


"The Scope of West European Security Coherence /
Problems and Perspectives of the Cooperation
of the Twelve"

EBENHAUSEN - 10/12 November 1988

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

PARTICIPANTI : G. BONVICINI
S. SILVESTRI




**WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY: THE SCOPE OF IDENTITY
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE COOPERATION AMONG THE TWELVE**

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Ebenhausen, 10-12/XI/1988

- a. Tentative agenda
- b. Tentative list of invitees
 - 1. West European integration and security cooperation: diverging and converging trends / Reinhardt Rummel, Peter Schmidt (26 p.)
 - 2. Our goal: The European security union – Plea for a European security policy / Hans-Gert Pöttering (10 p.)
 - 3. View of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs working group on integration (6 p.)
 - 4. The specific West European contribution in shaping future East West relations / Adrian Hyde-Price and William Wallace (14 p.)
 - 5. Intervento / Antonio Marquina (3 p.)
 - 6. Turkish perspectives on East-West relations and European security / Duygu Bazoglu Sezer (3 p.)
 - 7. Security challenges as perceived in the Mediterranean / Stefano Silvestri (9 p.)
 - 8. Mediterranean security: a Dutch view / Alfred E. Pijpers (6 p.)
 - 9. Institutional frameworks for security cooperation in Western Europe. Pt. I. Developments, aims and structural problems / Mathias Jopp (13 p.)
 - 10. Institutional frameworks for security cooperation in Western Europe. Pt. II. Arguments and options / Wolfgang Wessels (14 p.)
 - 11. Portugal and West-European security policy / Alvaro Vasconcelos (5 p.)
 - 12. The reactivation of WEU (2 p.)
 - 13. Security challenges and West European response: an Irish perspective / Patrick Keatinge (2 p.)
 - 14. Protocol of discussions / Olaf Mager (43 p.)



WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY: THE SCOPE OF IDENTITY
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STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK (SWP)

FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT

TENTATIVE AGENDA

West European Security Policy: The Scope Of Identity Problems and Perspectives of the Cooperation among the Twelve

November 10-12, 1988

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10

17:00 -- Opening Session

West European Integration and Security Co-Operation --
Diverging and Converging Dynamics

Paper: Reinhardt Rummel/ Peter Schmidt -- SWP, Ebenhausen

Speaker: Hans-Gert Poettering

20:00 -- Dinner

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11

09:00 -- Morning Session

The West European Contribution to the Shaping of East-West
Relations

Paper: William Wallace -- RILA, London

Comments from National Perspectives
(to be specified)

14:00 -- Afternoon Session

Security Challenges as Perceived from the Mediterranean

Paper: Stefano Silvestri -- IAI, Rome

Comments from National Perspectives
(to be specified)

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI


SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 12**09:00 -- Morning Session**

Institutional Frameworks for Security Cooperation in
West Europe

Paper: Mathias Jopp -- HSFK, Frankfurt/
Wolfgang Wessels -- IEP, Bonn

Comments from Representatives of Western Organizations
(to be specified)

13:00 -- Luncheon, followed by departures



Tentative List of Invitees (as of August 26, 1988)

**West European Security Policy: The Scope of Identity
Problems and Perspectives of the Cooperation among the Twelve**

November 10-12, 1988
Ebenhausen

Gianni **Bonvicini**, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Alfred **Cahen**, Western European Union, London

Dominique **David**, Fondation d'Etudes de Defense Nationale, Paris

Georges **Delcoigne**, European Communities, Brussels

Nikiforos **Diamandouros**, Athens

Nicole **Gnesotto**, Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision, Paris

David **Greenwood**, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen

Bo K.**Huldt**, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

Giovanni **Jannuzzi**, European Political Cooperation, Brussels

Mathias **Jopp**, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt

Patrick **Keatinge**, Trinity College, Dublin

John **Kornblum**, U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels

Guido **Lenzi**, Ministero della Difesa, Rome

Antonio **Marquina**, Instituto de Questiones Internacionales, Madrid

Carlos Miranda, Ministerio de Ascentos Exteriores, Madrid

Harald Müller, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt

Klaus Carsten Pedersen, Danish Institute of International Studies, Copenhagen

Alfred Pijpers, Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam

Hans-Gert Poettering, European Parliament, Luxembourg

Elfriede Regelsberger, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn

Sam Rozemond, Netherlands' Institute for International Relations
Clingendael, The Hague

Reinhardt Rummel, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Peter Schmidt, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Stefano Silvestri, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Constantin Stephanou, Greek Center of European Studies and Research, Athens

Jonathan Story, European Institute of Business Administration, Fontainebleau

Karl-Peter Stratmann, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Trevor Taylor, North Staffs Polytechnic, Stoke on Trent

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, Lisbon

William Wallace, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

Henning Wegener, Secretariat General, Brussels

Wolfgang Wessels, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn

Klaus Wittmann, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London

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R. Rummel/P. Schmidt

Draft, November 1988

**West European Integration and Security Cooperation:
Diverging and Converging Trends**

Prepared for the conference on
West European Security Policy: The Scope of Identity
Problems and Perspectives for the Cooperation among the
Twelve
Ebenhausen, November 10 - 12, 1988

Introduction

Integration in the field of West European security has again become a timely and important issue. This is not due to a major progress toward an independent West European defense and a central political structure but derives from incremental recent steps of integration and cooperation among West European countries. Those gradual developments create the potential for structural changes within the Atlantic-West European security setup as well as within continental East-West and North-South relations.

The impulses in Western Europe are neither oriented toward a revitalization of the early concepts of the European Defense Community nor are they based on a deliberate decision of West European policy makers to establish a security union by the year 2000. Rather, Western Europe is part and parcel of a relatively rapid process of domestic and international changes which create new and pressing challenges for further West European integration in the security sector. Such developments have occurred since the eighties within two diverse political processes: the transition from confrontative to cooperative patterns in East-West relations following Gorbachev's accession to power and the evolution in West European integration starting with the Southern enlargement and culminating in the decision on the Single European Act.

Along with the shift in Moscow's leadership and the beginning of a 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy, a new cooperative component in the relations of the two super-powers has been developed.¹ The INF agreement and the U.S.-Soviet talks on the reduction of strategic weapons are only two of many more signs for a new bilateral dynamics creating extensive repercussions on security policy in Western

¹ European Strategy Group, *The Gorbachev Challenge and European Security*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1988.

Europe. However, many among the West Europeans directly affected get the impression of being in a position to exercise only limited influence on these outcomes, whereas others look upon them as a chance for specific West European contributions to the modification of East-West as well as trans-Atlantic relations.

On the other hand, the West European integration process has also started on its way. Notwithstanding Turkey's application for membership to the EC, the Southern enlargement was completed, as for the time being, by the admittance of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Yet, Malta and Cyprus are also at the door steps of the Community, while other aspirants in Central and Northern Europe have started a serious discussion on joining the Twelve. Integrated Western Europe reaches out into new geographic and, indeed, geopolitical spheres. Measures to intensify the integration process have also been taken: the Single European Act and the decision to complete the Internal Market by December 1992. In addition, the strengthening of Franco-German defense cooperation and the revival of the Western European Union were proceeded - the latter being interpreted by many Europeans as the basis for a European security union. Overmore, in the United States, the President, Congress, and the American strategic community are unanimously claiming an increased West European contribution to Western defense efforts.²

It seems as if various processes would supplement each other in a perfect way: the new international need for a stronger security cooperation in Western Europe on the one hand and the more traditional domestic demand in Western Europe for an integrated security component, added to the previous unification activities. However, looking into the practical

² The emanating challenges for Western Europe from these U.S. demands are discussed by Sir Geoffrey Howe, *The European Pillar*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984/85, p. 330 - 343.

development of West European security cooperation more thoroughly, serious structural and conceptional problems on the way to an appropriate and productive Western European security identity become obvious and seem to disqualify - for the time being - any substantial plan for the construction of the European pillar in NATO or for an autonomous West European defense entity.

The West Europeans should, however, be aware of preconditions as well as consequences of their new integrational dynamic in order to direct the process rather than to be pushed by internal circumstances and by the international environment. In the following chapters we try to look at this dynamic from four different angles:

- from the perspective of the trans-Atlantic security setting,
- the security functions to be taken up by the West Europeans,
- the integration strategies applied by Western Europe, and
- the tasks ahead for West European integration and security policy.

These different perspectives of analysis are meant to widen the view of the issue and to show its most important dimensions.

I. The United States, security, and integration in Western Europe

There is reason to analyse the West European integration first of all as a part of the trans-Atlantic cooperation and integration process. The compatibility of a West European security union with NATO is, without any doubt, one of the most difficult problems. It is certainly part of most public speeches of officials and other experts, however, so far no ready-made solution is in sight. Unlike the integration in the field of economics and foreign policy, where the EC and

EPC have been built up, Western Europe's defense policy is already being tied on to a firm cooperative security framework, NATO. Supplementation to it seems to make sense only if additional gains were to be made in terms of strengthening Western defense and cohesion. However, it remains an open question if the West Europeans will be able to push the substance and organization of their own security interests without weakening the Western Alliance.

When the Atlantic-West European security system was created, after World War II, West European integration was regarded as an integral element of the organization of Western defense - at least from an American point of view. A close economic and political cooperation among West European states was not only intended to support NATO's defense efforts, by strengthening the bulwarks vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but was also expected, in the middle term, to make the U.S. engagement in Europe obsolete or, at least, to help reducing Washington's burdens.

President Kennedy's call for an equal partnership between the United States and the West Europeans was less an offer to share power in the Western Alliance than a demand for more equal burden sharing among the allies. The Europeans were not only asked to take over more of NATO's defense costs but also - even more important - to assure part of the protection of world-wide common Western interests. However, a West European international power which would carry such additional burden has not yet emerged. The United States has probably mistaken the foundation of the European Economic Community as being the beginning of a West European federation with authoritative foreign and security policy.

Those miscalculations or wrong expectations on the part of Washington may occur again if the United States will take the ubiquitous talk in Western Europe of the necessary strengthening on the "European pillar" and the declaration

of a Europeanizing of defense for real. It seems that the West Europeans have not yet become aware of the fact that 240 million Americans may not for ever continue to guarantee the security of 320 million West Europeans against 280 million Soviets. American disappointment tomorrow may be as wide as it has been when the original idea of a more comprehensive Atlantic alliance and a more equal burden sharing did not materialize in the last forty years.

Western Europe has played an active part in a trans-Atlantic integration framework in the field of security rather than in the creation of regional West European substance for defense and security of its own, except for France which has produced the only relevant structural change in NATO so far. While, in the field of security and defense, the United States was part and even leader of the cooperation and integration among Western allies, she remains an external actor when it comes to economic and foreign policy integration in Western Europe. In some respect West European integration was developed even in opposition to the United States and her trade and economic policy. The most prominent clashes occurred in agricultural trade: from the chicken to the corn war. The concertation of the Economic Summits has been trying to overcome part of the cleavages which exist here without, however, being able to go back to the golden days of the immediate post war situation. Western Europe and more specifically the EC has grown up as a powerful economic actor in the world, it has become an independent economic European pillar among Western industrial centers.

However, the military European pillar in NATO does not automatically follow this achieved position. There are too many traditions and difficulties to be overcome. Were the Europeans to enhance their substance and say in NATO, a restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance would be unavoidable. Henry Kissinger and others have made interesting suggestions in this regard. Does this mean that Western Europe now can

play this bulwark role Washington wanted it to play? And, if the Internal Market is the single most important challenge from Europe for the United States, will Washington tend to ask more impatiently for a larger share in the common defense efforts?

West European integration has achieved a stage where it will affect trans-Atlantic cooperation and integration, especially with respect to security questions. If, in fact, Western Europe were able to build up a European NATO pillar, this would mean the introduction of a further competitive element in the trans-Atlantic relations. Will we have to expect a series of trans-Atlantic "wars" following the wellknown pattern of agricultural trade? What would then be, on balance and in terms of security gains, the outcome of the West European integration and the Atlantic restructuring process? Could it be a relief or a burden for America? Would it help West European integration but harm Western Europe's security?

II. The range of security tasks and the West European integration process

Despite and because of the persisting structural asymmetries in the Alliance and the continuing (nuclear) protection of West European countries by the United States, the integration effort in Western Europe has not been without attempts for more self-assertiveness in the security sector. But, just as economic and foreign policy remain rather a side-theater of the trans-Atlantic security cooperation, security cooperation among the West European states has been at the margin of their preoccupation with community building. Nevertheless, the idea of a specific West European contribution to Western security, even without the establishment of a common defense union, was always on the the West Europeans' mind. Integration and security have

always been regarded as an unseparable organic connection³. Security, in this context, was not restricted to doctrines, soldiers, and weapons, but included a number of other and sometimes more relevant practical factors, such as intra-West European stability, economic and social progress, cooperative networks, etc.; factors which are not directly relevant in the military East-West balance but which play an important role for the Western cohesion and strength to cope with a wider range of dangers to West European interests.

The first contribution to the security of Western Europe in this wider sense was devoted to reconciliation among former enemies and to intra-alliance stability. The attempt to reach this goal via integration was the creation of the European Community for Coal and Steel, an organization which introduced a high amount of mutual confidence into formerly warmongering states while, at the same time, submitting major resources of war-making under a supra-national regime. Other attempts for confidence building followed ranging from the project of a European Defense Community via the European Economic Community and the Fouchet Plans up to the Franco-German security cooperation of today. Not all of them were successful. The Common Brigade and the Defense Council in themselves are not a direct contribution to the defense of Western Europe in terms of military missions. But they are helpful instruments of confidence, and valuable embryonic test cases for a diversification within the Western approach to security.⁴

From its very inception the Brussels Treaty and WEU were intended as an intra-European stability measure and have kept part of this function up to now. WEU was never really

³ Karl Kaiser, Ein unauflöslicher Zusammenhang: Sicherheit und Integration, in Werner Weidenfeld (Ed.), *Die Identität Europas*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung No. 225, Bonn 1987.

⁴ Maybe it is helpful for the success of this policy that there are hardly any possibilities to go beyond the test, as all German brigades are incorporated in NATO.

used as a nucleus of West European security integration. Only since the failure of the Genscher/Colombo initiative has it become a kind of substitute for the paralysed EPC thus starting an independent line of security integration in Western Europe. But even during this period the activation of the WEU (just like the Franco-German military cooperation) served - at least from a French point of view - to stabilize the political structure in Central Europe and to tie the Federal Republic as firmly as possible to the Western world.

The core challenge for Western defense has been to cope with Soviet expansionism, aggressiveness and excessive military capability. As all military forces of the WEU member countries and their command have been assigned to NATO, they have not been able to emerge as an identifiable West European contribution to overall Western defense. As an organization, WEU has not much helped to deter the USSR, to bring about arms control agreements, or to develop cooperative East-West networks. Since 1984, the activated WEU has not much changed in this regard; WEU could become a last resort, if NATO dismembered. Even with respect to so-called out-of-area security challenges, WEU has remained far below reasonable expectations, the very recent concerted mine-sweeping action in the Persian Gulf notwithstanding.

More important for West European security have been the policies for cooperative East-West relations by the EC and the EPC both of which played a substantive role during the CSCE process especially regarding the subjects of baskets II and III. This performance was one of the major reasons why political and economic aspects of security have become part of EPC's agenda. EPC helped to formulate and implement a West European position on economic and human rights questions.

It has been a precondition for an effective defense (and a challenge in itself) to organize the economic and technological competition among Western nations. The question of how to organize production and procurement of armaments has become more and more important. The integration efforts in this regard are very weak in Western Europe. The EC does not deal with subjects related to military goods. Other organizations, such as the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) have started practical approaches to the problem without being that much conceived in terms of West European integration. The same applies to organizations such as EUREKA and ESA which are defined to be dealing with non-military issues only, however, their existence and their achievements have undoubtedly military implications.

Part of this challenge was the question to which degree the West Europeans and the members of the Western industrialized world at large should organize an economic and technological exchange with the opposing Warsaw Pact countries. Here, again, the EC was a useful though not the only framework of consultation among West European nations. The issue of the beginning eighties will certainly re-emerge in connection with Gorbachev's economic reform policy. It has, in fact, already started with the Europeans asking to shrink the COCOM lists and the Americans asking their West European allies to refrain from large amounts of favorably conditioned credits for the Soviet Union.

A growing challenge for the West Europeans has been how to find enough public support for the security and defense policy of the Western alliance. In this regard, consensus building and legitimation has not only been a contribution to internal stability but also a factor of external efficiency. EUROGROUP has tried to bring about at least partial consensus among the European nations in NATO (with the exception of France) to convince the American government

of the West European contribution to the Alliance. WEU and partially EPC have been instrumental to develop a West European view on a wide range of security related questions and to propagate it among the European public. WEU's so-called Platform of October 1987 has had quite a stimulating effect on West European consensus building both for member and non member countries. The problem here remains how to implement the provisions of the Platform.

The record of Western Europe's attempts to take over some of the functions of a security community is ambivalent. Given NATO's existence, it is hard to justify additional endeavors for more security. Western Europe tries to identify specific tasks for West European "missions", such as the mine sweeping action, military technological cooperation, or contributions to the CSCE negotiation process. One problem is the unbalanced development of a collective West European actor for security policy (dealing only with the cooperative side of East-West relations). The other problem is that most of a West European security identity is gained by deviating from Washington's views.

III. Integration strategies and security in Western Europe

1. The models

The West European integration process has never only followed the classical models and strategies. It has been developed with federal as well as confederal elements, with supranational and intergovernmental components. It has been conceived as leading to a "superpower in the making" or as a civilian or neutral power-acting as an ally to the Third World countries. At present, the most prominent model seems be that of a "market power" combined with a European pillar in NATO. Security has always been included in those models, even in the civilian power model.

Two main integration strategies have influenced conceptional thinking in Western Europe: *defense-first* and *defense-last*. The *defense-first* strategy proceeds from the assumption that integration can only move forward if the process starts with a political and defense union. Defense and foreign policy are both the core areas of national sovereignty and the test areas for the political will of the member countries to proceed toward unity. They will provide the breakthrough for the whole integration process and all other sectors will follow. The Pleven Plans, the European Defense Community and the wider reaching European Political Community, were largely inspired by those integration strategies. They failed and were never picked up again. Fouchet's mission was less comprehensive and had to take into account that three sectoral communities had successfully been launched before.

The *defense-last* strategy is also based on the conviction that the defense sector is the crucial one. But exactly because of this sensitivity, all other areas have to be integrated first before the defense union can mark the final stage of the whole integration process. After the failure of Pleven's Plans this strategy has become, nolens volens, the dominant integration philosophy. Once the EC had developed to a relatively substantial level of economic integration, a pragmatic initiative for European Political Cooperation was taken and a concertation in security questions seemed a logic next step of development.

Within this strategy two main approaches have been applied: security integration *inside* or *outside* the Community system. The *inside-approach* was concentrated on the EPC which, from the outset, had to deal with security related subjects such as the Middle East conflicts and the CSCE. The Genscher/Colombo Initiative, which wanted to add defense ministers and the respective substructure to the existing EPC apparatus, was not acceptable to countries like Ireland,

Denmark and Greece. Since this unsuccessful attempt, the Single European Act and specifically its title III confines EPC to economic and political aspects of security and it may well be difficult in the future to go beyond these treaty boundaries.

Evolution toward security cooperation could rather be expected from another angle of the Community system, the Internal Market. The deliberations on the Internal Market are still in progress and the Community programs on technology are still to be implemented but their impact on armaments production, procurement and trade is at least a potential field for future integration of an important component of a West European defense union.

The *outside-approach* is centered around the Western European Union, the Independent European Program Group, and the Franco-German cooperation. Given the political hindrances within the Community system, some of the West European nations have decided to open up separate lines of security related integration. The boom of the Franco-German defense cooperation may well turn out to be a straw fire, given the multitude of unresolved strategic-military and political questions which arise in the West European-Atlantic security setup once Paris and Bonn were to go beyond their current table manoeuvres. IEPG, too, has entered a potential take-off period and it might well be that the defense ministers at their upcoming meeting decide to introduce an "Internal Market on defense goods" following the Vredeling Report. This would be a purely functional move largely disconnected from integrationist ideas.

The WEU, finally, is certainly the core institution for all those who are disappointed with the unsuccessful attempts of security integration elsewhere. Some look upon it as a host institution which temporarily serves West European security cooperation needs as long as the Community system is

constraint.⁵ Others regard WEU as the nucleus of the West European Defense Union to come and want to enlarge its members, intensify its work, and prepare it as an indispensable component of the future European Union.⁶ As it seems, both groups of protagonists may be disappointed. "In their wisdom, the statesmen who drafted the birth certificates of WEU, the modified Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris on the 23rd October 1954, specified in the preamble that the high contracting parties were resolved 'to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe.' Thirty-four years have now passed without WEU doing much to this end."⁷

It seems that neither the inside-approach nor the outside-approach is extremely successful right now. Yet, the integration process in security matters seems to continue somehow and has obviously switched to a new integration strategy which could be called the *as-well-as* approach: Both approaches are applied in a process of testing the scope and the possibilities for security integration. West European nations seize opportunities for security cooperation at various ends at the same time, may it be inside the Community system or outside, may it be in NATO (Eurogroup) or in bilateral relations. All of those attempts have their particular limits and their specific political chemistry, but they all have in common that they do not venture into the

⁵ See The Netherlands Commission for Peace and Security, Report on West European Security, The Haag 1987. Peter Schmidt, *Sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsperspektiven der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU)*, Ebenhausen, October 1985.

⁶ See Alfred Dregger, Die Europäer brauchen eine Sicherheitsunion, in *Die Welt*, 20 October 1988, p. 4

⁷ Eric Hintermann, European Defence: A Role for the Western European Union, in *European Affairs*, Vol. 2 No. 3 (Autumn 1988), p. 38. Hintermann who was an Assistant Secretary General of WEU is very critical on its working record to which he must have contributed: "Instead of dealing with the major problems of Europe's security dimension at a time of history when the political and strategic environment is rapidly changing, the WEU is being condemned by some governments to devote to permanent bureaucratic restructuring and endless clashes over the place of collocation for this London and Paris based organization." (page 31)

heart of defense policy making which remains basically a national and a NATO duty.

Thus, Western Europe disposes of a ring of Europe-oriented institutions and organizations which partly or entirely deal with security questions but, for the time being, this remains an endeavor at the fringes. The center, the defense organization, is located outside this circle. Will the coordination of the various components lead to more substance in a later stage? Will their activity gradually spill over into a European pillar in NATO or will they create a center of their own?

2. Intentions

There seem to be as many ideas on the appropriate combination of security and integration in Western Europe as there are political leaders. Like many other statesmen the French President wants to build a European pillar of the Alliance, because "Europe" without defense is unconceivable:

"L'idée d'Europe est indissociable de l'idée de défense. Or, présentement, il n'est pas de défense qu'atlantique. Je n'écris pas cela comme un reproche qui viserait l'Alliance, et principalement les États-Unis d'Amérique. Nous leur devons notre sécurité, donc notre liberté et le discours d'ingratitude n'est pas mon fort. Je désire seulement distinguer, une fois dissipé le brouillard des rêves à bon marché, quelques idées claires ancrées sur le réel. Seule la France, en Europe de l'Ouest, dispose de son autonomie de décision dans l'ordre stratégique. Et le seul embryon de défense européenne commune réside dans le traité franco-allemand de l'Élysée. Cela tient sans nul doute, et on ne peut lui donner tort, au fait que l'Europe cherche ailleurs les assurances de sa sécurité."⁸

The British Prime Minister, who has been the most critical of all on the intensification of the Franco-German security

⁸ François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France*, Librairie Arthème Fayard, Paris 1987, p. 101.

cooperation, focuses on the multilateral approach outside the Community system:

"It's not an institutional problem. It's not a problem of drafting. It's much more simple and more profound: it is a question of political will and political courage, of convincing people in all our countries that we cannot rely for ever on others for our defence... We should develop the WEU, not as an alternative to NATO but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence of the West."⁹

Helmut Kohl is the most outspoken by demanding "the elaboration of a European defense policy, having as its goal a European defensive capacity closely linked to that of our American partners." He uses the notion "union for defense" and never misses a chance to urge everybody

"to think seriously about the ways in which we can develop a common European defense which could eventually lead to the creation of a common European army."

However, it is not clear at all, how he wants to move from declaration to implementation, especially, when he asks to "concentrate our sovereignty in such a way as to be able to exercise it together so that it will be effective."¹⁰

Are the political leaders fully aware of the wide ranging differences among European public and experts on the major questions of security? It is basically to be questioned if the processes of economic, technological, and cultural integration presently require an extension to security issues at all, or else, if security issues should be singled out from EC's integration policy -- at least as far as deterrence is concerned. The purpose of such an approach would be two-fold: firstly, to avoid overloading the process

⁹ Margaret Thatcher, The future of Europe, Speech delivered in Bruges on the 20 September 1988, Europe Documents, No. 1527 (12 October 1988), p. 6.

¹⁰ Helmut Kohl, Deutsche Politik für Europa, speech given at the General Catholic Conferences in Brussels, 18 October 1988 (Europe, 19. October 1988, p. 3).

of unification (while facing severe problems in creating a homogeneous internal market), and secondly, not to endanger the specific West European goal of building a network of cooperative East-West relations.

A further problem may be seen within the various national interests and (correlated) heterogeneous coalitions in West European security policies. There are, for example, differences to be stated between nuclear versus non-nuclear states, depoloyment versus non-deployment states, large versus small and economically strong versus weak countries. Looking upon the debate on nuclear disarmament of short-range missiles, major differences in the positions of Bonn, Paris and London become obvious. On the other hand, broad consesus has been reached between these and other Central European states in regard to the role of nuclear weapons for West European deterrence policy while, in this respect, states at the West European periphery (Spain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland) are holding quite dissenting views.

This last context already indicates the problems of regional differentiation in Western European security policies, following the concentric circles pattern from the center to the periphery. Western Europe today is not at all a consistent integration area, as may also be seen by the following three factors:

1. In the past years, initiatives for a cooperative defense policy have mainly concentrated on Central Europe, particularly concerning the Franco-German military cooperation, the French-British dialog, and the revival of WEU. If at all, proof for counter-evidence is shown through the work of IEPG and the Genscher/Colombo initiative, both attempting to include a wide range of West-European member states. However, the Genscher/Colombo initiative had to turn from EPC to WEU just for the very reason that some EC member

states (Greece, Ireland, Denmark) would not agree to a West European security integration.

In Southern Europe, preconditions for independent regional cooperation have been rather detrimental (Turkey/Greece). There were no institutionalized regional structures and there was also little preference for a simple linkage with Central European initiatives. However now, analogue to the developments in the Internal Market, the Southern European member states prepare for an alignment with West European integration efforts, also in foreign and security policies. This will result not only in new demands upon a comprehensive definition of Western European security purposes but, correspondingly, also upon an adequate development of the institutional frameworks. Moreover, the relationships of South European states to Washington have to be redefined.

2. The conceptions of defense and disarmament policies in Northern¹¹ and Southern Europe¹² have taken on individual characteristics, coinciding in some respects only marginally with those in Central Europe. For example, the political pleading for nuclear-free zones (as in Denmark for Northern Europe, in Greece for the Balkan states) is widely propagated while only a political minority in Central Europe acts on this behalf. Tendencies to refuse nuclear means of deterrence within the own borders are also being shown in Spain, unfavourably looked upon by the nuclear powers Paris and London while Bonn, for reasons of conventional military asymmetry, still cannot afford such an attitude.

3. In the past nine years, attention has focused to a great extent on nuclear land based missiles and therefore on

¹¹ Jean-Pierre Mousson-Lestang, *La Norvège et l'Europe: a propos du Livre Blanc Norvégien*, *Revue du Marché Commun*, No. 314, February 1988, p. 64 - 67.

¹² Rafael Dezcallar, *On West European Defense Cooperation: A Spanish View*, *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1987, p. 153 - 169.

