INCONTRO BILATERALE

IMEMO - IAI

" PROBLEMI DI SICUREZZA IN EUROPA "

MOSCA, 2-9 APRILE 1990

Delegaz. IAI: G. BONVICINI
R. ALIBONI
M. CREMASCO
M. CARNOVALE
L. GUAZZONE
S. BIANCHINI
N. RONZITTI

PROBLEMI DI SICUREZZA IN EUROPA
Istituto affari internazionali
IMEMO
Mosca, 2-9/IV/1990

a. Agenda, elenco dei partecipanti sovietici
1. "Political trends in East-West relations and Southern Europe (outline)"/ Nadezda Arbatova, Vladimir Baranovskij
2. "East West cooperation, the linkage between economics and security (outline)"/ Piercarlo Padoan
3. "East-West relations and economics security: prospects for economic developments in Southern Europe and their relevance for East-West relations" / Elena Ostrovskaja
4. "Legal aspects of a transition toward a common European house"/ Natalino Ronzitti
5. "The arms control process in the Southern region of Europe : problems and perspectives" / Maurizio Cremasco
6. "The Vienna CFE talks and security in Southern Europe"/ Oleg Amirov
7. "Nuclear weapons (outline)"/ Nadezda Arbatova
8. "The role of naval and nuclear weapons"/ Marco Carnovale
9. "Unconventional weapons proliferation in the Middle East: the regional and international impact"/ Laura Guazzone
10. "Regional proliferation : arms race and deterrence policy in the Mediterranean"/ Yuri Pinhukov
11. "The balkans today: a peace zone or an European powder-keg"/ Stefano Bianchini
12. "The Middle East and European security (outline of presentation)"/ Roberto Aliboni
13. "Southern European security and the Middle East"/ Vladimir Avakov

E L E N C O

della delegazione sovietica al Simposio Sovietico-Italiano con l'Istituto Affari Internazionali sul tema "Problemi di sicurezza in Europa"

Mosca, 4-5 aprile 1990

1. BYKOV, Oleg

2. CSIADRINA, Irina

3. BARANOVSKI Vladimir

4. RASMEROV, Vladimir

5. BABAK, Vladimir

6. AMIROV, Oleg

7. STREGZNEVA, Marina

8. PINCIUKOV, Yuri

9. AVAKOV, Vladimir

10. OSTROVSKAYA, Elena

11. CERVIAKOV, Andrei

12. CERCASOVA, Ekaterina

13. TOMASCIEVSKI, Dmitri

14. VASILKOV, Nikolai

15. KAPCENKO, Nikolai

16. NAROCHNIZKAYA, Natalia

17. SOROKO-TSUPA, Andrei

AZIZ Kamilav

AGENDA

Mercoledi, 4 aprile

    10.00-13.00   La situazione generale in Europa; le relazioni Est-Ovest (gli aspetti mediterranei inclusi)

    14.15-17.00   I problemi della diminuzione del livello della confrontazione militare in Europa

Giovedi, 5 aprile

    10.00-13.00   Il problema della Germania

    14.00-17.00   La discussione del progetto congiunto (se sara la necessita si puo continuarla venerdi il 6 aprile da 11.00 a 13.00)

СПИСОК

ИТАЛЬЯНСКИХ УЧАСТНИКОВ СИМПОЗИУМА "ПРОБЛЕМЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В ЕВРОПЕ"

4 - 6 АПРЕЛЯ 1990 г.

1) Джианни Бонвичини

2) Наталино Ронцитти

3) Марко Корновале

4) Лаура Гуаццоне

5) Стефано Бианчини

6) Роберто Алибони

7) Маурицио Кремаско

Nadezhda Arbatova,
Vladimir Baranovsky

POLITICAL TRENDS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

(the outlines of the chapter for the IAI-IMEMO
research project)

Moscow, April 1990

The chapter will be devoted to the following research aims:

1) to define the specific role of Southern Europe in respect with East-West relations;

2) to assess the recent and on-going dramatic changes in these relations;

3) to analyse the impact of the new global political trends on the security in Southern Europe.

I

The specific role of Southern Europe in respect with the East-West relations is defined by several factors:

a) The region is geopolitically far from the core area of East-West military confrontation. The regional asymmetries in the structure of military forces of both sides, their posture etc. are less significant in security terms. Political sensitivity of all related problems is relatively less pronounced. At the same time strategic relations between East and West do not cover all security matters in the Mediterranean.

b) The role of the region in the international system is to a large extent conditioned by its geographical proximity to the conflict zones (the Near East, the Gulf, Northern Africa). Out-of-area problems increase the importance of the Southern Europe for all major international actors, including the USA and the USSR. The consequences for the region are

controversial: it could influence the development of the local conflicts which strengthens the international positions of the South European countries; and at the same time it becomes more vulnerable to the perspectives of globalization of the local conflicts which creates additional incentives for military presence of the superpowers.

c) The internal political structure in the countries of the Southern flank of NATO has traditionally been more polarized in comparison with other Western countries. As a result the internal political development in the post-war period has been more controversial; that's why the notions of "security" and "stability" for the NATO countries in the region not only refer to the external environment but are also significantly inward-oriented. Internal shifts in the South European countries (both to the left and to the right) are a serious matter of concern for the Atlantic alliance influencing the Western assessment of global political situation and definition of security priorities.

d) The South European countries of the "East" have possessed substantial level of autonomy in their internal development and foreign policy. The ability of Moscow to control non-NATO countries of the Southern Europe has always been more than questionable. In principle it increases the variability of the international development in the region - making it less dependent on the general state of East-West affairs and at the same time opening the way for local tensions. It has also created an additional incentive for a Soviet search of non-Warsaw Pact clients in the region.

e) The mission of the Atlantic alliance - that of insuring security in the Southern Europe - has been complicated by the permanent conflict between two of its member-states. Military dimension of this conflict acquires sometimes primary importance, which in itself downplays the role of East-West confrontation on a sub-regional level. But the relationship works also the other way round: the parties in the conflict oscillating between active search for the U.S. support and open (even if symbolic) manifestation of anti-Americanism, Washington has always been seriously motivated for playing both cards in order to prevent political vacuum that allegedly could be used by the opposite side in global East-West confrontation.

II

The changes taking place in Europe should be described in the most radical terms as creating a new international system - both regionally and globally:

a) Internal reforms in the USSR and even to a greater extent in the other Warsaw Pact countries make more and more irrelevant the very notion of the East-West confrontation.

b) Dramatic breakthroughs have already been achieved and could be envisaged in the nearest future in the field of the arms control and disarmament thus eroding the traditional parameters for ensuring security and opening the way for new security arrangements in Europe.

c) Not only the "Brejnev doctrine" is dead but the East European countries seem no longer to continue as being inscribed into a Soviet sphere of influence. Their increased and accelerating (West)Europeanization becomes more and more pronounced; however it does not exclude the establishment of "organic relationship" with the Soviet Union.

d) The future of the Warsaw Pact is more than uncertain. However the legitimacy of NATO seem to be questioned also - though with a substantial time gap in comparison with its Eastern counterpart.

e) The unification of Germany becomes a fact of life and will be achieved in a relatively close future. A unified Germany becomes the most powerful center in non-Soviet Europe.

f) The role of two superpowers on the world arena will continue to decline. The emergence of new independent actors could result in reducing the rigidity of the international system, at the same time making it more complicate and less predictable.

III

The security in Southern Europe is undoubtedly affected by the new development in the East-West relations:

a) The elements of confrontation in these relations being progressively reduced, the global framework for the development of political and economic relations between the USSR and the countries of Southern Europe becomes more favorable. The United States - if the new detente with Moscow continues - will probably be less suspicious about stronger

Soviet-South European ties. None of the participants will be inclined to perceive these ties as incompatible with the Atlantic solidarity.

b) The arms control and disarmament measures have already affected the South Europe (the INF treaty) and will hopefully do it in the future (the CFE talks). However the relative remoteness of the region from the key zone of NATO-Pact confrontation could result in a less substantial progress as compared with Central Europe. Such asymmetry could go beyond having only relative character - if the theory of increasing role of the flanks prevails.

c) At the same time the NATO South European countries seem to consider a more vigorous involvement in the discussions concerning the perspective development in the central part of the continent. The approach defining the territories of Italy, Spain and Portugal as a region adjoining the "central front" (and no longer as specific "Southern region") is only one sign of such evolution. It could be stimulated by the German unification generating concerns of the South Europeans to find themselves on the periphery of the continent. Another plausible scenario could be related to a more active sub-regional cooperation on security matters.

d) The recent political development in the non-Western countries of Southern Europe has clearly defined the possibility (if not probability) of the new security problems in the region. They could be related both to the process of disintegration of Jugoslavia and to increased tensions between some of the states. In order to prevent the destabilization it seems necessary to envisage serious measures aimed at facilitating internal reforms in (ex)socialist countries, creating more favorable conditions for their re-integration into the international community and into existing West European structures, stimulating sub-regional cooperation.

e) All the positive trends in the East-West relations notwithstanding, the western countries seem still to have concerns resulting from:

- the massive Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean;

- uncertainty about the role and the goals of the USSR in the Mediterranean and its geostrategic surroundings (including the Gulf);

- the Soviet arms deliveries to Syria and Libya.

f) However the western perceptions of the "threat from the South" and the growing Soviet uneasiness about the reliability of its traditional third world policy open the way for cooperation in the field of North-South relations. The South European countries could play a prominent role in such cooperation promoted by the political development in the non-European part of the Mediterranean and in general by the emergence of the Islamic fundamentalism with its ideological irreconcilability towards the West and the East alike.

EAST WEST COOPERATION. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND SECURITY
by Pier Carlo Padoan

Outline for the Iai Imemo meeting, Moscow april 1990

Cooperation between regions: some key issues

Cooperation between regions is crucially affected by the degree of cooperation within each single region, so let us start by considering this aspect. To define a region from an economic and a political point of view implies that countries partecipating to a regional agreement have an incentives in doing so, i.e. they reap benefits from partecipating to an agreement. However partecipation to an agreement implies costs for partecipating members. A regional agreement may be defined as a regime, i.e. a set of rules, norms, and institutions around which actors' expectations converge (Krasner 1983). In this respect a regime is a public (or collective) good for countries partecipating to it. The provision of public goods is costly as rules not only have to be agreed upon but they must also be credible, i.e. they have to be enforced. Two examples may clarify this point. Partecipation to a monetary union provides benefits in terms of lower transaction costs and lower uncertainty; it generates cost in terms of loss of monetary sovereignity. Partecipation to a commom market or custom union increases the welfare of members countries, however it entails costs in terms of lower protection for some of the national industries.

The way in which cooperation may be obtained depends on the structure of international relations, i.e. the distribution of international power (Guerrieri and Padoan 1988). Under conditions of hegemony the presence of a larger, more powerful, country assures the production of public goods, i.e. the implementation of a regime, as the hegemon is able and willing to bear a more than proportionate share of the costs of production of the public

goods. Smaller countries will act a s (partial) free riders insomuch as they will partecipate to the benefits of regime formation without paying their full share of supply costs.

When hegemony is absent, i.e. when the distribution of international power is more symmetric, cooperation is more difficult, although fortunately not impossible. Conditions for cooperation under "anarchy" or "oligopoly" are the following (Axelrod and Keohane 1985): a) agents (countries) must take a long time horizon, i.e. they must be ready to undergo repeated interaction among themselves so as to minimize the incentives to free ride; b) agents must be ready to alter their preferences so as to define a feasible set of cooperative solutions, i.e. they must be ready to give up some of their strictly nationalistic goals to implement an international agreement; c) the number of agents must be minimized so as to maximize reciprocal control (this condition must be intended not in its literal sense, minimization of the number of countries, but in its substantial sense, minimization of different national position); d) the role of institutions (as mechanisms which provide and distribute informations about others' behaviour) must be enhanced so as to stabilize the expectations each agents has about other agents' future behaviour.

The case we are interest in is obviously the latter -anarchy or oligopoly- since no single country in Europe, indeed in the whole world, is in the position today to act as a full hegemon.

Once we assume that the conditions for cooperation without hegemony within one region are met we must turn our attention to

the cooperation between regions.

Cooperation between regions depends, as we said above, also on the
degree of cooperation, internal cohesion, within each region. If
two regions enjoy the same degree of internal cohesion it is
convenient to treat each region as a unitary actor and apply the
conditions for cooperation without hegemony. Otherwise different
options are possible.

We will consisder these in a moment. Let us now recall that the
(quite limited) analysis of economic relations between regions
(see e.g. Krugman 1989) shows that the "spontaneous" tendency for
each single region is to maximize internal integration and
protection vis-a'-vis other regions. As a consequence the "pure"
economic outcome of a process of regionalization would be a
"polar" system, i.e. a system of regional blocs hardly
communicating with each other. Cooperation, and therefore further
integration, could arise if the conditions for cooperation
without hegemony were to apply.

However these might not be sufficient and cooperation would
simply not develop. A further condition can , however, be
introduced to help us out: issue-linkage, or, more generally, the
mutual perception of the fact that countries belonging to
different regions or blocs are related not only by economic,
strategic, or political ties but by all of them simultaneously.
The theory of international cooperation has shown (Tollison and
Willet 1979, Alt and Eichengreen 1987, Padoan 1989) that, if
countries explicitly recognize this fact and exploit it
constructively, they can implement cooperative agreements which
lead to further integration. Cooperation in strategic and

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political affairs can enhance economic cooperation and viceversa. To conclude this paragraph let us consider the case of two regions characterized by a different degree of internal cohesion: let us suppose that cooperation is stronger in region A and weaker in region B. This means that countries belonging to region B have weaker incentives to cooperate , e.g. they are less willing to interact over a long time horizon and/or they are less willing to change their national preferences. Consequently, if the appropriate issue linkages emerge, individual countries belonging to region B might find it profitable to increase their ties with area A, starting a process of integration on individual or bilateral basis. The development of such a process will depend, inter alia, on how area A will respond, which in turn depends, again, on the degree of cooperation within the bloc. If cooperation is strong within region A, this might well behave as a unitary actor and develop a "common foreign economic policy" vis-a'-vis the rest of the world. In such a case a situation of "regional hegemony" might develop with bloc A acting as an hegemon with respect to the single countries of area B. Such a relationship will develop, of course, if the hegemon (area A) finds enough incentives to increase integration with area B. However, defining a commom foreign policy might result more difficult for countries of region A than to cooperate in a process of integration among themselves. In such a case a process of bilateral cooperation might deveelop where single members of region A develop integration ties with single members of region B.

To sum up the process of cooperation between two regions may take up (at least) three forms: a) global cooperation where the two regions cooperate as unitary actors; b) hegemonic cooperation where one region acts a as a unitary actor and countries of region B act on individual basis; c) bilateral cooperation where cooperative agreements are defined on bilateral basis between single countries belonging to the two regions.

Problems of collective action in East-West cooperation

The present state of East-West relations seems to be taking either structure b) hegemonic cooperation, or structure c) bilateral cooperation, rather than structure a), global cooperation. In what follows we will try to support this statement and suggest possible scenarios.

Let us start by considering the degree of coperation within the West. Collective action in the West follows different levels. In the first place, as the Malta summit has confirmed, the bilateral relation between the United States and the Soviet Union represents a main point of reference for collective action in the world system. Strategic confrontation between the two superpowers is developing into a form of bilateral cooperation on several grounds, strategic , economic, and political tout-court. In other words a bilateral strategic confrontation is developing into a cooperative framework thanks to positive issue linkages between economics and security. This new form of cooperation produces positive externalities on the world system insofar as it generates new incentives to cooperation between East and West. We will return to this point later.

Cooperation within Western Europe is, paradoxically, more complex. Cooperation within the Community (and a fortiori for the rest of Europe) is non hegemonic as no single Europeran country is now in the position to exert hegemonic leadership in the region. Cooperation must therefore proceed along the lines of collective action under anarchy discussed above. Some of these conditions seem to be fulfilled in the Community. Countries do take a long term view in their interaction but they seem at times less willing to alter their national preferences to achieve common goals (the debate over monetary unification is a good example) while the number of actors is certainly not so small as to facilitate cooperative solutions. On the other hand relative strong Community institutions do provide a solid network that supports cooperation.

The developments in Eastern Europe may increase the difficulties for the process of cooperation in Western Europe in the sense that some Community members may find it convenient to develop bilateral relations with eastern countries. The German case is the most obvious but not the only example. The propensity to develop special bilateral relations at present should not be considered as an alternative to the process of integration in the Community, but rather an attempt to gain some leverage in order to partecipate to the process of Western integration itself. To take up the German example again stronger ties with East Germany put the Federal Republic in a stronger bargaining position in the perspective of both Monetary Union and Single Market developments. The results of the Strasbourg meeting, however,

suggest that positive issue linkages between economic and political affairs can enhance cooperation within the Community.

