

FONDAMENTALISMO ISLAMICO, SITUAZIONE IN NORD AFRICA ...

CeMiSS


Institute for National Strategic Studies

Groupe de Estudios Estrategicos

Francia. Ministère de la Défense. Direction aux Etudes générales

Roma, 7-8/XI/1989

1. "List of attendees, General information, Programme ..."
2. "The Islamic revival and Western security interests"
3. "Islamic fundamentalism"/ Valeria Fiorani Piacentini
4. "Loosing crises in North Africa"
5. "The situation in North Africa"/ Laura Guazzone



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA DIFESA

NDU/NISS - DEG - GEES - CEMISS

MEETING

7th - 8th november 1989

Roma - Palazzo Salviati

CEMISS welcomes you for the meeting

and hopes that you will have a pleasant and useful stay in Roma.

List of attendees

General information

Programme

List of Embassies and CeMISS telephones

Map of Roma

IAI (civil reasearchers)

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Dott. M. CARNOVALE
Dott. D. GALLINO

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Angelo	FASANELLA	(8 M)
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MEETING

NDU/NISS - DEG - GEES - CEMISS

AGENDA

Nov. 7th 0900 - Opening remarks
- Missions, organizations and programs of each Institute
1000 - Situation in North Africa
1300 - Lunch (Pal. Salviati)
1430 - CFE and Southern Flank
2020 - Dinner hosted by President, Italian Centre for High Defence Studies (CASD)

Nov. 8th 0900 - Islamic Fundamentalism
1230 - Lunch (pal. Salviati)
1400 - The Balkans
1600 - Conclusions
2000 - Dinner hosted by US Embassy

- Notes: 1. For each subject summary paper (optional for DEG and GEES)
2. English Language (translation available)
3. Civil clothes
4. Invited: Nato Defence College, CASD, MOD and MFA Italy, CINCSOUTH,
5. Representatives of US, FR, SP Embassies: 2 each.

13. Messing: luncheon facilities will be provided in Palazzo Salviati during the session days.

7. Dress: civil clothes will be worn throught the Conference and parties.

8. Accommodation: the delegates are accommodated as follows:

BERNINI BRISTOL Hotel (Piazza Barberini) Tel. 463051

. Gen. Paris

. Mr. Faucounau

Hotel ARCANGELO (Via Boezio, 15) Tel. 6543803

. Dr. Marr

. Prof. Lewis

. Dr. Johnson

. Col. Lowe

Expenses to your own charge

9. Transportation: delegates will be trasported by CeMISS.

10. Parking: for available private and or rental cars inside Palazzo Salviati upon specific request; give driver licence, car licence and car insurance to the admin personnel.

11. Public transportation: the nearest bus lines to the Palazzo Salviati are:

23-34-46-62-64-65-70-280

12. Administrative support: a small admin support staff will reside at the Montezemolo Area during Plenary Session.

They will be able to handle, type, reproduce documents under specific request and authorization.

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Conference venue: the Meeting will be held in Palazzo Salviati, Via della Lungara 81-83-85, near Vatican City, where is located the "CENTRO ALTI STUDI DELLA DIFESA" (Center of High Defence Studies).

2. Access to the Conference Facilities: the Meeting will occupy the Montezemolo area. Delegates are requested not to venture into other parts of Palazzo Salviati unless specifically invited and escorted. Toilet facilities, and administrative facilities are located near Conference room. Public Telephones (coins) are located on the ground floor.

3. Security: Delegates will be issued a Conference pass on the morning as they first arrive at Palazzo Salviati.

These passes, valid only for the duration of the conference, MUST BE SHOWN to the security personnel when entering the building and or the Conference suite. Passes MUST NOT BE WORN IN PUBLIC places and MUST BE HANDED IN to the security personnel at the end of the meeting.

4. Bags and briefcases: may be searched upon entering the Montezemolo Area; cameras and tape/video recorders are not permitted.

5. Classified documents: may remain in the Montezemolo Area during coffee and lunch breaks. Facility for overnight storage of documents up to NATO SECRET level will be available.

6. Audio and visual aids: View-graph, 35mm slide, video-tape and 16mm movie will be available. Operation of the facility will be responsibility of the presenter unless assistance is requested in advance through the admin staff.

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 10657
22 AGG. 1991

BIBLIOTECA

THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.

The views and findings in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as representing the policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS

Despite Iran's failure to successfully export its revolution, the Islamic revival has by no means peaked. It is gaining adherents among both sunni and shi'i sects. According to a well informed source, the Islamic resurgence is likely to be "the single most energetic force in the region for the foreseeable future." *

ISLAMIC TENDENCIES

Islamic revivalism is not clearly understood by most Western policy makers, many of whom tend to regard the resurgence as a monolithic movement. In reality, the revival is a complex social, political and religious phenomenon encompassing movements reflecting a wide diversity of behavior patterns, leadership, goals and methods, ranging from increased piety to political activism and radicalism. However, these movements do share a few common aims--restructuring society along Islamic lines; restoration of the shari'ah (Islamic law) to a dominant place in the polity, and removal, or careful control, of outside cultural influences which have intruded into Muslim society.

Despite this diversity, three broad tendencies can be identified. The first and by far the most prevalent, is "traditional" Islam, whose adherents accept Islam as the norm for everyday life. They would favor the establishment of the shari'ah

* Robin Wright, "The Islamic Resurgence: A New Phase?" in Current History, February, 1988, p. 53.

as the law of the state. Traditional Islam poses little or no threat to vital Western interests. Some of the most staunchly pro-Western regimes--in Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia--are thoroughly Islamic. However, their ties to the West have come under attack from more militant Muslims.

A second broad category of movements sees Islam, not as an accepted religion, but as an ideology and a guide for restructuring society. These groups have yet to develop practical programs and can often be rigid and uncompromising in their positions. The best known of these groups are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; the Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI) in Tunisia and the Jama'at al-Islami in Pakistan. These groups--the core of the revival--share certain characteristics with significance for the future.

