

EGYPT, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, INSTITUTE FOR DIPLOMATIC  
STUDIES -


Conference on the occasion of the 25th

Anniversary of the O.A.U.

Cairo, 25-28 JANUARY 1988

HA PARTECIPATO: ALIBONI

CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 25th ANNIVERSARY OF THE O.A.U.  
Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

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  - 5) LA DENUCLEARISATION DE L'AFRIQUE ET L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE' AFRICAINE (Ambassadeur A. Osman)
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  - 7) THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (Ambassadeur A. Haggag)
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- 17) THE OAU ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS (Xu Shannan)
- 18) DEVELOPMENT AID AS AN OBSTACLE TO SELF-DEVELOPMENT (M. Elmandjira)
- 19) HIGH COMMISSIONER'S STATEMENT ON REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (Abdel-Mawla El-Solh)
- 20) SPEECH by H. E. General Olusegun Obasanjo
- 21) ILO ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH OAU
- 22) PAPER presented by Mr. Amin Abu Senina
- 23) STATEMENT ON "ASPECTS OF UNDP COOPERATION WITH OAU IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA" (L. Cappelletti)
- 24) THE OAU AND MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF AFRICAN INDEBTEDNESS (Y. Boutros-Ghali)
- 25) PROTECTING AFRICA'S CHILDREN (R. S. Reid)
- 26) PAPER CONCERNING ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) ACTIVITIES.

Conference on the Occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U.

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PROGRAMME

25 January 1988

- 09.30-11.00 Opening Session (Cairo Room)
- Speech by H.E. Idi Oumarou, Secretary General of the O.A.U
  - Speech by H.E. Mr. Luis Echeveria, Former President of Mexico
  - Speech by H.E. General Olusegun Obasanjo  
Former President of Nigeria
  - Message of H.E. President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak  
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
delivered by the Prime Minister Dr. Atef Sidki
- 11.00 Coffee Break
- 11.30-13.30 First Working Session (Alexandria Room)

Political Perspective

- 25 years in the life of the O.A.U  
Prof. Gabriel Olusanya, Institute of International Affairs  
Lagos, Nigeria
  - Africa and Non-Alignment  
Prof. Ali-Eddine Helal, Cairo University
  - Problems and Aspirations in Africa  
Prof. Francis Ding, Wilson Center, Washington D.C.
- Debate

13.30 Lunch

16.00-18.00 Committee I (Cairo Room)

The O.A.U. and African Problems

- Peaceful solution of African Conflicts  
Prof. Omar Bisheer, Institute of African Studies, Sudan
- Comparative Analysis of the O.A.U. Decisions on  
Settling African Conflicts  
Dr. Samuel Asante, U.N. Council on Namibia, Lusaka
- Denuclearization of Africa and the O.A.U  
H.E. Ambassador Ahmed Osman, Former Under Secretary of  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt

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- The Role of the O.A.U in the Decolonization of Africa with Emphasis on the Elimination of Racism and Settler colonialism

Mr. Johnnie Makatini

Director, Dept. of International Affairs, ANC

Debate

16.00-18.00 Committee II (Alexandria Room)

Human Rights in Africa

- The Contribution of the O.A.U. to the Promotion of Human Rights in Africa  
Prof. Taslim Elias, Judge at the International Court of Justice
- The O.A.U. and the Rule of Law  
Prof. Raymond Ranjeiva, University of Madagascar
- The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights  
Dr. Ibrahim Badawy El Sheikh, Deputy Chairman of the African Commission on Human Rights

Debate

26 January 1988

09.30-11.00 Second Working Session (Cairo Room)

Problems and Achievements of the O.A.U

- 25 years of the O.A.U. Achievements and Difficulties  
H.E. Prof. Anatoly Gromyko, Director, Institute for African Studies, Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- The Economic Problems in the African Continent  
H.E. Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria
- The O.A.U. Achievements and Problems  
Prof. Xu Shannan, Deputy Director,  
China Institute for the International Studies

Debate

11.30-11.45 Coffee Break

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11.45-13.30 Committee I (Cairo Room)

Economic Perspective

- The O.A.U. and the African debt crisis  
H.E. Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, Assistant Secretary General  
of the O.A.U.
  - South-South Cooperation, Future prospects  
Prof. U.B. Kokorev, Institute for African Studies,  
Academy of Sciences, Moscow
  - Petroleum and African Solidarity  
Dr. Mourad Wahba, American University, Cairo
  - The O.A.U. and Multilateral Aspects of Indebtedness  
Dr. Youssef Boutros Ghali  
Adviser to the Prime Minister of Egypt for Economic Affairs
- Debate

11.45-13.30 Committee II (Alexandria Room)

Afro-Arab Cooperation

- Agriculture and Food Production  
H.E. Dr. Abdel Razzak Sedki, Former Minister of Agriculture  
of Egypt
- The Afro-Arab Cooperation  
H.E. Prof. Ibrahim Gambari,  
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
- Afro-Arab Cooperation  
Prof. Mahdi El Mandjra, University of Rabat, Morocco
- Afro-Arab Cooperation, The Record and the Prospects  
Dr. Samir Amin, Third World Forum

Debate

13.30 Lunch

16.00-18.00 Committee I (Cairo Room)

The O.A.U. and International Organizations

(Humanitarian, Cultural and Educational Aspects)

- Integrated Development of Drought-stricken Areas in Africa  
Dr. Kamal Saad, Representative of UNESCO in Cairo

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- The Refugees as a Human Problem posed to International and Regional Cooperation

Mr. Abdel Mawla El Solh, UNHCR Representative in Cairo

- Cooperation and Coordination between the O.A.U. and the W.H.O. in the Health Fields

Dr. Ashour Omar Gebreel, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean

- International Committee of the Red Cross and its Relations with the O.A.U.

Mr. Fred Isler, Head of Delegation of ICRC in Cairo

- UNICEF in Africa

Mr. Richard Reid, Regional Director of UNICEF for the Middle East and North Africa

Debate

16.00-18.00 Committee II (Alexandria Room)

The O.A.U. and the International Organizations

(Economic, Labor and Industrial Aspects)

- FAO Activities in Africa

Mr. Amin Abu Senina, FAO Representative in Cairo

- Activities of the I.L.O. in Africa and its Relations with the O.A.U.

Mr. Osman Mohamed Ahmed, Director of ILO Office in Cairo

- Cooperation between UNITAR and the O.A.U.

Mr. Michel Doo Kingue, U.N. Under Secretary General and Executive Director of UNITAR

- Aspects of UNDP Cooperation with Africa

Mr. Luciano Cappelletti, Resident Representative of UNDP in Cairo

Debate

19.30

Dinner Offered by H.E. Dr. Boutros Ghali,  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the  
Arab Republic of Egypt (Salon Luxor)



27 january 1988

09.30-11.30 Third Worling Session (Cairo Room)

Cultural Perspective

- The Effect of Modernity on African Culture  
H.E. Mr. Bona Malwal, Former Minister of Culture, Sudan
- African Culture with Special Emphasis on African Literature  
Prof. Angèle Boutros, Cairo University
- Culture, Development and African Unity  
Prof. Alex Kwapong, UNU-Tokyo

Debate

11.30 Coffee Break

11.45-13.30 Round Table (Cairo Room)

The O.A.U. on the Eve of the 21st Century

Speakers:

- Dr. Aminu Hussein, Addis Ababa University
- H.E. Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, Former Minister of  
Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
- H.E. Mr. Bona Malwal, Former Minister of Culture, Sudan
- H.E. Ambassador Akporode Clark, UN Council on Namibia

11.30 Lunch

16.00 Closing Session (Cairo Room)

Review and Closing Remarks

28 january 1988

Sight-Seeing and Free Programme

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25th Anniversary of the O.A.U.

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Mr.Amin Abu Senina	FAO Representative in Cairo
Mr.Osman Mohamed Ahmed	Director of ILO office in Cairo
S.E. Ambassador Samir Ahmed	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Prof. Roberto Aliboni	Director Institute for International Affairs, Rome
Mr.Abdel Mawla Al Solh	UNHCR Representative in Cairo
Dr. Samir Amin	Third World Forum
Prof. Samuel Asante	Lusaka
Dr. Adel Beshay	American University in Cairo
Prof. Omar Bisheer	Institute of African Studies, Sudan
H.E. Ambassador Tahseen Beshir	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
Prof. Angèle Boutros	Cairo University
Mr.Luciano Cappelletti	Representative of UNDP in Cairo
H.E. Ambassador Akporode Clark	UN Council for Namibia
Prof. Jesus Contreras	Mexico
Mr. Achol Deng	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
Mr.Francis Ding	Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.
Prof. Mohamed Dewidar	Alexandria University

Dr. Mona Makram Ebeid	American University in Cairo
H.E. Mr. Luis Echeverria	Former President of Mexico
Mr. Fouad El Bedeiwy	African Society, Egypt
Honorable Taslim Elias	Judge at International Court of Justice
Dr. Mohamed El Sayed El Said	Center of Strategic Studies, Al Ahram Newspaper
Dr. Ibrahim Badawy El Sheikh	Deputy Chairman of the African Commission on Human Rights
Mr. Salah Galal	Chairman of African Press Syndicate
Prof. Ibrahim Gambari	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria
Dr. Gabriel Ghanoum	Mexico
Dr. Ashour Omar Gebreel	Regional office for the Eastern Mediteranean WHO
Dr. Youssef Boutros Ghali	Adviser to the Prime Minister of Egypt for Economic Affairs
Prof. Talaat Ghoneimy	Alexandria University
Prof. Anatoly Gromyko	Director, Institute for African Studies Academy of Sciences, Moscow
H.E. Ambassador Ahmed Haggag	Assistant Secretary General of the O.A.U.
Mr. Ahmed Hamroush	Chairman of the Egyptian Committee for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity

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Dr. Ossama El-Ghazaly Harb	Center of Strategic Studies Al-Ahram Newspaper
Dr. Nabil Helmy	Zagazig University
Prof. Aminu Hussein	University of Addis Ababa
Prof. Ali Eldin Helal	Cairo University
Mr. Fred Isler	Head of ICRC delegation, Cairo
Prof. Alex Kwapong	United Nations University, Tokyo
Mr. Michael Doo Kingue	U.N. Under Secretary General
Prof. V.B. Kokorev	Institute for African Studies, Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Dr. Salwa Labib	Institute of African Studies, Cairo
Dr. Anwar Abdel Malek	
Mr. Johnnie Makatini	Director, Department of International Affairs, ANC
Mr. Bona Malwal	Former Minister of Culture, Sudan
Prof. Mahdi El Mandjra	University of Rabat, Morocco
Dr. Horeya Magahed	Cairo University
Dr. Abdel Aziz Mawar	Director, Institute of the Middle East Studies, Ain Shams University
H.E. General Olsegun Obasanjo	Former President of Nigeria

Mr. Gabriel Olusanya	Institute of International Affairs Lagos, Nigeria
H.E. Ambassador Ahmed Osman	Former Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Egypt
Dr. Gihad Ouda	Center of Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Newspaper
H.E. Ide Oumarou	Secretary General of the O.A.U
Prof. Raymond Ranjeva	University of Madagascar
Mr. Richard Reid	Regional Director of UNICEF for Middle East and North Africa
Dr. Kamal Saad	Representative of UNESCO in Cairo
H.E. Dr. Abdel Razzak Sedki	Former Minister of Agriculture of Egypt
Mr. Xu Shannan	Deputy Director, China Institute for International Studies
Prof. Jerzy Sztuki	Uppsala University, Sweden
Dr. Laila Takla	Member of the Shoura Council, Egypt
Dr. Mourad Wahba	American University in Cairo
Mr. El Sayed Yassin	Center of Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Newspaper

Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the OAU  
Cairo 25/27 February 1988

F.A.OUA/CAIRO 88/DECL.

DECLARATION OF THE CONFERENCE  
ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE OAU

Upon the invitation of the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, an informal non governmental Conference was held in Cairo, from 25 28 January 1988, to commemorate the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Establishment of the OAU.

Special guests, attending this non governmental Conference, in their private capacity were H.E. Luis Echeverria, Former President of Mexico and H.E. General Olesugun Abasanjo, Former President of Nigeria, who addressed the Conference at its inaugural session.

The Conference was opened by H.E. Dr. Atef Sedki, Prime Minister of Egypt, who read out a message from H.E. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, reaffirming Egypt's African vocation and its dedication to the service of the causes and objectives of the OUA.

H.E. Mr. Idi Oumarou, Secretary General of the OAU also addressed the Conference. He reviewed in detail the OAU's achievements as well as its shortcomings.

The Scholars, academicians and diplomats, versed in various disciplines, who attended this important gathering or forum to evaluate the performance of the OAU, had come from Europe, the Americas, Asia and of course from Africa. They devoted the ten sessions of the Conference to a multi-disciplinary study and an appraisal of past OAU performance and its future prospects.

Papers were submitted and discussions took place about the past performance of the OAU in the political field with a view to its improvement. Other topics considered were the peaceful settlement of disputes; the human rights of the African Man; the vital issues of food production and economic development; external indebtedness; and the need for closer Afro-Arab cooperation and African Latin-American cooperation, as pre-requisites for a sound South-South Dialogue and much-needed cooperation.



The plight of the African peoples of S. Africa and Namibia under the oppressive racist apartheid regime of Pretoria or its colonial rule was stressed by several speakers, who urged African governments and the world community to increase their active support to the freedom fighters until the toppling of the apartheid regime, and until Namibia gained its independence.

In this respect, a number of speakers advocated the imposition of the sanctions provided for in the U.N. Charter, in order to put a speedy end to this inhuman system and to usher in a period of peaceful and fruitful coexistence among all the inhabitants of South Africa, of an independent Namibia, and of the other countries in the region.

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Although the performance of the OAU was deemed to be on the whole satisfactory, some participants pointed to certain shortcomings in its past performance. In the opinion of the Conference, however, such shortcomings were inherent in the multilateral and governmental nature of the Organization.

The Conference was of the view that the future performance of the OAU in the field of peaceful settlement of African conflicts should and could be strengthened. Some participants were of the view that some structural reforms of the OAU were necessary so that the Organizations might be better equipped to cope with the new challenges of the technological revolution and of the Twenty-first Century.

However, there was a consensus that the OAU Charter in its present form was adequate although there was need for a political will, a new commitment and a re-dedication to the causes vital to Africa. The Conference therefore urged the African Heads of State and Government to exert further concerted efforts to achieve the two basic objectives of Africa; namely to put an end to African conflicts and ongoing wars by mediation and conciliation, and to mobilize all the potentials of the continent in favour of an increased production and a foster indigenous economic development, to bring about prosperity and progress through sub-regional and regional economic groupings with a view to the establishment of the African Common Market, as soon as possible.

Given the severe economic crisis of the African Continent and its growing foreign debt problems which impeded any effective progress, the Conference exhorted the O.A.U. to establish dialogue and contacts between developed countries and Africa, in order to find ways and means to alleviate the debt burden and provide African countries with greater resources for development. An international conference on Africa's foreign indebtedness could be an appropriate forum in this regard.

In this connection, the Conference called upon African countries to promote their economic cooperation with a view to achieving complementarity and a true South-South cooperation. Food sufficiency and rural development should be accorded high priority in African development plans.

More than ten years having elapsed since the first Afro-Arab Cooperation Summit was held in Cairo, in 1977, the Conference felt that this cooperation should be re-activated and that political aspects should not impede such cooperation.

As self-sufficiency and food security were of paramount importance for the two regions, the Conference strongly recommended the establishment of Afro-Arab enterprises in this field to be financed by investment corporations of the two sides.

The Conference deemed it necessary that the OAU machinery should be so strengthened as to enable it to play in the future a more active role in the economic and technical fields a role as decisive and as impressive as its past struggle for the independence of a great number of African countries.

As a result of the ratification of the African Charter of Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, and the establishment of the African Commission of Human Rights, the Conference thought that a new momentum should be given to this important institution which could be an essential element for the democratization and the economic development of the African Continent.

Given the fact that culture plays an undeniably important role in the progress of peoples, the Conference considered in detail the various aspects of African culture and the need to stimulate cultural exchanges and cooperation among African countries. It stressed the importance of preserving African traditions and values.

The Conference expressed its appreciation to President Hosni Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Egyptian Government for having taken the initiative of organizing this important Conference which deserves to be followed-up by others in Africa, in order to mobilize African and international public opinion and to draw their attention to the achievements of the O.U.A.

Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

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MESSAGE OF

H.E. PRESIDENT MOHAMED HOSNI MUBARAK

PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

TO BE DELIVERED BY

THE PRIME MINISTER DR. ATEF SIDKI

Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to an African land, and on an occasion that is close to the heart of the sons of Africa. 25 years ago, the world witnessed the emergence of our great African gathering, which truly ushered in a new and decisive phase in the history of the peoples of our glorious continent and their heroic struggle for freedom, independence, unity and progress.

25 years ago, the African will merged into an unforgettable historical event, when the Leaders of Africa and its founding fathers issued the Charter of African Unity which laid down the bases of solidarity, cooperation and common action among all African States, and charted for them the course for a better future.

If, through this historical get together, Africa was able to pull down the artificial barriers erected by colonialism over the ages to separate our peoples, the struggle waged by the peoples of the Continent has transcended this colonial legacy. This was not an easy exercise, nor was the struggle they waged over two and a half decade to rid themselves of hurdles and negative residues a negligible undertaking.

Our young Organization took upon itself three responsibilities : ensure the total liberation of African soil from the yoke of foreign domination and external control; provide the Continent with a climate of peace and stability and mobilize resources and potentials to build up African society and the African man, through a comprehensive socio-economic development.

During the struggle waged by Africa to meet the responsibilities of the morrow, the Organization of African Unity had to face numerous impediments and problems, and was exposed to a great number of plots, seditions and interferences.

A primordial challenge and the most provoking might well reside in the fact that the total liberation of Africa has as yet not been secured, since the heinous racist regime in South Africa still incarnates the real danger

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posed to the development and progress of the African peoples. Moreover, the racist South African Government still pursues its discrimination and apartheid practices in the most abject manner ever known in the history of mankind : the heroes of liberty from the African National Congress are still thrown in prisons, unjust trials conducted and those who struggle for dignity and Human Rights sentenced to death.

The crimes perpetrated by the white racist regime in Pretoria are not limited to sustained acts of aggression against our oppressed black peoples in South Africa and Namibia because this racist regime overtly terrorizes as well the frontline African countries, thus jeopardizing stability and security throughout the Continent.

While hailing the peoples of the frontline countries for their steadfast stand and courageous opposition to their oppressive neighbour, supporting and upholding the African Liberation Movements who pursue their heroic struggle despite the great losses they incur as a result of the perennial shortage in appropriate equipment, our African and human conscience clamours for an immediate effective and positive action at the level of the Continent, so that our opposition stands acquire a practical dimension and ensue in tangible and concrete results in the realm of reality.

We must therefore believe in our ability to act and in the need for joint, concerted, coordinated, diversified and intensified efforts, in terms of financial resources and spirit of initiative.

We must also realize that the struggle waged by Africa against South Africa does not stop at the boundaries of the Continent but transcends them to encompass the world, involving all honourable men and every living conscience. If we look at the internal raging storm among our African people and at the unceasing struggle waged by the Liberation Movements, we can but note the heralds of freedom and the perspective of banners of liberty flying throughout the Continent, that augur the fated reality of independence in the very near future.

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As regards the objective of peace and stability, our Organization has faced the dangers of division and paralysis. It was vital for our peoples to be aware of the schemes hatched to splinter their ranks and doom them to perdition. But, wisdom prevailed and the spirit of responsibility was enhanced, when the First Ordinary OAU Summit Conference which met here, on this land of peace, in Cairo, in July 1964, committed itself to respect the national boundaries of each Member State existing at the time of independence, and recognize them as a de facto reality that cannot be changed even if they were arbitrarily delineated, whatever practical or ethnic considerations.

The border disputes that are still ongoing are instrumental in creating a climate of suspicion and impairing good neighbourliness relations that should prevail among all African States. They also adversely affect the credibility of the principles that are the foundations of our Organization.

We have a deep regard for our Continent so heavily burdened by bequeathed problems which blow frenzied storms that destabilize and uproot peace, in addition to preventing deep sores from mending. Faced by the current challenges of the age, it behoves us - motivated by a profound sense of responsibility - to shape the future, pool resources and mobilize all potentials, and not wallow in the legacy of the past or be snared by the trap of the enemy. Moreover, Africa cannot remain committed to its principles or achieve its aspirations if it opens its doors to foreign interventions, surrenders to the cold war or lets itself be trapped by international polarization. Hence, the non-alignment of Africa, and the commitment of our Organization to this staunch principle are its strong shield and the vigilant protector against the storms of strife and the dangers of divergence.

The Organization of African Unity is the bastion that protects the peoples of the Continent upholds their solidarity and expresses their distinct personality on the international scene. That is why we must constantly keep in view a nobler goal and a single objective, namely to safeguard the Organization, ensure its cohesion and strengthen its entity, as a symbol of African will and an important instrument in joint African action.

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Since accession to independence and until this very day, our African Continent has been facing what I call the challenges of life. If the dawn of freedom has emerged, this dawn, alone, despite the great miracles it brought about, does not suffice. Africa is still greatly burdened by backwardness, a fate common to the majority of the peoples of the Continent, which digs a deep gap between their various living levels. It is a problem that not only affects the dignity of the Continent and its legitimate rights, but affects as well world peace. How can peace survive between glaring wealth and abysmal poverty in a world where distances no longer exist? There is also the problem of social differences within the same country, a situation that should be redressed and replaced by more equitable criteria that provide all the nationals of a country with equal opportunities.

There is no doubt that the critical economic conditions in Africa incarnate the problems of developing countries. The accumulation of structural imbalances in African economies and the escalating foreign indebtedness, together with an ongoing world crisis, have further been aggravated by drought, desertification and natural disasters. They also exploded a devastating crisis that did away with the life of millions of our peoples and is still threatening further millions with famine and an unsettled life.

It is high time for world public opinion to become aware of the tragedy lived by Africa because, while we are exerting utmost efforts to achieve development, all those efforts are dissipated by endless indebtedness, and our toiling masses have been unable to gather any economic benefits from such efforts, while we have arrived at the bitter conclusion that we must impose on ourselves further sacrifices, and toil more strenuously to finance penury.

This tragic situation basically emanates from the accumulation of unpaid debts, in addition to rising interest rates, a dwindling flow of new capital and diminishing export earnings as a result of the deteriorating international economic climate, affected by monetary practices and protectionist restrictions hurled by the mere whims of financial and basic commodity markets, prodded by a craving for greater wealth.



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Our creditors have nothing to lose if they sit with us at the same table so that, together, we may consider the ways and means likely to effect a breakthrough from the present impasse that perturbs our relations without any justification whatsoever, and impedes a new take-off in the interest of us all and in that of mankind.

There are developmental problems which prevent us from dealing with the effects of backwardness and promoting social justice; there are problems in terms of planning, supply and expertise. In all these domains, our Continent is in need of considerable assistance which we believe is the right that our backward people can claim from those who have already developed themselves; a right dictated by the solidarity that should exist among all men and the need to consolidate peace.

In addition to economic backwardness, there are the old residues that have left dark patches on the psychic forces of our Continent which can be removed only through tremendous efforts in the educational and cultural fields so that all the unseen shackles of the African man which hamper him and restrict his liberty may finally be removed.

We live in a world in which the just and legitimate demands of man are on the rise without, as a counterpart, an increase in the means allowing for the satisfaction of these just and legitimate demands. We can never get close enough to the fulfilment of the great aspirations of men without an organized action that calls for national mobilization stemming from the democratic will of the peoples; a mobilization that dictates inescapable sacrifices, but which will be freely accepted by an aware population looking forward to a take-off.

If we have among us, to-day, leaders and thinkers from Latin America, Asia and Europe, their presence embodies and reflects the reality of dialogue between the civilizations long lived by the peoples of Africa together with the peoples of the world. We must therefore bring to light the great humane ideals of these civilizations and endeavour at best to vindicate them.

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These great humane ideals have been downtrodden over the centuries by invaders, but they were never stifled in the heart of millions of the sons of Africa, who have long been oppressed, but remained alive and evolved the most precious aspects of the national culture of all our peoples. They must be reflected to-day in a new life for the countries of Africa. In truth, the ideals and principles that guided the peoples of the other continents in the organization of relations among themselves, are the very same ideals and principles that inspired Africa when it recovered its equilibrium and took off for unity, solidarity and closed ranks.

Distinguished guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Egyptian people who celebrate to-day the silver jubilee of the one African will have stood, over long eras, at the access door to the Continent, to carry out with determination and awareness their mission, teeming with a sense of responsibility and sentiments of amity.

Standing at this access door, the Egyptian people have endeavoured to make of their land a crossroad for civilizations and cultures towards wider vistas behind their soil. During this era, which can be truly called the era of Africa, our Egyptian people are still carrying out their historical mission towards the other peoples of the African Continent.

They stand by them in their heroic struggle for political and economic independence, as they stand by them in their struggle against racial discrimination.

They bear with them the responsibilities of the future to which Africa aspires so that it may affirm its personality, shape its future, compensate for the backwardness it had to endure for long centuries, exploit man's developmental potentials in all fields, build up its life and lead it towards a future basking in the sun of freedom, beaming beacons of hope as far as the eye can see.

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At this juncture, I wish to invite you, during your deliberations over the coming few days, to undertake, with courage and clarity, an overall review of the achievements of our Organization, and endeavour to outline the future measures needed so that Africa may step into the twenty-first century. Without study and analysis, we shall not be able to translate the sincerity of our will into sustained action and fruitful efforts in favour of Africa.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, who whole-heartedly share with the peoples of the African Continent their happiness at the silver jubilee of their great Organization, pledge themselves to remain true to that symbol, and what it reflects in terms of self-confidence and the ability to weave progress and build up the future.

May the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon you.

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Conférence tenue à l'occasion du

25ème Anniversaire de l'O.U.A.

Le Caire, 25-28 janvier 1988

F.A. OAU / CAIRO 88/ PL 2

La Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique  
et  
l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine

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Ambassadeur Dr. Ahmed OSMAN

La Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique  
et  
l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine  
- - - - -

En proposant l'idée de dénucléariser l'Afrique, l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine a rejoint les pays du tiers-monde et des autres peuples épris de paix qui veulent s'opposer à une répétition des horreurs produites par les deux bombes nucléaires lancées contre Hiroshima et Nagasaki en Août 1945. Surtout que tout usage des armes nucléaires aujourd'hui signifie tout simplement l'annihilation de notre planète.

Si la proposition faite par l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine dans les années 60, tendant à dénucléariser l'Afrique pouvait paraître tant soit peu idéaliste et invraisemblable, à cette époque, des événements ultérieurs sont venus confirmer la perspicacité et la sagesse de l'O.U.A. en formulant pareille proposition.

En effet, d'un côté, il existe dans le monde, depuis lors, trois régions dénucléarisées en fait et en droit. D'un autre côté, l'accord intervenu le 8 décembre 1987, entre les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S. portant sur l'élimination, pour la première fois, d'une catégorie de missiles nucléaires en Europe, prouve que le bannissement éventuel des armes n'est pas un rêve d'utopiste, comme certains se plaisaient de stigmatiser les adversaires des armes nucléaires.

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Une association japonaise a récemment organisé au Palais des Nations-Unies à Genève, une exposition qui vient nous rappeler d'une manière dramatique les effets terrifiants des bombes nucléaires lancées contre le Japon. L'exposition était composée de photos des destructions subies par l'homme, son environnement et des objectifs affectés par l'énergie nucléaire émanant de ces bombes.

Les photos présentées et les objets exposés donnent une image vivante de la magnitude de la destruction matérielle, des effets monstrueux sur les morts et les souffrances inouïes de ceux qui ont pu survivre.

Côte à côte de ces photos, l'exposition présentait de grandes cartes de la ville de New York, de Paris, de Londres et de Moscou, sur lesquelles étaient tracés des cercles montrant pour chacune de ces villes l'étendue des parties qui seraient détruites ou affectées par les vagues de destruction, si une ou plusieurs bombes nucléaires venaient à être lancées au centre de chacune de ces villes.

L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, pour sa part a décidé de prévenir l'Afrique contre pareil sort et a déclenché l'idée de dénucléariser l'Afrique, dans le sens d'un continent exempt d'armes nucléaires.

Nous traiterons dans cet exposé de trois points:

- A - L'origine de l'Idée,
- B - Son évolution,
- C - Les perspectives de sa réalisation.

A. L'origine de l'idée:

L'idée de dénucléariser l'Afrique a commencé par être une préoccupation des Etats Africains indépendants et elle est devenue par la suite une préoccupation commune des Etats Africains et des Nations-Unies.

La proposition de dénucléariser l'Afrique a fait son apparition pour la première fois, quand les Etats Africains ont été alarmés par les dangers des armes nucléaires sur leur continent par les premières explosions nucléaires entreprises par la France au Sahara il y a 28 ans de cela, en 1960.

En cette année, les Etats Africains ont saisi les Nations-Unies de ce problème. Un projet de résolution a été soumis à la 15<sup>ème</sup> session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies. Il contenait une invitation à tous les Etats à considérer et à respecter le Continent africain comme zone exempte d'armes nucléaires et demandant la cessation de tout test sur les armes nucléaires et sur les missiles ballistiques en Afrique et à éliminer toute installation destinée à être employée pour l'essai, l'entreposage et le transport de ces armes, et à s'abstenir d'ériger de pareilles installations. Il est vrai, que les Etats Africains, n'ont pas insisté sur le vote de leur projet de résolution, mais ils ont réussi à alerter les Nations-Unies et l'Opinion publique mondiale à leur problème.

C'était là l'origine première de la proposition de la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique. Comment cette idée a-t-elle évolué depuis lors.

B. Evolution de l'idée:

Nous allons étudier l'évolution de l'idée en 3 phases:

La 1<sup>ère</sup> phase comprend la période de 1961 à 1965.

La 2<sup>ème</sup> phase comprend l'année 1974.

La 3<sup>ème</sup> phase comprend la période de 1975 jusqu'à maintenant.

La première phase de 1961 à 1965:

En 1961, les Etats Africains soulevèrent la question de nouveau à la 16<sup>ème</sup> session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies. Cette fois-ci, une résolution a été adoptée, c'était la résolution 1652 (76) du 24 Novembre 1961.

L'Assemblée Générale a demandé aux Etats-Membres de ne pas entreprendre des essais nucléaires en Afrique sous quelque forme que ce soit, de s'abstenir d'utiliser l'Afrique pour tester, entreposer ou transporter des armes nucléaires et de considérer et de respecter le continent Africain comme une zone dénucléarisée.

Deux ans après cette résolution, le centre d'intérêt à propos de la dénucléarisation de l'Afrique a été transféré des Nations-Unies au premier forum Inter-Africain organisé au niveau de sommet. En effet, les Etats Africains reprirent la question en 1963, quand la Conférence au Sommet des



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Etats Africains Indépendants a approuvé une résolution sur le désarmement en général qui contenait des dispositions pour une action concertée vers le but de faire de l'Afrique une zone libre d'armes nucléaires.

Une année plus tard, en 1964, après la création de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, l'Assemblée des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements de l'Organisation se saisirent de la question à leur première session ordinaire réunie au Caire du 17 Avril au 21 Juillet 1964. Une déclaration sur la dénucléarisation de l'Afrique a été adoptée.

Dans cette même année, un autre forum international a été saisi de la question de la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique, En effet, la seconde Conférence des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements des pays Non-Alignés, réunie aussi au Caire du 5 au 10 Octobre 1964, a endossé la Déclaration de la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique.

En 1965, la question a été ramenée au Nations-Unies. L'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies à sa 20<sup>ème</sup> session, a souscrit à la Déclaration sur la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique par sa résolution 2033 (20) du 3 Décembre 1965, et a demandé à tous les Etats de s'abstenir

- de tester,
- de produire,
- d'utiliser ou
- de déployer des armes nucléaires

sur le continent de l'Afrique ou de transporter de pareilles armes ou de transférer des données scientifiques ou l'assistance

technique que ce soit directement ou indirectement, sous quelle forme que ce soit qui puisse être utilisée à aider dans la production ou l'utilisation des armes nucléaires en Afrique.

On peut dire donc, que dans cette première phase, une coopération entre l'O.U.A. et les Nations-Unies a été établie pour réaliser un but important pour l'humanité, lequel est de diminuer le risque d'une confrontation nucléaire en Afrique en essayant d'éloigner les armes nucléaires du Continent Africain. De plus, le mouvement des Non-Alignés a concourru à ce projet vital conformément au but des pays non-alignés.

### La 2<sup>ème</sup> Phase

Depuis 1965, une nouvelle phase a été réalisée. Après avoir discuté et adopté la Déclaration sur la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique sur le plan régional par la 1<sup>ère</sup> session ordinaire de l'Assemblée des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements de l'O.U.A. en 1964 et l'endossement ultérieur de cette déclaration par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies à la 20<sup>ème</sup> session 1965, un développement capital a eu lieu 9 ans plus tard en 1974.

Le Nigéria, au nom de 24 Etats Africains, a introduit un projet de résolution, qui est devenu la résolution 3261 E (29) du 9 Décembre 1974. Ce qui caractérise particulièrement cette résolution dans l'évolution de l'idée de la Dénucléarisation est le fait que cette résolution a été adoptée

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à l'unanimité, ce qui veut dire que l'établissement d'une zone libre d'armes nucléaires en Afrique, se trouve basé sur un fondement ferme et solide, lequel est le consensus de la Communauté Internationale. L'initiative prise à l'échelon régional par les Etats Africains est maintenant sanctionnée à l'unanimité à l'échelon international.

Dans cette résolution, l'Assemblée Générale a réaffirmé le contenu essentiel de la zone Dénucléarisée quand elle a requis de tous les Etats de considérer et de respecter le Continent Africain comme une zone libre de toute arme nucléaire et de s'abstenir de tester, de produire, de transporter ou d'entreposer des armes nucléaires sur le Continent Africain et de ne pas utiliser ou de menacer d'utiliser les armes nucléaires contre le Continent.

Dans cette résolution 3261 E (29) et les deux autres résolutions précédentes 1652 (16) et 2033 (20) l'Assemblée Générale a invité tous les Etats membres aux Nations-Unies et en particulier les puissances nucléaires d'assumer certaines responsabilités envers la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique.

Quelle a été la réaction des Puissances Nucléaires envers cette invitation à l'époque ?

Prenons un à un la réaction de chaque Puissance Nucléaire.

La Chine a appuyé l'idée de créer une zone dénucléarisée en Afrique et a déclaré qu'elle est prête à assumer des obligations à l'égard de la zone.

L'Union Soviétique a appuyé les efforts des Etats Africains pour établir une zone dénucléarisée en Afrique, en appuyant la résolution adoptée sur cette question par l'Assemblée Générale sur l'initiative des Etats Africains.

Les Etats-Unis ont considéré qu'il était encore prématuré à ce stade du développement de la zone d'énumérer les responsabilités spécifiques qui devaient être assumées par les Etats extérieurs à la zone, et que ces obligations devaient être l'objet de consultations entre les Etats de la zone et les Etats extérieurs à la zone.

Le Royaume-Uni, pour sa part, s'est réservé le droit d'examiner l'accord particulier qui pourrait être conclu entre les pays africains.

Quant à la France, elle était prête à respecter les intentions des Etats Africains de dénucléariser l'Afrique.

Nous en venons maintenant à la 3<sup>ème</sup> phase de l'évolution de l'idée qui comprend la période de 1975-1985:

Depuis 1975, l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies a examiné chaque année l'application de la déclaration, adoptant une série de résolutions à ce sujet. Malgré le fait qu'aucun pas concret n'a été réalisé à cet effet, les efforts

déployés pour la réalisation de la Déclaration se sont concentrés autour des thèmes suivants:

- a) Maintien du consensus international existant contre l'introduction des armes nucléaires dans le continent. En ce faisant, la communauté internationale a été guidée par sa conviction que la mise en oeuvre de la Déclaration serait une mesure significative pour la prévention de la prolifération des armes nucléaires dans le monde, ce qui conduirait vers le désarmement nucléaire et renforcerait la sécurité des Etats Africains.

En même temps, l'O.U.A., le mouvement des Non-Alignés, et la Conférence islamique, ont réitéré leur requête à tous les Etats de respecter le continent africain comme une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires, et de s'abstenir de tester, de produire, de déployer, de transporter, d'entreposer, d'user ou de menacer d'user des armes nucléaires contre le continent africain.

- b) Le second thème consacré par ces résolutions a été de renforcer le lien entre les Nations-Unies et l'O.U.A. concernant la mise en application de la Déclaration. Toutes les résolutions adoptées par l'Assemblée Générale depuis 1975 ont requis le Secrétaire Général de rendre toute assistance nécessaire à l'O.U.A. pour la mise en application

de cette Déclaration. Deux des résolutions adoptées ont été assez spécifiques à ce sujet, elles ont souligné expressément la disposition des Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements africains de conclure un traité international pour la mise en application de la Déclaration sous les auspices des Nations-Unies.

- c) Le 3<sup>ème</sup> thème qui ressort de ces résolutions se réfère à la détermination de l'Etendue Géographique de la zone. Elle comprend le continent africain, y inclus les Etats africains sur le continent, Madagascar et les autres îles qui entourent l'Afrique.

C. Les perspectives pour l'avenir:

Dans la 3<sup>ème</sup> phase de l'évolution de l'idée de la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique, l'accent a été placé sur la mise en application de la Déclaration adoptée par l'O.U.A. et sanctionnée par les Nations-Unies.

Malheureusement, l'examen par l'O.U.A. des modalités nécessaires pour la mise en application de la Déclaration a été entamé par un développement grave et inquiétant, c'est l'apparition des ambitions nucléaires de l'Afrique du Sud. Ce développement a cet effet particulier d'avoir un effet contradictoire sur les perspectives de réalisation d'une zone dénucléarisée en Afrique. En effet d'une part, il a compliqué la question et d'autre part, il a stimulé les efforts pour la résoudre. On craignait que tout développe-

ment ultérieur du potentiel nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud frustrerait les efforts déployés pour l'établissement d'une zone dénucléarisée en Afrique. D'autre part, la nouvelle situation créée par le potentiel nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud donnera plus d'urgence à la mise en application de la Déclaration.