Central Europe. To begin with, this was related to the deployment of INF, however now it concerns INF's destruction and verification. Consequently, problems following these disarmament activities (the question of compensation, the balancing of the conventional asymmetry) are drawing further attention to Central Europe. Although Mediterranean states will certainly hold quite a different view, regional security problems in the Mediterranean area as well as in the Middle East seem to be only of marginal significance to West European strategists compared to those in Central Europe. The threat deriving from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as overlappings of specific Mediterranean conflicts on one side, and the threat of an East-West conflict on the other side are of no comparable immediacy to the Central and Northern European states as to Southern European societies.

Apart from obvious national, geographical, and historical differences, actually altering processes therefore support a regionalization in Western Europe's security policy, a process that was given much less attention than the integration process. Hence, regionalization and integration are on the same terms of tension with each other as are unilateral and collective approaches to defense.

In contrast to the EC integration and the cooperation within EPC, security issues are obviously proceeded in patterns of graded integration and of "géometrie variable." The threat to security interests of the periphery of Western Europe is no integral part of an all-West European integration process. While the EC is doubling the set up for its structural programs to include the outskirts of a 12-state-Europe (Greece, Southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland) in the concept for the 1992 Internal Market, security issues are being proceeded on a selective basis.

The advantage of this strategy may be to bring about a security cooperation at all. However, it will certainly deepen the division between the West European states which probably will not to be overcome soon again. Negative consequences will presumably arise from the following two factors:

1. The completion of the West European unification by including security issues will be endangered. The burden-sharing among European nations concerning finances, defense, and political risks in terms of package deals will not work and unfavourable repercussions for the developments of the EC are likely.

2. But also defense and security objectives will be negatively affected. Depending on the cooperating forum, only sectors rather than the entire spectrum of West European security policy will be taken into consideration. Especially the dependencies between Central and Southern European security challenges will not be raised in an appropriate way. It will become more difficult to reflect the various Western European decisions reciprocally. Only exceptionally will the European states be able to act as a homogeneous group with common political ideas.

These splitting tendencies within the West European security community are not yet alarming. However, the diverse processes of subregional cooperation are likely to impede the development of a common West European security policy. It is, therefore, important to study some of the major questions in this regard:

1. How far advanced are the processes of national, regional and subregional differentiation; what are the diverse perceptions of and activities in West European security policies; are the options for advancing cooperation in West European security policy already restrained?

2. Is there, after all, sufficient congruity among the West European states to undertake steps for "strengthening the European pillar of the alliance" or for the "development of a West European *Ostpolitik*?" And could the new burden of a security-related *Südpolitik* be successfully carried out at the same time?

3. Of what kind are West Europe's mechanisms in reaching security policy agreements; are they qualified for reaching a continued consensus; do the existing institutions and authorities guarantee the implementation of collective decisions?

Scholars have started to deal more systematically with the subject of West European security cooperation and integration.¹³ But, so far, the two communities hardly meet. The workshop attempts to "measure" the scope of identity/heterogeneity as far as security policy in and for West Europe is concerned. We want to test the basis and the preconditions for further West European integration efforts in the field of security and defense. So far, experts in European integration and specialists in security and defense matters have too often worked in separate circles. This conference is intended to be a starting point for bringing these two communities together in a comprehensive and more systematic manner.

¹³ The very first move toward a more systematic approach was a stocktaking of research institutes in Western Europe, which deal with security questions. See Robert Rudney, Luc Reyckler, *In Search of European Security*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1986.

IV. Security and integration: Europe at the crossroads

For more than two decades the economic sector carried the West European integration process. Now, after some ten to fifteen years, during which foreign policy and monetary initiatives (EPC, EMS) bridged the gap, the economic sector is back at the center of the West European integration process. This time it is accompanied by two important flanking components, technology and security policy, which introduce methods of multilateral cooperation of their own: EUREKA, ESA, WEU, IEPG. The integration process has become more diversified but also more comprehensive. All of a sudden the European Union seems not to be such an utopia any longer as it used to be - even if its final shape continues to be rather blurred.

In former years the process of West European cooperation could be extended and intensified without producing fundamental changes in the political structure of Europe. Today this does not seem to be possible any longer. Almost all further steps of integration seem to affect the architecture of Europe in a more or less substantial way:

- The accession to the Community of German speaking countries would create the disputed point of an all-German hegemony.
- The entry of neutral states would undermine Western Europe's defense moral and leave East-West relations without the neutrals as a bridging element.
- The accession of another South European state, especially Turkey, would deemphasize the East-West inclination of the European architecture.
- A multilateralization of the Franco-German brigade would intervene in the existing NATO structure.
- The participation of non-EC members in the EMS and the EPC would blurr and disorient the integration process.
- An association of Hungaria to the EC would destabilize the integration process in COMECON.
- Already the invitation to Gorbachev, to address the European Parliament, touches the political-diplomatic

balance of continental East-West relations which have been respected so far.¹⁴

The West European integration process seems to have arrived at many crossroads at the same time without disposing of a specific vision of the political structure of Europe. Security related cooperation and integration does not occur in isolated, separated and clearly defined sectors any more. Security has become a more or less important dimension in many fields of integration. The level and scope of West European integration itself has taken on a security quality.

The present integration dynamics of Western Europe has substantially differing consequences for the European neighbors of the Community, partly attracting, partly rejecting them. A few examples: Neutrals, East European states, and the Soviet Union do not regard an ever closer defense cooperation within Western Europe as a constructive development. Some countries of the COMECON want to participate in Western Europe's technological programs and are keen on bilateral cooperation agreements. Others see mainly disadvantages from the upcoming Internal Market and push for a more intensified cooperation inside COMECON. EFTA countries see major problems which might flow from the Internal Market, some of them wanting to solve them by applying for EC membership. Does the West European integration dynamic lead to further separation between Western and Eastern Europe - an economic cleavage beyond the existing military and systemic ones?

Western Europe is both a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and a pillar of an all-European political structure including the Soviet Union. Its position and function in the Alliance

¹⁴ The European Parliament was quick in inviting Gorbachev to visit Strassburg in the Spring of 1989 in connection with his visit in France. See also Klaus Hänsch, Report on behalf of the Political Committee of the European Parliament on the political relations of the European Community with the Soviet Union, Document A2-155/88 (18.7.1988).

determines also Western Europe's relationship with Eastern Europe (see the pipe line deal, the CSCE process and, on the horizon, West European credits for Gorbachev's reforms). As the increased dynamics of integration suggest, Western Europe is likely to dispose of a wider range of manoeuvre in its Ostpoliitk but it will also have to use it. However, neither the West European position and function within an all-European political structure nor this structure itself has been conceptionally defined so far. Which role will the two superpowers claim and accept within this structure? Is it conceivable to design and develop part of the all-European structure without the Soviet Union? Even for such practical things as the interregional cooperation between EC/EPC and COMECON the necessary policy and instruments are relatively underdeveloped.

Recent initiatives for further integration in Western Europe have not been launched to shape continental East-West relations or to change the all-European political structure. The initiatives rather derive from the challenges of the industrial centers of the American-Pacific realm and from gradual changes in the Atlantic Alliance. The side effects of the adaptation process in Western Europe have an impact also on Eastern Europe. Is Western Europe able to and should it use this side effect to shape a specific Ostpolitik or should the Community avoid to overwork itself and rather concentrate on the Western challenges? Or should Western Europe parallel or primarily pick up the Eastern challenge and make it its main concern? If so, which would be the underlying assumptions for the direction of development in terms of power balance, society, and political structure? What would be the common moral of West European states in this case: IMF rules, linkage policy, deviation from the communist doctrine, priority for human rights, relations with both government and opposition?

Is the West European integration dynamic strong enough to build a concentric shaped space of gravitation with the EC in the center, the neutrals around them, the East European countries following and, finally, on the outer circle or as a kind of counter-point, the Soviet Union? Will the attraction of the West European integration all by itself overcome the problems of the Iron Curtain, the military antagonism, and the systemic contradictions? Does this mean that we don't have to invest any more in the laborious development of an entanglement network between East and West? Has it become of secondary importance to achieve a new East-West military balance in terms of minimal nuclear deterrence and leveling off of conventional asymmetries?

Or does the economic-technological attractiveness of Western Europe engender new types of danger, mainly in the perception of Soviet leaders who feel that all their concerns for an East European buffer space since Yalta are undermined? In other words, the EC Internal Market as a (peaceful!) instrument to the revision of the postwar political structure of Europe? This, with prominent German help and without the still pending peace treaty? Is this, by the same token, the solution to the German question?

Or does the far-reaching West European integration dynamic meet with Gorbachev's intentions? Does he need this challenge to help to mobilize and support the process of reform in East European countries as well as in the Soviet Union?

How to combine the two major dynamic processes in Europe, the integration boom in the Community of the Twelve, and the policy of *perestroika* in the USSR and in Eastern Europe? How to render them compatible and mutually useful? Originally both processes were not related to each other and have grown from their specific context. Or is the Soviet Union, too, driven by the American-Japanese technological-economic

challenge? Is Moscow thus admitting the failure of its deterministic-communist approach? Are these the preconditions for a normalization of relations on the European continent?

At any rate, the two dynamic processes in Europe are partially interdependent. Both will have an impact on the future political architecture of Europe. Will this be a concerted and jointly guided process? How will the West/Western Europe deal with the new political-structural plurality in the East? Will the West/Western Europe resist the temptation to instrumentalize instabilities in the East? What are the implications of these processes for the role of the United States in Europe and the influence of Western Europe on the leading power of the West?

iai ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° Inv. 8567

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Our Goal: The European Security Union -
Plea for a European security policy

Hans-Gert Pöttering

'If the New Year bells ring out in the year 2001 and the states of the European Community are no further advanced in the unification process than they are today, they will no longer be helping to write history; they will be written off by history,' warned Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a newspaper interview. By 2001 the Europeans will have to learn to speak with one voice, or they will be reduced to a marginal role. Further work had to be done on the European bridge of the Atlantic Alliance, was how the German Chancellor summed up his European political credo. We can only concur. Our goal must be the Political Union of Europe, encompassing a security union. The concept of security includes many elements: defence policy, certainly, but also foreign policy, economic conditions, national psychology and so on.

Security policy should and must serve the cause of peace - this is beyond dispute. Thus, in the quest for security, the concept of peace assumes a decisive significance. Our concept of peace also determines the partners with whom we choose to collaborate. In our technological civilization, in the nuclear age, peace is the essential precondition for human survival. But peace is more than weapons falling silent. Peace implies the ability of men to live together. A democratic, constitutional state lives in peace with its citizens because it makes freedom possible and is concerned with justice. It must therefore be one of our top political priorities to promote peace at home as well as abroad. Of course, we know that conflict is part of human life. The thing is to resolve disputes in a non-violent and humane way. The thrust of our foreign policy must be to promote peaceful co-existence with our neighbours, as fellow members of the family of nations. The desire for peace unites people. But peace is more than just the absence of war. Real peace is only possible under a just social system. Peace is not possible without justice, nor justice without freedom. It is thus essential to guarantee human rights and basic freedoms to ensure a peaceful future, not only in the divided country of Germany and the divided continent of Europe, but all over the world.

This concept of freedom means that as our security partners we can only accept those states that profess and practise the same principles and human rights as we do. For a democratic society, therefore, the only security partners can be other democracies. For the democracies of Western Europe it follows that the United States is Western Europe's security partner. For Western Europeans there can be no question of equidistance, that is, keeping both Washington and Moscow at arm's length. This does not mean of course that the Soviet Union and the other communist states of Europe can be excluded from the common striving for greater security. On the contrary, our policy towards the Soviet Union must be designed to reduce tensions, seek new fields for cooperation, promote arms control and disarmament, if these things lead to a stable equilibrium in Europe, and generally create confidence. Together with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries we must make every effort to increase our common security.

The Western Alliance, the North Atlantic Alliance, has proved its worth. For this we may thank not only the efforts of the United States, but also the countries of Western Europe. In the decades since the Second World War, however, the decisive factor in the security of Western Europe has been the United States' security guarantee. It is more than doubtful whether the United States will still be prepared to stand up for European security forty years from now, that is to say in the year 2028. No doubt it is desirable, but there is no guarantee. If anything, historical facts tend to speak against the idea that a country will guarantee the security of other countries for almost a whole century, risking in the event of a conflict the safety of its own territory and population in the process. The American nuclear guarantee for Western Europe, the presence of American troops on European soil, will be necessary, indeed indispensable for the foreseeable future. But it would fly in the face of historical experience if the American attitude towards Western Europe were to remain unchanged in the years to come. Europeans must make allowances for possible changes in American policy, however unwanted they may be, if only as a precaution in their own interest. But not solely for this reason.

One of the Western Alliance's basic problems since its foundation has been that politically and militarily it is unbalanced. The problem at the heart of the alliance is not that America is too self-assertive and too strong, but that Western Europe is politically too weak and lacking in self-confidence. It is necessary not merely to talk about the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, but also to build it. A European security union, epitomizing the foreign policy and security policy options of all Western Europeans wishing to participate would be a suitable basis on which to construct an 'Atlantic Alliance on two pillars'. A European security union must develop gradually. The first thing that is necessary is better coordination between the Western European partners on foreign and security policy planning. In this process the different approaches - European political cooperation (EPC) within the European Community, the Western European Union (WEU), NATO's Euro Group, Franco-German cooperation, and so on - should be seen as complementary elements of this new policy. It falls to Bonn and Paris to provide the spur in this process. The Franco-German brigade and the Franco-German Defence Council were steps on the right road. But in all their ventures Bonn and Paris should make it clear that Franco-German cooperation is open to all Western European partners wishing to take part. The opportunities for a European security policy worthy of the name have never been so great as they are today. The crucial point is to combine the various proposals into a practicable policy.

Two developments might, however, conspire to prevent the realization of a joint Western European security policy. The changes in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), might deter leading political forces in Western Europe from helping to make a Western European security policy a reality. In addition to this, the attitude, increasingly common in West Germany, that Europe needs to be 'freed' from nuclear weapons, might obstruct the tangible, gradual realization of a European security union.

À propos developments in the Soviet Union: we must wish Mr Gorbachev every success with his policy of renewal. In the interests of the people of that country of many nations, the Soviet Union, in the interests of the whole of Europe and also in the interests of the international community. There should and must be no doubt on this point, though we must always remain aware that

Gorbachev's reforms are not a democratization of the Soviet Union in the Western sense. The Soviet Secretary-General wants more openness and efficiency in order to enhance the dynamism of Soviet society. It is not his intention to do away with the Marxist-Lenninist system, the communist ideology. Even assuming that the outcome is a favourable one and that Gorbachev manages to force his plans through, the European democracies must be ready and able to defend themselves. At present, however, it is not evident which path the Soviet Union will take. Mr Gorbachev's ideas of perestroika and glasnost are encountering heavy opposition from the orthodox elements within the Soviet Communist Party. The abrupt downfall of his keenest supporter Boris Yeltsin is a sign of the breach within the ruling party. It is no secret that Gorbachev's deputy, Ligachev, and many other top officials are opponents of the reform line. The view put forward by many Europeans that we should 'help' Gorbachev in this power struggle completely overlooks the realities of life in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is not caught up in internal party difficulties because we adopt a particular attitude towards him, but solely because of domestic political and ideological differences, which we Europeans are unable to influence in any way. The fall of Boris Yeltsin clearly demonstrated that the official elite, the nomenklatura, fear for their privileges and those of their families. It is to be hoped that Gorbachev's reforms will lead to genuine pluralism and greater freedom for the people of the Eastern bloc but we have little chance of influencing this internal Soviet process.

No, the lesson to be drawn from the internal showdowns in the Kremlin by us Western Europeans is a different one. We must not allow our destiny and our foreign and security policies to be dependent upon the success or failure of a single person, who may be replaced tomorrow by a Stalinist. Western Europe should not look towards Moscow with delight or in dread and its policies should not be dependent on Gorbachev's fate. We Western Europeans must finally define our own, autonomous foreign and security policy and plead its cause abroad on a long-term basis. Only if we succeed in that will we really be independent of Moscow and at the same time capable of engaging in broad cooperation with the Soviet Union on an equal footing. We may, for example, join with the Soviet Union in seeking to achieve 'cooperative security'. If we act together as Western Europeans, there are tremendous opportunities ahead for a realistic policy of detente.

A Western European security union is only conceivable if France not only belongs to it but also perceives a responsible role for itself therein. In France, nuclear weapons - the 'force de dissuasion' - is of crucial importance to the strategic plan. Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberal and Gaullists are all agreed that there can be no strategy without the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. So anyone in the Federal Republic of Germany pleading for a Western European security policy, while advocating the denuclearization of Europe, is excluding France from efforts to achieve a joint European security policy. A joint European security policy without France would be condemned to failure; it would be inconceivable. France has the key role to play in the strategic plan of a European security policy. Anyone who cannot see this is either blind to the facts or dishonest.

But, quite apart from the role of France, would the denuclearization of Europe be such a desirable thing? A nuclear-weapons-free Europe would increase the risk of a conventional war. Many Europeans forget that since the end of the Second World War wars have broken out wherever an attack with conventional weapons was not linked with a threat to use nuclear weapons.

Since 1945 more than 140 conventional wars have claimed over 35 million victims. In this century alone Europe has twice been devastated with conventional weapons. Have the Germans forgotten that no German has yet been killed by a nuclear bomb, but that many millions of Germans fell victim to conventional weapons and traditional bombs? Have the Germans forgotten that when the freedom of Berlin was under threat of extinction the risk of an all-out nuclear war forced those involved to show moderation and military restraint?

Without the peace-keeping effect of nuclear weapons Europe is unlikely to benefit from a secure peace in the years ahead, either. The situation would, of course, have to be assessed differently if the Soviet Union were to evolve into a truly democratic state. For the foreseeable future, though, no such prospect is in sight. Nuclear weapons are political weapons. Their effect is to encourage moderation and to keep the peace, making it impossible to plan, wage and win a nuclear or conventional war in Europe.

A realistic peace policy for Europe must not dismiss the peace-keeping function of nuclear weapons. The necessary policies of arms control and disarmament must lead to a balanced combination of conventional and nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level, thus leading to greater military stability.

A Western European security union is a necessity. Neither illusions nor the rejection of nuclear arms must be allowed to prevent it. The Franco-German relationship is of particular importance in achieving this security union. In the short term we must succeed in Europeanizing France's strategic plans. The defence of France does not begin on the Rhine, but on the Elba. The necessary practical implications for strategy and tactics spring from this basic fact. It is essential to involve France's conventional forces in forward defence and to step up cooperation between Bonn and Paris on questions of nuclear strategy.

With its nuclear planning group, NATO has demonstrated that nuclear cooperation is possible, without control of the nuclear weapons having to be shared. We Germans do not want to have a finger on the trigger of French nuclear weapons; this must be ruled out. But we can demand that there should be no French use of nuclear weapons on German territory - if, indeed, at all - without agreement. For psychological and also for fundamental European policy reasons, Bonn and Paris must emphasize their bilateral cooperation is open to other partners. In particular, we should strive for close cooperation between Paris and London on nuclear matters.

If France and the United Kingdom were to make their nuclear forces available to deter an attack on their partners, it would signify the Europeanization of what have hitherto been national nuclear forces. This would be an important element in achieving the European security union. Such a step is also in keeping with the obligation to provide assistance under the WEU Treaty, whereby all parties agreed to provide the necessary support to repel an attack. Would it not accord with the logic of this agreement if all of the forces of the countries involved - including nuclear forces - had to help to deter an attack on other member states?

All the available instruments at bilateral level, within the Western European Union and European Political Cooperation (EPC) and so on, must now be utilized to step up the debate on security policy and come to some decisions.

A European security union is a crucial constituent of a European Union. In the October 1987 declaration of The Hague, the seven WEU states showed as much commitment to the goal of European Union as the twelve Member States of the European Community did in the Single European Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1987. All seven WEU countries are members of the European Community. If it should turn out that it is not possible at present to achieve the security union at Community level, because some Member States are still reluctant to tread this path, then the security union must be forged at WEU level. As the twelve countries of the European Community develop into a European Union, the Western European Union could ultimately merge into it. In other words, it is conceivable that the WEU and the European Community will one day be co-extensive.

This development must be accompanied by parliamentary control. This control function should be exercised increasingly by Members of the European Parliament. The present assembly of the Western European Union consists of national deputies. As in recent years, the European Parliament has increasingly developed into a forum for discussing security policy in recent years, a link between the assembly of the Western European Union and the European Parliament should be created. This can be done by augmenting the assembly of the Western European Union with Members of the European Parliament from the WEU countries. It would be appropriate if 50 per cent of this 'joint assembly' belonged to the European Parliament. If the European Community develops into the European Union, including a security union, it would be only natural for the European Parliament to control all the policy areas of the union. Admittedly, we have a long way to go before we reach this stage. For this very reason, realistic interim measures are required. On no account, however, must the European organizations concerned consider themselves in competition with one another. They all serve the same end: the European Union. The process whereby Europe finds its own identity must be accompanied by close consultations with the United States of America. Only in this way will it be possible to keep the European-American relationship free of irritations, misunderstandings and crises. The formation of the European security union would establish a solid bilateral structure within the Atlantic Alliance, based on Europe and America. The way would also then be clear for comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. Security

policy should also be understood in a broad sense in its bearing on East-West relations. The elimination of tensions, the establishment of trust and comprehensive cooperation require a meeting and exchange of people, information and opinions. The assertion of human rights in a divided Berlin, a divided Germany and a divided Europe will also become a key element in security policy. Mikhail Gorbachev speaks of the 'house of Europe'. We cannot give wholehearted credence to this term as it excludes the US. This is unacceptable to us. But we should nevertheless make use of the term 'the house of Europe' to go on the offensive. In the house of Europe it must be possible to walk from one room into another without running the risk of being shot on the threshold. For this reason, the walls, barbed wire and orders to kill that are characteristic of a divided Europe must be eliminated. There will not be any real justification for describing Europe as a 'house' until all the peoples of Europe are able to enjoy to the full their right to self-determination and their human rights - and hence also to live in liberty. In future, more use should be made of European political cooperation (EPC) to bring human rights issues into the East-West dialogue. This would enable us Germans, in particular, to turn a justified national aspiration into a matter for the whole of Europe.

At the same time EPC must be expanded with regard to security policy. At present it is limited - formally at least - under the Single European Act to the 'political and economic aspects of security'. Any perpetuation of this limitation is unacceptable. To be more effective the EPC should deal with all aspects of security, including the military ones. In this way the European Community can become a security union, too. This will not be handed to us on a plate; it will have to evolve gradually. Within the European Community the only conceivable instrument for achieving this goal is EPC. When the Single European Act is revised - after 1992 - the dynamic development of security policy must be taken into account. Countries wishing to join the European Community, especially if they are neutral, must not be allowed to impede this process.

The unification of the free part of Europe is in the German interest. It will ensure our freedom, foster peace, and enhance our ability to campaign effectively for the human rights of all Europeans. It will also give us the opportunity, as part of an historical process and within a united Europe, of overcoming the problem of a divided Germany.

ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° inv. 8547

BLIOTECA

**VIEWS OF THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
WORKING GROUP ON INTEGRATION**

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VIEWS OF THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INTEGRATION WORK GROUP

I Finland's line: an active participant, a critical conformist

1. Finland must take an active part in the European integration process. The opportunities for influence offered by various forums must be exploited: Nordic cooperation, EC-EFTA, Council of Europe, CMEA collaboration, the ECE and CSCE. The benefits of integration must be utilized to the utmost and the disadvantages minimized. Finland's line should be: an active participant, a critical conformist.

2. Finland's integration policy must not conflict with its policy of neutrality or its main social objectives. Membership of the EC is not a realistic possibility from either the Community's or Finland's point of view. Cooperation arrangements must strive to ensure that Finland can influence preparatory work and decision-making on the EES (European Economic Space), while preserving Parliament's authority with regard to new legislation.

One possibility in arranging relations between Finland and the EC would be to have joint decision-making and judicial procedures for the EC and EFTA on matters concerning the EES. The relationship between national decision-making and that concerning the two bodies must then be clarified, together with the questions not to be covered by such an agreement.

3. Finland must retain its independent power of decision in matters concerning trade with the Soviet Union. Finland must continue to act as a pioneer of such trade, developing new forms of cooperation and if necessary also in association with other European countries.

4. Finland must negotiate with other EFTA countries and support the endorsement of EFTA as a channel of negotiation.
5. Any agreement on the EES must provide an adequate balance of advantages and disadvantages. If necessary, it must guarantee Finland a period of adjustment or special conditions.
6. Finland succeeds best in international competition and combats the threats this poses when it pursues a disciplined, long-range economic policy. That means a policy of slow inflation and a stable currency, the aim being full employment and sustainable development.
7. If we wish to ensure Finnish companies equal opportunities within the EES, we may have to ease the regulations on foreign ownership. The aim must be for key natural resources and other ownership vital in the national interests to be kept in Finnish hands.
8. In opening up our labour markets to the EES we must move forward slowly. There is no reason to import foreign labour actively. Cures must be found for our labour shortage primarily by promoting the employment of the Finnish work force. When foreign labour is resorted to, such employees must be guaranteed the same benefits and rights as Finns.
9. The agreement must safeguard full access to EC cooperation programmes in the area of R&D. Finland must continue to increase its contribution to international cooperation in these fields.
10. European trainee and student exchange programmes must be fully utilized. Opportunities for foreigners to study in Finland must be improved.
11. Environmental cooperation to cover the whole of Europe must be substantially expanded within the EES. The countries of

Eastern and Central Europe must be supported in their attempts to save the environment.

12. The principles of justice and equality aimed at in the Nordic countries, taken in a new and broader sense, must be used as a starting point in developing the social dimension of the EES. Integration must not mean lowering our sights on social issues.

13. Balanced regional development in Finland must be safeguarded in the integration process. Far more resources must continue to be devoted to regional development here than in Western Europe on average. Decentralization of decision-making and executive power must continue. Opportunities for regional cooperation in, for instance, the North Cap and the Baltic must be seized.

14. Finland must take an active part in European cultural cooperation, especially within the Council of Europe. The European involvement of the Finnish scientific and cultural community and free civic organizations must be given full support. Investment in furthering the creativity of Finnish culture and developing communication systems must be increased, to achieve cooperation with other countries on as equal a basis as possible.

15. Finland must bring its human rights and treatment of foreigners up to the level called for by the Council of Europe. Finland must also take responsibility for the world refugee problem insofar as its resources allow.

16. No economic space should be created in Western Europe which excludes cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Pan-European cooperation and its institutions must be furthered side by side with Western integration.

17. The CSCE process must be further strengthened. Finland must work actively to ensure that the 1992 review conference in Helsinki can take place at the highest political level.

18. European integration must not exclude the Third World.

II TOWARDS OPEN DEBATE

The effects of the present stage of West European integration on the economy and society in Finland are diverse, ranging from tax and social policy to foreign policy. The creation of the European Economic Space, which would comprise both EFTA and the EC, with joint decision-making and judicial procedures, could mean that some decision-making power would be transferred to a supranational level.

Against this background, all future decisions taken on Finland's role in West European integration will be more far-reaching than those connected with the EC free trade agreement.

In this situation, decision-makers, organizations and citizens are expected to familiarize themselves with matters pertaining to integration and to debate policy freely. This requires from the government, in particular, open-minded preparation and active dissemination of information.

The Integration Work Group of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs proposes the following lines of action:

1. Parliament should be regularly provided with information and opportunities to discuss and take a stand on matters concerning integration. A special integration committee should be established in Parliament.

2. As actual negotiations between EFTA and the EC begin, the basis for preparatory work should be enlarged to give equal representation to various citizens' groups and organizations in Finland.

3. Research and surveys on the economic, political and social effects of integration should be increased considerably.

4. Parties, unions and professional organizations, the scientific and cultural community and free civic organizations should improve their readiness for and further European participation on all levels. The government should subsidize the involvement of organizations whose resources for international operations are limited.

5. Study of European languages at schools and adult education institutions should be increased.

6. Finnish corporations - also those operating only on the domestic market - should develop a strategy vis à vis integration.

