


MEDITERRANEAN WORLDS CROSSROADS:
RESOURCES FOR COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
Aspen Institute Italia
La Valletta, 30/VI-2/VII/1991

- a. "Conference program"
- b. "List of participants and observers"
- c. "Comunicato stampa"
- 1. "Allocution de Habib Ben Yahia"
- 2. "Welcoming address by Edward Fenech-Adami"
- 3. "Europe and the Middle East: basis for future cooperation"/
el-Hassan Bin Talal
- 4. "Session I: Commercial, financial and industrial resources:
proposals presented"/ (Jacques Huntzinger, Michel el Khoury)
- 5. "Session II: Energy, water and the environment: proposals
presented"/ (Umberto Colombo, Raphael Hadas-Lebel, Marc Pierini,
Bernard Glass, Atef Ebeid, Nekati Utkan, Andrew Borowiec)
- 6. "Session III: Human and cultural resources: proposals presented"/
(Louis Emmerij, Bruno Etienne, Mohamed Charfi, Roberto Aliboni)
- 7. "Reflections on peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean"/
Salah Bassiouny
- 8. "Intervention on: Energy, water and the environment"/ Salvino
Busuttil
- 9. "Challenges for cooperation between the North and South of the
Mediterranean"/ Alef Mohamed Ebeid
- 10. "The Financial Times: articles"/ presented by Francis Ghiles
- 11. "Energy resources planning in the Mediterranean countries"/
Raphael Hadas-Lebel
- 12. "The Gaza environment programme"/ Akram Matar Abu Kmiel
- 13. "Interconnexion et intégration: le cas tunisien"/ Claudio Moreno
- 14. "What strategy for economic growth and security in the
Mediterranean"/ Franco Reviglio
- 15. "Oil and cooperation between Europe and the Middle East"/ Ahmed
Zaki Yamani



2

CONFERENCE PROGRAM



Aspen Institute Italia

*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation
and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991
Mediterranean Conference Center



Aspen | Institute Italia

Conference Program



Presentation

The present climate in international relations calls for the design of confidence-building policies to relaunch economic cooperation and integration among the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. North-South tensions and South-South contradictions in the area are all the more critical in the aftermath of the Gulf war and could worsen if economic and social imbalances persist. A solid economic base is a prerequisite for the success of the on-going political process. The geopolitical unity of the shores of the Mediterranean (Europe, Maghreb and Middle East) with the Gulf area is a conceivable goal.

In 1985, Aspen Institute Italia launched a series of Mediterranean conferences convinced that political stability and economic ties could be reinforced through both a global approach and progressive implementation of subregional and regional agreements. The Mediterranean Manifesto, drafted at the 1987 conference in Barcelona, and the subsequent Mediterranean meetings identified specific areas of cooperation that are still valid and ought to be revived.

The particular and diverse resources of countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East provide the potential to establish complementary economic activities within the area. The setting up of networks and other powerful instruments of integration is expected to bring together all such available resources, both financial and non-financial, in a vast common effort to promote the Mediterranean as a peaceful route and a secure bridge for cooperation.



Co-Chairmen

Gianni De Michelis

*President, Aspen Institute Italia
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Italy*

Guido de Marco

*Minister of Foreign Affairs
Malta*

This conference was made possible thanks to the cooperation of the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Tourism.

Conference Objective

Discuss the cooperative use of resources available in the Mediterranean region extending from the Atlantic to the Gulf and propose confidence-building measures to enhance subregional and regional cooperation in the area.

Conference Format

Roundtable discussion is informal and off the record in order to encourage participants to intervene and discuss the issues freely. Every session is led by a moderator and introduced by a few opening remarks intended to launch the debate. Every participant is free to intervene limiting each contribution to a maximum of five minutes.

Simultaneous translation is available in English, French and Italian.

Participation is by invitation only.



Sunday, June 30

*20:00 Concert and Opening
Dinner*



Monday, July 1

9:00-9:10 Welcoming Address

Edward Fenech Adami

Prime Minister of Malta

***9:10-10:45 Public
Introductory Session***

New Challenges and Priorities

10:45-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00-17:00 Session I

***Commercial, Financial and
Industrial Resources***

*11:00-13:00 Commercial and
Financial Resources*

Moderator:

Mariano Alonso-Buron

*Director General, Institute of Cooperation
with the Arab World, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Madrid*

13:00-14:30 *Lunch*

14:30-17:00 *Industrial and
Technological Resources*

Moderator:

Giles Merritt

*Columnist, The International
Herald Tribune, Brussels*

20:00 *Reception*



Tuesday, July 2

9:00-12:30 Session II

***Energy, Water and the
Environment***

Moderator:

Umberto Colombo

*Chairman, ENEA - Italian Commission
for Nuclear and Alternative Energy
Sources, Rome*

9:00-10:30 *Energy and
Water Resources*

10:30-10:45 *Coffee Break*

10:45-12:30 *Environment*

12:30-13:15 *Press Briefing*

13:15-14:30 *Lunch*

14:30-17:00 Session III

Human and Cultural Resources

Moderator:

P.J. Vatikiotis

*Professor Emeritus, St. Anthony's
College, Oxford*

14:30-15:45 *Human Resources*

15:45-16:00 *Coffee Break*

16:00-17:00 *Cultural Resources*

17:00-18:00 *Closing Session*

17:00-17:30 *Summary by the
Moderators of the three sessions*

17:30-18:00 *Concluding remarks
by the Co-Chairmen*

20:00 *Reception*



Questions for Discussion

Commercial, Financial and Industrial Resources

- 1. How can the countries of the area combine their aggregate wealth of economic, financial, technological and human resources in a common development project that may enhance their interest in integration and reinforce stability through cooperation in the area? What would be the appropriate framework for negotiation and the most useful institutional instruments to that effect?*
- 2. Can the countries of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East significantly contribute to improve the functioning of the international oil market according to purely economic factors?*
- 3. Is it possible for the countries of the region to coordinate the use and investment of available financial resources - perhaps through a common financial institution - aimed at the balanced economic development of all countries concerned?*
- 4. How can the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the OPEC Fund for Economic Development make greater contributions to the development of the Mediterranean countries in need?*
- 5. Are European countries ready - in the framework of a successful Uruguay Round or on another basis - to grant a much higher degree of market openness to the countries of the Mediterranean and of the Middle East?*

- 6. Are Mediterranean and Gulf countries willing to give a strong impetus to the development of private enterprise and in what fields can Europe provide it?*
- 7. In what fields could the Mediterranean and Gulf countries share their agricultural and technological know-how? In what manner could such cooperation be brought about?*
- 8. To what extent is the lack of infrastructure in the field of communications and transportation hindering investment in the Southern Mediterranean countries and what can be done in the short to medium term to overcome this problem?*

Energy, Water and the Environment

- 1. How best can the Mediterranean community take advantage of the challenge posed to the region by energy, water and the environment in order to construct its unity in the way the founding fathers of the EC used coal and steel in the 1950s?*
- 2. Confidence-building measures should also focus on ways of increasing public support for Mediterranean cooperation. Do concrete initiatives exist to address these issues and if so, are they sufficient?*
- 3. Of the total amount of resources devoted to energy, water and environmental programs by the major international institutions, what is the share earmarked for the Mediterranean*

and Gulf Area vis-à-vis other regions? Is this share likely to increase in the future as an effort to promote more stability in the area? In what ways?

4. How can the countries of the area develop subregional cooperation on infrastructure projects, including the sensitive, but critical, use of water?

5. What types of innovative financing mechanisms for the environment presently being considered in various international fora could be appropriate for the Mediterranean?

Human and Cultural Resources

1. The Mediterranean risks becoming an area where new and dangerous tensions arise due to migration problems. The Southeast shore will exert increasingly high pressure on the industrialized Center-North. How can Europe and the Maghreb countries work together to help defuse this demographic pressure?

2. What are the necessary objectives of a short to medium term program to launch a forward thinking immigration policy? Should agreements be made on a bilateral basis? a multilateral basis? Who should act as interlocutors? Through what institutions?

3. Immigration is a responsibility that the single nations are beginning to delegate to the EC. How active a role does the Community envisage taking in this area? What decisions will be left to the individual countries?

4. Is there such a thing as a common Mediterranean cultural identity? In what does it consist?
5. Is it possible to reconcile the western models of democracy with the traditional values of Islam? If not, what alternative models does Islam propose?
6. How can a more relaxed and constructive understanding be established between Arab and Western cultures, in the immediate wake of the Gulf war, in order to overcome the mutual feeling of distrust and misunderstanding?
7. Can the development of communications, which is the source of daily information on the affairs and the cultures of other people, help to foster a more constructive exchange between the Arab-Islamic and Western civilizations?



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Information and Registration

At the hospitality desk located in the Holiday Inn hotel lobby. Registration takes place at the hotel throughout Sunday, June 30, and at the conference venue thereafter.

Spouses Program

Spouses are welcome to all conference events. Detailed information on sightseeing programs is available at the hospitality desk.

Travel

Ticket confirmations and post conference travel plans are handled at the travel desk in the Mediterranean Conference Center.

Transportation

Provided from the hotel to the conference venue and to all social events.

Participants, observers and spouses are kindly asked to wear their identification badges during all conference events.



**Aspen Institute Italia
is grateful to**

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Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino

*for their support in the launching of the
1991 program of activities*

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
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Aspen Institute Italia

*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

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CONFERENZA INTERNAZIONALE

Mediterraneo Crocevia del Mondo:
Risorse per la Cooperazione e l'Integrazione

(Malta, 30 giugno - 2 luglio 1991)

Malta 2 luglio - Percepita come entità politica autonoma l'Europa può svolgere un ruolo promotore della stabilità della democrazia e dello sviluppo della regione mediorientale. Per raggiungere questo obiettivo gli europei potrebbero avviare nel Mediterraneo un processo di sicurezza e cooperazione sul modello della CSCE.

Questo è uno degli aspetti emersi nella prima giornata di lavori della Conferenza Internazionale "Mediterraneo Crocevia del mondo: Risorse per la Cooperazione e l'Integrazione" organizzata da Aspen Institute Italia a Malta dal 30 giugno al 2 luglio.

Edward Fenech Adami, Primo Ministro maltese ha inaugurato la conferenza che si svolge sotto la presidenza di Gianni De Michelis Presidente di Aspen Institute Italia e Guido de Marco Ministro degli Esteri di Malta.

Nella Sessione Introduttiva pubblica sono intervenuti Habib Ben Yahia, Ministro degli Esteri della Tunisia, Atef Mohamed Ebeid, Ministro dell'Ambiente dell'Egitto, Ahmad Mango, Consigliere Economico del Principe Ereditario di Giordania, Djamel Ould Abbes, Presidente della Commissione Esteri dell'Assemblea Nazionale Algerina e George Vassiliou, Presidente di Cipro.

Alla conferenza hanno partecipato tra gli altri Michel Bruno, Governatore della Banca di Israele, Umberto Colombo, Presidente Enea, Rainer Masera, Direttore Generale IMI, Rinaldo Piaggio, Presidente e Amministratore Delegato Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA, Franco Reviglio, Professore di Scienza delle Finanze, Università Torino, Cesare Romiti, Amministratore Delegato Fiat Holding, Gian Mario Rossignolo, Presidente Industrie Zanussi SpA, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Presidente Centro Studi Energia Globale.

Al centro del dibattito non sono state solo le risorse politico-diplomatiche, messe a disposizione dall'Europa per la prevenzione o composizione dei conflitti nell'area, ma anche l'uso complementare delle risorse finanziarie, tecnologiche e industriali della regione mediterranea. L'esperienza europea della Comunità del carbone e dell'acciaio dimostra che la cooperazione politica può svilupparsi proprio mettendo in comune le risorse economiche.

I pareri emersi hanno rappresentato una pluralità di pareri. Secondo alcuni partecipanti è necessario che il dialogo politico preceda e sia alla base della futura cooperazione. Per altri, invece, proprio mettendo in comune le numerose e importanti risorse complementari dell'area si possono raggiungere ambiziose mete politiche. Sia che si scelga l'una o l'altra strada in ogni caso la decisione deve essere presa nel più breve tempo possibile.

Sul fronte economico è emerso il principio del "co-sviluppo" tecnologico, dove lo sviluppo comune delle tecnologie prende il posto del vecchio concetto di trasferimento di tecnologie.

Per quanto riguarda le risorse commerciali, dalla discussione è emerso che finché non ci sarà una zona di libero scambio nel Mediterraneo non ci sarà cooperazione. Più incentrata sulle istituzioni è stata invece la discussione sulle risorse finanziarie. La creazione di un' Istituzione finanziaria multilaterale, sul modello della BERS per l' Europa Centrorientale, è stata vista come uno strumento che può supplire ad un flusso di investimenti esteri diretti fino ad oggi troppo debole.

Un'altra proposta concreta per lo sviluppo dei paesi della regione prevede la creazione di una zona monetaria mediterranea, sul modello dell'Unione Europea dei Pagamenti, sorretta dalle valute forti dell'area.

Secondo alcuni andrebbero inoltre istituiti un Fondo finanziario per gli aiuti multilaterali e una società per ammortizzare i rischi legati agli investimenti.

Contrariamente ai programmi di aggiustamento strutturale previsti dalla Banca Mondiale e dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale, i finanziamenti a livello macro e microeconomico della Comunità europea dovrebbero avere come obiettivo prioritario l' incremento dell'occupazione e non si dovrebbero limitare ad arginare i danni sociali.

Destinare l'1% del Pil comunitario costituirebbe un'importante trasferimento di ricchezza che, più del trasferimento di armamenti, aumenterebbe la stabilità della regione.

La politica industriale e tecnologica dei paesi della sponda sud del Mediterraneo non può più essere attuata a livello nazionale, ma dovrebbe essere coordinata a livello regionale. E' questo l'obiettivo dell'accordo dei cinque (Maghreb) più quattro (Europa sudoccidentale) firmato a Roma nell'ottobre scorso sul modello dell'iniziativa pentagonale per l'Europa centrorientale.

Nella prima parte della seconda giornata la discussione si e' spostata su temi tecnici e principalmente sulle risorse strategiche dell'area: l'energia e l'acqua. Nel primo caso si e' sottolineata l'importanza di una maggiore efficienza nell'utilizzo delle risorse attraverso tecnologie già esistenti. Secondo alcuni partecipanti il settore che piu' beneficiera' di tecnologie di avanguardia nell'immediato futuro sara' quello del gas.

La situazione delle risorse idriche nella regione e' caratterizzata dai grandi diversita' di disponibilita' di acqua. Se da un parte la maggioranza dei paesi della regione potrebbe rischiare una pericolosa scarsita' di acqua, dall'altra esistono esempi come la Turchia dove tali risorse sono abbondantissime. Si tratta allora di giungere ad un uso comune. Ma questo obiettivo ha di fronte se' delicati problemi politici e diplomatici per la cui soluzione la Comunita' Europea ha già mosso i primi passi.

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI
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BIBLIOTECA



**Allocution de M. Habib Ben Yahia,
Ministre Tunisien des Affaires Etrangères
le 1^{er} Juillet, 1991**

à la Conférence sur le thème de la
Coopération Economique dans la
Région Méditerranéenne et le Moyen-Orient

Malte, 30 Juin - 2 Juillet, 1991

Excellences,
Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je voudrais d'abord adresser mes remerciements aux Autorités maltaises pour l'hospitalité qu'elles nous offrent, aujourd'hui, en nous accueillant sur cette terre qui nous est proche et familière.

C'est avec plaisir que je prends la parole à l'ouverture de cette Conférence que le célèbre Institut ASPEN Italie organise sur le thème de la "coopération économique dans la région méditerranéenne et le Moyen-Orient". Un thème qui interpelle, en effet, plusieurs groupes tels que le Dialogue Euro-Arabe, ou encore celui amorcé plus récemment entre les Dix de la Méditerranée Occidentale.

Il interpelle également des groupements régionaux et sous-régionaux tels que la CEE en Europe, pour autant qu'on assimile aussi la Communauté dans sa globalité à une entité méditerranéenne, le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe au Machrek ou l'UMA au Maghreb autant d'entités, je dirais, qui ont cristallisé et qui cristallisent encore les aspirations des peuples de ces régions, aspirations à une plus grande stabilité et sécurité dans la démocratie, la liberté, la paix et la prospérité.

Selon qu'on se place dans l'axe Nord-Sud ou dans l'axe Sud-Sud de la zone considérée, et tout en appréciant à leur juste valeur les tentatives explorées et les schémas de coopération déjà établis entre ces différents pays et groupements de pays, force est de constater que cette coopération n'a trouvé, jusque là, ni le rythme ni les moyens adéquats pour engager une véritable dynamique aux dimensions multiples, celle-là même susceptible de générer la cohésion économico-socio-politique que l'on souhaite imprimer à notre coopération.

Surcroît démographique et déséquilibre économique structurel par-ci, abondance de richesses, conflits armés, menace de pollution ou désastre écologique par là, ou alors évolution plus positive comme l'achèvement par la CEE de sa construction économique et politique en gestation depuis plus de trente ans, tel est schématiquement le tableau qu'offre globalement la région euro-méditerranéenne et moyen-orientale.

Un dénominateur commun, cependant, à tous ces pays et ces régions ou plutôt une ambition que la quasi-totalité d'entre eux souhaite réaliser à savoir la recherche d'une plus grande stabilité et d'une plus grande sécurité, chez soi d'abord, et dans son voisinage immédiat et médiat où les enjeux pour la liberté, le développement et la démocratie se trouve être au

coeur même de la problématique posée à tous, je veux dire à tous nos peuples et à tous nos pays aussi bien à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de leurs frontières.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Je voudrais limiter mon propos à l'ouverture de cette Conférence à deux reflexions qui me sont inspirées par le nouveau contexte que connaît la région méditerranéenne et moyen-orientale, région précisément plus affectée que d'autres par la guerre du Golfe et de ses conséquences.

Ma première réflexion est d'ordre politique et elle revient à la Méditerranée, ce creuset de civilisations, comme on l'appelle, qui a rayonné sur le Monde durant des siècles en apportant une contribution honorable à la civilisation universelle et qui se trouve, encore aujourd'hui, à la différence d'autres zones du globe, bloquée dans ses problèmes multiples et complexes, dont notamment la question palestinienne.

La Communauté internationale, par sa persévérance et sa tenacité en est arrivée à bout de l'Apartheid. Cette même Communauté se doit de "débloquer" la Méditerranée pour lui redonner sa vocation de lac de paix.

Sur ce plan et pour revenir à notre contexte, la priorité, dans l'immédiat, est d'organiser la sécurité dans la région arabe et il me plaît de souligner ici les divers efforts entrepris dans ce sens, qu'il faut, bien entendu, soutenir et appuyer; vous convenez donc, que la première sécurité est le règlement de la question palestinienne objet de tous les efforts diplomatiques déployés actuellement aussi bien au plan régional qu'au plan international.

Ces efforts partent souvent de visions ou d'approches qui ont certes leur mérite propre, mais qui reposent sur des données et des appréciations parfois sensiblement différentes. C'est ainsi que l'idée de la Conférence Internationale pour la paix, sans être définitivement écartée, semble avoir évolué vers une formule jugée actuellement pragmatique tandis que d'autres approches ont voulu s'inscrire plutôt dans un cadre régional élargi, choisi pour sa globalité, sa flexibilité et le caractère progressif qu'on voudrait lui donner.

Il s'agit du projet de la tenue d'une CSCM auquel mon pays adhère bien sûr et sur lequel les pays de l'UMA ont adopté une position commune favorable. Mais le réalisme politique nous commande toutefois, dans cette phase, de ne pas perdre de vue l'urgence que revêt le règlement de la question palestinienne, que nous considérons comme le début du "confidence-building process" et l'axe de dénouement pour bien d'autres conflits dont il ne faut, par ailleurs, minimiser la portée ou qu'il ne faut éluder.

De plus l'attitude prudente et je crois pragmatique adoptée par nos pays à l'égard du projet de la CSCM est également motivée par la mise en place et l'organisation d'un noyau de stabilité économique et politique entre les Dix pays de la Méditerranée Occidentale. Ce noyau de base devrait être conçu, à notre sens, comme une étape vers le renforcement du processus de paix, de sécurité et de coopération entre les Dix de la Méditerranée Occidentale (5+4+1) d'une part et les autres pays arabes et européens de la région orientale d'autre part.

Ma deuxième réflexion est d'ordre économique. Sur ce plan les mutations en cours dans le monde ont eu au moins trois conséquences sur les économies de nos pays:

- amener "à maturité" le problème de la dette auquel sont confrontés plusieurs pays et l'on observe, aujourd'hui, un certain déblocage qui s'opère dans ce domaine, en faveur de certains pays en Europe, en Afrique et en Amérique Latine;
- accentuer les difficultés des économies des pays en développement directement ou indirectement affectés par la crise en raison des répercussions économiques, financières et commerciales qu'ils ont dû subir de ce fait;
- la troisième conséquence est la nécessaire mobilisation de moyens financiers importants tant à l'échelle régionale qu'internationale aussi bien pour faire face à la reconstruction des régions affectées par la guerre que pour consolider économiquement et politiquement les pays engagés dans un processus d'ajustement économique et de libéralisation politique.

Ces questions que la crise a donc mis en exergue confirment, s'il en était besoin, la nécessité de mettre en oeuvre l'approche de co-développement en Méditerranée prônée par la Tunisie.

Le concept de co-développement, comme nous l'entendons, doit être compris comme une alternative nouvelle aux relations traditionnelles qui lient nos pays entre eux et avec l'ensemble européen et qui sont restées structurellement déséquilibrées tant sur le plan économique que social, avec tous les aléas que cela suppose.

La nouvelle politique intervenue dans notre région qu'est l'instauration d'une Démocratie naissante et le nouveau contexte européen commandent, désormais, un changement qualitatif dans les relations euro-maghrébines et interméditerranéennes. Ce changement doit se traduire, selon nous, par la prise en compte et la gestion commune de l'ensemble des problèmes qui se posent dans nos rapports en vue de les résoudre de façon globale et intégrée.

Dès lors, la notion de co-développement devrait reposer, selon nous, sur un concept global de sécurité considérée désormais dans ses dimensions humaine, culturelle, économique, sociale, politique et stratégique.

Appliquée à la Méditerranée cette conception suppose que l'on travaille pour aider à l'avenement d'un développement généralisé de l'ensemble de l'espace euro-méditerranéen dans le respect, bien entendu, des entités et des spécificités sous-régionales.

Le co-développement se définit, par conséquent, comme une nouvelle expression de la solidarité entre nos peuples devant se traduire par une nouvelle forme d'organisation des relations économique, sociale et culturelle entre l'Europe et le Monde Arabe avec comme finalité la co-prospérité, la stabilité dans la liberté et la sécurité pour tous.

Cette nouvelle approche peut s'articuler, dès lors, autour des axes suivants:

- la prise en compte de la dette contractée par nos pays auprès des pays prêteurs et son recyclage au profit de notre développement économique et social.

- La mise sur pied d'une institution financière méditerranéenne destinée à jouer le rôle des fonds structurels européens et à financer des projets d'investissements dans nos pays.
- Le développement du Partenariat industriel et commercial entre nos pays.
- Et enfin, la conclusion d'une Charte entre les pays émetteurs de main-d'œuvre notamment d'Afrique du Nord et la CEE destinée à préserver le statut et les intérêts de la colonie maghrébine en Europe et (ceux de la colonie européenne au Maghreb)

Excellences,
Mesdames et Messieurs,

Si la dette de plusieurs pays semble, en effet, trouver sous différentes variantes des ébauches de solutions satisfaisantes de la part de plusieurs pays européens, celle des pays du Maghreb continue à grever leurs balances de paiements et à pénaliser leurs efforts de développement. Il est, par conséquent, opportun que les pays prêteurs prennent en considération cette grande hypothèque qui pèse encore sur les pays à revenu intermédiaire de notre région, compte tenu du nouveau contexte.

Quant à la création d'une institution financière euro-arabe, il existe plusieurs projets ou idées de projets qui sont présentés à l'heure actuelle dans un cadre européen, arabe, ou multilatéral dont notamment le projet français portant création d'un "Mécanisme Financier pour le Monde Arabe".

Tout en saluant cette initiative française, la Tunisie voudrait insister sur la vocation d'un tel mécanisme à savoir:

- qu'il doit d'abord jouer un rôle de cohésion économique et sociale, en vue de corriger les déséquilibres existants et permettre ainsi à l'économie de marché de jouer de façon saine et équilibrée dans notre région d'une part;
- et qu'il doit également favoriser les investissements productifs à travers le développement du Partenariat commercial et industriel entre nos pays, d'autre part.

Quant à la structure de son capital, son mécanisme de fonctionnement et ses procédures de décision, ils devraient, à notre avis, être suffisamment équilibrés pour ne pas favoriser un groupe de pays par rapport à un autre.

Excellences,
Mesdames et Messieurs,

Avant de terminer mon allocution, je voudrais renouveler mes remerciements à Monsieur le Ministre De Michelis qui a bien voulu me donner l'occasion de m'adresser à vous à partir de cette illustre tribune.

Les éminents intervenants ici présents vont certainement développer dans l'intérêt de tous les différents thèmes inscrits à l'ordre du jour de cette Conférence où le dialogue de culture devra bien évidemment, occuper, la place noble qui lui revient.

A ce propos, je voudrais conclure par cette réflexion d'un homme de culture tunisien connu dans toute la Méditerranée et dans le Monde Arabe, tant elle me paraît significative et porteuse de promesses pour notre avenir commun, je cite "Il est une vérité que l'histoire nous enseigne: c'est toujours quand les hommes font preuve de créativité que le Bassin Méditerranéen est le centre du Monde."

Je vous remercie de votre attention.



Aspen Institute Italia

Welcoming Address by
the Honourable Edward Fenech-Adami, Prime Minister
presented on the occasion
of the Conference

Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991
Mediterranean Conference Centre

WELCOMING ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE EDWARD
FENECH ADAMI, PRIME MINISTER, AT ASPEN INSTITUTE
ITALIA CONFERENCE ON MEDITERRANEAN WORLDS
CROSSROADS: RESOURCES FOR COOPERATION AND
INTEGRATION - MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE CENTRE,
MONDAY 1 JULY 1991

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is my pleasure, on behalf of the Government and people of Malta, to formally welcome you to Malta and to this the latest in a series of Mediterranean Conferences organised by Aspen Institute Italia.

Two things are very often said about the people of the Mediterranean. The first is that their greatest love is rhetoric. The second is that it is a basic rule of rhetoric that a speech must have an exordium, or introduction, of some size.

Whatever the measure of truth in the first statement, the second is certainly false. It is quite in the authentic tradition of Mediterranean discourse to plunge in medias res; and I am sure you will not reproach me for doing so today.

The aim of this conference is the seeking of ways and means of co-ordinating the use of resources in the Mediterranean world. There may well be a misunderstanding about this aim and it may be good to get rid of it right at the very start.

There is a widespread tendency to presume that if countries bordering the same sea want to organise the management of certain resources by agreement among themselves, they

must be necessarily prompted by some deeper, hidden desire, namely to unite in one kind or another of political federation or superstate.

The mistake lies in the word "necessarily". It is possible, of course, for such a second order motivation to exist. It undoubtedly existed in the mind of the theorists of the so-called "functionalist" school who first urged that the road to the political union of Europe should be started by the pooling of one set of resources after another. But it is also perfectly reasonable to want to jointly organise the use of certain resources in certain circumstances without any such ulterior motive. The reason for wanting to do so may well be the nature of the resources themselves and the relevant conditions for their effective use.