- o Leadership is drawn mainly from young, lay students and intellectuals, often influenced by Western ideas.

- o Their main support comes from the growing middle class, but they also appeal to disadvantaged and alienated urban elements.

- o They are gradualists working for political and social change over the long term

- o Much of their rhetoric has an anti-Western tone, with implications for continued Western economic, cultural and security ties.

The third Islamic tendency is that of the militant radicals, such as the Hizballah and Da'wah groups (shi'i) and the Takfir

wa-l-Hijrah and Jihad groups in Egypt (sunni). They are distinguished from the mainstream groups by their desire for immediate political solutions and an obvious willingness to use violence. Their membership is miniscule, but they can threaten Western interests through dramatic acts such as hostage taking and sabotage.

REGIONAL FORCES ENCOURAGING THE RESURGENCE

The Islamic resurgence has been fueled by several area wide trends, likely to intensify in the next decade.

- o The failure of secular ideologies (Arab Nationalism and Socialism) to achieve their goals. Islam, an indigenous ideology, is filling the gap.

- o Intractable economic and social problems, including exponential population growth; an increasing debt burden; massive urbanization; obvious maldistributions of wealth and privilege; financial corruption and greatly restricted political participation. These problems contribute to local discontent and strike at the legitimacy of many Middle Eastern governments.

- o The failure to settle long standing regional conflicts (Arab-Israel; Iran-Iraq; Afghanistan) that continue to destabilize the region.

- o Large scale population movements in the Middle East and Europe that increase pools of unassimilated, often alienated refugees and workers that can be politicized by Islamic movements. Europe, with over nine million Muslims, often

unskilled workers living on the margins of society. constitutes a special case. The Islamic revival has particular appeal to such groups and, as the Rushdie affair illustrates, given an appropriate issue, they can provide a ready audience.

IMPACT ON WESTERN INTERESTS

Western policy makers need to examine the implications of these trends for future US and European interests in the area. These seem likely in four areas.

- o As mainstream Islamic movements gain greater strength in the area, they may successfully exert pressure on pro-Western governments to distance themselves from the West. This may affect economic ties; credit and financial arrangements; the flow of citizens; and the number and life-styles of Westerners living and doing business in the Middle East. In the security area, Middle Eastern governments may be more reluctant to enter into joint military production ventures with the West, and the US may be the focus of demands for a reduced military presence in the area. This could put pressure on NATO cooperation with the US in "out-of-area" contingencies in the Mediterranean and the Gulf.

- o The more militant Islamic groups may attempt to intimidate the West and its regional allies through sabotage and terrorism. In Europe, some militant activity, now directed at Europe's Middle Eastern policies, could be redirected against European governments and their treatment of local Muslims.

- o Islamic revivalist movements could destabilize some Middle

Eastern regimes, especially where states face overwhelming economic and social problems, (Egypt, Tunisia, Pakistan) or where Islamic movements have been repressed and driven underground.

o The Islamic resurgence may exacerbate regional conflicts (Arab-Israel/ Iran-Iraq) and make compromise more difficult; war more likely.

SOME CAVEATS

However, despite the dynamism of the Islamic revival, the West should not overestimate its "threat" to Western interests. Islamic movements, even those moving into the mainstream, do not appear to have majority support in any Middle Eastern country, while the militant radicals are a tiny fringe. The bulk of the population is loyal to more traditional forms of Islam which pose no apparent threat to Western interests. The region, at least for now, is exhausted by the eight year Iran-Iraq war. The dominant trend in the area is likely to be pragmatism already entrenched among the West's friends and allies, and growing in previously radical states (Algeria, Iran, Iraq). As Islamic movements move into the arena of open politics, they are likely to be held accountable by the public for their actions and compelled to produce more workable--and pragmatic--programs.

The West needs to develop a better grasp of the aims and goals of various Islamic movements. Policy makers need a conceptual framework for dealing with the revival--one that takes account of its complexity and distinguishes between those aspects which may damage Western interests and those which are

merely neutral. The West should also be exploring potential areas of cooperation with Islamic leaders, as well as investigating ways to deal with real, but limited, threats to long term western interests. Above all, the West should not appear to be on the wrong side of the future. Classifying all Islamic movements as potentially threatening could prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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BIBLIOTECA

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Islamic Fundamentalism

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

1. Preliminary remarks.

A correct analysis of Islamic fundamentalism will necessarily have to proceed on two levels, which are by no means parallel, the European/Western one and the Islamic one. In both, ideological and cultural themes intersect and are overlaid by internal and international political pressures, and by more strictly economic, financial and social urges.

Therefore, in order to understand the different ideological positions and their correlated political and institutional choices(that today stir and excite the Islamic World pressed by everincreasing demands of technological modernization, economic and social development), in the first place and preliminarily it is necessary to go back to those ideological trends and movements which so stirred 19th century Europe. And then to analyse their impact on the Islamic world with its culture and tradition, and its reaction.

In other words, on the one hand it is not possible to exclude the ideological trends and political movements which so shook Europe in the 19th century; in the other hand it is necessary also to go beyond the traditional Eurocentric patterns, and to enquiry how those ideologies and mevements affected, and were absorbed into 19th century Islam, and elaborated within into a "phenomenon" that was to become typically individual and Islamic.

This analysis will produce also a multiplicity and variety of historical and geographical "phenomena" - broadly outlined in this paper - which cannot possibly be reduced to only one typically "western" category: the one conventionally and commonly called by western scholars "Islamic Fundamentalism"(with its main filiation, the Islamic "Integralism"/"Integrism"). As a consequence, it is no less important and conditioning to bring this problem into focus in all its aspects and variants, and to agree upon what meaning and what cultural/political content we wish to give to this "Islamic Fundamentalism".

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2. The making of Islamic revival.

Thus the 19th century saw the birth and spread in Europe of ideologies and political movements destined to have deep-seated repercussions in the Islamic world: the legacy of the French Revolution, Romanticism, and - above all - around the second half of the century, Socialism and Marxism.

