THE SOUTHERN REGION OF EUROPE
AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW HOPES

IAI - RAND

ROME, 16-17/IX/1991

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RAND
Istituto affari internazionali
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a. (Programma)
b. Lista dei partecipanti
1. "The Atlantic Alliance: present status and future prospects"/
   David Nicholas
2. "Turkey's strategic dilemma"/ Doygu Bazoglu Sezer
3. "Turkey and the West after the Gulf war"/ Ian O. Lesser
4. "Back to the future: Balkan security after the cold war"/ F.
   Stephen Larrabee
5. "The Mediterranean and the Middle East in Western policy: new
   rules for an old game?"/ Laura Guazzone
6. "Europe confronted with migration: the political, economic and
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THE RAND
CORPORATION

Rome, September 16-17, 1991

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NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW HOPES

Monday, September 16

9,30   The Atlantic Alliance, Present Status and Future Prospects

       rapporteur: Nicholas
       respondents: Levine
                     Cremasco

       Discussion

11,00 Coffee break

11,15 Discussion continues with remarks by some American official
       and some Italian official present at the Conference

13,00 Buffet lunch

14,30 Turkey's Strategic Dilemma

       rapporteur: Sezer

       The West and Turkey

       rapporteur: Lesser
       respondent: Silvestri

Discussion

16,30 Coffee break

16,45 The Balkans: a powder keg?

       rapporteur: Larrabee
       respondent: Veremis

Discussion

18,30 End of the session

20,30 Dinner

Tuesday, September 17

  9,30   The Mediterranean and the Near East

           rapporteur: Guazzone
           respondent. Kemp

Discussion

11,00   Coffee break

11,15   Discussion continues with an introduction by Moratinos
           (Spanish official) and perhaps by other Italian and American
           officials present at the conference

13,00   Buffet lunch

14,30   Europe faces migration: political, economic and security
           implications.

           rapporteur: Boyer
           respondent: Vernez

16,15   Coffee break

16,45   Wrap-up and closing remarks

           closing remarks: Merlini
                          Thompson

18,00   End of the conference

20,30   Dinner

The conference will be held at the Centro Alti Studi Difesa (High
Defence Studies Center), P.zza della Rovere, 83.

Istituto Affari Internazionali

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INCONTRO IAI-RAND, ROMA 16-17 SETTEMBRE 1991

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NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

The Atlantic Alliance:
Present Status and Future Prospects

Address by Mr. David Nicholas
to the
RAND/Istituto Affari Internazionali Conference
On Southern European Security

Rome, 16 September 1991

I find it extremely interesting to note on this occasion
that the engagement of the Western powers in the "Cold War"
had its start in the Southern Region, with the proclamation of
the Truman Doctrine. Yet throughout the history of the
Alliance, it has had to be constantly reminded of the
importance of the southern region to overall European
security, due to the concentration of NATO effort on the
threat in Central Europe. The threat in the Southern Region -
despite several members having borders directly with the
Warsaw Pact and USSR - was seen to be more distant and
diffuse.

With the evolution of the new security equation in Europe
over the past several years, the experience of the Southern
Region in confronting a more complex and diffuse threat
environment assumes far greater relevance for the pattern of
alliance security as a whole.

Therefore, it is certainly fitting that we should be
meeting here today to address the challenges and hopes facing
NATO's southern region in this time of change and opportunity.

The issues discussed here over the next two days will
have tremendous impact not just on the Southern Region, but on
the ability of the Alliance to maintain its relevance to the
security needs of all of its members and neighbors. I would
like, then, to take this opportunity to set the stage for
these discussions by providing you with a brief overview of my
perceptions of the issues engaging the alliance and its
southern region as we move forward into the first post-Cold
War decade.

To begin with, it is important to focus on the fact that
the end of the Cold War does not necessarily mean that we no
longer live in a dangerous world. There is an ancient Chinese
curse with which I am certain most of you are familiar: "May
you live in interesting times." As the events of the past
year - in the Gulf, in Yugoslavia and, most recently, in the
Soviet Union - have clearly demonstrated, we are certainly now
living in interesting times! And it is easy to understand how
this could be interpreted as a "curse."

What is most obvious about these "interesting times" is that while threats to the security and stability of the alliance abound, the veneer of predictability that the cold war leant to these threats is missing. There is no longer a "reliable" enemy to help define the nature of the threats against which the Alliance must secure its members.

NATO had over forty years of experience in dealing with the Cold War threats to European security. Now it must adapt to a new, less certain, environment, in which no one can honestly claim to know what lies ahead. But this very uncertainty reinforces the need for a viable collective security arrangement among the North Atlantic democracies -

- cementing the trans-Atlantic linkage,

- precluding the renationalization of defense,

- and ensuring that no nation ought have to bear the burden of its own defense alone.

Within the next several months, the members of the Alliance will finalize a new NATO Strategic Concept designed to bring our strategy in line with these requirements in the post-Cold War world. The adoption of this Strategic Concept at the November summit here in Rome will mark a major step toward retaining the viability of the Alliance in its first post Cold War decade.

But I must tell you now that the future of the Alliance cannot be tied to the success or failure of any one single dramatic act or statement. Whether or not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a viable collective security organization, responsive to its members' needs will be determined instead by the way in which the alliance responds on a day-to-day basis to the new challenges that will be facing us over the next several years.

Several of those challenges are already apparent - and all of them have specific impact on the southern region of the Alliance.

First there are the challenges associated with the rise of nationalism and the concomitant calls for self determination on the part of groups emerging from years of domination by totalitarian communist regimes. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union provide the most dramatic examples of this process to date, but many other Eastern European nations recognize that they are not immune from these same tensions. As ethnic groups within these nations raise the question of equitable participation in the ongoing march toward freedom and independence being experienced by the nations themselves, the western nations are faced with a dilemma. Calls for ethnic self-determination place two sets of Western values in a state of dynamic tension:

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-    the democratic values of self determination,

-    and the equally important value of rule of law.

The extent to which the members of the Western Alliance can assist in resolving this tension without violence will have a dramatic impact on the security of its members in the near future.

This is especially true in relation to NATO's Southern Region, where the spill-over effects of the breakup of Yugoslavia could have immediate consequences for the territorial security of Greece and Turkey in Thrace.

At the same time, spill-over effects of a different type will pose problems with handling of refugees, and the long-range economic implications of having to respond to calls for support for economies already suffering from lack of a free market infrastructure – economies that may now be additionally burdened with the dislocation and destruction of war, or the creation of "independent" political entities incapable of providing for their own economic subsistence.

These are not challenges which the Alliance can resolve alone, nor are they even ones in which the Alliance ought necessarily be the primary vehicle through which resolution is sought. But they are challenges with which the Alliance must be directly engaged in consulting and coordinating an effective Western response among individual nations and other multinational organizations, to include the UN, CSCE, and the EC.

This brings us to the second set of challenges facing the Alliance as it enters the first post-Cold War decade: the relationship of NATO to the emerging pan-European identities in the security arena.

Last September, NATO Secretary General Woerner identified one of the crucial tasks facing the Alliance as that of contributing toward the building of a "new Europe." This task involves the complex process of harmonizing the policies of NATO with those of CSCE, WEU, the EC, and potentially those of emerging security structures for Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Of all these institutions, NATO remains the only trans-Atlantic organization dedicated to the collective security needs of all of its members. In meeting these needs, however, it is evident that there must be an effective partnership among organizations such as NATO and CSCE – and CSCM should one emerge – that share in the process of forging a more secure environment for the European community of nations.

Not all members of the Alliance envision this partnership in the same fashion, although all obviously share in the ultimate vision of a Europe that is secure, whole, and free.

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Within the next several years, as Europe progresses along its path toward increasing unity, the alliance will be called upon to accommodate an increasingly robust European security identity if it is to continue satisfying the broadest security needs of all its members. I am happy to report that, in the process of developing the new Alliance Strategic Concept, progress has already been made within NATO in this direction. Still, the process must be carefully managed to ensure that the maintenance of a solid European security pillar does not require duplication of effort and wasted expense by the members of the Alliance or their neighbors. This concept will best be advanced by maintaining progress within the Alliance rather than in competition with it.

Despite the collapse of the traditional Communist threat to the Alliance, there is still a sense of urgency associated with the need to make such progress. The events of the past year in the Persian Gulf have served notice that non-traditional threats to the peaceful evolution of trans-Atlantic security in the new world order are liable to be felt sooner rather than later. The third set of challenges to the Alliance will be to prepare to effectively secure the well being of its member states from such threats, from whatever the source.

As the Helsinki Final Act (1975-CSCE) noted, "security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area." Events over the intervening years have done nothing to diminish the accuracy of that assessment.

As the North Atlantic Assembly noted in its November 1990 Defense and Security Committee Report, there are at least 21 Third World countries that have either developed or are in the process of developing arsenals which include ballistic missiles. The vast majority of these are in the region that includes North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.Even if the Warsaw Pact had not collapsed, the Alliance could no longer afford to concentrate its entire defense effort to the East while ignoring this growing threat to its members' security interests in the South.

In the years ahead, NATO must respond to such less well defined threats if it is to remain relevant to the legitimate security needs of its members. Efforts to respond to such requirements are already clearly visible within the alliance:
- The creation of a NATO rapid reaction force will allow the alliance to project a deterrent posture into the territory of any member that finds itself threatened;
- The shift in basic allied defensive strategy away from static deployment of forces along an East-West dividing line and toward a posture based upon mobility will further enhance this capability;
- The discussions underway within the alliance regarding creation of a Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean also reflect a realization that there may be a growing

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need to deter acts hostile to NATO's vital interests in the Southern Region.

But the threats to be deterred are no longer so well defined as they were during the years of the Cold War, and precisely because these threats are less well defined, it will be increasingly more difficult to obtain the required Allied consensus to respond effectively to them.

This brings us to the final challenge I wish to discus this morning, and it is in many ways the broadest: there are many people today who are saying that with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of central communist authority in the Soviet Union, and with it the demise of the Communist threat to NATO, the alliance has outlived its usefulness to its members. If the Alliance is unable to agree on the risks to its members security interests in the new world order, and on the appropriate responses to those risks, then such people may be right.

It must be acknowledged that it is at least conceivable that the only force strong enough to forge a consensus among members of an alliance such as NATO has been the threat of attack from another superpower and its alliance. If that particular threat is no longer of immediate concern to the governments and populations of the trans-Atlantic partners - will the alliance self destruct?

One of the most dramatic accomplishments of the NATO Alliance over the past 42 years has been its ability to bind together in a single collective security organization many of the traditionally antagonistic forces within Europe. Who would have predicted at the outbreak of WW II that the post war peace would have been maintained by an alliance of Britain, France and Germany? In the Southern Region, the alliance has helped to buffer frictions between Greece and Turkey that, under other circumstances, might have erupted into a major conflict. Within the United States, the threat posed by the Soviet Union to vital American interests has served to overcome America's traditional reluctance to engage in "entangling alliances" during times of peace. Can the alliance, absent the threat of a massive and rapid military invasion from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, continue to provide a relevant security service to such diverse membership?

The answer to that question will depend upon the degree to which the allies have internalized the true meaning of membership in a collective security organization. It is <u>not</u> merely the ability to field a bigger force than your adversary (a capacity NATO traditionally has lacked). It is <u>not</u> merely the satisfaction of living under an externally provided "nuclear umbrella" to dissuade other nuclear powers from attacking you. It is <u>not</u> even the ability to present a united front when external events threaten several members.

(Although all of these things may be valuable alliance contributions.)

I, however, would posit that the true benefits of membership in the NATO alliance are drawn from the realization that no single member of the alliance need ever have to bear the burden of its own defense alone - and the corollary that no member should ever believe it necessary to arm itself to the point where it becomes more of a threat than an ally to its neighbors. These are the values that make the Alliance worth maintaining regardless of the transitory nature of specific external threats, and the ones which must be preserved by building upon the past 42 years of cooperative behavior among its members. They are values that even non-members of the Alliance should wish to see preserved among alliance members, for they benefit the entire community.

But they are not values that are intuitively obvious to all. They must be advanced through a process of education and discussion in fora such as this, so that their benefits are not lost in the euphoria of "victory" over an individual threat.

It is to that task we now must turn in our discussions over the next two days - and beyond.

"TURKEY'S STRATEGIC DILEMMA"

by

Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer

For Presentation At

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.

Bilkent University

Ankara

28 August 1991

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC DILEMMA

Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer

1. Introduction

The title of this paper assumes that Turkey faces a strategic "predicament, a perplexing or awkward" strategic situation. The tacit axiom behind this assumption is that fundamental changes in the international system in the last couple of years have resulted in a dilemma for Turkey's strategic outlook and policy to the world. "necessitating a choice between unpleasant alternatives."[*]

It might be useful to bring some clarification to the concept "strategic", too. In a recent article in International Security, Robert J. Art uses the term "grand strategy" to specify the goals that a state should pursue, including both security and non-security goals. and to delineate how military power can serve those goals.[**] I shall borrow this usage to illuminate whether, and, how Turkey's externally-involved fundamental goals and the military power that has served those goals might have been affected by the radical changes of the last few years, creating difficult new problems and challenges and necessitating a choice between unpleasant alternatives none of which seem to be fully satisfactory at this point.[***]

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[*] The meaning of "dilemma" has been borrowed from Webster's Dictionary.
[**] Robert J. Art.
[***] The Greek-Turkish conflict has not been included in this study.

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11. Turkish Goals and Strategy in Historical Perspective

The fundamental goal of Turkey ever since its foundation in 1923 as a modern state has been what every other state that has taken territorial roots within the anarchical international system has designated as elemental to its survival: The preservation of its territorial integrity and independence. The National Pact, the political document approved at a series of congresses convened by the Turkish Nationalists in 1919 and, finally, by the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, now under the Nationalists' control, defined and declared the territorial bourdaries of the new political entity that Mustafa Kemal hoped to found. Decisive military victories against occupying powers in multiple fronts (i.e. against the Greeks in the West, the Armenians and Georgians in the northeast,the French and the British in the southeast) culminated in the convening of an international peace conference at Lausanne in November 1922.

The Lausanne Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923, delineating and codifying the territorial boundaries of the new state. The territorial goals outlined in the National Pact were largely attained except in the cases of two previously Ottoman territories, namely Mosul-Kirkuk, the oil-rich provinces in northern Iraq, now under British mandate, and the Sanjak of Hatay, a province in Syria, now a French mandate. The British opposition to Turkish control over Mosul resulted in a decision in 1925 by the Permanent Court of Justice rewarding the province to Iraq to the chagrin of Turkey. Hatay eventually acceeded to

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Turkey in 1939, a process which was influenced by tacit French consent.

The particular experiences and circumstances that attended the emergence of Turkey at the end of World War I thus provided some of the constants in Turkey's strategy to the world outside. In 1923, it established its authority over the territorial, political and institutional core of the colossal but disintigrating Ottoman Empire that had ruled over large stretches of the Balkan, the Black Sea and the Arab lands for several centuries. The cadres who led the struggle represented the Turkish element of the multi-national Ottoman polity. They were motivated by nationalism and modernism. They had designated the territorial principles of the National Pact largely on the basis of Turkish-speaking population concentrations. Anatolia, or Asia Minor, had historically comprised the centerpiece of the empire where Turks had settled following their original encounter with Byzantium at Manzigert in 1071 AD. As the empire expanded between the 13-17th centuries, Turks settled in the Balkans, Arabia, Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa, but Anatolia remained their stronghold.

The end of World War I marked the Dooms' Day for the Turks, as they faced the threat of losing control over Anatolia, the only base for a homeland left to them eight centuries after their arrival from Central Asia. The War of Independence was thus a struggle for the survival of the Turkish homeland, of the Turkish nation. Mustafa Kemal. in an attempt to mobilize popular support for the struggle against the external enemy, and the ancien

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regime represented by the Ottoman court, and to consolidate the power of the new Center in Ankara against the legacy of the Ottoman-Islamic past, employed Turkish nationalism as the instrument of building a new, modern society. Historically speaking, the new nationalism promoted by Atatürk was the latest in the series of nationalisms that had overtaken previous Ottoman lands.

When the new Turkish state came to being in 1923, therefore, the ruling elite were conscious that they had to learn to cope with the legacy of the Ottoman past which literary left a ring of relatively young, ethnocentric states on the other side of its borders whose collective memories were dominated by misgivings, if not hostility, towards the Turks, the erstwhile rulers.

Against the background of the historical circumstances that marked the creation of modern Turkey, the physical protection of the country against potential or actual threats endangering or violating its territorial integrity, especialy those originating in the immediate surroundings,has persistenty shaped the strategic thinking of Turkish decision makers. The range of potential sources of inter-state conflict with neighboring countries, i.e. ethnic problems, territorial issues, ideological incompatibilities and continuing historical enemy images, inherited from the past made it impossible to relegate the question of pysical security to the background. The geopolitical attributes of the country provided another reason for caution independently of historical experiences. The legitimacy of this caution was in fact historically confirmed by the persistent

struggle among several great Powers for control over Constantinople and the Straits.

In the inter-war years Turkey relied heavily on diplomatic-political tools to foster a secure environment. Of the five neighboring countries, the Soviet Union possessed considerable military forces but was largely absorbed in the construction of "socialism in one country." The military equilibrium among the smaller neighbours in the region did not engender powerful perceptions of threat. Only the "Gathering Storm" in Europe pushed it into an alliance with France and Britain in 1939.

The Second World War and developments in early post-war years forced radical revisions and departures in Turkish strategic thinking. Europe was devastated. The Soviet Union emerged as one of the two most powerful victors, with political and military control beyond its borders over the eastern half of Europe. Stalin's demands in 1945-46 for territorial concessions from Turkey revealed the extent of the dangerous nature that Soviet intentions had acquired concerning this smaller and largely defenceless country on its southern borders. The prime concern of Turkish strategy, namely territorial integrity, seemed to be under imminent threat.

Space means little, of course, unless it is turned into living space by a collective spirit, provided among others by political ideologies. The Turkish founding fathers' allegiance to the ideology of Westernization contained inescapable and incontrovertible elements of class substance. The State set itself the task of fostering the creation of propertied classes and entrepreneurs in a land inhabited predominently by the

peasantry, a smaller group of landlords and a miniscule core of artisans, tradesmen and professionals. Greeks, Armenians and Jews had controlled the professions, arts and crafts, and trade, especially foreign trade, during the Ottoman period. The Greek-Turkish population exchange in the 1920s and the Armenian exodus during World War I eliminated these skills from Turkey, forcing the state to allocate huge investments to the development of human skills and resources as well as a business community. It assumed the responsibility for heavy investments in order to lay out the industrial infrastructure of the country until such time when skilled man-power could be developed in numbers large, rich and enterprizing enough to form the backbone of a dynamic new bourgeoise.

Accordingly, the preservation of the political ideology adopted by the founding fathers figured almost as powerfully as the sanctity of the territorial integrity of Turkey among the core priorities and vital goals of the country from the very beginning. Atatürk's Turkey was a good friend of the Soviet Union but was an adamant opponent of Communism.

The Second World War toppled the basic global and regional relationships and balances that had offered a relatively secure external world to Turkey, s it had to the rest of the world.

At the end of the War, Turkey felt threated from the Soviet Union both territorially and ideologically. Soviet military and ideological penetration had reached the heart of Berlin by then. Turkey did not possess the military power sufficient in quantity or quality to deter this newly refurbished collosal a power from

threatening its territorial integrity. Nor did it possess

appropriate ideological weapons i.e. propoganda

resources, intelligence, economic power, etc, to fight back a

demonstrably expansionist Communist State's ideological

subversion that threatened the budding capitalism of Turkey. Its

available military power could only be an instrument of conveying

Turkey's resolve to defend itself in case of aggression,

complicating the tasks of the offense. But it was not a force of

deterrence. So, Turkey chose to seek the deterrence that alliance

with a mighty power could offer, which at that historical moment

happened to be the United States, by far the most advanced and

richest capitalist society and militarily the single most

powerful state in the world enjoying nuclear monopoly. When under

the influence of the Korean War, the United States finally agreed

to extend its deterrence over Turkey by consenting to its NATO

membership in late 1951. Turkey's post-war "grand strategy" was

almost fully in place. The collective security of the Atlantic

Alliance and was secured for the protection of the territorial

and ideological integrity of the country against the Soviet

Union.

During most of the Cold War period this strategy seemed to

work to the full satisfaction of the decision-makers, presumably

providing Turkey with optimum physical security and Western

political-economic support. They felt a high degree of confidence

that the Soviet Union was deterred by NATO from intimidation and

aggression. For several decades until the eruption of the Cyprus

crisis in 1963-64, the Soviet threat was thus the exclusive

concern against which Turkish strategy was designed.

Strategic considerations began to expand its expand its purview in the 1960s. Every Greek challenge to the freedom and security of the Turkish-Cypriot community after 1964 increased Turkey's sensitivity to the question, culminating in 1974 in the use of force by the Turkish military for the first time since 1923 outside the boundaries of Turkey precisely for the protection of the Turkish Community.

