EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Instituto de estudos estratégicos e internacionais
Lisboa, 9-11/XI/1989

a. Programme
1. "Europe 1992: political and security implications"/ Gianni Bonvicini
2. "Developments in East-West relations"/ Henning Wegener
3. "The role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and peacekeeping"/ Fen Osler Hampson

PROGRAMME

The Institute for Strategic and International Studies (IEEI), founded in 1980, is a non-profit, independent organization, designed to provide research and information and foster debate on international affairs, defence and security. The organization of the International Lisbon Conference is one of the IEEI's regular activities. The present (seventh) conference is held under the high patronage of the Foreign and Defence Ministries, and has the support of the Inernational Secretariat of the Atlantic Alliance and of the US Mission to NATO. We also wish to thank the Portuguese Navy and the Banco Comercial Português for their cooperation..

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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7th International Lisbon Conference

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
Lisbon * November 9th-11th, 1989

Thursday * November 9th

I Opening session

The conference will be addressed by
H.E. Eurico de Melo,
Vice-Premier and Defence Minister

Welcome address
Ambassador José Calvet de Magalhães,
IEEI Chairman

II The implications for European security of current changes in the world order

10.00h

Introductory remarks
* Ambassador François de Rose

Respondant
* Victor de Sá Machado
Trustee, Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon

11.30h **Europe 1992: political and security implications**

Chairman : João Cravinho
Vice-Chairman, European Parliament

* Gianni Bonvicini
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Respondants
* Dr Peter Schmidt
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
* Adm. António Fuzeta da Ponte
Portuguese Military Representative to NATO

14.30h **Developments in East-West relations**

Chairman: Álvaro de Vasconcelos
IEEI Director

* Ambassador Henning Wegener
NATO assistant secretary-general, Political Affairs

* Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg
Brazilian Ambassador to Moscow

Respondants
* Armand Clesse
President, Luxembourg-Harvard Association

17.00h **Euro-Atlantic partnership: future challenges**

* Ambassador William T. Taft, IV
US Ambassador to NATO

* José Luís Nunes
Parliamentary Defence Committee

20.00h Dinner. Guest speaker on
Europe: New Challenges
* William Pfaff
IHT, Paris

Friday * November 10th

09.30h **The new Soviet policy and its implications**
* Mark Katz
US Institute of Peace, Washington

Respondant
* Fernando Jorge Cardoso
IEEI African Studies Group

III **Emerging factors of multipolarity**

11.30h Introductory remarks
* Ambassador Hisashi Owada
Deputy Foreign Minister, Japan

Respondant
* Ambassador José Calvet de Magalhães

14.30h **Political and economic factors**

* Gelson da Fonseca
Director, IPRI, Brasília

* Prof Alejandro Lorca
Director, IEGA, Madrid

Respondant
* José Medeiros Ferreira
Universidade Nova, Lisbon

17.00h **The greater relevance of regional powers**

Chairman: Prof Armando de Castro
IEEI Board

* Prof Blanca Torres
Director, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Mexico

* Air Cdre Jasjit Singh
Director, IDSA, New Delhi

* Prof Gabriel O. Olusanya
Director, NIIA, Lagos

Saturday * November 11th

09.30h **New Soviet Thinking and Europe**

* Gen Konstantin Mikhailov
  Soviet Foreign Ministry

Respondant
* João Soares
  Journalist, Lisbon

IV Regional issues in a changing world scene

11.30h **North-South cooperation and regional conflicts**

* Prof Armando de Castro
  IEEI Board

* António Carlos Pereira
  Editor, Política e Estratégia, São Paulo

14.30h **A new role for the United Nations?**

* Fen Hampson
  Senior Research Associate, CIIPS, Ottawa

Respondants
* Guilherme Oliveira Martins
  Presidency of the Republic

* Mohamed Ben Allal
  Director, ENAP, Rabat

V Closing session

16.00h Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Jaime Gama
Chairman, Parliamentary Defence Committee

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* Coffee breaks at 11.00h and 16.30h * Lunch at 13.00h
* Conference languages: Portuguese and English. Simultaneous translation from Portuguese into English.

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INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS

VII CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL DE LISBOA

A SEGURANÇA EUROPEIA E OS FACTORES DE MULTIPOLARIDADE MUNDIAL

7TH INTERNATIONAL LISBON CONFERENCE

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

EUROPE 1992:

POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Gianni Bonvicini

Lisboa, 9-11 de Novembro de 1989

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Europe 1992: Political and Security Implications

Gianni Bonvicini
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Paper prepared for the 7th International Lisbon Conference organized by the Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais on "European Security in a Multipolar World", Lisbon 9-11 November 1989. Provisional Draft. Do not quote.

Europe 1992: Political and Security Implications

The extent to which an association can be made between developments in European security policy and steps taken toward the completion of the internal market is not immediately evident. In order to understand the current situation and suggest hypotheses for the future course of European security policy in light of the outlook for 1992, it is useful to recall several recent developments.

The 1980s have been characterized by a renewed desire for a more autonomous European defence policy. Security has become a pressing concern for several important reasons, including the decision to accept the challenge to deploy euromissiles; the need to take an active role in the US plans for a defensive defence; the increasing risk of American disengagement, etc.

The course of development in the area of security policy has been indirectly related to the prolonged crisis in the process of economic integration: perhaps in reaction to the almost ten years of paralysis caused by conflict with the British on the budgetary issue within the EC, impetus for integration shifted to the EPC. Thus, it was in the EPC (the institution whose main goal is that of creating a European identity in the world) that the initial steps toward the definition of a European security policy were formalized. The first of these was the 1981 London Report, which committed the member states to coordination on "political" aspects of security; "economic" aspects were subsequently addressed by the Genscher-Colombo initiative and the 1983 Solemn Declaration in Stuttgart.

In spite of these efforts, progress was slow as the committees and groups within the EPC tended paradoxically to concentrate on problems of interpretation of the meaning of "political and economic" aspects (which topics to include in the debates) rather than on the issues themselves. Given these disappointing results, together with the desire to include military aspects (at least those related to doctrine and strategy) in the formulation of security policy, a different forum was sought for the debate, and the discussions were shifted from the restricted circles of EPC to the WEU. Though the WEU had been a dormant organization with no real power, its seven founding members managed to resuscitate it, albeit with cosmetic changes. As a result, a few small steps could be taken towards the development of an autonomous European security policy

with the development of the Platform on European Security Interests, the coordination (however superficial) of naval operations in the Persian Gulf and, finally, with the enlargement of the WEU to Spain and Portugal.

It was not until the adoption and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 that an attempt was made to deal with all aspects of European security policy under a single treaty. Article 30 of the SEA stresses the need for Europeans to take responsibility at least for political and economic aspects of their security (section 6a) and, what is perhaps more important, stipulates that Europe ensure the provision of technological and industrial conditions essential to its security (section 6b).

Thus the development of a European security policy has become a formal objective, set out by a treaty ratified by all twelve member states. In spite of this legalistic formulation of the issues, as will be seen in the following pages, the question of methodology and the issue itself remains: what should be the role for security policy within the dynamics of European integration?

* * *

The Single European Act and the outlook for 1992 has activated a mechanism that had been stalled for years: the unification of the European common market. When the Treaty of Luxembourg was signed in December 1986, few could have forseen the potential of the limited changes made to its precursor, the Treaty of Rome. In fact, the prevailing feeling was one of scepticism and resignation - yet another small step had been taken by the European governments.

After a few months, however, it was discovered, to the surprise of many, that a valid mechanism had been created within the Community and that the objective of a single market was a real possibility. On the basis of this certainty, the Brusselles Commission took the lead of a large grouping of economic and political forces in an effort to make a qualitative move toward economic and monetary union: the objective would be the creation of a community economic policy that would allow for market liberalization while compensating for the inevitable negative effects on economically disadvantaged areas and, at the same time, would constitute a further step toward the ultimate goal of the functionalist strategy of political unification.

With the Single European Act, therefore, the question of European identity and the nature of the process of integration has reemerged; the issue of European security is bound to be raised within this debate, at least in terms of the outlook for the future.

The question of European identity has long been debated; if this issue has reemerged with the proposal for the single market (which has given rise to the controversial concept of a "European Fortress") it is, as has been noted earlier, closely tied to the objectives and activities of European Political Cooperation. This cooperation, which is about twenty years old, has helped Europeans build their own identity in the field of international relations. Its activities have created a package of common positions and consistent policies (acquis politique), on the basis of which the Europeans have been able to exercise a certain measure of autonomy, in addition to the autonomy reached in the field of external economic cooperation. Now the completion of the Single European Market is going to reinforce this sense of identity (and possibly create the conditions necessary for the attainment of greater autonomy).