A further area of concern comes from the fact that developments in East-West relations are influencing the relations of the Community with developing countries. Increasing demand for cooperation coming from Eastern Europe puts pressure on the resources the Community is willing to devote to foreign assistance, consequently the South risks to be "crowded out" of financial support. This possibility has produced growing protest from developing countries such as those belonging to the ACP group which have a special relationship with the Community. Pressures coming from developing regions act with different force on single Community members depending on their specific national ties, thus increasing factors of attrition within the Community and increasing the difficulties in formultaing a common policy in favour of Eastern countries.

The state of collective action within Eastern Europe is weaker than the one present in Western Europe, especially in the present situation, as the process of political and economic reforms is following national lines which tend to weaken the ties represented by CMEA agreements, in spite of very recent attempts of the Soviet Union to relaunch CMEA as a supranational body (Consider the very recent proposal of Checkoslovakia to dismantle CMEA or to withdraw unilaterally from it).

This fact excludes at least for now, the "global cooperation" scenario but still leaves open , as we mentioned, the two other possibilities: hegemonic cooperation and bilateral agreements.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC SECURITY: PROSPECTS
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR EAST-WEST RELATIOINS

Ostrovskaya

1. The present situation on the european continent creates principal new conditions for strengthening of european economic security.

1a. In the 1990-th the Europe is getting a new quality. Rapid acceleration of integration processes within the EEC, creation of the single european market and on its basis - of european economic space are accomplished by outstanding social and economic reforms in the countries of Eastern Europe. Becomes obvious the aspiration of these countries to participate in the integration processes in Western Europe. Creation of the legal basis of economic cooperation between Hungary, Poland, Checoslovakia end the European Communities was the first step on this way. Suimultaniously the Communities use in more active way economic measures to support political changes. From the beginning of 1990 quantitive restrictions imposed on import of goods from these countries were abolished. Within the framework of the Euorpean Bank of Reconstruction and Development being now under establishment, is agreed to offer most of its financional

resourses to credit the projects in private sector. Checoslovakia and Hungary are investigating the posibility to conclude the assotiation agreement with the EEC. Obviously the similar question will be discussed by Poland and Romania in nearest future.

So clear trend towards the enlargement of the West European integration zone is evident. The time hedule and scope of these processes will be defined by the direction, speed and quality of the reforms in Eastern Europe towards the open market economy. .

1b. At a high speed is going the process of german-german unification. It can be suggested that the GDR - maybe with some exclusions - will join the present political, economic, social and legal structures in West Germany. As a result a unic - as to economic power - unified german state will be created. It's economic policy will influent the direction and speed of integration in Europe.

1c. The inclusion of the USSR into the integration complex in Europe is going slowly because of unstability of economic situation, complications in the development of economic and political reform, serious regional problems. Nevertheless the steps already done towards the creation of a new domestical and foreign economic management system on the basis of common used rules and procedures (freedom for foreign trade operations for each enterprise plus mananagement of the trade flows by the government through the custom tariff and

non-tariff instruments) as well as activity towards cooperation with international economic organizations (EEC, EFTA, OECD etc.) give a good sign concerning the soviet aspiration to be more active part in european economic life.

1d. Important for investigation of future deyelopment of european economic cooperation is the problem of CMEA activity. The latest decisions towards the use in intra - CMEA trade of hard currenc and market - oriented prices give a clear sign that in the present form the CMEA is unable to exist. It is not excluded that "the new CMEA" will be based on the principies of a free trade zone or custom union. However the positive result of such transformation will depend on the ability of the USSR and some other key CMEA members to coordinate the substance of their economic reforms in the nearest future.

2. So the situation in european economic security is rapidly changing. The strengthening of economic interdependence between Eastern and Western Parts of Europe, on the first stage, through creation of legal ptuctures and then by building of a real cooperation mechanism on the enterprise level give good opportunity for solving of this problem. However, every country of the Eastern Europe should have the right and posiblity to participate in this process on a non-discriminatory basis. To the USSR which occupies the sixth place in the list of world trading powers should be offered the equal posibilities to act jointly with other East

European countries on the continental economic scene. The good will of soviet government to create "a common european house" and appropriate economic basis for it shoud be supported by the EEC and EFTA members countries.

Rapid settlement of the question of the USSR membership to the GATT, practical enrichment of the USSR-EC agreement on trade, comercial and economic cooperation will help to complete the soviet economic reforms because in this case the internal economc legislation of the country should be transformated on the basis and principies of its international obligations It's necesarry to take into consideration the importance of economic security of every european country in the course of the german-german unification. For example the GDR is for the USSR with the trade volume of more than 10 bln. rbl. the trade partner number 1. and its possible adoption to the EEC should in no way limit present trade flows.

3. The countries of South Europe will face different effects from the coming processes. From the one side increasing wishes of some East European countries for financional and other kind of support will result in cutting respective domestic programmes especially in regional and social affaires. In the first run it touches the interest of Spain, Portugal and Greece due to their specific needs in this field. From the other side good investment and economic cooperation opportunities will be opened in East european market, taking into account its great demand for machinery,

equipment, high technology and consumer goods. The goods from the South Europe will be competitive oln the respective markets in the first line in the light industry.

4. The evaluation of future cooperation between Soutgh and Eastern Europe depends on the positions of south european countries on the european single market. That is why it is necessary to define the place of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece in Europe-92 (influence of european single market on the development of macroeconomic indices, specialization in intra-european and international division of labour, positions in high-tec indusry etc.).

5. The development of economic relations between South and Eastern Europe will be realized in the context of all european economic process. It is suggested to study mutyual intrests in development of various forms of cooperation (trade in goods, trade in servicies, scientifie and technological cooperation, economic information exchange, solving of global problems etc.). Concrete fields of economic cooperation will be analised provided the security aspects duly taken into account.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF A TRANSITION TOWARD A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE

Discussion Paper

by

Natalino Ronzitti
Professor of International Law
University of Pisa

1. Introduction

The CSCE is seen as a process, and its follow-up has given birth to a number of sub-processes in several sectors: security, economics, and human rights. This process has a low institutionalization and is based on the method of inter-governmental conferences. The 35 participating States meet in conferences devoted to different sectors of the CSCE and decide by consensus. Generally, the documents they adopt do not have treaty value. What are the goals of the CSCE process from an institutional point of view? Is it possible to foresee the birth of a regional institution under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter? One can image the ultimate goal of the CSCE as the creation of a pan-European system. Its peculiarity, if compared with other regional institutions, would be the coexistence of a regional system with a number of subsystems. In other words, the creation of a regional system does not entail -- as a consequence -- the extinction of the organizations which are currently in existence. A possible instrument for reaching the above goal is the gradual transformation of the actual system of soft-law on which the current European process is based into a system of binding instruments and legal obligations.

2. The Maintenance of Peace and Security

At present, a new system of security is difficult to foresee. The premiss is that there are regional organizations which have security systems (for instance, the Organization of American States, the Arab League) and those which do not (e.g. the Organization of African Unity). On this point, it is possible to foresee a step-by-step approach, along the following lines:

- the reduction of armaments;

- the increase of CSBM;

- the guarantee by the CSCE States of those members which choose to follow a policy of permanent neutrality;

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- the creation of an European system for settling disputes among CSCE members. This system is to be centered not only on non-binding mechanisms such as conciliation commissions, but also on a Court of arbitration with compulsory jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction should also embrace legal disputes related to security issues.

- gradual transformation of actual military alliances into political structures;

- inventory of duties stemming from Article 2 para.4 of the UN Charter prohibiting the threat and use of force in international relations;

- the creation of a system of collective security, linking the 35 CSCE States, provided it is compatible with the existence and maintenance into force of military alliances.

3. A Common European Legal Space

A common European legal space is of utmost importance for enhancing cooperation among the CSCE States. It can be instituted by using both the method of approximation of legislation and the creation of uniform law. The following fields are ripe for the creation of uniform law or for legislative harmonization:

- recognition of foreign judgements in civil matters (e.g. the EEC countries have concluded the 1968 Brussels Convention and this system now covers the EEC and EFTA countries through the Lugano Convention);

- company law;

- joint ventures;

- a statute of a model of a pan-European company;

- environment;

- transport.

Uniform law can be created, or harmonization of legislation reached through the conclusion of ad hoc treaties. However, one can image more flexible instruments, for instance, codes of conduct. Secondary legislation, on the model of EEC "directives", is foreseeable as long as ad hoc institutions are created. In effect, permanent specialized bodies should be constituted along the lines of the Conference of Participating States, which is to be considered the main organ of the CSCE process.

4. Economic Co-operation

There are a number of economic institutions linking CSCE members: EEC, EFTA

and COMECON. However, only the EEC has as an ultimate goal the political and economic integration of its members.

The CSCE should aim at creating and strengthening economic ties among the above institutions. How this goal is consistent with the actual EEC policy aimed at stipulating association agreements of broad scope with a number of Eastern European countries is a point worth discussing. In addition, new institutions, already in existence or those being created, could become tools for a pan-European cooperation, even though they have been established within the framework of a regional subgroup. For instance, the Environmental Agency being created by the EEC could become an institution to which other participating States can be associated. The Bank for Reconstruction and Development could become a bank of the CSCE countries. Eureka, at present linking EEC and EFTA countries, could become the instrument of the CSCE Participating States. Other agencies can be envisaged, especially for transportation, technical standards, etc. A problem to be solved concerns the power which should be granted to those institutions and the nature of their voting procedures. In particular, it must be determined whether decisions should be made by consensus only, or by some other procedure.

5. Human Rights

CSCE countries are bound by a number of human rights instruments. The members of the Council of Europe are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, and nearly all European States are parties to the 1966 UN Covenants on Human Rights. CSCE members are also bound by the soft law established within the framework of the Helsinki and Vienna Conferences. Both political and social rights are guaranteed to all individuals and, to some extent, to minorities. Only peoples, not minorities, are titulars of the right of self-determination.

At present, the real problem is not the specification of human rights, but their implementation and safeguarding at the international level through appropriate judicial or quasi-judicial means before which individuals must enjoy a locus standi. A number of solutions can be envisaged in that direction:

- the acceptance of the optional Protocol to the 1966 Covenants by all European States;

- the adhesion to the European Convention on human rights and the acceptance of its optional clauses;

- the strengthening of the Vienna mechanism on the human dimension and the creation of a new judicial body within the framework of the CSCE.

Minority rights, as a rule, are guaranteed by the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and

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Political Rights. Minorities also are titulars of rights according to the basic principles of Helsinki Final Act. The critical point is their access to supranational institutions. If a new mechanism for the protection of human rights is considered at the European level, a separate chamber for claims related to minorities can be established.

6. Conclusion

The CSCE process requires better institutionalization in order to reach the above goals. A "light" form of institutionalization would consist of creating a sort of political committee composed of high ranking officials of foreign ministries of the CSCE countries. Regular meetings of the CSCE foreign ministers should be envisaged. If necessary, foreign ministers should be accompanied by other colleagues of their cabinet (e.g. Ministers of transportation, education, finance etc.; they can also meet on their own). These meetings should stimulate cooperation in the fields previously mentioned. Consensus should be the formula for approving decisions at the political level. However, the institutions created through a consensus procedure could work on the basis of majority voting, in order to accelerate the process of decision-making.

THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION OF EUROPE. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES.

BY MAURIZIO CREMASCO.

The very likely conclusion of a CFE treaty this year will constitute the starting point of drastic reductions in men and armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces. This, in turn, will open a new era in the relationship between the two alliances characterized by a less confrontational military posture, higher transparency in their respective military activities, and more defense oriented and, consequently, less threatening military doctrines.

However, the CFE treaty will touch upon the level of a specific group of weapons systems (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters), and set a limit to the total men under arms, only for the East and West members of the two alliances, and only in the European territory.

The countries geographically located outside the area of operational responsibilities established by the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty, and outside the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals) area as outlined in the CFE mandate, will not be constrained and will be free to continue their military buildup, if they wish.

This is bound to raise the concern of the Southern European countries, because of the continuous, significant military buildup taking place in North Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf -- regions which are all geostrategically linked, directly or indirectly, with the Mediterranean area and Southern Europe.

The CFE mandate has explicitly recognized the peculiarity of the situation in the South by excluding a zone in Southern Turkey from the ATTU area, where the arms reductions will take place and will be monitored and verified.

In fact, the text of the CFE mandate document specifically states that: "In the case of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi,

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Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gozne, and thence to the sea."

Presumably, this was done to appease Turkey's security concern with respect to a potential Syrian threat, however unlikely under the present circumstances. This threat could materialize if Damascus should revive its old claims on the Turkish province of Hatay (Alessandretta).

Syrian armed forces are well equipped with modern armaments: T-72 tanks, BMP-1 AIFV (Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles), SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, SA-6 and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles, MIG-23, MIG-25 and MIG-29 combat aircraft, Mi-24 and Mi-25 attack helicopters (1).

But Syria is not the only country in the region which has built up a significant military capability.

Military expenditures are a good indicator of past achievements and future trends. According to the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Middle East military spending declined sharply by 15% in 1987 and by 12% annualy in 1984-87, after reaching a high level in the 1982-84 period (2).

Still, the Middle East region imported some $17.9 billion in arms, almost 38% of the entire world market. For the period 1977-1987, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia were the region's largest importers of arms. These three countries accounted for 33.2%, 20.4% and 11.6% respectively, of the region's arms imports in 1983-1987 (3).

A new study published in August 1989 by the Washington-based Congressional Reseach Service has reported that during the 1985-1988 period the Middle East received two-thirds of all armaments delivered to the Third World (4). Middle Eastern and North African countries have continued to expand and modernize their military inventories. This has been done despite a reduction in oil revenues and through a series of complex barter, offsets and net back agreements, whose precise amounts are not reflected in the official defense budgets.

There are several reasons for continued arms build-up: the regional instability created by many unresolved political issues, by the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and by the adventurous foreign and military policy of some nations; the domestic insecurity of authoritarian regimes which tend to compensate it with a belligerent external policy; the fears of conservative regimes of the spread of Iranian-style and Iranian-supported Islamic fundamentalism.

Whithin the framework of this arms build-up, there are at least three elements of special concern for Southern European countries: (i) the proliferation of the surface-to-surface missile technology, (ii) the proliferation of the capacity to produce chemical weapons and (iii) the proliferation of high technology weapons systems in the Mediterranean area.

(i) The proliferation of the surface-to-surface missile technology.

The proliferation of the surface-to surface missiles (SSM) could be either the result of direct acquisition from another country willing to export -- as in the case of the Chinese sale of CSS-2 intermediate range (3500 km.) missiles to Saudi Arabia (5) -- or the result of conversion of missiles already in the inventory into systems with longer ranges and better capabilities, or the result of indigenous or joint R&D efforts for the development of new systems.

The following are elements of the present ballistic missile proliferation trend, a trend which could lead to a more volatile and dangerous world security environment:

- the upgrading of missile systems on hand;
- the utilization of developing commercial and scientific space programs as a source of ballistic missile technology;
- the cooperative efforts by Third World arms producers to develop, modify and produce SSMs by sharing costs and pooling technical expertise;
- the use of foreign consultation and technological assistance;
- the hiring of foreign scientists and engineers at high salaries;
- the setting up of complex import schemes to avoid the restrictions imposed on the export of special technology items.

Reportedly, by the year 2000 at least fifteen nations will be capable of producing -- and possibly willing to export -- their own ballistic missiles (6). In spite of their crude technology and poor accuracy, these systems could be used with conventional warheads as countercity weapons -- as Iraq did in the recent Gulf war against the Iranian cities-- or employed with chemical warhead against military and civilian targets. In this case, the threat would be even more significant.

Finally, if the proliferation of ballistic missiles is followed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- a possibility which has acquired new relevance in the recent

past -- then even the European security problems would appear negligible by comparison.

An outline of the current research, development and production of surface-to-surface missiles in the regions geostrategically linked with the European Southern region is presented below (7).

- Saudi Arabia has deployed the Chinese CSS-2 missiles.

- Iraq has upgraded its SCUD-B missiles in a two-phase program between 1987-1988. The first modernized SCUDs (named al-Hussain) were upgraded to a range of 600-650 km and fired against Teheran. The Iraqis claim that the second upgraded version of the SCUDs (named al-Abbas) has a range of about 900 km. These missiles also were reportedly used against the Iranian cities. Finally, on December 1989, Iraq launched a three-stage, 48 ton rocket named Tammuz I, reportedly capable of carrying satellites into space, and there are reports that another missile (called al Abid with a range of 2000 km.) is being developed.

