de défense au sein de l'UEO, qui serait en parfaite redondance avec ce qui existe déjà: l'OTAN.

Soyons donc lucide, l'OTAN existe et n'est pas prêt semble-t-il, à l'horizon prévisible, d'être remis en cause par nos alliés. C'est au regard de cette réalité que nous devons agir. La France ne peut continuer à tabler sur une très hypothétique défense commune des Douze, et laisser se poursuivre en Europe un processus mené de façon concrète par l'OTAN et qui conduit à une redéfinition de la sécurité et de la défense en Europe.

Ils nous faut sortir de nos chimères et convaincre nos partenaires avec un autre discours. En parallèle avec la poursuite de l'Union politique des Douze, proposons un pari Français: celui d'une véritable européanisation de l'Alliance atlantique, d'une autre nature que l'actuel projet de replâtrage de l'OTAN.

Notre plan devrait poser clairement les conditions dans lesquelles nous serions prêts à participer de façon pleine et entière à une OTAN repensée: européanisation des principaux commandements, y compris le poste suprême, adoption du nouvelle stratégie rejetant le concept de bataille, coopération et interopérabilité des forces plutôt que leur fusion.

Ce plan suggérerait la remise en cause du concept d'intégration. Au regard des nouvelles conditions géopolitiques et stratégiques en Europe, ce dernier ne devrait plus avoir, sur le plan militaire, le même sens.

Ce concept s'illustrait notamment par ce que l'on a appelé "la prise de créneau". Chaque pays, chaque armée, sur les directives du Comité des plans de l'OTAN, était appelé à tenir un créneau géographique, qui s'inscrivait dans une stratégie globale, destinée à contrer une offensive massive du Pacte de Varsovie.

Ces directives ne devront plus avoir de raisons d'être puisque les scénarios de crise les plus probables auquel nous aurons à répondre réclameront des actions diplomatico-militaires certainement plus souples et plus variées qu'autrefois.

Ce concept d'intégration tenait également à la présence des armes nucléaires américaines à courte et moyenne portée. Ces armes constituaient l'épine dorsale du dispositif otanien. Elles servaient la stratégie de la riposte graduée et légitimaient la maitrise américaine. Sous l'effet de divers accords de désarmement ces armes seront retirées d'Europe. Une autre stratégie nucléaire, de nature plus politique que militaire, plus stratégique que tactique, exercée de façon combinée par les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France devra être adoptée.

En réalité, il s'agirait de revenir à l'esprit du Traité de 1949, qui privilégie, plus que l'intégration des forces, la coopération entre partenaires alliés. Elle devrait se traduire sur le plan politique, par le partenariat plutôt que le protectorat.

Sur ce plan, le Conseil Européen, permettra aux européens, d'harmoniser leurs vues et de peser davantage dans le cadre du dialogue euro-atlantique.

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Nos alliés accepteront-ils ce pari qui consiste à prendre davantage en main leurs responsabilités au sein de l'OTAN ?

Dans l'hypothèse où ceux-ci refuseraient de s'engager dans cette voie, au moins la situation serait-elle clarifiée. Nous serions à même d'en prendre acte et, refusant de nous rapprocher d'une OTAN encore trop américaine et si peu européenne, nous continuerons à travailler, pas à pas, à la construction communautaire.

Dans l'immédiat, quelle que soit la structure d'alliance militaire qui sera privilégiée ou créée, la France, pour tenir son rang et pour être l'un des éléments moteurs de cette alliance doit travailler à la crédibilité de ses armées. Elles devront être perçues par nos alliés comme incontournables. C'est là notre première et essentielle priorité.

François Fillon

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Draft

NATO REBORN

(By Admiral Sir James Eberle, GCB LLD.
Royal Institute of International Affairs)

For more than forty years, NATO has had a clear and visible primary purpose - the defence of Western Europe against the threat of military aggression by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO's aim has been to break down the post WWII barriers that had been erected between East and West. It has also served a number of other purposes, not least by providing in the political field, a strong and vital link in security policy between the United States and Western Europe; and in the military field, by building the habit of international cooperation amongst the armed forces of 16 countries to a degree which has not been achieved in almost any other field. Under such conditions, military action by one member state against another becomes difficult to conceive and to execute.

2. Now, the threat of military aggression by the Soviet Union has effectively disappeared; at least for the present. The Warsaw Pact is no more. Eastern Europe has thrown off the dead hand of communist rule. The `iron curtain' has been torn down. If NATO has thus achieved its primary purpose, then the question has to be asked "is this the end of NATO?". If it is not and there is a `new NATO' waiting to be born, then what is its new purpose and how can it best be fulfilled? We cannot separate consideration of these issues from even more fundamental questions about the effectiveness of military power, and the role of alliances in the `New World Order' which we are attempting to fashion.

The Utility of Military Power

3. It has been my contention for a number of years that the utility of military power is changing. The use of force is becoming increasingly less effective as a means of successfully achieving political goals. At the nuclear level, it has been clear for a long time that nuclear weapons were almost unusable, because they have become too powerful. To initiate nuclear war would entail not only destroying the enemy, but also risking the destruction of one's own country; and perhaps, through escalation in a strategic exchange, even ending civilisation in the world as we now know it. Nevertheless, the threat of their use has remained sufficiently credible to provide the deterrence of the ultimate sanction. At the conventional level, I have argued that the potential cost of conducting large scale conventional operations, bearing in mind the destructive capability of modern weapons and the sophistication of the infrastructure of a modern economy against which they might be directed, is so great that a major conventional war is becoming no longer an effective option for the settlement of international disputes.

4. It may be useful briefly to assess this hypothesis against recent events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In Eastern Europe, real and fundamental political change was achieved, almost without violence, by means of 'peaceful people power'. In the Soviet Union, despite support for the coup being given by the Minister of Defence, Marshal Yazov, and a number of senior generals, and tanks being deployed on the Streets of Moscow, the armed forces played a very small part in either the coup or its suppression; although the symbolism provided by the small number of armoured

vehicles that deployed to defend Mr Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament was important.

5. In the Middle East, the Allied forces inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Iraqi armed forces occupying Kuwait, in the largest scale military operation that has been mounted since WWII. The UN stated aim of restoring the legitimate Government of Kuwait was achieved with minimal Allied losses. Very heavy costs were extracted from the Iraqi side, both to their armed forces and to the structure of their civil society, costs which may not unreasonably be seen to be disproportionate to the scale of the original aggression. The operation was not however without cost on the Allied side. Apart from the obvious costs of mounting the operation, and of the reconstruction of Kuwait, there has been heavy and widespread pollution from the torching of the oil wells and the destruction of the refineries, the West has been drawn in to the issue of the independence of the Kurds, and there has been a strengthening of fundamentalism in some Arab countries. But perhaps the greatest cost is carried in the perception that, although the Allies had a great and glorious victory in battle, the war has not been won; and that although the war has changed the problem, it has not solved it. Sadam Hussein is still in power in Iraq. He continues to perpetrate horrifying human rights abuses upon his own people; he continues to defy the United Nations; he has resumed attacks on the Kurds; he has dismissed the Prime Minister, Saadoun Hamadi, who was appointed after the end of the Gulf war as the "acceptable face of Baathism"; and, despite some signs of progress in the Middle East Peace Conference, lasting peace and stability in the region continues to resemble a dream. Once again, the use of military

force, this time with great military success, has been ineffective in producing the wider political outcome that was desired.

6. In Yugoslavia, despite all efforts by the European Community to obtain an effective cease fire, violence in Croatia has steadily escalated to civil war. Nevertheless, this escalation has been accompanied by verbal recognition from both sides that a solution cannot be achieved by military means. The plight of the elderly, the injuries to children and the damage to part of Europe's cultural heritage, as in Dubrovnic, which have been vividly illustrated on TV screens around the world, must surely reenforce the view that war can no longer be an effective and acceptable means of achieving political change. This is of course not to say that military power is no longer an important factor in international relations; nor yet as a factor in national politics. I do,however, believe that the way in which military power can be used effectively has changed, and continues to change. Politico/military factors are now relatively less important than those in the political/economic field; and military force is a factor more likely to be effective in maintaining the status quo than in changing it, a view that has been strengthened by the movement of the political orientation of security policy towards "defence" rather than "offence". However, as force at the higher level becomes less usable as an instrument of change, it appears that the use of low level violence in the form of international terrorism and armed insurrection by national minorities is becoming more prevalent as a means of political coercion.

8. If the contention that the future utility of military power is moving towards the maintenance of the status quo, rather than an effective means of changing it, this has profound implications for the role, shape, and size of armed forces. There needs to be a rebalancing of some basic priorities of defence policy, such as that between defence against external aggression and the maintenance of internal law and order - a field in which the availability of sophisticated weapons to the terrorist has blurred the boundary that once existed between the civil forces of law and order and the armed services. There is renewed emphasis on the flexibility and mobility of armed forces, which carries with it wide implications for their equipment. In the revolutions in Eastern Europe, it was the `look alike' tank, the helicopter and the armed soldier that played the greatest role. Heavy artillery, long range rockets, supersonic fighters or sophisticated bombers played no part in the real change of political power.