Briefly: of the French Revolution it might be said that it represented a break with the past, mobilizing men and nations, and giving the contemporary world new political, institutional and ideological "models". Liberty, equality and fraternity were translated into models such as constitutional monarchy, radical democratic republic, moderate bourgeois republic, bonapartism. New political and social alternatives were put forward: power was no longer the monopoly of the aristocratic classes alone, but, for the first time, it genuinely entered into the hands of a new social class: the bourgeoisie. This was the professional bourgeoisie, the lawyers and the doctors, the bourgeoisie of industrial capital. It was no purely dynastic revolution: it was also a truly social, political and institutional one. And this revolution was to be exported from France - or rather, from the French middle-classes at bayonet-point - and was to acquire a typically international significance, which was not surprisingly assimilated by intellectual and middle-class men of other countries, including more than one Islamic country. Romanticism, in this respect, gave primacy to the values of "feeling", of individuality in general and of historical tradition, too, considered as the revelation of providential and divine designs. In the political field, it also implied a demand for the rights of individuals and nations to freedom of thought and conscience in rebellion against all forms of oppression, autocracy and conservatism, in the name of "nationalisties' rights to freedom". In other words the romantic movement was the great cultural force which introduced the idea of "nation" and "nationality" into the modern Islamic world, too.

And again, the analysis of the "ills" linked to the new social condition which arose with capitalist development was to lead to the birth of new doctrines, which fostered the founding of the new "social order" through a radical transformation of human life. These were the doctrines of Socialism, that began to circulate

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in Europe during the first decades of the 19th century, and of Marxism.

Socialist-inclined doctrines presented new social themes which basically vindicated the rights of a new social class, that of the "workers", of the people. These doctrines were widespread throughout the Islamic world, where cultural and political principles of "cooperation", "social equality", "union", "discipline" and "work" (democracy) were soon to be introduced.

The new conception of history expressed by Marxism, on the other hand, was to gain little following in the Islamic world: the doctrines of the Qur'an rejected class struggle; historical materialism was too alien to the cultural roots of Islam.

Thus, very approximately, these were the intellectual upheavals and social and political movements from which modern and contemporary Europe is born. For the Islamic world, too, the 19th century was an era of deep change. For the first time it found itself directly and seriously involved in European events and in the struggle for European dominance in Asia and in Africa, coming up against European material and technological superiority.

And the French Revolution and its message, Romanticism and Socialism were the channels that - with the concept of modernization - also introduced the Islamic world to those cultural ferments which, taking the form of social and political movements, were to culminate in the present-day revival. It was a long and very gradual process. But it may rightly be seen as having its roots in the beginning of the last century. And for this very reason, only by going back - however briefly - to the origins of this process, is it possible to isolate and to understand the stresses and the stimuli which were to lead to specific social changes and the ensuing political options.

Four main phases can be distinguished:

1) The first half of the 19th century: the opening of the Islamic world to Europe and European culture, and the birth of a mainly town-based and mercantile bourgeoisie and correspond to the birth, too, of political movements aiming at moderate reforms against the consolidated privileges of feudal regimes.

2) The second half of the 19th century - First World War: a time of unbridled European expansionism, in a struggle for political and economic

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privileges. It corresponds - for Islam - to a time of "national" reactions in defence of traditional values: the rise of movements - often led by the 'ulemā' in collusion with the bourgeoisie and the urban intelligentsia. We cannot speak - in this period - of popular movements; the leadership is still in the hands of a small élite. But it is in this last decade of the 19th century that demands began to take on a precise political form, and that the uprisings no longer broke out at random but in accordance with specific programmes mainly based on claims for "national rights" and a "constitution" .

3) The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1905), the First World War and the post-war period. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese conflict and its disastrous outcome (for Russia) had ^{serious repercussions} while two new powers emerged: one Asiatic - Japan - and the other European - Germany. The former was the demonstration of a successful policy of "western" modernization though fully preserving national traditions: a new model to be pondered with deep respect. On the other hand, the Russian defeat by Japan marked the collapse of the myth of undisputed European military supremacy. While Germany - for this same world - represented (as it still does) the alternative to the grip in which the traditional colonial powers were confining - or stifling - the search for an individuality of their own without losing their autonomy (and/or independence): Germany was a "non-colonialist" power, which could offer all the best technology, capital, first-rate officers and military instructors, without "territorial claims".

The First World War and its post-war territorial reorganization marked the collapse of another myth: that of independence from Europe, from European colonialism and from European economic interests. The Islamic world - now - struggles for independence, and its tone and attitude becomes more and more anti-European. The target is to get complete freedom from all interference in internal affairs. New "nationalistic" and "revolutionary" movements spread all over the Islamic world, while the 'ulemā' and the intelligentsia performed a remarkable work aimed at providing the political and military struggle with a solid ideological basis and support, which should have involved in this struggle and mobilized the great mass of the population, still largely illiterate and outcasted in its miserable condition of life. This was - broadly speaking - the situation at the outbreak of the Second World War

4) The Second World War and the post-war period.

3. The Second World War and the post-war period: commitments and Islamic and Islamic Political-institutional programmes.

The propaganda spread by the "totalitarian powers" against the "corrupt demoplutocracies", the strife which rent the Western powers during the Second World War, new or re-newed promises to the Islamic countries - never fulfilled, social uprisings which stirred up the same European world, definitely contributed to convert the already widespread feelings of dissatisfaction and intolerance into open revolt and rebellion.

Those rumblings of social renewal that had begun to circulate in the immediate pre-war period, began to take the shape of specific commitments and political-institutional programmes; the positions of the various social components and different political groups assumed precise and well-defined attitudes. As a consequence, on the one hand we have the traditional(conservative) parties and classes - whose interests(economic and financial) were strictly linked to those of the Western Powers - which held to their old and by then old-fashioned policies, without any feelings for the new pressing forces and the changes in the social background of their countries. On the other hand, we have the consolidation and strengthening of new political trends.

