

POLITICAL CHANGE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE:
CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990'S

RAND

Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy
Rhodes, 8-11/IX/1991

- a. (Programma)
- b. List of participants
1. "Security for the threat-rich and capacity-poor: Romanian defense and foreign policies after Ceausescu"/ Daniel N. Nelson
2. "Bulgaria: security concerns and foreign policy introductions"/ Duncan M. Perry
3. "Albania"/ Elez Biberaj
4. "Yugoslavia: the unmaking of a federation"/ Christopher Cviic
5. "The rise and fall of Tito's Yugoslavia"/ Predrag Simic
6. "The military and the Yugoslav crisis"/ Anton Bebler
7. "Greece and Southeastern Europe"/ Thanos Veremis
8. "Turkey in the new international security environment"/ Graham E. Fuller
9. "The strategic environment in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean"/ Ian Lesser
10. "Helsinki II: prospects for arms control, confidence building, and crisis inhibition for Southeastern Europe"/ Thomas J. Hirschfeld
11. "The role of European institutions in Balkan security: some lessons from Yugoslavia"/ James Steinberg
12. "Evolving superpower interests in Southeastern Europe"/ F. Stephen Larrabee
13. "Western policy: the challenges and options ahead"/ Uwe Nerlich

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*9 - 11 September 1991
Hotel Olympic Palace, Rhodes
Dodecanese islands, Greece*

Sunday, September 8

Afternoon Arrival of participants
21:00 Cocktails (Hotel Rodos Palace)
21:30 Dinner (official opening)

Speaker: The Honorable
Ms Virginia Tsouderou,
Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs

Monday, September 9

09:00 - 09:30 Opening Remarks

Thanos Veremis

Director ELIAMEP

F. Stephen Larrabee
RAND Corporation

09:30 - 10:30

**Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in
Southeastern Europe**

Paper: **Nikiforos Diamandouros**
University of Athens

Comment: **A. Ross Johnson,**
RFE/RL Research Institute,
Munich

10:30 - 10:45

Coffee break

10:45 - 11:45

Romania

①

Paper: **Daniel Nelson,**
Office of Congressman
Gephardt, Washington D.C

Comment: **Ioan Pascu,**
Office of the
Romanian President,
Bucharest

11:45 - 12:45

Bulgaria

②

Paper: **Duncan Perry,**
Radio Free Europe, Munich

Comment: **Stephan Tavrof**
Office of the
President,
Bulgaria

12:45 - 13:30

Albania

③

Paper: **Elez Biberaj,**
Voice of America,
Washington D.C

Comment: **Sali Berisha,**
Chairman, Democratic

Party,
Tirana

13:30 - 15:00

Lunch

16:30 - 18:30

Yugoslavia

(4)

Paper: **Christopher Cviic,**
Chatham House, London

(5)

Comment: **Predrad Simic,**
Institute of International
Politics and Economics,
Yugoslavia

(6)

Anton Bebler
Edvard Kardelj University,
Ljubljana

John Zametica,
International Institute
for Strategic Studies

18:30 - 18:45

Coffee break

18:45 - 20:00

Greece

(7)

Paper: **Thanos Veremis**
Director ELIAMEP

Comment: **Monteagle Stearns,**
Council on Foreign Relations,
New York

20:30

Dinner at Tavern "Ta Kioupia"

Speaker: The Honorable,
Mr. Andreas Andrianopoulos
Minister of Trade and
Research

Tuesday, September 10

9:00 - 10:30

Turkey

(8)

Paper: Graham Fuller,
RAND

Comment: Ali Karaosmanoglu,
Bilkent University, Ankara

10:30 - 10:45

Coffee Break

10:45 - 12:00

(9)

The Changing Strategic Environment

Paper: Ian Lesser,
RAND

Comment: Roberto Aliboni,
Director, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, Rome

12:00 - 13:30

Conventional Arms Control and Confidence
Building Measures

(10)

Paper: Thomas Hirschfeld,
RAND

Comment: George Katsirdakis,
NATO, Brussels

13:30

Lunch

16:30 - 18:00

Western Security Institutions and Southeastern Europe

(11)

Paper: James Steinberg,
RAND

Comment: John Roper
Institute for Security
Studies,
Western European Union

17:30 - 17:45:

Coffee break

17:45 - 19:15:

The European Community and Southeastern Europe

Paper: **Loucas Tsoukalis**,
Hellenic Center for European Studies, Athens.

Comment: **Fraser Cameron**,
European Community,
Brussels

20:30:

Dinner

Wednesday, September 11

09:00 - 10:45

The Role of the Superpowers

(12)

Paper: **F. Stephen Larrabee**,
RAND

Comment: **Aleksei Nikiforov**,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Moscow

10:45 - 11:00

Coffee break

11:00 - 12:45

Western Policy: The Challenges Ahead

(13)

Paper: **Uwe Nerlich**,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
Ebenhausen

Comment: **Pierre Hassner**,
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
Paris

12:45 - 13:00

Closing Remarks

13:00

Afternoon excursion to Lindos Beach
(if there is enough interest)

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Soviet Military Studies,
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Duncan Perry,
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Monteagle Stearns,
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WEU

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**SECURITY FOR THE THREAT-RICH AND CAPACITY-POOR:
ROMANIAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES AFTER CEAUSESCU**

Daniel N. Nelson

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, East European communist regimes were dependent on the implicit threat of Soviet intervention as an ultimate guarantee of their rule. Paradoxically, the insecurity imposed on East European populations by Soviet hegemony provided an element of security for the regime in power; the Soviet Army intimidated anti-communist populations by occupation or nearby presence, or provided an excuse for pseudo-nationalist appeals by communist elites.

After the Soviet strategic retreat, and the disbanding of both the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), East Europeans must find new bases for national security. For the first time in over two generations, governments and populations in East-Central and Southeastern Europe have a possibility to join in reassessing threats and to build up national capacities to meet such threats. Making this task far more difficult, however, is their simultaneous search for paths towards democratic politics and free market economies, all from the rubble of Leninist regimes.

Security is a function of the ratio between threats and capacities. To the degree that a dynamic balance is maintained between threats and capacities, imminent dangers are absent. Policies to abate threats while economic, political and military capacities are maintained are the components of a national security

debate.

The urgency with which new leaders search for guarantees or reinforcements for their countries' well-being has risen since communist regimes collapsed in 1989--and has now reached a fever pitch given the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. Many of the schisms within East European states have returned with a vengeance, while old irredenta abound, and new transnational issues have further complicated security planning.

Of the six East European states that had remained in the Warsaw Pact and CMEA, Romania's security environment is among the most complex. From Bucharest, one might not be sanguine about any of the country's borders, while having great concern about restive minorities and workers, or conspiracies among intellectuals. The whereabouts and intentions of former secret police, activities of nationalist organizations, schisms within the Army's officer corps, and weakened industrial output add to the litany of security-related concerns.

My focus on Romania highlights the conflictual process of transitions away from a regime that, arguably, was the most egregious example of communist dictatorship in Europe since Stalin. Within the general process of ending one-party authoritarianism, and metamorphoses into a free-market, plural democracy, Romania clearly has a long, steep road ahead. Yet, Romania too, must apply democratic norms to national security policy-making and free market principles to defense industries while exploring new ties to NATO, the EC, or other institutions by which to mitigate peril.

Romania is, however, undeniably different. Most East European communist regimes abandoned power and retreated in the face of non-violent popular coups. But, in Timisoara and Bucharest, a violent December two years ago was a painful expression of Romania's experience with tyranny. After a quarter-century during which Ceausescu's paranoia and megalomania worsened year by year, the Romanian population had reached the end of its endurance.

Romanian communism was substantively worse than most other states in which communist parties have ruled. With only a few exceptions (perhaps North Korea under Kim Il Sung and some years during Enver Hoxhe's long rule in Albania), Nicolae Ceausescu's regime was far more rigid in its adherence to central planning, repression of intellectual or artistic expression, surveillance of individuals and groups and rejection of any reform when compared with other post-Stalin Leninist system.

The specifics of Ceausescu's dictatorship, his crazed policies in the waning years of the communist regime, and the revolution of December, 1989 have been detailed and debated elsewhere.¹ The emergence of a National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Nationale or FSN) in the midst of December 20-22 fighting in Bucharest, at the core of which was anti-Ceausescu Communist Party elites, has been the crux of such debate. Conspiratorial theories, i.e., that the violence in Timisoara on December 17 had been utilized as a pretext by which another group of communists could gain power through a coup in Bucharest, emerged soon thereafter.² With Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman at the forefront of the FSN, its linkage to

the erstwhile Communist Party has been widely inferred--in their personal histories, policy choices or leadership behavior. From the outset, the Front was burdened by its own failure to distance its leadership from the past, and by the murky circumstances of its origins.³

Apart from the FSN's character, however, no one can contest that Romania--to a much more complete extent than elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc--was exhausted and despoiled by the severity of Ceausescu's dictatorship, and the cultural, socioeconomic and political costs Romania incurred due to such tyranny.⁴

It is small wonder that Romanian post-communism is often viewed as relatively more troubled than have been the experiences of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Regardless of these countries' many economic and political difficulties, Western perceptions tend to see Romania's transition to anything resembling democracy as likely to be longer and more conflictual. Such judgments may be exaggerated as the first decade after the Cold War reveals the tribulations of all erstwhile communist-ruled states.

Nevertheless, political norms of the past--for example, a propensity to rely on mobilization rather than autonomous participation, and a suspicion of those who criticize authority--have not been set aside entirely in Romania. Ceausescu's rule "succeeded", as well, in greatly handicapping Romania's egress from totalitarianism by preventing any development of alternative socioeconomic or political infrastructure; whereas, by contrast, Poland had a widespread alternative society built around the

Catholic Church and Solidarity, Romania in December, 1989 had nothing comparable with which to support new institutions.

In the two years since December, 1989, Romania's unimpeded movement away from Ceausescu's tyranny has been thwarted by several events. In the immediate aftermath of the December revolution, considerable international sympathy for Romania's plight existed. But it was not long before the traditional wing of Romanian politics (the Liberal and Peasant parties) began to re-emerge to attack the Front's political control, while intellectuals and students complained of the FSN's "neo-communism" and its "theft" of the revolution--charges that grew more insistent during the spring, 1990 electoral campaign.⁵ It was also in mid-March, 1990 that violence between Hungarians and Romanians in the Romanian city of Tirgu Mures, captured on videotape and shown worldwide, implied that Romania was a state without civic order.

After May 20, 1990 elections had resulted in an overwhelming, albeit imperfect victory for the National Salvation Front,⁶ another chance existed to improve relations with the West. Once again, however, complaints from both the historic parties as well as protests by urban intelligentsia about the conduct of the campaign (protests that included occupation of Bucharest's principal traffic intersection at University Square) tarnished the Front's legitimacy.

After the May 20 elections, the FSN government made matters far worse by forcibly removing demonstrators from University Square on the night of June 13, 1990. There was a violent response to this

police action, with protesters laying siege to government buildings and threatening its existence. Unable to gain Army intervention from the then-Defense Minister, Victor Stanculescu, while the regular police were ineffective or refused to act, Iliescu appealed for citizens to save the FSN government. His appeal was heeded with violent abandon by Jiu Valley coal miners, an element of Romania's industrial workforce that had been cultivated as FSN supporters. When the miners arrived in Bucharest the next day on commandeered trains and buses, they acted as vigilantes and attacked protesters, students and innocent bystanders while ransacking offices and apartments of opposition groups and leaders. The Government neither condemned them nor was it able to intervene to stop what has been called a "rampage".⁷

Western governments held the Iliescu-Roman government accountable for its apparent condoning of such wanton violence. Their disassociation from the FSN government was abrupt and far reaching, and Romania's reintegration with Europe and path towards democracy were dealt a considerable setback.⁸

Far more than the political lineage of Iliescu and Roman, or even the FSN's reluctance to dismantle fully the state's role in society and the economy, these episodes damaged the FSN's chances to achieve credibility as a post-communist government deserving support. Yet, since mid-1990, a draft constitution has been written, far-reaching economic reform legislation has been written and passed⁹, some (although far too few in the opinion of many observers) former Ceausescu loyalists have been tried and sentenced

to prison terms¹⁰, a new broadly-based anti-FSN political party (Alianta Civica or the Civic Alliance) has been formed, and local elections are scheduled for late October or early November. These critical steps, plus many other acts (e.g., halting the illegal "sale" of babies for adoption¹¹), have begun the arduous task of recreating a stronger ties between Bucharest and Western democracies.

We should remember, however, that the larger contest underway is one in which Romanian-specific events elaborate but do not define the future of Eastern Europe. From the Baltic to the Balkans, post-communist Eastern Europe has three essential goals--accelerating the transition to a market economy, institutionalizing democratic processes, and finding a new basis for national security. The pursuit of these goals must be simultaneous. Yet, their interaction is not necessarily synergistic.

There is ample reason to suspect that both the creation of a market economy and the recasting of national security planning connote political conflicts that undermine fragile proto-democracies. Freeing prices from government control, establishing a fully convertible currency, selling-off state owned enterprises and assets--these and other fundamental steps will, at least initially, create considerable pain before any gain is seen. New post-communist governments can ill afford an evaporation of public trust and support when such political legitimacy is one of the very few strengths on which today's new East European leadership can rely.

Yet, where market economic principles have been most completely implemented, governments quickly began to confront a significant increase in antagonism towards the new authorities as no better than the old (i.e., communists), doubt that anything will ever truly improve, and purposeful apathy (a "pox on all their houses" attitude) that defies amelioration through any technique.¹² Survey data also suggest that the rapid imposition of democratic processes before institutional supports (free media, broadly based parties, independent trade unions) are present yields much less meaningful political acts that provide little or no support for democracy.¹³

It is far too easy to presume that free markets and free governments can be created soon or without conflict. And, it may be wrong to assume that either democracy or a free market is coextensive with security for citizens or their government.

Romania's "story", as it were, is a case in point. A deeply embedded democracy and a robust market economy--even if such desiderata were to take firm root tomorrow--would not add up to irrevocable security for the state, government, or nation. A free market and a free government are necessary but insufficient for Romania's national security. New bases for a secure Romania must be found within a threat-rich, low-capacity environment that envelopes the country, while being compatible with the norms of a free market democracy.

ROMANIA'S THREAT ASSESSMENT

Romanians' security horizon is clouded by many perils, some of

which are perceptions magnified through the lens of Bucharest's political and economic uncertainties. Internally, Romania confronts a multitude of dangers to stability and well-being from 1) ethnonationalism, 2) the political strains of marketization, 3) the resistance of an old nomenklatura to change, 4) uncertain civilian authority over military and security forces, and 5) widespread suspicion and apathy of citizens towards political authority.

Externally, Romania finds itself buffeted by seriously strained relations with Hungary, the danger of a Soviet civil war or disintegration that exacerbates issues such as Moldova, and the worrisome prognosis of a greater Serbia emerging from Yugoslav dismemberment. Beyond immediate borders, Romania's greatly depleted economic condition, social conflict and political imbroglio makes the country susceptible to a variety of transnational threats.

Among parties and groups within Romania, there is little consensus about either a definition of security or the relative importance of such internal and external threats. Foreign and defense policy agreement breaks down quickly when specific decisions are required and alternatives are debated. Yet, broadly similar outlooks--for example, stressing non-negotiable Romanian sovereignty in Transylvania, residual Romanian interests in Bessarabia (specifically Moldova), and a need to address Soviet and Russian interests while moving closer to Western Europe, the United States and Japan--have denoted core Romanian interests for almost

all political actors.¹⁴

INTERNAL THREATS

Ethnonationalism is the virulent symbiosis between innocuous ethnic identity and intolerant chauvinism; it inflames the Balkans as nowhere else in Europe because of the fiendishly complex interweaving of nations and borders.

Romania's heterogeneity gauged by ethnic identity, language, religion, economic maldistribution of resources, and other gauges of intra-state differences pale by comparison to Yugoslavia. Yet, if one includes Hungarians (2.0 million or more), Gypsies (very conservatively 1.0 million) and other smaller minorities, at least 15% of Romania's population is non-Romanian. This sizeable minority population is more volatile politically because the Hungarians are the largest component of a diaspora thought to be a critical interest in Budapest, while the Gypsies are the fastest growing part of the population.

The debate about Transylvania extends well beyond the framework of this essay. During the latter years of communist rule, both Hungarian and Romanian regimes engaged in arcane disputation, using questionable scholarship, about who was in Transylvania first, and which culture had preeminent claim. To Hungary, the 1920 Treaty of Trianon is anathema, while to Romania it justifiably returned the region to its cultural heirs after Austro-Hungarian aggrandizement.

Since 1989, however, issues between the governments have turned less on historical debate than on matters of immediate

policy. These concerns are detailed later. Yet, the FSN government has also had to confront a small, albeit quite dangerous group--Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth)--that has organized in Transylvania and elsewhere in the country as a reactionary nationalist political force. Vatra has published a rabidly anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, weekly newspaper called Romania Mare, which has become the mouthpiece for diatribes against all minorities and moderation. Romania Mare has a large circulation throughout the country, and appears well-financed. Other extreme nationalist periodicals such as Europa also are sold widely in Romania.

To call this group or its media "ideological" would be far too generous; their claim to fame is the neo-fascism that they propagate. Vatra is suspected of having ties to former Securitate agents, or even to remnants of the 1940s Iron Guard. Regardless of its genesis, Vatra sustains itself through ethnic hatred that promote a mirror-image response from Hungarians and other groups.¹⁵

A June 29, 1991 Roundtable on the Dangers of Extremism, organized by the Democratic Anti-Totalitarian Forum, the National Peasant's Party, the National Liberal Party and others, issued a declaration warning of the dangers of an alarming growth of "leftist and rightist extremism", especially "...actions that tolerate and encourage xenophobia, chauvinism, [and] anti-semitism..."¹⁶ This coalition indicted, by implication, policies or actions of the FSN government. The Romanian Ministry of

Culture, however, responded by issuing a statement at the end of July, 1991, condemning the nationalist extremism of several publications.¹⁷ Prime Minister Roman has likewise characterized four newspapers and periodicals as "racist, chauvinistic and nationalist" and threatened to ban them.¹⁸ The underlying antagonisms on which such publications thrive, and to which they contribute, however, are products of factors not amenable to government proclamations.

Vatra, operating openly in the new political environment, seems to be gaining members; in its national union conference in Cluj during mid-May, 1991, the strength and considerable confidence of its membership was evident.¹⁹ Vatra's organizational efforts may extend into the Romanian Army and Interior Ministry, and allegations of Vatra funding for activities of the Party of National Unity of Romanians within military units have been reported.²⁰

Detracting from Romania's external image, while adding to the perception of intolerance domestically, were impressions of anti-Semitism in the country, emphasized by the visit of Elie Wiesel in early July, 1991. Weisel came to honor the several hundred thousand Jews who were taken from Romania to Nazi extermination camps in World War II--a part of Romanian history that has been too painful to recall. Both Romania Mare's coverage of Weisel's visit and the interruption of his address in Iasi by people denying that Jews' deaths occurred or were abetted by the Antonescu regime added to the image of a nation that did not want to come to grips with

its past.²¹ That Prime Minister Roman and President Iliescu both acknowledged the commemoration, and sent representatives to the Weisel speech, were generally not observed in the foreign press.

Taken together, ethnonationalism and residual images of intolerance create an atmosphere, in which the pluralism and accommodation critical to democracy are imperiled. These are an omnipresent threat to Romania's post-communist transition.

Marketization represents an equal or greater challenge. Thus far, the Romanian government's efforts to create a free market economy have been more limited than in ~~Poland~~^{Poland} or Hungary; privatization, freeing prices, and other measures have, however, been initiated.²² There are substantive reform proposals, with important legislative action now beginning to be put into effect. A law to privatize some agriculture was passed in February, 1991, and President Iliescu signed an far-reaching privatization law on August 14--to immediately distribute 30% of Romania's capital stock to the population via shares in joint-stock companies, while the other 70% will continue to be held by the state, albeit with the responsibility to sell shares.²³

Unfortunately, the opposition parties protested the privatization law by walking out before a vote, leaving the FSN majority to pass unilaterally such important legislation.

But prior to this legislation, price increases had been used as the primary mechanism for "marketizing"; the critical step of creating a new form of ownership, however, will now be begun. With this step will come heightened unemployment, as the many

enterprises that cannot operate profitably will close or become much smaller, with prices escalating further. An economy already in a tailspin will suffer further through at least the mid-1990s, and the political costs to any government will be grievous.

The already severe loss of public support absorbed by the FSN government since May, 1990 elections has not been solely or largely because of accusations about "neo-communism" or the miners' invasion of Bucharest in June, 1990. Rather, the principal issue, especially during 1991, has been the disastrous economic conditions that endanger the well-being of families and the lives of children.

In May, 1990 elections, the Front's parliamentary candidates accumulated over 2/3 of the popular vote. By late March, 1991, only 31% of a national sample indicated that they would vote for the FSN--although it remained the party with the largest proportion of public support.²⁴ Unquestionably, a 50% increase in Romanians' cost of living in the three months between October, 1990 and January, 1991 contributed to the government's diminished approval rating.²⁵ Huge price increases when price controls on basic foodstuffs were ended on April 1, 1991 certainly caused additional erosion of the Front's popular approval.²⁶ Just before these price increases were instituted, 74% of the same national sample acknowledged that they were worried or very worried about the shock of price liberalization.²⁷

Not surprisingly, strikes began to be more frequent and more widespread in 1991, hitting key sectors such as railway workers, doctors, teachers and others.²⁸ By August, the railway work

stoppages were continuing, while the major Brasov truck factory, defense industry workers, and others, were also out on strike.

This fear, not external attack, is an omnipresent peril to Romanians today, and the first stages of creating a market economy will exacerbate the suffering of a population long overdue for relief. For the FSN government or any party that sought to govern, coping with Romania's acutely crisis-ridden economy will cause political hemorrhaging that further erodes diffuse support while adding to the repertoire of extremists.

During 1991, the political distress of the FSN government because of economic calamity were evident; disputes between Finance Minister Theodor Stolojan and State Secretary Anton Vatasescu in March (reportedly over the second stage of price liberalization and the social safety net to accompany those price increases) led, indirectly, to a cabinet crisis.²⁹ Prime Minister Roman eventually acted to create a stronger team on economic matters, appointing Eugen Dijmarescu to the Finance and Economics posts, joining cabinet member Adrian Severin and Mugur Isarescu (Governor of the Romanian Central Bank) as the key policy-makers concerning the country's economic transition.

The old nomenklatura--all of those individuals whose posts of responsibility and career were based on party loyalty--numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A post-Ceausescu Romania faces, as have all of the East European states, a difficult passage towards a new leadership/managerial cohort. Such an endeavor is impossible if, as a criterion of entry into new governments, an entirely non-party

past is required. Simply put, there are insufficient numbers of people who simultaneously have no communist party background and possess adequate preparation to assume executive, legislative or judicial positions. Indeed, it is vital to recognize that Romania's ability to be governed at all in the first year or two after December, 1989 rested with a very small group of well-trained, cosmopolitan individuals. This cohort of fewer than ten people were friends and colleagues, had encountered each other as teaching cadre at the Communist Party Higher Academy (the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy), and had been critical of Ceausescu and many of his policies. To condemn these people by virtue of their past Communist Party membership, or their service to Romania in the communist regime, would be to ignore their deeper commitment and larger talents.

But criticisms have been widespread, directed at Iliescu and Roman individually, at their staffs or cabinet, and at their inability to clear out the larger mass of aparatchiks still in place around the country. At the FSN congress in March, 1991, opinions that the FSN government had concentrated power "...around technocrats" was heard, and that the Roman and Iliescu had enabled "political bargain hunters" to creep in "...from the old bureaucracy".³⁰ Resignations from within the FSN were made with the same kind of accusation; Claudiu Iordache, who had been a leader in Timisoara's uprising in December, 1989, resigned from an FSN party position saying that the Front was simply keeping communists and their policies in power.³¹ Sharper condemnation

came from the newspapers of traditional parties, for whom there had never been any doubt about who was still in power.³²

More problematic than holdover communist bureaucrats is the unease throughout Romania that the Securitate--the secret police--have been given a new lease on life. President Iliescu and Prime Minister Roman acknowledge that many erstwhile Securitate agents remain in the newly reconstituted Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI in its Romanian initials), headed Virgil Magureanu.³³ Seeing such doubt, the SRI has tried to create a more open appearance, has granted a number of interviews, and has generally sought to portray itself as a defender of Romanian laws and security.³⁴ The gap of trust has not been bridged, however, and both popular mistrust and questions about SRI loyalties do not help abate internal threats to Romanian security.

There is little doubt, in any case, that the minimal turnover of local-level officials in Romania has been detrimental to the effectiveness of economic reform and political pluralism. Calls for local elections are a direct consequence of suspicions that each county (judet) requires a thorough political house-cleaning before democratic forces or policy reforms can really have a chance. The FSN government has been thwarted, as well, by its limited control over local and regional authorities.

Loyalty of Romania's military to a post-Ceausescu democratic transformation is not certain. Lines of authority between civilian leaders and the army had grown tenuous during the communist period as Ceausescu constrained resources available to the military,

denied to the High Command a preeminence for national defense, and isolated the armed forces from technological imports that could have helped it to modernize. The dubious role of the regular Army in the first days of the anti-Ceausescu revolt--especially in Timisoara--have not helped the military's reputation. Iliescu and Roman now have their third defense minister in two years--after Militaru and Stanculescu--in General Constantin Spiroiu. That Militaru and Stanculescu were moved from their posts reveal two aspects of the weak link between civil and military authority; Militaru was opposed from within the Army, while Stanculescu had the severe political problem of being associated with events in Timisoara. Victor Stanculescu, who was switched to become Minister of Industry, retains considerable power, and is clearly tied to national security decision-making. Yet, the unwillingness or inability of Stanculescu to commit forces in Iliescu's behalf in June, 1990 and the mounting liability that Stanculescu represented are more than suggestive. Within the Army are all the cleavages, from nationalist to communist, that splinter post-Ceausescu Romanian politics--and the High Command has the Army's unity, not the national interest, as its first order responsibility.

But the most debilitating threat from within the Romanian political system is a pervasive doubt about the relevance of political authority to resolving problems and meeting demands. The National Salvation Front has seen its once formidable level of confidence wither as economic conditions worsen while FSN personages are unable to shake suspicions about their past or

current motives. This is not, precisely speaking, indifference to the public realm; instead, it is a purposeful turning inward, begun long ago in the misery of Ceausescu's dictatorship, away from a public political environment from which there was nothing to be gained.

EXTERNAL THREATS

Romanian borders are not endangered today by threatening armies. Almost without exception, however, political actors in Bucharest view the potential for future dangers to be significant.

Hungary's "threat" to Romania is not military. Rather, the Magyar diaspora in Transylvania is thought to be a cauldron in which Hungary's involvement can only be disruptive. Romanian decision-makers are, for the most part, suspicious about any Hungarian government presence--through consulates, educational exchange programs, investment initiatives, etc.--in Transylvania. Several important and highly specific points of contention exist. Hungary wants to re-open a consulate in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), to reestablish an autonomous Hungarian university in the same city, to open more border crossing points between the two countries, and to begin investment programs in that part of Romania. There are no territorial claims implied by any of these actions, but each has (as seen from Bucharest) the potential to develop loyalties towards Budapest, and to diminish Bucharest's control over this part of Romanian territory.

Neither Hungarian nor Romanian military leaders want a confrontation to develop or border incidents to escalate. One of

the ironies of the Hungarian-Romanian difficulty is the efforts by politicians to use the issue, and military high commands to defuse it. Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania is not an issue about which Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur wants to do battle--ever. Neither Victor Stanculescu nor Constantin Spiroiu have interests in confrontation with Hungary. To the contrary, we have seen efforts by both countries' militaries to advance bilateral confidence and security-building measures, including the spring, 1991 "Open-Skies" agreement between the two countries. Although largely symbolic (involving only four overflights per year), the accord breaks new ground and strongly implies that neither army has anything it wants to hide from the other in order to mount an attack.³⁵

Despite such an important step, however, Romanians recall with evident dislike a remark made by Hungarian Prime Minister Antall concerning his role as premier for fifteen million Hungarians--the number in the state of Hungary plus all the diaspora in the aggregate. There is also remembrance of Hungarians' redeployment of forces from the western border to the eastern frontier with Romania in 1989 and 1990, a measure that the West appears to have understood but that rankled Romanian sensitivities. •

The potential for difficulties with the Soviet Union, with independent republics such as the Ukraine, or with consequences of turmoil in the USSR (e.g., mass migration) have weighed heavily on Romanian security planners in 1991. Were Bessarabia not a part of the historical animosity between Moscow and Bucharest, the

potential for a closely cooperative relationship might exist. But Romanians still constitute 60% of the population in the Soviet republic of Moldova³⁶, which has asserted its autonomy during 1991. The Prut River, serving as the Soviet-Romanian border since the end of World War II, insulates Romania from few if any of the USSR's difficulties.

No Romanian government can turn its back on the plaintive appeals of people in Moldova for closer cultural and economic ties. Reunification of Romanian and Moldova, however, must be avoided in official Romanian pronouncements. There is no question of Moscow's vehement opposition to any movement in that direction. On the other hand, closer ties with an increasingly independent republic are feasible and have been the subject President Iliescu's meetings with officials of Moldova.³⁷ The Romanian government is particularly eager to secure cross-border access for family visitation, and very concerned about avoiding any action that would promote renewed ethnic fighting as there was in October and November, 1990, bringing thousands of Soviet Internal Ministry (MVD) troops into the republic.

And, to the West, Slobodan Milosevic is not reassuring. An enlarged, well-armed, nationalist Serbia will be troublesome to Romania insofar as both Serbs and Romanians reside on both sides of the state borders, and issues of illegal commerce and migration have long been matters of dispute. Croatians and Serbs, seeking perhaps to blame others for their warfare, have taken to blaming rogue Securitate units for fomenting violence and selling arms.³⁸

Reinforcements of the Romanian-Yugoslav border were undertaken in July and August, 1991 because of the sizeable movements of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) into and through Croatia. There is obvious concern that, were fighting to exceed the limited civil war of summer, 1991, guerilla units may seek sanctuary in Romania or try to resupply forces from Romanian territory. The Romanian military has also discussed responses were Yugoslav federal forces to intrude into Romanian territory in "hot pursuit". In all of this there is considerable worry in Bucharest that an entirely unwanted civil war may add to already weighty national security concerns.

POLICIES AND CAPACITIES FOR ROMANIAN SECURITY

Complexities and challenges of Romania's security environment are acknowledged by the FSN government. Defense Minister Constantin Spiroiu, in a July, 1991 interview, for example, noted that

"...today experts maintain increasingly that threats may come primarily from internal sources in the form of unexpected consequences from East European reform processes, or they could also be economic, social or national...[in addition] there are various nonconventional threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, environment, etc."³⁹

Romania's ability to respond creatively and quickly to a new security environment is constrained by the country's relative isolation from the West during the first two post-Ceausescu years, by disastrous economic conditions, and by the lack of a firm domestic political consensus.

Nevertheless, the Iliescu-Roman foreign policy has included a number of innovations among which are principal themes that any

Romanian government is likely to pursue.

Strenuous endeavors by both the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry have been made to repair Romania's damaged relations with industrial democracies. There is, to be sure, a sensitivity about being isolated, and a strong tendency in the FSN to suspect that the West responded negatively to Romania's May 20, 1990 election because the outcome was not what the West had desired. Yet, FSN views also acknowledge that Romania's poor image is a product of the country's bureaucracy, disorder, socio-political instability, strikes, and corruption.⁴⁰ Senior Romanian officials have recognized the need to convey their commitment to political and economic changes, and have made frequent trips to Washington, London, Paris, Tokyo and other capitals.⁴¹ Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, Minister Eugen Dijmarescu, Governor Mugur Isarescu (of the Central Bank), Minister Adrian Severin and other cabinet-level officials have made several trips to Washington, D.C. since mid-1990; the Foreign Minister's travel schedule has been, in fact, extraordinarily full.

In part because plans for a market economy are materializing and local elections are planned, the Bush Administration has reacted favorably and waived the Jackson-Vanik amendment--a critical first step towards renewing MFN. Although submission of MFN to Congress for approval is unlikely to happen until after local elections are held, the Romania can now begin to re-enter financial markets closed to it by American reluctance.

Foreign Minister Nastase, Economics and Finance Minister

Dijmarescu, and Central Bank Governor Isaurescu have sought to cultivate relations with the European Community at many forums. An EC-Romania bilateral trade and cooperation agreement took effect on May 1, 1991; Romania's aim, however, is an associate status with the EC.⁴²

Although a recitation of all initiatives taken by Romania to enhance bilateral ties with the West is unnecessary here, there have been particularly strong efforts to develop Italian-Romanian and Spanish-Romanian links. With Italy, for example, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in July 1991, and significant technical and scientific cooperation is planned as a consequence of Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis' mid-year visit to Bucharest.⁴³

Romania's relations with Hungary, as noted earlier, remain uneasy. The spring, 1991 "Open Skies" accord was an important, ~~albeit~~ *symbolic*, bilateral confidence and security-building measure. Fundamental differences remain. Before setting to rest larger issues of bilateral relations or holding a summit, the Hungarians want to hold talks with Romania at the working level about re-opening the Hungarian consulate in Cluj, more border crossing points, and the re-opening of an autonomous Hungarian university (also in Cluj). All of these matters are focused on the Transylvanian Hungarian population within Romania.

Romania has expressed a quite different view--i.e., that a broad treaty of understanding, cooperation and good will is first required to establish the "norms of bilateral relations", after

which "a future accord on a series of concrete actions..." is feasible.⁴⁴ Both sides accuse the other of having the proverbial cart before the horse, and neither has defused the tension. At international forums, for example at the July, 1991 CSCE Geneva meeting on ethnic minorities, the two countries clashed once again regarding the Romanian ethnic minority policy.⁴⁵

One of the most criticized steps taken by the Romanian government has been to sign a new treaty with the Soviet Union. In an interview discussing the treaty, Foreign Minister Nastase pointed out the advantages to Romania of retaining close ties with the Soviet Union--the raw materials, potential market, etc. Further, he pointed out that the treaty clarified thorny bilateral issues including the Romanian treasures taken by the Red Army, Serpent's Island (occupied by the USSR since the war), and other matters.⁴⁶

But Romania's concerns were deeper. The Soviets--particularly the Soviet military--were edgy about Moldova, and had sent additional troops to the republic in late 1990. Romania's justifiable concern was that, in addition to tension on the Hungarian border, a much more ominous adversary could emerge if provoked beyond the Prut River. That the treaty clearly denies to Romania any territorial ambition beyond the Prut--i.e., to reunite Bessarabia with other Romanian territory--was condemned by many in Romania's anti-FSN opposition. Yet, the treaty's reassurance to Moscow has enabled Bucharest to continue developing ties with the Moldovan government, including meetings between Foreign Minister

Nastase and Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Tiu,⁴⁷ and to promote contacts with the Russian Republic.⁴⁸

Serbia's effort to reassert dominance in Yugoslavia and/or the complete breakup of Yugoslavia have been ominous. Heightened readiness of Romanian troops in border areas has been evident, and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has nervously advocated EC and CSCE action to preclude dismembering Yugoslavia.⁴⁹ Romania is powerless to do anything to mitigate fighting between Croats and Serbs or others, but (as noted earlier) Croatian publications have alluded to possible involvement of erstwhile Securitate agents in supplying arms to Serbs in Slovenia.⁵⁰

To defend itself, Romania's military is woefully underprepared for any concerted attack. Its equipment is very outdated, and its training poor. Efforts by the post-Ceausescu government to depoliticize the Army and to professionalize it are underway. Defense Minister Spiroiu has emphasized the need to give "top priority to qualitative aspects in all areas of national defense", and has specifically referred to equipment and the standard of conscripts as matters requiring urgent attention.⁵¹ For the near term, however, Romania's 170,000 active-duty personnel remain an unlikely reservoir of the nation's security. Involvement in economic activity, that had absorbed almost 80,000 of the military's active personnel in 1989⁵², had a debilitating effect on readiness and equipment maintenance--an effect that Romania is now too poor to reverse any time soon.⁵³

Most broadly, Romania seeks to surround itself with more

layers of regional and multilateral security organizations. The aforementioned associate status in EC is one such linkage. To this have been added the notions of Danubian cooperation (a June 25-26 meeting took place in Bucharest), a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, and Balkan cooperation generally. President Iliescu has spoken of interlocking "harmonious relationships amidst the new all-European architecture and its sub-regional components".⁵⁴ Foreign Minister Nastase has elaborated this notion of an web of regional and sub-regional architectures that are "...temporary, until the establishment of a pan-European security system".⁵⁵

Romania fears, perhaps most of all, being separated from the rest of Europe--set aside in the Balkans to contend with its internal and external threats alone. To divide East-Central from Southeastern Europe is a "totally unacceptable and artificial" division, according to a Secretary of State in the Romanian Foreign Ministry--a division that perpetuates haves and have nots, both in terms of economic access to the West and the availability of security guarantees. Romanians of all parties are also uncomfortable with the notion of recreating a buffer zone vis-a-vis the USSR from countries of Eastern Europe.

SUMMARY

Romania must confront numerous intractable problems that make the country less secure than most of the other erstwhile communist states of Eastern Europe. Its capacities to meet these threats are certainly not military or economic. Romanian diplomacy must, indeed, bear the brunt of the country's security needs for the

foreseeable future.

A wide range of initiatives have been inaugurated; none of these alone provides the answer to Romania's security needs. Yet, Romanians have begun the arduous re-entry into Europe, with considerable promise that--provided domestic political democratization and economic reform continue--Romania's insecurity can be diminished during the 1990s.

NOTES

1. Among books on these subjects, the most notable are Mary Ellen Fischer's, Nicolae Ceausescu (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1990), Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
2. An early expression of this view was Vladimir Tismaneanu, "New Masks, Old Faces: The Romanian Junta's Familiar Look", The New Republic (5 February 1990).
3. Some of these criticisms of the Front from intellectual circles is reflected in
4. See Daniel N. Nelson, "The Romanian Disaster" in Anthony Jones, ed. Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1990), pp. 83-111. See also, generally, Daniel N. Nelson, Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1988).
5. I have detailed these charges and counter-charges in a special edition of Electoral Studies, Volume 9, Number 4 (1990), pp. 355-366.
6. A comprehensive report is National Democratic Institute for International Affairs/National Republican Institute for International Affairs, The May 1990 Elections in Romania (Washington, D.C.: NDI/NRIA, 1990).
7. For accounts of the miners' attacks in Bucharest, see
8. The flavor of Western commentary on June, 1990 events was a Washington Post editorial, "Romania's Stalinists" (17 June, 1990).
9. A compendium of such legislation and administrative reforms, with proposed time-lines, is Council for Reform of the Government of Romania, The White Book of the Romanian Reform (Bucharest: May, 1991). The Council is headed by Adrian Severin, Deputy Prime Minister, and de facto economic reform "czar" for the FSN government.
10. "15 Ceausescu Officials Jailed", Financial Times (26 March 1991); among those sentenced were former propaganda chief Dumitru Popescu, a former foreign minister Ioan Totu, both of whom received five and a half years in prison. A total of twenty one former politburo members were tried for genocide. A more complete report on these charges was issued by Rompres on March 25, 1991 and reprinted in FBIS, Daily Report: East Europe 91-058 (26 March 1991), p. 46.

11. Adopting Romanian children by Americans had led to a substantial black market of infants in Romania that was traumatic for families who wished to adopt, and impossible for the State Department to manage. Stories on this dilemma, and the Romanian action are numerous. Several that provide summary information are David Binder, "U.S. Issues Warning of Obstacles in Adopting Romanian Children", New York Times (May 24, 1991), Al Kamen, "U.S. to End Waivers for Romanian Adoptions", Washington Post (27 July, 1991) and an Associate Press dispatch, "Romanians Put Strict Curbs on Adoptions" carried in the Washington Post (17 July, 1991).
12. For comparison, political apathy and the dangers such a phenomenon represents to democratization in the Polish case is discussed in David Mason, Daniel N. Nelson, and Bohdan Szklarski, "Apathy and the Birth of Democracy: The Polish Struggle", East European Politics and Societies Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring, 1991), pp. 205-233.
13. See Mason, Nelson and Szklarski, op. cit. wherein a number of studies are cited concerning Poles' attitudes about the efficacy of participation in the post-communist setting.
14. Compare, for example, chapters by Ioan Mircea Pascu, who has served as Counselor to President Iliescu for Foreign Policy, and the views of Sorin Botez, Foreign Policy advisor to the National Liberal Party in Daniel N. Nelson, ed. Romania After Tyranny (Boulder: Westview, forthcoming 1991).
15. A very good synopsis of Vatra Romaneasca's lineage, tactics and implications, including descriptions of its principal organ Romania Mare and citations from its leaders, is Dennis Deletant's "Convergence Versus Divergence in Romania: The Role of the Vatra Romaneasca Movement in Transylvania", paper presented at the SSEEES 75th Anniversary Conference, 8-14 December, 1990.
16. See "Declaratie", in Romania Libera (2 July, 1991), p. 2.
17. See this Ministry statement published in Romania Libera (24 July, 1991), p. 1.
18. As quoted in RFE/RL Daily Report, #150 (8 August, 1991), p. 2.
19. This is the interpretation both of American diplomats then stationed in Romania as well as a number of European and U.S. scholars who have conducted research in Romania during 1991.
20. See a report on this matter by Constantin Vranceanu, ~~Romania Mare~~ Romania Libera (6-7 July, 1991), p. 3.

21. See Henry Kamm, "Romanians Are Told of Nation's Role in Mass Killing of Jews", New York Times (2 July, 1991) and Henry Kamm, "Anti-Semitic Taunt at Wiesel Talk in Romania", New York Times (3 July, 1991), p. A8.
22. A comparative discussion of privatization efforts in Eastern Europe acknowledges Romania's attempts, and notes the very minimal steps by Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. See Marvin Jackson, "The Progress of Privatization", Report on Eastern Europe (2 August, 1991), Vol 2, # 31, pp. 40-45.
23. See the announcement of Iliescu's action in a Rompres dispatch of 14 August 1991 reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-158 (15 August 1991), p. 31.
24. See IRSOP report, "Program Dupa un An..." (Bucuresti: IRSOP, 1991), dated April 10, 1991.
25. According to the Bucharest periodical, Economistul (3 March, 1991), a survey of 2400 goods and services indicated a 50% cost of living increase between October 1990 and January 1991.
26. Reuters reported on April 2 about the consequences of such price increases. See "Romania Upset and Resigned at Rise in Basic Food Prices", New York Times (2 April, 1991), p. A2; also "Romanians Face Big Price Rises", Financial Times (2 April, 1991).
27. This survey was conducted by IRSOP between March 26-31, 1991 with a sample of over 2,200 individuals. See IRSOP's report, "Program Dupa un An..." (10 April 1991).
28. Financial Times (19 June, 1991) reported these incidents in an article entitled "Romanian Strike Spreads".
29. Bucharest Domestic Service reported on this episode on 22 March 1991, in a dispatch reprinted by FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-057 (25 March, 1991), p. 36.
30. See Christian Science Monitor report (no by-line) on "Romanian's Party Congress" (19 March, 1991).
31. See the Washington Post (no by-line) (14 March, 1991), "Official Quits High Party Post".
32. See, for example, Sorin Stafan, "Regimului Frontul Savarii Nationale...", Dreptatea (4 April 1991), p. 3.
33. Such concern reaches the Western press. See, for example, Stephen Engelberg, "Uneasy Romania Asks: Where Are Spies Now", New York Times (13 February, 1991).

34. For example, see the revealing two-part interview of Major General Mihai Stan, First Deputy Director of SRI, by Stefan Mitroi in Tineretul Liber (8 and 9 February, 1991).

35. I discussed the results of these negotiations in Budapest in late April and early May, 1991 with Hungarian Defense Ministry personnel.

36. According to the Soviet census of 1989, there were 3.3 million "Moldovans" and 145,000 "Romanians". But there is no linguistic or cultural distinction between these two labels. Of all Moldovans, 2.5 million are in the union republic of that name, constituting 2/3 of the republic's population in 1989. After some migration to Romania, it is safe to estimate that at least 60% of Moldova's population is ethnically and linguistically Romanian.

37. Rompres (9 April 1991), for example, reported on a meeting between Nicolae Tiu and Ion Iliescu regarding Romanian-Moldova ties. See reprint of this dispatch in FBIS, Daily Report: East Europe 91-069 (10 April 1991), p. 37.

38. One example is the report on the Securitate in the Zagreb newspaper Vjesnik (7 May 1991), p. 4 regarding alleged activities by the former Romanian secret police in the town of Borovo Selo.

39. See the interview with General Constantin Nicolae Spiroiu in Adevarul (18 July 1991), author's translation.

40. See the commentary by Dumitru Tinu in Adevarul (16 May, 1991).

41. A high-level American delegation including Assistant Secretary of State Richard Shifter went to Bucharest in June, 1991 to discuss conditions for MFN. Prior to this delegation's visit, considerable debate within the State Department and Congress took place regarding a shift in U.S. policy towards Romania, prompted in part by the recognition that standards of conduct were being applied inconsistently if the Bush Administration's pro-MFN policy for China was compared with the position on Romania. Tangible economic reforms and scheduling of local elections were also critical to a change in U.S. policy.

42. A letter from Prime Minister Roman requesting talks on such an association with the EC was presented to President of the EC, Jacques Delors, by Eugen Dijmarescu on May 31, 1991 in Brussels. See a Rompres Dispatch of 31 May 1991 reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-106 (3 June, 1991), p. 31.

43. See the accounts of de Michelis' visit from Bucharest Radio, Rompres and other dispatches reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-142 (24 July 1991), p. 22-23.

44. See, for example, the exchange of letters during late June and early July, 1991 between Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenskzky and Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase as reported on Bucharest Programul Unu Radio, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe (10 July, 1991), p. 29.
45. The author discussed the Hungarian view with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszeszensky in Washington, D.C. in late July, 1991. The angry Romanian rejection of Hungarian complaints was carried by Rompres on 19 July 1991 and reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-139 (19 July, 1991), p. 25.
46. See the Nastase interview in Dimineata (10 April, 1991).
47. One such meeting occurred on 27 July, 1991 in Bucharest.
48. Rompres reported on Nastase's conversations with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Federation Foreign Minister, on 18 July 1991. See FBIS Daily Report: East Europe (19 July 1991), p. 24.
49. The text of a June 27, 1991 "Declaration of Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs" was made available to me by the Romanian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
50. See Vjesnik (Zagreb) of 7 May, 1991, p. 4.
51. See the interview of Spiroiu by Octavian Andronic in Libertatea (4-5 July, 1991), pp. 1-2.
52. Ibid.
53. For a more complete discussion of Romania's military in the post-Ceausescu era, one should consult Larry Watts, "The Romanian Army in December and Beyond", in Daniel N. Nelson, Romania After Tyranny (Boulder: Westview, forthcoming 1991).
54. See the text of his address to a seminar on "Perceptions and Concepts of Security in Eastern Europe" in Bucharest on 4 July, 1991 as reprinted in FBIS Daily Report: East Europe 91-131 (9 July 1991), p. 3.
55. A full elaboration of Nastase's views is in Lucia Verona's interview of the Foreign Minister in Azi (25 May, 1991), p. 1 and 4.

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Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute
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BULGARIA: SECURITY CONCERNS AND FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION¹

The events resulting in the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 and 1990 were fast-paced and have had great impact upon Western foreign policy, European security, and the world economy. Neither anticipated nor yet well-understood, the six year era of glasnost ["openness"] and perestroika ["restructuring"] is likely to be among the most important of the twentieth century. It resulted in processes yielding democratization, nascent free market economies, military realignment, and political and social reform -- albeit with varying degrees of fervor and ferment. In the Soviet Union, cradle of modern communist reform, the events of 19 August 1991 will surely cause reconfiguration of the chapter on reform, but it is too early to know precisely to what degree. In the countries of East Central Europe it appears that democratization accompanied by the creation of capitalist systems, is relatively firm. In the Balkans, on the other hand, success has been mixed, with Bulgaria showing signs of the most promising future.

This paper concerns the case of Bulgaria. It will broadly cover security questions and foreign policy matters along with a discussion of flash points, which, if ignited, could explode, with potential for fracturing the fragile democracy which this former communist land is evolving, as well as for adding to the destabilization of the Balkans.

BULGARIA: BALKAN BASTION OF THE USSR

Throughout the 40-plus years of communist control in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was the primus inter pares. And the USSR's bulwark in Southeastern Europe was Bulgaria, the only faithful follower of the Moscow line in the peninsula. Bulgaria is contiguous to all Balkan countries but Albania. Two of its neighbors are formerly non-orthodox, communist states, Yugoslavia and Romania. Today, both are experiencing turmoil. Multi-national and volatile Yugoslavia, long an independent actor in world affairs, but one, which, after 73 years of existence appears to be on the brink of fragmentation and civil war, extends along Bulgaria's western border. Romania, Bulgaria's northern neighbor across the Danube River, once a rogue member of the Warsaw Pact, is a country still very much controlled by the Ceausescu-era political and security infrastructure.

In contrast to Romania, Bulgaria was a firm and devoted member of the Soviet alliance. Bulgaria's past communist orthodoxy, from Moscow's perspective, coupled with its location on the northern borders of Greece and European Turkey gave it, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, a unique and strategic importance against these two N.A.T.O. members. In addition, its proximity to Turkey afforded the U.S.S.R. a potential stepping stone to the Turkish Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the Soviet's only naval and maritime passage from its warm-water ports on the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In sum, Bulgaria was the Soviet's bastion in the Balkans, a gateway into peninsula if the need for invasion should have arisen. With the Warsaw Pact now defunct, Bulgaria's nearness to the Straits is no longer an advantage enjoyed by the Soviets, for Bulgaria is not a military ally of the USSR, and, appears to be reluctant to become one again.² But Bulgaria was more than a jumping off point for Soviet troops, it evidently also served as Moscow's agent in some international affairs

wherein Bulgarian personnel acted at times as surrogates for the Soviet Union in such matters as international covert activities, training terrorists, conducting arms deals, and spreading disinformation among other acts. Bulgaria no longer performs such services for its former mentor.

Currently, Bulgarian national political leaders are largely in fact gazing westward anxious to enter Western trade and security alliances, hoping to be soon joining the European mainstream. The average Bulgarian is anxious too, to put the communist experience behind him. This shift away from the Soviet-style governments by each former Eastern European satellite will have long-term effects on the economies and security systems of all concerned; it has already unraveled the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.). Nevertheless, because of historic interdependencies, economic ties between Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. remain and will continue to remain strong for some time to come as they are bound together by market factors. At the same time, the changes have led to an overall reduction in Soviet impact on Bulgarian affairs, though Soviet influence is by no means dead in Bulgaria as we will see.

INTERNAL TURMOIL

Politics

Contemporary Bulgarian politics are a melange of ideological, social, and economic cross-currents. Until the summer of 1991, they could be generally grouped into the bipolar struggle between the Bulgarian Communist Party (B.C.P.), which changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (B.S.P.) in 1990, and the major opposition coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces (U.D.F.), founded in 1989. The B.S.P., whose program has evolved from authoritarian communism to a muddled, quasi-social democratic platform, was confronted by the U.D.F.

which, despite the fact that its constituent member organizations included such groups as social democrats, environmentalists, and agrarians, staunchly stood against the B.S.P. During the June 1990 national elections, the B.S.P. secured 211 seats, giving it a bare majority of 52.75% of the seats, while the U.D.F. came in second with 144 (36%).

To many, the U.D.F.'s comparatively poor showing was a significant disappointment. In the parliament that was formed as a result of these, the first free national elections in more than 40 years, the B.S.P. and the U.D.F. became locked in struggles which seemed often based less on political platform and more on inter-party enmity. Despite the often byzantine and at times apparently self-serving activities of deputies and their parties, significant legislation, in the spirit of democratization and a market economy, was finally passed, including, notably, a new constitution on 12 July. But in the process, the U.D.F. coalition, never robust, began to come apart. Two factions formed around the issue of whether the constitution should be approved before the then expected September elections (they are now set for October 12), or be postponed until afterwards. This turn of events may give the B.S.P., albeit itself somewhat fractured, a greater chance of winning a majority of seats in the new parliament. On the other hand, the August putsch in the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent diminution of prestige and power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union may cause Bulgaria's former communist party, the B.S.P., to lose support and influence in a coat-tail effect, thereby possibly counter-balancing the fragmentation in the U.D.F. by driving some who would have voted the B.S.P. ticket to the U.D.F. However, while the August events in Moscow could be an asset to the anti-communist U.D.F. coalition, it seems unlikely that sufficient organizational unity will be derived to fully capitalize on it, for U.D.F. factions seem unwilling to compromise sufficiently to retain a unified facade.

In a worst case scenario, the B.S.P. could carry the elections and democratization could be side-tracked or stalled, due to efforts to insure B.S.P. dominance in national and local affairs. Progress toward creating a market economy could be set back or even reversed, for the B.S.P. has opposed the "shock therapy" approach espoused by the U.D.F. and being employed in Bulgaria. The creation of a more authoritarian government then, cannot be ruled out, perhaps resembling the current Romanian model, wherein the government, made up almost exclusively of former Ceausescu-era communists, seeks to perform the minimum exercises needed to secure Western assistance, but to go its own way in a self-perpetuating process which protects party members, their rights and privileges.

More likely, however, if the B.S.P. wins, is that there will be scrambled coalition politics, wherein the majority B.S.P. would be obliged to make accommodations with the burgeoning agrarian movement to which it will likely lose members, and with the rump U.D.F. and its other splinters, prominently among them, the Social Democrats, which generally are likely to check serious recidivism. Democratization would likely be retarded in this model, but not halted.

The Economy

If the politics of the Bulgaria are in flux, the economy is even more uncertain. While Bulgaria has not experienced serious unrest of Albania, Romania, or Yugoslavia, it is fertile ground for increasing social problems thanks to an economy in shambles, the legacy of more than 40 years of central planning and associated problems of corruption, poor management, and a system which valued quantity over quality, among others.

The people of Bulgaria greeted the year 1991 angry and confused. Energy was rationed and there was less food in the shops than in

communist times and what there was, was more expensive. Unemployment was growing. Meantime, the economic crisis showed no promise of abating. People looked in disbelief at the meager accomplishments and activities of their new and democratically elected legislature which appeared unable to effectively deal with issues concerning the national good.

Peasants produced food stuffs for the nation but the prices were controlled by the state and selling was not profitable, even for collective farms. Thus, much food was hoarded by producers and distributors against a time when prices would rise. Government agencies demanded that agricultural enterprises turn a profit, but the rules of the state, at the same time, doomed the possibility of profit.³ Transportation was problematic too, as petrol became scarcer and more expensive. By Spring 1991, after prices were allowed to find market level, there was much more in the shops, shelves were not empty, though the prices were considerably higher and the number of consumers was lower.

Unwilling to cope with the painful economic reconstruction all around them, many of the best-trained Bulgarian young people began emigrating in large numbers as soon as travel restrictions were liberalized in 1990. By 10 June, according to official statistics, 44,105 Bulgarians with post-secondary education had left. Of this number 6,506 were educated specialists and scientific workers.⁴ The departure of these emigrants will certainly have an adverse effect upon the land for among them will be some of the best trained and brightest of the Bulgaria's young professionals. They have left because professional opportunities are limited. They believe a better life can be had abroad.

The brain drain notwithstanding, Bulgaria is making serious efforts at reform and has been able to persuade the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Community (E.C.) and other

organizations and agencies to provide financial support. But Bulgaria is attempting a "shock therapy" approach and the race is between whether the population can withstand the rigors of this radical solution to their economic woes or whether they will break before the course is run. With mounting unemployment and increasing discontent as manifested by such events as the nine-day Madan miners' strike for higher wages and better working conditions in August, it appears that the popular patience is wearing thin. Further, while data are very difficult to come by, there is evidence that particularly in the economic sphere, members of the former communist nomenklatura, many of whom still occupy important positions in the security and military forces, the bureaucracy, and in commerce, have been working against reform. Accompanying nomenklatura obstructionism, there is resistance from managers, administrators, and workers. These problems seem to have been fueled by such fears as becoming unemployed and/or, in the case of the nomenklatura, losing influence and privileged positions.⁵

In sum, discontent resulting from the harsh realities of the economic reformation could turn to unrest, inspired possibly in part by nomenklatura self-interest. Should there be disturbances, Bulgarian reform efforts will likely be severely damaged and its international credibility jeopardized.

The Muslim Question

Bulgarian politics are, and will continue to be, influenced by two internal trouble spots of major proportions, both with international ramifications, both emanating from the era of Ottoman imperial control of Bulgaria which began in the late 14th century. The first involves the Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and the second is the so-called Macedonian Question. The Ottoman Empire, of which Bulgaria was at least titularly a part until 1908, was a Muslim theocracy.⁶ Although it eventually

relinquished control of Bulgaria, a large number of people who, in the majority were ethnic Muslim Turks, augmented by a smaller number of Slavs whose forebears adopted Islam, remained in Bulgaria.

Historically, the Muslim and Christian communities did not integrate with each other, and the separation continued after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. During the 1950s through the 1980s, Bulgarian-Turkish formal relations were generally smooth, but not really close -- Bulgarians themselves never seemed to overcome the Ottoman "'Yoke' Psychosis,"⁷ that is, the not altogether accurate notion that Bulgaria existed for nearly 500 years under great oppression perpetrated by Ottoman authorities. Turkey, for its part, had and continues to maintain an interest in the well-being of the ethnic Turks and other Islamic peoples in Southeastern Europe.

Relations between Bulgaria and Turkey deteriorated virtually overnight when in December 1984, the Bulgarian government launched an assimilation campaign intended to transform ethnic Turks into "Bulgarians." The reasons for this attempt at cultural and religious transmogrification have never been publicly stated, though they appear rooted in the historical animosity between the two groups, based on the Ottoman Yoke syndrome. Often coupled with this is fear that ethnic Turks wanted to either secede or create an autonomous Turkish region within Bulgaria (setting up a Cyprus-like division of the country). In addition, the state of Bulgaria's economy was bad and getting worse. It is probable that this national purification campaign was also in part induced by the logic that if the population could be mobilized against the Muslims, its attention would be diverted from the increasingly evident national economic crisis. The fact that the non-Muslim population had a shrinking birth rate while the Muslims had an expanding one, was also used to aid the government in feeding anti-Muslim sentiments.⁸ In the

end, the assimilation program failed, but not before as many as 100 Muslims died resisting the authorities.⁹

Basic human rights were denied the ethnic Turks and even the use of the Turkish language was forbidden. In 1989, soon after taking office, the Bulgarian communist government which unseated long-time dictator, Todor Zhivkov, began a program of reinstating those human rights denied Muslims, and did so with the support of most political opposition groups, especially the U.D.F.

Of the 300,000-375,000 who fled to Turkey in 1989, as a result of Bulgaria's opening its border -- an effort to eliminate the "Turkish Question" by removing a large number of the ethnic Turks physically from Bulgaria -- about half have returned. When they left, much of their belongings and real estate were sold at low prices to non-Muslims or simply lost to the state. The government is attempting to find means to return such property; however, many, especially anti-Muslim nationalists and those living in the predominantly Turkish regions who reaped the profits resulting from ethnic Turkish departures, oppose, sometimes physically, the restitution of both the rights and belongings of those Turks who left. They also oppose the right to have the Turkish language taught to children in schools.¹⁰

The Muslims of Bulgaria, who comprise between ten and fifteen per cent of the total population, have been non-violent throughout both the assimilation campaign and the subsequent events. Some organized a political action group called the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), founded in 1989. Although not all members are Muslim or of Islamic heritage, the organization's focus is the protection and extension of Muslim rights in Bulgaria and in fact, in the elections of 1990, had the third largest showing, garnering 23 (5.8%) seats in the 400 seat national parliament. During the recent ratification debates concerning Bulgaria's newly passed constitution, the MRF representatives were stridently

vocal about making Turkish an official language of Bulgaria. No such measure was passed, but the episode, which involved the walk-out of MRF deputies from the legislature, is a warning that Bulgarian Muslims are likely to become more assertive in pursuit of their goals, thus creating a greater likelihood for confrontation between Bulgarian nationalists and Bulgaria's largest minority groups. At the same time, the ethnic Turkish minority is becoming better organized, more vocal, and more demanding. It will surely bring pressure on the government for a greater say in national affairs and increased minority rights, and it will thus become increasingly a target of intensified anti-Muslim vituperation and perhaps even violence from nationalist quarters.

Extreme nationalists, the anti-Muslims, have possibly been encouraged by members of the former nomenklatura seeking to obstruct the current government, through demonstrations and actions like those in the Turkish regions in February. Such actions could discredit Bulgaria's efforts to be accepted in and assisted by developed democratic nations, by creating internal stress which would present a backward and racist image abroad for Bulgaria at a time when the country needs aid and assistance. These people continue to argue that Bulgaria should expect attempts to create within Bulgaria, a Cyprus, dividing Muslim for non-Muslim regions. But such arguments seem simplistic. A Turkish invasion is certainly out of the question and a Cyprus-like division of their lands is improbable under any circumstances because the predominantly Turkish regions are not contiguous, the two main 'islands' being in south central Bulgaria, around Kurdzali and in the northeastern section of the country, around Razgrad and Shumen. Turkey, at present riding the crest of a wave of support from N.A.T.O. nations for its assistance during the Gulf War, is unlikely to sully itself by engaging in a territorial spat with Bulgaria. Moreover, Turkey is well occupied with its own minority

problems involving the Kurds, among whom an independence movement is active.

Undeterred by such logic, Bulgarian anti-Muslim nationalists present themselves and Bulgaria as the outermost European bastion facing Islam and play upon this, as concern about Islam and Muslim fundamentalism, accompanied by recent events in the Persian Gulf grows, especially in conservative circles internationally. Such behavior can have a severely negative impact on Bulgarian-Turkish relations which are now slowly mending. In fact, as Turkey attempts to work with Bulgaria, through the granting of aid and loans, Bulgarian nationalists could cause tension internally within Bulgaria between Muslims and non-Muslims, which could, in turn, damage Bulgarian-Turkish relations and which could result in a loss of assistance from Ankara.

The Macedonian Question

The Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991 and the federal military, controlled largely by ethnic Serbians and Montenegrins, mounted a campaign against Slovenia during which blood was spilled on both sides. It is unlikely that the republics can be reconciled despite the efforts of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) and the European Community (E.C.) at promoting a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The question really is, can the Yugoslav republics peacefully dissolve Yugoslavia and what kind of arrangement, if any, can they build on its rubble? The answer is not yet clear and no resolution to the de facto civil war is in sight. Integral to Bulgaria's interests and concerns in this connection will be the fate of Yugoslav Macedonia, which constitutes more than one-third of geopolitical Macedonia, most of which was accorded to Bulgaria in 1878 as a result of the San Stefano Treaty that imperial Russia dictated to the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish

War (1877-1878).¹¹ By the terms of the San Stefano treaty, Bulgaria's borders were expanded three-fold to include Thrace and most of Ottoman Macedonia. The inhabitants of Macedonia were largely Slavs whom Bulgarians argued, used a language and had customs closely resembling those of Bulgarians. Bulgarians regarded them as being of the same nationality, while the Slavs of Macedonia themselves, in general had no developed national consciousness at the time. Great power politics intervened and Macedonia was lost three months later at the Congress of Berlin, and re-awarded to the Ottomans. Since then the Macedonian Question has festered in the Balkans.

The term "Macedonia" has been used over time to designate various regions of the central Balkan Peninsula. Historical, political, and ethnic considerations have made it impossible to achieve international unanimity over the precise boundaries of Macedonia, parts of which are now in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia or the ethnic identity of the people living there. Since the Treaty of Berlin, heated, and at times, irrational debates over the ethnic make-up of Macedonia have flared among Bulgarian, Greek, and Yugoslav (and its regional precursor, Serbian) nationalists, with each side claiming the majority of inhabitants as their kin and the territory these people occupy as therefore a birthright of the interlocutor. The collection of these disputes has become known as the "Macedonian Question."