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The Specific West European Contribution in Shaping Future East-West Relations

Adrian Hyde-Price and William Wallace

The Strategic concerns of Western Europe

Western Europe was defined by the evolution of East-West relations in the years immediately after World War Two. It was the two 'superpowers' who imposed the new pattern of confrontation and cooperation on Europe. However, the West European countries, to a far greater extent than their East European counterparts, were never entirely passive actors. The sixteen countries which met at the invitation of France and the United Kingdom in July 1947, to respond to the Marshall Plan by establishing the OEEC, did not see their actions as a simple acceptance of American domination, but as a means of re-establishing their economic security in collaboration with the United States. M. Schuman, launching his 'Plan' three years later, recommended it first and foremost on security grounds - as the whole thrust of Monnet's post-war effort had indicated. 'Pour que la paix puisse vraiment courir sa chance, il faut d'abord qu'il y ait un Europe'.

Western Europe's security concerns in the late 1940s were desperately dependent on American support. But their priorities were never entirely identical with those of their transatlantic protector. There were, from the onset, specific West European concerns: largely implicit, even incoherent, then, but far more explicit today. They include:-

- 1) a preoccupation with the position of Germany, its future political structure and economic strength, far more acute than that of the more distant Americans.
- 2) concern for the future of the countries of East Central Europe not only as part of the political and ideological struggle between East and West but as countries with which they had natural social and economic links, temporarily cut but inconceivable to abandon for ever. This applied for more strongly to the northern Warsaw Pact members than to the two southern states - as it still does today. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were part of 'Western' Christendom. Their populations overlapped into Western

Europe: not only the ethnic Germans who remained but also the refugees and migrants who had left, and the new waves which followed from the GDR, from Hungary after 1956, and in slower trickles from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both Britain and France saw substantial Polish communities settle after the war: visible reminders of the failures of pre-war policies to protect either Czechoslovakia and Poland, and of the contribution the Poles made to the allies' war effort.

So concern to maintain stability in Central Europe, and therefore also in East Central Europe. Limited conflict in Europe was always in principle thinkable to American planners, as was limited conflict in East Asia, as part of the process of containing the Soviet Union. 'Limited' war was a contradiction in its own terms to all West European countries, all the more vivid a contradiction because of the destruction which conventional war had inflicted on them so recently. Any outbreak of fighting in central Europe would be a disaster, threatening to escalate out of control.

There was an unavoidable tension between these second and third aims- between the urge to restore 'normal' relations and to rediscover lost markets and the concern to maintain order and stability. The strains of destalinisation in the mid-50s led to disorder in Hungary. West German efforts to develop closer economic links with their Eastern neighbours in the mid-1960s, fuelled Soviet suspicions and contributed to the Warsaw Pact decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. West European pursuit of 'little détente' in the 1970s and 1980s has therefore become a sophisticated and cautious exercise, coordinated among the various governments through EPC, the EC, and through bilateral contacts- with long-term evolution as the aim rather than short-term changes. This essentially West European approach had been blessed by NATO's Harmel Report of 1967 and by repeated NATO consultations since. But there has been some truth in the bitter American comment that the Europeans wanted to pursue détente while the Americans provided deterrence, splitting Harmel's twin objectives between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The prime focus for West European security interests has been- and remains- Central Europe. The Nordic area has proved remarkably stable. In spite of recurrent anxieties over Norway's northern border and over Soviet

submarines in the Baltic, the 'Nordic balance' has been undisturbed- and so far no disorders in the socialist countries which border the Baltic have threatened to disturb it. The southern 'flank', the Mediterranean area, has been less easy to contain- and much less easy to agree upon a concerted approach towards. Jugoslavia from 1948 on was a common priority, partly resolved by economic assistance and by opening West European markets to that country. Greece and Turkey have been the focus for repeated crises, contained within the framework of NATO and -to a much lesser extent- within the various West European organizations, from the Council of Europe, as a symbolic forum for democratic representation, to the EC. The French Government attempted to persuade its allies in the late 1950s that the Algerian civil war was a threat to the West, and was rebuffed on this 'out of area' conflict. British and French action at Suez in 1956 was unsupported by the United States. For most of the 1960s and 1970s Mediterranean security was guaranteed by the United States, with France at one remove from the Alliance and Italy its only significant partner. Developments in the 1980s- intervention in the Lebanon, the Sinai's peacekeeping force, minesweeping operations in the Red Sea, and the assignment of a German destroyer group to the Mediterranean- suggest that this may now be changing. But that is a major question for this conference.

The Historical Experience

The first independent West European detente initiative in East-West relations following the stabilisation of the European security order was that of De Gaulle. The failure of his endeavour to forge a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals', however, was not due to Eastern taciturnity, but because of a lack of Western support.

The second initiative was launched by successive West German Governments from the late 1960s. It proved successful because it achieved intra-bloc support and intra-bloc compromise, both through NATO (from the Harmel Report onwards, which served as the basis for a new conceptual unity for Western policy towards the Socialist community) and the EPC (which at the outset appealed to the Germans above all for the multi-lateral cover it offered for the FRG's *Ostpolitik*). At the same time, the FRG's *Ostpolitik* was supplemented by superpower cooperation, linking European and global detente.

European detente in the 1970s was anchored in the various *Ostverträge* of the early seventies and in the Helsinki Conference of 1975, which served as a surrogate peace treaty. The CSCE process which emerged from Helsinki has provided an indispensable institutional framework for conducting East-West relations in Europe. It also provided the first successful test for EPC, enabling West European governments to develop their new consultative procedures around a process in what the USA was prepared to let the Europeans take the lead. The usefulness of the CSCE was particularly marked in the early eighties, when it provided a crucial forum for continuing East-West dialogue through the worst period of what has been called 'the Second Cold War' (Fred Halliday).

The experience of the sixties and seventies contains a number of important lessons for the future conduct of West European policy towards the East. First, that inter-bloc relations depend on a modicum of intra-bloc consensus and compromise. Unilateral initiatives from within either bloc are unlikely to be successful, whereas initiatives pursued in a multilateral framework have more chance of achieving results. Secondly, that equal stability for both alliances is essential for the East-West dialogue to produce results. Attempts at destabilisation or dividing the opponents alliance relationships are ultimately counterproductive and threaten the European security order. Systemic stability and a equilibrium between the two blocs is a vital prerequisite for East-West cooperation and understanding. Thirdly, that in terms of West European *Ostpolitik*, the crucial axis is the Franco-FRG relationship. This will be explored in greater detail below.

The Late Seventies and Early Eighties

By the end of the 1970s, East-West detente had begun to falter. Interestingly enough, however, it became apparent that the roots detente had sunk in Europe in the seventies proved strong enough to weather the chill winds blowing from both the East and the West. Despite the tensions caused by the Euro-missile deployments and the Polish crisis, the underlying reasons for the erosion of detente lay with developments outside of Europe, in Africa, Central America, South-East Asia and the Middle East, and this affected the superpowers more than it did the European states. As superpower relations went into deep-freeze in 1983-84, tensions within the two alliance systems mounted as each

superpower sought to rally its European allies behind a policy of confrontation. Within the Western Alliance there were disputes over the Urengoi oil-gas pipeline and economic sanctions, and in the WTO there were heated exchanges over the Hungarian-GDR theses on the role of small and medium states in maintaining dialogue in periods of international tension. The attractive power of detente to the Europeans is most strikingly illustrated by the case of the GDR, which had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the detente process in 1970-71, but which publically resisted the Soviet policy of confrontation with the West in 1983-84 (notably over the issue of Erich Honecker's scheduled visit to the FRG).

From the middle of the eighties onwards, however, the international climate has begun to improve as US-Soviet relations have thawed, and Europe has been subject to a number of potentially beneficial but nevertheless unsettling developments. Firstly, Mikhail Gorbachev's election to the post of General-Secretary of the CPSU, and the initiation of a far-reaching reform programme in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost*, *perestroika* and democratisation hold out the promise of a reformed USSR which would appear less threatening to the West, and also have great significance for the CMEA and the European members of the Socialist Community. The 'New Political Thinking' in foreign policy also promise to transform the Soviet Union into a more cooperative and accomodation participant in the international system. A number of Western commentators (for example Michael McGuire and Stephen Shenfield) have also argued that a major reassessment of military doctrine is under way in the Soviet Union which obviates the need for an offensive strategy against Western Europe in the event of hostilities breaking out.

Secondly, Soviet *perestroika* has important implications for Eastern Europe and for relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of this region. On his election to the post of General-Secretary, Gorbachev declared that his 'first commandment' was to improve relations with the fraternal socialist allies of Eastern Europe. It appears that the new Soviet leadership wishes to encourage the process of economic restructuring in Eastern Europe and in the CMEA in order to reduce the implicit Soviet subsidies to these countries and to harness their resources and technical expertise to Soviet *perestroika*. Furthermore,

Gorbachev wants to see political reform in these states in order to improve the international attractiveness of socialism. Hence, much more scope has been given to the East Europeans to pursue their own national paths to socialism (or as the cynics say, away from socialism!). At the same time there is a move towards filling in the 'blank spots' of history which have soured Soviet-East European relations (such as the Katyn massacre in Soviet-Polish relations), whilst there have been suggestions from leading Soviet spokesmen that the 'Brezhnev principle' no longer governs Soviet-East European relations. These trends promise to contribute to a re-shaping of the political map of Europe, and increase the scope and potential impact of West European *Ostpolitik*.

Thirdly, the underlying questions of transatlantic security and economic relations- the balance of burdens and responsibilities between the US and its European allies, the sharing of out-of-area security tasks, the definition of alliance strategy and the nature of the threats to be faced- are again rising to the surface. European reactions both to the SDI and to the Reykjavik summit reflected a growing unease at the apparent divergences of US and European priorities. The looming problem of the US budget deficit now overshadows the US conventional commitment to continental Europe.

In the course of the early 1980s West European governments strengthened their procedures for cooperation on foreign and security policy, in response to their unease at the quality of US alliance leadership. The London Report and the Genscher-Columbo Plan grew out of the crises over Afghanistan, Iran and Poland, and the painful awareness of West European governments of their inadequate coordination in responding to them. Confidential meetings among the European 'big three', and the revival of the Franco-West German security dialogue, led on to the resuscitation of WEU, as a forum through which the 'serious' West European governments could discuss security issues, from East-West relations to alliance strategy and arms control.

By 1986 WEU was again faltering, in the face of continuing differences of approach from within the French, West German and British Governments, and of intermittent disapproval from Washington for the topics discussed. The shock of the Reykjavik summit transformed the situation. Working groups sprang into

activity, foreign and defence ministers gave its meetings renewed attention. The 'Platform of European Security Interests' was agreed at the Hague in October 1987. The 'blessing' of the multilateral WEU framework was given to naval deployments by the Dutch, Belgians and Italians to the Gulf (and by the Germans to the Mediterranean). And in the course of 1988 the negotiations on Portuguese and Spanish applications to join were accompanied by significant changes in the emphasis of Spanish defence policy. Accession, in 1989, would transform this central front organization into a 9-member body of which 4 member governments (not including the UK Government's residual Cyprus commitments) had major forces and preoccupations on NATO's southern flank.

West European Policy towards Eastern Europe

Despite the broad consensus reached at the end of the sixties in NATO and the EPC over the general aims and desirability of developing good relations with the 'Eastern bloc', West European policy towards the region differs substantially in intensity and direction. To begin with, as has already been mentioned, the West is primarily concerned with the countries in the centre of the continent, rather than the Balkans and South-East Europe. Furthermore, Western interests and activities in these countries varies considerably, with the FRG and Austria playing the most active role, followed by France and Italy (and more recently perhaps, the United Kingdom). At the same time, for some Western Europeans (above all, France), an active *Ostpolitik* is as much about managing intra-bloc relations as it is a reflection of an intrinsic interest in the region for its own sake. These factors must be born in mind when considering the scope of Western policy towards the East.

Any discussion of Western *Ostpolitik* must begin with the Federal Republic of Germany. This is because the Cold War division of Europe fractured the territories of the former Third Reich and split the German people into two rival and antagonistic states and alliance systems. Not only does the FRG Government therefore perceive itself as having a direct interest in the GDR, but it also feels responsible for German minorities in Hungary, Romania, the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The region has traditionally been of great concern to the Germans for reasons of trade, economic interdependence, political influence and cultural affinities, and despite the *Westintegration* of the FRG,

the West Germans continue to have an abiding interest in the lands to their East. As Professor Werner Link has expressed it, the *Staatsräson* of the FRG is *Westbindung* (West bonding) and *Ostverbindung* (East connections).

With the failure of Adenauer's *Politik der Stärke* and the *Ostverträge* of the early seventies, the FRG ceased to be a formally revisionist power in Europe and became a status quo power. Consequently, the nature of the 'German Question' has undergone a process of change, in which the goal of political reunification has been subsumed within the broader and long-term question of establishing a *europäische Friedensordnung* (a 'European Peace Order').

Indeed, the division of Germany has emerged as a factor of stability in the post-war European security system, and there are few routes for a reunified Germany in either East or West. Nevertheless, as Richard Vine argues;

'a German "system" in which neither trade nor persons can move normally between the two parts and where cultural life is stifled, is not viable over the long run. Germany's cultural and scientific greatness in the past predated Germany's political unification; it is, thus, not obligatory to think of political reunification as a means of escaping the horns of this dilemma' (pp. 33-34).

Relations between the two German states have improved considerably over the past few years, with a record number of visits by East Germans to the FRG; growing economic and political links; town-twinning; and broad-ranging cultural exchanges. The joint SED-SPD document on 'Common Security and the Struggle of Ideologies' also represented an important- if controversial- landmark in political discussion and understanding between the two parts of Germany. Good relations between the German states, standing as they do in the heart of the continent and on the frontline between the world's most powerful military alliances, can therefore serve as a model of 'peaceful coexistence' between East and West. For this to prove durable, both sides must accept the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other; for the Federal Republic, the logical corollary of this is the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the GDR and the recognition of East German citizenship, however unpalatable this

might be domestically. West German *Ostpolitik*, therefore, cannot be the pursuit of reunification in other guises, for this threatens the European security system and would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and Germany's neighbours such as France and Poland. Rather, Bonn's policy towards the East must aim at improving the security situation in *Mitteleuropa*, and fostering and deepening economic, political and cultural ties with the countries of the region.

France, as a long-established nation-state on the Western edge of the European continent does not have the same cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties to East-Central Europe that the FRG has. Nevertheless, France has played an active role in the politics of the region, having had previous ties to Poland and Russia as partners in containing first Prussia and Austria and then a unified Germany. For similar security reasons, France played a key role in the politics of the region in the inter-war period. Although the Gaullist policy of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' did not significantly change the political map of Europe, France did succeed in the 1960s in establishing close relations with both Romania and Poland. However, over the last decade French cultural and political influence in the region has been waning, as the French have lost out to the Germans, both because of the attractive power of the FRG's markets, and because of the East Europeans' more favourable perception of Bonn's commitment to *Ostpolitik*. As a result of this, and because of French unwillingness to leave West European *Ostpolitik* to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, it appears that President Mitterrand's second term will witness renewed French interest in Eastern Europe (see Barbara von Ow in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 September 1988). It seems that Mitterrand wishes to see Franco-German influence used to limit the dangers of instability in Eastern Europe, in order to provide the most favourable conditions for the success of reformist endeavours in the Socialist Community and conventional disarmament talks in Europe. At the same time, the French élite has continued to be anxious—indeed, over-anxious about perceived tendencies towards neutralism, pacifism and Papalio in the FRG. The closeness of Franco-West German coordination on security and East-West relations is thus intended to anchor FRG Governments firmly in the Western camp. It is therefore as much about intra-bloc relations as it is about bloc-to-bloc concerns.

For Britain, Eastern Europe has traditionally been relatively low on the foreign policy agenda. Chamberlain's comments on Czechoslovakia in 1938 ('a small country about which we know very little') seemed to typify the British lack of interest in the region, except as a factor in the European balance of power. As an island state, the UK has historically felt itself to be somewhat distant from the affairs of the continent in the first place, and when Britain has been interested in Europe, it has been with Western or Central Europe (see Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s, W.Wallace and C. Tugendhat, p.2 and 12). Nevertheless, Britain's role as one of the Four Power states responsible for Berlin gives it a direct stake in East Central Europe. The Polish crisis and the perceived need for West European involvement in the FRG's *Ostpolitik* have made the Conservative Government more aware of the political and strategic importance of Eastern Europe, and in her second term of office, Margaret Thatcher, and her Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe, began an active programme of visits to the capitals of the Warsaw Pact. However, this reflects a change in style and priorities, rather than a fundamental reassessment of objectives. The goal of the British Government remains as before: to encourage economic and political reform, to boost British trade in the region, and to stimulate East European autonomy from the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the 'big three' (West Germany, France and the UK), Italy's primary interest is not in Central Europe, but in the Balkans and South-East Europe. Although in the early eighties Italy developed close relations with the GDR (with visits by Erich Honecker to Rome in 1985 and Craxi to Berlin in 1986), for geopolitical reasons it is primarily interested in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Albania. Italy's role in East-West relations is also of interest in that, along with the Foreign Ministry, it is home for two other important non-governmental institutions: firstly, the PCI, which has had an influential role to play given the challenge and attraction of Eurocommunism to 'existing socialism'; and secondly, the Vatican, which has been a decisive political force throughout the region, most notably in Poland, but also in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The re-emergence of 'Mittleuropean' cooperation has added a regional dimension to Italian interests, with politicians and regional authorities from the North-East focussing attention on strengthening links with Austrian, Hungary and Slovenia.

Regional differentiation and East-West Relations in Europe

The case of Italy illustrates one of the key features of East-West relations in Europe, namely the growing regional differentiation involved. At the heart of the East-West relationship is Central Europe, as we have already indicated, but for the countries on the periphery, the priorities and concerns are different. On the Northern front, for example, Denmark identifies with the security concerns of the Nordic countries, and this colours its attitude to nuclear deterrence and NWFZs. On the Southern front, Greece (although it too developed good relations with the GDR in the early eighties), is primarily concerned with Balkan security issues, and since the seventies has tended to see Turkey rather than the Soviet Union as its main security threat. East-West relations in the Balkans have a logic and dynamic of their own (reflecting the historical conflicts and animosities of the region), given that the area contains two rival NATO states (Greece and Turkey); two very different WTO states (Bulgaria, a state loyal to Moscow, and Romania, a rogue state in all sorts of ways); and two non-aligned socialist states with next to nothing in common (Yugoslavia and Albania). The peripheral status of Denmark and Greece go some way to explaining why these two countries, along with another Peripheral country, Ireland, have been regarded as the 'difficult' (sometimes also called the 'footnote') countries in NATO and the EPC.

Even in Central Europe, there are different processes at work. Relations between the two Germany states clearly have a logic and dynamic of their own over and above that of East-West relations in general (hence the perennial concern of the neighbours and allies of the two Germanies, such as France and Poland). Austria and Hungary also have such good relations that talk of an 'Iron Curtain' in this part of Europe has long since become unthinkable: Hungary now enjoys better relations with its bourgeois capitalist 'class enemy' to the West than it does with its 'fraternal socialist ally' in the East, Romania. The concept of a straight-forward East-West divide in Europe has therefore become as out-dated as the now widely discredited notion of a 'totalitarian' Eastern bloc. As the black-and-white contrasts of the old bipolar world of the Cold War have faded, the various cultural and political links which have patterned the texture of the European continent have begun to reassert themselves; this is most clearly demonstrated by the debates taking place about the meaning and

significance of the concept of *Mittel Europa*, which has captured the imagination of intellectuals as far apart as Prague and Vienna, Berlin and Zagreb, Florence and Krakow. This process of regional differentiation in East-West relations in Europe has further complicated the already difficult task of developing a common West European *Ostpolitik*.

The Scope of West European *Ostpolitik* and its Limitations

It has been suggested that the West's most effective *Ostpolitik* is simply that of presenting an alternative model of societal development to Eastern Europe. The scientific and technological achievements of the West speak for themselves; as Leonid Albakin has acknowledged (November 1986), 'In many scientific and technological fields, capitalism has gone far ahead of us and has essentially exceeded socialism' (Dawisha, p.121). The political liberties and democratic rights enjoyed (to varying degrees) by many in Western Europe, as well as the traditions of tolerance and open debate which have been an important current in at least some of the Western liberal-democracies, have an enormous appeal to many in East Europe. The cultural diversity and experimentation of the West have captured the imagination of many members of the intelligentsia in the East, whilst the consumer goods and material promise of Western markets exert an enormous pull on virtually all classes of East European societies. Youth culture is also heavily dependent on trends in the West, particularly as regards fashion and music. Nevertheless, the political and cultural pull of the West on East Central Europe is not absolute, given the awareness in the East of the West's own problems of unemployment, homelessness, drugs and crime. Furthermore, as Karen Dawisha has observed, East European regimes do have certain 'legitimacy reserves' upon which they can draw, given the wide spread popular acceptance of the values of socialism and the high degree of social and economic welfare which characterises the countries of 'existing socialism' (Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform, p.111). It is clear, therefore, that we need a more complex and differentiated analysis of the impact of the West on Eastern Europe as an alternative model of social and political development.

This takes to the heart of our present concerns; the relationship between the process of West European integration on the one hand, and the development

of East-West relations in Europe on the other. In terms of military/security integration in Western Europe, the building of a European pillar in NATO or the strengthening of the WEU might be seen as reinforcing the present security order in Europe, which perpetuates the division of Europe. This dilemma is not new: as early as 1948 some in the West worried about the consequences of the division of Germany and the creation of rival military alliances. George Kennan, for example, warned that, 'from such a trend of developments, it would be hard to find "the road back" to a united and free Europe' (Dawisha, p.195). As George Kennan has subsequently argued, the problem is that although both alliances were formed as instruments of policy to cope with perceived external security threats, they have increasingly become ends of policy because of their role in alliance cohesion and intra-bloc political management. The FRG has had to face this dilemma much earlier on, because Adenauer's policy of *Westintegration* effectively spelt the end of German aspirations towards reunification, as the Social Democratic opposition argued at the time. On the other hand, it can be argued that the current trends in West European security thinking represent the only realistic way forward, following the two-track strategy of the Harmel Report of safeguarding Western defence whilst pursuing a policy of dialogue and peaceful cooperation with the East.

The strengthening of WEU (if it can successfully be carried further); the impetus to economic integration and growth represented by the EC's 1992 programme; mutual recognition between the EC and the CMEA, together with closer bilateral cooperation between East and West European economies through trade, finance and joint ventures; the expansion of human and cultural contacts both through formal agreements and through the informal processes of television, reception and tourism; all these contribute to Western Europe which will exert an increasingly magnetic pull on its East European neighbours. A delegate at the most recent Soviet Party Conference warned his listeners that failure to make headway with Soviet economic reform would lead East European countries 'to look increasing towards their Western neighbours rather than to us'. Closer integration of Austria into the EC, whether by early full membership or by arrangements leading towards eventual membership, will further increase the force of the pull for Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The task for West European governments is to coordinate these different dimensions of East-West relations in such a way as to maintain the precarious balance between stability and change represented by gradual political evolution within East Central Europe. Coordination of these specifically West European policies with policies on arms reductions, nuclear and conventional strategy, and US-Soviet relations will prove the most difficult and delicate task ahead, linking West European priorities with those of the USA as alliance leader. Much will depend upon the perspectives - and the priorities - of the next US Administration. The impact on Western Europe of the domestic US debate on defence spending and commitments will complicate the transatlantic dialogue, particularly if (as on earlier occasions) it leads to strategic reformulations which the Allies will be asked to accept. So will the evolution of US policy on technology transfer, as West European companies and governments are pursued by CMEA enterprises hungry for advanced technology. So may well disagreements on policies towards the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, as Arab-Israeli tensions spill over into terrorism or local conflict.

WEU, if it can successfully provide the framework for coordination of security policies among the major West European governments, will play an increasingly important role, linking NATO and transatlantic relations to EPC and EC. But so will the European Community and its member governments, as they come to terms with the immediate and explicit demands from the EFTA countries - including the key European neutrals - for a redefinition of their place in a more integrated Western Europe, and with the less explicit hopes of the East Central European countries for closer economic relations. In a very real sense, the Austrians have again come to the centre of Europe; for the Community's response to the broader implications of an Austrian application will set the tone for East-West relations within Europe in the early 1990s.

Adrian Hyde-Price and William Wallace,
Chatham House, London.

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ALMIRANTE, 1 - TELS. 522 19 38 - 521 10 20 - 28004 MADRID

Dr. Antonio Marquina

The Spanish perception of the challenges to Western Europe in East-West relations were determined largely by the peculiar situation in Spain during the forty years of the Franco regime. A profound dearth of knowledge existed regarding the complex relationship between East and West. During this time, problems of security and strategy were not studied at the universities; the various governments since the democratic transition have done little to instigate such studies. This is due, in the first instance, to the fact that the subject of NATO divided the Spanish political forces, and subsequently, to the realization that pacifist studies were more profitable in terms of political votes for the present government. Neither did there exist any sovietologists at any of the few Faculties of Political Science.

From this perspective, we can understand in good part the difficulties and problems that have hampered the definition of security policy in Spain during the last few years.

The delayed exchange of diplomatic representations between Spain, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations must also be pointed out. This is yet another fact that explains the partial removal of Spain from the debate that most of the European Community nations maintain on the situation in Central Europe.

The Mediterranean is a different matter. Spain's interest in the situation in this zone has been relevant since the era of the Franco regime. The friendship with the Arab nations, the difficulties in the relationships with the principal Maghreb states and the awareness of the importance of Gibraltar have all contributed to a special interest in the Mediterranean region.

Another sphere of special interest has been and is the relationship with Latin America, as well as that with the United States. This latter, imbued with a strong military content permitted Spain's indirect integration into European defense.



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At the present, Spain's incorporation into NATO and the European Community has produced important changes, although several conditions have been maintained that pertain to the previous era of relative isolation.

The Spanish Government maintains a strong Europeanist orientation in questions regarding security. Spain supports the idea of a European Union standing for a common European foreign and defense policy, which it considers indispensable. Political and economic autonomy are insufficient; military autonomy is judged to be necessary to balance the existing disequilibrium with the United States and to reinforce the European pillar which is considered to be separate from NATO itself.

From this perspective, then, one can understand Spain's interest in its incorporation into the Western European Union, with the softening of the initial posture on Spanish integration to NATO. However, several problems remain to be solved, such as 1) the fact that non-integration into NATO's military structure would prevent a possible parallel admission of shared command in a European army; 2) the problem of the compatibility between forward defense and the rejection of the plan to send Spanish troops to defend the borders of its allies. Regarding this last point, it should be noted, however, that the creation of rapid deployment forces is a novel element and thus the problems of modernization and mobility of the Spanish Armed Forces should be kept in mind; and 3) the interest in disarmament, as was demonstrated by the speedy acceptance by Spain of the double zero option, is also more highly nuanced at present, as are the role of nuclear weapons in European defense and the "progressive reduction" of the American presence in Spain. The emphasis on solidarity with the Allies is a reality.

In any case, the reform policies that are being carried out by Gorbachev and the results obtained up to now are viewed



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ALMIRANTE, 1 - TELS. 522 19 38 - 521 10 20 - 28004 MADRID

very positively from Spain. In the words of the Secretary of Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position of "constructive vigilance" is being maintained.

To finalize this outline, the special relationships that have been created with France and Italy to promote strategic reflexion and coordination specially for the Western Mediterranean should be underscored. Cooperation has also been activated with Portugal. It can be said that at the present day, the Strait of Gibraltar and its accesses, as well as the situation in the Mediterranean, continue to be principal centres of Spanish interest.

From this perspective, the focus of the Western European Union should shift slightly more to the south with the entrance of Spain to this organization.

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TURKISH PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer

How does Turkey view the recent developments in East-West relations, i.e. the reduced tension, the accelerating search for expanded areas of accomodation and cooperation, and hence the growing stability between the East and the West? Inseparably linked to this is the question of European security: How does Turkey view the evolving European security scene against the background of developments in East-West relations?

These questions had been in the making for some time now, in fact ever since the dawn of strategic parity between the super powers. Two relatively recent and parallel developments have launched the debate to new heights and kept it there: The movement on nuclear arms control, more specifically the signing of the INF Treaty in Dec. 1987, and secondly, General-Secretary Gorbachev's innovative approaches to Soviet foreign and security policies as well as to domestic development. Together, they have reopened the vital and interrelated questions of the definition of "the character of the threat", the role of the U.S. in European security, the continuing relevance of the Alliance's military strategy of flexible response, and the perennial inter-Alliance and intra-Alliance tensions over the role of conventional forces for deterrence, and the question of the conventional balance or lack of balance and what to do about it.

