


**THIRD HEADS OF INSTITUTES MEETING**  
International Institute for Strategic Studies  
Wilton Park, 15-17/XI/1989

- a. Agenda
- b. List of participants
  1. "Regional stability in the developing world: managing the acceleration of history"/ John Chipman
  2. "Security and development: what is the relationship?"/ John Sewell
  3. "Third world regional conflicts in US-Soviet relations: the experience of the 1980s"/ Helmut Hubel
  4. "The rise and changing roles of regional powers: between Lilliputians and brobdingnags"/ Peter Lyon
  5. "The changing political strategic landscape in the Middle East"/ Ali E. Hillal Dessouki
  6. "Foundations and institutes"/ Robert O'Neill



Heads of Institutes Meeting

Wilton Park, UK  
15-17 November 1989

hosted by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Agenda

November 15 1989

9:30 Arrival at IISS and departure for Wilton Park by 10:00 a.m.

1:00 Lunch

2:30 Director's Introduction

François Heisbourg, Director, IISS

2:40

Approaches to the Study of Regional Security

Chairman: François Heisbourg, Director, IISS

Paper by John Chipman, Assistant Director, IISS

4:00 Coffee

4:30

Links between Development and Security

Chairman: Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Director, ISIS

Paper by John Sewell, President, Overseas Development Institute

6:00 Break up for Drinks

7:30 Dinner

November 16 1989

9:30

The Superpower Relationship and the Third World

Chairman: Robert Litwak, Secretary, International Security Studies  
Program, The Wilson Center

Paper by Helmut Hubel, Fellow, DGAP

11:00 Coffee

11:30

The Changing Weights of Regional Powers

Chairman: Prof. Blanca Torres, Director, Centre for International  
Studies, El Colegio de Mexico

Paper by Peter Lyon, Director, Institute for Commonwealth Studies

1:00 Lunch

2:30 Afternoon Break

4:00 Coffee

4:30

The Changing Strategic Landscape in the Middle East

Chairman: Dr Udo Steinbach, Director, Deutsches Orient-Institut

Paper by Ali Dessouki, Head, Center for Political Studies

6:00 Break

7:30 Dinner

November 17 1989

9:30

Foundations and Regional Security Studies

Chairman: Prof. Robert O'Neill, Professor of War, Oxford University

Discussion with Foundation Representatives

12:30

Conclusion:

The IISS and Regional Security

François Heisbourg, Director, IISS

1:00 Lunch

2:30 Disperse

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Heads of Institutes Meeting

Wilton Park, UK  
15-17 November 1989

hosted by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

List of Participants

- Ms Ruth Adams                    John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago, US
- Dr Assia Alaoui                    Centre d'Etudes Strategiques at the University Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco
- Dr Pilar Armanet Armanet        Institute of International Studies, Santiago, Chile
- < Prof. Desmond Ball            Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Canberra, Australia
- ✗ Prof. John Barratt              South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, South Africa
- Dr Hans Binnendijk              Director of Studies, IISS, UK
- Dr Gianni Bonvicini              Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy
- Prof. Pervaiz                      Qaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan  
Iqbal Cheema
- Dr John Chipman                 Assistant Director for Regional Security Studies, IISS, UK
- Dr Shahram Chubin               Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
- Dr Saadet Deger                 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm, Sweden
- Dr Ali Dessouki                 Center for Political Research Studies, Cairo, Egypt
- ✗ Dr David B. Dewitt             York University, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, North York, Ontario, Canada
- Mr Jayantha Dhanapala         United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, Switzerland
- Mr Jean-Luc Domenach         Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Paris, France
- Dr Ahmad Hamzah                Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- Mr François Heisbourg         Director, IISS, UK
- Dr Helmut Hubel                 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn, FRG
- Dr Chandran Jeshurun         Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, Singapore
- Ambassador N. Kiondo         Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania
- Dr A. Kislov                     Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, USSR
- Prof. Olav Fagelund             Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Oslo, Norway  
Knudsen
- Ms Bassma                        Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, France  
Kodmani-Darwish
- Dr Winrich Kühne                Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Haus Eggenberg, Ebenhausen, FRG
- Dr George Lambrakis             Director of Development, IISS, UK

Dr Lazlo Lang	Hungarian Institute of International Relations, Budapest, Hungary
Dr Robert S. Litwak	The Wilson Center, Washington, US
Dr Peter Lyon	Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, UK
Dr Ambler H. Moss, Jr.	Graduate School of International Studies, Miami, US
Prof. Robert O'Neill	All Souls College, Oxford, UK
Mr Charles E. Nelson	US Institute of Peace, Washington, US
Prof H.J. Neuman	Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Hague, The Netherlands
Prof. Gabriel Olusanya	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria
Mr Sukhumbhand Paribatra	Institute for Security and International Studies, Bangkok, Thailand
Mr Antonio Carlos Pereira	Center for Strategic Studies, Sao Paulo, Brazil
Dr Daniel Pipes	Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, US
Dr Jonathan D. Pollack	The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, US
Mr Nicholas Rizopoulos	Council on Foreign Relations, New York, US
Dr Joseph Romm	The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, US
Mr John Roper	Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK
Dr Alfred Schmidt	Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, Hanover, FRG
Dr Enid Schoettle	The Ford Foundation, New York, US
Mr John W. Sewell	Overseas Development Council, Washington, US
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India
Dr Udo Steinbach	Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg, FRG
Dr John D. Steinbruner	Brookings Institution, Washington, US
Dr Asher Susser	Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel
Prof. Blanca Torres	Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Mexico DF, Mexico
Dr Alvaro de Vasconcelos	Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais (IEE), Lisbon, Portugal
Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic	Zagreb University, Zagreb, Yugoslavia
Mr Bernard Wood	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), Ottawa, Canada
Maj.-Gen. Aharon Yariv (ret)	Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv, Israel
Dr El-Sayed Yassin	Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt

List of invited participants to  
Heads of Institutes Conference 1989

*Exe. Dir. →* Ms Ruth Adams      John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, US

Dr Assia Alaoui      Centre d'Etudes Strategiques at the University Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco

Dr Pilar Armanet Armanet      Institute of International Studies, Chile

Prof. Desmond Ball      Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) Australia

Prof. John Barratt      South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

Prof. Blanca Torres      Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Mexico

Dr Gianni Bonvicini      Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy

Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema      Quaid-I-Azam University, Pakistan

Dr Shahram Chubin      Graduate Institute of International Studies, Switzerland

→ Dr Ali Dessouki      Center for Political Research Studies, Egypt

Dr David B. Dewitt      University of York, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Ontario, Canada

Mr Jayantha Dhanapala      United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Switzerland

*S-I →* Admiral Sir James Eberle, GCB Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK

*Soldi? →* Dr Peter Hardi      Hungarian Institute of International Relations, Hungary

*PR 90 →* Mr Pierre Hassner      Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), France

Dr A.M. Hokororo      Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Dr Helmut Hübel      Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, FRG

Dr Chandran Jeshurun      Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISAS), Singapore

Ms Bassma Kodmani-Darwish	Institut Français des Relations Internationales, France
Dr Robert S. Litwak	The Wilson Center, US
Dr Peter Lyon	University of London, UK
Dr Ambler H. Moss, Jr.	Graduate School of International Studies, US
Prof. Robert O'Neill	All Souls College Oxford, UK
SL → Prof H.J. Neuman	Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Netherlands
Prof. Gabriel Olusanya	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Nigeria
Mr Sukhumbhand Paribatra	Institute for Security and International Studies, Thailand
Dr Jae Kyu Park	Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFE), South Korea
WUNW → Mr Antonio Carlos Pereira	Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Brazil
Dr Daniel Pipes	Foreign Policy Research Institute, US
NA Co-head → Dr Jonathan D. Pollack	The RAND Corporation, US
→ Dr Evgeni M. Primakov <i>MEMO</i>	Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR
Dr Joseph Romm	The Rockefeller Foundation, US
Dr Alfred Schmidt	Stiftung Volkswagenwerk, Hannover, FRG
→ Dr Enid Schoettle	The Ford Foundation, US
Mr John W. Sewell	Overseas Development Council, US
Prof. Haim Shaked	Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Israel
Ambassador Wang Shu	China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, China

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India
Mr Kjell Skjelsbaek	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Norway
Mr Clint Smith	The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, USA
Dr Noordin Sopiee	Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia
Dr Udo Steinbach	Deutsches Orient Institut, FRG
Dr John D. Steinbruner	Brookings Institution, US
Prof. Dr Michael Stürmer	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), FRG
Dr Walther Stützle	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
<i>last month 16/11</i> → Dr Peter Tarnoff	Council on Foreign Relations, US
Dr Seyfi Tashan	Foreign Policy Institute, Turkey
Dr Alvaro de Vasconcelos	Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais (IEE), Portugal
? → Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic	Zagreb University, Yugoslavia
Dr Jusuf Wanandi	Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia
<i>Klein-Polmer</i> → Mr Bernard Wood	Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), Canada
Maj.-Gen. Aharon Yariv (ret)	Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Israel
Dr El-Sayed Yassin	Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Egypt

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**REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD  
MANAGING THE ACCELERATION OF HISTORY**

**by Dr John Chipman**

Paper presented to the Heads of Institutes Meeting

hosted by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Wilton Park, UK  
November 15-17, 1989

REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:

MANAGING THE ACCELERATION OF HISTORY

by Dr John Chipman

Assistant Director for Regional Security Studies

International Institute for Strategic Studies

London

ENGLAND

Paper presented to

Third Heads of Institutes Conference

hosted by IISS at

Wilton Park

ENGLAND

November 15-17 1989

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not for citation

## Regional Stability in the Developing World:

### Managing the Acceleration of History

#### Introduction

In the West, throughout much of the 1970s and early 1980s, debate on problems of stability and security in the Third World was dominated by the dogmas, sentiments and policies of the 'globalists' and the 'regionalists.' In the 1990s and beyond, these categories are likely to lose whatever meaning they may have had. The ideological and political competition between the superpowers, while still alive; is less likely to be seen by either as truly determinant of 'global outcomes.' The increasing autonomy of local actors (whether states or insurgent groups) and their appreciation of their own local influence will create facts, situations, contexts which will complicate the assessments of outsiders. The speed of locally determined change, coupled with the speed in the change of global trends (political, economic, even climactic) will make strategic assessment daunting. With the acceleration of history, will come a decline in the manageability of most ensuing conflict.

In the past, the globalists believed in the inevitability of superpower competition in the developing world, for influence, resources and ideological satisfaction. They viewed existing or prospective conflicts as susceptible to external, usually superpower manipulation. People like Henry Kissinger argued that the East- West balance in the European continent needed to be defended as well as improved upon outside it, and that it would be invidious to the Western position in Europe for the Soviet Union and its allies to gain footholds in far away places. This was so even if in and of themselves, these areas could not pretend to strategic significance. Zbigniew Brezezinski drew attention to the reality of such

linkages and to the eccentricities of this global competition when he made the famous remark that the SALT 1 treaty had been buried in the sands of the Ogaden. Third World leaders whose non-alignment discourse and idealism tended to find its practical compliment in more cynical and hardly more discreet alliances with one or the other superpower tended only to confirm the view of the globalists that if the game were not widely played it might be dramatically lost.

The regionalists, usually area specialists and representatives of many (though not all) European chanceries, increasingly drew attention to the local sources of regional conflict and their intractability. Ethnic rivalries, clan politics, longstanding territorial disputes, and competitions between local powers were seen as primary causes of conflict. These were merely complicated by the interventions, direct or through proxies, of superpowers giving vent to their larger struggle for power and international prestige. The regionalists tended to favour economic rather than military solutions. They even argued, sometimes in paradoxical fashion, that superpower withdrawals could lead to the cessation of local instability, whose fires had not only been stoked, but occasionally ignited through superpower manipulations of otherwise quiescent local disputes. The protestations of countless Third World leaders, that the meddling of outside powers in their own affairs had given rise to unnecessary local strife, confused debates between those who felt the need to emphasise the larger geopolitical context of regional conflict, and those who gave pre-eminence to its local roots.

The intensified discussion between the superpowers in the late 1980s on regional conflict, and the increase of international pressure for the end of particular wars, contributed to the various 'peace-breakouts' of 1988 and 1989, in Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Southern Africa. The 'debate'

between the globalists and the regionalists has, however, been rendered sterile by two facts. First, that these and many other areas in the Third World are still affected by important conflicts and struggles for power. Second, that the domestic, regional and more 'global' features of Third World instability are generally accepted as so evidently complex as to defy neat classification. If the superpowers and other outside forces are beginning to make less fanciful calculations about the relative 'strategic' importance of certain states or regions in the Third World, the intricacy of insecurity in the developing world demands more comprehensive attention. This is so because many Third World states are at a loss as to how to meet the variety of security challenges they face, yet appeal to outside powers for assistance; because the classic instruments of external security promotion, be they military or economic aid, are so often found ill-suited to particular situations or are badly applied; because the methods employed by Third World states to advance their own security are equally often unrelated to the primary perils they face; because the number and range of threats to Third World security has become more impressive; and because the consequences of their mis-management, by local or outside forces, may so often be uncontrollable.

Thus, in a still insecure world, the calculations of the superpowers are recognised to have only modest impact on the prospects for Third World security, while the capacities of local leaders and states to manage regional stability has not improved even though Third World desires for independence and autonomy in local security management remain pronounced. Those who study insecurity in the developing world are compelled, while giving due regard to the large geo-political, military, and macro-economic forces that might play on the security of these states to assess the range of local issues which render the domestic manageability of stability and

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security so difficult, and, ex hypothesi, their exploitation by outside powers virtually uncontrollable. Amongst such factors, the dogmas, political prejudices, and idiosyncrasies of local leaderships are often central. Bad policies create insecurity: a malevolent effect of inflexible or merely poor management is to increase vulnerabilities to external pressures. Such pressures from the outside can also accelerate the forces of domestic change. No general theory of developing country security can be promulgated, but it is clear that the linkages between the various components of security, or contributors to insecurity, needs to be appreciated. Regional security in the developing world is about the management of diverse but accumulating demands and pressures.

It is not just that security in the developing world depends so immediately on non-military factors. This is evidently the case in Europe and North America as well and has been recognised ever since the US saw that its security interests would be advanced by the Marshall Plan. What is vitally important is that regional security in so many areas is determined by the external effects of policies implemented to attenuate domestic problems and by the domestic consequences of the external reactions to locally inspired change. Much is made of global interdependence, but regional interdependencies, of a cultural, economic, political or military kind are sufficiently powerful that the internal policies of states are of transnational significance. Thus in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America, policies pursued by governments to deal with ethnic disputes, environmental questions, secessionist movements, nationalist revival groups, economic depression, become security problems for others and inspire reactions which are not always pacific or neutral. This has not traditionally been the case over the last forty years in North America, Europe, Japan and Australasia. The developments in the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe in 1988 and 1989, however, suggest that the developed world will not be spared the security challenges -initially of a non-military nature - which derive from managing internal strife and the collapse of previously robust, if unjust, political structures. Indeed one of the features of politics in the political East may be that they will resemble some of the classic problems of the South (debt, ethnic and nationalist troubles, pressures for emigration, unmanageable domestic desires for accelerated domestic change, the collapse of state ideologies); and in consequence, the nature of West-East relations may well begin to imitate the previous concerns of North-South politics.

If international relations generally in the 1990s and the opening years of the 21st century will no longer be dominated by the shrill declarative and costly military competition between the 'forces' of communism and capitalism, it will no less certainly be dominated by the perpetuation of conflict by various means and to different ends between groups in the developing world, (as well as on the fringes of the USSR's European empire). A binary logic may no longer apply to global politics, but combustibility has not been eliminated because the importance of ideology is being dampened by the superpowers. It is equally too early to declare a victory of Western liberalism and that this has resulted in the 'end of history' and the gradual dying down of conflict.<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama's elegant but too brave by half argument to this effect depends a great deal on his belief in the spread of the universal homogeneous state and the view that in the absence of large-scale conflict between large

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History', in The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. See ripostes in the same issue as well as articles by Samuel P. Huntington, 'No Exit: The Errors of Endism' and Leon Wieseltier, 'Spoilers at the Party' in The National Interest Fall 1989 and Antony Hartley, 'On Not Ending History', Encounter, September-October 1989, 71-73.

states caught in the grip of history, there will evolve a Common Marketization of world politics. Yet, while the liberal idea is strong and the most important point of reference for many societies, struggles born of a pre-liberal past, or a non-liberal present, fought in the context of a world moving too fast, mean that for most in the developing world history is alive and imprisoning, modernity both a goal and an object of derision, but an impossible challenge in any case. For so many in the developing world it is the fragility of state structures that allows for regional turmoil, the strength of rejectionist, nationalist and secessionist movements that threaten a reversal of the accomplishments, however modest, of historical processes, and the rise or revival of differing ideologies, be they religious, ethnic or even environmental which can cause dramatic change significant enough to challenge any local interpretation of 'endism.' The smaller and weaker of such states may equally be victims of larger local states. These have felt more free to develop ambitious goals of influence and suzerainty of their own.

The existence of such forces ensures that regional stability cannot be guaranteed by the astute implementation of policies by central bureaucracies, aided by outside great powers no longer in the pursuit of messianic goals. It is true that there may be greater superpower disinterest in the conflicts of other regions - even if each will aspire regularly to present 'diplomatic solutions' in order to reinsure their status as powers with world-wide interests. It is equally evident that primordial rivalries in regions outside the great alliance systems, coming into conflict or even combining with modernist values or aspirations (economic and military) will produce instability.

If an important phase of history is drawing to a close on the East-West axis, the decline of 'the great ideological struggle' has meant for so

many regions (including Eastern Europe of course) an increase in the local saliency of unsolved problems. The role of the superpowers, the legacies of decolonisation, the challenge of a global economic order from which they feel estranged, these will still weigh on decisionmakers in the developing world. But nearly everywhere, local discontent, rivalries, tyrants and scapegoats are becoming more relevant.

The poorest regions of the developing world are condemned to tackle many of the complex issues of a modern world in which they lag ever more behind. This takes place, just as internal forces, sometimes because of the absence of external influence or pressure which might artificially contain or unite them (sometimes in any case), are threatening state structures or causing further divisions in society. The richer or larger states of the developing world in many cases have continued to add to the sophistication of their military holdings (conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons with delivery systems to match) and to participate in their international trade in a way bound to concern smaller neighbours and the international community. This occurs, even though many of their own domestic orders show fissiparous tendencies which remain potentially explosive.

Managing pressing modern aspirations and economic challenges just as traditional, historically rooted demands are made on the state is the central crisis within the vastly different areas of the developing world. These states do not applaud the end of history, rather they must struggle with its acceleration. Time is not on the side of the bureaucrat in such circumstances, even if he is newly imbued with the renowned pragmatism of the Western 'liberal', and certainly if he is not.

Analysts of regional security in the 1990s must therefore see the effects of the acceleration of history on the developing world. When the problems of the modern world are grafted on to the legacies of more

fundamental dilemmas solutions offered for one category may have dangerous repercussions on the other. Each of the looming problems shared by so many developing states discussed below - the crisis of central state power, the nature of local insurgencies, economic pressures, environmental and physical calamities, the resilience of the military imperative in political relations, and the residual importance of links with outside powers - have become increasingly interrelated, but not as a consequence more susceptible to ordered management. The de-acceleration of history, the abstention from wider global affairs, a return to the past and isolationism, is not surprisingly the preferred 'option' of the most disaffected groups and states of the developing world. Though the superpowers may now be in a mood for co-operation (even collusion) in the Third World, that spirit may well be irrelevant to the sources of local strife. Now that the superpowers have discovered the primacy of regional forces over their own, they may also, in common with other parts of the developed world, determine that the saliency for them of regional conflict is insignificant. In this evolving situation, to what extent can leaders in the developing world develop the tools of their own security management, and for what problems is international action and co-operation still relevant?

#### Nature of State Power and Security Management

The most immediate and consistent challenge to leaders in the developing world is to strengthen and maintain the coherence of the state. Indeed, one of the qualities of developing countries is that they are still in the process of developing the state or at least widespread respect for its ultimate power over the people who live within its borders. The need to assert power often exacerbates the same internal differences and tensions for which centralised state power is thought necessary. It is a

not unsurprising consequence of this effort of nation-building, which aims at establishing national pride, building the tools - often military - of central control, and combatting transnational influences which might undermine this task, that a deterioration takes place in regional relations. Regional instability is all too often tied up with incomplete or changing processes of national state assertion.

Particularly in the newer states issued from decolonisation, personal rule is the preferred instrument of national integration. The well-known remark of former President Bourguiba of Tunisia - 'What state? I am the state?' - aside from recalling the European origins of the association between the idea of state power and ruler, is indicative of the enduring role played by national liberators (and often their heirs) in the rule of the decolonised states. Even in states not formally colonised the importance of one man, or one sect in society remains key to central rule and is often the root cause of conflict. In Ethiopia, different nationalities were brought under the rule of an Amharic ruling class, to the evident detriment of other nationalities such as the Eritreans, Somalis, Oromos, Tigrayans and others. The dictatorship that succeeded Emperor Haile Selassie has not been more successful in solving this elemental problem - the task of 'Ethiopianisation' is still pursued.<sup>2</sup>

The connection between personal rule and ethnic domination exists in various parts of the developing world where political parties or groupings are often identified with clans or sects. The Ba'athist regimes in Syria, and Iraq, or the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, are obvious examples. In these circumstances regime security is often confused with state security;

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<sup>2</sup> See P. Anyang' Nyong'o, 'Crises and Conflicts in the Upper Nile Valley: Implications for Conflict Resolution in Africa', Paper prepared for research conference on 'Conflict Resolution in Africa', The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., October 15-18 1989, p. 14.

attacks on the legitimacy of an individual ruler interpreted all too willingly as an attack on the state. To supplement the reality of ethnic domination in many states (or replace its perception) religion is sometimes used as an alternative form of integration. In President Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistan the move towards the establishment of an 'Islamic state' on Sunni lines was an attempt to ensure the legitimacy of the regime yet it caused problems for the Shia minority and created new avenues of dissent. But the fact that political parties emerged with an Islamic focus also meant that the Benazir Bhutto regime had to move carefully if it wished to dismantle elements of the Zia Islamic legacy.<sup>3</sup> Revolutionary Iran is of course the extreme case of a country where religion became part of the state doctrine and dissatisfied groups from Tunisia to Malaysia have argued that answers to their own problems in society can also be found in Islamic integration. The importance of traditional religious rulers in many areas is such that central forces, even in secular states, must take them into account. Thus, when the military government in Nigeria in November 1988 chose a new Sultan of Sokoto without the support of local king-makers, this resulted in serious rioting of the Muslims in the north and a challenge to the federal government.<sup>4</sup>

The reality of power structures in many states in the developing world (particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East) is such that centralised control is a myth, a juridical fiction which must be maintained given the respect with which the state is held in the international community. Pre-modern tactics of control and influence must still be used

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<sup>3</sup> See Mahnaz Ispahani, 'Pakistan's Internal and External Security Environment', draft Adelphi Paper, 1989/90 typescript, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> See Strategic Survey 1988-1989, Published by Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 183.

to assure the continuity of power in the capital. In Afghanistan, the Najibullah regime has been offering local autonomy, weapons, money and titles to local leaders in the country, (such as Ismaili's in Baghlan province) who can keep open communications to the cities.<sup>5</sup> Central state power is thus reaffirmed by devolving power to trusted but still independent allies. The medieval rules of feudalism appear more relevant to current circumstances than more formal arrangements for de-centralisation. Where the central power is militarily strong, it can and often does deal with prospective opponents of the state, or state policy, through resettlement or forced migration. Thus Iraq has attempted to create a 30km wide security zone along the borders with Turkey, Syria and Iran clearing out Kurds to prevent them making common cause with their kin in neighbouring countries. Similarly, Brazil's Calha Norte policy has been directed towards moving native Indian populations away from borders with Columbia and Peru in order to prevent illegal trade. Most Latin American countries (as well as many other Asian countries) do not experience the same degree of clash between state and nation as do African and Middle Eastern states, but as discussed below, they must still deal with alternative centres of power which can emerge in situations where the strength of state machinery remains low.