The Twelve have become more visible internationally because of their political dimension; furthermore, they have become the object of external demands to react with greater determination and authority.

The growing pressure by third countries, reluctant in the past to recognize the artificial distinction between the EPC's political activities and the EC's economic responsibilities, is an incentive to add the security dimension to the Twelve's initiatives and statements. Requests to play a mediatory or buffer role in crisis areas (the Middle East, the Gulf, Central America, etc.) are rather frequent; furthermore, economic and security interests (oil, raw materials, etc.) keep European interests keen. It will be increasingly difficult, therefore, to believe that the various aspects of European activity can continue to be compartmentalized. Article 30, 6a of the Single Act in fact suggests that "closer cooperation on European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters".

The recent Austrian application for membership in the EC has confirmed that the there is a significant security dimension to the European identity and that there are closer ties linking the political, economic and security aspects of European activity. It is precisely this security dimension that is behind the EC's unofficial reluctance to accept Austria's request (made primarily for economic considerations) or, more accurately, the reluctance is motivated by the fear that Austrian membership could create obstacles to political unification, a process that must necessarily have a security dimension. This is the first time, in fact, that a request for membership has represented a problem for the future of the security and identity of Europe.

In conclusion, European security policy is part of the total concept of European identity and, as such, can not be considered in isolation. Since 1992 will reinforce this identity, it will also motivate, indirectly, the need for increased attention to its security dimension.

* * *

Though a theoretical basis now exists for the reinforcement of the European identity, a political mechanism for such reinforcement has yet to be worked out. The current developments in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, will necessarily affect plans for European defence as the profound changes in Poland and Hungary and the unrest in East Germany and on the Soviet borders make the future order of Europe uncertain. A wrong move on either side may upset the new process of detente.

Politicians are particulary concerned with public opinion; thus, it is not surprising that debate on European defence has been considerably subdued in the past several months.The attitude of public opinion towards security raises the problem of the compatibility between the desire for disarmament and the need for defence. One of the queries among political forces today is whether it is logical to set up plans for European defence at the very time when it seems likely a new historical period of negotiations for arms reduction is beginning. Defence and disarmament are only apparently irreconcilable. Recent history (for example, the case of the INFs) shows, on the contrary, that a defence effort can easily be followed by negotiations on the reduction of the same weapons that posed the new threat.

What must absolutely be maintained is the balanced equilibrium of forces in the field. On the basis of this principle recognized by both parties to the INF treaty, appropriate decisions can be made either with regard to rearmament, or the opposite. A first consequence of the acceptance of this principle is that today almost all pressure groups for unilateral disarmament seem to have disappeared, making it possible to deal more serenely with the basic question - whether to rearm or to negotiate.

If the question refers to European defence, it is phrased in inappropriate terms. European defence does not necessarily mean rearmament. It means rationalization and homogenization of national defences in a common context. Furthermore, the achievement of some kind of common European defence could also simplify the terms of negotiations for balanced disarmament in Europe. In fact, it is one thing for every state to negotiate on the mere basis of its own national defence requirements, and another for Europe to answer in a unitary way, on the basis of

homogeneous criteria, to an offer to reduce weapons. A lesson on the importance of common criteria in dealing with the problems of European defence (and also disarmament) is given by the case of the dislocation of the American F-16s from Spain to Italy. Acceptance of the relocation of the F-16s or negotiation of their withdrawal from Europe is not an Italian problem, but a common requirememt of Europeans and of NATO. The answer to this question must be given collectively, since it is on the basis of common defence requirements that the degree of use or negotiability of those forces should be determined.

The Europeanization of defence, therefore, can make negotiation routes more evident than they would be to single member states on the basis of their own, often discordant, defence principles.

* * *

Although the factors mentioned above are of topical interest, the fundamental reason justifying a greater European commitment in the security field is what has historically been indicated as one of the main factors in favour of a unitary European defence plan: upholding a stable and solid tie between a reviving Germany and its European partners.

A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then: Germany has achieved not only enviable economic strength, but also important and autonomous international political credibility. Nevertheless, the reasons for its linkage to the rest of Europe are even more valid today than they were in the past because of strategic issues in which Germany's role continues to depend on on the United States and NATO. Today, however, in light of the latest events and the profound developments in international relationships, the American umbrella may have become more uncertain (or is at least perceived to be more uncertain), rekindling that feeling of insecurity and fear that is so well expressed by the German word 'Angst'.

This feeling of 'Angst' has been reinforced by the uncertainty on the kind of policy to adopt towards the East and by the renewed debate on the issue of German riunification.

Sensitive to the above mentioned "problematique", the French decided to implement those clauses of the Elysée Treaty that provide for military cooperation with Germany, but which were neglected for decades as they were considered inconsistent with Germany's commitment in NATO. After the creation of a common Franco-German brigade, another step forward was the decision to create a Defence Council, which has to be ratified by both national assemblies in order to become operative, and therefore

constitutes a supplement to the original treaty. This is also a move in the right direction with regard to traditional French fears of losing ties with its partners on the other side of the Rhine.

While the basic reasons leading the two partners to deal with security problems bilaterally are understandable, there is some perplexity as to the usefulness of these undertakings in the development of a unified European security policy. In fact, if there is a basic weakness in the way in which the issue of continental defence is being faced today, it lies in letting France and Germany deal with it on their own. No one denies that an agreement between the two is a prerequisite for starting a European defence plan. No undertaking, even in fields other than the military, can succeed without the firm support of the two great European countries. But even if this is a necessary condition, it is not in itself sufficient to give the undertakings of the Bonn-Paris tandem a Community character. The risk is, in fact, that it may not be possible or desirable to shift them from the bilateral to the Community sphere.

* * *

As previously indicated, a discussion of European security involves political unification, which brings us to the question of istitutions. Progress here seems particularly difficult: very few political and institutional changes have been adopted to date in the various European arenas. It is difficult to understand how the complexity of the problem posed by common security is to be dealt with by such partial and limited instruments. Only political obstacles set by governments and many of the European political forces can explain the difficulties encountered so far in increasing the scope of proposals and actions undertaken.

The European Parliament was the first to assume leadership in drafting proposals in the field of defence. As early as 1975, the Gladwyn-Blumenfeld report on EPC linked foreign policy to defence. Later, the 1975 Klepsch, the 1980 Davignon-Greenwood, and the 1983 Ferguson Reports considered the issue of European defence policy indirectly, namely by introducing it through cooperation in the weapons production sector. Finally, the draft of the New Treaty adopted by the European Parliament in 1984 devoted a section to European defence.

The heads of government of Community countries are becoming involved in the rethinking of Europe's contribution to the collective defence of the West. Examples are given by the 1976 Tindemanns Report and by the 1983 Solemn Declaration in Stuttgart. Both documents, albeit in a most cautious way, attempted to affirm the concept that a coherent European

commitment in the field of security is needed, even if only with respect to economic and political aspects (so as not to offend Ireland, Denmark and Greece).

Outside of the EC, the issue has begun to be considered seriously by the WEU Assembly, essentially through the reports by Von Hassel in 1980 and by De Poi the year after and, more recently, in a number of resolutions.

All these projects have given considerable momentum to the European defence debate, but have resulted in few (if any) concrete initiatives. Moreover, the political level of the proposals has generally been lower than that at the time of the EDC; secondary aspects of European defence (industrial cooperation, coordination of existing or special agencies, etc.) have been preferred over genuinely political ones.

* * *

Four directions for the course of European security policy have emerged from these proposals:

The first starts out from the consideration that a certain pragmatic, functional attitude could help European reasoning on defence issues. The best approach is to begin cooperating in the field of weapons production and standardization. That would help solve various problems, as it would result in a more balanced equilibrium in the arms trade with the United States; greater progress in the field of high-tech; and better employment protection in a field which is particularly stable during times of economic difficulty. Furthermore, something of the kind could be undertaken by the EC, the only institutional framework able to launch a common industrial policy. This need has been considered both in the WEU's Platform and in the Single Act. In the former, the hope is expressed to 'pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments cooperation' (Title II, Point 4, Comma 6). This reiterates what was already stated in the Single Act, both in Art. 30, 6b - 'the High Contracting parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security' - and, more generally, in Title VI, which provides measures for industrial policy and the development of research and techonology. Actually, the goal of a unified market, also raises the question once again of the role to assign to the weapons industry, as well as the question of access to public contracts, now strictly reserved for national industries (Treaty of Rome, Art. 223, 1b). No progress has yet been observed in this sector, even though it cannot be ruled out that when the liberalization of markets does occur, the Community will have to decide on some kind of action in the field of industrial policy, including the weapons industry.