This paper will be an attempt by an independent observer to summarize how Turkey approaches the questions posed above.

1. East-West Relations and the INF Treaty

There is no question that Turkey welcomes the improvement in East-West relations in all its dimensions. She believes that the signing of the INF treaty has made important positive contributions to East-West relations, but that the treaty is not sufficient by itself to create the desired environment of mutual confidence and security in Europe and the world. A START agreement and a chemical-weapons-ban agreement should follow.

At the same time, however, the INF treaty has increased the prominence and significance of the conventional imbalance, thus paradoxically breeding

more insecurity than before, particularly in regions where the NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional imbalance is acutely adverse for the Alliance. Turkey sees the southern flank as one such region. In other words, progress in the nuclear arms control field should in no way overshadow the importance of the conventional dimension.

2. European Security Framework

European security requirements can be met most effectively with the active participation of the U.S.A. Therefore, the North Atlantic Alliance continues to enjoy a vital role in the preservation of European and world peace. Similarly, the strategy of flexible response should not be tampered with further, which continues to require an adequate mix of nuclear as well as conventional forces.

On the other hand, in order to help eliminate American apprehensions and budgetary constraints, the European NATO members should make greater contributions to common defense efforts within the framework of the Alliance. Turkey would probably join most such moves. However, if the European NATO felt it expedient to move in the direction of a separate security identity and to institutionalize it in the Western European Union, Turkey would want to be able to join such moves, too. Clearly there are serious obstacles to Turkey's joining, but she feels her resolve to be part of any emerging European security arrangement should at least qualify her favourable consideration in this process.

3. Indivisibility of security

Turkey believes that the security concept of the Atlantic Alliance is based on the idea that security is indivisible. This means that the Alliance should not compartmentalize its security priorities and requirements beyond the level of geographic and strategic compartmentalization that has been with the Alliance since its foundation. There are, of course, regional differences but these should not be made the basis of a new impetus for the enhanced political and military integration of one region as opposed to the further distancing of other regions. The recently gathering tendency to enhance the regionalism of the Center has been a source of concern to Turkey. Similarly, Mediterranean security should not be viewed as a

separate issue. These tendencies threaten to disrupt the strategic integrity of the Alliance. The same tendency could manifest itself, dangerously, at the conventional stability-reduction talks at the cost of a globalist approach.

At the other extreme, the question of out-of-area issues has always been a source of discomfort for Turkey. She looks at the NATO commitment strictly within the geographical boundaries defined by the treaty. Yet, she feels that NATO should review each case on its own merits in case of a threat to NATO interests from a third-party and in third-party areas.

4. The Soviet Union under General-Secretary M. Gorbachev

Mr. Gorbachev's internal reforms serve domestic purposes, but they would be instrumental in reducing East-West tensions. Therefore, the West can reap benefits from "perestroika" in indirect ways as well as directly by entering into economic and commercial exchanges. Yet, the West must proceed cautiously and must judge the Soviet Union by deeds rather than by words only.

Soviet Military Doctrine: The declaratory policy of revising the Soviet Military doctrine from one based on offense to one based on "active Defense" has not so far been reflected in either the qualitative or the quantitative measures of a military strategy. Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces facing the southern flank continue to be offensively manned, equipped and deployed.

5. Public Opinion in Turkey on Security Issues

Governments are increasingly feeling the pressure of the attentive public, in particular on the questions of A) The heavy burden of NATO-related defense expenditures on the economy, B) The peace initiatives of Mr. Gorbachev, C) Uncertainties of Turkey's future prospects with and in Western Europe, and D) The possibility of being left alone in bilateral security relationship with the U.S., in case NATO is allowed to further lose its collective security mission and identity and Turkey cannot move closer to Western Europe.

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Stefano Silvestri
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Security challenges
as perceived in the Mediterranean

1.

There is no "Mediterranean Region". The Mediterranean is a closed sea, shared by different political, economic, social, cultural and military realities. In the Mediterranean it is possible to draw the borders dividing various, autonomous, "Regions". Therefore, there are no "Mediterranean Perceptions" as such, of the security challenges.

Some countries, such as Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey are formally integrated in the Western security system, from the Atlantic Alliance to the European Community, with various degrees of participation and influence. Others are variously linked with the Arab League, and divide themselves according to inter-arab and muslim parameters. Israel share the the Western European countries its economic links with the EC and its security links with the US, remaining however basically a Middle Eastern power. Since the severing of the alliances between the USSR, Yugoslavia and Albania, no Warsaw Pact state is riparian of the Mediterranean. However, Bulgaria and Rumania are Balkan states (and the Balkans are a "Mediterranean" Region) and, together with the USSR, face the Black Sea.

Thus, the Mediterranean area is certainly not "unitarian". It extends beyond the Mediterranean Sea and its riparian countries. In this part of the world, crises involve the close intertwining of ideological, ethnic and political factors such as Islamism, assertive nationalism, intra-Arab rivalries or Arab-African disputes. The whole area, in security terms, is an "arc of crises" (to follow a definition by Brzezinsky).

Strategic military planning and security policies are equally divided. Forty years ago the Atlantic Alliance was established, turning the whole area in two sectors: a "northern" one, mainly concerned with the Soviet threat, and a "southern" one centered around decolonization and local crises and wars. The fading away of Cento (a kind of Eastern "arm" of Nato) has sharpened this distinction. Today, the Soviets see the Mediterranean strategic theatre through the planning of three different TVDs (the Western, South-Western and Southern TVDs), and the US, while putting all its Mediterranean forces under its European Command, has established a new Central Command in charge for the Middle East and the Gulf.

No single Mediterranean power is capable of imposing its will on the entire area by the use of military force or other means; rather, each is a somewhat "junior" partner in a coalition with stronger powers. Thus local conflicts and local security perceptions are mixed with larger and more important international ones. For the past forty years, moreover, neither superpower has attached to the Mediterranean enough importance and priority, or invested enough resources there to become its master. In Central Europe, the division and confrontation between East and West have effectively frozen and removed from the political picture the traditional intra-European conflicts. No such result has been achieved in the Mediterranean, where borders between the two "blocs" are muddled and dubious and alliances frail and changeable. A "balance of mutual impotence" has been created, failing to impose long-lasting order and stability on this area.

In Nato terms, a large part of the Mediterranean is "out of area". For many years, Americans and Europeans remained at odds on the problem of out of area commitments, with the US trying not to be obliged to support the dwindling European colonial empires. The year 1956, when the US effectively dealt the death blow to the Anglo-French military intervention against Egypt, marks the highest point of US disagreement with European colonial powers.

This situation was completely reversed shortly afterwards, when the Europeans gave back the Americans the same sympathy and aid they had received in the past on similar occasions - that is none.

No common strategy was conceived, therefore, that could be dealt with through the common machinery of the Atlantic Alliance. The "let us do the best we can" and "if somebody wishes to do more let him" attitudes on out-of-area issues were already present in the 1967 Harmel report: "Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its (NATO) security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies, or those of them who wish to do so, will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case demands."

They have been repeated at length in the final communiqués of the North Atlantic Council meetings of the '80s. Typically the Allies recognise that events outside the Treaty Area may affect their common interests as members of the Alliance. If it is established that their common interests are involved, they say that they will engage in timely consultations. Sufficient military capabilities must be assured in the Treaty Area, however, to maintain an adequate defense posture against the Warsaw Pact (the "primary" Nato mission). Individual member governments who are in a position to do so can endeavour to support, at their request, sovereign nations whose security and independence are threatened. Those Allies in a position to facilitate the deployment of forces outside the Treaty area may do so on the basis of national decisions.

Out-of-area developments are normally discussed at ambassadorial level within the Atlantic Council framework, but these discussions are general in nature and amount to information gathering and perception exchanging sessions rather than to real discussions of policy options. Furthermore, consultation, while

considered desirable, has often been cosmetic and very late with respect to the development of events.

The significant words of the Atlantic compromise are the following: "if it is established that common interests are involved". Therein lies the key clue to the difficulties, a clear indication of the uncertainty of the Allied commitment, of the different national perceptions of out-of-area challenges, and of the obstacles on the road to an effective and coordinated Allied response to crises outside the Nato-Warsaw Pact context.

The most important factor influencing the security perceptions of the Mediterranean countries, therefore, is the coherence that can be found between the strategic aims of the major external powers and the local interests and policies.

This factor could result in a kind of strategic interface, undermining the solidarity between Atlantic allies. The main problem for the Southern European members of the Alliance is understanding the scope of the "vital interests" guaranteed by the Alliance. This term has a direct bearing on the extension of American nuclear deterrence: therefore, it has to be used sparingly, especially when other doubts are growing with respect to the credibility of such a deterrence. According to the traditional behaviour of the Alliance, Central European interests have been considered somewhat more "vital" than the Southern European and Mediterranean ones. It is also true, however, that, at least in principle, the Southern European allies are currently guaranteed by the concept of "vital interest": this is the key pillar of extended deterrence for the Southern Region.

Out-of-area interests are more "opinable" than "vital", however. In 1983, the South West Asia Impact Study of Nato stated that no "conceivable contingencies" in the area were bound to create unmanageable security problems for the Alliance. A policy of greater involvement in overseas contingencies, resulting in a de facto linking the Southern Region of Nato and out-of-area crisis management - even for simple reasons of geographic proximity - will inevitably blur the strategic assessment of what is "vital" and what is "opinable", diminishing the strategic importance of present distinctions.

It is also true, however, that out-of-area crises are growing in strategic importance anyway, and that the American perception of the U.S. vital interests seems to be changing in the direction feared by the European Allies. The problem, therefore, exists and cannot be avoided. It has to be "managed". Thus, NATO will have to deal with the setting up of many strategies "à la carte" without losing its political and military coherence. Differing perceptions and alternate priorities of arms procurement will grow, straining NATO internal consensus and efficiency.

Meanwhile, the United States has tended more to inform its allies and seek their blessing than to consult, except in cases where it was felt that the issue had to be multilateralized in order to insure military support and burden sharing. Even then, reliance was placed on bilateral consultations with each European country, but with special treatment of "special" allies, in terms of the level of officials involved and the amount of information provided. The American consultation process before the April 1986 air attack on Libya is a very good example of this.

The United States has, understandably, never been very willing, in the course of consultations, to provide details of its planned military operations, or those ready for implementation. The risk of very damaging leakages is considered too high to be taken lightly, and information is given out on a selective basis, and only if and when necessary. Thus, again considering the April 1986 bombing of Libya, the information provided by the United States to the British Premier, Mrs Thatcher, was more detailed than that given to French President Francois Mitterand, which was, in turn, more complete than that submitted to the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi.

While considering the "southern" perceptions, therefore, it is also important to compare them with the US policies. There are basic areas of dissension between the US and the local countries, on various grounds, detrimental to the effectiveness of Western policies in the Mediterranean.

The US are generally considering local conflicts and policies from an East-West angle, while local countries underline the importance of endogenous factors. Thus, while the US are ready to cash in any "American option" taken by local powers as an asset in the East-West balance, Mediterranean countries, on the contrary, fear this political polarization as a new conflictual element, adding fresh insecurity to an already troubled spot.

American and Mediterranean attitudes also differ on the possibility of eliciting responsible cooperation from the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding some very short-lived attempts, the basic American attitude has been to keep the Soviet Union out of the Mediterranean (or to the lowest possible level of presence). More or less consciously, local powers do not consider this to be consistent with their long term stability concerns.

Dissensions appear on the question of terrorism. The US considers terrorism as a global phenomenon, and it is certainly true that terrorism has played against the US and in the hands of the Soviet Union. Still, terrorism is also a new manifestation of old regional factors that require both political and military responses. In the Mediterranean eyes the political factors are of paramount importance, while military responses alone can be counterproductive.

Summing up: from a Superpower's point of view, the Mediterranean is mainly a convenient line of communication reaching various strategic theatres, and a "flank" of various possible wars (from Central Europe to the Gulf). From a local point of view, on the contrary, the Mediterranean increases the risks of being unwillingly drafted in external crises, while local interests are somewhat downplayed if not simply ignored by the major players.

2.

Southern European perceptions of the threat are equally out of line with the main thrust of the Atlantic Alliance. The Spanish attention to the threat from the South, or the Greek concentration on the Turkish threat, are just two of the many anomalies. Each Southern European country has its own view of the Mediterranean and of its military needs.

Portugal, while firmly integrated with the Atlantic strategic theatre, has a somewhat residual role for the ground defence of North Eastern Italy.

Spain, much less integrated in the Allied structure and planning, is effectively reducing its utility as American bridgehead in the South, and strives to maintain its traditional strategic "isolation" from the European theatres.

France, apart from being a central European power of its own right, has possibly the strongest Mediterranean military power, after the US, but its military and strategic commitment in the area is apparently aimed mainly at establishing a kind of "Western Mediterranean" sanctuary, in line with the traditional appreciation of the Mediterranean as a "flank".

Italy is torn between conflicting interests and perceptions. It has a dual role, European and Mediterranean: its North Eastern border would be part of a Central European confrontation between East and West, while its Central Mediterranean location exposes the country to completely different threats and strategic requirements.

While Greece fears Turkey more than the Warsaw Pact, the latter is also part of the Middle Eastern strategic theatre and, sharing a common border and a Sea with the USSR, is probably the most exposed country of the Mediterranean and the less covered by an absolute Allied guarantee.

According to the prevailing Allied consensus, however, the Mediterranean is relatively less threatened and more "secure" than Central Europe, at least on East-West terms.

The Balance in the Southern Flank

	Nato present	Nato reinforced	Wars. P. present	Wars. P. reinforced
<u>Land Forces</u>				
Divisions	47	57	30,2/3	72,2/3
Tanks	6.203	7.231	7.481	17.736
Artillery,Mlrs	4.486	4.956	4.511	10.244
<u>Tactical Air</u>				
FGA	570	713	730	955
Fighters	194	194	955	1.015
Recce	112	121	118	118
<u>Naval Forces</u>				
Carriers	4			
Hel. and V/Stol				
Carriers	5		2	
Cruisers	5		9	
Destroyers	45		19	
Fregates/Corvettes	58		47	
FPBs	64		79	
Minesweepers	63		80	
Landing ships/cr.	135		48	
Attack submarines	58		36	

According to the Military Balance 1988/89 of the IISS, therefore, Nato holds a clear superiority over the Warsaw Pact in the Naval balance of forces, in the Mediterranean. The USSR Mediterranean Squadron includes about 40 ships, only 6 of which are major surface combatants, with 6 attack submarines, 2 of which modern and armed with long-range surface-to surface missiles. The Nato ships, however, are slowly getting older, while the Soviet ships are increasingly armed with modern missile systems.

The Nato's numerical advantage in terms of number of Army divisions would disappear with mobilization and reinforcements, while the Warsaw Pact has a greater number of tanks and other land weapons, and of aircraft (interceptors, ground attack, bombers and armed helicopters). Qualitatively, moreover, the Warsaw Pact forces are in better shape than the Greek and Turkish ones. 50% of the Russian tanks in the South-Western TVD are T-64/-72, and the Soviets are deploying modern systems like the Su-24 Fencer, the Hind assault helicopters and the SS-21 and SS-23 missiles.

For the Southern Region of Nato, the Allied military doctrine has meant a minimal role. If Nato held in the Center with conventional forces or nuclear weapons, should they be needed, peace would soon return, with little action on the Flanks. Nato's defeat in the Center, on the contrary, would give little choice to the Flanks but to accomodate Soviet wishes. Thus, Southern Region countries would have a vital stake in the success or failure of Nato defenses, but little effect on the outcome.

The lower state readiness of Soviet forces in the South-Western and Southern TVDs, as compared with the forces in the Western TVD, confirm the traditional wisdom, even if the technological improvement of Soviet Naval forces and of Soviet ground attack fighters and weapon systems could change somewhat this idyllic picture. Apart from some technological countermeasures, however, especially on the defensive capacity of the Navies and the Air Forces, no major reappraisal of situation is called for.

The picture changes more sharply, however, if other scenarios are taken into account.

One problem lies with the very high probability that any war in Central Europe would be likely to trigger early nuclear escalation. There is more room for maneuver in the Flanks though - whether it is political, military, or both. Thus, if the Soviets choose to launch a military attack against Nato to achieve limited gains, they will have to do so without total victory over Nato forces and without seeking to capture West Germany. Such a war for limited gains would make Nato's Southern and Northern Regions an attractive target, and a less risky one than those located in Central Europe.

Moreover, the increasing "conventionalization" of the Allied strategy, while attractive for general reasons, is also strictly linked to the geo-strategic features of the various military theatres which, in the Southern Region case, are widely scattered, far from each other and poorly integrated with the bulk of Nato's defences. The absence of a massive presence of American troops, on land, could further diminish the credibility of the Allied deterrence in the South (particularly in the South-East) and in the North-East.

A second problem stems from the possible connections between the escalation of an out-of-area military confrontation (e.g. in the Gulf, or around Israel) and the Southern Nato sector (particularly the Asiatic part of Turkey). Nato's Southern Flank is not merely a regional defence line against the East. It also guarantees a strong Western posture over the Middle Eastern Region. In the event of a local conflict turning sour, or in the event of an East-West confrontation, the Soviets might very well turn to Nato's Southern Region as a target of opportunity and an indirect but powerful way for gaining additional political and military leverage against the West.

A third problem is linked with the evolution of the threat, including indirect threats like international terrorism or the political utilization of economic pressures (e.g. taking advantage of the dependency of many Southern European countries from imports of oil and gas from the USSR, Algeria, Libya etc.). The careful exploitation of these indirect strategies could further disjoint the Alliance in the Mediterranean, helping to bring about a favourable outcome for political and military pressures.

It is not surprising, therefore, if the general attitudes of the Southern European countries vis-à-vis Nato is one both of asking for reassurance and commitment and increasing irresponsibility and neutralistic tendencies. Southern Europe needs Nato for its defence, but it is clearly dissatisfied with Nato's responses.

A case in point is the idea, apparently quite fashionable today, of a "diversionary" role of the Southern Flank, in case of military confrontation in the Center. It is an old story. During the I WW, a high number of the Italian offensives over the Isonzo were prompted by the requests of the Allied Supreme Commander, Foch, to relieve the French and the Russian fronts. The favour was reciprocated, however, when the last Isonzo offensive did turn into an Italian military defeat, helping the Italians to withstand successfully the pressure of the Central Empires. Is this kind of reciprocity still possible, in present terms? Given the greater risks connected with war on the Central Front, could we assume that Nato would be willing to relieve the pressure on the Southern Allies with an offensive on the Center? Furthermore, it is far from clear that the Southern European countries could easily and successfully shift from their present defensive posture to an offensive one, even with American help.

The perception of being drafted for fighting a distant war without fair reciprocity from the Allies, is certainly feeding the existing "neutralist" tendencies in some Southern European countries. All the more so, if the out of area crises are taken into account: the utilization of the Mediterranean bases and communication lanes by the United States, without prior consultation and agreement, increases the probability of irresponsible behaviour from the Southern Allies.

The Southern European Allies therefore remain relatively uncommitted to the common defense. The numbers are clear enough.

The Southern Countries share of the global defence expenditures of the Atlantic Alliance is the following:

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1986
GREECE	0.32	0.38	0.45	0.51	0.54	0.51
PORTUGAL	0.28	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.39	0.37
TURKEY	0.42	0.44	0.50	0.63	0.61	0.74
ITALY	5.71	5.82	6.56	6.54	6.75	6.55

Spain would add something like 3.5%, if considered. France goes from the 7.81% of the 1960 to the 9.32% of the 1986, including however all its defence expenditures for the Central Front and national defence. (source: G. Adams & E. Munz, Fair Shares, Defense Budget Project, Washington D.C., 1988)

This picture changes somewhat if the number of soldiers is taken into consideration (Turkey alone is granting the 12.61% of the total of the Alliance, with only 8.66% of the population): but these soldiers are relatively poorly armed, even considering the American military assistance program to Portugal, Greece and Turkey.

The Italian "exception" moreover is only apparent. Italy's contribution to its own defence, in percentage of its GNP, is one of the lowest of the Alliance: only 2.27%, for 1988.

3.

Could this situation change with the building of a European political and military pillar? The question is a difficult and somewhat theoretical one. Some considerations could be made, however.

All the Southern European countries hold a bias in favour of Europe, at least in principle. "Isolation" from the mainstream of European politics has always been a major problem, for all these countries. Democratic regimes, in all these countries, have played repeatedly the "European card" for strenghtening themselves. In the case of Greece and Spain (and in the case of the Italian Communist Party), a greater European defence cooperation is seen as a way out from the present "unequal relationship" with the US and a more acceptable justification for increasing their commitment to common defense. Europe is at the same time the main aim and the main trouble of the Turkish foreign policy, torn between its willingness to join the EC and the WEU and its nationalistic reaction against the present European rejection of the Turkish yearning.

Southern expectations and perceptions are not necessarily shared by the other Europeans. Could a "European pillar" be more oriented toward the South than the present Nato system? Presently after all the US is the only non-Mediterranean Nato ally effectively engaged in the Mediterranean, with considerable military forces. A recent decision of West Germany to send some naval forces in the Mediterranean, to help Nato to close the gap created by the American, French and Italian naval engagement in the Gulf, is a step in the good direction. In military terms, however, no real alternative exists to the permanence of the US present commitment for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean allies and for the maintenance of an acceptable balance of Air Forces.

No European pillar, therefore, could make without the US, in the South as well as in the entire Nato area. The European pillar, however, could be useful for at least two other reasons.

The first is a political one. The main problem of the Southern Flank is its perception of isolation and lack of a clear international "identity". A greater European integration could supply both (even if it could have some contrary effect on Turkey if appropriate compensatory steps are not taken).

The second is a strategic one. The importance and danger of the crises developing out of the Nato area is growing rapidly. Western Europe cannot ignore the requirements of world order, and European countries are increasingly asked to share the burden of managing overseas crises. Both the Western European Union (to be enlarged soon to Spain and Portugal) and the EC machinery have been already involved with out of area problems of various nature. A greater European coordination would make sense and would certainly help to establish a more balanced relationship between the American way of dealing with out of area crises and the European interests and priorities. Such a coordination, moreover, could ease some of the problems experienced by the Southern European countries, increasing the Allied solidarity in the Mediterranean while allowing for a differentiated (but still consensual) approach.

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MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY: A DUTCH VIEW

A.E.Pijpers (University of Amsterdam/University of Leiden)

Note prepared for the conference "West European Security Policy: the Scope of Identity", Ebenhausen November 10 - 12, 1988

1. The Dutch defence and security efforts are, both in military-strategic and in financial-material terms, for 90 % concentrated on the Central Sector. In addition, the North Flank plays an important role in Dutch (naval) strategy, and this flank is in any case considered more important than the South Flank. This is not only due to, obviously, the geographic location of the Netherlands, but also because the strategic link between the North Flank and the Central Sector is more direct than the link between the South Flank and the Central Sector. In case of a protracted conventional conflict between NATO and WP, the loss of Norway, and hence of the sea lines across the Atlantic, are probably more fatal for Western Europe as a whole than the loss of Turkey.

The Dutch defence priorities for the 1990s are fourfold: (a) to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent in Europe; (b) to realize a true conventional balance between NATO and WP (and hence to reduce considerably WP forces); (c) to reach acceptable

arrangements for burden-sharing between the US and Western Europa; (d) to further develop a West European security policy within a firm NATO-framework.

(2) Rummel and Schmidt are quite correct when they write in their report for this conference (p.20): "...regional security problems in the Mediterranean area as well as in the Middle East seem to be only of marginal significance to West European strategists compared to those in Central Europe". And yet the security situation in and around the Mediterranean, both in East-West and out-of-area terms, is not altogether a quantite negligeeable from a Dutch foreign policy and security viewpoint. On the contrary, it seems that security-related problems in this area, ranging from the strategic significance of Turkey and the Greek-Turkish dispute, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Libyan inspired terrorism, or the wars in Lebanon, are increasingly requiring some sort of decisionmaking in The Hague. Moreover, in the 1980s these issues have caused the Dutch government more often than before to take rather concrete diplomatic, economic, and sometimes even (very modest) military measures.

3. The Dutch involvement in this respect is mainly conducted via two multilateral fora (leaving the UN apart for the moment): (a) NATO, and (b) European cooperation, in particular EPC. There are, however, also examples of predominantly national initiatives. The

Dutch offer to Egypt to assist with the minehunting operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez (1984) is a case in point.

4. As a NATO-country the Netherlands is of course (indirectly) involved with issues like: the Russian naval expansion in the Mediterranean (always a point of attention for a country being itself the smallest of the larger West European naval powers); the Greek-Turkish dispute; the possible consequences of a large scale (American) RDF deployment in the Middle East or Gulf region for the balance of power in the Southern Region; the political stability in Turkey, Greece, or Portugal; the entry of Spain into NATO, etcetera. But, as said before, these concerns are not translated in any significant military commitment, apart from the participation of Dutch marines to NATO exercises like "Distant Hammer" (on Gibraltar and Sardinia), or the occasional showing of the flag in the ports of AFSOUTH countries.

The Dutch attitude on these NATO-issues is probably not very different from the viewpoints of its European neighbours. The only specific point is perhaps the inbuilt tension between on the one hand the Dutch NATO-line, and on the other, an outspoken human rights policy towards countries like Turkey (and formerly Greece or Portugal).

Since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the convulsions in the Gulf region, the position of Turkey, a cornerstone for both

NATO's South Flank as well as for South West Asia (NATO's South Flank-writ-large) became of urgent concern for the Alliance. Germany and the US have made strong efforts to improve inter alia the quality of the Turkish army. Recently, the Dutch government has decided to join these attempts, and to give annually Hfl.40 million "structural defense aid" to Turkey (as well as to Greece and Portugal) in order to underpin its commitment to the South Flank, and also for the sake of burden-sharing (cf. the third Dutch defense priority).

5. More interesting, and probably of increasing importance, is the EPC vehicle. About 40 -50% (depending on the criteria) of the more than 300 EPC declarations issued so far are related to crises and conflicts originating in or around the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Since almost two decades EPC has more or less forced the Dutch government to take up a position regarding these issues, and to make decisions about the required policy-measures (demarches, sanctions, fact-finding missions etcetera). At one occasion (MFO/Sinai) the Dutch got even militarily involved. These activities are in military terms of course negligible, but politically they are often quite sensitive because of the relationship with the US.

6. Thus, regarding the (political and economic aspects of) security in and around the Mediterranean, undoubtedly a process

of Europeanization has taken place in Dutch foreign policy. Due to the expanding scope of European economic and political cooperation, and due to an increased preparedness to certain kinds of European security cooperation (cf. the fourth Dutch defense priority), a country in the North-West of Europe apparently becomes at least politically closer involved with the problems of and nearby NATO's Southern Region.

7. The Gulf is of course not part of Mediterranean security, but there are obviously certain political links between, for instance, the Gulf war and the position of Turkey (or the situation in Lebanon), and as said before, operations of NATO countries outside Europe do incur compensation problems inside the NATO-boundaries. The West European naval operations in the Gulf, for instance, induced Germany to send some ships to Mediterranean waters (while Norway sent a patrol to the North Sea). Such moves are keenly noticed at Dutch naval headquarters in Den Helder, particularly when the German Navy is involved.

8. As a colonial power Holland had considerable interests in the Mediterranean. The Suez canal, of which Holland was the third largest user at the turn of this century, counted as a vital link with the Dutch East-Indies. Decolonization made of course an end to these concerns, but it is interesting to note that through the process of Europeanization, some "colonial" security issues (like

the balancing of continental and overseas defence priorities) have been returned to a certain extent on the security-agenda in The Hague.

9. Rummel and Schmidt talk about the "splitting tendencies" within the West European security community, and about "regional and subregional differentiation" in this respect (p.21). And they fear that "...the divers processes of subregional cooperation are likely to impede the development of a common West European security policy". This is perhaps true. But we see on the other hand countries in North-West Europe, large and small, taking political and even military responsibilities for operations on and beyond NATO's southern borders in the frameworks of WEU or EPC. Not exactly a process of "subregional differentiation" as it seems.