The 1970s were the years of East-West detente when alliance cohesion was subjected to a series of tests. The Turkish strategy had to grapple with two goals now: Protection against the Soviet Union and protection of the Turkish Cypriot Community. The latter goal was in many ways incompatible with the first goal, complicating the former's full achievement simply because it involved a conflict of interest with an ally, Greece. While this incompatibility in the two goals of the Turkish strategy has been a difficult fact of life, for everyone concerned, souring relations with the major allies who were at the same time major suppliers of military assistance, Turkish diplomacy managed to limit the damage caused by the Cyprus issue to alliance relations. The Alliance tolerated this incompatibility, even if reluctantly, essentially because the East-West confrontatio continued to be the central concern. The Turkish contribution to collective security in the southeastern flank was too important to dispense with without tolerant reflection.

The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the conflict with the West and the consequent disappearance of the Cold War have revised, once more, the basic premises, assumptions and

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calculations on which Turkish grand strategy was built.

III. Soviet New Thinking and Strategic Impasse for Turkey

Two major developments in world politics have brought what we
have called Turkey's grand strategy to an impasse, namely, the
collapse of the Cold War and, secondly, the Gulf crisis and the
war. How have they brought about this impasse ? What are the
problems that confront the Turkish strategy in the new
international environment ?

The process of the passing of the Cold War was generated by
the Soviet leadership's recognition under Mr. Gorbachev of the
decline of Soviet power and its concomitant decision to retreat
from the militarized geopolitical and ideological competition
with the West. The radical modification in the grand strategy of
its mighty northern neighbor has swiftly rebounded on Turkey's
own strategy to make it largely redundant by eliminating its
basic rationale. Turkey has gradually ceased to face a Soviet
threat as the latter engaged in a steady stream of domestic end
international moves between 1985-1990, demonstrating and
confirming its retreat as well as its willingness to go all the
way in order to be accepted by the West as a respectable member
of the international community.

The systemic implications and repercussions of Soviet
perestroika and New Thinking assumed spectacular proportions in
Europe where it culminated in the dissolution of the socialist
system in Eastern Europe and the end of the forced division of
this old continent. The impact on the post-war Western security
strategy was sweeping, forcing the Atlantic Alliance, the main

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instrument of this strategy, to a major reassessment. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued at the NATO Summit Meeting in London on 5-6 July 1990, represented the high-point of official consensus among the 16-members of the Alliance of the passing of the Soviet threat and the concomitant need to concentrate on the political role of the Alliance. NATO's outlook in the military domain has also come under review, promising a fundamental change in the Alliance's integrated force structure and strategy.

Against the background of such profound turn-around in the East-West security interaction in which the West has no longer needed to fear the East and to maintain a monolithic military coalition to contain it, Turkey has become much less important as a military ally. The West no longer needs its cooperation in the grand strategy against the Soviet Union forged in the late 1949s. Essentially, there may even be no need for a Western coalition strategy against the Soviet Union which is on the verge of total collapse and disintegration as a socialist union. Put differently, with the change in the correlation of forces in the world in which the Soviet Union has lost, Turkey's geographical and manpower assets in close proximity to the earstwhile powerful enemy have ceased to be of significance to the efense of Western interests in general and of Western Europe in particular.

The decline of Soviet power, and, as a consequence the end of the division of Europe have set in motion a process in which inherent political and social tensions and incompatibilities between Turkey and the West have not only been crystallized but

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somewhat magnified. They have done this in two ways: By pushing forth questions of democracy and human rights to the forefront of the Western agenda, and, secondly, by forcing the West to give urgent priority to the task of assisting the economic and political reconstruction of the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe so that the difficulties of transition would not overwhelm their young democracies and markets.

These developments outpaced and killed the chances of whatever leaverage Turkey might have enjoyed as a strategically poised country in any future negotiations with the European Community, already strongly critical of Turkey's formal application for membership in April 1987.

Other West European institutions have become less tolerant, too. The Council of Europe, which Turkey had joined in 1949, has expressed its dissatisfaction with a continuing adverse human rights record even after the return to parliamentary democracy in 1983. The Western European Union, the budding European defence pillar, has let it be known that Turkish membership was not in the cards.

Thus, the network of relations that Turkey had built with Western Europe in the heydays of the Cold War seem to have entered a state of paralysis, if not dissolution, at this historical moment when miliary and ideological security against the Soviet threat is no longer the determining influence in shaping Europeans' foreign and security policy choices and strategies.

The fragility of the country's place in the West had been a subject of apprehension to many in Turkey since the early years

of the pro-Western security policy. Many had argued that exclusive reliance on military relations to the exclusion of closer, organic political and economic ties could leave Turkey out in the cold if and when bipolarity ended for one reason or another. This line of reasoning formed one of the arguments advocated in the 1960s and 1970s in favor of a neutral foreign policy. On the other hand, a uni-dimensional interaction with the West was almost a foregone conclusion from the beginning for a host of reasons. Great asymmetries in the level of social and economic development and in the political cultures of Turkey and Western Europe presented systemic complications and obstacles to the task of close cooperation. In addition, the European collective memory continued to retain recollections of the "barbarian Turk" who not only ruled for centuries over southeastern Europe but who also carried the banner of Islam to the heartland of the Christian civilization. Even if Western Europeans had succeeded to muster the strongest political will at the top, the challenge of surmounting the wedge that socio-cultural, political and historical differences had formed in Turkish-European relations would probably have been impossible to achieve. In the event, Turkey's defence cooperation with the West was conducte predominantly within a bilateral framework with the United States, and, to a lesser extent with the F.R.G.

As soon as the Cold War came to pass, the assumption among some Turks of Turkey's inevitable drift from European mainstream political and economic trends have been largely vindicated.

Turkish strategy has thus found itself foundering in the face

of a fundamentally modified external world which has eliminated Turkey's military importance to the defence of Western interests in Europe.* The dominant military threat has disappeared. And, with it, military and political relations with the West have entered a downward slope. The resilience of the unnegligible degree of political and cultural affinity and rapport that had grown out of four decades of security cooperation, and, Turkey's internal achievements as a market economy were put to a severe test as the Cold War ended and as Europe recovered its sense of security as well as unity. This test has failed. Turkey has been largely shoved over from the agenda of the different political forces in Europe, led above all by the EC. The CSCE has remained the only venue through which Turkey, along with 23 others, can take part in the process of shaping a new and secure Europe.

The accelerated political alienation of Western Europe from Turkey in the wake of the Cold War was in many ways repeated in Turkish-American relations in 1989-1990. The American Congress pressed in Spring 1990 for the passage of a strongly anti-Turkish Armenian Resolution. It threatened to drastically cut, henceforth, the annual amount of military aid. Apparently, like West Europeans, the United States concluded tat cooperation with Turkey was no longer vital to the defence of Western Europe against the Soviet Union.

IV. Regional Arms Race and Revival of Nationalism

For Turkey the strategic dilemma resulted from its need for protection not against the Soviet Union now, but against

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* This analysis is not unanimously shared by the official establishment.

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two new potential threats, each of a different nature.

One was a geopolitical and military threat emanating specifically from the south of its borders where Syria and Iraq had combined technologically sophisticated armed power with coercive diplomacy and where Iran was displaying ideological animosity to the basic tenets of the Turkish society still overwhelmingly guided by the Kemalist tradition. The other was an ideological threat, namely the revival of nationalism in the Balkans and the Transcaucasus, which could ultimately lead to inter-state conflict. In short, the regions around Turkey had begun to bubble with strong signs of new types of threats against which it was basically unprotected.

The Transcaucasus was in a state of instability. In fact, great uncertainties loomed in the horizon about the future of the Soviet Union. If its eventual break-up was indeed inevitable, then, an independent Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in Turkey's northeast would constitute parts of the new constellation of power in the vicinity. The constraining influence of Moscow on these republics would disappear, possibly prompting Armenia, in particular, to search for Western allies in order o counterbalance Turkey's disproportionately greater power.

A novel new source of concern for Turkish strategy began to acquire greater clarity in the late 1980s as nationalism and ethnicity found a new lease on life in adjoining regions first with Soviet glasnost and later with the decline of the Cold War: The welfare and security of Turkish minorities in neighbouring countries. This issue had never been a strategic goal for Turkey

with the possible exception of ethnic Turks in Greece. From the Turkish perspective, Turkish-Cypriots form a category distinct from minorities in Greece, Bulgaria, Iraq and Iran. At that point in history in the 1950s, when the issue of the creation of an independent state of Cyprus entered the international agenda, Turkish-Cypriots possessed the national consciousness and the political will to asserts themselves as politically equal partners in the process. And, Turkey, in order to prevent ENOSIS. had the means to support them in this cause. Now, four decades later, it remains a strategic goal.

Turkey's outlook on Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, the two largest groups. have evolved through various stages until now when the resurgence of nationalism in the Balkans poses as a serious potential threat to the minorities's, security and welfare everwhere in the region.

One need not blow the regional implications of the question of Turkish minorities in the Balkans out of proportion especially when compared with the immensity and complexity of the situation in Yugoslavia where the force of ethnocentrism and nationalism seems to be heading towards a major conflagration. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that tere are powerful mutual perceptions of distrust. Turkey fears the possibility of the official sanctioning by Bulgaria and Greece of the suppresion of their respective Turkish minorities. Greece and Bulgaria fear possible Turkish complicity in minority issues accusing Turkey of ultimately considering military intervention, a la Cyprus intervention of 1974.

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It is true that Turkey was always sensitive towards the welfare of these two minorities. So, was Greece about the Greeks of Istanbul most of whom left Turkey following the eruption of the Cyprus conflict in mid-1950s. Every major confrontation on the island was followed by a wave of exodus of the Istanbul Greeks. What makes the current concern considerably different from the previous one is the broader context: The absence of constraints imposed by the Cold War, and, hence nationalism on the loose.

The force of nationalism might eventually impose itself on Turkey, too, if it is allowed to prosper in the outside world to the point of overwhelming the existing political power balance not only in the Balkans, but in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia as well. The latter two are regions where Turkish nationalism could find easy outlets, especially in view of the potential role that many in the Turkic Republics are beginning to ascribe to Turkey, at the minimum as the socio-cultural and economic center of attraction in the unfolding new stage of their national life.

In short, the resurgence of nationalism in regions around Turkey already seem to be evolving in directions that might ultimately impact Turkey's grand strategy by inserting new goals into it concerning Turkish minorities with an intensity and clarity that did not exist previously. As discussed above, Turkish security and non-security goals did not include, as a general principle, the protection of the Turkish minorities. Turkish diplomacy did pursue this goal at a measured pace and with prudent means. At this point of history when the force of

nationalistic under-currents and trends in the Balkans. the Transcaucasus and the Turkic Republics in Central Asia are gathering momentum. the Turkish moderation might be challenged pressuring it to embrace the goal of the protection of Turkish minorities and the promotion of Turkish nationalism in adjoining regions as a strategic goal.

There would be several obstacles in the way of the realization of such a goal. Most importantly, for a host of reasons Turkey could not support such a goal with military force. This assumption runs counter to Bulgarian and Greek complaints about the disproportionate force Turkey deploys in Turkish Thrace and on the Agean. Deployment and use are two different phases in inter-state interaction. Second, the political power that accured to Kurdish nationalism since the end of the Gulf War in late February 1991 has seriously complicated the task of Turkish nationalism to help preserve the territorial integrity of Turkey. In order to be able preserve its territorial unity - its elemental, irreducable goal since the beginning in 1923 - the country will need, first, to come to terms with Kurdish nationalism before it allows Turkish nationalism to determine the country's external objectives with respect to Turkish minorities and Turkic peoples. The Kurdish question wil be discussed further in the following section.

V. The Gulf Conflict

The Gulf crisis has ,through its various stages - pre-war, war and post-war - vindicated what informed opinion worldwide had been suggesting lately: That the center of the strategic struggle

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in the world had shifted from the East-West axis to the Third World.

The Middle East and the Gulf region have stood at the epicentre of Third World conflicts for some time, anyway, making Turkey constantly edgy about the possibility of being drawn into the regional conflicts and skirmishes in its south. Besides, the security of eastern and southern Turkey had been a gray area all along from the perspective of the Alliance's commitment to this part of Turkish territory, if need be. Aware that the defence of the Straits area constituted the cornerstone of SACEUR'S defence strategy, Turkey often carried a strong sense of uncertainty during the Cold War years about the extent to which the Alliance would be prepared to defend eastern Turkey even against a possible Soviet invasion.

When in the early post-Cold War months of 1989-1990 the world's attention turned to the sophisticated ballistic missiles and stockpiles of chemical weapons being amassed in various countries in the region, especially in Saddam Hussein's Iraq who combined this power with bullying tactics, and to a lesser extent in Syria known for its protection of the PKK, Turkey felt extremely uncomfortable with the developments in its south. Turkey actually felt physically vulnerable in a very serious way, for its military force was overwhelmed by quantitatively and qualitatively superior armaments in the hands of an aspiring regional hegemon. And, relying on his Arab credentials and his deadly arsenal, and taking Syria to his side, he whipped up an Arab storm over Turkey's Atatürk dam on the waters of the

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Euphrates, which, according to him was "Arab Water".

By Spring 1990, therefore, Turkish strategy was very much in a flux. Of the three components that are integral to the formulation of a country's grand strategy, namely goals, threats and military instruments, Turkey could possibly be certain about only one of them: The goal of the preservation of its territorial integrity. Everything else was so fluid in the external environment that one had difficulty in ascertaining the extent of the emerging threats and the degree to which the theoretically existing military force could be counted upon to deter, and, if necessary, defend against those threats. In fact, the passing of the Cold War had already swiftly an isolated Turkey in the chambers of the West, as previously discussed. Under the circumstances, Turkey could hardly even count on the deterrence power of its NATO membership. NATO itself was being publicly riddled by internal feuds over the proper allied strategy towards out-of-area conflicts.

The evolution of the Gulf crisis, the war, and its aftermath have helped clarify some of the imponderables and ambiguities faced by the Turkish strategy in the period of transition described above.

The crisis and the American response which put its dominant influence and imprint not only on the subsequent international response but on th cantours of the international system that has been emerging, have reassured Turkey of the continuing strategic importance of its land. Now, however, significance flowed from its proximity to the Gulf region rather than to an enfeebled Soviet Union.

The recognition of Turkey's strategic importance for the defence of Western interests in the Gulf/Middle East region has injected a new forceful momentum to U.S.-Turkey relations but has fallen short of a similar impact on EC - Turkey relations.

The Özal leadership possibly saw the Gulf crisis as soon as it began as an opportunity to recapture Turkey's previous strategic weight in the calculations of the West. Hence, there was a convergence of interests. Bilateral relations prospered offering Turkey a way out of the very recent isolation that it had found itself in as well as the promise of considerable military assistance.

The performance of the Alliance with respect to Turkey, the only frontline ally vulnerable to Iraq's missile attacks in retaliation for U.S. air sorties taking off from the Incirlik airbase, was not exactly heartening for the future credibility of NATO in subsequent possible out-of-area crisis. Admiral Jonathen T. Howe, Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in NATO's southern region, describes in a recent article NATO's response to the Gulf crisis, recounting the approval by the Defence Planning Council of the Turkish request on 17 December 1990, for the Alliance to deploy AMF-A (Allied Command Europe, Mobile Force-Air) to eastern urkey.* The debate within each country about the necessity, wisdom and merits of getting involved in protecting Turkey even by symbolic acts was more meaningful than appearances, however. It was obvious that NATO's European allies would be very, very reluctant to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty if Turkey did

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* Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and The Gulf Crisis," <u>Survival</u>, XXXIII: 3 (May/June 1991), p. 251.

actually become the target of Iraqi attack.

Second, the Gulf crisis and the war have left the region at least as dangerous as it was for Turkish interests, if not more, when the crisis began. Iraq's destruction as a major military power could be an end in itself only if its regional implications could be contained. But they were not. Perhaps they could not have been. As Iraq was exhausted militarily and politically by destruction, defeat and humiliation, Iran and Syria gained in stature and in a host of other ways. Both these countries have aspirations beyond their borders, and, from the Turkish perspective the outcome of the Gulf war cannot be considered to have served Turkish interests, since by practically eliminating Iraq from the military balance in the Gulf region, it has opened the door to Syrian and Iranian maneuvering for a leadership role in this part of the world.

The mobilization of Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish advance towards autonomy in northern Iraq, with the public prodding and active support of the U.S. and its European allies in the Gulf war, represent by far the most important development for vital Turkish interests ensuring frm the Gulf crisis. Multiple linkages and dynamics pushed the Kurds of Iraq to assume a major role in the resolution of the crisis to the satisfaction of the West. Their failed uprising eventally resulted in the introduction of several thousand American and European troops into southeast Turkey for the declared purpose of providing relief and protection to the Kurdish refugees, thus effectively deploying an interventionary force in southeast Turkey, and

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raising serious questions about Turkey's power to control its land.

The entire process of the internationalization of the Kurdish refugee problem and the autonomy talks between Baghdad and Kurdish leaders have, in turn, encouraged Turkish Kurds into political activism at best and into PKK violence at its worst. In short, exactly one year after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Turkey's territorial integrity is being threatened by resurgent Kurdish nationalism and escalating PKK terror deliberately designed to carve an independent Kurdish state out of Turkey. In early August 1991, the Turkish Army moved into northern Iraq in order to wipe out the PKK camps.

In a very important sense, the scope of the Kurdish confrontation with the Turkish state attests to the failure of Turkish nationalism and the ethos of modernization to create a unitary state and a participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity might have flourished fully without challenging the state. The Kurdish nationalists assisted by Great Britain, failed in 1923 to win the recognition of the international community for their cause, which they had, briefly, in the still-born Treaty of Sevres. The boundaries set forth in the National Pact in 1920 prevailed in 1923, repudiating the unratified Treaty of Sevres, with the exception of Mosul and Kirkuk and Hatay. The renewed Kurdish activity thus represents a profound challenge to the political, historical and legal legacy of the War of Independence out of which modern Turkey emerged.

VI. Conclusion

The review above of how major developments in the international system of the last few years have impacted on Turkish strategy should support the thesis suggested in the title that it has been faced with a dilemma. The Soviet threat, which had formed the determining influence in Turkey's post-war strategy of coalition protection, has disappeared, while simultaneously new categories of threats have emerged.

Turkey's distancing from the West in general and Western Europe in particular, the uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Union, especially in the Transcaucasus, and the powerful rise of nationalism in two adjoining regions, namely the Balkans and the Transcaucasus, threatening to intice actions and policies against the sizeable Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, loom as potential new threats to Turkish goals and interests.

The chaotic "new order" in the region that has evolved to the south of Turkey in the aftermath of the Gulf War has served to diversify and aggravate the potential dangers that had existed even before the crisis erupted. Iraq's military arsenal has been dismantled but the political climate in the Gulf has not improved. It is possible that insidious political passions and struggles have merely been sharpened among the regional contenders. Of immediate relevance to Turkish interests is the impressive gains that Iran and Syria have made as potential leaders in the region. The vacuum of power that Iraq's effective

elimination as a major actor for the foreseable future, thus, presents a serious source of concern to Turkish strategic thinkers.

The Gulf crisis has, through its various twists, mobilized and internationalized the cause of Kurdish nationalism. This is by far the most significant development in the post-Cold War era that faces the Turkish strategy as it directly threatens Turkey's territorial integrity. And, needless to say, it is essentially an internal problem with international linkages, requiring possibly a thoroughly new strategy utilizing internal and external tools.

Finally, Turkey's military force and military strategy, geared for four decades to cope almost exclusively with the Soviet threat through a military coalition with the Atlantic Alliance, falls short of providing the confidence that they can cope with an altogether new threat environment. Hence, the necessity for reform in the Turkish Armed Forces which will have to take as its point of departure the premise that the Atlantic Alliance can no longer be viewed in military security terms as far as Turkey is concerned.

TURKEY AND THE WEST AFTER THE GULF WAR

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I. INTRODUCTION[1]

Following the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe and the transformation of East-West relations, there was widespread concern among Turkish and Western observers that Turkey would be the victim of strategic neglect in the wake of the Cold War. Events in the Persian Gulf have returned Turkey to the front rank in terms of strategic attention, but it is unclear that this will yield tangible political and economic benefits. Moreover, the reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance after the Gulf war has focused on the country's role in Middle Eastern rather than European security. One consequence of this will be a growing tension between Turkish political aspirations and traditional foreign policy orientations on the one hand, and Western images of and interests in Turkey on the other. The success with which these elements are reconciled will have direct implications for the future of Turkey's bilateral and institutional relations with Europe and the U.S.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for Turkey and the West in the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf War. Specific issues to be discussed include: 1) the idea of Turkey as a bridge between east and west; 2) the prospects for Turkey in Europe, including Greek-Turkish relations; 3) Turkey's strategic position and alliance relations; and 4) the outlook for the bilateral relationship with the U.S.

II. IS TURKEY A BRIDGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST?

The notion of Turkey as a bridge between East and West is a
pervasive theme, both among the political and economic elite in Turkey
and sympathetic observers in Europe and the U.S. Geographically, of
course, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia. In cultural terms, as well,
Turkey is very much a product of both eastern and western influences.
Moreover, as Turks are quick to point out, Westernization in Turkey is
neither recent nor a veneer, and can be observed in the Byzantine
influences on Ottoman society.

