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TEPSA - GREEK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEMINAR ON THE GREEK PRESIDENCY

"GREECE IN THE E.C. - EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES"

ATENE, 26-28 MAY 1988

G. BONVICINI  
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ISI ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI  
8548

GREECE IN THE E.C. EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES:  
COLLOQUIUM ON THE GREEK PRESIDENCY  
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Trans European Policy Studies Association  
Athens, 26-28/V/1988

1. "Programme"
2. "Participants"
3. "The European community after the 'Delors package': the economic and social cohesion aspects"/ P.C.Ioakimidis
4. "Greek foreign policy priorities and European political co-operation"/ Christos Rozakis
5. "Is a Western European security policy feasible?"/ Constantine A. Stephanou

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COLLOQUIUM ON THE GREEK PRESIDENCY

organized by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
with the cooperation of the Trans European Policy Studies  
Association

"GREECE IN THE E.C. EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES"

Athens, Hilton Hotel, May 25,27,28 1988

PROGRAMME

First day (plenary Session 9-13.00)

Welcome addresses (9-9.30 a.m.)

Y.Kranidiotis (Special Secretary for EEC Affaires,M.F.A)

J.Vandamme (President of TEPISA)

1st Session (9.30 a.m.-13.00p.m.) The Evolution of Greece's  
European Policy

I Opening statement.: A.Koutsogiorgas (Vice President of  
the Greek Government,Minister of  
Justice)

II.Opening Speech: Y.Pottakis (Minister of Agriculture)

2nd Session (17 p.m.-20 p.m.) Priorities for the Community during  
the Greek Presidency.

Chairman: J.Vandamme

I. Economic Aspects (J.Papantoniou, Deputy Minister of  
National Economy)

II. Priorities for the Greek Presidency (Y.Kranidiotis)

Comments:

G.Alavanos (M.E.P.)

P.Avgerinos (M.E.P.)

Baron-Créspe (M.E.P.)

G.Giavarini-Azzi (Director of the Interior Coordination of  
the General Secretariat)

C.Filinis (M.E.P.)

T.Lambrias (M.E.P.)

Second Day

1st Session:(9.30 a.m.-13.00p.m.) Priorities of the Greek Presidency:  
internal Community Aspects.

Group I Implementation of the Single European Act.

Chairman: T.Peeters (Centrum voor Economische Studien, Leuven)

I. Internal Market:

Rapporteur: Professor J. Pelkmans (Director of the Interdisciplinaire Studie-Gröep Europese Integratie, Hågue).

Discussants: Associate Professor T. Giannitsis (University of Athens)

Professor J. Hasid (A.V.S.P. Piraeus)

G. Lalis (Assist. D.G. III)

Professor A. Papadimos (Economic Council Bank of Greece)

B R E A K

II. The European Community after the Delors Package: The Social and Economic Cohesion Aspects.

Rapporteur: P.C. Ioakimidis (Senior Policy Advisor on E.C. affaires, MFA)

Discussants: Professor D. Biehl (Institut für Europäische Politik)

A. Mitsos (Chef de Cabinet of the Commissioner Mr. G. Varfis)

Professor J. Vandamme.

Group II: Priorities of the Greek Presidency: E.P.C.

Chairman: G. Bonvicini (Secretary General of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma).

I. Greek Foreign Policy Priorities and EPC

Rapporteur: Professor C. Rozakis (University of Athens)

Discussants: C. ~~Petropoulos~~ <sup>YEROCOSTOPOULOS</sup> (Greek EPC ~~Director~~ <sup>Correspondent</sup>)

C. Silvestri (Vice President of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma).

B R E A K

II. EPC, WEU and European Security.

Rapporteurs: ~~Professor K. Ioannou~~ (Dean of the University of Thrace).

Professor P. Tsakaloyannis (E.I.P.A.,  
Maastricht)

Discussants: A. Cahen (Ambassador, Secretary General of  
the WEU)

N. Frangakis (First Counselor, Greek Permanent  
Representation at the EE)

G. Jannuzzi (Ministre Plénipotentiaire,  
Chief of Secretariat E.P.C.)

2nd Session: (17:00-20:00p.m.): Priorities of the Greek Presidency:  
External Economic Relations

Group I:

Chairman: R. Toulemon (President "Association Française pour l'étude  
de l'U.E.").

