## "TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS"
IPRA/Lund University Peace Research Institute, Lund, 17-20/VIII/1987

(1) programma e lista dei partecipanti

(2) Eichner, Klaus: "The peace movements of the United States of America and Western Germany: results of an intercultural empirical study"

(3) Finger, Matthias: "Understanding the new peace movement and its conception of political commitment"

(4) Gleditsch, Nils Petter: "The rise and fall of the new peace movement"

(5) Gross, Andreas: "Peace Movement and direct democracy in Switzerland: new chances, conflicts and possible impulses for new social movements in Europe"

(6) Hook, Glenn D.: "The anti-nuclear discourse in Japan: implications for praxis"

(7) Kalu, O.: "Political parties and peace movements"

(8) Kodama, Katsuya: "Red versus Green: a comparative study on peace movements in Japan, Denmark and Finland"

(9) Kurino, Ohtori: "Alternative security and peace movements in the case of Japan"

(10) Krasner, Michael A.: "Decline and persistence in the contemporary Danish and British peace movements: a comparative analysis"

(11) Lindkvist, Kent: "Mobilization peaks and declines of the Swedish peace movement"

(12) Rupprecht, Frank: "Peace movement in history and at present. Principles of a new attitude towards international affairs"

(13) Schlaga, Rüdiger: "Peace movement as a party's tool: the Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic"

(14) Shibata, Shingo: "Sociological implications of Hiroshima and the anti-nuclear movement"

(15) De Smet, Luc: "Belgian peace movement polled"

(16) Tomek, Ivan: "Some questions of peace and war in the public opinion in the CSSR"

(17) Vesa, Unto: "Finnish public opinion and peace movement"

(18) Waever, Ole: "Politics of movement: a contribution to political theory on and in peace movements"

(19) Wilson, Kenneth: "Peace activism, education and the causes of war"

(20) Winther, Judith: "The Danish peace movement and the political development nationally and internationally"

(21) Young, Nigel: "Peace movements and peace research"

(22) Zadra, Roberto: "On the future of peace movements in Italy and Western Europe"

# THE LUND CONFERENCE ON THE STUDY OF PEACE MOVEMENTS

*"Towards a Comparative Analysis"*

At Hotel Sparta,  Lund,  Sweden

17-20,  August,  1987

Organized by:

IPRA Study Group on Peace Movements

Lund University Peace Research Institute

**THEME:  TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS**

IPRA Study Group on Peace Movements have already organized
three conferences in Yugoslavia, Denmark, and UK. Substan-
tial development has been reported. However, the lack of
comparative work has been pointed out as a shortcoming
throughout the conference. At this conference, special at-
tention will be paid to the international comparison of re-
search data and conclusions.

**SUB-THEMES:**

        1. Public opinion and peace movements
        2. Analysis of the rise and fall of peace movements
        3. Alternative security and peace movements
        4. Political parties and peace movements

**CONFERENCE CONVENORS:**
        Katsuya Kodama (main convenor)
        Nigel Young
        Ole Waever

**CONFERENCE ADVISORS:**
        Håkan Wiberg
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**CONFERENCE ASSISTANTS:**
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**SPONSORED BY:**

        Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
        Tampere Peace Reseach Institute (TAPRI)
        Nordic Cooperation Committee (NORDSAM)
        Lund Univrsity Peace Research Institute (LUPRI)

**PLACE OF CONFERENCE:**        Hotel SPARTA
                                        Tunavägen 39. Lund
                                        Tel: 046-12 40 80

**FACILITIES:**

Post office, bank, kiosk, supermarket, pub, pay-telephones,
pay-copyingmachine, are available at the Sparta center. Bus
1 & 6 outside Hotel SPRTA take you downtown in 10 minuites.

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<u>PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE</u>

<u>OF A CONFERENCE ON THE STUDY OF PEACE MOVEMENT</u>

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August 17. 11:00
(Monday)          /      <u>REGISTRATION</u>
                 14:00
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                 14:00
                   /
                         <u>OPENING</u>

(some opening addresses)

Mr. Katsuya Kodama
Dr. Jan Öberg
Prof. Nigel Young

Prof. Gencho D. Piryov
'The international thinking and peace movements'

                 15:30
--------------------------------------------------------
                         Coffee (at the Conference Room)
--------------------------------------------------------
                 16:00
                   /
                         <u>RESEARCH ON PEACE MOVEMENTS</u>

Dr. Frank Rupprecht
'The concept (term, definition) of peace movement in past and
present.'