On pourrait assumer, que les perspectives de réalisation de la Déclaration sera décidée par le résultat de la course dans laquelle l'O.U.A. et les Nations-Unies se sont engagées pour mettre fin à la capacité de l'Afrique du Sud dans le domaine nucléaire militaire.

Nous allons voir ensemble les efforts déployés par les deux Organisations pour faire face aux dangers inhérents au potentiel militaire nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud.

C'est au Sommet Africain de Port-Louis (Ile-Maurice) du 2 au 7 Juillet 1976 que l'O.U.A. a évoqué pour la première fois la capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud et ses fâcheuses répercussions sur la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique.

Par sa résolution 31/69 adoptée sans vote le 10 Décembre 1976, l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies a partagé les préoccupations exprimées par le Sommet Africain de Port-Louis à l'égard des dangers inhérents à la capacité nucléaire militaire de l'Afrique du Sud.

L'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies a considéré que ce développement pourrait frustrer les efforts déployés par

l'Afrique pour établir des zones dénucléarisées en Afrique et ailleurs, comme un moyen efficace pour empêcher soit la prolifération des armes nucléaires, tant horizontale que verticale ou pour contribuer à l'élimination du danger de l'holocauste nucléaire.

L'Assemblée Générale ne s'est pas limitée dans cette résolution à exprimer sa préoccupation à l'égard de ce développement inquiétant mais elle a formulé un appel à tous les Etats de ne pas délivrer à l'Afrique du Sud ou mettre à sa disposition tout équipement ou de matière fissile ou de technologie qui permettrait au régime raciste de l'Afrique du Sud d'acquérir une capacité nucléaire militaire.

L'Attitude des Nations-Unies de 1976 à l'égard du potentiel nucléaire militaire de l'Afrique du Sud:

Depuis 1976, l'action des Nations-Unies à l'égard de l'Afrique du Sud, peut se résumer ainsi:

- a) Les Nations-Unies ont pris à leur charge de scrupuler soigneusement le potentiel nucléaire militaire de l'Afrique du Sud, à travers des rapports élaborés par le Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies sur sa demande.
- b) Les Nations-Unies ont discuté régulièrement de la mise en application de la Dénucléarisation de l'Afrique et des moyens pouvant faire face aux dangers émanant du potentiel nucléaire militaire de l'Afrique du Sud.



c) En scrutinant soigneusement l'évolution du potentiel nucléaire militaire de l'Afrique du Sud, l'Assemblée Générale a pu identifier certains des aspects dangereux de ce potentiel nucléaire, qui ont provoqué des préoccupations graves et même alarmantes aux Nations-Unies et à l'O.U.A.

Ces aspects, mis en lumière, par les Nations-Unies sont:

1. La capacité de l'Afrique du Sud à produire des armes nucléaires a été confirmée dans un rapport préparé par le Secrétaire Général sur la demande de l'Assemblée Générale.
2. La découverte en 1977 dans le désert de Kalahari de ce qui pourrait être un site sous-terrain pour des essais nucléaires, et un rapport qui suggère une explosion nucléaire de faible densité qui aurait pu avoir lieu en Septembre 1979, dans la partie de l'Océan Indien entre l'Afrique du Sud et l'Atlantique Sud à une distance relativement proche de l'Afrique du Sud.
3. La sophistication sans cesse croissante de l'Afrique du Sud dans le champ nucléaire.
4. L'augmentation de la capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud comme résultat de la coopération avec certaines puissances occidentales et Israël.
5. Le refus obstiné de l'Afrique du Sud d'adhérer au Traité de Non-Prolifération nucléaire.
6. Le refus de l'Afrique du Sud de conclure des accords de garantie avec l'Agence Internationale de l'énergie atomique, pour empêcher le détournement des matières nucléaires de l'usage pacifique à la production des armes nucléaires.

Les développements que nous avons décrits, déjà dangereux en eux-mêmes, ont été aggravés par la politique inhumaine suivie par l'Afrique du Sud sur le continent africain. En effet:

- a) La capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud est développée pour maintenir la suprématie blanche de l'Afrique du Sud, en intimidant ses voisins et en faisant du chantage à tout le continent.
- b) La capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud a été accompagnée d'un registre sanglant de violence, et d'attaques militaires et de subversion contre ses voisins africains. L'Assemblée Générale a adopté de nombreuses résolutions pour faire face à la situation dangereuse créée par la capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud.

Dans ces résolutions, l'Assemblée Générale a défini dans des termes clairs son attitude à l'égard des plans nucléaires de l'Afrique du Sud et a adressé un nombre de requêtes à l'Afrique du Sud.

Voici les principales dispositions adoptées par l'Assemblée Générale à ce sujet:

1. L'Assemblée Générale a déploré la croissance de la machine militaire de l'Afrique du Sud et sa volonté frénétique d'acquérir des armes nucléaires. L'Assemblée Générale ne s'est pas contentée de déplorer, mais elle a condamné vigoureusement toute tentative manifeste ou secrète d'introduire des armes nucléaires dans le continent.
2. L'Assemblée Générale a ensuite demandé à l'Afrique du Sud de cesser immédiatement le développement de sa capacité de produire des armes nucléaires.

3. Pour fermer toute échappatoire, l'Assemblée Générale a demandé que l'Afrique du Sud soumette toutes ses installations nucléaires et facilités à l'inspection établie par l'Agence Internationale de l'Energie Atomique.
4. L'Assemblée Générale a condamné toute forme de coopération que ce soit par un Etat, une société, une institution, ou même un individu avec le régime raciste de l'Afrique du Sud. L'Assemblée Générale a fait suivre cette condamnation par une demande à tous les Etats de faire cesser immédiatement toute collaboration militaire ou nucléaire avec l'Afrique du Sud.

En plus, l'Assemblée Générale a fait intervenir le Conseil de Sécurité et lui a formulé des requêtes spécifiques. L'Assemblée Générale à sa 10<sup>ème</sup> session spéciale destinée au désarmement a stipulé dans le document final ce qui suit:

En Afrique, où l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine a affirmé une décision concernant la dénucléarisation de l'Afrique, le Conseil de Sécurité prendra les mesures effectives appropriées chaque fois que cela sera nécessaire pour empêcher la frustration de cet objectif.

De son côté, le Conseil de Sécurité a adopté la résolution N° 418 (1977) imposant un embargo d'armes destinées à l'Afrique du Sud et a adopté la résolution N° 421 (1977) qui a établi un comité qui a élaboré un rapport concernant les moyens de rendre cet embargo obligatoire contre l'Afrique du Sud plus effectif.

L'Assemblée Générale, plus tard demanda au Conseil de Sécurité de terminer la considération des recommandations de ce comité établi par la résolution N° 421 (1977) concernant la question de l'Afrique du Sud pour pouvoir bloquer toute échappatoire dans l'embargo sur les armes et interdisant toute forme de coopération avec le régime raciste de l'Afrique du Sud dans le terrain nucléaire et tout récemment l'Assemblée Générale a exprimé son grave désappointement que l'emploi du veto par certains Etats a frustré les efforts du Conseil de Sécurité pour résoudre la question.

D'un autre côté, le dernier Sommet africain dans sa 23<sup>ème</sup> session (27-29 Juillet 1987) a confirmé ses résolutions antérieures à ce sujet et a demandé à tous les Etats de communiquer à son Secrétaire Général ses vues et ses observations relatives à la mise en oeuvre de la déclaration de l'Afrique et sur l'élaboration d'un projet de convention ou de traité à cet égard.

De cette présentation, on peut témoigner de la perspicacité des Etats Africains de vouloir épargner au continent le danger nucléaire de 1960.

Cette perspicacité dénote une sagesse et une maturité politique en optant pour une absence totale d'armes nucléaires du continent, ce qui a permis de mobiliser l'appui de la communauté Internationale à leur but légitime.

Les perspectives de réalisation de ce but dépendront d'une dernière analyse sur le résultat de la course dans laquelle l'O.N.U. et l'O.U.A. sont engagées pour mettre fin à la capacité nucléaire et militaire de l'Afrique du Sud, et le degré de coopération des cinq Puissances nucléaires avec les Nations-Unies à ce sujet.

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F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL3

LA COOPERATION AFRO-ARABE

BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES

PRESENTE PAR

M. SAMIR AMIN

## LA COOPERATION AFRO-ARABE

### BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES

F.A. OAU / CAIRO 88/ PL 3

1. Lorsqu'au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale l'ONU était créée, le processus de la décolonisation n'avait pas encore été amorcé et de ce fait, les Etats africains et asiatiques qui y étaient représentés se comptaient sur les doigts de la main. Mais cinq ans plus tard seulement, les Etats asiatiques et arabes formellement indépendants constituaient un groupe "arabo-asiatique" qui s'assignait l'objectif d'accélérer la décolonisation, notamment de l'Afrique, par le soutien des mouvements de libération. A Bandoung, en 1955, les principes de la solidarité des peuples et des Etats du Tiers Monde afro-asiatique étaient formulés d'une manière systématique. En premier lieu, on réaffirmait le droit inconditionnel de tous les peuples africains et asiatiques à l'indépendance, et on refusait le chantage "anti-communiste" auquel les Etats-Unis se livraient, permettant, au nom de la solidarité "atlantique" de la première guerre froide, de tolérer les guerres coloniales et/ou la répression systématique de la part des vieilles puissances coloniales, Grande Bretagne et France notamment. Les peuples et les Etats afro-asiatiques refusaient également de soumettre leur indépendance à la condition d'une association à un pacte militaire quelconque dont les Etats Unis se faisaient les promoteurs actifs contre l'Union Soviétique et la Chine. Mais simultanément, ils affirmaient leur "neutralisme positif", c'est à dire leur volonté de ne pas accepter davantage d'entrer dans une "zone d'influence soviétique", pour prix de leur liberté. Sur ces fondements, diverses organisations, formelles et informelles, de coopération afro-asiatique, furent créées, dont - "en 1957 - l'Organisation de Solidarité des Peuples Afro-Asiatiques, au Caire, et l'Organisation Panafricaine des Peuples, à Accra.

Les dix ans qui ont suivi - de 1955 à 1965 - ont été les grandes années de la coopération afro-asiatique en général et arabo-africaine en particulier. Il s'agissait évidemment d'un soutien mutuel politique où Etats indépendants et mouvements de libération nationale trouvaient leur place côte à côte. Ces dix ans ont été ceux de la grande "tempête" qui a contraint l'Europe colonialiste à céder : après avoir tenté d'abattre l'une des têtes du mouvement, par l'agression tripartite franco-anglo-israélienne contre l'Egypte en 1956, voulu limiter les concessions en Afrique du Nord à l'indépendance de la Tunisie et du Maroc (1956) en la refusant à l'Algérie que la guerre coloniale allait ravager huit ans (de 1954 à 1962), cédé la place aux Etats Unis pour prendre la relève de la France au Viet Nam (à partir de 1954), à partir de 1958-60, l'Europe choisissait finalement d'accélérer l'accession de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara à une indépendance qu'elle tentait de remettre aux mains de ses "amis".

Le conflit entre les forces politiques nationalistes radicales et celles qui surgissaient des concessions européennes allait diviser l'Afrique de 1960 à 1963 entre le groupe de Casablanca et celui de Monrovia, notamment sur la question du Congo (ex-belge). La fusion des deux groupes en 1963 est, comme on le sait, à l'origine de l'O.U.A. dont les membres s'engageaient à reconnaître les frontières coloniales et la balkanisation du continent, à ne pas s'ingérer dans leurs affaires "internes" réciproques et à se contenter de soutenir les seuls mouvements de libération des colonies non encore libérées (les colonies portugaises, la Rhodésie, la Namibie et l'Afrique du Sud).

2. C'est dans cette ambiance que les premiers projets de coopération intra-africaine, intra-arabe et arabo-africaine ont pris forme. Il s'agissait de prolonger la solidarité politique des mouvements de libération par une coopération économique nouvelle entre les Etats libérés du colonialisme refusant de se soumettre aux perspectives néo-colonialistes propo-



sées par l'Occident. Cette coopération était donc fortement sélective et n'entraînait que les Etats nationalistes radicaux : l'Egypte nassérienne, promotrice du mouvement y occupait une place décisive, aux côtés de l'Algérie indépendante (à partir de 1962), du Ghana de Nkrumah, de la Guinée de Sékou Touré, du Mali de Modibo Keita, de la Tanzanie de Nyerere (à partir de 1964-67). Les régimes néo-coloniaux quant à eux n'y étaient pas intéressés par principe, jugeant "l'aide occidentale" satisfaisante et ironisant avec mépris sur la coopération "entre pauvres" qui, selon eux, n'avaient rien à s'offrir mutuellement.

Les Etats nationalistes radicaux par contre nourrissaient un projet de libération globale de l'Afrique et du Moyen Orient qui aurait permis de surmonter les handicaps hérités du passé et de la colonisation, le "sous-développement" (entendu comme dépendance de l'impérialisme et non comme "retard et pauvreté") et l'éclatement en Etats plus ou moins artificiels, vulnérables par la médiocrité de leur taille. Le discours panarabe de Nasser et le discours panafricain de Nkrumah, loins d'avoir été des "utopies" absurdes, témoignaient au contraire de la perspicacité de ces dirigeants historiques du continent. Aussi la coopération envisagée n'était-elle nullement limitée à "l'aide financière" des uns aux autres. Au demeurant, celle-ci, compte tenu de la pauvreté générale des Etats en question, n'occupait qu'une place seconde dans l'ensemble des stratégies, politiques et programmes de coopération.

On envisageait deux volets à cette stratégie globale de coopération : la constitution d'un front commun face à l'Occident impérialiste, en vue de renforcer la capacité de négociation des partenaires et de réduire leur vulnérabilité ; la construction progressive d'une société régionale mieux intégrée par le développement de ses complémentarités internes permettant de s'affranchir, partiellement au moins, des rapports asymétriques et inégaux Nord-Sud.

Sans doute, les projets de "fronts communs" face à l'Occident ont-ils rarement dépassé le stade embryonnaire : les échanges de vues n'ont pas permis de créer des associations de producteurs efficaces (et seule l'OPEP devait émerger plus tard, dans une conjoncture différente). De même, les projets communs d'échanges technologiques et d'exploitation des ressources (minières, agricoles et industrielles), comme ceux permettant le renforcement de transports intégrés sont rarement sortis des bureaux de conception. Les circonstances conjoncturelles ne les favorisaient pas : l'époque était encore à la croissance globale facile et il paraissait plus aisé aux uns et aux autres de poursuivre l'action dans la ligne de moindre résistance, c'est à dire de promouvoir les exportations traditionnelles vers l'Occident, il est vrai pour en importer les moyens d'une amorce d'industrialisation. Mais ces limites traduisent aussi celles des régimes nationalistes radicaux de l'époque.

Des réalisations positives ont été néanmoins amorcées à l'époque, dans bien des domaines. L'échange d'étudiants et d'experts, les congrès populaires et les conférences d'associations professionnelles ont promu un véritable internationalisme afro-asiatique dont on aurait tort de sous-estimer l'importance. Les consultations politiques et militaires donnaient à cette coopération le sens de sa direction. Au plan même des résultats économiques - constructions d'industries et d'infrastructures diverses, intensification des échanges commerciaux - on avait amorcé un grand nombre d'actions positives. Les Etats partenaires s'inspiraient ici largement des modèles de coopération pratiqués par l'URSS et la Chine : crédits longs à des conditions favorables, remboursements en nature par les productions des projets réalisés etc...

On ne saurait cependant isoler cette coopération des contextes de politique intérieure des partenaires nationalistes radicaux et porter sur elle un jugement qui ne tienne pas compte des limites et contradictions propres à ces systèmes. Peut-être pourrait-on caractériser ceux-ci par le conflit interne latent entre la tendance à leur évolution dans un sens social progressiste et par leur cristallisation dans un projet national populaire et la tendance au renforcement du poids des forces sociales conservatrices nourrissant le projet de construction d'un Etat national bourgeois. Car les composantes du mouvement de libération nationale dont l'Etat nationaliste radical était sorti ne s'étaient pas encore heurtées frontalement. Le contenu indécis et contradictoire des politiques de développement poursuivies dans ces conditions traduit ce conflit interne latent. En fait, comme nous l'avons dit ailleurs (1), ce que nous avons appelé "le projet de Bandoung" était dans son axe essentiel celui de la construction d'un Etat national bourgeois, au sens que d'une part, il se proposait de parvenir à la maîtrise de l'accumulation interne et que d'autre part, il concevait celle-ci dans une "interdépendance globale" (c'est à dire en fait la poursuite de l'insertion dans le système capitaliste mondial) corrigée des inégalités héritées de la colonisation. Ce projet s'opposait aux tendances d'un projet national populaire, en fait, le plus souvent mal ou peu défini, qui eut impliqué une véritable "déconnexion" au sens où nous l'avons définie, et ouvert le long chapitre historique d'une transition susceptible de permettre le renforcement progressif des tendances au socialisme. La suite des événements devait confirmer la thèse qu'à notre époque, la cristallisation de nouveaux centres capitalistes (qui définit le contenu du projet national bourgeois) était impossible, dans le Tiers Monde en général, et particulièrement dans la région afro-arabe. Avant même que la crise globale n'ait conduit au démantèlement des tentatives bourgeoises nationales, la dérive, à partir du milieu des années 60, con-

damnait déjà presque ces expériences hâtivement qualifiées de "socialistes". Avec la chute de Modibo Keita et de Nkrumah et la défaite égyptienne de 1967, la première vague de cette coopération afro-arabe radicale s'épuisait.

3. En fait, le projet national bourgeois n'est parvenu à se déployer que pendant une courte période. Dès avant l'ouverture du temps de notre crise, que l'on peut faire remonter aux débuts des années 70, ses limites historiques étaient apparues avec assez d'évidence.

Avec la signature du traité de Rome en 1957 et l'amorce de la construction européenne, la pression néo-colonialiste du Marché Commun prenait la relève immédiate des vieux colonialismes. A peine indépendants, les Etats africains, devenus "associés" de la communauté, soumettaient leur vision du développement aux impératifs de la stratégie européenne (2). Les Etats nationalistes radicaux africains eux-mêmes acceptaient les conditions des conventions de Yaoundé (poursuivies par celles de Lomé) sans y voir trop d'inconvénients ; et ceux du Maghreb cherchaient à prolonger les "avantages" de l'ouverture du marché français à leurs produits traditionnels ou à ceux de leur industrie nouvelle (notamment de la sous-traitance textile). Simultanément l'Europe, devenue "amie", poursuivait sa politique de soutien - avouée ou hypocrite - au vieux colonialisme portugais, aux régimes de l'apartheid d'Afrique du Sud, de Rhodésie et de Namibie, à l'expansionisme sioniste.

Certes, l'Afrique de l'O.U.A. persistait simultanément dans son soutien aux mouvements de libération de l'Afrique portugaise et de l'Afrique australe. Mais les résultats de ces luttes de libération ne devaient se manifester que tardivement (1974 : indépendance des colonies portugaises ; 1980 : indépendance du Zimbabwe), et d'une manière incomplète puisque l'Afrique du Sud allait poursuivre jusqu'à ce jour ses interventions de déstabilisation sans que l'Europe n'y voit à redire (3)... Quant à Israël, il poursuivait son infiltration

au Sud du Sahara, pour le compte des Etats Unis ; et il a fallu attendre la guerre de 1967 pour le voir chassé, provisoirement et partiellement, de la région. En Asie certes, la dépendance néo-coloniale se faisait sentir moins fortement bien que la guerre du Viet Nam allait se prolonger jusqu'en 1975 et que les pays du Sud et de l'Est de la péninsule arabe n'ont acquis leur statut d'indépendance qu'à la fin des années 60.

Le renforcement progressif des forces conservatrices dominantes en Afrique, dans le monde arabe et en Asie allait donc nourrir, parallèlement au dépérissement des expériences nationalistes radicales, des courants nouveaux qui donnaient plus d'importance aux rapports Nord-Sud qu'à la coopération Sud-Sud.

La crise ouverte du système à partir des années 70 a accéléré les processus de décomposition du projet national bourgeois de Bandoung. Un réalignement global de l'Occident derrière les Etats Unis s'est dessiné qui, par le prétexte de la dette et par le moyen des interventions du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale, se propose d'imposer aux pays du Tiers Monde les "réajustements" que l'on connaît, qui ne font aucune place aux exigences d'un développement autocentré, tant au niveau national qu'au niveau régional ou collectif (4). Simultanément, l'Union Soviétique est soumise à la course épuisante aux armements que lui impose les Etats Unis dans sa stratégie de contre-offensive visant à rétablir son hégémonie et à imposer à l'Europe et au Japon le réalignement atlantique par le chantage au conflit Est-Ouest (5). De ce fait peut-être, l'Union Soviétique paraît être passée globalement à la défensive. Aussi les percées qu'elle a pûes faire, en assurant la défense de l'Angola et du Mozambique menacés par la déstabilisation Sud-Africaine et en intervenant dans les conflits de la corne de l'Afrique, à partir de 1975, sont-elles sans doute limitées et peut-être provisoires. Au Moyen Orient d'évidence, sa présence a été largement marginalisée, par le retournement de l'Egypte, ouvert à partir de 1973.

A son tour, ce recul général de l'esprit de Randoung a alimenté le renouvellement des courants idéologiques et politiques et des stratégies ambivalentes et même douteuses. Par exemple, il a permis à l'Arabie Séoudite de donner au courant "panislamique" une audience qu'il ne pouvait avoir tant que Nasser veillant, il ne lui était pas toléré de s'opposer au panarabisme unitaire militant. Ce courant allait donner naissance à des institutions (comme la Banque Islamique) qui prendront leur essor véritable un peu plus tard. Par exemple, il a permis de nourrir les illusions d'un "front commun" de l'ensemble des pays du Tiers Monde, indépendamment de leurs régimes et de leurs options internes, qui serait capable d'imposer à l'Occident une révision des conditions de fonctionnement du système économique mondial. Cette illusion a trouvé sa force sans aucun doute dans la victoire remportée par l'OPEP en 1973. Car il s'agissait bien sûr d'une victoire du Tiers Monde : pour la première fois dans l'histoire, des pays de la périphérie étaient capables d'intervenir efficacement - et collectivement - dans la fixation du prix d'une matière première importante. Peu importe de ce point de vue que les régimes qui ont été les principaux bénéficiaires de cette victoire aient été conservateurs. Peu importe aussi que l'OPEP soit parvenue à ce résultat par une habile exploitation d'une conjoncture de conflit interne au monde occidental (les Etats Unis ayant trouvé que ce réajustement des prix du pétrole pouvait faire leur affaire dans leur concurrence avec l'Europe et le Japon).

Il reste que la nature limitative de ces conditions a trop souvent été oubliée. Les limites et l'ambiguïté de ce qui allait être construit dans ce cadre ont été perdues de vue, au bénéfice d'un enthousiasme dont la suite des événements allait démontrer le peu de fondement. Le regroupement des non-alignés et du Tiers Monde pour présenter, sous le nom de Nouvel Ordre Economique International, un projet global de réforme des rapports Nord-Sud, en 1975, témoigne de ces illusions. Le refus obstiné opposé par l'Occident à cette tentative, prévisible, a hâté la décomposition ultérieure du Tiers Monde (6).

Cette décomposition a accentué - comme il fallait s'y attendre - les conflits internes propres au Tiers Monde. Sans doute ceux-ci sont-ils parfois anciens et ne sont-ils pas nécessairement tous le produit exclusif de l'héritage colonial et des manipulations des Puissances. Mais ce n'est pas un hasard si c'est précisément dans la région africaine et arabe - la plus faible et la plus vulnérable du Tiers Monde - que se sont multipliés à l'extrême ces conflits : Corne de l'Afrique, Tchad, Sahara Occidental, Iran-Irak, guerre civile du Liban, concurrence des deux Yemen etc...

#### 4. L'expansion de la coopération arabo-africaine

se situe pourtant précisément dans cette période ambivalente, c'est à dire à partir de 1973. La relation entre l'épanouissement de cette coopération et la "prospérité pétrolière" - qui occupe la période, de 1973 à 1985, pour, peut-être, se clôturer avec l'effritement de l'OPEP, en cours - est un fait d'évidence.

L'étude de cette coopération fait bien ressortir les caractères généraux de cette coopération au nombre de trois sans doute.

Premièrement, il s'agit de programmes importants par leur volume, de loin l'ensemble le plus impressionnant à l'échelle de l'ensemble du Tiers Monde.

Deuxièmement, il s'agit d'une coopération globalisée, entendant par là qu'elle concerne tous les pays africains et arabes, indépendamment de leurs régimes politiques et de leurs options idéologiques et sociales, internes et internationales. Les institutions financières mises en place dans ce cadre d'une coopération globale entre l'OUA et la Ligue Arabe (BADEA et autres) témoignent de cette conception globale de la coopération en question. Par là, elle tranche avec la coopération sélective des années 60.

Troisièmement, il s'agit de programmes conçus essentiellement à partir des moyens financiers importants mis à leur disposition, entre autre et même principalement, à partir des "surplus pétroliers" des années 70. Néanmoins, cet "avantage" comportait aussi ses aspects négatifs. Car il a contribué à fausser la perspective des exigences d'un Sud-Sud véritablement alternatif - et non complémentaire - du Nord-Sud, comme il a alimenté des espoirs mal ou peu fondés - sur la "richesse" financière illimitée des "pays pétroliers"... Aussi n'est-on pas surpris de constater que peu d'attention a été portée à la mise en commun des ressources non financières (expertise, possibilités de recherches technologiques) et à l'intensification des échanges internes au groupe de pays concernés (par la priorité donnée au développement des complémentarités agricoles, minières et industrielles, par des formules de remboursement des prêts par le moyen de cette intensification des échanges commerciaux).

Les uns et les autres ont leurs opinions sur les caractères positifs et les insuffisances de ces programmes de coopération afro-arabes. Les analyses proposées, tant au plan global qu'à celui des secteurs et des pays types étudiés, le permettent. Notre opinion personnelle est que le principe d'une coopération Sud-Sud est toujours positif par lui-même, quel qu'en soient les limites et les insuffisances dans tel ou tel cas de figure. Il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il est nécessaire aussi de faire ressortir les caractéristiques concrètes des projets mis en oeuvre par la coopération en question et à partir de là de porter une appréciation sur la signification de son développement dans la perspective d'une libération qui est synonyme pour nous d'un développement autocentré tant au niveau des Etats concernés pris individuellement qu'à celui de leur ensemble ou des sous-ensembles qui le constituent. Le combat pour une véritable coopération Sud-Sud l'exige.



Si l'on se place d'un point de vue formaliste, on peut accepter l'idée que le choix des projets soumis au financement des organismes de la coopération afro-arabe relève des seuls Etats bénéficiaires. Ce choix dépendra donc forcément de la nature des stratégies internes de développement. Et celles-ci sont dans bien des cas discutables, c'est à dire - de notre point de vue - qu'elles ne se proposent pas de construire une structure autocentrée aussi systématiquement que possible. Mais on reconnaît que les pays du Tiers Monde ont le droit de déterminer seuls leurs options et on refuse en principe que les agences du Nord ne s'en mêlent ; encore qu'elles le fassent en réalité comme en témoigne le discours permanent de la Banque Mondiale. On dira alors que l'entraide entre pays du Tiers Monde doit aussi reposer sur le même principe de respect scrupuleux des souverainetés. Poser le problème dans ces termes, c'est en fait évacuer la discussion sur les termes véritables de l'alternative : coopération globale ou coopération sélective entre pays engagés pour une libération économique de leur dépendance vis à vis du Nord ? Nous ne sommes pas tout à fait persuadés que le choix globalisé de la seconde coopération afro-arabe soit le meilleur. Et peut-être un exercice plus judicieux des choix (s'il était possible) aurait-il permis d'éviter des déboires. Le tonneau des danaïdes zairois est un bel exemple de gaspillage que la coopération internationale entretient parfois. Certains le souhaitent peut-être, pour quelques raisons politiques spécifiques (par exemple, cyniquement, parce que la stabilité du régime les préoccupe plus que l'amélioration des conditions de vie du peuple concerné...). En principe, ce type de calcul ne devrait pas être celui des responsables de pays du Tiers Monde, dont on suppose qu'ils ne nourrissent pas d'aspiration impérialiste, au demeurant disproportionnée. Certes, certains pays du Tiers Monde peuvent néanmoins partager les vues de l'Occident et, derrière lui, vouloir soutenir les mêmes orientations. Mais alors il est difficile de croire qu'ils soient capables d'imaginer un Sud-Sud qui soit autre choix qu'un complément destiné à renforcer le Nord-Sud...

Si le Sud-Sud est encore ce qu'il est (et il en est de même de la coopération afro-arabe, comme d'ailleurs des coopérations régionales arabes et africaines elles-mêmes), les responsabilités en sont donc multiples et à rechercher des deux côtés de la barrière : des pays finançant cette coopération (les pays de l'OPEP en gros) et de ses bénéficiaires (les pays africains et arabes "pauvres"). Jusqu'ici cette coopération n'a pas entraîné d'intensification sensible des flux commerciaux complémentaires. La raison en est que ni les uns ni les autres ne sont engagés dans des politiques de déconnexion au sens où nous avons défini ce terme. Ni les uns ni les autres n'envisagent des systèmes référentiels des prix internes (et de calcul de la rentabilité de choix destinés à renforcer le caractère autocentré de leur développement) distincts de ceux qui commandent la "rationalité" du système capitaliste mondial. Cette insuffisance se manifeste par le respect qu'ils nourrissent pour les "stratégies de la Banque Mondiale" qu'ils tentent de reproduire d'ailleurs jusque dans le détail mimétique des conventions de coopération... Dans une étude que nous avons faite de l'aide arabe aux pays membres du CILIS (le Sahel africain) (7), nous avons déjà noté que cette aide finançait des projets largement élaborés par les "donateurs" (les "amis du Sahel", l'Occident, Banque Mondiale en tête), qui ne s'inscrivent pas dans une perspective de développement autocentré de la région. Dans ces conditions, la croissance des flux financiers arabes s'est substituée à une réduction de ceux en provenance des pays et institutions de l'OCDE. Bel exemple de mise en pratique des idées du "trilogue" euro-arabo-africain, un moment à la mode : continuer à faire avec l'argent des autres (les pays de l'OPEP) ce que l'on faisait avec son propre argent (celui de l'OCDE) !

5. La coopération afro-arabe est pourtant une exigence objective majeure de la libération économique de cette région du Tiers Monde.

La raison en est que la région africaine et arabe est la plus faible et la plus vulnérable à l'échelle de l'ensemble du Tiers Monde contemporain. Elle constitue le ventre mou du système mondial, dont la capacité de résister aux pressions visant à son démantèlement et sa soumission sans réserves ou presque est, dans l'état actuel des choses, pour le moins que l'on puisse dire, douteuse. La raison de cette extraordinaire faiblesse est en dernière analyse, l'échec de la révolution agricole dans l'ensemble de cette région. Or celle-ci n'est même pas amorcée en Afrique dans son ensemble, alors qu'elle l'est, fût-ce d'une manière chaotique et par bien des aspects sociaux, négative, dans de vastes régions de l'Asie (Chine certainement, et de la manière socialement la plus positive ; mais aussi Inde, Corée du Sud, Thaïlande etc...) et d'Amérique Latine (Brésil, Mexique etc...). La révolution agricole - cet ensemble de transformations techniques, sociales et économiques garantissant une croissance stable de longue durée de la productivité par actif rural et par hectare cultivé - est la condition d'un développement quelconque. A son tour, cette révolution agricole exige une industrialisation de soutien, alors que l'Afrique dans son ensemble n'est pas encore entrée dans l'ère de l'industrialisation. Aucune politique d'"ajustement" aux tendances du développement mondial - comme celle préconisée par la Banque Mondiale - ne peut pallier cette faillite cruelle dont l'analyse est proposée dans un autre ouvrage collectif du programme africain de l'ONU et du Forum du Tiers Monde (8).

Le projet national bourgeois - qui domine encore la scène politique en Afrique et dans le monde arabe - est, de ce fait, condamné d'avance à ne rien produire que l'échec permanent. Si en Asie et en Amérique Latine, la marge d'un ajustement possible au développement mondial est suffisante pour nourrir encore quelque espoir (ou illusion, à notre avis) d'une cristallisation nationale bourgeoise, en Afrique et dans le

monde arabe, cette marge est nulle, ou presque. Plus qu'ailleurs encore donc, les termes de l'alternative sont : avancer vite vers un projet national populaire ou périr (au sens propre du terme parfois, par la famine).

Le morcellement de la région en petits Etats (comparativement à l'Asie et à l'Amérique Latine) aggrave la vulnérabilité et réduit les chances de s'en sortir dans le cadre de ceux-ci pris isolément. Sans doute les initiatives peuvent être amorcées ici ou là dans ce cadre. Elles le sont d'ailleurs fréquemment (d'où la répétition des tentatives d'avancées dites "socialistes" dans cette région), témoignage de leur nécessité objective pressante. Mais la fréquence des échecs provient aussi, en partie tout au moins, de l'absence de relais de coopération régionale efficaces permettant d'aller plus loin.

Il existe pourtant des éléments objectifs permettant de renforcer une unité arabo-africaine, qui trouvent leur origine dans l'histoire (le panarabisme et le panafricanisme ont des fondements objectifs) et dans le fait que la région dans son ensemble est traitée par le même adversaire d'une manière globale, tant du plan économique que stratégique, en utilisant de surcroît les mêmes instruments d'intervention (l'Afrique du Sud et Israël).

Le défi est donc facile à diagnostiquer, s'il est difficile à surmonter. "Développement" exige ici déconnexion, d'une manière encore plus visible qu'ailleurs. Il exige aussi la démocratie au sens que le projet national populaire doit ici prendre le relais des illusions fanées du projet bourgeois. Il exige enfin une coopération régionale étroite conçue comme complémentaire des stratégies locales et nationales de développement autocentré à contenu populaire. Pour avoir amorcé cette prise de conscience, même d'une manière largement intuitive et imparfaite, Kwame Nkrumah et Gamal Abdel Nasser resteront des prophètes de notre temps. Malheureusement, la coopération afro-arabe devait prendre son essor alors qu'ils avaient tous les deux disparu.

NOTES

(1) Samir AMIN, Il y a trente ans, Bandounq ; article présenté à la Conférence de l'UNU, tenue à cette occasion, Le Caire, 1985. Voir aussi, concernant les concepts clés de développement autocentré, déconnexion, maîtrise interne de l'accumulation, projet bourgeois et projet populaire : Samir AMIN, La Déconnexion, La Découverte, Paris, 1985.

(2) Voir K. AMOA, Lome III, Critique of a Prologue ; document ronéoté, UNU-FTM, Dakar, 1985.

(3) Ces questions sont abordées par un autre groupe de recherche du programme UNU-FTM, travaillant sur les pays du groupe SADC (Afrique Australe), dont les résultats seront également publiés.

(4) Le CODESRIA a consacré un numéro spécial de la Revue Africa Development à ces questions relatives aux interventions du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale en Afrique.

(5) Voir : Samir AMIN, La crise, le Tiers Monde et les relations Nord-Sud et Est-Ouest, Nouvelle Revue Socialiste, Paris, septembre-octobre 1983.

(6) Voir : Samir AMIN, Le NOEI et l'avenir des relations économiques internationales, Africa Development, n° 1, 1978.

(7) Samir AMIN, Pour une stratégie alternative de développement en Afrique, Africa Development, n° 3, 1981.

(8) Ce travail d'un groupe de chercheurs du programme UNU-FTM sera l'objet d'une publication prochaine.  
Voir également : Samir AMIN, Critique du rapport de la Banque Mondiale pour l'Afrique, Africa Development, n° 1-2, 1982.

Conference on the Occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U.  
Cairo, 25-28 January, 1988

F.A. OAU / CAIRO 88/ PL 4

**THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY**

**AND**

**THE AFRICAN DEBT CRISIS**

**Contribution by  
Ambassador A. Haggag, Assistant Secretary-General  
of the O.A.U.**

Mr. Chairman  
Excellencies and  
Distinguished participants,

During the last four years, the Organization of African Unity has been deeply concerned with the mounting, excruciating and debilitating external debt burden of African countries. The external debt problem was the subject of a major debate in the OAU Summit of 1984. It was singled out also as a major priority item in the Africa's Priority Programme, having been accorded a Chapter by itself in the Programme. The Africa's external debt crisis also featured prominently in the African submission to the Thirteenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa's Economic and Social crisis held in May 27 to June 1, 1986. Finally, the African external debt crisis was the subject of the Third Extraordinary Session of the OAU Summit on November 30 to December 1, 1987.

The subject of Africa's external debt crisis is not only an involved one, but is also complex. For that reason, I would like to discuss only three aspects of the problem, namely, the nature and evolution of African debt crisis; the position of the OAU in dealing with the crisis; and the bearing of this crisis on the African economic prospects in 1988.

Mr. Chairman,

I am sure that the difficult days of 1983 to 1985 are quite familiar to you all as well as the action

taken by the OAU Summit to face the serious economic crisis that had engulfed the continent. The Summit of 1985 called for the convening of an international conference on Africa's External Indebtedness. Then they decided in July 1987 to hold an extraordinary Summit to discuss this crisis in detail and to adopt a common position. The Summit was held in Addis Ababa on the 30th of November and 1st of December 1987. The African leaders discussed the evolution of the African debt and proposed several measures to tackle the problem either by the African countries themselves or the International Community.

Africa's external debt is defined broadly as all its external financial obligations outstanding at a particular point in time. These financial obligations are those contracted either by the government, or are guaranteed by the government for a public corporation or are contracted directly by public corporation and by the private sector. The definition is understood to cover such items as principal on public and publicly guaranteed debts; long, medium and short-term commercial loans and credits; suppliers' credit; private non-guaranteed debts; undisbursed debts; obligations to multilateral institutions including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; arrears on interest and other related payments.

The analysis of the evolution and magnitude of the debt indicates that Africa's external debt increased from US \$128 billion at the end of 1982 to US \$169 billion by the end of 1985. As a percentage of GDP, the debt increased from 40 per cent to 50 per cent and as a percentage of exports of goods and services, the debt increased from 194% to 260% over the same period. The lack of up-to-date and adequate statistics on all African countries makes it difficult to



estimate accurately the magnitude of Africa's external debt beyond 1985. However, at the end of 1986, Africa's total debt was estimated to be US \$200 billion. This represented 45 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 293 per cent of export earnings. The rise in the debt to export ratio shows that the growth in export earnings was exceeded by that of debt.

