L. DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERN. RELATIONS
HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

ANNUAL INTERN. CONFERENCE

"IF NEW ORDER COMES CAN CHAOS BE FAR BEHIND? - EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE GULF WAR"

JERUSALEM, 11-13 JUNE 1991

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IF NEW ORDER COMES, CAN CHAOS BE FAR BEHIND?
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER THE GULF WAR
<Annual International Conference>
The Leonard Davis Institute of international relations
Jerusalem, 11-13/VI/1991

1. (Programma)
2. "Trading blocs in the new world order"/ Neil Richardson
3. "The United States and the European Community"/ David Garnham
4. "Strategic aspects of Germany unity"/ Gebhard Schweigler
5. "European political union, the Middle East, the Dutch position in a new world order"/ Alfred Pijpers
6. "The applicability of the CSCE experience to the Middle East conflict area"/ Hans-Heinrich Wrede
7. "Israel, arms control in the Middle East and the European example"/ Itshak Lederman
8. "Causes and consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet empire: post-1989 Eastern Europe between Russia and the West"/ Melvin Croan
9. "The Middle East after the Gulf war"/ Giorge Mirski
10. "The contribution of the European Community to peace and economic prosperity in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: some proposals"/ Alfred Tovias
11. "Patron-client relations in the emerging security environment"/ Panayiotis Ifestos

(1)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations
Annual International Conference
June 11-13, 1991

If New Order Comes, Can Chaos Be Far Behind?: Europe and the Middle East after the Gulf War

Tuesday, June 11

Morning Session: 9:30 - 13:00 Chairperson: Amnon Sella

The Global Background

- Gwynn Morgan, Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to the State of Israel
- Martin Van Creveld, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Neil Richardson, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Afternoon Session: 15:00 - 18:00 Chairperson: Gabi Sheffer

Europe in the Post-Cold War World

- Uri Ullman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Ilan Greilsammer, Bar-Ilan University
- Hugo Kaufman, City University of New York

Wednesday, June 12

Morning Session: 9:30 - 13:00 Chairperson: Naomi Chazan

The United States and the European Community

- David Garnham, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Germany: The Unification Processes and Their Implications

- Moshe Zimmermann, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Gebhard Schweigler, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany
- Shlomo Aronson, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Afternoon Session: 15:00 - 18:00 Chairperson: Raymond Cohen

Developed and Less Developed Countries

- Alfred Pijpers, University of Amsterdam
- Roberto Aliboni, Istituto Affari Internazionale, Rome, Italy
- Amikam Nachmani, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Confidence-Building Measures

- Hans-Heinrich Wrede, German delegate to the Vienna talks
- Itshak Lederman, Tel Aviv University

Thursday, June 13

Morning Session: 9:00 - 13:00 Chairperson: Theodor Friedgut

The Disintegration of the Russian Empire and Its Implications

- Melvin Croan, University of Wisconsin-Madison
- Nissan Oren, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Gur Ofer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Giorge Mirsky, Institute of World Economy & International Relations, Moscow, USSR

Afternoon Session: 15:00 - 18:00 Chairperson: Erik Cohen

The European Community, the Middle East and Israel

- Lily Polliack, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Alfred Tovias, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Amnon Sella, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

THE LEONARD DAVIS INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Annual International Conference

If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"Trading Blocs"
in the New World Order

by

Neil Richardson

The University of Wisconsin-Madison

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

June 11-13, 1991

"TRADING BLOCS" IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

by Neil Richardson

The University of Wisconsin-Madison

> . . .the Uruguay round. . .consists of hundreds of bureaucrats and lobbyists from 100-plus countries negotiating little clauses and speaking in tongues laden with acronyms like MFN, MFA, VRA, TRIM, and TRIP. . . .
>
> Lee (1991)

The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations is the current, struggling effort to strengthen the faltering trade rules that directly affect most countries of the world. Many would characterize the stakes involved in terms of the perpetuation of free trade versus the rising tide of neomercantile protectionism.

Background

The initial impetus for creating a liberal economy in the 1940s came from the experience of the Great Depression and the calamitous war that followed. As conceived at Bretton Woods, the three institutional pillars of the new world economic order were to be the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Trade Organization. When, in 1950, the United States proved finally unwilling to embrace the authority of the proposed International Trade Organization, rendering it stillborn, the more limited General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) remained to function as the international agency for trade.

One objective was that liberal trade occur in order that national economies prosper. Thus, the GATT was to oversee agreements by which quotas were removed and tariffs were lowered. Furthermore, countries were to make reciprocal concesssions and impose identical

considerable success in the decades to follow. Seven rounds of multilateral negotiations have brought tariffs on dutiable goods from a 1947 average of more than 40 percent down to about 20 percent by 1961 and just 5 percent by 1979. The tangible result of these reductions has been the burgeoning of international trade since the onset of the new regime, with growth in annual world trade consistently outstripping growth in world product for more than four decades now. Accordingly, whereas trade represented about 10 percent of world product in 1950, it has steadily climbed to reach about 25 percent today.

The closely associated goal of the GATT framers -- and an idea of the liberal order more generally -- was to make countries economically interdependent so as to raise the costs and thereby reduce the likelihood of war among them. Thus, both economic and political gains would follow from the liberal world order envisioned and designed at Bretton Woods.

Article XXIV of the GATT Charter allows for members to create customs unions and free-trade areas.[1] This is a somewhat delicate matter in that members of free trade areas are permitted to reduce the tariffs they charge one another while retaining higher, GATT-level tariffs on imports from members outside the area. In short, tariff discrimination is allowed despite the broader principle of nondiscriminatory trade among all GATT members. Under Article XXIV the European Economic Community (EEC) was initiated in the 1950s, and with strong support from the United States, as was the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The EEC has been especially successful in deepening its mutual economic ties even as its membership has grown from an initial six to now twelve countries.

Other such formal arrangements among various groups of GATT members have followed, even if none has rivaled the success of the EEC. In North America, the U.S. and Canada signed a free-trade agreement to commence in 1988 that is, to date, stimulating new trade between them. In addition, the U.S. and Mexico are now vigorously discussing a similar arrangement -- with Canada and Mexico to follow -- the result of which would bring together a second continental bloc of formidable size.

The Uruguay Round Agenda

As noted, tariffs fell to generally very low levels by the 1970s. The general GATT arrangements began to experience political problems that have continued to this day. The

much of a barrier to trade. Perhaps the origins lie instead in the increasing numbers of countries that were industrializing and diversifying the trade competition -- including the Asian NICs as newcomers.[2] Whatever the exact nature of the causes, the political will for liberalism began to encounter important countervailing political pressure for protection from import competition.

In the United States, the government came to the rescue of its textile industry and, later, steel producers, and in each case it did so by an evolving set of elaborate quota agreements that clearly stand in violation of GATT free trade principles. Major losers in both cases are poorer countries. Meanwhile, Japan and the EC countries have even longer held fast to expensive protection and subsidy programs covering agricultural products. Here, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and several less industrialized countries are shut out.[3] And the list continues.

Another change is that trade in services has been growing especially quickly in the last two decades and even merited focused discussion during the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations 15 years ago, although only minimal progress in this area was achieved. Unanticipated in the original GATT document, service trade remains almost entirely subject to national rules and standards. This means, of course, that protectionism is easily devised, often exercised, and difficult to appeal under GATT guidelines because they are so nearly non-existent.

Intellectual property rights is another category of trade issues of recent vintage. Again, the GATT has not historically been concerned with trade in ideas and the resultant need to legislate uniformity and fairness in competition involving ideas and expression that would routinely call for patent and copyright compensation. However, a number of Asian and Latin American countries have for some years been pirating others' intellectual property with near-impunity, earning considerable ire from the more developed countries where most of this property originates.

The larger point, then, is that this protectionism has grown in prominence as traditional tariff barriers have fallen. Moreover, it is no longer just the protectionism of weaker economies in the system; ironically, there has been some liberalization in the Third World in the last decade even as the industrial countries have raised new barriers to trade. The further implication is, therefore, that the protectionists are no longer just small free

riders in the system; they now include states large enough to be spoilers of the collective good.[4]

These and other various complaints and complainants sum to the larger issue: Is the multilateral GATT trade system of some 100 member states (and another two score affiliates) in danger of collapsing under the weight of increasing non-observance? Is the GATT able to expand its coverage of goods and services to keep pace with the times? Can major trade-offs be arranged to reverse the trend of exceptions that are undermining the system? Or will the GATT simply fade into irrelevance as more and more states view it cynically as a "sucker's game" to which they will not contribute any longer by remaining open to foreign competition?

These questions have certainly gained currency in recent months with, first, the prospect of impending failure of the Uruguay Round then, in December, the apparent collapse of those negotiations. Now that the U.S. Congress has renewed President Bush's authority to negotiate for another two years, one might think that doubts about GATT's continued success have been quelled. But this is hardly the case.

The Uruguay Round negotiators are apparently verging on major breakthrough agreements concerning many services, intellectual property rights, and probably even a more liberal textile regime. Thus, various complainants stand to gain something as well as give up something in a package of trade-offs. However, progress on reduction of EC farm subsidies and Japanese agricultural protections has not been sufficient to satisfy the U.S. (and other grain exporters), and it is far from clear that the current impasse can be broken on either side.

Finally, it bears repeating that time does not stand still for the trade regime and these negotiators.[5] New issue domains -- such as services and intellectual property in recent years -- will continue to emerge. Recent candidates include environmental standardization and linkages between trade and the treatment of foreign investors. In addition, changing structures of national economies tend to complicate past agreements. Thus, today's elaborate textile quotas incorporate at least 40 countries under the labrynthine Multi-Fibre Agreement. Yet, this all began as a seemingly "harmless" and temporary agreement among fewer than one dozen parties some 30 years ago. In short, failure to conclude the Uruguay Round successfully would deal the regime's norms a severe blow.

Under those circumstances, the major trading states of Japan, the U.S., and the EC group may face within the next few years a new version of the classic security dilemma first described by the political realists.[6] The original dilemma, of course, concerns states that arm themselves for self-defense and, in so doing, only further stimulate other states' fears and military preparations. This dilemma is preconditioned by the anarchic condition of the interstate system. And, although each state has little choice to do otherwise, the collective result of this security dilemma is a progression in arms levels and a regression in security welfare for all.

The contemporary global economy presents the major traders with something of a parallel situation. The emerging weakness of GATT, both as an institution and as a set of (deteriorating) liberal norms, has encouraged traders to think of providing for their own economic security -- by means of regional groupings -- in the face of a slowly rising tide of protectionist "neomercantile" practices. In particular, the EC, the United States, and Japan have each begun to fear that the others, in the guise of appearing to continue to contribute to the collective good of the free trade regime by participating in it, are in fact taking a free ride. That is, each now worries that others are imposing protectionist barriers to their own markets and perhaps even engaging in predatory export policies while professing to uphold the liberal norms of GATT. Each is therefore impelled to take unilateral protectionist action precisely because a weakening GATT regime at some point returns its members to a state of anarchy wherein each must fend for itself. The first to "realize" this -- and take action on it -- "wins" (in game-theoretic parlance) for as long as other have not also defected from the regime. It wins by maintaining access to their markets while simultaneously closing its own to foreign competition.

Of course, in defecting from GATT and thereby temporarily "winning," a major state not only free rides, its unreciprocated gains are so large as to seriously harm others, thus "spoiling" the regime by forcing others to abandon it as well. So it is that a large defector can even deceive itself into undertaking a self-fulfilling prophecy that ultimately costs itself and all others their respective shares of what liberal economists describe as the gains from trade, both economic and political.

There is, of course, a middle ground as yet unacknowledged. It is entirely possible that the Uruguay Round will conclude with some success but still fall short of achieving triumphal breakthroughs on all of the old and new issues on its ambitious agenda. It is entirely possible that protectionism will make inroads on the policies and practices of some traders while others are convinced to liberalize further. In other words, the arrangements of the last 45 years may change only incrementally for many more years; the regime may muddle along.

Implications for the Middle East

What does all of this mean for countries of the Middle East? Surely, other commentators will have much to say about related possibilities in the remaining sessions of this conference. Some of scenarios are certainly intriguing.

To begin, it is probably safe to say that the major oil exporters in the Persian Gulf will be relatively unaffected by the answer to today's questions of rivalrous industrial trading blocs. Whatever happens, their oil exports will have a fairly soft market for at least several more years.[7] And, if the liberals are correct, protectionist blocs will fail to grow efficiently and will thereby prolong the weak market for oil. Because oil itself has long traded without tariff and there is no protectionist incentive regarding oil production in the industrial world, oil exports will not face new hurdles under any circumstance.

The impact of GATT's future could be much greater for other countries in the Middle East. Those covered by the Lome Convention will continue to have special access to the EC, even if there is a trade war among the three blocs. Yet, most of these are exporters of primary goods other than oil. As such, they are susceptible to drastic declines in demand and price when industrialized countries experience even mild recession. Accordingly, debilitating trade wars in the North could impose severe costs upon such countries as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt.

Israel finds itself in a unique position here. For it is, in principle, currently the only country in the world that should directly gain from a trade war despite the general decline in world product that would result. Israel's uniqueness stems directly from having separate free-trade agreements with two of the three prospective trade blocs, unlike any other

impose new, higher barriers to one another's products, Israel becomes the more attractive as an export platform.

Suppose that a U.S. firm wishes to sell in the huge market of the EC but finds exports to be blocked by some combination of quotas, tariffs, and nontariff barriers. If the firm is large and the market promising, an obvious alternative would be some form of direct investment that allowed for production within the EC. However, "trade wars" today would likely have linkage to foreign direct investment in the form of equity share limits, domestic content, and/or other performance requirements.[8] Happily for the firm -- and for Israel -- there is a third option, namely, production from an Israeli subsidiary with sufficient Israeli content to qualify for unfettered access to the European market. Of course, the principle applies equally to the European firm wishing to gain access to an otherwise closed U.S. market.

Both ways, the Israeli economy wins. This puts Israel in the odd position of having to contemplate seriously whether it would prefer to see the talks fail. As a practical matter, of course, such a scenario of Israel as a commercial bridge and beneficiary carries some risk that one of the other contracting states would want to renegotiate to preclude this sort of practice. Then, Israel would perhaps retain considerable access but suffer along with other countries during recession brought on by trade rivalries.

Conclusion

What, then, is in store for the trade system? Will three rivalrous blocs emerge? Or will the GATT negotiators instead reach the necessary compromises? Indeed, will the latter prospect be joined and further spurred by the independent growth of free-trade areas among various GATT members?[9] My own suspicion is that a weakened, sub-optimal compromise will result from the Uruguay Round, and that this will be enough to protect the regime from imminent collapse and the systematic trade wars that could follow.

My forecast is predicated on several ingredients, including a willingness to believe that the Japanese really are concerned that the bloc to which they would otherwise be consigned is much too small a market for their export-driven economy. The Europeans' motives appear to be more complex. But the task of East European revitalization would be a

particularly sluggish in recent years. In turn, the United States government has a stronger ideological attachment to liberalism than do the others.

All parties doubtless agree broadly that the GATT has overseen enormous levels of international commerce and many years of shared growth. It is difficult to believe that countries in a clearly illiberal environment would have fared so well. Finally, we should not lose sight of the apparent political success of the liberal post-war international system: There has been a long peace among the major participants during this Bretton Woods era.

Notes

1 See, for example, Jackson (1989), Chapter 6.

2 See Bhagwati (1991).

3 Indeed, the EC subsidizes food exports, as well. Total costs are about 75% of the entire EC budget.

4 See, for example, Hardin (1982).

5 This theme is stressed by Aho and Aronson (1985).

6 Emanual Adler suggested this parallel to me.

7 See Richardson (forthcoming 1991).

8 See Conybeare (1987).

9 This is Bhagwati's (1991) optimistic view.

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THE LEONARD DAVIS INSTITUTE
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Annual International Conference

If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"The United States and the European Community"

by

David Garnham

University of Wisconsin
Madison

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

June 11-13, 1991

Abstract

"The United States and the European Community"

For more than four decades US-Western European relations were grounded in NATO and rested on two facts: the formidable Soviet military threat and American economic dominance. This paper focuses on the political and military dimensions of the evolving relationship in an environment where these core conditions have changed.

American and Western Europeans broadly agree that the US should continue a major leadership role and that some (but fewer) American troops should remain in Europe. They also share basic political values. They disagree about other issues including: economics (especially trade and burden-sharing, e.g., apportioning Gulf War costs) and polices outside the North Atlantic area.

A changed relationship is inevitable and desirable. It will manifest itself principally within well-established institutions such as NATO, the European Community, and the Western European Union rather than in new arenas such as CSCE.

America fought its two largest foreign wars in Western Europe this century. In addition, the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of troops in Europe for more than four decades after World War Two and earmarked half its defense budget for European contingencies. Why is Europe so important to the United States? Ethnically, more than three-quarters of Americans are descendants of European immigrants, and America's political traditions evolved from European roots. Economically, the societies are closely integrated. In 1988, for example, total trade (exports plus imports) with the European Community countries constituted 21 percent of US trade (compared to 20 percent for Canada and 17 percent for Japan). In 1988, 47 percent of American foreign direct investments were in Europe.

Throughout the twentieth century, Europe has been America's principal non-Western Hemispheric concern. Since 1949, Washington has pursued its European interests through the North Atlantic Treaty. However, recent events have fundamentally altered Europe's strategic landscape. German unification, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe are of foremost significance. Meanwhile, the European Community is creating a single market (1992) and progressing toward Monetary Union (EMU) and possible political union. Simultaneously, America's immense budget deficits compel reduced expenditures for international programs, including defense. These factors are the context for my discussion of likely patterns of Euro-American relations during the 1990s.

This paper refers frequently to "European" attitudes toward Euro-American relations. This is a convenient "fiction". Western Europe is no monolith. There are, for example, major differences among British, French, and German perspectives. Indeed, important divisions arise within individual European

countries, and the United States, concerning issues such as NATO's future, the necessity for American troops in Europe, the role of nuclear weapons, and international economic relations.

Despite revolutionary change in European international affairs, American-European relations will change only incrementally during the next decade. Many things will remain constant: disputes over out-of-area actions, burden-sharing squabbles, and broad consensus that some Americans troops are still needed in Europe. Others things will change. Nuclear anxiety will fade, but economic friction will grow, especially over trade issues, now that allied security needs no longer compel cooperation.

By 2000, American troops deployed in Europe will decline from 300,000 to fewer than 75,000. American deployments of nuclear weapons will continue, but all landbased nuclear weapons will doubtless be removed. Meanwhile, the Western European Union (WEU)[1] will become an increasingly important focus of European defense cooperation. NATO's attempt to shift toward a less military and more political emphasis will misfire. CSCE will become more important, but neither Americans nor most Western Europeans will give priority to pan-European security structures.

Euro-American Relations in 2000:

1.

The Bush administration hopes to extend NATO's reach beyond the North Atlantic area. In May 1991, NATO's defense ministers moved in this direction by agreeing to form a corps-sized (50-70,000 troops) multinational rapid-reaction force under British command which might someday fight out-of-area.

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[1] The WEU includes nine of the twelve E.C. members, all but Denmark, Greece, and Ireland.

This possibility remains controversial. Europeans recall many conflicts including Suez, Algeria, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Korea, Vietnam, and Latin America, which divided Americans and Europeans. François Heisbourg, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, describes continental Europeans as "completely lukewarm to the idea of extending NATO's zone of action...."[2] Many Americans are also skeptical. Robert E. Hunter, a Carter administration National Security Council staff member, concludes that "As in the past," efforts to confront out-of-area issues "would surely fail."[3] A recent blue ribbon panel including David Abshire, Bill Bradley, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, Edward Meyer, Sam Nunn, Patricia Schroeder, William Simon, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt echoes Hunter's assessment.[4]

2.

The critical need to reduce US budget deficits is the driving impetus to withdraw American troops from Europe. Current plans call for reducing defense spending as a proportion of GNP to 3.6 percent in 1996. This represents an astonishing policy shift. As recently as 1988, the influential Wall Street economist Henry Kaufman was nearly alone in arguing that military

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[2] François Heisbourg, "Faut-il enterrer l'alliance atlantique?," Politique Internationale, No. 50 (Winter 1990-91), p. 164. Also see Frédéric Bozo, "La France et l'OTAN vers une nouvelle alliance," Défense Nationale, Vol. 47 (January 1991), p. 28 and pp. 32-33; Jean-Marie Guehenno, "America's Role in New Security Architectures," America's Role in a Changing World, Part I, Adelphi Papers, No. 256 (Winter 1990/91), p. 104; and Béatrice Heuser, "L'avenir de la sécurité européenne," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991), p. 56.

[3] Robert E. Hunter, "America's Role in New Security Architectures: A Commentary," America's Role in a Changing World, Part I, Adelphi Papers, No. 256 (Winter 1990/91), p. 111.

[4] See David Abshire. et al., The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe: A Report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991), pp. 10-11.

spending could contract by one-third to four percent of GNP.[5] Defense spending will now fall to the lowest percentage during the postwar era, even lower than the Carter administration level of 5.1 percent of GNP during FY 1978 and FY 1979. These cuts require overall military manpower reductions of nearly one-quarter. The US Army, which has the largest number of European troops, will decline more than 30 percent. Meanwhile, the Defense Department will close or downsize 225 European military installations during 1991.

Economics drives these cuts, but the fading Soviet threat explains the meager domestic opposition. The Soviet Union remains the preeminent European military power which most European and American officials consider a principal reason to preserve NATO and America's European military presence. However, when the Red Army is fully repatriated, NATO expects strategic warning of Russian aggression measured in years; since mid-1990 NATO has assumed tactical warning of 30 to 42 days compared to 10 days previously. Many Americans think this modest threat justifies only a small residual force in Europe to buttress the credibility of the American nuclear and conventional deterrents and to facilitate an unlikely return of large-scale American forces.

Historically, American elites supported large European troop deployments more than the mass public; the reverse is now true. A survey conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations during October and November 1990 found that the percentage of leaders wanting to keep the NATO commitment the same declined from 77 in 1986 to 35 percent in 1990, but the public percentage only dropped from 62 percent to 56 percent. Sixty-two percent of the American

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[5] See Henry Kaufman, "Memo to the Next President," New York Times Magazine, 9 October 1988, p. 36.

leadership sample favored decreasing the NATO commitment compared to only 31 percent of the mass public.[6]

As the Soviet threat dissolved, other arguments were marshalled to justify large US troop deployments in Europe. It is argued that highly mobile American troops based in Europe could be redeployed to regional conflicts.[7] A second argument sees American troops as glue necessary to integrate the Europeans: "If there is no, or only a symbolic American presence, there will not be integration. If there is no integration, there will be re-nationalization. If defence is re-nationalized, there may be an alliance, but it will resemble the loose compact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather than NATO...."[8] Perhaps this is true, but do Americans care? Critics of cuts in US defense spending rarely lament the European implications. Retired Army colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. is one such critic. Summers argues that "much of the world seems to be teetering on the edge of anarchy and the United States, as the world's only surviving great power... [may] be forced into the role of the world's policeman."[9] But he wants more spending on conventional forces for global intervention like those in Grenada, Libya, Panama, and Iraq. It is Europeans, not Americans, who foresee using these

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[6] John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 35 and p. 37.

[7] See, for example, John Roper, "Shaping Strategy without the Threat," America's Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No. 257 (Winter 1990/91), p. 79 and François Heisbourg, "Faut-il enterrer l'alliance atlantique?," Politique Internationale, No. 50 (Winter 1990-91), p. 167.

[8] Josef Joffe, "The Security Implications of a United Germany: Paper I," America's Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No. 257 (Winter 1990/91), p. 88.

[9] Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "How to Be the World's Policeman," The New York Times Magazine, 19 May 1991, p. 42.

troops to intervene out-of-area. According to the Army Chief of Staff, "the preponderance of the Army will be based within the continental United States...."[10]

3.

A diminished Soviet threat means less need for the American nuclear guarantee. The INF treaty was a major change, for the superpowers abandoned their landbased missiles with ranges from 500 to 5500 kilometers. NATO then abandoned plans to modernize Lance missiles, and NATO redefined nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort rather than first-use. Although Britain and the United States want to keep landbased nuclear weapons, this option is probably precluded by German reservations. It is unlikely that NATO can retain short-range nuclear artillery after Soviet forces have withdrawn behind the Polish and Czechoslovakian glacis. According to Karl Kaiser, "As the military threat fades the question of legitimacy is being raised. Many weapons systems that would be desirable in technical terms will no longer receive political support, and it can no longer be considered irresponsible to discard certain nuclear options."[11] Kaiser thinks it will be impossible to store nuclear warheads in Germany, so he envisions a "reconstitution strategy" under which warheads and delivery systems are held in the US or the European periphery for possible deployment, as needed, to Germany or other frontline

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[10] General Carl E. Vuono, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, "Strategy for Solo Superpower," The Washington Post, 19 May 1991, p. 1.

[11] Karl Kaiser, "From nuclear deterrence to graduated conflict control: German unification and the departure from current NATO strategy," Survival, Vol. 32, No. 6 (November/December 1990), pp. 486. According to Josef Joffe, "one should bet neither on the production of TASM or on the retention of existing air-delivered warheads on US planes based on the Continent." "The Security Implications of a United Germany: Paper I," America's Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No. 257 (Winter 1990/91), p. 87.

states. Washington's nuclear commitment will survive in some form because it backstops the relatively small British and French nuclear deterrents, and the nuclear commitment is much less dangerous to the US than formerly.