The need to take into account pre-state and native links within societies in the developing world can often impede the establishment of independent and efficient bureaucracies which can cope with the domestic demand for essential services. In many areas, bureaucracy where it exists is confused with government, whose official organs are simply used to maintain in power a single group. These naturally enough, reflect the

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<sup>5</sup> See Hamish Macdonald, 'Back to Feudalism,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 1989.

ideologies (often, as in the cases of Algeria and Vietnam of national liberation) which are held up as sources of legitimacy of the state. Pragmatic management of pressing social needs is not made easy by these structures.<sup>6</sup> There are of course cases in the developing world (Korea) where strong central government is mixed with a degree of bureaucratic efficiency. In those few circumstances where this is so, order may be treasured over distributive justice, but outside callers for 'greater democracy' must take into account the potential disorganising effect of too rapid moves towards pluralism.

Despite these problems of state coherence, control and management, the state is still the point of reference. This fact was graphically illustrated by the solemn meeting of the Lebanese parliament in Taif Saudi Arabia in October 1989, during which individuals from a state without an acknowledged single head, who no longer accurately represented the competing interests in Lebanese society, discussed the appropriate balance of confessional and other interests which must obtain in the country, at a time when large areas were under foreign occupation and control. Lebanon also offers many examples of the general thesis that much of the insecurity in the developing world derives from inadequacies of the state and of the tools used by leaders to force unity.<sup>7</sup>

#### Forms of Organised Insurgency and Civil Strife

Where the nature of central state power is weak or merely disrespected, feudal and provincial loyalties can be exploited by pressure groups, insurgents, rebels or terrorists. Their capacity to organise

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<sup>6</sup> Some of this is discussed in Yezid Sayigh, 'Security Problems of Developing States' draft Adelphi Paper manuscript, 1989, p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Lebanon's problems are surveyed in Hussein Sirriyeh, 'Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict,' Adelphi Papers no 243, Autumn 1989, Published by Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

themselves and garner sufficient support to present a challenge to central power and draw down resources and energy otherwise required for state management usually depends on an identifiable ideology, ethnic support, and some sort of political programme, however vague. Groups that challenge the legitimacy of the state not only create trouble at home, they affect the calculations of other neighbouring powers and this can invite further conflict. While it is state power that is still the most respected by the international community, many leaders in the developing world may control the capital city but find that elsewhere their capacity to advance centrally directed policies is absent.

Among the more dangerous types of groups now operating are nationalist revivalist groups who seek a reversal of history, a retreat into a past that they have mythified for political purposes. Their aim is the eradication of the present in the hope that the future will more closely resemble a past. Two examples will suffice. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, recalling as do other Cambodian groups the greatness of Cambodia's past (the people who built Angkor), and operating under an ideology of liberation, but without a realistic policy for the modern world, have terrorised without constructing. When in power from 1975-1978 the Khmer Rouge, while extolling the virtues of traditionalism tried to rush forward at a dizzying pace, simultaneously seeking to increase rice and steel production. The Kampuchean Great Leap Forward, the establishment of a new myth of economic invincibility, failed miserably because of a policy of autogenocide and forced migration. Their ideology of geographical isolation, when combined with perpetual terror meant that the Khmer Rouge attempt to somersault history only meant that the country was virtually

returned to the year zero.<sup>8</sup> Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia gave the lie to the Khmer Rouge proposition that Cambodia could live outside the real world, alone in its own world. With loyalty to it surrendered rather than won, the Khmer Rouge have been able to survive since thanks partly to external assistance from great and smaller powers alike. The Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) or Peoples Liberation Front in Sri Lanka began to wage terror in 1987 when the government made peace overtures to Tamils wishing to establish an independent homeland in the north and east. A Singhalese nationalist movement, espousing anarchism and a romantic idealism of a village past, it has been able to draw its support from the unemployed and the disaffected, the castaways of failed economic policies. The fact that the Tamil rebellion drew in an Indian force presence, and that this in turn helped to revivify Singhalese nationalism points to the unfortunate links between domestic conflict and regional politics, as well as to the inadequacy of isolationist doctrines as a remedy from the ills of the modern world.

Both these groups, and there are other ones who operate on similar premises claim national mandates for power or influence. Countless groups fight for 'aboriginal' or 'indigenist' rights, arguing the primacy of primordial over state ties and the inadequacy of central government policies towards 'native' peoples. The Marxist/Maoist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path in Peru) has terrorised the Peruvian countryside, but also increasingly the cities, pressing its case for fuller recognition of the Indian identity. Its struggle against the white elite in Lima, where it has been consistently successful in cutting water and electricity

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<sup>8</sup> See Karl D. Jackson, 'The Ideology of Total Revolution', in Karl D. Jackson (ed), Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death, Princeton, 1989, esp. pp. 58-66.

supplies, has been largely a campaign of a few radicals who have been able to co-opt disaffected Indians to their cause. The movement has recently made common cause with narcotraffickers operating in the country. Such groups as Sendero awaken ancient fears, and directly challenge the existing leaderships rights over the whole state. They also make life difficult for the groups on whose behalf they claim to act. Numerous other examples exist of organised ethnic or regionally based organisations who, in seeking recognition of native identities also intensify ethnic rivalries. The National Democratic Front in Burma ('uniting' Karens, Arakanese, Mons, Karennis, Shans, Kachins, Palaungs, Pa-Os and Was) fights the Burmese government, but its constituent members, some of whom participate actively in drug production and trade, also fight among each other and end up by disturbing whatever normal peasant life might otherwise exist. John Garang's Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan argues that unequal treatment of the south by central authorities in Khartoum is only a symbol of a basic Sudanese problem of how to integrate various groups towards a common purpose. His own operations in the south nevertheless demonstrate that the native population whose interests he claims to represent can be the unfortunate victims of armed rebellion against the north. Governments responding to such ethnically based struggles (in the cases cited as well as others) rarely display moderation and a sympathy for the root causes of discontent. Too often, because of the strategic insignificance of the country concerned, the most awful massacres are ignored by the international community. Such was the case in 1988 in Burundi, where the national army, composed almost entirely of Tutsis killed thousands of Hutus (the majority ethnic group) and created a huge refugee crisis in neighbouring Burundi to which 60,000 survivors fled.

In an ultimate challenge to central state power, many groups seek to secede and establish states of their own, playing on an ideology of self-determination which can find easy support amongst citizens of provinces or remote areas who are victims of uneven state development or of the success of a particular ethnic group with a firm grip on the central organs of power. The strength of any ethnic group with powerful complaints against the central power, or indeed which is itself in power, can be supplemented (as in the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, various groups in the Lebanon, Islamic fighters in Afghanistan) by their links with outside powers sympathetic to their cause and willing to offer support. Given an international atmosphere in which the direct military involvement of the superpowers is not regularly anticipated, the tendency of groups within developing country states to call in local regional power support, and for such powers positively to respond, could rise.

Organized rebellion against state authorities by ethnic groups, secessionist movements or drug lords acting in collaboration or through terrorists shows no sign of subsiding. Numerous states are bound openly to exploit the existence of rebel entities to advance their own external ambitions. Sometimes such groups are virtually created and almost entirely sustained by external powers, as in the cases of Iranian support for Hizbollah activists in the Lebanon, or South Africa's links with Renamo in Mozambique. In other cases the links are less direct and the objects of support more evidently autonomous as in the examples provided by Ethiopian support for the SPLA in Sudan, and for the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somalia, or the putative assistance provided by Pakistan to Sikh extremists in India or Indian help (often denied) to Sind separatists in Pakistan. Such links, which tend to be more subtle than overt and heavily military assistance (such as China's aid to the Khmer Rouge) are no less

complicating for regional security since they touch the core of central state control over the population. Leaders in the Third World whose 'nation-building' tasks are incomplete feel particularly threatened by such activity.

While there are many instances of differing ethnic groups throughout the developing world living peacefully cheek by jowl, sensitivity to the consequences of traditional differences and the rivalries these inspire, can intensify in periods of economic hardship. A decline in economic fortunes can give rise to ethnic tensions which would otherwise remain latent; states which are ethnically homogeneous arguably have a longer lead time to manage economic problems before these result in organised rebellion by coherent groups. Naturally, spontaneous riots with economic motivations (North Africa, Venezuela), as well as the cry for an improved political situation (China, Chile) can occur where the ethnic factor is not a determinant. But the existence of well-defined ethnic groups able to develop a case of oppression can not only accelerate the chances of opposition but contribute to the possibility of it being sustained especially in instances where the central power has in the past been weakened by the structural divisions of society.

Increasingly, in Pakistan, Burma, Columbia, Panama, Peru and elsewhere, organised challenge to authority with a debilitating effect on state structures has derived from the activities of narcotraffickers. These are able to operate transnationally and to use their vast wealth to acquire levels of armaments which often rival those held and maintained by the states in which they mainly operate. The drug challenge, thus organized, is an assault on public order and the rule of law. In Columbia, drug leaders have penetrated and control major sections of the government and the judiciary; in Panama they have become the government. Burmese drug lords

are linked with ethnic groups long struggling to emancipate themselves from a Burmese majority they perceive as domineering and arrogant. In many countries the drug dealers are more organised than the state military apparatus or such private corporations which may exist. Their power not only affects the safety of the population and distracts government attention from the tasks of development, but tarnishes the image of the state in international and particularly American eyes. Foreign policy towards such states becomes dominated by the phenomenon of drugs, often retarding decisions on economic assistance. While Western governments realize that compensatory economic aid must be granted as an element of any war on local drug production and eventual distribution, focus on the drug issue risks distorting the perception of overall security problems in producing, distributing or 'facilitating' countries.

A key set of concerns (themselves so often relevant to the drug problem) revolves around competition for scarce resources and the management of economic opportunities and vulnerabilities. Dependence on single exports, the distractions imposed by debt management, and difficult access to certain resources necessary either for agricultural or industrial growth directly impinge on developing country security.

#### Economic and Resource Pressures

There are many states, inadequately grouped under the too largely embracing term of Third World, whose economic development has proceeded well, in some cases spectacularly. The four dragons in Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) as well as the oil-rich states of the Gulf, cannot properly be said to have security problems which derive from economic woes. The acceleration of their economic history has if anything helped to harness the more powerful and dynamic forces in society in the service of national growth rather than mischief, and helped to check forces

of dissent by catering for their basic needs. For many other states, their own bad management or the poverty of their natural resources has meant that they are losing or have already lost control of their economic futures. World markets move too fast for them, free trade where it exists is too liberal, foreign penetration often perceived as too pervasive. Their attempts to protect themselves from pressures of this kind often only complicate things further: exchange controls, protectionism and restrictions on the free movement of populations can harm prospects for needed investment or technical know-how. In the case of the poorest lesser developed countries, such reactions to perceived vulnerability and penetrability so often lead to further isolation and deprivation.

For those countries rich enough to have been able to garner credit in the 1970s, the consequences of their debt-overstretch are now being felt. While many were able to service their debts when interest rates were low and exports continued to grow in the late 1970s, the world recession of 1980-1982 meant that money became expensive and external markets shrank.<sup>9</sup> For countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, debt management and its attendant problems have become a major feature of foreign policy. Their own decisions to suspend, or their intimations about defaulting debt repayments, naturally affect the availability of new capital. In the worst cases, the level of government deficits, the inability of authorities to raise further revenues from taxes and the monetarisation of debt (printing money, issuing certificates against gold reserves) create the conditions for hyperinflation, with all the attendant risks in terms of political stability. Brazilians are in the habit of referring to their situation as analogous to the afflictions of Weimer Germany - debt is seen as the

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<sup>9</sup> Clive Crook, 'Poor Man's Burden: A Survey of The Third World', The Economist, 23-29 September 1989, p.51.

equivalent of reparations payments - and the political implications of such financial entrapment are depicted as severe. The fact that capital flight from many of the heavily indebted countries is very high, amounting by some estimates to more than half their foreign debt, only compounds existing problems. The movement of capital outside the country creates foreign exchanges crises which in turn accelerates the flight of capital and rise of inflation. The speed of such financial developments and the vicious circles it creates makes policy planning near impossible. Still, optimists feel those countries which engage in reforms (income restraint, trade liberalisation) stand a chance to improve growth rates and thus encourage the possibility both of new lending and a return of departed capital. The stakes for these large debtors and their lenders are, however, high and the structure of the relationship between borrowers and their government and private lenders basically unhealthy. Quick fix solutions to the debt problem (debt for equity, debt for nature) can deeply affect a country's sense of sovereignty and hence perceptions of security. The debt problem and the feeling of helplessness which it encourages generally help to create circumstances in which other de-stabilizing elements can operate.

The richer debtor countries have the luxury at least of knowing that their problems are so important that they are sure of international attention at the highest level. The poorer countries attract the interest of international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, European Commission), but less often gain concentrated attention of Western leaders. An exception to this were those poorer African countries which were able to benefit from President Francois Mitterrand's decision in 1989 to wipe off their debt. The fact that some key 'medium-rich' countries (with commensurately higher obligations) like Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon and the Congo were excluded from this dispensation, showed the limits of such

munificence. Most of the francophone African countries in Africa also find themselves in an exceptional situation in that their membership of the Franc Zone has tended to protect them from the ravages of hyper-inflation that has affected so many other developing states. But there the exceptionalism ends. The poorer African states all have in common that where they have exports these are usually single, and of primary materials. Their vulnerability to world market prices is nearly total. Mechanisms such as STABEX or SYSMIN developed by the European Community to guarantee levels of revenue to these countries have helped, but have not been able to change the nature of the problem.

The poorest African states have a problem of mere survival. The economics of survival is a basic security challenge, but less often one that can create ordered attacks on the political order by those who suffer most. Those countries in Asia or Latin America who are above the survival threshold have the disadvantage that their peoples are able to develop aspirations which need to be met. The domestic management of such aspirations (now more clearly a feature too in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), is delicate given that economic ambitions mix with ethnic rivalries or politically charged relations between the poorer and richer regions in any given country. Government economic policies, whether driven by programmes drafted and possibly imposed on states by the international financial institutions, or entirely self-generated, too often carry the risk of inducing disaffection and conflict. A feature of developing states is that economic management has implications for political order, a problem less evident in the developed world, where political stability creates a backdrop which allows for long term planning.

Often national security concerns will affect the scope and timing of economic development plans. Central government policies might focus on

particular geographic areas where the infusion of capital is thought necessary for reasons of stability as much as simple reasons of economy. Spread over time, such policies can create conditions of uneven development (particularly when the priorities of colonial times have been carried over into independence), with the result that fissiparous tendencies in the body politic might be exacerbated. Pakistan's own ethnic problems have been often thus affected: the favourite treatment given to the richer Punjab especially by military regimes has contributed to the establishment of ethnically based movements in Sind and Baluchistan. In Syria, the Sunni majority has noted to its dissatisfaction the degree of development assistance given to the Alawite dominated Latakia region under Assad's regime.<sup>10</sup> In general, the need to make development more even, often by centrally directed policies of land distribution, rarely proceeds at a pace sufficient to slow down regionally based discontent. Few governments are able speedily to implement such plans as may exist: the difficulties encountered by Filipino governments since the early 1970s and the government of Zimbabwe since the early 1980s are typical. A too leisurely approach to the dismantlement of feudal structures simply accelerates dissent. Certainly the availability as well as the distribution of land has been one of the principal root causes of opposition to central state power in Central America. The competition for scarce agricultural resources is as much a source of conflict as the more glorified competition for oil or strategic mineral wealth.

In the future, strategic analysts will have to take more note of such problems. Specifically, the competition for water resources is likely to

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<sup>10</sup> See Valerie Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel: The End of an Era?, Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies by Gower Press, Aldershot, 1988, p. 114.

increase in importance, not least because water has become a central problem in that area of the world where arguably the political and military friction is greatest. In the Middle East, where the intra Arab and Arab-Israeli political and military rivalries continue to be intense, the water issue not only affects, but in some instances determines strategic calculations. Problems in this area provide a good indication of the complexity of resource issues. The pressure to exploit agricultural lands, particularly in the face of accelerating population growth, means that water is bound to become a more obvious element in regional relations. Since sources of water cross boundaries there can be few water exploitation policies whose effects are neutral on neighbours. For example, construction of the Ataturk Dam in the Turkish section of the Euphrates river could affect the downstream exploitation of water by the Iraqis and the Syrians. Tripartite negotiations over this problem have not always been satisfactory. Since 1982, Israel has diverted water from the Litani river crossing southern Lebanon (though the cost-effectiveness of this is now questioned), thus reducing the amount of water available to Lebanese farmers. Israeli dependence on water from the Golan Heights and the West Bank remains high. While the water tables in the West Bank are declining and Palestinian population increasing Israeli authorities have allowed Palestinians in the territories to consume only at 1967 levels. Egypt depends on the Nile for some 95% of its water resources, but water flow to Egypt is dependent on consumption in Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the last 18 months Egyptian interest in Nile Valley regional co-operation has increased with the growing realization of the impact of such vulnerability. If Egypt were to insist on a strategy of food self-sufficiency its water problem would be aggravated and as a likely consequence its relations with Ethiopia whose co-operation on water management issues has been

inconsistent, would decline.<sup>11</sup> Rich countries, like Saudi Arabia have the luxury of experimenting with techniques such as water desalination, but as a rule co-operation is the key to water management, and the enduring conflicts in the region only ensure that the water issue will be an increasingly aggravating problem, not least in the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute when a peace process begins to take shape.<sup>12</sup>

To the extent that economic and financial questions affect civil order and international strategic calculations, they naturally gain in importance. The fact that in so many parts of the developing world economic futures are determined by the successful management of natural resources, points to the significance of sound environmental policies for strategic stability. The natural or induced decay or destruction of the resources on which economic stability rests, or around which international attention focuses, can therefore intensify existing conflict and create the conditions for new rivalries.

#### Environmental and Physical Decay

The acceleration of 'environmental history' is a matter of global significance and of general comment. Its importance in the lesser developed parts of the world lies in the fact that the link between the state of the environment and economic pressures is particularly strong. These states and their peoples depend on a healthy environment for their own well-being and it is often in the developing world that the forces of physical decay are most relentlessly at work. Yet economic imperatives often drive leaders or

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<sup>11</sup> I draw this conclusion implicitly from the discussion in Tony Allen, 'Water in the Arab Middle East: The Nile. Changing Expectations and Priorities', Arab Affairs, Winter 1988-1989, no. 8, pp. 50, 51.

<sup>12</sup> See for an expanded treatment of some of these problems Rami Musallam, 'Water: The Middle East Problem of the 1990s', Gulf Report, London, February 1989, pp. 3-18.

their peoples to an accelerated depletion of natural resources. Governments are frequently incapable simultaneously of dealing with the debt and environment traps and this results not only in increased tensions with neighbours on whom the effects of nationally driven environment unfriendly policies are often felt, but also on friends and allies in the developed world who now put increasing pressure on Third World leaders to adopt sound environment policies. Environment issues have become international security problems both within the 'South' and between the North and South.

Many environmental problems in the South are caused directly or indirectly by policies pursued in the North, others are home-grown. In some areas, environmental dilemmas can less easily be blamed on government policies. The advance of the desert in Sahelian Africa which has severely affected agricultural and grazing capacities just as have the locust swarms in North Africa are environmental problems generally not consequences of the policies pursued by the suffering country. However, deforestation in the forest zones of sub-Saharan Africa certainly interacts with desertification in the arid and semi-arid zones.<sup>13</sup> Much European economic assistance to these areas is eaten up by the need to combat environmental challenges, thus affecting the proportion of assistance which can go to other development projects. The soil erosions in such countries as Haiti, Guatemala and India do owe their origins to overgrazing or poorly managed irrigation. These causes are themselves the result of desperate attempts by impoverished peoples to improve their lot in the short term and without some reversal of environmental destruction, their poverty and the political instability to which this can give rise, will continue. In the case of

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<sup>13</sup> Chris Simpson, 'The Battle of the Greens', West Africa, 9-15 October 1989, p. 1676.

Haiti, it has even been argued that reforestation is the key to its security and political order.<sup>14</sup>

The deforestation of the Amazon has wide reaching (and much argued) effects on the global climate, but also has damaged farming southeast of the rain forest, a fact which has contributed to Brazil's recent decision to co-operate more with outsiders on Amazon management. Differing perceptions of the scope and the urgency of the environmental consequences of Brazil's fiscally encouraged tree-falling has provoked tensions between Brazil and the West, but also encouraged new thinking on how best to provide technical and other aid to the Brazilian government. Whatever the source of environmental strife or its impact on extra-regional relations, the impact on local security can be major. Soil erosion and loss of tree cover can force people to leave their normal living areas. Environmental refugees, no less than political and economic ones, can have destabilizing effects on receiving areas. Moreover, nature rarely respects borders, so deforestation in one country can cause floods in another, thus potentially aggravating regional stability. Aside from the long term effects of deforestation or the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) on the environment and climate there are thus short term and intensifying problems of environmental trends or catastrophes with marked strategic implications.

The conflicting and various problems in South Asia offer good examples of such links. Deforestation in Nepal has led to local landslides which in turn has resulted in the migration of Nepalese to the flat lands bordering India. As a consequence there has been a heightened competition for scarce resources between these new 'immigrants' and the local people, whose different ethnic background has helped to provoke tensions. The Indo-

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<sup>14</sup> See Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security' in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989, vol 68, no.2, p. 166, 168.

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Nepalese trade war, set off in part by the regulation of Indian entry to the country which was feared to exacerbate ethnic tensions, has only encouraged further tree-felling in order to meet rising fuel needs. The resultant top-soil erosion has directly contributed to flooding in Bangladesh. This has served to displace some of the local Bengalis from their homes, most of whom have moved to the Chittagong Hill tracts, populated by non-Bengali tribal minorities, resulting in charges by the local population that the central government has sought to subvert their cultural and linguistic purity. Local insurgents have turned to India for military assistance, thus directly exacerbating bilateral relations. Attempts to manage water resources in the region to attenuate some of these problems have been stymied by the different strategic calculations of each country. Bangladesh would like to have barriers constructed in Nepal to slow flooding but also to help store water which could be used in the winter season when Bangladesh normally suffers drought. India fears that collaboration between Bangladesh, Nepal (and therefore also China) on water resources would be harmful to its interests. The Indian counter-proposal that a canal be constructed to divert waters from the Brahmaputra river (flowing from China to Bangladesh via India's northeastern territories) to augment water flow to Bangladesh in the dry season, runs up against the concern that this would displace more Bangladeshis and destroy badly needed agricultural lands.<sup>15</sup> All these problems perhaps pale beside the concern that as a result of the CFC inspired greenhouse effect, the rise of the oceans will entirely submerge the Maldives. While much analysis of South Asian security has focused on the local nuclear rivalries and the nature of political-military links with outside powers it seems evident that the

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<sup>15</sup> I am grateful to Shaukat Hassan of Dhaka University for pointing out to me some of these linkages.

implications of the environmental domino effect have pressing strategic consequences.