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Workshop
West European Security Policy:
The Scope of Identity

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Institutional Frameworks for
Security Cooperation in Western Europe

Part I

Developments, Aims and Structural Problems

by
Mathias Jopp

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Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung,
Frankfurt

1. Introduction

In recent years cooperation between the countries of Western Europe in the field of security policy has increased considerably. The WEU has been reactivated and for the first time European Political Cooperation has received a legal basis. The IEPG has developed into a focus for initiatives aimed at coordinating military procurement programmes and plans for cooperation in arms technology.

In addition to these multilateral developments it has also been possible to observe a remarkable increase in bilateral cooperation. Franco-German cooperation based on the Elysee Treaty has taken on such concrete form that other Western European countries have made critical comments on the subject. Great Britain and France have begun to take steps in the field of defence cooperation. Very recently efforts have been made to strengthen the links between Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany and similar initiatives in Italian-German relations have also begun to take place. In both cases Franco-German security consultation serves as a model. All this is happening with the aim of building a second pillar within the Western Alliance, however, at different building sites at the same time.

An important factor underlying these efforts involves Western European fears of being forced to play a minor role in security affairs as a result of changes in the relationship between the superpowers. During the first half of the 80s Western European countries attempted to work together in order to lend greater weight to their common interest in the revival of detente and arms control dialogue. Since the Reykjavik summit meeting in 1986 they have become increasingly involved in cooperation in an attempt to prevent the superpowers reaching agreement on disarmament measures which would be detri-

mental to specifically European defence interests.

2. The aims of security cooperation

A primary function of bi- and multilateral coordination is to bring together Western European interests in order to be able to exercise greater influence on the policies of the USA. It is also meant to reduce the structural imbalance in the Alliance's decision-making process (catchword: equal partnership). The move towards what is sometimes called "a more self-assertive Europe" is thus an attempt to gain greater public support for defence policy in some countries.

The construction of a European pillar within the Alliance is to demonstrate a European readiness to take on greater responsibility and also to make the Western European defence contribution much more visible in order to maintain the USA's firm commitment to the defence of Europe. It is clear here, however, that due to the present budgetary constraints in most Western European countries defence efforts cannot be improved by significant increases in defence spending, but only as a result of a coordinated management of resources.

At the centre of all Europeanization initiatives one will find that an attempt is being made to preserve the status quo within the Western defence system - even within the changed framework of the post-INF era - without wishing to pay an additional price for this. However, Europeans will only be able to play a greater role in the Western Alliance if France is involved in a variety of indirect, ie European ways, since its military re-integration within NATO is not foreseeable in the near future (although this would perhaps make things considerably easier).

Western European cooperation has been intensified significantly as a result of the disarmament process made possible by the superpowers. However, there are also other independent factors which have led to progress in the process of Europeanization. Western Europeans' consciousness of their economic and political role in the world has been substantially changed by progress in the field of EC integration. Moves towards security cooperation are thus also meant to accelerate the process of European integration and improve the technological competitiveness of Western Europe in relation to the USA and Japan. It is also clear that in the field of security policy a certain amount of momentum has been achieved in Western European institutional developments so that they are themselves having an impact within the community of twelve as well as in the surrounding region. (The number of applications for membership of the WEU and the EC should be seen in this light.)

However, the single mantle of joint policy goals conceals a large number of divergent interests. These can range from different national priorities in defence policy to divergences in opinion on concrete questions of arms control and disarmament (eg in relation to SNF) and different ideas on which European institutions need strengthening. The ironing out of these differences - not only between Bonn, Paris and London, but also, for example, between the Central and Southern European states - represents an essential part of the coordination process at different levels of security cooperation. On the one hand, overcoming these differences represents a problem for the development of a European security policy identity. On the other, however, the new challenges which have to be dealt with in arms control and disarmament policy not only present an opportunity to reduce the scale of the Soviet threat through negotiation, but also to accelerate the general European integration process including the field of security.

3. The development and scale of institutionalized cooperation

Efforts at achieving consensus on security and arms control questions are not restricted to one forum or organization. Discussions held within the WEU are aimed at this goal to the same extent as the coordination process within the EPC and the discussions held within the framework of Franco-German consultations. In addition to this there is also the Eurogroup of European NATO defence ministers (without France) and the Independent European Program Group (of which France is a member).

The Eurogroup largely devotes itself to the task of making the extent of European defence performance clear to the USA and publicizing it there through carefully directed public relations activities. In the long term it is questionable whether simply presenting the defence efforts made will be enough to convince the USA that the European contribution is sufficient.

The IEPG attracted greater public interest last year when it published a study called "Towards a Stronger Europe", which was drawn up by an independent group of experts. The study presented proposals for a strengthening of Europe's position in the fields of arms production and technology. The IEPG is also involved in assisting the low developed defence industries (LDIs) of some of its member states by offering support to facilitate their participation in cooperative technology programmes (CTPs). As a whole the practical results of IEPG activity are not as great as they could be and its stronger institutionalization through the establishment of a secretariat has not taken place.

Using the examples of Franco-German cooperation, the WEU and the EPC I would now like to present a brief overview of security-related cooperation in order then to des-

cribe the interaction between the institutions involved and their compatibility with NATO.

a) Franco-German security cooperation takes place on the basis on the Elysee Treaty of 1963. It first began to develop in the early 80s before the background of the anti-missile protests in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was then given further impetus by the disarmament policy of the superpowers. On the 25th anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty, on 22nd January 1988, both sides agreed to the establishment of a joint brigade. At the same time they also decided to form a Defence and Security Council in order to complete the existing bilateral consultative framework, although no new responsibilities were allocated to this body. Both governments wish to keep their cooperation open for the involvement of other countries and regard it as the security policy nucleus for a future European Union.

However, this view is not shared completely by others. In Great Britain and Italy it was greeted with criticism and even in the Benelux countries old fears reappeared about a Franco-German condominium which could be harmful to European unity. The USA, and to a certain extent NATO, reacted to the foundation of the council and the formation of a integrated military unit with discernible scepticism. It remains to be seen if Franco-German cooperation will be restricted to symbolic political measures or whether further concrete steps will be taken which could result in the foundation of a conventional Western European army. It is also unclear whether cooperation between the two countries might not lead to the emergence of new problems which could hinder future development.

b) The WEU is the only multilateral body within the Western Alliance in which the foreign and defence ministers from seven Western European NATO countries come to-

gether for joint discussions twice a year. Its revitalization in 1984 was closely connected with the problems experienced in expanding the EPC to include the field of security; however, it was also made possible by the concurrence of different national interests, particularly those of France and the Federal Republic. At the same time it also opened up an opportunity for the smaller states to be able to exert a greater influence on the defence policy of the big three.

In the Rome Declaration the member states of the WEU agreed to discuss the specific problems of European security and to attempt to harmonize their views. They agreed to do this in relation to the following areas: questions of defence and disarmament, political support for arms cooperation, and the effects on European security of crises in other parts of the world. In connection with the latter, in 1987 for the first time attempts were made at coordinating the dispatch of European naval units to a conflict region, the Persian Gulf, on the basis of paragraph VIII of the Modified Brussels Treaty and Section III, Number 4 of the Platform. The military operations of these ships in the Gulf, however, remained under national command. Nevertheless, this may have set a precedent for future Western European handling of NATO's out-of-area problem.

The "Platform" which was agreed in October 1987 by the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in The Hague is a smaller version of the original French proposal for a European Security Charter. The central idea underlying the consensus achieved in The Hague involves the perception that at present there is no alternative to the Western strategy of nuclear deterrence, that US involvement in Western European defence is absolutely necessary if it is to be effectively and credibly maintained and also that British and French independent nuclear forces are of considerable importance. Thus, es-

essentially the Platform reconfirmed old principles and interests, and did not offer new perspectives in relation to a further development of a specifically Western European security policy.

It is also in this light that one should see the minor improvements in the organizational structure of the WEU (the enlargement of the Permanent Council to include Political Directors, the formation of Working Groups) and the endless arguments on the question of the collocation of WEU bodies, which are at present divided between London and Paris. Another problem which long occupied the WEU related to the applications for membership from the Iberian countries. The reason for this was that Spain has maintained a critical stance towards nuclear deterrence. However, in March this year the Spanish head of government Mr Gonzalez unreservedly accepted the NATO summit communique, which included central elements of the WEU Platform. Agreement has also been reached between Spain and the USA on the question of military bases, so that it would now appear that nothing stands in the way of the acceptance of Spain as a member of the WEU. The example of Spain demonstrates the function of the Platform as a kind of filter in the integration process which facilitates decisions on the acceptance or rejection of new applications and also as an instrument for harmonizing different national attitudes towards the essential aspects of Western defence strategy.

A further problem of the WEU as an organization concerns the lack of attention paid to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), the three agencies for defence, arms cooperation and arms control, and the Parliamentary Assembly. The Council clearly only approves of the Assembly having a consultative function. Attempts at increasing public involvement have not found favour with the Council. The main reason for this is that the member

states primarily regard the WEU as a forum within which military aspects of security policy can be discussed in a discreet and frank way which is not possible within the EPC framework.

The WEU in its present form can thus be regarded as a kind of extension of the EPC which is selective with regard to its participants and the tasks it sets itself whilst at the same time not being restricted by the constraints of the EC framework. One of its primary activities involves reacting to the policy of the USA, and also that of the Soviet Union, in order to agree, if possible, on a coordinated approach at meetings of the NATO bodies (NPG, Eurogroup, DPC, Atlantic Council) which follow the sessions of the WEU Council. In doing this, care is taken not to give rise to the impression that it is a counterpole to NATO, but to underline its function as a complementary body in NATO decision-making processes.

c) The main political focus for security-related cooperation in Western Europe is clearly to be found within the EPC. Even though it received a legal framework within the SEA little has changed in the way it functions or its structures (foreign ministers' meetings, Political Committee, Group of Correspondents, Working Groups) apart from the establishment of a secretariat in Brussels. A common foreign policy has not yet been established. By attempting to create a European foreign policy identity, movements towards integration, for example, as laid down in the Draft Treaty for a European Union drawn up by the European Parliament, have not been achieved. Nevertheless, in Section III of the SEA the EC member states accepted the obligation "to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest" and "to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security". This was the most which could be achieved within

the EC framework and the long debate on the importance of security policy within the Community was brought to an end for the time being.

The limited range of the security dimension within the EC was again made very clear by the failure of the Delors initiative on a European security summit. In spite of this the foreign ministers have dealt with aspects of disarmament policy within the framework of their informal meetings (eg the one held in April 1987 in Turnhout, Belgium). In several official declarations the Twelve have also laid down their general position on arms control (a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons by 50 %, the banning of chemical weapons, the bringing about of a stable conventional balance in Europe). In doing so, the guidelines for disarmament policy agreed by NATO have been verified by the EPC.

Traditionally important areas of EPC's work are to be found in CSCE policy and dealing with general developments in East-West relations. In the light of more formal relations between the EC and Comecon and its member states it was decided at the EPC meeting in Ioannina held under Greek presidency to commission studies which are to outline the framework for a joint Western European Ostpolitik. Decisions on this are supposed to be taken at the Rhodes summit in December this year.

Further central themes of the EPC in recent years have related to the question of the position the EC countries should take towards crises and conflicts outside Europe, in particular in the Near and Middle East, in Southern Africa and in Central America.

The EPC largely sees its purpose as using diplomatic and economic means to contribute towards a peaceful solution of conflicts and the reduction of tension around the world. It also aims to provide support for regional co-

operation outside Europe. In pursuing such objectives the EPC occasionally finds itself in a position in which it is carrying out different policies from those of the USA. This has not helped to overcome the scepticism towards the EPC which has occasionally reappeared in most US administrations since the time of Henry Kissinger.

If one compares the policies of the EPC with that of the WEU it would appear that a clear division of labour between the two Western European institutions has developed: the cooperative policy elements in East-West and North-South relations are coordinated in the EPC and the more military aspects within the WEU. The range and extent of political action undertaken by the EPC is wider and because of its close links with the EC it also has an economic power base (EC trade and cooperation policy). The WEU, on the other hand, is essentially a forum for discussion.

The relationship between EPC and NATO could be described as one which tends to be mutually exclusive. The WEU, on the other hand, has close links with NATO because of the provisions of the Modified Brussels Treaty (even if there is a lack of institutionalized contact between the WEU and NATO). The relationship between the EPC and WEU can be characterized as complementary. The demarcation between the spheres of activity of the two organizations would appear rather artificial and in practice it is not always strictly adhered to. Because of their importance general aspects of security and arms control policy have become a part of EPC consultations. From the perspective of integration policy the WEU functions as an instrument of adjustment to the imperatives of Central European security and defence. The scope of the EPC, on the other hand, is much more wide-ranging. Specific national interests, for example, in relation to increased East-West cooperation or improved stability in the Mediterranean region and the Near East, are taken up and discussed in

the process of developing a common political approach. Undoubtedly, however, the reactivation of the WEU has also influenced non-WEU members' readiness to become more involved in the EPC.

4. Structural problems and national interests

The Western European partner states are agreed that they will continue to expand their cooperation in security-related fields, not least because it is generally accepted that the integration process would remain incomplete without the inclusion of security policy. However, a centralized structure for security policy decision-making has not yet crystalized and the responsibility for defence policy continues to remain in the hands of national governments and NATO.

Western European decision-making processes involve a variety of overlapping bodies and consultative arrangements, a fact which has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it enables a gradual synthesis to take place and facilitates the development of a common security identity without at the same time injuring the national self-esteem of those involved. On the other, however, it results in duplication, fragmentation and delays.

The process of the Europeanization of security policy is moving forward in small steps rather than in historic leaps. The different motives for supporting security cooperation, divergent orientations in defence policy, the power gap between the large and small states as well as between those possessing nuclear weapons and those without them all lead to the fact that most of the energy expended is absorbed in finding the lowest common denominator. The limits for security cooperation and integration in Western Europe are thus much more restrict-

ed than one might expect in the light of the divergences with the USA which periodically occur and the wide-ranging plans for European integration which are on the table.

One of the problems holding back further progress involves the various political preferences in respect of Western European institutions. The three medium-sized Western European powers, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, have very fixed views on the subject: whereas Great Britain, for example, would like to relocate the WEU in Brussels in order to ensure close contacts between the organization and NATO, France would like to bring together the WEU bodies in Paris, largely, but not only, for symbolic reasons. The French argument is certainly important if the WEU is not once again to become an empty shell. In relation to security policy the Federal Republic of Germany has mainly made efforts to accelerate the development of a European Union. However, as this has only found favour with France (to a certain extent) the FRG supports the idea of the WEU being a coordinating body. However, the level of French commitment to the WEU fluctuates considerably so that the Franco-German defence axis fulfills an additional, if also limited role here.

Generally it can be said that although most Western European governments are interested in intensifying cooperation, they try to avoid any strengthening of the institutional framework which could be of a more binding nature. This also explains their preference for consultative security and defence arrangements outside the EC framework.

The arduous progress being made along the road towards security cooperation should not necessarily be seen as an indication of the existence of structural barriers to maximizing the effectiveness of collective policy. It is

far more the case that it illustrates the difficulties confronting the institutionalization of cooperation in the security and defence field rather than demonstrating its impossibility. At the present time it is not only possible to observe a trend towards maintaining national autonomy in security matters, but one can also see a trend towards extremely diverse and complex forms of bi- and multilateral cooperation. It is to be expected that the collective learning processes which will take place in relation to the usefulness of cooperation and integration will lead to a harmonization of national interests and as a result Western European identity will acquire greater weight within the Atlantic Alliance.

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"WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY: THE SCOPE OF IDENTITY"

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Part II: Arguments and Options

Wolfgang Wessels

Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn

Not for quotation!

Bonn, Oct. 1988

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1. Do European institutions matter? - Pros and cons for a West European security set-up

Reflections about European (and other) institutions are often met with hard till mild scepticism about the relevance of political "forms". It is either the "personal" (pre)dispositions of governmental actors or the "objective" national interests which prevent or promote (West European security) policies. Institutional "engineering" is thus not a vital factor and might be even harmful, if it is directed against those "fundamentals" of (security) policies.

In a slightly milder version, the scepticism is based on the argument that the politicians in responsible positions are insufficiently aware of the need and the possibilities of using the existing (West European) structures more efficiently. Necessary is thus an operation to convince and teach politicians about West European security necessities and the optimal use of existing channels. The task for strategies is thus to mobilize the political "will" and improve the political "skill". Institutional set-ups should induce and promote learning processes without creating "unproductive constraints". The debate should be subject- and person-orientated: too "strong institutions" would lead to an overemphasis of legal arguments and unnecessary confrontations.

The role of institutions in general is on the other hand emphasized by different schools of social and political science. The major thrust is that - though institutions might not overcome "fundamental" cleavages - they influence perceptions, structure information channels, and develop "regimes" of common management of (security) problems.

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In our workshop we are more interested in the question, if West European security institutions matter and in what direction. One basic school stresses that the present institutional set up is sufficient to deal with all security questions efficiently and effectively. All attempts for a (West) European pillar are even counter-productive as they are undermining the present more efficient and effective institutional set-ups. This thesis is based on two closely related considerations: one is based on the analysis that the basic global security architecture is still bipolar. The main thrust of West European policies should be directed to the U.S., which is still and perhaps even more the main interlocutor with the USSR. The main avenue for that link is NATO. Any kind of possible "alliance within the Alliance" might only reduce the efficiency of NATO's work and at the same time the influence on the US and also on the USSR, thus the effectiveness would be reduced. The other argument of the "NATO School" is based on assumptions that the divergencies in the interests within Western Europe and the lack of "political will" will make West European security policy per se rather less than more efficient and effective: the West Europeans are perceived as not being willing or not being able to take up responsibilities together. Experiences with the "inefficient" bureaucratic EC policies (see "butter mountains") only increase the resistance to any communitarian approach.

The opposite "European School" stresses that the "demand" for West European institutions is increasing considerably. This demand has two origins: one line tries to show that it makes sense to have common European efforts for improving the security of Europe in and outside the NATO area (this aspect is dealt with in other contributions to this conference). The other line of the European School stresses the integration aspect:

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any kind of further evolution of the EC in view of 1992 and towards a "European Union" needs a stronger security dimension. This argument needs some more debate. The pro-security line of thinking is based on at least six closely linked arguments.

- (a) Some "state-like" European Union automatically implies a stronger security dimension. No (federal) state in the world does exist without it. As the political will to move forward to a European Union has been stressed by member governments and parliaments in ratifying the preamble of the Single European Act this consequence is logical.
- (b) Any kind of a "European Foreign Policy" (thus the goal of art. 30 SEA) is not conceivable without a direct security dimension.
- (c) To these two arguments which are deductions of broadly stated (and therefore quite vague) political goals other arguments stress inductive spill-over processes from real trends of integration processes.
- (d) Faced with new general foreign policy challenges the West European process needs or at least will lead - by a "spill-over process" - to a security competence. Interdependent problems cannot be artificially split up in several fora, for a long term. Functional necessities will have an integrating effect.
- (e) The same logic is derived from the dynamics of "1992". An Internal Market 1992 with some kind of monetary policies carried out by a central bank creates strong spill-over effects for a more articulated European role in the international

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system in the international system; from a stronger economic role, a security dimension should and cannot be excluded. An "economic giant" cannot play an adequate role without more direct competences or common capabilities in the security area.

- (f) This spill-over from ongoing and "flourishing" Community policies is supposed to work more directly from the EC research policies (new art. 130 f - q in the EEC treaty) programme - key word: dual use - and the public procurement programme of the White Book, which however excludes defence procurement so far.

The last argument for including security is that of integration strategies.

- (g) Political packages - vital ingredients for any integration strategies - show inherent tendencies to include more and more sectors of traditional "national" policies. The next major package - based on French-German interest constellations - could and should include monetary and security issues. These sectors are the vital vehicles for more progress towards European Union.

Against the demand for a security dimension because of general integration reasons at least six arguments can be put forward:

- (a) The goal of a European Union is at least vague (if not a concept without any substance); there is not a clear political mandate for more security policies.

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- (b) The EC "success" story of the last decades worked without a direct security dimension. Why do we need a change?
- (c) Hard-core security policies would "overload" the EC institutional system: neither are the present EC actors prepared to deal with security problems, nor is the security "club" prepared to work within this institutional set-up.
- (d) Security issues would block the EC decision-making: The heterogeneity of security positions and the divergencies of interests among member states would spill over to other policy fields, thus reducing the capacity of the EC institutions to tackle the priority problems of the EC; the complexity would become so enormous that - at least - the present system would stagnate or even collapse.
- (e) The legitimacy of the EC system is not large enough to deal with - at least - the hard-core security decisions.
- (f) Finally: the Community might play a more effective role in a broader security concept by not developing direct security policies. A "civilian power" which might be open for membership of neutral countries like Austria and closer links with East European countries might be more effective to stabilize a European peace system than a Community which moves towards a traditional super-power role. A "l'Europe à geometrie variable" concept might leave security to something like the WEU.

This exchange of arguments is based on different analyses of the reality and diverging perceptions of the future scenarios of European and global evolutions. We

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need to keep them in mind when evaluating future options.

2. Options for institutional set-ups

The demand for West European institutions were seen to be two-fold: To contribute to a more effective security policy and to further the integration process towards some kind of a European Union.

In reviewing and proposing certain options both functions should be taken as yardsticks for an assessment. We add considerations about the political feasibility. All of these remarks are of course no final judgements but serve to open and perhaps structure the debate.

- (a) First group of options: The improvement of information and communication processes within an institutional status quo - towards a "communauté de vues"

This set of options is based on the argument that the possibilities and channels to get together in order to "confront" interests and options are insufficient: more common or more efficient fora would lead to some kind of a "communauté de vues" on the West European security identity; in this view no basic institutional changes are needed - at least not in a first phase. The idea would be to improve the West European bodies already existing in NATO, WEU and EPC in a way which would lead to an optimal meeting of "brains". For this purpose one could propose:

Option 1: To adapt the working procedures and the scope of activities of the Independent European Programme Group and/or the Euro-Group

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In this option a more formalized procedure for the Euro-Group and - as a necessary precondition - the return of France to the Euro-Group or a scope enlargement of the IEPG would be required.

The heterogeneity of such a West European caucus is negative for both major functions: neither a more efficient management of "core" West European interests is guaranteed nor the process towards a European Union is promoted - at least as long as not all West European NATO members are members of the EC.

Option 2: To improve the deliberation capacity within the WEU

This option would see the potential for a stronger West European security identity within the WEU group - especially if it is enlarged to other West European countries willing to accept The Hague Platform of 1987. As this set-up is even generally accepted by the US, those West Europeans who are - *expressis verbis* - prepared to go along with a more intensified West European coordination of policies could build up their own forum. If the organisational deficits of the secretariat could be reduced by moving it to Brussels and the administrative infrastructure would be reinforced - e.g. by having permanent representations of the WEU linked to the NATO permanent representations - then at least those active countries could create a "communauté d'information" and a "communauté de vues" which could be a common basis for policies in the "communauté d'action", i.e. NATO.

This approach would meet the demand for a more efficient West European cooperation among a core group. In view of the integration goal it might however lead to an "Europe à la carte" which might even more reduce the coherence of West European foreign policy-making. This

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argument is less influenced by the fact that not all EC members would be participating - some of the resisting, unwilling countries might even be induced to "jump on the train leaving the station" - than by the parallelism of the several set-ups for West European foreign policy-making: the EC for external economic policy, the EPC for foreign policy and the WEU for security policy issues. On the other hand this division of labour might be useful for a more diversified and differentiated foreign policy-making. This option seems to be politically feasible.

Option 3: To enlarge the scope of the EPC deliberations

For this option the scope of art. 30 item 6a SEA could be "reinterpreted" or changed when the revision comes up in 1992. As the Community countries have already progressed considerably to build up a "communauté de vues" on general foreign policies this scope enlargement might develop into a European Foreign Policy in the broadest sense. The deficits as far as the identity in West European security positions and interests are concerned (as compared with WEU) might be overcome by an intensive learning process and spill-over effects from EPC and EC. This option ranks - in terms of the integration goal - higher than option 2, in terms of security purposes - at least at the beginning - lower. The willingness of some EPC members to enlarge this scope of EPC seems still to be limited.

- (b) Second set of options: to change the status quo by creating a new or different legal set-up: towards a "communauté d'action"

This set of options is based on the assumption that legal set-ups matter: they are needed to change political processes and understandings. A "Defence

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Union" and/or the European Union is thus not achieved by good will, more information or better coordination but only by some "saut qualitatif" of shifting competences and instruments to a more efficient and hopefully democratic institutional set-up on the European level.

Option 4: A (parallel) intergovernmental security treaty

This option is based on the assumption that a completely new set-up is to be established as the old structures (like the WEU) and projects (like the European Defence Community) cannot and should not be revived and as other existing forms like the EPC and EC are perceived as not being adequate for the specific needs of security policy.

This treaty which could be seen as a basic reform of the WEU or parallel to the treaty on EPC would shift some areas of security policies to a "common responsibility" like the EMS did in monetary affairs. The activities would be run by some kind of a Council and a proper administrative infrastructure without supranational elements. A higher common discipline and a common responsibility for major defence resources and security policy instruments would be installed. This new approach could be inside NATO but offer the possibility of replacing the NATO responsibility in the case the Alliance fails. The link to the process towards European Union would be nil. There are no indications for any political support of a completely new set-up.

Option 5: A revised EPC treaty

This option pleads for a more coherent and productive approach of West European foreign policy-making which should be based on the EPC experiences and in coherence to the EC's external relations. When the EPC revision

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comes up in 1992 the process towards a "European Foreign Policy" (see "preamble" of art. 30, SEA) would be based on shifting real competences in the foreign policy and security area to a common level which would be mainly run by an intergovernmental set-up with a slightly increased role for a secretariat and a strengthened administrative structure (e.g. permanent representations); the links to the EC institutions especially to the European Parliament and the Commission would be improved in such a way as to foster the "consistency". The advantage of such an option is: to improve the capacity for a more coherent foreign and security policy without a "sell-out" to supranational bodies, but also keeping the process within the broader evolution towards a European Union.

Option 6: A new chapter to the EEC treaty

In analogy to the new chapters on "environment," "cohesion," and "technology" in the EEC treaty - introduced by the SEA - economic security issues or at least parts of them - e.g. arms production - could become an area of Community activity; these policies would be run along the rules of the EC treaties, i.e. a monopoly of initiative for the Commission, unanimity for basic decisions, majority voting and cooperation procedure with the Parliament for follow-up decisions. This EC approach is supposed to rationalize arms production and lower costs. The expectation is implied that this industrial approach would lead to a spill-over process to common defence policy.

This option asks for an extension of the Commission's resources and of the administrative infrastructure, e.g. of the permanent representation to the EC.

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The exclusion of arms production from the present EC public procurement programme for "1992" signals the political problems of such a "communitarian" approach.

Option 7: Security competence in a federal constitution

This option aims to replace the traditional nation state - at least in the area of defence - fully by a European federal state whose federal institutions would dispose of full competence over security policies. Integration and defence functions would be completely integrated, but reality looks different...

- (c) A third set of options: establishing a more efficient West European Sub-Group

Option 8: A principal "nations" approach

This option is based on the assumption that the larger three (four? five?) countries of the Community have broader security interests, more resources at hand and are more willing to take up broader responsibilities. A core group could tackle the security issue without the smaller "nuisance" powers whose governments might even be glad to shift the responsibility to other countries to speak for Europe without participating in "nasty" decisions.

This option has its serious drawbacks. The assumption that larger West European powers have more in common is not proved. You might even need smaller countries as catalysator between diverging interests of the larger countries.

Smaller countries have also demonstrated that they are ready to take up responsibilities - see the ships of the

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WEU countries in the Persian Gulf and Dutch soldiers in the Sinai.

Finally such a core group might increase the "irresponsibility" of smaller countries and decrease the chances for a European Union. In spite of all advantages for them to diffuse responsibility - their claim to be governed by a "directoire" would be detrimental also to their confidence into the Community, the EPC and NATO.