One is represented by the Islamic revival and its multifarious attitudes. Another is represented by a secular movement, which has its roots in the cultural principle of "arabism" as the leit-motiv of national identity and cohesion. The latter led to the birth of the political movement - and then party - of al-Ba'th, still in power in Syria and in 'Irāq.

Islamic revivalism: in the post-Second World War period, in many Islamic countries the break with the conservative classes was imminent; these were still mainly urban, European in education, imbued with European ideologies and doctrines such as "nationality", "liberalism", "constitution", "social reforms"; but these were reforms coming from outside, imported, which had not germinated historically.

and culturally from within the "Islamic" culture and society; moreover, these were doctrines positively incomprehensible and completely alien to the popular and peasant masses, largely still illiterate. In this context and for these masses, since the very first growing of a nationalistic feeling the Mosque was to represent the only means of information and communication; as a consequence, it became very soon the centre of real and effective power.

The role of the Mosque in the process of Islamic revivalism is definitely central and unique. Before Radio and TV, the Mosque became the instrument through which it was possible to establish and maintain any link and contact with the people: the whole of the population - not only and not necessarily the literate élite - including the urban proletariat and sub-proletariat and the peasants, who still make up the majority of the population in more than one Islamic country, a mass often still oppressed and impoverished by an indiscriminate policy of exploitation of the land and increasingly heavy taxation. The Mosque is the only real instrument through which Culemā' and political leaders have their links with the people, communicate directly with them. Playing on the still strongly-rooted religious feeling, in this way they can achieve the spread of ideas and doctrines virtually nation-wide: cities and towns, villages and nomadic groups. In this way, and for this population, Culemā' and local leaders could present Islam as the expression of the purest cultural tradition, the only element of national cohesion against the abuses of a local ambiguous aristocracy and the exploitation by unwelcome "foreigners".

Thus came the break with the old conservative and pro-Western class in more than one Islamic country, thus we come to the revolutionary Islamic wave of the sixties.

Historical roots. We must go back once again to the end of the 19th century, to the wake of political agitators such as Jamāl od-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838 - 1897). Muslim scholar began to be aware of their moral strength, and started to re-organize the pan-Islamic movement into new and more modern models: a syncretism between European ideologies and Islamic thought.

The Qur'an and the Islamic texts were reread and restudied, re-thought in accordance with their original spirit, restored to their original purity and stripped of all the deviant superstructures that had distorted their original message during the

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course of centuries. Recurrent in the holy texts - and especially in the Qur'an - were themes of "justice", "social equality", "collaboration" and "cooperation for the well-being of the whole community of Believers"(themes which were - and had been - so stimulating in Europe, the Europe of revolutions and constitutions, the liberal, socialist Europe). Proceeding further along this line of doctrinal re-thinking, the very principles of the shari'ah were recalled: a Law which postulated at the root of all political power a contract between the people and its freely chosen and elected leaders. So that it was no longer necessary to import new political, social and economic doctrines from Europe; Islam and its texts themselves already represented an extremely modern doctrine, a doctrine that was not only religious but also social and political, which could be seen as having points in common with European ideologies; a doctrine which existed and had always existed in all Islamic cultural tradition, a doctrine which could be set against European/Western culture and cultural tradition.

Literature on this topic is rich and well documented. But beyond the subtle theological and philosophical debates that animated(and still enliven) the "Western" and the "Islamic" literary and political world, one point strikes the scholar: the formulation and elaboration of official Islamic doctrines - because this Islamic revivalism is far from monolithic - emerged as the most suitable instrument for the implementation of the declared aims of "modernization" and "social and economic development" and of the recasting of political power. And it certainly represents a major political turning-point, based on a process of ideological elaboration carried out on a strictly historical and scholarly basis, which gave to Islam a prestige and an indisputable authority of its own.

5. Which Islam?

Islamic countries today consider Islam as a national and institutional reality. In this context, social and economic needs(today more and more urgent and pressing) become priority targets in the framework of the new Islamic order. Schematically, such an Islam presents two distinct faces and aspects: "traditional" and "fundamentalist" at the same time.

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* The original conception of an Islamic state as a religious and political institution logically carried with it some important corollaries:

(i) the growing tendency to assume that political stability was assured only by orthodoxy; (ii) the concentration of various powers in the hands of the "leader", delegated ad hoc for the purpose of applying and defending the shari'ah; the justification of the political and social order and the authority set up under him was that he maintained the perfect community represented by Islam of the origins; (iii) the new relevance given to fiqh as opposed to pure theology.

Muslim jurists elaborated the theory; but - at the same time - inevitably the theory of the jurists became increasingly divorced from actual practice. And the monolithic unity of Islamic fundamentalism - being unable to come to terms with the state because it had de facto departed from the ideal broke into a multiplicity of realities. This development coincided - and was partly the result of - the rise of military governments; but its real origin is to be sought in the inner power-vacuum created by the political failure of the old ruling class (that class linked to Western interests and to Western aid), and in the wide gap between this class and the people, whose functions were limited more and more to the mere payment of taxes. In this respect, the anti-Western tone and attitude of many statual organizations originating from Islamic revolutions are significant - and by no means a pure coincidence.

* Thus we come to that phenomenon which is commonly and conventionally called "Islamic Fundamentalism". It is a very generic definition, a "Western" category, which is not accepted by Muslim scholars and thinkers. Before entering into further distinctions it is necessary to clear up some points.

* Theoretically, "if" we give to the word "fundamentalism" its philological meaning and content; "if" we analyse "fundamentalism" from an Islamic point of view, then both historically and in scholarly terms, fundamentalism can correctly identify the ideological and political movement which goes back to the end of the 19th century, when Qur'an and the Islamic texts were reread, restudied, re-thought in accordance with their original spirit, taken back to their original purity and stripped of all

the deviant superstructures which had distorted Muhammad's primitive message during the course of centuries. Such a conception does not involve and affect only the moral life of individuals; the sharī'ah considers the human being in every aspect of his life; the personal (including the religious and moral) sphere of his behaviour gets legal relevance at the same degree than his private and public behaviour. Which obviously gives to Islam - and to Islamic legacy - a firm grip, and a vivid emotional hold as well, on the "believer", on his religious pathos, and consequently on his everyday behaviour in its entirety.