- Egypt has produced and deployed, presumably with Iraqi and possibly North Korean help, the 90 km range SAKR-80 missile, a derivative of the Soviet FROG missile. Moreover, Argentina has, at least in the past, reportedly helped Egypt on the R&D of the VECTOR missile, a derivative of the CONDOR missile family. Iraq has also worked with Egypt on the development of the same CONDOR-VECTOR-BADR-2000 missile with a claimed capability of accurate delivery to 400 km and maximum range of 1200 km.

- Iran has developed and deployed, reportedly with Chinese and North Korean support, the OGHAB and IRAN-130 missiles with a range of about 45 and 130 km respectively.

- Israel has deployed the JERICHO 1 missile and continued the tests of the JERICHO 2 up to a range of 800-850 km. There are conflicting analyses on the long range missile test reported by the Soviet news agency TASS being conducted in the Mediterranean in September 1989. The test has been interpreted to be either the launch of the JERICHO 2B version capable of a maximum range of 1300-1500 km, or the failure of the second stage of an SHAVIT-OFEQ-2 launch vehicle. In fact, on September 1988, Israel launched, using the SHAVIT rocket, the OFEK-1 satellite with a 75 kg test payload. It has been suggested that the SHAVIT might provide the basis for the development of the JERICHO 3 ballistic missile, potentially capable of intercontinental ranges.

Furthermore, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and South Yemen possess the Soviet SCUD-B missiles, while Lybia, Syria,

North Yemen and South Yemen possess also the more accurate Soviet SS-21 missiles.

(ii) The proliferation of the capacity to produce chemical weapons.

The proliferation of the capability to produce chemical weapons, and the willingness to use them in regional conflicts, has been demonstrated in the course of the Iran-Iraq war.

But new disturbing patterns are emerging in the Mediterranean area. Egypt is reportedly continuing its development efforts (8), which however have been denied by the Egyptian government, while Libya, whose Rabta plant is again at the center of international attention and concern, appears to be the most recent newcomer in the CW proliferation race. In fact, after the 1989 crisis between Washington and Tripoli on the real scope of the plant, very recent news has confirmed that chemical agents are produced in Rabta (9).

(iii) The proliferation of high technology weapons systems.

The proliferation of high technology weapons systems in the Mediterranean area is best exemplified by the acquisition by Libya of Soviet SU-24 fighter- bombers in April 1989 (10). The Su-24 sophistication represents a significant qualitative jump in the operational capabilities of the Libyan Air Force. Because of its long range, high speed penetration, very low level navigation capacity, all-weather characteristics, and weapons load options the SU-24 is a formidable weapons system.

Obvioulsy, Italy is worried about these trends.

Italy's present threat perceptions and military scenarios (possible and credible as to various degrees) include:

- a bilateral military confrontation between Italy and a Mediterranean country over a controversy affecting important national interests;
- an Italian involvement in a Mediterranean crisis precipitated by other actors;
- an Italian participation in crisis-cooling or peace-keeping operations characterized by elements of potential military confrontation;
- hit-and-run military actions conducted by small scale terrorist units;
- blackmail by terrorist groups to convince the Italian government to refrain from assuming a specific foreign policy

line, or to press for the adoption of a particular policy in the context of a regional crisis;
- indirect threats to the Italian political and/or economic system.

It should not be forgotten that Italy has been the only European country to be attacked by Libyan missiles and that the Libyan Su-24 aircraft have a combat radius of action long enough to reach Italian territory with a low-low-low flight profile.

In spite of:

- the progressive fading of East-West antagonism;
- the eventual restructuring of the military and political aspects of the two alliances in Europe;
- the further development of the arms control process through a CFE 2 negotiation to be started soon after the conclusion of a CFE treaty;
- the establishment of a new European "order" to be achieved through a new Helsinki Conference, political instability and potential military confrontation stemming from the Mediterranean region and the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored.

Thus, more radical disarmament measures than those agreed upon at the CFE negotiations in Vienna, will tend to be resisted by the Southern European countries on the premise that it would be unwise to disarm while all the non-European countries of the region are maintaining or upgrading and modernizing their armed forces.

Furthermore, the regional instability and the regional arms race -- which are also fueled by the spread of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons -- could again lead to armed conflicts and open the possibility of intervention by external powers. This could, in turn, pose serious problems for those countries like Italy, which are by geographical position, political relations and economic ties an integral part of the Mediterranean region.

Certainly, it is difficult for the two superpowers and the European countries to exert effective influence the outcome of those regional political and military issues which constitute the primary cause of the endemic instability in the Mediterranean region and the Persian Gulf.

But something could be done in the realm of arms and technology transfers.

In 1987, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, followed in 1989 by

Spain, agreed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts exports of certain missile technologies and components. Even though the regime has not proved able to stem the proliferation of SSMs entirely, it has been a useful step in the right direction.

It would be desirable to have more nations, and in particular the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, join the MTCR.

Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union should reopen the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks, of which four rounds were held between May 1977 and December 1988, aimed at limiting and controlling the export of conventional armaments.
During the talks, the American and the Soviet delegations tabled drafts of political/legal criteria and military/technical criteria (i.e. weapon-related guidelines for arms transfer decisions. However, the two delegations were unable to agree on the actical application of these criteria in specific regional contexts.

It is recognized that the reopening of the CAT negotiations and an eventual agreement between Moscow and Washington would not be sufficient to reduce the arms transfer directed mainly to the Third World market. However, the United States and the Soviet Union are the principal arms exporters, accounting for 26.3% and 46.5% respectively of the world arms export shares in 1987 (11). Furthermore, for the period 1985-1988 the Soviet Union accounted for 34% of the Middle East market, while the United States accounted for 16% (12).

Thus, a U.S.-Soviet agreement to limit conventional arms exports could be an important symbol of a new superpower attitude, an incentive for other countries -- the European countries in particular -- to join the CAT regime and a signal to the world arms market that the times of easy access to high technology weapons systems are over.

Finally, the two superpowers should join their efforts and should participate actively in initiatives undertaken by the international and regional organizations, or conducted through diplomatic multilateral approaches, or initiated by the Western European countries through the EC mechanisms to find equitable solutions to the problems which are at the root of the endemic instability of the region. These include:

- the issue of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey;
- the issues which are still deeply dividing Iran and Iraq;

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- the Palestinian issue and the issue of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel;
- the Lebanese problem;
- the problem of the spread of Iranian supported Islamic fundamentalism;
- the problem of terrorism;
- the issue of the former Spanish Sahara and the possiblity of a new deterioration in the relationship between Marocco and Algeria.

Obviously, not all the efforts could be jointly conducted. Specific national interests should be safeguarded; regional sensibilities and politico/military alignments should be taken into due consideration; mutual distrust and suspicions should be overcome.

But the joint efforts would be made easier if the Soviet Union continues its trasformation toward a truly democratic system and if the past U.S.-Soviet confrontational approach to international problems fades away because of an improved relationship between Moscow and Washington and the successful conclusion of the various bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations.

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Oleg Amirov

The Vienna CFE Talks and Security in Southern Europe

1. The main problem which is to be solved at the negotiations on conventional armed forces, opened in Vienna in the spring of 1989, concerns the way to change the existing WTO-NATO military balance in Europe in quantitative, structural and spatial terms so as to implement the formula for the Vienna mandate - to eliminate disparities and the capability for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action.

2. The joint NATO forces on the southern flank comprise formations of armed forces of the Italy, Turkey, Greece, and also USA and UK. These forces are detached and placed at the disposal of the NATO command which has its headquarters in Naples. On the side of WTO, joint NATO forces are confronted by four Soviet military districts (Kiev, Odessa, North and Trans-Caucasus) and also armies of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The balance of conventional forces in the theater which ranks second in importance for the main-force groupings, next to the Central European theater of operations, is characterized by a significant concentration of military power (25 percent of the tanks, 32 percent of the artillery, 22 percent of the armed vehicles, and 18 percent of the helicopters).*)

3. The southern region poses the most difficult geostrategic situation. The USSR and WTO countries have common borders with NATO countries in the Trans-Caucasus, a land border between the USSR and Turkey, and in the Balkans, between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Although the common borders are greater here than in the center of Europe, direct contact between the opposing sides involves but a small part of the forces of the two alliances. Furthermore, neither the relief features of the area nor the geostrategic significance of the fronts presuppose the launching of large-scale operations involving conventional armed forces.

4. A feature of the southern flank is that it is closely linked with regional tension zones. The arms race that started gathering momentum after the 1973 oil crisis in the Arab world, the availability of huge financial resources and access to novel military technologies (including chemical warfare weapons) gave more freedom of action to the developing countries in crisis situations and lowered the psychological barrier against the use of military force.

5. A special role in the structure of military confrontation in this region belongs to naval forces. Should a war break out, the South European NATO countries are to employ their land and naval forces for retaining control over the Mediterranean region and ensuring the continuous reinforcement of the Central European theater of operations with troops and equipment. The negative impact exerted by the naval armaments buildup on the situation in the Southern Europe is complicated by the fact that this sphere remains outside the disarmament process.

6. The recognition of the principle of non-uniform reductions dramatically enhances the topicality of the problem of delineating subzones, or the problem of regional differentiation, as the Concluding Document puts it. The special significance of this problem is easy to explain: different configurations of the zone of priority reductions imply different initial balances of armed forces and conventional armaments and, therefore, a different scope of reductions and different resultant levels after the reductions (see Table 1).

7. The correct selection of zones of reduction and withdrawal of offensive armaments and equipment in the Southern Europe will help reduce the concentration of these forces and means of war in the vicinity of the line of contact of the armed forces of NATO and the WTO and a safe "separation" of the sides' military potentials. In this connection, one should bear in mind that, in the event of concentration by the potential aggressor of his forces for an attack, a transfer of troops at the forward line along the line of contact offers the defending side a far better opportunity to ascertain the direction of the main strike well in advance than it would have in the event of a transfer of the aggressor's troops from the depth of his operational formations toward the frontier.

8. In the final analysis, the entire range of possible measures to reduce and limit armed forces and armaments, confidence-building measures, etc., with the aim of averting surprise attack and eliminating the capability for conducting large-scale offensive action, boils down to extending the warning

time to a maximum so as to deprive the aggressor of his chief advantage - a surprise effect. Even deep cuts in troops and armaments are reversible in theory, and the aggressor can once again build up his potential through mobilization and accelerated development of military production; an agreement, however, would make the warning time run into months and years instead of days and weeks, which would practically render groundless any hope of a successful attack and would thus eliminate its probability.

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*) Depending on the methods of calculating the forces of the WTO and NATO, the quantities of armaments vary greatly. This depends both on the basic definitions of such concepts as "tank", "combat helicopter", etc., and on taking (or not taking) into account of the stocks in storage in particular zones, and so on. In this case, the author aimed not to compare the data of WTO and NATO, but only to show their distribution as an illustration.

Table 1.

Comparison of WTO and NATO zone proposals on the CFE Talks

Zones proposed by the WTO	Zones proposed by the NATO
Extended Central Zone (zone 1) NATO: Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlans, UK	Intermediate Zone (zone 3) Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlans, UK
WTO: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathia, Kiev MDs	WTO: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathia MDs
Southern Flanks (zone 3) NATO: Italy, Greece, Turkey	Rest of ATTU NATO: Greece, Turkey
WTO: Bulgaria, Romania, Odessa, North and Trans-Caucasus MDs	WTO: Bulgaria, Romania, Kiev, Odessa, North and Trans-Caucasus MDs

Nadezhda Arbatova

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(the outlines of the chapter for the IAI-IMEMO research project)

Moscow, April 1990

1. With the liquidation of the base of US strategic missile carriers in Rota (Spain) in 1979 and in step with the increase in the range of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the global nuclear-missile confrontation in the Mediterranean region is becoming less dangerous. At the same time the nuclear confrontation in this theatre of operations remains significant, and here the USA has great geostrategic advantages over the USSR. Besides sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) and attack tactical aircraft, nuclear weapons of the US land forces are deployed on the territories of Italy, Greece and Turkey.

The year 1988 saw the emergence of two new interrelated and yet divergent tendencies exerting an impact on the nuclear confrontation in the theatre of operations. The elimination, in accordance with the INF Treaty, of the ground-launched cruise missiles in Italy moderates this confrontation to some degree. On the other hand, NATO's recent decision to transfer US attack tactical aircraft from Spain to Italy, that is closer to the borders of the USSR and other WTO member states, intensifies it.

2. An important factor in the nuclear confrontation in the Mediterranean theatre of operations is represented by tactical nuclear weapons in service with the general-purpose naval forces. The US Sixth Fleet carries 300 units of tactical nuclear weapons designed to strike against ground targets and also to be employed against aircraft and submarines. Marine aviation, both carrier-borne fleet aviation and base aviation, carries the buck of the tactical nuclear weapons of the US Navy. These are the most obsolete weapons in the US entire tactical nuclear weapons arsenal and are due for modernization. Under the program, 758 dual capable sea-launched

Tomahawk cruise missiles out of a total of 3.994, are to be fitted with the nuclear warheads. According to some Western estimates (the glasnost in this field is still lacking in the USSR), the 5th Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean Sea carries 50-100 units of tactical nuclear weapons guided missiles against antiship strikes, depth charges and torpedoes.

The low threshold of the potential employment of tactical nuclear weapons on the seas due to the specifics of the equipment of the contemporary navies, and more particularly to an increasing proportion of dual capable systems, increases the possibility of a nuclear conflict breaking out and the risk of strategic forces being quickly drawn into a conflict.

The Western opposition to the Soviet proposal to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons is damaging to the security situations in the region. It is strengthening also the position of those in the USSR who are accusing the West of the intentions to make profit of our economic difficulties and to abuse the new political thinking.

3. The fact that the land theater is more or less fragmented accounts for the overriding importance of sea communications and naval forces on the southern flank. As distinct from the land forces, the basic elements of the naval forces of NATO and WTO on the southern flank directly confront each other. The main focus of the naval balance is direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR.

The US Navy is assigned concrete tasks such as providing support for the allies from the seas on the southern flank, the sealing off the Black Sea straits and the neutralization of the Soviet war fleet, attacks from the seas on the Soviet Union and its allies, in the event of a major war. In the Eastern Mediterranean the US Sixth Fleet has the mission of supporting Israel and the pro-Western Arab regimes.

On the basis of available information the Soviet squadron has the following tasks: preventing a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union and its allies by the US war fleet; countering conventional attacks from the sea against ground targets; delivering strikes from Central Europe against the southern flank in the event of war, defending the approaches to the Black Sea; impeding the use of force by the USA in the Third World in a crisis situation.

It should be noted that the war fleets in general and

particularly those operating in the Mediterranean have destabilizing qualities such as maneuvering ability and the capacity to transport large units and formations over great distances and to concentrate great combat power aboard a relatively limited number of facilities. In this regard a special danger is posed by aircraft carrier forces which constitute the main force of the general-purpose Navy of the NATO countries and of the USA above all. The capacity of the aircraft carrier fleets to transfer significant combat power over great distances creates a source of potential threat and determines its employment as a promptly acting and powerful instrument for interference in particular crisis situations.

The danger of confrontation between naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea is also linked with its specific geography. The closed configuration of the Mediterranean basin and its comparative narrowness predetermine the high concentrations of the deployed naval forces of the potential opponents. Therefore, there is an increased danger of incidents which, in a crisis situation, could develop into an armed conflict. For the same reasons the interaction and battle between the war fleets, the air forces, sea-launched and shore-based missile complexes in this area are intertwined more tightly than anywhere else (with the possible exception of the Baltic Sea area) into an operational-tactical tangle. The destabilizing influence of the geographical features of the Mediterranean Sea also makes itself felt in that its closed configuration assures naval superiority to the side which delivers the first strike and then blockades the straits.

The history of sea battles testifies that by reason of the special vulnerability of surface fleets the first strike proves, more often than not, to be the decisive one. In a crisis, one side can succumb to the temptation to destroy the enemy's main forces in a surprise attack. At the same time the risk of being subjected to such a strike stimulates the urge to deliver a preemptive strike. Undoubtedly, naval supremacy cannot determine the outcome of a major war, but it could change the correlation of forces on the southern flank and exert an impact on the development of events in the entire theater of operations.

4. Speaking about the problems of promoting security in the Mediterranean region it should be noted that obstruction by the West to any proposals made by the USSR and WTO is

due primarily to its reluctance to discuss the whole range of Mediterranean issues on both the political and military strategic plane.