The total debt service obligations for all countries for which data were available increased from US \$19.0 billion in 1982 to US \$ 24 billion in 1985. For nearly all African countries, the debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services is now well over 40 per cent and in some cases it exceeds 100 per cent. Given the bleak prospects in export expansion, the number of countries with the latter debt service ratio is expected to rise significantly by the end of 1995. By this date, the annual average debt service payments are expected to reach about US \$31 billion or 48.0 per cent of export earnings, with some of our countries far exceeding 100%.

The fact that debt service payments have increased faster than actual disbursements means that the net resource transfer has declined sharply and it did so from US \$20 billion in 1978 to US \$3 billion in 1985. As for commercial banks, there was a negative net resource transfer to Africa of US \$3 billion in 1984 alone. The IMF also extracted more resources from Africa than it provided in 1986 and this situation persisted up to February 1987. The clear implication of these development is that a large and increasing portion of Africa's export earnings and new disbursements are going into debt servicing, leaving little or nothing for rehabilitation and new investment required to fully implement Africa's recovery programme.

The above developments have been accompanied by structural shifts in Africa's external debt. First, there has been a shift from non-debt creating to debt creating flows, particularly over the period 1970 to 1982. Although this shift appears to have been reversed since then, the seeds of the debt-servicing crisis had already been sown. Of the debt outstanding, official sources constituted 63 per cent at the end of 1978 and 47.0 per cent by the end of 1983. Thus, there was a shift from official to private sources. Within official bilateral sources, concessional flows as a percentage of the total from this source declined from 84 per cent in 1975 to 62 per cent in 1985 for Sub-Saharan African countries only. This shift towards non-concessional debt was re-inforced by the fact that while financial market sources accounted for 15 per cent of the total debt in 1974, the share from this source rose to 36 per cent by the end of 1985. However, the concessionality of debt appears to have increased between 1983 and 1985; this improvement has not been adequate enough to alleviate the debt-servicing problem of African countries. This notwithstanding, the above shifts implied the hardening of the terms and conditions of new loans. For instance, the average interest rate on new lending increased from 5.0 per cent to 10 per cent between 1974 and 1985 while the grant element dropped from 32 per cent to 16 per cent over the same period.

This adverse development contributed to a situation where African countries were forced to reschedule their external debts at the Paris and London Clubs 83 times between 1979 and 1986.

Several factors have combined to precipitate the African debt crisis. They are of both external and

domestic in nature, and the debt phenomenon initially manifested itself in the structural dis-equilibrium between import requirements and export earnings which forced many African countries to resort to increased borrowing from external sources in order to meet the resource gap. As was indicated in the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), the following are the major causes which have aggravated the external debt crisis:

EXTERNAL CAUSES such as :-

- (i) decreased flows of concessional resources to African countries resulting in dramatic shift in debt structure from concessional to non-concessional loans with their hardened lending terms;
- (ii) the significant flight of capital and other resources resulting in net outflow of resources from Africa;
- (iii) insistence of the creditor community that African countries meet their debt service obligations without consideration to their ability to do so;
- (iv) unprecedented collapse of the prices of Africa's commodities and the consequential deterioration in the terms of trade which have undermined Africa's capacity to service its debt;
- (v) deteriorating terms of borrowing including sudden increase in the real interest rates

paid on long term debts, particularly commercial loans, and reduced grace and repayments periods;

- (vi) subsidies, mounting protectionist measures and restrictive business practices in the markets of the developed countries against exports from Africa;
- (vii) strict conditionalities, high cost and short term nature of some IMF facilities;
- (viii) activities of transnational corporations in African countries, especially inflated contracts, over-invoicing to imports and under-invoicing of exports; manipulations of commodity prices and of transfer pricing; excessive transfer of profits and other capital gains; and their preference for external borrowing instead of bringing in new equity capital;
- (ix) exchange rate fluctuations, especially the volatility of the US dollar vis-a-vis the other vehicle currencies, particularly as witnessed in the recent international financial and monetary turmoil;
- (x) consequences of past rescheduling which only serve to increase the debt burden, since such rescheduling is done at market related interest rates;
- (xi) aggressive economic destabilization policies

by external forces and freezing of African funds in foreign banks;

- (xii) military, economic and political destabilization by the racist South African regime against the Frontline and other independent States in Southern Africa.

DOMESTIC CAUSES :

- (i) rigidities in production structures, dependence on the export of a few raw materials and commodities and low complementarity of the African economies;
- (ii) excessive reliance on external sources for financing development and balance of payments;
- (iii) loan funds channelled to low-return projects;
- (iv) inadequate external debt management capacity at national level;
- (v) excessive resort to budget deficit financing through external borrowing both for recurrent and developmental expenditures;
- (vi) poor design, execution and monitoring of projects that lead to increased costs;
- (vii) low level of domestic resources mobilization due to lack of appropriate incentives to encourage savings;

- (viii) drought, natural calamities and environmental degradation resulting in reduced food production and leading to increased food import bills;
- (ix) economic dislocations that distort economic projections and necessitate diversions of resources, because of national disasters;
- (x) inadequate negotiating capacity of African countries vis-a-vis complex international financial mechanisms with respect to debt contracting and renegotiations;
- (xi) difficulties for African countries to adopt appropriate exchange rate policies;

At the OAU Secretariat we explored and analysed three scenarios for the future situation of Africa's External Debt. The first two scenarios make pessimistic assumptions of worsening debt and economic trends and historical baseline scenario of no improved change in the economic situation of African countries.

However, the third scenario upon which we based our recommendations for an international strategy for a solution to the African debt crisis is that conditions underpinning socio-economic trends and the pattern of financial flows to Africa as conceived in the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) and the UN Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD), would remain unchanged.

In this third scenario, we used two methods in projecting the volume of Africa's external indebtedness from now till the year 2000. They are :-

- (i) the determination of the foreign exchange gap according to which the overall balance of payments deficit of African countries as a whole has been computed and projected;
- (ii) the "saving gap" method whereby the savings deficit and shortfall in investment requirements have been estimated.

We argued that in the APPER, African countries were expected to mobilize from their domestic sources 64.4 per cent of their investment requirements for 1986-1990. Hence 35.6 per cent was expected from external sources. Based on that assumption we could project Africa's new loans requirements for the year 2000 as 31.9 billion.

Therefore if the proposed economic growth scenario which we could offer for negotiation with the international community as a whole is supported by the international community, it would mean a substantial reduction in debt burden and would generate savings of 34.9 billion dollars by the year 2000, which should boost the growth of GDP in most of the OAU Member States.

The success of the proposed international strategy with regard to Africa would depend on Africa's ability to re-organise its production structures in order to effectively mobilise its key development factors. Such an effort should include the implementation of debt relief measures and the use of new financing resources for

development.

Mr. Chairman,

The Third Extraordinary Summit which discussed the debt crisis was characterized by a serious debate and a definite desire to cooperate with creditor countries and not seeking confrontation.

The African Heads of State and Government issued at the end of the Summit an important Declaration in which they expressed the belief that a viable debt strategy should take fully into account our economic and social development needs and, in particular, the need to mobilize the necessary resources required for the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986 - 1990, which was adopted by the 13th Special Session of the United Nations general Assembly.

The OAU Extra-ordinary Summit also reaffirmed that external debt constitutes contractual obligations entered into individually by our Member States, and which they intend to honour. However, despite their willingness to pay, the present economic crisis, particularly the low level of their export earnings, makes it extremely difficult for them to honour their obligations. The problem of indebtedness is historically linked with that of development; its solution lies primarily in Africa's ability to engender real development. Consequently, developed countries and international financial institutions have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the solution of Africa's external debt problem through, in particular, a substantial increase in resource flows to African countries on concessional terms.



The Summit believed that the debt crisis of Africa would only be solved by an overall and equitable approach within the framework of an integrated, cooperative development oriented strategy that takes into account the particular characteristics of the debt crisis in Africa. In view of the interdependence between the economies of the debtor and the creditor countries, the strategy for the solution of the debt problem will need to be based on cooperation, continuous dialogue, and shared responsibility, and should be implemented with flexibility in an environment of strengthened international cooperation, bearing in mind the General Assembly and UNCTAD Resolutions adopted in that respect.

The Summit did not forget to note, with appreciation, that governments of a few developed creditor countries have taken or announced measures to cancel debt owed to them by some African countries. They urged all governments of creditor countries to extend to all African countries, and particularly, to the least developed and low income countries, these measures which should be implemented unconditionally, as a matter of urgency. They further urged the creditor countries, which have not yet done so, to emulate this example. They called for specific measures in this regard, specially:-

- (a) contributing effectively to improved international economic environment that will be conducive to economic recovery and accelerated development, through, in particular improved export prices for African primary commodities and removal of protectionist, quota and tariff measures impeding the export of African raw

materials, manufactured and semi-recessed goods to develop countries and defreezing of African funds in foreign banks ;

(b) increase resource flows to Africa through :

- increase in grants in bilateral assistance;
- increase in the grant element in the financing of International and Regional Financial Institutions;
- reduction in interest rates and extension of the repayment period and grace period of financial and commercial loans for all types of new loans;
- granting 50 years repayment and 10 year grace period for the repayment of all new loans;

(c) the total amount of the debt service of a debtor country should not exceed a reasonable and bearable percentage of its export earnings;

(d) conversion of all past official bilateral loans into grants;

(e) suspension of external debt service payments for a period of 10 years, starting from 1988, the scheduled date for the holding of the International Conference on Africa's External Debt ;

(f) adoption of the following principles within the framework of the renegotiation of Africa's debt :

- payment of part of official bilateral debt in local currency ;
- reduction of real interest rates on existing loans, the lengthening of maturity and grace periods for private loans ;

- (g) multi-year reschedulings of a minimum of 5 years should be the norm, with maturities of at least 50 years, 10 years grace and zero rates of interest.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to speak briefly on the performance of African economy during 1987 and the prospects for 1988, since the debt crisis is firmly linked to the economic situation. As the Economic Commission for Africa states, 1987 was a most disappointing year for Africa. Contrary to our expectations, overall economic performance was very poor. In spite of the restructuring process and wide-ranging reforms that have been initiated and pursued in most of our member States and the untiring efforts at policy adjustments, the region's economy has not significantly improved in 1987, due to the unabating negative influence of exogenous factors and constraints on African economic performance. With the continuing sluggish performance in overall output and the high levels of unemployment and population growth, there were hardly any improvements to be expected in the incomes of the majority of the African population. Indeed, output per head fell further in 1987, decreasing by about 1.5 per cent following the annual average decline of about 3.4 per cent that has taken place since 1980. This reduction in income, coupled with the decline in the availability of essential goods and services in most of our countries, has meant that overall living standards have continued to deteriorate.

During 1987, the African countries demonstrated, more than ever before, their continued commitment to APPER

and UN-PAAERD, and their determination to pursue vigorously and relentlessly most of the required policy measures and actions. Unfortunately, the response of the international community was grossly inadequate, leaving one to wonder what has become of the many expressions of international solidarity on which the UN-PAAERD was predicated. Two years have now passed since the adoption of APPER and yet the rays of hope for an imminent economic turnaround are far from being discernible.

Notwithstanding the overall poor economic performance in the region in 1987, however, some countries have decidedly done very well, a further confirmation that the African economy has changed for the better at least in one important respect, from one of uniform disaster to one that is increasingly and distinctly marginally better, at least for some countries. However, unlike last year when as many as thirty countries achieved an overall growth rate in output of over 3 per cent and thirteen of these had overall growth rates of 5 per cent and above, a smaller number of countries - 23 in all - achieved positive growth rates of 3 per cent and above in 1987.

Other positive developments include the mild recovery in overall commodity prices, with the commodity price index for the region rising by about 19 per cent in contrast to the fall of about 44 per cent in 1986, although such prices, on average, represented no more than 57 per cent of their 1980 levels. The firming up of oil prices accounted, however, for most of the gain in commodity prices, and although it has been some source of relief to the hard-hit oil economies of the region, the real gains in dollar terms has been heavily compromised and eroded by the dollar slide against other leading international currencies. Indeed, the over supply

of oil coupled with the quota restrictions of OPEC has negatively affected the volume of production of major oil producers in Africa.

On the negative side, there has been a rapid and unexpected deterioration in overall food production on the continent in 1987. For instance, cereal production is estimated to have fallen by about ten per cent, leading to forecasts of increased food aid requirements for 1987/1988. Indeed, but for accumulated stocks, and tubers and root-crops which, because of their greater resistance to weather variations, are usually available in many countries as a bulwark in times of cereal harvest failures, the aggregate food position on the continent would have been significantly worse in 1987. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in 1986 when, for a handful of countries, the real problem was how to dispose of exceptional food surpluses internally.

This year, a disturbing aspect of the food situation in some parts of the region is the potential lack of supply even from countries that normally provide surplus. As it is, drought has returned once again in full force in a number of African countries, especially in Eastern and Southern Africa, emphasizing the extreme vulnerability of the region to the scourge of climatic failures -a situation made worse by the fact that some of the affected countries are also stricken by civil strife, and have thus had their agriculture labour under the yoke of a double paralysis.

In addition, the cumulative external debt of Africa was on the increase in 1987, with a growing number of countries either outrightly unable to service their debts or maintain any tolerable level of imports without recourse to the IMF, the World Bank or accumulation in payment of

arrears. By now, the African governments and the creditor banks also, I believe, have become extremely fatigued with the complex and seemingly endless process of renewed debt rescheduling negotiations. So serious is the debt and debt-servicing problem in Africa, particularly in the fact of dwindling export earnings and stagnant Official Development Assistance (ODA), that African Heads of State and Government held an extraordinary Summit meeting of OAU in November/December 1987 on Africa's external indebtedness.

In the face of the unbearable debt burden and the decline in credit-worthiness that the countries of the region have had to face in 1987, the level of capital inflow remained depressed for most of the year with little promises of improvement even in the near future, in view of the likely impact of the recent stock market crash in decreasing the lending capacity of the international market. In addition, there can be little doubt that the current crisis in the world's currency and stock markets has added further uncertainty to Africa's immediate economic prospects.

According to ECA also, the economic signpost for 1988 appear quite uncertain and confusing, to say the least. Apart from the precarious and perilous nature of any forecasting exercise in a situation of so few and scattered data, there are at present so many unknowns and so much uncertainty in the world economy. Hence, the prospects for the African economy in 1988 would depend on several factors, the most decisive four being :

- the weather situation, especially after the not too favourable rains that have adversely affected Africa's agriculture in 1987;

- pursuit by the African governments of domestic reforms and sound economic management ;
- developments in the international environment at large ;
- response of the international community to the commitments which they entered into under the UN-PAAERD Common Position on Africa's External.

Based on the presumption that strong agricultural growth, stable oil prices and a modest rise in non-oil African export prices are likely to prevail in 1988, it is expected that the growth rate of overall production would be between 3 and 4 per cent. The other assumptions underlying this scenario are that the international community will respond more positively to Africa's recovery and development needs in 1988 and that the international environment will not further be disrupted even if there were to be no significant or major improvements in 1988. While it must be admitted that all available signs do not necessarily point in the direction that the economic prospects for 1988 will be significantly better than for 1987, there are some favourable features in the horizon. For example, already there are indications that the weather may be more favourable to agriculture in 1988, judging from the reported advent of rains in Eastern and Southern Africa in the latter part of 1987, and the prospects of good rainy seasons that have been forecast for the other parts of the region in 1988.

Quite apart from that a number of important initiatives have

been taking place in various platforms and fora such as the Paris Club, the Venice Summit and the Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF, all of which lead us to believe, if they were to be intensified, as indeed they should be, that the commitment of the international community is basically still alive, and that a breakthrough in genuine development assistance to Africa may not be that far away. We have also reasons to be hopeful that the current rallies in the world equity markets will turn into a sustained recovery; that the current efforts of the major industrialized countries aimed at better co-ordination of economic policies and at stabilizing the world economy will bear fruit and thereby avert a major recession, and, that, following the recent extraordinary Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on Africa's indebtedness, and the many valuable proposals that have emanated from that Summit, the problems of African debt and debt-servicing burden will be considerably ameliorated in 1988.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.



Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U

Cairo, 25-28 january 1988

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL6

INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT  
IN DROUGHT PRONE AREAS AND ARID ZONES  
IN AFRICA  
PRESENTED BY:  
KAMAL F. SAAD  
UNESCO REPRESENTATIVE IN EGYPT AND SUDAN

INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT  
IN DROUGHT PRONE AREAS AND ARID ZONES  
IN AFRICA

On behalf of the Director-General of Unesco, it is my great honour and privilege to have this opportunity to speak to you on this occasion of the Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity ( OAU), which in many respects marks a significant opportunity in the spirit of international as well as regional cooperation towards the development of the African countries for the welfare and peace of their people..

I do not wish to elaborate now on the current activities of Unesco in the African Continent, which are numerous and diversified as you are all well aware of, but I would like only to talk on one of the most important and striking incident of the draught phenomenon prevailing nowadays and for almost a decade in the arid and semi-arid regions of the world and particularly in the African Continent. In this regards, the Unesco experience in adopting an integrated approach through intersectoral joint efforts may prove relevant in reducing the hazard effect of both drought and desertification particularly in rural areas.

The African Continent is suffering from a continual drain on, and degradation of, its natural resources, e.g., plant cover, soils, water, animal and climate. This general degradation, coupled with the prevailing drought, has led to the suffering of the African people and to the lowering of their quality of



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life . The factors leading to such degradation are manifold and diversified. However, the outcome of the impact of these factors is the unpleasant situation currently evidenced particularly in the rural areas of the African countries.

Since 1968, the African Continent has been receiving less water, and the phenomenon of drought, which began by affecting the Sahel zone and then spread to all the semi-arid and sub-humid zones, has advanced even to countries with forests. The rainfall records has been fluctuating since 1968 around a new lower mean level. The various theories which have been so far advanced to explain the phenomenon of the decreasing rainfall in Africa are still insufficiently accurate or convincing as to serve as a basis for reliable predictions.

Thus, the degradation of land in Africa is one of the most alarming features of the African crisis. Four facets of the problem may be considered : (a) plant cover, (b) soils, (c) water and (d) energy. The combined impact of these factors has evidently resulted in the spreading of arid lands on a larger scale. Thus, as has been reported by UNEP, we are witnessing nowadays a shift of ecological zones : desertification of the Sahel, saharianization of the Savannah, savannization of the forests. Even if rainfall returned to the normal pre-1968 levels, only a portion of the degraded land could regenerate itself, the rest would need active intervention in the form of : dune fixation, sowing grass, planting trees, utilizing deep groundwaters, damming wadis, etc. and above all relevant vocational besides basic education and training.

With this view in mind, it is evident that integrated efforts of various disciplines shall constitute the only solution and endeavour leading to a sound socio-economic development of the areas stricken by drought. As regards to the complexity of these various environmental subjects, no single individual can today expect to be a master of all, but he can be and should be an



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adaptable member of a multi-disciplinary team of allied professions having a sole interest and goal which is the formulation of an integrated model or models of land rehabilitation and reclamation that would be ecologically sound and socio-economically viable. However, there is no one specific model that could be applied equally to all localities, but rather depends on the nature of the environment under consideration.

It is evident therefore that the appropriate channel for achieving such goal is an integrated approach through inter-sectoral joint actions composed of :

- (1) exploration of natural resources pertaining to soil, plant, water, animal, minerals and energy.
- (2) design of adequate development model relevant to the environment
- (3) vocational education and skill training of rural citizens to match with the designed model
- (4) implementation of acquired know-how.

Within the frame of these conceptions, Unesco initiated pilot projects known as " Integrated project in Arid Lands : IPAL ". This project has been applied in a number of African countries in the North and South of the Sahara, as well as in similar environmental localities in Asia and Latin America. For Africa, the IPAL projects are operational in Kenya, Tunisia and Lesotho while two other projects in Algeria and Sudan are in preparation.

These integrated pilot projects which involve in general : research, training and demonstration constitute integral and complementary parts of the current Unesco international programmes. For this, I will cite only 4 of them which are directly related to the IPAL projects and are meanwhile operating at the global level.

- (1) The International Hydrological Programme , known as the IHP was launched in 1975. It is a long term intergovernmental programme

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focused on the scientific and educational aspects of hydrology and water resources management, and based on an interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral approach to these aspects. The programme is broad based, having regard to the varying needs of the developing countries with particular emphasis to those affected by the natural climatological crisis which led to present prevailing drought, and by the influence of man on the hydrological cycle and land use which led to desertification. Among the numerous projects covered by the IHP, I should mention the Major Regional Project on Rational Utilization and Conservation of the Traditional Water Systems. This latter project is being implemented simultaneously in four regions : Africa, Arab States, Latin America and Asia.

(2) The Second Unesco International Programme is the Man and the Biosphere Programme known as the MAB. The main objective of the Programme, which was launched in 1970, is to develop the scientific bases necessary to comprehend the complex problems of land-use planning and conservation of the resources of the biosphere and to devise practical solutions ensuring the conservation and rational management of these resources for the present and future generations. In terms of thematic areas and environments, emphasis is placed on arid and semi-arid zones including the management and restoration of human-impacted resources and man's reaction to environmental aggression due to droughts and desertification.

(3) The third Unesco International Programme is the International Geological Correlation Programme known as the " IGCP ". The programme which was launched in 1973 is the one dealing with the earth's crust and its mineral and energy resources. The major regional project on the geology for Economic Development which is carried out in Africa gives main emphasis to the assessment of potential mineral resources and to the strengthening of the

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on-the-spot training and research and local infrastructures. Other activities relating to hazards of hydro-meteorological origin, as in the cases of drought and desertification, constitute an integral component of the IGCP.

(4) The fourth Unesco International Programme is that dealing with Education. Activities in this domain are diversified, not only in the spirit of education for all but also present in practically all the international scientific and applied programmes of Unesco. Education and training activities cover all aspects of the afore-mentioned three international programmes and are directed at levels starting from eradication of illiteracy to a coverage for technicians, under-graduate and post-graduate as well as for researches and decision-makers and planners in the various disciplines. As for the latter many planners feel that planning and development cannot only be done for the public, but also with the public.

The various activities pertaining to these four afore-mentioned International Programmes coupled with those of the IPAL Pilot Projects should lead ultimately to : compilation of all scientific data, establishment of various maps of appropriate scales, production of socio-ecological study, and implementation of package models in a carefully planned manner with the full participation of villagers and nomades via the establishment of village groups, rural animation and mass communication media. The package includes : small scale water development and mini-irrigation schemes wherever applicable, improved agricultural techniques and animal husbandary with due consideration to drought resistant species, plans for exploiting mineral resources and raw materials if applicable, and literacy, vocational and basic education and in-service training and skill development in the various development aspects relevant to the specific environment.

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In concluding, I should say that our past experience and practice in Unesco, show clearly that drought-stricken areas as well as desertized lands cannot be rehabilitated or halted by isolated measures, thus, an integrated approach is necessary taking into account the numerous facets, causes and impacts of these environmental aggressions.

Finally I would like to avail myself of this opportunity, on behalf of Unesco, to reiterate our continued cooperation and support to the OAU and its Member States.

Conference on the Occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U

Cairo , 25-28 January 1988

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL8

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN  
THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH (UNITAR)  
AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) \*

by

MICHEL DOO KINGUE  
UNITED NATIONS UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL  
AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UNITAR



## INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was established, in 1965, as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations and for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations, particularly in achieving its objectives for the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of economic and social development. A particular emphasis was put on issues of concern to Africa in UNITAR programmes of training and research since it was from Africa that a large number of newly independent countries emerged at the time UNITAR was established. This priority for Africa is also reflected in the fact that only African nationals have held the position of Executive Director of UNITAR which is at the level of Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.. Mr. Gabriel d'Arboussier of Senegal was the first Executive Director (1965-1968). He was succeeded by Chief Simeon Adebo of Nigeria (1968-1972) who himself was succeeded by Dr. Davidson Nicol of Sierra Leone (1972-1982). The current Executive Director, Mr. Michel Doo Kinkué of Cameroon, took over from Dr. Nicol on 1 January 1983.

2. In considering co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU, one has to take into account not only specific activities organized in response to OAU requests, but the overall co-operation between UNITAR and African countries in general, especially as most UNITAR activities in favour of Africa are designed for the region as a whole, even if specific assistance is also given by UNITAR to individual African countries at their Governments' request.

3. In the present document, a brief survey of past co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU will be made, followed by an account of current co-operation with an indication of possibilities of collaboration in the future.

#### I. BRIEF SURVEY OF PAST CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UNITAR AND THE OAU

4. As stated above, from their inception, UNITAR programmes of training and research have been largely influenced by African preoccupations as reflected in OAU meetings and resolutions as well as in relevant decisions of the United Nations. Actually, very early in its existence, UNITAR started co-operating with the OAU. At the beginning of 1967, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU requested UNITAR assistance in the training of officers from the OAU Secretariat. In consultation with the appropriate departments of the United Nations Secretariat, a two-month training programme for four OAU officers at United Nations Headquarters was arranged. Besides receiving training in the fields of committee work, conference co-ordination and documentation, the officers were also able, in accordance with their respective functions in the OAU Secretariat, to study the United Nations work and programmes in the field of personnel administration, economic development, and the problems of non-self-governing territories.

5. Some of the training activities in which UNITAR was involved at an early stage were courses for foreign service officers of developing countries. A large number of beneficiaries of those courses were African nationals. In 1969, two basic courses for recruits and junior officers of the foreign services in developing countries were organized. The

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first course, for French-speaking candidates, was conducted at Dakar, Senegal from mid-January to mid-May and was attended by eighteen officers from twelve countries. The second course, for English-speaking candidates, took place at Makerere in Uganda from June to October 1969 with twenty-four officers from fourteen countries attending. Arrangements were also made for the participants to be sent in groups for further practical training at the foreign ministries of certain countries which had agreed to co-operate by organizing and paying for the cost of these secondments. These basic training courses in diplomacy continued for a number of years.

6. While training programmes for multilateral diplomacy and international co-operation funded by UNITAR own resources are designed to benefit all Member States, even those programmes were tailored to meet the special needs of newly independent and other developing countries. Thus, following the adoption in December 1965 of General Assembly resolution 2099 (XX) on the United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Studies, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law, UNITAR launched the United Nations/UNITAR Fellowships Programme as a major part of that United Nations Programme of Assistance. Within the framework of that Programme, UNITAR organizes a training programme every year for developing countries' government legal advisers and university lecturers in international law aimed at updating and deepening participants' knowledge of recent developments in international law. Activities that are undertaken include participation of trainees in a six-week programme at The Hague Academy of International Law and special courses and seminars organized by UNITAR during that period, and three months of practical training in the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations or in the specialized agencies. Under that Programme, regional

training and refresher courses in international law are also organized for young government legal advisers and university professors of developing countries. In the case of Africa, such regional courses were held in 1972 in Accra, Ghana; 1974 in Kinshasa, Zaire; 1975 in Freetown, Sierra Leone; 1981 in Cairo, Egypt; 1984 in Yaounde, Cameroon. A similar regional course will be organized again in an African country in 1989.

7. In response to appeals by the OAU and the United Nations for assistance to newly independent African countries, UNITAR undertook, in 1980-1981, with funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a special programme of training for Government officials from Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe). The programme had four components: a bilingual secretarial course which lasted for a year from the end of October 1980 to the beginning of November 1981; a course in basic diplomacy organized in Geneva, Switzerland from September to December 1980; a programme in public administration and management that took place from February to December 1981 in Brasilia, Brazil; and a study tour in 1981 of senior government officials to United Nations Headquarters and United Nations agencies in Geneva, Paris, Rome and Vienna.

8. As a contribution to the assistance by the organizations of the United Nations system to African National Liberation Movements recognized by the OAU, UNITAR also organized under the Nationhood Programme for Namibia, two training courses in 1984 and 1985, one designed for 8 junior officials and the other for 24 senior officials and chief representatives of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). A three-month course was conducted in Geneva by the Centre for the Applied Study of

International Negotiations, and in New York at UNITAR Headquarters for the junior officials. It concentrated on the basic aspects of diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as on issues and processes of present-day international co-operation. For senior officials, a two-week course was held in Lusaka, Zambia, focussing on the analysis, planning, organization and administration of foreign policy and on certain key issues relating to multilateral diplomacy and co-operation at both the regional and global levels. The two courses were financed by a grant from the United Nations Fund for Namibia and were implemented in close co-operation with the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia as well as the OAU representatives in Geneva and New York.

9. UNITAR training activities for economic and social development also have been influenced by African preoccupations. In its early years, UNITAR organized a centralized group training programme in technical cooperation for all developing countries which was replaced, from 1968, by a two-year cycle of regional seminars, thus making the training available to larger numbers at less cost and also ensuring that the training was more related to the problems and circumstances of the areas from which the trainees were drawn. While the programme for each cycle included one regional seminar for Latin America, one for Europe and the Middle East and one for Asia and the Far East, there were two regional seminars for Africa, one for English-speaking participants and one for French-speaking ones. The programme was conducted in close co-operation with United Nations Development Programme and with its financial support.

10. The current Executive Director of UNITAR in 1984-1985 launched a UNITAR training programme for economic and social development mainly geared to meet the needs of African countries and of the least developed

countries of the world, the largest number of which are located in Africa. That programme emphasizes particularly the following areas: training for development managers, training in the modernization of public administration through training of trainers, training in the management of public enterprises and training for finance management. Thus, in 1984, two UNITAR/UNDP workshops for Directors of Planning of Ministries of Economic Development and Planning of African Least Developed Countries were held in April in Gaborone, Botswana and in September in Kigali, Rwanda for English-speaking participants and French-speaking participants respectively. The seminars/workshops dealt with issues concerning development organization, financing and management as well as issues concerning project design, implementation and monitoring. In 1987, two other training seminars were organized in Nairobi, Kenya and in Lomé, Togo for Permanent Secretaries of African Ministries of Economic Development and Planning. Those seminars were devoted to current problems concerning the organization, financing and management of African economies.

11. Regarding the modernization of public administration through training of trainers, a pilot programme was launched by UNITAR in 1984 involving trainers from national schools of public administration in French-speaking African countries. Two seminars were held in November 1984 and March 1985 in Dakar, Senegal, organized jointly by UNITAR and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (ENAP) of Quebec, Canada. The programme was aimed at improving the capacity of national schools of administration to design, implement and evaluate public administration and management curricula. Trainers from Congo, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal and Togo participated in that pilot programme. An international symposium on the modernization of public administration training in African countries was also organized by UNITAR in Berlin (West) in July 1985 with a view to developing proposals for improving the

performance of African training institutions in public administration and thus support the improvement of public administration and management in Africa. The participants included the directors of 14 African institutions of training in public administration (Ecoles Nationales d'Administration and Institutes of Public Administration).

12. The UNITAR training programme for economic and social development has been expanded recently and the current programme will be examined under the section on "Current and possible future co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU."

13. In the field of research, some of the early research activities of UNITAR were also influenced by African concerns, particularly studies on elimination of racism, on brain drain, on transfer of technology, as well as on development process. The outbreak of the drought in many African countries in the early 1970s led UNITAR to organize in Sacramento, California, in 1977, a major International Conference on Alternative Strategies for Desert Development and Management to which were invited representatives of African countries concerned with a view to familiarizing them with solutions that had been found to development problems of arid zones elsewhere in the world. The energy crisis of 1973 which so severely affected many African countries also prompted UNITAR to undertake research on small scale mining, on small energy resources as well as on technologies for the development of the vast resources of heavy crude oil more largely available than traditional crude oil. A UNITAR/UNDP Information Centre for Heavy Crude and Tar Sands was

established in New York City in 1981 following the organization by UNITAR in 1979 of an International Conference on the Future of Heavy Crude and Tar Sands. It is also the concern for appropriate energy development for African countries that led UNITAR to set up in Rome, Italy, in 1984, the UNITAR/UNIDP Centre on Small Energy Resources which, in November of this year, is organizing an International Conference on Energy for Rural Populations of Africa.

14. The actions of the Group of 77 and the Non Aligned Movement also led the General Assembly to influence the work programme of UNITAR in the field of research. African countries represent a major force in those two political groupings. UNITAR was thus involved in the 1970s in studies concerning several aspects of the New International Economic Order. One of the books published in 1980 under that research programme is entitled Africa, the Middle East and the New International Economic Order.

15. There were also some UNITAR research activities specifically focussed on Africa and on OAU's needs. One of the very first studies of UNITAR analyzed the relations between the United Nations and the OAU in political as well as socio-economic fields. The study, which was published in 1976 as a book entitled The OAU and the UN, made various suggestions for strengthening co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU, particularly as regards the settlement of disputes among African States, the handling of the remaining problems of colonialism and racial discrimination and the development of effective collaboration between OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. This publication, which was the result of close collaboration between UNITAR and the OAU Secretariat has been widely used as a reference document on the subject.



16. In 1977, UNITAR organized in Dakar, Senegal in co-operation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, a major Conference on the Future of Africa which examined the various problems facing the continent and attempted to present solutions to those problems. Unfortunately, the wealth of information assembled on that occasion and the results of the discussions held were not published with the exception of papers dealing with industrialization which were published in a book in French. As a result of that conference, UNITAR launched a research programme on Alternative Development Strategies for Africa which became a programme co-sponsored by UNITAR, the United Nations University (UNU) and the Third World Forum. UNITAR withdrew from the programme at the end of its first phase in December 1986, as the programme tended to be more academic than action oriented. The work completed during that first phase of the programme is now being published by the United Nations University. The following books have already been published under that programme: The Crisis in African Agriculture; Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa; SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa; The Conflict over Mineral Resources in Africa; The World Steel Industry: Dynamics of Decline.

17. UNITAR and the OAU resumed their direct and close co-operation in the field of research in 1980 following the adoption of OAU resolutions CM/RES/79 (XXV) and CM/RES/860 (XXVII) concerning the establishment of an OAU Political and Security Council. A proposal for the establishment of that Council was elaborated and analyzed in a series of papers prepared by UNITAR jointly with the OAU Secretariat. The final papers, which were developed in a UNITAR Workshop comprising African diplomats and experts, were considered in 1984 by an OAU Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee of Twelve and were later submitted as a document to the OAU Council of Ministers.

18. UNITAR also participated in the OAU Ministerial Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa, convened in Lomé, Togo in August 1985. As recommended by that Conference in its Programme of Action, UNITAR was actively involved in subsequent consultations which resulted in the establishment at Lomé of a United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

19. It is also worth noting that, in response to a request made by the United Nations General Assembly, UNITAR organized in October 1980, a conference on the "Prohibition of apartheid, racism and racial discrimination and the achievement of self-determination in international law." The conference was carried out in consultation with the OAU Secretariat and its report was published as an official document of the United Nations (A/35/677).

## II CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UNITAR AND THE OAU

20. Current UNITAR activities being carried out in favour of African countries have been designed taking into account OAU policy as presented in the Lagos Plan of Action as well as in the Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in July 1985 and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 as the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development in 1986-1990. In view of the foregoing and although there are no joint UNITAR-OAU projects, the UNITAR Work Programme in 1986-1987 as well as the new Work Programme being prepared for 1988-1989 contain several activities that are designed to help African countries achieve their development objectives. Most activities are in the field of training since in its resolutions 41/172

and 42/197 on UNITAR adopted in 1986 and 1987 respectively the United Nations General Assembly has requested UNITAR to give, in its action, the highest priority to training activities.

21. In its training programmes for multilateral diplomacy and international co-operation, UNITAR introduced in 1986 a new activity: seminars on foreign policy analysis and planning using modern methods of social science. The first such seminars were designed for Diplomatic Advisers of African Governments. The seminar for French-speaking countries was held in Libreville, Gabon in March 1986 and the seminar for English-speaking countries took place in Nairobi, Kenya in August of the same year. Similar seminars are planned for other officials of African Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In the same spirit of enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of African diplomacy, UNITAR has also designed a seminar on diplomacy and development as a follow up and complement to the seminars on foreign policy analysis and planning. The seminars to be held on diplomacy and development are expected to be organized for Directors of Co-operation in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as for high ranking officials of Governments involved in international negotiations in the development field. A third initiative taken by UNITAR in diplomacy training concerns the design of a seminar on the contribution of diplomacy to the promotion of security at the national, regional and international levels. While it is planned to benefit all developing countries, this type of seminar will be held on a regional basis. The seminars for Africa will thus address the particular security concerns of the continent. It is the intention of UNITAR to invite the OAU Secretariat to participate in all these seminars for diplomacy training.

22. In co-operation with the Ford Foundation and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, UNITAR, in 1985, launched a training programme for developing countries in the field of Human Rights under which two appropriate workshops have already been organized in Africa: in Dakar, Senegal in 1986 for French-speaking countries of West Africa and in Lusaka, Zambia, in November 1987, for English-speaking countries. Another workshop is planned in 1988 for Portuguese-speaking and other French-speaking countries. UNITAR has involved the OAU Secretariat in these workshops now that the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has entered into force. A representative of the OAU Secretariat attended the Lusaka workshop. UNITAR's co-operation with the OAU will continue in this field.

23. UNITAR has also launched new training programmes for economic and social development of special interest to Africa. The first of these programmes, which will start in 1988, concerns the training of debt managers. The programme was designed by UNITAR in 1987 in co-operation with the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and in consultation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the African Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), several other public and private banking institutions as well as Governments of Africa and other least developed countries (LDCs). It is planned to organize in 1988 two Sub-Regional Seminars on Development Financing and Debt Management for African countries and to implement, as from next year, the other elements of that comprehensive training programme, which also involves high level and medium level courses on debt management, courses on legal aspects of debt management, the organization of an exchange of experience among developing countries on the subject as well as the development of relevant curricula for African institutions of higher education. The programme is expected to be funded by UNDP as well as through special purpose grants to be provided by some industrialized countries.

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24. Another training programme that would contribute to the solution of some of the current African problems is the programme of training in the planning and management of disaster relief programmes, which UNITAR is designing in co-operation with the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) and in consultation with a large number of humanitarian organizations active in this field. The programme is expected to be ready for implementation by the end of 1988 and will also be a comprehensive training programme. Affected as it is by both natural and man-made disasters, Africa will be particularly interested in this programme. UNITAR intends therefore to request participation of the OAU Secretariat in the meeting of experts during which the programme will be finalized.