Option 9: A French - German Tandem

This option assumes that France and the Federal Republic of Germany have more in common and are more willing to integrate into a united defence structure, which would contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of other set-ups. By their activities they might stimulate others to follow and thus be "le moteur de l'intégration européenne". The validity of all these assumption is questionable.

3. Strategies

These options presented are not mutually exclusive and can at least partly be integrated into a coherent approach, if we come to some kind of common understanding on the basic questions. As for discussion purposes we should not exclude any of these possibilities - we never know how constellations might change and some highly speculative option might serve as a useful point of reference. To look for pragmatic steps forward we should follow a piece-meal engineering strategy, i.e. to try and exploit at the same time different existing channels and possibilities and to test their relative value. As for timing the revision of the EPC treaty and the other dynamics within the EC point at "creative constellations" in 1991/1992.

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West European Security Policy: The Scope of Identity

Ebenhausen, November 10-12, 1988

PORTUGAL AND WEST-EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Alvaro Vasconcelos

PORTUGAL AND WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

In briefly summarizing the challenges facing Portugal's security policy at a time when it is becoming 'Europeanized' — not only due to recent Portuguese membership of the Western European Union but mainly as a consequence of membership of the European Communities — three major topics can be identified:

1. Challenges to Portugal's security
2. Reorganization of relationships with the NATO allies
3. Modernization of the armed forces and 'normalization' of defence policy making

1. Portuguese security

Located in the extreme Western periphery of Europe, Portugal does not have a clear perception of a specific Soviet threat to its security.

The pro-Atlantic consensus and a 'tough' ideological approach to East-West relations created in the democratic political opinion and public opinion in general stems from the domestic crisis of 1974-75. The current 'new détente' in the East-West context and the effect it has in 'decoupling' Gorbachev (openness) and Alvaro Cunhal's Portuguese Communist Party (10% of the ballot in the last general election, 1986) will contribute to weaken even further the perception of a direct threat against Portugal's national territory. The geographical vicinity with North Africa (the Southern coasts of Portugal are at 192 km from the Moroccan coasts) does not as yet translate into the perception of a specific menace coming from the South, although some senior military have been

emphasizing a potential or emerging low-intensity threat originating in North Africa.

In European integration is to be found the main factor that brings Portugal close to the security concerns of Western Europe, namely of those of front line or north flank states, geographically closer to the East. Therefore a global threat and the East-West balance are now primarily being taken into consideration.

On the other hand, given the present international landscape and the domestic stability in Portugal, defence concerns are not so much a priority as economic development and readiness to meet the great challenge of 1992. Directly related to the quest for an affirmative identity within Europe is the relationship with Brazil and the Portuguese-speaking African states. In what concerns relations with Africa, the issue of military co-operation is cautiously and slowly being brought up; amongst various extra-European scenarios, this would certainly be the most likely for a future commitment of Portuguese armed forces, provided a certain general reticence is overcome.

2. Relations with allies

Portugal's defence relations with her allies most certainly are a priority issue in Portuguese security policy, and most prominently the bilateral relations with the United States, as well as those resulting from membership of the WEU and the consequences of Spain's accession to NATO.

Bilateral defence relations with the United States have represented,

since the early days of the Atlantic Alliance, the almost exclusive link binding Portugal to Western security interests and practically consisting of the use by the United States of air-naval facilities in the archipelago of the Azores. These facilities are considered by the United States as irreplaceable both in the European and in the out of area context (especially for the Middle East).

Portugal seeks today a redefinition of its relationship with the United States and would like to see it evolve from a bilateral to a multi-lateral NATO framework, thus putting an end to what some analysts call a rather US/Third World country type of relationship.

For out of area contingencies, Portugal has established since 1980, and more clearly since the agreement was signed in 1983, a case by case analysis of US requests for the use of facilities in out of area missions. There has also been harsher and wider criticism on the part of Portuguese leaders in what concerns the non fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by the United States with regard to agreed financial compensations for the use of those facilities.

Membership of the WEU is another clear indication of the 'Europeanization' of Portuguese foreign and defence policies, and also that Portugal is seeking a European component to balance its relationship with the United States. Portugal has no quarrel with the WEU platform and underlines the importance of the nuclear component of the NATO doctrine. Nevertheless, Portugal has stressed (perhaps more emphatically than other European allies) that the WEU should not be seen as an alternative to NATO but as a contribution to the European pillar of NATO concurring with its North-American allies.

As a result of Spain's accession to NATO, the need has arisen to think about the co-ordination between Spanish air-naval forces in the East Atlantic and the Iberlant, at present under the command of a Portuguese admiral.

There is potential room for bilateral tensions in this respect, if Portugal's concern over being given a subordinate role in the regional context is overlooked. The non-integration of Spain into the military command structure is therefore the worst possible solution from Portugal's point of view.

3. Military modernization and 'normalization' of defence policy making

As the country is part of an area thought of as fundamental for the reinforcement of Europe, and in particular of its Southern flank, it is considered in Portugal as highly probable that in case of an East-West conflict the Soviet Union would try to disrupt the reinforcement of Europe from North America. Generally speaking, the Portuguese doctrine overlooks the distinction between front, flanks and strategic rearguard. The major strategic options generally define the missions of the Portuguese armed forces as coincidental with the NATO missions, i.e. the defence of the sea lines of communication, namely the approaches to the straits of Gibraltar, the protection of the existing infrastructures, combined with the defence of the national territory — the so-called 'angles' of the triangle mainland-Madeira-Azores. The Portuguese armed forces, however, are ill-equipped to perform the NATO missions assigned to them. Aside from the three ASW Meko frigates and the modernization

of the Cicap surveillance system, the ongoing re-equipment programme is meeting with serious difficulties. Not least because the US assistance agreed in 1983 has been steadily and significantly decreasing: 205 million dollars in 1985, 117 million in 1988.

For the time being, however, the main concern of the government still is the thorough 'normalization' of the politico-military relations within the country, through a more decisive role of the Defence Ministry which will in turn become possible through the actual enforcement of the existing Internal Law of the Defence Ministry.

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**West European Security: The scope of identity, problems and perspectives of the cooperation among the Twelve,
Ebenhausen, November 10-12, 1988.**

The reactivation of WEU

- 1) Since the middle of the Eighties, the countries of Western Europe have been faced with a new situation in international relations. The changing situation calls for Western Europe to implement a European security policy.
- 2) The reactivation of WEU is the most significant step towards the construction of a European defence identity. In the Rome declaration the seven WEU-MS declared:

"Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase cooperation between the member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus."
- 3) In October 1987 the process of reactivation led to the adoption of the platform on European security interests. In the platform, the WEU-MS affirm their conviction, that the balanced policy of the Harmel Report remains valid:

"Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy."
- 4) In April 1988 the Council of Ministers charged the Special Working Group to present two reports on arms control and defence requirements and on the implementation process of the WEU-platform for the autumn ministerial session.

- 5) In accordance with the ministerial mandate reports on the consequences for Western Europe of the START-negotiations, on CST and on the implementation has been elaborated. They will be presented at the forthcoming ministerial meeting.
- 6) The most important achievement since the reactivation of WEU will be the accession of Spain and Portugal to the modified Brussels Treaty. The protocol of accession will be signed at the ministerial meeting.

The documents of accession will contain a political declaration which considers the reexamination of the modified Brussels Treaty and the corresponding protocols in order to adapt them to the present situation of Western European defence policy.

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Patrick Keatinge, Trinity College Dublin

1. Security begins at home

Two distinctive national concerns influence Irish attitudes towards the main body of European security issues, viz:

a. Northern Ireland

The terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland, mainly though not exclusively conducted by the IRA, is the security challenge for Irish governments. It has lasted some seventeen years to date and there are few grounds for optimism about its resolution. It absorbs about 25 per cent of total expenditure on security, and ties the very small standing army mainly to an aid-to-the-civil power role. 'Cross-border' security policy is framed in an institutionalised bilateral regime (the Anglo-Irish Conference) with the United Kingdom.

There is a broader European dimension. In the last twelve months IRA operations have involved the security forces in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain; the EC is actually and potentially involved (interior ministry cooperation via the Trevi Group, aid to the Anglo-Irish International Fund, Chancellor Kohl's European police force project etc.). Nevertheless, one general effect of the Northern Ireland conflict, so far as Dublin is concerned, is to distract political attention and (perhaps) material resources from general European security challenges.

b. Neutrality

Ireland's stance of neutrality predates the post-1945 east-west divide. However ambiguous in form and permissive in content, it has been sustained and in some respects accentuated through fifteen years of EC membership. Ireland is a 'footnote state' with regard to European Security, and in terms of formal alignment the footnote state (see the unilateral declaration deposited with the SEA instrument of ratification, 1987).

Title III of the SEA was the object of contradictory interpretations by the Irish Supreme Court. Official orthodoxy rests on the minimalist view, emphasising the looseness of commitment and exclusion of 'military security'. However, there is some evidence of revisionist thinking on neutrality. The Progressive Democrats (= liberal) have described it as 'bogus', partly because it does not address the requirements of a national defence policy, and leading Fine Gael personalities (e.g. Garret FitzGerald, Commissioner Peter Sutherland) have warned of an eventual call to arms in the context of further political integration. Fianna Fail (= Gaullist), which in the 1984 EP election campaigned on the slogan 'we will never join any military alliance', is more circumspect in government resting on the orthodox doctrine of the parallel development of political and economic integration, in which it is assumed that defence obligations are part of the ultimate phase of integration. The left is unequivocally pro-neutrality, as is the public at large, which has not yet been presented with a serious trade-off dilemma on the issue.

2. Nuclear issues

A marked anti-nuclear consensus has developed since the civilian nuclear option was ruled out by popular demand ten years ago, and sensitivities were heightened in the 'Third World War' scare of the early 1980s. This has served to underline traditional Irish disarmament policies in the United Nations context, particularly with regard to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty; there is also support for deep cuts in strategic arsenals and the strict maintenance of the ABM treaty. At a more popular level demands for nuclear free zones and the banning of (alleged) nuclear port visits and overflights have increased recently.

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The 'environment-nuclear linkage' is reflected in government positions. To date the impact has been mainly bilateral (protests against British nuclear installations, including, notoriously, the Sellafield reprocessing plant), but following the Cattenom ruling recourse to the Community, hitherto unsuccessful, may be renewed.

All in all, Ireland would hardly be comfortable with either the WEU platform or some future west-European minimum deterrent, even if more traditional reservations about neutrality were conceded.

3. The CSCE - towards an effective mutual security regime?

From an Irish point of view the consolidation and further development of the CSCE is an important goal. In the first instance this involves: a) an insistence on the link between the alliances' conventional stability talks and the CSCE proper, to reinforce the legitimacy of both processes; and b) a development of the CSBM regime ('Stockholm Mark II').


Further on the horizon are two possibilities. The first, which made a fleeting appearance during the final stages of Stockholm Mark I, concerns the availability of the neutrals for verification/supervisory roles in a changing relationship between the alliances. The second is the development of naval CSBMs; the traffic of (mainly NATO) submarines in the Irish Sea is already a public issue, and any redeployment of alliance forces away from central Europe towards the eastern Atlantic could raise further problems of this sort, for a state which has belatedly learned to recognize its maritime vocation.

Ireland may also take a more pointed interest in the economic dimension of the CSCE. Traditionally trade contacts with the eastern bloc have been minimal, but some recent positive developments (particularly in the air transport industry) may whet the appetite and lead to support for the Community's central role in evolving more substantial east-west economic links. The overlapping of EC and CSCE frameworks in this respect would not entail the 'identity dilemma' which Ireland encounters on security issues in the CSCE (i.e. being associated with the EPC club rather than the Neutral and Non-aligned club).

4. Linkages with non-European regional conflicts.

As one of the smallest EC member-states, in a relatively isolated geo-strategic location, specific Irish security interests are not extensive, but it would be a mistake to assume there are none. In the Mediterranean two challenges persist. Relations with Libya have been coloured by recent indications that Libya was a far more important source of arms to the IRA than had hitherto been assumed. As a long-standing contributor to UNIFIL Ireland has a potentially dangerous involvement with the Arab-Israeli dispute. In both cases, EPC provides an important diplomatic framework, though of course the UN is also important. Indeed, in the last six months it has become increasingly so, with Irish participation in UN supervision of both the Iran-Iraq truce and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Persistent popular pressures ensure that there is also the expression of distinctive positions on conflicts in southern Africa and central America, with some public perception that EPC/EC involvement is too quiescent. This should be seen in the context of popular support for development cooperation policies, including some emphasis on disarmament-development linkages.



**WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY:
THE SCOPE OF IDENTITY**

Problems and Perspectives of the Cooperation among the Twelve

November 10-12, 1988

Protocol of discussions

Olaf Mager

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The director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Prof.Dr. Stürmer welcomed the participants of the conference. In his remarks, he focussed on his experiences from a recent visit to Moscow. While the Soviet Union was prepared to redefine its foreign policy no such thing happened in the military field. The continuation of the military threat combined with a lack of new thinking in Soviet "Westpolitik" i.e. Gorbachev was making no concessions concerning Berlin and Germany, demonstrated a hardline approach which had to be taken into account. The notion of a common European house did not look more tempting today than it did under Breschnew. Mr.Stürmer outlined that change could only be realized if the Kremlin acknowledged that Western European integration would proceed; that US-presence in Western Europe enhanced stability, and that nuclear weapons will continue to be a necessary precondition for the coherence of a West European architecture as well as for global stability. It was for the Soviet Union to introduce steps which would allow Western Europe to respond and promote fruitful relations to secure peace and stability.

On behalf of the organizers of the conference (Institut für Europäische Politik, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Mr.Rummel opened the working sessions by pointing out the main thrust of the gathering: to exchange views between military strategists and integrationists on the issue of security cooperation in Western Europe. The security challenges and the integration process in Western Europe had reached a level where they demanded a synergetic approach of so far separate expert communities.

INTEGRATION AND SECURITY

Chairman Mr.Wessels asked Mr. Peter Schmidt to present his views on "West European Integration and Security Co-Operation - Diverging and Converging Trends" and Mr.Reinhardt Rummel on "Integration and Security: Recent Developments".

Their joint presentation was followed by Mr. Hans-Gert Poettering's comment. "Our Goal: The European Security Union. Plea for a European security policy."

In the following discussion, Mr.Pijpers asked Mr.Poettering to evaluate his statement on the direct link between the competition and dynamics of the European integration. While Mr. Poettering expressed a certain

necessity that the European Community should deal with security related issues, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Rummel had emphasized in their paper rather the opposite. They had written on page 16 : "It is basically to be questioned if the processes of economic, technological, and cultural integration presently require an extension to security issues at all." The question was whether the apparent dynamics of the internal market was in itself leading to the necessity of a closer defence and security cooperation in Europe. Mr. Pijpers suggested to take into account postwar developments leading to Western European integration to answer this question. The link of economic integration on the one hand and defence integration on the other hand was neither a pre-condition nor a basic requirement for the Western European integration.

In terms of the Single European Act, the relationship between title two and title three was non-existing. It was highly important to realize this fact. A spill-over suggested by many European-minded persons was not likely to happen. The neo-functional integration theory had revealed tendencies that the two areas were not interrelated and Haas had pointed out some thirty years ago that certain sectors of Europe were more likely to be converted by integration processes while others remained untouched. Defence and security remained a high policy sector and were not suitable for gradual integration. This theoretical observation today was again under revision. Nevertheless, the outcome remained doubtful.

Mr. Pedersen added that the linkage between the economic and the security dimension within the European Community would have an impact on the neutrals. Mr. Pedersen expressed concern not about the risk of endangering the specific West European goal of building a network of cooperative East-West relations (Schmidt/Rummel paper, page 17) but about the effects of making these two processes totally interdependent. Referring to his Nordic background he asked: What was more important for the European Community, taking up the security dimension or the further enlargement? In his view, NATO remained the most suitable forum in regard to defence and security issues. How important would a security component be for the EC if it would be a major obstacle in enlarging the Community in the foreseeable future? He regarded it as more important to invite i.e. Sweden as a new member than trying to define a European stance on security thus duplicating similar efforts within NATO and causing serious problems in the transatlantic relationships.

Concerning the two models 'defence-first' and 'defence-last', he denounced them as not very precise and pointed out that they would not reflect the actual developments. The example of the Nordic countries showed that there was, despite of strong integration in the civilian area, nothing like a defence union.

Mr. Müller explained that the character in both fields differed widely, making closer collaboration very difficult. The character of economic interdependence was very different from the character of military dependence. In the economic field autonomous forces were acting while in the military field something like that did not occur. Mr. Müller emphasized the need to explain the reasons for what he called 'this rush into Europeanization.' He recalled that the German peace movement raised concern in Europe "to keep the Germans in"; that president Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union proved that he was an unreliable political leader of the Western world and that the Rejkavik summit had made Europeans aware that they had to get together. The US policy had this unintended effect on Western Europe to make them worry about their own security. Certainly there has been no spillover from European integration to security related issues.

Mr. Vasconcelos raised the question why Europe should risk the destruction of NATO by shifting the emphasis away from the transatlantic framework, even if it was important to develop a common consensus on political issues, which clearly involves the security dimension i.e. in East-West relations and a trend to a more multiple structure in the international system.

If a trend to such a multiple international structure could be observed one had to raise the question what were the security needs emerging for Europe if it wanted to be and remain an active actor in world politics. Concerning the Southern European countries, one could discover that the existence of the European Community had changed their perceptions of the overall security needs of Western Europe in general and the security needs of the central or front-line states in particular. The development of a common European security identity and policy would mean the ultimate destruction of the Alliance. From the Southern European perspective there was a clear need to improve the balance of relationship within the Alliance i.e. less American and more European presence. The public support would be far greater for a European defence policy if it would

contribute to an substantial improvement within and not apart from the NATO Alliance.

Mr. Wittmann commented that the discussion of security matters in the European Parliament had been a qualitative step, although seemingly incremental. But the impression remains that the main focus of interests remains on the level of procedure, organization, institution, integration strategies and so on, and not on the substance. It seemed to him that WEU had a platform but no train. What should European security policy cooperation be? There were dangers in concentrating on purely institutional problems as a means of avoiding the substance.

One danger was of course that the differences in the perception of the military threat and the different national interests in this respect were papered over. Diverging motives and interests had to be identified. Contradictions and conflicting attitudes had to be discussed in order to agree on common principles. The Franco-German bilateral defence cooperation was a good example of diverging motives and interests. France's intentions were different from those of the Federal Republic.

All the talk about which forum might be best suitable was just another technique of avoiding substance. One negative effect of this talk could be seen in NATO. It was disruptive and created suspicion on substructures. NATO as an organization was very critical about the on-going talk and Mr. Wittmann had the impression that NATO rather felt to be on the defensive while not knowing what the outcome of the debate will be. The last comment he made was that the organizational approach currently discussed offered no answers at all to the burden-sharing issue which was the heart of the intra-Alliance problem. In this respect the question of definition of a European Pillar was rather of secondary meaning.

Referring to his recent visit to the USA, Mr. Wittmann said that Western Europe must come up with some adequate answers in the field of substance and burden-sharing or risk-sharing otherwise the new administration will have a tough ride on the Europeans.

Mr. Wallace warned the participants to believe that there would be no spillover between the economic integration and the security field. With the internal market of 1992, a lot of changes were going to happen. The image of national defence would change too. The idea of national procurement would become absurd because of the integration of industry. The purchase of weapon components from Swedish or Swiss-owned

companies raised interesting questions for arms procurement in the national context. The change was going to force the Europeans to collaborate especially in the field of arms cooperation and procurement.

Mr. Wallace expected certain spillover processes in the future effecting the relationship of Western Europe to neutral states as well as to Eastern Europe. The transatlantic burden-sharing issues for example lead to even more interesting questions of burden-sharing within Western Europe. The question who pays for what was rather difficult to answer as it raised both political and economical problems. Was it possible to introduce specialization among the national armed forces? What were the national priorities and capabilities in this respect? Who should pay for what and is there the basic trust and confidence in the first place? Mr. Wallace recalled a comment by Prime Minister Margret Thatcher who argued that the UK pays twice as much on defence than Italy. Is there going to be a "I want my military contribution back-attitude?" Questions of sovereignty and authority had to be solved as well. So far these kind of questions have been avoided for good national reasons. Asking for closer defence collaboration would open up a complete new set of very difficult questions.

In his reply, Mr. Poettering said that the picture presented was rather complex and difficult to approach. Given the many contradictions in Western Europe the European integration process had proved to be successful, thus providing reason for European optimism. The EC was not only seen as an economic fact but also as a political factor. Media attention had concentrated on the head of the commission, Mr. Delor, during recent summit meetings, and less on head of states underlying the importance of the European Community.

On the linkage between economic developments and security, Mr. Poettering did not argue that the internal market would lead immediately to a defence and security policy. On the other hand, the economic dynamics of the internal market would provide the basis for more arms cooperation within the European Community. The harmonization of technical measures, norms, etc. would allow far greater technological exchange. He regarded the change in attitudes of the British Labour Party members in the European Parliament as a great success in so far as they are now prepared to acknowledge the need for greater arms collaboration.

Comparing the problems of Western European states with those of the Eastern European countries, Mr. Poettering concluded that Western European countries were far better prepared to face the future than those behind the iron curtain. Concerning the enlargement of the European Community by Switzerland, Sweden or Austria, he mentioned the historical experience that the integration process developed in a rather pragmatic way. He understood that Denmark was in favour of Sweden's membership to EC because of the historical links. The same applied to Austria or Switzerland from the German perspective. But these countries would have to give satisfying answers to the security component of the EC. They should not be allowed to enter the Community if they obstruct the development towards a common European security policy.

He acknowledged that burden-sharing was a major issue. However, the notion of burden-sharing did not reflect adequately the relationship between the United States and its European allies. "Risk-sharing" would be much more appropriate. The main question was, in spite of American pressure, not "money" but psychological and political support. The transatlantic relationship was influenced by many aspects and it was likely that the debate would lead to different directions when economical considerations were included.

In this respect he pointed out that Western Europe had to take up its political and international responsibilities. The bombing of civilian targets in Libya by the USA would not have happened if the Western Europeans had got together to use political, diplomatic and economical sanctions in order to fight state-funded international terrorism. Western Europe did not share the responsibility but remained inactive, forcing the USA to act.

Concerning the different perception of security needs between Central Europe and the Southern region, Mr. Poettering agreed that the American presence was too dominant and that the Europeans should do more to supplement it, not only in the Southern region.

He partly accepted Mr. Wittmann's criticism concerning the substitution of substance. Institutions such as EPC and WEU were regarded as preconditions for discussions on security issues in a European context. He regarded the questions if Western Europe should accept a third zero-option; the question of a common perception on conventional reductions; the question how to react to the developments within the East-West relations and the response to the Soviet Union and its reform as very important in this respect.

Mr.Seidelmann wanted to know precisely if there had been any plans to include the military market into the concept of an internal market in 1992. If there were any plans, intentions or activities to elaborate an overall concept on the future of the East-West relations? If there were any plans to build up an integrated military space program? If there were any intentions in the European Parliament to develop a more comprehensive concept for the future conventional arms reduction talks?

Mr.Daguet wanted to know how Mr. Poettering assessed the reactivation of WEU and its relation to NATO.

Mr. Keatinge wanted to know, how a common defence policy could be made more acceptable in a European framework, taking into account that the Single European Act did not include the security dimension as such. Did Mr. Poettering see any attempts bearing in mind, that the Single European Act was based on consensus to include the defence dimension at the revision of the Single European Act in 1992?

In his response, Mr.Poettering declared that he had no masterplan but various ideas about the development of the European Community. A substantial difficulty for him as a politician was the necessity to get majority votes in the European Parliament. Being forced to realize that only compromises would allow progress, the interparliamentary cooperation has improved substantially in recent years.

Concerning the military market, he said that the internal market will contribute to a liberalization of the military market in one way or another. *W*

Concerning the relation between the European Community and Eastern Europe, he regarded the signing of a declaration between the EC and COMECON as an enormous victory for the former because the Soviet Union finally accepted the European integration as a historical factor of political reality in Europe. The Soviet Union would require economical assistance from the EC to modernize its "Empire." The EC had to think about a common concept how to handle this challenge. In his opinion, it seemed reasonable to improve relations on a bilateral basis between the EC and various Eastern European states. Such a concept should not only be economical oriented but should include political aspects i.e. human rights questions as well because time is working for the Western European democracies.

Concerning the space programs, Mr. Poettering mentioned various programs dealing with technological cooperation. There had been thoughts to promote the idea of a military surveillance satellite but this could only be introduced in the framework of the European Commission and the national states.

At this stage the European Parliament was not in a position to develop a comprehensive concept for conventional arms reduction but it supported asymmetrical reductions. The reduction of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact should be regarded as a criteria of the truthfulness of the Gorbachev reforms.

Mr. Poettering expressed his satisfaction with the state of the Franco-German relations. Mr. Poettering did not believe that the USA would fulfil its military commitment in Western Europe for another century. His conviction remained that a two pillar concept in the transatlantic relationship would enhance NATO's coherence.

Concerning the non-acceptance of defence and security within S.E.A., it was the aim of Mr. Poettering to reduce the present restrictions by just mentioning security without "its political and economical aspects" in the Single European Act revision in 1992.

THE SCOPE OF CHALLENGES: EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Mr. Mathias Jopp in the chair asked Mr. William Wallace and Mr. Adrian Hyde-Price to present their paper on "The Specific West European Contribution to the Shaping of East-West Relations." Their presentation was followed by comments from Mr. Pierre Champenois, Mr. Dominique David, Mr. Antonio Marquina and Mrs. Duygu Sezer, representing the various national and regional perspectives.

In the discussion, Mr. Greenwood pointed out that the theoretical discussion on how the integration process in the economical and military field should preside had a rather unreal quality. The idea that the economical integration would go hand in hand or at least in step with military cooperation was very doubtful. On the other hand, he realized that there were strong incentives for the convergence of both sectors in the framework of the EC. However, he thought that the key and vital imperative was the transatlantic burden-sharing issue, being very important from the security point of view. The trans-Atlantic connection had to be preserved and maintained in good shape. The burden-sharing

issue demanded some positive responses from the Western Europeans. Some presentations of the European position to the American administration, to Congress, to the media and to the public at large would have to be given in respect that the Western Europeans recognize the need to carry more risks, to assume a greater role and to bear a greater share of responsibility.

However, this process seemed to be difficult, taking into account the restraints on resources, lack of money and shortage of manpower. If there was no positive response from Western Europe, flashpoints i.e. regulations on hormone fed meat, would arise, mixing different aspects with possibly rather serious repercussions in the domestic context of the USA. Another flashpoint would be the particular problem concerning the modernization of short range nuclear missiles.

In such an atmosphere of mutual misperception the justification of American bases for the benefit of the Europeans would emerge in the discussion and the decision of the USA would depend on the European response. The only positive response the Europeans could offer, given the resources restraints, was finding more sensible, efficient, economical and effective ways of a) fielding forces and b) enquiring the arms faults.

Mr.Greenwood wanted to endorse the necessity for some better use of Alliance resources, mission specialization, reinforcements of the efforts to acquire arms for the forces more efficiently, and for all the activities going on under the aegis of the IEPG and related to the Alliance conventional arms planning arrangements. The problem of increasing the European contribution for the Alliance did carry the dangers of alienating some parts of the American strategist establishment while at the same time satisfy others. The problem would not be a question of choice but rather a challenge in the management of the Alliance. There was plenty of evidence of momentum and convergence in this preferable European settings. The IEPG would be the ideal instrument of making the arms market more transparent. It was in the interest of the ministries of defence to liberalize the European armament market in an attempt to get better value for money.

The European Community was actually moving into the military field through its technological programs i.e.strategic space programs which have military applications even in an otherwise civilian European Community. The question is not if the EC should assume a military role, the question is rather how is it going to manage it.

Mr. Greenwood insisted that there was no choice as the processes were going on anyhow. "Variable geometrie" was a fact of political life in the European Community. Therefore, one should not spend too much time in searching for comprehensive approaches but rather be pragmatic and pursue the current trends in the best possible fashion.