A significant segment of geopolitical Macedonia is Greek territory and of course it was the ancient Greeks, particularly Alexander the Great, who engraved the term Macedonia in world history. After the Slavic invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries A.D., the ethnic composition of Macedonia gradually changed and changed still further a result of other immigrations and the conquest by the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century. Over time, the Slavs emerged as the majority

population, though no mass national consciousness emerged until well into the twentieth century.

Bulgarians pressed their claims most rigorously. Bulgarian troops occupied Macedonia during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), World Wars I and II (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) and each time subsequently relinquished it. During World War Two, the Yugoslav partisan leader, Josip Broz Tito, argued that those Slavs living in Yugoslav Macedonia, now called the Federal Republic of Macedonia, belong to a distinct Slavic nationality called "Macedonian." According to this view these people possess a culture sharing characteristics with, but different from, those of the Bulgarians or the Serbians.

Under pressure from the U.S.S.R. during and following World War Two, the Bulgarian government allowed as how there was indeed such as thing as a "Macedonian" nationality and in the 1956 Bulgarian census, the authorities even listed 187,729 Macedonians living in the Pirin Region of Bulgaria. By 1965, however, as relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated, this number shrank to 8,750. Bulgaria, by 1968, had changed its policy to one resembling the 1914 position in which it was contended that the Slavs living in Yugoslav Macedonia were by origin Bulgarian as were those people living in Pirin. The 1975 census showed no Macedonians only Bulgarians in Bulgaria.¹²

The Bulgarian perspective on the Macedonian nationality is that Yugoslav government created it during and following World War Two, evidently in order to diminish if not invalidate the legitimacy of any Bulgarian claim on Yugoslav territory or people. It was also a means of defusing a tendentious political problem, for the Serbs had managed to alienate the Slavs of Macedonia before and during World War Two by means of their attempt to Serbianize the population. For post-war Bulgaria, the creation of a Macedonian nationality was a reasonable compromise, for as a defeated power, it could not claim Macedonia. But

it could hope that the population of Yugoslav Macedonia, if made identifiably separate from Serbs, and given its Serbian antipathies, might move toward Bulgaria in time as the two lands shared significant cultural, linguistic, and historical ties.¹³ Bulgaria maintained this line after Tito's fall from Stalin's grace, because the alternative was that Macedonia might be reincorporated into Serbia. Today, Bulgarian nationalists are calling this a sell out by the Bulgarian government in the interest of international communist unity.

Bulgarians generally regard the population of Bulgarian Macedonia, as purely Bulgarian. The Greeks consider those people living in Greece who speak a Slavic language Slavophone Greeks, that is Greeks who speak a Slavic language. Both Bulgaria and Greece currently officially reject the notion of a Macedonian nationality within their borders, though both countries possess a Macedonian minority according to Yugoslavia.¹⁴ The Bulgarian and Greek positions were categorically affirmed in February 1991 when Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitur Popov met in Athens and later in Sofia and declared Yugoslav claims regarding Macedonians in both countries "absurd assertions about a Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria and Greece."¹⁵

The Macedonian Question could become an international flash point. If Yugoslavia disintegrates, the question of Macedonia's fate will become more pressing. Yugoslav Macedonia is, after all, in the heart of the Balkans. Right now, the Macedonians themselves seem to be thinking in terms of being sovereign, but perhaps connected to the other Yugoslav states. They are not talking about union with Bulgaria, although there are factions that favor some kind of unity with Bulgaria. In Bulgaria there are various groups arguing for union. The biggest appears to be the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-United Macedonian Societies ("IMRO-UMS"), which declared itself prepared to lead a

"struggle against pan-Serbian chauvinism and Macedonianism until the ultimate triumph of truth."¹⁶ That is, members were ready to seek means to advance Bulgarian-hood in Yugoslav Macedonia which would serve to eliminate the Macedonian nationality and presumably sway the inhabitants of Macedonia somehow into the Bulgarian sphere. How such objectives would be reached is not plain, although violence is disavowed despite the fact that the group has named itself after a liberation movement dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Ottoman Empire and later, to the annexation of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria through the use of force.

For their part, some Yugoslav Macedonians have pleaded for both the official recognition of what they regard as the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and the union of all Macedonians in a Macedonian nation. Others in Yugoslav Macedonia have sought to demonstrate that the Slavs living in this area are Bulgarian.

Key factors in terms of the Macedonian Question are: Will Bulgaria accord recognition to those seeking ethnic Macedonian status in Bulgaria? If yes, Bulgaria faces internal problems among nationalists who deny the existence of such a group. If no, Bulgaria is likely to have international human rights organizations taking a more serious interest in the treatment of those claiming Macedonian nationality. This could have funding and prestige implications for Bulgaria internationally.¹⁷

Serbian machinations pose a far greater threat to Bulgarian security, though. If Macedonia chooses to break away from Yugoslavia, or, alternatively, if Yugoslavia disintegrates, Serbia, under current leadership, could seek to extend control over the Yugoslav Macedonians. Such an act would surely provoke a strong response in Athens and Sofia, both of which would likely consider intervention in Yugoslav Macedonia in the interest of preserving the balance of power. In Bulgaria's case, irredentists could force Bulgaria to seek to redeem part or all of

geopolitical Macedonia lost in 1878. The Greek government would oppose such action and presumably would argue for maintenance of current borders. In the process a potential Bulgarian-Greek confrontation could result.

If Yugoslavia breaks up and Macedonia becomes an independent actor, it will be forced to seek alliances or unions. It could look to Bulgaria as the lesser of evils between Belgrade and Sofia. Greece and Bulgaria would have to work together closely on this to avoid misunderstandings and to present a bulwark against Serbia. Given that the question of the absorption of Macedonia has caused animosity for more than 100 years, an internationally mediated settlement, perhaps with a neutral Macedonia could be necessary, such a possibility has greater validity now than ever before as the Macedonianization of the Slav population in Yugoslav Macedonia has had nearly five decades, more than two generations to take root. A referendum and self-determination will surely play in the solution.

INTERNAL REFORM AND SECURITY

Since the fall of Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria has made a concerted effort to demonstrate to Western nations that it too is part of the West. Bulgaria offered to assist the U.S. and allies in the Gulf War, it foresworn a multi-billion dollar contract with Iraq in the process, thereby sustaining significant financial losses -- though its government had little choice if it meant to demonstrate that its thinking was consonant with that of Western European governments. Further it risked damaging its still significant economic relations with the U.S.S.R. by officially and loudly sympathizing with the Soviet Baltic republics during the height of the Baltic crisis in January 1991. The U.S.S.R. reacted with a warning that the Soviet Union regarded the Bulgarian statements on the Baltic crisis as interference in an internal Soviet

matter.¹⁸ Such talk, warned Soviet Ambassador to Bulgaria, Victor Sharapov, could damage bi-lateral relations. During the early days of the democratization process (and perhaps again after the overthrow of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union), many Bulgarians were apprehensive about their own military's interference from the Bulgarian armed forces. Repeated assurances from the military were issued, like the one on 14 November 1990, when the minister of national defense stated "there is no danger of a military coup."¹⁹ And the military has indeed publicly refrained from interfering in events. But it has had an influence using many avenues, the most obvious being through the offices of important military figures in public positions, including the vice president of Bulgaria, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, and the minister of national defense, Colonel General Yordan Mutafov. Colonel General Dobri Dzhurov, former Minister of National Defense for more than 20 years, was instrumental in the removal of Zhivkov. Now, as the military fractures between old and young, advocates of the status quo and advocates for change, it appears that the military's influence will be diminished. However, it must be recalled that the Soviet imprint on military and security matters will be felt for years to come in Bulgaria until such time as those trained in and/or by the U.S.S.R. are fired or retired. Many are Sovietophile and opposed to reform, even while Bulgaria seeks to locate new allies and new security arrangements in the West.

So far, the government has been able to control the damage through retirements. Meantime, reform is afoot. The process is aided by the emergence of younger officers committed to reform. An influential organization of mid-level and junior grade officers in the military, the Bulgarian Legion, "Georgi Rakovski," was founded in 1990 by military personnel intent on reform. It has thousands members -- no precise figures are available -- and has become a watchdog of the general staff

and senior officer ranks.²⁰ Further, the military doctrine of the Bulgarian armed forces is now under review and clearly changing as witnessed by the unwillingness of the government to make a bilateral mutual defense compact with the Soviet Union.

The retiring of 76 State Security [Durzhayna Sigurnost] generals in July 1991 is also a sign that times are changing. Reorganization of that agency has given the impression of down- grading the importance of the secret police in Bulgaria. Formerly, no important action could have been taken in Bulgaria by its secret police without Soviet approval. While the KGB has been pulled out of interference directly in Bulgarian affairs, a great residuum of state security staff remain, many with loyalties to the U.S.S.R., which itself is not out of the secret police business, despite halting attempts at democratization, though this may begin to change since the failed coup begun on 19 August 1991 and the subsequent loss of power resulting from Soviet leaders' efforts to reduce the influence and power of the K.G.B.²¹

Changes notwithstanding, the uniformed police agencies in Bulgaria continue to be staffed by those who were Zhivkov's policemen. Apart from the fact that they are having to make a nearly 180 degree adjustment in terms of enforcing laws uniformly and in conformance with the constitution, it is difficult to imagine that these militia, so long schooled in the communist methods of law enforcement and mind set are fully trustworthy servants of democracy. Thus, until the military and the security apparatus are significantly diluted by younger, democratically minded staff, both sectors must be regarded as potentially unreliable.

But the signs are hopeful. With the appointment of Hristo Danov, a civilian and a lawyer, in January 1991, to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs and the reform-minded General Lyben Petrov as Deputy Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff in August 1991, the

process of civilianizing the government has begun. A civilian minister of national defense is not out of the question in the near future, particularly as such a move would symbolically demonstrate Bulgaria's progress toward greater democracy.

In the realm of foreign affairs and defense considerations, Bulgaria has at least gingerly over time, broached the topic of joining NATO. Bulgaria, a small state with a population of about 9 million, has throughout its modern history been under the protection of a great power, first imperial Russia, then Germany, then the Soviet Union. It is now standing by itself for only the second time in its modern history, without a great power protector.²² At the moment there are no predators, but the unaligned status of the country surely weighs on national leaders who seem to feel at once pleased and very uncomfortable having shed Soviet protection without having found a new champion. Militarily, N.A.T.O. is the only obvious alternative and the Grand National Assembly, the parliament, even unilaterally considered legislation that would authorize negotiations for membership. But the alliance members are unwilling to accept new candidates at present and Bulgaria strategically has backed away from the notion of N.A.T.O. membership.

Before the failed coup in the U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O. members were not interested in setting up a tense adversarial situation with the Soviet Union by signing up former Warsaw Pact Eastern European members. Whether this policy will now change is not clear, as there appear to have been political and economic reasons as well for blocking Eastern European countries' entrance at this time. In any event, the idea of Bulgaria's joining N.A.T.O. certainly represents a break with the communist past and is an indicator both that Bulgaria has broken with the Warsaw Pact tradition, and, at the same time, has directed its gaze Westward, where pragmatically the government realized military

superiority lay, a fact driven home by the allied action in Iraq in 1990 and early 1991, coupled with the breakdown of federal system in the Soviet Union and the accompanying fracturing of the military and security systems.

To support their arguments for joining N.A.T.O., some Bulgarians maintain that they could offer their country as a buffer, a logical land link, between feuding Greece and Turkey. But most politicians are realists and recognize that failing the obtaining of a membership in N.A.T.O., Bulgarian officials hope for normal relations with N.A.T.O. countries which would in turn provide Bulgaria protection in the event of conflict and in the vacuum created by the demise of the Warsaw Pact. This has been promised. Closer ties to N.A.T.O. would also facilitate the Bulgaria's distancing from the Soviet Union. A first step toward changing the relationship was the visit of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lyuben Gotsev's visit N.A.T.O. headquarters on 15 November to discuss issues of security and cooperation. Prime Minister Popov was there in early May 1991 and N.A.T.O. Secretary General Manfred Woerner visited Bulgaria in June 1991 as a mark of improved relations and was enthusiastically received. Bulgaria now has an observer team in Brussels at N.A.T.O. headquarters. Bulgarian leaders have expressed satisfaction with their reception by N.A.T.O. countries and have adopted a gradualist approach, wherein they will wait patiently for a N.A.T.O. nod at some future time, all the while seeking to demonstrate their worthiness for some status under the N.A.T.O. umbrella.

Of course there are those Bulgarians who take a cynical view concerning the value of N.A.T.O. membership, saying that Bulgaria would not benefit greatly from inclusion in the N.A.T.O. alliance any more than Greece has vis a vis Turkey. Their argument has it that because Turkey has a larger army and occupies a more strategic position from N.A.T.O.'s

a member, it would be a tertiary consideration, after Turkey and Greece, say these observers.²⁴ Even so, Bulgarian leaders, looking at Soviet and Balkan developments, would feel more comfortable with an associate member status in N.A.T.O. than to have no major affiliation at all.²⁵ Apart from defensive considerations, affiliation with N.A.T.O. would have definite economic advantages say supporters, presumably because it would give Bulgaria financial assistance and commercial aid in order to insure that its forces were well-armed and trained. In addition, there would be positive technological, ecological, and scientific ramifications for Bulgaria would, they expect, learn from and through, and profit by the association.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia during the communist era were not close since the Tito-Stalin break in 1948. Tension now remains because of uncertainties associated with Yugoslavia's civil war. Bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Romania, its only Balkan Warsaw Pact ally, were generally cordial during the communist era. They are now also strained, though the reason in this case is ecological, with each blaming the other for causing serious environmental damage on the other's territory.

Problems notwithstanding, Bulgaria has held discussions with the other Balkan countries about the possibility of a Southeastern European defensive and economic pact. It has also made overtures to the Hexagonale Group which recently admitted Poland. More concretely, the idea of a Bulgarian-Greek confederation, considered by politicians in both countries as a "guarantee of peace in the Balkans," is gaining in currency in Bulgaria.²⁶ A military alliance has also been placed on the table for discussion. Romania, with its National Salvation Front government of made-over communists, would probably consider such an

alliance undesirable, though it has nowhere to turn in the region for consolation except, perhaps Yugoslavia. Certainly a Bulgarian-Greek arrangement would make Yugoslavia or successor states, feel threatened, though it would be in part because of the Yugoslav embroglio that such an arrangement was made necessary. Turkey too, would be uncomfortable with the arrangement given the differences between the Greek and Turkish governments historically. Future developments in the Balkans then depend in part on the alignments that form in the peninsula.

In the international economic sphere, Bulgaria has made overtures to both the E.C. and the Council of Europe. Association with both organizations would afford Bulgaria a greater opportunity to politically and economically join Europe. Bulgaria received special guest status in the Council of Europe and it has been a member of the C.S.C.E. process since its inception. Bulgaria has held preliminary talks with the E.C. concerning affiliation in November 1990 and in the meantime was granted the same trading status as Poland and Hungary. Since the fall of Zhivkov, and particularly since the selection of Zhelev as president, relations with the France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and others have improved significantly. In the aggregate then, these improved relations bode well for internal economic reform and development assuming both continued external support and internal progress.

Finally, Bulgaria, like other Eastern European states, has opened diplomatic relations with Israel, broken in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This too, is a step away from its communist past. Meantime, Bulgaria has made it plain to the U.S.S.R. that it will welcome mutually beneficial ties with the U.S.S.R., but not one that entitles the Soviets to intervene militarily.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The Bulgarian government, intent on reaching out to the West, intent on walking with other European nations, is steadily if slowly democratizing. In so doing it has daily faced a fragmented and fractious parliament wherein B.S.P. and U.D.F. deputies have slugged it out for more than a year, yielding needed legislation in forms that have been late and often poorly conceived, the most recent example of which is the election law which was passed in August, after having been returned to the parliament twice for reconsideration by President Zhelev because of inadequacies.²⁷

Parliamentary problems and antipathies aside, the people of Bulgaria reflect a broad spectrum of thinking which comes in shades varying from Bulgaro-centric xenophobia, through Rusophobia and Rusophilia, to unabashed admiration of all things Western and a low regard for that which is Eastern European or Third World. Creating sufficient unanimity among the major groups as to the path Bulgaria should travel is the challenge which Bulgaria's political leaders must meet.

So far reformers have begun de-communizing, democratizing, and reorienting Bulgaria and Bulgarians. They have sought to purge the land of the entrenched and corrupt nomenklatura and de-claw the hold-over bureaucracy. They have initiated a process of depoliticizing most government agencies, including the Foreign Service and the security agencies. Further, they have presided over Bulgaria's disentanglement from the now-defunct Warsaw Pact and have refused the option of a bilateral mutual defense agreement with the U.S.S.R., thus demonstrating that militarily, Bulgaria has come a long distance in a short time.

Political leaders have been sufficiently successful in developing an economic reform program such that Western agencies, most notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are willing to work with

Bulgaria as it seeks to recover economically from the disaster of the communist rule. Nevertheless, the weak spot in Bulgaria's fabric remains the economy. Should the population become sufficiently frustrated with the economic dislocation it is suffering to protest volubly and perhaps violently, reform could be derailed. The government and the parliament have made major strides in the direction of creating a free market economy through such legislation as the privatization act, but progress is painfully slow and often retarded by the cumbersome, at times obstructionistic, and untrained infrastructure that makes up the government.

If the speed of reform and implementation outpaces serious dislocation, the promise of prosperity will divert the majority. If, on the other hand, reform appears hollow, intolerably slow, and more painful than previously, a violent shift backwards is all too possible.

A symptom of economic distress in a country is often the manifestation of extremism which demagogues are quick to exploit for their own ends. Certainly anti-Muslim factions are visible and vocal in the Bulgaria. To succeed in democratizing, current leaders recognize that they must contain Bulgaria's irredentist minority and nationalist-racists and continue the process according full human rights to its minority populations, especially the Muslims. The sooner the economy improves the sooner extremism will subside, for people with full stomachs will focus on issues of hope and increased prosperity rather than seeking scapegoats to blame for their troubles.

Democratic reformers will continue also to face rear guard action from an entrenched hold-over nomenklatura which it seeks to dilute with trained administrators and ultimately eliminate. And should the B.S.P. win in the forthcoming elections, it is most likely that Bulgaria's progress may be retarded, for many politicians, and B.S.P. politicians in

particular, have shown themselves to be less interested in the national good than in the protection, perpetuation, and prosperity of the party.

The risk of global war has been diminished greatly, not least because of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the reforms in the U.S.S.R. occurring in the aftermath of the failed coup. For Bulgaria this is important, as it provides an era of relative security during which to proceed with its process of democratization. The only clouds on the horizon are blowing from Yugoslavia, where the eruption of civil war could have significant impact on Bulgaria. Should Yugoslavia fracture, Bulgaria has the potential to be a force for instability by seizing all or part of Macedonia, or alternatively, a force for reason, promoting cooperation and an orderly transition to democracy in whatever countries emerge from the Yugoslav wreckage. In the best of scenarios, it will work closely with its neighbors and as such will be a central player in Balkan politics.

The Macedonian Question will continue to percolate, but reason, if exercised by Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, with understanding from Greece, may defuse most of the difficulties that Bulgarian and Serbian irredentism poses. If not, violence cannot be ruled out.

On balance, Bulgaria has the potential for being a major stabilizing force in the Balkans. It could set an example through further stabilization and democratization at home, and the statesman-like behavior of its leaders in the resolution of Balkan problems. Or, if political instability accrues and extremist factions gain in importance, the process of democratization could be halted while ethnic and religious turmoil will likely intensify, making Bulgaria a Balkan backwater.

Notes

1

Thanks to Patrick Moore and Kjell Engelbrekt, both of the Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute in Munich, for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

²When offered the opportunity to negotiate a bilateral, mutual assistance treaty with the USSR, Bulgaria's President, Zhelyu Zhelev, declined saying that Bulgaria had no interest in exclusive military arrangements with the USSR.

³Marvin R. Jackson, presentation, RFE/RL RI, 5 April 1991.

⁴See Vera Gavrilov, "Postelection 'Brain Drain' Feared," Report on Eastern Europe (Vol. I, No. 30) 27 July 1990, pp. 1-5.

⁵Marvin R. Jackson, "The Dangers of Procrastination in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism," Report on Eastern Europe (Vol II, No. 15), 12 April 1991, p. 3.

⁶Bulgaria became functionally independent in 1878, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin signed in 1878 by the European powers, granting Bulgaria the status of an autonomous principality within the Empire.

⁷J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 330-331.

⁸See John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 159-160 and Amnesty International, Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks (London: Amnesty International, 1986), pp. 19-20 for information about the population decline.

⁹Amnesty International, pp. 13-14.

¹⁰See Duncan M. Perry, "Ethnic Turks Face Bulgarian Nationalism," Report on Eastern Europe (Vol. II, No. 11), March 15, 1991, pp. 5-8.

¹¹This treaty was signed bilaterally by the Russian and Ottoman governments. The San Stefano Treaty was nullified by the Treaty of Berlin.

¹²Patrick Moore, "Bulgaria," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Communism in Eastern Europe (2nd ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 209.

¹³See Robert R. King, Minorities under Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 188.

¹⁴See Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987); and Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslav Macedonians Demand Greece's Recognition of Aegean Macedonian," Report on Eastern Europe (Vol. I, No. 33), June 1, 1990.

¹⁵Otechestven Vestnik, 21 February 1991.

¹⁶BTA, 2 August 1990.

¹⁷If political circumstances force the Bulgarian government to recognize a Macedonian minority within its borders the move could cause minor reverberations in Greece among the Slavophone population. The likelihood, though, of serious problems seems small because this group

is disappearing as a result of a long-term process of Hellenization. At present, Slavophone Greeks probably do not number more than 50,000 people and their national consciousness appears to be Greek. See William H. McNeill, The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) for observations concerning Slavs in Greece.

¹⁸Radio Sofia, 21 January 1991, 8:00 P.M.

¹⁹Duma, 14 November 1990.

²⁰See Duncan M. Perry, "A New Military Lobby," Report on Eastern Europe (Vol. I, No., 40), pp. 1-3.

²¹Presentation by Oleg Kalugin at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Munich), 16 August 1991

²²The first was during the reign of Prince Alexander of Battenberg (reigned 1879-1886), the interregnum (1886-1887), and the early years of Prince, later Tsar, Ferdinand's rule (1887- 1896).

²³Bulgarski Biznes, 10-16 December 1990.

²⁴Pogled, 18 February 1991.

²⁵The Guardian, 12 March 1991.

²⁶Podkrepa, 5 March 1991.

²⁷Zhelev was particularly concerned about the clauses which precluded Bulgarian citizens not resident in Bulgaria from voting, a measure that ultimately remained over his protest, thanks to efforts of the BSP deputies who appeared to fear that non-resident Bulgarians constituted possible opposition votes.

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Albania

Elez Biberaj
Voice of America

Paper prepared for the RAND-ELIAMEP Conference
"Instability and Change in Southern Europe"

Rhodes, September 8-11, 1991

The Albanian nation is going through one of the most critical periods in its modern history. Divided almost evenly between Albania and Yugoslavia, the more than six million Albanians are confronted with daunting challenges. Although the totalitarian regime has collapsed and the communists now share power with the democratic opposition in a coalition government, Albania is faced with the danger of prolonged instability as it embarks on the difficult road of establishing a genuine multi-party democracy and making the transition to a free-market economy. Its centrally-planned economy has practically collapsed, with citizens in some parts of the country threatened with hunger. Decades of communist misrule and repression have led to the disintegration of the moral fabric of the Albanian society. Economic decline, the tense political situation, and moral vacuum, have led to rampant cynicism and despair, most graphically reflected by thousands of Albanians risking their lives to flee the country. Despite the diminished role of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL), renamed the Socialist Party at its 10th Congress in June 1991, its tentacles still permeate much of the administrative structure and embattled communist conservatives are trying to block the democratic process. Although the balance has shifted perceptibly in favor of the Democratic Party and other opposition forces, with economic misery, the growing ineffectiveness of the interim government, and collapse

of discipline and the resultant, widespread lawlessness, Albania faces the real danger of disintegrating into anarchy unless there is large-scale foreign financial assistance. Albanian Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani has appealed to the West to help his country from "bleeding to death."¹

Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia, on the other hand, face equally if not more difficult problems. Serbia's strongman Slobodan Milosevic has forcibly stripped Kosova (Kosovo in Serbo-Croatian), where the majority of Albanians in Yugoslavia live, of all autonomy and disenfranchised the Albanian majority. Ethnic Albanians have refused to accept the legitimacy of Serbian rule, demanding Kosova's separation from Serbia. Since the outbreak of Albanian nationalist demonstrations in 1981, Kosova and Albanian-inhabited areas of Macedonia and Montenegro have been characterized by a persistent and violent conflict, which has reduced ethnic Albanians to a position of subordination. For ten years, ethnic Albanians have lived under virtual military and police occupation, which has prompted a prominent senior American official to declare that "there is no place in Europe in which police repression is as severe as it is in Kosovo province."² In the wake of the outbreak

¹ Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Aug. 19, 1991, p. 7, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C. -- hereafter FBIS-EEU), 91-161, Aug. 20, 1991, pp. 3-4

² Richard Schifter, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, "'To Hate All the People Your Relatives Hate.'" Address before the United States Institute of Peace International Conference on Ethnic Conflict Resolution Under the Rule of Law, Washington, D.C., June 12, 1991, p. 10

of clashes in Croatia, Serbia, claiming that an Albanian uprising was imminent, has dispatched additional forces to Kosova and has openly armed the Serbian minority. Albania's President Ramiz Alia has appealed to world leaders to take measures to prevent a Serbian "massacre" of ethnic Albanians and has put his country's armed forces on the alert.³ Meanwhile, Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosova, the largest Albanian political party in Yugoslavia, has said that if Slovenia and Croatia break away from Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians will have no option but to seek union with their mother country Albania. Rugova has also announced that a referendum will be held to decide the future of Kosova.⁴

The Albanians on both sides of the border evidently fear that once Serbia resolves its conflict with Croatia, either through force or political accommodation, it will turn its attention and resources to settling of accounts once and for all with the Albanians. While attention abroad has been focused on the conflict between Serbia, on the one hand, and Slovenia and Croatia, on the other, there has been a tendency to ignore Kosova, potentially a more explosive tinderbox. The outbreak of hostilities in Kosova could easily spill over and involve Yugoslavia's neighbors.

The rising specter of a conflict with Serbia, the emergence of Albanian opposition parties, and declining economy, have

³ Kosova (Tirana), July 12, 1991, p. 1. On July 30, 1991, two Albanian citizens were reportedly killed by Yugoslav border guards. See ATA [Albanian Telegraphic Agency] in English, 0805 GMT, Aug. 7, 1991, in FBIS-EEU-92-152, Aug. 7, 1991, p. 1

⁴ Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1005 GMT, Aug. 16, 1991, trans. in FBIS-EEU-91-160, Aug. 19, 1991, p. 38

contributed to a dramatic change in Tirana's foreign policy thinking. The new domestic and international context present Albanian decision-makers with both opportunities and risks as they search for ways to bring their country into the community of nations, forge new alliances in the rapidly changing Balkans to deal with a growing Serbian threat, and secure desperately needed foreign assistance to revive their economy.

BACKGROUND

Sandwiched between Yugoslavia and Greece, Albania for most of the period since it gained its independence in 1912 has been faced with an unfriendly external environment. The exclusion of large, compact Albanian-inhabited territories, particularly Kosova and Cameria, from the Albanian state that the great powers recognized in 1913 as well as subsequent Italian, Yugoslav and Greek attempts to further partition and/or dominate Albania, have made the Albanians overly security conscious. This sense of insecurity has further been reinforced by fears that any potential aggressor could easily overrun the country. Although a revisionist country interested in regaining its lost territories, Albania's strategic location, small territory, and limited manpower and economic resources have shaped its purely defensive strategy.

Its strategic location had given Albania an importance out of proportion with its size and actual resources and had made it

attractive to external powers interested in dominating or expanding their influence in this ever-volatile region. During the inter-war period Albania fell under heavy Italian domination, becoming Europe's first World War II victim. The Italians staged their invasion of Greece from Albania, complicating Tirana-Athens relations for decades to come. With the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, most Albanian-inhabited territories, including Kosova, were attached to the Italian-occupied Albania. For the first time since 1912, the majority of Albanians in the Balkans were united into one administrative state. At the end of the war, however, Kosova again fell under Yugoslav control.

Albania, the smallest and economically least developed state in the Balkans, has been in a less advantageous position than its immediate and significantly more powerful neighbors to provide for its own security and has relied for protection on external alliances and favorable international developments. Enver Hoxha, who ruled Albania from 1944 until his demise in 1985, sought to ensure his country's independence and economic development by forging alliances, in turn, with Yugoslavia (1945-48), the Soviet Union (1948-61), and China (1978-78).⁵ Following the invasion of

⁵ Albania's post-World War II foreign and security policy has been well documented. See Nicholas C. Pano, The People's Socialist Republic of Albania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978); Stavro Skendi, ed., Albania (New York: Praeger, 1956); Anton Logoreci, The Albanians: Europe's Forgotten Survivors (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); Ramadan Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975); Eugene K. Keefe, et al., Area Handbook for Albania (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971); William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet

Czechoslovakia in 1968, Albania considered the Soviet Union as its main enemy, although in the official parlance the two superpowers were considered as equally dangerous. Albania improved relations with its two contiguous neighbors and pledged to come to Yugoslavia's assistance in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. There were remarkable similarities between the Albanian and Yugoslav military postures in dealing with a perceived threat from the Warsaw Pact. Albania's 1976 Constitution contained similar provisions as Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution, stipulating that no citizen had the right to accept the occupation or surrender of the country. Moreover, the constitution prohibited the establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on Albanian territory.⁶

Hoxha's Albania was the only European state to boycott the 1975 Helsinki summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Tirana claimed that European countries could not ensure their security under the umbrella of the two superpowers. Albania also refused to participate in Balkan multilateral gatherings, concentrating instead on strengthening bilateral ties.

But despite the Albanian government's rhetoric, East-West

Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963); Harry Hamm, Albania -- China's Beachhead in Europe (New York: Praeger, 1963); and Elez Biberaj, Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986).

⁶ Kushtetuta e Republikes Popullore Socialiste te Shqiperise [The Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania], (Tirana, 1976)

disarmament agreements and the Helsinki accords, which called for the inviolability of international borders and confidence-building measures, enhanced Albania's security. Favorable international developments lessened Albania's perception of a hostile external environment. After China suspended its economic and military assistance, Hoxha refused to seek alternate sources of foreign assistance or to open up the country. The government, however, gradually toned down its ideological rhetoric and improved ties with other countries, most notably Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy. But the APL continued with its repressive domestic policies, strictly controlling all aspects of life. The consequences of Hoxha's isolationist policy soon became evident. After years of continual growth, the Albanian economy in the early 1980s began a steady decline.

Hoxha was succeeded in April 1985 by his close advisor Ramiz Alia. While publicly insisting on continuity with Hoxha's policies, Alia did initiated some changes. In foreign policy, pragmatism was given priority over ideology. He tried to stabilize relations with Yugoslavia, which were adversely affected by the simmering dispute over Serbia's harsh treatment of ethnic Albanians and Tirana's endorsement of demands that Kosova be granted the status of a republic.⁷ Albania increased significantly its cooperation with Greece, which in 1987 formally lifted the state of war with

⁷ For background on the 1981 demonstrations in Kosova, see Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, "The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views," Conflict Studies, nos. 137/138 (1982); and Elez Biberaj, "The Conflict in Kosovo," Survey, 28, no. 3 (Autumn 1984), pp. 39-57

Albania, established diplomatic ties with West Germany, and gradually elevated its ties with Warsaw Pact nations to the ambassadorial level. However, it continued to reject both American and Soviet offers to normalize relations.

Before 1990, Alia took no measures to dismantle the despotic political system and the over-centralized economic management system inherited from Hoxha. While tinkering with some cosmetic economic reforms, Alia continued to insist that the state run the economy. He remained adamant about taking any action that could threaten the APL monopoly of power.⁸

THE DEMISE OF COMMUNIST RULE

In the wake of the break with Moscow in the early 1960s, the Albanian regime had distanced itself from what it termed as "revisionist" parties in power in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the mid-1970s, as political divergences with China grew, Hoxha maintained that Albania was the only genuinely socialist country in the world. Alia explained the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 as the result of the ruling elites having deviated from Marxism-Leninism. He insisted that Albania's communist regime enjoyed widespread popular support and

⁸ For background see Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990).

developments in Eastern Europe would have no impact on his country.⁹

But despite Alia's optimistic tone, Albania faced remarkably similar problems as the other East European countries. Communist policies had failed abysmally, and large segments of the populace had been alienated from the ruling elite. Less than a month after Romanian dictator Nicoale Ceausescu's violent downfall, demonstrations broke out in Shkoder, the country's second largest city.¹⁰

The East European revolution caused the Albanian government to reassess its domestic and foreign policies. At a Central Committee plenum in January 1990, Alia launched what he termed as a democratization process, which involved separating the state from the party and taking steps to decentralize the economic system. Three months later, at another Central Committee meeting, as part of the democratization process Alia proposed measures aimed at improving the human rights situation. The People's Assembly in May 1990 approved changes in the country's penal code abolishing the death penalty for citizens caught trying to escape the country and lifted the ban on religious propaganda. Moreover, citizens were guaranteed the right to travel abroad and the Ministry of Justice, eliminated in the mid-1960s, was reinstituted, with the government committing itself to the rule of law. While these measures were

⁹ Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian, 1430 GMT, Dec. 12, 1989, trans. in FBIS-EEU-89-239, Dec. 14, 1989, pp. 1-4

¹⁰ Pellumb Sulo, "January 1990-April 1990: Shkoder as I Witnessed It," Bashkimi (Tirana), July 24, 1991, pp. 1, 3

significant in the Albanian context, they did not represent major reforms; they merely amounted to lifting some of the most drastic restrictions imposed by the totalitarian regime.

Increased domestic pressure for change, developments in Eastern Europe, and the continued deterioration of the situation in Kosova, forced the Albanian government to announce new diplomatic initiatives. The insistence of East European countries that all trade transactions be conducted in hard currency caused serious problems for Albania and coincided with a deepening economic crisis. Acknowledging that self-reliance had taken a heavy toll, in April 1990 Alia said the government would seek foreign assistance and would permit foreign investments. He also announced a sudden change in the stand toward the superpowers, saying that Albania was interested in reestablishing ties with both Washington and Moscow. This represented the clearest departure from Hoxha's policies, whose main pillar was rejection of all contacts with the two superpowers. Equally important was Alia's request that Albania be admitted as a full member of the CSCE, which required Tirana to bring its human rights legislation up to the level of other CSCE members. At the same time, Tirana expressed willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the European Community.

By seeking to expand foreign relations and to improve the regime's image on the international arena, Alia hoped to arrest the declining authority of the ruling APL. In a meeting with the visiting U.N. General Secretary in May 1991, Alia reportedly promised that all citizens would be permitted to travel abroad,

political prisoners would be released, and believers would be permitted to open churches and mosques, which had been closed in 1967 when Hoxha's regime proclaimed Albania the world's first atheist country. Alia's failure to deliver on these promises led to widespread disenchantment. Many people came to suspect that the recent measures were intended solely to impress foreigners.

Alia's foreign policy initiatives met with limited success. The downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War had resulted in the decline of Western strategic interest in Albania. The United States and ~~the~~ Western Europe conditioned the improvement of ties with Albania's progress toward genuine political pluralism, full respect for human rights, and the implementation of reforms that would eventually lead to the creation of a market economy. Socialist Albania had missed its window of opportunity by rejecting Western offers for close ties in the 1960s and the 1970s and by boycotting the Helsinki process. If during the Cold War, the Western alliance was willing to bailout Albania economically, in 1990 it was unwilling to contribute to the survival of Europe's most corrupt and repressive, Stalinist regime. Albania's relations with West European countries suffered a serious setback after more than five thousand Albanians stormed foreign embassies in Tirane in July 1990. With unprecedented international attention focused on Albania, the last communist domino in Europe, Alia permitted the refugees to leave the country. The embassy incident represented a major setback for the APL and was a clear indication that the regime, despite its highly repressive nature,

was not invincible. Alia's reluctance to use the armed forces to prevent the refugees from entering foreign embassies suggested the government was sensitive to the political dangers of attempting to suppress such a large number of people. Several countries, including West Germany, closed their embassies and froze relations with Tirana. Pressure on the regime increased to follow the example of other East European countries and allow the creation of opposition parties. Alia argued strongly that yielding to demands for political pluralism and radical economic reforms would exacerbate both economic and political problems and even lead to the collapse of Albania's socialist system.

The Albanian government tried desperately to improve its international image. In the fall 1990, Alia became Albania's first head ~~of~~^{OF} state to participate in ~~the~~^{at} the U.N. General Assembly session. In October 1990, Tirana hosted the second conference of Balkan foreign ministers; the first such conference had been held two years earlier in Belgrade. But to Alia's chagrin, the conference failed to support Tirana's request and Albania was the only European country absent from the CSCE summit meeting held in Paris in November 1990.

In response to growing unrest, the regime moved on two fronts. On the one hand it intensified the campaign against regime opponents. On the other hand, the APL leadership introduced the notion of pluralism of ideas, according to which Albanians would be permitted to freely express their ideas but could not form political parties. Alia also declared that the APL would give up

its constitutionally guaranteed monopoly of power. A new election law approved in November 1990 provided for multi-candidate elections and permitted mass organizations, until then transmission belts for the party, to put forth their own candidates.

The Establishment of Opposition Parties Alia's new measures failed to placate domestic critics who were advocating political pluralism. In December 1990, following four days of student demonstrations at Tirana University, the Albanian regime belatedly joined its former East European communist allies in sanctioning the establishment of opposition parties. After 47-years of unchallenged rule, the communists agreed reluctantly to end the one-party system. Alia's grudging acceptance of political pluralism reflected an ambivalence between his desire to avoid bloodshed and his determination to orchestrate the process of reform, prolonging as long as possible the APL's control of the government.

Within a short period of time, several political parties were formed. The Democratic Party was created on December 12, 1990. Led by a group of intellectuals and students headed by Dr. Sali Berisha, an outspoken personality, the Democratic Party challenged the premises of the APL's domestic and foreign policy. It advocated a Western-style, multi-party system based on respect for human and individual rights and the establishment of a free market economy. It called for the full integration of Albania into Europe and its democratic institutions, denouncing the communist regime's isolation policy. While emphasizing the importance of Albania

strengthening ties with Western Europe, the Democratic Party viewed the United States as the best source to help Albania to get back on its feet economically and politically. In contrast to the APL, the democrats from the outset concentrated on the plight of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. In its program, the Democratic Party committed itself to struggle "for the realization of centuries-long aspirations of the Albanian nation for independence, union and progress in accordance with the spirit of international documents..."¹¹ Berisha, addressing more than 100,000 people at a rally celebrating the establishment of the Democratic Party, said his party did not consider as permanent the division of the Albanian nation. The Democratic Party, he said, "will fight with peaceful means and in the framework of European integration processes to realize [the Albanians'] rights for progress and national union."¹²

The Democratic Party was followed by the creation of several other political parties, groups and associations, the most important being the Republican, Agrarian, Ecological, National Unity and Social Democratic parties and the Kosova and Cameria associations, advocating respectively the protection of the rights of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia and Greece. While expressing support for a pluralist democracy, protection of human rights, and emphasizing the importance of rule of law, the new parties did not

¹¹ Rilindja Demokratike (Tirana), Jan. 5, 1991, p. 3. Emphasis added.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 5

share the Democratic Party's proposal for a radical overhaul of the country's economic system, advocating instead gradual economic changes. In the arena of foreign policy, however, they shared the Democratic Party's objectives of greater interaction with Western countries, the opening of the country to foreign investments, and supported Kosova's union with Albania in the event of Yugoslavia's disintegration.

On March 31, 1991, Albania held its first multi-party elections in more than half-a-decade. The election campaign had been conducted in a highly tense political atmosphere, with periodic clashes between opposition supporters, on the one hand, and the army and the police force, on the other. With enormous resources at its disposal and denying the opposition access to the media and the necessary resources to spread its message, especially in the countryside, the APL won 169 seats in the 250-seat People's Assembly. The Democratic Party won 75 seats, OMONIA association, representing ethnic Greeks, 5 seats, and the communist-controlled National Veterans Organization 1 seat. The new People's Assembly elected Alia as president for a five year term. Reformist economist Fatos Nano was asked to form a new government. But despite their election victory, the communists were unable to govern the country. Only two months after the elections, Prime Minister Nano's government was forced to resign as a result of a three-week general strike organized by the newly created Independent Trade Unions. The APL accepted opposition demands that new elections be held in May or June 1992 and agreed to a power

sharing arrangement, retaining only eight posts in the 24 member cabinet. Nano was replaced by Ylli Bufi, former Minister of Food and a member of the Central Committee of the APL.

Since December 1990, political reforms in Albania have outpaced by far economic reforms. The interim government lacks a broad political base to carry out far-reaching changes. The economy is still largely state owned and directed, and the government has had limited success in attracting foreign investments. While the communists have repudiated traditional Marxist principles, moving their renovated Socialist Party closer to the model of West European social-democratic parties, they still oppose radical economic reforms. The Socialist Party's program advocates a mixture of state, collective, and private ownership, but rejects total privatization of state ownership.¹³ In contrast, the Democratic Party insists that only market based reforms can reverse Albania's precipitous economic decline.¹⁴ Nano, who was elected chairman of the Socialist Party at the 10th Congress in June 1991, has distanced the party from Hoxha's policies, going so far as to insist that it is a new party. But despite its claims of "total renovation," the Socialist Party is burdened by close to fifty years of Stalinist ideological baggage. The communists have become so discredited that their renovation is unlikely to reverse their demise.

¹³ Zeri i Popullit, July 3, 1991, pp. 1-3

¹⁴ See Berisha's testimony before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Rilindja Demokratike, May 29, 1991, pp. 1, 5

However, by controlling an absolute majority in the People's Assembly, the communists are in a position to bloc the approval of legislation required to implement radical economic reforms. The opposition is pushing for early elections. In preparation for the upcoming elections, opposition parties have moved toward greater coordination of their activities and have demanded that Alia resign and stand trial for embezzlement and abuse of power.¹⁵

In less than a year, Albania has come an extraordinary distance in the dismantling of the totalitarian state. But it has a long way to go in establishing a genuine democracy and a free market economy. Tirana will need not only encouragement by foreign governments of private investments but also substantial technical and financial assistance. Compared to other East European countries, Albania is small and will not require enormous amounts of aid. Indeed, a fraction of the assistance the industrialized nations now provide to individual East European countries, would go a long way in facilitating democratic reforms in Albania.

The Role of the Military During more than four-and-a-half decades of communist rule, the Albanian society was subjected to a greater degree of militarization than any society in Eastern Europe. The armed forces and the much dreaded Sigurimi, represented the main pillars of Hoxha's dictatorship. A cardinal rule of Hoxha's regime was the total control of armed and internal security forces by the APL. Probably in no other East European country was

¹⁵ The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1991

the ruling communist party able to exercise such continuous and pervasive control over the military as did the APL. The Constitution promulgated in 1976 designated the First Secretary of the APL as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Throughout 1989-90, the military hierarchy maintained a high profile and strongly supported Alia's refusal to relinquish the APL's monopoly of power.

Alia did not shy away from using force to retain power, but was careful to avoid excessive use of force that could have led to large-scale bloodshed or civil war. His initial reaction to student demonstrations in December 1990 was to use internal security forces to crush the demonstrators. With the police intervention having failed and student unrest spreading, Alia convened a special meeting of the Central Committee. The majority of Central Committee members reportedly opposed ordering the army to crush the student demonstrations, fearing that a massacre would trigger a popular anti-communist revolt.¹⁶ Alia's momentous decision to accept student demands for political pluralism was followed by the outbreak of spontaneous anti-communist violent

¹⁶ Mehmet Elezi, "The Intellectual and Demo(Bureau)cracy," Zeri i Rinise (Tirana), May 11, 1991, p. 4. During the first half of 1990, Elezi, a former First Secretary of the Union of Albanian Working Youth, worked in the APL Central Committee apparatus and had frequent contacts with Alia. After he questioned the leadership's stand on political pluralism, the role of the media, and some aspects of the country's foreign policy, in July 1990 Elezi was transferred to a party post in Elbasan, but did not lose his Central Committee post. At a plenum of the Central Committee in November 1990, Elezi advocated the legalization of opposition, but other participants failed to support him publicly. For his views on developments during 1990, see *ibid.*, May 11, 15 and 29, and June 1, 1991

demonstrations in Shkoder, Elbasan, Kavaje, and Durres. Alia ordered the police and army troops, backed by armored vehicles, to restore order.

As tensions mounted during the early part of 1991, the President relied increasingly on the security forces and the military to maintain order, while maneuvering to reach a political accommodation with opposition forces. On several occasions, the situation seemed to be getting out of control as clashes between civilians and security forces increased, claiming several casualties. The situation became especially tense on February 20, 1991, when some 100,000 demonstrators toppled Hoxha's statue in Tirana. Alia reportedly ordered the police to open fire on protestors. In a highly unusual development, the President was summoned by disgruntled military and security officials to the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to explain why he had "abandoned" Hoxha. Alia reportedly said his order to use force had not been carried out.¹⁷ In June 1991, former Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, acknowledged that Alia had given the order to use force, but added that he refused to follow it because it would have led to a massacre.¹⁸

The President faced perhaps his toughest challenge from the military when a group of officers and cadets at a military school in Tirana issued an ultimatum demanding the restoration of Hoxha's

¹⁷ Neshat Tozaj, "The Imperative of Times," Rilindja Demokratike, June 19, 1991, p. 3

¹⁸ Dylber Hoxha, "Hekuran Isai Refutes Ramiz Alia," Rilindja Demokratike, June 19, 1991, p. 3

monuments that had been toppled by demonstrators in the capital and in other cities.¹⁹ Although it seems that Minister of Defense Kico Mustaqi supported the rebels, he was retained in the caretaker government formed on February 22 by Prime Minister Fatos Nano. Subsequently troops were used in an attempt to stop the exodus of Albanians from the port of Durres and in crushing post-election anti-communist demonstrations. Four Democratic Party activists were killed in Shkoder on April 2 by security forces and the opposition blamed Alia personally for giving the order, a charge the President denied.

One of the main demands of the opposition was the complete depolitization of the armed forces. Berisha called for the disbanding of party committees in the military and the internal security forces, the elimination of political commissars, and the restoration of military ranks, abolished in 1966. Prior to the March 31 elections, tensions between the military leadership and the opposition were high. Communist hard-liners, accusing Alia of having betrayed Hoxha, saw the armed forces as the last-stronghold of communism. The opposition accused the armed forces of using intimidating tactics against opposition supporters, giving arms to members of the organization "the Volunteers of Enver Hoxha," formed by conservative communists in February 1991, and using military vehicles to transport APL supporters and sympathizers to communist-sponsored rallies.

¹⁹ See David Binder, "Albania's Hard-Liners and Democracy Backers Battle for Control," The New York Times, Feb. 24, 1991, p. 10

The Law on Constitutional Provisions, approved by the People's Assembly in April 1991, calls for the full depolitization of the armed forces. Political parties are prohibited from conducting activities in the army. The law, which supercedes the 1976 Constitution and will be in force until a new constitution is passed, designates the president as the commander-in-chief.²⁰ In the coalition government formed in June 1991, the Democratic Party nominee Perikli Teta became Minister of Defense. For the first time since 1944, a non-communist was put in charge of the People's Army. Although the APL retained the post of the Minister of Public Order, the opposition had achieved a major victory.²¹

While the military, as other institutions, is in the process of redefining its role, it is likely that during the difficult transition period from communist totalitarianism to pluralism democracy it will be called upon to play an increasing role in putting down social unrest. Similarly, ideology will cease to play a significant role as the Albanians take steps in the direction of creating a professional military, whose main task will be to defend the country from outside aggression. While the possibility of a military coup cannot be ruled out, such a development is unlikely. The army is in no position to deal with the nation's many problems and a military takeover will only throw Albania into further political turmoil. And conservatives have been disgraced to such an

²⁰ ATA in English, 0913 GMT, May 1, 1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-085, May 2, 1991, pp. 1-6

²¹ Zeri i Popullit, June 12, 1991, p. 1

extent that seemingly they stand little chance of drumming up significant support to stage a comeback.

ALBANIA'S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY

The introduction of political pluralism had an immediate and significant impact on Albania's foreign and security policy. Foreign policy had long been the prerogative of the First Secretary of the APL and the Politburo and was not the subject of public debate. The opposition parties challenged the APL monopoly over foreign policy formulation, and called for the full depolitization of the foreign affairs establishment. For the first time since 1944, foreign policy came under close public scrutiny. While in the past, domestic public opinion had paid no role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, the introduction of political pluralism heightened national feelings. Issues long considered taboo, such as the question of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia and Greece, became subjects of heated public debate.

In early 1991, the Democratic Party organized a demonstration to protest Foreign Minister Reiz Malile's visit to Cuba and China. The democrats, advocating a reorientation of Albania's policy toward Western Europe and the United States, criticized Malile for having invited Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to visit Albania and

demanded his resignation.²² Both Malile and Sofokli Lazri, Alia's chief foreign policy advisor, reportedly exercised a restraining influence on Albania's expansion of ties with the West, advocating instead the the development of close relations with the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Cuba. Lazri, who apparently was in charge of the formulation of foreign policy, was blamed for the poor state of Albania's relations with West Germany and the deterioration of ties with Italy. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1987 had raised hopes that West Germany would assist Albania's economic development. The much hoped for cooperation with West Germany never materialized because of the Albanian government's intransigence on human rights issues and rejection of foreign credits and investments. Tirana's refusal to permit an Albanian family that had entered the Italian embassy in 1985 to leave the country, had brought relations with Rome practically to a standstill. Because of opposition criticism, Malile was replaced by his deputy Kapllani, and Lazri resigned.

Whereas during the election campaign foreign policy had become a highly contentious issue, with the APL accusing the opposition of attempting to sell out the country to the foreigners, a remarkable consensus has emerged regarding the main foreign policy goals and objectives. While the Socialist Party, burdened by Hoxha's devastating isolation of the country, have been less vocal on foreign policy issues, there appears to be agreement across the

²² Abdi Baleta, "Renewed Toasts," Rilindja Demokratike, Jan. 30, 1991, p. 6

political spectrum that Albania needs to rapidly open-up to the outside world.

Relations with the Superpowers Albania's relations with the superpowers have undergone rapid and positive change. On the eve of the elections, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Albania after a hiatus of more than fifty years. Washington made no secret that this was a deliberate decision aimed at boosting the democratic process in Albania. Democratic Party leaders had all along urged the United States to proceed with the normalization of relations. In a highly unusual development, which could not escape the attention of communists in Tirana, the State Department invited Democratic Party leaders Berisha and Gramoz Pashko to attend the signing ceremony.²³

The restoration of Albanian-American relations was hailed as a momentous event in Albania. A prominent journalist Shaban Murati, said the event provided a historic chance for the Albanian nation. Murati argued that movement from a bipolar to a multi polar world necessitated significant changes in Albania's foreign policy strategy. He said Albania's national interests will best be served by developing close economic and political ties with the United States and other industrialized nations.²⁴

Washington's support ensured Albania's admittance in the CSCE.

²³ The Washington Post, March 13, 1991, p. A22; and The Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1991, p. 7

²⁴ Shaban Murati, "A Historic Chance for the Albanian Nation," Zeri i Popullit, March 17, 1991, p. 4

In June 1991, Secretary of State James Baker visited Albania, a reflection of the importance the United States gives to the democratization of the tiny Balkan country. He informed the Albanians that the United States would provide \$6 million worth of assistance. He said Washington was prepared to provide additional support if meaningful political and economic reforms are implemented.²⁵ Following Baker's visit, numerous American delegations visited Tirana to assess Albania's needs for humanitarian and technical assistance.

While the Albanians seemingly have exaggerated expectations of the level of assistance the United States is able or willing to provide, Washington has indicated it will include Albania in all its East European aid programs, has pledged to provide technical assistance in many sectors, and has urged private American investments. Albania does offer good investment opportunities, particularly in the oil industry and in the development of the infrastructure for the expansion of tourism. There is also a large, relatively well-to-do Albanian community in the United States, which played an important role in promoting the establishment of diplomatic relations and is eager to help Albania's economic revival. Albanian-Americans have been remarkably effective in lobbying the U.S. Congress and administration on Albanian issues.

The Soviet Union had tried for years to woo Albania back into

²⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, "300,000 Albanians Pour Into Streets to Welcome Baker," The New York Times, June 23, 1991, pp. 1, 8

the Warsaw Pact, promising economic assistance. Despite significant changes in the international arena even before the East European revolution, the Soviet Union continued to view Albania as an attractive beachhead in the Adriatic. Soviet military strategists apparently never forgave Nikita Khrushchev for his tactless handling of the Albanians, which led to the Tirana-Moscow break and the Soviet withdrawal from the naval base at Sazan, near the port of Vlore. Before 1990, the Albanian government had rejected Moscow's offers to restore ties, and continued to view the Soviet Union as potentially representing the main threat to Albania. Tirana's hostility to Moscow was further reinforced by Soviet support for Serbia's crackdown against ethnic Albanians. Until December 1990, the Albanian communist regime was one of the harshest critics of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies.

However, the deterioration of the economic situation, increased domestic pressures, and the declining authority of the APL forced Tirana to change its stand on many issues, including its stance toward the Soviet Union. Tirana-Moscow relations were restored in summer 1990, but the event lacked the enthusiasm and euphoria that permeated the subsequent establishment of Albanian-American ties. Preoccupied with its own domestic problems, Gorbachev's Soviet Union did not take any significant steps to expand relations with Albania. Gorbachev, however, has invited Alia to visit the Soviet Union. Significantly, Alia and the Socialist Party joined opposition parties in strongly denouncing the aborted

coup d'état against the Soviet President. While Albanian-Soviet economic cooperation will probably increase, Moscow's influence in Albania is likely to remain insignificant.

Western Europe Since the beginning of 1991, Albania has moved toward a closer association with Western Europe. Albania has lifted self-imposed constraints that had limited its external economic interaction, liberalizing its legislation to attract and encourage foreign investments and the establishment of joint ventures. Albania's long-term stated objective is full integration into the European Community, with which it established relations in June 1991.

The Albanians have appealed to Western Europe for large-scale assistance to stabilize the economy, whose decline has accelerated with the rapid disintegration of the old system. They have requested technical assistance, improved trade ties, and financial aid. However, the West has been slow in responding to Albania's requests, because of the widely held perception that large-scale aid will serve only to prop up an increasingly disintegrating economy. The Albanians appear particularly disappointed that Germany has not played a greater role.²⁶ Of all the major Western countries, only Italy has sent significant financial assistance to Albania. Italy has been forced to take an active role because it has been confronted with waves of Albanian refugees. Between July

²⁶ The German embassy, which had been closed down in July 1990 after Albanian refugees stormed foreign missions in Tirana, was reopened only in August 1991.

1990 and August 1991, some 40,000 Albanians have fled to Italy. Political tensions which followed the dawning of Hoxha's statue in Tirana on February 20, 1991, led to the illegal emigration of some 24,000 Albanians to Italy. Rome returned several thousand refugees, granted Albania \$50 million in emergency humanitarian aid, and declared it would not accept other refugees. These steps, however, did not prevent other Albanians from fleeing across the Adriatic. In August 1991, some 20,000 refugees fled to Italy. This time they were all sent back. Italy granted Albania an additional \$120 million in humanitarian and economic aid.²⁷

But the harsh treatment of refugees has led to increased anti-Italian feelings. There is also concern about growing Italian influence, with many Albanians fearing that Italy will eventually dominate Albania economically and politically as it did in the 1930s.

The Balkans Albania's relations with its contiguous neighbors have historically been characterized by simmering ethnic disputes. Historical obsession with encirclement by a Greek-Yugoslav alliance has led Albania to seek security by turning for protection to distant powers.

The resurgent border and inter-ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and the federation's likely disintegration could cause a realignment of Balkan states, presenting Albania with both

²⁷ ANSA in English, 1042 GMT, Aug. 19, 1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-161, Aug. 20, 1991, pp. 26-27

opportunities and risks. Not only the issue of Kosova and other Albanian-inhabited areas in Yugoslavia, but also Macedonia, are likely to appear on the agenda. In order to deal with a growing Serbian threat, Albanian diplomacy is concentrating on strengthening ties with Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria and forging a new relationship with independent-minded Croatia.

In recent decades Albania has had excellent political ties with Turkey. However, economic cooperation has lagged. While high-level contacts have increased and Albania is eager for a closer relationship with Turkey, Tirana has been careful not to antagonize Athens, with whom relations have steadily improved in recent years. The Greeks have supported the democratization of Albania and have pledged to help in its economic revival. The issue of the ethnic Greek minority has become less contentious since the improvement in the overall human rights situation in Albania. Tirana has agreed to facilitate contacts between the Greek minority and Athens, and is reportedly creating favorable conditions to stimulate Greek investments.²⁸ Political contacts between the two countries have improved considerably. However, a new irritant that could affect bilateral relations is the issue of ethnic Albanians, known as Cams, who were forcibly expelled from Greece at the end of World War II. Under increasing domestic pressures, Albanian leaders raised the Cam issue with the visiting Greek Prime Minister

²⁸ ATA in English 0951 GMT, Aug. 1, 1991 in FBIS-EEU-91-149, Aug. 2, 1991, p. 5

Constantine Mitsotakis in January 1991.²⁹ The Greeks have not recognized the existence of an ethnic Albanian population in their country nor have they been willing to consider Cams' claims for compensation for property they left behind.³⁰

While Albanian-Greek relations have improved substantially, suspicions persist on both sides. The Albanians fear that prolonged instability could revive Greek claims on southern parts of their country. Moreover, they are concerned about a potential alliance between Greece and Serbia. The Greeks, on the other hand, are seemingly distressed about Albania again falling under Italian domination.

Tirana's ties with Bucharest and Sofia have shown no appreciable improvement. Albania apparently does not see great opportunities in cultivating closer relations with Romania and Bulgaria, who are preoccupied with their own internal problems. However, Tirana's attitude toward Sofia could change in view of developments in Yugoslavia.

Albania has taken advantage of Yugoslavia's growing fragmentation to establish independent links with Croatia and, perhaps more significantly, Macedonia. High level delegations from both Yugoslav republics have visited Tirana and Albania has been

²⁹ See The New York Times, Jan. 14 and 15, 1991. See also Abdi Baleta, "Why is Mister Mitsotakis Coming to Albania?" Rilindja Demokratike, Jan. 12, 1991, pp. 5-6

³⁰ For the Albanian perspective on the Cam issue, see Bashkim Kucuku, "Cameria -- a Forgotten Palestine," Rilindja Demokratike, Feb. 16, 1991, p. 6; and N. Mergjyshi, "Authentic Proof of the Cam Tragedy," Zeri i Popullit, July 5, 1991, p. 3

invited to visit Skopje.³¹ Albania views both Croatia and Macedonia as natural allies against Serbia, although the existence of a large Albanian population in western Macedonia complicates relations with Skopje. In a significant development that could lead to the improvement of Albanian-Macedonian relations, the largest ethnic Albanian political party in Macedonia has expressed support for Skopje's proposal to hold a referendum on Macedonia's independence. Nevzat Halili, the leader of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, said in an interview that his party would support Macedonia's independence if its leaders would pledge to treat the Albanians as a nation, rather than a nationality (minority), recognize Albanian as an official language together with Macedonian, and ensure the development of Albanian culture and education.³² After the outbreak of unrest in Kosova in 1981, Macedonia had instituted highly repressive policies against the ethnic Albanians. But with Macedonia's increasing conflict with Serbia, there appears to have been a mild relaxation in Albanian-Macedonian tensions.

Albanian-Yugoslav relations are at their lowest point since the late 1940s and the early 1950s, when border skirmishes were quite frequent. Both sides have massed troops on the border and there appears to be little direct communication between Tirana and Belgrade.

While tensions in Kosova were high throughout the 1980s, the

³¹ Zeri i Popullit, July 13, 1991, p. 1 and July 26, 1991, p. 1

³² Die Presse (Vienna), Aug. 12, 1991, p. 4, trans. in FBIS-EEU-91-157, Aug. 14, 1991, p. 44

situation was exacerbated in March 1989, when Serbia stripped the province of its autonomy. When Albanian members of the Provincial Assembly declared Kosova's independence from Serbia in July 1990, Milosevic suspended the provincial parliament and government, and shut-down the Albanian-language radio, television, and daily Rilindja. Rejecting the legitimacy of Serbian rule, ethnic Albanian deputies met clandestinely in the city of Kacanik and proclaimed Kosova a republic.³³ While the decision was supported by the overwhelming majority of Kosovars, the Serbian government denounced it as "an unconstitutional act" and a direct attack on the territorial integrity of both Serbia and Yugoslavia, and intensified plans for the Serbianization of Kosova. Since September 1990, more than 70,000 Albanians have been fired from their jobs and replaced by Serbs brought into Kosova from Serbia. In a stepped-up of recolonization of Kosova, the Serbian parliament adopted a law encouraging Serbs to resettle in the region.³⁴ Serbian authorities have replaced a large number of Albanian professor at the University of Prishtina and have threatened to

³³ Zenun Celaj, "Kosova Declared a Republic Within the Framework of Yugoslavia," Zeri i Rinise (Prishtina), Sep. 14, 1990, pp. 7-9. Celaj, a prominent journalist and Secretary of the Prishtina-based Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Liberties, was the only reporter present at the Kacanik meeting. He was arrested and spend a month in jail for allegedly having attended an illegal meeting. For Celaj's personal account of imprisonment see his article "I Was Not Alone," Koha (Prishtina), Nov. 8, 1990, p. 10

³⁴ See Cord Meyer, "Relying on brute force in Kosovo," The Washington Times, July 19, 1991, pp. F1, F4; and Peter Maass, "Ethnic Albanians Feel Serbia's Crackdown," The Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1991, p. A20

shut-down all Albanian-language schools that do not accept Serbian school curriculum which neglect the study of Albanian culture and history. Ethnic Albanian leaders have warned that Milosevic is pursuing a deliberate policy aimed at provoking an uprising in Kosova, which would then be put down by Yugoslavia's Serbian-dominated army, forcing in the process hundreds of thousand of people to cross the border into Albania.

The political turmoil in Kosova has caused a precipitous rise of Albanian nationalism. With the intensification of fighting in Croatia, there have been increased demands in Kosova for measures to create a self-defense system. Croatian emissaries have reportedly urged the Albanians to stage an uprising. Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman, however, had alienated the Albanians by accepting Milosevic's plan to exclude their representatives from talks on the future of Yugoslavia. Kosovar activists have warned the population to be wary of Croatian designs. Claiming that Croatia and Slovenia had "sold Kosova," a prominent Kosovar journalist has urged that ethnic Albanians stay clear of the Serb-Croat conflict:

... many pan-Slav political circles wish to set Kosova aflame. Propaganda to hurl the Albanian population in Kosova into a general uprising suits certain Croatian political circles at such a time. Thus, the fire must be kindled in Kosova in order to save Croatia. Consciously or not, this propaganda is also receiving support among certain political forces in Kosova. This must not happen in Kosova at any cost, even though our policy of patience enables the police, military, and Chetnik forces to swagger up and down Kosova... However, this does not mean that the Albanian people should sleep. The Albanians must make maximum preparations for war while at the same

time opposing war by every means.³⁵

Facing increasing pressure from militants within their own ranks over the apparent failure of their policies to break Serbia's hold over Kosova, six political parties, led by the Democratic League have established a committee to coordinate their activities. In addition to holding a referendum on Kosova's future status, the coordinating committee, chaired by Rugova, is considering the possibility of the formation of an interim government.