25. UNITAR will also continue to develop its ongoing training activities in the field of economic and social development. The seminars organized in 1987 for Permanent Secretaries of African Ministries of Economic Development and Planning have identified a number of follow-up activities that UNITAR will initiate soon, funds permitting. Seminars are thus planned for higher and lower ranking officials of African Ministries of Economic Development and Planning covering several aspects of development organization, financing and management as well as project design, implementation and monitoring.

26. The training programme for environmental management launched by UNITAR in 1986 as a joint venture with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and which is designed for all developing countries will also continue, thanks to the financial contribution of the Swiss Government which has supported the programme from its inception.

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Nationals of a number of African countries have already benefitted from this programme or will attend the 1988 courses. This applies to specialists from Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Uganda. The programme comprises three courses. One is for junior civil servants and scientific research workers and lasts for a period of six months. It is the one that is now being organized from November to April and from February to July. Another course of three-month duration, is for mid-level government officials who have had some experience in the management of natural resources. The third course is for high-level specialists. The programme uses the most advanced technologies available for the management of natural resources.

27. UNITAR will continue to design and implement specific training programmes for African National Liberation Movements recognized by the OAU, at the request either of the OAU, the United Nations, UNDP or of those Liberation Movements. Specific training requests that the OAU itself may make for the benefit of its staff will also be entertained, funds permitting.

28. In the field of research, it is worth noting that the seriousness of the problem of refugees in Africa has led UNITAR to publish in 1987 a book entitled Coping with Africa's Refugee Burden. A Time for Solutions. The book examines particularly the outcome of the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) and makes recommendations for future action by the international community to ensure comprehensive solution of benefit to both the countries that grant asylum and to the refugees themselves.

29. As mentioned above (see paragraph 13) UNITAR has established in Rome, Italy, in 1984, a UNITAR/UNDP Centre on Small Energy Resources, the functions of which include:

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(i) the systematic collection of data concerning small energy resources in all parts of the world;

(ii) the study of the development of new technologies applicable to small energy resources from the exploration stage to production and utilization;

(iii) the organization of training seminars and meetings including study tours, for the exchange of technical information of interest to members supporting the Centre and to developing countries.

The Centre publishes, in English and French, a quarterly Newsletter sent to all African Governments through UNDP offices. The Centre has organized in May 1987 in Pisa, Italy, a Workshop on Small Geothermal Resources which was attended by several specialists from developing countries among which were the following African countries: Algeria, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia. The Centre is now involved in the preparation of an International Conference on Energy for Rural Populations of Africa to be held in November 1988. A meeting of experts involving representatives of ECA, ADB, the OAU and from other appropriate institutions in Africa and in other parts of the world is scheduled to take place in Rome in March 1988 for the preparation of that International Conference. As the activities of the Centre cover all energy resources with the exception of nuclear energy, the Centre is expected to be, in the field of research, one of the important elements of future co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU.

30. Another research area where co-operation may be developed in the future between UNITAR and the OAU is in the follow-up to the 1977 UNITAR

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Conference on Alternative Strategies for Desert Development and Management mentioned in paragraph 13 above. As the African continent continues to be affected by drought, UNITAR is considering the possibility of organizing an appropriate follow-up to that Conference, including the holding of another International Conference that would update the wealth of information that was made available at the Sacramento Conference of 1977.

31. UNITAR in 1984-1985 launched a research programme on the future of the main developing regions of the world, the purpose of which is to mobilize scholars and research institutions of each of the regions in order to encourage solutions to the development challenges of the region concerned and to bring the scholars' suggestions and recommendations to the attention of the decision makers of the region. Under that programme, in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1986, UNITAR organized an International Conference on the Future of Latin America which involved approximately one hundred Latin American scholars and politicians who discussed all issues that need to be taken into account in considering the future of their region. Some 80 papers were prepared by those and other Latin American experts for the Conference which is now being followed up by national seminars on the future of each Latin American country organized by Governments of those countries. Such national seminars have already been held in Venezuela, Costa Rica and Chile. Others are planned for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. UNITAR has recommended to the OAU Secretary-General that in co-operation with the ECA, ADB and the African Bureau of UNDP, a similar conference on the future of Africa be also organized by the OAU in association with UNITAR before the end of the 1980s.



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32. The above mentioned projects and ideas of projects concerning co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU do not exclude other possibilities of co-operation between the two institutions. UNITAR is open to suggestions in this respect from the OAU.

33. Two important elements must be taken into account in considering the development of co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU. The first element is that the role of UNITAR in the United Nations system is to promote innovations that would enhance the effectiveness of actions for the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of economic and social development. UNITAR is therefore not involved in indiscriminate training or in general academic research. In keeping with its mandate, its training action concentrates on training in multilateral diplomacy and international co-operation and on innovative training schemes that would enhance the promotion of economic and social development; which explains the particular emphasis put by UNITAR on training in the organization, financing and management of development activities. UNITAR action in the field of research is also limited to research meant to promote the maintenance of peace and security and economic and social development, without duplicating the efforts undertaken by other institutions of the United Nations system.

34. The other important element to be taken into account in considering the development of co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU is the fact that UNITAR is an institution funded through voluntary contributions. As a result, its resources are unpredictable. Their level for a given year depends upon the good will and generosity of Member States. In the 1980s, the United Nations system has been facing a growing financial crisis consecutive to the crisis of multilateralism that affects most of its

organizations. UNITAR is one of the United Nations institutions that are the most affected by the financial crisis. Some governments of developed countries that were annoyed by UNITAR's involvement in research on the New International Economic Order in the 1970s even campaigned to have UNITAR closed down. Thanks to the OAU support manifested by resolutions in favour of UNITAR adopted by the 1986 and 1987 OAU Summits, African delegations succeeded, during the debates on UNITAR in the United Nations General Assembly, to save UNITAR from closing down. The extent to which its activities in favour of Africa will continue to develop and expand depends therefore on the availability of extrabudgetary resources (special purpose grants) to fund those activities. In the field of training, the Government of Switzerland has been, until now, the main and the most generous donor to UNITAR for its programmes in favour of Africa and the least developed countries. UNDP is also expected to play an important role, particularly as regards the funding of training projects for debt management and for the planning and management of disaster relief programmes. The research programme in small energy resources is mainly supported by the Government of Italy. Other possible research programmes do not yet have well identified donors. One important aspect of co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU must therefore also be for OAU Member States to support UNITAR financially even through token voluntary contributions that would match their strong political support, and to campaign for donors' funding of UNITAR programmes that are largely designed in favour of African countries as illustrated in this paper\*. UNITAR is governed by a Board of Trustees of 20 members appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

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\* In 1986-1987 only the following 17 African countries made voluntary contributions to the budget of UNITAR called the General Fund: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania and Zaire.

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after consultation with the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council. Four of the 20 current members are representatives of African countries: Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and Nigeria. The representative of Algeria is the current Vice-Chairman of the Board.

35. The Executive Director of UNITAR is one of the few Under-Secretaries-General of the United Nations who is a member of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) which is composed of all the Executive Heads of the main organizations of the United Nations system and meets at least three times a year under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is in that Committee that all issues of concern to mankind are freely discussed between those Executive Heads with a view to recommending appropriate solutions to them. This means that through the Executive Director of UNITAR, Africa and the OAU have a permanent spokesman in the Committee, regardless of whether an African is heading one of the other organizations of the United Nations system. It was for this vital reason that African delegations to the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly fought an attempt that was made by some Western countries delegations to downgrade the position of the Executive Director of UNITAR. If they had succeeded, Africa and the OAU would have lost their permanent seat in this important Committee. This is also a greater reason why co-operation between UNITAR and the OAU must be strong and exemplary.

Conférence tenue à l'occasion du  
25ème Anniversaire de l'O.U.A

Le Caire, 25-28 janvier 1988

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL 9

ALLOCUTION DE S.E. IDE OUMAROU, SECRETAIRE GENERAL  
DE L'OUA, AU SYMPOSIUM SUR LE 25EME ANNIVERSAIRE  
DE L'OUA ORGANISE PAR L'EGYPTE

Le Caire, 25 janvier 1988

Monsieur le Président,

Messieurs les Ministres,

Excellences

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Mes premiers mots, sont des mots de remerciements : remerciements personnels au Président Hosny Moubarak, à son Gouvernement et à son peuple, pour l'honneur qu'ils m'ont fait, et qui me vaut aujourd'hui d'être parmi les hôtes de marque de ce Symposium organisé par l'Institut Diplomatique du Ministère Egyptien des Affaires étrangères, pour marquer les Vingt-cinq premières années d'existence de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine.

Remerciements aussi du Secrétariat Général de l'OUA à l'Egypte éternelle, à l'Egypte militante et Membre-Fondateur de l'OUA, dont la bienveillance coutumière et l'attachement aux idéaux de notre Organisation, se traduisent encore aujourd'hui, vis-à-vis de celle-ci, par un éloquent témoignage de plus : un témoignage de fidélité particulière

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et d'affection, un témoignage de confiance et d'encouragement, mais aussi un témoignage d'invite à poursuivre, et de préparation à aborder l'avenir pour réaliser de grandes ambitions.

Eh bien, ce témoignage-là, va droit au coeur du Secrétaire Général de l'OUA. Et quand je dis Secrétaire Général de l'OUA, j'entends celui qui est actuellement au pied de l'ouvrage pour entretenir les espérances, et pour souffrir les peines du Continent, mais celui aussi que le hasard a placé là pour recevoir, en des jours comme celui-ci, des honneurs qu'il doit humblement orienter vers ses illustres devanciers, j'ai nommé, Diallo Telli, Nzo Ekangaki, Eteki Mboumoua et Edem Kodjo. Sans oublier, bien sûr, le Docteur Peter Onu qui, par des temps d'incertitudes et de grandes préoccupations, eut à tenir, pendant

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deux ans, la barre, sous forme d'un intérim particulièrement difficile et frustrant. Car c'est grâce à la tenacité et aux efforts de ces remarquables fils du Continent, que le Secrétariat Général de l'OUA est ce qu'il est aujourd'hui, et que l'OUA, en tant qu'Organisation, peut s'y fier pour parler de l'Afrique de demain.

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Monsieur le Président,

Messieurs les Ministres, Excellences,

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Dans quelques mois, il y aura 25 ans que l'OUA «a pris forme, alors que beaucoup s'attendaient à la voir péricliter», 25 ans que «l'OUA s'est mise en mouvement, alors que beaucoup s'imaginaient qu'elle serait mise au grand froid, pour être congelée».

Bien entendu, et vous l'avez deviné, je ne fais là qu'adapter aux circonstances un mot du Président Nasser qui fit effectivement, pour s'en réjouir, ce double constat ici-même, au Caire, en 1964, pour saluer le tout Premier Sommet Ordinaire de notre Organisation.

Je voudrais donc en profiter pour saluer sa mémoire; pour magnifier ce qu'il a fait pour l'Egypte, pour le monde arabe et pour l'Afrique; pour louer son africanité et son sens des intérêts de l'Afrique, qui en ont, tout naturellement, fait un des Pères-Fondateurs les plus convaincus, et donc les plus engagés, de notre Organisation.

Quoi donc de plus normal que de voir l'Egypte prendre aujourd'hui la tête de nos Etats pour



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organiser cet important forum de réflexion, dont le thème central est le 25ème Anniversaire de l'OUA?

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Donc, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Ministres, Excellences, Mesdames, Messieurs, un quart de siècle, après sa création, l'OUA existe toujours, et se raffermi malgré les vicissitudes de l'histoire.

Mais elle n'a pas seulement que le mérite d'exister : le miracle de sa naissance s'est muée en une réalité vécue; et il faut bien reconnaître que, sous sa houlette, le Continent a connu pendant ces derniers Vingt Cinq ans, des changements et des mutations très profonds.

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L'enfantement difficile augurait pourtant une croissance semée d'embûches et de pièges sournois pour une bébé-OUA qui s'était fixé des objectifs ambitieux, dont l'essence allait délibérément à l'encontre des intérêts impérialistes et néocolonialistes d'alors.

Ainsi, au cours des années 60 et 70, l'Organisation Continentale eut notamment à faire face aux séquelles les plus pernicieuses du colonialisme : division arbitraire des peuples à l'intérieur de frontières artificielles, classification idéologique en Etats modérés et progressistes, en Etats francophones et anglophones...

Les luttes ethniques et tribales, attisées pendant le règne des Empires coloniaux ne manquèrent pas non plus de secouer bon nombre de nos jeunes

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Etats indépendants, assombrissant souvent les relations interétatiques, et faisant apparaître la recherche de l'Unité Africaine comme un mythe.

Mais, l'Afrique unitariste a survécu à l'oeuvre de sape des démons fossoyeurs, car comme devait le noter notre frère Tesfaye Gebre Egzi, alors Secrétaire Général Provisoire de l'OUA au Sommet tenu ici même en 1964, «même en cette période d'incertitude, la volonté de se régénérer continuait à agiter les peuples d'Afrique, et ne pouvait être complètement étouffée».

L'Organisation Continentale entreprit donc de libérer tous les peuples africains du joug colonial; de protéger l'indépendance, la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale des Etats déjà libérés et de renforcer leur solidarité en

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exaltant leur unité. Et en voilà déjà assez pour ébranler les milieux impérialistes, notamment ceux qui étaient liés à l'empire colonial portugais, et au régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud.

Allait-on donc la laisser faire? Hélas non, car à peine engagés les premiers combats, que la voilà confrontée à un troublant désordre au sein de ses propres troupes : des conflits frontaliers, aussi subits qu'inopportuns opposèrent en effet entre eux certains pays membres.

Mais l'OUA éteignit très vite ces conflits, et s'en servit même, fort opportunément, pour amener nos Etats à édicter, et à accepter les principes directeurs qui devaient guider l'action politique commune dans ce domaine : le règlement

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pacifique des différends, la non-immixtion d'un Etat dans les affaires intérieures de l'autre, et le respect de l'intégrité territoriale de chaque Etat.

Les Etats-membres devaient par ailleurs s'accorder sur la nécessité de ne pas remettre en cause les frontières léguées par la colonisation, mettant ainsi une sourdine aux conflits latents, induits du découpage arbitraire de notre Afrique en Etats de fortune.

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On pouvait dès lors penser que l'unité était désormais libre de toute entrave, qu'elle pouvait allègrement marcher vers sa propre concrétisation. Or déjà se développait un autre débat : en effet, de quelle unité parlait-on?

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Celle de ceux qui préconisaient la voie institutionnelle par la création immédiate d'un Gouvernement Continental, ou celle de ceux qui préféraient d'abord que se développe un certain esprit de l'Unité, et que se créent les bases socio-économiques de cette Unité?

Le rêve de l'Unité, disaient en effet les premiers, devait devenir une réalité immédiate. Mais les autres répliquaient que, sortant à peine de la nuit obscurantiste du colonialisme, les Africains se connaissaient à peine, qu'ils devaient plutôt commencer par faire l'inventaire de ce qui les rapproche et de ce qui les divise pour procéder avec méthode. Qu'ils devaient, en un mot, bâtir l'Unité.

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Tout le monde était cependant d'accord qu'il ne fallait pas attendre pour en mettre en place les fondements, et cela malgré les nombreux obstacles que, ni les uns ni les autres n'ignoraient, ni ne minimisaient.

Tout le monde se ralliait ainsi à l'avis du Président Nyerere, qui estimait, à juste titre que, pour quelque grandes qu'elles paraissent, les difficultés ne pouvaient être insurmontables, qu'elles ne devaient, tout au plus, que nous embarrasser à la manière des pattes du jeune rejeton de l'animal qu'on appelle mille-pattes qui demanda un jour à sa mère : «de toutes ces pattes, laquelle dois-je mouvoir d'abord»? Et la mère mille-pattes de répondre : «Avance, mon enfant, avance».

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Et ce fut ce conseil qu'un des Pères-Fondateurs de notre Organisation emprunta à la sagesse de la gent animalière, qui prévalut! Au point que l'OUA en fait aujourd'hui encore son profit.

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Heureux dénouement ! Car même le colonialisme portugais, le plus ancien, le plus tenace et le plus rétrograde a dû finir par céder devant les coups de boutoir de l'Afrique militante, solidairement mobilisée derrière les mouvements de libération.

Ainsi, depuis la création de l'OUA à laquelle n'avaient participé que 32 pays indépendants, 17 autres pays devaient être libérés du joug colonial.

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Aujourd'hui, la seule épine qui reste dans le pied de notre Continent, est l'occupation illégale de la Namibie combattante par l'Afrique du Sud raciste.

Mais, là encore notre solidarité est en voie de venir à bout de cet anachronisme, grâce à l'intensification de la lutte menée par le peuple namibien lui-même sous l'égide de la SWAPO, et grâce aussi à la Communauté internationale sensibilisée par notre action, et décidée à en finir avec les politiques de domination, de discrimination raciale et d'oppression.

Le régime raciste n'en est-il pas, en l'occurrence, à adopter la stratégie de la fuite en avant? En tout cas un régime qui ne parvient

plus à contrôler la situation, un peuple qui ne veut plus être gouverné, une confrontation qui se développe au grand jour et s'étend dans le maquis, le quadrillage des zones frontalières de la Namibie où opèrent les combattants de la SWAPO, l'agression et l'invasion de pays limitrophes, et plus particulièrement de l'Angola, sont des signes qui ne trompent pas. L'Afrique du Sud est au bord de la défaite, et déploie des efforts désespérés pour se protéger contre le peuple dominé que rien n'arrêtera désormais, sinon la reconnaissance de ses droits, la fin de son oppression et sa totale libération.

L'apartheid aussi est traqué, et se comporte maintenant comme un fauve blessé voulant entraîner dans sa chute ses bourreaux. Les menées subversives et destabilisatrices de l'Afrique du Sud contre

les pays de la Ligne de Front révèlent le désarroi d'un régime incapable de réalisme, et à plus forte raison de se remettre en question. Si au moins, certaines puissances ne l'aidaient pas à nous tenir tête, et à narguer la communauté internationale tout entière, nous en serions, depuis bien longtemps, à sonner l'hallali!

Mais la lutte continue! A la fois contre le régime honni d'apartheid, et contre ses partisans; pour la libération du peuple sud-africain, mais aussi pour l'indépendance prochaine de la Namibie.

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Faut-il en conclure, Monsieur le Président, que la solidarité africaine n'a été manifeste, au cours de ces 25 dernières années, qu'en faveur de la libération des seuls peuples qui étaient

encore sous le joug colonial? Bien sûr que non, puisque des pays déjà libérés, mais dont l'indépendance et la souveraineté étaient menacées, ont connu à travers l'OUA, quelques manifestations concrètes de cette solidarité.

Ainsi l'Afrique fit instantanément bloc autour de la Guinée, du Bénin et du Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) lorsque, par des actions massives et destructrices non provoquées, ces pays furent agressés par des mercenaires recrutés, entraînés et mandatés par des puissances extérieures.

L'Afrique soutint également, et de la manière la plus ferme, la Zambie lorsqu'elle dut faire face, dans les années 1972-73, aux agressions répétées des troupes du tristement célèbre rebelle Ian Smith.

Aujourd'hui, face aux menées subversives de Prétoria contre les pays indépendants de l'Afrique Australe, l'OUA s'efforce d'appuyer son action politique et diplomatique de soutien à ces pays, d'une assistance matérielle et financière destinée à les aider à sortir de leur dépendance structurelle des circuits économiques de l'Afrique du Sud. Ainsi, pour la première fois, un million de dollars a été mis, en 1987, à la disposition de la SADUC par notre Organisation pour inciter les bailleurs de fonds étrangers à investir davantage dans les projets économiques de la région.

Ainsi, le devoir m'incombe de profiter de cette tribune pour appeler l'attention de l'Afrique et du monde sur ce qui se passe présentement en Angola où, ouvertement alliée aux bandits de l'UNITA qu'elle a armés, qu'elle encadre, qu'elle actionne à loisir et qu'elle couve de ses forces terrestres et de son aviation, l'Afrique du Sud exerce des pressions militaires de désorganisation économique et de stabilités contre le peuple et contre

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le gouvernement angolais. Je dis qu'il serait opportun et urgent que le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies se penche de nouveau sur cette brûlante question.

De même, et toujours dans son devoir de solidarité avec les Etats africains, notre Organisation ne s'est pas fait faute de se ranger aux côtés de nos frères libyens lorsqu'en Avril 1986, leur pays dut subir, de la part des Etats-Unis, des raids meurtriers sur Tripoli et Benghazi.

La solidarité que l'Afrique témoigna à l'Egypte, lors de l'agression de son territoire par les troupes israéliennes, demeure quant à elle, encore dans toutes les mémoires, puisque, en dehors des réprobations et condamnations unanimes, elle se traduisit, de façon spectaculaire, par la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre l'ensemble des Etats membres de l'OUA et l'Etat d'Israel. provocateur et arrogant. Elle ouvrit ainsi une nouvelle ère de relations afro-arabes particulièrement intenses et privilégiées, qui devait déboucher sur le Sommet historique tenu dans cette même ville du Caire, en Mars 1977.

Les fruits de cette Coopération sont malheureusement encore loin, très loin des espoirs suscités, il y a dix ans, à l'intérieur de ces deux mondes complémentaires qui, s'ils pouvaient seulement éliminer un peu plus rapidement les obstacles pour se retrouver, pour se concerter et pour entreprendre ensemble, constitueraient un maillon sans nul doute très fort de la Coopération Sud-Sud, et seraient même en mesure de faire évoluer plus positivement la cause de plus en plus injuste, de plus en plus précaire, de plus en plus tragique, de nos frères Palestiniens.

C'est le soutien à la cause palestinienne et à l'OLP est, depuis longtemps, une autre dimension du combat et des activités de l'OUA. Au point que pas un Conseil des Ministres Ordinaire,

pas un Sommet Ordinaire, ne s'achève à l'Africa Hall, ou ailleurs, sans examen préalable, par ces instances, de la question palestinienne et de la situation au Moyen Orient.

Inutile donc de dire ici que ce qui se passe actuellement dans les territoires occupés de Cisjordanie et de Gaza, nous afflige très profondément, et que nous condamnons par conséquent, très fermement, les tueries quotidiennes et les expulsions de Palestiniens, auxquelles Israël a désormais recours pour tenter de mater toute insurrection, et de légitimer son occupation. Et je profite encore de cette tribune pour lancer, au nom de l'OUA, un nouvel appel à la communauté internationale pour la tenue urgente d'une Conférence internationale sur la paix au Proche Orient.

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Et c'est le lieu de saluer ici, très chaleureusement l'effort de paix du Président Hosny Moubarak qui, inlassable, travaille quotidiennement, et en âme et conscience, pour la paix en Afrique et au Moyen Orient.



Monsieur le Président,  
Messieurs les Ministres,  
Excellences,  
Mesdames, Messieurs,

Si tout ce que je viens d'évoquer montre éloquemment la combativité de l'Afrique dans le domaine de la décolonisation, il révèle aussi une chose bien sérieuse : à savoir que le combat pour l'unité et la libération du Continent avait tant accaparé les forces vives de nos pays, que ceux-ci n'avaient pas toujours perçu l'opportunité d'exercer la même solidarité dans la mise en oeuvre des autres objectifs de l'OUA, j'ai nommé ceux plus concrètement liés au bien-être des peuples africains.

En effet, bien que ces objectifs fussent inscrits dans les premières lignes de la Charte, et qu'ils fussent évoqués dès les tout premiers sommets de l'Organisation, aucune action concrète ne fut réellement tentée au niveau continental avant le Sommet de Lagos de 1980 qui adopta enfin, et cela sous la pression d'une crise économique aussi grave que généralisée, le premier programme de développement intégré de l'Afrique.

Aujourd'hui, nous en payons hélas, mais très logiquement, la facture. Sous forme de retard de notre monde rural, de sous-production, de famine. Sous forme aussi d'une économie extravertie; de sous-équipement; de récession économique qui s'aggrave d'année en année; d'une mainmise de plus en plus ouverte du FMI, et autres institutions bancaires sur nos options économiques; d'une chute

continue du prix de nos matières premières, et donc d'une dette extérieure si lourde qu'elle dépasse parfois nos recettes d'exportation. Sous forme enfin, ou plutôt encore - puisque l'énumération semble sans limite- d'un mal social que nous avons de plus en plus du mal à étouffer, et donc d'une course dépersonnalisante, mais nécessaire, vers une aide extérieure qui se fait de plus en plus difficile, et qui s'étirole même comme une peau de chagrin.

Que n'avions-nous pas entendu plus tôt les conseils d'un Chef d'Etat comme le Président Félix Houphouët Boigny, Père-Fondateur lui-même, qui conjurait l'Afrique, déjà au plus fort de sa lutte de libération, d'accorder aussi une certaine place au mieux-être de ses laborieuses populations, car affirmait-il, «un homme qui a faim, n'est pas un homme libre»!

Ainsi, s'il est donc vrai, comme le notait le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies en 1973, lors du 10ème Anniversaire de l'OUA, que «la voix de l'Afrique a marqué d'une empreinte de plus en plus forte l'examen des grandes options fondamentales dans les enceintes internationales», il n'y a pas non plus de doute que la voix de l'Afrique unie aurait été encore plus retentissante si la puissance économique avait suivi le pas de l'influence politique et diplomatique.

Or ce fut en 1985 seulement que l'Afrique se mobilisa de nouveau, derrière la bannière de l'OUA, pour réfléchir un peu plus profondément, et disons même un peu plus courageusement, sur elle-même et sur les causes de la crise qui la frappe de plus en plus durement.

Elle reconnut alors ses propres fautes en matière de politique économique et de gestion; analysa l'environnement international défavorable qui exerce un effet dévastateur sur ses faibles économies; souscrivit à un certain nombre de mesures urgentes et d'engagements, puis adopta, pour finir, un Programme de Redressement Economique (1986-1990) à la mise en oeuvre duquel elle invita toutes les parties du monde, et toutes les nations.

Résultat, elle se retrouva devant de les Nations Unies. Pour s'entendre dire, après quelques promesses jusqu'ici sans suite, et des témoignages de sympathie, ce qu'en long et en large elle savait déjà : à savoir que c'est à elle-même qu'il incombe de prendre en charge son développement, en y associant plus étroitement ses populations; en revoyant ses orientations; en améliorant ses

méthodes de gestion, et en procédant à des réformes indispensables pour tirer les meilleures performances des ressources qui sont siennes, qui ne sont pas du tout négligeables, mais dont beaucoup sont simplement gaspillées.

Le message était donc très clair, et il faut dire que, dans un certain sens, il a été bien reçu. Car nos pays sont, depuis, globalement crédités d'efforts remarquables en matière de réformes structurelles. Réformes qui, malheureusement, manquent encore leurs buts du fait des retards de la communauté internationale à libérer son aide d'appui, de la détérioration continue des termes de l'échange, des fluctuations trop fortes des monnaies, et du poids de la dette extérieure qui nous saigne à blanc, puisque faisant désormais de nous, oh! paradoxe des temps!, des exportateurs nets de capitaux.

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Voilà donc, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Ministres, Excellences, Mesdames, Messieurs, dans quelle impasse économique se trouve actuellement notre Afrique, vingt-cinq ans après la création de l'OUA!

Le défi est donc, et là je vais paraphraser Nasser au Sommet constitutif de notre Organisation, pour bien montrer, s'il en était besoin, que les Pères-Fondateurs avaient bien les pieds sur terre, et savaient déjà très clairement ce qu'ils visaient. Le défi, disais-je, est donc que notre Continent, vingt-cinq ans après le miracle de la naissance de l'OUA, se trouve toujours devant les impératifs de la vie, et il doit, avait dit Nasser, dans des circonstances difficiles, faire la preuve de son aptitude à subsister et à se développer, et plus encore,

de son aptitude à renouveler la vie elle-même, à l'orienter vers le meilleur."

Or ma conviction, en l'occurrence, est que l'OUA a désormais pris une bonne conscience de cet état de choses, et a même pris, peut-être, la direction de la bonne voie. Qu'il me suffise seulement de citer quelques actions concordantes de ces deux ou trois dernières années : j'ai déjà parlé du Sommet de 1985 qui a adopté le Programme Prioritaire de Redressement, je n'y reviendrai pas. J'ai également parlé de la Session Spéciale de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies consacrée à la Situation Economique Critique de l'Afrique, je n'y reviendrai pas non plus.

Mais je citerai dix autres actions qui ont à mes yeux une certaine signification :



1. La création d'un Comité Directeur Permanent chargé d'évaluer, chaque fois que de besoin, la situation économique de nos Etats; de préconiser des actions à entreprendre pour y faire face; d'examiner l'environnement économique international et les grandes négociations qui y ont cours; de dégager une position africaine commune qui mettrait en exergue les préoccupations majeures du Continent;
2. La mise en place d'un Fonds d'Urgence de Lutte contre la Sécheresse et la Famine, qui est fonctionnel depuis un peu plus d'un an, et qui a déjà apporté une assistance de solidarité à une quinzaine de nos pays durement frappés par la sécheresse;

3. La tenue d'une Conférence de nos Ministres du Travail et des Affaires Sociales pour examiner les modalités pratiques de la mobilisation de nos ressources humaines, et de toutes nos ressources humaines, dans la mise en oeuvre du Programme Prioritaire de Redressement;
4. L'organisation d'une Conférence des Ministres de la Culture pour bien cerner les dimensions culturelles de notre développement, car développement pour développement, il importe que l'Afrique bâtit pour elle-même, en tenant compte de ses cultures et traditions;
5. L'organisation d'une première Conférence des Hommes de Science Africains, pour dire

comment tirer de la science et de la technologie, les connaissances modernes susceptibles de favoriser un développement accéléré du Continent africain;

6. L'accélération des consultations au niveau du Continent, et plus particulièrement au niveau des regroupements économiques sous-régionaux pour consolider les bases d'une plus grande coopération interafricaine, et aboutir, à terme, à la création d'une Communauté Economique Africaine;
7. La tenue d'un Sommet Extraordinaire sur la Dette Extérieure de l'Afrique pour impliquer nos créanciers dans la recherche d'un partenariat économique qui sauvegarderait leurs intérêts, et qui serait pour nous générateur de progrès;

8. La tenue d'une Conférence des Ministres Africains de l'Information et de la Communication pour sensibiliser les médias africains aux préoccupations africaines de l'heure, et pour obtenir leur restructuration rapide, à la fois pour être au diapason des exigences d'un Nouvel Ordre Africain de l'Information, et au diapason des exigences d'un Nouvel Ordre Mondial de l'Information;
9. Un dynamisme nouveau insufflé à la charge de Président en Exercice pour imaginer et conduire une campagne internationale de sensibilisation aux problèmes du Continent africain;

10. Enfin un Secrétariat Général en voie de restructuration et d'informatisation, pour être en mesure de traiter efficacement les problèmes économiques du Continent.

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Certes toutes les actions ci-dessus énumérées, et d'autres qui sont en cours, ou qui viendront, notamment dans le domaine de la lutte contre la sécheresse et la désertification, sont loin d'être suffisantes pour relancer sensiblement les affaires économiques du Continent, et surtout elles n'effacent pas les retards cumulés. Elles marquent peut-être simplement un éveil, une prise de conscience collective, une nouvelle détermination vers la réalisation d'une très légitime et d'une très profonde aspiration. Car, comme l'avait souligné le Président Senghor lors de la célébration du dixième Anniversaire de l'OUA, il s'agit pour

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notre Afrique, je cite : «par et par-delà la croissance économique, par et par-delà le mieux-être, de porter chaque africain à la limite de ses possibilités, à son plus-être. Alors, aux dires des économistes, l'Afrique pourra nourrir trois milliards d'hommes». «Je dis qu'alors, - c'est toujours le Président Senghor qui parle -réssuscitant les vertus de Saint Augustin, d'Ibn Khaldoun, réssuscitant les vertus de nos bâtisseurs, de nos sculpteurs, de nos peintres, de nos poètes, au Nord et au Sud du Sahara, l'Afrique contribuera puissamment à l'édification de la civilisation de l'universel» fin de citation.

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Monsieur le Président,

Messieurs les Ministres,

Excellences,

Mesdames, Messieurs,

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Donc le 25 mai prochain, l'OUA fêtera son Jubilé d'Argent. Et elle le fera sous le thème : «Unité - Solidarité - Libération - Développement».

Le Développement est bien sûr, l'ultime objectif de notre combat. Et ce développement, nous le voulons à la fois complet, rapide et harmonieux.

Mais il n'y a pas de Développement sans Libération totale de nos Etats, sans Libération totale de notre Continent. D'où le devoir qui nous incombe, non seulement de poursuivre notre lutte pour parachever l'indépendance politique que nous avons parfois chèrement acquise, mais aussi pour libérer notre Afrique de la trop grande tutelle économique extérieure qui s'exerce

actuellement sur ses Etats, et qui entrave grandement leur libre essor vers le Développement.

Or cette Libération elle-même implique que la solidarité qui nous a permis de vaincre le colonialisme et ses tenants, continue, encore et encore, de cimenter nos efforts et de sous-tendre nos actions. Elle implique donc notre union, c'est-à-dire l'union de nos Etats, l'union de nos peuples, l'union de notre Continent.

Et c'est là que j'en arrive, hélas, à exprimer un regret : regret de voir qu'en ces temps décisifs, où notre Afrique désire tant se faire entendre pour se faire réhabiliter et respecter, et déploie en conséquence des efforts considérables pour soigner son image de marque, son prestige et sa crédibilité; regret de voir qu'en ces temps



où, malgré tous les efforts de nos peuples et de nos gouvernements, les aires de disette s'étendent dans bon nombre de nos Etats, et les cas de famine se multiplient sur notre Continent, des foyers de tensions venir encore nous distraire du devoir sacré que nous avons de nous entendre, et de nous serrer les coudes pour seulement entreprendre ensemble, et pour bâtir.

Et je ne parle pas ici de ce qui se passe en Afrique Australe. Je parle notamment de la situation entre la Libye et le Tchad, et de son impact sur la paix du Continent, et sur la crédibilité de notre Organisation; je parle de la guerre au Sahara Occidental et de ses répercussions sur la sécurité et sur la stabilité de la région; je parle de la situation dans la Corne de l'Afrique et en Afrique de l'Est, je

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parle de toutes ces régions d'Afrique où des problèmes de voisinage viennent de temps en temps compromettre les relations de fraternité, et la saine complémentarité qui doivent exister entre les peuples et les Etats.

Devant les défis de toutes sortes qui assaillent présentement notre Afrique, l'heure ne peut en effet être, pour nous, qu'à l'Union. Et cet objectif doit être recherché assidûment, patiemment, et résolument, si nous voulons que l'OUA survive, et que l'Afrique libérée se développe derrière sa bannière, dans l'unité et la solidarité.

Je vous remercie de votre attention.

Conference on the Occasion of the

25th Anniversary of the O.A.U

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

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MESSAGE ADDRESSED BY

MR LUIS ECHEVERRIA

FORMER PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE THIRD WORLD CENTER

FOR ECONOMICAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE CONFERENCE ON THE  
OCCASION OF THE 25 th. ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

CAIRO, January 25, 1988.

This outstanding conference takes place while, in the third world, arises the conviction that political independence of our countries has often become into a kind of neocolonialism, deriving from financial and technological dependency.

Some limited forms of industrial progress and even the mere effort to survive, have implied an excessively high level of foreign debt not having an easy way out, or an increased underdevelopment, happening to exist in those countries who wish to keep, with dignity, a Non-alignment status.

It is obvious that the solution to be found in theory as well as in daily practice in most countries from Africa, Latin America and Asia, is a solution which, at the same time, preserves political sovereignty - undermined by the lack of economical sovereignty and by extreme poverty - and is a true way for weakeless fight against underdevelopment expressed as a vicious circle of poverty, ignorance, malnutrition, unhealthy conditions, technological dependency and debts.

How can a real Non-alignment be achieved while obtaining the proper means for progress ? How can our governments, our universities and technological institues as well as our social scientists be persuaded that it is possible to follow a developing way of our own, a way sometimes just outlined but an existing one ?

With the crisis of multilateralism with the direct and indirect aggressions to the United Nations organization, with the repeatedly proven pressures against different institutions of the UN system, with all this in mind we see that in the centers of capital and industry exists a tendency to propose that they think - with sincere will, sometimes - that their own way is the only way to progress, stating, at the same time, that the third world is ingenious in its efforts to find its own way to give a solution to its problems, while keeping safe its independence.

In international conferences, everybody keeps talking about " Developing countries ", but there are no more " Developing countries ". On the contrary, in recent years there is a multiplication and strengthening of the characteristics of growing underdevelopment countries, due to the increasing financial and technological dependency.

As far as the Non-aligned countries concerns, it is not enough to declare in a formal way their Non-alignment . It is necessary that those who have taken a position of Alignment even saying that they have not do so, take a place beside those countries who keep the original ideas and positions of Non-alignment.

In United Nations, there is a " Group of 77 " but this name corresponds to the original group. Now those countries are 127. So, the name must be " Group of 127 " , As to show a force which could again, if plenamente manifested and if it refuses to disappear, regain a substantial meaning as it had in the uprising moments when it was called, with sarcasm but, at the same time with fear, " The automatic majority " or " The tyranny of majorities ". Human majority is, certainly, the population of the third world.

To accuse, is not enough. The critic of ourselves, the selfcritic is necessary. A selfcritic leading us to the research of ways of our own in domestic policy and in international policy ; in defending our working forms ; in small and medium size industry ; in craftsman ' s production ; in traditional medicine; in agriculture, cattle raising and fishery using traditional forms; in every aspect and form in which our people can solve their problems.

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All this, of course, without denial of modern achievements of science and technology, wherever they are now and whichever is the ideology of the country proposing them, but avoiding the possible increase of dependency and without the sacrifice of the prices of raw materials or manufactured goods we produce, avoiding too the unequal exchange which, by now, is in a constant grow.

These are some thinking that, in the name of the Third World Center for studies of the Third World, from Mexico, an institution which is part of the non governmental organizations of the UN , we liked to bring to you, here, in a brief statement , and with our congratulations to the Organization of African Unity as well as our wishes for the solution of its problems; for the strengthening of its fundamentals of mutual and reciprocal understanding; for the perfection of the OAU fight against Apartheid and racial discrimination, this contemporary form of slavery; for the achievement of new steps forward in the defence of territorial sovereignty and the independence of peoples who have been colonies ; for the preservation of its wise cultures; and willing that the OUA will never get away from the study and the understanding of Latin American and Asiatic countries who have very similar problems as those affecting African countries.