I. The EEC and the Mediterranean/Gulf Countries.

Rapporteur: Professor L. Tsoukalis (Oxford University)

Discussants: E. Rhein (Director in the General Directorate  
for External Relations)

Professor A. Lorca (Universidad Autónoma de  
Madrid)

Assistant Professor S. Perrakis (University  
Thrace)

B R E A K

II. The EEC and the Developing Countries

Rapporteur: B. Ryelandt (Commission, D.G. VIII)

Discussants: I. Kaftanzoglou (Scientific Advisor, Ministry  
of Research)

K. Pantazi (M.E.P.)

Group II:

Chairman: Mme E. Regelsberger (Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn)  
The EEC and the Comecon

I. Framework of Trade Relations:

Rapporteur: Professor M. Maresceau (University of Ghent)

Discussants: Professor S. Latchinian (University of  
Leipzig)

S. Wallden (Specialist in East-West Economic  
Relations)

S. Plaskovitis (M.E.P.)

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II Political Considerations.

Rapporteurs: Professor C. Stephanou (Director of Greek  
(Center of European Studies and  
Research)

J. Palmer (Journalist "The Guardian")

Discussants: Professor R. Rummel (Stiftung Wissenschaft  
Und Politik Ebenhausen)

R. Triumph (M.F.A., Bonn).

Third day (9.00-13.00 p.m.)

Chairman: J. Souriadakis (President of the Greek Center of  
European Studies and Research)

Future of the Community after the Delors Package

Speakers D. Williamson (Secretary General of the Commission  
of the E.C.)

R. Perrisich (Alternate Director, DG III)

The Presidency of the Council : Opportunities and Constraints

Speaker G. Varfis (Greek Commissioner)

Final Report

Rapporteurs: Group I

R. Toulemon

T. Peeters

Group II

Professor A. Fatouros (University of Thessaloniki)

COLLOQUIUM ON THE GREEK PRESIDENCY

"GREECE IN THE E.C.: EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES"

ATHENS, 26, 27, 28 MAY, 1988

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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFTER THE "DELORS PACKAGE":  
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COHESION ASPECTS

(TEPSA Conference on "Greece in the E.C., Experiences and perspectives")

Athens, 26-28 May 1988

Intervention by Dr P.C. Ioakimidis

1. The Brussels European Council (February 1988) is certainly going to be a landmark in the Community's history. After two successive failures, the European Council succeeded in taking decision on the so-called "Delors Package" - namely on creating the conditions for the successful implementation of the Single European Act, or, to put it differently, on the conditions for the creation of the "Common Economic Space". Thanks to these decisions, we can now feel confident that the Community would be able to attain the objectives which has set for itself for the next four to five years:

(i) the completion of the internal market, the establishment, that is, of "an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured" on the basis of the Commission's White Book.

(ii) the strengthening of economic and social cohesion through the reform of the Structural Funds (Regional Fund, Social Fund, EGGF-Guidance ) and the doubling of their overall resources by the year 1993 (doubling the resources for the less developed regions by 1992).

(iii) the development of new policies mainly in the field of research, technology, industry, environment.

The Brussels decisions ensure that the financial resources required for the attainment of Community's objectives will be available. The European Council agreed to raise the Community's resources from approximately 1% of the combined GNP at present to 1,20% by 1992 (in payment appropriations), namely for 35 becus to 53 becus. It decided also to restructure "the own resources system of the Community" by setting up a fourth resource linked to GNP of each member state, something which reflects more accurately the relative prosperity of the member states. Furthermore, it agreed to a more effective system of "budgetary discipline" for curbing agricultural expenditure as well as to a more effective and transparent system of budget management. Last but by no means the least, it decided a series of measures for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (stabilizers) which would contribute to the process of adjusting the agricultural policy to new patterns of demand and supply worldwide.

Thus, for the next five years the Community will not be confronted with major budgetary crises and financial asphyxia of the kind we have experienced over the recent years.

2. Furthermore, we have now a much better idea of what the completion of the single, unified market would mean to the European Economy. The so-called Cechinni report, produced for the Commission, shows that the gains to be reaped from the elimination of all barriers would amount to between 170 and to 250 billion ECUs. In macroeconomic terms, the internal market would generate: an additional 4,5% of GDP growth, a 6% reduction in inflation rates, 1,8 million new jobs, a reduction of public deficits equivalent to 2,2% of GDP and an improvement of external balance representing a 1% of GDP. Should the completion of the internal market be supported by the appropriate macroeconomic policies then the macroeconomic gains are considerably enhanced (7% extra growth, 5 million new jobs).

