

SESSION EUROPEENNE DES HAUTES ETUDES DE DEFENSE
Institute des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale
Paris, 14-25/XI/1988

1. "Dossier: accueil-information organisation"
2. "Discours...à la première session européenne de l'Institute des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale"/ Michel Rocard
3. "Allocution du General, Chef d'Etat-Major des armées devant la session européenne de l'I.H.E.D.N."
4. "L'Europe et son effort de defense"/ P.Champenois
5. "The bases of European security"/ Lothar Ruehl
6. "Les negociations sur le desarmement et la securite de l'Europe"/ Roland Dumas
7. "West-East relations: state and prospects, especially in the field of disarmament and arms control"/ Helmut Schaefer
8. "Discours...à la session européenne de l'IHEDN"/ Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Ministre de la Defense
9. <Discorso di Malfatti?>
10. "Discours du secretaire general de l'UEO à la session européenne de l'IHEDN"/ Alfred Cahen
11. "Topic I: the bases of European security"
12. "Topic II: Europe's contribution to its defence effort"
13. "Topic III: disarmament negotiations and European security"
14. "Topic IV: Europe and the Atlantic Alliance"

iai ISTE UTQ AFFARI
INTER. ZI. GIALI-ROMA

n° inv. 8760

28.2.1989

BIBLIOTECA


INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES
DE DEFENSE NATIONALE

PARIS-FRANCE

Session Européenne
des
Hautes Etudes de Defense

DOSSIER

ACCUEIL-INFORMATION ORGANISATION



QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

JUILLET 1988

INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES
DE DEFENSE NATIONALE

Session Européenne
des
Hautes Etudes de Défense

14 au 25 novembre 1988

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Session Européenne
des
Hautes Etudes de Défense

14 au 25 novembre 1988

NOTE D'INFORMATION

A l'attention des auditeurs de la 1ère session européenne

Pièces jointes : Annexe I : Programme de la session
Annexe II : Logement

L'Institut des hautes études de défense nationale a reçu mission d'organiser du 14 au 25 novembre 1988, une session internationale d'auditeurs civils et militaires venant des 7 pays de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale.

Cette note a pour but de donner aux auditeurs des éléments d'information qui leur permettront d'aborder la session dans les meilleures conditions, afin d'en tirer le maximum de profit.

Elle comporte à cet effet :

- une brève présentation de l'Institut,
- un exposé sur les buts, la composition et le programme de la session,
- des indications concernant l'organisation matérielle de la session et en particulier les renseignements sur les conditions d'arrivée à PARIS.

I - L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE DEFENSE NATIONALE

Installé à l'Ecole Militaire à PARIS, l'Institut des hautes études de défense nationale dans sa forme actuelle a été créé en 1948, au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, pour donner à des personnalités de la fonction publique, des armées et des autres secteurs d'activité une information approfondie sur la défense nationale comprise au sens le plus large.

121) L'information est donnée aux auditeurs sous diverses formes.

Ils reçoivent des dossiers préparés par les sections de la direction des études, qui comportent des textes réglementaires, des extraits de revues ou d'articles, des déclarations officielles françaises ou étrangères faisant apparaître les courants de pensées les plus divers.

Le contenu des dossiers est complété par des conférences suivies de débats, prononcées par des responsables de haut niveau ou des spécialistes français et étrangers.

Par ailleurs, l'information est également recueillie par les auditeurs au cours de voyages dans les Armées et de visites d'installations militaires ou de grands complexes industriels ou économiques.

Enfin l'I.H.E.D.N. met à la disposition de ses auditeurs un centre de documentation informatisé.

122) La réflexion est conduite dans chaque comité sous la direction d'un président choisi par ses camarades. Les conclusions tirées de ces débats sont consignées dans des rapports qui servent de point de départ aux séances plénières de restitution au cours desquelles les auditeurs de la session rassemblés confrontent leurs points de vue.

Travaux et séances plénières se déroulent dans un esprit particulièrement ouvert et où toutes les opinions sont admises, dans un climat de tolérance et de respect mutuel. Quant aux travaux écrits, l'imagination peut s'y donner libre cours, à condition que le réalisme et le sens du concret y soient présents.

Certains de ces travaux peuvent faire l'objet d'une publication officielle.

II - LA SESSION EUROPEENNE DES HAUTES ETUDES DE DEFENSE.

21) But

La session doit être l'occasion de mener une réflexion commune sur divers aspects de la sécurité européenne, et de créer ou d'approfondir les liens entre responsables de pays différents. Elle contribuera ainsi, comme celles qui suivront, au développement de l'esprit européen de défense.

233) Travail en comité

Chaque comité choisit très vite un thème d'étude général ou plus spécifique valable pour toute la durée de la session, ayant un rapport étroit avec l'un ou l'autre des thèmes directeurs proposés.

Il en délibère au cours des séances de travail en comité et établit un rapport dont les grandes lignes seront présentées en séance plénière à la fin de la session.

Ces rapports ne pourront être transmis ou publiés qu'avec l'accord de l'ensemble des pays participants.

III - ORGANISATION MATERIELLE DE LA SESSION

31) Direction de la session

L'organisation de la session et son déroulement sont placés sous la responsabilité du Directeur de l'Institut. Un groupe de cadres de la Direction des Etudes est chargé de la conduite générale de la session. (voir pièce 02).

L'adresse de la session européenne est :

IHEDN/Session Européenne
Ecole Militaire
21, Place Joffre
75700 PARIS
Téléphone : 1 - 45 50 32 80 (poste 33 776)

32) Vie de la session

321) Accueil des auditeurs

Les modalités de mise en route des auditeurs étrangers depuis leur pays d'origine sont à la charge des autorités locales.

Leur accueil se fera le lundi 14 novembre à partir de 17 heures à

l'IHEDN.

325) Divers

Les auditeurs étrangers feront parvenir à l'Institut, par le canal diplomatique, 5 photos d'identité destinées à l'établissement des cartes d'accès à l'École Militaire, et de l'annuaire de la session.

Ils seront détenteurs des documents d'identité correspondant aux accords entre les pays membres.

326) Transport

L'Institut assurera, par des navettes de cars, le transport quotidien entre le Méridien-Montparnasse et l'École Militaire.

un vjs

A N N E X E I

PROGRAMME DE LA SESSION

(CONFÉRENCES ET VOYAGES)

DATE	HEURE	CONFÉRENCES ET VOYAGES	CONFÉRENCIERS
Lundi 14.11.88	17 h 00	Accueil des auditeurs - dîner en commun	
Mardi 15.11.88	10 h 30 - 12 h 30	Discours de présentation puis discours d'ouverture	Directeur de l'IHEDN <u>Premier ministre (ou membre du gouvernement)</u>
Mardi 15.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	Les fondements de la sécurité européenne 1	Allemagne 1
Mercredi 16.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	Les fondements de la sécurité européenne 2	France 1
Mercredi 16.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	Les fondements de la sécurité européenne 3	Royaume-Uni France 2,
Jeudi 17.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	L'Europe et son effort de défense 1	
Jeudi 17.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	L'Europe et son effort de défense 2	Belgique
Vendredi 18.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	Les négociations de désarmement 1	France 3
Vendredi 18.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	Les négociations de désarmement 2	Allemagne 2 / ou Luxembourg ?
Samedi 19.11.88	07 h 00 - 18 h 00	Visite à la Force Océanique Stratégique à BREST	
Lundi 21.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	Les négociations de désarmement 3	France 4 / <u>ou</u> Allemagne 2 ?
Lundi 21.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	L'Europe et l'Alliance atlantique 1	Luxembourg / <u>ou</u> Allemagne 2 ? France 5.
Mardi 22.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	L'Europe et l'Alliance atlantique 2	
Mardi 22.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	Coopération technique et spatiale/Armements 1	Italie
Mercredi 23.11.88	07 h 00 - 18 h 00	Visite à l'Aérospatiale	
Jeudi 24.11.88	09 h 00 - 10 h 30	Coopération technique et spatiale/Armements 2	France 6
Jeudi 24.11.88	14 h 00 - 15 h 30	Coopération technique et spatiale/Armements 3	Pays-Bas
Vendredi 25.11.88	15 h 45 - 17 h 15	Discours de clôture	<u>Secrétaire Général U.E.O.</u>

références : Françaises, 6 ; Pays de l'U.E.O., 7 ; U.E.O., 1.

Note : chaque conférence est suivie d'une séance de travail de comité qui occupe la deuxième partie de la demi-journée.

ANNEXE II

CONDITIONS DE LOGEMENT

Le logement des auditeurs n'est pas pris en charge par l'Etat Français. Les auditeurs ont toute latitude pour se loger à PARIS, pendant la durée de la session.


Pour les auditeurs qui le souhaitent, les chambres seront réservées à l'hôtel MERIDIEN MONTPARNASSE (1) du 14 au 25 novembre 1988. Les dates exactes, à la convenance de chacun, pourront être arrêtées par entente directe avec la direction de l'hôtel.

[Le transport quotidien entre l'hôtel et l'Ecole Militaire serait alors assuré par les soins de l'Institut.]

[Ceux qui arriveraient avant cette date, prendront les dispositions nécessaires pour prévoir leur accueil et leur hébergement.]

Ceux qui ont prévu différemment leur hébergement à PARIS, sont invités à le faire savoir à l'I.H.E.D.N. par l'intermédiaire de leur ambassade, étant entendu que leur transport quotidien vers l'Ecole Militaire ne pourra pas alors être assuré par l'Institut.

(1) Hôtel MERIDIEN PARIS MONTPARNASSE (catégorie Luxe 3 étoiles)
19 rue du Commandant Mouchotte
75014 PARIS
Tél. (1) 43 20 15 51
Tarif : 500 F par nuit (chambre simple ou double) + petit déjeuner (50,00 F).



EXTRAITS DE L'ENCADREMENT DE L'INSTITUT

DIRECTION DE L'IHEDN.

Directeur :

- Général de Corps Aérien Alain SUQUET poste : 33 600.

ÉTAT-MAJOR - CABINET.

Chef d'Etat-Major :

- Colonel LOUISIN postes : 33 601

Chef de Cabinet :

- Chef d'Escadron MARTIN 33 169

Aide de Camp :

- Aspirant MAGNIENT 33 600

Centre de Documentation

- Madame ERULIN 33 613

DIRECTION DES ETUDES DE L'IHEDN

Directeur adjoint, chargé des Etudes :

- M. JACQUES, Ministre Plénipotentiaire poste : 33 617

SECTION RESPONSABLE DE LA SESSION EUROPEENNE

- M. BRETON, Conseiller des Affaires
Etrangères poste : 33 605

- M. le Colonel SEBE (Terre) poste : 34 943

SECRETARIAT

- Premier Maître QUINQUIS poste : 33 776

Note : une ligne P et T (numéro non encore obtenu) sera mise en place au secrétariat de la session, du 14 au 25 novembre.

Le secrétariat de la Session Européenne disposera également d'un numéro sur le Central Militaire : 33 378.

RENSEIGNEMENTS PARTICULIERS SUR LE FONCTIONNEMENT
DE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES
DE DEFENSE NATIONALE

1) ENCADREMENT

Le Général Directeur et son cabinet ont leurs bureaux au château GABRIEL (13, place Joffre). Le Directeur adjoint civil, l'Officier général adjoint E.M.S., le Directeur des études, la direction des études, les sections, le secrétariat de la Direction des Etudes et le service administratif sont installés dans le bâtiment 11 (entrée 21, place Joffre).

Le Directeur et les adjoints de la session sont installés au premier étage au-dessus de l'entresol, dans le bâtiment à droite de l'entrée de l'Artillerie.

Un secrétariat se trouvera pendant la session au rez-de-chaussée du même bâtiment.

2) ASSIDUITE

L'obligation d'assiduité résulte de l'engagement moral de tout auditeur acceptant de suivre la session.

Celle-ci forme un ensemble dont aucune des activités ne doit être négligée. Il est particulièrement recommandé de prévenir, éventuellement par téléphone, le bureau de session, de toute absence à l'une quelconque des séances de l'Institut (en dehors des heures de bureau, téléphoner à la permanence : 33 601).

La plus grande exactitude est demandée au début des conférences par égard pour les conférenciers et l'auditoire.

3) VOYAGES D'INFORMATION ET D'ETUDES

PARTICIPATION

Les voyages font partie intégrante de l'enseignement de l'Institut.

PROGRAMME

Le programme précis de ces voyages sera communiqué en début de session.

- HEBERGEMENT

Voir note d'information.

- NOURRITURE

Voir note d'information.

- HABILLEMENT, BAGAGES

Des prescriptions particulières à chaque voyage seront données en temps utile.

- PIECE D'IDENTITE

Se munir des documents d'identité correspondant aux accords entre les pays membres (carte nationale d'identité ou passeport en cours de validité).

4) DIVERS

1) Une bibliothèque et un service de documentation sont à la disposition des auditeurs à l'entresol de l'I.H.E.D.N.


2) Une plaquette nominative est remise le premier jour à chaque auditeur ; le port de cette plaquette sur le revers est recommandé pour faciliter la connaissance des auditeurs et des cadres.

ECOLE MILITAIRE

A : bureaux des organisateurs : 1er étage
 - secrétariat
 et salles de comité : Rez-de-chaussée

B : - Amphithéâtre du CHEAR
 C : - Amphithéâtre "DES VALLIERES"
 D : - Général directeur IHEDN/EMS/CHEM
 E : - Mess des Officiers

PLACE JOFFRE



AVENUE DE LOWENDAL

Pour l'organisation des comités, nous demandons aux auditeurs de langue française de nous préciser s'ils parlent assez couramment l'anglais pour participer aux discussions dans cette langue.

2

DISCOURS DE MONSIEUR MICHEL ROCARD, PREMIER MINISTRE,
A LA PREMIERE SESSION EUROPEENNE
DE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE DEFENSE NATIONALE

(15 NOVEMBRE 1988)

n. 10, 30

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n° Inv.	8760
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BIBLIOTECA	

MESSIEURS LES MINISTRES,
MESSIEURS LES OFFICIERS GENERAUX,
MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

VOUS ETES VENUS DES SEPT PAYS QUE COMPRENAIT L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE JUSQU'A SON ELARGISSEMENT A L'ESPAGNE ET AU PORTUGAL, POUR REFLECHIR, ENSEMBLE, AUX ENJEUX DE LA SECURITE EUROPEENNE. JE SUIS HEUREUX DE VOUS ACCUEILLIR ICI, ET D'INAUGURER LA PREMIERE SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE DEFENSE NATIONALE. PERMETTEZ MOI DE REMERCIER TOUS CEUX QUI ONT RENDU POSSIBLE LE SUCCES DE CETTE INITIATIVE, FRANCAISE A L'ORIGINE, EUROPEENNE DESORMAIS. ELLE TRADUIT LA PRISE DE CONSCIENCE PROGRESSIVE, PAR LES EUROPEENS, DE LEURS INTERETS ET DE LEURS OBJECTIFS COMMUNS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE.

IL SERAIT ABSURDE DE VOULOIR TRANSFORMER CETTE SESSION EN EXERCICE D'AUTO-SATISFACTION. SI LE CHEMIN PARCOURU EST IMMENSE, CELUI QUI NOUS RESTE A FAIRE EST ENCORE LONG. DES DIFFICULTES EXISTENT, QUI TIENNENT A LA DIFFERENCE DE STATUT DE NOS PAYS, A LEURS HISTOIRES, DIVERSES, ET QUI SE SONT SOUVENT AFFRONTES, A LEURS CHOIX PLUS RECENTS, POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES ; ELLES TIENNENT AUSSI A L'APRETE DE NOTRE ENVIRONNEMENT, ECONOMIQUE ET TECHNOLOGIQUE NOTAMMENT, QUI FAVORISE LES CRAINTES, AIGUISE LES COMPETITIONS.

.../...

MAIS, COMME L'A RAPPELE IL Y A PEU DE TEMPS, ICI MEME, LE PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, CES DIFFICULTES DOIVENT AU CONTRAIRE NOUS INCITER A AGIR. APRES TOUT, IL Y A PEINE PLUS DE TRENTE ANS, QUI PENSAIT QUE LA CONSTRUCTION DU MARCHE COMMUN SERAIT AISEE ? AURAIT-IL FALLU POUR AUTANT Y RENONCER ? L'ESPACE COMMUN DANS LEQUEL NOUS VIVONS, L'ESPACE EUROPEEN, QUE NOUS AVONS CONSTRUIT EST AUSSI UN ESPACE STRATEGIQUE. QUEL EST-IL ? SELON QUELS PRINCIPES DOIT-IL S'ORGANISER ? COMMENT PEUT-ON EN HATER LA REALISATION ? TELLES SONT LES QUESTIONS QUE JE SOUHAITE ABORDER, AUJOURD'HUI, DEVANT VOUS.

L'IDENTITE DE L'EUROPE

1. L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE : DES VALEURS ET DES INTERETS SPECIFIQUES.

NOUS AVONS, NOUS EUROPEENS DE L'OUEST, UNE VISION SPECIFIQUE DE CE QU'EST L'EUROPE ET DE CE QU'ELLE DOIT ETRE. CE MESSAGE PARTICULIER, IL S'ENRACINE DANS LES VALEURS AUXQUELLES NOS PAYS CROIENT, ET DONT ILS SONT LES GARANTS.

APRES DES SIECLES D'HISTOIRE TOURMENTEE, PARFOIS SANGLANTE, L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE A PU SE DEVELOPPER DANS LA COOPERATION AU COURS DE DECENNIES PASSES. CETTE SOLIDARITE

NOUVELLE N'A ETE POSSIBLE QUE PAR LA REFERENCE COMMUNE ET
CONSTANTE A CERTAINES VALEURS, QUI FONDENT L'IDENTITE
EUROPEENNE ; C'EST AUSSI DANS LE RESPECT DE CES PRINCIPES QUE
LA DEMARCHE ENTREPRISE POURRA S'ELARGIR A D'AUTRES CONTREES.
J'Y REVIENDRAI DANS UN INSTANT.

CETTE SPECIFICITE EUROPEENNE, QUELLE EST-ELLE ?
ELLE TIENT A TROIS CARACTERISTIQUES QUI FONT DE L'EUROPE
OCCIDENTALE UN SYSTEME UNIQUE. ELLE SEULE, EN EFFET, ALLIE LA
DEMOCRATIE PLURALISTE ET LE RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, UN
HAUT NIVEAU DE DEVELOPPEMENT AINSI QU'UNE PROTECTION SOCIALE
SANS EQUIVALENT. ILS SONT INDISSOCIABLES : L'EUROPE
QUE NOUS CONSTRUISONS FORME UN TOUT.

CETTE EUROPE A AUSSI SA PROPRE VISION DU MONDE.
ELLE A DES RESPONSABILITES PARTICULIERES, QUI NE COINCIDENT
PAS NECESSAIREMENT AVEC CELLES DE SON ALLIE ET AMI AMERICAIN.
LES ETATS-UNIS ONT DES ENGAGEMENTS PLANETAIRES, QUE NOUS
POUVONS PARTAGER, QUE NOUS POUVONS CHOISIR DE SOUTENIR.
L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE EST DANS L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE, EN
ASSUME LES CHARGES, EN PARTAGE LES OBJECTIFS.

MAIS L'EUROPE A SA PROPRE VOCATION PLANETAIRE, SES
PROPRES ENGAGEMENTS HORS D'EUROPE, ET UN ROLE SPECIFIQUE A
JOUER DANS LES EQUILIBRES MONDIAUX : ELLE EXERCE UN ATTRAIT
CROISSANT SUR CERTAINES REGIONS DU TIERS MONDE, CAR SA PAROLE

N'EST CELLE D'AUCUNE IDEOLOGIE. POUR ELLE LES ENJEUX DE SECURITE EUROPEENS SONT MULTIPLES ET NE SAURAIENT SE RAMENER AUX RELATIONS AVEC L'UNION SOVIETIQUE : AINSI EN EST-IL DE LA MEDITERRANEE QUI EST UNE ZONE D'ENGAGEMENT CROISSANT ET D'INTERETS POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES ORIGINAUX.

L'EUROPE N'EST PAS, NON PLUS, SEULEMENT L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. JE NE VEUX PAS LA EVOQUER D'AUTRES INSTITUTIONS COMME LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE OU L'UEO. L'EUROPE, C'EST AUSSI VARSOVIE, BUDAPEST OU PRAGUE, QUI NE SONT PAS POUR NOUS SEULEMENT UN ENJEU DE LA COMPETITION EST-OUEST, MAIS FONT PARTIE DE NOTRE HISTOIRE. NOUS ENTENDONS LES RAYER NI DE NOTRE MEMOIRE, NI DE NOTRE AVENIR.

NOS PAYS ONT EN COMMUN DES VALEURS IMPORTANTES ; MAIS AUSSI DES INTERETS DE SECURITE FONDAMENTAUX, QUI SE TRADUISENT NOTAMMENT PAR DES RISQUES COMMUNS : SI UN CONFLIT DEVAIT ECLATER, IL EST INCONCEVABLE QU'IL NE NOUS TOUCHE PAS TOUS. NOUS AVONS NOTRE VISION DU MONDE ET DE L'EUROPE : ELLE SEULE PEUT INTEGRER UNE PREOCCUPATION SPECIFIQUE DE L'EST ET DU SUD DANS UNE VISION GLOBALE DE SECURITE. COMMENT, DANS CES CONDITIONS, NE PAS VOULOIR CONSTRUIRE LE PILIER EUROPEEN DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE ? LA FRANCE, POUR SA PART, Y EST DETERMINEE : DANS LE RESPECT DE LA SPECIFICITE DE NOTRE DOCTRINE DE DEFENSE, NOUS SOMMES RESOLUS A NOUS ENGAGER DANS LA VOIE EUROPEENNE.

2. LE PILIER EUROPEEN DE L'ALLIANCE.

SI L'EUROPE QUI SE CONSTRUIT A L'OUEST CHERCHE A COOPERER POUR SA SECURITE, CE N'EST PAS PAR ESPRIT BELLIQUEUX. N'INVERSONS PAS LES FACTEURS : C'EST L'EUROPE POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE, CULTURELLE QUE NOUS CONSTRUISONS, QUI ETEND SA VOLONTE DE SOLIDARITE A LA DEFENSE, ET NON L'INVERSE. IL N'Y AURAIT PAS, D'AILLEURS, DE DEFENSE QUI TIENNE SANS FONDEMENT POLITIQUE.

DE SON COTE, L'UNION SOVIETIQUE N'A PAS CESSE, ELLE, SON EFFORT DE DEFENSE. LA PERESTROIKA N'A PAS ENCORE TROUVE DE TRADUCTION MILITAIRE. JE N'AI PAS LA MANIE DES CHIFFRES, MAIS LAISSEZ-MOI VOUS EN RAPPELER QUELQUES UNS, QUI PARLENT D'EUX-MEMES : DE 1985 A 1986, LA PRODUCTION SOVIETIQUE DE CHARS, D'ARTILLERIE, DE LANCE ROQUETTES MULTIPLES A DEPASSE LA TOTALITE DE CES MATERIELS EN SERVICE DANS LES ARMEES FRANCAISE ET ALLEMANDE ; DE 1986 A 1987, L'ARSENAL STRATEGIQUE SOVIETIQUE A CRU D'UN NOMBRE DE TETES EQUIVALENT A CELUI DES SYSTEMES STRATEGIQUES FRANCAIS. LE PACTE DE VARSOVIE A CONTINUE, AU COURS DES DOUZE DERNIERS MOIS, A SE RENFORCER, ET LE DESEQUILIBRE AU DETRIMENT DE L'OTAN EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS CONVENTIONNELS RESTE INCHANGE.

LA PLUS GRANDE PRUDENCE MILITAIRE S'IMPOSE DONC TANT QUE LA NOUVELLE PENSEE SOVIETIQUE N'AURA PAS TROUVE DE TRADUCTION CONCRETE, TANT QUE LES IDEES -FORTES AU DEMEURANT-

DE "SUFFISANCE RAISONNABLE" OU DE POSTURE DEFENSIVE, RESTERONT, DE L'AVIS DE TOUS LES SPECIALISTES, DES DECLARATIONS D'INTENTION.

EH BIEN, ME DIREZ-VOUS : QUE FAITES VOUS DONC DE L'ALLIANCE ? L'OTAN N'EST-ELLE PAS CE QUI GARANTIT LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE ?

L'ALLIANCE S'EST CONSTRUITE AUTOUR DES ETATS-UNIS, QUI ONT AIDE UNE EUROPE EN RUINE A SE RELEVER. AUJOURD'HUI, CELLE-CI EST PROSPERE ET DYNAMIQUE : IL EST NORMAL QU'ELLE SOIT PLUS FORTE, ET LES BUDGETS DE DEFENSE N'EN SONT PAS LA SEULE MESURE ; C'EST A UN PARTAGE NOUVEAU DES RESPONSABILITES QU'IL FAUT NOUS HABITUER.

LA QUESTION POSEE ICI N'EST PAS CELLE DES CHOIX POLITIQUES FONDAMENTAUX QUE LES UNS ET LES AUTRES ONT PU FAIRE : INTEGRATION OU INDEPENDANCE NATIONALE. IL SERAIT MALADROIT ET INUTILE DE CHERCHER A LES REMETTRE EN CAUSE : NE REANIMONS PAS LES VIEILLES QUERELLES ! CELA NE DOIT PAS EMPECHER QUE, DANS LE RESPECT DE CES CHOIX, S'ELABORENT DES COOPERATIONS PARTICULIERES, SOUPLES, ADAPTEES A UN ENVIRONNEMENT EN CONSTANTE EVOLUTION. L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE NE PEUT PAS SE CONSTRUIRE COMME UN CADRE RIGIDE ET GLOBAL ; MAIS BIEN PLUS COMME UN TISSU DE COOPERATIONS ET DE SOLIDARITES SPECIFIQUES, AU CAS PAR CAS. C'EST AUSSI QUE

S'IMPOSERA PROGRESSIVEMENT UNE APPROCHE MULTILATERALE DES QUESTIONS DE SECURITE.

CETTE EUROPE DE LA COOPERATION COMBINE L'ACQUIS DE LA CEE ET L'ESPOIR DE LA CSCE, LA CONFERENCE POUR LA SECURITE ET LA COOPERATION EN EUROPE. ELLE S'EXPRIME A L'UEO, QUI FAIT ENCORE SES PREMIERS PAS. J'Y REVIENDRAI PLUS LOIN. ELLE S'EXPRIME AUSSI AU GROUPEMENT EUROPEEN INDEPENDANT DE PROGRAMMES, LE GEIP, POUR LA COOPERATION EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS. DES EFFORTS SONT A FAIRE A CET EGARD. J'EN REPARLERAI. ELLE S'EXPRIME ENFIN DANS LE DOMAINE DU DESARMEMENT, DANS LE CADRE DE LA CSCE.

3. LE DIALOGUE ENTRE LES DEUX EUROPEES.

DES RAISONS GEOGRAPHIQUES ASSUREMENT, MAIS BIEN PLUS UNE HISTOIRE COMMUNE, POLITIQUE ET CULTURELLE, UNISSENT LES DEUX PARTIES DE L'EUROPE. N'EST-CE PAS D'AILLEURS LA RAISON POUR LAQUELLE LA FRANCE A TOUJOURS REFUSE QUE LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR L'EUROPE METTENT EN PRESENCE DEUX BLOCS, DEUX ALLIANCES DE NATURE D'AILLEURS SI DIFFERENTES L'UNE DE L'AUTRE ? N'EST-CE PAS POUR CELA QUE LA FRANCE ACCORDE TANT D'IMPORTANCE AU PROCESSUS DE LA CSCE, QUI MET EN PRESENCE LES 35, C'EST-A-DIRE TOUS LES PAYS EUROPEENS AINSI QUE LES ETATS-UNIS ET LE CANADA ? LA DEMARCHE POLITIQUE D'ENSEMBLE QUE REPRESENTA L'ACTE FINAL D'HELSINKI DOIT ETRE POURSUIVIE SANS RELACHE. C'EST AINSI SEULEMENT QUE POURRA ETRE SURMONTÉE PROGRESSIVEMENT LA DIVISION DE NOTRE CONTINENT.

OR, SI L'AVENIR DE L'EUROPE APPARAÎT AUJOURD'HUI ENCORE SOUS LES TRAITES DE LA DIVISION, SI BERLIN NOUS RAPPELLE QU'IL Y A DEUX EUROPE EN UNE, EST-CE A NOUS, EUROPEENS DE L'OUEST, QU'EN INCOMBE LA RESPONSABILITE ? LE CONTROLE EXERCE SUR LES PAYS DITS DE L'EST EMPECHE QU'IL Y AIT AUJOURD'HUI UNE COMMUNAUTE POLITIQUE DE L'ATLANTIQUE A L'OURAL.

POURQUOI NIER CEPENDANT QUE DE GRANDS CHANGEMENTS SONT EN COURS EN UNION SOVIETIQUE ? M. GORBATCHEV A ENTAME UN VASTE MOUVEMENT DE REFORMES, IL CHERCHE A INSTAURER UNE RELATIVE TRANSPARENCE ET UNE CERTAINE EFFICACITE ECONOMIQUE, IL A ENGAGE SON PAYS DANS UNE POLITIQUE DE DIALOGUE ET DE COOPERATION AVEC L'OUEST. TOUT CELA EST VRAI. TOUT CELA DOIT ETRE SALUE ET ENCOURAGE. D'AILLEURS, L'ENSEMBLE DES PAYS OUEST EUROPEENS, ET AVEC EUX LA FRANCE, ONT AUJOURD'HUI DES RELATIONS A LA FOIS PLUS NOMBREUSES ET DE MEILLEURE QUALITE AVEC MOSCOU. JE M'EN REJOUIS. QU'UNE POLITIQUE A L'EST PLUS ACTIVE, PLUS IMAGINATIVE, PLUS EXIGEANTE AUSSI, SE METTE EN PLACE, EST LA CONDITION NECESSAIRE DU RAPPROCHEMENT.

MAIS JE M'ETONNE, CHAQUE FOIS QUE J'ENTENDS CERTAINS AFFIRMER QUE, DESORMAIS, L'INITIATIVE EUROPEENNE EST DU COTE DE MOSCOU ; JE M'ETONNE DAVANTAGE ENCORE, LORSQUE J'EN ENTENDS D'AUTRES PRECONISER DE RALENTIR LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE DE DEFENSE, SOUS PRETEXTE QUE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE

DECOUVRE LES VERTUS DE LA COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE ET DU DIALOGUE EUROPEEN, ET QUE POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS DEPUIS 1945 NOUS AVONS QUELQUE ESPOIR DE VOIR LE DESARMEMENT PROGRESSER.

SI CELA M'ETONNE, C'EST QU'IL Y A BIEN LONGTEMPS QUE L'EUROPE SE CONSTRUIT, DEPUIS 1957 AU MOINS, ET ELLE NE CESSE DE SE FIXER DE NOUVEAUX DEFIS ; C'EST QU'IL Y A PLUSIEURS ANNEES QUE NOUS, A L'OUEST, PARLONS DE TRANSPARENCE ET DE DIALOGUE : N'EST-CE PAS TOUTE LA PORTEE DES ACCORDS DE STOCKHOLM, SIGNES IL Y A MAINTENANT PLUS DE DEUX ANS ? SI JE M'ETONNE, ENFIN, C'EST QUE, PROFONDEMENT ACQUIS A LA CAUSE DU DESARMEMENT, JE NE SAURAI L'OPPOSER A CELLE DE LA SECURITE.

SEULE UNE EUROPE OCCIDENTALE SURE D'ELLE FERA AVANCER LE DIALOGUE ENTRE LES DEUX EUROPEES.

L'UNE DES DIFFICULTES QU'IL Y A DEFINIR L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE, C'EST QUE, COMME LES POUPEES GIGOGNES, ELLE EST FAITE D'EUROPES AUX DIMENSIONS DIFFERENTES, QUI S'EMBOITENT L'UNE DANS L'AUTRE. N'EST-CE PAS LA, D'AILLEURS, UN PROCESSUS QUI NOUS EST BIEN FAMILIER ? L'UEO VIEND DE S'AGRANDIR DE DEUX PAYS AMIS, L'ESPAGNE ET LE PORTUGAL ; LES DOUZE DE LA CEE ONT COMMENCE A SIX ; LES ELARGISSEMENTS SUCCESSIFS N'ONT PAS ETE FACILES : QUI SONGERAIT AUJOURD'HUI A LES REGRETTER ?

EN TOUT CAS PAS NOS VOISINS DE L'EST, FORT DESIREUX DE MULTIPLIER LEURS LIENS AVEC LA CEE : CELLE-CI VIENT D'ETABLIR AVEC LE CONSEIL D'ASSISTANCE ECONOMIQUE MUTUELLE, LE CAEM, DES RELATIONS OFFICIELLES, PREMIERE ETAPE D'UNE SERIE D'ACCORDS QUI DEVRAIENT CONTRIBUER A LA MODERNISATION DES PAYS D'EUROPE DE L'EST.

4. DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE.

LA CAUSE DU DESARMEMENT A BRUSQUEMENT PROGRESSE. L'ACCORD DE WASHINGTON -LA DOUBLE OPTION ZERO- A SERVI DE REVELATEUR. AU SCEPTICISME GENERAL A SUCCEDE L'ESPOIR : UN MANDAT SUR LES PROCHAINES NEGOCIATIONS CONVENTIONNELLES POURRAIT ETRE BIENTOT SIGNE A VIENNE.

CERTAINS S'ALARMENT : N'EST-CE PAS LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE QUE L'ON BRADE ? D'AUTRE S'INDIGNENT : LE DESARMEMENT PROGRESSERAIT PLUS VITE SI NOUS SUPPRIMIONS TELLE CATEGORIE ENTIERE D'ARMES, SI NOUS ACCEPTIONS LA DEMILITARISATION PURE ET SIMPLE D'UNE PARTIE DE L'EUROPE.

LE DESARMEMENT, EST UNE CHANCE A SAISIR, CELLE D'UN EQUILIBRE PLUS STABLE ; CE N'EST PAS SEULEMENT FAIRE MOINS, C'EST AUSSI FAIRE MIEUX. L'EXIGENCE DE SECURITE NE DISPARAIT PAS : DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE VONT DE PAIR : JE NE SAURAI POUR MA PART RENONCER A L'UN OU L'AUTRE DE CES PRINCIPES.

LES PRINCIPES DE L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE

Maintenant que nous voyons un peu mieux de quelle Europe il s'agit, laissez moi vous exposer à grands traits les principes qui doivent guider la coopération européenne de défense.

Premier principe, donc : savoir combiner l'exigence de sécurité et le désarmement. C'est ce qui permet la stabilité. Le volet désarmement permet de passer d'une situation marquée par la supériorité à un processus de recherche de la suffisance. Suffisance en vertu de quoi ? C'est là qu'intervient le critère de la sécurité : il faut réduire et faire peser des contraintes particulières sur les armements qui serviraient à une attaque brusquée et par surprise ou qui permettraient une guerre prolongée. Cela implique qu'on en diminue le nombre et qu'on les déconcentre géographiquement.

En effet, la stabilité ne découle pas de la seule diminution des armes : les nombres sont symboliques, ils peuvent être trompeurs. La parité numérique n'est pas un critère pertinent, à lui seul, de stabilité : la localisation des forces est importante ; leur combinaison aussi. Du processus de désarmement en cours devrait en tout cas résulter qu'aucune partie de l'Europe n'ait une sécurité diminuée, inférieure à celle des autres.

C'EST LA MEME PREOCCUPATION QUI NOUS ANIME POUR CE QUI EST DES ARMES CHIMIQUES : NOUS SOUHAITONS VIVEMENT QUE LA CONFERENCE DE PARIS FAVORISE LE SUCCES DE LA NEGOCIATION DE GENEVE. C'EST EN TOUT CAS L'ESPOIR DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, QUI A PRIS L'INITIATIVE DE CETTE CONFERENCE. C'EST BIEN EVIDEMMENT AUSSI LE MIEN.

UN MOT ENCORE, EN DEHORS DU PROBLEME DE LA VERIFICATION SUR LEQUEL JE REVIENDRAI PLUS LOIN : LE DESARMEMENT NE SAURAIT ECARTER LA NECESSITE QUE LES FORCES AUTORISEES S'ADAPTENT A L'EVOLUTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE ET OPERATIONNEL. CE PRINCIPE, DE BON-SENS, NE DOIT EVIDEMMENT PAS SERVIR DE PRETEXTE AU CONTOURNEMENT DES ACCORDS. MAIS, ON NE PEUT BLOQUER LES PROGRES DE LA RECHERCHE TECHNOLOGIQUE, CELA N'ABOUTIRAIT QU'A BAISSER LES BRAS DANS LA COMPETITION INTERNATIONALE.

DEUXIEME PRINCIPE : LES FORCES CLASSIQUES ET NUCLEAIRES SONT NECESSAIRES, ENSEMBLE, A LA DEFENSE DE L'EUROPE. LE NUCLEAIRE ET LE CONVENTIONNEL SE COMPLEMENTENT L'UN L'AUTRE, TOUT EN AYANT LEUR CARACTERE SPECIFIQUE. LES TENTATIONS DU TOUT NUCLEAIRE COMME CELLES D'UNE "DISSUASION CONVENTIONNELLE" -HISTORIQUEMENT SANS FONDEMENT- SONT EGALEMENT UTOPIQUES, ET DESTABILISATRICES. LE LIEN ENTRE FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES ET NUCLEAIRES EST FONDAMENTAL : IL FAUT QU'UN ADVERSAIRE NE PUISSE PARIER SUR LE CONTOURNEMENT DE LA DISSUASION.

LA FRANCE, POUR SA PART, FAIT D'UNE DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE AUTONOME LE FONDEMENT DE SA DEFENSE. C'EST AINSI QU'ELLE DISPOSE DE FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES ET DE FORCES NUCLEAIRES, PRE-STRATEGIQUES ET STRATEGIQUES, QUI FORMENT UN TOUT. AUCUNE DE CES ARMES NE MENACE NOS VOISINS ET AMIS. ELLES SONT DESTINEES, QUELLE QUE SOIT LEUR PORTEE, A RENFORCER LA DISSUASION, ET NON MENER UNE BATAILLE.

DANS LE CONTEXTE DE DESARMEMENT QUE NOUS CONNAISSONS AUJOURD'HUI, IL SERAIT DANGEREUX - ET CONTRE-PRODUCTIF - DE RENONCER UNILATERALEMENT A TEL OU TEL ELEMENT D'UNE PANOPLIE, CONVENTIONNELLE OU NUCLEAIRE ; C'EST AU REGARD DE L'ENSEMBLE D'UN DISPOSITIF DE DEFENSE, DE SA COHERENCE GENERALE, QUE S'EVALUE L'INTERET DE CHAQUE SYSTEME.

CES PRINCIPES FONDENT LA DOCTRINE FRANCAISE : LA FRANCE NE SAURAIT, POUR ELLE-MEME, Y RENONCER. NUL NE LE LUI DEMANDE SERIEUSEMENT, D'AILLEURS. UN ADVERSAIRE EVENTUEL SAURAIT, AINSI, QU'EN ATTAQUANT L'EUROPE IL NE PEUT ECARTER LE RISQUE D'UN PASSAGE AU NUCLEAIRE. C'EST CE RISQUE QUI ASSOIT LA PAIX DE L'EUROPE ET LES FORCES NUCLEAIRES FRANCAISES, ET BRITANNIQUES D'AILLEURS, JOUENT A CET EGARD UN ROLE ESSENTIEL. ELLES RESTERONT AU COEUR DU PROCESSUS DE DISSUASION EN EUROPE.

MAIS LE DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE DOIT ETRE COMPLETE PAR UN DISPOSITIF CONVENTIONNEL CREDIBLE. LES NEGOCIATIONS DE VIENNE CONTRIBUERONT A LA STABILITE DE CE DISPOSITIF. L'AUTRE VOIE A EXPLORER EST CELLE DE COOPERATIONS PLUS NOMBREUSES DANS LE DOMAINE CONVENTIONNEL : LA BRIGADE FRANCO-ALLEMANDE EST LE PREMIER PAS FRANCHI EN CE SENS. EST-IL ABSURDE DE PENSER QU'UN JOUR, DES PANS ENTIERS DE NOS FORCES CLASSIQUES SERONT IMBRIQUES ?

TROISIEME ET DERNIER PRINCIPE : IL FAUT PARLER DE L'EUROPE AVEC TOUS LES PAYS D'EUROPE.

LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE APPARAÎT PARFOIS LIMITEE AUX RELATIONS FORTES QUI UNISSIONT CERTAINS PAYS : JE SONGE, BIEN SUR, AUX RELATIONS FRANCO-ALLEMANDES. ELLES SONT ASSUREMENT AU COEUR DE L'EUROPE FUTURE ; ELLES NE CONSTITUERONT PAS A ELLES SEULES L'AVENIR DE L'EUROPE. C'EST AINSI QUE JE ME REJOUIS TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT DE L'ELARGISSEMENT DE L'UEO A L'ESPAGNE ET AU PORTUGAL.

IL VA DE SOI QUE TOUS NOS PAYS N'ONT PAS LES MEMES PREOCCUPATIONS DE SECURITE ; QUE TOUS N'ONT PAS LES MEMES INTERETS ; QUE TOUS ENFIN N'ONT PAS LES MEMES MOYENS. LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE DOIT PRENDRE EN COMPTE LA DIVERSITE ET LA MULTIPLICITE DES ENJEUX : J'ESPERE AINSI VOIR GRANDIR UNE VERITABLE POLITIQUE MEDITERRANEENNE DE L'EUROPE. MAIS ELLE

.../...

DOIT TOUT AUTANT ETRE SOLIDAIRE : NUL NE PEUT OUBLIER QUE LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE EST UNE ET GLOBALE ; NUL NON PLUS NE PEUT SE DESINTERESSER DE L'EQUILIBRE MONDIAL : IL FAUT FAVORISER L'ECHANGE D'INFORMATION SUR LES SITUATIONS DE CRISE ; C'EST ENSEMBLE AUSSI QU'IL NOUS FAUT ABORDER LES PROBLEMES PARTICULIERS QUE POSE LA PROLIFERATION DES TECHNOLOGIES MILITAIRES.

LES VOIES DE COOPERATION A DEVELOPPER

1. LA COOPERATION EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS.

COMMENT DONC, DES AUJOURD'HUI FAIRE AVANCER DAVANTAGE LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE ? LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE A RAPPELE L'IMPORTANCE QU'IL ACCORDE A LA COOPERATION EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS. L'HARMONISATION DES INTERETS CONCURRENTS, L'UNIFICATION PROGRESSIVE DE NOS MATERIELS EST INCONTESTABLEMENT UN OBJECTIF PRIORITAIRE.

N'Y A-T-IL PAS QUELQUE ABSURDITE A VOIR CHACUN DE NOS PAYS DEVELOPPER, SEPAREMENT, DES SYSTEMES IDENTIQUES ? L'ECHEC D'UN PROJET COMMUN D'AVION DE COMBAT FUTUR, L'INCAPACITE OU NOUS AVONS ETE DE COOPERER SUR UN CHAR SONT DES AVERTISSEMENTS SERIEUX, ET COUTEUX : A EPARPILLER AINSI NOS EFFORTS, A MULTIPLIER SANS RAISON LES FRAIS DE RECHERCHE

ET DEVELOPPEMENT, NOUS FAVORISONS NOS CONCURRENTS INTERNATIONAUX. LA REDONDANCE DE NOS PROGRAMMES EST AUSSI ABSURDE MILITAIREMENT : LA COMPLEXITE CROISSANTE DES SYSTEMES D'ARMEMENTS IMPOSERA DE PLUS EN PLUS, SI L'ON VEUT QU'ILS SOIENT COMPATIBLES, DE LES CONCEVOIR ENSEMBLE. A DEFAUT, ON RISQUE L'INEFFICACITE OPERATIONNELLE.

EST-CE LA CE QUE NOUS VOULONS ? POUR MA PART, JE N'ENTENDS PAS M'Y RESOUDRE. IL NOUS FAUT PARIER SUR LA COOPERATION.

LA COOPERATION EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS TELLE QUE NOUS LA PRATIQUONS DEPUIS QUARANTE ANS BAT DE L'AILE. DEUX PHENOMENES L'EXPLIQUENT TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT, QU'IL FAUT MODIFIER PAR DES INITIATIVES VIGOUREUSES :

* D'ABORD : S'IL EST DIFFICILE DE COOPERER SUR TEL OU TEL PROGRAMME, C'EST QUE LES TECHNOLOGIES UTILISEES ONT ETE DEVELOPPEES NATIONALEMENT : IL NE FAUT DONC PLUS CHERCHER A COOPERER EN PRIORITE SUR LES PRODUITS FINIS -LE CHAR, L'AVION, LE MISSILE- MAIS LE PLUS EN AMONT POSSIBLE, SUR LES TECHNOLOGIES QUI LES COMPOSENT.

QUELLES SONT CES TECHNOLOGIES ? CE SONT CELLES QU'IL NOUS FAUDRA MAITRISER POUR QUE NOS FORCES ARMEES REMPLISSENT LES MISSIONS QUE LEUR IMPOSERA NOTRE ENVIRONNEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE ET OPERATIONNEL D'ICI 20 ANS.

C'EST DONC DE NOS MISSIONS FUTURES QU'IL FAUT PARTIR - LA DEFENSE AERIENNE, LA PENETRATION DES DEFENSES, L'ALERTE AVANCEE, POUR N'EN CITER QUE QUELQUES UNES - POUR DEFINIR LES TECHNOLOGIES PERMETTANT DE LES REMPLIR. COOPERONS DONC POUR EVALUER CES MISSIONS ET DEVELOPPER CES TECHNOLOGIES.

* DEUXIEME PROBLEME : L'ABSENCE D'HARMONISATION DE NOS BESOINS OPERATIONNELS. LES SYSTEMES CONCUS A PARTIR DE CES TECHNOLOGIES DE BASE POURRAIENT SOUVENT ETRE COMMUNS : SEULE UNE PLANIFICATION A 30 ANS DE NOS BESOINS OPERATIONNELS LE PERMETTRA, LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE L'A RAPPELE. MAIS PLUS LE NOMBRE DES PARTICIPANTS EST ELEVE, PLUS L'EXERCICE EST DIFFICILE : QUE CHACUN DE NOS PAYS COMMENCE DONC DE MANIERE BILATERALE, ET, POUR MIEUX PREPARER L'AVENIR, ARRETONS-NOUS UN INSTANT SUR LE PASSE : DEUX A DEUX, EVALUONS LES SUCCES ET LES ECHECS QUE NOUS AVONS CONNUS, CREONS LA CONFIANCE POUR METTRE A PLAT NOS BESOINS FUTURS.

SANS DOUTE AUSSI FAUDRAIT-IL DEVELOPPER LES ACHATS CROISES ET LES APPELS D'OFFRE OUVERTS : UNE EXPERIENCE EN COURS ENTRE LA FRANCE ET LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE ME SEMBLE A CET EGARD ALLER DANS LE BON SENS.

POUR METTRE EN OEUVRE CES INITIATIVES NOUVELLES, JE NE CROIS NI A UNE STRUCTURE LOURDE, CREEE DE TOUTES PIECES, NI A LA SEULE BONNE VOLONTE DES ADMINISTRATIONS NATIONALES. IL FAUT S'ACCORDER SUR UN ORGANE SOUPLE DE COORDINATION, QUI

FAVORISE LA MISE SUR PIED DE PROGRAMMES DE COOPERATION PRECIS, RASSEMBLANT QUELQUES PAYS SEULEMENT ET EN ASSURE LE SUIVI. ON PEUT SE DEMANDER S'IL NE POURRAIT ETRE RATTACHE AU GROUPEMENT EUROPEEN INDEPENDANT DE PROGRAMME.

JE NE TIENS PAS POUR L'INSTANT A DEVELOPPER DAVANTAGE CES PRINCIPES. VOUS ME PERMETTEZ D'ABORD D'EN DISCUTER ENCORE AVEC MES HOMOLOGUES EUROPEENS, AVEC QUI J'AI DEJA EU L'OCCASION DE M'ENTREtenir LONGUEMENT A CE SUJET. J'AI DEMANDE AU MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE DE SUIVRE CES QUESTIONS AVEC UNE ATTENTION PARTICULIERE ET DE FAIRE REFLECHIR SES SERVICES AUX FORMES CONCRETES QUE POURRAIENT PRENDRE CES INITIATIVES.

2. LA COOPERATION DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA

VERIFICATION.

LE DESARMEMENT, JE L'AI DIT, SERA DE PLUS EN PLUS PRESENT DANS LA COOPERATION EUROPEENNE. DES NEGOCIATIONS SONT EN COURS OU S'OUVRIRONT PROCHAINEMENT : DES MAINTENANT, IL EST UTILE DE SE PREPARER, ENSEMBLE, A LA BONNE MISE EN OEUVRE DES ACCORDS AUXQUELS, ESPERONS-LE, ELLES PERMETTRONT D'ABOUTIR.

DEUX DIRECTIONS PRINCIPALES ME SEMBLE-T-IL SONT A EXPLORER AVEC UNE PARTICULIERE VIGILANCE : CELLE DE LA TRANSPARENCE DES DONNEES ET DE LA VERIFICATION DES ACCORDS.

**LA TRANSPARENCE D'ABORD : LES ACCORDS DE
DESARMEMENT S'INSCRIVENT DANS UN PROCESSUS POLITIQUE GLOBAL,
QUI TEND A REMPLACER LA MEFIANCE ET LA CONFRONTATION PAR LE
DIALOGUE ET LA COOPERATION. FAVORISER LA TRANSPARENCE LA OU
REGNAIT LE SECRET EST DONC PLUS QUE SOUHAITABLE, NECESSAIRE A
L'APAISEMENT DU CLIMAT INTERNATIONAL. TOUT NE PEUT ETRE DIT ;
BEAUCOUP PEUT ETRE FAIT : PAR EXEMPLE, L'ECHANGE
D'INFORMATIONS SUR L'ORGANISATION DES FORCES, LES BUDGETS DE
DEFENSE, LES MANUELS D'ENSEIGNEMENT MILITAIRE, LES PROGRAMMES
D'ARMEMENTS MAJEURS.**

**POURQUOI NE PAS ENVISAGER LA CREATION D'UN CENTRE
EUROPEEN DE LA TRANSPARENCE, QUI AURAIT POUR MISSION DE
RASSEMBLER DES INFORMATIONS, DE LES DIFFUSER ET DE LES
EXPLIQUER ? IL FAUT EVITER L'ENLISEMENT DANS DES PROCEDURES
LOURDES. PLUSIEURS SOLUTIONS CONCRETES SONT ENVISAGEABLES,
NOTAMMENT LE RATTACHEMENT DU CENTRE DE LA TRANSPARENCE A DES
INSTITUTS EXISTANTS, ET JE SOUHAITE QUE LE MINISTRE D'ETAT,
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES LES ETUDIE DANS LES PLUS
BREFS DELAIS.**

**LA VERIFICATION MAINTENANT : UN ACCORD DE
DESARMEMENT DOIT ETRE VERIFIABLE S'IL VEUT ETRE CREDIBLE.
L'ACCORD DE WASHINGTON SUR LES FORCES NUCLEAIRES
INTERMEDIAIRES A CONSTITUE UNE INNOVATION A CET EGARD ; IL
INDIQUE LA VOIE A SUIVRE. INCONTESTABLEMENT, LE DESARMEMENT**

CONVENTIONNEL PRESENTE DES DIFFICULTES DE VERIFICATION PLUS GRANDES : IL N'EST PAS BIEN COMPLIQUE DE CACHER UN CHAR, OU UN SOLDAT ! UN EFFORT D'IMAGINATION S'IMPOSE. DEJA DES IDEES CIRCULENT. N'EST-CE PAS L'OCCASION DE RELANCER LE PROJET D'UNE COOPERATION EUROPEENNE POUR UN SATELLITE D'OBSERVATION? UNE INITIATIVE REGIONALE DE CE TYPE PERMETTRAIT D'ATTACHER L'UTILISATION DE L'ESPACE A L'ESPRIT DU DESARMEMENT, ET NON A LA MULTIPLICATION DES ARMES.

3. LA COOPERATION DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA REFLEXION STRATEGIQUE.

C'EST PAR L'IMPORTANCE DU DIALOGUE QUE JE VOUDRAIS TERMINER. VOUS ETES ICI POUR PARLER, ECHANGER, ETUDIER. SANS CETTE COMMUNICATION, SANS LA CONNAISSANCE QU'ELLE PERMET DES INTERETS DES UNS, DES ASPIRATIONS DES AUTRES, L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE N'AVANCERA PAS.

CETTE SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'IHEDN EN EST LA MARQUE : NOUS POUVONS, SANS FIERTE EXCESSIVE, RECONNAITRE QUE L'IHEDN A JOUE UN ROLE IMPORTANT DANS LA DIFFUSION DE L'ESPRIT DE DEFENSE EN FRANCE. IL S'AGIT DE MEME DE PERMETTRE QUE S'IMPOSE PROGRESSIVEMENT UNE SENSIBILITE EUROPEENNE EN MATIERE DE SECURITE, SUSCEPTIBLE DE DONNER NAISSANCE A UNE VERITABLE CULTURE STRATEGIQUE EUROPEENNE. A CETTE FIN, L'ENTREPRISE DONT VOUS ETES LES PIONNERS EST A POURSUIVRE.

C'EST POUR CELA QUE JE SOUHAITE LA CREATION D'UN INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES HAUTES ETUDES DE SECURITE, RATTACHE A L'UEO SELON DES MODALITES A PRECISER. CELA PERMETTRAIT A L'UEO, QUI HESITE ENCORE, DE MIEUX CHERCHER SA VOIE.

COMMENCONS DONC PAR LUI PERMETTRE DE DEVELOPPER UNE PENSEE EN COMMUN. LA MISSION DE CET INSTITUT SERAIT LA FORMATION ET L'ENSEIGNEMENT, POUR QUE SE DIFFUSE UN ESPRIT DE DEFENSE COMMUN, ET QUE SOIENT SENSIBILISEES LES OPINIONS PUBLIQUES NATIONALES A LA NOTION DE SECURITE COLLECTIVE EUROPEENNE. IL N'EST PAS QUESTION D'UNIFORMISER LES POLITIQUES, MAIS D'ABORD DE FAVORISER LA CONVERGENCE DE NOS ANALYSES. FAUTE D'UNE GRAMMAIRE COMMUNE, COMMENT PARLER D'UNE MEME VOIX ?

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

J'AI CONSCIENCE QUE NOTRE TACHE EST ARDUE. C'EST A LA FOIS EN PERMETTANT LA MISE EN PLACE PROGRESSIVE, PAR COOPERATIONS SUCCESSIVES, D'UN PILIER EUROPEEN DE L'ALLIANCE, ET EN FAVORISANT UNE POLITIQUE ENVERS L'EST PLUS ACTIVE, PLUS AMBITIEUSE, MIEUX COORDONNEE AUSSI, QUE NOUS AVANCERONS DANS LA VOIE DU RAPPROCHEMENT ENTRE LES DEUX EUROPEES. CETTE TACHE EST LA NOTRE, VOTRE REFLEXION, ICI, DOIT L'ENCOURAGER. VOUS ENTREPRENEZ UN EXERCICE DIFFICILE ET DE LONGUE HALEINE ; IL N'EN EST QUE PLUS NECESSAIRE.

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A L L O C U T I O N

DU GENERAL, CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES DEVANT LA SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'I.H.E.D.N.
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- MERCREDI 16 NOVEMBRE 1988 -

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS LES AUDITEURS,

PERMETTEZ-MOI D'UTILISER POUR VOUS SALUER CETTE APPEL-
LATION QUI RECOUVRE LA DIVERSITE DE VOS TITRES ET DE VOS FONCTIONS
MAIS QUI EST AUSSI LA MARQUE DE LA GRANDE COMMUNAUTE A LAQUELLE
APPARTIENNENT TOUS CEUX QUI ONT FREQUENTE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES
ETUDES DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE.

CET INSTITUT A TOUJOURS EU LA VOLONTE DE S'OUVRIR
LARGEMENT VERS L'EXTERIEUR. C'EST AINSI QU'IL A PRIS L'HABITUDE
DEPUIS QUELQUES ANNEES D'ACCUEILLIR DES RESPONSABLES CIVILS ET
MILITAIRES DE PAYS AFRICAINS ET DE MADAGASCAR. JE ME REJOUIS DE LE
VOIR AUJOURD'HUI OUVRIR SES PORTES AUX REPRESENTANTS DES PAYS DE
L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE. JE SOUHAITE ARDEMMENT QUE CETTE
RENCONTRE SOIT LA PREMIERE D'UNE LONGUE SERIE ET, QU'A TRAVERS VOS
ECHANGES ANIMES, ELLE VOUS PERMETTE DE FORTIFIER UN ESPRIT DE
DEFENSE COMMUN ET D'APPORTER, DANS CE DOMAINE, VOTRE PIERRE A LA
CONSTRUCTION DE NOTRE GRAND DESSEIN EUROPEEN.

LE THEME QUI NOUS REUNIT CE MATIN, "L'EUROPE ET SON
EFFORT DE DEFENSE" ME CONDUIT TOUT D'ABORD A PRECISER LE CHAMP
QUE JE SOUHAITE DONNER A CET EXPOSE AVEC LE RISQUE INEVITABLE
D'OCCULTER CERTAINS ASPECTS QUE NOUS POURRONS ABORDER SI VOUS LE
SOUHAITEZ AU MOMENT DES QUESTIONS.

JE ME SITUERAI DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE À COURT ET MOYEN TERME POUR LAQUELLE IL ME SEMBLE PLUS RÉALISTE D'ENVISAGER L'EUROPE COMME UNE JUXTAPOSITION DE PAYS APPORTANT CHACUN, À LEUR FAÇON, LEUR CONTRIBUTION À L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE EN S'EFFORÇANT DE RÉALISER UNE MEILLEURE SYNERGIE DE LEURS MOYENS, PLUTÔT QUE D'IMAGINER UNE DÉFENSE EUROPÉENNE, ENTITÉ UNIQUE DONT LES CONDITIONS NE ME PARAISSENT PAS ENCORE RÉUNIES.

CELA VA SANS DIRE MAIS CELA VA ENCORE MIEUX EN LE DISANT : L'EUROPE DONT NOUS ALLONS PARLER CE MATIN EST EN FAIT LA PARTIE DE L'EUROPE QUI, DU CAP NORD AU CAUCASE, FAIT FACE AUX PAYS REGROUPÉS DANS LE PACTE DE VARSOVIE. IL S'AGIT DE SA DÉFENSE ET DANS MON ESPRIT CELA VEUT DIRE, AVANT TOUT : EMPÊCHER TOUTE ATTAQUE, LA DISSUADER. LE DIALOGUE QUI S'OUVRE ACTUELLEMENT ENTRE CETTE EUROPE QUE J'APPELLERAI DE L'OUEST ET CELLE DE L'EST DEVRAIT CONDUIRE À UNE RÉDUCTION DES TENSIONS ET L'ON NE PEUT QUE S'EN FÉLICITER. MAIS IL FAUT AUSSI CONSTATER QUE LE MAINTIEN À NOS PORTES D'UN APPAREIL MILITAIRE CONSIDÉRABLE DANS LES TROIS DOMAINES, CONVENTIONNEL, CHIMIQUE ET NUCLÉAIRE ET SA MODERNISATION CONSTANTE NE PERMETTENT PAS DE RELÂCHER L'EFFORT.

LES PAYS DE L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE CONSTITUENT INDISPUTABLEMENT LE FONDEMENT DE CET EFFORT EN RAISON DES DISPOSITIONS DU TRAITÉ AUQUEL ILS ONT ADHÉRÉ ET DES INTÉRÊTS COMMUNS DE SÉCURITÉ QU'ILS ONT DÉFINIS, EN RAISON AUSSI DES RESSOURCES QU'ILS CONSACRENT À LEUR DÉFENSE. L'ADHÉSION DE L'ESPAGNE ET DU PORTUGAL DEVRAIT ENCORE RENFORCER CETTE ENTITÉ. AU-DELÀ DU CERCLE DE CES PAYS CONVAINCUS DE LEUR COMMUNAUTÉ DE DESTIN, IL CONVIENT AUSSI D'ADJUIRE NOS PARTENAIRES EUROPÉENS DES FLANCS NORD ET SUD DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE DONT L'EFFORT EST INDISPENSABLE POUR ASSURER LA SÉCURITÉ DE L'ENSEMBLE. SOULIGNONS ENCORE L'APPORT -JE CROIS QU'ON L'OUBLIE TROP SOUVENT- DES PAYS NEUTRES DONT, POUR CERTAINS, LA DÉTERMINATION ET LES MOYENS DE DÉFENSE NE PEUVENT ÊTRE CONSIDÉRÉS COMME NÉGLIGEABLES PAR UN AGRESSEUR ET PEUVENT MÊME CONSTITUER UNE SÉRIEUSE CONTRAINTÉ POUR L'EXÉCUTION DE SES PLANS.

L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE CEPENDANT NE SE MESURE PAS SEULEMENT À L'AUNE DES RESSOURCES CONSACRÉES AU FONCTIONNEMENT ET À L'ÉQUIPEMENT DES MOYENS DE DÉFENSE MILITAIRE OU ENCORE À CELLE DES CONTRAINTES QUI RÉSULTENT DE LEUR STATIONNEMENT ET DE LEUR ENTRAÎNEMENT. IL S'APPRÉCIE AUSSI À TRAVERS LES ACTIONS QUI VISENT À PRÉSERVER LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE ET À PRÉPARER LA DÉFENSE ÉCONOMIQUE. IL REPOSE ENFIN -JE DEVRAIS DIRE AVANT TOUT- SUR L'ADHÉSION LA PLUS LARGE POSSIBLE DES CITOYENS AU CONCEPT DE DÉFENSE QUI LEUR EST PROPOSÉ CE QUI IMPLIQUE UNE CLAIRE PERCEPTION DES VULNÉRABILITÉS, DES MENACES ET DES ENJEUX.

COMPTE-TENU DES FONCTIONS QUE J'OCCUPE, JE ME LIMITERAI AUX ASPECTS PLUS PARTICULIÈREMENT MILITAIRES EN TENTANT DE RÉPONDRE À TROIS QUESTIONS :

- QUELS ÉLÉMENTS DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE NOS PAYS DOIVENT-ILS PRENDRE EN COMPTE EN CETTE FIN DE SIÈCLE POUR DÉFINIR LES ADAPTATIONS ÉVENTUELLES DE LEUR EFFORT DE DÉFENSE ?
- QUELLE EST LA NATURE ET LA VALEUR DE CET EFFORT ?
- QUELLES SONT LES EFFORTS QU'IL FAUT DÉVELOPPER OU PROMOUVOIR POUR VALORISER LES ACTIONS ET FAIRE FACE AUX ÉVOLUTIONS QUI SE PROFILENT ?

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L'ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE ACTUELLE M'INCITE À RETENIR TROIS FACTEURS : LES MENACES, LA STRATÉGIE DES DEUX GRANDS ET LE PROGRÈS DES TECHNOLOGIES SOUS L'ANGLE DE LEURS CONSÉQUENCES POUR LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA DÉFENSE.

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MALGRÉ UN CERTAIN ABAISSEMENT DES TENSIONS, LA MENACE MILITAIRE RESTE UNE RÉALITÉ EN EUROPE TANDIS QUE DE NOUVEAUX DÉFIS ET UNE PLUS GRANDE INCERTITUDE CARACTÉRISENT LA SITUATION À LA PÉRIPHÉRIE VOIRE OUTRE-MER.

EN EUROPE L'ABAISSEMENT DES TENSIONS EST LIÉ AUX NÉGOCIATIONS POUR LA MAÎTRISE DES ARMEMENTS. DANS L'ESPRIT DU RAPPORT HARMEL QUI PRÉCONISAIT À LA FOIS LA MODERNISATION DES OUTILS DE DÉFENSE ET LA RECHERCHE D'UN DIALOGUE PROPICE À LA DÉTENTE, ON DOIT SE FÉLICITER DE LA REPRISE INTERVENUE DEPUIS TROIS ANS. LA SIGNATURE DU TRAITÉ DE WASHINGTON CONCERNANT LES FORCES NUCLÉAIRES INTERMÉDIAIRES, LA FRÉQUENCE DES RENCONTRES À TOUT NIVEAU ENTRE LES DEUX GRANDS MAIS AUSSI ENTRE LES PAYS, DANS LE CADRE DE L'ONU ET DE LA CONFÉRENCE POUR LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA COOPÉRATION EN EUROPE, LAISSENT ESPÉRER DE NOUVELLES RÉDUCTIONS DES ARMEMENTS NUCLÉAIRES AINSI QU'UNE AVANCÉE EN MATIÈRE DE RÉDUCTION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES ET CLASSIQUES.

IL RÉSULTE DE TOUT CELA UN SENTIMENT LÉGITIME DE SOULAGEMENT GÉNÉRAL MAIS AUSSI UN AFFAIBLISSEMENT DE LA PERCEPTION DES MENACES POUR DES OPINIONS PUBLIQUES SOUVENT SENSIBLES AU CHARM DES SIRÈNES DU DÉSARMEMENT QUI NE DISCERNENT PLUS LE CARACTÈRE BÉNÉFIQUE DE LA DISSUASION POUR N'EN RETENIR QUE LE RISQUE ET LE COÛT.

POURTANT LES CARACTÉRISTIQUES DES RAPPORTS DE FORCE EN EUROPE DEMEURENT ENCORE INCHANGÉES.

LES ARSENAUX NUCLÉAIRES STRATÉGIQUES DES ETATS-UNIS ET DE L'URSS, VOUS LE SAVEZ, RESTENT À HAUTEUR DE 12 000 TÊTES DE PART ET D'AUTRE. CONSTAMMENT MODERNISÉS, TOUJOURS PLUS PRÉCIS, MOINS FACILEMENT DÉTECTABLES GRÂCE NOTAMMENT À LA MOBILITÉ DES LANCEURS, CES PARCS SONT D'UNE DIMENSION SANS COMMUNE MESURE AVEC CEUX DES PUISSANCES EUROPÉENNES DÉTENTRICES D'ARMEMENTS COMPARABLES. QUAND BIEN MÊME LE NOMBRE DE TÊTES NUCLÉAIRES STRATÉGIQUES DES DEUX GRANDS SERAIT RÉDUIT DE 50 %, LA NATURE DE LA DISPROPORTION N'EN SERAIT PAS FONDAMENTALEMENT CHANGÉE POUR LA FRANCE ET LE ROYAUME UNI.

QUANT AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES DE THÉÂTRE, EN SUPPOSANT ACHÉVÉ LE DÉMANTÈLEMENT PRÉVU PAR LE TRAITÉ FNI, ELLES LAISSENT ENCORE UNE LARGE SUPÉRIORITÉ AU PACTE DE VARSOVIE D'AUTANT PLUS PRÉOCCUPANTE SI L'ON CONSIDÈRE QUE LES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES STRATÉGIQUES LES PLUS MODERNES DE L'URSS PEUVENT REMPLIR LE RÔLE PRÉCÉDEMMENT DÉVOLU AUX SS 20.

JE RAPPELLERAI ENCORE LE DÉSÉQUILIBRE FLAGRANT À L'AVANTAGE DU PACTE POUR LES ARMES CHIMIQUES POUR LESQUELLES IL A ADMIS DÉTENIR DES STOCKS DE L'ORDRE DE 50 000 TONNES D'AGENTS CHIMIQUES. À LA DIFFÉRENCE DE L'ALLIANCE, IL NE FAIT AUCUN DOUTE QUE LE PACTE INTÈGRE L'EMPLOI DE TELLES ARMES DANS SA DOCTRINE, CE QUE TRADUISENT LES CAPACITÉS DE SES ÉQUIPEMENTS, L'ORGANISATION DE SES UNITÉS ET LEURS EXERCICES D'ENTRAÎNEMENT. POURRONS-NOUS PARVENIR À UNE ÉLIMINATION DES ARMES, DES STOCKS ET DES MOYENS DE PRODUCTION ? POURRONS-NOUS METTRE AU POINT DES MESURES DE VÉRIFICATION FIABLES QUI DONNENT UNE RÉELLE VALIDITÉ À UN ACCORD ? BEAUCOUP DE PAYS SOUHAITENT UN PROGRÈS RAPIDE DES NÉGOCIATIONS, ET C'EST LE CAS DE LA FRANCE, MAIS FORCE EST DE RECONNAÎTRE QU'AUJOUR D'HUI LA CAPACITÉ DU PACTE DANS CE DOMAINE RESTE ENTIÈRE TANDIS QUE L'EMPLOI DES ARMES CHIMIQUES SUR D'AUTRES THÉÂTRES NE SEMBLE PLUS L'EXCEPTION.

JE SOULIGNERAI ENFIN LA SUPÉRIORITÉ DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE POUR LES ARMEMENTS CONVENTIONNELS ET LA VOLONTÉ COMMUNE DES CHEFS D'ÉTATS OCCIDENTAUX, LORS DU DERNIER SOMMET DE L'ALLIANCE, À VOULOIR PORTER LA PRIORITÉ DES EFFORTS SUR CETTE QUESTION. QUELS QUE SOIENT LES ESPOIRS SUSCITÉS PAR L'ADOPTION QUE J'ESPÈRE PROCHAINE, DU MANDAT DE CETTE FUTURE NÉGOCIATION ET AUSSI GRANDE SOIT LA VOLONTÉ POLITIQUE, IL FAUT S'ATTENDRE À UN CHEMINEMENT ASSEZ LENT EN RAISON DES DIFFICULTÉS QU'IL Y AURA À S'ACCORDER SUR LES DONNÉES QUANTITATIVES ET QUALITATIVES.

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HORS D'EUROPE ÉGALEMENT, LA PÉRIODE QUE NOUS TRAVERSONS, SEMBLE PLUS CARACTÉRISÉE PAR LA DIMINUTION DES TENSIONS ET LA RECHERCHE DE LA NÉGOCIATION QUE PAR UNE EXTENSION DES CONFLITS ARMÉS.

L'ARRÊT QUE L'ON ESPÉRAIT SANS TROP Y CROIRE, DE LA LONGUE GUERRE ENTRE L'IRAN ET L'IRAK CONSTITUE LE SIGNE LE PLUS TANGIBLE DE CETTE ÉVOLUTION. D'AUTRES ESPOIRS SE DESSINENT EN AFGHANISTAN, AU CAMBODGE, VOIRE EN AFRIQUE AUSTRALE OU ENCORE, PLUS PRÈS DE NOUS, AU SAHARA.

MAIS CETTE ACCALMIE QUI PERMET NOTAMMENT D'ALLÉGER LES DISPOSITIFS MILITAIRES OCCIDENTAUX DANS LE GOLFE ARABO-PERSIQUE, NE DUIT FAIRE OUBLIER NI LES ANTAGONISMES MILLÉNAIRES, NI LA PERSISTANCE DES TENSIONS AU PROCHE-ORIENT QU'IL S'AGISSE DE LA SITUATION LIBANAISE OU DE LA QUESTION ISRAËLO-PALESTINIENNE. ON VOIT DANS TOUTE CETTE ZONE PERSISTER LES AFFRONTEMENTS ET LES INCERTITUDES TANDIS QUE SE DÉVELOPPENT DES POTENTIELS MILITAIRES DE MOINS EN MOINS CONTRÔLÉS PAR LES GRANDES PUISSANCES EN RAISON DE L'ÉMERGENCE DE NOUVEAUX PRODUCTEURS D'ARMEMENT. L'APPARITION DES MISSILES BALISTIQUES À CAPACITÉ CLASSIQUE, PARFOIS CHIMIQUE VOIRE NUCLÉAIRE Y DEVIENT TRÈS PRÉOCCUPANTE.

AU SUD DE LA MÉDITERRANÉE, LA LIBYE SEMBLE TEMPÉRER SON ATTITUDE AGRESSIVE MAIS CONSERVE LA CAPACITÉ DE FAIRE PESER UNE MENACE AÉRIENNE ET BALISTIQUE SUR UNE LARGE PARTIE DU BASSIN ET DE PERTURBER DES ÉQUILIBRES RÉGIONAUX TOUJOURS FRAGILES, NOTAMMENT DANS LES PAYS DU MAGHREB. PLUS AU SUD ENFIN, LES RISQUES DE DESTABILISATION DES PAYS D'AFRIQUE DEMEURENT LATENTS ET CONSTITUENT UNE DONNÉE À PRENDRE EN COMPTE POUR LA SÉCURITÉ MONDIALE.

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AU-DELÀ DE L'AFFAIBLISSEMENT DES TENSIONS ET DE L'EFFET DÉMOBILISATEUR SUR L'ESPRIT DE DÉFENSE, FORCE EST DONC DE CONSTATER QUE LES MODIFICATIONS VISANT À UNE RÉVISION FONDAMENTALE DES RAPPORTS DE FORCE ET À UN ACCROISSEMENT DE LA STABILITÉ CONVENTIONNELLE SONT EN DEVENIR. RIEN NE LAISSE ENCORE APPARAÎTRE LA RÉDUCTION DE L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE.

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OUTRE LE NIVEAU DES MENACES, L'ÉVOLUTION SENSIBLE DE LA STRATÉGIE DES DEUX GRANDS DEVRAIT À MON SENS INCITER LES PAYS D'EUROPE À FAIRE PREUVE D'UNE PLUS GRANDE PRUDENCE ET À RECHERCHER LES CONDITIONS D'UNE SÉCURITÉ MOINS TRIBUTAIRE DE LEUR PUISSANT ALLIÉ. CECI NE SIGNIFIE PAS QUE NOUS PUISSIONS NOUS PRIVER DE L'APPUI DES ÉTATS-UNIS POUR ASSURER LA SÉCURITÉ EN EUROPE.

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INDÉNIABLEMENT, LES DIRIGEANTS SOVIÉTIQUES ACCEPTENT AUJOURD'HUI UNE PLUS GRANDE TRANSPARENCE ET SEMBLENT VOULOIR RÉORIENTER EN PRIORITÉ LEUR ORGANISATION INTERNE, LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET LES RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES. MAIS ON PEUT CRAINDRE QU'UNE UNION SOVIÉTIQUE MODERNISÉE ET CAPABLE À TERME DE MOBILISER AVEC NOTRE AIDE TOUT SON POTENTIEL ET SA PUISSANCE, CONTINUE À PROMOUVOIR SON DESSEIN ULTIME D'HÉGÉMONIE.

SE SENTANT EN EFFET TRADITIONNELLEMENT EN CERCLÉE ET MENACÉE, CONTINUANT À MAINTENIR SON EMPRISE SUR LES PAYS DU PACTE ET SUR SES GLACIS SOUS PRÉTEXTE DE LES DÉFENDRE, ELLE NE PEUT QU'ENTREtenir UN OUTIL MILITAIRE FORT -MONSIEUR GORBATCHEV N'EN FAIT PAS MYSTÈRE, DANS SON LIVRE "LA PERESTROIKA"- TOUT EN CHERCHANT PAR SES DISCOURS SUR LA DÉNUCLÉARISATION ET LE DÉSARMEMENT, À AMOINDRIR LES CAPACITÉS DE DÉFENSE DES OCCIDENTAUX.

DÉNUCLÉARISER, C'EST-À-DIRE DÉSANCTUARISER L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE, CONSTITUE À N'EN PAS DOUTER L'UN DES TROIS OBJECTIFS MAJEURS DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE, LE SECOND ÉTANT LA COUPURE DU LIEN EUROPE DE L'OUEST/ÉTATS-UNIS ET LE TROISIÈME LA DIVISION DES EUROPÉENS EUX-MÊMES.

GAGEONS QU'ELLE SAURA EXPLOITER SIMULTANÉMENT LES HÉSITATIONS, LES DIFFÉRENCES D'APPRÉCIATION VOIRE LES DIVERGENCES DES EUROPÉENS ENTRE EUX ET DES EUROPÉENS AVEC LES ÉTATS-UNIS, SUR LES MODALITÉS DE LA MODERNISATION DES APPAREILS DE DÉFENSE OU ENCORE SUR LES CONDITIONS D'OBTENTION D'UNE PLUS GRANDE STABILITÉ CONVENTIONNELLE. GAGEONS QU'ELLE TENTERA AINSI DE DIVISER L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE ET DE FAVORISER UNE TENDANCE AU DÉSENGAGEMENT AMÉRICAIN SUR CE CONTINENT TOUT EN FAISANT MIROITER AUX PAYS D'EUROPE LA PERSPECTIVE D'UNE "MAISON COMMUNE", ALORS QUE LA DIVISION BIEN RÉELLE DE CE CONTINENT DEMEURE INTANGIBLE POUR L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE.

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DU CÔTÉ DE NOS ALLIÉS AMÉRICAINS, DONT LA VOLONTÉ D'ENGAGEMENT EN EUROPE NE ME PARAÎT PAS DEVOIR ÊTRE MISE EN DOUTE AUSSI LONGTEMPS QU'ILS MAINTIENDRONT DES CAPACITÉS NUCLÉAIRES ET CONVENTIONNELLES SUR CE CONTINENT, J'OBSERVE PAR CONTRE DES ÉVOLUTIONS QUI DOIVENT INCITER À LA RÉFLEXION.

LE BESOIN DE RÉDUIRE LEUR DÉFICIT BUDGÉTAIRE N'EST PAS SANS CONSÉQUENCES SUR LE NIVEAU DE LEURS DÉPENSES MILITAIRES ET L'ON PEUT SE DEMANDER DANS QUELLE MESURE L'AMPLEUR DE LEUR EFFORT, NON PAS AU SEIN DE L'ALLIANCE MAIS ICI EN EUROPE, NE SERA PAS RÉVISÉ. LE THÈME DU PARTAGE DU FARDEAU SUR LEQUEL IL Y AURAIT BEAUCOUP À DIRE, EST À NOUVEAU À L'ORDRE DU JOUR ET IL EST À CRAINDRE QUE LES PLAIDOYERS RÉDIGÉS PAR LES PAYS DE L'EUROGROUPE À L'ATTENTION DES PAYS NORD AMÉRICAINS NE SUFFISENT PAS À ATTÉNUER LA PRESSION DU CONGRÈS POUR RÉDUIRE LE NIVEAU DE PARTICIPATION AMÉRICAIN. PAR AILLEURS, LES ÉTATS-UNIS NE PEUVENT SANS DOUTE PAS INVESTIR À LA FOIS DANS L'INITIATIVE DE DÉFENSE STRATÉGIQUE ET DANS LA DÉFENSE DE L'EUROPE.

CES TENDANCES TRANSPARAISSENT À TRAVERS DES ÉTUDES STRATÉGIQUES COMME "DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE" QUI, BIEN QUE NON OFFICIELLES, SONT LE FRUIT DES RÉFLEXIONS DE HAUTES PERSONNALITÉS RÉPUBLICAINES ET DÉMOCRATES. LES CONCLUSIONS DE CETTE ÉTUDE OÙ L'EUROPE, RAPPELONS-LE, N'EST PAS CITÉE, SOULIGNENT LA STRATÉGIE MONDIALE DES ÉTATS-UNIS, L'IMPORTANCE CROISSANTE DU PACIFIQUE, LA VOLONTÉ DE TRAITER LES CONFLITS RÉGIONAUX LE PLUS LONGTEMPS POSSIBLE PAR MOYENS CONVENTIONNELS, LE RECOURS PLUS SÉLECTIF ET PLUS LIMITÉ AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES, LA NÉCESSITÉ DE DISPOSER DE FORCES D'INTERVENTION RAPIDES CAPABLES D'ÊTRE DÉPLOYÉES SUR LES LIEUX DE CRISE À PARTIR DU TERRITOIRE AMÉRICAIN.

J'ARRÊTE LÀ CETTE ÉNUMÉRATION MAIS NE FAUT-IL PAS VOIR À TRAVERS CES OBJECTIFS UNE CERTAINE CONVERGENCE DES INTÉRÊTS AMÉRICAINS ET SOVIÉTIQUES À RECOURIR PLUS TARDIVEMENT AUX ARMES NUCLÉAIRES ET À VOULOIR TRAITER UN CONFLIT EN EUROPE PAR MOYENS CONVENTIONNELS AFIN DE PRÉSERVER LA SANCTUARISATION DE LEURS TERRITOIRES ?

L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE DES PAYS EUROPÉENS DOIT AUSSI POUVOIR RÉPONDRE AU DÉFI DES INNOVATIONS TECHNOLOGIQUES QUI OUVRONT EN PERMANENCE DES HORIZONS NOUVEAUX POUR LES APPLICATIONS MILITAIRES.

A DÉFAUT D'ATTEINDRE LEUR OBJECTIF AMBITIEUX, L'INITIATIVE DE DÉFENSE STRATÉGIQUE ET SON ÉQUIVALENT SOVIÉTIQUE CONDUIRONT AU MOINS À DES PROGRÈS DANS LA DÉTECTION PRÉCOCE ET AU RENFORCEMENT DES DÉFENSES TERMINALES FACE AUX MENACES S'EXERCANT À PARTIR DE LA TROISIÈME DIMENSION.

LES PROGRÈS QUE L'ON PEUT ATTENDRE AUSSI DANS LE DOMAINE DES TRANSMISSIONS ET DU TRAITEMENT DE L'INFORMATION PERMETTENT D'ENVISAGER UNE GESTION PLUS COHÉRENTE DES ENSEMBLES DE FORCES À L'INTÉRIEUR DE VOLUMES D'ACTION RENDUS PLUS EXIGUS EN RAISON DES PERFORMANCES ACCRUES DES SYSTÈMES D'ARMES ET DE LA RÉDUCTION DES DÉLAIS DE RÉACTION.

OUTRE UNE EXIGENCE ACCRUE D'INTEROPÉRABILITÉ, CETTE ÉVOLUTION TECHNOLOGIQUE N'EST PAS SANS CONSÉQUENCES D'ABORD SUR L'ÉLÉVATION DES COÛTS DES SYSTÈMES D'ARMES ALORS QUE LA CONCURRENCE ÉCONOMIQUE SE FAIT PLUS SÉVÈRE, ENSUITE SUR L'IMPORTANCE DES CRÉDITS À ACCORDER AUX RECHERCHES ET DÉVELOPPEMENTS AFIN DE DONNER À L'EUROPE UNE PLACE À LA HAUTEUR DE SES MOYENS ET PRÉSERVER AINSI SA LIBERTÉ D'ACTION.

AU MOMENT OÙ LA PERCEPTION DE LA MENACE S'ATTÉNUÉ ET OÙ CERTAINS BUDGETS DE DÉFENSE STAGNENT VOIRE DÉCROISSENT, IL Y A POUR LES PARTENAIRES EUROPÉENS UN ENSEMBLE DE PROBLÈMES DONT LA SOLUTION EXIGE SANS DOUTE UN EFFORT DE SOLIDARITÉ ET DE COOPÉRATION.