Whereas until now Rugova had insisted on peaceful resistance and had pinned his hopes for a peaceful solution on intervention by the international community, he is under pressure to pursue a more assertive strategy against Serbia. Even prominent personalities have urged that "the Albanians' political activity should shift from issuing declarations to tangible preparations for a strategy of self-defense."³⁶ Professor Rexhep Qosja, Kosova's preeminent scholar, has reproached political parties "for retreating before Serbian policy" and permitting the development of a situation in which Albanians are unprepared to defend themselves. In sharp contrast with Rugova and other activists, Qosja maintains that irrespective of whether Slovenia and Croatia remain in Yugoslavia, the only solution to the problem of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia

³⁵ Fehmi Ajvazi, "Pan-Slav Maneuvers," Bujku, Aug. 4, 1991, p. 2

³⁶ Flaka e Vellazerimit, July 28, 1981, p. 4

is unification with Albania.³⁷

The Albanian government has expressed alarm at the possibility of an Albanian-Serb armed conflict in Kosova. At the same time it has assured Belgrade that it has no territorial claims on Yugoslavia, but has insisted that the ethnic Albanians be permitted to have their own republic.³⁸ Tirana has resisted calls to recognize the Republic of Kosova, proclaimed at the Kacanik meeting.³⁹ According to an Albanian Foreign Ministry spokesman, "the Republic of Kosova cannot be recognized internationally as an entity as long as the Kosova Assembly has not declared its independence from Yugoslavia."⁴⁰ In an interview with a foreign correspondent, President Alia said that Albania will not intervene militarily in Kosova.⁴¹

³⁷ See Qosja's interview in Fjala (Prishtina), no. 27 (July 1991), pp. 3-5

³⁸ Zeri i Popullit, July 14, 1991, p. 4

³⁹ Mehmet Elezi, "Kosova and the Albanian Question in Light of Some New Conditions," Bashkimi, July 8, 1991, p. 4

⁴⁰ Quoted in Zagreb Radio Croatia in Albanian, 2045 GMT, Aug. 14, 1991, trans. in FBIS-EEU-91-159, Aug. 16, 1991, p. 27. The three Albanian opposition parties as well as the Socialist Party have "recognized" the Republic of Kosova. See Kosova, July 12, 1991, pp. 1, 3

⁴¹ Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Aug. 21, 1991, p. 10, trans. in FBIS-EEU-91-163, Aug. 22, 1991, p. 1

NATIONAL UNIFICATION: THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE?

With the reunification of Germany, the Albanians remain the only divided nation in Europe. Albania has a population of about 3.3 million. There are almost as many Albanians in Yugoslavia. While there are no exact figures, it is believed there are slightly more than 2 million Albanians in Kosova, between 500,000 to 700,000 in Macedonia, and 50,000 in Montenegro. An estimated several hundred thousand are scattered throughout Yugoslavia, with large communities in southern Serbia, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana. Inhabiting compact territories on the border with their mother country, the Albanians proportionally constitute the largest irredenta in the world. The Albanians have the highest birthrate in Europe: 25.3 per thousand in Albania (1989) and 29.9 per thousand in Kosova (1987). The Albanian population is also Europe's youngest: more than one third of Albania's total population is under fifteen years of age; sixty percent of Kosova's population is under 27 years old. Based on current projections, by year 2000 there will be four million Albanians on each side of the current state boundaries separating Albania and Yugoslavia. Thus there will be almost as many Albanians in the Balkans as Serbs, and several times more than Montenegrins and Macedonians. The question begs itself: How long can such large communities of the same nation remain divided?

Since World War II, Albania's claims to Kosova have been dormant. Hoxha downplayed the issue, giving priority to state-to-

state relations with Yugoslavia. Alia has been even less supportive of the ethnic Albanians. Most Kosovars who crossed the border during the 1980s to escape prosecution in Yugoslavia for nationalist activity were turned back.⁴² In contrast to Hoxha, Alia did not formally endorse ethnic Albanian demands for a republic, stressing that the status of Kosova was a Yugoslav internal issue. During the Balkan Foreign Ministers Conference held in Tirana in 1990, Alia received the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar. According to Yugoslav news reports, the Albanian leader "expressed respect for the integrity of Yugoslavia and Serbia."⁴³ This statement run counter to the Kacanik declaration which had proclaimed Kosova's independence from Serbia.

It is abundantly clear that post-World War II ethnic Albanian communist leaders were loyal to Belgrade and did not advocate union with Albania. With its crackdown, Serbia has now relegated the Albanians to the bottom levels of the society. Relying on brute military and police force to maintain peace and order, the Serbian government has threatened ethnic Albanians' physical security, locked them out of political institutions and processes, and restricted their access to education, jobs, medical care and social services. Serbian repression measures, ostensibly undertaken to

⁴² Sinan Hasani, Kosovo: Istine i Zabluda (Zagreb: Centar za Informacije i Publicitet, 1986), p. 203; and Milovan Drecun, "Preparations of the Skipetars for an Armed Rebellion," Politika (Belgrade), July 14, 1991, p. 14, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, East Europe Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), no. 91-111, July 30, 1991, p. 66

⁴³ Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1436 GMT, Oct. 26, 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU-90-209, Oct. 29, 1990, pp. 3-4

fight Albanian "nationalism and irredentism" have indeed encouraged independence sentiments and helped unify the ethnic Albanians. Ethnic consciousness among Albanians in Yugoslavia has never been more powerful than it is now. An increasing number of Kosovars apparently feel they have no future in Yugoslavia.

For decades the question of the unification of the Albanian nation was taboo in both Albania and Yugoslavia. However, the issue is now increasingly being discussed on both sides of the border. The emergence of opposition in Albania has been accompanied with a hardening of Tirana's position on Kosova and the issue of national union now dominates political debate. Although Albania and Kosova have developed independently of each other during most of this century, there is a much stronger sense of unity among Albanians on both sides of the border than is commonly viewed by outsiders. Even in the long absence of free movement across the border, cultural cooperation between Prishtina and Tirana universities in the 1970s, the Kosovars' adoption of the standard Albanian literary language, and the explosion of Albanian-language publications, radio, and TV have reinforced the bonds between the two parts of the Albanian nation. While sentiments for unification are increasing, neither activists in Kosova nor in Albania have gone beyond rhetorical statements. Recognizing the preponderant power Serbia enjoys in relations to both Kosova and Albania, the Albanians have been careful to emphasize that secession is a last resort.

Kosova's union with Albania would involve border changes and could trigger a massive response not only from Serbs, which

consider the province a sacred ground, but also from Montenegrins and Macedonians. Although Albanians are ill prepared for an armed confrontation, the number of them ready to make the sacrifice is evidently growing.

Serbia has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to crush by force any attempt to wrest away Kosova. However, Albanian national movements have cropped up again and again. By failing to seek a solution that will meet minimum ethnic Albanian demands, Milosevic has planted the seeds of a bloody armed conflict that Serbia sooner or later will have to reap. The costs of keeping Kosova under Serbia's control are likely to increase considerably especially if Slovenia and Croatia secede from Yugoslavia. Serbia's economy, already in a shambles, will be heavily taxed by the costs that continued military occupation of Kosova will entail. Time and demographic trends appear to favor the Albanians. Moreover, international support for Serbia is likely to erode and Western governments will face increasing pressure to impose sanctions against Belgrade.

Serbia's fears of Albanian irredentism are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The rift between the Albanians and the Serbs appears unbridgeable and even granting Kosova the status of a republic will probably turnout to be too little, too late. Despite vehement repression, the ethnic Albanians have displayed remarkable staying power and are pursuing their demands for independence from Serbia with a passionate intensity. The eventual separation of Kosova from Serbia appears inevitable. In the long run, an armed

conflict could be no less detrimental to the Serbs than to the Albanians. The problem is how to achieve the divorce peacefully. This is a question that begs the attention of the United States and Europe as they brace themselves for a changing shape of the Balkan region.

Albania and Kosova could be on the verge of economic collapse and a bloody orgy. The outside world needs to recognize the urgency of the situation and take appropriate measures to help Albania get out of its current precarious situation and prevent Kosova from drifting toward civil war, which can assume unforeseeable proportions. Failure to act now could face the international community with the prospect of a long war and hundreds of thousands of displaced Albanians desperately seeking a haven.

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YUGOSLAVIA:

THE UNMAKING OF A FEDERATION

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London

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(Footnotes to follow)

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Introduction

States usually break up in wartime as a result of military defeat and/or political revolution. This is how the three great empires of our ~~own~~ time - the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian - came to an end at the close of the First World War. The Russian empire's successor, the Soviet Union, may yet prove an exception by dissolving peacefully in peacetime. Yugoslavia's own disintegration is taking place in peacetime but to the accompaniment of much internal violence, thus conforming to no previous pattern.

[There are many reasons for Yugoslavia's crisis ~~leading to its break up~~ but foreign intervention of any kind is not one of them. The principal reasons for what is happening in Yugoslavia now is that its main nations have come to reject it - at least in its present form - as not measuring up to their very different (and often mutually exclusive) national needs and aspirations.

[For the Serbs, Yugoslavia's most numerous people (36% of the total population according to the 1981 census), the chief problem was that, increasingly, in the second post-1945 Yugoslavia that Marshal Tito and the Communist Party set up the Serbs' dominant position, assured in the first 1918-1941 Yugoslavia, had come to be eroded. For the non-Serb majority, ^{on the other hand, there} had come a point where Yugoslavia had become an obstacle to their national aims and so they wanted it ~~either broken up into completely independent states or, possibly,~~ turned into a loose grouping ('confederation') of sovereign states, cooperating within a version of the Common Market - rather as the Soviet republics after the demise of the Soviet Union now they hope they will be able to do. ^{if that was not possible completely broken up}

[Until relatively recently, these divergences in national perceptions within Yugoslavia were of academic interest only. For three and a half decades after the ~~First~~ ^{Second} World War, Yugoslavia was held together by a strong leader at the head of a loyal Communist Party and ~~an~~ army. The fear of falling under Soviet domination, from which Yugoslavia escaped in 1948 thanks to Tito's successful defiance of Stalin, created a bond

between outright supporters of the Tito regime and those who opposed it, which also helped to keep the Yugoslav state together. Another cohesive factor was the country's growing prosperity during the last two decades of Tito's life, which created a mood of optimism and hope. Last but not least, whatever Yugoslavia's own citizens thought of their state, whether or not they wanted it, the outside world did. In the eyes of the West, an independent Yugoslavia (even if Communist ruled) was an important asset during the Cold War. To keep it aloof the West was prepared to reach into its pocket. Now all those cohesive factors are gone. Tito died in 1980, aged 88. His death was followed by the onset of a severe financial crisis which soon developed into a crisis of the whole economic system. The Cold War ended in 1989, removing the last vestiges of unity generated by common fear of a external danger. ~~Shortly afterwards, in 1990, the~~ Yugoslav Communist Party finally broke up. It had long been divided not only along ideological lines into reformist and 'dogmatic' wings but also (and more important) into six republican (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two provincial (Kosovo and Vojvodina) parties. The party's demise occurred at the abortive congress in Belgrade in ~~January~~ February 1990. And so what happens to Yugoslavia became, for the first time in its history, for its peoples to decide, without anybody from the outside telling them what to do. ~~What showed most clearly~~ ^{But} ~~was that~~ they disagreed profoundly about what should happen next. Ironically, what they could agree about was that most of them thought that they had had a raw deal in Yugoslavia since it was first set up in 1918.

Differing national perceptions

The most vociferous complaints about Yugoslavia for many years, particularly since the mid-1980s, had been the Serbian. The grievance against post-1945 Yugoslavia was most clearly set out in the draft memorandum prepared in 1985 by a working group of the Serbian Academy of Sciences under the chairmanship of ~~xx~~ Antonije Isakovic, its 'vice-

President and one of Serbia's most prominent writers. The document alleged that:

● The federal government had ever since 1945 pursued a discriminatory policy towards Serbia in the economic field while at the same time favouring Croatia and Slovenia, the two western republics, in whose leaders' hands most of the economic decision-making was concentrated. According to the Memorandum's authors, at the root of this lay the anti-Serb bias in the pre-1945 Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its then directing body, the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow.

● The partition of Serbia into three parts under Tito's 1974 Constitution was further evidence of that bias. The division ~~was~~ into 'Serbia proper' and the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had existed since the early days of post-1945 Yugoslavia but it was only after 1974 that the two provinces were allowed direct participation in decision-making at the federal level, bypassing Serbia.

● The Serbs in Kosovo and in Croatia were subjected to a policy of discrimination ^{and} ~~terror and persecution~~ aimed at driving them out (Kosovo) or assimilating them (Croatia). In both cases, the Memorandum's authors alleged, the Serbs were subjected to a policy of 'genocide'.

The Memorandum's authors saw behind all these policies a clear guiding principle - that of a 'strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia' and called for its reversal, especially the abolition of the 1974 Constitution which gave Kosovo and Vojvodina ~~the~~ what amounted to de facto status of republics. The document's main conclusion was that, under Tito (part Croat and part Slovene) and his second-in-command for many years, Edvard Kardelj (a Slovene), the Serbs had been treated unfairly in Yugoslavia. ~~etc~~

The Memorandum, now widely recognised as a seminal document, did not signal Serb rejection of Yugoslavia - as was alleged by some of its (Serb and non-Serb) critics ^{in 1985} ~~at the time~~ when it was first leaked to the press, but only of Tito's version of it. The Serbian backlash

against Tito's Yugoslavia was accompanied by an explosion of nostalgia for the first, royalist Yugoslavia. The view that emerged from a flood of publications about the 1918-41 period was that, despite its many imperfections, the first Yugoslavia - with its Serb dynasty, Serb-controlled army, civil service and diplomacy - was a state Serbs could identify with and call their own because it assured them of a leading role as its Staatsvolk.

The Serbs' disenchantment with Tito's Yugoslavia had its ~~exact~~ counterpart in that among the country's non-Serbs - though for exactly the opposite reasons. The Slovenes, one of Yugoslavia's smallest nations (1.1% of the total population), had ~~in~~ before 1941 (and for a while after 1945) been among the most fervent supporters of Yugoslavia, not least because they saw in it a protector against predatory German and Italian imperialism. By the mid-1960s the Slovenes had become alarmed that a new centralist trend then in evidence in Yugoslavia (not least in the cultural field) could become a threat to their national identity, leading to a form of Serbianisation under a Yugoslav cover. Perhaps even more important in the early days, the Slovenes as an important contributor to Yugoslavia's gnp and hard-currency exports (far larger than ~~to~~ their share in the population of Yugoslavia) resented the huge and ever-growing expenditure on the federal army and civil service and inefficient investment projects in the less developed areas of Yugoslavia. This generated a feeling that Slovenia was in various ways getting less out of Yugoslavia than it was putting into it. Meanwhile, in a peaceful Europe, the once serious threat from the West had disappeared as Austria and Italy became friendly neighbours and attractive economic partners, ~~worth getting even closer to.~~

For the Croats, too, the second largest nation of Yugoslavia after the Serbs, Yugoslavia had at one time seemed a welcome prospect. At the end of the First World War, as Austria-Hungary broke up, Croatia was faced with the threat of annexation by Italy of most of its Adriatic coast (including the islands) promised to Italy in 1915 under the Treaty of

London as an inducement to join the war on the Entente's side. For the Croats, union with Serbia, itself an Entente coalition member, within a new Southern Slav state seemed the best protection against Italian claims on its territory. [The Croats' disillusionment with Yugoslavia started earlier than that of the Slovenes - already in pre-1941 Yugoslavia.]

The main reason was that instead of equality they expected the Croats met political suppression culminating in the murder in 1928 in the Belgrade parliament of several of their deputies by a Serb deputy. Stjepan Radic, the popular and widely respected pacifist leader of the Croat Peasant Party, ~~himself~~ ^{in the same incident} was wounded and later died as a result of complications. The royal dictatorship introduced in the wake of the Belgrade killings ^{in 1929} was particularly harsh in Croatia, helping the rise of an extremist Croat nationalist movement, the Ustasas (Insurgents). In 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated by a Macedonian terrorist working with the Ustasas.

[Completely alienated from the Yugoslav kingdom, most Croats welcomed its dismemberment by the Germans and the Italians in 1941. But they soon became disillusioned ^{with} by the regime of Ante Pavelic, the Ustasa leader, placed in charge of Croatia by the Germans and the Italians. The Pavelic regime killed many thousands of Serbs and Jews (as well as gypsies and Croats who belonged to the opposition). In post-1945 Tito Yugoslavia the Croats remained, because of the horrible crimes committed by the Pavelic regime, a 'nation on probation'. This was ironic in view of the Croats' massive participation in the anti-Fascist struggle on Tito's side. The explanation for this was the predominance in the police, the army and the state administration in Croatia after the war of Croat Serbs, many of them former partisans. The Serbs were particularly prominent in the Communist Party of Croatia in numbers often several times larger than their proportion of the population in Croatia (11.6% in 1981).

The process of democratisation, which began in the whole of Yugoslavia

in 1966 with the sacking of ~~the~~ Aleksandar Rankovic, the powerful secret police chief and party cadre boss, himself an ethnic Serb, received a ~~powerful~~ setback in Croatia in 1971. In response to complaints by prominent Croatian Serbs, Tito instituted a harsh purge that killed off the political and national revival, 'the Croatian Spring', which ^{had} started in 1966. The purge, which stultified political and cultural life in Croatia for nearly two decades, also had another important side-effect: it strengthened pro-independence sentiment in Croatia.

In contrast to the disenchantment of the Croats and the Slovenes, pro-Yugoslav sentiment remained strong among the ~~hardened~~ Bosnian Moslems and the Macedonians (^{Poth} recognised for the first time as ethnic nations in Tito's Yugoslavia) ~~as well as among the Montenegrins~~, traditionally close to the Serbs (and indeed, historically considered part of the Serbian nation) ~~and~~ got a republic of their own after 1945. Yugoslavia's ethnic Albanians, like the Macedonians harshly treated in pre-1941 Yugoslavia, continued to be ^{suppressed} ~~harshly treated~~ for two decades after 1945 (unlike the Macedonians whom Tito wooed right from the start to help strengthen their attachment to Yugoslavia) But in the wake of Rankovic's fall, which ushered in a period of general liberalisation in Yugoslavia the Albanians obtained not only greater autonomy in Kosovo but also increased help for their economic and cultural development, including the university in Pristina, the capital of the Kosovo province.

~~The 1974 Constitution gave Tito the position of President-for-life. In that capacity he chaired meetings of Yugoslavia's collective state presidency made up of representatives of Yugoslavia's eight federal units - the six federal republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The eight were elected for a four-year term by secret vote in their respective assemblies, to whom they also remained directly responsible.~~ The centre hits back

ly responsible. (Given the separate federal representation of Serbia's two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the member for Serbia represented only the republic's territory outside the provinces - the so-called Serbia proper).

After Tito's death in May 1980, the state Presidency became the collective head of state. To help its smooth functioning, a position of the President of the Presidency was created, based on a strict rotation among the ~~eight~~ eight federal units. The duties of the ~~President of the Presidency~~ Presidency included (apart from the ceremonial and representative ones), appointing the federal government; signing of laws passed by the two federal assembly chambers (one representing the republics and provinces and the other all citizens as such); and, perhaps most important of all, acting as commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav People's Army. In this last function, the Presidency had the right to introduce a state of emergency in the country in response to a possible outside threat. Its ability to do this in response to a domestic crisis, however, was limited by the principle of consensus. In other words, it required unanimity among all the eight federal units. The 1974 Constitution thus combined federal and confederal elements, balancing ~~substantially~~ a substantial autonomy of the individual federal units with a centralism inherent in supremacy of the federal over the republican and provincial ~~assemblies~~ legislatures.

[Until the spring of 1990, Yugoslavia's supreme legislative body was the Yugoslav federal assembly. Of its two chambers, the assembly of the republics and provinces, whose members were appointed by republican and provincial assemblies, was the more powerful because it had the right to veto decisions of the federal government. If supported by the ~~collective state~~ Presidency, the federal government could implement a controversial decision as an emergency measure - but only for a period of up to two years. In the course of 1989-91 the emergency procedure ceased to be an exception. In fact it became the norm, indicating the emergence of deep divisions among the federal units. At first those

divisions were mainly over economic matters - notably the size of the federal budget and methods of financing it - but gradually purely political aspects took over.

[The political divisions among the federal units sharpened in the 1989-91 period as ^{and led to} ~~a result of~~ certain changes which undermined the 1974 constitution and thus also the authority of the federal state. By the end of the 1980s, a sharp differentiation had occurred within the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (official name since 1952: 'League of Communists of Yugoslavia'). On the one side were Party conservatives: (strongly represented in the Party organisation in the Yugoslav People's Army) and the leadership of the republic of Serbia. What united those two groups was the aim they both shared - that of re-centralising Yugoslavia by removing the confederal features of the 1974 constitution. On the other side stood Party reformists, strongly present in the top ranks of the Party in ~~Slovenia~~ Slovenia and Croatia (by then Croatia had shaken off the legacy of the post-1971 repression) who not only resisted the push for re-centralisation but also worked to strengthen political pluralism and civil liberties in Yugoslavia. The polarisation soon became acute. ^{Open} ~~and~~ confrontation between the two factions caused the disintegration of the postwar system ^{amid} ~~accompanied by~~ growing civil strife.

The Milosevic Campaign - X-head

It was from ~~Serbia~~ that the initiative came which led to the collapse of the status quo. Serbia sought to strengthen its weight within the Yugoslav federation. If the Academy Memorandum ^{had} provided a theoretical basis for Serbian reassertion in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period, action was provided by Slobodan Milosevic, who became Serbia's Party leader in 1986, a year after the Memorandum's publication. Within a year, he was acclaimed as the right man to lead what has since come to be known as treći srpski ustanak (the third Serbian uprising) - an allusion to the two that occurred in the nineteenth century against the Ottoman empire.

[Milosevic, a hardline Communist but also a brilliant ^{popular} ~~populist~~ politician.

in tune with the frustrations of the Serbs, found the starting point for his campaign of Serb reassertion among the Serb minority in Kosovo. In 1389 the Turks had inflicted on them in Kosovo Polje a heavy defeat that eventually led to their loss of independence and subjection to Ottoman rule for the next five centuries. Recovery of Kosovo became the Serbs' constant hope and aim. By 1912, however, when Serbia did regain Kosovo from the Turks in the First Balkan War, the bulk of the ^{Kosovo} Serbs had left, whereas the number of Albanians had increased.

Principally because of the Albanians' high birth-rate, this demographic trend had continued despite the Serb authorities' best efforts in the 1918-41 period to 'encourage' ~~as many~~ ^{the} Albanians to leave. In 1941 the census showed the Albanians as making up 67.2% of Kosovo's total population. By 1981 their share had increased to 77.4% of the total. According to incomplete figures largely based on estimates (the 1991 census was boycotted by Kosovo's Albanians), their ~~percentage~~ share of Kosovo's population had gone up to 90% while that of the Serbs has dropped to below 10% (from 18.4% in 1961).

[A second main factor here has been steady Serbian emigration from the province which the Serbs blamed on local Albanian 'terror' and the Albanians put down to strong financial incentives for the Serbs to leave: the land-hungry Albanians, with their large families, were prepared to pay handsomely for the Serbs' houses and farms enabling them to seek a brighter future elsewhere. Kosovo is Yugoslavia's poorest region with a high unemployment rate and bleak economic prospects. Milosevic skillfully exploited the allegations about Albanian 'terror' against the Serbs of Kosovo to build a new and aggressive populist movement. He paid a dramatic visit to the province in the Spring of 1987 and promised local Serbs that 'nobody would ever beat them again'. In the autumn of 1987 he used the Kosovo Serbs' alleged plight to ~~remove~~ ^{purge} the ~~previous~~ Serbian Party of supporters of the previous leadership.

[In October 1987, in response to Milosevic's demands for more 'law and

order' in Kosovo, a federal police unit was dispatched there. As a concession to Serbian feelings, ~~Fedil~~ ^{Fedil} ~~Boxha~~, an old partisan and an Albania's Vice-President during President Tito's time who was the most senior ethnic Albanian Party figure, was expelled from the Party. These developments demonstrated the advanced state of decomposition of the ruling Party, which alone controlled the instruments of discipline and coercion at the federal level - including the army. [Serbia was challenging the central Party authority throughout 1988 and 1989 by using its state republican machinery ~~to~~ and mass media to organise hundreds of demonstrations by Serbs throughout the republic, denouncing the state leaders of Kosovo and Vojvodina and demanding 'Serbia's reunification'. This campaign, an amalgam of xenophobic nationalism and Chinese-style 'cultural revolution', was officially called 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' and extended across Serbia's borders, targeting politicians in other parts of Yugoslavia ^{who were} critical of Serbia's actions and unwilling to endorse them. It came to involve the Serb minorities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina (32% of the total population) and Croatia ~~(11.6%)~~ (11.6%). It also spread to Montenegro, a republic closely linked to Serbia both by history and tradition. After several rallies held ~~there~~ by Milosevic supporters (some of them 'bussed' from across the border in Serbia) in Titograd, Montenegro's capital (it reverted to its old name of Podgorica in 1991), a pro-Milosevic group came to power there in January 1989.

[In the same year the Serbian assembly passed several amendments to the republican constitution, which removed key aspects ~~of the autonomy~~ of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The amendments abolished the provinces' right to ~~to~~ make their own laws (within the framework of federal laws); to run their own security, territorial defence and courts; to make their own economic decisions; and to act independently of Serbia within the federal Yugoslav institutions. Those decisions, triumphantly described by Milosevic's supporters as the 'unification of Serbia', were unprecedented in post-1945 Yugoslav history. This

was not only because their effect was to 'rub out' two federal units but also because of the way they were brought in and implemented - unilaterally and in open defiance of Federal Yugoslav authorities. Yugoslavia's federal structure could not withstand the Serbian onslaught and began to totter.

The most important consequence of the changes was substantially to increase the Serbia's influence in the federation. The amendments abolished any basis for the provinces' separate representation at the federal level. Serbia never took the logical next step which would have been in their ~~disregard~~ de jure removal from federal bodies. ¹ Serbia pretended that all that was involved was ~~reorganisation~~ ^a re-organisation of its internal ~~administrative~~ administrative arrangements. The other republics, unwilling to sanction the new situation but unable to reverse it, meekly acquiesced in what was a significant shift in the Serbia's favour in the internal ^{Yugoslav} balance of power. On the federal ^{Votes} Presidency Serbia now controlled three instead of one ~~vote~~. In the summer of 1990 Serbia incorporated these amendments into its new republican constitution.

By the end of 1989, it was clear to everybody in Yugoslavia that the Milosevic campaign had been a success. The governments and party leaderships of ~~Kosovo and~~ Vojvodina and Montenegro had been replaced by pro-Milosevic loyalists. In Kosovo, however, with its predominantly Albanian population, the campaign had run into strong resistance. A number of mass demonstrations and two general strikes, held ~~between~~ in Kosovo in the winter of 1988-89 and involving hundreds and thousands of Albanians showed that the population had not accepted the obliteration of the province's autonomy. The resistance was finally broken by the intervention of the Yugoslav army approved by the federal Presidency - ~~the~~ not unanimously (Slovenia voted against). There was considerable loss of life ~~principally~~ among the local Albanian population. Surrounded by tanks, the Kosovo assembly ratified Serbia's amendments. In the summer of 1990, however, it refused to approve the new Serbian constitution.

tution. For this, it was punished by its immediate dissolution by the Serbian authorities. This caused a constitutional crisis involving the whole of Yugoslavia without a constituent assembly, whose representatives in the federal bodies became illegitimate - and so, logically, also those bodies themselves.

The onset of democracy

X-head

This crisis of Yugoslavia's state system was quickly overshadowed by another, even more important for Yugoslavia's future - that of the ruling party. It was brought to a head in the autumn of 1989 by the decision of the Slovene assembly to amend the constitution of the Slovene republic to allow for multiparty elections to take place in the spring of the following year. Slovenia thus became the second republic formally to defy a major provision of the 1974 constitution by ~~abolishing~~ ^{replacing} one-party rule by the multiparty system. In the winter of 1989 Croatia followed Slovenia's example. In both these republics, the change was approved by the republican branches of the Communist Party, without the approval of the central leadership and in advance of the all-Yugoslav party congress. When the congress convened in February 1990, no agreement on political and economic reforms ~~needed by Yugoslavia~~ could be reached, and the Party fell apart.

Multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia (April 1990) were followed by similar elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 1990), Macedonia (November 1990) and finally Serbia and Montenegro (December 1990). In Kosovo the election were boycotted by the Albanian majority population and so legitimate order ^{could} ~~has~~ ^{be} ~~not~~ ^{be} restored. In Slovenia a broad coalition called Demos won the election (though Milan Kucan, leader of the reformed Communists, was elected president). In Croatia the election was won by the right-of-centre Croatian Democratic Union. It achieved a majority of seats though not of votes. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three nationalist parties representing the three main national groups won shares of vote close to their total share of the population and decided to ^{form a coalition} ~~share~~ the government. The parties were: the Party of Democratic Action representing the Moslems ~~population~~, the Serbian Democratic

constitutional reform.

In April 1991, Croatia and Slovenia had submitted to the other republics a proposal for the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose union of sovereign states. The blueprint for such a confederation took its inspiration from the actual organisation and work of the European Community - rather as the organisers of the new Union in place of the old Soviet Union are doing. Variations were introduced to meet Yugoslavia's needs. Thus a common currency, foreign policy and defence were to be retained, and possibly also a common parliament, but the prerogatives of all central institutions were to be considerably reduced.

Serbia and Montenegro rejected this model in favour of a federation ~~more~~ more centralised than that under the 1974 constitution. The two-chamber system would be retained but the composition of both would be modified. Instead of the republics having identical numbers of deputies, their number in the second chamber would depend on the numerical size of the nationalities while the provinces would lose their direct representation in both chambers. According to this model, the power of the federal centre would be enlarged, especially in the economic sphere. ~~The two republics furthermore declared~~ ^{The two} ~~republics furthermore declared~~ their intention in the event of their proposal being rejected to seek a re-drawing of internal borders in a way that would ensure that all Serbs and Montenegrins lived within the same state.

In June 1991 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia came up with a third model which sought to combine features of the first two, though it leaned more towards the Croat-Slovene proposal in its affirmation of republican sovereignty.

Towards a Greater Serbia?

Serbia's declaration of intent over internal borders was perceived ~~as~~ ^{a threat} by the non-Serb ~~nationalities~~ (including even some Montenegrins) as a first step towards the creation of a Greater Serbia. These internal borders were not ethnic. They could not be, given the ^{untidy} territorial distribution of ethnic groups. This was especially so in Bosnia-Herzegovina where

where no nationality could claim a majority. Any attempt to create a state of all Serbs threatened not only the breakup of the republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but also the incorporation of thousands of ~~of~~ Croat and Muslim ~~nationals~~, something that could not be achieved without war.

Serbia acted in pursuit of its plan. In the summer of 1990, it gave its support to the so-called Autonomous Province of Krajina within the republic of Croatia. This mountainous area, inhabited mainly by Serbs, is vital to Croatia: through it pass the main ~~transport~~ ^{transport} routes linking Croatia's Adriatic coast with the north. 'Krajina's' refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Croatian government has been buttressed by an armed body of irregulars, supplied and maintained by Serbia with the full and increasingly open support of the Yugoslav army. This has allowed ~~the~~ 'Krajina' to block the movement of people and goods through much of Croatia.

In the summer of 1991 similar 'no-go' areas were established in some Serb-inhabited areas of eastern Croatia close to the Serbian border. A similar approach was adopted in Bosnia-Herzegovina where two 'Krajinas' - one in the north and the other in the south were created ~~with the aid of~~ (the latter with the aid of the Montenegrin government). Various Serb spokesmen openly say that the aim of all those moves is to carve out a Greater Serbia which would include large parts of Croatia, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia with the provinces and, possibly also (according to some Serb nationalists) Macedonia, called 'Old Serbia' before 1941.

Unable to reach an agreement over their ^{and alarmed by Serbia's expansionism} demands, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence on June 25th as referendums held in Slovenia in December 1990 and in Croatia in February 1991 ^{had} ~~authorised them to~~ ~~provided no agreement was reached with the rest of Yugoslavia~~. The Yugoslav army went into action in order to secure border crossings seized by the Slovenes but was repulsed. After ^{three} ~~repeated~~ EC missions ~~were sent~~ to Yugoslavia ~~(three together)~~ a cease-fire

fire was arranged in Slovenia with provision for the army's withdrawal within a specified time and supervision of the process by EC monitors. In July, in the immediate aftermath of Slovene secession, an onslaught was mounted against Croatia by the Serb irregulars ~~and Yugoslav~~ quite openly supported by the Yugoslav army. Large-scale destruction was caused particularly by the use of artillery and air ~~bombardment~~ ^{bombardment} in Eastern Croatia; some 150,000 people were made homeless (mainly Croats); and more than 300 people were killed. At the end of August a ceasefire in Croatia was arranged by the EC and a peace conference on Yugoslavia was convened for September 7th in the Hague under the chairmanship of the former British Foreign Secretary and Nato's ~~former~~ Secretary-General, Lord Carrington. But above the whole scene there was a big question-mark - the role of the Yugoslav army which several senior political figures including the federal President, Mr Mesic, and the federal Prime Minister Mr Ante Markovic, proclaimed to be out of control.



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THE RISE AND FALL OF TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

The question that foreigners most frequently asked Yugoslavs during the 1970s was: "What will happen in the country after President Tito dies?" They typically answered with self-confidence that political inheritance of "Tito's" Yugoslavia is sufficiently firm to outlive the charismatic marshal. It seemed that reasons to support their self-confidence were abundant: in 1948 Yugoslavia experienced the conflict with Stalin, becoming the first country to leave the communist block; Yugoslav self-management has for years attracted attention as a more humane and democratic alternative to the Soviet model; during 1950s and 1960s economy developed more or less successfully; as one of the founders and leaders of the non-aligned movement Yugoslavia became the respected and influential member of international community, while occasional eruptions of nationalism between Yugoslav republics were suppressed by undeniable authority of Tito, the League of Communists and the Yugoslav Army.

However, less than a year after marshal's death Yugoslavia faced the first major challenge when in April 1981 mass demonstrations of the Albanian minority broke out in the southern province of Kosovo, demanding that this province obtains the status of the seventh Yugoslav republic. Post-titoist Yugoslav communist leadership managed to temporarily suppress these demonstrations by force and political means, only to face a new, much more serious challenge in the months that followed. During 1970s economic growth in Yugoslavia was mainly sustained owing to considerable borrowing abroad. When global debt crisis broke out in early 1980s, Yugoslavia with a foreign debt of some \$20 billion became one of the most seriously affected developing countries, since foreign debt servicing at that time required more than 40 %

of the country's foreign currency receipts. Unwilling to undertake major economic reforms, Yugoslavia entered a decade-long period of economic decline, which has completely eroded the legitimacy of the ruling party, which led the country into increasingly profound economic, social and political crisis.

The reason why relative political consensus among the Yugoslav political elites prevailed during 1980s first of all should be sought in strategic interest of the West to safeguard the stability of Yugoslavia, which represented the "buffer" between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in Europe since early 1950s. Under such circumstances, economic and political turmoil in Yugoslavia opened scope for intervention by the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Treaty, with immediate consequences on the overall geo-political balance in Europe. The last occasion when it became directly apparent was during the 1981 crisis in Poland. Increasingly obvious inability of Yugoslavia to resolve its crisis and changes in Eastern Europe brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev's policy in the Soviet Union caused, however, that strategic interest of the West for Yugoslavia start to diminish. Formerly leading reform socialist country, Yugoslavia lagged more and more behind the changes in Eastern Europe.

Profound internal crisis and changes on the East of continent have entirely eroded the legitimacy of the Yugoslav post-titoist leadership and created a political vacuum in which historic animosities between the Yugoslav ethnic groups came into the foreground. Efforts by the Yugoslav federal governments, particularly of the Prime Minister Ante Markovic, to implement necessary economic and political reforms failed under the resistance of republican elites, which increasingly resorted to political mobilization on nationalist grounds as the background of their legitimacy. This has led the country into the situation of ethnic conflicts which in 1991 escalated into open armed clashes.

Generally, one may say that the crisis in post-titoist Yugoslavia came about as the consequence of three groups of factors: collapse of the specific Yugoslav model of socialism, profound and unexpectedly quick changes in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe, and aggravation of historic animosities between Yugoslav nations. In spite of thirty years of reforms which made Yugoslavia a unique case among socialist countries, disintegration of post-titoist Yugoslavia demonstrated that the "Yugoslav model" essentially kept all the "fatal weaknesses" of the Soviet model of socialism which brought about its historic collapse.

Tito's Heritage

Victory of Tito's partizans made Yugoslavia come out of the World War II as a communist state. In the period between 1945 and 1951 Yugoslavia has been consistently introducing the "soviet model" in which it sometimes even went ahead of other East European countries. In the foreign-policy area Yugoslavia became a part of an emerging eastern military block. Even after the conflict with Stalin in 1948, by forced collectivization of land Yugoslav communists tried to prove their dedication to the Eastern block. Only in early 1950s under an increasing military threat from the East, Yugoslavia asked the US for help. Between 1951 and 1954 Yugoslavia has entered the strategic alliance with the West undertaking certain military obligations in case of a military conflict between the eastern and western military alliance in Europe. However, while the influence of relationship with the US and West European countries led to dramatic reversal in the Yugoslav foreign policy, changes within the country were much slower and incomplete.

In early 1950s Yugoslavia faced a double challenge. On the one hand, conflict with the Soviet Union and other communist countries caused an identity crisis of Tito's regime, which was compelled to secure its legitimacy by thoroughly redefining its ideology starting with the critique of Stalinism. The solution was found in Karl Marx's late works and the idea of self-management as the "only true form of socialism", which was introduced in June 1950 by the Law on Transfer of Management of State Enterprises to Workers. On the other hand, alliance with the West has forced Yugoslav communists to open up toward western cultural and

political influences. However, liberalization soon reached its political limits, which was clearly demonstrated in mid-1950s in connection with the conflict between the Yugoslav communist top leadership and Milovan Djilas, who became the most famous Yugoslav dissident. In this way the Communist Party has clearly shown how far it was willing to go in the liberalization process - until late 1980s position of the communist elite and principal elements of the communist authority remained domain reservée which was beyond suspicion. Outside this framework, unlike the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Yugoslav communists were willing to accept changes, which allowed Yugoslavia to become the most liberal communist state during the following decades.

The climax of this process was marked by the 6th Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party, held in Zagreb in 1952 and 7th Congress, held in Ljubljana in 1958. However, Stalin's death and changes in the Soviet Union introduced by Nikita Krushchev announced the end of the Yugoslavia's strategic alliance with the West and gradual shift in its policy. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia did not come back under the umbrella of Eastern block, but instead found its international position within the non-aligned policy, which Tito defined together with the Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Egyptian President Nasser by the end of 1950s and beginning of 1960s.

Internally, cosmetic changes of the soviet model reached their limits in Yugoslavia by the end of 1950s and beginning of 1960s. Reasoning of the Yugoslav communist leadership at that time was under strong influence and works of reform-oriented economist from Eastern Europe who determinedly advocated market-oriented reforms of administrative-planned economy. By early 1960s Yugoslavia started to open toward the west in intellectual sense and Yugoslavs were the first citizens of a communist country who were allowed to travel freely abroad, which also resulted in faster penetration of western ideas and considerable liberalization in science and culture. In the first half of 1960s the first market-oriented economic reform was carried out and enterprises obtained much greater competences, state has reduced its

influence on the economy, for the first time after World War II individuals were allowed to set up private enterprises, while economic relationships with western market economies began to expand rapidly .

Initial results of economic reform were encouraging - economic growth rates in Yugoslavia at that time were relatively high, relieved of much of administrative restrictions enterprises were increasingly successful on the local and foreign markets, foreign-exchange receipts increased, living standards of citizens rose from year to year - to put in a nutshell, the "Yugoslav model" at that time was successful, which earned it an exceptional international reputation.

On the negative side, however, Yugoslav reform raised a number of problems, above all because of incompatibility of market economy and political democratization with the monopoly of communist party's authority. In the economic sense, Yugoslavia at that time had to cope with rising inflation, sharp distinction between successful and unsuccessful enterprises, with rising number of unemployed, rising social differences, persistent foreign-trade deficits, corruption and a whole range of other phenomena, which the communist economic, legal and political system kept under control with increasing difficulty. In the political sphere, liberalization raised the problem of growing opposition to the regime, which at that time, however, was still leftist. The most serious challenge to Tito's regime nevertheless was brought about by renewed national aspirations of certain Yugoslav nations and ethnic minorities, which contributed to serious political conflicts which broke out among the communist party leadership in the second half of 1960s. Initial efforts by Yugoslav communists to push national conflicts in the background by creating the Yugoslav nation failed and the idea was abandoned after the fall of prominent Serbian communist Aleksandar Rankovic, who was replaced from his office in 1964 together with a group of his associates in police apparatus.

The turning point in the League of Communists' policy occurred in 1968. The first in a sequence of events that led Tito

to retreat were mass student demonstrations in Belgrade and other Yugoslav cities, on which they declared political demands addressing serious criticism to the communist leadership because of their privileges and corruption. During the same year the country also experienced the first mass demonstrations of ethnic Albanians, who demanded greater political and cultural autonomy, including the establishment of a separate Albanian republic in Kosovo. Although these political protests were suppressed by force and political means, the Party's conservative wing felt rather alarmed and demanded that reforms be abandoned and that the country turn to tried bolshevik forms of authority. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and emergence of Breznev's doctrine of "restricted sovereignty" of communist countries in the same year, however, were the causes of a true panic among the top Yugoslav political leadership, who became aware of frailty of their position.

In spite of the fact that both liberal and nationalist opposition to the regime was suppressed, in late 1960s and early 1970s Yugoslavia has completely abandoned reforms in both economic and political sphere. During that period Tito won in a political confrontation with most liberal and nationalist-inclined younger-generation communist leaders in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Their place was subsequently taken by politicians who used to be elected during the 1970s only according to the principle of political loyalty to Tito and Party veterans. Abrupt interruption of the process of transfer of authority from veterans to younger generation of politicians and "negative cadres selection" during 1970s largely explain the total failure of the Yugoslav communist leadership in post-titoist period in overcoming the growing economic and political crisis.

Thus the Yugoslav communism faced the second identity crisis in its post-war history, because it became obvious that further market reforms and continuation of political democratization would irreversibly destroy the very foundations on which the power of the communist party rested. Return to the former regime, however, was not feasible because of disastrous critique of sta-

linism in Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s. Faced with such alternative top Yugoslav communist leadership again resorted to proven methods from early 1950s - the solution was "neither capitalism, nor stalinism", i.e. "new qualitative stage in the development of the Yugoslav socialist self-management based on authentic Marxism". The main ideologist of the Yugoslav party during the 1970s, Slovenian Edvard Kardelj, developed in early 1970s an entirely new ideological platform referring to Karl Marx's late works (Kardelj's ideas about self-management and federalism were actually much closer to the thinking of French XIX century anarchist Jean Joseph Proudhon and European XIX and XX century anarcho-sindicalists). Considered within the broader scope of development of communism in the second half of the XX century, one may say that this shift of the Yugoslav communism in terms of its motives, depth and extent is only comparable with the "cultural revolution" in China.

Kardelj's ideas have been included in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution (which is still in force), so-called Associated Labour Act and a number of other statutes and codes adopted during 1970s. With them the ideas of market economy and political pluralism were abandoned altogether and replaced by concepts of so-called "associated labour", "compactual economy" and "socialist self-management". The main idea was that in a "self-managed society" the role of enterprises and market is taken up by "communities of freely associated producers" who regulate their mutual relations by agreement. All economic processes become subject to agreement between workers and their associations, while effects of market relations and free competition were entirely disregarded. Within the political system, Kardelj has largely adopted the demands of national movements from 1960s, transferring most of political competences from the federal level to the level of federal units (the only areas that remained in the competence of federal organs were defense, foreign policy, foreign economic relations and a number of other issues), with republics and autonomous provinces having almost equal competences.

Utopian by its contents, Kardelj's economic system was completely unfeasible in practice. However, owing to accumulation from the former period and uncontrolled borrowing on international capital markets the Yugoslav economy functioned seemingly successfully during 1970s. Federal units have used their newly acquired power to build quasi-autarchic economic systems, reducing trade between republics to minimum. Foreign loans were largely used to build factories that never started to operate and to "buy social peace" by subsidizing unprofitable enterprises and enormous public expenses. In an attempt to ensure legitimacy for their authority, local political elites at that time started to systematically instigate nationalism, opposing the federal government and increasing tensions between nations. Behind slogans on self-management and "associated labour" started the comprehensive process of restoration of state socialism, with the only difference that main centers of political power were created not at the federal but at the level of eight Yugoslav federal units. This led to what would later be named "polycentric statism", i.e. specific polycentric political system in which eight Yugoslav federal units and equal number of communist parties, each by itself, developed independent and mutually confronted party states.

Although all the elements of the future Yugoslav drama were already on stage during 1970s, the system functioned owing mostly to the effect of five factors. First, with support of "his" party and army, Tito was an unquestionable arbiter in all political conflicts. Second, in spite of growing economic crisis living standard of Yugoslavs continued to increase during the 1970s. Third, Yugoslav communism continued to enjoy great political legitimacy. Fourth, in spite of mutual animosities, none of the Yugoslav federal units was truly jeopardized. Fifth, tensions in the relations between East and West brought about by Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and Yugoslavia's active role on the global (through the non-aligned movement) and European scene (through CSCE) worked cohesively.

None of these factors outlived Tito, who died in May 1980.

Crisis of the eighties

During 1980s three main elements of the Yugoslav model - self-management, federalism and non-alignment - began to gradually experience crisis, deepening the regime's legitimacy crisis, and exacerbating the differences between Yugoslav nations and ethnic minorities.

Problems in economic relations with other countries, in particular the debt crisis, forced the Yugoslav federal government in early 1980s to introduce tight restrictive measures. Economy, used to do business in quite different conditions, had difficulty in adjusting. The immediate consequence was sharp fall in the living standard of Yugoslavs, who again, after many years, had to cope with shortages and hyper-inflation. An attempt to implement the programme of market-oriented reforms in the first half of 1980s, contained in the so-called Long-Term Programme of Economic Stabilization (1983), failed because of resistance of federal units that became autonomous and unpreparedness of the federal leadership to face the programme's social consequences. The programme of political reforms in mid-eighties had similar fate. This has fully revealed all the weaknesses of the constitutional system of 1970s and together with increasingly apparent inability of the Yugoslav political elite to reach consensus on any major issue, undermined the legitimacy of the League of Communists, and hence self-management, as the key element of the Yugoslav model.

"Polycentric statism" and declining legitimacy of the regime during 1980s contributed toward strengthening of nationalism and centrifugal tendencies in Yugoslavia. The first open challenge to post-titoist Yugoslavia came from ethnic Albanians, when less than a year after Tito's death mass demonstrations broke out in Kosovo, demanding that Kosovo obtains the status of the seventh Yugoslav republic. Although federal leadership reacted sharply, seeing in this demand the first step toward complete separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia and its subsequent merger with neighboring Albania, the problem could not be solved. Moreover, Albanian separatism only added fuel on the fire of Serbian discontent

with constitutional solutions of 1974, under which Serbia de facto lost control over both its provinces. On this matter the interests and viewpoints of Serbian communist elite coincided with those of the Serbian intelligentsia (up until then they were sharply confronted), leading to change at the top of the Serbian party, when Slobodan Milosevic was elected to this office in 1987. Expressing the requests of Serbian nationalism, Milosevic became the first Yugoslav communist leader who openly opposed constitutional solutions of 1974, and thus the entire Tito's political inheritance.

Although leaders of other Yugoslav republics were probably ready to accept to some extent the changes in relationship between Serbia and its provinces (which were carried out pursuant to constitutional changes in Serbia in 1989), the emergence of Milosevic's supporters in another Yugoslav republic - Montenegro - and change of Montenegrin leadership have triggered the alarm. The first reaction came from Slovenian communists, who openly opposed Milosevic's Serbia by supporting the demands of ethnic Albanians and opening scope for strengthening of the Slovenian nationalism. In Croatia and other republics reactions ranged between reserved protest and search for common language with S. Milosevic's ideas. Escalating nationalism in Serbia (which for the first time in its history pursued separatist and "Greater Serbia" ideas instead of "unitarist", i.e. pro-Yugoslav viewpoints) until the beginning of 1990s has caused the chain reaction of nationalism of all Yugoslav nations. In view of the ¹⁹⁹⁰ fact that except Slovenians, all other nations (particularly Serbs and Croats) live in diaspora, mixed with other nations, it is almost impossible to draw ethnic borders in Yugoslavia. Explosion of nationalism in 1990 and 1991 in all Yugoslav republics, which typically presented maximalist territorial claims, brought about mutual conflict of national programmes and growing chauvinism. The fact that these processes coincided with the first free multi-party elections in Yugoslav republics after World War II (1990) has buried hopes for the country's democratization, because with rare exceptions some 250 newly founded political parties offered

exclusively nationalist programmes, which differed only by national affiliation and degree of militancy (except declarative support of "market and democracy" only a negligible number among them offered comprehensive programmes of economic and political reforms).

The third cornerstone of Tito's model - non-aligned policy - inspired confidence at the beginning of 1980s. Aggravation of relations between the US and the USSR after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Tito's firm resistance to attempts by Fidel Castro and the "progressive wing" to bring the movement into the "natural alliance" with the eastern bloc by the end of 1970s have contributed to considerable international credibility of non-alignment. In spite of that, non-aligned failed in their efforts to set North/South relations on different grounds by introducing the "new international economic order" project. This has marked a final failure of the movement's efforts to expand their activities beyond the framework marked by East-West conflict to relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries. When in mid-eighties M. Gorbachev introduced new ideas to the USSR politics and thus set in motion irreversible changes in the entire eastern block, the non-aligned policy started to lose its *raison d'être*. Yugoslavia's efforts in 1989, when it became the chairman of non-aligned, to start "modernization" of the movement, never went beyond bare rhetoric not only because of escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, but also because of overall marginalization of the international role of the Third World countries after the beginning of revolutions on the east of Europe.

The last attempt to prevent the complete collapse of the system, impending ethnic conflicts, and begin gradual transformation in Yugoslavia was made by Prime Minister Ante Markovic. Although in his inaugural address he mentioned building of a "new socialism" as target of his programme, it was obvious that this only served to calm down conservatives, while the true aim was radical transformation of the Yugoslav political, legal and economic system toward market economy and political pluralism. After his convincing appearances on the domestic and international

scene earned him Western support, in December 1989 he revealed his package of reforms, which partly contained measures aimed at slowing down hyperinflation, and partly measures aimed at long-term structural transformation of the Yugoslav constitutional and economic system. The initial results indicated qualified success - inflation was reduced, foreign-exchange reserves sharply increased to almost \$10 billion, liberalization of prices and some 80% of imports increased supply and destroyed monopolies on the Yugoslav market, during a year some 50,000 private enterprises were registered, foreign investment reached record high level compared with preceding 20 years, etc. In the foreign-policy field, Mr Markovic's government and federal parliament already since mid-1989 started sharp reversal "toward Europe" announcing his intention to make Yugoslavia a full member of the Council of Europe, EFTA, OECD and associated member of the European Community.

Social consequences of Mr Markovic's "shock therapy", dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and first multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia early in 1990 have substantially changed the entire political environment, leaving the federal government without political support. His belated and half-way attempt in 1990 to establish his own party - Alliance of Yugoslavia's Reformativ Forces - failed in the elections in four remaining Yugoslav republics in the second half of the year. First open attacks on Mr Markovic's reforms came from Serbia, which was particularly affected by them due to its "heavy" industrial structure. Seeing in Markovic's policy the competition to the League of Communists of Serbia (which in the meantime changed its name to the Socialist Party of Serbia) shortly before multi-party elections in this republic press in Serbia undertook fierce propaganda campaign against Ante Markovic. Not long afterwards, however, even greater challenges to federal government's authority came from other Yugoslav republics - Slovenia and afterwards Croatia and other Yugoslav republics according to their one-sided decisions ceased to pay customs and taxes into the federal budget. "Run on banks" and mass purchase of hard currency started in

Slovenia. Foreign currency was subsequently transferred to banks in neighboring Austria, so that the government, faced with rapidly declining foreign-currency reserves, had to stop free sale of foreign currency and thus de facto give up on internal convertibility of dinar. Faced with substantial deficit of the republican budget, at the end of December Serbia issued nearly \$1.7 billion without federal government's authorization. Escalating nationalism, inter-republican conflicts, trade wars and inability of the federal government to do anything have eroded the reputation of Ante Markovic, who until mid-1991 tried to preserve the main results of the reform by resorting to conservative monetary policy and extremely restrictive use of modest foreign currency reserves.

Disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, failure of Ante Markovic's reforms, loss of authority (and true power) of federal institutions and blockade of multi-party elections for the federal parliament by republics who became autonomous resulted in a situation where the Yugoslav Peoples' Army remained as the last federal institution. As long as the Yugoslav federal Presidency (eight-member organ consisting of representatives of all republics and provinces) seemed to perform normally, the army mainly remained outside political conflicts. However, when in May 1991 Serbia and Montenegro refused to consent to the election of the Croat Stjepan Mesic to the office of the President of the Presidency, the Army remained without political control. This has created a political "vacuum" which the army faced when after the proclamation of sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, it was ordered by the federal government to "reestablish legal order on the western borders of Yugoslavia.

This has set the scene for the Yugoslav tragedy and civil war that followed in subsequent months.

From Lenin to Self-Management and Back

Considering a broader perspective, one may conclude that the development of the Yugoslav model of "self-managed socialism"

followed the logic of development of all communist societies, showing undoubtedly the results and limits of this form of social organization. In this respect one may identify five main stages, which show that the Yugoslav model, in spite of its numerous specifics, in essence remained within the framework of the Leninist model of socialism.

First, in Yugoslavia as in other socialist countries people became gradually aware that this model has definitely exhausted its development potentials and became an unsurmountable obstacle which has to be removed in order to overcome growing structural crisis, and society become involved in contemporary civilization's processes. Compared with the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries, Yugoslavia was specific mainly in that it first faced this problem in the foreign-policy area, when it left the block of communist countries, which triggered the thirty-year long process of reforms. Only in late years of Tito's life and, in particular, after his death, the system definitely failed and this happened in the very moment when these processes have spread through all European communist countries.

Second, in Yugoslavia, as in other communist countries, the way out of the crisis has been sought in market economy and pluralistic democracy. Unlike other communist countries, who decided to undertake these changes motivated primarily by internal reasons, impetus for reforms in Yugoslavia came from abroad, i.e. from need of the country to adjust its internal development first to the strategic alliance with the US and Western Europe, and then to its new non-aligned policy. In this respect communist Yugoslavia, until the most recent wave of changes in Eastern Europe, has probably done the most.

Third, reforms in Yugoslavia between 1950 and 1980 proved that "repairs" i.e. half-way reforms of state socialism cannot change its structural flaws. In spite of numerous reforms the system remained essentially the same, burdened by all weaknesses faced over the past four decade by the Soviet Union, China and other communist societies.

Fourth, inconsistency of economic and political changes, which as a rule stopped when they disputed the system's main premise - unlimited power of the communist party - caused the crisis of reformative programmes and their ultimate abandonment. Even modest attempts of changes, after initial success, raised numerous problems which the communist system was unable to keep under control (inflation, mass bankruptcies, rising unemployment, excessive investments, increasing internal and foreign debt, loss of control over macro economic processes, accelerated widening of social and regional differences, growing opposition to regime, eruption of nationalism and separatism, etc.). This would trigger the chain reaction, because after micro economic reforms it was necessary to carry out macro economic reforms, and then legal and other reforms and ultimately raise the question of political changes, i.e. demolition of the monopoly of communist party's power. Progress of reforms inevitably eroded the system, while attempts to keep changes within its framework deprived market mechanism of its true meaning. In Yugoslavia this was unquestionably demonstrated by abandonment of reforms in mid-sixties and failure of reformative programmes of 1980s. In essence, the reason for failure of market and democratic oriented reforms was structural incompatibility of the communist and market-pluralistic forms of social organization.

Fifth, the crisis of the model and failure of attempt to transform it caused the final crisis of the entire system which in Yugoslavia as well as in other European communist countries fell apart by the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s. The entire history of reforms in these countries proved that the system cannot be changed but instead has to be replaced.

Collapse of the League of Communists and communist ideology in Yugoslavia did not, however, bring about the collapse of the system, which continued to exist with unchanged symbols in the form of numerous nationalisms. The whole system of political mobilization, indoctrination and collectivism, as well as most members of the former communist elite quickly adjusted to new conditions. Unwilling to undertake true changes, and in face of rising

economic crisis, social protests and increasing intellectual confusion, new political forces could maintain their position only by persistent escalation of ethnic animosities and political mobilization on national grounds, which inevitably led to open conflicts between nations. Thus in fact the former communist totalitarianism was replaced by the new national totalitarianism. However, Titoist ideology and vital political institutions were destroyed, as well as other mechanisms which kept together the "second Yugoslavia", releasing centrifugal forces which brought the country on the brink of total civil war.

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THE MILITARY AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

The military's general position and place in the crisis

The Yugoslav armed forces have played a visible and also important, un- or half-visible roles in the deep and painful crisis in the multinational state of "Southern Slavs".¹ The role of the federal standing "Yugoslav People's Army" (YPA) - the main component of the Armed Forces, became highly controversial. It has been praised by many in Yugoslavia's eastern part, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro, sharply criticized and condemned by many in the north-western part (Slovenia and Croatia) as well as among the large Albanian majority in Kosovo.²

Under the conditions of growing societal polarization along political, ideological, national, religious, regional, cultural and civilization lines, the Yugoslav professional military found themselves in a highly unpleasant predicament - "damned if you do, damned if you don't". Their leadership allowed YPA to be drawn into the struggle between opposing political forces, which

1. Its official name since 1930 - Yugoslavia - is partly a misnomer as it was forced also on a sizable non-Slavic population, excluded the South Slavic Bulgarians and included among the three "founding nations" the Slovenes, who are culturally closer to the Western than to the Southern Slavs.

2. Ethnical Albanians have the official status of a "nationality" (national minority) although they are at least four times more numerous than the smallest official Yugoslav "nation" - the "Montenegrins".

have been largely but not exclusively regionally and nationally-based. Equally unwisely and unlike most of their former or present East European "real-socialist" colleagues the Yugoslav professional military openly advocated a lost political option - reviving Bolshevik Marxism and re-establishing "true socialism", Yugoslav communist style. Inside Yugoslavia they actively championed re-establishing a centralized federation - a platform fully discredited in most non-Serbian areas.

The professional military have for decades publicly condemned internal nationalism and chauvinism in Yugoslavia. Many of them have been intimately unhappy about the wave of Serbian nationalism which brought Slobodan Milošević to power in the largest Yugoslav republic - Serbia and which he adroitly exploited. The second point of divergence concerned the attitude toward the late dictator, President and Marshal Tito. While the late Commander-in-Chief continues to be YPA's official saint, S.Milošević allowed sharp public attacks against Tito's cult in his regime's press and derived part of his popularity with the Serbian public from these attacks. This position was closely related to the ambivalence toward Yugoslavia. In his pronouncements S.Milošević vacillated between advocating the preservation of Yugoslavia (on Serbian terms, of course) and the creation of "Great Serbia". This ambivalence did not sit well with YPA's official all-Yugoslav ethos.

Yet the military leadership politically aligned itself with this communist and populist regional baron, viewed by many, also among YPA officers, as the greatest individual menace to Yugoslavia's survival within its post-1945 borders. The political alliance with S.Milošević has been based on ideological closeness,³

3. N.B. Dr.Mira Marković (Mrs.Slobodan Milošević) became the chief ideologist of the YPA-sponsored communist party and a member of its executive committee.

national-cultural affinity with over three quarters of Yugoslav professional officers and NCOs, as well as on converging economic and institutional interests. Its main objective has been to preserve as much as possible the existing federal institutions and large federal budgets. These have served as one of the biggest sources of employment and income for the Serbs and "Montenegrins" (who together constitute over 80 percent of all federal employees) and for Serbia. YPA is by far the single largest and the most expensive federal institution, with its headquarters, like all other federal institutions, located in the Serbian and federal capital Belgrade. The Yugoslav military-industrial complex has, since 1919, served as the most important instrument for transferring large sums of public funds from the more developed northwest to the east, south-east and center of Yugoslavia. During the last decade appropriations for YPA, expressed in percentage of net social product and of the total federal budget, has been sliding down from about seven and 70 percent to about four and 50 percent respectively. In US dollar equivalent it oscillated between 2.2 and 2.9 billion, due to high inflation and unstable exchange rates.

Since the foundation of the "people's democratic" Yugoslavia in 1945 the YPA has constituted the strongest pillar of Tito's authoritarian one-party rule. Unlike, for example, in the neighboring Romania, the Yugoslav army and the military institutions of repression (security service, prosecutors, courts, jails and even concentration camps) were more important for establishing and maintaining Tito's regime than corresponding civilian institutions. In its internal life YPA truly reflected the basic features of the regime and its strategy of integrating the multinational conglomerate - Tito's personality cult, monopoly of power in the hands of the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" (LCY), by origin an alien supra-national ideology of Marxism-Leninism, centralist authoritarian political system behind the

facade of a quasi-federation (copied from USSR), the goals of creating a "new socialist man" through pervasive indoctrination and a new Yugoslavia through melting in the future all her nations and ethnic groups into a single "Yugoslav nation".

When Tito's Yugoslavia started visibly disintegrating in the decade following his death in 1980, the Yugoslav professional military strenuously endeavored to stop and even to reverse this trend. These efforts were predicated largely, although not exclusively, by the military's corporate interests, covered by and partly mixed with sincere and altruistic concerns for Yugoslavia's survival in one piece. The military have had the obvious and, in a way, understandable desire to preserve: the institution itself (YPA); its privileged access to federal treasury (as it used to be under Tito); its wide internal autonomy; its system of extensive political surveillance over the entire state; the absence of effective oversight by any civilian institution; its far-ranging control over the Yugoslav military-industrial complex; YPA's internal political-ideological set-up and centralist unitarian orientation etc. All these desires coincided to a large extent with the interests and preferences of the Serbian leadership under S.Milošević. The presence in Serbia of most central military institutions and of YPA elite units (for example, the Guards, the Paratroop Brigade in Niš, the main Air Force bases with the most advanced aircraft in Yugoslav inventories - MIG 29s etc.), of the largest factories for producing arms and military equipment etc. - provided for extensive common interests in preserving the essentials of the Titoist "real-socialist" system. These have been the dominance of so-called "social" (in fact state) property, rule by the communist party (renamed into the Serbian Socialist Party), extensive state controls and interventions in economy, ruling party's exclusive control over the mass media etc.

Although S.Milošević's Serbia has been, in many respects, YPA's natural ally in assuring its survival, this liaison further undermined the YPA's standing in many parts of Yugoslavia - notably in Kosovo, Slovenia, in most of Croatia, in several areas inhabited by Moslems and in Macedonia. The federal defense minister General Veljko Kadijević's public endorsing of the Serbian and Montenegrin communists (prior and between two rounds of elections in December 1990) and his conspicuous greetings to the two elected communist presidents of republics (with no greetings to others) has exacerbated hostility toward YPA as institution among many, mostly non-communist parties, including even those in Serbia. And non-communist parties were successful or victorious in four Yugoslav republics out of six.

By taking such a controversial and highly obtrusive political stance as well as by inflexibly refusing to contemplate thoroughgoing reforms of the federal army, in line with momentous changes in society, the YPA leadership gravely endangered the YPA's very existence as an all-Yugoslav institution. Comparisons between the fates of YPA, of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1917-1918 (along national lines) and of the East German Nationale Volksarmee in 1989-1990 (along political-ideological lines) have ceased to be far-fetched. After the dramatic changes in Albania (spring-summer 1991) and in the Soviet Union (August-September 1991) the Yugoslav military establishment remained practically the last bastion of Bolshevism on the European continent.

The Yugoslav Federal Armed Forces

Ranked in 1948 as the third largest regular land force on the European continent, YPA today, 42 years later, represents only a medium-small size conventional standing army. Its total uniformed manpower (around 220.000 at Tito's death) has continued shrinking toward the level of around 170.000, which it would have reached

by 1992. This reduction occurred mostly for the lack of funds, thanks to neo-detente and, from 1991 on, also due to reduced intakes of conscripts from the north-west. From March 7, 1991 Slovenia stopped altogether sending recruits to YPA, with exceptions of volunteers. By September 1 practically all Slovenes left, were dismissed or retired from YPA. The total number of Croats has also significantly diminished through desertions and dismissals. Loud public demands to reduce or suspend recruitment, to stop sending recruits to conflict areas and outside one's own republic developed in Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The number of deserters from among the ethnic Albanians and Bosnian Moslems has also increased. After the mini-war in Slovenia (June 26-July 4, 1991) YPA more than made up for its losses by retaining many recruits and by mobilizing reservists, mostly the Serbs. With these intakes YPA's total manpower by September 1, 1991 probably approached the level of 230.000, with a very appreciably changed and more homogeneous national composition. On the other hand YPA ceased to be the only army on the territory of Yugoslavia.