In other areas, the dominos are perhaps not so closely stacked but the link between existing conflicts and their economic/environmental implications should not be ignored. For example, in May 1989 the Thai government offered to mediate between the Burmese government and rebels operating on the Thai-Burmese border. Thailand had previously seen such entities as the Karen National Union (KNU) as providing a useful buffer, keeping the Burmese army at bay and preventing illegal cross-border trade. A Burmese offer of logging concessions to Thailand meant that Thai companies wished to see safe access to Burmese timber areas which could only be brought about by clearing rebels from the border, itself only possible as part of a peace package.<sup>16</sup> No negotiations ensued, but the offer was symbolic of how economic decisions (with environmental consequences) could drive strategic decisions. Indeed Thailand's Golden Land (Suwanaphume) strategy to create more efficient economic co-operation amongst the Indochinese countries spurred numerous peace initiatives during 1988-1989, but some of her neighbours fear that Thailand's recent depletion of her own natural resources (marine and forest) would mean that its own external economic ambitions would be environment unfriendly. In Central America, the economic causes of conflict are primary, but there have also been environmental implications of attempts to satisfy economic concerns given the fact that the exploitation of natural resources is the principal source of income throughout the region. In most countries, poor farmers have been driven out of their arable land by cattle grazers and have begun to cut down hillside forests in search of more land. In El Salvador, where

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<sup>16</sup> Bertil Lintner, 'Crossed Signals', Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 June 1989, p. 27.

virtually the whole of the forest has been cut down, most rebels come from families deprived of arable land. While Nicaragua has moved to deal with the land distribution question - so fundamental to conflict generally in the region - it may be that resettlement plans, particularly on the eastern frontier, will have environmental side effects which would pose security problems in the future.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, the capacities of leaders in the developing to take into account the security implications of economic programmes with environmental consequences is bound to become an element of good government. The economic effects of environmental destruction, internal migrations of peoples in search of better situations, the problems raised by environmental refugees, are all issues which will not only occupy places in domestic agendas, but will become integral to the good management of regional international relations. States whose domestic economic/environmental policies are developed without concern for their external implications, may well risk conflict with neighbours which could include a military dimension.

#### The Resilience of the Military Imperative

While the sources of instability are rooted in the history of state structures, the exacerbating effect of economic and environmental factors and the complexity of regional relationships, they are naturally aggravated by the persistence of the military solution as the ultimate option of state leaders and their internal or external opponents. Even the poorest states in the developing world have, through their arms acquisition programmes, entered with vigour the modern world. Ethiopia, by some measures the poorest country in Africa, with some 316,000 men at arms, has the

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of these issues see Gregory Wirick, 'Environment and Security: The Case of Central America', in Peace and Security, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Summer 1989, vol 4, no. 2, pp. 2-3.

continent's largest standing army. Three of the other poorest African countries, Sudan, Chad, and Mozambique have nevertheless sought to maintain the ability to conduct armed conflict. In these, and other poor countries of the Third World affected by insurgencies, war has become politics by other means; government the management of conflict.

Richer states have sought to make great leaps forwards for reasons of prestige, regional rivalry, and external markets in their ability to produce and export arms. Brazil's medium-tech arms industry has made that country a leading actor in the South-South arms trade. More states appear close to crossing the nuclear threshold. They are doing so, in South Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, in circumstances in which it is not clear that robust mutual deterrence structures can be developed simultaneously with the rise in possession which would make nuclear inventories stabilising factors. The proliferation of chemical weapons and their actual use during the Iran-Iraq war points to difficulty with which the appearance of new types of weapons in conflict areas can be accommodated within deterrence frameworks. The spread of ballistic and cruise missile delivery systems indicates a growing capacity for over the horizon combat which can heighten regional perceptions of threat and raise the possibilities of pre-emption.

This general interstate proliferation of armaments and their delivery systems, which complicates both the prospects for arms control and for conflict management is coupled to a dynamic of intra-state armaments diffusion which heightens the internal opportunities for armed conflict. The sophisticated small arms trade is such that guerrilla groups throughout the world are able to garner for themselves quite impressive inventories. The permeability of borders means that states close to conflict zones will find that arms circulate uncomfortably freely: the war in Afghanistan has

meant that in Pakistan, arms are easily available for the use of various groups. In such situations the state loses one of its usual major attributes: monopoly control over armed force. The capacity of those who oppose state policies to translate this into armed opposition is becoming more pronounced. Where semi-feudal political structures are married to the diffuse possession of arms, the chances of conflict being instigated is all the higher. This factor only increases the need for outside assistance and arms suppliers, just as it raises the level of tensions that can produce conflict.

In this context of accelerating and proliferating abilities to wage war, research on how wars are begun, continued, terminated, but then re-started is as relevant as ever. The consequences of regional conflict for friction in neighbouring areas: the destabilising effect of refugee and exile populations, and the disruption of normal trading patterns, among other results, are themselves often the causes of further dissent and rivalry. In these complicated conditions, in which the prospects of civil and interstate war seem still high, the contributions outside powers might make to conflict promotion or to conflict management appear ambiguous. Regional powers like India may more often, though not necessarily successfully, pursue policing tasks because conflict in neighbouring countries is related to domestic security. But in a world in which strategic calculations are unlikely to be made primarily on ideological grounds, the greater powers will shy away from engagement.

To compensate for insufficient military power to deal with internal or external threats, states in the developing world have traditionally borrowed power from the outside. The superpowers have usually responded positively to such requests largely because of the nature of their own rivalry, while other Western powers (particularly France, who effectively

offers a security guarantee to most of francophone Africa) have for reasons of prestige, or a desire to keep arms markets, sustained some external security relationships. Yet alliances are constraining and it is reasonable to ask what their importance will be in an evidently more fluid international system, and equally, what influence outside powers can have on conflict which may remain intense but, in the developing world at least, carry reduced geopolitical significance.

#### The Resort to Outside Power and Regional Security Management

The speed and nature of current events has begun to militate against the creation of new strategic alliances between strong outside powers and regional actors in search of security guarantees. The Soviet Union is drawing down its commitments in recognition that its security depends on a better management of scarce resources, and the US may distance itself from some allies in the developing world since the perceived need to compete with the Soviet Union will decline. The Soviet Union will still see itself as responsible to governments it has supported (Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola) just as the US will sustain commitments to those whose basic existence or geopolitical position depends heavily on such support (Israel, Egypt, Pakistan). States in the developing world may still call on outside powers to perform security tasks on a 'contractual basis' as Kuwait did during the Iran-Iraq war, but the North-South dimension of strategic/military alliances is probably entering a period of secular decline. Where outside great powers retain a genuine wish to promote the conditions of security, and in circumstances where states in certain regions require development assistance, an interdependence of interests exists which creates the basis for collaborative activity. More narrowly, when outside powers still require regional markets for arms sales and local states with money to spend desire to buy arms, security relationships will

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be established and maintained. Such relationships, as in the past, will have their political consequences. Local states will wish to secure assistance without risking external control of policies or unwelcome responses from neighbours, just as outsiders will wish to guard against the cynical use of assistance given and be prepared for its impetuous dismissal. Agreements will be struck, but these will not be the foundations of new alliances or North - South blocs.

It does not follow from this that regional security organisations or alliances will gain a pre-eminent role in managing regional stability. Such organisations seem to have proliferated in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America during the 1980s. But in the peace break-outs of the 1980s, no regional organisation played a primary role. In South -west Asia, the Gulf, and Southern Africa, deals were struck because local actors wished this and outside powers facilitated compromise. The UN, not a regional organisation, was the bureaucratic instrument of choice to help shape and bless these efforts. The creation and maintenance of new structures will have political significance, but it is not to these organisations that regional actors will happily delegate the right or capacity to manage conflict. Alliances may redefine problems, or make conflict more difficult amongst the members, but will not replace the pursuit of national interests by powerful local states or their proxies.

Recent developments in the 'Arab world' illustrate these points best. The Gulf Co-operation Council did not craft the policy which led to the deployment of Western navies in the Gulf - Kuwait did - and was certainly divided about its possible consequences. The existence of the organisation did not help to facilitate Western deployments; the US and European states negotiated access rights on a bilateral basis. The organisation was brought into being as a result of the Iran-Iraq war and broadly its members

supported Iraq during the war. Yet Iraqi intimations about joining the organisation at the war's end produced concern. This was attenuated by the creation of the Arab Co-operation Council (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen) comprising states 'left out' by other regional arrangements. The political and economic logic for this organisation is not self-evident, but its existence certainly shapes the details of intra-Arab politics. Similarly, the establishment of the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA: Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya) in February 1989, was made possible by Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement. Through its goal of political and economic integration for the region, it dampened the saliency for regional relations of the Polisario struggle for the Western Sahara. Its existence raises the political costs of major disputes between the member states, since so much capital has been invested in the ideology of integration. It is arguable that Libya's behaviour at the May 1989 Casablanca conference, at which Col. Gadaffi effectively agreed to the PLO peace programme subscribed to by other Arab states present may not have been possible were it not for his new agreement with his Maghreb neighbours. Yet while this, like other regional alliances, may impose marginal constraints on the activities of radical powers, it will not be able to prevent radical activity when this becomes defined as a necessary state aim.

The greater prudence likely to be shown by outside powers with respect to regional conflict and the inability of regionally based organisations to determine outcomes or to force peace, means that local powers and actors will maintain an independence of will and capacity which will be singularly important. Some, like Syria, or in a different way India, will be able to wield with effect their regional power. The ambitions of potential or actual local hegemony will be whetted, and it

will be some time before they feel that they cannot influence their immediate environment.

Yet most actors, no less than the great powers from outside, will be forced increasingly to take closely into account local complexities. Leaders in the developing world may seek to become more careful about their alliances with the superpowers but they may also feel the need to be more circumspect in declaring that regional problems derive from outside interference or structural asymmetries in the international system. The urgency of local problems will be too great. Often domestic problems will appear paramount. The riots in Algiers in October 1988 which helped to accelerate liberalizing reforms in Algeria were carried out by a young generation who could not conceive that their own problems were part of the legacy of colonialism. Their complaint was against the policies of local leaders; their revolution one determined by their interpretation of domestic inadequacies. Increasingly, one suspects, developing states will have to take into account the sentiments expressed by the historian Macaulay during the debate on the 1832 Great Reform Bill in England: 'Woe to the government which thinks that the steady and long continued movement of the public mind is to be stopped like a street riot.'

States in the developing world not engaged nor immediately affected by violent conflict are likely increasingly to see their security in more modest and domestic terms. The new Argentine foreign minister declared in August 1989 that the Menem government did not pretend to lead groups or alignments, did not wish to be defined by any universal ideology and needed first to solve its own internal economic problems before defending broader international causes.<sup>18</sup> Most other states, closer to major areas of

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<sup>18</sup> Drawn from interview with Domingo Cavallo in 'Aproximaciones para retomar el dialogo con Gran Bretana' in La Prensa, August 1989.

conflict, however, will not have the luxury to so freely determine national lines of policy. In the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and Africa, the ambitions of local powers, the transnational links between opposition groups, and the interdependency of regional relations constrain national choices. State leaders will be all too aware of the ease with which apparently ritual government decisions on development, economic policy, the environment, external relations can have explosive consequences. In actual areas of conflict, the momentum of domestic and regional actors will not easily be slowed down by outside forces. The maintenance of control in capital cities in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Horn of Africa, Angola and numerous other areas will not mean that the countrysides will be free from regular and complex outbursts of violent conflict.

All this means that the relevance of superpower involvement to regional conflict resolution is bound to vary tremendously. In key strategic areas (like the Middle East), it is clear that both superpowers need to be involved, even if asymmetrically, to ensure that the right parties take part and that no one can spoil a possible peace. The important initiatives must, however, still be locally inspired as well as accepted, and neither superpower can impose a peace. In less strategic areas (Horn of Africa) both superpowers may well decide to loosen their links with the major state combatants. In itself this is not likely to reduce the intensity of conflict though it might affect the level of armaments used and would imply that the international saliency of the conflict would also be lower. In areas contiguous to the superpowers, it has been shown that superpower withdrawals, or decline in aid can help facilitate a peace process but not bring solutions. In Afghanistan, conflict has remained high and the manoeuvres of regional actors (Saudi Arabia, Iran) has complicated the prospects of resolution and made it difficult in the future, because of

the new linkages created, for the superpowers positively to affect change. When regional politics intensify in the absence of superpower constraint, the resultant new complexities become daunting for prospective external manipulators of local problems. In Central America, the superpowers have stepped back, and the prospects for a regionally initiated solution have thus marginally improved. However, other issues (economic instability, drugs) will continue to engage the concern of the US, just as conflicts between Islamic groups in Afghanistan challenge Soviet security interests. Superpowers will still be concerned by trouble in neighbouring areas, but may not have the instruments to create tranquillity. Pressure by the Soviet Union on a key ally (Vietnam) to withdraw from Cambodia helped to engage a peace process in South-east Asia, but the interests of a local power (China) and the domestic taste for conflict, will mean that solutions to conflict in Indochina will not be forthcoming. It is likely also that the international community will again tolerate a high level of conflict in Cambodia as long as its international aspects are diminished. As the civil war aspect of the conflict reasserts itself, the superpowers will become irrelevant.

There are thus some areas where superpower withdrawals can help a peace process, but not create peace, just as there are others where their involvement remains important to forcing a peace process which continues to be elusive. Where the superpowers are unable or fear to tread, the Europeans will be no more willing or able to saunter in positively to affect change. The experience of imperialism and decolonisation has conditioned the Europeans against optimism about their capacity to manage dissent in outlying regions. In such circumstances, grabbing international attention will be the main challenge to beleaguered peoples in the developing world. Sadly, there are regions where conflict will persist, and

even increase in intensity, without causing any international alarm. Iraq was successful in internationalising concern about its war with Iran which the international community had lived with for some time and this helped to bring about a ceasefire. But this may be the exception that proves the rule that few combatants are able to so concentrate the minds of others on their conflicts. Equally depressing is that there are regions where particular conflicts may be solved because of outside power agility or indifference, but new issues and problems of local origin will ensure instability.


The ends of wars do not always, as European history records, create the conditions for peace. The international relations of the European continent today revolve around the effort, delayed for half a century, of creating continental peace with the overt consent of the peoples involved, a process which is bound to be volatile. Maintaining a European order, without refrigerating the post-war order, will be a huge task. In the developing world, the challenge of preserving order amid change and change amid order is all the more great.

### Conclusion

The complexity of internal and international security in the developing world is growing. Analysts will not find in diplomatic cables and political demarches, in military deployments and armed interventions all the stuffings of regional security problems. Those wishing to analyze conflict and stability in the developing world will have to marry their knowledge of area studies with their appreciation of international relations, their perceptions of public policy problems with strategic assessment, their sensitivity to domestic political culture with an awareness of transnational environmental, economic and ethnic forces which can effect change. In approaching the security of a particular geographical region, it will be all the more necessary to take into account the linkages

between the various contributors to stability and instability discussed above. The particular dynamics of each region is different as is the hierarchy of issues which affect stability. But it is in addressing that dynamic and assessing that hierarchy that an analyst can make a contribution to understanding regional security.

To be of interest to policy makers, such analysis must also distinguish between problems which can be solved only by the hands of local forces, and those which have the sources of solution at least partly outside the region concerned. Nation building tasks, ethnic questions, ideologies which mobilize domestic forces, economic policies, resource management, military plans and expenditure, these may all appear issues initially in the hands of local policy makers, but they can all be affected by external forces. The human tragedy for Third World states is that these problems are cumulative and interrelated. Thus, the cold accountancy of power and security which until recently was a satisfactory method of analyzing security relations in the European continent, is largely irrelevant in the majority of Third World cases. As history in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe accelerates, as their problems appear more daily analogous to those normally associated to those in the developing world outside, it is to be hoped that strategists who turn their attention to these areas, will begin asking the right questions.



**SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP?**

**by John Sewell**

Paper presented to the Heads of Institutes Meeting

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## I. Introduction

Since 1945, security and stability in the developing world have been strongly influenced by the interplay of factors that are essentially internal (although many have their origins in, or were exacerbated by, the colonial period), and an international environment shaped by the superpower conflict. The interrelationship between internal and external factors has differed in various areas of the Third World and over time, and outcomes have been extraordinarily diverse.

There can be little argument about the tragic costs of insecurity and conflict in the developing world. Almost all of the wars and conflicts that have taken place since 1945 have occurred in the Third World--millions of people have died as a result. The economic costs of these wars have been immense, and military expenditures in the developing countries have been growing at a much more rapid rate than in the industrialized world (which, of course, was already well armed). The opportunity costs of foregone development are unquantifiable but undoubtedly huge.

Despite the obvious importance of both economic and social development and security in the Third World, and the fact that the three are obviously linked, the nature of the relationship is far from clear. Moreover, there is a strong asymmetry in research and analysis on the relationship. A great deal of work has been done on the impact of security policies (usually defined as military expenditures) on development; very little analysis is available on the impact of development models on the security of developing countries or their peoples, or about how various development strategies might improve security in the Third World. The literature of development economics is largely silent on the impact of military spending on development, and on the relationship of economic and social development to security.

This paper is designed to set the stage for further discussion of these important issues. Part I lays out the issues and provides a few definitions; Part II summarizes the development and security "record" since 1945; Part III analyzes the impact of security policies on development; while Part IV takes on the task in reverse--the impact of development policies on security. Part V raises suggests that some of the fundamental elements of the policy environment are changing, and raises the implication of those changes for security and development in the 1990s. Finally, Part VI outlines some general conclusions and, to stimulate discussion, suggests alternative scenarios for the decade ahead.

Some definitions are needed to clarify issues. Development is used here to refer to the process of economic growth (particularly growth per capita) with relatively equitable distribution, and improved human well-being as indicated by such measures as literacy, life expectancy, and infant mortality. There are, of course, numerous other aspects of "development," more difficult to measure but nonetheless critical--for example, human rights, political participation and democracy.

The traditional definition of security concerns the ability of the state to protect its territorial integrity and to provide for the well-being of its people. The emphasis has been upon the military aspects of security, including, particularly, defense of borders, use of military force when necessary, and the maintenance of internal stability. Writing on international security has been very much dominated by Western analysts attempting to come to grips with security issues in the nuclear era. In recent years, some analysts have broadened the definition to encompass issues of economic security and, more recently, environmental security. [See two excellent articles, "Redefining Security," by Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989; and "Redefining Security," Richard H. Ullman, International Security, Summer 1983].

For most developing countries, however, concerns about internal security, usually defined as internal stability, are at least as important as concerns about external threats. The majority of developing-country leaders are preoccupied with the need to promote economic growth, to satisfy at least the most basic needs of rapidly growing populations, to increase the national cohesion of diverse groups living within borders defined by colonial powers, and to deal with an international economic environment that seems either unsympathetic or actively hostile. Underpinning all of those motivations is the desire of most regimes to ensure that they continue to stay in power.

## II. The Development and Security Record

### A. Development

From 1950 to 1980, the developing countries compiled a spectacular record of economic growth. In fact, in the post-war period, the developing countries as a group grew at a faster rate than the developed countries did at any time during their own industrial revolution. The share of developing countries in real gross world product grew from 15 percent in 1960 to 22 percent in 1985.

As a result, many of these countries are now important participants in the expanding global trading system. In 1965, they accounted for only 7 percent of exports of manufacturers; by 1985, their share of global manufactured exports had risen over sixteen percent. The composition of their exports also changed with traditional labor intensive products

diminishing in importance to exports of machinery, chemicals, and transport equipment. These trends also were manifest in the military and security field as an increasing number of developing countries became arms producers and exporters, including, in some cases, of quite sophisticated weapons.

This remarkable economic progress in the developing world was unevenly shared. The result has been a growing differentiation among and between countries. The performance of the six Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)--Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and Taiwan--was particularly impressive, but a number of other middle-income countries also industrialized at substantial rates. Some of these have emerged as important regional powers, most notably India in the South Asian region.

In contrast, the low-income countries--concentrated in South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa--have grown much more slowly and remain heavily dependent on exports of primary commodities and on foreign aid for financing. As a result, the very concept of the developing world is difficult to sustain, especially as the differences among developing countries are likely to grow in the period ahead under any reasonable assumptions of economic progress.

It is worth noting that the development performance of the developing world's long-standing democracies is substantial and steady compared to authoritarian regimes. Equally important, their record on equity is much better. [See "Democracy and Development, by Atul Kohli, a chapter in Development Strategies Reconsidered, Transaction Books, published for the Overseas Development Council, 1986].

Important achievements also were made in improving human well-being, despite the persistence to this day of unacceptable levels of absolute poverty. Life expectancy rose, and infant mortality rates fell in most developing countries. People in developing countries in 1985 could expect to live an average of about 60 years, compared to just over 50 years in 1965. Literacy has spread dramatically, and primary education became a reality for most children in the developing world.

## B. Security

Since 1945, the superpower rivals have managed to keep an uneasy peace in the developed world, but the Third World has been racked by military conflict. This dismal record can be attributed in part to the extension of superpower rivalry to the developing world, but also to factors indigenous to the Third World. Many newly independent states in the developing world inherited boundaries imposed by colonial powers which contained diverse ethnic and political groups. In Africa especially, new governments were weak and management skills scarce. The result was a rapid rise in both internal and external conflicts.

The interplay between external and indigenous factors affecting security is complex. The introduction of superpower rivalries in areas such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East has led to increased insecurity and conflict, and certainly exacerbated existing tensions and conflicts and fueled local arms races. On the other hand, the trend towards militarization that was in evidence in Latin America up until the 1980s can be traced predominantly to indigenous factors, including the choice of growth-oriented development strategies designed to increase national power and prestige that necessitated the suppression of demand from labor and other groups. The continuing tensions and periodic conflicts between India and Pakistan have their origins in ethnic and religious differences, and territorial disputes.

The record of internal conflict and instability also is not very encouraging. There were at least 280 coups or revolts in the developing world in the four decades after 1945. In addition, there has been a strong trend toward a growing military influence on societies and governments throughout the Third World. The 1989 edition of Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures judges that over half the developing countries covered in the report are under what she defines as military control; the largest number in a decade.

The economic and social costs of conflict have been very high. As indicated earlier, Sivard estimates war- and war-related deaths since 1945 to be nearly 22 million, most of which occurred in developing-country conflicts. (Other estimates are even higher.) She cites one estimate of property losses as high as \$500 billion. A contemporary example illustrates the costs. The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) estimates that South Africa's efforts to destabilize neighboring countries have cost them more than \$10 billion in war damage, lost economic opportunities, and additional defense expenditures since 1981. (More recent estimates put the costs much higher.)

As a result of growing external and internal conflicts, military budgets grew exponentially. According to Sivard, developing-country military expenditures grew from \$28 billion (1986 dollars) in 1960 to \$144 billion in 1987, more than doubling as a percentage of global military expenditures. The increase in arms imports by Third World countries is even more dramatic. By 1987, developing countries purchased more than three-quarters of all arms transferred throughout the world. (It is worth noting that the majority of arms are produced and purchased domestically.)

These trends slowed only after the debt crisis hit in the 1980s. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988, the rate of increase in global expenditures is slowing because of the marked decrease in developing-country military expenditures in the last few years. Growth rates have turned negative in the heavily indebted regions of Latin

America and Africa, and among members of OPEC, probably as a result of the debt crisis and the drop in the price of oil.

The sophistication of arms available to LDC governments has grown, and a number of LDCs now manufacture and export weapons, including, in some cases, the most sophisticated varieties. In earlier decades, weapons sold to developing countries tended to be the cast-offs of industrial-country military establishments. More recently, however, developing countries have been purchasing increasingly sophisticated weapons. A growing number have access to nuclear weapons technology, and a larger number possess or have the capability to produce chemical weapons. In addition, a small but growing number of developing countries now manufacture and export weapons, mainly to other developing countries. [See Arms Production in the Third World, edited by Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Taylor & Francis publishers for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1986]. For instance, an important component of Brazil's exports is military equipment, including planes, guided missiles, tanks and small arms. In its latest publication, ACDA points out that at least 16 developing countries have acquired or are now acquiring their own ballistic missiles.

### III. The Impact of Security Policies on Development

As indicated earlier, the preponderance of research on the relationship of security and development has concentrated on the impact of military expenditures, including arms transfers from industrial countries, on economic and social development.

There are two schools of thought. The first maintains that military expenditures can have a positive (or at least a non-detrimental) impact on economic growth and development. Military expenditures stimulate the economy and increase industrial output, providing employment, increasing the demand for a wide variety of goods and services and manufactured goods, and promote technological process with beneficial spin-off impacts for the civilian economy. In addition, the military acts as a stabilizing force in countries with weak central governments, and creates a cadre of technologically trained manpower. Finally, if military budgets are financed through foreign aid, then scarce domestic resources are freed up for needed expenditures in the civilian sector.