Global Security

9. Whilst NATO has been one of the most successful regional alliances of all time, the global balance of power has for many years been kept between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. There is now only one superpower, a situation which leaves no room for a global balance of power. The United States is now effectively the sole agent of the international community in the military enforcement of global security - the "Guarantor of last resort" of international politics - as was demonstrated in the Middle East war. Whilst the United States continues to exercise responsible global leadership, it is not at all clear that the American people will

wish to be the`world's policeman' for all time. The costs are high- and there are pressing societal problems at home.--Nor would such a hegemonic role be welcomed in a number of parts of the world.

The alternative is to aim to build anew a multilateral system of regional and global security and enforcement, which includes a central authority responsible for all aspects of disaster relief, based on the United Nations, in which burdens, risks and responsibilities would be fairly shared throughout the international community. Whilst some would see this as no more than a romantic pipe dream, there have been encouraging signs that the UN Security Council may now be able and willing to shoulder the very wide responsibilities that were placed upon it in the Charter, and to exercise the considerable power that Nations can provide to it. At the present time, both the European Community in relation to Yugoslavia, and the US with regard to Iraqi non compliance with the peace terms, are turning to the United Nations for international support and endorsement.

11. Such a system must provide a balance between global and regional structures. The emergence of a new wider Europe and the evident need for a new structure for the longer term peace and security of the Middle East raises important questions about the development of other regional structures. There has been a proposal for the establishment of a Conference for Security and cooperation in the Mediterranean(CSCM). This proposal may have a part to play in any newly emerging Middle East Order. In the Far East, there have been proposals for some similar form of security structure as a framework for Asian Security cooperation - a CSCP(Pacific) perhaps. In Latin America, we see the growing

spirit of democracy, and the prospect of greater political and economic stability, leading to the solution of disputes by political rather than military means. The relationship between such regional developments and the United Nations will require very careful consideration. If the United Nations is to act as an effective overarching global structure to a series of regional security arrangements, then the role of the Security Council, its membership, its mode of operation and its relationship with the still growing General Assembly will need to be re-examined.

The Security of Europe

12. Last years summit conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reinforced the role of the CSCE by setting up a small permanent secretariat; by regularising the processes of political consultation; by setting up a conflict prevention centre, by instituting a parliamentary assembly, and by supporting an office to encourage free and fair elections throughout Europe. Most Western leaders made it clear, however, that, while the CSCE had an important part to play in European security, it had little part to play in European defense. The CSCE could not be regarded as a replacement for NATO, primarily because it commands no means of enforcement. This tacitly recognised the growing need to define more clearly the use of the words "defense" and "security". Whilst there is no agreed rigorous definition of these two terms, there is a general understanding that security policy is about political ends; and defence policy is about military means. Security involves the process of political dialogue. Defense involves the structure and operation of armed forces. Security includes risks and challenges that lie outside the fields of military competence.

Defense ultimately rests on the ability of armed forces to prevail in war.

13. The prospect of a continuing period of uncertainty about the definition of the future "Europe" and its political and economic structure may suggest a strong raison d'etre for the continuation of NATO, broadly as we have known it, as a bastion around which European security can be maintained. There must however be doubt that continuation of the appearance of the existing security structure is sustainable, at a time when the very basis of the threat to that security has fundamentally changed as a result of the collapse of communism, and the break up of the Soviet Union. It runs the considerable risk that NATO will lose public support and increasingly be seen to resemble the dinosaur, whose fate we all know.

14. Of course NATO is already changing a great deal. It has extended the hand of friendship to its former foes, with whom it is now establishing good military to military relations. Ambassadors from former Warsaw Pact countries are 'accredited' to the NATO Headquarters. NATO has reorganised its ground force structure, with emphasis being placed on the formation of a new multi-national rapid deployment force. Member states have already announced major reductions in the forces that will be available for NATO assignment. The Alliance has conducted a review of the Alliance's underlying strategy. It is having to cope with the problems of implementing the CFE agreement. A review of the NATO Command structure is underway. NATO is indeed trying hard to come to terms with the problems of defence planning when there is no readily identifiable enemy. Nevertheless, there is a strong suspicion that there is still a

great deal in NATO that is not changing. This reflects the view that NATO must continue to stand as a pillar of stability in a sea of uncertainty. NATO has also become such an enormously large and complex organisation that even if its disbandment were to be ordered tomorrow, it would still take a very long time to run down.

15. One most important thing that has not changed is NATO's membership, although several former Warsaw Pact countries have declared their wish to join. It is argued that to admit new members at this time would so change the character of NATO that it would no longer be recognisable as an Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, a major impediment to widening the membership is the strength of the security guarantee provided by article five of the North Atlantic Treaty that states that an attack on one will be considered an attack on all.

16. The continuation of the need for a strong transatlantic security dialogue, for which NATO has for the last forty years been the principle forum, is predicated on assumptions about the place of the United States in Europe and of the indivisibility of the security of North America and that of Western Europe. This has been the basis of the term "Atlantic Security", which carried with it a powerful maritime message that the North Atlantic Ocean was a central feature of that security. Because NATO's use of it for the reenforcement and resupply of Europe was threatened by very powerful Soviet submarine forces, defence of the Atlantic sea lines of communication was a vital interest of the Alliance. Whilst the Soviet submarine force still exists, it is very difficult to foresee circumstances in which it could convincingly pose a threat either to the United States or to Western Europe.

The very concept of "Atlantic" security has become blurred. It becomes synonymous with "European" security. And unless the people of both Western Europe and the United States are clear as to the interests of both sides that are served by the continuation of the United States as a `European' power, and as a power in Europe, then no amount of mouthing the sacred words that US participation in the defense and security of Europe is vital both to Americans and Europeans will be enough to maintain public support for it on either side of the Atlantic.

17. It has been argued that the strategic case for the continuing US involvement in European security rested on the need for the US to act as a political and military counter-balance to the Eastward pull of the mass of the Soviet Union on the countries of central Europe. There was, I believe, much strength in this argument. However, since the failure of the Soviet coup, it is clear that the "mass of the Soviet Union" has largely disintegrated, militarily and politically. Even the credibility of the threat posed by Soviet nuclear power is declining as the number of fingers on the Soviet Nuclear safety catch increases. Thus, the need for the presence of US forces on the ground in Europe, either to provide an immediate counter to a conventional attack on NATO territory, or as `nuclear hostages' giving credibility to US nuclear guarantees, is hardly likely to be enough to convince large elements of US Congressional opinion that `our boys' cannot be brought home. Nonetheless, the US military deployments in peacetime in Europe are seen as an earnest of the wider American interest in the stability of Europe and constitute an important prejudgment of the strategic decision

about direct US involvement on the European continent if that stability is threatened.

18. Europe needs to recognise that a weakening of the security link between the US and Europe would almost inevitably accentuate the Westward pull of the Asia Pacific region on the United States. Whilst the emotional ties of most Americans, even on the West Coast, still tend to lie with Europe, and despite increasingly difficult relations with Japan, US trade flows increasingly towards Asian Markets. This trend may well be accelerated by the changing ethnic balance of Asians and Hispanics within the United States.

19. In the London Declaration, NATO extended the hand of friendship to the East and began the process of strengthening its relationships with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. At the Council meeting at Copenhagen in June, the member governments, in approving a special statement on Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, announced that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other States in Europe". Whilst this statement was intended to reassure the former Warsaw Pact countries and to prevent a security vacuum forming on NATO's Eastern borders, it fell somewhat short of their aspirations. Since June, a great deal has happened as the Soviet Union has continued to fall apart. If the process of NATO's strengthening of its relations with Central and Eastern Europe is to continue successfully as it must, then this will inevitably give rise to growing pressure from these countries for some more formal relationship with the Alliance, including

eventual membership. NATO must therefore begin to consider a widening of the Alliance.

Defence and the European Community

20. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the emergence of newly independent States whose declared aim is to become pluralist democracies with market orientated economies, has added a major new dimension to the problems of the further development of the European Community. Whilst the two inter-governmental conferences have been addressing the issues of economic/monetary union and political union for the existing twelve members, as part of the process of "deepening" the Community, the list of those countries who are potential applicants for future membership, the process of widening the Community, has grown dramatically. It now numbers more than twenty. For many of these potential new applicants, the success of their move towards democracy and market economics is heavily dependent on their having market access to Western Europe: and particularly for the former CMEA countries for whom the problems of transition, the need to pay for their energy supplies from the Soviet Union in hard currency, and the almost total collapse of the Soviet market for their manufactured goods, has had a traumatic effect on their economies. The opening of EC markets to such a potential flow of low priced goods will inevitably carry significant penalties for Community members. However, if the EC is not willing to respond effectively, then there will be an increasing risk of political instability in Eastern Europe and of population migration westwards. Whilst such political instability should not be equated to a military

threat to Western Europe, there can be no doubt as to its effect on European Security, defined in its wider sense. Whilst it may be possible to envisage an eventual wider European Economic Area from `Brest to Brest', it is extremely difficult to imagine it being paralleled by a political community of such a size along the lines now being negotiated in the two IGCs. In this case where can the elements of defence and security for a wider Europe be fitted in?