Prof. Nigel Young
'Research on peace movements'

Dr. Vilho Harle
'The implementation of peace ideas: The case of the outlawry
of war'

                 17:30
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                         Free time
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                 19:30
                   /
                         <u>WELCOME PARTY</u> (at the Conference Room)

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August. 18. 09:00
(Tuesday)

<u>PUBLIC OPINION AND PEACE MOVEMENT</u>

Dr. Unto Vesa
'Finnish public opinion and peace movement'

Dr. Lue De Smet
'Belgian peace movement polled'

Dr. Ivan Tomek
'Some questions of peace and war in the public opinion in CSSR'
    10:30

------------------------------------------------------------
          Coffee (at the Conference Room)
------------------------------------------------------------
    11:00

<u>ANALYSIS OF THE RISE AND FALL OF PEACE MOVEMENTS</u>

Dr. Niels, Petter Gleditch
'The rise and fall of the 'new' peace movement'

Mr. Katsuya Kodama
'Red vs. Green: A comparative analysis of peace movements in Finland, Denmark and Japan'

Prof. Klaus Eichner
'US-and West German peace movement'
    12:30

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          Lunch (at the Sparta Restaurant)
------------------------------------------------------------
·August. 18. 14:00

<u>ANALYSIS OF THE RISE AND FALL OF PEACE MOVEMENT</u>

Prof. Michael Krasner
'Decline and persistence in the contemporary Danish and British peace movements'

Mr. Jörn Böy Nielsen
'On Danish peace movement'

Ms. Judith Winther
'The Danish peace movements and the political development'
    15:30

------------------------------------------------------------
          Coffee (at the Conference Room)
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                    16:00
                       ,
                    ANALYSIS OF THE RISE AND FALL OF PEACE MOVEMENT
Dr. Kent Lindkvist
'On   Swedish peace movements- analysis of the rises and
falls'

Dr. Roberto Zadra
'Peace movement in Italy'

Dr. Matthias Finge
'The new peace movement and its conception of political en-
gagement' '
                    17:30
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                    Evening free, but alternatives will be suggested

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August. 19. 09:00
(Wednesday)     ,
                         ALTERNATIVE SECURITY AND PEACE MOVEMENT

Prof. Ohtori Kurino   ·
'Alternative security and peace movements in the case of
Japan'

Dr. Glenn Hook
'The  anti-nuclear  discourse  in  Japan:  Implication  for
praxis'

Dr. Suman Khanna
'Non-Violence:The means to an end or the means and the end?'

          10:30
----------------------------------------------------------------
                    Coffee (at the Conference Room)
----------------------------------------------------------------
          11:00
             ,       PEACE EDUCATION AND PEACE MOVEMENT

Dr. Magnus Haavelsrud
'Education and development- in relation to peace movements'

Dr. Kenneth Wilson
'Peace activism, education and the causes of war'

Prof. Jörgen P. Jensen
'100 years of indoctrination debate initiated by Danish
peace movements'
                    12:30
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                Lunch (at the Sparta Restaurant)
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            14:00
               /

                POLITICS AND PEACE MOVEMENT

Mr. Ole Waever
'Politics of movement- towards a political theory for peace
movements'

Prof. Susan E. Myers
'Domestic factors in U.S. national security policy:The in-
fluence of four non-governmental organizations on nuclear
weapons manufacturers and nuclear weapon policy'

Dr. Anders Gross
'Peace movement and Suiss direct democracy: New chances, new
conflicts and possible impulses for new soc. movement in the
Wester Europe'

            15:30
------------------------------------------------------------
                Coffee (at the Conference Room)
------------------------------------------------------------
            16:00
               /

                EAST-WEST DIALOGUE

Mr. Köszegi Ferenc
'Brothers in peace? Peace movements in East and West Europe'

Mr. Rudiger Schlaga
'Peace movement as a party's tool. The peace council in the
German Democratic Republic'

Prof. Tom Kronsjö
'Institutionalization of peace movements'

            17:30
------------------------------------------------------------
                Free time
------------------------------------------------------------
            19:30
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                DINNAR    at Chinese Restaurant,
                          (Tatung,   Bantorget 6)


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August. 20. 09:00
(Thursday)

### CASE STUDIES OF PEACE MOVEMENT

**Dr. Nils Ivar Agöy**
'The Norwegian peace movement and the question of conscientious objection to military service in Norway 1885-1922'

**Dr. Ron Eyeman**
'A comparative study of Green Peace movements in Europe'

**Dr. N. N. Naik**
'World peace movements: India's role for peace and disarmament'

10:30
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                        Coffee (at the Conference Room)
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11:00