The opposing view holds that resources invested in military expenditures detract from economic growth and development and distort the national economy. In this view, the military sector competes with the civil sector for financial and human resources, as well as skilled labor and access to advanced technology. Investment in the civilian economy has a greater effect on economic growth and development. In addition, arms transfers and military aid skew national priorities and encourage groups within Third World countries that favor higher military

expenditures. Military expenditures, therefore, tend to encourage the trend toward militarization in developing societies.

The arguments between these two schools have raged for over two decades but recent analytical work has demonstrated what common sense told most observers. On balance, resources applied to economic and social development have a more beneficial impact on economic growth and human well-being than their use for military purposes.

Two major analyses of the impact of military expenditures have been published this decade--Nicole Ball's Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton University Press, 1988), and Saadet Deger's Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). Each is based on exhaustive analysis of available data (and in Deger's case an economic analysis of a 50-country sample). Both authors come to essentially the same conclusion: although generalizations are difficult and the data uncertain, military expenditures are on balance detrimental both to economic growth and development more broadly defined. (The major studies on both sides of this question are summarized in Appendix 3 of Security and Economy in the Third World.)

Ball points out that while there are potential positive effects from military expenditures, the negative effects far outweigh them (p.389). Similarly, Deger concludes that

"... the effects of an increased military burden are growth-depressing...In terms of savings, investment and techniques (or spin-off), military expenditure has relatively more harmful effects on the growth rate of the economy and thus on the structure of development that LDCs can construct." (p.245).

Several amplifications, however, are important, particularly for the following section. First, the above conclusions are not true of all countries over all periods. As Michael Brzoska points out, arms production in developing countries can have some beneficial effects. [See "The Impact of Arms Production in the Third World," Armed Forces and Society, Summer, 1989, pp. 507-530]. And for countries that have to export to repay their debts, military production will be particularly important. Second, the relationship of security expenditures to the militarization of society is not clear; some militarized governments have kept security expenditures relatively low on a per capita basis (Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, for instance), while democracies such as India have a much higher level. Finally, there is no guarantee at all that the resources saved by lowering military expenditures will be used in turn for productive investment or programs that improve human well-being. In fact, the opposite is just as likely to be true.

#### IV. The Impact of Development Policies on Security

The relationship between development strategies and security is more complex. The central problem is that economic and social development can both increase and decrease security, and that there are many country cases that illustrate both possibilities.

For analytical clarity, it is very important to distinguish between the impact of development on external and internal security. Just as it is true that paranoids have real enemies, so, too, states have real reasons to be concerned about threats to their external security. Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, Ethiopia and Somalia do indeed pose threats to each other, and rational governments take steps to protect their national identity and sovereignty.

Those inter-state tensions will persist in the future, and there is every prospect that new disputes will arise. As Saadet Deger points out:

"Some of the disputes are imbedded in the deep historical consciousness of the people concerned; others are the product of arbitrary colonial divisions of geographical areas, without a proper awareness of tribal, racial or national needs; some have been fueled by genuine economic and occasionally hegemonic motives of acquiring more land or control over access routes; still others have been caused by dictatorial or fanatical leaders of strong countries."  
(p.21)

If development is defined in terms of growth and industrialization, then development may enhance the ability of a country to protect itself against external threats. Growth provides the resources to pay for military expenditures, and industrialization enhances the country's ability to produce and service modern weapons. Growth also can provide resources to distribute to groups that are actual or potential rival claimants to power. A government with the allegiance of the majority of its citizens (because growth and development are providing visible evidence of progress), probably is in a better position to mobilize the population against external threats. (There is, of course, the opposite case where governments use the prospects of external threats to divert attention from their own development failures).

It is the relationship of development to internal security that poses the most difficult analytic problems because of the close link between security and stability. Americans often are left uncomfortable with the prospect of radical political change because of their own unique political heritage (Liberal America and the Third World by Robert Packenham and Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World by Howard J. Wiarda proved the best analyses of this viewpoint), and because of a fear that radical change would create circumstances beneficial in one way or another to the Soviet Union. It

has been this fear, plus the obvious Soviet interest in expanding its influence in the Third World, that added the Cold War to the mix of indigenous factors in the internal security equation.

Linking internal security and stability, however, gives rise to a major problem. Much of the popular discussion of these issues has assumed that economic and social development will lead to greater stability, and therefore security. Yet the reality is that development itself (particularly rapid economic growth) is inherently destabilizing. It requires change in established patterns of behavior, production, and relations between people, institutions and governments. In addition, growth inevitably produces inequities as some groups or regions progress more rapidly than others. (This argument was best laid out by Mancur Olsen in a pioneering article entitled "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, December, 1963.) Instability as a result of rapid growth and development is not necessarily bad, particularly if the result is improved levels of economic growth and well-being for the many men and women who continue to live in conditions of abject poverty. But decision makers and analysts have to face the paradox that economic growth and social progress can lead to considerable "insecurity" while, on the other hand, suppressing growth and social improvement may also lead to the same outcome for different reasons.

A further complication arises because some degree of stability is necessary for both economic and social development. Without stability, large-scale investors or small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs will not save or invest in ways that add to future production. For the reasons indicated earlier, however, civil unrest is inevitable in the development process, and governments will feel compelled to keep it within some sort of limits. (My colleague, John Lewis, refers to this task as the need to establish "bounded turbulence"). Thus some expenditures on external security or internal stability are probably justified.

There is, however, a very thin and often indistinguishable line between a legitimate concern with security and stability, and the tendency of authoritarian governments in the developing countries to equate security with their continuation in power. (In her recent book, Nicole Ball suggests that the phrase "internal security" be replaced by "regime security.")

Finally, there is the question of how much is "enough". At some point, there will be diminishing returns to additional investments in military, police, and other security programs. As there are multiple roads to security, resources would then be better applied to other types of programs, including those that give promise of supporting more equitable economic growth and social progress. Given the current very high levels of military expenditures in many parts of the developing world, it is likely that point has long since been reached.

The relationship, therefore, between choices of development strategies and internal security is particularly complex. Three seemingly disparate country cases illustrate the point:

Iran in the 1970s was a case of considerable progress in terms of growth and development traditionally defined. By the middle of that decade, per capita income had reached \$2000, nearly 50 percent of the population lived in urban areas, education had spread, and land had been more widely distributed. The conventional wisdom of the time held that Iran was well on its way to becoming a modern power in economic and military terms. Yet, in a few short years, the "modernizing" regime of the Shah collapsed and was replaced by a fundamentalist religious regime of the most uncompromising variety. [See The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic by Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, Columbia University Press, 1984, which is a fascinating study of why developments in Iran do not fit the political development theories of Western analysts].

Sri Lanka was the country which seemingly "did everything right." Its record of performance on meeting basic human needs despite very low levels of income is universally cited as a major development achievement. Per capita income in 1980 was only \$200, but 85 percent of Sri Lankans were literate and life expectancy reached 66 years. In the 1970s a new government adopted liberal market-oriented reforms to stimulate growth. But in recent years the country has been tragically riven by ethnic violence with a pattern familiar to many countries, including Northern Ireland.

Mexico enjoyed three decades of uninterrupted high levels of economic growth from 1946 to the mid-1970s. Levels of human well-being also improved, but distribution of income and opportunity was very inequitable. In the 1980s, economic conditions turned adverse: real wages dropped 40 percent, no new net jobs have been created, and social programs have been cut back. Not surprisingly, there has been a growing concern, particularly in the United States, about instability in Mexico. Yet not only has there been very little political unrest, yet alone violence, but there has been a remarkable amount of political and economic opening throughout the Mexican system.

Can anything be said about the development/security relationship when the outcomes, even among a sample of three, are so diverse? What follows are some generalizations put forth for discussion.

First, the combination of economic growth and equitable access to health, education, and employment, all other things being equal, will lead over time to a more stable society. But the combination is rare, and in any event the timetable for progress is long. In the intervening period, internal stability is either likely to deteriorate or repression increase.

Second, sustained, long-term economic growth and spreading literacy is likely over the long run to generate demands for increased political participation. South Korea's record of growth and industrialization has been paralleled by high levels of education and health and relatively equitable distribution of income. Yet the lack of political participation and restrictions on human liberties continue to cause political unrest.

Third, equity within societies is important to promoting long-term stability; in the near term, however, security and stability may be more directly affected by the direction of economic (and probably social) improvement. If the rising economic tide is lifting all boats, unrest may not become critical even if some parts of the population are advancing at a more rapid rate than others.

Fourth, other factors, such as religion, ethnicity, and regionalism, are at least as important to stability as the extent and pace of economic and social progress. These factors were assumed by many political theorists to diminish in importance under the impact of modernization. But in actuality, they remain very potent forces. The current tragic conflict in Sri Lanka illustrates the point. In addition, ethnic or regional tensions may be exacerbated during periods of rapid social and economic change when the aggrieved group feels that it is not getting a fair share of the fruits of progress.

Fifth, the congruence of patterns of development with the culture and values of the particular society is very important. The Shah's grandiose development plans, including ostentatious consumption and heavy foreign (particularly American) influence, ended up alienating a large number of Iranians because the development model did not conform to the values of important segments of Iranian society. On the other hand, Mexico's remarkable stability in this decade, despite numerous and harsh economic shocks, may be due in part to its strong political culture based on a revolutionary model dating from the early part of this century.

#### V. Is the Policy Environment for Security and Development Changing?

The coming decade may be fundamentally different from any other in the post World War II period. Trends in the international system, and within both developed and developing countries, may be changing the policy environment in which problems of development and of security will have to be addressed. In the decade ahead, the old agenda of long-standing development problems will be overlain and will interact with a new agenda of global issues crucial to both North and South.

## The Old Agenda

The Third World is still underdeveloped despite marked progress and the internal and external conditions that have led to insecurity over the last four decades persist and may be worsening. There are more poor people than ever before, and they have grown poorer; inequities within countries have not changed; as economic progress has slowed, regional and ethnic tensions have increased. Finally environmental degradation will worsen the problems of most developing countries. As a result, issues of economic security are at least as important for many countries as military threats.

In most parts of the developing world, the 1980s have been a lost decade for development. High interest rates, falling commodity prices, heavy debt burdens, negative net transfers, volatile exchange rates, and restricted markets in the industrial countries, plagued a faltering international economy. World recession and then crippling debt-service payments caused growth among Latin American countries to slow to an annual average rate of 1.9 percent between 1980 and 1987 (compared with an average of over 6 percent in earlier decades). Among the most heavily indebted countries average income was \$1,560 in 1980 and only \$1,400 by 1988, a drop of 10 percent. Social progress also has been halted, according to UNICEF, with infant mortality improvements slowing markedly. In addition, the drastic reductions in public spending on social expenditures will aggravate the longer-term outlook for poverty alleviation.

As a result, the problem of global poverty looms as large as ever. Despite measurable progress, the stark reality is that the poor are still very poor, and because of population growth, there now are more of them. Roughly one in five of this planet's five billion men, women and children lives in absolute poverty, struggling with malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, infant mortality, and short life expectancy.

Prospects for the future are not bright in the absence of radically different policies. In its most recent World Development Report, the World Bank projects that it will take major changes in current policies (including difficult measures to reduce imbalances among the developed countries) if growth rates in the developing countries are to return to earlier levels. An analysis by my colleague Stuart Tucker points out that most projections of near-term growth in developing countries imply that they will still be poorer in 1992 than they were in 1980, and that it will be well into the next century before most developing countries make up for lost time by regaining the levels of per capita growth that they would have achieved if the 1965-1980 growth trends had not been derailed by debt and recession. [See "The Legacy of Debt: A Lost Decade of Development, Overseas Development Council, Policy Focus No. 3, 1989].

In addition, there are a number of new and intensified pressures on the developing countries, arising most notably from the need to meet growing demands for new jobs and to deal with the exploding urbanization:

\* Since 1950, cities in the developing world have been growing approximately three times faster than those in the industrial world. By the turn of the century, half the world's population will be urban, and 18 of the 21 largest cities will be located in the developing world. Third World cities are growing very fast, but squatter settlements, shanty towns, and low-income neighborhoods in cities are growing about twice as fast. The problems of providing livelihoods and services for these multiplying urban populations are immense. Yet if they are not, additional yeast is added to already unstable urban areas which have traditionally been one of the main loci for political and economic unrest.

\* Unemployment and underemployment in developing countries already average 40 to 50 percent. Between 1985 and 2010, all of the world's population increases in the important 20 to 40 years age group will take place in the developing world. At least 600 million new jobs--more than the current total number of jobs in all the industrial market economies--will have to be created just to accommodate the new entrants into the labor force who are already alive today.

These pressures are exacerbated by continued population growth. Population growth rates are slowing (except in sub-Saharan Africa) but at least an additional 3 to 5 billion people on top of the current 5 billion already alive will inhabit the earth by 2020. The problems of managing these much larger populations will strain even further the capacities and resources of many developing countries.

#### The New Agenda

To make matters more complex, the old agenda of development challenges is overlain by a new agenda of global challenges.

The first and perhaps most important new element in the international policy environment is the far-reaching developments now under way in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Outcomes are, of course, unpredictable, but the course of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe obviously will have a heavy influence on superpower relationships in the developing countries and on development itself. A return to the policies of the past in the Soviet Union could lead to a resurgence of superpower competition in the Third World. On the other hand, continuing economic and political liberalization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could give rise to new openings for development brought about by U.S.-Soviet cooperation in regional dispute settlement in the Third World, massive reduction in military expenditures (allowing the possibility of some increase in resources for development), and perhaps

even joint address of pressing global problems [See Economic Reconstruction in Conflictive Regions, Transaction Books for the Overseas Development Council's U.S.-Third World policy perspectives series, 1990]. It may well, however, also lead to a new and different form of 'competition'--this time between the needs of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the developing countries for resources and policy attention, particularly from the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. [See Pulling Together: The International Monetary Fund in a Multipolar World, Transaction Books for the Overseas Development Council, 1989].

Second, just as the Third World is no longer an undifferentiated monolith, so, too, the industrial countries of the "North" are also no longer a unified bloc. Three power centers have emerged--the United States, Japan, and a unified Europe. There are growing differences among the three, particularly in economic policies, and each is groping for a new role in the world. Japan has not yet decided what kind of leadership role it wants to play; the United States cannot yet adjust to being a very powerful nation among many powerful nations; and Europe seems preoccupied with its own internal integration. The political and economic interests of the three in the Third World and in development are not necessarily the same, and at least in the economic sphere, may be in conflict. The waning of East-West tensions and the growing strengths of some regional powers also will lessen the direct influence of the superpowers, and indeed all outside actors in the developing world. (Witness the willingness of the traditional powers to defer to India to deal with internal security problems in the Maldives and Sri Lanka.)

Third, a set of new "threats" to security now demand serious attention, most notably the environmental deterioration and the spread of drugs. Threats to the global environment are real. Massive and potentially irreversible environmental destruction threatens to consume the earth's resource base as logging, agricultural expansion and urban growth destroy forests. Deforestation undermines development by destroying watersheds, reducing the availability of fuel and materials; destroying species, and affecting global climate. At the same time, industrial and other activities in the developed world appear to be raising the temperature of the earth's atmosphere, posing a threat of unknown dimensions to virtually everything on which mankind depends.

The rising tide of illegal drugs is not only a social problem but represents a new security threat with North-South dimensions. The main consumers are in the rich industrialized countries; the main producers in countries that are poor and predominantly agricultural. Producer and consumer countries blame each other for the problem and the debate over the locus of responsibility is increasingly acrimonious. Political leaders in some developing countries view anti-drug crusades as imposing significant economic costs and major political challenges, and increasingly powerful drug lords are causing direct security problems within and between countries.

The "Twin Revolutions"--economic liberalization and democratization--will have a considerable impact on both security and development in the Third World. In Latin America, 26 of 33 countries are now under democratic rule or in transition to democracy; in Asia, South Korea, China, the Philippines, and Thailand people are struggling to promote democratic values; and Nigeria, which contains one-quarter of Africa's people, is in the midst of transition to democratic government. In Latin America and Africa the recognition that economic liberalization and privatization are part of the answer to their development dilemmas is widespread. Michael Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF, calls this shift in thinking about development strategies the "Silent Revolution."

These trends are essentially hopeful but they may, however, make the development/security equation even more complex as responsive governments try to satisfy both their electorates and the International Monetary Fund. In addition, political and economic liberalization are threatened by the harsh international economic environment. If sufficient capital is not forthcoming from domestic or international sources, increasingly impoverished populations will grow increasingly weary of years of "belt-tightening", eroding the capacity and legitimacy of governments, particularly those that are increasingly responsive to their electorates. [See Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Transaction Books, published for the Overseas Development Council, 1989].

Finally, revolutionary developments in science and technology, particularly in information processing, industrial raw materials, high-speed global communications, and biotechnology, may be contributing to fundamental shifts between industrial and developing countries. This new "Third Industrial Revolution" threatens to increase the gap between industrial and developing countries as many countries will be hard pressed to compete in industries that require massive amounts of capital and technological skills. Unless these developments are understood and anticipated by policymakers, prospects for developing countries that do not already have a significant industrial and technological base will worsen. [See Growth, Exports, & Jobs in a Changing World Economy, Agenda 1988, Transaction Books, published for the Overseas Development Council, 1988].

## VI. Conclusions

One thing is clear: neither problems of security nor development are likely to be ameliorated in the near term. The causes of instability and insecurity, as well as the roots of interstate tensions in the developing world, will remain as potent forces. The developing world, therefore, is not likely to be a "safer" place in the 1990s. If this situation is to change, policymakers and researchers will have to give a great deal more attention to the old and new agendas of security and development

problems. The implications of this conclusion form the last section of this paper.

The outcomes of the interplay between the two agendas are difficult to predict and there are many possibilities. For the sake of discussion, however, two scenarios, purposely starkly drawn, can be set forth.

In the first scenario, the existing superpowers become increasingly preoccupied with their own problems. The East is struggling with economic reform and political liberalization, and the three new power centers in the West are preoccupied with redefining their respective roles and in creating new relationships with the East. As a result, both East and West lose interest in most parts of the developing world, recognizing that it is of little security significance and that past efforts to influence events have wasted vast resources. In the developing world, a few countries do well, notably the NICs (and others that can take advantage of the new industrial technologies), as well as the "giants"--India and China. The majority of the Third World, however, continues to deteriorate, plagued by debt, diminishing resource transfers and closing markets in the industrialized countries. In addition, high population growth rates and growing environmental stress lead to a general deterioration in welfare. Inter- and intra-state conflicts proliferate adding to the problems of the developing countries but they are largely ignored by the major powers. The great divide between the industrial world and the majority of the developing world grows wider.


There is, however, a more benign scenario because some aspects of the current situation are encouraging. The superpower relationship evolves into decreased competition and meddling in developing-country conflicts. This in turn allows increased attention to addressing and resolving regional conflicts and to slowing the global spread of weapons of mass destruction. The "new agenda" issues are seen as important for both North and South, leading to new initiatives to sustain the environment, renew global economic growth, slow population growth, and address problems of narcotics trafficking and terrorism. New donors, such as Japan, provide an increasing amount of resources for development in the South, and the new salience of the global agenda issues renews political support for development in the other industrial countries, particularly the United States. Violence and conflict, of course, continue, but the superpowers and emerging regional powers, working increasingly through international institutions, actively seek to resolve or contain conflicts.

In this more optimistic scenario, there is a potential for a creative role for outsiders linking security and development policies, a separate and complex issue beyond the scope of this paper. The World Bank will shortly publish a paper (Security for Development in a Post-Bipolar World, by John Stremmlau) outlining some of these possibilities, including providing financial and political incentives for national reconciliation for countries torn by civil strife, assisting programs aimed at reinforcing regional peace and security agreements, providing rewards and

penalties for any major change in the level of a borrowers military expenditures, and helping developing countries meet the costs of participating in new regimes to meet new security threats. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the Overseas Development Council is undertaking a series of case studies of development in post-conflict situations and also will publish a series of papers on Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the development aid field.

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The development challenge remains the great unfinished agenda for the next decades, demanding priority for its own intrinsic importance. Much is yet to be learned about the relationship of development patterns to internal security and stability. But only the most Panglossian observer could promise that the development progress so urgently needed by the world's poor majority will automatically lead to a more secure world except over the very long run. The dilemma lies in the fact that the absence of equitable economic and social development is likely to mean that the road to insecurity and instability will be even shorter and more direct.



THIRD WORLD REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

- THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980s

by Helmut Hubel

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I. The Third World - the Superpowers's "Principal Battleground"?

Since the late seventies the dominating view in the West has been that the centre of U.S.-Soviet competition has shifted to the Third World. President Reagan's first CIA Director formulated this thesis well: "(The Third World) will be the principal U.S.-Soviet battleground for many years to come."<sup>1</sup> Ten years later, in 1988/89, major events have occurred which have questioned the rationale of this thesis: The Soviet Union has withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan; the Soviet allies Cuba and Vietnam are going to pull back their forces from Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia respectively; the Iran-Iraq war has come to a halt without having involved the superpowers in mutual hostilities; in the Arab-Israeli conflict the U.S. and Soviet Union are now engaged in bilateral talks and a dialogue with all the parties involved. The East-West dimension of Third World conflicts has also decreased in other contentious regions, such as Central America. As the 1980s come to an end, there is a world-wide trend towards great power restraint, dialogue, and search for peaceful solutions of regional conflicts. However, in several cases the superpowers' military aid to warring factions con-

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<sup>1</sup>. William C. Casey, "Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust", in: Wall Street Journal, 22 April 1983, p. 28. See also his "What We Face. Remarks at Westminster College", Fulton, Missouri, October 29, 1983, Central Intelligence Agency, Public Affairs. For a scientific explanation of this argument, see Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Machtprobe. Die USA und die Sowjetunion in den achtziger Jahren (Test of Strength. The United States and the Soviet Union in the Eighties), Munich: Beck 1989.

tinues, indicating continuing disagreement and rivalry. This paper argues that U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Third World has lost its former centrality and ideological zeal. However, it expects some rivalry to continue, if only in regions of major strategic significance.

In assessing the change and drawing conclusions from the experience of this decade, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: What has changed in the superpowers' attitudes and behaviour and why did it occur? What do these events mean, presently and in the coming years? Finally, what are the consequences for the Third World: How do key regional actors perceive the changing role of the superpowers and what might be the impact on their behaviour?

The following deliberations concentrate on Third World regional conflicts from the viewpoint of the two major powers. This paper does not deal with the problem of instability and crisis in the developing world as "objective processes".<sup>2</sup> Instead, it investigates those cases which have attracted immediate responses from the superpowers.

Although U.S.-Soviet competition is essentially global in character, the experience of the last two decades shows that there is only a limited number of issues where Washington and

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<sup>2</sup>. For a theoretical treatment of the subject see Sharam Chubin, "The Super-Powers, Regional Conflicts and World Order", in: IISS, Adelphi Papers 237, The Changing Strategic Landscape, Part III, Spring 1989, S. 74-93.

Moscow have opposed each other directly and where this competition has significantly influenced their bilateral relationship. Afghanistan, Angola/Namibia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cambodia, Ethiopia, the Gulf, and Nicaragua are not at all representative of the vast number of current Third World conflicts. What has brought them into the immediate sphere of superpower contest since the second half of the 1970s was the perception in the United States that Soviet involvement in these conflicts was undermining the global balance of power. The Gorbachev leadership has responded to these concerns. Struggling with the Soviet Union's internal crisis, Gorbachev has decided to liberate his country from these entanglements, particularly Afghanistan, by simultaneously improving relations with the United States and China. In a way, he repeated the Kissinger/Nixon approach of the early 1970s, which facilitated the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam by a simultaneous rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing.