The second line of reasoning suggests starting cooperation at a higher level. On the one hand, there is the European Parliament proposal to include European defence in a global project of revision of the Treaty, while leaving it under the partial control of the member states. On the other hand, there are the WEU plans to divide the competences among three different institutions, the WEU for strictly military aspects, the EC for industrial policy aspects, and the EPC for foreign policy aspects all unified under the European Council and coordinated by the executives appropriately reformed of the three institutions. Two plans, as can be seen, which in the long run provide for an overall redefinition of the European institutional balance and the approval of new agreements. It is, therefore, a long term strategy, which for the time being can only serve as an ultimate reference goal for smaller and more gradual cooperative actions among bodies in different institutional spheres.

The third line to pursue is a separate relaunching of the WEU while waiting for the right time to deal with the issue in the Community. In this way, the problem of the countries reluctant to start collaboration in the defence field would be overcome. Actually, this course was attempted by the defence and foreign affairs ministers of the seven WEU countries in the two successive meetings in Rome in October 1984 and in Bonn in April of the following year. Unfortunately, the results were rather poor, despite the fact that just before the relaunching started, one of the major political obstacles to the WEU's functioning was removed: namely, the restrictions on Germany's production of certain conventional weapons. What was achieved from an institutional point of view was the doubling of the number of meetings of the Council of Ministers, and the trasformation of existing agencies, which had since fullfilled their goals, into bodies more appropriate to the WEU's needs: one for the study of disarmament and weapons control issues; the second to promote cooperation in the weapons field; the third for the study of issues concerning security and defence. But for the moment the reforms are more formal than substantial. The most recent step toward relaunching has been, as has already been mentioned, the establishment of the Platform on European Security Interests, a comprehensive document which tries to put some order into the jumble of different defence goals of the WEU's member states: a kind of charter on European identity, which at least has the adavantage of constituting a starting point for future work in establishing a real doctrine on European security.

The last plan was to include European security policy in the EPC. Despite repeated attempts mentioned above, what has been achieved so far is merely the mention of the concept of political and economic security in some reports.

In any case, the EPC has dealt with situations in the past, albeit in a pragmatic way, that were directly related to security problems, like the support of Great Britain in the first phase of the Falkland conflict or the policy of sanctions against Iran when the American hostages were being held. The problem is to determine the extent to which the EPC is capable of developing the instruments it has at its disposal.

* * *

It is quite evident that for now the Europeans will have to face the problem of a common security policy with the few instruments and the limited authority at their disposal. Since the failure of the unitary institutional plan which was implicit in the draft treaty worked out by the European Parliament in 1984, partially taken up again the following year by the Dooge Committee, work has to continue using the tools in hand, with the aim of bringing some homogeneity and rationality into a very disorganized field.

Even if the process appears extremely difficult, it is wise to set down some guidelines for a plan for an overall renewal of the political-institutional aspects of European defence.

Given that, at least in theory, the most appropriate sphere is the Community, European defence should be an extension of the activities of the EPC and of the EC (for economic aspects). Only in this sphere, as was proven by the success of European participation in the ECSC or by intervention in some recent crises, can actions of any international credibility be carried out. If the first steps are to be taken by the WEU, as recent signs seem to indicate, then it is wise to remember that a move in this direction would only make sense if used instrumentally to overcome the most immediate obstacles (mainly Ireland). But the underlying strategy must be to place this first step into the political framework of broader and joint European cooperation.

The basic principle is, therefore, to maintain the linkage between European defence and the plan for political unification. There is, in fact, a firm belief that the integration can only proceed if political, economic, and security factors are taken into consideration. This thesis has been expressed very authoritatively by the President of the Commission, Delors, in a number of interviews and has been set down in Point 2 of the WEU Platform in which the Seven recall their 'commitment to build a European Union, in accordance with the Single European Act...convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security" and security, as indicated in the preceding discussion, is a global concept, which can only be artificially split into partial

or sectorial aspects. With respect to institutions, globalization means moving toward a common and uniform decision-making system and, therefore, in the long run, toward the creation of unitary bodies. This must be the main goal of all new undertakings in the field of defence: ad hoc bodies or old revitalized institutions must be brought into a framework of progressive decisional integration. This applies even more to bilateral initiatives, like the French-German one, presently outside of any common institutional framework.

Given the current political and institutional reality, the division of competences among different bodies must temporarily be accepted; this principle is reiterated in Art. 30, 6 c), of the Single Act, in which it is recognized that 'nothing in this title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security, between certain of the High Contracting parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance'. This situation has been experienced by the Europeans since the decision made in the early seventies to establish EPC along side the European Community. Today this division is being proposed again: WEU for military, EPC for political, and EC for economic problems; with the aggravating factor, however, that there are a different number of members in the various institutions, causing difficulties in passing from one to the other.

The third principle refers to 'consistency' among decisions made in different institutional spheres. This important criterion, in the absence of homogeneity in the decision making processes, allows for considerable unity in the achievement of concrete results; it has often been successfully applied to the EPC and the EC, and has been formally recognized in the Single Act. In the past, the EC's economic instruments repeatedly supported and substantiated statements and policies adopted by the EPC. This was also the case in situations directly involving security policy, for example, sanctions taken at times of international crises. The principle must be gradually extended to possible decisions in the military field, made within the WEU or European groups connected to NATO, such as the Eurogroup and the IEPG. This effort must be carried out even if the numbers of members of the different institutional bodies do not formally coincide. What matters is that the partners in the Community coherently pursue the policies decided upon in any of those contexts.

Of course, when going from principles to institutional reality, matters get considerably more complicated. Nevertheless, the Europeans' desire and advantage in gradually accepting a way of thinking and acting which enables them to pursue homogeneous policies and behaviour should not be ruled out *a priori*. From this point of view, the progress made with the approval of Article 30 of the Single Act and with the partial reform of the

WEU, although not outstanding, has the merit of following the logic of the principles illustrated above. Today, cooperation among the various institutions has to be accelerated and made more meaningful. Once the division of responsibilities among the EPC, the EC and the WEU is temporarily accepted, a coordinating mechanism should be established.

As has been proven by past experince, the EPC basically provides a political 'cover' for actions taken in other institutional spheres; this cover should not, however, as often happens, be limited to a simple and sometimes belated declaration of support to undertakings already carried out in other arenas or by individual groups of countries. EPC political activity should be a priori, giving 'continuity', in the sense of keeping a constant check on the developments of actions and situations. Use of the instrument of political 'delegation' to other institutions or groups of countries can even be envisaged. It is crucial, though, that the cover function be carried out efficiently, as it is perhaps the EPC's most important feature. On the other hand, the EC has the institutional task of backing certain decisions and possible security actions with economic measures. As for the WEU, it should begin to put its agencies to work concretely and to maintain necessary relations with NATO groups, the Eurogroup and the IEPG. The military tasks presently taken care of in part by the Europeans in NATO or those taken on by groups of countries (such as out of area actions) on a case by case basis should obviously be assigned to it.

The problem of ensuring 'consistency' among the various institutions could be solved to a certain extent in two ways:

At a technical level, the task of maintaining linkages could be assigned to ad hoc committees or agencies. For example, the suggestion to create an arms agency which would coordinate the military-economic undertakings of the WEU and the EC, could be followed up. A European Nuclear Planning Group in the WEU framework could be set up, connected to the group by the same name in NATO. The WEU agency for the study of disarmament and arms control could meet with the EPC's existing Planning Group, which can, in principle, informally discuss any topic including security.

At the political level, coordination is probably more difficult, given the well known reluctance of some EC members to deal with security matters. Nevertheless, another attempt could be made with Gymnich type (informal) Foreign Affairs Ministers Councils, or special European Councils (Delors' proposal) with the aim of establishing the basic trends in Europe on major disarmament questions. Discussions of this kind have already taken place, as is attested to by the declaration welcoming the

INF Treaty approved by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in December 1987. But, the European Council's role in coordinating security policies should be even more explicit. At the political level, the proposals for some form of dialogue and formal linkage between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament could be taken up, with the possibility of elected members of the Strasbourg Parliament also sitting in the Paris Assembly. In any case, it is important to stress direct involvement of the parliamentary assemblies in the process of development and control of European security policies.