21. Both the recent British-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defence and the Franco-German Initiative and draft treaty on Political Union and Common Foreign and Security policy have recognised the WEU as the vehicle for developing a common security policy for the Union and a stronger European defence identity. Whist there is disagreement about the position of the WEU with respect to NATO and The EC, there is now clear agreement that the WEU should be the defense and security arm of the Union.

A New NATO.

22. If the membership of the NATO Alliance must eventually be widened, then a revision of the Washington Treaty must be considered. NATO has always been a defensive alliance. It has defended Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. There is now no readily identifiable threat against which West European countries need now defend themselves; although there is a growing North/South dimension of European security, enhanced by concern over the possible development of Islamic fundamentalism. The greatest threat to the security of a wider Europe is no longer the threat of external attack, but that of violent internal division under the pressures of growing nationalism and a

potential continuing divide in economic prosperity. This reduces the emphasis that has been placed on the importance of Article five of the North Atlantic Treaty that defines an attack upon member state as being an attack on all. A new 'NATO' treaty would be better based on the fundamental commitment of European states not to initiate armed action again any other member state; and, in the case that such action did occur, to take such action, including military action, as necessary to restore the status quo ante, and to resolve the issue by peaceful negotiation. Such a treaty would have far greater impact and cohesion than a web of bilateral non aggression pacts. It would be a revision of the basic NATO treaty. It would be open for signature by all independent European countries that were members of the CSCE. With its signature would come the ending of NATO as we now know it.In this way the 'New NATO' would become the defense arm of the CSCE, in the same way that the WEU can become the defense arm of the European Community.

23. The new treaty organisation would carry forward many of the existing elements of NATO. Like NATO, the new alliance would be both a political and a military alliance. It would have a strong military planning function. In the research, weapon development and procurement field, it would seek as much rationalisation and standardisation between national military forces as possible, thus reducing costs and the competitive element in technological development. In the operational planning field, its principle attention would be devoted to peacekeeping contingencies and to disaster relief. It would have a skeleton operational command structure to permit the rapid deployment within Europe of small highly mobile multi national

units. It would develop common operational procedures and standards thus permitting the close easy working of national forces; and would conduct joint military exercises. It would have the capability of providing a European contribution to UN operations. It would maintain close relations with the WEU and an Atlantic dimension.

24. It has frequently been said that, for the present, the structure of European security, with its many institutions, will inevitably be without any coherent architecture; and that capabilities are more important than structures. But we are in a period of transition - and we do need to have some vision of the eventual position that we should like to reach. It still may be early days in that process of transition. But the violent instability that has already been released does call for vision of a "New European Order". This has been an attempt to construct the outline of a new security and defense order, that is compatible with the trend in the political and economic development of a wider Europe within a new world order.

1.11.91 J.H.F.E.

To a wider NATO.

The Heads of Government who will [next week] be meeting for the NATO summit in Rome will have three principal issues on their formal agenda. They will be asked to agree the new NATO strategy, which unlike its predecessor, will be a publicly available document. They will need to discuss the implications for NATO of the recent US and Soviet statements about their unilateral reductions in short range and ship based nuclear weapons. They will wish to discuss the future relationship between NATO and the Central and Eastern European Countries.

At the NATO Council meeting at Copenhagen in June, the member governments, in approving a special statement on Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, announced that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other States in Europe". This statement was intended to reassure the Countries of the former Warsaw Pact and to prevent a security vacuum forming on Germany's eastern and southern borders. However, it fell substantially short of the aspirations of countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia whose leaders have called, and continue to call, for full membership of the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO has extended the hand of friendship to the East, and is now engaged in deepening its relationship with the former Warsaw Pact countries. It is inevitable that the successful deepening of this relationship will give rise to further pressure from these countries to become members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Since June a great deal has happened. The Soviet "Union" continues to fall apart. In Yugoslavia, there is civil war. In Western Europe, the WEU is increasingly widely being seen, and recognised by governments, as the 'defence and military arm' of the European Community; although its character and relationship to NATO is a matter of hot debate. At such a time, when the world order is changing rapidly and uncertainly, it is important that we have some vision of the desirable longer term future.

Any new global international security order must be based on the United Nations. There have also to be regional security organisations. Such a structure for Europe was enshrined in last years CSCE 'Charter of Paris'. However, as British Ministers have regularly pointed out, the CSCE cannot replace NATO, largely because the CSCE has no means of enforcement. Why then should we not consider NATO becoming, in the longer term, the defence and military arm of the CSCE?

This might be achieved by revising the NATO Treaty to open its membership to all CSCE countries. This would suggest the revision of Article five which establishes that 'an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all'. This commitment was of course entirely appropriate when NATO was an Alliance <u>against</u> the Warsaw Pact. It is very much less appropriate today when the Alliance is <u>for</u> the stability of a wider Europe; and when the greatest perceived threat is not that of massive external attack but of internal instability within Eastern and Central Europe.

A new commitment, to replace Article five and to reflect the UN Charter, would renounce the threat or use of force and commit members not to initiate any armed action against another member state. In the event that such action did occur, member states would commit themselves to taking such measures, including the use of force, as necessary to restore the status quo ante; and to resolve the issue by peaceful negotiation. In the event of an attack by a non-member state, the treaty would similarly commit members to assist in restoring the status quo ante.

Like NATO, the new Alliance would be both a political and a military alliance. It would continue to have a strong Atlantic dimension. It would carry forward many of the existing military planning elements of NATO, principally directed towards peacekeeping operations. It would have a skeleton operational command structure to permit the rapid deployment of small multi-national combined arms units. It would have the capability of providing a European contribution to UN operations and to international disaster relief. It would maintain close relations with the WEU, with whom many of its forces would be interchangeable.

In Rome, NATO leaders can be expected to re-affirm the importance of NATO as the foundation of European security for the immediate future. But they must also look to the longer term. The British Government has rightly supported in principle the further widening of the European Community, and criticised those who wish to place a ring fence around its present membership. Its attitude to future NATO membership should be the same.

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Draft paper subject to discussion

SECURITY- AND DEFENSE POLICY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

by Ambassador R. PANIS

In Western Europe, in Europe in general, also in the U.S.A., a debate came of the ground about a security policy adapted to the changed circumstances in the political and security field.

Because of the fundamental change of the security climate and because of its ongoing evolution, it is not at all astonishing that no clear, explicit, global, certainly unanimous, concept, even analysis imposed itself, delineated itself up to now. Is it understandable that it still will have to develop and grow, that the data on which it will have to be based, still have to become more clearly outlined, will have to sink in, also to be sifted out.

It is therefore necessary to think in terms of an evolution towards a European security policy, the possibilities of and the possible ways towards such a policy. It has therefore to be kept in mind that such an evolution not a priori be excluded or cut off, that meaningful ways - options - not a priori be excluded or closed.

As always happened when a further step on the road to (West) European integration was envisaged, or even seemed to impose itself, own national traditions, conceptions, sensibilities and interests, even narrow ones, and problems of sovereignty, resp. transfer or abandonment of sovereignty came to the fore, formed stumbleblocks which had to be overcome or gotten around, such is also the case in the matter of the integration of a security policy in the common or overall interest of Europe.

It is not astonishing - however regretable it is - that, in the prevailing not yet clearly perceived circumstances, existing institutions show a tendency towards playing (or wanting to play) a major role in this search, in this debate.

Not necessarily with a view to offer a contribution from the standpoint of the overall interest: mostly from the standpoint of the interest of the institution itself.

The debate therefore takes, or seems to take the form of manoeuvering for position, of drawing the cover to one's side or keeping it drawn to one's side, of a battle for turf, by and between institutions which originated in different circumstances, were created with different objectives.

As one here deals with political - in the sense of all-encompassing, all-including - visions and conceptions which have to be brought together in the general political - all-encompassing - interest, certainly not with the interests (including self-preservation) of institutions (born out of, as a reaction against other circumstances) one has to think in terms of the emergence of a policy.

Creation, transformation, reduction or liquidation of institutions must be adaptations to this policy, even gradually emerging policy. Institutions are instruments of a policy, not postulates or unavoidable data to be assumed because they happen to exist, of a policy.

The search for a policy must start from the facts and circumstances which it must supply an answer to. The searching for a security policy must be based upon the threats, risks, dangers to which that security is exposed.

Therefore :

- first : what is meant by security ?
- then : to what dangers and risks is European security exposed ?
- therefore : how can a European security policy be developed to protect Europe against these risks ?
- and, lastly, : which instruments (institutions) are needed to that end, resp. can existing institutions contribute to that end and under what conditions ?