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AU TERME DE CE CONSTAT PROBABLEMENT INCOMPLET DE LA SITUATION GÉNÉRALE ET DE SES ÉVOLUTIONS, IL FAUT MAINTENANT EXAMINER L'ÉTAT DE LA DÉFENSE EN EUROPE.

JE N'AI PAS L'INTENTION DANS CETTE SECONDE PARTIE DE DRESSER UN BILAN DES EFFORTS DE DÉFENSE DES PAYS EUROPÉENS. IL FAUDRAIT ACCUMULER DE NOMBREUX INDICATEURS CHIFFRÉS DONT L'ÉQUIVALENCE SE RÉVÉLERAIT SOUVENT DISCUTABLE. JE PENSE PAR EXEMPLE AUX TENTATIVES POUR COMPARER DES BUDGETS DE STRUCTURE DIFFÉRENTE S'APPLIQUANT À DES ENSEMBLES QUI NE RECOUVRENT PAS TOUJOURS LA MÊME CATÉGORIE DE MOYENS.

IL ME FAUT POUTANT AVANCER UNE APPRÉCIATION, NE SERAIT-CE QUE POUR SUSCITER VOS RÉACTIONS ET AMORCER LE DÉBAT. L'EXERCICE EST D'AUTANT PLUS DÉLICAT QUE JE SUIS JUGÉ ET PARTIE MAIS JE VAIS ESSAYER DE M'Y LIVRER AVEC OBJECTIVITÉ ET FRANCHISE SANS MASQUER LES DIFFICULTÉS. CETTE ANALYSE DEVRAIT PERMETTRE DE DÉGAGER LES FORCES MAIS AUSSI LES FAIBLESSES VOIRE LES LIMITES DE NOTRE AMBITION COMMUNE.

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JE NOTE TOUT D'ABORD QUE TOUS LES PAYS EUROPÉENS, À L'EXCLUSION DES NEUTRES OU DES NON ALIGNÉS, ONT ADHÉRÉ PEU À PEU AUX DISPOSITIONS DU TRAITÉ DE WASHINGTON. OR, AUCUN D'ENTRE EUX NE PARAÎT SONGER AUJOURD'HUI À QUITTER CETTE ORGANISATION MÊME SI LA NATURE DE LEUR PARTICIPATION MET EN LUMIÈRE DES DIFFÉRENCES.

LES PAYS DE L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE, APRÈS AVOIR RELANCÉ CETTE INSTITUTION ONT RESENTI DEPUIS 1986, SANS DOUTE EN RAISON DES NÉGOCIATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX GRANDS, LE BESOIN DE RESSERRER LEURS LIENS, DE CONCERTER LEURS POSITIONS EN ESPÉRANT QUE LEURS INTÉRÊTS DE SÉCURITÉ SOIENT MIEUX PRIS EN COMPTE.

CERTES IL N'EST PAS QUESTION POUR EUX DE BÂTIR UNE COOPÉRATION OPÉRATIONNELLE DONT LE DOMAINE EST DU RESSORT DE L'OTAN. MAIS LA STRUCTURE DE L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE CONSTITUE UNE ENCEINTE PRIVILÉGIÉE POUR DÉFINIR DES ACTIONS DIVERSES SUSCEPTIBLES DE RENFORCER LA SÉCURITÉ TANT DANS LA ZONE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD QU'HORS ZONE. DANS CE CADRE, L'ADOPTION DE LA PLATE-FORME SUR LES INTÉRÊTS EUROPÉENS EN MATIÈRE DE SÉCURITÉ A REPRÉSENTÉ UN PAS IMPORTANT.

AU-DELÀ DE L'AFFIRMATION COMMUNE D'UNE VOLONTÉ DE DÉFENSE, UN AUTRE FACTEUR DE FORCE PRIMORDIAL EST L'ACCEPTATION PAR LES PAYS DE L'UEO MAIS AUSSI PAR LES PAYS DE L'ALLIANCE, D'UN SYSTÈME DE DÉFENSE FONDÉ SUR LA DISSUASION QUE PROCURE UNE COMBINAISON APPROPRIÉE DE FORCES NUCLÉAIRES ET CONVENTIONNELLES. CETTE VOLONTÉ TROUVE SA CRÉDIBILITÉ DANS LA CONTRIBUTION MAJEURE QUE LES PAYS EUROPÉENS FOURNISSENT À LA CONSTITUTION DE CES FORCES. C'EST AINSI QUE LE ROYAUME-UNI ET LA FRANCE APPORTENT À LA DISSUASION NUCLÉAIRE UNE VALEUR AJOUTÉE QUI VA BIEN AU-DELÀ DE LA PART ARITHMÉTIQUE QUE REPRÉSENTENT LEURS FORCES. CETTE PLUS-VALUE RÉSULTE DU FAIT QU'IL S'AGIT DE DEUX PAYS EUROPÉENS ET AUSSI DE DEUX CENTRES DE DÉCISION DISTINCTS DONT L'INDÉPENDANCE AJOUTE UN FACTEUR SUPPLÉMENTAIRE D'INCERTITUDE POUR UN AGRESSEUR ÉVENTUEL.

LA CONTRIBUTION EUROPÉENNE S'EXPRIME ENCORE À TRAVERS LA PART QUE LES PAYS ASSUMENT POUR LA DÉFENSE CONVENTIONNELLE.

CONSIDÉRANT LES FORCES DISPONIBLES EN EUROPE ET EN ATLANTIQUE, ON CONSTATE QUE LES PARTENAIRES EUROPÉENS FOURNISSENT 95 % DES DIVISIONS, 90 % DES EFFECTIFS, 90 % DE L'ARTILLERIE, 80 % DES CHARS, 80 % DES AVIONS DE COMBAT ET 65 % DES NAVIRES DE GUERRE MAJEURS. ILS DISPOSENT AUSSI DE 3 500 000 SOLDATS EN SERVICE ACTIF ET AUTANT EN RÉSERVE, SOIT 1,5 À 2 FOIS PLUS QUE LEUR PARTENAIRE AMÉRICAIN (1).

(1) SOURCE : ÉTUDE DE L'EUROGROUPE "THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN NATO"

AJOUTONS ENFIN À CETTE LISTE NON EXHAUSTIVE, LES EFFORTS QUE NOS PAYS DÉVELOPPENT EN MATIÈRE DE COOPÉRATION MULTILATÉRALE ET BILATÉRALE POUR ACCROÎTRE L'INTEROPÉRABILITÉ, POUR RAPPROCHER DES BESOINS OU ENCORE POUR METTRE SUR PIED DES FORCES ÉQUIPÉES DES MÊMES MATÉRIELS OU DESTINÉES À REMPLIR DES MISSIONS EN COMMUN. LE GROUPE EUROPÉEN INDÉPENDANT DE PROGRAMMES, LA MISE SUR PIED D'UNE FORCE AÉRIENNE DE DÉTECTION DES AÉRONEFS VOLANT À BASSE ALTITUDE, LA CRÉATION D'UNE BRIGADE FRANCO-ALLEMANDE CONSTITUENT DES EXEMPLES DE CES ACTIONS EN COOPÉRATION VISANT À RENFORCER LA SÉCURITÉ COMMUNE. MAIS CES EFFORTS SONT-ILS SUFFISANTS ?

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CONSIDÉRONS MAINTENANT, COMME L'ON DIT PARFOIS, LA "BOUTEILLE SOUS SON ASPECT À MOITIÉ VIDE" AFIN D'IDENTIFIER LES FAIBLESSES OU LES LIMITES DE LA DÉFENSE DE L'EUROPE.

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POUR CERTAINS, LA POSITION DE LA FRANCE À L'ÉGARD DE L'OTAN PARAÎT UNE FAIBLESSE QUE SEULE LA RÉINTÉGRATION DE SES FORCES DANS LA STRUCTURE MILITAIRE INTÉGRÉE POURRAIT ÉLIMINER. JE VOUDRAIS EN QUELQUES MOTS MONTRER QU'IL S'AGIT "D'UN MAUVAIS PROCÈS" ET QU'EN FAIT, LA POSITION DE LA FRANCE CONSTITUE POUR L'ALLIANCE PLUS UNE FORCE QU'UNE FAIBLESSE.

IL EST VRAI QUE LES FORCES FRANÇAISES NE S'ENGAGERAIENT PAS AUTOMATIQUÉMENT AUX CÔTÉS DE L'ALLIANCE ET QU'UNE TELLE DÉCISION EST STRICTEMENT NATIONALE. MAIS LE PROCESSUS EST PARFAITEMENT IDENTIQUE POUR LES AUTRES PAYS DE L'ALLIANCE. IL Y A BIEN À CE STADE, DANS LE CADRE DES DISPOSITIONS DU TRAITÉ DE WASHINGTON, AUTONOMIE DE DÉCISION POUR TOUS. LA SEULE DIFFÉRENCE VIENT DE CE QUE LES FORCES FRANÇAISES N'OCCUPENT PAS UN CRÉNEAU DANS LA DÉFENSE DE L'AVANT.

EN RAISON DE CETTE SITUATION, CERTAINS CRAIGNENT QUE L'ENGAGEMENT DES FORCES FRANÇAISES AUX CÔTÉS DES ALLIÉS N'INTERVIENNENT PAS OU TROP TARDIVEMENT. POUR ÔTER CE DOUTE, JE RAPPELLERAI QUE, DÈS 1966, LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE A CONSIDÉRÉ QUE LA FRANCE AURAIT EN CAS DE CONFLIT EN EUROPE À COMBINER SA STRATÉGIE AVEC CELLE DE SES ALLIÉS. CETTE VOLONTÉ S'EST TRADUITE PAR LA MISE EN PLACE DE MISSIONS MILITAIRES FRANÇAISES AUPRÈS DES GRANDS COMMANDEMENTS, PAR UNE SÉRIE D'ACCORDS OPÉRATIONNELS, PAR DES EXERCICES, PAR DES MESURES DE RÉORGANISATION PERMETTANT AUX FORCES DE MANIFESTER PLUS TÔT LA SOLIDARITÉ DE LA FRANCE ET D'APPORTER UN APPUI SIGNIFICATIF : PRÈS DE 20 % DES FORCES DE L'ALLIANCE EN CENTRE EUROPE AVANT L'ACHEMINEMENT DES RENFORCEMENTS ALLIÉS.

N'Y-A-T-IL PAS LÀ UNE VOLONTÉ DE SOLIDARITÉ INDÉFECTIBLE ET PRÉCOCE DE LA PART D'UN PAYS CONVAINCU QUE SA SÉCURITÉ EST ÉTROITEMENT LIÉE À CELLE DE SES ALLIÉS ? FAUT-IL RAPPELER QU'ICI MÊME LES PLUS HAUTS RESPONSABLES POLITIQUES SE SONT SUCCÉDÉS POUR AFFIRMER AVEC FERMETÉ LA DÉTERMINATION FRANÇAISE À EXPRIMER AU PLUS TÔT CETTE SOLIDARITÉ ? VOICI UN MOIS, LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DISAIT À CETTE TRIBUNE QUE LA FRANCE "SERA PRÉSENTE DÈS LA PREMIÈRE MINUTE, AVEC TOUTES SES FORCES Y COMPRIS NUCLÉAIRES".

MAIS IL EST VRAI AUSSI QU'EN CAS D'ENGAGEMENT, LES FORCES FRANÇAISES DEMEURERAIENT SOUS COMMANDEMENT NATIONAL PARCE QUE LA DÉCISION D'EMPLOI DES FORCES NUCLÉAIRES NATIONALES QUI LES COUVRENT EN PERMANENCE NE PEUT ÊTRE PARTAGÉE MÊME SI DES CONSULTATIONS PRÉALABLES PEUVENT SE DÉROULER ENTRE LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE ET LE CHANCELIER DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE.

IL S'AGIT LÀ D'UN PROCESSUS BILATÉRAL QUI N'EST PAS FONDAMENTALEMENT DIFFÉRENT DES PRATIQUES EN VIGUEUR AU SEIN DES ORGANISMES INTÉGRÉS. LA DÉCLARATION D'ATHÈNES, EN EFFET, LAISSE BIEN AUX CHEFS D'ÉTAT DES ÉTATS-UNIS ET DU ROYAUME-UNI LE SOIN DE DÉCIDER EN DERNIER RESSORT DE L'EMPLOI DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES.

N'Y-A-T-IL PAS LÀ UNE GARANTIE DE CRÉDIBILITÉ ? N'EST-CE PAS ACCROÎTRE LA DISSUASION QUE DE MAINTENIR COMME NOUS LE FAISONS UN LIEN INDISSOCIABLE ENTRE FORCES CLASSIQUES ET FORCES NUCLÉAIRES ? NOUS POURRONS REVENIR À CES NOTIONS AU MOMENT DES QUESTIONS MAIS JE VOUDRAIS POURSUIVRE NOTRE PANORAMA.

UNE DIVERGENCE INQUIÉTANTE ME PARAÎT RÉSIDER DANS L'ATTITUDE RÉSERVÉE DE CERTAINS PAYS D'EUROPE QUANT AU PARTAGE DU RISQUE. LE SUJET EST SENSIBLE MAIS NOUS IRIONS À L'ENCONTRE DE L'ESPRIT DES TRAVAUX CONDUITS DANS CET INSTITUT SI NOUS ESCAMOTIONS CET ASPECT.

LE PARTAGE DU RISQUE EST UN ÉLÉMENT CLÉF DE LA DISSUASION. LA CRÉDIBILITÉ DE CE CONCEPT IMPLIQUE QUE CHAQUE PAYS SIGNIFIE CLAIREMENT SON INTENTION DE SE DÉFENDRE ET PRENNE D'ABORD SA PART DE LA DISSUASION EN ACCEPTANT LE STATIONNEMENT ET LE TRANSIT SUR SON SOL D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES OU EN DÉVELOPPANT SES PROPRES ARMES. OR CERTAINS PAYS DE L'ALLIANCE N'ACCEPTENT PAS OU MAL DE PRENDRE CE RISQUE DÈS LE TEMPS DE PAIX. IL EXISTE MÊME DES COURANTS DE PENSÉE QUI SE DISENT FAVORABLES À DES OPTIONS TYPE TRIPLE ZÉRO OU À LA CRÉATION DE ZONES EXEMPTES D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES SANS VOIR MALHEUREUSEMENT, QUE CES ZONES RESTERAIENT DES RÉCEPTACLES POTENTIELS. IL Y A LÀ DES ATTITUDES NÉFASTES POUR LA CRÉDIBILITÉ DE DISSUASION. LA SÉCURITÉ DE L'EUROPE PAR LA DÉNUCLÉARISATION ET PAR UNE PRÉTENDUE DISSUASION CONVENTIONNELLE EST UNE IDÉE FAUSSE. J'AURAI L'OCCASION D'Y REVENIR.

LA CRÉDIBILITÉ EXIGE AUSSI QUE NOUS SOYONS ATTENTIFS AUX MODERNISATIONS QUI INTERVIENNENT OU INTERVIENDRONT DANS LES SYSTÈMES NUCLÉAIRES À COURTE PORTÉE OU AÉROPORTÉES SOVIÉTIQUES. COMME L'A DIT UN JOUR MONSIEUR WÖRNER DEVANT LE CONGRÈS DES TECHNIQUES DE DÉFENSE : "L'URSS MODERNISE, N'EN PARLE PAS ET NOS MÉDIAS SONT MUETS. NOUS PARLONS ET NE MODERNISONS PAS ET NOS MÉDIAS EN PARLENT SANS CESSÉ". FIN DE CITATION. CETTE SITUATION ELLE AUSSI PEUT COMPROMETTRE LA SÉCURITÉ.

CERTAINS D'ENTRE VOUS POURRAIENT SOULIGNER À JUSTE TITRE QUE LA CRÉDIBILITÉ EXIGE ÉGALEMENT LA MODERNISATION DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES SANS POUR AUTANT COMPROMETTRE LES EFFORTS DE RÉDUCTION DES ARMEMENTS. PAR ANALOGIE AVEC LES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES, ILS POURRAIENT AVANCER QUE LE PARTAGE DU RISQUE, C'EST AUSSI ACCEPTER AU MIEUX LE STATIONNEMENT SUR SON SOL DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES ALLIÉES, AU MINIMUM FACILITER L'ACCUEIL ET LE SOUTIEN DES UNITÉS DANS LE CADRE D'OPÉRATIONS DE RENFORCEMENT ET DE REDÉPLOIEMENT.

JE SUIS TOUT À FAIT D'ACCORD MAIS EN NOTANT TOUTEFOIS QUE LA SIGNIFICATION N'A PAS LA MÊME PORTÉE QUE POUR LES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES. LA FRANCE, DANS CE DOMAINE, EST PARFOIS MONTRÉE DU DOIGT MAIS JE RAPPELLERAI SEULEMENT QUE DES MESURES SONT DÉJÀ PRISES DANS CE SENS.

J'EN VEUX POUR PREUVE LES EXERCICES SE DÉROULANT SUR LE TERRITOIRE FRANÇAIS AVEC DES TRANSITS D'UNITÉS DU ROYAUME-UNI OU DES DÉBARQUEMENTS DE MOYENS SUR LES CÔTES ATLANTIQUES. J'EN VEUX ÉGALEMENT POUR EXEMPLE L'EXISTENCE SUR LE SOL FRANÇAIS DU RÉSEAU D'OLÉODUCS INTERALLIÉS PAR LEQUEL SERAIT ACHÉMINÉE UNE PART IMPORTANTE DU CARBURANT NÉCESSAIRE AUX OPÉRATIONS EN CENTRE-EUROPE.

LA TROISIÈME FAIBLESSE RÉSIDE NON PAS TANT DANS LA DIFFÉRENCE DE STRATÉGIE ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'OTAN DONT J'AI SOULIGNÉ LE CARACTÈRE COMPLÉMENTAIRE ET LE FACTEUR SUPPLÉMENTAIRE D'INCERTITUDE QUI EN RÉSULTE MAIS DANS LE RÔLE TROP IMPORTANT, IL ME SEMBLE, QUE L'OTAN VEUT FAIRE JOUER AUX ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES.

VOUS SAVEZ QUE LA FRANCE DIFFÈRE DE SES ALLIÉS QUANT AU CONCEPT D'EMPLOI DE SES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES DE THÉÂTRE QU'ELLE QUALIFIE DE PRÉSTRATÉGIQUES. ELLE VEUT AINSI MONTRER QU'IL S'AGIT D'ARMES AU SERVICE DE LA DISSUASION ET NON PAS D'ARMES DESTINÉES À UNE BATAILLE QU'ELLES DOIVENT PRÉCISÉMENT INTERDIRE. OUTRE LEUR FONCTION ESSENTIELLE ET TROP SOUVENT OUBLIÉE D'UNE DISSUASION D'UNE FRAPPE EN PREMIER ADVERSE, LEUR EMPLOI NE PEUT EN EFFET SE CONCEVOIR QUE DANS LE CADRE D'UNE FRAPPE UNIQUE D'ULTIME AVERTISSEMENT APPLIQUÉE SUR DES OBJECTIFS MILITAIRES ET NON PAS SOUS LA FORME DE FRAPPES SUCCESSIVES ET DOSÉES COMME LE PRÉVOIT LA DOCTRINE DE LA RIPOSTE GRADUÉE ET DE LA BATAILLE DE L'AVANT.

JE NE SUIS PAS CONVAINCU QU'UN RENFORCEMENT CÔUTEUX DES MOYENS CONVENTIONNELS, RENFORCEMENT VERS LEQUEL D'AILLEURS PERSONNE À L'OUEST NE S'ENGAGE VRAIMENT, DESTINÉ À RETARDER LE PASSAGE AU NUCLÉAIRE, SOIT DE NATURE À RENFORCER LA DISSUASION. CECI N'EXCLUT PAS, BIEN AU CONTRAIRE, LA MODERNISATION DES MOYENS AFIN D'ÉVITER LE CONTOURNEMENT DE CETTE DISSUASION.

L'INTRODUCTION DE TOUTES LES TECHNOLOGIES ÉMERGENTES ET LA RÉALISATION DE STOCKS DE MUNITIONS COHÉRENTS POUR TENIR PLUSIEURS SEMAINES FACE AU PACTE NÉCESSITERAIENT EN EFFET DES DÉPENSES EXORBITANTES ALORS QUE LE CONTEXTE GÉNÉRAL N'EST PAS FAVORABLE À UN TEL ACCROISSEMENT DES DÉPENSES DE DÉFENSE.

PAR AILLEURS UNE BATAILLE CONVENTIONNELLE EN EUROPE SERAIT PROBABLEMENT TOUT AUSSI INSUPPORTABLE QU'UN CONFLIT NUCLÉAIRE AUQUEL ELLE SEMBLE INÉLUCTABLEMENT DEVOIR ABOUTIR. EN EFFET, LA DISSUASION CONVENTIONNELLE N'A JAMAIS EMPÊCHÉ LA GUERRE MÊME DANS DES SITUATIONS DE RAPPORT DE FORCES ÉQUILIBRÉS EN EUROPE VOIRE MÊME DANS DES SITUATIONS DU FAIBLE AU FORT HORS D'EUROPE.

JE NE SUIS DONC PAS DE CEUX QUI CROIENT À LA DISSUASION CONVENTIONNELLE MÊME SI BIEN ENTENDU IL CONVIENT D'EXIGER DES SOVIÉTIQUES LA DISPARITION DES DÉSÉQUILIBRES. JE SUIS DE CEUX QUI PENSENT QUE C'EST LA DISSUASION NUCLÉAIRE COMPLÉTÉE PAR UN NIVEAU CONVENTIONNEL SUFFISANT QUI NOUS A VALU 40 ANS DE PAIX.

POUR CLORE CE CONSTAT DES FAIBLESSES OU DES INSUFFISANCES, J'INSCRIRAI AU PASSIF LE BILAN DES MODES DE RÉALISATION D'ARMEMENT.

NOUS AVONS TOUS PRÉSENT À L'ESPRIT DES EXEMPLES DE SYSTÈMES D'ARMES DÉVELOPPÉS EN COOPÉRATION PAR UN NOMBRE PLUS OU MOINS GRAND DE PARTENAIRES EUROPÉENS. CITONS PAR EXEMPLE LE CHASSEUR DE MINES TRIPARTITE, LES AVIONS JAGUAR, TORNADO, LES HÉLICOPTÈRES LYNX, LES MISSILES DE DIFFÉRENTE NATURE, TELS LE MISSILE ANTICHARS MILAN, LE MISSILE SOL-AIR ROLAND.

DE NOMBREUX PROJETS SONT EN PHASE DE DÉFINITION OU DE DÉVELOPPEMENT COMME L'HÉLICOPTÈRE NH 90, OU ENCORE LES MISSILES ANTICHARS DE 3ÈME GÉNÉRATION. MAIS IL FAUT BIEN RECONNAÎTRE QUE LA PART DES ARMEMENTS DÉVELOPPÉS DANS LE CADRE D'UNE COOPÉRATION EUROPÉENNE RESTE FAIBLE POUR BEAUCOUP DE NOS PAYS.

JE CROIS INUTILE D'EXPOSER TOUTES LES CONSÉQUENCES QUI RÉSULTENT DE CETTE SITUATION. SOULIGNONS CEPENDANT LA DUPLICATION DES EFFORTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT QU'ENTRAÎNE L'ADOP-TION DE SOLUTIONS NATIONALES COMME ON LE CONSTATE POUR LES CHARS DE COMBAT OU AUJOURD'HUI, UNE FOIS ENCORE, AVEC LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE DEUX AVIONS DE COMBAT EN EUROPE. SOULIGNONS ENCORE LES DIFFI-CULTÉS ENGENDRÉES EN MATIÈRE D'INTEROPÉRABILITÉ DONT CERTAINES NE PEUVENT ÊTRE RÉSOLUES MÊME AU PRIX D'UN EFFORT FINANCIER. SOUS CET ASPECT, LE POIDS DU PASSÉ EST SOUVENT CONSIDÉRABLE. EN FAIT, LES EXIGENCES DES INDUSTRIELS PRÉVALENT SOUVENT SUR CELLES DES ÉTATS-MAJORS QUI SONT PRÊTS LE PLUS SOUVENT À S'ENTENDRE. CELA COÛTE CHER ET NUIT À L'EFFICACITÉ DES FORCES.

IL Y A DONC DANS LE DOMAINE DES ARMEMENTS UNE SITUATION GLOBALEMENT PEU SATISFAISANTE AU MOMENT OÙ L'ÉVOLUTION DES TECHNIQUES, LES CONDITIONS NOUVELLES DES THÉÂTRES D'OPÉRATIONS ET LES LIMITES DES RESSOURCES EXIGENT DE TIRER LE MEILLEUR PARTI DES EFFORTS CONSENTIS. J'AURAI L'OCCASION D'Y REVENIR AU COURS DE LA TROISIÈME PARTIE DE MON EXPOSÉ QUE J'ABORDE MAINTÉNAINT.

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QUELLES ACTIONS FAUT-IL DÉVELOPPER OU PROMOUVOIR POUR VALORISER NOS FORCES ET RÉDUIRE NOS FAIBLESSES AFIN D'ACCROÎTRE L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE EN EUROPE ? JE VAIS DÉVELOPPER QUATRE AXES D'EFFORT ET VOUS PROPOSER DE RETENIR POUR LA PÉRIODE DES QUESTIONS TOUT CE QUI EST RELATIF À LA COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE BI ET MULTILATÉRALE COMPTE TENU QUE CE DOMAINE NE POSE PAS DE DIFFICULTÉS MAJEURES.

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LE PREMIER DOIT VISER À DÉVELOPPER UNE ACTION GÉNÉRALE D'INFORMATION À L'ÉGARD, BIEN SÛR, DES INSTANCES DIRIGEANTES MAIS SURTOUT DES RELAIS D'OPINION AFIN D'ATTEINDRE À TRAVERS EUX LES CITOYENS.

CETTE INFORMATION DOIT PERMETTRE DE METTRE À LEUR DISPOSITION DES ÉLÉMENTS OBJECTIFS ET CLAIRS QUANT À LA NATURE DES RAPPORTS DE FORCE ET AUX PERSPECTIVES DE LA MAÎTRISE DES ARMEMENTS SOUS TOUS LES ASPECTS DE FAÇON À CONTREBATTRE DES APPRÉCIATIONS MANIFESTEMENT ERRONÉES.

L'EXERCICE N'EST PAS SIMPLE MAIS IL EST INDISPENSABLE.

IL N'EST PAS SIMPLE CAR IL FAUT RENDRE ACCESSIBLES ET ASSIMILABLES DES DONNÉES CONSIDÉRÉES SOUVENT COMME CONFIDENTIELLES DONT L'INTERPRÉTATION EST COMPLEXE. IL EST DÉLICAT AUSSI DANS LA MESURE OÙ CETTE CAMPAGNE D'INFORMATION PERMANENTE PEUT ÊTRE REÇUE COMME UNE ACTION DE PROPAGANDE ET CONTESTÉE PAR DES COURANTS D'OPPOSITION AGISSANT LIBREMENT DANS NOS SYSTÈMES DÉMOCRATIQUES.

L'EXERCICE EST POURTANT INDISPENSABLE AFIN DE DONNER LES ÉLÉMENTS D'APPRÉCIATION NÉCESSAIRES À DES CITOYENS QUI N'ENTENDRAIENT QUE LES PROPOSITIONS IMPRESSIONNANTES DE DÉSARMEMENT CONTENUES DANS LES DISCOURS VENANT DE L'EST ET LARGEMENT DIFFUSÉS DANS NOS SOCIÉTÉS DE LIBERTÉ.

CONCRÈTEMENT, IL S'AGIT DE DÉVELOPPER L'ESPRIT DE DÉFENSE EN AGISSANT À TOUT NIVEAU ET À TOUT MOMENT À TRAVERS LE SYSTÈME ÉDUCATIF MAIS AUSSI PAR LES MÉDIAS OU ENCORE PAR LES ORGANISATIONS PROFESSIONNELLES VOIRE SOCIO-CULTURELLES. LA DÉFENSE EST EN EFFET L'AFFAIRE DE TOUS.

CHACUN DE NOS PAYS A DANS CE DOMAINE UNE EXPERIENCE QU'IL IMPORTE DE PARTAGER. L'INITIATIVE QUI A CONDUIT A VOUS RASSEMBLER AU SEIN DE L'IHEDN VA DANS CE SENS.

LE DEUXIEME AXE D'EFFORT SE SITUE PLUS AU NIVEAU DES INSTANCES DIRIGEANTES QUE DES OPINIONS. IL DOIT AVOIR POUR OBJECTIF DE PRESENTER UN FRONT UNI SUR LES GRANDES QUESTIONS STRATEGIQUES DONT J'AI DEJA SOULIGNE L'IMPORTANCE POUR LE MAINTIEN DE LA SECURITE SUR CE CONTINENT.

LA DETERMINATION DES INTERETS EUROPEENS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE, LA DEFINITION D'UN ESPACE STRATEGIQUE COMMUN, L'ELABORATION DE POSITIONS CONCERTÉES QUANT AUX OBJECTIFS ET AU PROCESSUS DE LA MAITRISE DES ARMEMENTS, LA CONJUGAISON DES EFFORTS POUR CONTRIBUER A LA SECURITE OU AU RETABLISSEMENT DE LA PAIX, LA OÙ LES INTERETS EUROPEENS SONT CONCERNÉS, SONT AUTANT DE DOMAINES SUR LESQUELS LES POINTS DE VUE DOIVENT SE RASSEMBLER SI NOUS VOULONS ABOUTIR A UNE EUROPE PLUS UNIE ET PLUS FORTE, APPORTANT SA JUSTE PART A LA SECURITE MONDIALE.

L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE OFFRE UNE STRUCTURE SANS ÉQUIVALENT POUR HARMONISER LES POSITIONS DE NOS PAYS ET POUR LEUR CONFÉRER UNE PLUS GRANDE CAPACITÉ D'INFLUENCE A LA FOIS SUR LEURS ALLIÉS MAIS AUSSI DANS LES NÉGOCIATIONS DIVERSES.

IL IMPORTE AINSI DE TRADUIRE EN ACTIONS CONCRÈTES LES OBJECTIFS QUE NOUS NOUS SOMMES FIXÉS EN ADOPTANT LA PLATE-FORME DE LA HAYE IL Y A UN PEU PLUS D'UN AN. LAISSONS AUX EXPERTS LE SOIN D'AVANCER DES PROPOSITIONS PARMİ LESQUELLES ON PEUT SOUHAITER DES CONSULTATIONS SUR LES QUESTIONS RELATIVES A LA STABILITÉ CONVENTIONNELLE, DES RÉUNIONS DES CHEFS D'ÉTAT-MAJOR POUR FAIRE ENTENDRE DES AVIS TECHNIQUES SUR CE TYPE DE PROBLÈMES OU ENCORE POUR DONNER L'IMPULSION A LA COOPÉRATION MILITAIRE ET A LA RECHERCHE D'UNE PLUS GRANDE INTEROPÉRABILITÉ.

TOUTES CES ACTIONS NE SE VEULENT EXCLUSIVES DES RELATIONS BILATÉRALES QUI DEMEURENT NÉCESSAIRES POUR AFFINER DES SOLUTIONS PLUS SPÉCIFIQUES À CERTAINS PAYS. ELLES NE SE VEULENT EXCLUSIVES NON PLUS DES PROCESSUS DE L'ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD. ELLES CHERCHENT AU CONTRAIRE À APPORTER LA DIMENSION COMPLÉMENTAIRE D'UN ENSEMBLE EUROPÉEN PLUS UNI ET À RENFORCER AINSI LA CRÉDIBILITÉ DE L'ALLIANCE.

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LE TROISIÈME AXE D'EFFORT DÉCOULE DE CES PRINCIPES SUR LESQUELS NOS CHEFS D'ÉTAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT SE SONT ACCORDÉS. MAIS IL CONVIENT DE LEUR DONNER UNE RÉALITÉ ET UNE VISIBILITÉ À MON SENS ESSENTIELLES. POUR RÉSUMER D'UNE PHRASE, JE DIRAI QU'IL IMPORTE DE NE PAS BAISSER LA GARDE DE NOS SYSTÈMES DE DÉFENSE TANT QU'AUCUNE CONTREPARTIE SIGNIFICATIVE N'AURA ÉTÉ RÉALISÉE EN MATIÈRE DE RÉDUCTION DES CAPACITÉS OFFENSIVES DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE, EN MATIÈRE D'ÉLIMINATION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES OU ENCORE DE RÉDUCTION DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES STRATÉGIQUES.

UN TEL OBJECTIF EXIGE DE MONTRER NOTRE ATTACHEMENT À LA DISSUASION NUCLÉAIRE ET NOTRE DÉTERMINATION À POURSUIVRE NOS EFFORTS DE DÉFENSE. C'EST À CE PRIX QUE LES GOUVERNEMENTS OCCIDENTAUX TROUVERONT LE MEILLEUR APPUI POUR NÉGOCIER UNE PLUS GRANDE SÉCURITÉ À UN NIVEAU PLUS BAS D'ARMEMENT.

EN EFFET, LA CRÉDIBILITÉ DE LA DISSUASION NE PEUT ÊTRE ASSURÉE PAR LE SEUL DISCOURS. IL FAUT AINSI DONNER UN CONTENU CONCRET À DES FORMULES ENCORE TROP VAGUES TELLE "LA COMBINAISON APPROPRIÉE DE FORCES NUCLÉAIRES ET CONVENTIONNELLES". LA CRÉDIBILITÉ DE LA DISSUASION NUCLÉAIRE EN EUROPE NÉCESSITE UN EFFORT PARTICULIER DE NOS PAYS AFIN DE BIEN MONTRER QUE CETTE AMBITION EST AUSSI LA NÔTRE ET PAS SEULEMENT CELLE DE NOTRE PUISSANT ALLIÉ AMÉRICAIN.

POUR CELA, IL FAUT CRÉER LES CONSENSUS NÉCESSAIRES POUR L'ACCEPTATION DU DÉPLOIEMENT D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES SUR LE MAXIMUM DE NOS TERRITOIRES QU'IL S'AGISSE DE MOYENS AÉRIENS POUVANT ATTEINDRE LE TERRITOIRE SOVIÉTIQUE, DE MOYENS AÉRONAVALS TRANSITANT DANS LES PORTS OU D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES DE THÉÂTRE SEULES CAPABLES DE CONFÉRER AUX FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES UNE VALEUR DISSUASIVE. AINSI L'ACCORD DONNÉ PAR L'ITALIE POUR LE REDÉPLOIEMENT SUR SON TERRITOIRE DE LA 40IÈME ESCADRE AÉRIENNE DE F 16 CONSTITUE UN SIGNE FORT QUE LES RÉACTIONS SOVIÉTIQUES ONT D'AILLEURS SOULIGNÉ.

CETTE ACCEPTATION DU PARTAGE DU RISQUE EST PRIMORDIALE POUR LA DISSUASION CAR ELLE CONDITIONNE LE MAINTIEN DE LA PUISSANCE AMÉRICAINE EN EUROPE ET LE COUPLAGE ENTRE LES DEUX RIVES DE L'ATLANTIQUE. REFUSER LE RISQUE OU DU MOINS EN RÉDUIRE L'IMPORTANCE SERAIT ENCOURAGER LE REDÉPLOIEMENT DES MOYENS NUCLÉAIRES DE NOS ALLIÉS AMÉRICAINS SUR DES NAVIRES OU DES BOMBARDIERS À LONG RAYON D'ACTION. UNE TELLE ÉVOLUTION POURRAIT ABOUTIR À LA REMISE EN CAUSE DES PROCESSUS DE CONSULTATION VOIRE DE L'IMPORTANCE DE LA PRÉSENCE CONVENTIONNELLE AMÉRICAINE EN EUROPE.

NOUS DEVONS AUSSI ÊTRE DE LA PLUS EXTRÊME VIGILANCE QUANT AU DÉVELOPPEMENT DES SYSTÈMES NUCLÉAIRES SOVIÉTIQUES EN PARTICULIER DE LA MODERNISATION DES ARMES DE THÉÂTRE. PARALLÈLEMENT, IL CONVIENDRA DE S'ASSURER QUE LES CAPACITÉS D'ATTEINDRE LES FORCES MILITAIRES DU PACTE DEMEURENT, NE SERAIT-CE QUE POUR LE DISSUADER DE FRAPPER EN PREMIER CAR IL EN CONSERVERA LA CAPACITÉ.

TOUTES CES ACTIONS, À L'ÉVIDENCE, NÉCESSITENT POUR LONGTEMPS ENCORE DE MAINTENIR LES EFFORTS BUDGÉTAIRES D'AUTANT QUE LA COHÉRENCE EXIGE AUSSI LA MODERNISATION DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES. JE VOUS RENVOIE TOUTEFOIS AUX RÉSERVES QUE J'AI FORMULÉES PRÉCÉDEMMENT QUANT À L'AMPLEUR DES EFFORTS NÉCESSAIRES ET À LA FAUSSE SÉCURITÉ QU'IL Y AURAIT À FONDER LA DISSUASION SUR CES SEULS MOYENS.

LE QUATRIÈME AXE D'EFFORT, POUR TERMINER, DOIT CONDUIRE À RECHERCHER UNE PLUS GRANDE CONCENTRATION DES EFFORTS EN MATIÈRE DE RÉALISATION DES ARMEMENTS AFIN, LÀ AUSSI, DE MIEUX RENTABILISER L'EMPLOI DES RESSOURCES SANS PRÉLÈVEMENT EXCESSIF SUR LES RICHESSES NATIONALES. POUR CELA, IL NOUS FAUT RÉDUIRE LES DUPLICATIONS -POUR NE PAS DIRE LES MULTIPLICATIONS- DE CERTAINS SYSTÈMES D'ARMES.

LE TEMPS N'EST PLUS DE CONVAINCRE LES POLITIQUES ET LES MILITAIRES DE L'INTÉRÊT ET SANS DOUTE DU CARACTÈRE INÉLUCTABLE DE CETTE ÉVOLUTION MÊME SI NOUS CONNAISSONS LES DIFFICULTÉS OU LES CONTRAINTES, PAR EXEMPLE, DES DÉVELOPPEMENTS EN COOPÉRATION. LES POLITIQUES Y VOIENT UN MOYEN D'ASSURER LA DÉFENSE À MEILLEUR PRIX EN ATTENDANT QUE LES PROGRÈS DE LA MAÎTRISE DES ARMEMENTS SE MATÉRIALISENT. LES MILITAIRES, ÉGALEMENT SENSIBLES AUX ASPECTS FINANCIERS, Y VOIENT SURTOUT UNE GARANTIE D'INTEROPÉRABILITÉ ET SOULIGNENT L'INTÉRÊT DE RAPPROCHER AU PLUS TÔT LES BESOINS OPÉRATIONNELS ET D'HARMONISER LES CALENDRIERS.

LA SENSIBILISATION EST SANS DOUTE PLUS RÉCENTE CHEZ LES INDUSTRIELS COMPTE TENU DE LEUR INTÉRÊT À CONTRÔLER LE TRANSFERT DE TECHNOLOGIES QUI FONT LEUR AVANTAGE ET DE PRÉSERVER LEUR LIBERTÉ D'ACCÈS AUX MARCHÉS À L'EXPORTATION DANS LE CADRE D'UN SYSTÈME D'ÉCONOMIE LIBÉRALE. CEPENDANT, LA TENDANCE AU RÉTRÉCISSEMENT DE CES MARCHÉS, LA CONCURRENCE INTERNATIONALE SÉVÈRE, LA NÉCESSITÉ D'INVESTIR DES CRÉDITS IMPORTANTS À LA RECHERCHE ET AU DÉVELOPPEMENT QUE LES ÉTATS NE PEUVENT PLUS TOTALEMENT ASSUMER, SONT AUTANT DE RAISONS QUI DOIVENT LES INCITER À REGROUPER LES EFFORTS, À MULTIPLIER LES ENTENTES POUR ATTEINDRE L'ÉCHELLE SUFFISANTE.

A L'INSTAR DE CE QUE NOUS AVONS FAIT POUR LE DOMAINE CIVIL AVEC LES PROGRAMMES EURÉKA ET ESPRIT, SACHONS AUSSI DANS LE DOMAINE MILITAIRE METTRE EN COMMUN OU PARTAGER CERTAINS EFFORTS EN MATIÈRE DE RECHERCHE ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT. SACHONS ENCORE DÉVELOPPER DES PROCÉDURES D'ACHATS CROISÉS ET, PEUT-ÊTRE AUSSI, ENCOURAGER UNE CERTAINE SPÉCIALISATION.

EN UN MOT, SACHONS CONSTRUIRE DE FAÇON PRAGMATIQUE UNE INDUSTRIE EUROPÉENNE DES ARMEMENTS À PARTIR D'UN POTENTIEL INDÉNIABLE OU CHACUN, IL EST VRAI, NE POURRA GAGNER SUR TOUS LES TABLEAUX.

DE MÊME, LES RÈGLES D'ÉLIGIBILITÉ EN VIGUEUR AU SEIN DE L'OTAN DEVRAIENT-ELLES ÊTRE ASSOULPIES AFIN D'ÉVITER DES SITUATIONS PARADOXALES QUI FONT PAR EXEMPLE QU'UNE FUSÉE EUROPÉENNE ARIANE NE PEUT PLACER SUR ORBITE DES SATELLITES DESTINÉS À LA DÉFENSE DE L'EUROPE. N'Y A-T-IL PAS LÀ UNE CERTAINE PERVERSION DU PARTAGE DU FARDEAU ? FAUT-IL MIEUX METTRE EN PLACE CES SATELLITES PAR DES LANCEURS CHINOIS ? OÙ EST L'INTÉRÊT DES PAYS EUROPÉENS DANS CE CAS ? JE VOUS LAISSE JUGES.

IL Y AURAIT ENCORE BEAUCOUP À DIRE SUR LE THÈME DE LA MEILLEURE UTILISATION DES RESSOURCES. IL FAUDRAIT POUR CELA DÉVELOPPER NOTRE CONCERTATION ET MIEUX TIRER PARTI DE STRUCTURES COMME LE GROUPE INDÉPENDANT DE PROGRAMMES OU ENCORE ÉTENDRE DES ORGANISATIONS COMME FINABEL QUI RASSEMBLENT AUJOURD'HUI LES CHEFS D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DE NOS ARMÉES DE TERRE.

POUR CELA, IL FAUT D'ABORD SE RENCONTRER. LES ENCEINTES ET LES OCCASIONS NE MANQUENT PAS. CETTE SESSION Y CONTRIBUE À SA FAÇON ET JE ME FÉLICITE QUE LE CENTRE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES DE L'ARMEMENT, DONT NOUS OCCUPONS L'AMPHITHÉÂTRE, ORGANISE L'AN PROCHAIN, À L'IMAGE DE VOTRE RÉUNION, UNE SESSION EUROPÉENNE DE RESPONSABLES DE L'ARMEMENT POUR FAVORISER DE NOUVEAUX RAPPROCHEMENTS.

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ME VOICI AU TERME DE CET EXPOSÉ CONSACRÉ À L'EFFORT DE DÉFENSE EN EUROPE.

EN DÉPIT DES INSUFFISANCES OU DES FAIBLESSES QUE J'AI MENTIONNÉES, CETTE ANALYSE NE ME CONDUIT PAS AU PESSIMISME MÊME SI L'OBJECTIF QUE NOUS VISOUS, CELUI D'UNE EUROPE PARLANT D'UNE SEULE VOIX AU SEIN DE L'ALLIANCE ET DISPOSANT D'UN OUTIL DE DÉFENSE EUROPÉEN PLUS HOMOGENE, EST ENCORE LOIN.

NOS PAYS APPORTENT DES ATOUTS IRREMPLAÇABLES À LA DÉFENSE DE NOS INTÉRÊTS COMMUNS. LA DIMENSION EUROPÉENNE QU'ILS DONNENT À LA DISSUASION NUCLÉAIRE, L'IMPORTANCE DES FORCES CONVENTIONNELLES QU'ILS RASSEMBLENT, LA SOMME DE LEURS EFFORTS BUDGÉTAIRES QUE LES CONSÉQUENCES DU MARCHÉ UNIQUE DEVRAIENT PERMETTRE ENCORE DE VALORISER, LE NIVEAU DE COOPÉRATION ENTRE LES FORCES MILITAIRES SONT DES SIGNES MARQUANTS QUI INCITENT SANS DOUTE NOTRE ALLIÉ AMÉRICAIN À NOUS DEMANDER PLUS ET NOTRE GRAND VOISIN DE L'EST À CHERCHER À NOUS AFFAIBLIR.

MALGRÉ NOS DIFFÉRENCES ET LES OBSTACLES, IL NOUS FAUT CONTINUER À RASSEMBLER CE CAPITAL ET À MOBILISER NOS OPINIONS AFIN DE RESTER VIGILANTS AUSSI LONGTEMPS QUE LES RÉDUCTIONS D'ARMEMENTS SOUHAITABLES NE SE SERONT PAS MATÉRIALISÉES.

SUR CETTE VOIE, TROIS DANGERS NOUS GUETTENT : LE RELÂCHEMENT PRÉMATURÉ DE NOTRE EFFORT DE DÉFENSE SANS CONTREPARTIE SUFFISANTE À L'EST, LA DIVISION DE NOS PAYS SUR LES GRANDES QUESTIONS STRATÉGIQUES AVEC LE RISQUE DE VOIR LES DEUX GRANDS RÉGLER LES PROBLÈMES DE DÉSARMEMENT À LEUR NIVEAU ET ENFIN LA DÉNUCLÉARISATION DE L'EUROPE. NOUS POUVONS LES DÉJOUER SI, COMME PAR LE PASSÉ NOUS EN AVONS LA VOLONTÉ. SOUVENEZ-VOUS DE LA BATAILLE POUR LE DÉPLOIEMENT DES MISSILES DE THÉÂTRE JUSTEMENT BAPTISÉS EUROMISSILES. FÉLICITONS-NOUS QU'ELLE AIT ÉTÉ GAGNÉE CAR SI LES PERSHING II N'AVAIENT ÉTÉ MIS EN PLACE, LES SS 20 SERAIENT PROBABLEMENT ENCORE DIRIGÉS SUR NOUS POUR LONGTEMPS.

JE NE DOUTE PAS QUE LA COMMUNAUTÉ DE DESTIN QUI NOUS
LIE ET LE POTENTIEL QUE REPRÉSENTENT LES 320 MILLIONS D'EUROPÉENS
SOIENT LA SOURCE DE NOTRE DÉTERMINATION POUR RÉALISER LE PILIER
EUROPÉEN DE LA DÉFENSE AU SEIN DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE SANS
LAQUELLE IL NE SAURAIT Y AVOIR DE SÉCURITÉ EN EUROPE. IL EST TEMPS
QU'UNE EUROPE DEVENUE MAJEURE SUR LE PLAN ÉCONOMIQUE LE SOIT AUSSI
DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA DÉFENSE.

JE VOUS REMERCIE DE VOTRE ATTENTION.

EFFORT DE DEFENSE

ANNEE 1987

ETUDE OTAN JUILLET 88	PAYS	PIB (GDP)	DEPENSES DE DEFENSE	% DEPENSE DE DEFENSE /PIB *
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MILLIONS \$ US courants

EUROPE

U.E.O.	3.770.054	128.949	3,4
U.E.O. + ESPAGNE + PORTUGAL	4.095.066	137.549	3,4
OTAN EUROPE	4.398.543	148.181	3,4
NEUTRES EUROPE ** (sauf YOUGOSLAVIE)	416.620 (1986)	9.950	

AMERIQUE DU NORD

OTAN AMERIQUE	4.850.262	296.919	6,1
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* AVEC PENSIONS

** SOURCE MILITARY BALANCE (Suède, Finlande, Suisse, Autriche)

EFFORT DE DEFENSE

ANNEE 1987 MILLIONS DE \$ US courants

ETUDE OTAN Juillet 88	PAYS	PIB (GDP)	DEPENSES DE DEFENSE	% DEPENSE DE DEFENSE /PIB *
UEO	FRANCE	873 861	34 530,4	4,0
	RFA	1 118 839	34 135,1	3,1 ^{Sans BERLIN}
	ROYAUME UNI	666 722	31 209,1	4,7
	ITALIE	751 261	18 354,0	2,4
	PAYS BAS	214 641	6 503,4	3,0
	BELGIQUE	138 526	4 143,7	3,0
	LUXEMBOURG	6 204	73,1	1,2
TOTAL	UEO	3 770 054	128 948,0	3,4
AUTRES PAYS EUROPEENS	ESPAGNE	288 925	7 469,7	2,6
	PORTUGAL	36 087	1 130,6	3,1
	NORVEGE	83 068	2 759,2	3,3
	GRECE	46 996	2 839,5	6,0
	DANEMARK	102 126	2 143,5	2,1
	TURQUIE	65 961	2 889,6	4,4
	ISLANDE	5 326	/	/
TOTAL OTAN EUROPE		4 398 543	148 181,0	3,4
OTAN AMERIQUE	ETATS_UNIS	4 436 018	288 157,0	6,5
	CANADA	414 244	8 762,1	2,1
NEUTRES (Military balance 87-88)	SUEDE		4 080	
	FINLANDE		1 260	
	SUISSE		3 180	
	AUTRICHE		1 430	

* AVEC PENSIONS

EFFORT MILITAIRE DE RECHERCHE ET DEVELOPPEMENT

SOURCE
SIPRI YEAR BOOK 1987

ANNEE 1985

	PAYS	MILLIONS \$ US PRIX TAUX DE CHANGE 1980	R et D /BUDGET* DEFENSE %
UEO	ROYAUME UNI	3 814,2	12,79
	FRANCE	3 152,1	11,26
	RFA	1 139,8	4,27
	ITALIE	325,2	2,85
	PAYS BAS	49,2	0,93
	BELGIQUE	1,4	0,04
	LUXEMBOURG		
TOTAL	UEO	8 481,9	7,94
AUTRES PAYS EUROPEENS	NORVEGE	50,7	2,50
	ESPAGNE	36,3 **	0,52
	GRECE	3,8	0,13
	DANEMARK	2,7	0,17
	TURQUIE	0,9 **	0,03
	PORTUGAL		
	ISLANDE		
TOTAL OTAN EUROPE		8 578,3	6,98
OTAN AMERIQUE	ETATS_UNIS	27 796,7	13,08
	CANADA	133	2,18
NEUTRES	SUEDE	387,1	11,19
	FINLANDE	7,1	0,60
	SUISSE		
	AUTRICHE		

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Séminaire U.E.O.


I.H.E.D.N., Paris le 17.11.1988

h. 9?
Exposé de M. P. CHAMPENOIS

L'EUROPE ET SON EFFORT DE DEFENSE

L'Europe et son effort de défense ; ce titre laisse supposer que l'Europe de la défense existe et que l'effort qu'elle consent pour sa défense soit le résultat et d'une vision cohérente et d'une appréciation unique de ce que sont ses besoins. Tel est sans doute l'objectif mais telle n'est pas encore la réalité.

Les chiffres ne manquent pas, qu'il s'agisse de présentations nationales ou de tableaux donnant une vision globale des efforts des uns et des autres. L'abondance des données disponibles et les diverses combinaisons auxquelles s'emploient les experts, selon ce qu'ils souhaitent démontrer, contribuent, en définitive, plus à entretenir la confusion dans les esprits qu'à faire la lumière sur ce qu'est réellement l'effort de défense européen. Les premières questions qui viennent à l'esprit, avant même de chercher à comprendre la signification des chiffres, est de savoir, tout d'abord, de quelle Europe il s'agit et, ensuite, de quelle défense, compte tenu du contexte géostratégique. Alors seulement il sera possible de saisir la mesure relative d'un effort européen ou plutôt des différentes contributions faites au nom d'un tel effort. Ces deux questions préalables se résument en ceci : quelle Europe et quelle défense pour cette Europe ?



Quelle Europe ?

Pour la Belgique, la marche vers l'Union Européenne inclut la sécurité et la défense. Peut-on réellement parler de souveraineté européenne sans défense alors que celle-ci en est l'expression par excellence ?

Poser la question dans ces termes, c'est déjà y répondre. Mais le fait est que certains parmi les Douze évitent de la poser, du moins dans des termes aussi directs. D'autres, par contre, dont M. GORBATCHEV lui-même, sont conscients que la marche vers l'Union débouchera naturellement sur la défense. Du moins semblent-ils le craindre. Aussi cherchent-ils, entre autres par des projets pan-européens du type "Maison Commune", à inhiber "le processus" dans l'espoir de mieux le contrôler ou de l'arrêter dans sa course à une étape intermédiaire. Pour l'URSS, l'Europe des Douze peut s'épanouir mais il est préférable qu'elle ne dépasse pas la sphère économique.

L'enjeu de la sécurité comme élément de la construction européenne est considérable. Sans dimension de sécurité, il n'y aura vraisemblablement jamais de réelle souveraineté politique européenne. La finalité du processus se trouverait modifiée. L'URSS semble l'avoir compris mieux que les Européens eux-mêmes.

La vision majoritaire en Belgique est celle d'une Europe souveraine à la fois européenne et occidentale, c.à.d. engagée aux côtés de ses partenaires nord-américains. C'est tout le contraire d'une Europe neutre ou non-alignée. Les données géostratégiques sont telles qu'une Europe neutre et non-alignée serait nécessairement sous surveillance - même si elle n'était que bénigne - de l'URSS.

Les exigences de sécurité d'une telle Europe et, dès lors, l'effort requis seraient d'une toute autre nature que dans le cadre d'une défense occidentale ; mais il ne s'agit que d'une hypothèse à mentionner pour mémoire.

Mais - dira-t-on - la souveraineté européenne, c'est le très long terme. Entretemps, les Douze ne sont pas d'accord sur la place que la défense occupe, et devra occuper, dans la construction européenne. Peut-on réellement parler, dans ces conditions, de l'Europe et "sa défense" ?

Que dire aussi à ceux qui sont Européens, et qui plus est alliés, et qui ne font pas partie des Douze par choix ou pour toute autre raison ? la réponse - un peu facile j'en conviens - est que la défense européenne n'existe pas encore, mais qu'il y a, par contre, une vocation européenne partagée par certains plus que d'autres.

C'est ici qu'intervient l'UEO qui regroupe des pays européens qui ressentent plus directement que d'autres la communauté de destin qui les lie. Ils ont décidé de donner à cette communauté une expression dans le domaine de la défense. Cette démarche va se poursuivre non pas comme une formule alternative, mais parallèlement à celle de l'Union, aussi longtemps que les Douze, en tant que groupe, ne seront pas prêts à reprendre, à leur niveau, les engagements de l'art. V du Traité de Bruxelles révisé, ainsi que les engagements politiques découlant de la plate-forme de La Haye.

Il serait excessif et inexact de prétendre que l'UEO incarne l'Europe de la défense, pour la bonne raison que, toute vocation mise à part, l'Europe de la défense, c'est plus que les pays membres de l'UEO. Ceci dit, les engagements souscrits par ceux qui sont aujourd'hui les Neuf, notamment dans la plate-forme de La Haye, vont se traduire - du moins faut-il l'espérer - par une cohérence plus grande de leurs efforts de défense respectifs. C'est en ce sens, et à ce niveau, que, qualitativement, on peut déjà parler d'un effort de défense européen ou plus exactement d'un effort identifiable comme tel. C'est finalement par rapport à l'art. V du Traité de Bruxelles révisé et aux exigences de la plate-forme européenne qu'il faut mesurer les efforts consentis par les uns et les autres.

Quelle défense ?

Dans la plate-forme de La Haye, les pays signataires parlaient en leur nom, mais ils étaient conscients de ne pas limiter

l'Europe au seul espace UEO. La plate-forme réaffirme un certain nombre de données inéluctables car touchant à la géopolitique et certains principes fondamentaux, tels l'indivisibilité du risque et, par conséquence, l'unité de la stratégie propre à le conjurer, c.à.d. unité de la dissuasion, couplage avec les Etats-Unis tant au niveau nucléaire que conventionnel.

Concrètement, cela veut dire que le maintien d'une dissuasion crédible est et restera fondé, pour l'avenir prévisible, sur une combinaison adéquate de moyens

nucléaires et conventionnels. Ces exigences ont été reprises par le Sommet de l'OTAN, c.à.d. qu'elles sont valables non seulement pour tous les Européens, qu'ils soient membres des 9, des 12, mais aussi pour tous les alliés nord-américains ou européens. Telle est la loi de l'indivisibilité, telles sont les données de base de toute défense de l'Europe.

La Stratégie des Neuf n'est donc pas et ne peut pas être fondamentalement différente de celle des Seize. Un but de l'UEO est de valoriser les contributions spécifiques de ses membres. C'est à ce niveau que s'opère le processus d'identification. Cette identification ne peut aboutir à passer sous silence que les efforts des autres Européens contribuent aussi, et souvent de manière très significative, au renforcement du potentiel de la sécurité européenne et à l'expression concrète d'une solidarité plus large qui découle du Traité de Washington.

Sans vouloir entrer ici dans un débat inutile sur les mérites de la riposte flexible et de la défense de l'avant, contentons-nous de constater, comme le fait la plate-forme, que la contribution des Européens à la mise en oeuvre de la dissuasion implique, de leur part, un effort nucléaire et conventionnel crédible et efficace. Tel est le prix de leur détermination à défendre l'intégrité des frontières.

Mais il y a aussi une autre dimension plus large que la sécurité. Elle dépasse singulièrement la notion de défense des frontières dont parle l'art. V. Il s'agit, cette fois, de l'art. VIII qui élargit singulièrement l'horizon européen. C'est toute la question de la défense des intérêts de sécurité européens hors Europe. Elle ne s'inscrit plus directement dans le cadre de l'Alliance, quand bien même elle ne doit pas méconnaître les exigences et la solidarité entre alliés.

Ces efforts sont-ils à la mesure des exigences ?

C'est donc en partant de la plate-forme de La Haye qu'il faut apprécier les contributions des pays membres en faisant à la fois le bilan de ce qui se fait mais aussi de ce qui devrait se faire pour en développer toutes les potentialités qu'elle contient. Je le ferai à partir de trois grandes catégories d'exigences : le nucléaire, la défense conventionnelle, les intérêts hors Europe.

Le nucléaire

C'est une contribution essentielle. Elle est directe dans le cas de la France et du Royaume-Uni. Pour d'autres, elle prend la forme d'une association ad hoc avec les Etats-Unis. On dit parfois que le nucléaire ne coûte pas cher ou qu'il s'agit de la forme de dissuasion la plus économique parce que la plus absolue. C'est une façon toute relative de parler.

On songe, en disant cela, aux double-capacités auxquelles sont associés les pays européens non nucléaires. Dans ce cas précis, le coût spécifique ne porte effectivement que sur la mise en oeuvre de la capacité nucléaire proprement dite et non sur le développement, l'achat, l'entretien du système nucléaire. Les charges ou les ogives restent propriété du Gouvernement américain. Le lanceur, est propriété du pays hôte. Le coût d'une telle dissuasion est donc égal au coût conventionnel augmenté marginalement du coût nucléaire à charge des Etats-Unis.

La situation des deux forces nucléaires autonomes est toute différente . Nul ne contestera l'ampleur de l'effort français en matière nucléaire ni le prix de l'indépendance. Nul ne contestera non plus le coût du programme de modernisation des forces nucléaires britanniques, malgré les économies résultant de la coopération avec les Etats-Unis.

Mais en matière nucléaire, l'effort budgétaire ou financier n'est encore qu'une partie du coût total. Il s'agit avant tout d'un investissement en termes politiques. Pour les pays européens associés aux Etats-Unis, ce coût politique est même l'essentiel, comme en témoignent les débats qui entourent le problème de la modernisation.

Cet engagement est la manifestation la plus visible de la volonté des Européens et des Américains de partager le risque, ainsi que les charges et les responsabilités qui en découlent. C'est l'expression même du couplage, donnée inquantifiable mais néanmoins fondamentale.

L'existence de forces nucléaires qualifiées d'autonomes dans un cas, d'indépendantes dans l'autre constituant, elles aussi, au-delà de nuances dont je ne veux pas sous-estimer l'importance, une contribution utile et reconnue comme telle à la dissuasion. Leur mérite est d'apparaître aux yeux des autres Européens comme une réassurance, alors même que, pour l'ennemi potentiel, elles accroissent encore la marge d'incertitude.

A terme se posera le problème de l'euro-péanisation de ces forces. Il serait vain de discuter aujourd'hui de la manière dont cette mutation s'opèrera car elle n'est pas pour demain. Elle poserait aujourd'hui des problèmes insurmontables. A vouloir forcer le mouvement dans ce sens, au nom d'une certaine conception de l'Europe, on aboutirait très certainement à l'effet inverse ou encore à précipiter le processus de dépérissement des forces nucléaires autonomes. Il est a priori difficile de voir en quoi la cause de l'identité européenne et, à plus forte raison, celle de la défense européenne serait servie par une telle précipitation, à moins de se déclarer partisan d'une dissuasion purement conventionnelle. Mais on sait qu'elle n'est ni réaliste, ni crédible à terme prévisible.

Le conventionnel

C'est le domaine où, ensemble, les Européens font le plus mais où les insuffisances sont aussi les plus flagrantes.

Et pourtant, à se contenter d'une information purement statistique, les choses ne se présentent pas si mal.

Vous connaissez tous ces chiffres dont il ressort que :

- en moyenne, les Européens dépensent 3 % du PNB pour leur défense. Mais c'est une mesure approximative et finalement fort peu significative des rendements effectifs. Certes les uns dépensent plus que d'autres, mais la vraie question, c'est à quoi et comment ?

S'agissant de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler les outputs, l'Europe (chiffres Eurogroupe, c.à.d. tous moins la France) représente à elle seule 90 % du personnel, 95 % des divisions en place, 80 % des chars, 80 % des avions de combat, 65 % des bateaux disponibles.

Mais ce n'est encore qu'une partie du problème ou une présentation utile sous l'angle du burden sharing, mais sans plus.

Les chiffres des pays UEO ont le mérite de présenter la réalité sous forme d'éléments plus comparables puisque ces pays forment un ensemble plus homogène et que la France en fait partie, ce qui correspond à une plus juste appréciation des choses. De plus, point n'est besoin ici de faire la distinction entre forces intégrées et forces nationales puisque toutes concourent à la mise en oeuvre des engagements UEO.

Une étude vient d'être présentée aux Ministres sur les contributions des Etats membres à la défense commune. Elle conclut que, depuis 1970, les dépenses de défense des Etats membres ont augmenté de 31 % en termes réels. Dans les 90 % des forces et capacités alliées en Europe fournies par les Européens, la grande majorité l'est par les pays de l'UEO, comme on pouvait s'y attendre.

L'effort de défense, c'est aussi le soutien dans le domaine de l'infrastructure, de l'accueil, de la logistique que se fournissent entre eux les pays membres de l'Alliance sur des bases bilatérales ou multilatérales. Le cas le plus exemplatif est celui de l'Allemagne fédérale où sont stationnées la plus grande majorité des forces alliées et où se déroulent les grands exercices, le tout appuyé par une infrastructure considérable. En Belgique, les accords sur les lignes de communication au profit des renforts

américains, canadiens, anglais et français représentent un élément non négligeable de l'effort de défense, quand bien même il n'est pas directement quantifiable. Tous ces pays, y compris la France, sont à un titre ou l'autre engagés dans ce type d'activité qui, dès le temps de crise, modifierait profondément leur environnement civil.

Contrairement à ce qu'affirme souvent le Congrès américain, l'Europe n'est ni absente ni irresponsable lorsqu'il s'agit d'assumer sa part de la défense collective. Mais le bilan est moins rose que les chiffres ne le laisseraient croire, même par rapport aux exigences d'une défense minimale et en dehors de toute prétention d'équilibrer le Pacte de Varsovie au niveau conventionnel.

Ainsi, les statistiques publiées à un titre ou l'autre méconnaissent que :

- en termes non plus de nombres mais de capacités effectives, le bilan est beaucoup moins brillant. Pour l'Eurogroupe, les chiffres camouflent des disparités considérables entre le Nord et le Centre d'une part, le Sud de l'autre. Les gros bataillons sont dans le Sud, le matériel sophistiqué au Centre, sans contiguïté géographique entre l'un et l'autre ;
- Certes d'un point de vue UEO, c.à.d. essentiellement le Centre Europe, la situation est nettement plus homogène, mais l'insuffisance des capacités stationnées effectivement à l'avant et l'absence de réserve en nombre suffisant, compromettent une défense de l'avant dont il faut reconnaître que les exigences sont très lourdes .

Les chiffres cités plus haut ne visent que les forces en place. Elles ne pourraient résister, à elles seules, aux divisions de l'Est sans importants renforts ;

- la démographie joue contre nous très certainement dans la région Centre Europe.

Face à ces contraintes qui nous affectent plus directement qu'elles ne touchent l'Est et en particulier l'URSS qui bénéficiera toujours d'une faculté de concentration et de mouvement sur les lignes intérieures qui nous feront toujours défaut, les nouvelles technologies offrent une solution autant qu'elles nous posent de nouveaux problèmes. Le coût de ces technologies est tel que le gain d'efficacité risque d'être effacé par la diminution plus que proportionnelle des nombres. A chaque cycle de rééquipement, les quantités diminuent au point qu'il n'est pas exagéré de parler de désarmement structurel.

Les solutions

Les chiffres sont une chose, les réalités qu'ils révèlent ou qu'ils camouflent en sont une autre. Ce qui compte surtout, c'est l'enseignement que l'on veut bien en tirer.

Les Alliés, les Européens plus encore que les Américains, sont confrontés à une menace bien réelle. La réponse au défi réside moins dans une quelconque volonté de faire plus en termes budgétaires que de faire mieux en combinant les efforts des uns et des autres. Certes, certains peuvent et devraient faire plus. Mais, au point où en sont les choses, il est raisonnable de dire qu'une maximisation des efforts individuels aboutirait à une maximisation de nos inefficacités combinées.

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Les Pays de l'UEO qui se déclarent unis par une même communauté de destin doivent, s'ils veulent être crédibles, commencer à s'organiser pour renforcer leur effort combiné. C'est ce que recommande la plate-forme de La Haye. Seules des coopérations concrètes et visibles permettront de rendre "manifeste" l'engagement de défendre les frontières.

L'effort pour y parvenir est multiforme.

Depuis une quinzaine d'années, la voie traditionnelle, mais indirecte, vers la coopération européenne en matière de défense a été la coopération dans le domaine de l'armement. Cette voie garde toute son importance. Le maintien à terme d'un effort européen de défense crédible passe, au préalable, par le maintien, en Europe, d'une industrie européenne viable. Le maintien d'une telle base industrielle requiert des efforts et peut entraîner des coûts supplémentaires. L'offre monétairement la plus avantageuse n'est-elle pas le plus souvent américaine ? Encore faut-il que l'industrie européenne reste compétitive car il ne peut s'agir d'acheter n'importe quoi à n'importe quel prix sous prétexte que le produit serait européen. Ceci est avant tout affaire de coopération et d'organisation.

Le GEIP a le mérite de regrouper tous les alliés européens. Cette organisation, à la naissance de laquelle la Belgique a fortement contribué, a donné effectivement naissance à quelques projets menés en coopération. Ces projets ne sont pas assez nombreux pour permettre une distribution adéquate des participations. Le GEIP reste trop souvent un cadre multilatéral où s'organisent de simples coopérations ponctuelles et limitées à quelques partenaires. Ce qui manque au GEIP, c'est une réelle vision d'avenir qui soit européenne au plein sens du

terme. Au-delà des actions ponctuelles, il faut une stratégie industrielle. Le GEIP est conscient du problème, mais sa solution dépasse les compétences des seuls Ministres de la Défense. Poser le problème en ces termes, c'est poser la question du rôle de la Communauté Européenne ; c'est aussi s'interroger sur l'impact du grand marché européen, l'avenir de l'art. 235 du Traité de Rome.

La défense de l'Europe, pour ne pas même parler de la défense européenne, passe par la définition d'une stratégie industrielle. C'est un domaine dont l'UEO devra se préoccuper non pas pour définir des besoins ou gérer des programmes, mais pour donner, dans toute la mesure du possible, les impulsions politiques nécessaires. Encore faut-il que l'UEO ait elle-même une vision suffisamment claire des grands axes de cette stratégie industrielle de la sécurité.

Si une politique industrielle forme un préalable, l'effort de défense, c'est avant tout l'affectation des forces et la mobilisation des moyens au service d'une stratégie. Voici des domaines où, au niveau européen, tout ou presque reste à faire. Il ne suffit pas d'affirmer, comme on le fait encore trop souvent, que l'organisation des aspects militaires de la défense, c'est l'affaire de l'OTAN pour les uns ou que la solution du problème est à rechercher, pour les autres, dans un superbe isolement ou, à la limite, par le seul biais de la coopération bilatérale.

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Dans l'OTAN, l'intégration est, finalement beaucoup moins poussée qu'on ne le dit. Elle est réelle et complète au niveau des structures de commandement ; et encore, elle ne devient effective qu'en temps de guerre, pour autant que les Gouvernements nationaux donnent le feu vert en temps voulu. Les forces et les moyens, eux, restent nationaux, bien qu'il faille noter un développement des programmes multilatéraux financés par les budgets d'infrastructure. L'intégration est donc relative, mais elle a l'immense mérite de fournir, dès le temps de paix, un cadre de planification très utile.

Quand il s'agit d'intégration, l'Europe en tant que telle est absente ; pourtant, sa vocation, c'est précisément l'intégration. Elle pourrait et devrait faire beaucoup plus. Il est courant de parler de partage des charges et rôle et des responsabilités au niveau atlantique. Certes, dans tout ce débat, l'élément de discours l'emporte sur l'action concrète ; mais il n'empêche que le débat atlantique est intense. Rien de tel au niveau européen, et pourtant le partage de l'effort ne devrait-il pas être vu comme un problème intra-européen, avant qu'il ne devienne un problème transatlantique. Le partage de l'effort de défense, c'est, pour les Européens avant même les Américains, le partage des tâches, des missions et, en définitive, c'est aussi la rationalisation.

La rationalisation a mauvaise réputation. On y a généralement eu recours pour justifier l'abandon d'une mission ou une diminution de l'effort spécifique. Pourtant, l'Europe de la défense n'aura de sens que si elle débouche sur une plus grande efficacité. Il y a plusieurs façons de rationaliser pour éviter le gaspillage des ressources, l'une d'elles est la spécialisation.

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Une question qui se pose est évidemment de savoir comment spécialiser au-delà des tâches périphériques ou d'une répartition de fait qui existe déjà, parce que nombre de pays européens ne disposent pas de toute la panoplie des capacités requises pour faire face, globalement, à la menace soviétique. Pour spécialiser de façon efficace, il faut des structures de décision appropriées, c.à.d. des structures supra-nationales. Il est clair que l'Europe n'en est pas encore là, mais le moment est venu de se mettre en chemin. L'UEO n'a pas elle-même une vocation supranationale, mais elle peut fournir un cadre de réflexion et de concertation.

Sans vouloir résoudre ici, sur le plan des principes, la délicate question de la spécialisation, certaines coopérations concrètes peuvent être lancées sur des bases ad hoc. La coopération ne doit pas nécessairement s'étendre toujours à tous les sept et, aujourd'hui, aux neuf pays membres. Il y a place pour des programmes bi- ou trilatéraux. La Brigade franco-allemande est un exemple. Cependant, l'Organisation devra veiller à la cohérence des démarches et éviter qu'elles ne conduisent à prononcer des exclusives.

La réalisation et la gestion en commun de projets opérationnels constituent une autre piste de réflexion. Des programmes tels que l'aéromobilité, l'interdiction à longue distance, la collecte et le traitement de l'information que de telles missions exigent, sont autant de domaines qui dépassent les capacités individuelles d'un pays tel que la Belgique. Que dire de l'espace où l'Europe est très présente sur le plan civil, mais étrangement absente sur le plan militaire.

Le choix, pour nombre d'Européens, est de s'associer en combinant leurs ressources dans des domaines bien précis où ils décident de concentrer leurs efforts. Toute autre voie les contraindra tôt ou tard à l'abandon.

Celui-ci aurait un effet délétère non seulement sur le pays considéré, mais sur l'Europe en tant que telle. Les uns, certes, maintiendraient, pour un temps encore, leur effort, mais les autres n'auraient d'autre choix que le repli. La solidarité européenne serait entamée. L'effort global en pâtirait.

Nous n'avons donc pas beaucoup de choix, quand bien même nous ne sommes pas nécessairement d'accord entre nous sur les remèdes et les procédures. Mon propos est simplement de souligner que le maintien, à terme, d'un effort de défense crédible sur le plan européen nécessitera une gestion des efforts nationaux dans un esprit européen. Encore faut-il que les pays puissent se mettre d'accord sur un véritable projet. Ne commençons pas par poser le problème en termes de souveraineté ou d'abandon de la souveraineté ; ce serait le meilleur moyen de ne pas aboutir. Mais engageons-nous à coopérer sans exclusive ni a priori quant à la meilleure formule possible. Le développement progressif d'une identité européenne en matière de défense devrait permettre de mieux sensibiliser les opinions par rapport aux exigences de la défense et de dégager les ressources correspondantes.

Les intérêts hors Europe

La défense de l'Europe, c'est - on l'a dit - plus que la défense des frontières, c'est aussi la défense des intérêts de sécurité européens où qu'ils soient menacés (comme le dit l'art. VIII).

La proposition que l'Europe puisse avoir des intérêts stratégiques qui ne se résumeraient pas à la seule addition des intérêts nationaux ou de puissance de ses membres est nouvelle. Curieusement, l'UEO en tant qu'Organisation a toujours eu des compétences hors Europe avant même d'avoir conscience qu'elle avait des intérêts. C'est probablement la raison pour laquelle elle ne les a jamais exercées.

La perception est en train de changer. Les pays de l'UEO s'éveillent à la dimension hors zone. Comme on dirait dans l'Alliance, l'évolution de la menace, son caractère omnidirectionnel et multiforme, la diversification des pôles de risque font que les choses changent.

Il est clair que la Belgique n'aurait pas envoyé une flotille dans le Golfe arabo-persique pour s'y livrer, même avec d'autres partenaires, à des opérations de déminage pour des raisons d'intérêts purement nationaux. C'est une certaine vision de la présence de l'Europe et de son rôle dans le monde qui l'a amenée à agir de la sorte.

Certes, le Golfe est un exemple parmi d'autres qui n'est pas nécessairement appelé à se représenter, du moins dans les mêmes termes. Mais le problème est posé. Les réponses se situent au niveau politique et politico-militaire.

Au plan proprement politique et diplomatique, l'action doit viser à jeter les bases d'un environnement propice à l'épanouissement pacifique de nos intérêts légitimes. Cette compétence est au sens le plus large exercée par les douze dans le cadre de la coopération politique européenne. Mais s'agissant des intérêts proprement stratégiques, la politique ne se conçoit pas sans les moyens d'action correspondants.

Faut-il créer une force d'intervention européenne, comme l'idée en est parfois soulevée?

Quels seraient le cadre, les structures, les schémas de prise de décision et de commandement ? Seule l'UEO pourrait fournir un tel cadre, mais l'Organisation n'a pas, pour le moment du moins, d'ambitions opérationnelles, bien qu'il s'agisse d'un domaine où on ne peut pas affirmer a priori qu'il y ait double emploi avec l'Alliance qui, elle, n'a pas de compétences hors zone.

Il faut opter pour le pragmatisme. Les capacités existent. Plusieurs pays ont des forces d'intervention rapides (France - UK) ou comptent s'en doter (Espagne). Même la Belgique n'est pas sans moyens. Il y a donc place pour des synergies au sein de l'UEO et, ici aussi, pour des spécialisations. Les Européens pourraient créer non pas une force permanente d'intervention, mais un pool de forces et de moyens susceptibles d'être affectés hors zone.

Le fait est que la dimension hors Europe ou hors UEO va prendre une importance croissante. Au-delà de la mise en commun des moyens disponibles, l'effort des Européens doit porter sur la mise en place et, là où c'est nécessaire, sur la création de capacités de projection de forces, à commencer par des capacités de transport aérien et de soutien logistique à longue distance. Le hors zone a donc une place dans la définition d'une structure européenne de défense, ainsi que dans ses ramifications industrielles.

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J'ai tenté de décrire non pas tant l'effort de défense au service de l'Europe que les composants nucléaire, conventionnel au sens le plus large, hors Europe de cet effort.

L'Europe de la défense n'est encore qu'un projet. Les réalisations là où elles existent sont fragmentaires et partielles. L'UEO ne coïncide ni avec l'Europe ni avec l'aire géographique de la défense européenne. Toutefois, les coopérations qui se nouent sous son égide permettront de donner aux efforts de défense des membres une certaine cohérence européenne.

En guise de conclusion, je voudrais faire quelques remarques qui me semblent aussi fondamentales qu'élémentaires.

- Il n'y aura pas de défense européenne sans que les Européens individuellement maintiennent, et si possible améliorent, leur effort national de défense. Comme le précise la plate-forme, il faut veiller à ce que le niveau des contributions de chaque Etat reflète ses capacités de manière adéquate. A plus long terme, l'établissement de normes européennes en matière de défense serait une bonne chose. Mais l'engagement restera avant tout une responsabilité nationale.
- Il faut veiller ensuite, toujours en citant la plate-forme, à l'utilisation efficace des ressources. C'est à ce niveau que la coopération intervient.

- La défense de l'Europe, c'est l'adhésion à une dissuasion nucléaire et conventionnelle appuyée sur la disposition des moyens correspondants.

- Enfin, l'effort de défense européen s'intègre dans une politique européenne de la sécurité au sens le plus complet du terme. Cet effort n'obéit pas à une dynamique propre mais s'adapte à un besoin qui, lui-même, est fonction d'un certain niveau de menace. Cette menace n'est pas une donnée fixe.

Le contrôle d'armement fait partie intégrante de notre politique de sécurité. L'espoir existe que la négociation permettra d'améliorer la stabilité. Le contrôle d'armement ne changera pas, même en étant optimistes, les données de notre stratégie, mais il pourra en alléger les exigences tant sous l'angle des nombres que des conditions de déploiement. Le coût de la défense de l'avant ou de la défense des frontières pourrait en être réduit d'autant en mettant l'accent sur les réserves plutôt que sur la rapidité de réaction. Encore faudrait-il que les Européens fassent la démonstration qu'ils sont prêts à négocier, mais aussi à maintenir l'effort voulu individuellement et collectivement.

LOTHAR RÜCK

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SPEECH AT IHEDN SEMINAR: 17 NOVEMBER: THE BASES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

It is a great pleasure to have been asked to participate in this seminar on European security. This is my first visit to another WEU country since I became Minister of State at the FCO, and the first occasion I have had to speak about security policy. I am delighted that my first foray into these subjects should be undertaken here in Paris. I should like to pay tribute to the French Government for having conceived and brought into being this seminar. I hope that it will fully realise the ambitions entertained for it.

Nonetheless, pleasure is mixed with anxiety. This is a formidable audience for a maiden speech on European defence. It was, after all, only last month that the President of the French Republic, in this very hall, hinted that it might be a difficult subject to address effectively: "Generous discourses on the subject flood the public scene. But they remain vague." But while I admit to adding to the flood, I hope that I can avoid adding to the vagueness.

I start with two debating points.

The North Atlantic Alliance seems to be in a perpetual state of crisis. Each year we are told by commentators, and sometimes by our own advisers, that the challenge which faces the Alliance has never been more acute; the threat never more insidious; the difficulties never more intractable. Doom and gloom are NATO's constant companions.

Yet European security and the prosperity which has grown under the protection of that security, have been the great success story of the last forty years. The institutions established in the late 1940s, set on their way by the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk signed by France and the United Kingdom, remain in place today, despite the vast changes in our circumstances since those days. The interlocking structure of institutions, bringing into partnership and alliance the countries of Western Europe and the countries of

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North America, remains the basis of European security - the subject of our discussions.

So are things really changing? Is the Western security nexus in the process of altering its fundamental character? Are we, with all the talk of European defence identities and burden-sharing, witnessing some shift in the tectonic plates of the transatlantic security relationship? Or is it going to be business as usual, with only minor variations and hiccups, for another 40 years?

Let us look first at some of the current trends. It is one of the phenomena of the 1980s that the Europeans are examining more closely their role in the Alliance and the organisation of their security. There are a number of objective reasons for this. Let me cite a few of them. First, our own increasing economic success. We are richer than we were, and our combined economic power is now much closer to that of the United States, whose share of the free world's total production steadily declines. It is increasingly hard to resist recognising that we can now afford to do more in our own defence. And if we sense this, so do the Americans - particularly as the constraints on their defence budget have grown, and they have become more conscious of commitment to other parts of the world (South West Asia, Central America) as well as to Western Europe. But the central fact is that the US is now a debtor nation, with intractable domestic economic problems to face; this potentially provides a background for tension between electorates within the Alliance in a way which is new. And 1992 provides a further stimulus to rapid European growth, and therefore, a further cause of readjustment in the relative economic strength of the two ends of the Alliance structure.

However healthy our economies, though, no economy ever seems quite healthy enough to keep up with the costs of defence equipment: somehow they always grow faster still. And that is another factor which in the 1980s has pushed the Europeans together to find ways of spreading the load by increasing competition and collaboration between us, though the example of EFA and Rafale, to which President Mitterrand drew attention, shows that, sadly, we still have a long way to go. Another factor is the simple one of

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demographic changes: as the birth rate falls in many of our countries, notably in Germany, it requires us to look again at how we organise our security.

These are practical factors. There are new political factors too. As we develop our economic integration within the EC towards the challenge of 1992, and work at enhancing our political cooperation, it is not surprising that we should look speculatively at our security arrangements as well, and wonder whether there is a role for the Twelve. You do not need me to remind you of the whole long-running psycho-drama of the INF Agreement, and the new perspective which this gave to links between Europeans in the defence field. And my last - but far from least - example: the Gorbachev phenomenon. By his deployment of the notion of a common European home, obscure though it may be, he has given a specific extra push to thinking in Europe about what the links between us should be. But more generally, the changes that he is striving to make to the Soviet system, and the changed approach to the rest of the world which is implied, provide another reason for re-examining some traditional attitudes. As a number of commentators have pointed out, one effect of Gorbachev's changes of direction has been to cause the main focus of east-west relations to return to Europe.

All this means that there is currently much talk about the European defence identity and the European pillar. So I take as my theme a simple question: what does it mean, at the end of the 1980s, to be a "good European" as far as security and defence are concerned?"

My starting point is Mrs Thatcher's speech in September to the College of Europe in Bruges. It aroused a certain interest. But the defence section of that speech was the subject of fewer commentaries than some other parts, perhaps because it offered less to those who are only interested in trying to prove that Britain is less committed to Europe than her partners. Let me briefly recapitulate the main points she made on defence, which give the lie to this proposition.

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She emphasised that within the Atlantic Alliance the Europeans should bear a full part of the defence of freedom, particularly as Europe grows wealthier. She did not see the future of European defence as an institutional problem or a problem of drafting. NATO and the WEU had, she said, long recognised where the problems of Europe's defence lay and had pointed out the solutions. It was now a question of giving substance to those declarations: of keeping up public support for nuclear deterrence; of meeting the requirements for effective conventional defence; of developing the WEU, not as an alternative to NATO, but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence of the West; above all of preserving Europe's unity and resolve. Arms control should be pursued. But the West would achieve successes in that field not because their cause was right but by the strength of their defence.