NATO's negative position on the idea of nuclear-free zones in Europe is basic to its negative attitude toward denuclearization of the Balkan Peninsula on the whole. According to NATO's leadership, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkan Peninsula would change the regional balance in favour of the USSR (taking into account its geographical proximity to Southern Europe) and would have a negative impact on NATO's defensive strategy and on possible negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.

The negative attitude of the NATO countries toward the Soviet proposals on the withdrawal of ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons is also based on the assumption of Soviet-American geostrategic inequality in the region. The withdrawal of ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons and of the entire Sixth Fleet is considered to be strategically damaging to the entire alliance, because the Soviet Union does not need seaborne strike forces for land attack in the Mediterranean being able to carry this mission from land bases.

The problems of control over the withdrawal of the ships and especially submarines carrying nuclear weapons represents also a serious obstacle. More precisely almost all ships and submarines are nuclear-capable and many of their combat means are dual-capable systems; the problem consists in establishing control over the nondeployment of nuclear weapons by the war fleets. This problem should obviously be resolved not only regionally but also on a global scale.

The West's negative attitude to the Soviet proposal on the withdrawal of the navies of the two great powers from the Mediterranean Sea is rationalized by several considerations. First, the withdrawal of the 5th Soviet squadron and a freeze on a number of ships in the Mediterranean, in the view of the West, should not be examined in isolation from the USSR Black Sea Fleet and its land-based and ship-aviation. Second, a breeze on the numerical strength of the naval forces in the Mediterranean inevitably poses a question of control over submarines which are able to pass (and do pass) unidentified through the Strait of Gibraltar and reinforce their fleets. Obviously, along with the reluctance of the

West to discuss the problems connected with the restriction of naval activities, there is a range of concrete problems requiring identification and a more detailed practical examination.

The negative impact exerted by the naval armaments buildup on the situation in the Mediterranean region is complicated by the fact that this sphere remains outside the disarmament process. The elaboration of major agreements on the restriction of naval activities and cutbacks in naval armaments under present conditions is impeded by the absence of any appreciable headway in two areas: at the negotiations on conventional armaments in Europe (the situation is complicated by "the German problem") and in the sphere of the region's conflicts.

But without waiting for results in these two areas, it would be possible at this stage to outline a number of concrete steps for furthering confidence-building measures which would exert a stabilizing influence on the situation in the region.

In this respect it would be expedient and quite legitimate to include the question of the permanent Soviet naval patrol in the Mediterranean waters in the light of present-day realities. In regard to the prevention of a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, the permanent presence of the Soviet squadron appears to be insufficiently effective, if the performance of this mission means orienting it toward a preemptive strike which in itself increases possibility of an armed conflict breaking out on the seas. Perhaps, it would be more expedient to prevent a US nuclear attack from the seas by maintaining capability for a retaliatory strike against the territory of the USA and not by the way of preemptive strikes against American ships which carry nuclear weapons.

As regards the task of countering conventional strikes the combat capabilities of the Soviet squadron are hardly very impressive. The threat to the USSR from the Mediterranean is insignificant and, furthermore, the Soviet fleet there, as shown above, is extremely vulnerable. Its survivability depends on its pre-emptive actions which can provoke a potential enemy's attack. In this sense, the Soviet fleet could, perhaps, be employed more effectively in the Black Sea, where the geostrategic situation for the USSR is more

favorable and where its mission would not be to break through the straits but, on the contrary, to blockade them in order to ensure the defense of the Black Sea coast of the USSR and that of its allies from the sea.

The US-Libyan armed clashes in recent years show the function of the Soviet squadron, consisting in restraining the USA in crisis situations, without involving NATO and WTO. However, this function in turn needs to be supplemented by wider political action than "mere" power confrontation.

The Soviet Union's permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea becomes under the essentially new present conditions increasingly counterproductive. It provides both a pretext for propaganda of a Soviet threat and "a justification" for the escalation of the naval presence of the USA and its allies in the region. The question of revising the permanent Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea does not rule out the possibility of its reestablishment, if the need should arise.

At the same time it seems that the participation of the Soviet war fleet, jointly with the navies of other countries, in maintaining peace and freedom of navigation under the UN aegis, would be not only possible under such conditions but certainly meet with a much more favorable reception in the European countries of the region.

EAST-WEST COOPERATION AND
SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Joint Research Project by the

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INTRODUCTION

This paper will deal with the implications for security in South-Eastern Europe of those NATO and WTO forces which are excluded from the current CFE talks in Vienna. It will concentrate on two types of forces, namely naval and nuclear weapons. While not all air-forces are formally included in the CFE talks, for purposes of this project will be treated in the paper dealing with those negotiations.

NUCLEAR FORCES

Nuclear forces are not formally part of CFE negotiations. "Dual capable" forces, however, have not been excluded. This is a comprimise formula which was reached in order to reconcile on the one hand the NATO insistence not to initiate, after the INF treaty, a new formal negotiation on nuclear weapons before substantial results are achieved with conventional force reductions; and on the other hand, the desire of the Warsaw Pact not to exclude what is left of nuclear forces of the two alliances in Europe. The Pact did not, moreover, accept to exclude "dual capable" systems only because they had a nuclear role, among other reasons because the Soviets argue NATO has a marked superiority in this field.

This paper starts from the premise that the nuclear problem of South-Eastern Europe is not divisible from that of the rest of Europe. Because of the nature of the weapons, it does not make any strategic sense to try and devise nuclear-tight compartments among the various sub-regions of Europe. Therefore, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the reasoning proposed here applies to the East-West military

relationship in Europe as a whole as much as to the South-Eastern region.

Nuclear weapons can be seen as accomplishing a purely deterrent or also one of warfighting in case of failure of the deterrent. The following paragraphs will brief overview of the evolution of Soviet and NATO thinking on matter. Western (and particularly US) thinking has followed a circular development; Soviet thinking has, roughly speaking, followed in its wake, lagging behind of several years. At the beginning of the nuclear era, deterrence and warfighting were seen as strictly connected. Nuclear weapons were seen as simply the most potent explosive to be employed in otherwise conventional operations.

No later than the first studies revealed the enormity of the collateral damage that any nuclear use, even the most limited, would have caused, doctrine began to move toward a conception of nuclear war as a total war. Under this assumption, nuclear use should not so much influence the development of the battle in the field, but should have primarily served the purpose of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy, and thus dissuade him form attack in the first place.

Subsequently, there emerged a problem of credibility with this supreme threat against offenses which might have been serious but not threatening of the vital interests of the attackes party. Strategists returned therefore to think about ways to utilize nuclear weapons in ways somehow proportional to the possible kinds of offences, even just conventional ones. Around the middle of the sixties, both NATO and, a few years later, the USSR, moved to re-couple theater nuclear concepts to the conventional correlation of forces by introducing ever greater flexibility and selectivity in their respective doctrines and operational plans.

The main thesis argued here is that, contrary to these tendencies, it is in the interest of all Europeans to maintain, and possibly to strengthen, a conceptual as well as operational distinction between nuclear and conventional forces. The goal of this should be to retain a high degree of deterrence of any type of conflict, and that can only be associated to the risk of nuclear escalation. This distinction is coherently maintained only by the UK and France. That the US has moved to more flexible options should not come as a surprise: it has tried to minimize the dangers to its own homeland in case of war. But Europeans, including the Soviets, can not make any use of such a distinction: every war in Europe would be "strategic", even if it were not nuclear. Nuclear weapons must be seen only as an instrument to prevent it.

Yet, in an era of rapid political change in Eastern Europe, with the Soviet Union retreating politically and militarily and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) collapsing, perhaps a few words should be said to justify the need for a nuclear deterrent within NATO. The military threat to peace in Europe is not withering away with the disgregation of the Soviet bloc. As one authoritative analyst recently put it, the capability to attack would "vanish only if weapons and soldiers ceased to exist", which is not likely to be the case for a long time indeed. In all other conceivable scenarios, the ability of nuclear weapons to make war unusable as an instrument of policy can not be replaced. [1]

This rather simple concept, which is the basis for nuclear deterrence, has not always received the attention it deserves. Recent changes in the Warsaw Pact have highlighted the three serious mistakes which NATO has made in justifying the

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[1] Kaiser, Karl: "Why Nuclear Weapons in Times of Disarmament?", in The World Today, Vol. 45, No. 8-9, August/September 1989, p. 136.

maintenance of nuclear arsenals in the past. At times these mistakes have been nothing but a mere bluff. First, NATO has often tied the need for nuclear weapons to the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons, e.g. during the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) debate in the late seventies and early eighties, when these systems were presented as a counter to the Soviet SS-20. Gorbachev disposed of this rationale with relatively little effort by agreeing to sign the INF treaty. A plethora of Soviet nuclear weapons, however, continues to be capable of hitting Western Europe.

Second, NATO has long tied the need for a nuclear deterrent to the unfavorable correlation of conventional forces in Europe. Pointing to the conventional imbalance was the easiest way to win the necessary public support for nuclear weapons. However, both on-going negotiations and budgetary pressures in many countries might soon eliminate this justification as well. NATO must therefore now prepare to argue the nuclear case differently. At lower force levels, it can be argued, force-to-space ratio problems will make the need for a nuclear deterrent more and not less important. [2]

Third, the necessity for a nuclear deterrent has been tied to the political character of the governments in the WTO. Nuclear weapons were often presented as a tool to contain otherwise unmanageable communist expansionism. The logical conclusion is that since these societies are now more pluralistic and open, they will be more peace-loving, and that therefore the West no longer needs military precautions. To varying degrees, all WTO governments are now moving away from orthodox

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[2] With conventional forces thinly spread along the borders, it may actually be easier for an enemy to find "holes" for deep penetration with small mobile forces. Kaiser, Karl: "Why Nuclear Weapons..." op. cit., p. 136-139. For a discussion of force-to-space ratios, see Mearsheimer, John J.: Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 47-48, 94, 181-183.

communism toward more pluralistic forms of polities. But it is far from clear that communist ideology, and not the geopolitical preeminence of the USSR in Europe, whatever its system of government, has been the main threat to the security of post-war Western Europe. In addition, rising nationalism and resulting risks to international stability constitute a new and still imponderable menace to peace in Europe.

NAVAL FORCES

Unlike nuclear forces, the study of naval forces in the South-Eastern Europe can and must be considered separately from rest of continent. This is because of the peculiar situation which characterizes that theater of operations, the actors involves and the nature of naval forces themselves.

The Soviet Union vigorously insists that NATO--and particularly US--naval forces in the Mediterranean constitute a threat to its homeland which it can not afford not to address in the process of arms control. In addition, Moscow argues that, just as it gave in to Western requests for asymmetrical cuts on land forces where it was clearly superior, NATO should now accept asymmetrical cuts of naval forces, where the East is qualitatively and quantitatively outdone. Marshall Akhromeev, personal adviser to Gorbaciov, in a testimony to the US Congress in 1989 has even explicitly stated that the successful conclusion of the CFE talks. depends upon their expansion to naval forces.[3] It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will be so inflexible after all, but it is likely that it will be necessary to deal with the issue in the future.

The West, however, still refuses to include naval forces in any formal

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[3] Cited in The International Herald Tribune, 22-23 and 24 July 1989.

negotiation. As will be discussed below, this stance stems from both military and political considerations. Nonetheless, both formal and informal discussions about the issue continue, both between East and West and within the Western Alliance. It must not be forgotten that some measures of naval arms control have already been implemented for a long time (as in the case of the US-USSR agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea and, more recently, of the analogous Soviet-French and Italian-French treaties).

Aside from the two superpowers, it hardly needs to be said that naval arms control is particularly relevant for the countries at the flanks of NATO. Inasmuch as naval arms influence the conventional balance on land, they affect the riparian regions more directly. This is particularly true at the conventional level, since naval nuclear arms tend to have a longer range and are therefore less restricted to operate at the rims of the European landmass.

It is also immediately apparent that the problem of naval arms control presents not only military but also political aspects, particularly in a region like the Mediterranean where the East-West confrontation is intermingled with several other conflictual relationship between riparian and adjacent countries and where the superpowers are involved as well. In addition, the political role of the US naval presence in the Mediterranean can hardly be overemphasized.

It is less often considered, moreover, that naval arms control in the Mediterranean involves important legal aspects which stem from the fact that the jurisdiction over the seas is much more subject to controversy than the land areas which are involved in current arms control negotiations in Europe.

In light of the complex issued outlined above, the paper purports to do the following. First, it will explore the potential of naval arms control in the Mediterranean for improving military security in Europe, and particularly in Southern Europe. It will do so by assessing the naval military balance in the region and how it affects the correlation of forces on land.

Second, it will explore alternative negotiating scenarios. Should naval issues be included in the CFE talks at all? Should progress in one area be made contingent on progress on other areas of arms control?

Third, it will assess the political implications of possible East-West naval agreements for East-West relations, inter-allied relations in NATO, and relations of the members of the two alliances with other states in the Mediterranean region.

Finally, it will analyze the legal implications of possible naval arms control regimes with reference to their infringement on international customary law regarding access to and navigation through Mediterranean waters.

Military Significance Because of the inherent flexibility which stems out of fleet mobility, superpower negotiations on levels of naval weapons will necessarily have to be conducted on a global scale, though regional sub-ceilings are also conceivable. The Mediterranean region could be one of these. Regional sub-ceilings would entail negotiated limitation to fleet mobility in the region covered by the talks. This issue is particularly complicated in the Mediterranean due to the non-homogeneous claims of riparian states. Several factors contribute to make naval arms control a more complex and delicate issue when compared to other conventional arms control negotiations.

One important factor which would make any East-West naval negotiations

intrinsically difficult is that the importance of naval forces for NATO is far greater than it is for the Warsaw Pact, and it is much greater for the US than it is for the USSR. This is not only a matter of force or deployment asymmetry, as for the land and air forces, but also of grand strategy. NATO is an alliance divided between two continents with many insular or peninsular member states. On the contrary, the Warsaw Pact is a geographically solid bloc of contiguous states. In addition, the US is a maritime power with vital sea lines of communication, while the USSR is a continental power with no such maritime interests. Moreover, US naval forces in the Mediterranean constitute the only effective link among the several NATO operational theaters and the bulk of time-urgent reinforcements. These forces also perform a crucial intelligence and communication mission for the whole Southern region of the alliance. This is not the case for the Warsaw Pact, which performs these same missions with land-based systems.

A paramount aim of the study should therefore be to define possible alternative goals of future naval negotiations, if any. Aside from the classical goals of arms control--save economic resources, improve crisis and arms race stability, reduce tensions--it is important to assess whether and to what extent the grand strategies of the two alliances, and of the two superpowers in particular, could adjust to possible negotiating scenarios.

A second complicating factor of naval arms control is the difficulty of verification. In order to be effective, any verification scheme would have to be extremely intrusive, much more so than either East or West would probably be willing to accept. While remote sensing might play a role as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, conventional limitations would have to be conducted through painstakingly

complex fine-combing of the vessels involved.

There is also a special problem for submarines, which could easily hide in the unevenly warm, shallow and salty waters of the Mediterranean, where they can mask their sound emissions more easily than in blue-water oceans.

Another important factor of complexity is that the role of third countries in the East-West correlation of forces is more pronounced for naval forces than it is for land forces in Europe. Several Arab states possess significant naval--including submarine--forces, and so does Israel, and their weight would be significantly increased should the US and Soviet fleets in the region be substantially reduced or withdrawn altogether. In fact, naval forces in the Mediterranean are not solely oriented toward East-West missions, but also perform important crisis-management and peace-making missions.

In light of these complexities, naval arms control might initially achieve more rapid results in the field of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) than through actual force reductions. Naval CSBMs might differ from analogous land measures because they would have to take into account both the inherently greater mobility of naval forces and the difficulty of establishing clear-cut limits in terms of force levels participating in maneuvers and force movements.

Nonetheless, because of their lesser political sensitivity, naval CSBMs clearly represent the path of least resistance toward militarily significant naval arms control in the Mediterranean. After the US-Soviet agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea of 1972, France and Italy concluded their own agreements with the Soviet Union. This study will explore the hypothesis of making these treaties into a multilateral and homogeneous agreement, involving the largest possible number of participants.

UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT

The production of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons (CW) and their use in combat is often portrayed as a new factor of the strategic equation in the Middle East. In fact, these developments are neither new nor confined to that region.
However, the widespread acquisition of unconventional weapons and their actual use are essentially phenomena of the 1980's and of the Middle East region.

This paper will concentrate on two issues: the likely effects of proliferation on the politico-military balance of the region; existing and potential anti-proliferation policies. Preliminary to this analysis is country-by-country review of the situation. Finally, the paper will dress a tenptative agenda of the linkages between the proliferation of unconventional weapons in the Middle East and broader security issues at the East-West, West-West, North-South and South-South levels.