* * *

CONCEPT OF SECURITY

for the individual as for a community (organised in a State if the population wants or accepts it) is the guarantee of
- life, existence, survival;
- a certain way of life, to which this community/society (and its members) are attached;
- a form of organization of society which makes possible this way of life (e.g. a state with an appropriate structure and way of functioning);
- a certain value system in which this way of life is rooted.

To guarantee and preserve all this, a community (just like an individual) must be in a position to take decisions which favour it or which are necessary for it. Each at his or its own level and taking into account (respecting) the (security) interests of the broader/larger community/society of which he or it is part : the local-, subregional-, regional-, state-level. Also - because that also is a community/society - on the level of Europe.

ANALYSIS OF THE RISKS

What are the risks to which the Security of this community/society "Europe" is exposed, it being understood that we start here from the community which Western Europe is.

There is no need to demonstrate that the security climate and environment in Europe - and, also because of that, in the world, has recently been changed fundamentally. Therefore also the risks for Europe's security.

The military threat to Western Europe has very significantly decreased, and therefore the relative weight of a defense policy upon the security policy, of which it is a part, has similarly decreased. Political and security thinking is (and can be) far less militarised.

A security policy includes much more than a defense policy. Security, as defined above, is exposed to - certainly now - also other than military risks, of an economic as well as a political and, seen from a certain angle, social risks.

Defense policy is part of, i.e. subordinated to security policy.

Security policy is by its very nature political, i.e. much larger, encompassing also other aspects and components of a national resp. european policy, bringing them all together. That means economic-, commercial-, industrial-, monetary policy as well as policy regarding scientific research, technology, R & D and transfer of technology.

In that sense, security policy is part of policy tout-court, in different area's of internal policy as well as foreign policy in all its aspects, as a whole, as global policy.

Without the artificial or purely technical, methodological borderlines between foreign policy in the narrow sense on the one hand, commercial policy, financial and development policy on the other. These moreover mostly are delimitations between the respective competences of institutions, national or european. Often they are at the origin of incoherences between what are considered and dealt with as separate elements of a global foreign policy, or determined by separate, different decision-making mechanisms.

> EEC, and within EEC, Commission and Council are competent for some aspects of foreign policy, often touching on global foreign policy, often giving this a specific direction, often also inspired by it.

* * *

Keeping this always in mind, and starting from the changed circumstances and the modified security environment - as far as clear already and even if still evolving - what are the risks and/or threats to which (Western) Europe's security now is exposed.

I. First and foremost :

The instability in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe (here including the Soviet Union - as of now), in the whole of Europe - plus, to the east of us.

Local conflicts (including border conflicts), previously more or less suppressed or managed, could very well turn from latent to acute.

- e.g. Yugoslavia
- e.g. in the Soviet Union (as of now) some 80 seats of conflict can be counted, many latent, some (Armenia/Azerbaidjan) acute, and
- e.g. of the 33 borders between the (15) constituent republics of the USSR, 3 only are uncontested by one of the parties or by both.

Economic chaos, anarchy (also political), the social repercussions of these, or of reforms, can lead to blow-ups.

Extreme nationalism can incite to inward-turning and autarcy (even if that also can feed and sustain economic and social problems).

It also can lead to tensions between national groups and nationalisms (ethnic, religious, social antagonisms). As a result (potential) irredentisms leading to open conflicts. The relation/tension between nationalism and the status of minorities can give rise to open conflict.

Not only become civil wars thinkable, but they can very well become possible in many places. So do conflicts - even wars - which straddle international borders.

For (Western) Europe this gives rise to a twofold risk :

1. as a consequence of conflicts, civil (and other) wars, but also of economic chaos, anarchy or social dissaray, massive refugee streams and, more generally, migrations susceptible to threaten the equilibria of west european societies;

and

2. involvement of western Europe (or west european states) in civil or local international wars via
   - escalation of regional conflicts
   (a war in which the big powers, or in which Europe becomes involved is a world war, as opposed to a local war, a civil war or a regional armed conflict)
   possibly as a result of
   - built-in automatisms
   (technical e.g. automatic mobilisations cfr. 1914, as well as political e.g. guarantees, promises, correctly or wrongly understood declarations, alliances, etc.)
   (the rule : never threaten to take measures which - in case the threat is not believed or does not have effect - bring about consequences catastrophic or otherwise unacceptable, unbearable for one's own security (1).)

* * *

To avoid destabilizing migrations as well as involvement via escalation, efficient crisis-prevention is necessary;
(i.e. the rupturing of the spiral : risk = crisis = conflict = war)
as well as a policy of crisis management
(when and if the spiral starts accelerating).

To attain both it is obligatory that (Western) Europe be politically one and strong, which means that a European (political) Union (rapidly) be created, with an own foreign policy, and in which decisions can be taken timely and fast, and those decisions implemented fast, in which - in the common interest, inclusive common security interest, coherent and common action can be, and is, undertaken unanimously.

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1. As defined above.

Note 1. that means not as for instance in the Yugoslavia crisis, where the quarrelling between Europeans, the incoherence of the "European policy, the contradictions and the actions (verbal or on the spot) unthought out as regards the consequences, by several of the European actors, have led to an intensification of the crisis/conflict rather than to prevention or management.

Note 2. economic and financial means and instruments (in the competence of EEC) do have to be and stay coherently correlated to a global foreign policy of which a global security policy is part.

* * *

II. Second risk of (Western) Europe's security : regional conflicts elsewhere than in Europe, and their consequences for and repercussions on Europe.

The disappearance of the East-West polarisation brought about a diminished control (of the 2 superpowers) on the train of third world clients built up in the framework of that confrontation.

The disappearance of this adversary attitude could make (and has made) it easier to calm down, even to solve some regional conflicts on the basis of local causes and situations, by way of cooperative action of the big 2, in many cases also by U.N. action which has become possible again.

However, the disappearance of the East-West confrontation and therefore of the concommitant control on regional actors, can give scope to a multiplication of regional crises, to their turning from latent to acute, to their getting out of hand and coming to a head.

This may result in risks or threats for Europe's common interest - security interest in the broad sense used here.

- threats to the international order which also per se is a european security interest (e.g. Iraq's agression against Koweit);
- risks resulting from the instability within third world countries (cfr. Zaïre), including chaos, anarchy, civil war, up to possibly border-straddling conflicts;
- risks for the own social and economic interests (e.g. massive migrations; e.g. provision of energy and raw materials).

It is a valid question to ask if the interests of investors in third world countries, or the interests of nationals established there, are ipso facto national - or european - interests, and if this is not more a question of opinion than one of facts. In this respect one can think of the terminology current in The Netherlands and according to which a distinction is made between the "national interest" and the "interest of nationals".

* * *

From the point of view of these risks also, the indicated means for the defense of common european interests, is a politically strong Europe, with its own foreign policy, including its own security policy, within the European (political) Union.

As regards economic-, commercial-, development policy etc. (within the competence of EEC) again the problem poses itself of the means to be used and activated towards an objective, and of a coherent global foreign policy of which these (partial) policy areas and instruments are part and parcel.

On this level the problem is also obviously posed of a potential for power projection, and that leads to posing the question of a European military power factor.

* * *

III. Finally the third risk for Europe's security, the residual, military (2) risk originating in
- the Soviet Union, resp.
- the "new" Union (cfr. Heisbourg : less Union and less Soviet)
- should the case arise : Russia
- should the case arise, other - or several - ex-union or successor states

against which a foreign- and security policy has to be worked out, where however a defense policy is directly involved.

The classical answer to, parade against the threat emanating from the (old) Soviet Union, was the Atlantic Alliance, more specifically the integrated military structure : NATO.

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2. other risks originating there are included under risk I above (chaos, instability, economic and migration risks; the risk of escalation/involvement)

A. Nuclear risks

Should nuclear dispersion take place in the Soviet-Union (i.e. de facto nuclear proliferation) nuclear deterrence would not (not any more) be efficient.

- just as it is and would be inefficient against, say Libye's Khadaffi or a Saddam Hussein type
- question is if it would be efficient against even a local nuclear monopoly of Russia, taken into account the forms which russian nationalism could take
- the parallelism and simultaneity of political pluralism (in direction democracy) and nationalism (ethnic, linguistic, religious) does not signify that nationalism and totalitarianism exclude each other mutually. The opposite of totalitarianism is the rule of law, resp. an international legal order. Historically, nationalism often led to totalitarianism and often totalitarianism has exploited nationalism (incl. in the Soviet-Union, russian nationalism during World War II.

The question has to be asked if the nuclear risk could not better be met by reduction of nuclear weapons (per definition on both sides), renouncing the principle of (absolute) nuclear deterrence, resp. falling back on a minimal nuclear deterrence (i.e. a residual one, with in fact very few nuclear systems, with minimal destructive power, maximal target finding guarantee, and without reduction of the (strategic) range).

B. Conventional risk

Priority for Europe's security interest is complete implementation of the C.F.E. agreements (including verification and confidence building measures) with possibly shortened periods for withdrawal or destruction.

It is clear that in the now prevailing circumstances one could (and should) go much further along these lines (C.F.E. II, III, etc.), not only in a quantitative ("beancounting") sense, but also in a qualitative sense (defensive deployment, clearly defensive weaponsystems and strategies).