3. The question then arises; what comes next; what would provide the new impetus and dynamism for European integration. Although we have yet to fully implement the decisions of the European Council and, of course, to accelerate, at Council level, the pace for the adoption of the proposals for the internal market, we ought to define the new areas for action beyond the "Delors package" and the White Book, action which would complement the current measures, enlarge the scope of integration and carry the Community to a new and more advanced stage of development.

More to the point, I would argue that the process of completing the internal market should be placed in a wider context with an enlarged package of parameters for policy action. This package could conceivably include:

- (a) the institutional and policy-making edifice of the Community,
- (b) defense and security of Europe
- (c) the reinforcement of monetary cooperation and the institutional development of the EMS
- (d) new types of action for strengthening economic and social cohesion

This broader package could well form the basis for articulating a more "integrated approach" to European integration which would bring economics, politics and defense into a coherent framework. This, after all, is the logic and spirit of the Single European Act, the very title of which ("single") underlines the need and desirability for erasing the artificial dichotomy between economics and politics. The need for wider packages is all important and it will become even more obvious in the very near future. This is especially true with respect to defense. Hitherto we have failed to recognize the linkage which does exist between the economics of the internal market and European security in allocating costs and benefits between

the member states. It seems that sooner than later we will have to address all aspects of European integration (economics, defense) in a unified framework and in a unified and coherent manner.

Only a few remarks on each one of the new parameters:

(a) the institutional and policy-making problems:

The following aspects should be considered:

(i) how to enhance coordination in the working of the Council of Ministers and consistency of output. It might be advisable to examine the possibility of reducing considerably the number of Councils, which have proliferated during the past years as a result of the expansion of the Community's activities. Four or five Councils appear to be really indispensable (General Affairs, ECOFIN, Agriculture, Internal Market). The tasks of the rest can be transferred to these four-five Councils.

(ii) the leadership problem of the Community. There have been suggestions for entrusting the leadership to a relatively big country of the Community (or to a group of countries). This solution is of course objectionable on many grounds. The right thing to do is to seek ways for providing "institutional leadership" to the Community which would reflect the collective wisdom and interests of all member states, but enjoy at the same time the necessary institutional autonomy and authority to perform its function.

(iii) Related to this aspect is the need for looking afresh at the role of Commission and its president, the role of the European Council, the functions of the European Parliament.

(b) European Defense and Security:

The sole point to be underlined here is the need for

conducting the debate on defense and security within the framework of the Community exploiting to the full the potential of the Single European Act. Alternative frameworks or other arrangements of restricted membership for conducting the debate or building the defense identity of the Community, no matter how desirable they may appear to some countries, could well endanger the whole process of integration and give rise to conditions for a two-tier Europe.

(c) Coordination of economic policies/EMS:

(i) The conduct and coordination of macroeconomic policies should be done in such a way as to contribute to the objective of strengthening economic and social cohesion, as provided for by the Single European Act (art. 130D).

(ii) the complete liberalization of the capital movements and the persisting instability in the international economy necessitate the institutional development of the monetary system (EMS) and the launching of the process for the establishment of a European Central Bank. Again, all these initiatives should form part of a coherent package of policy actions to be advanced in a balanced and coordinated fashion.

(d) Economic and Social Cohesion:

I have already set out my ideas on this crucial topic in a 1986 TEPSA paper. In the meantime, we have the European Council decisions which, as noted, mark a turning point in the Community's attempts at developing a coherent structural policy to serve the objective of social and economic cohesion. Yet the attempts could not and should not be terminated at this point. Strengthening economic and social cohesion is to be seen as an ongoing process encompassing the totality of the Community's activities.

Three basic points should be borne in mind:

(i) even with the doubling of the resources of the Structural Funds, the Community will spend no more than 0.3% of its total GDP on regional development, a tiny fraction of what federal governments normally devote to the same objective. The question, therefore, of a more redistributive budget remains open and quite relevant.

(ii) most studies confirm the rather obvious hypothesis that the benefits to be accrued from the internal market would be unevenly distributed between member states. As the report by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa puts it, "there are serious risks of aggravated regional imbalances in the course of market liberalization".

(iii) strengthening economic and social cohesion is a vital condition for the completion of the internal market not only in that it would win over the less prosperous member states in the negotiating process but also, and equally important, because it would underpin the effective functioning of the unified market itself.