The elaboration of the original 19th century theory led to the elaboration of the modern Islamic doctrines which aim at providing the Islamic world with legal shara'itic instruments that make modernization, social^{and} economic development perfectly compatible with Islamic legacy and tradition. Therefore it is correct to state that originally Islamic Fundamentalism was a speculative theoretical movement on a worldwide scale. But its impact on the different politico-institutional and ethno-cultural realities has given rise to a real multiplicity of currents of thought and theories, and - consequently - to a multiplicity of political and institutional solutions.

Within this broad fundamentalist trend, today it is possible to sketch at least three main tendencies:

1) Integralist (or "Integrist") Islam.

To quote Maxime Rodinson, "Integralist Islam aims at solving through religion all social and political problems; at the same time, it aims at restoring the integrity of the dogmas": the dogmas as a whole in their entirety, including the "tradition" (or sunna) as fixed in the 8th-9th centuries in four orthodox schools.

In this respect, it is possible to consider "Integrist" the Wahhabi movement, which led to power the Āl- Sa'ud giving rise to the Sa'udi dynasty in Saudi Arabia; the religious fundamentalism of the Wahhabis is based on the orthodox school of Ibn Hanbāl, the most conservative of the four, born in the cradle of Islam, that is La Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula. Also, we can include

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in this trend the Salafiyah and some other movements in India and in Indonesia, whose adepts are recruited among the poorest and the most backward classes of the local population.

2) Reformist Islam.

This can be the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, or of al-Mahdudi in Pakistan.

I assume that facts and events concerning the Muslim Brotherhood and Hasan el-Banna' are well-known. Nevertheless, with regard to the M.B. I wish to stress some distinctive features: (i) for the first time we face an Islamic movement born as a popular and mass-movement; (ii) leadership was(and still is) drawn mainly from young students and intellectuals - their main support comes from the middle-class, but it also appeals to disadvantaged peasants and alienated urban elements; (iii) the M.B. can be considered the first Islamic movement with a solid social and political structure and organization; (iv) the M.B. was(and still is) the first Islamic movement which started its activity on the basis of a well-preordained programme. This aims at establishing an Islamic state built on the pure principles of Islam, bearer of an universal message, and therefore a theocratic and extra-territorial state; in this state "equality" and "justice" were (and still are) to be achieved, together with the technological modernization, through a well-structured plan of economic, social, financial and agricultural reforms within the limits of Islamic legacy. Consequently, today M.B. - still widespread, and mostly clandestine - distinguishes itself (1) by its anti-Western (when not real xenophobic) tone and attitude; (2) by its disagreement with the present ideological-political solutions, that turns to violent hostile activities aimed at destabilizing the present régimes in more than one Islamic country.
(or "Arabia", i.e., Syria
~~and Arab states, i.e., Gulf~~)

3) Progressive Islam.

Progressive Islam accepts the legal instrument of fiqh. Through a strict interpretation of the "pillars" of Islam, this trend attaches a secondary importance to the sunna (or tradition), thus privileging the Qur'an as the main source of the whole Islamic legacy. Such a mechanism provides progressive movements

with a considerable flexibility, and makes it possible to reconcile Islamic principles with modern technology, economic and social development.

- * Through this legal procedure - one of the main points of disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood - progressive Islam overcomes completely the integralist reformism of M.B. Showing a sound pragmatism - and making large use of the aqi - it moulds and fits Islamic Law(in theory and practice) to the different "territorial" realities.

Progressive Islam finds its ideological basis in the doctrine of Islamic Socialism, as first postulated by Islamic revisionism, and subsequently modified and institutionalized by Jamāl Abd en-Nāser into the well-known doctrine of "Naserism". This reflects a change in theory and practice, a trend towards a secular conception of the state which is now considered a secular administrative organ in the name of the population, that delegates all powers to one leader, freely chosen and elected (large use of the referendum). "Unity - Discipline -Work" is the motto of Naserism, and - later on - of Gheddafism, too. Both doctrines, Naserism and Gheddafism, attach great significance to slogans such as "socialism"(or "social solidarity"), "democracy", "cooperation". In the Title II of the Egyptian constitution of 1956(Economy and society), we can read as follows: "This is a socialism which springs from the conscience of the whole Nation and from the evolution of its social thought, which has spared her the class-struggle". This is "the real triumph of all nationalistia strengths over the dark elements of oppression and exploitation" that - for a very long period - had totally subdued the Nation and deprived her of all her authority, powers and wealth".

- * Revolution. Revolution plays an essential role in this game: it represents the necessary step towards freedom; it is the only way and means of break with the past, of making up for lost time, of starting that process of social and economic development through reforms that cannot be delayed any longer. Revolution can - or must - shed tears and blood; but it is only one moment in history that has to be faced, one historic moment which is absolutely necessary if we are to get rid of the old corrupt ruling classes and - at last - to conquer "freedom", "socialism" and "unity".

- * Progressive Islam assumes that there are no European cultural "loans" in its doctrines. It refuses to accept that European Socialism can have affected or influenced Muslim thinkers and scholars. Marxism and Capitalism are definitely rejected. The theory of Progressive Islam has its basis in the Qur'an. But it looks to technology as a necessary tool to fulfil the programme of economic development and social solidarity.

Leadership is generally drawn from the military class(which had education, means and weapons to seize political power and, with it, the leadership of the "nation"). Its main support comes chiefly from the army(which means control of the country - military control - and order - military order) and from young students and intellectuals(who provide the new régimes with the administrative class): Egypt, Lybia, Algeria etc.