Does that recipe for Europe's defence display a lack of commitment? Of course not. But let me in any case offer some specific ingredients to put in the recipe outlined by Mrs Thatcher in Bruges.

The starting point of any defence policy, not just in Europe now, but anywhere at anytime, has to be an objective appreciation of the potential threat it is designed to counter, measured by capabilities not by declared intentions. And despite some signs of restraint by the Soviet Union and her allies in several areas of the world in recent years, most recently we hope, in Angola, the potential threat to Europe has not changed. We hope that it will and we assiduously watch for any signs, for example, that Soviet equipment programmes are changing. But so far, as M. Rocard pointed out here on 15 November, the signs are not there. A comprehensive modernisation programme covering the strategic and theatre nuclear as well as the conventional fields continues. Soviet defence spending amounts, by our estimates, to some 14-16% (or perhaps more) of their GNP and continues to grow by 2% in real terms each year.

I confess to some amazement therefore when Soviet spokesmen complain that any modernisation of the Alliance's theatre nuclear systems will be totally contrary to the new spirit of the times. Let us, as the Chinese advise, seek truth from facts. The facts are

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these. The Soviet Union is continuing to replace its FROG short-range nuclear missiles with the longer-range, more accurate SS21s. It has introduced five theatre air-launched cruise missiles. Its fleet of Backfire and Fencer nuclear capable aircraft continues to grow. Its nuclear capable artillery are being modernised. At sea it has recently deployed the SSN21 sea-launched cruise missile. And what about the numbers of its warheads in Europe? There has been no claim of any reduction in recent years.

NATO has reduced its warheads by 35% over the past decade. It has published the numbers which it now possesses, 4,600. Unlike the Soviet Union which is going ahead full steam with a panoply of modernisation programmes, the Alliance is at present discussing options. Sadly, options do not deter.

So the first characteristics of a good European in the defence field is realism: the ability to appreciate how things are; and not to confuse them with how we hope one day they may be.

Which brings me to the specifics of what we Europeans should be doing. Our Heads of State and Government agreed at the NATO Summit in March that the Alliance's strategy of deterrence remain valid and that our forces should be kept up to date as necessary. How can we better implement that strategy?

I suggest that it is by a combination of adequate inputs, improved outputs and a better pooling of our efforts, both practical and intellectual.

My predecessor in this job gained himself some notoriety by a speech to the WEU Assembly in which he stated frankly the views of the British Government on the adequacy or otherwise of particular countries' defence inputs. I will not repeat his remarks today. But I would underline the seriousness we attach to inputs. The British Government announced on 1 November significant increases to its defence spending over the next three years which will restore real growth to the defence budget, of 1.7% in 1990/91 and 1.3% in 1991/92 on current estimates of inflation. Defence spending in Britain is now some 20% above what it was when the Conservative

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Government took office in 1979. Yet as a proportion of our GNP it is the same as in 1978. Which underlines the point that as we grow richer we Europeans can afford to shoulder a greater share of the Alliance defence burden than before, without eating up a greater proportion of our national wealth. But since my predecessor spoke to the WEU Assembly trends in defence spending have not universally moved in the right direction. For example, I cannot but express our disappointment at the Belgian Government's announcement in August that it intends to cut its 1989 defence budget by 3.4% in cash terms from the 1988 level.

So my second characteristic of the good European is commitment, including financial commitment, to defence. Making speeches and commissioning reports is fine. But at the end of the day we must be willing to put our money where our mouths are.

Improving outputs is just as important as improving inputs. We need to pursue efforts to introduce more competition into defence procurement and to collaborate more with one another where this makes economic sense. A significant range of future British defence equipment will be produced collaboratively. We are partners in the European Fighter Aircraft, the EH101 and Al29 Helicopters, the TRIGAT anti-tank weapon, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the NATO Frigate Replacement. We need to cooperate more in the logistics and training fields where significant opportunities for savings exist, for example, in simulator training. We need to look at the possibilities of common programmes. We already have the common airborne early warning programme. We should be looking at other capabilities which we will need in future, eg. advanced surveillance and target acquisition, where the systems which will be deployed will cover areas exceeding those of individual army corps.

So the good European, in the defence field as elsewhere, is the one who tries to maximise the return of his investment, and increasingly that involves common or collaborative action or cross-procurement. There are always good reasons, or powerful lobbies, for buying or acting nationally. But in the long run we will surely hang separately if we do not hang together.

Just

Just as conventional forces need to be kept up to date, so too do nuclear forces. As the WEU Platform stated, it is only the nuclear element of deterrence which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. The Platform went on to emphasise that, in addition to the contribution which the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make to deterrence, the cooperative arrangements which certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. Of course we need to take account of political sensitivities and of progress in arms control. But at the end of the day, our force planning cannot be based on hope. Decisions do have to be taken. President Mitterrand said in his IHEDN speech that France would not deny itself any type of weapon which the other powers possess and added that this reasoning applied to the Hades. M. Rocard said on Tuesday that "it would be dangerous and counter-productive to give up unilaterally any particular element in the nuclear or conventional arsenal". We welcome this statement of French determination to modernise as necessary. It sets a good example to all of us as France's allies.

In the nuclear field, therefore, the good European accepts that subscribing to the theory of deterrence has practical consequences which must be followed through, if the theory is not to become hollow words.

Having efficient forces and good equipment is not however sufficient in itself. Deployments, and plans for co-operation in a crisis, are equally essential. One of the unique features of WEU is Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty which commits each member to afford another member which is attacked "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". I read with the keenest interest the official text of President Mitterrand's IHEDN speech. France's allies will have noted the clear assurance that "France will be at her allies' side from the first minute". In the WEU Platform, the WEU members re-commit themselves to defend any member country at its borders. In a report to this week's WEU Ministerial this concept has been further developed. Stress is laid in it on the importance which several member states attach to their commitment to Germany on whose territory they station forces under

various arrangements. And reference is made to the constancy of effort which is required in maintaining them.

For an effective defence to be mounted in Europe's particular conditions, an integrated command structure is necessary. Without it there would be little coherence in our defence. I fully recognise that not all members of the Alliance wish to make their defence arrangements, as we do, within NATO's Integrated Military Structure. I hasten to add, in case any French members of the audience are beginning to bridle, that they are not about to be subjected to a pressing invitation to rejoin that structure. France's steps to thicken up her defence links with her neighbours seem to me to demonstrate a determination to show that there are other ways of meeting the commitments of solidarity. We welcome developments such as the exercise called 'Cheeky Sparrow' which took place last year in which French forces operated alongside German forces within 100 kms of the inner German border. We ourselves have made proposals for the further development of Anglo-French co-operation, suggesting that French forces might participate in exercises in the NORTHAG area, that there would be practical benefit to the common defence in reinforcement exercises using French ports, and that there is scope for further co-operation in the naval field. The response to these proposals has been extremely positive and can provide a good example of how the pooling of efforts can strengthen European defence.

The proposed Spanish contribution to the Alliance will also significantly boost European defence, and is something which we unreservedly welcome. Discussion of guidelines governing this contribution have gone well in Brussels and we look forward to detailed co-ordination agreements now being drawn up between Spain and the major NATO Commanders. We are delighted that Spain will be discussing with us in the WEU from now on the developments of the concept of defence at partners' borders.

But
The bilateral links and co-ordinated ^{with} agreements, important though they are, can only work in limited cases. They may be appropriate for countries who see their role as contributing to a strategic reserve or as operating principally in the air or maritime

fields. But they are manifestly not the way to organise a collective defence of the frontline, particularly along the Eastern border of the Federal Republic. For those European countries - the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom - who along with the Germans, Americans and Canadians actually help defend this frontline, integrated command arrangements are essential.

So, the good European accepts that the obligation of solidarity in defence means the necessity of an integrated force posture at least for those countries who participate directly in forward defence. And even where integration is not considered to be feasible or politically acceptable, the more closely the defence efforts of an individual country can be aligned with those of its allies the better.

But improvements to our defence planning and to our defence posture cannot, on their own, guarantee our security. In the nuclear age, and on a continent where the level of military confrontation, both nuclear and conventional, is as high as it is in Europe, arms control has to be an essential element in our security arrangements. We Europeans have a vital responsibility for ensuring that our political and intellectual input into arms control is strong and clear-headed. In formulating this input we must bear in mind the lessons of the past, as well as our hopes for the future. The ABM, SALT and INF Treaties, and the progress made in START, show that arms control agreements can be reached with the Soviet Union which genuinely enhance Western, and particularly European, security. But they also show that such agreements will only be reached after patient practical negotiation. They also show however that although new thinking may now be gaining ground in Moscow, the Russians give nothing away for nothing when it comes to arms control. They will make deals with us if they see that our defences are strong and if they have a mutual interest in signing up to a military balance at agreed levels. But they will certainly not bother to make deals with us if we are weak and divided or if they think that they can achieve their objectives as a result of our own unilateral actions. Certainly they have an economic interest in making progress. But all the evidence of Russian and Soviet history is that they will not throw away an advantage on the security

side even if it enables them to have a higher standard of living. We must not therefore risk allowing any such uncovenanted advantages to them.

This means that the Europeans must have a clear view of their arms control priorities and be prepared to formulate and implement credible policies for achieving them. Within the WEU we are beginning to do this. We have analysed the particular implications for Europe of the prospective START Treaty which we all support and which we all hope will be achieved during the coming months or years. And we have discussed the prospects for the conventional stability talks which we hope can begin later this year or early next.

These latter talks will be crucial for European security. They will be the test of whether Mr Gorbachev is serious in what he has said about reducing asymmetries and about eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large scale offensive action. What the West needs are clear and precise proposals to put on the table the day that the new talks open. Good work has already been done in developing such proposals. Of course, political sensitivities are involved, particularly when it comes to zonal arrangements and the precise nature of the linkage of the new talks with the CSCE process. But I hope that such sensitivities can be kept in perspective. It is substance - the military reality - which matters and which we should be addressing. We must not spend too much of our time distracted by the arcana of theology.

Nor should we assume that arms control, on its own, can resolve our security dilemmas. This applies in particular to the field of short range nuclear forces. As I have said earlier, the requirements of deterrence mean that decisions will be needed over the modernisation of these forces. There are those who argue that such decisions can, or should, only be undertaken in the context of some arms control proposal. For my own part, I would never rule out arms control as an element in enhancing European security in any field of military capability. But, bearing in mind our other priorities, it is surely for those who favour an arms control approach to explain of what it would consist; how and when it might

/ work

work; and why the Russians would have any incentive for negotiating on terms which we would find acceptable.

So the good European needs always to bear in mind the possibility of enhancing security through arms control; and to contribute in an active, intellectual and practical manner to the formulation of proposals for this purpose. But he also needs to remember that arms control cannot by itself be a panacea for our security problems; and that arms control, as the past teaches us, will only work if the other side is convinced of our resolve and our seriousness and has a mutual interest in negotiating.

I hope that this British recipe for European defence can serve as a practical input to your discussions. With strong defences we can, as Mrs Thatcher has said, pursue dialogue with the East on a consistent basis in good times and bad. ^{As a result} ~~In the~~ arms control ~~field~~, it is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated that we in the West have the initiative in every single field. It was the Alliance's INF proposal which was accepted by the Soviet Union. It is the US proposals which form the basis of the emerging START agreement. The framework of the CW Convention is Western. The final text of the Conventional Stability Talks mandate will be extraordinarily close to the original Western draft. On the substance of conventional arms control, Mr Gorbachev has now accepted the Western idea that asymmetries should be eliminated by the side with the most reducing. So let us not undersell ourselves. We do have a winning formula in both the defence and arms control fields. We should not change it; we should develop it. And let Mr Gorbachev come to us. The foundations of the common European home have been laid by the West: free economies; human rights; and a manifest incapacity to attack the East. If Mr Gorbachev wishes to have a room in the house, he is welcome. But it will be our house, which we have no need to think of rebuilding.

INTERVENTION DE MONSIEUR ROLAND DUMAS
MINISTRE D'ETAT, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
DEVANT LA SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'IHEDN
(PARIS, 18 NOVEMBRE 1988)

h. 9
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LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT
ET LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE

JE SUIS PARTICULIEREMENT HEUREUX DE M'EXPRIMER DEVANT VOUS, RESPONSABLES VENUS DE PLUSIEURS PAYS EUROPEENS, SUR LE SUJET DU DESARMEMENT. A UN MOMENT OU LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST S'ENRICHISSENT DE PERSPECTIVES NOUVELLES, LES EUROPEENS ONT LEUR PROPRE VISION DES CHOSES, QUE PERSONNE D'AUTRE NE PEUT EXPRIMER A LEUR PLACE.

L'UNE DES MOTIVATIONS ESSENTIELLES DES ETATS MEMBRES DE L'UEO A ETE, EN DEVELOPPANT LEUR COOPERATION AU SEIN DE CETTE ORGANISATION, DE MIEUX AFFIRMER LES INTERETS SPECIFIQUES DE L'EUROPE EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE ET DE DESARMEMENT.

L'URGENCE DE CETTE REFLEXION S'EST PARTICULIEREMENT MANIFESTEE APRES LE SOMMET DE REYKJAVIK, OU LE RISQUE A PRIS CORPS D'UNE NEGOCIATION ENTRE LES DEUX GRANDS SUR LE SORT DE L'EUROPE, DONT L'EUROPE ELLE-MEME EUT ETE ECARTÉE, ALORS QU'ELLE ETAIT AU COEUR DU DEBAT.

AFFARI NAZIONALE ROMANA
8765 28.2.1989
BOTTECA

ON NE PORTE PAS ATTEINTE A LA SOLIDARITE DES MEMBRES DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE SI L'ON CONSTATE LES DIFFERENCES DE PERCEPTION NATURELLES ENTRE LES UNS ET LES AUTRES QUI RESULTENT DE FACTEURS GEOGRAPHIQUES ET POLITIQUES EVIDENTS. SELON QU'ON SE PLACE D'UN COTE OU DE L'AUTRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE, DES NOTIONS TELLES QUE DISSUASION, RIPOSTE, AVERTISSEMENT NUCLEAIRE, BATAILLE, GUERRE LIMITEE, ENGENDRENT NECESSAIREMENT DES REACTIONS DIFFERENTES.

MEME PARMY NOS ALLIES QUI, CONTRAIREMENT A NOUS, S'APPUIENT SUR LA STRATEGIE DE LA "RIPOSTE FLEXIBLE", CEUX QUI APPARTIENNENT A L'EUROPE ONT TENDANCE A INTERPRETER CETTE DOCTRINE EN PARTANT D'INTERETS SPECIFIQUEMENT EUROPEENS.

LA REFLEXION EUROPEENNE COMMUNE QUI A COMMENCE, ET DONT CETTE SESSION REPRESENTE UNE NOUVELLE MANIFESTATION, N'A POUR BUT EN AUCUNE FACON DE RENFORCER CES DIFFERENCES DE PERCEPTION ENTRE AMERICAINS ET EUROPEENS, MAIS DE PERMETTRE A CEUX-CI, EN DEFINISSANT PLUS CLAIREMENT LEURS INTERETS EN TANT QU'EUROPEENS, D'APPORTER UNE MEILLEURE CONTRIBUTION A LA SECURITE OCCIDENTALE DANS SON ENSEMBLE.

CETTE REFLEXION COMMUNE, A QUELLES CONCLUSIONS ABOUTIT-ELLE POUR CE QUI EST DU DESARMEMENT ? J'EN APERCOIS DEUX PRINCIPALES :

- EN PREMIER LIEU, NOUS PENSONS TOUS QUE DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE EUROPEENNE SONT DEUX OBJECTIFS QUE L'ON NE DOIT PAS DISSOCIER.

IL SERAIT IMPARDONNABLE DE SE LAISSER ALLER A DES ACCORDS DE DESARMEMENT DONT LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE AURAIT A SOUFFRIR. MAIS CE SERAIT AUSSI MECONNAITRE GRAVEMENT L'ESPERANCE DE NOS PEUPLES QUE DE CHERCHER A RATTRAPER CE QUI AURA PU ETRE GAGNE AU TITRE DU DESARMEMENT DANS UNE CATEGORIE D'ARMES, PAR UN NOUVEL EFFORT DE DEFENSE DANS UNE AUTRE.

POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS PEUT-ETRE DEPUIS L'IMMEDIAT APRES-GUERRE, UNE VERITABLE DIMINUTION DU NIVEAU DES FORCES SANS AFFAIBLISSEMENT DE NOTRE SECURITE NE PARAIT PAS HORS DE PORTEE. CERTES, AU VU DES DESEQUILIBRES EXISTANTS, LA REALISATION DE CETTE ESPERANCE DEPEND PLUS DE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE QUE DES OCCIDENTAUX ; MAIS POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS, CETTE PERSPECTIVE N'EST PLUS UNIQUEMENT DU DOMAINE DU DISCOURS, IL N'EST PAS IMPOSSIBLE QU'ELLE ENTRE DANS LE CHAMP DE LA REALITE. NOUS DEVONS NOUS Y PREPARER SERIEUSEMENT, AVEC VIGILANCE, SANS ARRIERE-PENSEE. MIEUX VAUT S'Y PREPARER EN EFFET QUE DE NIER L'EVOLUTION EN PRATIQUANT LA "POLITIQUE DE L'AUTRUCHE".

IL VA DE SOI QUE, SI UN PROCESSUS DE DESARMEMENT S'ENGAGE, LA REFLEXION EUROPEENNE COMMUNE SUR LA SECURITE DEMEURERA NECESSAIRE ET, JE DIRAI, PLUS QUE JAMAIS NECESSAIRE, CAR IL FAUDRA QUE LES EUROPEENS DETERMINENT LES MOYENS PROPRES QU'ILS DOIVENT CONSERVER DANS LA NOUVELLE SITUATION. ILS DOIVENT D'ABORD LE FAIRE ENTRE EUX.

L'INTERET COMMUN DES EUROPEENS DE L'OUEST EST QU'UN NOUVEL EQUILIBRE DES FORCES NE PORTE PAS ATTEINTE, NON SEULEMENT A LA SECURITE OCCIDENTALE, MAIS AUSSI A LA

POSSIBILITE POUR LES PAYS D'EUROPE DE CONTRIBUER PAR LEURS MOYENS PROPRES A LA DEFENSE, COMME A LA DISSUASION. JE PENSE ICI BIEN EVIDEMMENT A LA CONTRIBUTION QUE LA FORCE NATIONALE FRANCAISE, MOYEN SUPREME DE NOTRE SURVIE, APPORTE A LA DISSUASION D'ENSEMBLE, AINSI QU'A L'APPORT DE NOTRE ALLIE ET PARTENAIRE BRITANNIQUE.

2. LE DEUXIEME MESSAGE DES EUROPEENS, TIENT DANS LE FAIT QUE LE DESARMEMENT EST UN OUTIL AU SERVICE D'UNE VISION POLITIQUE.

QUELLE EST CETTE VISION ?

A) C'EST TOUT D'ABORD LA DISPARITION PROGRESSIVE DES DIVISIONS HERITEES DE LA GUERRE, L'APPARITION DE RELATIONS POLITIQUES, ECONOMIQUES, CULTURELLES PLUS FLUIDES ENTRE TOUS LES ETATS, DE L'ATLANTIQUE A L'OURAL.

CETTE IDEE D'UNE EUROPE PLUS SOUPLE, PLUS FLEXIBLE, VA DE PAIR AVEC UNE PLUS GRANDE TRANSPARENCE DES REALITES MILITAIRES, LA DISPARITION PROGRESSIVE DES DESEQUILIBRES DANS LES ARSENAUX, DES RISQUES D'INTIMIDATION, ET MEME D'AGRESSION.

DANS CETTE VISION-LA, CELLE DE L'EUROPE DE LA CSCE, LE DESARMEMENT A NATURELLEMENT UN GRAND ROLE A JOUER : IL DOIT FAIRE SAUTER L'UN DES VEROUS - LE DESEQUILIBRE MILITAIRE - QUI ENTRAVE LES PROGRES VERS LES RELATIONS NOUVELLES QUE NOUS VOULONS ETABLIR.

B) N'OUBLIONS PAS, DANS CETTE PERSPECTIVE, LE ROLE DE L'EUROPE DE LA COMMUNAUTE : CHACUN SAIT QUE LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPEENNE NE SERA COMPLETE QUE LORSQU'ELLE S'ACCOMPAGNERA DE CET ATTRIBUT INDISPENSABLE DE L'IDENTITE POLITIQUE QU'EST LA CAPACITE EN MATIERE DE SECURITE. IL N'Y A PAS DE CONTRADICTION ENTRE NOS EFFORTS DE DESARMEMENT ET L'EMERGENCE DE CETTE IDENTITE EUROPEENNE EN MATIERE DE SECURITE.

POUR QUE NOUS AUTRES EUROPEENS PUISSIONS PORTER NOTRE MESSAGE DE DEPASSEMENT DES DIVISIONS, NOTRE MESSAGE DE DESARMEMENT, AVEC AUTANT D'EFFICACITE QUE NOUS LE SOUHAITONS, IL FAUT QUE NOUS NOUS SACHIONS CAPABLES D'EXISTER, DE NOUS DEFENDRE SI ON NOUS MENACE, EN UN MOT, QUE NOUS SOYONS L'EUROPE ADULTE. D'OU, LA ENCORE, L'EXIGENCE FONDAMENTALE QU'IL Y A A NOUER AUSSI SERRE QUE POSSIBLE L'ARTICULATION ENTRE DEFENSE ET DESARMEMENT.

3- QUELLE DOIT ETRE LA DIRECTION PRINCIPALE - LE FIL CONDUCTEUR - DES EFFORTS DE DESARMEMENT ? MA REponse EST CLAIRE : IL S'AGIT DE TENDRE VERS UN MINIMUM, VERS LA SUFFISANCE.

CE THEME EST, DEPUIS LONGTEMPS, VOUS LE SAVEZ, UNE CONSTANTE DANS LA POLITIQUE DE SECURITE DE LA FRANCE : C'EST LUI QUI DICTE NOTRE POSTURE DE DISSUASION MAINTENUE AU STRICT NECESSAIRE ; C'EST LUI QUI NOUS FAIT PREFERER UNE DOCTRINE A DEUX ETAGES SEULEMENT : L'ULTIME AVERTISSEMENT ET LA FRAPPE

STRATEGIQUE. C'EST LUI QUI NOUS FAIT SOUHAITER QUE LES GRANDES PUISSANCES REDUISENT MUTUELLEMENT LEURS ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES REDONDANTS. C'EST AUSSI CE PRINCIPE QUI NOUS INTERDIT DE NEGOCIER LA REDUCTION DU NOTRE TANT QUE L'ECART DEMEURERA CE QU'IL EST.

- IL EST ENCOURAGEANT QUE LES NOUVEAUX DIRIGEANTS SOVIETIQUES NOUS AIENT EMPRUNTE CE THEME DE LA SUFFISANCE.
N'ENTEND-ON PAS MAINTENANT M. GORBATCHEV PARLER DE "SUFFISANCE RAISONNABLE" DANS LE DOMAINE DES FORCES CLASSIQUES ?

LA SUFFISANCE, C'EST-A-DIRE SACRIFIER LE SUPERFLU ET CONSERVER LE NECESSAIRE.

SACRIFIER LE SUPERFLU : IL NE SERVIRAIT A RIEN DE PROCLAMER QU'ON A DEFINITIVEMENT OPTÉ POUR UNE POSTURE MILITAIRE DEFENSIVE, SI TOUT - LE VOLUME ET LA LOCALISATION DES FORCES SUR LE TERRAIN, LES BUDGETS MILITAIRES, LES INSTRUCTIONS DONNEES AUX COMMANDANTS DES UNITES, L'ENSEIGNEMENT MILITAIRE LUI-MEME - MONTRAIT QU'ON CONSERVE EN FAIT UNE CONCEPTION ET DES CAPACITES QUI SONT CELLES DE LA CONTRE OFFENSIVE, VOIRE DE L'OFFENSIVE PURE ET SIMPLE.

A CET EGARD, LA "SUFFISANCE RAISONNABLE" POUR CHACUN, EST, A NOS YEUX, LA PIERRE DE TOUCHE DE LA VOLONTE DES SOVIETIQUES DE DESARMER, DONT LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE A PROPOSE DE FAIRE LE TEST EN DEUX OU TROIS ANS DANS LE CADRE DE LA NEGOCIATION SUR LA STABILITE CONVENTIONNELLE QUI VA S'OUVRIR BIENTOT.

LA SUFFISANCE, C'EST AUSSI CONSERVER LE NECESSAIRE, LE MINIMUM INDISPENSABLE. NOUS PARVIENDRONS D'AUTANT MIEUX A FAIRE DISPARAITRE CE QUE LES ARSENAUX ACTUELS - CLASSIQUES ET NUCLEAIRES - ONT DE SUPERFLU, QUE NOUS CONSERVERONS CE MINIMUM NOUS PERMETTANT DE NOUS PRESERVER DE L'AGRESSION. SI L'OPTION NUCLEAIRE DISPARAISSAIT, SI NOUS N'AVIONS PLUS D'ARMES ATOMIQUES, LE DESARMEMENT S'ARRETERAIT : LE DESARMEMENT N'EST POSSIBLE AUJOURD'HUI QUE PARCE QUE NOUS SOMMES, EN QUELQUE SORTE, ADOSSES A LA DISSUASION. ET IL IRA D'AUTANT PLUS VITE, ET D'AUTANT PLUS LOIN, QUE CETTE DISSUASION SERA MAINTENUE A SON NIVEAU NECESSAIRE ET SUFFISANT D'EFFICACITE.

- CECI EST AUSSI VRAI EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'EVOLUTION TECHNIQUE DES FORCES. LE MINIMUM NECESSAIRE A LA DISSUASION, C'EST EVIDENT, EVOLUE AVEC LA MENACE, QUI ELLE-MEME EST FONCTION DE L'EVOLUTION DES TECHNOLOGIES. PLUS PROCHE ON SERA DU MINIMUM, PLUS IMPORTANT IL SERA DE MAINTENIR LES FORCES AU NIVEAU TECHNIQUE VOULU.

JE VOUDRAIS PROFITER DE CETTE REFLEXION POUR CORRIGER CERTAINS MALENTENDUS, CONCERNANT NOTRE ATTITUDE SUR LA MODERNISATION DES ARMES A COURTE PORTEE.

TOUT D'ABORD LA MODERNISATION DES ARMES FRANCAISES, ET NOTAMMENT DES ARMEMENTS PRESTRATEGIQUES : CELLE-CI EST ENGAGEE ET SE POURSUIVRA. ELLE VISE PRECISEMENT A MAINTENIR L'EFFICACITE TECHNIQUE D'UN ARSENAL DELIBEREMENT CONTENU AU

VOLUME QUE NOUS ESTIMONS NECESSAIRE POUR EMPECHER LA GUERRE. NOTRE CONCEPTION DE LA DISSUASION, ET LE ROLE QU'Y JOUE NOTRE ARMEMENT PRESTRATEGIQUE, NOUS INTERDIT DE FAIRE DEPENDRE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE NOS PROGRAMMES NUCLEAIRES DES RESULTATS D'UNE QUELCONQUE NEGOCIATION.

ENSUITE LA MODERNISATION DES ARMES A COURTE PORTEE DE NOS ALLIES DE L'ORGANISATION INTEGREE : NATURELLEMENT, IL NE NOUS REVIENT PAS DE LEUR DICTER DES CHOIX.

NOUS CONSTATONS QU'UN BESOIN EXISTE, DONT ILS CHERCHENT LA SOLUTION. ET S'IL S'AGIT LA ENCORE DE MAINTENIR A NIVEAU L'ARSENAL EXISTANT, NOUS N'Y VOYONS RIEN QUE DE NATUREL. NOTRE RECOMMANDATION EST D'ORDRE POLITIQUE : LE MOMENT OU S'ENGAGENT LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT CONVENTIONNEL N'EST PAS FORCEMENT LE MEILLEUR POUR PRENDRE DE TELLES DECISIONS.

SI, A L'ISSUE DE DEUX OU TROIS ANS DE NEGOCIATION SUR LES ARMEMENTS CLASSIQUES, AUCUN MOUVEMENT SIGNIFICATIF N'A PU ETRE ENREGISTRE POUR ATTESTER DE LA VOLONTE DES SOVIETIQUES DE REDUIRE L'ACCUMULATION DISSYMETRIQUE D'ARMEMENTS QUI EXISTE A LEUR PROFIT EN EUROPE, IL SERA PLUS AISE ALORS DE PRENDRE LES DECISIONS QU'ON A ESTIME NECESSAIRE. NOUS SAVONS CES DECISIONS AUJOURD'HUI DIFFICILES : FAISONS DE CETTE DIFFICULTE UN ATOUT.

IL NE S'AGIT, ON LE VOIT, NI D'INTERFERER AVEC LE
PROCESSUS NORMAL DE DECISION DE L'ORGANISATION INTEGREE, NI
D'ETABLIR QUELQUE LIAISON QUE CE SOIT, EN TERME DE NEGOCIATION,
ENTRE LA DISCUSSION PROCHAINE SUR LA STABILITE CONVENTIONNELLE
ET LES REALITES NUCLEAIRES. LA FRANCE EST ET DEMEURE OPPOSEE A
CE QUE L'ON MELE, DANS LA NEGOCIATION, LE NUCLEAIRE ET LE CON-
VENTIONNEL.

IL NE S'AGIT PAS NON PLUS DE SE RESIGNER PAR AVANCE A
DEUX OU TROIS ANS DE BLOCAGE DANS LA NEGOCIATION CONVENTION-
NELLE. IL S'AGIT PLUTOT DE CREER DES MAINTENANT UNE INCITATION
A ENGAGER UNE NEGOCIATION PRODUCTIVE.

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II. JE VIENS, MESDAMES ET MESSIEURS, DE DEFINIR LE
MESSAGE DES EUROPEENS DANS LE CHAMP DU DESARMEMENT :
DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE ; DESARMEMENT ET VISION POLITIQUE ; ET
D'INDIQUER COMMENT, A NOTRE AVIS, LE DESARMEMENT DOIT ETRE AXE
SUR LA NOTION DE SUFFISANCE.

JE VOUDRAIS MAINTENANT EN TIRER DEVANT VOUS CERTAINES
DES CONSEQUENCES POUR LES NEGOCIATIONS EN COURS OU PROCHAINES.

1. LA NEGOCIATION CHIMIQUE, TOUT D'ABORD.

ELLE CONSTITUE POUR NOUS, VOUS LE SAVEZ, UNE PRIORITE.
LA FRANCE A VOULU LE SOULIGNER EN INVITANT, EN TANT QUE
PUISSANCE DEPOSITAIRE DU PROTOCOLE DE GENEVE DE 1925, TOUS LES
ETATS PARTIES ET LES AUTRES PAYS INTERESSES PARTICIPANT AUX
TRAVAUX DES NATIONS UNIES, QU'ILS EN SOIENT MEMBRES OU Y SOIENT
OBSERVATEURS, A PRENDRE PART A UNE CONFERENCE QUI SE TIENDRA A
PARIS DU 7 OU 11 JANVIER PROCHAINS.

CETTE CONFERENCE A UN DOUBLE OBJECTIF : REAFFIRMER
L'INTERDICTION D'USAGE DE L'ARME CHIMIQUE, DONNER L'IMPULSION
NECESSAIRE A LA NEGOCIATION A GENEVE, D'UNE INTERDICTION PLUS
GLOBALE : CELLE, NON SEULEMENT DE L'USAGE, MAIS ENCORE DE LA
FABRICATION, DU TRANSFERT ET DE LA POSSESSION D'ARMES CHIMI-
QUES.

LES CIRCONSTANCES RECENTES N'ONT FAIT QUE SOULIGNER
L'IMPORTANCE DE CETTE ENTREPRISE : OU BIEN L'ON SE RESIGNAIT A
CONSIDERER COMME INEVITABLE L'USAGE D'ARMES CHIMIQUES DANS CER-
TAINS CONTEXTES, ET IL N'Y AVAIT PLUS A DONNER CHER DES EFFORTS
FAITS A GENEVE POUR BANNIR COMPLETEMENT CES ARMES. OU BIEN L'ON
REAFFIRMAIT, AUSSI SOLENNELLEMENT QUE POSSIBLE, L'INTERDIT
INTERNATIONAL QUI PESE SUR L'USAGE ET L'ON SAUVAIT AINSI LES
CHANCES DE PARVENIR A L'INTERDICTION COMPLETE.

IL N'Y A PAS DE "SUFFISANCE" EN MATIERE D'ARMEMENTS
CHIMIQUES. LA SEULE SUFFISANCE, C'EST L'OPTION ZERO.

JE VOUDRAIS A CET EGARD SOULIGNER LES DECLARATIONS DU
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE A NEW YORK PUIS ICI MEME A L'IHEDN,
SUR LA CONCEPTION FRANCAISE DE LA NEGOCIATION CHIMIQUE : NOUS
AVONS RENONCE A L'IDEE DE MAINTENIR UN DROIT A LA PRODUCTION
D'ARMES, MEME SOUS CONTROLE INTERNATIONAL ETROIT, DURANT LES
QUELQUE DIX ANS QUE DURERA LA DESTRUCTION DES STOCKS UNE FOIS
LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE MISE EN OEUVRE.

CELA NE SIGNIFIE PAS QUE NOUS ACCORDIONS UN INTERET
MOINDRE AU PROBLEME DU MAINTIEN DE LA SECURITE PENDANT CETTE
PERIODE DE TRANSITION. M. MITTERRAND L'A RAPPELE. C'EST UN
PROBLEME SUR LEQUEL NOUS AVONS DEMANDE UN DEBAT APPROFONDI A
GENEVE. CAR, SI LA SUFFISANCE DANS LE DOMAINE CHIMIQUE, C'EST
L'ABSENCE TOTALE D'ARMES, IL IMPORTE QUE CE SOIT L'ABSENCE
TOTALE POUR TOUT LE MONDE. NOUS DEMEURONS PREOCCUPES PAR LE
MONOPOLE DE FAIT QUI RISQUE D'ETRE CELUI DE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE
EN EUROPE D'ICI QUELQUES ANNEES, TANT QUE LA CONVENTION N'AURA
PAS VU LE JOUR, ET QUE SES PREMIERES DIX ANNEES NE SE SERONT
PAS ECOULEES. NOUS DEMANDONS DONC QUE DES L'ENTREE EN VIGUEUR
DE LA CONVENTION, LES UNITES DE PRODUCTION SOIENT DESACTIVEES
ET PLACEES SOUS CONTROLE JUSQU'A LEUR DEMANTELEMENT EFFECTIF.
NOUS DEMEURONS PREOCCUPES EGALEMENT PAR LA PROLIFERATION
CHIMIQUE DANS LE TIERS-MONDE, ET LA TENTATION POUR CERTAINS
D'ECHAPPER A LA REGLE GENERALE.

CE QUI IMPORTE EN MATIERE D'ARMES CHIMIQUES, C'EST DE CREER UNE INCITATION TRES FORTE A CE QUE LA PROGRESSION VERS ZERO, LOIN DE SUIVRE UNE ASYMPTOTE INTERMINABLE, SE FASSE AUSSI RAPIDEMENT QUE POSSIBLE.

2. LES NEGOCIATIONS CONVENTIONNELLES, EN DEUXIEME LIEU.

J'AI DEJA EU L'OCCASION DE LES EVOQUER. JE VOUDRAIS SIMPLEMENT RAPPELER LES RAISONS QUI EN FONT UNE AUTRE DE NOS PRIORITES.

NOUS NOUS SOMMES PRONONCES POUR L'ACCORD SUR LES FORCES NUCLEAIRES INTERMEDIAIRES, PARCE QU'IL MARQUAIT UN TOURNANT MAJEUR DANS LE DESARMEMENT. POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS, ON SE DEBARRASSAIT D'UNE CATEGORIE ENTIERE D'ARMES, DONT LES VOLUMES ETAIENT DISSYMETRIQUES DE PART ET D'AUTRE, ET EN S'ACCORDANT SUR LES PROCEDURES DE VERIFICATION TRES INTRUSIVES, DONT L'ACCORD DE STOCKHOLM SUR LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE AVAIT OUVERT LA VOIE.

CEPENDANT, SI L'ON VEUT POURSUIVRE DANS LA VOIE DU DESARMEMENT REGIONAL EN EUROPE, IL NOUS PARAIT QUE L'ECLAIRAGE DOIT ETRE MIS SUR LE CONVENTIONNEL APRES LE NUCLEAIRE : LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE AVAIT REGRETTE QUE L'ON N'AIT PAS COMMENCE PAR LE COMMENCEMENT, LES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES STRATEGIQUES DES DEUX GRANDS. ON A VOULU COMMENCER LE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE PAR L'EUROPE, C'EST-A-DIRE LES FNI. C'EST

IMPORTANT, MAIS IL EST TEMPS QUE LE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE
RENOUE AVEC L'ORDRE LOGIQUE : L'ACCORD START EST, DANS CE
DOMAINE, LA PROCHAINE ETAPE ATTENDUE. S'AGISSANT DE L'EUROPE,
C'EST LE CONVENTIONNEL QUI DOIT MAINTENANT PRIMER : D'OU LA
PRIORITE QUE NOUS LUI ACCORDONS.

CETTE PRIORITE EST D'AUTANT PLUS VIVEMENT RESSENTIE QUE
CERTAINES IDEES, QUI ONT EU COURS OUTRE-ATLANTIQUE CES
DERNIERES ANNEES, ONT DONNE A PENSER AUX EUROPEENS QUE,
S'ILS N'Y PRENAIENT GARDE, LA MAITRISE DE LEUR SECURITE
RISQUAIT DE LEUR ECHAPPER. A TOUT LE MOINS, CERTAINS DES
FACTEURS QU'EUX MEMES JUGEAIENT ESSENTIELS DANS LA DEFINITION
DE LEUR SECURITE, RISQUAIENT DE N'ETRE PAS SUFFISAMMENT
RECONNUS. JE FAIS ALLUSION ICI A LA FOIS A L'AMBITION D'ERIGER
UNE DEFENSE ANTI-MISSILE OU A L'IDEE, CARESSEE LORS DU SOMMET
DE REYKJAVIK, DE SUPPRIMER TOUS LES MISSILES BALISTIQUES :
ETAIT-ON PRET A PRENDRE SON PARTI DU DESEQUILIBRE CONVENTIONNEL
EN EUROPE ALLAIT-ON DECIDER DE LA SECURITE EUROPEENNE SANS
L'AVIS DES PRINCIPAUX INTERESSES ?

LA PERSPECTIVE DE L'OUVERTURE TRES PROCHAINE D'UNE
NEGOCIATION SUR LA STABILITE DES FORCES ET ARMEMENTS CLASSIQUES
NOUS CONVIE PRECISEMENT, NOUS AUTRES EUROPEENS, A MANIFESTER
COMMENT S'ARTICULENT DANS NOTRE ESPRIT LA REDUCTION DES ARSE-
NAUX PRESENTS SUR NOTRE SOL ET NOTRE VISION DE L'EUROPE FUTURE.
C'EST LA TOUT LE PRIX DE L'ENTREPRISE QUE NOUS ALLONS ENGAGER.

D'OU L'IMPORTANCE ESSENTIELLE QU'IL Y A A MES YEUX A NE PAS DELEGUER PUREMENT ET SIMPLEMENT AUX DEUX ALLIANCES, OU AUX DEUX PUISSANCES QUI Y ONT LE PLUS DE POIDS, LA CONDUITE D'UNE NEGOCIATION, ET PLUS ENCORE L'EXPRESSION D'UNE VISION, QUI, L'UNE ET L'AUTRE, SONT ET DOIVENT RESTER D'ABORD CELLES D'ETATS EUROPEENS, INDIVIDUELS ET SOUVERAINS, QUI ONT CHOISI D'OEUVRER ENSEMBLE A LEUR AVENIR COMMUN.

ON A IMAGINE DES SOLUTIONS COMPLEXES POUR TRADUIRE LE FAIT QUE, DANS L'EUROPE DES 35, CELLE DE LA CSCE, LES PAYS QUI APPARTENAIENT AUX DEUX ALLIANCES AVAIENT UNE RESPONSABILITE PARTICULIERE DANS LA SECURITE TELLE QUE NOUS LA VIVONS, ET AVAIENT DONC UN INTERET PLUS IMMEDIAT QUE D'AUTRE A ETRE IMPLIQUES DANS LES REDUCTIONS TELLES QUE NOUS LES SOUHAITONS.

CEPENDANT TROP DE COMPLEXITE NUIT. CERTES IL N'EST PAS ABSOLUMENT NECESSAIRE DE REMETTRE EN CAUSE TELLE OU TELLE SOLUTION TECHNIQUE A UN PROBLEME TECHNIQUE. MAIS IL FAUT QUE LE MESSAGE POLITIQUE, LUI, NE S'EN TROUVE PAS BROUILLE : LA NEGOCIATION SUR LA STABILITE CONVENTIONNELLE S'INSCRIT POUR NOUS DANS LE PROCESSUS DE LA CSCE, C'EST-A-DIRE DANS LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE ET CULTUREL DES 35 PAYS DE CE FORUM.

ELLE DOIT S'Y INSCRIRE DES AUJOURD'HUI, PUISQUE LE LANCEMENT MEME DE LA NEGOCIATION NE SERA POSSIBLE QUE COMME L'ELEMENT D'UN RESULTAT EQUILIBRE DE LA REUNION DE VIENNE.

ELLE DOIT S'Y INSCRIRE AUSSI A MESURE QUE LES SEMAINES PASSERONT, CAR NOUS NE VOULONS PAS LAISSER S'ORGANISER UNE ONCE DE DIVERGENCE ENTRE CE QUE FERAIENT SUR LA SECURITE LES 23 MEMBRES DES DEUX ALLIANCES, ET CE DONT POURRAIENT DISCUTER SUR LE RESTE LES 35 ETATS DE LA CSCE.

IL NOUS FAUT TROUVER LES MOYENS PRATIQUES -REUNIONS D'INFORMATION DE LOIN EN LOIN, MAIS AUSSI RENDEZ-VOUS POLITIQUES POUR DECIDER DES GRANDES ORIENTATIONS -, AFIN QUE L'ON NE RENONCE PAS , A MESURE QUE LA NEGOCIATION SE FERA PLUS COMPLEXE, A Y IMPLIQUER DIRECTEMENT LE JOUR VENU TOUS LES ETATS, PARMIS LES 35, QUI LE SOUHAITERONT.

CETTE AMBITION, LA FRANCE L'AVAIT AFFICHEE DES 1978 EN LANCANT LA CONFERENCE SUR LE DESARMEMENT EN EUROPE. ELLE L'A REALISEE A STOCKHOLM VOICI DEUX ANS AVEC UN ACCORD A 35 SUR LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE. IL RESTE A LA CONCRETISER POUR LE DESARMEMENT PROPREMENT DIT : C'EST LA TACHE QUI S'OFFRE A NOUS ET CECI DANS L'IMMEDIAT.

AINSI POURRA-T-ON LEVER ENFIN CE QUE J'APPELAIS TOUT A L'HEURE LE VERRU DES DESEQUILIBRES CLASSIQUES SUR LA VOIE D'UNE EUROPE PLUS OUVERTE ET PLUS UNIE, DE L'ATLANTIQUE A L'OURAL. SI NOUS Y PARVENONS, MESDAMES ET MESSIEURS, LE THEME QUI ETAIT LE MIEN AUJOURD'HUI -DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE DE L'EUROPE - NE SERA PLUS SEULEMENT UN THEME DE DISCOURS : IL SERA DEvenu UNE REALITE./.

(4)

WEST-EAST RELATIONS - STATE AND PROSPECTS,
ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

SPEECH GIVEN BY
HERR HELMUT SCHAEFER, MINISTER OF STATE AT THE
FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
AT THE IHEDN EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON DEFENCE ISSUES
IN PARIS ON 21 NOVEMBER 1988

h. 9?

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO ADDRESS TODAY THIS
INSTITUTE, WHICH HAS LONG-STANDING TRADITIONS, AND AT THE SAME
TIME TO SPEAK AT A PREMIERE, A EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON SECURITY
ISSUES. LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY PARTICULAR
SATISFACTION AT

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THE HOLDING OF SUCH A SEMINAR, WHERE HIGH-RANKING REPRESENTATIVES OF WEU COUNTRIES CAN DISCUSS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. THIS SHOWS THAT, FOLLOWING ITS REVITALIZATION, THE WEU HAS GAINED FURTHER WEIGHT. WE HAVE SUPPORTED FROM THE OUTSET THIS INITIATIVE LAUNCHED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

- 2 -

WEST-EAST RELATIONS, NOT LEAST IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT I SHALL SPEAK ON, HAVE UNDERGONE AN ALMOST BREATHTAKING DEVELOPMENT.

THE PROGRESS MADE IN DIALOGUE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE EAST IS A MANIFESTATION AND CONSEQUENCE OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

- 3 -

FOUR SUMMIT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN THREE YEARS - AND SUBSEQUENTLY VARIOUS BILATERAL MEETINGS
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT LEADERS OF EC COUNTRIES AND GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHOV - ARE A VISIBLE SIGN OF A DYNAMIC UPWARD TREND. AT THEIR
FIRST SUMMIT IN GENEVA, GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHOV AND PRESIDENT

- 4 -

REAGAN REAFFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO INTENSIFY DIALOGUE AND
CO-OPERATION ON A BROAD BASIS AND IN ALL FIELDS.

THE INITIATION OF A SOVIET POLICY OF REFORM SINCE THE ELECTION OF
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHOV HAS MADE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO
THIS CHANGE. ~~NO SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED, BUT A~~

~~FEEL~~ EVEN ON A SOBER ASSESSMENT, WE HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE

- 5 -

THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS OPENING UP BOTH INWARDLY AND OUTWARDLY ON ACCOUNT OF ITS DETERMINATION TO MAKE ITS ECONOMY AND SOCIETY MORE EFFICIENT. THIS RENDERS THE SOVIET UNION A BETTER AND MORE RELIABLE PARTNER. AFTER MANY YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION THERE IS THUS FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PROSPECT OF A THOROUGH IMPROVEMENT OF WEST-EAST RELATIONS. THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE EXPLOITED. *There has nothing to do with euphoria, but with a pragmatic assessment of our own interests.*

- 6 -

THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN WEST-EAST RELATIONS WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE STEADFAST AND REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLICY, AS DESCRIBED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. THE MAINTENANCE

- 7 -

OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND OF COHESION AND SOLIDARITY
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR A POLICY
OF DIALOGUE AND CO-OPERATION - A POLICY DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN
EVER MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WEST-EAST RELATIONSHIP.

- 8 -

THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAS ALREADY HAD
AN IMPACT ON DISARMEMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. A MAJOR LANDMARK IN THE
RAPPROCHEMENT OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS' POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND
ARMS CONTROL WAS THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1986. IT WAS A
BREAK THROUGH TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVE DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE AIMED AT
TANGIBLE RESULTS. THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT LAID THE BASIS FOR

- 9 -

THE CONCLUSION IN DECEMBER 1987 OF THE TREATY ON THE GLOBAL
ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
MISSILES. PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS MERELY RESTRICTED ARMS AT A HIGH
LEVEL. NOW AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS IS BEING DESTROYED FOR THE
FIRST TIME.

- 10 -

THE INF TREATY REFLECTS IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES:

- WHOEVER POSSESSES MORE WEAPONS HAS TO SCRAP MORE;

- 11 -

- THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE AGREED ON STRINGENT, MUTUAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS THAT ARE COMPULSORY AND REPRESENT A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS WEST-EAST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.

THESE PRINCIPLES ALSO SET THE TREND FOR FUTURE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS. THE INF TREATY MUST BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER FAR-REACHING

- 12 -

DISARMAMENT STEPS IN THE CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL FIELDS.

|| WE WANT TO CREATE GREATER SECURITY THROUGH EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS, AND WE SEEK THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

AT THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN REYKJAVIK ON 11 AND 12 JUNE 1987, THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE DEFINED

- 13 -

THEIR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL TO BE ELABORATED BY THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,

- 14 -

- THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE AND SECURE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BY THE ELIMINATION OF DISPARITIES, IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AND

- 15 -

- IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONVENTIONAL
BALANCE AND THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
TANGIBLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET
LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS OF SHORTER RANGE, LEADING
TO EQUAL CEILINGS.

- 16 -

THESE GOALS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE WESTERN
POSITION IN THE DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO
COMBINE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AT A LOWER LEVEL WITH THE ENHANCEMENT
OF THE DEFENCE CAPACITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE, AT THE SAME TIME
REDUCING
THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

- 17 -

SINCE THE FUTURE OF OUR CONTINENT IS AT STAKE, WE EUROPEANS BEAR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT OF WEST-EAST RELATIONS THROUGH PARALLEL POLITICAL EFFORTS. THE CSCE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI DIRECTS THE COURSE TOWARDS A NEW ORDER ON OUR CONTINENT, IN WHICH ALL EUROPEANS CAN LIVE IN PEACE AND ENJOY THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS. THE FINAL ACT CONTAINS

- 18 -

ALL ELEMENTS NEEDED FOR CREATING A PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPE MARKED BY RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BY CO-OPERATION IN ALL FIELDS AND BY THE REPLACEMENT OF CONFRONTATION WITH CO-OPERATION. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LINKS THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN EUROPE TO THE CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-

- 19 -

DETERMINATION OF ALL NATIONS. THE CSCE PROCESS PAVES THE WAY FOR REDUCING TENSIONS, RECONCILING DIFFERENCES AND DEVELOPING COMMON INTERESTS ACROSS THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO POLITICAL SYSTEMS. IT VIVIDLY REFLECTS THE AWARENESS OF EUROPE'S UNITY AND IDENTITY. AT THE SAME TIME IT SECURES OUR LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA.

- 20 -

THE CSCE PROCESS THEREFORE CONSTITUTES A BROAD-BASED APPROACH TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION. OF ESSENTIAL IMPORTANCE IS THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION, WHICH IS INTENDED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPE'S DIVISION AND BRING ABOUT PROGRESS IN WEST-EAST RELATIONS THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED BY THE PEOPLE CONCERNED. THE HUMANITARIAN ELEMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS WIDENS THE SCOPE OF THE

- 21 -

TRADITIONAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS AN EQUAL COMPONENT OF DETENTE. HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BECOME A LEGITIMATE TOPIC OF THE WEST-EAST DIALOGUE. THE QUEST FOR GREATER PERSONAL FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND FOR THE EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS HAS BEEN REINFORCED AND FURTHER LEGITIMATED BY THE CSCE PROCESS. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT

- 22 -

THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE OF LATE PAID MORE ATTENTION TO THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION OF THE CSCE IN THEIR DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND IN THEIR DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER CSCE COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION'S DECLARED READINESS TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS IS A VISIBLE MANIFESTATION OF THIS

- 23 -

DEVELOPMENT AND AT THE SAME TIME A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE WEST'S
PERSEVERANCE.

WE ARE THEREFORE WILLING TO SUPPORT WITHIN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK A
HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, FOLLOWING ONES IN PARIS AND

- 24 -

COPENHAGEN, PROVIDED THAT - LET ME EMPHASIZE THIS - IT MEETS THE
STANDARDS SET BY THE PRECEDING MEETINGS.

FURTHER PROGRESS IN WEST-EAST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING WAS BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE FINAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED BY THE CDE AT STOCKHOLM IN 1986. THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE AGREED ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT

- 25 -

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED BY MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. THIS MARKED A MAJOR STEP ON THE ROAD TOWARDS GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND THE ELIMINATION OF DISTRUST IN EUROPE.

- 26 -

AS YOU KNOW, THE WEST PROPOSED IN ITS BRUSSELS DECLARATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, ISSUED AT THE END OF 1986, THAT PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS BE HELD: ON THE ONE HAND, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE 23 MEMBERS OF THE TWO ALLIANCES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND, ON THE OTHER, NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE 35 SIGNATORIES TO THE CSCE FINAL ACT ON FURTHER

- 27 -

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THE OBJECTIVES, MODALITIES AND PARTICIPANTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS THEIR STATUS IN RELATION TO THE CSCE PROCESS HAVE SINCE THEN BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA. WE HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE SOON CONCLUDED BY REACHING CONSENSUS SO THAT THE START OF THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS IS NOT DELAYED ANY LONGER.

- 28 -

THE DISCUSSIONS ON A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE ARE AT AN ADVANCED STAGE. MOST OF THE TEXT FOR THE MANDATE HAS ALREADY BEEN DRAFTED. THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED VARIOUS IMPORTANT WESTERN DEMANDS:

- 29 -

- THE MAIN GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ESTABLISH STABILITY AND SECURITY (AND NOT REDUCTIONS, AS DEMANDED BY THE EAST);

- REDUCTIONS ARE A MEANS TO THIS END AND STAND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING ALONGSIDE OTHER MEASURES;

- 30 -

- A STABLE AND SECURE BALANCE IS FIRST TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; IN OTHER WORDS, IT DOES NOT EXIST YET;

- THE AIM IS NOT EQUAL REDUCTIONS, BUT EQUAL CEILINGS IN LINE WITH THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS; THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF

- 31 -

SPECIAL ZONES HAS BEEN REPLACED BY THE WESTERN ONE OF REGION-
AL DIFFERENTIATION;

- PROVISION HAS EXPRESSLY BEEN MADE FOR A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND FOR THE RIGHT TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WITHOUT
ANY POSSIBILITY OF REFUSAL.

- 32 -

IN THE TALKS HELD BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND HIS SOVIET
COUNTERPART, FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, ON THE FRINGES OF THE
UN -

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IMPORTANT PROGRESS PROVED POSSIBLE. THE SOVIET
UNION HAS DROPPED ITS ELEVENTH-HOUR DEMAND THAT FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BE
EXCLUDED AND ACCEPTED A COMPROMISE FORMULA FOR DUAL-CAPABLE WEAPON
SYSTEMS. THE FORMULA FOR THE MANDATE NOW ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS

- 33 -

CORRESPONDS TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF 1 SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR,
THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAD ALREADY
DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW ON 30 JULY:
THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, INCLUDING
CONVENTIONAL ARMS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE EXCLUDED; DUAL-CAPABLE
WEAPONS MAY BE NEGOTIATED.

- 34 -

THE MAIN ISSUE STILL UNSETTLED IS THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. ABOVE ALL THIS CONCERNS A STRIP OF TERRITORY, ALONG
TURKEY'S BORDER WITH ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS, WHICH TURKEY WOULD
LIKE TO SEE EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS AND THE FEW OTHER
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS CAN NO DOUBT BE SOLVED WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE,
GIVEN GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES.

- 35 -

WE HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE BEING STARTED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. IT IS HIGH TIME THAT THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF EUROPE'S SECURITY IS MADE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE FINAL ADOPTION OF A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS PRESUPPOSES A BALANCED AND SUBSTANTIVE

- 36 -

OUTCOME TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA. WE HOPE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS SOON REACHED THERE.

WE SEEK A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS IN THE AREA EXTENDING FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL EUROPEANS TO USE THE FRESH MOMENTUM OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS

- 37 -

FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELIMINATING THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN THE
CONVENTIONAL SPHERE.

A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE TASKS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
REQUIRES A SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SITUATION
EXISTING IN EUROPE TODAY. ALL RESPONSIBLE ANALYSES ARRIVE AT THE

- 38 -

CONCLUSION THAT THE WARSAW PACT, WITH THE SOVIET ARMY AS ITS CORE,
POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY FOR LAUNCHING SURPRISE ATTACKS AND
LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
DOES NOT POSSESS ANY SUCH CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. THE AIM OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT MUST BE TO ELIMINATE
THIS CAPACITY FOR LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVES AND SURPRISE ATTACKS.

- 39 -

BUILDING ON THE RESULTS OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1986 AND ON THE POSITIVE EXPERIENCE GAINED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION, WE SEEK TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT INCREASING THE TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY ACITIVITIES. THE AIM CANNOT BE/ SOLELY TO IMPROVE GRADUALLY THE MEASURES ALREADY AGREED ON AT STOCKHOLM; INSTEAD, WE ARE

- 40 -

STRIVING FOR NEW, SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES. AGREEMENT LARGELY EXISTS ON A MANDATE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES. THE ONLY UNSETTLED QUESTION IS THE NATURE OF THE LINK BETWEEN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE PROCESS. IT SHOULD BE

- 41 -

POSSIBLE, IN OUR VIEW, TO SETTLE SOON THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES OF
OPINION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ACCORDS HIGH
PRIORITY TO THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF A GLOBAL AND ADEQUATELY VERIFI-
ABLE CONVENTION PROHIBITING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS, OF

- 42 -

WHOSE TERRIBLE EFFECTS WE HAVE AGAIN BEEN REMINDED RECENTLY, MUST
BE ABOLISHED ONCE AND FOR ALL. WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF REDOUBLED
EFFORTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT SO THAT A SATISFAC-
TORY SOLUTION CAN SOON BE FOUND TO THE OUTSTANDING VERIFICATION
PROBLEMS. EVERY COUNTRY MUST BE ABLE TO RELY ON ANY MILITARILY

- 43 -

RELEVANT VIOLATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN BEING SUBJECT TO A
HIGH RISK OF DISCOVERY.

THEREFORE WE ALSO WELCOME THE FACT THAT A CONFERENCE OF THE SIGNA-
TORIES TO THE 1925 GENEVA CONVENTION IS TO BE CONVENED AT PARIS
NEXT JANUARY. WE SHALL DO OUR UTMOST TO HELP MAKE THE CONFERENCE A

- 44 -

SUCCESS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT SHOULD STIMULATE THE GENEVA
NEGOTIATIONS. ABOVE ALL WE SHOULD SEEK TO ENSURE THAT NO COUNTRY
IN THE WORLD REFUSES TO ACCEDE TO THE CONVENTION.

IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, CONSIDERABLE RAPPROCHEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED
AT THE START TALS ON HALVING THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE

- 45 -

UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE PLEASING SIGNS THAT NEXT YEAR THE START NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED UNTIL NOW. A START AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS CONCERNS NOT ONLY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY ALSO SERVES EUROPE'S SECURITY INTERESTS.

- 46 -

WESTERN EUROPE'S SECURITY IS PARTICULARLY ENDANGERED BY SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE EAST POSSESSES HUGE SUPERIORITY IN THE FIELD OF LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES WITH RANGES UNDER 500 KM. WHILE THESE SOVIET SHORT-RANGE MISSILES AND THE CORRESPONDING SYSTEMS OF OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, FOR WHICH SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE USED, TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 1350, THE ALLIANCE HAS ONLY 88 LANCE

- 47 -

SYSTEMS, THIS IMBALANCE IS THE REASON FOR THE GERMAN DEMAND THAT LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES WITH RANGES UNDER 500 KM SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. IN REYKJAVIK THE ALLIANCE ADOPTED THIS APPROACH AND DEMANDED TANGIBLE REDUCTIONS OF THESE SYSTEMS LEADING TO EQUAL CEILINGS.

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THE ALLIANCE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED THIS ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE IN MARCH 1988. IN KEEPING WITH THE REYKJAVIK MANDATE, THE ALLIANCE IS DEALING WITH THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE ELABORATION OF A COMMON ARMS CONTROL POSITION IN THE SNF SECTOR IS AN ESSENTIAL TASK IN THIS RESPECT. NOT UNTIL THE RESULTS OF THIS WORK ARE AVAILABLE WILL THE NEED FOR A DECISION ON MODERNISATION HAVE TO BE EXAMINED.

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A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN LINE WITH THE ALLIANCE'S OBJECTIVES CALLS FOR POLITICAL SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE CAPACITY. WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THAT, UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES AND WITHIN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE STRATEGY OF WAR PREVENTION REQUIRES A SUITABLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND

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CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE UNITED STATES' CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE WILL REMAIN INDISPENSABLE.

IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GOAL OF A PEACEFUL ORDER FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST BE

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SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE AND BROAD-BASED
CO-OPERATION.

THE TWO SUPERPOWERS UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS
RESPECT, TOO. BUT THE EUROPEANS EQUALLY BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. THEY MUST NOT ONLY PERCEIVE THEIR RESPONSIBILI-

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TY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT ALSO LIVE UP TO IT. THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP POLITICAL CONCEPTS FOR
SHAPING EUROPE'S FUTURE AND THUS THE CHANCE TO PLAY A PIONEERING
ROLE.

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TO MAKE FURTHER HEADWAY IN WEST-EAST RELATIONS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE UNITEDLY PRESENT COMMON POSITIONS IN SECURITY POLICY AND IN POLICY TOWARDS THE EAST.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IS GRADUALLY ACQUIRING THE ROLE ASSIGNED TO IT BY THE PLATFORM OF 27 OCTOBER 1987. THE WEU IS INTENDED TO

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GIVE THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION A SECURITY DIMENSION, WITHOUT WHICH EUROPEAN UNION WOULD BE INCOMPLETE. IN THE PLATFORM ON EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS, THE WEU COUNTRIES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY MUST INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE NECESSARY EFFORTS FOR MAINTAINING POLITICAL SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ADEQUATE MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT ALSO - AS IMPORTANT

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INTEGRAL PARTS - DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL AS WELL AS DIALOGUE AND COMPREHENSIVE CO-OPERATION WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. FULL USE OF THE CSCE PROCESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPREHENSIVE CO-OPERATION IS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS COMMON SECURITY POLICY.

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FOLLOWING THE ROME DECISIONS, THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IS ANOTHER MAJOR BOOST TO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL ARE FOR THEIR PART TAKING ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS FULL INTEGRATION INTO THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION. THEY ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT ALL PARTS OF THE MODIFIED BRUSSELS TREATY OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES AND TO ACCEPT UNCONDITIONALLY THE ROME DECLARA-

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TION OF 27 OCTOBER 1984 AND THE PLATFORM ON EUROPEAN SECURITY
INTERESTS OF 27 OCTOBER 1987 AND PARTICIPATE IN THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION.

THE POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE REFORM OF THE BRUSSELS TREATY,
WHICH THE MEMBER STATES MADE WHEN SIGNING THE PROTOCOLS OF ACCES-

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SION, PERMITS THE TREATY TO BE SUITABLY REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF
PRACTICAL RESULTS AND OF FUTURE CO-OPERATION. IN HIS ADDRESS TO
THIS INSTITUTE, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND RIGHTLY DEMANDED A REFORM OF
THE WEU IN ORDER TO MAKE IT BETTER ABLE TO ACT AND TAKE DECISIONS.
THE ENLARGED WEU WILL DEAL WITH THIS TASK.

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IN THIS CONNECTION CHANCELLOR KOHL SUGGESTED ENSURING THAT IN FUTURE THE MEMBERS OF THE WEU ASSEMBLY ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. SUCH A STEP, WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN PROPOSED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, WOULD INDICATE THAT WE TAKE THE GOAL OF CLOSER SECURITY CO-OPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE SERIOUSLY.

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ALLOW ME AT THIS POINT TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY POLICY. FRANCO-GERMAN CO-OPERATION HAS BECOME A CONSTANT FACTOR OF EUROPEAN POLITICS. OUR CO-OPERATION GIVES MOMENTUM TO THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE MUST STRESS TIME AND AGAIN THAT IT IS NOT AN

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EXCLUSIVE PARTNERSHIP DIRECTED AGAINST OTHERS, BUT A PARTNERSHIP
AIMING AT THE STRENGTHENING OF WESTERN EUROPE.

IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE THAT THE TWO
COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR

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CONVICTION IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE PROTOCOL ON THE FRANCO-GERMAN
DEFENCE AND SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND
FREEDOM IS THE PREREQUISITE FOR PROGRESS ON THE ROAD TOWARDS A
LASTING PEACEFUL ORDER IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

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AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL, THE AIM IS TO DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE CO-OPERATION ON ALL ASPECTS OF SECURITY POLICY. THIS IS AT THE SAME TIME INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF THE ALLIANCE AND TO HIGHLIGHT EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP ON EQUAL TERMS.

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WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY POLICY DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO OUR EASTERN NEIGHBOURS; INSTEAD IT SERVES THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND LONG-TERM STABILITY THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, THE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WEU AND FRANCO-GERMAN

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CO-OPERATION ARE PURSUED OUT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT WE SHARE WITH ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED OR MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT.

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IN SEEKING TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS NOW FOR A PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BEAR IN MIND THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THIS WORK, TO DEFINE ITS GOALS AND DESIGN THE ARCHITECTURE FOR THIS EUROPE. THIS NEW ORDER MUST NOT BE CHARACTERIZED BY SEPARATION, BUT BY OPEN DOORS, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR PEOPLE, IDEAS AND GOODS AS WELL AS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

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THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AS MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND AS CSCE PARTICIPANTS, HAVE AN INDISPENSABLE PART TO PLAY IN HANDLING THIS COMMON TASK.

NEVER BEFORE HAVE THE PROSPECTS BEEN GREATER FOR ESTABLISHING IN EUROPE AN ORDER IN WHICH COUNTRIES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS CAN

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LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACEFUL COMPETITION. PRESIDENT RICHARD VON WEIZSAECKER APTLY DESCRIBED THIS TASK OF SECURITY POLICY IN HIS SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE AWARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHARLEMAGNE PRIZE.

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"NO ONE SHOULD BE GIVEN CAUSE TO DOUBT THAT WE WILL DEFEND OUR FREEDOM IF IT IS THREATENED. EVEN THOUGH IN THE NUCLEAR AGE WARS CAN NO LONGER BE WAGED, LET ALONE WON, WE REMAIN DUTY-BOUND TO PREVENT THEM.

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BUT NO LESS IMPORTANT FOR SECURITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE ARE THE NON-MILITARY COMPONENTS OF CO-OPERATION IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. PEOPLE ARE AGAIN BECOMING AWARE OF THE OLD, THE LARGER EUROPE. THE TIME IS RIPE FOR AN OPEN CONCEPTION WHICH EXCLUDES NO EUROPEAN NATION."

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DISCOURS DE JEAN-PIERRE CHEVENEMENT
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
A LA SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'IHEDN
(mardi 22 novembre 1988)

h. 9

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
8760
28.2.1989

Mesdames, messieurs,

Je me réjouis de la possibilité qui m'est donnée de prendre la parole devant vous. Responsables administratifs et militaires, représentants du monde syndical et du secteur privé, vous avez choisi de consacrer deux semaines entières, prenant sur un temps que je sais précieux, à une réflexion sur les conditions de notre sécurité commune. Soyez assurés que je mesure l'intérêt de l'entreprise.

En proposant à ses partenaires de l'UEO d'organiser une session européenne de l'IHEDN, la France n'entendait pas seulement favoriser la tenue d'un colloque supplémentaire. Je suis en effet profondément convaincu de l'importance du rôle joué ici en France par cette institution originale qu'est l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale dans l'émergence progressive d'un consensus national sur la défense. Et je crois que si l'IHEDN a pu jouer ce rôle, c'est précisément en associant, année après année, des personnalités militaires et civiles, du secteur public comme du monde économique et social, à une réflexion sur les grandes questions stratégiques et les conditions concrètes de la défense du pays.

C'est la même ambition que nous nourrissons pour l'Europe et c'est pourquoi je me félicite que ces deux semaines soient appelées à trouver l'an prochain un prolongement, puisque la

.... /

Belgique a fait connaître lors de la récente réunion de l'UEO à Londres qu'elle était disposée à accueillir une session analogue à celle-ci. Permettez-moi de me réjouir d'ailleurs à l'idée que nous accueillerons alors parmi nous lors de cette nouvelle session, des amis espagnols et portugais. Cet élargissement de notre cercle contribuera à donner à notre réflexion sa pleine dimension.

Vous avez déjà entendu de nombreux orateurs éminents. Je voudrais, pour ma part, décrire tout d'abord brièvement la situation de l'Europe, telle qu'elle découle des quarante dernières années de notre histoire. Puis je tenterai de préciser ce que pourraient être à mon sens les conditions d'un équilibre durable de sécurité sur notre continent. Enfin, je formulerai quelques propositions concrètes de nature à nous permettre de progresser pas à pas dans la direction ainsi esquissée.

I - La dissuasion nucléaire a été et reste le fondement de la sécurité européenne.

La seconde guerre mondiale a eu pour conséquence la division de notre continent. La ligne de partage passa sur les lieux mêmes où s'étaient rejoints, ceux qui, ensemble, avaient combattu pour la liberté. Les peuples affranchis du nazisme par l'armée rouge se virent imposer par Staline un régime qu'ils n'avaient pas librement choisi. Les pays de la partie occidentale de l'Europe s'associèrent à une puissance non européenne pour garantir leur sécurité.

L'Europe voyait ainsi, pour la première fois de son histoire, sa sécurité garantie de l'extérieur. Cette protection, accordée par les Etats-Unis, était d'autant plus crédible qu'elle était celle de la seule puissance nucléaire alors existante.

Raymond Aron pouvait écrire, à cette époque, que si la paix était impossible, la guerre demeurait improbable. La division de l'Europe empêchait une paix véritable, fondée sur les relations de confiance relative qu'autorise entre Etats un partage à peu près commun des mêmes valeurs. Mais, parallèlement, la guerre demeurerait improbable du fait de l'existence de l'arme nucléaire, et, par suite, de l'exercice d'une dissuasion déjà à l'oeuvre avant même d'avoir été largement conceptualisée.

Aujourd'hui sans doute le tableau de la sécurité en Europe s'est-il modifié. Les rapports de forces ont évolué. Quatre puissances nucléaires coexistent sur notre continent. L'Europe s'est reconstruite. Le P.N.B. des pays du Marché Commun égale à peu près celui des Etats-Unis. Ce dernier qui représentait 45% du PNB mondial, n'en atteint plus aujourd'hui que 22%. La menace soviétique qui, à l'époque de Staline, en 1948, était ressentie comme imminente, a été relativisée. Madame Thatcher va jusqu'à déclarer que la guerre froide est désormais derrière nous. Pourtant l'Union Soviétique a accédé à la parité nucléaire avec les Etats-Unis. L'Europe continue -militairement- à n'exister qu'en creux, entre les deux Superpuissances.

La géographie des missiles fait apparaître deux pics gigantesques : les arsenaux stratégiques plusieurs fois redondants des deux Superpuissances. Entre ces deux pics, une profonde dépression : l'Europe. En Europe deux tentatives méritoires pour édifier deux donjons dissuasifs : la force nucléaire française et la britannique, qui dominent certes la plaine, mais que surplombent deux Himalayas nucléaires : 12.000 têtes nucléaires stratégiques de part et d'autre, quelques centaines entre les deux.

Il n'est pas normal ni sain dans ces conditions que les Européens continuent à s'en remettre pour l'éternité aux Etats-Unis du soin de les défendre. "La défense commune de l'Europe occupera bientôt le devant de la scène". Ainsi

s'exprimait François Mitterrand dans sa Lettre à tous les Français de mars 1988. Simplement, il faut la faire. Les forums ne manquent pas, comme l'UEO, ni les expérimentations, comme celle de la brigade franco-allemande. Ce qui manque c'est le concept.

Or, l'objectif reste bien de rendre la guerre impossible sur notre continent. Si l'Europe, promptement auparavant à régler ses querelles par les armes, n'a pas connu de conflit sur son sol depuis 1945, et ce, malgré un clivage idéologique exacerbé, c'est très largement grâce à la dissuasion nucléaire.

Si celle-ci nous apparaît comme le seul concept répondant pleinement aux impératifs de la sécurité en Europe, c'est parce qu'elle n'a pas pour but de gagner la guerre, mais de l'empêcher.

Or, toute guerre en Europe, y compris conventionnelle, provoquerait des ravages d'une ampleur incalculable, qui en rendent pour les Européens la perspective inacceptable.

Le seul concept de défense qui réponde donc aux intérêts des Européens c'est le concept de dissuasion, parce que les Européens ne peuvent accepter l'idée même d'une bataille, fût-elle limitée, sur leur sol.

Cette notion de dissuasion fonde aujourd'hui la défense de la France par elle-même. Notre position particulière au sein de l'alliance ne procède nullement d'une quelconque prétention à l'originalité, ni d'un égoïsme national à courte vue. Elle découle d'une réflexion sur la nature même de la paix, à l'ère nucléaire, et sur la volonté de forger à l'Ouest de l'Europe un rôle dissuasif qui, face à la Superpuissance soviétique, à laquelle la géographie a accroché le petit cap européen, puisse contribuer à l'équilibre et à la paix de notre continent. Comme l'a rappelé, en effet, ici même, le Président de la République, l'équilibre et la paix de l'Europe

constituent, après la préservation de notre indépendance et de notre identité, l'un des objectifs majeurs de notre défense. L'idée de dissuasion proportionnelle, chère au Général Poirier, implique que la France puisse être capable en permanence d'infliger à tout agresseur éventuel un dommage au moins égal à l'enjeu qu'elle représente. D'où l'idée de "suffisance". Pour être efficace, la dissuasion n'a nullement besoin de rivaliser avec les arsenaux redondants des deux Superpuissances.

Si maintenant on veut réfléchir à ce que peut être une dissuasion européenne, le Général Fricaut-Chagnaud a excellemment résumé l'objectif auquel nous devons tendre: "Sur un théâtre d'opérations où quatre puissances nucléaires seraient inévitablement impliquées, l'importance des enjeux est telle (en fait la suprématie mondiale) que toute possibilité d'y limiter, par quelque moyen que ce soit, l'extension géographique et l'escalade de la violence est proprement chimérique. Les conséquences d'une telle escalade sont suffisamment redoutables et bien connues pour retenir un agresseur de déclencher l'incontrôlable"¹.

Mikhaïl Gorbatchev l'admet du reste à sa manière lorsqu'il écrit dans le livre Perestroïka que "la guerre nucléaire est impossible à gagner" et qu'"il n'y aurait ni vainqueur ni vaincu dans un conflit nucléaire généralisé. La civilisation mondiale périrait inévitablement. Ce serait un suicide plutôt qu'une guerre au sens habituel du terme". La dissuasion nucléaire, effectivement, interdit de faire la part des gains escomptés et des pertes prévisibles au cours d'un conflit. Ou, plus exactement, les pertes sont par définition supérieures aux gains. La guerre n'a plus d'objet rationnel.

¹ "Replâtrer ou rééquilibrer".. Stratégique.

Encore convient-il, pour qu'il en soit ainsi sur notre continent, que la dissuasion soit entendue dans son acception stricte. A l'heure actuelle coexistent en Europe deux stratégies de la dissuasion, celle de l'OTAN fondée sur la riposte graduée, et celle de la France, qui est une dissuasion du faible au fort refusant la notion d'armes nucléaires tactiques. Les armes préstratégiques françaises ne sont pas des armes de théâtre destinées à rétablir sur le champ de bataille un équilibre rompu. Nous ne considérons pas que la France puisse gagner une bataille nucléaire tactique. Tel n'est pas notre objectif.

Comme l'a récemment déclaré le Président de la République : "Nos armes nucléaires préstratégiques ne sont pas destinées à prolonger les armes conventionnelles. Elles se placent par définition au début du processus nucléaire". Délivrées en une frappe unique et non renouvelable, elles constitueraient un ultime avertissement, ayant son efficacité militaire propre, de façon à signifier à l'agresseur qu'à poursuivre son entreprise il s'exposerait au feu nucléaire stratégique. En effet, à vouloir conférer trop de flexibilité à la riposte, on risque de rendre possible l'escalade du premier barreau, puis des suivants, par un effet d'entraînement débouchant à la fin sur la guerre nucléaire. Les progrès technologiques rendent de plus en plus destructrices les armes conventionnelles. Toute politique visant à relever le seuil nucléaire ne correspond pas à l'intérêt européen. Il ne s'agit pas en effet de contenir la guerre. Il s'agit de l'empêcher.

Tel est notamment le rôle de l'"ultime avertissement" : faire en sorte que les armes nucléaires restent des armes de non-emploi. Le paradoxe de la dissuasion est que pour y parvenir, l'emploi de ces armes ne doit pas cependant être tout à fait improbable : La palette des armes d'ultime avertissement doit être assez large pour créer une ambiguïté maximale dans l'esprit d'un agresseur éventuel. La

conception française moderne de la dissuasion est donc une conception raffinée, qui implique, pour être efficace, une certaine capacité d'abstraction. Historiquement, la doctrine française de dissuasion est passée par plusieurs stades successifs :

- Tout d'abord, la doctrine primitive à l'époque du général de Gaulle, fondée sur "le tout ou rien nucléaire", c'est-à-dire sur les représailles massives à travers la stratégie anti-cités.
- Puis, sous le septennat de M. Giscard d'Estaing, pour échapper à la perspective du "tout ou rien", l'idée d'utiliser des armes nucléaires tactiques, dans une "bataille nucléaire" qui serait commune à l'Allemagne et à la France, a été avancée.
- Sous le premier septennat de François Mitterrand on est revenu à la notion de dissuasion stratégique sans cultiver à nouveau pour autant la conception primitive : l'idée d'un ultime avertissement donné par des armes dites "préstratégiques" et destinées à ouvrir la voie à une ultime négociation a été affirmée. Mais cet "ultime avertissement" ne saurait être réduit à un simple "coup de semonce". Il doit avoir, aux termes de la loi de programmation militaire de 1987, une "efficacité militaire propre". En créant dans l'esprit d'un agresseur éventuel l'ambiguïté la plus grande quant à la forme qu'il pourrait prendre, cet ultime avertissement contribue pleinement à l'efficacité de la dissuasion, qui est d'empêcher la guerre. Comme l'a déclaré ici même, le 11 octobre dernier, le Président de la République :
 "Les armes préstratégiques, terme qui a été finalement préféré à celui d'armes tactiques, et les armes stratégiques concourent ensemble à la dissuasion. Elles ne sont pas séparables. La dissuasion forme un bloc dont on ne peut distraire tel ou tel type d'arme nucléaire". Et le Président de la République ajoutait :

"Ne repétons pas la tragique erreur commise face à l'invasion hitlérienne en Autriche : "Jusqu'ici mais pas plus loin". C'est le langage de la faiblesse. Si l'on accepte que l'ennemi aille jusqu'ici, on acceptera qu'il aille plus loin".

Telle est la conception française de la dissuasion du faible au fort. Telles sont les raisons pour lesquelles la France refuse la dénucléarisation de l'Europe, dans l'intérêt même de l'Europe. La dénucléarisation de l'Europe occidentale serait certes conforme aux intérêts de l'URSS, qui disposerait, en tout état de cause, d'un énorme avantage conventionnel.

A supposer que la dénucléarisation ne se résume pas au retour à un simple duopole nucléaire, seuls l'URSS et les Etats-Unis conservant un stock dit "de sécurité", on voit bien que la dénucléarisation de l'Europe occidentale donnerait à l'URSS un avantage stratégique majeur, tout à fait comparable à celui qu'elle recherchait hier par le déploiement des SS20. D'un côté une Superpuissance qui, par la force des choses, le restera, et de l'autre un conglomérat de nations boutiquières, ayant renoncé à pourvoir par elles-mêmes aux besoins de leur défense, déshabituées de penser à l'échelle du monde et résignées à chercher leur sécurité dans la bienveillance d'un protecteur, aujourd'hui celui-ci, et demain celui-là.

On peut se demander par ailleurs si la dénucléarisation de l'Europe ne répondrait pas aussi à la propension de certains milieux américains à vouloir confiner, à toute force, à l'Europe, un éventuel conflit, sans risquer d'entraîner une escalade nucléaire pouvant impliquer le propre territoire des Etats-Unis. Chacun ici connaît le rapport sur la "dissuasion sélective" paru il y a quelques mois outre-Atlantique.

La volonté de sanctuariser le territoire des Etats-Unis à 6.000 Km d'un conflit européen dont on suppose qu'il pourrait être contenu dans des limites acceptables, rejoint ainsi une vieille tradition isolationniste.

On peut comprendre enfin que certaines opinions publiques européennes de pays qui n'ont pas eux-mêmes accès à l'arme nucléaire se laissent aller à rechercher leur sécurité dans l'illusion d'une bienveillance éternelle et sans contrepartie de la part de l'URSS, et de garanties que les Etats-Unis, aux dires mêmes de Henry Kissinger, ne sont plus guère en mesure de leur apporter.

Cette illusion consacrerait la résignation au déclin et à l'effacement de l'Europe.

La seule question qui vaille à nos yeux est celle de la liberté. Sans indépendance nationale la démocratie devient une abstraction, une réthorique sans substance. Le constat vaut pour toutes les nations d'Europe, qui ensemble peuvent préserver leur indépendance, à condition qu'elles le veuillent. C'est là notre intérêt, et c'est aussi celui de nos alliés américains dont la protection, utile jusqu'à un certain point, peut aboutir à la longue, et s'ils n'y prennent garde, à déresponsabiliser et à infantiliser les nations concernées.

Et c'est l'intérêt de l'Europe de l'Est aussi dont la capacité à évoluer à l'avenir, implique une paix durable, garantie par un équilibre stable.

C'est ainsi qu'il faut comprendre les choix de la France. Notre pays, pour sa part, n'entend pas renoncer à sa dissuasion ; il ne la met d'ailleurs pas en oeuvre dans son seul intérêt ; elle pourra, le jour venu, constituer avec la force nucléaire britannique, l'embryon d'une dissuasion européenne. D'ores et déjà, elle contribue à renforcer la dissuasion globale de l'alliance atlantique. La détermination française à conserver une capacité nucléaire crédible et indépendante est un gage de non-guerre en Europe.

S'interroger comme on le fait parfois sur l'extension explicite de la garantie nucléaire française aux autres pays

européens, c'est méconnaître le rôle implicite qui, depuis longtemps, est déjà le sien. Notre dissuasion protège à la fois notre territoire national, qui se définit en termes géographiques, et nos intérêts vitaux, dont la définition est politique et peut varier en fonction des circonstances de la crise.

La France est -en dehors de l'URSS- le seul pays nucléaire de l'Europe continentale. Des liens profonds nous unissent à nos voisins. Comme l'a souligné ici même le Président de la République, la "notion d'espace commun, en raison même de l'étroite étendue de nos territoires, habités par une forte densité de population, souligne à quel point nos sorts sont liés". Ainsi, l'incertitude sur l'étendue et la nature de ce qui, dans une situation de crise, serait perçu par la France comme ses intérêts vitaux, incite l'agresseur potentiel, en compliquant ses calculs, à une sage retenue. C'est du reste cette fonction qu'a soulignée la plate-forme de l'UEO.

Mais notre détermination n'est pas seule en cause. Le Président de la République a rappelé que la sécurité de l'Europe, et d'abord celle de l'Allemagne, engageait les trois puissances nucléaires de l'Alliance. C'est à l'Alliance d'empêcher, par sa détermination initiale, toute invasion.