In political, economic and strategic terms, Turkey will continue to
be a potentially important actor in Europe, the Middle East and Central
Asia. But does this make Turkey a natural "bridge" between Europe and
the Middle East, and does it give Turkey a special role and status?
Physically and philosophically, Turkey has the potential to act as a
bridge between these regions, but this role is not automatic and
requires the existence of favorable conditions.

At a minimum, Western and Middle Eastern countries must be willing
to see Turkey as a useful interlocutor. The history of Ottoman rule, on
the one hand, and the more recent experience of Turkish cooperation with
Western aims in the Middle East, on the other, encourages an arm's
length relationship between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors.
Economic and resource interests might favor closer relations, as they
did prior to the Gulf crisis, but these could just as easily emerge as
causes of friction. Turkey is clearly linked to the Arab world through
Islam, but even here Turkey's secular orientation sets it apart. A
growing role for Islam in Turkish society and politics might
reinvigorate these ties, but would very likely produce an equivalent
estrangement from the West.

The Turkish elite's keen awareness of Turkey's long involvement in
European affairs, indeed its role as part of the West, is only dimly
reflected in prevailing European attitudes. With the very significant
exception of Turkey's role in blocking Russian and later Soviet

ambitions in Europe and the Caucasus, Europe has historically been far
more concerned with constructing barriers to Turkish power and influence
on the continent than with engaging Turkey as a strategic bridge. As
the imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, Europe will lose a good
deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of Turkey. Indeed, as
Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a
danger that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability:
a strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security
concerns; a political liability because of its position outside the
European Community and its close bilateral relations with the U.S.

With regard to contemporary security problems in the Middle East,
Turkey is again more likely to be seen as a barrier to political turmoil
and military threats than as an agent for dialogue. Only in the more
limited sense of Turkey's role as a model for political and economic
development in the Middle East does the notion of Turkey as a bridge
have significant political resonance in Europe. Even here, European
perceptions are not entirely to Turkey's advantage as observers are just
as likely to identify "Middle Eastern" elements in Turkey's domestic
political situation, including human rights problems.

A related argument finds the concept of a bridge unconvincing
because the Turks themselves are not in a position to fully understand
both Europe and the Middle East as a result of their ambiguous history
of involvement in both regions.[1] Although there may be some truth in
this assertion, it neglects the equally important issue of whether
Turkey's European and Middle Eastern neighbors are interested in having
Turkey as an interlocutor. Moreover, opinion in Turkey remains
relatively conservative in its view of the recent changes in East-West
relations, making it more difficult for Turkey to play a leading role in
relation to post-Cold War initiatives. Indeed, some Turkish observers
suggest that it is for precisely this reason that the West, and the U.S.
in particular, must engage in an active strategic dialogue with
Turkey--in short, "strategy towards Turkey is too important to be left
to Turkey alone".

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[1]Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p.14.

III. PROSPECTS FOR TURKISH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

The prospects for Turkey "joining" Europe in the institutional
sense, that is, becoming a full member of the EC and the WEU, remain
poor.[1] Ironically, the the prospects for Turkish membership in both
organizations are perhaps worse today than before the Gulf war, and many
observers in Turkey are aware of this. The crisis in the Gulf and
Turkey's essential role in the allied coalition has reinforced the
belief, widespread among European policy elites, that Turkey is an
important and dependable *Middle Eastern* ally. As the EC explores the
development of a common foreign and security policy, it is likely that
it will be increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden of an
exposure in the Middle East--particularly in the wake of the Gulf
experience.

Turkey and the European Community

The issue of EC membership is only partly about the economic
consequences of extension for Turkey and Europe. Far more significant
are the political implications of full membership, and the need to
address the fundamental question of how Europe should be defined--or
whether it should be defined at all. Historically, Turkey has been part
of the European economic system. Anatolia's main trading partners have
traditionally been European, whether Venetian, Ragusan, Genoese or
English.[2] After the nineteenth century, this was a dependent

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[1]A recent study entitled "Turkey in 2020", sponsored and published
by *Cumhuriyet*, surveyed the opinions of 32 leading members of the
Turkish political and intellectual elite on a range of issues, including
the prospects for Turkey and the West. The results suggest that there
is a solid consensus on the durability of westernization in Turkey, and
that Turkey will be a participant in the general process of European
integration, short of full membership in the EC. Only a third of the
participants thought that Turkey would be a member by 2020. See
"Intellectuals View Future of Economy, Regime", *Cumhuriyet*,26-30 March,
2-5, 9-13 April 1991, published in full in *FBIS-West Europe Report
(Supplement)*, 25 June 1991.
[2]The history of these trading relationships is described at length

partnership, but prior to this it was very much an equal relationship. From a strictly practical point of view, the essential objective for Turkey is not EC membership *per se*, but assured access to the European market.

Although within the European economic system, Turkey is not in the European mainstream, a situation reinforced by the marked westward drift of the European economic center since 1945.[3] In this context, it is worth speculating on the long term consequences of the reintegration of the Eastern European countries for the economic balance of Europe, and Turkey's position in relation to it. The notion of Turkey as a bridge between east and west may well be more convincing in the economic than the political context. Turkish economic initiatives in the Soviet Union and the Balkans, including the ambitious proposal for Black Sea Economic Cooperation, could make Turkey a more promising economic partner for Europe regardless of EC status.[4]

Less tangible, but critical from the Turkish perspective, is the symbolic value of EC membership and its internal and external political consequences. Full membership would confirm and reinvigorate the Western-looking, Ataturkist tradition, and give a valuable external imprimatur to the democratic process in Turkey. It would also provide a context for Turkish foreign and security policy at a time of strategic

in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, first published 1949).

[3]Eberhard Rhein, "Turkey and the New Europe", remarks presented at a conference organized by the *International Herald Tribune*, Istanbul, November 14, 1990, p.10.

[4]The volume of trade between Turkey and the Soviet Union has risen from $477 million in 1987 to roughly $1.9 billion in 1990. In 1989, this resulted in a Turkish trade surplus with the Soviet Union of over $100 million. The first meeting to discuss the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region proposal was held in Ankara on December 19, 1990, with the participation of Turkish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Soviet representatives. Subsequent meetings have been held in Bucharest and Sofia, with a conference finalizing principles of cooperation held in Moscow on July 11-12, 1991. "Agreement Reached on Black Sea Economic Project", *FBIS-West Europe Report*, 16 July 1991, p. 42. See also, Sukru Elekdag, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region Project", paper prepared for *Turkish Economy and Dialogue*, forthcoming 1991.

flux. The incentives for Turkey are neatly summarized in Seyfi Tashan's comment that "NATO is our legal foot in the Western camp, but the EC is the real one".[5]

The European Commission's December 1989 decision to postpone negotiations on Turkey's application until at least 1993 rules out the possibility of full membership in the near-term. The longer-term prospects for membership will be shaped not only by economic and political developments in Turkey, but by the evolution of the EC itself. A Community of roughly its current size and composition, concentrating on the deepening of existing institutions and arrangements, is unlikely to encourage the formal integration of Turkey. On the other hand, a wider EC, having embraced some or all of the EFTA and Eastern European countries, is more likely to see the benefits of Turkish membership. More precisely, this would be an EC in which the problems of Turkish adjustment would be submerged beneath a much broader task of integration.

To the extent that Turkey's application is taken seriously in Brussels, there is considerable confusion over the meaning and implications of President Ozal's recent trade initiatives. The notion of a free trade agreement with the U.S., and elements of the program for Black Sea economic cooperation, would be incompatible with full Turkish membership in the Community (indeed, they might also conflict with arrangements to which Turkey has already committed itself under the existing Association agreement with the EC, including the objective of a full customs union by 1995).[6]

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[5] Seyfi Tashan is President of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara. Quoted in *The Economist*, June 18, 1988, p.29.

[6] The original Association Agreement with the EC was concluded in 1963, and envisioned a three stage movement toward full membership over a period of 25 years. The agreement is currently in its second, or transitional stage. The stagnation of relations with the EC in the 1970's, and subsequent efforts to revitalize ties through the Association Agreement in the late 1970's and again following Turkey's return to civilian rule in November 1983, are described in Ismail Erturk, "Turkey and the European Community", *International Relations*, Vol. viii, No. 2, November 1984. See also, David Barchard, "Turkey and Europe", *Turkish Review*, Autumn, 1989.

Part of A European Pillar?

The very real possibility that Turkey will be excluded from the
Western European Union may well emerge as an even more pressing concern
for Ankara than the broader question of EC membership. President Ozal
has expressed his dissatisfaction with Turkey's observer status in the
WEU in pointed terms, asserting that Turkey could not be expected to
play its traditionally strong role in defense of the continent while
being unable to "participate fully in the making of the new Europe". [7]
Uncertainty about the future role and significance of NATO, and the
extent and character of the U.S. involvement in Europe, will reinforce
this concern. Turkish exclusion would be understood in Ankara as a
demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate
security role on the continent. The denial of a formal role, of the
sort that NATO has offered, would, in the Turkish view, ignore centuries
of involvement in European affairs. The fact that the Turkish role has
more often been that of an adversary rather than an ally should not
obscure the fact that the strategic involvement of Turkey has been of
great importance to the European balance in the past (does the history
of Franco-German enmity argue against the participation of either
country in the WEU?)

To be sure, the WEU's concern about the risks involved in embracing
Turkey also extends to the Greek application. In both cases, the desire
to move forward quickly in developing a European security pillar
suggests the postponement of difficult membership questions. With
regard to Turkey, the prospects for participation will be driven by the
future relationship of the WEU to the EC. Should the EC formally
embrace the WEU as its security arm, the prospects for Turkish
membership will probably evaporate, although a confident WEU might well
be interested in developing a closer consultative relationship with
Turkey. In these circumstances, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to withhold full membership from Greece.

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[7]Comment during the Paris meeting of the WEU, June 5, 1991, quoted
in Reuters. Turkey applied for membership in the WEU in 1987 and a
special consultative mechanism has been established whereby the country
holding the WEU presidency is empowered to act as a liaison. The
Turkish application is being held under "active" consideration.

In the wake of Turkey's strongly pro-Western stance in the Gulf crisis, and the consequent rise in Turkish expectations, the outlook for EC and WEU membership is no brighter than before, but the political consequences of stagnant relations between Turkey and Europe will be more serious.

Bilateral Relations in Europe

The prospects for Turkey's bilateral relations in Europe will continue to be shaped by prevailing attitudes towards Turkish membership in the EC, as well as the related issue of restrictions on the movement and status of Turkish workers in Germany and elsewhere. In the wake of the Gulf war, the response of individual NATO allies to Turkish defense requirements on its eastern and southern borders will be a potential source of friction.

The significance of these issues as sources of conflict and cooperation will continue to be most evident in Turkish-German relations. The fact that both countries share a history of active economic, political and strategic cooperation is a complicating factor, raising expectations but also producing a certain wariness on both sides. The perceived tardiness of the German response in contributing to the Allied Mobile Force deployments to Turkey during the Gulf crisis has left a negative impression on Turkish opinion, an impression that has not been erased by subsequent contributions (indeed, the swiftness of the German assistance to Kurdish refugees in Iran only reinforced the impression that the problem was not the German government's difficulty in committing forces outside the Central Region, but the reluctance to commit German forces in defense of Turkey). Ozal's pointed remarks on this issue may perhaps be dismissed as exaggerated, crisis-induced rhetoric, but there can be little doubt that they reflect an acute sense of frustration over German policy and attitudes.[*]

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[*]In an interview of January 24, 1991, broadcast on German television, President Ozal termed Germany "an unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the Alliance for forty years and was "now unwilling to stand by Turkey in its time of need". Ozal went on to

With regard to EC membership, as well, there is a clear sense of frustration over Germany's unwillingness to facilitate Turkey's application. This frustration is all the more acute since Germany is widely seen, accurately or not, as the one country that could engineer a favorable response within the Community. To the extent that France gives priority to rapid integration within the existing Community, it will almost certainly be unwilling to play such a role. Italy and Spain could play a helpful role on the question of Turkish membership, and improved EC-Turkish relation more generally. But in the absence of German or French involvement, progress toward full membership is unlikely.

With the apparent end of the Cold War, north-south relations in the Mediterranean have become the focus of growing debate, not only in the southern European countries, but in Europe as a whole. The key issues being raised in this context include the problem of the developmental and demographic imbalance between north and south, and the resulting immigration pressure; the implications of political change in the Maghreb; and the growth of conventional and unconventional arsenals along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The debate on these security and security-related issues is taking place against a background of uncertainty with regard to the broader question of Europe's long-term relationship with the Islamic world--including the Islamic population in Western Europe and the Balkans. It is unlikely that Turkey's relations with the West, and especially the prospects for EC membership, can remain unaffected by the evolution of this broader relationship. President Ozal has hinted at the risks inherent in allowing religion to drive political decisions in the EC and elsewhere. If Islam emerges as an overt bar to Turkey's membership in the EC or the WEU, this might drive Turkey into a closer relationship with the Middle East, encourage the spread of fundamentalism, and "send a wrong signal to the rest of the Arab world".[9]

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criticize the role of German firms in supplying chemicals to Iraq. BBC World Service, January 24, 1991.

[9]Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "Turkey Remains Confident It Will Join European Community", *New York Times*, March 17, 1990.

Greek-Turkish Relations

Greek opposition continues to serve as an impediment, not only to
Turkish membership in the community, but also to a significant deepening
of relations at the current level. An optimistic assessment suggests
that this situation may be changing for two reasons. First, there are
tentative signs that both Athens and Ankara have recognized that
institutional expressions of Greco-Turkish animosity may no longer serve
the interests of either country in a less tolerant, post-Cold War
environment. This observation applies to both NATO and the EC, and is
reinforced by the perceived importance of being "members in good
standing" at a time of strategic flux and economic stringency. Second,
as NATO enters a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish
involvement in the EC can serve to "anchor" and stabilize Greek-Turkish
relations, already discussed in moderate circles, may gain wider
currency. Ironically, as the incentives for Greek opposition to Turkey
within the EC may be declining, there is a growing perception in Turkey
that Europe as a whole tolerates and even fuels Greek-Turkish enmity as
a pretext for holding Turkey at arms length.[10]

With the important exception of the Turkish minority in Greek
Thrace, the outlook for Greek-Turkish relations across a range of
historically troublesome issues is no worse, and possibly better, than
at any time in the recent past. The shift to a conservative government
in Greece is a positive development, despite Turkish fears that the
Mitsotakis regime, with strong support in the West, will feel free to
pursue a harder line on Greek-Turkish relations. On the persistent
problem of Cyprus, the prospects for a settlement, while hardly bright,
have been enhanced by the active involvement of the UN and the recent
visit of President Bush to Greece and Turkey. The emergence of the U.S.
as a broker in the Cyprus dispute could change the balance of incentives
in Athens and Ankara as both sides seek to assure themselves of a secure
bilateral relationship with Washington in the wake of the Gulf war.[11]

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[10]John Murray Brown, "Turkey Survey", *Financial Times*, May 20,
1991.

[11]See Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names the Next Challenge: Cyprus", *The
New York Times*, July 19, 1991.

The trend toward regional political and security initiatives around
the Mediterranean, including Balkan cooperation, could promote stability
in Greek-Turkish relations if the bilateral climate is supportive.[12]
Under less favorable conditions, Greece and Bulgaria may be driven to
more overt cooperation as a means of countering Turkish power in the
Balkans.[13]

An essential point is that the prospects for cooperation and
conflict between Greece and Turkey will turn critically on the overall
evolution of relations between Turkey and the West. Turkish isolation
from European initiatives, particularly on security matters, will worsen
the prospects for crisis management in the Aegean.[14]

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[12]The Greek government has issued a proposal for disarmament along
the borders between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. Bulgaria has expressed
its support for the proposal. Turkey has reacted cautiously, wary of
the fact that the proposal does not extend to the Aegean. See "Premier
Announces Border Disarmament Proposal", statement by Prime Minister
Mitsotakis of 12 July 1991, quoted in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, 15 July
1991, p. 37.

[13]See Paul Anastasi, "Greek-Bulgarian Tactics for Turkey", *New York
Times*, 7 February 1991.

[14]On the outlook for Greek-Turkish relations, see *Aegean Issues:
Problems and Prospects* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989); James
Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey--Problems, Policy
Choices and Mediterranean Security,* (London: Brassey's, 1991); and
Dimitri Constas, ed., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic
and External Influences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), with
contributions by both Greek and Turkish authors.

IV. THE SECURITY DIMENSION

Turkey and NATO

Turkey shares with the U.S. a strong interest in the preservation of existing security structures and relationships, not least the NATO link. Traditionally, this observation has applied to most of the Southern Region countries, but the Turkish stake in the maintenance of the institutional status quo is especially.pronounced since the alternative of a European defense identity remains closed to Turkey. Germany's response in the context of the NATO decision to send AMF reinforcements to Turkey during the Gulf crisis, referred to earlier, has also left lingering doubts about the dependability of the NATO guarantee in the absence of a Soviet threat. Nonetheless, the NATO connection retains tremendous symbolic and material importance. Above all, participation in the Alliance is seen, rather like the prospect of EC membership, as a symbol of Turkey's membership in the Western democratic club, and gives Turkey a greater voice than it might otherwise have in international affairs. Equally important, in the wake of the changes in Europe and developments in the Gulf, is NATO's ability to provide a multilateral and Euro-Atlantic context for defense cooperation that might otherwise appear too heavily weighted toward the bilateral relationship with the U.S. and Middle Eastern security.

Despite the growing attention to Southern Region security issues within NATO, including the problems and risks facing Turkey, it is worth considering how useful the Southern Region framework will be in assessing Turkey's future position within the Alliance. Traditionally, Turkey has shared with NATO's other southern allies certain distinguishing characteristics. Leaving aside the Italian case, these have included a lower level of economic development, the experience of a democratic transition, and a relatively low level of military potential (despite high manpower levels). Unlike its Southern Region allies, Turkey has never seen the Soviet threat as distant and diffuse--but rather as an historically potent and pressing reality.[1]

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[1]The history of Ottoman imperial decline is in large measure the story of Turkish retrenchment in the face of Russian power. See Paul B.

Turkey is also isolated from the trend toward Europeanization evident elsewhere across the Southern Region. In strategic terms, this has meant that countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece are increasingly unwilling to adopt positions on security policy, including defense cooperation with the U.S., that are at variance with the views of their EC partners. The fact that Turkey stands outside this process suggests a Turkish position within the Southern Region, and within NATO as a whole, which is becoming more rather than less distinctive.

East-West Relations and Arms Control

Even in the current climate of detente and disengagement, Ankara retains a cautious approach to the East-West strategic relationship that sets it apart from the NATO mainstream, and distinguishes it sharply from its Southern Region counterparts. This conservative approach to the question of the Soviet (or Russian) threat is partly a product of Turkish history, and perhaps also a result of the Turkish attachment to a strategic view which has served it very well within the Alliance and ensured a central position for Turkey during the Cold War. Certainly, Turkey would be uniquely exposed to the effects of a disintegration of the Soviet Union, with all that this might imply for the future of Azerbaijan and Armenia. More tangibly, the security benefits flowing from the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and conventional arms control are least direct, and even ambiguous, in the Turkish case. The large conventional arsenals facing Turkey on its Middle Eastern borders are outside the current arms control framework, a concern that is only partially offset by the "exclusion zone" in southeastern Turkey provided for by the CFE agreement. Moreover, Turkey's relative proximity to Soviet forces behind the Urals, and the prospective improvement in the

Henze, *Turkey, The Alliance and the Middle East: Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective*(Washington: International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, Working paper No. 36, 1981; and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

quality of the Soviet forces in that region, will leave Turkey in a relatively unfavorable position within the Alliance after CFE.

As part of the CFE arrangements, Turkey is scheduled to be the beneficiary of substantial transfers through "cascading", permitting the modernization of much out-dated equipment while satisfying the reduction requirements of the treaty.[2] Observers are already speculating on the potential effect of these transfers on Turkey's defense-industrial program, as well as the operations and maintenance costs of the new systems.[3] More importantly, the experience of the Gulf War not only confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed forces to wage modern conventional war, but also cast doubt on the value of the equipment to be acquired from the allies following CFE. Not surprisingly, the new priorities include Patriot and additional F-16s.[4] Without such systems, Turkey will be highly vulnerable to air and ballistic missile attacks on its territory; a vulnerability which may affect Turkey's willingness to permit allied military operations from Turkish bases. Turkey's inability to defend itself against weapons of mass destruction and the consequent need to allow the presence of foreign forces as a deterrent is likely to be seen as a double blow to Turkish sovereignty.