But - once again - it must be stressed that such a military and political power, autocratic and absolute, is generally based on the personal charisma of the leader. This is a point not to be undervalued. The leader is supported by a small élite (chiefly represented by his personal "police" and by his personal clients); with regard to the masses, it is obvious that the leader(with his charisma) can also easily appeal to the urban elements and to the peasants, but they very seldom reflect a genuine and sincere pathos. In other words, in these states it is possible to notice a wider and wider gap between the leader and his supporting élite on the one hand, and the mass of the population on the other (for instance: Pakistan at the time of Zia ul-Haqq).

- * Progressive Islam also presents a different face.

This is the progressive Islam of the new emerging professional bourgeoisie(intellectuals, jurists, doctors, architects, engineers, bankers, etc.): well-educated people in Western Universities and Institutes, who - because of their professions - have everyday contacts with the different social classes of their country. These same persons - due to their particular competence, capacities and professions - sooner or later get to key-offices in the Administration. And this is precisely when we witness a peculiar phenomenon: openly this professional bourgeoisie professes to believe in a "progressive" Islam; and this is a position perfectly coherent with their professions. But

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as soon as they grasp power, they become definitely anti-Western in tone and attitude; they start to recruit adepts (or scholars) among the youngest, intellectuals and students. In a certain way they are a small state within the territorial state they are living in.

This is a phenomenon widespread throughout the Near East(Jordan, for instance), the Gulf Area(E.A.E., Kuwait, Bahrayn), Pakistan, etc. Today we are facing groups that became on more than one historical moment real political pressure forces, and played a decisive role in the life of or another country. Undoubtedly they exert a firm, strong control and influence over the present ruling class, which is still strongly linked to Western Powers and to their interests and economic systems. Undoubtedly these groups are an emerging new force, which can become a destabilizing element in these areas.

This very sketchy excursus aims at giving the idea of a strong worldwide Islamic revival since the end of the 19th century, that produced sound theories and realities.

But we also witness an evolution of the original conception of Islamic Fundamentalism, which led to a fragmentation of its original theoretical unity.

Today we are dealing with a phenomenon very typical of Islam, and very deeply rooted in its own historical tradition; that is, ethnic-cultural distinctions (and divisions , with their particularisms and individualisms) once again burst out; this gives us the photographic image of an Islamic world that is far from being a strong monolithic entity.

On the one hand we have the uprising wave of Islamic nationalisms(plural: no longer "nationalism"), supported by bully leaders, who are not always backed by their popular basis and by popular consensus; on the other hand, we have pro-Western rulers(supported by Western aid), who are not always - or very seldom - backed by the local population or by their own middle-class.

On the one hand , again, we have the waving flag of the most conservative orthodox Islam(sunni Islam), torn into many particularisms, tendencies, personal ambitions; on the other hand, we have the waving flag of the most integrist shi'i Islam,

today led by the Islamic Republic of Iran, that tries to export its religious and revolutionary model; but, at the same time, this shi'i world does not keep itself from fighting against other ethnic-cultural groups - Muslims included -- usually not of the same tendencies.

Shi'i Islam is distinguished by its willingness to use the weapon of terrorism and violence(Hezbollah'i, Da'wa groups, etc.), as are today other militant radical groups(sunni, such as the Jihad groups in Egypt, etc.).

- * But in spite of the predominant anti-Western sentiments (West and Western Powers are still identified in the propaganda with corrupt capitalism, with veiled colonialism, with cultural and religious decay...), all this Islamic world, in its entirety, thirsts for "technology" - which is unanimously considered the real basis and legacy of political power and leadership. This is why - in spite of a more or less aggressive anti-Western attitude - the same governments and leaders still look to Western capitals, technology and aids.

In my view, there many points to be studied, understood from inside, put into a proper perspective, and then dismantled and defused.

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Looming Crises in North Africa

North Africa is a unique region, one that defies easy classification. While it shares a common religion, language, and culture with the Arab east, North Africa is basically Mediterranean in its orientation. Historically, it owes its geographic identity to more than 130 years of European colonial

rule. The Arab east merely referred to the region as the Jazīrat al-maghrib (islands of the west); it remained for France, and, to a lesser extent, Britain and Spain, to carve out Nation-State identities during their colonial stewardship. In the process, they bequeathed to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya identities distinct from the rest of the Arab world.

The Cold War of the post-World War II period also served to project northern Africa into the forefront of Western strategic planning. Considered an integral part of the Western Mediterranean security zone, North Africa became a focal point for the creation of a wide array of military bases and ancillary installations, all intended to provide NATO with a "defense in depth" capability in the Mediterranean basin. The United States, for its part, established several Strategic Air Command bases, a Naval Air Facility, and an intelligence collection complex in Morocco; a strategic air base (Wheeler Field) was established outside Tripoli, the capital of Libya, during the reign of that country's monarch, King Idris.

Post-Independence Moroccan nationalism, together with the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy by Muammar Qaddafi-led forces in 1969, led to the evaporation of the formal American military presence in both countries. Nevertheless, Morocco's ruler, King Hassan, has perceived a confluence of common regional interests with the United States and a close collaborative relationship has been forged in recent years.

These have included: (1) American access to several former air bases to meet crises in the Middle East; (2) opportunity for U.S. intelligence agencies to monitor Soviet fleet movements through the Straits of Gibraltar; (3) participation in joint military exercises and sharing of intelligence information; and (4) adoption of supportive policies and actions by King Hassan on problems of particular importance to Washington relating to the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

While the United States does not have comparable ties with Algeria and Tunisia it does share with the leaders of these strategically situated states several common interests. These embrace the peaceful resolution of local boundary disputes, the orderly processes of political and economic change in the region, and the exclusion of non-regional destabilizing forces.