I thank the institute of diplomatic studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, for the opportunity and the honour to share distresses and reflections with all of you in this conference.

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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE OAU TO THE  
PROTECTION AND PROMOTION  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Prof. Taslim ELIAS, JUDGE AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Probably an outstanding feature of the Charter of the United Nations is its emphasis on human rights in its provisions. This is most noticeable in considering that it follows the aftermath of the Second World War and the memory of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It made the Great Powers at the same time both humble and more responsible for the great height which science has reached in the infliction of punishment on the human race as well as in their own power to humiliate the less powerful and the oppressed. Apartheid, especially as practised by the Nazis and in South Africa, reached its height in the behaviour of nations and this culminated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The various War Crime Trials not only showed the depravity to which the human mind could descend, but also the extent of man's inhumanity to man.

The most outstanding provision in the whole of the Charter is the one containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 which at once became the shibboleth of the constitutions of almost all newly independent States, as well as the point of departure in almost all the existing constitutions. It does not acquire its name and prominence merely because of its inclusion in the new constitutions, which mostly reproduced the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only in part, but also because



its proclamation as a United Nations faith in the human mind represented, for all the new nations as well as the old, a new beginning as an affirmation of the faith of man in the new world. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is, as we all know, later supplemented by the two Covenants on Political and Economic Rights and on Social and Civil Rights, both of which were adopted in 1966 and 1972 respectively as binding world legal instruments to provide for the protection and promotion of human rights, not only at governmental level but also at sub-governmental level. They were supposed to serve for the governance of international relations as well as for interhuman and interstate relations between States and individuals in their mutual relations with one another. It is no doubt true that it is still for the governments of the world to ensure the protection of human rights for which these Covenants have provided as well as for the amelioration of the conditions of man, but their existence serves to illustrate the case and urge of the governments of the world, especially as Members States of the United Nations, to ensure their protection and their constant promotion.

The existence of these Covenants is a constant illustration that the United Nations, not outlet in its Charter, is anxious to promote decolonization, but that it also enhances the importance of self-government as a right and privilege of nations; but it also entails the overwhelming obligation to behave as sensible adult nations. The United Nations, in various provisions in the Charter, defines the rights and duties of States, great and small, to exist and carry out their

international relations as sensible people for the maintenance of peace and security and not in any way to endanger peace. The Charter also emphasizes the need for every self-governing State to behave accordingly in their internal and domestic relations with their citizens, to obey the rule of law and, indeed, to practice democracy as a government in their public and private policy. Self-government does not give any State the right to subjugate and oppress, either as individuals or as groups, any class of its citizens. This is why the Charter, in Article 2, paragraph 7, provides for the rights of intervention by other States in the internal affairs of a State that does not behave according to the accepted standards of international law. It is a principle of public international law and of the Charter that no State can be interfered with by another or others, except in the case of self-defence and then in accordance with well laid down principles of international law. But it is important to remember that the United Nations retains for itself the right of even global self-defence for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is an important principle of contemporary international law.

As far as Africa is concerned, the story of human rights' protection and promotion can be told as dating back significantly to the African Conference held in January 1961 in Lagos, Nigeria, under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists, established in Geneva. This was held on the Rule of Law and the Conference laid down the three principles of the Rule of Law as between government and the people and as between government and the citizens. As the General Rapporteur of

the Conference, I read a paper on what can be called the classical definition of Dicey on the Rule of Law and how the new governments of nations in the United Nations should behave in accordance with Dicey's principles. The points were emphasized that most of the new governments were exercising the powers of government for the first time in their lives and mistakes of various kinds were likely to be made, more from inexperience than from deliberate mischief. The governments were to be ready to correct these errors and, even more, to avoid making them wherever possible. The Conference was attended by some 2,200 delegates from Africa, Asia and a few from Europe and <sup>America</sup> The discussions were very lively and interesting, mostly because this Lagos Conference was generally regarded as the first of its kind on the subject in Africa. The African members from French-speaking African countries played a very important part in both the discussions on the floor and in the organization of the committee work. In particular, they took an active part, with their other colleagues from other parts of the world, in moving a resolution for the establishment of an African Commission of Jurists along the lines of the Geneva Commission, under whose auspices we were holding our Conference. This was a popular idea which was followed up in the following year.

In the Organisation of African Unity, which was sponsored by the late President Tubman of Liberia and the late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in Monrovia in May 1961, most of the delegates, from some 23 African countries, agreed to form a Pan-African organization for the

purpose of promoting political and economic interests of the new African States. The Monrovia Group, made up mainly of delegates of Liberia and Nigeria, were all that attended. States following the Casablanca Group, including Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia and Algeria, did not participate in this first OAU-African Group meeting. A draft constitution was adopted and agreed to be completed at the January 1962 meeting in Lagos where some 30 States in fact attended, to adopt what was supposed to be the final draft. The late Emperor Haile Selassie then intervened and suggested that both the Monrovia and the Casablanca Groups of States should attend a joint meeting in December 1962 in Addis Ababa, since it was, in his view, better for the two Groups to work as one in the interest of Africa. It was accordingly decided that the Casablanca Group should be shown the OAU draft and that if they had suggestions to make for improvement they should do so in the May 1963 meeting to be held in Addis Ababa by both the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. Having had much to do with the Charter from its origin, I had to gather together some five or six new ideas from the Casablanca Group and incorporate them in the OAU Charter, for consideration in Addis Ababa. A new committee was set up to consider the new draft and to recommend the final draft for adoption. In this way the OAU Charter was born. It must be borne in mind that the original name of the Organisation was the Organisation of African States, but, at the Addis Ababa meeting the name was changed and adopted as the Organisation of African Unity, thus reflecting the French African phraseology.

In the Charter itself human rights were reflected in a few provisions, but the most significant were articulated in the Commission of Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration in Article 20 of the Charter. It was only at the OAU Conference in Cairo in January 1964 that a Committee on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established, under my Chairmanship, and the terms of Article 20 were agreed. In January 1965, at a Conference of the OAU held in Accra, a well-attended Conference, the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established for the Organisation and Mr. Justice M.A. Odesanya of Nigeria was appointed as President of the Commission, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, a post he held for four years. At the insistence of African Members who attended the Lagos Conference in January 1961, a meeting of African lawyers held a Conference under my Chairmanship in Lagos, after some preparatory work had been done for the establishment of an African Commission of Jurists. Two Conferences were later held, the first drafted the Constitution at the Commission and the second conference, in 1966, adopted the Constitution for the Organisation and Working of the African Commission of Human Rights. At the second Conference, however, the idea went round that the headquarters of the Commission should be in Addis Ababa, and then located in the Secretariat of the OAU, with officers also to be established within that Secretariat. I have never heard of the African Commission of Jurists since that date.

In November 1968 the Secretary-General of the United Nations invited me to prepare the Background Paper for a

Conference on Human Rights in Teheran. It was a well-attended Conference, especially by Arab country members who participated in the Conference, notably in the drafting of the Conference document entitled "The Declaration of Teheran 1968". I must say that that document is so telling that I was obliged to quote it as part of my Judgment in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, (United States of America v. Iran), 1981, in which the Court, among other things, condemned the taking of American hostages and the inhuman treatment they received.

But let us return to the OAU and the history of its evolution on human rights. In 1979 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and also the Secretary-General of the United Nations both sent out invitations, to me and to Mr. Keba Mbaye, the then President of the Senegalese Supreme Court, to submit separate Background Papers for a conference that was about to be held in Monrovia, Liberia, on Africa on Human Rights. The Conference itself considered the Background Papers and adopted a paper which was sent to Banjul in the Gambia in 1980 for another conference of the OAU on the same subject. It turned out that the Banjul Conference was a well-attended one at which were present a fair number of activists from various countries, such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and the Central African Republic, who shortly before that date had been involved in discussions about liberation movements in Africa, and seemed to have taken a very pro-African stand in regard to human rights, especially in regard to the more recently independent States in Central Africa, probably

because of the pro-African approach the title of our paper was adopted as The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. Some of the provisions of the Charter did not, however, reflect this ambivalence. The bulk of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights remains as commonly accepted in international African circles, without too much emphasis being placed upon the curious title of "Peoples' Rights".

The OAU would seem to have accepted the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights since, in its next meeting, held in Nairobi in July 1981, it adopted the Charter but with only a majority of about 16 out of 25 required by the Charter.

Through the effort of the Commission of Jurists of Geneva, which continued to follow up the OAU at its conferences in Monrovia, Dakar and Banjul, the Commission, through its Secretary Mr. Niall McDermott, invited me to a Conference in Nairobi in 1985, the purpose of which was to organize our efforts to get the OAU Member States to give the African Charter the necessary boost to get the majority of 25 to adopt the Charter. Just before this Conference, however, it is important to remark that the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists had invited me and Mr. Keba Mbaye in sending a general appeal to all Member States of the OAU to give the necessary support for the adoption of the Charter, which had been last dealt with in January 1981 in Nairobi.

At the Nairobi Conference <sup>in December 1985</sup> it was agreed to do two things; the first was to address a letter to the then President of the OAU, President Diouf of Senegal, inviting him to use his

great influence to have the OAU Charter adopted with at least the ten more signatures then required, and also to join with some of his colleagues in generally promoting the cause of the Charter, remembering that it was the first major contribution that the OAU was to make to international law and to the United Nations. Also at Nairobi we took the occasion to adopt a Nairobi Declaration on Apartheid, condemning South Africa and its policy, which the United Nations and the majority of mankind had at that time just condemned.

It is interesting to relate that, at the last meeting, held in Dakar in June 1987 we were all happy to receive the news that the OAU had, by a majority of 32, adopted the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, more than the 25 required in October 1986, thus ending the first part of the story. The next question tackled at the Conference of June 1987, <sup>in Dakar</sup> was to establish the Commission provided for by the Charter, appointing some 23 members of the Committee, which should enforce the provisions of the Charter now that it is in force. The debate was then as to the location of the Commission, Senegal struggling to be the headquarters while others thought that it should be neither in Senegal nor in Addis Ababa. As it happened the OAU Head of States and at their meeting in Addis Ababa established the headquarters of the new Commission there in August 1987.



Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U.  
Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

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STATEMENT  
BY  
Mr. KADRESS VENCATACHELLUM  
DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF UNIDO  
AND  
SENIOR INDUSTRIAL ADVISER IN ETHIOPIA  
ON  
UNIDO ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA  
AT THE  
CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION  
OF THE  
25th ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE  
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

STATEMENT BY UNIDO REPRESENTATIVE

ON

UNIDO ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

Mr. Chairman,

His Excellency, the Secretary General of the  
Organization of African Unity,

Distinguished representatives of International Organizations,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is indeed a privilege and a great honour for me to have the opportunity to address this august assembly on behalf of UNIDO, on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee celebration of the OAU.

Mr. Chairman,

First of all I would like to express, on behalf of the Director-General of UNIDO, our appreciation to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for taking the initiative to organize this Conference on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee celebration of the OAU, and for its generous hospitality and warm welcome extended to the participants at this Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to say that at the time when OAU was created back in 1963, UNIDO did not even exist in its present form. It was then known as "Centre for Industrial Development", established in New York. In January 1967, the Centre was converted into an autonomous UN organization, UNIDO based in Vienna, but it was still dependent on the UN Secretariat for its funding. The first Executive Director happened to be Dr. Ibrahim Abdel-Rahman, a distinguished son of Egypt. The idea of UNIDO becoming a Specialized Agency of the UN germinated under his term of office. Dr. Abdel-Rahman was succeeded by another Abdel-Rahman - Dr. Abd-El Rahman Khane, another distinguished son of Africa. Dr. Khane actively pursued the idea of UNIDO as a specialized Agency, until its final conversion in January 1986. Thus, the existence of UNIDO to-day is very much the result of the direction provided to the Organization by those two sons of Africa.

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Since its establishment, UNIDO has sought to develop a close collaboration with the OAU. However, it was only in 1979 that a close liaison was established between UNIDO and the OAU. It started during the preparation of the Lagos Plan of Action, when UNIDO provided the services of an expert. The assistance continued with UNIDO providing the services of an industrial adviser to OAU for about 6 years. Since then our co-operation with the OAU has been intensified through the Joint OAU/ECA/UNIDO Committee for the IDDA and the preparation of economic papers for various meetings of OAU.

Mr. Chairman,

Since the establishment of UNIDO in 1967, emphasis and priorities have always been accorded to its activities in Africa. The value of its total Technical Assistance Programme in Africa amounts to about USD 327 million, most of which were funded by UNDP. For Egypt this amounts to about USD 20 million. In 1973, UNIDO delivered a total of USD 20 million worth of technical assistance to developing countries and 32.4 percent went to Africa. And in 1986, 36 percent of the technical co-operation activities of UNIDO were carried out in Africa, as compared to 37 percent in Asia and the Pacific. Although these figures are rather small compared to the enormous efforts made by the African Countries themselves, they have made a significant impact as they have contributed to the development of various industrial activities on the Continent. The main emphasis of these activities include industrial strategies and policies, industrial planning, industrial institutional infrastructure development, accelerated development of human resources and technological capabilities for industrial development and development of industry in such strategic areas as iron and steel, fertilizer, building materials, agro-industry, energy, chemical industries, engineering industry-agricultural machinery and implementation.

The assistance of UNIDO to Africa was not limited to the country level - but was also directed to strengthening African institutions promoting industrial development, such as ARCEDEM, PTA, SAADC, Africa Regional Centre for Technology etc.

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UNIDO has also developed a dynamic programme of assistance to African Countries for the mobilization of resources of their investment projects. The industrial promotion Forum which was recently organized for Egypt is an example of those measures. In addition UNIDO has also carried out a wide variety of industrial studies at the sectoral, national or at the sub-regional level, as well as within the framework of the UNIDO consultation system which has contributed to the thinking and crystallization of approaches for industrial development in Africa.

Within Egypt, in particular, projects carried out by UNIDO include energy conservation in the metallurgical plus and other industries, promotion of bentonite use in agriculture, plastic development centre for agriculture purpose, fertilizer development programme, establishment of a multi-purpose pesticide pilot plant, development of small and medium feeder industry in the automotive industrial sector, engineering development design sector, management information system for Arab contractors, establishment of a national garment fashion and design centre, etc. This is only indicative of the type of projects carried out by UNIDO in Egypt during the most recent years.

Since late 1971, UNIDO participated in several African countries in the preparation of the industrial part of the UNDP Country Programmes through industry sector briefs, project proposals for possible inclusion in the Country Programme, and comments on draft Country Programmes before their submission to the UNDP General Council.

The activities of UNIDO in Africa have been welcomed by the meetings of the OAU Council of ministers and the Heads of States and Governments. Those activities also contributed to the realization by the African governments themselves to intensify their efforts in accelerating the pace of industrialization on the continent. Thus, in the Lagos plan of action, in recognition of pivotal role of industrialization in the economic development of the continent, the African Heads of States and Governments decided to proclaim the period 1980-1990 as the Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA). That proclamation received universal

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support at the international level when the United Nations General Assembly also adopted a resolution for proclaiming the same decade. In spite of the efforts made by the African Countries with the support of the international community to implement the programme for the decade, industrial situation in Africa still remains in general at a modest level. The economic crisis affecting many countries in the region, led towards the adoption of Africa Priority Programme of Economic Recovery (1986-1990) by the OAU Heads of States and Governments and the UN Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (1986-1990), and all points to the need to accelerate the industrialization process on the Continent. The above programme which was developed with the active participation of UNIDO recognized the fact that a durable solution to Africa's economic problems and external debts burden would depend in the long run on the development of industrial sector. Hence, the African ministers of industry have recommended the proclamation of a second IDDA. That recommendation has been fully endorsed by the OAU Heads of State and Governments.

Mr. Chairman,

Our co-operation with the African Development Bank started with the signature of a Co-operation Agreement in January 1983. So far, this co-operation with the ADB has been rather limited. We are therefore looking forward to a closer collaboration with the ADB in promoting the industrialization of African countries, so as to achieve the target set in the Lagos Plan of Action, that is 2 percent of World industrial production for Africa by the year 2000.

With regard to our co-operation with the Economic Commission for Africa, a Joint ECA/UNIDO Industry Division was set up in 1974 and UNIDO provided the services of some experts and consultants to assist ECA in promoting industrial development in Africa. UNIDO also co-operated with ECA in organizing several regional seminars and workshops in Africa on various aspects of industrialization as well as the debt problem of Africa. UNICO also co-operated with ECA in organizing several regional seminars and workshops in Africa on various aspects of industrialization as well as on the debt problem of Africa.

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Another form of assistance provided by UNIDO to Africa is through the Senior Industrial Development Field Adviser (SIDFA) Programme, which started in October 1967. In 1978, there were about 36 SIDFAs, 13 of whom were posted in Africa. There are currently 29 SIDFAs on board and 12 of them are in Africa. I must point out that one of the main functions of a SIDFA is to provide advice to Governments on crucial industrial issues and made recommendations in that respect.

Mr. Chairman,

Since the inception of the Industrial Development Decade in Africa (1980 to 1990), UNIDO was happy to collaborate with ECA and OAU in translating the fundamental principles contained in the Lagos Plan of Action into an operational programme. The IDDA programme was then divided into two phases: a preparatory phase lasting from 1982 to 1984 and an implementation phase covering the period 1985 to 1989.

During the preparatory phase of the IDDA programme, UNIDO assisted several countries in the formulation and implementation of their programmes for the Decade. The assistance provided was related in particular, to the provision of technical strategies and policies; the development of pilot industrial and demonstration plants, industrial manpower and technological capabilities; the strengthening or establishment of industrial institutional infrastructure; the preparation of industrial studies for the eventual production of an industrial atlas of Africa, etc. Investment promotion activities were organized as a means of assisting African countries to mobilize financial resources for their Decade programmes and projects.

The activities foreseen during the implementation phase of the IDDA included the establishment of priority core industries and related industrial manpower, technological capabilities and institutional machinery; the processing of local raw materials, the mobilization of financial resources; the promotion and realization of intra-african industrial co-operation; the production, distribution, conservation and processing of food, the repair and maintenance of equipment; and the rehabilitation and improvement of

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efficiency of existing factories. However, owing to the severe financial crisis faced by UNIDO during the past two years, the resources made available for the IDDA programme for the biennium 1986-1987 were reduced from USD 8.6 million to USD 2.7 million. As a result, most of the planned activities I just mentioned had unfortunately to be suspended by UNIDO.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to take this occasion to reiterate the positive cooperation existing between UNIDO and OAU not only at the level of the Secretariat but also with the individual member states. I would also like to place on record UNIDO's continued support, within the limitation of its resources for the laudable efforts being made by the African Countries themselves in response to the great challenge they face in their economic and industrial development. We also rely on the continued support of the African Countries to the strengthening of UNIDO as a Specialized Agency of the United Nations.

I wish OAU every success as it moved into its adulthood.

Thank you very much. Shokran guezilaen !

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THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

Dr. Ibrahim Ali Badawi El-Sheikh

Vice-Chairman

of the

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

Cairo, 25-1-1988



THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

Introduction

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that promoting and ensuring respect for Human and Peoples' Rights has been the challenge for Africa.

This point of view, was confirmed by this morning discussions. Discussions which clearly pointed out that the subjugation of Africa to colonialism, racism and apartheid was flagrant violation of the African Human and Peoples' rights. These discussions demonstrated that the path of full respect of human and peoples' rights is the only way to better life in democracy, peace and development.

Therefore it is heartening, for me, to discuss, at this moment of reflection, here in Cairo, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

On June, 1981, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, adopted the said Charter. The Charter, having mastered the ratification of the Simple majority of member States of the OAU, came into force on 21 October 1986.

The coming into force of the Charter, only Five years after its adoption, was considered a 'miracle' by the eminent jurist of Senegal, judge KEBA MBAYE (Judge at the International Court of Justice).

Indeed, it is a miracle. While it took the U.N. covenants on Human rights (Civil, political-Economic, Social and Cultural rights) 10 years to enter into force (1966-1976). The African Charter entered into force only 5 years after its adoption. The Charter does not only provide for wide range of rights to be promoted and protected but also establishes a system of control for the promotion and protection of these rights and duties.

However, the true miracle would be fully realized, when the Charter is ratified by the total of the African States and effectively implemented at the National and regional Level.

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I would throw few observations on these three criteria:  
Ratification, National and International Implementation.

Ratification:

Article 63, para. 3 requires ratification or adherence of a simple majority of the member States of the OAU for the Charter to come into force. Three months, after having obtained that majority and in accordance with that article, the Charter came into force.

So for 34 African Countries including Egypt have ratified the Charter. Egypt signed the Charter in November 1981 and ratified it in March 1984.

The ratification of the rest of the 50 African States is vital to enhance the legal and moral force of the Charter. The Charter as you know call for activities to promote the rights and duties contained in it. It also provides for certain procedures to protect these rights in case of violation. While non-States partly could follow at will any recommendations made by the African Commission on human and peoples' rights in relation to the promotional activities, the protection provisions of the Charter could not possibly commit but States party to the Charter.

The question of the ratification may cause certain difficulties for some countries. The lack of qualified personnel to study the legal implications of the Charter could easily hinder or at best delay such ratification.

To facilitate such process, one should envisage the potentials of the availability of the O.A.U., U.N., other multilateral or bilateral sources of relevant technical assistance, to countries requesting such assistance.

There are several grounds which would encourage African States to ratify the Charter. These include the following:

- 1 - The Charter bases itself on various instruments which have been endorsed by the African States. These include the OAU Charter, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- 2 - The preambular of the Charter lays emphasis on the link between the African historical tradition and values, ON one hand, and the concept of human and peoples rights, on the other hand.
- 3 - Peace and development in Africa is closely tied with ensuring respect for human and peoples' rights. It is well established now that peace cannot be realized ON just and permanent basis unless it is roated in a process of development centered around the human dignity and the full participation of peoples. Development efforts cannot succeed, and who needs Peace and Development more than Africa ? A Continent which is faced by problems of under development, unjust international economic order, a persistent aggressive regime of "Apartheid" and several types of threats and instability. Hence the importance of the Charter to enhance Africa's ability and international Solidarity for better tomorrow.

I avail myself of this opportunity, to salute Judge Elias and Judge Keba M'bye and others for the efforts to encourage the ratification of the Charter by the majority of African States.

#### NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

Under Article 1 of the Charter States parties to the Charter recognize, Rights, Duties and Freedom contained in the Charter and consequently undertake to adopt "Legislative or other measures to give effect to them".

One would submit here that National implementation requires basically a Legislative action to enable individuals to invoke relevant Legislation in defence of their rights.

In this regard, it is highly important to detail recourse procedures available to victims of violation. The notion of recourse procedure should be wide enough to cover judicial administrative, and other organs.

Unless individuals, have access to effective recourse procedures, the protection of rights would be undermined. It is heartening to see that Article 7 of the Charter refers to the right to appeal to competent National Organs against acts of violation of rights guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force.

The Charter does not spell out all non-legislative or other measures to be taken at the National level. These, in principle are left to States. These would include media, education, teaching, technical, administrative administrative and economic plans. In this record, I would, in particular, refer to the Provisions of Articles 25 and 26:

Article 25:

States parties to the Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.

Article 26:

States parties to the Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.

Non-legislative measures are of vital importance especially with regard to economic, social and cultural rights.

Individual Rights and duties to be ensured:

The individual rights include among other things: equality, integrity of person, liberty and security of person, right to defence, freedom of belief and religion, freedom of movement, association, assembly, right to seek asylum, protection of non-nationals, the right to property, the right to work, the right to best attainable state of physical and mental health.

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The duties include, among other things, duties towards his family, society, the State, other legally recognized communities and the International community, towards the family and towards his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities in its service.

Peoples' Rights:

These include, among other things, equality of all peoples, right to self-determination, sovereignty over resources and the right to economic, social, cultural development with due regard to human and peoples' rights and the right to National and International Peace and Security.

REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

The African Charter set a system of control to ascertain whether or not States are complying with their obligations. It provides for the establishment of a commission of experts to supervise its implementation.

The African commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which is composed of 11 experts was elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 29 July 1987. I am honoured to have been elected vice-chairman of this commission. The Commission was convened for the first time on 2nd November 1987. (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).

The Commission will strive to promote respect for human rights and protect them. The promotion would be effected, inter alia, through research, studies, preparing model legislation in the field of human rights and co-operating with national, regional and international organisations concerned with human rights. The protection would be effected through examining inter-state and individual complaints about violations of the Charter. The Charter provides also for a reporting procedure (article 62) under which:

Each State party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the Charter comes into force, a report on

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the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the Charter.

The Commission in its Second Session in Dakar, Senegal, February 1988, will elaborate its programme of work and consider its rules of procedure, which, among other things, would govern the handling of States, communications and other communications' (complaints) as well as the consideration of States reports.

The wisdom, independence and the courage of the said Commission coupled with the good will of States party and the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU, would contribute to the creation of the right atmosphere for the operation of the Charter.

Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would refer to certain apprehensions or critics concerning the Charter. These include the following:

- 1 - The Commission, though independent, will have to report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU which, for political reasons may not endorse the Commission's recommendations.
- 2 - States may invoke the references of the Charter to the rights of peoples and duties of individuals to the detriment of the individual rights.
- 3 - Political motivations may negatively obstruct the protection activities of the commission in relation to the use of inter-state or other complaints procedures.

To these critics, I would say that it is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU which, adopted the Charter, and one expects that by the same token, and in good faith, the Assembly would be interested to see the Charter implemented.

As to the question of inter-relation between rights and duties, the Charter sets the rules under which individual rights should be respected and States party are expected to comply with these rules.

With regard to the protection activities, I believe that promotional and protection activities should complement each other.

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However the commission should seriously examine any alleged violation to rights in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the commission's rules of procedure.

#### CONCLUSION

By adopting the Charter Africa has reaffirmed its conviction in the human and peoples' rights and that human dignity is the central concern of development and that peace and development depend on the respect for human rights as much as the realization of human rights depends on peace and development and that without full respect for human and people's rights there will be no meaningful peace or development.

Effective national implementation is vital to ensure the said rights and that would not only depend on legislative action but also on other measures such as education, teaching and encouraging national institutions involved in promoting human rights and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to respect rights at national, regional and international levels.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Charter, it is a project which, we in Africa, should make it work. Let us mobilize the political will and popular support to ensure its success.

I hope that in a spirit of dialogue and cooperation between the States Party to the Charter and the African Commission, the process of the implementation of the Charter would successfully be effected for the interest of individuals, peoples, States and the whole of Africa.

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## African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

### Preamble

The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present convention entitled «African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights»,

*Recalling* Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of «a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing *inter alia* for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples' rights»;

*Considering* the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that «freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples»;

*Reaffirming* the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

*Taking into consideration* the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights;

*Recognizing* on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem



from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their international protection and on the other hand, that the reality and respect of peoples' rights should necessarily guarantee human rights;

*Considering* that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone;

*Convinced* that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights;

*Conscious* of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion or political opinion;

*Reaffirming* their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations;

*Firmly convinced* of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

## Part I: Rights and Duties

### Chapter I: Human and Peoples' Rights

#### *Article 1*

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.

#### *Article 2*

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and

freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

#### *Article 3*

1. Every individual shall be equal before the law.
2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.

#### *Article 4*

Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.

#### *Article 5*

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.

#### *Article 6*

Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

#### *Article 7*

1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:
  - (a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;
  - (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal;
  - (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;
  - (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.

2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.

#### *Article 8*

Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.

#### *Article 9*

1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.

#### *Article 10*

1. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.
2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article 29 no one may be compelled to join an association.

#### *Article 11*

Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.

#### *Article 12*

1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law.
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality.
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the laws of those

countries and international conventions.

4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.

#### *Article 13*

1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.
2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country.
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law.

#### *Article 14*

The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

#### *Article 15*

Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.

#### *Article 16*

1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.
2. States parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.

#### *Article 17*

1. Every individual shall have the right to education.
2. Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community.
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.

#### *Article 18*

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical and moral health.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community.
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.

#### *Article 19*

All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another..

#### *Article 20*

1. All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.

#### *Article 21*

1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised

without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic co-operation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law.

4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity.
5. States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.

#### *Article 22*

1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.

#### *Article 23*

1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern relations between States.
2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, States parties to the present Charter shall ensure that:
  - (a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State party to the present Charter;
  - (b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State party to the present Charter.

#### *Article 24*

All people shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.

#### *Article 25*

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.

#### *Article 26*

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.

### **Chapter II: Duties**

#### *Article 27*

1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised communities and the international community.
2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.

#### *Article 28*

Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.

#### *Article 29*

The individual shall also have the duty:

1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need;
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service;
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or

- resident he is;
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened;
  5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance with the law;
  6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society;
  7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of society;
  8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African Unity.

## Part II: Measures of Safeguard

### Chapter I:

#### Establishment and Organization of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

##### *Article 30*

An African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called «the Commission», shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa.

##### *Article 31*

1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples' rights; particular consideration being given to persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity.



*Article 32*

The Commission shall not include more than one national of the same State.

*Article 33*

The members of the Commission shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, from a list of persons nominated by the States parties to the present Charter.

*Article 34*

Each State party to the present Charter may not nominate more than two candidates. The candidates must have the nationality of one of the States parties to the present Charter. When two candidates are nominated by a State, one of them may not be a national of that State.

*Article 35*

1. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall invite States parties to the present Charter at least four months before the elections to nominate candidates;
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall make an alphabetical list of the persons thus nominated and communicate it to the Heads of State and Government at least one month before the elections.

*Article 36*

The members of the Commission shall be elected for a six-year period and shall be eligible for re-election. However, the term of office of four of the members elected at the first election shall terminate after two years and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years.

*Article 37*

Immediately after the first election, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity shall draw lots to decide the names of those members referred to in Article 36.

*Article 38*

After their election, the members of the Commission shall make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties impartially and faithfully.

*Article 39*

1. In case of death or resignation of a member of the Commission, the Chairman of the Commission shall immediately inform the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or from the date on which the resignation takes effect.
2. If, in the unanimous opinion of other members of the Commission, a member has stopped discharging his duties for any reason other than a temporary absence, the Chairman of the Commission shall inform the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall then declare the seat vacant.
3. In each of the cases anticipated above, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall replace the member whose seat became vacant for the remaining period of his term unless the period is less than six months.

*Article 40*

Every member of the Commission shall be in office until the date his successor assumes office.

*Article 41*

The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall appoint the Secretary of the Commission. He shall also provide the staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the Commission. The Organization of African Unity shall bear the cost of the staff and services.

*Article 42*

1. The Commission shall elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairman for a two-year period. They shall be eligible for re-election.
2. The Commission shall lay down its rules of procedure.
3. Seven members shall form the quorum.
4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.
5. The Secretary-General may attend the meetings of the Commission. He shall neither participate in deliberations nor shall he be entitled to vote. The Chairman of the Commission may, however, invite him to speak.

*Article 43*

In discharging their duties, members of the Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity.

*Article 44*

Provision shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the Commission in the Regular Budget of the Organization of African Unity.

Chapter II:  
Mandate of the Commission

*Article 45*

The functions of the Commission shall be:

1. To promote Human and Peoples' Rights and in particular:
  - a). To collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights and, should the case arise, give its views or make recommendations to Governments.
  - b). To formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislations.
  - c). Co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights.
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter.
3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU.
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

### Chapter III: Procedure of the Commission

#### *Article 46*

The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may hear from the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity or any other person capable of enlightening it.

#### Communication from States

#### *Article 47*

If a State Party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State Party to this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the attention of that State to the matter. This communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt of the communication the State to which the communication is addressed shall give the enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. This should include as much as possible relevant information relating to the laws and rules of procedure applied and applicable and the redress already given or course of action available.

#### *Article 48*

If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by the State to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure, either States shall have the right to submit the matter to the Commission through the Chairman and shall notify the other States involved.

#### *Article 49*

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State Party to the present Charter considers that another State Party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the Commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the State concerned.

#### *Article 50*

The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.

#### *Article 51*

1. The Commission may ask the States concerned to provide it with all relevant information.
2. When the Commission is considering the matter, States concerned may be represented before it and submit written or oral representations.

#### *Article 52*

After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it deems necessary and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of human and peoples' rights, the Commission shall prepare, within a reasonable period of time from the notification referred to in Article 48, a report stating the facts and its findings. This report shall be sent to the States concerned and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

#### *Article 53*

While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government such recommendations as it deems useful.

#### *Article 54*

The Commission shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government a report on its activities.

#### *Other Communications*

#### *Article 55*

1. Before each session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications other than those of States parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the members of the Commission,

who shall indicate which communications should be considered by the Commission.

2. A communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its members so decide.

#### *Article 56*

Communications relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in Article 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they:

1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity;
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Charter;
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity;
4. Are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media;
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged;
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter; and
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.

#### *Article 57*

Prior to any substantive consideration, all communications shall be brought to the knowledge of the State concerned by the Chairman of the Commission.

#### *Article 58*

1. When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that one or more communications apparently relate to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these special cases.
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and

Conference on the Occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the OAU

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL 17

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

CULTURE, DEVELOPMENT AND AFRICAN UNITY

By: Alexander A. Kwapong

Vice-Rector

United Nations University

All Africans are very much in the debt of the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for taking the initiative in organizing, in collaboration with other academic institutions and research centres among which I am proud to count the United Nations University, this most important international conference on the role of the Organization of African Unity during the last 25 years in the decolonization of the continent, its contribution in settling African disputes and in the promotion of co-operation between the various states of Africa. To have been included among the eminent participants invited to this Silver Jubilee conference, many of whom are themselves historical and living embodiments of the OAU, is a wonderful privilege for which I am deeply grateful, and it is with a sense of genuine humility and gratitude that I rise to make these remarks.

Silver jubilee anniversary celebrations are rightly regarded as significant occasions in human affairs, occasions for joyful celebration and sober reflection on the failures and achievements of the past and for purposeful re-dedication to face the challenges of the future. Survival for a quarter century is achievement enough; but survival with growth and also with a record of accomplishment over one of the most difficult and epochal periods of world transformation, especially for our continent which, by and large, has emerged from colonial servitude to political independent status, is ample cause for joyful congratulations. I believe the time is indeed ripe for science and scholarship to take a good look at the Organization of African Unity after the first 25 years of its existence.

The measure of the OAU's achievement can be seen despite Africa's present major economic and social crisis if one compares the state of affairs today on



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the continent with conditions as they were in colonial Africa after the Second World War. We should therefore, first of all, in any reflection on the achievements and problems of the OAU salute and pay fitting tribute to the memories of the great sons and daughters of Africa, many of whom are no longer with us today, whose unremitting dedication, determination and, above all, vision brought into being the Organization of African Unity. In any assessment of the role and contribution of the Organization of African Unity, pride of place must surely be given to such names as those of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, to name just these few leaders who are no longer with us today. Others, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, are happily with us and continue in their various ways the struggle in the furtherance of the aims and objectives of the OAU.

Africans of my generation have each their own particular memories of the conception and birth of the OAU that have been shaped by the political, economic and social circumstances of their various countries. As a young man in Ghana, in the years immediately following the attainment of independence as the first full-blown colonial territory to do so in March 1957, I remember watching with great fascination, from what seemed to most of us in Ghana at least to be the epicentre of the decolonization struggle, the unfolding of the several events during the five years between Ghana's independence and the creation of the Organization of African Unity. I may only mention here the various All-African People's Conferences, the first of which was organized by Nkrumah and supported by George Padmore and others, which was held in Accra in

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December 1958, followed by the others in Tunis, Cairo, Addis Ababa and Leopoldville, as Kinshasa was then known. We watched, as it were, from the ringside Nkrumah's championship of a continental African union government and the opposition of those who differed strongly on this and favoured a regional, step-by-step approach. We vividly remember the controversies and the clashes between the so-called militants of the Casablanca group of states and the so-called moderate states of the Monrovia group. Above all, we recall the Congo crisis which loomed so large on the African horizon and threatened to abort the whole idea of the birth of a Pan-African organization dedicated to fostering the unity of the continent.

When the Charter was signed at the summit meeting of heads of African states in Addis Ababa on the 25th of May 1963 amidst much rejoicing and euphoria and with a lot of goodwill, in what can only be described as a historic reconciliation between bitter contestants and rivals, it seemed that, in the final compromise between the idea of a continental political union government that Nkrumah so passionately championed and that of a consultative body of sovereign equal African states meeting together and working together by consensus which was enshrined in the OAU Charter, the Nkrumah visionary ideal had totally failed and that the step-by-step approach of the pragmatists had totally triumphed. From today's perspective, one may ask who was right and who was wrong. History will no doubt provide the answer in due course, but I believe that, if Africa is to attain its fullest destiny, then the measure of Africa's progress will surely be judged by how much the pragmatism that was enshrined in the OAU Charter is able to come closer to the Pan-African vision of a truly united Africa. I am sure we all agree that

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those days are still far away, but this should remain the fundamental, long-term goal on the agenda for the next 25 years.

In reviewing what the OAU was able to accomplish over the past 25 years and how it can cope with the great challenges that now face the continent, we shall do well to remind ourselves of the seven stipulations of Article Three of the Charter which contain the very essence of the Organization. These are: (i) the sovereign equality of all member states; (ii) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; (iii) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for the inalienable right to independent existence; (iv) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; (v) unreserved condemnation in all its forms of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state; (vi) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; (vii) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to blocs.

The political sovereign equality of member states was thus solidly entrenched in the Charter as the supreme objective or premise of the OAU and it is within the limitations of this premise that one must assess the Organization's accomplishments as well as failures over the past 25 years in all the various areas of its development. Judged within these limitations, it is a wonder that so much was accomplished and that the OAU has been able to survive intact over the last 25 years.