Three "areas" can be singled out for policy action in the new efforts for further strengthening cohesion:

(a) the "social area". The need for creating the condition for a "unified social area" is all the most important as the process for completing the internal market gathers momentum. Greece, as the forthcoming presidency, intends to focus attention on this aspect without however neglecting at all other important areas of the Community's businesses. More specifically, and in order to take into account the social sideeffects of the internal market, action should be taken:

- on implementing Article 118A of the Single European

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Act in its broader sense for the protection of workers and safeguarding the latter's fundamental rights (adoption of the framework directive)

- on reinforcing the "social dialogue" on the basis of article 118B

- on combating unemployment

- on education and culture

(b) the area of new technologies which, to a considerable degree, will determine the pattern of production, the structure and the organization of the European economy. The less prosperous states and regions of the Community should be given the means to benefit from the new technologies. Their exclusion from the new economic activities built on the new technologies could well give rise to new developmental and structural imbalances which would perpetuate and even aggravate the dualistic pattern of European economy. To avert all this, action should be directed at transferring new technologies and know-how to less prosperous states and regions and at fostering industrial and technological cooperation particularly between small and medium-sized enterprises.

(c) transport: an effective and competitive transport network throughout the Community is essential for the integrated market. For the peripheral states of the Community however, like Greece for instance, this network is a prerequisite for their unhindered access to the internal market. As the core of that market will be situated in central Europe it is important to build the appropriate transport infrastructure which would enable the peripheral states to get their products to the market.

The basic aim should be to create the environment for "an internal market with human face" as a basic component of the ultimate objective - European Union.



*Greek Foreign Policy Priorities  
and European Political Co-operation*

Greek foreign policy is determined by three national priorities which run through the whole period from the restoration of democracy in 1974 to the present. These firm priorities, which, however, have not always been served by the same tactical approach, are: a) rectification of the Greek-Turkish crisis, including a solution to the Cyprus question, b) accession to, initially, and improvement of Greece's position within, latterly, the European Economic Community, and c) modernisation of the country's international relations, taking the experience of Western Europe as a model.

Three different political approaches and sets of tactics have been applied to these firm priorities, and, *grosso modo*, could be seen as having been implemented in three separate periods: 1974-81, 1981-85 and 1985 to the present.

1. The first period, during which the foundations were laid for Greek foreign policy throughout the post-dictatorship period, coincided with the period of government by the New Democracy party. While laying down priorities, the New Democracy governments followed the following tactics:

a) On issues between Greece and Turkey, Greece displayed moderation towards the revisionary policy of Turkey and attempted to find a peaceful solution. On the one hand, Greece tried to restrict the extent of the crisis, leaving initiatives to the Government of Cyprus and supporting its efforts indirectly. On the other, the claims of Turkey were received with a considerable degree of good will, and it was agreed to solve the problems by negotiation. This approach was persevered with despite the fact that Turkey constantly went back on its word and procrastinated,

making the dialogue, in the end, simply a means of precluding a conflict without warning.

b) Greek accession to the European Community had a dual purpose: first, to withdraw from the unilinear and dysfunctional connection with the United States (which had been dictated by the needs created by conditions immediately after the War), and second, to incorporate the country into a mechanism which would not only bring it firmly into line with Western European options but would also - and most important - contribute to the bourgeois modernisation of the State.

c) The modernisation of Greece's international relations was principally aimed at consolidating conditions of good-neighbourliness with the other Balkan states, at developing relations with the USSR (which had been affected by the trauma of the Civil War) and at improving relations with the nations of the South.

2. These priorities continued to be applied, with a change of tactics, during the period 1981-85, which coincided with the term of the first PASOK administration. More specifically:

a) On Greek-Turkish affairs, Greece refused to become involved in any form of dialogue, while efforts were made to strengthen the country's intervention in the Cyprus question.

b) In relation to Greece's penetration into the framework of the Community, efforts were made to improve the Greek position (both institutionally and politically) by promoting economic claims and demands for special treatment and with initiatives within European Political Co-operation. The particular nature of Greek positions within EPC, to the extent to which it is not identical with a symbolic role-undertaking (both inside and outside the Western system), can be attributed to the special concept of modernisation promoted by the new Government.

c) This modernisation revolved around three ideological concepts: first, the need for the climate of detente to be maintained in East-West relations at a time at which the Cold War atmosphere seemed to be reviving, second, the development of a world peace policy for North-South as well as East-West relations, and third, closer links between countries which are geographically and culturally related (especially those of the Mediterranean). These concepts of modernisation often brought Greece into conflict with the other participants in EPC. This was caused both by Greece's failure to put forward her views as proposed European positions (stating them, instead, as national variations) and by the fact that the period in question was one of intense East-West confrontation.