The state of affairs

The record of past misjudgements about Middle Eastern military developments is such that one should be cautious about drawing too many conclusions on the basis of current assessments of capabilities and potentialities. The following information is based on what analysts believe to know as of spring 1990...

Israel

Israel's domestic military industry is the most sophisticated and developed of any Middle East state, and it is certainly qualitatively superior to those of its Arab rivals. This is reflected in the edge that Israel enjoys at the regional level in conventional and unconventional weapons and delivering systems, both deployed and under development.

Speculations about Israel's nuclear program are widely known after Vanunu's revelations in 1986-52 . Although important details are still unclear, it can be stated that Israel has a sophisticated nuclear capacity and arsenal.

Israel's nuclear arsenal is believed to comprise most likely
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52. The Sunday Times, 5 October 1986.

100-200 bombs, including some fission bombs suitable for missile warheads or tactical uses. All this means that Israel's nuclear arsenal is only slightly inferior to China's. Delivery systems, apart from the ballistic missiles discussed below, include several hundred aircrafts and probably some artillery pieces; also, nuclear capable missiles are believed to be deployed in hardened silos (Spector, 1988).

Israel's CW capabilities, like those of many countries, are little known. However, they are believed to include warheads for the Jericho I ballistic missiles (Robinson, 1990; Spector, 1988) together with advanced anti-CW equipment.

Reports indicate that Israel deploys two types of ballistic missiles: the US-built MGM-52C Lance (range: 110 km; some 12 launchers; CEP: 150-400 mt) and the locally produced Jericho I (some 50 missiles; range: 450 km). Already tested and possibly deployed are two improved variants of the Jericho system: the so called Jericho II, tested in May 1987 with a range of 800 km and a payload of 450 kilograms, and the Jericho IIB, tested in September 1989 with a 1,300 km range (the test flight ended in the Mediterranean some 400 km north of Benghazi, Lybia53). Some 100 Jericho of the second generations could be already deployed.

Israel launched in Sept. 1988 of a low-earth orbit satellite -the Ofek I- by a rocket baptised Shavit, a special version of Jericho IIB. This added a potential autonomous early warning dimension to Israel's military capabilities; moreover, the Shavit may provide a basis for a Jericho 3 with a potential range up to 7,000 km54 .

Two other developments must be underlined regarding Israel's actual and potential missile capacity. The first is the ability to deliver nuclear strikes beyond the Middle East region (most notably the Jericho IIB can reach the Soviet Union's southern territory); the second is the Israeli effort to develop an ATBM capacity in co-operation with the US55 .

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53. See Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 November 1989, p. 1143; it must be noted that there are contradictory reports about the range of the Jericho II and IIB versions (see for instance Navias 1989 and Jane's, cit.)

54. IISS The Military Balance 1989-90

55. The US-Israeli Arrow ATBM program formally started in July 1988, and in March 1990 the Secretary of defense made known that the US had offered Israel acquire the modified surface-to-air Patriot system.

Syria

No nuclear capacity or intention has been attributed to Syria, the only hint in this direction being a vague nuclear guarantee allegedly extended by the USSR in the 1980s - at least according to Defence Minister Mustapha Tlass. The meaning of this alleged 'extended deterrence' is more questionable than ever, given the decline of Soviet military assistance to Syria in 1989.

Syrian CW capabilities include production of a variety of CW agents and munitions, began in the mid 1980s with the assistance from West European firms; CW are stockpiled for battlefield missions (Webster 1989, as quoted in Robinson 1990). The main Cw production center is believed near the city of Homs.

At least two types of ballistic missiles in Syria's arsenal are supposed to be able to deliver chemical warheads (most probably VX nerve gas): the 65 km of range Frog-7 (some 24 deployed) and the 300 km Scud B (some 18); both missiles are of scarce counter-force and even counter-city value given the combination of their limited range and/or accuracy.

Syria has no domestic missile program, but its line-up of ballistic missiles includes the more accurate SS-21 (120 km; some 12-18 launchers) besides the already mentioned Frog and Scud. However, Syria's existing missile arsenal is unable to cover the entire Israeli territory. To fill this gap Syria has actively sought to procure longer range missiles in the late 1980s, first the 500 km SS-23 from the USSR and then the M-9 from China, but the effort has failed so far (according to Israeli sources Syria turned to North Korea in Dec. 1989).

Egypt

A full party to NPT since 1981, Egypt has shown no nuclear intention since that time.

On the other hand, Egypt's ability to produce and deploy CW has a long history. Actually, Egypt is the only Thirld World country, other than Iraq, with an internationally confirmed record of use of CW (phosgene & mustard aircraft bombs during the 1966-67 intervention in North Yemen). Cooperation with Iraq in the production of CW warheads is likely, as it is a recent renewal of production at home56 .

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56. The Arms Control Reporter, p. 704.B.375, April 1989.

Egypt's missile line-up comprises three models already deployed: Fog-7, Scud-B and Saqr-80; the latter is a missile with a range of 80 km, locally produced in cooperation with Iraq and possibly North Korea. In addition, since 1984 Egypt has been a partner to the much talked about Condor II-Badr 2000 program together with Argentina and Iraq; the program, designed to produce a missile with a range of at least 800 km and good accuracy, has been slowed down due to US pressures57 . Also, under development in co-operation with North Korea there is thought to be an upgraded ScudB version.

Iraq

In spite of recurring speculations, Iraq's nuclear capacity is believed to be many years away58 . Allegations that Iraq "may not become a nuclear producing country, but can be a nuclear -possession nation" seem discounted by 1989 IAEA reports (Iraq ratified the NPT in 1969)59 .

Iraq's capacity in both CW production and use is well documented. Mustard and nerve gases (Tabun and Sarin) are produced, stockpiled and deployed. Chemical warheads (probably being developed in co-operation with Egypt) would constitute the next step in Iraq's CW capacity.

The Iraqi missile force is believed to consist of 30 Frog-7, 36 Scud B and two domestically upgraded versions of the Scud B, the 600 km al-Hussain and the 900 km al-Abbas, both employed against Iran in the 1988 so called War of Cities.

As for the missiles being developed, besides participation in the Condor II- Badr 200 program with Egypt and Argentina, on December 5, 1989 Iraq tested a new missile and announced the
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57. In spite of their number, reports on the Condor II program are contradictory on the technical aspects. On 5 December 1989 Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian born rocket scientist, was sentenced in the US for illegal exports related to the program; in September the US State Department declared that "Egypt has terminated its co-operation" in the Condor program (Jane's Defence Weekly, 30.9.89, p.630)

58. This assessment may have to be reconsidered in the light of the tentative of smuggling nuclear-triggers from the US, foiled in London on March 29, 1990.

59. The Arms Control Reporter, p. 453.E.1, July 1989.

existing of another one.
    The missile tested from al-Anbar base near Baghdad and named
Tammuz I was in fact a rocket capable of putting a satellite
into orbit   and, therefore, a potential ICBM. The Tammuz is
obviously a response to the Israeli satellite launch   and
demonstrated   once   more   that Iraqi capabilities have been
underestimated by the rest of the world; therefore, although
unconfirmed, the announced existence of yet another missile, the
2,000 km al-Abid, should not be discounted60 .

Iran

    In spite of ongoing efforts to revive its civilian research
program, the Iranian nuclear program has been slowed down because
of the changes in bilateral realtions following the revolution;
morover, the plants suffered severe damages from the Iraqi air
raids in 1985 and 1987. Therefore, although Iran has the
political incentives 'to go nuclear', the acquisition of nuclear
weapons on the part of this NPT party it is not anywhere near.
    Iran is known to produce and stockpile CW, as it is
suspected   to have used them against Iraqi forces. According to
Webster's testimony, "production of CW agents, including mustard,
blood and nerve gases, began at a factory in the vicinity of
Tehran in the mid-1980s with assistance from West European and
Asian firms. The Iranian program is expanding. Agent-filled bombs
and artillery shells are being stockpiled for   battlefield
missions" (Webster, 1989).

    As for the Iranian missile arsenal, it includes an unknown
number of: Frog-7, Scud B, improved Scud B (range: 400 kms)61,
Oghab, Nazeat, Shahin-2 (these short-range missiles- respectively
40 and 100-130 kms- were developed locally with Chinese
assistance). While no long-range missile program is attributed to
Iran, it is believed to be developing another short-range system:
the Iran-130.

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60. The Arms Control Reporter, 706.B.24, Jan. 1990, quoting Iraqi
sources confirmed by the US Defense Intelligence Agency on
8.12.1989 (no details were given on the landing site).

61. The existence of the an improved version of the Scud B in the
Iranian inventory is a speculation reported by several sources
(Edgar O'Ballance "The Military Balance in the Middle East and
Maghreb", Middle East Strategic Studies, n. 3, 1989; "The global
proliferation of ballistic missile", Jane's Defence Weekly,
23.12.1989).

Libya

Libya's nuclear ambitions are well known as is the fact that they have been frustrated so far. A party to NPT, Libya is many years away from possibly building nuclear weapons indigenously.

The suspected CW plant at Rabta has been at the center of US and then European concern for some time. Before a blaze broke out on March 14, 1990, the US believed the Rabta plant was "the single largest CW production facility in the Thirld World, although it is smaller than the combined Iraqi capacity" (Webster, 1989); the plant was supposed to produce mustard and nerve gases as well as providing munition-filling facilities. The present state of the plant is uncertain62 .

Finally, Libya's missile capacities are limited at present (some 35 Frog-7 and 75 Scud B), but it is believed to be striving to acquire a longer range system, either from China, Brazil or private sources, that would enable it to target Israel as well as Southern Europe. None of these efforts have been successful sofar, and the most promising program, the acquisition of the Brazilian MB/EE system, seems still far away.

Saudi Arabia

With the acquisition of some 20-60 CSS-2 from China, announced in March 1988 (the missiles may not be deployed yet), Saudi Arabia has entered the missile proliferators' family through the main door. In effect, the CSS-2 has as a range of much as 3000 kms, thus enabling Riad to target all of Iran, Israel and parts of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, this missile capacity is not highly significant in military terms, given the inaccuracy of the system and the fact that they are designed only for conventional high explosive warheads (unconventional warheads are not known to be possessed or sought by Saudi Arabia). The Saudi missile capacity, therefore, has a preeminently prestige and deterrence role, the latter being especially oriented towards Iran.

Moreover, in order to dispell regional and international concerns and pressures, Saudi Arabia has ratified the NPT and pledged not to transfer the missiles.

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62. According to independent satellite reconnaissance the plant would have suffered only small damages (Le Monde, 21.3.1990).

Implications for regional stability

The military level- The first conclusion to be drawn from the facts outlined above is that since the end of the Gulf war the Middle East region has entered a new stage of its long dated arms race. This new stage consists of two related aspects: 1) the relentless drive by the four main regional military powers (Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Israel) to acquire parity with each other in the local version of a 'triad' deterrent (nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and medium - to long-range ballistic missiles); 2) the entrance of Saudi Arabia as a new actor into the regional military equation (Libyan attempts to do the same have been frustrated so far).

This new stage in the Middle Eastern arms race is disturbing because of the crisis instability it generates at its various steps of development and because of its effects on security developments outside the region (this latter aspect is discussed below).

As far as the regional balance is concerned, it could be said that as long as some kind of parity between the main opponents is not reached (or perceived) crisis stability remains fragile and the risks are high. Although political analysis may suggest that the probabilities of a war breaking out deliberately are low, it remains that the usual arrays of preoccupations about miscalculations, accidents, terrorist action and irrational behaviours are justified.

Moreover, it must be said that the establishment of a stable system of deterrence relationships is especially unlikely in the Middle East the multiplicity of actors and conflicts being the main but not the only obstacles to that.

Analysts from within and beyond the region have recently embarked in analysis about the effects of the recent military developments on the two 'hotter' regional fronts: Syria vs. Israel and Iran vs. Iraq. Their conclusions seem to converge on one point: unconventional proliferation is less destabilizing on the Gulf front because the depth of "the Iran-Iraq theater is too large for initial tactical gains to have momentous strategic consequences. Consequently, neither an opening missile strike nor a ground attack involving CW could decide the outcome of a new war, and this means that there is less incentive to employ these means or to prevent their employment" (Heller, 1990).

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Since just the opposite is true on the Syrian-Israeli front, the introduction of unconventional means is considered particularly destabilizing in this case because it creates "a widening gap between the strategic options of one party (Syria), and the declining room for manoeuvre of another (Israel)" (Navias, 1989).

Although this is not the place to comment on these analyses, it should be underlined that, as it usually happens, the assumptions on which they are based should be considered carefully before assuming they are correct. Just to give an example, the cited analyses seem not to consider some basic factors for the Syrian-Israeli case: e.g. the qualitative (as opposed to numerical) edge enjoyed by Israel or the existence of an Israeli nuclear capacity.

Also, the military significance of the unconventional means 'newly' introduced in the region should not be overestimated. The missile issue must be tackled within the technical context of a particular system's range, accuracy and payload, and very few countries in the Middle East can boast of deploying a missile system that successfully combines the three ingredients. While, for instance, the Saudi IRBMs can carry a non-conventional warhead for a long distance, this missile is not particularly accurate and the availability of the needed warheads can not be taken for granted. Similarly, the military efficiency of CW is known to be unpredictable and its value in combat is limited63 .

It is also noteworthy that none of the current analyses takes an Israeli-Iraqi confrontation into consideration.

In fact, if the effects of unconventional proliferation are evaluated in the context of the general military-strategic situation (including conventional weapons and systemic factors) it could appear that the overall correlation of forces among the Arab states and between the Arab states and Israel has not changed dramatically in the 1980s.

Incidentally, it can be noted that the more sophisticate regional military balances become, the more we see developing the kind of contradictory strategic analyses that has so far distinguished the East-West security debate. Experience from that debate should teach analysts, if not the concerned parties, to avoid the logic of the 'worst case' mentality, knowing, as we
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63. For a detailed analysis of this point see Robinson 1990.

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do, its negative effects on perceptions and, ultimately, on the arms race itself.

Nevertheless, reasons for concern and even fears remain and could be lessened only if and when existing source conflict in the Middle East is politically defused, and arms control and reduction measures are introduced in the region. The chances of attaining this safer state of affairs are not many, but the possibility does exist.

The political level

As elsewhere, the likeliness of the use of military force in the Middle East is dependent on the overall political developments. In this context, two trends seem to have emerged in the 1980s: on the one hand, a record of failure to achieve political objectives by military means; on the other, a deescalation of traditional interstate conflicts (Dessouki 1989).

As for Israel, its strategic aim of eliminating Palestinian resistance does not seem to have been well served by the use of force either at home (the intifada) or in Lebanon; also, both Syria and Israel have learned the limited use of military power in controlling Lebanon. Finally, the exausting 8-year Iran-Iraq war has brought the belligerants at least back to the starting point, if not to an even worse situation.

In a longer historical perspective, the Arab states seem to have realized that there is no military solution to their conflict with Israel and, with the qualified exception of Syria, do not seem orientated to use their military power in that context, if not as a bargaining chip on the long awaited diplomatic table.

Like the Arab-Israeli conflict, other traditional Middle East interstate conflicts have also been deescalated in the 1980s, thus permitting the restoration or creation of regional and sub-regional co-operation schemes. Now, "the nature of security threats in the Middle East is increasingly recognized as being domestic, developmental and non-military" (Dessouki, 1990).
Although there is no room for excessive optimism -(traditional conflicts, however deescalated are not solved and the 'new' security threats are especially intractable)- it can be stated that political incentives for the use of military force seem scarce, and this should mitigate the risks even in case of an acute crisis situation.

Thus, if this assessment is correct, there are some

political grounds for trying to implement a set of policies that could mitigate the instability inherent in the current stage of the Middle East arms race.

Leaving aside for the momemt the discussion of the general political and diplomatic efforts needed to bring about a solution to the new and old threats to security in the Middle East, the more specific issue of anti-proliferation and arms control actions will now be considered.

Existing arms control initiatives and their prospects

Nuclear- The pros and cons of the existing nuclear anti-proliferation regime   -(a constellation of international treaties, institutions, codes, and bilateral nuclear-trade arrangements)- are too complex and well known to be elaborated here.

Probably less known is the proposal to institute a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The Shah of Iran prosed to create such a zone in 1974; the proposal was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly. Interest in the proposal has been revived from time to time (for instance, after the 1981 Israli bombing of the Iraqi Tammuz I reactor).
While the resolution does not define a zone, in 1985 Egypt said that "all concerned parties should belong to the zone, and should comprise, as a minimum, the Arab States, Israel, and Iran" 64.