This conference, on its agenda, will look at the record of the Organization, particularly in helping to solve or to contain disputes between member states, and so it would not be appropriate for me to dwell at length on

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what has been the major preoccupation of the Organization. One can, however, accept the conclusion which has been drawn by fair-minded observers that the OAU that was created was essentially "an organization to defend the territorial and political status quo in independent Africa, a thing of governments and rulers rather than of peoples, though not necessarily immune to popular pressures."<sup>1</sup> But how fair or how realistic, given the circumstances of the antecedents of the Organization, is the harsher verdict pronounced by such disillusioned radical critics of the Organization like Walter Rodney who, eleven years later after the Organization's creation at the sixth Pan-African Congress that was held in Dar es Salaam in 1974, attacked the illusion created by existing African regimes "that the OAU represented the concretisation of African unity. The OAU is the principal instrument which legitimises the 40-odd (now 50) mini-states visited upon us by colonialism" and for maintaining the separation of African peoples within existing territorial boundaries and stifling criticism of any "exploitative, oppressive and autocratic African state... even when the most elementary civil and human rights are trampled on."<sup>2</sup>

Whatever its shortcomings and its failure to promote the ultimate goals of Pan-Africanism and, above all, its failure to safeguard elementary civil and human rights and to protect democracy within the various member states, the Organization did, however, under Article Two, seek, and has been able, to promote co-operation in various fields - such practical fields as political and diplomatic co-operation; economic co-operation; including transport and communications; educational and cultural co-operation; health, sanitation and

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nutritional co-operation; scientific and technical co-operation; and co-operation for defence and security.

If the Addis summit in 1963 explicitly rejected the Nkrumaist proposal for a political union as unrealistic and premature, it implicitly adopted his basic political credo, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you." To this, most Ghanaians would also add his other motto: "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa." Today, with the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, most of southern Africa has gained its political freedom from colonial rule. Except, however, for apartheid South Africa and Namibia and all the virulent struggles that now engage the frontline states and continue to bedevil all else on the continent, it would appear that the political credo of Nkrumah had worked in the early sixties and seventies. Co-operation, particularly in the political and diplomatic fields, and in the various areas listed in the second Article of the Charter, has made some modest progress over these years. Today, however, we are fully aware of the serious limitations of this seductive credo of the primacy of the political process as a panacea for achieving the total liberation, unity and development of the African continent.

Hindsight from the facts of actual post-independence has brought home to us the necessity for a much more comprehensive and a more holistic credo. Of course, the political process is still critically important and it is quite clear that the political framework of the Organization of African Unity will have to approximate more and more to the basic union vision of Pan-Africanism if the continent is to achieve its overall aspirations. But it is now clear

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that we ignore at our continuing peril the economic, social and, above all, the cultural, that is to say, the human dimensions, of the need for African unity. Only within these dimensions can we attain the genuine kingdom of African independence and unity. That is the essence of the challenge to the governments and peoples of the African continent, and this, in fact, can be seen very clearly in the present crisis of development that now afflicts the continent.

Despite the heroic efforts made by several African governments and the intervention of the United Nations which considered the emergency situation in a special session in 1986, most African countries continue to remain within the shadow of this deepening crisis. In several countries, the severe drought conditions of the last few years brought sharply into focus the long-standing underlying and deteriorating social, economic and ecological conditions that were untouched by the attainment of political independence. "A large-scale ecological breakdown, a decline in food production, distribution and delivery, deficiencies and deterioration of basic infrastructures as well as the lack of essential inputs and services, had already brought millions of Africans to the brink of disaster. It was the successive years of drought which pushed many of them over the edge and into the famine emergency."<sup>3</sup>

The constituent elements of this crisis have been well analyzed: a severe decline in agriculture and food production and their failure to keep pace with natural population growth and urbanization; an increase in food imports in most countries; and a disastrous fall in export commodity prices, hand in hand with a crushing debt burden which is one of the highest per capita in the developing world. Many African governments have been forced to

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postpone, if not forego, many normal development activities, not least education and other social and cultural development programmes, with a consequent continuing vicious spiral of growing political, economic and social instability.

At the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to African issues in 1986, the Organization of African Unity proposed the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery for 1986-1992 (APPER) as their response to this crisis, and this was adopted by the UN. Under this programme, the Africans accepted full responsibility for the development of their continent and made a commitment to undertake the structural adjustment and reforms of their economies while the international community in return offered to provide sufficient support for the African development efforts. However, a year and a half later, as has been emphasized in the Abuja statement issued at the end of the Abuja International Conference in June 1987 and in the recent report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is clear that, despite courageous efforts made by many African governments to effect various reforms, insufficient progress has been achieved and the response of the international community has been far from adequate. At least 28 African countries have introduced tough far-reaching economic policy reforms essential to reviving the recovery and development process and, as a result of these reforms and more favourable weather conditions, both food production and manufacturing output have seen modest increases. Nevertheless, this increased production has been largely counteracted by the international economic trends which have dealt a very severe blow to the African economic recovery. The most important exogenous factors are in fact the disastrous

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fall in commodity prices, on which most African economies are dependent, and the mounting external debt burden of most African countries. Commodity prices fell to their lowest levels in more than 30 years last year and Africa's export income declined from US\$64 billion in 1985 to US\$45 billion in 1986, suffering thereby a total deterioration in trade terms of 32 per cent.

It is now therefore agreed that Africa's economic reforms cannot succeed by self-reliant efforts alone, without additional financial assistance, and the donor countries are now very much aware of the need to increase these resource flows to Africa. The African debt servicing burden continues to increase and it has been stated that the International Monetary Fund, for example, was the net recipient of a net outflow of almost a billion dollars from Africa during the year. Particularly hardest hit were the low income African countries whose real GDP growth declined in per capita terms and in 17 "debt distressed nations" annual debt servicing requirements in fact are estimated to triple from US\$2.3 billion in 1985 to US\$6.9 billion during 1988 to 1990 (see Africa Recovery, November 1987, No. 3, p. 16).

As the Chairman of the OAU, President Kaunda, told the United Nations General Assembly in October last year, the recovery programme has been simply a matter of survival and the Africans are determined to press ahead. Nevertheless, one and a half years after the adoption of this programme and despite some limited initiatives here and there, the international community's overall response has fallen far short of the requirements of the programme. President Kaunda in fact emphasized that Africa in this crisis has been losing on all counts and that unless effective solutions are found for the debt and commodity problems and unless resource flows at levels adequate to compensate



for the outward transfer of resources away from Africa are ensured, prospects for bringing about recovery and development in Africa will become forever elusive and the continent will forever be a victim of the vagaries and misery of perpetual crisis. All fair-minded observers will agree with both the assessment of the Secretary-General of the UN and President Kaunda.

There can therefore be no dispute whatsoever that any measures that deal only with the emergency situation but do not reach to the root causes of the crisis of development in many of the affected countries will ultimately come to nought. Of course, the exogenous factors which affect the overall economic performance of African countries in an interdependent or interrelated global economy need to be constantly emphasized and dealt with. But it is my major thesis that, in the last analysis, only self-reliant efforts and unified action by the African peoples themselves to master their own common destinies will provide the only true medium- and long-lasting solutions to the present malaise. It is within this context that we should now look at the challenge faced by the people posed by the subject of culture and development and its relationship with African unity.

In any reappraisal of the crisis of development now facing Africa, it is clear to me that we must begin with a closer look at the nature of the African historical experience and of Africa's place in the scheme of human history. Only then can we hope to draw any meaningful conclusions as to the essential tasks that await all Africans with regard to the educational process, especially in the areas of research, advanced training and the dissemination of knowledge, and its application to the concrete policies and steps as well as the institutional structures that must be adopted concerning the critical

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issue of cultural identity in order to enhance the continent's capacity to cope with its overall situation in a global, interdependent world, a world in which Africa, alas, continues to play a dependent role.

Recent scholarship has identified three major issues that have dominated Africa's historical experience that are pertinent particularly to sub-Saharan Africa's present situation and future evolution. The first is the basic issue that the black peoples of Africa have no history and have no meaningful place in the history of mankind. The second is the question of the three and a half centuries of the slave trade and its historical impact on Africa itself and on the rest of the world. And the third, which is a natural successor to the second, is what the colonial experience meant and continues to mean for Africa. These three issues are of course closely intertwined and must be taken together in any sober reflection on the challenge posed by the crisis of African development.

Concerning the first, it is enough to say that we have today come a long way from the fog of racial prejudice and ignorance which characterized European thinking since the nineteenth century about the continent's ahistoricity typified by the philosopher Hegel's opinion that the black peoples of Africa formed no part of human history and Richard Burton's view that it was "egregious nonsense" to question the natural and inherent superiority of Europeans over Africans, or the views of the academic historians like Trevor Roper and particularly Reginald Coupland of Oxford who made the classic observation that "the main body of Africans, the Negro peoples who remained in their tropical homeland between the Sahara and the Limpopo, had had ... no history. They had stayed, for untold centuries, sunk

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in barbarism. Such, it might almost seem, had been nature's decree ... So they remained stagnant, neither going forward nor going back. Nowhere in the world, save perhaps in some miasmic swamps of South America or in some derelict Pacific Islands, was human life so stagnant. The heart of Africa was scarcely beating."<sup>4</sup>

I think it is now well known that, as a result of the tremendous advances in historical and scientific research during the quarter century of the OAU's experience, we have now moved a long way from this ignorance about the origins of mankind and of Africa's dynamic prehistory. The initial two volumes of the Unesco General History of Africa, devoted to methodology and African prehistory and to the ancient civilizations of Africa, have shed impressive light on Africa's prehistory and protohistory. They have shown that the Egyptian civilization was as much "white" as it is "black" and belonged as much to the Mediterranean as it was part of the rest of the continent on which it was situated; and the profile of the various ancient civilizations on the continent, their evolution and their interactions in the Mediterranean, Saharan, eastern, western and southern African parts of the continent have been clarified. Major issues and gaps have been identified through the patient collaborative efforts of scholars both African and international.

This interdisciplinary research now employing the combined tools of written sources, archaeology and particularly the fruitful field of oral traditions, ethno-linguistics and musicology, is now looking at the history of the peoples of Africa as a whole from within and not from without. Of course, the rediscovery and reassessment have just begun, and major gaps still exist; but the challenge to African historiography is now being scientifically

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addressed and requires much stronger support on a continent-wide basis from the OAU. The bewildering multiplicity of ethnic groups and linguistic traditions need not be a source of weakness but, in fact, could be an enriching source of strength. Historical and linguistic research and scholarship has clearly demonstrated during the past 25 years the underlying cultural unity of the continent and has, in fact, provided a scientific and scholarly basis to the vision of the Pan-African visionaries like E.W. Blyden, Casely Hayford and their later successors like Nkrumah, Senghor and others. But African leaders must, above all, be made to see this matter of cultural and linguistic policies as one of the highest priorities now for African development. After the initial flush of independence, they tended to lose their urgency. They must be brought back into the centre stage.

Such policies should accord continuing priority to the three languages of the OAU - English, French and Arabic - as vehicles for Africa's international discourse and interrelations. This has obvious implications for the educational curricula of our African schools and universities, and for this educational and cultural development the OAU has a major role to play. But I think the greatest challenge in this area now is to grasp the nettle of the issue of local and national languages. In this regard, history, both ancient and contemporary, in particular the experience of many developing nations in Asia and Latin America, emphasizes the imperative need to inculcate genuine knowledge of not only one's mother tongue but also of other major non-mother tongues, preferably of regional significance, at least on a step-by-step, incremental scale. While many African nations cannot, for example, hope easily to achieve Japan's linguistic and cultural homogeneity, a prerequisite

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to effective national development, I believe practical beginnings can and should be made leading ultimately to the sensitive issue of *linguae francae* in Africa. One admires Adu Boahen's bold prescription (in Unesco's General History of Africa, Vol. VII) of Swahili in East Africa, Hausa for Nigeria, and Twi for his own country, Ghana; but it is for scholars and intellectuals to broaden and deepen, through scholarship and science, the necessary options for action by policy- and decision-makers. Until and unless we Africans are able to confront realistically in Africa the major issue of language which is the essential gateway to any cultural self-expression and authenticity, we will continue to suffer from a severe and debilitating human handicap, the handicap of cultural alienation, which bedevils any human development.

African modernization must therefore be firmly rooted in African cultural authenticity and true self expression. This is primarily an educational challenge and so the issue of language is seen as an essential dimension in education and cultural development. This cultural challenge encompasses the arts, the dance, music, poetry, beliefs, values and the traditional religious systems which, despite all appearances to the contrary, have continued to hold their own beneath the veneer of much westernization, side by side and underlying the major religions of Islam and Christianity.

Since the time of the foundation of the OAU, many African universities have established institutes of African studies and several have worthy accomplishments in the area of culture and development to their credit. But the crucial question is: how much has such research in African languages, African history, religions and cultural values, succeeded in transforming the educational curricula in the schools and universities of the various member

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states of the OAU, and, indeed, the general educational systems and intellectual life inherited from the colonial experience; and how far has this succeeded in filtering down to the average man and woman? In most African countries, not least in my own of Ghana, to take as an example, there is a rich cultural legacy of myths, legends and proverbs embracing all aspects of human experience and wisdom bequeathed to us by our ancestors. The more we know these proverbs, the more we are struck by their profundity and depth of wisdom. Besides the unlettered masses in the rural areas, how many African intellectuals and leaders of all persuasions today are familiar with a fraction of these proverbs? Indeed, how many of our school children and our younger generation of educated or "modernized" young men and women can speak and write their mother tongues at all, in which these gems of ancestral wisdom and values are enshrined with a comparable degree of facility as they do the international languages of English or French?

Despite the controversies and the disagreements over the political strategies to be adopted in the attainment of African unity, there was no question about the common inspiration that all the various leaders who helped to found the OAU drew from the great Pan-African thinkers and men of action of the black diaspora in the United States and the Caribbean like Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. du Bois, Aimé Caesar and Leon Dalmás, and on the African continent like E.W. Blyden, Casely Hayford and, in our days, Nkrumah and Senghor.

Thus, in the heady days of independence and post independence, the founders of the OAU all drew their common inspiration from the wellsprings of Pan-Africanism in seeking to reassert the validity of African culture as an essential foundation upon which the African renaissance could be constructed.

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In this regard, and in this venue in Cairo, it would be pertinent to remind ourselves of the words pronounced by President Senghor in the University of Cairo on the 16th of February 1967 in the presence of President Nasser and several other Egyptian dignitaries when he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Cairo: "If we want to build a united Africa, we must make certain it will be a firmly united Africa, and therefore we must base it on our common cultural traits and not on our political differences. I have said that there are two cleavages, two stumbling blocks to African unity. There is the division between English-speaking and French-speaking countries, and there is the division between Arab-Berbers and Negro-Africans. The latter seems to me the more formidable, because it is the oldest and because it derives from the ambivalent nature of Africa itself." "On the one hand," he goes on, "we have to remain ourselves, and on the other hand we must open ourselves to the other. This we must do in order to give and to receive. You must remain Arabs, otherwise you will have nothing to offer us. And when I say Arabs, I am not even referring to Arabism, which is a programme, a will to action; I am speaking of Arabness, that Arabness which is the hearth whence the virtues of the eternal Bedouin radiate. As for us, who we live south of the Sahara, we must remain Negroes. And I mean precisely Negro-Africans. That is to say, each day we must slake our thirst at the gushing springs of rhythm and the image-symbol, of love and of faith. But, in giving, we must also be capable of receiving."<sup>5</sup>

One may not agree with the contents of what Negritude had to offer in this context, but I believe people will agree with Senghor when he argues that "the task which the militants of Negritude have assigned themselves is the

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task of assuming the civilizational values of the Black peoples, of bringing them up to date and if need be of fertilizing them with alien influences. These values must be experienced in and for oneself, but they must be made real also in and for others. Only thus will the contribution of the new Negroes to world civilization be realized."<sup>6</sup>

These concepts have been advanced during the past 25 years by several distinguished writers like Wole Soyinka and Ezekiel Mphahlele, who have thrown valuable light on the implications of these concepts for African cultural development. Nevertheless, the great challenge that now lies before the Organization of African Unity is how to ensure that these general concepts are translated into general policies and practices that are effectively promoted and institutionalized throughout Africa in the educational and particularly the developmental processes of the continent.

This brings me, in fact, to the issue of modernization, to science and technology and their relationship with culture. It is now generally agreed that science and technology are unquestionably indispensable to modernization, and that failure to master science and technology spells an even greater dependency and a dismal future for Africa in the emerging post-industrial and so-called information revolution now sweeping over the rest of the world; a revolution that is propelled by breakthroughs in such fields as microelectronics and microprocessors, biotechnology, satellite communication and imagery, and solar and renewable energy. Unquestionably, Africa is lowest in the scale in the growing technological gap between the developing and the developed countries. On this crucial issue, I believe the OAU now has to move from just theoretical interest and lip service to practical co-operative and



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sustained efforts. Much scientific and technological development has been accomplished in several Third World countries from the 30 years of international co-operation in research and development within the framework of the UN Development Decades. The experience gained from such multilateral and bilateral research and development efforts has led to agreement on some basic propositions and policy guidelines which the OAU now must seek effectively to transform into action. Basic science and its thorough mastery on a generalized national scale is an essential first step to any meaningful technology acquisition, creation and transfer. Technology is the product of a very specific human activity within certain socio-economic relations and cultural and value systems. The so-called transfer of technology is no more than the transfer of products of that technology with all the values and lifestyles in them. The mere transfer of technologies does not lead to technology transfer unless one has the capacity to understand fully the knowledge and skills behind these techniques. Therefore, building national and regional research and development systems and improving one's educational capability should be the major prerequisite for African countries to acquire effective technology and to hold their own in these global scientific and technological revolutions. The cultural dimension must be constantly borne in mind and indeed integrated into research and development programmes. The effective application of such research in the basic sciences and engineering should thus go hand in hand with advances in the social sciences and the humanities but within a different type of relationship between scientists and other peoples and between the R&D systems and the productive sector.

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This implies, first and foremost, as a sine que non for us in Africa, co-operation among our various African countries and regions in the field of science and technology as well as of course with other developing countries. Such co-operation, while strengthening the various national and collective capabilities, should also bring about an active and self-sustaining capacity internationally. It is only thereby that Africans can hope to participate on any ultimate basis of equality in the present post-industrial and information revolution to which I have already referred.

The task is therefore to harness recent advances in the new frontiers of science and technology so as to upgrade traditional skills and occupations. This challenge has been fully recognized by the UN system which has adopted the Cultural Decade (1988-1997), the major premise of which is the indispensability of the cultural dimension in the promotion of development. I shall return to this subject in a few minutes.

As the distinguished Indian scientist, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, has well pointed out, "In the past, industrialization was synonymous with urbanization, centralization, automation and pollution. Today, it is possible to promote in rural areas" (and we need no reminder that the bulk of our population in Africa is rural) "sophisticated agro-industrial complexes based on decentralized infrastructure and production techniques that will help to marry the techniques of science with the culture and skills of the people. Science and technology are important components of the wall dividing poverty and prosperity. Today, there are unusual opportunities for all developing countries, especially those bypassed by the great benefits of science and

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technology, to improve the quality of life of their rural and urban poor through the integration of traditional and emerging technologies."<sup>7</sup>

To achieve success in all such development efforts calls for not only the appropriate strategies, policies and socio-cultural and political conditions. It requires, above all, the necessary human resources - the scientists, the technologists and the scholars who can only effectively operate within the necessary institutional framework such as universities and scientific research and development institutions. It calls for building the appropriate interdisciplinary networks of institutions co-operating on a national and regional basis to develop the research and training capabilities of our continent. This is an important and in fact an overriding challenge for the OAU.

Africa is a continent well endowed with natural resources, yet the least developed region as its present crisis shows. In the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development in Africa, our OAU leaders have clearly recognized Africa's special needs which require particular attention and concentration. They have singled out the glaring lack of appropriate research and development institutions of the requisite calibre and resources and Africa as one of the major factors for Africa's relative backwardness among the developing countries and for its declining output in all key sectors and especially for the failure to achieve national food security systems such as Asian countries have been able to build. Seven years have passed since then, and it is now time to put the Plan of Action into action.

The requisite initiatives, therefore, must now be strongly undertaken under the auspices of the OAU. One such step is the Regional Food and

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Nutrition Project which the UN University and the Association of African Universities are jointly undertaking with African institutions. Another major effort is the proposed United Nations University's Institute for Natural Resources for Africa (INRA), an initiative in response to the Lagos Plan of Action and to the demands of African scientists and scholars. Its principal objective is to help strengthen existing national and regional institutions and enable them to operate at a higher level so as to make a real contribution to the effective use and management of the continent's rich natural resources. As INRA's prospectus puts it, and I quote, "The plight of the continent calls not only for immediate disaster relief but also for sustained medium- and long-term scientific and technological research and training development efforts."<sup>8</sup> One must here commend such initiatives as the recent establishment of the African Academy of Sciences and the Brazzaville Conference of African Scientists sponsored by the OAU in 1987. These encouraging steps need to be strongly supported by the OAU.

As I have already observed, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed on the 8th of December 1986 the World Decade for Cultural Development which will be officially inaugurated this year and will end in 1997 shortly before the year 2000. The adoption of this Cultural Decade gives very strong recognition to the decisive role which culture is seen to play in the promotion of development. Greater emphasis is to be placed on the cultural dimension in the developmental process and in the stimulation of creative skills and cultural life in general as an essential ingredient for any progress in such development activities.

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How can Africa benefit from this global effort to broaden the definition of culture and place it at the centre of development? What part will Africa play in this "new moral and social contract" that would remedy the shortcomings - and failures - of a certain narrow conception of economic development? As Unesco's A Practical Guide to the World Decade for Cultural Development, 1988-97 puts it: "Henceforward, the individual is no longer considered as a mere 'agent of progress'; he or she must be seen as an integral whole within the society of which he or she is an active member and the raison d'etre." <sup>9</sup>

Unesco, in order to give concrete form to this programme, has worked out four major objectives in its plan of action which seeks to acknowledge the cultural dimension in development, assert and enhance cultural identities, broaden participation in cultural life, and promote international cultural co-operation. Unesco foresees that, as the decade advances, member states will work out specific programmes and implement these in co-operation also with international organizations involved. The question, therefore, to be asked, is how the OAU and its various agencies can participate effectively in helping to place culture at the centre of African development and in the efforts to achieve the integration between traditional and the modern processes which are essential for its advancement into the twenty-first century. Again, as the Practical Guide puts it, "... it is recognized that true growth must go hand in hand with respect for the environment and for the quality of life. Wastage of energy is considered harmful and greater account is being taken of the quality of human relationships as well as individual and community lifestyles. In developing countries, the desire to combine

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progress, justice and solidarity with respect for specific cultural values has become increasingly clear."<sup>10</sup>

The question then is: how can the African states within the framework of the OAU move from theory to praxis, from concept to actual effective implementation? That is one of the challenges that now lies ahead and I hope that this conference will devote some time in looking into specific ways in which the OAU can take advantage of this Cultural Decade and help to marry the development process with the cultural foundations of the continent.

This international conference is surely not the occasion to set out a detailed educational and cultural blueprint for the programme of action of what our governments must undertake in concrete specific terms within the framework of the Cultural Decade; but it is necessary to establish as soon as possible for the various countries of the continent priorities for the most cost-effective means of achieving immediate relief and medium- and long-term solutions to the socio-economic, political and, above all, cultural dilemma in which the continent finds itself; and it must build up the capacity to implement such strategies without delay.

To conclude these remarks, I would reiterate what I said in my opening remarks, that we Africans, in northern, western, eastern and southern Africa, must as a first requisite draw upon our common historical reawakening to see ourselves as first and foremost Africans; as a people within a continent of infinite ethnic and linguistic diversity but possessed of an underlying common cultural and historical solidarity; not as Anglophones, not as Francophones, not as Lusiphones nor Arabphones or whatever, but as "Africaphones" with a common African identity and solidarity. Only thus can we in Africa cease to

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continue to live in a state of unconsciousness and alienation and begin to use our own human roots instead of, as now, the roots of others. Accordingly, pride of place must be given by our various African governments and peoples in any development strategy for the long term economic, social and political renaissance of Africa to enhancing the role and work of the various men and women and institutions and organizations that promote the cultural heritage of the continent in all its diversity and richness. Creativity in all the various aspects of life, in our values, in our beliefs, in our hopes and aspirations, is an important and essential factor in the African development process. It is not an either/or solution but a holistic strategy on the basis of which Africa can hope to take its rightful place in the comity of nations on an interdependent globe in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

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THE OAU'S ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

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## The OAU's Achievements and Problems

The celebration of the 25th anniversary of its founding is an occasion to recall what the African Unity Organization has achieved and calculate what more it still has to achieve.

The OAU is a politically powerful organization. Referring to voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations, a ranking US official made an illustrative description in his bitter complaint that the third world countries, like a bulldozer, had crushed everything on its way across the international community. Much of it should be attributed to the OAU. Whenever its member states take a move on certain African questions in the UN general Assembly, the other third world countries are always readily to fall in with them, thus constituting a formidable force for the Western countries to deal with. Even in making its policy toward Africa, almost every one of the other third world countries would look up to the OAU and see what stance it had taken and take it as something referential.

Ever since its founding in 1963, the OAU has set decolonization of Africa as its goal. During the inaugural meeting of OAU in May 1963, for instance, a special resolution on decolonization was adopted, condemning the forcible imposition of colonial and settler rule as a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned and calling upon the colonialist regimes to take immediate steps toward the granting of independence to the African peoples in their territories. The OAU reiterated this stand at the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly on total political freedom of Africa in May 1966, and in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969, and on many other occasions.

The idea of self-determination was widely upheld in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. National self-determination was a prelude to national independence. And national independence would lead to decolonization of whole Africa. Thanks to the efforts made by the OAU and the struggle waged by the peoples concerned many African countries have won their national independence one after another since 1963. Whole Africa is decolonized except Namibia and South Africa where white minority rule is still in force.

A common goal can serve to unite diverse groups in a country and disputing countries in a continent in a joint fight. But, once the common goal is fulfilled, they will sooner or later fall apart as evidenced in the regional conflicts in Africa. The OAU, taking the maintenance of unity among the African countries as its obligation, has set up many committees to conduct peaceful negotiations between the conflicting parties, with a view to solving their problems.

The OAU and its member states also turned their attention to the economic front. In 1979, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference was called and a regional program of action was adopted, and then in 1980, the Lagos summit was held and a continental program of action was passed.

The OAU and its member states have done everything possible, trying to bring peace and prosperity to the continent. But because of historical background and severe circumstances, some old problems remain while some new ones have occurred, with which the OAU has been preoccupied.

# I

South Africa's apartheid problem remains unsolved. So does the problem of South African occupation of Namibia.

The Botha regime carried out three-pronged operation. First, it staged some political reforms, hoping to pacify the black majority. Secondly, it indiscriminately slaughtered the black people who staged demonstrations. Thirdly, it repeatedly made attempts to eliminate the African National Congress that has all along fought against apartheid and white minority rule, and the South West Africa People's Organization that has all along fought for the independence of Namibia. South Africa even repeatedly sent its troops into its neighbouring countries in hot pursuit of the ANC and the SWAPO. The Botha regime's three-pronged operation was designed to consolidate its white minority rule in South Africa and tighten its occupation of Namibia. But the black people were more infuriated than satisfied with the political reforms that have kept apartheid untouched. They staged one

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demonstration after another, keeping the South African society boiling. The indiscriminate slaughtering of black people and repeated invasion of the neighbouring countries by South Africa further outraged world public opinion.

The OAU, supported by other third world countries, calls for a comprehensive and mandatory sanction against South Africa in order to force it to submit to internal and external demand. But the third world countries had had no relations to speak of with South Africa. So their resolute stand on sanctions could not be made a direct leverage on Pretoria. The Western countries, especially the United States, that had had close relations with Pretoria would not comply under one pretext after another. The United States viewed the Pretoria regime as the only country it could rely on in the region in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. It refused to impose sanctions on South Africa on the ground that it would have helped the white rightists get into power, thus decreasing U.S. influence over South Africa while increasing Soviet influence over South Africa's neighbouring countries. Only when internal and external pressure had increased to an unbearable degree did the Western countries impose sanctions on South Africa, but they are very selective and mild.

Anyhow, the whole process does indicate that the Western countries are not immune to pressure as one might imagine. Pretoria seems certain to go on with its brutal activities in view of the situation in the region. That could be a help, so to speak, from an adverse direction. To get a comprehensive and mandatory sanction might be impossible, but more severe sanctions than present ones can be hoped for.

South Africa was an important world supplier of strategic and precious minerals. Its isolation, the sluggish international growth, the numerous strikes and demonstrations within the regime along with the more or less coordinated sanctions could have had a telling blow on South African economy and brought the regime to heel. But as a matter of fact, that is not the case. It suggests that a thorough study should be made of the matter.

What worries the OAU and its member states most might be the fact that Africa has been in the grip of an aggravating debt crisis ever since the early 1980s. Its total debt, official and commercial, accumulated to a disastrous portion of \$200 billion in 1986. Its total outstanding debt accounted for 54 percent of its total GDP. The ratio of its scheduled debt service averaged about 40 percent of its export earnings. For 22 low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, this ratio averaged 55 percent, and in many cases exceeded 100 percent. In fact, debt service payments became so unmanageable that many countries stopped payments altogether. The situation will turn for the worse if all foreseeable factors are taken into account.

World demand for Africa's raw materials has been low and will be getting lower in view of the declining growth rates in the Western countries. Africa will be further affected when a recession in the Western countries sets in. As a result, the prices of Africa's raw materials are bound to fall lower.

In such a financial and economic situation, Africa is offered and is to be offered many debt relief measures, including selective cancellation of debt, rescheduling of official debts, application of longer grace and maturity periods and lower interest rates on condition that the debtor countries undertake structural adjustments. But all these debt relief measures seem to fall far short of adequacy, especially to the most debt-distressed countries. To them, what is needed is an over-all debt relief measure, including selective cancellation of debt, conversion of debt into investment, loans into grants, lengthening of repayment periods, interest rate cuts, and ensurance of inflow of financial resources. But it sounds good but is hard and even impossible to materialize. The creditors can not be expected to do all that the debtors want them to.

What Africa faces seems to be a complex problem. Besides the alleviation of present debt burden and ensurance of inflow of foreign financial resources, Africa has to deal with how to revitalize its economies, to increase its trade and to break further fall of prices of its raw materials that might be caused by declining growth rates in Western countries.

It is clear that what Western countries and international financial institutes can offer cannot meet all Africa's requirements. It is accepted that the debt problem should be solved in the context of economic development and cooperation. But the structural adjustments suggested or imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank on many African countries have so far proved not to be so satisfactory. So other ways have to be sought, in combination with strengthening economic cooperation among African countries, economic cooperation that was initiated at the Lagos Summit.

The Western market for Africa's raw materials has been shrinking. Therefore, the third world market might as well be explored to see whether it can be expanded. To bring South-South cooperation closer could not only mean an increase of trade among the third world countries, thus breaking further fall of prices of Africa's raw materials, but could also mean a help to stimulate Africa's economies.

The debt crisis is wide-spread in the third world. It might bring the third world countries together. But that does not mean all debtor countries in the third world can see eye to eye with each other on the matter of debt. There are many categories of debtor countries. Those debtor countries that are capable of debt service payments are more interested in an ensured inflow of financial resources than in the debt relief measures that might hinder the inflow. Whereas those debtor countries that have difficulties in repaying their debts are interested in both debt relief measures and inflow of financial resources.

In North-South dialogue, the problem of debt should take a prominent place on the agenda. If the debtor countries of the same category can take an unified stand, it might strengthen their hand in the dialogue.

Conference on the Occasion of the  
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DEVELOPMENT AID AS AN OBSTACLE TO SELF-DEVELOPMENT

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DEVELOPMENT AID AS AN OBSTACLE TO SELF-DEVELOPMENT

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The experience of the African continent since its independence indicates that the African countries have not yet found an appropriate approach to ensure a steady economic and socio-cultural development so as to secure a minimal well being for their population and to guarantee a reasonable degree of independence. This is an incontestable fact which African governments have officially recognized. This is what we can read in the report of the OAU Council of Ministers of 1980 (XXXIII Rev.1, p 27):

"Analysant les resultats des strategies de developpement, suivies jusqu'a present par les pays africains, les delegues ont montre que ces strategies n'ont abouti qu'a maintenir l'Afrique dans un etat de sous-developpement et dans une dependance excessive vis-a-vis de l'exterieur."

It is difficult to be more explicit about the failure of the development models followed by Africa. The above assessment is also a clear condemnation of the programmes of development aid and technical assistance. The tone of the report of the Council of Ministers was made even stronger by the Heads of States of the OAU during the Monrovia Summit (1979) in a "Declaration of Commitment on the directing principles to be respected and the measures to be taken in favor of national and collective self-reliance for economic and social development...".



This Declaration is unique in the annals of inter-african cooperation. It opts for an endogenous development within the framework of collective self-reliance with economic integration as the key objective without forgetting the protection of human rights and the importance of democratic liberties. The last operative paragraph of the Declaration called for the holding of the first African Economic Summit which took place in Lagos in 1980 and led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action.

This brief historical background was simply meant to point out that the Africans, at all levels of responsibility and in all fields of competence, are very conscious of the failure of a strategy of development which is essentially extroverted and which is fully dependent on development aid. They have also thought out alternative options such as those in the Plan of Action of Lagos which raised many hopes in Africa not so much about its substantive content but because it represented the expression of a continental political will to bring about a radical change in development strategies and to give concrete meaning to the concept of "self-reliance".

These expectations were unfortunately short-lived for internal as well as external reasons. One need not dwell on how the Lagos Plan of Action was received by some of <sup>the</sup> major providers of development aid. Some of them went to the extent of making a special report and proposing another plan for Africa. The African countries who were seeking external financial resources had to abide by the views of the "donors" and had to forget about the priorities of the Lagos Plan of Action.

No African country was ready nor willing to translate into its national plans the strategy, content or spirit of the Plan of Action of Lagos. Putting an end to the economic balkanization of Africa is a proposition that suits neither the national leadership nor, much less so, the non African institutions deeply involved with development aid in Africa. The international economic situation and the droughts of the early eighties did not facilitate things.

The image of Africa became that of a continent ridden by famine and misery. Worldwide compassion and charity hitched their wagons to the development aid train. In the space of six years the position of the African countries was completely transformed. The culmination of this change was the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Africa held in New York in May 1986 at the request of the African countries themselves. It was the first time, in the history of the United Nations, that a special session of a General Assembly was convened to deal with the problems of a continent.

What a regression from the atmosphere of dignity, determination and hope of the Lagos Economic Summit of 1980 to the absence of self-assurance, an outright dependency quite close to mendicity, a lack of conviction, a superficial pity, blunt hypocrisy and even bad faith which characterized the U.N. Special Session on Africa. It was quite difficult for any African to feel proud on that occasion. Even the rare African leaders who were making triumphant statements about the results of the meeting could not hide their uneasiness.

The key word of the meeting was the "realism" which the Africans had shown in the plan they were presenting (the African Programme for the Economic Recovery of Africa) for the period 1986-1990 representing a total expenditure of \$ 128 billion dollars of which they were ready to finance \$ 82 billions (64%) and were seeking a total international contribution of \$ 46 billions - that is about \$ 9 billion dollars per year. The Africans received many compliments for their approach (including their "sound" revision of the targets of the Lagos Plan of Action) but many more lessons on how they should go about their development but no firm commitment as to the objectives for which the Assembly was convened.

The harsh political realities of the international system, the cold facts of the prevailing international economic order, the vested interests of the bilateral schemes and the crisis which multilateral cooperation has been undergoing, these last few years, made it quite apparent that the "new realistic" African approach would be applauded but would not lead to any operational results.

Even if these meager amounts were made available they would not in any way solve the economic and social problems of Africa. The inherent fallacy which is at the root of the development process concerns the role and function of "aid". Until a country has endogenously reached a minimal level of development, through its own means, it can not benefit equitably from programmes of economic cooperation calling for important external financial inputs.

The difficulty in Africa is that many of its national entities do not have the sufficient critical mass (population and resources) nor an economy of scale to enable them to develop in a self-reliant manner: half of the African countries have populations of less than 5 million people and only two countries have populations of more than 50 millions. The only option left for the survival of a good number of African countries is "development aid" which in many instances amounts to a subsidy to stay afloat.

It has become very hard , if not impossible, for countries which are not part of economic groupings of more than 100 million people to ensure a sustainable economic growth. The building up of these regional and sub-regional groupings, which was called for in the Lagos Plan of Action, is a difficult task which must overcome political and economic obstacles not to speak of powerful vested interests.

In the light of what has preceded let us see, now, why "development aid", as understood and practiced today is an obstacle to the economic and social development of Africa.

1. The results of the last quarter of a century of development aid to Africa speak of themselves when one sees the present state of underdevelopment of the Continent.

2. The reliance on external sources of aid has encouraged the maintenance of economic and social structures inherited from the colonial period which are in themselves obstacles to development because they reinforce dependency.

3. Development aid discourages innovative and creative solutions including the formulation of development models more attuned to the needs of the countries concerned.

4. The programming, administering and monitoring of development aid lead, quite often to interventions in the free choice of economic policies of countries and restrict the flexibility of their plans.

5. As a politico-technocratic process, development aid, does not allow for a participatory approach and excludes those to whom the aid is destined from formulating their needs.

6. Development aid has become a business on its own with its sponsors and clients, its managers and supervisors, its experts and consultants, its suppliers and customers all constituting a chain of solidarity which is not always corruption-proof.

7. As the greatest proportion of development aid is of a bilateral nature the "receivers" dispose of limited freedom of movement and become inevitably, at one point or another, constrained by the pressures of the "donors" in areas which extend far beyond economic cooperation.

8. Development aid does not facilitate inter-african cooperation even in the instances of the regional projects which are very limited in number.

9. Development aid is not conducive to South-South cooperation.

10. Development aid excludes the fields which have become the key factors of economic development such as the advanced technologies or includes them under schemes of "technological transfer" which simply means the sale of products. They thus contribute to the accentuation of the "North-South" gap.

One could go on with such an inventory of reasons which show how development aid, voluntarily or involuntarily, has become one of the main causes of the underdevelopment of Africa. I have on purpose avoided challenging the very concept of development "aid" because one can easily show, and this has been done many times over including by the present author, that in straight accounting it is the "receivers" who are really aiding the "donors" in terms of flow of financial resources.

In conclusion, I sincerely believe, that Africa does not stand any serious chance of developing economically and socially unless it stops relying on aid and opts for a new development model based on self-help and inter-african integration. It would thus not only develop but would also enter a new age of dignified, efficient and enriching international cooperation with no "receivers" and no "donors".