YPA consists of three main arms, the Land Forces (and in them the Infantry) constituting by far the largest and, for prospective cadets, the least attractive component. Geographic division of the state into YPA's military districts used for many years to largely coincide with boundaries between federal units (six republics, two autonomous provinces). Some YPA's practices (e.g. appointments of MD commandants) were geared to Yugoslavia's federal structure. The centralist backlash under the previous Defense Minister Admiral B. Mamula led in 1988-1989 to YPA's reorganization into the present three continental (1st, 3rd and 5th) and one maritime area or war-theater ("TVD"-like) commands.⁴ YPA

4. This new territorial division was internally justified in purely military terms, inspite of strong indications of largely political motivation. The federal parliament and the public were not even informed about the reorganization. Its later critics

also repealed practically all concessions to territorial (regional) assignments and posting, except in its reserve units (around 500.000 strong in early 1991).

Yugoslavia being more than self-sufficient in production of most small arms and of standard ammunition, the federal army has been armed with the domestically-produced family of light weapons mostly based on Soviet licences (Kalashnikovs, portable anti-armor rockets etc.) or developed from older German weapons. Some arms and equipment are of domestic design and production (light guns, armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers etc.). Yugoslav defense industry has produced also some training and combat aircraft (Galeb, Orao), missile boats, diesel submarines, etc., combining typically domestic frames and hardware with crucial imported Western (jet engines, electronics, avionics etc.), Eastern or Eastern-licensed components (e.g. missiles).

However the main systems of (obviously only conventional) heavy weapons have been either straightforward imports from USSR, Soviet-licensed imports from former WTO members (Poland and CSSR-ČSFR) or mostly or totally domestically produced weapons based on Soviet licences - tanks M-54/-55, T-72, M-84 (an improved version of T-72), PT-76, heavy guns, frigates Split and Kotor (improved Soviet Koni), missile and torpedo craft, most missiles in all three arms, aircraft MIG-21s and MIG-29s, helicopters Mi-8 and Ka-25 etc. The degree of YPA's technological dependence on Soviet weaponry and of the Yugoslav military-industrial complex on its Soviet counterpart has been by far the highest among the European non-bloc states. Moreover the Yugoslav military has had a better access to the newest generations of Soviet weapons than most WTO armies. Yugoslavia thus obtained T-72s and MIG-29s earlier than

noticed considerable coincidence between the area of the 1st and 3rd MD and territorial claims by Serbian nationalists expressed in a memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science (1986).

her WTO neighbors. Early deliveries, lower prices than in the West, payments through barter trade and the access to Soviet military academies have been used by the Soviets to preserve the connection. The relationships with the Yugoslav professional military (where some Rusophile sentiments and ideological similarity survived the period of Soviet-Yugoslav hostility in 1948-54) and with the Yugoslav military-industrial complex remain one of the few sources of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.

JPA has had in its armories a large and in some categories (such as main battle tanks and combat aircraft) excessively large holdings of relatively or plainly obsolete heavy weapons. The maintenance of this bulky and costly arsenal has exceeded Yugoslavia's economic power. Severe economic and budgetary difficulties led i.a. to reductions in exercises and to de facto lowering of training standards. The military leadership's over-ambitious and unrealistic attempt to resolve several very difficult technological, financial and employment problems by expansive and highly risky launching domestic production of a multi-purpose jet (Novi avion) fell through due to the lack of funds and to resistance among civilian elites. The combat value of the Yugoslav military arsenal has been considerably reduced by very low computerization of C³ and still more by growing political and national tensions in the federal state.

The official Armed Forces of Yugoslavia draw their origin from the "Partisan Detachments and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia". The Partisan Detachments were established under Josip Broz's, alias Tito's leadership in 1941, on the territory of the then defeated and dismembered Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The official "Day of the Armed Forces" is December 22 - the day in 1941 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is said to have formed the "First Proletarian Brigade" (in fact the brigade was established on December 21 - Joseph Stalin's

birthday). The unit was intended to and indeed served as the model for other Partisan units and since 1944 for the entire "Yugoslav Army" (renamed in 1952 into the "Yugoslav People's Army"). It emulated the Soviet Red Army - used red stars and red banners as symbols; strived to become Marxist-Leninist and indeed became anti-pluralist in spirit, atheist and closely intertwined with the Communist Party (through a system of political officers and party cells down to platoons); was plebeian by social origin of its personnel, all-Yugoslav in its national composition (but with Serbian as the only language of command and administration), and practiced extraterritorial enlistment and posting. Most officers and NCOs in that brigade were in fact Serbs and "Montenegrins" by national origin.

Many of these characteristics have remained intact to-day, as Marshal Tito during more than four decades of his rule, took particular care to conserve and insulate "his army" not only from nationalist but also liberal (and in his views corrupting) influences emanating from civilian society and the "bourgeois West". The percentage of communist party members among YPA officers was high already in 1945 and 45 years later stood at over 96 percent. The federal army has represented for decades the largest agency for recruiting new party members (from among conscripts and cadets) and for regularized and organized political indoctrination of the Yugoslav male population on behalf of LCY.

"The Organization of LCY in YPA", over 100.000 strong, used to enjoy a fully autonomous status within the ruling party and in fact became a communist military sub-party with an ideology and some practices distinct from its other (civilian) parts. Unlike in other "socialist" East European states the ruling communist party (and civilian political police) has lost since the early 1950s its institutionalized civilian control over the professional military. Moreover the LCY central bodies have been used

by professional military personnel ("seconded" to work in the party) to oversee key civilian institutions and to protect in them the military's own corporate interests. Tito's personal control over YPA's high command could not substitute for the LCY's institutional loss. Consequently behind the facade of his dictatorial rule (particularly pronounced in the military sphere) the Yugoslav professional military have obtained an autonomous and privileged position in the state. This autonomy has grown since his death and continued to-day.

The symbiotic relationship between the ruling party and the army as well as the results of several decades of intensive indoctrination in the ranks had potent consequences when Tito's one-party system started crumbling. The YPA leadership first stonewalled and then openly criticized the trends of de-Titoisation, liberalization and pluralization in Yugoslav politics, on the grounds that they ushered the restoration of capitalism and interethnic strife. It quite rightly perceived that the undoing of the Titoist order would bring in its wing desintegration of Yugoslavia and dismantling of YPA - at the least, the way both were set up in 1944-1945. However till to-day the Yugoslav military refuse to admit that the seeds of instability and self-destruction were in the very political and ideological foundations of the Titoist order (which they still largely espouse) and that Yugoslavia's long-term stability could have been achieved only on a different, pluralist democratic basis.

The Yugoslav military have claimed and partly pretended their own non-intervention in the state's political life. Since mid-1980s they made many pronouncements in favor of "true democracy" and pledged support to all "peaceful, democratic and constitutional changes". Yet they have actively, though mostly verbally, resisted the processes of pluralization and democratization in

Yugoslavia. Till the very end of one-party rule, YPA (through its LCY organization) kept refusing to come to terms with political pluralism and free multiparty elections.

The Yugoslav military's political culture was well reflected in an official document presented by the defense ministry to the SFRY Assembly in spring 1989. The perfectly legal opinions and public proposals for: reducing defense budgets; reforming the military-industrial complex; revising arms production and arms exports policies; reorganizing the defense system; setting up again, disbanded in 1945 regionally and nationally-based military units, with their own languages of command; changing YPA's language policy; decriminalization of conscientious objection; YPA's depolitization; allowing the military personnel's participation in religious services etc. were branded by it as seditious attacks against YPA and Yugoslavia. YPA demanded prevention and suppression of such public proposals, as the military's corporate interests were equated with Yugoslavia's survival.²

The political and ideological polarization in Yugoslavia has acquired to a great extent national and cultural coloration. Due to Yugoslavia's heterogeneity and varying exposure to Western liberal political influences the process of political pluralization has proceeded unevenly, progressing geographically largely from north-west toward the south-east. In the north-west of Yugoslavia it coalesced also with anti-Belgrade sentiments, fueled by some national/language and economic grievances. The process of democratization has indeed destabilized the federal state, the old constitutional order and aggravated YPA's relations with two of the three "founding nations" of Yugoslavia (first with the Slovenes and then the Croats). It also con-

S. Zvezni izvršni svet "Informacija: bistvo, viri in ocene napadov na koncepcijo splošne ljudske obrambe in zlasti na JLA", št. 8-1/890083, Beograd, 16. 3. 1989.

tributed to spoiling the relations between these two nations and the Serbs.

Yugoslavia is one of rare states with legal provisions for a balanced regional recruitment into professional military ranks and unique in having this principle elevated to a constitutional obligation of the Armed Forces;

"As regards the composition of the officer corps and the promotion to senior commanding and directing posts in the Yugoslav People's Army, the principle of the most proportional representation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces shall be applied" (Article 242, Federal Constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia, 1974).

The YPA is thus mandated to come as close to proportional composition (and not representation) as possible, primarily in its upper (general rank) echelons. In Yugoslavia the proportionality by republics and provinces considerably differs from proportional composition by national origin (e.g. the largest Yugoslav nation - the Serbs live in significant numbers in three republics and two autonomous provinces). In practice this rule has been only very imperfectly applied to the recognized "Yugoslav" Slavic nations only, with preferential treatment given to only nominal "nationals", to officers of mixed origin, to cross-nationally married etc. Even in this form it has been subject of continuous internal criticism coming from the largest overrepresented group on the ground that the rules of promotion into general ranks favor officers from underrepresented nations and violate the principle of citizens' equality.

Due to biased personnel policies, and also to objective circumstances - very uneven levels of economic development, large differentials between regions in prevailing prices and wages,

very uneven rates of unemployment, uneven public prestige of military occupations (the highest being in Serbia and Montenegro) etc. - the Yugoslav military has only partly implemented the above-mentioned constitutional provision, inspite of some efforts and expense. The least skewed composition has been maintained in the (greatly inflated) general ranks, while in officer and still more so in NCO ranks the Serbs, "Montenegrins" and the "Yugoslavs" (usually nationally mixed, mostly Serbian speakers) have been overrepresented in various degrees.

Among active YPA generals in 1990 these three groups counted together represented in 1990 around 70 percent (or 103), among colonels 81 percent (the Serbs with the very akin Montenegrins 76 percent), among lieutenant-colonels 77 percent etc.⁶

Underrepresented in the entire military professional corps have been the Croats, Slovenes, non-Slavic "nationalities" (national minorities) of ethnical Albanians, Hungarians and Romanians as well as the Gypsies (Roms) and the Vlachs, officially still unrecognized even as "nationalities". This distribution could be seen from the following table:

6. These percentages and figures were calculated by Lt-Col. Teodor Geršak, Rt. and published in "Nacionalna struktura poklicnega starešinskega kadra JLA" and "Kdo drži v rokah jugoslovansko armado", Obramba (Ljubljana), no.4, 1991, pp.56-59 and no.6/7, 1991, pp.48-50). They were based on the data published by Dr. Slaven Letica in the Zagreb weekly Danas, no.468, February 5, 1991, and probably stemming from a secret federal document. These figures were largely confirmed by the otherwise partial and manipulated statistics published by the Belgrade daily Politika on April 16, 1991. According to the daily their source was the federal defense ministry.

TABLE 1: NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE YUGOSLAV POPULATION (1981),
PROFESSIONAL OFFICER AND NCO CORPS (1981) AND OF
RECRUITS (1989)

Nations and "nationalities"	% in popu- lation (a)	% in prof. mil. (b)	(b) as % of (a)	% among recruits
- "Montenegrins"	2,5	6,2	248	2,48
- Croats	22,1	12,6	57	18,52
- Macedonians	5,8	6,3	108	6,11
- Muslims	8,4	2,4	28	12
- Slovenes	8,2	2,8	34	7
- Serbs	39,7	60,0	151	31
- Albanians	6,4	0,6	9	9
- Hungarians	2,3	0,7	30	1
- Nationally undecided				
"Yugoslavs"	1,3	6,7	515	7
- others	3,3	1,6	48	6

Sources: Podružbljanje varnosti in obrambe, 1983-84, RK
ZSMS: Ljubljana, p.18; Response by the Federal Execu-
tive Council in the SFRY Assembly on February 2, 1990.
N.B. Discrepancies between columns 1 and 4 are probably
due to differences in procedures of reporting between
civilian statistical offices and YPA, as well as to
demographic and administrative changes between 1981 and
1989.

Following the old Soviet practice YPA publishes almost no mean-
ingful statistical data on itself, including the data on its
professional corps. (The pre-war Yugoslav Royal Army was more
open on this score.) It seems that YPA's national composition
since 1981 has become even more imbalanced in favor of the Serbs
- "Montenegrins", in part due to economic reasons and to the
YPA's policies, which alienated considerable body of public
opinion in the three main underrepresented areas (Kosovo,
Slovenia, Croatia). During and following the hostilities in
Slovenia and Croatia in summer 1991 YPA's national composition

has become less heterogenous and considerably more Serbian-dominated. Practically all Slovenian recruits fled, left or were demobilized, while most professionals-Slovenes resigned or were retired. The fall-out of Croats was smaller but still noticeable. In spite of these imperfections the Yugoslav professional military have for long positively contrasted with the armies in all neighboring Balkan states (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania), which practice openly assimilationist and discriminatory policies toward national minorities.

Article 243 of the Federal Constitution stipulates that "the equality of languages and alphabets of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia shall be insured in the Armed Forces... In matters of command and military training in YPA, one of the languages of the nations of Yugoslavia may be used, and in parts of the country- the languages of the nations and nationalities". However in practice YPA has for decades grossly violated the principle of equality of the languages and alphabets. The exceptional allowance was transformed into the rule, as the Serbian language was made the only YPA language, not only for command and training but for entire system of administration, education, for communication within YPA as well as between YPA, civilian authorities, mass media and other subjects. The only concession to the Catholic north-west has been in the uniform application by YPA of Latin script (this however has violated the equality of the Cyrillic alphabet, used by three groups - Serbs, Macedonians and "Montenegrins"). The YPA command prevented the use of languages other than Serbian even in nationally homogenous or almost homogenous units with different mother tongues (in YPA Reserve). It has angrily rejected in principle all proposals to allow the formation of active nationally homogenous units, even where it would make sense in terms of group cohesion and military efficiency (e.g. Alpine and some naval units). Criticisms and protests against the unitarist and assimilationist language prac-

tice have for decades been stigmatized as "nationalist" and suppressed.

The YPA language policy has been closely related to the system of extra-territorial recruitment and posting, as well as to its practice in promotion to higher ranks. The entire system was designed to weaken and, if possible, to uproot national and regional identity and to cultivate presumably supranational "all - Yugoslav" orientation among the military personnel. For this purpose the mandated regional quotas have been in fact manipulated with. Extra-territorial posting, national uprooting and official communication exclusively in Serbian language have led to frequent and, at least, partial assimilation, mostly into a "Serboslav" culture.

Many non-Serbs quietly tolerated language discrimination in YPA as long as the Titoist system and its judicial repression of "oral delicts" lasted. Changes in political climate as well as the air of political and national emancipation from 1981 on, led to mounting public criticisms of YPA, particularly sharp in Slovenia. The top brass has long ignored or rejected them and only from 1988 made several minor, mostly cosmetic concessions (small signs on barracks, in addition to large signs in Serbian, the written text of the soldier's oath in four languages Slovenian and Macedonian editions of YPA's weekly Narodna Armija - for propaganda purposes, etc.). It has continued to reject many demands consistent with the federal constitution - taking the oral oath in one's own language, translating signs and regulations inside YPA into other Yugoslav languages etc. This inflexibility gave additional fuel to grievances against the federal authorities and contributed to further desintegration of Yugoslavia.

In summer 1989 the military committed a major political blunder.

They staged in Ljubljana a clearly politically motivated process against three journalists from a Slovenian youth opposition journal Mladina, particularly critical of YPA, and one professional NCO, a Slovene. In spite of unusually wide and sharp public protests, demonstrations and many unpublicized and well-intended petitions, the military pointedly staged the trial in the middle of Slovenia in Serbian language. This act of arrogance and of national humiliation utterly discredited and isolated YPA in that republic and significantly contributed to sharpening tensions between the Slovenes and the Serbs (as all Serbian mass media took YPA's side). Since that event occasional signs on walls and public cries about YPA as "occupation army" started appearing in Slovenia. The main culprit at the Ljubljana trial, sentenced to jail, was J. Jansa. YPA's unfair persecution of her public critic made of him a local hero, brought him to the Slovenian parliament and to the present position of minister of defense. This capable opponent played a key role in defeating YPA's armed intervention in Slovenia in summer 1991.

One of the controversial questions in difficult relations between the YPA leadership and the two north-western republics (formerly parts of Austro-Hungary) concerned the double structure of the Yugoslav Armed Forces and the existence of the Armed Force's second component, similar to the former Austro-Hungarian Landwehr/Honved and called the Territorial Defense (TD).

The excessive scare caused by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 brought Marshal Tito to abolish YPA's 23-year old monopoly and to agree to establishing TD. Unlike YPA, this mostly lightly-armed militia force was based in six republics and two autonomous provinces. It has been organized and financed by them and has used corresponding national languages for command and in administration. There has been no General Staff of TD, while the TD commandants in republics and provinces

used to be appointed by the C-140 (President Tito and since 1980 the SFRY Praesidium-collective presidency) with each republic's consent. Commanding TD generals were often by origin from the republic in question, but after many tours of duty elsewhere and thoroughly "Yugoslavized". The total TD manpower has been about four to five times larger than that of the active YPA, while the sum total of its yearly funding has been about 12 times lower. TD in many respects depended on YPA's schools, logistics etc. and used to buy from it older weapons. Many TD professionals were YPA officers (active "on loan" or retired).

The YPA leadership ever since 1969 did its best to maintain this very uneven relationship and effectively (if not formally) to monitor or control TD. Its assistance in personnel led to the situation where active and retired YPA generals filled all the posts of TD commandants, chiefs of staff etc. The TD HQs have been staffed with many YPA officers and confidants. YPA has showed particular interest in having its reliable officers as heads of TD intelligence and security services. In the mid-1980s, under Admiral B. Mamula, it succeeded in institutionally almost submitting TD to itself through redesignating the YPA General Staff into the General Staff of the Armed Forces and changing the rules of subordination in emergency and war time. These fundamental changes, inconsistent with the federal constitution, were effected by the YPA command without even informing the parliament, let alone having its consent.

YPA and the current political scene

No wonder that political and national tensions in the federal state negatively affected also the relationship between the two components of the Armed Forces and between the federal standing army and the police in, at least, two republics. In spite of the military leadership's strenuous efforts, tensions between na-

tional groups started also spilling over into YPA's ranks.

As desintegration of the Titoist system dramatically accelerated in the late 1989-early 1990 the military leadership tried to exploit the period of confusion, caused by transition from a single-party to a multi-party system. It wanted to achieve its long-sought institutional goal-to prevent the appearance of any conceivable rival forces, or to assimilate the already existing ones (by making of them auxiliary components of YPA). The top brass has continued this drive well into spring 1991, exploiting the weakness and the distinct centralist orientation of the Federal Executive Council (cabinet) led by A.Markovic, as well as being supported by the strong pro-military lobby in most civilian federal institutions. These institutions, notably the federal presidency and the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly, have continued to be dominated quantitatively by Serbian communists ("socialists") and their close allies.

The goal of fully submitting TD was already earlier at hand in most republics, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro (in Kosovo TD was in fact dismantled after the Albanian national unrest in 1981). In spring 1990 the YPA leadership moved to accomplish its strategic goal also in Slovenia and Croatia. It apparently wanted to preempt the expected victory of nationalist, non-communist and anti-communist parties and to deprive them of possibly their own armed force. This preemptive mini-coup was to be carried out in secret between April 17 and May 15, 1990. According to then President of the federal presidency Dr.Janez Drnovšek, even this collective C-i-C was not properly informed, let alone authorized the move. The federal parliament and the governments in the republics and provinces (otherwise responsible for organizing and maintaining TD) were to be kept strictly in the dark. The action consisted of YPA's secretly prescribing TD a new doctrine (which contained clearly unconstitutional elements) and of disarming to

the full the entire TD (by transferring all weapons from separate TD armories to YPA armories, under the pretext of preventing possible thefts, and locking them up). Both measures were carried out to the full in Croatia. It was due to previous heavy infiltration by YPA, to a high percentage of the Serbs in the Croatian TD command positions, and to the new non-communist Croatian government's unwisely weak response. As a result, Croatia was deprived of over 200,000 light weapons, paid for and rightfully belonging to her. The Slovenian President M. Kučan learned about the disarming action from a lower TD commandant when the sweep was already carried out in a half of Slovenian units. It affected allegedly about 40,000 weapons. He immediately ordered it stopped.

The disarming of possible rival forces has been justified by the desire to prevent a civil war. The YPA command however undermined the credibility of this claim by its abetting, very partial and supportive attitude toward the armed Serbian rebels in the Knin area in Croatia. The same applies to YPA's many-sided assistance to the Serbian police, whose persecution of the Albanian community in Kosovo came on many occasions very close to provoking bloody interethnic clashes. If carried through to the full the disarming would have allowed the centralist political bloc in Yugoslavia to blackmail Slovenia and Croatia into submission and into consenting to a recentralized federal state, dominated again by the Serbian bureaucracy and by the military-industrial complex. This and other moves, including sharp public attacks by high YPA representatives against the newly and democratically elected governments, embroiled YPA as active party in the ever sharper confrontation between the mostly non-communist leaderships in the two northwestern republics, who advocated then a confederalist solution for Yugoslavia, and the centralist bloc headed by Serbia. In this confrontation the positions of the two blocs radicalized and so did the methods used.

Enjoying full support in practically all federal civilian institutions, the YPA command clashed first with the government in the smaller Slovenia (May-October 1990). At stake was effective YPA's control over the Slovenian TD and over all recruitment matters. Following the attempt of TD disarming, the Slovenian government demanded that the TD commandant (an Air Force loyalist general of Slovenian origin) be dismissed and all confiscated weapons returned. When the federal presidency and the YPA command refused, Slovenia enacted several additional constitutional amendments, took over full peace-time control and command over its TD, appointed a new acting TD commandant (a Major), obliged the previous commandant to vacate the TD Staff building and refused to send Slovenian recruits to YPA garrisons outside Slovenia and Croatia. The latter move heeded loud public demands to stop supporting Serbia's repressive colonialist policy in Kosovo.

Slovenia also partly compensated for the lost TD weapons by imports, mostly from the West and Singapore. Particularly valuable proved to be imported portable anti-armor and anti-aircraft rockets, for instance, the Armbrusts. Due to high national homogeneity and to the consensus over Slovenia's sovereignty (in a radically revamped confederate Yugoslavia or, if not, as an independent state) the Slovenian government, in a confrontation with YPA could rely on both its TD and police. Soon TD, about 75.000 strong, became the base for the new regular Slovenian army in the making.⁷ Legislation enacted in March 1991 provided for national service to be performed in Slovenia's TD and its police force instead of YPA. The duration of national service was twelve unilaterally reduced from to seven months. The federal army was asked to vacate by September 1, 1991 a third of all its installations in Slovenia. Slovenia's proposed contribution to financing

7. TD lahko brani Slovenijo, Delo, March 25, 1991, p.2; Slovenska vojska, Mladina, March 26, 1991, pp.10-14.

YPA in 1991 was reduced by about two thirds, bringing it down to Slovenia's share in Yugoslavia's population and not, as earlier, in GNP. In May 1991 the Slovenian government tabled an official proposal on a division of the federal military property and on YPA's gradually thinning presence in Slovenia (to last until January 1, 1994). In mid-May 1991 the Slovenian TD started, on a trial basis, to train the first contingent of recruits. This development sparked a local non-shooting confrontation with a group of YPA tanks and armored vehicles as well as the arrest of a regional TD commandant by the YPA military police. The incident in Maribor foreshadowed a much larger armed conflict between the same actors only six weeks later.

Although two and a half times more populous than Slovenia, Croatia's position in some respects has been appreciably weaker. Its government was forced, from summer 1990, to deal with an armed Serbian uprising in the Knin area, with local Serbian secessionism and with armed infiltration from Serbia proper also in several other areas in Croatia. Faced with these challenges and YPA's hostility, the Croatian regime could rely neither on its disarmed TD nor on a good part of its regular police (traditionally to a high percentage traditionally manned by the Serbs from Croatia). Consequently it embarked on speedily beefing up Croatian special (para-military) and reserve police units.

As YPA blocked several Croatian requests for speedy purchasing domestic light arms, Croatia turned to the Hungarian government. In spite of Belgrade's strenuous protests in Budapest, Croatia imported, bypassing federal customs, allegedly between eleven and 30 thousand Kalashnikov assault rifles and handguns as well as a considerable quantity of corresponding ammunition. These Soviet-made weapons are said to have been bought by Hungary from the stocks of the East German NVA and then resold to the Croats. The weapons were given to the Croatian reserve police and, according

to YPA's accusations, were also illegally distributed to many activists of the Croatian ruling party (HDZ). The Croatian government denied any significant illegal arming in the Croatian community. The truth has been probably between the two conflicting claims.

YPA's pressure against illegal arms proliferation has been in fact directed against the Croatian police from which a regular Croatian army was developing. In April 1991 the special paramilitary (commando) units were separated from the police, renamed the "National Guards" and subordinated to the Croatian ministry of defense. The Croatian government's plan was allegedly to have in its new army by 1991-1992 about 20.000 soldiers, 200 tanks, 116 aircraft, two frigates etc. Moreover, Croatia like Slovenia, developed its own small military intelligence service to monitor YPA's activities, while the YPA security service infiltrated several local branches of HDZ and stepped up its illicit surveillance of the new Croatian government.

YPA's moves and Croatian counter-moves led to conflicts between officials and agents on the local level and to growing mutual suspicions and tensions. These in turn fueled the next round in the ascending spiral of the Yugoslav crisis. At almost every turn of this spiral one found YPA's actions or threats as a cause, important catalyst or a pretext. Often, but not always these consequences probably run against the subjective desires of the military.

Once it became clear that S. Milošević and his party were heading toward to a victory in the Serbian elections in December 1990, the top Yugoslav brass made an ostensible concession to political pluralism in Yugoslavia. Around January 1, 1991 the "LCY or-

8. Bela roka. Kako nastaje hrvaška armada, Mladina, March 26, 1991, p.15.

ganization in YPA" was officially disbanded and activities of all political parties officially banned in YPA. However this delayed response to the insistent Croatian and Slovenian demands for YPA's depolitization was in fact faked departization with no depolitization. Official communist symbols and political organs in YPA, with the same party workers, were retained. The professional military personnel was advised to join the newly founded "League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia" (LC-MY) as individual members outside the barracks. The YPA command more than actively supported the initiative and ostentatiously attended the founding convention the new party. YPA political officers were allowed, to put it mildly, to actively work for LC-MY during office hours while Col.Gen.Stevan Mirkovic, Ret. became its de facto head. In a secret circular in late January 1991, produced by the YPA Political Department, the federal army's political platform was stated in terms identical with those of the LC-MY program. The existence of this communist party was said to be necessary "to secure YPA's unity and internal cohesion". The most important among YPA's "urgent tasks" was to reestablish "socialism" in Yugoslavia and to assure that by summer 1991 LC-MY becomes "the leading political force in Yugoslavia". This effectively meant unseating the present democratically elected governments in three or four republics, most importantly in Croatia and Slovenia. The circular demanded that all professional personnel actively engage themselves in attaining these political goals in society at large and propagate them, particularly among the young. The military security was charged with protecting LC-MY from hostile infiltration. Amendments to the national defense law, tabled in February 1991 by the defense ministry and passed in May 1991, allowed furthermore activities in the Armed Forces by "a party" during emergencies and in war. It is not hard to imagine which party had the military in mind. The party "ban" was

9. Delo, January 3., 1991, p.3.

thus clearly intended for all parties other than LC-MY.

Simultaneously with its support to the Serbian "socialists", the YPA leadership prepared several moves to politically discredit the Croatian government and to obtain or provide the pretext for toppling it. An order signed by the SFRY Praesidium to disarm illegal paramilitary formations was prepared by the military already in October 1990 but its enactment was delayed, for tactical reasons until January 9, 1991. One of its intentionally imprecise provisions authorized YPA to assume directly protection of human rights throughout the state (surely above the police and thus introducing under a civilian cover a kind of military rule). When the Croatian government rejected the order's applicability to its reserve police, YPA tried to exert on it military pressure by putting army units in Croatia and Slovenia on the highest state of alert and by moving around heavy weapons. Furthermore YPA publicly threatened to disarm the Croatian formations by force. A bloody clash between the two opposing forces was barely avoided around January 26, 1991 and a temporary, uneasy truce was introduced as a compromise measure. However tensions have continued and intensified. Local inter-ethnic violence and clashes between the Serbian rebels in Croatia and the Croatian police gave YPA a pretext for its expanded deployment outside the barracks and for armed interference in at least a third of Croatia's territory.

Coordinated with the dead-line for disarming "para-military units", YPA launched in February 1991 a highly irregular and unusually vitriolic propaganda campaign against the Croatian minister of defense Col. Gen. M. Spagelj, Ret., former commandant of the Zagreb MD. Exposing its own extensive system of illegal wiretapping, of surveillance over all important civilian institutions in the federal state, the wide use of agents-provocateurs and sacrificing several of them (one committed suicide) YPA presented through the Serbian mass media and its own press a

propaganda film and a collection of damaging documents.¹⁰ The film and the documents were designed to implicate Gen.M. Špegelj, also the Croatian minister of interior and indirectly the Croatian President F. Tudjman, in numerous criminal activities. These notably included preparations for an armed rebellion, for terrorism against the YPA personnel and for atrocities in the Virovitica area. YPA's accusations were used by the Serbian government and its propaganda machine to try to justify imposing emergency measures in Croatia and direct federal rule through the military, including the prohibition of HDZ (demanded by a Serbian-led majority in the Federal Chamber).

Soon after the flare-up of tensions on January 25-26, 1991 a military prosecutor in Zagreb formally charged Gen.M.Špegelj and issued a warrant for his arrest by the military police (which already apprehended a dozen local civilian officials). Croatian authorities responded by physically protecting him, while the Diet (Sabor) granted all Croatian ministers immunity from prosecution. General Špegelj's trial in absentia in April provoked numerous protests and also disorders in Zagreb and Split. This clash between YPA and Croatia highlighted the simultaneous existence in Yugoslavia of several conflicting legal orders, which obviously placed YPA into a delicate position. YPA's leaders pointedly declared several times that they were bound to act according to the federal constitution and federal laws alone. These proclamations were made every time in response to Slovenia's and Croatia's unilateral acts of growing legal emancipation from federal tutelage and control. But when Serbia grossly violated the federal constitution, stripped Province of Kosovo of its autonomy, disbanded Kosovo's legal institutions, adopted a clearly confederalist constitution and made Serbia's

10. For example, a full issue of the military's own journal Narodna armija, on 66 printed pages, was devoted to denouncing HDZ (no.2694, February 28, 1991)

President Commander-in-Chief of her armed forces (in clear violation of the Federal constitution) YPA kept silent or clearly supported it (in Kosovo). The same applies to YPA's quiet but effective protection of secessionist rebels in the so-called "Krajina" in Croatia. YPA's legalist and constitutionalist position has been thus, in some respects, a pretense as well as a tool to resist democratic and pluralist evolution away from the Titoist order, in other respects.

The military leadership, including two "grey eminencies" Adm. B. Mamula and Col. Gen. S. Mirković, both retired, denied many times YPA's intention to stage a coup, or to be engaged in any other unconstitutional action. The first putchist statement was made by General S. Mirković publicly in August 1991 during the attempted coup in the Soviet Union:¹¹ "The Army should be given far wider powers. If the Army is not given these powers, she should take them." But it is also true that numerous speculations about an "imminent military coup" in Yugoslavia failed so far to materialize. On the other hand, one finds in Yugoslavia several elements generally conducive to overt unconstitutional military intervention - a deep economic, social, political and moral crisis, almost a collapse of the federal government and of the constitutional order at the federal level, sharp clashes and even unbridled hostility among civilian elites, the army's institutional insecurity, open appeals by various groups (mostly from Serbian-inhabited areas) for YPA to intervene etc. In her history since 1804 Serbia (state-legal predecessor of Yugoslavia) has had a long string of regime changes through assassinations and military coups. Moreover pre-war Yugoslavia experienced two coups, whose protagonists were exclusively Serbs. One of these coups was

11. Vreme (Belgrade), no. 44, August 26, 1991, p. 28. It was not accidental that this shift occurred soon after a visit to Moscow by a top LC-MY delegation. General S. Mirković was obviously and prematurely elated by the news about the coup's success and talked about "international support" to LC-MY.

straightforward military (in April 1941).

However one could state even more reasons which mitigate against a military coup- YPA's extremely limited ability to rule the state and to lead it out of the crisis, negative experiences in other countries (including in Greece and Poland), Yugoslavia's high external dependence and the West's clearly negative attitude to and open pressure against such a possibility, YPA's still Marxist ideology etc. Very importantly YPA's multinational composition has played a strong restraining role, as any large-scale political move clearly against legal authorities in republics could and, in at least two cases, did endanger YPA's internal cohesion. Moreover, as long as the centralists and the Serbian bloc has controlled major federal institutions there was also no need for any YPA action without a legal and constitutional cover.

The Yugoslav professional military have always considered themselves, also in pre-war Yugoslavia, as one of the most important, if not the most important integrative factor in the state. It is a cruel irony that YPA's behavior in recent years has had opposite and highly divisive effects. Its evident interest in preserving intact the key central structures and itself has worked as a powerful obstacle to saving the Yugoslav community of nations in a radically revamped form - as long as all nations were still willing to accept the Yugoslav framework. Roughly by December 1991 this chance went down the drain, thanks also to YPA's posture and actions. YPA has become widely perceived in the more economically and socially developed north-west as a centralist and neo-Bolshevik threat to budding democracy and to national freedoms. Many YPA officers find this characterization as unfounded and unjust. But this perception is an empirical fact to which the YPA leadership certainly greatly contributed and which the above mentioned secret YPA document graphically confirmed.

By spring 1991 in Croatia and in the areas in Herzegovina inhabited by the Croats hostility toward YPA became wide-spread and took the form of mobs attacking military installations (Zagreb, Split), blocking military convoys, insulting military personnel and members of their families. YPA's direct and indirect threats, contrary to the intentions, did not only deter but even strengthened secessionist sentiments in Slovenia and Croatia, the popular desire to leave the disjoint Balkan state and to join orderly, democratic and prosperous Europe.

On the other hand, YPA's capacity to act as an interethnic peace-keeping force has been seriously limited by the lack of corresponding doctrine, organization, equipment and training. Above all it is due to YPA's highly partial national and political profile, as all important conflicts inside Yugoslavia involve the Serbs and most parties governing in the republics are non-communist. Hence insistent public proposals and internal pressure, particularly strong in the two northwestern republics, to internationalize the Yugoslav crisis, to draw in the EEC and CSCE, to invite foreign observers and even foreign peace-keeping troops.

On national grounds alone YPA's involvement as super-police has been less objectionable in cases of mass political unrest and disorder violence within the Serbian community, as it happened after peaceful but prohibited demonstrations staged by opposition in Belgrad on March 9, 1991. However the intimidating use of YPA's tanks and armored carriers, although without shooting, set a dangerous precedent. YPA in fact was utilized by a majority in the presidency to prop up S. Milošević's regime and its near-monopoly in the Serbian mass media (the immediate cause for the demonstrations). This use was objected to by the Serbian liberal and ardently nationalist opposition, as well as by the two north-

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west republics and was branded as illegal and unconstitutional. The YPA command in a public statement claimed, on the other hand, that it only followed orders by C-i-C, without making favors to anyone.¹² In three cases of overt political use in February-March 1991, YPA's armored units (Pakrac, Beograd, Plitvice) were ordered to the scene by the sharply divided presidency, with the Croatian and Slovenian governments strongly objecting. In all these cases military units arrived too late to prevent violence or to influence the outcomes of local conflicts. In this sense their interventions were superfluous. On the other hand, presumably preventive, highly visible movements of armour in several localities in Slavonia and Herzegovina in April-May incited protests and tensions. They were ex post facto declared war exercises. From mid-May 1991 on the YPA command has been moving troops in four republics without proper authorization by civilian institutions in the form of orders issued by C-i-C.

The complete loss of civilian control over YPA came about as a result of two periods of institutional void at the apex of the federal state. The first, brief period occurred around March 16, 1991. S. Milošević's setback in his confrontation with Serbian opposition led to a dramatic crisis in the federal presidency. YPA was again in the center of squabbles during a three-day session of that body, staged in part inside YPA's headquarters. In spite of the obvious psychological pressure a majority turned down the military's proposals, vehemently championed by President B. Jović, to institute in fact emergency rule, to allow for YPA's enhanced readiness, expanded discretionary powers as well as to issue ultimatums to Croatia and Slovenia. For the first time outvoted in the Presidium, three members of the Serbian bloc, including B. Jović resigned, while S. Milošević in a TV broadcast denied the federal presidency's authority over Serbia and

12. Politika, March 13, 1991, p.13.

legality. Probably never after 1941 was Yugoslavia closer to a military coup than in mid-March 1991, immediately after this Serbian walkout.¹³ The ensuing Serbian obstruction of the presidency was probably designed to instigate a military intervention in the suddenly created vacuum at the helm of civilian power, and to overshadow its own troubles in Serbia.

The top brass, however, after several days in a closed session evaded the implicit invitation. A body, hitherto unknown to the public and called the "Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia"¹⁴ issued on March 19, 1991 a public statement.

This declaration on resolving the Yugoslav crisis contained the following public pledges:

- not to permit any changes of "SFRY borders" unless an agreement is duly reached, according to the federal constitution (N.B. It is not clear whether the term "SFRY borders" applies only to Yugoslavia's external or also to her internal borders. Depending on an interpretation, this dictum could mean (a) preventing by force Slovenian and Croatian secession, (b) preventing by force secession of Serbian-inhabited areas from Croatia and Bosnia, or (c) both. The federal constitution makes any border change practically impossible, requiring an agreement of all Yugoslav republics);
- under no circumstances to allow interethnic armed clashes

13. The second half of 1948 - spring 1949 was thought to have been the period of a possible anti-Tito coup by a group of pro-Stalin generals of Montenegrin origin.

14. Narodna armija, March 21, 1991, pp. 5-7.

N.B. The federal constitution does not provide for this body. Apparently, according to secret regulations, it could exist in wartime and emergencies. The defense minister is the Chief of this Staff.

and a civil war (N.B. In its first part this pledge means taking over the constitutional and legal role of the police forces, lending YPA's protection to armed Serbian rebels in Croatia and possibly also in Bosnia, against legal police repression);

- not to allow violence from whatever side in settling conflicts between nations, republics and political parties (N.B. The meaning could be the same as above);
- normal conditions should be secured for the Armed Forces, including recruitment according to federal laws, subordinating TD to YPA as well as YPA's regular financing, according to previously undertaken obligations (N.B. This point contains an implicit threat to bring Slovenia and Croatia in line by force as well as a demand for defense appropriations above the amount agreed to by the republics);
- as the SFRY Praesidium did not accept the measures proposed by YPA to carry out the disarmament order, YPA can not be held responsible for possible illegal arming in any part of Yugoslavia (N.B. This could mean that YPA will turn blind eye to the creation of paramilitary formations also in Serbia);
- YPA will not meddle, as before, in political negotiations about the state's future.

This public statement omitted a very important point which was also contained in the letter sent by YPA's command on the same day to the SFRY Praesidium.¹⁵ In this point the military declared that they themselves (and not C-i-C) would determine the level of needed readiness to contain sharp conflicts. This was exactly what the presidency rejected several times on March 12-15. This part of YPA's statement was tantamount to a declaration of disobedience toward C-i-C. The pronouncement was characterized by

15. Delo, March 21, 1991, p.1.

some politicians and some media as a "soft military coup". The verbal abrasiveness in the statement coupled with the pledge not to intervene was conceivably a compromise between, as rumored, two fractions among the top generals. The moderate conservative group is said to be headed by General V.Kadijević, defense minister, while the "hawks" have as their top representative but not the brain Col.Gen.B.Adžić, Chief of Staff.¹⁶ The military leadership itself strongly and publicly denied the existence of these fractions. So far there were no proofs to support the rumours.

B.Jović's return to the presidential position, the reconstitution of the Serbian bloc in the Praesidium and continuing tensions and conflicts between the two largest nations (Serbs and Croats) allowed YPA's leadership to get away with its controversial and obtrusive declaration. Moreover the military repeated their demands on April 2 and on May 6 issued an ultimatum to the Presidency. In a five-point message to President B.Jović, made public by his ministry, general V.Kadijević blamed the Praesidium for the beginning of a civil war in Yugoslavia. He claimed without any proof given that the civil war started because C-i-C did not accept the military's proposals. The general admitted ineffectiveness of YPA's actions to prevent interethnic clashes, declared that YPA units would be given shooting orders in self-defense, demanding that all civilian institutions (including the Praesidium) secure "normal conditions for resolving the Yugoslav crisis". In the last point, the "Staff of the Supreme Command" (obviously without C-i-C) made it known that it on its own ordered YPA's combat preparedness and mobilization of some reservists. If civilian authorities fail to do so, the military would "effectively"... "secure peace" (even if not ordered by C-i-C). In a compromise package adopted on May 9, 1991

16. Anton Bebler, Po svoje tragični generali, Delo, March 23, 1991, p.20. General Kadijević is a Serb from Dalmatia. who declared himself a "Yugoslav". General Adžić is a Serb from Herzegovina.

the Praesidium swallowed even this humiliation by stating that YPA acted constitutionally and legally.¹⁷ The Serbian leadership could thus score an important point in its maneuvering aiming at legalizing YPA's role as political arbiter in conflicts between republics and in resolving the Yugoslav conflict.

The second period of institutional vacuum occurred between mid-May and early July 1991. The four-member Serbian bloc in the presidency prevented for more than six weeks the inauguration of Stipe Mesić, a Croat highly negatively viewed by the YPA command. When the Serbs finally gave up, under strong Western pressure, they made S. Mesić and the Praesidium utterly impotent and incapable to control the military.

During the period of formal vacancy, on July 26, 1991, two north-western republics Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. However only Slovenia started implementing it effectively and also symbolically by taking over federal custom offices on its territory, replacing federal symbols and signs at international border crossings with Italy, Austria and Hungary etc. In the vacuum of power the Federal Executive Council issued an order (without constitutional foundation) which authorized the YPA border guards to assist the federal police inspectors and federal customs officials in imposing federal police controls (a new development contrary to the previously existing legal order), in reestablishing federal customs controls and in effectively closing most international border crossings from and to Slovenia, including three airports. The intention of the federal cabinet was to retake one of the biggest sources of federal revenues, to cancel off the psychological impact of the two declarations of independence, to seal Slovenia and particularly Croatia off the West and to force them to revoke the declarations. These inten-

17. Delo, May 7, p.1 and May 10, p.1.

tions fully coincided with the positions and preferences of the YPA command and of the Serbian political bloc. The cabinet's order gave YPA long-sought, although flimsy legal pretext for carrying out its long-range political intentions stated in the circular of the YPA Political Department in January 1991.

The legal cover given by Ante Marković's cabinet was insufficient not only on constitutional but also on operational grounds. It did not authorize the use of arms (except in self-defense) and of troops other than lightly armed border guards. Partly imitating the Soviet military's moves in Lithuania the YPA command sent into action tanks, self-propelled guns, armored carriers, combat helicopters and ordered intimidating low-level flights of combat aircraft even before the cabinet's order. This show of force was staged probably with the Federal Prime-Minister's oral agreement. Later he and several key ministers claimed innocence stating that the YPA command grossly overstepped the authorization. The Prime-Minister however never censured his Defense Minister, let alone suspended or dismissed him. The military on their part denied any wrongdoing.

The operation was based on a wrong appreciation of the political situation, misunderstanding of the mood in Slovenia, on gross underestimation of the Slovenian TD and the Slovenes' resolution to resist. The top brass drew a wrong analogy with Kosovo where YPA's demonstrations of heavy weapons did have intimidating effect. In Slovenia however YPA's armored columns, without infantry and logistical support, with limited supply of ammunition, food, and fuel water etc., were blocked in many places by TD and the population. Federal troops, policemen and customs officials could reach only about a half of designated targets. Having been encircled and cut off of their bases and supplies they could not hold even the captured border crossings for more than several days. Many of federal units, utterly ununiformed or grossly misin-

formed about their true objectives, started desintegrating, mostly along national lines. With considerable although uneven self-restraint on both sides only limited hostilities in 72 separate locations developed, lasting about ten days.

According to Slovenian reports, YPA deployed outside the barracks 115 tanks, 32 self-propelled guns, 82 armored vehicles, 24 helicopters and carried out 15 bombing and strafing air-attacks, mostly against civilian targets. Out of about 30.000 troops available in and close to Slovenia the YPA command sent out only 3.000 - 4.000. The entire YPA force in Slovenia was facing at the height of the engagements around 35.000 mobilized TD reservists and 10.000 regular, special and reserve policemen. In addition, about 120.000 members of Slovenian Civil Defense (the most developed in Yugoslavia) and Home Guards were activated.

The ill-conceived, badly prepared and executed, clearly political super-police action by the much better armed YPA ended with its humiliation and a political defeat for the federal government. The conflict caused 74 deaths (45 YPA personnel, 19 Slovenian TD and police personnel, six Slovenian and ten foreign civilians), about 350 wounded and very considerable economic damage. According to an assessments by the Slovenian government the direct and indirect damage to the Slovenian economy amounted to the equivalent of about three billion US dollars. YPA lost about a half of its total strength in Slovenia, mostly through defection (7.900) and capture (4.643 soldiers and 139 federal policemen), 31 tanks, 230 other vehicles and six helicopters. After an initial cease-fire, violated many times, the armed conflict was finally stopped under direct EEC pressure. On the political side the conflict brought in results, which were again diametrically opposite to YPA's intentions - Slovenia's drive towards independence became irreversible and her international standing has increased. The humiliated federal government was obliged to accept inter-

nationalization of the Yugoslav crisis as well as EEC's direct patronage and a strong say in Yugoslavia's internal matters. The latter has been always an anathema for the Yugoslav military.

YPA's untenable position in Slovenia, the real threat of spreading desintegration in combat units and the escalation of armed conflicts in Croatia led to a decision by the federal presidency on July 18, 1991 to withdraw YPA units and institutions from Slovenia in three months. The YPA command even shortened this deadline to September 15. The evacuation strengthened YPA's hand in dealing with Croatia, which probably was one of, if not the main motivation for the pull-out.

In spite of the pressure from EEC and USA armed hostilities in Croatia picked up in intensity and ferocity. Accompanied by mass criminal activities (looting, arson, robberies, road blocking, extortion etc.) and terrorism (hostage taking, blackmail, mine laying, blowing up rails, bombardment of inhabited areas, particularly in the night etc.), these armed hostilities reached by late August 1991 the proportions of a war. It has been fought along the lines separating mostly Serbian-inhabited enclaves from mostly Croat-inhabited areas as well as for towns, road and rail junctions inside and between the Serbian enclaves. The object of these hostilities was firm control over close to a third of the Republic of Croatia's territory, including parts with strong Croatian majorities. The mixture of a civil and an interstate war, with a strong ingredient of mass anomic interethnic violence, involved three groups of armed units:

- a) Croatian regular and reserve police, Croatian National Guards (a new Croatian army),
- b) Local rebel regular and reserve police and Territorial Defense units in Serbian-inhabited areas; paramilitary and commando units organized in Serbia and Vojvodina and infiltrated into Croatia; local rebel irregular Village

Guards,

- c) YPA regular units normally stationed in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, beefed up by YPA reservists from Serbia and Vojvodina and supported by armor, artillery, helicopters and combat aircraft.

In most cases armed engagement have involved the first two groups of combatants. YPA as institution has claimed and partly maintained the posture of an interposition force, presumably controlling tampons between the adversaries and separating them. Its mission was officially defined as prevention of mass interethnic violence, to which individual high officers were adding "the preservation of Yugoslavia" and "protecting the unarmed Serbian people in Croatia". In fact many local YPA commanders have cooperated tactically with well-armed Serbian rebels, shielding them from Croatian Counter-attacks, supplying them with weapons (including minethrowers and mortars), ammunition, intelligence and often also with food. Many Serbian rebels are YPA reservists, wear regular YPA uniforms and carry weapons taken from the armories controlled exclusively by YPA. On many occasions and under different pretexts YPA armor, artillery and warplanes attacked the Croatian forces, as well as villages and towns, inhabited mostly by Croats. In no known case, except by mistake, did the "neutral" YPA units fired at or attacked the positions of Serbian rebels, let alone arrested or disarmed members of their illegal military formations (as they are obliged to do by the federal laws).

By September 1, 1991 warfare in Croatia involved about 100.000 armed personnel on all sides counted together, caused over 1.000 deaths (mostly among civilians but including also over 350 Croatian policemen and National Guardsmen), over 4.000 seriously wounded, over 300.000 refugees (of which around 25.000 in Hungary) and huge material damage, comparable to that in Lebanon.

The growing violence sped up EEC diplomatic activities. Having put a strong pressure on the leadership of Serbia EEC finally succeeded in having a cease-fire agreement signed (on September 2, 1991 in Belgrade) and the activities of EEC and CSCE unarmed observers extended to Croatia. YPA and the Serbian rebels were not parties in this agreement. Largely due to this fact the agreement failed to produce an effective cessation of hostilities and even instigated new ones. This in turn endangered a conference on Yugoslavia, convened by EEC in the Hague on September 7, 1991.

Politically protected by the Serbian bloc in the federal presidency and taking no orders from any civilian institution the Yugoslav military leadership, without staging an outright military coup, continued thus to gravely interfere in Yugoslav politics. Their actions made Yugoslavia's survival less probable, even on a reduced scale.

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Greece and Southeastern Europe

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The impossible task that European policy-makers and scholars are faced with in these times of rapid change is a constant updating of their premises concerning world politics. When a considerable body of traditional premises will have been revised we might find ourselves in the aftermath of a veritable revolution in international affairs with an altogether new "paradigm" of analysis (to use Thomas Kuhn's term somewhat freely). Until then we will have to grapple with what notions appear relevant.

One of the questions which have acquired prominence recently is how to reconcile the integrative with the disintegrative tendencies in Western and eastern Europe. In both instances the national state in its traditional form is the point of departure either for the formation of a continental confederation, or for the creation of independent national fragments. In both cases the viability of the national state is being questioned - in western Europe from the point of view of human rights, in eastern Europe from the angle of militant - nationalisms.

As western Europe moves towards political integration its weaker components will want to insure the survival of their cultural identity in a Community dominated by the larger states. The trend to recognise and secure the rights of national and cultural minorities in the EC at the eve of political unification, constitutes an encouragement to eastern Europeans striving for the

political independence of their historical ethnicities or "imagined communities" (1). In other words, the support and sympathy extended by certain western European states towards the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, when it is not prompted by self-seeking motives (i.e. zones of influence) it is motivated by genuine interest in the liberal values that inspire civil societies (2).

However, the history of nationalisms - especially in South Eastern Europe - is often chequered with totalitarian overtones which bear little regard for principles of tolerance and democracy. Furthermore, the revision of state boundaries that disintegration implies, threatens to distabilise the entire Balkan region with unforeseen effects on its security. We will expand on this problem later on in this paper.

Political Developments and Perceptions

The transition from a bipolar international order into an uncertain future, found Greece in the fold of NATO and the European Community - a privileged state of being in the Balkan region of the post - 1990 period. Yet these privileges had not been apparent to more than half of the Greek electorate during a good part of the eighties. The Communist party held on to its Soviet loyalties in a rapidly changing world, while the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) had layed claims since its formation on the dissaffected of all strata in society. The leader of the movement, Andreas Papandreou, also capitalised on the ill - feel-

ings generated by American policy in Greece during the junta period and the Cyprus crisis and devised a comprehensive theory according to which foreign imperialism was responsible for all the country's problems. When the ratification of Greece's accession treaty with the EC was brought to parliament for discussion, in 1980, Papandreou and his deputies chose to be absent. (3). Furthermore the leader of PASOK promised to withdraw Greece from NATO once in power.

The combination of socialism, nationalism and populism, that comprised the ideological triad of PASOK, has been quite unique in Greek politics. Even more striking was the movement's mass appeal to a heterogeneous public and its firm foundation on grass-roots organizations and regional committees all over Greece. Although the movement's origins are as recent as the resistance attempts against the Greek military dictatorship, Papandreou became an interlocutor in the right-left debate on the civil war. To the dismay of the Communists, he sought to usurp the wartime tradition of resistance against foreign occupation and even included in his ticket the commander in Chief of the Communist forces during the Greek civil-war (1946-49). A late-comer into Greek public affairs, Papandreou who had made his academic mark in the US in the forties and fifties, chose to champion the cause of the vanguished left in the seventies when the last embers of the civil war cleavage were dying out. Surprisingly, this element of anachronism and the irrelevance of the civil-war division to the younger generations, did not prevent PASOK from coming to power in 1981 and hold on to it for seven

and a half years.

The impact of an ideology which rekindled fears of past police-state practises and evoked the cleavage that had divided Greek society for almost three decades, constituted the imaginary element in the ideology that took Greece by storm in the eighties. The more concrete aspect of PASOK's impact was no doubt its appeal to the less privileged and its widespread promises of social benefits and hand-outs. During PASOK's tenure in power the government promoted significant income redistribution and social benefits but these policies were not accompanied by economic growth and were thus financed by loans. This in effect meant that the cost of social policy would burden future taxpayers.

The turning point in PASOK's fortunes was the illness of Papandreou and his absense from the administration of power during the summer of 1988. An influential member of the cabinet, Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, who replaced the ailing Papandreou in the actual running of the state, proved an embarassement for PASOK. The various scandals that errupted in the Winter of 1988-89 implicated Koutsogiorgas along with certain PASOK ministers, and reached the doorstep of the convalescent Prime-Minister. Although the elections of June 1989 took a heavy toll on PASOK, whose electoral percentage fell to 38%, New Democracy with 43% was unable to form a government and entered a coalition of limited mandate with the Communists. The electoral system, a variety of proportional representation, was engineered by PASOK

in such a way as to prevent the formation of a one-party government. The elections of November 1989 gave New Democracy 46% of the vote but still produced no government.

Since the Communists were reluctant to cooperate with PASOK before a catharsis of the scandals was effected, all three parties in parliament entered a National Union government under octagenarian former banker, Xenophon Zolotas as a way out of the impasse. Several months later the declining economy caused the resignation of Zolotas and new elections in April 1990. New Democracy finally managed to secure the narrow margin required for the formation of a government (with the aid of a deputy from the diminutive D.I.A.N.A. party). PASOK won 39% of the vote and the Alliance of left wing forces declined to 11%.

The Mitsotakis government was faced with the dire prospects of balancing the budget, liquidating problematic firms under state responsibility, and trimming the public sector. Although the Summer of 1990 was marked by a rash of strikes, New Democracy managed to secure the Mayors of Athens and Thessaloniki in the municipal elections of October 1990.

Foreign Policy Developments

Certain aspects of PASOK's foreign policy were veritable exercises in irrelevance. At a time of general decline of the non-aligned movement, Papandreou chose to establish ties with essentially anti-western neutrals of Northern Africa and the

Middle East. When the Reagan - Gorbachev tug of war on disarmament was beginning to bear positive results, he joined the group of six leaders (Mexico, Argentine, Sweden, India, Zambia, Greece) to promote world denuclearization and continued to press for nuclear-free zones in the Balkans. Finally Papandreou's reluctance to join with the US and Western Europe in condemning the Soviet Union on issues such as Poland and the downing of the Korean jumbo, won his government points with Moscow but caused him significant damage in Washington which was much more important for Greek interests.

PASOK's policy towards the West, stripped of its declaratory aspects, did not in fact differ widely from that of many community members. Soon after his advent to power he quietly dropped his intention to withdraw from NATO and to hold a plebiscite to decide Greece's membership in the EC. Furthermore he renewed the tenure of US bases in Greece in 1983 although he claimed that this was the beginning of their removal. Yet without any visible benefit for Greece, Papandreou insisted in creating the impression of being the maverick of the western world. It has often been said that his much publicised rebellious image appealed to his followers and that the electoral support he derived from it merited - in his own calculations - the damage this caused to Greece's position in the West. On the whole, Greek parties traditionally varied only marginally in their choice of westernization and development. During the second world war however socialists and communists questioned or rejected the western model of social and economic development. The Greek civil war between 1946-49

generated a bipolarization of attitudes towards the West which persisted into the seventies.

PASOK reflected a resurgent isolationism in certain segments of society which seek to protect themselves from western competition and the dislocations of adjustment. Based on a parochial sense of moral superiority but acknowledging the economic power and technology of the West, the constituency of PASOK opted for the phantasy of the "Third Way" (4).

Both major parties, PASOK and New Democracy, agreed on their basic positions vis a vis the problems between Greece and Turkey. Unlike Karamanlis who had conducted bilateral discussions with Turkish officials but with no success, Papandreou insisted from the outset that any discussion with Turkey would be tantamount to forfeiting Greek security.

The most significant deviation of PASOK's policy was heralded by the Davos meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in February 1988. Almost a year before, a crisis caused by Turkey's decision to send a research vessel escorted by warships to explore for oil in the continental shelf around Lesbos, Lemnos and Samothrace, brought the two states close to an armed clash. The crisis was diffused but it became clear that perhaps a future confrontation could not be averted given the delicate state of relations in the Aegean. Furthermore, the burden of enormous defense spending on the ailing Greek balance of payments and the long military service which detracted from

the government's populist image, convinced the Greek Prime Minister that he should take the initiative to raise the threshold of war between Greece and Turkey. In a speech to officers in Yanina, he explained that the rapprochement would eliminate the Triangular relationship between Greece, the United States and Turkey and would free his country's defense and foreign policy from dependence on US aid and mediation. In the Spring of 1988, Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Mesut Yilmaz raised the question of the "Turkish" Minority in Greek Thrace and dismissed any possibility of a Turkish military withdrawal from Cyprus before the two communities came to an agreement and solution. The Greek side soon realised that Cyprus was not considered by the Turks as part of the Davos package while the Moslems of Thrace were being forcefully brought into the picture. Although some progress was made in accident prevention in international waters of the Aegean, the Davos spirit quietly expired in 1989.

After the changes of 1989-91 swept the bipolar international order, it became apparent that Greece, in spite of Papandreou's verbal exercises in imaginative foreign policy, was no more prepared to face the emerging crises than the other states in the region. A past of comfortable loyalty to the western camp and the subsequent socialist reaction which cultivated the view that all Greek misfortunes since 1974 had been - master - minded by the US, deprived policy - makers from the flexibility of adapting rapidly to new realities.

It was the difficult task of the New Democracy party that won

the elections of April 1990 to curtail the huge internal and external deficits while improving Greece's image as a dependable member of the West. Both priorities were naturally associated with Greece's main foreign policy considerations: 1) The evolving depth and shape of the European Community that will determine Greece's economic future and 2) the forms of collective security that will accommodate this country's most important concerns.

Greece, along with other southern EC members, favours an acceleration of the community's political unity through a "deepening" of its institutions (5). In terms of security, the Greeks view the CSCE as a valuable forum for problem - solving in certain areas such as arms control and human rights monitoring, but as an unwieldy mechanism of collective security. The absorption of the WEU by the EC as its security component which might also strengthen the credibility of European unity, is considered as a first option. However until European affairs acquire more stable features, NATO will continue to be an operational institution which could be made more competent in providing security to members exposed to the post-Warsaw Pact instability.

Relations with the US have been accentuated by the conclusion of the DCA agreement in July 1990 which determines the operation of American bases and installations in Greek soil for the next eight years. Constantine Mitsotakis was the first Greek Prime Minister to visit Washington since 1964 and the positive climate in Greek-American relations was encouraged by Greece's military support to the allied cause during the Gulf war. Stressing the

necessity of decisively opposing invaders, Greece has also made its air-space and bases available to the multi-ethnic contingency forces.

Greece's main problems with Turkey stem from that country's aspirations to enhance its role as a regional power. Strangely enough Greece has a stake in Turkey's westernization because the process would tend to improve the latter's democratic institutions and minimise its acquisitiveness in its relations with its western neighbours. Although Turkey's entry into the European Community has been postponed, Greece could still become a supporter of this Turkish cause in the future if it becomes apparent that a solution of the ailing issues between the two states has been set in motion. Cyprus is the necessary catalyst of any prospect of such improvement and the reluctance of the Turkish - Cypriot leader to come to any credible agreement with the opposite side, during the negotiations of August 1991, might indicate that in spite of US and UN efforts to the contrary, the present conjuncture is inopportune for a meaningful discussion of the Cyprus question.

The Significance of Economics

As the Balkan states are attempting their transition into the market economy, economics acquire a special significance as an instrument of foreign policy in this backward region of Europe. If its finances had been in a better condition, Greece would have profited from this unique opportunity to extend aid and invest-

ments to its adjacent states. The prospects of becoming the centerpoint of commercial activity through its Thessaloniki harbour are good, but on the whole Greece's economy will have to undergo the pangs of restructuring which previous governments failed to put into effect.

The high growth rates of the sixties were impeded by the 1973 oil shock. Still GDP grew by 6 percent per annum on average, during the decade of the seventies. Growth in the eighties declined to 1.6 per cent and by 1987 Greece was overtaken by Portugal (until then the poorest member of the EC) although in the former more equitable distribution of income has eradicated poverty. The main reason for this decline of growth was the failure of government to restructure the economy after the second oil price shock when most developed countries moved away from labour intensive industries to output with higher technological content. These readjustments were followed by unemployment which Greek governments considered socially divisive. Instead of allowing uncompetitive firms to expire, PASOK undertook expensive measures to salvage them and made them the responsibility of the public sector.

Although EC membership revived foreign investment in Greece, the end of protectionism hit native firms hard. High level of consumer demand have always outstripped domestic supply causing high imports and inflation, but the redistributive income policies of PASOK, fuelled private demand further and worsened the chronic trade imbalance. Transfers from the Community cushioned

the current account deficit although at the same time encouraged demand and contributed to the trade deficit. The persistent trade imbalance owed much to the high unit labour costs and therefore low productivity. The income policy under the 1985 stabilization program reduced, within two years, unit labour costs below those in the Community but when the policy was suspended the problems returned. High inflation since 1974 is largely due to cost-push through wage increases unmatched by a corresponding rise in productivity.

The factor which renders formal statistics unreliable in their negative picture of growth, is a rigorous parallel economy which defies fiscal control. "Monitoring the self employed - particularly tradesmen, professionals and landlords - is notoriously difficult and the large numbers of small industrial and retail establishments makes, inspection of books difficult" (6). Remittances from seamen and emigres constitute another source of untaxable income that cannot therefore be monitored accurately. It is suggested that thanks to a rigorous parallel or "paraeconomy", the GDP is actually 29 per cent higher than officially recorded (7).

Remedies to the ailing economy do not differ widely and resemble the measures employed during the successful term of Kostas Simitis as Finance Minister (1986-87) New Democracy's stabilization program strives to lower inflation to single figures, to curtail PSBR to a level which will reduce aggregate public sector debt as a proportion of GDP and to cut the current account deficit

to a level at which it can be sustained by non-debt capital inflows. The EC decided to grant Greece an ECU 2.2 bn loan linked to commitments on economic policy (8). For the above to bear fruit, austerity measures should be stringently applied which will curtail the spending power of the average Greek and will trim the public sector to more manageable levels. Should the measures persist and the Greek public realise the necessity of the accompanying hardships, Greece will have transcended its present problems by 1994.

High defense spending has been a consistent burden on the economy. During the last decade Greece has ranked first among NATO countries in military expenditures as a proportion of GDP (6.6% in constant prices). Furthermore the country paid "a high social cost for defense in that its average conscription period of 22 months is the longest in NATO" (9). In keeping with detente in South-Eastern Europe, the tripartite government of November 1989 - March 1990, agreed on significant defense cuts.