The Sources of Disequilibrium

Over the past two years, the idea of a "Grand Maghrib" has gained increased currency in northern Africa. The geographic reach of this grand design would extend from Mauritania in the west to Libya in the east. Its basic goal would be to fashion a regional regime of political collaboration and economic cooperation -- one that, hopefully, would serve as the forerunner of some, as yet unelaborated, form of political union. The concrete manifestations of this "drive" toward regional definition and cooperation have been reflected in:

- °° The conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship by Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania requiring the signatories to resolve their differences peacefully;
- °° The reestablishment of diplomatic and economic ties between Morocco and Algeria, together with agreement by the former to United Nations intervention to bring a halt to the debilitating war in the Western Sahara;

•• The formation of regional committees to address common concerns provoked by the scheduled emergence of a European Economic Community in 1992.

Even Libya's Muammar Qaddafi appears to have been caught up in this tide of regionalism. Since late 1987, he has agreed to Organization of African Unity (OAU) mediation in Libya's territorial dispute with Chad, reestablished diplomatic and economic relations with neighboring Tunisia, and offered to enter into a political union with Algeria.

Despite these regional seductions there is much in the political and economic landscape of contemporary North Africa to demand attention by the Bush administration and Washington's European friends and allies. The primary threats to regional equilibrium emanate from several quarters -- local as well as external -- and reflect serious economic, doctrinal, territorial, and political-military problems which loom close on the horizon. Each of the threats warrant close study by U.S. policy planners and members of the national security intellectual community.

The Missile-Chemical Threat

As 1988 entered its waning days, most Americans were probably startled to learn that Colonel Qaddafi, despite his public relations de-demonization campaign, had embarked on a weapons acquisition program that threatened to alter the military balance in the Middle East and North Africa. CIA Director Webster announced publicly in late October that Libya was acquiring a capacity to manufacture significant quantities of chemical weapons; at the same time, it had concluded a contract with Brazil to purchase the "Orbita" missile which has an estimated range in excess of 300 miles.

Secretary of State Shultz subsequently opined that the spread of sophisticated missile technology and the use of chemical weapons in the Third World has become a source of concern in the United States. "The worst nightmare of all" Shultz said, "would be the eventual combination of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the hands of governments with terrorist histories."

The nightmare is about to become reality. The new weaponry in the hands of Qadaffi raises disturbing possibilities, since the Colonel would have a force multiplier of incalculable political, psychological and military advantage -- one which is not available to his neighbors or past adversaries. The latter must now take into account the very real spectre of political blackmail by Qadaffi, such as concessions demanded of Chad for relinquishment of control over the disputed Aouzou Strip, termination of Egyptian adherence to the Camp David Accords, or Tunisian agreement to a forced political marriage with Libya.

The entrance of Libya into the chemical weapons club poses difficult policy choices for the new U.S. administration. It can seek to buttress the defense capabilities of friends in the region while intensifying diplomatic initiatives to conclude an international treaty banning chemical weapons. Should this strategy prove unrewarding, the U.S. government may feel constrained to challenge Qadaffi to dismantle his chemical weapons facilities, failing which the U.S. or others would feel free to take appropriate military action to neutralize Libya's production and storage facilities.

The Demographic "Bomb"

Throughout the northern reaches of Africa political leaders face a menace to which they have no ready response. Since independence, the populations of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have more than doubled -- this as a consequence of a population growth rate on the order of 2% per annum.

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This "explosion" is reflected in the fact that at least one-half of the maghrib's population is less than 16 years of age. The result is a near Malthusian political and economic situation for hardpressed governments.

Given declining world oil prices, as well as the depressed market for such other leading North African exports as phosphates, natural gas, ~~iron ores, and citrus products, most local governments find themselves~~ unable to meet demands for stabilized commodity price supports, full employment opportunities, allowances for education, control over inflationary forces, and dozens of other imperatives. As a result, all North African governments have been the object of episodic riots and demonstrations by disillusioned youths and others who feel themselves to be marginal members of their national societies. Algiers was the scene of the most recent violent demonstrations with more than 200 deaths acknowledged by the government of President Chadli ben Djedid.

Especially worrisome for North African regimes is the anticipated graduation of the European Community into an integrated common market zone by 1992. North Africa will be excluded from membership, thus placing each country at a potential disadvantage in terms of access for North African products. The urge to form a "Grand Maghrib" can be understood in part as a desire to fashion a cohesive (united) economic entity in order to enhance North Africa's bargaining position. France, which has a vested interest in maintaining close ties with its former dependencies, would be under some compulsion to support their application for special status with the Market if they could present a united front. The need is especially urgent since 1 million North Africans are in Western Europe as "guest workers" whose remittances serve to ease the pain of less advantaged family members at home.

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The Tide of Fundamentalism

Recent events in North Africa suggest that the Islamic resurgence has taken deep root in the Maghrib. Its depth and reach in states that have been relatively stable over the past two decades indicate that Islam will be a force that is an effective competitor vis a vis Western "modernism-secularism".

Islam, however, is a religio-political force that has many faces and doctrines. Its activism is expressed in forms ranging from the mildly reformist -- involving demands for changes in school curricula and adoption of modest dress by women -- to the more puritanical, extremist protestations of various fundamentalist groups. The zealots represent a virulent form of anti-secularism and anti-modernism.

The spread of fundamentalism across North Africa has sent shock waves through governments as far afield as Morocco and Egypt. During 1987 alone, elections in Egypt showed that the Moslem Brotherhood had become that country's largest ~~legal force~~ ^{opposition party}; in Tunisia, riots and demonstrations were linked to local fundamentalists, many of whose leaders were imprisoned by the Bourguiba regime (major ~~sentences~~ ^{prison} sentences that were meted out were a major contributing cause for the downfall of President Habib Bourguiba late in 1987); in July, the most dramatic trial in Algeria's post-independence history led to the conviction of 187 fundamentalists for criminal activities against the state; Morocco, the previous year, had also experienced political turbulence as a result of the seditious activities of the new religious wave.

Islam's resurgence could spell political difficulty for the present generation of government leaders should economic conditions worsen.