Regarding the NWFZ the position of the main concerned parties is as follows: ´

Egypt: it was the first, after Iran, to call for its creation and has supported the idea ever since (in 1989 Egypt submitted yet another resolution about the zone to the UNGA, that adopted it). Its proposal requires that all parties to the zone adhere to the NPT.

Israel : in 1981 it called for the convening of a preparatory conference to negotiate a multilateral treaty for a ME NWFZ. It believes the negotiating should be done among the parties' in the region (as for Tlatelolco) and that a NWFZ would inhibit local wars more than adherence to the NPT or unilateral adherence to IAEA standards.
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64. The Arms Control Reporter, A/40/442, 28.7.85

Iran: it is unclear if it still supports the proposal
launched by the Shah.

Iraq: it called for a NWFZ in April 1989, on the condition
that all parties in the region, including Israel, accede to the
NPT. Subsequently, the chief of the Iraqi delegation at the
Geneva Conference on Desarmement specified that the zone should
be free of all weapons of mass destruction (including chemical).

The United States: they are very interested in the process,
but set five criteria: regional initiative; comprehensivness;
verification; no detriment to regional or international security;
prohibition of all nuclear explosive, including PNE.

The USSR: its most recent position was expressed in
Shevardnadze's speech to the Egyptian Parliament in February 1989
in which he called for the institution of a zone free of nuclear
and chemical weapons as a step towards a more comprehensive
system of confidence building measures65 .

Chemical-The negotiations that have been taking place within
the UN Conference on Disarmament since 1968 for a ban on CW seem
to be approaching a successful end. Like the NPT the future CW
convention will be the central piece to an international
antiproliferation regime comprising the Geneva Protocol of 1925
and multilateral (like the suppliers' code of the Australia
Group) and unilateral actions. Morover, a CW convention will
probably be complemented by true disarmament on the part of the
two superpowers.

However, given the spread of the relevant technology -due to
its connection with civilian production- and given the existing
weapons stockpiles, an effective CW ban needs an even more
genuine co-operation of the parties than the NPT does. In other
words, since a CW ban is even more difficult to enforce, its
effectivness depends to a larger extent on the consistency
between its aims and the security needs of its parties.

It is this fact that makes the objections of the developing
countries to the proposed antiCW regime worthwhile. These
objections were voiced clearly at the 1989 Paris Conference and
their most vocal supporters were the Arab countries (backed by
Latin Americans). Apart from the usual protests against the
egemonism of the 'North' countries (that want to keep for
themselves the means of military and economic power), the Arab
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65. TASS 23.2.1989)

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countries asked that a link is established between all means of
mass desctruction, and namely between nuclear and chemical
weapons.

     In effect, the Arabs states see CW as an 'equalizer' vis-a-
vis Israel's nuclear weapons (Ezz 1989; Dessouki 1990) and the
fact that this is hardly true in military terms, seem to
underline the deterrence value attributed to CW.

     Regardless of any judgement on its substance, this attitude
is relevant as far as it can hinder the fruitful implementation
of any anti-CW regime by drawing many developing countries not to
subscribe it or to subscribe conditionally.

     A way out from this impasse could be an effort to create a
nuclear and chemical weapons free zone in the Middle East. As
mentioned before, the USSR and Iraq support this idea and Israeli
prime minister Shamir has called at the UN in June 1988 for a CW
free zone.

     Delivery systems- The only existing multilateral initiative
to restrict proliferation of delivery systems is the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreed upon by seven Western
nations66 in April 1987. The primary goal of the MTCR, pursued
through two sets of controls on technology exports, is to stop
the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying
nuclear weapons.

     Although there is some evidence that the regime has slowed
some Third World missile programs, it has several weaknesses.
However, there is a consensus that the most effective way to
address the problem of missile proliferation is by strengthening
the MTCR, if only for lack of clear alternatives.

     The main weaknesses of the existing regime are the
following:

-it addresses only a category of delivery systems suitable for
unconventional weapons, missiles of over 300-km of range and 500
kg67 , thus contributing too little to prevent the proliferation
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66. The seven original participants in the MTCR are: the US, UK,
Canada, West Germany, France, Italy and Japan; Spain joined in
December 1989.

67. "The 500 kg paylod threshold is based upon the assumption
that a nuclear proliferator's warhead will weigh at least as

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of shorter range and chemically armed missiles;

- all the participants have already been applying the MTCR in a
relaxed or partial way; in particular: West European adherents
have been unwilling, to date, to enforce the MTCR provisions in a
stringent way , while US partiality vis-a-vis Israel is
undermining the regime in several ways68 ;
- .the main obstacle to the MTCR however, comes from the non
participation of many counries that possess just the kind of
technology the MTCR strives to restrict: the USSR and China would
be the most important partners to attract, but the reluctance of
other European countries (like Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland) or
of developing countries like Argentina or Brazil to join the
regime is equally important.

In fact, as for CW disarmament or any other anti-
proliferation regime, the larger the membership, the better. In
this sense, besides adopting measures to strengthen the existing
regime it would make sense to pursue the suggestions made by the
USSR in favour of a new multilateral agreement, to be negotiated
in the framework of the UN (at the CD ?), which could enlarge
scope, means and partenership of the MTCR.

As forthe Middle East in particular, the only regional arms
control initiative concerning missile proliferation has come
from the US. In December 1988 the Reagan Administration in fact
proposed separate talks with Egypt and Israel in view of a
regional initiative to limit fears of surprise attack and
possibly reduction of missiles deployed. Since then, however, the
idea has made no progress (the Soviet suggestions on regional
arms control, discussed under the CW paragraph, seem to go very
much in the same direction).

Conclusions

The ongoing US-led international effort to cope with the
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much" (Karp, 1990, p. 13).

68. For details on West Europeans' attitude see IISS-Strategic
Survey 1988-89 and Karp 1990, p.15-18; as for the US-Israeli case
it must be said that US partiality, besides its direct political
and military effects (see Karp 1990, p. 23-24), has important
side effects insofar as the Israeli government and privates are
helping other proliferators around the world (China, South Afri-
ca..).

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worldwide spread of unconventional weapons is problem-ridden.

Nevertheless, the NPT, the MTCR and the hopefully forthcoming CW ban are important measures and, to date, the only existing means to cope with unconventional proliferation. Therefore these initiatives must be strengthened.

To this end the existing and future anti-proliferation regimes should not embody old style East-West rivalries: putting the treaties in the UN framework could be useful, and Soviet co-operation is a must. Moreover, these should be implemented vigourously and homogeneously by all adhering parts.

In addition to that, the existing and perspective regimes should be complemented by unilateral restraint and action, especially by the most interested parties: the US and USSR, which opened the gates to proliferation in the past and are still expected to respond to South-North threats, have an important role to play in this sense.

Restrain should be exercised vis-a-vis regional allies or partners whose military technology is already too developed to be constrained by the anti-proliferation regimes (Israel and North Korea fall in this category), while action -namely under the form of pressures to be brought in bilateral relations- should be exercised by all parties towards proliferators.

Finally, regional CBMs and arms control initiatives -too often object of scorn in the past- should be actively pursued. In this context, the US policy of supporting only regionally led initiatives in order to stimulate local action is undoubtedly wise, but should not be pursued too literally: since it is in our interest to see regional proliferation and military risks decreasing there is a price to pay.

Western European action in initiating regional arms control processes in the Middle East could be a good complement to superpowers' acttion; especially if it is geared toward low profile, technical actions such as facts finding, arbitrations and exchanges of information on water rights, maritime boundaries etc.

The security linkages

Unconventional weapons proliferation, especially in the Middle East, is connected to broader security issues in so many ways that, here, the linkages can be just briefly recalled:

East-West: the issues of proliferation influence the US-USSR

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and NATO-WPT arms control agenda in many ways. For instance: 1)
the issue of Thirld world missile proliferation adds extra
interests to the negotiation of short-range nuclear forces, since
this would ban Frog, Scud and Lance missiles; 2) missile
proliferation in the Middle East could revive interest in ABM as
it is already keeping ATBM initiative alive; 3) the perceived
growing   threats   from   the   South can produce smaller arms
reductions in Europe (namely in naval forces) than it would
otherwise be realized.

West-West: Intra-Western relations are and will be affected,
as in the past, by different appreciations of causes and effects
of Middle Eastern problems. In particular, differences   in
attitudes between the US on one side and Western Europe and Japan
on the other regarding the trade between security and economic
interests is especially disturbing in the context of anti-
proliferation efforts.   Different security perceptions between
the US and Western Europe are likely to impinge in the East-West
issue mentioned before. Finally, the whole question of how to
handle out-of-area contingencies remains to be tackled in the
framework of the new parameters of European security.

North-South: Unconventional proliferation poses new problems
and reinforces old ones in the context of N/S relations. The main
issues pending in the security sphere, already mentioned in the
course of this paper, are: 1) the extension of the military reach
of Middle Eastern countries; 2) the difficulties arising from
establishing and mantaining anti-proliferation regimes. These
concerns   must be seen in the general context of N/S relations,
where a group of countries (broadly coinciding with   the
proliferators) is on the whole increasingly less vulnerable to
political and even economic pressures coming   from   the
'North'(Iraq is a good case in point).

South-South: As far as the Middle East is concerned,   the
effects and limits of unconventional proliferation have been
considered in the preceding sections of this paper. It remains to
be noted that 'horizontal' transfers of weapons and weapon
technology are creating new alliances and antagonisms whose
security implications are still to be fully understood.

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REGIONAL PROLIFERATION, ARMS RACE AND DETERRENCE POLICY

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Yuri Pinchukov

Institute of World Economy and International Relations

USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, USSR

Abstract

For a long time a military-strategic situation in the Mediterranean was determined by the NATO-WTO military preparations. But now, when the spectre of a direct military conflict between the superpowers in Europe appears to be less probable then ever before, new sources of military instability are coming up to the surface - that are sub-regional conflicts and chronic tension in the the Mediterranean. If the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe proceeds successfully, in the near future the Mediterranean may prove to be the most heavily armed area in the world. The politico-economical map of the region demonstrates an extremely wide spectrum of countries with different military potentials, various degrees of economic and industrial development, substantial inequalities in energy resources and raw materials stocks. The military-economical heterogeneity of the regional states strongly influences a strategic situation in the Mediterranean. The problems of the regional security

are complicated by the region's neighborhood with several major military powers and by the permanent presence of the US and Soviet naval forces as well.

An extremely unstable politico-psychological environment is evidenced by almost permanent military clashes, local wars, terrorist's activity, large and impulsive arms transfers that feed up runaway arms race. From the military point of view stability of the region is aggravated because of the short distances between the borders of many rival states: even short-range weapon systems can reach their vital targets. Economic and industrial centers of the regional states are located near the borders or near the coastline. This increases the risk of a sudden and deadly effective attack from sea, air or land.

Permanent perception of the dangers fuels arms race between the less developed Mediterranean states. But when trying to change the military imbalance with their adversaries they have a limited choice of armaments. Far from equal possibilities for the acquisition of advanced weapons and military hardware from the suppliers of arms force them to seek their own ways of increasing military capabilities. In comparison with the offensive types of armaments defensive systems are usually more sophisticated and expensive. Therefore it is not surprising that the directions of the regional arms race are shifting towards building-up the offensive military arsenals. Bomber-aircraft and surface-to-surface ballistic missile capable to attack targets located deeply in the territory of

neighboring states may be considered as a "purely" offensive weapon systems proliferating in the Mediterranean. A sizable proportion of tanks and armored vehicles typical for the land armies of the countries of Northern Africa and the Near East clearly indicates the offensive strategy of the regional states. In situation where the potential opponents are seeking to acquire offensive weapons capable of inflicting heavy losses within the population, or to damage and destroy industrial centers and military installations, in a best case, only fragile military equilibrium may be established in the region. In the absence of effective military instruments of defense against the offensive weapons, any regional state tends to acquire retaliating or deterrent force consisting of some kind of offensive weapon. The political objectives of the regional states are clear enough: in situation of mutual vulnerability the attainment of some approximation of deterrence is justified.

There are signs of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles emerging in a new role as weapons of regional deterrence. The first generation of these weapons are medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying conventional warhead of up to 1000 kg. The maturation of industrial and technological capabilities of a number of countries of the Southern and Southeastern Mediterranean permits them to implement their own programs for development of ballistic missiles technology. Israel's progress in this field has already widely recognized. Last year Iraq has achieved a substantial progress in missile

technology. It demonstrated a rocket capable to put a satellite into space orbit. Egypt and some other countries of the region seem to conduct the efforts in the same direction.

Land armies of several regional countries are equipped with the limited number of tactical ballistic missiles mostly of foreign origin. It is interesting to note that these types of armaments is almost absent in the more advanced states of the Northern Mediterranean. Except France there are no states developing ballistic missiles for military purposes, notwithstanding some of them are definitely capable to produce advanced versions of rocket launchers. For the developed countries ballistic missiles appear to be "a low technology". But from the military point of view a deterrent weapons need not possess technological sophistication. It may serve only one aim -to make any kind of defense against the deterrent weapon inefficient or impossible. That is the use of deterrent weapon must guarantee inescapable vulnerability of the opponents. The scale of destructive effect or inflicted damage are of a secondary, though important, value. It is why the regional stockpiling of these "elder" weapon systems now begins to threaten even the recognized military powers of the world.

Regardless of the reasons for its initiation, the ballistic missile proliferation, damages military stability on a sub-regional, regional and global levels. As it follows from the strategy of use of threat, acquisition of ballistic missiles for the purpose of deterrence creates a powerful stimulus to increase their destructive force. There are two ways of

increasing the lethality of a weapon - to increase the missiles' accuracy and to use more powerful or more lethal warheads. Less advanced countries choose the latter approach. Therefore the regional arms race of deterrent armaments stimulates the research and development programs or other kinds of efforts to acquire non-conventional munitions. There is no doubt that any country to "go nuclear" has to reach a higher level of technological development. Nowadays for a new nuclear weapon state to become a major power it is necessary to demonstrate not only a workable nuclear explosive device, but its ability to launch ballistic or long-range cruise missiles. It may also possess nuclear weapons delivery vehicles deployed on invulnerable platforms or at hardened launching pads. "Crude" nuclear bombs carried by airplanes wouldn't be regarded as a realistic deterrent in the world of high technology weapons. One shouldn't overestimate the deterrent effect of missiles armed with the chemical munition warheads. Their military usage is still questionable, because of evident technical obstacles and operational difficulties preventing battlefield use of the combination of such weapons in a realistic situation. (For example, the question is to be answered: how to prevent the burning of chemical agent when the unused rocket fuel explodes over target; or how to create a lethal concentration of toxic substances over the target, providing relatively small weight of load and low toxicity of chemical agents now said to be in possession of the developing countries. The solution of all these problems suggests an

achievement of significantly higher level of military R&D then even the majority of the developed countries had reached).

Theoretically, long-range ballistic missiles belonging to the regional states of the Mediterranean are capable to attack targets in the territory of the developed countries. This may press them to cope with the threat by using any possible countermeasures, which do not exclude pre-emptive military strikes. Any actions of the kind might be justified in view of terrible consequences for the entire European continent of the destruction of a nuclear power reactor by the terrorist or irrational(accidental) ballistic missiles attack.

The race of deterrent weapons with the participation of many states of the region would have to be uncontrollable. Many countries might have to be stimulated to acquire weapons of mass destruction, even those who up to now have abstained from "going nuclear" or "chemical" . The countries already possessing the mass destruction weapons may look for the developing of ABM systems and space weaponry. As the result, the regional arms race could finally bring about radical changes in the whole military-strategic situation in the world.

Missile technology proliferation highlights the issue of the regional security in the Mediterranean. Increased attention to the danger of missile proliferation makes sense as a prudent safeguard in the face of its threatening consequences magnified by the synergistic confluence of regional and global, technological and political, military and economic factors. It should be stressed that any simple and assured remedy of the

threat of the proliferation in the Mediterranean is absent. The

approach should be taken to the establishment of a combined

international regime of nuclear, chemical and missile

nonproliferation.

THE BALKANS TODAY: A PEACE ZONE OR AN EUROPEAN POWDER-KEG?

(East-West Relations and Developments in South-East Europe: the Balkans)

(first draft)

by Stefano Bianchini

Preliminary Statement.

The Balkans: the use of this word to indicate a political, strategical and geographical unitary area makes today much more sense than only one year ago. Deep transformations in the regional balance of power are going on: the change of relations between the two Blocs, the new situations provoked by the Gorbatchev policies and the influence they played on the Balkans encouraged radical upheavals in Bulgaria and in Romania. From some points of view, today we can see a bigger similarity between the different Balkan countries, or - at least - a trend to achieve a bigger political-institutional and economic-structural similarity between them.