Take, for instance, the biological resources of the sea. Fish are notoriously not very respectful of the boundaries drawn in terms of international law across the waters between different countries. Yet unless there is co-operation among those countries for the management of fishery resources in the seas between them, it is unlikely that any of them will secure the optimum sustainable yield.

Countries which agree to joint management of such resources need not be nursing any ulterior dream of political union in the future. They may be just acting according to common sense - both economic and ecological.

Both the Government of Malta and the Aspen Institute of Italy, among others, have been now for several years, saying that it is becoming everyday more imperative to build networks of functional co-operation across the Mediterranean.

This is not to be taken to imply much more than just that. In particular, it is not advocacy of a Mediterranean alternative to the European Community, or to Arab or African similarly conceived communities. It is not even equivalent to a plea for the aggrandisement of the European Community. The two ideas are not alternatives, and they are not at the same level. They complement each other at different levels.

Thus, the Government of Malta does not regard its seeking of full membership of the European Community and its systematic initiatives aimed at building a network of cooperative functional institutions as in any way conflictual. Rather, in our view, they are reciprocally supportive.

Declaredly, political ideals are overriding considerations in the context of our European aspirations. The concept of sustainable development is the guiding light in our promotion of Mediterranean functional co-operation.

One main difference between the European and the Mediterranean perspectives arises precisely out of the fact that the first is essentially land-centred, while the second is sea-centred. Some implications of this difference emerge if one considers that the European Community has been able to establish common agreements in relation to the management of both biological and mineral resources in the context of the North Sea, but has not done so in that of the Mediterranean.

Here obviously, effective agreements have to involve both Community and non-Community members, since they all share the same sea. Specialised functional agreements concerning the Mediterranean would have to be of a somewhat different kind from the intra-Community agreements reached in marine affairs, but they would

obviously be complementary, not antagonistic or alternatives, to them.

At this point, I think I should introduce another small caveat against possible misinterpretation. By underlining the value of co-operative resource management projects justifiable purely on grounds of sustainable development, in the area under consideration, I do not wish to discount the importance of other wider and more politically oriented initiatives.

Indeed, there are projects afoot aimed at the consolidation of security in the area, among other things, by widening its concept beyond the military to include safeguards against natural or technological catastrophes. Again between programmes of action aimed primarily at the improvement of international relations or the harmonisation of foreign policy goals and programmes of action aimed at satisfying requirements of sustainable development, the question is not one of an either-or choice, but of a both-and strategy.

I think I should now mention some of the resource management co-ordination projects in which Malta is taking a particular interest, and which are also particularly relevant to the central topic of this Conference.

Between the 8th and the 10th July, a meeting is being held in Damascus to discuss a proposal for the setting up of a Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe under United Nations Development Programme Auspices. The scope of the Centre is being conceived as very comprehensive, addressing both land-centred and sea-centred problems. Otherwise it is quite similar in concept to another, much more modest proposal, restricted to the marine sphere, elaborated by the

International Ocean Institute and put forward by the Government of Malta, for the establishment of a Mediterranean Centre for Research and Development in Marine Industrial Technology.

The idea was that this would be a small co-ordinating centre at the core of a network which was not just an information exchanging network but also a practical project generating one.

Such practical projects would have to be initiated by a commercial enterprise, so that they would be a response to demand side probing. They would need the participation of at least one developing and one developed country in order to ensure that rather than a commercial transfer of technology, the joint development of adapted technology would ensue.

The support of an international organisation is also envisaged, in order to ensure that not only do the initiators derive profit from the enterprise, but that eventually the results become available generally.

Thus, the project combines the idea of "technology co-development", with a funding strategy involving both public and private investment, facilitated by international endorsement and operating on a centrally lean and well distributed administrative structure.

A number of probable areas of research and pilot production envisaged for the Mediterranean Centre for Marine Industrial Technology are the same as those mentioned in the context of the Environment and Development Centre for the Arab Region and Europe, and also in the preparatory papers for this Conference. These include: fresh water management, particularly desalination

techniques; use of alternative sources of energy; the impact of biotechnology on aquaculture; the management of marine and coastal regions.

As is well-known, it is in relation to pollution control that most success has been achieved in the way of setting up Mediterranean wide institutions; but this is also a problem of such scope that there is still ample room for more co-ordinated management. A clear instance would be the better utilisation of remote sensing. This is another area in which Malta has taken initiatives in a Commonwealth, rather than strictly Mediterranean, context.

Another kind of resource where better organisation could benefit the Euromediterranean world as a whole is the financial. It is known, for instance, that the Mediterranean states which are not members of the European Community have more than 60% of their world trade with the EC countries, and only 10% with the United States. Yet the paper-dollar remains the main reserve currency in practically all of them. It is possible to assist the development of financial centres at places in the Mediterranean which are well-equipped because of their conditions of political stability and institutional legality, as well as monetary solidity, to function as nodes in a more international ECU System.

A third kind of resource, and the most important, which could multiply its yield through greater cooperation in the Mediterranean is the human. It is well known that a major demographic shift is fast occurring in the area. Within a short lapse of time the majority of the population will no longer be on the Northern side, but on the Southern and Eastern. Population will have grown to some 220 million on the North, and to some 300 million on the South and East sides by the year 2005. Increasing urbanisation will render

this situation more explosive, unless it is tackled with real seriousness.

In this perspective, I would like to pay tribute to the Community of Mediterranean Universities which is less than ten years old, but has done much in the way of developing an academic network of cooperation between the two hundred or so universities in the region.

This is most important as an antidote to the cultural barrier that was climbing higher as science and technology grew unequally on the North and on the South. The University of Malta has not only played an active part, alongside its pioneering sister, the University of Bari, in the rapid growth of this intellectual cooperation. It has itself, with the support of the Foundation of International Studies, developed Mediterranean studies as an area of academic strength and excellence, as is evidenced by the Journal it is publishing with studies of considerable contemporary and far from merely antiquarian interest.

Worthy of special note is the setting up of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy. In all its activities, the Academy is seeking to involve as many Mediterranean countries as possible. The revival among the Mediterranean countries, of their ancient skills in cross cultural communication and negotiation is particularly to be hoped for at this time of increasing awareness of the interconnections between environmental and developmental concerns. The establishment at the Mediterranean Academy of a chair of Environmental Diplomacy by the United Nations Environment Programme is a recognition of the direction to be pursued.

The practical measures needed to ensure that the concept of sustainable development is implemented at a regional as well

as at a global level require innovative steps in international relations. It is clear that the international funding required if the measures now calculated to be the minimum needed to meet such challenges as those of climate change and of preserving biological diversity are to be implemented cannot be found without the introduction of some form of international taxation. It is interesting to note that an inquiry among tourists in the Mediterranean region carried out by the International Ocean Institute established that the vast majority of the tourists expressed the readiness to pay a tax the proceeds of which would go to subsidise sustainable development measures for the Mediterranean as a whole. Region wide cooperation in this perspective has become a crying need.

It would not be difficult to continue with examples of the very different ways in which the pooling of resources in the Mediterranean region could take shape. But it will be the Conference as a whole that will be doing it.

I will conclude this address by repeating a point that it is our task to highlight.

The coming together of the two parts of Europe which had been kept asunder for far too long after the Second World War needs to be strengthened by a new North-South solidarity across the Mediterranean sea between Europe and Africa.

The dangers of the cold war have been dispelled at the time that we became aware of the threat of global warming. It is necessary now to fortify our commitment to economic, ecological and socio-cultural cooperation.

The very real danger of a resort to violence as a reaction to the worsening of North-South imbalances can only be

averted by the generation of the new forms of solidarity implicit in the concept of sustainable development.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is my hope that this Conference will make a significant contribution to identifying concrete ways to further subregional and regional cooperation and integration. I wish you well in your work.

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Aspen Institute Italia

ADDRESS BY
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE
EL-HASSAN BIN TALAL

"EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION"

DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE ON
ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

ORGANIZED BY ASPEN INSTITUTE - ITALIA
AT LA VALLETTA/MALTA
30 JUNE - 2 JULY, 1991

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

MR CHAIRMAN,

DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,

IT IS INDEED A PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE HERE WITH YOU TODAY. OBJECTIVITY LIES AT THE HEART OF THE CHALLENGES FACING ALL OF US IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. OUR GATHERING IN MALTA BRINGS TO MY MIND FREDERICK THE SECOND WHO WAS BROUGHT UP IN THE 13TH CENTURY NOT FAR FROM HERE IN SICILY. HE WAS RENOWNED TO HAVE ACHIEVED A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ISLAM AND A MUSLIM VIEW OF CHRISTIANITY. HOW CAN WE TODAY ACHIEVE A SIMILAR OBJECTIVITY IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES FACING ALL OF US IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (EUROPE, MAGHREB AND THE MIDDLE EAST)?

IT IS PERHAPS OF RELEVANCE TO CONSIDER WHAT THE HISTORIANS TELL US ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF FREDERICK THE SECOND: "HE HAD INDEED HAD THE GOOD FORTUNE TO HAVE GROWN UP IN SICILY IN A MIXED CULTURE THAT UNIQUELY COMBINED ELEMENTS OF ANTIQUITY, ARABIC AND JEWISH WISDOM, THE OCCIDENTAL SPIRIT OF THE MIDDLE AGES, AND NORMAN REALISM. THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF HIS COURT REFLECTED THIS HERITAGE".

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THE ISSUES CONFRONTING US TODAY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ARE TRANS-NATIONAL AND INTER-CULTURAL IN THEIR ESSENCE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY CONCEPT THAT ADDRESSES THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PEOPLE, RESOURCES-ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURAL IDENTITY. WE HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER TO EVOLVE AN INTELLECTUAL HINTERLAND OR A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR TACKLING CONSTRUCTIVELY OUR COMMON PROBLEMS. THIS IS EQUALLY TRUE WHETHER WE ARE ARABS OR EUROPEANS, OR WHETHER WE ARE MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS OR JEWS. AS WE APPROACH THE 21ST CENTURY IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CAPTURE WHAT FREDERICK THE SECOND REALIZED IN THE 13TH.

DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES,

JORDAN HAS BEEN ADVOCATING FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR CONCEPT CAN BE DESCRIBED IN THE FORM OF A REGIONAL MATRIX. IT PROVIDES A GLOBAL VIEW THAT AT THE SAME TIME ALLOWS AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUENT PARTS. BY "MATRIX" WE MEAN A PLACE OR MEDIUM IN WHICH INTERACTION IS DEVELOPED RATHER THAN A MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION. OUR APPROACH DOES NOT ENTAIL AN AMBITIOUS HEGELIAN AGENDA TO FIND MORE REALITY IN A WHOLE THAN IN ITS PARTS, OR TO RECONCILE

SCIENCE WITH RELIGION. IT IS RATHER BASED ON THE CONVICTION THAT THERE NEED NOT BE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN LOOKING AT THE WHOLE AND FOCUSsing ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. NOR INDEED SHOULD THERE BE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING THE WHOLE AND ITS PARTS FROM DIFFERENT VANTAGE POINTS OR PERSPECTIVES. THUS THE DIVERSITY OF PEOPLES AND CULTURES IN OUR BROAD REGION DOES NOT MAKE A FICTION OUT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. DIVERSITY IN THIS SENSE CAN ENRICH THE UNITY OF THE WHOLE.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR ENDEAVOURS TO EVOLVE A COMMON LANGUAGE THEN BY NECESSITY WE HAVE TO ACHIEVE AN ARAB UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPE AND A EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARAB WORLD; OR A SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE NORTH AND, A NORTHERN VIEW OF THE SOUTH. THE MORE WORRYING ASPECT OF DIVERSITY IN OUR WORLD IS NOT SO MUCH THE CULTURAL OR IDEOLOGICAL BUT RATHER THE ECONOMIC. IN ORDER TO DEAL POSITIVELY WITH THIS REALITY, THE "HAVES" AND THE "HAVE-NOTS" MUST CAPTURE AN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW EACH OF THEM PERCEIVES THE OTHER. THIS APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN BROADLY DEFINED, AND TO THE NARROWER CONTEXT OF THE OIL AND NON-OIL COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE LIST OF RELATIVISMS IS ENDLESS, BUT THE ISSUE IS TO ACCEPT MULTIPLE PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRUTH AS A STARTING POINT FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE.

DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,

THE SERIES OF MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCES LAUNCHED IN 1985 BY THE "ASPEN INSTITUTE ITALIA" IS A COMMENDABLE EFFORT IN THAT DIRECTION. THE ADOPTED GLOBAL APPROACH TOWARDS ISSUES, COUNTRIES AND RESOURCES HAS INDEED CREATED A BETTER AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL BUILDING-BLOCKS FOR COOPERATION. THE PROGRAMME OUTLINE OF THIS CONFERENCE SETS A SPECIFIC GOAL OF FOCUSING ON COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN RELATION TO CRUCIAL RESOURCES. THIS OUTLINE PROPOSES A TRILATERAL APPROACH ENCOMPASSING FIRSTLY THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES; SECONDLY ISSUES OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND WATER; AND THIRDLY HUMAN AND CULTURAL RESOURCES.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THROUGH OPERATIONALISING THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS WE CAN EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE A PROCESS FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN OUR REGION. A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (CSCME) CAN DRAW ON THE MORAL WEIGHT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN EUROPE. I HAVE ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION EMPHASIZED THAT THE "HELSINKI 34" ARE INTEGRALLY INTERLINKED TO THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE TRIANGLE OF ENERGY, ARMAMENTS AND DEBT. THE "HELSINKI 34" ARE THE MAIN CONSUMERS OF MIDDLE EAST OIL, ITS MAIN SUPPLIERS OF ARMS AND ITS MAIN CREDITORS. I AM THEREFORE MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN THIS CONFERENCE FOR SEARCHING FOR COMMON SOLUTIONS THROUGH DEEPER ANALYSIS OF EACH OTHERS' ISSUES. IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT OIL

REVENUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE LITERALLY FUELED THE ARMS RACE, WHICH IN ITS TURN HAS BEEN LARGEY BEHIND THE EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS FACED BY MANY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ANY EFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION OF ARMS CONTROL MUST THEREFORE BY NECESSITY FOCUS ON THE ISSUES OF ENERGY AND INDEBTEDNESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE RECENT PROPOSAL FROM BRUSSELS FOR A EUROPEAN ENERGY CHARTER CAN PROVIDE USEFUL GUIDELINES FOR TACKLING CONSTRUCTIVELY THE ISSUE OF ENERGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

A RECENT STUDY BY THE SWEDISH MINISTRY OF LABOUR ON REFUGEE AND IMMIGRATION POLICY HAS APTLY STATED THAT "PEOPLE FLEE NOT TO WEALTH BUT FROM POVERTY". THIS IS AS TRUE FOR EUROPE AS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THE RECENT GULF CRISIS HAS ADDED A SERIOUS NEW DIMENSION FOR US. ABOUT 200,000 PALESTINIANS/JORDANIANS HAVE RECENTLY MOVED FROM THE GULF TO JORDAN IN A SEARCH FOR SECURITY. THIS REPRESENTS ABOUT 6% OF JORDAN'S TOTAL POPULATION. IN THE EC, IN CONTRAST, AND AFTER THREE DECADES OF MIGRATION, FOREIGN RESIDENTS ARE EQUIVALENT TO ONLY 3.3% OF THE POPULATION. SUCH A LEVEL HAS CREATED MOUNTING CONCERN IN EUROPE ABOUT THE TWIN DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES FROM THE SOUTH AND THE EAST.

THE HEAVY BURDENS, BOTH HUMAN AND ECONOMIC, THAT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED ON JORDAN BY THE GULF CRISIS EXPLAIN JORDAN'S CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE-MAKING IS NOT WASTED. THE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT WILL DIFFUSE THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION CONFRONTING JORDAN AND THE REGION. THIS HUMAN DIMENSION IN FACT LIES BEHIND JORDAN'S CALLS FOR AN URGENT AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM. SUCH A SETTLEMENT WILL PROVIDE A MAJOR KEY TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST. AS IT HAS BEEN RIGHTLY SAID, THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF SECURITY SHOULD BE PEOPLE AND NOT STATES, NOR THE ELITE, THE AFFLUENT OR THE MORE POWERFUL.

DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES,

IN TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE, I FIRMLY BELIEVE IN THE TRILATERAL APPROACH BASED ON DEMOCRACY/SECURITY/PROSPERITY FOR OUR REGION. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF DESPAIR HAVE TO BE REPLACED BY THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACE AND PROGRESS. EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM SHOULD BE TACKLED BY DEMOCRATIZATION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. IMAGINATIVE APPROACES TO ARMS CONTROL CAN PROMOTE SECURITY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DIVERTING HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TOWARDS SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON ARMS CONTROL THAT EMPHASIZES BOTH THE "HARDWARE" AND "SOFTWARE" DIMENSIONS. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE

WHAT ANALYSTS CALL "DYNAMIC STABILITY" THROUGH THE "REGULATIVE APPROACH" RATHER THAN MERE "STATIC STABILITY" THROUGH A "MECHANISTIC APPROACH".

IN THIS WAY A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBM'S) CAN BE PRACTICALLY DEVELOPED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SUCH A STRUCTURE CAN ALLOW FOR MILITARY STABILITY BETWEEN STATES AND MILITARY FORCES OF DIFFERENT SIZES. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE IS REGIONAL SECURITY RATHER THAN ARMS CONTROL OR REDUCTION FOR ITS OWN SAKE. THE PURPOSE IS THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE AS STIPULATED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. OF COURSE, A MAJOR PRE-REQUISITE FOR SUCH A PROCESS IS A BREAK THROUGH IN RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

A BROADLY DEFINED SECURITY CONCEPT MEANS TACKLING THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT. THIS IS AS TRUE FOR THE MILITARY AS FOR THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY. A HEALTHY SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. THE CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY (MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC) AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL CAN BE CLEARLY SEEN IN NEW INITIATIVES AT THE "HELSINKI-34" AND "G7" LEVELS. EFFORTS ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY FOR EVOLVING NEW STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE. SIMILARLY, PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN MADE TO EXPAND THE FORUM OF THE G7 TO CONSIDER

POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC MATTERS. A MORE CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE USE OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS IS BEING ATTEMPTED. A GERMAN DIPLOMAT HAS RECENTLY SAID: "WE REFUSE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ATLANTIC SECURITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION; FOR WE WANT BOTH". IN THE SAME SPIRIT, THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

IN CONCLUSION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE PROBLEM FACING US TODAY IS TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER FROM ONE ANOTHER'S PERSPECTIVE. YOUR ENDEAVOURS IN THIS CONFERENCE ARE INSTRUMENTAL FOR EVOLVING THAT LOST OBJECTIVITY OR COMMON LANGUAGE THAT LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MULTI-CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE "MEDITERRANEAN WORLDS CROSSROADS".

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*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

PROPOSALS PRESENTED

Session I: Commercial, Financial and Industrial Resources

POUR UNE COOPERATION ET UNE INTEGRATION FINANCIERE EN MEDITERRANEE.

par Jacques Huntzinger

Interdépendance économique et financière des trois Méditerranées

Différentes dotations en ressources naturelles et différents degrés de développement économique créent en Méditerranée une certaine hétérogénéité des modes et niveaux de développement économique, des ressources et niveaux de vie, entre riverains européens, producteurs de pétrole et non-producteurs de pétrole.

Cependant, cette hétérogénéité, loin d'établir un fossé entre les "trois Méditerranées", est porteuse de complémentarités. Nous sommes en effet, pour beaucoup d'entre nous, conscients d'un "avenir commun méditerranéen". Avenir commun qui ne prend plus seulement ses racines dans les liens historiques et culturels de la Mare Nostrum, mais aussi dans les complémentarités méditerranéennes en matière de production, d'échanges commerciaux, de prestations de services, de ressources humaines et de capitaux.

Il nous faut aujourd'hui aller plus loin et penser en termes "d'intérêts communs méditerranéens", puis forger et orienter notre réflexion en pleine conscience de cette complémentarité doublée d'interdépendance. Il nous faut prendre conscience "d'un intérêt commun à nous développer ensemble".

Ces propos peuvent apparaître comme un plaidoyer de plus en faveur de l'investissement direct ou de portefeuille -partenariat et délocalisation-. Mais il faut aujourd'hui apporter une tonalité nouvelle à ce concept, un élément nouveau : celui de l'intérêt réciproque, voire du besoin réciproque.

Faiblesse des investissements directs ou de portefeuille

Or, on constate à ce jour une extrême faiblesse des investissements directs et de portefeuille européens ou du Golfe au Maghreb et dans les pays tiers méditerranéens en général : faiblesse par rapport au volume total des investissements européens et des monarchies pétrolières ; faiblesse relativement au volume des dons, prêts et crédits liés dispensés par la classique "coopération financière". A titre d'exemple : les investissements directs de la France au Maghreb représentent moins de 1% du volume global de ses investissements dans le monde ; les investissements espagnols au Maroc ont fortement augmenté (4,4 milliards pesetas en 1990) mais restent sans commune mesure avec l'enveloppe financière du protocole hispano-marocain de juin 1988.

Cette prédominance des dons, prêts et crédits est plus nette encore si l'on considère non seulement les protocoles financiers bilatéraux, mais aussi les opérations de financement des divers organismes multilatéraux opérant sur la zone.

Les actuels processus de financement en Méditerranée

En effet, en 1989, le flux de capitaux publics à long terme vers le Sud du Bassin méditerranéen atteignait presque 9 milliards de \$, l'aide officielle au développement 2,5 milliards de \$ et les prêts privés non-garantis 180 millions de \$.

Les institutions de Bretton Woods (Banque Mondiale et FMI) sont à l'origine de près des deux tiers des fonds multilatéraux alloués à la région : aussi, leurs pratiques et politiques impriment fortement leur marque sur celles de l'ensemble des institutions multilatérales de financement opérant dans la région.

Les autres sources multilatérales de financement sont essentiellement, dans l'ordre :

* la BEI, dont les prêts doivent porter, dans le cadre des quatrièmes protocoles financiers CEE-Maghreb/Machrek, sur 1.300 millions d'écus. (Ces quatrièmes protocoles financiers prévoient par ailleurs loctroi de 775 millions écus sur les fonds budgétaires de la Communauté, soit un total de 2.075 M écus)

| | Algérie | Maroc | Tunisie | Egypte | Syrie | Jordanie | Liban | Israël |
|---------------|---------|-------|---------|--------|-------|----------|-------|--------|
| { prêts BEI | 280 | 220 | 168 | 310 | 115 | 80 | 45 | 82 |
| { fonds budg. | 70 | 218 | 116 | 258 | 43 | 46 | 24 | -- |
| { total | 350 | 438 | 284 | 568 | 158 | 126 | 69 | 82 |

* la Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD) et le Fonds Africain de Développement (FAD)

* le Fonds International pour le Développement Agricole

* et les institutions multilatérales arabes : la Banque Islamique de Développement, le Fonds Spécial de l'OPEC, le Fonds Arabe pour le Développement Economique et Social.

Aller vers un réel partenariat financier

Au delà d'une nécessaire coordination, il se présente un problème de représentation des pays méditerranéens dans de telles institutions ; problème qui fait obstacle à une véritable coopération, à un véritable partenariat financier, du moins à l'échelle régionale méditerranéenne.

En effet, la France, l'Italie, le Portugal et l'Espagne détiennent à elles quatre 20% des voix (voting power) à l'AID et au FAD, 10% au FMI et à la BIRD, moins de 7% à la BAD.

L'Algérie, l'Egypte, la Libye, Malte, la Mauritanie, le Maroc et la Tunisie détiennent à elles sept moins de 2% des droits de vote à la BIRD et 16% à la BAD.

Aussi l'influence des uns et des autres sur les politiques générales de ces institutions multilatérales est-elle limitée, voire mineure. Cet état de fait, encore une fois, est incompatible avec la recherche actuelle de coopération concertée, de partenariat, en particulier entre interlocuteurs et partenaires méditerranéens. Elle est plus incompatible encore avec la promotion d'une politique régionale d'intégration et de co-développement.

Un instrument multilatéral de financement et de participation

Comment promouvoir les interdépendances entre les deux rives, stimuler les investissements directs et de portefeuille, développer et fluidifier les flux financiers méditerranéens, en optimiser l'efficience, développer les opportunités d'investissement sur la base d'une vision dynamique des avantages spécifiques ?

On peut penser à une -ou deux- institution qui aurait deux axes, deux branches d'activité :

- La première consisterait à coordonner les flux de financement multilatéraux existants et à proposer un cadre de concertation plus spécifiquement centré sur la Méditerranée ; une instance de dialogue entre créateurs et débiteurs, projets publics et privés ; un conseil dans lequel serait assurée une représentation paritaire des divers acteurs économiques méditerranéens et des créanciers (méditerranéens ou non).
- La seconde activité serait la traduction du concept de partenariat, appliqué au financement de l'économie à l'échelle méditerranéenne.

Une idée pourrait être de créer, à côté de la première instance de coordination des aides et crédits classiques, un fonds d'investissement, ou plus exactement un "fonds méditerranéen de participation et de conseil à l'investissement". Cette idée de participation à l'investissement a dores et déjà donné lieu à des réalisations telles que FINALEP, société algéro-européenne de participation, ou la SPPP, Société (maroco-européenne) de Participation et de Promotion du Partenariat, ayant toutes deux pour objectif de promouvoir la création ou le développement d'entreprises productives privées associant des partenaires algériens ou marocains à des partenaires ressortissant de la Communauté Européenne, de préférence des PME et PMI. L'une et l'autre interviennent essentiellement par acquisition de participations au capital des entreprises concernées. L'une et l'autre sont elles-mêmes des sociétés en partenariat et leur capital est souscrit par des institutions financières publiques et privées, nationales ou communautaires : Banque Algérienne de Développement Local, Crédit Populaire d'Algérie et Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique pour FINALEP (plus, prochainement, BEI et DEG) ; capitaux à risques prévus par le troisième protocole financier Maroc/CEE, banques, sociétés d'assurance et investisseurs marocains pour la SPPP.

C'est ce mode de financement, ce partenariat financier au service du partenariat productif qu'il pourrait être extrêmement profitable de reproduire à l'échelle méditerranéenne (ou à l'échelle euro-méditerranéenne), en lui donnant de ce fait sa dimension intégratrice.

Communication de M. Michel El Khoury
Gouverneur de la Banque du Liban

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je devrais sans doute ajouter, mes soeurs et frères en Méditerranée. Si nous sommes tous réunis aujourd'hui dans cette île si hospitalière de Malte, épitomé parfait de la Méditerranée, c'est bien parce que nous avons une appartenance -au moins- en commun. Que nous soyons du Nord, du Sud, de l'Est ou de l'Ouest, nous participons tous de la civilisation de la vigne et de l'olivier ; séparés, mais unis à la fois, par la Méditerranée. Nous avons en commun un patrimoine, certes, mais aujourd'hui, ce sont surtout nos aspirations qui nous réunissent, et aussi sans doute quelques problèmes.

(C'est pourquoi je suis particulièrement heureux de ce moment de réflexion commune et de concertation, et je voudrais adresser mes remerciements chaleureux à Aspen Italia, à MM. les ministres Guido de Marco et Gianni de Michelis, et aux organisateurs de cette conférence, pour leur très louable initiative.

(Nous sommes ici ce matin pour nous interroger sur la manière dont nos ressources financières, commerciales et industrielles peuvent contribuer au développement, à la stabilité, au bien-être et à la prospérité de notre région. Quelles formes de coopération peut-on envisager ? Quel pourrait être le rôle des institutions économiques et financières internationales et régionales existantes ? Quel rôle la CEE, déjà partiellement méditerranéenne, peut-elle jouer dans le processus d'intégration économique des pays de la Méditerranée et du Moyen-Orient ?)