The French deplore the relegation of nuclear arms to "last resort" status. They say it invites a long conventional battle with threats to use nuclear weapons postponed until the defense is failing. This contrasts with French policy which seeks to deter all war by threats of early and massive nuclear attacks when a threat to French vital interests is confirmed. The NATO allies demur; they anticipate substantial tactical warning before a Soviet attack, and could threaten nuclear escalation as a crisis intensified.[12]

Although Germany is the principal focus of America's nuclear commitment, NATO's flanks are also affected. Although the French have debated possibly extending their nuclear umbrella to Germany, "it is difficult to imagine that France could one day brandish its nuclear force to deter an attack against Sicily, Anatolia, or Thrace or against the extreme north of Norway."[13] The dilemmas of extended nuclear deterrence are soluble, even for Germany, only by forming a European state, so Germany joins the "sanctuary" defended by British and French nuclear arms.[14] Because this union remains a distant prospect, the US will continue to perform this function in the immediate future. However, the details of future nuclear deterrence are obscure, and Anglo-French forces will probably become more important. As Jacques Morizet

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[12] See François de Rose, "Quelques nouveaux paramètres de sécurité en Europe," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991), p. 44.

[13] Béatrice Heuser, "L'avenir de la sécurité européenne," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991, p. 55.

[14] See Holger H. Mey and Michael Rühle, "German Security Interests and NATO's Nuclear Strategy," Aussenpolitik, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1991), pp. 29-30.

has written, "the nuclear void now forming in central Europe can only reinforce the European contribution of French nuclear deterrence by underlining the role it could play in a situation of last resort."[15]

4.

America's budget deficits will produce more than military budget reductions. As David Gergen writes, "As budget problems persist, burden-sharing will clearly gain as an issue in American politics."[16] This was illustrated by American reactions to allied Gulf War contributions. Intense animosity was directed toward Japan and Germany for what Republican Senator John McCain called "contemptible tokenism" in sharing the costs of defeating Iraq. In September 1990 the House Representatives passed overwhelmingly (370 to 53) an amendment to require Japan to pay all costs to maintain American troops in Japan. Recent public opinion surveys reflect this attitude. Even during the proud afterglow of the Gulf War, a survey conducted in March 1991 found that only 46 percent (compared to 51 percent opposed) of respondents agreed that, "The United States should take the LEAD military role where there are problems in the world requiring a military response," but 57 percent (compared to 38 percent) agreed when the question was worded, "The United States should take the LEAD military role where there are problems in the world requiring a military response, with the cost shared by a broad group of

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[15] Jacques Morizet, "Pour une relance de la coopération Franco-Allemande de défense," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991), p. 25.

[16] David Gergen, "How is American Changing? American Leadership: The Challenges Back Home," America's Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No. 257 (Winter 1990/91), p. 4.

allies."[17]

Trade issues also fuel Euro-American discord. Washington says the European Community sabotaged the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in December 1990 by rejecting substantial cuts in agricultural subsidies to noncompetitive but politically powerful European farmers. In early 1991 the EC was placed on a "priority watch list" because a Community guideline recommends limits on non-Community television programming. The US also resisted "buy European" provisions in European public procurement. The Community retorts that despite years of American lip service to free trade principles, the United States now blocks reforms in nonmerchandise trade, especially aviation and telecommunications.

Public opinion reflects these disputes. American elites remain more committed to free trade (only 33 percent of leaders believe that tariffs are necessary) compared to the general public (54 percent favor tariffs). But this gap is narrowing, in 1978 only 23 percent of leaders defended tariffs compared to 57 percent of the public.[18] American protectionism is usually directed at Japan rather than Europe. However, 40 percent of the American public (38 percent of leaders) considers Europeans unfair traders, and 30 percent of the public (41 percent of the leaders) believes that European economic competition could become a "critical threat" to the United States during the coming decade.[19] There are also European counterparts to these

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[17] Americans Talk Issues, Serial National Surveys of Americans on Public Policy Issues: Survey #15 (Washington, D.C.: American Talk Issues Foundation, 1991), p. 39.

[18] John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 26-27.

[19] John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 27.

American perception. Americans were outraged by French actor Gérard Depardieu's alleged admission that he participated in his "first" rape at age nine. Many French interpreted this not as moral revulsion but as evidence of American protectionism driven by Hollywood's fear that Depardieu's film "Cyrano" might sweep the Oscars.[20]

International finance is a less publicized field of battle. All of the largest European economies now participate in the European Monetary System's exchange-rate mechanism, and the German Bundesbank largely determines Western European monetary policy. Despite massive pressure from Washington, Germany stonewalled the Bush administration's attempt to aid the US economy by lowering foreign interest rates. Germans perceived a foolish and politically motivated attempt to stimulate the American economy before the 1992 presidential election, and German Finance Minister Theo Waigel denounced America's massive budget deficits and low savings rate which impede global economic vigor. Bush was rebuffed as thoroughly as the Carter administration's attempt to influence German monetary policy.

Conflicts over economic issues will continue and expand, for example the quarrel over inviting President Gorbachev to the 1991 Group of Seven summit meeting. These conflicts could intensify as Europe becomes more economically integrated and less dependent upon America's security guarantee. A mutual perception that Americans and Europeans are economic rivals more than security partners could undermine US willingness to retain a meaningful military commitment. If Europe is primarily an economic rival, rather than the first line of American defense against the Soviet threat, Americans will

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[20] See Figaro-Magazine, 29 March 1991, pp. 52-54.

have less reason to protect European interests.[21] I share Josef Joffe skepticism that "the US [will] continue to shoulder the burden of securing those who have become less dependent and hence less pliant -- and do so for the sake of European stability as such, and not in order to contain is existential rival in the theatre of foremost importance?"[22]

Euro-American economic rivalry should remain less hostile than Japanese-American relation.[23] But considerable estrangement is possible, and in a more unipolar world Europe may distrust and resent American domination. Consistent with longstanding French concerns, President Mitterrand already fears "that the United States seeks to use NATO as a means to perpetuate its dominant influence on Western policy toward the Soviet Union."[24] And Moïsi and Rupnik write that although European anti-Americanism has declined, there is "rejection of what is perceived as excessive American power."[25] Anti-Americanism is prevalent even in Britain; Anthony Crosland explained it many

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[21] See Dominique Moïsi and Jacques Rupnik, Le nouveau continent: Plaidoyer pour une Europe renaissante (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991), p. 155.

[22] Josef Joffe, "The Security Implications of a United Germany: Paper I," America's Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No. 257 (Winter 1990/91), p. 90.

[23] One recent book even predicts possible war between the two countries. See George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991).

[24] Michael Brenner, "Une nouvelle optique sur la sécurité européenne: le regard de Washington," Politique étrangère, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Autumn 1990), p. 556.

[25] Dominique Moïsi and Jacques Rupnik, Le nouveau continent: Plaidoyer pour une Europe renaissante (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991), p. 156. However, a survey of French adults (N=919) conducted in March 1991 indicated that although 62 percent of respondents agreed the world was entering a period "marked by the domination of the United States," only 27 percent were made "uneasy" by this and 58 percent were "reassured." See, World Opinion Update, Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 1991), p. 55.

years ago as, "a natural resentment at the transfer of world power from London to Washington."[26] Without a renewed threat, from Russia or elsewhere, this attitude may spread.

5.

During the early postwar years, a European-based security structure seemed an inevitable outgrowth of European unification. But after the European Defense Community initiative collapsed in 1954, and West Germany joined NATO, European integration (except for the European Political Cooperation) turned toward economics. The recent Euro-revolution triggered new interest in political union, and most EC members now favor such a union to constrain German power. The notable exception was the Thatcher government which feared German domination. Nicholas Ridley, a member of Thatcher's cabinet and a prime ministerial confidant, expressed this view with pungency by dismissing European monetary union as, "a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe."

Germans realize that unification stimulated fears of teutonic hegemony and Rapalloesque anxiety of Germany's Eastward drift. Some Germans see this manifested in the closing of Franco-Polish ranks when Bonn hesitated before accepting the Oder-Neisse border and think that the recently formed Pentagonale is directed against Germany.[27] To assuage these fears, and to preclude a recrudescence of German nationalism, Germany must be embedded within a united Europe. Chancellor Kohl calls German unity and European

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[26] Quoted in Stephen Haseler, "British bulldog snaps unfairly at Uncle Sam's polished heels," The Sunday Times, 12 May 1991, p. 7.

[27] The Pentagonale consists of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy (the driving force), and Yugoslavia. Its ostensible agenda focuses on addressing common concerns including air links, high-speed trains, hydroelectric power, and gas pipelines.

unity, "two sides of the same coin," and in March 1991 he demonstrated Germany's commitment to political union by linking German's acceptance of EMU to simultaneous approval of political union.

Washington is schizophrenic. American policy gives ritualistic support to European integration, and the Bush administration is more genuinely supportive of united European political action than the Reagan administration. Moreover, Washington, unlike London, strongly supported both German unification and the goal of anchoring Germany within European structures. Michael Brenner contends that President Bush and Secretary Baker believe "a powerful EEC would be a major element of stability in the climate of novelty and uncertainty which currently exists in Europe."[28]

During its first eighteen months in office (until the Kuwait invasion), the Bush administration was discomfited by the degree to which Washington was overshadowed by decisions taken in Bonn and Moscow. American schizophrenia arises, therefore, from a longing to retain the traditional American leadership position. Because NATO is the central structure of American leadership, Washington is especially temperamental when Europe challenges its primacy in defense and foreign policy. The Bush administration wants to divide responsibility so the US remains predominant on defense policy issues while the Community leads on European political and economic issues. An example was Washington's willingness for Brussels to direct the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which has 39 members and capital of ECU 10 billion.

The Bush administration became more vocal in late 1990 and early 1991 as

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[28] Michael Brenner, "Une nouvelle optique sur la sécurité européenne: le regard de Washington," Politique étrangère, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Autumn 1990), pp. 546.

the pace of progress toward EMU and political union accelerated. On three occasions between December 1990 and April 1991, the Bush administration told Europeans that European unification must "reinforce" rather than weaken the Atlantic Alliance.[29] Washington has a chronic dislike of European caucuses, and Bush administration behavior parallels Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt's infamous (in Europe) letter sent in the mid-1980s to dissuade the WEU from discussing ongoing arms control issues. As a senior US diplomat once told The New York Times, "We've always told them to get their act together, but when they do, we tell them they're undermining NATO consultation."[30] A German journalist described "a reflex of American diplomacy. As soon as NATO's exclusivity seems jeopardized it reacts like a jealous husband -- no rival should come to close to the woman of his choice."[31]

At least at the outset, "political union" will take only a tiny step toward a federal Europe. It will involve small but potentially significant changes such as more supranational decision-making and expanded power for the European Parliament. To deserve the label, a political union must eventually encompass foreign and security policy, and it's probably true as a high French Ministry of Defense official wrote, that the Community "will not continue for long to speak of a central European bank, a common currency, or regulations covering pollution and free exchange without beginning, one day or another, to

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[29] At the December 1990 meeting of NATO foreign ministers, just prior to a WEU meeting in February 1991, and in an April 1991 telegram from Secretary Baker to Luxembourg during its presidency of the E.C.

[30] James M. Markham, "The Alliance Enters the Age of Edgy Reassurance, The New York Times, 27 September 1987, p. E3.

[31] Günther Nonnenmacher, "NATO on the verge of far-reaching change as US troop pullout is planned," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 April 1991. Translated in The German Tribune, 19 May 1991, p. 5.

address its own defense."[32]

To Britain and other opponents of European union, the Gulf War demonstrated Europe's inability to frame a common security policy and proved the necessity for American leadership. To proponents, such as France, the war proved that Europe's vital interests required European institutions to formulate and implement common foreign and defense policies. The EC is divided into at least three camps: France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Greece think political union should encompass defense policy; Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark are opposed; and neutral Ireland is sui generis. France wants majority voting on foreign and defense policy which London abhors.

The WEU is increasingly viewed as a means to shift the emphasis from NATO to the Community. French foreign minister Roland Dumas describes the Franco-German initiative as attempting to create "a common foreign and security policy while not eliminating national armies."[33] Dumas thinks WEU could be a useful device to accomplish that goal. One proposal, raised by Italy during its presidency of the European Council, is the absorption of the WEU by the EC when the WEU's Brussels Treaty expires in 1998. Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand jointly urged "a clear organic relationship" between the WEU and the Community.[34]

Britain and the Netherlands fear that linking WEU to the EC will alienate

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[32] Gérard Dominique (pseudonym), "Pour une CEE de la défense," Le Monde, 11 April 1990, p. 2.

[33] Jacques Amalric, et al., "Un entretien avec M. Roland Dumas," Le Monde, 12 March 1991, p. 3.

[34] Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, "La lettre commune be MM. Kohl et Mitterrand," Le Monde, 10 December 1990, p. 4.

Washington and hasten America's retreat from Europe. Washington claims that strengthening WEU will weaken NATO and marginalize the non-Community NATO-European states, especially Norway and Turkey. Therefore, WEU should expand to include non-EC members of NATO. Washington also wants the WEU to consult NATO before taking action outside the North Atlantic area.[35]

London wants WEU as NATO's European pillar, not the EC's defense pole. Paris rejects this, for it perpetuates American dominance while blocking the essential evolution of integrated European institutions. In fact, France denies any need for peacetime integrated military commands. The French foresee sufficient warning time to consult and respond as the threat evolves. For Paris, interoperability is the essential capacity, but Secretary Baker's message to the Community emphasized "the essential character of NATO's integrated military structure...."[36]

6.

France wants a European security organization; Britain thinks that the US must remain the crux of European security. A third approach relies on national means to respond to the diminished threat. Pan-European security is a fourth alternative, e.g., the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[37] As the Cold War ended, CSCE emerged as a main focus for European security issues, especially in Germany. In the December 1990 all

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[35] See David Buchan, "Ministers seek NATO talks on Defence," The Financial Times, 29 April 1991, p. 4 and "Nouvel avertissement des Etats-Unis aux Douze à propos de la défense européenne," Le Monde, 2 May 1991, p. 5.

[36] Remarks of American NATO Ambassador William Taft as quoted in David Buchan, "US envoy denies NATO is holding up EC progress on common security," The Financial Times, 2 May 1991, p. 2.

[37] The thirty-four member CSCE includes Canada, the United States, and every European state except Albania.

German elections, the FDP, SPD, and Green party platforms all made favorable references to the CSCE or what the Greens called a "pan-European order of peace."[38]

Some conservative French politicians including Charles Pasqua, François Fillon, and Philippe Séguin agree that Cold War institutions such as NATO and the EC are obsolescent. Europe should now think in continental terms of a pan-European security system stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.[39] In general, however, French elites are less enthusiastic about CSCE than are the Germans.[40] The French government accords more prominence to NATO, the WEU, and the European Community, and RPR leader Jacques Chirac explicitly rejected the concept of "an institutionalized CSCE which would play the role of the European UN."[41] Most leading British politicians are even more dismissive. According to Foreign Secretary Hurd, CSCE "cannot in the foreseeable future become an organization offering collective military security guarantees of the old traditional kind. So far as members of NATO are concerned, it will not replace NATO."[42] CSCE will become more important, but neither the United

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[38] Helmut Nagelschmitz, ed., Procedures, Programmes, Profiles: First All German Election (Bonn: Inter Nationes, December 1990), p. 33, p. 37, and p. 42.

[39] See, for example, Philippe Séguin, "Le nouvel horizon de l'Europe," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (March 1991), pp. 41-50. According to Alain Minc, "The European Community died 9 November 1989."

[40] There are exceptions such as Frédéric Bozo. He writes that "currently the true European priority is to define and reinforce a new security context within the CSCE, a task in which France must play a predominant part." "La France et l'OTAN vers une nouvelle alliance," Défense Nationale, Vol. 47 (January 1991), p. 27.

[41] "L'appartenance à l'OTAN est <<la destination naturelle>> de l'Allemagne unie," Le Monde, 13-14 May 1990, p. 4.

[42] Douglas Hurd, "The CSCE: Need for a New Magna Carta," Speech to the CSCE Ministerial Meeting, New York, 2 October 1990.

States nor most Western European governments will grant priority to a pan-European security structure.

Why I May Be Wrong:

I believe that despite revolutionary changes in Europe's strategic terrain, the effect on Euro-American relations will be evolutionary. This is largely true because neither the United States nor any major European state seeks a rapid transformation. Britain's Conservative party is particularly wedded to the Atlanticist status quo, but only slightly more than the German CDU/CSU and both major American parties. Even the three principal French parties (PS, UDF, RPR) accept this status quo. Without stronger pressure to quickly remake the institutional landscape, only gradual change is likely.

There are, however, several improbable possibilities which might upend my prediction. It is conceivable, for example, that the US might withdraw its troops more quickly or more completely. There are domestic interests which favor this policy. On the right, this is the longstanding position of "libertarians" (who want to reduce all government expenditures)[43] and "neoconservatives," who believe that resources committed to Europe are needed elsewhere. During the Cold War these were minority positions; the centrist American consensus embraced the European commitment. The collapse of the Soviet Union's external empire, to be followed perhaps by internal disintegration, obviated a need to offset a global Soviet threat, and many American conservatives are reverting to isolationist roots which atrophied after Dwight Eisenhower captured control of the Republican Party forty years ago. Burton Pines of the Heritage Foundation calls conservatives "reluctant

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[43] See Ted Galen Carpenter and Rosemary Fiscarelli, America's Peace Dividend: Income Tax Reductions from the New Strategic Realities (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, August 1990), pp. 18-22.

internationalists."[44] Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote that the United States should now focus on domestic problems and "not try to manage the balance of power in Europe....Neither can the U.S. be expected to sustain an expensive role in an alliance whose chief role is to diminish European fear of a resurgent Germany. Americans have more pressing priorities."[45] And, in a provocative echo of George McGovern's presidential theme, Pat Buchanan wrote that after the Cold War, "America should come home."

Since the Vietnam War, neoisolationism has exerted its strongest grip among Democrats. For example, in the key January 1991 congressional votes to authorize force against Saddam Hussein, rather than continuing to rely on economic sanctions, only three House Republicans (compared to 179 Democrats) and two Senate Republicans (compared to 45 Democrats) voted no. As Republican conservative internationalism erodes, Charles Krauthammer foresees a foreign affairs realignment: "The Left-Right debate of today will gradually transform itself into the isolationist-interventionist debate of yesterday."[46] William Hyland, former national security official and current editor of Foreign Affairs, now asserts that, "The United States has never been less threatened by foreign forces than it is today...[but] never since the Great Depression has the threat to domestic well-being been greater....[Therefore,] What is desperately required is a psychological turn inward." America needs, Hyland argues, to "start selectively disengaging from abroad...." This includes

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[44] Burton Yale Pines, "A Primer for Conservatives," The National Interest, No. 23 (Spring 1991), p. 67.

[45] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time," The National Interest, No. 21 (Fall 1990), p. 43.

[46] Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," The National Interest, No. 18 (Winter 1989/90), p. 47.

Europe where only "a skeleton structure for emergency redeployments" is required.[47]

America confronts massive domestic problems, and in a relatively benign world many Americans, even including foreign affairs professionals, wish to shed external burdens. To the extent that happens, Europe will be the principal casualty, for in no other region are America's allies better equipped to fend for themselves. There are, obviously, pressures to reformulate U.S. policy to turn toward domestic problems. This might translate into reductions of America's commitment to Europe which go further or faster than I have suggested here. It is notable that for the first time in the surveys of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the public is now more supportive of NATO (56 percent prefer to "keep the commitment the same") than the leaders (35 percent). The leaders also favor a smaller American troop deployment in Western Europe, 101,200 compared to 181,3000 for the public.[48] Presumably, the elites are leading public opinion on this issue. Therefore, although a slow evolution in the status quo is likely, more dramatic changes in Euro-American relations are possible.

A second improbable event is a revival of Soviet bellicosity. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the removal of Soviet troops from Central Europe, and the shrinking of Soviet conventional forces, have reduced the Soviet capacity for aggression regardless of the particular regime in power. Moreover, the Soviet economic base is so fragile that Western Europe and the United States could counter a threat quite easily. Nonetheless, the brutal

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[47] William G. Hyland, "Downgrade Foreign Policy," The New York Times, 20 May 1991, p. A15.

[48] John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 35.

repression of demonstrators in Vilnius, and Soviet efforts to evade clear provisions of the CFE treaty, demonstrate that even Gorbachev can pursue policies which rattle the West. Gorbachev's successors could be much more unnerving. Should the Soviet Union implode, the prospects are both unpredictable and dreadful, especially given the arsenal of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Although NATO is ill-suited to manage domestic Soviet chaos, an intensified perception of "threat" from the East could retard or halt the evolutionary developments I have described.

A third possibility is German expulsion of foreign troops. Nearly fifty years after the war, and with the Soviet threat largely removed, will united Germany continue indefinitely to tolerate the presence of large numbers of foreign troops? Will Germans not be tempted to follow the example of France (which declared autonomy from NATO in 1966) or Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (which are being freed from the Red Army)? This possibility is increasingly reflected in German public opinion. In March 1990 56.5 percent of West German respondents said they would welcome the complete withdrawal of US troops from Germany, and only 38.6 percent were opposed.[49] Although many Germans still consider foreign troops as "protection" rather than "occupation," this may change if the Cold War recedes from memory.

NATO's new eight corps configuration may help to address this problem. Except for one all-German corps assigned to former East German territory, all of these corps (including the rapid-reaction corps) will be multinational formations of national divisions. Only one corps will be commanded by an American; however, SACEUR will remain an American officer. Repackaging NATO

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[49] "Polls: Most Germans and Americans for German Unity," The Week in Germany, 13 April 1990, p. 2.

forces in a more multinational and European container may prolong their acceptance by the German people. The French, whose forces have served under German command in bilateral exercises, have discussed possibly stationing German air or ground forces in France.[50] This might also lessen the appearance that Germany is a unique case which requires foreign forces to guard against renascent German nationalism.

Elsewhere in Europe, policies which might be unacceptable under NATO auspices are presented as "European" positions. For example, Spain broke a long isolationist tradition by sending naval forces to the Persian Gulf following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. But Madrid carefully acted under WEU rather than NATO patronage. It is similarly possible that troops from other EC countries may be acceptable in Germany, especially if German forces are deployed elsewhere in Europe, while American troops are not. The American role as the ultimate guarantor of European security will be complicated if both nuclear warheads and American troops are relegated to the European periphery, and this could accelerate the reshaping of Euro-American relations.

The fourth improbable possibility is quickening of the pace of European political union, including a defense community. Although there is substantial rhetorical enthusiasm for European unification, a federal European state remains a distant possibility. Even the French, whose rhetorical support for European union is high, emphasize a "confederation" of sovereign states. Rapid progress toward more meaningful European unity which would transform the

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[50] See, for example, Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud, "Construire le pôle ouest-européen de sécurité," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991), p. 37 and François de Rose, "Quelques nouveaux paramètres de sécurité en Europe," Défense nationale, Vol. 47 (April 1991), pp. 47.

Euro-American relationship seems improbable. Indeed, although the unification of Germany has increased pressure to strengthen European institutions, in the security field the ebbing of the Soviet threat has resuscitated national approaches.

Conclusions:

Increasingly, Washington perceives the EC as an important actor distinct from its individual members. This is illustrated by the Trans-Atlantic Declaration of November 1990, semiannual US-EC summits among the presidents of the US, European Council, and EC Commission, and the proliferation of Cabinet and Commission-level contacts. Rather than reflecting intimacy, these contacts reflect new political realities: America's economic edge over Europe is shrinking, and Brussels is a decision center which now rivals Bonn, London, and Paris.

Europeans and Americans agree that Washington must provide the West's central leadership and that some US troops should remain in Europe. They disagree concerning economic issues, such as trade and burden-sharing, and many political issues, including America's greater propensity to intervene in regional conflicts. There is substantial mutual respect between Americans and Europeans, but on this issue there is substantial mistrust. Many Americans think Europeans are what Lyndon Johnson called "nervous Nellies," and as Timothy Garton Ash recently wrote, "in France, in Germany, in Italy, one encounters much more often than in Britain a basic, deep-seated reluctance to believe that a war -- particularly an American-led war -- can be either necessary or justified, even against such a blatant, relentless, and

certifiably tyrannical aggressor [as Saddam Hussein]."[51]

In the post-Cold War world, without the glue of a common enemy, Europe and America will drift apart. This is the natural effect of economic competition and political differences compounded by America's preoccupation with domestic problems and the advance of European unification. This will not happen quickly. There is so much inertia accumulated over so many decades, so many habits which will only slowly change, that the immediate future will resemble the past. But eventually the revolution of the last two years will translate into important changes in Euro-American relations. In 1976, Richard Rosecrance prematurely labeled America an "ordinary country." In 1990, Ambassador Kirkpatrick accurately labeled America a "normal country," and a normal America will not indefinitely tolerate the abnormal relationship with Europe.

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[51] Ash, Timothy Garton Ash, "The War in Europe," The New York Review of Books, 7 March 1991, p. 16.

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THE LEONARD DAVIS INSTITUTE
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If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"Strategic Aspects of German Unity"

by

Gebhard Schweigler

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
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Strategic Aspects of a United Germany

The strategic aspects of a united Germany in a Europe no longer divided by an Iron Curtain are, at the same time, mind-boggling and mind-soothing. The thorough rearrangement of the European landscape that began slowly with *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, continued with the first breach in the Iron Curtain in Hungary, accelerated with relatively free elections in Poland, culminated in the demise of Communist rule and the collapse of the Soviet empire throughout Eastern Europe, and brought about the reunification of Germany: This series of events and the changes they brought, long the goal of Western policies, but for many ever less a realistic hope, to this day nearly defy comprehension. The Cold War is over, the West has won, and Europe is almost "whole and free," a fact at once cause for celebration and a source for new uncertainties, as the dangers of instability and unpredictability — according to President Bush the new enemies of the post-Cold-War world — become more apparent.

One of the main features of the rearranged landscape of Europe is a united Germany. It, too, seems fraught with new uncertainties, but it also appears to hold out the promise of lasting stability in the heart of Europe. The Cold War saw the pursuit of two containment policies, one designed to "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world," until "the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power" had been achieved.[1] The other, less outspokenly pursued containment policy sought to prevent the reemergence of Germany as a powerful factor of instability in Europe by firmly establishing democracy in that part of Germany controlled by the Western allies and by tying the newly created Federal Republic of Germany securely to the West. This policy implied the division of Germany, at least for as long as Soviet power had not mellowed or broken up.