In contrast to central Europe, strategy in NATO's Southern Region has been concerned primarily with the conventional aspects of deterrence and defense. Nuclear weapons have played a relatively peripheral role in Turkey's relations within the Alliance. The issue of nuclear weapons based in Turkey could become more difficult as the Soviet threat

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[2]NATO's Equipment Transfer Program is expected to result in the "cascading" to Turkey of some 1,050 modern tanks (M-60 and Leopard), 600 armored combat vehicles from the U.S. and Germany, and 70 M110 artillery pieces from the U.S. Turkey is also to receive 40 F-4 fighters in addition to attack helicopters and surface-to-air missiles. Greece will also be a substantial recipient of cascaded hardware. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 6, 1991, pp. 18-19.

[3]John Murray Brown, "Arms Windfall Dilemma for Turkey", *Financial Times*, June 27, 1991, p.6.

[4]Existing modernization plans are detailed in Gen. Dogan Gures, "Modernization and Restructuring of the Turkish Land Forces", *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, February-March 1990; and October 6, 1990 interview with then Minister of National Defense, Safa Giray, quoted in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, 16 November 1990., p.36.

continues to recede and pressure mounts for the removal of the remaining short-range systems in Europe.[5] "Singularization" is unlikely to be any more attractive in Turkey than elsewhere within the Alliance. Over the longer term, progress (or lack of progress) on nuclear nonproliferation in the Middle East could influence Turkish views on this question.

Non-European Security Concerns and Their Implications

A shift in emphasis of Turkish defense priorities from traditional lines in the Balkans and the Caucasus to address new risks in the Middle East, including those emanating from Syria, Iran and Iraq, as well as the activities of Kurdish separatists on Turkish territory, may encourage a further separation of Turkish and European security interests.[6] Although security on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is relevant to European security broadly defined, this is an area where Europe is likely to prefer a leading American role. At the same time, developments in the southern Soviet republics may encourage a more active Turkish role in the Caucasus (although pan-Turanism has few adherents in current official circles). In both cases, a reorientation of Turkish foreign and security policy eastwards would be difficult to reconcile with the Western-looking Ataturkist tradition and the desire for a formal role in Europe.

One way of reconciling these tensions in Turkish policy might be for NATO to embrace an out-of-area role. In practice, this is both unlikely for the Alliance and problematic for Turkey. In the Turkish view, the defense of Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is clearly an "in-area" responsibility, and hardly a "gray area" as some of the debate during the Gulf crisis implied. The adoption of an out-of-area role by the Alliance, through which Turkey might be called upon to provide

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[5]Duygu Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000", in *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989).

[6]The rise of competing security interests in the Middle East was evident even before the conflict with Iraq. See, e.g., Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy: Challenges of Adaptation to the Post-INF Era", *RUSI Journal*, Winter 1989.

forces or more automatic access to facilities for intervention in the
Middle East, would severely complicate Turkey's sensitive relations with
the Arab world.

V. TURKEY AND THE U.S.

To the extent that Turkey is frustrated in its relations with Europe, the bilateral relationship with the U.S. will acquire additional significance.[1] Although the experience of the Gulf crisis has resulted in a great deal of good will toward Turkey, a measured expansion of economic and security cooperation may still fail to satisfy heightened expectations in Ankara. An important question for the future concerns the degree to which Turkish public and elite opinion will distinguish between Turkey's difficult relations with Europe and relations with the West as a whole. In the absence of dramatic trade and security gestures toward Turkey --and these are unlikely to be forthcoming for a variety of reasons--it may prove difficult to insulate the bilateral relationship from the adverse effects of a European rebuff.

A Window for Expanded Defense Cooperation?

The experience of the Gulf war provides a number of incentives for Turkey to consider a closer defense relationship with the U.S: The crisis and its aftermath have heightened the Turkish sense of insecurity with regard to developments in the Middle East; Turkey's active involvement in the allied coalition have raised expectations about security assistance to Turkey; and, as noted earlier, observation of the conflict has lent greater urgency to the long-standing Turkish interest in modernizing its armed forces. To the extent that the NATO response to Turkey's requests was seen as limited or grudging, this too argues for closer ties to the U.S.

Despite these incentives, the prospects for a sharp increase in the U.S. military role in Turkey are limited. The U.S. is unlikely to seek

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[1]Notably, only a small number of the respondents in the *Cumhuriyet* "Turkey in 2020" survey thought that Turkey would have closer relations with the U.S. than Europe through the end of the century and beyond. FBIS-West Europe Report, 25 June 1991, p.33.

a significant expansion of its presence in a period of force reductions and economic stringency. Such an expansion would also send certain signals to the Soviet Union which might not be desirable under current conditions. Moreover it is unreasonable to assume that the prevailing (i.e., post-Gulf) level of security and economic assistance will continue against a background of declining enthusiasm for security assistance in Congress. The problem of an adequate *quid pro quo* is thus likely to become more difficult, although Turkey will certainly be among the strongest claimants for future security assistance funds, even at lower levels.

In the wake of the Gulf war, U.S. security assistance to Turkey has been raised from $553.4 million to $635.4 million, mostly in the form of outright grants (assistance to Greece has traditionally included a high proportion of concessionary loans). Against this background, the controversial "7-10" ratio which Congress has applied in allocating assistance to Greece and Turkey may lose much of its significance.[2]

The essential issues for the future are more likely to concern Turkish cooperation in regional crises and, more specifically, U.S. access to Turkish facilities for non-NATO contingencies. The careful Turkish approach to the basing and use of the multinational rapid response force assembled near Silopi on the border with Iraq (the air component will operate from Incirlik and Batman) provides some evidence of the Turkish sensitivity to matters of sovereignty.[3] Accommodating a purely U.S. force would raise more serious political acceptance problems. The continued deployment of foreign forces on the Turkish border with Iraq has been widely criticized by opposition parties on the left and the right, and Ankara has imposed strict conditions on the character and use of the new force. Prime Minister Yilmaz has also ruled out the use of Turkish bases for renewed U.S. air strikes against nuclear facilities or other targets in Iraq.[4]

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[2]See Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, p. 38.

[3]Turkey is to contribute a battalion sized unit to the force of 3,000, which will include components from the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Turkey has established a deadline of September 30, 1991 for the withdrawal or extension of the force.

[4]"Bush Says Iraq is Mistaken to Bar Access to Nuclear Arms Programs", *The New York Times*, July 29 1991.

An essential consideration for the future will be Turkey's need to balance its security relationship with the U.S. with its interest in promoting political and economic relations with key Middle Eastern states, including Iran and Iraq (the latter had emerged as an important trading partner for Turkey prior to the Gulf crisis, and Iraqi oil exports through Turkish pipelines to the Mediterranean will certainly resume at some point).[5] In the absence of political obstacles, Turkey is also in a position to play an important part in the economic reconstruction of its neighbors, including Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. The Turkish leadership will undoubtedly give careful consideration to the regional effects of too active and visible defense cooperation with the U.S. Future Turkish policy in this area may well have more in common with its restrained behavior in 1967 and 1973, than with the recent and perhaps unique experience in the Gulf. Overall, the outlook for U.S. access to Turkish facilities in non-NATO contingencies is likely to remain highly circumscribed in the absence of a direct threat to Turkish territory.

A New Strategic Relationship?

Over the next decade, there will certainly be a desire for a "more mature" relationship with the U.S. in which security assistance in the traditional sense and defense cooperation play a less prominent role and political and economic ties come to the fore. This has already taken the form of calls for an expanded "strategic relationship", by which its proponents mean strategic in the broadest sense. Trade, and particularly the relaxation of textile quotas, will be a central issue in this diversified relationship. President Ozal's proposal for a free trade agreement with the U.S. is unlikely to progress very far at a time when U.S. trade policy as a whole is in a state of flux; incremental improvements are much more likely.

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[5]Trade with Iraq has accounted for up to 18 percent of Turkish imports and 13 percent of exports. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West".

Since 1945, the American perception of Turkey's strategic importance has shifted from an initial post-war focus on the country's central position in the "northern tier" blocking Soviet access to the Middle east, to its importance in the containment of Soviet power in Europe.[6] To the extent that the post-Cold War U.S. interest in Turkey focuses once again on its role in Middle Eastern security (and this is likely to be the focus of Turkey's own defense concerns over the next decade) the task of developing an active role for Turkey in the new European security order will be more difficult.[7] The U.S. is in the unique position of being able to promote the strategic importance of Turkey in both arenas.

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[6]This evolution is portrayed in detail in Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1980).

[7]On the recasting of Turkey's strategic importance in Middle Eastern terms, see Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989); and Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West".

VI. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the wake of the Cold War and events in the Persian Gulf, Turkey faces substantial problems of adjustment in its relations with the West. At the same time, Europe and the U.S. will need to reassess the pattern of relations with Turkey that had been dictated by the containment of Soviet power and the traditional perception of Turkey's role in European security.

In the absence of sweeping political change in Turkey, the country's long-standing Western orientation will almost certainly hold. Yet, formal membership in Europe -- that is, full membership in the EC and the WEU -- remains distant and perhaps unachievable. The outlook may be different if the Community expands into Eastern Europe. However, as with the heightened expectations brought about by the Gulf crisis, the failure to offer full membership to Turkey in an expanding EC would make the political consequences of Turkey's rejection more acute. While Turkey's fundamental orientation toward the West is unlikely to be supplanted by interests elsewhere, Turkish frustration with its position on the European periphery could lead to a more active political and economic role in the Middle East and across the Black Sea. The cumulative effect of new initiatives in these areas could be substantial, and might eventually affect Turkish attitudes on security matters. The attractive notion of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East--increasing its strategic value to both--will remain largely a potential one unless there is a willingness on the part of both sets of neighbors to see Turkey play this role.

If Turkey remains outside the process of Europeanization affecting NATO's Southern Region, and if Turkey's strategic importance is defined largely in Middle Eastern rather than European terms, Turkey's will become increasingly distinctive and perhaps isolated within the Alliance. The existence of competing security institutions in Europe (NATO, WEU, CSCE -- possibly CSCM) will further reduce Turkey's ability to play an active role in European security affairs.

Under these conditions, the bilateral relationship with the U.S. acquires greater significance and visibility. In this, there is a risk of unfulfilled expectations on both sides. Turkey will expect more from the U.S. in a new strategic relationship, including active political support on key issues such as EC membership which the U.S. may not be able to affect. The U.S., for its part, may be surprised by Turkey's less than automatic cooperation in future non-NATO contingencies as Turkey's sensitivity to questions of sovereignty and political freedom of action in the Middle East asserts itself.

Europe can reinforce Turkey's Western orientation by ensuring that Turkey is engaged in the process of European integration, including the development of a defense identity, even if this requires creative arrangements short of full membership in the EC and the WEU. The U.S. can foster the durability of the bilateral relationship by exploring new initiatives beyond the security realm. Above all, the U.S. as a power in Europe and the Middle East can help to promote the strategic importance of Turkey in both regions.

Finally, the involvement of Turkey in Europe will contribute to the stabilization of the Greek-Turkish relationship, thereby ameliorating one of the most serious security risks in post-Cold War Europe. If Turkey is isolated, or worse, the Greek-Turkish border comes to be seen as the front line in a looming confrontation between Islam and the West, the prospects for crisis management in the Aegean will worsen considerably.

Back to the Future:
Balkan Security After the Cold War

F. Stephen Larrabee

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INTRODUCTION

The Balkans have traditionally been an area of turmoil and political instability. In the 19th century the explosion of rapid nationalism throughout the region earned the area the reputation as the "powderkeg of Europe."* The onset of the Cold War and the emergence of bipolarity tended to dampen the most visceral conflicts in area. However, with the end of the Cold War, the Balkans threaten once again to become a new seat of instability and conflict.[1]

The Cold War gave security relations in the Balkans a certain stability and predictability. Bulgaria and Romania were members of the Warsaw Pact.[2] Greece and Turkey, not withstanding differences between them, were members of NATO. Non-aligned Yugoslavia acted as a kind of strategic buffer and "balancing wheel." Albania pursued a policy of "splendid isolation," refusing (until very recently) to take part in any security arrangements or multilateral organizations in the region.[3]

The end of the Cold War has upset this delicate balance and set in motion trends that could effect security alignments in the region over the next decade. While a new "security order" has yet to emerge in the region, the old bipolar one is crumbling under the impact of the changes unleashed by the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and other recent trends such as the Persian Gulf war. What exactly will replace the old order is not clear, but new patterns are beginning to emerge which could have an important impact on security relations in the region over the long-term.

At the same time, there has been an upsurge of nationalism and a "re-nationalization" of politics in the area. This has been most visible in Yugoslavia where various republican leaders, especially those in Serbia and Croatia, have sought to use nationalism to bolster their legitimacy and popular support. But it has also been the case in Romania, where nationalist groups like Vatra Romaneasca

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* For the purposes of this paper the Balkans are defined as including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece and Turkey.

[1] For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Balkan Security after the Cold War," *International Security*, Fall 1990, pp. 58-91.

[2] Romania was formally a member of the Pact. However, it stopped sending officers to Soviet military academies in the early 1960s and refused to take part in joint maneuvers thereafter.

[3] Albania became an inactive member of the Warsaw Pact after the break with Moscow in 1961 and formally withdrew from the Pact in 1968 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

have begun to play a visible political role, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria, where the Macedonian question has resurfaced as an issue in domestic politics.

As a result, the Balkans have emerged as a new source of instability. Indeed, unrest in the Balkans could prove to be the main obstacle to the creation of a stable security order in Europe. Whereas in Western Europe there is a strong trend toward closer cooperation and integration, in the Balkans the trend is in the opposite direction: toward growing fragmentation and nationalism. Yugoslavia, in fact, could be a harbinger of the type of conflicts which are likely to erupt in the Balkans in the future.

This paper examines the changes in the Balkans since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. It focuses on the types of security threats that may emerge in the region in the future as well as the potential for new power alignments. A final section explores the implications for Western policy.

YUGOSLAVIA

The most serious threat to stability in the Balkans is posed by Yugoslavia's disintegration. In the last two years ethnic violence has reached dramatic proportions. By mid 1991 over 300 persons had been killed in ethnic-related clashes and the country was on the brink of civil war. The mediation by the European Community in June has bought some time, but it is unlikely that it can prevent the collapse of the current federation. The real question now is whether the repercussions of this disintegration can be contained or will spread and inflame other ethnic disputes in the Balkans and beyond.

The origins of the disintegration can be traced back to the decentralizing reforms undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970s that gave increasing decision-making powers to the various republics. This weakened the authority and control of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LYC). In effect, the regional parties became the real foci of power and Belgrade was progressively forced to cede decision-making power to the republics.[4]

This trend was accelerated in the 1980s by four factors. The first was Tito's death in May 1980. Tito acted as the final arbitrar of ethnic disputes. His prestige and authority helped to keep Yugoslavia together. On occasion, as in the Croatian crisis in 1971, he had not been adverse to threatening to use the Yugoslav army to restore order. His death, however, removed a crucial linchpin of the Yugoslav system and initiated a gradual process of erosion that directly contributed to the present crisis. The complex institutional mechanism set up after his death, with its rotating presidency, proved too unwieldy to provide the strong and effective leadership needed to manage Yugoslavia's economic problems and contain the explosive nationality tensions that lay smouldering beneath the surface.

At the same time, the deterioration of the Yugoslav economy accentuated the divisions between the richer republics like Slovenia and Croatia and the poorer ones such as Serbia and Montenegro. Slovenia and Croatia resented having a large part of their national income siphoned off by the central government in Belgrade to pay for inefficient "white elephant" projects in the south. As a result, they began to push

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[4]On the impact of this devolution, see in particular Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (London: L. Hurst, 1977).

for increasing economic and political autonomy. This in turn exacerbated relations with Serbia, which supported a strong central government.

The end of the Cold War also contributed to the disintegration. Tito had often used the threat of outside intervention to keep nationality tensions in check. As long as Brezhnev was in power, this continued to have some residual effect. The advent of Gorbachev, however, deprived the Yugoslav leadership of the "external threat," and reduced the fear of many Yugoslavs that internal tensions would be exploited by the USSR or prompt a Soviet intervention. When Moscow did not intervene to save the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, especially the GDR, the threat lost its credibility entirely, and the individual republican leaderships felt freer to pursue their nationalist agendas.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the process of democratization contributed to an intensification of nationality tensions. Multiparty elections in 1990 led to the emergence of strongly nationalistic governments in all the republics. However, in Croatia these were strongly anti-communist, while in Serbia and Montenegro the local communist parties were able to make some cosmetic changes and exploit wide-spread fears of the economic impact of market reforms to retain power. This anti-communist/neo-communist split reinforced traditional ethnic, religious and cultural differences between the Slovenes and Croats, who were predominantly Catholic and had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire prior to World War I, and the Serbs and Montenegrins, who were orthodox and had spent long periods under Ottoman rule.

In retrospect, the Kosovo issue can be seen as an important catalyst for the intensification of nationality tensions. In the 1970s Kosovo had achieved a high degree of autonomy. While officially a province located within Serbia, after 1974 Kosovo had for all intents and purposes many of the rights and prerogatives of a republic. The dramatic increase in the Albanian population in the 1960s and 1970s led to the effective "Albanization" of the province, and to the migration of many Serbs, who began to feel increasingly unwelcome in an area that they considered the cradle of their statehood and culture.[5] This in turn fueled rising Serbian nationalism. At the same time, dissatisfaction grew among the Albanian population

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[5]In the early 1960s the Albanians made up about 65 percent of the population in Kosovo. By the early 1980s about 90 percent of the population of Kosovo was Albanian.

of Kosovo, which is the poorest region in Yugoslavia, as the economy declined and unemployment increased.

Slobodan Milosevic, who became leader of the League of Communists of Serbia in May 1986, sought to exploit the rising Serbian resentment against the Albanians for his own political purposes. Beginning in 1987 he introduced legislation into the Serbian parliament that progressively curtailed the rights of the Albanians, and in July 1990, he disbanded Kosovo's parliament and imposed strong curbs on the Albanian media. He also encouraged mass demonstrations in Montenegro designed to topple the leadership there and replace it with one more willing to act as a pliant tool of his own increasingly expansionist policy.

Milosevic's increasingly expansionist policy and his repressive policies intensified fears in both Croatia and Slovenia that Kosovo was but the first step in a larger effort to expand Milosevic's and Serbia's power. It thus reinforced their determination to press for a looser confederation of sovereign states, and if that proved impossible, to leave the federation entirely. Milosevic, however, remained adamantly opposed to any significant decentralization of power that would give the other republics greater sovereignty. At the same time, he stepped up efforts to foment discontent among Serb communities in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovenia and Macedonia as a means of applying pressure on these republics. He also began to raise veiled threats that if a confederation did evolve, Serbia's borders would have to be changed to incorporate all Serbs within its territory.

Milosevic's election as President of Serbia in December 1990 convinced the leadership in both republics that little was to be gained by remaining in the federation and gave secessionist impulses in both republics greater momentum. His effort in May to block Stipe Mesic, a Croat, from assuming the Presidency as provided for by the Constitution, effectively paralyzed the government and unleashed a major constitutional crisis. This formed the background to the clashes in June when Slovenia sought to implement its declaration of independence by assuming control of border posts.

The intervention by the Yugoslav army in Slovenia in June was an important watershed in the crisis. It had three important effects. First, it destroyed the myth of the "military option." The poor performance of the Yugoslav armed forces against the much less well-equipped Slovenian forces as well as the number of defections by JVA recruits raise serous doubts of whether any large scale military intervention could be effective. At the same time, the intervention deepened splits in the

leadership of JVA between moderates like Defense Minister General Veljko
Kadijevic, who see the main purpose of the army in preventing violence, and
hardliners such as General Blagoje Adzia, the Chief of the General Staff, who see its
function as keeping the federation together -- by force if necessary.

Perhaps most importantly, it led to shift in Western policy. Until the military
intervention most Western countries, including the EC and the U.S., strongly
supported Yugoslavia's unity. This policy indirectly contributed to the belief in some
circles in the army and Serbia that the West would tolerate a military crackdown in
order to keep the country together. The strong stand taken by the EC and the U.S.
against military intervention shattered that myth and eroded support for the
military option and weakened the role of the army as a factor of domestic unity.
Military intervention, it is now clear, would not only provoke civil war, but lead to
Yugoslavia's economic and political isolation.

Finally, intervention reinforced the determination of Slovenia to leave the
federation and made the prospects for transforming the current federation into a
loose confederation of sovereign states, as proposed by the heads of Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Macedonia, more difficult. The EC mediation has bought some
time but it is unlikely to be able to halt the final breakup of Yugoslavia. Milosevic
and the military leadership appear increasingly to recognize this. Indeed, Milosevic
seems to have accepted the fact that Slovenia will leave the Federation. His strategy
now appears to be aimed at creating a "Greater Serbia" rather than at preserving a
strongly centralized federation.

In principle, Slovenia's departure would pose relatively few problems.
Slovenia is the most prosperous republic in Yugoslavia and its population is highly
homogeneous. (Nearly 90 percent of the population is Slovene.) Moreover, it has
strong ties to Austria, having for a long time been a part of the Austro-Hungarian
empire. Thus while "disassociation" would have a strong economic impact, leading
to an estimated 30-40 percent drop in living standards, Slovenia could survive,
especially if it received significant Western assistance.