Nous en revenons là au concept de dissuasion. Il importe que "l'Alliance ne se perde pas dans des finesses stratégiques, qui, de flexibilités en flexibilités, empêcheraient toute décision, sinon trop tard".

Cette mise en garde à l'égard de nos alliés est aussi un appel aux Européens pour qu'ils mettent de l'ordre dans leurs idées.

La sécurité de l'Europe implique enfin -faut-il le rappeler?- un esprit de défense européen.

II - Un équilibre de sécurité durable pour garantir le cours nouveau.

Le cours nouveau que Monsieur Gorbatchev fait prendre à son pays est sans doute une chance à saisir pour l'établissement de relations stables entre l'Est et l'Ouest du continent, puis dans le reste du monde. On peut analyser la Glasnost en URSS même, comme un moyen de relever le défi de la modernisation économique. Cette analyse serait cependant incomplète. L'originalité de la démarche de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev consiste à dépasser le traditionnel réformisme économique, illustré avant lui par Khrouchtchev ou Kossyguine, pour mettre en cause la nature monolithique du système politique lui-même, en cherchant à introduire à travers la "transparence", ces valeurs des Lumières qui sont depuis longtemps l'apanage des nations avancées et qui n'ont jamais pris que superficiellement racine dans la société russe.

Ce réformisme politique dirigé d'en haut ne peut manquer de faire surgir de puissantes contradictions. Les risques de déstabilisation ne sont pas négligeables : on le voit, s'agissant des nationalités, en Transcaucasie, dans les pays baltes, et à nouveau dans l'Europe balkanique.

Le recours aux capitaux, aux technologies, et même aux idées venus de l'Occident, peut nourrir des contradictions sociales et nationales d'un type nouveau mais qui sont sans doute inévitables, si l'URSS entend sortir de son immobilisme.

Comme l'a dit le Président de la République, le rapprochement des deux parties de l'Europe sera l'affaire de cette fin de siècle et du siècle prochain. Ce rapprochement ne pourra s'opérer que de manière progressive. Il doit être géré avec responsabilité. Deux fois, l'Europe a

sombré en ce siècle. La France, pour ce qui la concerne, intègre la dimension du temps dans le dépassement de l'Europe de Yalta.

Les espoirs que nous pouvons légitimement nourrir pour l'avenir ne doivent pas nous conduire à perdre de vue le potentiel considérable que les forces du pacte de Varsovie entretiennent aujourd'hui sur la fracture géopolitique de notre continent. Nous sommes bien obligés de constater que, depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir de Monsieur Gorbatchev, l'effort de défense soviétique ne s'est toujours pas ralenti. Je ne crois pas aux intentions agressives de l'URSS de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev. Mais si celle-ci veut réellement rassurer, elle doit ramener ses forces stationnées au coeur de l'Europe d'une posture offensive à la simple défense. Alors chacun comprendra.

Selon le dernier rapport de l'International Institute for Strategic Studies les forces du pacte de Varsovie comprennent 21.300 chars dans la zone Jaruzelski contre 13.000 aux forces de l'OTAN, 12.200 moyens d'artillerie contre 3.500, et de l'Atlantique à l'Oural 53.000 chars contre 22.200, et 36.000 moyens d'artillerie contre 10.600.

Même si les déséquilibres sont moins accusés pour les hélicoptères et les avions de combat, il y a là une situation malsaine à laquelle il importe de mettre fin, par des mesures de déconcentration appropriées.

La paix de l'Europe passe d'abord par le désarmement ou plus précisément par une réduction des armements et des dépenses d'armement qui grèvent lourdement les budgets, et d'abord ceux de l'URSS et des Etats-Unis. Mais pour que ce processus corresponde à une sécurité accrue pour les Européens, il faut que ceux-ci soient capables de préserver durablement une posture de défense crédible. Il n'y a pas de symétrie en effet entre les capacités

militaires des deux Superpuissances et celles des nations d'Europe occidentale.

C'est pourquoi la dissuasion qui correspond à une posture essentiellement défensive, est un concept parfaitement adapté à ce que les Européens doivent tendre à réaliser. L'existence d'un rôle de dissuasion, à l'Ouest de l'Europe, peut fonder un équilibre de sécurité durable à l'échelle du continent.

Par la force des choses, en effet, l'URSS restera une Superpuissance. Grande comme 45 fois la France, environnée de puissances montantes : le Japon, la Chine, l'Inde, affrontée aux mutations du monde musulman, ayant à faire face au réveil des nationalités au sein d'un Empire multinational hétérogène, soucieuse de maintenir sur l'Europe de l'Est un contrôle qu'elle considère comme l'acquis de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, qui peut croire que l'URSS cessera d'être une formidable puissance nucléaire, mais aussi conventionnelle, capable de mobiliser, sur un espace d'un seul tenant, d'immenses ressources ?

Demain, comme aujourd'hui, les Européens devront donc veiller à leur sécurité et préserver un esprit de défense. A ces conditions seulement, le rapprochement des deux Europes pourra s'effectuer sur des bases saines. L'évolution de l'Europe de l'Est, en particulier, implique une Europe de l'Ouest confiante en elle-même et en ses valeurs.

Les réflexions faites précédemment sur la dissuasion nucléaire et l'histoire de notre continent depuis les quarante dernières années nous montrent la voie à suivre. C'est le mérite du général de Gaulle que d'avoir, en forgeant un concept national, identifié, aux yeux des Français, la dissuasion et l'intérêt national, jetant ainsi les

bases du consensus que nous connaissons aujourd'hui sur la défense.

Un consensus analogue ne s'établira en Europe que si les Européens prennent davantage conscience de la nécessité de pourvoir eux-mêmes à leur sécurité.

L'adoption d'une position défensive par l'URSS constitue le corollaire de l'émergence d'un concept de dissuasion autonome à l'Ouest.

On ne peut séparer la défense européenne et la sécurité européenne, pas plus qu'on ne peut évoquer la défense européenne indépendamment de la réorganisation nécessaire de l'alliance atlantique.

Le pilier européen de défense dans l'alliance atlantique doit aussi jouer le rôle d'un môle d'équilibre à l'échelle du continent européen tout entier.

Ces deux objectifs simultanés peuvent paraître difficilement accessibles, tant le poids des intérêts et celui des habitudes semblent conforter le statu quo. Mais celui-ci est miné par de puissantes contradictions qui demeurent aujourd'hui encore feutrées mais qui risquent d'éclater demain si une volonté politique claire ne se manifeste pas de la part des gouvernements européens pour dépasser de manière positive les blocages actuels.

L'ouverture à l'Est, la correction des déséquilibres existant entre l'Est et l'Ouest dans le domaine des armements, la recherche d'une posture défensive de part et d'autre, sont inséparables d'une volonté de défense vigilante de la part des nations ouest-européennes.

Faire prendre conscience aux opinions européennes des exigences de leur défense, c'est-à-dire d'une paix durable sur notre continent, est d'abord l'affaire des dirigeants

politiques. Cela suppose le courage de tenir le langage de la vérité. Il n'y a pas de symétrie entre les Superpuissances qui doivent réduire leurs arsenaux et les pays d'Europe qui doivent maintenir à un niveau de stricte suffisance, une capacité de dissuasion.

L'émergence d'un esprit de défense européen ne pourra être l'oeuvre des seuls hommes politiques. Ce ne pourra être qu'une oeuvre collective et chacun de vous, qui exercez dans vos pays respectifs des responsabilités importantes, a un rôle à jouer dans cette perspective. C'est pourquoi je me félicite de la tenue d'une session comme celle à laquelle vous participez actuellement, et je ne peux que m'associer totalement à la proposition formulée devant vous, la semaine dernière, par le Premier ministre, lorsqu'il a évoqué la création d'un Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité rattaché à l'UEO.

La maison commune européenne existe déjà, à l'Ouest du continent, bâtie sur des valeurs partagées de démocratie et de liberté. Nous qui y demeurons, tendons la main aux européens de l'Est. Les liens de l'histoire, ceux de la civilisation tissent entre nous une puissante parenté, d'actifs cousinages. C'est ainsi que seront progressivement réunies les conditions qui permettront de surmonter la coupure de l'Europe.

C'est la finalité de la politique de nos pays, qui dès l'origine ont pris une part active au processus d'Helsinki et, depuis son ouverture, à la conférence de Vienne, dont nous souhaitons le prochain aboutissement.

III - Les voies à défricher.

Je vais maintenant m'efforcer de préciser plus concrètement les moyens de parvenir à un équilibre de sécurité durable.

1. Cela passe d'abord sans nul doute par le renforcement constant des liens que les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest ont d'ores et déjà tissés entre eux dans leurs relations bilatérales comme au sein d'instances multilatérales.

Le dialogue franco-allemand est à cet égard exemplaire. Mais il ne se veut nullement exclusif. Bien au contraire, la France, comme la République fédérale, conçoivent leurs efforts conjugués comme une contribution à l'émergence progressive d'une défense européenne.

Il conviendra de rechercher le cadre le mieux adapté à cette fin. Sans doute nous faut-il commencer par donner vie à la notion de pilier européen de l'alliance. Mais il nous faut aussi mieux définir le rôle de l'UEO, ce qui du reste peut être un axe de réflexion privilégié pour les stagiaires européens de l'IHEDN que vous êtes.

2. Il faut réfléchir aussi aux rapports que nous souhaitons voir s'instaurer entre la construction européenne au sein de la CEE et l'Europe de la défense.

Il est d'ores et déjà un domaine dans lequel le développement de la CEE aura des conséquences, même si nous les apprécions mal. Il s'agit des industries de l'armement. Je voudrais y insister, car c'est un secteur dans lequel des progrès de la coopération me paraissent, malgré des échecs récents, à la fois possibles et souhaitables.

a) Sans une base technologique et industrielle, en effet, nous ne pourrons bâtir une Europe de la défense autonome.

Or, les industries européennes se trouvent aujourd'hui confrontées à un double défi :

- un défi technologique et financier : la sophistication des systèmes d'armes, le poids croissant des dépenses de recherche et de développement, et la généralisation des technologies de l'informatique et des communications, entraînent des augmentations très importantes des coûts de production unitaires, et impliquent une coopération accrue.
- un défi industriel européen : 1992 verra la réalisation de l'acte unique et la mise en place d'un marché intérieur européen. Même si le traité de Rome ne concerne pas formellement le domaine de l'armement, l'imbrication croissante des activités de hautes technologies, civiles et militaires, ne permettra pas aux industries de défense de rester à l'écart des changements profonds qui affecteront le tissu industriel, commercial et financier en Europe. Les frontières en effet sont de plus en plus poreuses entre industries de l'armement et secteur civil.

Cela est particulièrement vrai dans les recherches amont ou dans le domaine des technologies du futur. Le programme Eureka, des programmes communautaires comme Esprit ou Race, comportent dans beaucoup de secteurs des thèmes complémentaires de ceux qui intéressent la défense : matériaux nouveaux, électronique ultra-rapide, logiciels, langages de haut niveau, intelligence artificielle, etc ...

Cela est vrai aussi aux stades du développement et de la production, en particulier dans les domaines de

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l'informatique et des micro-processeurs, du contrôle aérien, des télécommunications, de l'aéronautique, etc.

Ce sont du reste souvent les mêmes entreprises qui déploient leurs activités dans des secteurs civils et militaires connexes. Comment imaginer que l'application à leurs activités civiles de règles arrêtées par la Communauté demeurera sans effet sur leurs activités militaires ? Les entreprises devront tenir compte de ces données nouvelles.

Il faudra d'abord, comme l'a rappelé ici le Premier ministre, surmonter les problèmes nés des décalages dans les calendriers d'équipement de nos armées.

Dans cette perspective, trois voies me semblent pouvoir être suivies parallèlement :

- l'harmonisation de nos besoins militaires qui déterminera la cohérence des réponses industrielles à apporter,
- la mise en commun de nos efforts de recherche, y compris par la création d'un fonds commun,
- la définition de stratégies industrielles dépassant le cadre étroit des marchés intérieurs nationaux et impliquant des normes et des réglementations communes.

Si nous voulons favoriser la naissance d'une industrie européenne de l'armement, il nous faudra enfin mener une réflexion approfondie sur la notion de préférence communautaire. Des études sont en cours à Bruxelles sur l'opportunité d'instaurer des droits de douane sur l'importation de matériels de défense à partir de pays tiers.

Nous aurons à apprécier si c'est la bonne voie. Reste qu'il n'est pas admissible que tant de pays qui se

.../

veulent à la pointe de l'Europe, préfèrent systématiquement s'adresser à des fournisseurs étrangers pour pourvoir aux besoins de leur défense : avions, radars, missiles, hélicoptères, etc... La liste serait longue de tous ces manquements à une solidarité européenne bien comprise. Or, il n'y a pas d'autonomie en matière de défense sans une industrie d'armement puissante.

Qu'on ne demande donc pas à la France de renoncer aux moyens de son indépendance, au nom d'une Europe ouverte à tous les vents et refusant par principe de se protéger contre ceux qui ont érigé le protectionisme en règle de conduite.

L'Europe doit se ressaisir si elle veut exister et n'être pas vouée à la colonisation.

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* *

La politique de la France forme un tout. J'ai délibérément choisi de ne pas m'étendre sur de nombreux aspects sur lesquels le Président de la République s'est exprimé avec force et clarté : le désarmement conventionnel et chimique, en particulier, où la France a fait des propositions nouvelles.

Encore une fois, le désarmement est une des manières de parvenir à une plus grande sécurité. Le contrôle et la vérification, là aussi, sont d'intérêt européen. Comment ne pas évoquer la nécessité pour nos nations de se doter de moyens spatiaux, satellites d'observation, optiques, radars, infra-rouges ? Là encore des initiatives sont à prendre.

J'ai eu l'occasion de le rappeler au dernier Conseil des Ministres de l'UEO à Londres le 14 novembre dernier.

... /

Si nous sommes capables de relever le défi du Marché unique en 1993, si nous nous donnons les moyens d'organiser l'Europe comme un ensemble cohérent, sans nier la diversité des nations qui font sa richesse, si l'Europe devient au contraire le moyen pour chacune d'accomplir sa vocation, la dimension de la défense s'imposera naturellement comme la conséquence de cette intrication croissante d'intérêts.

Il faudra seulement éviter qu'au nom du marché unique lui-même, des exigences de la compétitivité, de l'harmonisation des fiscalités, de la réduction des prélèvements, ou d'un discours fallacieux sur l'effacement des menaces, les Etats dont c'est la responsabilité relâchent excessivement un effort de défense qui est déjà tellement plus bas que celui de l'URSS ou des Etats-Unis. Bref, seule la perspective historique peut nous permettre une vue en relief, cet alliage rare d'ouverture et de vigilance, dont l'Europe a aujourd'hui besoin pour s'affirmer. Comme l'Italie jadis, François Mitterrand le rappelait récemment, "L'Europe se fera par elle-même ou elle ne se fera pas".

Jean-Pierre CHEVENEMENT

Melfatti

Mardi, 22, n. 14

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Signor Presidente,

L'"aggiornamento" dei termini in cui il problema della sicurezza europea è stato affrontato fin qui con successo dai nostri Paesi deriva dalla rapida evoluzione della situazione internazionale.

Ho parlato di "aggiornamento", poiché sono convinto che i punti di riferimento fondamentali sui quali abbiamo costruito in Europa nei decenni passati la nostra politica di sicurezza (e che, per ultimo, nell'ottobre dell'anno passato, abbiamo descritto nella Piattaforma de L'Aja sugli interessi europei in materia di sicurezza) sono destinati a restare l'asse portante delle stesse scelte ulteriori che saremo chiamati a compiere.

Evitare qualsiasi equivoco a questo riguardo è la prima cosa da fare per assicurare e rafforzare la nostra sicurezza; sono evidenti, per conseguenza, i doveri di chiarezza che abbiamo, in primo luogo, nei confronti delle nostre opinioni pubbliche.

ISTITUTO ALEN 101 - ROMA
n° inv. 6760
28.2.1989
BIBLIOTECA

E' pur vero, però, che dobbiamo attrezzarci con animo aperto al nuovo che emerge sulla scena internazionale, non per rinnegare la nostra politica complessiva e le sue fondamentali linee ispiratrici, che anzi, a nostro giudizio, trovano molte volte conferma proprio nelle novità che si manifestano, ma per adattarle alle nuove circostanze per trovare tempestivamente la risposta giusta per i problemi nuovi che si presentano.

Così si dovranno trovare tempestivamente le risposte adeguate perché il risanamento della economia mondiale e in questo quadro la soluzione, con carattere di priorità, del problema del deficit di bilancio degli USA e del passivo della bilancia commerciale di questo Paese; e la soluzione del problema del debito dei Paesi del Terzo Mondo come il deteriorarsi dei termini di scambio di questi stessi Paesi, dovranno avvenire per via cooperativa e non per via di accentuata tensione e confronto, non, quindi, con le guerre commerciali, con le barriere protezioniste, con le manipolazioni monetarie.

Così lo stesso problema del cosiddetto burden sharing, sul quale tornerò, e che certamente è

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all'ordine del giorno dei rapporti interatlantici, potrà trovare la sua composizione positiva solo non ponendo in discussione da nessuna delle parti in causa i cardini sui quali riposa la difesa comune e che sono stati riassunti nella Piattaforma de L'Aja richiamando il principio non rinunciabile secondo il quale "la sicurezza dell'Alleanza è indivisibile", come, di conseguenza, è irrinunciabile la presenza delle truppe americane sul continente europeo.

A sua volta, l'evoluzione in corso nell'Unione Sovietica e nei Paesi dell'Est suscita il nostro interesse e non può che trovare il nostro incoraggiamento ove essa avvenga nella giusta direzione, per salvaguardare legittimi, reciproci interessi. Perestroika e glasnost, in buona sostanza, possono auspicabilmente aprire la strada a condizioni più umane di vita per le popolazioni interessate al rispetto dei loro diritti, secondo le prescrizioni dell'Atto Finale di Helsinki, ad un atteggiamento più equilibrato sul piano delle relazioni internazionali, ad una più concreta disponibilità nel campo della riduzione degli armamenti.

*Forse aveva qualche cosa da
avere dietro gli occhi
come una fine di
SPIONAGGIO -*

E' un fatto che la decisione di ritirare le truppe dall'Afghanistan e la stessa adesione all'opzione zero nel negoziato sulle INF o la disponibilità per la prima volta espressa, prima a Stoccolma e poi nel Trattato di Washington, ai controlli e alle verifiche in situ, rappresentano da parte sovietica tante inversioni di rotta rispetto ad atteggiamenti, ad indirizzi, a scelte precedentemente assunti e che considerano di volta in volta gravemente lesivi dei nostri legittimi interessi e di principi irrinunciabili e cause, quindi, delle crisi della distensione.

Non vi è quindi, per conseguenza, nessuna ragione per non esplorare a fondo le opportunità che presenta la "nuova politica", per approfondire il concetto di "alta sufficienza" nel campo militare o per precisare (e limitare) da parte nostra il significato della "casa comune europea"; con lo scopo, ovviamente, di rafforzare in primo luogo la nostra sicurezza e quindi, sviluppando in modo coordinato la nostra risposta rispetto al nuovo che si manifesta all'Est e più in generale sulla scena internazionale, così da accrescere, in definitiva, l'identità e la forza dell'Europa.

Tra le novità di maggiore rilievo che si vanno producendo vi è dunque il graduale affermarsi, nel corso degli ultimi anni, di una più aperta e costruttiva atmosfera di dialogo nei rapporti Est-Ovest in generale, il profilarsi di ulteriori significativi sviluppi nel processo di disarmo e l'emergere di prospettive nuove in parecchi campi, da quello delle relazioni internazionali - con specifico riguardo all'integrazione europea - a quello degli sviluppi tecnologici; tutti problemi che forniscono motivo per una approfondita riflessione sulla sicurezza europea.

Già con la conclusione dell'ultimo conflitto mondiale ed il conseguente passaggio a più ampi equilibri mondiali la sicurezza dell'Europa è stata del resto condizionata da fattori che travalicano l'ambito regionale, primi fra tutti l'andamento delle relazioni tra le due maggiori potenze e la stabilità strategica complessiva, ma anche dalla congiuntura in diverse aree geografiche e specialmente in quelle più vicine.

Signor Presidente,

L'avvio della stagione dei grandi negoziati sul disarmo ha certamente avuto profonde ripercussioni sul

tessuto delle relazioni tra i Paesi europei, creando nello stesso tempo un reticolo di indicatori ma anche di canali di dialogo di indubbia efficacia.

Il graduale affermarsi sulla scena internazionale di un sempre più consolidato orientamento degli Stati Uniti e dell'Unione Sovietica verso un approccio mutualmente meno conflittuale e più cooperativo, che si è tradotto nel volgere di un breve arco di tempo in concrete misure di controllo degli armamenti, sembra preludere all'apertura di una fase radicalmente nuova del rapporto tra le due superpotenze, capace di influenzare in maniera profonda l'insieme delle relazioni internazionali.

Si tratta di sviluppi di rilevanza straordinaria come anzitutto il previsto smantellamento di un sistema di armamenti nucleari - i missili a portata intermedia - che minacciava direttamente l'Europa.

Da parte italiana, compresi gli ambienti più informati su queste questioni, non si è d'altronde mai ritenuto giustificato il timore o il dubbio che l'accordo potesse influire negativamente sulla saldezza del raccordo tra Stati Uniti ed Europa, che è fondata

sul ben altri fattori di natura politica e storica ed anzitutto sulla comunanza di ideali democratici e di interessi di sicurezza.

Non bisogna a mio avviso dimenticare che lo storico accordo del dicembre 1987 ha assunto rilevante importanza non solo in ragione della sua specifica finalità, ma anche perché sancisce il principio dell'asimmetria delle riduzioni e dell'intrusività delle misure di verifica. Il grande dettaglio nell'applicazione delle misure di controllo relative alla precisa esecuzione degli obblighi derivanti dal Trattato costituisce infatti una delle sue caratteristiche più peculiari. Le numerose ispezioni già condotte da personale sovietico ed americano presso le basi di schieramento della controparte forniscono concreta riprova dell'alto grado di apertura e trasparenza cui si è pervenuti nel settore della sicurezza militare. Tale evoluzione rappresenta indubbiamente una prestigiosa acquisizione del processo di disarmo e controllo degli armamenti, e costituisce allo stesso tempo un fondamentale elemento di fiducia suscettibile di stimolare il dialogo e di consentire il conseguimento di sempre più ambiziosi obiettivi,

specialmente in vista del raggiungimento di un auspicato accordo sul dimezzamento degli arsenali strategici sovietico e americano.

Una siffatta interpretazione mi sembra vieppiù avvalorata dall'atmosfera improntata ad aperta collaborazione che è prevalsa nel corso della prima ispezione di base condotta da parte sovietica in Italia, presso la base missilistica di Comiso, nello scorso mese di agosto.

L'accordo sugli euromissili costituisce, quindi, il punto di partenza di un processo più ampio: la realizzazione della doppia opzione zero non è in fondo che la punta di un iceberg poiché accanto ad essa vi è una serie di intese, ancora più importanti e di cui già si intravedono le linee fondamentali, ancora semisommerse, ma destinate gradualmente ad emergere.

In tale quadro, mi riferisco anzitutto alla prosecuzione della trattative sovietico-americane sulla riduzione degli arsenali strategici e sulle questioni spaziali. Nonostante l'inevitabile rallentamento determinato dalla fase elettorale americana, mi sembra infatti che esistano buone prospettive di progressi

conclusivi nel corso del prossimo anno, in particolare riguardo alle opzioni di intesa già delineate per un dimezzamento degli arsenali strategici delle due grandi potenze.

A parte l'unanime approvazione già espressa da tutti gli alleati europei riguardo a tali prospettive intese, mi sembra che effettivamente esse siano suscettibili di contribuire in modo significativo alla sicurezza europea: la prevista drastica riduzione della componente missilistica "pesante" e una possibile diminuzione della rilevanza dei missili balistici nella futura ristrutturazione degli arsenali dovrebbe anzitutto consentire un accrescimento della stabilità strategica in generale. Ma soprattutto la sensibile contrazione della sovrabbondanza dell'arsenale sovietico dovrebbe consentire una parallela riduzione della minaccia nei confronti dell'Europa Occidentale.

Mi sembra pertanto che da parte europea non debbano aversi esitazioni nell'incoraggiare le prospettive di un accordo START appoggiando ovviamente le opzioni che meglio corrispondono alle esigenze di sicurezza europee. Tanto per fornire un esempio, mi sembra che corrisponda agli interessi dell'Europa una

riduzione ai livelli più bassi dei missili mobili - come gli SS-24 e gli SS-25 - che per l'Europa potrebbero rappresentare una minaccia quanto più diretta. Sull'altro versante siamo naturalmente interessati al mantenimento da parte degli Stati Uniti di capacità che consentano un perdurante collegamento tra la sicurezza americana e quella dei Paesi europei.

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Quanto alla trattativa sulle questioni spaziali mi sembra anzitutto di dover rilevare che il mantenimento del rispetto dell'Accordo ABM consente - nel campo dei rapporti strategici - il perdurare di condizioni di stabilità e di prevedibilità che corrispondono agli interessi dell'Europa. Non ritengo tuttavia che nel quadro di una crescente prevedibilità vada esclusa la possibilità di intese che, sulla base di nuove tecnologie, consentano una graduale evoluzione del rapporto strategico offesa-difesa, in armonia con l'aspirazione dei popoli a ridurre i rischi di conflitto nucleare ed a promuovere il consolidamento delle condizioni della pace e della sicurezza a livelli progressivamente più bassi di armamento offensivo.

Signor Presidente,

Come il Ministro degli Esteri Andreotti ha recentemente avuto occasione di notare, il problema di un riequilibrio a più bassi livelli delle forze convenzionali in Europa rappresenta uno degli elementi centrali nel quadro dei rapporti Est-Ovest. Gli squilibri esistenti in questo settore del rapporto di forze fondamentale per la stabilità europea hanno infatti tradizionalmente determinato tensioni e sospetti, influenzando negativamente sulla situazione politica generale e contribuendo al perpetuarsi delle divisioni.

E' con gli accordi di Stoccolma che per la prima volta è stato innescato un processo suscettibile di migliorare la sicurezza militare di tutti i Paesi europei, indipendentemente dalla loro appartenenza ad Alleanze, e di progressivamente riequilibrare le gravi attuali asimmetrie e disparità tra i diversi schieramenti militari in Europa. In tale ottica, ha preso avvio, in piena coerenza con le deliberazioni dei Ministri atlantici raccolte nelle Dichiarazioni di Halifax del 30 maggio 1986 e di Bruxelles dell'11 dicembre dello stesso anno, una serie di consultazioni

informali a margine dei lavori della Riunione di Vienna sui seguiti CSCE per l'elaborazione del mandato per un foro sulla stabilità convenzionale in Europa. A tali colloqui partecipano i 23 Paesi membri della NATO e del Patto di Varsavia, quei Paesi, cioè, le cui forze esercitano un più immediato impatto sugli essenziali equilibri della sicurezza europea. Il futuro negoziato sulla stabilità convenzionale, di cui ci si attende ormai l'avvio a breve scadenza, costituirà la migliore opportunità di cui l'Europa, il continente in cui sussiste la maggiore concentrazione di armi e di eserciti, abbia potuto fino ad oggi disporre per ricercare migliori equilibri a più bassi livelli di forze, e specialmente di quelle maggiormente idonee per all'avvio di attacchi di sorpresa o di operazioni offensive su larga scala. Nessuno si nasconde che il compito dei negoziatori sarà certamente arduo e che sarà quindi necessario da parte di tutti dimostrare grande apertura e flessibilità per far progredire il dialogo e conseguire i primi risultati concreti in questo campo. Ciò sarebbe della massima importanza per consentire il superamento graduale delle divisioni e delle difficoltà che finora hanno ostacolato un rapporto più cooperativo tra le due parti dell'Europa e per promuovere un

effettivo consolidamento della sicurezza a più bassi livelli di forza.

La percezione della minaccia da cui fin dal dopoguerra i Paesi dell'Europa Occidentale si sono sentiti confrontati è del resto strettamente riconnessa con i gravi squilibri costantemente esistiti in questo settore. Indubbiamente la riduzione a livelli equilibrati più bassi delle forze e degli armamenti più rilevanti delle due Alleanze avrebbe dunque il positivo effetto di ridimensionare drasticamente tale percezione di minaccia e di incertezza. Anche se tale parità complessiva non potrebbe garantire la stabilità, essa rafforzerebbe comunque le condizioni della sicurezza, e promuoverebbe la tendenza ad una crescente fiducia e cooperazione reciproche.

La sicurezza e la stabilità verrebbero d'altronde promosse ulteriormente ove potesse prevenirsi, oltre che ad una situazione di equilibrio, alla attuazione di riduzioni e di ristrutturazioni degli schieramenti militari suscettibili di privilegiare nettamente le capacità difensive rispetto a quelle offensive.

Il profilarsi di una tale prospettiva mi sembra in effetti in linea con esigenze sempre sottolineate da parte occidentale. Mi sembra altresì una palese dimostrazione della tesi che attraverso misure di disarmo possa pervenirsi a rafforzare sensibilmente la sicurezza dei Paesi dell'Europa Occidentale.

Signor Presidente,

Esiste un altro foro negoziale, quello della Conferenza del Disarmo a Ginevra, in cui è in discussione una questione fondamentale per la sicurezza dell'Europa. Mi riferisco alla eliminazione totale e globale delle armi chimiche, cui da parte italiana si è tradizionalmente attribuita la massima priorità.

L'impiego indiscriminato delle armi chimiche, anche e soprattutto contro le popolazioni civili, è un fatto che suscita presso tutti noi orrore e riprovazione. Non può inoltre non rilevarsi come nei conflitti regionali le armi chimiche costituiscano una permanente tentazione ad estendere le ostilità a livelli che giustificano le più allarmate reazioni della Comunità internazionale. Il loro possesso presuppone una tecnologia semplice, risorse non illimitate, un

addestramento anche sommario, ciò che rende le prospettive del loro impiego assai attraenti in ragione della loro efficacia proporzionalmente assai elevata in rapporto ai costi.

Per tale ragione, da parte italiana (e ricordo qui che l'Italia non possiede armi chimiche, né le ospita a qualunque titolo sul suo territorio) ci si è sempre attivamente adoperati per dare impulso al negoziato ginevrino, e si è espressa aperta soddisfazione per i sostanziali progressi, pur se ancora non conclusivi, registrati nel corso degli ultimi anni.

Il bando di queste armi, dunque, ed un adeguato sistema di controllo sono di vitale importanza e debbono intervenire con l'urgenza che deriva, altrimenti, dal rischio crescente di una proliferazione.

Signor Presidente,

Da parte italiana si è sempre ritenuto e si ritiene che al fine di una efficace salvaguardia della sicurezza del mondo occidentale, compresa evidentemente l'Europa, siano fondamentali il collegamento con gli Stati Uniti e l'apporto delle forze convenzionali e

nucleari americane, come del resto sottolineato nella "piattaforma sugli interessi della sicurezza europei" adottata all'Aja. La necessità di mantenere questo collegamento costituisce tuttora il cardine della politica seguita dall'Italia sia nel campo del disarmo, che in quello della difesa, riguardo cioè a tutte le questioni che attengono alla sfera della sicurezza.

Allo stesso tempo ci sembra che un rafforzamento delle condizioni di stabilità in Europa possa contribuire in modo decisivo al consolidamento della pace e della sicurezza internazionale, tenuto anche conto che sul nostro continente corrono i confini tra i Paesi membri delle due maggiori Alleanze.

Nelle nostre concezioni, l'andamento del processo di disarmo influenzerà in modo decisivo le prospettive di una accresciuta sicurezza negli anni a venire, diminuendo drasticamente le esigenze di ampi arsenali di armamenti sofisticati e offensivi per far fronte alla minaccia. In tale contesto mi sembra di poter rilevare come vi sia una ovvia interrelazione tra l'adeguatezza della forza militare necessaria per mantenere la sicurezza e l'entità della minaccia. Ove questo potesse pertanto essere drasticamente ridotto,

anche i requisiti della difesa e della deterrenza verrebbero corrispondentemente compressi.

In particolare, il ristabilimento dell'equilibrio sul piano convenzionale e l'eliminazione delle armi chimiche dovrebbero avere l'effetto di ridurre la dipendenza dal nucleare per una efficace deterrenza e di comprimere il rischio di un uso precoce delle armi nucleari in caso di conflitto. Mi sembra pertanto che, ove si verificano le necessarie premesse, non debbano sussistere preclusioni circa la possibilità di ulteriori riduzioni di armi nucleari - e non solo di quelle strategiche - senza pregiudicare, ma anzi rafforzando le condizioni di stabilità. I Paesi dell'Europa Occidentale d'altronde non potranno trascurare in tutti i successivi passaggi verso equilibri basati su un numero ridotto di armamenti la necessità di rafforzare e preservare la propria sicurezza mediante una visione comune, garantendo l'efficacia dei propri apparati militari e procedendo verso una graduale integrazione della difesa europea.

20-10-1964
In tale contesto, sembra constatarsi una crescente "domanda d'Europa". Gli Alleati americani in particolare, in ragione delle difficoltà del bilancio

federale e alla luce della crescita economica dei Paesi europei (oltre che del Giappone), ritengono che questi ultimi dovrebbero assumere maggiori responsabilità ai fini della sicurezza comune. Le condizioni politiche, sociali ed economiche dell'Europa difficilmente consentiranno, a mio avviso, di prevedere, nella fase attuale, una significativa accentuazione degli sforzi nel campo delle dotazioni di difesa. Ma certamente sussiste da parte degli Europei la volontà di assolvere pienamente alle proprie responsabilità e di sostenere la propria parte di oneri - che non sono soltanto finanziari ma anche politici - nel modo più equo ed adeguato. Vari sono i modi per farlo. Tra questi vi è sicuramente all'ordine del giorno il problema della ottimizzazione delle risorse impiegate, anche mediante un maggiore coordinamento degli sforzi che gli europei possono compiere tanto sul piano militare che su quello industriale, oltre che, per quanto ci riguarda, il raggiungimento degli obiettivi posti nell'ambito NATO dal Conventional Defence Improvement Plan.)

L'Italia ha dato recentemente dimostrazione concreta di tale volontà assumendo la decisione di ospitare lo stormo degli aerei F-16 finora basati a

Torrejon, quando la Spagna chiuderà tale base per gli americani. Manteniamo inoltre negli anni l'impegno che abbiamo assunto nell'ambito della NATO per un incremento costante, in termini reali, del nostro bilancio della difesa.

In ogni caso, la capacità di deterrenza in possesso degli Stati Uniti è l'unica - per le sue dimensioni - che possa assicurare una adeguata protezione all'intera area dell'Alleanza, secondo le esigenze che potrebbero configurarsi in diverse situazioni di crisi.

E' inoltre nell'ambito di una comunità transatlantica può contare su di una profondità strategica più ampia e quindi più idonea a fornire credibilità al deterrente occidentale. E ciò senza disconoscere il contributo che i deterrenti britannico e francese forniscono alla deterrenza complessiva.

Ma al di là degli aspetti più direttamente politici della futura sicurezza europea, si prospettano per gli europei delle opportunità che, se colte tempestivamente, sembrano suscettibili di conferire

nuovamente all'Europa una più significativa vitalità nel campo della sicurezza.

Signor Presidente,

non possiamo, come appare evidente, nasconderci il fatto che nel campo della sicurezza comune talune incognite si vanno profilando. Esse si ricollegano in parte con le difficoltà di bilancio che in questa congiuntura vanno incontrando gli Stati Uniti e con l'emergere di tendenze, in seno al Congresso e all'opinione pubblica americana, a ridurre l'impegno e la presenza di proprie forze in Europa. Per parte mia, sono persuaso che si tratti di una fase di transizione suscettibile di essere superata tanto più rapidamente quanto più accortamente gli europei sapranno predisporre una confacente risposta comune ai problemi che si vanno manifestando. E in tale contesto, mi pare incontrovertibile che l'UED possa fornire un contributo determinante all'emergere di una più definita identità europea anche nel campo della sicurezza e della difesa.

Il processo di rivitalizzazione dell'UED costituisce un tentativo di delineare una risposta alla

crescente domanda d'Europa da parte dei Paesi Europei che, sulla base del Trattato di Bruxelles del 1948, modificato nel 1954, hanno sempre avvertito uno specifico coinvolgimento nelle questioni della difesa europea. Si tratta in sostanza, non di creare delle istituzioni e degli organismi alternativi a quelli della NATO, ma al contrario, di accentuare la vitalità e rafforzare le strutture dell'Alleanza Atlantica - che deve rimanere il perno della sicurezza occidentale - attraverso il consolidamento del "pilastro europeo" e un più efficace e coordinato apporto degli Alleati europei alla difesa comune.

Il ruolo dell'UED ci sembra vada inquadrato in quell'obiettivo di costruzione di un'Europa integrata non solo economicamente, ma anche politicamente, in cui la tematica della sicurezza costituisce una delle dimensioni essenziali. Ciò comporta, conseguentemente, l'esigenza di approfondire in seno a tale organismo i problemi concernenti la comune sicurezza e le prospettive di una più ampia cooperazione nel campo della difesa. Un siffatto procedere potrà promuovere un più stretto raccordo fra Paesi uniti da una sostanziale comunanza di interessi e di vedute al fine di

proteggerli più efficacemente e anche con l'obbiettivo essenziale di rafforzare il pilastro europeo dell'Alleanza Atlantica in una congiuntura particolarmente delicata.

Il Governo italiano considera globalmente positivi i risultati finora raggiunti attraverso l'azione di rilancio dell'UED. L'adozione della "piattaforma sugli interessi europei in materia di sicurezza" rappresenta senza dubbio un importante risultato. L'Italia partecipa attivamente, insieme agli altri partners, all'esercizio di attuazione di questa piattaforma - cui ha dato notevole impulso l'ultima riunione del Consiglio Ministeriale - ed in particolare di quelle disposizioni che delineano un programma per il futuro. Nella piattaforma sono stati enunciati i principi generali che ispireranno l'azione comune degli alleati europei nelle scelte che dovranno assumere in maniera strategica e di sicurezza.

Le impostazioni essenziali dell'Italia in tema di ampliamento del ruolo dell'Europa e della cooperazione tra Europei nel campo della difesa comune hanno come capisaldi l'obbiettivo dell'integrazione europea - con

la progressiva messa in comune degli strumenti di difesa - e il mantenimento e rafforzamento della vitalità dell'Alleanza Atlantica. Ciò rappresenta anche il fondamento della convinzione del mio Paese che l'UEO debba svolgere un'essenziale funzione di coagulo delle iniziative che si muovono nello specifico settore - anche per evitarne la frammentazione - e di impulso verso un progressivo ampliamento delle forme di collaborazione.

Il Governo italiano ha naturalmente accolto con viva soddisfazione la decisione del Consiglio Ministeriale - che esso aveva sempre cercato in ogni modo di promuovere - di invitare il Portogallo e la Spagna ad aprire trattative in vista della loro adesione all'UEO. L'Italia è sempre stata convinta che tale adesione potrà contribuire in maniera assai significativa, da un lato, ad una più precisa definizione di una identità europea in materia di sicurezza e, dall'altro, ad un più diretto impegno dei due Paesi nella difesa e nella sicurezza dell'Europa.

Signor Presidente,

Alla luce di quanto precede, emerge in tutta chiarezza come l'obiettivo dei nostri governi debba essere e sia quello di promuovere un coordinamento crescente e forme di cooperazione sempre più ampie tra gli Alleati Europei sia per quanto riguarda la politica del disarmo, sia per quel che concerne la difesa comune, nel quadro di un processo generale, suscettibile di condurre ad una graduale messa a punto di una politica estera dell'Europa.

Le complessità di un tale processo non possono ovviamente essere ignorate, date anche le diversità tra i Paesi europei e le differenti percezioni cui essi spesso ispirano le rispettive politiche. Ma lo sforzo di concertazione e di graduale unificazione, anche nel campo della sicurezza, è necessario per consentire all'Europa di svolgere un ruolo di crescente rilevanza nell'interesse della stabilità del continente e di quella internazionale in genere.

Numerosi sono, d'altra parte, gli elementi di accelerazione e di novità presenti sulla scena mondiale attuale. Ne abbiamo già accennato, ma conviene

riprenderli ed ampliarli. Essi derivano da un ventaglio negoziale per le riduzioni degli armamenti molto ampio, tanto che non ha avuto, fin qui, l'eguale, così come dalle ipotesi che all'Est come all'Ovest cominciano ad essere affacciate perché si arrivi ad una situazione nuova in cui le capacità di difesa delle parti prevalgono sulle rispettive capacità di offesa.

Questi problemi si pongono nel momento in cui le due superpotenze sono confrontate sia pure, ovviamente, in modo diverso, dal riassetto delle rispettive economie, e in cui questo problema può incidere sui rispettivi bilanci militari. Sarà bene completare il quadro rilevando i nuovi problemi che emergono nei rapporti dell'Europa con gli USA, specie in materia economica e che dovrebbe essere nell'interesse di qua e di là dell'Atlantico di affrontare nel massimo spirito cooperativo.

Non va neppure taciuto l'emergere in futuro sulla scena internazionale di nuovi poli di attrazione politica, militare ed economica né il rischio di una crescente disseminazione, nel mondo, se non si interviene per tempo, di micidiali strumenti di distruzione. A nostro giudizio, se prevarrà la ragione,

l'Europa sarà spinta a farlo con una ispirazione e una volontà comuni.

Per quanto riguarda più direttamente i problemi della sicurezza i negoziati per la limitazione ed il controllo degli armamenti rappresentano, secondo la nostra analisi, soltanto la prima di una lunga serie di "improrogabili appuntamenti" che l'Europa non può e non deve mancare.

Sollecitati dai molteplici fattori di cambiamento dei rapporti strategici fin qui prevalenti, gli europei sono chiamati a svolgere un maggior ruolo a sostegno della propria sicurezza. Questo maggiore, comune impegno appare giustificato dalla necessità che l'Europa sappia esprimere e far valere le proprie esigenze di sicurezza ed essere allo stesso tempo nelle condizioni di adottare concrete misure in questo senso.

Verrà il momento (noi ci auguriamo presto) in cui dovremo rendere operative le nostre dichiarazioni sulla Unione Europea ed i nostri comuni convincimenti che la costruzione di un'Europa integrata resterà incompleta fino a che questa costruzione non si estenderà alla sicurezza e alla difesa.

Non per questo evidentemente il Governo italiano è contrario alla politica dei piccoli passi, compresa la parziale integrazione di alcune componenti dell'armamento convenzionale; tale politica, al contrario, trova le mie autorità senz'altro aperte e disponibili, a condizione, per altro, che essa si inserisca in un disegno che non contraddica l'obiettivo principale dell'integrazione politica o fornisca un alibi per allontanarsi, in realtà, da questo.

Ma per quanto l'approccio possa essere graduale e pragmatico, non si può sfuggire, tuttavia, alla coerenza del disegno generale, ed è per questo che, in conclusione, ho evocato l'Unione Europea e non voglio certo ignorare i problemi di sovranazionalità che essa comporta.

Non posso negare che la strada da percorrere sia ancora lunga. Ma non per questo dobbiamo rinunciare ai nostri ideali, e questa considerazione ci deve rafforzare anzi nel convincimento che la loro progressiva realizzazione passa oggi in misura notevole non solo attraverso il raggiungimento dei traguardi comunitari posti per il 1992, ma anche nella ricerca e nella realizzazione di forme sempre più strette di

cooperazione e di concertazione sul piano generale della politica estera come, nel campo della sicurezza e della difesa cui i nostri Paesi hanno fatto riferimento sia con l'Atto Unico che con il rilancio dell'UEO.

E' solo così, infatti, che si rispetta l'unicità del disegno della costruzione europea e questo resta anche il modo adeguato per rispondere con la nostra identità e al livello delle nostre responsabilità alle nuove sfide che ci verranno proposte nell'evolversi della situazione internazionale.

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Embargo 16h00

25 novembre 1988

Alfred Cohen
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iai	ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n°	8760 28.2.1989
DISCOURS DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'UEO A LA SESSION EUROPEENNE DE L'IHEDN - PARIS 25 NOVEMBRE 1988	

DISCOURS DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'UEO A LA SESSION EUROPEENNE
DE L'IHEDN - PARIS 25 NOVEMBRE 1988

C'est pour moi, à la fois un honneur et une joie de rendre hommage à l'esprit d'initiative et à la persévérance des plus hautes autorités de la République française qui sont à l'origine du succès indéniable de cette première session européenne des Hautes Etudes de Défense dont le projet remonte à la fin de l'année 1985.

En effet, ce projet me fut présenté notamment par le Général Fricaud-Chagnaud et par Monsieur Pierre Schwed, alors Président en exercice des anciens auditeurs de l'Institut, dont je veux ici saluer l'action qui fut déterminante dans la genèse de cet enseignement. Il s'agissait d'instruire des questions européennes de défense les décideurs qui, dans tous les domaines d'activité de nos pays d'Europe occidentale, détiennent les postes de responsabilité et sont aptes à servir de relais d'opinion. Ainsi pourrait se créer, par-delà les frontières et les barrières professionnelles, un groupe d'hommes et de femmes informés des problèmes de défense, ayant travaillé ensemble à promouvoir une approche commune et maintenant des liens entre eux.

Vous en êtes, Messieurs les Auditeurs, l'avant-garde mais dès l'an prochain vous en serez devenus la première promotion. Je souhaite que, d'ici trois ans, le bon aboutissement du projet fasse que l'UEO ajoute aux deux fleurons de sa relance - la "Plate-forme" de La Haye et l'élargissement à l'Espagne et au Portugal - un troisième, celui du Haut Enseignement Européen de Défense. Ainsi, les organes de

la coopération européenne en matière de sécurité auront-ils un double relais vers l'opinion publique de nos Etats européens, celui de l'Assemblée parlementaire et celui, complémentaire, du réseau des anciens auditeurs de ce nouvel enseignement permettant aux responsables informés et influents que vous êtes d'oeuvrer pour le développement du consensus sur la sécurité européenne.

C'est ce qui a été remarquablement réussi dans le cadre français par l'Association des anciens de l'IHEDN, sans l'existence de laquelle on ne peut comprendre le large accord autour des principes fondamentaux de la politique de défense qui se constate en France et qui transcende les clivages politiques, sociaux voire confessionnels.

Un projet similaire à l'échelle de l'Europe occidentale correspond à un besoin réel clairement identifié, dès 1984-85, par M. Genscher, ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, lorsqu'il assurait la présidence du Conseil ministériel de l'UEO. Monsieur Genscher fut, dès l'abord, vigoureusement soutenu par l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale.

La nécessaire sensibilisation de tous les secteurs de l'opinion sous les auspices de l'UEO ne peut avoir de meilleur outil que le travail de réflexion et de définition des conditions et des moyens de la sécurité européenne dont vous avez jeté les bases au cours des quinze jours que vous venez de passer ensemble dans le cadre prestigieux de l'Ecole Militaire. Je veux ici rendre un hommage tout particulier à la petite équipe qui, autour de l'Amiral Hugues puis du Général Suquet, a travaillé d'arrache-pied depuis octobre 1987 à la préparation de cette brillante session européenne, en collaboration avec le SGDN et le Quai d'Orsay.

Permettez-moi donc de remercier ici, en votre nom et au nom de l'UEO l'Amiral Brem, le Colonel Sebe et Monsieur Francis Breton. Je sais combien vous avez été sensibles à leur compétence et leur disponibilité d'autant plus admirables que les sessions nationales et régionales de l'IHEDN les soumettent à rude épreuve et requièrent leur énergie semaine après semaine.

L'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, créé le 30 janvier 1949 et placé sous la haute autorité du Ministre de la Défense nationale, a pleinement réussi à convaincre ses auditeurs de l'interpénétration entre stratégie militaire et conduite politique de la guerre en cas de conflit, mais aussi entre gestion politique des crises, fondements économiques de la sécurité et politique générale de défense en temps de paix.

Cette brillante réussite se place dans la perspective d'une action destinée à se poursuivre puisque la Belgique a d'ores et déjà accepté d'organiser une session semblable l'an prochain dans le cadre de son Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense. Ce projet acquerra donc, au fil des sessions, ses lettres de noblesse européennes.

Monsieur Michel Rocard, Premier Ministre français, a confirmé et même amplifié cette perspective, en réclamant ici même la "création d'un Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité, rattaché à l'UEO selon des modalités à préciser."

Messieurs les auditeurs, reprenant le chemin de vos pays et occupation respectifs, vous deviendrez les missi dominici de l'Europe de la sécurité, c'est-à-dire d'une Europe sûre de la paix qu'elle veut garantir par la dissuasion et renforcer par le dialogue, d'une Europe sûre d'elle-même et de son devenir qui tend la main aux Nations captives et veut assurer le développement harmonieux de ses peuples par la coopération de Brest à Vladivostok. Cette Europe forte, prospère et paisible dont vous êtes des pionniers sera par son rayonnement pacificateur un élément majeur de la stabilité planétaire.

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LE CONTEXTE EST/OUEST ET LE CONTEXTE TRANSATLANTIQUE

Cette première session européenne des Hautes Etudes de Défense prend place à un moment crucial dans l'évolution des problèmes touchant à la sécurité de nos pays européens considérés, bien entendu, dans l'indispensable perspective de la solidarité atlantique.

Ces problèmes se sont, en effet, inscrits durant la fin des années 70 et le début des années 80 dans une série de contextes statiques tant en ce qui concerne la situation en URSS et au sein du Pacte de Varsovie qu'à l'égard des rapports Est/Ouest et de la relation transatlantique.

A Moscou, la fin du règne de M. Brejnev et - après la courte transition du passage au pouvoir de M. Andropov - le gouvernement de M. Chernenko se sont trouvés caractérisés - au plan interne comme à celui de la politique extérieure - par un rigide immobilisme.

Ce dernier n'était pas nécessairement favorable à une évolution positive des rapports Est/Ouest. En fait ceux-ci furent marqués, à l'époque, non par les progrès de ce que l'on a appelé - à plus ou moins juste titre - la détente mais, au contraire, par un regain de tensions. Néanmoins ce rigide immobilisme des politiques soviétiques - pour n'être pas constructif - prêtait auxdits rapports une prédictabilité qui n'allait pas sans confort, notamment pour les décideurs et négociateurs occidentaux.

La rigidité en question ne s'étendait pas, reconnaissons-le, à l'ensemble des rapports Est/Ouest. Des mouvements étaient à l'oeuvre dans certains pays du Pacte de Varsovie qui devaient aboutir aux événements de Pologne d'une part et, pour quelques-uns des Etats en question, à une affirmation plus marquée de leur personnalité nationale vis-à-vis de l'URSS d'autre part.

Enfin l'Alliance atlantique vivait, alors, une période de statut quo. Ses doctrines politiques - inscrites particulièrement dans le rapport Harmel - ne faisaient l'objet d'aucune contestation. (Je ne dis d'ailleurs pas qu'elles doivent le faire car la doctrine Harmel me paraît, pour l'essentiel, aussi valable aujourd'hui que lorsqu'elle fut présentée à l'Alliance en 1967 avec son double volet de nécessaire effort de défense et de dialogue avec l'Est. (D'ailleurs, lorsqu'on décidera, en 1984, au niveau atlantique - à l'initiative du Ministre belge des Affaires Etrangères M. Tindemans - de la réexaminer, les Alliés décideront finalement, lors de leur réunion ministérielle de Washington, d'en confirmer la teneur quitte à adapter certains aspects de sa mise en oeuvre à une situation caractérisée plus par un regain des confrontations que par un approfondissement de la détente.)

De même les stratégies de l'Alliance n'étaient pas mises en cause. Lorsqu'elles se trouvaient discutées, c'était simplement pour définir des voies nouvelles destinées à en rendre l'application plus efficace. Enfin, des problèmes jadis aigus - et qui le sont depuis redevenus plus que jamais - comme celui du partage du fardeau de la défense commune ou comme l'éventualité pour les troupes américaines stationnées en Europe de se trouver rappelées aux Etats-Unis avaient perdu - à l'exception de la question du partage du fardeau de la défense commune durant quelques mois en 1980 - leur acuité et avaient acquis une sorte de qualité rituelle.

Or, voici que, maintenant, tout a changé. Depuis trois ou quatre ans ces contextes statiques ont disparu. Et les choses ont été si vite que l'impression prévaut qu'ils nous ont quittés depuis des décades.

En Union Soviétique, le rigide immobilisme a fait place à une politique d'intense mouvement. Sans doute, certains des aspects de celle-ci, notamment en matière de relations extérieures et de sécurité, sont-ils de nature tactique. Un grand débat se poursuit d'ailleurs sur la signification, la portée, la substance même des réformes proclamées à Moscou. On s'interroge sur leur durée possible. Ce débat a une indéniable utilité.

Cela dit, il est difficile de nier que quelque chose d'important, surtout au plan interne, mais avec d'inévitables retombées dans le domaine des relations extérieures, est en train de se passer en Union Soviétique dont on ne peut pas ne pas tenir compte.

Ce mouvement a évidemment des conséquences pour les autres Etats du Pacte de Varsovie. Celles-ci demeurent toutefois peu claires. Il y a, d'une part, une tendance de ces pays à s'affirmer davantage - bien qu'avec prudence car les leçons de l'histoire (Hongrie, Tchécoslovaquie), demeurent très présentes à l'esprit. Cette affirmation se manifeste au niveau national, au niveau des rapports Est/Est, au niveau européen et, même à un niveau international plus large. On constate aussi une combinaison de mesures très limitées de libéralisation et de réactions de durcissement dues à l'inquiétude de directions qui se sentent menacées comme, par exemple, en Tchécoslovaquie et en Pologne pour ne rien dire du cas très spécial constitué par la Roumanie.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'impact du mouvement en question sur les rapports Est/Ouest est évident. Les tensions n'ont, sans doute, pas disparues mais le dialogue est désormais à l'ordre du jour et les négociations, particulièrement dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, ont acquis un rythme qu'elles n'avaient pas connu depuis longtemps.

Tout cela pourrait suffire à expliquer la fin du statu quo au sein de l'Alliance atlantique. Un autre motif existe toutefois dont l'importance n'est pas moindre. Il s'agit du débat qui se développe de part et d'autre de l'océan sur l'avenir de la relation transatlantique.

Aux Etats-Unis, ce débat est nourri par des livres comme ceux du professeur Paul Kennedy : "Rise and fall of the great powers" ("Grandeur et Décadence des grandes puissances") - ou du professeur David Caleo : "Beyond American Hegemony" ("Au-delà de l'hégémonie américaine"). De notre côté de l'océan, il l'est par des ouvrages comme celui de M. John Palmer, correspondant sur le continent du "Guardian", ouvrage intitulé "Europe without America" et dans lequel il

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écrit : "le monde économique militaire et politique de l'Alliance atlantique dans lequel deux générations d'Américains et d'Européens ont grandi jusqu'à l'âge adulte depuis 1945 est visiblement en train de se désintégrer....même le plus sobre des observateurs discute maintenant ouvertement de la crise au sein de l'ensemble atlantique et s'interroge sur le fait de savoir combien de temps il pourra survivre sous sa forme présente".

Je ne partage pas, PAS DU TOUT, l'analyse de M. Palmer mais je constate - le moyen de faire autrement - la réalité du débat.

Nous nous trouvons donc aujourd'hui face à des rapports Est/Ouest en pleine évolution et à une relation transatlantique dans une sorte de transition dont il ne faut ni exagérer la gravité ni nier l'importance.

Dans de telles conditions le devoir de tous les Alliés est de concourir à la sauvegarde de la solidarité atlantique sans laquelle il n'est pas de défense crédible de l'Occident et donc de l'Europe occidentale et sans laquelle il n'est pas de dialogue sérieux et fructueux avec nos interlocuteurs de l'Europe orientale, notamment en matière de contrôle des armements.

LE ROLE DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE ET, NOTAMMENT, DES "NEUF" DE L'UNION DE
L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

Ici nos Etats de l'Ouest de l'Europe et particulièrement les "Neuf" de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale ont un rôle à jouer. Je dis bien particulièrement mais j'ajoute immédiatement certainement pas exclusivement car nous appartenons tous à la fois à l'Alliance et à la construction européenne et notre intention n'est pas, au contraire, d'y constituer un club fermé.

Il est essentiel que ces Etats d'Europe définissent ensemble, notamment en matière de sécurité, leur identité, leurs intérêts et leurs options.

S'ils ne le font pas ils risquent de se trouver affrontés à de graves dangers dont la menace pèsera à la fois sur chacun d'entre eux, sur le processus de construction européenne et sur l'Alliance.

Tout d'abord, ils pourraient devenir, de façon croissante, dans le cadre du dialogue entre super-puissances d'une part et de l'évolution des relations transatlantiques d'autre part, des pions et non plus des joueurs, des partenaires de l'échiquier international.

Ensuite, les moins importants d'entre eux - mais peut-être pas eux seulement - seraient, dans ces circonstances, tentés de se dégager de l'effort commun de défense. Pourquoi en effet participer à un effort si l'on a rien à dire d'utile et d'efficace ?

Enfin quelques-uns, faute d'attitude concertée, harmonisée, pourraient se trouver appelés à poursuivre des voies différentes pour ne pas dire divergentes. Cela ne s'avérerait-il pas fatal aussi bien pour l'Alliance que pour la construction de notre Europe et pour chacun des pays européens intéressés ?

Au contraire, si nous nous trouvons capables, comme on le dit, en anglais, de façon imagée, "to put our act together", nous nous révélerons sans doute en mesure d'assumer un plus grand rôle comme aussi une plus grande partie des risques et des responsabilités au sein de l'Alliance et de renforcer - dans la perspective de l'échéance de 1992 - le travail d'édification de notre Europe.

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LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPEENNE

Tout cela m'amène naturellement à une réflexion à propos de cette dernière.

Les avatars de l'histoire et les obstacles aussi divers que nombreux que le processus de construction européenne a rencontrés sur sa route, en ont fait une oeuvre complexe aux facettes variées.

Je compare volontiers ce processus à une plante sur laquelle, au moment de sa naissance, une méchante fée aurait placé de lourdes pierres faisant obstacle à son épanouissement. La pauvre plante est, dès lors, obligée, pour croître, de lancer ses branches dans les sens les plus divers. Des sens, en tout état de cause, que la nature - et en l'occurrence la logique de la construction européenne - n'avaient pas prévus.

C'est ainsi que nous connaissons aujourd'hui :

- avec le Conseil de l'Europe, l'Europe des Vingt-et-un ;
- avec les Communautés Européennes et la Coopération Politique Européenne, celle des Douze ;
- avec les membres européens de l'Alliance atlantique celle des Quatorze que nous retrouvons notamment dans le Groupe Européen Indépendant des Programmes - bien que l'Islande n'y participe pas et - partiellement puisque la France et l'Islande n'en font pas partie dans l'EUROGROUPE. ;
- avec l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, celle hier des Sept, aujourd'hui des Neuf ;
- et ce sans compter la multiplication des relations bilatérales que les Alliés européens ne cessent pas de tisser entre eux.

Puis, il y a bien sur cette Europe de la C.S.C.E. à laquelle deux Etats Nord-américains nés de l'Europe, liés à elle et qui, dans cette mesure, lui appartiennent participent.

Et aussi, cette maison commune européenne à la construction de laquelle M. Gorbatchev nous convie et sur laquelle j'aurai l'occasion de revenir.

M. Michel Rocard, Premier Ministre français, a parfaitement décrit dans le magistral exposé qu'il a prononcé en ouvrant la présente session, ce foisonnement d'Europes.

A travers tant d'Europes peut-il en émerger une qui soit unique et qui concilie vision géopolitique, vision culturelle, vision économique et vision institutionnelle.

En réalité, une telle Europe se profile autour de plusieurs pôles. Le Conseil de l'Europe, l'Europe des Douze, la partie européenne de l'Alliance et aussi l'U.E.O.

Il s'agit, en quelque sorte, d'une construction à multiples enceintes mais reposant sur les mêmes fondations qui sont les valeurs démocratiques et humaines auxquelles tous ses participants adhèrent.

Voilà au stade actuel ce qui me semble être la véritable "Maison Europe". Elle s'érige, maintenant, non sans difficultés il est vrai, depuis quelque quarante ans.

Ne serait-il pas déraisonnable de l'abandonner pour une autre bâtisse dont la dénomination est séduisante mais dont les plans ne paraissent pas clairs et qui de toute façon n'existe pas encore?

Cette construction - NOTRE Maison Europe - est d'ailleurs ouverte à tous ceux qui partagent déjà ou qui décideraient de partager à l'avenir les valeurs démocratiques et humaines sur lesquelles elle repose.

Ses occupants sont, d'autre part, prêts à tout dialogue avec qui, n'adhérant pas de la même façon aux mêmes valeurs, le souhaitent.

Ils sont d'ailleurs conscients de la division du continent et de la nécessité de la surmonter.

La Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité adoptée par les Ministres de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale le 27 octobre 1987 ne précise-t-elle pas, dès son début - et là je voudrais la citer - que "l'Europe est au centre des relations Est/Ouest et, quarante ans après la fin de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, elle reste un continent divisé. Les conséquences humaines de cette division

demeurent inacceptables, bien que certaines améliorations concrètes aient été apportées à un niveau bilatéral, et sur la base de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Nous devons à nos peuples de surmonter cette situation et d'exploiter, dans l'intérêt de tous les Européens, les possibilités qui pourraient se présenter de nouvelles améliorations".

Ils sont aussi conscients des liens que l'histoire de même que la culture ont tissé entre Etats de l'Europe orientale et de l'Europe occidentale.

Ils souhaitent donc créer, sinon une maison, du moins un jardin commun où ceux de l'Est et ceux de l'Ouest pourraient se promener et parler d'un meilleur avenir et où leurs enfants pourraient jouer de concert en attendant cet avenir. Encore faudrait-il que ce jardin fut démuné de murs qui en sépareraient deux parties.

Cette construction européenne qui nous est propre, l'échéance de 1992 peut la renforcer considérablement pour autant que les Douze demeurent ouverts d'abord au plan de leur relations avec les participants aux autres enceintes de la construction européenne et notamment ceux du Conseil de l'Europe, mais aussi au plan de leur rapports avec leurs Alliés, avec l'autre partie de notre Continent et enfin avec le monde dans son ensemble et notamment le Tiers monde.

Mais prenons y garde, seule une Communauté Européenne dotée d'une vision et d'une vocation globale celle que souhaitaient ses "pères fondateurs" pourra répondre à ces exigences.

Si notre "Maison Europe" se limite à un marché unique - quelle que soit l'importance de celui-ci - elle deviendra bientôt une entité mercantile vite repliée sur une vision de plus en plus étroite de ses intérêts, prête à toutes les tentations protectionnistes, finalement hostiles aux autres et en butte à leur hostilité, répugnant de plus en plus à assumer ses indispensables responsabilités qu'il s'agisse de sa sécurité, du dialogue Est/Ouest ou du développement des Etats jeunes.

Certes, la construction européenne ne se développe pas à partir d'un plan précis d'un architecte.

C'est d'ailleurs ce qui rend si vaine la discussion théologique sur ce qu'elle doit devenir dans son ultime incarnation.

Jean Monnet l'avait bien compris qui écrivait en conclusion de ses Mémoires: "Ceux qui ne veulent rien entreprendre parce qu'ils ne sont pas assurés que les choses iront comme ils l'ont arrêté par avance se condamnent à l'immobilité. Personne ne peut dire aujourd'hui la forme qu'aura l'Europe où nous vivrons demain, car le changement qui naîtra du changement est imprévisible ..." Mais il ajoutait: "C'est jour après jour qu'il faut ouvrir son chemin, l'essentiel est d'avoir un objectif assez clair pour ne pas le perdre de vue".

Cela c'est l'indispensable vision globale autour de laquelle l'Europe doit se bâtir.

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LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE

Cette Europe, comment en concevoir la sécurité? D'abord bien sûr au sein de l'Alliance.

Tous les orateurs qui m'ont précédé et qui se sont exprimés à ce sujet, l'on dit mieux que je pourrais le faire.

Je me bornerai donc ici à développer, à cet égard, trois points.

L'importance, tout d'abord, attachée par la Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité, à cet aspect des choses.

L'indispensable nécessité - et c'est mon second point - de l'engagement nord-américain à nos côtés. Et ce, dans notre intérêt, dans l'intérêt de l'Alliance mais aussi celui des Alliés nord-américains.

Des choses importantes - j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le dire - se passent à l'Est de notre Continent.

Pour la première fois depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, un mouvement se dessine qui pourrait à terme - mais je ne sais lequel - permettre d'entrevoir des modifications peut-être substantielles de la situation géostratégique de notre continent.

Elles ne sont évidemment pas possibles sans les Européens eux-mêmes qu'ils soient de l'Est ou de l'Ouest.

Elles ne le sont évidemment pas non plus sans la super-puissance qu'est l'URSS.

Mais elles ne le sont pas davantage sans les Etats-Unis.

Et la question que l'on est en droit, dans ces conditions, de poser au Président élu de ces Etats-Unis est: "Croyez-vous le moment bien choisi - pour vous-même comme pour nous - de vous dégager de notre Europe?"

Enfin troisième point, la nécessaire émergence dans l'Alliance d'un pilier européen.

Il s'agit d'une notion très ancienne puisque la formule se trouvait utilisée, dès 1962, par le Président Kennedy. Il ne s'agit pas pour autant d'une notion bien précise. Elle peut recouvrir de nombreuses réalités plus ou moins modestes ou plus ou moins ambitieuses allant de la simple - mais essentielle - coopération en matière d'armements à une organisation commune européenne de nos forces et de notre défense, en passant par une réflexion en commun sur les problèmes qui nous affrontent et qui touchent à notre sécurité.

Une définition a été donnée de ce pilier par le Professeur David Greenwood, directeur du Centre des Etudes de Défense de l'université d'Aberdeen, dans un article paru dans la revue de l'OTAN.⁽¹⁾ Elle me paraît, à ce stade, particulièrement bonne parce qu'elle est suffisamment concrète pour permettre l'action et large pour n'empêcher aucune évolution. Elle se formule de la façon suivante:

- une personnalité européenne plus affirmée pour traiter des problèmes de la sécurité de notre Europe considérée, bien sûr, dans le contexte de la solidarité atlantique;

(1) "Construire le Pilier européen: questions et institutions" - "Revue de l'OTAN", No. 3 - juin 1988 - page 13.

- des structures solides et durables de coopération intra-européennes.

Ainsi conçu, le pilier européen de l'Alliance peut se constituer à partir d'éléments déjà existants, à savoir:

- les coopérations bilatérales entre Alliés européens;
- les organisations euro-atlantiques tels que le Groupe Européen Indépendant des Programmes et aussi l'Eurogroupe;
- les organisations européennes comme les Communautés, la Coopération politique et l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale.

Mais il existe une autre dimension que la dimension atlantique et à laquelle il nous faut aussi être attentifs.

C'est la dimension de la construction européenne.

On a dit et répété que celle-ci ne serait jamais complète si elle ne comportait pas un aspect sécurité.

La chose se trouve écrite dans le Document sur l'Identité Européenne adoptée à Copenhague, en décembre 1973, par ceux qui étaient encore les Neuf. Elle est affirmée par le rapport Tindemans de décembre 1975 - qui conserve aujourd'hui toute son actualité - et qui précise que l'Union européenne demeurera incomplète tant qu'elle n'aura pas une politique commune de défense.

Elle est la base des dispositions prévues, en la matière, par le projet de Traité sur l'Union européenne adopté en février 1984 par le Parlement européen.

Où en sommes-nous à cet égard?

Le problème de la création d'une dimension européenne de la sécurité se pose, en réalité, depuis le début même du processus d'édification de notre Europe, entamé il y a quelque quarante ans, au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale.

Les efforts n'ont pas manqué, au contraire, pour la développer.

Les dernières tentatives entreprises à cet égard - dans ce qui était encore les Dix - tendaient à la réaliser en donnant à la Coopération Politique les compétences voulues en la matière.

La chose paraissait raisonnable.

Qu'est-ce, après tout, que la coopération politique sinon un effort destiné à harmoniser les politiques étrangères des Etats membres et qu'est-ce qu'une politique étrangère sans son prolongement naturel dans le domaine de la sécurité sinon une politique étrangère incomplète et donc boiteuse. Il était dès lors normal que l'on donnât à la coopération politique les pouvoirs nécessaires pour assurer à l'Europe sa dimension sécurité.

Malheureusement, les efforts déployés dans ce sens n'ont abouti qu'à moitié puisque les Douze n'ont aujourd'hui de compétence que pour traiter des aspects politiques et des aspects économiques de la sécurité et pas de la sécurité en tant que telle.

Néanmoins, l'Acte unique européen adopté par les Dix, aujourd'hui Douze, en décembre 1985, constitue un progrès même s'il demeure limité - car il inscrit formellement la sécurité au nombre des préoccupations des Etats membres des Communautés et de la Coopération politique.

Son article 30 paragraphe 6 ne porte-t-il pas:

a) Les Hautes Parties Contractantes estiment qu'une coopération plus étroite sur les questions de la sécurité européenne est de nature à contribuer de façon essentielle au développement d'une identité de l'Europe en matière de politique extérieure. Elles sont disposées à coordonner davantage leurs positions sur les aspects politiques et économiques de la sécurité.

b) Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont résolues à préserver les conditions technologiques et industrielles nécessaires à leur sécurité. Elles oeuvrent à cet égard tant sur le plan national que, là où ce sera indiqué, dans le cadre des institutions et organes compétents.

c) Les dispositions du présent titre ne font pas obstacle à l'existence d'une coopération plus étroite dans le domaine de la sécurité entre certaines Hautes Parties Contractantes dans le cadre de l'U.E.O. et de l'Alliance Atlantique.

Entre-temps la Déclaration de Rome avait marqué la relance de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale et depuis, les Ministres de cette dernière ont procédé - en adoptant en octobre 1987 la Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens de sécurité - à une première définition d'une identité de notre Europe en la matière.

Le Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale vous a admirablement parlé de cette dernière.

Qu'il me suffise, dès lors, de rappeler que celle-ci est née, s'est développée et aujourd'hui réactivée, poursuit son action dans le double contexte de la construction européenne et de la solidarité atlantique.

Dans le premier cadre, elle s'affirme comme un élément - l'élément sécurité - de la construction européenne. Elle ne fait aux côtés de deux autres - Communautés européennes et Coopération politique - qui en sont à ce stade les dimensions respectivement économiques et de politique étrangère.

Elle est reconnue comme telle de façon croissante.

Il ne s'agit pas de nier ici la finalité politique ni la vocation globale que les pères "fondateurs" ont octroyé aux Communautés et qui ressort clairement des préambules du Traité de Paris créant la C.E.C.A. et des Traités de Rome. Elles sont évidentes. Simplement tant qu'il n'est pas possible d'en développer, notamment à l'égard de la Sécurité, les potentialités, l'U.E.O. qui constitue la seule partie de l'édifice Europe où il soit possible à les Européens de réfléchir en commun et de se concerter sur des problèmes relevant de ce domaine, doit jouer son rôle.

M. Jacques Delors, Président de la Commission, qui n'est pas un homme à transiger sur les compétences - actuelles ou à développer - des institutions dont il a la charge et qui ne manque pas de les rappeler à chaque occasion, a bien voulu le reconnaître lorsqu'il a déclaré en septembre 1987 à la tribune de l'Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense de Bruxelles :

"En termes institutionnels, mon espoir porte sur la réactivation de l'U.E.O. et sur sa capacité de jouer, un jour prochain, le rôle nécessaire d'interface entre Communauté européenne, Coopération politique et Alliance atlantique. Cet espoir se fonde sur le fait que, depuis sa réactivation, intervenue, il faut le souligner, dans un contexte plus difficile que propice - réponse à l'annonce unilatérale du programme IDS, rencontre de Reykjavik, accélération des négociations de Genève - l'U.E.O. a permis que s'instaure, à travers des rencontres fréquentes et régulières des Ministres de la Défense et des Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Sept Etats membres, une réflexion de fond sur la défense de l'Europe.

Elément de la construction européenne, l'U.E.O. a le devoir - qu'elle observe aussi scrupuleusement que possible - de conserver avec les deux autres les rapports de collaboration les plus étroits.

Elle a aussi celui de demeurer extrêmement attentive à leur évolution et aux conséquences que celles-ci peuvent avoir pour elle.

Car si, à un moment donné, LES DOUZE DEVAIENT SANS RESERVE, SANS ARRIERE PENSEE, adhérer à une dimension européenne de la sécurité, l'U.E.O. ne devrait-elle pas s'interroger sur son avenir et être prête, le cas échéant, à se fondre dans le courant principal de l'édifice Europe.

Mais tant que ce n'est pas le cas elle a un rôle propre à remplir et elle doit l'assurer pleinement.

A l'égard de la solidarité atlantique, l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale se révèle comme l'une des réalités, que j'ai énumérées plus haut, à partir desquelles un pays européen de l'Alliance pourrait être érigé.

J'ai la faiblesse de penser qu'elle occupe à cet égard une place privilégiée du fait :

- de sa compétence générale en matière de sécurité ;
- de son Assemblée parlementaire qui développe - avec son Conseil des Ministres - un dialogue démocratique, c'est-à-dire, public au niveau européen ;
- de l'évidente volonté politique que ses Etats membres, parfaitement traduite dans la Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité.

Cette dernière précise d'autre part sans ambiguïté la manière dont les Sept, aujourd'hui Neuf depuis l'adhésion de l'Espagne et du Portugal à l'Organisation le 14 novembre dernier - envisagent non seulement leurs intérêts de sécurité mais aussi les options et les responsabilités qui en découlent et cela autour de trois grands ordres d'idées :

- les conditions de sa sécurité ;
- ses critères ;
- les devoirs qui en découlent non seulement au plan de la défense mais aussi du contrôle des armements et du dialogue avec l'Est.

La Plate-forme a d'ailleurs d'ores et déjà reçu une application concrète de par les actions concertées et coordonnées menées dans le Golfe par cinq des Etats U.E.O. en toute solidarité avec les deux autres pour y maintenir une liberté de navigation essentielle pour notre Europe.

L'adhésion toute récente de l'Espagne et du Portugal donne à tout cela une dimension supplémentaire et une situation accrue.

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LES PRIORITES DE L'EUROPE EN MATIERE DE SECURITE

Voilà donc la construction européenne en train de mettre en place non sans difficulté ni parfois quelque confusion - mais les choses ont-elles jamais été faciles ou simples dans l'oeuvre d'édification de notre Europe - les éléments de sa dimension de sécurité.

Quelles doivent être, dans cette perspective, ses priorités?

Elles se trouvent indiquées dans la Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens de sécurité.

Plus précisément ces priorités portent, pour l'avenir immédiat :

- en ce qui concerne le volet défense, d'abord sur notre rôle dans l'Alliance et sur la part de responsabilités et de risques que nous sommes prêts à y assumer et ensuite sur notre détermination à réagir à tout événement menaçant notre sécurité comprise dans le sens le plus large - où qu'il apparaisse dans le monde et donc, aussi, dans les régions qui n'appartiennent pas à notre zone directe de défense ;

- en ce qui concerne le volet dialogue sur les négociations Est/Ouest.

A ce dernier égard des choses considérables, je vous l'ai déjà dit à deux reprises - se passent en U.R.S.S. Elles annoncent l'avènement d'une possible phase nouvelle dans les relations entre nos deux parties du Continent, et, à partir de là, dans l'ensemble des relations internationales, une phase que j'appellerai, sans doute faute d'imagination, celle de "l'après après-Seconde Guerre mondiale".

Nous devons y être ouverts et définir ou préciser des initiatives susceptibles de faire évoluer les choses dans un sens favorable à la sécurité de chacun et à la commune réduction des armements au plus bas niveau possible sur base d'un équilibre réel et vérifiable.

Si je viens d'ajouter le verbe préciser au verbe définir c'est que je constate qu'une grande partie des initiatives qui nous viennent de Moscou et qui sont bien accueillies par nos opinions sont, en réalité, les copies conformes de propositions qui avaient déjà été faites de notre côté.

L'Europe sera donc attentive à prendre toute la part voulue dans la préparation des positions de négociations de l'Alliance et dans les négociations elles-mêmes où elle sera présente.

Elle veillera à ce que celles-ci s'inscrivent dans le contexte d'un "concept global" tenant le plus grand compte de ses besoins de sécurité comme aussi de l'évolution de l'ensemble des rapports Est/Ouest, notamment au sein de la Conférence sur la sécurité et de la coopération en Europe.

L'évaluation qui sera faite des possibilités de progrès réels, à ce dernier égard, se gardera de ne tenir compte que de la "corbeille" relative au contrôle des armements et de celle portant sur la coopération économique et technologique.

On veillera tout autant à la troisième portant sur la libre circulation des personnes, des idées, et de l'information sur le continent Européen tout entier.

Ce n'est qu'ainsi que s'élimineront progressivement les obstacles à des contacts de plus en plus étroits à travers l'ensemble de l'Europe et que la division de celle-ci pourra se trouver un jour surmontée.

Il sera temps alors d'examiner - dans le prolongement de la CSCE qui peut se révéler à cet égard un instrument de grande valeur - quel cadre institutionnel il sera, le cas échéant, possible de donner à des rapports qu'un dialogue visant TOUS leurs aspects aura pu faire évoluer positivement.

Mais - et nous en revenons ici au volet Défense - si les Etats membres veulent prendre toute la part qui leur revient dans la négociation, ils doivent aussi être prêts à assumer celle qui doit être la leur dans la protection de leur sécurité.

Les évolutions encourageantes que nous constatons en Union Soviétique, les signaux positifs qui nous viennent de Moscou n'empêchent pas que la menace - dont l'existence est à l'origine de l'Alliance et de l'effort de défense poursuivi dans ce cadre par les Alliés européens - demeure. Elle est nucléaire, spatiale, chimique et conventionnelle : elle repose sur un déséquilibre quantitatif et une doctrine d'emploi offensive.

Certes, l'intention proclamée de la direction soviétique est de passer, en la matière d'une position offensive à une position défensive. Il faut s'en réjouir et encourager une telle tendance.

Si elle venait à se concrétiser, nous aurions alors affaire à deux Alliances, l'Atlantique et le Pacte de Varsovie dont la défense et non l'attaque serait l'axe de leur stratégie. Ce serait là, en quelque sorte, la "mesure de confiance" par excellence, celle qui constituerait sans conteste l'étape décisive vers un renouveau profond des rapports Est-Ouest.

Mais nous n'en sommes pas là.

Ni le déploiement des forces du Pacte de Varsovie, ni l'instruction donnée à ses troupes, ni le caractère des manoeuvres auxquelles celles-ci participent, ni la nature des armes produites et le rythme de leur production - tous domaines où le passage d'une position offensive à une position défensive ne pourrait manquer d'être remarqué - ne donnent, à ce stade d'indications de changements. Certes, ceci peut prendre quelque temps et nous devons porter attention à tout ce qui se produira à cet égard.

Mais en attendant, la dissuasion demeure toujours indispensable pour garantir la paix et la liberté de l'Europe occidentale.

La Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens de sécurité garde donc toute sa valeur lorsqu'elle énonce "dans les circonstances actuelles et à échéance prévisible, il n'existe pas d'alternative à la stratégie de l'Ouest pour prévenir la guerre, stratégie qui a assuré la paix dans la liberté pendant une période exceptionnellement longue de notre histoire. Pour être crédible et efficace, la stratégie de dissuasion et de défense doit continuer à se fonder sur une combinaison appropriée de forces nucléaires et conventionnelles, dont l'élément nucléaire est le seul qui puisse confronter un agresseur éventuel à un risque inacceptable" et lorsqu'elle dit "Nous sommes déterminés à assumer chacun notre part de la défense commune, tant dans le domaine conventionnel que nucléaire, conformément au principe du partage des risques et des responsabilités sur lesquels repose la cohésion alliée :

- dans le domaine conventionnel, nous continuerons tous à participer aux efforts en cours pour améliorer nos défenses ;
- dans le domaine nucléaire également, nous continuerons à assumer nos responsabilités : certains d'entre nous en poursuivant des coopérations appropriées avec les Etats-Unis ; le Royaume-Uni et la France en continuant à maintenir des forces nucléaires indépendantes, dont il sont déterminés à préserver la crédibilité.

Ce dernier passage nous fait toucher à un problème qui porte en anglais le nom rébarbatif de "burden-sharing" et auquel je préfère la locution française qui a maintenant cours "le partage du rôle des risques et des responsabilités".

Mais quel que soit le nom qu'on lui donne le problème est là. Il pèse sur la relation transatlantique et il continuera très visiblement de le faire de manière aiguë dans l'avenir prévisible.

Il serait erroné pour l'Administration américaine de réduire cette question à des comparaisons chiffrées le plus souvent trompeuses et d'accorder aux alliés européens, dans ce domaine, des espèces de bonnes et de mauvaises notes.

Une telle position serait contre-productive et dès lors nuisible.

Bien plus important me semble-t-il est pour les alliés de prendre ensemble la mesure de leur solidarité et - dans la perspective des intérêts partagés - de se répartir d'un commun accord, les risques et les responsabilités de notre défense commune en même temps que les rôles.

Ne nous dissimulons pas que la chose ne sera guère facile dans le contexte économique-budgétaire que connaissent les alliés Nord-Américains et Européens mais elle le sera d'autant plus que ces derniers seront plus prospères, mieux organisés et, si cette organisation est dotée d'une finalité politique - plus prêts à s'assumer.

Cela dit, il est important pour les Européens de se souvenir que le premier consommateur de sécurité doit aussi être, en l'occurrence, le principal producteur de cette sécurité.

En tout état de cause, notre sécurité comprise dans son sens le plus large ne se limite pas à la zone de notre défense directe. Après le Traité de Bruxelles modifié par les accords de Paris et la Déclaration de Rome d'octobre 1984 - qui constitue "l'Acte de renaissance" de l'U.E.O. - sa Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité le reconnaît puisque les Etats membres s'y affirment résolus à "concerter nos politiques sur les crises sévissant hors d'Europe dans la mesure où elles sont susceptibles d'affecter nos intérêts de sécurité".

Cet engagement a d'ores et déjà été suivi de manière concrète puisque des opérations navales, destinées à assurer la liberté de navigation dans le Golfe ont été poursuivies, de façon concertée et coordonnée, par cinq Etats membres de l'U.E.O., en totale solidarité avec les deux autres.

J'ai eu l'occasion de le mentionner mais je voudrais souligner l'importance de l'événement dont les Ministres de l'Organisation ont tiré le 14 novembre dernier les conclusions suivantes que je cite "notant avec satisfaction le succès de la concertation des Etats membres de l'U.E.O. en ce qui concerne les activités européennes dans le Golfe. Ils ont précisé en particulier que tous les pays membres avaient apporté une contribution, que ce soit directement ou en remplaçant les forces nationales envoyées dans le Golfe, ou financièrement, et qu'ils se consacraient actuellement à une tâche importante consistant au déminage d'une route de navigation (opération Cleansweep). Ils ont reconnu que l'expérience tirée des activités dans le Golfe renforcerait la capacité de l'Europe à mener une action concertée à l'avenir".