As the chieftains of fundamentalism seek to institutionalize their movements, they also offer "tangible and constructive alternatives in politics, the economy and society". ** For the United States, accession to power by such groups would pose a serious challenge to U.S. influence in the region -- particularly given the likely adoption of policies and ~~strategies by their leaders which condemn the U.S. naval presence in the~~ Mediterranean, supports anti-Israel movements, and seeks to weaken Western cultural influence in the Maghrib.

Territorial Wars

"While we wait for wiser days, we will bid you farewell." With those words, the representative of King Hassan II announced Morocco's withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984. The immediate cause for the Moroccan withdrawal was the decision taken by the majority of the OAU to seat a delegation claiming to represent the original inhabitants of the Western Sahara. Morocco, which had annexed the former Spanish possession in 1975, claimed that the Western Sahara was an integral part of Morocco proper and, in consequence thereof, its suzerainty should be recognized by the OAU.

The territorial claim by Hassan has been contested by a guerrilla movement, the Polisario, which claimed to represent Sahraoui aspirations for independence. The conflict itself had embroiled not only the OAU in controversy but had soured Moroccan-Algerian relations and had even attracted the intervention of Muammar Qaddafi on behalf of the Polisario.

With Algerian diplomatic support, United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar scored a significant diplomatic breakthrough in August 1988.

** See the excellent article by Robin Wright, "The Islamic Resurgence; A New Phase?", Current history, February 1988.

After meeting with Moroccan and Polisario representatives, he secured agreement for a peace plan, the essential ingredients of which included the following: (1) a cease-fire in place between contending military forces; (2) followed by a referendum on the part of the Sahraoui population; and (3) a final determination, under United Nations auspices,

as to the future disposition of the Western Sahara. For his part, the Secretary-General committed the United Nations to create a peace supervisory and referendum control force to permit the Sahraoui population to decide whether they wish to be incorporated into Morocco or to become an independent entity. Several significant obstacles must be surmounted, however:

- °° Identification of Sahraouis qualified to vote, plus agreement on the right of Moroccans who have migrated to the disputed territory to participate in the referendum;
- °° The role of local Moroccan officials during the referendum; and
- °° Withdrawal of Moroccan military forces, presently demanded by Polisario, to ensure free and unfettered referendum.

Morocco has rejected demands that the military and civil administrators withdraw from the Western Sahara prior to the referendum. For its part, Algeria has signalled its impatience with Polisario demands and -- as already noted -- has moved to normalize relations with Morocco.

Failure to resolve territorial disputes in the region is another significant threat to U.S. interests in North Africa. While Washington has only limited leverage as the United Nations and the OAU address these questions, the Bush administration clearly has a vested interest in the longevity of the existing Moroccan and Chadian regimes.

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Failure to resolve local territorial disputes could undermine the political legitimacy of Hassan II and Hissé-Habre, a brilliant tactician who heads the government at Ndjamena, the capital of Chad.

From the perspective of the Bush administration, North Africa must be viewed as a region in delicate equilibrium. Traditional East-West issues ~~no longer are at the pinnacle of U.S. government concerns in the maghrib.~~

Much more threatening would be a concentration of threatening forces -- the challenges posed by worsening demographic and economic trendlines, the emergence of fundamentalist forces, the spectre of Western Europe in 1992, and the debilitations likely to accompany failure to resolve wasting territorial disputes.

Overshadowing all of these adverse threat indicators is the missile-chemical weapons threat posed by Muammar Qaddafi. Should this threat become concrete reality, the United States would have to seriously consider preventive military action. Qaddafi has a demonstrated capacity for playing a spoiler role.

The alternatives to a U.S. military response to the Qaddafi threat are problematic at best. Efforts at regional cooperation warrant close attention, but pressing economic-social difficulties afford Qaddafi and local Islamic fundamentalists too many targets of opportunity. Thus, the threats are proliferating in North Africa and we have yet to devise an effective strategy to stabilize what is today a region of great strategic importance to the United States.

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THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

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I. Introduction

The current political/economic situation in North Africa is the result of several underlying problems and trends, common to the development of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. It is ~~this fundamental commonality that gave rise to the establishment~~ of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and justifies a relatively optimistic view of future developments in the region.

II. Background Tendencies: constraints and opportunities at the regional level

(i) Constraints

- structural limitations of the economy (gap between resources/needs; deficiencies in economic management)
- significant population increases
- socio-cultural crises caused by the process of socio-economic modernization
- limitations of the political system (centralization, rigidity, low participation)

(ii) Opportunities

- parallels in the patterns of crisis and reform in the four countries
- the change in Algerian regional policy
- increased economic complementarity and, consequently, renewed bilateral and multilateral cooperation (UMA)
- disengagement from regional conflicts

(iii) The current situation in North Africa is determined by the interaction of the following factors:

- the current process of political economic reform in all countries of the UMA
- the fact that economic reform is more difficult than political reform
- the slow, modest, but steady progress in regional integration through the UMA and bilateral relations.

II. The International Scene and the Regional Situation

While the current international political trends favour the political dynamics in North Africa, international economic developments are less favourable.

(i) Favourable international factors

- the process of East-West detente
- the trend toward the regionalization of international relations

(ii) International factors less favourable to the current processes of integration and reform

- price trends of the main products of the Magrehb (hydrocarbons, agricultural products, and low technology manufactured products)
- the unwillingness of the European Community (the major trading partner and political interlocutor of the Maghreb) to increase its political/economic guarantees to that region

III. National Situations

For the four major countries of the region (Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, 1988-89 was the year that marked the beginning of the political reforms that have been continuing, though not without obstacles specific to the individual national situations. The economic reform programs begun in the period 1984-86, on the other hand, have been proceeding with greater difficulty. With respect to the processes underway in the other countries of the UMA, Mauritania continues to lag behind.

IV. Conclusions

There are three possible scenarios for development in the Magrehb in the medium term:

- (i) greater integration (national, regional and international)
- (ii) fragmentation and conflict
- (iii) contained crises

The current political/economic situation supports the actualization of first of these scenarios.

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