Croatia's departure, however, is another matter. Croatia has a large Serb
minority -- 600,000 or about 11.5 percent of the republic's population. The
intensification of Croat nationalism has exacerbated age-old antagonisms between
the Croat majority and Serb minority. Milosevic has sought to exploit these
antagonisms for his own purposes. He has used the Chetniks, who share his goals of
a greater Serbia, to stir up tensions among the Serbs in Croatia and create a climate

of fear and unrest. His main goal appears to be to create a fait accompli militarily and then force Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman to strike a deal.

In essence, this deal would allow the ethnic Serbs in Croatia to be incorporated into a "greater Serbia" in return for the incorporation of the Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina (who make up 32 percent of the republic's population) into Croatia.[6] This, in effect, would result in the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such a solution, however, is opposed by the Muslim majority in Bosnia-Hercegovina, who make up 43 percent of the republic's population. They see preservation of the republic as the main guarantee of their security and status. Thus any effort to carve up Bosnia-Hercegovina could inflame tensions with the Muslim population, which is heavily armed, further increasing the prospect of civil war.

Milosevic's effort to create a greater Serbia is also likely to fuel a drive for independence on the part of Macedonia. Given traditional Serb-Macedonian antagonisms, few Macedonians are likely to find the prospect of remaining in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia attractive. If that is their only choice, they are likely to prefer independence. A highly nationalistic independent Macedonia, however, would be source of instability in the Balkans. It would be at odds with all its neighbors -- Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia.

The most serious impact, however, would be on Kosovo. Most Kosovars would prefer to be an independent republic within a reconstituted democratic Yugoslav confederation. However, they have had their political rights systematically curtailed by the Serbs over the last two years and they would have little to look forward to in a greater Serbia except increased repression. Thus many Kosovars are likely to see union with Albania as an increasingly attractive option in the future, especially if Albania continues to democratize.[7] At the same time, the Albanian government is likely to give increasing moral, diplomatic and even material support to the Kosovars. In short, Kosovo is a crisis waiting to happen. Indeed, it could trigger the next round of bloodshed in the Balkans.

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[6]Judith Dempsey, "Secret Talks over Yugoslav Borders to be Restarted," *Financial Times,* July 10, 1991. Tim Judah, "Creation of Islamic Buffer State Discussed in Secret," *The London Times,* July 12, 1991.

[7]On February 10, 1991, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug published the results of a poll taken by the Kosovo Albanian-language youth weekly *Zeri i Rinse* showing that the majority of Albanians think that the solution to the provinces lies in merging with Albania. Only seven percent of the respondents supported negotiations with Serbia, while 31 percent favored an armed struggle. See Radio Free Europe *Daily Report* Nr. 30, February 12, 1991.

Milosevic's policy could also exacerbate relations with Hungary. There are some 430,000 Hungarians in Yugoslavia, most of them in Vojvodina which was ceded to Yugoslavia by Hungary after World War I. Like Kosovo, Vojvodina has the status of an autonomous province within Serbia. However, since 1989 the rights of the Hungarian minority have been progressively curtailed as part of Milosevic's policy of "Serbianization." In general, Hungary has pursued a cautious policy in the current crisis, aligning itself with the EC. At the same time, it has expressed growing concern about the fate of the Hungarian minority.[8] Thus if there are border changes, Hungary could demand that the question of the status of Vojvodina be opened up. But even if it does not raise claims on Vojvodina, Budapest is likely to make the issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina a major diplomatic issue.[9]

Milosevic may eventually succeed creating a "greater Serbia" by force. But it is hard to see how such a greater Serbia will fit into the new Europe. Milosevic's goals are directly at odds not only with those of most of the republics in Yugoslavia, but also with those of the majority of states in Europe today. Thus unless there is a change in Serb policy, Serbia is likely to find itself increasingly isolated diplomatically.

Indeed, Serbia could become the "new Albania" of Europe -- a bastion of neo-communist and xenophobic nationalism increasingly cut off from the rest of Europe. Unlike Albania, however, Serbia is too big and powerful to exist in splendid isolation. In addition, it is expansionist, whereas Albania was not. Such a state would be a source of constant instability and turmoil. Internally, it would face constant unrest among discontented minorities -- Muslims, Hungarians and Albanians -- while externally it would be in conflict with all of its surrounding neighbors, except perhaps Romania.[10]

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[8]See Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungary's Policy on the Yugoslav Conflict: A Delicate Balance," *Report on Eastern Europe*, August 9, 1991, pp. 34-44. Also Victor Meier, "Budapest möchte klare Verhältnisse in Jugoslavien," August 12, 1991.

[9]Another source of tension may be refugees. In the last two weeks of August, nearly 10,000 refugees poured into Hungary, many of them members of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Relations with Yugoslavia were also strained by violations of Hungarian airspace by the Yugoslav airforce en route to bombing targets in Croatia. See Carol J. Williams, "Serbian-Croatian Conflict Spills into Hungary," *Los Angeles Times*, August 25, 1991.

[10]Both Romania and Serbia have large Hungarian minorities on their territory and share a common concern about Hungary. This could propel them into a tacit or informal alliance.

In short, Milosevic's attempt to change Yugoslavia's internal borders by force and create a greater Serbia sets a dangerous precedent. If he succeeds, others in the Balkans and elsewhere may be encouraged to try to do the same. Thus the Yugoslav crisis could have a ripple effect throughout the Balkans, exacerbating other conflicts and turning the region once again into a source of major instability and turmoil.

BULGARIA

Prior to 1989 Bulgaria was Moscow's most important ally in the Balkans. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, however, has deprived Moscow of its main strategic foothold in the Balkans and forced Bulgaria to craft a new security policy. Sofia would like to align itself more closely with Europe, but the prospects for integration into the EC or NATO in the near future are slim. Moreover, it is not a member of regional groupings like the Hexagonale (formerly the Pentagonale) or the loose triangular cooperation between Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Bulgaria's approach to security is dominated by its traditional fear of Turkey. Bulgaria was under Turkish domination for nearly 500 years and this has left a strong imprint on Bulgarian national consciousness. The Zhivkov regime consciously played up the "Turkish threat" in order to boost its own legitimacy. Moreover, the regime's effort to forcibly assimilate the Turkish minority was a periodic source of friction in relations with Turkey.

Bilateral relations seriously deteriorated in the summer of 1989 when the Zhivkov regime compelled some 300,000 ethnic Turks to emigrate to Turkey, causing severe social problems for Turkey and forcing Ankara to close its border with Bulgaria. The reversal of Zhivkov's policy by his successors has contributed to a gradual improvement in relations, especially in the economic field.[11] Bulgaria and Turkey have also begun to establish closer military contacts. In July 1990 a military delegation, headed by Lt. General Radnyn Minchev, Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, paid a visit to Turkey -- the first visit to Turkey by a Bulgarian Chief of Staff in the post-war period.

These developments have helped to put Bulgarian-Turkish relations on a firmer footing. However, the Turkish minority issue continues to be residual source of tension. Bulgarian officials worry, moreover, that Turkey's strong support for the U.S. in the Gulf War could result in an intensified effort by Washington to build up Turkey as a regional military power, further tipping the military imbalance in Bulgaria's disfavor.

The Bulgarian military, which remains dominated by officers with close ties to the Zhivkov regime, has sought to play up the Turkish threat and use it as an excuse

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[11]For details, see Kjell Engelbrekt, "Relations with Turkey: A Review of Post-Zhivkov Developments," *Report on Eastern Europe*, April 26, 1991, pp. 9-10.

for continued close security cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, there is strong resistance among the leading opposition forces to signing any new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union which perpetuates security ties to the USSR. Moreover, the massive economic and ethnic problems in the USSR reduce its attractiveness as a credible protector. Indeed, to the extent that any country has leverage over Turkey, it is the United States, not the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria's residual concern with Turkey has been a prime motivation behind Sofia's effort to forge closer ties to Greece. In 1986 the two countries signed a Declaration of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation which included provisions for cooperation in the defense area. Recently both countries have stepped up defense cooperation and agreed to coordinate their regional strategies more closely.[12] While it is still too soon to talk of an "Athens-Sofia" axis, the closer cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece highlights the degree to which old alignments and patterns have begun to shift in the Balkans as the Cold War confrontation fades.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia -- and particularly the prospect of the emergence of an independent Macedonia -- adds a new uncertain element to the Balkan equation. An independent, highly nationalistic Macedonia would be a source of instability in the Balkans. It would put pressure on both Greece and Bulgaria to recognize a Macedonian minority. Some groups might even raise territorial claims and resurrect calls for a Greater Macedonia.[13] At the same time, nationalist groups within Bulgaria might raise demands for the restoration of a "greater Bulgaria," which would include Macedonia. In such a heated atmosphere, violence and even terrorism could increase, posing a serious threat to the process of reform and democratization in Bulgaria.[14]

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[12]Paul Anastasi, "Greece and Bulgaria Plan Anti-Turkish Strategies," *New York Times*, February 7, 1990.

[13]Since 1989 several groups have surfaced demanding the recognition of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, particularly the border district of Pirin. For details, see Patrick Moore, "The Macedonian Questions Resurfaces," *Report on Eastern Europe*, April 6, 1990, pp. 46-49.

[14]One disturbing aspect of the growth of nationalism in Bulgaria since 1989 has been the tendency of some of the nationalists to idealize the old IMRO, the Macedonian terrorist organization, which operated as a state within a state from 1919-1934 and was responsible for the assassination of numerous politicians, including King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. See "Bulgariens Nationalisten auf dem Vormarsh," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, June 13, 1991.

ROMANIA

Romania has also been affected by the winds of change that have swept across
Eastern Europe. For decades Romania earned a reputation as a maverick because of
its willingness to deviate from Soviet policy on key issues such as participation in
the Warsaw Pact, relations with Israel, ties to West Germany, INF, support for the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. This won Ceausescu accolades in the West and
often prompted Western leaders to overlook or downplay Romania's abysmal human
rights record.

The demise of the Cold War has ended Romania's special role as a go-between
East and West and deprived it of its maverick function. Indeed, Romania's position
has changed 180 degrees: once the most "anti-Soviet" country in Eastern Europe,
today it is Moscow's best ally in Eastern Europe. In April 1991 Bucharest signed a
bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, which contains clauses
that prohibit either side from joining an alliance directed against the other and
forbid the stationing of foreign troops on the natural territory of either side.[15] The
treaty also calls for continued military contacts.

The Romanian-Soviet treaty reflects the degree to which Romania has begun
to edge closer to the Soviet Union since 1989. Economic factors undoubtedly played
an important role: with its economy in shambles, Romania needs Soviet economic
assistance, especially raw materials.[16] Politically, moreover, it remains somewhat
isolated. With the exception of France, which has traditionally had special ties to
Romania, most Western countries have been skeptical of the Romanian leadership's
commitment to genuine democracy and have kept their distance from Romania.

Two issues could emerge as major sources of tension in the future. The first is
the problem of the Hungarian minority. This has been a perennial source of tension
between the two countries. The Kadar regime in Hungary generally tried to play
down the issue. However, the situation of the minority significantly deteriorated in
the 1980s, and under pressure from intellectuals and dissidents, the Kadar regime

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[15]See Vladimir Socor, "The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and its Regional Implications,"
Report on Eastern Europe, May 3, 1991, pp. 25-33.

[16]Romania is the only country in Eastern Europe that has its own indigenous oil supply.
However, production has fallen off in recent years and in the last decade Romania has been forced to
import increasing amounts of oil from the USSR.

was forced to adopt a more assertive stance on the issue, raising it in a number of international fora, including the CSCE.

The collapse of the Ceausescu dictatorship initially raised hopes that the condition of the minority would improve. And for a short time, these hopes seemed to be justified. However, under pressure from conservative nationalist groups like Vatra Romaneascu, the National Salvation Front backed off from some of its initial promises and, as a result, Hungarian-Romanian relations today are little better than they were under Ceausescu.

The second potential source of tension is the Bessarabian issue. Bessarabia has changed hands several times over the last century. In 1940 it was annexed by Stalin and parts were incorporated into the Moldavian SSR and the Ukraine. Ceausescu refrained from raising the issue openly, probably in order to avoid giving Moscow any pretence for increasing pressure on Romania. However, the issue has reemerged since 1989, in large part because of the stronger nationalistic stand taken by the National Front in Moldavia in its effort to gain independence from Moscow.

The main goal of the Front is to achieve independence from the Soviet Union. Unification with Romania is seen as a long term goal rather than an immediate prospect. Its policy has been aimed at creating "two Romanian states" with close political and cultural ties.[17] During his visit to Romania in February 1991, for instance, Moldavian President Mircea Segur spoke of creating a "cultural federation" between the two countries.[18] This concept envisions the creation of a web of close cooperation and contacts at a variety of levels, both governmental and societal, in many different fields -- education, science, religion, and culture, but falls short of actual political unification.

At the moment the majority of Moldavians see political merger with Romania as undesirable.[19] The reassertion of Romanian national identity and cultural integration with Romania go hand in hand with a strong Moldavian patriotism and desire for statehood. As Segur has noted, "We have not proclaimed our sovereignty

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[17]For details see Mihai Carp, "Cultural Ties Between Romania and Soviet Moldavia," *Report on Eastern Europe*, July 27, 1990, pp. 41-44.

[18]See Vladimir Socor, "Moldavian President Breaks New Ground in Romania," *Report on the USSR*, February 22, 1991, pp. 20-23.

[19]In a poll taken by the Romanian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and the Moldavian Academy's Institute of Social Sciences in July 1991, 71 percent of the Moldavians polled agreed that "Moldavia and Romania should form two independent states in the period ahead," 17 percent disagreed, and 12 percent had no opinion. See Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, Nr. 151, August 19, 1991.

in order to merge with somebody else but to become masters of our own house."[20]
Moldavia sees closer ties to Romania as buttressing its drive for statehood and
sovereignty.

The Iliescu government has also generally sought to downplay the issue of
unification. While acknowledging that the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia was a
"historic injustice," Romanian President Ion Iliescu has warned that it would not be
in Romania's interest to try to redraw the borders. The new Soviet-Romanian
Friendship Treaty makes no mention of Bessarabia and reaffirms the sanctity of the
present borders between the two countries. In recent months, however, the
Bessarabian issue has resurfaced as a heated topic of debate in Romanian politics.
The Soviet-Romanian treaty was strongly criticized, both by the Moldavians and the
domestic opposition in Romania, as implying tacit acceptance of the incorporation of
Bessarabia into the Soviet Union. Moreover, in June 1991, the Romanian
parliament passed a resolution condemning and pronouncing null and void *ab initio*
the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 and the ensuing Soviet
annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania. While the
resolution did not directly call for a revision of the borders, it did refer to Bessarabia
and Northern Bukovina as "sacred Romanian lands" and called on the Romanian
government to assist in the fulfillment of the "legitimate aspirations of the
population of the forcibly annexed Romanian territories."[21]

The parliamentary resolution underscores the strong emotional feelings about
Bessarabia among the Romanian population at large. The failed coup in the Soviet
Union, moreover, adds a dynamic new element to the equation. The accelerated
disintegration of the Soviet Union in the wake of the coup could thrust the issue of
unification between Romania and Moldavia to the forefront of the political agendas
in both countries more rapidly than initially anticipated. As happened in Germany,
the idea of a gradual step-by-step process of unification may simply be overtaken by
events as the populations in both countries take matters into their own hands,
leaving the politicians to pick up the pieces.

The Bessarabian issue, however, is a two-edged sword. Calls by Romania for a
return of Bessarabia might encourage Hungary to demand the return of

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[20]Tass, October 22, 1990.
[21]Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, No. 119, June 25, 1991. For a detailed discussion, see Vladimir
Socor, "Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania," *Report on Eastern
Europe,* July 19, 1991, pp. 23-27.

Transylvania, which was added to Romania as part of the peace settlement after World War I. Indeed, it is probably no accident that the Hungarian minority in Romania has supported the Romanian position on Bessarabia.

In addition, some 30-35 percent of the population in Moldavia is non-Romanian -- mostly Russian. A reincorporation of Moldavia into Romania would significantly change the ethnic composition of Romania, creating another large ethnic minority with within its borders with strong ties to one of its neighbors. It would also create tensions with the Ukraine, since a large part of the Moldavian lands annexed by Stalin are today part of the Ukrainian SSR.[22]

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[22]The Romanian Parliament's resolution on Bessarabia, for instance, was strongly condemned by the Ukrainian media as a violation of the Helsinki Accord and effort to overturn the postwar territorial status quo. For details see Socor, "Annexation of Bessarabia and Bukovina Condemned by Romania," pp. 25-26.

ALBANIA

Albania has been an anomaly in the Balkans in the postwar period. Basically a Yugoslav satellite in the first years after World War II, it gravitated into Soviet orbit after the Tito-Stalin break in 1948. In 1961 it then broke with Moscow and became a Chinese protege. After the break with the Chinese in 1976, it pursued a policy of "splendid isolation," refusing until relatively recently to play an active role in European or Balkan politics. Internally it remained the most orthodox communist state in the Balkans, combining domestic repression with rabid xenophobia.

In the last few years, however, the winds of change that have swept across Eastern Europe have also begun to have an impact on Albania. The upheavals in Eastern Europe increased the pressures for change in Albania, leading to major domestic unrest in 1990 and early 1991. The unrest badly shook the Albanian Labor Party (ALP) and forced the party to undertake a series of democratic reforms, including the convocation of democratic elections in March 1991. The ALP succeeded in winning the elections, largely because of the weakness of the opposition. As in Bulgaria and Romania, however, the ALP has been forced to gradually cede power in the face of mounting strikes and protests. In June the government of Prime Minister Fatos Nano, a member of the ALP, was forced to step down in favor of an interim care-taker government, headed by Ylli Bufi, a reform communist, and agree to hold new elections in the summer of 1992.

At the same time, Albania has begun to pursue a more active foreign policy, especially in the Balkans. The Balkan opening began prior to the initiation of the democratization process, but the recent domestic changes have given it greater impetus. Relations with Greece have improved significantly, highlighted by the ending in August 1987 of the state of war that had existed between the two countries since 1940. This paved the way for a significant expansion of relations, especially in the economic area, though relations continued to be marred by differences over the Albanian treatment of the Greek minority, most of whom are located in southern Albania (Northern Epirus) near the Greek-Albanian border.[23]

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[23]The exact size of the Greek minority in Albania is unclear. Albanian sources claim there are about 60,000 members but Greek officials claim as many as 400,000. The exact number is probably somewhere in between.

Albania also revised its attitude toward Balkan cooperation. Under Enver Hoxha, the Stalinist dictator who ruled Albania until 1985, Albania had strictly refused to participate in multi-lateral cooperation in the Balkans. However, under Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's successor, Albania attended the Balkan summit in Belgrade -- the first time it had ever attended such a meeting -- and in October 1990 it hosted the Balkan foreign minister's meeting in Tirana. In June 1991 Tirana joined the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), another important break with the past.

These developments highlight the degree to which Albania has begun to break out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation recently. The process of democratization is likely to give these trends greater momentum. In the next decade Albania is likely to become a more active player in Balkan politics. At the same time, the process of democratization in Albania is likely to be highly unstable. Hence both Greece and Italy could be faced with an even greater number of refugees.

The main impact of Albania's emergence from its isolation, however, is likely to be on the Kosovo problem. Faced with continued repression by Serbia, the Kosovars are likely to look increasingly to Tirana for support, especially if Albania continues to democratize. The government in Albania has made clear that it intends to give the question of human rights in Kosovo high priority and Albania has become increasingly vocal in its criticism of Serbian policy toward Kosovo lately.[24] Thus Kosovo could prove to be the next flashpoint in the Balkans.

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[24]In mid July the Albanian parliament passed a resolution warning that the "use of genocide" in Kosovo and other Albanian territories in Yugoslavia would "turn into a fight for the existence of the Albanian people" and that Serbia would "face the reaction of *the whole Albanian nation.*" (italics mine). (RFE *Daily Report*, Nr. 131, July 12, 1991). In addition, on July 13 Albanian Prime Minister Ylli Bufi met with Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League in Kosovo as well as the Albanian leaders in Macedonia, and emphasized to them that Albania supported the "democratic struggle" of the Albanians in Yugoslavia for "their legitimate rights." (RFE *Daily Report*, Nr. 133, July 16, 1991).

GREECE

The end of the Cold War and democratization process in Eastern Europe have
also had an impact on Greek policy and interests. On the one hand, it has opened up
new opportunities for Greek diplomacy in the Balkans. At the same time, it has
revived old conflicts and animosities, such as the Macedonian issue, whose
reemergence could negatively affect Greek security interests in the region.

The increased instability in the Balkans threatens to undo much of the effort
which Greece has devoted to trying to improve relations with its Balkan neighbors
over the last decade. Much of the credit for the improvement belongs to Prime
Minister Constantine Caramanlis, who made a "Balkan opening" a major tenet of his
foreign policy in the wake of the Cyprus crisis in 1974.[25] Caramanlis' Balkan policy
was part of a general effort to expand Greece's foreign policy options and reduce
reliance on the U.S. in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. But it also was designed
to outflank Turkey and gain support for Greece's policy on Cyprus.