The Federal Republic, after a good deal of internal controversy, accepted both the ties that bound it to the West and the division of Germany. But Chancellor Konrad Adenauer insisted that the West pursue a "policy of strength" towards the Soviet Union in order to hasten the demise of Soviet power and to make possible the eventual reunification of Germany along West German lines. He thereby sought to merge the two containment policies into a cohesive approach to the rehabilitation and reunification of Germany. This approach was embodied in the grand bargain struck between the Federal Republic and its occupation powers in the early 1950s. When the Federal Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the Brussels

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1 George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (originally published in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947), in Robert A. Goldwin and Harry M. Clor (eds.), *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 2nd ed.) p. 347. Kennan argued that it might take ten to fifteen years until the Soviet Union would feel compelled to retreat.

Treaty (Western European Union) — and thereby gained a significant measure of national sovereignty — it formally declared:

> that she will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.[2]

At the same time, West Germany and its alliance partners committed themselves to the "peaceful pursuit of their common goal: a reunified Germany, with a democratic constitution similar to that of the Federal Republic, and integrated into the European community."[3]

As it turned out, the premises on which these dual containment policies were based proved to be correct; and both sides also kept their promises. The Germans did not attempt to overcome the division of Germany by force; occasional protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the division of Germany, as far as the Germans themselves were concerned, was not a threat to peace in Europe. (Others may have felt that the division of Germany was a mainstay of peace in Europe.) Nor did the Federal Republic, as was often feared, strike a separate bargain with the Soviet Union and, in the process, loosen its ties with the West. Soviet power did weaken as the result of Western containment efforts that saw policies of strength pursued more or less vigorously (which at times led to significant intra-alliance conflicts over the proper mix of firmness and detente[4]). And when reunification finally became possible, the Western allies — above all the United States — gave their full support, indeed encouraged the Germans to move

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2 The Federal Republic also declared that it "has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter." (Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, London, September 28 - October 3, 1954; quoted according to C.C. Schweitzer et al. (eds.), *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents*. Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1984, p. 294.)
Article 2 of the UN Charter not only enjoins all members to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;" it also obligates member states to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

3 This was the often quoted clause in Article 7 of the Paris Agreements of 1954, which provided for West German membership in NATO and the WEU, the continued stationing of allied troops on German soil, the build-up of West German armed forces, significant constraints on German military power (in particular renunciation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), and sovereignty for the Federal Republic of Germany.

4 The first time this conflict arose was at the end of the Adenauer era, when the West German chancellor argued for a policy of firmness toward the Soviet Union, and the United States - especially under President Kennedy - initiated a policy of detente designed to cope with the effects of strategic parity. Later, after Bonn began to pursue its new *Ostpolitik*, the fronts became reversed. Now it was the Federal Republic that complained about alleged American rigidities, and the United States that bemoaned too much German flexibility, if not indeed laxness. These — by now almost academic — controversies are still reflected in the burgeoning debate over what won the Cold War: "Peace through strength" according mostly to Mr. Reagan or "change through rapprochement" according mostly to Mr. Genscher.

more speedily than they themselves were initially inclined.[5] Thus the goal spelled out in the 1950s, a Germany peacefully unified on the basis of Western ideals, was achieved on October 3, 1990.

Because the process of German unification took place with the full support of its Western allies and strictly along Western lines, the strategic aspects of German unity are nowhere near as massive or troublesome as might otherwise be the case. To be sure, a united Germany is larger than the old Federal Republic (almost by half), more populous (78 million instead of 62 million), and economically more potent (at least over the longer run). This could imply a more powerful Germany as well, one that — especially if left to its own devices and free of its moorings — might become dangerous again. Some feared that a united Germany, following its own unreconstructed ways, might feel compelled to repeat the errors of its past. Others worried that the end of the Cold War would recreate the systemic conditions for traditional European rivalries and German efforts at continental dominance.[6]

But united Germany was not set free of its moorings and left to its own devices. Rather, the Germans themselves as well as their alliance partners sought to make sure that a united Germany would, in many ways, remain tied down and thus secured against potential ill winds or flood tides. This was achieved both through the internal process of unification and through external measures that were necessary to effect a final settlement of the German question. Most of the concerns regarding a united Germany could be alleviated in the process. Nevertheless, the new conditions created by the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany will likely raise new problems and thus not lay to rest all concerns for and about the Germans. A closer look at the internal and external aspects of German unification should, however, help to put these into proper perspective.

Internal Aspects

When reunification suddenly appeared possible sometime after Christmas 1989, and after initially cautious West German speculations about a drawn-out unification process moving from the establishment of "confederal structures" to the creation of a German confederacy and finally to a united Germany in the context of a united Europe had proven to be short-lived,[7] there were

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5 See Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung. Die internationalen Aspekte* (Bergisch Gladbach: Bastei-Lübbe, 1991), pp. 50-59.

6 The most prominent exponent of this point of view is John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.

7 See Chancellor Helmut Kohl's ten-point program of November 28, 1989, reprinted in Kaiser, *Deutsche Vereinigung*, pp. 158-168.

only two realistic choices as to how it might be done. One was for representatives of the two German states to work out a new constitution for a united Germany — one that would combine the presumed or proven best elements of both — and submit it to the German people for approval according to Article 146 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law. This was the approach favored by the leaders of the East German revolution, who (working together at a "round table") presented a corresponding proposal. The other approach was for the German Democratic Republic (or some constituent parts) simply to join the Federal Republic according to Article 23 of the West German constitution, which left open that possibility to "any part of Germany." That meant, in essence, the wholesale takeover of East Germany by West Germany, or, put differently, the extension of the Federal Republic all the way to the Oder and Neisse rivers. The effect would be to create a united Germany that would be a Federal Republic writ large.

It did not take long for the Article-23-solution to emerge as the only realistic option for reunification. More and more East Germans, appalled by the conditions socialism had left behind, eager to enjoy West German standards of living as quickly as possible, and afraid that their newly gained freedom might not be permanent, showed themselves determined to forego any alleged advantages of socialism and to seek the security and welfare of life in a Federal Republic of Germany. Accordingly, they began to demonstrate for "Germany, united fatherland" (or, as some wit put it in a play on the German phrase, for "*Deutschland, eilig Vaterland.*) The election results of March 1989 nailed down that approach.

In West Germany, too, the Article-23-approach quickly carried the day. For one, it was the fast track to unity, and no one could be sure that the window of opportunity opened by the Soviet Union would be not be shut again before too long.[8] There simply was not enough time, nor much inclination, to go through a drawn-out process of designing and approving a new constitution. More important, perhaps, was the fact that the incorporation of (as it eventually was determined) five new East German *Länder* into the Federal Republic was exactly what most West Germans wanted. It meant that their political, social, and economic system — which they had come to support and appreciate — would not have to be changed. Since the West Germans had made that attachment to the Federal Republic's system a central element of their own newly established sense of national identity,[9] the unification of Germany through the

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8 Chancellor Kohl, challenged on the haste with which unification was carried out and on the problems such haste has caused, has since taken to arguing that this window of opportunity was open for only a few weeks.

9 For supporting evidence on this point see Gebhard Schweigler, Grundlagen der aussenpolitischen Orientierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rahmenbedingungen, Motive, Einstellungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985).

takeover of East Germany did not present a challenge in terms of having to change their identity.

Conversely, however, such a change of identity is precisely what they asked the East Germans to do. In essence, the East Germans were told that they were welcome to join the Federal Republic, but that they would have to adopt the West German ways. In less clear terms, the West Germans also indicated that the East Germans should not count too much on the solidarity of their new fellow-countrymen. Chancellor Kohl took that sentiment into account when, in the December 1990 West German elections, he campaigned — and won - on the promise that reunification would not cost the West Germans anything (because, as he claimed, it would practically pay for itself through increased consumer demand and massive investment programs, both leading to substantial economic growth).

One further extremely attractive feature of the Article-23-approach was that it would keep all of the Federal Republic's external relations, rights, and obligations unchanged. Thus a united Germany would not have to renegotiate its membership in the European Community, in the Atlantic Alliance, or in many other international organizations. The ties that bound it in countless ways would remain untouched. For the West Germans this was an important point, for they had included these ties, too, in their definition of national identity. The fact that these ties would remain, and the internalized constraints in place, also made this approach to German unity attractive to German's neighbors and allies. Their support, in turn, stimulated German efforts to conclude reunification arrangements as quickly as possible. In record time, and with much backbreaking effort, the two German states negotiated an agreement spelling out the myriad details of the unification process.[10]

As attractive and effective as the Article-23-solution turned out to be, it did have its catches. One such "Catch 23" was the fact that it did not allow the Germans themselves an outright vote on whether or not they wanted unification under those terms. This could have put a cloud on the legitimacy of the whole process, but elections in East and West Germany helped dispel most such clouds. (One cloud that remained was the charge that the chancellor had lied when he promised no new taxes because of reunification, a promise that was broken massively less than half a year later.)

Another, potentially more serious catch has to do with the fact that a feeling of national solidarity — based on a strong sense of national consciousness and cohesion — was curiously

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10 The "Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands" encompassed more than a thousand pages as drafted, and changed, once ratified, not only some portions of the Basic Law, but also a large number of laws and regulations. It was published in the Federal Government's *Bulletin*, September 6, 1990, pp. 877-1120.

lacking throughout this process of almost automatic reunification. This lack of outright nationalism clearly had its advantages; had West Germany been gripped by nationalist fervor, outside support for German unity might have been less readily forthcoming. Yet because reunification itself was not based on nationalist excitement — the lack of such excitement was clearly evident even on October 3, 1990 — the process of unifying the two disparate parts of Germany has now turned out to be quite difficult. For the fact remains that, over the course of the division of their country, Germans in East and West had become estranged from each other, developing in the process different sets of attitudes and behavioral patterns.

To some extent the mood in Germany appears to have turned sour. Many West Germans are not willing to consider the sacrifices necessary for bringing East German standards up to those prevailing in West Germany; they resent, therefore, the demands by the East Germans. The East Germans, in turn, find that their hopes for rapid improvements have not all been fulfilled.[11] Rather, more and more of them are forced to join the ranks of the unemployed,[12] as East German enterprises — deprived of their traditional protected markets in Eastern Europe and exposed instead to the rough winds of free markets — are collapsing at an alarming rate. Outside investments in the five new *Länder* have not kept pace, as unsettled property claims and uncertain legal obligations pertaining to environmental pollution and workers' rights have contributed to an unfavorable investment climate. In short, the "largest leveraged buyout in history" (as unification according to Article 23 was occasionally called) could prove to become just that: an economically dubious proposition, at least over the short term, leaving those bought out without a job and the buyers deeply in debt.[13]

The currently rising level of dissatisfaction, which finds its political expression in a string of election setbacks by Chancellor Kohl's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), may well turn out to be a short-term problem, particularly if Kohl should, once again, be proven

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11 In May 1991, 53% of the West Germans still felt that the costs for unification were too high; 54% of the East Germans thought that not enough was being spent. Another poll at the same time showed 78% of the East Germans believing that the Federal Government was not doing enough for the creation of equal living standards; only 27% of the West Germans shared that belief. All in all, 84% of the East Germans felt they were second-class citizens; almost one-third indicated that there were times when they longed for good old GDR-times. See "Bürger zweiter Klasse mit Zukunftshoffnung," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 7, 1991, p. 6.

12 Some projections see the level of East German unemployed as rising above 50% by the end of 1991. Currently relatively low official unemployment figures (10.5%) are somewhat deceiving, since many East Germans have been forced into early retirement or are already working on very short hours (and are thus functionally unemployed).

13 Some 8000 state-owned firms were taken over by a specially created holding agency, the *Treuhandanstalt*, which is charged with trying to sell these firms to the highest bidder or to dissolve them. This process has become much more cumbersome than originally envisaged; until May, 1991, only 1900 had been sold. As a result, the immediate costs of unification have increased tremendously (to more than DM 100 billion a year). Most of the necessary funds - almost DM 70 billion in fiscal year 1991 — are being raised on the capital markets, thus sharply increasing the level of public indebtedness (as well as the level of interest rates).

right and conditions in East Germany will increase dramatically for the better within the near future (at most five years, Kohl promises). The question remains, however, to what extent political turmoil and social unrest might, in the meantime, undermine the political stability of united Germany. Put differently: If Bonn was not Weimar, could Berlin once again become Weimar (assuming Berlin were indeed reinstated as Germany's capital[14])?

It is hard to imagine that social and political unrest as the result of unification policies could threaten the political stability of Germany. To begin with, the Federal Republic's political institutions seem to be well designed to cope with such pressures (this proven capability was one of the reasons for following Article 23). The most that could happen is a change in government, although the current opposition, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), appears to be caught in a trap of its own making, arguing on the one side against raising taxes, while pleading on the other side for more massive help for East Germans. In any case, a change of government would hardly be a sign of instability, nor would it lead to significant changes in Germany's domestic or foreign orientations. The Kohl government could also be helped by a second important factor, namely a booming economy in West Germany, which tends to alleviate many of the difficulties (not least by decreasing the need for drastic tax increases). Furthermore, even if East German patience should wear thin rapidly and West German solidarity not increase accordingly — both somewhat doubtful propositions — demonstrations of dissatisfaction in East Germany alone would not suffice to cause massive political instability in Germany as a whole. Bonn or Berlin, whichever it will be, will not become Weimar. Germany neither is in danger nor will it become a danger, to itself or to others. This is one of the most important strategic aspects of united Germany.

External Aspects

Trust is fine, control is better. This generally useful political maxim was applied in the process of German unification as well. Germany's erstwhile enemies and occupation powers, later the respective alliance partners of the two Germanies, and on the basis of postwar agreements still retaining certain rights and responsibilities pertaining to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, were in a strong legal and political position to exercise such control, when they had to agree, together with the two German states, on a "final settlement in regard to Germany" (so the offi-

14 The arguments over Bonn vs. Berlin are focused mostly on the symbolism and the economic consequences of such a move. There is, however, also the question whether the government, by moving to Berlin, might not risk the danger of exposing itself too much — almost as a hostage — to potential unrest in East Germany, whereas it would be far removed from such dangers if it stayed in provincial Bonn.

cial title of the treaty) that gave full sovereignty to a united Germany. That "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty of September 1990 defined the conditions under which Germany was to be reunified. In the process, it also laid down the most important strategic parameters of Germany's role in international politics.

The treaty partners apparently were concerned about political stability in a united Germany; their clear interest was to prevent a recurrence of Weimar. Thus Article 2, reiterating the Germans' commitment to peace, referred specifically to the constitution of a united Germany, according to which all activities designed to interfere with the peaceful life of nations (in particular all preparations for aggressive warfare) are outlawed and punishable by law.[15] In a letter accompanying the treaty, the two German foreign ministers pledged in addition that a united Germany would not permit the establishment or operation of parties or organizations that might threaten the political order or that agitate against international understanding. Ironically enough, under these provisions the Federal Republic had previously prohibited Communist as well as neo-Nazi groupings; now explicit reference was made to "parties and organizations with national-socialist orientations."[16] In this protocol notice, the two German foreign ministers also committed a united Germany not to reinstate property owners whose holdings had been expropriated by the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1949;[17] this was likely a last attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to prevent the reemergence of the *Junker*-class as an evil influence on German politics.

The commitment not to allow organizations that agitate against the constitutional order or international understanding could present a German government with an interesting dilemma in the case of German refugee organizations. For the "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty, as its first order of business in Article 1, also finally settled the question of Germany's boundaries. Agreement on postwar borders as the definite borders of united Germany was probably less problematic than it might have appeared. The overwhelming majority of Germans had long accepted that finality — except for the refugee organizations, whose (waning) political influence Kohl had to take into account before he could agree to a renunciation of all claims to former German territories as a condition for reunification.

Article 1 states explicitly that Germany has no claims against other states and will not make any such claims in the future. To make sure of that promise, it was agreed that Germany would

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15 "Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland vom 12. September 1990," in Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung*, pp. 260-268.

16 See "Gemeinsamer Brief...", September 12, 1990, in Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung*, p. 269.

17 As might be expected, this commitment was challenged in court by former property owners. The Federal Republic's Constitutional Court, however, ruled that the two governments had the right to commit a united Germany that way. It would, in any case, have been both a legal and an administrative nightmare to reinstate former property owners' rights.

eliminate all references to the possibility of unredeemed German territories from its constitution. This was done in the context of the *Einheitsvertrag*, which, upon ratification, eliminated Article 23 from the Basic Law and changed the wording of Article 146. There are thus no more legal grounds for seeking a revision of Germany's borders. Refugee organizations — even if their activities should not be outlawed on new constitutional grounds, were they to agitate for such a revision — are extremely unlikely to effect any change. Precisely because there is an overwhelming consensus among all Germans on this issue, their political influence in this regard will be miniscule. From that perspective, too, peace seems secure.

A military powerful united Germany might, in the event of domestic turmoil and unrest, be tempted to externalize its problems and thus become a threat to peace in Europe. To forestall any such possibility — and in order to maintain a reasonable balance of military power in Europe — the "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty imposed significant limitations on the military power of united Germany. Thus Germany continues to be committed (according to Article 3) not to seek any access to weapons of mass destruction, i.e. to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Given the state of German public opinion in regard to such weapons, there never was — and unlikely ever will be — any temptation to produce or possess ABC-weapons. This commitment was, therefore, easily made and will be credibly maintained.

Limitations on the overall size of the armed forces of Germany were no more controversial, but — since they require drastic reductions from present levels — will have more difficult ramifications. According to Article 3, Germany agreed to reduce the number of its soldiers "within three to four years" to 370,000 (no more than 345,000 of which may belong to the army and air force).[18] Before reunification, the West German *Bundeswehr* was limited to 495,000 soldiers, the East German *Nationale Volksarmee* to 170,000 (of which only some 90,000 remained at the time of unification); thus the armed forces of united Germany will eventually consist of almost half the force level the two separate German states commanded previously.

Reductions of this size will cause obvious personal problems for officers and NCOs no longer required and some economic problems for those areas where military installations will have to be closed. Given West Germany's demand for qualified labor, its nearly insatiable appetite for scarce housing and real estate, and the general distaste of its population for things military (including the nuisances of field maneuvers and low-level training flights), these problems

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18 This reduction was agreed upon in talks between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990; the formal commitment was made on August 30 in Vienna at the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks. Article 3 merely quotes that formal commitment, which also included the expectation on the part of the German governments that other countries would similarly agree to reductions in the personnel strengths of their armed forces. Such reductions are already proceeding unilaterally, but are also the subject of further CFE negotiations.

should be easily manageable. There is, in any case, not a single public tear being shed over this constraint on German military power. If anything, there is some expectation that, as the Soviet threat recedes ever further and as new arms control measures take hold, the size of the German armed forces can be reduced even more. With the costs of unification reaching almost astronomical proportions, such a "peace dividend" would be quite welcome for most Germans.

The incorporation of East Germany's armed forces into the *Bundeswehr* presented more difficult problems. Given the *Nationale Volksarmee*'s background as an armed force thoroughly indoctrinated and controlled by the ruling communist party, there was some obvious concern that civilian control along the lines of the Federal Republic's system of *Innere Führung* be established quickly. Consequently, when the *Bundeswehr* took command of the *NVA* at midnight of October 3, 1990, all general officers and all other officers older than 55 were summarily discharged. (At the same time, the *NVA*'s military intelligence services, its military prosecutors, and the propaganda units were disbanded.) All remaining officers were given "special status," on the basis of which they can be relieved on two months' notice; those not discharged can apply for a two-year employment contract. From that pool of candidates some 4000 officers (out of a total 32 000 on duty in September 1990) will eventually be chosen for retention according to merit and performance qualifications.[19] In the meantime, all command positions are in the hands of some 2000 *Bundeswehr* officers. This radical takeover of the *NVA* by the *Bundeswehr* met with some resentment not only among the dissolved *NVA*, but also among the East German population at large. Still, given the need for establishing effective civilian control and subjecting the East German armed forces to the discipline of the *Bundeswehr*'s command structure,[20] there was hardly any alternative.

Once the *Bundeswehr* has reached its level of 370,000 soldiers, only 50,000 will be stationed in the five new *Länder* (half conscripts and half non-permanent and professional soldiers). These will be given thorough training in the ways of the *Bundeswehr*[21] (with particular attention to the NCO corps) and will thus not present an alien and potentially threatening element within the German armed forces.

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19 See the remarks by the Commander of the newly established *Bundeswehrkommando Ost*, Lt. General Jörg Schönbohm, to the German-American Conference of the Atlantik-Brücke, Berlin, April 1991, on "The German-Unification and the Taking Over of the East German Army (NVA)," published as *Rundschreiben Nr. 2/1991* (Bonn: Atlantik-Brücke, 1991).

20 The wholesale takeover of the *NVA* by the *Bundeswehr* also meant that most of the *NVA*'s equipment was no longer needed. The *Bundeswehr* calculated that it would have to get rid of some 260,000 tons of ammunition, 100,000 vehicles, and more than 10,000 TLE. Some of that surplus equipment, however, came in handy as German support for troops fighting in "Desert Storm."

21 *Bundeswehr* standards in regard to living conditions are much higher than those that prevailed in the *NVA*. To equalize such standards and in the process dispel a significant source of dissatisfaction among East German soldiers, the German government will have to make major improvements in East German military installations, at a projected cost of more than DM 16 billion. Additional costs will be incurred in cleaning up environmentally polluted East German military installations.

One of the major questions — and potential stumbling blocks — in the reunification process pertained to the issue of continued NATO membership of a united Germany. Initially, the Soviet Union sought to gain some kind of neutrality for a united Germany. When the Soviet leadership was forced to realize that this could not be achieved (and would, in any case, not be in the Soviet Union's interest, since a neutral Germany might be more dangerous than one tied down in NATO), it focused instead on the issue of the status of the former GDR. In the "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty the Soviet Union finally agreed that a united Germany would have the right to choose which alliances it wants to join (Article 6). On the — certainly undoubted - assumption, however, that a united Germany as a Federal Republic writ large would maintain its membership in NATO, the treaty specified (in Article 5) that *Bundeswehr* units operating in East Germany could not be assigned to NATO as long as Soviet troops are stationed there.

Far more important — and in its implications far-reaching — is the provision (embodied in Article 5) that foreign troops shall not be stationed in the former GDR, once the Soviet troops have left. Since only foreign troops have access to nuclear weapons, this also means (as Article 5 does, in fact, spell out with its insistence that no nuclear-capable systems be deployed in East Germany) that the territory of the former GDR will become a nuclear-free zone. Again, this provision was quite uncontroversial in Germany itself. It could, however, prove to be troublesome in the future, as a strong anti-nuclear mood in Germany might insist on making all of Germany a nuclear-free zone. Less likely, though not to be ruled out entirely, is the possibility that German public opinion might take a liking to the idea of all of Germany — and not just the former GDR — being free of foreign troops. In that sense, Article 5 of the "Two-plus-Four"-Treaty could turn out to be a real "sleeper" — a long-term vehicle for the realization of traditional Soviet goals.

Of course, these Western concessions pale in comparison to the truly momentous concession the Soviet Union had to make: the total withdrawal of its forces — some 380,000 (plus 220,000 dependents) — from East Germany by the end of 1994. It was this concession that made reunification possible; and it was a concession, as has become evident since (not least in Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze's resignation from office), that did not come easy to the Soviet leadership. To be sure, it cost the Germans a significant amount of *deutschmarks*.[22] Bonn agreed to pay directly some DM 13 billion for transportation costs, housing construction in the Soviet Union, the retraining of Soviet military personnel, and the local costs of Soviet troops as long as they are stationed in Germany.[23] In addition, Germany granted special trade

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22 For details on the German-Soviet arrangements regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops, see the corresponding treaties and agreements in Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung*, pp. 318-357.

23 The fact that Soviet troops stationed in East Germany now receive regular payments in *deutschmarks*, at a time when the possession of hard currencies is a sign of extreme privilege — and considerable wealth — in

privileges, credits, and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union,[24] so that the total level of German financial support in 1991, according to a statement by Chancellor Kohl, amounted to DM 33.7 billion.[25] In the process, Germany, perhaps more than other Western countries, became committed to the success of Gorbachev's reform program, in which it sees a significant contribution not only to its own security, but to the security of the entire Western world. Under the circumstances, all of this seems hardly unreasonable.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany and the Eastern European countries, the attendant collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the gradual disappearance of the Soviet threat are the major defining characteristics of a radically changed strategic situation in Germany and Europe. They make possible corresponding changes on the part of Germany and its alliance partners, such as the reduction of German troop levels and the withdrawal of significant portions of allied forces stationed in Europe (that is, forces stationed mostly in Germany). From that perspective, the strategic picture is changing drastically and steadily.

Viewed from a different perspective, however, any observer should be impressed by the strategic factors that have not changed and by the elements that remain in place. Thus Germany is still a member of NATO, under terms that have not been changed (including, importantly, the subordination of German combat forces to NATO's integrated command). Deterrence structures have not been dismantled, while German nuclear abstinence has been reaffirmed. Allied forces are still stationed on (West) German soil and will stay there, if at reduced strength, for the foreseeable future, not least because of German insistence on their presence (and the security guarantees that they provide). And Germany is committed as strongly as ever to the European Community and the goal of bringing about a European Union. Germany, in other words, remains self-constrained as well as contained. In that very important sense, reunification has changed little in the strategic situation in and around Germany.

Stability and Change

Conditions are stable after the unification of Germany. But it is also evident that, as Europe emerges from the ravages of the Cold War, significant changes will take place. To prevent

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the Soviet Union itself, points to a potential problem, namely a reluctance of the part of Soviet troops to be send home and thus forego these privileges. A rising (though publicly unknown) number of Soviet deserters highlights this issue, which could become more troublesome in the future. It does present a strong incentive to both sides to conclude the withdrawal process as rapidly as possible.

24 The German government also guaranteed that contracts between East German firms and the Soviet Union concluded prior to unification would be fulfilled.