Il est indéniable que le bassin méditerranéen offre un immense potentiel pour une coopération économique, financière et commerciale plus étroite. Nul doute que des propositions constructives et des commentaires avisés seront énoncés au cours de la discussion qui va suivre. Qu'il me soit donc permis d'ouvrir le débat par quelques observations simples sur le sujet.

Je voudrais m'attarder brièvement sur les facteurs qui pourraient entraver une démarche progressive vers une plus grande interaction économique, sociale et humaine ; facteurs qui requièrent sans doute une approche globale des solutions.

- Il ne peut y avoir d'interaction heureuse sans stabilité, et nous savons qu'il ne peut y avoir de stabilité fiable sans développement. Aujourd'hui, les foyers de tension actuels et potentiels que connaît notre région, ajoutés à la

méconnaissance que nous avons les uns des autres, à l'incompréhension, et à la méfiance, entravent une coopération saine et constructive. L'instabilité qu'ils entretiennent pose de sérieux obstacles au mouvement des hommes, des capitaux, du travail, et des marchandises, d'une rive de la Méditerranée à l'autre. Elle suffirait à elle seule déjà à expliquer les déséquilibres de niveaux de développement, ne serait-ce que par l'obligation dans laquelle elle place de nombreux pays de consacrer à leurs systèmes de défense des fonds qu'ils souhaiteraient employer à la promotion de leurs ressources, à commencer par leur capital humain. Avons-nous la possibilité et la volonté de nous entraider pour trouver une solution durable à ces conflits et à ces crises ?

- Les différences et les contrastes de la Méditerranée font sa richesse, mais ils reflètent parfois des déséquilibres graves : disparité des niveaux de développement, d'industrialisation, d'urbanisation ; contrastes aigus des situations démographiques. Malgré les progrès remarquables accomplis par les pays des rives Est et Sud au cours des vingt dernières années, force est de constater que les disparités fondamentales se perpétuent et sont aggravées par les circonstances économiques défavorables que connaissent la plupart des pays

méditerranéens non-membres de la CEE, surtout à la suite de la crise du Golfe qui a davantage encore creusé le fossé de la mésentente : endettement croissant (la dette est passée de 94 milliards de dollars en 1980 à 200 milliards en 1989; elle a pratiquement doublé) ; transfert important des ressources financières ; effondrement des prix du pétrole pour certains d'entre eux ; exode du travail et des investissements.

((Au cours des vingt dernières années, si le PNB global de ces pays a augmenté, le revenu moyen par habitant a diminué dans tous les pays non-membres de la CEE -à l'exception de l'Egypte, de la Turquie et d'Israël. Les pays du Sud de l'Europe, quant à eux, avec 46% de la population du bassin méditerranéen, ils en réalisent 81% du PNB)).

-Un troisième facteur de blocage réside dans la diversité des régimes économiques de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée. Les échanges régionaux sont handicapés par diverses structures tarifaires et non-tarifaires, coûteuses et désavantageuses. Dans la plupart des pays non-membres de la CEE, le secteur public, protégé, n'a pas le dynamisme et l'efficacité de sa contrepartie privée, tandis que divers obstacles découragent l'investissement étranger.

Une libéralisation des conditions économiques et financières faciliterait les échanges et les investissements, et certains

signes portent à croire qu'un changement des économies méditerranéennes se dessine d'ores et déjà, à la suite des transformations survenues dans les pays d'Europe de l'Est et en Union soviétique. Ce "bonus" de la détente Est-Ouest a servi de catalyseur aux économies mixtes, entraînant une relaxation des obstacles administratifs et des contrôles, la restructuration du secteur public, et l'encouragement de l'investissement étranger. Beaucoup reste à faire toutefois pour nous rapprocher des conditions idéales de la coopération.

S'il paraît nécessaire d'intégrer le politique à l'économique, les difficultés inhérentes à cette démarche ne doivent toutefois pas nous faire perdre de vue le grand potentiel d'intégration économique de tous les pays de la Méditerranée. Leur complémentarité si évidente, pourrait même bénéficier, paradoxalement, du fait que tous les pays concernés n'ont pas des niveaux de développement similaires. En effet, l'effort à accomplir vers le développement, pourrait alors s'orienter non vers la similitude, mais vers la complémentarité dont l'objectif final serait de mettre les biens, les capitaux, les compétences et les technologies à la portée de tous à un coût accessible ; on pourrait presque parler de troc.

Pourquoi nous acharner tous à atteindre des niveaux précis spécifiques et élevés dans tous les domaines, industriel, agricole, technologique, alors qu'il serait infiniment plus

utile, une fois atteint un degré minimum de développement, d'épanouir des ressources spécifiques, ou des vocations déjà inscrites dans notre pratique ou notre histoire: pourquoi continuer à surindustrialiser l'Europe et y importer massivement de la main-d'œuvre, au lieu d'implanter davantage d'industries dans les pays à forte densité démographique et contribuer ainsi à la croissance tant des pays investisseurs que des pays d'implantation ? Pourquoi essayer de doter à prix d'or d'une agriculture des pays dont les terres ne s'y prêtent pas naturellement, et laisser en friche d'autres pays aux terres éminemment arables mais qui n'ont pas les moyens et les technologies nécessaires pour les rentabiliser et suffire à la fois à leurs besoins et à ceux de leurs voisins à vocation différente ? Même les pays producteurs de services, comme le Liban, trouveraient des débouchés pour leur savoir-faire. Ce ne sont là que quelques exemples parmi d'autres.

Tout cela, évidemment, ne se fera pas sans efforts. Sans prétendre apporter des réponses aux questions que nous nous posons, voici quelques idées que j'aimerais proposer à votre réflexion :

- Pour atténuer les déséquilibres, une extension de l'assistance économique et technologique des pays les plus développés vers les moins développés sera sans doute nécessaire. Mais l'assistance purement financière qui, en définitive, ne fait que parer au plus urgent, ne constitue pas une solution à long terme, et ne fait pas justice aux capacités que ces pays recèlent mais qui ne s'épanouissent ni ne s'expriment. Une assistance visant à éduquer, à former, à développer les compétences me semble indispensable, tout comme il est nécessaire -et je crois que nos collègues écologistes partagent ce point de vue- de contribuer à élargir les perceptions et les mentalités pour une meilleure prise de conscience de la collectivité et de nos responsabilités les uns envers les autres et envers notre région. Ce sont là des tâches qui relèvent des gouvernements, ou des instances intergouvernementales, dont certaines existent et d'autres sont à mettre sur pied. Pourquoi ne pas envisager la création d'une Conférence régulière de la Méditerranée dont la mission consisterait à identifier les problèmes et les solutions, à assurer le suivi de la réalisation de projets, et à se pencher sur des questions comme l'opportunité et la manière de rééchelonner ou de "refinancer" les dettes pour les uns, ou de relever raisonnablement les prix pétroliers pour les autres, de


manière à dégager des surplus financiers pouvant être prêtés ou investis ?

- Toutefois, les actions au niveau des Etats ou des instances qui les regroupent ne peuvent avoir qu'une incidence tardive sur le quotidien de la coopération, notamment au niveau des échanges commerciaux et financiers, et plus particulièrement à celui des investissements. La coopération acquiert une dimension tangible lorsqu'elle concerne la vie de tous les jours et se fonde sur des considérations qui ne sont pas prioritairement politiques. C'est pourquoi il me paraît souhaitable d'encourager les initiatives privées de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée, en favorisant un meilleur échange et une plus grande accessibilité des informations et des données sur les possibilités, les opportunités et les projets. Il s'agit là d'un domaine qui relève plus particulièrement des institutions financières. La perspective d'une banque méditerranéenne peut paraître un peu lointaine, mais l'on pourrait d'ores et déjà mettre sur pied un noyau constitué de diverses grandes banques des deux rives, et de sociétés financières et commerciales importantes qui s'occuperaient de l'étude, du financement et de l'exécution de projets d'intérêt commun ; une sorte de "Clearing House" pour les investissements.

- Je voudrais enfin mentionner rapidement un domaine où la coopération pourrait s'instaurer très rapidement du fait même qu'il est déjà commun à toute la Méditerranée dont il constitue la ressource la plus florissante : le tourisme, puissant facteur d'échanges, et depuis bien longtemps puisqu'il permet d'aller voir Rome au Liban, Médine en Espagne, Byzance en Afrique, et toutes ces civilisations à Malte. Le tourisme offre encore un immense potentiel de coopération et d'investissements, et donc d'intégration. Il appelle à de nouveaux efforts en vue de faciliter le mouvement des personnes et des biens, notamment au niveau des installations et des transports. A ce propos, le projet de liaison fixe entre l'Europe et l'Afrique à travers le détroit de Gibraltar a pratiquement valeur de symbole. Mais il est indéniable que cette ressource si précieuse du tourisme viendrait à tarir si l'on ne soigne pas une mer malade de la terre, et une terre malade du béton et des déchets. Il nous faut soutenir et accélérer les projets d'assainissement et de conservation comme le Plan Bleu.

Il aurait été approprié que je clôture mon intervention en empruntant à Paul Valéry, Fernand Braudel ou Michel Chiha quelques belles paroles sur leur chère Méditerranée, mais en tant que Gouverneur de la Banque du Liban, je suis très tenté de conclure plus prosaïquement par quelques mots sur le

redressement que le Liban a amorcé avec succès au cours de l'année écoulée. Des plans de reconstruction sont à l'étude, et l'objectif principal des politiques monétaire et fiscale est de rétablir dans un avenir proche la stabilité financière qui avait naguère caractérisé ce pays. Malgré le conflit prolongé qu'il a enduré, le Liban a réussi à maintenir son système libéral de change. Nous le maintiendrons car nous estimons qu'il est pour une bonne part dans la confiance qu'inspire le système économique libanais. Nous commençons à resserrer les rangs de notre petite famille, mais il est réconfortant de le faire au sein de la grande famille que nous représentons tous ici.





*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

PROPOSALS PRESENTED

Session II: Energy, Water and the Environment

Proposals for Session II on Energy, Water and the Environment

By Umberto COLOMBO

The importance of local participation in the ultimate implementation and sustainability of environmental policy measures calls for the establishment of a close dialogue at the regional, national and local levels. The creation of a regional network of public information bodies on energy and environment could thus help to build a wide constituency for environmental action and cooperation. The network could promote the exchange of information and stimulate common activities on environmental awareness related to specific regional problems such as water management, energy efficiency, waste and coastal management. Such activities could consist in the preparation of audiovisual material for schools, home use and the media as well as the promotion of training courses for teachers, civil servants from provincial and local government (e.g. large and small city administrators) and opinion leaders. Financing for the network and, where necessary, for the activities it will stimulate, could be sought from international institutions such as the EC, the World Bank, UNESCO, UNEP, UNDP and specialized agencies.

Working at the regional level on joint public messages stimulating environmental awareness would represent a challenge to cooperation not only in environmental activities but also in the cultural domain, for it implies a change in mentality and behaviour and the adoption of a common goal, within different cultural systems.

There are, in the Mediterranean region, numerous cooperation programmes in the field of renewable energies. Several specialized institutions have been or are being created and demonstration projects set up. The time seems ripe to undertake an overall cooperative evaluation of activities in this field in the countries of the region to learn from successes and failures. Such evaluation could form the basis for planning future activities with a stronger regional or subregional thrust.

International solidarity with regard to the water problem has to be built in the region through the formulation and adoption of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the sharing of a common resource (e.g. State-State transfers through underwater pipeline). Current laws tend to be unclear and differ from country to country, while international law has yet to be established. It is important that efforts for a regional regulatory framework be pursued which would also facilitate technology cooperation and transfer.

The ultimate success of a European energy market in terms of sustainability will depend on the measure in which it will open a window to the South. The European Energy Charter should, therefore, not only concern East-West but also North-South energy cooperation. The 'specific agreements' of the Charter seem to provide for this and it is therefore proposed that a working group be set up to work in such direction.

La maîtrise de l'énergie dans les pays méditerranéens

par Raphael Hadas-Lebel
Conseiller Général d'Elf Aquitaine

1. La situation énergétique des pays méditerranéens se caractérise par une grande disparité de situations selon les zones concernées:

- la zone d'Europe du Sud est fortement importatrice, même si elle consomme avec une relative modération, variable selon les pays, le taux de dépendance énergétique demeure élevé

- la zone d'Afrique du Nord exporte les deux tiers de sa production (principalement vers l'Europe du Sud) et consomme beaucoup. Mais seul le Maroc a une situation de forte dépendance énergétique

- les anciens pays socialistes (Yougoslavie et Albanie) vont connaître une sensible augmentation de leur consommation.

La croissance des besoins en production électrique sera particulièrement sensible en Italie (après l'arrêt du programme nucléaire), en Turquie et dans une moindre mesure en Espagne.

Ces disparités justifient d'autant plus une coopération régionale dans le domaine de l'énergie.

2. D'une façon générale, il n'y a pas d'évolution exceptionnelle à prévoir pour la consommation comme pour la production des formes d'énergie que sont le charbon, le pétrole, l'hydro électricité ou le nucléaire. Une exception majeure: le gaz. Le bassin méditerranéen va connaître un essor considérable de son industrie gazière dans les dix ans à venir et la consommation va y croître sous la double impulsion des centrales électriques fonctionnant au gaz et du processus de libéralisation de la politique gazière dans la CEE. De surcroît, le gaz est considéré comme une ressource écologique à haut rendement énergétique. L'Algérie sera un acteur important, dans cette perspective. Des compagnies pétrolières comme AGIP ou ELF, qui ont une grande expérience de production gazière peuvent apporter une contribution appréciable et contribuer à l'établissement de formes originales de coopération entre sociétés pétrolières et pays producteurs.

3. Le développement des économies d'énergie est, dès lors, un enjeu majeur pour les pays méditerranéens. À un double titre:

- parce qu'il est le meilleur moyen de réduire la dépendance énergétique de la plupart des pays concernés: les énergies renouvelables, en particulier, sont des énergies nationales et non épuisables.

- parce que c'est aujourd'hui l'action de prévention la plus efficace à court terme pour protéger l'environnement, et notamment pour limiter l'effet de serre.

Deux séries d'actions doivent être privilégiées:

- des initiatives de chacun des pays concernés pour renforcer la maîtrise des consommations d'énergie. La France, par exemple, se fixe un objectif de doublement du rythme des économies d'énergie dans les cinq prochaines années. Ces initiatives concernent principalement trois secteurs: le logement (meilleure isolation thermique), l'industrie (co-génération, chauffage par radiations infrarouges et ultraviolets, utilisation de membranes cryogéniques, isolation des parois opaques) et les transports (études sur les carburants de substitution et du véhicule électrique).

- des actions à plus long terme pour développer les énergies renouvelables. Des perspectives limitées existent sans doute dans la région pour le développement de l'énergie hydraulique. Il ne faut pas non plus sous-estimer les difficultés techniques et économiques de certaines tentatives: géothermie, énergie éolienne, solaire thermodynamique, coûts élevés des carburants dérivés de la biomasse (deux ou trois fois les prix actuels du pétrole). Mais les pays méditerranéens ont des atouts dans le domaine de l'énergie solaire (ensoleillement, intérêt du photovoltaïque dans l'habitat rural dispersé). Les pays du Nord, et notamment la CEE, doivent favoriser activement un transfert de technologie vers les pays du Sud dans ce domaine novateur des énergies renouvelables.

Aspen Malta, Session II, 2 July 1991

WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE-EAST : AN E.C. VIEW

Outline by Marc Pierini

- As far as water resources are concerned, the Near and Middle East region presents a striking feature : most countries have a major water deficit situation (present or foreseen) while Turkey has a major disposable water surplus. Notwithstanding the related political, technical and financial issues, there is a potential for complementarity.
- As it has been experienced in other regions of the world, issues involved in sharing water resources are numerous :
 - . policy issues such as sovereignty, sharing arrangements, legal framework for such arrangements, monitoring and policing of such arrangements
 - . technical issues relating to infrastructures and costing of water resources
 - . financial issues relating to the construction of infrastructures, to the collection and use of revenues from water resources.
- Diplomatic contacts relating to water issues have traditionally been intense in the region. Several specific initiatives have been taken already, including President Ozal's "Peace Pipeline" proposal and the Middle East Water Summit to be held in Istanbul early November.
- "Water politics" in the region are obviously complex ones. Unsolved pre- and post-Gulf War political issues, add to the difficulty.
- Our basic assumption therefore is : regional cooperation in water resources is a must, but, given the political complexities, it is highly probable that the traditional means of cooperation between suppliers and users of water and financiers wont suffice.
- In fact a regional forum or body of a political nature, encompassing supplier countries, user countries, major donor countries and international financial institutions might prove the only way to handle the complex issues at hand.

- This is where the EC historical experience might prove useful : In the post-World War II context, amid a devastated Europe with rancor and hatred rife, six countries decided to pool their coal and steel resources in order to start together on the road of reconstruction and prosperity. The enterprise was technical in appearance, highly political in substance. This enterprise, born in 1950, was called the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was the precursor to the European Economic Community (EEC) born in 1957.

- The key to ECSC's success was its High Authority, a technical-political body independent of Member Governments and responsible of policy proposals (to be decided by Governments) and of policy implementation. The High Authority was subsequently merged into the EEC Commission, now the executive organ of the European Communities.

- As stated by the EC Commission to the EC Foreign Ministers on 15 April 1991, it might prove useful to draw on the ECSC experience of the 50's and to look into its relevance for Middle East water issues.

- The following proposal is therefore submitted for discussion : the creation of a Middle East Water Authority. Ideally its membership would consist of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israël, Jordan, Egypt, Irak, Iran, the six member countries of GCC, Yemen. An appropriate representation of the Palestinian leadership would be included in a form to be determined in harmony with the peace process' result.

- The Middle East Water Authority would cover 4 broad policy areas :

. increase of water availability (pipelines, local dams and other works, water-related environmental works, desalination)

. reduction of water consumption (water management policies and techniques, water-related agricultural research and policy)

. water quality (waste water policy and management, fertilisers/pesticides-related issues)

. legal framework for water-sharing arrangements (multilateral agreements on resource-sharing, cost-sharing, pricing policy, dispute settlement)

- Born itself of several devastating conflicts, the European Community has demonstrated that regional cooperation first, regional integration later can be powerful instruments for dialogue and peace between nations. This is its cardinal message to the Middle East region.

**L'ENVIRONNEMENT EN TANT QUE
DIMENSION DE LA COOPERATION MEDITERRANEEENNE,
par Bernard Glass, Directeur du Plan Bleu**

Lors des précédentes manifestations organisées par Aspen Institute Italie, le Plan Bleu par ses responsables a pu présenter ses travaux d'approche systémique et prospective du Bassin Méditerranéen. En particulier, les 18 pays riverains et la CEE, signataires de la Convention de Barcelone de 1976, ont été destinataires en 1990 du rapport de synthèse faisant ressortir les "Futurs" de la Méditerranée à l'Horizon 2025.

La démarche ainsi entreprise pendant 10 ans en mobilisant jusqu'à 300 experts de tous les pays constitue, par sa méthodologie et par son champ d'exploration d'une région mondiale, où la problématique Environnement-Développement se conjugue à une grande fragilité géopolitique, une initiative unique. Elle a inspiré des interventions spécifiques:

au niveau du Bassin par la Banque mondiale et la Banque européenne d'investissement par leur "Programme pour l'Environnement Méditerranéen (PEM)", comportant notamment un Programme d'Assistance Technique (METAP) avec des objectifs opérationnels intéressant l'Eau, les Déchets, les pollutions accidentelles et l'Aménagement du Littoral et également par la CEE (Charte de Nicosie d'Avril 1990).

au niveau des pays riverains par la mise en place de programmes d'aménagement côtiers (Turquie, Syrie, Grèce, Yougoslavie) et l'élaboration de scénarios nationaux, le dernier pays en date étant la Libye.

Il apparaît aujourd'hui, d'une part la pertinence de la démarche des scénarios tendanciels et alternatifs, même si certaines hypothèses, notamment celle concernant le contexte international, et certains facteurs d'évolution dont le changement climatique, doivent être actualisés, d'autre part la nécessité de renforcer des stratégies de "développement durable", appelé également "développement écologiquement viable".

Les récentes investigations, menées en liaison avec des équipes nationales ou locales, sur des zones côtières de certains pays permettent de confirmer et de préciser trois niveaux de prise en compte de l'Environnement dans sa définition habituelle c'est-à-dire intéressant à la fois les pollutions, la protection de la nature, la gestion des ressources naturelles renouvelables dont l'eau et le cadre de vie.

Tout d'abord le niveau national ou local apparaît en général celui où s'effectue le "bouclage" des effets négatifs des surconsommations, des surexplorations, des pollutions des ressources (sols, eaux continentales, zone marine infralittorale, écosystèmes naturels terrestres...) ainsi que des surconcentrations de l'habitat et des activités. Dès lors, il apparaît aux responsables de ce niveau, avec le concours éventuel de partenaires extérieurs, de définir leur stratégie pour éviter ou limiter cette "autopénalisation".

Selon la configuration et la localisation de certains bassins versants, nappes phréatiques, courants marins, courants aérologiques, la solidarité par les ressources naturelles et les pollutions implique la recherche de solutions bilatérales ou multilatérales (exemples de la convention Ramego, du programme Adriatique, du règlement des eaux de l'Euphrate).

Enfin, à l'instar des programmes à l'échelle planétaire, pour les grands enjeux de l'Environnement Méditerranéen, la coopération internationale à l'échelle du Bassin sera scule en mesure d'apporter des réponses aux problèmes constatés ou potentiels. Il s'agit du contrôle continu de la qualité des eaux de la mer, du maintien de la biodiversité et de la préservation de certaines espèces animales ou végétales, de la mise en place d'une force d'intervention en cas de pollution accenditelle majeure, de l'évaluation globale du changement climatique en cours, de la communication appropriée en direction des pays riverains, de l'organisation des moyens autorisant l'approche optimale de tels objectifs.

S'il fallait suggérer des priorités en réponse aux problématiques environnement-développement actuellement identifiées, quatre fonctions principales semblent devoir être privilégiées au nom de l'environnement, au titre de l'indispensable coopération méditerranéenne:

- * la connaissance des évolutions en liaison éventuellement avec l'Agence européenne de l'Environnement
- * la communication et la formation
- * le financement en direction des pays en voie de développement
- * le renforcement institutionnel de la coordination internationale

L'EAU, UNE CONTRAINTE MAJEURE POUR LES PAYS MÉDITERRANÉENS

Le Plan Bleu, dans sa démarche prospective "Avenir du Bassin Méditerranéen", à l'horizon 2025 a fait ressortir le rôle majeur de la ressource "Eau" pour les pays méditerranéens.

Malgré l'importance de certains phénomènes, en zone méditerranéenne, dus à l'eau telles que l'érosion et la salinisation des sols les enjeux déterminants, tout particulièrement pour les pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée, sont illustrés par la balance entre les besoins et les ressources en eau.

La prospective des besoins et des ressources eau a permis de répartir les pays riverains en trois groupes :

- Ceux où les disponibilités en eau resteraient notables jusqu'en 2025 et au delà, ce groupe comprend des pays à faible croissance démographique (France, Italie, Grèce, Yougoslavie) et les pays à croissance plus forte (Albanie, Turquie et Liban). Le maintien d'une marge confortable implique des efforts d'aménagement et de maîtrise des eaux au plan quantitatif et qualitatif notamment pour l'absorption des redoutables effets de pointe estivale.
- Ceux où les disponibilités en eau, bien qu'encore confortables aujourd'hui, se réduiraient sensiblement (Maroc, Algérie, Espagne, Chypre). Les demandes globales en eau pourraient, en principe, être satisfaites jusqu'en 2025, grâce à de nouveaux aménagements ou à d'importants transports d'eau interrégionaux et à condition de freiner les consommations.
- Ceux où les disponibilités actuelles sont déjà réduites ou négligeables. Les "indices d'exploitation" des ressources dépassent déjà ou dépasseraient dès l'an 2000, 100 % c'est-à-dire que les ressources régulières sont ou seraient utilisées plus d'une fois ou complétées par des ressources non conventionnelles (nappes fossiles, dessalement, etc.). Six pays, soit un pays sur trois, doivent ainsi s'engager dans une gestion drastique de leur ressource eau, que leur croissance démographique soit faible (Malte), moyenne (Israël, Tunisie) ou forte (Egypte, Libye, Syrie).

L'eau à ce titre est porteuse de ruptures pour un certain nombre de pays qui n'assureront pas avec rigueur une gestion prospective, technique et économique, de cette ressource dont le réchauffement climatique, de surcroît, peut perturber le cycle naturel.

Dans certains cas, lorsque plusieurs pays sont tributaires d'un même bassin versant, la gestion raisonnée et partagée suppose un règlement international pour éviter la "guerre de l'eau".

By Atef EBEID

The southern part of the Mediterranean region have in the long run and will continue to have excess supply of natural and human resources.

The surplus of oil and natural gas is both seen and foreseen. Some strategic minerals are not yet exploited.

Land for development/touristical/urban and agricultural is not used in full. The region is expected to have a huge surplus of human capital. The rate of growth in population is one of the highest in the world. Family planning programs are expected to succeed in reducing the rate, however population will continue to grow for the next 30 years to come.

The southern part has a good part of the world human heritage a stable pleasant weather, and non-polluted sandy beaches. The potential for touristic development is excellent. Co-operation between the north and the south should be shaped to serve the interests of the two groups.

This should be done through joint efforts:

- 1) To explore and ensure supply of natural resources: oil, gas and minerals;
- 2) To upgrade the skills of human capital and the creation of demand for it at the south which will help stop immigration;
- 3) To develop the touristic coastal zone for drawing an increasing part of the growing international demand for tourism.

Three main difficulties are foreseen:

- 1) The region is still a potential risk for investment because of the reluctance to reach permanent and longlasting peace;
- 2) Many of the countries which could contribute to peace suffer from shortages of capital;
- 3) Capital needed during the first few years should be cheap and fast disbursed, which is hard to find, but is possible.

It is proposed to take one or two countries as a showcase and mobilize enough external resources to speed up the development of its human, natural and touristic resources.

This criteria should be used:

- 1) The commitment to peace and free trade;
- 2) The decontrol of the economy.

The development of models for success is hoped to demonstrate that peace and co-operation is the best option for making a better future for the people in the region.

The mechanism for Financing should be to ask the nominated countries to prepare a list of projects ready for financing in the following areas:

- 1) Infrastructure needed for speeding the use of available natural resources and for the development of the touristic zones;

- 2) The structural adjustment of its human resource development systems and mechanism.

These countries should be notified in advance about the amount of cheap money available every year for use for upgrading education and health service. Experience shows that direct financing through capital made available bilaterally to a special account in the country is the most efficient and effective mechanism.

P E A C E P I P E L I N E P R O J E C T

By Necati Utkan

INTRODUCTION

The Peace Pipeline Project seeks to provide a supply of water available from sources of excess in Turkey and deliver a firm supply to regions of need in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arabian Gulf States. A Feasibility Study is proposed to enable a thorough technical and economic analysis to ensure that such a project can be brought to full realization.

The water delivered through the Peace Pipeline is not intended to replace, but rather supplement, existing water supplies in the countries served. This additional source of water will allow for greater economic expansion and development of the region, and will reinforce the dependability of supply.

WATER SUPPLY

Water for the project will be obtained from excess water in the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers.

The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) has extensive hydrology records on the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers and have done a considerable amount of study on the water availability and surplus water in the two rivers.