Où peut-on imaginer, pour le futur, une telle action concertée?

Ce ne sont pas les régions qui manquent, de la Méditerranée à l'Afrique Sud saharienne, du Pacifique à l'Océan indien.

D'ailleurs, un sous-groupe du Groupe de travail spécial de l'U.E.O. suit régulièrement l'évolution des choses en Méditerranée, cette zone qui nous est si proche et dont l'importance pour l'Europe n'est pas à souligner.

CONCLUSIONS

Cette première session européenne de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale a constitué sans aucun doute un grand succès.

Celui-ci est dû bien sûr à l'excellence de l'organisation qui lui a été assurée et dont j'ai eu l'occasion de remercier les responsables en entamant mon exposé. Il en est aussi redevable aux éminentes personnalités qui ont bien voulu venir ici exposer leurs idées, chefs et membres de gouvernements, personnalités politiques éminentes, le chef d'état-major des Armées français, importants responsables du secteur public ou privé, experts réputés.

Plusieurs suggestions ont été faites dans des domaines divers mais qui touchent tous à la sécurité de notre Europe et notamment par Monsieur Michel Rocard, Premier Ministre de la République française. Il a été particulièrement souhaité qu'une coopération européenne s'instaure d'urgence dans trois domaines :

- celui de la recherche et du développement (aussi en amont que possible) des systèmes d'armes et des procédures de vérification ;
- celui de la définition des besoins d'équipement pour les 30 prochaines années et de l'harmonisation des concepts opérationnels ;

- celui des technologies de l'espace.

Il a été, en outre, proposé de créer un centre européen de transparence chargé de faire le bilan des forces en présence. Un satellite d'observation dans le double but de recueillir des informations sur les déploiements des forces et de contribuer à la vérification des accords de maîtrise des armements,

A l'égard de la réalisation de certaines de ces idées, l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale pourrait jouer un rôle utile.

Le Centre de réflexion dont elle doit disposer pourrait assumer les responsabilités de centre européen de la transparence.

L'U.E.O. pourrait, d'autre part, favoriser l'harmonisation des programmes d'équipement militaire des pays membres afin de préparer en amont les projets de coopération dont la définition et la gestion se feraient dans le cadre du GEIP. Il s'agirait donc d'évaluer les besoins des pays membres et de mettre progressivement sur pied des échéanciers communs pour le renouvellement des matériels échéanciers, dans le cadre desquels pourrait s'élaborer la coopération industrielle tout en effectuant des économies d'échelle.

D'un autre côté, la nécessité de s'adresser à nos opinions, de parler aux Européens occidentaux de l'avenir de leur sécurité a été soulignée. A juste titre.

L'Europe, j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le dire, est d'abord une vision d'avenir.

Mais c'est aussi une multiplicité de processus complexes allant sans doute dans le même sens - celui de plus d'échanges et d'harmonisation entre nos Etats - mais qui demeure obscure à nos publics. C'est certainement le cas dans sa dimension de sécurité.

Quels sont les besoins de celle-ci ? Comment s'articulent-ils avec les négociations en matière de contrôle des armements ? Comment s'inscrivent-ils dans cette défense commune atlantique qui paraît parfois si lointaine à bon nombre de nos compatriotes qu'ils s'en distancient sans difficulté ?

Autant de problèmes dont nos ministres, nos hauts fonctionnaires, nos experts traitent à l'U.E.O. Mais autant de problèmes que nos opinions publiques ignorent, méconnaissent ou connaissent mal et dont elles tendent, dès lors, à se désintéresser.

Un fossé peut donc se creuser et - se creuse sans doute - entre les perceptions qu'ont de la sécurité de l'Europe une "élite" d'experts et le gros du public.

La chose est excessivement dangereuse car il est difficilement concevable dans nos démocraties de définir et de mettre en oeuvre une politique de défense dans le consensus de la majorité des citoyens.

Elle est, notons le, beaucoup moins sensible en France qu'ailleurs et l'action de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale et de son association d'anciens auditeurs a assurément sa part dans cette situation.

C'est pourquoi cette première session européenne présente tant d'importance, en elle-même d'abord, et par ses prolongements ensuite.

Ces prolongements, quels peuvent-ils être ?

En premier lieu, une poursuite régulière de telle rencontre, la Belgique a finalement accepté d'organiser la prochaine en 1989 et la Grande-Bretagne a fait savoir qu'elle était intéressée pour 1990.

En second lieu au-delà de l'organisation ponctuelle de tels séminaires, Monsieur Michel Rocard - et je lui en suis reconnaissant - a souhaité la création d'un Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité rattaché à l'U.E.O.

Je désire beaucoup la création d'un tel Institut.

En troisième lieu, pourquoi n'aurions nous pas une association des anciens auditeurs de ces sessions européennes ?

Je souhaite personnellement beaucoup que les liens tissés au cours de cette première session, dans la complicité intellectuelle des Comités comme à l'occasion des péripéties des visites, perdurent. Si vous concevez, Mesdames et Messieurs les auditeurs, le projet d'une association d'anciens de cette session, et des sessions européennes à venir, soyez assurés que les organes ministériels de l'UEO vous offriront le soutien administratif et matériel nécessaire à la réussite de cette entreprise. Votre initiative facilitera la mise sur pied des sessions à venir.

Ces sessions, cet Institut, cette éventuelle association d'anciens joueraient à l'égard de nos publics un rôle important comportant celui de notre Assemblée parlementaire et celui que s'efforcent de jouer le Conseil permanent et le Secrétariat général de l'UEO.

Unir les hommes constitue la condition sine qua non de l'avènement d'une Union Européenne indépendamment de toutes les formules institutionnelles que l'on peut imaginer ou récuser. Cette session européenne constitue un premier pas de cette symbiose d'où émergent les équipes qui, au gré de circonstances patiemment attendues, forgeront l'Europe de la sécurité et lui donneront les moyens de son rayonnement pacifique. La réflexion commune d'hommes

et de femmes d'origines et de formations diverses est indispensable à la définition par la concertation des objectifs prioritaires et des concepts fondamentaux d'une stratégie européenne pour la consolidation de la paix et la promotion de la libre circulation des hommes et des idées sur toute l'étendue du continent européen.



DIRECTION DES ÉTUDES

EUROPEAN SESSION

of

ADVANCED DEFENCE STUDIES

SUMMARY

TOPIC I : THE BASES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

iai	ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n° Inv.	8760
	28.2.1989
BIBLIOTECA	

PARIS

14th - 25th NOVEMBER 1988

SUMMARY

TOPIC I : The bases of european security.

TOPIC II : Europe's contribution to its defence effort.

TOPIC III : Disarmament negotiations and european security.

TOPIC IV : Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

TOPIC V : European cooperation : space, technology, arms.

TOPIC I: THE BASES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

- Platform on European Security Interests
Document UEO n° 1122 - 27 th october 87.

- Brussels treaty permanent commission
Communiqué of 17 th april, 1948.

- Interview given by Mr François MITTERRAND, President of the
Republic, to the "Nouvel Observateur" - Friday, 18 th december 1987.

- Speech of Mr Jacques CHIRAC, Prime minister, at the
Institute of Higher National Defence Studies - 12 décembre 1987.

- WEU and european security, by Daniel COLARD
Excerpts from "National Defence" - March 1988.

Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité

La Haye, 27 octobre 1987

1. Soulignant l'attachement de nos pays aux principes qui fondent nos démocraties et résolus à préserver la paix dans la liberté, nous, Ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense des Etats Membres de l'U.E.O., entendons réaffirmer la communauté de destin qui lie nos nations.
2. Nous rappelons notre engagement de construire une union européenne, conformément à l'Acte Unique Européen, que nous avons tous signé en tant que membres de la Communauté européenne. Nous sommes convaincus que la construction d'une Europe intégrée restera incomplète tant que cette construction ne s'étendra pas à la sécurité et à la défense.
3. Un instrument majeur pour atteindre cet objectif est le Traité de Bruxelles modifié. Ce traité, en instituant des obligations d'une portée considérable pour la défense collective, a constitué l'une des premières étapes de l'unité européenne. Il envisage également l'association progressive d'autres Etats européens s'inspirant des mêmes principes et animés par la même détermination. Nous estimons que la relance de l'U.E.O. apporte une importante contribution au processus plus large de l'unification européenne.
4. Nous visons ainsi à développer une identité européenne en matière de défense qui soit davantage cohérente et traduise plus efficacement les engagements de solidarité que nous avons souscrits dans le Traité de Bruxelles modifié et le Traité de l'Atlantique nord.
5. Nous attachons une grande valeur à l'engagement continu, dans cet effort, de l'Assemblée de l'U.E.O., qui est le seul organe parlementaire européen mandaté par traité pour débattre de tous les aspects de la sécurité, y compris les questions de défense.

NOTRE DÉMARCHE PROCÈDE DES CONDITIONS ACTUELLES DE LA SÉCURITÉ EUROPÉENNE

1. L'Europe est au centre des relations Est-Ouest et, quarante ans après la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, elle reste un continent divisé. Les conséquences humaines de cette division demeurent inacceptables, bien que certaines améliorations concrètes aient été apportées à un niveau bilatéral, et sur la base de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Nous devons à nos peuples de surmonter cette situation et d'exploiter, dans l'intérêt de tous les Européens, les possibilités qui pourraient se présenter de nouvelles améliorations.

Platform on European Security Interests

The Hague, 27 October 1987

1. Stressing the dedication of our countries to the principles upon which our democracies are based and resolved to preserve peace in freedom, we, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member States of WEU, reaffirm the common destiny which binds our countries.
2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.
3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This Treaty with its far-reaching obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It also envisages the progressive association of other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification.
4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.
5. We highly value the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defence.

OUR STARTING POINT IS THE PRESENT CONDITIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations and, forty years after the end of the Second World War, a divided continent. The human consequences of this division remain unacceptable, although certain concrete improvements have been made on a bilateral level and on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act. We owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit in the interest of all Europeans the opportunities for further improvements which may present themselves.

2. L'évolution récente des relations Est-Ouest, notamment en ce qui concerne la maîtrise des armements et le désarmement, de même que d'autres développements par exemple dans le domaine des technologies, pourraient avoir des répercussions considérables pour la sécurité européenne.

3. Nous n'avons pas encore assisté à une diminution de l'effort militaire que l'Union soviétique poursuit depuis de nombreuses années. La situation géostratégique de l'Europe occidentale la rend particulièrement vulnérable aux forces supérieures, tant conventionnelles et chimiques que nucléaires, du Pacte de Varsovie. C'est là le problème fondamental pour la sécurité européenne. La supériorité des forces conventionnelles du Pacte de Varsovie, et sa capacité à mener, par surprise, des opérations offensives de grande envergure, constituent dans ce contexte une préoccupation particulière.

4. Dans ces conditions la sécurité des pays d'Europe occidentale ne peut être assurée qu'en relation étroite avec nos alliés nord-américains. La sécurité de l'Alliance est indivisible. Les relations transatlantiques reposent à la fois sur des valeurs et des intérêts communs. Tout comme l'engagement des démocraties nord-américaines est crucial pour la sécurité européenne, une Europe occidentale libre, indépendante et de plus en plus unie est essentielle pour la sécurité de l'Amérique du Nord.

5. Nous sommes convaincus que la politique équilibrée que préconise le Rapport Harmel demeure valable. La solidarité politique et un potentiel militaire adéquat au sein de l'Alliance atlantique, la maîtrise des armements, le désarmement et la recherche d'une détente véritable restent partie intégrante de cette politique. Sécurité militaire et politique de détente ne sont pas contradictoires, mais complémentaires.

II

LA SÉCURITÉ EUROPÉENNE DOIT SE
FONDER SUR LES CRITÈRES SUIVANTS

1. Notre objectif premier reste de prévenir toute forme de guerre. Nous entendons préserver notre sécurité en restant prêts à nous défendre et en maintenant des capacités militaires propres à dissuader toute agression ou intimidation, sans pour cela rechercher la supériorité militaire.

2. Dans les circonstances actuelles et à échéance prévisible, il n'existe pas d'alternative à la stratégie de l'Ouest pour prévenir la guerre, stratégie qui a assuré la paix dans la liberté pendant une période exceptionnellement longue de notre histoire. Pour être crédible et efficace, la stratégie de dissuasion et de défense doit continuer à se fonder sur une combinaison appropriée de forces nucléaires et conventionnelles, dont l'élément nucléaire est le seul qui puisse confronter un agresseur éventuel à un risque inacceptable.

3. La présence importante des forces conventionnelles et nucléaires des États-Unis joue un rôle irremplaçable dans la défense de l'Europe. Elles sont l'expression concrète de l'engagement américain à la défense de l'Europe et constituent le lien indispensable avec les forces de dissuasion stratégiques des États-Unis.

2. New developments in East-West relations, particularly in arms control and disarmament, and also other developments, for example in the sphere of technology, could have far-reaching implications for European security.

3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.

4. Under these conditions the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the Alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.

5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel Report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.

II

EUROPEAN SECURITY SHOULD BE
BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA

1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority.

2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the Western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

3. The substantial presence of US conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the US strategic deterrent.

4. Les forces européennes jouent un rôle essentiel: la crédibilité globale de la stratégie occidentale de dissuasion et de défense ne peut être maintenue sans une contribution majeure de la part de l'Europe, en raison tout particulièrement du déséquilibre conventionnel qui affecte très directement sa sécurité.

Les Européens ont une responsabilité majeure en matière de défense tant sur le plan conventionnel que nucléaire. Dans le domaine conventionnel, les forces des pays membres de l'U.E.O. constituent une part essentielle des forces de l'Alliance. S'agissant des forces nucléaires qui toutes participent à la dissuasion, les coopérations que certains Etats membres entretiennent avec les Etats-Unis sont nécessaires à la sécurité de l'Europe. Les forces indépendantes de la France et du Royaume-Uni contribuent à la dissuasion globale et à la sécurité.

5. Le contrôle des armements et le désarmement font partie intégrante de la politique de sécurité occidentale; ils n'en sont pas une alternative. Ils devraient permettre d'instaurer un équilibre des forces stable au niveau le plus bas compatible avec notre sécurité. La politique de contrôle des armements, comme notre politique de défense, devrait tenir compte des intérêts spécifiques de l'Europe en matière de sécurité dans une situation en évolution. Elle doit être compatible avec le maintien de l'unité stratégique de l'Alliance et ne doit pas empêcher d'améliorer la coopération européenne en matière de défense. Les accords de contrôle des armements doivent être effectivement vérifiables et résister à l'épreuve du temps. L'Est et l'Ouest ont un même intérêt à réaliser cet objectif.

III

LES ETATS MEMBRES DE L'U.E.O. ENTIENDENT ASSUMER PLEINEMENT LEURS RESPONSABILITES

a. Dans le domaine de la défense occidentale

1. Nous rappelons l'obligation fondamentale de l'Article V du Traité de Bruxelles modifié de porter aide et assistance par tous les moyens en notre pouvoir, militaires et autres, dans le cas d'une attaque armée dirigée contre l'un d'entre nous. Cette garantie, qui relève notre destinée commune, renforce les engagements que nous avons pris dans le cadre de l'Alliance atlantique, à laquelle chacun de nous appartient, et que nous sommes déterminés à préserver.

2. Nous sommes convaincus qu'une Europe plus unie apportera une contribution plus forte à l'Alliance, au bénéfice de la sécurité occidentale dans son ensemble. Cela renforcera le rôle de l'Europe dans l'Alliance et assurera la base d'une relation transatlantique équilibrée. Nous sommes résolus à renforcer le pilier européen de l'Alliance.

3. Nous sommes déterminés à assumer chacun notre part de la défense commune, tant dans le domaine conventionnel que nucléaire, conformément au principe du partage des risques et des responsabilités sur lesquels repose la cohésion alliée.

Dans le domaine conventionnel, nous continuerons tous à participer aux efforts en cours pour améliorer nos défenses;

4. European forces play an essential role: the overall credibility of the Western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution, not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way.

The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member States represent an essential part of those of the Alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the cooperative arrangements that certain member States maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.

5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of Western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Alliance and should not preclude closer European defence cooperation. Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

III

THE MEMBER STATES OF WEU INTEND TO ASSUME FULLY THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

a. In the field of Western defence

1. We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide all the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve.

2. It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance, to the benefit of Western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the Alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

3. We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion.

In the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the ongoing efforts to improve our defences.

- Dans le domaine nucléaire également, nous continuerons à assumer nos responsabilités: certains d'entre nous en poursuivant des coopérations appropriées avec les Etats-Unis; le Royaume-Uni et la France en continuant à maintenir des forces nucléaires indépendantes, dont ils sont déterminés à préserver la crédibilité.

4. Nous restons résolus à poursuivre une intégration européenne qui s'étende à la sécurité et la défense et à contribuer de manière plus efficace à la défense commune de l'Ouest:

En conséquence, nous entendons:

- assurer que notre détermination à défendre, à ses frontières, tout Etat membre soit clairement manifeste au moyen de dispositions appropriées;
- améliorer nos consultations et élargir notre coordination en matière de défense et de sécurité et examiner à cette fin toute mesure pratique;
- tirer le meilleur parti possible des mécanismes institutionnels existants permettant la participation des Ministres de la Défense et de leurs représentants aux activités de l'U.E.O.;
- veiller à ce que le niveau de contribution de chaque pays à la défense commune reflète ses capacités de façon adéquate;
- viser à une utilisation plus efficace des ressources existantes, notamment en étendant la coopération militaire bilatérale et régionale, poursuivre nos efforts pour maintenir en Europe une base industrielle technologiquement avancée et intensifier la coopération en matière d'armement;
- concerter nos politiques sur les crises survenant hors d'Europe, dans la mesure où elles sont susceptibles d'affecter nos intérêts de sécurité.

5. Soulignant la contribution vitale que les pays de l'Alliance non membres de l'U.E.O. apportent à la sécurité commune et à la défense, nous continuerons à les informer de nos activités.

b. *En matière de contrôle des armements et de désarmement*

1. En matière de contrôle des armements et de désarmement, nous poursuivons une politique active visant à influencer les évolutions à venir de façon à renforcer la sécurité et à favoriser la stabilité et la coopération dans l'ensemble de l'Europe. La fermeté et la cohésion de l'Alliance ainsi que des consultations étroites entre tous les Alliés restent essentielles si l'on veut obtenir des résultats concrets.

2. Nous nous sommes engagés à mettre au point notre concept global de maîtrise des armements et de désarmement, conformément à la Déclaration de l'Alliance du 12 juin 1987, et à mener nos travaux dans le cadre de ce concept tel qu'il est envisagé particulièrement aux paragraphes 7 et 8 de cette déclaration. Un accord entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique pour l'élimination globale des missiles FNI basés à terre d'une portée de 500 km à 5.500 km constituera un élément important dans une telle approche.

3. Dans la suite de notre approche, nous exploiterons toutes les possibilités de nouveaux progrès vers des réductions des armements compatibles avec notre

- In the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate cooperative arrangements with the US; the UK and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.

4. We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a more effective contribution to the common defence of the West.

To this end we shall:

- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements;
- improve our consultations and extend our coordination in defence and security matters and examine all practical steps to this end;
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the Defence Ministers and their representatives in the work of WEU;
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects its capabilities;
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional military cooperation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments cooperation;
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect our security interests.

5. Emphasising the vital contribution of the non WEU members of the Alliance to the common security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities.

b. *In the field of arms control and disarmament*

1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the Alliance and close consultations among all the Allies remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about.

2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the Alliance's declaration of 12 June 1987 and we will work within the framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An agreement between the US and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 km and 5500 km will constitute an important element of such an approach.

3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with

sécurité et nos priorités, en tenant compte du fait que les travaux en ce domaine soulèvent des problèmes complexes et interdépendants. Nous les étudierons ensemble, prenant en considération les exigences politiques et militaires de notre sécurité, et de l'évolution des différentes négociations.

c. Dans le domaine du dialogue et de la coopération entre l'Est et l'Ouest

1. La responsabilité commune de tous les Européens n'est pas seulement de préserver la paix, mais de le faire de manière constructive. Les dispositions de l'Acte final d'Helsinki continuent à nous guider dans la réalisation de l'objectif visant à surmonter progressivement la division de l'Europe. Nous devons par conséquent continuer à utiliser pleinement le processus de la CSCE afin de promouvoir une coopération globale entre tous les Etats participants.

2. Les possibilités contenues dans l'Acte final devraient être exploitées à fond. En conséquence nous entendons:

- chercher à accroître la transparence des activités et des potentiels militaires et la prévisibilité des comportements, conformément au document de Stockholm de 1986, grâce à de nouvelles mesures de confiance,
- mettre tout en oeuvre pour assurer un respect total des droits de l'homme, sans lequel il n'est pas de paix réelle possible,
- ouvrir de nouvelles possibilités de coopération à l'avantage de tous dans les domaines de l'économie, de la technologie, de la science et de la protection de l'environnement,
- multiplier les occasions d'accroître la libre circulation des personnes, des idées et de l'information dans l'ensemble de l'Europe, et intensifier les échanges culturels, et promouvoir ainsi des améliorations concrètes dont bénéficieront tous les peuples européens.

Notre objectif est de promouvoir l'intégration européenne. Dans cette perspective nous poursuivrons nos efforts pour aboutir à une coopération plus étroite en matière de sécurité, le couplage avec les Etats-Unis étant maintenu et les conditions d'une sécurité égale dans l'ensemble de l'Alliance assurées.

Nous sommes conscients de l'héritage qu'ont en commun tous les pays de notre continent divisé, dont tous les peuples ont un même droit de vivre dans la paix et la liberté. C'est pourquoi nous sommes déterminés à faire tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour atteindre notre but final d'un ordre de paix juste et durable en Europe.

our priorities, taking into account the fact that work in this area raises complex and interrelated issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotiations.

c. In the field of East-West dialogue and cooperation

1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not only to preserve the peace but to shape it constructively. The Helsinki Final Act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of gradually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE process in order to promote comprehensive cooperation among all participating states.

2. The possibilities contained in the Final Act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend:

- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm Document of 1986 by further confidence-building measures;
- vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which no genuine peace is possible;
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and the protection of the environment;
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges, and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe.

It is our objective to further European integration. In this perspective we will continue our efforts towards closer security cooperation, maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring conditions of equal security in the Alliance as a whole.

We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION

Communiqué of 17th April, 1948

"The Five Foreign Ministers of the Signatory Powers of the Brussels Treaty met in Paris on 17th April, 1948, in Consultative Council under the terms of Article 7 and agreed on the following arrangements with a view to ensuring the implementation of the agreement of 17th March.

- (1) The Permanent Consultative Council shall be composed of the Five Foreign Ministers - The Council will meet in each of the capitals of the Signatory States in turn whenever such a meeting is believed necessary, and in any case once every three months.
- (2) The Permanent Organ of the Council shall be composed of the diplomatic representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Holland, in London and the representative appointed for this purpose by His Majesty's Government. It will be assisted by a Secretariat. It will meet at least once a month.
- (3) The security problems envisaged in the Treaty shall normally be handled by the responsible Ministers of the different countries, who will meet in London to discuss them whenever this is deemed necessary. In order to pursue the study of these same questions a permanent Military Committee shall be set up in London under the authority of the Council and under the control of the Political representatives mentioned in paragraph (2).
- (4) The Council shall decide on periodical meetings, in a place to be designated, of Ministers or competent experts to deal with economic, social and cultural questions. In order to pursue the task undertaken at the meetings, the Council shall decide to set up special Committees to this end.
- (5) All the Committees mentioned above shall report to the Consultative Council."

Lancaster House, S.W.1.

7th June, 1948.

"On 17 March 1988 it will be forty years since the Brussels Treaty was signed.

The Treaty, which was amended in 1954 by the Paris Agreements, constitutes the legal basis of Western European Union (WEU).

This organization, which was reactivated in 1984, is today the centre of European political cooperation in security matters, within the context of Atlantic solidarity which it seeks to strengthen.

The adoption in October 1987 in The Hague of a "Platform on European Security Interests" and the coordination within the Organization of the naval operation in the Gulf are part of the same process.

This anniversary will be commemorated by a speech on 17 March in The Hague by Mr. Hans van den Broek, Netherlands Foreign Minister, whose country at present holds the presidency of WEU."



"Il y aura quarante ans le 17 mars 1988 que le Traité de Bruxelles a été signé.

Ce Traité, amendé en 1954 par les Accords de Paris, constitue la base juridique de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale (UEO).

Cette organisation qui a été réactivée en 1984, est aujourd'hui le centre d'une coopération politique européenne en matière de sécurité s'inscrivant dans la perspective de la solidarité atlantique qu'elle souhaite renforcer.

L'adoption en octobre 1987 à La Haye d'une "Plate-forme sur les intérêts européens en matière de sécurité" et la coordination au sein de l'organisation de l'opération navale dans le Golfe participent de cette même démarche.

La commémoration de cet anniversaire fera l'objet d'un discours à La Haye le 17 mars de M. Hans van den Broek, ministre des Affaires étrangères des Pays-Bas, pays qui assure actuellement la présidence de l'UEO."

LA RELANCE DE L'UEO : UNE DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT GOERENS

PARIS (EU), mardi 29 décembre 1987 - Dégageant les conclusions des travaux du Comité des Présidents, organe directeur de l'Assemblée, qui s'est réuni la semaine dernière à Paris, M. Charles Goerens, Président de l'Assemblée de l'UEO, a fait la déclaration suivante :

1. Au terme de l'année 1987, il faut se féliciter de l'adoption par le Conseil de l'UEO, le 27 octobre dernier à La Haye, de la "plate-forme sur les intérêts de sécurité européens", qui représente la première manifestation d'une volonté, de la part des pays membres, d'affirmer l'identité européenne en matière de défense, depuis l'échec de la Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) en 1954.

2. D'autre part, la concertation entre pays membres de l'UEO face à la crise du Golfe constitue une "première" dans l'application du paragraphe 3 de l'Article VIII du Traité de Bruxelles modifié dont l'efficacité pourrait être renforcée par la création, au sein du Secrétariat Général de l'UEO, d'une "cellule de crise", capable de fonctionner en permanence, face aux menaces qui affectent les intérêts européens hors de la zone OTAN.

3. En ce qui concerne le problème de la restructuration des agences de l'UEO, demeuré sans solution à la veille de l'échéance du 31 décembre 1987 : le Comité des Présidents exprime l'espoir que sera dégagée prochainement une solution qui soit à la hauteur des défis lancés à l'Europe de la défense, dont la voix parvient difficilement à se faire entendre sur des dossiers qui engagent son avenir.

4. En ce qui concerne enfin l'élargissement de l'Union, le Comité des Présidents constate que la cohésion de l'Europe occidentale dans son ensemble serait affaiblie par le refus d'ouvrir les portes de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale à des pays tels que le Portugal et l'Espagne.

5. Dans ces conditions, l'Assemblée de l'UEO, sous l'impulsion de son Président et de son Comité du Président réuni le 17 décembre à Paris, a tenu à assurer le Conseil de son appui en 1988, dans les efforts qu'il entreprendra pour dégager une solution de ces problèmes afin de répondre à l'attente de l'opinion publique européenne."

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Press Department

INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MR FRANCOIS MITTERRAND,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,

TO THE 'NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR'

Friday, 18 December 1987

Q. Is this Washington Agreement historic or not?

PRESIDENT - This is the first time that the Soviet Union and the United States have disarmed since the Second World War and it is the first time that on-site inspections have been allowed. In that sense, this exceptional event will be historic if it marks the beginning of a genuine peace process which will have to be taken much further for it will not become historic if we stop there.

Q. Usually, the aim has been to try to impose limits. Is the process now being reversed?

PRESIDENT - Let's face it, there has always been 'over-arming'.

Q. You said in Le Creusot that one either had to disarm or over-arm. Why?

PRESIDENT - Because there is no other choice. Failing a disarmament agreement, each of the two superpowers will endeavour to be better equipped and stronger than the other. It's a matter of escalation. It has always been like that and cannot be otherwise. There is no evidence to the contrary. And a country like France, which must maintain its credibility and nuclear deterrent, has to do the same.

Q. Some people find the total euphoria in American public opinion irresponsible. What is your view?

PRESIDENT - It's a good thing to disarm and I find it quite normal that people should be pleased about this. But the euphoria is excessive. What the Americans and Russians have just agreed in Washington reduces their total nuclear arsenals by less than 10%. This is good but not enough.

Q. In Europe, the man in the street is saying that all this is happening without us.

PRESIDENT - Of course it is happening without us since these are negotiations between Americans and the Soviets about American and Soviet weapons and their agreement is binding only on them.

Q. When it is said that this is happening without us, does that mean at our expense?

PRESIDENT - I don't think so. It would be at our expense if the Russians and Americans had persuaded us to reduce our own levels of armaments. This has indeed been suggested to us on various occasions but, from the start, we have categorically rejected any such possibility. The matter has not been mentioned since, until the next time that is!

Q. Do you not think yourself that we have a right to have some say in the matter?

PRESIDENT - Not only do I not regret that France was not party to the negotiations but, if I had been asked, I would have refused. If France had been involved, it would have been required to place its weapons on the table, which was inconceivable. There is such an imbalance in the ratio of forces! The Americans have some 13.000 strategic nuclear warheads and the Russians over 11.000. We, for our part, have some 300 which is enough for us but gives us no margin of manoeuvre in disarmament whilst the others enjoy such superiority. On 28 September 1983, in my address to the UN, I set down the three necessary conditions for France to be associated with the future of nuclear disarmament.

Q. What were they? Could you outline them again?

PRESIDENT. - Of course. Firstly, that the gap between the nuclear potential of the two superpowers and our own should, to begin with, be considerably reduced; secondly, that the conventional imbalance in Europe be corrected and chemical weapons eliminated; thirdly, that the outbidding in anti-missile, anti-satellite and anti-submarine weapons should cease.

Q. You have therefore confirmed to me that you are the European Statesman who most approves of this agreement.

PRESIDENT - That's for you to judge. But there is a logic to the facts. When, in 1977, the Soviets installed their first SS20 missiles targeted on Europe, I alerted public opinion. These missiles which, with a range of 4.500 km, could not cross the Atlantic and therefore hit America, did however threaten the entire military structure of Western Europe from Northern Norway to Southern Italy. I saw in this threat a desire to split the European and American allies and to weaken their defence reflexes through division.

When in 1979 the NATO integrated command decided, over a four year period, (i.e. by 1983) to instal American Pershing II and cruise missiles on the continent of Europe if the Soviets maintained or, worse, increased the number of their SS20s, what I said everywhere, including in the National Assembly was: "Neither SS20s, nor Pershing IIs".

When, in 1983, the Soviets refused to withdraw the SS20s and I detected hesitation in some quarters to implement the NATO decision, I said in the speech to the Bundestag in Bonn that I favoured the Pershing II deployment which, in my view, was the only way of restoring the balance in this category of weapons between East and West and of forcing the USSR to negotiate. Well now, since the Americans and Russians have today agreed, by a process of reciprocal inspection, to remove the SS20s and Pershing IIs, I can only give my approval.

In short, it was NATO which first proposed the zero-option which is another way of saying "No SS20s and no Pershing IIs"; it was then Ronald Reagan who reiterated this commitment in 1981. Should one be against the idea because Mikhail Gorbachev has now in turn come round to the idea?

Q. A number of leaders cannot openly oppose the disagreement but secretly reject it in their subconscious ...

PRESIDENT — What do you mean "they cannot? ..." Of course they can!

Q. . . . What I mean is that they cannot morally oppose it . . .

PRESIDENT - Why? They have only to state their view. It's a question of intellectual courage. If they believe that the Washington Agreement is a threat to our security they should say so and stop pretending.

This is a curious approach and a strange kind of patriotism. On the one hand, the impression is given that the two zero-options are a catastrophe and, on the other, they are supported. I prefer people who oppose the idea and give their reasons.

Q. . . . Behind their exhortations and their calls for vigilance one senses a fear of being deserted by the Americans.

PRESIDENT - At all events, clearly, there must be vigilance! As to the decoupling, i.e. the separation of the United States from Europe, there is no forgetting what the Alliance means, that is indeed a real danger.

Q. . . . Has the automatic solidarity or coupling between the United States and Europe been called into question by the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement?

PRESIDENT - Make no mistake, solidarity has never been automatic! It was because the immediate intervention of the United States in Western Europe was uncertain that General de Gaulle wanted to leave the NATO integrated command and provide France with an independent nuclear deterrent force under his control. Nothing has changed since. Some leading American figures have clearly stated that they have no intention of being drawn into a war in Europe without the opportunity for prior assessment. Others have been more reassuring. An example of the former case is Henry Kissinger and of the latter Ronald Reagan. The problem is not new. The Reagan-Gorbachev agreement did not create this vacuum; it has been there for some time.

Q. But does the agreement expected this vacuum?

PRESIDENT - No, security depends on a balance of nuclear forces between East and West and on the certainty in the mind of each Bloc that any threat to this balance would endanger peace. The absence of any automaticity in Western solidarity undermines this certainty but the Washington Agreement has no bearing on it.

Q. The main argument of the opponents of the zero-options is that security also depends on the presence of American forces in Europe and that the removal of the Pershing II missiles undermines this presence.

PRESIDENT - It would be paradoxical to suggest that security in Europe had only been ensured for four years from 1983 to 1987 thanks to the Pershing II missiles alone. But it is true that the American military presence on our continent is an important deterrent factor.

Q. Because it commits the Americans?

PRESIDENT - In some ways, yes. Nevertheless, this commitment depends more on the feeling of the United States, as a world power, that they cannot lose interest in Europe without endangering themselves. At the end of the day, it is all a matter of resolve on the part of the American people and of their President. No strategy can replace political will.

Q. So many factors about which you were saying that there were grounds for doubt and that it was that which prompted the decisions by General de Gaulle.

PRESIDENT - The Atlantic Alliance is a reality which must not be underestimated. However, having come round to a strategy of graduated or flexible response between 1962 and 1967 under the impetus of President Kennedy and Mr MacNamara, the European members of the NATO integrated structure preferred not to know when and under what conditions the Americans would come to their aid on the ground.

Q. In this connection, are the Europeans and the French right or wrong in thinking that the presence of American troops in Germany strengthens the coupling?

PRESIDENT - Yes. It is a sign of a healthy Alliance.

Q. Do you think they will leave?

PRESIDENT - Not under present circumstances.

Q. Do you dread it happening?

PRESIDENT - As Aragon said, nothing is ever certain.

Q. May I come back to your criticism of NATO strategy? Have you always been opposed to "the flexible response"?

PRESIDENT - I have strong reservations about this strategy which offers a worrying way out for our transatlantic allies. I know that I am one of the few who think in this way. Generally, this opinion surprises and shocks Atlantic milieux. I realised this only recently last May in Venice when I had a detailed discussion on the subject with Mr Reagan, Mrs Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl. I always come back to the same point. The aim of the deterrence strategy is to prevent war not to win it. Anything which detracts from this worries me. Many people lose sight of this fact.

Q. Could NATO adopt a strategy of total response?

PRESIDENT - This is not the prevailing state of opinion. But France rejects any form of flexibility for itself.

Q. Was not the 'flexible response' logically unavoidable?

PRESIDENT - Avoidable, yes. No country would run the risk of a nuclear war or a conventional war which would inevitably lead to a nuclear war if it thought it would be the victim. That is our best guarantee.

Q. To come back to your argument, therefore, basically one of the risks of 'decoupling' arises from this strategy of flexible response ...

PRESIDENT - No. A flexible strategy is not the cause but the effect of hesitating to give deterrence its true content.

Q. Can one say therefore that the spirit of the Washington Agreements has steepened this slope?

PRESIDENT - On the contrary, it allows us to come back to the true deterrent, namely the long-range nuclear weapons which can directly hit enemy territory.

Q. One idea put forward and which apparently frightens some of the elite is that of the 'denuclearization' of Europe and the world.

PRESIDENT - For the time being, it is no more than an idea. Firstly, several years will be required to implement and oversee the Washington INF agreement, then several years more to achieve the planned 50% reduction in the US-Soviet strategic arsenal and several years more than that to make a further step forward. Secondly, denuclearization would presuppose disarmament and a balance of forces at a low level and in all areas. We have not reached that stage. Everyone knows that 'angelism' has not so far been the hallmark of international relations. To achieve it would be admirable. Leave me time to get used to it.

Q. Do you think it is achievable despite the US-Soviet disagreement over the ABM Treaty and SDI?

PRESIDENT - The two superpowers can, if they wish, find common ground based on compliance with the ABM Treaty and a 50% cut in their strategic weapons. They merely have to agree on the type of tests authorized in space because laboratory research is no longer a problem.

Q. May I come back to my question on denuclearization ...

PRESIDENT - If you wish. Then let me be clear. As long as there is a threat to the integrity and independence of our country, irrespective of what form that threat takes, be it nuclear, conventional or chemical, France will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability.

Q. The Communist Party says that you are opposed to denuclearization and are therefore a war monger.

PRESIDENT - They are wrong and they know they are. But who would dare ask France to abandon its weapons before the superpowers had abandoned theirs? Neither the Americans nor the Soviets are asking us to do that. I think French people understand my reasoning.

Q. And during this period will the credibility - vital to our deterrent force - remain intact?

PRESIDENT - Yes. When the Americans and Russians overarm themselves, it is a major effort for us to stay above the credibility threshold. But we have done so and will continue to do so. Happily, disarmament opens up new prospects.

Q. Don't you think that the French deterrent has, to however a small degree, been undermined psychologically? By SDI, the current debate and technological progress?

PRESIDENT - All this has to be set in different contexts. Flexible response is already twenty years old. The implementation of the American SDI is far from being ensured. Neither of these two things has signed away the French deterrent which depends solely on our political will.

Q. In your thinking, everything that is not a global response undermines deterrence.

PRESIDENT - Yes.

Q. In the Federal Republic you spoke again of the neutron bomb ...

PRESIDENT - We have the capacity to manufacture the neutron bomb whenever we wish. But I said in Hanover that France would not take such a decision if there were possibilities for conventional disarmament in Europe.

Q. In 1980 and 1981 you said on two occasions that the Soviet Union was in the process of stockpiling weapons to win a war without waging one.

PRESIDENT - The aim of any strategy is to obtain without war what one could obtain with war. That's known as the strategy of threat. But I do not believe for one minute that the Soviet Union has bellicose intentions. Its people know the terrible price of war and its leaders are advocating peace. Therein lies everyone's interest.

Q. Do the good intentions shown by Mr Gorbachev in these agreements imply that he has abandoned the traditional desire to decouple the United States from Europe?

PRESIDENT - No. Even though I am convinced that Mr Gorbachev wants peace for its own sake and all that flows from that.

Q. ... Prominence is being given at the moment to a number of impressive texts on the logic of the Soviet Union - Tatu and Hoffmann have done this - namely, that there is a durability in the will to bring about decoupling which has been constant over the last two decades. Do you not think that a situation might arise where France would be forced to yield to these pressures?

PRESIDENT - One merely has to say no and stick to that.

Q. Is that so easy?

PRESIDENT - I will reiterate for you what I have written and stated several times. As long as France has the technical and financial capability, it will equip itself with all the weapons which the others possess. It's quite simple. If these weapons disappear everywhere else, the same will happen here.

Q. Why have we decided to manufacture chemical weapons?

PRESIDENT - Because of the rule I have just described. Because they are manufactured in the Soviet Union and in the United States. But I hope that the superpowers regain their self-control, respect the long-standing agreements (in respect of which France is the depository State), banning the use of chemical weapons and that these agreements are extended to include manufacture and storage. Long live the world without chemical weapons? Our diplomacy is directed to that end.

Q. Does nuclear disarmament increase the importance of conventional forces?

PRESIDENT - It brings them more to the forefront and spurs us on to reduce them to achieve a balance of the present forces at the lowest possible level which precludes the possibility of surprise attack. The normal framework for these negotiations is the Vienna Conference which brings together all countries of Europe and is not simply a 'Bloc-to-Bloc' negotiation.

Q. All things considered, do you have an opinion regarding these agreements and their follow-up?

PRESIDENT - That the balances be preserved. It would be unthinkable that disarmament should reduce the level of security in the world when it is designed to increase it.

Q. Have the Soviet Union or Americans informed you of their talks?

PRESIDENT - Yes, Ronald Reagan telephoned me on Friday evening in Antibes where the Franco-African Summit was taking place and in Paris I have received emissaries from Mr Gorbachev.

Q. Now a question which everyone is asking. What is our deterrent force protecting? Can Germany be associated with it? Who else is protected by it?

PRESIDENT - I'll give you the standard reply. The aim of the

deterrent strategy is to protect our country from war and what are known as its vital interests. The President of the Republic is the only person able to decide if and when these interests are threatened. The Federal Republic of Germany is our ally in two ways: firstly, within the context of the Atlantic Alliance and, secondly, by virtue of the Elysée Treaty signed in 1963 between de Gaulle and Adenauer and whose military provisions I revived twenty years later with Chancellor Kohl. We are planning to strengthen our links by the end of January 1988. This strengthening will not go as far as sharing the decision-making and using nuclear forces because these competences come under national authority and also because the Federal Republic has, since the last World War, been subject to special constraints. It is nevertheless our intention to create and develop with the Federal Republic an embryonic joint conventional army and to work together to start to build a European defence.

Q. So there is no possibility of discussing any sharing of nuclear weapons with the Germans?

PRESIDENT - The nuclear decision and its implementation cannot be shared with anyone.

Q. But what can be shared?

PRESIDENT - Everything else.

Q. What then is the meaning of the expression 'common strategic space' and the phrase used by Jacques Chirac in his recent speech to the 'Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale', namely 'there can be no battle of Germany and a battle of France'?

PRESIDENT - It means that the dual Franco-German alliance will operate come what may.

Q. Thus France would give nuclear cover to Germany?

PRESIDENT - It is within the Atlantic Alliance that this question arises. The President of the Republic nevertheless decides when aggression against the Federal Republic threatens the vital interests of France.

Q. Did Jacques Chirac consult you?

PRESIDENT - He sent me the text of his speech a few days before he gave it.

Q. Some people are saying that he has gone further in his remarks that you did during your State visit to Germany.

PRESIDENT - He said the same thing in a different way. I have just repeated it to you.

Q. Are there any possibilities of agreement between France and Germany on pre-strategic weapons?

PRESIDENT - French atomic weapons, whatever their nature, i.e. strategic or pre-strategic, are part of a whole. This whole is the independent nuclear deterrent strategy no part of which can be dissociated or be placed under any other authority than that of the President of the French Republic.

Q. I should like to ask you in particular how France and the Federal Republic will organize their deployments if France one day has to use its pre-strategic weapons which, in view of their short range, are known to be able to hit Germany.

PRESIDENT - My reply will be brief. The ultimate warning is not solely restricted to short-range weapons.

There would be no need to issue the ultimate warning on German soil.

Q. To whom will it be directed?

PRESIDENT - Please, let's keep to the conditional tense. We are referring here to an extreme situation should unfortunate circumstances bring that about. The ultimate warning is intended for whoever poses a threat.

Q. In 1986, again in an address to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale, Jacques Chirac spoke of warnings in the plural.

PRESIDENT - There is no flexible response as far as France is concerned. Therefore no plurals. That is also the opinion of the Prime Minister.

SPEECHES *and* STATEMENTS

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Sp. St/LON/87/87

SPEECH OF M. JACQUES CHIRAC, PRIME MINISTER, AT THE
INSTITUTE OF HIGHER NATIONAL DEFENCE STUDIES
(12 DECEMBER 1987)

"For the second time since the beginning of this legislature I have the pleasure of speaking to the students of your Institute. I welcome this opportunity of telling you about the thinking behind the Government's policy in an area of crucial importance to our country.

"The main landmark in National Defence policy since March 1986 was the tabling in Parliament of a new Military Programme Act which charts our defence policy principles and capabilities. To my mind, one essential result of institutional coexistence is the fact that that legislation was adopted practically unanimously by Parliament.

"This massive approval, an unprecedented event in the history of the Fifth Republic, reflects the underlying endorsement by the French of the defence policy defined by General de Gaulle.

"It thus enables France - as I have found for myself in my talks with top foreign leaders - to be heard and respected on the international scene. No-one, indeed, can speculate on a reconsideration of our major defence policy guidelines.

"Lastly, it reflects an all-round conviction that there is no alternative to exerting ourselves.

"The financial effort to equip our armed forces is indeed considerable, since a steady annual increase of 6% in real terms is provided for, following an exceptional effort of 11% for the year that is now ending.

"The new Programme Act reasserts the primacy given to the nuclear forces. It opens up the spatial dimension to our defence and it provides our conventional forces with the capabilities to perform their duties on the national territory, in Europe and in the rest of the world.

"The decision speedily to equip our country with the new capacities required to conduct its policy and exercise its sovereignty was all the more vital because there are more and more factors of instability in the world and regional crises are growing to disquieting proportions.

.../.

"France, a nuclear power and a member of the Security Council, cannot remain passive in the face of events or sometimes upheavals that directly or indirectly affect her security.

"By merely referring to the daily news, we can see that violence is all too often a substitute for policy in many regions of the globe. It is a concept of international relations we can on no account agree with, but which we do not accept to have inflicted on us. That is why France means to exercise her responsibilities. She does so if necessary by using her armed forces to safeguard her legitimate interests or those of countries close to her. That has been the case in Chad, in the Persian Gulf and at the approaches to the latter.

"The land, air, naval and carrier-based forces we have deployed in those two regions have demonstrated yet again that they are an essential element of our presence in the world.

"Neither in Chad nor in the Gulf do we have any intention of imposing any sort of order from outside, but we mean to contribute to peace-keeping and respect for the right of friendly States to a secure life inside their recognized frontiers.

"You will understand my wish to take this opportunity of expressing once again to our armed forces the country's gratitude for the peace mission they are pursuing with a coolness, courage and dedication of which we can be proud. In my own name and that of the Government, I should like today to address a message of esteem and friendship to the men who are serving, far from their families, under often difficult conditions.

"France also has a capital role to play in East-West relations, which have taken a new turn since Mr. Gorbachev, a dynamic and determined statesman, came to power in the Soviet Union.

"So she means to make her voice heard and remain true to the major principles laid down by General de Gaulle: national independence, solidarity with our allies, dialogue with the Eastern bloc.

"The headline news today is the intermediate nuclear forces agreement President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev have just signed in Washington.

"I have very often stated my position on this event, which had been expected for several months already and which I welcome. You will therefore understand why I think it more useful today to tell you my views on the future, with regard to the stakes for European security and France's role.

"The debates over the adoption of the double 'zero option' showed that the West Europeans considered the retention of the American presence on their continent to be absolutely necessary.

"They have also recalled that the dialogue between the two great powers can develop under its own steam and with its own priorities.

.../.

"It is significant, in this connection, that the INF treaty has preceded an agreement to reduce the strategic armouries, which should logically have been the first disarmament task for the two greatest powers, as I have recalled in Washington and Moscow.

"Indeed, the momentum for nuclear disarmament should not be confined to Europe, for, as will never be repeated often enough, it is by nuclear deterrence that peace has been preserved on our continent for more than forty years.

"That is why I have stressed the danger of falling in with the Soviet reasoning whereby, by a succession of proposed 'zero options', the American nuclear presence in Europe, which we all believe vital, could be jeopardized and even eliminated.

"So we have chosen, as duty demanded, to warn our public opinions against undue or premature optimism and remind them that a credible defence effort, far from thwarting a lasting improvement of East-West relations, is on the contrary one of the conditions for it.

"Our public opinions must realize that reducing weaponry is not an end in itself: it is meaningful only if it contributes to effectively strengthening everyone's security.

"The Washington agreement, which is consistent with the objectives our allies set themselves in 1979 and features some innovatory provisions on mutual inspection, is undoubtedly a milestone in the history of our continent. It raises many question marks for the future, both political and military, and in some respects it is a challenge for the Europeans.

"There is indeed a real danger of seeing divergences emerge, varying according to countries, as to the security policy to be pursued. For what do we find in the wake of the double 'zero option'?

"The Americans insist on a reinforcement of their allies' conventional defence capabilities, something most of them are not in a position to do.

"Great Britain and France, who have learnt from history that there is no such thing as a purely conventional deterrence in Europe, must imperatively maintain the priority they rightly give to their nuclear deterrent forces, without giving up, in other sectors, capacities for action in the world that also contribute to European security.

"German public opinion, for its part, seems to fear that that country might now be a 'special case' in relation to the Soviet nuclear threat. This impression is probably exaggerated, since the whole of Europe is within range of the various categories of nuclear arms the Soviet Union possesses and will go on possessing in far too great quantities, even after the INF have been dismantled. But how can one fail to understand the anxiety of our German friends, considering their situation?

"Other countries also have their national worries. I am thinking in particular of Spain who, after unequivocally confirming her membership of the Atlantic Alliance, now means to play an active part in European security. France, who is so close to her in so many respects, understands this aspiration and will endeavour to further it.

"If we did not take care, differences of national perceptions could cause significant divergences between our countries' defence and disarmament policies.

"This is why I am glad that those centrifugal tendencies are counteracted to good effect by the will of Europe's statesmen and peoples to consolidate their community of destiny. That, to my mind, is proved beyond all doubt by the recent proclamation by Western European Union's seven member nations of the principles underlying their common security, as proposed by me before that organization's Parliamentary Assembly last year. The 'platform' adopted in The Hague on 27 October 1987 is an event that will go down in history: for the first time, European countries have solemnly voiced their determination that defence will be part and parcel of the construction of Europe, by agreeing on a range of clear principles and firm commitments.

"This course must in my view be open to all countries in Europe who will want to take on their share, and I am glad that the significance of that event has been perfectly understood in the United States: the Atlantic Alliance cannot be strong if Europe is weak.

"Even though based on shared convictions, solidarity would nevertheless remain an empty word if it were not expressed through concrete measures.

"For her part, France draws three conclusions from this.

"She intends, first of all, to tighten her bilateral relations with her different partners, which meet specific and complementary necessities. For instance, France and Great Britain, as nuclear powers, have obvious convergences of interests and I would like to see these concretized as soon as possible. More far-reaching cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany answers a historical requirement we all recognize. Finally, with Italy and Spain we have embarked on very fruitful political and military cooperation which may be particularly useful in the Mediterranean.

"Our country also wants the European nations to assert themselves as such in the realm of defence. Indeed, their ability to be heard in the world depends on their collective will to exercise their responsibilities. That European solidarity must be embodied today in WEU whose role, in line with the commitments entered into at its birth, is to create genuine European defence-mindedness.

"Lastly, France means to play an active part in the thinking exercise the Atlantic Alliance is to undertake on the political and military challenges of the coming years.

"Those discussions must take as their starting point a political and military reality: the coexistence of French and NATO strategies.

"The failure of General de Gaulle's attempts to establish a genuine European pole of defence and the doctrinal controversies that surrounded NATO's adoption of a flexible response strategy, whose premises we disputed, accentuated the differences for several years.

"It became clear, however, particularly with the new spurt given to Franco-German cooperation, that an efficacious synergy of the different strategies was possible.

"Can we today contemplate going further?

"I shall make three observations.

"The first concerns our allies' concept. It is patently obvious that the initial ambitions of the flexible response doctrine have considerably evolved over the past twenty-five years.

"Our allies have gradually recognized the need to give clearer precedence to deterrence capabilities than to those of a potential nuclear battle. That was one of the essential justifications for the Pershing II deployment, which was to permit the withdrawal of a substantial number of shorter-range weapons.

"On the concept of deterrence, there have thus been signs of an implicit rapprochement between France and her allies over the last few years.

"My second observation concerns the evolution of both our nuclear and conventional capabilities. As I already stressed here in September 1986, France now has the means to assert the European dimension of her security. With the maturing of our prestrategic nuclear arms we can now make more flexible use of our air-land battle force. At the time when PLUTON was the principal nuclear warning instrument, its operational readiness was our forces' priority duty: because of this we tended to reserve those forces for national requirements as near as possible to our sanctuary. The entry into service of the ASMP releases us from that constraint. PLUTON's replacement in 1992 by HADES, with a far longer range, will put the finishing touches to that evolution. Were the Federal Republic of Germany to be the victim of an aggression, who can now doubt that France's commitment would be immediate and wholehearted? There cannot be a battle of Germany and a battle of France. It is by reiterating in this way its determination to fulfil the obligations it has freely taken on that our country will best contribute to deterrence in Europe.

"By the same token, France's prestrategic warning must be ready for delivery immediately: the Head of State deems that our vital interests are at stake, that is, if necessary, well before the invasion of national territory. The deterrent value of such a warning depends, to my mind, on two combined factors: it must be specific, efficacious and limited, since we refuse to get caught up in a repetitious chain

reaction of exchanges which would be the negation of deterrence. It must also be able to penetrate the adversary's capabilities as deeply as possible.

"Deeper relations of all kinds - political, economic and cultural - with our neighbours, particularly the Germans, help make the Western European nations an indissociable entity; so France could never regard her neighbours' territory as a 'glacis'. There must be no doubt about this, in the East or West.

"My last observation concerns the state of opinion in France and Germany. The object of setting up the Rapid Action Force in 1982 was to answer the expectation of our German neighbour.

"The response to the recent 'Cheeky Sparrow' ('Moineau Hardi') exercises constitutes a success.

"More recently, Chancellor Kohl took the initiative of proposing a Franco-German brigade. This idea, hard to imagine even a few years ago, was well received by everyone on both sides of the Rhine. The Government is actively working to implement this proposal as quickly as possible, as it is to set up the future Defence and Security Council.

"But these initiatives will be fully meaningful only when the fundamental problem is tackled: can France and the Federal Republic of Germany agree on joint strategic concepts, as they are urged to by the Elysée Treaty whose twenty-fifth anniversary they are preparing to celebrate? Given the Federal Republic's place in the Atlantic Alliance, we must also ask ourselves to what extent our country and all its allies can bring their concepts more closely into line while respecting our independence. Only on that condition can we genuinely form the 'common strategic space' to which General de Gaulle was referring just before sealing the Franco-German reconciliation with Chancellor Adenauer.

"Indeed, might France conceivably, when it came to it, take decisions with regard to the French units in the Joint Brigade that would be at variance with those the Federal Republic of Germany was taking for the German contingent in the same brigade? Such a situation would obviously be absurd and contrary to the basic intention behind Chancellor Kohl's initiative.

"The same question arises with respect to the Rapid Action Force, which should be able to operate wherever its contribution would prove useful.

"I want, in any event, the Franco-German rapprochement to be rightly perceived as a necessary and irreplaceable contribution to the security of the whole of Western Europe, and its dynamics to extend to our other partners and allies.

"In developing these considerations before you, I am fully aware that it is not just France, from whom much is expected, who is involved.

"Quite obviously, all the Western nations have been facing fundamental questions now that the Soviet Union, abandoning the intimidation policy symbolized in the eyes of public opinion by the SS20 deployment, is declaring herself determined to lay the foundations of more trustful relations and to that end proposing ambitious disarmament plans.

"For France as for her allies, the essential question today bears on the very concept of deterrence in Europe.

"The discussion on the double 'zero option' put the emphasis solely on the arms of which the withdrawal was contemplated. All the European countries concur, however, on the need to maintain a satisfactory balance between conventional forces and nuclear capabilities.

"That is why they undertook last spring to work out with their North American partners a global disarmament concept allowing them, in the face of a very coherent Soviet approach, to assert their own priorities, particularly that of correcting the conventional and chemical imbalances in Europe.

"France is playing an active part in those discussions which could provide the Atlantic Alliance with an opportunity of reformulating, as the WEU countries have succeeded in doing, the principles on which our security policy must be based for the coming years.

"Such joint discussions should confirm that the necessary independence of the centres of nuclear decision-making, far from harming solidarity, strengthens global security: while nuclear decision-making cannot be shared, the existence of three independent nuclear forces greatly extends the deterrent effect to everyone's benefit.

"Over the years to come, pursuit of disarmament and credible defence policies will not always be easy. To succeed in this, France and her European partners will have to display both a national and collective will.

"As General de Gaulle had understood, Europe can never be strong if its nations suffer from self-doubt. France can rightly be proud of her defence effort over nearly thirty years. That justifiable feeling must find fulfilment today in the European defence-mindedness France earnestly wishes to see develop"./.

WEU AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Daniel COLARD *

Excerpts from "National Defence" - March 1988

M. Daniel Colard is a specialist in international relations whom we know well and always appreciate. Last May he spoke to us at length about summit diplomacy and the urgent need for Europe to "speak with one voice". The platform drawn up by WEU in The Hague in October 1987 gives him the opportunity to develop the fundamental criteria of this European security which now seems to be gradually establishing itself.

FROM THE "CHARTER" ON EUROPEAN SECURITY TO THE HAGUE "PLATFORM" OF 27 OCTOBER 1987

The idea of drawing up a solemn and fundamental charter on the principles of western European security stems from a French initiative. It was put forward in fact by the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, six weeks after the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik (11-12 October 1986), at the Parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union on 2 December 1986. He stated that "decisions vital to European security might be taken without Europe's having any real say in the matter" and this must be avoided. Why not therefore codify in a document common to the seven member States (Benelux, France, Italy, FRG, UK) the major principles on which consensus on security is based in order to give "real content" to the Europeans' wish to "speak with one voice" vis à vis the Americans and the Soviets?

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Thus the US-USSR Summit in Iceland served as a spur and a catalyst in making Europeans aware of the Old Continent's vulnerability: the swift succession of events - in particular the arms control negotiations on the first zero option (dismantling of Euromissiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,000 kilometres), then the second zero option (shorter range missiles of a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres), finally the Gorbachev proposal on the global double zero option - and the prospects of a third summit between President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev in Washington before the end of 1987 completed the process. It should not be forgotten however that the WEU Council of Ministers at its informal session in Luxembourg on 13 and 14 November 1986 had mandated a group of experts to prepare an interim report on "European security interests" in the present strategic context. This report was examined in April 1987 by the Foreign and Defence Ministers in the Luxembourg capital and led to an agreement in principle that the Permanent Council of WEU should prepare, on the basis of the definitive report, a "platform identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at their next ministerial meeting in The Hague"(1).

During the summer intense negotiations began among the seven governments, and in spite of the reticence of Italy, which attempted in the autumn to stifle the French project(2), the diplomatic discussions were completed on schedule. Following the meeting in The Hague, the 14 Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Seven unanimously adopted on 27 October 1987 not a charter - the United Kingdom rejected the term - but a "platform on European security interests"; thirty-three years after the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1954 which, following the failure of the EDC, enabled the FRG to rearm within the framework of NATO and modified the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the Western Union becoming WEU to keep a watch over the German government; three years after

(1) Communiqué published 28 April 1987 in Luxembourg; document 1100 in the Official Report of Debates of WEU: extraordinary session of the Assembly, April 1987.

(2) Italy feared the Franco-British nuclear leadership and preferred America to lead in an alliance of sixteen, ie. NATO.

the Rome Declaration of 27 October 1984 reactivating Western European Union ...

1948-1954-1984-1987, these four dates mark the history of the only European organization competent to deal with all aspects of security, including defence questions. What might be described as the "Reykjavik syndrome" gave birth to the adoption by Europeans of a balanced and substantial text on the guiding principles of their common security, something that was still unthinkable immediately after the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November 1985 in Geneva. The contents of the document that we shall analyze - still not very well-known - deserves attention and consideration; the speed with which it was prepared and the framework within which it was drafted is worthy of note. Could it be that Europe as a military force was born in The Hague on 27 October 1987? It is too early to assert this but it may well be that historians of the twenty-first century will look upon that day as the birth of Europe as a defensive force ...

SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE PLATFORM ON COMMON SECURITY

According to the dictionaries, a platform is essentially a flat horizontal surface, varying in height, and designed to receive and support something heavy. English speakers first used the word "platform" figuratively in the political context. In politics, the concept evokes a series of ideas or principles on which a common policy can be based and explained. It is thus assumed that once a platform is built it needs to be completed by some construction and joint actions. In other words, it is not an end in itself but a starting point.

In the WEU document, the platform relates chiefly to "European security interests". The title itself gives an idea of the diplomatic compromise that was necessary to reach agreement. It also echoes Carlo Galluzzi's report adopted a few days earlier on

14 October 1987 by the European Parliament on the "Political Dimensions of a European Security Strategy"(3). Let us examine briefly the formal and material presentation of this document before looking at its fundamental points.

As regards form, the text consists of seven pages: it is preceded by a kind of preamble, then structured into three parts: the first part is entitled "Our starting point is the present conditions of European security"; the second, which is the most important, states the "the fundamental criteria of European security"; the last, which is the most developed and detailed, states that the member States of WEU intend "to assume fully their responsibilities" in three specific areas: in the field of western defence, in the field of arms control and disarmament, in the field of East-West dialogue and cooperation. Legally, the document is not a treaty; it makes observations, fixes criteria and proclaims political intentions and so it is no way binding from the point of view of positive law. Its authority lies in the margin of norms; one may speak about a "code of good conduct", a "gentleman's agreement" or again a political "modus vivendi" in security matters. But it only commits seven of the twelve EEC members; Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland are not concerned.

As regards the contents, the document is perfectly clear, well-constructed and very balanced. France, which was the initiator stated that it was "very satisfied" and that "it was the first collective demonstration by Europeans to assert their identity" in an ultra-sensitive area and thus added a new dimension to the building of Europe. The common platform is not so much a programme of action as a codification of the doctrine and strategy of the Seven of WEU. Often Gaullist in inspiration it naturally results from mutual concessions but is characterized by a marked realism, a cautious pragmatism and a definite positive will.

(3) Resolution of 14 October 1987; document A2-110/87 of the EP. It should be noted that this resolution recommends going beyond the cleavage between the "technico-military aspects" (which are of the competence of WEU) and the "political framework" which forms part of the attributions of the Twelve. Collaboration between the EEC and WEU should, according to the report, be realistically expressed in terms of "general orientations" in matters of defence, but also in a series of specific areas concerning armaments or the analysis of military crises.

The part which serves as a preamble first refers to the resolution of European democracies to preserve "peace in freedom" and reaffirms the "common destiny", which links them as well as the will to construct a "European Union", in accordance with the Single Act of February 1986(4). Above all, in a very remarkable passage, the Foreign and Defence Ministers state their firm conviction that "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence". The purpose of "European integration" - this word is no longer suprising in the 80s - is quoted on three occasions. The Seven also aim to develop a "European defence identity" which will translate more effectively into practice the "obligations of solidarity" to which they are committed through the Brussels Treaty which is described as an important instrument, and the North Atlantic Treaty. The commitments arising from the Brussels Treaty are of considerable scope since Article V provides for military assistance in the event of armed aggression in Europe, which not the case for Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949.

Realism is shown through the objective description of the present conditions of European security: the division of Europe which leads to "unacceptable human consequences" which should be overcome by exploring all the possibilities of the Helsinki Final Act adopted by the 35 States participating in the CSCE in 1975; western Europe's vulnerability in the face of both superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union which are being strengthened militarily.

Under these conditions, the platform points out, the security of the western European countries can only be ensured "in close association with our North American allies". "The security of the Alliance is indivisible". This short but vital sentence emphasizes the interdependence between the two sides of the Atlantic. A Community of values and interests between the

(4) The Single European Act entered into force on 1 July 1987. It contains a very important Article 30 on "European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy" which, in paragraph 6(a) states that the High Contracting Parties are ready "to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security" and "are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security".

pluralist industrial democracies, admittedly, but if America's commitment is "vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united western Europe is vital to the security of North America". In other words, to use a well-known formula, the Seven are seeking "independence within interdependence" by reminding the United States that in the rivalry between the two superpowers, it is the Old Continent which makes the difference and gives the West a plus. If Europe were to be pulled into the Soviet orbit, East-West relations and the world balance would be completely upset ...

The end of the preamble refers to the famous Harmel report of 1967 on the future tasks of the Atlantic Alliance, which remains perfectly valid in relations with the socialist States. Military security and a policy of détente, far from being contradictory are complementary as stated succinctly by Georges Pompidou when he was President of France: "Détente + defence = security".

This then is a brief summary of the specific features of the joint declaration on security. The crux of this declaration is the subject of the second part.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CRITERIA OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

If one compares the speech made by J Chirac on 2 December 1986 at the WEU Assembly with the platform, France has broadly succeeded in gaining support for its views by its partners, Benelux, Italy, the FRG and the United Kingdom because the text contains the five security criteria put forward by the Prime Minister. Each one merits brief comment.

The first criterion is the prevention of any kind of war. WEU intends to preserve our security "by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority".

The second criterion is vital and fundamental for the two nuclear powers, France and Britain: "In the present circumstances and as

far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war". And the text immediately goes on: "To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk". In other words, "peace in freedom" depends on a no war strategy, namely, the atomic deterrent which has guaranteed status quo in Europe for over 40 years.

The third and also the fourth criterion are the corollary of the previous one. The Seven solemnly assert that "the substantial presence of US conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe". Why? Because they embody the American commitment and provide the "indispensable linkage with the US strategic deterrent". The Foreign Minister of the FRG, Mr Genscher, did not dispute this paragraph and hence one cannot see how he could plead for the "third zero option" (the removal of tactical missiles of between 0 and 500 Km) ie. the total denuclearization of Germany. The coupling between Europe and the United States is the sine qua non condition of the defence of the Old Continent.

But European forces also play an essential rôle: "The overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution, not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of western Europe in a very direct way". This major contribution is both conventional and nuclear.

It is true that as regards conventional weapons, the forces of WEU form an essential part of the forces of the Atlantic Alliance. With respect to nuclear weapons, the seven member States loudly proclaim, what is essential, that all "form a part of deterrence" and that the "cooperative arrangements that certain member States maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe". Above all they recognize that the independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security. This key notion is directly reproduced from the declaration on Atlantic relations

adopted in 1974 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of NATO (paragraph 6). Furthermore, the partners of France and the United Kingdom give them a free hand as regards the modernization of their arsenals, Paris and London being determined to maintain the credibility of their nuclear weapons. Thus, the two capitals can now be certain that they will not be in a critical and politically delicate situation of isolated atomic powers if Mr Gorbachev's Soviet offensive towards obtaining a nuclear-free Europe continues after the signature of the INF Treaty in Washington on 8 December 1987. This point is, for the French Government, the only western and continental European nuclear power, of the greatest importance for the future of Arms Control Negotiations(5).

The final criterion of western security policy is that arms control and disarmament are an "integral part" of this joint policy and not "an alternative to it". What goes without saying sounds even better when said. The aim is to achieve a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with security, being careful to take into account the "specific European security interests" in a changing diplomatico-strategic situation. Arms control policy must finally be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the Alliance and should not preclude closer European defence cooperation. As for Arms Control Agreements they have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

The prevention of war, the coupling of conventional and nuclear forces, the coupling of the United States and Europe, the maintenance of the strategy of deterrence within the Euro-Atlantic framework, arms control and disarmament, these are the cornerstones of the security of the Old Continent. These five criteria form a solid block, but the solemn assertion about

(5) The problem of counting third party nuclear forces was first raised by the USSR at the time of Brezhnev at the SALT I talks (Semionov Declaration) and then by Mr Andropov in the context of the Euromissiles talks in 1983.

the nuclear deterrent dominates the WEU platform. Realism triumphed over idealism, in spite of the influence of pacifist and anti-nuclear currents which threaten certain member States. This is something to be welcomed and it has a good deal to do with France's efforts.

THE SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITIES COMMON TO THE SEVEN

The last part of the document deals with the fields in which the member States of the Brussels Treaty intend to assume fully their responsibilities. These fields are respectively western defence, Arms Control problems and East-West dialogue. As there is not space to make a complete analysis we will confine ourselves to looking at the main ideas.

As regards the defence sector, the text recalls first of all the obligation of automatic assistance which stems from Article V of the 1948 treaty - the expression of a "common destiny" - which strengthens the commitments made under the Atlantic Alliance. A more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance and ensure the basis for a "balanced partnership across the Atlantic". Hence the strategy of the Seven: "We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance". The idea of a two-pillar community goes back to President Kennedy's grand design set out in the famous speech in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, but at the time the United States notion was to dissolve the emerging Common Market of the Six into a vast free-exchange area which would inevitably be dominated by America ... The international context of the 80s is obviously very different.

The States state their determination - in accordance with the principle of risk- and burden-sharing - to carry their share of the common defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field(6). Similarly they proclaim that they remain determined to pursue "European integration including security and defence and

(6) The text states explicitly that France and the United Kingdom will continue to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.

make more effective contribution to the common defence of the West". They then enumerate the steps that can be taken to ensure this dual political commitment: improve consultations and extend coordination; make the best possible use of existing resources by expanding bilateral and regional military cooperation. One particular innovation is worth emphasizing at this point: the will to concert national policies on "crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect security interests". This is the delicate "out-of-area" problem to use the NATO terminology. The North Atlantic Treaty, as we know, makes no mention of this question and Europeans have always been reticent to act together outside the area covered by the 1949 treaty. For the first time the Seven promise to act in concert, and to illustrate this attitude of mind they decided that their navies, although setting off separately to the Gulf, would henceforth exchange information and coordinate their operations. Moreover, the Ministers will inform the Alliance countries that are not members of WEU of their activities.

The Seven also intend fully to assume their responsibilities in the field of arms control and disarmament. How? By pursuing an "active policy" aimed at strengthening security, stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe. To obtain concrete results, close consultations should be developed on the one hand between all the allies and on the other hand the firmness and cohesion of the Alliance should be maintained. The text refers to the agreement between the US and the Soviet Union on INF and of the need to develop an overall European concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the declaration of the Atlantic Alliance adopted on 12 June 1987 in Reykjavik which would provide for: a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the superpowers, the global elimination of chemical weapons, the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings.

The common responsibility of all Europeans finally extends to dialogue and cooperation between East and West. It is important to give priority to preserving the peace and to shaping it constructively. This is not merely the absence of war. This negative definition would certainly not make it possible to overcome gradually the division of Europe arising from the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. Here we find overtones of the Gaullist philosophy underlying the platform on security. Indeed the instrument which can overcome the politics of blocs is still the Helsinki Final Act which binds the 35 States participating in the CSCE. It is therefore necessary "to make full use" of all its possibilities, in particular: to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities in accordance with the Stockholm Document of September 1986 by further confidence-building measures; to promote and provide for the "full respect of human rights", without which no genuine peace is possible; to open new possibilities for cooperation in all the fields relating to the second basket; to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges; and "thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe".

Thus the security and defence policy defined by WEU is given a global content: political, military, economic, humanitarian and cultural. Although the style leaves something to be desired, the intellectual and ideological exercise is quite a success. And the effort made to "speak with one voice" in the strategic debate of the late 80s is both praiseworthy and encouraging. The last paragraph of what constitutes the first document in which the Seven attempt to define formally a "European security identity" sums up well the whole common undertaking: "We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe". This is admittedly a very broad and noble ambition, a grand humanist and political design for the twenty-first century, a rendez-vous that Europeans made with history providing they give proof of tenacity and an unshakable will.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK OF REYKJAVIK
AND THE HAGUE POLITICAL SIGNAL.
A HISTORIC OCCASION AND HOPE FOR EUROPE?

In the common platform the French Government saw the first collective demonstration by Europeans of the will to speak with one voice and to affirm their identity in the sphere of security. This view is absolutely correct if one recalls that the subject had become taboo following the failure of the EDC (1950-1954) and the Fouchet Plan (1961-1962). The Dutch Foreign Minister spoke of a "European identity card" and the UK Foreign Minister saw the platform as "another important step towards the rebirth of WEU". Even more significant, the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, positively and personally welcomed the adoption of this text in the speech that he made in Washington on 4 November 1987: "Last week, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Western European Union issued an impressive declaration. It reaffirmed the importance of maintaining our nuclear and conventional deterrents and affirmed a positive western European identity in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We welcome these developments".

This charter came into being at an opportune moment; after the psychological shock of the Reykjavik summit (October 1986) and just prior to the signature by the two superpowers of the treaty on the dismantling of INF on 8 December 1987 in Washington. The political signal from The Hague fits into a window of opportunity which enables certain Europeans - the members of WEU - to make their voice clearly heard in the great US-USSR strategic debate at the end of this twentieth century. This probably offers to the pluralist liberal democracies of the Old Continent a chance or a historic opportunity for western Europe to decide to take its own political and military destiny in hand without which it will not really exist in the twenty-first century and will remain not a subject of but an object of history.

As Dominique Moïsi, Deputy Director of the IFRI, justly pointed out in a recent article, the dual zero agreement is the concrete

realization by the United States and the USSR of their respective limits, of their internal crises and perhaps even of their decline. But will that mean more Europe? To this crucial question he gives the only reply possible: "Everything will depend on the Europeans themselves". And he adds: "Without being fully aware of it, we are entering into a transitional phase of our international system which nevertheless does not correspond to a shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world. There will always be less America and no doubt less nuclear deterrence, more Germany, more Japan and probably more China"(7).

For there to be more Europe it is naturally important that this platform on common security should not remain an empty shell, a simple declaration of generous intentions without genuine content. Its seven signatories must therefore reach an early agreement on the follow-up in order to translate these noble ideas into action and concrete decisions: this will certainly not be an easy task in view of our knowledge of the degree of complexity that the European security dossier represents.

The Europe of WEU does not coincide with the Europe of the EEC, but three member States of the Europe of the Twelve are knocking at the door of the Seven: Spain, Portugal and Greece. The problem of the enlargement of Western European Union is thus raised, but the accession of these three new candidates raises political difficulties inside the Brussels organization and the Atlantic Alliance. The absence of consensus is, for the time being, holding up this enlargement process.

Furthermore, the privileged development of Franco-German cooperation on the basis of the Elysée Treaty of 22 January 1963, in particular the activation of its military element since 1982, arouses a certain degree of reticence from Italy and the United Kingdom: the setting-up of the mixed brigade and the Defence Council brings the fear of a Franco-German directorate within WEU. The major speech made by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac on 12 December 1987 at the Institute of Advanced National Defence Studies(8) should remove these misunderstandings and

(7) Le Figaro of 5-6 December 1987: "The shrinking of America".

(8) Défense Nationale , February 1988.

susceptibilities on the part of our partners since the Head of Government called for the creation of a true European defence spirit : "He explicitly stated that the capacity of Europeans to be heard in the world would depend on their collective will to exercise their responsibilities". This solidarity should, as a priority, find expression today in WEU, a privileged framework for developing reflexion and joint action in defence matters: "The Atlantic Alliance cannot be strong if Europe is weak".

Thus, from something that is bad - the US-USSR agreement on FNI concluded over the heads of Europe and the persistent Soviet threat aimed at obtaining a total denuclearization of the Old Continent - some good may come, ie. the outline of a security-conscious Europe . Profound changes are taking place; we are living at the end of a period, namely the post-war period and the beginning of another one which marks the end of a world and not the world ... A new international order, a new balance of forces, a new security model are emerging. Europeans are becoming aware; they know perfectly well what they want - to live in peace and liberty - but they hesitate about the means to achieve this, the sacrifices to be made and the line to take to accept the challenge of security and create a European defence identity. What they are not fully aware of is that the time available to achieve this grand diplomatico-strategic design - before the year 2,000 - is probably limited(9) and that nothing, absolutely nothing can be achieved without an unshakable will and the political determination on all occasions. History may hesitate, but it is never renewed; after the windows of opportunity have been opened, as the strategists say, they then close.

The Hague document adopted by the Seven on 27 October 1987 set out the framework for a European defence policy. It states a series of key principles for the future; it is a result of joint exploratory work and the product of a very specific historical context. It delivers to the public opinion of our respective countries a message of hope. "God helps those who help themselves". Let us not over-estimate this platform: much

(9) In addition to the deadline of the open market of 31 December 1992 we should also mention that the Brussels Treaty of 1948 - the basis of WEU - was concluded for 50 years and thus expires in 1998.

remains to be done; let us not under-estimate that either; it is a good starting point. In the battle for security, France is now in the front line: as the Prime Minister said "There can be no battle of Germany and a battle of France". If there has to be a battle it will therefore be a battle of Europe. For the time being this is essentially political; we shall win it or lose it together. Let us take as a slogan the words of Georges Bernanos: "The future does not happen to us, we create it" ...

January 1988
Daniel COLARD



INSTITUT DES HAUTES ÉTUDES DE DÉFENSE NATIONALE

DIRECTION DES ÉTUDES

EUROPEAN SESSION
of
ADVANCED DEFENCE STUDIES

TOPIC II : EUROPE'S CONTRIBUTION TO ITS DEFENCE EFFORT

iai	ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n° Inv.	8760 28.2.1989
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PARIS 14th - 25th NOVEMBER 1988

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EUROPE AND ITS DEFENCE

by

Jacques ISNARD

(Excerpts from "ETUDES", No. 368, January 1988)

Europe is the first continent to rid itself of nuclear weapons. Following the Soviet-American agreement on the dismantling of Euromissiles, a limited but significant stock of nuclear weapons will slowly disappear. And this for the first time since an atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. The immediate reactions of those European countries which are most concerned have been very different; even within the political parties there have been considerable variations in analyses of the results of such an agreement on Europe's long-term security. Will such a shock help Europe recover its identity, starting with reflections on how to maintain its autonomy?

In fact, everything started some years ago. In 1977, the Soviet Union deployed its first SS 20s, stating that they would replace the older SS 4s and SS 5s, which were technically out of date. The new missile, with its three warheads and a range of 5,000 km, was more accurate than its predecessors. Slowly - too slowly undoubtedly - Europe realised that the SS 20s posed a new threat, especially for its continent.

The SS 20s could not reach the United States and were probably intended to strike at Europe's military bases. They were clearly both a military and a diplomatic weapon aimed at cutting Europe off from other world theatres in which the two great powers might face one another. Together with its strategic nuclear capabilities which now gave it near overall parity with the United States, the SS 20s gave the Soviet Union a regional superiority in Europe, where the American NATO weapons were the only safeguards. The West did not reply until 1979. Officially, NATO's answer came with the setting up, between 1983-1989, of Pershing ballistic missiles and nuclear cruise missiles in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

For a number of reasons, things were not in fact quite so simple. In the first place, the American missiles deployed in Europe were not comparable to the Soviet SS 20s; their range (between 1,800 and 2,500 km) did not enable them to cover the whole Soviet Union, whereas the 1977 SS 20s could strike anywhere in Europe. In addition, a number of - often violent - opposition movements aimed at opposing NATO's decisions grew up in West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Lastly, by proposing a dialogue on the Euromissiles to the Soviet Union, while setting up their own riposte, the United States unwittingly fell into a trap which later proved inextricable when Soviet diplomats chose negotiation rather than a head-on clash with Washington. In short, the option chosen at the time by NATO would shake Europe for a number of years.

In the East, on the other hand, the SS 20 programme continued and even went beyond the Soviet Union's security needs, when 270 missiles were deployed in March 1987. Since then, fifty-six countries in Europe and Asia are threatened by the SS 20s, which means that 60 per cent of the world's population could be wiped out in under fifteen minutes.

THE REYKJAVIK AGREEMENT

Both Leonid Brejnev and Youri Andropov made a number of proposals for negotiations with the United States; these were always rejected by Ronald Reagan on the pretext that they were only publicity ploys. The two great powers indulged in a game of ping-pong. The Soviet Union threatened to stop discussing strategic weapons, while the Americans made the spectacular move (in November 1981) of proposing the newly christened "zero option": to remove all missiles from Europe.

Real discussions were restarted at the beginning of 1985, with a number of disarmament proposals following each other from both sides of the Atlantic and the Reykjavik "Summit" in Iceland.

The Reykjavik "Summit" meeting in October 1986, between Ronald Reagan and Michael Gorbachov, was not as unsuccessful as the Europeans thought for some time afterwards. The Soviet Union was unable to persuade the United States to give up their anti-missile space project - the strategic defence initiative (SDI). But the Reagan-Gorbachov meeting was none the less termed part of the movement which led to the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe and, at the same time, to the risk of "freezing" the French and British arsenals, which were intended to contribute to Europe's deterrent.

As the Soviet-American discussions continued, two ideas started to converge: Ronald Reagan's wish to end his term of office with a world agreement on disarmament and the Soviet diplomats' obsessive desire to denuclearise Europe, so as to leave them with a superiority of conventional weapons vis-à-vis the Western powers.

The result was the 1987 agreement between the two Super Powers with the first "zero option" on Euromissiles (weapons with ranges of between 1,000 to 5,000 km) and the prospect of a second "zero option" on short-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km). For the moment, the Soviet Union dropped its requirement that the objectives of the SDI must be reduced, before there could be a third "zero option" on very short-range missiles (less than 500 km). In other words, the Americans and the Soviet Union were prepared to scrap their Lance and Honest John missiles on the one side and the SS 4s, SS 12s, SS 23s, SS 21s and Frogs on the other. Both artillery and aircraft carrying nuclear munitions were left untouched.

Until the Atlantic Alliance, in June 1987, accepted a discussion on the elimination of very short-range missiles (the double "zero option") without however fixing any dates, the voices of the United States' partners sounded somewhat discordant.

In France, for example, François Mitterrand said "yes" to the "zero option", while his Defence Minister, André Giraud, thought there was the danger of a "European Munich".

In the Federal Republic, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was at first against the Soviet proposals, ended by agreeing with the United States and decided that the Pershing missiles, held in Germany for the Americans, should be included in the negotiations. In the United Kingdom, the Thatcher Government tried to maintain the national deterrent, largely dependent on American support, whereas logically the Reagan-Gorbachov agreements would break the links between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Europe was unable to decide what its disarmament policy should be and thus reacted passively to outside initiatives, even though they were in its own interest. An organisation as important as Western European Union (WEU), made up of the seven European countries most closely concerned with the discussions, was not consulted.

EUROPEAN DISCORDANCE

How did this come about? How can 250 million Europeans have so little influence on their own future? Why do they seem so apathetic? Has Europe's strategic position been weakened by agreements concluded over its head? If the setting up of American Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe confirmed the ties between Europe and America, would the removal of these missiles from European territory prove to be the end of American involvement there?

The arguments differ depending on whether the double "zero option" only is taken into account, or whether the third "zero option" is considered as an accomplished fact. The same is true of the answers to the above questions. In the first case, the nuclear risk is concentrated on West Germany. In the second case, Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical armaments puts the only two independent European nuclear Powers - France and Great Britain - in a very uncomfortable position. But they have a point in common: relations between Federal Republic of Germany and her European allies and, with them, the future of Europe are at the centre of the debate.

In the first case: the double "zero option" would lead to the elimination of all missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,000 km from both sides of the Elbe and NATO would be left with only short-range nuclear weapons, which can only hit targets in Eastern Germany, for the protection of Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is able to strike at any part of the Federal Republic right up to the French and Benelux frontiers from the territories of its Warsaw Pact allies.