The Papandreou government essentially built on the foundations laid down by
Caramanlis. The cornerstone of his Balkan policy was his support for the creation of
a nuclear free zone in the Balkans, a Romanian initiative launched in the 1950s
which was revived by Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in the summer of 1981.
Papandreou's support for the Bulgarian initiative was primarily influenced by
domestic concerns -- particularly his desire to appease the left wing of his party.
Politically it was an empty gesture which cost him little since it had no chance of
implementation. At the same time it allowed him to portray himself as the
champion of peace and detente in the Balkans.

The most visible improvement in relations has been with Bulgaria. Both
countries share a common fear of Turkey and in recent years they have sought to
increasingly coordinate their policies. In 1986 the two countries signed a
Declaration of Friendship and Good Neighborliness. The declaration committed
both sides to consult in case of a threat to security in the region and also provided for
increased military contacts.

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[25]For a detailed discussion see Nikolaos A. Stavrou, "Greek-American Relations and Their
Impact on Balkan Cooperation," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides, *Greek-American
Relations: A Critical Review* (New York: Pella, 1980), pp. 149-186. Also Evangelos Kofos, "Greece and
the Balkans in the '70s and the '80s," *Yearbook 1990* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defense and
Foreign Policy, 1991), pp. 193-227.

The collapse of communism in Bulgaria and the initiation of a far-reaching process of democratization in Sofia since late 1990 has given greater impetus to this rapprochement. In February 1991 the Greek and Bulgarian chiefs of staff signed a military cooperation agreement that called for regular exchanges of military delegations and the initiation of work on bilateral confidence-building measures. Bulgaria also strongly supported Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis' initiative for the creation of a zone free of offensive weapons along the Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian border.

The process of democratization in Albania has given new impetus to the general improvement in relations between Albania and Greece noted earlier. At the same time, it has created new refugee problems between the two countries. The unrest in Albania in January 1991 resulted in the flight of more than 10,000 refugees to Greece, forcing the Greeks to proclaim a state of emergency.[26] Renewed unrest could stimulate a new wave of refugees far exceeding that faced by Athens in early 1991, exacerbating Greece's current economic difficulties and creating significant social and economic problems over the long run.[27] Moreover, there is a danger that any tensions in Kosovo could spill over into Greece.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has caused particular unease in Athens, primarily because of the possibility that it could lead to the emergence of an independent Macedonia, thus reviving the Macedonian question. After the Stalin-Tito break in 1948 the historical differences over Macedonia were largely muted. However, since Tito's death in 1980, the Macedonian leadership in Skopje has adopted a more nationalistic position on Macedonia and stepped up its demands for recognition of the "Macedonian minority" in Greece.[28] This has led to increased polemics and border incidents between the two countries.[29]

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[26]See Paul Anastasi, "Athens Alarmed over Refugees from Albania," *New York Times,* January 3, 1991. Also William Montalbano, "Ethnic Greeks Leave Albania in Greater Numbers to Seek Fruits of West," *Los Angeles Times,* January 13, 1991.

[27]The problem is compounded by approximately 200,000 Poles working illegally in Greece. The issue of illegal immigration, however, is not limited to Greece. It is becoming a major problem in *all* the southern members of the EC.

[28]Greece does not recognize a separate Macedonian minority; it claims that the Slavic population in the Greek parts of Macedonia are "Slavophone Greeks." For a good discussion of the roles of the Macedonian issue in Greek-Yugoslav relations see Evangelos Kofos, "The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation," (Thessaloniki: The Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987).

[29]See Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslav Macedonians Demand Greece's Recognition of Aegean Macedonians," *Report on Eastern Europe,* June 1, 1990, pp. 45-49; also Kerin Hope, "Greek-Yugoslav Row Blows over Macedonian Issue," *Financial Times,* June 22, 1990; and Victor Meier, "Wieder die Mazedonische Frage," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 22, 1990.

An independent nationalistic Macedonia would exacerbate recent difficulties. In particular Greek officials fear that Turkey could begin to support the Macedonian position more openly as a means of putting pressure on Greece. The visit of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov to Turkey in July 1991, for instance, caused considerable unease in Athens and prompted warnings that any Turkish support for Macedonia could jeopardize the chances for an improvement of Greek-Turkish relations.[30]

The most serious threats to Greek security, however, are posed by the long-standing differences with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean.[31] While neither issue at the moment seems on the verge of eruption, as long as the disputes remain unresolved, there is always a danger that some unforeseen incident could trigger a conflict, as almost happened in 1987 when Turkey sent a drilling ship, the Sismik II, into disputed parts of the Aegean. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and an open conflict was avoided. But the incident nevertheless highlights the potential dangers that exist as long as the disputes remain unresolved.

It was partially the recognition of this fact that led to the initiation of the "Davos dialogue" between Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in early 1988. The Davos meeting contributed to a general improvement in the atmosphere between the two countries.[32] However, the dialogue never really got off the ground. It generated strong domestic opposition in both countries and fizzled after Ozal's visit to Athens in June 1988. Moreover, the abortive dialogue underscored that there could be no serious improvement in bilateral relations without a resolution of the Cyprus question.

There have recently been tentative signs that both countries may now be willing to pick up the threads left hanging when the dialogue was broken off in 1988.[33] It is within this framework that the proposal in July 1991 by Mitsotakis for

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[30]See the remarks by Greek Foreign Minister Andonios Samaras on Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network 11:30 GMT, July 11, 1991. Translated in FBIS-WEU-91-134, July 12, 1991, p. 41.

[31]For a comprehensive discussion of the differences over the Aegean, see Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," *Adelphi Papers* 155 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1979-80). On Cyprus, see Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Winter 1988-89). For a balanced Greek view that highlights the problems both issues have played in relations with the United States, see Theodore Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[32]For a detailed discussion, see Ellen Laipson, "Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era," *Congressional Research Service*, December 1, 1988. Also Ronald Meinardus, "Eine neue Phase in der griechisch-Türkishen Beziehungen," *Europa Archiv*, Folge 14, 1988, pp. 403-411.

[33]See "Anzeichen eines griechisch-türkischen Dialogs," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, July 7-8, 1991.

the establishment of a zone free of offensive weapons along the Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian border should be seen.[34] While Turkey rejected the initiative because it did not include the Dodecanese islands, the proposal nevertheless, represents a small but important sign of Greece's interest in renewing a dialogue with Turkey and a point of departure for future discussions.

There have also been signs of movement on the Cyprus issue. The general deterioration of the situation in the Balkans has intensified the interest of the Mitsotakis government in seeing the Cyprus issue resolved. The Bush Administration has also given a resolution of the dispute high priority. While it has not made any specific new proposals, it has sought to act as a behind-the-scenes "catalyst" to infuse new life into the long-stalled inter-communal talks.[35] As a result, the prospects for a Cyprus settlement are today better than they have been in years.

Much will depend on the results of the quadripartite conference scheduled to be held in Washington in September under United Nations sponsorship. While a number of differences still remain to be resolved, the conference could prove to be an important step toward an overall settlement of the Cyprus issue. A resolution of the Cyprus issue would remove an important source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe generally. In addition, it could also give new impetus to efforts to resolve bilateral differences over the Aegean.

Greek-Turkish issues have also been strained by minority issues, particularly the rights of the Turkish minority in Greece.[36] The Turkish minority, supported by the Turkish media, complain that Greek legislation discriminates against them and makes it difficult for them to gain prosperity.[37] The Greeks, in turn, complain that the Greek orthodox minority in Istanbul, once over 100,000, has been reduced to less than 6,000 as a result of systematic Turkish economic discrimination.

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[34]For details of the Greek proposal and the motivations behind it see "Entspannungs initiative für Sudosteuropa," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, July 16, 1991.

[35]Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names Next Challenge: Cyprus," *New York Times*, July 19, 1991. Peter Thompson, "Bush Offers 'Catalyst' Role on Cyprus," *Independent*, July 20, 1991. James Gestenzang, "Bush Calls on Greeks to Settle Cyprus Dispute," *Los Angeles Times*, July 19, 1991.

[36]There are several hundred thousand Muslims in Greece, mostly located in Thrace near the Turkish border. Some of these are gypsies and Pomaks. However, the majority, about 100,000, are ethnic Turks.

[37]See Kerin Hope, "Conservatives Fight a Losing Battle Among Greek Moslems," *Financial Times*, April 3, 1990. Also, "Race in Thrace," *The Economist*, March 2, 1991, p. 46.

In and of itself the problem of the Turkish minority is not particularly important. However, it takes on greater significance within the overall context of other Greek-Turkish differences and the general reassertion of ethnic conflicts within the Balkans, particularly in Yugoslavia.. If Yugoslavia's disintegration exacerbates Muslim-Christian tensions, Turkey might begin to take a more assertive posture toward the rights of Muslims throughout the region, especially the Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. In addition, as the issue of minority rights gains greater visibility in Europe, Greece could face increased criticism from some of its Western allies regarding its treatment of the Turkish minority.[38]

These considerations appear to have prompted the Mitsotakis government to adopt a more liberal policy toward the rights of the Turkish minority.[39] Taken together with other Greek initiatives, the recent shift in Greek policy on the minority issue could contribute to an easing of Greek-Turkish tensions and lay the groundwork for the resumption of a broader dialogue on other outstanding bilateral issues.

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[38]In 1991 the report by the U.S. State Department on human rights, submitted to Congress annually in the spring, for the first time explictly mentioned Greece's treatment of the Turkish minority. This is a small but important example of the way in which minority rights could begin to impinge on bilateral relations.

[39]During a visit to Thrace in May 1991 Mitsotakis announced that Article 99 of the Greek citizenship law, which discriminates between citizens of Hellenic and non-Hellenic origin, would be amended to establish full equality of citizenship for Christians and Moslems alike. See Mitsotakis' interview with the Turkish daily, *Hurriyet,* June 15, 1991, in FBIS-WEU-91-118, June 19, 1991, p. 33.

TURKEY

The winds of change have also had an impact on Turkey. By nature of its geographic position, religion and history, Turkey looks both East and West. It is a member of NATO, but it also has strong ties to the Middle East and the Balkans.

In the aftermath of World War II, Turkey was regarded as an important bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as a staging ground for a counter-threat against the Soviet Union. Turkey's control of the Dardanelles and Bosphoros Straits was particularly important and provided a significant obstacle to the Soviet Navy's access to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey's army -- the second largest in NATO -- also served to tie down Soviet troops in the Caucasus that might otherwise be employed on the Central Front.

Several recent developments have begun to alter Turkish security perceptions and could affect the role Turkey may play in the future. These include:

Changes in the Soviet Union

Gorbachev's emphasis on East-West detente has diminished Western perceptions of the Soviet threat. The lessening of the Soviet military threat in turn has reduced Turkey's strategic importance as a barrier against Soviet expansion into the Middle East. At the same time, it has led to a shift in Turkish threat perceptions. Turkey now sees the main threat to its security coming not from the Soviet Union but from Iraq and Syria. Turkish defense strategy has begun to reflect this new threat perception.[40]

Gorbachev's emphasis on perestroika has also strengthened centrifugal tendencies within the Soviet Union and sparked a renewal of nationalism and Muslim consciousness within the Central Asia republics of the USSR.[41] Many of these Muslims look to Turkey to play a leadership role among the Turkic peoples of the world, especially those in Central Asia. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Turkey was a beacon for emerging Central Asian nationalism. While Turkey has sought to play down its Pan-Turkic role since the founding of the Turkish Republic, Ankara

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[40]See Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, pp. 34-48.

[41]On the revival of national consciousness in Central Asia, see in particular Graham Fuller, "The Emergence of Central Asia," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1990, pp. 49-67.

could be compelled to rethink this policy by developments in the Central Asian republics, especially if its effort to gain full membership in the EC fails.

The impact of developments in Central Asia on Turkish policy have already begun to be felt. The Soviet Republic of Turkamenistan, for instance, has asked to open consulates in Turkey. And during his visit to the USSR in March 1991, President Turgut Ozal paid a visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakstan -- the first time that a Turkish president has ever visited these republics. Turkish radio broadcasts and cultural exchanges with the Central Asian republics have also increased. To be sure, these efforts hardly represent a new wave of Pan-Turkism, but over the long term, developments in Central Asia could have a more substantial impact on Turkish policy, increasing Turkey's orientation towards the Muslim world and the Middle East.

The prospect of the emergence of an independent Armenia, moreover, adds an important new element that could affect Turkish policy. Turkish relations with Armenia have been strained by the Armenian campaign to obtain international recognition of the genocide of 1915 as well as the nostalgic yearning to recover the former Armenian territories in northeast Turkey ceded to Ataturk in 1921.[42] The advent to power of a non-communist government in Armenia in August 1990, however, has led to a rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. The new non-communist government in Yerevan, headed by Levon Ter-Petrossyan has shelved -- at least for the time being -- all irredentist demands on Turkey.[43]

The thaw in relations with Armenia are another example of how the changes in the Soviet Union have begun to impact on Turkish policy. In response, Turkey has pursued a two-track policy. On the one hand, Ankara has tried to improve relations with the "center." During Ozal's visit to the USSR in March, the two countries signed an Agreement on Good Neighborly Relations. Trade with the Soviet Union has more than quadrupled and during Ozal's visit in March a number of agreements were signed that could raise the volume of trade to $10 billion (from $1.9 billion in 1990) by the end of the decade.[44]

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[42]Between 1974-1985, Dasnak terrorist groups and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) murdered more than 45 Turkish diplomats and members of their families as part of a campaign to call attention to the Armenian cause and force the return of the "lost lands."

[43]See Elizabeth Fuller, "The Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 20, No. 10, May 15, 1991, pp. 4-6.

[44]See Jonathan Eyal, "Ozal Aims to Revive Turkish Power," *Guardian*, May 21, 1991.

At the same time, Ozal has sought to develop a network of bilateral and multilateral ties with the individual republics. The Turkish proposal for the creation of a Black Sea Economic Zone has been the centerpiece of this effort. The zone, which would include the RSFSR, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania and Bulgaria, is in part designed to offset Turkey's continued exclusion from the EC. But it also represents an attempt to exploit the Soviet republic's desire for an infusion of capital and investment. With its expanding market economy and good ties to the newly emerging autonomous republics, Turkey is well placed to become a major economic power in the Black Sea region over the next decade.

European Integration

Turkey has also been affected by recent progress toward European integration. One the one hand, this has increased the desire of the Turkish elite, especially President Ozal, to forge closer ties to Western Europe. On the other, it has intensified Turkish fears of being excluded from Europe.

A cornerstone of this effort to forge closer ties to Europe has been Turkey's application for membership in the EC. For Turkey the membership in the EC is not just an economic issue. It is seen in Ankara as a symbol of Turkey's political acceptance by Europe and a guarantee of Turkey's Western orientation. Hence the EC's decision in December 1989 not to consider the Turkish application until at least 1993, has caused disappointment in Turkey and been seen in some Turkish circles as proof of an "anti-Turkish bias" in Western Europe. Many feel that the Community is opposed to Turkish membership because Turkey is a Muslim country.

Turkey has staked high hopes on entering the EC. A broadening of links without full membership, as currently advocated by the EC Commission, falls short of Turkey's expectations and could reinforce the disillusionment with Europe which has been gaining ground in certain sectors of the Turkish elite lately, strengthening the hand of those who would like to see a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy away from the West.

In addition, the effort to create a strong security and defense component within the EC and to revitalize the WEU poses problems for Turkey since Ankara is not a member of either organization. If defense and security functions are increasingly assured by these organizations, Turkey would effectively be excluded from having a voice in the development of European foreign and security policy. Over the long term this could have a major affect not only on Turkey's ties to

Europe, but on the whole process of Westernization, which since Ataturk has been closely tied to joining Europe.

The Gulf Crisis

The Gulf crisis underscored the strategic importance of Turkey to the West, especially to the U.S., in any Middle East and Persian Gulf contingencies. The Turkish contribution to the allied war effort was considerable. While Turkey did not contribute troops, it did allow the use of NATO airbases on Turkish soil for allied bombing sorties into Iraq; it deployed nearly 100,000 troops along the Iraqi border, thereby tying down a substantial number of Iraqi troops which otherwise would have been available to counter an allied thrust into Iraq from Kuwait; and it closed down the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean through which Iraq exports over 50 percent of its oil, thereby imposing significant economic hardships on Iraq and undercutting Baghdad's overall military effort.

These moves reversed Turkey's previous policy of carefully avoiding involvement in Middle East and Persian Gulf conflicts. Moreover, they entailed significant economic and political costs. Turkey lost some $7 billion in export revenues, tourism, and transit fees as a result of its closure of the pipeline to the Mediterranean. Ozal's policy met stiff domestic opposition. It was severely criticized by opposition parties as well as members of his own party and triggered the resignation of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay.[45]

By committing himself so firmly to the allied war effort Ozal took a major political gamble. He clearly hoped that his gamble would pay substantial political dividends. With Iraq weakened, Turkey's role in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region could be substantially enhanced. Thus along with Iran, Turkey could prove to be a more influential actor in the region in the future. However, Turkey's secular tradition as well as Arab resentment of the centuries of Ottoman rule impose limits on Turkey's effort to fill any power vacuum that may emerge in the wake of the Gulf war.[46]

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[45]Clyde Haberman, "As Leader Keeps Nations War Role Secret, Many Turks Express Alarm," *New York Times*, January 22, 1991.

[46]The problems posed by Turkey's status as a secular state were highlighted during Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani's visit to Ankara in May 1991. Rafsanjani created a minor scandal by refusing to visit Ataturk's mausoleum (a break with normal protocol during a state visit to Turkey) because of Ataturk's separation of state and religion and by refusing upon his departure at the airport to shake hands with a female member of the Turkish delegation, Imren Aykut, the Minister of Labor, because she was not wearing a veil, as is the custom for Muslim women in Iran. Rafsanjani's actions,

Ozal clearly expects that his firm support of U.S. policy will bring tangible political and military benefits in relations with Washington. Two areas in particular are high on the Turkish agenda: increased military assistance and a revision of the 7-10 ratio to Greece and Turkey which has been upheld by the U.S. Congress in recent years. Ankara also hopes to obtain better access to American markets for its foodstuffs and textiles.

Ozal also hopes that Turkey's firm support of the allied war effort will increase Turkey's prospects for entry into the EC. Here, however, Turkey may face disappointment. As noted earlier, West European reservations about Turkish membership are strong, both on political as well as economic grounds. Turkey's economic development is substantially below that of the average EC member. Community members are also concerned about the impact of access to Turkish labor on the EC market at a time when many members are facing significant unemployment problems. These concerns are not likely to be alleviated by Turkey's support of the Gulf War.

The Gulf War, moreover, has served to focus greater international attention on Turkey's treatment of the Kurds. As a result, Turkish policy has come under sharper criticism by human rights groups in Western Europe. This criticism has struck a raw nerve in Turkey, reinforcing anti-Western sentiments.[47] The Turkish attacks on rebel bases in Northern Iraq have also been widely condemned in Europe. The Kurdish issue is thus likely to add a new irritant to Turkey's relations with Europe, further complicating its efforts to join the EC.

Finally, the Gulf War could have important long-term implications for domestic stability within Turkey itself. Since 1984, Kurdish guerrillas in southeastern Turkey have conducted a guerrilla war that has claimed the lives of over 1400 Turkish soldiers and civilians as well as 866 members of the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The large influx of Kurdish refugees into Turkey as a result of the Gulf War has heightened Turkish sensitivities about the possible impact on domestic stability in the Kurdish provinces. To defuse Western criticism and possible pressures for the creation of a separate Kurdish state, in January 1991

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which many Turks found offensive and insulting, caused a storm of criticism in the Turkish press. See "Angriff auf den Türkischen Laizismus," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung,* May 25, 1991.

[47]Clyde Haberman, "Turks Outraged as Kurd Aid Backfires," *New York Times,* May 17, 1991. Wolfgang Günter Lerch, "Die Turkei über den Westen verbittert," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* May 8, 1991.

Ozal lifted some of the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language imposed during the period of martial law in the early 1980s. However, Ozal's Kurdish policy is highly controversial and has provoked widespread opposition, even within his own party. Many Turks, especially the military, fear that any relaxation of controls could provoke increased unrest and lead to the fragmentation of the Turkish national state. On the other hand, a repressive policy toward the Kurds risks stimulating increased criticism from Turkey's Western allies, further isolating Turkey from Europe.

The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has opened up new prospects for Turkey to improve relations with its Balkan neighbors and expand its influence in the region, especially in the economic area. Turkey's growing economy and close ties to the Middle East make Ankara an attractive source of investment capital for Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. Indeed, if the plans for the creation of the Black Sea Economic Zone takes off, Turkey could emerge as a regional economic power in the Balkans in the next decade.