DSI have developed master plans for the ultimate use of the waters of both rivers and have made calculations on the quantity of the surplus water that will flow into the Mediterranean after all projected agricultural, industrial and domestic utilization has been satisfied. Major irrigation projects exist and are planned in the Adana area with inter-basin transfers of water from the Seyhan River to the Ceyhan River via a tunnel from the Asagi Catalan Dam. Inter-basin transfer of the Ceyhan River is also planned for the Menzelet Irrigation Project.

DSI have calculated that the average flow in the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers is 39,17 million cubic metres per day. The planned use of this water in Turkey is approximately 23,04 million cubic meters per day. Thus, an average of 16,1 million cubic meters of water per day remains available for other humanitarian uses. Extensive development in the watersheds of the two rivers has already occurred and many dams have been constructed. More dams are planned for construction and others are under construction at the present time.

WATER QUALITY

DSI has recorded water quality in the Seyhan & Ceyhan rivers since 1978. These records show the availability of good quality water. At the present time the extent of water treatment (if any) has not been determined, but this question will be investigated in the Feasibility Study.

PIPELINE ROUTES

Western Pipeline

The Western Pipeline, involves the diversion of water from the Seyhan River downstream of the existing Seyhan Dam near Adana and the diversion of water from the Ceyhan River downstream of the existing Aslantas Dam near Ceyhan. The water will be pumped via pipeline following the existing railroad route from Ceyhan to Osmoniye, crossing over the Nur Mountains via a tunnel, at elevation 700 metres, through a mountain pass near the town of Bahce. The route continues south passing near the towns of Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Water flows by gravity from the Bahce Pass to Homs. From Homs the topography gradually rises from elevation 300 metres to 900 metres above sea level on the plateau between Damascus, and Amman. Beyond Amman, the route continues via Tabuk to Medina, Saudi Arabia. A major mountain range separates Medina from the coastal centers of Yanbu and Jeddah and pump stations will lift the water via a pipeline and tunnel through these mountains. Water would then flow by gravity to Mecca, Jeddah and Yanbu. There is a potential for recovery of some of the pump station energy by the installation of a hydroelectric facility on the Red Sea side of the mountain range to utilize excess head. The total route length of the Western Pipeline is approximately 2650 kilometers.

Gulf Pipeline

The Gulf Pipeline follows the same route as the Western Pipeline to Hama where it diverges from the Western Pipeline. Water is pumped from Hama to elevation 900 metres, crossing the high plateau of Eastern Jordan parallel to the Iraq-Jordan border until it intersects the route of the existing Trans-Arabian Oil Pipeline (TAPLINE). The water then flows by gravity along a route that continues along the TAPLINE alignment to the Arabian Gulf coast and then along the coastline of the Arabian Gulf to Ras Al Khaimah. Should water be required to be delivered to Muscat in Oman, a small pumping station would be required to cross mountains separating the Gulf of Oman from the Arabian Gulf. The total route length of the Gulf Pipeline is approximately 3900 kilometres.

WATER QUANTITY

The technical Feasibility Study was based on a flow of 3,500,000 cubic metres per day for the Western Pipeline and a flow of 2,500,000 cubic metres per day for the Gulf Pipeline. This water was distributed to the main population centers along each route by assigning flows in approximate proportion to their respective populations. After discussions with each country these water delivery quantities will be revised to suit their requirements and hydraulic design varied accordingly.

WESTERN PIPELINE

| Location | Assumed Water Delivered (Cubic Metres per Day) | | |
|--------------|---|----------|-----------|
| TURKEY | 300,000 | subtotal | 300,000 |
| SYRIA | | | |
| ALEPPO | 300,000 | | |
| HAMA | 100,000 | | |
| HOMS | 100,000 | | |
| DAMASCUS | 600,000 | subtotal | 1,100,000 |
| JORDAN | | | |
| AMMAN | 600,000 | subtotal | 600,000 |
| SAUDI ARABIA | | | |
| TABUK | 100,000 | | |
| MEDINA | 300,000 | | |
| YANBU | 100,000 | | |
| JEDDAH | 500,000 | | |
| MECCA | 500,000 | subtotal | 1,500,000 |
| | | TOTAL | 3,500,000 |

GULF PIPELINE

| Location | Assumed Water Delivered (Cubic Metres per Day) |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| KUWAIT | 600,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 600,000 |
| SAUDI ARABIA | |
| JUBAIL | 200,000 |
| DAMMAM | 200,000 |
| AL KHOBAR | 200,000 |
| HUFUF | 200,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 800,000 |
| BAHRAIN | |
| MANAMA | 200,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 200,000 |
| QATAR | |
| DOHA | 100,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 100,000 |
| UAE | |
| ABU DHABI | 280,000 |
| DUBAI | 160,000 |
| SHARJAH/AJMAN | 120,000 |
| UMM AL QAIWAIN/ RAS AL KHAIMAH | 40,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 600,000 |
| OMAN | |
| MUSCAT | 200,000 |
| | subtotal |
| | 200,000 |
| | TOTAL |
| | 2,500,000 |

PIPE SIZE AND TYPE

The main pipeline routes will require pipe that varies in size from 3 metres to 4 metres. Branches into the various points of delivery will vary from 1 metre to 2 metres in diameter.

The type of pipe varies from steel fabricated pipe in the high pressure pumped sections of the pipeline, to prestressed concrete cylinder pipe in the gravity and low pressure pumped sections and ductile iron, concrete and rolled steel pipe in the small diameter branches.

The majority of the pipe is expected to be prestressed concrete cylinder pipe, that would be manufactured in each country through which the pipeline passes, using local material where possible.

The major portion of the pipeline will be buried about 2 metres below the ground level or located in tunnels in the mountain areas.

A more detailed evaluation of the pipe diameter, length, and pipe material will be made during the Feasibility Study when more information has been developed on the topography, pumping station locations, water storage locations, geology and other route constraints.

POWER & FUEL SUPPLY

It is anticipated that the water pumps will be powered by electrical energy, either purchased from the participating country or generated by separate electric power generating facilities within that country. Evaluations will also be made of the supply of power by high voltage AC/DC transmission facilities from sources outside the participating country.

Fuel availability will play a major role in the size and location of the generating facilities and available fuel sources will be evaluated in the Feasibility Study.

The initial technical study indicates a need for 900 MW of power required for the Western Pipeline, utilizing 11 pumping stations along the route. The Gulf Pipeline would require 600 MW of power, utilizing 5 pumping stations. The quantity of power required and the location and number of pumping stations will be further refined during the Feasibility Study. It is anticipated that the amount of power can be reduced by refinements to the route alignment and by the use of tunnels through the mountains in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to reduce the elevation that the water has to be pumped.

COST ESTIMATE

The Western Pipeline has been estimated to cost approximately \$ 8,500,000,000 U.S. Dollars and the Gulf Pipeline has been estimated to cost approximately \$ 12,500,000,000 U.S. Dollars. All costs are based on 1986 dollars. The construction period is estimated to be approximately from 8 to 10 years.

The unit cost of water analysis completed to date are based on conveying 3.5 million cubic metres per day for the Western Pipeline and 2.5 million cubic metres per day for the Gulf Pipeline, 350 days per year. The project life has been taken to be 50 years, which is typical for major water supply projects.

The average cost of water for the Western Pipeline and Gulf Pipeline has been calculated at \$ 0.84 per cubic metre and \$ 1.07 per cubic metre, respectively.

The construction cost estimate and the unit cost of water will be further refined during the Feasibility Study as more data becomes available.

FEASIBILITY STUDY

The Feasibility Study will evaluate key technical criteria relative to the pipeline route location, hydraulics, scouring, delivery of the water and other elements of the Peace Pipeline Project. The study will develop the project costs and provide the information necessary to authorities in the participating countries to make informed judgments as to the economic, and technical viability of the Peace Pipeline Project.

Brown & Root was requested by the Turkish Government to evaluate the technical feasibility of transporting water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers to the Arabian Peninsula in 1986. Because of the project's technical and economic merits, Brown & Root has developed several concepts and analyses to a point that it is convinced that a formal, more detailed Feasibility Study report is necessary.

A summary of the elements of work that Brown & Root has undertaken to date includes :

1. Pipeline Alignment Routes
2. Pumping Stations and Power Supply Estimates
3. Fuel Supply, Power Recovery Evaluation
4. Hydraulic Analysis - Pipe Size and Type
5. Water Supply Hydrology - Review of Turkey's Master Plans for Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers
6. Operation and Maintenance Requirements
7. Construction Cost Estimates
8. Cost of Water Analysis and Cost Sensitivity Analysis

SCOPE OF WORK

The Scope of Work envisaged for the Feasibility Study includes the following :

i. Reconnaissance and data collection in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates and Oman to obtain published information and pursue needs and interest in the benefits of the Peace Pipeline Project. Data collection requirements include :

- a) Topographic Mapping (desirable scale 1:25,000 up to 1:250,000)
- b) Aerial or Satellite Photography (to augment dated data on topographic mapping)
- c) Geotechnical/Geohydrological/Seismic Data
- d) Hydrological/Meteorological data on the Ceyhan & Seyhan Rivers
- e) Water Quality at the source and Usage Data at delivery locations
- f) Information on existing and planned roads and railroads and other grade dependent facilities which could augment route location information.
- g) Data on availability and characteristics of construction materials available in each country
- h) Location, capacity and degree of utilization of existing power plants, transmission lines, gas & oil pipelines
- i) Undertake a site reconnaissance of the Seyhan and Ceyhan river water source to establish water diversion points.
- j) Undertake a pipeline route reconnaissance to verify on the ground the feasibility of the recommended route.

2. Using published data, evaluate alternate pipeline routes, identify route constraints and recommend an optimal pipeline alignment to be utilized in the Conceptual Engineering design phase.
3. Based on optimal route location, perform a hydraulic analysis of the pipeline and size the pipeline and hydraulic facilities. Establish feasible water delivery rates and points of delivery. Establish pumping requirement.
4. Establish power requirements and identify power and fuel constraints. Evaluate power recovery options.
5. Recommend feasible locations of pump stations, energy supply, access roads, surge and regulating tanks, intermediate storage locations and water delivery point terminal reservoirs.
6. Evaluate and recommend types of pipelines to be utilized and their potential source of supply and place of manufacture.
7. Identify operation and maintenance facilities and construction support facilities.
8. Prepare a schedule for the conceptual engineering, topographic aerial survey and geotechnical and geologic survey, preliminary and detailed engineering design and construction of the project.
9. Prepare a cost estimate for the design, construction and operation of the pipeline.
10. Establish construction cash flow requirements.
11. Prepare a cost of water analysis and an economic analysis of the project.
12. Complete a Feasibility Study Report and identify a Plan of Action and Milestones to accomplish the Peace Pipeline Project.

FEASIBILITY STUDY - DESIGN APPROACH

During the Feasibility Study, mapping and other technical information will be obtained from each country. The pipeline alignment will be further refined from this data. After the initial alignment is established, a project team will conduct a reconnaissance of the alignment route and the associated facilities locations. Alternate routing will be identified and existing development that is not shown on the available mapping that would affect system location will be recorded. Features that would affect the conveyance system location include archaeological sites, pipelines, powerlines, buildings, roads, railroads, wadis and sabkhas.

Using the refined pipeline alignments, the pumping station locations will be established together with flow regulation and surge tanks for hydraulic control and valve and metering stations. Water delivery volumes and water storage reservoir locations will be established by consultation with local authorities together with any other facility that could affect pipeline location.

The location of initial pipe manufacturing plants will be established and bulk material supply schemes for manufacture of the pipe will be developed.

The locations for operation and maintenance facilities will be developed. The general scope of operation and maintenance schemes will be outlined and cost projections refined.

The results of the Feasibility Study will be enhanced greatly by the work already undertaken to establish the proposed content of the Peace Pipeline Project. Brown & Root have evaluated a series of potential concepts and have developed, order of magnitude cost estimates. A significant result of Feasibility Studies will be to verify the technical and cost considerations developed to date.

Turkey offers water via 'peace pipeline'

By Andrew Borowiec
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Turkey offered its huge water resources to barren Middle Eastern countries yesterday, proposing to build a twin "peace pipeline" that would reach the heart of the Arabian peninsula and act as a unifying factor.

The cost of the project is tentatively estimated at \$21 billion. No feasibility studies have been undertaken so far, but Turkey hopes that the aftermath of the Gulf war will facilitate the work and financing.

The scheme was presented at a conference discussing plans for a Middle East water summit to be held in November in Istanbul, sponsored by the Global Water Summit Initiative here.

GWSI founder Joyce R. Starr called for a "crucial confidence-building approach to regional peace" that would be enhanced by joint exploitation of water, the area's scarcest resource. She described the Middle Eastern water crisis as a "strategic orphan that no country or international body seems ready to adopt."

"I see the scarcity of water resources as stimulating cooperation and peace, not conflict," said Dr. Farouk Baz, a geologist at Boston University who served as an adviser to the Egyptian government.

He and other speakers challenged the widely held view before the Gulf war that the water shortage would cause the next Middle East conflict.

"Water must become a bridge for cooperation," said Necati Utkan, Turkish ambassador to Iraq and personal representative of President Turgut Ozal, who presented the pipeline project.

The basin of the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers near the southern city of Adana would be the source of the flow of water Turkey proposes to pump across the Arab world, an area once ruled by the Turkish Ottoman Empire before World War I. Mr. Utkan said the two rivers, which irrigate a large area and empty into the Mediterranean, have a 63 percent water surplus that is now completely wasted.


One pipeline would cut across Syria and Jordan to western Saudi Arabia, reaching the holy Muslim city of Mecca. About 1,500 miles long, it would cost \$8.5 billion.

The other would carry water to eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, for a length of some 2,000 miles at a cost of \$12.5 billion.

Most countries in the Persian Gulf area have an acute water shortage and mainly rely on costly water from desalination plants.

Asked why Israel was not included in the initial Turkish plan, Mr. Utkan answered that "Arab countries and Israel are not yet ready to cooperate in such a project."

The "peace pipeline" would supplement the existing water supply in the countries involved and would be used mainly for industrial consumption and irrigation, he added, ex-



Map by Henry Christopher • The Washington Times

pressing hope that specialized international organizations finance the project once all feasibility studies are completed.

Miss Starr said the Turkish proposal is not part of the areawide water management study to be made at the Istanbul summit.

"Confidence-building measures and strategies for dispute resolution will be tabled" at Istanbul, she said. "The objective would be to establish post-summit agreement proce-

dures, including the development of an organizational structure."

The summit "will launch a new institutional framework for water security through the creation of a Middle East Water Policy Center," Miss Starr said.

She charged that "despite irrefutable evidence that the [Middle Eastern] region is approaching dangerous water shortages and contamination, Western leaders have so far failed to treat the issue as a strategic priority."

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***Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration***

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

PROPOSALS PRESENTED

Session III: Human and Cultural Resources

Outline for the discussion on human resources

by Louis Emmerij

1. If we survey the world economic situation today, we will note that three regions are in economic and/or political trouble, namely Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. All three are on Europe's doorstep.
2. The "world" economy, to all intents and purposes, covers the OECD countries, plus East and South-east Asia. These make up the train travelling on the fast track. At the other extreme, we have the least developed countries and other low-income countries which are on the slow track. Between the two, a third track exists, which includes many Latin American countries, South Asia, China and Eastern Europe. The train on the slow track is chugging along in a totally different direction from the fast track "economic TGV". In other words, the former countries are threatened by involuntary delinking from the world economy.
3. We are witnessing the advent of global product and financial markets. A great deal of discussion is currently underway about this. Surprisingly, however, there is little discussion about global labour markets, global employment opportunities and, indeed, the global employment problem.
4. Countries which do not have access to sophisticated technologies have no access to the global product and financial markets. These are, of course, the very countries in the slow train referred to above. As we note these economic differences, we can also observe simultaneously very different demographic pressure areas across very short distances. For example, north of the Mediterranean we have rich but stagnating and even declining populations, rapidly ageing, with all that this entails in terms of

attitudes and behaviour. An older population is more inward-looking, more protectionist, with a world to lose. South of the Mediterranean we have a poor, but young population with what this also entails: outward-looking, dynamic, aggressive, with a world to conquer. These psychological differences, caused by the age structure of a population, have vastly underestimated implications on the economic decision-taking process. There will be other consequences also. Unless changes in policies are forthcoming, it is obvious that the next wave of international migration is just around the corner.

5. A transnational policy must be designed to include action at the national, regional and international levels.

At the **national level** a system of governance must be introduced which decentralises economic decision-making power as closely as possible to the *forces vives* of the nation. Governments must exist to stimulate people rather than to sit heavily on their backs. The correct macroeconomic policies, diversification of economic structures and export patterns, and participatory development, are the keys at the national level.

At the **regional level** there is a need for regional economic integration. It is paradoxical that the successful regional economic blocs are to be found in the "economic TGV": Europe 1992, the North American Free Trade Area and the "flying geese" of East and South-east Asia. Regional integration is the key to creating the necessary "space" needed as a launching path into economic development. It will also provide the necessary scale for the establishment of centres of excellence in education and science.

If capital does not flow to where the people are, the people will flow to where the capital is. In this connection, I may be allowed to agree with the Italian "one per cent proposal" in which the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposes that the European Economic Community reflect on the possibility of raising the quota of funds destined for the development of Eastern European countries and developing countries to the level of one per cent of the EC's GNP, beginning in 1993. This would amount to \$62 billion per year, on average, between 1993 and the year 2000. He suggests that 25 per cent of these funds could

go to Eastern Europe, 25 per cent to countries on the Mediterranean southern shore, and the remaining 50 per cent to the developing countries. Obviously, such an inflow only makes sense if the low-income countries have taken appropriate action at the national and regional levels, as indicated above.

The first component of an international policy must, therefore, be a stimulation of international demand to create a sufficient number of productive employment opportunities to unclog the global labour market and to ease migratory pressures.

A second component of a transnational policy must be education and training. I believe that a different approach is required to reduce the amount of time individuals spend in the labour market during their lifespan. Such an approach would have to be comprehensive and include educational policies, labour market policies and social policies, combined with economic restructuring and international financial policies of the type just mentioned. The essence of this approach is to transform the rigid sequential system of school, followed by active life, followed by the retirement period, into a more flexible recurrent system in which it would be possible to combine or alternate periods of education, work and retirement throughout a person's adult life. Although an important change, this proposal would nevertheless be equitable: equality of educational opportunities for everyone would be boosted, and income distribution would consequently become less skewed. Weaker groups in society, who are presently becoming more and more vulnerable, would find strength in the additional opportunities offered by a return to education and other forms of self-improvement.

Finally, Europe should design an international migration policy. Maintaining the status quo is the best way to invite the next wave of international migration into European countries which would, in turn, stimulate further extremist political reactions. What is needed is an active policy with respect to international migration and not just a passive *ad hoc* reaction to events as they materialise. A select international migration policy is needed, agreed upon by all parties — the receiving and the sending countries — concerned. This can only be acceptable and effective in the context of such a comprehensive set of policies as is proposed here.

The policy approach proposed amounts to the elaboration of development contracts between Europe and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Such development contracts would be long-term in nature and would be comprehensive. They would contain a national component by which the developing countries commit themselves to a number of national policies, and also an international component by which the industrial countries would launch a consistent international financial, economic, trade and development assistance policy in favour of their partner countries. After the pragmatic and short-term policies of the 1980s, it is urgent to raise our sights again and to introduce longer-term planetary policies with more vision and courage. "Where there is no vision the people perish", but before doing so they will migrate!

Paris, June 1991
wp/cj

Pour des politiques culturelles
par Bruno Etienne
Professeur de l'IRENAM
Aix-en-Provence
France

De même au Nord, c'est à dire dans la rive sud de l'Europe, les discussions sur le peuple corse et sur les statuts de décentralisation, la position de l'Italie et de l'Espagne dans la crise, rendent de plus en plus crédibles des négociations locales entre les îles (Corse, Sardaigne, Sicile, Baléares), les villes (Marseille, Gênes, Barcelone) et avec le Sud; déjà Marseille signe des accords avec Tunis, parce que le statut régional permet aux régions de passer certains types d'accords sans porter atteinte à la souveraineté de l'Etat centralisé, qui a déjà bien du mal à mettre au point l'Acte unique européen.

En effet, le changement le plus radical de cette décennie me paraît être ici la déconcentration a produit de la dégéopolitisation.

Le déclin d'une politique qui s'identifiait strictement à l'Etat produit une diversification et un renouvellement des espaces politiques possibles. La nouvelle fonction politique se constitue selon un double mouvement: vers le bas qui renforce les pouvoirs locaux et régionaux, et vers le haut avec l'exigence naguère utopique d'un gouvernement européen.

Pour que les Etats maghrébins, et surtout les forces démocratiques qui y sont au travail, se posent les questions de leur propre domination et errements, il ne suffit pas de leur proposer de nous imiter! (d'ailleurs imiter quoi? nos scandales et nos "affaires"?) Il faut proposer des fédérations: fédération des îles, des villes, des minorités, des exclus de la modernité car les nouvelles routes de hautes technologies (par ex. l'axe Barcelone / Montpellier / Milan / Munich) vont accroître les disparités à la périphérie. Il faut proposer des axes Barcelone / Corte / Tunis ... en effet.

La Méditerranée est un continent liquide dont les berges sont solides et dont les habitants, mobiles depuis des millénaires, ont une culture anthropologique assez identique (segmentarité, particularisme y compris négatifs, logique de l'honneur) pour ne pas mettre à profit cette double idée.

Dans une Europe germanico-protestante capitaliste dure, c'est-à-dire libérale, les minorités du Sud (Juifs, Pieds noirs, Beurs, émigrés) sont des ponts entre le Nord et le Sud. Sur ce plan la présence islamique en France, de plus en plus française, est une chance pour la France. Son statut d'ancienne puissance coloniale s'estompe derrière un nouveau statut de puissance musulmane et celui-ci pourrait être utile même à l'Europe où les minorités musulmanes de différentes sortes sont de plus en plus présentes (Pakistanais, Turcs) avec des statuts juridiques forts différents.

Dans cette Europe-là, les minorités culturelles et cultuelles du Sud ont plus de chance de s'épanouir dans des fédérations tournées vers le Sud que dans le jacobinisme ou le centralisme démocratique; l'Etat-Nation doit peut-être soutenir les Kurdes là-bas mais ne pas oublier les siens ici: Corses, Catalans, Basques qui regardent ailleurs eux-aussi. Certes on ne les gase pas! mais l'autonomie de la Cataluna est un modèle pour tous ceux qui ne se contentent pas de la "déconcentration" proposée par le gouvernement français.

Une nouvelle catégorie ambiguë est apparue en effet distinguant entre les migrants intra-européens et les migrants extra-européens: sur ce plan les deux rapports "Marceau-Long", notre expérience en matière d'enseignement religieux, ou les efforts faits pour harmoniser le statut religion en France par rapport aux statuts européens en la matière, ou les dernières mesures prises à propos des "carrés musulmans" me paraissent positives; il ne suffira pas de repeindre les banlieux. Il faut au contraire donner cette responsabilité-là aux hommes-ponts émigrés, immigrés installés, enfants en transit de culture, bi-nationaux, etc..; ils peuvent être les acteurs de nouvelles relations Nord-Sud comme nous le laissait espérer le discours de Cancun. C'est à cette condition que de l'autre côté certains pourront défendre la démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme dont l'image a pris une sérieux coup de suspicion dans cette crise.

par Mohamed Charfi
Ministre de l'Education et des Sciences
Tunis

Une civilisation, c'est d'abord un esprit, une manière de se rapporter au monde en se l'appropriant. Or, un esprit se définit tant par son déploiement dans l'espace que par ses aventures à travers le temps. C'est pourquoi, une civilisation est, en dernière analyse, une particularité spirituelle qui porte, en elle, la marque de sa détermination par le géographique et l'historique; deux éléments indissociablement liés qui fondent l'avènement des cultures, leur vocation et leur devenir.

La Méditerranée en est, me semble-t-il, un exemple typique. S'étendant à perte de vue, cette mer, confiante et discrète, a toujours présenté aux habitants de ses deux rives, le spectacle de l'infini, cultivant ainsi, chez eux, le désir d'aller au-delà. Aussi le méditerranéen est-il par vocation, ouvert à l'altérité. Sa géographie a largement déterminé son histoire. En s'arrachant constamment à son sol natal, il n'a pas seulement eu l'occasion de connaître d'autres cieux, mais aussi de reconnaître d'autres hommes.

C'est pourquoi, chez le méditerranéen, le sentiment de la Particularité demeure vivement solidaire de la conscience de l'Universalité. Chez lui, le sens de la *différence* se dégage toujours sur un fond d'*Identité*.

Ainsi, lorsqu'on se demande par exemple, si les valeurs "démocratiques occidentales" sont conciliables avec les "valeurs traditionnelles de l'Islam, on risque, à son insu, d'occulter une identité méditerranéenne au profit d'une différence désormais absolutisée. En effet, sans trop s'attarder sur la richesse des échanges humains et culturels, échanges plusieurs fois millénaires entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, cette question peut très légitimement se poser à propos du rapport entre valeurs traditionnelles, chrétiennes ou juives, et valeurs démocratiques modernes.

Sur la rive sud de la Méditerranée, la chose n'est en rien substantiellement différente, surtout pour l'islam, religion qui érige le principe intangible que l'appel à la voie divine doit se faire " *par la sagesse et la douce exhortation* ". C'est pourquoi, aussi paradoxalement cela puisse paraître, l'histoire nous enseigne que depuis le premiers califes jusqu'à l'Empire Ottoman, l'Etat en terre d'Islam avait une nature politique et non religieuse. C'est que les prescriptions et les règles coraniques ne devant, par vocation, s'imposer à personne, n'auraient, à cause de ce volontarisme foncier, constitué des règles juridiques extérieurement contraignantes, éléments nécessaires tant à la fondation d'un Etat qu'à son fonctionnement. Aussi comprend-on pourquoi un Etat Islamique est en dernière analyse, une hérésie, un ruse, un moyen de se faire obéir en s'arrogeant le titre pompeux de "Représentant de Dieu sur Terre". Il va sans dire que ce spectre de totalitarisme a largement contribué à fausser non seulement l'image de l'Islam, mais aussi son rapport à la modernité en général, à la démocratie en particulier. Or, non seulement l'Islam est compatible avec la démocratie, mais il la revendique.

Le respect de la différence bien comprise est certes une vertu mais la différence absolutisée occulte une ressemblance profondément humaine, une communauté de vocation.

La politique méditerranéenne de coopération culturelle devrait donc avoir pour objectif à la fois la compréhension de l'autre et le respect de ses particularités et de ses problèmes d'une part et d'autre part la solidarité entre tous ceux qui réfléchissent et qui agissent au Nord comme au Sud de la Méditerranée pour l'adoption et l'adaptation des valeurs de démocratie, des droits de l'homme et de fraternité humaine.

Mass media and cultural cooperation

By Roberto Aliboni

The role of mass media, particularly of television, is of great importance in Mediterranean relations. Even in the absence of infrastructures for extending the range of broadcasting, the narrowness of the basin allows for images to be easily received from West European stations in a number of countries (e.g.: from Italy and Greece in Albania and part of Yugoslavia; from Italy, France and Spain in the Maghreb countries. This fact played an important role during the Gulf crisis, when images of «Arab defeat» coupled with the rhetoric of «Western victory» and the reality of an overwhelming technological power combined with and complicated the process of political change in the Maghreb countries.