## II. The Superpowers and their Changing Relationship

At the end of this decade, it has become apparent that the Soviet Union has chosen a policy that no longer directly challenges U.S. interests and supremacy in several Third World regions. Instead, by propagating a "balance of interests", it seeks to safeguard basic Soviet interests by political means. This decision is the consequence of a sober analysis, undertaken by Soviet experts since the early 1980s and accepted by the new leadership, that Soviet engagements in the 1970s have not in-

creased the strength of the "socialist world system" but have led to a no longer sustainable drain of economic resources and to intolerable international isolation.

The United States, having engaged in a test of strength with its major opponent in Europe and Southwest Asia, regards the INF treaty and the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan as major achievements of the Reagan era. The more "gentle" and cautious approach of the Bush Administration indicates the change of threat perceptions. It responds also to the increased difficulties in pursuing bold policy goals, as the role of Congress has become even stronger and the financial limitations more obvious. With the "Soviet threat" fading, "global issues" such as Third World indebtedness,<sup>3</sup> the issue of drug trade,<sup>4</sup> and environmental problems<sup>5</sup> regain attention -- complex problems much more difficult to cope with.

#### 1. The Soviet Union

There is evident change in Soviet policy towards the Third World, although Western experts are still debating its scope. Those who stress the basic continuity of Soviet policy declare

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<sup>3</sup>. See, e.g., the recent Non-Aligned Summit meeting in Belgrade (September 1989), focussing on economic issues instead of old ideological battles.

<sup>4</sup>. See the Colombian Cocaine war and President Bush's "declaration of war" against drugs in late Summer 1989.

<sup>5</sup>. See Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security", in: Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989, pp. 162-177.

Moscow's military retreat from Afghanistan to be an exception.<sup>6</sup> Others, alluding to the turmoil inside the Soviet Union and the uncertain future of Gorbachev, are questioning the durability of change and advise the West to be prepared for future rivalry.<sup>7</sup> There are also experts who detect different modes of Soviet behaviour towards various Third World regions and warn against conclusions which are too general.<sup>8</sup>

This observation is particularly useful because it helps to understand the present state of flux in Soviet attitudes. Whereas Moscow's diplomacy is dealing with these issues in a markedly improved manner, the Politbureau has, at least in some cases, avoided final decisions. Only those observers who hold an image of a perfectly coherent Soviet posture towards the Third World will be surprised. There has never been any "masterplan" nor has Soviet thinking and behaviour been consistent over time. Its attitudes have rather shown a cyclical pattern of expansion and

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<sup>6</sup>. See, e.g., Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 32, 272.

<sup>7</sup>. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, "Discord or Cooperation in the Third World?", in: Stephen Sestanovich, Andrew C. Goldberg, Francis Fukuyama, Bruce D. Porter, Coping with Gorbachev's Soviet Union, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988, pp. 24-36 (Significant Issues Series, Vol. 10, No. 9), p. 32, who, although stressing the "Soviet retreat" under Gorbachev, predicts new challenges from a "modernized" Soviet conduct.

<sup>8</sup>. See S. Neil MacFarlane, "Bush's Missing Link in Nicaragua", in: New York Times, 6 April 1989, p. A35, and ibid., "The Soviet Union and Southern African Security", in: Problems of Communism, vol. 38, No. 2-3, March-June 1989, pp. 71-89; 72-74.

restraint.<sup>9</sup> After the optimistic and expansionist phase of the second half of the 1970s, the Soviet approach in the 1980s has clearly shifted to a pessimistic and cautious assessment. Moscow has finally learned the lessons of former major powers in the developing world that it is relatively easy to intervene militarily but very costly to sustain its own presence or that of "proxies".

This new perspective is also the consequence of a younger generation of experts which the post-Brezhnev leaderships, first Andropov and then Gorbachev in particular, have promoted in the decision-making apparatus. With their more pragmatic (but nevertheless power-oriented) outlook, they have replaced the old guard of the Brezhnev years: Aleksandr N. Yakovlev succeeded the ideological éminence grise Mikhail A. Suslov; Anatoli F. Dobrynin replaced Boris N. Ponomarev, the former Comintern activist, in the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee.<sup>10</sup> There is also a more prominent role for Karen N. Brutents in the ID who has stressed in his writings that the Soviet Union should focus on major developing countries instead of poor and weak

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<sup>9</sup>. See S. Neil MacFarlane, "The USSR and the Third World: Continuity and Change under Gorbachev", New York: The Harriman Institute Forum, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1988, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup>. In October 1988 Dobrynin became Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser, providing the new president with a foreign policy expertise separate from the Party apparatus.

"socialist-oriented".<sup>11</sup> Evgenii M. Primakov -- originally a Middle East expert and from November 1985 to Summer 1989 head of the Academy of Science's Institute of World Economy and International Relations, IMEMO -- who became one of Gorbachev's closest advisers and a leading spokesman of perestroika in foreign affairs, explicitly advocated U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Third World conflicts.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, since the early 1980s Western experts have observed an evolving debate among Soviet scholars and politicians on the Third World.<sup>13</sup> Some of the most outspoken Soviet critics have explicitly stressed the negative impact of Moscow's Third World policy under Brezhnev which provoked a "united anti-Soviet

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<sup>11</sup>. See, e.g., his article "Voprossi teorii: Sovetskii Soiuz i osvobodivshiesia strany" (Questions of Theory: The Soviet Union and the Liberated Countries), in: Pravda, 2 February 1982, p. 4-5.

<sup>12</sup>. See his "Novaia filosofiiia vneshnei politiki" (A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy), in: Pravda, 10 July 1987, p. 4, and "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts", in: International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6, 1988, pp. 3-9. On 3 June 1989 Primakov became the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, one of the two chambers of the new newly elected Congress of People's Deputies, and had to give up his former posts -- a further indication of Gorbachev's growing preoccupation with internal problems. On 20 September 1989, in Gorbachev's most comprehensive change of the Party leadership, Primakov became a non-voting member of the Politbureau.

<sup>13</sup>. See Stephen Sestanovich, "Do the Soviets Feel Pinched by Third World Adventures?", in: Washington Post, 20 May 1984; Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World, Santa Monica: RAND R-3337-USDP, February 1986; and Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986.

front" among the major powers.<sup>14</sup> Others have emphasized the intolerable economic costs of maintaining the high profile in the Third World.<sup>15</sup>

For Gorbachev, focussing on internal "restructuring" and trying to create a favourable international environment to facilitate this Herculean task, the Third World has lost major importance. Positively responding to U.S. insistence, he was ready to negotiate settlements of the major contentious Third World problems between the superpowers. Similar to several military issues he pursued a "disarming strategy", enabling diplomatic agreements by making partially remarkable concessions. The military withdrawal from Afghanistan, which he pushed through against formidable obstacles, contained all elements of his new orientation. By reversing his predecessors' policy, Gorbachev managed to cut internal and international burdens. However, aware of the in-

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<sup>14</sup>. See Viacheslav (I.) Dashichev, "Vostok-Zapad: Poisk novykh otnoshenii. O prioritetach vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva" (East-West: the Search for new Relations: On the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet State), in: Literaturnaia Gazeta, No. 20, 18 May 1988, p. 14. The political importance of this article can be demonstrated by the fact that some of its main arguments have been included in the theses of the Central Committee for the 19th All-Union Party Conference, see Pravda, May 27, 1988, p. 1-2.

<sup>15</sup>. See, e.g., V.(italii V.) Zhurkin / S.(ergei A.) Karaganov / A.(ndrei V.) Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti - starye i novye" (Challenges of Security - New and Old ones), in: Komunist, No. 1, 1988, pp. 42-50; 49. See also the statement of Nikolai P. Shmelev, one of Gorbachev's economic advisers, who, before the Congress of People's Deputies on 8 June 1989, pointed to the Soviet aid to Latin America and exclaimed: "This source alone would suffice to maintain the balance of the (Soviet, H.H.) consumer market for the years which we need to deal with our immediate problems ..." (Izvestiia, 9 June 1989, p. 10).

herent risks of his move, he did not risk Soviet humiliation by letting the Communists in Kabul collapse and continued Soviet arms supplies to the Najibullah regime after the withdrawal of his forces.

More than four and a half years after Gorbachev came to power, many attitudes and responses in internal and foreign policy are still in a state of transition. In many cases he has defined the problems but has not been able to produce tangible improvements. As he desperately needs success, foreign policy has proven to be a useful instrument where he has been able to translate concessions into diplomatic breakthroughs. In the Third World the new leadership has decided to cut back Soviet overextension in regions without high importance. This explains the remarkable Soviet cooperation on conflicts such as Angola, Namibia, Cambodia and possibly also on the Horn of Africa. However, until now Moscow has been much less forthcoming in places where significant Soviet geopolitical interests and prestige are at stake, particularly in Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

Instead of focussing on traditional partners in the developing world, the Gorbachev/Shevardnadze modernization of foreign policy has put significant emphasis on expanding ties with key states in the Third World, regardless of their internal structure. Recent Soviet approaches towards Egypt, Israel, Iran, and the oil-rich states on the Arab peninsula demonstrate this attitude. A similar pattern is also visible towards leading Latin American states, such as Mexico and Brazil, or the ASEAN and

other rapidly industrializing Asian countries. The Soviet economy is not sufficiently flexible and does not offer huge incentives to outside investors. Therefore Moscow cannot expect quick benefits from this re-orientation. In the longer term, if the economic perestroika leads to tangible results, this approach may well lay the basis for a gradual expansion of Soviet economic and political ties with key states of the developing world.

## 2. The United States

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the presidency of Ronald Reagan can be understood as the American answer to the perceived Soviet challenge since the late 1970s. It was the "Soviet expansionism" and Jimmy Carter's "humiliation" in Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan that made Reagan's Manichean message convincing to the majority of voters.<sup>16</sup> Reducing the complex problems of Third World instability to the Soviet threat,<sup>17</sup> Reagan dealt with regional conflicts by fighting the

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<sup>16</sup>. However: "It was the economy, not foreign policy, that sealed the Democrats' fate in 1980." (William Schneider, "Conservatism, Not Interventionism: Trends in Foreign Policy Opinion, 1974-1982", in: Kenneth A. Oye / Robert J. Lieber / Donald Rotchild (eds.), Eagle Defiant. United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1983, p. 38.)

<sup>17</sup>. "Let's not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world." ("Reagan's World", Interview with Karen Elliot House, in: Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1980, p.1.) There are also several similar statements during Reagan's presidency. Still in 1986, high Pentagon officials, such as Fred C. Iklé, claimed that the Soviet Union had "outflanked" containment and was "the driving, organiz-

presence of the Soviet Union and its "proxies", particularly Cuba and Vietnam. His program (called "Reagan Doctrine")<sup>18</sup> of rolling back "Communism" -- particularly in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Central America -- generally enjoyed support among U.S. public opinion and Congress.<sup>19</sup> Only in the case of Nicaragua, the centrepiece of his crusade, Reagan, despite all his rhetoric, was not able to convince a majority that the CIA's covert actions to topple the Sandinistas were in accordance with U.S. values. What finally finished the military part of his Nicaraguan policy, was the persistent public fear of becoming involved in a "second Vietnam" and the revelations of the Iran-Contra-Affair.

In the other prominent cases Reagan's "low-intensity warfare"<sup>20</sup> proved to be rather successful, as far as Soviet involvement was concerned. Supplying military aid to guerilleros in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua and rewarding neigh-

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ing force" behind all Third World conflicts (see International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1986, p. 8).

<sup>18</sup> See Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine", in: Time, 1 April 1985, p. 54-5 and, for a useful analysis, Raymond W. Copson and Richard P. Cronin, "The 'Reagan Doctrine' and its Prospects", in: Survival, January/February 1987, pp. 40-55.

<sup>19</sup> See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July", in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No.4, Spring 1986, pp. 698-714.

<sup>20</sup> See Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Low-intensity Conflict. Future Challenges and Lessons from the Reagan Years", in: Survival, July/August 1989, pp. 359-74 and (from a critical perspective) Michael T. Klare / Peter Kornbluh (eds.), Low-Intensity Warfare. Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, New York: Pantheon, 1988.

bouring governments such as Pakistan, Zaire, Thailand, and Honduras for granting them sanctuary was clearly more cost-efficient in comparison with the Soviet burden of keeping the beleaguered "Socialist" governments in power and sustaining their mismanaged and war-worn economies. Furthermore, U.S. military interventions in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, and the Persian Gulf demonstrated a new determination to apply direct power. Finally, the Reagan Administration linked regional issues with the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship, thus making Soviet "good behaviour" a precondition for improved relations and agreements on nuclear issues.<sup>21</sup>

It is significant that Reagan's approach towards the Soviet Union changed before Gorbachev came to power. In order to gain re-election in autumn 1984, Reagan had to adapt to the changing mood within U.S. society and to formulate a more conciliatory approach towards Moscow.<sup>22</sup> Already in January and then in September 1984, he proposed a dialogue on regional conflicts.<sup>23</sup> In

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<sup>21</sup>. "(...) My administration has made it plain that continuing Soviet adventurism in the developing world is inimical to global security and an obstacle to fundamental improvement of Soviet-American relations." ("Freedom, Regional Security, and Global Peace", Message from the President to the Congress, March 14, 1986, in: American Foreign Policy 1986, Washington, D.C. 1987, p. 1-2.) See also the critical remarks by Primakov, "USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts", (Note 12), p. 3.

<sup>22</sup>. See the extensive and convincing explication of this argument in Czempiel, Machtprobe, (Note 1), pp. 238-82.

<sup>23</sup>. See Address by President Ronald Reagan, 16 January 1984, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 23 January, pp. 40-5 and Address by President Ronald Reagan Before the 39th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, New York, 24 September 1984, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,

fact, he and his second Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, were offering the Soviet Union an "equal role" in arranging its retreat from the Third World!

The official superpower dialogue on regional conflicts started in February 1985, one month before Gorbachev came to power. Since then, parallel to the negotiations on nuclear arms, Moscow and Washington have engaged in an intensive and confidential dialogue on various levels, focussing on several regional conflicts. This has contributed significantly to a series of diplomatic agreements since 1988. In some cases, e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf war, the results of these consultations cannot be measured in dramatic changes of U.S. or Soviet behaviour, although careful observers were able to detect several accommodations. Compared with the time before the mid 1980s,<sup>24</sup> the ongoing confidential dialogue was a new pattern of discrete superpower interaction, exploring ways and means for parallel or cooperative action.

One may speculate whether the Reagan/Shultz approach of pushing back and simultaneously talking to the Soviet Union would have been equally successful towards a more assertive Soviet leadership. In a rather unusual historical coincidence, however,

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31 October 1984, pp. 1352-59.

<sup>24</sup>. See Harold H. Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena, 1967-86", in: Alexander L. George / Philip F. Farley / Alexander Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons, New York and Oxford 1988, pp. 540-80.

Reagan's determination and Gorbachev's re-assessment worked together in promoting cooperation and diplomatic arrangements. It was therefore not a coincidence that several breakthroughs in regional issues occurred in the last months of Reagan's presidency. He left office with the impression that he had won the "test of strength" with the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

The agreements on Afghanistan and Namibia were a direct consequence of superpower cooperation. Progress in the Cambodian conflict took place both because of U.S.-Soviet talks and the Soviet-Chinese rapprochement. The ceasefire in the Gulf war occurred mainly as a result of internal and regional factors, but it was also a consequence of the superpowers' pressure on Iran.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the cessation of hostilities fitted into the picture of a "peace epidemic",<sup>27</sup> the changing international climate and a trend towards conflict termination.

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<sup>25</sup>. See Czempiel, Machtprobe, (Note 1), p. 324.

<sup>26</sup>. The Soviet Union tacitly endorsed Iraq's "city war" and was protecting Kuwaiti oil transports against Iranian attacks; the United States pursued an arms embargo against Iran; finally, the erroneous shoot-down of the Iran Air 655 by the USS-Vincennes paved the way for Khomeini's change of mind in July 1988. A year before, both had agreed on a diplomatic initiative which paved the way for the U.N. Security Council's resolution 598.

<sup>27</sup>. Stanley Hoffmann, "Lessons of a Peace Epidemic", in: New York Times, 6 September 1988, p. A23.

### III. The Significance of the Change

In many cases it is still too early to speak about conflict resolution. What has changed is that several contentious Third World conflicts have been deprived of their East-West dimension and reduced to their internal and regional problems. It is remarkable that in some cases superpower restraint was followed by regional initiatives. As regards Angola and Cambodia, all the parties directly involved started to negotiate on the future of their countries after the great powers had reached some agreement on the international aspects of the respective conflict.

In the case of Central America, the regional initiative of President Arias and his colleagues was essential for superpower restraint. The Soviet Union, drastically reducing its oil supplies and curtailing other economic aid to Managua in 1987, pushed the Sandinistas to agree to the Arias plan and begin with "national reconciliation". However, it was only in May 1989 that Gorbachev indicated to President Bush that Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua had stopped,<sup>28</sup> which -- if true -- would meet the second basic demand of the Central American Peace Plan. With his gesture, the Soviet leader was also responding to the changes in U.S. attitudes and behaviour.

After coming to power, the Bush Administration was determined to avoid a repetition of former painful internal controver-

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<sup>28</sup>. See Washington Post, 16 May 1989, p. A1/17. Spokesmen of the Sandinistas have denied that claim and, still in Summer 1989, U.S. officials have doubted its validity.

sies on policy towards Nicaragua. In April 1989, after 22 days of negotiations with Congress, Secretary of State James A. Baker managed to get a "humanitarian aid" program for the Contras funded. However, this was not without having granted the House and Senate an unusual degree of future influence on the administration's decision-making. President Bush, lacking his predecessor's charisma and power, particularly towards Congress, is more concerned with managing gradual change and scoring points through compromise solutions, internally and internationally. The "Reagan crusade" has obviously ended.

At the same time the Soviet leadership, increasingly preoccupied with internal turmoil and sweeping changes in Eastern Europe, only considers Afghanistan and the turbulence in the Middle East as major Third World challenges, warranting further priority attention. Significantly, since Secretary Baker's Moscow visit in May 1989, the superpower dialogue has focussed on these three regional issues: Nicaragua, Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict and other Middle Eastern issues.

It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev can convince Bush to agree on a kind of trade-off between the two major "geopolitical" problems, i.e. a parallel cessation of superpower military involvement in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and an understanding on the two countries' political future.<sup>29</sup> The Bush Administration has

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<sup>29</sup>. Several Western experts have suggested this idea, see e.g. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Linking two Crises", in: New York Times, 6 October 1985, p. E21; Evan Luard, "Superpowers and Regional Conflicts", in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, No. 5, Summer 1986, pp. 1006-25; and MacFarlane, "Bush's Missing Link", (N. 8).

agreed to further U.S.-Soviet talks on the future of Afghanistan, after initial hopes had failed that the Mujahedin would quickly topple the Najibullah regime as soon as the Soviet troops had left. Moreover, the new Pakistani leader, Benazir Bhutto, is much more concerned about relieving her country from the Afghan refugee problem than her predecessor, Zia ul-Haq.<sup>30</sup> If Moscow and Washington could reach an agreement on mutual restraint in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, it would signify that they have finally accepted those "ground rules" of "non-interference in the other's sphere" which scientists have already proclaimed.<sup>31</sup>

The Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains the oldest and most intricate regional conflict between the two superpowers. Despite several diplomatic moves, the internal situation in Israel does not give hope for quick and lasting progress. Nevertheless, the international pattern of influence has changed significantly. The level of confidential dialogue between Washington and Moscow has been unprecedented and both have acted along similar lines. Both powers have gradually enlarged their

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<sup>30</sup>. See Bernard Weinraub, "Bush and Bhutto Agree on Afghan Aid", in: New York Times, 7 June 1989, p. A3. - However, the Pakistani military remains a powerful actor in the ongoing conflict.

<sup>31</sup>. See Chubin, "The Super-powers" (Note 2), p. 79, quoting Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of World Politics, London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 209-11. Actually, the basic problem with these two conflicts has been that the superpowers did not behave according to these "rules"!

political access to the actors of the conflict. The Soviet Union, although still stalling a resumption of diplomatic relations, is pursuing a rather close dialogue with Israel and both of its major parties. Since December 1988, the U.S. government has been holding official talks with the PLO. Moscow, taking into account some Israeli arguments, has softened its conditions for an international conference. Washington, while debating with the PLO about elections in the occupied territories, has demonstrated significantly less cordiality towards Israel than former Administrations.<sup>32</sup>

In the foreseeable future, the superpowers will probably continue to pursue several diplomatic efforts to further reduce the international repercussions of regional conflicts and -- if local actors and circumstances permit -- to promote peaceful settlements. Through their diplomatic involvement the two major powers will take care that their basic interests are safeguarded. The talks on more peripheral conflicts, such as Angola, Cambodia, and now also on the Horn of Africa, however, cannot match the importance of the major issues, Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

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<sup>32</sup>. See Secretary of State Baker on 22 May 1989 before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a speech observers called "unusually blunt" towards Israel and "almost clinically balanced". (New York Times, 23 May 1989, p. A1/10.) Indeed, among other factors, Bush does not owe his presidency to the support of Jewish voters who clearly favoured his Democratic rival.

The Middle East will remain the region where no power can decisively influence events.<sup>33</sup> Here, because of its strategic importance, lies the greatest potential for future superpower disagreement and renewed rivalry. One indicator is the continuing arms sales of both powers to this area. Although Moscow has repeatedly warned against the spread of chemical weapons and missiles<sup>34</sup> (which, theoretically, now can also reach Soviet territory), it is continuing major weapons sales of other categories to countries like Iraq, Syria, and allegedly also Iran.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, the Islamic Republic after Khomeini promises to be one major test case as to whether the superpowers can manage their rivalry without impeding their overall relationship.

#### IV. The Consequences for Third World Countries

For many leaders in the developing world, the superpowers' lessening confrontation and continuing dialogue on regional issues has significant repercussions. There is an instinctive fear among regional actors that the great powers might exert a condominium and impose political solutions. However, given the

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<sup>33</sup>. For a further explanation, see Helmut Hubel, "Nonregional Powers in the Middle East: New Trends in the Eighties?", in: The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1988, pp. 52-75.

<sup>34</sup>. See Shevardnadze's speeches in Cairo (Izvestia, 24 February 1989, p. 4) and in Vienna (Pravda, 7 March 1989, p. 4).

<sup>35</sup>. During Secretary Baker's visit in Moscow he was said to have complained about this matter (personal information).

intricacies of local and regional politics, several actors could sabotage solutions imposed against their will. Experience teaches that major regional powers have successfully resisted superpowers collaboration by ignoring Moscow's wishes or influencing the decision-making in Washington. The fate of the joint U.S.-Soviet declaration on the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1 October 1977 is a case in point.<sup>36</sup>

Nevertheless, by its sheer happening the great power dialogue has changed perceptions and is forcing regional actors to re-evaluate their traditional approaches.<sup>37</sup> This has been particularly the case with close partners and allies of the superpowers. As the East-West confrontation is waning, their relative importance to their patrons is obviously shrinking too. Contrary to the "golden years" of Reagan's presidency, Israel today has

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<sup>36</sup>. Abraham Ben-Zvi, The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973-1986, Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1986 and *ibid.*, "American Diplomacy and the Limits of Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1981-1988", in: Coexistence, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 115-20; 119, concludes: "In the final analysis ... it is likely that the regional context rather than the global level will ultimately determine the fate of any collaborative Soviet-American drive, assertive and coercive as it may be. (...) Israel is likely to fiercely resist the pressures extended and may ultimately (...) prevail (...)."