Turkey's status as a Muslim state may also enable it to play a more active role in the Balkans in the future. The Muslim issue, in fact, could emerge as a major source of tension in the Balkans in the coming decade. There are some four million Muslims in Yugoslavia. About two million of them -- 43 percent of the population -- live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Another two million live in Kosovo, several hundred thousand in Macedonia and another 100,000 in the Sanjak region of Serbia. Seventy percent of Albania's population (about 3.4 million) are Muslims. There are another million or so Muslims in Bulgaria (10 percent of the population) and several hundred thousand in Greece. Taken together, the Muslim population in the Balkans is larger than that of several states in the region. Moreover, the birth rate of the Muslim population is several times higher than that of the non-Muslim population.[48]

Over the long term, the growth of the Muslim population could rekindle the old conflicts between Christianity and Islam. Many dominant nationalities in the

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[48]Kosovo provides an example of the potential implications of this trend. In the early 1960s, some 65 percent of the population in Kosovo was Albanian (the majority of which were Muslims). However, by the 1980s, due to their high birth rate, the Albanians represented 90 percent of the population and had succeeded in taking over the province, and driving out the Serbs, who had previously been the dominant minority. This shift in the composition of the populations was one of the main factors contributing to an intensification of current tensions in Kosovo.

Balkans associate Muslims with the long years of Ottoman occupation and see them as an alien cultural and religious force within a predominantly Christian society. Moreover, they fear that the growth of Muslim consciousness and Muslim fundamentalism witnessed elsewhere may spread to the Balkans. Yet if Muslim political rights are suppressed -- as is currently the case in Serbia and to a lesser extent, in several other Balkan states -- the Muslim population may increasingly begin to seek support from outside forces, especially Turkey.[49]

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[49]One small example of what could become an emerging trend is provided by the visit of Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim President of Bosnia-Hercegovina, to Ankara in July 1991. Izetbegovic's visit was designed to elicit Turkish political support for Bosnia-Hercegovina. See Izetbegovic's interview in *Der Spiegel*, July 22, 1991.

WESTERN POLICY

In the past the Balkans were largely regarded by much of the Western community as a backwater, and with the exception of Yugoslavia, little attention was paid to the area. Most of Western attention since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 has tended to be focused on the countries of Central Europe -- Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The Balkans have been largely neglected. Instability in the Balkans, however, poses the most immediate and serious threat to European security. Without addressing this issue, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to create a stable security order in Europe.

The Yugoslav crisis highlights the dangers of instability in the Balkans. As noted earlier, the disintegration of Yugoslavia would have consequences that go well beyond its present borders. Italy, Greece and Austria could be faced with a major influx of refugees that could severely tax their social and economic infrastructures. Moreover, the disintegration of Yugoslavia is likely to accentuate other ethnic conflicts, especially the Macedonian and Kosovo disputes. Thus the West has a strong interest in seeing that the current crisis in Yugoslavia is defused and managed in a way that minimizes bloodshed and instability.

Western policy has been slow, however, to recognize the depth of the crisis and its larger implications. As long as Yugoslavia acted as a barrier against Soviet expansion into the Balkans and southern flank of NATO, Western interest in Yugoslavia remained high. However, once the Soviet "threat" receded, Western interest in Yugoslavia rapidly diminished. Indeed, the lack of active efforts at "crisis prevention" -- in contrast to "crisis management" -- was one of the main weaknesses of Western policy during the Yugoslav crisis. By the time the West began to give the crisis high-level policy attention, it was too late.

Yugoslavia, however, could be a microcosm of the type of security threats that Europe is likely to face in the future. The Yugoslav crisis highlights the lack of effective policy mechanisms available to deal with such crises. As long as the main threat was a Soviet invasion, the Western alliance at least had instruments at its disposal which might help to deter a crisis. While there was no automatic Western commitment or security guarantee to Yugoslavia, NATO had contingency plans to deal with a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. Moreover, the U.S. had often repeated the

importance which it attached to preserving the security, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

Today, however, the main threat is not external but *internal:* ethnic violence and civil war. NATO is not well structured to deal with such threats. It played virtually no role in the Yugoslav crisis. The crisis underscored the limits of NATO's utility in responding to security challenges that do not directly threaten member state's security. Yet it is precisely these type of crises, rather than a massive Soviet invasion of Europe, that are likely to pose the main threats to European security in the coming decade.

NATO's decision to create a new "rapid reaction force" in part represents an attempt to address this problem. But the rapid reaction force exists largely on paper. Moreover, it lacks adequate lift capability to really be of much use in any future "out of area" crisis. Finally, there is no clear consensus regarding under what circumstances it could be used. If some Alliance members are hesitant to send forces to deter an attack on Turkey -- a NATO member -- how likely are they to agree to send troops to stop a conflict between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania? Is Yugoslavia "out of area"?

The Yugoslav crisis has also underscored the limitations of the CSCE. During the crisis the CSCE proved a useful forum for dialogue, but its ability to act as an instrument of crisis management -- let alone crisis prevention -- was seriously hampered by the need to obtain the unanimous approval of all members for any collective action. In most instances, the CSCE did little more than endorse EC actions.

The ineffectiveness of NATO and the CSCE forced the European Community, almost by default, to fill the void. The EC has sought to use the crisis to demonstrate its capacity to act as the main instrument for crisis management in the new Europe. It played a critical role in brokering the compromise that led to a cease-fire in the fighting in Slovenia in early July. This high profile policy, however, contains certain risks. If it succeeds, it could significantly enhance the EC's prestige and give new impetus to the development of a common security policy. But if it fails, the EC's image could be tarnished and efforts to create a more coherent foreign and security policy could be set back indefinitely.

The effectiveness of the Community's efforts at mediation has been limited by the lack of consensus over objectives as well as by its inability to mount collective

military action or provide peace-keeping forces.[50] At the same time, the crisis has highlighted the deep divergences within the Community over the future direction of EC foreign and security policy. While some members, like France, advocate the creation of a military force that could be used for peacekeeping functions, others such as Germany are reluctant to see the EC take on such responsibility, preferring to rely on the CSCE and the UN. Moreover, there is no consensus over what role the WEU should play. Is the WEU to be a "bridge" between NATO and the EC or the defense arm of the European Community? Who would command any WEU peace-keeping force?

Finally, the crisis has raised fundamental questions about the role of the superpowers, especially the United States, in shaping the new security order in Europe. Both superpowers largely adopted a low profile approach to the crisis, preferring to let the Europeans take the lead. Indeed, President Bush appears to view the crisis primarily as a "European problem" that should be solved by the Europeans.[51]

This low profile approach, however, entails certain risks. For one thing, it is likely to reinforce the impression, already strong in many circles in Europe (especially France), that the U.S. is no longer interested in European affairs and does not intend to play an active role in Europe in the future. Moreover, if the EC mediation succeeds, or even if it only buys a little time, the EC, rather than NATO, will be seen as the paramount political-security institution in Europe and the one most capable of addressing the type of security threats likely to arise in Europe in the future. At the same time, the crisis is likely to give greater momentum to efforts to create a common European foreign and security policy within the EC.

In short, the Yugoslav crisis raises central issues that go to the heart of the debate about the organization of the new security order in Europe. The Yugoslav crisis is not an aberration. It is typical of the type of security threats that Europe is likely to face in the coming decade. With the demise of the Cold War, the focal point of Western security concern is likely to shift southward -- to the Balkans and

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[50]For an excellent discussion of the EC's approach to the Yugoslav crisis and its implications for future EC policy, see James B. Steinberg, "The Role of European Institutions in Balkan Security: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia," paper prepared for the RAND-ELIAMEP conference on "Instability and Political Change in Southeastern Europe," Rhodes, September 8-11, 1991. A revised version of the paper will appear as a chapter in F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.) *Balkan Security in the 1990s: Old Problems, New Challenges* (forthcoming).

[51]See Carole Kaps, "Bush sieht in der Bewältgung den Krise in Jugoslavien zunächst eine Aufgabe der Europäer," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* July 10, 1991.

Mediterranean. The Western democracies will have to craft a new set of policies to deal with these new security threats. The sooner they begin, the better.

The Mediterranean and the Middle East in Western Policy:
New Rules for an Old Game?

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Introduction

The present politico-strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas is dominated by the joint effects of the war against Iraq, the end of East-West confrontation and the dislocation of the post-communist states.

As was the crumbling of the Berlin Wall for Europe, the Gulf War seemed to mark a new start for the reorganization of the regional and international order: the United States asserted itself as the only superpower, while Europe, the Soviet Union and the United Nations demonstrated the scope and limits of their respective contributions to the management of the "new international order". Finally, regional conflicts seemed to emerge as the principal threat to world security in the post-Cold War era.

Yet, the global implications of the Gulf War are more complex and vary depending on whether the war is seen as an event with almost unrepeatable characteristics, or whether the main threats to world security today are felt to be of a non-military nature (the environment, drugs, migrations, resources, etc.). Furthermore, the events of the summer of 1991 -- civil war in Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the USSR -- have cast doubt on the "lessons of the Gulf". They call for new priorities and strategies and seriously debilitate the view which sees the Third World as the main troublemaker for global security.

Also the regional effects of the Gulf War are evident, and yet ambiguous. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the riparian countries was enhanced, but the region is still wrought by old and new fractures and the politico-institutional ties between the Mediterranean and the architecture of European security have yet to be clarified.

In the Middle East, it is not at all clear whether the strategic imbalances caused by the guardianship imposed on Iraq, the splitting of the Arab world, and the "singularization" of Iran can be compensated by the attenuation of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the containement of conventional and non-conventional proliferation.

Finally, the management of security in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East remains open to either cooperation or competition among the United States, Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union.

1.   The Mediterranean

The war in the Gulf completed the process of strategic transformation of the Mediterranean underway in the eighties. With the attenuation and subsequent disappearance of the traditional Soviet threat in Europe, the Mediterranean has lost its role as the Southern Flank of NATO and has become the borderline between the Euro-American Alliance and the conflicts in the so-called "arc of crises" extending from Afghanistan across the Horn of Africa to Morocco.

At the same time, the weakening of East-West constraints

has enhanced the autonomy of purely regional cooperative or conflictual relations and of the national policies of the main regional actors, whether they lie along the shores of the Mediterranean or not.

The interaction of these two parallel trends is contradictory, causing both greater integration and greater fragmentation in the Mediterranean.

On the one hand, the continued importance of the Middle East in Western energy supply and the growing need to protect European territory from the fall-out of regional conflicts of increasing lethality, reinforces the continuity between the Mediterranean and the Middle East and reduces the traditional differences in the approaches of Europe--which tended to separate the two regions-- and the United States, which has always seen the Mediterranean as "the place where the Gulf begins".

On the other hand, the end of the conditioning imposed by the Cold War enhances the regional autonomy and favours sub-regional cooperative undertakings like the "Hexagonal" or the Western Mediterranean Group (Italy participates in both). It also makes totally European management of the Yugoslavian crisis plausible, although not necessarily decisive.

The potential strategic contradiction between the requirements of a homogeneous and solid border and the North-South, Eastern-Western and more local fractures characterizing the Mediterranean region came to the fore -- miraculously without exploding -- during the Gulf crisis.

The most serious fracture in the Mediterranean which was

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not split wide open by the crisis is between North and South. The war was perceived in the Maghreb -- much more than in the Middle East -- as a war _also_ between North and South, between the rich and the poor. But some concomitant factors, above all the differences among the Arab countries and government/opposition dialectics within the single countries, limited -- but did not eliminate -- the subversive potential of that perception. A different stance on the part of Libya, for example, would have lent a completely different meaning to Algeria's enrollment during the war of a million volunteers for Iraq.

The specificity of the policies of the Southern European states also became evident without, however, leading to rifts. France, Italy and Spain took pains to keep open diplomatic communications with the Maghreb and the rest of the pro-Iraqi Arabs and to underline differences from the strategy of the coalition: all three countries nevertheless participated quickly and substantially in it.

Even minor conflicts in the region were temporarily put aside during the Gulf crisis. For example, after twenty years of cross vetos in NATO, the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NOFM) had at one point Turkish naval units operating under Greek command.

Finally, the wide range of political and institutional frameworks -- NATO, WEU, bilateral accords and national actions -- did not compromise the overall rationality of the military deployment in the Mediterranean, which turned out to be the supply line for the Gulf theatre of operations.

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No complaints, then? Actually, the Gulf lesson remains ambivalent for the Mediterranean: it teaches that fractures exist, but also that they can be overcome. Instead of hoping for a repetition of the exceptional circumstances that combined on that occasion, the problem now is to establish the conditions needed to make what was achieved under exceptional conditions attainable normally. Here, the prospects darken: all the problems of the North-South relationship remain at both the global and the regional levels; the developments in the Balkans have opened up a new area of conflict; and last of all, the Mediterranean region is still without a unifying politico-institutional framework.

2. The Middle East

Just as there is only one real loser of the Gulf War -- Iraq -- there is also only one indisputable winner in the region-- Saudi Arabia.

Yet, Saudi Arabia is a weak winner, structurally unable to constitute the fulcrum of a new inter-Arab order. Then again, Saudi policy seem clearly aimed at isolating the Arabian Peninsula from the regional political context.

The first to give up de facto the anti-Israeli boycott, the Gulf Cooperation Council-GCC countries offer only passive support to the Arab-Israeli peace conference, barely condescending to send an observer to represent them. The withdrawal of the peninsular countries from the regional context is even more evident in the severing of the umbilical cord of financial aid and the substitution of Arab labour by Asian, possibly non-

Islamic, or East European workers.

Any remaining involvement of the GCC countries in regional affairs is strictly defensive (and sometimes vindictive, as Saudi attitudes towards Yemen indicate).

The guardianship imposed on Iraq and the introversion of the countries of the Peninsula neutralize the power of the Arab pole in the Middle Eastern strategic equation, add weight to the two military powers left in the region, Israel and Iran, which, however, have conflictual relations with the rest of the region, and pave the way for the rehabilitation of Turkey as a regional power. In the absence of a solid axis of inter-Arab alliance, Egypt seems incapable of exerting a decisive influence on the new regional order.

This situation of strategic imbalance can only be stabilized in the long term by a new regional balance of power; however, in the short and medium terms the direct intervention of a powerful external actor with influence over all regional actors is required.

At the moment (but for how long?) the American political and military presence responds to these criteria and is, thus, in a position to attempt stabilization of this key area for Western security.

If successful, the three processes on which the current American strategy is based -- the Arab-Israeli peace conference, control of NBC proliferation and post-war conventional rearmament, security guarantees to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula -- will remove some of the most important destabilizing factors of the old regional order.

However, each of these three processes is so complex as to risk failure, and so partial as to risk leaving intact (even in case of success) some of the destabilizing components of the problem.

In the most positive hypothesis, the success of the American-lead action could, in the course of the next 10 to 15 years, lead to the establishment of a new regional order founded on cooperative rather than conflictual ties.

An evolution towards this scenario, or more realistic intermediate variants involving continued residual conflictuality contained by the overall integrative trend, would be in keeping with the general evolution in the Third World in the post-Cold War period.

Many countries of the South are turning to regional cooperation for more effective and less marginal integration into a now unipolar international system. This regionalist tendency began to emerge strongly in the Arab world after the clear decline of East-West confrontation (Arab Maghreb Union and the moribund Arab Cooperation Council were formed in February 1989) and has been hindered in the Mashreq mainly by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Yet, the development of cooperative regionalism is now much more difficult in the Middle East: the war has dramatically intensified the economic, demographic and political crisis in the Arab world and none of the strategies implemented in the postwar period is directed at dealing with it.

As clearly demonstrated by some of the motivations behind

Saddam's adventure and by the persisting vitality of Islamic fundamentalism, economic factors were and remain at the origin of the political instability in the region, but the political and economic resources needed to counter them have not yet been mobilized.

All projects to date aimed at systematically tackling the financing of regional development have been shelved. The American idea of establishing a Middle Eastern bank after the model of the EBRD for the East has been set aside because the major potential financers, the GCC countries, continue, despite declarations to the contrary, to prefer the old system of direct political financing.

European proposals (in particular French and Italian) for linking the bank's financing mechanism to agreement between oil producers and consumers were opposed by the US, interested in keeping the price of oil low. Finally, contingent financial difficulties and the policy of political disengagement pursued by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia lend little credibility to the recovery of a constant flow of inter-Arab finances -- apart from emergency distribution during the crisis -- in spite of the plans to that end announced by the GCC.

As for the political crisis, it is evident that the lack of democratic legitimacy of most of the Arab regimes in power makes the implementation of badly needed economic restructuring programmes difficult, encourages the Islamic oppositions to resort to violence in order to change the status quo and favours the cyclical recurrence of armed nationalism as a surrogate for legitimacy.

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Encouraging democracy from the outside is difficult, but not impossible, as the European experience shows. Certainly, the absence of a comprehensive strategy for economic action in the region weakens the potential leverage of putting political conditions on aid.

But what is really worrisome is that the search for immediate political stability in the region is once again prevailing over the need to foster democracy, a prerequisite for long-term stability. This choice, taken for granted by the regimes in power, has been adopted out of necessity by the extra-regional actors, who reward the policies of the useful allies -- Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel -- regardless of their record in human rights.

In fact, the incipient democracies in the Arab world -- the Palestinians, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria and Tunisia -- have paid the highest political and economic price for the conflict. And in this way, the West continues to be seen as the defender of the status quo and risks jeopardizing the emergence of a democratic-liberal alternative to the rise of fundamentalism in the democratization process.

The need to flank immediate political and military actions, like those being taken by the US, with more long-term actions aimed at removing the democratic and economic deficits -- the structural causes of the regional instability -- was clearly perceived by the Western allies during the Gulf crisis. However, this second part of the strategy for stabilization has not yet been translated into concrete action.

At the regional level, the continued existence of structural elements of instability and the possibility that current American-lead stabilizing actions may be only partially successful, make a long period of covert conflictuality during transition to a new balance of power very plausible, even if large scale conflicts would be ruled out.

The most obvious sources of crisis will be the definition of the future of Iraq, which the neighbouring states will insistently try to influence, and of the role of Iran in controlling the Gulf. However, the Arab-Israeli peace conference could also have important repercussions: apart from the revanchism of the more radical Palestinian factions, the negotiating process could trigger, for instance, a violent conflict over succession to the Assad regime in Syria and encourage an intractable polarization of the Israeli polity.

Rather than list the various types of conflict that could kindle or rekindle in the region and the inevitable regional repercussions, it is more important to emphasize that after the Gulf War, it will be more difficult for the West to "forget" the conflicts in the Middle East, as it did the Iran-Iraq war and the civil war in Lebanon. Direct Western and, above all, American military and political involvement could be the trip-wire that will make intervention in future Middle Eastern conflicts more necessary. This is an alarming prospect.

3.   The Mediterranean and Middle East in Western Policy

The Gulf War has proven that American leadership today is

both undisputed and financially and politically dependent on its allies. Only the wholehearted willingness of the Western allies to support the United States will be able to keep up its present high level of international commitment in the future, but the implications of such support are evaluated differently on the two sides of the Atlantic.

The greater strategic importance of the Mediterranean demands a continued American military presence in the region, even if at lower numerical levels. Thus, European economic and military support of the American presence in the region is more important than ever before. For the US, this support mainly entails the development within NATO of the European defence pillar and the formulation within the Alliance of more cogent mechanisms to make the European response to out-of-area crises more reliable and effective.

However, the Mediterranean is both the supply route of the Middle Eastern system and an extension of the European system. Thus, while the integration of American and European rapid intervention forces already took place, de facto, in the Middle Eastern theatre (in the war against Iraq as well as in Safe Haven operation for the Iraqi Kurds), the institutionalization of this integration has been opposed by the Europeans on the grounds of its negative effects on the development of European security identity.

European support for the strategy of stabilization in the Middle East after the war has been high: the resumption of political and economic relations with Damascus and the offer of preferential association with the Community made to Tel Aviv

certainly helped persuade Syria and Israel to accept the peace conference. In the same way, regional control of armaments by exporting countries would not be possible without European cooperation.

But Europe has interests in the Middle East that are distinct from those of the United States and its backing will not consist in open-ended support for the timing and modalities of American diplomatic actions, unconditional acceptance of the American oil policy or total political and economic cooperation with the US' regional allies.

For example, the Europeans are still against excluding the PLO from the Arab-Israeli negotiations for fear of fragmentation of the Palestinian interlocutor to the advantage of the Islamic fundamentalists of Hamas. European support for Turkey and for Saudi Arabia is also conditional: in case of the former, for the uncertain effects of the entry of Turkey into Europe; in case of the latter, for the Saudi regime's authoritarianism and policy of support for Sunni integralism.

For Europe, the Gulf War provided, to use the words of Jacques Delors, "an objective lesson -- if one were needed -- on the limitations of the European Community. It is true that giant steps have been taken ... but the Community's influence and ability to act have not kept pace".[1]

Although the Gulf War occurred at the beginning of negotiations defining the contents and institutions of the Political and Economic Union, it did not accelerate the process of endowing the Community with a clear and common foreign,

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security and defence policy. On the contrary, despite the efforts of some of its members, among which Italy, the crisis merely exacerbated the differences existing between the major countries with respect to the ultimate goal of European Political Union.

The outcome of this debate will only be institutionalized upon the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (December 1991), however, current developments suggest that the Union will not be equipped in the near future with the instruments needed for an autonomous foreign policy and will continue to resort to external resources for the application of its foreign policy orientations.