Defense: Continuity and changes

Papandreou's defense policy was always much more in line with that of his predecessors - a fact which confirms the consensual nature of Greek defense decisions and outlook. The major points of agreement between the two larger parties in the past could be summarised as follows: 1) By remaining in NATO Greece could better secure western understanding on her key Defense issues. 2) Given the unanimity principle, Greece could prevent the adoption

of collective NATO decisions that would prejudice command and control arrangements in the Aegean and undermine Greece's position there. 3) Relations with Turkey should be kept below the level of armed confrontation. A few years ago, both PASOK and New Democracy would describe Greece's strategic importance for the West in the following terms: Greece shares a common border with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, it provides an avenue of support for the Yugoslavs, it guards the approaches to the Adriatic Sea, it lends strategic depth in the Aegean, it controls the sea lanes in the eastern Mediterranean and off northeastern Africa through the island of Crete, and finally, along with Turkey, Greece helps to control an area that is of vital importance to Western defense (10).

To what degree have the changes in Eastern Europe altered these assumptions? There is no doubt that the entire security concept of Western Europe and the US vis a vis the Soviet Union have been revised drastically during the past years. The Soviets are no longer perceived as a threat to western security but other regional problems such as the Gulf crisis, mass illegal migration from the islamic world to Europe and the resurgent Balkan nationalisms have made the Eastern Mediterranean perhaps the most sensitive of European frontiers and have compensated Greece and Turkey for some of their losses in strategic importance to the West. Be that as it may, the forces that kept the two camps together have been dicipated and the challenges to regional security that stem from the disintegretion of Yugoslavia, pose new threats and require new remedies.

A Greek View of the Balkans

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was not greeted with enthusiasm throughout South-Eastern Europe. Albania's antiquated regime resisted the changes despite the mass exodus of its people. Yugoslavia through its Serbian champions of national unity considered this anti-nationalist ideology as the only binding tissue between its different ethnicities. Romania's National Salvation Front that succeeded Ceausescu and won 66% of the popular vote, included a number of former Communist party members. Finally, Bulgaria's Socialist Party, which secured 47% of the vote, is a new name for the old ruling party (11).

There is a little doubt that Communism in Bulgaria had also brought benefits from its Soviet patron in the form of cheap energy, military security and a market for uncompetitive local products. But what was perhaps more important was that they all shared in various degrees an ideology which kept nationalism and irredentism under lock and key. Since the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact prohibited any phenomenon that would cause internal disintegration or strife between allies, the communist Balkans enjoyed a protracted period of uneasy peace although at a serious cost to their development, their freedoms and the state of human rights.

The demise of the ideology that was hostile to nationalism and religion, and the end of the Warsaw Pact have revived pre-World War II ethnic, religious and political conflicts in

Greece's volatile neighborhood. Relations with her neighbouring Balkan states, with the exception of Turkey have been without major problems since 1974.

Given the rigid structures of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's fear that institutionalised Balkan cooperation could affect the cohesion of its allies, bilateralism rather than multilateralism determined Greece's relations with the states in the region. The first timid attempts at multilateral cooperation initiated by Karamanlis in 1976, involved meetings of Balkan experts on such subjects as transport, communications, energy, commerce etc, leaving political issues aside. This forum for dialogue was opened to political subjects by Papandreou who adopted an old Romanian proposal for a regional nuclear-weapons-free-zone. Although the deliberations of experts on the question failed to make progress, it gave the multilateral Balkan forum an important political dimension (12).

With the change of Soviet attitudes and the Gorbachev-led experiment of Perestroika underway, the meeting of six Balkan foreign ministers in Belgrade of February 1988, dealing with confidence, security building measures and minority questions, heralded a new period of interbalkan relations. Since that time Balkan Foreign Ministers have met on several occasions to monitor progress on issues of common interest. The meeting of Foreign Ministry high officials held in Tirana on 18-20 January 1989, examined guidelines to govern relations between Balkan neighbours and the meeting of experts in Bucharest on 23-24 May 1989, dealt

with confidence and security building measures (13).

Greece's bilateral relations with Bulgaria were institutionalised with the signing of the "Declaration of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation" in September 1986. In spite of criticism levelled against Greece for its rapprochement with Bulgaria, the declaration was in fact the culmination of a long process of resolving old conflicts on territorial and ethnic issues and was motivated by both states' problematic relations with Ankara and Skopje. The gradual Soviet drift from the region contributed to Bulgaria's fear of isolation, while Greece felt the need to secure her northern flank in case of conflict with Turkey (14).

Since 1990 the Soviet Union has discontinued exports of cheap energy to her Balkan associates and the loosening of its defense lifeline with Bulgaria is proving traumatic for the latter. Greece has displayed a vivid interest in alleviating Bulgaria's plight by extending moderate financial support and a remedy for its isolation by providing cooperation in the field of defense. During Prime Minister Lukanov's visit to Athens in mid-May 1990, Mr. Mitsotakis said that there was a "special relationship between the two countries" and indicated that Greece would promote Bulgarian interests in the EC (15).

Relations with Yugoslavia have been traditionally good with only the Republic of Macedonia literally obstructing communications with Belgrade. There is no doubt considerable invention in

the formative myths of all nationalisms, but the Socialist Republic of Macedonia since its foundation in 1945, has exceeded the norm. By appropriating a geographical term which only in ancient times signified a political (but never an ethnic) entity, has layed claims to a past that preceeded the Slavic incursion in the Balkans by one thousand years. Since the demise of communism in the Republic, the nationalist government of Skopje has revived irredentist aspirations on Greece's territory, which in the distant past had been voiced by Bulgaria. With an area of 34,177 sq.km and a population of 2,122,000 Greek Macedonia is the largest of Greece's ten regions (16). Although no official statistics exist on the number of Greeks with slavic linguistic and cultural affiliations, it is estimated that 30-40 thousand are of slavic background, without in any way sharing Skopjean irredentism. The threat to Greek security caused by Skopje is therefore negligible but the periodic closure of the bordess to trafic from Greece, impedes the main land artery to the West and causes friction with Belgrade. In this time of crisis, the government of Yugoslavia is held hostage by the Republic which has announced a plebiscite in September to decide its future course.

Ties between Greece and Albania have been expanded through a cross-border trade agreement signed in April 1988 and the termination of the state of war that remained in force since the Second World War. A year before, Greece renounced its old claims to Southern Albania. After the thaw of the Papandreou period, relations have vacillated between carrot and stick politics. The fate of the Greek minority in Albania which constituted the main thorn

in Greek-Albanian relations, is losing its urgency as the country is slowly joining the European family (17).

Relations with Romania have been traditionally good. Without common borders and old feuds to settle, the two states share a cultural history that goes back into Ottoman times. After the overthrow of Ceausescu, Greece was one of the first states to aid Romania and continues to be a route of communication with the EC and NATO.

Addressing an audience of policy-makers, scholars and members of western institutes in Bucharest (18), NATO General Secretary, Manfred Woerner, tried not to raise the hopes of former Warsaw Pact members that the Atlantic treaty would be revised to include them. The need for security structures to replace the collapse of the old order is currently a pressing issue in the former Communist states. The deplorable condition of the economies and the slow pace of transformation in mentalities, leaves the reform of political institutions as the sole achievement of modernization in certain South-Eastern European states. Nations that attained statehood not too long in the past, with brief histories of parliamentary politics and a weak tradition of civil societies now realise how vulnerable they are to internal nationalist strife and external threats of irredentist nature. The similarity of the problems each state faces impedes their solution and exacerbates their severity. The present plight of Yugoslavia is perhaps an exaggerated version of the cleavages that bedevil most if not all Balkan states.

The Yugoslavian Catalyst

Yugoslavia has harboured two basic tendencies since her foundation as a modern state in the aftermath of the First World War:

The one, championed by the Serbs, whose nationalist aspiration to unite the South Slavs under their guidance has been the consistent force behind Yugoslav unity and the other, harboured by the Slovenes and the Croats who believed that they could safeguard their independence from the Habsburg Empire within the framework of the new state (19). The expiencies and conjunctures that brought different ethnicities and religions into a unitary state in the interwar period and a federation after the Second World War, did not allay the original diversity of purpose between the two incompatible motives in the construction of Yugoslavia.

The Communist ideology, expounded by the Croat partisan who led the dominant resistance movement against the axis occupation forces, subscribed to the principles of a unified Yugoslavia. By destroying the fascist separatist Ustasha Croats, Tito upheld in essence the cause of the Serbs. The federal structure which he adopted was aimed at minimising the friction between nationalities and religious groups. In fact however the system "provided the framework for some nationalities to create embryonic nation states" (20). The subsequent friction between the federal government and the republics became a constant feature of Tito's

regime, kept under control only due to his own personal authority and vigilance over republican and provincial leaders. However incompatible the two tendencies of unity and independence have been, they share at least one characteristic: Nationalism. The Serbs that aspire to unify the racial community of South Slavs, are no less nationalistic than their separatist Croat adversaries who look to national independence for fulfilling their own destiny. Serbia clinged to its special brand of communism longer because of the unifying mission of the particular ideology. Western Europeans who believe that anti-communism is always a democratic credential, overlook the fascist background of hard-core Croatian nationalism.

The nationalist variations in Yugoslavia defy exact description. To the Democratic and totalitarian (Fascist, Communist) varieties we must also add the contrived nationalism of the Macedonian Republic and the transformation of a religious community into an ethnic label in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Western Attitudes towards the Region's Future

The European Community constitutes the best hope not only of Slovenia and Croatia but of Serbia as well and therefore wields considerable influence in Yugoslavia. As an institution the Community upholds the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act codifying Europe's post-war borders - a fact which influences the policy of states with historically disputed territories. When an EC delegation led by Jacques Delors met with the Slovene President during

an official visit to Yugoslavia, it was made clear to him that fragments of Yugoslavia, would not be considered for membership and that the unity of the state would constitute a precondition for future application. Yet when the EC envoys took a three-point plan for a cease - fire to the embattled state, the plan included the freezing of the implementation of independence implying thus a recognition of independence. In the European Parliament resolution on Yugoslavia of 13 March 1991, the EC altered the requirements for admission from a single state to a "single political entity" (21). The absence of consistency characterises the policy of most institutions and states wavering between the integrity of Yugoslavia and self-determination of its constituent parts. The Alpe-Adria association for regional economic cooperation, between Slovenia, Croatia, Austria, Hungary and parts of Italy (as opposed to the Pentagonale which includes among others the entire Yugoslavia) established the separate identities of the two Yugoslav Republics. Italy, the moving force behind Alpe-Adria and the Pentagonale, has given conflicting messages of its position vis a vis Yugoslavia's future. Although Foreign Minister, De Michelis stated his government's determination to conform with the EC line, at another instance he intimated his preference for a break-up to avoid bloodshed. The CSCE upholds the integrity of international borders confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act. Yet in the German case the CSCE set a precedent for revising borders on the principle of nationality (22).

The position of most European states (Western and Eastern) is influenced by varied and often conflicting motives which defy

neat classification:

1) Fear of cultural assimilation in a future federation of Europe prodes some smaller members of the EC to sympathize with Slovenia and Croatia. 2) There are those whose preference for a united Yugoslavia is influenced by their own vulnerability to secessionist demands (Czechoslovakia, Romania). 3) The aspiration to a sub-regional (Austria) or regional role (Germany, Italy) has elicited words of support for secession. 4) Secession is also encouraged by the advocacy of self-determination (Holland). 5) Fear of undermining the territorial status quo of the Balkans with unforeseen consequences for the rest of Europe, constitutes the most sober position in the EC with France as its advocate. The above categories are neither exhaustive nor consistently in force, but they provide an indication of the complexity that bedevils any European attempt at mediation in Yugoslavia.

The United States continues to play a decisive role in the region although its new foreign policy priorities have not been clarified yet. There is little doubt that throughout the cold-war period, the United States had become a defender of the status quo in the globe - a position shared by the Soviet Union in Europe. Neither side dared to instigate changes that could lead to a nuclear conflict - a possibility that discouraged the most ardent Marxists in the Kremlin or human rights and self determination advocates in Washington. Now that the spectre of mutual destruction has gone and President Bush's "new order" is incubating, a change of attitude on the necessity of the status quo might be

imminent. It is difficult for a country that once plunged into a devastating civil war in order to prevent the secession of its southern states, to justify the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However moving away from support of the status quo towards backing the secessionist states, is a gradual process which is not immediately apparent (23).

Initial American support for Milosevic was reversed after it became clear that he was promoting Serbian nationalism rather than Yugoslav unity. Albanian and Croat lobbies in Washington, along with the decline of Milosevic's credibility, instigated the Nickles Amendment according to which, continuation of US aid to Yugoslavia depended on the improvement of human rights in that country. The eventual removal of American financial support "appeared to prepare the way for recognition of individual republics as independent states, which was implicit in US Secretary of State, James Baker's announcement that future assistance would be on a case to case basis" (24). In his late July trip to Yugoslavia, Mr. Baker stated that his government would not object to a peaceful process leading to independence (25).

On the level of realpolitik, the adoption and protection of a weak state entity could create a domain of influence for the United States in an ever-changing strategic environment. On the other hand an encouragement of Slovenia, Croatia and perhaps other Republics to go their way, would create an unfavourable precedent for the Soviet Union. The coup of 19 August, no matter how quickly it collapsed, indicated among other things, concern

of a segment of the Armed Forces for the future of the Soviet Republics. If the West could overlook the disintegration of Yugoslavia it cannot ignore its important side - effects on the region and even beyond that.

Regional Problems and Greece's Concerns

The predicament that holds the future of Balkan security on balance, has already been described. The United States as well as European institutions and governments however, have not yet finalised their decision between supporting the integrity of state borders in the region or the demands for self-determination of its ethnic groups.

Given the classification of European motives on this predicament (attempted above) we shall try to place Greece in that perspective. Greek views on the question have not been affected by secessionist demands within her territory or her own irredentist claims on others. The Islamic minority in Greek Thrace, even if its Turkish element was to be dominated entirely by the foreign policy priorities of Turkey, constitutes a small percentage of Greece's total population. On the other hand Greece has renounced its claims to Southern Albania and has no irredentist designs in the region. Of the potential independent entities that will follow a break-up of Yugoslavia, Greece can exert no influence on Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. Her traditional ties are with Serbia which possesses a population roughly the size of Greece's.

Even friendly relations between Greece and Serbia could prove problematic if Skopjea choses to remaine in the Yugoslav (more appropriately now termed "Serboslav") fold after a break-away of other Republics. In her choice therefore between upholding self-determination or the territorial status quo in the region, Greece could offer the formula of Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos as an alternative solution (26):

In view of the forces of fusion already underway in Western Europe (and possibly a Europe unified in its entirety in the future) the tendencies of fission might prove an impediment to the prospects of unification. States as we know them, are the constituent parts of the Federal European system now evolving with guarantees for the preservation of the character of its integral parts. Within each state, ethnic, religious and cultural subgroups will also be protected from forced assimilation. Should the process of fission lead to fragmentation of states into ever-increasing weak units - in the image of Medieval Europe, larger powers will sooner or later engulf or dominate them. Instead of a united Europe, a Carolingian cluster of fiefdoms could develop under the influence of the larger regional powers.

Yugoslavia in particular could be likened to a Russian doll - within each Republic are sub-groups and in each sub-group there are perhaps others. Securing the individual right and their full and free expression of religious, cultural and other preferences, is the cornerstone of any federal system, be it a Federal State or a European federation of states. "The concept of protecting

the rights of individuals ... as promoted by the UN and further developed by the Council of Europe, seems a more appropriate foundation for safeguarding the rights of the members of any sub-groups" (27).

The claims of minorities or sub-groups, to a separate state-existence, will create disturbances not only in the state directly concerned, but in the larger region of such occurrences. In the Yugoslav case, the secession of Kossovo could lead to its eventual annexation by Albania, which might also aspire to the western part of the Macedonian Republic with its sizable Albanian minority (20%). Should the Macedonian Republic decide to bolt the Union it could revive old Bulgarian irredentist appetites. Serbo-Bulgarian relations are currently at a low ebb. An attempt of Serbia to prevent by force the Macedonian Republic from bolting (28) or Bulgaria to incorporate it once it has left, will undoubtedly mean war between them. An enlarged Bulgaria adopting Skopjean irredentism or reviving its own, will undoubtedly constitute a serious concern for Greece.

A worst-case scenario would anticipate a similar chain-reaction of changes involving Hungary, Vojvodina and possibly Romania in the north, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the center.

Despite its parochial internal politics, Greece remains a haven of stability and peace in the region and favours 1) the solution of a confederation in Yugoslavia (with the possible

exclusion of an independent Slovenia), 2) and a monitoring of human rights by the EC, the CSCE or the Council of Europe to insure individual rights within each state of the confederation.

The final element of distabilization and division in the Balkans would be the introduction of the "Ottoman factor".

Since the end of Ottoman presense in the region, the Balkans had not witnessed a Turkish involvement in the affairs of indigenous Moslems, until recently. Turkey's interwar participation in bilateral treaties with Balkan States and attempts at Balkan cooperation, were recast under a different setting in the postwar East-West division. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Turkey found it opportune to approach the Turcoman populations of the Soviet Union and the Moslems of the Balkans. Given Ataturk's doctrine of the secular state, it had been impossible for Turkish policy-makers to establish links with Balkan Moslems on the basis of a common religious heritage. This development became feasible by the gradual convergence of Islam and Turkish nationalism, a process that has been facilitated by Mr. Ozal's advent to power. The reconciliation of nationalism and Islam after the forced separation attempted by Ataturk, is based on the ideology elaborated by the most influential exponent of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Goekalp, during the first decades of our century. According to Goekalp the Turks partook in three traditions, those of the Turkish nation, the Islamic community and western civilization (29). Whereas the Founder of modern Turkey considered the islamic element incompatible with his own western orien-

tation, it is entirely possible that the present convergence of the two other elements of Goekalp's triad will ultimately impede the prospect of Turkey's entry into the western Community. Be that as it may, Turkey since 1989 has been making inroads in the Balkan peninsula via islamic outposts. More than five and a half million Moslems of Bulgarian, Turkish, Serbian and Albanian ethnic origin, reside in a geographic wedge that extends from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, separating Greece from her Slavic Christian neighbours. Turkey is exploring the possibility of becoming the champion of the Balkan Moslems thus enhancing her influence in the region and creating another yet alternative to her strategic importance after East-West detente.

Rekindling the islamic element may prove dangerous in a region already torn by separatist movements and extremely destabilising in Albania with 2/3 Moslem and 1/3 Christian populations and in Skopje with over 20% Moslems. Should religion become a vehicle of foreign policy and power politics, Greece would most likely pursue its own northern axis with Bulgaria, Romania and Russia.

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TURKEY IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

by

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TURKEY IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

by Graham E. Fuller

The extraordinary revolution and turmoil in global politics unleashed by Gorbachev in the past five years have left few countries untouched. The republics of the Soviet Union and Moscow's East European empire have been the most directly ~~unaffected~~. Other regions have been indirectly affected as fading Cold War paradigms create new policies and interrelationships. Turkey own geopolitical environment has been remarkably affected in this period, moreso than at any time since the 1930s. These international changes, coupled with important internal change and reform inside Turkey, suggest that Turkey may be undergoing a profound transition in its international relations scarcely imaginable ten years ago. While Turkey has been one of the more responsible and sober players in the region since the foundation of the Turkish republic over seven decades ago, predictions about Turkey's future security environment--Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Aegean, Russia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, are profoundly problematic.

Traditional Turkish Geopolitics

The collapse of empire--any empire--obviously involves wrenching change for the old metropole and its newly independent progeny. Relationships must be refounded on a completely new footing, for which history often provides very little guide.

Just as in the collapsing Soviet Empire today, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created major conceptual problems for those responsible for charting Turkey's new regional politics. What were Turkish national interests to be in the new environments of post World War I Russia, Europe and the Middle East?

Turkey's foreign policy orientation since the founding of the Turkish republic has involved several key themes. In the early days of the republic, Turkey's territorial integrity was the dominant concern: conflict with Greece, Armenia, Russia, British Iraq and French Syria involved the establishment of new borders. In Turkish eyes it was not merely a question of defense and security, but also the very definition of a radically new nation-state called Turkey.

Security did not consist exclusively of relations with neighbors: relationships with the major imperial powers of the period also had profound impact on the degree of acceptance that Turkey might enjoy in the new international environment. Turkey's place in the new post-World War I international order was carefully wrought, involving a whole series of new legal relationships that firmly established its position both in the region and the world. Unlike many other emerging nationalist states, Turkey had a remarkably high degree of respect for the international order and sought to work through its established instruments.

After World War II the emergence of Soviet expansionism naturally posed a new set of challenges to Turkey. Turkey's international orientation was fundamentally driven by that fact and has been so down to the emergence of Gorbachev's perestroika.

Today it is evident how much the global character of the Cold War "corrupted" the "normal" character of international relations in the region. As Russia struggles to grasp and reformulate the character of its "true" national interests, so too the national interests of other states are partially affected by that same process.

Today Turkey must now reassess not only its security needs in the new international environment, but also the possibility of at least partial reformulation of its national interests in the light of new circumstances. Reformulation of national interest is not, of course, an easy task. Far from being an "objective" process, the conceptualization of national interest involves often conflicting visions--political, economic and cultural--of different partisan groups. Should Turkey be European or Muslim, associated with the capitalist or socialist world, friends of the First World or the Third, interested in narrowly conceived state interests, or a broader Pan-Turkic vision?

The Domestic Element in Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish politics had already begun to change well in advance of the Gorbachev revolution. Turgut Ozal, arguably one of the most influential political figures on the Turkish scene since Ataturk, had already helped bring about a profound reorientation of Turkish domestic policies that have direct impact on Turkey's foreign policy as well. While these new policies and developments came into existence under the supervision of Ozal, the basis for them had obviously been slowly forming for a long time; Ozal has been the

primary catalyst--and a remarkable, if controversial one.

The first major area of change was the renewed move towards democracy in the wake of military intervention in 1980. The Turkish military has had several occasions to drastically intervene in internal politics over the past several decades by taking over power when the top military leadership came to believe that the country was drifting towards anarchy. These political interventions have been very controversial within Turkey, and a variety of motives have been attributed to the military interventionists. Whatever case may or may not be made for the wisdom of such military intervention, democracy seems in practice ultimately to have been strengthened and widened after each intervention, regardless of the laws passed in the immediate aftermath. Turkey has quite simply been growing more accustomed to the practice of democracy and the proliferation of political views. This gradual evolution in the direction of ever greater democracy, while far from complete, strengthens Turkey's standing among the nations of the world in which democracy is seen as a basic value of the country. Any absence of those values simply makes it harder for the Western world to deal closely with Turkey.

Today, Turkish democracy, while incomplete, is leading to the development of a society more willing to consider a broader range of ideological issues, to debate long-forbidden issues such as Communism, Islam, and the Kurdish issue in ways that will ultimately strengthen the Turkish nation. In a period when chaos will predictably be a major feature of political events in the Balkans and all over the Soviet Union--not to mention perhaps in

the Middle East as well--the international system benefits from a nation whose stability and track record for international prudence is by and large impressive. (In this context I would view the Cyprus issue as a major exception, where Turkey, rightly or wrongly, chose to move unilaterally rather than in conjunction with international instruments to influence the course of that crisis.)

The second, and perhaps even more radical internal change in Turkey, is in the economic sphere: the abandonment under Ozal's direction of nearly seventy years of statist policies and a reversion to an open market economy. These policies not only brought an extraordinary surge of growth to the Turkish economy, but lent it an international orientation that has direct affect on Turkish foreign policy. Turkey saw major new opportunities for markets in the Middle East, not only in Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, but also in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. The presence of economic interests in that area inevitably raised Turkish political consciousness as well towards Middle Eastern politics.

Turkey's new export-oriented policies sharply increase its interest not only in the Middle East, but in the developing economies of the Balkans, the Black Sea, the emerging independent republics of the Soviet Union. Most of all it increases Turkish interest in Western Europe itself, where Ankara views the frustrating quest for integration in the EC to be an important foreign policy goal with major political implications. This opening of Turkish policies, partially akin to the process of perestroika in the Soviet Union or the "infitah" in Egypt, has

still not run its course.

Turkey now possesses an international orientation unprecedented in its past. Whereas foreign policy had long been the exclusive preserve of a highly skilled and educated foreign policy elite, today Turkey's external economic interests serve to widen the base of foreign policy formulation and to interject newer elements of broader public opinion into the process. This process is still underway, and is typically resisted by the foreign policy professionals--as in all countries.

The popularization of foreign policy does not, of course, automatically lead to stability of the foreign policy process. Public opinion is usually far more fickle and nationalistic than the foreign policy establishment of any country; it is quite possible that the sobriety that has so long characterized Turkish foreign policy will be increasingly affected by other interests. These interests include economic and commercial goals which the business community might urge upon Turkish foreign policy; Islamic groups and sentiments that introduce an "Islamic factor" into Turkish foreign policy; and nationalist/neo-Pan-Turkist impulses that increase Turkish interest in the Turkic world to the East.

Lastly, in a world in which massive reevaluation of national interests are under way--starting in Russia and stretching to the United States at the end of the Cold War--Turkey too may need to reconsider the character of its national interests in ways not considered before. Here the democratic process in Turkey will liberate this process of policy reformulation. Already much of the revered Ataturkist tradition--so valuable and critical to the

national survival in an earlier era of Turkish history--is now coming under reexamination. With a lessening of Ataturkist values--statism, isolationism, elitist paternalism, avoidance of Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideological interests--factors such as nationalist/Pan-Turkist and Islamic ideologies have greater room for influence. Neither of these ideological policies in themselves can be described as negative or positive: the wisdom and efficacy of such policies depends entirely on the wisdom with which they are implemented.

Under any circumstances, Turkish internal politics have been undergoing profound change in the last decade, coinciding with the Gorbachev revolution in the Soviet Union. The role of internal politics will now be more important than ever in the formulation of the Turkish national interest and the policies that it pursues.

Turkey and Russia

Despite the stunning changes in the Soviet Union--that augur so well for the future international role of Russia--the policies of Russia--as the one country in the region capable of invading and taking over Turkey--will still retain some salience for Ankara. The history of Russian-Turkish relations over the centuries provides sufficient evidence of the importance of this massive political land mass to Turkey's north. Even a benign, democratic and stable Russia will have considerable impact on Turkey's interests. And Turkey will remain concerned indefinitely about the possible resurgence of non-democratic ideology or nationalist-expansionist tendencies in Russia. As long as the process of

democratic reform continues apace in the Soviet Union, Turkey will have less reason to seek firm security guarantees from the West against Moscow.

The Soviet threat to Turkey from a realistic point of view has not had purely negative impact upon Turkish interests, however. It was specifically this threat that enabled Turkey to develop much closer ties with Western Europe and the United States over the past forty years. From that point of view, some elements within the Turkish state may regret the diminution of the Soviet threat if it will weaken NATO and Turkey's special role within it. For other elements within Turkey, the lessening of the Soviet threat increases foreign policy flexibility and options with lessened dependence on Western power.

Turkey's strategic relationship with the Soviet Union is now taking on a different character. The end of communist ideology and the emergence of "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy suggests that Russia is much less likely to threaten Turkey's territorial integrity. It also suggests that Moscow has now far less reason to fear a strong Western presence in Turkey, and will be less interested in seeking to destabilize Turkey as it did in the seventies as a means of weakening NATO power. In this sense Turkey no longer represents any military threat to Moscow. And the Turkish communist party, in whatever state it may continue to exist, will no longer be seen as an instrument of Soviet influence in internal Turkish politics.

But even a democratic Russia will have strong interests in Turkey as a geopolitical neighbor of major importance. Turkey's

control of the Black Sea straits and major presence in the Black Sea gives both of them common interests. But the new arms control agreements in between NATO and the Soviet Union are of less comfort to Turkey than to Western Europe since major elements of the Soviet armed forces have now moved east of the Urals, relieving pressure on the West, but arguably increasing potential pressure on Turkey. Turkey will therefore maintain a cautious vision of Russian power in the decades ahead, regardless of what progress is made in West European-Russian relations.

Even more important, however, is the emergence of independent republics in the Soviet Union--many of which are quite likely to be independent countries at some point in the future, even if closely linked in some new confederal unit. Overnight Turkey's contiguous relations with the Soviet Union are in the process of being transformed into relations with emerging independent states that will now serve as buffers between Russia and Turkey. This startling new geopolitical metamorphosis will have unpredictable consequences on the nature of Russian-Turkish relations. All of these new entities or states-to-be are relatively small--Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia and thus present no military threat to Turkey directly. However, issues of probable growing instability in many of these states suggests new complications for Turkish interests and relations in the decades ahead.

Turkey's likely involvement in the evolution of Soviet internal politics is not limited to those republics immediately contiguous to Turkey. Well to the east, the Muslim republics of Central Asia are all Turkic--with the exception of Tajikistan. As

these republics continue to develop their nationalist feelings, the importance of their Turkishness is likely to push them towards greater focus on Turkey. Turkey has always been the natural center of the Turkish world, and Ankara may come to represent for many of these republics a more attractive alternative window to the West than Moscow.

Yet it will not come easily for the policy-makers in Ankara to develop special relations with the Muslim and Turkic areas of the Soviet Union. The Atatürkist legacy expressly warned Turkey of the dangers of involvement in Pan-Turkist or irredentist policies. Such advice made very good sense in the past in view of the Soviet Union's abilities to visit punishment upon Turkey for support of such provocative activities. Today, however, close Turkish relations with these republics need not represent a threat to Moscow. Turkey might easily be a force for wise, experienced and moderate policies, a model of the secular Muslim state to these young republics.

The range of Turkey's potential ties extend yet further east into China where the large Turkic minority of Xinjiang province is in increasing contact with their fellow Turks across the Sino-Soviet border. Growing Turkic nationalism is likely to be viewed as a greater danger in China than even in the Soviet Union. Economic benefits could flow from these contacts however; serious discussion is under way about rail links running from Beijing to Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tehran and Istanbul--a de facto "Turanian line" that will certainly heighten cultural awareness and cultural contacts among all those Turkic

areas.

It will be some time before Turkey moves towards a more "Turkic" type of foreign policy. Ataturk's strong antipathy to ethnic adventurism is deeply imprinted upon Turkish statesmen. On the other hand, if Turkey finds that many of its options for EC membership are increasingly closed--as they now seem to be--Ankara may find advantage in broadening the vision of its foreign policy to include more Turkic-oriented policies. Some violation of the Ataturkist legacy has already occurred in this area with Turkish support for the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish population of Bulgaria, that has served to sour relations with both those states. Turkey has also expressed interest in the Turkmen population of northern Iraq, which brings it into conflict with Baghdad. It is not a far reach for Turkey to develop closer ties with Azerbaijan and even some of the Central Asian states. But at the same time, Turkey will likewise not wish to jeopardize the important relations it has with Russia.

While the Ataturkist tradition is still strong in Turkey, it may be weakening in some respects as Turkey's internal situation continues to undergo profound change in the economic, political, and social spheres. Public opinion and the press too, tend to be more interested in the "external Turks" (dis Turkler) of the world than is the Foreign Ministry itself. If a more strongly nationalist movement were to come to power in Turkey, the country could well adopt a bolder policy towards the external Turks. The character of those policies could be either negative or positive depending on the wisdom and moderation of the policy-makers.

Turkey and the Balkans

Turkey, of course, is no stranger to the Balkans after so many centuries of domination over it under the Ottoman Empire. In a sense, Turkey has not really had a chance to develop "normal" relations with most of the Balkan states since their integration into the Soviet Empire for over forty years. Indeed, for this same reason Balkan politics themselves have not evolved "normally" during this period. Just as in the USSR, the post-communist era in the Balkans opens up new questions about the character of future relations among these states as they regain true independence after the long communist night. No one can predict exactly how interrelationships will evolve.

Greek-Turkish enmity has long characterized the eastern flank of NATO. Will the new Balkan environment increase or decrease that enmity? Independent Bulgaria may well join Greece in the common perception that Turkey is the great power to be neutralized in the region. What Balkan states may see their interests as lying with Turkey; perhaps Balkan enemies of Bulgaria and Greece, such as Albania, working on the basis that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend?"

Will the collapse of traditional Yugoslav authority lead to a strengthening of the Muslim region of Bosnia? Would the Bosnians--living in a sea of Orthodox Slavs--look to Turkey for support--at least on the moral level? And would Turkey alter its historic tendency to remain aloof from most Pan-Turkic issues? Here again, a nationalist regime in Ankara in the future might see

its interests differently and could opt to inject itself more closely into Balkan politics.

Will Turkish interest in a new Black Sea consortium of nations positively affect its relations with Bulgaria and Romania over the longer run? Will Turkey see the Balkans as a potentially important trading partner? Might it come into classic geopolitical rivalry with Germany as each seeks influence there? The complementarity of economic interests need to be examined closely to develop some initial hypotheses on the economic factor in the Balkans.

Balkan politics have been liberated far too recently to eliminate any number of possible scenarios of Turkish involvement in the region, positively or negatively.

Turkey and the Middle East

The impact of change in Soviet policy has reached the Middle East as well, sharply affecting the environment around Turkey.

First, Turkey's shift of focus towards an export economy brought Turkey into the Arab world even before the Gorbachev revolution. Turkish construction know-how was exported to the Arabian peninsula and Libya early on in the eighties. Second, the Iran-Iraq war also had major impact on the Turkish economy as Turkey became the single largest trading partner for both Iran and Iraq, as a transit point and as a source of products to meet their heightened needs during the war. Turkey was already beginning to reorient its trade toward the Middle East to a significant extent.

The recent Gulf War brought greater change to traditional Turkish foreign policy. Whereas Ankara traditionally would have

maintained a strict neutrality towards conflict in the Middle East, on this occasion Turkey, under the strong prodding of President Turgut Ozal, came down four-square on the side of the allies and the Security Council, committed its own troops to the conflict, and permitted Turkish airbases to be used by the allied forces in offensive air-strikes against Iraq. As noted above, the Turkish press also indulged in discussions of the Turkmen minority in northern Iraq, suggesting a clear-cut Turkish interest in the welfare of Turks outside of Turkey. A challenge had been laid to Iraq; Ankara did not shrink from hostile relations with Iraq in the interests of increasing Turkish leverage both with NATO and in the region.

The conflict with Iraq also unleashed the Kurdish issue anew. Ankara took a major step forward in granting Turkish Kurds the right to use the Kurdish language in public and for music--although still not for the media or education. Talk of greater reform in the Kurdish areas of Turkey is underway. Most importantly, Turkey has now begun to explicitly recognize the existence of the Kurdish problem and to entertain discussion about how to deal with it.

Solution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey cannot be separated from the issue of the Kurds in Iraq and Iran. There is no doubt that the Kurdish issue will be looming larger in Turkish politics in the next decade than in the several last. The issue will likewise involve Turkey in the internal affairs of both Iraq and Iran to the extent that the Kurdish problem is common to all three states. This Kurdish problem, and the human rights problems that

spring from it, and the sympathies many in the West have for the Kurds--all militate against Turkey's interests in the West and complicate its relations in the East as Arab states and others perpetuate suspicions towards Turkish intentions on the Kurdish issue.

Turkey's status in the Middle East is also affected by the possible evolution of a new security regime in the Persian Gulf. With the continuing Western demand for secure oil supplies and the likelihood of the eventual collapse of the monarchies of the Gulf, security issues there will remain high on the international agenda. Turkey has always been considered a potentially important player in any effort to construct a broader Persian Gulf security system. Ankara's serious involvement in the Gulf War suggests too that important Turkish geopolitical interests will be affected.

In reality, the Middle East today is the most volatile region of the world, and an area where a de facto threat to Turkey is greater than ever before--even in comparison with the traditional threat from Russia. The proliferation of weapons places Turkey well within range of the evolving missilery of many regional states at the same time as the region remains totally devoid of any kind of arms control--in conspicuous contrast to the NATO's long-term dealings with the USSR. Weapons of mass destruction used against Turkey are no longer a purely theoretical threat; Turkey may well feel it must move itself to develop such capabilities rather than to depend on the uncertain guarantees of other Western powers that have already proven reluctant to back Turkey in regional conflict.

The emergence of now independent Turkic republics in the

Soviet Union is also likely to create frictions between Turkey and Iran. Both Turkey and Iran feel they have "special ties" with Central Asia: Turkey because of their Turkic character, Iran because of its centuries-long cultural domination and frequent political control of parts of that region in the past. Rivalry for influence may well emerge. More seriously, as the republic of Azerbaijan grows more independent and the Turkic character of its culture and society is emphasized, similar emotions may well develop in Iranian Azerbaijan. As Soviet Azerbaijan looks more to Turkey, Tehran may well feel a threat from Turkey if any movement for greater autonomy or even independence and unity with Soviet Azerbaijan should develop in Iranian Azerbaijan.

Turkey's future role in Arab politics remains uncertain. Basically the Arab states continue to view Turkey with minor misgivings based on Turkey's previous imperial role in the region, and, more importantly, Turkey's membership in NATO and general support for western interests. Can Turkey be "trusted" by the Arabs to be sensitive to the political aspirations of the Arab world?

If a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli settlement should emerge in the next few years, the face of Middle East politics will be further changed. The polarity of the confrontation with Israel will tend to give way to a less clearly unified body of interests among the Arab states. With a settlement with Israel, it will be more difficult for any Arab state to dictate what "Arabism" is or to demand Arab unity in the face of a major challenge. In an Arab world whose politics are more

fractured, Turkey can more readily enter into closer political relations with other Arab states as new political alliances emerge.

In short, the Middle East itself is undergoing major changes, some as an indirect result of the convulsions in the Soviet Union. Turkey will face new challenges, new openings, and new opportunities for influence than at any time over the past half century. How will Turkey react to these opportunities? Will we see a new, broader formulation of Turkish national interests that might involve it more closely in regional competition? The answer to these questions are of interest to all those states that are contemplating a great role for Turkey within the European community.

Turkey and Europe

Turkey's deepest foundations in Europe over the past forty years have been with NATO. NATO has served two functions. It has provided critically necessary defense guarantees to Turkey against possible Soviet expansionism. While left-or-center elements in Turkey have questioned the degree of that Soviet threat, the saga of Iranian Azerbaijan during and after World War II and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it difficult to state that Soviet expansionism was not a realistic threat. Secondly, the Soviet threat provided the major rationale for Turkish inclusion in the heart of Western European security concerns. This association was valuable to Turkey, anchoring it in the eyes of the United States and Europe in the broader European context, helping fulfill a long and deeply held Turkish aspiration

to be considered as a European nation. Indeed, the collapse of the ideological mainspring of Soviet expansionism now raises questions about the depth and extent of Turkish involvement in European affairs.

Turkish membership in the European Economic Community has long possessed its own particular complications as to the compatibility of the Turkish economy with that of Western Europe. If Turkish membership in the EC was uncertain before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the emergence of the East European states as independent entities today has vastly complicated the European economic and social equation: it is more difficult to gauge Turkey's role now when the European status of its East European neighbors is far from resolved.

In the event that Turkey is not afforded EC status in the decade ahead, one of the powerful determinants of Turkey's economic development is sharply affected. What are then the economic factors in Turkish national interest? Direct trade ties with the United States? With Eastern Europe? With the Black Sea states? With the newly independent states of the Soviet Union, including Russian itself? Or with the Middle East? Where will the most effective sources of economic complementarity lie? Turkey's search for alternative trade ties are already prejudicing its case for full membership in the EC.

Turkish ties with Europe will continue to contain some element of a security relationship as long as NATO continues to exist. Even in the event of the atrophying of NATO, CSCE security relationships also involve significant Turkish cooperation. But

major questions now arise in the European view of its own security arrangements. How broad will that concept of security be?

If a Soviet Union in turmoil remains an active threat to European security, then Turkey, as a critical part of the NATO structure, will maintain an important position in regional security affairs. If there is a chance that a resurgent and expansionist Russia may yet emerge on the world scene, then Turkey's role is again vouchsafed. But Russia as a direct military threat to Europe seems unlikely in the near future, given the death of the ideology that gave birth to the Soviet challenge in the past. An expansionist Russian/Slavic nationalism is too weak a force in Russia today to demand much attention at the moment. Russia is likely to remain preoccupied with internal problems of unity and the need to establish a firm economic foundation for the future.

Today Western Europe is naturally asking the hard questions about Turkey. In crudest terms, how much should Western Europe interest itself in Turkey's future? What are the likely threats to Turkey today? How much are Western European security interests affected by non-Soviet security threats to Turkey?

The Gulf War posed this question in a new and ambiguous way. Turkey's political activism and commitment to the US, NATO, and the allied cause was appreciated, lending weight to Turkey's claim that it associates its own interests with Western interests. Yet Turkey's very activism and the emergence of its own independent interests vis-a-vis Iraq also proved disquieting to those states in Europe such as Germany that are concerned about the Turkish agenda in the region. Does a more activist Turkish role in the

Middle East and the Muslim regions of Russia spell a Turkey that might drag Western Europe into conflicts in the Middle East that are of limited interest to Europe? The Soviet threat was very much part of the European security agenda, but Middle Eastern issues are less clearly so, especially when it includes problems such as resurgent Kurdish nationalism even within Turkey itself.

European "National Interests"

The question of Turkey's future security role in Europe will therefore depend primarily on Europe's own formulation of its long term interests. How Euro-centric will the future EC be? Under the startlingly different world conditions now coming into existence will the term "Europe" come to include all of Eastern Europe? All of the Balkans? Russia? Turkey--on more than an honorary basis?

Equally important will be Europe's evolving view of the Muslim world. Let's be frank: the Muslim character of Turkey, despite its responsible international conduct over the past many decades, does remain a consideration in European thinking. Muslim societies tend to be viewed in the West as representing different styles and value systems than Western countries. How "European" will Turkey really be over the longer run? That is the often unspoken issue on European minds in the next decade.

But as President Ozal himself often points out, Europe should be interested in Turkey not in spite of its Muslim character, but precisely because of it. In my view, the chances are very good that nationalism and religion will grow as factors in international politics in the next decade and century. The modern world, perhaps

in reaction to the rampant internationalism and cultural homogenization that modern communications have brought us, seems to crave ever more deeply expression of particularism, regionalism, and uniqueness of cultural identity. While international tensions on a global level are likely to recede, not to be polarized again as they were during the Cold War, local conflict will now be freer to rise. Local conflict is less dangerous, is no longer likely to spark global nuclear war between superpowers, and may now even be of limited interest to most of the great powers of the world. Thus local conflict will become more commonplace, and the search for expression of national identity will be an important characteristic of those conflicts, certainly in parts of Eastern Europe and perhaps even in parts of Western Europe itself.

If there is a danger of a polarizing factor in international politics that could again tend to divide the world into warring camps, it very likely could be a function of the old "North-South" conflict, or the haves versus the have-nots. What would be even more disturbing would be the emergence of Islam as an ideological factor aligned on the side of the have-nots. Muslim countries are among the most intense in their search for a way to preserve their religious-cultural identities. It is important that Islam not be encouraged to move in the direction of supporting any kind of "North-South" confrontation.

Here is where the depth of the European political vision matters greatly. Will Europe seek to limit its political and economic unity to what are essentially the "Christian" nations of Europe? Will a de facto Christian vs. Muslim political divide

emerge, recreating a neo-Crusader mentality on the part of either Christians or Muslims? Here is where Turkey's role in Europe is of particular importance. The case for Turkish membership in Europe should indeed be strengthened by the very fact of being Muslim. Turkish membership suggests a cultural diversity for Europe that will be of importance in European dealings with other Muslim nations. Turkey thus can serve as a bridge between the two cultures; it can strengthen its own commitment to European political values while seeking to preserve much of its own Muslim cultural values. This kind of a Turkey is important as a model for the rest of the Muslim world as well.

European relations with Turkey are of course far from being the only intimate ties Europe has with the Muslim world. The development of a concept of a Mediterranean union of some kind immediately links all of southern Europe with the Levant and North Africa. By any standard North Africa is a neighbor of Europe; the relations across the Mediterranean are more significant for North Africa than are its horizontal relations across North Africa. The Turkish role in the EC thus becomes merely one facet of a potentially more complex concept of Europe and its periphery. Muslim migration to Western Europe, already well advanced, will require close political and economic links between Europe and the Muslim states of the region to enable this process of migration and integration to take place more gradually and smoothly. The integration of these Muslim states into Europe in some capacity will also play a major role in the secularization and democratization of that area of the world, helping establish a new

and moderate form of Islamic civilization. If this cultural fusion cannot develop, and is instead blocked by deterring the integration of Muslim states into Europe in some sense then harsh cultural confrontation is likely to emerge in the region in the next century. The question of Turkish membership in the EC embodies this choice.


Conclusion

We are traversing a period of extraordinary international change. Turkey is one of those countries sitting in the eye of the hurricane as change swirls around it. Turkey has basically been a source of considerable stability and predictability in past decades. Will Turkey continue along the same cautious course that has marked its past policies--defined by a Eurocentric focus, a neutrality towards most conflicts in the Middle East and an avoidance of irredentist and revisionist policies as relates to most countries of the world? (Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Iraq show that Turkey has in fact made significant exceptions in eschewing involvement in the affairs of the external Turks.) Or will Turkey too be affected by regional change and begin to explore new paths in the expression of its national character? The issue remains open. My guess is that Turkey will remain relatively cautious in pursuit of its foreign policy for many years to come, but that we will see a Turkey more interested in a role of influence and leadership among the external Turks, more interested in the economic benefits of ties with the Muslim states of the region, and perhaps more assertive of its goals in Europe. A more activist

and moderate form of Islamic civilization. If this cultural fusion cannot develop, and is instead blocked by deterring the integration

Turkey would seem the most likely new direction for Turkey to pursue in the coming decades.

A change of policy need not imply a destabilizing policy. But it suggests that Turkey will not be able to be taken for granted and that its own national interests will be more openly expressed, complicating the policies of the region as a whole. Turkey will figure more prominently in the politics of all the regions around it, except possibly in Western Europe itself.



9

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

The strategic environment in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean has been strongly affected by the sweeping changes in international affairs over the past few years. The new prominence of Mediterranean security issues on the European and American security agenda, encouraged by events in the Balkans and the Middle East, is fast eroding the region's position on the strategic periphery. At the same time, the sense of increased security in central and northern Europe brought on by the political transformation in the east, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the strategic contraction of the Soviet Union, has hardly been mirrored in Southeastern Europe where traditional antagonisms persist and flourish and political revolutions remain half-made. To these must be added a range of new concerns, many of which are a product of developments in the Middle East.

The thesis of this paper is straightforward: That the Mediterranean, and above all the Southeastern Europe/Eastern Mediterranean region, has emerged as a dominant center of risk in the new Europe. As such, it will demand the increasing attention of Europe and its institutions, and by extension, the interest and involvement of the U.S. as a European power. Moreover, by virtue of history and geography, the region is linked to Middle Eastern as well as European security. This paper suggests some trends affecting the strategic environment, and considers alternative approaches to thinking about the region's role in security terms: that is, as an extension of the European security canvas; the "place where the Persian Gulf begins"; and as an area of strategic consequence in its own right.

¹The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's and are not necessarily shared by RAND or its research sponsors.

II. STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: SOME TRENDS

East-West Disengagement

Since 1945, developments in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, particularly those concerning NATO's Southern Region, have been viewed overwhelmingly in relation to the Cold War and the East-West strategic competition. Indeed, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean featured prominently in the early history of the Cold War.¹ Yet, with the exception of periodic crises, the general level of interest in regional security problems in the area never approached the consistent attention devoted to defense in central Europe. The predominant role of nuclear forces in strategic thought throughout most of the post-war period tended to focus attention on the defense of "core" interests in Europe. This encouraged the neglect of security problems outside NATO's Central Region, and especially in southern Europe where the perception of the Soviet threat was relatively distant and diffuse and security as a whole more conventional in character.² In the prevailing climate of political relaxation and military disengagement in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance as a whole has perhaps come to resemble the traditional conception of its Southern Region, as security perceptions reflect a waning of the Soviet military threat, less reliance is placed on the nuclear aspects of deterrence, and regional concerns assume a more prominent place on national and institutional agendas.

In the immediate aftermath of the political revolutions in Eastern Europe, there was considerable concern that new opportunities and requirements in the east would absorb material and intellectual

¹See, for example, Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

²See Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Paradigms Lost: A Retrospective Assessment of the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Competition in the Alliance's Southern Region," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 9, 1990.

attention which might otherwise have been directed toward southern Europe and the Mediterranean. In economic terms, these fears have not yet been realized. The limited ability of the reforming economies in Eastern Europe to absorb large scale investment together with Western concerns about the character and pace of political change, particularly in the Balkans, have introduced an element of restraint which recent events in the Soviet Union may only reinforce. At the same time, developments in the Adriatic and the Gulf have prevented, and indeed reversed, any diversion of strategic attention toward the east. Notwithstanding the costs imposed by participation in the Gulf coalition, this reversal of fortune has been most pronounced in the case of Turkey.

The end of the Cold War has already released a variety of explosive ethnic tensions, with implications for security beyond national borders and beyond Europe's regions. The near civil war in Yugoslavia, with all that it implies for the political evolution of the Balkans and Eastern Europe as a whole, provides the clearest example of what is at stake, even beyond the prospect of disastrous refugee flows. The disintegration of the Soviet Union itself would most directly affect the welfare and security of the Black Sea region and could pose enormous dilemmas for Turkish policy toward the southern republics.

In the Middle East, the waning of the East-West competition has reduced the risk of superpower confrontation, but has also removed many of the superpower-imposed constraints on the behavior of regional actors. It is arguable that under Cold War conditions, Moscow would never have "permitted" Iraq to invade Kuwait for fear of the escalatory risks involved. The central and eastern Mediterranean is home to important actors whose behavior may be shaped by the absence of traditional Cold War considerations--most notably Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Israel. Their actions, in turn, will influence the security environment facing Greece and Turkey.

If the revolution in East-West relations has increased the risk of conflict affecting Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, it has also made possible a variety of new initiatives for cooperation in a

regional context. Prominent examples include the Italian sponsored *Hexagonale*, Balkan cooperation, and Turkey's proposal for economic and political cooperation in the Black Sea.³ In a broader sense, the CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean), in which Italy and Spain have been most active, is also a product of the new environment in which the demilitarization of East-West relations has given greater freedom of action to small and medium powers, encouraging the pursuit of regional initiatives. Notably, these initiatives, while reflecting a new interest in regionalism, emphasize the acceptance of existing frontiers. For Italy, Greece and Turkey, these proposals are both useful vehicles for political activism and evidence of a desire for political reassurance in an uncertain security environment.

Europeanization and Its Limits

Across most of the countries that have traditionally constituted NATO's Southern Region (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey), attitudes toward foreign and security policy are increasingly European in character. One consequence of this trend has been a progressive decline in the distinctiveness of the Southern Region within the Atlantic Alliance, and a convergence of security perceptions within western Europe. To the extent that Europe as a whole worries less about Soviet intentions and capabilities, and becomes more concerned with security and security-related problems emanating from the Mediterranean, this convergence is likely to be even more pronounced. The strategic implications of this trend are at least two-fold.

First, bilateral patterns of cooperation with the U.S. will be affected by the growing importance of the transatlantic security discourse with the European Community, even in the absence of an operationally potent European defense organization. It is less and less thinkable, for example, that individual southern European countries will be willing to grant the U.S. the use of bases and overflight rights--

³The *Hexagonale* is an effort to foster regional cooperation between Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and, most recently, Poland.

or to contribute military forces of their own--for contingencies outside the NATO area if their EC partners are unwilling to do so. As the recent coalition experience in the Gulf demonstrated, the growing requirement for a Europe-wide consensus on defense cooperation with the U.S. outside Europe does not preclude extensive cooperation, but will limit U.S. freedom of action in those cases where a clear convergence of interests does not exist. In sum, the era in which the U.S. could count on the assistance of one or two key allies in Southern Europe in carrying out operations unpopular within the Community as a whole has probably past..

Second, Turkey, as a participant in neither the EC nor the WEU (and whose prospects for membership in both organizations remain poor) is increasingly isolated from the process of Europeanization shaping the rest of NATO's Southern Region. To the extent that Turkey's post-containment, post-Gulf War strategic importance continues to be seen in Middle Eastern rather than European terms, Turkey's distinctiveness within the Alliance will be reinforced. As the current situation suggests, the problem facing Turkey in the wake of the Cold War is less that of strategic neglect broadly defined and its political and economic consequences, but rather the narrower and more potent risk of exclusion from the European security equation and its effect on Turkey's relations with the West. As the EC moves to develop a common foreign and security policy, it will be more difficult for the Community to accept the additional burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East which Turkish membership in the EC or the WEU would impose.

An Expanding Security Canvas

The concept of Mediterranean security is expanding both geographically and functionally in a manner that will influence security perceptions in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere. More precisely, the content of the security debate is growing, a phenomenon reflected in the NATO context by the notion of "an expanding Southern Region." The U.S. perception of the southern flank has never been limited to NATO's five southern allies and the direct threats to their security. Conflicts and

crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, including the problem of assuring access to oil supplies, have played a key role in U.S. strategy toward the Mediterranean. European, and particularly southern European security interests in the south have traditionally been drawn along more limited lines.

In the emerging strategic environment there may well be a greater degree of convergence between southern European and American perceptions with regard to the scope of Mediterranean security, as problems of stability and development in North Africa receive greater attention on a bilateral basis, within the EC, and in new initiatives on security and cooperation such as CSCM. With regard to the latter, there is a strong intellectual and practical rationale for defining the Mediterranean region in broad geographical terms, and expanding the definition of security to include social, economic and political, as well as military factors.⁴

Character of Security in the Eastern Mediterranean

There will continue to be certain significant differences between the western and eastern Mediterranean in security terms. Without ignoring the existence of territorial issues such as the future of the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, and the problem of conventional and unconventional proliferation which spans the southern and eastern shores, the most pressing problems in the western and central Mediterranean are overwhelmingly political and economic in character. The demographic imbalance between a prosperous north and a poor south, and the resulting immigration pressure is not a security problem in the direct sense, although friction over immigration policy could encourage a more general deterioration of north-south relations in the Mediterranean, thereby increasing the risk of conflict over other issues. By contrast, in the eastern Mediterranean the potential for open conflict is much closer to the surface and the level of armament

⁴"Non-papers" and other documents outlining national views on CSCM are assembled in *The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the War in the Gulf: The CSCM* (Rome: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1991.)

considerably greater. Even in the wake of the Cold War, the strategic stakes in the Eastern Mediterranean will remain high, drawing the attention and involvement of the U.S. and, at lower but still significant levels, the Soviet Union. The concentration of security risks in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, including those flowing from the Arab-Israeli and Aegean disputes, friction between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors, the use of the Suez Canal, and inter and intrastate conflict in the Balkans, suggests that a Mediterranean approach to security and cooperation becomes more difficult as one moves east. Certainly, security initiatives in the eastern Mediterranean will be more demanding of the active involvement of extra-Mediterranean powers.

Migration

The movement of large numbers of people in response to violence or political and economic pressures is likely to be a persistent concern for Italy, Greece and Turkey, particularly in the absence of rapid and positive change in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. The social and economic costs imposed by these movements have already contributed to a "reassessment" of national security in the Adriatic and Aegean regions. In historical terms, of course, economic migration and refugee flows have played a consistently important role in shaping the strategic environment in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵ If one includes the problem of Kurdish refugees and the very large movements of ethnic Turks which might follow from further instability in the southern Soviet republics, it is clear that issues of migration will occupy a prominent place on the strategic agenda of policy-makers and strategists around the region.

Continued refugee flows and prolonged lawlessness in the Adriatic region could impose considerable costs on Italy and Greece. The response may be a strategy of physical interdiction in the short term,

⁵See, for example, the extensive treatment of population and migration issues in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, first published 1949).

or longer-term economic assistance to limit future migration, or both.⁶ As separatist movements gather momentum in Yugoslavia and possibly elsewhere in the Balkans, the control of arms shipments may emerge as an even more pressing concern.

Communications and Resources as Strategic Issues

As a result of their position on the periphery of the European economic space, Greece and Turkey will have a strong stake in the maintenance of unimpeded transport across the Balkans and the Adriatic. The prolonged closure of the Yugoslav land link to the European market would be particularly troubling at a time when European economic integration is the focus of attention. Greater reliance on the maritime link across the Adriatic would raise new commercial issues and perhaps reinforce the commonality of strategic interest between Greece and Italy. Economic development in Eastern Europe, coupled with new regional initiatives in the former area of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, may also lead to a revival of Trieste as a link between south central Europe and the Mediterranean. This would introduce new actors with a stake in the stability of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean as a whole.

The strategic environment in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean will also be shaped by resource and resource-related issues. Access to energy supplies, in particular those arriving via the Suez Canal and oil pipelines terminating in the Levant, will be a continuing source of European and U.S. interest in the region. Prior to the Gulf War, more than half of Europe's oil imports were obtained via the Mediterranean. The shipment of Iraqi oil through Turkish pipelines, halted as part of the program of economic sanctions following the invasion of Kuwait, will undoubtedly resume at some point. In the near

⁶Greece has absorbed perhaps 150,000 migrants in 1990-91, including 30,000 Pontian Greeks from the Soviet Union, 50,000 Albanians (perhaps half of whom are ethnic Greeks), and 8,000 Romanians. Marlise Simons "Acharnai Journal", *New York Times*, August 5, 1991. In the third such exodus of 1991, at least 18,000 Albanians arrived in Italian Adriatic ports, resulting in the announcement of over \$120 million in humanitarian and economic assistance to Albania from Italy and the EC. *Los Angeles Times*, August 13, 1991.

term, the resumption of shipments will facilitate the payment of Iraqi reparations. Over the longer term, the desire to diversify the shipping routes for Gulf oil, avoiding an over reliance on Hormuz, is likely to reassert itself strongly.

The control over water resources will be an important dimension of the strategic environment ashore in the eastern Mediterranean, with potentially important implications for Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria. As with oil, it is unlikely that water and other resource-related objectives will serve as causes of conflict in their own right; that is, in the absence of underlying regional ambitions and fears. In combination with wider territorial and political concerns, resource issues can exert a strong influence on national strategies and provide a spark for conflict.⁷ This could also be the case in relation to resource issues in the Aegean.

Overall, an expanding definition of security in Europe as a whole is likely to result in increased attention to Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean for the simple reason that, in the absence of renewed East-West competition, many of the most prominent security and security-related problems will emanate from this region. An expanding security canvas may also suggest an expanded set of participants. To the extent that Germany begins to recast its defense policy to address risks outside central Europe, and to support allied strategies outside the NATO area, the Mediterranean will be the first and most natural outlet. Indeed, a sizeable portion of the German navy was deployed into the Mediterranean in support of NATO operations during the Gulf crisis.⁸

⁷See Ian Lesser, *Resources and Strategy: Vital Materials in International Conflict, 1600-Present* (London: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1989).

⁸The presence included 17 vessels and 2,200 men. *FBIS-West Europe Report*, February 19, 1991, p. 22. See also Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, May/June 1991.

The Mediterranean as a Center of Security Concerns

The Mediterranean will be a center of residual military power even in the wake of conventional arms control agreements and unilateral reductions, as significant arsenals in the Maghreb and the Levant remain unaffected. To these must be added the U.S., Soviet and European naval and naval air forces which remain outside the CFE framework. As a result, the link between European arms control and increased security is more ambiguous in the Mediterranean context, and perhaps least automatic in Southeastern Europe. Countries around the region will be justifiably wary of future initiatives that might alter regional balances, most importantly between Greece and Turkey, and among Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors. More broadly, the large and increasingly sophisticated arsenals along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean suggest a future in which there will be a greater balance of military capability between north and south.⁹ One consequence of this trend may be the growing significance of major non-littoral states in regional deterrence.

Some Consequences of the Gulf War

The experience of the Gulf War has reinforced existing concerns about the post-CFE military balance in the region. First, the war strengthened fears with regard to the proliferation of unconventional weapons--chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear--together with the means for their delivery at longer ranges. The continuing proliferation of conventional as well as unconventional arsenals, coupled with aircraft and ballistic missiles of increasing range, could transform the strategic environment in the Mediterranean, directly affecting the countries of Southeastern Europe. Looking strictly at the Mediterranean littoral, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria all

⁹Roberto Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean*, Chaillot Papers, No. 2 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1991), p. 6; see also Laura Guazzone, "Threats from the South and the Security of Southern Europe," paper presented at the Institute for Strategic and International Studies Tenth Anniversary Conference, Lisbon, 8-10 November, 1990, pp. 13-15.

possess ballistic missiles of varying range and accuracy, and are seeking to acquire more capable systems.¹⁰ In the absence of a parallel nuclear capability, these systems are unlikely to alter the outcome of potential conflicts around the Mediterranean (most of which are south-south, rather than north-south), but their presence may exert a strong influence on strategic calculations along the northern shore of the Mediterranean. In particular, the threat of retaliation against population centers in southern Europe or Turkey could complicate decisions regarding intervention in the Middle East or the support for U.S. or allied operations outside Europe.

The recent threat of Libyan retaliation against targets in Spain and Italy in the event that bases in these countries are used to attack Libya suggests the possibility of more serious incidents on the pattern of the 1986 missile attack on the island of Lampedusa.¹¹ Crete, with its U.S. facilities, would be similarly vulnerable. The era of the "sanctuarization" of military facilities and population centers in southern and southeastern Europe in regional conflicts may be drawing to a close, with important implications for relations across the Atlantic as well as the Mediterranean.¹² In some respects, of course, Southeastern Europe has never been a sanctuary in relation to conflict in the Middle East, as the prevalence of international terrorist incidents in Italy and Greece suggests. Efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology as well as more prosaic weapons in North Africa and the Levant may well lead to demands for European, U.S. and Soviet naval and air reductions in the Mediterranean as a *quid pro quo*.

¹⁰See Janne E. Nolan, *The Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World* (Washington: Brookings, 1991); Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," *Adelphi Paper* No. 252 (London: IISS, 1990); and W. Seth Carus, *Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990).

¹¹"Foreign Ministry Reacts to Al-Qadhdhafi Threats," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, July 29, 1991, p. 21.

¹²Guazzone, "Threats from the South and the Security of Southern Europe," p. 13.

Second, the Turkish role in the Gulf coalition has resulted in growing Western attention to Turkey's position in the Middle East and the vulnerabilities and military modernization requirements flowing from this. The transfer of equipment "cascaded" to Turkey under CFE, together with expanded U.S. security assistance to Turkey will help to address long-standing modernization needs, bolstering deterrence in the Middle East.¹³ At the same time, this assistance will give rise to considerable anxiety in Greece and Bulgaria about the longer-term effects of Turkish defense improvement on the regional balance in the Balkans.¹⁴

The U.S. and the Mediterranean

The level and character of the U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean will play an important part in shaping the strategic environment in the region over the next decade. This involvement is hardly new. The U.S. has been a Mediterranean power in at least a limited sense for almost two hundred years, and the its military presence is not simply a transitory phenomenon flowing from the requirements of the Cold War. As the East-West military competition in Europe wanes, the continued concentration of the U.S. presence in central Europe would do little to respond to new security problems emanating from the Mediterranean, and might worsen the prospects for a continued U.S. presence in Europe, at whatever level, by raising German "singularization" concerns. In a period in which forces are being reduced across Europe, the essential question is not one of additional presence, but rather residual presence and its location.¹⁵ If the

¹³Under NATO's Equipment Transfer Program, Turkey is to receive some 1,050 M-60 and Leopard tanks, 600 armored combat vehicles and 70 artillery pieces, as well as 40 F-4 fighters, attack helicopters and surface-to-air missiles. Greece will also be a substantial recipient of cascaded equipment, including 700 tanks, 150 armored combat vehicles, and 70 artillery pieces. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 6 July 1991.

¹⁴See, for example, Yannis G. Valinakis, "Greece and the CFE Negotiations" (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1991), p. 23.

¹⁵The economic and strategic implications of a U.S. withdrawal from southern Europe are treated in Jane M.O. Sharp, ed., *Europe After an American Withdrawal: Economic and Military Issues* (Oxford: Oxford

Mediterranean is becoming more important to the security--broadly defined--of Europe as a whole, it is likely to become more important to the U.S. as a European power. In principle, this suggests that the U.S. military presence in and around the Mediterranean is likely to be the most durable dimension of its future presence in Europe.