The Federal Republic of Germany would become the battlefield in any East-West conflict which the Great Powers were unable to prevent and would be the weakest link in the NATO chain. In such circumstances, it is impossible to prevent it from feeling that it has links with Eastern Germany, since both are in the same situation. How to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from fraternising with her other half? How not to fear that, in trying to recover its national unity, the Federal Republic of Germany will not drift into some form of "national neutralism"?

The second case, that of the triple "zero option", would lead to the disappearance from Europe of all nuclear missiles with ranges from 0 to 5,000 km. This is probably the most satisfying solution as far as West German interests are concerned: but it is also the most embarrassing for France. What would become of French pre-strategic nuclear weapons, its Pluton and, tomorrow, its Hades missiles, carrying explosive charges with ranges of 120 to 450 km? For how much longer can the French pretend that these large-scale Soviet-American discussions are no concern of theirs? For how much longer can the French prevent denuclearisation, with the United States, the Soviet Union and their own allies combining to put pressure on them?

But if this triple "zero option" were ever put into effect, it could permanently destabilise the European military balance. Soviet military power is based on an unequalled conventional and chemical arsenal. This gives it an unprecedented ability to carry out an air and ground offensive in Central Europe which could only be counter-balanced by the threat of using nuclear, including neutron, weapons: the strategy of weak against strong. Even François Mitterand, who for a long time remained suspicious of the doctrine established under General de Gaulle's presidency, has adopted these theories and reminded the Germans of them during the joint exercise known as "Cheeky Sparrow", held by the French and German armies.

What with Western Germany's feelings of solidarity with East Germany and France's resentment of the prospect of a denuclearised Europe, there is little room for the partisans of common security in Europe to manoeuvre. "Neither Pershings nor SS 20s" has been the cry here and there, and rightly so. But then the corollary is no Soviet army strong enough that its presence alone can destroy any wish for collective autonomy in the West.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN ENTENTE

From this it will be seen that a dialogue on European security depends first and foremost on a Franco-German understanding, not based on words but built painstakingly and with all the difficulties that sometimes beset old married couples.

In 1963, this struck two men like a premonition. Just twenty-five years ago, General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed a treaty of friendship and solidarity - the Elysée Treaty - between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the time this privileged alliance was laughed at by the two countries' neighbours, who sneered at the Franco-German "axis" which, according to them, was unlikely to live longer than other such treaties in a troubled world.

After the impassioned, post-war arguments, the Elysée Treaty laid down ways and means of reconciling the two countries' military doctrines so as to arrive at shared concepts. There were regular meetings between the Defence Ministers and the Army Staffs, as well as exchanges of personnel and cooperation on armaments questions, all aimed at bringing the two armies to work together without, however, setting aside collaboration with other allied countries.

The first results were encouraging, as when it was decided to undertake the joint manufacture of a number of military items: the Transall transport aircraft, the Alpha jet training and tactical support aircraft, a family of anti-tank missiles, etc. Curiously enough, they could not counter-balance a number of considerable failures, such as the aborted plan for a joint battle tank or, later, the disagreement on the definition of a fighter aircraft, in which the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain would also have been interested. But on the whole the results were positive, although some ambitions were not fulfilled.

Twenty years later, in January 1983, François Mitterand, speaking in the Bundestag, was able to express his satisfaction at the long road France and West Germany had covered together. "We have learnt to work together to achieve a common security", he said. An indirect but graceful bow to General de Gaulle and his efforts.

Today, Paris and Bonn are trying to move into a higher gear. In spite of some scepticism, François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl continued all through 1987: during the "Cheeky Sparrow" exercise, when the French Rapid Intervention Force went to the help of the West German 2nd Army Corps, which was threatened by an armoured "enemy" from the East; at the fiftieth Franco-German "Summit" which followed in Stuttgart, at which the two countries decided on the joint manufacture of a combat helicopter for the end of the century and at which they outlined plans for a "defence council", an organisation for strategic studies, in which other European allies such as Italy or Belgium would take part. All these are signposts on the way towards greater solidarity on security matters.

The French President would have liked to go even further by reassuring the Germans on the use France intended to make of its pre-strategic nuclear weapons, such as Pluton or Hades and the weapons carried by the Mirage, Jaguar and Super-Etendard aircraft.

As far back as February 1986, François Mitterand had expressed his readiness to consult his West German allies if the need arose of using these French weapons on their territory. Two restrictions would apply: that the speed of engagement left enough time to do so and that the West Germans understood that the final decision remained with Paris.

In October 1987, the French President, speaking ambiguously as he does so often and so well, told Bonn that there was no certainty that an ultimate French nuclear warning would necessarily be given on West German territory. It was an admirable formula which, on first analysis, seemed to postulate that French weapons were for use against an enemy only. But the fact is that these sibylline declarations imply an early engagement in an international crisis arising in Europe from France to West Germany or within the Atlantic Alliance.

AMERICAN UMBRELLA VERSUS FRENCH SUNSHADE?

This is the heart of the discussion. Neither France nor Great Britain are able to offer their West German partner a "nuclear umbrella" which would be anything like the American "cover". Not only is it technically impossible, but the Germans do not wish to exchange even today's weakened American assurances for still vaguer French promises. Although the American "umbrella" may have been damaged by the discussions with the Soviet Union, the French "sunshade" seems to be almost inexistent.

However, France is not completely lacking in arguments and weapons. Its construction, alone, of a full complement of nuclear deterrents gives it some special responsibilities. The French "bomb", the result of a political desire maintained continuously by different governments over twenty-five years, has also become a diplomatic stake.

In 1966, when France left NATO, it did not apply the "empty seat" policy vis-à-vis its allies. On the contrary, it has continued ever since to stress its solidarity. It signed the Ailleret-Lemnitzer Agreements (named after the Head of the French Army Staff and the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe). In 1974, these texts were supplemented by the Valentin-Ferber Protocol (named after the Commander of the First French Army and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe). In 1978, a number of conventions completed the military build-up and no-one has denounced them.

What do these texts say? Roughly, they foresee that the French pre-strategic nuclear arsenal - Pluton ground missiles and weapons carried by Mirage and Jaguar aircraft - would give massive support to the First Army or each of its three component Corps, as soon as French forces went to the assistance of allied troops in Europe. Provided that they received their orders from the French Government only, or rather from the President of the Republic, as Head of the Armed Forces under the French Constitution of 1958.

Such are the agreements between France and its main European allies, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, who are key members of NATO.

Such a plan could become out of date and inapplicable as a result of the changes in the European theatre which would come with the gradual disappearance of Soviet and American intermediate and short-range missiles.

TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DETERRENT

If this should happen, could France or Great Britain take over America's protective rôle or at least play their part completely in the common defence? To put it bluntly, have the French the means and the desire and are they even interested in setting out to organise an "intermediate echelon", to use André Giraud's expression, for a European deterrent and, furthermore, would it appear convincing to the Federal Republic?

We know the United Kingdom's answer to these questions. George Younger, the Defence Minister, recently explained: "We are all in favour of tightening our links with France. But such collaboration stops where Anglo-American agreements begin.". These special agreements are as old as time and exclude any cooperation with third parties.

On the other hand, France's ideas are more ambiguous and, in the present somewhat uncomfortable period of "cohabitation", fluctuate between a return to the hard-line deterrence of old, which would isolate France in the European "bath" in which it would be plunged, or a natural slide towards a disguised reintegration into the NATO sphere of influence.

Proof of this can be seen in the debate which has been going on in France in the last months on whether there are any weapons and their attendant security systems which could one day be used as the starting point for building a European deterrent.

Today, François Mitterand seems to doubt this; his reservations, expressed on the other side of the Rhine, about the future of the French Hades system which he accuses of frightening the Germans because they might become its target, show that he is thinking of the possibility of returning to a deterrent of the strong by the weak, based in the first instance on strategic weapons.

André Giraud, and probably also Jacques Chirac and Raymond Barre, who are inclined to be vaguer than the Defence Minister, are more in favour of building up a European deterrent echelon, based on French pre-strategic weapons: ASMP air-to-ground missiles mounted on aircraft or mobile S.4 ground-to-ground missiles, which will be the future air- and ground-based carriers for the French nuclear arsenal, could, if stationed in Germany, fire as far east as possible.

This discussion is far from finished. In the first place, it has come up against a major obstacle: apart from not wishing to spoil the game, the Federal Republic is not allowed to launch a nuclear war on its own. It must use the double lock system, which indirectly reassures Moscow. This is the case with the American key which makes it impossible to act without a final

"green light" from Washington. It would have to be the case if France and the United Kingdom ever decided, to the detriment of the Soviet Union, to allow Bonn any sort of say in the use in Europe of nuclear weapons, jointly managed with the Federal Republic.

Meanwhile, European defence is growing slowly, day by day, without any signs of enthusiasm on the part of those most closely concerned; it is based on a main "pillar" of Franco-German cooperation on conventional arms, which both Paris and Bonn maintain does not compete with Euro-Atlantic solidarity. They are jointly building a new combat helicopter. They are jointly trying to set up a mixed brigade of 4,000 men, taken from West German regiments which do not come under NATO command. Together, they will try to develop a new generation of anti-tank weapons for use by both armies. They will together define the tasks and make-up of the future Joint Defence Council. But all this must be done without irritating the American "godfather" who has the final word.

One eye on the blue Vosges mountains and the other on Europe's southern flank. This zone and, in particular, the Mediterranean, could remain without cover, although French eyes are on it. The rise of what is known as "Islamic fundamentalism" because no better description has yet been found, and instability in the African countries are as many areas of international crisis for the populations living around the Mediterranean, who have witnessed so many upheavals. France, too, is involved.

So are Spain and Italy. Hence the proposals made in Paris, Madrid and Rome to tighten the links which have been loosened by time and to organise concrete means of collective defence; offers of cooperation on armoured naval and air weapons have been made to Spain. Italy has been offered joint anti-aircraft defence and naval equipment, such as torpedoes. France has proposed participation to both in the joint development

of a military observation net-work based on the Helios satellites. Italy has already replied; 15 per cent of the programme involving some eight billion francs, will be taken over by the Italian Ministry of Defence. With a contribution of five per cent, Spain is moving in the same direction.

Thus, a complete puzzle or a whole Meccano game is being built up. The stakes are high. The smallest incident could destroy everything in an enterprise which is all the more fragile or under threat because the participants cannot be sure of their success. Faced with this challenge, the Europeans remain divided, discouraged, bitter and seemingly paralysed by the vastness of the undertaking. Although progress has been made, any advances have often been contested. For example, a frown from the United States or the Soviet Union is enough to make the British, the West Germans and the French - although less often - ask themselves whether they are doing the right thing in trying to achieve an independent Europe.

Truth to tell, these worries and soul-searchings are due to the fact that political Europe has remained in limbo and, as a result, military Europe is dragging its feet. Does being a European mean feeling threatened today? Would an outside aggressor be attacking a group of countries which cannot live together or strengthen their ties? Or would this threat be aimed at the individual States which make up this artificial entity we call Europe? "In the face of our destiny, and of those who try to eliminate us, we are always alone", says Michel Debré, one-time French Prime Minister, although he does not deny that a certain solidarity among Europeans exists.

If brotherly ties are to exist in Europe, they will also include the financial, industrial, scientific, cultural, social and monetary ambitions inherent to this vast continent. If it were otherwise, it would be up to each country to protect its own life.

Jacques ISNARD

Dr. Lothar Rühl, State Secretary in the German Federal Ministry of Defence

Franco-German co-operation – Supportive of the Alliance and of Europe

Excerpts from "REVUE DE L'OTAN" - December 1987

Franco-German solidarity is politically fundamental to the common security of the countries of North-West Europe. It is in this context a privileged, though not exclusive, relationship. For the two neighbours, the security community with the other nations of the region – Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – is militarily, as well as economically and politically, the vital additional factor. Franco-German co-operation must take account of this reality, which is rooted in geography and history as well as in the European economy. But there is also a second reality with which this co-operation and its underlying *entente* must be reconciled, namely the close and solid link with the United States and

Canada, whose military presence in Europe, and strategic commitment to the Continent, are irreplaceable.

No Franco-German or European concentration of forces, no model for military co-operation between the countries of Western Europe, no continental political configuration could replace this link with North America. The geopolitical and strategic unity of the NATO area, and the military solidarity with the United States, are the foundations of Western Europe's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a military world power and a Eurasian continental power with a dominant position at the centre of Europe. Stable European security depends on the American counterweight, without which there can be no balance of power in Europe between West and East.

This reality is of particular consequence for the security of Western Europe since, within the global balance of power, there is no balance of military forces in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; rather, the Warsaw Pact combines military superiority in Europe with the further advantage of its geostrategic position. Not even the combined forces of the West European countries would suffice to create a balance of conventional forces with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, let alone offset the total military might of the Soviet Union in Europe as a whole. In this respect, too, the American forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean could not be replaced by forces from Europe. Moreover, European forces do not have the same political and strategic quality in the eyes of the Soviet Union as do those of the United States.

French policy in the Alliance and in Europe has taken account of this reality. Since General de Gaulle withdrew France from the NATO integrated military command in 1966/67, no French Government has ever proposed that France should take over the United States' role of

protecting Western Europe, or shield it against the Soviet threat with French nuclear weapons, or defend it with French troops in the event of war. French policy in the Alliance is based on independence but also on solidarity with the United States.

Compatible with pragmatic co-operation

France's strategic autonomy and sovereign national defence have led her to occupy a special place apart in the Alliance, but these factors are fully compatible with pragmatic co-operation for the common good and - with the participation of French forces - for the common defence. Both strategic and operational co-ordination between France and NATO are possible without the need for France to return to the integrated military command.

Herein lies the basis of military co-operation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The two partners are moving towards a common goal from different starting positions. It is geography, which for Napoleon was the fate of nations, which is making this co-operation towards joint defence and security necessary, valuable and possible.

French troops are now taking part in exercises in Germany. These troops would provide direct French support for forward defence in the early stage of any conflict. Following the Franco-German *Saucy Sparrow* exercise in Bavaria in September 1987, President Mitterrand stated that French troops had proved 'that they would be able to come to the aid of their German ally' as soon as the necessary decision had been taken, and had shown how this could happen at the right time and in the right place. Germany had never actually had any doubt about French readiness to fulfil its Western European Union Treaty commitments as an ally of the Federal Republic, and



Dr. Rühl

to provide armed assistance on German soil.

The 1987 *Saucy Sparrow* exercise clearly indicated to the countries of the Warsaw Pact that, in the event of an attack on German territory or against NATO territory as a whole, France would not only show political solidarity with her Allies but would also support forward defence in Germany with powerful forces. This support had already been made manifest in the *Franconian Shield* exercise of 1986. In 1987, the deployment of troops from the *Force d'Action Rapide* (Rapid Deployment Force) at the head of reinforcements from the First French Army, mounted a 'counter-attack' in Bavaria - at a distance of only some 70 km from the Eastern border, of the Federal Republic, thereby demonstrating even more clearly France's military readiness to co-operate in the defence of its Allies.

Exercises of this kind are to be repeated with other French troops, either those stationed in Germany or those which can be moved forward into Germany thus presenting a regular pattern of French participation. French troops are also to

exercise jointly with other Allied forces in Germany. In this way, practical military co-operation in the Alliance - one of the aims of Franco-German military relations - is strengthened.

There is an obvious difficulty in major Franco-German exercises of this kind being part of NATO manoeuvres because France has to mark its special position outside the NATO integrated military command by mounting normally only bilateral land exercises. It was for this reason that the then Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Rogers, readily agreed to the exclusion of the 1987 German army exercise from the *Autumn Forge* series of NATO manoeuvres. In the future, such arrangements will become increasingly necessary to enable France to participate, and to allow the Alliance to benefit from the availability of French troops, in testing the concept of common defence. These arrangements will be even more important if the French forces involved are not part of the First French Army but have been specifically made available for this purpose.

Clear political and military signal

The French President used the occasion of the Bavarian exercise to announce that, in their participation in the common defence, French forces would no longer be confined within the boundaries which had been laid down in 1966/67 for their operations. The 1987 *Saucy Sparrow* exercise was accordingly carried out significantly eastwards of the arc formed by Rotterdam, Dortmund and Munich, with this boundary being crossed in the Ingolstadt-Kehlheim area on the Danube. The First French Army thus came to assume a reserve role in support of an Allied defensive deployment in a sector adjoining the area of initial close-border defence. In the 1987

exercise, this was practised in a critical area in which the southern flank of the Second German Corps is unprotected up to the Austrian border. This, too, carries a clear political and military signal, thereby enhancing European security. The obvious interest shown in this geographical aspect of the exercise by Warsaw Pact observers, present in accordance with the CDE (the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe) agreements, demonstrates that such signals are understood.

Military co-operation with France can be organized, and French operations co-ordinated with those of the

Allied forces in NATO's integrated military structure, without strategic concepts having to be altered. The differences between French strategic doctrine and NATO's 'flexible response' are in fact not so great that, below the doctrinal level, they cannot in practice be reconciled or reduced. With operations involving conventional forces, this is already largely being done, as the various exercises and trials with tactical-operational command and deployment procedures among the Allies have shown. The critical area lies with the nuclear options for which French forces are also trained and for which the necessary support, such as airborne units, is held in readiness under central



French and German forces participating in the *Saucy Sparrow* exercise in Bavaria last September.

1987 Atlantic Award



Mr. Pierre Harmel, delivering the 1987 Atlantic Award lecture in Brussels last November after receiving the Award from NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. While Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Harmel initiated the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance – the Harmel Report – which was adopted by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1967. The Atlantic Award was instituted in 1984 and is presented to a citizen of an Alliance member country who has made an outstanding contribution to the Alliance's objectives.

control. The main problem here concerns France's 'pre-strategic' weapons which, as President Mitterrand has made clear in several public pronouncements, are not intended to be used in tactical nuclear operations in the sense of 'flexible response' but are held in readiness in order to give a 'final warning' prior to the use of strategic nuclear weapons as the French reply to continued aggression against Western Europe.

This last-resort signal would not, according to the French doctrine, be repeated, or become part of a limited escalation using 'pre-strategic' weapons, because this would render the warning signal unclear or open to question in the mind of an aggressor who, though possessing nuclear weapons, was attacking with conventional forces.

This raises the question of where the nuclear systems for this presumably one-off deterrent signal should be located. Referring to this in his October 1987 speech in Brühl, President Mitterrand said that French nuclear weapons would hit

'the aggressor' and that the warning signal would not be sounded on German territory.

Nevertheless, it would still clearly be necessary for Paris and Bonn, as has been agreed between them, to consult about the deployment arrangements and the targets to be selected, provided there was enough time, and for the use of French 'pre-strategic' nuclear weapons to be co-ordinated with NATO's theatre nuclear force operations, i.e. the practical application of the NATO strategy of flexible response.

This problem cannot be resolved exclusively within the bilateral context of the Franco-German relationship. It requires French co-ordination with NATO partners and with Allied Commanders throughout Europe, for which a doctrinal discussion about strategic autonomy and strategic thinking is not absolutely necessary and indeed would be only marginally useful.

In the event of a crisis or war, French troops would, according to French strategy, only be deployed in Central Europe against an attack

from the Warsaw Pact, accompanied by 'deterrent cover', just as Allied contingents would be linked to NATO's theatre nuclear forces. These nuclear options will thus have to be harmonized, at least as regards their employment; yet it is at present unlikely that France would participate in any NATO targeting planning. In the Franco-German relationship, the German partner can do no more than assert its national interest in timely and meaningful consultations about use 'on German territory', as was agreed in principle between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl in 1986. It goes without saying that the Federal Republic expects the same treatment in this matter as that accorded to it by the United States and the United Kingdom, and Allied Commanders within the framework of NATO consultations and the relevant procedures established for the purpose.

Intended to bolster US presence in Europe

There can be no doubt that Franco-German military co-oper-

ation neither should nor could release Germany from NATO integration nor from the resultant joint Allied defence posture. This is neither the French nor the German intention. The governments of both countries have also made it quite plain that their common purpose is to strengthen the Alliance with their co-operation over military and security policy, to bolster the presence of American forces in Europe, especially on German soil, to support forward defence in the Central Region, and to facilitate French participation in the common defence and in NATO's 'crisis management'.

Replacing the American with a French nuclear deterrent is neither possible nor even envisaged in either Paris or Bonn. French policy and strategy are based on the US strategic commitment to Europe's security and on the presence of strong American forces on the Continent, primarily in the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, French strategy does not regard German territory as a classical glacis on which Allied troops could defend the Eastern border of France and where French troops could join them in mounting a major delaying action. French military strategy has moved away from the classical glacis mentality of the past. Even with her special position of strategic autonomy outside NATO's integrated military structure, France recognizes the imperative necessity of defending herself on German soil alongside her German neighbour. This means that the defence of the Federal Republic is just as important for France as her own defence, because if NATO were to lose the battle for Germany, then the battle for France – assuming the attack continued across the Rhine – could no longer be repulsed, let alone won, with French forces.


Following a NATO defeat in the Federal Republic of Germany, the only option left to France would be to initiate a nuclear retaliatory strike against the aggressor. Such a decision

would have to be taken in a militarily hopeless situation with the maximum risk of a pre-emptive, limited and selective nuclear attack by the aggressor on France. Preventing a situation such as this must be the priority objective of any French security policy in Europe.

In the face of this inescapable reality, French policy envisages a 'common space' (*espace commun*), namely a common security area encompassing France and the Federal Republic to be protected jointly by military means within the context

of the Alliance, that is to say, with the participation of the other Allies. This policy deserves Alliance support. Indeed, in the interests of the Alliance as a whole, as well as in its own interest, the Federal Republic resolutely backs this French position.

The same purpose is also served by the experiment with a Franco-German brigade which is specifically intended to give practical expression to the common defence interest and the concomitant solidarity between the two neighbours. Under this arrangement, no German units will be



President Mitterrand (left) and Chancellor Kohl give a press conference during the exercise. President Mitterrand stated that French troops had proved that they would be able to come to the aid of their German ally as soon as the necessary decision had been taken.

detached from their NATO commitments. The Franco-German experiment will offer other Allies useful information and experience for similar joint units in Europe and it may also serve as an example for the European partners in the NATO integrated structure of how sections of their land forces could be inter-linked. This possibility remains open for the future.

The same could be said of the impending establishment of a Franco-German Defence Council or Council for Defence and Security between the two governments which is designed to give political guidance to moves towards co-operation, and to act as a joint political authority, though without legal powers. This new Council would consolidate the existing bodies for security policy and military co-operation established since the Elysée Treaty of 1963. It is thus intended to give co-operation

firmer central control, together with a clear political mandate, at the level of Heads of State and Government, competent Ministers and administrators, while the national responsibilities of the two governments would remain intact.

This situation will undoubtedly continue as long as the countries of Western Europe have not organized a structure for their common defence, and there is no European political authority which can exercise supranational control and provide a federal European executive. The Western European Union (WEU) cannot take on this task, and its membership is currently limited to seven West European countries. Franco-German military co-operation, however, is additionally intended to strengthen European co-operation within WEU, which is a politico-military security pact with a

commitment to mutual assistance, but has no military organization of its own – nor should it have – and it could not mobilize European forces, lest NATO's integrated military structure, i.e. Allied forces under international command, is prejudiced. Consequently, Franco-German co-operation seeks to strengthen the European component of NATO defence, and WEU can play a part in this. The Franco-German Defence Council would serve the same purpose without France having to assign its forces to NATO within the integrated command structure.

In political terms, therefore, this co-operation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany is in step with the Alliance and with Europe; it does not seek to constitute an alternative to NATO nor to the close links with the United States. ♦

Defence co-operation is Europe's future

AS IT LOOKS NOW, there will be at least seven different European military helicopters flying in NATO Europe by the end of the century: improved versions of the BO 105P, Gazelle and Lynx, the Italian A 129 Mangusta and the proposed Light Attack Helicopter (LAH), sometimes called Tonal, as well as the Franco-German Eurocopter or CATH in three versions.

This is in addition to the US forces in Europe which operate their own AH-1 Cobra and AH-64 Apache helicopters. They all face the same threat.

Furthermore, there is another threat, no less serious, but of our own making. That is the undermining of our defensive capability through the waste of astronomic amounts of money because we fail to harmonise requirements and time schedules and continue to develop too wide a variety of equipment in relatively small series.

Everyone is aware of it and many have argued for years that something should be done about it. Substantial budget increases are not realistic political options. Co-operation is the main tool for improving our conventional defence and increasing the output and the effectiveness of our yet massive investments.

Making better use of the available funds, by eliminating the existing extremely wasteful duplication in the development and the production of defence equipment, is a must in order to stop the process of structural disarmament, which is the dangerous consequence of the ever-growing imbalance between the costs of weapon systems and the level of defence budgets.

Enhanced co-operation will not only strengthen Europe's conventional defence. It will also improve the position of the European defence industry on the world marketplace, it will reinforce Europe's political position as such and therefore improve the strength of NATO as a whole.

There is a long way to go, full of obstacles firmly rooted in political and industrial national interests. But it is my strong conviction that it will ultimately prove a passable way. I admit that it requires a certain attitude of Euro-optimism. Pessimists still find more evidence to illustrate their attitude. They can point at the helicopter field, for instance.

As to the older types of helicopters, it is understandable that Germany, France and the UK cannot afford to scrap the existing BO 105s, Gazelles and Lynxes.

Improved types must at least bridge the time gap until new generations of helicopters are available and they are planned to be in service even longer. But, after all, it means prolongation of a lack of co-operation in the past, and even the improved aircraft will not render up-to-date answers to the threat of tomorrow.

A new challenge to European co-operation could have been the development of a common battlefield helicopter for the 1990s

By Jan van Houwelingen*



and beyond. By the end of 1985, Michael Heseltine, then UK Secretary of State for Defence, made an effort to find a single European solution for the two collaborative battlefield helicopter projects under consideration: the Franco-German PAH 2/HAC/HAP and the British-Italian-Netherlands LAH.

Heseltine drafted a resolution to that end to be signed by the Defence Ministers of the five countries engaged in the two projects. The endeavour failed.

It is hard to understand, certainly for the public but even for many insiders, that a common threat by a highly standardised opponent is translated into such a variety of staff requirements that the development of a single European helicopter is probably out of the question, with all the painful financial consequences thereof.

During a number of years it even seemed impossible to harmonise requirements of only two nations. We all know the difficulties the French and the West Germans went through before they reached their recent agreement. The ongoing four-nation study on the Light Attack Helicopter has so far produced less problems but the proof of the pudding is not yet there, and will not be until September.

In itself it is an achievement that two major European nations are together developing such an important weapon system as a future battlefield helicopter. The political impact should certainly not be underestimated.

No less valuable is the four-nation objective to develop a similar weapon system. But the positive sides are thrown into the shade by the mere fact that efforts and resources could not be assured while we all need our armed resources so badly to keep our forces at an adequate level.

These and other examples of the troublesome struggle for more co-operation and standardisation among allies will, ultimately, harmfully influence public willingness to provide the necessary funds.

How long can we go on asking for real budget increases if we fail to demonstrate that we do use our money in the most effective way, and in such a manner that in the long run defence industries can survive and will not be strangled by national military hobby-horses or shortsighted protectionism?

The European helicopter industry has a respectable record with production of around 11 000 aircraft between 1974 and 1984. The challenge is great. In the next two decades helicopter replacement in the western world is estimated at about 20 000 with a value of \$US70 billion in 1988 dollars. About 70% will be for military use.

It is of vital importance to the European helicopter industry to create the best possible starting position for this lucrative race. That is by no means the case yet.

Against that background it is all the more sad that, apparently, it is not feasible to combine the development and the production of 427 Eurocopters and some 200 LAHs. If so, a lot of milk will be spilt and the crying is left mainly to the taxpayers.

The damage can be contained if all six nations and their industries participating in the two projects make a serious effort to reach as much commonality as possible between the two aircraft. The new anti-tank guided missile system Trigat is a good common basis. If we could share other crucial parts as engines, transmission and rotor we could save 10 to 15%, which equals about G3 billion (\$US1.59 billion).

These figures are rough estimates just to indicate the order of magnitude. But they are worth taking seriously.

Recently representatives of the six nations met as members of the European Helicopter Collaboration (EHC), formally founded by France, Germany, Italy and the UK in 1985 and of which Spain and The Netherlands became new members of late.

It was agreed among the six to exchange the latest detailed information on the staff requirements for the PAH-2 HAC/HAP and the LAH.

Arrangements were made that, after a short study period, The Netherlands would call a meeting of operational and technical experts to ascertain possibilities for commonality. Next autumn the EHC in plenary session will consider the results of the work by the experts up to that point.

Success will largely depend on the degree of flexibility on both sides to harmonise requirements, schedules and industrial planning as much as the current state of affairs permits without causing serious delays or frustrating existing basic agreements among partners. Rationality and economics should be the key notions and common European interests, the umbrella.

The position of each of the six members of the EHC is different. That goes for helicopter history, industrial capability, military potential and other aspects. Such a diversity is, in a way, our strength. Let us make the optimum use of it. An old saying still holds: small is beautiful, big is powerful, only the combination is successful. ■■■

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Excerpts from "Luxemburger Wort" of 23rd January 1988

Action Committee for Europe (Comité d'Action pour l'Europe):

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF EUROPE

At the end of a two-day meeting recently held in Paris under the chairmanship of the President of the Senate, Mr. A. Poher, and the President of the National Assembly, Mr. J. Chaban-Delmas, the Action Committee for Europe adopted a declaration listing decisions and steps to be taken not only to establish the European single market in 1992, but also to lay the economic, monetary, security and defence foundations needed for European union.

According to statements made by the Committee, consisting of politicians, trade unionists and employers, the Community must first put its house in order, especially in view of the effects of recent events (fall of the dollar and stock market) on our economic future. The Committee addressed an urgent appeal to the Council of Europe to take those decisions which were not taken in Copenhagen last December, at the next Summit in Brussels.

On joint agricultural policy, the declaration said that, while it needed adjustment, it must also take account of the different functions of farmers in our society and in the international economic environment. This means that the rural exodus must be halted and that there can be no unilateral production without international agreements with Europe's main competitor in this field. A healthy world market can only be the result of negotiated agreements on self-limitation and reciprocity.

On the single market, the declaration stated that its realisation must be accompanied by a strengthening of economic cohesion between regions and improved technological cooperation; account must also be taken of social policies. A considerable and lasting reduction of unemployment was mentioned as the main aim for a strategy on growth cooperation, in which social dialogue would have to play an important part. This part of the declaration was strongly supported by the trade unionists attending the meeting.

Faithful to its tradition, the Committee once more stressed the need for a monetary union. Stable exchange rates and a halt to inflation, which are essential if the single market is to be successful, call for a joint, decision-taking, monetary authority. According to the declaration, the ECU must become a real currency, managed by a joint authority. According to the Committee, the establishment of such an authority would involve the difficult and delicate, but necessary, task of either modifying the Treaty of Rome or of writing a special treaty.

A European security and defence system

The main work of the Committee involved discussing a document entitled "Recommendations for establishing a European security and defence system", drafted by a working group chaired by Jacques Chaban-Delmas. This document, which was approved by a large majority of those present, is based on a conviction that, in the long term, there can be no economic and social solidarity unless it extends to security questions, via a common defence policy. In other words, an integrated Europe would be incomplete unless it included security and defence. This was stressed in the statement made by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union (WEU) at their meeting in The Hague on 27th October 1987, under the heading "Platform on European Security Questions".

Following the Reagan-Gorbachov agreements, thinking in Europe has certainly changed. While these agreements were made over the heads of the European countries they are, according to the Committee, in favour of establishing a European defence and security system within the Alliance. According to the declaration, the aim remains the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace through deterrence. But as the Ministers at The Hague stated in the above-mentioned declaration, such deterrence remains based on a suitable combination of nuclear and conventional forces. In the light of the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, the European nuclear powers - France and the United Kingdom - have a special contribution to make towards the maintenance of an effective deterrent and must therefore, according to the Committee, coordinate their nuclear potentials at the operational level.

It is worth noting that this part of the recommendation received wide approval, especially from the German SPD representatives led by Egon Bahr.

According to the so-called "Monnet Committee", the European defence and security system will give Europe a full and active part to play in negotiations on disarmament and its control as well as in future discussions on European security between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In order to set up such a European defence and security system within the Alliance and to establish the rights and obligations of the participating countries, according to the Paris declaration, an inter-governmental meeting will have to be called to amend the texts of the WEU Treaty. At the moment there are seven Member Countries, the six founder countries of the Community and the United Kingdom. The Committee felt that WEU should be open to any European countries who were ready to accept the stringent obligations resulting from security and defence, including a fair share of the financial burdens.

The Committee's next meeting will take place in The Hague next November, to coincide with the 100th anniversary of Jean Monnet.

At the receptions held during the Paris meeting, both President Mitterand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac congratulated the Committee for its courage and initiative which they welcomed and supported. This certainly augurs well for its chances of success.

Astrid Lulling

Maintaining Security in a Changing World

Excerpts from " STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES 1988"-

(London Her Majesty's stationery office)

THE DUAL APPROACH

101. The last year has seen continued improvement in the atmosphere of East-West relations and important achievements for NATO's strategy for peace. At the end of 1987, the two elements of the Alliance's balanced security policy — strength in defence and readiness for dialogue — brought about the first ever negotiated reduction in nuclear weapons. At their summit meeting in Brussels in March this year, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the validity of this dual approach, and reasserted the vital importance of the Alliance's strategy of deterrence as the guarantee of our collective security. It was thus a successful year for NATO and for British defence policy, confirming our policies on the course that we and our allies must follow to maintain security in a changing world.

102. A year of unprecedented progress in arms control discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the signature, in December 1987 at the Washington summit between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, of the historic treaty eliminating US and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear (INF) missiles. As the NATO summit agreed, this is a milestone in the Alliance's efforts to achieve a more secure peace, and the result of the political courage, realism and unity of its members. Soviet leaders were brought to the conference table because NATO deployed, in the face of much opposition, limited numbers of INF missile systems comparable to those already deployed by the Soviet Union. Unilateral gestures could never have achieved the same result. Indeed, had such gestures been made, we would face today the increased threat from Soviet missiles, with no countervailing force on the Western side.

103. The last year also saw the successful introduction of the confidence- and security-building measures agreed at the Stockholm Conference of 1986. And there was encouraging progress in other areas of arms control including, particularly, US-Soviet negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, where there is now the prospect of agreement on a treaty reducing superpower armories by 50%. Further details are given in Chapter 2.

'There is such a horror of war in the great nations who passed through Armageddon that any declaration or public speech against armaments, although it consisted only of platitudes and unrealities, has always been applauded; and any speech or assertion that set forth the blunt truth has been incontinently

relegated to the category of 'war monger' The cause of disarmament will not be obtained by Mush, Slush and Gush. It will be advanced steadily by the harassing expense of fleets and armies, and by the growth in confidence in a long peace.'

*Winston Churchill,
1932*

Developments in the Soviet Union

104. We are now at last beginning to see signs of change in the Soviet Union, reflected elsewhere in Eastern Europe. At home, Mr Gorbachev has set in train a series of wide-ranging reforms. Abroad, he has argued the need for 'new political thinking' in the nuclear and space age, and has laid stress on the growing interdependence of the countries of the world community. This 'new thinking' acknowledges that there is more to security than military might and that Soviet security cannot be maintained on terms that inevitably mean insecurity for others.

105. The British Government has welcomed the reforms that are taking place in the Soviet Union. More open internal policies, which bring the Soviet people more information about their own country and the world outside, are self-evidently desirable. And more pragmatic, less aggressive, external policies ought to make the Soviet Union a less uncomfortable neighbour. Certainly, as the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Gorbachev at RAF Brize Norton in December 1987 again showed, we are now able to pursue our bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union in an atmosphere that is more open and constructive than before.

106. Although it would be imprudent to rely on a sustained change in Soviet attitudes, the prospect of its taking place is a challenge that the West must accept. The willingness of the present Soviet leadership to take part in the mutual concessions necessary to achieve an INF agreement is a good sign. But these are early days and we shall be looking for hard evidence, in the form of actions rather than words, that the 'new thinking' represents a genuine and lasting shift in Soviet policy towards the West, and not merely a new approach to the presentation and execution of old policies. Progress in arms control has not yet been matched by comparable steps over issues such as human rights, equally important for the creation of lasting confidence between East and West. Soviet preparedness to withdraw from Afghanistan is a welcome step, but it is too early to tell whether this heralds a new Soviet approach to regional conflicts.

107. Nor has there been any let-up in the Soviet Union's military modernisation programmes, described in Chapter 6. By the mid-1990s virtually the entire Soviet strategic nuclear force in place in the mid-1980s will have been replaced by new or modernised systems. And the Soviet Union is continuing to modernise its theatre nuclear forces in Europe, where even after the INF Treaty is implemented it will continue to enjoy a huge numerical advantage: improvements include the introduction of more accurate shorter-range nuclear missiles and the deployment of more advanced nuclear-capable aircraft, which will soon carry new nuclear-capable stand-off missiles. The Soviet Union continues to enjoy very substantial advantages in conventional forces, and is updating them so effectively that in key areas, such as aircraft and armour, the West's technological lead is being eroded (see page 56). Soviet capabilities for chemical warfare (see page 69) far outstrip those of the West and cannot be justified by any comparable threat from NATO. These Soviet forces are deployed and structured in such a way as to give them a capability for offence and surprise (see page 5).

108. There is no reason to believe that Soviet leaders want war in Europe. But the Soviet Union has not, in the past, been reluctant to exploit the threat or use of force to achieve its political ends. And its avowed aim of removing all nuclear weapons from Europe would expose the countries of Western Europe to the intimidating power of Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical forces, which could be used in attempts to impose Soviet will.

'Reflecting upon almost four decades of common endeavour and sacrifice and upon the results achieved, we are confident that the principles and purposes of our Alliance remain valid today and for the future. We are united in our efforts to ensure a world of more secure peace and greater freedom. We will meet the opportunities and challenges ahead with imagination and hope, as well as with firmness and vigilance. We owe no less to our peoples.'

The Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 3 March 1988

The NATO Response

109. It was against this background that NATO leaders met in Brussels in March to take stock of the situation facing the Alliance and to set guidelines for future action. At that meeting they reaffirmed that:

- the link between the European and North American allies was vital to the security of each (see paragraph 112);
- NATO defences should remain strong, recognising the crucial role of the nuclear deterrence provided not just by the United States' strategic deterrent but also by the presence of effective and up-to-date nuclear weapons in Europe (see below);
- they were willing to seek dialogue with the countries of the Warsaw Pact and further arms control agreements (see Chapter 2), based on their confidence in a sure defence.

In particular, all the NATO leaders agreed that, for the foreseeable future, there was no alternative to the Alliance's policy of deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, and expressed their resolve to keep them up to date where necessary.

110. NATO's deterrent policy is carried out through the strategy of forward defence (see page 15) and flexible response. Effective conventional forces will remain an important element in this strategy; but, however strong, they cannot achieve deterrence alone. So long as the West faces an adversary armed with nuclear weapons, it is self-evident that we must retain a similar capability to deter him from using or threatening to use them. More fundamentally, the need for the nuclear element in deterrence rests on the imperative to avoid any further war in Europe, conventional or otherwise; for even conventional weapons, of the power now available, would bring destruction on an unprecedented scale. The achievement of conventional parity would make an important contribution to enhancing international security. But even if an equal balance of conventional forces were to be reached, it could not be relied on to prevent aggression. History offers many examples of attacks launched against the odds; for example, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 his forces were substantially outnumbered. For the foreseeable future, only nuclear weapons will be able to confront a potential aggressor with risks so unacceptable that aggression is no longer a rational option.

111. This reality is recognised in the arms control priorities endorsed at the NATO summit, and in particular in the reaffirmation by NATO leaders that further reductions in nuclear weapons, after the reduction in US and Soviet strategic arms now under negotiation, would come about only in conjunction with the establishment of conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons.

Nuclear Forces in Europe


1. The INF Agreement will remove NATO's Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, but will not affect the validity or credibility of the strategy of flexible response. Even after the agreement is implemented, substantial numbers of nuclear-capable delivery systems will still be assigned to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

2. These remaining systems will have to be structured effectively to ensure that they remain a balanced and survivable force. There will also continue to be a need, articulated in the decisions of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Montebello in 1983 and reaffirmed at the NATO summit in March 1988, to

keep these forces up to date, so that the West can maintain deterrence with the minimum number of warheads.

3. There is nothing new in all this; it circumvents neither the letter nor the spirit of the INF Agreement — a fact clearly recognised by the Soviet Union in its own modernisation programme (see Chapter 6); nor is it inconsistent with reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is already 2,400 less than in 1979. It is rather part of the normal, continuing process of review and, if necessary, adjustment to ensure that NATO's forces remain effective and credible. As in the past, the United Kingdom will play its full part in this process.

Figure 1 Land-Based Theatre Nuclear Systems Remaining in Europe after Implementation of the INF Treaty ♦



- ♦ - French systems are not included. They comprise about 80 Mirage IIIE and Jaguar aircraft and 30 Pluton short-range missiles.
- - All capable of delivering tactical nuclear bombs.
- - Air-To-Surface Missiles available for use.
- * - Total Aircraft and Artillery, numbers assigned a nuclear role not known.
- * - Of which 700 are assigned a nuclear role.
- ▲ - Of which 2,500 are certified for nuclear use.

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

112. A strong and stable partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic, resting on shared values and interests, lies at the heart of our security. As we explained in last year's Statement, neither North America nor Western Europe could carry the full burden alone. The presence in Europe of the conventional and nuclear forces of the United States plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe and provides the essential linkage with the US strategic deterrent. Conversely, the credibility of allied defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution.

113. That European contribution is substantial. The defence expenditure of European NATO countries has steadily increased, and is now around one-third higher in real terms than it was in the early 1970s, enabling Europe to improve the quality of its forces. The European nations provide some 90% of the manpower, 85% of the tanks, 95% of the artillery, and 80% of the combat aircraft stationed in Europe, as well as 70% of the major warships readily available in the event of a conflict. European standing forces currently comprise over 3.5 million men and women, compared with US forces totalling 350,000 in Europe and 2.3 million world-wide. The active duty reserves of the European countries total 3.2 million men, compared with a US total of 1.7 million. Europe's aim is to make better use of the substantial resources it already devotes to the Alliance by more effective cooperation in defence and security matters: a more cohesive European effort can make a greater contribution to the Alliance than the sum total of our individual national efforts.

114. There has been extensive activity in the field of European security cooperation during the last year. The potential of the revitalised Western European Union (WEU) was demonstrated by a series of meetings, under its auspices, which helped to concert contributions by member states to mine-clearance operations in the Gulf (see page 35). Although it has no role in either operational deployments or force planning, the WEU can provide a valuable forum for coordinating policy on such out-of-area issues.

115. The WEU also met twice in 1987 at Ministerial level, in Luxembourg in April and in The Hague in October. These opportunities for both Defence and Foreign Ministers jointly to discuss European security issues are a unique feature of the WEU. The meeting in October was marked by the publication of the *Platform on European Security Interests*, which set out how the seven member states intend to contribute to NATO's future security. It included their commitment to maintain credible and effective deterrence, based on both nuclear and conventional defences, and to pursue an active arms control policy aimed at enhancing security and fostering stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe. The platform will provide a basis for the development of the WEU as a forum for harmonising Western Europe's defence effort in support of the Alliance. The United Kingdom will continue to contribute constructively to this work when we take on the Presidency of the WEU in July this year.

'We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing, which are fundamental to allied cohesion We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and to make a more effective contribution to the common defence of the West.'

The Common Platform on European Security Interests, WEU Ministerial Council, 27 October 1987.

116. The two meetings of Eurogroup Ministers in 1987 provided an opportunity for informal discussion of defence planning issues from a European perspective. The progress of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in pursuing European armaments cooperation is described in paragraphs 408-411.

117. The European allies continue to strengthen their already close bilateral defence relations. At the Anglo-French summit in January 1988 a number of proposals for greater bilateral military cooperation were discussed, their purpose being to strengthen the collective defence arrangements of the Alliance. These include the further development of existing plans for wartime reinforcement that involve the use of French facilities, and the scope for closer French involvement in the forward defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, we have reached agreement with France on defence of the Channel fixed link and set up arrangements for obtaining better value for money in procurement (see paragraph 415). The Government welcomes bilateral arrangements that contribute to the collective defence of NATO, and will continue to seek such opportunities wherever they arise.

EXTRAIT DU DISCOURS PRONONCE AU SENAT PAR LE MINISTRE
DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, MONSIEUR GIULIO ANDREOTTI, SUR
LES PERSPECTIVES DE LA DETENTE INTERNATIONALE
(16.6.1988)

Il me semble également opportun de m'arrêter sur le rôle de l'Europe.

Il n'y a pas de doute que l'Europe Occidentale ne puisse, avant tout, se soustraire à la contribution indispensable au maintien des équilibres militaires qui représentent la condition de sécurité ainsi que de progrès dans le contrôle des armements. A l'occasion du dernier Conseil Atlantique de Madrid, les alliés se sont accordés sur la nécessité d'un dialogue avec l'Est dans le maintien inaltéré du cadre de la sécurité commune. Ceci est d'autant plus nécessaire dans un moment où, face à tant de changements qui nous prennent, nous pouvons le dire, au moins en partie au dépourvu, il nous semble nécessaire de renforcer la solidarité atlantique au lieu de l'affaiblir. Et ce renforcement ne peut pas se faire seulement avec des communiqués et des déclarations. Il faut amarrer cette solidarité à des bases sûres qui permettent de favoriser, par des comportements appropriés, l'évolution des autres vers des positions de plus grande tolérance, d'une compréhension accrue et d'une interdépendance harmonieuse.

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Le Gouvernement italien ne peut pas ne pas tenir compte de ces exigences et il l'a démontré ces derniers jours avec la décision d'accepter le redéploiement en Italie des F 16 qui quitteront la base espagnole de Torrejon. Nous ne pouvons pas fonder notre sécurité d'aujourd'hui sur ce que sont encore les attentes d'un lendemain meilleur. C'est là une exigence morale bien plus que politique. Elle fait appel à la responsabilité de la chose publique qui, en matière de défense, impose aux gouvernants, pour reprendre les paroles du Document Conciliaire "Gaudium et spes", "le devoir de sauvegarder le salut des peuples qui leur ont été confiés en traitant avec un sens élevé des responsabilités les choses d'une si grande importance". Il est également écrit dans le livre de la Sagesse que, je cite, "notre force soit la règle de la justice car la faiblesse apparaît inutile".

Les éléments évolutifs qui ressortent des négociations en cours encouragent à espérer en un rapprochement vers des objectifs d'une plus grande sécurité, à des niveaux de forces plus bas. Dans cette phase annonciatrice d'espoirs nous ne devons pas gâcher les perspectives positives en anticipant le résultat d'un processus dont nous ne pouvons, pour le moment, que pressentir les débouchés. Nous devons donc concilier les diverses exigences, pas nécessairement contradictoires, en procédant avec réalisme, en nous abstenant d'illusions faciles mais en cultivant, au contraire, les graines susceptibles de donner des fruits. Voilà

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pourquoi nous ne devons pas décevoir les attentes de notre opinion publique qui réclame la consolidation et l'élargissement du processus de désarmement sur les traces du premier résultat obtenu avec l'accord sur les Forces Nucléaires Intermédiaires. Mais nous ne devons pas non plus oublier la sauvegarde des équilibres essentiels politico-militaires, dans le cadre d'une stabilité et d'une sécurité renforcées en Europe.

Je veux ici répéter que notre Gouvernement, comme ceux qui l'ont précédé, constate le caractère constructif de la doctrine de l'Alliance Atlantique qui pose comme préliminaire à toute leur de dialogue en matière de réductions le maintien d'un potentiel approprié tendant à assurer l'équilibre des forces.

Pour avancer avec succès dans la construction d'une société pacifique, inspirée des principes de la justice et du respect réciproque, nous devons pouvoir négocier en partant de positions qui ne soient ni de supériorité, mais non plus de faiblesse. Dans le secteur des armes conventionnelles dans lequel l'Union Soviétique et ses alliés du Pacte de Varsovie maintiennent intact leur avantage, il n'est certes pas possible de renoncer à une composante défensive importante, en particulier pour la sécurité de la partie Sud de l'Alliance, représentée par les F 16 aujourd'hui basés en territoire espagnol.

Sur ce point il convient d'être clairs et, surtout, il ne faut pas donner prise à doutes ou spéculations qui désorientent: le déplacement des F 16 n'a aucune connexion avec l'accord sur les forces

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nucléaires intermédiaires qui concerne d'autres systèmes. Dans le cas des F 16 nous sommes en présence d'une mesure à caractère logistique, dictée par la nécessité d'éviter une réduction de la partie déjà en position d'infériorité.

Nous n'augmentons pas, avec le redéploiement des F 16 sur notre territoire, le potentiel militaire de l'Alliance. J'ai déjà eu l'occasion de souligner à la Chambre des Députés que les préliminaires de notre décision sont à rechercher dans le démantèlement d'une des quatre bases américaines existantes en Espagne. Le redéploiement n'augmente pas notre potentiel militaire mais le maintient inaltéré dans un contexte qui voit actuellement le Pacte de Varsovie nettement supérieur, sur le plan conventionnel, à l'Alliance Atlantique.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Sénateurs,

Dans les rapports est-ouest il reste beaucoup à faire et le résultat d'une négociation qui s'annonce longue et difficile pour augmenter la détente et réduire les armements dépend également de la cohésion de l'Occident et de la capacité des alliés à empêcher un désarmement unilatéral qui ne peut qu'être contre-productif.

Précisément à Washington, au début de cette semaine, il a été une fois encore confirmé que l'Italie a donné par sa fermeté, à travers le déploiement des euromissiles, une contribution en faveur de la paix dont seulement maintenant il est possible de recueillir

les résultats. Nous avons offert une démonstration, pour reprendre les paroles du Président américain, "du sérieux de l'Italie, de la volonté de partager les risques et les avantages de l'Alliance".

L'Europe occidentale ne doit pas seulement contribuer au maintien des équilibres: c'est à elle qu'incombe une action cohérente et coordonnée pour élargir et approfondir dans toutes ses formes le dialogue avec l'Est. C'est là que l'Europe peut projeter, sur le plan de l'économie comme de la culture, les lignes de sa "défense avancée", en profitant précisément, avec mesure et réalisme, des perspectives qui s'ouvrent à l'Est. Je ne crois pas que les démocraties libres de l'Europe doivent se limiter à attendre qu'une phase plus avancée de dégel et des démarches plus concrètes de libéralisation ouvrent de nouvelles attentes. L'Europe devra continuer à offrir une contribution active qui, en augmentant les garanties de sécurité réciproque, ouvre la route à la multiplication des échanges.

L'Europe communautaire devra donc donner un soutien efficace à la recherche des solutions négociables aussi bien en ce qui concerne les crises régionales que pour abréger, dans le secteur du contrôle des armements, la route qui reste à parcourir sur la voie du compromis. Pour pouvoir le faire efficacement, pour qu'elle puisse s'acquitter des tâches auxquelles elle ne peut se soustraire aussi bien envers ses propres citoyens qu'envers les peuples de toutes les parties du monde, l'Europe doit aller au-delà sur le chemin de l'unité politique. L'année prochaine se dérouleront

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les élections pour le Parlement Européen: nous devons en faire une occasion de réflexion sur cette nécessité, même dans les perspectives d'un rapport plus stable Est-Ouest pour lequel nous continuons passionnément à travailler, certains de pouvoir continuer à compter, dans notre action, sur le soutien des forces parlementaires.

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INSTITUT DES HAUTES ÉTUDES DE DÉFENSE NATIONALE

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EUROPEAN SESSION

of

ADVANCED DEFENCE STUDIES

TOPIC III : DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

iai	ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n° Inv.	876 28.2.1989
BIBLIOTECA	

AIAT 4 - 6413/88

PARIS 14th - 25th NOVEMBER 1988

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EUROPE AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT
TO DISMANTLE THE INF

by Alain BELLAMAL*

Without a doubt, Europe has never talked so much about defence - her own defence. The incompleteness of the European institutions and the inadequacy of a political and economic Europe with twelve members (EEC) and a military Europe with seven members (WEU) has, never, perhaps been so obvious.

The Soviet disarmament initiatives and also the lack of confidence concerning protective America were the causes of this realisation which had not been clearly expressed until then.

Incapable of speaking with one voice and playing the rôle she ought to be playing in negotiations between the two superpowers, Europe has been worried since the agreement signed in Washington on 8th December 1987, to dismantle the Euromissiles. Without rejecting the indispensable help of the United States or her membership of NATO, Europe is concerned about the consequences of this agreement and, without any supranational political body and with relative indifference on the part of the public, is looking for ways of coordinating the development and production of armaments and even of working out a common strategy which would include the nuclear field.

The unassertive and ambiguous rôle of Europe in the origins of the agreement.

The contents of the discussions between Reagan and Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit on 11th and 12th October 1986 and the near-signing of an agreement to dismantle Euromissiles was a big surprise for the Europeans who were annoyed at not having been previously consulted. The failure of the talks had brought a feeling of relief in the various capitals although the bitterness towards Washington remained.

The Soviet proposals put forward on 29th February 1987 revived the subject. Mr. Gorbachev proposed to eliminate, within five years, the INF in Europe (in reality the LRNF, "Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces" with a range of 1000 to 5500 km) and to leave in the United States and the eastern part of Russia 100 nuclear warheads (i.e. 33 SS 20 with three warheads in Russia and 100 single-warhead Pershing II or cruise missiles in the United States). He also voiced the Soviet intention to start discussions on vectors with a range of 500 to 1000 km, the SRINF "Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces" and to remove (but not destroy) the SS 22s and SS 23s, the Scud and Scaleboard in Czechoslovakia and in the GDR as soon as an agreement had been concluded on the LRINF. Lastly, the Soviets had agreed to dissociate the negotiations on strategic armaments and Euromissiles and had

* Pen name.

abandoned the idea of asking the Americans to give up SDI. For this reason, the Americans had agreed to discuss INF in Geneva. On 16th June 1987, they proposed the "double zero" option, i.e. the total elimination of LRINF and SRINF, which was accepted by the Soviets on 22nd July. However, the latter also demanded the destruction of 72 West German Pershing 1A, the nuclear warheads of which were under American control. Bonn gave in to these demands on 26th August. The main obstacles were thus removed.

The talks begun after Reykjavik had given the Americans time to consult their European allies, particularly in NATO. The Europeans were pleased that concertation had been renewed, but did they really speak with one voice?

As a general rule, all the European countries had welcomed the Soviet revival of the issue. They were obliged both by the wish they had expressed in 1981 to achieve such dismantling and also by the more or less heavy pressure of public opinion. Public opinion, to a varying extent, all seems to favour disarmament, especially in the Scandinavian countries where there is widespread pacifism, but also in the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, Italy and Greece.

According to a poll carried out by the weekly magazine "Stern" seventy-five per cent of the German population took "Mr. Gorbachev's proposals very seriously". Another opinion poll, carried out from November 1986 to January 1987 (i.e. immediately after the Reykjavik summit) in France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, showed the latent wish of the population to eliminate nuclear weapons. Seventy per cent of the Italians, thirty-five per cent of the British and twenty-five per cent of the French to whom the question was put thought that it would be possible to have a common European defence based solely on conventional forces.

The European Parliament had echoed the positions taken by the EEC countries. On 12th March 1987, it approved, with a small majority, the opening of the American-Soviet discussions on the INF, taking account of the Soviet intention to reach an agreement later on a reduction of shorter range nuclear missiles and conventional and chemical weapons. More and more contacts were made between leading politicians and heads of States and governments. The President of the EEC Commission (a body without competence in the field of defence) went so far as to propose, albeit in vain, that a European council should be convened to discuss the INF problem. The Strasbourg Assembly also asked for a special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the twelve Common Market countries in order to reach a joint position.

WEU, the only European organisation with competence in defence matters, had also attempted to do this at the meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Luxembourg at the end of April. The seven Member Countries were either nuclear powers (France and the United Kingdom) or countries which had, or should have had, American Euromissiles on their territory (the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy).

In reality, Europe did not react as such. The countries' official and unanimous approval of the American-Soviet talks hid deep disagreements. Europe spoke with many voices, some of which were even discordant.

Three countries holding Euromissiles, Belgium, Italy and especially the FRG, which was more in favour of overtures towards the Eastern countries, called for a successful outcome to the negotiations. Belgium postponed the installation of missiles which had not yet been delivered. The Netherlands were optimistic about a possible non-deployment although they felt obliged to continue with work on infrastructures. Italy alone agreed to complete the siting of these weapons.

The Soviet proposals caused some concern in Belgium, Italy, the FRG and the Netherlands but it was chiefly France together with the United Kingdom which expressed the greatest reservations, with a relative consensus of the political formations.

Conversely and completely apart from the rest of Europe, Mr. Papandreou had appealed to his European allies and partners to accept the Soviet proposals unconditionally. Moreover, he had stated that his government would ask for the removal of the American non-INF nuclear weapons located in Greece, even if the project to denuclearise the Balkans failed.

The Washington agreement and its consequences for Europe

The Washington agreement, signed on 8th December 1987, provides for the dismantling of all LRINF and SRINF weapons within three years (excepting nuclear warheads and electronic systems). At first sight this seems to be an advantage for the West since 1500 Soviet warheads would be destroyed as compared with 400 American ones.

In reality, the disappearance of the INF (which represent less than five per cent of the nuclear arsenal) leaves the Soviet Union in a dominant position on our continent, even without counting her strategic weapons, because of the number and size of her short-range nuclear weapons (less than 500 km) and her chemical and conventional armaments. The FROG and, even more, the SS 21s stationed in the Soviet satellite countries can reach targets in the FRG. The Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces and most, if not all, of the national Staffs share the same concern.

The dismantling of the Euromissiles leads to decoupling between the United States and Europe. A conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact could no longer lead to a nuclear response from NATO against Soviet territory apart from marginal effects from on-board systems and especially those from central systems which are chiefly American but also British and possibly French; which would be disproportionate in the latter case to start with. Since the European countries are no longer launching platforms for nuclear weapons against the USSR as far as the United States are concerned, their strategic value is thereby lessened.

According to NATO's "flexible response", a breakthrough by the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact would be countered by using nuclear arms, not only against the first enemy echelon in the form of short-range vectors but also against the rear areas including Soviet territory. The elimination of Pershing II and cruise missiles makes the doctrine less credible. An important link of deterrence disappears.

The momentum of the agreement on the INF may lead the United States to a unilateral withdrawal of part of their forces stationed in Europe. Several other factors act in the same way; the realisation that the United States pay more than their share; the lassitude caused by the attitude of certain countries such as Denmark, Spain and Greece, which want to reduce or even eliminate the American military presence; the idea of a possible European shock-awakening in the case of American disengagement; the unpopularity of Europe which is accused of protectionism and illegal commercial practices and, finally, the need to make savings. The subject of withdrawal will doubtless play a rôle in the forthcoming presidential campaign.

European proposals are still indecisive.

Europe must be prepared for this eventuality which is dangerous for her security since the coupling would be even more tenuous. She must therefore try to convince the United States not to make a unilateral reduction of their troops stationed on the old continent but at least to link a possible withdrawal to an identical disengagement of Soviet troops in the framework of the CSCE for instance, rather than that of the MBFR. She must denounce the connections between American supporters of isolationism, West German "greens" and West European pacifists.

The fact that the Americans have all too often expressed their intention of reducing their troops in Europe is scarcely an encouragement to the Soviets to negotiate on this issue. However, a bilateral withdrawal would meet both the wishes expressed by the USSR in the negotiations on the MBFR and the deep feelings of the peoples of Eastern Europe who would certainly be pleased to see some of the Soviet troops stationed on their territory returning home. Certain satellite countries, although unable to voice their opinion in international fora, could bring pressure to bear on Moscow to reach a partial and simultaneous withdrawal of American and Soviet forces by pointing out, for example, the advantages likely to accrue from détente in commercial exchanges and technology transfers. A country such as Hungary would certainly work towards this end.

The Americans, like the European allies (at least the most important ones), have now realised that they should not confine themselves to eliminating just the INF but should pursue negotiations on conventional and chemical weapons. The Soviets hope to make progress and they propose a third zero option regarding nuclear rockets or missiles with a range of less than 500 km, such as FROG and the SS 21 in the East, Lance, Pluton and subsequently Hades in the West (sometimes known as "Short Nuclear Force" SNF) and even nuclear artillery. The

FRG, which is exposed to these attacks together with Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, is in favour. Conversely, the second echelon and the nuclear European countries, France and the United Kingdom, are afraid of a total denuclearisation of Europe which would leave them at the mercy of the conventional and chemical weapons of the Warsaw Pact.

Discussions on a possible third zero option would no longer be confined to the two superpowers. For the first time, they would involve France, which has its own fully independent system, and the United Kingdom which uses national warheads placed on American vectors. This country's dependence on the United States (to a certain extent the opposite of that of the FRG with regard to the Pershing 1 A missiles if it is assumed that the Lance vectors, of American design and manufacture, belong fully to the Bundeswehr) gives the USSR a further reason to announce new negotiations. The Soviets could, in fact, accuse the Americans of getting round the INF agreement in this way. The pressure they have successfully exerted for the withdrawal of the West German Pershing 1 A missiles, although the warheads were American, encourage them to follow this line.

This fundamental opposition between the four main European powers (the FRG and Italy on the one hand, France and the United Kingdom on the other) was brought fully into the open at the last WEU meeting in The Hague on 26th and 27th October 1987. The FRG and Italy are in favour of conventional weapons, believing that the so-called smart weapons have or will soon have the same destructive power as "small" tactical or pre-strategic nuclear weapons. They believe that in this way the gap between conventional and nuclear weapons, from the point of view of effectiveness, has disappeared or is disappearing. The inherent power of smart weapons, together with their accuracy, fill the gap, as far as destructive capability is concerned, between the ordinary "conventional" and the "conventional nuclear" or, even more, the "neutronic nuclear". This doctrinal standpoint also hides the refusal to give France and the United Kingdom the major rôle in European defence. Without denying the advantage of the new conventional weapon systems which they also hope to develop, Paris and London clearly state that the defence of Europe can only be based on nuclear deterrence. They believe it is essential to keep a psychological gap between conventional and nuclear weapons. This concept has prevailed since all the WEU member countries have officially reaffirmed the need to maintain nuclear deterrence. However, divisions still remain, with Belgium and Luxembourg more in support of the Franco-British point of view and the Netherlands expressing solidarity with the Federal Republic of Germany. The other European member countries of NATO, but not of WEU, seem to be just as divided. Denmark and Spain prefer to give up nuclear weapons in favour of modernised conventional arms.

In order to give renewed credibility to the response and to prevent the complete denuclearisation of Western Europe, the third zero option should be refused and short-range nuclear weapons should be modernised and increased in number to bring them up to the quantitative level of similar Soviet systems. The increase in their range up to 500 km (the limit allowed by the INF agreement) would make it possible to apply the threat beyond the two Germanies to a certain extent, which would perhaps lessen Bonn's reservations. The effectiveness of these weapons - American, French and British - would be increased by setting

up neutron warheads, the destructive effect of which is well-known against armoured formations. Such a solution does not fit in with the spirit of the negotiations between the two superpowers; it goes against public opinion and does not correspond to the present United States' trend to withdraw into itself. In addition, the USSR would refuse it since it wishes, on the contrary, to obtain a denuclearisation of the European continent.

Another option would be to demand a reduction in the number of Soviet short-range nuclear weapons to bring them down to parity with the Western missiles. This would have the disadvantage of preventing the Alliance from increasing the number of its own missiles and would therefore deprive it of useful nuclear means on a lower than strategic level. However, it would have the advantage of stopping the process of denuclearising Europe and would also be closer to the wishes of the people.

The West could thus increase its nuclear means capable of reaching Soviet territory from the sea and air. Such a development assumes that SSMR (air-to-surface medium-range) missiles will be fitted to bombers and cruise missiles also (ALCM: Air Launched Cruise Missile) and at the same time that they will be carried on surface ships and submarines (SLCM: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile). The increased numbers of these Forward Based Systems (FBS) in the sea and air space adjacent to the USSR would give great importance to NATO's flanks in the Mediterranean and even more in northern areas, in the Baltic and especially in the Barents Sea. A naval aviation doctrine, somewhat similar to that of the United States in Asia, would replace the ground doctrine of non-strategic nuclear strikes against Soviet territory. This would involve the use of air and sea bases in the Netherlands and especially in the United Kingdom and even in Norway. In order to escape such a threat, Mr. Gorbachev proposed, on 1st October 1987 in Murmansk, the denuclearisation of Northern Europe (an old idea) and a reduction of military activity in the adjacent sea and air space. In this way he hoped to attract the attention of public opinion and back the refusal of the Norwegian Government and the reservations of the Netherlands and even British Governments who do not wish to be the only ones concerned by a possible change in the nuclear doctrine of the Alliance. On the Southern flank, the American bases in Spain and Greece are becoming more important at the very time that Madrid and Athens are asking for them to be reduced or even eliminated. The Soviets are all the more anxious to avoid this circumvention of the INF agreement as the fact that they have no bases hinders them from bringing a similar threat to bear on Western Europe although it does not altogether prevent it.

The Washington agreement, concluded as a result of direct American-Soviet negotiations, concerns the whole of Europe, both East and West, where the LRINF and SRINF are stationed. It provides for stringent controls of the sites (operational or not) where the missiles are located (in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, the FRG and Italy but also in Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia) together with a control of the places where the weapons are manufactured, stored and destroyed, i.e. in the United States and the USSR.

Strictly from the point of view of international law, the absence of European countries from the negotiations is considered to be an anomaly because the agreement provides for inspections on their territories. The USSR seems to have been more aware of this than the United States since, with a remarkable sense of timing, she invited a delegation from WEU (which includes the West European countries concerned) for the first time to Moscow from 6th to 12th April 1987, with a remarkable sense of timing. As far as the USSR is concerned, WEU can be a further means of decoupling between Europe and the United States. Although the USSR is against European unification, she may find it advantageous, at least for the time being, to give it an international dimension which it does not yet have. The United States merely held bilateral discussions in NATO with the countries concerned without the least consideration for European sensitivity. The US finds it difficult to accept the idea of Europeans discussing defence problems amongst themselves. The signing of the agreement of 8th December has forced them to conclude supplementary agreements with the five European allies concerned in order to lay down the conditions for Soviet inspections.

Although Europe is also absent from the discussions on the reduction of strategic weapons, she takes part in the Geneva talks on chemical weapons in the UN framework. She has even helped in the work of the CSCE in Vienna and will continue to voice her views at the next conference on stability which is due to take place in 1988. Certain European countries (but not France) take part in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna although the usefulness of these discussions is no longer manifest due to the lack of results, the small number of participants and the reduced area of application. The idea of disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals must replace that of disarmament in Central Europe.

Towards European defence?

The conclusion of an agreement on the INF was foreseeable. The pressure of public opinion, both American and European, was added to the two leaders' urgent desire to succeed. Reagan needed to succeed in order to leave the political scene as an apostle of peace and Gorbachev needed to prove that his international policy was well founded, calm his domestic opponents and devote more resources to the economy.

Since Euromissiles are destined to disappear, NATO must strengthen its conventional forces. Certain circles in the United States envisage, on the contrary, a reduction of the number of American troops in Europe. The Europeans would have to bear the burden alone. For financial reasons (especially for the United Kingdom and France who are permanently obliged to modernise their nuclear forces), for demographic reasons (the FRG in particular) and for psychological reasons, they are unable to do so. The increased length of military service in the FRG and Belgium will not be able to offset the lack of manpower resources. These factors could lead the allies to ask France to fill certain front-line "sectors". The inadequate number of short-range nuclear missiles capable of dealing with targets in Czechoslovakia and the FRG could incite them, for the same reason, to call for Pluton and consequently Hades missiles to be set up in the Federal Republic. In

compensation, the FRG could make a financial contribution towards the cost of keeping allied troops on her territory. However, in addition to the problem caused by France's intention not to integrate her forces in an interallied command, the engagement of her troops at the East German and Czechoslovakian frontiers would deprive NATO of reserves.

The Reykjavik discussions and the signing of the Washington agreement have acted as a catalyser. The Europeans have realised their precarious situation between the two superpowers. Of course, public opinion does not react very strongly because the medias and the teaching programmes do not pay enough attention to European affairs. However, governments are feeling an ever stronger need to study the implications of the strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow. The great amount of consideration given to the defence of Europe after the Reykjavik talks has only just begun. As President Mitterand said, "Let us finally prepare for the time when Europe, provided with a central political authority, will take her own decisions with regard to her security". It is high time that Europe provided herself with the means of ensuring her own defence.

The single European act, which was ratified by the national parliaments in 1986, will enable the Community to study security questions from the point of view of their political, economic and financial implications. The Strasbourg Parliament is already taking an interest in defence but as yet there is no forum which allows Heads of State and governments to take joint decisions in this field.

WEU, which was set up even earlier than the EEC and which was reactivated and reorganised in 1984, remains the only European organisation with competence in defence matters. The Washington agreement on the dismantling of INF, together with doubts concerning the perpetuity of the American defence effort on our continent, incited the seven member States to reconsider European defence on the basis of the charter defined by Mr. Chirac at the WEU Assembly on 2nd December 1986. The Ministerial meeting in The Hague at the end of October 1987, enabled them for the first time to state officially on behalf of Europe the need to keep a credible nuclear deterrent and thus to stress the irreplaceable importance of the nuclear factor which alone is "capable of confronting a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk". Spain, Portugal and even Greece and Denmark seem to wish to join WEU. The organisation should accept these candidates, bringing to eleven the number of its members and extending its field of activity to the Mediterranean. Only one member country of the EEC would not be a member of WEU: Ireland, which is neutral. The momentum effect could come into operation and bring the number of member States up to twelve. However, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are still against an extension of WEU; they stress the need to complete the current restructuring which consists of collocating the various sections of the Organisation. Without extension there can be no real complementarity between the EEC which, although it deals with economic questions, is also devoting more and more time to political issues, and WEU, the defence forum.

European identity would assert itself more strongly if WEU had more members, was able to speak on behalf of the whole Community and represented the European pillar, the firm counterpart of the United States in the Atlantic Alliance.

In order to be more effective, the various sections of WEU should collocate, not in Brussels as certain people would like, but in Strasbourg, the headquarters of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, to avoid absorption by NATO or confusion with the EEC which would be awkward for certain States. Ministerial meetings should include not only Foreign and Defence Ministers, as is the case at present, but also Ministers of Finance. Like the EEC, WEU should also provide for meetings of Heads of State and Prime Ministers: in this way the relations between the EEC and WEU would be facilitated. In order to strengthen real complementarity, no new EEC candidates should be accepted unless they join WEU at the same time.

The setting up of an institute for advanced European defence studies, modelled on the NATO Defence College in Rome or on some other example, would make it possible to bring teachings into line and strengthen relations between national bodies and thus consolidate the spirit of defence. Exchanges of trainee-officers between colleges and fighting units should become more general, which implies appropriate language training.

In addition to increasing the defence budgets, the development of modern weapon systems needs coordination between financial resources and research. A united Europe has the means of taking up the technological challenge and equipping herself with the nuclear and conventional weapons she needs (including the so-called smart weapons capable of compensating, to some extent, the imbalance with respect to the Warsaw Pact even if the USSR is carrying out research to counter this threat). With the encouragement of France, but also that of the FRG, the United Kingdom and Spain, she should extend her remarkable achievement in space to the military field by launching observation satellites for a closer perception of the threats. The Italian (and perhaps the Spanish) participation in the French military satellite project Helios offsets the refusal of the United Kingdom and West Germany. Certain politicians, even British ones, have no hesitation in promoting the joint development of a cruise and a ballistic missile by the "four great European States" (FRG, France, Great Britain and Italy). The possibility that the Americans will give up the Trident programme could force the United Kingdom to turn even more to France in order to modernise her strike force.

Mrs. Thatcher, who is not generally Community-minded even if she admits the need for European cooperation, is more so where defence is concerned. French and British industrialists now meet from time to time in order to harmonise their research and production. Is there perhaps a movement (with the cooperation of several other countries) towards an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, towards a military Eureka at the capital deadline of 1992?

* The parliamentarians of the WEU Assembly are selected from the national representatives to the Council of Europe. This is an added argument.

The public submitting of tenders by the administrations of the member countries should logically apply to the Ministries of Defence as it does to other ministries when a true common market is set up in 1992. Even if there are strong reservations, everything should be done to remove the traces of ostracism with regard to military administrations. In addition, considering the strong economic effect of the independent European Programme Group responsible for coordinating the development and production of armaments in Europe, certain politicians advocate its attachment to the EEC before the deadline of 1992 at the latest.

The use of similar equipment will result in a strengthening of the links in the operational field. Technological cooperation will lead to more fruitful contacts between General Staffs, in order to work out joint operational concepts, and between fighting units to verify how these concepts are put to work. This would facilitate the setting up of logical European machinery, standardised for lack of integration under a single command structure. The recent creation of a Franco-German defence council and a Franco-German brigade has great value as a symbol and these will be the starting point of a European defence framework, which should preferably be set up in WEU so as not to increase the number of responsible bodies.

Already some people's thoughts are turning to a subject which was considered taboo not long ago: the setting up of a European deterrent force, i.e. a Franco-British one, that would serve the whole of twelve-power Europe and firstly Germany which cannot become a nuclear power by virtue of international agreements. The harmonisation of the patrol schedules of the SSBM, the refit periods and the target distribution represent real progress. Discussions are proceeding in political formations and in certain military Staffs to enlarge the idea of national sanctuaries, which is the particular wish of the German Defence Minister, the future Secretary-General of NATO. There would then be coupling between the nuclear core made up of the French and British nuclear forces (which would be even more precious with the elimination of American Euromissiles) and the conventional units, particularly the Bundeswehr. A European deterrent force, the components of which would be modernised round about 1995 (with the introduction of the Trident II missile for the British and the M 5 missile for the French) would have, according to certain studies, a greater destructive capability than 100 million men and, particularly, than that of almost the whole of Soviet production. With such a destructive capacity, it would be a further factor of indecision for the Soviets, like the deterrent of Communist China. A nuclear response from Europe or from the People's Republic of China could lead to a Soviet counter-strike, but the USSR would have to keep weapons ready to be used against the United States. There is, however, the problem of the British modernised nuclear force. According to certain political observers, the Trident missiles would be rented to the United States and the maintenance would be done on the other side of the Atlantic.

There is also the problem of a possible production of intermediate missiles by Europe. In reality, the pressure of public opinion forbids such a programme which the Soviets would consider as a way of getting round the INF agreement.

The setting up of a European task force by the member countries of WEU, which would be capable of operating both inside and outside the NATO zone, is even supported by British politicians working together in a study circle called the "Bow Group", some of whom belong to Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet. The European military projection in the Persian Gulf gives a certain topicality to these bold reflections.

The strengthening of the Paris-London axis must not harm the special relations between Paris and Bonn and push the FRG towards neutralism. The action of the other countries, particularly Italy with her essential Mediterranean rôle, must converge towards a unification of doctrines. France, in fact, has just signed agreements with Italy in order to interconnect radar networks and organise joint air and naval patrols in the Mediterranean (in particular with AWACS aircraft which will shortly be delivered by the United States) and Spain could also take part. Such a development in European defence concepts will doubtless depend on establishing a supranational political power.

Public opinion lags behind the intergovernmental discussions. According to various polls carried out early in 1987, only 19 per cent in Germany and 35 per cent in France want a European defence which is independent of the United States; 13 per cent of the British population and 8 per cent of the French are in favour of setting up a Franco-British nuclear force. However, other and more recent polls give much higher percentages in support of European defence.

By her initiative, the USSR has brought the negotiations on the INF out of the impasse in which she herself had put them and has led the Western countries to define their position. The signing of an American-Soviet agreement, which will soon be ratified by the American Senate, forces the Europeans to take a new look at the defence of Europe.

Europe was involved in the decision to site Euromissiles but she found herself excluded from negotiations between the two superpowers on their dismantling which engaged her future. Deprived of cruise and Pershing II missiles but still threatened by an impressive array of intercontinental vectors, short-range nuclear weapons (1400 warheads compared with the 88 of NATO), chemical and conventional weapon systems, Europe must find a response in a better coordination of arms production and in the harmonisation of concepts concerning the use of forces, which doubtless implies increasing the power of European organisations. The affirmation of her identity must, however, go together with the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The better the performance of the French and British deterrent forces is, the greater the Soviet pressure will be to have them taken into account in disarmament negotiations, especially if the USSR herself has to reduce her strategic nuclear weapons as the result of an agreement of the START type with the United States. The modernisation of the two deterrent forces, French and British, and even more so the possible and hypothetical creation of a real European deterrent force could lead, sooner or later, to constraints imposed by a treaty.

Like his predecessors, Gorbachev is trying to decouple Europe from the United States, to disarm Western Europe, to prevent European unification and to convince the West of his desire for peace in order to trade with them and especially to facilitate the technology transfers which the USSR so badly needs. The CSCE could provide her with an opportunity to reach her aim. In the short term Europe (like the United States) would find this an advantage by developing her exports to this immense market, but in the long term she would mortgage her independence vis-à-vis a neighbour who would not only be powerful from the military point of view but also from the economic one. Since they have not been able to take part in the Eureka project, the USSR and her East European satellites are trying to get rid of the coercive COCOM regulations or to have them made less stringent and declare their willingness to rebalance commercial exchanges (when they are in their favour) by increasing their high technology imports.

Gorbachev can wait for an auspicious time to put forward new disarmament proposals: a drifting of Germany towards "national neutralism" (facilitated by a political and military withdrawal of the US and a standstill in the building of Europe), a change of alliance in this country which would associate Mr. Genscher's party with the Social-Democrats or, even better in a few years' time, an electoral victory of the British Labour Party, a large fraction of which is still in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The non-Communist European left, influenced by the pacifist ideas of Central and Northern Europe, might one day enable Gorbachev, who is an excellent strategist, to make a new decisive pawn move on the European chess board.

The proposals set out in Murmansk by the Secretary-General of the CPSU, on 1st October 1987, were intended to impress public opinion and to avoid a new air/sea deployment of NATO's medium-range nuclear weapons.

Disarmament negotiations are continuing in international conferences (the MBFR and the CSCE in Vienna and strategic and chemical weapons in the UN in Geneva). Negotiations on conventional disarmament, which will continue in 1988, may lead to a certain balance being established again between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets may well accept asymmetrical reductions as they did for the dismantling of the INF.

However, with pressure from the Germans, there will be a great risk of agreeing to eliminate short-range nuclear weapons, which would be a decisive step towards the denuclearisation of Europe: this would only be desirable if there were a real balance between the two blocs as far as conventional and chemical forces are concerned.

Conventional arms control: the future agenda

Excerpts from "THE WORLD TODAY"

Karl Kaiser

FEBRUARY 1988

The political context

After the successful conclusion of the negotiations on an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) at the American-Soviet summit in December 1987 the focus of attention has shifted to the field of conventional arms control. This is an area in which negotiations have so far failed to produce any result and which is going to become increasingly important as east and west reduce their nuclear weapons arsenal.

Many elements will come into play as east and west attempt to improve conventional stability in Europe and to cut the cost of armament for both sides in a new round of negotiations: the improvement of the west's conventional force structure, the future of NATO's doctrine of flexible response, the internal structure of west European cooperation, the Franco-German relationship, the role of the Soviet Union within the Warsaw Pact and hence the internal structure of the socialist bloc, the establishment of new links between eastern and western Europe as well as the future of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policy within the Soviet Union. More than ever, western policy on

arms control will have to consider the wider political and security implications of actions in the field of conventional arms control. Politicians and experts will, therefore, face a difficult problem. On the one hand, they must not let the complexity of the problems paralyse their capacity for concrete action; on the other hand, they must constantly consider the wider implications of their steps and explain them to their public at home.

In the course of the post-war period arms control negotiations have tended to take on an increasingly public character. To a growing extent, the secret diplomacy of the negotiating table has been complemented by public discussion, meant to put pressure on other governments by mobilising public opinion and parliaments. The most recent and most intensive form of such an interaction of diplomacy and public debate could be observed from the time NATO took its 'double-track' decision in 1979 right up to its most recent evolution into the 'double zero' solution. The next round of negotiations on conventional disarmament is likely to give further impetus to this trend towards increasingly 'public' arms control negotiations, be-

cause the numerous links with various political areas are likely to produce much mobilisation and public articulation of divergent interests. Moreover, Gorbachev's new and dynamic style is characterised by a significant shift towards public diplomacy calculated to maximise support both in his own home constituency and in the west.

The next round of conventional arms control negotiations will be a complicated process likely to last a number of years. The complexity of the problems will make partial solutions easier and grand solutions highly unlikely. Progress in this area will conceivably take the form of isolated steps in certain sectors which will, it is to be hoped, form a mosaic of change that increases stability in Europe and reduces the cost of armament.

In earlier years, attempts in east and west to influence each other's public opinion were asymmetric in structure. The governments of the Soviet Union and its allies were able to use the media in the west to mobilise individual groups or parties within the pluralistic structure of western democracies in favour of its arguments and initiatives. Given the closed character of socialist countries, their monolithic political structures and state control of the media, western countries did not have the same instruments at their disposal in trying to influence the east. However, new developments have increasingly upset this asymmetry. Public communication is no longer a one-way street from east to west. The societies of eastern Europe are undergoing changes resulting in an increasingly lively discussion of different points of view. In particular within the Soviet Union, the beginnings of genuine debate can be observed. However, *glasnost* not only represents the goal of Gorbachev's policy but also the more or less inevitable consequence of technological and social changes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Given the growing volume of facts and information relayed through television, radio, printed media or direct broadcasting satellites, a process of public discussion of facts and arguments on arms control and disarmament is likely to evolve even within socialist societies.

Conventional disarmament negotiations are likely to last for many years. In that time further technological developments and breakthroughs are likely further to intensify communication between east and west. It is, therefore, probable that in the course of this process the dynamics of mutual influencing in a public process of communication will intensify and will characterise the future conventional arms control negotiations. Such a growing parallelism between diplomacy at the negotiating table and public process of mutual influencing and communication is nothing new for the west, but the increasing participation of east European countries will offer western democracies a growing chance that they can use creatively in the forthcoming round of conventional arms control.

Nuclear conditions of conventional disarmament

Within NATO's strategy of flexible response, nuclear and conventional weapons form an organised whole with each component occupying a clearly defined place in relation to the other. This system of interaction will cause changes in the conventional sector to spill back into the nuclear sector. Put simply, this means that changes of the conventional balance to the west's disadvantage will increase the relevance of its nuclear weapons. This is also applicable to the forthcoming negotiations on conventional weapons and would, in fact, work against the tendency in many western countries to reduce the relevance of nuclear weapons. Conversely, a reduction of the nuclear component in flexible response would increase the relevance of the conventional sector. In the hypothetical case of nuclear disarmament at the expense of the west, the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact would become an even greater

threat to European stability than it is today. In such a case, a change of the conventional force ratio in favour of the west would become even more urgent.