In the defence domaine, "variable geometrie" was just a starting point. Concerning the Western European contribution to the improvement of East-West relations there would be no spectacular choices available. The management of the challenge was the problem. It offered no grand design. In his conclusion, he emphasized the lack of linkage to existing structures in approaching arms control and conventional stability talks. He said, one should attach great importance to the "house" we already belong to. It was important that there should not be any separate approaches by individual residents in the European wing of the existing house. In the arms control track there was a danger that in making internal military dispositions politicians and decisionmakers must not be hostages to the outcome of arms control processes.

One should take good care of the defence planning. In this respect the Bundeswehr Plan 89 was really hostage to arms control in the 1990s and is not a viable proposition for the Bundeswehr. He denounced this kind of defence planning, as it would create all kinds of incentives to accept arms control proposals and it would undermine the Western European negotiation position. His final point focussed on the fact that Western Europe exists and that this fact set the pace for the future. But it must continue to exist and must be able to develop according to its own interests and should not be inhibited by considerations of how to avoid offending either the USA or the Soviet Union. In his last comment, he criticized a sentence in the Rummel/Schmidt paper, who had written, on page 23, "Western Europe is both a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and a pillar of an all European political structure including the Soviet Union." In his opinion this was not an appropriate assessment of the current situation.

Mr. Müller challenged the notion in the paper of Mr. Wallace that Western Europe should try to preserve the stability in East-West relations. He would in general agree with that but pointed out that stability was rather the exception of the rule while instability was more likely to emerge when change was moving on within the Eastern bloc. Western Europe had to be prepared to cope with this kind of instability. In this respect it was important to develop a common stance with the

United States because the backlash of another Poland crisis would be terrible. The linkage between economical integration and moving into the security dimension in due course of 1992 could enforce the division of Europe. On the other hand there were four counterarguments.

1. The political consequences were largely context dependent;
2. such a development would be very much policy dependent;
3. the positive consequences of the existence of Western Europe on Eastern Europe could only continue if the integration process moved on. One should not stop integration for the sake of stability;
4. there was still a situation of competition going on between East and West, a competition for the basic question of order and society. But Western Europe was likely to win this peaceful competition if it would exploit the progress and the advantages of European integration.

Considering European security integration, one had to keep in mind that the geostrategical realities would not be resolved, even if Gorbachev's reform prove to be successful. The Soviet Union will remain a military superpower with the possibility and capability to act independently and unlimited. The Western European states should take this into account as well as the possible withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe and should elaborate possible alternatives to secure stability which had to be regarded as a precondition for successful arms control and disarmament processes. This was a main argument in favour of European integration in the security field. Concerning the Alliance management, Mr. Müller agreed with Mr. David except for the question if Alliance management was either a transatlantic or nontransatlantic choice. The problem was that this was not feasible but that Western Europe had to occupy the middleground. X

Mr. Story referred to the notion of regionalization of defence. This might be true in a European perspective but the brain of European defence was basically located in Washington. What was missing was a European defence brain. This seemed to be a crucial question in respect of the American attitudes to remain in Europe and the European attitude to substitute American presence. He asked, what should be the character of an European brain. Should it have a complementary character or should it be designed as a substitute. It was important in this context to

realize how the USA perceives developments of the Western European integration process. The internal market of 1992 was being sold in the USA as a kind of economical "Fortress Europe" with rather negative side-effects.

This was rather antagonistic as at the same time the situation in Eastern Europe opened up. Western Europe had to prevent a situation where the ambiguous attitudes of the United States concerning 1992, and particular in the area of arms procurement, created fears that the access to European markets would be limited.

Concerning the enforcement of the division in Europe, he raised the point that this is not likely to happen if one took into account how parts of US immigrants from Eastern Europe had improved the links and exert political influence to improve the East West relations. The European perception of Western European integration on the one hand and NATO on the other was different from the American perception of Western Europe and Eastern Europe as the USA regards herself as an integrated part in the former.

Mr. Stephanou came back to the core question of whether the software dimension should be supplemented by the hardware dimension. He accepted some problems of definition of both dimensions i.e. disarmament being software and nuclear planning hardware. For this reason there had been no EPC initiative in disarmament debate but only reactive steps. Therefore, one would expect more initiatives from institutions like the WEU in the future to the extent that military experts participate in the process of policy making, planning and disarmament. In his opinion it would be productive and useful to promote the software dimension in the European context. There are two ways of looking at the problem. First, the Community could attract the neutrals and maybe at some point the Eastern Europeans which should not be rejected out of hand. However, the danger persisted that the original Community could not pursue its interest to develop a security community as long as neutral states remain neutral. One had to take into account that i.e. the Soviet Union would not like the acceptance of Austria into the European Community whatever the Community stands for. As far as the hardware dimension was concerned, the need for a new military organization did not exist even if there were some problems within NATO. In the Southern region the American presence and its security guarantees could not be substituted by Western Europeans as there was no such thing as a

common European fleet. There was no clear need for supplementing the NATO in the Mediterranean. But a more interesting aspect was the "out of area issue." What were the options of the Western European states to support the USA in this respect? The Gulf minesweeping exercise had been a success for a joint European attempt of safeguarding interests in a troubled region. But there were other out-of-area issues within the Mediterranean itself such as Malta or Cyprus.

Mr. ~~Bonvicini~~ made it clear that Italy could not be regarded as a marginal country as it was implied in the outline of Mr. Wallace. The Italian foreign policy directed to Eastern Europe had always focussed on the core of Eastern Europe and not at its fringes. Such a strong Italian interest in Yugoslavia or Albania was not the case even if Italy was interested to maintain constructive relationships with these countries. So far, all the Italian foreign initiatives had an impact on and improved the East-West relationship. Within the NATO context, it was Italy who accepted the INF deployment without much debate and it was just recently that Italy accepted the stationing of US F-16 squadrons refused by Spain.

The paper of Wallace and Hyde-Price was a curiosity in the sense that it started with the American attitude towards East-West relations and ended emphasizing the importance of Austria's entry into the European Community which would clearly overestimate Austria's political importance.

The basic problem of how to continue and develop the European integration process remained unsolved while trying to improve the East-West relations. The answer was very difficult but there was room for Western Europe to act united as it had been showed in the CSCE process or by signing bilateral agreements with the COMECON. The importance of the economic challenge underlined the need to act together i.e. in relation to the Soviet Union which required financial aid to implement its economic reforms. In the economic field there were strong incentives for Western Europe to be more united than less. In respect to improving East-West relations, he warned of a revitalization of old concepts of "Mitteleuropa" which were dangerous and would involve great risks for the Western European integration. The concept raised the problem of German reunification, it promoted tendencies in some Eastern European countries to disassociate themselves from the Soviet Union and it undermined the position of Austria as a neutral state.

Finally, the concept of "Mitteleuropa" envisaged a vision which could blow up not only the Western European integration but also promote regional disintegrative tendencies which would be extremely difficult to control.

Mr. Keatinge raised the question of the perception of the Soviet threat. The fact that the Soviet Union had not implemented the new thinking in its armed forces and its defence planning would lead to the impression that Gorbachev's reforms were just another empty peace offensive. One wondered if Gorbachev was not capable of controlling the military. Or if it was just a precondition of having a better negotiation position.

His other point focussed on the framework of negotiations. In this respect the CSCE framework seemed to be suitable as previous progress had shown i.e. the human rights issue or the proposed second round of the Conference on Confidence building measures in Europe.

The CSCE had some relevance and a legitimizing role that may actually prove to be quite important if and when substantial negotiations take place. It would be difficult for either side to withdraw from negotiations if they were threatened to suffer a defeat. In this context, the role of neutral states had been important and should be acknowledged in future considerations.

Mr. Pedersen rejected the idea to separate the Northern flank from the central area. This area which was highly industrialized and has strong democratic structures was closely integrated in Western Europe. He stressed the importance to maintain and re-inforce the transatlantic relationship as NATO had proven its capability to preserve peace and security for the last four decades. Trying to substitute NATO would be opposed by the Nordic countries. The tendency to overemphasize the consequences of the opening up in Eastern Europe should not lead to a reduction of Western European commitments to the Alliance. So far, nothing much has changed in favour of the West and a careful evaluation of the negotiation positions would show that the West had to be very careful not to accept disadvantageous arms control agreement for the sake of improving political and economical links with the Soviet Union. The Danish government was strongly in favour of NATO but accepted that a better Alliance management was required to re-impose a balance between the USA and Western Europe. In this respect the problem was not so much a question of institutions but to cut the immense loss through duplication in the arms sector. This waste of resources had to be reduced

to the minimum. Another positive and productive step would be the reintegration of France into the military branch of NATO to improve the coherence of NATO. Western Europe should be aware of the dangers of too much talk on Europeanization which could have counterproductive consequences on the transatlantic relationship and would not help to develop the existing institutional structure i.e. WEU and EPC to handle security related issues in favour of strengthening NATO.

In his comment Mr. Ferraris pointed out that at present not all European NATO members contribute their fair share to the common defence. Denmark, for instance, was not prepared to accept NATO strategy on nuclear weapons. In respect to burden-sharing, it was evident that there were different degrees of responsibility for the common cause. For example, the Federal Republic was not prepared to use its armed forces outside the central front. Concerning the problem of military stability, one would have to realize, as Mr. Müller did, that it was likely that in the near future the political situation and the political systems within Eastern Europe would show great signs of stress and instability. Europe was heading to a decade of great instability. Taking on this challenge, Western Europe should not forget that financial support had grave implications. How should Western Europe react to a new flair of uprisings in Poland? What should the West do if Gorbachev did not succeed with his reforms? Questions of this kind should be answered in advance and not when it was too late.

So far, there was no common Western European policy in political or even economical terms to the developments within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Austria might be a testcase in various ways but not so much in respect to the Soviet attitude but for the European Community. As Austrian motives for joining the Community were primarily economical, the possibility that the new member would be able to obstruct the political dimension of the Community were rather serious. The membership of Austria would actually prove, in which ways the European Community will develop. A refusal to let Austria in would be a clear sign that economical motives were not a sufficient precondition for membership.

Concerning the vision of "Mitteleuropa", Mr. Ferraris said that it would be rather difficult to implement such a vision. One should not forget the strength of public opinion. The acceptability of Western European defence efforts could not be taken for granted. This vision could lead to

moral disarmament and subsequently to a reduced perception of the need to defend ourselves.

Mr. Wittmann pointed out, that in fact public opinion was absolutely crucial in all aspects which had been mentioned in the debate. During the recent years, public approval for NATO's military deterrence was rather low. Too low, in respect to the present situation where Gorbachev's appeal to Western societies created a false sense of security. The dangers of this situation were two-folded. Public readiness to carry the burden of deterrence and defence were eroding, and the Western public would not support NATO's proposal for conventional arms reduction talks. Various points have to be mentioned:

- The explication of the threat i.e. the factors which were threatening security and stability in Europe i.e. the geostrategic situation and the military capabilities.
- The limitations of the arms-control process; arms control should not be regarded as an end in itself, but should be seen as one instrument which could enhance stability;
- The rationale of nuclear weapons, even if the use of military force seemed to be a taboo in the debate;
- The explanation that the improvements of Western defence were not directed against the arms control process. NATO had the right as a matter of principle to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons regardless Soviet propaganda.

This was a challenge to Western politicians and security experts and less the military. Nevertheless, the military had to improve its public standing and had to justify the need for military security.

Mr. Sivistri explained that it was rather difficult to define a European identity in East-West relations and in the transatlantic relationship. He wanted to stress the relationship between European identity and detente and cooperation with the Eastern European states. This seemed to him to be no contradiction as Western Europe would have been confronted with even greater managerial problems, had it been less integrated. He based this assumption on two arguments. The attitude of the West vis-à-vis Gorbachev's reforms were rather relaxed as various Western European countries offered financial and economical aid to the Soviet Union. Those

Western European countries which were not too keen on helping the Eastern bloc would probably re-define the balance within the West.

Secondly, grave changes would have to take place in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc if Gorbachev would continue to implement his reforms. This would of course lead to a high degree of instability. Western European financial support would in this respect contribute to instability and would create various problems for the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies. It seemed to him that instability was the price to pay for a change of direction. Therefore, it was very important for the West to agree on a common economical policy. The need for some really strong common institutions and strong common policies was evident.

In respect to Austria, he disagreed with previous statements on its international importance. Austria was neither a bridge to the Arab world, nor between Eastern and Western Europe. She was in an uneasy situation if she would like to enter the European Community. Austria's position would depend on the degree of relationship between the European Community and the Soviet Union and not vice versa. That did not mean that there would be no EC alternative for Austria.

He made a last comment on the Western European Union which did not work very well. The organization had no operational role, after it had lost its arms control function vis-à-vis the rearmament of the Federal Republic. It was a good consultation machinery but nothing else. Its advantages were limited and the likelihood of finding a permanent role within the European security dimension were poor.

He felt very uneasy about a debate within the German Social Democratic Party to water down Western European integration within the European Community for the sake of following the idea of a "Common House." Their ideas of saving the political and integrational part of the European dream through WEU would have very serious consequences.

Mr. Pedersen referred to the question how the West should handle the Soviet challenge or how the West could exploit the instability of the Eastern system. In his opinion the West should be very careful not to finance the inefficiency of the Eastern European economical system. The West should deal with the Eastern bloc on purely commercial terms. In this respect, he pointed out that the Foreign Secretary of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze, at a recent conference in Copenhagen, showed

more interest to abolish the COCOM list than finding ways and means to improve East-West trade in general. This seemed to him to be a clear indication that the Soviet Union was still not prepared for real cooperation.

Mr. Vasconcelos pointed out that there was a clear temptation for "continentalization" of the European foreign policy. It was a normal temptation, resulting from the geographical situation of Western Europe. In the future, Western Europe could have the choice between a continentalization including a strong policy to the Eastern bloc with all dangers that this implied i.e. the destruction of the stable postwar system in Europe and a continuation of the rather successful Western European integration process. The attractiveness of the European integration was very strong in the South. Turkey was interested to join the EC, and her application was far more serious and important than that of Austria. The Western Europeans should pay more attention to the Turkish case and the possible consequences of either letting them in or excluding them from Europe. What would be the outcome in respect to the security dimension if Turkey would be kept outside? What option would remain for Turkey in this case? These seemed to be limited. Mr. Vasconcelos concluded that Western Europe should take the opportunity to improve its relations with the USA. More attention should be paid to the United States and less to the relations with the Soviet Union. If Western Europe was putting too much emphasis on relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it might risk the destruction of the transatlantic Alliance. Western Europe should try to strengthen its part within NATO.

Mr. Schmidt made two comments on "open" versus "closed Europe" and the question of the European identity. In respect to the first he asked for some precise definition. Would a "close"-European approach exclude Poland from becoming an EC-member? In the context of giving loans to the East this would have no impact on the Western European integration at all. The division of Europe had no practical relevance. He concluded that Western Europe had to maintain the Alliance while improving its relations to Eastern Europe.

Concerning the European identity, Mr. Schmidt pointed out that the Federal Republic was not in such a comfortable position as Denmark in respect to the public attitude to defence spending, arms control and nuclear weapons. The search for a European identity in the security dimension was closely related and even caused by the need to win back

public approval. "Waving the European flag" might be a useful public relation exercise. A second point was to improve the intra-alliance management by i.e. something like the WEU platform which had the aim to stabilize the current structure. Of course, there were some accepted contradictions i.e. the Franco-German defence cooperation in respect to the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons which would not allow to speak of a Western Europe security policy but of a security policy in Western Europe.

Mr. David said that France did not expect the Federal Republic to choose between the protection of the USA and the cooperation with France. The first question would be open and the answer was not evident. So far Western Europe had not agreed on the necessity of a Western European defence "personality." Western Europe would have to deal with strategic aims and the problem of choice between various strategic aims. The strategic aim of Western European countries at the present were a) to reinforce the Atlantic Alliance while acknowledging the limits of the American commitment in Europe or b) to build a European political and military system while knowing that the Atlantic Alliance would remain a necessity for the future.

If the Federal Republic or other states would choose between France and the USA, they would have to choose between these two strategic aims. There were various problems involved in the Franco-German defence cooperation as France and the Federal Republic did not follow the same strategic aim. Some day, they would have to agree on the same strategic aim, otherwise the discussion on strategic concepts and military planning would be senseless.

French reentry into NATO was not a subject of the public debate. There was no point for France to re-enter NATO while it was revising its military strategy. On the other hand there had been substantial progress considering the degree of cooperation between European partners within NATO.

Mr. Daguet pointed out why France had left the military organization of NATO in 1965. While the concept of a European Pillar was always on the European agenda the United States was ready to accept such a European defence identity and it was doubtful if its consequences? Mr. Daguet was not sure if the USA would accept the economic implications in terms of an European armament market.

The French initiative to reactivate the WEU was not directed to weaken NATO but to provide a forum for truly European discussions on security issues.

Mr. Wallace made some final remarks on the European security dimension. He thought that France was more Atlantist while the Federal Republic was more European minded. Concerning his paper, he said that he was referring to an evolutionary process. When the European Political Cooperation was set up everybody was rather critical apart from the French Government who was the initiator. The same happened to the Rome treaties. There had been always scepticism in respect to new initiatives and institutions.

Concerning Eastern Europe, he expected slow and gradual changes. There was no chance that any of the Eastern European countries would be able to join the European Community in the foreseeable future. But time was moving and there might be an option to invite these countries in the long run. The question was how to assess the evolving structure of Europe. Things were moving very rapidly at the moment. The magnetic pool (Germany and her neighbours) was increasing. This presents problems for the Western Europeans at least as much as for those who were attracted to join the Community. The definition what Western European integration was about and how far it should include the security dimension, had to be evaluated. This would allow an answer how to react to an immense queue of countries who would like to become members or more closely associated with the Community.

Another problem was the relationship to the United States in the context of 1992. The Western European states were forced to redefine their interests which were actually overlapping within political, economical, financial, social and security dimensions.

The problem of public opinion and the perception of the Soviet threat was not limited to West Germany. The emergence of Gorbachev had raised a degree of confidence in the Soviet leadership. The idea to promote a European identity was regarded as a possible way to regain part of the lost in the East-West PR battle.

The question of the neutrals and whether to let them into the Community would dilute the present working arrangements. There was obviously an interaction. Those who wanted to join would have to make their own priorities clear. A good example was Spain's entry into WEU

and the signing of the WEU Platform. Spain had to accept the basic assumptions of the Western European security system. Another aspect was the contribution these countries could offer to the EC. In respect to Western European burden-sharing this would impose some difficult questions. A Western Europe where there were three net contributors to the European Community budget (Britain, France and West-Germany), three countries who made major contributions to Western European defence while all the other countries were net beneficiaries, was not stable in the long run.

His last point focussed on the competition between East and West and West/West. There were actually three different ideas. The West European sense of social values was actually divergent from the transatlantic. One had to beware if talking about a European identity that Western Europe should not automatically assume a division between East and West. In respect to 1992 Western Europe would try to achieve a rather different model of social and economic relations than the Americans had wished towards the European.

THE SCOPE OF CHALLENGES: MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

Mr. Rummel as the chairperson asked Mr. Stefano Silvestri to present his paper on "Security Challenges as Perceived in the Mediterranean." Comments followed from national and regional perspectives by Mr. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Mr. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Mr. Alfred Pijpers and Mr. Harald Müller.

Recalling some positive statements by various speakers about the attitudes of their countries towards the Alliance, Mr. Bonvicini pointed out that this did not contradict the findings of Mr. Silvestri. He had mentioned a lower degree of solidarity from the fringes towards the Atlantic Alliance. The problem was however the definition of "fringes." Turkey and Italy did not belong to the fringes as far as their attitudes and contributions to NATO were concerned. It seemed to him that France was on the fringes of NATO. The question of fringes and solidarity depended on the context, the perspective and the issues involved.

As far as the Mediterraneans were concerned, they were confronted with threats not covered by NATO. The fragmentation of the answer which clearly appeared when analysing the security situation in this area was a true reflection of the lack of an institutional framework in which discussions and consultations could take place in times of crisis. The lack

of an institutional framework made it difficult to help the Southern European states to behave in a more coherent way.

The main problem in this area was the way in which the USA behaved. The political and military weight of the USA in the Mediterranean was even stronger than inside NATO. In NATO the USA had to follow certain rules and procedures and was confronted with strong and determined partners. In the Mediterranean area, where the United States had a variety of choices to pursue her interests the situation was different.

How could the Western European countries answer the challenge which arose out of the specific situation in the Mediterranean area? The answer had to be pragmatic in so far as to rely on bilateral agreements, a network of multilateral agreements in particular to fight international terrorism, etc. Clearly, this would not be sufficient; the problem remained to upgrade the security cooperation. Based on the present bilateral agreements this seemed to be difficult to achieve. Real progress could only be obtained on a more institutionalized level. In that respect building up a European Pillar would be a good solution. The Mediterranean region was a well defined area which would be suitable for such an exercise.

But WEU would not be the appropriate body as it lacked funds, resources, had a poor image, no obvious role and no military capacity. The problem was more complex than building up a European Pillar. Answers had to be found vis-à-vis the relationship to the United States and her involvement in the Mediterranean. How to include the USA in an European effort to develop a more coherent policy towards the Mediterranean?

Concerning joint American and European political objectives in out-of-area issues in the future, Mr. Wallace asked what kind of relationship should Western Europe develop vis-à-vis the USA? Should Europe be prepared to make a greater contribution towards following American strategic priorities in an area where European assumptions and American interests diverge more than elsewhere? An area where the military presence of Europe was much lower than at the central front and where the American sense of controlling the region was higher. Unless there was a substantial change in Western European attitudes, capacities and approaches Western European out of area missions i.e. in the Gulf and the Lebanon would be determined by American strategic interests. The implications of changing European capabilities and approaches were far

larger than the incremental development in European cooperation at the central front where it was much easier to talk about strengthening WEU, using institutions which were available, strengthening the mechanism of bilateral consultations, etc. None of these instruments existed in the Mediterranean. The Gulf mine-sweeping mission was a failure and the blame must be shared among the British and French governments who were reluctant to "europeanize" their efforts. Had there been a change of American attitudes this would have raised a number of serious questions. If one looks at mediumterm and longterm threats in the Mediterranean and possible Western European response there were no easy answers as the continuation of diverging interests between USA and Europe was very likely to remain. How did Western Europe see its role to stabilize an unstable region under conditions in which the likelihood of conflict with the United States would persist? And where the use of American bases in Europe to reinforce the area would have to be defined?

The test for a European Pillar within NATO was much more likely to be in the Mediterranean area than at the central front. Mr. Wallace explained that he had no answers to these questions which were even more difficult to solve than any partial American withdrawal from the central front in the next ten years. It was reasonable to assume that the Americans would share the assessment that the Mediterranean was a rather more acute area of strategic interest and an area where there was likely to be more disorder than at the central front where the European could take a great share of responsibility.

Mr. Wegener argued that out-of-area crisis for Western Europe were diminishing. He defined "out of area" as a military threat to the Alliance which had to be met with military means outside the NATO territory. The superpowers had reduced their out-of-areas involvements as an instrument of superpower competition. The Soviet Union was even prepared to solve regional crisis. He proposed that out-of-area crisis would become at the same time more demilitarized, less international and less dangerous for the Western world. This implied that the threat had shifted and the necessity for stability had increased. The West Europeans would have to play a primary role to stabilize policies by using diplomatic instruments and economical aid. But that was not out-of-area crisis containment. Containment meant some military action by a certain number of countries. The Alliance countries and probably the Europeans were much better in doing non-military things. They could bring to bear the various economical, cultural, political, diplomatic instruments in a

more harmonious way. The question of participation of labour within the Alliance for dealing with crisis elsewhere in the world would be easier to handle by Europeans than by Americans. The present discussion reminded him more of the traumata of the past than future needs.

In respect to the security situation in the Mediterranean area, Mr. Wegener did not share the negative assessments mentioned before. Given the situation in Northern Africa which turned out to be more peaceful in external affairs where various conflicts had been solved or became manageable while the Middle East remained an area of concern, it seemed to him that Europe should take on the challenge of introducing peaceful and stabilizing policies especially with the Arab countries.

In this rather reassuring perspective he hoped that the conflict between a European defence identity and Alliance policies would become also more an objective of relaxed considerations.

Mr. Champenois said that the attempt to discuss the Mediterranean, the flanks and out-of-area in one session were rather confusing. He mentioned that while the threat seemed to be invisible the ways how to handle it remained invisible as well.

As the Mediterranean was close to the "out-of-Europe area" it was justified to ask if there were specific European strategic interests in these regions which were more than the combination of the traditional nationalistic interests. In Belgium there was a growing perception that there were strategic interests as such and that they have to be protected. This was implied in the WEU Platform. Belgium had been traditionally openminded to out-of-area activities mainly directed against Africa. It had maintained an air-borne brigade which could be used for peacekeeping missions. He agreed with Mr. Müller that public opinion would only approve humanitarian goals in the use of armed forces. Force projection would not be justifiable.

Discussing out-of-area-activities in a WEU framework would be really at the verge of Alliance solidarity. The approach should be complementary and would allow great potentials for burden-sharing. Because the main single reason which led to conflicts within the Alliance had been the question of burden-sharing. European contribution in this respect would help to influence the American public that Europe was prepared to take its fair share.

Concerning the Middle East there were potentials for conflicts with the USA and he wondered if Europe should contribute to activities which were not in her strategic interests. Therefore he recommended that Western Europe should decide on a case to case basis, keeping the global picture in mind. Finally he agreed with Mr. Wegener, in so far as there was room for diplomatic initiatives, stabilizing policies and peace-keeping which would allow even EPC to play a more active role.

Mr. Diamandouros focussed his remarks on public opinion in general. The public opinion had a major impact on the security debate. An important question was what actually determines public opinion. He proposed to link the international dimension with the domestic background and to compare the shift of the public attitudes in various European states. To exploit this linkage would allow a greater understanding of public opinion in general and would offer perspectives on how security and defence policy could be legitimized in future. One immanent factor for the present situation was the general crisis of major domestic institutions to continue to play an important role for what functionalists would call "interest aggregation."

The erosion of domestic institutions i.e. churches, trade unions, political parties, parliaments, governments etc. as well as the crisis of social democrats provoked the creation of new social movements. New social movements began to have an effect on the domestic arrangements. The search for alternatives reflected the way how public opinion was drifting.

Mr. Ferraris did not accept Mr. Wegener's remarks on a peaceful change in the Mediterranean area. He pointed out that the Moslem movement was constituting a serious threat which would be difficult to cope with. While the threat of a direct military engagement in the Mediterranean region was rather low, the risks of political blackmailing remained high. This was the most likely challenge in the region. Western Europe should be prepared to carry its full share of its political and military responsibility in such a way as to strengthen the confidence and security of the Southern flank. The Southern flank in this respect was as important as the Central or Northern flank.

He made a last comment on the general perception of Italy and her importance to NATO. While there had been only one Adelphi Paper on Italy within the last decades the Italian military capacity had improved substantially in recent years. Italy had participated in the Gulf mission not

only with a number of mine-sweepers but also with warships. The overall commitment to NATO was strong and it would be necessary to acknowledge the Italian contribution.

Mr. Wallace defended his initial statement on the importance of Italy by saying that in security terms only the big three were relevant. He suggested a much more active collaboration between Italian, French and Spanish armed forces within the WEU to strengthen the European presence in the Mediterranean. He said that this would be a reasonable instrument to make the other Europeans more aware of the security situation in the Mediterranean area. Mr. Bonvicini insisted that the Italian military contribution to the Alliance should not be underestimated.

From a Danish perception, the problem within the Mediterranean was the lack of a visible Soviet threat because major navy formation were concentrated in the Black Sea, Mr. Pedersen said. The balance of East-West forces was rather more favourable to the Western side given the strong presence of the American fleet in the Mediterranean sea.

Concerning the public opinion issue, Mr. Petersen agreed that it was rather difficult to define and to assess its impact. An obvious reason were the lack of precise questionnaires. Usually, public opinion polls were primitive and useless for academic analysis. Cross-references showed that the public gave contradictory answers. Polls were a kind of temperature curve.