Traditionally, the U.S. presence in NATO's Southern Region has served to promote the cohesion of a theater with diverse or even conflicting security interests, and to "couple" security across Europe's regions as well as across the Atlantic. In the wake of the Gulf war, there will be a further and important need to balance the European and Middle Eastern dimensions of Mediterranean strategy. The planned transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing to Crotona in Calabria, will be relevant to security in both arenas, and a valuable hedge against reductions in naval presence as a result of economic stringency, or less likely, naval arms control. The base itself will facilitate the rapid deployment of forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and could support the sort of multilateral initiatives which are likely to be a central feature of future security arrangements in the Mediterranean (e.g., a NATO rapid response force, and a permanent naval force).

Soviet Interests and Behavior

The process of Soviet strategic contraction suggests a declining level of Soviet military presence and activism beyond its borders. The Soviet Union will, however, retain a strong political and economic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Roughly 30 percent of all Soviet imports and exports flow through the Black Sea route. The Soviet Union also makes intensive use of the Suez Canal, with over 1,000 transits per year.¹⁶ There has also been a marked

University Press, 1990), in particular, the chapters by Athanassios G. Platias and Saadet Deger on Greece and Turkey.

¹⁶A.P. Mikhailovsky, *The Mediterranean Sea: Security and Cooperation (Military Strategic Aspects)*, paper presented at the Madrid Complutense University Summer Seminar on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, July 15, 1991.

expansion of Soviet economic and political relations with Turkey in recent years. The Turkish proposal for economic cooperation in the Black Sea, which is supported by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, is a reflection of perceived political as well as economic benefits. A leading economic role in the Black Sea is viewed in Ankara as enhancing Turkey's attractiveness to the EC. At a minimum, it could help to offset Turkey's position on the periphery of Europe. For Moscow, an uncertain future for the southern republics makes the prospect of a Turkish economic and political role in Azerbaijan and elsewhere a relatively attractive alternative to more radical Islamic influences.

III. THINKING ABOUT STRATEGY TOWARD THE MEDITERRANEAN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Three broad approaches to thinking about the Mediterranean in strategic terms can be identified, each with specific implications for Southeastern Europe. They should be seen less as competing alternatives than as overlapping dimensions of the strategic environment.

1) The Mediterranean as an Extension of the European Security Environment

This view is in many ways the most traditional and NATO-centric. It focuses, above all, on the problems confronting the Southern Region countries, and defines developments around the Mediterranean in terms of their effect on the security of Europe and the nature of the transatlantic relationship. This approach is particularly attentive to the distinctive effects of conventional arms control in the center and south of Europe, and emphasizes the role of the U.S. presence in binding together security interests in the European center and south. The strategic environment, in this context, is characterized by a pronounced reorientation of European security concerns toward the south.

Within Southeastern Europe, this approach argues for a less peripheral position for Greece within the Atlantic Alliance. Should Turkey's strategic importance come to be seen, again, in European rather than Middle Eastern terms, Turkey would also benefit from this adjustment of European security interests. If Turkey remains outside of Europe in a formal sense (i.e., outside of the EC and the WEU), and perhaps turns its attention to competing foreign and security policy interests in the Middle East, the Turkish border with Greece and Bulgaria could increasingly be seen as the political-military "fault line" between Europe and the Middle East.

Instability in in the Adriatic or Aegean derives much of its strategic significance from the fact that conflict in these regions may have negative consequences for the political and economic evolution of Europe as a whole. The disintegration of Yugoslavia could encourage

ethnic conflict and separatism elsewhere in Eastern Europe, as well as regional movements affecting Spain, Italy and Greece. A new crisis in Greek-Turkish relations would probably ruin Turkey's already poor prospects for membership in the EC, but might also severely complicate Greece's integration in the European mainstream. In this context, Turkish membership in the EC might contribute to the prospects for crisis management in the Aegean by providing an additional institutional anchor for Greek-Turkish relations.

2) The Mediterranean as the Place Where the Persian Gulf Begins

Recent events in the Middle East have reinforced the idea, always prominent in U.S. strategic thought, that the Mediterranean derives much of its strategic importance from its proximity to areas of crisis and potential conflict outside Europe. This approach tends to emphasize the economic and logistic dimensions of security, including the sea lines of communication for oil, access to the Suez Canal, and the role of bases and forces in the central and eastern Mediterranean in supporting operations beyond the littoral.

In this view, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single geostrategic entity, with Turkey and Egypt (Suez) providing a continental and maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Italy and Greece also occupy important positions on the logistical axis stretching from the Azores to the Gulf. Ninety percent of the material needed to support the coalition operations in the Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert storm arrived via the Mediterranean.¹ If the U.S. and its European allies had been compelled to rely exclusively on the Indian Ocean route in deploying force to the Gulf, the capacity for rapid power projection would have been greatly reduced.²

From the narrower perspective of naval strategy and the maritime interests of the U.S. and Europe, it is likely that the free movement of

¹Draft Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, North Atlantic Assembly, 1991, p. 10.

²Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis", *Survival*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3 (May/June 1991), p. 247.

ships between the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean Regions will take on greater importance in the future. The essential factors in this regard will be the enduring requirement for a substantial presence in and around the Gulf, together with possible (budget-driven) reductions in naval forces in the Mediterranean. Even if the U.S. does not maintain a continuous carrier battle group presence in the Mediterranean (during the Gulf crisis, and for the first time in decades, there was a period in which there was no U.S. carrier group in the Mediterranean), very substantial U.S. and European forces will remain in the region. Under these conditions, however, the ability to shift forces between the Mediterranean and the Gulf via the Suez Canal will be a strategic imperative.

The tendency to view the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Middle East as part of a single strategic complex is also evident in the Italian approach to CSCM which has emphasized the interdependence of security interests from Gibraltar to Iran.³ In addition to giving CSCM a broader and more visible political agenda, the definition of Mediterranean security in comprehensive terms reflects the perceived vulnerability of southern European countries to developments in the greater Middle East.

3) The Mediterranean and its Regions as Areas of Strategic Consequence in Their Own Right

Fernand Braudel's notion of the unity of the Mediterranean may be less persuasive in contemporary political and strategic terms, but there is undoubtedly a need to address regional security problems in the Mediterranean, including those in Southeastern Europe, on their own terms; that is, in addition to their links with broader issues of European and Middle Eastern security. This is an approach which enjoys a long tradition in Europe but is largely alien to American foreign and security policy which for good strategic reasons has tended to see the Mediterranean as an extension of the European and Middle Eastern security environments.⁴

³Italian Non-Paper on CSCM, in *The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the War in the Gulf: The CSCM*, p. 118.

⁴See Ellen Laipson. "Thinking About the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 1990, p. 63.

The Cold War encouraged the linkage of regional security concerns for purposes of deterrence and political reassurance. In this context, turmoil in Yugoslavia was dangerous largely because it invited Soviet intervention; conflict between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean was corrosive of alliance cohesion and weakened deterrence and containment in the Southern Region. With the waning of the Soviet threat, the strategic problem is quite different, and encourages the isolation rather than linkage of regional problems. Yugoslavia provides one example of this. Europe's arms length approach to Turkey's Middle Eastern and internal security problems provides another.

While the strategic contraction of the Soviet Union has created the conditions for renewed political turmoil in the Balkans, it may also encourage the settlement of disputes elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean. Leaving aside the prospects for an Arab-Israeli detente, which would greatly simplify Greek and Turkish relations with the Arab world, the experience of the Gulf war may open the way for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Movement on the Cyprus problem could, in turn, pave the way for an overall improvement of Greek-Turkish relations which would serve the longer-term interests of both countries. In the absence of an active Soviet threat in Thrace, the EC and NATO may well prove less tolerant of the constraints imposed by difficult relations in the Aegean. As NATO seeks to develop rapid response forces, with a permanent naval component in the Mediterranean, the resolution of long-standing command and control disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean will be essential. If both countries remain outside the WEU, or the WEU itself fails to develop an operational alternative, participation in new NATO arrangements of this sort will be important for both strategic and political reasons. Further incentives for moderation arise from Greek concerns about the reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance in the Middle East and its consequences, and Turkey's interest in promoting favorable perceptions as it presses for entry into the EC.

It is clear that the problems and potential responses posed by the on-going crisis in Yugoslavia--and potential conflicts elsewhere in the Balkans--are of a fundamentally different character than those

originating across the Mediterranean, in North Africa and the Middle East, or in the Aegean.⁵ Unlike many of the other security concerns touched on in this paper, the U.S. has only a limited involvement in and influence on Balkan affairs (Greece and Turkey apart). In the Balkans, European influence predominates and the EC enjoys wide prestige and legitimacy as an interlocutor. This is in direct contrast to the situation in the Levant where the U.S. is the dominant external actor, and the Aegean, where the U.S. is both an important actor and a common interlocutor. To the extent that Germany emerges as the dominant European actor in Balkan affairs, this too may encourage more active German involvement in the Mediterranean.

Bridge or Barrier?

Finally, should the Southeastern Europe-Eastern Mediterranean region be considered a bridge linking Europe and the Middle East, or a barrier insulating Europe from risks emanating from the south and east? The legacy of Ottoman rule in the Balkans encourages a view of Southeastern Europe in which Greece and Bulgaria, in particular, form a strategic *glacis* on the European periphery. In the prevailing Turkish view, the notion of a *glacis* is also relevant, but here it is to be found on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders (and in a different context, the border with the Soviet Union). With regard to political and economic relations in the Middle East and around the Black Sea, the notion of a "bridge" has greater resonance. Ultimately, the issue of barrier versus bridge--and in the case of the former, where the "fault line" lies--is likely to depend, above all, on the overall evolution of Europe's relations with the Islamic world.

⁵See Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean*, p. 3.

IV. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In sum, the strategic environment in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean is being shaped by important trends emanating from Europe and the Middle East, and affecting the prospective role of the region in European and American security perceptions. The decline of the Cold War and the strategic contraction of the Soviet Union have encouraged the renewal of historic antagonisms in the Balkans, and removed constraints which the superpower competition had imposed on the behavior of regional actors in the Middle East. Taken together with the problem of conventional and unconventional proliferation in the Mediterranean and the mixed effects of the CFE process on southeastern Europe, the region emerges as a center of post-Cold War security risks.

At the same time, the security canvas is expanding both geographically and functionally as Europe faces a host of security and security-related concerns, including migration, emanating from the Mediterranean. This is contributing to a redefinition of national security in which the Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe have moved from the strategic periphery to center stage. As a consequence, the region is likely to become more important to the U.S. as both a European and Middle Eastern power. Against this must be set the uncertain evolution of the Soviet Union and its external behavior, and the ability of events in the east to capture the strategic attention of the West.

Finally, one of the most significant trends affecting the countries of NATO's Southern Region has been the progressive Europeanization of foreign and security policy. Traditional patterns of security cooperation with the U.S. will be affected by this process. To the extent that Turkey remains outside of Europe in a formal sense, Turkey is likely to become increasingly unique and perhaps isolated within the Southern Region, and within the Alliance as a whole.

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**Helsinki II: Prospects for Arms Control, Confidence Building, and
Crisis Inhibition for Southeastern Europe**

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Helsinki II: Prospects for Arms Control, Confidence Building, and Crisis Inhibition for South-Eastern Europe

Thomas J. Hirschfeld RAND

August 1991

I. Introduction:

Although the CFE and CSBM agreements of 1990 went far to make all European states feel more secure from the prospects of massive invasion, they did not address European security in its regional aspects directly. The CSCE-wide negotiations beginning in march 1992 sometimes called Helsinki II, can be expected to consider *inter alia* how regional issues, and especially those affecting South-Eastern Europe can be dealt with. This is in part because the troubles in Yugoslavia have highlighted them.

The change in the European political climate and the end of the Warsaw treaty also left Eastern European states without formal arrangements for their external security. It has also become clear that massive invasion, or threats of massive invasion were not the only future security problem. The Yugoslav case and other examples of regional unrest suggested how vulnerable the South-East could be to turmoil involving dissident minorities and break-away provinces. Still, the absence of outside involvement in these causes has provided some hope that greater dangers in the form of un-neighborly outside political and military support for dissident peoples may be containable. In the long run, that hope depends on keeping the issues of minority human rights from becoming territorial questions.

Human rights could be kept separate from territorial issues by having states accept mutual obligations that: A) remove the legal basis for some neighboring state to act in support of a national movement in a neighboring country in its own territorial interest, but; B) asserts the continuing respect for human and minority rights, backed by a wider international community. Arms control arrangements would be of little use for regional problems in an area like South Eastern

Europe, without a political framework of that kind. The concurrent need for a commonly acceptable and political framework for consultation and action highlights the need to strengthen European institutions, notably those of the CSCE.

Military pressures from outside the region aside, the central military security problem in the South-East consists of preventing local internal conflicts from becoming regional or European, by drawing in forces beyond the borders of affected countries. Arms control measures can help keep conflicts local, by focusing on the problems of invasion and external military assistance to internal movements.. They can do virtually nothing about internal strife itself. The European arms control agreements of 1990 and their follow-on forums, themselves provide building blocks to further improve security for South-Eastern Europe. These building blocs include: 1) the reductions and transparency measures in the agreements themselves, which diminished threatening arsenals, and made military behavior more visible and predictable in all European countries; 2) the virtually continent-wide verification and inspection system; 3) institutionalized dialogues, and ; 4) opportunities to focus, exploit, and expand these measures to the advantage of South-East European states through regional cooperation and through the Helsinki II negotiations, beginning in March 1992. Several measures, some of them new and most of them modest, seem worth considering. Yet taking advantage of these opportunities may require more intense and long-lasting political cooperation among regional states than may be tolerable.

This chapter identifies the background to the Helsinki II discussions including the achievements and shortcomings of the two Vienna agreements of 1990, among the 22 NATO and former Warsaw Treaty partners and among the now 35 CSCE members. It then outlines the changing threat environment in Europe with particular reference to the problems of the South-East, followed by a description of a hypothetical but necessary political framework for organizing arms control efforts in this region. Against that

background, particular arms control approaches and types of measures are then examined for their suitability to this region.

II Background:

It is a truism that arms control in Europe dealt with Western Europe's concern about massive Soviet invasion, and surprise attack, problems of the past. This is not to denigrate the achievements of the two Vienna arms control negotiations, the CFE and CSBM forums. On the contrary, there would be no addressing the security problems of today's Europe, or of South-Eastern Europe, if the East West confrontation that bedeviled the continent for over four decades had not been brought under control in Vienna.

Just two years ago, European arms control made sense as an enterprise to build confidence between members of two antagonistic alliances by increasing the transparency of military activities in Europe, and by adjusting force levels between them to parity. The CSBM talks achieved greater transparency from the Atlantic to the Urals, for all CSCE partners. Between NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty partners, CFE provided a more secure and stable force balance at lower levels, much reduced prospects of a surprise attack using forces in place, and circumscribed capacities for either side to initiate effective large scale offensive action. These military benefits apply most particularly in the area that held the densest military confrontation between the two former blocs, the so-called center region of Europe.

Yet the end of the cold war has exposed other problems, many of them problems of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, issues which have been masked, suppressed or de-emphasized for the past forty years. And the CFE conventional force balance adjustments did not improve South-Eastern Europe's regional military balances in any fundamental way. [Footnote: see also Yannis G. Valinakis, *Greece and the CFE Negotiations*, Stiftung Wissenschaft u. Politik, SWP-AP2711, Juni 1991, p 22] If the CFE treaty ensures that NATO and former Warsaw treaty forces will be in balance for the first time since the late 1940s, it also assures that each of the

subregional balances will be characterized by an imbalance of force, even after CFE implementation, of which perhaps the greatest is the codified imbalance between the USSR and its former Allies in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, even if the treaty is responsible for codifying that particular imbalance, it is a somewhat better relative balance than before CFE, in the sense that Soviet forces are smaller. [**Footnote: Ivo H. Daalder, The CFE Treaty, an Overview and an Assessment, The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991, pp 23-24**] It is also worth recalling that there are South-East European states other than present or former members of the two alliances. Two factors in the regional balance, (Yugoslavia and Albania) are unaffected by CFE and its provisions. One (Albania) has forces that remain unconstrained and unobserved by the CSBMs agreed concurrently in Vienna among the then 34 CSCE partners. The CFE experience demonstrates the inherent difficulty of codifying European military balances through arms control, outside the familiar East West framework. At a minimum, Helsinki II will need to invent ways to involve the unaffected remaining 12 states in some obligations similar to those assumed by CFE participants.

The CFE treaty, the collapse of Warsaw Treaty arrangements, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe leave some East-European states in a situation where the ideological confrontations of yesteryear are gone, and national forces can no longer depend on collective security, but are constrained by treaty with respect to their potential growth. South-East European States, especially those that are not NATO members therefore have a stake in an ongoing European security process, in the hope or expectation that some other collective arrangements can alleviate the remaining *external* security problems.

Some progress has been made beyond the CFE treaty. With the exception of Albania, all of the states of South-East Europe, and all their European neighbors are parties to the December 1990 Vienna Agreement on Confidence and Security Building

Measures (CSBMs). Thus they already belong to a system which provides a high degree of transparency about military capabilities and activities in Europe West of the Urals. Information about the structure, size and location of national military forces is to be provided annually in detail, and will be subject to inspection and evaluation. Also, all significant exercises, except alerts, are to be notified in advance.

Furthermore, The CSCE summit of 1990 in Paris called for a second Helsinki Conference for March-June 1992, which would establish "new negotiations on disarmament and confidence building" on the basis of a "more structured cooperation among all CSCE states on security matters." The structure of 35 participants represents a deliberate departure from the East West oriented CFE framework of confrontational NATO - Warsaw Treaty states. It implies instead an attempt to devise measures that address the security of each of the 35 CSCE member states on some equitable national basis still to be determined.

When Helsinki II opens, the Warsaw Treaty will no longer exist. In a dramatic reversal, the USSR's former partners have to varying degrees attempted to move away from the USSR by establishing closer ties with Western bodies. This is particularly true for the so-called Northern Tier states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As exposed neighbors of the USSR with serious economic problems, these governments tend to favor further reductions, which would in the first instance involve Soviet forces. Even if they do not fear another Soviet military invasion, they are concerned about the de facto establishment of some new buffer zone between East and West, and their future relegation to some Soviet sphere of influence in such a zone. [Footnote: **Central Europe: Adjusting to Reality, Strategic Survey, 1990-1991, IISS London, 1991, p 159**] NATO has so far kept Eastern Europeans at arms length. Aside from announcing that they would regard attempts to coerce Eastern Europe with "grave concern", the June 1991 Copenhagen NATO Meeting confined NATO's new East-West links to meetings of officials and experts to exchange views and information on

security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, and exchanges of experience in the arms control field. The latter two should facilitate cooperation at Helsinki II. Copenhagen also provided for Intensified military contacts between NATO, East European and Soviet counterparts, and opportunities for parliamentary educational and media delegations to visit NATO headquarters.

This rather thin gruel highlights the security vacuum in Central and South-Eastern Europe, one which may, however not be permanent. Events rather than deliberate policy may determine the shape of security arrangement. As a first test of that proposition, the Yugoslav Federation is disintegrating. This process will inevitably affect Helsinki II planning. Individual government's experience with managing the conflicting imperatives of reestablishing order, protecting human rights, preventing undue bloodshed and avoiding the dangers and expense of direct involvement will inevitably color the positions individual governments take in Helsinki, and the kinds of measures they suggest. What the Yugoslav experience demonstrates is the possibility that internal upheavals will continue, and that European Security forums must make some effort to address them. These are however, not the only possible threats which Europe as a whole and South Eastern Europe in particular now faces.

II Dangers:

Among the potential threats to European security with some military implications are: 1) internal Soviet collapse, with nuclear assets remaining in the hands of dissidents or newly formed independent entities or movements- i.e. not under central control; 2) Soviet incursions into neighboring territory or Soviet pressures on neighbors to the west ; 3) attempts by Eastern European governments, groups, or populations to reclaim perceived national destinies, at each other's expense, or at the expense of Soviet territory; 4) threats to European populations from outside Europe (missiles, terrorism, or externally induced ethnic minority turmoil within European countries)

Nuclear aspects of internal Soviet collapse is largely beyond our scope of discussion here. The possibilities of Soviet incursions into neighboring territory, or pressures on neighbors to the west is a continuing concern, and one that affects future arms control agreement design directly. For this purpose, the East-West framework remains militarily relevant. Thus whatever force adjustments are contemplated for negotiation at Helsinki II will be reviewed by NATO with respect to whether that measure increases or reduces Soviet ability to seize and hold territory, or to intimidate neighbors. Furthermore the residual confrontation is something that actually needs to be managed as long as there are significant Soviet forces outside the USSR.

Thus Western force levels will still be in flux as Helsinki II opens. NATO's intended reorganization into eight Corps is not planned for completion until 1994, a good two years after Helsinki II begins. From a military viewpoint, whatever agreement emerges could usefully constrain Soviet ability to generate forces in Europe or for Europe. Presumably that involves some improved understanding of Soviet buildup rates using forces outside the CFE area, that is Soviet forces East of the Urals. Yet to be effective and stable over the longer term, whatever arrangements emerge from Helsinki II should also help alleviate the political alienation of the USSR, and reduce the xenophobia and suspicion of the military leadership. In short, there has to be something in Helsinki II, for them.

These problems are are largely residual issues leftover from the CFE process. They only affect the security of South-Eastern Europe to the extent that countries of that region remain concerned about Soviet pressures or incursions, or anticipate territorial disputes with the USSR or its components. More immediate local security issues would be attempts by Governments, groups or populations to right perceived historical wrongs at the expense of others. Such prospects now represent the most familiar form of potential European "instability", or perhaps more to the point, uncertainty. The unravelling of the Yugoslav Federation is only the latest and bloodiest example of how

historic antagonisms survive. The familiar Baltic cases, the gradual estrangement of Czechs and Slovaks, the fate of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the separate aspirations of the peoples of Moldavia and Bulgarian treatment of its Turkish minority, are now almost as familiar to Western opinion as Greek-Turkish differences, the Cyprus dispute, or those hardy *Western* perennials, Northern Ireland and Basque separatism. Other issues, like Macedonian national identity, or Greek-Bulgar and Albanian-Greek differences may not be far behind. These actual or possible situations represent neither the full spectrum of dreadful possibilities, nor even a complete list of riper potential disputes. Attempted land grabs involving former Soviet territory may be the most dangerous, if least likely prospects, at least in the short term.

This list merely illustrates what has become a familiar if imprecise anxiety for all 35 CSCE members, that there are possibilities for the traditional forms of trouble, primarily if not exclusively in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether and how the EC, some CSCE mechanism, NATO the WEU or whatever deal with turmoil inside Yugoslavia will go far to establish or reduce public enthusiasm for these forums, and for their powers, procedures and composition. Failure to do anything useful in the Yugoslav case will spread public discredit among organizations claiming or aspiring to roles in European security, and increase the European public's sense of frustration with what exists.

Nevertheless, a key difference between current East European disagreements and those of the pre-1914 period is that, for now, no large outside power seems inclined to participate on any side in such quarrels, a factor which which could allow disputes to remain localized when fighting breaks out. In contrast to the pre-1914 pattern, some CSCE participants will wish to assure that they themselves do *not* somehow become involved in East European conflicts. As a hypothetical example, most European states would not wish to be obliged to even consider shooting down Yugoslav aircraft, if such aircraft were for example involved in strafing targets within Yugoslavia. Few may be

willing to to deploy national forces, even as part of some collective effort, for confronting federal Yugoslav troops (or separatists) on the ground. Instead, several participants would prefer to consider measures now which would have inhibited, if not actually prevented the use of Federal troops against breakaway areas. For this purpose, some states may propose a system of liaison personnel at military headquarters and airfields, with the thought that such -presence might delay, diminish and complicate ground and air operations..

Even if larger powers outside may not want to become involved , smaller parties may try to bring them in This process as future prospect was illustrated in a Bulgarian draft of a prospective Bulgarian /Soviet Treaty, which included a clause about "mutual assistance", presumably aimed at assuring Soviet support in a future dispute with Turkey.[Footnote:"*Friends, Not Allies*": The Economist, June 15-21st, 1991, p 50

As for the northern tier states, these seem unlikely in the short run to contemplate adventures at each other's expense, or even at the expense of a fragmenting USSR. Having fixed its Western frontier by treaty, Poland in particular would seem disinclined to raise questions about its other borders, lest such behavior justifies calling into question its newly fixed frontiers with Germany. [Footnote: If the USSR comes apart, it is possible that frontier claims may arise from other sources, such as the Ukraine, Byelorussia or Lithuania.]Furthermore, the small professional forces each northern tier state plans for should not be adequate for settling minority-related disputes in countries next door, or righting historical wrongs by seizing and holding territory. If anything these states work hard to differentiate themselves as responsible candidate members of the European Community from their erstwhile treaty partners and neighbors in the Balkans. Yet they, like their Balkan neighbors, now inhabit a security vacuum for which Helsinki is at best a partial solution. *Pro tempore*, CSCE may provide the nearest term, most conveniently available

security arrangements, even if these are not effective for all desirable purposes. Like it or not, Yugoslavia demonstrates why the CSCE would have to be invented now, if it did not already exist.

III Organizing Security:

A. Political Framework: Writ large, arms control measures are contractual obligations between sovereign states. They perform the limited function of helping states-parties to agreements assure each other, and thereby themselves, about the size, configuration, readiness, composition, movement and location of potential adversary forces. Arms control agreements are hardest to negotiate, and perhaps most necessary between parties who distrust each other. Even if arms control helps alleviate distrust over time, it is no substitute for political arrangements between potential adversaries. With respect to potential tensions in South-Eastern Europe, arms control is a limited instrument indeed. It has, for example no demonstrable direct utility with respect to what may be the most significant class of potential problems, internal turmoil. At best, some arms control measures may help with the *external* aspects of internal problems. To be effective for that purpose, an external political framework is necessary, to define and limit the interests and behavior of outside powers.

Limiting the behavior of outside powers is important, to assure that internal conflict or local conflict in Eastern or South-Eastern Europe, should it break out, remains geographically confined. Although keeping conflict internal or local is an obvious desideratum (the worst alternative is having a local dispute grow into a general European war), local parties in dispute may have different views. Local parties have incentives to drag some external power in, to avoid defeat. The attempts by Slovenia and Croatia to achieve external recognition (and thereby suggest prospects of outside support in order to intimidate the Belgrade Government) are an obvious recent case. In a hypothetical worst case, Bulgaria may wish to hedge against Turkish moves to protect Turks in Bulgaria by attempting to involve the USSR

Outside powers will therefore need to agree with each other and with the states of South-Eastern Europe on not acting individually, whether to act collectively, and if so, on how. They would then need to agree on measures which would limit involvement of outside powers. Agreement involves *sharpening general understanding about the identifiable differences between cross-border crimes that governments commit, and sufferings that governments inflict within their own frontiers*. In other words, *separating territorial and minority questions*. That separation could be promoted by some general CSCE formula under which all European States would continue to recognize existing international borders while renouncing claims to territory not under national control. In effect such a declaration would help reduce minority problems to human rights issues, in which the International community has a legitimate but limited interest. Such a formula would neither support nor prejudice the legitimacy of internal independence movements. It would nevertheless remove the legal basis for a neighboring or other outside state to act in its own territorial interest in support of such a movement. [Footnote: see Charles Cooper, Keith Crane, Thomas Hirschfeld and James Steinberg, *Rethinking Security Arrangements in Europe*, N-3107 AF, The RAND Corporation, August 1990.] A modification of the Helsinki I formula in legally binding form, forbidding frontier changes except with the consent of the parties, *and defining "parties" as the CSCE member national governments concerned*, is one possible approach.

States outside South-Eastern Europe could also make individual or collective declarations with respect to particular events there, as they arise. One often mentioned type of specific undertaking is the negative security assurance. This could for example involve external powers agreeing not to use the territory or airspace of particular affected states for military purposes. Such an undertaking might, for example, be used to assure the USSR that NATO had no plans to exploit disputes along the Soviet border. This is a possible NATO or EC declaration formula with respect to outbreaks in Yugoslavia or

involving Romania and Moldavia. On the other hand, neither NATO nor any NATO country could articulate such a principle as a general proposition without abrogating defensive obligations with respect to Greece and Turkey. Thus the *general* utility of negative security assurances for South-Eastern Europe seems limited

Any arms control or arms control related arrangements considered with respect to South-Eastern Europe must take extra-European factors into account. Turkey in particular is limited in the types of constraints on its own forces or territory that it can accept, by virtue of facing chronic and dangerous Middle Eastern problems whose management is largely outside the European context. The CSCE process has acknowledged this factor by removing South-Eastern Turkey, and Turkish forces there from the circumscription of CFE treaty obligations and CSBMs. Yet Greek observers have been concerned with having significant parts of Anatolia outside the area of limitations and not subject to observation and inspection arrangements. This area, in the view of some Greek spokesmen could serve as the venue for a Turkish force accretion directed at Greece, or at least for reinforcements directed at Cyprus. Cyprus aside, Greek concerns about an unconstrained area need to be balanced against Turkish security requirements with respect to Turkey's Eastern frontiers, as demonstrated in the late Gulf war and its aftermath. It may be difficult to design measures that meet Greek requirements let alone negotiate them, unless some more compelling relationship between Turkish buildup potential in Eastern Anatolia and threats to the Greek metropole can be analytically established.

B.Arms Control Arrangements and the South-East:

There follow descriptions of arms control arrangements including forums, classes of measures and individual measures some of which already exist and apply in Eastern Europe, which can be further expanded and adapted to South Eastern Europe, or which can be extrapolated from existing arrangements for European security to the possible advantage of South-East European States. Some or all of these measures or

variations on them may arise at Helsinki II or in the follow on-forum that Helsinki II is to establish.

1. Exploit Existing Forums:

The existing forums for discussion and resolution of Europeans security problems are yet to be fully developed or usefully exploited. The two Vienna negotiations established follow-on forums for limited further negotiations, for continuing exchanges of information, to assure the implementation of the agreements and their verification systems to the continuing satisfaction of all parties, and if and where possible, for the resolution of disputes. Each forum represents some limited opportunities to increase security in South-Eastern Europe.

The follow-on talks to the CFE negotiations presently under way are to resolve the unfinished East-West business of the 22 remaining NATO and former Warsaw Treaty member states are called the CFE 1a talks. Although their possible agenda is broader, the short time remaining before the scheduled opening of Helsinki II in March 1992 limits the number of possible achievements. The most one could reasonably expect before Helsinki II is: 1) National limitations on active duty ground and air personnel, and ; 2) modalities for the aerial inspections agreed in principle in the verification protocol to the CFE agreement. National personnel limits are a political imperative, because the German personnel limits of 370,000 agreed in connection with German unification are enshrined in the CFE treaty, but conditional on the acceptance of similar personnel limits by the other 22 participants. Thus the other participants, including the USSR West of the Urals and all Eastern European states except Albania and Yugoslavia will be called on to agree to national personnel limits of their own.

CFE 1a is therefore an opportunity for the states of South-Eastern Europe to reconsider their own regional balance. Once national personnel limits are agreed among the 22 it may be possible to persuade the rest of the CSCE-35 to establish limits of their own in the framework of Helsinki II. With respect to South-Eastern Europe that would

mean limitations on Yugoslavia,(or whatever component parts emerge from present turmoil), and on Albania, the CSCE's newest member. The issue of establishing parallel manpower limits on newly emerged European states, e.g. Slovenia, Lithuania, provides unforeseen complications. Aside from the obvious issues of codifying permanent personnel imbalances with respect to such countries larger neighbors, there is the question of whether raising this question provides the USSR with an opportunity to reopen the the force balance issue for all of Europe. The USSR could be expected to argue that with the disappearance of the Warsaw treaty, and the virtual realignment of many of its former members, the only secure forces balance among the 22 would be a new definition of 'parity" namely between the USSR on the one hand, and all of NATO on the other, and furthermore at lower levels.

If agreed, the CFE aerial inspection modalities should serve as a model for future agreed adversary aerial inspections. Such inspections could be conducted in the Balkans between parties wishing to assure themselves that obligations of the CFE treaty are being complied with. They could also serve as a model for any supplementary aerial inspection arrangements that East European states might agree on, with each other, such as the open skies arrangements that have already been agreed between Romania and Hungary.

The CFE participants also created a Joint Consultative Group(JCG), an institutionalized dialogue among the 22 remaining CFE participants. This forum considers questions and complaints about compliance with the treaty and its circumvention, and differences among the parties about interpretation of text. Beyond resolving technical questions and considering disputes arising from the way parties implement the treaty, the JCG is also empowered to adopt measures that enhance the effectiveness of the treaty, which suggests some possibility of further negotiations in the CFE framework. CFE partners could, for example run a watching brief on new types of military equipment being produced in or for Europe, or introduced into Europe, to see whether such equipment should be limited by agreement in any follow on negotiations.

One possible feature of Helsinki II will be attempts to determine what obligations already accepted among the 22 the CFE participants can be broadened or adapted to all 35 CSCE members, in the service of a comprehensive European Security system. An obvious candidate for expansion is the inspection system which assures compliance with the CFE treaty In South-Eastern Europe that would mean finding a formula for exposing Yugoslav and Albanian forces to the same degree of observation as is required of the Soviets, Turks, Bulgars, Romanians and Greeks.

The most useful potential forum for South-Eastern Europe is the CSCE complex, especially its Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). For those same reasons the CSCE is also the most contentious forum. The CSBM negotiations conducted in the now again 35 nation CSCE framework provides for a Committee of Senior Officials, which can be convened by an emergency mechanism [Note: Not further elaborated], in "emergency situations" to assist the CSCE Council in reducing the risk of conflict. To that end, the CPC "in its initial stages" is authorized to give support to the implementation of CSBM's such as:

- a mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities
- annual exchanges of military information
- a communications network
- annual implementation assessment meetings
- cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature

These tasks are listed *without prejudice to other tasks concerning a procedure for conciliation of disputes, and broader tasks relating to dispute settlement.* [Footnote: see **Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions Contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, November 16, 1990, page 4]**

The June 1991 meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers in Berlin agreed that the CSCE should somehow be able to intervene in potentially explosive disputes *in member*

countries. The USSR initially blocked proposals that would permit the CSCE to call members into emergency session. Apparently with the Baltic states in mind, the USSR argued that affected member states would first need to determine for themselves if a particular issue *is an internal one*. If so, it was outside the CSCE purview in the opinion of Soviet Foreign Minister Besmertnykh. On this point the Soviets were supported by Turkey, apparently out of concern that Greece would raise the Cyprus problem

[Footnote: Marc Fisher, Soviets Block European Conflict Proposal, The Washington Post, June 20, 1991, p A 7] Yet in the debate that followed, CSCE partners changed the unanimity rule which has bedeviled action in the CSCE since the founding of that forum, at least with respect to emergency action. The parties have now agreed that a state concerned about a security matter can call an emergency meeting, and have national representatives to the CSCE confer regardless of subject, at the instance of one member with the support of at least twelve others. This rule was successfully invoked by Austria, in response to the Yugoslav emergency **[Footnote: Theresa Hitchins, CSCE Performance in Yugoslavia Crisis draws Kudos, Defense News, Monday July 8, 1991]**. As currently interpreted by CSCE members, the rule imposes no limits on what may be discussed, although action still apparently requires unanimity.

This is clearly not the last debate about the nature of the "emergency mechanism" or about the powers of the CPC. Helsinki II is certain to return to this subject. Many CSCE partners, notably Germany and its East-European neighbors regard the CSCE as crucial. Chancellor Kohl, for example, has called the CPC the acid test of the effectiveness and credibility of the CSCE process. So even if the CPC plays no useful role in helping adjust disputes in Yugoslavia, it seems likely that important states will cite that failure as a reason for reviewing the CPC's role, and strengthening it. And some Balkan states may find it in their interest to weigh in in favor of a stronger CPC, come March 1992.

The U.N. and its renewed prospects may be worth a word before leaving the subject of using existing collective security forums for the benefit of South-Eastern Europe. At some point the UN could be called on by some state or group of states to help resolve a dispute in Europe, or to provide peacekeeping assistance in the wake of some conflict. In the short run, however the chances for UN action in European disputes seem much lower than collective European efforts. It may be noteworthy that the immediate response of UN headquarters and the Secretary General to the deepening Yugoslav crisis was to rule out action regarding Yugoslavia pending the outcome of European efforts to restore peace.[Footnote:Tamara Jones, Reaction: U.S., Europe Consider Banning Arms to Yugoslavia, Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1991 pp A 15/16]

The one area of potential UN action that may have some marginal utility for South-Eastern Europe is the prospective UN register of arms transfers. Britain, Japan and the USSR among others have espoused central recording of arms transfers. If arms transfers were centrally recorded at or near the time of purchase, the world community and individual governments could track which country, province, locality or movement was buying what, and call both buyer and seller to account in some established forum, in public, and through diplomatic channels. Embarrassing transactions would need to be justified. Those hidden, would face the danger of coming to light.

If such a registry system were operating effectively, South-East European governments involved in disputes could watch each other more accurately, and thereby avoid misperceptions with respect to relative buildups. More significantly, governments might be able to better observe stockpiling of weapons and consumables by internal movements such as Kurds or Macedonians. How effective such observation might be depends in large measure on the content, timing, and stringency of the obligations to report, and on cooperation.

A global register under UN auspices does not exclude a European one established by the CSCE .Several states may propose such a register for the 35 at Helsinki II . For that matter there is nothing to prevent such a central registry from being established for South-Eastern Europe. And multiple registries for different purposes and areas could check and complement each other. Had such registries been in place and operating perhaps a year before the Yugoslav crisis began, it might have inhibited some of the bloodshed. Registries might have caught at least some of the considerable transfers of Soviet weapons from Germany and East European weapons to Slovene and Croat organizations in 1990 and 1991.[Footnote: **Peter Maass, East Bloc's Cold War Arsenals Are Arming Ethnics, the Washington Post, July 8th, 1991**]

Finally, It is useful to recall in this context that in the 1990 CSBM agreement, the CSCE achieved consensus on common use of the UN military budget reporting instrument. Information in that standardized and therefore readily comparable detailed format is to be provided all participating states no later than two months after a budget has been approved by national authorities. Participating states may query each other about the information provided, and states parties are committed to "make every effort to answer such queries fully and promptly".[Footnote: **Articles (14),(15), and (16), Vienna Document 1990, of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference On Security and Cooperation in Europe**] Helsinki II may well expand and deepen the dialogue about military budgets.

Military budget discussions are a useful arms control measure because they provide:

- 1) a calculation of comparable relative levels of expenditure over time, indicating increases or decreases in overall national defense efforts.

2) a proportional description of what defense money is spent on. It is important to know, for example, whether expenditure increases reflect personnel pay raises or new generations of combat aircraft. As a legitimate subject of inquiry, the more anxiety provoking aircraft purchases would presumably need to be justified by the purchaser to some of the potential target states.

Nevertheless, unlike the earlier described proposed central weapon registry which may help track weapon acquisitions of potential insurgents, budget reporting only addresses *external* security concerns. Yet in combination, the two approaches suggest a new form of arms control, where intended acquisitions of major systems require early reporting and discussion in a European context. **[Footnote: The author is indebted to Ambassador Jack Maresca, the U.S. representative to CSCE for this concept]** That kind of dialogue, by its very existence could inhibit, delay and reduce the variety and volume of actual purchases by all participating countries. By contributing to a slower rate and volume of change in the weapon holdings of European forces (and thereby reducing each country's need to react to change in neighboring countries), such a measure may especially interest to the countries of South Eastern Europe who tend to be poorer than their Northern and Western neighbors.

2. Regional Collective Security :

Regional security arrangements are the most difficult. Yet generic arrangements such as a Balkan pacts where all regional states somehow agree to combine against outside invasion, respect each other's existing territorial integrity, agree to consult and cooperate in the event of trouble, or coordinate approaches to troubles inside the region or affecting it are often prescribed. For example, on June 9, 1991 Romania's Defense Minister General Spiriou called for new "Inter-Balkan" political and security arrangements and a "Union of Central and Eastern Europe", which would however "Not operate as a military Alliance". **[Footnote: Richard Norton-Taylor; Britain to train Romanian Army, The Guardian 6/10/91 p 8]** Arrangements along such

lines should obviously be encouraged. Yet the content and effectiveness of individual measures counts as much as the political framework. Practical measures are somewhat harder to derive, because of the absence of a clear common antagonist, and because of past disputes between virtually all South-East European countries. Thus the types of measures that are worth considering regionally are few, and many of them are flawed.

Briefly then, these are:

a) Establish clearly defensive force postures

Defensive doctrine includes avowed self restraint prior to attack, and no first use of any military means. Other possible features include:

- 1) common (and therefore predictable) mobilization procedures;
- 2) mostly fixed prepared defenses on national territory along presumed enemy routes of advance;
- 3) low levels of force readiness
- 4) no equipment or consumables stored forward

The weightiest common argument against adopting an overall defensive force postures is that such a force posture inhibits counter-attack, an often necessary tactical recourse in warfare. As with all suggested *regional* solutions, to be effective extra-regional states with whom regional states have potential disputes must somehow be brought into line. In other words forces in Hungary and the USSR, for example would perforce need to adopt the same or suitably compensating defensive configurations as forces in South-Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, adopting *some* more defensive postures may make sense, regionally for South-Eastern Europe, and sometimes in combination with countries outside the region. These are:

- **Mutual pullbacks from frontier areas** This type of measure was put forward as a regional security suggestion by Greek prime Minister Mitsotakis on June 12, 1991. The fate of this proposal, so far, is a graphic illustration of the types of

difficulties that tend to plague regional arms limitations in South-Eastern Europe. Briefly, he suggested the removal of CFE treaty limited items from Greek Thrace, European Turkey, and a corresponding area of Southern Bulgaria.. The Bulgarian government appears willing to discuss this proposal further. For its part, Turkey did not reject the proposal outright, asserting instead that Turkish security could not be considered in pieces, and that the problem of Greek buildups in the Aegean also needed to be included in these discussions.[**Footnote See Premier Announces Border Disarmament Proposal, (page 37) and Bulgaria Accepts Proposal (page 38), as published FBIS-WEU-91-135 15 July 1991; Also Greek Demilitarization Proposal Rejected, in FBIS-WEU-91-138, 18 July, 1991]** This same type of measure may also be presented in Helsinki II by one or more Nordic states as an approach to regional problems. In its conceptual form, mutual pullbacks means agreement by all parties to withdraw forces, depots and other facilities, and units with particular weapon systems some agreed distance back from national frontiers. Patrols could be conducted on a regular basis, in common, by forces from the adjoining states, or by designated third parties, in the thinned out zone. Distances from frontiers could presumably be adjusted to account for terrain differences. More important, although universal application is not excluded, states sharing particular frontiers could agree not to bother, or only to apply this provision in certain frontier areas. Choice about which frontiers to pull back from: 1) allows states to avoid the expense and difficulty of required compliance for particular frontiers. (Turkey's security requirements with respect to her Eastern and Southern frontiers and her forces in Cyprus, are clearly different from her requirements in the West, for example): 2) attempts to accommodate the paradox that although not all frontiers are equally significant from a security standpoint, they nevertheless are best treated in similar fashion in treaty language about frontier security. **[Footnote: The fact that it is usually desirable to treat all partners to an agreement alike, or at**

least have the obligations that bind them read alike, should not be taken to mean that arrangements with specifically regional applications for particular regions like South-Eastern Europe have no place in a CSCE arms control framework. On the contrary, it may be possible to devise local or regional obligations that bind particular CSCE partners, and then get agreement among the others to respect them.]

- **Force Structure limits:** The CFE agreements went far to circumscribe the heavy weapon holdings of national armed forces in Europe, by establishing ceilings on national holdings of Battle Tanks, Artillery, Armored Combat Vehicles, Combat Aircraft and Combat Helicopters, and defined each of these weapons for treaty purposes, for the first time. These weapons were chosen because they, and the units that contain them are the main elements of forces that would be required to seize and hold territory in Europe. Although further cuts in these weapons within South-Eastern Europe are possible, such regional cuts would further aggravate the imbalance between the forces of these states and those of the neighboring USSR. This suggests that further cuts in these weapons *on a regional basis* would not be desirable. On the other hand, it may be possible to limit the readiness of forces which contain these weapons in ways that would increase warning for all parties in an equitable way. For example, the heavy divisions or regiments that contain these weapons could, by agreement, have only one *maneuver element* manned by active duty personnel. The other two or three (e.g. Battalions per regiment-Regiments or brigades per division) would be manned by reserves, who in turn, would be limited in the amount of training they could get. Even if the reserves were close by, they would lack the day to day familiarity with equipment, commanders, and procedures, and the habits of subordination and cooperation on which military efficiency depends. Thus it would take all parties longer to prepare effective potential invasion forces for war. This measure would require frequent and detailed mutual inspection. Its effectiveness would be limited to increasing warning of the types

of cross border attacks that are the precursors of attempted conquest of one nation by another. It does not affect the lighter forces that states need for internal purposes, and for rapid short term operations abroad. Finally , the number of men actually under arms in each CFE participating state should be limited for all East European states except Yugoslavia and Albania by CFE 1a, as noted above.

Even if Helsinki II succeeds in imposing personnel limits on the 12 CSCE states not covered by CFE obligations (including Yugoslavia and Albania) those personnel limits it would not directly affect the capacity of each state to generate large forces using reserves. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible for Helsinki II (or some South East-European regional collective) to agree on the number of reserves each country may have, and to limit the frequency and size of reserve call-ups and training in some supplementary agreement.

In theory, it is also possible to abolish conscription. An end to conscription usually means an automatic reduction in the number of actual and potential personnel under arms: actual because regular personnel are usually more expensive to train and maintain than conscripts, and potential because of the smaller number of reserves generated by a smaller regular force than by a conscription system. These factors, in combination means fewer trained men .Thus it becomes more difficult to generate the large forces which are needed to seize and hold terrain . The US and Britain have found professional armies more effective and useful in modern war. Both countries appreciate the limited political constraints on employing professionals where necessary.

Continental countries on the other hand value the political constraints which a citizen army is credited with imposing on governments, and especially on high commands The former Communist states of Eastern Europe may be caught between wishing to get rid of a party-oriented military system, and the possible dangers of substituting a new professional military not strongly rooted in the general population.

- **Non-acquisition arrangements:** It might be possible to agree regionally on the non-acquisition of particularly threatening or clearly destabilizing weapon systems. For example, it may not be too late to avoid acquisition of individually operated (or hand held) anti-aircraft missiles, or not to acquire new generations of surface to surface missiles. Because hand held anti-aircraft missiles are favorites of irregular forces, governments may welcome an agreement not to acquire, transfer, or permit the transit of such systems. It might also be possible to affirm and refine regionally undertakings made elsewhere about non-acquisition of surface to surface missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and inhumane weapons in a regional context.

- **Nuclear Free Zones (NFZs)** are the most familiar form of non-acquisition arrangements. Frequently propounded and seldom achieved (the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone established by the treaty of Tlateloco is the only existing example), nuclear free zones remain popular with governments of non-nuclear states that wish to remove actual or potential nuclear threats from neighboring countries, or have disagreements with states that possess or host them. With the end of the cold war went much of the urgency that this idea may have had for South -Eastern Europe. Indeed the Short-Range Nuclear Force (SNF) talks contemplated to begin in the fall of 1991 are expected to regulate the nuclear relationship between the US and the USSR in Europe as a whole. These talks should provide for an adequate residual nuclear balance at much lower levels than now exists.

Residual interest in a Balkan nuclear free zone as a contribution to nuclear stability in Europe may therefore be much reduced . In the past Greece, Romania and Bulgaria favored the establishment of such a zone, with mild support by Yugoslavia. Turkey strongly opposed the regional NFZ idea, making any nuclear withdrawals from the area contingent on a European solution to the problem. For example Ankara refused to attend the Balkan summit of 1984 until the NFZ idea was given a less prominent place on the agenda. Since then the NFZ idea has figured rhetorically and occasionally in

discussions, but without much emphasis in official discourse. [Footnote: See F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Southern Periphery*, pp 192-193, in *Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s*, Paul S. Shoup Editor]

b) **Increase Dialogue.** In planning for Helsinki II, some governments , including the U.S. have suggested a permanent dialogue on security issues, where military subjects of all kinds could be raised by member states, in the belief, that such discussions could generate new measures that would benefit Europe, either as a whole, or regionally. Dialogues about military doctrine and other subjects between U.S , Soviet, and NATO Warsaw Treaty military personnel, experts and academics over the past few years seem to have yielded benefits for all parties. Aside from eroding simplistic, two-dimensional "enemy" images, such talks are said to foster more sophisticated understanding of what concerns particular opponents, and about why particular armed forces acquire certain weapons or train and deploy in particular ways. Dialogue apparently yields the double benefit of increased sophistication about the meaning of adversary force dispositions, and greater confidence about the nature of adversary intentions. Furthermore, personal contacts established at such conferences can be pursued to yield more of the same. Most participants appear to agree that there are benefits to this sort of dialogue, for all sides, without being able to specify exactly what they are, or to quantify them.

If some Balkan or South-East European security system came into being, or some South-Eastern CSCE caucus, this procedure may be a relatively simple and cost-free first step to foster better relations between potential antagonists. For that matter, NATO, and the CSCE itself provide a large number of established forums where potential antagonists can organize dialogues. For example undertakings about not assisting insurgencies in neighboring states could be vetted for their military effectiveness, in forums of this kind.

Hot lines, that is dedicated and secure communication links between potential disputants at the highest level are a frequently suggested palliative for international difficulties. Their value lies in the presumed merit of allowing national leaders to deal directly with each other in emergencies, in a final effort to avoid conflict. The best known Hot Line, between Washington and Moscow, was established to inhibit inter-continental nuclear exchanges in a world where missile flight times took less than half an hour. The actual usefulness of hot lines in situations involving prospects of conventional war is still to be tested or demonstrated. For risks of war in South-Eastern Europe, aside from the reliability and exclusiveness of carefully maintained dedicated communications, there is no obvious advantage to hot lines over diplomatic dialogue or if political levels are required, direct telephone communications between leaders.

Hot lines may be of greater value in this region *once conflict has begun*, and one party or another wishes to end it. In those circumstances, pre-arranged and reliable communications would be invaluable. But communications about conflict termination are better established between the antagonists and a pre-arranged third party, rather than directly. This is because: 1) the mutual credibility of antagonists is low, and; 2) conflict termination requires a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the messenger, and in the content and nature of the message. One need only recall the Chinese warning of August 1950 about entering the Korean war if U.N. forces approached the Manchurian frontier, to see why verbal precision and reliable interlocutors are necessary. On that occasion, the Chinese sent an elliptical warning through a party the U.S. government distrusted, Indian U.N. delegate V.K. Krishna Menon. The message was therefore presumed to be self serving propaganda, and ignored. In the South-Eastern Europe context, prior agreement among potential disputants to remain in continuing contact with a European institution like the CPC, or with a mutually agreeable Capital,

could at a minimum provide a reliable channel for arranging cease fires, or at least discussing them at the point where one party found that useful.

c.) Mutual Surveillance:

In combination with CFE reductions, CSBMs will have reduced the risks of massive surprise attack to something close to the vanishing point. And once the CFE and CSBM ground inspection regimes are in place and operating, an increase in inspection quotas with the attendant administrative expenses may not be very welcome.

Even If Helsinki II does nothing to increase notification thresholds, or inspection quotas for the Continent as a whole, that may not matter much to South-Eastern Europe with respect to worries about enough warning of massive invasion from the USSR or other neighbors. It is the other class of military problems more peculiar to this region that might require more attention. That is dissident minorities, and breakaway provinces, with un-neighborly outside support for either. If there is a military threat, it may be infiltration of light forces or irregulars in support of dissidents, rather than cross-border operations of heavy forces. If so, in the long run that could mean that governments could welcome: 1) more detailed oversight over remote regions on their own territory and that of their neighbors, and; 2) more control over outside access to national territory.

A worldwide open skies agreement may come, someday. Before that, there may be an open skies agreement among the 22 CFE participants. CFE 1a may succeed in exposing territory and military facilities in all of Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals and in all of South-Eastern Europe (minus Albania and Yugoslavia) to adversary observation by air. Helsinki II may extend such agreed aerial observation to all of Europe. In South-Eastern Europe, Hungary and Romania have already negotiated an open skies agreement of their own. Furthermore, Article XV of the CFE treaty calls on parties not to use concealment measures to impede verification of compliance "by national, or multinational technical means"(while allowing certain broad categories of concealment

practices). In other words, the future may bring: 1) an inter-continental aerial inspection regime; 2) a European aerial inspection regime covering all European territory, keyed to the verification of CFE agreement compliance as expanded by Helsinki II, and; 3) the beginnings of some Europe-wide understanding about how much concealment from overhead (e.g. satellite) observation is legitimate. These prospects could be building blocks for future regional cooperation among governments, if there is the political will. They might be exploited by additional measures in South-Eastern Europe, keyed to the special kinds of potential security problems noted above, such as:

- Ad hoc open skies agreements among all or some Eastern European states, featuring common operation of observation aircraft (or permitted aerial adversary inspections). These could help parties in dispute assure themselves and each other about what may or may not be going on in remote areas, at least to some extent. To be effective on a regional basis such inspections may require creation of a common flight information region, to assure air traffic safety.

- Overhead surveillance could also help. As photographic resolution and radar imagery of commercially available satellite photography improves, governments may wish to contract with foreign owners of overhead systems for continuous coverage of particular areas.

Conclusions

To Be submitted after Rhodes conference discussions.

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**The Role of European Institutions in Balkan Security:
Some Lessons from Yugoslavia**

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RAND

Paper prepared for the RAND-ELIAMEP Conference
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* The views expressed in this paper are the authors' own and not necessarily those of RAND or any of its sponsors.

PREFACE

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS IN BALKAN SECURITY: SOME LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the drawing down of the Cold War has raised the profile of long-suppressed sources of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. This has led to renewed interest, over the past two years, in the role that European security institutions might play in addressing non-East West conflicts. To date, most policy analysis has focused on theoretical discussions of future European security architectures. But the recent conflict in Yugoslavia has demonstrated the concrete and immediate importance of adapting political institutions to meet these new challenges.

This paper examines the experience of "European" institutions, the European Community (EC), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Western European Union (WEU), and NATO, as well as the United Nations, in the Yugoslav crisis. The paper begins by reviewing the evolution of the principal elements of Europe's new security architecture, then turns to the actions of the various institutions in responding to the Yugoslav conflict. Drawing on the preliminary lessons learned from this experience, the paper concludes with some observations for the future.

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SUMMARY

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I. THE ARCHITECTURE DEBATE: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE

For forty years, European security was structured around the bipolar division of Europe. The central conflict between East (the Warsaw Pact) and West (NATO) achieved a high degree of equilibrium through a balance of terror (conventional and nuclear) that confined conflict primarily to the political level. This two bloc arrangement also helped suppress conflict within each bloc. In the West, the importance of maintaining solidarity in the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact drew nations together and helped minimize historical rivalries, while Soviet domination served to suppress conflict within and between Warsaw Pact nations.

The Cold War structure did not completely eliminate other sources of instability within Europe: the continuing disputes between Greece and Turkey (both NATO members) over Cyprus, the Aegean Islands and Thrace, on occasion flared into military confrontation. The Balkans also witnessed tensions between Turkey and Bulgaria; Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (over Macedonia); and Albania and Yugoslavia in connection with Kosovo. But the fear that a small conflict in the Balkans might embroil the superpowers played a role in constraining the virulence of these disputes.

The Berlin Wall's collapse and the rise of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe brought a brief period of euphoria and sanguine hopes for a peaceful Europe. But it soon became apparent that Europe's security problems had not disappeared; rather, the end of the Cold War unleashed ethnic, national and religious conflict simmering under the surface of the Long Peace. For policymakers, the urgent question was how to adapt Europe's political and security institutions to meet the new challenges.

NATO

For NATO, the effort began with the agreement to give the organization a more "political" orientation,¹ and to modify its military approach from one

¹NATO had always maintained an element of political orientation, expressed in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and elaborated by the Harmel Report in 1967. But in practice, the Cold War focused NATO's efforts on military preparedness and coordination.

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focused exclusively on the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, to a more flexible posture.² NATO began to move cautiously to develop ties with former WTO countries, while shying away from explicit security guarantees that could exacerbate tensions with the USSR, or embroil NATO in ethnic and national conflict.³

NATO continued to see its role primarily as a pole of stability in Europe,⁴ and a counterweight to the Soviet Union's military power. It staked out a more limited role in Eastern Europe. While declaring that "the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion are ... of direct and material concern to us", the NATO Foreign Ministers identified NATO's role in European security as one among several actors: "a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements."⁵

The June 1991 NAC meeting did underline a number of steps to strengthen links between NATO and Central/East European nations in addition to the formal diplomatic liaison established in 1990. These steps include:

- meetings of officials and experts on security policy, military strategy and doctrine, as well as arms control and non-proliferation;
- intensified military contacts and training;
- participation in non-military NATO activities;

²See the London Declaration, July 6, 1990: "We approve the mandate given... to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the alliance to the new circumstances....Today, our alliance begins a major transformation."

³A number of East European leaders have sought NATO security guarantees or association agreements. See Richard Weitz, "NATO and the New Eastern Europe" *RFE Report on Eastern Europe*, May 24, 1991, pp 30-34. But they have been rebuffed by NATO: in the words of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, NATO membership "would not be in either their own or the Soviet Union's interest -- I would also add: Not in our own interest either." *Aftenposten*, September 11, 1990 (FBIS-WEU-90-182, September 19, 1990, p. 1).

⁴According to the Copenhagen Declaration on "NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe" issued by NATO's North Atlantic Council (June 7, 1991): "The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance ... contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free."

⁵"Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" (June 6, 1991)

- expanded NATO information programs; and
- enhanced Parliamentary contacts.

But the new relationship was carefully couched as "contribut[ing] to the achievement of the objectives of CSCE while preserving its responsibilities and mechanisms." In short, NATO's leaders left the principal responsibility for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe to other actors, most notably the CSCE: "We will seek to reinforce the CSCE's potential for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes by appropriate means, such a creating a suitably structured emergency consultation mechanism and strengthening the Conflict Prevention Center."⁶

⁶The warmth of the NAC's embrace of CSCE contrasts sharply with NATO's earlier, more skeptical view: "With 34 very different countries, each with a right to veto, what can we do if a real conflict breaks out?" Manfred Woerner, *Liberation*, October 17, 1990, quoted in Weitz, op. cit p. 33.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The end of the Cold War focused European attention on the principal "pan-European" political arrangement, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In several respects, the CSCE seemed ideally suited to meet the new challenges likely to face European stability. Its membership included virtually all European states,⁷ plus the United States and Canada, its mandate extended from security issues to human rights and economic development, and its format was not tied to the two major security blocs.⁸ The CSCE, through its support for human rights and free expression in Eastern Europe, was seen by many as a contributing factor to the demise of two bloc system in Europe. These features made CSCE seem particularly attractive to East European nations who sought a forum to address their new security concerns in a way that transcended the two blocs.⁹

At first, the efforts to enhance the CSCE met with opposition from the United States (as well as many of the United States' NATO partners) who feared that the CSCE would undermine existing security arrangements without providing an effective mechanism to take its place. Over time, however, the United States and others began to see the CSCE as complementary to NATO, filling a gap that they were unwilling to fill through extending NATO guarantees to Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union's policy evolved in the opposite direction: the USSR initially promoted the CSCE as an alternative to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but as the Cold War ended and the USSR became increasingly preoccupied with internal dissent, it began to worry that the CSCE would interfere in its internal affairs.

The result was the Paris summit of November, 1990, culminating in the Paris Charter, which reinforced the role of the CSCE, extended its responsibilities to include promoting of minority group rights and democratic reform, and, for the first time gave it an institutional basis. The Paris summit created three new permanent institutions: a secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in

⁷ Albania did not become a member of the CSCE until June, 1991.

⁸ Thus the Confidence and Security Building Measures adopted in Stockholm in 1986 were negotiated on an individual basis by the member countries, in contrast with the bloc-to-bloc negotiations among the 23 that developed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

⁹ Czechoslovak leaders were particularly enthusiastic about a new, all European security forum, building on the CSCE.

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Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. The 34 also agreed to annual meetings of Foreign Ministers who would act as the CSCE "Council".

At the Paris summit, the 34 declined to adopt a proposed "emergency mechanism" that would allow for convening special meetings of the CSCE in response to a crisis. As the Yugoslavian crisis intensified in the spring of 1991, both the United States and the USSR put aside their previous objections, and at the June, 1991 Berlin CSCE Council, agreed on an emergency procedure triggered by the request of one member state, with the support of 12 others. In agreeing to the emergency mechanism, the USSR insisted that the 35 Foreign Ministers reiterate their commitment not to intervene in any nation's internal affairs. Moreover, the emergency mechanism in no way altered the requirement that the CSCE could act only by consensus.

The European Community

Within Western Europe there was new emphasis on developing a uniquely European approach to security. The effort was impelled by a number of factors, including the desire to embed German unification in the process of closer European integration and (in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) the need for a structure to facilitate West European participation in non-European conflicts (given NATO's constraints on acting out of area). Proposals for expanding the EC's role fell into two categories: a more integrated "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP), building on the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) to address the political and economic aspects of security, and a potential role for the EC in defense policy, initially through a rapprochement between the Western European Union (WEU) and the EC.

The EC's involvement in "foreign" policy dates back to the early years following the Rome Treaty (1957), primarily through the external aspect of its commercial policy (tariffs, trade agreements and eventually economic assistance programs). Since the early 1970s, the European Community had become increasingly involved in the political aspects of foreign and security policy through EPC, an intergovernmental process outside the Community's normal decisionmaking procedures, designed to facilitate the development of joint views and policies on external matters.

The intergovernmental EPC's limitations led many to call for a more effective, "common" approach to foreign and security policy cooperation. This

effort received a considerable boost from the political changes in Europe and led to a Franco-German proposal in April 1990 for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on European Political Union that would include a common foreign and security policy. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many EC leaders began to discuss an explicit defense role for the EC. As deliberations proceeded in the IGC, most EC nations supported strengthening the Community's foreign policy role, but were divided over key issues such as majority voting in common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the relationship between CFSP and the "communitarian institutions" (EC Commission and Parliament), and the development of a distinctive European defense identity in conjunction with the WEU. The IGC is scheduled to finish its work in December, 1991.

In its early years, the EC's involvement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans was limited, but not inconsequential. Through EPC, the foreign ministers frequently were called on to address the Cyprus problem, though with little effect. The Community played a larger role in supporting democracy's restoration in Greece, by suspending Greece's association agreement with the EC after the 1967 coup, and holding out the prospect of reactivating the association agreement (and ultimately full membership, which was achieved in 1981). Turkey, too signed an association agreement with the Community and a number of economic agreements, but the Community's reluctance make good on its commitment to Turkey's membership¹⁰ (with the ever present threat of a Greek veto) caused enduring tensions in the EC-Turkey relationship.

The EC's relationship with the COMECON countries of Eastern Europe was limited (due to the unwillingness of COMECON to recognize the EC),¹¹ but Gorbachev's change in policy in 1985 paved the way to a joint COMECON-EC agreement in 1988. This in turn led to individual trade and economic agreements with all seven European COMECON countries. The EC's role in Eastern Europe took on an added dimension at the Paris G-7 summit in July, 1989, when the leading industrial nations asked the Community to take responsibility for coordinating aid (from the G-24) to Poland and Hungary (later extended to Czech,

¹⁰The EC-Turkey association agreement explicitly makes reference to the eventual goal of membership.

¹¹In 1987, EC exports to all COMECON countries amounted to 19 billion ecus, compared with 33 billion to Switzerland alone. Nicholas Colchester and David Buchan, *Europower* (Economist Books, 1990) p. 215

Romania, and Bulgaria, and in the summer of 1991, the EC began negotiations for economic aid to Albania).