3. The third period, from late 1985 to the present, has been notable for two changes in the tactics for implementing what are basically the same priorities: the tactic of gradual normalisation of relations with Turkey, with the restoration of political communication and efforts to find peaceful solutions to the problems, and Greek conformity with the general directions taken by the Community. This shift can be attributed both to the alterations in the international environment which have come about in the meantime (changes in East-West relations, indications of Community interest in the particular features of the Mediterranean countries and Greece, different priorities in Turkish foreign policy, etc.) and to changes in the Government's mentality, with the adoption of the European direction as the principal priority and realisation of the need for immediate rectification of the country's pending international affairs.

These co-ordinates in Greek foreign policy will continue, for the foreseeable future, to determine Greek positions within EPC. It is very likely that in the months to come the Greek Presidency will attempt, in this spirit, to improve its position on Greek-Turkish relations, to help towards a

solution of the Cyprus problem, to remind the Community of the importance of the Balkans, to play its part in assuaging problems in the Middle East and to promote the rapprochement between East and West (and particularly between Community and Socialist countries) as well as peace policies. Given that the foundations for such activities have already been laid, the Greek Presidency will play the pragmatic role of developing them technically.

CONSTANTINE A. STEPHANOU  
DIRECTOR  
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IS A WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY FEASIBLE?

Working Paper  
for the Athens Symposium  
on the Greek Presidency  
of the Council of Ministers  
26-28 May 1988

Revised Draft

## 1. WESTERN EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

The basic question asked by W.European diplomats and analysts of the Soviet Union is whether the changes that have occurred in Soviet behaviour towards the West and more specifically W.Europe are the result of 'new thinking' and newly defined goals or should they be considered a mere change of style, aiming at achieving the same goals by other means. Should for example declarations by Mr.Gorbachev on the need to build a common European house from the Atlantic to the Urals be taken seriously or should they be considered mere propaganda, masking renewed efforts aiming at the decoupling of W.Europe from the United States and at neutralising the former?

One cannot fail to note that the Soviet Union has changed its positions on very substantial East-West issues. This is evidenced by the signing of three major agreements in the past twenty months namely:

- the agreement on confidence and security building measures signed in Stockholm on September 21, 1986,
- the agreement on INF signed in Washington on December 8, 1987 and
- the agreement on Afghanistan signed in Geneva on April 14, 1988.

In the case of the CSBM agreement, the Soviet Union accepted measures which have substantially reduced the danger of a Soviet surprise attack on W.Europe. In the case of the INF agreement, the Soviet Union accepted to eliminate substantially more missiles and warheads than the West. Finally, in the case of the Afghanistan agreement, the Soviet Union has undertaken to withdraw its troops from a neighbouring country which risks being overrun by unfriendly forces.

The above changes in Soviet policies aim at achieving security objectives with lower military spending, as well as convincing the West of the new intentions towards it. Soviet proposals on the triple-zero option or the elimination of nuclear weapons in Germany tend however to be perceived by W.European analysts as propaganda, as long as they are not accompanied by commitments on asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces. However, as in the case of INF, in the case of the TNF proposals, W.European governments understand that if they do not respond intelligently to the Soviet Union they risk losing public support and faith in their policies.

Finally, W.European governments are somewhat perplexed with the far reaching Soviet proposals on economic cooperation and the Soviet demand for membership of GATT which would lead to the elimination of quantitative restrictions in East-West trade. The prevailing view has been to relate these issues with those of human rights and economic reforms in Eastern Europe.

## 2. WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY DILEMMAS

### 2.1. The commitment to nuclear deterrence

NATO'S doctrine of flexible response is based on the assumption that NATO'S conventional forces can only delay the attacking WTO forces and that sooner or later NATO would have to resort to nuclear weapons to stop enemy forces. Flexible response involves the early use of short-range nuclear weapons and if these failed to produce results, NATO would resort to intermediate or long-range weapons.

The elimination of INF implies an increased reliance on short-range nuclear weapons because there are reasons to believe that the United States, Britain or France would not be very eager to use their strategic forces to punish the Soviet Union for undertaking limited military operations against front-line NATO countries. Therefore short-range nuclear weapons are essential to the defense of these countries, as long as they cannot withstand conventional attacks. However short-range nuclear weapons do not provide absolute security to front-line countries, to the extent that a future Soviet administration could accept the risks of limited nuclear exchanges which would not affect Soviet territory.