In conclusion, the outlook for '92 and, particularly, the approval of the Single European Act has stimulated a dynanamic process that must necessarly include the security dimension. From a political point of view this assumption is becoming more pressing every day; from an istitutional point of view the strategy to be adopted can be gradual, in accordance with the existing limitations on the competences of various European institutions. Nevertheless, a process of coordination among the different bodies must begin, bearing in mind that "consistency" is not just a criteria, but a matter of fact: economy, foreign policy and security are aspects of the same common activity and are difficult to isolate.

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VII CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL DE LISBOA

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7TH INTERNATIONAL LISBON CONFERENCE

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Emb. Henning Wegener

Lisboa, 9-11 de Novembro de 1989

A general sense of excitement surrounds the extraordinary events which we witness at the present time. The attempt of the wartime allies to bring a new order to Europe provided a degree of stability which for some time now has only concealed the new forces of history at work. And now, like huge tectonic shifts that release long pent-up geological pressures, we see the historical crust of the old state system beginning to break open as the search for a new and as yet unclear configuration begins. There is little doubt that we are moving, for the third time in this century, towards a new international order - this time without the catalytic effect of a large war, but through the collapse of a once powerful political ideology and hegemonial system. These changes are now coming upon us with such inevitability, they shake up our known world with such rapidity, that a very fundamental question needs to be posed: Are we perhaps witnessing a new and irreversible acceleration of history which will replace the former repetition of cycles between consolidation and change? Is it possible that global interdependence and the advent of ultra-fast communication and information techniques have launched history on to new laws of rapid transition? In any event, the result is that our long-term planning and political management processes - on the national and international level - seem hardly suited to the rapid-fire sequence of new and unforeseen events, such as they emerge in the East-West relationship as part of more comprehensive global processes.

Where should we look for reference points in this fleeting environment in which all components of an inherited system appear to change at once?

To assess developments in the East-West relationship, allow me to take as a convenient starting point and rough baseline this Institute's conference almost a year ago. What are the main characteristic changes since then?

Changes in the Soviet Union

The past year has seen the unfolding of the newly gained powers of the Supreme Soviet. This parliamentary achievement may be the most momentous part of the process of Soviet change. The establishment of an elected body as the arbiter - and perhaps increasingly the ultimate arbiter - in the domestic and foreign policy process, despite residual autocratic ingredients, has the potential of propelling the Soviet Union into a development that could see it emerge in the long term as a more democratic state with a degree of power sharing and a range of individual and collective choices which have been absent throughout the entire course of Russian and Soviet history. In the shorter term, and in the same direction, it has the potential to break the domination of a huge and rigid party bureaucracy, and to weaken the established military hierarchy further. A second important change is a new measure of the newly gained conceptual clarity on the part of the Soviet Government in foreign and military policy. From Shevardnadze's speech at the Foreign Ministry in July 1988 and Gorbatchev's memorable delivery before the United Nations almost a year ago, we have now come to Shevardnadze's 23rd October speech to the Supreme Soviet. It contains a wholesale repudiation of past foreign policy and an admission of errors which goes far beyond previous Soviet soul-searching. Most important among these is perhaps Shevardnadze's recognition that the Soviet military policy had been based on objectively erroneous assumptions of a comprehensive Western military threat and that this wrong assumption was the most momentous error of Soviet policy, leading to ruinous military overinvestment.

Indeed, such open admissions of the failures of the system have become common. Soviet self-criticism in the economic and social sphere has become an almost daily occurrence, domestically and in international contexts. However, while the need for fundamental systemic change is now acknowledged, few successful reform ventures have been undertaken and the economic

debate is conducted against the dramatic backdrop of an unprecedented economic deterioration, a slow-down of production and supply and - this is the third momentous chain of events - an increasingly volatile development of the nationalities issue. There is even the prospect that the Soviet Union will have to face either disintegration of the core empire or at least long-drawn internal struggles that will weaken the economy further. New thinking in foreign policy, by contrast, has taken hold, testifying to a deliberate Soviet policy to ensure stability and co-operative relationships on its external periphery. This gives credence to the view that the Soviet Union will become a more manageable foreign policy partner in the longer term, as long as domestic reform remains the priority concern. In Eastern Europe, tolerance for the Polish non communist-led government emerges and political pluralism in Hungary demonstrates that the Soviet Union is increasingly practising a policy of non-involvement, the limits of which are hard to fathom. The East German refugee haemorrhage and leadership change equally show that the movement towards full East European emancipation will not stop. Reformist pressures in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria point in the same direction. In arms control, the past year has seen a breathtaking confirmation of the hypothesis that the Soviet Union is firmly determined to disinvest itself of a policy of military superiority and to move to a new, as yet undefined lower level of defensive forces, more clearly disengaged from their forward-stationed position in Eastern Europe.

On the whole, thus, Moscow's behaviour over the last year suggests that the Soviet leadership becomes increasingly aware of the gravity of its shrinking resource base, as well as its dwindling power reach over the outside periphery. In the interest of maintaining the core empire and regaining its competitiveness, it is thus prepared to surrender some of its assumed imperial rights positions in Eastern Europe and in Third World regions for the greater benefits of co-operative

relationships, an opening towards integration into international and West European economic processes and the hope of seeing its economic plight alleviated and its remaining worldpower burden eased.

Reactions in the West

During the period 1986-1988, views varied considerably among the Allies as to how these Soviet developments should be assessed, giving rise to often lively internal debates. The last year has produced a striking convergence of analysis. The Allies agree that the Soviet policy shift is fundamental, that whole-scale changes of the system are required and underway, and that the Soviet Union has significantly redefined its external security requirements. The Allies are also prepared to recognise beneficial changes in the Soviet attitude, including a broad Soviet quest for stability at the outer periphery and a new approach towards Eastern Europe, the European Community, the presence of US forces in Europe, and important principles of Western military thought, including, at least in an incipient manner, the acceptance of residual nuclear deterrence as a stabilising feature of any future European security equation. Allied views also converge in acknowledging the long-term nature of Soviet and East European social and economic rehabilitation, the prospect of a painful process of stagnation and decline of the Eastern production capabilities. Most importantly, the Allies have a common apprehension about the prospect of a long-drawn period of instability and potential crisis which might leave the political process in East Europe in a precarious state for a long time and the economy and environment in limbo over decades. Given the enormous dimension of the new centrifugal energies now set free, the manageability of the whole reform process raises considerable doubt. The Allies are thus clearly sensitive to the ambivalent, open-ended nature of these comprehensive changes and of the double need for the Alliance to provide for solid security in the long term and to manage change in an extremely volatile and unpredictable environment.

There is also convergence on the basic premises for action. At its May 1989 Summit, Allies formulated more clearly both the future functions of the Alliance and its position towards change in the East. Let me elaborate on both.

While in the first 40 years of its existence the Alliance, notwithstanding the overriding political agenda of the Washington Treaty, had the protection of its territorial integrity against an immanent military threat as its basic preoccupation, and stability, in terms of preserving the status quo, as its overarching goal, the Summit has now documented the shift to a new Alliance self-identification and joint political strategy.

During the major part of that period, the Alliance looked for stability in the status quo. Comprehensive change now makes this quest for stability by preservation futile. Thus, the stability notion must be rendered dynamic. Not stability in terms of keeping the status quo for all times, but the active shaping of political relationships that develop to become more stable and balanced are now the order of the day. It is thus incumbent upon the Alliance to look at its task, on the basis of adequate security at all times and to ensure that its political vision is increasingly enacted during the process of political transition. This transition must be made smoothly. Its disruptive and retarding features must be subdued and its beneficial features underlined. Political stability must now be sought by overcoming the status quo. In the same vein, military stability cannot be the paradox and inconvenient stability of the Cold War. This static and costly confrontation must, again, be looked at in a dynamic model in which the arms control imperatives of the Soviet system and the redefinition of Soviet security requirements give the Alliance leverage to move towards a long-term security equation that provides a lower and more acceptable equilibrium of forces. The Alliance is thus engaged - and the Summit texts testify to this - in a major redifinition

of the way in which it does business, becoming more politically active and more management-oriented. Deriving enhanced stability from change, the Alliance will be a focal point of Western endeavours to help manage change in the East. It will also have to take on, as never before, the management of arms control and important management tasks in the establishment and maintenance of a future, post-CFE arms control regime.