Yugoslavia, which was outside COMECON, had a privileged place in the EC's economic relations.¹² The first EC-Yugoslavia agreements date from 1970; the EC and Yugoslavia entered into a broad ranging cooperation agreement in 1980 which went into effect in 1983 (with an interim agreement covering 1980-83). The agreement covered trade, financial aid and cooperation in technology, energy, industry, science, agriculture, transport, environment and science. Most customs duties and quantitative trade restrictions were eliminated for Yugoslav industrial goods (today 90% of industrial exports to the EC are zero tariffed), as well as concessionary tariffs on a number of agricultural commodities. In 1985 the EC and Yugoslavia reached a five year agreement on trade in textiles, to cover the period 1987-1991.

Under the aegis of the European Investment Bank, Yugoslavia borrowed 200 million ecu for electrification and transportation projects, and a second agreement was signed providing for up to 550 million ecu over the period 1985-1991. An adjunct agreement provided up to 60 million ecu in loans for improving the north-south highway system. By December, 1990, Yugoslavia had already borrowed 50% of that amount for infrastructure investments.

In its role as administrator of the G-24's Phare program, the EC reached an understanding with Yugoslavia on 3 1/2 year, 35 million ecu technical assistance grant to help in financial and economic restructuring (in connection with a \$400 million World Bank sponsored structural adjustment loan.) Overall, Yugoslavia had received commitments of 3.6 billion ecu in assistance (loans and grants) from the G-24 since 1989, including 100 million ecu from the EC.¹³

On June 24, 1991, the EC signed a five year, 730 million ecu loan agreement with Yugoslavia. The aid package was seen as an incentive for the Federal Government to seek a peaceful resolution of the impending crisis.¹⁴

Yugoslav-EC trade has grown measurably in recent years: Yugoslav exports to the EC grew from 2.8 billion ecu in 1982 to 7 billion ecu in 1989. Yugoslavia's

¹² All data on EC-Yugoslav economic relations is from EC Commission unless otherwise noted.

¹³ Financial Times, June 20/30, 1991, p. 3.

¹⁴ Financial Times, June 29/30, 1991, p. 3.

trade deficit with the EC also narrowed during this period, from 2.2 billion ecu in 1981 to only 34 million in 1989.

Yugoslavian immigrants are one of the larger immigrant groups in the EC and Yugoslav workers are covered by EC guarantees against discrimination in employment.

The Western European Union

The members of the long-dormant WEU began to revive the organization in 1984, as a forum for European cooperation on security and armaments policy. This effort took on new importance with the WEU's role in the Gulf mine sweeping operation in 1987, and in the Platform on European Security Interests. Although much of the initial interest in the WEU centered around out-of-area activities, the search for a more Euro-centered forum for military cooperation within Europe led Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis to propose incorporating the WEU into the EC, an idea embraced (at least as a long run objective) by France and Germany.

Other actors

There are a number of other groups and organizations that make up the European political security landscape. Three, in particular, are important to Central and Eastern Europe. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental association of European democracies, whose activities focus primarily on human rights. The Hexagonale is a regional grouping of Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland,¹⁵ designed to promote regional cooperation in economic development, transportation, environment, telecommunications, social and cultural affairs. Another regional grouping, the Visegrad group of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, has recently emerged as a forum for those three Central/East European states to discuss cooperation in security and other matters, including their relations with the EC.

In the background lies the United Nations. Although the United Nations' role in regional instability was enhanced by its actions in connection with the Iraqi

¹⁵The group was previously known as the Pentagonale; Poland became a member at the end of July, 1991. The Nordic Council is another important regional organization whose activities affect the European security landscape, but which, by reason of geography, plays no active role on Balkans issues.

invasion of Kuwait, traditionally the UN has played a very limited role in Europe (in part due to the fact that the East-West confrontation virtually guaranteed stalemate in the Security Council on any important European crisis.) As the prospect for cooperation between the West and the USSR grows, however, the UN could potentially play a greater part in security problems that do not directly affect the Security Council member states.

II. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

During the spring of 1991, it became increasingly clear that a potential confrontation loomed between the Serbian dominated Federal Yugoslav government and the independence minded Republics of Slovenia and Croatia. As the two Republics began to move toward independence, both individual nations and European institutions appealed for a peaceful settlement, focusing on their desire to maintain (in some form) the unity of Yugoslavia. In the weeks before the crisis quickened, the CSCE debated Yugoslavia at its Berlin Council meeting and the EC dispatched Commission President Jacques Delors to Belgrade. Secretary of State James Baker also visited Yugoslavia following the CSCE meeting. But the preliminary efforts to head off the crisis were primarily rhetorical, and unsuccessful.

The Yugoslav crisis exploded when the governments of Slovenia and Croatia decided to declare their independence from the Yugoslav Federation on June 25, 1991. The initial confrontation centered around Slovenia, which sought to assert control of its international border crossings, and led to an armed confrontation with the Federal Army. These actions raised alarm throughout Europe, and set in motion a series of efforts by various European institutions to defuse the crisis.

The European Community's Response

From the earliest days of the crisis, the European Community became the single most important institutional actor in the effort to find a solution to the mounting Yugoslav crisis. The EC's relatively rapid response was facilitated by the fortuitous occurrence that the European Council (EC heads of state and government) had previously scheduled a meeting to take place in Luxembourg beginning on Friday, June 28. Earlier in the week, the EC gave its first indication of the difficult policy line the Community would seek to walk: Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos (whose country held the EC Presidency) stated that the EC would not recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia or Croatia, but Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek (the

Netherlands would succeed to the EC Presidency on July 1) also warned that the EC would not support the Yugoslav Federation "at any price."¹⁶

On the eve of the EC summit, Germany proposed that the EC hold "urgent consultations" on the Yugoslav crisis, and Germany and Italy together asked that the Council authorize a high-level EC mission to Yugoslavia.¹⁷ The EC Council considered two options: invoking the CSCE mechanisms or authorizing direct EC involvement.¹⁸ Germany also raised the issue of suspending EC aid to Yugoslavia.¹⁹

On June 29, the European Council agreed to send the "Troika" (foreign ministers from Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands)²⁰ on a mediating mission to Yugoslavia. They also agreed to support Austria's request to convene the CSCE emergency mechanism and to freeze aid to Yugoslavia unless there was an immediate cessation of violence (reportedly this action was opposed by Italy).²¹ As the Troika departed for Belgrade, the EC called on Slovenia to suspend its declaration of independence, asked the Serbian leaders to support installing Stipe Mesic as head of the collective presidency (Mesic, a Croat, was scheduled to become head as a result of the normal rotation of the Presidency, but his appointment was blocked by Serbia and its allies) and a cease-fire with forces returning to their barracks.²²

The overnight mission to Belgrade and Zagreb produced the EC's first success -- an agreed suspending of hostilities and a three month moratorium on

¹⁶ Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 1).

¹⁷ Agence France Presse, June 27, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 1).

¹⁸ Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 1).

¹⁹ Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 2). The EC had signed a five year, 730 million ecu loan agreement with Yugoslavia on June 24, one day before Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. The aid package was seen as an incentive for the Federal Government to seek a peaceful resolution of the impending crisis. In addition, Yugoslavia had received commitments of 3.6 billion ecu in aid from the G-24 over the preceding two years, including 100 million ecu from the EC. *Financial Times*, June 29/30, 1991, p. 3. Only about \$5 million in aid was from the United States. *Guardian*, July 1, 1991 p. 6.

²⁰ The EC's troika consists of the Foreign Minister of the country holding the EC Presidency, as well as the Minister from the immediate past and next succeeding presidency nation (with the Presidency rotating every six months in alphabetical order). The troika would change to Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal on July 1, as the Netherlands assumed the Presidency.

²¹ Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 2).

²² Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991, Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network June 30, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-126, July 1, 1991. p. 1).

Slovenia and Croatia's move toward independence. It was hailed by senior European officials as a sign of the Community's political coming of age: "This is hour of Europe" (Poos); "From our point of view, it is a good sign for the future of political union. When a situation becomes delicate, the Community is able to act as a political entity." (Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis).²³

But the fragility of the agreement was apparent from the beginning: Slovenia's Foreign Minister said "The Slovene delegation informed the [EC] foreign ministers very clearly that it cannot withdraw from the independence of Slovenia because that is the cause for which Slovenian people have already died."²⁴ The parties in Yugoslavia disputed among themselves just what they had agreed with the Troika. As fighting continued, Poos, on behalf of the EC, threatened to freeze all aid unless the agreement was implemented immediately.²⁵ In an effort to salvage its earlier efforts, the Troika returned to Yugoslavia on the night of June 30 to nail down in concrete terms each sides' undertakings,²⁶ and on July 1, Mesic was confirmed as the head of the Federal Presidency. The second troika mission was followed by a "scout mission" of senior diplomats from the three Troika countries.²⁷

In response to the Troika's initial mission, Slovenia called on the EC to send observers to monitor the terms of the agreement,²⁸ a request immediately supported by Germany.²⁹ After the CSCE meeting in Vienna declined to endorse sending CSCE observers to Yugoslavia, support for EC sponsored observers grew among the Twelve, and France called for an emergency EC Foreign Ministers

²³ Guardian, June 29, 1991, p. 8

²⁴ The Sunday Times, June 30, 1991, p. 1.

²⁵ The Times, July 1, 1991, p. 1.

²⁶ Guardian, July 1, 1991, p. 6. Some, especially the British, were said to believe that the Troika should have remained in Yugoslavia on its first visit until the cease-fire was assured. Guardian July 3, 1991 p. 21. In its leader on the same time, the Guardian characterized the early effort as "improvisation" and "hasty and ineffective". Id. p. 20

²⁷ Guardian, July 3, 1991, p. 8. At this point the Troika consisted of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal.

²⁸ Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network, June 30, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-126, July 1, 1991. p. 17).

²⁹ Hamburg DPA, June 30, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-126, July 1, 1991 p. 21)

meeting in the Hague on July 5.³⁰ Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also raised the prospect of an EC arms embargo.³¹

At the July 5 meeting in the Hague, the EC Foreign Ministers agreed to embargo arms shipments to Yugoslavia, and to suspend EC aid.³² They also dispatched the Troika for a third visit to Yugoslavia. In response to the CSCE's endorsement of an EC arranged observer mission, a group of senior EC officials were sent to lay the groundwork for a group of civilian observers to monitor the cease-fire.³³ The Ministers held out the prospect of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia if the violence continued.

This first step toward a more sympathetic approach to Slovene and Croatian independence came about under growing public pressure against what was perceived as the EC's unduly pro central government stance. The first signs of dissent began to appear in Germany simultaneously with the early EC actions, as a number of CDU Bundestag members called for a policy more supportive of Slovenia and Croatia.³⁴ In a strongly worded statement, the Chairman of the CDU stated:

We won our unity through the right to self-determination. If we Germans think everything else in Europe can stay just as it was, if we follow a status quo policy and do not recognize the right to self-determination in Slovenia and Croatia, then we have no moral or political credibility. We should start a movement in the EC to lead to such recognition.³⁵

These criticism were echoed by senior SPD spokesmen after a hasty trip to Yugoslavia.³⁶ Similar concerns were viuced in Italy, especially among political

³⁰ Agence France Presse, July 3, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-128, July 3, 1991 p. 1)

³¹ Berlin ADN, July 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-129, July 5, 1991 p. 13).

³² Prior to the July 5, EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Van den Broek and EC External Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen met with Secretary of State Baker in Washington, where the US Secretary of State gave his support to the EC's efforts and indicated that the US would join in suspending aid and imposing an arms embargo. *Le Monde*, July 5, 1991, p. 4. Baker conceded, however, that these measures where largely symbolic.

³³ Agence France Presse, July 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-129, July 5, 1991 p. 1); Antenne-2, July 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-130, July 8, 1991 p. 1)

³⁴ *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 27, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-215, June 28, 1991, p. 11); Berlin ADN July 3, 1991 and Hamburg DPA, July 4, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-129, July 5, 1991 p. 14).

³⁵ *Guardian*, July 2, 1991, p. 8

³⁶ *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 2, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-127, July 2, 1991, p. 17.)

leaders in the region near the border with Slovenia³⁷ as well as by the leader of the Italian Republican Party.³⁸ There were also the first hints of divisions among the Twelve. Chancellor Kohl noted that some (unnamed) EC countries had "considerable problems in separatist ideas in their own countries" and thus were "more interested in projecting any decisions in Yugoslavia to their situations at home."³⁹ Spain's Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez agreed that "many differences are in fact observed" but contended that in the end, the Twelve continued to speak "with one voice".⁴⁰ Slovenia's President, Milan Kucan, contended that the EC's preoccupation with preserving Yugoslavia's unity had encouraged the central government's recourse to force.⁴¹

In response to these pressures, as well as Serbian intransigence, Germany and Italy (along with Belgium and Denmark) increasingly moved toward supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. France, Spain and the Netherlands remained the most resolute in favor of preserving Yugoslavia's unity (although criticism in the French press grew as the crisis dragged on), while the U.K. positions was somewhat in the middle.⁴² The EC's statement at the July 5, 1991 Foreign Ministers meeting was an attempt to bridge the differences among the Twelve (one journal characterized the communique as "papering over" the differences).⁴³

On July 7-8, the Troika met with representatives of the central government, Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia on the Adriatic island of Brioni and hammered out a Common Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis. The Brioni Declaration ("accepted" but not signed by the various Yugoslav parties), contained four points:

- 1) the Yugoslav parties alone should decide their future;

³⁷ Guardian, June 29, 1991, p. 8

³⁸ Giorgio de la Malfa criticized the "uncertainty and errors of judgement by the EC and the Italian Government in supporting the Federal [Yugoslav] government in such a total way." ANSA, July 4, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-129, July 5, 1991, p. 23.)

³⁹ Guardian, July 2, 1991 p. 8; see also Hamburg DPA, July 1, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-127, July 2, 1991, p. 17).

⁴⁰ Madrid RNE-1 Radio, July 3, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-129, July 5, 1991, p. 29)

⁴¹ Le Monde, July 6, 1991, p. 4

⁴² See Washington Post, July 5, 1991, p. 15; New York Times, July 7, 1991, p. 4.

⁴³ The Guardian, July 6, 1991 p. 6

- 2) negotiations on Yugoslavia's future should begin no later than August 1;
- 3) the Yugoslav presidency will assert its authority over the federal army; and
- 4) all parties will refrain from unilateral acts, especially acts of violence.

The Declaration contained two annexes: the first provided for Slovenia's police to control border crossings, with customs revenues to be remitted to the federal government and a "green zone" near the border crossings where federal troops would remain stationed pending negotiations over the transfer of responsibility to Slovenia; an end to the federal army's blockade and its return to barracks; and a return of seized military equipment and release of all prisoners. The second annex called for dispatching 30-50 EC observers to Slovenia and "if possible" to Croatia to monitor the Declaration's implementation. The Declaration went into force at midnight on July 8.⁴⁴

The Troika left Brioni on a relatively optimistic note; Poos stated after the meeting that "if all parties respected their promises, the agreement would permit the beginning of a new Yugoslavia."⁴⁵ Chancellor Kohl called the agreement "a decisive step on the path toward peace and understanding."⁴⁶ Others, including Van den Broek and Delors were more cautious.⁴⁷

On July 10, the EC Foreign Ministers met and endorsed the decision to send 30-50 observers to Yugoslavia "to stabilize the cease-fire and to monitor the suspension of the implementation of the declarations of independence." Each nation chose its own participants (the group also included representatives from the Commission), generally drawn from the ranks of diplomats, retired military or in some cases, military officers in mufti. At the strong insistence of the U.K. the observers were not permitted to carry any weapons, even for self-defense. The U.K. also insisted that the funding for the effort come from national governments, not EC funds.⁴⁸ The Ministers rejected Germany's suggestion to include observers from other CSCE countries; Van den Broek said that broader participation in the

⁴⁴ *Le Monde*, July 10, 1991, p. 3

⁴⁵ *Le Monde*, July 9, 1991, p. 4

⁴⁶ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 9, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-131, July 9, 1991 p.

10)

⁴⁷ *Financial Times*, July 10, 1991, p. 2.

⁴⁸ *Le Figaro*, July 11, 1991, p. 3.

observer force would be acceptable only if Yugoslavia requested it.⁴⁹ The Ministers also created a task force of senior officials from the Twelve to assist in the negotiations contemplated by the Brioni Declaration.⁵⁰

An "advance party" of ten EC observers (from the Troika countries) arrived in Yugoslavia on July 9, but their journey to Slovenia was delayed by federal authorities, who claimed the Ljubljana airport was unsafe.⁵¹ The formal team of observers began assembling during the week of July 15, the first arriving in Yugoslavia on July 16, under the direction of retired Dutch Ambassador Jo van der Valk.⁵²

Initially the observers were sent to Slovenia. But with the Yugoslav government's decision to withdraw federal forces from Slovenia (a *de facto* acceptance of Slovenia's independence) attention shifted to Croatia.⁵³ Although the Brioni declaration contemplated the possibility of extending the observer mission to Croatia, there was confusion over what role the observers could play in Croatia,⁵⁴ and the effort to extend the mandate was resisted by federal Yugoslav authorities.

As fighting in Croatia escalated, the EC foreign ministers met again on July 29 in Brussels, joined, at the EC's invitation, by representatives from the Yugoslav federal presidency and the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Van den Broek tabled a proposal for joint Croatian/federal patrols to implement a cease-fire, but he and British Foreign Secretary Hurd opposed the idea of an EC "peacekeeping" force in response to France's suggestion of a "blue helmet" European force for Yugoslavia, perhaps under WEU auspices.⁵⁵ The Ministers decided to extend the observer mission to Croatia and to increase the number of observers to 200 plus 300 support personnel (and to permit participation by other

⁴⁹ Agence France Presse, July 10, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-133, July 11, 1991 p. 1)

⁵⁰ *Le Figaro*, July 11, 1991, p. 3.

⁵¹ *The Times*, July 12, 1991, p. 10

⁵² Berlin ADN, July 16, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-137, July 17, 1991 p. 16. The EC observers wore armbands with the blue European flag emblem as identification. *The Times*, July 17, 1991 p. 10

⁵³ *The Times*, July 20, 1991 p. 10

⁵⁴ The head of the EC observer group initially suggested that Croatia was "not part of the mandate." *The Times*, July 17, 1991 p. 10

⁵⁵ Agence France Presse, July 28, 1991 and Berlin ADN, July 26, 1991; *Die Welt*, July 26, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-145, July 29, 1991 p. 1, 15, 16); *The Times*, July 27, 1991, page 9, July 30, 1991 p. 9.

CSCE nations). The ministers also agreed to send the Troika back to Yugoslavia.⁵⁶

But the latest round of EC sponsored mediation (on August 3-4) met with resistance, both from Serbia (whose representatives boycotted a meeting with the Troika) and from pro-Serbian forces in Croatia who refused to allow EC observers to enter contested areas. On August 4, the Troika left Yugoslavia, announcing that "there is nothing more we can do here."⁵⁷ The Foreign Ministers met again on August 6, and debated further economic sanctions (such as a trade cutoff), as well as the French proposal to send in WEU sponsored peacekeeping forces. They asked the CSCE to support the EC's efforts.⁵⁸

The shock value of the Troika's withdrawal and the threat of economic sanctions may have contributed to a cease-fire agreement announced by the Yugoslav Federal Presidency on August 6, although the heavy losses suffered by Croatian forces, and the threat of unilateral actions by Austria and Germany (to recognize the Republics and impose economic sanctions) were also a factor.⁵⁹

The CSCE's response

The CSCE's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis preceded the actual outbreak of hostilities. During the Berlin CSCE Council meeting on June 20, the foreign ministers had agreed to support the "democratic development, unity and territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia and called on the parties to "redouble their efforts to resolve their differences peacefully through negotiations."⁶⁰

As the crisis began to unfold, Austria notified Belgrade on June 27 of its concern over "unusual military activity" in Yugoslavia, invoking a requirement that Yugoslavia clarify its intentions under the Stockholm Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as further amended in the Paris CSCE Charter, Article 17, through the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. Representatives to the CPC met in Vienna on July 1.⁶¹ The representatives

⁵⁶Brussels La Une Radio, July 29, 1991; Paris Antenne 2, July 29, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-146, July 30, 1991 p. 1)

⁵⁷Washington Post, August 5, 1991, p. 1

⁵⁸New York Times, August 7, 1991, p. A3.

⁵⁹New York Times, August 8, 1991, p. A6.

⁶⁰Guardian, June 28, 1991, p. 28

⁶¹The Times, July 1, 1991 p. 8. The CSCE's involvement was further complicated by the fact that Yugoslavia itself held the chair of the center for conflict prevention (though Germany

(including Yugoslavia) agreed on an immediate cease-fire and return of troops to barracks, but no agreement was reached on Austria's proposal that the CSCE send observers.⁶²

Austria, along with Italy, also sought the support of the EC 12 to invoke the newly established CSCE emergency mechanism, which was approved by the EC heads of state and government in their meeting on June 28.⁶³ Austria made the formal request on June 30, and representatives of the 35 met in Prague (the seat of the CSCE secretariat on July 3.⁶⁴ At the outbreak of the crisis, Germany was chairing the coordinating group of senior CSCE officials in Prague in charge of the new CSCE emergency mechanism. While the procedure allowed for thirteen nations to invoke crisis consultations, it still required unanimity (including the agreement of Yugoslavia) to act. In his capacity as chair of the CSCE emergency mechanism, Genscher planned to travel to Yugoslavia on July 1-2, but fighting in Slovenia prevented him from reaching Ljubljana.⁶⁵

At the Prague meeting, the CSCE officials reached agreement on two diplomatic missions: the first, "a good offices" mission would seek to promote a dialogue among the parties "in consultation and agreement with the Yugoslav authorities"⁶⁶. The CSCE also approved the idea of sending observers to monitor the cease-fire, with the arrangements to be carried out by the EC (leaving open the possibility of enlarging the observer group to include other CSCE states.)⁶⁷

chaired the political directors group in charge of the crisis mechanism). Since it was directly implicated, Yugoslavia was obliged to pass the chair to Albania, next in line but only recently admitted to the CSCE, which has its only problems with Yugoslavia in connection with Kosovo

⁶²Vienna Oesterreich Radio Eins, July 2, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-127, July 2, 1991. p. 1).

⁶³Agence France Presse, June 27 and June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991. p. 1,2). The Council of Europe's Assembly and the European Parliament's Political Committee, also supported convening the CSCE emergency mechanism. Helsinki Radio Network, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-126, July 1, 1991. p. 2).

⁶⁴Vienna Oesterreich Radio Eins, June 30, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-126, July 1, 1991. p. 2). Under the emergency mechanism, Yugoslavia had 48 hours after the official request to provide an explanation of its actions, after which time an emergency meeting is convened (if supported by the initial requestor plus 12 other CSCE nations).

In the end, Austria and the EC Twelve were joined by the United States, Czechoslovakia and Sweden in requesting the CSCE senior officials meeting. *Guardian*, July 2, 1991 p. 8.

⁶⁵*The Guardian*, July 2, 1991 p. 1

⁶⁶*The Guardian*, July 4, 1991 p. 9; *Le Monde*, July 5, 1991, p. 5. The Soviet Union initially resisted the idea of CSCE involvement, but eventually accepted it so long as it was with the consent of the Yugoslav government. *The Guardian*, July 5, 1991, p. 8.

⁶⁷*Le Monde*, July 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.

At this point, the CSCE ceded the principal initiative to the EC, although discussions continued over expanding the EC observer group to include other CSCE states. On August 8, the CSCE political directors met again in Prague and decided (with Yugoslavia's agreement) to send some 200-500 additional observers (from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Canada, as well as the EC countries) to help monitor the truce in Croatia.⁶⁸ Germany, as chair of the group, undertook to coordinate the new observer mission with Yugoslavia. The CSCE also reiterated its "good offices" offer to help bring about negotiations.

The WEU's response

The WEU initially responded quickly to the developments in Yugoslavia. The WEU Defense Ministers, who were meeting in Luxembourg on June 27, suggested that the CSCE "encourage efforts" to negotiate a settlement,⁶⁹ and urged the EC to invoke the CSCE's conflict prevention mechanism.⁷⁰

But for the most part, the WEU remained inactive. After the EC decided to send unarmed observers in mid-July, WEU Secretary General Wim van Eekelen suggested that a group of several hundred military observers would be safer and more effective, in light of the continuing violence in Yugoslavia.⁷¹ His suggestion generated some discussion among EC Foreign Ministers, but received little support at the time. In August, as the conflict in Croatia escalated, however, France took up the call for a possible WEU peacekeeping mission, and the WEU Ministers were scheduled to discuss the possibility in a meeting on July 7 in London. Van Eekelen reiterated his proposal, but indicated that the WEU would not act unless the EC concluded that its diplomatic efforts were exhausted.⁷² Britain, Portugal and Germany continued to voice reservations about that approach.⁷³

⁶⁸ New York Times, August 8, 1991, p. A6 and August 9, 1991, p. A5. At the time, there were some 150 EC observers already in Yugoslavia.

⁶⁹ Agence France Presse, June 27, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991, p. 1).

⁷⁰ Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991, p. 1).

⁷¹ Reuters, July 15.

⁷² De Volkskrant, August 3, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-151, August 6, 1991, p. 1).

⁷³ New York Times, August 8, 1991, p. A3; Berlin ADN, August 1, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-148, August 1, 1991 p. 6); Lisbon RDP Commercial Radio, August 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-151, August 6, 1991, p. 26). Spain's Foreign Minister indicated that he favored European troops only as a last resort. Madrid TVE Internacional Television, August 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-151, August 6, 1991, p. 32).

NATO's Response

Throughout the crisis, NATO maintained a low profile. On June 27, a NATO spokesman stated that NATO was "greatly concerned about the deterioration of the situation" and indicated that NATO was "following the situation closely."⁷⁴ NATO's political committee held an extraordinary session to discuss the crisis.⁷⁵

NATO's reluctance to become involved was attributable in part to the United States' inclination to allow Europeans to take the lead. The Financial Times quoted one US official: "After all, it's not our problem, it's a European problem."⁷⁶

Throughout July, the Political Committee continued to meet, primarily as a forum for exchanging views and a channel between the United States and the NATO members who belong to the EC. The US did not waiver from its approach of leaving the initiative to the EC and CSCE. There was no visible indication that NATO discussed playing a military role or initiating contingency planning, although it is possible that some discreet activities went forward.

The UN Response

Throughout the crisis, the UN also maintained a low profile. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar seemed at pains to stress that the crisis was an internal matter that the Yugoslavs should resolve on their own. He specifically rejected the idea of sending UN observers in response to any Slovene request on the grounds that "Slovenia is not an independent UN member."⁷⁷ That view was echoed by US UN Ambassador Thomas Pickering, who stated that "the UN has no role in Yugoslavia" unless the EC and CSCE efforts failed.⁷⁸

In early August, as the EC countries sought to intensify pressure on the Serbians to end the fighting in Croatia, EC countries supported the plan of France

Germany's reluctance to commit European forces stems in part from the on-going domestic debate over using the Bundeswehr for actions outside the NATO framework. The fact that Germany, the current WEU chair, is reluctant to commit European forces could pose particular difficulties for gaining a consensus on a WEU role.

⁷⁴ Agence France Presse, June 27, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-125, June 28, 1991, p. 1).

⁷⁵ Le Monde, June 29, 1991 p. 2.

⁷⁶ Financial Times, June 29/30, 1991, p. 3

⁷⁷ Der Spiegel, July 1, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-127, July 2, 1991 p. 2).

⁷⁸ Washington Post, July 4, 1991, p. 19.

and Britain to open discussions in the UN Security Council, with a view to UN action if fighting should threaten other countries.⁷⁹

The Pentagonale

The Pentagonale also met on several occasions to discuss the Yugoslav crisis. The Italian government in particular sought to promote this forum as an alternative for reaching a political agreement in Yugoslavia, but the group took no concrete actions in part due to the Yugoslov government's claim that Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were supporting the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.⁸⁰

⁷⁹New York Times, August 8, 1991, p. A3; France-Inter Radio, August 5, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-151 August 6, 1991 p. 2).

⁸⁰Wiener Zeitung, July 25, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-145 July 25, 1991 p. 3). Pentagonale meetings took place on July 26-27.

III. LESSONS FROM THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

At the time this paper was written, a fragile two week cease-fire held in Croatia. The Serbian dominated central government appeared to accept (*de facto* if not *de jure*), Slovenia's independence. But the inter-mixing of Serbs and Croats on Croatia's territory seemed to guarantee that further conflict lay in the path of an enduring political settlement. Lurking in the shadows were festering ethnic conflicts involving Bosnian Moslems and Croats in the mixed ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungarians in Voivodina, Kosovo's Albanians and the endemic problem of Macedonia, all of which could worsen if Serbia moves to create a Greater Serbia from the ashes of the Yugoslav federation. It is unlikely that the international community's concern and involvement with Yugoslavia's disintegration of Yugoslavia will end in the near future.

The Characteristics of the Yugoslav Conflict

The outbreak of internal conflict in Yugoslavia was the first European security crisis in the post-Cold War era. For several reasons, the conflict posed a difficult test for European political and security institutions:

1) The conflict was internal.

Although neighboring states worried about the possibility of large number of refugees fleeing the conflict, and problems arose with Yugoslav military activities (including overflights) at the Austria border, there was little danger that military conflict would spread across international borders.⁸¹

The fact that conflict was internal posed problems for many of the relevant political institutions. For NATO, the dispute was "out-of-area" and therefore outside the ambit of NATO's military response under Article V and VI of the Washington Treaty. The WEU faced a similar problem: although the Brussels Treaty contains no geographical constraints similar to NATO's Article V and VI, few believed that the conflict posed a direct threat to its members' security.

⁸¹The prospect of transborder involvement was raised during the flurry of diplomatic activity in early August, as some voiced fears that Germany, Italy or other European countries might intervene in Yugoslavia to protect their nationals from the escalating violence. *New York Times*, August 8, 1991, p. A3.

For the CSCE, its involvement was complicated by the constraints imposed on intervening in a member nation's internal affairs without its consent, a point the USSR insisted on in agreeing to the new emergency crisis mechanism. Similar constraints virtually eliminated the UN from playing a role; of all the institutions, it was most determined not to become embroiled in internal conflict.

2) The dispute pitted the principle of self-determination against the idea of inviolable national borders.

The conflict raised a delicate and sometimes embarrassing dilemma for European nations; the inherent tension between support for the principle of self-determination and the belief in preserving the international status quo. Since the Helsinki Accord of 1975, the foundations of European stability had been built on the principle that international borders should not be altered through the use of force. At the same time, the democratic revolutions of 1989-90 had heightened European awareness of the importance of self-determination, a principle also enshrined in the Helsinki Accord and the Paris CSCE charter.

Each of the European nations had a different approach to balancing these conflicting interests. For Germany, the problem was particularly acute; having just achieved unity on the basis of the GDR people's right to determine their own destiny, it was increasingly awkward for the German government to turn its back on the claims of Slovenia and Croatia to do the same.

The European nations facing their own national separatist movements (Spain, France, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and, to a lesser extent the UK) feared that hasty support for independence could have repercussions at home. As a result, they tended to support efforts to maintain Yugoslavia's political integrity.⁸² Needless to say, this concern was greatest in the USSR. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stated: "We are looking for ways to resolve the problem by peaceful means, respecting the peoples of Yugoslavia but proceeding from the premise that we favor Yugoslavia's integrity and are committed to the inviolability of borders." He added that if nations failed to respect this principle, "developments in Europe will be out of hand."⁸³

⁸²Ironically, the Dutch Foreign Minister invoked an extension of the principle of inviolable borders to internal borders as a possible rationale for international intervention to prevent the dismemberment of Croatia. "It is not acceptable that *internal* or international borders be changed unilaterally by force." *New York Times*, August 8, 1991, p. A3. (emphasis added).

⁸³*Los Angeles Times*, July 10, 1991, p. A6.

These differences were apparent in the deliberations of both the EC and the CSCE; the more homogeneous EC had somewhat greater success in achieving consensus than the more diverse CSCE.

3) Most institutions were new or in the process of evolution.

In many respects, the Yugoslav crisis was "premature"; it caught Europe in the act of self-redefinition. The most dramatic case is the CSCE -- less than one week after the CSCE Foreign Ministers agreed to an emergency response mechanism, it was put through its first trial by fire.

For the European Community, the process of foreign policy cooperation dated back to the creation of EPC in 1970. But the Twelve were in the throes of debating a strengthening of foreign policy cooperation in the direction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (in the context of the on-going intergovernmental conference on political union.) The WEU was embroiled in a debate over two alternatives for its future: as an independent West European military organization operating in conjunction with the EC, or as a strengthened European pillar under the umbrella of NATO.

NATO, too was in the midst of redefinition: with the London Declaration it had moved away from its near-exclusive preoccupation with the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, but the on-going strategy review had yet to define its role in confronting the new security challenges in Europe. The UN, fresh from its successful involvement in the Gulf conflict, had ambitions to play a larger part in international stability; but little thought had gone into its role in crises such as Yugoslavia.

4) The conflict exposed the divergent geopolitical orientations of European nations.

The Yugoslav crisis had its most direct impact on Yugoslavia's neighbor states. Austria, with its close historical, political and economic ties to Slovenia, naturally felt the most acute stake in the conflict, as well as an affinity for the Slovene's cause. Italy, too shared some of the same connections.

Germany presented the most complex case. Historical bonds between Germany and the two Republics remained strong; many Germans (and Austrians) continued to refer to Ljubljana and Zagreb by their German names Laibach and Agram, dating back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Economic ties were extensive, and there was deep emotional support, especially in Bavaria, for the cause of independence. At the same time, German activism in favor of

independence created a certain unrest among other European states; there was even some dark muttering about Germany's ambitions to create a German zone of influence through the region.⁸⁴ For this reason, the German government was forced to walk a fine line, embedding rhetorical support for self-determination in the self-imposed policy constraint of the need to act collectively.

5) The leading actors of the post-Cold War era took a back seat.

The Cold War era in Europe was dominated by the two superpowers, who gave policy direction to their allies, and whose confrontation indirectly helped to suppress smaller conflicts in Europe, out of fear that they would escalate into an East-West confrontation. The decision by both the United States and the USSR to remain relatively aloof from the Yugoslav conflict in some ways contributed to the outbreak of violence, since the parties were emboldened to risk military confrontation, without triggering a massive conflagration. At the same time, the relative absence of the superpowers gave other European nations and institutions freedom to maneuver. But they faced a difficult problem of forging consensus in the absence of a single, dominant policymaking voice.

Taken together, these factors posed difficult challenges for the political/security institutions efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. Yet there is little reason to believe that the Yugoslav crisis is unique. Many, if not all of these factors are likely to be present in future European crises. For this reason, the successes and failures have profound implications for the evolution of European security institutions.

Lessons Learned: Some General Conclusions

The developments in the Yugoslav conflict suggest five general lessons on the role of security institutions in Europe's future.

1) The limited utility of outside military force in resolving ethnic conflict, especially internal conflict.

Throughout the Cold War, the balance of military forces, and the threat of military response to aggression played a key role in maintaining European

⁸⁴ *Le Monde*, July 4, 1991, p. 4 "L'Allemagne, puissance protectrice des Sloènes et des Croates." Sceptics also pointed to the alliance between Germany and the Croatian fascist government during World War II.

German officials were highly sensitive to this concern. One remarked "the very idea of Germany, or Austria or Italy being involved in [a European military intervention] is politically impossible. History forbids it." *Guardian Weekly*, July 28, 1991 p. 7.

stability. Yet in the Yugoslav situation, no nation seriously advocated military intervention; and even the possibility of peacekeeping forces proved controversial.⁸⁵

There were a number of reasons behind this diffidence. None of the nations had a legal or political commitment to come to the aid of the warring factions; none saw their supreme national interests sufficiently threatened by the victory of one side or the other to warrant the risk of casualties or long-term political entanglement in Yugoslavia's conflict.⁸⁶ Equally important, it was unclear what military intervention would achieve; although a major commitment of forces might bring a temporary halt to the fighting, it was uncertain whether they would contribute to an underlying political settlement that would restore stability to a disintegrating Yugoslavia.

The most important consequence of this conclusion is for NATO. While it is difficult to dispute NATO's value in protecting its members against aggression, the Yugoslav crisis tends to underscore the limits of NATO's utility as a military organization in responding to future security challenges such as Yugoslavia that do not directly threaten member nations' security. This in no way diminishes NATO's importance as a political consultative transatlantic forum, but it has significant consequences for NATO's future force requirements and military planning.

2) The importance of economic leverage (carrot and stick).

Precisely because the use of military force seemed unavailing, the existence of economic levers became a crucial factor in determining the relative importance of outside actors. On the negative side, the limited trade and aid ties between Yugoslavia and the United States contributed to keeping the United States on the sidelines. By contrast, the EC and its member nations had extensive economic

⁸⁵When asked about the prospect of European military forces intervening in crises such as Yugoslavia, Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis stated: "I do not think this would be a suitable instrument... in the event of a civil war and armed clashes, there is no military solution. We cannot anticipate the presence of military troops that might be able to stay in power for a long time with legal means. We must find a political solution." *Wiener Zeitung*, August 1, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-148 August 1, 1991 p. 13).

⁸⁶The two partial exceptions were Austria and Italy, which sent military forces to their borders with Yugoslavia when fighting broke out between Slovenia and the Yugoslav army. *New York Times*, July 1, 1991, p. 6; Rome RAI Radio, July 7, 1991 (FBIS-WEU-91-131 July 9, 1991 p. 20.)

relations with Yugoslavia, which provided them with a variety of tools in seeking to influence the outcome of the dispute.⁸⁷

These tools were available against all sides to the conflict. In the run-up to the conflict, the EC (which at that time focused its efforts on slowing the breakaway Republics' drive to independence) made clear that membership in the EC (with its attendant economic benefits) was unlikely to follow a declaration of independence.⁸⁸ Once the focus shifted to halting the military actions of the Serbian led central government, the EC moved to consider sanctions, beginning with suspending economic aid and an arms embargo, and, as the situation in Croatia deteriorated, moving toward the most potent weapon, trade sanctions. The EC also offered the central government incentives in the form of a new economic assistance package in the event that the parties reached a peaceful political settlement.

It is difficult to judge the efficacy of economic measures in bringing about a cease-fire and paving the basis for a political settlement. It is clear that threat of withholding EC membership did little to slow the movement for independence in Slovenia and Croatia. Similarly, the arms embargo was primarily symbolic, since none of the parties depended heavily (at least in the short run) on outside assistance to carry on the conflict. The threat of trade sanctions after the failed EC mission on August 2-4 may have played a larger role in bringing about the cease-fire in Croatia; one can only speculate as to whether an earlier decision to threaten a trade cut-off might have headed off the violence.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that the availability of economic measures contributed to the predominant role played by the EC. In the future, economic leverage seems likely to play an increasingly important role in responding to future threats to stability.

3) *The importance of institutional fora for collective decisionmaking and the limits of consensus.*

⁸⁷The Yugoslav crisis thus different from the Gulf War, where the military dimension predominated and Europeans, lacking the institutional means for collective response, were forced to take a back seat to the United States' leadership. But the availability of economic sanctions (imposed by the EC at the outset of the crisis, assured that the community could play a role.

⁸⁸According to Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Slovenia and Croatia conduct about 2/3 of their trade with EC countries. *Financial Times*, July 8, 1991, p. 11.

The divergent interests of outside actors, and the lack of a single, generally accepted policy leader (as discussed above) might well have led to chaos in responding to Yugoslavia crisis. Instead, the availability of structured fora facilitated both dialogue and compromise in forging an agreed response to the conflict.

That said, the consensus within the various institutions tended toward a "least common denominator" response. It was relatively easy to reach agreement on condemning the violence and urging a cease-fire, much harder to implement common courses of action. The EC had difficulty with simple steps such as suspending aid; more controversial measures, such as holding out the prospect of recognizing the Republics if Serbia did not accept the cease-fire and political dialogue, proved highly contentious. The CSCE faced similar daunting problems, and the broad spectrum of opinions and interests limited its ability to respond. The specific strengths and limits of the two institutions (as well as possible avenues of improvement) will be discussed in greater detail below.

4) *the need for early intervention and the importance of pro-active policy.*

Commentators have harshly criticized both individual governments and political institutions for failing to act early and effectively to head off the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia. To a large extent, the institutions functioned primarily as a bucket brigade to put out the fire, rather than helping to prevent it in the first place.⁸⁹

To some extent, this was a problem of substantive policy, rather than institutional functioning. Most governments (vainly, as it turned out) hoped to keep Yugoslavia together by focusing on their support for a federal or confederal solution; they underestimated both the determination of the breakaway Republics to achieve independence and the willingness of Serbia to use force to prevent it.

But the institutions' ineffectiveness prior to the outbreak of violence also reflects institutional limitations: a tendency to avoid confronting difficult problems when members hold divergent views until absolutely necessary. This deeply complicated effective intervention. Crisis response and management mechanisms are at present insufficient to permit early action; improving early

⁸⁹ See, e.g. Lawrence Freedman, "Yugoslavia provides lesson in the art of the possible" *The Independent*, July 3, 1991 p. 19.

warning and consultation must be a focus of future development (this point is developed further for the EC and CSCE, below).

5) the value and risks of multiple institutions with overlapping responsibilities, and the need to coordinate their efforts.

The response to the Yugoslav crisis was highly improvisational. It was difficult to foresee which of the many potential institutional actors might be most effective, and nations' initial instinct was to activate all of them, in the hopes that one or more might hold the key.

This, in the end, proved a strength of the emerging European security architecture. Although many nations continue to stress the importance of NATO as a pillar of stability, in the event NATO was unwilling (and perhaps unable) to play a major role.⁹⁰ After the first tentative probings, the CSCE moved to the sidelines, but it was an important forum to engage the Soviet Union in developing a common viewpoint (particularly important in view of the historical links between Serbia and the USSR, and the Soviet Union's concern over the implications of any precedent for its own internal problems.) The CSCE also was an important forum for the countries of Eastern Europe, who, by reason of geographical proximity and their own internal ethnic conflicts, felt no small stake in the agreed response.

While the EC quickly emerged as the first among equals, the EC ministers frequently sought support from the broader international community; through the CSCE, with the United States through consultations in NATO, and in the latter stages, through the United Nations Security Council. Although there was little inclination to move to a military response, the existence of the WEU provided the EC an option for considering military involvement.

The use of multiple institutions on occasion threatened to confuse and overwhelm the process of trying to forge an effective policy, particularly at the early stages of the conflict. At times, the collective response resembled a three (or four or five) ring circus, as government representatives met simultaneously in several fora searching for an agreed policy. Coordination resulted primarily from the presence of the EC nations in all the principal institutions, and the *de facto* acceptance of the EC as the lead institution. The problem might well have been

⁹⁰Had the United States chosen to play a more active role, it is conceivable that NATO would have been more involved.

more acute had US or Soviet interests been more directly implicated (as say in a dispute involving a NATO member, or one of the USSR's neighbors) which might have led to greater divergences among the various institutions.

The experience of the Yugoslav crisis, and the on-going process of institutional definition, may, over time, lead to a more explicit division of labor between institutions. But the flexibility offered by overlapping jurisdictions is in itself an asset; it extended the range of options for the international community.

Lessons Learned: The EC and CSCE

The crisis in Yugoslavia also presents important lessons for the individual security organizations.

The European Community

Beyond a doubt, the EC's involvement in Yugoslavia marked a watershed for Community foreign policy. Whether the effort will be judged a success may depend on the outcome of the conflict and the effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. But even at this stage, it is possible to draw some important conclusions.

The crisis marked the European Community's coming of age in European security policy.

While the EC nations' leaders may have differed among themselves on the appropriate course of action, there was no dissent from the conclusion that the Community should become involved. The initial response was facilitated by the timely coincidence of the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on June 28, but there is little doubt that the Foreign Ministers would have swung into action in any event.

Equally significant, there was a clear commitment to try to reach a common approach prior to any unilateral action. This was especially important given the divergent viewpoints and interests of the EC members; despite considerable domestic political pressure, the EC governments held fast to their attempt to develop a common line. The habits of consultation and cooperation built up over twenty years through EPC seemed deeply ingrained in EC government's foreign policymaking processes.

The Community's response was handicapped by the need to achieve consensus, but it is unclear whether moving to decisionmaking by majority would influence the outcome.

One of the key issues in the on-going intergovernmental conference on political union is extending qualified majority voting to the Community's foreign policy arm, in order to implement a more effective common policy. While there is no doubt that the need to develop a consensus under existing EPC practices contributed to the tentativeness of the Community's response, it is unlikely that majority voting would have altered the outcome. The importance of the issues at stake in Yugoslavia made it unlikely that Community would try to impose a common response on a strongly recalcitrant member (even if majority voting were available). Conversely, the pressures on Community members with divergent views to compromise are sufficiently strong to help lead to a consensus even without the formalities of majority voting. While majority voting might have made a difference on matters of implementation (for example, whether the observers could carry personal firearms for self-protection), most of the implementing decisions were reached with relatively little controversy.

The EC's response would benefit from an ongoing, institutional foreign policy "arm".

The limitations of the "Troika" approach to carrying out joint foreign policy were evident in the Yugoslav crisis. The Troika's shifting composition (including the need to rotate the Troika's membership in the first week of the crisis) not only raised questions as to "who speaks for Europe", but also brought into play a complex problem of coordinating national foreign policy bureaucracies (the principal staff support for the Troika.) The problem is compounded when the smaller EC nations make up the Troika, as was the case for much of the Yugoslav crisis.

The EC Commission's low key, yet effective assistance to the Troika's work eased some of these problems, and points the way to a more effective solution. While it is likely that the Community will continue to take key foreign policy decisions on an intergovernmental basis, there is a clear need for the Community to evolve some form of "foreign ministry", that could both staff the intergovernmental process and implement its decisions (the current EPC secretariat is but a small step in this direction.) Community governments are unlikely to accept an EC Foreign Minister with stature equal to national Foreign

Ministers, but they should be prepared to delegate to the Commission (in the person of the Commission President, or a specially designated Vice President for Foreign Policy) a clearer and more extensive role in representing the joint or common Community foreign policy.

The EC needs to improve its ability to anticipate and act early in response to emerging foreign policy crises.

The weakness of the Community' foreign policy apparatus is particularly glaring in formulating joint policy before a crisis becomes acute. Although the EPC consultation network has facilitated routine policy dialogue among member states, most contingency planning takes place at the national level, and foreign ministers in EPC rarely address policy questions unless thrust upon them.

Developing a "Community" foreign policy staff could facilitate anticipatory policy development. This staff would be charged with monitoring potential sources of instability, and formulating policy options for Ministers on a Community-wide basis, to assure that tomorrow's crises, as well as today's, are subject to collective deliberation.

The Community needs the ability to mount collective military action, at a minimum for peacekeeping purposes.

The issue of a "defense identity" for Europe is one of the most hotly contested issues in the ongoing intergovernmental conference on political union. While many accept the desirability of more concerted military action outside of Europe, the role of a possible "European" defense force in Europe is more controversial.

For the core problem of defending NATO member states' security, a strong case can be made for preserving NATO's central role (at least so long as the United States remains committed to its obligations under Article V of the Washington Treaty.) But the problem of conflict "in Europe" yet "out-of-area" reveals a glaring hole in the military component of European security. For crises in Eastern Europe, NATO military intervention (with its flavor of superpower involvement and potential conflict with Soviet interests) seems likely to prove inappropriate. The UN is a potential avenue for peacekeeping forces, but the UN seems loathe to intervene in European security issues, especially internal ethnic conflict.

This leaves two possibilities, the EC/WEU or the CSCE. But the broad scope of CSCE's membership, and the relatively informal nature of CSCE's

processes makes it difficult to envision a CSCE organized force in the near term (although the CSCE might well be prepared to lend its political support to others' peacekeeping efforts.) The EC/WEU therefore seems the natural locus for contingency planning and organizing on-call forces.

Whether this force is associated with the European Community or a "stand alone" WEU seems less important, since the WEU membership is a subset of the Community, and would therefore follow the same policy direction adopted by the Community.

As noted above, military force may be irrelevant to many of the likely crisis that Europe will face in the future. But the menu of European responses would be enriched by the availability of quickly available, trained forces accustomed to working together and supported by competent planning, prior to the outbreak of conflict.

The CSCE

The CSCE is in its formative stages as a European security institution. The Yugoslav crisis demonstrated that despite the requirement of consensus, and the limits on interfering in a nation's internal affairs, the CSCE's institutional components (the emergency mechanism and the Conflict Prevention Center) have already emerged as relevant actors in the European security landscape. But the CSCE has much to learn from Yugoslavia.

The CSCE's most valuable role is as a forum for dialogue.

As a forum that brings together all European nations plus the United States and Canada, the CSCE has a unique ability to foster dialogue over emerging crises. In the case of Yugoslavia, the CSCE proved particularly useful in providing a platform for the nations to call Yugoslavia to account for its actions and to involve the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in developing agreed policy. While it is possible to enhance the CSCE's ability to act (see below), it is important not to sacrifice this valuable function in aid of making the CSCE more effective.

In particular, a premature effort to move the CSCE away from consensus decisionmaking could prove counterproductive.⁹¹ The CSCE is a place where all

⁹¹For a more extensive discussion of the CSCE's evolution and its future role in European security, see James B. Steinberg *Integration and Security in an All-European Order*, RAND P-7733, (July 1991).

35 nations can come and have their views considered without fear of being outvoted; majority voting or some kind of CSCE Security Council could cause states involved in a conflict to walk away from the CSCE entirely. While some form of non-consensus decisionmaking may make sense in the future, that time has not yet arrived.

The CSCE can enhance European stability by extending its role in norm setting.

As discussed earlier, one of the most difficult problems posed by the Yugoslav crisis is the tension between stability based on existing borders and non-interference in internal affairs, on the one hand, and the broad commitment to the principle of self-determination. This conflict is present in Europe's international constitutions, the Helsinki Accord and the Paris Charter.

The CSCE could contribute to a more stable Europe by developing clearer norms governing the conflict between these principles. Although each case is in the end unique, and states' deep political interests are often at stake, more concrete guarantees of minority group rights, local autonomy and even criteria for peaceful secession could constrain governments' behavior, or at a minimum, give institutions and concerned outside parties a clearer mandate for acting in support of the agreed norms. This effort will prove contentious, but it could make a contribution to dealing with endemic problems of nationality and ethnicity. While this will prove difficult, the CSCE's success with individual human rights under daunting circumstances is encouragement for this task.

CSCE institutions should be streamlined by merging the emergency mechanism with the Conflict Prevention Center and enhancing the role of the CPC as a mediator.

The parallel activities of the CSCE senior officials in Prague and the CPC in Vienna contribute little except an element of confusion. The dispersal of CSCE institutions serves an important symbolic purpose in rewarding states that had contributed to CSCE's new role, but these considerations are outweighed by the importance of streamlined CSCE functioning. There is no need to repeat on the level of the 35 the European Parliament's comedic commuting between Brussels, Strasbourg and the staff headquarters in Luxembourg.

At the same time, the CSCE's structure should be strengthened. Germany's role as Chair of the senior officials group in Prague illustrates several problems.

On the one hand, Germany's activism, its strong support for the CSCE and its competent Foreign Ministry enhanced the CSCE's effectiveness; what might have happened if Malta held the chair? Germany's chairmanship also raised concerns; its relatively unique perspective arising from its close association to Slovenia and Croatia led some to argue that Germany was using the CSCE for its own purposes.

Part of the answer is to enhance the role and stature of the CSCE Secretary General, and consolidate his activities with the CPC. The history of international institutions shows the limits of Secretary-Generalships (consider the case of NATO and the UN), but in a situation where the member states might authorize using the CSCE's good offices to broker a political solution (as in Yugoslavia) a well-respected, well-staffed leader with no encumbering political ties or responsibilities could prove valuable.

Lessons Learned: Balkan Stability and new European Security Order

Other papers at this conference will address the complex political, economic and security problems facing the Balkans in the coming years. For the purposes of this analysis, a few concluding words will suffice.

The nature of the security issues that may erupt in the Balkan region will pose a severe test to all relevant European security organizations. Some will involve internal ethnic disputes, others potentially more dangerous cross-border conflicts. In the latter case, the stakes in preventing or containing conflict will be even higher than in Yugoslavia. Yet they may prove even more difficult for institutions that depend on a high degree of consensus.

Consider, for example, a potential conflict involving Turkey and Greece. For institutions that contain both members, such as NATO and the CSCE, there are few tools, other than moral suasion, available (witness NATO's relative ineffectiveness in resolving past Greek-Turkish conflicts). Institutions that contain only one of the parties (such as the EC), could face even greater barriers to action other than unilateral support of the member country -- it is hard to act in an even handed manner when one of the parties to the conflict has a veto over policy. At present, only the WEU stands outside this conflict, and thus in principle could play an honest broker role. But the WEU, with its military orientation, is poorly oriented to political conciliation and mediation (though this could change if there is a move to consolidate the EC and WEU.)

This suggests several conclusions. First, it is important not to overestimate the ability of any of these institutions to respond effectively to new outbreaks of violence in the Balkan region. While they will certainly seek to play a role, as they have in Yugoslavia, there is no guarantee that their involvement will be decisive.

The second point is the importance of early intervention. The most effective time for consensual fora such as CSCE to become involved is before the simmering conflicts explode, when mediation and dialogue are most likely to produce political solutions. The concrete steps identified above to strengthen the EC and CSCE can help in this process.

Finally, the European institutions may prove most effective in their long-run role of integrating states into a broader political, economic and security framework. Just as the EC has helped end long-standing rivalries between member states, so too should the habit of cooperation and the elaboration of ties among the European states helped to constrain the outbreak of conflict. The EC has the most to offer in this regard because of the extensive economic as well as political relations among its members; but CSCE too has an economic component, and all Balkan nations belong to CSCE, while for most, membership in the EC remains in the distant future, if it all.

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Evolving Superpower Interests in Southeastern Europe

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INTRODUCTION

The involvement of the Great Powers in Southeast European affairs has been one of the chief characteristics of Balkan politics in recent centuries. Indeed, several countries, particularly Greece and Bulgaria, owe their emergence as modern states to Great Power intervention. This pattern reached its height at the end of the nineteenth century when Britain, Russia and Austro-Hungary vied for influence in the region. Their intense rivalry and effort to exploit Balkan nationalism for their own purposes helped make the Balkans the "powder keg of Europe" and directly contributed to the onset of World War I.

The pattern was repeated in the early postwar period, as the Balkans became the focal point for an extension of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania (after 1948) became Soviet satellites and members of the Warsaw Pact, while Greece and Turkey joined the Western camp, entering NATO in 1952. Yugoslavia, initially a close Soviet ally, broke with Moscow in 1948, adopted a non-aligned position, though it maintained close ties to the West. Thus, after 1948, the Balkans were effectively divided into two camps, each dominated by one of the superpowers, with Yugoslavia acting as an important "balancing wheel."

The end of the Cold War, however, has largely shattered this pattern. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe the Soviet Union's influence in the region has declined. At the same time, with the decline of the Soviet threat, U.S. perspectives have shifted, as Washington's relatively low key profile in the current Yugoslav crisis underscores.

The marginal involvement of the superpowers in the Yugoslav crisis raises several intriguing questions. Does this relatively low profile in the Yugoslav crisis represent an aberration? Or is it the harbinger of a more general shift in the policy of the two former rivals? What role are the superpowers likely to play in Southeast Europe in the future? Will reduced involvement of the superpowers in Balkan affairs contribute to greater regional stability? Or will it lead to increased fragmentation and unrest?

This paper addresses these questions. The first section focuses on U.S. and Soviet policy toward the Balkans in the early years of the Cold War. Section II examines the impact of detente on superpower interests in the region. Section three examines the current crisis in Yugoslavia. Soviet and American interests and

policies are studied next. A final section looks at superpower interests in the future and institutional mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts in the area.

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THE COLD WAR AND THE SUPERPOWERS

Superpower involvement in Southeast Europe in the early postwar period was a direct product of the Cold War. The United States had few strong indigenous interests in the Balkans. The region had never been a major focal point for U.S. policy. American interest emerged largely as a by-product of its overall interest in preventing the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe. This interest, however, did not begin immediately. Rather it grew gradually with the onset and intensification of the Cold War and the growing perception of the need to counter Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and Iran.

The withdrawal of British power from the Mediterranean in early 1947 faced the U.S. with a major choice: whether to replace the British as the major power in the area, or risk the possible fall of the governments in each country and the possible extension of communism further south into the Balkans. The decision to extend aid to Greece and Turkey in March 1947 was not seen by the Truman Administration as an isolated incident but as part of a larger effort to prevent the extension of communism worldwide. In order to obtain Congressional support for the assistance to Greece and Turkey, the Truman Administration had consciously portrayed the aid as a part of a larger struggle between "two ways of life" and as part of a broader policy to support the effort of democratically elected majorities to resist the violent overthrow or subjugation by armed minorities.¹

The clear implication was that if the U.S. did not assist Greece and Turkey, they would fall under Soviet domination. In actual fact, however, the Soviet Union had done very little to assist the communist rebels in Greece. A Soviet military mission did not arrive in Greece until 1943. Once in Greece, the mission maintained a low profile; its main task appears to have been to dampen the hopes of the guerrillas that they could expect much Soviet support or assistance.

¹On the background to the formation of the Truman Doctrine see in particular Joseph Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: _____ 1955); Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) and John Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Also Gaddis' insightful article, "Reconsiderations: Was the Truman Doctrine the Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1987, pp. _____.

Stalin appears never to have really trusted the Greek communists. He did not believe they had much chance of success.² Moreover, he feared that they might provoke U.S. military intervention in an area where Stalin had limited control and which lay outside his primary sphere of influence. Hence, he pursued a cautious policy, *discouraging* the guerrillas on several key occasions from resorting to force. He also delayed sending aid on several occasions, seriously crippling the effort by the Greek communists to overthrow the government in Athens.³

Stalin's rather cautious approach to the Greek civil war was dictated by two concerns in particular: (1) his desire not to unnecessarily provoke U.S. intervention; and (2) his concern about Tito's increasingly independent behavior. In actual fact, it was the Yugoslavs who were fueling the fires of the Greek civil war, not the Soviets. Stalin feared that if the Greek civil war succeeded it would increase Tito's power and make him even more difficult to control. Hence he argued that the insurgency in Greece had to "fold up," as he told Djilas in February 1948.⁴

For the same reason Stalin opposed Dimitrov's proposal in 1947 for a Balkan Federation, which he feared would be dominated by Yugoslavia, and encouraged Albanian resistance to Yugoslav domination. Stalin's main aim was to see pliant communist regimes installed in the Balkans who were prepared to subordinate their narrow parochial interests to the larger interests of Soviet foreign policy. Hence he mistrusted both the Greek communists and Tito, whom he regarded as far too independent to be a useful tool of Soviet foreign policy interests.

The Truman Doctrine provided the political basis for increased U.S. involvement in the Balkans and a gradual expansion of U.S. ties to Greece and Turkey. Both countries were willing to put aside their traditional differences in the face of a strong perceived threat from the Soviet Union. That was the main rationale for the entry of both into NATO in 1952 and the common glue that insured that both would subordinate their own narrow national interests to those of the U.S. and the Alliance as a whole.

The Stalin-Tito break in 1948 provided new opportunities for U.S. policy which America quickly seized. The decision to render economic and military assistance to

²See his remarks to Milovan Djilas in February 1947 that the Greek uprising had "no chance of success at all" and "must be stopped." Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 182.

³For an excellent analysis of Stalin's policy and its various shifts, see Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁴Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 181.

Yugoslavia in its struggle against Moscow was purely pragmatic and dictated by simple *realpolitik*. Tito was an ardent communist. But he opposed Moscow's effort to expand its influence in the Balkans. And in the final analysis that was the decisive factor conditioning U.S. policy.

American assistance to Yugoslavia did not turn Yugoslavia into a full-fledged ally, but it ensured that Yugoslavia did not fall back into the Soviet camp. It also contributed to a reduction of tensions with Greece and the formation of the Balkan Pact, signed by Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in Bled in 1954. The Pact was largely a deadletter by the time it was signed, but it did reflect the degree to which the Balkans had essentially divided along bloc lines by the mid 1950s.

THE IMPACT OF EAST-WEST DETENTE

In the 1960s and 1970s the "tight bipolarity" that had characterized East-West relations in the early postwar period began to dissipate. Centrifugal forces, spurred in particular by detente and the more relaxed East-West atmosphere, began to erode the ability of both superpowers to maintain cohesion within their respective alliances.

The impact was first felt in the Warsaw Pact. In 1961 Albania defected to the Chinese camp. This was followed by the emergence of a more autonomous policy on the part of Romania. The conflict with Romania began as a disagreement over the division of labor within Comecon. But it gradually expanded to encompass a whole range of issues: ties to China, relations with West Germany, reform of the Warsaw Pact, the Middle East, and detente in Europe. On all these issues Romania adopted a position that significantly differed from that of Moscow.⁵

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 gave a new boost to centrifugal forces within the Balkans. In the wake of the intervention, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania seemed on the verge of forming a de facto anti-Soviet alliance. All three not only strongly condemned the Soviet invasion, but began to cooperate more closely. There was even talk in some circles of a "Belgrade-Bucharest-Tirana axis."⁶

Even more worrying from the Soviet point of view were growing signs of Chinese diplomatic activity in the Balkans in the immediate period following the invasion. This raised the prospect that the Balkans might become a Chinese sphere of influence. Such fears, however, proved to be exaggerated. China, as it quickly became clear, was too far away to really be a decisive factor in the Balkans. It could provide strong verbal support for Romanian and Yugoslavian independent initiatives -- but little else.

The growing polycentrism within the Soviet bloc in the 1960s prompted a shift in U.S. policy. As the signs of changes in Eastern Europe began to proliferate, the U.S. began to move away from the effort to "rollback" Soviet power and put greater emphasis instead on a policy of "peaceful engagement" or "bridgebuilding" in

⁵For details see Robert L. Farlow, "Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1971, pp. 54-63.

⁶*Magyar Hirlap*

Eastern Europe. The prime goal of the new policy was to exploit the increasing diversity within Eastern Europe and encourage a broad process of East-West reconciliation designed to gradually alter the East-West status quo in the West's favor.⁷

Romania was one of the principal focal points of this new policy. President Nixon's visit to Romania in 1969 -- the first visit of a U.S. President to Eastern Europe in the postwar period -- symbolized the Administration's effort to exploit the new fluidity in East-West relations and encourage Bucharest's increasingly independent path. In 1975 Romania was awarded most favored nation (MFN) status, another important sign of Washington's desire to encourage Ceausescu's deviation.

The U.S. also continued to voice strong support for Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity. Yugoslavia's non-aligned position was seen as an important bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Balkans. Concern about the possibility that Moscow might seek to exploit any instability in Yugoslavia in the wake of Tito's death led the Carter Administration to consider resuming arms sales to the Yugoslavs.⁸ But public revelation of the fact embarrassed the Yugoslavs and put a damper on the move before it could be consummated.

However, the same forces that had precipitated strains within the Soviet camp also contributed to an erosion of cohesion within the southern flank of NATO. The 1963-64 Cyprus crisis precipitated a sharp deterioration of U.S. relations with both Greece and Turkey. America's threat to cut off aid to Turkey if it invaded Cyprus, contained in a letter from President Johnson to Turkish President Ismet Inonu,⁹ unleashed a wave of public indignation and prompted Turkey to undertake a reassessment of its foreign policy. In the aftermath of the crisis, Ankara began to diversify its foreign policy. This reassessment was reflected in particular in an effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union and develop closer ties with the Middle

⁷One of the chief intellectual architects of the new policy was Zbigniew Brzezinski, later President Carter's National Security Advisor. See his *Alternative to Partition* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

⁸Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. to Sell Arms to Yugoslavia and Wider Military Cooperation," *New York Times*, October 14, 1977.

⁹The Johnson letter is reprinted along with Inonu's reply in the *Middle Eastern Journal*, 20:3, (1966), pp. 386-93.

East.¹⁰ Turkey also became guarded about allowing the U.S. to use Turkish facilities.

The eruption of the Cyprus crisis a decade later in July 1974 further exacerbated American relations with both allies.¹¹ Unlike 1964, however, the U.S. proved unable to prevent a Turkish invasion of the island. This failure underscored the degree to which power relations on the southern flank had changed. With the onset of detente, neither Greece nor Turkey were willing to put alliance solidarity automatically ahead of what they perceived as vital national interests. By 1974 the threat of possible Soviet intervention -- which had helped to deter Turkey in 1964 -- had lost much of its credibility and could no longer be used as an effective instrument to ensure alliance solidarity and compliance with U.S. policy preferences.