On the other hand there was solid evidence that Gorbachev had an impact on public opinion. The expectation of Gorbachev's reforms have accelerated and were now out of proportion. The lack of common sense would have rather serious implications for the future policymaking. He criticized that too much credit was given to the Soviet Union in advance. Opinion leaders had a great responsibility not to overestimate the likelihood of real improvements regarding the Soviet Union in so far as, apart from other things, the primary motivation for the reforms were based in the domestic setting.

Mr. Vasconcelos acknowledged that the military threat in the Mediterranean region was not as strong as at the central front. This raised serious political problems in the domestic situation of Southern European countries to justify defence spending.

The lack of a clear threat and the existence of NATO did not on the other hand reduce another sort of threat which was not strategic but was defined in social, economic and demographic dimensions. In a few decades, there would be twice as many people living in the South than today. The enlargement of the EC had changed the trade structure of various countries i.e. Tunisia , Morocco, and created serious economical problems in respect to the provision of food and employment. There would be more economical and social problems in the near future. He said that these were the kind of issues one should discuss and he agreed that it was not a military problem at all, as long as security guarantees could be provided.

France's policy in North Africa was a good example Western Europe could follow. French action in North Africa was not of a direct intervention but to protect a country i.e. to secure its borders. This allowed France an image of actually protecting and defending Arab countries while similar steps by the USA would be regarded as attacking, thus forcing Arab countries into solidarity. Western Europe would be much better suited to react to different kind of threats in this regions than the Americans. A clear division of labour would be sensible in so far as Western Europe could provide a full spectrum of nonmilitary instrument to take up various challenges.

Another remark focussed on Portugal's future in the Alliance. Portugal would support in strong terms an "Atlantist" Europe and by no means a "Europeanized" Europe. The basic precondition for European security rested on the American commitment to Western Europe.

Mr.Greenwood came back to the issue of burden-sharing with a Mediterranean facette. He said, if one considered for various reasons any changes in the size and shape of American forces in Western Europe due to the fact that there was a new American administration, one wondered in the region of AFCENT, how the other member countries could help the Germans to support the Americans to stay by a more efficient use of resources. In the Southern area AFSOUTH, one would have to assist the Italians to help the Americans to stay. But there were various things, the Western Europeans could do to forestall pressure from the USA. For example, why should not there be more European warships in the Mediterranean sea? Could not Western Europe improve its naval presence and offer the USA to provide some escort groups? This could be a productive European step in the burden-sharing debate. His second

point focussed on the pressure for greater Host Nation Support. That was desperately unfair in the AFCENT area as the Federal Republic was doing her utmost to fulfil her obligations. In the AFSOUTH area it was much more difficult to see on whom the burden rested. One aspect of a European defence cooperation may have to invent a system of "Host Continent Support" rather than mere Host Nation Support.

In relation to out-of-area Western Europe had to accept some risks to validate the European commitment and responsibility outside the Mediterranean. Even if future conflicts would be solved with non-military instruments, as had been suggested by Mr. Wegener, Western Europe had to declare where it had military capabilities available for the support of USA.

Mr. Wessels came back to the role of Italy and a book by Mr. Wallace on the "principal nation approach" implying that NATO or the EC could actually run on the Big Three in Europe. Mr. Wessels pointed out that the underlying implication was contradictory to the NATO and Community treaty which say that every member should share responsibilities and burdens. But Mr. Wallace raised some crucial question of intra-Alliance burden-sharing. In respect to Italy, it was rather difficult to evaluate her precise contribution depending which GNP to take. The one which was taken to argue that Italy was a member of richer nations within the club or the one which was usually used to reduce her burden to the Community. To start a discussion of intra-Alliance burden-sharing would run into very deep waters. These kinds of debates were easier to resolve if there was a hegemony power to impose a set of rules on any member and to make some final decisions. In the case of the European Community the question of burden, responsibility and contribution would come up much more outside NATO than inside.

His second remark focussed on the unreliability of public opinion polls. He thought that public opinion in a historical context was very much characterized by various traumata i.e. the traumata of Germany. In this respect he did not understand the demands on the Federal Republic to send her troops abroad because this would raise traumata in Germany and outside Germany. The collective memory was a factor which had to be kept in mind, looking at public opinion. Another question was if there were any common traumata i.e. in the case of bombing Lybia when Germans remembered the attack on Poland in 1939 and Americans referred to Munich in 1938.

His third remark explained the divergence of theoretical approaches i.e. by Engelhardt who argued that there were post-materialistic trends in Western Europe. The post materialist rationale claims that with the historical distance to wars, people become more peaceful, looking more to policies of codetermination, democracy, human rights and environmental issues etc. and less to questions of the use of military forces and war in general.

Mr. Wessels would not agree that this argument was very strong as the Federal Government made some decisions which were accepted without public outcries such as the extension of the military duty and social service. This fact should be included when talking about responsibilities and burden-sharing.

Concerning the fear of being overrun by foreigners, Mr. Wessels raised the question who was actually deciding which traumata was on the agenda or who was deciding what was the threat. The controversies after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan between the USA, who was arguing that this was a threat to world peace, and European political leaders who argued that it was just a regional crisis, showed that it would be useful to develop a common methodology of traumatas. A common understanding would reinforce the acceptability of common defence efforts in the public opinion.

Mr. Story mentioned the multiplication of threats. Referring to the East, he observed the collapse of the party state which raises rather difficult questions in the West currently discussing how to perceive recent reform attempts. One of the features of this internal debate was in the Mediterranean countries the attitude of the domestic Communist parties towards the Gorbachev challenge. Nonetheless, some of the Communist parties had contributed to the Europeanization argument. One thing related to the threat was the very different way in which the public opinion was formed in Mediterranean countries. There were different patterns of perception between the Central region and the Southern area.

On the economical side, he mentioned that all the Mediterranean countries were completely dependant on access to the EC market for their exports. Consequently, the internal policies of the EC as well as the external had rather serious implications for Southern nonmember states i.e. in the field of agriculture or in the textile market. In this respect, he raised the question of the EC position in the textile market, where Turkey was the major supplier to E.C. while at the same time, mainland China

was emerging as a key supplier and competitor to the world clothing market.

Mr. Stephanou recalled the discussion of threats and argued that it was time to look at the resources available to meet the threats. In terms of crisis, the number of armed forces might not be sufficient or available due to changing social values. The attitude towards human sacrifices was one reason for the loss and lack in military manpower. Therefore, it did not seem to be realistic to talk about any European efforts to substitute the American presence in the Mediterranean sea. Even in the economical field, when countries like Turkey and Egypt were looking for loans in Japan, it was not obvious what the Community could do to strengthen the Mediterranean area. He wondered if the European Community was fulfilling its responsibilities i.e. vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, who was still completely dependant in economical terms on the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Sezer pointed out that the Soviet armament programme was going on without any pause in so far as shipbuilding was concerned. She said that Turkey was rather concerned about Soviet activities in the Black Sea and from a Turkish perspective one felt perplexed to see how the Western European public opinion was responding. For Turkey, the threat was not invisible. Apart from the military threat there were social and economical threats as well as the dangers of political terrorism.

Another point she mentioned was the Black Sea incident in February 1988 when the US Navy challenged the Soviet Union. The US Navy was exercising its right of free access to sea which lead to an accident between two warships. This created a rather uncomfortable security environment for Turkey.

Concerning the interests of Western Europe in the social developments i.e. in the question of human rights, this had helped to liberalize the political system in recent years and Mrs. Sezer expressed her gratefulness for the public attention.

Mr. Silvestri made final comments on some of the questions and problems raised during the discussion. It was evident that the perception of a threat to the Mediterranean region was to a lesser extent a military one but rather political, internal, social, economical and demographical. The European Community could pursue its interests through crisis management or crisis prevention with non-military instrument. He agreed that there was much more cope for a European role. On the other hand

these instruments would not be an adequate substitution for a strategy which could lead Europe through the complex picture that had emerged vis-à-vis the Mediterranean area as well as vis-à-vis the Eastern European states. The political aims of Western Europe would have to be defined without ignoring the security context and the findings of a strategic analysis in which they could be implemented.

In this respect the pattern and the shape of relations between the European Community and i.e. to Magreb countries could be seen as an example where the Community did not help. The Magreb countries were split by internal divergencies. All single states were competing with each other for better market access and export opportunities. The need and necessity for a civilian strategy was obvious and it should be based on a global perception of the role the European Community. It could play a role in political as well as security terms. He insisted, recognizing the opposition to security related issues, that at least the analysis should be made in an integrated way.

Apart from that, he mentioned the dilemma that the European Community could not escape the question of military security. Even if the Eastern threat in the Mediterranean was less than at the central front and even if there was a kind of geographical balance, one should look at the situation from a rather more differentiated perspective.

The likelihood of a Mediterranean crisis escalating into a military dimension should not be underestimated even if the probability remained low. This had to be taken into account as well as all the other non-military threats. The role of the USA and NATO in the Mediterranean had to be defined before looking for better instruments for crisis management, burden-sharing and European participation in out-of-area activities. Western Europe could not renounce its relationship with the USA. NATO had not yet succeeded in dealing with out-of-area activities even if it was very much involved in indirect terms i.e. the military planning process and procurement. This dilemma of the Western Europeans could not be solved by acting together within the institutional framework of WEU or EPC. In the end, Western Europe had to cooperate with the USA for consultations and planning purposes. Therefore the Atlantic dimension should not be ignored. He pointed out that the European interest in crisis management should be slightly different from what the US perceived or wanted. Thus, it was very important that the consultations with the United States in times of crisis should start at a

very early moment to decide which instruments and methods to safeguard and pursue Western interests should be applied.

If it was not possible to enlarge NATO to deal with these problems in the first place, Western Europe should try to solve the problems of consultations with the Americans. This was on the other hand a NATO problem as well. The role of the WEU or EPC would be to re-examine and rebuilding the relations with the USA within NATO on political issues where the general agreement was lower than on issues concerning the central front. He agreed that another serious problem was the attitude of the Southern European states towards the military threat and their contribution to the common defence efforts.

THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE

The third session dealt with the "institutional response," Mr Schmidt was in the chair. Mr. Jopp and Mr. Wessels presented their papers on the "Institutional Frameworks for Security Cooperation in Western Europe." Comments followed from the perspective of EPC (Mr. Ferraris) WEU (Mrs. Hoppe) and NATO (Mr. Wegener)

Mr. Seidelmann made it clear, that his comments on the present institutional network were based on a system analysis approach or on the viewpoint which was used in industrial management analysis. Both approaches proposed that the system was more than the sum of its units. In so far, the present network or system did not only constitute duplication, but multiplication of work. It produced institutionalized competition. It prevented an effective grand strategy combining economic, political and military dimensions of security to a complete and effective way of dealing with the Soviet Union. It allowed a perpetuation of the traditional US leadership approach and finally, it did not solve the main problems of integration, the dominance of the nation state, because its primary design as a multilateral system lacked a strong integrative approach. In sum, the objectives of European security were confronted with a huge gap on the institutional side. A gap between proclamation and political reality. The whole Europeanization debate and its dynamics had some political functions such as to compensate the lack of acceptance in security policy in the early eighties. The talk about security issues was a result of a certain stagnation in the integration process within Western Europe. It was also a reaction to a certain frustration in Western Europe realizing that the US leadership was a major fact in political life. If Western Europe wanted to pursue such ideas as Europeanization,

building a European Pillar or being a better partner of the USA in the Atlantic Alliance, it had to reduce the institutionalized chaos to a clearcut, systematic, workable and manageable system. Another equal important aspect was to reduce the role of the nation state and sovereignty. If those steps were not pursued, the talk would remain as an ideological alibi and would lead nowhere.

Mr. Stephanou made it clear, that Greece was interested in participating in European defence institutions but was afraid of the dividing aspects involved. The invisibility of security was a correct notion of Mr. Wegener and should not be ignored. Concerning the revision of the EPC which was mentioned by Mr. Wessels as an option, Mr. Stephanou pointed out, that this was the only forthcoming event which had to be decided in 1992. All other options did not fit in a timetable so far. He asked, what gains could be achieved. Was it an attempt to go back to the origins of the Genscher/Colombo initiative in 1981 which was supported by the Greek Government at that time? To invite the Ministers of Defence to participate in the discussion on security matters? This would allow an end to the artificial division of economical and political aspects of security from more military matters. Even if this sounded institutionalwise reasonable, one should not forget the issues which were on top of the agenda such as the whole nuclear debate, the future of nuclear deterrence, the commitment to nuclear weapons and their modernization. He said that the Greek government tended to be against a commitment for nuclear weapons. This might be reversed in case of a new government in the near future.

Mr. Stephanou wanted to know how other countries regarded these problems and if they could make some remarks of how to handle the issues. Otherwise, he would not understand why one should add another substantial problem to EPC. Involving the EPC in military related security issues could have negative implications in connection with the European neutrals or the Eastern European countries. He concluded that Western Europe should be satisfied with the provisions by NATO. NATO had secured peace and stability since the late forties. Any alternations would cause new problems. The Community should play its economical and political role without including the military dimension.

Mr. David insisted that France had no intention to weaken NATO by cooperation with its European allies in WEU and within the bilateral Franco-German defence cooperation. France was interested to have a

European forum in which European security problems could be discussed and where a European debate could take place i.e. on a common response to the American SDI. He agreed that it was impossible to have a precise definition of a European Pillar.

Concerning the Franco-German defence cooperation, he made it clear that the symbolic value should not be underestimated while its military usefulness was doubtful. The joint brigade would not weaken NATO. Its function was rather political than military.

In respect to EPC, he said that Mr Wessls views on the institutional developments were very interesting in so far as the need for a new treaty or at least of opening a new chapter had been raised. But as all the institutional instruments were available, the real question was if the Western European governments had the the political will to reach a common position i.e. on the perception of the Soviet challenge.

Mr. Pedersen regarded both presentations as a systematic listing of options and constraints. Mr. Wegener's intervention was appreciated as the Danish government would refuse to support Europeanization, if it would be pursued in contrast to US interests. Any negative implications for NATO should be avoided in dealing with European security from a European vis-à-vis Atlantic perspective.

In accordance with Mr. Wegener's remarks he would argue that the Soviet threat had been diminished while the East-West relations had been improved. Today, Western Europe was confronted with a far more civilized Soviet challenge. How had the United States had taken up this challenge? Had she become more unreasonable then in the past few years? Had she consulted and informed Europeans less than she used to do? He wondered, whether there was a real necessity to add a security dimension to the very dynamic integration process within the EC. In his view, it was far from being decided if the gains for pursuing this kind of policy would justify the costs. Finally, he pointed to the example of Japan, who enjoyed prosperity and growing political influence without paying too much for defence.

Mrs. Regelsberger said that the general assessment on the achievements and importance of the EPC had been too negative. The EPC forum had played an important role in the early eighties to convince the USA to continue a kind of dialogue with the Soviet Union. At the moment, EPC was the forum in which a common European Ostpolitik

was being formulated. On the institutional aspect and the comments of Mr. Wegener one could conclude that there was no need for multiplicity of debate and discussion. The logical consequence would be, that EPC would not be required at all. Then the question would remain, how do deal with various overlappings and dependent sectors and problems.

Concerning the theme of the conference, she had the impression that there was a certain mis-balance between the security requirements in the Mediterranean and the institutional set-ups. She suggested to include other institutions like the EC and other instruments Western Europe could use to deal with the Southern challenge. Security should be regarded not in narrow military terms but in its political, diplomatic and economic dimensions.

Mr. Wallace mentioned the economic aspects of the security dimension which offered rather strong incentives for working together. None of the Western European governments had a longterm defence expenditure plan. This was partly why there was an interest in closer procurement collaboration, closer training collaboration and introducing specialization among the armed forces. Given the diverging pressures in strategic options and security policy, procurement policy and military cooperation, these questions were more or less discussed in various settings. Security policy was discussed in WEU. Procurement questions in IEPG and military cooperation would be handled in multiple bilateralism which was developing. Further progress was denied by questions of sovereignty which would not be overcome in the near future. Closer cooperation would require a division of labour between armed forces, such forcing political decisions on sovereignty. The need for arms procurement collaboration and the discussions on security policy would force the governments in the near future to consider what kind of developments they were prepared to accept on the ground. If there was no progress, the development would pursue in piecemeal and symbolic fashion along present lines.

Mr. Stratmann made some remarks on the acceptability of security policy. The debate on defence among the political elites showed great divergence in regard to the basic assumptions of Western European security objectives. The discussion and debate was going on between and within governments, within political parties, the parliament and interested groups. These divergences led in terms of political guidance to utter confusion among the general public. The management of the public

debate was a complete disaster. The result, a crisis of acceptance was the responsibility of political elites which had used the debate for self-serving reasons. On the other hand, the public in general would react soberminded if the arguments would have been presented in a reasonable way. Now it was necessary to restore the discipline of debate in order to reduce the degree of confusion. WEU style platforms would not impress the general public as it was obvious that general agreement existed on any issues related to security among the Western European states. The familiar pattern of looking to the USA to come up with new ideas and initiatives and, once they occur, to criticise them should cease to exist. Western Europe should take far more positive steps than the existing responsive reaction without proposing own constructive ideas. This was, as far as Mr. Stratmann was concerned, the heart of the problem. Solutions have to be found by the Western European NATO members.

Mr. Greenwood came back to the question if the European institutional efforts would enable the Western European members of the Alliance to make a more effective, efficient, constructive and coherent contribution. Looking at recent developments, Mr. Greenwood saw some positive but still modest results emerging from WEU, the IEPG and other institutions. The observations by Mr. Wegener of new developments in political relationships and military management were correct and promising in so far as a better European contribution to the present and future Alliance role and functions was required. He warned not to be too cautious in analysing specific European security problems as the North Americans and the Northern European states traditionally did the same. In any case, the idea that one must not do things which could disturb the present NATO set-up and the NATO organization should not lead to the implicit argument that NATO could not be changed at all. NATO could be adapted to integrationist impulses on a European level. He supported the idea of Mr. Wessel who introduced the approach of piecemeal engineering in respect to WEU, EPC and IEPG. Each institution had potentials to further developments as they were interlinked.

Mr. Champenois made some remarks on the Belgian attitudes on WEU and its revitalization. Belgium was interested on a kind of EPC structure. The Platform of the WEU Council seemed to be an important document in this respect even if one could not be absolutely sure about the direction it would finally take. The paragraph on border protection could lead to some disturbance within NATO but this could evolve only in the far future. The report mentioned by Mrs. Hoppe would be a status quo

orientated report reflecting the difficulties of implementing the platform. There were various aspects which would have no impact at all on present NATO structure. On the other hand various improvements could be concluded within WEU which would produce advantages for NATO infrastructure. It was quite clear that there was no room for a European strategy.

Concerning the American reaction, he concluded that WEU was not regarded as a threat for NATO, as it was actually providing transparency.

Mr. Vasconcelos raised the question if there was a clear need for a common European security policy. His argument rested on the assumption that NATO was sufficient to resist the military threat at the central front. The major disadvantage of NATO was the lack of public approval of its strategy of nuclear deterrence. While the political elites understood the importance of the NATO strategy, the public was more influenced by European bodies such as WEU than by NATO or the USA. That was the reason, why the WEU platform was important to rebuild public support for European security policy even if it did not include the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. He said that public opinion would most likely to be influenced by institutions closely associated with the European Community.

Mr. Jopp made some concluding remarks. He agreed with Mr. Ferraris on the bureaucratization of the EPC and Mrs. Hoppe's comments on the WEU. These European institutions were not going to replace NATO but rather reducing the dominance of the US leadership on European affairs in the long run. He made it clear that he doubted if such developments would be desirable. The USA was interested in a certain kind of a European Pillar which could deal with conventional defence improvements, greater burden-sharing and greater participation in out-of-area problems. These demands were justifying the European collaboration efforts. On the other hand, US leadership attitudes were creating problems for Western European governments which were confronted with a lack of information and consultation as well as unilateral actions.

All together the European initiatives were designed to improve intra-Alliance relations and to reinforce NATO's coherence. In the foreseeable future the EC institutional balance should not be jeopardized by very delicate security questions such as arms control, disarmament and nuclear deterrence. A lot had to be done within the Community in respect to 1992

and to complete the efforts of an internal market in the monetary dimension.

Mr. Jopp had a longterm vision of bringing EC and WEU together which would fall under the "defence-last" heading of the Rummel/Schmidt paper.

Mr. Wessels closed the session with remarks on the European Pillar. It was obvious that the notion was extremely vague; the lack of a clear institutional concept made it necessary to think through what it would mean for NATO to have a kind of pillar within the organization i.e. would it be a precondition to revise the NATO Treaty? Or should one add up individual points in a piecemeal fashion which would finally be the European Pillar within NATO?

He agreed with Mr. Seidelmann's assesement of the system but not with his conclusions. As a liberal minded person, Mr. Wessels thought, that competition was required for progress.

Mr. Wessels did not agree with Mr. Stratmann's remarks of influencing public debate. It was a fact of political life that the security debate, giving more public interest in security matters, had become confused because it was always difficult for the public to follow the elite debates. The inconclusiveness of debates were responsible for a confused public.

Concerning the problem of acceptability, the problem in Europe was the large divergence of the public debate as they differed in various countries. The European Parliament had not been able to constitute a distinctive role in the debate. He suggested to follow a piecemeal engineering exercise. He disagreed with negative comments on the EPC but agreed that it had suffered through bureaucratization.

Concerning the argument that progress depended on political will, Mr. Wessel insisted that the political will was a part of an institutional process and could not be seen isolated from the political context.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION ON FUTURE STUDY

In the last session of the conference, Mr. Rummel asked what were the research areas, what were the topics, and which questions should be raised in the context of integration and security.

So far, it seemed that both schools had become more or less separated, not only in subject but also by the academics who dealt with it. The conference had helped to look at the subjects from both perspectives. Nevertheless, there had been a time when both groups neglected each other. When they started to discuss with each other, it seemed to be a kind of neutral criticism; institutionally a "double monologue."

The integrationists often disregarded that the integration process was not an end in itself. But it should be seen, at least to a large extent, as an instrument to solve problems for the people in Western Europe and beyond. In this particular case, it should strengthen defence and security or at least keep it on an appropriate level. Integrationists also tend to forget the structural differences between the security sector and the other sectors, in which integration processes had been pursued in the last decades. This neglect was caused by the fact that there had been integration within the security dimension since the beginning of NATO. This had particular structural consequences.

Integrationists disregarded the effects of European talk on integration in the security field. Mr. Rummel had the impression that the conference contributed to a more differentiated view among integrationists. The case that there were various options and not just a European Security Union made the discussion more differentiated, less deterministic and helped to come closer to reality. But one should go beyond that and ask where and how integration could be used in the field of security. The impression persisted that strategists were not taken the idea of Europeanization too seriously. He asked them to be more objective.

How could a more autonomous identifiable, selfassertive Western Europe produce better defence contributions in Western Europe? It would be difficult to measure the degree of improvement, but Mr Rummel suggested that strategists would find means and ways to do it. This was not only a question about substance or talk but an attempt to evaluate the space between both dimensions. How to keep up defence-spending? How to preserve intra-Alliance solidarity? These questions could only be solved on the basis of consensus among the NATO member states. The particular experience of finding consensus within the integration process in Western Europe could be used for the security integration process. Integration should be regarded as an instrument of consensus-building.

The aim of the conference was not to reach specific results, but was intended to launch a broader research orientated thinking process in the overlapping fields of integration and security. A level of integration had been reached in Western Europe and also a level of security needs which did not allow the continuous separation of both perspectives. Both should be seen in terms of interaction. Therefore, he suggested to continue activities which have been started by the conference. He invited the audience to contribute ideas for further study:

Mr.Greenwood said that within the specific security domaine one of the important events had been the recognition of the need for careful and proper articulation of thoughts about military matters, defence dispositions, modernization, arms control. One had to ensure that nothing was done in the arms control domaine which inhibited desirable modernization. One should not expect that arms control was solving all the specific security problems. It would be dangerous to solve these problems in ways which might sabotage the arms control process. It would be unfortunate if things happened in the area of European security in the context of Euro-building which would prejudice the continuing success of the security community.

His second point referred to short-term and long-term visions. He used the metaphor of sailing in this context. Three basic requirements have to be available: The capability to run a sailing boat, navigation skills and a clear destination. The same applied to the problem of European security.

Mr. Pijpers suggested the linkage of central institutions towards the security dimension in Western Europe as another research topic. Two central institutions emerged, NATO and the nation state. To pursue research in the field of integration and security, some kind of knowledge was required on the effects of integration on the nation state. The history of the European integration process showed, that market expansion was actually reinforcing and strengthening the role of the nation state. Stanley Hoffman had discovered that the increase in strength of the Community and the European integration had rather positive effects on the consolidation and the legitimacy of the nation state. The idea of an internal market in 1992 raised the question, to what extent the market would have implication for the nation state i.e. in so far as the increasing prosperity would be around 5% of the GNP. To what extent would it be transferred to the nation state and further on to the defence sector? This

point should be incorporated in the analysis of processes between integration and defence.

Mr. Pedersen suggested to analyse the implications of the Soviet threat. Another topic could be the relationship between security and the questions of enlarging the European Community. He asked if the EC should make it more difficult for outsiders to enter the Community for the sake of pursuing a common security policy. A last suggestion was to include American academics into research projects of this kind, as the effects of the policies on NATO and the transatlantic relationships were of crucial importance.

Mr. Heisenberg suggested to start the analysis from a NATO perspective. One should ask what could be useful for NATO.

Mr. Seidelmann regarded the conference as a fruitful exercise which provided an overview of the variety and complexities of issues involved. He recommended to concentrate on more concrete problems, single issue analysis in the field of arms control, Soviet threat perception, arms procurement, out of area. These questions could be dealt with in specific workshops allowing to go into empirical details.

His second proposal focussed on the need to elaborate common elements in the diverging national viewpoints on security and defence policies. An evaluation of the common viewpoint as a common determinant on issues would be required as a basis for constructive proposals to enlarge the security collaboration. The common viewpoint could be confronted with political reality and could be used as a political standard for what policy should approach. He said that it was legitimate for political scientists to set up standards.

His third proposal was to continue the critical evaluation of the institutions and of certain international developments in the USA and the Soviet Union to search for a common issue platform and to adapt the academic thinking to future developments.

Mr. Silvestri suggested to avoid the discussion on engineering institutions as the obvious lack of power to change them would make it an useless exercise. Two problems should be analysed. One was mentioned by Mr. Greenwood, the question of specialization which subsequently led to the question of defence budgets and operational requirements in NATO. The other problem should be out-of-area. These two problems

created a kind of demand which could be met in various institutions. The institutional problem was to evaluate what kind of answers could be provided to these problems and to define the limits that were institutionalized within these institutions. A precise interpretation of the treaties could offer new opportunities of collaboration in the security sector. This led to the question of cooperation between the various institutions. What kind of cooperation should be allowed? What kind of interconnection should be established with NATO, WEU, IEPG and EC? Another research area could be the question of enlargement and the preconditions in terms of the security dimension.

Mr. Champenois suggested to look at the question of industrial strategy as it was the basis for arms procurement collaboration. IEPG did not look at these problems and it lacked an European dimension in so far as most programmes were in a bilateral context. It had not yet succeeded in developing an industrial strategy. There was an element of this in the Community, and there were national strategies which should be combined. He expressed his reservations on a discussion of arms control because one would have to limit the research to broad generalities such as if arms control contributes to stability. If a meaningful discussion was required there was no institution available which had access to relevant information sources. It would be extremely difficult to discuss arms control issues without constantly referring to its implication on NATO military strategy.

Mr. Ferraris suggested to study the consequences and repercussions of 1992 on the security and political dimension. How the national interests would be converted by common economical interests and the integration process vis-à-vis the need for security?

Mr. Kramer took up Mr. Rummel's remark that integration should not be regarded as an aim in itself but should also be seen as an instrument to solve problems. He said that it was a good "guiding line" how to bring together various strands of scientific research. Both subject areas could be very useful in respect to the East-West dimension. What could be a specific European contribution by the various institutions in addition to what was going on in the Alliance context or the superpower relations? The other field were Mediterranean challenges. The importance of the region would increase in the near future, not particularly in military terms but in fields related to security. A combination of various approaches and various institutions could be developed to face these challenges.

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