Nuclear arms control and disarmament, therefore, circumscribe the conditions for conventional disarmament. The separation of the two areas, sometimes propagated by politicians and experts, could have fatal consequences. If NATO governments fail to recognise this close interaction and neglect the nuclear component, wrong moves or inaction within the nuclear area could worsen the conditions for conventional disarmament.

A western policy of conventional disarmament must take into account several problems of the nuclear component of flexible response and act accordingly:

1. Within the United States one can observe a growing malaise about the nuclear commitments involved in extended deterrence to protect western Europe. Since limited conflicts can lead to nuclear escalation and potentially reach the United States, the desire to create guarantees or constraints to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons is growing there. The proposal for an east-west agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons formulated in the United States and widely supported in Europe, would create a zone of guaranteed non-nuclear war-fighting. Consequently, the risks of a conventional war would become relatively calculable and the likelihood of war would increase. Since conventional war continues to be, if not the only, then the most important likely trigger of nuclear war, a no-first-use proposal would, in fact, increase the probability of nuclear war which it claims to reduce. A total removal of tactical nuclear weapons or the acceptance of a no-first-use posture would threaten European stability and turn conventional disparity into an even greater problem of conventional arms control policy.

2. The de-legitimation of nuclear deterrence has been going on for several years. The political forces working in this direction span the entire political spectrum and range from President Ronald Reagan (in justifying SDI) and the Catholic bishops of America to the anti-nuclear protest movements of western Europe. A reversal of priorities is involved here: the priority of war prevention as a consequence of the incalculable risk of nuclear weapons is replaced by the priority of damage-limitation dictated by the enormous destructiveness of modern nuclear weapons. And so, a more probable conventional war becomes more acceptable than an improbable nuclear war. There is a lesson here for the policy of conventional arms control: de-legitimation of nuclear deterrence makes conventional disarmament decisive for stability in Europe—the very area where the west is at a structural disadvantage. For this reason such a de-legitimation is not in the west's interests.

3. NATO's theoretical option—to respond to the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority by using tactical weapons in case of aggression—can be cancelled by the Warsaw Pact at the beginning of a conflict if by superior conventional means it succeeds in destroying the tactical nuclear potential of NATO. Such a scenario is constantly taught at Warsaw Pact manoeuvres. If successful, such an action would reduce a nuclear response to strategic means which the United States can hardly use for limited conflicts. The strategy of flexible response would be rendered ineffective. To be sure, this is only a theoretical danger, but it must be taken seriously. The conclusion from all this is that western conventional arms control policy must avoid agreements which increase the capability of the Warsaw Pact to undermine flexible response at the tactical nuclear level; and better still, must try to reduce the existing conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

4. A further problem of flexible response derives from the considerable superiority of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons

with a reach of less than 500 kilometres which will remain after the double zero agreement on INF weapons has been implemented: a Warsaw Pact superiority of roughly 10:1 remains in the field of short-range missiles. In view of this superiority, western decision-makers are likely to suffer from 'self-deterrence' since they will face the prospect of triggering an immensely destructive strike with superior tactical weapons if they make the first escalatory step. If their reluctance to escalate were to become a reasonable certainty, a zone of non-nuclear war-fighting would be created which would allow the Warsaw Pact to bring its conventional superiority into play and in which relatively calculable risks would make war more probable. This means that, given the disparity of tactical nuclear weapons with a reach of less than 500 kilometres, both conventional reductions with the aim of parity of options and the creation of a balance of ground-based tactical weapons are of crucial relevance for European stability.

5. Since the 1950s, it has been western policy not to try to match the conventional armament of the Warsaw Pact. As a result, the east managed to achieve conventional military superiority over the west while remaining relatively poorer. The west, however, relied on the deterrence value of nuclear weapons and thereby bought social and economic progress. The western dependence on nuclear weapons for maintaining stability has, therefore, always remained considerable. That dependence is actually increasing as western military budgets stagnate or diminish and because the conventional share is indeed being reduced in the case of the nuclear powers. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s NATO arms production of decisive weapons systems represented only a fraction of the Warsaw Pact production, e.g. all of NATO produced only 40 per cent of main battle tanks of the Warsaw Pact between 1984 and 1986. The deployment of Spetsnaz troops for offensive purposes goes on. The western lead in technology and the growing unreliability of the military forces of the Soviet Union's allies for aggressive purposes only moderate, but do not offset this disadvantageous trend for the west.

The simple fact remains that, as a consequence of the new INF agreement, nuclear weapons are being eliminated at the very moment when the west's reliance on nuclear weapons has increased as a result of the deterioration of the conventional balance. Contrary to the public presentation of flexible response, such a reliance is real. The prevailing rhetoric of NATO and its member governments has put a growing stress on no-early-use of nuclear weapons. This is not matched—as many politicians and military men would have liked—by growing conventional options to repel aggression by non-nuclear means but is simply a political response to increasing anti-nuclear feelings in Europe and a growing malaise in the United States about being implicated early in tactical nuclear war.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that, as NATO prepares a new round of conventional arms control, it must undertake concomitant steps to preserve and improve the minimum structure of flexible response. Without such policies, conventional arms control will either be rendered extremely difficult or could even undermine stability.

The most important condition for the maintenance of minimum deterrence is to prevent the current disarmament process from turning into a 'triple zero': total denuclearisation of central and western Europe. The double zero agreement on INF weapons does not end flexible response as some argue, but it could endanger the strategy if various pressures combine to produce a total denuclearisation. To some extent, such pressure may result from the momentum that could evolve from a desirable solution to achieve balance in the field of nuclear weapons under the 500-kilometre range. It is highly likely that, now that the INF agreement has been concluded, certain

political forces in West Germany will argue that this country alone carries the nuclear risk of tactical nuclear warfare. To be sure, this argument is incorrect since other European countries (Norway, Denmark, Britain, Benelux, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey) are within reach of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, and all European countries can be hit by Soviet strategic weapons in a tactical mode. Nevertheless, such an argument could easily reinforce the existing anti-nuclear sentiments and create pressure in favour of total elimination of all nuclear weapons from central Europe. This course would command the support of those Americans who feel uneasy about extended deterrence and would like to confine the American nuclear posture to a purely strategic one. Naturally, such an outcome would be vigorously promoted and supported by the Soviet Union whose strategic goal has always been to eliminate nuclear weapons from central and western Europe. Understandably, because that would enable it to maximise its conventional superiority and geopolitical advantage without in any way diminishing the role of its own strategic nuclear weapons which can be targeted (even in a tactical mode) to any point in western Europe. A triple zero solution would, therefore, fundamentally undermine west European security.

On the eve of the new round of conventional arms control negotiations and in the midst of successful attempts at nuclear disarmament, the west must now define the 'bottom-line' of flexible response. Such an attempt could consist of three elements:

1. A vigorous effort should be made to convince the public in the democratic western countries that, even under conditions of nuclear and conventional disarmament, a minimum deterrence remains imperative. To be sure, successful conventional disarmament would reduce dependence on the use of nuclear weapons but, contrary to certain assertions being made in the current political debate in Europe, even a conventional balance does not eliminate the need for nuclear deterrence. The function of nuclear deterrence is to prevent war whereas a purely conventional constellation makes war more likely because of a relatively calculable risk. The disappearance of nuclear deterrence is imaginable only where the political conflict has been resolved at its root.
2. The minimum elements of a tactical posture in Europe should be defined now and pursued in future decisions on procurement and modernisation: an adequate aircraft capacity with sufficient range and modern penetration technology in combination with stand-off weapons that can reach targets within the Soviet Union, the assignment of sea-based systems to SACEUR and a sufficient number of short-range nuclear missiles with a range below 500 kilometres (possibly in a package combining total elimination of all nuclear artillery with a modernisation of the Lance missile in numbers roughly equal to its Soviet counterparts at present western levels).
3. A stronger cooperation between the British and French nuclear deterrents in combination with a European consultation process (but without shared decision) could strengthen the role of these nuclear forces in a European mode.

The central problems of conventional arms control

1. **East-west asymmetries.** Four asymmetries will have to be dealt with in the forthcoming round of arms control negotiations.² The first is an asymmetry of military doctrine. NATO's military doctrine is defensive both in intention and capabilities. The basic philosophy of the NATO Treaty is defensive.

None of the participating democracies underwrite anything but a defensive policy (West Germany has even stated this purpose as a principle in its Constitution). The military posture

of the Alliance is built on the principle of forward defence in Europe designed to prevent an attack against western territory. Though NATO has a limited tactical ability to move forward a few kilometres or to make selective strikes deep into the territory of an aggressor, it has no capacity to move forward into, and hold the aggressor's territory. Its military incapacity to attack is complemented by a political inability to attack, since NATO as an alliance of democracies would never agree to it even in the unlikely event of a member trying to find support for such a policy.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, is defensive in intention but offensive in capability. Starting from the premise that a war must be fought on the territory of an aggressor, the Warsaw Pact proclaims itself to be defensive in purpose but capable of launching an attack into the territory of the aggressor. In line with this, it has acquired a massive capacity to move into western territory and to hold it even under conditions of short warning and/or limited reinforcement. And so East Germany is defended by fighting in West Germany. The force structure (with its emphasis on a combination of mobility and fire-power), the training of officers and soldiers as well as the constant practice of manoeuvres prepare the Warsaw Pact for offence in case of war. The moment the offensive capability is no longer constrained by a defensive intent (as under the present Soviet leadership), the western alliance would be threatened.

A second problem consists of the asymmetry of options between the two pacts. This asymmetry derives from the differences in doctrine. In a long process of arms procurement and training the Soviet Union has acquired options of attack with a relatively short warning and a capacity to invade. These options are due to significant inequalities of forces in areas crucial for offence, such as main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, bridging equipment, multiple rocket-launchers, or special units such as Spetsnaz troops. Depending on how one counts, the west would face inequalities in an order of magnitude of around 1:2 and 1:3.

A third problem lies in the asymmetry of geography. Whereas the Soviet Union is a superpower located in Europe and therefore able to bring in reinforcements from a relatively limited distance, the United States is situated across the Atlantic and has to move its reinforcements across the Atlantic. Stability can, therefore, be achieved only by compensating this inequality. Moreover, the pacts are not comparable with regard to their hinterland as long as France remains outside NATO integration and projects that posture into conventional arms control measures.

The fourth inequality is due to the asymmetric share of American and Soviet forces within their respective alliances. Whereas American troops represent only 11 per cent (16 per cent without Spain and Turkey) of NATO land forces (army and air force) in Europe, the Soviet share of Warsaw Pact forces west of the Urals is 46 per cent. From a western perspective, Soviet force represent the primary threat. Consequently, attempts to increase stability would have to deal primarily with them.

The criteria for conventional arms control on which western consensus is beginning to evolve reflect one of the lessons of the so-called Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talk in Vienna over the recent years. It is that reductions per se should not be the goal of western policy. Since stability is the yardstick, the main target of arms control must be to reduce existing capacities for short-warning attack and invasion. Such a goal can be pursued through a variety of methods. These range from increased transparency (which increases warning time) to changes of the structure of the armed forces (e.g. removal of offensive elements or changes in the state of combat readiness), reductions with ensuing destructions of weapons or redeployment of units or weapons to rear areas.

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Given the substantial conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in central Europe, reductions would have to be asymmetrical. According to a Rand study,⁹ a 3:1 reduction in division equivalents in favour of NATO would still substantially worsen NATO's situation, and only a reduction of 4:1 would slightly improve it. These strikingly unequal ratios are no surprise since they reflect the long years of Soviet arms buildup which led to a significant superiority in a number of fields. In all likelihood, the Soviet Union will denounce such ratios as unfair or excessive, sometimes even quoting from western studies that might support its case. An obvious conclusion to be drawn for a negotiating strategy would be to avoid ratios when discussing reductions and to return to the concept of common ceilings which are a well established and acceptable concept, though they require unequal reductions in case of asymmetries.

Whether the Soviet Union will accept sufficiently asymmetrical reductions remains to be seen. Though the principle has been accepted by Mr Gorbachev in a speech on 10 April 1987 and at the Warsaw Pact summit in May 1987, the long history of MBFR talks gives no clue whatsoever as to Soviet willingness to proceed in that direction in practice. What reasons could induce the Soviet Union to give up its present significant military and political advantage? The first is only moderately convincing. First, such asymmetric reductions would lead to savings of resources, but that is only true in the very long run, since initially conventional disarmament will absorb additional funds for the re-direction of personnel as well as investments for the conversion of the armaments industry. Second, such a move would no doubt have a positive impact on the world and improve the standing of the Soviet Union. Third, such asymmetric reductions could be pursued in connection with western concessions in the field of economic relations and a freeze on conventional technology. The first could by no means be excluded, but would be difficult to implement. A freeze on conventional technology is highly problematical since it would deprive the west of the most important means for tackling its growing manpower problems and the existing east-west inequalities.

2. Intra-western problems. Intra-western disagreements over the negotiating method, i.e., the problem of the inter-Alliance and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework of negotiations, are likely to appear trivial in comparison with the divergencies which are likely to emerge once NATO moves beyond the present agreement on general principles, such as stability, invasion capacity and so on, and attempts to work out practical proposals which translate them into reductions, force redeployments, geographical zones, verification and so on.⁴

Differences of opinion could quickly come into the open if the Soviet Union were to seize the initiative and present proposals before the west has worked out a practicable negotiating strategy. In such a case a superficially attractive offer with an asymmetric reduction which is presented as fair and possibly even accepted as such by many groups in the west could reduce the chances for working out sensible solutions that could increase stability.

Consensus on reducing the invasion capacity of the Warsaw Pact has to be translated into agreement on what types of weapons should be reduced first and in what order of priority. Even the eastern side has agreed to the principle that defence should be 'non-offensive' but the packages to be worked out have to combine many different elements: quantity and quality of weapons, training, combat readiness and so on. Many weapons can be used both for offence and defence, and whether they can be used in one or the other mode depends on numerous other factors that have to be taken into account.

The disaggregation in geographic zones will no doubt

represent another difficult problem. Such a disaggregation is a prerequisite for restructuring the military postures of both sides according to agreed criteria in order to maintain adequate defence without providing capacities for offence and invasion. But any geographic disaggregation creates differences in status of these zones and therefore raises delicate political problems, e.g., for a country that has to reduce (like West Germany), and countries that have to receive redeployed units or material (like the Benelux or France).

Verification will be another difficult problem. Since the formulas of reduction, restructuring or redeployment of forces will inevitably be complex, they require an intensity of verification that will be without precedent in the history of arms control. How far one should go is by no means an east-west problem alone, but will have to be settled first among western countries.

France will have the special problem of being forced to make up its mind about the status of its territory if redeployment schemes in negotiations require the availability of French territory for units or weapons. Moreover, both France and West Germany will no doubt want to ensure that measures in the field of conventional arms control do not impede their efforts to build a stronger mutual security relationship.

3. Intra-eastern problems. Soviet troops have always had a double function in eastern Europe. They have been a factor of defence and offence opposing the forces of NATO and, second, a policing factor guaranteeing Soviet influence in Germany. Significant reductions which are bound to affect Soviet troops more than those of its allies are likely to affect the internal policing role. While the west has an interest in seeing that role reduced, this factor cannot be introduced explicitly into the east-west arms control negotiations. The evolution of the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact will greatly determine the relevance of this question. Moreover, as the 1981 Polish crisis has shown, Soviet troops can play their hegemonial role within the Warsaw Pact system without being inside the territory of the country in question. In the last analysis, the relevance of this factor in forthcoming negotiations on conventional arms control can only be decided by the Soviet Union itself.

Towards a feasible approach to conventional arms control

Even a superficial look at the issues of the forthcoming round of conventional arms control reveals the extraordinary complexity of the issues to be negotiated, even if they are broken down into smaller components of negotiation, such as reduction packages, verification measures, thinning-out moves and so on. Moreover, each item is interconnected with many other sensitive areas. Within the west, views differ on many important issues. It can, therefore, be predicted with reasonable certainty that it will take a long time before the first substantial agreements can be concluded between east and west in this field. The question, therefore, arises whether one could not organise an approach to negotiations according to feasibility and practicability of progress and proceed accordingly in succeeding phases.

1. A discussion of military doctrine A first phase of negotiations could consist of a thorough discussion of the military doctrines of both alliances. Several practical reasons suggest such an approach. First, such a round in which both soldiers and diplomats take part, could lay the groundwork for later negotiations on specifics by analysing thoroughly which threats each side perceives with regard to the military posture, procedures and doctrine of the other. By identifying the central elements of threats, important criteria and priorities for the ensuing negotiations could be identified. Such discussions can, third, be started without being forced to overcome the numerous divergencies of views within the west and can, therefore, begin reasonably soon.

Moreover, such discussions would have eminently political reasons. First, they would have an impact on the western public besides clarifying the issues at the negotiating table. A review of the military doctrine would provide an opportunity to bring into relief the striking disparity between the defensive claim of the Warsaw Pact's doctrine and the offensive reality of its force ratios, force structure, training and readiness. A review of these issues would lay the ground for a better understanding by the western public—not only of the general issues but also of the need for asymmetric reductions.

Second, a discussion would have an impact on the east as well. Some of the public arguments carried into the east could well have a moderate though not insignificant impact. Even more important, the participating Soviet elites will be exposed to a critical analysis of their own doctrine and posture. Conceivably, such a process may help those forces in the Soviet bureaucracy willing to challenge military orthodoxy and its tremendous political and economic burden for the Soviet Union.

Some argue against such a discussion of doctrine on the grounds that it will either be used by Soviet propaganda to denounce NATO's policies, or that it will result in a confrontation of irreconcilable views on military data worse than that experienced during the MBFR talks. However, NATO has nothing to fear from such a debate. By now the Alliance is used to controversy about its policies which, after all, enjoy clear political support by the participating countries. NATO has a good case when it comes to comparing eastern and western military doctrine. Finally, only a test will show whether or not a discussion will get bogged down in disagreements on data and whether or not Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy will have its impact here as well.

2. The priority of confidence-building. Even if east-west measures on military hardware or troops prove difficult and time-consuming to agree upon, a lack of success in this area need not prevent progress in the realm of confidence-building. New measures of confidence-building could superimpose greater transparency on the existing military setup in east and west with all its asymmetries so that both sides can become confident not to become the object of surprise moves or disadvantageous changes in military strength.

Such confidence-building measures could consist of a further intensification in scope of the measures agreed upon at the Stockholm Conference in 1986 by creating a dense network of observation on both sides of the east-west border, notably in central Europe. Such measures could cover both manoeuvres and all movements of troops and material. Moreover, they would have to include the perhaps most important element that the Stockholm Agreement failed to cover: alert exercises of military units. From the point of view of crisis stability, such exercises deserve prior notification and some degree of observation even more than manoeuvres do.

Confidence-building measures as an opening of a new round of conventional arms control in Europe would have the net effect of increasing stability even without reductions; would lay the groundwork for the relatively dense network of verification that has to accompany later reductions or redeployment measures; and would, it is hoped, create a political atmosphere conducive to more far-reaching measures of conventional arms control.

3. An agreement on equal levels of arms production. Agreement on military data, not to mention reduction and redeployment formulas, will be difficult and time-consuming. If the asymmetries which the west is rightly concerned about cannot be reduced quickly, one can at least try to prevent them from getting worse in a parallel action.

Taking the average of 1984-6 production of both alliances in military equipment particularly relevant for the conventional

posture in Europe and therefore for stability, the following picture emerges:

Category	NATO as a percentage of Warsaw Pact
Tanks	40
Other Armoured Fighting Vehicles	55
Towed Field Artillery	21
Self-Propelled Artillery	19
Multiple Rocket Launchers	27
Self-Propelled AA Artillery	24
Towed AA Artillery	4
Bombers	18
Fighters	79

(Source: United States Department of Defence, *Secret Military Power*, 1987, p. 122)

An agreement to reduce—possibly in phases—the production of military equipment to roughly equal levels would circumvent the inevitably controversial discussion on what forces exist and where (though that has to take place when reductions and redeployments are negotiated) and instead focus on future outcomes. Verification is relatively easy since it need not cover large areas but only the exit points of production.

The fact that it is Soviet production that has to go down substantially not only underscores the western point about excessive military over-insurance of the Soviet Union in the past but may be attractive to those forces in the Soviet elites who want to liberate themselves from the tremendous economic cost of that unnecessary over-insurance.

4. Key measures. A discussion of military doctrine, new confidence-building measures, and an agreement to scale down asymmetries in production could be the elements of a first phase of conventional arms control to be followed by carefully worked out and inevitably complex packages of reductions, redeployments and so on. Nevertheless, an attempt could be made to identify approaches that are simple, feasible, and affect conventional stability favourably. Such measures could be initiated relatively early. They could include proposals, such

as that by Senator Sam Nunn to reduce equal percentages of American and Soviet troops in Germany or Phil Karber's suggestions to phase out tanks to roughly equal levels in the central front area.⁵

Conclusion

As the west enters a new phase of conventional arms control it will have to reconcile its activities in three complex areas: the preservation and, possibly, restructuring of the nuclear prerequisites for conventional arms control; the pursuit of conventional arms control proper starting with a debate on military doctrine and confidence-building measures; and, finally, the improvement of its own force structure and internal alliance arrangements. Even some progress in conventional arms control will not remove the necessity to engage in such improvements, in strengthening the European pillar of NATO and in preserving the American-European links. Needless to say, western policy should encourage reform and change of military policies in the Soviet Union. But western concessions that would further reduce its already inadequate conventional posture can only come as a consequence of significant Soviet moves, not as its precursor. Nevertheless, many signs in the Soviet Union suggest that for the first time there is a genuine chance to pursue successful conventional arms control between east and west.

¹ See, for example, François Heisbourg, 'Die NATO vor der entscheidenden Bewährungsprobe. Die neue Lastenverteilung im Bündnis', *Europa-Archiv*, No 8/1987, and Uwe Nerlich, 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Western Policies and Objectives', in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson (Eds.), *Conventional Arms and the Security of Europe* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).

² See also Karsten D. Voigt, 'Von der nuklearen zur konventionellen Abrüstung in Europa—Kriterien konventioneller Stabilität und Möglichkeiten der Rüstungskontrolle', *Europa-Archiv*, No 14/1987.

³ James A. Thomson and Nannette C. Ganitz, 'Conventional Arms Control Revisited. Objectives in the New Phase', in Nerlich/Thomson (Eds.), *op. cit.*

⁴ With regard to the difficulties see Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Perspektiven konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa', in *Außenpolitik*, No 4/1987, and David S. Yost, 'Die Kontrolle konventioneller Rüstung vom Atlantik bis zum Ural. Ein Mittel zur Behebung der Mängel bei MBFR?', in *Europa-Archiv*, No 10/1987.

⁵ See Phillip A. Karber, 'Conventional Arms Control Options', in Nerlich/Thomson (Eds.), *op. cit.*

Excerpts from "STUDIA DIPLOMATICA" of 16th March 1988

TOWARDS AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE*

Pierre HARMEL
Minister of State

We have come a long way since Lenin's "inescapable" war, the period of thaw under Krushchev when "war was no longer inevitable" and the joint declaration by President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev on 19th and 21st November in Geneva: "A nuclear war could never be won and must never take place!". The language of the Soviet leaders has evolved; there has been a progressive change towards another choice, a transition from the cold war to acceptance of "coexistences" to ward off the inevitability of conflict.

This evolution corresponds to the position and unchanging wishes of the West. In 1946, President Eisenhower made a real offer of peace to Stalin. As soon as the Atlantic Council was formed, it made a similar declaration; and from 1955 to 1964, at all the meetings of the Council of the Alliance, careful studies of the causes of tension and proposals for adequate means of reducing them were included in the communiqués published at the end of its sessions. It is certain that during these first ten years little was accomplished to create détente except for the opening up of the political field and the increasing attempts to seek bilateral contacts between the Eastern States and Western Europe.

During the next ten years, from 1964 to 1975, this process developed considerably. In 1964, it led to the proposal by the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Rapacki, for a meeting of a "European Conference on Security". In December 1965 and December 1966, the Alliance noted officially the development of contacts and made known its desire to establish better relations with the East in the political, economic, social, scientific and cultural fields. The Atlantic Council, meeting at Reykjavik in June 1968, decided to "give priority to a study of the possibility of balanced force reductions for East and West, particularly in Central Europe".

The decision taken in December 1966 to carry out a joint study of the future tasks of the Alliance was a further example of this continuing process. Work on this study, proposed by the Belgian Government, was immediately begun. The resulting report will be twenty years old on 16th December next. I do not intend to comment on it anew. I should merely like to stress that it was not a turning point in the policy of the Alliance, but a timely, formal and unanimous confirmation of the two axes, always complementary, of its aims: a solid defence ensured by the Allies and détente.

* Address on the occasion of the presentation of the 1987 Atlantic prize by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, on 25th November 1987.

Twenty years after this report, I should like to put forward five different points for consideration.

1. The continuance of Alliance policy, linked to its two axes, defence and détente, has been marked, since 1967, by moments of strength, periods of profound crisis and by a remarkable revival. I shall briefly recall these events.

2. It must be loyally admitted - and public opinion must be made aware of this - that these ambitious projects for détente bring to light the complex problems of firstly, the balance between the Alliance forces and those of the Warsaw Pact and of another balance, that of the responsibilities of each of the pillars of the Alliance, on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. The third component of East-West relations is that for forty years the philosophies have remained unaltered, but society has changed, both in the East and West. This movement has prompted the evolution of political and economic attitudes in the East and the West and it must influence the relations between groups of States with different political systems.

4. Another change. During the last forty years, the East-West debate has been a dominant factor, at least in the Northern Hemisphere. It will continue to be a crucial factor in the future. But elsewhere enormous masses of people, countless numbers of rising generations are fighting for survival. Increasing influences are making themselves felt, those of the new great nations, those of numbers and necessity and those of mystical passions: they are disturbing the fragile balance of a multipolar world.

5. How could the internal dialogue within the Alliance and its external dialogue with the Eastern countries not be influenced and changed by these multiple components of the future?

* * *

These are the questions on which I should like to dwell for a moment, without providing the qualified developments they call for in the limited time available. But each one of you devotes your life and constant thoughts to these questions and I know you will complete my paper as necessary.

1. FROM 1967 TO 1987: PERIODS OF STRENGTH, PROFOUND CRISIS, REMARKABLE REVIVAL

When one looks at the past twenty years, it is not easy to try to make a global appreciation of the efforts to reduce tension and it is dangerous to sum the situation up in three stages. Nonetheless;

- on the credit side progress is greater than one generally imagines;

- there has been much that is negative, leading in the years 1982-1983 to the policy of détente being called into question;

- this being so however, since 1985, the revival has been surprisingly dynamic.

Oddly enough, the positive sum of détente actions is rarely established and to this day there is no proof that it has been the subject of strictly scientific and complete publications.

Amongst the international acts on arms limitations, the most important are undoubtedly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1967, followed by the agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons (SALT I), the Treaty on antimissile ballistic systems ABM (1972) and the SALT II Agreements (1979).

Amongst the political acts of great significance were the signing in 1970 of the Treaty of the Federal Republic of Germany with the USSR and Poland,

the signing of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in June 1972, the signing of the Treaty on relations between the two German States in December 1972,

the adoption of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975, the important final texts of the Madrid and Stockholm conferences,

and finally, in the economic, commercial, scientific and cultural fields, the numerous bilateral agreements between States with different régimes, the summits, state visits and working visits which have strengthened diplomatic and intergovernmental relations, as well as the public declarations made on these occasions.

I think that the legal description, analysis and synthesis of all these actions should be undertaken and carried through to a successful conclusion by one or several university teams. Such a study would be useful in all countries to those with the same goal in view.

However, at the same time during these twenty years, actions contrary to détente were accumulating. In both camps, the growth of nuclear forces was not brought under control. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Warsaw Pact armies, the pressure brought to bear on Poland in 1982, the measures carried out by the USSR in Afghanistan, and the support given to revolutionary movements in Africa all served to increase tension. At the same time a growing fear was felt within the Alliance, clearly expressed in 1982, by the Foreign

Minister of the FRG, Mr. Genscher: "The danger now is obviously not primarily an attack on Europe in the form of a Great War. Instead the danger lies in a gradual shift in the balance of power in the world. At the end of such a process the Western democracies, and above all the European ones, would then be forced into compliance and subjugation by the Soviet Union demonstrating its overwhelming military superiority and by its control of sea lanes and Third World regions that are of vital importance for energy and raw material supplies to the West." (1). I also share this fear.

In 1977, tension was further increased by the stepping-up of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed in their hundreds by the USSR at West European targets. In 1979-80, when the Alliance offered not to retaliate by installing comparable weapons on condition that an agreement on the total elimination of these weapons in both camps could be drawn up, the USSR refused negotiations on this subject. All this led, in 1983, to a freezing of East-West dialogue and communications and engendered increasing scepticism in the Alliance on the possibilities of real agreement on arms limitation.

At that time, some people in the West considered that the policy of reducing tension had failed. In both camps, those who had never been convinced spoke up again. Even so, at its meeting on 8th and 9th December 1983, the Atlantic Council managed to overcome its deception and confirmed its two-fold wish for firmness in defence and an opening up of dialogue and cooperation. In my opinion, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Tindemans, greatly helped by proposing to the Council a joint evaluation, adapted to the prevailing circumstances, of the 1967 report on the future of the Alliance with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. Six months later, the Permanent Representatives had completed their task and the Atlantic Council published the Washington declaration of 31st May 1984, renewing its support for the balanced approach in the 1967 report: maintenance of military strength, political solidarity between Allies, the pursuit of a more stable relationship between Eastern and Western countries. The Washington declaration concluded: "Experience points to the continuing need for a full, consistent and realistic implementation of the two main tasks of the Alliance."

The 1984 declaration also contains positive phrases regarding a "more constructive dialogue": cooperation, mutual understanding, identification of joint interests, enlarging areas of agreement, eliminating or isolating areas of discord, economic exchanges and cooperation.

During this time, from 1982 to 1985, there were four successive Secretaries-General of the USSR Communist Party: Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982, Yuri Andropov (died 1984), Constantin Tchernenko (died March 1985), and Michael Gorbachev, the present holder of this post.

After six long years, President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev were able to resume Summit contacts. The first meeting took place from 19th to 21st November 1985 at Geneva and both praised the conclusions which outlined anew the themes of possible dialogue and improved exchanges.

As early as 15th January 1986, Gorbachev, the new Secretary-General, proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapons before the year 2000. The sequel to these talks is well-known, the sudden Summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, the agreements and disagreements expressed there, and today the forthcoming signing by the two Heads of State, in Washington, of the Treaty on the verified elimination of intermediate nuclear weapons.

In my rôle of witness, I am impressed by the boldness of the projects which have been considered over the last two years, by the depth of creativeness which has followed a long silence, but also by the prudence of the approaches made during the real agreements.

2. INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF DETENTE

Getting down to facts, it can be seen that for two years in both the Eastern and Western camps, total disarmament has not been asked for; no-one is ready for unilateral disarmament. However, the declared objectives present a common goal: no reduction of security, setting it nonetheless at a lower level, on a cooperative basis, with a constant search for balance.

The Atlantic Alliance cannot stop reaffirming its desire to defend itself by maintaining the security of allied territory through adequate and balanced deterrent machinery.

The Warsaw Pact, whose existence has just been extended for thirty years (2), set out its own military doctrine for defence in 1987 (3): "... the obligation to maintain its armed forces, in such a state and at a level which will enable them to counter all attacks against any member country of the Treaty from the outside".

On these clearly defined terms, one must welcome all attempts at de-escalation and the first stages proposed in both camps at the same time:

- the elimination of intermediate nuclear weapons which will no doubt be achieved in a few days;
- a further fifty per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear forces of each camp;
- the limited but significant proposal made by the Atlantic nations at Vienna on 5th December 1985, regarding more than symbolic reductions to conventional armed forces in Europe. The Warsaw Pact replied with a counter-proposition on 11th January 1986. Since then, the members of both Alliances have undertaken to establish a mandate for new negotiations, geographically and materially more extensive, and aimed in particular at reducing the offensive capacities of opposing armies in Europe.

These three projects, which form the beginning of the movement to reduce armaments, have the advantage of not calling into question the general strategy of the Alliance - security and deterrence - otherwise they could not have been made! Furthermore, the existing links in the strategy between nuclear and conventional weapons should be clearly explained to public opinion in our countries. A reduction in one or other of these defence systems calls for a preliminary question in a series of questions concerning, successively, three kinds of armaments.

On chemical weapons - so horrible - the Geneva Disarmament Conference continues to work for their overall ban, but a world-wide treaty along the lines of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be necessary.

On the total elimination of nuclear weapons envisaged by the superpowers, the hundred or more States, signatories of the Treaty for the non-proliferation of atomic weapons, should be informed how they will be defended by the superpowers against a threat or a nuclear attack by a State which breaks the clauses of the Treaty, a non-signatory nation or some anonymous and violent aggressor.

In order to bring this about, the five States possessing nuclear power, all members of the United Nations Security Council, must be party to a unanimous project of denuclearisation.

Finally, it would be necessary for all the member States of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact to support a project whereby, without strategic or short-range nuclear arms, the same security through deterrence as that of the last forty years would be achieved.

It may be noted moreover that, in the absence of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional weapons for the defence of the Atlantic zone will bring many problems.

What type and what level of defensive conventional weapon should be maintained or installed so that, on land, sea and in the air, our population can be defended against warlike acts by a moderate system of deterrence?

How could the balance of power on both sides be established, in view of the very different geo-political conditions existing in the West and in the East?

Mr. Tindemans was right a year ago to propose that the Alliance consider all the problems which would result from conventional disarmament. And at the NATO Ministerial meeting at Halifax, a decision was taken to set up a high-level working group on the control of conventional armaments. The Atlantic Council informed this group on 11th and 12th June 1987, at Reykjavik that their task was "to achieve a global and stable balance of conventional forces, at a lower and controllable level". (4)

On the other hand, we should no doubt be encouraged by the position adopted at the Summit Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact Treaty on 29th May 1987 in Berlin when the following declaration was made:

"The process for reducing military confrontation in Europe must be continuous. It should guarantee at each stage, a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Because of the asymetry of the armed forces in the two blocs in Europe, due to historical, geographical and other factors, the Conference declares itself ready to eliminate, during these reductions, the disparities between one or another factor, working from the lowest level upwards."

Whatever the original convergent elements, for which we must be glad, one cannot hide from public opinion that this great task will be complicated and arduous. It can only be completed with openness and transparency, as well as imagination. In addition, it must be remembered that even greater cohesion will be needed within the Alliance if a fair share of tasks and unity of views on the aims to be achieved are to be maintained among the Allies.

3. IMMUTABILITY OF DOCTRINES AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY

The third component of current East-West relations is the least easy to describe in a few words. How can changes in society over the last forty years affect the development of political régimes or influence the relations between countries with contradictory doctrines?

As a start to this line of thought, I should like to quote a well-known text and recall a memory.

The text is that issued by Pope John XXIII in April 1963 entitled "Pacem in terris". It says: "Once laid down, philosophical doctrines do not change, whereas the historical movements based on these doctrines for economic, social, cultural or political reasons are aimed at specific and changing conditions of life. These movements can be considerably influenced by such changes. As a result, meetings between the supporters of differing philosophies can present real or promising future advantages on the practical level." (5).

In discussions between both Eastern and Western governments, I noticed several times that this text, which speaks of relations between countries with different régimes and opposing doctrines, carried considerable weight and often influenced behaviour.

Now, a memory. As soon as the war was over, a race for knowledge started gradually in the developed countries. The USSR was justly proud of being first into space. But from then on we believed the time would come where changes resulting from this race for knowledge would bring the socialist countries closer to more open societies. The first signs came in 1956, during the Budapest revolt, when we heard that in the university community of Leningrad, teachers and students were angered because the news of the Hungarian uprising had not come to them

directly and were horrified because there was no mention of it in their newspapers. We thought it was impossible to start and maintain a quest for truth and scientific or technical creation among the most gifted and dedicated of our youth if they were deprived both of knowledge of what was happening in the world and the privilege of communication.

I will not say more about restructuring, transparency and democratisation, which have recently become key words in the USSR, Poland and China, except that they must be of interest to us, that they must raise prudent hopes throughout mankind and that such reforms must be followed with understanding.

We do not know whether these tendencies can be called "liberalisation", because they will not alter Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Perhaps we should only say to our Eastern partners that our doctrines in the West have remained immutable for the last forty years: all man's political, social, moral and religious life under our régimes is still based on the freedom of each individual and his responsibility for his decisions and acts. But, at the same time, there have been changes in our society. What the East continues to call the "capitalism" of the West has been mutualised, socialised, has shared out nearly half of our national revenues and our so-called "market" economies have been transformed into mixed economies.

Discussion of these subjects between the various régimes may perhaps become less difficult in the future.

4. WIDENING THE DISCUSSION

A further aspect of present East-West relations must undoubtedly be added to the above.

Changes not only affect the northern hemisphere or the highly industrialised countries. There have been considerable alterations elsewhere in the last twenty years: they already affect the present and future of highly developed societies in their relations with those of what is still called the Third World. The following seem to me to be the most important of these aspects.

- Two huge countries, soon to make up forty per cent of the world's population - Communist China and India, with its pluralist democracy status - have, after courageous efforts and considerable bio-vegetable research, overcome their populations' basic food problems: by increasing agricultural productivity they have become self-supporting and India now exports rice.

- These, and many other countries, especially S.E. Asia whose mercantile capacities are well-known, have enormous reserves of young people from which to select the scientific and technical élites who are helping them to emerge rapidly.

- As the world's most populated areas are able to meet their own food requirements and start to export agricultural and industrial products, traditional producers will lose their privileged positions, which are already endangered.

- At the same time, in a number of desolate countries another third of the world's population grows unceasingly. Some are tragically desperate, others develop uncontrollable mystic passions. Soon the old, industrialised and privileged world of East and West will only contain one-sixth of the world's population.

- Lastly, no responsible persons anywhere can ignore these continuing events as, in under less than thirty years, the stratosphere has been inhabited by man's inventions in communications and observation, to mention only these. Man-controlled space around the world has doubled. Data processing, data banks and telecommunication systems have spun a net for the instant transmission of ideas and events around the world, which is so vast and dense that cultural and political interpenetration can no longer be avoided. As Ambassador Cassiers said recently, Theillard de Chardin's "noosphere", a world community of the mind, is becoming a reality. No one, and no political régime can today remain isolated and closed.

It has been noted with joy that both Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gorbachev have mentioned this unification and multipolarisation of the world in their recent speeches. Such new attitudes may soon widen political summit talks to include, and also go beyond, the technical and mainly military aspects of East-West relations. It would influence new world balances. Ideally, discussions between two superpowers would lead towards greater concertation, and the need for a new economic and social order would lead to the search for the beginnings of a world authority.

I have never forgotten the words of a Swiss journalist, René Payot, published forty years ago, in 1947. Speaking of the antagonism between the Allies at that time, he concluded: "the giving of new themes to Soviet-American discussions will be decisive for pacifying the universe.". (6) We are now in 1987 and perhaps the hour for this new discussion is about to ring.

In this way, the recommendations of the Atlantic Council, made in Washington in 1984, which I quoted earlier, would achieve their full value. "Finding common interests", "cooperation", "widening of areas of entente" would become counsels heavy with meaning.

5. SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

It would be a paradox if, while a great effort is being made to reduce tensions, public opinion lost interest in the permanent safeguarding of the joint interests of North America and Europe and the maintenance of the special solidarity existing between the allied countries on either side of the Atlantic. Such convergence is more important than ever in a time of economic, monetary and commercial unrest, even more so as the time for political union in the EEC approaches and when WEU aims to develop a "more coherent identity of European defence" (7).

I hope that a short reminder of our reciprocal behaviour since the beginning of the Alliance will help to strengthen our future ties. We must remember that none of the initial stages in the construction of Europe could be separated from defence problems: each of these major events came about with the support and encouragement of American and allied governments.

It must not be forgotten that the first joint defence effort after the war was made by France and Great Britain when they signed the Dunkirk Treaty in 1947: a year later, on 17th March 1948, the Benelux countries and the two allies signed the Brussels Treaty of "Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence". Ambassador André de Staerke, who was present at the treaty's signing, recalls that, at that moment, the telephone rang in P.H. Spaak's office. Mr. Truman, President of the United States, was calling the Belgian Foreign Minister to congratulate him, adding: "Now that five European countries have united for their defence, the United States will also be able to participate.". Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4th April 1949, was born.

We must not forget the speech made by Winston Churchill in Strasbourg on 11th August 1950. It was the beginning of the Alliance and he suggested that a European army should be set up within it. This speech was immediately seconded by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Neither must we forget that as soon as the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1952, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries set up an ad hoc committee to draft a European Joint Policy Treaty to cover the European Defence Community Treaty, signed on 27th May 1952. Paul van Zeeland, at that time Belgian Foreign Minister, was touched by Dean Acheson's satisfaction at Belgium's support of the European Defence Community. When it broke down in 1954 and the Brussels Treaty was extended to include the Federal Republic of Germany in a collective system, WEU, intended to cement the building of Europe, was again supported by the United States.

Lastly, we must remember that the proposal to gradually balance the Alliance by setting up two pillars - of which the European pillar remained to be built - was made in 1961 by President Kennedy and that it was approved by the then President of the European Commission, Mr. Hallstein.

All these memories became highly significant when, some days ago, on 27th October, the Defence Ministers of the seven WEU countries published in The Hague their platform for European security to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and to make a greater contribution to Western security as a whole. (7) President Reagan's reply came at once. On 4th November, he approved such a partnership. "Equal relations will not reduce our ties", he said, "but will strengthen them. They will not weaken our potential, but extend it."

Recent events have confirmed the logic of our common history. There are still defence problems, but they have gone much further. They will improve European and Alliance solidarities, if the United States, Canada and the European NATO countries are certain that efforts made within a smaller circle form part of our collective security and that of our joint approach to discussions with the Eastern countries.

That the United States, Canada, the seven WEU countries, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece and the Scandinavian countries should be concerned with their own situation and have their own problems to settle should never come as a surprise and we must show understanding friendship to them all. But the interests of the Atlantic collectivity should always come before domestic interests. If future peace and security depend on new world balances, these latter will stem more and more from cohesion in the Alliance.

We have considered the Alliance and its duration as a continuous movement towards peace. Perhaps it is going through a hopeful but difficult period. At such times great men are important.

Will you allow me, Lord Carrington, Mr. Secretary-General, to express publicly my satisfaction in seeing you bring the matchless diplomatic traditions of your great country, augmented by your own talent, to the Alliance.

In you, every Head of State or Government, every Foreign and Defence Minister, each Permanent Representative of the sixteen Allied Countries has found a wise counsellor and guide. I am sure that the Eastern countries feel the same respect for you as we do here. To the difficult game of international relations we know you have brought a higher vision of common interests by looking at essentials and, when necessary, by cutting through the knots that hinder their advance.

If the horizon of East-West relations has grown clearer, it is because you have helped to lighten it. As a simple citizen, allow me to thank you.

NOTES

- (1) Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER. "Toward an overall Western strategy for peace, freedom and progress," Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1982.
 - (2) Decision of April 1985 at Warsaw.
 - (3) Declaration at the Ministerial meeting of the Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th June 1987 at Reykjavik.
 - (5) Encyclical letter, "Pacem in Terris", Spes 1963, para. 159.
 - (6) René PAYOT. "Antagonisme entre alliés", Hommes et mondes, June 1947.
 - (7) The Hague. "Platform on European Security Interests", 27th October 1987.
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Mr. HANS VAN DEN BROEK, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Let me start, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you, and of course the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, for inviting me to this very impressive meeting. Past experience of these meetings suggests that they can be extremely stimulating for the political and public debate within our Alliance. I have no doubt that this will hold especially true for this meeting, attended as it is by such an august list of prominent and experienced individuals.

I believe it was prudent of the organizers of this conference not to extend the scope of this exercise in forward-looking and reflection about East-West relations beyond the nineties, since it is quite nerve-racking enough trying to produce a reliable assessment of what exactly is going on in the eighties. No-one can deny that only two years ago our outlook on the prospects of East-West relations was quite a different one and, as far as I am concerned, certainly a less hopeful one than today.

The significant progress in arms control is, of course, a case in point: double zero INF, 50% START, ban on chemical weapons, talks on conventional stability, talks about nuclear testing. Are we moving too fast? Are we surrendering to a comfortable form of madness or a dangerous form of sanity? I do not think so. I believe it is rather a question of carefully selecting opportunities to enhance security and stability at lower levels of armaments. And it is certainly my feeling that, we should look for "all weather agreements", which can effectively withstand the changes - for better or for worse - that might take place in the Soviet Union or other East European countries. They should in fact meet the standard of enhancing security and stability under all circumstances.

The merits of the INF double zero agreement, I know, are being disputed in some Alliance quarters, but I believe that these critics take too dim a view of the Alliance. The security of the West does not depend on one particular weapon system, but on a satisfactory mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based on a realistic threat assessment. I do not feel that our strategy of credible deterrence is endangered by an agreement that significantly reduces the threat to Western Europe by eliminating warheads on a three to one basis in our favor. Certainly, further nuclear reductions, specifically in Europe, are undesirable without first completing our homework on a comprehensive concept of arms control, effectively clarifying the requirements of Alliance security and its strategy of deterrence. But let there be no misunderstanding. Regarding INF, I thought that the Alliance had already made its position clear towards the Soviet Union as far back as 1981.

Obviously much more can be said about the arms control aspect of East-West policies, but before I unduly upset NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, who will be addressing this meeting after me and who is undoubtedly much more competent in this field than I am, let

me turn to another point. Allow me to make a few observations on some other developments in East-West relations, on the outcome of which I believe the West probably has far less influence, but which are extremely important for the future of East-West relations.

In the first place I am thinking of the restructuring of the economies not only of the Soviet Union, but also of other East European countries. It is remarkable to note that in the wake of reforms in the Soviet Union rather drastic economic reforms are now being successively announced in other countries as well: not only in Hungary, whose economy was already more liberalized than that of the Soviet Union, but also in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and, notably, Poland.

I feel the most intriguing question which this reform poses is not in the first place whether it is going to succeed. Of course that is important, but what is much more intriguing is the question of whether this reform will in fact leave the political system, as such, intact. I believe we can all safely assume that Secretary General Gorbachev and all the other party leaders in Eastern Europe are dedicated Marxist communists, convinced of their ideology.

If the economic reform plans that have been announced should materialize, however, it is hard to envisage how these could be implemented without certain political adjustments also being made. I do not know whether you share this experience, but my experience in contacts with East European leaders including Soviet leaders is that although they begin by stating quite clearly that the political system is there to stay, that the monopoly and supremacy of the Communist Party in that socialist system are there to stay, as the debate continues and focuses on issues such as increased flexibility in the economic systems, on decentralizing the economic system, on modern management in a modern economy etc., it becomes hard to imagine that in the longer run all this will be compatible with preserving the foundations of the present political structure.

What the outcome of such a confrontation will be, of course, remains to be seen. My feeling is that, in spite of the fact that we can only, at most, have a limited influence on the course of developments we should encourage the process of "perestroika" wherever possible.

In other words, I am not one of those who feel that an economically stronger and more prosperous Soviet Union would automatically pose a greater military threat to the West, for the simple reason that I do not believe that it will be possible for these economic reforms to materialize unless further internal liberalization occurs.

Frankly, I do not know, Mr. Chairman, whether we are now talking about East-West relations in the nineties, because the process may well take longer. On the other hand it might well be that this process will come to an end sooner, although in that case I think the outcome for the West would probably be less positive. If Gorbachev fails, my feeling is that

the only forces in the Soviet Union which will be served will be those which are hostile to Western interests.

Under these circumstances trying to capitalize constructively on the new opportunities being opened up by the Soviet Union should be one of our prime policy goals. We should pursue this goal not with a lack of self-confidence, which I feel we in Europe, at least, sometimes suffer from, but on the contrary with a large dose of self-confidence based not only on our strong economic position but also, and more particularly, on the virtues and values of our basic democratic systems. We should certainly not fear the confrontation with Eastern Europe in this respect.

Mr. Chairman, it may be difficult to influence economic developments in the Soviet Union directly. The question is whether we can have a more significant influence on another important issue of East-West relations, that of respect for human rights. I think that the Western countries have by now made it quite clear to the Soviet Union that in improving East-West relations in the longer term a proper balance must be struck between arms control issues, economic co-operation and, last but not least, the human dimension.

In saying this I have unfolded before you the road-map which we feel provides such effective orientation for future East-West relations, the road-map in fact of the Helsinki Final Act, the contents of which are by now well-known. And I note at this point that where in the past, and even as recently as two or three years ago, it was absolutely impossible to have any kind of discussion on human rights with the Soviet Union or other Eastern European countries, this issue is now at least being discussed, not only in the form of exchange of monologues but indeed by exchanges of views, real discussions, although these clearly reveal the rather fundamental differences of interpretation which still remain as to the terminology of the Helsinki Final Act.

Then there remains, I think, the important test for the West, of whether we are also prepared and determined enough to make it absolutely clear to the Soviet Union that respect for human rights and liberalization in that sense is an essential prerequisite for a further improvement of East-West relations, that we are not only seeking arms control agreements as such, but that the question of human rights is inextricably connected with Western policy in that field. We will be put to the test shortly in Vienna, where we will have to show whether we are serious on this point and whether we are prepared to adhere to the Western proposals made at the CSCE follow-up meeting with respect to the human dimension of the Helsinki process.

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. There are, of course, numerous topics in East-West relations on which one could dwell, one of which is whether the new leadership in Moscow is really introducing changes in Soviet foreign policy in general. Looking at a number of

incidents I do indeed have the feeling that the key issue in the Soviet Union at present is consolidation rather than expansion. And, when I see the developments in Afghanistan, my feeling is that progress is indeed being made and that within a year or so this subject may disappear from the international agenda altogether. I hope I am not overly optimistic, but I would not be at all surprised.

When I look at what the Soviet Union is now prepared to do, for instance in terms of co-operation in the UN framework, I see something that has not been seen for many years, if ever. Moscow is even starting to pay its contribution. That may not be something to boast about, I admit, but nevertheless it does indicate that the SU is taking a closer interest in this forum than it has done in the past. And when I consider the conclusions which the Security Council arrived at on the 20th of July with respect to the Gulf region, I feel certain that this also has something to do with an attitude in Moscow, which was less likely as recently as two years ago. In other words, all kinds of changes are taking place.

I am not trying to be, and could never really be a illusionist. We shall (without a doubt) have to see the deeds that follow the words. The only plea I am in fact making, is that we should stop contending that nothing has changed until, and unless, all our demands have been fulfilled, or all our criteria have been met. There is a process going on at present which we should monitor very carefully. Moreover, if we want the outcome of this process to be a positive one, we should, as I argued before, show more assertiveness and self-confidence. But at the same time we must not overlook the fact that there are still a number of very intriguing questions which call for a constructive solution in West-West relations and which can also strengthen our own posture, thereby helping to produce a more convincing stance in East-West relations.

Touching now on the subject of the WEU, which was mentioned by the Chairman earlier, I think that he and I both feel that to judge by its results the revitalization process of WEU is clearly showing progress. In particular I am referring to the decisions taken by five of the seven WEU member states to show that they will cooperate in defending vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf. "Out of area" problems, which even within NATO often provoke a lengthy and sometimes difficult discussion, have, I feel, for the moment been dealt with by the WEU in a most constructive way. And as president of the WEU until the middle of next year, we certainly wish to continue to boost the position of WEU and to strengthen its standing.

Let there be no misunderstanding; close consultations with other partners and notably the United States remain essential, also as far as WEU is concerned. Speaking on behalf of the Netherlands government, we hold the firm conviction that further integration of Europe, further revitalization of the WEU where military policies are concerned, will prove to be to the benefit of the Alliance as a whole. And we certainly wish to continue along these lines.

The limits to such co-operation, of course, are very clear: if it does not serve to strengthen the Alliance as a whole we would in fact be undermining our own interests. That is exactly where the limit lies.

Mr. Chairman, I think my time is up; I have used too much of your patience already. I would like to conclude by saying how much I welcome the fact that this conference is taking place, how much we are also looking forward to the results of these discussions, and hoping that they will at least provide us with some more guidelines on how to determine and shape our future policies regarding East-West relations. Clear-cut answers may not be readily available. But a brain-storm can help us in seeing how, in future, stability between West and East can be enhanced and improved.

And talking of clear-cut answers not being expected, this reminds me of a story which itself illustrates the extremely good contacts that exist between the allies, since it in fact originated in the United States and reached me via Denmark and, I believe, Greece: it is about a balloon that got lost in the clouds above Washington. All of a sudden the clouds parted and the desperate crew in the basket saw some people standing on top of a high building. "Where are we?" they yelled. And the reply from the roof was: "You are in a balloon!" Well, that sort of answer is absolutely correct but entirely useless. What we hope will emerge from this meeting is food for further reflection. Nobody has all the answers on these subjects. I wish you a very rewarding conference and I hope to welcome you tonight at the reception. Thank you very much.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for this welcoming address. Before giving the floor to NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington I suspend for one minute in order to let the late-comers in.

I now give the floor to the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Carrington.

Increased Security through Conventional Disarmament -
the Western Concept

by

Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany.

Conventional stability, the central issue of European security, is rightly moving more and more to the fore of West-East disarmament efforts. Together with my French counterpart, Roland Dumas, I appealed on 28 January 1986 at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-building and Disarmament in Europe that Europe's security problems be tackled at their roots. Even then we pointed out that the conventional imbalance is the key problem of military security in Europe. The observation that we made then is just as valid today: If we are to achieve a far-reaching improvement in Europe, we must devote just as much attention to conventional stability as to the nuclear balance.

There is surely no country that has a greater interest than the Federal Republic of Germany in the establishment of lasting stability on our continent in respect of conventional forces. The overriding goal of our security policy, that of reliably and effectively preventing war waged with any kind of weapons on our continent, requires that conventional arms control be accorded due priority in the arms control process.

In the declaration on conventional arms control adopted at the Warsaw summit, the Warsaw Pact also stated that the West-East arms control dialogue must now focus on the establishment of conventional stability as a matter of priority. On important issues the East has moved towards the positions on conventional arms control developed by the Western Alliance since the meeting of foreign ministers at Halifax in May 1986.

At that meeting the foreign ministers of the Alliance advocated, on a Franco-German initiative, bold new steps in the conventional sector and set up a high-level task force to elaborate a common Western concept of conventional arms control. On the basis of this group's report, the ministers adopted at Brussels in December 1986 the Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, which defined the objective of establishing conventional stability and proposed West-East discussions at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting on a mandate for negotiations to that end.

At the latest meeting of NATO Heads of State or Government in March 1988, the Alliance gave further substance to its common concept for negotiations on conventional arms control and set out its position in a separate declaration.

The views held by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shaped the Alliance's concept to a considerable extent. Our objectives are:

- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels,
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security and, as a matter of high priority,
- the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

Our proposals for the coming negotiations are aimed at a situation in which the forces of both sides in Europe are, in terms of their structure, number and deployment; no longer capable of surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, as is already the case in the West. This requires more than merely numerical reductions and limitations of conventional forces. Their structure and especially their equipment, deployment and readiness must also be changed.

Decisive for the capacity to seize foreign territory are superior conventional forces with high fire power and mobility. They primarily take the form of armoured or mechanized formations with major equipment comprising main battle tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery.

The concept of equal ceilings has proved a valuable instrument in arms control for eliminating destabilizing disparities. It is the underlying concept of the INF Treaty, too: Whoever has more weapons must scrap more.

Equal ceilings for major equipment in the whole of Europe would constitute considerable progress compared with the existing situation. However, they are not sufficient on their own to attain the increased stability we desire if the option of deploying and concentrating at random the residual forces is not simultaneously restricted. Particular importance attaches in this respect to forces that are stationed on foreign territory and are kept at a high level of readiness. The Western negotiating proposals will therefore include specific limitations on the stationing of forces outside one's own territory.

An arms control agreement aimed at conventional stability must limit not only the strength of conventional forces but also their employment options. This calls for accords that reinforce and bolster the impact of the agreed reductions and limitations by subjecting the residual forces to additional obligations. Stabilizing measures are therefore needed to restrict the deployment, activities, readiness and peace-time presence of the residual forces and of the equipment needed for offensive operations. These measures must be of such a nature that they do not reduce the defender's capability to react, but hamper surprise attack by an aggressor by obliging him to make extensive preparations. The stabilizing measures must also be designed in such a way that no zones with different degrees of security are created in Europe.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, the Soviet Union demonstrated its readiness to accept Western ideas by concluding the INF Treaty. The declaration entitled "Negotiations on the reduction of forces and conventional arms in Europe" adopted in Warsaw shows that the Warsaw Pact is also prepared to rethink its position in the conventional sector. The current movement by the Warsaw Pact towards Western positions is all the more remarkable if one recalls the proposals that the East made only two years ago.

The notion of equal reductions on both sides, which was the basis of the proposals contained in the Budapest Appeal of June 1986, has now been replaced by the suggestion that the process of conventional arms control should start with the elimination of existing disparities.

With its readiness to exchange data and to allow the latter to be monitored by on-site inspections, the East has altered its position in a remarkable manner. At the CDE talks in Stockholm, the Eastern negotiators still rejected the proposal made by NATO countries to exchange information annually on the composition and geographical deployment of ground and air forces throughout Europe. The readiness for more openness now signalled by the Warsaw Pact is a favourable sign for the coming negotiations.

It will be necessary, however, to draw the right conclusions from the unproductive data discussion that occurred at the MBFR talks for many years. It would not be of use to anyone if we were to deal exclusively with data

during the next few years. To avoid such a development, the main aim in the forthcoming negotiations should be to discuss constructive proposals, with the relevant force data being exchanged concomitantly. In this connection it is important to note that the Warsaw Pact document also refers to the exchange of starting data needed for the negotiations.

Negotiations on conventional stability in the whole of Europe relate to more than the reduction of individual weapon systems; they relate to the gradual development of co-operative structures that are based on a common perception of the role of armed forces. We therefore welcome the fact that in its declaration the Warsaw Pact responded favourably to the Western demand that forces on both sides should exclusively have a defence capability and not be capable of launching surprise attack or offensive operations. As early as December 1986, the Western Alliance enunciated the philosophy underlying its endeavours towards conventional stability: "Military forces should exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of initiating aggression and not for purposes of political or military intimidation."

We, too, consider it important to discuss military doctrines in order to reach agreement on an exclusively defensive mission of forces and to derive criteria from that for the establishment of conventional stability. The renunciation of an offensive capability must be visibly reflected in the strength, equipment, deployment and command principles of the forces.

This rapprochement of both sides' ideas is particularly important because it creates a favourable starting situation for the future negotiations. The Eastern side, too, is increasingly striving for conventional disarmament. The responsibility for peace borne by all the parties concerned requires that advantage be taken of the opportunities afforded by the changed West-East relationship and that a negotiating process be initiated in which all the parties seek to attain structures in Europe that ensure lasting peace and replace confrontation by co-operation in all fields.

The paramount task at present is to do our utmost so that negotiations on conventional stability can start before the end of the year. Together with Roland Dumas I appealed at the Vienna follow-up meeting on 1 July of this year that all the participating countries make a joint effort to bring the

meeting to a successful conclusion now. It is pleasing to note that the participants in the Warsaw Pact summit also expressed their intention to complete the Vienna meeting as soon as possible through the adoption of a substantive and balanced document. This determination must now be translated into concrete decisions at the conference table.

It is essential not to waste any time at this stage and to direct all resources towards settling the unresolved issues at the mandate discussions and towards achieving balanced overall results at the Vienna meeting.

The demand for increased momentum of disarmament measures in all fields, as expressed in the Western disarmament concept enunciated at Reykjavik in June 1987, is in line with the logic of our security thinking enshrined in the Harmel Report adopted by the Western Alliance in 1967: Disarmament and arms control are integral parts of Western security policy.

We need substantive progress in all areas of the CSCE for the sake of far-reaching improvements in West-East relations and the intensification of co-operation in Europe. This will pave the way for the commencement of negotiations on conventional stability and further confidence- and security-building measures. Everyone concerned must now live up to his own responsibility for ensuring that resolute use is made of the existing opportunities for a decisive improvement in West-East relations and seeing to it that the central problem of European security is tackled.

Interview

with Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany,
on disarmament and European affairs,

published in "Welt am Sonntag"
on 21 August 1988

Whilst on holiday in Bavaria, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gave the following interview to WELT AM SONNTAG:

WELT AM SONNTAG: In a speech on 1 February 1987, when Mikhail Gorbachov had been in office for just under two years, you said that he should be taken seriously and held to his word. Meanwhile the INF Treaty has been concluded, a US-Soviet agreement on halving strategic nuclear weapons is in the offing, the withdrawal of the Russians from Afghanistan is under way, peace in Angola is being negotiated, the Warsaw Pact is offering conventional disarmament and admits that, to obtain the equal ceilings it suggests, asymmetrical disarmament on its part may be necessary. In other words, the situation has improved dramatically. However, in this situation the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany still states that we need a comprehensive security concept within NATO. Would it not have been possible, indeed necessary, to develop such a concept during the last one and a half years?

GENSCHER: We have a comprehensive concept of disarmament, which embraces strategic arms, chemical weapons and conventional disarmament. We must now incorporate missiles with ranges under 500 kilometres into this comprehensive concept.

To ensure lasting peace in Europe, it is essential for us to tackle as a matter of priority the central problem of European security, in other words to seek conventional stability through the elimination of Eastern superiority and capability of attack. For the purposes of durable stability in Europe it is not sufficient merely to create equilibrium at a lower level. What we need is a system of co-operative security in Europe, which in turn would not be sufficient on its own to safeguard peace if it were not accompanied in the political, economic, cultural and technological sectors by stabilizing structures achieved through the creation of positive interdependence and through confidence-building fostered by co-operation.

Mankind is today able to destroy itself by taking the wrong decisions not only politically and militarily but also ecologically. This gives rise to a new dimension of responsibility reaching into the future and determining the destiny and freedom of all future generations. It calls for co-operation for

the sake of man's survival. This must be the paramount objective of all political efforts today.

But we must, of course, take account of these new developments in our defence efforts as well. Nobody can pursue disarmament, while at the same time pretending that in the defence sector nothing has changed. This requires conceptual work and decisions by the Alliance.

WELT AM SONNTAG: What do you have in mind when you speak of conceptual work and decisions in the defence sector?

GENSCHER: The West's security policy is geared exclusively towards defence. Our strategy is designed to prevent war. Its requirements must be decided in the light of changing conditions. Today's decisions cannot, of course, be based on hopes for tomorrow. It is therefore essential to discuss, as demanded by NATO, the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to draw the necessary conclusions as regards weapons, equipment, deployment, readiness and structures.

WELT AM SONNTAG: It is not quite clear to me what you mean by the need to change military doctrines. After all, already at this stage the Bundeswehr and NATO do not have the capability to launch surprise attacks or initiate large-scale offensive operations.

GENSCHER: That is true, we are not able to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensives. But further disarmament steps naturally have an impact on our defence. Let me cite an example: NATO's two-track decision involved the deployment of Cruise Missiles and Pershing IIs, with the modernization of Pershing IAs also being envisaged. Owing to the Soviet Union's readiness to eliminate its intermediate-range missiles worldwide, these elements of the Western defence posture have become superfluous. This means that the structure of Western defence is influenced by the structure of Eastern military efforts. One can therefore rightly state that the West is already unable to initiate large-scale offensive action and that nonetheless, with changing military structures in the East, our structures will also change.

WELT AM SONNTAG: You said that we still need a concept for missiles with ranges under 500 kilometres. What do you envisage?

GENSCHER: It is clear that in the field of short-range missiles the East enjoys considerable superiority. It therefore serves the Western security interests to achieve ceilings in this sector, just as we seek them in the conventional domain. Delaying the negotiations in this field means that we have to live longer with the Soviet superiority.

WELT AM SONNTAG: By next year at the latest the question of modernizing the short-range nuclear systems will be up for discussion. US General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, says that he has been instructed to submit by the end of this year a quantitative analysis on the future structure of this arsenal.

GENSCHER: The presentation of analyses is the task of the military.

WELT AM SONNTAG: General Galvin assumes at any rate, as he stated during an interview with WELT AM SONNTAG, that a political decision on modernization is due.

GENSCHER: The action to be taken in respect of short-range missiles has to be decided on in the context of the comprehensive concept. We are by no means under pressure of time. We are talking of short-range missiles which will be decommissioned in 1995 at the earliest. Adequate nuclear weapons are needed under the existing circumstances; they are not weapons for waging war, but ones for preventing it. As a deterrent against war, short-range weapons are the least significant.

Moreover, it is worthwhile considering - irrespective of the short-range missiles - the philosophy underlying the NATO two-track decision and the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty has produced more, and not less security in Europe. For this reason, there is no need for new military efforts to offset any loss of security.

WELT AM SONNTAG: In a keynote speech one and a half years ago, you stated that Europe must at last be made an efficient unity, which is the only

means of ensuring the political, economic and technological self-assertion of our continent in the world of tomorrow. And you also said that Franco-German co-operation is, so to speak, the cardiac muscle of such unification. What do you mean by that?

GENSCHER: European unification of the Twelve is a matter of political and economic urgency. The European Community must become fully capable of political action. By creating a single market it has the opportunity of becoming the driving force of world economic growth. Close Franco-German co-operation is indispensable in this context.

Europe has started to move in two respects: Firstly, there is the process of European unification, and secondly, parallel to the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union an improvement in West-East relations is occurring in Europe. Some people wonder whether European unification and improved West-East relations are mutually incompatible. European unification is at present the most advanced form of integration of sovereign countries, which is particularly important on account of the underlying common values. But this does not preclude efforts aimed at improving the relations of the EC countries with their neighbours in the East. This endeavour is even indispensable if one views Europe as a whole. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the momentum of the process of unification within the European Community is also attractive to our Eastern neighbours who want to co-operate with us economically.

WELT AM SONNTAG: How is this European house to come about?

GENSCHER: In the post-war period, the European identity seemed lost for a long time due to the Cold War and ideological animosity. This European identity was also neglected intellectually. In the East, ideology took precedence over the European identity, and in the West, there were Europeans who equated Western Europe with the whole of Europe. This phase now lies behind us. The awareness of Europe's identity is growing ever stronger in both West and East. This constitutes a very strong force for shaping Europe's future, notwithstanding the different systems of values existing here and in the East.

WELT AM SONNTAG: You have said that we Germans in both States bear special responsibility. What do you mean by this?

GENSCHER: We Germans have a special role to play because we live in the centre of Europe. Our desire for West-East rapprochement is today consonant with the interests, wishes and aspirations of our neighbours in West and East. This has not always been so in German history.

No other nation's destiny is so closely bound up with Europe's destiny as is that of the Germans. All the problems today besetting Europe are concentrated on German soil. The separation of Europe into two ideological systems separates the Germans - no other nation. Other nations belong completely to either one or the other system. The same holds true of the two military alliances. They face each other on German soil, and the highest concentration of all kinds of weapons exists on German soil.

WELT AM SONNTAG: Let us reflect on the risks of this development.

GENSCHER: In this nuclear age, confrontation is the greatest risk. Every step towards co-operation serves to reduce this risk.

WELT AM SONNTAG: What is the intended goal of the development outlined by you?

GENSCHER: The goal is obvious: A peaceful order in Europe, as envisaged in NATO's Harmel Report. Two grand designs for Europe's future are essential: firstly, unification within the European Community, into which the Federal Republic of Germany is just as firmly integrated as into the Western Alliance. The European Community is the only opportunity for Europe's democracies to assert themselves politically and to hold their own in competition with the other major economic centres of the world, namely the United States and Japan.

The second grand design is the Helsinki Final Act. It charts the course towards a peaceful European order, to be achieved with the participation of the North American democracies.

WELT AM SONNTAG: How is the German question to be dealt with in this dynamic process?

GENSCHER: Despite decades of separation, Europe has not become two Europes, and the German nation has not become two nations. I speak of separation, and not of division. Division is definitive, whereas separation can be overcome. Everything that brings Europeans closer together likewise brings Germans closer together. Our policy can thus be only a European peace policy. This means we clearly reject any solo national efforts or hankering after neutralism.

WELT AM SONNTAG: How do you in this connection view the US-Soviet, US-European and European-Soviet relationships?

GENSCHER: Soviet policy is naturally always geared to the relationship with the United States because important questions can only be settled with the United States. But the improvement of US-Soviet relations also has an impact on Europe. Moscow seeks good relations with the United States so that it has greater scope for developing its relationship with the European allies of the United States. This is also recognition of the firm links between the North American and European democracies. This bond cemented by the Western Alliance is indispensable for European and American security.

WELT AM SONNTAG: Can it not be assumed that in this process Europe is increasingly acting as a political unity?

GENSCHER: The process of political integration is naturally continuing. The process of economic integration is demanding its due; it cannot be mastered unless followed by the political aspect. It is fortunate that in this decisive phase the leader of France, President Mitterrand, holds the same position on Europe's prospects as we do. Like us, he feels there is a need for bold steps in the process of unification within the European Community. President Mitterrand rightly urges that a European monetary area be created. In our country much half-heartedness has still to be overcome in this respect.

WELT AM SONNTAG: A cardinal question: How reliable are the new policies of the Soviet Union?

GENSCHER: In 1967 the West made the offer of establishing a peaceful order in Europe. In 1975 we agreed on the path leading to that goal in the Helsinki Final Act. However, the radical improvement of West-East relations also required that the Soviet Union become more open.

This shows how wrong it is to believe that the West lacks a concept. It took a long time until the Soviet Union responded to this concept in its policies. Gorbachov is doing that. He deserves credit for making the Soviet Union capable of co-operating in a far-reaching change in West-East relations - by pursuing a policy of opening up the country both inwardly and outwardly.

But this process would not have been possible without the foundations laid for it: the Harmel Report, the Helsinki Final Act and the Federal Republic of Germany's policy of concluding treaties with its Eastern neighbours. The latter was, as is well known, the prerequisite for the Helsinki Final Act. This in turn shows that German policy makes an indispensable contribution to West-East relations. This is the special responsibility we Germans bear as part of our European responsibility. German policy serves national interests the more it pursues European interests. It would be all the more detrimental to our national interests if it were less European and were geared to solo efforts at the national level.

German-Soviet relations are of central importance for Europe or, as Gorbachov puts it, play a key role in this respect. We live up to this responsibility as a reliable member of the European Community and the Western Alliance.

WELT AM SONNTAG: When Gorbachov went on holiday, Ligachov demanded that Soviet foreign policy must retain the aspect of a class struggle. How do you view this?

GENSCHER: In the past, the Soviet Union and its leaders appeared to be a monolithic bloc. However, the more the Soviet leadership and society open up, the more we shall be able to detect different views and objectives in the Soviet Union. Seen from this angle, such remarks and the reactions to them are but a logical element of this development.

WELT AM SONNTAG: The decisive question is whether the course followed by Gorbachov can be consolidated.

GENSCHER: I returned from Moscow convinced that, despite all the problems, obstacles and time factors, the course followed by Gorbachov is increasingly being consolidated. We in the West can help to make this development irreversible by means of constructive conduct aimed at cooperation.

WELT AM SONNTAG: What do you expect from Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in October?

GENSCHER: The Chancellor's visit is regarded by both the Soviet leaders and ourselves as an outstanding event. With this visit and with Mr Gorbachov's visit in return in the first half of 1989 we shall be taking important steps forward in German-Soviet relations. In other words, there is a chance of achieving a triad: With the Ostpolitik we paved the way for the Helsinki Final Act. By playing an active part in bringing about the Helsinki Final Act and in its further development we made a second important contribution. Now, through a fundamental improvement in German-Soviet relations we can make an enduring contribution towards a radical improvement in West-East relations and hence towards furthering the European cause.

ITALY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

ABSTRACT FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI, BY PIERO OSTELLINO. PUBLISHED ON THE QUARTERLY REVIEW "RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI", JANUARY 1988.

Q. The Atlantic Alliance seems to live permanently under the contradiction between the joint nature of its decision making process and the US monopoly on nuclear arms and its power of deterrence. These contradictions emerged recently with the agreement between the US and the USSR to dismantle medium and short range euromissiles. How do you believe the situation can be avoided in which, on one hand, the Europeans feel overpowered by the Americans in terms of their own security, and, on the other, the Americans feel like hostages in Europe in terms of the security of the Old Continent?

A. We should not forget that with this system (NATO) we have kept the peace and reversed the threatening international trend. I have already said that this relationship between Europe and the US is much more than it appears to be on the surface. Do not forget that with the Helsinki Agreement all of Europe participated on an equal footing with the USA and Canada in formulating its programme for security and cooperation. Those longing for a separation - even if it is inspired by historically valid motives and honest concerns about the future - are dangerous. Forty years ago it would have seemed unbelievable that

there could be the stable presence of hundreds of thousands of North American troops. Luckily it has happened and it is real. European defence debates (best if in the headquarters of the Western European Union) should not ignore this international aspect - even if only to avoid stimulating a US position characterized by tiredness.

Q. How have the role and the nature of NATO changed, if indeed they have, in the last twenty years, with the arrival of nuclear parity between the US and the USSR, the economic development of Western Europe and the consequent and growing demand for more political-strategic autonomy on the part of Europeans? How should the strategy of the Alliance be reformed in the light of these developments?

A. The Alliance has gradually changed strategy, and I have had the opportunity to witness the various stages (massive retaliation, flexible response, mixed deterrence etc.). A reduction in missiles implies global reflection, but we must convince the East block to reduce their conventional forces, so as not to obligate us to scale up to reach new parity. This is in terms of military strategy, but that is not everything.

Q. In this respect, what, in your opinion, might be the most effective and opportune political solution to give a more European dimension to the defence of Europe without causing disturbances in the Atlantic Alliance?

A. If lower balances are achieved for the various forces it should not be difficult to resolve this delicate problem. It is essential to solve the problem of the role of the two West European nuclear powers, if they wish to remain such, and to eventually get a commitment from each to spend more, keeping in mind that conventional weapons are increasingly sophisticated and expensive.

Q. There are those who say that a more "European" defence policy - as in the past was said of a more integrated commercial policy or a common currency - could be an empirical tool for obtaining European political unity, which at the moment seems to have no concrete opportunities for realization. Are you in favour of a step by step approach (as has been taken for example in regards to a common currency) or are you for identifying a preliminary political solution for each sectorial initiative? In the framework of institutionalized politics do you not think an increase in the prerogatives and powers of the European Parliament could create the setting for the placement of individual sectorial initiatives?

A. In presenting such a predetermined course today we would risk a scenario like that of 1954 with the European Defence Community. I am very favourable towards giving the Parliament in Strasbourg more powers, except for military problems (e.g., Ireland's reservations and difficulty of mentioning specific aspects of security in the Single Act). The lack of such an instrument for dialogue and mediation weighs heavily on the Community and leaves us trapped in a system which is still too intergovernmental.

Q. Italy is a regional middle power allied to a global superpower. It sometimes happens that the regional interests of the middle power do not entirely coincide with the global interests of the superpower ally (as in the case of the Achille Lauro and, more recently, concerning the Gulf). In your opinion, what are the best political and operative means available to our country at the diplomatic and military levels for playing our role as a middle power without compromising our commitment of loyalty to our principal ally?

A. Besides general ones such as the UN, there are two other external constraints adopted by the Italian Parliament: the Atlantic Treaty and the European Community (the two "terms of reference essential to our foreign policy", as expressed by the Lower House in November 1977, proposed by that body and even voted for by the Communists). Being an ally or a community member does not, however, mean blindly following a one-way path. It involves discussions whenever there are doubts or differences, without prejudice and as far as possible without obvious ructions.

To cite Sigonella in a general context seems exaggerated to me. It was only one of those summer storms which leave the sky bluer than ever. When we discovered that the person concerned had been an NSC officer, who ended up in the news over Irangate, the incident was further blown out of proportions. When I communicated to Washington that, because of the unjust accusations against us (indeed,

we saved all the passengers except, unfortunately, one), Italy would be absent from the summit of the Seven in New York, from which France had already pulled out, Reagan sent Whitehead, Shultz's assistant, to Rome and all the differences were ironed out.

Q. Italy sometimes finds itself in similar situations with regards to her European allies: e.g., the recent Italian "perplexity" over the French proposal for an integrated European defence system to substitute for the relative American disengagement following the agreement on European missiles. In this case as well, how is it possible to reconcile a line of national interests with a commitment to loyalty to European allies with which Italy is involved in a process of political integration?

A. Italy has never pulled out of discussions on European defence, which are necessary, particularly at the WEU. Yet, why should Italy always be the odd one out when we read that France and Germany want to build up a joint force which would be the cornerstone of a new concept of Europe? Let me add that in France there are two schools of thought as to the role of this strike force: those who see it as an exclusively national one, and those who see it as a common factor of European defence.

Q. What political and strategic role do you see Italy playing in the desirable creation of a more European defence of Europe?

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A. This is an open problem which needs to be elaborated and discussed in a very calm and thorough manner, taking care to choose the right moment to explain our position. It should not be seen as related to the USA-USSR nuclear arms agreement (or, better, NATO-Warsaw Pact) and should not encourage American disengagement.

Q. Still in reference to the strategic role of this country, what is your opinion as to eventual "outer area" commitments beyond the limits of the Mediterranean? Do you think that these are beyond the scope of Italian military policy?

A. "Outer area" commitments do not follow any common strategy, or function within any defined framework. However, there remains the harmonization on the political and economic aspects of security, in both the Atlantic and European spheres. Until now it does not seem to me that there have been any interventions which have induced us to go beyond the scope of Italian military policy. Parliament has never given any general authorization in this regard. Both the Lebanon and the Gulf are very specific and motivated cases. The deployment of the navy was for one reason only: the protection of the merchant fleet. Other limited forms of intervention, either by small groups of nations or under the auspices of the UN, were to contribute to the stability of areas which are vital for us. With regard to this a healthy pragmatism is also advisable.



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NATO'S FUTURE:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

AT

COLLEGE D'EUROPE
BRUGES, BELGIUM

MONDAY, 1ST FEBRUARY 1988

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NATO'S FUTURE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

When the Rector first invited me to speak to you, I confess that my reaction was one of profound apprehension. As a British Secretary General of an Atlantic organisation addressing an establishment with such impeccable European credentials, I was only too well aware of a trenchant remark made by Helmut Schmidt. "Britain", he said, "is notorious for Governments, Labour or Conservative, that think the Atlantic is narrower than the Channel".

But along with some others of my countrymen, I have been taking geography lessons. And if North America still looms large in my view of Western security, I hope that no-one would seriously regard that as simply a matter of national prejudice or narrow NATO bias. For there are really quite a lot of people who still accept two simple propositions: first that the Atlantic Alliance is a basic reality; secondly that it is so unlikely that Europe would be able to assure its own defence in the foreseeable future, that it would not be wise to waste time discussing it. And if anyone thinks that last assertion is too blunt, then I would ask them to apply to the President of the French republic, because it was François Mitterrand who said it, not me.

So I hope there will not be too much of a rush for the exit if I reveal what might be taken as a lack of originality and European idealism in my approach and declare my colours from the start. I propose to review the current security scene - which, of course, in my limited world means politics and defence rather than economics and ecology. I shall go on to consider the prospects for an enhanced European rôle in security affairs, but I confess at the outset that the rôle I foresee will still take place in continuing partnership with the United States and within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. A predictable outcome, I'm afraid. But if my interpretation will be orthodox, the plot is by no means so dull.

Because we already live, as the Chinese say, in interesting times. Many of the old "givens" of the security system which has been with us in Europe for 40 years are being questioned and there is greater potential for uncertainty and misunderstanding than has been the case for perhaps the last 20 years. There is the new climate of East-West relations; a changed approach on the part of the Soviet leadership; the Warsaw Pact is in flux; and intra-Alliance relations here in the West are becoming increasingly complex. Above all, there has been a change in popular perceptions of the nature of the threat and of the prospects for the future.

When I first became Secretary General less than 4 years ago, all arms control negotiation had been broken off. Afghanistan, Poland and the Euro-missile row had taken their toll and there was virtually no dialogue whatever between East and West. Public support for NATO had been damaged by those in

Europe who saw the Alliance as concerned only with arms proliferation; and support was growing for unilateral disarmament. All that has been transformed. Now we have the INF agreement. There are more radical and exciting prospects for genuine arms control than ever before. The threat from the Soviet Union is popularly perceived to be receding under Mr. Gorbachev's charismatic leadership. And many in Europe now who worry seriously about defence are concerned not with the problems of stagnation, but with the risk that events are moving all too fast. One man's 'window of opportunity' for radical disarmament and for a new relationship between the two halves of Europe is another man's 'iceberg', whose melting tip is encouraging our navigators to discard their charts when the threat to safety still looms large under the surface. In short, we have new opportunities and new challenges.

How you look at the situation and strike the balance of advantage at present depends in many ways on how you interpret that new milestone for security in Europe - the INF agreement. I will not tax you with a long litany of the agreement's benefits: important though the event is in eliminating a complete category of current nuclear weapons; good though I believe it to be for Western security; and potentially valuable as it should prove in our future arms control effort through the precedents it sets for asymmetric reductions and mandatory verification. Like most good things, the agreement has become the subject of a public relations 'hype' and I do not feel particularly comfortable in the realms of hyperbole.

There are three sets of questions which the INF agreement has brought into sharper focus.

The first are these. Is the agreement the result of NATO's collective approach to security; is it, as some critics claim, the result of an American preference, signalling an historic decoupling or disengagement from Europe; or is it a victory for those who wish to denuclearize Europe for whatever reason? The answers to these are in fact easier than the critics would claim. The agreement was originally proposed by the Alliance; it was implicit in the so-called "twin-track" decision taken in 1979; and, although put forward in negotiating form by President Reagan, it was the subject of the most intensive Alliance consultation than I or anyone else can remember. It is truly NATO's agreement, despite Mr. Gorbachev's clever attempts to claim otherwise and turn it to propaganda advantage. Of course there are benefits in it for the Soviet Union. That's how you get balanced agreements. But NATO's Military Commanders have assured us that their ability to carry out their military mission remains, despite the system we have given up. More generally, the agreement conforms to NATO's broad policy objective. These are all points which I am sure the US Senate will remember in the ratification process now underway.

What that NATO policy is - something on which you will still find me unsurprisingly orthodox - is known in NATO circles as the Harmel Doctrine. It can be stated simply as follows. The maintenance of security and stability requires continuing effort in both the political and military fields. In the political field, because a military stand-off is not a desirable or easily sustainable objective in itself; so that our defence efforts should be regarded, not as a fence to hide behind but a basis on which we can work for a safer and more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and at lower levels of military forces than before. And in the military field, because we have little reason to believe that diplomacy and arms control approaches will achieve our objective if we are not prepared to maintain a sufficient counterweight to Soviet military power.

But this brings me to the second slightly harder set of questions - what is now a sufficient military counterweight?