### CLOSING

> 1.session: a short summary of the conference

> 2.session: for the future works of IPRA
> Study Groups on Peace Movements

12:30
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14:30     Guided tour around Lund city(optional)
          *start at Kulturen
          *the tour covers Cathedral, Lund
           University Old Building and Lundagård

"The Peace Movements of the United States of America and Western
Germany: Results of an Intercultural Empirical Study"

by Klaus Eichner, University of Hamburg, FRG

Paper to be presented at the Lund Conference on Peace Movements

In this paper, some results of an intercultural study comparing the U.S. American and the West German peace movements are presented and discussed. Among other things, these findings are confronted with presumtions and analyzes as they have been put forward in commentaries of the press or in publications of the peace movement.

Both the study and this report are based on the conviction that the essential elements of the two nations' peace movements are covered by an analysis of the structure of the peace groups. It is also presumed that this comparison covers the extreme poles of the Western peace movements: It has been repeatedly claimed or suggested that the U.S. American peace movement occupy the poles of pragmatic orientation, conventional political means, patriotism, neutrality with respect to party politics and professionalism in that sense that the U.S. peace movement functions as a pressure group. In contrast to this, the West German peace movement should rather be labelled an ideological movement, which utilizes unconventional means. It has been said to be oriented internationally and partially towards the Soviet Union. With respect to party politics, it be leaning fairly strongly towards the left. It has been described as a citizens'action committee, and, as such doesn't work in a professional manner. Other peace movements in the West, such as the Scandinavian, the French and the ones in Southern Europe be placed in the middle of the spectrum defined by these two extreme poles. The French peace movement e.g. be a case in point displaying both a strong orientation towards the Communist Party and a patriotic and pragmatic orientation.

The credo of this study is that the intercultural comparison of two poles opposite to each other with respect to their social orientation is of particular importance when we are concerned with the exploration of a social phenomeneon, especially because it is exactly the 'difference' between the two social units that enables us to dicover what it is that such movements really have in common. An intercultural comparison of such social units permits the identification of idiosyncratic cultural conditions, but also, as has already been voiced, of elements which are common to both movements.

The guiding question thus reads: How is peace work organized in different societies ? Does the cultural and political system within which the movement operate have any impact on them or rather, how do the peace movements utilize the social and political opportunities ?

Also, how does the common notion of peace pervade the current efforts of the movements and how do they appraise their achievements ?

These questions can be investigated empirically, or rather statistically by comparing samples. Under certain conditions significant differences can be stated, the condition being that both samples of peace groups are random samples of their populations. In addition to this, structural comparisons can be made based on relations among factors which are either of the same kind or diffeent.

A random sample of peace movements was collected according to a particular modus in each case. Both were questionned by mail survey which was identical in large parts. Data collection was completed in 1985/86. The study thus contains data and information on peace movements on the threshold of SDI, whereas Gorbachev's peace initiative was advanced later.

In the ongoing presentation, some exemplary results concerning organizational structure, system of action, demands and assessments of succes are presented and interpreted.

Simple comparisons reveal that the U.S. American peace movement represented in the peace groups which are "officially" known (Peace Resource Book 1986) without doubt is a more professionalized organization than the West German. On the average, American peace groups show a considerably higher level of hierarchy than German ones. Not only is there a higher average number of different positions, the American peace movement has available positions which are, in part, full-time jobs and, as such, office holders are paid for their work. These positions-executive director, volunteer coordinator, fundraiser, editor etc. - practically do not exist within German groups. Considering the average age of peace group members, it is worth noting that the U.S American peace movement has considerably less members of student age but has more members in higher age groups, relatively

speaking. Thus the age pyramid of the U.S. peace movement is much closer to the one of 'normal' organizations than the German peace movement.

Table 1: Age Pyramid of Peace Movements



A similar picture results from the analysis of various status features: The percentage of people with graduate education being about equal (27 %), the German peace movement having slight preponderance, there is a difference with respect to blue collar and white collar workers. Within these categories, and especially with regard to white collar workers, the U.S. peace movement clearly predominates. It is interesting that the percentage of unemployed members is markedly higher in the U.S. A. - 11 % than in the FRG, where only 4 % of the membership is unemployed. This may be due to the fact that the work done in the U.S. peace movement tends to incorporate aspects of professional qualification, in particular political ones, which attrack unemployed to the movement.