<sup>37</sup>. Arab leaders, e.g., expressed surprise that, before the meeting of the Arab League in Casablanca in May 1989, they had received messages from both superpowers urging them to adopt "constructive resolutions" on the Arab-Israeli conflict to contribute to a peaceful settlement. (See New York Times, 24 May 1989, p. A9.)

much more difficulty in trading her importance as a "strategic ally" to the United States. Similarly, Pakistan is no longer the "front state" vis-a-vis Soviet military power and U.S. Congress has shown much more concern about Islamabad's nuclear ambitions than it did before 15 February 1989. Under these conditions, the late Zia ul-Haq's gamble of using the Soviet occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan for squeezing U.S. military and economic aid and simultaneously trying to determine Afghanistan's future through "fundamentalists" like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has run into difficulties.<sup>38</sup> Other traditional U.S. friends have similar experiences, for example King Hassan II. of Morocco who recently, for the first time, has acknowledged the Frente POLISARIO as his adversary in the Western Sahara conflict. Only future foreign aid programmes of the Bush Administration will tell whether countries like Zaire, Thailand or Honduras will also be affected by the peace processes in their respective neighbouring countries. Given the huge U.S. deficit and Congressional pressure on Bush to reduce it, they might well be among the losers.

As for the Soviet Union, several of its traditional friends in the Third World have already become victims of Gorbachev's perestroika. Already in the early 1980s, certain Third World leaders could no longer be sure that by declaring themselves "Marxist-Leninists" they would be automatically granted Soviet

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<sup>38</sup>. Early September 1989 the U.S. and Pakistan were said to have reached an agreement to send military aid directly to Afghan field commanders, bypassing the seven Peshawar-based leaders.

aid. On the contrary, Moscow has openly "encouraged" Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua and others to ask capitalist countries for aid. Gorbachev's sweeping changes have not spared CMEA members either. Besides their own reasons, Cuba and Vietnam decided to withdraw their troops from Angola and Cambodia respectively, because the Soviet leadership was no longer willing to finance their foreign campaigns. And despite his willingness to call back his troops from Angola, Fidel Castro has recently indicated a further reduction of Soviet aid.<sup>39</sup>

The superpowers have changed the parameters of regional conflicts not only by modifying their approaches towards traditional partners. Gorbachev's repeated declarations that his country encourages peaceful solutions and wants to strengthen the United Nations' role in peace keeping are a remarkable message.<sup>40</sup> If he and his supporters succeed in normalizing the Soviet Union's external behaviour -- thereby actually ending the October

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<sup>39</sup>. A. Kamorin, "Eksport v tropicheskom ispolnenii, ili Pochemu sovetskie i kubinskie partnery perestaiut ponimat' drug druga" (Exports Tropical-Style, or Why Soviet and Cuban Partners Are Ceasing to Understand One Another), in: Izvestiia, 3 August 1989 (evening edition), p.5, in a remarkably blunt article, is quoting and confirming Castro: "The situation is now such that we cannot even say that the timely deliveries which we have received from socialist countries for 30 years will continue to arrive with the same precision now."

<sup>40</sup>. See his article, "Real'nost' i garantii bezobasnogo mira", (Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World), in: Pravda, 17 September 1987, p. 1-2, and his speeches before the U.N. in 1987 and 1988. For an analysis of this shift, see Edward C. Luck and Tobi Trister Gati, "Gorbachev, The United Nations and US Policy", in: Washington Quarterly, No. 4, Autumn 1988, pp. 19-35.

revolution of 1917<sup>41</sup> -- Moscow will no longer be the "natural ally" of forces in the Third World demanding revolutionary change.

In stressing "state interests" instead of ideological affiliations, the present Soviet leadership has significantly widened its political options. Syria, the PLO, and other Arab countries, e.g., have been told that the Soviet leadership would like to normalize relations with Israel. By talking with Jerusalem and at the same time withholding the restoration of diplomatic relations unless Israel agrees to engage in serious negotiations with the Palestinians, Moscow has established itself as a formidable player in the ongoing diplomatic game.

This Soviet move helps to explain why the U.S. was finally ready to establish a formal dialogue with Yassir Arafat's organization. The decision of the U.S. government to open talks with PLO was finally taken after Arafat, supported by Moscow, changed his position towards Israel. Without the Soviet encouragement and the U.S. insistence, Israel's leader Itzhak Shamir would probably have decided to deal with the Intifada according to Ariel Sharon's and not to Itzhak Rabin's approach. However, even a combined superpower attempt will probably not be suffi-

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<sup>41</sup>. This was the tenor of George Kennan's testimony before the U.S. Congress in April 1989 (see the abridged version "Just Another Great Power", in: New York Times, 9 April 1989, p. E25). Similarly also Eberhard Schulz, Das "neue politische Denken" und die Deutschen (The "New Political Thinking" and the Germans), Cologne 1989 (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 15-1989), p. 9-10.

cient to convince Israel's government that it should exchange land for peace. If the Bush Administration applied real pressure, it is rather doubtful whether it could preserve its base of domestic support for such a controversial undertaking.<sup>42</sup>

As Third World leaders see their opportunities for playing the two major powers off against each other fading, their temptation will increase to involve other powers to further their goals. During the 1980s, China's role as a weapons exporter particularly to the Middle East has considerably increased. In selling CSS-2 long-range missiles to Saudi Arabia, Silkworm missiles to Iran, and trying to provide Syria with missiles (which the Soviet Union had denied), Beijing has obviously begun to take advantage of the changing pattern of great power involvement in the Middle East.

In some Asian trouble spots China's role might even become crucial. In the Cambodian conflict, e.g., Beijing probably holds the key for a workable agreement between the four Cambodian factions which would also decide on the future role of the Khmer Rouge.

The EC countries and Japan will also be asked to play a more prominent role. Whereas their capabilities and determination will remain limited to play a political role clearly distinct from the U.S., their financial and economic potential might well contribute to bolster the settlement of conflicts. Already

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<sup>42</sup>. See Ben-Zvi, "American Diplomacy and the Limits of Superpower Collaboration", (Note 36), p. 118.

during the 1980s the West Europeans, through quiet diplomacy, have helped to calm down the Central American crisis. Japan, particularly dependent on Gulf oil, was repeatedly engaged in a discrete manner in containing the tanker war. Japan, now the biggest single donor of foreign aid, is trying to translate her financial capabilities into a new political role.<sup>43</sup> In the future, several war-worn Third World countries will probably turn even more to the EC countries and Japan for economic aid which both superpowers are no longer able or willing to grant.

The United States and the Soviet Union will nevertheless continue to attract Third World attention. By the sheer size and sophistication of their arms export capabilities, they will continue to have a decisive impact on regional military balances.<sup>44</sup> Although, since autumn 1988, both are talking about the possibilities of curbing the proliferation of particularly destabilizing weapons, such as chemical warheads and medium-range missiles, there seems to be little prospect for far-reaching and lasting agreements. For both of them, weapons sales will remain a valuable source of income (particularly for the Soviet Union,

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<sup>43</sup>. See Bernhard May, Japans neue Entwicklungspolitik (Japan's New Development Policy), Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989 (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Reihe Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, vol. 57).

<sup>44</sup>. See the detailed analysis of Stephanie G. Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars. The Dominance of the Superpowers, New York: Praeger, 1986 (Published with The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., The Washington Papers/122).

yearning for hard currency) and an instrument for gaining or maintaining political influence. Again the Middle East, with many oil-rich and insecure leaderships, does not promise any reduced demand for arms.

#### V. Outlook into the 1990s

Any prognosis of superpower interaction and Third World responses depends, first of all, on the future Soviet role. If Gorbachev survives politically over the next years, during which the Soviet Union will inevitably face major unrest, the chances are rather good that the recent trend towards retrenchment and cooperation can be sustained. Focussing on internal restructuring, this Soviet leadership would continue to apply a narrow definition of state interests in the developing world and concentrate rather on geopolitically important regions, particularly South Asia and the Middle East.

If the Gorbachev experiment fails, several developments can be imagined. Without going into details, it seems clear that -- if Moscow would still be a formidable power player -- the pendulum could swing back, presenting the Soviet Union again as an assertive power towards its neighbours and beyond. However, even if the Gorbachev rule is replaced by an orthodox or military leadership, it is questionable what it could gain from renewing support of revolutionary movements in the Third World. As has been discussed earlier, the Soviet disillusionment with such an approach is older than Gorbachev and would probably outlast him.


Furthermore, the old ideological slogans have been so thoroughly discredited that probably nobody would be able to turn back the clock. If there were a return to the Stalinist model, it would rather mean seclusion from regions beyond immediate Soviet geopolitical interest.

Like in other major East-West issues, Gorbachev is providing the West and the Third World with a "window of opportunity". If he manages to preserve his country's present international course, there is a better chance than ever in post-war history to further defuse East-West controversies in the developing world. Nevertheless, in playing a rather constructive role and helping to settle outstanding conflicts, Moscow is expecting "compensation" by having its continuing political involvement as a great power respected.

In several conflict areas, the United States and the West is confronted with the subtle challenge of promoting peaceful settlements according to Western interests and simultaneously keeping the Soviet Union involved. If Moscow sticks to its constructive role, Washington would be wise to avoid a repetition of the Kissinger approach of the 1970s of paying lip-service to super-power cooperation in the Middle East and actually pushing the Russians "out of the game".

Finally, another problem should be mentioned: If East-West confrontation continues to fade, there is a danger that outside powers might lose interest in Third World regional conflicts and tend to "leave them alone". Too much "benign neglect", however,

would miss a rather unique chance to defuse a problem which has poisoned East-West relations since the 1970s.



**THE RISE AND CHANGING ROLES OF REGIONAL POWERS:  
between Lilliputians and Brobdingnags**

**by Dr Peter Lyon**

Paper presented to the Heads of Institutes Meeting

hosted by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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"A great Statesman by consulting all sort of Men, and by contemplating the universal Posture of the Nation, its Power, Strength, Trade, Wealth and Revenues, in any Council he is to offer, by summing up the Difficulties on either Side, and by computing upon the whole, shall be able to form a sound Judgement, and to give a right Advice: and this is what we mean by Political Arithmetick."

Sir Charles Davenant: Discourses on the Publick Revenues, and on the Track of England (London, 1698)

"Actually some very simple quantifications appear to be adequate for the rough approximations of strength in world affairs on which most broad generalizations about the balance of power rest. We are dealing here in macrometrics, the technique of measuring in a broad context where precise detail is not very significant. The patterns and trends in international relationships are what we want to see, not the details; the forest not the trees."

Ray Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977. A Calculus of Strategic Drift (for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC)

# THE CHANGING ROLES OF REGIONAL POWERS

Peter Lyon

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**THE RISE AND CHANGING ROLES OF REGIONAL POWERS IN THE  
1980S AND 1990S: between Lilliputians and Brobdingnags**

Peter Lyon

The taxonomy of states remains in a resolutely primitive and highly academic state: that is to say, there are few, if any, established orthodoxies about the grading of powers or settled multipurpose codifications of practice. Martin Wight, in the posthumously published version of his fragmentary second edition of *Power Politics* (first edition, 1946; second edition 1978/9), wrote, apparently in 1972, with characteristically olympian assurance that "the grading of powers can be traced back to the beginning of the states-system. It begins in the simple recognition that states are of different kinds and magnitudes. It develops into the doctrine that, according to their size, they have different roles in international society". But, having traced the intellectual pedigree of treatment of this subject briefly from Aquinas to Botero in the late 16th century, he makes a few casual remarks about ranking in the 16th to 19th centuries, in Europe, but does not discuss the 20th century at all, nor does he admit to knowledge or use of the term "regional power".

## Terminology

To write about 'regional powers' obviously requires something to be said about both 'regions' and 'powers'. Current terminology is however, not only unstandardised, it is in much usage protean, tricky and treacherous.

In international politics 'region', and by extension 'regionalism', connotes some areal ensemble of countries or territories defined or designated for some purpose or purposes as a unity, and which may or may not be served by some common institutions. By 'powers' is meant states, ostensibly sovereign entities endowed with international personality and general recognition - though the much trickier question as to what constitutes the main ingredients of power is part and parcel of the substance of this essay.

For present purposes and in a preliminary way it is worthwhile pointing to some primitive but roughly serviceable distinctions which recur in the literature - notably 'hegemony' as contrasted with oligarchy or multipolarity and then the contrast between 'balance of power' with its implied structure or constellation of powers in uneasy equilibrium and 'concert of powers' with its connotations of some degree of, or disposition towards, co-operativeness between its

members. Hegemony is meant here in its straightforward (non-Gramscian) lexicographical sense to connote 'leadership, predominance, the preponderance of one state among several' (according to Webster).

Within the contemporary third world the only unequivocal hegemonical power in a particular region is India in relation to South Asia. The next closest candidate is South Africa in relation to the region of Southern Africa - but its local preponderance may already have peaked, among its regional constellation, and now be on the decline, because of domestic pressures and changes principally. There have been a number of aspiring would-be regional hegemonies in particular areas in the recent past - e.g. Indonesia or Vietnam vis à vis 'their' parts or the whole of South East Asia, or Nigeria vis à vis West Africa or Brazil vis à vis much of South America - but each of these ambitions have been frustrated and remain unfulfilled for reasons of domestic weaknesses and distractions principally.

Hegemony is a relatively rare condition for a regional order. Much more common is a situation where there are conflictual and occasionally co-operative relationships between several powers of roughly comparable weights so that no one can easily assert primacy. Such is the condition of the Middle East where neither Turkey, Egypt

or Syria will concede primacy to each other even without the complicating factor of the existence of Israel. Thus most regional systems are oligarchic, multipolar or polycentric.

Much effort and many articles and books have been expended in discussing the utilities or otherwise of balance of power as a concept. Here a roughly serviceable distinction is employed, by analogy from late 19th century European history, as between 'balance' implying rivalries and structured antagonisms and 'concert' meaning some consultative and co-operative mechanisms. Thus in contemporary South east Asia ASEAN may be said to be a concert whereas the whole region, with the rivalries continuing between Vietnam - Laos and ASEAN (with Burma and Cambodia, in their very different and distinctive ways, being uneasily between these two camps) may be said to be a regional balance of power.

Reference is sometimes made in the literature about current international politics to pariah or outcast states.

Used descriptively or analytically rather than merely perjoratively and polemically the term pariah (which is, incidentally, a Tamil word in origin) are those countries, or regimes (currently South Africa, Israel and Taiwan) whose legitimacy in the society of states is

challenged and denied by other incumbent governments who explicitly and deliberately seek the overthrow and replacement of the existing outcast system. For the student of strategy it is notable that the three countries currently most often designated pariahs are all threshold nuclear powers (see further below) with considerable military capability vis a vis their neighbours. But there are some strikingly obvious differences too. Taiwan is the object of China's irredentism and its military power is principally to deter and prevent being re-incorporated in China by force. Taiwan's military power otherwise has no marked regional resonances. Israel and South Africa, by contrast, each have considerable significance in shaping the character and fortunes of their respective regions. Some of Israel's Arab opponents deny the legitimacy of the existence of an Independent state of Israel (see further below, on the Middle East) whereas the opponents of Pretoria's white minority government oppose not the legitimacy of the State but of the regime.

#### Regionalism and contemporary geostrategics

Regionalism in contemporary international politics is principally, though not exclusively, the affair of governments. Regionalism should thus be seen mainly as an instrument of national policy, seeking more to strengthen than to supercede the independent

statehood of the members who collectively associate together in a joint regional enterprise, but as co-participants on the global stage.

This is an age of much conflict and many wars as well as the spawning of many new regional organizations within the third world. The coincidence is not entirely accidental. Both processes are in some respects attributable to the fact that rapid and widespread decolonization has taken place, especially since 1960. New states, new sovereign entities, have arisen, mostly as successors to the overseas empires of west European powers; and what were once territorially demarcated administrative units within these empires have through decolonization become dubbed with the insignia and appurtenances of sovereign statehood. The viability of many of these states, however, in terms of their political cohesiveness, their state-wide systems of order administration and law, the legitimacy of their governments and the functioning of their social, educational and other welfare services is often more nominal than actual, more proclaimed than practised. Even the precise extent and exact demarcation of portions of their territories may be unclear or disputed. None the less newly independent states usually are at least as eager as older states to enjoy membership in some international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and this well nigh invariably includes membership in one or more of a regionalised character.

Novitiates on the global stage, newly enfranchised in the global village, they tend also to be professed enthusiasts for regionalism (a luxury usually denied or unavailable during colonial rule). Globalism and regionalism are thus seen not as antithetical but complementary.

War is still today, as in the past, a principal means of political and territorial change internationally. Fear of the consequences of any future war between Great Powers has engendered unprecedentedly wide and deep concern to avoid such a catastrophe and has put enormous premiums on the cost of maintaining deterrents and the uneasy balance of terror between the principal nuclear powers whilst, in a sense, licensing local wars. Nuclear stalemate and superpower competitions has also made all the major military powers arms conscious and arms suppliers to others - the long list of recipients includes all the consequential third world powers and the 1980s saw a number of them becoming arms exporters too. Virtually all the limited wars of the past forty years have been fought in the third world, all have been waged with weapons mostly supplied by a few major powers.

It is possible to interpret a great deal of the Great Power rivalries and of international politics generally since the Second World War (and even before) as competition and tension along a vast broken

frontier zone of 'the world-island of Eurasia'. Territorial rivalries in eastern and central Europe, in the North African littoral, between Israel and her neighbours, in the Arab lands generally and especially for the small Arabian Gulf states, in South and Southeast Asia - in each of these regions actual or potential conflicts fit into a very large and very complex pattern of Great Power tension, and entwine with other explosive issues of prestige, status, security, local and regionalist rivalries and competition for control of resources or the allegiance of peoples. These are what the American political geographer Nicholas Spykman, modifying Mackinder's geopolitical theories in 1944, suggestively called 'the rimlands' of the world-island of Eurasia -and in so doing Spykman gave a remarkably prescient anticipation of the actual preoccupations of subsequent American 'containment' policy, though not of Soviet and Chinese actions and reactions.

Around or across the periphery of Eurasia runs an international frontier zone, a broken series of international lines a geopolitical geosyncline. Contemporaneously this is most marked by partition lines which, according to many passionate patriots, are reminders and scars of the political surgery that 'vivisected' their nation, their patrie. Thus we can today trace this international fault line from the borders of Ulster with Eire in the north-west, through the

Oder-Neisse line, through Cyprus, and around Israel, to Kashmir, Indo-China - Vietnam (until recently divided) and partitioned Korea. Merely to describe these partitioned states as constituting continuing boundary problems is to demean their complexity, their many dimensions and their ever-present explosiveness. Each case presents, in some aspect at least, highly intractable boundary problems. What were at first only intended as provisional lines of administrative convenience, which in their origins usually only represent very recent and arbitrarily arrived at lines of demarcation, nevertheless become hardened, entrenched, fortified, as practice confirms again the truth of that sardonic French saying that nothing endures as long as the provisional. When we add, as we must, to the list of the major continuing unresolved problems of Eurasia the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Indian disputes then it is abundantly clear that the Eurasia is where the greatest and most internationally threatening local disputes still supperate and have escalatory potential.

The world's geostrategic constellations are then remarkably in flux currently. American and Soviet erstwhile superpower influence is either in decline or retreat, from some regions more obviously than from others. In consequence local, regional, powers perceive new opportunities or better chances to realize old ambitions. Whether causally or merely coincidentally some military planners in the major

regional powers have begun to broaden the scope of their security perspective from preoccupation with securing their territorial perimeters to more ambitious even expansive, notions of external defence and regional influence . This is most evidently true of Asia today and particularly of India, China, and, more tentatively, of Japan. But there are also some spotty indications of changing ambitions and capabilities elsewhere - notably in the Middle East and in Southern Africa.

The deceptively simple term 'the third world' implies a solidarity which is either non-existent or else it is confined to a few relatively theatrical but not deeply consequential plenary conferences.

Alternatively it connotes a rally, an idea (or set of ideas) a mystique, an eclectic ideology. Within its capacious cloak of 'the third world' may be discerned a number of regional and functional associations which serve to express certain persistent affinities and antipathies which have found some current institutional expression.

It needs to be stressed, further more, that regional contexts vary enormously. No one region is exactly analogous to any other and therefore telling comparisons between them is much more likely to draw attention to differences than to similarities.

Of almost all contemporary states and corporate powers it might be said, "We are all regional powers nowadays." Virtually every member state of the UN counts itself as in or of a region in some sense or other of this conveniently protean term for helping to define any country's multiple identities. To move beyond these obvious truisms, however, to determine which are, or might be, regional powers of consequence in contemporary and future geostrategics is to enter more problematical, conceptually underdeveloped and certainly swampy ground - and this demands close attention to contexts and the elements of continuity and change at work within them.

In the continuing contemporary debate between globalists and regionalists each camp has its characteristic preoccupations and distortions. Globalists tend to exaggerate the ubiquitous capabilities, presence and influence of the two so-called superpowers, to assimilate too readily international relations to the study of the foreign policy and strategic concerns of a few, sometimes only one or two, major powers as if the globe is, and will be, principally moved by these giants, the Brobdingnags of our contemporary world. Regionalists too readily tend to succumb to what may be called the anthropological fallacy, myopia or naivety : insistence on the consequences and inimitable idiosyncrasy of their context and region,

thereby exaggerating their cocoon-like insulated properties - a dwarf like or Lilliputran perspective it may be called.

Faced with these two standard astigmatisms, from either end of the conceptual telescope as it were, a middle term perspective (let us call it a Gulliver - not gullible - like viewpoint) may be helpful. One which hails the 'shooting star' qualities of middle or medium powers in the international constellation of powers, the volatilities of would-be major regional powers on the Snakes and Ladder board of international politics, and notes the joker-like quality of some cards of Indeterminate - because very variable - characteristics. The metaphorical language which one employs in discussing their qualities is a testament to their abiding ambiguity.

#### Five aspects of contemporary regional geostrategics.

##### A. India and South Asia

The relativities of power vis a vis its neighbours have conferred on India a degree of predominance in its region which is the most pronounced in the contemporary world, has been marked since 1971, and this seems likely to persist in the 1990's.

The forward projections of India's military production and procurement plans (especially the development of its blue-water navy, its nuclear potential and rocketry) have attracted much international attention and comment. The world's arms bazaar is open for India. But probably not on as favourable terms as the Soviet Union for more than a decade and a half has extended to India.

Recent events in South Asia (all of which receive at least token recognition and discussion within SAARC) have demonstrated both India's willingness to act as a regional policeman or security regulator (as in the Maldives in October 1988) and the limitations even on her capacity to play such a role (witness India in Sri Lanka 1988-89).

B. China, the Middle Kingdom and neo-tribute

Classical Chinese cosmologies accorded the central pivotal role in world affairs to their country and civilisation. Presumably many contemporary Chinese believe that ideally such a role should be realized in the future. Meanwhile, China today finds itself almost surrounded by awkward neighbours and therefore with some interest in the regions of west, south, east, north-east and south east Asia - but with none of these regions has China enjoyed a notably stable

relationship during the past forty years.

China remains to a considerable extent an enigma. Its military capability and actions in the immediate future will be a function of a number of interacting internal variables - notably, the induction of a new generation of leaders, how the economy is managed and develops, how those in power in Beijing react to neighbours, whether to teach military lessons, and whether by high or low profile means. What does seem apparent at present is that the intention is to modernize China's armed forces and to develop a blue-water naval capability.

In the late 1980's China's warships began to exercise and patrol deeper into the western Pacific and occasionally engaged in manoeuvres as far as Iwo Jima, more than 2500 nautical miles from their home ports - the navy's principal eastward concerns seem to focus on Taiwan, the main sealanes, the presences of the Soviet and US navies, and, in the longer term, on Japanese strategic intentions and capabilities.

C. Japan - north-east Asia, and its expanding security zone.

Japan's homeland is situated in a region, north-east Asia, where locational and contemporary geostrategical factors have combined to

make the Soviet Union, China and the United States active presences. Thus we have the apparent paradox that Japan is undoubtedly the first or second of the world's economic powers but not by any means the dominant military power in the region which includes its homeland.