Nuclear deterrence has been a cause of discord among allies and EPC partners. Thus a minority of these countries which usually included Greece and Ireland have voted in favour of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions sponsored by Eastern and non-aligned countries calling for the prohibition of the first-use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Denmark and Spain are opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons in their territories and thus reject the concept of risk-sharing which is of paramount importance to NATO and WEU. The decision of the recent WEU summit in the Hague to accept the accession of Spain and Portugal would indicate that the Spanish problem has been overcome, although the Spanish government is strongly criticised in Spain for repudiating the ban of nuclear weapons, resulting from the referendum decision on accession to NATO.

## 2.2.The triple-zero option

A few years ago two NATO members and EPC partners, namely Greece and Denmark, had supported the freezing of the deployment of INF. At present, three NATO front line countries, namely the Federal Republic, Greece and Turkey refuse to commit themselves to the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons deployed in their territories. Following the INF agreement the Federal Republic has become increasingly aware about its exposure to short-range Soviet missiles. Commenting on the Soviet 10:1 superiority in these weapons a leading German conservative F.J. Strauss wrote recently "The Alliance makes sense to us if the citizens of the Federal Republic objectively and subjectively have the same security as the citizens of the W.European states and North America. Otherwise one day the way to neutralism will be ahead of us"(1).

Already large segments of W.German public opinion support the triple-zero option. However the United States have clearly stated that if they had to withdraw their nuclear weapons from W.Germany, they would also withdraw their troops. Moreover, the British commitment to W.German defense appears to lie on the same premises, as evidenced by Mrs.Thatcher's insistence in the Brussels summit of the Alliance on the need to modernise INF, following the elimination

of INF. In this summit, only the French among the nuclear powers appeared not to mind too much about W.German reservations. This attitude probably results from French willingness to extend the national nuclear umbrella to W.Germany.

Greece's refusal to modernise nuclear weapons stored in its territory is consistent with its previous disarmament initiatives, including the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. From a military point of view a significant factor is the non-deployment of SS-21 and SS-23 missiles in Bulgaria to replace the aging Scud B and Frog-7 missiles, as well as the fact that no nuclear warheads were made available for these missiles by the Soviet Union.

### 2.3.Reduction of conventional forces

In the MBFR negotiations NATO's basic goal was to bring about asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces with the view of reducing NATO's inferiority in tanks, artillery and aircraft. However, modern armour and anti-tank missiles manufactured by the Western nations have raised doubts about the validity of NATO's evaluation of the conventional balance and the resulting Western insistence on asymmetrical reductions.

At any rate, the Soviet Union appears for the first time willing to discuss asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces. Such reductions would probably be tied to Western concessions on matters such as the development of new weapons and the so-called emerging technologies.

Western policies on conventional arms reductions have been defined up to now in the framework of NATO and in the absence of France which has had doubts about the concept itself. A W.European policy on the matter should necessarily include France and would have to take into account its views about the need to extend the geographical scope of the negotiations to the whole of Europe, including the European area of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain meaningful results. The Soviet Union has recently accepted the French position, assuming perhaps that the extension of the geographical scope of the negotiations to the Mediterranean and possible discussions on ceilings of the Mediterranean fleets of the superpowers (2) could create additional difficulties to NATO. The participation of European neutral and non-aligned countries in a future Conference on Disarmament in Europe would add to these difficulties.

### 3.CONCLUDING REMARKS

The European Parliament in its Resolution of 17.6.87 on the implications for the European Community of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (3) has rightfully pointed out the need to activate EPC in order to obtain a mandate for the second phase of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which would include in its agenda conventional forces reductions and would absorb the MBFR negotiations.

The second phase of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe will open as soon as the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of CSCE reaches its end. W.European countries



should be prepared to face comprehensive arms control and disarmament proposals by the Soviet Union which would include the elimination of short-range missiles, the creation of nuclear-free zones and large reductions of conventional forces. W. European countries will have to reach common assessments of the security risks within the framework of WEU. Moreover, they will have to activate EPC in order to produce counter-proposals which would take into account not only the security requirements but also the long-standing wishes of the peoples of W. and E. Europe. Thus W. Europeans may have to accept the withdrawal of U.S. forces from C. Europe in exchange for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from E. Europe.

W. European states can no longer afford to be ignored or, at best, regarded as second or third rate partners in negotiations on European security. Together with a common defense posture they should also define common positions on arms control and disarmament and make good use of the opportunities which are at present available.

#### NOTES

1. European Affairs 4/87 at p. 12
  2. Proposals in this respect were made by Mr. Gorbachev during his recent visit to Yugoslavia.
  3. O.J. C 190/64, 20.7.87
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