An Emerging Relationship

These new orientations will translate as follows in the various fields of action:

(a) The Allies are unanimous that change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must be welcomed, that its beneficial features must be supported and that economic and social reform in particular must be facilitated by mutually compatible Western policies.

(b) According to this logic, the Allies will press for political change and the fuller implementation of the provisions of the CSCE documents and the Helsinki process as a whole, encompassing our vision of a peaceful and more constructive relationship among all states in East and West.

(c) This positive attitude towards change and mutual co-operation is particularly existent in the economic domain. The NATO Summit has formulated a veritable charter of co-operation with the East. While recognising that systemic change is essentially incumbent upon the Eastern states and cannot be substituted for by any form of external assistance, the Allies have made it clear, in word and deed, that they will provide assistance wherever economic and social reform are being enacted by Eastern leaders. In the

last analysis, the West is ready to hold out all fruits of its productive economic and social systems and make these available, commensurate with the degree of systemic change and improvements in the absorptive capacity of the Eastern countries for the benefit of genuine and meaningful joint endeavours. As regards Eastern Europe, a two-phase model must clearly be kept in mind. In order to ensure that a rapidly moving political process and the slow changes in economic and systemic reforms do not fall apart too widely, the first phase requires rapid material aid to reforming countries. The manifold forms of assistance to Poland and Hungary currently co-ordinated by the European Community, reflect this approach convincingly. In the second phase, such massive material assistance cannot be at the centre of the new East-West relationship. Co-operation must be much more geared to the systemic dimension, with well chosen actions to improve the prerequisites for free and mutually beneficial exchanges.

(d) Beyond such direct economic relations, there is a broader purpose on the part of all Allies to integrate the Soviet Union and the East European states increasingly into the international economic system and to engage specifically the Soviet Union in global and regional endeavours of common interest. The bilateral US-Soviet agenda of the past two years illustrates this approach as much as the Soviet willingness to pursue avenues of broadly based co-operation, and the Malta Summit of early December will further demonstrate the potential which these policies hold.

(e) Arms control has changed in both functions and significance. While it is now a primary agent for a comprehensive redefinition of the role of the military factor in the East-West relationship and thus overridingly important, it has somehow lost its role as the sole driving force of an improved East-West relationship. We are now at a time when large-scale political improvements and progress in arms control go hand-in-hand - as they should - and bring their synergistic effects to bear on the overall process. The Vienna negotiations are likely to come to fruition before the end of 1990 and will provide a dramatic improvement in military stability between the two Alliances. The successful completion of this agreement and its implementation - which may be somewhat more difficult than expected because of the huge industrial and social problems of scaling the vast Soviet military machine down to radically lower levels - will in all likelihood be the most important political single event of the post-war era. A successful agreement will translate effectively into reality the Western concept of conventional stability - a mix of starkly asymmetrical reductions of key weapon systems to parity levels, coupled with an intricate system of measures to regulate military conduct with a view to making it more transparent and reassuring. Notwithstanding its already dramatic dimensions, a successful conclusion of the current Vienna negotiations will release further irresistable pressures towards more arms control in Europe and towards further reductions and reallocation of resources. I see both the necessity and the unique opportunity for the West to use this process to approximate even more fully a stable military equation along the East-West axis, where the West would benefit from the current open-endedness of the Eastern reform process to bind the Soviet Union into military

arrangements that would be more defensive, less costly and more durable. It is essential that the West should seek to dominate conceptually this further phase of comprehensive arms control, as it has dominated the current phase of the Vienna negotiations. There is now a chance that we can persuade the Soviet Union to accept our vision of how mutually defensive and reassuring military structures on a lower force level might look before the advent of - and for - the 21st century and well before the prospect of a regenerated and more assertive Soviet Union with reawakened world power aspirations re-emerges from its present predicaments, as it conceivably would. Military stability in a conventional dimension will always require the stabilising underpinnings of a nuclear deterrent guarantee and there may now also be the chance to benefit from the incipient recognition on the Soviet side that co-operatively constructed, compatible and reassuring levels of nuclear weapons of all ranges, on the part of both Alliances, are in the Soviet interest as much as in that of the West.

(f) The Allies have not yet formulated in detail their vision of what the European political architecture of the next decades should look like: the future of the European Community, the assumption of security policy tasks in Europe, the implementation of the European defence pillar supplementing the Alliance. But there appears to be convergence of views that Western political and economic structures would not only need to remain intact, but would require further strengthening as the major prerequisite for future stability in Europe. The worst kind of Europe in the face of instability and uncertain developments in the East, potentially of a disintegrating Soviet core empire, would be an unstructured Europe with a floating mass of

unrelated states looking for points of attachment and shelter. One of the greatest contributions to stability would thus be the rapid further development of the European Community and in that spirit, success in the current quest for a fuller and economically more meaningful relationship between the Common Market and EFTA. But it is also broadly felt in the Alliance that new institutional perspectives must also be opened to the emerging participants from Eastern Europe and that it would be fatal to our policy of overcoming the division of Europe, if no such arrangements were conceived and no such perspectives were opened. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the most blatant expression of Soviet hegemonial power over Central and Eastern Europe, is now, according to the intentions of its members, undergoing "restructuring". Stress is being laid on the political nature of the WTO as an intended instrument of political exchange and of harmonisation of foreign and security policies, with some economic overtones. It will be interesting to see how this process evolves and what institutional underpinnings a new version of the WTO will have. From an Allied viewpoint it should be clear that a political structure, covering the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the basis of strict equality and sovereignty of participating nations, and cleansed of its former ideological component, could well perform useful functions and enhance stability in difficult times. It could also assume - and probably must - similar tasks of management in the arms control field as NATO is now facing. Such developments would need close attention and perhaps a degree of encouragement from NATO nations.

These are the principal elements of an emerging East-West relationship that would approach most nearly a new political order in Europe, and the political vision which NATO's leaders have put forward at their Summit last May. A new quality of the East-West relations will be beneficial in itself and meet our aspirations, but it will also be of global significance, enabling a more co-operatively acting world of the North to shoulder those global responsibilities which will inexorably come the way of all of us whilst the 21st century draws nearer. NATO with its unique transatlantic dimension will be the indispensable main player in these historic undertakings. It has served us well in the past; it is now as vital in intent as it has ever been.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING

Fen Osler Hampson

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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING

by

Fen Osler Hampson

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EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
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The end of the 1980s witnessed the negotiated settlement of some major regional conflicts which had plagued the Third World throughout the 1970s and 1980s.[1] The Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. The Iran-Iraq war, which had persisted for the better part of a decade with enormous loss of life to both countries, ground to a halt. A peace agreement was hammered out between Cuban, Angolan, and South African representatives under United States mediation to end the 13-year old war between South Africa and Angola and allowing for Namibia's independence. Sino-Soviet efforts to normalize relations saw the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. The countries of Central America agreed to a peace plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez calling for a cease-fire, a halt to foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment to national reconciliation, and free and democratic elections.

Many see a direct linkage between the settlement of these regional disputes and the new detente in superpower relations coupled with the rise of a new leadership in the Soviet Union. There is certainly strong circumstantial evidence to support this view. However, it is also true that these conflicts could not have been resolved, or progress achieved in negotiations aimed at dispute settlement, without the active and direct

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involvement of the United Nations. Once again, the international community seems to be rediscovering the value of the UN in conflict resolution and dispute settlement. Or, in the words of former UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Sir Brian Urquhart, "the UN is improvising its way back towards a position of influence."

This paper addresses four questions. First, where has the UN been involved in peace-making and what has been the nature of this involvement? Second, what accounts for or explains this recent round of activity by the UN in the settlement of regional disputes? Third, what role can (or should) the UN play in the future settlement of regional disputes? Fourth, how might the UN's role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping be strengthened or expanded?

Recent UN Involvement in Peace-Making

The means and methods of UN involvement in regional conflict have taken a number of different forms: public appeals in the form of UN resolutions asking parties to stop armed hostilities, to restore the status quo ante, to start negotiations, or to use the good offices of the Secretary-General or other representative of the Secretariat; provision of channels of communication between adversaries (formal and informal); provision of mediation services, good offices, and other forms of intermediary assistance; provision of fact-finding and observation commissions; provision of peacekeeping forces; and the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance.[2]

The UN has been involved in all of these ways in a number of recent major regional conflicts where the belligerents have sought to find a negotiated solution to their differences.[3]

Iran-Iraq war. In the summer of 1988 Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 as the basis for talks with Iraq to end the Iran-Iraq war. The provisions in the

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[2]See Kjell Skelsbaek, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes by the United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Bodies," Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1986), pp. 139-54.