Note 1. However, the Gulfwar clearly demonstrated the offensive capabilities of NATO weaponsystems.

Note 2. In connection with risk nr. II, the question is not if, but to what extent, this is necessary - and if it then have to be NATO weaponsystems deployed on NATO territory.

It is above doubt in any case that the conventional risk, already, under the pressure of political circumstances, has decreased in large measure.

As a matter of fact, the time required for the preparation of a massive offensive by the Soviet-Union (or Russia) has increased to such an extent that a surprise attack can be considered as in practice excluded, that warning time has substantially been stretched, that political pressure by means of military show-of-force has also become quasi impossible.

So that this warning time can be fully put to use, the warning must reach as fast, as soon as possible, those responsible for it being put to use. Therefore, apart from that for an (autonomous - european) political intention-analysis, also the need for an (autonomous - european) observation, i.e. an own european observation satellite.

> (to autonomously gather facts and information and evaluate it, to be less dependent of the "intelligence" supplied by the USA (on a selective, ad hoc basis and directed towards persuading).

On the basis of the information it itself gathered and on that of its own analysis and evaluation, Europe has to develop its own policy in its own security-interest, the peculiar common security interest of Europe.

This peculiar european security interest should be correlated to the broader community of interest, namely the atlantic community (common value systems !). That does not mean however that the European interest per se and always coincides with, is identical with the interest of the USA, certainly not that, a priori the European interest should always be subordinated to the interest of the USA, not even as regards the residual military risk originating in the Soviet-Union.

In this respect, i.e. regarding NATO doctrine, deployment, armament and functioning, more later.

* * *

Provisional conclusion

Again and again, an analysis of the three categories of risks for the security and security interests of (Western) Europe, the conclusion imposes itself that

- a specific european security-interest exists
- which is common to the whole of (Western) Europe
- and that, on those grounds, an own European security policy ought to be conceived, defined and pursued

but also that an appropriate instrument to that effect does not (yet) exist.

That instrument could be the European (political) Union (structured federally, confederally or however, as long as the capacity is there to take its own decisions and to implement them - in a sufficiently timely, fast and efficient manner - whenever common interests are at stake, whenever shared risks have to be coped with.)
but then indeed as one actor in the field of foreign policy (which includes security policy) in view of the defense of the also (security) interests of that entity, i.e. common european interests.

One actor, one agent, one entity, which excludes mechanisms and procedures aiming at coordination only. Mechanisms such as E.P.C. This sometimes indeed led to a coordinated, even quasi-common policy (e.g. CSCE-Madrid and the forcing by the 10 of agreement on the Stockholm-mandate, and indeed the survival of CSCE as such).
Most of the time however only a minimal coordination is effected between - autonomous - national policy-options and decisions. Minimal coordination (the smallest common denominator) or concertation, often verbal only. National policy decisions which are all too often contradictory, neutralizing each other. EPC very often (most of the time) is inefficient, occasionally counterproductive.

* * *

Ergo, a foreign policy of and by the European Union qualitate qua, and defense of common interests by the European Union as such.

A European foreign policy includes a European security policy, which therefore also has to find its place in the European Union, has to be defined by and implemented by the European Union.

Note : a common defense policy (not only the competence limited by the Single Act to economic and political aspects of security, and of which anyhow an extremely restrictive interpretation prevailed in practice, and of which de facto very slight (or no) use was made.) would (will) logically, and out of factual inevitability follow...with time. Even an own defense organisation.
(cfr. the experience with the oh so slow but still, evolution from "common market" to "single market").

About institutions more and more precisely later, but the emergence of a bilateral Alliance between the European Union and the USA (3) lies in the same line of evolution.

* * *

Fear is to be expressed here that the Intergovernmental Conferences and the Maastricht Summit will not lead to a European Union with, as such, an own European foreign (and, as part thereof security) policy, and the instruments to define and implement that policy, from the departure point of a viewpoint reached in common in the common interest.

Some hope might be expressed that Maastricht and the Maastricht compromise (4) does not close doors or block roads in the direction of desirable (necessary !) further development and construction.

The hope might also be expressed that the, to be accepted as certainly coming, widening of the EEC/European Union, does not lead to a thinning out, or is invoked as an element (argument) against the building of the European Union. One is not opposed to widening because one pleads for deepening first, deepening precisely to make widening possible.

* * *

The - evolving - European Union - is, as such, an institution, or rather an entity consisting of institutions whose task it is to conceive and to execute its policies with a view to defending the interests and protecting the security interests of the community which is Europe (not today's institutions, rather the community/society of which the Union is, or is bound to become the form of organization).

* * *

Apart from the - evolving - European Union, there exists, as instruments of a security policy, other, older institutions with a specific organization, specific tasks and functions.

Some are wider than the European Union which is part of them (although not yet as such) (U.N.-CSCE). Others exist next to the European Union (NATO) or function more or less in parallel to it (W.E.U.).

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3. (two partners instead of 1 + 15, or one big fish and 15 small fry)
4. in the sense of John Viscount Morley : "On compromise"

These institutions of which the tasks and the functions - sometimes the reason for existance - might overlap with those of an (when adult) European Union are the object of following findings and considerations.

I. NATO

In this regard - although they do apply not only to NATO, but to all institutions - two preliminary remarks.

A. All institutions suffer from institutional inertia. The heavier the institution, the greater the inertia (and NATO is a particularly heavy institution !).
As regards NATO following examples may serve as illustrations (5)
- the NATO reaction to the (Belgian) Plan Charlier when end 1989 it was communicated to them, and when Belgium was forcefully upbraided for jeopardizing the NATO commitment to "forward defense". Since then - and why not end 89 ? - it is very much in question if that strategy still makes (made) the slightest sense and NATO has in fact decided to abandon it.
- the strategy of "flexible response" with its component the so-called short range nuclear weapon systems (Lance and follow-up on Lance) tactical nuclear weapons (artillery etc.) and the threat with "first use" (of nuclear weapons) was similarly considered by NATO as put into jeopardy when in Germany and - officially - Belgium opposed the Lance modernization plans of the USA. The recent Bush initiatives and proposals seem finally to have caught up - as has been the case before - with European conceptions and perceptions.

B. All institutions have a (seen from within : vital) interest in, and therefore aspiration to self-conservation, survival and self-preservation.
For NATO two illustrations :
- The efforts of NATO-as-such, which have been ongoing for quite some time now, to play a part in actions and competences regarding "out-of-area" (which it is politically impossible for NATO to acquire formally), and the related "two hats" theory concerning the Rapid Intervention Force, recently organized in such a way that it is anchored within NATO but could act out of area under a W.E.U. flag (given agreement of NATO, or on incitation of NATO), and is therefore not autonomously European.

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5. As regards W.E.U., or the complex NATO/W.E.U., the platform of The Hague can be cited as example. Cfr. its "nuclear component" and the recent Bush proposals.

- Ideas one hears expressed in NATO headquarters and by the NATO bureaucracy concerning the widening of NATO up to the including of the Soviet-Union, so-called to manage a common all-European security and counteract the for example nuclear threats which could emanate from the Third World.(6).

* * *

Political science considers it as a law that interstate institutions oriented to the outside (e.g. offensive or defensive alliances) do not survive the disappearance of, in casu, the threat, and that efforts to give the association other functions (e.g. political), certainly inward oriented functions, are doomed to failure (7).

* * *

What were the objectives pursued with the conclusion of the Atlantic Alliance and the creation of NATO ?

A. To prevent, deter, if need be collectively defend against, a massive, possibly surprise attack by the Soviet-Union (later : by the, as reaction to the creation of NATO, formally created Warsawpact as a since then, formal military extension of the Soviet-Union).
   This is - see above - not today's problem.
B. To involve (keep involved) the USA in the defense of security and stability of (Western) Europe, resp. against the potential political pressure of the Soviet-Union.

   Taking into account the residual military risk originating in the Soviet-Union (or the territory of today's Soviet-Union - cfr. above - Risk nr. III) the Atlantic Alliance still has an outwards-oriented objective, be it much reduced in size.
   Given this reduction of (threat or) risk, pressure mounted, in the USA as well as in Europe, to reduce defense expenditure.
   In the USA this leads (and already led) unavoidably to a reduction (already started) of the presence of US troops in Europe (8), a reduction also and therefore of the weight of the USA in the military structures of NATO and, as a consequence thereof in the Alliance.

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6. Escalation/involvement (as regards say China) and automatism leading to World War III seems not even to have been thought of.
7. cfr. A. Wolfers, : "Discord and Collaboration", Baltimore, 1962, - p. 29.
8. Until recently the U.S. thesis was : no U.S. troops in Europe if they are not protected by nuclear weapons in loco. The recent Bush proposals and initiatives may lead to a nuclear free Europe !

Europe, and the Alliance have to adapt to these changed circumstances and to the changes which will inevitably still follow.