25 Quoted according to "Ein Kanzler — fasziniert von der eigenen Erfolgs-Story," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 22, 1991, p. 3.

these changes from becoming chaotic and to channel them into a steady process of peaceful evolution will be the major task of European statecraft in years to come.

The primary issue, now that the German Question has been solved, is the design of an adequate security structure for all of Europe. This architectural effort hinges on developments in the Soviet Union and thus on the question to what extent these might be managed by the West. Answers to this question are inherently difficult, if not impossible; they are, therefore, also likely to be controversial, in domestic and international politics, for a long time to come.

As already indicated, Germany considers it a vital element of its security policy to promote the reform processes mostly identified with President Gorbachev. For this purpose it is prepared to invest significant resources, though its own are nowhere near enough to help solve the Soviet Union's problems. Demands for a Marshall-Plan-type rescue effort on the part of all Western industrialized countries will likely meet with wholehearted support in Germany, especially if agreement could be reached on the conditions under which financial aid should be advanced. Germany is no more eager than any other country to throw good money after bad; it is, however, somewhat less demanding in regard to such issues as self-determination and national independence for individual Soviet republics (in particular the Baltic states). Not only does the German government feel almost personally obliged to Gorbachev; it is also convinced that a semblance of cohesion and the maintenance of stability in the Soviet Union is in the West's interest.[26] That approach may, at times, be in conflict with more cautious — or radical - policies pursued elsewhere.

In general, all members of the Western alliance share the conviction that "the Atlantic community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship."[27] Exactly how this is to be done remains open to some debate. NATO has offered a range of close diplomatic and military contacts, designed to enmesh the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in an ever closer network of relations, but it has shied away from keeping a door open for NATO-membership of East European countries out of fear that such a step might be considered provocative by the Soviet

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26 As Chancellor Kohl put it in a speech in Washington in May 1991: "The Soviet leadership will surely realize that the right to self-determination will eventually prevail. But it cannot be our goal — and it would be foolish to orient our policies accordingly — to contribute to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a whole. Such a policy would destroy all chances for genuine disarmament and lasting peace and would, therefore, never meet with my agreement." (Quoted according to "Ein Kanzler - fasziniert von der eigenen Erfolgs-Story," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 22, 1991, p. 3.)

27 From NATO's 1990 London Declaration, quoted according to "Baker, Genscher Issue Statement on NATO, CSCE," *U.S. Policy Information and Texts* (USIS Bonn), May 15, 1991, p. 30. See also the Declaration of the 1991 NATO Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen, which emphasized that the security of NATO countries is inextricably linked with all other European countries. (See "NATO-Partner bieten Osteuropa enge Zusammenarbeit an," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 7, 1991, p. 1.) The following discussion draws on these statements.

Union. Great emphasis is also placed on expanding the scope and reach of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), particularly through the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Center. However, all of these proposals leave open the question of what a Western response should be, were conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to deteriorate to such an extent that national or transnational violence took place.

An important role in the process of making Europe whole, free, and secure has already been played and will continue to be performed by the European Community. There is good reason to believe that the European unification process launched in connection with the establishment of a truly common market by 1993 served as a major impetus for the efforts of Eastern European peoples to throw off the shackles of Soviet control and socialist inefficiencies. The European Community, not least under German leadership, remains committed not only to the goals of 1993, but also to the longer-range efforts to create a Political Union. Until 1993, and possibly until the Political Union has been set in motion, the European Community will not accept additional members; that is, it will first seek to "deepen" its structure, before it attempts to "widen" it. Thus the hopes of some Eastern European countries that they might join the European Community and thereby participate not only in the EC's welfare, but also enjoy its protection, will not find fulfillment over the short term. Over the longer term, however, and after a period of association that would also be a trial period of sorts, the Eastern European countries may very well become members of the European Community.

The disappearance of the Soviet threat — at least in terms of a large-scale surprise attack by conventional forces — on the one side and the Western European unification processes on the other side have presented the Western alliance with the dilemma of having to design new force structures commensurate with these changes. An important element of this dilemma is the question of the continued military presence of the United States in Europe. Germany and the United States itself are the strongest proponents of a continued U.S. role in any European security structure. Such a role is best maintained in the context of NATO, which is therefore not to be dissolved (even though the Warsaw Pact has been formally disbanded). However, if European Political Union is to be achieved, the European Community will have to assert its own role in European security affairs, thus potentially diminishing the American role.

The outlines of the emerging debate over a European "defense identity" — possibly focused on the Western European Union (WEU) as its core — versus transatlantic security structures are already in place. On the one side are those — principally France, traditionally suspicious of the United States and eager to protects its own security and status — who argue that a "European pillar" is necessary not only for reaching the goal of a truly united Europe, but also in order to let European gain greater control over their own affairs. On the other — mostly American -

side are those who are afraid that the construction of a "European pillar" could lead to bloc-building within the alliance and thus endanger alliance cohesion; the United States role in Europe would, in the end, be marginalized and then come to an end — with ill effects on Europe and the United States.[28]

More immediately, the United States is afraid that — in an arrangement where it serves as security guarantor of last resort — it might be drawn into conflicts by countries with which it has no formal alliance agreements, and under circumstances over which it has no control. The Bush Administration has insisted, therefore, that "NATO needs to be the principal venue for consultation and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty, wherever such policies originated;" and that "NATO should maintain an effective integrated military structure to provide for collective defense." At the same time, the Bush Administration has let it be known that it is "ready to support arrangements our European allies decide are needed for the expression of a European common foreign, security and defense policy."[29]

In pursuit of that strategy, NATO has proposed a number of changes that amount to a "radical reorganization of its forces in Europe."[30] Overall force levels are to be drastically reduced (by as much as 50 percent in the American case). Seven new corps, made up of multinational units (at division level), will be organized. An augmentation force (of as yet undetermined size), most likely exclusively American, would be made available to "reconstitute" Western strength in the improbable event of a major land attack. To deal with more likely locally limited contingencies within the NATO treaty area, a Rapid Reaction Corps is to be established, under British command, with multinational divisions, and enjoying protective aircover provided by the United States; it could respond in five to seven days. A mobile unit of about 5000 troops could be deployed in emergencies within 72 hours.[31]

The dilemma of being caught between a pro-European (that is, mostly French) and an Atlantic orientation in its security policy is not new for West Germany; but it is a particularly difficult

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28 For some details concerning this controversy that began with a Franco-German proposal of February 4, 1991, and culminated in a demarche by the United States in April, see "Amerika befürchtet seine Ausgrenzung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 9, 1991, p. 5.

29 Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the State Department, speaking to the German-American Conference of the Atlantik-Brücke in Berlin, April 18-21, 1991, as published in the Atlantik-Brücke's *Rundschreiben Nr. 3/1991*, May 23, 1991, p. 8.

30 "NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by 50%," *New York Times*, May 29, 1991, pp. 1/14.

31 The creation of the Rapid Reaction Corps was pushed primarily by the United States and Great Britain on the basis of their experiences in the Gulf War; Germany went along with that plan. France, not integrated in NATO's command structure, had hoped to push for a European-based rapid reaction force. French President Mitterrand was reported to have reacted "furiously" to NATO's surprise decision. See "France is Miffed at NATO Plan for Rapid Force," *International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 1991, p. 2.

one for a united Germany after the end of the Cold War, looking toward further European integration. It is compounded by the nuclear problem. Germany feels that it cannot forego the security guarantees offered by the American military presence in Germany in general, and its readiness to use nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes as a "last resort" in particular.[32] The same kind of protection is not (yet?) available from either France or Great Britain, the two other nuclear powers in NATO. Nor is it likely that a united Europe will be able to take care of its own nuclear deterrence needs within the foreseeable future. Thus Germany is caught between its reliance on the United States on the one side, and its desire for further European integration on the other. Much of the answer as to how that conflict might be resolved will depend on a French willingness to cooperate more closely with NATO (for which there are occasional indications).

The German dilemma is increased by virtue of the fact that a united Germany — finally reinstated as a member of good standing in the international community — realizes that it must play a more active international role in the future. Its hesitant reaction to the Gulf War, when it seemed as if Germany wanted to occupy the moral high ground and only grudgingly provided financial support to the coalition and affected countries, eventually made it clear to the Germans that they would be taken up on their claims to a "foreign policy of responsibility" in ways other than per checkbook.

Germany has insisted that its constitution does not allow employment of the *Bundeswehr* except for defense purposes or "to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law" (Article 87a, Basic Law). Since Article 24 of the Basic Law states that, "for the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security,"[33] the prevailing interpretation of these two constitutional requirements has been that the *Bundeswehr* could be used only within the treaty area defined by NATO. Demands for out-of-area employment, such as during the Gulf War, were denied with reference to these constitutional restrictions (that were, after all, incorporated in the Basic Law as a precaution against a rebirth of German militarism).

Germany is now faced with the problem of either having to change its constitution in order to allow *Bundeswehr* missions outside of NATO (that is, under U.N. auspices), or to change its interpretation of the constitution (according to some legal experts a simple solution to the prob-

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32 At the same time, the German government has made it quite clear that short-range — and particularly battlefield — nuclear weapons have no future in Germany. NATO's nuclear component will, therefore, have to be sea- and/or air-based in the future.

33 Article 24 continues: "in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world."

lem). The public debate over this issue is in full swing.[34] The Kohl government, having committed itself to a constitutional amendment, is now caught in a legal and political bind. The opposition SPD, whose support is required in order to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the *Bundestag*, is willing to go along with such an amendment, but is tempted to restrict it to U.N. peacekeeping ("blue helmet") missions only, which would, in fact, narrow the Federal Republic's freedom of maneuver. Under these conditions, Kohl is unwilling to seek a constitutional amendment.

As a way out of this dilemma, the Kohl government may seek to link the question of a German military contribution to out-of-area contingencies with the process of European unification. That is, if a united Europe were to establish a European military force, German troops could participate alongside other European soldiers (which would also minimize the specter of German soldiers once again appearing on the international scene).35 Which is one reason for Germany's strong interest in establishing a European Union. And that, in turn, is another element in united Germany's basic dilemma concerning its security orientation.

Germany realizes that with unification it has come close to achieving what it always wanted: to become a normal country and to be treated like a normal country. It is now faced with the problem of also having to behave like a normal country (where normality is defined both by Western values and the standards set by the world community). To deal with this problem responsibly will require some changes in attitudes, some changes in procedures, and, above all, some time. Eventually, however, united Germany should become normal in precisely that sense; all indications point in that direction. This, then, is the major strategic aspect of German unity: stability in change.

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34 Public opinion polls show a fairly solid majority against such a change of the Basic Law: 55% in May 1991, as opposed to 38% in favor. During the Gulf War (in February) opposition had been as high as 68%. (See "Uneins über den Paragraphen 218," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 25, 1991, p. 9.)

35 For Kohl's speculations in this regard, see "Kohl warnt vor einem Versinken Deutschlands in provinziellen Diskussionen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 18, 1991, p. 2.

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If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"European Political Union, The Middle East, and the Dutch Position in a New World Order

by

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EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE DUTCH POSITION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

At present the twelve member states of the European Community (EC) are hard working on what they prefer to call a "Political Union". What is the significance of such a "Union" for Europe's role in world affairs? Has it any different impact on the conflicts in the Middle East? What is the position of a country like the Netherlands in the Union? What her possibilities to steer Europe's foreign policy ?

To answer these questions we need first to recapitulate the origins, functions, and - likely - outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference on European Political Union (IGC-EPU). Next we shall try to assess its meaning for the Twelve's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, while finally some remarks will be made on the evolution of Dutch foreign policy in a new European and world setting.

I. Origins and functions of the IGC on Political Union

The political origins of the IGC-EPU, which started after the decision of the Rome European Council of 14th/15th December 1990 are twofold:

(1) Firstly, the dynamics of "Europe 1992" created the right momentum for the Twelve to advance into areas where progress has been long overdue: Economic and Monetary Union, and Political Union. The highly successful implementation of the 1992-programme; its penetrating effects on national decisionmaking and national legislation; its magnetic influence on the EC's North,-Central-, and South-European neighbours (triggering, among many other reactions, a new wave of association and membership requests); its world wide repercussions on trade politics, all have revitalized, in combination with a galaxy of new policy initiatives by the European Commission, the old European dream of an economic, monetary; and political union, both for pressing internal as for external purposes.

(2) This in itself already quite impressive drive got an additional urgency by the dramatic upheavals taking place in the EC's most sensitive adjacent regions: Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The uncertainties created by the end of the Cold War, the very sudden German reunification process, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation of NATO's military and political functions, led to several attempts to create "order" in the New World Order (by means of, for instance, the Charter of Paris or the Transatlantic Declaration - a similar Declaration between the EC and Japan will soon follow), but it also led to a natural reaction among the Twelve to herd closer together on their

"sheltered island of peace amidst violence and turmoil". The Gulf War, putting Europe's capacity for security cooperation and crisismanagement against a background of a massive redeployment of American troops, seriously to the test, could only could reinforce those feelings.

The IGC-EPU, therefore, serves a number of important functions:

(1) Firstly, to further amend the Community-Treaties to the necessity of more effective decisionmaking in the EC, of a better balance between her institutions, and of more democratic control. To these ends many proposals have been tabled by all the national delegations, the most sophisticated so far being the voluminous "non-paper" presented on April 12th by the Luxemburg Presidency. This "non-paper", amounting to a kind of "consolidating draft treaty", gives in a nutshell a comprehensive impression of the wide range of issues being presently negotiated by the Twelve under the heading of a "Political Union".

(2) The second major function of the IGC-EPU is to enhance the security profile of the EC. This function has gradually come to dominate the mere constitutional adaptations, and has by now become the core-issue of the IGC, causing considerable political discord among the participants, with France and the Netherlands being the most outspoken antagonists to date.

The controversy goes back to an Italian proposal, presented

during the Italian EC-Presidency in the autumn of 1990, to give the Community more responsibilities in the fields of security and defense, by transferring the tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) to the prospective European Political Union. The European Commission aired similar views, but he majority of the member states, meeting in Asolo on 6th/7th October (foreign ministers) and in Rome on 27th/28th October (European Council - "Rome-I"), had a number of reservations on the Italian proposals. At the European Council of 14th/15th December ("Rome-II") it was agreed, however, to expand the scope of the EPU's security profile beyond the present line drawn by Art.30 para. 6a of the Single European Act (i.e beyond coordination on the political and economic aspects of security), to include also military security and certain defense issues, like arms control, disarmament, the coordination of arms exports policies, CSCE matters, UN-peacekeeping, and non-proliferation.

At least two important points remained unsettled, however: the exact scope of the Union's competence on security and defense, and the organization of these functions.

A Franco-German proposal on these points, presented on the eve of "Rome-II" (a second draft followed in March 1991), has encountered considerable resistance from several member states, in particular from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark, and for different reasons, Ireland. Mitterrand and Kohl suggested to provide the Union with a common defense policy, and

to create to this end a close link between the EPU and the WEU, under the common roof of the European Council.

The controversy is not about the desirability to preserve NATO's core-functions, nor about the necessity of creating a stronger European pillar inside the Atlantic Alliance, and not even about the idea that a European Union in the end ("finalite politique") should have a common defense identity. On these point all the member states more or less agree. Sharply divergent viewpoints, however, exist as to the point how independent Europe's security arrangements should be on the short- and medium term, and centers around the question (to simplify a complicated, still ongoing debate) whether the WEU ought to find a place in the Political Union (under the supervision of the European Council) as France strongly prefers, or should rather develop as a European pillar in an outspoken Atlantic framework, as a bridge between NATO and the EPU.

(3) The IGC-EPU still has a third function, less visible perhaps, but not less important. Right after the "European Revolution", and in the wake of the Gulf War, it serves, in addition to mechanisms like the CSCE-process and the debates in NATO or the WEU, as a kind of "Concert of Europe", in order to redefine the positions of the member states vis-a-vis each other, and vis-a-vis the Community institutions, in a transformed international environment.

France in particular could use some reassurance in order to offset two serious inroads on her international position:

(a) Due to the disappearance of the immediate Soviet threat, the progress in East-West arms control, and the transformation of the military and political role of NATO, the use of France's "exclusiveness" in NATO has become less evident, and so did the function of one of the great symbols of French power: the force nucleaire.

(b) German reunification has pre-empted to a large degree the possibility to use Germany's post-war "inferiority" in political-psychological and military respects, as a leverage to gain easy German support for French European projects. The sudden merger of the two Germanies has changed the rules of this French game. Germany has gained full political sovereignty (with self-imposed military restrictions), its economic and political weight in Europe has been further increased (despite the heavy financial and political burdens of unification), and it surely is also in "moral" respect on the same par with the rest of the EC, after nearly half a century of outstanding democratic performance. It was not by chance that French diplomacy went through a deep crisis in the months following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

France, therefore, got on the look-out for alternative sources of power, "Europe" being, not for the first time, one of the most suitable platforms. Paris could use the idea of coupling the WEU

more closely to the EC/EPC for two purposes: (a) Granting the European Council a clear authority over (certain) security matters would further legitimize the role of this body as the "directory" of a booming and prosperous Community, and through it, improve the position of the larger member states in general, and that of a presidential political system like the French Republic in particular. (b) At the same time it provides Paris with an excuse not to become involved in NATO's integrated structure. The WEU is very useful in this respect, because on the one hand it signals (via Art.V) a true French commitment to Europe's security, while on the other hand cooperation would largely take place at an intergovernmental level, to a considerable degree independent from direct American interference, and weakening the Bonn-Washington axis to booth.

The Dutch objections against the proposed WEU-EPU link are not only concerned with security considerations or with the "intergovernmental" set-up of the structure (NATO, after all, is a very intergovernmental organization as well), but also with the hidden French motive of trying to gain the upper hand in the new European Union. As a "smaller medium-large" power the Netherlands always is very sensitive about its exact place around the table, and very much on the guard when the larger member states try to introduce elements into the Community which might easily impair the influence of the smaller ones.

To what extent these plans will succeed remains to be seen, but the above remarks may serve as a brief reminder that "Political Union" is not only about about twelve like-minded states sincerely aspiring for more unification, or for a more unified European role in the world, but also about the reshuffling of power among a group of states in a shaken European and world order (with the case of France just one, be it clear, example).

Nor is the Political Union exercise driven by blueprints on e.g. Europe's future role in Eastern Europe or the Middle East which go much beyond the present policies in this regard. And though the foreign policy and security provisions of the Union will undoubtedly surpass the restrictions of the SEA, they remain largely on an intergovernmental footing, within a firm Atlantic framework.

Hence it would be quite exaggerated to suggest that with the signing of a new treaty on Political Union (which will probably take place during the Dutch EC-Presidency in the second half of this year), a new powerful international actor is to appear on the world scene.

And yet, for a number of reasons the outcome of the IGC-EPU will make some difference as far as the international role of the EC is concerned.

(1) Firstly because a well-publicized launching of a "new"

European Political Union could only reinforce the positive effects created worldwide by the "Europe 1992" programme. It will probably also give an extra boost to the aspirations and claims of the European Commission to play a salient role in world affairs. The joint economic or military power of the Union may in itself become not that much larger, her prestige probably will rise, and the Union-project could further reinforce the propensity of the EC (nurtured particularly after the SEA) to use more eagerly Community instruments for clear political purposes, even in those cases where their usefullness is not very clear. Sometimes one even gets the impression that the EC tends to employ her economic weaponry not only for the purpose of bringing about certain policy results, but also to show the world that she, though still lacking the instruments of a superpower, too has "muscles".

(2) Furthermore, it should be realized that certain provisions of the "consolidated draft treaty" have a direct bearing on the international role of the Union. The "consistency" paragraphs (Art.B para.2; Art.C para 2), for instance, or the provisions about the role of the European Council (Art. C para. 1,2), or those implying the merger of the European Political Cooperation Secretariat with the General Secretariat of the Council (Art. D para.3), allow for a further pooling of the foreign policy resources of the Union, and might indeed produce, if adopted, a more effective posture of the Twelve in world politics.

II Europe and the Middle East

Though a European Political Union, then, will in many respects, at least for the time being, rather amount to a SEA-II than to a new federation, its psychological weight will also increase, and it will tend to use its - still restricted - foreign policy instruments perhaps more eagerly than before. Moreover, whatever the solemn atlantic declarations and loyalty pledges to NATO, a stronger Union could hardly escape the logics of more structural transatlantic tensions. The recent American objections against the EPU-WEU link were only a reminder of more frictions to come, quite irrespective of the best intentions on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

There are no indications, however, that Europe in the shape of a Political Union is about to develop a new strategy in the Middle East. A "Union" makes not that much difference with a "Community"; divergent national interests will inevitably continue to restrict the perspective of a strong unified approach; Israel in particular will not allow a key role for Europe; and the Europeans themselves are widely aware of the predominant American influence in the region after the Gulf War.

Moreover, there is perhaps an additional reason why Europe's

role in the Middle East will not be completely different from what we have seen in the past two decades or so: it is not very clear whether a very different approach would better serve Europe's interests. Or to put it in other words: the mixed assortment of common declarations, fact-finding missions, economic cooperation and political dialogues, financial assistance, diplomatic and economic sanctions, peacekeeping operations etcetera, has, in combination with the policies of the individual member states (sometimes out of step with the common EPC positions previously agreed to), and with a neat division of labour with the United States, after all not been that bad for certain European economic and politcal interests. Let me try to explain my point.

The EC's policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict have often been characterized as "being only declaratory", as "lacking unity and impact". Fred Halliday's remarks at a recent round table debate on Europe and the Middle East are a case in point. Halliday writes: "...in retrospect the Venice Declaration amounted to nothing but that - a set of words in the wind. It made no impact whatsoever on the Arab-Israeli dispute or on any of the major actors within it. Nor did it lead to significant changes in the policies towards Israel on the PLO pursued by separate EC members."

These observations seem to me not quite to the point for several

reasons:

(1) The Venice Declaration was a deliberate attempt of the EC to play a larger role in the area, next to the efforts of the United States; it opened for the Palestinian people the perspective "to exercise fully its right to self determination"; and it held the opinon that the PLO would have to be associated with peace negotiations. The Nine declared also to be "deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East". This document, which was followed by a series of other measures (like the celebrated fact-finding missions), can, measured only by the strong disapproval it met in Washington and Jerusalem, certainly not be considered as a "mere set of words in the wind". It is still one of the basic documents for the EC's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

According to the provisions of the SEA Art.30 para.2, which stipulate the obligation to consult each other and to develop "common principles and objectives", the EPC record on the Middle East is not that negative. Whatever the obvious weaknesses of Europe's common declarations, and whatever the individual transgressions of the common line, it remains true that initially nine, and later ten and twelve West European countries, many of them with very specific national sympathies in the region, have succeeded in gradually developing a reasonably consistent policy on several key aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

(2) The Venice Declaration probably has made a substantial impact on the evolution of this conflict as well, in so far it explicitly reinforced the status and position of the PLO (without demanding any significant concession in return), and by doing so has contributed to the hardening of the positions on both sides of the conflict. If the EC from the beginning had followed more or less the American line on the Palestinian question, there would have been a very powerful Western bloc, which might have tipped the balance of world opinion more in favour of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people rather than in favour of the legitimacy of the PLO. This argument is of course highly speculative, but it just wants to show that the impact of "Venice", though perhaps not very positive, is not by definition absent.

(3) Moreover, EPC has been successfull in the sense that it led to a certain "Europeanization" of several national foreign policies. Through its elaborate consultations on several levels, Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, were gradually forced to leave their rather pro-Israeli bent, while on the other hand countries like Spain and Greece came to improve their relationship with Israel under European supervision.

The confusion about the significance of Europe's role in the Middle East is undoubtedly related to the rather ambiguous status of the EC as an international actor, but it is also caused by the

fact that the criteria by which to judge this role are often mixed up.

The best way, both to judge the degree of success of the European involvement with the Middle East and to understand its (likely) evolution under the prospective European Political Union, is to use the yardstick of Europe's broad pattern of sometimes contradictory, collective and individual interests in the region. Peace and stability are undoubtedly key interests but they are not the only ones. And it sometimes serves Europe better to remain aloof, or to show not too much unity, than to really develop a true common foreign policy.

III. The Dutch position

(to be completed)

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If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
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"The Applicability of the CSCE Experience to the Middle East Conflict Area"

by

Hans-Heinrich Wrede

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Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

June 11-13, 1991

The Applicability of the CSCE Experience to the Middle East Conflict Area

"Shamir envisages Helsinki Process":
this headline in a March issue of the International Herald Tribune promised more than the article delivered. It was pointed out that the Prime Minister was interested in the possibility of a rapprochement between Israel and the Arab States based on practical measures that stopped short of full recognition. A Government Committee was to outline Israeli ideas for a process that - according to the IHT - some officials see as a Middle Eastern version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

From the Arab side, the former Oil Minister of Saudi-Arabia, Sheik Ahmed S. Jamani, also expressed interest in the Helsinki concept (Interview of March 15, 1991, with the "Zeit") and declared:

> "Like in Europe we need a sort of CSCE process for the Arab world ... with three "negotiation baskets": security in the region; human rights, democracy and religious tolerance; redistribution of wealth between the states and within the states ..."

Both Prime Minister Shamir and Sheik Jamani have been reacting to voices from Europe, among them the Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis, his German counterpart Genscher and the Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky suggesting to examine the CSCE experience with the view to ascertain its usefulness for the Middle East. In particular, Gianni de Michelis has repeatedly - and in quite elaborate terms (e.g. in the "Guardian", issue of March 13, 1991) - called for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM).

Italy's Foreign Minister, borrowing in his proposals heavily from UN and CSCE principles and procedures, demanded, i.a., that

"all the interested parties must be invited to join ... without allowing negotiations to be held back because of mutual vetoes (if some decline the invitation)".

De Michelis :

"Access to the CSCM would be open to all parties who are willing to comply with a set of principles that would be a kind of entry ticket to the new club."

It might be worthwhile to turn now from these rather general pronouncements to the CSCE itself, its evolution since the early 70'ies, its substantial subject matters as well as its rules of work.