The crisis had serious repercussions on American relations with Turkey. The imposition of the arms embargo by the U.S. Congress in February 1975 was seen by Ankara as an unwarranted slap at a loyal ally and provoked a marked deterioration in relations. In retaliation, Ankara shut down four important intelligence gathering networks, which remained closed until the embargo was lifted in 1978 by the Carter Administration. Activities at Incirlik airbase and other facilities were also curtailed.

Relations recovered somewhat after the lifting of the embargo of 1978. The Reagan Administration saw Turkey as an important asset in its effort to prevent an expansion of Soviet power into the Persian Gulf. In 1982, after difficult negotiations, the Administration succeeded in signing an important co-location Operation Base Agreement with Ankara, which provided for the expansion and modernization of ten airfields in Turkey. The modernization of the airfields brought U.S. and NATO fighters within closer striking distance of the Persian Gulf. Turkish willingness to sign the agreement reflected Ankara's growing concern about overall Soviet intentions in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. Turkish officials, however, were quick to emphasize that the bases were to be used only for NATO contingencies, and that their use was subject to Turkish approval.

Relations with Turkey throughout much of the 1980s remained marred by differences over a host of issues ranging from debt repayment to security assistance. These differences were highlighted by the difficulties in concluding a new Defense

¹⁰For a detailed discussion, see Udo Steinbach, "Grundlagen und Ansätze einer Neuorientierung der Türkischen Aussenpolitik" (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 1973).

¹¹For an excellent discussion of U.S. policy during the 1974 crisis, see Lawrence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975, pp. 34-78.

These differences were highlighted by the difficulties in concluding a new Defense Cooperation Agreement to replace the one signed in 1980. A new agreement was finally signed in May 1987 -- more than a year after it was supposed to go into effect -- and it remained unratified until 1988. The reasons for the delay had more to do with subsidiary issues like military assistance and congressional support for the Armenians than they did with any fundamental difference over the content of the agreement itself.¹²

The level of security assistance also proved to be a periodic source of friction. In overall levels of assistance, Turkey ranked fourth behind Egypt, Israel and Pakistan. But the U.S. Congress consistently cut the Reagan Administration's aid requests in order to maintain a rough 7:10 ratio between aid to Greece and aid to Turkey. As a result, aid packages usually fell considerably short of what Turkey thought it deserved, leaving Ankara feeling frustrated and bitter. Relations were further exacerbated by annual Congressional Resolutions condemning the massacre of the Armenians in 1915 by the Ottoman Turks.

The 1974 Cyprus crisis also had a strong impact on U.S.-Greek relations. The inability of the United States to prevent the Turkish invasion and the perception of a U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey in the crisis unleashed a wave of anti-Americanism and anti-NATO feelings. Under strong pressure from public opinion, Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, who had been called back from his Paris exile to take over the reigns of power in the midst of the crisis, was forced to temporarily withdraw Greece from the military structure of NATO. (Greece quickly rejoined the military wing in 1980 after public indignation had abated.)

These moves were part of a larger reorientation of Greek policy which was designed to reduce Greece's reliance on the United States and strengthen ties to Europe. The cornerstone of this policy was the decision to accelerate Greece's entry in to the EC which Caramanlis regarded as an important guarantee against his country's backslide into dictatorship. Moreover, by tying Greece more tightly to Europe, membership in the EC gave Greece a new point of reference and anchor, thus allowing it to reduce its dependency on the United States.

In the aftermath of the crisis, Greek security perceptions also underwent a marked shift. Greek concern about a "threat from the North" (the Warsaw Pact)

¹²See Richard Haass, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean -- Greece, Turkey, Cyprus Part I," *Adelphi Papers* 229 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1988), pp. 61-71.

diminished and was replaced by a growing preoccupation with the "threat from the East" (Turkey). In January 1985, the Papandreou government formally announced a shift in Greece's military doctrine designed to reflect the new threat perception. The announcement of the "new" doctrine, however, was largely for public consumption. It essentially institutionalized changes that had already taken place in Greek defense policy since the 1974 Cyprus crisis.¹³

The Cyprus crisis also exacerbated Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean.¹⁴ In the wake of the invasion, Greece moved to fortify a number of the islands off the Greek coast. Its security policy also became increasingly oriented toward maintaining an overall military balance in the Aegean and preventing a Turkish invasion.

These bilateral disputes tended to spill over into NATO and erode Alliance cohesion on the southern flank. Under the Rodgers Agreement, which provided for Greece's reentry into NATO, a new allied air force command (Seventh AFAF) was to be established in Larissa, northern Greece. However, the Larissa headquarters was never opened because of differences with Turkey over air command responsibilities. Greece also repeatedly cancelled its participation in NATO exercises in protest over the exclusion of the island of Lemnos on the grounds that this policy represented tacit support of the Turkish position in the Aegean.¹⁵

The advent to power of Andreas Papandrou's PASOK party in 1981 added new strains to an already wobbly relationship. Papandreou's vitriolic anti-American rhetoric, as well as his flirtation with third world radicals and lax attitude toward terrorism, were a source of constant irritation to American officials. Papandreou also demonstratively departed from NATO positions on a number of key issues such as INF deployment, the Soviet shooting down of the KAL airliner and sanctions against Poland. The net effect of these actions, as one U.S. official has noted, was a "difficult relationship in peacetime and an uncertain commitment about the availability of Greece and its facilities in a crisis."¹⁶

¹³See Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change," in John Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 271-272.

¹⁴A detailed discussion of these disputes is beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive analysis see Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," *Adelphi Papers* 155 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1979-1980).

¹⁵For a good discussion of NATO command and control problems caused by the Greek-Turkish dispute, see Robert McDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, Part II," *Adelphi Papers* 229, pp. 72-89. Also Veremis, *Greece and NATO*, pp. 267-278.

¹⁶Haass, "Alliance Problems in the Mediterranean," p. 64.

Papandreou's bark, however, was often worse than his bite. Despite his anti-American bluster, he was careful not to allow relations with Washington to deteriorate too far or to take actions which might irrevocably jeopardize ties to the United States. He never withdrew from NATO -- in large part because he recognized that Greece would be *even more vulnerable* outside of NATO than inside. In 1983 a new base agreement was concluded that gave the U.S. continued use of the most important bases, and in early 1987 the two countries signed an agreement for the Greek purchase of 40 F-16 aircraft. In short, cooperation in essential areas continued but the atmosphere remained strained.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have thrust Southeastern Europe back into the forefront of European politics. Old ethnic antagonisms have resurfaced, especially in Yugoslavia. At the same time, Balkan politics has taken on a new fluidity and potential new alignments have begun to emerge. Indeed, the Balkans could prove to be the main stumbling block to the creation of a stable security order in Europe in the post-Cold War era.¹⁷

This has led some analysts to worry that we may witness a "new Eastern Question" and that the Balkans could again emerge as the "powder keg of Europe."¹⁸ There is, however, an important difference between the current period and the one prior to the outbreak of World War I: In the pre-World War I period, the Great Powers were deeply involved in Balkan affairs and sought to exploit local Balkan conflicts for their own purposes.

This is not the case today. The Soviet Union is in a period of foreign policy retrenchment and domestic turmoil. It is likely to be primarily preoccupied with its own internal problems for some time to come. Moreover, as a result of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe it has lost its main strategic foothold in the Balkans -- Bulgaria. Similarly the United States is in the process of reassessing its interests in Europe in light of the end of the Cold War. How far this reassessment will go is not yet clear, but it raises fundamental questions about the role which the U.S. will play in shaping the new security order in Europe in the future.

The approach adopted by both superpowers to the current Yugoslav crisis highlights their shifting political interests in the region. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was a pawn in the larger superpower competition for influence in Europe. It served as a kind of "balancing wheel" in the Balkans. Any change of Belgrade's non-aligned status would have upset the balance in the region and given

¹⁷See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security*, Winter 1990/91, pp. 58-91.

¹⁸See in particular Dennison Rusinow, "Challenged Premises of U.S. Policy in Southeastern Europe," in Paul Shoup (ed.), *Problems of Balkan Security* (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990), pp. 258-261. For similar views, see also Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* Spring 1990, pp. 5-41, and John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *Ibid*, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.

the other superpower important strategic advantages. Hence both superpowers sought to prevent Yugoslavia from drifting into the other camp.

The Soviet Union, however, never really reconciled itself to the "loss" of Yugoslavia and continued to harbor hopes that Yugoslavia might some day ally itself more closely with the Socialist camp. Yugoslavia presented an important ideological challenge. It represented an alternative model of socialism that could infect Eastern Europe and lead to an erosion of bloc cohesion. Moreover, the Soviet military viewed access to Yugoslavia's ports and facilities as an important strategic asset which could enhance the flexibility of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet and increase Moscow's capability for power projection.

The United States, in turn, saw Yugoslavia as an important bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Balkans. Any shift in Yugoslav policy back toward the Soviet Union would have tipped the balance of power in the Balkans and had serious implications for Greece and Turkey as well as Romania's ability to pursue its maverick course. Thus Washington strongly supported the preservation of Yugoslavia's unity, territorial integrity and non-aligned status. Indeed, in the mid 1970s, U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's independence was considered by American officials to be "bordering on the vital."¹⁹

The end of the Cold War, however, has reduced Yugoslavia's importance in the eyes of both superpowers. Ideologically the "Yugoslav model" has lost whatever attraction it once had. Today it is seen in Eastern Europe not as a model to be emulated but as one to be avoided at all costs. At the same time, the mellowing of the military competition with the U.S. has reduced Moscow's interest in and need for Yugoslavia's port facilities.

Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the current Yugoslav crisis is the *marginal role which the superpowers have played*. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have largely been content to sit on the sidelines and let the Europeans manage the crisis. This passivity presents a stark contrast to the situation a decade ago or even five years ago when Yugoslavia's disintegration would have provoked a strong reaction on the part of both powers.

¹⁹See the speech by Hal Sonnenfeldt, at the time a key aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to a group of U.S. Ambassadors in London in December 1975. The speech outlined what later became known as "the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." See "State Department Summary of Sonnenfeldt Remarks," *New York Times*, April 6, 1976.

The Soviet Union has viewed the crisis largely through the prism of its own domestic problems. Its main concern has been the impact which the disintegration of Yugoslavia might have on the *internal situation within the USSR*, particularly on the aspirations of the key republics in the USSR for independence.²⁰ Consequently, Moscow has strongly supported the territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia. At the same time it has opposed any effort to internationalize the conflict for fear this would set a precedent and legitimize outside interference in its own affairs.²¹

The U.S. has also taken a low key approach to the crisis. Despite clear warnings that Yugoslavia was on the verge of collapse, the Bush Administration put the issue on the backburner -- in part because it had no easy answer to how to deal with the messy situation, but also because its attention was focussed on other more pressing issues: German unification, the crisis in the USSR, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the Gulf War. As a result, Yugoslavia received very little high-level attention within the U.S. government until it was too late.²²

There was, moreover, an inherent contradiction in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia -- one which was never fully resolved. On the one hand, the U.S. expressed its support for preserving Yugoslavian unity. On the other, it supported democratization and respect for human rights. The two elements, however, tended to contradict and work at cross purposes with one another.²³ The emphasis on democracy and human rights tended to strengthen the hand of the anti-communist

²⁰Soviet analysts have made direct parallels between the current situation in Yugoslavia and that in the Soviet Union. As one commentator bluntly put it, "The situation in the USSR is too similar to that of Yugoslavia for the comparison to go unnoticed." (P. Felgenguaer, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 29, 1991.) See also Radio Mayak 1330 GMT, July 26, 1991. Translated in FBIS-Sov-91-146, M. Sarantsev, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 20, 1991, FBIS-Sov-91-143, July 25, 1991.

²¹At the Berlin meeting of the CSCE in June 1991, the Soviets initially blocked Western efforts to strengthen the CSCE crisis management mechanisms and only grudgingly agreed to a compromise formula near the end of the meeting that allowed a member to call an emergency meeting of the CSCE if its motion was supported by 12 out of the 35 members. However, the CSCE can still take no formal action without the agreement of *all* members.

²²The U.S. handling of the Yugoslav crisis bears marked similarity to its approach to the Cyprus crisis in 1974. In Cyprus the U.S. also had considerable advanced warning of an impending crisis, but the warnings received little attention at the top levels of government. American policymakers, especially Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, were preoccupied with Watergate and the Middle East and did not give the Cyprus issue high-level attention until it was too late. For details see Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus."

²³The American view, however, was that these goals were mutually reinforcing rather than competing. See the speech by U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman "American-Yugoslav Bilateral Relations in Light of Current Changes in East-West Relations," at the U.S.-Yugoslav Roundtable, "American and Yugoslav Views of the Nineties," held in Belgrade, March 20-21, 1990, in *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XLI, p. 9.

opposition forces, who in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, were strongly nationalistic and separatist while the emphasis on preserving Yugoslavia's unity lent support to the least democratic forces like the Army and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, who favored a strongly centralized Yugoslavia.

In general, however, the main emphasis was on preserving Yugoslavia's unity. American policymakers worried that any encouragement of separatist trends in Slovenia and Croatia would have a ripple effect elsewhere in Eastern Europe, encouraging a host of separatist and irredentist movements from the Baltics to Bessarabia. This was an understandable concern -- one shared by the EC and the Soviet Union as well -- but the U.S. remained wedded to the policy long after it had become clear that the preservation of a centralized federation along Titoist lines was impossible and that the only hope of avoiding civil war was the creation of a looser confederation which gave the constituent republics greater independence and sovereignty -- a solution firmly opposed by the Yugoslav army and Serbia.²⁴

To some extent, in fact, continued U.S. (and EC) insistence on the preservation of Yugoslavia's unity may have indirectly contributed to the intensification of the crisis by encouraging the belief in Serbia and within the Yugoslav military that the U.S. and EC would countenance a military crackdown in Slovenia in order to preserve the unity of the federation if the crackdown took place quickly and with little bloodshed. After the military intervention in Slovenia at the end of June, the United States adopted a low profile, preferring to let the EC take the lead in managing the crisis. Indeed, President Bush appeared to view the crisis primarily as a "European problem" that should be solved by the Europeans.²⁵

This low profile approach, however, entails certain risks. For one thing, it is likely to reinforce the impression, already strong in many circles in Europe (especially France), that the U.S. is no longer interested in European affairs and does not intend to play an active role in Europe in the future. Moreover, if the EC mediation succeeds, or even if it only buys a little time, the EC, rather than NATO, will be seen as the paramount political-security institution in Europe and the most

²⁴As late as mid June 1991 when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Yugoslavia, the U.S. was still insisting that Yugoslavia's unity had to be preserved. See David Hoffman, "Baker Urges Yugoslavs to Keep Unity," *Washington Post*, June 22, 1991; David Binder, "United Yugoslavia Goal of U.S. Policy," *New York Times*, July 1, 1991; "Baker Backing for United Yugoslavia," *Financial Times*, June 22/23, 1991.

²⁵See Bush's interview with Carola Kaps, "Bush sieht in der Bewältigung der Krise in Jugoslawien zunächst eine Aufgabe der Europäer," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 10, 1991.

capable of addressing the type of security threats likely to arise in Europe in the future. At the same time, the crisis is likely to give greater momentum to efforts to create a cohesive European foreign and security policy within the EC. Both of these developments could weaken European support for NATO and a strong American role on the continent.

In short, the Yugoslav crisis raises central issues that extend beyond Yugoslavia and go to the heart of the debate about the organization of the new security order in Europe and the American role in it. Does the United States intend to help shape that order or will it be content simply to be a kibbitzer on the sidelines? Is Yugoslavia simply a "European" issue to be primarily managed by the Europeans or does it involve important U.S. interests as well? How the United States answers these questions will have a major impact on its future role and place in the new security order now under discussion in Europe.

SOVIET POLICY AND INTERESTS

Similar questions can be raised about Moscow's role in the future. Conceivably close ties may eventually emerge between Serbia and a reconstituted Soviet Union or Russia, but Moscow's ties to Bulgaria, once the most loyal and orthodox of Soviet allies, are likely to weaken visibly as the process of democratization intensifies. In the future Bulgaria is likely to seek closer ties with Western and Central Europe and to play a more independent role in the Balkans. Bulgaria's fear of Turkey, however, will probably make it reluctant to sever ties with Moscow completely. Given the large imbalance of forces that currently exist along the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier in Turkey's favor, Sofia will probably want to maintain some military links with Moscow as a kind of "insurance policy." But the days of Bulgaria's slavish obedience to Soviet policy interests are clearly over.

Relations with Romania have significantly improved since Ceausescu's overthrow. Once the most "anti-Soviet" country in Eastern Europe, today Romania is Moscow's best ally in Eastern Europe. In April 1991 Bucharest signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, which contains clauses that prohibit either side from joining an alliance directed against the other and forbids the stationing of foreign troops on the natural territory of either side.²⁶ The Soviets have tried to push the treaty as a "model" for Central Europe. However, Moscow's other former allies have made it clear that they will not sign such a treaty, since it would limit their sovereignty and could not only block their membership in NATO but also the European Community.

Over the longer term, however, differences over Bessarabia seem likely to cast a larger shadow over relations. Bessarabia was annexed by Stalin in 1940; parts of it were incorporated into the Ukraine, while the majority of the territory became what is now the Moldavian SSR (Moldavia). For the moment, the Iliescu government in Romania has sought to play down the issue. It has concentrated on improving cultural and political contacts with Moldavia rather than pushing for

²⁶See Vladimir Socor, "The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and its Regional Implications," *Report on Eastern Europe*, May 3, 1991, pp. 25-33.

political unification. However, the government has made clear that it sees unification as a long term goal.²⁷

The government's approach has been strongly criticized as being too cautious. The Soviet-Romanian treaty came under strong domestic attack because it made no mention of Bessarabia and because it explicitly accepted the current borders. Moreover, in June 1991, the Romanian parliament passed a resolution condemning and pronouncing null and void *ab initio* the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 and the ensuing Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania. While the resolution did not directly call for a revision of the borders, it did refer to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina as "sacred Romanian lands" and called on the Romanian government to assist in the fulfillment of the "legitimate aspirations of the population of the forcibly annexed Romanian territories."²⁸

The parliamentary resolution underscores the degree to which Bessarabia remains an emotional issue among the Romanian public. At the moment the majority of Moldavians appear to prefer two separate Romanian states. However, as Moldavia emancipates itself from Soviet tutelage and freedom of travel increases, the sense of spiritual and cultural unity between Romania and Moldavia is likely to increase. Over time, this could lead to growing pressures for unification -- especially if Yugoslavia breaks up -- and exacerbate relations with Moscow as well as Kiev.²⁹

From the Soviet point of view, however, the most important concern in the Balkans is likely to be Turkey's future orientation. Through its control on the Dardanelles, Turkey blocks Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Turkey

²⁷In an interview with the Kyodo new agency in Tokyo on August 8, Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase said that Romania hopes to achieve unification with Moldavia in three stages: (1) formation of a cultural federation; (2) formation of an economic federation; and (3) a merger "on the German model." This is the first time that a senior Romanian official has explicitly outlined a strategy for unification with Moldavia. Previously Romanian officials had limited themselves to calling for greater cultural and political cooperation between "two independent Romanian states." The shift in the Romanian position appears to be a response to growing popular sentiment on the Bessarabian issue. See *Radio Liberty Daily Report*, Nr. 151, August 9, 1991.

²⁸*Radio Liberty Daily Report*, No. 119, June 25, 1991. For a detailed discussion, see Vladimir Socor, "Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania," *Report on the USSR*, July 19, 1991, pp. 23-28.

²⁹Moldavia actually compromises only a little more than half of the original Moldavian lands annexed by the USSR. The rest of the territory lies in the Ukraine. Thus any demand for unification implies a challenge to the Ukraine's borders. Hence the Ukrainian media reacted sharply to the declaration of the Romanian parliament on Bessarabia, charging that in pressing for a revision of postwar borders the declaration "contravened the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki Accords." See Socor, "Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania," p. 26.

acts as a gateway to the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Good relations with Turkey are of immense strategic importance.

Turkey has traditionally seen the Soviet Union as the chief threat to its security. However, the end of the Cold War has led to a shift in Turkish security perceptions and a decline in concerns about the Soviet military threat. Today Turkey no longer sees the main threat to its security coming from the north (the USSR) but from the south (Syria and Iraq).

Since the late 1980s, moreover, there has been a visible warming in Soviet-Turkish relations. During Turkish President Turgut Ozal's visit to the USSR in March 1991, the two countries signed an Agreement on Good Neighborly Relations. Economic relations in particular have blossomed. In the last few years trade between Moscow and Turkey has more than quadrupled. As a result of agreements signed during Ozal's visit, the volume of trade is expected to increase to \$10 billion (from \$1.9 billion in 1990) by the end of the decade.³⁰

Turkey, in fact, has begun to emerge as an important economic factor within the Balkans. Its proposal for the creation of a Black Sea Economic Zone, which would include Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and the Ukraine as well as the three Caucasian republics in the Soviet Union (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan), has sparked considerable interest in the USSR and underscores Ankara's growing economic attraction. The proposal is likely to become more important as the individual republics begin to exercise their newly gained independence and sovereignty.

At the same time, the growth of Muslim consciousness and nationalism within the Central Asian republics in the USSR adds a new dimension to Soviet-Turkish relations.³¹ Many of these Muslims look to Turkey to play a leadership role among the Turkic peoples of the world, especially those in Central Asia. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Turkey was a beacon for emerging Central Asian nationalism. While Turkey has sought to play down its Pan-Turkic role since the founding of the Turkish Republic, Ankara could be compelled to rethink this policy by developments in the Central Asian republics, especially if its effort to gain full membership in the EC fails.

³⁰Jonathan Eyal, "Ozal Aims to Revive Turkish Power," *The Guardian*, May 21, 1991.

³¹On the revival of national consciousness in Central Asia, see in particular Graham Fuller, "The Emergence of Central Asia," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1990, pp. 49-67.

The impact of developments in Central Asia on Turkish policy have already begun to be felt. The Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan, for instance, has asked to open consulates in Turkey. And during his visit to the USSR in March 1991, President Turgut Ozal paid a visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan -- the first time that a Turkish president has ever visited these republics. Turkish radio broadcasts and cultural exchanges with the Central Asian republics have also increased. To be sure, these efforts hardly represent a new wave of Pan-Turkism, but over the long term, developments in Central Asia could have a more substantial impact on Turkish policy, increasing Turkey's orientation towards the Muslim world and the Middle East.

U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY

The end of the Cold War is likely to have an important impact on American interests and perspectives on the Balkans and the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has reduced the importance of the area as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. On the other, it has increased the importance of the region within the framework of Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf contingencies.

There has always been a school within the United States, particularly within the U.S. Navy, which has viewed the Mediterranean as the "place where the Persian Gulf begins." The Gulf War strengthened that perspective. Ninety percent of the material needed to support the coalition operations in the Gulf during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm arrived via the Mediterranean. As Ian Lesser notes, if the U.S. had been forced to rely on the Indian Ocean route in deploying forces in the Gulf, its capacity for rapid power projection would have been greatly reduced.³²

In short, the United States is likely to maintain a strong interest in Southeastern Europe, especially the Eastern Mediterranean. However, in the future this interest is likely to be dictated less by concerns about a potential Soviet threat to Europe than by the role that bases and facilities in the region may play in contingencies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. This gives the U.S. a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Greece and Turkey (particularly the latter) and encouraging the two countries to resolve their bilateral differences. It also suggests that "out of area" issues are likely to become a more important part of the security dialogue with both countries.

From the American perspective, the picture on the southern flank looks brighter than it has in years. In Greece, the defeat of Andreas Papandreou has removed an irritating thorn in the U.S. side. While Papandreou's bark was often worse than his bite, his sharp anti-American rhetoric and tendency to depart from many agreed Alliance positions put strong constraints on the degree of U.S.-Greek accord. His successor, Constantine Mitsotakis, the leader of the New Democracy, has made good relations with the U.S. a cornerstone of his foreign policy, and since he took office in April 1990 American-Greek relations have significantly improved.

³²Ian Lesser, "The Strategic Environment in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean," p. 13.

The signing of a new Defense Cooperation Accord (DECA) in July 1990 has significantly contributed to the more cordial atmosphere. Papandreou had made the bases a major domestic political issue and negotiations had been deadlocked for over a year. Within a few weeks after coming to power, however, Mitsotakis signed the new agreement, which allows the U.S. to maintain its most important facilities in Greece, the port at Souda Bay and the communications facility at Gournes, both on Crete, as well as several other communications installations located on the Greek mainland.³³

The base agreement removes an important irritant in U.S.-Greek relations and assures American access to key facilities over the next eight years. Over the long run, however, Greece is likely to gradually reduce its reliance on the United States and align itself more closely with Western Europe. Greece's entry into the EC has contributed to a gradual "Europeanization" of its foreign policy -- a trend which is visible elsewhere in the southern region as well (with the exception of Turkey).³⁴ Today Greece looks as much to Brussels as it does to Washington.³⁵ This is a major shift from the situation a decade ago.

The end of the Cold War seems likely to reinforce this trend. The decline of the Soviet military threat and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe diminishes the importance of the U.S. military guarantee for Greece. At the same time, Greece's need to stay in step with its EC allies on defense issues is likely to intensify the trend toward the "Europeanization" of Greek foreign and defense policy. This does not preclude bilateral cooperation with the United States, but it will limit American freedom of action on those issues in which there is not a clear convergence of interests.³⁶

The bilateral tie to Washington, however, will still remain important. The U.S. acts as an important constraint on Turkey. If the connection to Washington is allowed to significantly atrophy, the U.S. might be tempted to put all its eggs in the

³³Two other bases in the Athens area, the Helleniko air base and the communications station at Nea Makri, are to be closed down as part of an overall reassessment by the Pentagon of U.S. military needs in the post-Cold War era. See Paul Anastasi, "Greece and U.S. Sign Eight Year Pact on Bases," *New York Times*, July 9, 1990.

³⁴See Ian Lesser, "The United States and the Mediterranean After the Cold War," *Yearbook 1990* (Athens: The Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, 1991), p. 230.

³⁵On Greece's recent relations with the EC, see in particular Panos Kasakos, "Die neue EC-Agenda und die griechische Europapolitik," *Europa Archiv Folge 7*, 1991, pp. 215-224.

³⁶On this point see the insightful discussion in Ian Lesser's paper, "The Strategic Environment in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean," p. 5.

Turkish basket. Moreover, only the United States has the leverage to induce Turkey to make the concessions necessary to obtain a Cyprus settlement. This gives Greece a strong incentive to maintain good ties to America.

The end of the Cold War is also likely to affect U.S. perceptions of its interests in Turkey. The United States has traditionally tried to maintain an awkward balance in its relations with Greece and Turkey. Strategically, however, Turkey has always been the more important of the two, especially in the eyes of Pentagon planners. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO, behind the United States. Moreover, Turkey's control over the Straits would allow it to block the entry of the Soviet Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean in the case of a conflict.

In recent years, however, Turkey's importance has shifted in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Whereas a decade ago Turkey was primarily seen as helping to deter a Soviet threat to Europe, today its significance is seen increasingly within the context of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The Gulf War has reinforced that perspective, especially within the Defense Department. Turkish approval for the use of its military airbases played a critical role in the Gulf War.³⁷ Turkish President Turgut Ozal's support of the U.S. in the Gulf War was an important break with Turkish policy. In the past Turkey has been extremely cautious about allowing the U.S. to use Turkish facilities for Middle East contingencies.³⁸ Ozal, however, concluded that it was to Turkey's advantage to support the U.S. against Saddam Hussein, despite strong domestic opposition. His policy provoked a storm of criticism, both from the opposition parties and the military, and led to the resignation of the chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Necip Torumtay.³⁹

Ozal's decision represents a major political gamble. He appears to hope that his firm backing for the U.S. in the Gulf War and his close personal ties to President Bush will bring important political benefits for Turkey. High on his agenda is increased military assistance for the modernization of the Turkish armed forces and

³⁷See Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, pp. 34-48. The redeployment of 100,000 Turkish troops along the Iraqi border also forced Iraq to redeploy a substantial number of troops to the north which otherwise would have been used to defend Kuwait. And Turkey's closure of the Mosul pipeline, through which 54 percent of Iraq's exported oil flows, significantly contributed to the success of the economic sanctions against Iraq.

³⁸In the Arab Israeli war, for instance, Turkey denied the use of its airfields to U.S. planes for operations connected with Israel.

³⁹See Clyde Haberman, "As Leader Keeps Nation War Role Secret, Many Turks Express Alarm," *New York Times*, January 22, 1991.

greater access of Turkish products to U.S. markets.⁴⁰ He is also hoping for active American support of Turkey's membership in the EC.

Turkey's prospects for entering the EC in the near future, however, remain slim. Indeed, if anything, the Gulf War has led to further irritations in relations with Europe. The European (especially German) reluctance to aid Turkey during the war infuriated many Turks and reinforced the deeply-held belief among many Turks that Europe remains opposed to Turkey for religious and cultural reasons. European criticism of Ankara's treatment of the Kurdish refugees has also provoked resentment in Turkey leading to new tensions in relations.⁴¹

Moreover, in contrast to Greece, Turkey is isolated from the general process of "Europeanization" shaping the rest of the southern region. It is neither a member of the EC or the WEU. If defense and foreign policy are increasingly shaped by these institutions -- as some Europeans want -- Turkey risks being excluded from having a voice in the development of European security policy. Turkish membership in the EC or WEU could essentially extend the geographic scope of these organizations to the Turkish-Syrian border, raising the "out of area" issue in a more acute form. As the hesitant attitude of some European countries, especially Germany, to sending reinforcements to Turkey during the Gulf War underscores, many Europeans are profoundly uncomfortable with this notion. In short, the real problem facing Turkey in the wake of the Cold War is less strategic neglect "but rather the narrower and more potent risk of exclusion from the European security equation and its effect on Turkey's relations with the West."⁴²

Turkey's cool relations with Europe and the danger of exclusion from key European security bodies have made the U.S. connection even more important. The United States hopes to develop a "new strategic relationship" with Ankara and sees Turkey as playing an important role in enhancing stability in the Gulf and the Middle East. During President Bush's visit to Ankara in July 1991, the two countries agreed to intensify cultural, educational and commercial relations. Bush also pledged support for Turkey's military modernization program, including the co-production of 160 F-16 jet fighters, and to increase aid to Turkey to \$625 million for

⁴⁰See Ozal's interview in *Hurriyet*, January 30, 1991. Translated in FBIS-WEU-91-046, March 8, 1991, p. 23.

⁴¹Clyde Haberman, "Turks Outraged as Kurd Aid Backfires," *New York Times*, May 17, 1991. Wolfgang Günter Lerch, "Die Turken über den Westen verbittert," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 8, 1991.

⁴²Lesser, "The Strategic Environment in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean," p. 5.

FY 1992 -- a substantial rise over the \$500 million of military assistance for FY 1991.⁴³ This would, in effect, break the 7:10 ratio of aid for Greece and Turkey mandated by Congress.⁴⁴

Congress has traditionally cut back Administration requests in order to preserve the 7:10 ratio. But it may be less inclined to do so this year in light of Turkey's strong support for the U.S. in the Gulf. Clearly that is what Ozal is hoping -- and the Greeks fear. However, if the gamble fails, there could be a backlash in Turkey. Many Turks are bound to feel that their loyalty and commitment to the Western cause has once again gone unappreciated. This could strengthen anti-Western forces in Turkey.

However, even if the Administration succeeds in its effort to obtain increased assistance for Turkey, Ankara is likely to remain cautious about allowing the U.S. to use its facilities for "out of area" contingencies. Turkey has strong economic and political interests in the Middle East and it is unlikely to want to jeopardize these -- as its reserved attitude toward the deployment of a multinational "rapid reaction force" near Silopi on the Iraqi border underscores. Turkey has imposed strict conditions for employment of this force and set a deadline of September 3, 1991 for its withdrawal or extension.⁴⁵ Prime Minister Yilmaz has also explicitly ruled out the use of the bases for renewed air strikes against Iraq.

In the end the key to the success or failure of the Administration's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean may hang to no small extent on a resolution of the Cyprus issue. The intercommunal talks now being conducted under UN auspices have gone on for 17 years without visible success -- in part because the U.S. has rarely given the talks high priority.⁴⁶ The Bush Administration, however, has put the Cyprus

⁴³See Mark Nicholson, "Bush Pledges Aid for Turkey," *Financial Times*, July 22, 1991. The \$500 million for FY 91 was the formal request. However, total aid came to closer to \$800 million if "off budget" items are included, such as the delivery of a consignment of F-4 aircraft.

⁴⁴The Administration has requested \$350 million in military assistance for FY 92 for Greece. However, the 7:10 ratio has always been somewhat artificial. It does not include economic support funds (ESF) which Turkey receives but Greece does not, or "off budget" appropriations, which Turkey has often received. In addition, much of Turkey's assistance is grant aid whereas that to Greece is in the form of credits. For a comprehensive discussion of the Greek-Turkish aid problems, see Ellen Laipson, "Greece and Turkey: The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid," *Congressional Research Service*, December 26, 1989.

⁴⁵Jonathan Rugman, "Turkey Seeks Veto Over Allied Force," *The Guardian*, July 19, 1991.

⁴⁶For a detailed discussion of the intercommunal talks see in particular Richard N. Haass, "Cyprus: Moving Beyond Solution?" *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1987, pp. 183-190. Also Haass, "Alliance Problems in the Mediterranean," pp. 66-68. Haass was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast European Affairs in the Reagan Administration. Both articles reflect the Reagan Administrations' "low key" approach to Cyprus.

issue high on its policy agenda and has sought to actively push behind-the-scenes for a settlement of the conflict.⁴⁷ While a number of key issues still remain unresolved, the prospects for a resolution are today better than they have been in years.

Much will depend on the results of the quadripartite conference to be held in Washington under United Nation's auspices in September 1991. A successful outcome of the conference could facilitate a resolution of the dispute and remove one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the Eastern Mediterranean. It might also help re-ignite the "Davos process," which has languished since Ozal's visit to Athens in June 1988, and give new impetus to the effort to resolve some of the key bilateral differences over the Aegean.⁴⁸

A Greek-Turkish rapprochement would ease the current U.S. dilemma considerably. Greek fears of Turkey would be significantly reduced (though not entirely removed) and Athens would be less obsessed with maintaining the 7:10 ratio. This would free the U.S. to pursue relations with Turkey on their own merits rather than making them hostage to U.S.-Greek relations. Congress would also be more sympathetic to aid requests for Turkey.

⁴⁷The U.S. has not put forward specific proposals, but rather has sought to act as a behind-the-scenes "catalyst" for a resolution of the conflict. See Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names Next Challenge: Cyprus," *New York Times*, July 19, 1991. Also Marlise Simons, "Greek Chief Hopes Visit by Bush Will Help Settle Cyprus Dispute," *Ibid*, July 18, 1991.

⁴⁸In early 1988 there were signs of a thaw in Greek-Turkish relations, which began with a meeting between Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and (then) Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in Davos, Switzerland in January 1988. The Davos meeting initiated a dialogue between the two leaders that led to a substantial improvement in the atmosphere in bilateral relations. However, the rapprochement generated strong domestic opposition in both countries, and quickly fizzled after Ozal's visit to Athens in June 1988. For a detailed discussion see Ellen Laipson, "Greek-Turkish Relations: Beginning of a New Era," *Congressional Research Service*, December 1, 1988. Also Ronald Meinardus, "Eine neue Phase in der griechisch-Türkischen Beziehungen," *Europa Archiv*, Folge 14, 1988, pp. 403-411.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE EMERGING POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ORDER

The end of the Cold War has had a dual -- and somewhat contradictory -- impact on security in Southeastern Europe. On the one hand, it has reduced the importance of the area as an area of potential superpower confrontation. Neither superpower has shown a proclivity to try to exploit the new fluidity in the region to make major strategic gains at the expense of the other, as was the case in the nineteenth century.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has led to the proliferation and reemergence of a number of regional disputes in the area: the Macedonian question, the Bessarabian issue, Kosovo, Hungarian-Romanian differences over Transylvania, and the Turkish minority issue in Bulgaria could all heat up in the near future. The Cold War did not resolve these disputes, but it did tend to keep them in check. With the demise of the Cold War, they have begun to resurface with greater intensity.

Yugoslavia could be a microcosm of the type of future security threats that Europe is likely to face in the future. The Yugoslav crisis, moreover, has highlighted the absence of effective institutional mechanisms available for dealing with such crises. The EC has played a valuable role in mediating the crisis, but as Jim Steinberg's paper demonstrates, the effectiveness of the Community's effort has been limited by the lack of consensus over objectives as well as by its inability to mount collective military action and/or provide peace-keeping forces.

NATO, by contrast, has played virtually no role in the crisis -- a fact which is unlikely to go unnoticed by America's European allies as they ponder how best to ensure their security in the coming decade.

The CSCE has proven a useful forum for dialogue during the crisis, but its effectiveness is hampered by the need to obtain the unanimous approval of all members for any collective action as well as the lack of a mechanism for enforcing its discussions. In most instances, it did little more than endorse EC actions. The Conflict Prevention Center may eventually prove to be a useful vehicle for dampening and preventing such local crises, but at the moment it is too weak and underdeveloped to play an effective role in this regard.

This underscores the need for both superpowers to devote greater attention to strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention and conflict management. In the case of the United States, this argues for a policy not of disengagement, but one of

active diplomatic engagement. Otherwise the U.S. may find itself increasingly marginalized and less able to shape the new security order in Europe.

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Rough Draft

Western Policy:
The Challenges and Options Ahead

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Paper prepared for the RAND-ELIAMEP Conference
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1. Once again: Present at the Creation

Rhodes is an island with a rather unique experience. Well over two thousand years ago (2235 to be precise) and just a few steps away from here down at the harbour it was the location of the most authentic "colossal" failure in history. An earthquake destroyed that statue that had been regarded one of the world's wonders. It lasted for but 56 years. What we are discussing here are some of the implications of another earthquake in recent years and months and weeks – one of enormous social and political dimensions that brought to an end what had been envisaged as a transformation of mankind and became the most colossal failure in history – communist rule. It had lasted for some 74 years.

It had been the origin and prime mover of the most systematic and universal confrontational order in the life of nations. Conversely, the unraveling of that imperial structure – especially since the summer of 1989 – displayed a rather logical sequential structure. It undid an unprecedented military confrontation that was robust, although NATO had faced a maturing invasion capability combined with the means to suppress its nuclear responses. It undid the German division, although even German governments had at times assumed that the unification issue had been put to rest. It undid the enforced Soviet rule in East European WP countries, although consolidating the belt of "people's republics" had been a prime priority of Soviet European policy for decades. It thus undid the European division, although the shadows of possible Soviet relapses remained. All this happened without any Soviet military intervention in spite of overwhelming Soviet military power. During the 74 hours in August of 1991 even the shadows of suppressive restauration disappeared. With the military confrontation already gone, now the political competition which had been the source of tension since the late 1940s and in many ways since 1917 was about to vanish. While the process had been initiated in the center – in Moscow –, the crumbling began at the periphery – literally at barbed wires surrounding that structure. Yet the cataclysmic end happened again right in the center.

This process of unraveling destroyed what (I believe) Schewardnadse has called a "horrible stability", thereby unleashing passions and forces with

obvious destructive potential that had hardly figured prominently in the previous international order since 1945. Indeed, along with human rights these passions and forces had been superseded by the communist rule. To paraphrase what a great nineteenth century-European has said about absolutism, totalitarianism has "violated and tortured nationalities for so long that nationalities now turn to nationalism however much that may contradict the prevailing trends that are geared toward internationalism. It is both plausible and justified that suppressed and dismembered nations stand up to get their nationality recognized again".¹

At the same time it is obvious that new circumstances have been created through civilization (infrastructure, communication, economical interdependence, to name a few) as well as through political innovation, especially after World War Two. They will continue to influence international affairs even in those areas where traditional conflict patterns are now resurfacing. Some of these circumstances – most noticeably the United Nations – even tend to acquire at long last the importance that had been envisaged for them at the outset.

In short, what we witness today are two countervailing trends – one "back to the future" guided by revived fears and pre-bipolarity concepts of conflict and order, the other "forward toward unlocked opportunities" guided by post-bipolarity views on limited sovereignty and cooperative order. To reconcile these two megatrends is what future political competition over international order is about. They will combine with two traditional tendencies that will acquire special relevance during the current phase of profound reconstruction – one to preserve patterns which appeared advantageous in recent decades, another that requires fresh looks, imagination and initiative. There will be continuity and change, but the issue is the resulting mix.

Momentuous change has already altered the European political map, and while most of the post-1917 and post-1945 structures that had been imposed have been undone, the dynamics of change is still strong. But the objectives are now different: In the former GDR, in MOE states and most

1 Constantin Frantz, *Die Überwindung des Nationalismus*, in: *Der Föderalismus als universale Idee*, ed. by Ilse Hartmann, Berlin 1948, p. 343f. (I owe this reference to Bernard von Plate.)

recently in the USSR a process of reform and reconstitution is under way. Outcomes are uncertain, but the basic trend is toward cooperative structures. Since August 21 this reconstruction is clearly gathering momentum. Reforms in MOE states are no longer overshadowed by the dangers of relaps in the USSR, and reforms in the USSR tend to be less stalemated by the task of building simultaneously democracy *and* a federation with centrist forces eager to prevent both. The removal of potentially imminent threats of totalitarian restauration does not by itself resolve the enormous problems of economic and social reform, but it removes major obstacles on the road to reconstruction and provides reforms with the air of freedom that will encourage initiative and synergism inside and incentives for support outside. The prudent approach toward reconstituting a Soviet Union of sovereign republics certainly fits into the overall development and reinforces the dominant trend toward an increasingly cooperative constellation involving the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the new Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – a zone characterised by increasing interdependence (which in effect means transfer of sovereignty), self-restraint and political interaction. The stability of this emerging constellation is not a given, and its scope and limits may be somewhat fluid, but short of major blunders or relapses this new "Silk Road" (as Eduard Schewardnadse has called this Eurasian-North American belt²) will be the dominant international structure with two major conglomerates on the Eurasian landmass developing toward unprecedented constitutional patterns – mixed systems with some central authority cum constituent parts that can remain the focus of loyalty.³

There do exist conceivable variations from this pattern as a result of national assertiveness, failure of reforms, new challenges from outside, unilateral action, or trends toward regionalism that would turn this constellation into a more disjunctive, if not competitive, environment or create an international viscosity that would absorb the current dynamics of change.

2 Eduard Schewardnadse, *Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit*, Hamburg 1991, p. 285.

3 To label the West European or new Soviet unions "federation" may confuse rather than clarify the issues, because, as Robert Bowie and Karl J. Friedrich have pointed out in a classic on federalism, any historically known federations is *sui generis*, and the two emerging ones undoubtedly are. We still need to understand them on their own.

The prime task of governments throughout this constellation is to reinforce trends toward restraint, interdependence, transfer of sovereignty where this serves common purposes, and the stabilization of cooperative structures. Yet, as President Bush has stated, this belongs to the "hard work of peace". Among the various risks and challenges are some of a military security nature. The most important of these relate to non-military conditions of security, in particular the success of reforms in Eastern Europe and the new Soviet Union. Western tailored support thus has an important security dimension. Failures could eventually lead to strategic *vacua*, if not to an eventual reconstitution of a hostile strategic environment.

In assessing future risks and challenges one needs to be clear about whether one assumes the "Silk Road"-constellation or one resulting from some general deterioration of that overall framework. It could be extremely misleading to look at generic contingencies in isolation, leave alone to justify security arrangements in terms of scenarios that require contextual analysis before they can provide any basis for military planning.

2. The Southern Periphery in Perspective

The Eastern and Southern Mediterranean littoral is widely regarded as areas from which future military instability and conflict are most likely to spring. This is what our conference is about, and we have reviewed a number of contingencies. However, they are critically important for two reasons: they could require security action, but they could also invite fatally wrong assessments, if not responses.

It is important to assess future contingencies in crisis-ridden areas like South Eastern Europe and the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean littoral in terms of the general constellation assumed: It makes a difference of profound strategic importance whether the "Silk Road"-constellation is anticipated or some less desirable variation. If it is the latter, one needs to spell out the assumptions about what has changed. The least plausible approach would be to assume a cooperative highly interactive Eurasian-North American zone in the North and a new hostile environment on the Southern periphery. With a substitute threat from the South: This could

easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy that could indeed pose problems that are hard to cope with.

It is also crucial to draw some lessons from recent experience in regard to future dimensions of military power as they may affect also the regions we are discussing here. A few general observations are in place:

- (1) Until the late 1980s any of the major changes within the former Soviet orbit would have been expected to trigger large-scale employment of military forces with grave risks for East-West security. Instead the world is witnessing since 1989 a new *"tradition of non-use"* of Soviet military power (to paraphrase Tom Schelling's formula).
- (2) Iraq has been a Soviet ally with treaty links, and in many NATO exercises of the past a Yugoslav breakup scenario has been the assumed origin of a major conflict between the USSR and NATO following Soviet intervention on behalf of Serbia. Instead the world has seen Soviet strategic cooperation with the United States on Iraq (although with an inclination to capitalize on Western preoccupation in a dual crisis – just as in the Hungary-Suez scenario), and the Soviet interest in Yugoslavia was mainly restricted to avoiding a possible precedent for a Soviet scenario which by now is already behind us. Instead – and contrary also to the familiar 1914 analogies – the Yugoslavian conflict (deplorable and uncivilized as it is) turns out to be the first of a new kind of *conflict – encapsulated and contained*. Rather than being the source of violent escalation it is becoming an "internal matter of the community of nations".⁴

4 Hans Dietrich Genscher in the German Bundestag on September 4, 1991. With his observation on rethinking the concept of non-interference in internal matters he is reinforcing a view that the French Foreign Minister Dumas had initiated in the aftermath of Desert Storm (**) with the result of the Kurdish resolution. There is now an observable trend even among formerly traditionalist international lawyers to reconsider non-interference in favor of a qualified right to interfere in internal matters. It may be a long way until this gets adopted in the UN. But it could become a more promising issue for the Helsinki II Accord thus setting an important precedent.

- (3) During Desert Shield and Desert Storm NATO has shifted forces and stockpiles to the Gulf area to an extent that would have left NATO precariously vulnerable had the USSR changed its stand on the Iraqi aggression and turned more hostile, if not tempted to exploit Western weaknesses. Given the internal Soviet stiffening since mid-November 1990 this certainly was not to be counted out completely.

This happened along with a possible shift of Soviet policy on the Gulf (see Primakov's rather different recommendations on Iraq) and with the crackdown on Lithuania, and indeed in view of a possible general relaps in Soviet internal developments with far-reaching external consequences - as anticipated in Schewardnadse's resignation speech of December 20, 1990.

While much of this happened in anticipation of the implementation of the CFE Agreement (which still was associated with some related quarrels, in particular over Art. III), the thinning out of NATO capabilities went far beyond and concerned the stockpiles not only of the NATO countries involved in the coalition, but e.g. of the Bundeswehr. One may view this a gamble or a considered policy based on *reciprocal Soviet-Western confidence* (emanating e.g. from the Helsinki summit between Bush and Gorbachev). It certainly dwarfs whatever confidence-builders in the Helsinki-process could come up with.

- (4) While unilateral use of force has visibly ceased to be a viable political option in the East-West context (some local conflicts aside that have been successfully encapsulated), there has been a concurrent revolution in the use of force: For the first time the *UN authorized the use of force* to enforce peace (the Korean case has been noticeably different) and thus legitimized coalition warfare engaging 28 nations, although with a tightly circumscribed mandate. This is often described as a unique scenario with a villain and a stake which is unlikely to repeat itself. However, the lasting importance is more likely to rest with the major *precedent* it provides and the increasing chances for Soviet cooperation in international peace enforcement.

- (5) The coalition was unique in that it brought together *Western and Arab military forces* – Arab forces including from countries that often in the past had displayed rather hostile attitudes toward the West as in the case of Syria. This, too, clearly has implications for future crisis-management and peace enforcement as it should reshape many of the political perceptions that still enjoy a role in current descriptions of the "Southern threat". This is not to say that risks and uncertainties in the area are negligible, but it underlines the need for differentiated assessments, the prospects for future coalition building and the appropriateness of discriminate responses.
- (6) Conversely, the Iraqi aggression is often regarded as the first of a new type of aggression with an oil-rich islamic country armed with modern weaponry on a massive scale and engaging the West in a conflict where Western interests are vulnerable and Western responses limited. Instead there is reason to assume that a similar preparation for aggression will not be met again by the kind of benign neglect Saddam Hussein has enjoyed. Surveillance is going to be increasingly tighter, and the chances for future coalition building involving Arabs in the region will continue to exist unless the handling of the Israeli-Palastine issue masses things up. At the same time the experience of the Gulf war should serve as a *powerful deterrent* simply in terms of military outcome. As Lawrence Freedman has put it, "there is now no question that in regular warfare the West and the Third World are in different classes".⁵ Rather than exemplifying the dominant type of future aggression, the Iraqi experience will impact in terms of its outcome: It is likely to have an influence on comparable nations that compares to the manner in which Hiroshima conditioned the behavior of nations on the Northern half of the globe. In other words, it is unlikely that a Kuwait-type aggression will result from another massive conventional force build-up. As Henning Wegener has observed, Desert

5 Lawrence Freedman, *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, in: *Survival*, May/June 1991, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 202.

Storm may well have been the last major tank confrontation in history.

- (7) This may also mean that efforts toward acquiring modern *means of mass destruction* will be reinforced in the area with implications far outside the area. This is certainly the most important security concern by far in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean littoral and beyond. It also does require military preparation, but, more importantly, it requires a combination of diplomatic conflict resolution and effective non-proliferation regimes.
- (8) It has been argued that in the Gulf as in Yugoslavia conflicts have unfolded because the end of the Cold War provided a freedom to act at low risk, but while this may be so it is also true that *lowered risks means reduced danger of escalation* into a major war as well as enhanced chances for *cooperative crisis-management* by former adversaries. To that extent the now familiar paradigm of forces unleashed after the cap of bipolarity has been lifted needs careful consideration. It is certainly not the dominant trend. Rather there is abundant evidence (as there began to be after the Moscow Summit in May of 1972) that local and regional conflict partners see their leverage of playing up major competitors gone and that the chances to employ military forces successfully for political purposes is vanishing. Contrary to earlier suspicions this is so in the absence of some superpower condominium.
- (9) The Soviet-American dialogue over German unification and then during the Gulf crisis may well have been the *final* of what used to be *superpower-bilateralism*. It will remain an essential relationship, but while the USSR is turning into an inward-looking mixed system combining central as well as republican centers of action, the United States too will undergo major changes in its international conduct. Familiar oscillations (like between declinism at the end of the 1980s and current triumphalism) aside, the United States no longer is in the central position where it manages a dominant conflict relationship with the resultant discipline of allied coalitions and

thus with a continuing potential for playing up one against the other.

Moreover, current and understandable American moods notwithstanding, the Gulf war has demonstrated what many prudent observers and officials have argued throughout the 1980s: that future crisis-management on a large-scale can no longer be sustained by the United States alone. What the United States achieved in the Gulf was a broad system of a *ad hoc*-cooperation as a result of brilliant diplomacy. But without the voluntary support from many countries – only part of them belonging to the coalition of 28 – the United States would have been simply unable to conduct Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In particular, the logistic base provided by Germany or Spain – to mention just two – as well as financial support from Japan, Germany or Saudi Arabia against the background of the American budget deficit were imperative for the American ability to exercise its central role. Clearly no other country could have replaced the United States. I.e. the *American role* will remain *critical*, but *in need of legitimacy* derived from the UN, of *massive support*, and of *consensus*. Moreover, while traditional US alliances or, in any case, NATO was important for its support structures (logistics, communication, etc.), what was needed was an *ad hoc*-coalition.

- (10) The Iraqi aggression and Desert Shield/Desert Storm affected profoundly the political climate generated at the time of the London Summit in July 1990. It diffused expectations of peace dividends and reinforced conservative views on how to reform the Atlantic Alliance that were more at home in London than in say Bonn. Reform in regard to strategy, force structure and above all command structure became in large measure a question of how best to preserve some national holdings in NATO. This applies even to the most innovative force structure change – the rapid reaction force (or rather its land component).

The irony is that in the view of many the Gulf War provided a new rationale for NATO which at times has been described in terms of a "multidirectional" risk assessment with increasing emphasis on

Central and South Eastern Europe and the Southern regions as the likely origins of future military challenges to NATO. Yet the American demarche of February 26, 1991, left but one area of engagement for collective European military action outside a NATO context, namely "out-of-area" where this is least likely to happen. On the other hand, it is obvious that except for Northern Norwegian and Eastern Anatolian contingencies all military contingencies would originate as non-NATO cases with uncertain rules of engagement.

Given this expanding scope for crisis management, one may observe that the American role in Yugoslavia did not exactly reinforce confidence in American crisis management. Rather it reinforced the need for providing the European Community with more effective means in similar future contingencies. (As a side issue, the manner in which the Community acted within her narrow confines should have reduced the WEU to what it is – a holding pattern and procedure for minor diplomatic occasions.)

- (11) As a corollary, the nature and time-structure of future military conflicts in and around Europe tend to change in a way that affects the transition from crisis to major war as well as the nuclear dimension of conflicts. The time-structure of conflicts will typically allow not only for long preparation time (which in effect creates a requirement for flexible readiness that it may not always be easier to meet than a requirement for near-instant preparation), but for a range of institutional choices prior to a transition to NATO defense. In fact, most conceivable future military contingencies in and around Europe will never turn into a NATO case and those which could will require *sequential* arrangements for the transition from peace to crisis to war – something the American demarche of February 26 has strictly ruled out, yet something that comes with the nature of future conflict.

Similarly the nuclear dimension is changing. Not only are the contingencies that would have led to the consideration of nuclear employment in the past strategic environment, clearly going to become remote contingencies, but contrary to the language of the

London Declaration and, it seems, the successor document to MC 14/3, only a few types of future potential military conflict in and around Europe will have any nuclear dimension: Most of those will lend themselves (as in the Yugoslave case) to self-encapsulation, and major conventional aggressions will offer much better chances than in the past for conventional war-termination. The phrase that "there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted" is therefore clearly misleading, almost certainly politically counter-productive and not at all descriptive for the continued utility of nuclear deterrence which in my mind definitely continues to exist.⁶

- (12) In past strategic conditions the ultimate threat not only tended to let lesser cases appear to be covered, but it was the defining contingency also in regard to political control and to command structures. The result was a ^{highly} ~~highly~~ compartmentalized alliance system within which the United States and to a degree Great Britain maintained control, yet were extremely careful in specifying their commitments. This system has served the interests of many countries. It has mostly crumbled during the last twenty or so years with NATO and the US-Japanese Treaty remaining.⁷ In future circumstances extreme contingencies will cease to be the defining ones, except for security arrangements of last resort.

The question is whether NATO should be confined to an alliance of last resort which would dramatically reduce its political and strategic utility or whether it will be reformed in a manner that responds to the new political and strategic environment. This would give it a role within a network of interlocking institutions that could still be dominant and it would reinforce a key role for the United

6 Unlike earlier nuclear phraseology, this formula displays a high degree of unconstructive ambiguity. It is not clear whether it is confined to contingencies that may require to resort to extreme responses or to any contingency. Nor is it clear whether for the same kind of contingency weapons of last resort will be introduced later than in the past or whether the contingencies requiring weapons of last resort are going to be more remote. Clearly only the latter can be meant, but this would require a rather different statement on what might become a nuclear contingency than is envisaged in line with the London Declaration.

7 For an enlightened interpretation of the Japanese interest in sticking to the treaty see David Halberstam, *The Next Century*, New York 1991, pp. 79-88.

States in European affairs that is seen to be in all or most European countries' interest. Indeed, as a very senior American study group has recently pointed out, the "United States will need to be flexible in its institutional choices as it continues to play a role in Europe".⁸

13. All these dimensions have a special bearing on the regions under consideration here. One crucial point needs to be added. There was a Soviet dimension to most Mediterranean problems the West was facing since the end of the Second World War. In Potsdam it became clear that the USSR was trying to reach out into the Mediterranean with demands for a base on Turkish territory and Soviet trusteeship over Libya.⁹ Subsequently the formation of NATO was shaped in large measure by events in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular in Greece and Turkey. The Truman doctrine was the visible response. However, it was obvious from the outset that the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Central Europe were difficult to combine within one homogenous security system. It was the United States and Great Britain facing a Soviet threat in all these disparate areas that tended to forge one coherent alliance. However, in 1948 Bevin still favored a Mediterranean security system distinct from an Atlantic alliance and with a separate status for European states not bordering the Atlantic, and American views turned in similar directions.¹⁰

The outcome in 1949 was different. But the relationship between AFCENT and AFSOUTH or in broader terms the center and the flanks has always tended to be unorganic in many ways, and Turks and Norwegian alike have time and again expressed their worries about preoccupation with the Center. There has been one influential school of thought (especially in the United States with Albert Wohlstetter as the lead figure) which has argued persistently that the Center is stable, whereas the flanks and the South

8 Facing the Future. American Strategy in the 1990s. An Aspen Strategy Group Report. Landham 1991, p. 25.

9 Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance*. New York 1989; see also *Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine*. Hearings held in the Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. Eighties Congress. First Session on S. 938 (Historical Series). On the historical background see e.g. Norman E. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807*. Chicago 1970.

10 See Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman: *The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The launching of the North Atlantic Treaty*, in: *International Affairs*, 1983, Vol. **, pp. 351-363.

Eastern part in particular are exposed to military danger. They recommended to shift the Alliance's defense emphasis from the core to the flanks. The fallacy in this argument has been that destabilizing the Center that was facing maturing invasion capabilities would also have rendered the flanks more vulnerable because the Alliance could have been coerced at vulnerable spots like Berlin. There were delicate issues of horizontal and vertical escalation at stake.

Ironically, the Alliance's center and its Southern part have hardly ever co-operated more closely than during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, i.e. in a non-NATO case. The temptation for NATO is obvious. But so are the shortcomings. The Soviet military threat is gone. Soviet support for nations or civil war parties in the Balkans and the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean is an unlikely contingency for the foreseeable future. Countries in the area thus also lose their Soviet card in diplomatic gambles. Instead there will be increasing political and strategic cooperation among major external powers in regional crises. This does not mean that the new USSR or constituent republics will not rediscover own interests. They will. But at least within what appears to be the most stable constellation - the "Silk Road"-constellation - antagonism and confrontation will not pay. Commonality will.

3. Political Role and Common Policies

To that extent regional and subregional conflicts in South Eastern Europe will increasingly fall within the realm of crisis management by the European Community with the CSCE as a legitimizing framework. There are three reasons why. First, the Yugoslav case shows the need for speeding up the process toward a Political Union capable of exercising joint crisis management. Second, given the non-military conditions of insecurity in candidate countries, the Community is likely to have leverage that no other organization possesses. Most importantly, the growth of the Community is governed by transfer of sovereignty. This confines nationalism without destroying national identities. It displays standards for future accession as members or associated nations that ought to be upgraded in the light of the Yugoslav experience. The Community not only should develop toward a security union, but she should be understood to be based on common security principles as in effect she is. Also it is conceivable that in a developing CSCE system as well as in case of a strengthening of the UN the Community (as well as the USSR) may eventually acquire some

corporate membership status.¹¹ Conversely, the CSCE with its increasingly legitimizing capacity could conceivably authorize or mandate the Community, and in more extreme cases, NATO to take action (some embryonic version of that has already occurred in the case of Yugoslavia). In this manner a staged European security system would develop that defines roles and creates a kind of multiple multilateralism. To the extent NATO ceases to be organized in terms of extreme major contingencies and adapts to a development toward a non-unitary mixed and staged system, it will remain an important element. After all, one reason for why many East European countries want to be closely connected with NATO is to be in one organisation together with the United States.

In this respect there is no difference in principle between MOE states and South Eastern Europe countries except that the latter are more diverse in terms of former alignments as well as their potential for reform and consequently of their eligibility for Western organisations.¹²

The Maghreb which the American demarche of February 26 also claimed to be within the scope of NATO is clearly a main concern for the Latin European states. Problems there could increasingly become as absorbing as German concerns over Central and South Eastern European developments thus pulling European interests again in different directions. With EC 92 these concerns will spread to the whole Community and thus create a priority conflict that will be hard to resolve. But in some crucial areas like migration common policies should be within reach.

The Middle East will remain the most crucial area, although (as has been pointed out) in the post-war situation the chances for political settlements have improved. In one important respect the war has changed the character of the region: Given the web of complex interrelations between the "Silk Road" system and the Middle East, that region has moved closer to

11 This idea of corporate membership was e.g. launched by Adenauer in 1952 when he proposed EDC corporate membership within NATO. (See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876-1952. Stuttgart 1986, p. 879.) A similar issue with even more complex implications will undoubtedly come up with the formation of the new USSR.

12 Given that Turkey's membership within the EC is regarded as unlikely in the near future, it is important to recognize that with the political map on the Balkans changing in some sense Turkey is moving closer to Europe. However, its real importance will be defined in the Western-Soviet-Arab triangle.

becoming a subsystem or extension of the emerging order. It is inconceivable that major external powers will cease to shape outcomes there, and these efforts will be increasingly governed by common or at least compatible objectives. And while it would be a secular mistake to create a uniform Southern threat in order to justify collective defense in the West, Desert Shield demonstrated that NATO's dissuasive effects do indeed reach far beyond its so-called treaty area. There will be a continuing need for some collective defense system involving the United States. However, for a complex organisation of sixteen sovereign member states it is too much to expect that its reform will keep pace with the changes in the European and international environment. What was envisaged at the London summit was pointing in the right direction. The subsequent implementation – driven by the Gulf experience as well as by preservation interests – displayed increasing conservatism, whereas changes in NATO's environment unfolded further in dramatic manner. The reforms envisaged for the Rome summit in two months time would have been inadequate even without the recent events in the USSR. Today one can only hope that the Rome summit will have a rather different agenda – to assess the new situation and to do what the London summit achieved at the time: to set directions for further developments. Any current agreement on command structure, force structures, strategy, and most importantly on the future rationale for NATO will need to be revisited in the light of European changes. Most of what is at stake is outside the scope of this conference, but the outcome of these developments will have a bearing on the security of the regions reviewed here.

There is one dimension that warrants particular attention. NATO's liaison concept, i.e. its policy for shaping relationships with former WP countries, has proven useful. (For one thing it is remarkable that since July 1990 there is a NATO desk in the Soviet Foreign Ministry.) This liaison concept has been refined through the Copenhagen Declaration on Partnership. At this stage it needs reconsideration in at least for respects:

- The non-differentiation between the USSR and former non-Soviet WP states no longer holds. On the one hand, there always has been a profound difference: The USSR has been and to a degree will be a strategic prime partner with a major role in the process of reordering Europe, whereas all others defined their problems in terms of their

intermediate positions between the USSR and NATO. Now the new USSR is going to be more stratified with important implications for the liaison policy, whereas fears on the part of former non-Soviet WP states to become part of a buffer zone ought to be dismissed.

- The concept of partnership so far was understood to be confined to a rather narrow agenda. Under the new circumstances there is maybe less reason for formal arrangements with NATO, but the scope for pragmatic cooperation should clearly broaden.
- So far NATO has dismissed the idea of cooperating with subregional security groupings like the MOE troika. In future circumstances subregional security cooperation should be seen as one trend within the "Silk Road"-constellation, and it is conceivable all the way from the Nordic Council via a reactivated Baltic Council, an MOE troika, some version of the Rumanian proposal and beyond. Even organizations like the Gulf Council in some way belong here, and the SCCM proposal certainly warrants support. What is important here is that both the Community (or EPU) and NATO should encourage such cooperation as well as networking among such groups (the Gymnich formula for the EPC system is one possible method for networking, the Rumanian proposal for an observer status is another). Most importantly, both the Community and NATO should envisage cooperative links with such subregional groupings. (The association council for EC association of MOE states is one conceivable forum). This is particularly true for the Vishegrad troika. But this kind of broadened liaison-concept should be developed more systematically throughout Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe.
- Lastly, this kind of cooperation should not be confined to former WP states, but along with developments toward an EPU and thorough NATO reforms they should extend beyond.

(Final sections to follow)

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