C. Third objective was : rearming the F.R.G. and 1) incorporate its military potential in the defense of Western Europe against the threat from the East, as well as 2) avoid that German rearmament acquires a national character and becomes an instrument of a German national policy.

* * *

Note : For the residual risk (nr. III) from the East, objective C 1) stays valid (although see also sub objective B), be it much reduced in size.
For objective C 2) it makes sense to maintain the Alliance (and NATO), even if there are other "de-nationalizing", integrating, means and mechanisms available or conceivable : for instance a European Union with a defense dimension, it being understood that one way does not exclude the other.

Moreover, the weight of the unified Germany within the European Union and the weight of the German military force within a (possible) defense dimension of the European Union, have to be kept in mind.

Therefore also that it makes sense to maintain the Atlantic Alliance.

As regards NATO more specifically, the growing resistance in German public opinion against singularization of Germany as it results from NATO military structures and deployments manoeuvres, low overflights, stationing of allied troops (9), concentration of weaponry and its deployment, mainly if not exclusively on German soil (10) should not be ignored or underestimated.

* * *

In view of the adaptation of objectives and means to circumstances, changed and in ongoing change; a distinction must be made between the Atlantic Alliance as such and NATO as an integrated military structure.

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9. cfr. Egon BAHR (and SPD) : also German troops to be stationed on the soil of the European allies including France. The same for training, manoeuvers and low overflights and damage to the environment.
10. cfr. the opposition of the F.R.G. against the deployment of Euromissiles on German soil only.

As was made clear in the foregoing, here thoughts are foremost focused on the evolving of an Atlantic Alliance of which, on the one hand, the European Union, on the other the USA are the two partners (1 + 1).

That way, a forum remains in existance, resp. it becomes more efficiently structured, for political consultation (or as the case may be or rise : coordination).

The political consultations within the Atlantic Alliance (about which more later), as a matter of fact, were (or are) not the only ones in the West/West context. Certainly when or where economic considerations prevailed upon purely military ones, this role was taken over by G 7, and in as far as economic as well as, more and more so, political subjects came to be laid on the table of G 7 , this clearly was due to the triangular dimension, in which apart from the USA and Europe (EEC in fact) also Japan as involved, and its involvement considered necessary.

If it is or, as it is, deemed desirable that a quasi-permanent forum for West/West consultations be maintained, then the Atlantic Council (regularly on ministerial level and permanently on the level of permanent representatives) can meet that requirement. (Alongside with G 7 if and when the participation of Japan in such consultations is considered oportune but then on a more frequent and more intensive "day by day" pattern).

It is clear however, that then the Atlantic Council (independently of its military, defense function) should function as a real forum for consultations. The Council should indeed then go further than is traditional during the formal part of official meetings, where a "collective monologue" (Piaget) takes place (11), and change its mode of operation (exchange of information regarding adopted or already implemented positions, or ongoing actions - e.g. Vietnam at the time - mostly selective and directed towards persuasion, supplied by national delegations was (and is ?) the rule (12), rather than consultations by way of dialogue to which already Spaak, as Secretary General of NATO aspired.)

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11. although the importance of lobby - and other preparatory bilateral contacts is not here all the way underrated.
12. as was occasionally the exchange - by those who had some - of political "intelligence", indeed also on a selective basis.

Note : In connection with a 1 + 1 Alliance USA/European Union, the objection is often heard that, when Europe speaks with one voice, what it says - or can say - results from a, often laboriously elaborated compromise, which is not open to negociation, not a flexible position, but a "text" so delicately balanced that no iota can be changed.
Such speaking with one voice is and was not always bad or counterproductive (e.g. the 10 and their position concerning CSCE) whenever strong and clear, common and in common elaborated positions allow for as well strength as flexibility (which is not the case when a "position" results from divergences amongst the members, plastered over in a delicate verbal compromise).
Just that now is, or becomes possible as soon as the European Union conducts its own, common foreign policy, and functions in such a way that it can adapt rapidly and modulate its point of view or position according to the development and unfolding of events or negociations.

To assume that role and function as a real consultation forum, a specific political structure of the Alliance is required : a Council including a permanent Council.

Not necessarily required to that effect, - or then only in another, military, perspective - is an integrated (military) structure, NATO stricto sensu.

In as far as an integrated military defense of the Alliance and its partners is necessary - which it is as a guarantee against the residual military risk from the East, this organisation needs to be thoroughly rethought and adapted (i.e. also many "holy cows" slaughtered (13)) and needs a clear distinction to be made between Alliance Council (political) and NATO Council (defense) and both need to be structured separately according to the specific tasks of each (14).

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13. In 1984 already, GORBATCHOV insisted on the need to distinguish between "dogma" and stereotypes, usages, traditions and inertia's which had been "cannonized into dogma".
14. To avoid confusion between the general, and a subordinated, specific, technical field, as well as (re-)militarization of political thinking.

As regards NATO and NATO strategy :
- "forward defense" does not make sense any more (lengthening of warning time in the case of the rebuilding of a Soviet massive attack capability - greater strategic depth).
- it is in the interest of Europe's security that offensive capabilities, deployments and weapon systems be built down.
- that doctrines such as F.O.F.A. and Air/Land battle be abandoned.
- a more widely spread deployment with reinforcment capabilities and adequate mobility, in a clearly and explicitly defensive spirit became possible and is desirable.

and as regards the nuclear component of NATO strategy :
- the strategy of "flexible response" and the concommitant "first use" doctrine does have to be questioned. The recent Bush initiatives have indeed pushed back the risk of early nuclear escalation.

Still, also in this restructuring of the nuclear capacity of the USA and fargoing reductions notwithstanding, large numbers of nuclear weapons are maintained (resp. stocked) and "first use" is not discarded.

a) sea-launched nuclear weapons are reduced in number and stationed/stocked on land, not eliminated (as a deterrent which, includes possible first use);
b) this measure is anyhow (cfr. declarations of Cheney) reversible;
c) air-launched nuclear weapons - and their first use (in case of conventional superiority of the adversary, in general or in the field, certainly but not only) are preserved also for NATO (15);
d) which does not at all exclude further development (and stationing in Europe ?) of T.A.S.M., on the contrary considers it the key nuclear weapon in the reduced nuclear potential.
(cfr. the SALT agreements which led to reduction/limitation of certain types of weapons, but to development and multiplication of other, often more powerful systems - e.g. mirving).

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15 BUSH : "We will of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO's security" (extract of the Bush Initiative speech).

Note 1 : Moreover, the Bush proposals are first and foremost an answer to the risk of spreading and dispersion of (especially less controlable short range resp. tactical) nuclear weapons amongst possible succession states of a dismembered (or sharply decentralized) Soviet Union.

This proliferation problem is not however tackled in these proposals in a global sense (also for the Third World for instance). As a matter of fact, a prohibition of nuclear testing is not only not explicitly mentioned, but implicitly Bush rejected in fact a test-stop, even moratorium.

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Note 2 : In the case of substantial reductions of the number of nuclear weapons, and of the types of nuclear systems, on the road to a "minimal (nuclear) deterrent" with "as few as possible" nuclear heads, the question arises, if then, in Europe, the (even also reduced) French and British nuclear potential would not be "sufficient". (with a very limited number of U.S. strategic/intercontinental nuclear missiles as a "last reserve", and as a factor of coupling in the US/European Union Alliance).

Note 3 : Given the fact that nuclear proliferation as such entails serious risks, the question can be asked if a test-stop, a prohibition of nuclear tests would not be the best way - relatively easily verifiable moreover - to avoid nuclear proliferation.
And if one would opt for "minimal deterrence" as mentioned above, the question could be asked if the opposition of the (existing) nuclear powers to such a measure, really makes sense.

* * *

Fundamental changes of the structure and organisation, as well as of the way of functioning of NATO can, have to be introduced to adapt to new circumstances.

a) Here the question of the 1 + 1 formula for the Alliance, and her organs (in casu NATO) will not be raised again.
b) A multinational staff exists and remains necessary. Its multinational character - and equilibrium - can in fact be increased. (that does not encounter technical - or language - difficulties or obstacles, as is the case for multinational (certainly small) army units.
c) That staff can be substantially reduced in proportion to the present, heavy organization. A C.C.C. adapted to the new circumstances and the new strategies is needed but can be kept as light as possible.

d) Standardizing (and interoperability) of weaponsystems can be realized in a European Single Market, a fortiori in a European Union. First within Europe, then between the two partners of the Alliance, with the USA.
e) The idea (or practice) of an American Saceur does not have to be rejected as such and may (still) make sense (be necessary) to ensure the presence on the territory of Europe of a minimum of American troops, even a NATO staff within the Alliance with (essential in that respect) American involvement.
f) Inasfar however as this NATO function of a US Saceur be limited to a NATO function, even, although that does not seem to be unavoidable, the bringing together of the one - Saceur (NATO)-function and the function of commander in chief of the American troops assigned to NATO (or brought in as reinforcements) in Europe, in one person.
That however implies the end of the notion that the US-NATO contingent also is a US force, stationed on a (NATO)base in Europe and to be used if need be (or is judged to be by the US) for intervention or action (under the command of Saceur ?) outside of the NATO context or "out of area".