# AFRO-ARAB COOPERATION

LINGUISTIC GROUP	# STATES	AREA (km <sup>2</sup> )	POPULATION	CONTRIBUTION TO OAU BUDGET
ANGLOPHONE	17 (34%)	7.000.000 (22%)	275.000.000 (50%)	32%
ARABOPHONE	8 (16%)	10.500.000 (35%)	150 (27%)	43%
FRANCOPHONE	10 (38%)	10.000.000 (33%)	100 (18%)	20%
LUSOPHONE	6 (12%)	30.500.000	25	5%

M. Elmandjra, Cairo Jan. 1988



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High Commissioner's Statement  
(Refugee Problems & Achievements)

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Mr. Abdel-Mawla El-Solh  
UNHCR Representative in  
the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo, 26 January, 1988.



Mr. Chairman,

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.

I would like to seize this opportunity of the O.A.U. 25th Anniversary to extend on behalf of the High Commissioner for Refugees and UNHCR Branch Office in the Arab Republic of Egypt our sincere felicitations, wishing your conference successful and positive achievements.

I am quite certain that O.A.U. is the closest organization to the refugee plight and has cooperated with the High Commissioner in finding satisfactory solutions for refugee problems.

You will recall that the High Commissioner, Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocké, had raised in his statement to the 38th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme in October 1987, four major observations concerning difficulties with which today's refugees are currently being faced. I would like to share with you the following topic excerpts from his statement:

- refugees are increasingly obliged to reside and wait in first asylum countries for longer periods of time;
- old and new crises continue to multiply the number of refugees;
- refugees and asylum-seekers are knocking at the doors of an increasing number of countries in all continents;
- there is a growing tendency for refugees to be confused with economic migrants.

The combination of these four factors has resulted in a "fear" of refugees and increasing hostility and mistrust towards them. This has in turn led to the adoption of restrictive and unilateral measures, and the real danger of a progressive erosion in the principle of asylum, which will paralyse, if unchecked, every possibility of international co-operation and burden-sharing.

To reverse this trend and to undo this stagnation, I have mentioned that UNHCR will attempt, on the one hand, vigorously to pursue the search for durable solutions - voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement - and on the other, to go beyond emergency aid for long-stayers in first asylum countries. We will pursue these goals by

promoting co-operation among countries who ought to contribute decisively toward this end.

Where then do we stand today and what progress has been achieved?

Concerning voluntary repatriation, 250,000 refugees returned home during 1986 and 1987, either through UNHCR assistance or spontaneously. This includes, particularly, mass returnee movements to Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda which, I am encouraged to note, partly offset new challenges in Africa. Among these challenges is the serious situation in Southern Africa which causes me great concern. It is my hope that the proposed convening of an international conference on this situation, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and UNHCR, will lead to concrete steps to alleviate the plight of refugees in that region.

Included in the global voluntary repatriation effort has been the return, under UNHCR auspices, of a few thousand refugees to El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. I am pleased to inform you that the number of refugees who have repatriated during the first nine months of this year already exceeds the total for all of 1986. With the recent opening of new and additional UNHCR offices in these three countries, we will be in an even better position to monitor reintegration programmes and ensure the well-being of future repatriates.

These accomplishments are important in that they underline the viability and the reality of voluntary repatriation even after years of temporary residence in countries of first asylum. While the number of repatriates is still modest compared to the total refugee population throughout the world, the success of voluntary repatriation emphasizes above all the need for political will on the part of the governments concerned to achieve this vital solution.

We should also bear in mind that a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Kampuchea would allow five to six million refugees to return home under the same conditions of security and dignity. With respect to the Afghan situation, the largest single caseload of refugees in the world has faced an uncertain future for nearly eight years. The hospitality and generosity with which the Governments of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have received these refugees during this period remains greatly appreciated. While assistance and self-sufficiency programmes continue satisfactorily, the urgency and necessity of meeting all the needs of Afghan refugees cannot be emphasized enough. These refugees, the majority of whom are women and children, deserve the earliest possible political settlement that would allow them to return home. In this connection, I should reiterate my hope that the ongoing efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations will lead to a political resolution of the Afghan conflict.

Another concrete illustration of UNHCR's readiness to assist in voluntary repatriation, assuming the necessary political will by governments exists, can be cited with respect to refugees from Laos in Thailand, who comprise nearly half of the entire caseload in South-East Asia. While voluntary repatriation has not been the exclusive durable solution for this caseload, it is clear that it will have to be a major one in the future. A related issue is that of the so-called screened-out

persons from Laos presently in Thailand which must also be addressed by the two Governments concerned. My Office will nevertheless continue to contribute to efforts in resolving the prevailing impasse. Of course, it is understood that once both governments have reached an understanding on the return of these persons to their country of origin, the same condition of a dignified and safe return would also apply to them.

A slightly varying shade of UNHCR's assistance and contribution towards voluntary repatriation can also be witnessed in a nearby region, namely South Asia. You will recall that following the signing of an accord between Sri Lanka and India in July, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Colombo between UNHCR and the Government of Sri Lanka on 31 August. Under the terms of this Memorandum, UNHCR would provide an initial two million dollars for emergency assistance to Sri Lankan Tamils who have returned home from India as well as some internally displaced persons. While it may be premature to predict what effect current events may have on Sri Lankan Tamil asylum-seekers in other countries, UNHCR is ready to play a constructive role, within the terms of its mandate, whenever invited to do so.

My comments on local integration will be very brief, though this should not be seen as a reduced commitment to pursue this durable solution when and where feasible. The reality is nevertheless that except in a number of African countries, China and Mexico where it has been applied in an exemplary manner, local integration has been the least utilized durable solution when seen against the background of our recent achievements in finding lasting solutions. I am aware of the political, economic and social difficulties that confront host countries and refugees alike when considering this option. I will refer to this durable solution later, when we consider the question of refugee aid and development.

I should now like to say a few words on resettlement. When one speaks of this durable solution, one almost automatically associates it with the 13-year refugee legacy in South-East Asia. Resettlement has undeniably been the "success story" of the international community's commitment to find a lasting solution to the plight of Indochinese fleeing war, conflict and persecution. A remarkable, 1.4 million Indochinese have found new homes through resettlement, an almost unparalleled achievement by the international community.

On the other hand, and most unfortunately, the situation also represents unfulfilled hopes for thousands of others still languishing in harsh camps, many for nearly a decade. Today some 130,000 Indochinese refugees under UNHCR care are still waiting in countries of transit in South-East Asia, with a steady stream of new arrivals continuing to join them.

All of this points to the pressing need to exert renewed and decisive efforts to address the root causes of the continued outflow of refugees and to explore other solutions. Otherwise, resettlement opportunities will continue to diminish and perhaps at one stage no longer exist.

My recent mission to South-East Asia reinforced my conviction that countries of resettlement, transit and origin must urgently agree on a

"package" of understandings in which each would shoulder its proper responsibilities towards the attainment of a durable solution. UNHCR has conducted, during the course of the past year, extensive consultations with countries belonging to each of these three groups. We must now reach a global consensus of views and strategies if we intend to pursue our achievements and, indeed, to go beyond them.

In the course of my recent visit to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, I had the opportunity to raise such matters with the highest authorities of that country. I noted with satisfaction the commitment to the Orderly Departure Programme and the resolution of procedural problems which should allow this recently troubled programme to regain its desired momentum in the coming months. More importantly, I view this programme not merely as a channel for legal departures but as a context for dialogue for broader humanitarian issues. It is this latter potential that needs to be further explored in order to address the wider implications of the continued outflow.

I should now like to turn to the subject of our informal consultations with European governments, which have been under way for some time. These consultations encompass issues concerning the granting of asylum, resettlement and voluntary repatriation: the granting of asylum for those who have arrived directly in Europe and North America; resettlement from countries of transit for those who are considered to be eligible; and finally the study of the modalities for possible repatriation, when the time comes.

UNHCR's preoccupations in this domain can be summarized as follows. First, governments should not attempt to solve the problem of refugees through the promulgation of measures and laws designed to control immigration. Second, it is essential to identify clearly those who flee persecution and violence and to distinguish them from other migrants. Third, the rules and procedures applicable to asylum-seekers must be maintained intact. Fourth, all measures taken to deal with immigration issues should have the necessary built-in flexibility to safeguard the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees in search of protection and their access to the exercise of these rights. Fifth, what is the relationship between the path being pursued within the context of these consultations and other efforts being made to control immigration and to implement common immigration standards?

Nevertheless, I should like to underline some of the encouraging progress that has already been made in the context of the European consultations. First and foremost there has been a general recognition of the complexities of the present situation. In addition, a greater awareness has developed that a collective approach will create the necessary conditions for solutions, and that unilateral action is creating a bottleneck or merely passing the problem to a neighbour. This point is further reflected in related deliberations taking place in other European forums, which is of course a most positive development. Moreover, it is widely accepted that the delicate situation of countries of transit, whose burden continues to increase, must be taken into consideration.

All this work must now rapidly lead to concrete action which will underline the principle of burden-sharing with the first asylum countries

and which will allow the transit countries of South-East Asia and the Middle East to continue to do their part. Again concerted action by all concerned will be required to negotiate further progress beyond that already attained by the European consultations. UNHCR will continue energetically to play its proper role. The accord concluded in Sri Lanka in July demonstrates once again, as was the case with South American refugees in the early 1980's, that any asylum being sought could very well be of a temporary nature.

This problem raises the larger issue of international protection, which as you know, is the primordial task entrusted to the Office. While we recognize that the character of the present-day protection problem is increasingly fluid and complex, UNHCR remains vigilant to the need to respond to any undermining of its international protection responsibilities. Our consultations with governments and other partners have been predicated on the humanitarian and universal nature of my Office's competence and the body of relevant international law that provides the legal underpinnings of UNHCR's competence.

Last week during the meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection we witnessed some vivid and indeed memorable examples of the international community's ability to reach consensus on a number of significant protection concerns, notably on the vital item of Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements. The international community had been waiting in anticipation of this event for a long time. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate all those who have, through their efforts over the years and particularly during the past few weeks, helped bring this to fruition. I am confident that with the endorsement of these conclusions during the Plenary, we will have taken a giant step in the vital task of protecting refugees who find themselves in zones of conflict or in situations of great vulnerability.

In fact, the agenda of the Sub-Committee and its related documentation, including the Note on International Protection, provide a comprehensive indication of the protection issues confronting the Office. It is, of course, my intention to work closely with governments to enhance their protection capacities, without losing sight of the High Commissioner's unique responsibility to look beyond narrow considerations to global humanitarian ones. The consensus reached by the Sub-Committee last week on refugee children is one example of our ability to work successfully towards such goals.

An illustration of UNHCR's willingness to assume the physical protection of refugees in areas of conflict through active consultations with governments and timely solutions-oriented assistance can be cited in Central America. Our efforts in this region received a significant boost with the renewed willingness on the part of governments to take humanitarian considerations into account, which was already evident last year. This has now culminated in the signing of the Peace Agreement of Guatemala by the Heads of State of five countries in the region on 7 August. It was most gratifying to note the accord's numerous references to the fate and well-being of refugees, including their protection, and the specific recognition of UNHCR's necessary role in this process. It was only five months ago that I convened a Consultative Group of six personalities in Geneva to discuss solutions to the problems

of refugees in Central America. I am pleased to note that their recommendations, which include a regional conference in 1988 to formulate concrete solutions, have been well received by governments of the area. While I am aware of the obstacles before us, I have every reason to believe that the present openness to humanitarian problems expressed by the governments concerned will be taken advantage of to further the cause of refugees in the region.

In describing the range of the Office's current protection concerns and actions, I am aware that questions have been raised over the years, both within and outside the Office, regarding the scope, nature, extent and means of carrying out UNHCR's international protection function for refugees. That this should be the case is only natural, since answers to these questions relate to the specific needs of persons seeking asylum or refugee status. As these needs vary, so must the solutions. The content of international protection thus cannot be static. It changes with time, circumstances and the needs of its beneficiaries.

I need hardly reiterate that international protection provides the basic raison d'être for my Office. All our other functions, including the search for solutions must, therefore, relate to this basic objective. In fact, the Statute of the Office specifically states that one means of protecting refugees is through providing solutions for them. Therefore our constant endeavours to attain solutions for refugees are integral to our overall protection effort.

UNHCR is aware of the fact that while solutions are found for some refugees, new refugee problems continue to arise across the world. As indicated in my Aide Memoire of 10 July 1987 to members of the Executive Committee, over 600,000 new refugees have arrived on the scene during the past 12 to 18 months, joining the existing 12 million or so in first asylum countries.

To tackle these challenges thoroughly, efforts have been made during 1986-87 to go beyond the provision of emergency aid. I have stated on numerous occasions that UNHCR must react to refugee crises with a strategy that combines effective emergency response, the establishment of basic services and timely action to pursue income-generating activities which will promote self-reliance. This approach, applied rapidly, would address the needs of both the refugees and the host country for whom the prolonged presence of the refugees means additional economic and social strains. Accordingly, my Office has sought to reinforce in action the connection between refugee aid and development schemes. We have maintained close contact with both multilateral and bilateral development agencies active in countries hosting refugees, so as to integrate, wherever possible, the refugee population into the mainstream of national development activities. In this way a gradual phasing out of UNHCR assistance can take place as the baton is effectively grasped by development agencies.

Our collaboration with the World Bank has continued with the inauguration of the second phase of the successful income-generating project for the refugee areas in Pakistan. A number of new initiatives with the Bank are under way in Somalia and the Sudan. This year for the first time, we have explored possibilities for collaboration with the

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Somalia and Uganda. Another recent development has been the evolution of UNHCR's co-operation with UNDP. An agreement has been reached on guidelines between the two agencies to cover returnee programmes and an orderly phasing out of relief in favour of development schemes. The ICARA II process set in motion some three years ago remains of high priority to my Office and it is my hope that some of the assistance which, during the last few years has been absorbed by drought and famine-related programmes, will now revert to ICARA II-type projects. You will recall that UNDP was designated by the relevant General Assembly Resolution (37/197) as the focal point for development activities in areas affected by the presence of refugees.

It follows then that an increasing convergence of views will link all those who ought to contribute, first, to assisting host countries to grant asylum and, second, to the simultaneous pursuit of the three durable solutions. It is not because we seek an easy way out that we request the simultaneous contribution of all; but rather because experience has shown that it is only through this effort that we can go forward in the implementation of solutions and avoid the impression of some that they are the only ones shouldering the burden. This is, therefore, a matter of confidence and solidarity.

The generous support of the donor countries bears testimony to the solidarity of the international community in providing UNHCR with the financial means to carry out its tasks. I am indeed indebted to the donor community for the support to our appeals for contributions. At 28 September, General Programmes showed a total income of \$ 297.8 million against a revised target of \$ 348.9 million, thus leaving a shortfall of \$ 51.1 million or 14 per cent of the budget. As far as the Special Programmes are concerned, almost all 1987 activities have been entirely financed. Since May, we have adjusted the budgets according to the actual rate of implementation and kept you regularly informed of our changing funding requirements. I am aware of some concerns expressed about the level of the 1988 projected General Programmes budget and should like to reiterate that, first, recent efforts undertaken to assess, as accurately as possible, the actual needs of refugees are reflected in these figures and, second, the review mechanisms now in place will enable us to carry out a thorough target review early next year. As you know, the United Nations Auditors have been insisting for years on greater rigour and precision on UNHCR's part in addressing a number of management deficiencies and, as you are also aware, their current report reflects their appreciation of the progress being made. Specifically, our assessment and control capacity has been greatly enhanced and I am pleased to confirm that this year we anticipate a much higher level of obligation compared to budget than has been achieved in recent years. It should, therefore, be possible to reduce by a few million dollars the amount required for the 1988 Programme Reserve. Any attempt to propose further cuts on the basis of dollar figures rather than on the basis of assessed refugee needs would be particularly unfortunate at this time, when the link between our planning and our implementation is so much stronger.

Steps have been taken to discipline our travel activities to ensure the most co-ordinated and effective use of our travel funds, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication and overlap. As a result it has already

been possible for us to cut an estimated \$ 400,000 from our travel budget for 1987, as reflected in the addendum to our Programme Support and Administration figures (A/AC.96/696/Add.1). I would nevertheless like to underline that travel to and from the field is vital to UNHCR's ability to protect refugees fully and is an integral part of our ability to be fully responsible and accountable to you, the international community. I should also like to confirm that the mandate of the management consultancy firm will have been fulfilled at the end of this year.

The relationship between UNHCR and governments is a subject which is often discussed. This can be explained by the fact that governments have to act in respect of the rights of refugees, and that they are the only ones who can make possible or impossible UNHCR action in favour of refugees. In turn, UNHCR has a duty to intervene in all cases to remind parties concerned of their obligations to correct any deviation in their path of action, and to search for, in conjunction with the competent authorities, dignified and humane solutions to the dilemma of refugees. Let us not forget that UNHCR's mandate to perform this function comes from the community of States.

While the UNHCR/government relationship is natural, necessary and ongoing, it is not, however, exclusive. As everyone is aware, the community of non-governmental organizations has for many years played an increasing role in the implementation of UNHCR assistance programmes. These are organizations which have repeatedly translated the courage of their convictions into tangible action. Our recent efforts to enhance the technical capacity of UNHCR aim simply at forging a meaningful partnership with our friends and at enabling us to assume fully our own responsibility for leadership, co-ordination and accountability. It has never been the intention of UNHCR to take over tasks which have traditionally been entrusted to our operational partners. Moreover, in many industrialized countries voluntary agencies actively participate in the search for viable solutions for asylum-seekers in accordance with the principles and procedures of refugee law. Furthermore, NGOs play an important role, to which UNHCR must pay tribute, in sensitizing public opinion and raising awareness of refugee problems. Their contribution to the constant dialogue that needs to be maintained with national authorities cannot be under-estimated.

NGOs must, for their part, bear in mind the basic principles of impartiality, independence of action and political neutrality that serve to guide UNHCR in its efforts in favour of refugees. To ensure the safeguarding of refugee rights, these efforts need often to be exerted with discretion and utmost care.

At the same time, UNHCR wishes to state again its commitment to continue to assume the leadership role which has been entrusted to it by the international community. The steps taken during the past 18 months are proof of this commitment. In order to succeed, we must receive the full and generous support of governments and NGOs, and we pledge ourselves to earn and to maintain this support.

Since I sought the support of this Committee at its last session, UNHCR has attempted and accomplished a great deal. I would like to



look at the problems of refugees across the world, the year 1986 has, in many respects, seemed very difficult if not bleak. I believe that since the beginning of this year some progress has occurred. These indications of progress are still very fragile and it is vital and urgent to reinforce them.

The efforts currently being made in many regions of the world to promote the peaceful settlement of dispute should help UNHCR to identify and fulfill humanitarian opportunities, however limited they may initially be, which will allow refugees to find a solution to their plight.

I can assure you that the results achieved these last few months, while in some respects still modest, have triggered amongst us at UNHCR - as many colleagues have confirmed to me - a renewed will to persevere and amplify our efforts. This drive should meet and engage with the commitment of those States which, in one way or another, are able to help alleviate the refugees' plight throughout the world. The most important thing is to accelerate the momentum which has begun to gather force during the past year. One cannot wait any longer. What is at stake is the future of men, women and a multitude of children who only ask to take their destinies back into their own hands.

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Mr. Chairman,

It is worth mentioning the O.A.U. Refugee Convention which has been one of the most generous, useful and legal international instrument pertaining to refugees, our wish is that other regional conventions follow the same example.

I hope the continued cooperation between UNHCR and the O.A.U. will bring peace and settlement to the refugee problems and give the opportunity to the international community to divert from emergencies to development, peace and dignity.

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Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the O.A.U.  
Cairo, 25-28 January 1988.

F.A.OUA/CAIRO 88/PL 22

SPEECH

by

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

Former Nigerian Head of State

On the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the  
Organisation of African Unity

In Cairo on 25<sup>th</sup> January

1988

SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL OLUSEGUN OBASANJO FORMER  
NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) IN CAIRO ON 25TH JANUARY, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN,

YOUR EXCELLENCIES,

DISTINGUISHED LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

LET ME START BY CONGRATULATING PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT FOR ORGANISING THIS CONFERENCE TO MARK THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR CONTINENTAL ORGANISATION THE O.A.U. EGYPT AS A CRADLE OF WORLD CIVILISATION AND AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTOR TO MANKIND DEVELOPMENT, AFFORDS US THE RIGHT SETTING TO TAKE STOCK OF THE LAST 25 YEARS OF <sup>THE</sup> OAU, ESTABLISH OUR PRESENT POSITION AS AN ORGANISATION AND AS A CONTINENT AND CHART A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE IN FACT FOR THE NEXT TWENTY-YEARS. THE CIVILISATION OF EGYPT IS INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH THE NILE AND THIS SETTING IN THIS CONGENIAL ATMOSPHERE ON THE NILE RIVER SHOULD INSPIRE THIS AUGUST GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED POLITICIAN, ACADEMICIANS, ADMINISTRATORS, JURISTS AND ACCOMPLISHED AFRICANS IN ALL WALKS OF LIFE TO NEW LIGHT.

LET ME AT THIS JUNCTURE COMMEND THE VISION, THE FORESIGHT, THE COMMITMENT AND THE SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF THE OAU. WHATEVER MIGHT HAVE BEEN THEIR SHORT-COMINGS INDIVIDUALLY IN THE RUNNING OF THE AFFAIRS OF THEIR COUNTRIES AND THE CONTINENT, I BELIEVE THAT ON THIS OCCASION AND IN THE TWENTH-FIFTH YEAR OF THE ORGANISATION THAT THEY BEQUEATHED TO US, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THEM, WE SHOULD RESPECT THEM, WE SHOULD HONOUR THEM. IN A SENSE, THEY ARE OUR HEROES.

TAKING STOCK, ON THE CREDIT SIDE, WE CAN RECORD, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OAU ITSELF, ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE REMEMBERS ITS DIFFICULTY OF BIRTH

THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE ORGANISATION, DE-COLONISATION ESPECIALLY OF PORTUGUESE COLONIES, SOME SUCCESS ON MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION, SPOTS OF DEVELOPMENT LIKE THE ONE WE ALL CAN WITNESS HERE IN CAIRO. WE MUST ALSO ACCEPT THAT WE HAVE THINGS THAT WE MAY NOT BE TOO PROUD OF, ON THE DEBIT SIDE. NAMIBIA HAS NOT YET BEEN LIBERATED, AND TO THAT EXTENT WE ALL AS AFRICANS ARE STILL COLONIAL SUBJECTS; APARTHEID POLICY CONTINUES IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INHUMAN TREATMENT, THERE ARE WARS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, ENCOURAGED, FUELLED AND SUPPORTED IF NOT DIRECTLY CARRIED OUT BY THE SOUTH AFRICA REGIME. ELSEWHERE WE HAVE CIVIL WARS AND SUB-REGIONAL WARS TAKING BIG TOLL IN SAPPING AND DESTROYING HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF AFRICA. OUR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS PROBABLY THE GREATEST FAILING OF ALL OF US AND THE GREATEST FAILING OF ALL OF OUR CONTINENTAL ORGANISATION. IF AFRICA IS NO LONGER A DARK CONTINENT (WHATEVER THAT MEANS) AFRICA HAS TAKEN ON THE REPUTATION OR NOTORIETY OF BEING A CONTINENT OF DROUGHT, DEBT, DESERTIFICATION, DISEASES AND DEATH BY WEAPONS WE DO NOT PRODUCE. WHATEVER MAY BE THE MACHINATIONS OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE IN ALL THESE, WE AFRICANS MUST ACCEPT THE LION SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY. THIS IS THE POSITION IN WHICH WE ARE. IT IS NOT TO ME A COMPLETELY HAPPY SITUATION.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF A CONFERENCE OF SUCH A HIGHLY DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF AFRICANS AND FRIENDS OF AFRICA LIKE THIS SHOULD BE USED TO ENLIGHTEN OUR PATH AND TO CHART A NEW COURSE, TO GIVE US NEW TARGETS, NEW APPROACH AND NEW CHANNELS OF ATTAINING THE BEST FOR AFRICA. LET US ASK OURSELVES PERTINENT AND RELEVANT QUESTIONS. HOW CAN WE BE MORE UNITED? HOW CAN WE SUBSTITUTE PEACE AND HARMONY FOR DIVISION AND WARS WITHIN OUR BORDERS AND WITHIN OUR SUB-REGIONS? CAN'T WE USE THE OLD AFRICAN WISDOM AND PRUDENCE IN SOLVING CONFLICTS WITHIN AFRICA? CAN'T WE SUBSTITUTE DISCUSSION AND DIALOGUE FOR VIOLENCE AND MILITARY ENGAGEMENT? SHOULDN'T WE ENTHRONE JUSTICE, FAIRNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN

OUR BORDERS AND DISCARD DOMINATION, INTOLERANCE AND GREED? CAN'T WE SUBSTITUTE DEVELOPMENT FOR UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND LACK OF PROGRESS. WE HAVE THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES. WE NEED THE POLITICAL WILL THE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND DETERMINATION. WE ALSO NEED THE COOPERATION AND UNITY OF PURPOSE. TO ME THESE OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS ARE THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. IF THE FOUNDING FATHER OF THE OAU LEFT US THE HERITAGE OF THE CONTINENTAL ORGANISATION, IMPERFECT AS IT MAY BE, LET US ASK OURSELVES, WHAT HERITAGE ARE WE GOING TO LEAVE FOR THE NEXT GENERATION.

CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I WISH YOU A HAPPY DELIBERATION AND I WISH OAU MANY YEARS AS INTEGRATING AND UNIFYING ORGANISATION FOR AFRICA.

THANK YOU.

Conference on the occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the OAU

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL 24

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

ILO ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA  
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH OAU

I would like, first, to thank the Institute of the Diplomatic Studies of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its kind invitation and for giving me this honour to address you briefly on "The ILO Activities in Africa and Its Relations with OAU" on this happy occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the OAU. It is a real pleasure to be given this opportunity, and I wish to extend to OAU and its member states sincere congratulations with good hopes for more solidarity and success.

For this brief talk, I have to mention that I refer mainly to a report on "The Role of the ILO in Technical Cooperation" which was submitted by the Director-General of the ILO to the International Labour Conference held last June in Geneva.

For long years, ILO has always been and will continue to be highly concerned with problems of development in Africa. Almost one third of ILO membership is from African countries which are effectively participating in all ILO policy level and decision-making bodies, in addition to a decentralised regional and field structure which is well oriented towards African socio-economic conditions.

The ILO programme in Africa, like in other Regions, seeks to respond to the needs of specific countries, mainly in social fields. But the fact that the ILO is deeply committed to social progress does not imply that it has little to contribute to economic growth; in carrying out its mandate, the ILO makes a distinctive contribution through its technical cooperation programme to economic growth as a source of all social benefits. This contribution, which is both direct and indirect, relates to many areas such as manpower and employment planning, productivity and management, vocational training, small-scale industries, technology and labour relations. The ILO has also important contribution to make in mobilizing domestic resources which in most African countries are the main sources of investment. For example, ILO Technical Cooperation in developing entrepreneurial skills, credit and producer cooperatives, workers' enterprises and various forms of rural organisations has served to enhance the mobilisation of local savings and other resources, adding to the flow of capital and helping to channel it to productive investments. It is also an objective and a method of approach

of ILO technical cooperation to help African countries promoting their natural capabilities in the fields of ILO competence. The ILO being a tripartite organisation, composed of Governments, Employers and Workers, has also a leading role in assisting the African Employers' and Workers' Organisations in building and strengthening their capabilities in areas of ILO competence.

The ILO Technical Cooperation Programme in Africa has had to cope with the problem of increasing demands for assistance and changing priorities during the past few years. In adapting itself to this new challenge, the ILO Programme has been guided by the resolution concerning the most urgent problems of Africa and particularly food security adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1985, and by policy and programme guidance emanating from ILO regional meetings and Governing Body. Account has been taken at the same time of the various plans and strategies proposed for Africa by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the World Bank and the United Nations, notably Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its 21st Session. The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) adopted by the General Assembly at special session in 1986, provides an agreed framework for international cooperation in this regard. The ILO is a member of the Inter-Agency Task Force established to follow up the Programme of Action. Largely as a consequence of these developments, certain new trends or shifts of emphasis have become distinct in the ILO programme, such as closer attention to the integration of economic and social aspects of development. New methods of action have also been introduced for purposes of needs assessment and programme planning in a number of African countries. At the same time the process of decentralisation of ILO technical services, which was launched in Africa in 1981, has strengthened its position in Africa. The network of ILO Offices in Africa now comprises, in addition to the Regional Office in Addis Ababa, ten area offices. The possibility of strengthening the ILO's presence in a number of additional countries by flexible and ad hoc arrangements is also being examined. In addition to a team of experts



on labour and population, there are five regional teams and centres dealing with employment, vocational training and labour administration in Africa.

Another feature of the technical cooperation in Africa is the ILO's anti-apartheid programme of action. During the past few years the ILO has intensified and enlarged its activities through a number of short and long-term objectives related to the immediate needs of apartheid victims and to strengthening the independent trade union movement inside South Africa. To achieve the short-term objectives, the ILO has focused on vocational training and rehabilitation, small enterprise development, workers' education and assistance to migrant workers. To meet the long-term objectives, including the strengthening of the planning and administrative capacities of the national liberation movements, the ILO has been engaged in a number of projects in the field of labour administration, management development, employment and manpower planning, and rural development.

In terms of expenditure, the share of Africa in ILO's Technical Cooperation Programme rose from US \$ 42.5 million in 1980 to US \$ 53.5 million in 1986, i.e., from 43% to 52.5% of the total budget of ILO technical cooperation.

The growing cooperation of ILO with African countries has been more strengthened by the excellent relations which exist between the ILO and the OAU since its inception 25 years ago. The ILO and OAU continued to consult regularly and to collaborate on matters of common concern. The ILO Regional Office works closely with OAU Secretariat in the organisational arrangements of the Sessions of the OAU Labour Commission which are held annually to discuss labour questions as well as ILO activities in Africa. The ILO also participates regularly in other high-level meetings of the OAU such as those of the Council of Ministers and the Heads of State and Government. On the other side, the OAU is always represented in the annual International Labour Conference, ILO Governing Body, Regional Meetings in Africa and other ILO meetings.

Cooperation between ILO and OAU is continuing now in such fields as population, social security and vocational rehabilitation in pursuance of the Lagos Plan of Action. The ILO will also be

exploring further possibilities of joint action with OAU under Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery. The ILO cooperation with OAU regarding African Liberation Movements is well manifested in the continued ILO assistance to OAU - recognised national liberation movements through the implementation of various projects which come within ILO competence.

Many of the concerns and activities of the ILO will continue to figure prominently in its programme during the years ahead, although some are likely to demand additional attention. For example, given the collective decision of the African Heads of State and Government in 1985 to lay increased emphasis on investment in agriculture and food production, the ILO will need to give special attention to rural development, with a focus on promotion of agro-based industries, development and maintenance of rural infrastructure, including transport, communication and storage and marketing facilities. The use of cooperatives in promoting rural development will need to receive further consideration.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that over the years, the ILO African Advisory and policy-related bodies and its decentralised structure in Africa together with its excellent relations and cooperation with OAU have sharpened the ILO's awareness of African needs and aspirations and helped its technical cooperation programme to be better equipped and more responsive to them.

Many thanks, once again, to the Institute of Diplomatic Studies of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to all of you, and best wishes for the OAU for a prosperous future.

Thank you.

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Conference on the Occasion of the  
25th Anniversary of the OAU  
Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

F.A.OUA/CAIRO 88/PL 25

PAPER PRESENTED BY

Mr. Amin Abu SENINA

FAO Representative in Cairo.

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to address this distinguished gathering today upon the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity.

There will be no time for me to speak about all aspects of the activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Africa, so I shall focus briefly on highlights of our contribution towards promoting the aspirations of the Organization of African Unity concerning agricultural development of this continent, starting with the 1960 FAO African Survey, then the Regional Food Plan for Africa in 1976, and finally briefly highlight ongoing operational activities.

### THE FAO AFRICA SURVEY

From 1960 onwards, African decolonization became a reality. By 1965, 26 newly independent African countries had become members of FAO. The Organization took a series of special measures to help them face the challenge of planning and organizing their agricultural development.

In 1960-61, the FAO AFRICA SURVEY, a report on the possibilities of African rural development in relation to economic and social growth, was prepared in cooperation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ILO and other organizations. It covered 33 countries lying between the tropics.

The SURVEY made a preliminary analysis of the issues facing African governments and of the possible directions for international action.

The report dealt extensively with the macro-economic framework within which agricultural development would have to take place. It analysed the technical problems facing the development of crop and livestock production, fisheries and forestry. Above all, it placed the emphasis on institutional questions: the organization of planning, the need for education and training, and the problem of adapting traditional forms of land tenure to the requirements of modern agriculture.

The basic technical problem that has dominated much of Africa's agricultural development over the last two decades was clearly identified; "Planning for better forms of land use in Africa"

THE REGIONAL FOOD PLAN FOR AFRICA

The African food situation started to deteriorate rapidly from about 1970. By 1976, African governments, and the international community as a whole, were seriously alarmed. In that year the FAO Regional Conference for Africa called for the preparation of a regional food plan which would, on its implementation, enable the African member countries to be "self-sufficient in food within a period of ten years".

The Regional Food Plan for Africa was published by FAO in 1978.

In suggesting the strategies that might lead to self-sufficiency in Food Production, the plan divided the Continent into five ecological sub-regions. It was clear that the relative importance of yield increases and area expansion would vary widely between subregions, but overall the greater contribution (53%) would come from increases in the area under cultivation.

The plan emphasized that there was no simple formula for improving agricultural performance. General approaches must be translated into specific policies, plans and programmes at national level; these, in turn, could not be formulated in isolation from a country's overall economic and social development strategy.

The Regional Food Plan could provide only a framework for developing national self-sufficiency objectives and strategies, strengthening multinational cooperation, and harmonizing policies, especially in production and trade.

With these reservations, the plan set forth a series of suggestions for short-, medium- and long-term action. They ranged from improved production practices to the development of infrastructure, and covered such fields as disease control, institutional development, conservation, research, fisheries, and the promotion of locally produced foods as a substitute for imported cereals.

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The plan had an important follow-up at political level: it was drawn upon for the drafting of the agricultural section of the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted in 1980 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. The Lagos Plan contained specific provisions for implementing the earlier, and more general, Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa. It remains the most authoritative expression of the political will of African states to bring about "an effective agricultural revolution in Africa".

Its objectives and guidelines were reaffirmed in the Harare Declaration by African ministers of agriculture at the 1984 FAO Regional Conference for Africa and, in the Declaration of the Twenty-First Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Current Economic Situation in Africa, issued in July 1985.



OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

At the end of 1988, FAO was operating almost 1,000 technical cooperation projects in Africa, with finance coming from the United Nations Development Programme, from Trust Funds and from the Organization's own Technical Cooperation Programme. About half the work of the FAO Investment Centre was devoted to mobilizing funds for investment projects in Africa. The region was the prime focus of FAO action to promote emergency relief and agricultural rehabilitation.

The Organization has thus concentrated an increasing proportion of its total effort on the African region.

Resource surveys have analysed the development potential of vast areas of the continent. Soil conservation projects have attempted to bring indispensable new techniques to traditional farmers. Irrigation has been extended. The correct use of fertilizers has been promoted. National seed services have been strengthened. Research capacity has been built up.

Farmers have been helped to protect their crops from plant diseases, insects, rodents and (with limited success) birds. Food storage facilities have been improved, permitting a reduction in waste.

Livestock have been protected against disease, and pasture management has been improved, thus opening the way to increased production and consumption of meat and milk. Multi-sectoral projects have sought to promote new forms of village-level development. Both inland and marine fisheries have been fostered. Countries have been helped to make better use of their forests.

Alongside national projects, the Organization has undertaken a series of regional and subregional programmes. Support has been provided for locust control. A long-term programme of trypanosomiasis control is under way, and a campaign for eradication of rinderpest has been prepared.

Various forms of support, including assistance in long-range planning and in project formulation and execution, have been given to such regional organizations as the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, the Economic Community of West-African States, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the Mano River Union.

The range of FAO activities in Africa has thus become almost as broad as the mandate of the Organization itself.

Conference on the occasion of the

25th Anniversary of the OAU

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL 26

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

STATEMENT

BY

DR. LUCIANO CAPPELLETTI

RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

ON

"ASPECTS OF UNDP CO-OPERATION WITH OAU

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA"

The Organization of African Unity, which is celebrating its 25 year jubilee, is involved in a wide spectrum of activities on the African Continent, as mandated by its member states: political activities, economic activities, social activities, cultural activities, etcetera. The United Nations Development Programme, which I represent here in Egypt, and which is the largest Organization for technical co-operation in the world, has a close and fruitful co-operation with the Organization for African Unity in all these activities, excluding only the strictly political activities which are outside the mandate of our Organization.

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This co-operation has been two-ways. On the one hand, UNDP has assisted OAU in the performance of its programme and in the achievements of its goals.

On the other hand, OAU has assisted UNDP in the identification of the priorities for the development programmes supported by UNDP in Africa.

Many UNDP programmes in Africa bear the mark of OAU in the sense that they are the outcome of OAU deliberations, or OAU recommendations, or OAU plans of action. Particularly in the last few years, this very close inter-action between UNDP and OAU has intensified. I would say that there is no major deliberation of OAU or no major action plan of OAU which does not elicit a sizeable response by UNDP in terms of related development activities in individual African countries; or in groups of African countries in the case of regional activities.

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- 2 -

This close relationship goes back to the year 1971 when the two Organizations negotiated the first Co-operation Agreement. The first outcome of this new Agreement was a comprehensive programme of assistance to African Refugees, an issue which was particularly acute in those days but which has not disappeared and has continued to receive UNDP attention to this day. Many other activities followed in subsequent years.

Later, in 1975, a second more formal and more comprehensive Agreement was concluded between UNDP and OAU. This Agreement provides for exchange of information, reciprocal representation at each other's meetings, mutual co-operation in various fields, including assistance to African people still under colonial rule.

This Agreement has been fully implemented throughout the years. OAU is represented in all major UNDP meetings. Contacts between the two secretariats are maintained on a continuous basis also through the office of a special representative of UNDP in Addis Ababa. Yearly consultative meetings take place at the operational level to renew ongoing co-operation and plan new co-operation. UNDP even contributed to strengthen the capacity of the OAU Secretariat in the economic sector (including planning, monitoring and evaluation of development projects) through a large-scale training programme for the OAU staff.

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The outcome of this close inter-action and co-operation between UNDP and OAU is wide-ranging and is exemplified by scores of events, projects and programmes which cannot be even briefly summarized given our limited time. I can only mention two or three examples of large and relevant programmes which have had a significant impact on the development of Africa or have helped to solve some of Africa's critical problems.