However, the CSCE came only into existence after the German "Ostpolitik" bore its fruits: the bilateral treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union, Poland, the CSSR, and, most significantly, the GDR. Part and parcel of this treaty network was the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. In all of these ground-breaking East-West accords one basic idea was put into concrete terms: despite of continuing differences of principle, the treaty signatories were determined to arrive at a practical modus vivendi in order to ease the hardships of the division of Europe, most dramatically manifested by the Berlin Wall.

This new - and successful - approach was best expressed in the "Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republik" (signed Dec. 21, 1972). According to the Preamble of the Treaty, the FRG and the GDR have

agreed to develop normal good-neighbourly relations in

> "Proceeding from the historical facts and without prejudice to the differing views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Repbulic on questions of principle, including the national question,
>
> Desiring to create the conditions for co-operation ... for the benefit of the people in the two German States."

Furthermore, in so-called "Statements of Record" attached to the Treaty, the "High Contracting Parties" underlined even more clearly their deep differences by saying:

> "The Federal Republic of Germany states on record: "Questions of nationality have not been regulated by the Treaty."
>
> The German Democratic Republic states on record: "The German Democratic Republic proceeds from the assumption that the Treaty will facilitate a regulation of questions of nationality."

Finally, in a unilateral letter not rejected by the GDR, the Federal Government confirmed its position on German unity by declaring:

> "... this Treaty does not conflict with the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination."

Thus, the process of normalizing relations between the FRG and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe could commence and did - certainly only very gradually - benefit the people in Germany. The path to multilateral East-West understanding in Europe was cleared by the FRG; its avant-garde role for the CSCE constitutes a genuine historical accomplishment. What "Ostpolitik" did bilaterally, the CSCE has attempted to do in a large multilateral framework.

In 1975, the Heads of State and Government of 35 countries - all

European states (with the exception of Albania) and the two North American countries, USA and Canada - signed the Helsinki Final Act, a political declaration of high significance, however, not a treaty binding under international law. The Helsinki agreement covers an unusual mixture of topics, split-up in so-called "baskets": Principles, including the respect of human rights, to govern the relations between States and confidence building measures in the military field (basket I); cooperation in the economic field, in environment, science, technology and other matters (basket II); humanitarian cooperation in human contacts across the frontiers, information, colture, and education (basket III).

The Helsinki results are far from what the Soviet Union originally wanted to achieve. Already during the 50'ies the Soviet Union had asked for an "All-European Security Conference" in order to get once and for all formal recognition and confirmation of the post-war order in Europe, especially the establishment of the GDR and the set-up of the Warsaw Pact under Soviet domination. In addition, the Soviets clearly aimed at removing the United States of America from European soil.

Against these Soviet objectives, the Western Alliance succeeded in insisting on some essential points in the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act:

First, full participation of the North American States in the Helsinki process;

Secondly, possibilities for change in Europe, with particular regard to the frontiers: "Their frontiers can be changed ... by peaceful means and by agreement".

Thirdly, raising human rights to an equally ranking principle of inter-state relations (relevant UN-resolutions did not endorse human rights on such a high level) and making humanitarian co-operation a central field of their relations;
Finally, the inter-relationship of the ten Helsinki principles: "They will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others".
CSCE principles are not to be observed in a selective fashion: All of them are equally valid. In practice: The right of self-determination must be respected, but cannot be obtained by use of force. Human rights are rights of individual citizens, but can also be advocated directly from government to government: the principle of non-interference in internal affairs cannot hinder the persistent plea for human rights.

In 1973, when the preparatory consultations for drafting the Helsinki Final Act were initiated, just a few flexible procedures were adopted. One of the rules stipulates that "the Conference shall take place outside military alliances" and that all states will participate as "sovereign and independent states ... in conditions of full equality". Critics at the time called these principles cynical fiction, completely contrary to the true state of affairs (subordination of Middle and East Europe under Soviet rule). Now - almost 20 years later - the peaceful evolution in Central Europe has finally proven the validity of the CSCE. The message of the process is: it takes long, but it can succeed.

The main procedural reason for the time-consuming character of CSCE meetings is obviously the principle of consensus. But it does ensure

- that no state must fear to be "outnumbered";
- that smaller states will not be dominated by the "big ones";
- that willingness to compromise is indispensable;
- that agreed results - while often reflecting merely the lowest common denominator - take into account the interests of all.

Within the CSCE concept, the notion of all-embracing cooperation has, from the beginning, been a central feature, however, more in theory than in practice. Only very recently, at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation by the 35 CSCE participating states in the spring of 1990, this objective laid down in Basket II has found the sincere support of all. More generally, the participants have at last acknowledged what is well known from everyday life: only if one sees his own interests duly respected, will he take into account the interests of the other one as well; only the fair accomodation of each others's interests wil assure durable accords. No doubt: as it has been conceded before, things in CSCE take long. But, the over-all record since Helsinki is remarkable. Cooperation and contacts based on the CSCE accords of 1975 contributed towards freedom of movement in the divided Europe and to the gradual advancement of human rights despite many severe setbacks. CSCE also allowed first, albeit modest steps towards military confidence-building. The key issue has been the full implementation of CSCE commitments, especially those in the fields of human rights.

Because of Soviet lack of "performance", the CSCE-Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83), to some extent also in Vienna (1986-89), centered largely on condemning flagrant disrespect of human rights. The main cause of concern was, of course, the persecution and imprisonment of dissidents in the Soviet Union and the plight of the Jewish people in that country (as well as their futile attempts to obtain exit visa). At the same time - fortunately -it was possible to agree on further measures in the military field (Stockholm 1986), in commercial exchanges as well as in the creation of better conditions for human contacts, unimpeded information and cultural activities across the borders from West to East and, eventually, vice versa, too.

The CSCE also convened a number of experts' meetings e.g. in the field of human rights and human contacts (Ottawa 1985, Berne 1986). Other subjects high on the international agenda were also discussed in CSCE gatherings, for example, environment problems (Sofia 1989) and jounalists' working conditions (London 1989).

Summing up the CSCE history, its topics, its work methods and its results, one might come to a somewhat paradox conclusion: CSCE has rendered the resolution of problems possible by problem accumulation. The CSCE approach has linked seemingly incompatible subjects together, with the aim of finding solutions for all of them, solutions, however, that are mutually dependent in their actual implementation. This then is the "Genius of the Final Act", as Hans-Dietrich Genscher once phrased it, to collect just about all imaginable problems in three "baskets" and to offer solution models (some slightly concrete, most of them very vague).

Today - especially after the recent main event of the CSCE, the Paris summit in November 1990 where 34 Heads of State and Government adopted the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" - the global approach developed since Helsinki that combines military confidence-building, comprehensive cooperation with human rights' implementation is accepted by everyone. It is derived from the recognition that military strength alone cannot ensure peace but that only an extended concept of security which includes all components of international relations will establish enduring stability and "make the world safe for diversity". At least in Europe, it appears, policy makers now agree without reservation that genuine peace along with social justice in the international realm can be reached only by common efforts across frontiers and beyond ideological confrontations, by determined joint action against world-wide dangers (e.g. pollution, terrorism, minority problems, the ever-deepening North-South-gap).

Whether CSCE experiences, structures or norms might also, to some extent, be applicable to the Middle East, can be judged and decided by the responsible statesmen in the region alone. Of course, no one would be so foolish to transfer CSCE principles and practices prematurely or sweepingly to a completely different environment. However, if one perceives the CSCE as a learning process (with quite a significant amount of trial and error), then, with an appropriate degree of caution and modesty, some CSCE insights and ideas might be of use elsewhere as well.

Albania - as mentioned before - acted in the early 70'ies by the maxim of Groucho Marx:

"I do not want to be a member of a club which accepts me as a member."

Last year, Albania applied for membership in the CSCE, giving up its long, futile course of isolation. In Paris, Albania was accorded observer status.

Evidently, in the Middle East as of now, the potential participants in a CSCE-like conference do not yet share at all the same perception of the basic priniciples governing the relations between states. Both the German "Ostpolitik" and the CSCE have proven, however, that, with solid safeguards on the procedural level, no state can be overruled. Moreover, every state is obliged to state its case persuasively. In the last analysis, among many negotiating partners, one state needs to convince just one more in order not to become isolated and to be accused of blocking consensus.
If one state declares the supremacy of just one principle, that won't work. In the CSCE, all principles are equal and must be implemented together and in parallel.
CSCE teaches patience; the leitmotif of implementing the commitments of Helsinki certainly was slow motion. But - again - small steps in all fields and at all levels did contribute to confidence-building in a very large sense, well beyond the original meaning of this military terminus technicus.

The major lesson of Europe's path to peace is: people must be able to communicate and to meet, to inform each other about their daily lives and about their countries. Simple experiences like student exchanges, sports events, town-twinning arrangements, telebridges can immensely help in overcoming barriers of misunderstanding and of prejudice.

The newly appointed personal Representative of the UN-Secretary for the Middle East, the Swiss Ambassador in Washington, Edouard Brunner, is a CSCE "veteran" and enjoys a great reputation as one of the leading spokesmen of the Neutral and Nonaligned countries in the CSCE. Mr. Brunner, known as a creative and prudent diplomat, has a few weeks ago (interview with the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", issue of April 12, 1991) stated that he did not exclude drawing eventually from CSCE experiences in the negotiating process for the Middle East. Another observation of his was that initial movement towards rapprochement between the Middle East antagonists might be confidence-building measures which - according to Brunner - in a first stage would be rather humanitarian ones than military measures. - In the Middle East, governments, propagandists, the so-called "common people" - all of them need, as it has been the case in Europe, to get rid of "Berührungsangst" and of "Enemy perceptions". This can be accomplished by a concerted effort of dialogue and encounter on all levels. With other words: implement "Basket III" of the Helsinki Final Act! The effort required will be neither easy nor quick, but it must be started. No state and no person has reason to abstain from this effort or to shrink back from such basic human interactions: nor does any government need to fear a Conference based on clear, firm ground rules. On the other hand, of course, as a precondition of dialogue between equals, vigilance and a sufficient defense remain necessary. With regard to stock markets it was observed:

> "In any market, as in any poker game, there is a fool. An astute investor once said that any player unaware of the fool in the market probably is the fool in the market." ("Liar's Poker" by Michael Lewis, Penguin Books 1990).

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy addressed the American University in Washington (on June 10, 1963). His statement is rightly considered to be a breakthrough towards détenté and an early forecast of the CSCE vision. Kennedy's message, both sober and hopeful, is still applicable today and to conflicts everywhere. He said:

> "Let us focus on a more practical, more attainable peace based on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned ... Let us not be blind to our differences - but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved..."

When and if the Kennedy appeal is heard in an eventual Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, no participant runs the risk of becoming "the fool in the market". Quite to the contrary, everyone will benefit from it.

Note : The Annex provides excerpts of major documents from the CSCE history and other relevant materials:

- The Helsinki Decalogue (Helsinki Final Act 1975)
- Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament (HFA 1975)
- Compliance and Verification (Excerpt from Stockholm Document 1986)
- Implementation of the Stockholm Document (Excerpt from the "Report on Arms Control and Disarmament and on Changes in the Balance of Military Power 1988" by the Government of the FRG 1990)

- Art. XVI (Joint Consultative Group) of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (1990)
- New structures and institutions of the CSCE Process (Excerpt from the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" 1990)
- Ten-point program of Confidence-building measures for the Middle East (excerpt from Remarks by James Goodby at UN- Conference on CSBM's in Vienna, Feb. 25, 1991).

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If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"Israel, Arms Control in the Middle East and the European Example"

by

Itshak Lederman

Tel-Aviv University

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

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"ISRAEL, ARM CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE

Contents

I. Introduction

II. The Challenge of Arms Control in the Middle East

III. Avenues of Arms Control in the Middle East

IV. Israel and Arms Control in the Middle East

V. The European Example

VI. Conclusion

Endnotes

"ISRAEL, ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE"

by Dr. Itshak Lederman

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I. INTRODUCTION

The war in the Gulf has clearly exposed the dangers of an unlimited arms race in a region as volatile as the Middle East.

The piling-up of huge quantities of conventional and unconventional weapon-systems has enabled Saddam's Iraq to occupy Kuwait overnight and to threaten all its neighbors. The destruction of the Iraqi war machine was made possible only by the unflinching determination of US leadership, its patience in building an international coalition against Saddam and its success to defeat the Iraqi troops.

The aggression of Iraq against Kuwait and its repulsion has inflicted numerous casualties on the whole region and caused heavy damages to the economies and environment of the parties involved in the war.

The political and military nature of the Gulf war has put Israel in an awkward position, forcing her to absorb Skudds missiles attacks on its civilian population without a response, while coalition forces have been crippling Iraq's military forces and strategic infrastructure. Saddam's

threat to use unconventional weapons added a menacing dimension to the already violent conflict.

Thus, regional arms control has been marked by the US as one of the main pillars of its policy in the Middle East after the Gulf war ended.(1) But arms control has been an anathema to Middle Eastern actors, given the region's internal conflicts and the continuous involvement of great powers in its politics and economics.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Israeli interests in and basic positions on arms control in the Middle East and to assess the chances of its success in the wake of the Gulf War. The European experience in arms control negotiations and agreements and especially in developing Confidence Building Measures (CBM) provides a useful lens through which possible Israeli policies are assessed and recommended.

The analysis focuses, first, on the challenge of developing arms control processes in the Middle East.

Second, possible avenues of conducting arms control processes in the region are briefly discussed.

Third, Israel's interests and its positions on various arms control initiatives are examined.

Fourth, lessons of the European case in developing arms control and CBM processes are briefly reviewed and their relevance to the Middle East is duly assessed.

Finally, an effort is made to define an overall

approach to regional arms control, that will preserve its national security on the one hand and promote the chances of peace in the region, on the other.

Before getting down to the main analysis it is appropriate to define several key terms that are used in the paper.(2)

Arms control is defined here as the process of freezing current levels of weaponry of the participants in the process or of reducing these levels according to agreed-upon quotas, in an orderly and verifiable manner.

CBM are defined as mutual activities and procedures aimed at reducing the level of tension among rivals and enhancing the confidence and trust among them. CBM include both political and military activities.

Verification(3) is a process of ascertaining the truth of a situation. In the language of arms control, verification refers to both the process and the means by which the parties to an agreement are able to ascertain with confidence that the other party or parties are abiding by the terms of the agreement.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

It should be stated from the outset that the main challenge facing arms control process in the region is how to begin it and ensure participation of the main regional players as well as the involvement of the main suppliers of

weapon systems to the region.

Once an arms control process is opened in the region, many other difficulties--of essence and of procedural nature --will certainly arise. However, the main challenge is to begin the process in the first place.

Why is it so difficult to begin the process in the Middle East? the difficulties are both internal and external.

External Difficulties

The chances to reach a suppliers' agreement, curtailing arms sales to the region are not so bright. First, political factors, such as the establishment of a regional security system in the Gulf with US involvement and the returning of a more conservatively oriented Soviet Union to the Middle East arena--strongly favor new and huge arms sales by both the US and the Soviet Union.(4) Following them are France and Great Britain.

In addition, strong economic and internal pressures are applied by the main defense industries on their governments in the West as well as in the East, to grab the new opportunity and supply the Middle East with arms in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

Other major suppliers, like the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea and suppliers from Latin America, are not reluctant, even after the Gulf War, to sell any

arms-- even ballistic missiles--to the Middle East, in order to get hard currency.

Thus, it seems that the only chance of restraining somewhat the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a US led initiative to arrive at a formal or tacit agreement by the main suppliers, including the Soviet Union and China. Even in this case the prospects of success are not convincing. It will be difficult to initiate such an agreement as we approach election time in the US, and it will be even more difficult to monitor a tacit agreement of restraint.

Regional Difficulties

Internal complexities of the region present what seems to be unsurmountable difficulties on the road towards an arms control process. The Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as many other violent and latent conflicts, urge every nation in the region to arm itself to the teeth. Ethnic, religious, cultural and societal rivalries and tensions, prevailing in the region, promise to further inflame the perpetual arms race.

The conventional wisdom of the region clearly teaches that only the strong ones survive and secondly, that any scenario is possible. thus, once and again, every major war in the region gave incentives to a new arms race, preparing the way for the next round.

Arms control negotiations between Israel and the Arabs face many special difficulties, in addition to the general ones, mentioned above.

First, both sides differ in their concept of arms control's objectives. While Israel considers the arms control negotiations as an integral part of the general peace process and as a means to achieve an end--a comprehensive peace, the Arab states view arms control as an end by itself, aiming to constrain Israeli power and to weaken its deterrent posture, especially the unconventional one. Arms control could be also used to preserve the asymmetry of conventional forces between Israel and the Arab states.

Second, the fact that most of the Arab states still do not recognize Israel will probably prevent the opening of any arms control process before a political recognition is achieved or before political negotiations begin. The preferred arms control process, from the Arabs point of view, is to force Israel, by international pressure, to sign the NPT or the upcoming CWC.

Third, Israel would not agree, of course, to the Arab concept and positions as stated above. From the Israeli point of view, any arms control process must include all types of weapon-systems, conventional and unconventional alike. the main reason for that position is the asymmetry in the conventional field, prevailing between Israel and the

Arabs. However, assuming negotiations on all types of arms, Israel will probably agree to open arms control negotiations before the beginning of political negotiations, because negotiating on arms control by itself imply a certain recognition of the Arab states in Israel.

Prospects of negotiations

What are the prospects,if any, of opening an arms control process in the Middle East, taking into consideration the many difficulties mentioned above?

First and foremost, the Gulf War and the devastation it inflicted on the region has enhanced the overall chances of opening an arms control process in the Middle East.

There is a general agreement, at least a rhetorical one, among all the important actors, on the urgent need to limit the arms race in the Middle East. The US, the Soviet Union, and the Europeans on the suppliers side and Israel, Egypt and the Gulf states on the buyers side, have been signaling their will to consider such an endeavor since the war ended. Israel, for example, has recently suggested to convene an international conference on arms control in the Middle East.(5) However, the Israeli position accentuates the need to negotiate limitations on all types of weapons, beginning with conventional arms while the Arabs focus on unconventional arms control. The US and the Western powers want to focus on unconventional weapons and to establish a

control mechanism on nuclear plants. Israel has a traditional position in this respect, supporting the initiative to establish the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone, pending parallel negotiations on limiting conventional arms. But in spite the significant differences among the actors, there is a mutual desire to do something in this field--and that is a new phenomenon in the Middle East.

Second, the possibility of opening a peace process between Israelis and Arabs has enhanced the chances of including arms control negotiations within its framework.

Third, if an agreement is reached on a CBM process between Israel and the Arabs, it is plausible to assume that arms control negotiations will follow.

The balance between the difficulties and the prospects to open an arms control process in the Middle East is more favorable now than it was before the Gulf war. The questions that have to be answered before such a process is opened are: how to begin the process? what are its possible frameworks? what are the areas of negotiations and who will participate in them, and finally, what verification mechanisms should be used to control the prompt execution and maintenance of the agreements.

III. AVENUES OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

There are several options to develop an arms control process in the Middle East; however, some of them have better chances to succeed than others. The main avenues of arms control in the Middle East are the following:

(1) A suppliers agreement on limiting arms transfers to the Middle East;

(2) Applying international pressure on states in the Middle East to join international agreements that prohibit unconventional weapons--for example, the NPT and the CWC.

(3) Regional negotiations on conventional arms control, unconventional arms control or both.

(4) A regional CBM process.

(5) Arms control negotiations within the framework of a peace process between Israel and the Arabs (including the Palestinians).

(6) Demilitarization arrangements that include restrictions on forces and weapons within specific zones.

(7) Verification regimes to monitor all types of agreements and arrangements.

A suppliers agreement

This avenue could succeed only if the main suppliers agree, formally or tacitly, on ways to restrain arms sales

to the Middle East: by a total or partial embargo or by quotas. While the US, Western Europe and the Soviet Union tend to agree on some "rules of the game"(6), states like China and North Korea put obstacles and threaten to impede the process. Applying international pressure on those and other uncooperative states as well as offering them incentives to participate in the effort (aid packages for example), might convince them to join the process. However, it should not be forgotten that the main suppliers themselves face strong internal and external pressures to continue and sell arms to the Middle East.

It is clear that without a suppliers' agreement there is a small chance to negotiate successfully arms control agreements in the Middle East. American initiatives and leadership like the Bush Arms Control Initiative of May 29, 1991, are crucial to the success of this endeavor.

Preventing proliferation

International cooperation to prevent proliferation of unconventional weapons in the Middle East as well as to block sales of technologies supporting independent development of such weapons in the Middle East--might develop in several ways.

One alternative is to reach an agreement among the main suppliers to prevent any sale of equipment and technologies, critical to the development of unconventional weapons. This

and progress be made.

The first condition is the participation of the main arms suppliers in the process, formally or tacitly behind the scene.

The second condition is having some progress in the peace process between Israel and the Arabs. Only a positive atmosphere would enable the adversaries of the Middle East to negotiate on arms freeze or reduction.

The third condition is having parallel negotiations on conventional and unconventional arms.

The fourth condition is phasing the negotiations and agreements, thus enabling the participants to monitor compliance with their implementation.

A regional CBM process

Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, Europe has acquired positive experience in developing and successfully applying CBM in the Continent. Establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided the framework within which the Stockholm agreement was signed on September 1986.

The European CBM included exchange of data and schedules of major exercises in Europe; inviting military observers to these exercises and obligatory On-Site-Inspections (OSI), based on annual quotas, to monitor exercises and large military activities.

It can be plausibly argued that the chances of a CBM process to succeed in the Middle East have significantly improved since the Gulf War, because of the following developments:

(1) The regional recognition that war could be devastating and that its risks should be minimized.

(2) The opportunity to include a CBM process as part of or even a prologue of a peace process.

(3) Strong American support of the process which reduces risks of war and enhances a positive atmosphere among adversaries that do not have to give up their positions in other fields of negotiations.

Arms Control as Part of the Peace Process

It seems that this scenario has the best chances of success, since the Arab-Israeli conflict is mainly a political one. Once both sides agree to renew the peace process, the general atmosphere will change and enable also CBM and maybe arms control negotiations. It could be argued that progress or setbacks in the political process would have significant influence on the progress of CBM and arms control. Thus, a main strategy to close the gap between the participants' positions will be to link phases in both

processes (the peace process and the arms control process) and to design mixed packages, consisting of political and arms control components.

Demilitarization and Limited-Forces Zones

Former and current Arab-Israeli agreements include military annexes, establishing demilitarized buffer zones or limited-forces zones, in the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Although these arrangements can not be termed arms control in the classical sense, they do impose limitations on forces and arms in pre-designed zones, thus supporting the agreements themselves. The acquired experience in this area can definitely teach us important lessons that are relevant to a more comprehensive process of arms control in the Middle East.

Verification Regimes

Verification regimes of political agreements, CBM and arms control agreements are a must in the Middle East context, as they were in the European and Superpower contexts.

The violent and unstable environment of the Middle East requires the establishment of strict verification regimes to any agreement between Israel and Arab states.

Verification regimes fulfill three major tasks: detection of violations, deterring violations and promoting

the confidence in the agreements (important for internal politics) and between the signatories. In the Arab-Israeli context, verification regimes that include CBM such as joint committees, direct lines of communication and maybe joint inspection teams, could enhance the overall confidence and trust in the region.

It should be mentioned that Israel, Syria and Egypt have positive experience in operating during 17 years now, verification regimes of the Israeli-Syrian Separation of Forces Agreement (1974), the Israeli-Egyptian Separation of Forces Agreement (1974), the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement in the Sinai (1975) and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty (1979). This valuable experience could be used in the design of verification regimes to peace agreements, arms control agreements and CBM agreements in the Middle East.

Summing up, it is clear that the prospect of beginning an arms control process in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab States depends on the following <u>necessary</u> conditions:

(1) A suppliers agreement, formal or tacit, to limit arms sales to the region.

(2) The opening of a peace process in the region. Arms control and CBM within the framework of such a process has better chances to begin and eventually succeed.

(3) Agreed upon principles on arms control and CBM, between Israel and the Arabs.

Having briefly analyzed the challenge of arms control in the Middle East and reviewed its main avenues, it is appropriate to focus on the Israeli point of view, interests and strategies on arms control. As in the peace process, arms control could not be advanced in the Middle East without Israel. It is therefore very important to understand the Israeli concerns and assess the best ways to sooth them, in order to guarantee an active Israeli participation in the process.

IV. ISRAEL AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Israel has not been an active player in the arms control field for obvious reasons. However, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Israel has strategic and tactical objectives in joining arms control and CBM processes in the Middle East. Understanding the Israeli interests and concerns will enable us to assess the broad lines of a possible Israeli arms control strategy.

It should be emphasized once again that for Israel arms control and CBM are and will always be only a means and not an end. Their main objective is to facilitate the road towards peace and stability in the Middle East.

Another important aspect of the Israeli general concept

of arms control is its incorporation in the overall national security strategy and policies. In this respect it follows the classical approach to arms control, as developed by Schelling and Halperin during the sixties.(7)

Strategic and Tactical Objectives

The strategic objectives of Israel in a Middle East arms control process are:

(1) The integration of arms control and CBM processes within the framework of an Arab-Israeli peace process. Arms Control and CBM are grasped as elements that can promote the peace process.

(2) The reduction of security expenses and the possibility to direct scarce resources to domestic needs such as "Aliya" (immigration) absorption and the development of the economy.

(3) Stabilization of the Middle East and reducing the risk of deterioration into new wars.

(4) Blocking one-sided initiatives of arms control which endanger Israel's security and its deterrent posture in the Middle East.

The tactical objectives of Israel in following arms control initiatives in the region are as follows:

(1) Opening another line of communication with

the Arab states that agree to participate in CBM and arms control processes:

(2) Cooperating with the US, the vital ally, that initiates, favors and promotes these processes.

(3) Scoring points in the perpetual battle over the sympathy and support of the international public opinion.

(4) Blocking, by its positive approach, new American arms sales to Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and other Gulf States, and maybe preventing the implementation of huge arms sales planned by China and North Korea to Syria, Iran, Libya and Algeria.