Instead, it should be put the question if the explanatory categories of the first IAI-IMEMO project with the use of the generic words "East" and "West" make still a sense, or if it is better to speak about a large number of subjects playing a role like: EEC, USSR, and Balkans; or Italy, Germany, USSR, and Balkans; or US, USSR, EEC, a (in perspective) unified Germany, Italy - as a country geostrategically and directely involved in the area - and Balkans.

On the other hand, the diminished likelihood of international clashes between the two Blocs encourages new tensions in the Balkan lands (tensions largely linked with the problem of security, because the actual open phase has changed the security perception of the States). These tensions, in their turn, can strengthen pre-existing conflicts with the risk to create new regional destabilizations. That is why the situation of the Balkans countries today is half-way between the possibility to

become a peace zone or to come back to the ancient role of European "Powder-Keg". Integrating and disintegrating elements are equally present, even if probabily the last ones are increasing in the recent period.

I

Factors of instability in the Balkan area

Today one of the greatest factors of instability is caused by the increasing of the economic backwardness in the Balkan lands and by the deterioration of the national economies.

The Balkan lands, as it is known, are economically the most European underdevelopped countries, the so called "European South". Here we can remember that Yugoslavia has a debt of 15 milliard US $ and an inflation rate of 2500% (1989); Bulgaria has a debt of 8 milliard US $ and a stagnant standard of living; Romania has no debt, but a distroyed economy. Greece (with Portugal) is economically the weakest country of EEC. Albania and Turckey are largely underdevelopped. Generally speaking, in the Balkan area, Agricolture, Tourism, Communication Roads, Trade and Technology are underdevelopped fields. The big factories are mostly out of date. So, any economic policy adopted by a government to lead the country out of the crisis, will have enormous social costs, with the risk to break out social tensions, making vain any efforts and creating instability in the country.

Consequently, the economic crisis and the underdevelopment encourage illusions about the existence of a nationalistic way of "leading the country out of the crisis". I am refering now to the illusion of opposite (and in turn contradictory) opinions. For instance, on one hand it's growing the idea to lead the country out of the crisis appealing to nationalism – and breacking up the old multinational frames –. On the other hand, the same political members think possible to achieve later, as a little indipendent national unity, a EEC imagined as a last hope. At the same time, the cultural exasperation caused by the stalinist conception of "making sacrifice today for a better tomorrow" gives to large social strata (above all the weakest ones and the politically less informed) new illusions. In fact, they believe that it is possible to achieve "immediately everything" just having strong links with the Western societies

and Western parties, doesn't care with whom. All that is not practicable; great social conflicts can increase, with the risk – still more dangerous – that every ethnic group can see nationalistic meanings in the reasons of his own economic deterioration. So, an explosive mixture has been prepared.

The second factor of instability in the Balkan area is precisely caused by nationalism. The nationalism, as we have already stressed, is always linked with the economic crisis that had affected the Balkan countries. A short, but undoubtedly not exhaustive survey of the likely most crucial centres of regional instability should consider the influence of the following factors:

A) The danger of a Yugoslav breakup.

Yugoslavia faces a ten-years deeper and deeper crisis that has increased the disintegration forces in the economic and institutional framework. The different political alternatives for the future of this country risk to appear only "weak solutions". A too large decentralization, mostly in the economic field, and a ceaseless weakening of the role and the powers of the federal government make impossible to adopt any policy to balance the economy of the country. The authoritarian and centralistic option would break out strong oppositions in some nations of the country and in that way the preliminary statements of a civil war will be laid. A military action – because of the multinational framework of the Army – would bring the same divisions of the civil world inside the Army too. Consequently, the only unitarian institution of the present Federation (even if it isn't the only unitarian factor) would be removed. The multipartitism and the abandonment of the party guiding-role by the former League of Communist of Yugoslavia can really increase the country disgregation by making more and more involved the way of taking decisions. So, if Yugoslavia will not reach a new balance between decentralization and federal institutions (and consequent electoral Acts), the breakup of the country is possible.

This breakup could not be pacific, because it's not possible to split the Yugoslav regions in an ethnically clear way. In addition to this, it's not possible to break suddenly economic links, even if the serbo-slovenian conflict has given a blow to the market unity.

In that case the perspective of a civil war "everybody against everybody" is rather likely, with incalculable consequences: the Peace Treaties with the neighbouring

countries will go down in value (for instance, Italy could risk a cancellation of the Osimo Agreements). Moreover, the problem of the refugees will change the ethnic balance in the border's regions: as far as Italy is concerned, this situation could have a negative influence mostly in Trieste, with a rapid spread of destabilization to the surrounding areas.

B) The Kosovo drama.

The Kosovo drama undoubtly presents several problems linked to the problem of human rights. Of course, it affects the yugo-Albanian relationships. At the same time, it helps a new raise of serbian nationalism that, in turn, instigates the improvement of slovenian and croatian nationalisms. The evolutionary process of German unification makes unimaginable the creation of a Kosovo republic inside Yugoslavia, because the Serbs are afraid that, in the same way, an Albanian unification process could be started.

Anyway, in Kosovo it exists an Albanian enough spread belief favorable to the separation from Yugoslavia with the aim to achieve, later, a determining influence upon Tirana's government. This perspective can take advantage of better available funds, even monetary, due to the strong Kosovo clan's ties with Western Albanian emigration. At the same time, this perspective could provoke serious tensions among Albanian people with the likely risk to cause a civil war.

In any case, if the actual situation doesn't change: the Kosovo region will become, step by step, a "permanently destabilized" area as Nothern Ireland or Euzkadi. Consequently, this will cause a deep clash among the other Yugoslav nationalisms till to encourage the disintegration of the country.

C) The Albanian unsolved enigma.

However directly or in an emotional way involved in the Kosovo drama, today Albania has all to lose by a Yugoslav breakup, because its security would be in danger. Anyway, how to explain the recent Albanian proposal (at the end of 1989) to the other Balkan countries to consider definitive the borders settled after the II World War? We shouldn't forget that Albania is the only european country that didn't sign the Helsinki's agreements. Does this proposal mean a Tirana's tendency to take precautions while instability fears are increasing? Certainly, the Bulgarian and

Romanian upheavals can influence the political and institutional future of Albania, even if we shouldn't underestimate the peculiarity of this country, nor its particular communist tendency.

Actually we can imagine 4 possible evolutions in future: 1) An Albanian participation to a "Marxist-Leninist" alliance (with Cuba, China and Nothern Corea). This assumption is really rather weak, because a great geographic distance separates these countries and because each country lives in a specific and different context. 2) A large opening process to the Western societies (and, in this case, towards Italy, mostly if a solution of the problem, created – some years ago – by a family of Albanian refugees in the Italian Ambassy in Tirana, will be reached). 3) An increase of the pro-perestrojka forces inside the CP of Albania with a gradual introduction of reforms in the society. 4) A popular riot and an overthrow of the régime: this is an assumption similar to the Ceausescu's overthrow in Romania, but it doesn't appear so probable for Albania at the moment, in spite of local protests that are happening in Albania.

This last assumption, anyway, could create the conditions for the growing of the multiparty system: in this case, Albania could become also much more attractive for Albanian people living in Kosovo (even when in Yugoslavia multipartitism will be consolidated). Consequentely, separatist tendencies in Kosovo will raise, adding fuel to the Serbian reaction. Anyway, it is remarkable that, in the present period, Albania is carrying out a policy of prudent international opening and the Albanian participation to the Balkan multilateral cooperation (here mentioned later) is growing.

D) The Macedonian controversy.

This is a geopolitical central question for the stability of the Balkan. The recent upheavals in Bulgaria seem to wake old nationalistic passions, in spite of the contrary tendency of the new government and of large part of the opposition forces. The last demonstration held in Sofia in march 1990 revealed the retourn to some panBulgarian tendencies with the risk to open a new front in the yugo-Bulgarian relations. And what's more in Greece, the Athens government hasn't recognized, till now, the degree of the Skopje University, rising in Macedonian people the frustration for every kind of non-recognition.

F) The Islamic revival.

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Since the last decade and in different ways, this revival is playing a role everywhere in the Balkan peninsula. Bulgaria has to face not only the problem of the Turkish population (with all the economic implications in the areas of Kardzali and Razgrad), but also the future of the islamic Bulgarian minority. In Greece, the Cyprus controversy that affects the relations with Ankara is still open. In the meantime the status of the Turkish minority in Thrace seems not solved, as well as the complex question of the territorial waters in the Aegean sea, the control of that sea and the consequent mutual security. In Yugoslavia too, the islamic fundamentalism is increasing in Bosnia, whilst also the Kosovo drama can be seen through the prism of the religious clashes. In this sense, the links emerged between the well-known Agrokomerc firm and Gheddafi's Lybia could appear significant in the building of the Zagreb Mosque, as well as the reactions of the Islamic Conference (held in Ryyad in march 1989) in connextion with the "Albanian-islamic persecution" in Kosovo.

G) The Albanian-Greek relations.

Even if they are surely improved in the last years, the Albanian-Greek relations suffered, at the beginning of 1990, from some internal tensions emerged in Southern Albania for religious (and political) reasons. As it's known, people living in that area believe in the Greek-orthodox religion: the Greek-Orthodox Church considers Greek all this people, in spite of the different ethnic origin, either Greek or Albanian. At the beginning of this year, Europe was informed about political tensions in some areas of Albania, including the South, by the Greek mass media and the Greek Orthodox Church. These last ones had paied particular attention to those areas because of the situation of the Greek (religious) minority (that is partially Albanian). The informations given created confusion and negative influence in the mutual relations between Tirana and Athens.

H) The difficult transition to democracy in Romania.

After Ceausescu was ousted and killed, this country has lived a period of easily breakable transition to democracy, threatened by constant pressures of destabilization. Xenophobic nationalism emerged again in Transilvania. In addition, a new controversy risks to involve Soviet Union in connextion with the status of Bessarabia (or Moldavian Soviet Republic): in fact, because of the Romanian upheavals

and the consequent freedom from despotism, moldavian people living on the other side of the Prut river can increase the feeling of a strong attraction for Bucharest. In this case, also, the integrity of the Soviet State could be directly involved.

In the meantime, great social tensions are growing up in Romanian countryside, where the peasants are not satisfaied of the new land-property Act. Romanian anticommunism (for certain aspects quite understandable) caused some border incidents with Yugoslavia, that hasn't had – up to now – great consequences. The Romanian government revealed divisions and deep hesitancies when, last january, it had to face some tumults caused by exacerbate and politically confused people.

So, it seems that, generally speaking, the political members of the new Romania haven't yet adequate instruments and enough political culture to face political and social tensions, mostly when they show intollerance and violent feeling; in this case, a particular danger can raise when the delicate relations with the Hungarian minority are involved.

As a matter of fact, the country appears – for some aspects – to go adrift and the possible explosion of Romania can have serious consequencies on its neighbouring countries too.

From these short notes it's clear that it exists the possibility for Italy (because of Yugoslavia), as well as for Soviet Union (because of Romania) to be directly involved into Balkan nationalistic tensions, even if this could happen only at the borders.

II

The multilateral cooperation in the Balkans

In spite of all the factors of instability existing in this area, the Balkans – known in the mithology and in the popular belief as an historical "Powder-keg" – boast also a tradition of historical thought and concrete diplomatic attempts to achieve local form of integration (from Svetozar Markovic to the yugo-Bulgarian project of Balkan Confederation till the Balkan Pact of 1954). A similar process has developped again during the second half of the Eighties. It is my belief that this is the only "positive" alternative for the future of the Balkan area. We should, therefore, concentrate the attention on the efforts of Balkan multilateral cooperation that are under way.

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It had never happened, in the past, that the representatives of all the six Balkan governments (at the Ministers for Foreign Affairs level) have met together to discuss about the future of one of the most tumultous and crucial areas of Europe. This happened, instead, the 26th February 1988 in Belgrade. Of course, at that time, it didn't take place (and it couldn't be otherwise) any "historical turning-point" in the inter-Balkan relations. Anyway, the prudence is never enough, when you have to consider the events of an area so tormented like this.

However, if these six States could carry on according to the layout defined in Belgrade, in conformity with the spirit and the atmosphere predominating in that occasion, then something of really new will catch the attention of the Old Continent.

The importance of that meeting, in fact, lies either in the active participation of all the countries of the area (including Albania), or in the cultural and methodological approches predominating. In short, a common firm belief has grown: the overcoming of the Balkan backwardness is tightly linked to a new view of the international relations and of the security, with reference to the principles enacted in the final Act of Helsinki.

Moreover, there is a fact not taken for granted at all.

Everyone has agreed that the problem of the minorities should be faced with comprehension and teleration, considering them as a "Bridge of Friendship" between the States and not an Instrument of division and clash.

Since then, the convergence of the inter-Balkan efforts has produced several meetings (a dozen only in the 1989), about lots of questions of common interest.

A special convergence has been achieved about the questions linked to the fight against the illigal drug traffic, the international terrorism and the illigal traffic of weapons (this last policy is not taken for granted at all).

A good level of convergence has also been achieved about inter-regional transports, while the activity to establish a Research Institut for Balkan Economic Cooperation to be founded in Athens is still pursued.

At the moment, instead, the research of agreements on problems so crucial and delicate like the convocation of a future meeting of the Heads of State, the creation of a nuclear and chemical weapon free zone, the solution of the problem of human rights and the respect of the minorities, seem to be more complicated.

It's important, besides, that – after the deep upheavals in Bulgaria and Romania, the process of multilateral cooperation hadn't stopped. In fact, it's continuing: a meeting of High Officials of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs had been held in Athens from 7th to 9th March 1990. The next summit of Ministers for Foreign Affairs will be held in Tirana in the second half of October 1990, while other twelve meetings on various fields of common interest and significant activities have already been summoned for the current year.

It's also very important to remember that during the last meetings of High Officials of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs in Tirana (1989) and in Athens (1990) proposals and tendencies of particular interest had emerged.

Here I would like to quote only some of those proposals:

a) the Bulgarian proposal to hold – in the frame of the new democratic processes that followed the 1989 upheavals – an Assembly of Balkan peoples with the participation of personalities of the scientific, political and religious world;

b) the convocation of two meetings on cultural, humanitarian and mass media matters to be held in Sofia (at the end of 1990) and in Ankara (1991);

c) the Albanian proposal to elaborate a "Code of goodneighbourliness" for Balkan lands;

d) the creation of a Center whose task will be to avoid crisis in the Balkan peninsula. This proposal gained a general agreement and it shows the existence of a common effort of the Balkan countries to save regional stability by themselves.

Among the other proposals under discussion, there is also the one to create a Parliamentary Group of Friendship and an inter-Balkan Cooperation, as well as the idea to establish a "Balkan Economic Chamber". It exists even the possibility to adopt a kind of little "Helsinki Act", particularly valid in the Balkan region.

So, there is a strong impression of deep and intense working among political diplomacies and economic experts of the Balkan countries with the aim to create a new inter-regional atmosphere. It is my belief that it's absolutely necessary to avoid a

drammatic stop of this process that could be caused by one of the several latent regional crisis, mentioned above.

In consequence of this process, East and West cannot remain an inactive audience, but they must encourage and support it. Particularly, it seems to me of great importance to turn the attention to the following questions:

a) how to face the problems of the regional economic and social backwardness and what kind of policies should be better to adopt in order to overcome the actual situation. The Balkan lands need regional infrastructures (for instance, good communication systems), firstly to make easier the economic integration of the area and the reasearch of unitary policies; secondly, to improve the multilateral trade and the tourism. The organization in Belgrade of a "Balkan Fair" for june 1990 opens new perspectives. These countries need also high developed technologies as well as great help to save the Environment. In connection with all these aspects, particularly the EEC could assure its help, stimulating the modernization of that area.

b) how to make faster, in the Balkan region, the creation of a nuclear and chemical weapons free zone. This perspective is of a great importance because it allows the increase of military confidence, and the research of new security-building measures in all the Balkan peninsula. In this context, for instance, Yugoslavia has already suggested, in May 1989: 1) to establish prior notification of military manoeuvres and exercices as well as of major military movements; 2) to exchange military informations on the organization of armed forces; 3) to promote contacts between garrisons and visits to military units as well as a gradual reduction of armaments.

c) how to cancel every subversive meaning from the minority and territorial question. In the Balkan countries a firm bilief is spreading: it's necessary to separate the ethnic minorities problems from the territorial problems. This should be faced in a frame of multilateral relations, because History has shown that the bilateral approach is too often without any positive perspective. Only in a frame of multilateral relations, it seems possible to reduce the old enmities and to make easier the research of general criterias that should inform, later, the policies of each government. This is a real stake, but it must be strongly supported from East and West, because the peace of the Old Continent is involved.