Caution, even timidity at times, has been the general hallmark of Japan's 'global diplomacy' (if that is not too fanciful a phrase). By contrast Japan as an economic power is manifestly of great importance in the world economy and therefore in the communings and deliberations of the group of Seven, of GATT or in connection with ASEAN. Here Japan usually displays a sharply focussed and fairly narrowly self-interested expression of Japanese concerns. Despite its currently great economic weight in the world Japan since its defeat in the Second World War has not been the dominant power in its own unstructured uninstitutionalised region, or cockpit, of north-east Asia - the simultaneous compresence of the Soviet Union, China and of the United States ensuring that this is so. Great economic power and technological expertise can, however, be converted into military power and the trends of the past ten years indicate that Japan is both becoming a more considerable military power (not least in naval terms) and is in practice extending its security or self-defence zone and will probably continue to do so in the 1990s - whether within the continuing terms of an alliance with the United States or with

increasing unilateralism remains to be seen.

D. The Middle East

In recent years much SIPRI literature on regional constellations of power (especially as depicted and discussed in its Yearbooks) has tended to emphasize 'the Middle East' as a volatile area with high escalatory potential for general war. This is not a new viewpoint. But recent trends have encouraged a rather different assessment according to which the Middle East is to some extent being decoupled from general superpower rivalries as external major powers increasingly adopt a semi-detached posture relative to this region. This is certainly an eminently debatable subject.

E. Southern Africa

Up to date readings of weapons inventories and indicators of economic strength confirm South Africa's undoubted superiority vis a vis each and all of its immediate neighbours whilst the withdrawal of Cuban troops, coupled with current Soviet and American caution regarding this region, combine to enhance this local hegemony. Furthermore, the immediate effects of trade sanctions have been to increase the degree of autarky in the South African economy whilst

boosting its domestic arms production. It may well be, however, that for internal domestic reasons principally South Africa's regional ascendancy has peaked and this regional giant's clay feet will become increasingly apparent in the 1990s.

War Potential and Capabilities - the insignia and inventories of military power.

While political and other changes in the 1980s may have reduced stark bipolarity and increased polycentricity, pluralism has further differentiated and distinguished the two so-called superpowers from all others. Before the 20th century warfare was basically two dimensional, it was fought either on land or at sea. The first world war witnessed the serious advent of submarine and air warfare, and the era of continuing cold war has seen space added to make contemporary warfare in principle five-dimensional for the most sophisticated and advanced of current military powers. By these standards all powers are inferior to the United States and the Soviet Union. Inventories of current weapons systems and the deeply ambiguous concepts of war potential and capability applied to the condition of the next ranks of military powers, including the most powerful in the third world; suggest that only between a dozen and a score actually or potentially can be actively consequential outside

their own borders.

### Armies

Assessing the qualities and trend lines of third world armies is in some respects easier and in several others more difficult than those of the first and second worlds. Easier because many third world armies have a combat record either against a foreign adversary or against insurgents in their own country. Harder because those elements of professionalism, regular and testing training and exercising, maintenance of equipment and weaponry - all these factors tend both to change rapidly and reliable data about their exact condition at any moment of time, let alone over time, is often very difficult to come by.

To be capable of acting in neighbouring countries or further afield, an army needs logistic capabilities, its own or those supplied by others, which few third world armies possess nowadays.

The Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia in 1978 depended critically on Soviet air-lift support. Similarly, the induction of Cuban troops into Africa in the late 1970s was facilitated by Soviet logistics. Present indications are that such facilities will be made available

very sparingly, if at all, in the 1990s. So long as Gorbachov remains at the helm of Soviet government.

The record of the recent past bristles with ironies. The Vietnamese army which eventually forced the US to withdraw from erstwhile Annam and Cochin-China by 1975, and then inflicted considerable damage on the PLA in 1978-9, has not been able to impose its hegemony over the whole of former Indo-China and lately has had to withdraw, in whole or in large part, from Cambodia. The Indian army having achieved a decisive predominance over Pakistan in 1971 has not been able in 1988/9 entirely to defeat and disarm the Tamil tigers of north Sri Lanka.

The Algerian, Egyptian, Nigerian or Indonesian armies, whether still de facto in power or not in their respective countries, today seem much less formidable forces than they have appeared to be at times in the past thirty years and each has been compromised either by taking on the appurtenances of governmental office or by the mortifications of dealing with internal violence. And these are but illustrative examples selected almost at random. Most contemporary third world armies are not efficient fighting forces but rather ambiguous assets of the State : ostensibly a principal protector of the State against external predators but actually liable to commit coups against its

incumbent government.

The sheer plenitude of coups - numbering many successes and presumably even more failures - has spawned a considerable diagnostic and explanatory literature and a sub-branch of strategic studies - 'coupology' it may be called, a subject which is most unlikely to become obsolete in the 1990s. In general, Sammy Finer's thesis - that there is an inverse correlation between the level of a country's political culture and the propensity of the military to coup - remains true. But so many countries fall within the rubric of low political culture that it is, and will remain, necessary to distinguish between types of coup, and their sequels and consequences.

### Navies

The contemporary third world is not replete with modern navies. One fairly recent study claimed that only three countries (Argentina, Brazil and India) had genuinely operational blue-water navies (see appendix). Given the long lead time (and expense) it takes to move from ordering to having an operational navy this situation does not seem likely to change significantly in the years immediately ahead, except perhaps for one or more of the three countries already mentioned - India, China and Japan. Even those with adjacent force

projection navies numbered only five in 1980 (See appendix). Most third world countries have only token navies.

### Air Forces

The spread of air forces within the third world is very much a recent development, not so much since the Second World War as since the 1960s. Virtually all sizeable countries nowadays aspire to have a national civil airline (though some of these are now being privatised) and a complementary air fighting force. Even so, analysts such as Robert Harkavy and Geoffrey Kemp have rightly reminded us that for third world air forces, the distinction between nominal and actual operational inventories is an important one. Maintenance, training and sustaining genuine combat readiness can be both costly and beyond the capabilities of many aspiring air forces. Within the contemporary third world Singapore, Taiwan, and Israel are exceptions rather than the rule in maintaining what appear to be both sophisticated and efficient air forces.

### Nuclears and other weapons

The dynamics of arms acquisition and transfer will continue to be of consequence and affect both the realities and estimates of regional

constellations of power in the present and future.

Because nuclear weapons are seen as the principal currency of military power and because of their horrendous powers of destructiveness attention will continue to focus on the problem of nuclear proliferation. Recent wars and other forms of conflict in the third world, combined with greater world sensitivity to environmental issues, has accorded a much higher salience also to matters affecting the manufacture, sales and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which are sometimes cynically referred to as poor countries' nuclear weapons.

The latest favourite weapon of choice in the third world is said by some analysts to be the blunt, dirty surface-to-surface missile, available to anyone who can buy or build one. These weapons are proliferating fast in conflict zones. Today's missiles available in the third world have been characterised as being like long range car-bombs : they can tear up houses and kill civilians but are militarily insignificant. More accurate, longer range missiles are, however, rather rapidly coming on stream, and with them potential death rates will soar.

Present surface-to-surface ballistic missiles are propelled on a

preset course and fly on their own momentum, without further guidance, unlike guided missiles. Sea-launched or air-launched versions, which require submarines and advanced aircraft, are still beyond the reach of most of the smaller missile powers. Cruise missiles, such as the Silkworms that China sold to Iran, have a limited market because they are difficult to operate.

Of the 20 or so countries with ballistic missiles either in their arsenals or under development, 14 are acquiring missiles sophisticated enough to carry nuclear warheads. Of this group only Israel is believed to have nuclear warheads, but India is probably capable of building them. Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea and Iraq all have nuclear programmes, but are unlikely to produce and show nuclear warheads for some years. The approaches of these countries to the NPT review conferences, and the NPT regime, in 1990 and 1995 could be revealing. For third world countries ballistic missiles are a ticket to higher political and military status. Missiles might turn a militarily marginal country into a significant regional player if logistics confer credibility.

Between the estimates and evaluations embodied in the complex concept of the war potential of powers, of nations, and the retrospective wisdom cast by the record of actual performance in

their most recent war, if any, lies the uncertain, always ambiguous present.

Some, perhaps many, of the shibboleths of the 1970s and 1980s regarding regional security systems are not dead and may be expected to be re-iterated, revived or recast in the 1980s.

Plus ça change ...

The versatilities and virtuositities of strategists and of strategic studies are increasingly being tested. To the traditional needs to know about military technology, arms transfer, the size, condition and capabilities of various weapons systems and armed forces, etc, the student of present and future third-world security scenarios, of regional constellations and their operative statics and dynamics, also needs nowadays to be familiar with, or to learn about, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental pollution, etc - and this is an indicative, by no means an exhaustive, list of the ever-widening spectrum of actual or potentially relevant contributory factors.

History is not at an end. At no previous time have so many regions and vast populations found themselves drawn so irresistibly into new orbits of activity, new spheres of conflicting political influence, and

new social ideologies, which, disrupting old habits, also generate new or heightened expectations or fears but leave many of the peoples of this planet ill at ease and insecure. Humanity is not in permanent repose but is engaged in multifarious activities, sometimes co-operative, often conflictual.

Given the fluidities obviously at work today within most regional organizations, it would be unrealistic to regard most of them as any more than fragile structures, temporary shelters or arenas for assemblage and consultation. Their existence is not so much proof against regional wars, but their continuance and workings provide some suggestions that war between the members is unlikely.

It may be discouraging, but I believe it is realistic and necessary to end on a sceptical note. The main organic forces which alter the weights and structures of military, economic and technological relationships between the peoples of the world, which widen or narrow their horizons or beliefs, which stimulate or inhibit them regarding fresh effort, which create new arenas or institutions for human endeavour and action - these are not, and cannot be, adequately portrayed in the elaborate tables of the annual Military Balance of the IISS or of SIPRI, nor even by the ingeniosities of Ray Cline or any other of the intellectual heirs of Charles Davenant and subsequent

generations of politico-military arithmeticians. But debate on these matters will, and must, go on.

Third-World naval hierarchy (1980)

Categories of navies	Regions	South America	Central America and Caribbean	South Atlantic	Africa	Mediterranean	Middle East	Indian Ocean	Far East	Totals by category (number, % of total)
6. Regional force projection navies	Brazil Argentina			(Brazil) (Argentina)				[Australia] India	[Australia]	3 1.9%
5. Adjacent force projection navies	Peru Chile						Iran	(Iran)	North Korea South Korea	5 4.8%
4. Offshore territorial defence navies	Venezuela Colombia	(Venezuela) (Colombia) Mexico	(Venezuela)	Egypt Libya	(Egypt) (Libya)	(Egypt) (Libya)	Pakistan (Indonesia) (Thailand)	(Pakistan) (Indonesia) (Thailand)	North Korea South Korea Indonesia Thailand Taiwan Philippines	10 9.6%
3. Inshore territorial defence navies	Ecuador Uruguay	Cuba Dominican Republic	(South Africa) (Nigeria) (Uruguay) (Ghana)	[South Africa] Nigeria Ethiopia Ghana	[South Africa] Nigeria Ethiopia Ghana	[Israel] (Syria)	[Israel] Syria	(Malaysia) (Ethiopia) Burma Bangladesh	[New Zealand] Vietnam Malaysia (Burma)	12 11.5%
2. Constabulary navies			(Guinea-Bissau) (Gabon) (Guinea)	Algeria Somalia Guinea-Bissau Gabon  Guinea Tanzania	(Algeria)	Iraq Saudi Arabia South Yemen Oman  North Yemen (Oman) (North Yemen) (Tanzania)	(Iraq) (Saudi Arabia) (Somalia) (South Yemen) (Yemen)	Singapore	12 11.5%	
1. Token navies	Suriname Guyana	Guatemala (Suriname)	(Mauritania) (Senegal)	Morocco Mauritania	(Morocco) (Tunisia)	Kuwait United Arab Emirates	(Kuwait) Sri Lanka	Kampuchea Brunei	57 54.9%	
		Bahamas	(Zaire)	Senegal	(Lebanon)	Oatar	(United Arab Emirates) Guinea	(57+5=62) (59.9%)		
		Costa Rica	Angola	Tunisia		Lebanon	(Oatar)			
		Trinidad & Tobago	(Suriname)	Zaire		Jordan	(Bahrain)	Tonga		
		Haiti	(Ivory Coast)	Angola		Bahrain	(Mozambique)	Solomon Islands		
		El Salvador	(Congo)	Sudan			(Kenya)			
		Panama	(Cameroon)	Ivory Coast			(Madagascar)			
		Nicaragua	(Liberia)	Congo			(Mauritius)			
		Honduras	(Benin)	Mozambique			(Djibouti)			
		Barbados	(Guyana)	Kenya			(Maldives)			
		(Guyana)	(Cape Verde)	Cameroon			Scycheles			
		Jamaica	(Sierra Leone)	Liberia			(Comoros)			
		St Vincent	(Gambia)	Madagascar						
		St Lucia	(Equatorial Guinea)	Benin						
		Grenada		Zanzibar						
		Belize		Cape Verde						
		St Kitts		Sierra Leone						
				Gambia						
				Togo						
				Mauritius						
				Djibouti						
				Equatorial Guinea						
				Comoros						
Landlocked navies	Boliva Paraguay			Malawi Mali					Laos	5 4.8%
	12	19	(23)	(24)	37	(7)	13	(15)	7	(29)
									16	(17)
									104	100.0%

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Note: Both quantitative and qualitative considerations were taken into account in developing the hierarchy, and are described in detail in this chapter. States are ranked hierarchically within as well as between ranks. States are listed without parentheses for their main region and within parentheses for regions they overlap. Regional totals are listed similarly at the bottom of the hierarchy, with totals listed without parentheses for states in the key region and within parentheses for overall totals. Navies of four enclave developed states (Australia, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa) are included in the hierarchy as well for illustrative purposes, because they are physically located amidst developing states. While these enclave navies are positioned approximately with respect to the ranks of the hierarchy, they are not included in the regional totals here or in regional weaponry graphs in Parts II and III. Their distinctive position is emphasized by placing them in brackets in the appropriate boxes.

Source: Michael A Morris, *Expansion of Third World Navies* (Macmillan Press, 1987) p35.

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THE CHANGING POLITICAL-STRATEGIC  
LANDSCAPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST\*

The political-strategic security environment in the Middle East is steadily changing on the eve of the 1990s. The change is related to a multitude of forces and factors from within (domestic developments and regional interactions) and from without (new American-Soviet relations). Manifestations of the change include the Palestinian INTIFADA, renewed Arab solidarity, the formation of Arab regional groupings, the proliferation of unconventional weapons including nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities, the ceasefire in Iraq-Iran war and the efforts to reach peaceful settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict.

The impact of new changes is better appreciated against the more stable features of the region. Strategically, it is situated at the crossroads of ancient world controlling a number of crucial passages and waterways. By virtue of location, it is the southern belly of the SU enjoying obvious political and strategic advantages. Economically, the region accounts for 62 percent of the world identified crude oil reserves and 29 percent of proven gas reserves. There is sharp asymmetries in the distribution of resources such as land, water, population and oil, the leading to differences in GNP: from \$680 in Egypt, \$1630 in Syria to \$8.860 in Saudi Arabia and \$19.120 in the United Arab

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\*This paper is a very early draft of an Adelphi paper,  
Criticisms and comments are welcomed.

Emirates (World Bank figures for 1985). Politically the region is a home to a number of intra-state and inter-states protracted social conflicts which find its origin in ethnic, communal religious and sectarian fragmentation. It also harbors one of the longstanding conflicts of the twentieth century; the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Militarily, the region is the most armed in the third world. According to SIPRI statistics for 1987 the value of arms imported to the Middle East and North Africa totalled \$11.925 billion or 48.2 percent of all arms imported by the third world including central and South America, South Asia, Far East, Sub-Sahara Africa and South Africa (total \$12.799 billion).

the five countries having the largest share of third world arms imports (percent) during the period 1984-1988 include four Arab states as follows: Iraq (13.9), India (12.4), Saudi Arabia (8.1), Egypt (6.9) and Syria (6.2). Moreover, a number of countries in the region have credible endogenous arms industries.

The objective of this paper is to underline some of the basic political strategic trends and issues which affect the regional security environment in the 1990s. While we take the whole region into consideration, the focus is Egypt, Israel and the Arab MASHREQ (East) including Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The paper

argues that there is a deescalation of traditional interstate conflicts, both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli, that this deescalation is likely to continue, and that domestic political cleavages and competition over resources are likely to become more pronounced. The Arab-Israeli conflict will increasingly take the form of an "Internal War" within the territories controlled by Israel with further marginalization of the direct role of other Arab states. In this view, the current arms race in the region, though serious and dangerous, is understood in terms of keeping the military regional balance and primarily as a deterrent. Thus, security threats in the Middle East are increasingly recognized as of domestic, developmental, and non-military nature. As will be shown later this development is related to the maturation of Arab state system.

The paper is divided into three sections: The first deals with the deescalation of inter state conflicts and the emergence of a new Arab consensus; the second with the Palestinian INTIFADA and its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict; the third with the changing security environment in the region.

#### I- THE NEW ARAB CONSENSUS

One major trend in Arab politics is the deescalation of interstate conflicts and the movement from political fragmentation (1979-1985) to cooperation and solidarity. There exists a new spirit of pragmatism, depolarization and deideologization in inter-Arab relations. The milestones of this movement are the three Arab summit meetings of Amman (November 1987), Algiers

(June 1988), and Casablanca (May 1989).

The change did not take place overnight, it was a reaction to a decade of division and disunity, and the recognition of its weakening impact on all actors. Thus there was first a general improvement in bilateral relations between Arab states. Diplomatic relations were resumed between Libya and each of Tunisia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Algeria resumed its relations with Morocco and a Maghrebi summit meeting was held in Algier in June 1988. South Yemen normalized its relations with Oman and North Yemen.

Another manifestation is the termination of a number of armed conflicts. The war between Libya and Chad came to an end by the close of 1987 and the two countries resumed diplomatic relations.

A ceasefire was effected in the Western Sahara war, notwithstanding the recent episode of October 1989. As to the Iraq-Iran war, the escalation of hostilities in 1988 (the missile war of cities and the tankers war) and the enhanced naval western, particularly American, presence was a catalyst for deescalation and ceasefire. It may be true that a higher degree of danger and risk was needed to get Iran's acceptance of the ceasefire in July 1988. There remains two hot spots, Lebanon and Sudan. Thanks to the "Taif" negotiations in which a number of regional and international actors contributed, the Lebanese civil

war seems to be approaching a turning point. As to the war in Southern Sudan, the coup of July 1989 initially created new hopes for reconciliation but were soon dashed away. The ceasefire is still there, but even if the war resumes it is conducted at a low level having no noticeable spillover or influence on the region.

A third manifestation is the rehabilitation of Egypt and its reintegration into the institutions of the Arab system. In contrast to 1979 when all Arab states severed diplomatic relations with Cairo (with the exception of Sudan, Somalia and Oman), in October 1989 all relations were reestablished with the exception of Syria, Lebanon and Libya. If we exclude Lebanon which does not have an independent foreign policy, Egypt has functional relations with Syria and Libya. As to Syria, Egypt participated in Damascus international fair in August 1989 and its minister of economy went there on this occasion.

Presidents Mubarak and Gaddafi met in late October 1989 and signed a number of protocols of cooperation. Finally, Egypt's return to the Arab League took place in a dignified manner, no apologies were given and Cairo emphasized its respect of all its contractual commitments.

A fourth manifestation of the deescalation of inter-states conflicts and renewed interest in Arab solidarity is the formation of two Arab groupings in February 1989: Union de Maghreb Ar (UMA) including Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen. If we account for the other six countries

member of the Gulf cooperation Council (GCC)

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE, most Arab states (15 out of 21 ) are members of a regional grouping.

The emergence of these groupings raises a number of interesting issues: one issue is the relation between the three groupings and between them and the Arab league. Some observers already warned that these groupings should not lead to the further weakening of the Arab league and its institutions. Another issue is the vulnerable position Arab states not belonging to any grouping (Gibboutti, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria and Sudan) may find itself in. For instance ,Syria perceived the formation of ACC as an attempt to isolate her. A third issue is the potential source of tension within each grouping and the degree of internal political cohesion. Whether these groupings will develop into security communities needs further investigation. Such a development requires the existence of a common perception of external threat.

All these developments contributed to the successful convening of the Arab summit meeting of Casablanca (May 22-24, 1989). The summit was attended by all Arab states except Lebanon ( 18 kings and presidents, one crown prince and two ministers: Mauritania's minister of industry and Somalia's foreign minister ). The mere attendance of all Arab states was a symbolic act of solidarity in itself. The summit effected a series of bilateral reconciliations, Egypt-Libya, Egypt-Syria and Syria-PLO, which were necessary for the achievement of a new Arab consensus.

The major unsettled dispute remains the Iraqi-Syrian one which manifests itself in Iraqi support of the Christian anti-Syrian camp in Lebanon. Syria stands out as isolated and vulnerable as never before since the October war of 1973. Syria followed a systematic policy of political and military support to Iran against Iraq. For a while Syria argued that it could use its leverage on Iran to moderate its behavior and help end the war. That did not prove true and Damascus lost this card. The war ended due to Iranian exhaustion and inability to continue the war, rather than to Syrian mediation. Syria did not even manage to save Kuwait from Iranian rockets and threats. Syria is a clear loser; it backed the wrong horse while its rivals; Egypt and the PLO supported the right one. Add to this Syrian entanglement in Lebanon and deteriorating economic situation at home. Some Syrian observers expressed the fear that, in order to destabilize the regime in Damascus, Iraq might mobilize its army along the norther border. The Deir al-Zor area is identified as the most sensitive point. There has always been pro-Iraqi sentiment in this area because of geographic proximity and family and commercial ties accross the Euphrates. This is an unlikely possibility and Iraq will be quite hesitant in using military power against Syria.

## II-AL -INTIFADA AND THE ARAB-ISRTAELI CONFLICT

Much have been written on al-intifada (the uprising) in the West Bank (population 970.000) and the Gaza stip (630.000) which has

continued for the last 23 months. What is of concern to us here is its political-strategic implications. As a form of collective action, the uprising mobilizes and moulds the Palestinians in the spirit of self-reliance. Its essence is a moral and psychological warfare to delegitimize Israeli occupation and, similar to other situations, it devises its own methods of operations to neutralize the occupier's military superiority and to reduce the balance of forces to a test of wills.

Thus the Intifada leadership resorted to various means of civil disobedience and resistance including strikes, demonstrations, closure of markets, refusal to pay taxes, and boycott of Israeli goods. Firearms were rarely used against the Israelis since it was perceived as a self-defeating tactic. The uprising leadership want to keep the image of a confrontation between youngsters throwing stones and the Israeli army, an image which has proven to be of great political and media impact. Though the Intifada controls no lands, its command on the populace is unchallenged and it has already built a network of administrative and service structures. Ultimately it brought confidence to the Palestinians and forced confusion and agony to the Israelis, thus transforming both of them. The uprising initiated a long overdue debate within Israel on its future and destiny bringing the issue home probably more than ever before.

The Intifada was a reaction against Israeli occupation, but also a cry against Arab neglect of their fate as manifested by the Amman summit meeting of 1987 where the Iraq-Iran war and the

threats to Gulf states took precedence. The uprising meant that the primary actors to the conflict are not just the Palestinians, but primarily those of them who live under occupation. It follows that the modus operadi of resistance is no longer border infiltrations from outside, but rather the grassroots mobilization of a whole population and its involvement in a collective act of defiance whose objective is to demonstrate Palestinian rejection of Israeli occupation, to show their will as a people for self-determination, to create a favorable image in western media, and to bring a sense of urgency for the resolution of their problem.