An Arms Control Strategy for Israel

Based on those objectives Israel has to prepare a strategy to deal with two dangerous developments in the arms control process. The first danger lies in the traditional approach of the big powers and the Arab states favoring international mechanism of controlling unconventional capabilities(8)--without a simultaneous initiative to cut significantly Arab quantitative superiority in conventional arms and without linking the arms control process and its progress to the peace process and its progress. Historical evidence on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict

supports Israeli caution in this respect.

The second risk is presented by the possibility of a new, spiraling arms race in the region, which will prevent Israel from investing its scarce resources primarily in "Aliya" absorption and economic development.

In order to achieve its objectives and cope successfully with dangerous developments, Israel should design a coherent and positive strategy of arms control.

The Israeli position, already declared by its policy-makers(9), before and after president Bush announced his arms control initiative for the Middle East, is on the right truck, namely, a plea for a regional conference on arms control, dealing with all types of weapons and including the main suppliers.

The general outline of an Israeli arms control strategy would probably include the following elements:

(1) Promoting the idea of a regional conference dealing with arms control issues, beginning with CMB and conventional arms and continuing with unconventional arms.

(2) Encouraging the inclusion of arms control and CBM processes within the framework of the peace process.

(3) Developing new initiatives of unconventional arms control, such as a regional agreement on CW within the framework of the CWC.

(4) Stating clearly what is not acceptable to Israel, namely, focusing primarily on unconventional arms control without parallel negotiation on conventional arms, and separating arms control development and phases from progress in the peace process.

A common line to all these elements should be the design of detailed plans and their coordination with the US.

Getting down to details raises the question whether Israel could learn from others' experience in the fields of arms control and CBM. The European example comes immediately into one's mind.

V. THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE

The overall arms control effort in Europe included two main elements: a confidence building process and arms reduction negotiations.

The CBM Path(10)

The CBM process began with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This agreement included three areas or "baskets" of cooperation: economic and technical cooperation "basket", security "basket" and human rights "basket".

In the security field, the CSCE served as the framework to promote security and stability in Europe. Eleven years of

conferences and negotiations were needed until the Stockholm Agreement was signed in September 1986.(11)

The Stockholm Agreement, signed by 35 European nations, focused on CBM such as a joint committee, exchange of military data, regular exchange of schedules of exercises and out-of-garrison activities, and obligatory OSI of exercises and military activities all over Europe, according to agreed-upon quotas, by ground and aerial inspection teams. The objective was to reduce the probability of a surprise attack in Europe and to establish trust among the military echelons. A second, more cooperative package of CBM is scheduled to be signed in Moscow in May 1992.

The Arms Reduction Path

Parallel to the CBM path, NATO and the Warsaw Pact conducted during 16 years (1973-1989) the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) talks on their conventional forces--to no avail. The main obstacles to reach an agreement in this framework of arms control were: disagreement on the data concerning the European balance of forces; disagreement on how to cut the forces; and rejection of OSI by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The breakthrough in the conventional arms negotiations in Europe was achieved when Gorbachev changed dramatically Soviet traditional stands and the Warsaw Pact agreed to the principle of asymmetrical cuts of forces in Europe and to

intrusive OSI. The mandate of the talks was changed accordingly as well as the name of the framework. The Conventional Forces of Europe (CFE) talks were conducted from March 1989 until their successful conclusion and the signing of the first CFE agreement in Paris, on November 19, 1990.

The European Success

Why have these long and arduous negotiations finally yielded agreements in the two paths of CBM and arms control?

Many agree that the "Gorbachev factor" played the decisive part since 1985 in the successful conclusion of these agreements and indeed, without the strategic change in policy, made by Gorbachev in arms control as well as in other foreign policy fields, it is difficult to imagine how those negotiations would have come to conclusion.

However, it could be plausibly argued that the long negotiation processes contributed eventually, by their mere existence, to the successful conclusion of the agreements. The laborious efforts done in joint negotiation teams during many years, have clarified positions, cleared data and got both sides to know each other well. Once the strategic change was made, it took in both cases (Stockholm and CFE I) about two years of rapid negotiation to finish the job.

Another factor was the persistence of the Europeans, in spite of all the ups and downs in Superpower relations

during the seventies and eighties, to press on and continue the negotiations.

Main Lessons for Israel and the Middle East

The situation in the Middle East is quite different from the conditions in Europe. In Europe all the states have recognized one another and did not question the legitimacy or sovereignty of any state. In the Middle East many Arab states still do not recognize Israel and are reluctant to deal with it in any framework.

Second, while the Arab-Israeli conflict alone has produced five major wars in the last 43 years--and is still volatile and hazardous - the European scene, apart from Cold War tensions and crises, has not witnessed an actual war between the two rival blocs during that time.

The physical parameters of both areas (Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Middle East) are also dissimilar in many aspects: the area of operation, the differences in forces, numbers, geography, topography and population concentration.

Moreover, in the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel faces alone the whole Arab and Muslim worlds while in Europe there were two opposing alliances.

In spite of the significant differences, I would argue that several lessons could be adapted from the European case to the Middle East. These lessons are the following:

(1) Two separate but not mutually exclusive negotiation tracks can be conducted simultaneously: one on CBM and one on arms freeze and reduction.

(2) The special characteristics of the Middle East as a regional sub-system promise better chances of success to the CBM path rather than the arms reduction path. Moreover, it can be plausibly argued that successful implementation of CBM would promote the peace process and bring, maybe, later on, a successful negotiation on arms reduction.

(3) In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is more probable that a political process will be opened before an arms control one. However, negotiating CBM or even implementing CBM without formal agreement might happen before peace negotiations are opened.

(4) A breakthrough in the Middle East context, both in the peace process and in the arms control process, might happen with Arab open recognition of Israel. If this breakthrough is implemented, it would be parallel in significance to the strategic changes in foreign policy, made by Gorbachev.

Nevertheless, even if such a formal

recognition in Israel comes later, the negotiation process is by itself a recognition of the Arabs in Israel.

(5) From the Israeli perspective, negotiating conventional arms reductions must be based on two unshakable principles that proved to be vital in the European case as well: first, applying asymmetrical cuts of the Arab forces that enjoy a large quantitative superiority over Israel and second, the establishment of strict verification regimes to monitor the execution and maintenance of the agreements.

IV. CONCLUSION

After the Gulf War ended the chances to begin an arms control process in the Middle East have clearly improved.

The devastation that was inflicted on the region and the danger of using chemical weapons by Iraq, have raised the interest of many states of the Middle East in the arms control process.

Despite many difficulties awaiting down the road to arms control in the Middle East--both external and internal--the US is leading, with the Bush initiative, the international thrust to begin an arms control and CBM processes in the region.

However, one cannot copy exactly the European path to arms control and CBM in the Middle East. The differences between the two regions are too vast. However, clever adaptation is possible and several lessons could be learned in the Middle East from the European experience. Two lessons are very clear: first, it is difficult to begin the process and second, the process is long, arduous and complex.

Therefore, the main questions awaiting answers are how to begin the process, and how to prepare for it. The answers are not entirely clear but several tentative conclusions can be drawn.

First, all the involved parties have to do something in order to enable the opening of the process.

The U.S. has already come forward with a general initiative under the president's name. Now, it is expected to consult all the potential participants and find the "golden equation" that will serve as an agreed-upon opening gambit of the process.

The main arms suppliers have to agree at least on some restricting "rules of the game" on arms sales to the Middle East. Every member in this group will have to balance pressures from within (political and economic pressures to export arms) and from its allies in the region and to agree on some shared guidelines with other members of the group.

Moreover, the U.S., USSR and the Europeans will have to find the way of persuading China, North Korea and other arms

exporters to cooperate with this endeavor.

Finally, the members of this group have to understand that the solution is not in compelling Israel to sign the NPT and the upcoming CWC, although it seems to be the easy way for them. It is true that proliferation of unconventional weapons in the Middle East is a very dangerous phenomenon, first and foremost threatening the region itself. However, as was the case in Europe, issues of limiting conventional and unconventional arms and questions of security and peace are all intermingled; therefore they should be learned carefully and addressed by the initiators of solutions.

The Arab states can contribute to the process by recognizing Israel or by agreeing to open first a CBM process. Another alternative for them is to agree to open a comprehensive process dealing simultaneously with conventional and unconventional arms control as well as with CBM.

But the Arab side should not expect to rely only on the unconventional part of the process, using indirect avenues such as the NPT or CWC.

Israel needs arms control and CBM now,as components in a general peace process with the Arabs and as a solution enabling, if proved successful, to direct its scarce resources to "aliya" absorption and economy development.

The Israeli contribution to the opening gambit of the

process might be by agreeing to negotiate simultaneously all types of arms control. Furthermore, my conclusion is that only mixed packages of phases and components of the peace process and the arms control/CBM processes might prove practical and successful. Therefore, a detailed Israeli proposal along these lines might serve as an incentive to open the arms control process.

It seems to me that the general outline of the emerging Israeli arms control strategy are sound enough: using CBM and arms control as a means to an end (peace, stability); negotiating simultaneously both conventional and unconventional arms control; promoting the idea of a regional conference on arms control with the participation of the main suppliers.

The second question that has to be answered is how to prepare effectively to the process. Here, my concluding remark is that we can advance the arms control process by studying the sides positions and then proposing compromises that take into consideration the concerns of all. Secondly, preparing detailed plans and proposals, would enable us to move from abstract principles to practical arrangements.

Endnotes

1. Other elements of U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War were: building a security system in the Gulf; promoting the peace process between Israel and the Arabs; developing frameworks of economic cooperation in the Middle East. Bush presented these points in his "victory" speech before the U.S. Congress, on March 6, 1991.

2. See Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New York, St. Martin Press, 1987), chap. 16.

3. Richard A. Scribner et al., The Verification Challenge (Boston, Birkhauser, 1985), chap. 2.

4. See Walter Musberg and Rick Vartzman, in The Wall Street Journal, cited by Ha'aretz, March 13, 1991, p.B2.

5. Ha'aretz, May 29, 1991, p. A1, p. A4.

6. These "rules of the game" might include agreement on a list of items that are banned to export, especially items and technologies necessary for the development and production of unconventional weapons; they might include also a pledge of these states to monitor more closely the export initiatives

of their defense industries.

7. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). On the main approaches to arms control see Michael Nacht, The Age of Vulnerability (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1985), chap. 6.

8. The idea of establishing such a mechanism was included in president's Bush arms control initiative for the Middle East, announced on May 29, 1991.

9. Ha'aretz, May 29, 1991, p. A1, p. A4.

10. April Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 9.

11. John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference (Washington D.C., Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

THE LEONARD DAVIS INSTITUTE
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Annual International Conference

If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

Working Outline for a Paper on:

"Causes and Consequences of the Disintegration of the Soviet Empire: Post-1989 Eastern Europe between Russia and the West"

by

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The University of Wisconsin-Madison

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

June 11-13, 1991

INTRODUCTION: Overall Argument -

Once a threat to Europe and the West by virtue of an expansionist foreign policy animated by a chiliastic ideology and solidly based upon a powerful and expanding military arsenal, the Soviet Union in the present phase of precipitous decline continues to pose a menace to Europe, no longer on account of its strength but due rather to its weakness. The threat to international stability posed by Soviet weakness has been registered:

1. In Europe where the retreat of Soviet power (a) is incomplete (still in progress, even after the formal demise of the WTO), and (b) leaves behind a zone of insecurity in the former Eastern Europe, once a.k.a. "the socialist community in Europe," which has now become Central Europe plus South East Europe (the rebalkanized Balkans). The former, only recently seemingly so optimistic about its rebirth as a region (Kakania Plus, or the Hapsburg realm redux) on the road "to rejoin Europe" has more recently, for reasons to be discussed, turned into a "zone of chaos and [creeping] hopelessness" (Havel). In Southeast Europe, the situation is even worse and threats to security and stability are even more pressing - and potentially much more explosive.

2. Inside the Soviet Union (Disunion) itself where the apparent free fall into the economic abyss is accompanied by enthnonationalist violence. Both factors may portend domestic "Lebanonization" (the spectre of the USSR as a thermonuclear Lebanon has been invoked by no less a commentator than M. Gorbachev, having been originally concocted by Z. K. Brzezinski.) Even short of the ultimate doomsday Soviet scenario, the USSR's domestic disintegration poses other kinds of security threats, including that of a massive outpouring of population to the West.

3. By extrapolation, despite the apparent hopes of the Bush Administration, the USSR cannot be counted upon as a reliable (or even very effective) broker of peace in the Middle East. On the other hand, its capacity for mischieve on this region (perhaps more than in any other) still exists.

I. THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF THE DECLINE OF SOVIET HEGEMONY IN EASTERN EUROPE

A. Was Soviet "New Political Thinking," together with its antecedent corollary, "obshchii evropeiskii dom," and the (inevitable?) consequences - the end of the Soviet Empire - an instance of the Primat der Innenpolitik?

1. The Evidence: The GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria.

2. A "Counter-factual" Consideration: The critical role of Poland throughout the 1980's.

3. The "German Question" as the Key - what Gorbachev gambled and what he gained.

II. POST-1989 EASTERN EUROPE

A. Generally Avowed Goals:

1. Marketization
2. Democracy
3. "Return to Europe."

B. Problems - General

1. Trials and Torments of Economic "Decommandification": Pace, Sequence, Timing.

2. Pluralism is <u>not</u> Democracy; anti-Communist consensus rather short-lived and probably insufficient to sustain requisite socio-economic sacrifice and insufficiently broad and deep to support necessary institution-building or to foster democratic rules of the game.

3. The Europe to which ex-Eastern Europe seeks to "return" is one to which most E.E. countries never belonged (except culturally); Europe (EC) has set preconditions: the free market and political democracy, posing a major dilemma for both EC and EE (may be viewed in terms of the classic "chicken-egg" conundrum.)

C. Issues - Particular

1. The resurgence of nationalism (and, more generally, irrationalism in politics).

2. The spread of ethnonationalism (infecting previously politically dormant peoples, e.g. the Gagauz).

3. The reemergence of territorial irredentism and the rebirth of historical revisionism with respect to the latter, in some instances calling into question the territorial settlements of 1919-21 as well as of 1945.

a. Examples of one or more of the above may be found in the following cases:

i. Czechoslovakia (the Czech Lands - Slovakia, and most recently, Moravia)

ii. Hungary (Transylvania, Slovakia, and, perhaps soon, the Banat (Vojvodina)

iii. Romania (Transylvania, Moldavia - Moldova)

iv. Bulgaria (Turkey, Thrace, Macedonia)

v. Yugo-Slavia (Kosova, Serbia-Croatia, Croatia-Krajina, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia-Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, etc.)

vi. Albania (Kosovo, Macedonia)

vii. Possibly, in the near future, Poland (Ukraine, Belorussia, Vilnius-Wilno)

III. REGIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE WAKE OF THE RETREAT OF SOVIET POWER AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST RULE

A. The Role of United Germany in the New Eastern Europe (more likely in Central Europe than Southeast Europe):

1. Constraints on German Involvement

a. The high, protracted cost of absorbing the ex-GDR ("Five new Laender")

b. The rising costs of the bilateral German-Soviet relationship

IV. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Optimistic - EE joins Europe economically, politically, and militarily in a phased sequence involving first, associate, then, full membership in EC, full membership in (an ever more powerful?) CE, and full participation in CSCE and/or an enlarged, revamped, renamed NATO.

B. Pessimistic - None of the above; rather, precious little real regional cooperation especially in ex-Eastern Europe; ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, local armed clashes, anarchy approximating Hobbes' "state of war."

C. Realistic - An unstable mixture of A. + B. While it seems unlikely that the immediate future belongs to some organic European concert a la R. H. Ullman's European Security Organization (to complement a territorially expanded version of the EC's Project 1992 - see Ullman, Securing Europe, (Princeton, 1991), one should not seek solace in John Mearsheimer's prescription for a new balance of power through nuclear proliferation to European state actors, East and West (see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," International Organization, Summer, 1990).

CONCLUSION: The basic question for this Conference to discuss remains what role, if any, a newly organized, partially organized, and/or largely disorganized Europe can be expected (or else: might be encouraged) to play in the Middle East. For a variety of reasons, not least of all historical, the prospects for a constructive role for Europe in the Middle East may be considerably better than those for the Soviet Union. They may be better but, alas, need not necessarily be such (also, at least in part, for historical reasons.) And even if the former rather than the latter, that may not really be to promise all that much by way of a practical contribution to the solution of the region's many problems.

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"The Middle East After the Gulf War

by

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The Middle East after the Gulf War

G. Mirski

It is, of course, too early to assess full implications of the Gulf War. Even short-term results, especialy in Iraq, are not quite clear. However, some preliminary observations can be made.

1. Widely anticipated outburst of pro-Saddam Arab nationalist feeling throughout the region leading up to popular uprisings and overthrow of existing regimes has not materialized. Sure, there was widespread protest against the American military presence, violent expression of pro-Iraqi sympathies, lots of angry demonstrations and so on but not a single action of revolt occured nor were there any attempts to actually challenge the government. No Djihad-type crusade was mounted, no volunteer forces rushing to Saddam's aid were to be seen. Even the Palestinians - Saddam's most ardent supporters - steered clear of the battle. Contrary to some predictions, King Hussein managed to survive once again. No real threat was posed to Saudi Arabia. The Baathist regime in Syria has been able to get away with actually declaring its refusal to back Iraq even in the case of Israel's involvement in the war.

Thus, Saddam Hussein's grand strategy misfired. The Baghdad dictator's ultimate goal - to cause a great upheaval in the whole area and to lead the Arab masses to a new revolutionary war

against Zionism, America and pro-Western local regimes - has proved to be totally unrealistic. However, this is not for the first time that Arab radical nationalist and revolutionary expectations have been dashed. Suffice it to recall the feeble response - to put it mildly - of the Arab world to the Palestinians' predicament back in 1982 when the PLO was beleagured by the Israelis in Beirut.

What is the significance of this seemigly inadequate reation of the Arab society to what radical leaders have called an imperialist plot and a terrible threat to the Arab nation? Why has the genuine and intense mass feeling failed to be translated into political action on the State level?



In my opinion, one possible explanation might be found in the very nature of mass feeling in the Third world - and maybe in the world at large - at this point in time, at the end of the XX century.

Masses are discontent - to various degrees - practically everywhere. Roots of this discontent are to be traced back, roughly speaking, to two sources: first, national humiliation felt to be the result of sinister foreign influence, of exploitation by outside forces, and, second, frustration and despair caused by inadequate if not outright disastrous performance of local authority. In the first case popular anger is directed at the outside, in the secong case it is adressed to the nation's rulers.

What we are witnessing now is interiorization of the popular discontent. People are more likely to blame their own governments for their predicament than outside influences. In practice this leads more often than not to exacerbation of local tensions of ethnic, religions and clan nature since any given government can always be open to blame for its preferential treatment of some groups to the detriment of others. Anti-government feeling can easily be transformed into inter-communal hatred. As to foreign oppressors, their soldiers and administrators left long ago, new generations have never seen them, national liberation movement belongs to a past era, anticolonial slogans fail to arouse young people. Revolt against authority is the name of the game. Rejection of old established patterns of social and political behaviour, of grand ideologies felt to be more and more irrelevant, is becoming widespread.

Of course, in the Arab world things look a bit different due to the ever-present and exteremely painful Palestinian issue. But, as the siege of Beirut and the latest Gulf war have shown, even in the Arab society the nationalist anti-Western feeling nourished by the Palestinian humiliation is not strong enough to cause mass engagement in a crusade. Even the appearance of American, British and French armed forces on the Arab soil, close to the Holy Places, failed to produce the anti-Western and anti-establishment upsurge that Saddam had obviously hoped for.

So, the leaders of the anti-Saddam coalition were perferctly right when they disregarded dire predictions about horrible and incalculable consequences of their military action against Iraq. The Middle East has not gone up in flames.

Events have once more confirmed the remarkable stability of the Arab regional order, stability of the state structure in the Arab world. Underneath the troubled surface there lies a solid foundation. No amount of wars, conflicts and coups d'Etat have yet changed the map of the Arab world. The same states with the same frontiers continue to exist for decades - sometimes even with the same rulers. Viability of the Arab states, artificial as origin of some of them may be, strength of local state nationalisms is a truly impressive phenomenon.

2. This brings us to the fate of the Iraqi state. Can it survive the terrible defeat? Judging by the latest developments it can.

Diverse opinions may be voiced as to the wisdom of President Bush's decision to halt the fighting at the moment when just one more effort was needed to destroy Saddam Hussein's war machine. Obviously the President was not prepared to let another Shiite Islamic Republic emerge alongside Iran. Probably, too, he was unwilling to commit his nation to fight in an internal struggle in a far away country with uncertain and unpredictable prospects. The fact remains that Saddam was allowed to massacre the Shiites and Kurds. Both revolts were crushed. No Iranian or Turkish intervention followed.

5

Whatever Saddam's personal fate may be, Iraq does not appear to be heading for disintegration. Once more Kurdish hopes for an independent entity have been dashed. In this respect, too, nothing has really changed on the map of the Arab East. However, it would be hard to deny that Iraq has faced a disaster unparalleled in its long and tortuous history.

As late as last July Martin Indyk wrote that Saddam Hussein was posturing "as leader of the Arab world in a way that resonates with Arab "street". He provides an antidote to their humiliation. He is the one who is standing up to the United States and Israel while the other regimes look weak and impotent by comparison. This serves very well to legitimize him in the Arab world as a leader, and he may, in fact, see himself as Nasser's successor". Today it is Iraq that looks weak and impotent compared to the other regimes. Devastated and bleeding, the country lies prostrated at the feet of the victorions allies. Both as a military power and as a regional great power Iraq has ceased to exist, at least for the time being.

Thanks to criminal ambitions and incomparable stupidity of the Baghdad dictator who is sure to enter history as the most hapless adventurer of the XX century, the once prosperous, dynamic and powerful Iraq has lost overnight its claim to supremacy in the Gulf. To fill the resulting vacuum, Iran seems to be vigorously reasserting itself as the dominant regional power. Iran, along with Israel, appears to have gained most from the Gulf War without firing a shot. However, it is hard to imagine Iran achieving actual hegemony in the area. Since the

Imperial era the nation's prestige and influence have suffered - first, as a result of the bloodthirsty Islamic revolution, and second, because of Iran's inability to win the war with Iraq. Saudi Arabia, on her part, is unlikely to let the Iranian challenge go unanswered. In all probability, no single dominant local actor will emerge in the Gulf area after the dust has settled.

Anyway, this time the regional game is not going to be played only by home teams. The United States has entered the arena and is not likely to leave it. There is no way the Gulf Arab states can do without some degree of American military presence even if Saddam Hussein is out. Deep mistrust of Iran, if anything, provides ample justification for setting up a regional security system with Western military might at the centre of it. In this context, it would be difficult to envisage in the foreseable future any open confrontation between, say, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The American military presence in the region is evidently believed to be able to exercise sobering and stabilizing influence.

But here we come to the really big question: can the American leadership be expected to gain regional acceptance? Is it likely that what is certain to be seen in many quarters as an attempt to impose Pax Americana will not be resented by local public opinion?

It is true that the Gulf blitzkrieg has enormously enhanced American prestige, but mainly on the official level. As regards Third World public opinion, deep-rooted, latent, long-standing

Antiamericanism (or, to be more precise, resentment of U.S. power and suspicion of American intentions) has, if anything, increased as a result of this war.

Last October, while on a visit to New Dehli and lecturing at the Institute of Defense Studies, I was surprised to hear local scholars voice their indignation about the arrogant way the Americans were handling the Gulf crisis. "Why should the Americans have the right to decide who is to rule in Kuwait?" By the way, people who spoke like this were Hindus, not Moslems.

The incredibly swift rout of the Iraqi armed forces has shocked and aggrieved a lot of people in the Third World but has not basically changed their opinion about the whole thing. What is more, the very swiftness and brilliance of the American-led coalition's victory have provoked dismay and anxiety. Public opinion is alarmed by what is seen by many as the inevitable arrogance and assertiveness of the U.S. in the wake of this victory.

The new American position of strength on the global scale coupled with the weakening of the Soviet influence has caused deep concern among wide sections of public opinion, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. At the same time it should be borne in mind that fundamentalist forces are in the ascendancy throughout the area. Of course, they cannot but feel frustrated now, after their poor showing during the Gulf crisis. However, such sentiments as frustration, humiliation, complex of inadequacy usually breed anger and lust for revenge rather than resignation. Anti-American protestations from those quarters in

the event of an obvious U.S. hegemony within the framework of a new security system are likely to be so loud and sound so convincing to broad masses ("the street") that one can hardly see local governments disregarding the new popular mood. No Middle East leader can afford to ignore mass discontent originating from the Gulf War (seen as a new Arab humilitation) and the seemingly untractable Palestinian deadlock; for both issues it is America which is to blame, in the eyes of "the street" and radical fundamentalists.

As a consequence any kind of Gulf security arrangment providing for a paramount American role and based on the premises of the U.S. military might and readiness to intervene is bound to be severely attacked if not rejected outright by the majority opinion both in the Arab states and Iran.

It is only natural since, the louder the talk about America remaining the only world superpower, the stronger the resistance to growth of U.S. power and influence in world affairs. Therefore, it seems doubtful that the Americans can become chief architects and guardians of peace in the proposed Gulf security system without causing severe embarassment to the very governments they are ready to protect.

Nor is the situation likely to improve for the Americans if they succeed in ensuring cooperation of the Soviet Union as a partner in the new security system. Given tradition of distrust towards both superpowers and old suspicions as regards alleged

attempts at dictate and condominium, what the responce of the Middle East and the Third World in general will be to joint American and Soviet efforts to mediate in regional conflicts?

Will the Third World recognize the U.S., after the Gulf crisis, as the sole superpower or even a world policeman? Maybe the era of superpowers as such is definitely over, this very notion having become obsolete?

It would be safe to assume that no single regional actor as well as no single outside power are likely to play a dominant role in the Gulf security structure or bear the main responsibility for preserving peace in the area. Logic seems to indicate the United Nations as the only force capable of directing efforts designed to ensure Gulf security.