* * *

Note : As regards the "out of area" problematic see below. But one has to start from the fact that it is politically excluded, and will remain so, that NATO as such would become competent for out of area action. That it therefore also should remain excluded to introduce this competence into NATO by the backdoor, by way of some astute formula or procedure.
Which again does not exclude that all security problems and preoccupations are liable to be the subject of consultations between the (2) partners of a (new) Atlantic Alliance.

* * *

II. W.E.U.

The saying (flash of wit) that W.E.U. is a "sleeping beauty" often kissed but never woken up misses pertinency, misses the ball.

Characteristic for W.E.U. is that it is a lightweight structure, flexible and adaptable, which, when necessary or useful, can be revived and inserted. (16)

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16. Even if it is true that W.E.U. often has been used by national governments in order to hang up on it - as on a coathanger - national policies which otherwise would have been rejected by national political and public opinion.

When W.E.U. was created, the pursued (and attained) objective was the rearmament of Germany (F.R.G.) and its insertion into NATO which could and would thus become possible. Per definition this is (was) a transition function.

Before the adhesion of the U.K. to EEC, W.E.U. (given its composition, and given that it existed in that particular form) fulfilled the role of (only) forum for contact and dialogue on a high and political level between the U.K. and the then "six". Also a transition function.

On the condition that it stays flexible, lightweight and adaptable, W.E.U. can also exercise a transition function during the period when the evolving European Union does not (yet) have a defense policy, resp. organization.

To this effect it is favourable that periodical contacts, also on the level of Foreign and Defense Ministers take place, and that "observers" (of the same level) of states who are not member of W.E.U. but are members of EEC, resp. the European Union, be (silently even) present.

In order to be and stay able to fullfil this transition role, W.E.U. should however not be or become, even be seen or perceived to be, only a bridge to NATO. That would indeed exclude all evolution towards a defense in the framework of the European Unión.

To be real and credible, a defense dimension of an evolving European Union needs a degree of autonomy (and, say, right of initiative within an Alliance), cannot only be a "complement" (17) of NATO, a prolongation, even just a NATO subsidiary for "out-of-area" operations.

Threats to European security emanating from "out-of-area" find their origin in risks I and II (see above). In that context consultations can take place within the Alliance, possibly, on a ad hoc basis, even coordination with the USA, including military coordination.

The point is however that here, per definition, European (security) interests are at stake which are not necessarily congruent with US interests, nay, in certain hypotheses could up to a point run counter to them.

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17. cfr. the since withdrawn Dutch (presidential) draft for a Union Treaty, and the Italo/British text published on the eve of that withdrawal.

From this it results that the mechanism (and the automatism) corresponding with risk n° III (the East) where common security interests US/Europe are at stake, can and should not enter into play here, should not even exercise a dominant influence. That, in other words, a real (high) degree of European autonomy should exist (come into being) which makes possible a European policy in the European interest.

Whereby one does not deal here with the question of what precisely the particular European interest in any specific case would be, or the corresponding European policy - related also to specific European sensitivities - should be.

That is a task for the decision making process and procedure of and within the European Union in dealing with foreign and security policy.

In other words, also in the transition period towards a European Union foreign, security and defense policy, W.E.U. may not be dependent of NATO, not even technically or in matters of logistics, and must be able to act independently of any non-european (18) agent.

Note : dependency which does exist in the case of the Rapid Intervention Force and the two-hats formula, where Europe (W.E.U.) could refuse to undertake anything, is however not in a condition to act on its own.

W.E.U. can therefore - as a transition function, be responsible for coordination (including military coordination) between its member states and has to evolve towards common action (as long as the evolving European Union can not (yet)).

It is therefore not necessary that W.E.U. has at its disposal its own integrated military organization (as this would preempt the form which the defense dimension of the European Union will take). But surely needed is that W.E.U. has at its disposal a staff (in the military sense of the term) as well as a (fast-functioning) decision making mechanism. Also probably that this staff has authority over Rapid Intervention Forces (19) of its own (of the member states grouped in W.E.U.), to be activated only by W.E.U., to exist and operate only for and within W.E.U., independent of any (also technical or logistic) intervention from outside of W.E.U.

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18. = not member of the European Union. (full member or on the road to becoming so)
19. European and at this stage managed and directed by W.E.U. even if consisting still of national elements.

From the foregoing some clear conclusions can already be drawn.

A. An Atlantic Alliance still makes sense, has to be maintained but to be restructured. With time into an alliance between 2 partners : the European Union on the one hand, the USA on the other. (20) The objective being 1) meeting the residual military risk (nr. III) from the "Soviet Union" and 2) offering a forum for consultations.

B. In view of risk III an integrated military structure still makes sense. However, taking into account the utterly reduced threat, NATO can and has to be fundamentally reformed and "thinned out".
- the cost has become disproportionate with the risk.
- thinning out of deployment and positioning.
- transition to adapted (defensive) strategies, deployments and weapon systems.
- organization and structures also have to be lightened and restructered (a reduced multinational staff - reinforcement possibility and procedures and adapted mobility and logistics).
- a structural incapacity to attack has to be built in.
- the NATO approach, its mode of functioning and its decision making mechanism have to be adapted (inter alia in the framework of the new Alliance).

C. W.E.U. must remain, in a lightweight form, with a limited role, autonomous (i.e. independent of NATO), as a transition to a defense dimension of the European Union.

D. The objective - to be reached gradually if not (yet) otherwise possible - remains a European Union, with competence for a European foreign policy, including a European security policy, and a capability for timely and fast decision making in the common interest of Europe. Upon which, in time, a defense dimension will grow with instruments of its own (including military integration).

E. In order to reach this goal, to make possible and facilitate this evolution, a council of foreign and defense ministers could be (should be) created within the framework of the European Council (21).

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20. Certainly formula's can be thought of with a view to involve Canada, as well as other (European) states which (for the time being) are not members of the European Union.
21. K. DE GUCHT en S. KEUKELEIRE : "De tijd wacht op niemand", Roularta, 1990, p. 242.

This could - with a formula of observers - correspond with the W.E.U. council (as long as W.E.U. exercises a transition function).

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Observation 1

The problem of a possible extension of W.E.U. (Norway - Turkey) has to be placed in the framework of the transition function of W.E.U. and the final objective of a defense dimension within the evolving European Union.

As a result, the role of the flank countries of the NATO territorium, which only makes sense in relation to the risk or threat from the side of the Soviet Union, does have to be dealt with or settled with or within the Alliance.

As a result also, only states which have adhered to, or are in a transition-to-adherence, can be accepted as members of W.E.U. Such can be imagined for - in time Norway.

For Turkey the situation is completely different. Does the European Union accept the membership of an essentially non-European state or not (and then why not the Maghreb countries ?). That should be the criterium for Turkey's entry into W.E.U. Certainly not that, in the classical East/West opposition Turkey occupies geographically a strategically important place. (22)

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Observation 2

At the beginning of all security wisdom there is crisis prevention. First and foremost this is a question of timely identification of a potential crisis. That again is a question of observation and analysis : first of all a political and diplomatic task. Timely analysis and identification is essential to timely and fast preventive action.

It is therefore in the interest of European security that the European Union be competent for, certainly and first of all, Foreign Policy.

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22. A situation which can be met via NATO and via the Alliance, when both are structured in a different way (1 + 1). (association formula's for instance).

Whereas one could conceivably limit oneself to coordination (EPC) of observation and analysis (although even at this level and to this effect a - supranational - European instrument, certainly for analysis from a global European viewpoint would be desirable and advisable) for preventive action a fastworking, central, European instrument must be in existence. Not only in the form of or at the level of meetings (regular and ad hoc) of foreign ministers (with if need be defense ministers present) but indeed a permanent European council (vide COREPER) of foreign affairs (of Europe), capable to bring about - fast - the definition of a position, resp. a decision by the ministerial council.

In the matter of crisis prevention the importance is indeed to act fast and before one has to react (per hypothesis too late) to an already opened crisis. (23)

Note : The Gulf crisis may serve as an example of this "reacting" and "too late". The crisis indeed became clearly visible in April/May 1990 but no timely preventive action (diplomatic pressure on both parties) was undertaken. Reactions only followed the outbreak of open conflict in August.
The preliminaries of the crisis/conflict in Yugoslavia could also be cited.
Could this be a lesson with regard to potential crisis development in the Soviet Union ?

Observation 3

Crisis management also is first of all a political and diplomatic activity, which however must be conceived, defined, formulated and implemented even faster and in a particularly flexible way. What has been said before with respect to crisis prevention and the need for an instrument capable of rapid decision making, a fortiori applies here.

To make that possible, to allow clear and fast decisions, majority rules and decisions are imperative (with in certain cases - see later - conceivably the possibility of "opting out").

Damage control and limitation, for Europe, European interests and European security in this case, is part of, an aspect of crisis management. Which is one more factor that pleads for...see above.