The intifada created a new political and psychological situation in the region. First, it proved its ability to continue and survive, thus becoming a sort of "a way of life" for the palestinians. second, less than massive fascist tactics, it seems that no military solution is possible. The real danger to the uprising is no longer Israeli military repression but its ability to maintain its internal unity against religious sectarianism

( Hamas) and local infighting.

A major impact of the intifada has been a new sense of realism and pragmatism in palestinian circles. It was the uprising which allowed the Palestine National Council in November 1988 to accept all UN resolutions including resolutions 242 and 338, to recognize the state of Isreal, and to declare the foundation of a sovereign

Palestine state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Afterwards the Palestinian leadership demonstrated diplomatic flexibility and embarked on a serious effort to open dialogue with Jewish, Zionist and Israeli organizations. One important conclusion is an adhoc negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Another is the Palestinian-PLO dialogue which has not been of great substance so far.

The preceding analysis leads us to two conclusions. One is that the military confrontation is increasingly taking the form of "internal war" within the lands controlled by Israel and is taking place between the Palestinians and Israelis whether they are in uniform or not. Already a number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank have taken law into their hands and conducted reprisal raids against Palestinian villages. Some Israeli authors have pondered about the impact of continued domestic violence on Israeli democracy and inter-Jewish relations. A particular crucial group is Israeli-Palestinians and for how long can they watch what is happening to other Palestinians.

The second is the marginalization of the role of Arab states. Politically, all Arab governments, with the possible exception of Syria, support the PNC resolution and the Intifada. Militarily, the Syrian quest for strategic parity is made almost impossible by Soviet emphasis on balance of interests, not balance of forces.

Of particular interest in this regard is Iraq's position toward Israel. One alarming view is that Iraq would revitalize the

Eastern front and engage in conflict with Israel. This is highly unlikely for a number of reasons. For a while Iraq will be preoccupied with the tasks of economic and political reconstruction. Another reason is that, even after reaching a political settlement, Iraq will continue to perceive Iran as a major potential threat. The deep Iraq-Iranian hatred and mistrust, fuelled by eight years of brutal war, is impossible to defuse overnight. This will remain a central factor in the military and political situation in the Gulf for some time to come. Third, the reactivation of the Eastern front require Iraqi-Syrian cooperation which is almost an impossibility. Reserve General Avraham Tamir, former director general of Israeli foreign ministry, is of the view that rather than cooperation with Syria, Iraq would in fact reduce the threat posed by Syria.

Moreover, such reactivation seems off place at a time when PLO makes peace overtures towards Israel accepting its right to exist. Finally that view ignores the emergence of new political realism in Baghdad. The Iraqi leadership is unlikely to alienate countries such as Egypt and Jordan whose political and military support during the war was pronounced, or Kuwait and Saudi Arabia whose financial support was crucial. The ACC is another manifestation of Iraq's new pragmatism. It is interesting to note that the charter of the Council made no reference to Israel or the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is more likely that Israel does not perceive Iraq as an

immediate threat. For long, Israeli strategic thinking adhered to the 'periphery theory' articulated by David Ben-Gurion, that Israel has to ally itself to geo-strategic periphery Middle Eastern states (Iran and Ethiopia) against the Arabs. Thus, despite Iranian vehement anti-zionist propaganda Israel was ready to support Iran militarily during the war. Indeed, the idea of the contra affair originated in Israel rather than Washington. Gradually, in 1987-1988, Israeli official policy moved the periphery theory and in June 1988, Defense Minister Rabin stated that the war no longer served Israeli interests.<sup>1</sup>

It is in this context that the new arms race in the region is better understood as an equalizer. R. Litwak once argued that "perception of the regional military balance affect internal political debates in an often complex and subtle manner," and that Iraq's Perception of a growing military imbalance with Iran in its favor encouraged its leadership to initiate large scale military operations. Thus, the acquisition of new arms must be seen in relation to the regional military balance and whether it maintains the balance or destabilize it. Admittedly, this is not always easy to establish because of different perceptions and conflicting states' interests. What is important to recall, however, is that arms are the symptoms, not the causes of a conflict and that a breakdown of regional military balance in favor of one actor is a potential invitation to war. The proliferation of unconventionanl weapons in the Middle East and its consequences will be dealt with later.

### III-THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

From the preceding analysis, it seems that the security environment in the Middle East in the 1990s will be shaped by three major dilemmas: A political-social dilemma, a resources dilemma and a military dilemma.

A. THE POLITICAL-SOCIAL DILEMMA refers to the potential tension between two contradictory emerging trends and forces. The first is a new spirit of realism and pragmatism in Arab politics which reflects itself in political relaxation (political parties in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, political elections in Jordan and Morocco, and debate on political pluralism in Iraq), and economic privatization (Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and to a lesser degree in Syria) at home, and Arab solidarity and deescalation of interstate conflicts at the regional level as outlined in section I of the paper. The second is confrontational in nature and is epitomized by the rise of militant Islamic groups, and the political consequences of developmental failure in societies experiencing rapid population increase.

Of particular interest here is the impact of Islamic groups on society and polity. The basic threat posed by these groups is primarily moral and ideological. Islamic militant groups have not developed yet strong organizational structures capable of challenging ruling regimes, nor have they been able to penetrate the army to effect a coup. Their immediate threat lies in their political discourse and message which is more acceptable to the populace at large and of definite delegitimizing influence on

the ruling elites. Their influence is enhanced by lack of political participation, political authoritarianism and cult personality. It is also compounded by deteriorating economic conditions and growing disparities in society. Instead of dealing with the socio-economic and psychological roots of the problem, most governments relied on security measures which increase the popularity of these groups and showed them in the image of martyrs, an image on which they thrive and flourish. Egypt provides an example of a country which follows a multi-dimensional strategy in dealing with these groups involving cooptation, containment and repression. In 1989, Algeria legalized the establishment of an Islamic party.

The two trends apparently push towards opposite directions and conclusions. Ironically, some aspects of each reinforce the other. For instance, the deescalation of external threats may lead to the crystalization of domestic cleavages long suppressed or diluted by the "external enemy". Also, privatization of the economy tends to create new sources of conflict and political liberalization provides the opportunity for its articulation. Thus, if these trends continue, particularly in societies which experience economic crises, increasing unemployment and heavy foreign debt burden, we are more likely to observe more problems of political stability and threats to ruling elites' legitimacy.

These developments bring to the fore the linkage between domestic and external conflicts. In particular, three elements need to be further investigated in the third world context. First, the

relation between deocratization and security, i.e., how political pluralism and multipartism affect social integration, political cohesion and encourage trans-state loyalties and affinities. Second, the relation between failed economic development and security, especially the political consequences of debt and food insufficiency. Third, the relation between communal-ethnic conflicts and security.

We hypothesize that with the deescalation of external conflicts and the new mood of Arab solidarity, domestic conflicts are likely to manifest themselves in a forceful and stronger fashion. More challenges to the legitimacy of ruling elites are likely to become evident. If these trends continue, these elites have to settle their domestic political debts in the 1990s.

The domestication of conflict is related to a more fundamental process happening in the Middle East, that is the maturation and hardening of state structures and values. For long, the "state" was perceived as a fait colonial, and therefore, was seen as a transitory phenomenon to be replaced eventually by a broader Arab unity. The state was besieged from the outside by calls for pan-Arabism and from the inside by ethnic formations having trans-state links. The rise of Arab pragmatism is a function of the decline of Pan-Arab ideology as pronounced in the 1950s. It follows that the importance of Pan-Arab issues as tools for mobilization and legitimation are likely to decrease in the future.

B. THE RESOURCES DILEMMA refers to imbalance between limited available resources and ever expanding population. The Middle East possesses some 5 percent of the world population which increases annually by an average of 2.9 percent. It increased from 184.05 million to 230.89 million in the span of eight years (1975-1983), that is to say an increase of 25 percent. This was accompanied by a decrease in the area under Arable and permanent crops as well as the irrigated area. It follows that food import for almost all Arab countries tend to increase.

The area under cultivation ranges from less than 1 percent of the total area in the GCC countries, to over 30 percent in Syria. Sudan contains around 40 percent of all Arable land in the region permanently devoted to crops. Had it not been for a totally inadequate infrastructure and chronic political instability, Sudan could have become the bread basket of the Middle East and Africa.

Land is available in all countries but the critical variable is shortage of water. A study on the natural resources in the Middle East concludes by suggesting :."even when oil is taken into consideration, there is little doubt that land and, more importantly water are the Middle East most important natural resources". Water is obtained either by surface waters or by tapping underground reservoirs. And each has its own problems.

The region includes a number of rivers such as the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates and the Jordan river. There exists a lot of problems of distribution of water between states which are likely to

become more pronounced. For instance, there are Sudanese grievances about the Nile treaty with Egypt of 1958, and there exists no treaty organizing the relations between countries of the Nile basin. The Jonglei Canal project in Southern Sudan represents an Egyptian-Sudanese effort to better utilize existing resources, but due to the war in the South, the project came to a stop.

The Tigris-Euphrates basin and Shatt al-Arab is divided between Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Also the Jordan river water is shared by Jordan, Israel and Syria. Of less importance the Orontes and Lytani rivers. The Orontes flows through Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, and the Litani through Lebanon and Israeli-occupied territories.

As to underground reservoir water, the reservoir is often in a desert unpopulated area, or the costs are too high to make tapping the water economical. Countries are becoming more sensitive as to the use of underground water. Israeli water policy in the occupied territories is a case in point, and Gaddafi's ambitious project to create a great river is a different one.

As the value of water increases, the relative importance of states may change and water geopolitics will be a major security concern. Ewan W. Anderson argues "indeed, it may be predicted with confidence that in the future water will increasingly become a key factor in confrontations over political frontiers," in the

Middle East.

C. THE MILITARY DILEMMA refers to the introduction of advanced weapons ( especially long-range missiles ), the development of a nuclear deterrent, and the acquisition of chemical and biological capabilities. These developments raise a number of questions related to stability of conflict regimes (primarily the Arab-Israeli conflict) and/or their resolutions. For instance, there is a question of whether an Israeli nuclear posture will maximize Israeli security and enable it to pursue its regional objectives from a position of strength, or will it lead the Arab states to build their own nuclear capability (Iraq) or to acquire an equilizer in the form of chemical weapons.

This development has to be seen against the legacy of the regional military balance between Israel and the Arab states in the last four decades. Past experience demonstrates two important lessons. First, in terms of integrated war capabilities, Israel enjoys more power than any one or combination of Arab countries. The Israeli advantage is not numerical but systemic and qualitative. Thus, even when Arab states fought under the best of circumstances in October 1973 (concerted Egyptian-Syrian attack, advantage of surprise, and definite numerical superiority), Israel could turn the tide of the war to its favor. Due to the modernization of Arab armies, however, the human and material price for victory has tended to increase. A war is proven to be more difficult and costly, and

Israel's ability to terminate war rapidly and with minimal losses are diminishing. Second, uptill now both the Arab states and Israel adopted an essential conventional; defensive posture which entails denying one's territory to the other, limiting damages to itself, and destroying the other's armed forces in the battlefield. Neither resorted to the use of mass destruction weapons or, with few exceptions, engaged in cities war or attacking civilian targets.

It is against this background that the proliferation of unconventional weapons represent a destabilizing element. Six states (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya) have a chemical weapon (CW) capability. Five of them, except Libya, have or working to get a biological warfare capability. Ten countries possess surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and some are developing their own independent missile capability : Israel: Jericho 2 and the Arrow, and Egypt and Iraq: Badr 2000 modelled after the Argentina condor 2 . Israel has a nuclear capability and Iraq attempts to develop one.

The introduction of unconventional, particularly cw, weapons change the nature of the regional military balance and of the target of war. They pose threats not just to states, but to people and societies. Societies are no longer just affected by war but become its immediate target.

The proliferation of unconventional weapons has been debated from at least two perspectives and by two groups. On the one side, the

globalists and the pure arms control experts warn from the serious implications of such a process, and call for the establishment of arms control regimes. On the other hand, the regionalists and the more politically sensitive to the intricacies of regional conflicts link the successful establishment of arms controls regimes with corresponding political measures for conflict resolution.

In the Middle East, the CW cannot be separated from the nuclear. The Israeli ambivalence of its nuclear capability has been perceived by Arab states as a major threat and source of regional military imbalance. As perceived by the Arab states, Israeli nuclear capability has three implications:

1. It influences Israel political priorities and options.
2. It threatens the physical security of Arab countries, and
3. It creates new threat perceptions and forces Arabs to change their military strategies and postures. Thus their search for an equalizer.

To say that however is not reassuring and we have to investigate under what conditions these weapons can be used. Indeed, some were already used in the Gulf war and its strategic impact go beyond the direct actors in the Arab-Israeli or the Iraq-Iran war. For instance, the SSM's deployed on Iran's Gulf coast could strike at targets anywhere on the Southern shores of the Gulf, those deployed to the north and east could reach targets in the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistan. Similarly, Iran's

missiles reach of over 400 km have within its reach all of Syria, parts of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Israel and the Soviet Union.

Can these weapons be used in the Arab-Israeli conflict? From past experience it seems that CW is used against countries which cannot respond in kind. Both Israel and the Arab states recognize that the other party has the ability to respond in kind. Arab states also recognize that Israel has an elaborate defence system against CW, and it recognizes that Israel has strong retaliation potential with devastating consequences to an adversary using CW. On the other hand, given Israel's conventional arms superiority, the need does not arise for the use of CW. Hypothetically, CW may be used in three instances: A state may use it when facing imminent military collapse, or a state may use it against a domestic foe, or it may use it against a country which does not have it.

A successful arms control regime in the Middle East requires the political resolution of the Arab-Israeli and the Iraq-Iran conflicts. Military and political measures are to be parts of the same package which may include CBM measures (verification: Trust and verify) and peace keeping operations.

#### CONCLUSION

In this paper we made a three-fold argument: first, that internal political conflicts will increase in importance in contrast to inter-state ones. This will affect all pan-oriented issues and

the way Arab states dealt with the Intifada is a case in point. The issues of political participation and legitimation are likely to be the focus of intensive debates and fights. Second, given the developmental failure and the paramountcy of domestic issues, the competition over resources is likely to increase. Third, the proliferation of unconventional weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological, is a destabilizing factor to the regional military balance. Paradoxically, arms race takes place in a political environment more prone to peaceful settlement. The new high level of risk may be an eye-opener and an incentive for a historical compromise to the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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**FOUNDATIONS AND INSTITUTES**

**by Professor Robert O'Neill**

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FOUNDATIONS AND INSTITUTES

ROBERT O'NEILL

It is tempting but tedious to use one of the stock phrases from the analysis of intra-alliance relations to characterize the nature of the partnership between foundations and research institutes. Clearly a relationship of such high mutual dependence is also one replete with tensions. But as it is one of the most important bases of good research and ultimately, of improvement in the human condition, it is worth a little direct thought and analysis in its own right from time to time. The thoughts I set out here are, of course, drawn almost entirely from experience on the institute side of the relationship, experience of seeing my own and others' submissions accepted or rejected and experience of trying, not always successfully, to understand why the decisions fell the way they did. But these thoughts have also been shaped by the occasional experience of being allowed to step to the other side of the line either to sit in judgement on the submissions of others or to provide advice on the longer term shaping of foundation priorities.

The classical model of institute-foundation relations that we are all brought up to respect is, like that which forms the basis of capitalist economics, a very simple one. It is one

on the basis of a program  
(others further about process)  
↑

where the institutes propose and the foundations dispose. It is a free market transaction, in which foundations shop around for what they see to be the best ideas to support and the institutes vie with each other to attract foundation attention. Free competition between institutes controls the quality of the ideas on offer. The numbers of foundations and relative absence of market dominance by any of them keeps the market open and unbiassed. Quality should prevail.

That at least is the theory. We all know that the practice is somewhat different. Institutes do not always compete with each other: often they are rather good at avoiding competition by colluding or by tacit restraint. Or they take little or no notice of what others have on offer, bumbling on with what they know they can do and just hoping against hope that someone will keep them going. If they have a special advantage in terms of status in the market, e.g. as the only institute of its kind in a particular country or region, or as the pet of one or more foundations, they can sometimes get away with an extremely trashy product in terms of submissions and publications, yet still obtain funding. They can often buttress themselves further against the blast of competition by running to governments for support. All too often governments provide resources for reasons which have little to do with research quality or utility and a lot to do with

national chauvinism, cronyism, jobs for the boys (and girls these days), and position play in domestic politics.

Not all the problems lie on the institute side, of course. Foundations do not always know a good idea when they see one. For that matter they do not always know a bad one. The commodities from which they are selecting are by their nature somewhat new to the buyer. The packaging provided by experienced old hands in the institutes will often keep a foundation officer from looking too deeply into what the package itself contains. This is known to the cognoscenti of the institute-foundation game as the <sup>Meaples</sup> Italian syndrome. The foundation officer who has little idea of what he or she wants, is all too easily fascinated by superficial attractiveness and gimmickry (the Californian syndrome), or made gullible by a sense of mission (the Iranian syndrome). Sometimes the buyers do not really search through the market, preferring to deal with a handful of established institutes who, on the whole, they trust as we all trust Harrods or Fortnums, only to realize after many years of quick and convenient trading that they have been given a bad deal. This we term the West End syndrome. Also it is not unknown for the buyer to be under pressure at home to bring something back, no matter how poorly stocked the market is. We may call this the Polish syndrome. Or the buyer may patronize a particular supplier because he or she knows that someone at home likes

that supplier or wants to have a particular type of product and is not at all fussy about the quality of its construction. These respectively are the Sicilian and Irish syndromes.

I write some, but not all, of this with tongue in cheek. It is a rather imperfect market and we cannot expect the classical model to be universally applicable. None the less it is still a good model to keep in mind for the longer term planning of our relationship and against which to put forward some ideas for improving the quality of the partnership that both sides need for a creative life.

First some thoughts for institutes:

1. Better products are needed in terms of submissions, both as to substance and as to the way in which they are put together. All too often institutes throw submissions together as a kind of formality, to set the seal on a deal that they hope has already been done or because they just do not believe that it is worth the necessary effort to write good submissions,

*network of institutes → downwards competition not yet equipped  
→ devaluation (the case of Spain) →*

2. Institutes may co-operate but they are foolish to try to eliminate competition between each other. That way the quality of the market as a whole is decreased and everybody will suffer in the long term.

3. Institutes should recognize their own particular areas of strength and try to utilize them, and impress the foundations with what they have to offer in these regards. At the same time institutes should take note of their areas of weakness and think hard as to whether they need to eliminate them for their own longer term good. Some they can accept, but not all.

4. In developing their strengths, institutes need to remember that their major assets are human. These cannot be turned on and off like a tap. Recruitment policies must be planned with a view to the work of each institute several years ahead. Retention of key staff is also an important matter: organizations must be run happily if people are to want to stay.

*Thinking  
on the  
job*

*policy oriented*

5. Institutes need to do market research - both as to what the customer is likely to want to buy and as to what the customer might be impressed into buying, even though he did not know he wanted it until he saw it. Institutes need to remember above all that really nobody owes them a living. They have to satisfy some consumers (and of course these need to be far wider than simply the funding foundations) if they are going to survive, and those consumers must feel that they are receiving value for the money and other resources they are contributing. Satisfied customers lead to rising demand. Most of us believe that our field needs still further support: the

best way to impress new foundations is to impress the ones who now support us.

Second some thoughts for foundations:

1. Foundations need continually to lift their capabilities as buyers or selectors in this expanding field of research institutes bidding for support. It is unsatisfactory that some foundations enter the market place only spasmodically due to whims of board members or staffs or, more frequently, excessive work pressures on the available assessment staff. Board members and staffs need to be expert in appraising what a large market has to offer. If they want a good product they must show that they know how to recognize one and will buy on quality and value. Foundations need to face their own responsibilities to the market in seeing that their staffs are adequate for the task in hand. Scrimping on staff positions can prove to be a very false economy in the long run. It is not just a matter of staff numbers: quality is also vital. Person for person they must be able to match wits with the institutes, and know enough about the field to be able to sniff quality both in the ideas coming forward and in the people proposing them. They must also be able to judge the management capabilities of those who will have to carry research proposals through to become finished publications.

Board members, the ultimate source of sovereignty in the world of foundations similarly need to know their fields in some substantive depth and stay in close touch with them. They should have the qualities which enable them to assess critically and wisely the advice given them by their staffs. They must be willing to devote the necessary time to maintain true expertise as buyers in the market place.

2. The quality of the market could be improved if there were more customers active in it. One of the most important sources of imperfection in the competition is the relatively small number of sponsors to whom institutes can look for support. Thirty years ago the shortage was more on the supply side. In the interim the number of suppliers seems to have increased far more rapidly than the number of consumers. As mentioned above, the best way to expand trade is to satisfy the existing customers. It is not the only way: institutes can go out and canvass amongst foundations who are not active in their field; foundations who are busy in the field and like what they see there can let other foundations know that they might be missing out on something interesting and important.

3. Foundations should go to some trouble to let institutes know how their longer term interests and priorities are moving, and seek feedback on whether these are sensible directions to take. Foundations must, for the sake of the

market as a whole, take their own decisions on longer term priorities, and be tough enough to push the institutes around a little if necessary. At the same time the foundations need to be alive to the possibility that they can be tempted into trendiness and pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp. They can be saved from this fate by exposing their own ideas to the critical judgement of the institutes, noting particularly the quality of those who respond positively. If a foundation wants to have a particular piece of research done it can always find someone willing to do it, but when it is only the bottom end of the market which is interested that is the time for second thoughts. The bottom end is not always wrong of course, but it is the bottom end none the less.

4. In taking the opinions of institutes, foundations must be very careful to avoid biasing the market. This is extremely hard to achieve, but it can be done, as some of the foundations have clearly shown. It calls for staff of real mettle and for a tough-minded relationship between foundation staff and their board members. If everyone involved understands the different functions of institutes and foundations, and has a dedication to maintaining the quality of the relationship between them, then its problems are soluble. But if not the result can be the sort of erosion of quality which characterizes the economies of communist states.

5. Foundations are also in competition in various subtle ways with each other. I do not mean by this that we are talking in any real sense about a seller's market. The surplus of supply from the institute side is virtually a permanent factor. But this situation makes it all the more important that foundations should review their own position and performance in the market alongside those of other foundations. They have to act as buyers who feel a responsibility to develop the natural competitive strength of the market. They need to talk together and co-operate to a degree, yet without acting as a cartel. If they do the market will soon know and suitably biased products will be offered, or other tactics will be used by institutes to sell their wares.

6. The whole system benefits from the existence of differences between foundations regarding research interests and policy stances. The foundations themselves should seek to maintain this diversity, rather than as sometimes happens, all rushing to support work on the major crisis topic of the year.

7. The process of assessment is very much a two sided one. Institutes feel better balanced and more secure if they are supported by a larger number of foundations than a smaller. They are always looking to add to their portfolios of funders for more reasons than simply to increase their incomes. But all responsible institutes know that there is money available

that they would be ill-advised to accept. Foundations, to be really effective and highly regarded, also have a professional code of ethics to follow. Who defines and upholds this code I do not know. It is largely a matter for the foundations to keep each other up to the mark. None the less the institutes also have some leverage here, and a duty to each other to turn away money that is tainted or carries a presumption that it is to support research that will serve pre-ordained conclusions.

In conclusion:

All of us involved in the relationship between research institutes and foundations face conflicting pressures and temptations. On the one hand we have responsibilities to the field as a whole, as well as to our own best interests in the longer term, and on the other we have short term financial pressures for the institutes to take the money and run or for the foundations to dole it out quickly and painlessly. Obviously the first set of factors must be given predominance in our thinking about funding and research strategies. We all have to be conscious of standards to be maintained, fostering quality and free competition on both sides, if our joint resources are to be used effectively. If we can stay friends in the process, so much the better, but it must be a friendship based on mutual respect for our different positions.

and roles in the market. A cosy, non-critical relationship between institutes and foundations spells decline for both.