The UN has many shortcomings, and there is no denying that its record of failures appears impressive. Yet, mankind has not created anything better and more efficient.

The UN recently was able to overcome differences of opinion, mobilize dozens of nations and mount a large-scale campaign in order to liberate one of its member countries which had fallen victim to agression. Vast potential of this international body has been demonstrated to the whole world. Now it is time to translate this potential to peace-keeping operations.

For the question is simple: if not the UN - what else? Can we, looking at the situation in the Gulf area in a sober and realistic way, imagine a top dog emerging out of the crowd of

local actors? Is it so difficult to see that no possible combination of regional powers can ensure stability and enjoy trust throughout the area?

Saudi Arabia hegemony is clearly unacceptable to Iran and vice versa. Iraq, even without Saddam, will remain unpredictable, suspicious in the eyes of all its neighbours. Western predominance is out of the question as well as hypothetical joint American-Soviet peace-keeping mission. So we come back again to the UN.

Now, a vital question arises: what is the content, the function, the raison d'etre of a security system in the Gulf area?

Evidently, the first priority should be to ensure free flow of oil to the world market. This means both intra-state and inter-state stability; the first is practically impossible to guarantee with any measure of international control while preservation of the second is the explicit task of any regional security structure. The aim should be, of course, to safeguard sovereignty of the existing states and ensure unviolability of their frontiers as well as to prevent armed conflicts between states. Preventive, profilactic activities are of paramount importance.

Ideally, it would be most welcome to initiate a process of arms reduction throughout the region. Unfortunately, at this point in time it looks totally unrealistic. All the indications are that, far from expressing readiness to disarm, regional powers are bent on increasing, not diminishing, their military

potentials. It was King Fahd who said recently that Saudi Arabia intented to procure more sophisticated arms. No doubt, others will follow suit. It is to be feared that, instead of arms reduction after the recent war, what we are going to witness is a new and probably unprecedented spiral of regional arms race. One inevitable by-product of this arms race is growth of regional tension, mutual suspicions, more bad blood between neighbours.

In this situation, only the UN may look relatively impartial and unbiased. Whatever the accusations (many of them just) directed at the international body, it would be difficult to label it a tool of a particular group of states. What the UN is in principle able to do is maintain a balance of interests. At crucial points the UN can prove to be quite useful and efficient. Of course, one can recall its dismal failure in the period preceding the Six Day War but, on the other hand, the UN record in Lebanon has not been so bad at all. Anyway, past record is not always a sure indicator of what can be expected in the future. The global situation has changed dramatically, it is no more determined by the East-West conflict, the Cold War is over and the new spirit of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West augurs well for establishing a comprehensive security structure in the Gulf area.

The main advantage of such a structure functioning under the auspices of the United Nations is that, otherwise, it will surely be seen as either West-dominated or Arab-oriented or Saudi-controlled or Iran-influenced, and this will be enough to deprive the new organization of universal credibility in the

region. The UN certainly can not be said to enjoy complete trust and confidence of any of the local actors, yet it will be seen as the lesser evil compared to any other pattern of regional security-building, with one or the other of the local states claiming for supremacy.

In really hot spots, in crucial places of the region, UN forces are much more likely to be accepted than those of either regional or outside powers. Of course, for real protection of oil fields and the militarily weak states on whose territory oil is produced, no Lebanon-type or Sinai-type "blue helmets" contingent is suitable. For this reason, some American forces - not numerous but equipped with most advanced and sophisticated weapons - are likely to stay in the area for an indefinite period if invited to do so by the local governments, possibly along with elements of armed forces of some other Western powers. It is understood that no ground forces are to be stationed in the area but only air and sea units. If the United Nations can be brought into the picture, it could be a great contribution to the process of maintaining peace and stability in the region.

But the Gulf area is only a part of the Middle East, and by no means the most dangerous and troublesome. A comprehensive Middle East security system aiming at reducing tension, settling conflicts and removing weapons of mass destruction is inconceivable without finding a way out of the Arab-Israeli deadlock. We have now to adress this issue: what changes if any has the latest Gulf war brought to it?

3. Israel is believed to be the biggest beneficiary of the war, next to the United States. Quite probably, the Israeli establishment feels that the nation is more secure than ever in its history now that its most dangerous Arab adversary has been knocked out. The Arab military option has all but disappeared, at least for the time being.

There is, however, another side to the picture. For the first time ever the Jewish state was hit by long range missiles, and the fact that the Israeli army controlled the West Bank proved to be totally irrelevant in this respect. Who can guarantee that in 10 or 20 years some Arab state will not possess missiles far more deadly and accurate than the Scuds? If the Israeli military doctrine, this argument runs, is based on the posession of the West Bank as a buffer zone separating the heartland from the enemy, its validity has been seriously challenged by the war lessons. Isn't it time to realize that occupation of a piece of land is no safeguard against air attack? The conclusion is that the Israelis should not miss the opportunity to exchange land for peace, especially now, for the Arab world is in disarray, the PLO crippled, and Israel can afford to talk peace to the Arabs from position of strength - a situation which is not certain to last forever.

There is undoubtedly logic in this argument but counter-arguments may be advanced at once. Vital as the posession of the West Bank may be to the Israeli defense, it could never have been the cornerstone of Israel's military doctrine, and Iraqi missile attacks have proved nothing and have changed

nothing. There is no denying that some time in the future Israel can once again be subjected to missile attacks and even air bombardments, possibly with arms of mass destruction, but conclusions to be drawn from this are, first, that everything must be done to strengthen the nation's defense, and, second, that in order to intercept the enemy missiles, time and space are needed which are provided precisely by the Israeli military control of the West Bank.

As to the "land for peace" slogan, the objections are that no one can guarantee the beginning of an era of peace once a Palestinian state is allowed to be set up. Some would say that such a crucial concession could be considered by the Arabs a fatal proof of weakness on the part of the Jewish state and could lead to more Arab demands. Moreover, many in Israel are not happy with the idea of a Palestinian state (even linked to a UN-sanctioned and UN-guaranteed peace treaty with all the Arab neighbours) because they do not believe in stability of that state and suspect that in a very short time it will fall prey to internal feuds of the Lebanese kind with unforeseeable consequences for the Israeli security.

Of course, these arguments can be countered by another line of reasoning emphasizing impossibility of a permanent occupation of the territory inhabited by rebellious population which will never give up fighting for its rights, for an independent entity. Debate may go on ad infinitum with practically no chance of either side succeeding in changing the opponent's view. Plausible arguments may be found to justify both "hawkish" and "dovish"

lines. What matters is not so much sober political calculation weighing up all pros and contras as mass psychology. Most Israeli Jews seem to fear and distrust the Arabs. They feel that an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, given Arab mentality and political culture, is very likely to degenerate into an unruly and chaotic community in a state of permanent internal warfare with extremists almost certain to come out at the top of the heap in the end. Many are unhappy about the prospects of guerillas armed with portable missiles setting up their bases just several miles away from Tel-Aviv. Continued occupation of the West Bank with all its undeniable evils is still regarded by many, if not most, Jews as a lesser evil compared with unpredictability and uncertainties of abandoning the territories.

The last Gulf war has, if anything, increased Israeli anxiety and lessened the chances of a peace settlement on Arab terms. The hawks in Israel have become more hawkish. As to the doves, their convictions and arguments have been badly shattered or even undermined by the incredibly short-sighted if not outright suicidal position taken by Arafat during the crisis. There is no way any Israeli government can ever agree to have even indirect contacts with the present PLO leadership, and any outside pressure aimed at shifting Israel away from this position will lack inner conviction and bear no fruit. Moreover, Arafat and his people have been seriously and, possibly, irreparably discredited in Western eyes as well. This is not to say that the PLO as such has already been discarded for ever as a negotiating

partner. You simply cannot hope to find any kind of meaningful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute while ignoring the PLO. But the truth is that right now chances of that body being officially involved in the process of negotiations are slim indeed.

This also means that the long-standing idea of a UN-sponsored international conference is at present a non-starter. Anyway, there could never have been much hope of such a conference really being able to find a final and satisfactory solution to the conflict. More likely than not, it would have been permanently and hopelessly deadlocked, totally exhausted by mutual bickering.

Yet, this conference was regarded for years as about the only possible way the United Nations could make its contribution to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now that the prospects for convening an international conference seem bleak, does this mean that the UN has no role to play in the whole business? Not necessarily. Even allowing for the well known Israeli dislike of the world body, some useful function for the UN can surely be found. For instance, UN observers might monitor the proposed elections in the occupied territories if only to reassure the Palestinians that those elections would be fair. Nobody can do this kind of job better than neutral observers sent by the UN. Also in the future some sort of role for the UN might be welcome when it comes to supervising conditions for the development of a process of local political participation during the interim period of transition from occupation to a Palestinian home rule.

However, in this particular conflict UN possibilities of mediation are bound to be less important than those of other outside forces, especially the United States.

Nobody knows yet what will come out of that grand scheme for the creation of a New World Order put forward by President Bush. But the first real proof of viability and effectiveness of this scheme could be a breakthrough in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This could also be a preview of things to come in other areas of the globe. If the United States with its newly won power and prestige after the brilliant performance in the Gulf misses this historic opportunity, the whole idea of the New World Order is likely to be discredited and eventually to collapse in an athmosphere of indifference and cynical "deja vu" attitude.

Meanwhile it would be wrong to exaggerate the American possibilities and peace-making potential. No Pax Americana is in sight. No single nation, however strong, rich and influential, can resolve an international conflict. Possible contribution by the other Western powers as well as by regional actors is essential. But what about the Soviet Union?

4. Because of the mounting internal difficulties in the Soviet Union it has become commonplace among Western experts to write it off as a world power. "Dissolution at the Soviet Empire" is a cliche. Some international analysts have been writing about world affairs and their solutions as if the Soviet Union has already ceased to exist.

Maybe this country has really lost its claim to a superpower status but this does not mean that it is no longer a great power. There is a substantional difference between the two terms. Great powers existed at all periods in history, long before the term "superpower" was first used, and Russia for centuries was one of them. Unless the Union disintegrates (God forbid!), it will undoubtedly continue to be a great power. As such, it will have its legitimate role to play in the Middle East.

The Middle East was important to the Soviet Union mainly for geopolitical and ideological reasons. A major battlefield of the Cold War, the area was also considered vital in terms of an eventual "hot war". Having some military facilities there - just in case - was a definite asset. The military in Moscow always had a high place for the Middle East of their scale of priorities. As to ideology, there was a time when this region had the highest concentration of regimes of socialist orientation.

Since Gorbachev came to power and perestroika started, both those factors have been steadily losing their importance. Nobody thinks about a possible Soviet-American war any more, and the "battlefield value" of the area has dwindled. In the ideological context, too, priorities have changed: promoting socialism in the Third World and thus weakening the world capitalist system can hardly be called a major preoccupation of the Soviet leadership at present.

What remains is the natural desire of a great power - not a superpower, not a champion of a great messianic cause, but just plain great power - to assure its legitimate geopolitical interests in a vital area.

Both for domestic and external reasons, the Soviet Union will resent being pushed out of the picture in the Middle East. This country has to be a party both to a security system in the Gulf area and the Arab-Israeli settlement. Recognition of these natural and legitimate Soviet demands is a sine qua non condition of any cooperation between the West and USSR in the Middle East.

The Soviet record on the issue of German reunification as well as in the UN Security Council during the latest Gulf crisis should have reassured the West as to Moscow's sincerity in trying to open a new page in the history of our relations. There is no ground whatsoever for suspecting the Kremlin of having some kind of hidden agenda in the Middle East. Our first priority is to eliminate possible causes and sources of regional conflicts threatening the newly found cooperation with the West, the Middle East being, of course, potentially the most dangerous of all the conflict areas in the world.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

THE LEONARD DAVIS INSTITUTE
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Annual International Conference

If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
Europe and the Middle East After the Gulf War

"The Contribution of the European Community to Peace and Economic Prosperity in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: Some Proposals

by

Alfred Tovias

The Hebrew University

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

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1. Divergent economic trends in the Northern and Southern rims of the Mediterranean.

There has been an on-going debate for almost two years in the European Community on whether the rejection of communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany should lead to some rethinking of what Europe is all about i.e. to widening or rather to an accelerated deepening in the process of European integration.

Those opting for acceleration argue that it will result in more economic growth (e.g. as a result of the completion of the Internal Market), which will trickle down to the periphery too. In a recent paper[1], Jakob Kol of Erasmus University in Rotterdam, estimates that developing countries' exports to the EC could rise on a permanent basis by 0,5%.[2] It will also result in

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[1] Kol.J., The EC-1992 Program and the Developing Countries, in Fatemi, K., ed.(1991), International Trade and Finance in the 1990s, Proceedings of the First International Trade and Finance Association Meeting, Volume II, Marseille, May 31- June 2.

[2] Kol's estimations are based on a very controversial study previously published by R.Baldwin, estimating that the EC-12 GNP growth rate will increase by 0,5% permanently as a result of the completion of the EC's Internal Market.See Baldwin, R.(1989), The Growth Effects of 1992, Economic Policy, October, pp.247-70.

an all-European political leadership, more acceptable to the periphery than US or German domination. On the other hand, those arguing for widening postulate a thorough reconsideration of priorities, and argue that a further enlargement of the EC to the East should come first.

In my view, the latter school has been unjustly maligned and accused of wanting to torpedo the European idea. Viewed from the periphery it seems obvious that this criticism does not hold water. The EC cannot hope to succeed ultimately as an island of political stability and economic welfare in an ocean of misery and instability. There is little doubt now that the European Community appears to the outside world, particularly to its external periphery, as increasingly attractive, not only as a market but as a model for economic, social, technological and last but not least, political development[3]. Meanwhile, the demographic explosion in the Maghreb, the Mashrek and Turkey, which are the focus of this paper, critically undoes all the good which could normally be expected from the adjustment and economic

[3] A small proof of that is that 8 million non-EC citizens are currently legal residents of the Community, a figure which has not changed much in the last 15 years. But about 3 million more have been entering there illegally since 1974/75 when new legal immigration was virtually stopped almost simultaneously everywhere in the EC. More than half of non-EC immigrants come from the EC's Mediterranean periphery.

reform policies recently introduced. These have included trade liberalization which was at last adopted in recent years by some key countries like Morocco, Turkey, Egypt or Algeria, mostly in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF. The diverging population growth trends in the Northern and Southern rim of the Mediterranean are set to continue. In 25 years from now the population of the Maghreb will reach the 100 million people mark, the Arab world 400 million, while the EC-12 native population will be stagnant. By 2025, Egypt's population will be as large as the one of Spain and the one of Italy together. The economic gap between the Northern and Southern rims of the Mediterranean is already very large and increasing, and so is the corresponding frustration and resentment in much of the Arab world. Suffice it to say that according to World Bank figures Spain's GNP per capita was in 1989 more than 10 times the one of her neighbour, Morocco[4]. The real growth rate of the GNP per capita in the 1980s reached 2.4% in Spain, 1.3% in Morocco, 0.6% in Tunisia and 0.0% in Algeria. Not surprisingly, many try to escape their individual fate by emigrating (legally or ilegally) to the territory of a not-geographically-distant Community of more than 320 million rich consumers(and now 340 if we include the ex-GDR) and where

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[4] Spain: 9150 $ per capita; Morocco : 900 $ per capita. The World Bank Atlas 1990.

the scarce production factor is precisely the unqualified labor force which they happen to possess[5]. South-North mass labour movements are not, however, an acceptable proposition to most Europeans[6]. The leaders of the Maghreb and Mashrek know this. They also know since long that it is not the existence of Israel in their midst or the Palestinian conflict which is the cause of the frustration of their citizens.

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[5] The problem of illegal immigration is attracting public attention by the importance of the sheer numbers. For example in early May, 5000 illegal Moroccan workers were being expelled from Spain in one single week!. See El Independiente, May 5 1991.

[6] Only a minority thinks that given the rapid ageing of the population of Western Europe it would be advisable to let in young immigrants from South and East on a quota basis as the US does. See The Economist, March 16 1991.

2. The economic contribution of the EC to peace and stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

If it will not act in the domain of immigration[7], how can the European Community contribute to economic growth and political stability in its Mediterranean periphery ? In the wake of the Gulf war, there seems to prevail a consensus among EC leaders that the Community is not in the business of giving "security guarantees" [8]. The EC's intervention capability remains strongest where to date it has always enjoyed some comparative advantage in distributing "goods" or "bads", that is in the realm of trade and development assistance. It is not true as is sometimes suggested, particularly in Community circles, that the EC has exausted all the possibilities of promoting Mediterranean non-members' exports by signing cooperation agreements[9]. At the

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[7] On May 13 1991 for the first time a meeting of the Council of Ministers was convened to discuss a Commission proposal suggesting a close coordination of the development policies of the Twelve and of the EC itself so as to influence migration flows. The main idea of the Commission is to include a migration chapter in future cooperation agreements with individual developing countries and to intensify the fight against illegal immigration.

[8] See The Economist, February 23 1991.

[9] All the EC agreements concluded with Israel(1975) and with Maghreb and Mashrek countries(1976) provide for duty-free access into the Community of industrial products, but not for agricultural products. Moreover, for some sensitive products, such as clothing, some Mediterranean countries have been asked by

time of the Camp David agreements and in order to promote economic interdependence among former belligerents, a team of Israeli political economists[10] were proposing among others that the EC, in its bilateral agreements with Egypt and Israel, should redefine goods liable for free access to the EC market as those originating in an area comprised by Egypt, Israel and the EC. The same could apply to EC financial protocols; the rules on tied aid to Israel could be liberalized so that funds could be used to purchase goods in Egypt and viceversa. But instead of footing the "peace" bill with trade and aid concessions, the EC preferred to release declarations, which may have contributed to give some content to what is called in EC-parlance "European Political Cooperation" but clearly added nothing to the Camp David package, which in spite of all its deficiencies, is the only game in town. The Camp David package seems also to work for more than a decade now containing frustration and turbulence in an important part of the Mashrek, namely Egypt. In fact, designs for cooperation plans among Israel and its neighbours (including the Palestinians) have been drawn up and are ready[11] and the EC could have an important

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the EC to restrict "voluntarily" their exports.

[10] See Arad R., Hirsch S. and Tovias A., The Economics of Peace-Making: Focus on the Egyptian-Israeli Situation , London, Macmillan (for the Trade Policy Research Centre), 1983.

[11] See, e.g., Ben Shahar, H. et al.(ed.), Economic Cooperation and Middle East Peace, London, Weidenfeld and

role in their implementation. Third parties can be shown to make a positive contribution to the economics of peace-making because their participation in cooperative ventures increases the range of cooperative transactions between former belligerents which are likely to be economically feasible and because of the conflict-reducing element in a third-party presence[12]. In respect to the latter argument, former belligerents tend to have an even greater aversion for foreign domination of domestic firms than normal if the foreigners are precisely former enemies. The presence of third parties from the Community would in all likelihood reduce conflict between former belligerents (such as Israelis and Palestinians, Greeks and Turks, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) because the latter would probably prefer to let the EC, perceived as a neutral party, dominate the cooperative venture (e.g. in the domain of water exploitation), thus reducing the range of conflict without limiting the range of economic cooperation. Moreover, the EC's involvement would be perceived by past enemies as providing partial insurance against the other side deciding to dissociate. All these factors taken together would raise the expected gains from any cooperative venture involving the EC and would therefore increase the level of

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Nicolson, 1989.

[12] See Arad,R., Hirsch,S.and Tovias A., op.cit., pp.76-81.

economic intercourse between regional partners, others things being equal. The Community could of course make its participation in aid and trade packages conditional upon the maintenance of full cooperation between the former belligerents, in the same vein as the US did with the OEEC in 1947-48.

3. The political contribution: promoting Western-type democracy.

All what is proposed above and much more can be done in the economic domain. If, however, the European Community thinks this is not enough to leave its own "signature" and wants to contribute in the political realm as well as the economic, then I have something very simple to suggest: Announce publicly that those countries in the EC's external periphery with a Western-type democratic regime and sharing the same concept of human rights as all EC members do will eventually be considered as potential members of the Community. Such a bold declaration would send a very important signal to democrats and non-democrats alike in the potential candidate of the EC's external periphery. The least one can say is that this method worked pretty well in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain[13]. It is not pure rethoric to

[13] See forthcoming book by Pridham, G.(ed.),Encouraging Democracy :The International Context of Democratic Transition in

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say today, with hindsight, that the actual transition and consolidation of democracy has been a more successful process than any of the possible political scenarios for these three countries one might have thought of back in the early 1970s . One explanation is simply that Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese understood perfectly well what was at stake: Either behave in a civilized manner and be accepted in a club of free, democratic and prosperous countries or be left back.

But beyond the message sent to the people of the three Southern European countries, there was also another less acknowledged one: A message to any of their non-democratic neighbours that an attack or agression by the latter against the new member would alter profoundly the relationship between the EC and the aggressor. I think, for instance, that the entry of Greece in the Community may have had a stabilizing influence over Greek-Turkish relations. It is also unthinkable that, should Israel become a member of the EC, the Arab boycott could prevail. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the EC has been moving recently in the direction of collective solidarity and security, precisely in the context of the Gulf crisis. On August

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Southern Europe, Leicester, Leicester University Press, to be published in the autumn 1991.

21 1990 it adopted the following declaration: "Any attempt to injure or threaten the security of any citizen of the European Community will be considered as an offensive act against the Community and all its member States and will provoke a unanimous response from the whole Community" [14].

4. Redefining Europe for purposes of membership.

My proposal will surprise those who consider Europe to be a geographic concept; a continent with borders defined once upon a time well before the emergence of the nation-state and of the idea of sovereignity of the people as well as the definition of human rights. I think this is a very poor concept. If the continent were not inhabited by its present residents with their values and institutions, it would not be Europe. In other words, rather than a spot in the world map, Europe is a civilization, based on common cultural and educational heritages which incidentally have its roots in ancient Greece and Rome. The

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[14] "Declaration des Douze sur la situation des ressortissants etrangers en Irak et au Koweit. (Reunion ministerielle extraordinaire de la Cooperation Politique Europeenne), Paris, August 21,1990" in Assemblee de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, Report by Mr.Pieralli, Paris, 36th session, 2nd part, doc. 1242, September 20 1990, p.28. Quoted by Schwok, R., "Kuwait crisis", unpublished paper.

latter two had a long-lasting influence on all the Mediterranean area, rather more in fact than on Scandinavia. If those thinking ahead accept the idea that Albania, Bulgaria or Rumania have the right to apply for EC membership (once they become real democracies), then by the same token they should accept the same for Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and all the Arab countries around the Mediterranean. Those who do not question the "European" nature of Iceland[15] for purposes of membership, should not do either when considering other geographically closer countries in the EC's external periphery![16] In fact, those accepting Iceland, Cyprus and Turkey as potential EC members have a rather elastic concept of geography, as it should be. They are stating implicitly that in examining potential EC membership, political rather than physical geography or what is called by D.Moisi "the geography of values" should take precedence[17]. For instance, in terms of physical geography Cyprus lies to the South of the Anatolia peninsula, which as we all were taught in school is in Asia. It must therefore be the case that those who would

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[15] Just for the record, Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Area.

[16] Iceland is more than 1700 kms away from Scotland and more than 2000 km away from Norway, the nearest country in the continent.

[17] See Moisi, D.(1989), An Ambivalent Europe is Reconsidering its Map, International Herald tribune, March 23.

consider favorably an application of membership into the EC by Cyprus or Iceland must be thinking in terms of cultural values and political institutions shared by countries in close neighbourhood. It must be stressed here that the religious and ethnic backgrounds of the potential EC members' residents has never been and is not a criteria for judging how "European" a country is. Not a single word can be found mentioning such a requirement in any EC document (e.g the Treaty of Rome or the Single European Act). Whoever dares these days to suggest in the EC that a Turkish application should be rejected on the grounds that Turkey is a Moslem country, is turned down with horror and disgust by a distinct majority, and quite rightly so .

5. Why should the EC intervene at all?

Southern European countries, like Spain, France and Italy, should give the above proposal deep thought. They are continuosly drawing the attention of other EC countries to the need to anchor the Maghreb to the European Community. My argument here is that doing this in terms of economics is not enough and that the EC could, if it really wished to, do much more to catch the imagination of the Mediterranean people. In my view the EC

should do what is suggested here for its own interest. It may be taken as a philantropic gesture, but it is really about economic and political self-preservation. Europe imports between 60% to 70% of its energy from the Southern rim of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Its economic welfare is also dependent on the availability of cheap labor to fill in some unqualified and menial jobs either in the EC itself or in its close periphery (e.g. labour-intensive services, construction work, seasonal agriculture). In the political realm, the Community has an interest in promoting democracy around the EC, because for some still not well explained reasons, social scientists have discovered that democracies do not fight each other. The ultimate aims would be 1) to prevent that a non-democratic country in the Community's external periphery turns against her, and 2) to prevent that out of the violent disputes among non-democratic countries in the external periphery of the EC, the latter suffers from a backlash (e.g. a wave of refugees). This leads to a last point. The political contribution of the EC to peace and economic success I am suggesting here should be limited to its external periphery. There are several reasons for this: First, the EC has not yet a super-power status in world politics. But it can clearly assume regional responsibilities. Second, the countries in the external periphery of the Community share with her

basically the same environment and strategic concerns as well as similar consumption patterns and standards. Closeness is definitively a factor when having to delineate where the Community should leave its imprint.

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If New Order Comes Can Chaos Be Far Behind?:
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"Patron-Client Relations in the Emerging Security Environment"

by

Panayiotis Ifestos

Panteios University

Maeirsdorf Faculty Club, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

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PATRON - CLIENT RELATIONS IN THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Panayiotis IFESTOS, Panteios University, Institute of International Relations, Athens, Greece.