[3]The following review is drawn from Fen Osler Hampson, "A Post-Modernist World: The Changing International Politico-Security System," in Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations: The Tory Record/1988 (Toronto: James Lorimer), pp. 52-56; and Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms

Resolution include a UN-supervised cease-fire, withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries, prisoner exchanges, the establishment of a panel to determine responsibility for the war, and the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. The cease-fire formally commenced on August 20, 1988, and both parties agreed to send their representatives to Geneva for negotiations under UN auspices. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established by the Security Council, providing for a force of 350 observers from 24 countries to monitor the cease-fire.

There have been several rounds of talks. None as yet has seen significant progress in implementing Resolution 598. Outstanding difficulties include the failure of Iran and Iraq to establish a joint cease-fire monitoring group, continuing differences over navigation rights in the Shatt al 'Arab waterway, unresolved boundary disputes, and unresolved differences over exchange plans for prisoners of war.

Afghanistan. In April 1988, agreement was reached by Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union and the United States as guarantors, for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan under a UN observer mission. Immediately after the accords went into affect, the United Nations Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was sent to the region to begin monitoring the Soviet withdrawal. Coordination of economic and humanitarian assistance programs was also initiated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan in May 1988. On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet forces left Afghanistan.

Angola-Namibia-South Africa. A peace agreement was concluded in Geneva in November 1988 between representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa under U.S. mediation, calling for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 and leading to full independence for Namibia by April 1990. (Resolution 435 calls for a cease-fire, a UN peacekeeping force, and UN-sponsored elections in Namibia.) In February 1989 the UN Security Council

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International Peace and Security, The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, October 1989), pp. 161-216. For various historical accounts of the UN's role in peacekeeping, see Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 1985); Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst for the International Peace Academy, 1984); and Henry Wisemen, ed., Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Prospects (New York: Pergamon, 1985).

authorized the deployment of a United Nations ransition Assistance Group (UNTAG) composed of nearly 5,000 peacekeeping troops and police officers and 1000 civilian election monitors. To oversee Cuban troop withdrawals, a 70-member UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) was established in December 1988 by the Security Council.

Western Sahara. The conflict in the Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco against the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio do Oro (Polisario) has been an ongoing one for some 13 years. In 1988, however, a UN-brokered peace plan calling for a cease-fire and referendum on self-determination of the Western Sahara was accepted in principle by Morocco and the Polisario Front. In September 1988 the Security Council voted for the appointment of a UN Special Representative for Western Sahara to oversee the implementation of the peace process. The post was assumed by Hector Gros Espiell of Uruguay who began his mission earlier this year.

Cyprus. The UN has maintained peace-keeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for many years. In 1988 UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar launched a peace initiative that secured the agreement in August 1988 of Greece and Turkey to hold new talks on unifying the island. After an initial round, talks were temporarily suspended with a commitment to resume in the future.

Central America. UN peace-keeping and observer forces will also play a role in the Central American peace process. The Central American Peace Plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, signed on August 7, 1987, by the presidents of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, calls for a national reconciliation with opponents, a cease-fire within existing constitutional frameworks, democratization in each country, efforts to halt aid to insurgents, a commitment to provide no assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, and free and democratic elections. After several fitfull starts, the Arias Plan was "reactivated" by the five countries in February 1989. The same month the five also requested from the Secretary-General that a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain, and West Germany, as well as from an unnamed Latin American country, be sent to Central America to verify that none of the countries involved in the peace process supports any subversive activities in neighboring countries, to report on cross-border guerrilla movements, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. A UN fact-finding mission to assess peacekeeping requirements has just reported to the Secretary-General.

Following approval by the Security Council and General Assembly, a UN peacekeeping and observer force (ONUCA) will be deployed in the region. The UN has also been active in the refugee issue, sponsoring a conference on Central American refugees in April 1989 in Guatemala City.

Indochina. The United Nations has presented a variety of proposals that could provide the basis for a comprehensive settlement in the conflict in Cambodia. The withdrawal of Vietnamese occupying forces has helped ease tensions although the major parties to the conflict, the Soviet-funded, Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the titular leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, continue to remain at loggerheads. In April 1989, Vietnam formally asked Canada, Poland, and India to form a monitoring commission to verify the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia scheduled to end in September 1989. Canadian conditions for participation are a Vietnamese agreement for withdrawal, UN Security Council endorsement of the plan, a clear peacekeeping mandate with a set lifespan, proper funding, and evidence that this would be part of a comprehensive solution to the Cambodean problem. In July 1989, the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) foreign ministers meeting in Brunei declared that a UN-monitored Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and subsequent elections, would have to be part of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia.

Explaining the Recent UN Role in the Settlement of Regional Disputes

What accounts for this apparent progress in the resolution of several major regional conflicts? A key factor, and one which also explains the growing trend towards multilateralism, is the new detente in superpower relations. By bringing pressure to bear on client states who are belligerents the superpowers have facilitated conflict settlement and resolution processes. Current improvements in East-West relations have clearly helped bring about the tentative settlement of several major regional conflicts including the Iran-Iraq war, Angola-Namibia, the Western Sahara, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.[4]

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[4] For a useful discussion of these developments see William Gutteridge, "The Case For Regional Security: Avoiding Conflict in the 1990s," Conflict Studies, No. 217 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989), pp. 1-12.

(In the latter case, the new Sino-Soviet rapprochement and Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech marked the beginning of a redefinition in attitudes among the three members of the Sino-Soviet-Vietnam triangle, and it is unlikely that Vietnam's phased withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia would have occurred without strong pressure from the Soviet Union.)

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has also committed itself to international cooperation and multilateral institutions. It has indicated it wants to reinvigorate the UN by making better use of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and other UN bodies to resolve international disputes.[5]

But improved superpower relations are obviously not the only factor which explains these trends. War weariness also accounts for the desire of belligerents to terminate hostilities. This is what some observers call the "ripeness" phase of dispute settlement: the prospects for a negotiated settlement to a conflict are greater when war weariness has set in among the parties and a conflict has reached a plateau or "hurting stalemate" in which unilateral advantage is no longer possible.[6] In the Iran-Iraq war eight years of conflict had clearly taken their toll on the economies of both sides and in human lives and suffering. In the Central American conflict war weariness in the region's population, as well as the dynamic leadership exercised by President Arias, helped generate momentum for the nascent peace process. In Angola-Namibia the conflict had reached a stalemate and there was strong interest on the part of all parties to end a lengthy guerrilla war that had grown too costly. Vietnam's continuing occupation of Cambodia likewise had

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[5] See, for example, Vladimir Petrovsky, "From crisis to preventive diplomacy in the United Nations," paper delivered at the Conference on the Reduction of the Risk of Nuclear War through Multilateral Means, Kingston, Ontario, October 7-8, 1988; and Vladimir Petrovsky, "Towards the 21st Century: The Future for Multilateral Diplomacy," in The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Global Security: Report of the Annual Conference of the Department of Public Information for Non-Governmental Organizations (New York: United Nations, September, 1988), pp. 30-32.

[6] See Richard N. Haass, "Ripeness and the settlement of international disputes," Survival, Vol. 30, No. 3 (May/June 1988), pp. 232-51; I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 251-68.

become extremely costly and was proving a major drain on Vietnam's economy, although this factor alone was not sufficient to bring about a troop withdrawal and a resolution to the conflict.

In some regions the prospects for peace have been affected not so much by improved U.S.-Soviet relations as by domestic developments. A new U.S. administration and a new bipartisan consensus between the administration and Congress--based on the recognition that past U.S. policies to the region were a failure--have had a positive impact on the prospects for peace in Central America. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from several Third World regional conflicts is also linked to Gorbachev's domestic economic reforms and his desire to reduce the drain of military spending on the Soviet economy.

UN peacekeeping and mediation efforts in these conflicts have been affected by this confluence of cross-cutting trends and events. UN involvement also could not have occurred without high levels of international cooperation more generally, including the concurrence of the parties to the dispute, the support of the five permanent members of the Security Council (and concurrence of at least four non-permanent members), and the willingness of countries to make troops available for peacekeeping and observer missions.