III

Final Remarks

East and West cannot afford the luxury of a destabilization of the Balkans; the risk for Europe to be directly involved in one of the conflicts, that could sooner or later break out, really exists.

In order of that it should not happened, in case either of bilateral or multilateral conflicts the Great and Medium Powers, and the EEC too, should avoid to support one or the another country . History has already shown several times that the Balkans are a "Powder-Keg", mostly when the Great Powers add their contradictory interests to the old regional enmities; for exemple, when the Great Powers decide to become a kind of "protector" of one or more Balkan countries. On the contrary, today it's necessary to pour oil on troubled waters and to look to the Balkan area with great caution and prudence.

So, it's necessary to encourage every tendency to regional integration in the economic as well as in the political field, even if this last perspective seems to be very difficult to realize in short-term. It seems to me that the opening process of Belgrade (1988) and its developments offer to East and West new chances to overcome step by step old mistrusts and clashes.

In the last analysis, the stability of each Balkan country must be assured as a condition for regional stability and for a mutual confidence between East and West. This stability will be reached only:
a) if the multilateral ties among the Balkan countries will be improved;
b) if the development of a local democratic political thought will be encouraged;
c) if strong links between the Balkan region (as a whole and not as separate areas) the EEC (where Italy can play a leading role) and Soviet Union will be assured. Of course, adequate infrastructures of communication, trade and transport should be developped.

In addition to the above mentioned questions of economic cooperation between EEC and Balkan lands, particular help must be sent in short-term to each country of this area. That help will allow, in the Balkan countries, the realization of economic

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balancing policies and social assistence with the aim to avoid too strong social conflicts and to make easier the reconversion of unemployed workers. So, it should be possible to diminish the tensions and to encourage a better integration of the Balkans in Europe. At the same time, policies of well-balanced development could gradually take shape, making less uthopian the perspective of the future Balkan Confederation as an autonomous regional subject integrated with EEC or into a new European political frame. In fact, troughout these transformations a direct political and economic link with Soviet Union could be strenghtened. In this way it could be possible to offer to this country new openings and markets as well as sufficient guarantees for its security in an area always delicate and crucial for Moscow.

In the end, it's not possible to underestimate the need of a great debate about the Oversovereignty question in Europe. A political and cultural thought must be developped with the aim to overcome the concept of "Nation-State". This concept, as a matter of fact, is not practicable for the Balkans.

In fact, national sovereignty and economic sovereignty of a Nation-State are concepts that must be considered again in accordance with the new paneuropean perspectives of the XXI century. This is not the case of cultural sovereignty. The italian democratic political thought, on these specific aspects, numbers, among the others, the ideas of Mazzini, Gramsci and Spinelli. This political thought should deepen the concept of european democratic federalism firstly to go further the romantic national concepts of Herder and Von Schlotzen and secondly to find consequent new links with the actual cultural and political needs of Soviet Union as well as Balkan peninsula. The reasons of these needs are easily understandable.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SECURITY

IN EAST-SOUTHERN EUROPE

Joint meeting between the IAI and the IMEMO

Moscow, April 2-3, 1990

Outline of the presentation of Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, IAI

on "The Middle East and European Security"

1. <u>Changes in the international environment</u>. USSR policies toward the
Arab countries are changing. Near and Middle East priorities are being
downgraded in the framework of generally diminishing support to Third World
countries. National security may suggest the Soviet leadership to upgrade
the importance of the prevailingly non-Arab Northern Tier countries
(Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq).

In particular, the Soviet posture underwent a change in regard to the
Arab-Israeli crisis. In the framework of a number of conditions (generally
shared by the West), the USSR is now encouraging the PLO mainstream to
negotiate with Israel, while reviving its own relationship with the latter.
The new policy with respect to Jewish migration to Israel is emblematic of
a definite change. This change is so relevant that it is being pursued
although it creates difficulties for Moscow with its Arab friends. It is
precisely because of this new Soviet policy toward Israel, that Arabs tend
to see current changes in USSR and in Europe as damaging for their
international interests. In any case, they feel that the USSR is no longer

as decisive a factor in the Middle East politics as it used to be. Consequently, they are beginning to think of Middle East politics in a framework in which East-West competition can no longer be exploited and in which cooperation between East and West may even prevail with the USA tending to be the main interlocutor.

2. <u>Changes in the Middle East</u>. The changes in the international environment mentioned above are occurring at a stage in which the Arab politics are also changing, mainly as a consequence of the outcome of the war with Iran.

The victory over Iran has saved the Arab regimes and -more generally speaking- secular Arab nationalism from the mortal danger of Islamism. The victory reinforced the Arab regimes. It was also the outcome of a succesful effort to improve their effectiveness on economic, administrative and military grounds. Efforts have been especially important in importing weapons and building up a local military industry.

As a result, Arab States are now stronger. They continue to be vulnerable, however, because their new technological and managerial strength has no social foundations and is void of political consensus. Political democracy made almost no improvement and the establishment of economic freedom is just at its beginning. For this reason they did not manage to remove the important social causes at the root of Islamic unrest. Despite the victory over Iran and the weakening of Islamic movements it may have brought about, the Islamic opposition cannot be considered over.

From a European point of view, these developments have an ambiguous relevance. On the one hand, the survival of the nationalist regimes, based as they are on secular values (close to both Western and Socialist polities to the extent taht they all share the legacy of the French Revolution) is consistent with European security. On the other hand, the inability of the

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Arab regimes to promote democracy and economic development keeps regional instability alive and makes the reinforced Arab regimes (as they emerge from the hard try of the Gulf war) more dangerous to international relations than their predecessors were. This is less consistent with the interests of European security.

3. Regional crises. As different as the new situation may be, the most important test of Middle Eastern policy remains the Arab-Israeli crisis. It must not be overlooked, however, that the Gulf war has only been suspended to date. Its end did not eliminate its causes (it may be compared to the end of the first World War). In the same sense, radical Islamism is now a defeated force but its sources have not been eliminated. It may well happen that against the interests of the security of the European States the new Arab nationalism merges with the Islamic forces in a single drive. Independently of oil, the interest of both East and West for the Gulf crisis to be settled is very high. Soviet national security is affected by Gulf instability, particularly by the influence of radical Islamism. From the Western point of view nationalist unrest fuelled by Islamism in the Soviet Asian Republics is an obstacle to detente. Radical islamism in any case remains a factor of international instability which is destined to continue to disturbe Western interests too.

There are reasons -and hints- for an increased Soviet profile in Iran and the Northern Tier that should not be misunderstood by the Western countries. It may be interesting to note in this respect that the US posture was recently reformulated by dropping the defense of Iran from the strategic regional goals of Washington. What could be the consequences of the lower profile shown by the USSR in the Near and the Middle East? It may confirm the American Administration in rebuffing any idea of an international conference and in pursuing the effort of bringing Israelis,

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Arabs and Palestinians to negotiate under an updated Camp David-like framework. The Israeli government is unable to support the American effort, however. If the Labour will be able to lead the country alone, it will be amenable to the negotiations encouraged by the USA. One should not forget, however, that Mr. Peres started the rapprochement with the USSR and championed -along with King Hussein- the idea of an international conference which would include the Soviets (though it may not be exactly the kind of conference the Soviets would expect to have). As a result, a change in the Israeli leadership is essential in order to arrive at the negotiation pushed forward by the USA, but the same change may bring about a role of the Soviets in the crisis.

This may suggest that some form of East-West cooperation for solving the Arab-Israeli crisis is needed, despite the weakness of the current USSR position in the region. The main goal of the USSR in this crisis has always been that of ensuring its presence and the interests of its allies. Now that it seems evident that Arab and Islamic radicalism may also work against Soviet security, particularly against its overwhelming security interest in East-West detente, Soviet policy should emphasize the necessity of its presence but explicitly change its policy toward regional friends. While the USSR has already made important changes in its policies toward the PLO and terrorism, clearer steps are necessary in regard to Syria and Libya.

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The South of Europe as the region bordering on the Middle East, where the longest post-war conflict is sustained, experiences directly and outrightly   the consequences of any changes in this area. Any crucial development of the situation in the zone of the Arabi-Isralian conflict has an immediate influence upon the security of the South European countries. But security of the South of Europe is by no means isolated from European security as a whole. The security issues of the Southern Eorope could be examined only within the broader context of the East-West relationship.

2. The improvement of the Soviet-American relations, positive changes on the European continent have brought about new elements of stability in Europe. One of the consequences of the ameliora-tion of international relations has been active involvement of the great powers in the settlement of a number of regional conflicts. The results speak for themselves: Afghanistan, South Africa, changes in Central America, cease-fire between Iraq and Iran. Perhaps, only the Middle East has been influenced in the least measure by the present global trends.

3. It is probably possible to say that the developments in the Middle East itself and generally in the world in 1980's, allowed the international community, and first of all - Europe, to obtain a certain sense of immunity against the most destructive potentaial consequences of the Arabi-Isralian conflict. Here are the principal of these changes:

- Camp-David which actually excludes the possibility of an Israeli-Egyptian military confrontation, and thus - a large-scale Arabi-Isralian war;

- the defeat and elimination of the Palestinian military structures in Lebanon;

- the Iranian revolution and the Irani-Iraqi war, which shifted the focus of attention and polarized the Arab world;

- accumulated through national and joint efforts "durability reserve" of the West in case of a short-term oil embargo;

- the process of the East and West getting out of the state of the cold war.

At present the risk of a direct military confrontation between the USSR and the USA, owing to this or that development of the situation in the Middle East, that many people had considered as a probable and most dangerous variant of the Arabi-Israeli conflict's escalation, has been practically brought to nought. Realism and pragmatism, which are characteristic of the current Soviet foreign policy, exclude resorting to a "missile ultimatum" with unpredictable consequences (as it occured in 1956) as an instrument of the Middle-eastern policy. Anything of this kind is improbable on behalf of the other side either.

4. All this resulted in relative passiveness of the great powers. The U.S. repeatedly gave proof of its lack of interest for active involvement in the process of settling the Arabi-Israeli conflict. The capability of the Soviet Union to influence the situation in the Middle East (especially in the first half of 1980s) was quite limited due to the changes in relations with Egypt, the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon and some other factors. Under these circumstances the West European countries' attempts to dynamize the peace-making process in the Middle East were a failure.

5. However, the above mentioned "immunity", even if such a
view-point is to be acrnowledged, is rather a relative one. It is
an illusion to speak of any steady immunity at all. Middle East as
an area of interlacing important political , economic and military
interests of European states and the great powers fully retains its
previous significance. All the forecasts - both short - and long-term ·
witness to the fact that no cardinal changes in this respect can
take place.

6. Security of the neighbouring regions of the South of Europe-
above all, security on the European continent and global security
will be influenced in habitual manner by the situation in the Mid-
dle East until the conflict is not resolved. The new state of the
East-West relationship will probably allow to lessen the most de-
structive consequences of a potential escalation of violence in
the Middle East. But the question stands whether the trends gaining
strength in the East-West relations are irreversible enough to be
tested in that manner.

7. Recently new trends have emerged in the Middle East, that
seem possible to be attributed to inhabitual factors of the threat
to European security. First of all, it concerns the armsrace in
the region. For the whole decade the countries of the Middle East
have been carrying on large-scale purchases of modern armaments.
The level of military spenditure of the direct participants in the
Middle East conflict fluctates within the 20-25 percent margin of
their GNP, considerably exceeding the similar indicator, for instanc
for the US (6%), the NATO countries (4,5%). The slight reduction of
military purchases of Egypt, Israel and Syria in 1989 is mostly
explained by internal economic reasons and can hardly be viewed as

a long-term tendency. The trade routes mainly pass through European countries and there is no ground to consider them fully invulnerable against terrorist activity.

8. Yet, the major obstacle in military sphere is the acquirement of ballistic missiles by the countries of the Middle East. Medium-range missiles are developed by Egypt and Iraq, and they have already been tested successfully. "Jerihone - I" and "Jerinone - II" missiles have been commissioned in Israel. Syria has purchased Soviet "SS-21" missiles. The appearance of armaments of such a class in the Middle East, aside from direct military and political consequences of their deliberate usage for the first time raised the issue of the possibility of triggering hostilities as a result of unsactioned or accidental launch of missiles. The presence of chemical weapons stocks in the region, enterprises producing toxic agents, research in the field of nuclear arms in a number of countries, first of all - in Israel, only emphasize the dramatism of the situation.

9. The unsettled conflict also creates a favourable setting for terrorism. This is not a new phenomenon for the Middle East, although capturing and holding hostages been practiced in 1980's on a broader scale than before. Public condemnation of international terrorism by Arafat can be considered as a conscious renunciation by the PLO leader and the part of Organization backing him of this "means of struggle". But the Palestinian movement is broader than the PLO. The PLO itself has not yet overcome its split entirely . The idea of terrorist activities as an efficient method of struggle is not that ultimately outdated with the Palestinians. The latest example is the attack on the bus with Israeli tourists in Egypt. Some islamic fundamentalist organizations of nonpalestinian origin

do not give up terrorism either. A new impulse to terrorist activities could be given by a short-sighted policy of Israeli authorities, consisting in setling Jewish immigrants from other countries on the occupied territories. The calls to "acts of vengeance" in the countries, through which Jewish emigration is channeled, are heard from certain islamic fundamentalist organizations. There are various ways in which an outbreak of terrorist activity might occur. One Should not exclude the possibility, that certain forces in Israel could inspire or provoce acts of terror on behalf of settlers to justify their own accusations against the PLO. Until the Palestinian problem remains unsolved, there will be ground for terrorism.

10. Resolution of the Palestinian issue is the key to the settlement of the Arabi-Israeli conflict and the normalization of the situation in the Middle East. Everybody understands it today, but the question whether all are prepared to implement this understanding is still to be answered. Solution to the problem could not be brought from outside, it is in power of the parties to the conflict themselves. But leading world powers (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Western Europe, Japan) are quite in position to support and push forward the process of peace-making.

11. Mr.Arafat's peace initiative which included recognition by the Palestine National Council of the Israel's right to exist and the relevant UN resolutions, and his speech at the General Assembly session in Geneva introduced a new element into the situation in the Middle East. Intifada on the ~~Jordania~~ West bank is a proof of the Palestinian people's determination to fight for the implementation of its rights to the end. Israel faces a challenge - both political and strategic. For the first time it carries on war not against

states and "terrorist" organizations, but against people, deprived
of its sovereign rights. International recognition of the Palestini-
an rights cannot but exert pressure on Israel. Political cir¢es can
not ignore increasing support for the idea of dialogue with the PLO
displayed in Israel itself (54 percent of Israelians advocate such
a dialogue). Mr.S.Peres staked on dialogue, Mr.I.Shamir still opposes
it. The protracted government crisis so far does not give the answer
to the question which line is gaining. But it is absolutely clear,
that the balance of forces in Israel itself is developed and will
continue to be developed in favour of dialogue with the PLO and sett-
lement.

12. Talks are probably not far off. From the international
angle one might speak of consensus as regards an international con -
ference under the UN auspices with the participation of all the
parties concerned. The majority of potential participants of the
conference express their support for the "umbrella" formula or, ac-
cording to Mr.H.Mubarak - for the "psychological cover" of direct
negotiations between the immediate parties to the conflict. Other
participants should confine themselves to mediatory functions,ful-
filled only at the request of the negotiating parties themselves.
Any attempts on behalf of indirect participants to exert pressure,
to impose conditions or to make decisions, concerning anyone, in
the course of the conference could be only counterproductive. Rea-
diness to provide appropriate guarantees of the conditions, agreed
upon by the negotiators, would be the best major world powers con-
tribution to the success of the conference.

13. Conference could be a success only, if it will be
oriented to a settlement with the participation of all parties conccer
ned, based on the principle of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied

territories, the recognition of the Palestinian people's right for selfdetermination, the consideration of the legitimate aspirations of all the states of this region, including Israel, for security. Any partial agreements or bilateral accords should be aimed at the quest or for the global setllement and coordinated with the ultimate goal of the comprehensive solution of the conflict in the Middle East.

14. The major powers' of the world collective efforts might be of great use. But any one of them is also able to add confidence in their future to the parties,involved in the conflict, and to make them feel a part of the common human family by unilateral means By intensifying dialogue with the PLO, the U.S., West European countries would bind it still closer with the peace-making process. The resumption of the diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel would help the latter to get rid of alienation complex. Diplomatic relations might not be a remuneration for proper conduct. This is a norm of the international life. Peace in the Middle Easti is not the utophia, it is rather a quite fissible compromise of not fully coinciting interests. But to achieve it each side should make a contribudion, adequate to its capabilities, harmonizing its own interests with interests of the others. This is the only way to realize the principle of unity for peace.