More broadly speaking, the well-known «demonstration effect» resulting from contacts between societies with unequal incomes (and values) is tremendously multiplied by mass media like TV, video etc: demands of consumption, inconsistent with income, are suddenly introduced, thus making developmental policies more difficult to pursue.

Finally, in cases of great political and demographic pressure, mass media can encourage migration, providing stimuli which go well beyond economic necessities.

This adverse pattern of relations is accentuated by the unidirectional character of production. Transmissions (from news to fiction) go almost invariably from North to South, from West to East (within the North) and from the USA elsewhere. The European Community undertook policies in order to «protect» its culture and its industry from American influence. What should it do in regard to Mediterranean countries?

As for communications, developmental and cultural problems are intertwined. Developmental policies can be thought out only as a result of cultural policies. The general approach to intercultural relations is «protective» rather than «creative». In other words, in a situation of worldwide and accelerated intercultural contact such as we are experiencing, what is pursued by agencies and government is more the preservation of received cultural values than the creation of «universal» cultural values or patterns. But both should be pursued within the framework of cooperatives policies intended on the one hand to avoid the disruption of given values, but on the other hand to encourage new values shared by different cultures.

This means that the EC and its Mediterranean partner should adopt a highly cooperative approach in mass media and the communications industry, a field that today is not explicitly included in their developmental agreements. This approach should be less directed at

protecting Mediterranean industries in this field than for stimulating their development. The aim should be not the transmission of «Arab» serials along side «European» ones but rather the creation of new products through culture cooperation leading to the convergence of shared values.

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**Reflections on Peace and Cooperation
in the Mediterranean**

paper presented by

Salah Bassiouny

on the occasion of
the Conference

*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I feel greatly honoured to be able to participate in this august gathering. I believe that the continuation of this process of meetings dealing with different topics of vital concern to the countries of the mediterranean will ultimately lead to an impact on the future and would also end the deadlock and frustration which have been the dominant feature in the different fields of cooperation, whether political, economical, social or cultural.

Allow me Mr. Chairman, to express words of praise and gratitude to his Excellency Mr. Gianni De Mikhilis the Foreign Minister of Italy, for his relentless efforts to follow such a noble objective and for his continuous efforts to assist in the promotion of peaceful settlement of the Arab Israeli Conflict. It is a situation still full of hazardous and unforeseen dangers. I am also grateful to the Aspin Institute Italia for the comprehensive background papers on the topics of this meeting.

Mr. Chairman,

The paper starts with the political prospects after the Gulf War. This is a wise approach, since this is the first meeting after the end of the war and since the impact of the

war is not over yet. In fact, we should expect more to come in the future. While I do not fully disagree with the essence of this political brief, I feel that in addition to what has been expressed in the paper, one may add the following:-

- 1- We are facing after the war a political and economic situation within the Arab Region which can be described, somehow, as status-quo-ante. There ~~were~~ ^{are} still hopes that serious developments will emerge after the war which will open the way for a modern renaissance in the Arab World. ~~However, instead of these great hopes,~~ ^{and an end to} ~~we face~~ ^{At present, talk} disappointment and frustration. ~~We have talked all along~~ ^{we have} about a new system of security ~~bilateral~~ ^{multilateral} ~~and~~ ^{there are talks} ~~with~~ ^{between} ~~the~~ ^{Arab} states; ~~we have~~ ^{talked} about an Arab economic community ~~hoping~~ ^{realizing} ~~to~~ ^{not} ~~the~~ ^{Arab} community where the contracting states would cede a very limited portion of their sovereignty. We have hoped for an effective and straight-forward policy to begin negotiation between Israel and the Arab side, but we seem to be in the same position as before the Gulf War.

- 2- All efforts by the United States, the European Community and The Soviet Union to convince Israel of the necessity to convene the regional conference have been in vain. The only positive factor in this bleak situation is what we witness of the declared insistence of the outside powers in keeping with their positions to convene the conference through consecutive statements. At the same time counter positions ad statements are emanating from the Israeli Government as if we are in a war of statements without any serious move towards peace. Again, a basic question to Israel is still without an answer. Is it willing to be part of our region and behave likewise or it still believes that its place is in Europe and that part of its mission, as such, is to disrupt the Arab World??
- 3- And to worsen this situation an avalanche of European of Jewish migration from the Soviet Union is continuing to Israel. Thus adding a most serious factor of destabilization in the Middle East and aggravating the already volatile and precarious situation. There is linkage between this problem and the other one of Arab migration to Europe. So long we discuss, the future of cooperation in the Mediterranean, we cannot ignore the impact of such a problem on the Arabs and look only to the apprehensions of Europe. Again, let us not forget

that this is a European migration and that the policy of Europe and the U.S. in closing the door to Soviet jews is responsible for the present serious dimensions of the problem.

- 4- While there is a process of disarming Iraq of its mass destruction weapons, the Middle East region is again re-starting with a new arms race. It would have been more convenient to apply what is being done with Iraq as part and parcel of a general policy for the elimination of mass destruction weapons in all states of the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman,

In the background report presented by the Aspin Institute Italia, the words of mistrust, misunderstanding and lack of confidence between Western Democracy and Arabism have been repeated. Nothing can be more true than this general description of the state of affairs between the Arab Moslem World and Europe. When we analyze this present phenomenon, we have to remind ourselves that the history of the Arab World with Europe has been, at least for the last two centuries, a history of disappointment. The Arab World whether during periods of colonialism or after its independence has been faced in fact with an European policy which,

not only it did disappoint the Arabs in their aspirations and developments, but it looked as a policy aiming at keeping the backwardness; political and economic of this part of the Mediterranean.

If I may be more explicit, the European policy seemed, to the Arabs, as a more or less an anti-Islamic policy and that there will be no way for the Muslim Mediterranean Arabs to cooperate with the Christian Mediterranean North. Within this unfortunate perception the Arabs interpreted European actions and behaviour. It is no wonder that there is a revival of Islamic fundamentalism as an answer to this mistrust and misunderstanding and let me add that since the end of the Second World War, Christian-Jewish dialogue has been going on, it led to a better understanding and positions satisfactory to both religions.

As far as a Christian Moslem dialogue, only through minor meetings in the last few years that some kind of dialogue started. I am stressing this point because I believe that time has come for this type of dialogue between Islam and Christianity to take place at the highest level of both clergy in order to dissipate the misinformation, the mistrust and misunderstanding whether in Europe or in the Arab Muslim World.

Mr. Chairman,

My third point will deal with the financial resources and development. The main factor, as rightly described in the background paper is that "a minority of the Arab countries still keeps a planned economy and many others lack an adequate legal frame work for economic activity and the necessary supporting services". I concur with this statement, however I think that, without exception, all the south Mediterranean countries are moving by different degrees to market economy and the development of the private sector. If I take the case of Egypt, the Egyptian Government is moving ahead and with consistent and consecutive measures towards full market economy. Foreign Business might not be 100% happy about the Egyptian investment law, banking law, labor law, etc., but I think the Egyptian government and other governments in the region will not be against a special meeting where proposals presented to it, - as outlined in page 8 of the report on different basic rules of law governing investment property rights, corporation banking law, bankruptcy regulations, labor law - could be discussed and left to each government to implement them in its appropriate way.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that with the present changes in the world and the ideas and actions towards the establishment of a new world order, all members of the world community would not like to be left outside this order. More and more the principles of cooperation and integration are accepted. More and more sensitivities of the past are disappearing.

I believe that the Arab Countries are willing for a new era of cooperation with Europe. It is the turn of Europe to act and be really the bridge to the Arab World. These conferences are laying the foundation of this bridge. It will take time an effort for this bridge to rise over the waters of the Mediterranean. However, much more, is demanded from Europe in order that this noble objective is achieved.

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INTERVENTION ON: ENERGY, WATER AND THE ENVIRONMENT

IN HIS OPENING SPEECH TO THE CONFERENCE, THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALTA REFERRED TO THE PROPOSAL TO CREATE A MEDITERRANEAN CENTRE. RATHER, IT IS A DOWN-TO EARTH PROPOSAL TO CREATE A MEDITERRANEAN CENTRE FOR INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY WHERE, ON THE SUCCESSFUL EUREKA MODEL PIONEERED IN EUROPE, ORGANIZATIONS (PARASTATAL OR PRIVATE) FROM THE 'NORTH' JOIN HANDS WITH SIMILAR OUTFITS IN THE 'SOUTH' IN CONCRETE PROJECTS FOR JOINTLY CONDUCTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, LEADING ULTIMATELY TO JOINT COMMERCIAL VENTURES PRODUCING FOR AND EXPORTING INTRA AND EXTRA REGIONALLY.

INTRA-REGIONALLY, THE MEDITERRANEAN OFFERS, EVEN ON THE BASIS OF EXPANDING (FOR SOME OMINOUSLY) DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN THE SOUTH, A VALUABLE MARKET WHICH SUCH VENTURES COULD SERVICE. IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, DEMAND FAR EXCEEDS SUPPLY. WITH GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONS IN EUROPE (WHICH MUST SOONER RATHER THAN LATER APPLY, TO THE SOUTH) NEW NON POLLUTING RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY COULD BE DEVELOPED OFFERING ALSO, FOR EXAMPLE, SOLUTIONS TO THAT OTHER GREAT MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM, WATER. SOLAR DESALINATION THROUGH THE HARNESSING TOGETHER OF PHOTO VOLTAIC AND REVERSE OSMOSIS PROCESSES COULD BE A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR JUST SUCH A JOINT VENTURE.

EXTRA-REGIONALLY, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE MEDITERRANEAN COULD NOT EMULATE, MUTATIS MUTANDIS, THE EXPORT SUCCESSES OF SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG. INDEED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOUTH BE NOT 'CONDENMED' TO IMPORTING OBSOLESCENT (AND OFTEN 'RELATIVELY POLLUTING) TECHNOLOGY FROM THE NORTH; BUT, RATHER, SHOULD DEVELOP WITH, AND NOT SIMPLY RECEIVE A TRANSFER FROM, THE NORTH HIGH TECHNOLOGY-BASED INDUSTRIES. THE MARKETS OF BLACK AFRICA THEMSELVES POSE IMPORTANT DEMANDS WHICH HOPEFULLY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES SHOULD, IN TIME, ENABLE TO BE MET.

FROM BLACK AFRICA, TOO, THE SOUTH SHOULD BE INCREASINGLY ABLE TO IMPORT RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCE WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED AND CONSUMED WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMUNITY. ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY SHOULD, INDEED, OPEN ANOTHER PARTNERSHIP TO SOUTH OF THE SOUTH.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE THUS GENERATED WILL BE A TYPICAL INTEGRATION FROM NORTHERN EUROPE THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN TO NORTHERN AND BLACK AFRICA. BASED ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY, SUCH INTERDEPENDENCE WILL BE SIMULTANEOUSLY A FUNCTION AND FOMENTOR OF POLITICAL SOLIDARITY.

POLITICAL SOLIDARITY POSTULATES THE NEED FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE PLAN OF ACTION WHICH, IN A MEDITERRANEAN CONTEXT, MUST ADDRESS INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

NOTORIOUSLY LEFT OUT OF UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL STRUCTURES, THE MEDITERRANEAN HAS ONLY ONCE BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT ITS FORMAL CREDENTIALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT WAS THE BARCELLONA CONVENTION, GROUPING TOGETHER ALL MEDITERRANEAN STATES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MARINE POLLUTION, THAT FIRST BROUGHT TOGETHER, INITIALLY ~~ON~~ ON THE TABLE OF EXPERT NEGOTIATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY ON THE DESK OF FORMAL ASSENT, ALL THE COUNTRIES BORDERING THE MEDITERRANEAN.

IN FORMULATING THE MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN, THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP) MADE THE FIRST INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MEDITERRANEAN STATES SIT TOGETHER TO PLAN AND EXECUTE PROGRAMMES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE MARINE LIFE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, PROTECTING ITS ECOLOGICAL BALANCE AND PROMOTING WAYS AND MEANS FOR ITS SUSTAINABILITY AS AN ECOSYSTEM. IT IS CLEAR THAT WHEN NON-CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ARE TACKLED, MEDITERRANEAN STATES CAN RISE TO THE OCCASION. ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION HAS PROVED SO FAR TO BE A CORNERSTONE ON WHICH THE EDIFICE OF A "MEDITERRANEAN HOUSE" COULD EVENTUALLY BE CONSTRUCTED.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN COULD, AND SHOULD, EVOLVE IN A NUMBER OF OTHER DIRECTIONS: FINANCIAL, COMMERCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL. THERE IS INDEED THE NEED TO PROVIDE THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTO WHICH ECONOMIC REALITY CAN BE INCORPORATED. WHAT THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD LACKS TODAY IS A COHERENT AND STRUCTURAL FORUM WHERE NOT ONLY REASONED DEBATE IS POSSIBLE BUT WHERE IT IS EXPEDIENT TO FORMULATE POLICIES AND ESTABLISH NORMS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A WHOLE.

IV A MEDITERRANEAN ASSEMBLY

IT SEEMS TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT WE NEED AN ASSEMBLY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, EVENTUALLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES VOTED BY DIRECT SUFFRAGE BUT INITIALLY WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS ALREADY ELECTED TO THEIR NATIONAL ELECTIVE BODIES MUCH IN THE SAME WAY AS THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE OPERATES.

THE DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING SUCH A PROPOSAL ARE REAL, AND THERE IS NO POINT IN FUDGING THEM. A NUMBER OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE PARLIAMENTS IN THE ACCEPTED "WESTERN" SENSE WITH THE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE OF A FREE ELECTORATE ABLE TO VOTE WHOMSOEVER THEY WISH INTO POWER TO GOVERN THROUGH A SOVEREIGN ASSEMBLY. DEMOCRACY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE.

YET WE SHOULD PERHAPS BE BOLD IN TACKLING THESE SITUATIONS AND NOT BE FRIGHTENED BY THE CHALLENGES THEY POSE. SHOULD WE NOT CONSIDER THAT THE VERY DESIRABILITY OF HAVING SUCH AN ASSEMBLY MIGHT SPUR SUCH STATES AS LACK PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY TO TAKE STEPS TO INTRODUCE IT? SHOULD NOT THE ADVANTAGES OF UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION THAT SUCH AN ASSEMBLY OFFERS INSPIRE THEM TO CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCEMENT?

THE GOVERNANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH SUCH AN INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION WOULD OFFER A POTENTIAL COHESION OF MEDITERRANEAN PEOPLES AND THEIR LEADERS. INDEED, ONE OFTEN WONDERS WHETHER IT IS THE LEADERS THEMSELVES WHO LACK THE NERVE TO COME UP WITH, AND TO FOLLOW UP, CREATIVE MEASURES WHICH CAN SPEED UP THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

SOLIDARITY WOULD BE A MAIN BENEFIT OF SUCH AN ASSEMBLY: SOLIDARITY THROUGH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION. THE ASSEMBLY COULD FOR EXAMPLE MANDATE DIRECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, MARINE AND LAND BASED; IT COULD OFFER AN "ERASMUS" TYPE INTER-UNIVERSITY PROJECT FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN; AND IT COULD, THROUGH AN INTERNATIONALLY FUNDED MEDITERRANEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK SUPPORT COLLABORATIVE PROJECTS, WITH AN INTRA REGIONAL DIMENSION, BUT WITH EXTRA REGIONAL EXPORT-ORIENTATION. THE ASSEMBLY COULD HAVE ITS OWN HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES, E.G. A COURT, AND ITS OWN SOCIAL CHARTER WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE UNITY OF MEDITERRANEAN RESOLVE CAN ONLY SIGNIFY, IN OUR AGE, A PURPOSEFUL QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE REGION, WITH THE ATTENDANT NEED TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY AVOID CONFLICTUAL CAUSES. THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS CAN COME ABOUT THROUGH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONTAINMENT OF FUNDAMENTALIST RISE OF SHIITE INTEGRISM. BUT IT IS NOT ONE THAT ANY REAL OR PERCEIVED HEGEMONY, OF WHATEVER INSPIRATION, CAN RESOLUTELY NEUTRALIZE.

A PROPOSAL FOR MEDITERRANEAN TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IN THE EUREKA MODEL HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE BY MALTA, EXAMINED BY UNI AND FURTHER ASSESSED BY OTHER AGENCIES SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK. MALTA IS CANVASSING THE CREATION OF A MEDITERRANEAN INDUSTRY/TECHNOLOGY COORDINATION CENTRE AND HAS ALREADY IDENTIFIED NUMBER OF PROJECTS (EG. SOLAR DESALINATION) WHICH THE CENTRE COULD PROMOTE.

OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION COULD RELATE TO COMMUNICATIONS (Eg POOLED AIRLINE AND MARITIME SYSTEMS, THE LATTER NOTABLY LACKED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN), TOURISM (EG. MULTI-DESTINATED PROGRAMMES), MEDIA (EG. MEDITERRANEAN TELEVISION STATIONS, COMM NEWS AGENCY FACILITIES), SEA AND SEABED RESOURCES (JOINT FISHING AND SEA-MINING VENTURES), OFFSHORE OIL EXPLORATION (JOINT VENTURES ESPECIALLY IN DISPUTED AREAS OR THROUGH JOINT EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES).

THE POSSIBILITIES ARE THERE, AND MALTA'S CATALYTIC POWER, BECAUSE OF GEOGRAPHICAL SMALLNESS AND OBJECTIVE NEUTRALITY, CAN HELP THEIR FULFILMENT. IT IS A VOCATION WHICH IT WANTS TO FOLLOW.

BUT IT IS AN AVOWEDLY SHARED VOCATION. IT REQUIRES WILLING PARTNERS. THAT WILLING DISPOSITION DEPENDS VERY OFTEN CULTURAL OPENNESS, AS IT PRESUPPOSES AN AVAILABILITY OF THE OTHER PARTNER OR PARTNERS.

AND, IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IT IS THE CULTURAL DIVIDE THAT HAS TO BE BRIDGED.

WE SHOULD DO FOR CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT WHAT BRUNTLAND DID FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AN IDEA VENTILATED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE WORLD CULTURAL DECADE HELD AT UNESCO, PARIS, LAST YEAR. WE SHOULD THEN FOLLOW UP WITH A CULTURAL EUREKA PROGRAMME WHERE WE APPLY THE EUREKA ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION PHILOSOPHY TO CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL JOINT VENTURES. *

IF A MEDITERRANEAN CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING MOVES CLOSER, THEN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES WILL FALL INTO PLACE MORE EASILY.

THE MEDITERRANEAN CULTURAL EUREKA COULD BE THE PLACE WHERE ULYSSES COULD REST.

* THIS PROPOSAL IS BASED ON AN IDEA SUGGESTED TO ME BY ELIZABETH MANN BORGSESE

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CHALLENGES FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Mr Atef Mohamed EBEID

The southern part of the mediterranean have and will continue to have huge natural and human resources that contribute to the welfare and stability in the south and the north.

To plan for better use we have to look at the past, for evaluation and learning. We can easily see the following:

A good part of the natural resources, financed military tension, hatred, and destruction.

Accumulation of military tension encouraged and strengthened the role of governments, and minimized the role of people in making decisions for the future. This lead to the following results: (1) series of wars and (2) Government dominated economies.

The use of resources to finance wars and/or the preparation of wars, and the dominating role of the government lead to economic tension.

Economic failure lead to low rates of growth, resulting in: inflation, unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure. This in turn lead to a new type of accumulated tensions i.e. social tension. In many countries in the region the number of the poor increased. The rich got richer and the poor got poorer.

Social tension lead to two serious results: (1) immigration of capital (capital flying has been taking place and will continue, unless things change), (2) immigration of those who are capable of making the change: skilled labour, scientists, qualified technicians and professionals, bright managers.

Social tension lead to religious tension. The failure to offer solutions, and the deterioration of the quality of life invited the development of religious organized groups. They claim that religious based regimes, could offer the needed solutions and maintain a better quality of life.

The impact of that accumulated tension (military, economic, social and religious) on the mediterranean and the whole world is so serious. It means that: the area will be, as we see it now, the main exporter of: (1) immigration labour, (2) terrorism, and (3) hatred. Can we stop that and how? Yes, through the following set of strategies.

Getting people and leaders in the region to know, appreciate and support negotiation rather than confrontation. This could be done by:

- moral persuasion for free press and people participating in decisions making;
- encouraging active and continuous dialogue among the leaders of the region;
- positive partnership role of U.S. and Europe. This will provide needed guarantees during the period of testing the intentions of the countries of the region.

Asking each country in the south to prepare itself for a period of sustainable growth through: (1) the application of a macro-economic policies which guarantee the transformation of its economy to a market oriented economy, (2) the recognition and facilitation of free trade, and (3) sustainable peace.

Commitment to help the southern countries to develop and implement its master plan for:

- (1) Developing the infrastructure needed for attracting and motivating private investment and the export of surplus natural resources (oil, electricity, tourism, and water) with emphasis on electricity, gas, and water networks, roads and telecommunication systems.
- (2) The establishment of national private network for the transfer of cheap technologies needed for the production base in agriculture, industry, tourism and services.
- (3) The preparation and implementation of a structural development plan for human resources, geared to allow every adult to develop a productive skill.

The development of the marketing and financial infrastructure needed to support the efficient performance of the production base.

The mechanism for that should be:

- (1) The establishment of a fund for financing the development of the region. It will provide needed capital for countries which satisfy two requirements:
 - (a) operating a free market economy;
 - (b) participating in the regional effort to substitute negotiation for confrontation.

- (2) The source of that capital should be guaranteed for the next ten years by G7 and the countries of the G.C.C.
- (3) Capital for the infrastructure will be given as grant. Capital for financing the development of the economic base will be given to financial institutions in the receiving countries for lending on commercial terms to the private sector.
- (4) Receiving countries will be responsible for all the preparations needed to make the infrastructure projects ready for finance. Capital will be made available, once the contractor is selected. If they needed technical assistance for the preparation of the master plan, they will seek to get it from bilateral aid funds.

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Francis Ghiles

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*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

Tuesday

25th June

Islam and democracy

THE NEW Algerian government is, in one sense, only of the caretaker variety. It is intended to hold office until the parliamentary elections, which were to have been held next week, but which President Chadli Bendjedid has postponed - probably till October - after the violent clashes with Islamic militants at the beginning of this month. But the decisions to be taken in these four months could be crucial not only for Algeria's future but also for North Africa as a whole, and of some importance to Europe too.

Algeria is the most populous of the three Maghreb countries and, thanks to the mineral wealth of the Sahara, easily the richest. Until a few years ago it was also much the most tightly controlled, economically and politically. But since the riots of 1988 Mr Chadli has embarked on a bold experiment of liberalisation.

All three regimes face vigorous opposition from Islamic movements whose programmes inspire fear not only in the regimes themselves but in much of the westernised middle class. Only in Algeria has the regime, to the alarm of its neighbours, taken the risk of allowing overtly Islamic opposition parties to take part in the electoral process.

One of them, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), won a spectacular victory in local elections a year ago. Since then many secular-minded Algerians have come to feel that the outgoing government was too lax in allowing the FIS to exploit the freedom granted, and to abuse a democratic process which some of its leading members openly despise.

Legitimate doubts

Certainly the FIS has used mosques for political activity, and people on the fringes of it, with or without the connivance of the leadership, have resorted to violence. Although its chief spokesman, Sheikh Abassi Madani, proclaims his willingness to abide by the rules of the democratic game, there are legitimate doubts whether he would be able, even if willing, to maintain those rules once installed in power.

At first sight the declaration of martial law, the resignation

of the reforming government and the postponement of the elections, followed by a wave of arrests of Islamic militants and the claimed discovery of a plot "to create an armed organisation to destabilise the state institutions", make it look as if Mr Chadli has yielded to such fears and embarked on a path similar to that of President Ben Ali in Tunisia. Certainly he is determined to keep order in the streets, and the appointment of two women to the cabinet suggests a willingness to meet Islamic opposition head on.

Free polls

But the new prime minister, Mr Sid Ahmed Ghozali, has made it clear he expects the FIS to participate in the "free and clean" elections to be organised in the autumn. He has given instructions to avoid any unnecessary arrests or repression, and is seeking a consensus on changes to the electoral boundaries, which his predecessor had rigged flagrantly to the FIS's disadvantage. He appears confident that in a free and fair election those Algerians who favour a free and modern society will be found to outnumber those who believe they can put the clock back to the time of the Prophet.

No one can pretend the task of organising free elections in such a highly charged atmosphere is going to be easy. Mr Ghozali's success or failure will be determined, as he is well aware, partly by economic factors. He badly needs the confidence of Algeria's foreign creditors, and he should be well placed to win it, both through the technical competence of himself and his colleagues and because the west, especially Europe, has an obvious stake in his success.

If he succeeds, the force of Algeria's example will be considerable throughout North Africa and perhaps in the wider Arab world. But the effect of his failure, whether Algeria falls under an Islamic regime or back into military dictatorship or, perhaps most plausibly, into a long period of instability, would be most unhappy, not least for Europe which would face a new and massive influx of Moslem immigrants.

A bloody path to the ballot box 6.6.91

Algeria's experiment with democratic reform has already been undermined. Francis Ghiles reports

Algeria's trail-blazing role as the first Arab state to embark on the transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy is in jeopardy.

As the evidence from eastern Europe and Africa shows, such transitions are always difficult. But Algeria, as elsewhere in the Arab world, has to confront a conundrum: how does an aspiring democracy cope with a movement which clearly has substantial support but which makes no secret of its contempt for the freedom of political choice?

In the space of a violent 24 hours, the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) has succeeded in derailing President Chadli Bendjedid's plan to hold the country's first multi-party general election in three weeks.

Following rioting in the centre of Algiers on Tuesday night, during which at least one policeman and three FIS supporters were killed, President Bendjedid imposed a state of emergency and put off the elections *sine die*. Today the army guards the main public buildings in Algiers, and the country's political future is uncertain.

Much is at stake. An economic reform programme is at a crucial stage in a country which owes its creditors some \$25bn, and which has played in recent years an important mediating role between the west and the Arab bloc.

What is happening now is particularly important because of the distance Algeria appeared to have travelled after bloody riots in October 1988 broke the monopoly on power held by the Front de Libération National (FLN) since independence in 1962. Algeria subsequently embarked on what looked like the boldest economic and political reforms in the Arab world.

The appointment of former foreign minister Mr Sid Ahmed Ghozali as the country's new premier suggests that the political and economic liberalisation undertaken in the last year or so will continue.

Should the Islamists come to power, however, either through the ballot box or by unconstitutional means, the

reform programme will almost certainly be at risk, and the country will join the group of intolerant, fundamentalist states whose other members include Iran and Sudan.

Perversely, President Bendjedid's decision may well have relieved many ordinary Algerians. Since the FIS won control of a majority of town councils in last June's local poll, there has been growing concern about what are widely seen as the demagogic and thuggish practices of fundamentalist militants.

A clash between the FIS and the government led by Mr Mouloud Hamrouche appeared inevitable after the collapse last week of a strike called by the fundamentalist party spokesman, Mr Abassi Madani. He wanted to protest against new constituency boundaries that he felt discriminated

detailed economic or social programme appropriate to the running of a modern state.

Over the past year, the dinar has lost 70 per cent of its value and prices have risen sharply as the financial reins have been tightened on state-owned companies. Meanwhile the governor of the central bank, Mr Abderrahmane Hadj Nacer, has succeeded in getting many of Algeria's creditors, though not the French, to refinance existing loans. Foreign debt repayments remain heavy, absorbing more than two-thirds of Algeria's oil and gas export receipts.