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One example refers to activities related to the implementation of the so called Lagos Plan of Action, a comprehensive set of priorities for the development of Africa adopted by African Countries in 1980. Several projects connected with the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action have been supported by UNDP.

Among this group of projects we could mention the following projects: the preparatory activities for the establishment of the African Economic Community, the preparatory activities for the establishment of the African Energy Commission, the development of the Fouta Djallon Massif in Guinea.

In other cases UNDP activities were directed at establishing or strengthening research or training institutions in various fields such as civil aviation, telecommunication, meteorology and others all important foci of development for the Lagos Plan of Action.

In still other cases UNDP has acted as a catalytic agent attracting through small initial inputs - sizeable investment from bilateral sources or from banking institutions in various priority sectors indicated in the Lagos Plan.

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UNDP has pledged sizeable assistance to another closely related programme sponsored by OAU namely the Priority Programme for the Economic Recovery of Africa for the period 1986-1991. UNDP assistance pledged so far for this programme focusses on the strengthening of African Institutions, the transfer of science and technology and some further assistance towards the establishment of the African Economic Community.

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- 4 -

One of the most successful UNDP contributions to Africa has probably been the management and the co-ordination of the Emergency Programme for Africa following the Sahel Draught of the early 1980's. After some initial different arrangements, the task of managing and co-ordinating this vast relief programme sponsored by the international community was assigned to UNDP, UNDP being the UN Organization that, for its operational approach and for its wide network of offices in the field, was considered to be better equipped to deal with the complex set of operations and logistics involved. This management and co-ordination role of UNDP was not limited to the United Nations System, but extended also to the donor Governments and bilateral programmes that participated in the operation.

UNDP not only provided the organizational structure for this large operation but also made available considerable resources of its own. On the whole the operation was very successful and was probably one of the most fruitful and most appreciated contributions of UNDP to the development and the welfare of the African Continent.

Incidentally, UNDP involvement in this critical emergency did not finish with the end of the relief phase: it continued after the worst had passed with a number of rehabilitation schemes and development activities aiming at the avoidance or at least the containment of future emergencies, such as ground water development, anti-desertification measures, agricultural development, etcetera.

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Another area of significant involvement for UNDP in Africa is structural adjustment. This is relatively a new area for UNDP but considering the crucial importance of the subject matter it may hopefully lead to some important results. The economies of many African countries are currently in a critical state. The path to economic recovery will require some decisive structural adjustment or, in other words, a package of economic policies consisting of adjustment of exchange rate, fiscal reform, readjustment of the terms of trade in favour of the agricultural sector, reconsideration of the role of the Public Sector, promotion of the Private Sector and a host of other measures.

The importance of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that in sub-saharan Africa 28 out of 46 countries in the region have already adopted in various degrees this package of measures and other countries are seriously considering it.

Structural adjustment may be traumatic but there is a firm consensus in the international community that there may be no option and that some form of adjustment may be the conditio sine qua non for a meaningful economic recovery.

UNDP has assisted a number of African countries in this area and the willingness of UNDP to help Governments to the fullest of its ability in the implementation of structural adjustment policies decided by them has been reiterated by the Administrator of UNDP in October 1987 in an important intervention at the United Nations.

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The UNDP involvement in the economic development of Africa goes well beyond these few examples. UNDP is present in each African country with a variety of projects and activities. The yearly allocation of UNDP to the African Continent is in excess of 250 million dollars. In addition, UNDP also finances a large regional programme which is formulated in consultation with OAU and comprises regional co-operation activities undertaken by African Countries. UNDP thus supports thousands of development projects in all sectors.

I have brought here with me a few copies of a Compendium of UNDP projects in Egypt as of January 1988. The Compendium lists about 80 UNDP projects which are active now or are planned to be launched in the near future. If you multiply this by 50, or, since Egypt is a fairly large country, by 30, this will give you an idea of the volume and complexity of UNDP technical co-operation activities in Africa.

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UNDP projects are planned by Governments according to their own priorities. They are generally executed by the United Nations Specialized Agencies: ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO and a host of smaller UN Technical Agencies.

You have heard, or you are going to hear today, many of these projects being mentioned by my United Nations Colleagues who are participating in this session.

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These are projects planned and financed by UNDP but executed by one or other Specialized Agency. They are sometimes called UNDP projects, some other times UNESCO projects or FAO projects and so on. They are, in fact, both; but in essence they are really Government projects assisted by the United Nations System.

Indeed, the complex process of partnership in development combines in a close process of inter-action Governments, inter-governmental organizations - first of all, in the case of Africa, OAU - UNDP and United Nations Specialized Agencies, all converging in different capacities and with different roles towards one common objective which is economic development and, through it, human development and the general improvement of the people.

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Conference on the occasion of the

25th Anniversary of the OAU

F.A.OAU/CAIRO 88/PL 27

Cairo, 25-28 January 1988

THE OAU AND MULTILATERAL ASPECTS  
OF AFRICAN INDEBTEDNESS

DR. YOUSSEF BOUTROS-GHALI

Over the last few years, the third world has experienced external shocks of such magnitude, that they have managed to shake the fundamental structures of its countries, and forced the international community to recast its view of the economic problems of the third world. What had started, in the mid seventies as a serious but temporary liquidity crisis, after years of austerity programs sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, has developed into a full fledged Third world debt crisis today. With, now the benefit of hindsight what could be thought of as a temporary crisis for some, should have been diagnosed then, as the beginning of a deeper more structural disturbance for others. The problem lay in that the fragile economic structures of a number of less

of a deeper more structural disturbance for others. The problem lay in that the fragile economic structures of a number of less developed countries could not withstand even the mildest of shocks, and certainly, under the remedies proposed by the international communities, could not be expected to recover from them. The remedies relied heavily on applying restrictive fiscal and monetary policies to these economies so as to reduce, temporarily their need for scarce external resources, while simultaneously using the vehicle of rescheduling to postpone financial obligations into the future. As it turned out, and again I emphasize, with the benefit of hindsight, austerity applied to structurally undeveloped economies could not reduce much the need for external resources, and rescheduling supposed that these economies could at some point in the future generate enough surplus resources to both cater to their current needs and additional obligations accumulated from the past. The surplus never materialized and the vicious circle of the external debt crisis was started: to wit a country could not grow out of its debt problem because it lacked the external financing to develop its domestic resources, and it lacked the external financing because it had an external debt problem. In the meantime, rescheduling postponed an ever increasing proportion of present obligations into the future.

I submit Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we are facing now what was then the future and the economies of low income developing countries are no better off today than they were thirteen years ago. They are certainly not better able to service a greatly magnified external debt.

I submit also that what has come to be called the African debt problem is but the more extreme representation of a wider third world phenomenon. The causes for the the African debt crisis do not differ much from those of other third world countries, except perhaps for the fact that the African continent had and still has a more undeveloped economic structure and has suffered more than its share of external calamities both natural and economic. The African debt crisis differs from that of the rest of the Third world only in magnitude and degree not in nature or substance. The Debt problem of the Third World is a systemic problem, in need of systemic solutions. It is no longer a circumstantial problem resulting from the convergence of unfortunate coincidences.

I should like, thus, to suggest to you Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, what could be termed, by right of my origins, an African view of the Third world debt problem, and would seek your help in outlining, however vaguely the elements of an African solution to the problem. Since the phenomenon as I mentioned earlier, is common to the entire third world but differs only in degree, the solution should also be common to all countries and only differ in degree between Africa and other less developed country groups.

As exposed by my distinguished colleague, the external debt problem of Africa was the subject of extensive debate over the years, starting as he mentioned in the OAU summit of 1984, to the Africa Priority Programme, finally to the Third Extraordinary Session of the OAU Summit on November 30 1987. In parallel, the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank have held their

annual meetings last September where the Third World Debt Crisis featured prominently. The communiques of the various intergovernmental groups and committees at these meetings, along with the recommendations of the last OAU summit are a true reflection of the views of the various factions in the international community, on the Debt Crisis. To formulate the elements of an African view, we need to examine the recommendations of all participants in the meetings. A word of caution: we seek elements for a positive solution, not a normative one. We all know what should be done, and what rights we the Third World, have by virtue of our belonging to the same world community as developed countries, but this is an imperfect world and we should look for what can be done now, however little.

#### I- The International Community's Views of Present Prospects and solutions.

From a review of the communiques of the major groupings in the Annual Meetings of the Bretton Woods organizations and the resolutions of the last OAU Summit, one can discern the still fundamental differences of diagnosis. This is best represented by an interpretation of the statements of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund on one hand, and the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty Four, and the OAU Summit on the other.

#### A- The Interim Committee Statement.

The Interim Committee is essentially the Policy making body

of the International Monetary Fund. Its views reflect the views of the main players in the international financial scene; more specifically the industrial countries and major shareholders in the two largest international financial organizations of the post-war period.

The views expressed by the group of countries in the committee did not differ much from those implicit in the Baker Plan of September of 1985. The Plan, named after the US Secretary of the Treasury, was proposed at the 1985 Annual Meetings of the Fund and Bank. The Plan relied on three main elements:

- 1- The first element consisted in the adoption by debtor countries of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural policies to promote growth and balance of payments adjustment. Incidentally, by adjustment, read reduction in external resources needed for continued growth.

2. the second element was a continued role for the World Bank and the Fund in orchestrating adjustment programs and increased and more effective lending by other multilateral development banks. Such lending would take the form of cofinancing, investment guarantees, etc... Promises of additional US contributions to the various organizations were made. some kept, most not.

3. The third element was proposed financing from private sources in support of comprehensive adjustment programs. The plan called for a public commitment of some US\$ 20 billion of new lending from the international banking community to a group of heavily indebted countries.

After the Plan was made public there followed a period of



"Plan watching" where each adjustment program with any of the two organizations was carefully examined for signs showing it was a "Baker Plan program". To date none have materialized.

The 1987 Interim Committee communique reiterated thus that the solution of the international debt problem lay in a combination of growth oriented adjustment, increased financing (presumably and mainly through more rescheduling) and "policies in industrial countries that will secure stable world financial conditions and open and growing financial markets".

Nevertheless the committee notes that the present international economic situation is characterized by increasing trade protectionism, increased export subsidization, conservative domestic policies in industrial countries and a climate generally not conducive to increased international trade from developing countries. In reaction the committee emphasized the need for more extensive use of economic indicators in the Surveillance of international financial relations by the International Monetary Fund. The committee welcomed also the partial innovations in the solutions implemented to date for the debt problem, viz. debt equity swaps, debt securitizations, etc... but stressed that the case-by-case approach to the resolution of the world debt crisis remained adequate.

Thus while the main industrial countries recognize that "exceptional (financial) assistance" is needed, they do not recognize that the third world debt problem is a systemic problem and that it can only be resolved by systemic solutions that, while not forsaking the case by case approach, must first operate

a fundamental change in the way the burden of adjustment is distributed around the world.

#### B. The Group of Twenty Four

The Group of Twenty Four is also an intergovernmental group that reflects the views of a somewhat wider grouping of countries. The representation of third world countries is greater in the group and their grasp of international issues is more oriented towards a third world view.

In reflection of this fact, the statement of the group is prefaced by a harsh judgement on the 1980's as fast becoming "the lost decade" for the third world. Their diagnosis of the present international financial situation is that it is "untenable" and that the present solutions to the problems, although effective in reducing the current account imbalances of low income countries, "has not brought about a solution to the problem". "The three building blocks of the present strategy (austerity, growth, and external debt rescheduling) show serious inconsistencies". Their diagnosis of the present international economic juncture corresponds to that of the Interim Committee group although formulated in starker terms. There is a continuing worsening of the terms of trade, rising interest rates and their accompanying deflationary tendencies in the industrialized world, a continued rise in world protectionism, barriers to imports and a general reduction in access to markets by developing countries. These prospects by the groups admission, and by objective assessment of international economic conditions, are expected to continue for

the at least the coming two to three years. The prospects for african countries, given their heavy concentration in primary commodity exports, their dependent economic structures and their riggid external financing needs, will be at the more extreme end of the spectrum.

In the face of such an assessment the Group of Twenty Four outlines the broad strokes of a systemic solution to the international debt crisis. Its building blocks can be discerned faintly as :

1- A reduction in the "debt overhang" in the third world. More specifically the move "from debt rescheduling to debt reconstruction. The means for this debt forgiveness are only sketched as the conversion of official (ODA) loans to grants and the restructuring of the interest burden on all other debts towards greater concessionality.

2- Additionality in resources through a greater capital allocation to the newly created SAF facility in the IMF, along with increased access limits to the resources of both the Fund and the Bank and a greater transfer through commercial, private and other channels of financial resources.

3- Complementarity of adjustment in developed countries through the adoption of more expansionary policies, the reduction of trade barriers and exports subsidies and increased economic assistance. Such countries should undertake the macroeconomic and structural adjustments necessary for improving their economic performance, improve access to their markets for third world products.

4- The group appears committed to maintaining

international organizations as the basic framework for operating this change in the international environment.

These are, as I could interpret them the main elements viewed by the Group of Twenty Four that would constitute an outline of a systemic solution. They remain vague but begin to provide the basis for our formulation of an African view of the Third World Debt problem.

C- The OAU Summit of November 1987

The African Heads of State issued a communique at the end of the Summit that basically recaptured, albeit in a much more concrete fashion the resolutions of the Group of Twenty Four. My distinguished colleague has already elaborated the resolutions, I will dwell on them only briefly.

Economic development it was stated, was a cooperative effort worldwide, in need of integrated policies. Developed countries had the responsibility of contributing to the creation of an economic environment that would promote growth and development in Africa. Economic development could only be achieved with greater resources through grants, greater concessionality in existing debt obligations through longer maturities and grace period, lower interest rates and the forgiveness of part of the debt for some countries.

## II- Elements of an African View.

Let us note before I briefly submit to you, Mr. Chairman Ladies and Gentlemen, the elements of an African View that the Third World faction adopts the systemic approach to the resolution of the Third World and more specifically the African debt problem. It is correct in doing so. Such a view raises all the issues relevant for the formulation of a synthesis and the outline of the building blocks of a solution that is African in its focus, while addressing the Third World in its scope.

I submit that an African view, addressing more immediately the African debt problem and more broadly the Third World, would need four building blocks:

- 1- Multilaterality in debt management
- 2- Additionality in resources
- 3- Conditionality in program design and finally,
- 4- Complementarity in policies.

### 1- Multilaterality in Debt Management.

The first building block relies on a number of facts that should be spelled out if our analysis is to progress. As in the Andersen fairy tale it is time that somebody noticed that the emperor has no clothes. African countries, cannot repay nor continue to service all of their external debt or can do so with great difficulty and at great cost to their peoples. This truth springs more from the stark mathematical projections of future prospects, than from any ideological bent. Furthermore if some

countries can repay their debt they should be foregiven it so as to concentrate their resources on economic development. It should thus be a fact that not all of the 200 billion US\$ of African debt will be repayed, some will need to be forgiven by creditor countries. Foregivenness however raises a problem of "moral hazard". How are we, as represented in an organization such as the OAU, to distinguish between those countries that genuinely deserve to have their debt foregiven and those that can, if managed well, continue to service their debt. More precisely, how would forgiving the debt of one country not push others more viable to adopt policies that would force foregivenness upon them also. This problem arises because, in pursuing a positive approach to the solution we seek to outline, it is not conceivable, at this juncture, that creditor countries will be willing to foregive all of 200 billion US\$ of debt.

It is, therefore incumbent on african countries through an organization such as the OAU to establish a financial solidarity throughout the continent. Such solidarity, would allow Africa to decide on those countries most deserving or most in need of debt foregivenness, and those that can continue to bear some of the burden of their debt service. Such a multilateral debtor coalition would need to address a multilateral creditor coalition such as now exists in the Paris Club. An African Club in a sense, would guarantee that an equitable distribution of the benefits of foregivenness on the debtor side would be matched by an equally equitable distribution of its burdens on the creditor side.

2- Additionality of financial resources.

he second element -- Additionality of resources-- relies on the fact that, it is not enough to foregive external debt, this mere takes care of the present burden of past mistakes. It does not address the future. The rigid economic structures of most African and indeed Third World countries, impose that if these economies are to grow they must have as an indispensable element, external financial resources. At their stages of development there are no substitutes for foreign currency. Higher economic growth rates will require higher transfers of resources from the developed countries to the African continent, over and above any foregiveness of debt. Without such transfers no economic growth can occur nor can any permanent solution to the problem.

### 3- Conditionality in Program Design

As for the third element -- Conditionality in program design -- it is inevitable that under an organized scheme of transfer of resources from the developed world to the African continent there appear the need for the orderly monitoring of progress, the monitoring of the appropriate use of resources, and for the establishment of coherent frameworks for macroeconomic management in the recipient economies. Such requirements will impose that a set of performance criteria, monitoring benchmarks and indicators be established. In other words that there be a framework of conditionality, both from the debtor to the creditor and vice-versa. The Bretton Woods Institutions of today do have a framework of conditionality; it is not quite adequate and still very unilateral. It is being developed however to address the new issues of growth, structural change, social equity in

development and the like. Such a framework will have to be developed jointly between debtors and creditors within an appropriate multilateral framework and should guarantee an orderly and continuous transfer of resources.

#### 4- Complementarity of Policies

The performance of African and more generally Third world countries is greatly affected by economic policies pursued in developing world. This imposes the fourth building block, Complementarity of policies. Variables such as international interest rates, primary commodity prices, import prices are determined essentially in developed countries. Economic policies, that produce an outcome of all these variables that remains favorable to the African continent cannot be left to coincidences. In addition, market access to African products in developed countries, barriers to trade, tariffs, quotas will determine to a large extent the possibilities of economic growth in the continent. All these policies have to be synchronized, both among developed countries and between developed and African countries.

These four elements, Multilaterality, Additionality, Conditionality and complementarity, represent what, I submit, should be the building blocks of an African view of the solution to an African Debt problem.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the pessimists among us will say that such an elaborate new international system cannot



be planned and an orderly transition to it cannot happen. The lighter groups among pessimists will say that the present system will slowly deteriorate in chaos, both financial and economic. From such chaos, a system such as I have just described will emerge, at great cost to the international community and great hardship to lower income group countries foremost among them the African countries. Those on the other hand, with a bleaker disposition will say that chaos can only lead to further chaos and that ultimately no organized system will emerge.

Personally, I remain optimistic. There has to be at first the political will to operate an orderly transition from the present system to another more adapted to present world conditions. A new Bretton Woods Conference is needed, one that will include those countries that were not even formed when the first round was held in the late forties. Following that, substantial work will remain to be done in establishing the institutions, the frameworks, and the various channels for the proper functioning of the new system. A number of recent indicators point to this direction, the new Structural Adjustment Facility of the IMF, The recent Mexican debt Scheme are but a few that come to mind. The thousand mile journey will have to begin with one step.

Cairo, January 26, 1988

PROTECTING AFRICA'S CHILDREN

A PAPER PRESENTED BY

MR. RICHARD S. REID

UNICEF REGIONAL DIRECTOR

FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AT THE SILVER JUBILEE ANNIVERSARY

OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

(CAIRO, 25 - 27 JANUARY, 1988)

## Protecting Africa's Children

Mr. Chairman, excellencies, honored guests,

I am here today to speak of bad news and good news. The bad news is the general failure of our civilization, over much of the past decade and a half, to protect and nurture the children of the poorer countries -- especially the children of Africa. This failure is indisputable, and it is an indictment of all of us, North and South -- an abomination from which none of us can hide. The facts of this failure are so stark that they seem to leave us no moral choice other than immediate corrective action. To shrug these facts off -- to claim that the conditions of most African children are not unacceptably wretched, or to insist that things are improving satisfactorily -- is to make a mockery of our claims, the world's claims, of progress and humanity.

To make clear the general failure I speak of, let me give only three illustrations. There could be a host of others.

Item: Infant-child mortality -- the death of children before their fifth birthday -- the most telling indicator of national development, an unflattering mirror of national priorities. Every day, close to some 11,000 black African under-fives die, mainly from malnutrition and the infectious diseases. That is 11,000 a day, my colleagues, not 11,000 a week or 11,000 a month. Another child, a mother's son or

daughter, a person, will die before I finish this paragraph. One out of every six children born in rural Africa today will not live to age one. And, unlike the picture in Africa in the Fifties and Sixties, which saw child mortality fall steadily against a backdrop of bright hopes, the situation today in the late Eighties is one of an overall retrograde drift. The absolute number of annual child deaths in the continent has risen from 4 million in 1970 to 4 1/2 million today.

Item: Water, the basis of life: only one African child in five has access to a minimum sufficiency of clean water. The rest, like their siblings and parents, get by on 5 to 10 liters a day -- which by World Health Organization standards is less than half the amount needed for the minimum human needs of drinking, cleaning of the body, food preparation, and washing. Five liters of water may support bare survival, but this is brown and brackish water with a level of fecal contamination that is virtually certain to produce 5 or 6 bouts of diarrhea per year in each child who drinks it. The dehydration of diarrhea, of course, is the preeminent killer of African children -- as well as the major cause of malnutrition among them. Yet we look passively on as 150 million rural Africans, mainly women and girls, trudge for three to five hours a day to polluted ponds, uncovered wells, and waterholes. We point to blueprints for piped-water schemes and mechanized boreholes that claim vast yields, although we know that few of the schemes have been implemented and most of the boreholes have been abandoned.

Item: Female education. Fewer than one of three African girls of primary school age are in fact in school -- and, in absolute terms, enrollment levels for girls are not getting any better as Africa moves toward the 1990s. All of us here would agree with Bishop Nzimbe of Kenya, who said, "Train a man and you train an individual; train a woman and you build a nation." Many of us are aware, moreover, of the numerous studies proving that the level of a mother's education is the single key determinant of her children's health -- that infant mortality among children whose mothers have had four years of primary schooling is a half to two-thirds lower than among the children of illiterate women. Yet we continue to stand by and watch as the education of most African girls stagnates at the 30 per cent level.

We have here, then, Mr. Chairman, in these three illustrations, a profile of failure -- more than enough bad news. If children do "constitute the main wealth of the Continent," as the OAU assembly of Heads of States and Government said in its July 1987 Addis Ababa resolution, and if what I've cited above is a fair sample of the prevailing picture for children, UNICEF's constituency, in Africa, is this the whole global picture, or the whole picture for this Continent? Are there favorable counter-trends? Is there any encouraging news alongside the bad?

The answer is yes. There are good signs that our break of faith with children over these past 10-15 years is now being

confronted, and in some exhilarating cases reversed, in more and more parts of the world -- including Africa. Compared with the brute mass of the problems, the current of change is still relatively small, but it is strong and rising. We in UNICEF, and increasing numbers of others, think this new current can turn the tide for children -- and convert the defense of children into an offensive on their behalf: a counterthrust that may also have built into it a permanently renewable and cost-free energy source. I will speak about that energy source later; but first, Mr. Chairman, let me share with you several developments reflecting a new hope for children in the very categories I cited earlier in the context of failure -- that is, child mortality, clean drinking water, and girl's education.

Infant & Child Mortality: The upward curve of absolute numbers of child deaths seen in Africa since 1970 may be ready to flatten out and descend. Outside the Continent, on many other sides, we see steadily decreasing child mortality. Global child deaths are 5000 a day less in 1988 than they were in the early Eighties. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) accounted for nine per cent of the world's child mortality in 1980; their share is now down to seven per cent. Egypt, on the strength of the world's most effective pairing of oral rehydration and immunization, is on the road to cutting its 1980 child

mortality levels by more than half. Against measles, the main killer among the vaccine-preventable diseases, Tanzania and the Congo have since 1985-86 had immunization coverage levels that were not reached in many parts of the U.S. until the 1970s. Turkey averted 22,000 child deaths in a single year with its 1985 immunization campaign. Other equally encouraging recent country cases could be cited, some from Africa. It is clear that a world counter-trend against child mortality is being generated. We might hypothesize that sooner or later it will be Africa's turn. But in the meantime 11,000 children are dying each day. Why not sooner?

Access to Clean Water: Though the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade has not been crowned with universal success, and a single plastic jerry-can is an average rural African family's water ration for a day, there is a stirring of change in some countries. One, Nigeria, has adopted a low-cost UNICEF project model that is rapidly expanding toward a goal of reaching some 25 million people in rural areas with heavy-duty, deep-well handpumps that will provide at least 20 liters of pure water per person per day. Similar advances are being made in Uganda with a differently-tailored affordable technology. For both countries, these initiatives mean that rural children and adults in large areas have now begun to quadruple their water use for a cost to government of a tenth of what had been paid before for mainly non-functional mechanized schemes.

The water coming from these rural handpumps is as clean as anything available in the best city systems, and the time needed to collect it is only a fraction of the long hours spent earlier. I feel that nothing really substantive -- except a lack of will -- is stopping any country in the Continent from embarking on water-supply breakthroughs such as these in Nigeria and Uganda. And nothing would build a surer foundation for the health and hygiene of small children.

Female Education: Here again, the African situation stands against a relative backdrop of higher girls' enrollments in other regions. On average, female enrollment levels are two times higher in Asia, even though poverty levels are very similar. But here again the negative tide of the past decade may be turning in the Continent. A few sub-Saharan countries, typified by Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Tanzania, have registered girls' primary enrollment figures that compare with those of any region in the world. Kenya has cut its infant mortality rate by half in the last 20 years; one study contends that this is overwhelmingly due to a steady national rise in female education. Ninety-one per cent of Kenya's girls are enrolled in primary school.

I think that these last instances of good news in child protection -- of a rallying against the failures of the past decade -- can serve as more than encouragement. They can be



instructive, because they did not happen by accident. All of them share a crucial common element which was conspicuously absent in the social sectors of developing countries 10 to 15 years ago. In those days we called the missing element "political will," and it became a kind of Holy Grail, forever tantalizing and nebulous. We debated among ourselves how to capture or generate this will or catalyst and put its force behind the basic services. Today we call the igniting element national targetting for children, and suddenly everything jells; countries find themselves harnessing more political will than we ever dreamed of.

It is the target that makes the difference. Targets tap the ancient hunter and collector in all of us. It is a matter of the purest motivational psychology. Having a specific numerical goal, linked to a deadline date, proclaimed by the Head of State and owned by the government -- this is something that rivets the attention and brings up the adrenaline. It cannot be fudged or ingnored like the vague aims of most service functions. It locks everyone into a performance obligation; but more than that, a target focuses energy and makes work immediately meaningful -- every task completed is an increment toward a tangible end product. It compresses hope and excitement. It was this spirit of immediacy and shared purpose -- a target -- that animated the 1984 literacy campaign in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The target of eradication -- nothing short of eradication -- was the engine that drove the global smallpox campaign to its final success eight years ago. Egypt, beset by cycles of diarrheal dehydration among its children for countless generations, decided in the early

Eighties to convert its problem into a solution by setting a target many saw as utopian -- the education of 80 per cent of its mothers in oral rehydration therapy.

The fact of the target made success inevitable: there was no turning away from a goal so clear and urgent. And today Egypt has brought diarrheal dehydration under control -- the tide has been turned; hundreds of thousands of deaths have been averted. Once seriously set, national targets, especially targets for the protection of children, seem to release social forces that mount in proportion to the difficulties faced. That is why we in UNICEF expect the Sudan, facing the most daunting circumstances, to have 55 per cent of its under-ones protected by vaccination at the end of 1988. That is their target. The fact that the country is struggling up from a three per cent coverage level two years ago makes this target even more keenly sought.

Targets, of course, are not automatically galvanizing to a society; they can be as sterile and as social as cigarette sales quotas. What electrifies them in the cases we have discussed is the component of protest and compassion that comes from the wish to save children. This is the renewable energy source I mentioned earlier. The protection of children has an irresistible, bottomless appeal when it is made into a national purpose. Social arousal provides the force; the target provides the outlet.

One of the most striking examples of the force of the child protection reflex when linked to a target is the recent case of immunization in Lebanon. Seven months ago in devastated Beirut,

UNICEF had a dream -- to vaccinate at least 80 per cent of Lebanon's children before the country's worsening malnutrition brought on epidemics of measles and other childhood killer diseases. To do this would mean reviving the national health services, which had been out of action for several years. It would mean getting pledges of cooperation and non-disruption from the chiefs of all of the country's warring factions -- which had been fighting each other almost without let-up for 12 years, and had come to regard free-wheeling violence as a way of life. Finally, because of the approach of winter, there would be only three months to get ready -- to obtain the guarantees of cooperation; to order and receive from abroad enough vaccines, syringes, and cold chain equipment to suffice for 300,000 children; to train hundreds of Health Ministry and other staff; to organize house-to-house cooperation in each of the country's 24 cazas, or districts; and to mobilize a national awareness-raising campaign through television, radio, mosques, and churches.

Lebanon managed this. For three periods of four days each in September, October, and November, the guns were silent, gunmen at checkpoints handed out immunization leaflets, a gridwork of vaccination stations sprang up in schools, marketplaces, and places of worship, power failures and petrol shortages were overcome, the doctors and health workers emerged from obscurity to become the main actors on the national stage, and 90 per cent of the child target population were immunized. Everything that UNICEF had dreamed was realized.

As the achievement sank in, the media around the world called what had happened "a miracle." But the real dynamic was something more down-to-earth. A society was transformed for a while by the urge to protect its children. When the facts of their children's peril were put to them, the people of Lebanon, the violent and the decent, never hesitated to do what was asked of them. The achievement in Lebanon was not a miracle; rather, it was a compound of elements latent in all countries: a powerful urge to protect children when the danger is known; a target-defined action to deliver that protection; and a narrow window of time to carry out the action.

The calling up of an irresistible force in Lebanon is something that could happen anywhere. It can happen, and has begun to happen, in Africa. The 1985 Burkina Faso Commando for children and the 1987 immunization push in Senegal are proof of that. There is a clear and present danger for children in almost every country in the Continent. Everywhere there is a reservoir of compassion and an urge to rise up and say "No" in thunder to preventable child deaths. National targets aimed at doing something about those deaths are no less feasible in Africa than anywhere else.

Mr. Chairman, there is something in the wind now -- a new sense of what is possible in keeping faith with our children. It is circling and spreading, bringing hope, perhaps bringing permanent change. In Lebanon, the impact of the immunization

campaign created a startling gridwork of new service channels that will carry essential drugs, school supplies, and food stocks until the country can rebuild itself. Large social actions for children generally leave such permanent marks for the good. They create new infrastructure and regenerate attitudes. They create a climate for bold thinking -- and permit the setting of such goals as UNICEF's aim, in the Middle East and North Africa Region, to see the aggregate infant mortality of the 18 member countries reduced, by 1990, to half of what it was in 1980.

For those of us working for the protection of children, Mr. Chairman, there will always be some bad news mixed with the good, some setbacks clouding the advances. There will never be a perfect straight-line progression away from the waste of child life and hope that characterized so much of the past 15 years. But the message from Lebanon and the other countries that have stood up to be counted is that the cause of children can unlock remarkable energies, and give whole populations a shared purpose. When this conference adjourns, that message can be carried back to the states of Africa by each of us. Let us keep in mind the numbing loss of 11,000 children a day. Let us cry out that such a loss is intolerable -- and let us resolve to cut it by half, and then by half again, during our lifetimes. Let that be our target.



## COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is one of the three components - the other two being the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the 144 recognized National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - making up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

A humanitarian institution, the ICRC is the founding body of the Red Cross. As a neutral intermediary in armed conflicts and disturbances, it attempts, either on its own initiative or basing its action on the Geneva Conventions, to provide protection and assistance to the victims of international and civil wars and of internal disturbances and tension, in this way making its contribution to peace in the world.

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Cairo, 26th January 1988

Founded in 1863, the ICRC has constantly pursued its original aim: to protect and assist the victims of armed conflicts.

However, this devotion to its original objective implies for the ICRC a perpetual re-assessment of its function. For although it is true that suffering is ever with us, the nature of conflicts and the categories of the victims affected by them are continually changing.

Those victims were, first, the wounded of armed forces in the field, to whom were later added the shipwrecked, prisoners of war and, above all, the civilian population, those unfortunately easy targets of contemporary conflicts: women, old people, children, killed, maimed or orphaned by indiscriminate bombing; populations displaced, tortured or even wiped out by persons in authority exercising abusively the power in their hands.

As a consequence of the changed nature of conflicts, the ICRC's concern is now directed not only to international conflicts, but also to the ever more numerous and deadly non-international conflicts and to internal disturbances and tension. In addition, the increasingly ideological character of conflicts, guerrilla techniques, weapons of mass destruction and the shift of focus of modern conflicts to the Third World have raised new problems for humanitarian action. Sweeping over people living in already very precarious conditions, such conflicts brutally upset the equilibrium and very quickly make it indispensable for essential goods, in particular food and medicaments, to be provided to ensure the survival of the people.

As a private, independent institution, the ICRC has been entrusted by the international community with well-defined functions; in particular, the Geneva Conventions have bestowed upon it the right to visit prisoners of war and civilian internees during international armed conflicts and have granted it the possibility to propose its services for other humanitarian tasks in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The ICRC's right to put forward such a proposal-or, as it is often called, the right of initiative-is also laid down in the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and is the basis for ICRC action in situations of internal disturbances or tension.

After this introduction about the ICRC, let us focus on Africa. This continent has been and continues to be the scene of numerous armed conflicts, internal disturbances and tensions. As a result, the ICRC was obliged to deploy in recent years almost half of its fieldstaff on the continent, i.e. some 200 staff members and more than a thousand locally recruited personnel, in delegations in 14 different countries: Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Tchad, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Nigeria, Togo and Kenya. Through its 14 delegations, the ICRC was able to provide protection and assistance for hundreds of thousands of victims of armed conflicts on the African continent; the cost of these activities in 1986 was 160 million swiss francs. (SFr. 380 mio in 1985).



It would take up too much time to enumerate the activities of the ICRC in each and every country. Furthermore, some activities should be seen and valued in the long term, because they are an ongoing process over years. However, in order to illustrate the ICRC's work, Ethiopia may serve as an example where a fairly wide range of different types of activities have been deployed in recent years.

Affected by prolonged conflicts and serious droughts, the population in the North of Ethiopia was ICRC's main concern in recent years. Thousands of people had to be provided with food assistance in order to simply survive. At the peak of the relief operation in 1985, more than 10'000 tons of food to nearly 800'000 beneficiaries were distributed every month. This was done by setting up over 40 distribution points in the affected regions. People from the surrounding areas would come on pre-arranged dates to the distribution points in order to receive monthly rations which they could take home to their village, thus discouraging their uprooting and have them crowded in camps. This operation is known under the term "land bridge".

In very remote and inaccessible areas, food and other relief items were dropped from low flying aircrafts.

Parallel to the "land bridge" food distribution, seeds and simple agricultural tools were also distributed in order to encourage the population's resettlement in their home villages and allow them to tend their fields. All is geared towards self-reliance and self sufficiency. In line with this concept, great attention was paid to

sufficient and adequate supply of drinking water by sinking of new wells or repairing existing ones, wherever possible, coupled with education campaign to the rural communities how to maintain their wells.

To achieve all this, the logistic means required were enormous. 85 lorries, 63 trailers and 71 other vehicles were necessary. Apart from big warehouses in three main cities, 45 smaller warehouses were set up all over the area. Because of serious difficulties encountered in transporting goods by road (caused by the security situation or road conditions during the rainy season), the ICRC also made use of air transport. Up to 4 cargo aircrafts and up to 5 lighter aircrafts were involved in this operation.

During periods of severe malnutrition, therapeutic feeding centers were set up. In 1985, nine of such centers, admitting a total of 30'000 infants and mothers, were operating. During their stay (generally 4 to 6 weeks) they receive 4 to 6 meals a day and treatment under medical supervision until their condition has improved.

In most feeding centers emergency reservoirs and distribution points for water were set up in order to guarantee adequate drinking water supply and avoid the outbreak of epidemics.

In order to rehabilitate the many victims who have lost a limb, the ICRC had established in 1982 two rehabilitation centers which now operate under the supervision of the Government, with some technical backing of the ICRC.

One of ICRC's conventional duties are the reunion of separated families, search for missing persons, keep up the links between families and relatives when communications break down and, in case of detained person, help them communicate with their family through Red Cross messages. A peculiar activity developed in 1986. Following population transfers to the south-west of the country organised under the governmental resettlement programme, many children found themselves abandoned in camps of ICRC therapeutic feeding centers. Seriously concerned about the plight of these "orphans", a new type of operation with a view to reuniting families was set in motion. After determining where unaccompanied children came from, delegates transported them, more often than not by air, to the sites of general food distribution where they were shown to the crowd of recipients in the hope that a member of their family would recognize them and take them in. This programme carried out with the active participation of the English section of Save the Children Fund was extremely successful and almost 1500 unaccompanied children or orphans in Tigre and Wollo found homes again, thanks to the joint campaign.

Throughout the year, basic medical relief was distributed by the ICRC. First aid was given and the wounded and severely sick were evacuated, whenever necessary.

Alongside with all these activities mentioned above, meetings were organised to disseminate the basic principle of the Red Cross and of international humanitarian law for various audiences, including government and party

officials, the armed forces, the police, medical personnel, teachers and general public. In 1986, these meetings were attended by over 300'000 people including 8000 members of the armed forces.

Last but not least, the ICRC follows up on some 229 Somali prisoners of war made captive during the Ogaden war and still held captive. It is hoped that a speedy solution will be found for the repatriation of these prisoners (as well as those held by Somalia).

The preceeding pages talk of things achieved in full cooperation with the Ethiopian Red Cross, but they should not hide the fact, and here we refer again to Africa in general and to the world at large, that many things remain unachieved, often for lack of will on behalf of those who have the power or who could use their influence to facilitate the humanitarian work of the ICRC without giving away anything. Still too often are innocent victims the prey of politics, deprived of their rights, becoming nothing less than hostages and used in a power game over which they have no control.

It must be recalled that the ICRC acts in accordance with a mandate received from the international community which, in turn, is committed to "respect and ENSURE respect" for the existing international humanitarian law. It is therefore with great satisfaction that the ICRC has taken cognition of the resolution 1059 (XLIV) introduced by Egypt and adopted by the Council of

ministers of the Organisation of African Unity at its forty-fourth session in Addis Ababa in July 1986 and which expresses its full support to the International Committee of the Red Cross and its activities. Let us hope that the effect of this resolution lives up to the spirit with which it was drawn up.