This means that Europe's policy towards the Middle East will continue to use Community instruments in the economic and diplomatic fields only, while its security policy will remain that of its member states.

That is why the attempts of some member states -- in particular France, Spain and Italy -- to transform their policy towards the Mediterranean-Middle East region into Community policy are unlikely to progress.

In the "Conclusions" of the European Council of December 1990, the Community adopted an integrated concept of security and in the "Declaration on Euro-Arab relations" of 7 September 1990, committed itself to translating it into a policy towards the region.[2]

However, the failure to consolidate the instruments needed for a common foreign policy and the limitations placed by some member states on common management of security policy make the 'communitarization' of a project like the Conference for Security

and Cooperation in the Mediterranean-CSCM, proposed by the Southern EC members, problematic.

A greater European contribution to management of the military dimension of security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East could, instead, involve a substantial change in present patterns.

Yet, the British proposal -enjoying US backing- to provide on a contingency basis NATO's nascent Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with a second WEU "hat" for interventions out-of-area is opposed openly by France and de facto by Germany, which has not yet matured the political and constitutional conditions for participation in it.

The alternative French proposal calling for the use of the European RRF plus the various European national Rapid Deployment Forces is even less likely to be accepted, as it does not solve the German problem and presupposes the existence of crises in the management of which the US cannot or will not want to be directly associated.

Even if the thorny problem of the politico-institutional chain of command of European forces in the out-of-area were solved, the question of which scenarios could require an exclusively European military intervention in the region would remain.

While a scenario of this kind can be hypothesized in North Africa, the present politico-institutional preeminence of the US and the absence of any European political action in the Middle East and the Gulf make it less likely there except for the case -
- no longer very plausible -- of a local crisis in which the

successor entity of the Soviet Union would oppose the United States.

It is hard to imagine what kind of changes the assumption of foreign policy responsibilities by the individual Soviet republics could bring about. But it can be hypothesized that the greater the foreign policy unity of the future configuration -- for example through alliance of the central government with the Russian Federation --, the more likely that the basic Mediterranean and Middle Eastern policy direction established under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze will remain.

In any case, the Middle East remains a region of crucial importance for the successors of the Soviet Union, both as a terrain for maintaining the status of international power, member of the Security Council and Number One interlocutor of the West in such fields as regional arms control, and as a neighbouring region whose developments have a direct impact on a number of former Soviet republics.

With the conclusion of the Gulf War, the Soviet Union definitively gave up its traditional "Arab policy" in the region, founded on special relations with Syria, Iraq and the PLO and aimed at influencing the Arab-Israeli conflict, in favour of a "Muslim policy" pursuing a cooperative relationship with the regional states -- Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia -- having the most direct effect on the evolution of the Soviet Muslim republics.

The signing of a cooperation treaty with Turkey in March 1991, the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia

and the continuing good relations with Iran guaranteed by the cooperation agreement of June 1989 have confirmed this trend.

This refocussing towards central Asia, generally in keeping with present American Middle East policies , will probably be confirmed whether a central authority is maintained in international policy or whether greater decentralization is introduced. But it seems likely that the "entity" succeeding the USSR will be able to contribute positively to the international strategy of stabilization in the area, participating actively in the Arab-Israeli negotiating process and in arms control in the region, only if there is such a central foreign policy authority.

For such a unitary actor, as for the pre-coup USSR, an overall interest in cooperation with the West would probably prevail over the desire to conduct divergent policies towards the individual Middle Eastern regional actors (for example, Iran). The single republics, on the other hand, could be tempted to give more importance to bilateral relations and domestic policy, even if divergent from Western interests.

More worrying is indeed the prospect of an extention of the Middle East system through the active involvement of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Muslim ex-Soviet Republics.

Finally, the refocussing towards Asia of Middle Eastern Soviet policy has removed one of the reasons for the presence of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean: the capability to provide military support for its Arab policy. In addition to the end of East-West confrontation, the need to drastically restructure the defence policy and reduce the military budget,

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this change is likely to give new impulse to traditional Soviet
insistence on naval arms control in the Mediterranean-Black Sea
regions.

4. Conclusions

Under the joint effects of the Gulf war and the dislocation
of the post-communist states, the strategic picture in the
Mediterranean is characterized by two main phenomena: a
persistent North-South gap, aggravated by the potential slide
into the Third World of a part of the Balkans; and the absence
of a consistent politico-institutional framework for management
of regional security.

Although a Western security policy, based on the strategy
of stabilization undertaken by the United States, exists in the
Middle East, it could be insufficient in ensuring a peaceful
transition to a new regional balance of power. Apart from the
internal contradictions of the American strategy, such as
oscillation between direct intervention and dependence on
regional allies, it does not adequately deal with the structural
roots of the instability in the region, that is, the economic and
democratic deficits.

The continuation of the recent Soviet policy in the
Mediterranean-Middle East region by the successor states to the
Soviet Union is not likely to create any rivalry with the West
and could lead to a virtual withdrawal from the Mediterranean.
Nevertheless, the assumption of greater foreign policy powers by
the former Soviet republics --possibly compounded with a weak or

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absent central foreign policy authority-- could result in the
prevalence of regional over international interests in Middle
East policy, thus multiplying the divergences from Western
strategy.

Notes

1. Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture given at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 7 March 1991 (text published in Survival, March-April 1991, p. 99).

2. "The Community and its members are also resolved to contribute to the formulation of a regional cooperation policy aimed at making a constructive contribution to the solution of the structural problems afflicting the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions, both with respect to stability and to economic and social well-being."

THE SOUTHERN REGION OF EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW HOPES

IAI-THE RAND CORPORATION
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Preliminary draft

Europe confronted with migration: the political, economic and security implications

Yves Boyer[1]

As exemplified by the EC summit agenda in Luxemburg in June 1991, one of the most pressing issues confronting the governments of West Europe is that of population migration towards Europe. The British Prime Minister M. John Major expressed at that occasion:'...the alarm at the potential immigration from South to North, and East to West that could occur over the next 10 years'.

The problem posed by migration is indeed of a global nature. It has an economic and social impact on West European countries that absorb a continuous influx of a population numbering very few skilled workers and hailing from the southern part of the Mediteranean basin in particular. Since many of them bring their families, their assimilation may provoke hardship among West Europeans societies where people have to coexist in the context of different cultures, religions and customs. In France for example, the rise of the National Front provides an illustration of how those issues have already modified the political landscape. In Western Europe as a whole, the question of migration has provoked intense debate on the future of its societies. A polarization of attitudes is developing between those advocating the development of a multi-cultural society on the one hand, and

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[1]Deputy director, CREST-Ecole polytechnique

those advocating a total integration of immigrants regardless of their origin on the other.

Until recently the issues raised by migrations have only marginally affected security concerns. Given the multitude of immigrants, terrorism for example, may benefit through the creation of some very small but effective cells. However, in the coming decade, the effect of the phenomenons that are at the origin of migrations from the south of the Mediterranean basin on Western Europe security, may well become far more evident. Such considerations will provide main focus of this paper.

In a broad sense, current migration towards Western Europe is closely related to demographic changes which are taking an unprecedented course of an historical significance: if the world population grew on average at a rate of 14% per century in the eight centuries to 1800, the same proportionate growth has now occurred in a period of less than eight years[2]. Accordingly, if no innovative policies are pursued by the European Community (EC), migration, particularly from the southern shores of the Mediterranean , may become a grim issue for an EC already under pressure from revolutionary demographic changes.

Populations in the Mediterranean basin: fewer,older and richer, in the North; greater, younger and poorer in the South .

Changes in the population over the next few years are almost certain to occur. However, longer term projections depend on the evolution of fertility rates. For obvious reasons such rates are difficult to predict and project. Nevertheless, one can say that on the whole during the next 30 years, there will be a steady decline in the population of Western Europe. While the average annual growth of the world population is 2.46%, Western Europe has the lowest rate: West Germany (before unification) had a rate of 0.27% while the French figure is 0.53%. In stark contrast Algerian and Egyptian growth stands at 2.58%. Between 1988 and 2025 while the population of the world will increase by 75%, the population within the geographical limits of NATO will increase by only 17%. If the combined population of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries represented 22% of the world population in 1988 , in 2025 it will represent only 12%. More disturbingly, the 17 to 29 age group of the world's male population will increase by 48% between 1990 and 2025. In the NATO countries however, it will fall by about 14%.

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[2]Nicholas Eberstadt, Population change and national security, Foreign Affairs, summer 1991.

More specifically, it is predicted that the population of the twelve members of the EC will increase by 3 to 5 millions while in Africa it will rise by 900 millions by 2025. The population of North Africa alone will increase by about 140 millions. Taken together with the fertility rate, such a difference between the two shores of the Mediterranean is unprecedented.

Population in the Western Mediterranean basin 1970-2015 (in millions)[3]

	1970	2000	2015
Fr/Ital/Spain	137.6	154.2	153.1
Mor/Alg/Tun	34.1	81.2	111.3

Since 1974 Algeria has had a birth rate which is twice as high as that of France, the opposite of the situation in 1950. Today there are 100 000 more births each year in Algeria than in France. The difference could be as much as 200 to 300 000 by the beginning of the next century. In North Africa (Egypt and Sudan included) where the population is a third that of the EC , there are nevertheless one million more births[4]. By the middle of the next century, Morocco, which had 9 million inhabitants in 1950, could have a greater population than that of West Germany (before reunification).

As a consequence of the demographic boom, the North African population similarly to the Islamic population as a whole, will become younger . In 1985, among the 15 countries in which Islam is the religion of the majority of people (excluding the Muslim population in the USSR), 8 have a population of 15 years olds and under, which is greater than for the equivalent age group in France. In 2015 all 15 countries with the exception of Malaysia, will surpass France.

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[3]ibid.
[4]RAMSES 87-88; IFRI, Ed. Economica, Paris 1987.

Population of young people aged 15 or below (in millions)[5]

	1970	2000	2015
Fr/Ital/Spain	35.1	27.3	25.4
Mor/Alg/Tun	16.3	36.4	43.3

In contrast to the demographic boom on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, stagnation characterizes the northern part, with a greater share of the population getting older. This phenomenom is of a particular importance given the reasoning of the French economist and historian, Alfred Sauvy: "Rome did not fall due to the number of its adversaries rather due to the advancing age of its population".

Population of 65 years old and more (in millions)

	1970	2000	2015
Fra/Ital/Spain	15.5	23.8	26.4
Mor/Alg/Tun	1.4	2.8	4.1

Among the many consequences of this trend, it is noticeable that certain parts of France (south and north of the Garonne river) as well as some areas of Italy and even Spain, are in the process of desertification . In these zones, the costs of repairing roads, maintaining health services etc. will increase dramatically. On the contrary, on the other side of the Mediterranean, if land shortage is not a problem, water is lacking particularly in Algeria which already imports more of one third of its food

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[5]Projections démographiques et transformations des environnements géo-stratégiques, Philippe Bourcier de Carbon et Gérard-François Dumont, Fondation Europe Université. premières assises, Paris september 24-27, 1986.

supply. Logically such an imbalance in the same country should imply a transfer of population.

Realities and perspectives of migrations in the Mediterranean area

Migrants to Western Europe fall into three general categories : migrant workers, illegal immigrants and political refugees requesting asylum. Since 1974, the majority of EC countries have closed their borders to immigrant workers. This measure has lead to an increase in clandestine immigration to Western Europe. It is common practice in many European countries to regularise foreign immigrants for their own sake as well as for the purposes of controlling individuals whose situation may marginalize them to the point of forcing them to resort to crime in order to survive. In Italy for example, two operations between January and June 1990 allowed 336000 people to benefit from regularization.

Political refugees pose a difficult problem since many unemployed immigrants whose entry in Western Europe would otherwise be refused, choose to ask for political asylum. This is illustrated by the increase in the percentage of people claiming asylum between 1983 and 1989, which was of the order of 35.3% in the West Germany and of 39.9% in Sweden [6]. In certain cases there is a clear justification for such a request as exemplified by the case of 320000 Bulgarians of a Turkish origin who fled to Turkey in 1989, to avoid renouncing their rights as a minority. In many cases however, prospective immigrants with no political axe to grind simply take advantage of the current legislation in order to enter into Western Europe. Germany has been particularly affected by this phenomenon: it has received 200000 people asking asylum in 1990 under article 16 of its Constitution which guarantees the right of asylum to every victim of political persecution. In the UK the situation is very similar. It is estimated that in 1990 the number of people settling in Britain after claiming asylum probably equals that of those legally admitted in accordance with immigration legislation. In the southern portion of the EC, this phenomenon is also exerting increasing pressures: between March and August 1991, three waves of Albanian immigrants attempted to obtain asylum from the Italian authorities.

More generally, political asylum has recently modified the pattern of migration of workers: in 1990, the traditional providers of migrant workers (Maghreb, Turkey, Yugoslavia), provided only 13% of non-EC workers . The vast majority of the remaining percentage corresponds to new trends in

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[6]Système d'observation permanente des migrations-SOPEMI, Direction des affaires sociales, de la main-d'oeuvre et de l'éducation, OCDE/GD(91)129, Paris 1991

migration coming outside of Europe. Whatever their origin, EC members will not easily remedy this sharp rise in 'political' refugees. Countries such as France are making the conditions more stringent; in Germany, such modifications are already provoking opposition between political parties on the the modification of article 16 of the Fundamental Law. In coping with this problem EC countries are torn between various considerations.

Regarding Eastern Europe and Russia, given the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the Helsinki Act proclaiming free rights of travel, West Europe cannot forbid the circulation of the inhabitants of those countries[7]. This issue has been debated (without results as yet) in a pan-European conference on this topic held in Vienna in January of this year. If the EC has to institute a new régime governing immigration, it will have to take into consideration the imperative to control extra-European immigration, notably from the southern Mediterranean area which constitutes the principal source of immigration in southern Europe.

Foreigners from the Maghreb, Turkey and Yugoslavia living in some EC countries [8]

	Algerians	Moroccans	Tunisians	Turks	Yugos.
FRG	5924	61648	24292	1612623	610499
Spain	675	14885	291	217	384
France	820900	516400	202600	146100	64400
Italy	4041	77971	41234	4695	29790

Consequences of the demographic trends in the Mediterranean basin

According to many forecasts[9], migrations from the Maghreb towards Europe will increase in the future. Such prospects will represent a challenge

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[7]See: Europe's new immigrants; Financial Times, August 13, 1991.
[8]SOPEMI, op. cit.
[9]L'Europe va devoir rouvrir ses frontières, Libération July 10, 1991.

of an unprecedented magnitude for the EC when at the same time migrants from Eastern Europe may arrive massively due to economic difficulties in their countries. There is no fatality to transform this phenomenon into a chaos and a failure degenerating into the development of ethnic tensions. On the other hand, policies defined to regulate movement of population and to facilitate the absorption of immigrants will not be easy to design and to implement. On the whole at least four issues are at stake.

1-Overcoming fears and suspicions to facilitate assimilation.

In some segments of the West European population anxiety is the key words when mentioning immigration. A feeling of being overwhelmed by waves of immigrants coming from the south is far from being spread only into extremist movements. Recently, the French deputy-minister for foreign affairs argued by example that the developped world' is now in the same situation than the Roman empire during the IIIrd century A.D.'[10]. Such attitude is based on irrational thinking as well as declaration from third world leaders such as, by example the then president of the Algerian Republic, colonel Houari Boumedienne who once declared that if no possible entente on economic development is reached with Europe:'..no nuclear weapons could stop waves of millions of people who will leave the poor areas in the south to invade the rich north; those people will then not arrive as friends..'[11].

Such declarations exacerbate widespread feelings against immigrants. This is also the case with some social behaviours from migrants with a different culture prticularly those concerning the rights of women as well as the compatibility of the Charria (the muslim law) with the values of the Western societies. Put together those factors are severly complicating the potential assimilation of migrants of muslim origin.

2-Adapting legislations to potential unbridled immmigration and to facilitate assimilation.

One way of assimilation favoured, at least in countries like France, is the emancipation of women from traditions that forced them into a status inferior to the men. This imbalance of status has already provoked many difficulties in divorced Franco-Algerian couples and a nation-wide debate about girls wearing veils into schools to respect the islamic law. In that case

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[10]Alain Vivien, Le Monde, 7-8 July 1991.
[11]Colonel Houari Boumedienne, interview given to V.Walker-Leigh during the UN confernece on raw materials, March 1974; interview published in Middle East N°1, May-June 1974.

the French law prevailed. Those issues are far from negligible since in France the number of mixed marriages reach an unprecedented level (22214 in 1988) and now there are more French women married to Algerian men than to portugese; still in 1988 there were 82214 legitimate children born with at least one parents being a foreigner, at this total one shall add 300000 Franco-Algerian children.

The adaptation of the migrants to the rules and the behaviours generally accepted in Western countries is a sine qua non condition for assimilation. This can be witnessed by a gradual change in habits from the part of migrants particularly in the birth rate: the fertility rate of Algerian women leaving in France has diminished from 8.1 in 1978 to 4.8 in 1989.

In many European countries the trend is now, with the promoting of policies aimed at favouring assimilation, to limit and tightly control the flow of migrants. This has been particularly the case in Germany and in Italy which is now a country receiving immigrants when during tens of years it sent workers abroad. Both countries modified recently their respective laws regarding immigration.

In Italy the 'Martelli' Law adopted in February 1990 offered a status to immigrants already present on the Peninsula. The law acknowledged the principle of regrouping families. However immigration will be tightly controled; visas will be needed to enter Italy for people coming from the Maghreb and each year the number of migrant allowed to enter in Italy will be adjusted.

In Germany a new law on immigration replacing the last one of 1965 has been voted in April 1990. It took into consideration the desire of many immigrants already leaving in the FRG for a total integration in the german society, at the same time the law maintained the principle of temporary stay in Germany for immigrants.

At the EEC level the control of migrants is made by unformal working groups ('Trevi' group for security), the Schengen agreement[12] itself did not deal specifically with migrants.

3-Promoting the development of the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea

The economical and trade relations between the EC and the Maghreb has to be perceived in the overall economic relations between the Third world and the developped countries that, with 15% of the population, earns 80% of the world wealth. In the three most important countries of the south-

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[12]The Schengen Agreement has been signed in June 14, 1985; its convention for implementation has been signed in June 19, 1990; 8 EC countries are part of the agreement.

western side of the Mediterranean sea , protests and riots have been recently provoked by economic difficulties: riots in Tunisia in January 1984 linked to increases in food, general strikes in Morocco late 1990, riots in Algeria during 1990...

Two types of measures are currently contemplated to improve the dialogue between Europe and its neighbours from the other side of the Mediterranean sea. One is of a political nature. Designed to establish a permanent dialogue based on what has been done in the framework of the CSCE it seeks to channel evolutions in this part of the world that may otherwise become an area of instability. Instability may arises also from internal upheavals linked to economic stagnation and unemployment exploited by fundamentalists movements connected with the revival of Islam. The issue for Western Europe is to modify the present equation in this area where interdependance co-exists with economic disparity. The dialogue to further the economic development of the south of the Mediterranean sea may now be facilitated after the creation of the Arab Union of the Maghreb(AMU) in Marrakesh (january 1989) with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Up to now the EEC policy towards those countries did not however fulfil expectations and need to be totally reconsidered particularly in areas like agricultural products since AMU countries have growingly food shortages: 20 Mt in the late sixties, 50Mt in 1990[13].

4-The strategic dimension.

In the western part of the Mediterranean sea the demographic imbalances and the economical difficulties which are linked are not of a military nature. However some measures have to be taken to reduce potential agressivity and risks of a military nature. As a principle it seems important to avoid NATO to be embroiled in this area, if the temptation may arise northern countries of the Alliance will be very reluctant to be participating in policing this zone. This is wisely that the parliamentary forum of the Alliance, the North Atlantic Assembly, decided to manifest its interest to this issue in creating, in November 1990, a new sub-commission on the Mediterranean basin which was not however attached to the Military Commission.

However there are two aspects of a strategic nature that shall be taken into consideration by Western European countries confronted in the next few years by an increased demographic imbalances in the Mediterranean basin. The first one is the proliferation issue. This question has been recently raised

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[13]Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Europe and the Maghreb: Strategies for Closer Links, in: The European Community after 1992: A New Role in World Politics? Ed. by Armand Clesse and Raymond Vernon, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden Publ.1991, 557p.

in the case of Algeria following rumors[14] reporting that, with the help of China, Algeria was building a nuclear reactor in Aïn Oussera being able to produce in two years from now 8 kilos of plutonium per year. The second issue linked but not exclusively to proliferation, concerns the field of intelligence gathering. It shall be stressed that the three West European countries with a Mediterranean facade, France, Italy and Spain are associated to built and operate the first European military reconnaissance satellite. This project in itself is far less suffisant and others measures have to be taken, at least in France to considerably enhance intelligence gathering in order to reduce the risks of unexpected events ranging from terrorists coup to technological breakthrough of a strategic signification.

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[14]The Sunday Times, April 28, 1991.