At the same time, the UN has some special attributes which are conducive to international peace-making. First, in international mediation the Office of the UN Secretary-General can be objective and independent, more so than the great powers. Second, governments who are prepared to negotiate but are afraid of losing face or appearing weak can use the UN machinery as a channel for communication because they will be seen as cooperating with world opinion. Third, neutrality or impartiality is critical to the UN's record in peacekeeping: the Blue Helmets "have no enemies, are not dispatched to achieve victory, and can use force only in self-defence."[7] Finally, the UN has to

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[7]H.E. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, United Nations, "Keynote Address," in The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Global Security, p. 8.

some extent become the victim of its own recent success which has generated new calls for the use of its "good offices" in dispute settlement.[8]

The UN's Future Role in Regional Conflict

Many see a growing role for the UN in the settlement of regional disputes. Indeed, some would like to see the UN's role expand even further to the prevention of regional conflicts. They foresee exciting new possibilities for multilateralism in the "new thinking" of Mikhail Gorbachev and recent Soviet proposals for UN reform. A wealth of proposals have been offered not just by the Soviets to strengthen and improve the UN's role in international mediation and peacekeeping. These include more comprehensive and regular procedures for monitoring the world security situation, earlier treatment of disputes and questions of peace and security, a wider and more regular use of regional organizations as part of the overall international system for peacekeeping and peace-making, firmer links between conflict control and the negotiation and settlement of disputes, more positive support for UN peacekeeping and peace-making efforts, more systematic ear-marking of material and logistical support for peacekeeping, standardization of equipment, creation of naval peacekeeping forces, creation of a formal military peacekeeping force, and the establishment of a UN multilateral war risk reduction center.[9] These measures

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[8] The recent record of success by the UN in international mediation and peacekeeping compares favorably with its overall record which has been a mixed one and marked by a general decline in the number of successful referrals over the past three decades. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984," in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 3-72. For a useful discussion of the UN's interaction with the changing international environment, see Raimo Vayrynen, "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts," Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1985), pp. 141-71.

[9] See, for example, Maurice Betrand, "Can the United Nations be Reformed?" in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 193-208; Maurice Bertrand, "The Process of Change in an Interdependent World and Possible Institutional Consequences," John P. Renninger, "What Structural Changes Are Needed in the System of International Institutions," A.V. Shustov, "Problems of Improving United Nations Work," and James Sutterlin, "Strengthening the Role of International Organizations in Dealing with Regional Conflicts," papers delivered at the UNITAR/USSR Association for the

(some of which are discussed at greater length below) suggest ways to bolster and strengthen the role of the UN in international mediation and peacekeeping while, at the same time, opening further avenues to security cooperation and conflict management in Third World regional conflicts.

But enthusiasm should be tempered with several cautionary notes about the possibilities of widening the UN's role in regional conflict management and resolution. First, we have to recognize that the current dialogue and cooperation between the superpowers on regional conflict does not necessarily imply that they will want to use the UN to prevent or resolve all regional conflicts in the future. Absent such cooperation, the UN's hands are tied. Second, even if the superpowers rekindled interest in the UN continues to flourish, UN involvement in dispute settlement also depends upon the willingness and desire of belligerents in regional conflict to use its good offices. If disputants are skeptical about the UN's impartiality, or worry about undue influence exercised by the great powers in the Security Council, this will limit or thwart the UN's role in the peace process.

Third, there is a fundamental problem that the organization faces which concerns the dilemmas of international mediation and peacekeeping in conflicts where the line between interstate or regional and domestic or communal violence is blurred. Most states refuse to allow outside intervention in their own internal affairs and the concept of state sovereignty and non-

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United Nations Roundtable on the Future of the United Nations in an Interdependent World, Moscow, U.S.S.R., September 5-9, 1988; Brian Urquhart, "The role of the United Nations in maintaining and improving international security," Survival, Vo. 28, No. 5 (September/October 1986), pp. 387-98; Tapio Kanninen, "Towards effective war risk-reduction within the United Nations framework," paper delivered at the Conference on the Reduction of the Risk of Nuclear War through Multilateral Means, Kingston, Ontario, October 7 8, 1988; Diego Cordovez, "Strengthening United Nations Diplomacy for Peace: The Role of the Secretary-General," Nabil Elaraby, "The Office of the Secretary-General and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," Mircea Malitza, "the Improvement of Effectiveness of United Nations," and Brian Urquhart, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and How Their Role Might Be Enhanced," in The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, pp. 161-76, 177-212, 237-52, and 253-62; Richard S. Williamson, "Towards the 21st Century: The Future for Multilateral Diplomacy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 88, No. 2141 (December 1988), pp. 53-56. On the possible role of the UN in naval peacekeeping operations see S. Shaw, "Naval Peacekeeping as a UN Option for the Gulf," Naval Forces, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1988), pp. 8-9; Cyrus Vance and Elliot L. Richardson, "Let the UN Reflag Gulf Vessels," The New York Times, July 8, 1987; and Cyrus Vance and Elliot L. Richardson, "Put the UN into the Persian Gulf," The New York Times, October 20, 1987.

intervention is enshrined in international law. Under its Charter, the United Nations is only supposed to deal with interstate conflicts. Many Third World conflicts, however, are rooted in intrastate tensions such as ethnicity, communal strife, socio-economic problems, etc.[10] It has become increasingly difficult to police conflicts at the interstate level without getting involved in domestic disputes. This poses a major dilemma for the peaceful resolution of disputes generally, and the UN's role in international meditiation and peacekeeping, in particular. If regional conflicts are immersed in intrastate conflicts and disputes, this will frustrate peacekeeping efforts directed at establishing stability at the regional level. Regional confidence-building efforts will be more likely to break down if intrastate conflicts cannot be contained within national borders and threaten the domestic political stability of the parties concerned. Peacekeeping forces may also find themselves in the direct line of fire in conflicts where the line between interstate and intrastate violence and military confrontation is murky, and countries which are being asked to contribute peacekeeping forces may choose not to do so because the operation is too risky.

This problem is all too evident in the UN's imminent peacekeeping and observer role in Central America. The Esquipulas II accords call for domestic reforms and the ending of civil wars along with the termination of interstate hostilities. The UN is being asked to provide peacekeeping and observer forces in a conflict where none of the domestic warring factions are parties to the accords. In addition, for the first time the UN will monitoring elections in a country, Nicaragua, which is an independent state. The challenge is an even greater one in Cambodia where the appropriate political, military, and material conditions for a successful UN intervention do not exist right now. The UN's controversial and bloodied record in the Congo in

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[10] See Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in the Third World," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., National Security in the Third World: The Management of External and Internal Threats (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 14-43; Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions," in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, eds., International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp. 33-34; and Kumar Rupesinghe, "Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their Applicabilitty to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts," Bulletin of Peace Proposals , Vo. 18, No. 4 (1987), pp. 527-39. For an excellent analysis of the historical processes underlying this trend, see Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

1960-64 (where ONUC found itself caught in a civil war and had to use force to prevent the secession of the province of Katanga) and its ambiguous mandate in Lebanon are stark reminders of the dangers of peacekeeping in confrontations where the domestic/interstate boundary is blurred. Edward Luck and Peter Fromuth underscore the hazards of UN intervention in civil confrontations.

> In a civil war the job is far messier. If a country is to avoid partition, territorial settlements won't suffice. Instead, a governable national fabric has to be rewoven from a tangle of political, ideological, ethnic, tribal, religious and other threads. The peacemaker becomes a surrogate state-builder, monitoring elections, resettling refugees and rebuilding the economy, bureaucracy and infrastructure.[11]

Fourth, there are obvious tradeoffs between certain kinds of conflict management, like peacekeeping, and conflict settlement or resolution. The interposition of peacekeeping forces in certain conflicts may in fact "freeze" the possibilities for settlement by moving these conflicts to a "stable" equilibrium from which it is difficult to budge the parties to the dispute. Short-term "management" of a conflict will inevitably have an impact on its possibilities for long-term settlement and resolution. Importantly, many of these consequences will be unintended or unanticipated. For example, UN forces have kept the peace in Cyprus for almost 25 years but no resolution of the conflict is in sight because the parties cannot agree to a negotiated settlement. Peacekeeping and other forms of confidence-building are no substitute for conflict settlement and resolution and it is obviously important not to lose sight of these longer-term objectives when addressing the immediate problem of implementing cease-fires and ending military hostilities.[12] At the same time, however, we have to ask whether the

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[11] Edward Luck and Peter Fromuth, "UN faces risky role in Cambodia," The Ottawa Citizen, August 26, 1989.