On Monday Algeria's reforms received the imprimatur of the IMF, which granted Algeria a standby credit of SDR 300m and a further loan of SDR 210m which can be drawn if the oil price falls below \$20. The board of the World Bank is also set to approve a \$350m loan to modernise the banking sector.

The credibility of the FIS has not simply suffered from its inability to deliver on promises to find jobs and housing for all. The party also shot itself in the foot during the Gulf crisis, when it first came out in favour of its paymasters in Saudi Arabia and then switched allegiance to Iraq. As a result, the FIS had begun to worry that it might fail to win a majority in the June 27 elections.

It may be too early to say that Algeria's experiment in democracy is dead. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of President Bendjedid's commitment to democratic reforms. The media are freer than in any other Arab country. That very freedom, however, has allowed Algerians to vent the deep bitterness they feel about the 26 years of misrule endured at the hands of the FLN.

For all its divisions and the failure of last week's general strike, the FIS retains a large constituency. The shortage of housing and water supplies and the high unemployment rate are not problems susceptible of quick and easy solutions. Whatever promise for the future Algeria's economic reforms may hold, the present is bound to remain a time of hard work and austerity.

The fundamentalist FIS has succeeded in derailing plans to hold the country's first multi-party general election

against the fundamentalists. However, the fire and brimstone FIS preacher Mr Ali Belhaj did not join Mr Madani's call, having made no secret of his disdain for the electoral process.

After the strike collapsed, the FIS governing council disavowed its spokesman, thus making their bitter infighting public. Moreover, two new Islamic fundamentalist parties, An Nahda Islamyia and Al Irchad wa Islah, have emerged in recent months, creating a climate of often violent competition for the Islamic vote.

Mr Hamrouche's success in purging the FLN of its old and corrupt "barons" had allowed the party to field younger candidates. The former prime minister argued that a reformed FLN provided Algeria with the only hope of implementing economic reform. Beyond its insistence on imposing sharia law and its denunciation of corruption, the FIS has never given any indication of having a

The Algerian army, responsible for public order in the capital since President Chadli Bendjedid declared martial law on June 5, has effectively challenged the country's powerful oslem fundamentalist movement to a trial of strength day. It has given orders that Friday prayers are to be held inside mosques, and not in the streets, following demonstrations which left eight dead and brought tanks onto the streets earlier this week.

Mr Chadli is determined to assert the state's authority, after a period when the fundamentalists seemed able to get away with almost anything, up to and including murder. Yet I assume that by postponing parliamentary elections (which had been scheduled for yesterday) he has abandoned his experiment with democracy. It could appear to be wrong, to judge by interviews which he and his new prime minister, Mr Sid Ahmed Ghozali, gave to the FT last week.

The experiment began in 1988, after the riots which provoked the worst crisis of Mr Chadli's presidency. He embarked on a programme aimed at turning Algeria - a country regarded since it won independence from France 29 years ago as one of the toughest, most tightly-controlled and suspicious of everything western in the Arab world - into a multiparty democracy with a free market economy.

No one should doubt the difficulty of the task Mr Chadli has set himself. But both he and Mr Ghozali made it clear that they firmly intend to go ahead with elections in the autumn, and that they believe delaying the polls will make it possible to hold them under freer and fairer conditions.

Much of the agitation which led to martial law being declared was focused on the demand for presidential elections as well as parliamentary ones. Mr Chadli (whose current mandate runs till 1993) has now promised to hold early presidential elections after the parliamentary ones - a promise the Islamic opposition claims to have extracted from him in return for calling off its general strike. But he insists there was no bargaining or negotiation. It was always his intention, he says, to hold presidential elections after the parliamentary ones, and he told party leaders this at the end of last year.

Mr Ghozali, for his part, makes it clear there is no question of banning the main Islamic party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), which scored a sweeping victory in local elections a year ago. "You can't have exceptions to

A testing time for democratic ideals

Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid and his prime minister, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, speak to Edward Mortimer and Francis Ghilès



Protesters in Algiers and, left and right, President Bendjedid and Prime Minister Ghozali

democracy," he explains. "You either have 100 per cent democracy or zero per cent." The FIS, one of whose main grievances is the flagrant gerrymandering of constituency boundaries by the previous government, will be invited, along with other parties, to join a liaison committee in which Mr Ghozali hopes to reach a consensus on whether, and how, the electoral law needs revising. His strategy of isolating the extremists may have borne its first fruits this week, when a moderate wing of the FIS made public its objections to the confrontational tactics of the party leader, Sheikh Abassi Madani.

The president and prime minister are strikingly different in background and mannerisms. Mr Chadli, in his halting French, comes across as the simple soldier, proud of his record in Algeria's 7½-year war of independence and now struggling to set his country on the right road. Mr Ghozali spent much of the independence war as a student in Paris, where he gained a diploma from France's top engineering institute, the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées.

What the two men have in common is a reputation for honesty, an ability to put things across to ordinary people, and - it seems - a commitment to the idea of democracy. Originally chosen as a compromise candidate for president, during the bitter power struggle that followed the

was not affected by this month's crisis and change of government, and was thus able to soothe the nerves of foreign creditors to whom more than half Algeria's hard currency income is pledged.

Mr Ghozali too is fully committed to the free market reforms, but determined to correct what he sees as 10 years of "disinvestment" in key Algerian industries. He looks to Europe for "positive interference", in the form of debt relief and economic aid, at a time when some Europeans talk of a "duty to interfere" in Third World countries to uphold human rights. After all, he says, "the success of democratisation depends on economic success"; and he gives himself an 80-90 per cent chance of success if "economic and financial accidents" can be avoided.

He admits that his government, like its predecessors, has no democratic legitimacy and is liable to be seen by the public as a continuation of the old one-party state. This means, he says, that it lacks the authority to enforce the full rigour of the law against Islamic militants. He is convinced that the FIS

cannot win a majority in free elections, but insists that to suggest it will not be allowed to do so would vitiate the democratic process. And he is determined to keep repression to a minimum, knowing that excessive use of force can drive uncommitted young people on to the FIS's side.

Mr Ghozali has already intervened to prevent FIS militants being automatically arrested when legal charges are brought against them, and to persuade employers to take back workers who went on strike at the FIS's bidding. To try to ensure that those arrested are not tortured, as often happened in the past, he has appointed an independent lawyer as human rights minister - the first in Algeria's history; and his interior minister is a veteran career diplomat, unconnected with the police or armed forces.

"Martial law means the police in the hands of the army," he says, "not the army replacing the police. The Algerian army is not used to police methods, and we must be careful not to get it used to them." But the defence minister, General Khaled Nazar, is a holdover from previous governments and answers directly to the president. Many people will wonder, especially after this week's use of force, how much control Mr Ghozali really has over this aspect of policy.

Yet both president and prime minister seem determined to prove that Algeria can be a democracy, in a sense which has so far eluded the rest of the Arab world and indeed most of the Third World. Mr Ghozali, who was foreign minister in the previous government and believes that pan-Arabism at the popular level is still a real force (witness the outpouring of Algerian solidarity with Iraq), none the less asserts boldly that "the Arab world will exist in reality only when all the Arab countries have democratic regimes".

And Mr Chadli believes the assumption, widespread inside and outside Algeria, that only a change of president would make any real difference, is rooted in a stereotype of Third World politics as essentially one-man rule. It is a stereotype he wants to break. "We didn't want to take that route," he says. "We wanted a real democracy, not a sham one. And what we wanted, so as to have a real democracy, is an independent parliament and a government designated by the majority, which will be responsible to that parliament."

Can that really be done, in a country with Algeria's problems and traditions? The next four months will tell.

Both men believe that delaying the elections until the autumn will allow them to be held under freer and fairer conditions

death of Houari Boumediene in 1978, Mr Chadli initially enjoyed only a narrow margin of manoeuvre. But he soon began dismantling the most oppressive aspects of Boumedienne's austere socialist state.

One reform by which he sets great store is the recent granting of independence to the central bank. Its governor, Mr Abderrahmane Hadji Nacer,

Francis Ghiles, FINANCIER TIMES

De la capacite qu'auront les pays du Maghreb l'Egypte a relever les cinq defis auxquels ils sont confrontes aujourd'hui dependra, dans la decennie a venir les apports qu'ils pourront tisser tant entre eux- surtout au Maghreb, qu'avec la Communaute Economique Europeenne. Ces cinq defis sont:

1- la croissance demographique et celle de la population active, qui se traduisent par un problem vital de creation d'emplois et de resorption du chomage.

2- la dependance de leurs economies par rapport aux exportations d'une seule categorie de produits, généralement primaire.

3- le troisieme defi relève de ce dont je voudrais vous tenir plus longuement, l'endettement extérieur.

4- le quatrième defi est celui de l'autosufisance alimentaire.

5- enfin reste le defi de la technologie dans un monde où acceleration des changements dans tous les domaines place s pays de la rive sud de la Mediterranee devant des choix difficiles.

Avant de considerer la question de l'endettement extérieur nous avant, je me permettrai de faire quelques remarques sur les defis dont je viens de faire la liste. La premiere est que la fecondite baisse plus vite que prevu dans les pays du Maghreb mais que la pression des mouvements islamistes pourrait contraindre les gouvernments de la region à mettre leur politique de planning familial en sommeil.

Sur le deuxième on peut noter que la Tunisie et le Maroc ont réussi à diversifier leurs exportations plus que l'Algérie et la Libye. Malgré ces efforts les produits dit primaires occupent encore 60% de leurs exportations. Quant aux importants revenus tirés des remises des expatriés et du tourisme dans les deux pays, leur fragilité est amplement soulignée par les retombées de la guerre du Golfe. Leur chute cette année a des effets immédiats et graves sur les équilibres financiers extérieurs. Fragilité qui hypothèque vite la gestion de la dette extérieure.

Quant au quatrième point il faut souligner que le Maroc a fait de remarquables progrès, même s'il convient de noter les effets négatifs, en termes économiques, de l'extrême disparité qui existe entre les revenus que différentes catégories sociales tirent de l'agriculture. La Tunisie a progressé mais souffre du manque d'une vraie "politique" agricole. Quand à l'Algérie, j'oserais dire qu'elle vit une contre révolution agricole fondamentale pour son avenir. Le coût des importations alimentaires pese sur la balance des paiements en Tunisie, mais ce poids est plus lourd en Algérie.

Pour revenir à la question qui nous préoccupe aujourd'hui, celle de l'endettement extérieur, la situation qui prévaut en Algérie, au Maroc, en Tunisie et en Egypte diffère beaucoup. Ceci étant, les quatre pays sont confrontés quelque soient les chiffres différents qu'ils alignent quant au taux du service de leur dette ou au rapport entre dette extérieure et Produit National Brut à des contraintes très fortes s'ils veulent assurer un flux de recettes en devises et une croissance économique suffisantes. Suffisantes pour leur permettre de faire face à un service de dette qui va en s'alourdisant sans

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proteger l'avenir de leur economie.

En reechelonnant sa dette, tant aupres des banques (Club de Londres) qu'aupres des organismes de credit gouvernementaux (Club de Paris) trois fois depuis 1983, et ce a des conditions tres favorables, le Maroc a reussi a reduire le cout du service de sa dette et assurer un flux d'importations egulier. Les larges facilites consenties par le Fond monetaire International et la Banque Mondiale, ainsi que les bons tres importants consentis par l'Arabie Saoudite (\$700m a l'automne dernier, mais plusieurs milliards de US\$ depuis cinze ans) ont aide le Maroc mais le stock de dette Marocain considerablement augmente et se monte aujourd'hui a l'équivalent de 100% du Produit National Brut. D'autre part le Maroc n'a acces qu'a des lettres de credit a un an aupres de banques internationales qui n'ont pas voulu lui consentir de facilites financieres plus longues depuis 1983..

En dehors de la Turquie, qui a connu un moratoire provisoire dans ses paiements exterieurs a la fin des années 970, avant la grande crise de la dette et du Mexique qui fait l'objet d'un sollicitude toute particulière de la part des US, aucun pays ayant reechelonner sa dette aupres des banques internationales n'a pu avoir par la suite acces au marche international des capitaux.

La Tunisie gère ses affaires avec prudence et s'est refusee de lever des credits financiers massifs dans la periode d'euphorie des années 1970, estimant que ceux ci comportaient trop de risques en cas de retournement de la conjoncture economique internationale. C'est ainsi qu'elle a su conserver une structure de sa dette exterieure ou les credits bilateraux gouvernementaux bonifies ainsi que les rets d'organismes multilateraux de financement dont le terme est particulierement bon, occupent une place preponderante. La Tunisie est un petit pays a economie fragile qui ne peux se permettre un derapage, d'où une prudence justifiee.

Un etalement du remboursement de sa dette lui permettrait néanmoins de degager un surcroit de ressources pour le financement de plus de projets, politique qui encouragerait une croissance plus rapide et la creation d'emplois dans une conjoncture ou plus d'emplois sont perdus que crees. Une telle politique, si elle etait possible contribuerait, a stabiliser la situation tant economique que sociale.

Est-il besion de souligner que tout allegement de la dette des pays Maghrebins ou de l'Egypte se traduit par des commandes nouvelles pour l'industrie europeenne? Qui plus est, refinancer une dette coute, dans la plupart des cas, moins cher aux bailleurs de fonds occidentaux que des reechelonnements repetes, qui ne peuvent que deboucher sur des allegements de dette. Ce qui semble freiner la tendance au refinancement pour les pays n'ayant pas reechelonner c'est la constitution de tres fortes provisions defiscalisees aupres des banques creancieres.

On peut comme l'Egypte reechelonner sa dette d'Etat a Etat au Club de Paris et se trouver miraculeusement du cote de l'occident dans une guerre. Vos amis effacent une partie de votre dette pour vous remercier de vos services. Une telle situation est néanmoins tout a fait exceptionnelle et les Etats Unis on clairement dit, a la recente session interimaire du FMI, qu'ils refuseraient a d'autres pays ce qu'ils avaient encourage pour l'Egypte et la Pologne. Les considerations politiques demeurent preminentes.

Le cas de l'Algérie suscite aujourd'hui un interet particulier pour des raisons tant economiques et financieres que politiques. La dette exterieure de ce pays s'eleva a environ \$25 milliards. Trois criteres permettent d'apprecier

ne telle decision prise par le deuxième crediteur de l'Algérie, et qui donne le ton au marché international pour ce qui est de ce pays, serait considérable.

La France a déjà consenti cette faveur à l'Irak - une telle décision ne créerait donc aucun précédent. Enfin la perspective d'un Club de Paris n'est guère goutée par nombreux observateurs vu le "psychodrame", notamment médiatique, que il pourrait donner lieu de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée.

Enfin, les banques Japonaises qui tiennent plus de la partie de la dette bancaire algérienne sont farouchement opposées à une telle opération.

Les banques n'aiment guère l'incertitude mais le processus de démocratisation et de libéralisation économique dans lequel l'Algérie est engagée autorise peu de certitudes, sauf à espérer que les dirigeants actuels sont sincères dans leur volonté de changer la nature de la gestion politique, industrielle et financière du pays et dire que peu d'observateurs auraient prédit après les émeutes d'octobre 1988 que le Président Chadli Bendjedid irait aussi loin aussi vite.

Ceci dit de nombreux exemples récents, tant en Europe de l'Est que dans des pays du Moyen Orient soulignent à quel point des régimes dits "forts" se sont avérés être des colosses au pied d'argile, colosses qui ont fait courir de grands risques aux banques occidentales et à l'état français que des pays à situation politique plus ouverte mais certaine.

De quoi demain, en Algérie, sera-t-il fait? Nul ne le sait. Le scénario "iranien" n'est pas nécessairement, sur le plan politique que j'entends, le seul qui vaille d'être considéré. Au plan politique il serait irresponsable de se féliciter de ce que l'Algérie tienne des élections libres pour ensuite se plaindre du résultat. Quand décider de ce que l'on veut faire avec la dette algérienne? Avant les élections auquel cas certains se plaindront que la France "aide" ou "tient rigueur" l'actuel gouvernement? Après, auquel cas une décision qui se placerait d'apparaître comme un blâme adressé au peuple algérien, une "punition" d'avoir élu une certaine majorité, pourrait être très mal interprétée. Pourquoi ne pas juger sur ces faits? De toute façon, l'Algérie ne changera pas de place sur la carte géographique de la Méditerranée et les questions commerciales, financières, celles ayant trait à l'immigration d'autres ne disparaîtront pas.

A moins d'une chute catastrophique des cours du brut cette année, il semble probable que l'Algérie ne sera pas acculée à échelonner sa dette. L'augmentation attendue des ventes de gaz naturel à partir de 1993, la reorganisation actuelle du commerce extérieur - notamment pour ce qui est du sucre, du café et des huiles, laisse augurer d'un emploi des ressources en devises plus rigoureux. L'Italie et l'Espagne; la Belgique, le Japon ont adopté ces derniers mois des positions relativement souples qui suggèrent que ces pays souhaitent aider l'Algérie à étaler ses remboursements. La position française semble, ces derniers mois plus réticente. Le FMI, avec qui l'Algérie vient de conclure un second accord appui fortement à la démarche algérienne.

Il est aussi intéressant de noter, en guise de conclusion, qu'un rereéchelonnement ne pourrait qu'encourager ceux, à Alger, qui par démagogie ou incapacité croient, ou feignent de croire, que la bouffée d'oxygène momentanément apportée par un rereéchelonnement permettrait de remettre à plus tard les réformes économiques. Quelques milliards de dollars de plus auraient, s'ils étaient dépensés de manière immédiate et

n poids. Les deux premiers qui donnent un aperçu de la liquidité à terme sont le rapport de la dette au PNB et aux portations, respectivement de 43,7 et 229% en 1989. Le troisième qui permet de mesurer le "cash flow" et la situation court terme est le service de la dette par rapport aux portations, qui était en 1989 de 77%. Les deux premiers pourcentages suggèrent que le stock de dette - entre 2 et 2,5 fois les recettes annuelles d'exportation, n'est pas trop lourd - compare à bien d'autres pays du tiers monde. Par contre le troisième pourcentage souligne le grave problème de liquidités qu'il fait face au pays. Le Président de la Banque Mondiale et le Directeur Général du FMI sont d'accord pour reconnaître que le véritable problème n'est pas l'ampleur de la dette extérieure, mais la structure de ses échéances.

On n'oubliera pas que le risque algérien a été considéré pendant des années comme un risque particulièrement "bon" par les banques internationales. On prenait en compte des revenus extérieurs garantis même si fluctuants, un parti unique au pouvoir pouvant sans trop de difficultés obliger la population à réduire sa consommation ainsi qu'une politique extérieure pacifique de "respectabilité".

Néanmoins, la perte de la moitié de ses revenus extérieurs entre 1986 et 1988 et l'opposition du FLN aux timides tentatives de réformes suggérées par le Président Chadli Bendjedid expliquent que la gestion de la dette extérieure, dont le montant exact a même un moment été caché Chef de l'état, ait dérapé entre 1985 et 1988. L'état demanda à ses banquiers d'emprunter court pour financer des importations courantes, jusqu'à payées cash. La part de la dette à court terme, c'est à dire à moins de 12 mois, dans la dette totale, a accéléré de 5,37% à 6,77% entre 1984 et 1989, passant de \$704m à \$1,717m.

D'autre part, la part importante des monnaies autres que le dollar US dans le portefeuille de la dette (57% en 1989) a eu une grave conséquence, par l'intermédiaire de l'effet de dévaluation, de provoquer d'importantes fluctuations de l'encours de la dette exprimée en Dollars US. La Banque d'Algérie a estimé que la dépréciation du dollar a causé de 5%, entre 1986 et 1989, la dette libellée dans les autres monnaies.

Depuis 1986, les engagements mobilisés par l'Algérie ont surtout été concentrés sur les crédits commerciaux et des émissions obligataires en DeutscheMark et en Yen. Depuis octobre 1988 le pourcentage des crédits financiers dans l'encours total de la dette diminuent. Cette évolution n'est pas propre à l'Algérie. Les pays du tiers monde et les pays de l'Est ont de moins en moins accès au marché financier international. Les banques deviennent d'autant plus frileuses que part ailleurs l'institution des ratios Cooke les obligeent à provisionner plus qu'avant contre tout risque pris sur un pays hors zone OCDE.

Il est amusant de remarquer que face à cette situation sur le tiers monde, nombre de banques internationales se sont lancées dans la spéculation - sur le marché des changes et le marché immobilier.

Pour revenir à l'Algérie, les créances portées en risque par les banques représentent 46% de la dette totale de l'Algérie, dont \$1,700m sont des créances à moins d'un an.

Tous ces facteurs expliquent que les conditions d'endettement se soient détériorées l'échéance moyenne ayant chuté de 9,3 années en 1986 à 3,5 années en 1989. Plus de 70% de l'encours total de la dette arrive à échéance entre 1990 et 1993. Quand elles sont ajoutées à la chute des revenus extérieurs, ces données expliquent comment le chiffre de 77%

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apport entre le service de la dette et les exportations, a
ce atteint.

Il convient de noter ici que le derapage dans la gestion de
la dette constatee entre 1986 et 1988 etait aussi du a une
politique de ne pas imposer une limitation trop
caconienne des importations au risque de briser la machine
economique tres dependante des importation d'entrants.

Le recours incontrole aux credits commerciaux des
fournisseurs a non seulement raccourci l'echeancier de
emboursement, mais il a abouti a des surcouots et
urfacturation des produits importes en contrepartie de delais
e payments allonges. Ces surcouots resultent d'arrangements
entre les fournisseurs et les grandes banques internationales
et ils ont eu pour resultat de deteriorer la qualite de la
signature algerienne. Bien plus, l'incorporation de
"sweeteners" a pour consequences de tarir les sources
traditionnelles de financement a moyen et long terme.

En effet, en beneficiant de "sweetener", alors que les
reances sont relativement peu risquees, les banques prennent
l'habitude de privilegier cette forme de financement a court
terme. Et chacun sait que le court terme ne fait que rarement
l'objet d'une restructuration. Ceci pose la question du role
et de l'influence des banques sur le sort economique de pays
ouverains.

L'objectif d'Alger depuis la fin de 1988 tient en quatre
phrases- reduire le recours au financement court, reduire le
recours au credit fournisseur, utiliser pleinement les lignes
de credit gouvernementales, tout faire pour allonger la vie
oyenne de la dette.

L'Algérie sera-t-elle contrainte de reechelonner sa dette,
et a quoi ne tiennent aucunement ses responsables économiques
et financiers et ce auquel est totalement oppose son principal
ailleur de fonds, le Japon ? Ce dernier a fait savoir, apres
l'annulation d'une grande partie de la dette polonaise qu'il
l'encouragerait plus les prets japonais aux pays ayant
beneficie de telles remises de dette ou ayant volontairement
reechelonner. Le FMI et la Banque Mondiale, pour ce qui
concerne l'Algérie ne semblent pas favoriser un
reechelonnement.

Un autre facteur crucial intervient qui argue contre un
reechelonnement. Les grandes compagnies internationales qui
signent aujourd'hui des accords de joint-venture avec
l'Algérie n'apprecieraient pas une telle politique car l'image
de marque de l'emprunteur s'en trouve durablement atteinte. Vu
l'interet que suscitent les joint-ventures avec l'Algérie dans
certains milieux internationaux, les responsables Algériens
savent trop bien qu'un reechelonnement hypothiquerait le futur
dans le secteur des hydrocarbures, dont la modernisation et le
developpement demeurent un des gages de lendemains meilleurs.
Un reechelonnement rendrait quasi-impossibles les
possibilites de montages de "buy back". Un "buy back"
consiste a affecter le produit des exportations au paiement
des avances consenties au titre de l'investissement Dans le
cas de l'Algérie le secteur gazier se prete particulierement a
ce genre d'operation.

Refinancer la dette semblerait donc une solution plus
appropriee. Cependant, compte tenu de la reticence des banques
occidentales, autres que japonaises, a prêter sans la
garantie des pays dans lesquels elles sont domiciliées, le
refinancement bilatéral les credits gouvernementaux offre
vraisemblablement une solution plus simple. L'Italie s'est
déjà engagée dans cette voie en signant au début de ce mois un
pret de US\$ 7 milliards et l'Espagne est prête à suivre.
L'attitude française sera cruciale ici. L'impact politique

responsable fairent en effet croire au peuple algérien que l'état providence est de retour. Cela serait néanmoins le pire des résultats à rendre à l'Algérie dont les responsables financiers, aujourd'hui, parlent vrai.

A la lumière de l'analyse développée ci-dessus, il apparaît que la politique des autorités algériennes en ce qui concerne leur dette extérieure ressortit d'une analyse cohérente des forces internationales en jeu et résulte de la logique de débénéficiation économique et financière lancée depuis 30 mois à Alger. Elle n'est pas le résultat d'un orgueil mal placé.

Aspen Institute Italia

Energy resources planning in the Mediterranean countries

ENGLISH VERSION

by Raphael Hadas-Lebel, General Counsel of Elf Aquitaine

1) The energy situation in the Mediterranean countries is characterized by a great disparity of conditions of the various zones:

- Southern Europe is a great importer of energy. Even if consumption varies substantially from one country to another, the rate of energy dependence remains high.
- Northern Africa exports two thirds of its production (primarily to southern Europe) and it consumes a great deal, Morocco being greatly dependent upon energy imports.
- Former socialist countries (Yugoslavia and Albania) are going to experience a considerable increase in their consumption.
- The growth in the need for additional electric generating capacity will be particularly significant in Italy (after the cutting of the nuclear program) in Turkey and to a lesser degree in Spain.

This situation justifies a regional energy cooperation program in the area.

2) No exceptional evolution can be foreseen in the years to come with regard to consumption derived from coal, oil, hydroelectricity or nuclear power. Gas is a major exception. The Mediterranean basin will experience a considerable increase in its gas industry in the next ten years and gas consumption will grow due principally to two factors. The central generating plants switching to gas and the process of liberalization of gas policy in the EC. Above all, gas can be considered the most energy efficient ecological resource. Algeria will be a main actor from this point of view. Petroleum companies such as AGIP or Elf Aquitaine, which have long experience in gas production, can make a significant contribution and will contribute to the establishment of original forms of cooperation between oil companies and producing countries.

3) The development of energy conservation is, therefore, a major undertaking for Mediterranean countries for two reasons:

- because it is the best way of reducing energy dependence for most of the countries concerned: renewable energy sources in particular are national in "nature" and not exhaustible.
- because today the most efficient short term action for the protection of the environment is to limit the greenhouse effect.

Two sets of actions must be favored:

- initiatives by each country to reinforce the energy conservation measures. France, for example, has set itself a goal to double its conservation measures in the next five years. These initiatives principally concern three sectors: housing (better thermal insulation); industry (co-generation, infrared and ultraviolet heating, utilization of cryogenic membranes) and transportation
- longterm actions to develop renewable energy. Only limited prospects exist no doubt in the region for the development of hydraulic energy. The technical and economic difficulties of certain actions should not be underestimated: geothermal, "eolian" energy, solar thermodynamics, high costs of fuels derived from biomass (2 or 3 times the current price of petroleum). But Mediterranean countries have great capabilities in the field of solar energy (sun exposure, photovoltaic interests in scattered rural housing.)

Northern countries, notably in the EEC, should actively promote technology transfer to the southern countries in this promising and innovative field of renewable energy.

Aspen Institute Italia

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The Gaza Environment Programme

paper presented by

Akram Matar Abu Kmial

on the occasion of
the Conference

***Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration***

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

Mr. President,

I would like to thank you personally and the Aspen Institute for giving me this opportunity to attend such a wonderful conference. Thanks to the Malta government for their hospitality. Congratulations to Mr. De Michelis for his successful mission in Yugoslavia. I hope a similar success will be achieved in the Middle East to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A peace which would recognize the legitimate rights of Palestinians and self determination and ends in a sovereign Palestinian state beside Israel.