INTRODUCTION

Searching for underlying patterns in interstate relations at times of continuous and rapid change is not the simplest of all exercises in political analysis, especially when, as in the field of Patron - Client relations, theoretical speculation is not as yet formalized, encompasses few systematic empirical evidence, and lags behind the evolving realities of contemporary international affairs. Even more so, theoretical analysis in general, did not as yet adequately explore the nexus between environmental change and foreign policy behavior.[1]

Referring to an emerging security environment, one should firstly outline the old security system, then tentatively mention some elementary elements of the emerging new structures, and lastly, compare the two or focus on their main differences. This is again not an easy task. As you all Know, political analysts almost never agreed as to what are the principal characteristics of the contemporary international system.

Throughout the post world two era, the prevailing view regarding international relations has been that of a bipolar world. Later on, in the 1970s and 1980s, analysts increasingly referred to the existence of a loosed bipolar system[2] as well as to new phenomena, such as interdependence and regional integration. The prevailing image, however, has been that of world governed by security considerations, in the context of which states and nations were competing, conflicting, and fighting over questions of national military security.[3] At the centre of this image lay the East - West confrontation, its derivative conflicts, and the nuclear factor.[4] Let us however not focus on the much analyzed post - war international system and concentrate instead on patterns as they emerge at the dawn of the magic date 2000 a.c.

THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The emerging security system has more than one overlapping characteristics in a pattern of a uniquely fluctuating complexity: First, militarily, it is still bipolar but potentially unipolar, especially in the conventional realm, if USSR's internal problems are taken into account. As regards

USA, economically and militarily the strongest pole of power, is in search of a role in the mid of a transitional period. Its policies during the recent Gulf crisis could be interpreted as an attempt to define this role.[3] Second, in parallel or in combination, appears a complex multipolarity of middle (or potentially super -) powers, both in military and economic terms, especially with regard to the latter aspect. Third, in addition to phenomena such as interdependence and transnationalism, there is a tormenting uncertainty as regards the exact potential role of new collective or singular actors such as the EEC, Germany, and Japan. Last but not least, smaller but well organized actors such as Israel, Iran (and until recently Iraq), which are in addition nuclear or potentially nuclear, claim a decisive role in regional affairs, in areas crucially vital for the welfare and strength of the bigger powers.

It follows that an extremely complex and fluctuating security environment encompasses the following, often overlapping principal characteristics: **nuclear bipolarity, potential military unipolarity, an emerging economic and probably military multipolarity, sub-systemic[4] bipolarities, sub-systemic multipolarities, and continuous growth of the non-governmental aspects of the system."** Regarding the latter factor, our view, is that the contemporary world is both state-centric and multi-centric, but predominantly the former.

A tentative graphic outline of the just described complex system is attempted to be drawn in the attached table.

If the just outlined interstate complexity is taken for granted, a comprehensive interpretation of patron-client relations would not be feasible. We should therefore pursue a less ambitious task, by assuming a much simpler world. The following working assumption could therefore be proposed: **The system is still bipolar. However, there are clear signs that it entered a transition, moving towards a complex military and economic multipolarity. USSR, still an otherwise formidable military power, is for the time being "neutralized" due to its internal problems. Sub-system actors, in varying degrees, can influence considerably global processes, but could not possibly challenge the predominance of central powers, especially USA, when her vital interest are at stake (as in the case of Kuwait).** An introductory and elementary test of some of these assumptions will be attempted later on.

It should be noted that as regards East-West relations in particular, it is still not prudent to infer that bipolarity is over because the Warsaw Pact is dissolved or because USSR faces internal problems. This is so because military

capability and external behavior are not always in line with internal economic and sociopolitical coherence.[8] Nonetheless, it is correct to note, that, despite the fact USSR - and probably tomorrow Russia - retains a formidable military capability, its internal transformations inevitably produce important variations within the international system as we have Known it since WW2.

PATRON - CLIENT, THEORETICAL RELEVANCE

In a world of complex and multidimensional as well as varying relationships among the composing elements of the international system, patron - client is in itself an emerging theoretical field. Its limited analytical tools have in effect been heuristically borrowed from the field of "comparative government".[9] Moreover, in the absence of adequate theoretical tools, one could experiment, also heuristically, with adjacent approaches in fields dealing with variations in behavior in situations involving different power structures and power relationships.

It follows that patron - client relations in contemporary world affairs, encompass a multitude of phenomena. Moreover, as with other political phenomena, patron - client relations are bound to fluctuate as a concept, in line with the ebb and flow of international politics. Furthermore, domestic structures or non-state factors are important inputs at the behavior's formative stages.[10]

Patron - client relationships between a big state and a small state, a strong power and a weak state, or to this effect between any dyad of states or groups of states or political organisms, could take a multitude of forms and shapes.[11] A patron in such a relationship[12] aims at fulfilling certain policy objectives, by offering reciprocal compensation to a client state willing or in need to comply. The reciprocity is based on material benefits and protection for the client. The patrons means are a function of the degree it can assist the client state, the size of the material benefits it could provide, and the political support it could offer. Correspondingly, the client state may expect various rewards for its behavior and actions, such as protection, favourable trade terms, assertiveness, self-respect status, loyalty, and the patron' s favourable stand in one or more of its international conflictual interactions. The client' s means is usually political alignment, rending services, following the patron' s lead, permitting air and sea passage to ships and

airplanes, granting military bases, and assisting the patron in military conflicts. Certainly, a weak state's attempt to extract from a larger ally a certain desirable behavior, could use a number of other means as well. For example, according to the **"tyranny of the weak"** formula, a small state could manipulate a great power found in an **" investment trap".**[13] The weak state could stress its possible unreliability as an ally, threaten it will withdraw from an alliance, or show sheer stubbornness and persistence in demanding fulfilment of its objectives, irrespective of the great power's wishes.[14]

Patron - client relations could be described as interactions between states in response to international situations or changes. These responses usually aim at satisfying an entity's goals on at minimizing existing dangers. More than the strong state's system, a weak state's system is penetrated,[15] to the extend its vital interests depend on external elements of authority and power. In a similar sense, the weak state voluntarily complies with the strong power's wishes, in some sort of political adaptation, in order to realize some of its state objectives. Borrowing the analytical tools developed in another context by James Rosenau and others, client behavior could be viewed as "adaptive".[16] Political adaptation in this sense, is the state's voluntary adjustment of its foreign policy to external demands and trends, "in order to keep the resulting fluctuations in the society's economic, social,political and physical structures within acceptable limits".[17] As Hansen notes, unlike Rosenau's original formulation of political adaptation , which is principally preoccupied with the actor's survival, this conceptual framework could lent itself to a larger set of goals and strategies.[18] **A client's behaviour in this sense, therefore, could be seen as an adaptation in accordance with the wishes and interests of another state (the patron), in order to be rewarded in other fields.**

We shall now briefly examine the salient environment in the context of which patron-client relationships function. We already adopted the working assumption that the emerging security environment in the context of the transitional 1990s, is peculiar, uncommon, and rapidly fluctuating. Depending to what sector of international activity we refer or at which level our analysis evolves, the system could be called unipolar, multipolar, or an intermediary mix. Furthermore, there is an uneven distribution of economic and military power among the salient poles of the system.[19] Security in such a context encompasses military as well as non military factors. In military as well as in non military interactions, the

projection of a state's power is nowadays a much less straightforward matter than in earlier times.[20] Some hints on this fact will be given later on when we shall refer to the recent Gulf crisis

Multipolarization adds to the complexity of the relation between the strong and the weak actors of the international system.[21] Naturally, this is also true for patron-client relationships. Goldmann supported[22] that an international system may include not only more than two leading powers but many bipolar sub-systems. "In such a situation, coalitions are expected, and the only question is who will join forces against whom. Far reaching and lasting coalitions between the two leading components may be rare in bipolar systems. The application of the coalition hypothesis may therefore be greater in a non - bipolar system than in a bipolar one".[23] Similarly, Deutsch and Singer indicated that an increase in the number of independent actors increases the pairs of dyads in the total system, a situation which adds to the interaction numbers and which could have destabilizing effects.[24]

In other words, multipolarization may expand the opportunities of weaker powers in interstate bargaining. As Waltz notes in this context, weak states often find opportunities for maneuvering in the interstices of a balance of power situation.[25] Especially when a weak state's position and policies are important for the maintenance of the overall balance of power, a system of many poles may function in a way which strengthens the bargaining power of the weak.[26] In addition, improved social awareness, the revolution in communications, the danger of conflicts escalating to a nuclear confrontation, and the functioning of international cooperative forums, such as the U.N. and the EEC, are all factors which make the use of force less attractive than in the past. Such a development, of course, could not but strengthen the position of weak states. Certainly, it should be stressed that norms of this kind may have less application in conflictual bipolar sub-systems even if they operate in a broader stable multipolar environment.

THE GULF CRISIS AND PATRON - CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

Running out of space and time, we should now proceed to an elementary test of some of our propositions formulated earlier. The Gulf crisis of August 1990 to February 1991, may

provide us some evidence concerning the evolving underlying trends in the security environment of the 1990s. Of course, a detail examination of all the aspects of the conflict relevant to patron-client relations - let alone a detail examination of all the aspects of the conflict - would not be necessary at present.

Patron's as well as client' s attitudes are usually best demonstrated during times of acute crisis. When military confrontation is in sight, or when actual war occurs, stakes are higher, and the actor's basic behavior patterns, more apparent.

Examination of the October 1973 Middle East war, have shown, inter alia, an emerging independence of strong regional powers vis a vis their superpower patrons.[27] Compared to 1973, the functioning of patron client relationships during the 1991 Kuwait crisis, revealed both similarities and dissimilarities.In the first place, it should be noted that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have shown that revolutionary strong regional actors can still act with greater freedom during periods of detente. America's dynamic and effective military and political counter - offensive, could be explained in terms of the situation prevailing in the Soviet Union. USA's and USSR's corresponding role during the conflict, confirms that, as argued earlier, the international system is militarily bipolar, but for all practical purposes unipolar in political terms. Whether this is a permanent feature of the international system, i.e.,the coexistence of military bipolarity and political unipolarity,[28] remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the effective American counter-offensive would prove determinant and catalytic in bringing about a new systemic regional and world order. Whatever the outcome, we could predict that there is still a long way before each actor's role takes a relatively final shape.

At this point,it should be noted that the traditional "counter-patron" of the international system, that is, the USSR,has taken a markedly lower profile early in the Gulf crisis, an attitude which endured until America' s successful ground assault. In many instances, USSR joined diplomatic forces with the United States,[29] and Moscow's peace initiatives which followed throughout the crisis were ineffective face-saving differentiations. Moreover, detente and good relations with USA have been of much greater value for Moscow than what it had been in 1973.[30] As regards the historical juncture of the early 1990s, USSR behaves almost as a "civilian power",[31] than as a major political and military force with readily available world - projectible power. If

this is valid inference as regards the role of the Soviet Union, we could easily explain the absence of client's "classic tactics" in Iraq's behavior, that is, its inability to play the one big power against the other.[32] It is also indicative of the opportunities other regional powers have to follow successfully this "tactic". Iraq's failure to understand this reality could not possibly be explained in rational political terms.[33] The same could be said as regards Baghdad's rejection of the French and Soviet initiatives, a political behavior which lead to its almost total isolation.

Although as mentioned above the traditional counter - balancing patron was not available to the region' s actors, the "tyranny of the weak"[34] phenomenon was not altogether absent in USA's relationships with many of region's states. Client states such as israel and Turkey were making their alliance with the USA conditional to many and various rewards. Other regional powers such as Iran were behaving in an independent and sovereign manner, skilfully exploring the crisis to their country's interest.

Turkey, for example, as early as August 1990, linked its behavior to rewards involving billions of dollars, America's help to Turkey's relations with the EEC, and a more favourable stand of the United States[35] in its dispute with Greece.[36] Turkey's ability as a client to explore its patron's position of need was demonstrated when Angara originally refused to allow the use by the USA of its four largest military bases.[37] Most possibly, such an attitude would have been much more difficult to occur during the cold war period.[38]

Israel is another case of a regional power behaving in a sovereign and independent manner. In fact, Israel was highly rewarded to do what it was fully in its own interest,[39] that is, to abstain from using military force against Iraq. Such an action would have probably cause the collapse of the alliance against Iraq. Moreover, it was in Israel's interest to let others to destroy the army of its strongest enemy in the region, without its own arm forces firing a shot. Still, the United States could not "impose" on Israel not to act. It was obliged to reward Tel Aviv's self-restrain and publicly praise the prudence of the Israeli government. This fact is another indication of patron's limits in imposing their views on smaller allies, even if the stakes are considerably high.[40]

USA's military and political performance during the Gulf crisis impressed upon the world the view that America is the dominant power in a unipolar world. Moreover, President Bush's call for "new world order"[41] and Washington's determined opposition to Iraq, left little doubt that the United States

was in pursuit of such a role. Still, it seems as if contemporary international relations are not an easy arena, even if a patron acts in the absence of "counter-patrons". Political hypocrisy[42] and dubious expediences were nowhere absent during the Gulf crisis. Nonetheless, two salient features in America's policies are easily discernible. **First,** Washington was anxious to stress that its policy had the formal approval of the U.N. **Second,** the American government was anxious to further legitimize its policies by securing a multinational participation in the army gathered against Iraq, even if this participation was only symbolic.[43]

The above facts indicate that big powers in the contemporary international system, be patrons or otherwise, are bound to be constrained by psychological and moral factors, to a greater degree than in earlier times.[44] To the extend this reflects reality, it reinforces the client's position in their pursuit of rewards and gains in their dealings with the big powers. Otherwise stated, the current international system, be it unipolar, bipolar, economically multipolar,[45] or a mix of the above, seems to strengthen the clients' position in patron - client relationships,[46] to the extend the "social restraint" inherent in international norms"[47] of behavior increases over time.

Moreover, the American "leadership" role was a function of a number of other factors such as the readiness of USA's rich allies to contribute financially, and the impact in American domestic politics if allies were shirking.[48] As the Gulf crisis have shown, America's position in an international system perceived as dominated by one power, was not altogether straightforward. Persuasion rather than compellence was in every day's diplomatic agenda in inter-ally politics: 1) as already mentioned, the UN had to issue successive resolutions in order to legitimize the use of force by their arm forces 2) Allies had to be persuaded to dispatch - mostly symbolic - military units. 3) Smaller Middle East countries had to be rewarded in order to be persuaded to favour a future regional pact designed in Washington. 4) rich Gulf states had to be convinced both to contribute financially and to provide for a post - war reconstruction bank. 5) as we also already mentioned, Israel had to be rewarded in order to be persuaded not to act in a way which could turn against its own interest. 7) Turkey was the recipient of material and moral support in order to be persuaded not to occupy Iraqi territory if its army was involved in ground fighting, e.t.c. The above and other interstate interactions involved a complex pattern of political, military, and other trade offs, in the context of which the bargaining power was not always in the patron's side.

Last but not least, the Gulf crisis have shown that patron - client relationships in the post cold war period, are functioning in a much more complex and complicated environment than in earlier post WW2 periods. Both patrons' as well as clients' objectives had to be fulfilled in an environment of sub-systemic dyads. Indicatively, we refer to the broader Israeli - Arab dyad, the controversial Iran - Iraq dyad, the Greco - Turkish dyad, the Iran - rest of the Arabs dyad, e.t.c. While such sub-systemic interactions were not absent in past conflicts, the Gulf crisis have shown that they are much more intensive than in earlier times. However strong the patron, in this case the United States, she had to cope cooperatively with clients' demands. In parallel, it should be stressed that the interactions during the crisis indicated the emergence of a dominant power, towards which weaker powers developed intensive client attitudes.

Overall, one could also observe that USA's role in the Gulf crisis evolved in unique circumstances. Namely, military intervention took place in relatively non - controversial legal circumstances, it was carefully prepared, and executed without public opinion constraints. In a less comfortable situation, one should expect a more difficult task and higher clients' claims. Already, some clients' attitudes referred to, earlier, indicate that the American intervention in the Gulf could not be easily repeated. Sub-systemic independently minded behavior grows, as are the big power's economic and other constraints. The international system, at this transitional juncture, be it bipolar, multipolar, or any intermediary mix of these situations, is bound to be much more complex and difficult to deal than in earlier times. The same applies to the "new world order", if one sees any signs of it in the horizon of 2000.

In sum, in the international environment of the 1990s, it seems as if the margins of clients' manoeuvrability are enlarged. This is is mainly due to the fact that the number of poles in military, economic, and political terms increases, a development which contributes considerably to the enhancement of the comparative resources of the client in the complex patron - client processes. During peaceful times, the social/political constrains inherent in contemporary international norms of conduct, condition the patron's behavior. During crises, the clients' bargaining capacities are upgraded, inter alia, causing for the "tyranny of the weak" phenomenon to occur. Regarding political adaptation as a "voluntary" adjustment of a state's foreign policy to external situations and demands, it is constantly occurring in interstate interaction. As the Gulf crisis have shown, however, at least in certain cases and within certain limits, adaptation is not anyhow an one way street in the relations between strong and weak states.

NOTES

1. On this question see Ch. Kegley & P. McGowan, challenges to America, Sage Yearbook, Beverly Hills, 1979. Also, McGowan & Shapiro, the comparative study of foreign policy, a survey of scientific findings, Sage, 1973, ch. xiii

2. It would be futile to attempt to refer to all studies which analyze the post war bipolar or loose bipolar international structures. Virtually every introductory book does so. For insightful works see K. Waltz, theory of international politics, Adison-Wesley,Massach. 1979. Also, St. Hoffmann, Gulliver's troubles, Mcraw Hill, N.Y., 1968. Also, the state of war,Praeger, N.Y.,1965. Also, R. Rosecrance, bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, Sept. 1966. Also, M. Kaplan, system and process in international politics, Wiley, N.Y.,1964. Also, K. Goldmann & G. Sjostedt (eds), power, capabilities, interdependence, Sage,1979.

3. D.Puchala & St. Fagan, international politics in the 1970s : the search for a perspective, International Organization, vol. 28, spring, 1974, p.248.

4. For analysis on the fundamental character of this conflict, see P. Ifestos, nuclear strategy and European security dilemmas, towards an autonomous European defence system ?, Gower, England, 1988, ch. 10.

5. Throughout the post war era USSR has been both a military and an "ideological superpower". She has also been economically largely self - sufficient. However, things are evolving. As regards its future position in world politics, it will by and large be determined by the outcome of its internal fluctuations.

6. For analysis on the term sub-systemic in the sense used here, see K. Goldmann, in Goldmann & Sjostedt, op, cit.

7. For a recent analysis on the complexities of the modern system and the growth of sub-groupism in a dyadic state-centric/multi-centric world, see James Rosenau, turbulence in world politics: A theory of change and continuity, Princeton un. Press,1990.

8. USSR, during the post war era, is a characteristic example. See Waltz, op. cit.

9. See Michael Handel, weak states in the international system, Frank Cass. England, 1981, p. 132, and note 44.

10. Needless to stress that the present paper cannot afford the luxury to focus attention on national diversities and the state's domestic structures. In fact, given the limited scope of our contribution, we could only examine certain type of responses to the state's evolving external conditions in what now commonly called post scold war era.

11. M. Handel (op. cit.), regards patron - client relationships as predominantly occurring between unequal partners. In our analysis, we expand the concept to include certain relationships between equal or roughly equal partners. In certain instances, one could also envisage situations whereby a big power in need may act as a client towards a smaller power in order to serve a specific foreign policy objective. Notwithstanding, the rule is that the patron is the big/strong power and the client the small/weak side.

12. We follow Handel's definition (ibid p. 132-3), who adopts the patron - client concepts followed in comparative government analysis.

13. See D. Ellsberg, papers on the war, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1972. By "investment trap" it is meant that a larger power must continue to support its smaller partner, if the latter acts against its wishes and interests, in order to protect its previous political or military investment.

14. For analysis on these aspects see G. Sheffer, independence in dependence of regional powers: the uncomfortable alliances in the Middle East before and after the october 1973 war, ORBIS, vol. 19, 1975-76, esp. pp. 1521-23.

15. See J. Rosenau, the scientific study of foreign policy, Frances Pinter, 1980, p. 136-8. It should be stressed, however, that unlike Rosenau's definition, the present analysis emphasizes interaction when state actors and interests are involved, rather than transnational non - governmental forces.

16. Political adaptation is a term elaborated in the writings of J. Rosenau. For example see ibid, ch. 18. Also, his book, the study of political adaptation, Frances Pinter, London, 1981. Also his article in Comparative Politics, vol. 2, April 1970. For a recent extensive examination of political adaptation, see H. Mouritsen, Finlandization: towards a general theory of political adaptation, Gower, England, 1988. See also, Peter Hansen, Adaptive behavior of small states: the case of Denmark and the European Community, Sage International Yearbook, vol. ii, 1974.

17. See Rosenau, 1980, op. cit., pp 505-6, and Hansen, ibid, p. 149.

18. See ibid, pp 114-50.

19. For analysis of economic and security issues in international interaction in this respect, see Goldmann, op. cit. p. 136. On the concept of "civilian power," see P. Ifestos, **European Political Cooperation, towards a framework of supranational diplomacy ?**, Gower, England, 1987, ch. 3.

20. This is particularly true for nuclear power. Even for conventional power, however, great powers are nowadays anxious to comply with certain norms of conduct. Relevant as we shall see, is the insistence with which USA pursued the issuing of UN resolutions which would authorize them to apply force during the Gulf crisis in 1990/91. For analysis on this question, see, **the new international norms of conduct among states and the position of the weak states**, in Handel op. cit. (appendix B).

21. See Goldmann, op. cit., p. 132-3. Also, Mouritzen, op. cit., ch. 16.

22. See ibid.

23. Goldmann, ibid, p. 134. Goldmann's coalition hypothesis suggested that the higher the tension between the leading members, the less chances they have to use resources against the weak. Consequently, the "power of the weak" is greater.

24. See K. Deutsch & D. Singer, **multipolar power systems and international stability**, World Politics, vol. 16, no 3, 1964, esp. pp 392-5. Further in the analysis, they support that, even if multipolar systems under the rules of the balance of power policies are shown to be self-destroying, the instability of a tight bipolar system appears to be greater (p. 406).

25. K. Waltz,op.cit., p. 184-5. For discussion of this question see also D. Vital, **the survival of small states**, Oxford Un.Press, London, 1971. Also, P.McGowan & H. Shapiro, **the comparative study of foreign policy**, Sage, 1973, pp 174-5. Also Mouritzen, op.cit. Also, Handel, op.cit., pp 175-87.

26. See Handel, ibid, p. 176.

27. See G.Sheffer, op.cit., pp 1515-38. Also, C. Bell, **the October Middle East war**, International Affairs, Oct. 1974, vol. 50, no 4. Also, Ath. Platias, **High politics in small countries: an inquiry into the security policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden**, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Un., 1986.

28. Combined, as we mentioned, with economic multipolarity.

29. For the early stages of the crisis, see "Time" August 13, 1990, p. 16.

30. For 1973, see particularly, C. Bell, op.cit., esp. pp 542.

31. For analysis of this term see P. Ifestos (1987), op.cit., ch. 3.

32. For this aspect see Sheffer, op.cit., p. 1535.

33. If Baghdad could understand this reality would have certainly taken a less risky course, particularly as regards its response to the French and Soviet peace initiatives (in october 1990 and February 1991 respectively).

34. "Tyranny of the weak" in patron - client relationships refers to the consequences for the patron as a result of the small client's behavior and actions. For analysis on this term, see Astri Shurke, **gratuity or tyranny: the Korean alliances**, World Politics, July 1973. Also, Sheffer, op.cit.

35. We counted tenths of declarations by Turkish and Greek leaders during the Gulf crisis of 1990/91, explicitly stating that their governments' participation in the alliance against Iraq, aimed at securing favourable American positions in their bilateral disputes, and favourable treatment in the "new world order".

36. See the "Independent", 8.8.1990.Also, the "Economist", October 20, 1990,p. 60.

37. See the "Time", August 27, 1990. As a leading article in the "Economist" (27/10/1990, p. 15) put it, Turkey joined the anti-Saddam alliance partly in order to win more tolerance for its occupation policy of part of Cyprus.

38. During the cold war period, small states manoeuvrability was relatively constrained. For analysis, esp. with regard to allied states, see D. Constas,**systemic influences on a weak, aligned state in the post-1974 era**, in D. Constas (ed.),**the Greek - Turkish conflict in the 1990s**, Macmillan, U.K., 1991. Also, Deutsch & Singer, op. cit.

39. Israeli leaders were cultivating the opposite view even before their country was attack with SCUD missiles (see the "Time", 8/10/1990). By so doing, they were raising the patron's reward for self-restrain not to interfere with USA's strategy. For the Israeli demands as early as september 1990, see the "Economist", december 15. 1990.

40. USA's success in restraining Israel was higher during the 1973 crisis. For 1973 see Sheffer, op. cit.

41. Speech to the Congress of the USA on september 11, 1990.

42. We refer to double standards due to the fact that many other conflicts were not resolved in the same spirit and with the same means as in Kuwait.

43. Reversely, smaller states were anxious to participate, even symbolically, in order to secure America's future favours. For the structure of the arm forces in the Gulf during the crisis, see the "Time", october 1, 1990.

44. The same search for legitimization was pursued by the USA in Korea and Vietnam, however, with much less emphasis. It is obvious that each case should be seen in its historical context as well as in the context of the interests and stakes involved.

45. Or any other mix of these factors.

46. On this issue see D. Constas, op. cit., p. 136.

47. At the time the USA was building up the Alliance against Iraq, its means were persuasion rather than compellence.For example, Washington successfully manoeuvred by sending contrasting messages to its allies. Soft - liners were being assured that it will exhaust all peaceful means, to the Arabs that it will follow a fresh line on the Arab - Israeli conflict, to Israel that it would not accept linkages between Kuwait and the Palestinian issue. Allies were also rewarded with financial and economic aid. See the "Time" october 15, 1990.

48. See reporting on some aspects of this problem in the "Economist", February 23, 1991, pp 45-6.

49. To the extent the rest of the governments worldwide adopted the view that Iraq's invasion was illegal and that it should be sanctioned.