One or two general points have always been constant. First of all, as a defensive Alliance, we don't need superiority and are not seeking to achieve it. Neither do we need to match the Warsaw Pact weapon for weapon, man for man - which is just as well, because we certainly don't. But neither can we define military sufficiency in terms of conventional forces alone; even if a balance did exist in that area. Because conventional forces have never, in our quarrelsome history, been a deterrent to war. And because the Warsaw Pact still retains - and upgrades - a very considerable nuclear capability, despite all the peace rhetoric; and there is no answer in purely conventional terms to nuclear threats or blackmail. The difficulty comes over the next stage in deciding on what mix of conventional and nuclear forces constitute enough to maintain the credibility of flexible response. Partly because technical experts have different opinions within the Alliance and partly because deterrent sufficiency is not just a matter of technical capabilities.

There has indeed been a good deal of misunderstanding about what this concept of flexible response does mean. This was exposed in particular during the INF debate when there was concern expressed in some quarters that abandoning cruise and Pershing missiles would remove so-called rungs in the ladder of escalation. But this was based on a fallacy - the myth that NATO strategy ever envisaged some form of pre-determined war fighting escalator, with, as it were, 99 steps to Armageddon. NATO's forces, both conventional and nuclear, are there for deterrence - a principle which depends on the uncertainty of how we might respond to any aggression rather than on the certainty of a precise progression. But to remain credible, the Alliance needs to retain a broad mix of capabilities, in terms of their deployment, survivability and range, which could respond appropriately to any threat against us, while conveying the risk of a more damaging response to any aggressor should he persist.

Vague in a sense. But no-one should misunderstand that the deliberate vagueness in certain areas about flexible response has led NATO to maintain more forces than really necessary. For example, over the past 10 years, the Alliance has already made major unilateral reductions in theatre nuclear systems; nearly 3,000 warheads have been removed from Europe. One is entitled to ponder why it is that the Soviet Union has not seen fit to take similar unilateral steps of their own - for example, over the short-range missiles which are of such concern to the Alliance as well as to the Germans at present. To offer to place the matter in arms control, when the imbalance in this area is of the order of 15 to 1, is hardly an adequate answer to why such enormously superior potential needs to be maintained in the first place and constantly upgraded.

None of what I have said about what constitutes military sufficiency for the Alliance gives a complete answer to the problem of how much is enough, but it does, I hope, indicate some of the difficulties of precision.

This then brings us to the third most and difficult question of all; not of how much, but of how best to go about it, how indeed to follow up the INF agreement in the 'right' way.

At centre stage will be the vigorous pursuit of arms control possibilities, on a more radical basis than has previously been thought possible. This search need not be confined to the strategic, conventional and chemical areas already under discussion. The Alliance has the objective, as its foreign ministers have recently reaffirmed, of developing a comprehensive concept to ensure that the arms control possibilities in all areas are explored, that the interrelationship between various negotiations are considered and that the cumulative potential is kept in mind, always towards the objective of security at the lowest possible level of forces.

Few would question such objectives. But the practicalities are another matter. I would judge that there is a real chance of securing a START agreement and 50% cuts in strategic forces this year. But on chemical weapons, there are formidable problems, given the extent of Soviet holdings and the difficulties of all-important verification especially for a ban which has to be global in effect. Similarly in the conventional field the problems are enormously more complex than those encountered in arms control so far and although I spoke earlier about the importance of securing Soviet acceptance of the principle of asymmetric reductions, it would be unwise to estimate the difficulties when the sheer quantitative superiority we face in critical areas such as tanks and artillery are of the order of 3 to 1.

To say that the arms control process will take time, should not imply any NATO foot-dragging on our part. Of course this will be alleged, given the natural desire to wish to press ahead with disarmament and the present state of East-West relations in general. But Mr. Gorbachev's achievements, though welcome, have to be kept in perspective. It is the Soviet system which he is seeking to make more effective. The fact that, at this stage, his domestic priorities coincide with an interest in better relations with the West does not mean that the identity of interest can be guaranteed to persist, or indeed that Mr. Gorbachev will himself endure. Communism is not about to be abandoned, and uncertainties about the future of the Soviet system and the stability of Eastern Europe will be inescapable. You do not have to be a reactionary hawk to see the commonsense in a position which says that all opportunities for dialogue and creating trust should be explored, but that our consequent actions should take into account continuing Soviet military capability as well as stated intentions. Our attitude should also take into account the outcome of the CSCE review meeting in Vienna where Soviet readiness for progress on a broad range of East-West issues including profound concerns of human rights will be put to the test.

In other words, we shall need to proceed in a balanced way, and that will not be easy. I have little doubt that anyone in Western Europe will underestimate the importance of working politically to secure a more constructive political relationship between East and West, or further measures of arms control. What seems to me to be likely is that they will underestimate the extent to which the chances of achieving that depend on a continuing determination to do what is necessary by way of defence.

The temptation to relax our effort is inherent in healthy democracies where security is too easily seen as the antithesis of freedom rather than its essential foundation and safeguard. But we shall need to remember that if we want arms control of the right kind - that is balanced agreements which maintain stability - we shall get them only by maintaining credible and effective defences, and not by providing the material for Soviet Embassies to report: "Comrades, they are disarming anyway, so we don't have to give up a thing we don't want to".

Even in the present improved East-West climate, the Soviet Union are bound to seek to advance the effort to seek our unilateral disarmament at a time when they are continuing to modernize their own capabilities across the board, or have just done so. For example, the decoupling of Europe from the United States through a policy of denuclearization has long been a Soviet objective and we will need to be ready to resist the claim which will inevitably come, that any modernization of our own nuclear forces, quite outside the INF agreement, will be contrary to its spirit or letter.

This raises the more general question of the transatlantic relationship. Now I do not happen to believe that there is any evidence that the United States is becoming an unreliable ally which is moving into isolationism. Deeply shared values and interests bind us together, still symbolised by over 300,000 US troops in Europe and the continuing nuclear guarantee. But there is no doubt that budgetary pressure in the United States together with the multiplicity of their other international responsibilities, may, if only involuntarily, call for some reduction in resources available to NATO. This will require careful management to avoid the return of potentially divisive burden-sharing debates within the Alliance.

Where then does this leave Europe? Some ideas one hears as radical alternatives for Europe seem to me to be impracticable - or literally indefensible. The dream, for example, that the two halves of Europe could live in peace, independent of both superpowers or under some sort of demilitarised guarantee, fails to answer the basic question of how to prevent Europe in those circumstances from falling increasingly under Soviet influence. Even if you stretch to the point of claiming that there is a moral equivalence between the United States and Soviet Union, the facts of geography cannot be twisted so easily. And those who advocate a 'go it alone' strategy for Western Europe have to overcome some not insignificant transitional objections - that transferring sufficient resources from the civil to military sector could undermine the type of society which we seek to defend in the first place; that the Soviet reaction to an increased Western European capability would itself be destabilising, that the arrangement would pre-suppose or encourage a far greater degree of isolationism on the part of the United States than currently exists.

More telling and to the point perhaps, is the view on both sides of the Atlantic, that the conditions which produced the Alliance in its present form 40 years ago have changed; and that Europe in particular could be expected to do much more for its defence; both as a matter of more equitable burdensharing with the United States and on the basis that a continent in which Europeans did more for their own security might actually find it easier to construct a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union. In many ways I suspect that this will become a necessity and not just an option, given US budgetary trends. And if Europeans attach so much importance to NATO as they continue to profess to do, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that their governments ought to do a little more than they are at present to keep it in good shape, particularly when one considers the difference between the share of resources which are allocated for defence from this side of the Atlantic, and the levels still sustained by the United States.

One option is of course for the European Community to play a greater rôle, and I would be the first to agree with the proposition that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. I am all for the strengthening of political co-operation and for the political aspects of security to be included as part of it. Similarly I believe that the WEU has a real rôle to play, even though it excludes not only the United States and Canada, but also seven of the fourteen members of NATO including the two that happen to share borders with the Soviet Union. The WEU support for European naval deployments in the Gulf has helped to counter the criticism, much of it justified, that Europe does far too little to assist in the management of crises beyond its own backyard. There are also bilateral examples of co-operation, notably the new Defence and Security Council established by France and Germany which can also be helpful in intensifying defence co-operation among the European members of the Alliance.

But the only caveat I would make, and it is a fundamental one, at least in the present circumstances, is that the objective of such forms of co-operation should be to support and strengthen the transatlantic partnership, simply because I believe that it continues to provide the best basis for our security. And the corollary to that is that patterns of European co-operation which tend towards exclusivity, cut across, or duplicate alliance activity should be avoided. For example, what that distinguished American diplomat George Vest called in a different context the 'habit of co-operation', has taken deep root in the integrated military structure of the Alliance as one of the strongest bonds between member states; and one of the hardest for outsiders to assess.

If you look at European security from this point of view, it becomes a question not of new institutions or indeed strategies, but of how to ensure that what has worked well up to now should go on working well in the years ahead. And that means not only that the Europeans should play an increasing part in the task of ensuring their security, but that they should provide constructive contributions on a number of fairly specific issues at present.

First on resources. Anyone unlucky enough to be familiar with my speeches will know that one of my abiding themes has been the fact that most Europeans spend, on a GDP per capita basis, only about half as much on defence as do Americans. Of course, crude comparisons can be misleading. But we are unlikely to have the luxury of debating such points in the abstract as congressional pressures get to work. Unfortunately we are not likely to have the luxury of sympathetic finance ministers

either. This is why it is so important that we should at least see to it that the resources that are available are used more efficiently than they are at present. Whether you look from the standpoint of European industrial integration or as a matter of greater defence effectiveness, there is the same interest in a better co-ordinated approach to armaments planning and closer European collaboration in the research, development and procurement of equipment. Much has already been done, but the impetus must be sustained both on an Alliance-wide basis and within the Independent European Programme Group.

Secondly, the arms control process. This is now moving into areas where the European interest is central and a stronger European voice needs to be heard. The single most worrying factor in European security is the Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces. We cannot credibly complain about our defence resource problems or, indeed, claim that this is a major reason for needing to retain a broad up-to-date inventory of theatre nuclear forces if we do not, at the same time, take more urgent action in arms control to redress conventional imbalances and eliminate current capabilities for attack on short warning and large-scale offensive operations. We need to build upon recent progress in developing a mandate for these negotiations and secure agreement with the East to open discussions in the near future. There may be an historic opportunity in this field which must not be missed.

Thirdly, the nuclear question. There are always those who question the morality of nuclear weapons. And I suspect the pressures will increase now that the INF agreement has been signed and some people at least will be encouraged to press forward towards denuclearization. This will need to be answered effectively by the Alliance as a whole, not just by the United States or the two European countries who happen to be nuclear powers. And the European contribution will need to involve actions as well as words to maintain the effectiveness of the remaining theatre nuclear forces, pending any further arms control progress. It would neither be morally defensible nor indeed good for our security or for the cohesion of the Alliance if the United States were expected to maintain a credible strategic nuclear guarantee while Europe allowed its own share of nuclear responsibilities to slide.

This is not to belittle the problems which individual nations may have in terms, for example, of the share they have to carry of the nuclear burden. The problem of nuclear burdensharing, of balancing out responsibilities and benefits, is not a new one although new concerns have been expressed following the INF agreement. But the Soviet Union's nuclear reach still extends to all European countries; there are no sanctuaries these days; a threat against one member of the Alliance is indeed still a threat against all. By the same token, any problem perceived

by an individual member of the Alliance must be recognised and dealt with in a way which meets the collective interest and thereby demonstrates our continuing solidarity. This applies not just to nuclear issues, but to the field of defence issues generally. Whether in Europe or in the United States we shall all need to keep the overall interests of the Alliance in mind.

If I have outlined some of the pitfalls which exist at present, I would not wish to leave the impression of overall pessimism. I have no doubt that the Alliance will manage the present situation and not only exploit opportunities for improved East-West relations and arms control, but also do what is necessary to preserve security. I have dwelt rather fully on this last element, only because I happen to agree with this view: if you live next door to an elephant, you watch his physique as well as his psyche. And even if you conclude that he is rather progressive and really quite friendly, you still want all the help you can get to maintain the fence that protects your flower beds.

"New" Western European Union: Uniting Europe or Dividing NATO?

—by Dr. Dov S. Zakheim—

Almost phoenix-like, the Western European Union, until recently an obscure, moribund European multinational organization based in Paris, has begun to command the world's headlines. The seven-member body consisting of Europe's leading powers—France, Britain, Italy, and West Germany, as well as the Benelux countries—has come to symbolize a new era of Franco-German military cooperation as well as European efforts to anticipate and offset the impact of the impending INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In late October, the seven member nations agreed to a "Platform on European Security Interests," which underlined Europe's determination that NATO incorporate both a nuclear and a conventional deterrent. Again, employing WEU as their political forum, the member states agreed this fall to send warships to the Persian Gulf to help keep it open for navigation. Clearly, WEU is having new life pumped into it as its members pursue a semi-independent approach to Europe's future defense posture.

This is not the first time that the organization has served as a medium for Europeans to define a special role for themselves and to reorganize accordingly. The organization's creation was, in fact, a product of the failed attempt to create a European Defense Community—akin to the European Economic Community—in the early 1950s. Ironically, it was France, currently the prime mover behind WEU's rejuvenation, that sounded the death knell for the EDC by refusing to ratify the EDC agreement in the French National Assembly. WEU then came into being as a weak substitute for the EDC: Its major purpose was to ensure West Germany's integration into the NATO force structure. In addition, it was meant to monitor the growth of German armaments and promote armaments standardization among its member states.

Despite its seeming connection to the European Defense Community, the actual membership of the WEU derived from the older Brussels Treaty Organization, which had come into existence upon the signing of

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the Brussels Treaty in 1948. Article V of the Treaty, which remains in force, commits the member states *automatically* to the defense of one another in the event of attack. The North Atlantic Treaty merely commits member states to take *whatever steps* are constitutionally necessary to come to one another's defense. In other words, the North Atlantic Treaty permits endless legislative and ministerial debate while a crisis or even conflict wears on. The WEU took on a special role once the FRG became an active player in NATO, and it appeared that WEU's utility was likely to be at an end.

Of course, like most highly bureaucratized international organizations, WEU did not die. It merely toiled on, producing studies that few read and fewer cared about. Its assembly, created as an afterthought by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, engaged in regularly scheduled meetings and long debates, passing meaningful but impotent resolutions on all aspects of European defense. The organization sought to promote armaments cooperation among Europeans, but in this aspect as well, its efforts tended to be for naught.

Nevertheless, because WEU had not died, and because, as a result of the Brussels Treaty Organization from which it sprang, WEU's membership included both Britain and the EEC's Six, it became extremely useful again in the early 1960s. For it was then that Harold Macmillan, reversing long-standing British attitudes to cooperation with the Continent (Churchill had once said, "We are with them, but not of them"), decided to apply for membership in the EEC. All of a sudden, those endless con-

tacts between European and British parliamentarians in the Assembly during the 1950s became vehicles for promoting the British application among the legislatures of the Six. Similarly, the meetings at ministerial level afforded the British numerous opportunities to make their case, especially with the support of the residents of the Benelux and Germans, Italians, and the reluctant French. Thus it appeared for a while that the WEU organization would come to serve the useful, though unintended, purpose of aiding in the economic reorganization of the Continent.

The British application was rebuffed by DeGaulle early in 1963, but the importance of WEU did not immediately decline. Throughout the sixties, the organization was a major focus for Britain's efforts to join the EEC. It continued to serve as a point of contact between British parliamentarians and their counterparts in the Six, with many British MPs seeking to influence the Europeans into supporting Britain's application. In fact, as matters developed, the French became so incensed at British attempts to employ WEU as a vehicle for pressing their case for EEC membership that they boycotted WEU Ministerial Council meetings in 1969 and 1970. Only when the issue of membership was shifted to the EEC Council of Ministers did the French return to WEU. Nevertheless, it is arguable that WEU did play some role in Britain's ultimately successful attempt to enter the EEC: the experience of those British MPs who attended the Assembly's sessions over the years may clearly have influenced its vote in support of entry when Prime Minister Edward Heath finally negotiated an arrangement with the EEC's member states—especially France—in 1973.

Again, however, once the "mission" toward which WEU had made a minor contribution was accomplished, its relative importance declined yet again. The organization, comfortably housed in Paris, became more of a relic than a source of ideas or innovation.

There were, to be sure, occasional attempts to revive the WEU. As a prime example, Michel Jobert, then the French

Foreign Minister, proposed in 1973 that WEU be responsible for ensuring European harmonization of the procurement and manufacture of armaments. Jobert's proposal went nowhere, however, partly because the Gaullist foreign minister was suspected of merely trying to wean Europe away from its close relationship with the United States within NATO.

Jobert's proposal for WEU, whatever his motives, foreshadowed continuing French interest in the organization for the remainder of the decade and into the eighties. In fact, it became clear that in many ways WEU was the only viable European organization that might act as a serious force for change. The larger Eurogroup, which comprises most of NATO's European member states, has met with limited success in coordinating European armaments cooperation within NATO. The European Communities still do not address themselves to defense matters, and in any event include neutral Ireland. Only WEU has afforded—and affords—a vehicle through which the major contributors to Europe's Central Region defense posture could take coordinated action to promote what in the sixties was called a "twin pillars" policy, that is, a strong European pillar to match that of the United States.

The urgency of the need for such a pillar has not been lost on Europeans. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) has been criticizing European posture for a decade, though his famous amendment is of more recent vintage. Sentiment for US troop withdrawal from Europe has been growing in Congress and in informed American policy circles as the implications of the US deficit crisis and its likely impact on future defense budgets becomes ever more clear. The US defense budget will soon sustain its third consecutive decline in real terms. Next year is an election year, and, as Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) demonstrated in his 1986 reelection campaign, anti-Pentagon politics can be winning politics. Thus, the defense budget could well sustain yet another cut in Fiscal Year 1989.

Clearly, projections of budget reductions, or even of modest growth in the US defense budget, argue against the maintenance of the level of US defense commitments in all their current aspects. Something will have to give. And the Europeans, heeding the voices of the latter-day Mike Mansfields, are concerned that what will give will be US deployments in Europe.

Coupled with the concern about American troop levels in Europe is a deeper, yet more immediate worry about the implications for NATO's defense posture of the INF agreement. It is no secret that many European officials and observers are worried by the INF agreement. The French have been the most vociferous in arguing the dangers of a reduction in NATO's nuclear posture (see article, p. 88), but other Europeans privately share the French view. The fears revolve around three issues. First, does

the INF treaty presage the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, as President Reagan reportedly proposed to Gorbachev at Reykjavik? Second, can the West effectively cope with Soviet conventional forces that will continue to outnumber those of NATO? Third, and most troubling of all, do these developments indicate a trend leading to the acceptance of Europe as a battleground, a nightmare that Western Europe has always sought to avoid by relying upon the deterrent that nuclear weapons provided?

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Of course, all of these worries might be mitigated if Europe were prepared to spend significantly more monies for its own defense. There is no indication, however, of any European readiness to do so. Moreover, even if Europe were to bolster its conventional defense, it would still not ensure itself that its territory would not become a battleground. In European eyes, only the deterrent provided by nuclear weapons provides that assurance, as it has for the last four decades.

Where, then, does WEU fit into this scheme of things? The organization does provide a vehicle for realization of some degree of increase in European military cooperation. Because it is a small organization, unhindered by the antinuclear, quasi-neutralist longings of the Scandinavians or by the never-ending squabbles among the Greeks and Turks, it actually might promote some progress among those countries that directly contribute to the defense of Western Europe.

It has been the French, almost in the tradition of Michel Jobert, who have pressed for the revival of WEU. Jacques Chirac, himself a Gaullist, was the first major European leader to draw attention to WEU as a potential vehicle for intensifying European cooperation. Chirac was also the moving force behind the "Platform of Security Interests" adopted at the WEU ministerial meeting in October.

Since there have been many attempted revivals of WEU, not to mention many attempts to foster more systematic military cooperation in Western Europe, it is fair to ask whether this time is different—will the WEU finally take on real meaning, and will the Europeans do more to cooperate among themselves?

While it is obviously too early to answer

such questions definitively, there are indications that "this time" things really are different. France and the FRG have, for the first time, created a joint brigade and engaged in major joint exercises. While the exercises were not an unequivocal success—language problems were among the most serious difficulties encountered by the troops—it appears that the leaders of both countries are determined to push ahead with their cooperative efforts.

At the WEU October meetings, French delegates pointed to their cooperation with the FRG as an example for other WEU states to follow. British officials have likewise been reported to be sympathetic to French efforts, a position consistent with the Thatcher government's attempts to balance its Atlanticist posture with closer defense relations with its major NATO allies. As for the smaller states, any attempt to foster greater European cooperation falls squarely within their historical position of supporting all forms of European cooperation and, by more closely tying French forces to those of other NATO European states, adds to their collective deterrent posture.

Not everyone in Washington supports French efforts to revive WEU. Suspicion of France is nothing new to the State Department, and particularly when it is a Gaullist seeking to promote European cooperation. From DeGaulle himself, through Jobert and others, European cooperation always meant Europe without the United States. State Department memories are long and unforgiving.

Skeptics at State and elsewhere misread the issue, however. Though a Gaullist, Chirac is not DeGaulle, nor is his defense minister, André Giraud, anti-American. Far from it, Giraud, who spent years in the US and speaks fluent English, enjoyed a particularly close relationship with Caspar Weinberger and is likely to have excellent rapport with Frank Carlucci. Defense relations between France and the US are better than they have been for years. Arms cooperation is excellent, with the American purchase of the Thomson-CSF RITA system and France's recent purchase of the Boeing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System being two prominent examples.

There is no indication that France seeks to lead the other WEU members up the garden path away from NATO, or that any of them would allow her to do so. Instead, WEU appears to be providing for greater intra-European cooperation to supplement the contribution of the United States to the defense of Europe. To the extent that France is further entwined into the defense of Central Europe, to the extent other Europeans are somewhat relieved of their nightmare of a nuclear-free Europe, and, most importantly, to the extent that Europeans are seen to take their defense requirements seriously enough to justify continuing America's level of effort in Europe, WEU will, finally after 30 years, have done the job it was always meant to do. ■ ♦ ■

HOW TO RE-ARRANGE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND AMERICAN POWER

(Excerpts from "Monde Diplomatique" - February 1988)

Are we to see the end of a certain idea of the Atlantic Alliance after the Reagan-Gorbachov Summit meeting? Washington seems ready to gradually withdraw its forces from Europe. Many people favour the "triple zero option", including Mr. Chevardnadze in Bonn on 19th January. Is Europe heading towards what is called "Finlandisation", an unfair expression when one considers the independence shown by the Helsinki authorities? Refusing to submit means a different European defence to that of the 1950s.

by General C.-GEORGES FRICAUD-CHAGNAUD
(former President of the Foundation for
National Defence Studies)

The king was naked and did not know it;
Europe is not naked but dares not admit it.

Once the noise with which the media accompanied the Reagan-Gorbachov meeting and the signing of the intermediate missile agreement had died down, only one important question remained. Has Europe's security been put at risk?

The immediate merits and disadvantages of such an agreement can be discussed, the nuclear warheads to be destroyed can be counted or the fact that the American missiles in Europe can no longer reach Moscow can be worried over. But I think we must look further and ask ourselves whether the very nature of the Alliance and its foundations are not in danger and what we must do to maintain our security.

It is quite obvious that the excessive zeal of all the propaganda aimed at showing that the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles would be a guarantee of the ties between Europe and the United States will have to be paid for in terms of public confidence. At the time, we wrote that such ties could only exist in the mind of the President of the United States.

What has become equally clear is that President Reagan's position at Reykjavik (1) was not forced on him but was rather what the United States had aimed at all the time: to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe so that no conflict there, or a limited nuclear war, would imperil the American continent.

All European remonstrances - from Mrs. Thatcher's reprimand to Chancellor Kohl's hesitations - were in vain.

After "zero option" and "double zero option" certain people in Germany and elsewhere are now advocating a "triple zero option": the withdrawal of all short-range nuclear weapons. The result, with two barriers down and a third already falling, is to put at risk the entire flexible response strategy which the Alliance adopted after France's withdrawal from the integrated military command.

While the Pentagon now assures us (2) that the Alliance's conventional forces can beat a Warsaw Pact attack, Mr. Carlucci, the new Defence Secretary, has launched a "ballon d'essai" to prepare European opinion for the gradual withdrawal of American forces. This withdrawal became foreseeable as far back as November 1986, but the new economic and financial situation will both justify it and make it inevitable.

So we are now seeing the end of a strategy and the demise of a certain concept of the Alliance, even though its death throes may last some time and it is not in our interest to hasten them.

Once the enthusiasm surrounding the "first disarmament agreement in history" dies down, there is grave danger of a growing feeling of insecurity in Europe faced with a Soviet Union whose size blots out the horizon. It is even the greatest danger, as an obsequious fear would lead Western Europe into a sort of gradual "Finlandisation".

To obviate such a risk, the Americans are once more laying stress on the strengthening of conventional forces in Europe. This old idea has no more chance of being accepted under today's economic conditions than it had in the past. None of the undertakings given from Lisbon (1952) to Brussels (1979) has been kept. This procedure was well understood by both Henry Kissinger (3) and Les Aspin (4).

Having understood that another effort at rearmament is near-impossible, the need for - hopefully unbalanced - conventional disarmament is being advocated by some. So that, in the end, what forces remain will be at the lowest possible balanced level. But it is still difficult to see why the Soviets should suddenly abandon the considerable advantages which Mr. Gorbachov has cleverly gained for them. In any case, such a procedure, however desirable, would be both long and difficult; meanwhile, the unbalanced situation with its attendant fears and respect would remain.

The Possibilities of a Second Pillar

Luckily, there is another solution, made possible by France's tenaciousness, thanks to General de Gaulle, in producing its independent nuclear armament and in continually modernising it. This should enable Europe to ensure a greater part of its own defence. Since they cannot avoid it, European politicians are, more or less timidly, joining in. Recently, in particular, a Security Charter was adopted by Western European Union (WEU). In passing, it is interesting to see that America's reaction gives a new pointer to its attitude to Europe: whereas two years ago Ambassador Burt refused Europe the right to a common position, President Reagan welcomed the adoption of the Charter on 4th November 1987.

But all these efforts to build a second European defence pillar, whether or not accompanied by the changes proposed by Henry Kissinger (an American Secretary-General of NATO and a European Supreme Commander), are likely to remain ineffective as long as it is not decided how the United States will contribute to, rather than ensure, European security. Any attempt to bring the arguments back to those of the 1960s, between "Atlantists" and partisans of a French

national deterrent, are unrealistic. The same applies to attempts to interpret recent French actions as a careful return to the integrated NATO structure. Times have changed and we no longer move on the same plane, even if France can today share the benefits of what it has learnt with Europe and the Alliance.

What is needed is a conceptual break-through (5) which takes account of the economic, political and military upheavals of the last thirty years (GNP ratios, emergent Europe, modernisation of French and British nuclear forces, Rapid Intervention Force, etc.). To do this, the existence in Europe of a sort of "deterrence through recognition" (6) must first be accepted. In a theatre of operations including four nuclear powers, the stakes are so high (world supremacy, no less) that any hopes of limiting the geographic extension or the escalation of violence are vain. The results of such an escalation are dangerous and well-known enough to prevent any aggressor from starting something he could not control.

The result is deterrence through recognition, which uses none of the mechanics of deterrence through reprisals or prevention, but is based on a calculation of probabilities. Such a form of deterrence obviously not only needs a strong defensive will, backed up by sufficient conventional forces, but also limited independent nuclear means which can inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor.

"Unacceptable" means so damaged as to prevent a wounded aggressor, faced by an unharmed United States, from pursuing the only motive for such an aggression: the dream of world supremacy. In passing, it can also be said that recognition of this fact removes any notion of threat, judged by some to be morally unacceptable, from our side.

Build-up of a Denial to Submission

The results of moving into the nuclear era are now clear enough to enable the building of a European defence system which is not a reduced version of the 1950s model.

On the one hand, the conventional forces, reorganised in a way it would take too long to go into, can provide such a denial of submission; it means not tempting a prospective aggressor by letting him think he could attack anywhere without starting a war.

On the other hand, the French and British strategic nuclear forces are now in a position to destroy Soviet industry by more than fifty per cent. In a two-sided (Europe-USSR) world, this might not be enough. But, luckily for us, Christopher Columbus discovered America and, in any case, the USSR with its shaky economy cannot risk being weakened by European blows.

This has two main consequences:

- the key to European security is a strong America, determined to maintain its world rôle. A firmly established alliance is a great "plus" and its outward signs, in the shape of American troops in Europe, will long remain necessary, so as to allow public opinion to become used to the new strategic situation;

- the second consequence is that Russia cannot run the risk of attacking Europe alone and, in order to avoid the situation described earlier, would have to attack Europe and the United States at the same time. This is an additional advantage for European security.

In these circumstances, the problems of guarantees, their extent and credibility, should no longer spoil the climate of the Alliance. The nuclear guarantee provided by the United States will no longer be necessary since its very existence is the basis of security in a Europe which has at last decided to take its fate in its own hands. Equally, France and the United Kingdom need no longer provide guarantees for Europe because the European countries will together build up their own security with a combination of political will and conventional and nuclear forces.

Security based on facts is better than false illusions about doubtful guarantees. With this new approach to security problems, which takes account of the changes of the past thirty years, the structure of the Alliance can be reorganised. Any other attempt at reform is likely to be nothing more than "muddling through".

(1) The Reykjavik Summit took place on 11th and 12th October 1986 (Editor's note).

(2) Newsweek, No. 49, 7th December 1987.

(3) Newsweek, 12th October 1987.

(4) Statement by the Chairman, House of Representatives Arms Control Commission, 29th September 1987.

(5) And not only "creative diplomacy", to use Mr. Kissinger's expression in the article quoted.

(6) See "L'Europe de la dissuasion et des solidarités actives", Stratégique, No. 29, 1st quarter 1986, and "La règle du jeu", Science et Vie, December 1986.

Alfred Cahen, Secretary General of Western European Union

Relaunching Western European Union. Implications for the Atlantic Alliance

Both the Brussels Treaty, signed on 17 March 1948 and forming the basis of Western European Union, and the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949, which gave rise to the Atlantic Alliance, stemmed from a similar international context, identical concerns and the same determination. The states of Western Europe, and those of North America, had to get down to the task of facing a

threat which was becoming more and more dangerous for them.

It is, moreover, indicative that a speech by President Truman, which launched the NATO Alliance, was made on the very same day that Belgian, French, Luxembourg, Netherlands and UK ministers were meeting in Belgium to sign the Brussels Treaty.

It is also remarkable that this

speech by the American President, made before the US Senate, to some extent echoed that made two months earlier, on 22 January 1948, before the House of Commons, by Ernest Bevin, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

That great supporter of the Atlantic Alliance, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, was undoubtedly right when he wrote in his



A statesman with considerable credentials in European as in Atlantic matters, Paul-Henri Spaak.



Alfred Cahen, Secretary General of WEU.

memoirs: 'In my opinion, the new (Washington) Treaty was to be on an Atlantic scale what the Brussels Treaty was on a European scale'. Indeed, the evolution of the two treaties was to remain intimately linked.

It cannot be forgotten that after the failure of the European Defence Community in the summer of 1954 and what would have been its logical consequence, a European Political Community – a failure which was a veritable tragedy in the process for the construction of Europe – it was through the Paris Agreements of October 1954, enlarging WEU to include Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, that the integration of Germany into the framework of Atlantic states was assured, and where, over the years, it was to become a major element.

One of the documents signed in Paris at that time, a Protocol amending and complementing the Brussels Treaty, added a new Article IV which stated: 'In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council

and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters'.

The context, both Atlantic and European, in which the Paris Agreements were signed, is brought out clearly in the memoirs of Lord Avon, the former UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, who explained why he proposed to his Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, that a peacetime military commitment be made to Europe of a kind that was unprecedented for Great Britain. He expressed the view that the successful outcome of the Conference that was to lead to the Paris Agreements depended on a new commitment by Great Britain to maintain its forces on the European continent and not to withdraw them against the will of the majority of the powers of the enlarged Treaty of Brussels. He realized that this would be, for Great Britain, an unprecedented commitment, but the harsh reality was that it was impossible to organize an effective system of defence in Western Europe, which moreover was essential for the security of Great Britain, outside a major British contribution².

The Paris Agreements laid down a whole series of provisions, in addition to those referred to above. Thus a WEU Council was created, as were a Parliamentary Assembly, an Armaments Committee to ensure European cooperation, and an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose task was to monitor the observance of certain limitations imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of armaments production, as well as of certain obligations accepted by all the WEU member states, particularly with regard to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

All this was clear evidence that the promoters of the Paris Agreements wanted to give Western European Union the means to take measures likely to develop a European security

dimension, admittedly on a more modest scale than could have been achieved by the European Defence Community, but nevertheless adequate and capable of progressive expansion.

Opportunities not taken

Western European Union did not, however, really make the most of these opportunities, contenting itself with carrying out tasks, in the shadow of NATO which, while not insignificant, were generally of a routine nature. Its Council did however serve as a useful forum for consultations between the Six of the European Community and London after the Rome Treaty had entered into force in January 1958, but when the United Kingdom joined the Community in 1973, WEU lost its role. Ministers then deserted the Council, which virtually held no more meetings at that level until 1984, thus thwarting the Assembly's efforts to establish a democratic dialogue on European security problems.

In these circumstances, it may well be asked why the seven member states of WEU decided, some two years ago, to reactivate the organization and again give it a role, particularly as there is no shortage of organizations in which the Europeans can consult one another or consult and act together with their North American allies, particularly on security matters – the European Communities, the Atlantic Alliance, Eurogroup, the Independent European Programme Group and so on.

It is therefore in a European, Atlantic and Euro-atlantic perspective that this relaunching of Western European Union must be understood. The construction of Europe

1 Paul-Henri Spaak's Mémoires, Volume I, p. 264, 'Les Grandes Études Contemporaines' Fayard 1969.
2 Quoted in Paul-Henri Spaak's Mémoires op.cit., Volume I, p. 310.

has now been pursued for some forty years, not without difficulty, indeed hampered by endless obstacles and forced to take different directions along a frequently checkered route. The Council of Europe, which originates from the London Treaty signed about a month after the Treaty of Brussels, was one of the first moves in this direction. It was followed by the European Community, first with six member nations, then nine, then ten, and now twelve, which laid the foundations for the process of European construction, in a supranational framework to which Political Cooperation was subsequently added, this time in an intergovernmental context.

With the Community, the construction of Europe has its economic dimension. With Political Cooperation it has its foreign policy aspect. But what it has lacked since its creation is a security perspective, and yet if this serious shortcoming has not been remedied it is not through lack of effort. Apart from the abortive European Defence Community, numerous efforts have been made, particularly since 1970, but also

before then, as the *Fouchet Plans* show.

In this context, the Document on a European Identity of 14 December 1973 should be noted. Prepared in Copenhagen by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of what was then the nine-member European Community, it lays stress on the fact that foreign policy and security issues have an important role to play in achieving a more united Europe.

Furthermore, the report prepared by the then Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, in December 1975, at the request of the member states of the European Community – and which, incidentally, is still remarkably valid and topical – maintains that European union 'will remain incomplete as long as it lacks a common defence policy'.


For their part, both the European Parliament and the Assembly of Western European Union have long committed themselves to working towards the establishment of a defence policy. This has been shown recently by a draft Treaty for European Union – largely inspired by the efforts of Mr. Altiero Spinelli and the

'Crocodile Club' and endorsed by a European Parliament Resolution on 14 February 1984 – which, in defining the mandate of European Union in the area of international relations, includes questions of security.

In addition, spurred on by the European Parliament, the Commission of the European Community has set in hand the task of bringing the production of military equipment, particularly conventional weapons, within the scope of the Community industrial policies.

Political Cooperation

But it was Political Cooperation which seemed to offer the best framework for developing a European security dimension and it is here that the greatest efforts along these lines have been made. The aim of Political Cooperation is to harmonize the foreign policies of the present twelve members of the European Community, and what is a foreign policy without a security aspect? Unfortunately, these endeavours have not yet succeeded in achieving all the anticipated results.



The Paris Agreements are signed in 1954.

After fourteen years of experience, the Six, then Nine, then Ten, and now twelve, have never succeeded in agreeing to put discussion of questions affecting security on a systematic basis within Political Cooperation. Nevertheless, certain member states have launched major initiatives aimed at changing the situation and at formally endowing Political Cooperation with significant responsibilities for security matters. Thus, at the instigation of the United Kingdom Presidency of the European Community Council in the second half of 1981, the Community was urged to entrust Political Cooperation with real powers in this domain, which would have enabled it to long last to tackle security questions in a systematic way. Despite long and difficult discussions, this attempt failed. Only with difficulty did the *London Report*, approved in December 1981 by the European Council, acknowledge that Political Cooperation was entitled to address the 'political aspects of security'.

Another attempt was made as a result of the Genscher-Colombo initiative. Here again, discussions were difficult and often acrimonious. When they concluded with the adoption of a *Solemn Declaration on European Union* in Stuttgart on 18 June 1983, Political Cooperation had been relegated to discussing only the political and economic aspects of security.

What is the reason for these total or partial failures? In essence, because three of the then ten members of the European Community - Ireland, Denmark and Greece - could not, for various reasons, agree to move forward on this issue.

In my view, it is the accumulation of these failures, or near failures, each time efforts are made to give the European Community genuine opportunities for working together in the security field - as well as a growing interest, at both the public and at the governmental level, in problems concerning the defence of



Anthony Eden, later to become Lord Avon.

Europe - which are the basis for the initiatives aimed at relaunching Western European Union. What the Ten of the European Community were unable to do, the Seven of WEU decided to do in the meantime amongst themselves, particularly as they had, in this regard, an instrument which, up till then, had only been used intermittently.

It is therefore in this European perspective that the initiatives which have led to the reactivation of WEU must be seen. But they are also due to the fact that all WEU's member states belong to the Atlantic Alliance, and to a clear understanding by its members that there can be no credible defence of the West, and hence of Western Europe, without the Atlantic Alliance.

This dual aspect, European and Atlantic, to the relaunching of the WEU emerged from the very start of the process which was to lead to its reactivation. Both can be found in the first working documents, particularly in the French memorandum of 2 February 1984 and the Belgian

memorandum of 2 April the same year.

But it was in the Rome Declaration of 1 November 1984, which in a way constitutes the act of rebirth of Western European Union, that these twin concerns appeared most strikingly. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the seven WEU member nations, meeting in the Italian capital, after affirming their commitment to the promotion of the unity and progressive integration of Europe, stated that they were 'conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen Western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions,' and they 'underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the member states in the field of security policy, and to encourage consensus'.

At the same time, they pointed out that 'the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the foundation of Western security, had preserved peace on the Continent for 35 years', and that 'this permitted the construction of Europe'. They also stated that they were convinced 'that a better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to the greater solidarity among its members'. Finally, they stressed the 'indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area' mentioning in particular 'the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies' and stressing 'the crucial importance of the contribution to the common security of the allies who are not members of WEU' and 'the necessity, as a complement to their joint efforts, of concertation with them'.

It is therefore clear that the statesmen who met in Rome did not want to relaunch WEU outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance but

rather within it, in solidarity with all their allies, whether from Europe or North America.

Need for simplified relationship

This dual membership must be clearly understood in order to grasp the full scope of this renewal of WEU and the consequences that it may have for Europe and for the Atlantic Alliance. At first sight, it undoubtedly suggests to me that relations between European Community partners and NATO will not be made any easier. Those nations of the European Community who do not belong to WEU – as well as NATO member states who do not belong to it – feel understandable concern in this regard. However, I am deeply convinced that a more careful examination will reveal that such a step would be a consistent and positive one for both the European construction process and for the Atlantic Alliance.

Before writing this article, I wanted to reread the passage in Henry Kissinger's memoirs³ on the *Year of Europe* and it is clear from this, that the experience of launching this initiative was a very difficult one for him. Was it because, as he seems to feel, this call for a renewal of the Alliance⁴ came up against a European desire to use, or even to deflect, this move by Washington for the purpose of setting up Political Cooperation, then in its infancy?⁵ I am not sure. Simply, what happened at the time was that the European Community of the Six, and then the Nine, had found, since the European Summit at The Hague in 1969, a new vitality which they wished to maintain. This new lease of life was very soon to be expressed by the accession to the Community of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, and also by the creation of Political Cooperation. The Year of Europe to some extent clashed with this movement which



Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans who, when Prime Minister in 1975, prepared a comprehensive report on the concept of European union.

was already underway, and its development was obviously affected by it. Does that mean, however, that there was anything like a firm European intention to present Washington with inflexible attitudes on foreign relations which might harm the cohesiveness of the Alliance?

The future has proved that there was not. Without any doubt, Political Cooperation is harmonizing the attitudes of the member countries on foreign affairs with increasing success. But channels have been opened up which enable consultations on matters of substance to be held in good time with the NATO Allies who do not belong to the Community, whether they are European or North American.

It was in fact Henry Kissinger himself who was to write in his well-known article in 1984, on *A plan to reshape NATO*: 'Many in this country (the United States) seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defence effort and thus weaken the

common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case... In the field of defence, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States. Europe analysing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the United States essential. Greater unity in defence would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense

³ Henry Kissinger *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 700 and 701. Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Michael Joseph 1982.

⁴ 'We wanted to give a new political impetus to the Atlantic Alliance with a so-called Atlantic Declaration... We thought that the new generation that had grown up since the end of the Second World War needed to see its leaders dedicate themselves to purposes beyond the prudent management of technical decisions if governments were not to lose their legitimacy and the Alliance its cohesion'.

⁵ 'All our allies, having geared their cumbersome Community machinery to the Atlantic dialogue, were eager to continue the process, for it was a useful foil against which to elaborate their European identity'.

forts across the whole panoply of weapons'.⁶

crossroads organization

In the light of this experience, and of the declared goals of the Seven of WEU, I am fully convinced that it is possible - and of course desirable - for WEU to fulfill its dual European and Atlantic task. For it to do so however, it has to be fully aware of its twin vocations, of the role incumbent on it as a *crossroads organization*.

Thus, as regards the task of constructing Europe, WEU must bear in mind what consequences this process will have for it. In this article, I would like to deal with only one of them. It seems obvious to me that if a reactivated WEU really is an element in the construction process, any important change of substance, any significant alteration in the evolution of European integration, cannot fail to have consequences for WEU as well. For if it finally became established that the Twelve of the European Community were ready to give themselves a real security dimension without further ado, that would be something new, capable of

strongly influencing in the immediate future the destiny of Western European Union, which might be required to question its future and even its very existence. That being said, and as long as this is not the case - and the outcome of the European Council in Luxembourg on 2 and 3 December 1985 suggests that it is not at this stage at least - the WEU will continue to be the only European centre for reflection and coordination on security problems, a responsibility it must assume to the full.

As regards the Atlantic Alliance, WEU's dual vocation involves consequences which seem to me to be clear. First of all, with regard to what WEU must *not* be. It must not be a *group apart* where final decisions are prepared which would subsequently be submitted to the other Allies on a take-it or leave-it basis. Less still could it become a place where attitudes would be developed which might be understood by third parties as 'suggestions' or even 'proposals' made independently of the NATO Alliance. Even less could it be the centre of an approach to Allied strategy which clearly put it at a

distance from Alliance doctrine on the matter.

What is needed, however, is to give the seven member states of Western European Union an 'active centre for reflection and cooperation on security matters. In an inter-connected European network, it is important that this takes place. It can only be useful to those who participate in it, to the other European countries in the NATO Alliance and to the latter's North American partners.

This centre for reflection and cooperation ought to have, thanks to WEU's Parliamentary Assembly, fruitful contact with European public opinion, constituting the starting point for a really democratic public dialogue on security questions on a European scale.

The Declaration of Rome has moreover already stressed the importance of this aspect in calling for the Assembly of Western European Union, as the only European Parliamentary body mandated by Treaty to discuss defence matters, to play a growing role; the Declaration also underlined the important contribution which the Assembly has already made to the renewal of WEU, and the Assembly should continue its efforts towards strengthening solidarity between the member states and to work towards consolidating the consensus of public opinion on their security and defence needs.

The marked coolness of a growing sector of European opinion with regard to Atlantic security and, in the Atlantic context, to European security, has shown how important it is to develop such a dialogue for the Alliance and, within the Alliance, for Western Europe.

At the same time, this crossroads organization status of Western European Union must make it careful to avoid duplicating the work of other institutions whose objectives are, in the main, similar or close to its own.

Member Countries	NATO	EEC	WEU
BELGIUM	X	X	X
CANADA	X		
DENMARK	X	X	
FRANCE	X	X	X
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	X	X	X
GREECE	X	X	
ICELAND	X		
IRELAND		X	
ITALY	X	X	X
LUXEMBOURG	X	X	X
NETHERLANDS	X	X	X
NORWAY	X		
PORTUGAL	X	X	
SPAIN	X	X	
TURKEY	X		
UNITED KINGDOM	X	X	X
UNITED STATES	X		

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *A Plan to Reshape NATO*, in *Atlantic Community Quarterly* 1984, Volume 22, No 1 (Spring), p. 41.

This means, for example, that WEU must maintain the closest relationships with both the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance as well as institutions which have developed inside or alongside NATO, such as Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme Group. Here again the Declaration of Rome is clear. It states, for example, that Ministers drew attention to the need to make the best use of existing resources by increased cooperation and, through WEU, to give political impetus to the armaments cooperation process.

In general, the new Western European Union must therefore retain the closest contact and the most effective relations as regards coordination and cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance as such and with each of the Allies who are not members of WEU.

Factor for strengthening Alliance

If at this stage, I were required to draw a conclusion on the reactivation of Western European Union from the viewpoint of transatlantic relations, I would say that in my view it represents a major factor for strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, in three respects:

- the progressive introduction of a European security dimension. This may of course raise some minor problems for some allies at first, but in the long run, it will ensure a stronger Alliance;
- the development, within the Alliance, of a stronger European will which, at the same time, can be expected to help it to face up to its responsibilities and ensure that the entire Atlantic relationship is better balanced. The desire of the member states of Western European Union to develop their activities in close contact with their allies, and with their non-member European allies in particular, may enable the European allies to take part in this movement;



Van Parys

Henry Kissinger wrote, in a 1984 article, that *increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States.*

- finally, the fact that the WEU Council is meeting again at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers ensures, with WEU's Parliamentary Assembly, that a democratic public dialogue is resumed which can involve European opinion in the great debates on security problems and thus help to recreate in this connection a consensus which takes account both of the existing reality and public aspirations.

The construction of Europe and Atlantic solidarity have all too often been set against each other. This is in fact a false problem, and I am pleased that two voices - one French and one American - have spoken out recently to say so. The first is that of Ambassador de France, Jean-Marie Soutou, who wrote in *Figaro - Economie* on 24 February that France and the Federal Republic of Germany 'would have no reason to move away from what has, after all, been their common policy for thirty years, and which is based on Europe and the Alliance together'. The second is that of Stephen J. Ledogar, Deputy Permanent Representative of

the United States to the North Atlantic Council who, in that same month at a symposium organized in Brussels on the theme *High technology, Western security and economic growth: an agenda for the future*, whilst recommending caution and even vigilance in order to avoid any split within the Alliance, recognized that: 'an appraisal of existing realities... does not in itself rule out nor should it necessarily discourage, concerted Western European efforts towards increased self-sufficiency in security matters' adding: 'these groups (in which he included WEU) are composed of Allies and friends who have very powerful interests in protecting the North Atlantic security arrangement; that is the US objective also. They believe that a stronger, more politically coherent Europe can contribute more to the Alliance on its own behalf, or, depending on one's point of view can, perhaps, better influence or counter-balance the United States'.

These two statements do not merely echo Henry Kissinger's conclusions in the article which I have referred to above⁷ but also those of a statesman with considerable credentials in European as in Atlantic matters, Paul-Henri Spaak. Writing towards the end of his political life, he summed up his achievements as follows: 'In this way, my Parliamentary life ended with a decision to remain faithful to one of the great causes which I had defended (the Atlantic cause)... I did indeed feel somewhat sad that day, but I consoled myself by recalling the struggles I had taken part in and the results which had been obtained. *I had contributed, through the Atlantic Alliance, to ensuring peace in Europe, and I had contributed to the building of a united Europe.* I had thus achieved two of my aims.'⁸ ♦

7 *A Plan to Reshape NATO*, Atlantic Community Quarterly, op.cit.
 8 Paul-Henri Spaak's *Mémoires*, op.cit., Volume II, pp. 421 and 422.

Western European Union: Birth, Development and Reactivation

by M Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General WEU

The problem of creating a specifically European dimension to security cooperation has existed since the very beginning of the integration movement, in which a growing number of Western European states have been involved for some forty years. As the only forum for joint discussions between European Foreign and Defence Ministers, the Western European Union (WEU) has a key role to play in establishing a European identity in security matters.

However, the early history of the WEU, and its recent reactivation must be seen in the dual context of the process of European integration and developments in the Atlantic Alliance; indeed, NATO and WEU have been linked from the beginning. But what is WEU and how did it come into being?

The first post-war diplomatic landmark in Europe's search for common security was the signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948. WEU, which was actually created over six years later in October 1954, owes its origin to this Treaty.

The Brussels Treaty is, in fact, one month older than the agreement which set up the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (signed on 16 April 1948); one year older than the agreement which established the Council of Europe (London, 5 March 1949); and three years older than that which launched the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 8 April 1951) and which was the first stage in what was to become Europe of the Six, then the Nine, then the Ten and now the Twelve. The Brussels Treaty is also more than a year older than the Washington Treaty (4 April 1949) which founded NATO and set European security firmly in the Atlantic framework.

What was this Brussels Treaty?

It was an alliance between five states — Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — in what became known as the 'Western Union'. In theory, the commitment to mutual military aid was

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stronger than that in the later Atlantic Alliance, although in practice this formal difference is outweighed by the existence within the latter of NATO's Integrated Military Structure¹. Indeed, upon the foundation of NATO, the military structure of the Brussels Treaty Organisation was absorbed into NATO.

Nevertheless, the Brussels Treaty was the first attempt to promote a Europe which needed to organise itself — as the Treaty's title and preamble confirm — both in defence and in the economic, social and cultural fields². The Brussels Treaty, like the later Washington Treaty, came into being in an international climate dominated by a growing threat from the East. This resulted in a determination by the states of Western Europe and North America to meet that threat.

Significantly, the speech by President Truman to the US Congress, which was to herald the birth of the Atlantic Alliance, was delivered on the very same day on which the Belgian, United Kingdom, French, Luxembourg and Dutch Foreign Ministers signed the Brussels Treaty. It is also remarkable that Truman's speech to some extent echoed that which had been made two months earlier (on 22 January 1948) in the House of Commons by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, and which led to the Brussels Treaty.

The Alliance and the Western Union — which was later to become Western European Union — were therefore linked from the beginning. They were to remain so from then on.

After the failure of the proposed European Defence Community in the summer of 1954, the Paris Agreements of October that year — otherwise known as the Paris Protocol — enlarged the Brussels Treaty to include both the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, thus transforming the Western Union into the Western European Union. This, in turn, made it possible for the Federal Republic to join NATO.

The Paris Protocol, besides modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, also contained provision for a new Article to be inserted in the Treaty, which specified the relationship of WEU to NATO:

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

So it was that WEU succeeded the Brussels Treaty Organisation. It was to have much wider objectives and increased resources. In particular, the new agreements provided for the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly, a Committee to promote cooperation among member States in the field of armaments manufacture, an Agency which was called upon to carry out a number of controls on armaments production by the Contracting Parties — particularly by the Federal Republic of Germany — and the historically

unique undertaking by the United Kingdom to maintain certain specified forces on the European mainland.

Between 1957, the year in which the Rome Treaties came into force, and 1973, when the United Kingdom acceded to these Treaties and to the Paris Treaty which had established the European Coal and Steel Community, WEU served as a valuable — indeed the only — forum in which the UK and the 'Six' could meet together.

After UK accession to the Rome and Paris Treaties, however, WEU lost this *raison d'être* and went into hibernation.

The Council was not to meet again at Ministerial level until 1984, eleven years later. Only the WEU Assembly retained any dynamism, confirming its place as the only European public forum specifically empowered by Treaty to discuss security and defence questions.

Throughout this period, the process of building Europe continued. Following the Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports, European Political Cooperation was established after 1970. This gave a foreign policy element to European reconstruction, to add to the economic cooperation embodied in the Communities. Considerable efforts were also made to establish a security dimension in the framework of Political Cooperation discussions, reflecting the view that progress towards a European foreign policy would otherwise be incomplete. But the hoped for results were not achieved.

From the London Report of December 1980, the Genscher-Colombo Initiative and the Solemn Declaration on European Union of June 1983, right through to the Single European Act of December 1985 (now ratified and in force from 1 July this year), all that has been achieved is that the Ten (now the Twelve) members of the European community can discuss the political and economic aspects of security — but not really security itself. This is primarily because three members of the Twelve — Denmark, Greece and Ireland — refuse, for various reasons, to engage in discussions of security which involve acknowledging, even if only implicitly, a possible alignment (as opposed to neutrality) of the EC.

By the end of 1983, the accumulation of failures or part-failures led the seven other member States of what was then the Ten to go it alone and in 1984 they reactivated the WEU — an organisation which was available to them but which they had scarcely used for ten years.

The other important element in this decision was the perception that growing problems in West/West relations and the Alliance framework needed better European coordination if they were to be properly managed. WEU member states recognised that, through a reactivated organisation, they could make a more positive contribution to discussions in the Atlantic community and thus help to strengthen their security.

This reactivation was decided upon and set in train by three successive ministerial meetings: a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris on 12 June

1984; a joint meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Rome on 26 October 1984; and a meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Bonn on 22 April 1985.

The October 1984 Rome ministerial meeting adopted a Declaration which, in a way, was the 'Certificate of Rebirth' for the WEU. It specified the Union's task and the context in which it was to be accomplished. Noteworthy in this connection are paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Declaration.¹

The role of the reactivated Western European Union has been clearly identified in the history of its revival and in the content of the Rome Declaration.

It is the only European forum where Foreign and Defence Ministers can meet for joint discussions on the major security issues of concern to them and their countries. WEU is not a decision-taking or operational forum, but one in which greater harmony of views can be achieved. In the longer term, there is little doubt that by establishing an on-going dialogue among its member countries, it will help the development of converging views.

In time, common positions on particular issues may perhaps be achieved. These will help to create a 'European' security identity, which itself will permit the gradual reconstruction of a Western European public consensus on security issues. Here, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly is sure to play a leading part.

The target of these developments is not to create a substitute for the foundation of European security, namely, the Atlantic Alliance. It is rather to reinforce that foundation by bringing a clearer European perspective into Alliance decisions. This will help secure the irreplaceable strategic link with the United States and guarantee the American presence in Europe.

As an element in European construction, WEU stands alongside the European Communities and Political Cooperation. This has a number of consequences. For example, the following points need to be considered.

Firstly, there must be sustained co-ordination and cooperation with the Communities and Political Cooperation.

Secondly, any changes in the composition of the Communities and Political Co-operation would have consequences for WEU. For example, Portugal and Spain expressed interest in the WEU when they were preparing to join the Ten. Turkey did the same when it was applying for full membership of the Communities and Political Cooperation. Greece has also indicated interest in WEU membership.

Lastly, the reactivated WEU is likely only to develop as long as full scale security discussions among the Twelve remain impossible. In these circumstances, which seem set to continue for the foreseeable future, WEU's role as the only European forum for security discussions will continue. But should circumstances change, the WEU would bow to the

primacy of European Political Cooperation.

In the context of the Atlantic Alliance, to which all WEU Member States belong, and without which all their governments agree that there can be no credible defence of Western Europe, the reformed WEU should help generate a better transatlantic balance. That is the base of a stronger 'European pillar of the Alliance'. WEU members should also retain close contacts and effective co-ordination with their non-WEU European Allies. Indeed, the Rome declaration itself calls for this in demanding 'full transparency' by WEU nations about their work with the Alliance partners.

Is WEU capable of carrying out its task and fulfilling its vocation?

The revival of WEU effectively began over two years ago. Things have not been easy for a number of reasons, including:

— The sporadic nature of the 'European reflex' on the part of member governments, a phenomenon that is fairly common to the whole process of European construction, whether it be in the context of the Communities, Political Cooperation or WEU. It is seldom that all the Member States want the same thing at the same time and with the same intensity. Naturally, this hampers progress towards consensus.

— Separate national motivations in WEU, which have often been divergent, in contrast to the common motivation to reactivate.

— The concern by WEU members not to undertake activity in the sensitive security field which would risk dividing the Alliance that they sought to strengthen, or drive away the Americans they wanted to stay; this, and the fact that the security problems impinge closely upon national sovereignty, led to lengthy debates.

— WEU's position as a 'crossroads organization' between the Twelve and the Atlantic Alliance, which brings with it the obligation to avoid any harmful duplication whilst at the same time having to assert its own role.

— The fact that WEU was dormant for ten years.

Despite these difficulties, reactivation has nevertheless become a reality. WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers acknowledged this in their Communiqué following their meeting in Luxembourg on 28 April this year. WEU is in consequence beginning to play its proper role.

On the route to achieving this, major structural and organisational surgery has been undertaken in order to transform an organisation once set up to control rearmament into a political forum for security debate. Like an old house, the façade has been kept, but behind it the edifice has been rebuilt from the foundations upwards. The old armaments control protocols have been swept away, new Agencies created, a dynamic Council with numerous working groups formed, and the Secretariat revitalised. This process continues in the second phase of reactivation.

It could be argued that the secret of the success of the Twelve's Political Cooperation is that it brings together, for regular and detailed consulti-

tion, those who have the relevant responsibility in the capitals, be they Ministers, Political Directors or experts. Happily, this is now happening too in the Western European Union's Council.

There are now at least two meetings every year of Foreign and Defence Ministers. The Political Directors meet periodically, generally with representatives of equivalent rank from the Defence Ministries. In principle, they meet four times a year although this frequency has yet to be formalised. They have already met four times in 1987.

A Special Working Group, made up of either Deputy Political Directors or Politico-Military Directors, from Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), again with representatives of comparable rank from the Defence Ministries, is now meeting with increasing frequency, once a month or more.

Lastly, experts from the capitals also meet under the same auspices to examine questions entrusted to them, such as the problems raised by the Strategic Defence Initiative, Western European security principles and, since the Luxembourg ministerial meeting on 27 and 28 April, security questions in the Mediterranean. To date, this makes three groups of experts, to which a fourth is to be added to examine the allocation and management of defence resources. The frequency of their meetings is dictated by the volume of their work.

These developments — the meetings of Political Directors, the Special Working Group and the Groups of Experts — are entirely new to WEU and are an addition to the Permanent Council, which is made up of the Ambassadors of the Member countries and which sits in London. The Council's main task is to coordinate all the Organisation's activities.

These new structures came into being and have been developed in response to the needs of reactivation. They were given official blessing by Ministers at the 27-28 April Luxembourg meeting.

What has the WEU achieved with these new structures which, together with the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Executive, constitute its new heart?

At their last two meetings in Luxembourg, Ministers have been able to discuss the specific issues for Europe raised by the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit. At the first, they were able to clarify the possible implications of the Reykjavik decisions for European security, and to establish a loose consensus on what should be sought from future consultations in the Alliance framework.

This process was continued at the second meeting, in April, from which the communique made clear the underlying considerations which had to be met in subsequent Alliance security decisions. For example, the communique asserted that 'the presence of US nuclear forces and the presence of US troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security of the whole Alliance'. It also made clear that there was no alternative to 'a credible

deterrent against all forms of aggression'.

Later, while stressing the continuing need to develop 'co-operation and dialogue with Eastern European countries', the communique expressed full support for American efforts to achieve an effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union on the total elimination of conventional weapon disparities between East and West in Europe.

Such statements are powerful messages to other nations and the general public alike. They spell out what the Europeans are looking for in arms control deals and on what principles such deals should be based. They also underline what needs to be kept so that deterrence can continue, and appropriate security policies maintained. Above all, they form a clear statement of European concerns which must be taken into account in the decision-making process between the superpowers, or in the preceding Alliance consultations. As such, they form part of the consultation process, and assist the formation of consensus. The impact of this meeting, and others like it, was clearly seen in, for example, the outcome of the Reykjavik North Atlantic Council in June and in the strength of European input into the American negotiating position at Geneva. WEU has thus been proving its worth on a very broad scale.

A more recent example of WEU's value in helping to create a distinct 'European Viewpoint' on matters affecting common security came on 20 August this year. The Netherlands, who currently hold the Presidency of WEU, called a special meeting at The Hague, at which experts from the seven WEU nations considered the possibility of providing minesweepers for the Gulf.

The responses of the individual WEU nations on this question have subsequently been made clear; five of the seven WEU nations have now sent minesweepers to the Gulf region. The meeting at The Hague served to form a common European approach to matters in the Gulf. It was the first time that the WEU had been used to consider problems outside of Europe.

The August meeting was widely reported in the press, and the statement issued after the meeting held that 'Europe's vital interests require that freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times'.

But at lower levels too there have been achievements. The SDI Specialists Group has prepared one report, which it sent to the Assembly, and in which for the first time a group of European nations were able to agree on a set of considerations for understanding the potential long term impact of strategic defence. Further work has continued, as mandated by Ministers at their April 1986 Venice meeting, on the political and strategic implications of ballistic missile defence. Another consensus report has been completed.

Another group, meeting under the auspices of the Special Working Group, produced an interim report entitled 'European Security Interests', which it is now seeking to finalise. Indeed, it intends to go further, and to

seek to establish a common platform for identifying the principles of European security with a view to possible publication. And one should not forget the Agencies: at the request of the Council, they have prepared reports on a wide range of subjects in the field of arms control, security, and armaments co-operation. They have considered verification problems, the non-military threat, technology transfer, and perception of the strategic balance. Recently, the Agencies produced an excellent report on the Japanese armaments industry, one of the very few of its kind in the world. Not even NATO has done such work. This was sent in publishable form to the Assembly.

There is no doubt that more good work — much unique — can emerge from WEU.

Meanwhile, the Assembly continues with its own reports and debates. Perhaps the most exciting recent event was the December 1986 speech to the Assembly by the French Prime Minister, M Jacques Chirac. This was the first time in 24 years that a French Prime Minister had addressed the WEU Assembly; evidence of the success of the reactivation. M Chirac's major intervention on questions of European security, which received widespread international publicity, set out a number of principles which he, at least, wished to see European countries espouse as the basic guidelines for their security. And M Chirac argued firmly that these should be discussed, elaborated, and perhaps even adopted in the framework of WEU; it was a tribute both to the organisation, and to the parliamentarians who, for during the twelve dark wilderness years, kept its light alive.

These important examples show that WEU is rapidly beginning to fulfil its expectations. It is becoming a forum in which views are developed and an understanding of European security elaborated. Much more work is in the pipeline. The next Ministerial meeting is fixed for 26/27 October in The Hague and a further date is being considered for Spring 1988. At the official level, activity in support of these meetings, and in the development of WEU itself, continues to expand.

What of the future? The Transatlantic relationship within NATO, which remains the guarantee of Europe's security, seems to be going through a period of change.

Discussions on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that the status quo may be under threat, insofar as the determination of Europeans to further strengthen their contribution to their collective security may be tested. Western Europe will thus have to face technological, military and political challenges.

The seven member nations of WEU will have to define in concrete terms their possible policies in two respects. First in the sphere of arms control, they will need to continue to define the type of action required to ensure that specific European interests are properly represented in negotiations.

Next, in the sphere of defence itself, they will need to consider carefully how best to play a larger role.

The need to establish a 'European identity' in the sphere of security is becoming increasingly urgent. It is in this context that WEU can play a most important part.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Article V of the Brussels Treaty:

'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'.

2. The economic, social and cultural responsibilities were to be gradually transferred to the OEEC, to the Council of Europe and to the European Communities as these organisations came into being.

3. The relevant paragraphs of the Declaration adopted after the Rome meeting are:

'3. Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of the specific western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimension, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework, in order to increase cooperation between the member States in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus. In this context, they called for continued efforts to preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and cooperation.

4. The Ministers recalled that the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the foundation of western security, had preserved peace on the Continent for 35 years. This permitted the construction of Europe. The Ministers are convinced that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area. They recalled in particular the vital and substantial contribution of all the European Allies, and underlined the crucial importance of the contribution to common security of their allies who are not members of WEU. They stressed the necessity, as a complement to their joint efforts, of the closest possible concertation with them.

7. The Ministers called attention to the need to make the best use of existing resources through increased cooperation, and through WEU to provide a political impetus to institutions of cooperation in the field of armaments.

8. The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions.
- arms control and disarmament.
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe.
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations.
- the development of European cooperation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.

9. The Ministers recalled the importance of the WEU Assembly which, as the only European parliamentary body mandated by Treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon to play a growing role.

They stressed the major contribution which the Assembly has already made to the revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to pursue its efforts to strengthen the solidarity among the member States, and to strive to consolidate the consensus among public opinion on their security and defence needs.

The United Kingdom is represented by a senior official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Article from "Soldat und Technik" (Journal for Technical Training, Continuing Education and Information in the German Federal Armed Forces), February 1988, pp. 59-62:

EUROPE AND AMERICA

Developments in the Trans-Atlantic Relationship

By Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Dr. Wolf-Ulrich Jorke

"The Atlantic Alliance has stood the test for over four decades, and yet there is a distinct irritation in the relations between America and Europe."¹

Excerpt from a speech by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, at Harvard University at a ceremony on the 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

From an historical perspective, the alliance between North America and the West European democracies has indeed stood the test for an extraordinarily long period of time. It has secured the peace in Europe. In recent times, however, the mutual irritations and annoyances in the trans-Atlantic relationship seem to be increasing.

Irritations in the trans-Atlantic relationship are not a new phenomenon in the more than forty years of its history since the end of the Second World War; NATO has already survived many crises. What is new is that so many questions are arising at the same time, and that they meet upon an international political situation that is characterized by dynamic change. We live in a time of accelerated change, in the period of the third industrial revolution and the transition to a postindustrial society. The pressure to

modernize, which is produced by developments in high technology, exercises its influence on economic and social structures and may bring about some crises of adjustment. At the same time, the recent turbulences in the stock markets and currency exchanges have made clear for all to see that our world is characterized by increasing international interdependence.

In the Soviet Union we can see the attempts being made under General Secretary Gorbachev to break up the crust that encumbers their system, and to achieve accelerated change in order to strengthen their industrial base, particularly through the introduction of high technology. What we now have is a phase of dynamic development whose direction, configuration and result will be of decisive importance for the future capabilities of individual states as well as communities of states in the 21st century; it is bound to determine global and regional stability.

Also to be seen in this context is the question concerning the further development of the relationship between Europe and America, and particularly of the relations between the U.S. and Germany: Is the Atlantic becoming wider on both sides? Have there been any changes in the significance of the overall structural conditions?

Changes in the United States

In the United States we can observe changes which may dislodge Europe and European interests from the minds of both the public and the elites. This development might result in a decline of the influence that Europe has on the globally oriented U.S. foreign policy.

* The present generation of American politicians did not consciously experience the Second World War. The priority that Europe had in the post-war period has been replaced

by the interest in current affairs such as the Iran-Contra affair, the Latin American debt crisis, and U.S. involvement in the Gulf area.

* Due to the American electoral system and the manner of selecting members of Congress, domestic political concerns dominate the work of most members of the U.S. Congress.

* There have been changes in the foreign-policy establishment. The more Europe-oriented elites of the East Coast are no longer the only constituents in the formation of U.S. foreign policy.

* In addition, in foreign-policy matters the United States frequently speak with various voices. The three distinct centers of political power (President, Senate, and House of Representatives) are elected at different times and are each responsible to their own electoral constituencies.² This may limit their ability to take action in foreign-policy matters, encumber foreign-policy issues with domestic political themes, and give some influential senators a great deal of political clout in the foreign-policy arena.

* The shifts in economic growth, and the subsequent demographic shifts, have moved the economic and demographic centers from the North to the South and from the East to the West of the United States.

* The demographic composition of the American population has also changed; e.g., the proportion of the white population, which is presently at about 80 percent, is continually decreasing. In California, for example, there will be an approximate balance between "Anglos" and "Latinos" at about the turn of the century. The increase in the significance of the Hispanic population in the South of the United States during recent years has resulted in an expenditure of approx. 450 million dollars

for Spanish-language advertisements in 1987.³ Spanish also tops the list of languages that members of the American elite would like to have their children learn, at the rate of 34 percent. This is followed by French (22 %), Japanese (16 %), Chinese (12 %), and Russian (10 %). German (3 %) is no longer in demand.⁴

* In trade relations the Pacific Region -- a new center of economic growth -- has since the beginning of the eighties replaced the European Community as America's biggest supplier, and the tendency is rising. The countries of the Pacific Region account for the largest portion of the deficit in the U.S. balance of foreign trade. In 1986, Japan alone achieved a trade surplus in the amount of 55 billion U.S. dollars, while the threshold countries of South-East Asia achieved almost 40 billion dollars. The trade surplus achieved by the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, amounted to only 15 billion dollars; this is rather modest in comparison, and corresponds to that of Taiwan.

* We cannot fail to notice a certain tendency toward the Pacific Region, which is even increased by the inclusion of the Pacific Ocean in the global competition between the superpowers. This implies a further increase in the importance of the naval component in the global strategy of the United States and the U.S. Navy.

* While the economic prowess of Western Europe has increased considerably and the Pacific Region has developed ever more strongly, the United States has lost its earlier dominance in economic performance and economic relations. In 1950, for example, the United States still produced 40 percent of the world's product, but in 1987 only 22 percent; and the tendency is still downward.

* For the Americans it will be important to regain economic competitiveness and dynamism so as to be able to secure

their national potential for the 21st century through well-aimed modernization. The measures they take to improve their high-technology base will be of central importance, not least from a military point of view.⁵

Most of the general structural conditions described here imply a gradual de-Europeanization. These conditions are not very favorable for Europe and European interests, and they are difficult to influence. With the increasing significance of other regions in the world, Europe has lost importance in relative terms. Nevertheless, Europe will remain indispensable for the United States from the perspective of U.S. global security-policy interests and America's own security, for as long as the containment of the Soviet Union remains the overriding objective of U.S. policy. A departure from this goal is not to be expected.⁶

Critical American Attitudes Toward Europe

The United States are faced by two challenges: In the area of security policy, the Soviet Union has achieved a position of equal rank as a world power; and in the field of economic relations, America is confronted by increasing world-wide economic competition from Western Europe, Japan, and the Pacific Region. In both of these areas the United States have lost their earlier dominance and have thus reached the limits of Pax Americana. Even if the United States continue to be the most powerful nation, it will be a question of central importance to them in the future how they will be able to exercise their position of international leadership without having hegemonic capabilities.⁷ All U.S. allies are increasingly being asked to provide more relief, and their individual contributions will be examined very critically from the perspective of fair burden sharing.

The following policy areas are subject to criticism from the American perspective:

* U.S. economic relations with the European Community are burdened by trade impediments (e.g., Airbus), making it more difficult to find solutions to the economic problems of the world. Protectionism -- particularly in the agricultural field -- has resulted in a reduction in the value of U.S. agricultural exports by 41 percent, from 44 billion dollars in 1981 to 26 billion dollars in 1986.⁸ U.S. agricultural exports are therefore already far below those of the EC. It seems inevitable that there will be confrontations, even up to the point of a trade war, and at least frequent friction.

* While the Americans regard Europe as having only regionally defined interests -- as opposed to their own global role -- they do not have any idea of what role Europe might actually play as an equal political and economic partner, particularly since in such a situation the American freedom of action would be reduced.

* With regard to security policy and strategy in particular, the Americans see themselves as the superior and leading power. In their view, having too close ties to Europe because of the stationing of U.S. troops on the European Continent constitutes an obstacle to their global freedom of action as a world power, which finds expression primarily in naval terms. In addition, such fixed commitments prevent the re-channeling of scarce resources toward the strengthening of the American naval strategy by means of a 600-ship navy and flexible rapid deployment forces that can be employed world-wide.⁹

* The Americans therefore expect from the Europeans a larger contribution to conventional defense, and they regard this as a sensible division of labor. It is difficult for the Americans to understand why Europe, which

has become rich under the American nuclear umbrella, should be so highly dependent on the U.S.A. for its protection. They point out that the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, spends barely half of what the U.S. spends on defense, measured in terms of proportion of GNP.

* Closely related to the question of a more balanced burden sharing as demanded by the U.S. is the American commitment to areas outside the NATO Treaty area. In the U.S. there is a strong sentiment that the Europeans only reluctantly support the American global commitment, if at all. The U.S. commitment such as the one in the Gulf area is definitely also of benefit to the Europeans (and the Japanese, as well).

* The misgivings which Europeans have in the combat against international terrorism increase the view of many Americans that they are being left largely to themselves. Particularly the lack of support from Europe in the air raid to Libya in 1985 was incomprehensible to many Americans, and it has triggered off a lot of discussion that was critical of Europe. The action taken against Libya has also shown that Americans and West Europeans use different yardsticks and categories for evaluating political ideas, actions, and decision-making.¹⁰

* In the Federal Republic of Germany there are some 240,000 American troops, more than two thirds of the total of 326,000 stationed in Europe. Also to be taken into consideration here are the dependents of these servicemen. The Federal Republic of Germany, as the host country, is not always experienced by them in a very favorable light. Many young American soldiers write to their families back home that they are in a financially bad position here, that they have to live in bad accommodations, and that there are some business people in West Germany who do not wish to have American soldiers in their bars and restaurants.

In American television there can be seen films of demonstrations and blockades at U.S. military facilities in Germany, as well as evidence of brutal terrorist attacks. Thus there is slowly developing a distorted picture of the Federal Republic of Germany as a host country, which increasingly influences the views of the public and the Congress in the United States.

Critical European Attitudes Toward the U.S.A.

Recently, critical attitudes have been voiced in Europe as a result of America's enormous budget and trade deficit, the turbulences on the currency exchanges and in the stock markets, and the new discussions concerning security policy and strategy following the October 1986 "Summit of Reykjavik" and the signing of the INF-Agreement December 1987.

* Of particular concern in Europe is the increase in protectionist thinking, particularly in the U.S. Congress, which has already led to export-restricting agreements. There is a danger that bilateral agreements may bring about a break-down of the world's economic system, and that trade relations will be changed to the disadvantage of the Europeans as a result of the declining value of the dollar.

* In the field of high technology, through additional restrictions the Americans have strongly impeded the transfer of technology, even to Western Europe. For non-U.S. firms it has recently become much more difficult to cooperate with U.S. firms in the area of high technology because U.S. export controls have been increased for national security reasons (new security regulations). In the research on the so-called "super-conductor" there has already been a first serious case of the exclusion of foreign experts from participation in technological developments with a future impact.¹¹

* There are also partly divergent views and evaluations in the question of East-West relations and the assessment of the threat from the Soviet Union. Americans see the structure of international relations as being dominated by the East-West conflict, much more so than do the Europeans, and they criticize the Europeans for holding on to a detente policy. The Europeans, on the other hand, emphasize the reduction of tensions through increased co-operation. They are opposed to the militarization of the East-West conflict, and they are particularly against the transposition of this conflict to the regions outside Europe and against bilateral agreements on these areas between the two superpowers. On the other hand, from an American perspective it is difficult to understand why the Europeans have a need to cooperate across the East-West bloc boundaries.

* The summit at Reykjavik between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in October 1986 has brought about a change in questions of security policy and strategy. The Europeans are primarily concerned with the question of the extent to which their security can be maintained in a world with fewer nuclear arms.¹² There now arises the old question of how the community of risks and dangers which exists between the United States and Western Europe can be preserved in such a manner that a regionally restricted conventional and/or nuclear war can continue to be prevented in Europe.

Already in the discussions concerning SDI, which began in 1983, the German Federal Government has emphasized -- not without reason -- that Germany has a vital interest in preventing the emergence of zones of unequal security and in maintaining extended deterrence in order to avoid any disadvantages for the Alliance that may result from the extraordinary significance of existing conventional imbalances. In the case of a conflict, the Federal Republic of Germany will give priority to its termination

as rapidly as possible, even by means of threatening the first use of nuclear arms. In U.S. strategic thinking, on the other hand, nuclear arms are regarded as weapons of last resort, or as a means of conducting war; ^{12a} however, their employment will have to be such that a near automatic resort to strategic nuclear arms can be avoided. Even after the signing of the Washington INF-Agreement ("double-zero option"), Western security and global political stability will continue to be based on deterrence. As history has shown, it is effective only in its nuclear form.

Strengthening the European Pillar

In view of the changes that are currently taking place, including in the area of security policy, the democracies of Western Europe are faced by huge problems and challenges. The development that has led to the INF-Agreement has provided the stimulus for the West European States to draw more closely together and has made clear that there is a necessity for the creation of a common European position on security policy. The outlines of a European identity in security matters have already become clearer. The very intense Franco-German relations can serve as a basis for bringing about the urgently necessary strengthening of the European pillar by way of revitalizing the Western European Union. However, the Western European Union must not become a competitor of NATO, nor must it endanger our alliance with the United States.

However, there are no signs of the emergence of European nuclear force or a West European security organization that would be capable of guaranteeing the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. Any type of European defense organization can be no more than just a pillar in the framework of a sensible distribution of roles within the context of the indispensable Atlantic Alliance.

...

The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany

The security of the Federal Republic of Germany is to a large extent dependent on the United States. As a non-nuclear power, the Federal Republic of Germany depends on the United States both for the maintenance of a credible deterrent as well as for all other actions and negotiations concerning the control and limitation of nuclear armaments. Due to this "dual dependence", the German interest in nuclear arms policy can be determined only indirectly by way of the German relationship with the United States.¹³ The Federal Republic of Germany is therefore vitally dependent on the security partnership with the United States. For the present there are no realistic alternatives to this situation in the security policy arena.

As a result of this dependency, changes in U.S. policy -- whether in the area of arms control or of East-West relations -- will be a constant problem for German policy-makers, a problem for which there will have to be a steady search for solutions.

In addition to this dependency in the security policy area, there are other areas of dependence, such as that of free world trade. The Federal Republic of Germany is the world's most important trading nation.

About two thirds of our imports are brought in from across the seas. In the case of some vital raw materials, particularly crude petroleum, this holds true for 100 percent of the goods imported. The share of the manufactured goods that is exported is about 33 percent; that is, some sectors of our economy depend on exporting more than 50 percent of their manufactured goods. The Federal Republic of Germany depends on the free flow of trade across the seas. Only the United States, as a naval world power, can guarantee the free flow of trade.

Summary and Prospects

This analysis has shown that the weight of the general structural conditions has changed and will continue to change. The Atlantic Ocean has indeed become wider. Nevertheless, the pointed alternative of "Europe or America?" would be a wrong formulation of the question. Despite the increased importance of the Pacific Region and of Japan the United States will remain a world power with a European orientation, and with opposite coasts across both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Subsequent to its loss of hegemony, however, America will continue to experience changes in its exercise of alliance leadership, both from the economic and from the security-policy perspective. The Atlantic Alliance will have to continue to change from being an alliance with a hegemonic power as its leader to being one that is increasingly characterized by structures composed of equal partners. American policy will increasingly have to take into consideration world-wide interdependence, and it will have to be based more and more on multilateral diplomacy, despite the temptations of unilateralism.¹⁴

Both in the economic and the security-policy arena, American dominance has already decreased to the extent that a "system of shared responsibility"¹⁵ will be needed to be able to jointly solve the coming crises of adjustment in the world economic system. It will also be necessary to adjust to the structural crises of the advanced industrial societies, which are aggravated by the developments in high technology, and to the dynamic developments in the field of East-West relations, which are now in the offing. While America will continue to be the strongest and most influential power, it will depend more than ever on its partners in Western Europe and Japan. The logic of the foreseeable

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historical development will be the shouldering of a greater part of the responsibility by the Europeans, and with it will also go a larger share of the burden.¹⁶

During the present phase of accelerated change it will be necessary to take action toward shaping the future. Considerable efforts will be required to stop the United States and Europe from drifting apart. The Atlantic Ocean must not become wider! Despite some disturbances and irritations in the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic, there continues to be a fundamental agreement in the area of security policy. In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany will have to undertake an analysis of its interests and attempt to integrate the various elements of its economic and security policy into a convincing overall strategy.¹⁷ This is an area in which the absence of a "strategic community" in Germany becomes painfully evident.

The model of a "mature partnership"¹⁸ advanced by Richard R. Burt, the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, demands of both the Europeans and the Americans that they take seriously the necessary adjustment to the changes taking place in the distribution of weight within the Alliance, so that the Atlantic partnership will be able to preserve and actively shape its future capabilities.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Reprinted in Europa-Archiv 15/1987, 10 Aug. 1987, p. D 419.
2. Cf. Jürgen Heideking, "Die Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 30-31, 25 July 1987, p. 19.
3. Time Magazine, 20 July 1987, p. 37.
4. Cf. John E. Rielly, "Die öffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten im Herbst 1986", Europa-Archiv 5/1987, 10 March 1987, p. 144. (english in: Foreign Policy, spring 1987)
5. Cf. Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, "Internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und nationale Sicherheit der USA", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, November 1986.
6. Cf. Gebhardt Schweigler, "die Außenpolitik der USA", in Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), Weltpolitik: Strukturen, Akteure, Perspektiven (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 332.
7. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Macht und Interdependenz", in Kaiser and Schwarz (see fn. 6), p. 87.
"The imperial overstretch" is discussed by:
- Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. (New York, 1987), and by
- David P. Calleo. Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. (1987)
8. Time Magazine, 9 Feb. 1987
9. As argued, for example, by Brzezinski and Kissinger.
10. Cf. Ulrich Weisser, Strategie im Umbruch (Herford, 1987), p. 118.
11. Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 17 Aug. 1987. p. 9, and Time Magazine of 10 Aug. 1987, p. 36.
12. See the statement by the U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, "Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control and the Future of Deterrence", of 17 Nov. 1986, in U.S. Policy Information and Texts, 18 Nov. 1986.
- 12 a. Cf. Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter. Discriminate Deterrence. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. January 1988
13. Cf. Leroy Miller, "Die deutsche Doppelabhängigkeit", in Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung 1987, pp. 23-50.

14. Cf. Ernst-Otto Czempel, "Amerikanisch-sowjetische Beziehungen nach Reykjavik", in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 1-2, 10 Jan. 1987, pp. 3-15.
15. See the speech by Richard R. Burt, "The International Economy: Toward a System of Shared Responsibility", of 4 Nov. 1987, reprinted in German translation Amerika-Dienst of 4 Nov. 1987.
16. Cf. Francois Heisbourg, "Die NATO vor der entscheidenden Bewährungsprobe: Die Lastenteilung im Bündnis", in Europa-Archiv 8/1987, 25 April 1987, pp. 225-236.
17. Cf. Dieter Wellershoff, "Die Sicherheitsvorsorge verlangt eine Gesamtstrategie", in Europäische Wehrkunde/WWR, No. 6, 1987, pp. 307-316.
18. See Richard R. Burt, "U.S.-German Relations in a Changing World", (Speech held at the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation on 12 Nov. 1985).