The Gaza Environment Programme

Introduction

The Gaza Strip lies on an area of 360 sq. km. It has a population of seven hundred thousand inhabitants. This makes Gaza the most highly populated area in the world. The Gaza Strip has no proper structures to take care of the environmental problems.

The Gaza Strip suffers from a variety of environmental problems such as water pollution, water hardening, sea water pollution, improper garbage collection, insufficient sewerage systems, etc. And since there is no proper body to tackle these problems it was recently decided to form: The Gaza Environment Programme

- * NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION: THE GAZA ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
- * It is an independent Non Governmental Organization.
- * The aim of this organization is limited to establish the means needed to research, document and find solutions to the already existing environmental problems.
- * To locate all the existing locations of natural or historic value and prepare the means for their protection.
- * Prepare proper educational programmes to inform the general public of the size of the environmental problem. Also improve the public awareness on how to help reduce this problem.
- * Use all available means to contact local and international organizations that share the same interest.
- * Attend conferences and prepare publications on subjects related to the protection of the environment.

The problems Gaza is facing:

1. Sewerage: the already existing sewerage system does not cover all of the Gaza Strip area. Also it is not equipped with the necessary means to treat the final stage of the sewerage.
2. Garbage: garbage is not collected on a proper basis. There is no location in the Strip for collecting, sorting and treating the garbage properly. The municipality is under-staffed and under-equipped.
- 3.(and the most important) Water pollution: this problem has two direct effects. The first is on the drinking water, the second is on sea water. Drinking water is very much effected by the bad sewerage system that leaks into drinking water wells. Sea water is effected by the garbage and the sewerage that is being dumped into the sea. The decrease in the amount of rainfall in the last three years had a drastic effect on the amount of available drinking water. The increasing number of dams being built to divert the water before it reaches the Strip has a drastic effect also.

Plan of action:

- * Make research to study and document the size and the scope of the problem.
- * Make plans for the short and the long term strategy that eventually will reduce the damage caused.
- * Start a series of educational programmes to make the public aware of the problem.
- * Cooperate with all interested organizations and governments for the purpose of finding the means to solve this problem.
- * Import the expertise to help installing the proper frame for solving this problem.

The Need:

- * We need expert advice to help define the size of the problem. And to help in setting short and long terms plans on how to solve it.
- * Make studies and distribute publications to increase public awareness of the environmental problems.
- * Establishment of a Gaza office for the Gaza Environment Programme. This office will serve to coordinate between the local and the international environmental bodies.
- * Make future plans to protect the Gaza sea shore which is losing an average of 10 cm\year to the Mediterranean sea.
- * Establish a national museum to preserve the history of the Gaza Strip. Gaza is considered one of the oldest cities in the World.

Financial Information:

Budget for setting up a local office:

This is a proposal to furnish one office for the G.E.P. in Gaza city. The long term plan is to have more offices so as to cover all the Gaza Strip area. The proposal also includes the running expenses of this office for a period of one year :

| Item | \$ |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1- Salaries: | 33,600 |
| - Coordinator 12 x 800= | 9600.00 |
| - Researcher 12 x 800= | 9600.00 |
| - Secretary 12 x 500= | 6000.00 |
| - Messenger\cleaner 12 x 350 | 4200.00 |
| - Night Guard 12 x 350 | 4200.00 |
| 2- Equipment: | 16,600 |
| - Desks (3) | 900.00 |
| - Tables (3) | 300.00 |
| - Conference tables (3) | 600.00 |
| - Chairs for use in offices (24) | 1200.00 |
| - Metal Drawers (2) | 800.00 |
| - Metal cabinets(3) | 1050.00 |
| - Photocopier (1) | 4500.00 |
| - Computer set (2) | 4400.00 |
| - Printer (1) | 2850.00 |
| 3- Running Expenses: | 17.400 |
| - Stationary for one year 12 x 300 | 3600.00 |
| - Office rent for one year 12 x 400 | 4800.00 |
| - Tel. Elec. Postage 12 x 450 | 5400.00 |
| - Office Maintenance 12 x 300 | 3600.00 |
| - Contingency 10 % of Total. | 6760.00 |
| Total (s) | 74,360.00 |

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BIBLIOTECA



**Interconnexion et Intégration:
le Cas Tunisien**

présenté par

Claudio Moreno

à la Conférence sur le thème de la
Coopération et l'Intégration dans la
Région Méditerranéenne

Malte, 30 Juin - 2 Juillet, 1991

La création d'un espace économique et social commun dans la méditerranéenne est la condition nécessaire et à ne pas retarder dans le but de permettre une intégration réelle et équilibrée des peuples qui y vivent.

Un développement accéléré et harmonieux de cette région ne peut faire abstraction de l'augmentation -- parfois de la création ex-novo -- d'un système de réseaux à plusieurs niveaux d'interconnexion.

Ce système doit servir avant tout à dépasser le tabou de la Méditerranée comme obstacle, barrière naturelle entre mondes différents et incompatibles, qui doit au contraire devenir un pont utile entre pays à vocation synergique.

Dans ce domaine, l'interconnexion verticale doit permettre de trouver des issues aux lignes d'intégration horizontale au niveau maghrébin et dans un cadre plus ample, à celui de toute la région nord-africaine. La rentabilité de cette intégration est évidente (exemple: développement du réseau routier et ferroviaire au niveau inter-régional); l'intégration risquerait autrement d'être trop onéreuse et donc destinée à ne pas être réalisée dans l'immédiat.

Je voudrais m'arrêter un instant sur les trois aspects principaux où cette interconnexion peut se réaliser de façon concrète, celui énergétique, celui des transports et enfin celui des télécommunications.

1) Interconnexion énergétique:: gaz/électricité

La réalisation d'un gazoduc sous-marin dans le Canal de Sicile a été l'une des premières formes -- et probablement la plus clairvoyante -- d'une réelle intégration horizontale. Fonctionnant depuis 1983, le gazoduc a consenti de transférer en Italie, en passant par la Tunisie, environ 11 milliards de mètres/cubes par an (en moyenne) de gaz provenant des gisements algériens de Hassi R'Mel.

Le projet actuel qui vise au redoublement du gazoduc, en partie déjà en cours d'exécution, pourra porter la fourniture de gaz, qui transitera par le territoire tunisien, jusqu'à 22 milliards de mètres/cubes par an de gaz. Ceci, outre à produire des bénéfices économiques (royalties) évidents pour les deux pays maghrébins, leur donne la possibilité d'atteindre une nouvelle source de développement.

Un projet analogue de gazoduc à travers le Détrroit de Gibraltar, actuellement à l'étude, devrait permettre la fourniture de gaz algérien à travers le Maroc à l'Espagne, le Portugal et la France.

Mais, au delà de ces œuvres gigantesques, il reste encore beaucoup à faire afin de rendre meilleure et plus complète l'utilisation du gaz existant et encore inexploité en Tunisie et surtout en Libye.

Toujours dans le domaine de l'interconnexion énergétique, celle du secteur électrique semble la plus apte à promouvoir le processus de développement des Pays du Sud du bassin de la Méditerranée.

A cet égard, l'ENEL a conçu un grand projet à l'échelle européenne capable de répondre à trois exigences spécifiques:

- une diversification des régions d'approvisionnement d'énergie électrique (dans une optique d'économie, surtout en prévision d'une nécessité croissante d'importer de l'énergie);
- une possibilité technique d'aide mutuelle et de compensation des pointes des réseaux;
- un intérêt stratégique en vue d'accéder à de nouveaux fournisseurs potentiels d'énergie électrique.

Dans ce sens, des études pour la réalisation d'une liaison en courant continu par l'intermédiaire d'un câble sous-marin (capacité d'environ 600 MW) sont en cours entre le système électrique italien et grec. Cette liaison, souhaitée et financée par la CEE, ouvre des perspectives ultérieures d'interconnexion avec d'autres fournisseurs potentiels qui possèdent d'amples disponibilités tels que l'Albanie et la Turquie.

Une autre étude de faisabilité concerne le projet d'installation d'une centrale thermo-électrique de 1400 MW (avec stations de conversion au Cap Bon (Tunisie) qui serait reliée au système électrique italien au moyen d'un câble sous-marin. Cette nouvelle centrale exploiterait le gaz et le fuel algérien, tunisien et libyen.

Mais l'aspect encore plus intéressant serait la liaison de réseaux de gazoducs et/ou de oléoducs et électroducts les grandes ressources énergétiques de la Libye, de l'Egypte et du Soudan.

Ces programmes ambitieux, qui recevront sans aucun doute dans un prochain futur une forte impulsion de la disponibilité des nouvelles technologies et de nouveaux matériels en matière de supraconductivité (qui consentiront le transport à grande distance d'énergie électrique virtuellement sans pertes) sont à long terme, le prélude pour d'autres intégrations ultérieures et plus étendues dans le même champ entre régions géographiques diverses.

Il est à noter que le projet d'installation d'une centrale thermoélectrique en Tunisie constituerait un cas intéressant d'inversion du trend seculaire qui veut le Sud du bassin de la Méditerranée exportateur dans le secteur énergétique seulement de matières premières sous aucune valeur ajoutée.

II) Interconnexion dans les transports: canal intermodal

La modernisation du réseau existant, la création de nouvelles infrastructures routières dans les régions qui en sont encore dépourvues (aussi bien européennes que celles des pays du bassin de la Méditerranée) augmentera l'impact de l'interconnexion en matière de transports, qu'ils soient maritimes, routiers, ferroviaires ou aériens, avec des bénéfices aussi du point de vue social.

Les échanges internationaux actuels lient inextricablement les rôles des pays producteur et des pays consommateur et les flux commerciaux semblent de plus en plus s'orienter vers différentes directions.

La nécessité de trouver une grande partie de la production courante de produits manufacturés dans un bref rayon, l'incidence de la valeur ajoutée sur les produits transportés, la plus grande célérité demandée aux échanges, sont des considérations qui tendent à privilégier les relations de type "continental"; les transports terrestres sont en effet considérés plus flexibles et plus rapides.

Mais l'introduction d'un réseau de transport combiné entre l'Italie et la Tunisie, rendu possible grâce aussi à la future création d'une liaison fixe sur le Détrroit de Messine, et par la perspective d'instituer un service de liaisons marines -- bateaux roll-on roll-off et ferry-boats -- intégrant le système ferroviaire européen à celui nord-africain, assumerait une importance exceptionnelle.

Le tourisme aussi, autre source d'interéchange Nord Sud, ne pourrait qui profiter de la création de circuits de transport intégré euro-méditerranéen (exemple: entre la Sicile et la Tunisie).

L'Italie, grâce à sa position géographique, rejoindrait alors l'extraordinaire résultat de passer de pays de destination unique à pays aussi de transit et donc carrefour des itinéraires intercontinentaux.

III Interconnexion dans le domaine des télécommunications

Le domaine de l'interconnexion en matière de télécommunications (téléphoniques, télégraphiques, télévisées et informatiques) a encore un chemin long et complexe à faire.

Le cadre global existant est largement insuffisant pour les exigences des courants actuels de trafic et il le sera encore plus dans un futur immédiat.

En Tunisie, au niveau informatique, la tendance est de pousser l'utilisation du moyen à une diffusion capillaire pour toutes les structures organisationnelles. Mais cette action est suivie par une carence des circuits locaux de liaison et, encore plus, des circuits à longue distance. Dans le cadre de l'immense développement des communications, le futur de ce secteur détermine, dans cette région aussi, la nécessité de disposer de renseignements mis-à-jour en temps réels. Cette exigence sera encore plus évidente lorsque l'interdépendance et l'intégration économique entre les divers ensembles géographiques seront ultérieurement développées. De toute manière, ces processus devront tendre vers une solidarité toujours plus prononcée afin d'accentuer les intérêts communs et respecter l'identité culturelle de chacun.


Parmi les projets à l'étude, je voudrais rappeler celui qui prévoit la pose d'un cable sous-marin à fibres optiques dans le Canal de Sicile entre Kélibia et Trapani à travers l'Île de Pantelleria, projet à réaliser avec des technologies avancées et innovatrices.

Dans le secteur télévisé l'interconnexion Nord Sud est une réalité depuis déjà plusieurs années; la diffusion des programmes européens dans les pays d'Afrique Nord-occidentale représente un facteur de connaissance, de progrès et d'enrichissement culturel dont il faut cependant évaluer l'impact cas par cas.

Le développement de la technique de transmission par satellites permet en outre une réception beaucoup plus ample et non plus réglementée par des accords bilatéraux. Les responsables des stations d'émission doivent être conscients qu'ils ont une responsabilité majeure vis-à-vis des différents destinataires.

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Le système complexe d'interconnexions décrit ne doit pas être considéré seulement et uniquement une fin en lui-même dans le but d'améliorer les contacts entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée mais plutôt une action stratégique qui tend à créer sur la rive africaine la plus proche une zone économique équipée, des centres qui fournissent des services de niveau européen, des pôles du tertiaire avancé enfin, qui constituent d'autre part une base apte et propice au développement d'un vaste tissu de joint-ventures et\ou, tout simplement, d'investissements européens dans les pays nord-africains.





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What Strategy for Economic Growth and Security in the Mediterranean?

paper presented by

Franco Reviglio

on the occasion of
the Conference

*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

THE MEDITERRANEAN: A FRAMEWORK OF GROWING ECONOMIC IMBALANCE (1)

Though the growth rates of the developing countries of the South and East Mediterranean in the 1980s were generally higher than the average for developing countries elsewhere (see table A1), the period also saw the worsening of a number of fundamental imbalances in the region:(2)

- a) growing food dependence and a worsening of the current account balance of payments (see table A2);
- b) deterioration of the job market with a sharp increase in the rate of unemployment (see table A3).

Dependence on food imports places limits on economic growth because it leads to a reduction in imports of machinery and other intermediate goods necessary for domestic production.

Future prospects indicate that the existing imbalances will become more acute, given populations trends (see table A4). In the period

1990-2010, the active population will increase by an annual average of 2.6 percent, rising from a total of 63 to 106 million. In order to maintain the current employed/active population ratio, it is estimated that Gross Domestic Product will have to grow by an average of 6.5 percent (this estimate is based on the optimistic hypothesis that the ratio of economic growth to job demand will remain unaltered).

Structural economic reform programs were launched in only a few countries of the region, and even then only after 1986, the year of the counter-oil shock, and later than in other geographical regions. This delay can be attributed to several factors:

- a) The relatively weak financial pressure exercised by foreign debt, thanks to the central role of bilateral financing on easy terms in which the exposure of foreign banks is relatively modest (see table A5). With the exception of Turkey and Morocco, the restructuring of debt on a multilateral basis only took place after 1985. Nevertheless, in two countries (Libya and Syria), a backlog of outstanding payments has accumulated because debt restructuring has not as yet been undertaken.

(1) In the preparation of this paper, I have drawn on documents and tables compiled by F. Zallio for the 'Commission for the Study of the International Economy' of the Italian Foreign Ministry, which I chair.

(2) Mediterranean region in this respect encompasses not only the countries bordering on the Mediterranean but also some countries, such as Syria and Jordan that gravitate toward this area.

b) Strong Arab and Soviet financial support (see table B4 and A6).

DELAYS IN STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC REFORM

More than any other geographic region, the Mediterranean, with the exception of Turkey and Morocco, has maintained a policy of centralism and closure toward the outside world.

After 1986, the picture began changing slowly: even the oil-producing countries have had to undergo a period of structural adjustment, turning to fresh foreign credits and a reshaping of existing debt. At the end of 1989, the foreign debt of the region had risen 37 percent over 1985 figures, much more than in other areas (in the same period in Latin America, for example, foreign debt rose by only 8 percent). By 1989, the foreign debt of the Mediterranean region stood at \$159 billion in contrast to the \$422 billion of Latin America (see table B1). As a result, there was a sharp increase in the cost of debt servicing.

The growing need to define and implement structural economic adjustment programs has met with major difficulties. There have been numerous cases of credit cancellation or substitution by the IMF (as in the case of Morocco, for example) and only partial withdrawals of agreed conditional credit, as in the cases of Egypt and Jordan (see tables B2 and B3). Only Turkey has been able to do away with IMF credits through the extinction of its debt in May 1990.

In recent years, particularly after 1989, there has been a push to adopt structural adjustment and economic reform programs in various countries, primarily because difficulties have arisen as a result of a reduction in Soviet financial support (the case of Syria) and, prior to the Gulf war, thanks to reductions in Arab financial assistance, as in the case with Syria and Jordan (see table B4).

However, these difficulties eased up in the final months of 1990 because of the financial repercussions of the Gulf crisis, which gave rise to an exceptional investment of 15.7 billion dollars in the period 1990-91, of which 8.3 billion was paid in March 1991 to those "friendly" countries worst hit by the crisis (see table D1).

NEED FOR GREATER EC ECONOMIC COOPERATION

In the short and medium term, the implementation of structural economic reform has a negative impact on earnings and employment, and thus calls for an increase in external financing which, to date, has been absolutely insufficient (for data on financial flows in the 1985-88 period, see table C1). Given the budget constraints of the United States and the Soviet Union, the EC, Japan and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) should begin to play a more active role.

To date, the role of the EC in the region has lacked balance: the disproportionate weight of trade (49 percent of all commercial exchanges) has not been matched by development aid, which has registered a relatively low level (in the period 1985-88, around \$20 billion out of a total of some \$45 billion) (see tables C1 and C2).

Italy has outstripped all other countries in trade exchanges (accounting for 14 percent of the exports to and 9 percent of the imports from the region) (see tables C3 and C4).

The amount of additional annual financing necessary can be estimated at somewhere between \$9.5-11 billion. This figure is based on a calculation of the resources necessary for stabilising employment levels throughout the region and on analysis of the successful experience of Turkey in implementing the first phase of economic reforms. The estimate is consistent with the Italian proposal to increase the level of cooperation to 1 percent of the EC's GDP.

The objective of this financing should be to encourage structural economic reforms to open up economies to the outside world. Possibilities include the setting up of temporary hard currency funds to sustain exchange liberalization of commercial exchanges and of stabilisation funds to underwrite currency convertibility.

Likewise, it is necessary to open up EC borders to agricultural products from the Mediterranean region, maintaining a system of preferential access, despite the entry of Spain and Portugal into the Community, and liberalizing the importation of textile products, thus indirectly stimulating direct investment.

Direct investment -- modest, except in Turkey and to a lesser extent in Egypt, despite legislative improvements in some countries

-- should be stimulated through easy credit facilities and insurance guarantees for overseas investments.

The EC should also increase its contribution to training programs in order to improve low productivity.

THE ROLE OF SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE KUWAIT EMERGENCY

A rapid increase in internal demand in the South and East Mediterranean is most unlikely, notwithstanding the processes of regional economic integration under way.

The most important of these is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which is aiming to introduce a customs union and a single market by the year 1995. But the picture is uncertain because of the unresolved political differences between member countries and the serious imbalances in the productive structures of the Maghreb countries. In fact, domestic liberalization could generate wide trade deficits in Algeria and Libya which could, at the same time, be kept in check through external financing in convertible currency.

A strong push in the direction of regional integration has come recently from the flow of political financing made available in the context of the Gulf crisis. After the invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG) was set up by the G-7, the countries of the GCC, other European countries and South Korea.

These countries put together \$15.7 billion for the period 1990-91 in favor of the countries worst hit by the crisis. To date, funds have gone mostly to Egypt and Turkey (plus a small amount to Jordan), thus easily helping cushion both countries from the economic impact of the crisis.

Unfortunately, these "one time only" emergency disbursements have not been tied to economic reform for development, nor have they been coordinated with the development cooperation programs of member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Further, they have been limited contributions to "friendly" countries and have not benefited the Maghreb countries.

Nevertheless, there are signs that the Arab countries which took part in the liberation of Kuwait (the six members of the GCC, Egypt and Syria) intend to stabilize their cooperation and tie it to development, conditioning financing on economic reform and the growth of the private sector, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises. Such a reading can be drawn from the final communique of the 11th session of the GCC Council in December 1990 and from the so-called "Damascus Declaration" of March 1991.

These countries have understood that they must shift from a phase of emergency to one of medium to long term cooperation. As a result they have declared their commitment toward this development aid by considering the establishment of a \$5 billion fund for the next three years and \$10 billion for the next 10.

NEW MEDIUM- AND LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

New medium- and long term development cooperation in the Mediterranean is a necessary prerequisite for collective security in the region. In this context, there are two major objectives:

- a) the reconstruction of Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon;
- b) the adoption and implementation of economic reforms to promote the development of the area and to integrate the region within the international economy as a necessary condition for bringing political stability to the region.

The achievement of these two objectives calls for a new institutional structure, possibly based on a permanent coordination of efforts among DAC countries, Arab countries, the EC and the large industrialized economies (Japan, United States and Soviet Union).

The frame of reference for such a new institutional structure is obvious:

- a) The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG);
- b) The Renewed Mediterranean Policy drawn up at the end of 1990 by the EEC to earmark increased resources for the five-year period 1992-96 and including eight financial protocols for a total of 2.5 billion European Currency Units (ECUs) covering eight countries of the southern Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Turkey);
- c) Free trade negotiations currently under way between the EC and the GCC;
- d) National contributions from EC member countries, valued at 2 billion ECUs for the five-year period 1992-96;
- e) The bringing together of those countries which have signed the "Damascus Declaration" and those which have not;
- f) The establishment of an extraordinary international fund for the reconstruction of Lebanon;
- g) The fund being set up by the GCC should earmark \$5 billion over the next 3 years and \$10 billion over the next decade.

The major unresolved problem to be faced is that of the deep division within the Arab world. And it is here that the EC has a delicate and crucial role to play, particularly with regard to countries like Algeria, Jordan and Tunisia.

A JOINT PROJECT AMONG OIL PRODUCING AND CONSUMING COUNTRIES TO ENSURE GREATER STABILITY IN THE AREA?

A joint project among the oil producing and consuming countries which gravitate toward the region, including the Middle East countries, could play an important role in providing stability and security in the Mediterranean area.

As is known, the Middle East has over 2/3 of world hydrocarbon reserves and over 3/4 of the crude oil producing capacity. At present approximately 37-38 percent of world oil production and consumption comes from the Middle East. These figures are bound to increase due to the progressive depletion of reserves in other parts of the world. Therefore, it is inevitable that the importance of the Middle East in the world political balance will increase due to the delicate role that oil, the world economy's life blood, necessarily plays.

In the past, the strategic and political interest of the consumer countries to control the political and economic security of oil reserves often clashed with the interests of the oil producing countries. These interests often diverge owing to differing internal socio-economic situations with a growing chasm between "wealthy" and underpopulated oil producing countries and "poor"

overpopulated producers and non producers, diverging regional conflicts such as in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, and differing alignments within the sphere of influence of the major powers.

As a result the oil market has at the same time both determined and suffered the consequences of instability in the area, withstanding shocks and countershocks which have exacerbated tension and produced crises in the area in addition to creating costly economic damage world wide. The last years have witnessed an increasingly uncertain and volatile oil market which has provided a particularly unfavorable climate for business decisions.

Indeed, one of the main reasons behind the industrialized countries' interest in the Gulf crises was to make sure that the majority of oil producing countries, who provided a guarantee of reserves to the oil consuming countries, would not lose control of these wells. In other words, the consumer countries had to prevent the keys to the oil wells from going to a country hostile to the rest, capable of setting off new oil shocks as a political weapon.

How could we transform oil from a tension-creating resource between Islam and the West to a resource that leads to cooperation and stability? One possible method would be establishment of a regional fund for economic development aid aimed at stabilizing the price of oil and coordinated by both the oil producers and consumers.

The financial resources to be channelled to this fund could be shared equally between consumer and producer countries. A corrective mechanism should be established to take into account oil price fluctuations, resulting in increasing and decreasing the respective contributions in keeping with the buyer's and supplier's market situation that may prevail at any given time.

The first endowment to this fund could come annually from some of the resources the EC should allocate for development aid toward the South, according to the Italian proposal at the Council of Europe at the close of 1990 (equal to .25 percent of the EC's GDP, approximately \$15 billion).

A corresponding amount could be provided by producer countries. At the same time, an automatic mechanism should be set up to tie future contributions to the variations in the price of oil.

Through this proposal, within a few years, the fund could have an annual intake of \$30 billion, a sufficiently large amount of money to promote development in the area and to prevent the potentially dangerous clashes with the industrialized countries. Such a project could greatly benefit mutual cooperation and security in the region.

The fund should be administered by a new institution, a regional development bank. The bank would have the responsibility to make disbursements following preestablished criteria in keeping with

the results of the various countries' market-oriented structural reform process. Obviously, industrialized non EC countries would also take part in this new institution.

Unfortunately, as we shall soon see, it seems that the time is not yet ripe for such an institution. However a platform on which to construct a new system of solidarity and understanding between the countries of the region must be found.

A NEW MULTILATERAL BODY FOR COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?

There is strong, and to date successful, opposition to the setting up of a new permanent multilateral financing body along the lines of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to promote cooperation in the Mediterranean region. On the contrary, in recent months, prevalence has been given to a "case-by-case" approach, with strong limits to multilateral activity.

In synthesis, Arab donor countries would apparently prefer a mechanism that allows them not to lose control over where financial flows should be directed. With this in mind, these countries are thinking more along the lines of a series of assistance consortia organised for recipient countries, with an umbrella group bringing donor and beneficiary states together to define the priority- conditions for disbursements to the consortia of individual countries.

This tendency echos the document issued at the end of March by the World Bank and the IMF, which expresses reservations over the proposal to set up a permanent new multilateral body for the region.

The line of thinking that appears to be prevailing so far runs the risk of defining various different criteria for conceding resources to individual countries on a case-by-case basis, thus slowing the move toward economic reform. At the same time, this blocks any attempt to come up with a compromise that would permit generalized and truly effective action to promote the security of the region or to extend assistance to the countries of the Maghreb.

Alongside the financial flows foreseen via the consortia, it seems clear that there is a need to find a multilateral solution. Where such a solution proves impossible, the EC should look for agreements on a sub-regional basis for improving cooperation with the Arab Maghreb Union along the following lines:

- a) In the medium- and long-term, a free trade zone between the EC and the future Maghreb Customs Union (a proposal put forward in the Commission's so-called "non-paper" of April 1991);
- b) Support for the creation of a Maghreb investment and foreign trade bank;
- c) Wider use of the ECU in the baskets in which local currencies are based along the lines of the European Payments Union (EPU);

d) The creation of an EC hard currency fund to support the convertibility of Maghreb currencies.

Table A1 Economic growth and food dependence

| | GDP growth (average annual % rate) 1965-80 | GDP growth (average annual % rate) 1980-88 | Cereal imports (thousands of tons) 1974 | Cereal imports (thousands of tons) 1988 | Food imports (% of total) 1965 | Food imports (% of total) 1988 |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <u>Low-income economies</u> | 5,4 | 6,4 | | | | |
| Mauritania | 2,0 | 1,6 | 115 | 219 | 9 | 21 |
| <u>Middle-income economies</u> | 6,1 | 2,9 | | | | |
| <u>Lower-middle income</u> | 6,5 | 2,6 | | | | |
| Egypt | 6,8 | 5,7 | 3877 | 8479 | 26 | 19 |
| Morocco (1) | 5,6 | 4,2 | 891 | 1643 | 36 | 12 |
| Tunisia | 6,6 | 3,4 | 307 | 2116 | 16 | 18 |
| Turkey | 6,3 | 5,3 | 1276 | 380 | 6 | 2 |
| Jordan | .. | 4,2 | 171 | 874 | 28 | 19 |
| Syria (1) | 8,7 | 0,5 | 339 | 1044 | 22 | 17 |
| (Lebanon) (1) | -1,2 | .. | 354 | 537 | 28 | .. |
| <u>Upper-middle income</u> | 5,6 | 3,3 | | | | |
| Algeria (1) | 6,8 | 3,5 | 1816 | 6130 | 26 | 30 |
| Libya | 4,2 | .. | 612 | 1435 | 13 | 15 |
| <u>High-income economies</u> | 3,7 | 2,8 | | | | |
| Israel (1) | 6,8 | 3,2 | 1176 | 1799 | 16 | 8 |

(1) GDP is at purchaser values.