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23. Even if that is also far too often the case with purely national governments. The sheer weight of the Foreign Policy COREPER could contribute to solving this kind of problem.

Observation 4

The problem of the deployment of an interposition force arises here : of a force, peace keeping force, keeping separate from each other the potentially fighting parties.
Interposition force, not intervention force.
This can be useful or even necessary for crisis prevention. Also for crisis management, to prevent escalation toward armed conflict or the use of force and weaponry, or in order to control, consolidate and guarantee an agreed cease-fire.

Not to separate by force fighting parties, which is a post facto police action, i.e. a military, a militarily active, intervention, an act of war in which the military element (police or intervention force) is exposed to and submits to entirely different expectations and criteria than a peacekeeping or interposition force.

Should such an interposition force go over and above its preventive and/or cease-fire guaranteeing role, an escalation ladder would be climbed leading to qualitatively different action.

An acceptable role for an interposition force is only acceptable for him who sends it out, if the "receiving" parties, both or rather all, accept it.

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The creation and sending out of an interposition force can be organized and agreed bilaterally, between Europe and the parties to a crisis/conflict.

It can also - and that seems preferable - be raised multilaterally. In the case of a crisis/conflict limited to Europe or a specific European interest, in the framework of CSCE (see later). Otherwise, the U.N. is - and in principle always remains - the appropriate as well as competent forum.

The European Union could, either on its own and autonomously, or, preferably in a multinational framework (CSCE and/or U.N.) act to set up or contribute by its participation in the setting up of such a peace keeping force.

The most normal, logical instrument for such action would per se be a European Union with a defense dimension and competence - with decisionmaking on the basis of a majority rule (possibly with opting out possibility).

In a (the) transition phase, as sketched earlier, W.E.U. as an autonomous agent.

Not however - per definition - NATO or a mechanism/instrument tied to, dependent of NATO.

Observation 5

That would as a matter of fact, ipso facto mean a built-in escalation automatism, with all the risks that implies for major power confrontation, including military conflict, and would ensure (24) - without any control by the European Union - the transition from local/regional conflict to world crisis resp. world war.

Moreover it seems indicated - in view of observations 2 to 4 above - to keep in mind that, also in crisis prevention or crisis management, actions or operations, neither the starting point nor the means of implementation may be a political or preventive strategy (such as a deterrence or dissuasive strategy) which, in case it does not succeed, would ipso facto lead to unacceptable consequences, catastrophic also for its initiator.

Observation 6

The duality, resp. polarity between on the one hand nationalism and on the other hand the rights of minorities and (a difference in degree but not in kind) border straddling irredentisms, is not dealt with here.

Does there really exist no hope for, is there not some trend to the scuttling of the XIXth. century "Nation State alone and alone holy" in the direction of a - also international community/society - organised according to a model of which the poles and lines of development are, on the one hand the large scale, macro-, supra- or multilateral plane, on the other hand the micro-, local, regional plane, and the positioning of the idea and or fact of the "nation" (as a community of culture lato sensu) within that framework.

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To complete the above some considerations with regard to two global, resp. all-European institutions : CSCE and UNO.

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24. e.g. from Serajevo to World War I.

Following the events of 89/90 in Central and Eastern Europe and the end of the East/West confrontation, resp. the disappearance of the Cold War front, much attention was paid to sketches for a new "European architecture" in (most of) which a new and expanded role was envisaged for CSCE.

In the end those ideas were in fact smothered by the Paris CSCE summit. To the disappointment of many :

- the Paris Charter remained a political document, politically binding (like the Helsinki Final Act), did not become a legally binding document.
- And no (real) crisis prevention mechanism was set up. The so called Vienna crisis prevention center only received a minimal task in connection with verification of confidence building measures (Stockholm and Vienna) not even arms control or reduction measures (CFE).

CSCE was, since its creation and via the periodical general and specific follow up meetings a (the only) encounter and dialogue forum between East en West. Because of that function, and in view of it, the concensus rule to which all and every decision, text, complement or precision of the Final Act was submitted, was not only understandable, but in the given context unavoidable, the only possible way.

Since then CSCE has grown into also a forum and mechanism for cooperation. Neither the institutions nor the procedures (i.e. the concensus rule) of CSCE have been adapted however.

It should be possible (25), via delegation and rotation, i.e. discarding of the absolute concensus rule, to come to the establishment of a real crisis prevention center, with a capacity for efficient and fast decisionmaking and action. What could have been - mutatis mutandis - a regional Security Council for Europe (26) with binding rules and binding majoritarian decision power.

Also with at its disposal a CSCE peacekeeping force to which all (also the neutral) European states as well as US and USSR could, on an ad hoc basis, participate, with also therefore a European Union component and in any case "political" involvement of all.

That way polarization around an internal or across borders conflict with escalation-automatisms could be avoided and "intervention in internal affairs" de-nationalized - i.e. national rivalries neutralized - and dealt with in a non partisan way.

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25. and would have been possible in Paris.
26. in which though both USA and USSR remain involved.

CSCE certainly has not (yet ?) evolved resp. been adapted fully to the changed circumstances prevailing in Europe.

II. The U.N.

Since the disappearance of the polarization between the two superpowers and the East/West confrontation of which it was the expression, the U.N.O. can again play the part which originally was reserved for it. This applies in the first instance to the Security Council which (finally) can fulfil the task foreseen for it, can function in the way the founders and the Charter foresaw (27).

In that respect it would be desirable that the U.N. and the Security Council in particular, be adapted to the circumstances and power relations of today, i.e. as they have been modified since the founding of the U.N. after World War II.

- a first question concerns the acceptance of Germany and Japan as permanent members;
- a second question concerns the representation of the European Union : qualitate qua as a permanent member or, via a common foreign policy, the commitment and obligation of the represented member states (France, the U.K. and ... Germany possibly, as permanent members, as well as the rotating non-permanent member/member states) to speak and act with one voice - that of the European Union.
- a third problem, which will not be dealt with here is an equitable representation of the other (Third World) countries and continents.

The provisions of the Charter concerning a U.N. peacekeeping force, interposition force and intervention force, do have to be rehabilitated and actions in this field do have to be undertaken by the U.N., resp. the Security Council itself. Otherwise the Security Council would loose all credibility in the end. To this effect the military Committee, resp. the military staff of the Security Council has to be revived and has to function (28) normally as provided for.

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27. Although then the (especially the permanent) members of the Security Council have to participate, in the spirit of the Charter, in its action (i.e. not abuse of their monopolistic or hegemonic position) and not (only) use it as an instrument of their own national policy in contradiction to general rules and norms, respectively block its action (e.g. the U.S. and the Israelo-Arab conflict).
28. The way in which a military operation is conceived and conducted determines (at least partly) the result of the intervention, and as regards the solution of the crisis or conflict, the consequences deriving from that solution.

Should, on an ad hoc basis, in a specific crisis a U.N. peacekeeping force be created, resp. activated, the European Union (not however its member states separately) would have to envisage, in view of the European interest, to furnish a component.

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Observation

As in the foregoing (part I) specific and potentially direct and immediate risks for the security of Europe were considered, no mention was made of the North/South problematic which, in time, could jeopardize the security - certainly sensu largo - of also Europe.

The challenge here is fundamentally of an economic nature and lays in the (short as well as long term) juxtaposition of, and the relations between a (poor) Third World and the (rich) "North".

An equilibrated structure of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) and the reactivation of its functions could, in that respect, play an important and security favouring role.

It is not as such evident that G 7 or even a G 7 plus - the rich men's club - or for sure the "Trilateral" (Europe, the U.S. and Japan) - the richest men's club - could be the appropriate forum for consultations (resp. action) on planetary, including North/South problems and desequilibria.

Ecosoc - whose structure, composition and procedures are not dealt with here - could and should be just that. The European Union is in a good position to take the initiative here, in the framework of its common foreign policy, and in its own European interest.

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Post-scriptum

No mention has been made here - not even under the heading "Institutions" of the Council of Europe. This organization indeed plays no direct role in the field of European security.

It can be accepted however that the Council, in this respect, plays an indirect role. As a matter of fact, the Council of Europe, consisting of the European democracies, can be of help and provide "technical assistance" to the new or emerging, evolving democracies in Europe.

In essence, democracy is not only a question of forms of organization, but of certain norms prevailing and respected within a society or state. Thus the principle of the Rule of Law where a state of law for the citizen exists and the state and its organs (have to) respect the law, where functions an independent judiciary and where respect for human rights is assured.

In many of these area's, the Council of Europe can provide advice and assistance to potential "newcomers" in the transition phase (29).

As regards human rights, since and by the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE participating states recognize that respect for them contributes to security.

It is encouraging therefore that not-yet-democratic European states wish to adhere to the European human rights conventions and declare their willingness to submit themselves to the procedures and the jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights.(30)

The Council of Europe should not oppose this, on legal and procedural grounds and formula's could certainly be worked out to make this possible.

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29. Which can as such be considered as promoting security.
30. Which not even all the original Member States of the Council of Europe were ab initio prepared to do.