[12] For a critical discussion of peacekeeping see Paul F. Diehl, "When Peacekeeping Does not Lead to Peace: Some Note on Conflict Resolution," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 47-53. For a review of different national positions on the operational aseptcs of peacekeeping see Report of the Secretary-General, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, A/AC.121/36 and Addendum A/AC.121/36/Add.1, United Nations General Assembly, March 21, 1989 and April 4, 1989.

alternatives are any better. The best should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good.

Finally, in focusing on the role of the UN in regional conflict we should not overlook the potential contribution of regional or sub-regional cooperative efforts in the peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building process. Leslie Brown argues that small regional groupings, like the Contadora Group, the Central American peace plan group, and ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), are especially well suited to address the resolution of specific regional security problems. The reasons include small size, the narrow focus and agreement among the members that they have a common problem requiring a common solution, their mutual concern about the threat of superpower involvement and escalation (and obvious desire to limit such involvement), their geographical proximity (and perhaps common language, religion, or cultural heritage), and their methods of operation (which tend to be informal and unbureaucratic by comparison with larger regional or international organizations).[13]

Although these groupings may be better suited for mediation and peaceful intervention in regional conflicts than international entities like the UN, collaborative regional attempts at conflict resolution can be complemented by formal technical assistance from the UN to monitor verification and compliance with negotiated agreements. For example, in both Central America and Indochina, parties are looking to the UN and other third-parties for their involvement not just in verification and observer activities but also, more generally, for assistance in refugee settlement, economic support, and diplomacy. The two approaches to peace-making--the regional or subregional and the international--are thus not mutually exclusive.

Strengthening UN Machinery

Proposals to strengthen the role of the UN in international peace-making and peace-building must first begin with a clear appraisal of the changing nature of international conflict. As alluded to above, intrastate violence has

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[13]Leslie H. Brown, "Regional collaboration in resolving third-world conflicts," Survival, Vol. 28, No. 3 (May/June 1986), pp. 208-20.

replaced interstate warfare as the major form of "international" conflict. Civil wars are now the major form of warfare and of the 127 wars since the Second World War all but two (in Hungary and in the Soviet border-area with China) have been fought in developing countries.[14]

The roots of these conflicts often lie in ethnic or religious tensions which, in turn, have been fueled by social and economic grievances. The importance of resolving the social, economic, and cultural causes of these conflicts is thus essential to conflict prevention in international affairs. Article 2 of the UN Charter states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter: but his principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measure under Chapter VII." However, as James Sutterlin notes, it should not be concluded that the UN has no role to play in alleviating the domestic roots of violence. The UN has played an important role in coordinating international emergency relief efforts in regions such as Africa (1985-86) and addressing human rights violations (another cause of conflict) through quasi-mediatory means. As Sutterlin writes, "The Charter of the United Nations recognizes that international cooperation in resolving social, economic, cultural and humanitarian problems is an essential element in maintaining peace. There is need for this mandate to be exercised more purposefully to lessen causes of societal conflict."[15] Proposals to strengthen the UN's capacity in this area include transforming the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) into a Council

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[14] War deaths have also been heavily weighted toward Asia and Far East (Asia accounts for 55 percent of the world's population but about 70 percent of war deaths). Civilian death tolls are also rising: from about 50 percent of the war dead in the 1950s to about 75 percent in the 1980s. See Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditure 1987-88, 12th edn. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1988), pp. 22-28; and Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989, 13th edn. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1989), p. 23.

[15] Sutterlin, "Strengthening the Role of International Organizations in Dealing with Regional Conflicts," p. 2.

of Ministers that would maintain a "global watch" system to monitor economic and social areas and improve the coordination of international relief efforts.

The mediation capabilities of the Office of the Secretary General could also be used more effectively than they are now for crisis prevention and to defuse hostilities before they escalate to armed conflict. However, this depends upon timely information, leverage, mediation capabilities, and also the ability to impose sanctions, if necessary, to deter the likelihood of war.[16]

The Secretary General of the UN has been actively involved in mediation in a wide range of conflicts: Afghanistan, the Falklands, Iran-Iraq, Cyprus, the Western Sahara and elsewhere. However, his efforts have occasionally been frustrated by a lack of proper and timely information and his dependence upon national governments, the media, and other institutional sources for information. The creation within the Secretary General's Office of an Office for Research and the Collection of Information (OCRI) is intended to improve data collection and interpretation and to help the Secretary General better anticipate regional and international developments.

But information is not the only requirement for crisis prevention. Issues have to be brought to the attention of the Security Council so that appropriate responses can be developed early in a crisis rather than later. To the extent Council members see a common interest in avoiding conflict, it is important that they exercise collective influence in the early stages of conflict. The UN's role might also be enhanced by greater use of positive and negative inducements in regional conflict situations. The threatened or actual use of sanctions (such as the threat of an arms embargo in the Iran-Iraq war) can sometimes help bring about movement toward negotiations. An intriguing suggestion, first proposed by the Palme Commission, is the use of peacekeeping forces as a deterrent to conflict. In the case of border tensions if one party requests the deployment of UN forces on its side, after appropriate consideration of the request, a peacekeeping force would be deployed on that state's territory. Such forces would serve as a "deterrent" against military aggression because both parties would then run the risk of firing at a "neutral" third party. The presence of an impartial peacekeeping

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[16]The discussion here and of the proposals that follow are drawn from ibid., pp. 2-7.

force on the ground would also help increase transparency and deal with border violations. In instances where the threat of military aggression lies at sea (like the Falklands) rather than on the ground, the use of maritime peacekeeping forces should also be considered.

The development of an effective crisis-prevention mediation, peacekeeping, and "deterrent" capability in the UN will require planning and effective coordination--more so than now exists within the organization. Some suggest that the ORCI and the global watch staff should form a kind of "war risk-reduction center" and that these institutional reforms should be complemented by confidential consultations in the Security Council to discuss specific means and measures for maintaining peace.[17]

Conclusion

It has been suggested here that the changing global situation and recent negotiated settlement of several major regional conflicts is creating new opportunities for third parties, particularly international organizations like the UN, to play a major role in the peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building process. In the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and Asia, the demand for international mediation and peacekeeping, verification, and observer forces is growing. At the same time, however, successful third party intervention in regional conflicts depends upon the nature of the issues under dispute, the timing of the intervention, the qualities and skills of the intervener, and the methods used. Moreover, intrastate and intercommunal conflicts--which increasingly characterize the nature of armed conflict in today's world--will be resistant to the use of traditional international institutional mechanisms and approaches to conflict settlement and resolution. The absence of well-defined political, geographical, and cultural boundaries in these conflicts greatly complicates as well as limits the possibilities for successful intervention by external actors like the UN.

Nevertheless, international institutions have proven themselves remarkably adaptable to new conflict situations and changing geopolitical realities. The development of better methods and forms of crisis prevention (as opposed to crisis management) is clearly essential if the UN is to respond

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[17] Ibid., p. 10.

effectively to the challenges of regional security. Enhancing the UN's mediation and peacekeeping capabilities will enable it to play an expanded role in the prevention and settlement of regional disputes. But the UN's role will have to be complemented by regional and/or sub-regional efforts, especially in those conflicts where states (and sub-state actors) are wary about or have actively and purposely sought to exclude outside parties from the conflict resolution and settlement process. The peace-making and peace-building process in these conflicts will be peacemeal and untidy—what Joseph Nye has called "peace in parts."[18]

The objectives of UN intervention in regional conflict may be narrowly focused or quite broad in orientation depending upon the situation concerned. In some cases, the goal may be to intervene once with a view to stopping hostilities and implementing a cease-fire. Other interventions may be directed at crisis prevention or bringing about an orderly transformation of power, after which the services of the UN will no longer be required. Where the objective is the creation of a series of confidence-building measures, which can only be implemented gradually over a prolonged period of time, the UN will have a strong incentive to entrench and institutionalize its role in the peace process. In this latter instance, the UN will require the requisite financial and administrative resources, as well as strong and sustained international support, to remain actively engaged in the peace process. Having said this, there is little doubt that significant opportunities for developing new approaches to the peaceful settlement of disputes are emerging in today's world, along with a renewed role for the UN. In a real sense, the UN is moving "back to the future!"[19]

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[18] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[19] See "The United Nations: Back to the Future," The Ford Foundation Newsletter, Vol. 20, No. 1 (February 1989), pp. 1-5.