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1990, Washington, 1990.

Table A2. Current Account Balance, 1970-1991 (min \$) (1)

| | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 (2) | 90 (3) | 91 (4) |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Algeria | -125 | 42 | -126 | -445 | 176 | -1658 | -882 | -2323 | -3538 | -1631 | 249 | 90 | -183 | -85 | 74 | 1015 | -2230 | 141 | -2040 | -1200 | 805 | -300 |
| Egitto | -148 | -207 | -464 | -558 | -1320 | -2383 | -1430 | -1200 | -1220 | -1542 | -438 | -2136 | -1852 | -330 | -1988 | -2166 | -1812 | -245 | -1190 | -1691 | -1800 | -1500 |
| Giordania | -20 | -62 | 6 | 13 | 3 | 45 | 36 | -17 | -288 | -7 | 374 | -39 | -333 | -391 | -265 | -261 | -40 | -352 | -294 | 385 | -670 | -470 |
| Israele | -562 | -432 | -50 | -377 | -1463 | -1758 | -636 | -287 | -868 | -718 | -577 | -960 | -1896 | -1944 | -1300 | 1109 | 1620 | -868 | -623 | 1148 | -200 | -700 |
| Libia | 645 | 783 | 238 | 66 | 2700 | 392 | 2844 | 2159 | 738 | 3771 | 8214 | -3963 | -1560 | -1643 | -1456 | 1906 | -156 | -1045 | -1823 | -500 | 550 | 0 |
| Marocco (5) | -124 | -59 | 48 | 97 | 226 | -528 | -1397 | -1855 | -1338 | -1521 | -1420 | -1844 | -1878 | -891 | -989 | -891 | -212 | 175 | 467 | -790 | -220 | -200 |
| Mauritania | -5 | .. | .. | 14 | 47 | -63 | -86 | -123 | -79 | -115 | -134 | -148 | -277 | -214 | -111 | -117 | -195 | -147 | -96 | .. | .. | .. |
| Siria | -69 | -58 | 28 | 339 | 167 | 93 | -772 | -167 | -15 | 946 | 251 | -308 | -250 | -844 | -794 | -958 | -504 | -298 | -151 | 784 | 970 | 1300 |
| Tunisia | -53 | 6 | -4 | -61 | 48 | -170 | -408 | -578 | -473 | -308 | -361 | -387 | -667 | -578 | -770 | -587 | -618 | -60 | 213 | -159 | -250 | -780 |
| Turchia | -44 | 43 | 212 | 660 | -561 | -1648 | -2029 | -3140 | -1265 | -1413 | -3408 | -1936 | -952 | -1923 | -1407 | -1013 | -1465 | -806 | 1596 | 966 | -2480 | -2400 |
| Total (6) | -505 | 56 | -112 | -252 | 24 | -7678 | -4760 | -7530 | -8347 | -2538 | 2750 | -11630 | -9848 | -8842 | -9006 | -1962 | -5611 | -3505 | -3941 | -1057 | -3295 | -5050 |

(1) Current income including public transfers

(2) Our estimates for Algeria, Lybia and Mauritania

(3) Our estimates

(4) Our forecasts

(5) Excludes outstanding capitalized interest

Source: IMF, "International Financial Statistics", volume XLIV no. 3, March 1991, Washington.
Our estimates and forecasts

Table A3 Unemployment Rate: most recent official figures

| | % | Year |
|-------------|------|------|
| Algeria (1) | 27.0 | 1988 |
| Egypt (2) | 14.7 | 1986 |
| Israel | 9.9 | 1990 |
| Morocco (3) | 16.3 | 1989 |
| Tunisia | 15.9 | 1989 |
| Turkey | 10.2 | 1990 |

(1) Including agricultural underemployment; net rate: 17.5% in 1989.

(2) Census; figures for the following years are even more underestimated

(3) Only urban population

Source: Italian statistics office

Table A4 Active population, 1950-2025 (.000 units) (1)

| | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2020 | 2025 |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Algeria | 2691 | 2855 | 2945 | 4051 | <i>4834</i> | 5819 | 8378 | 11965 | 15712 | 17308 |
| Egitto | 6331 | 7507 | 9172 | 11298 | <i>12837</i> | <i>14574</i> | <i>19114</i> | 24561 | 29454 | 31742 |
| Giordania | 321 | 439 | 583 | 645 | 799 | 992 | 1489 | 2291 | 3560 | 4335 |
| Israele | 493 | 759 | 1094 | 1446 | <i>1610</i> | <i>1806</i> | 2201 | 2542 | 2811 | 2927 |
| Libano | 457 | 520 | 658 | 742 | 769 | 914 | 1178 | 1477 | 1777 | 1896 |
| Libia | 321 | 377 | 519 | 755 | 904 | 1076 | 1514 | 2149 | 3051 | 3584 |
| Marocco | 2666 | 3340 | 4048 | 5688 | <i>6676</i> | <i>7824</i> | <i>10503</i> | 13587 | 15568 | 16226 |
| Mauritania | 303 | 360 | 433 | 516 | 590 | 679 | 929 | 1316 | 1794 | 2096 |
| Siria | 1030 | 1264 | 1564 | 2188 | <i>2596</i> | <i>3101</i> | <i>4649</i> | 7139 | 10329 | 12017 |
| Tunisia | 1063 | 1181 | 1326 | 1908 | <i>2224</i> | <i>2594</i> | <i>3378</i> | 4243 | 4894 | 5099 |
| Turchia | 11954 | 13963 | 16071 | 19090 | <i>21385</i> | <i>23696</i> | <i>28752</i> | 34949 | 40406 | 42673 |
| <u>Totale</u> | 27630 | 32565 | 38413 | 48327 | <i>55224</i> | <i>63075</i> | <i>82085</i> | 106219 | 129356 | 139903 |

(1) Figures in italics are projections

Source: ILO, Economically Active Population. Projections 1985-2025, 1986.

Table A5 Distribution by creditor of public and publicly guaranteed long-term external debt, end 1989 (percentage shares)

| | <u>Multilateral</u> (1) | <u>Bilateral</u> | <u>Commercial Banks</u> | <u>Other Private</u> (2) | <u>memo:</u> <u>Concessional</u> (3) |
|--------------|----------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Algeria | 8,6 | 21,7 | 22,5 | 47,2 | 2,8 |
| Egypt | 13,3 | 71,2 | 1,0 | 14,5 | 31,6 |
| Jordan | 14,7 | 43,1 | 20,4 | 21,8 | 32,3 |
| Lebanon | 35,5 | 56,8 | 0,0 | 7,8 | 17,1 |
| Mauritania | 33,0 | 64,8 | 0,3 | 2,0 | 70,3 |
| Morocco | 23,4 | 54,9 | 15,6 | 6,1 | 35,5 |
| Syria | 28,3 | 54,3 | 0,2 | 17,2 | 42,3 |
| Tunisia | 33,5 | 42,4 | 5,1 | 19,0 | 36,0 |
| Turkey | 24,9 | 23,1 | 39,0 | 13,0 | 15,8 |
| <u>memo:</u> | | | | | |
| Brazil | 15,6 | 15,3 | 57,6 | 11,5 | 2,6 |
| Mexico | 19,5 | 7,4 | 61,5 | 11,7 | 0,4 |

(1) Inclusive of the use of IMF credit.

(2) "Other private" includes suppliers' credits, bonds and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export credit agency. Together with the exclusion of short-term debt, that implies an underestimation of the debt owed to commercial banks and governments.

(3) Concessional debt (loans with an original grant element of 25% or more) as a percentage of total external debt.

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1990/91, Washington 1990.

Table A6 Soviet credits (million of roubles; figures as of November 1, 1989)

| | Total Commitments | Credits (1) | Cancellations | Restructurings 1986-89 (2) |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------------------|
| Algeria | 2519,3 | 2447,7 | 0 | 560,0 |
| Egypt | 1711,3 | 1711,3 | 0 | 8,2 |
| Jordan | 369,0 | 355,8 | 0 | 99,5 |
| Libya | 1707,3 | 1584,6 | 0 | 360,1 |
| Morocco | 2,2 | 2,0 | 0 | 0 |
| Syria | 6742,6 | 6514,6 | 1,7 | 992,7 |
| Tunisia | 17,7 | 17,7 | 0 | 0 |
| Turkey | 91,8 | 91,7 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>13161,2</u> | <u>12725,4</u> | <u>1,7</u> | <u>2020,5</u> |

(1) Total commitments minus interest

(2) Inclusive of interest

Source: "Izvestiya", March 2, 1990, morning edition.

Table B1 Gross Foreign Debt (amount at period end, millions of \$)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Algeria | 19377 | 18374 | 22796 | 24748 | 25074 | 26067 |
| Egitto | 20384 | 40218 | 42997 | 49121 | 49485 | 48799 |
| Giordania | 1977 | 4153 | 5026 | 6373 | 6564 | 7418 |
| Libano | 491 | 416 | 458 | 496 | 500 | 520 |
| Marocco | 9678 | 16409 | 17926 | 20504 | 20334 | 20851 |
| Mauritania | 845 | 1502 | 1773 | 2044 | 2072 | 2010 |
| Siria | 2749 | 4028 | 4873 | 5091 | 5199 | 5202 |
| Tunisia | 3527 | 4880 | 5898 | 6741 | 6675 | 6899 |
| Turchia | 19119 | 26010 | 32842 | 40800 | 40864 | 41600 |
| <u>Totale</u> | 78147 | 115990 | 134589 | 155918 | 156767 | 159366 |
| <u>Memo:</u> | | | | | | |
| Amer. Latina e Caraibi | 242535 | 389974 | 409708 | 445122 | 427597 | 422188 |

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1990/91, Washington 1990.

Table B2 IMF credits and loans outstanding (year-end; \$ millions) (1)

| | 1980 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 (2) |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----------|
| Algeria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 619 | 672 | 676 |
| Egypt | 177 | 48 | 42 | 31 | 183 | 156 | 152 | 124 | 125 |
| Israel | 199 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Jordan | 0 | 0 | 63 | 70 | 81 | 48 | 96 | 94 | 95 |
| Lebanon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Libya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mauritania | 34 | 30 | 30 | 44 | 71 | 68 | 62 | 51 | 50 |
| Morocco | 316 | 991 | 1190 | 1026 | 1071 | 937 | 845 | 749 | 744 |
| Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Tunisia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 183 | 271 | 277 | 270 | 176 | 177 |
| Turkey | 1054 | 1426 | 1326 | 1085 | 770 | 299 | 48 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Total</u> | 1780 | 2495 | 2651 | 2440 | 2448 | 1785 | 2093 | 1866 | 1867 |

memo

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Western Hemisphere | 1301 | 11519 | 14512 | 16358 | 18136 | 16341 | 15688 | 18184 | 18086 |
| Developing Countries | 9492 | 34194 | 38618 | 40862 | 41477 | 34373 | 31293 | 31872 | 34547 |

(1) Exclusive of Trust Fund loans and of the Trust Account of ESAF loans.

(2) End-January.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1990 and vol. XLIV, no. 3, March 1991.

Table B3 Stand-by Arrangements, Extended Arrangements, Structural Adjustment Facilities and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities provided by the IMF (SDR millions)

| | <u>Arrangement Period</u> | <u>Amount Agreed</u> | <u>Undrawn Balance:</u> | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | as of 31.1.91 | at date of termination |
| <u>Stand-by Arrangements</u> | | | | |
| Algeria | 5.89-5.90 | 156 | | 0 |
| Egypt | 5.87-11.88 | 250 | | 134 |
| Jordan | 7.89-1.91 | 60 | | 33 |
| Mauritania | 6.81-3.82 | 26 | | 0 |
| | 4.85-4.86 | 12 | | 0 |
| | 4.86-4.87 | 12 | | 0 |
| | 5.87-5.88 | 10 | | 0 |
| Morocco | 4.82-4.83 | 281 | | 0 |
| | 9.83-3.85 | 300 | | 0 |
| | 9.85-2.87 | 200 | | 190 (1) |
| | 12.86-4.88 | 230 | | 0 |
| | 8.88-12.89 | 210 | | 0 |
| | 7.90-3.91 | 100 | 52 | |
| Tunisia | 11.86-5.88 | 104 | | 13 |
| Turkey | 6.80-6.83 | 1250 | | 0 |
| | 6.83-6.84 | 225 | | 169 (2) |
| | 4.84-4.85 | 225 | | 56 |
| <u>Extended Arrangements</u> | | | | |
| Marocco | 3.81-10.83 | 817 | | 681 (3) |
| Tunisia | 7.88-7.91 | 207 (4) | 138 | |
| <u>Saf</u> | | | | |
| Mauritania | 9.86-9.89 | 24 | | 7 (5) |
| <u>Esaf</u> | | | | |
| Mauritania | 5.89-5.92 | 51 | 34 | |

(1) Cancelled December 1986.

(2) Replaced by the stand-by arrangement of 4.84.

(3) Replaced by the stand-by arrangement of 4.82.

(4) Reduced to 138 millions of SDR (May 1990).

(5) Replaced by the Esaf of 5.89.

Source: IMF, Annual Report, 1980-1990; IMF, International Financial Statistics, vol. XLIV, no. 3, March 1991.

Table B4 ODA net disbursements by Arab donors, 1970-89 (\$ millions)

| | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|-----------------------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Algeria | 1 | 31 | 81 | 54 | 114 | 39 | 13 | 41 |
| Iraq | 0 | 265 | 864 | -32 | -21 | -37 | -28 | 37 |
| Kuwait | 148 | 910 | 1140 | 771 | 715 | 316 | 108 | 169 |
| Libya | 64 | 275 | 376 | 58 | 68 | 63 | 129 | 82 |
| Qatar | .. | 307 | 277 | 8 | 18 | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| Saudi Arabia | 172 | 2699 | 5682 | 2630 | 3517 | 2888 | 2048 | 1171 |
| UAE (1) | 0 | 929 | 1118 | 122 | 87 | 15 | -17 | 25 |
| <u>Total</u> | 385 | 5417 | 9539 | 3609 | 4498 | 3284 | 2257 | 1526 |
| <u>Total 1988</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>prices and</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>exchange rates</u> | 1526 | 12181 | 13534 | 5495 | 5549 | 3524 | 2257 | 1541 |

(1) Incomplete data for 1985-89.

Source: OECD, Development Co-operation. 1990 Report, Paris 1990.

Table C1 Total Official Flows, gross, cumulative 1985-88 (\$ millions)

| | Total | EC + members | France | FRG | Italy | US | Japan | Arab countries |
|--------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Algeria | 2742 | 635 | 239 | 128 | 10 | 21 | 260 | 159 |
| Egypt | 11298 | 2605 | 317 | 1300 | 394 | 6455 | 551 | 212 |
| Israel | 6957 | 568 | 15 | 418 | 97 | 6354 | 1 | 0 |
| Jordan | 3137 | 233 | 15 | 112 | 37 | 274 | 107 | 1764 |
| Lebanon | 452 | 186 | 79 | 30 | 47 | 76 | 0 | 48 |
| Mauritania | 1027 | 396 | 194 | 52 | 50 | 79 | 25 | 228 |
| Morocco | 6097 | 2242 | 1441 | 287 | 328 | 642 | 112 | 674 |
| Syria | 2630 | 226 | 45 | 104 | 1 | 0 | 222 | 1882 |
| Tunisia | 2488 | 868 | 239 | 161 | 265 | 158 | 92 | 213 |
| Turkey | 7650 | 1557 | 62 | 1131 | 100 | 762 | 294 | 367 |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>44478</u> | <u>9516</u> | <u>2646</u> | <u>3723</u> | <u>1329</u> | <u>14821</u> | <u>1664</u> | <u>5547</u> |

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Paris 1990.

Table C2 Total Resource Flows, net disbursements, cumulative 1985-88 (\$ millions)

| | Total | EC + members | France | FRG | Italy | US | Japan | Arab countries |
|--------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Algeria | -705 | -349 | 720 | -85 | -280 | -414 | -394 | 69 |
| Egypt | 11210 | 3199 | 1202 | 1366 | -128 | 6320 | 573 | 98 |
| Israel | 13226 | 488 | 49 | 276 | 26 | 12790 | -4 | 0 |
| Jordan | 2704 | 626 | 425 | 178 | 28 | 217 | 42 | 1577 |
| Lebanon | 461 | 178 | 99 | 27 | 43 | 130 | 0 | 44 |
| Mauritania | 795 | 346 | 163 | 45 | 51 | 74 | 23 | 140 |
| Morocco | 4233 | 1374 | 825 | 253 | 210 | 635 | 101 | 581 |
| Syria | 2652 | 422 | 108 | 306 | -51 | -10 | 249 | 1764 |
| Tunisia | 1155 | 518 | 154 | 74 | 171 | 37 | 39 | 40 |
| Turkey | 9783 | 3896 | 353 | 2313 | 26 | 734 | 2139 | 158 |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>45514</u> | <u>10698</u> | <u>4098</u> | <u>4753</u> | <u>96</u> | <u>20513</u> | <u>2768</u> | <u>4471</u> |

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Paris 1990.

Table C3 Main trading partners, 1989 (percentage shares)

| | EC | France | FRG | Italy | US | Japan |
|-------------------|------|--------|------|-------|------|-------|
| <u>Algeria</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 61,7 | 13,5 | 7,4 | 20,3 | 18,8 | 1,5 |
| Imports | 62,1 | 24,7 | 9,5 | 14,5 | 9,3 | 3,2 |
| <u>Egypt</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 35,5 | 3,8 | 3,0 | 14,1 | 2,9 | 2,7 |
| Imports | 37,8 | 6,7 | 9,7 | 7,0 | 15,4 | 5,5 |
| <u>Jordan</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 4,3 | 1,2 | 0,2 | 1,5 | 0,6 | 2,7 |
| Imports | 28,3 | 6,2 | 6,0 | 3,9 | 13,8 | 3,4 |
| <u>Israel</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 30,0 | 4,3 | 4,5 | 3,7 | 29,7 | 7,1 |
| Imports | 48,5 | 3,9 | 10,4 | 5,6 | 17,2 | 2,6 |
| <u>Lebanon</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 21,0 | 4,6 | 2,5 | 6,4 | 5,5 | 1,1 |
| Imports | 45,8 | 8,9 | 7,9 | 13,0 | 4,6 | 3,5 |
| <u>Libya</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 81,1 | 5,5 | 20,1 | 37,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| Imports | 59,3 | 6,8 | 13,5 | 22,2 | 0,0 | 4,3 |
| <u>Mauritania</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 43,4 | 10,4 | 0,1 | 14,4 | 1,7 | 26,3 |
| Imports | 65,0 | 29,9 | 4,4 | 4,4 | 2,6 | 1,2 |
| <u>Morocco</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 57,1 | 27,0 | 6,4 | 5,3 | 1,5 | 4,0 |
| Imports | 54,0 | 23,3 | 6,8 | 5,8 | 8,7 | 1,2 |
| <u>Syria</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 31,0 | 9,6 | 2,0 | 15,5 | 2,4 | 0,1 |
| Imports | 41,7 | 11,4 | 10,6 | 7,0 | 7,9 | 4,2 |
| <u>Tunisia</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 73,7 | 24,0 | 12,9 | 18,4 | 1,9 | 0,2 |
| Imports | 66,5 | 26,1 | 11,8 | 13,5 | 5,6 | 1,4 |
| <u>Turkey</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 43,1 | 4,5 | 18,2 | 7,9 | 7,6 | 1,7 |
| Imports | 41,7 | 5,6 | 15,0 | 7,3 | 10,9 | 3,7 |
| <u>Total</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 49,6 | 9,0 | 10,4 | 14,4 | 11,4 | 2,8 |
| Imports | 49,2 | 11,2 | 11,1 | 9,4 | 10,7 | 3,3 |

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1990, Washington 1990.

Table C4 Trade between Italy and the countries of the region
 (millions of lire)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <u>Algeria</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 1802212 | 1430177 | 1003140 | 1035905 | 1617089 | 1394419 |
| Imports | 4787061 | 2438371 | 2306250 | 2074074 | 2913909 | 3093988 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -2984849 | -1008194 | -1303110 | -1038169 | -1296820 | -1699569 |
| <u>Egypt</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 1843776 | 1224245 | 982759 | 996385 | 1096977 | 1611513 |
| Imports | 3057728 | 1195129 | 1307320 | 1315804 | 1949317 | 1980639 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -1213952 | 29116 | -324561 | -319419 | -852340 | -369126 |
| <u>Jordan</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 457628 | 317214 | 243613 | 182769 | 154909 | 126413 |
| Imports | 108656 | 61777 | 49925 | 45588 | 23691 | 12739 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 348972 | 255437 | 193688 | 137181 | 131218 | 113674 |
| <u>Israel</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 800283 | 900042 | 1034847 | 1048586 | 1121356 | 1193016 |
| Imports | 522825 | 403457 | 431858 | 514503 | 599822 | 583626 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 277458 | 496585 | 602989 | 534083 | 521534 | 609390 |
| <u>Lebanon</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 544749 | 412801 | 241646 | 598908 | 359647 | 349622 |
| Imports | 63814 | 34275 | 40584 | 51642 | 50260 | 59010 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 480935 | 378526 | 201062 | 547266 | 309387 | 290612 |
| <u>Libya</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 2401567 | 1406329 | 1441750 | 1637341 | 1580802 | 1297169 |
| Imports | 6811254 | 2962065 | 3083485 | 3306975 | 4215970 | 5650270 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -4409687 | -1555736 | -1641735 | -1669634 | -2635168 | -4353101 |
| <u>Morocco</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 305765 | 295556 | 307118 | 348807 | 502980 | 572543 |
| Imports | 299601 | 242964 | 238548 | 321588 | 367510 | 426184 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 6164 | 52592 | 68570 | 27219 | 135470 | 146359 |
| <u>Mauritania</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 29775 | 22947 | 25040 | 18445 | 28510 | 34867 |
| Imports | 152127 | 113642 | 97796 | 75276 | 105387 | 103848 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -122352 | -90695 | -72756 | -56831 | -76877 | -68981 |

Sequence table C4

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|-------------------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <u>Syria</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 485337 | 349282 | 215302 | 154373 | 179462 | 213707 |
| Imports | 384081 | 228127 | 298684 | 167485 | 245091 | 289955 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 101256 | 121155 | -83682 | -13112 | -65629 | -76248 |
| <u>Tunisia</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 609789 | 486292 | 516572 | 603959 | 811259 | 986127 |
| Imports | 663534 | 457734 | 514418 | 626413 | 793982 | 943526 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -53745 | 28558 | 2154 | -22454 | 17277 | 42601 |
| <u>Turkey</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 1346642 | 1255964 | 1350813 | 1194393 | 1391356 | 2022432 |
| Imports | 877602 | 764168 | 931358 | 1244184 | 1694790 | 1554992 |
| <u>Balance</u> | 469040 | 491796 | 419455 | -49791 | -303434 | 467440 |
| <u>Total Area</u> | | | | | | |
| Exports | 10627523 | 8100849 | 7362600 | 7819871 | 8844347 | 9801828 |
| Imports | 17728283 | 8901709 | 9300226 | 9743532 | 12959729 | 14698777 |
| <u>Balance</u> | -7100760 | -800860 | -1937626 | -1923661 | -4115382 | -4896949 |

Source: Italian Statistical Institute

Tabella D1

**Gulf crisis financial assistance: commitments for 1990-91,
as at 11 March 1991**

(\$ million)

| | To Egypt, Turkey and Jordan | | To other states ¹ | | Total | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Committed | Disbursed | Committed | Disbursed | Committed | Disbursed |
| Saudi Arabia | 2,848 | 1,788 | 1,773 | 1,403 | 4,621 | 3,191 |
| Kuwait | 2,500 | 855 | 1,184 | 763 | 3,684 | 974 1,618 |
| UAE | 850 | 820 | 619 | 619 | 1,469 | 1,439 |
| European Commission | 805 | 624 | 0 | 0 | 805 | 624 |
| France | 209 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 230 | 0 |
| Germany | 1,190 | 360 | 144 | 0 | 1,334 | 360 |
| Italy | 650 | 37 | 9 | 0 | 659 | 37 |
| Other EC ² | 189 | 102 | 1 | 1 | 190 | 103 |
| Japan | 2,126 | 800 | 103 | 0 | 2,226 | 800 |
| South Korea | 98 | 5 | 17 | 2 | 115 | 7 |
| Norway | 24 | 7 | 82 | 60 | 106 | 67 |
| Switzerland | 120 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 120 | 16 |
| Other ³ | 171 | 68 | 0 | 0 | 171 | 68 |
| Total | 11,741 | 5,482 | 3,959 | 2,848 | 15,700 | 8,530 |

¹Bangladesh, Djibouti, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria²Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK³Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland and Sweden

Fonte: "Reed", 22 March 1991

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Oil and Cooperation between Europe and the Middle East

proposals presented by

Ahmed Zaki Yamani

on the occasion of
the Conference

*Mediterranean Worlds Crossroads:
Resources for Cooperation and Integration*

Malta, June 30 - July 2, 1991

1. We have first to recognize certain facts. The European Community, even if they succeed in reducing their share of oil consumption, vis-a-vis other sources of energy, will still have to consume more oil in the future which means that, although they may decrease their oil consumption percentage-wise, it will increase volume-wise. The same is true of Japan and the United States, as well as anywhere else in the world.

Most of the oilfields outside of the Gulf will start decreasing production, therefore with this decrease in production on one side and the increase in oil consumption on the other, demand for Gulf supply will increase. The Gulf is the main source of incremental oil in the world, which means that European dependence on Gulf oil is definitely increasing rather than decreasing.

2. All the so-called oil crises have occurred because of either, a political action or political events, regardless of the economical fundamentals. Therefore it is important to eliminate any such future events or decisions in order to secure a stable supply of oil. However, this cannot happen unless we have:
 - a solid regional security system,
 - a stable political situation within every country in the area, that is through democracy and respect for human rights,
 - a redistribution of wealth among states in the area, and within every rich state.

The main reasons for the present unstable situation are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. Without a solution to these problems no stability can be achieved.

The Iraqi situation has also to be addressed, at least once we see a change in the regime. It is impossible to imagine 18 million people living in a pre-industrial age whilst all their neighbours are far better-off. A study of the financial situation in Iraq revealed that, with the payment of reparations, and servicing of their commercial debts, Iraq will run an annual deficit even if they reach their previous level of production, and without any expenditure on re-construction. Something like the Marshall Plan for Europe after World War 2 must be considered for Iraq in the future.

Besides the security of supply Europe, as well as the rest of the world, must achieve a stable, reasonable price of oil. The world has already suffered a great deal with the sharp increases and decreases in the price of oil. We have a few ideas and have carried out some studies showing the possibility of price stability, however, nothing can be achieved without tripartite co-operation between major oil producers, major oil consumers and major oil companies. Therefore an international dialogue, well prepared for, is a necessity.

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