If the degree of cooperation with similar institutions is regarded as another indication of a movement's professionalization, a clear difference emerges: The correlations between the dummy variable U.S.A and various levels of cooperation read:

| | |
|---|---|
| local cooperation | +.37** |
| national cooperatioon | +.55** |
| international cooperation | +.12 |
| | (** .001 level of significance) |

It is obvious that the U.S. movement's preponderance is extremely strong on the national level which reflects geographically and culturally the dominating importance of the nation in the U.S.A. Also U.S. peace groups are older on the average than West German peace movement. This is a hint not so much at less tradition of the West German peace movement than that it indicates less continuity of the institutions and organizations, respectively. Both cultures have seen peace movements for more then 50 years, but the West German peace movement is the movement of NATO's double track decision whereas the American is the movement of vietnam and increased nuclear armament.

An interesting parallel exists with respect to the development of mean membership. Usually, average membership decreases during boom periods of group formation, while it increases in periods of consolidation and decreases again in times of stagnation. The German peace movement exemplifies this pattern to an almost paradigmatic extent.

Table 2: Membership and Foundation in the FRG

While group formation culminated in 1980, membership was at its lowest point but grows considerably up to 1983. In 1984 stagnation seems to set in with respect to group foundations as well as average membership. Membership development of the U.S. peace movement takes a similar course though membership reaches its lowest point in 1981. But in all, the development takes a more even course.

Table 3: Membership in the U.S.A. (indexed to FRG)



This courve likewise exemplifies the more professional orientation of the U.S. peace movement although memberships can not be compared directly because the mode of membership participation is very different: While the West German peace movement recruits simply 'members', the U.S. peace movement has available volunteers, members and people on the mailing lists.

In summing up these exemplary data, it can be said that the U.S. peace movement has in fact achieved a higher degree of organizational professionalism and continuity and acts upon it, respectively.

There is even harder evidence for this thesis as soon as the basic sample comparison is abandoned in favor of an organizational-structural approach. Following thoughts serve as an illustration: There are certain structural interrelations which have been noticed again and again. One of these finding is,

for instance, that at least in the initial phase, the degree of outside cooperation increases as the organization gets older. Now, if there exists such a positive relationship between the age of a country's organisation and their degree of cooperation with similar organizations, we shall assume that this country's organizations tend to exhibit conventional organizational structures. This is exactly what can be maintained with respect to the U.S. peace movement: Throughout we find a strong positive correlation between the organization's age and its degree of cooperation on various levels. This is not at all true for the German peace movement; there is even a slight negative relationship between these two factors. Thus the peace movements of the two countries exhibit completely different organizational structures.

Now, the question is wether these different organizational forms also produce different outputs. Often, the system of action is viewed to be the central output of such a movement. The term 'system of action' refers to the type of externally oriented actions that are carried out by the organization as well as to the continuance and frequency of these activities. Organizational efforts doubtlessly focus on the range of peace activities, and external attention centers around them as well.

Looking at the wide range of activities that have been carried out, the first thing to comment on is that the U.S. peace movement performs some activities that either do not have a counterpart in the West German peace movementor are hardly ever performed by it. Some examples are canvassing, phone banking, talk shows. The following activities are relevant for both peace movements: leafletting, film/slide show, panel discussions, rallies, protest in silence, peace fasting, peace worship, occupation of buildings, blockade of military facilities and arms plant, traffic blockade.

In accordance with the introductory thesis, it can be stated that the U.S. peace movement tends to carry out informative and intermediary activities, whereas the West German peace movement tends to engage in direct or coercive activities. The finding that panel discussions, film showings and worships are more important to the U.S. peace movement is highly significant. Both

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attach about equal importance to peace fasting and protest in silence.

Two reasons seem to account for this finding: on the one hand, intermediary activities require an organizational management of the kind that is more easily provided by semi-professional organizations. On the other hand, the bias concerning the utilization of means can be safely attributed to the possibilities and chances which lie in the particular political system. Canvassing, letterwriting campaigns, phone banking, etc. are probably adequate conventional means of political pressure and lobbying. Since the pressure extorted by the U.S. peace groups is concentrated on people rather than on parties, these activities have at least some prospect of succes. Within a political system organized around party politics, these activities would probably be ineffective - at least this seems to be the perception of the peace activists. Thus the peace movements of these countries are definitely 'children' of their political systems whose possibilities they utilize persistently.

In addition to this evident output, another one which could be delineated as a mental output can be analyzed: I am referring to the demands the peace movements direct at themselves. There an underlying parallel of argumentation exists but there is also a bias through all demands.

First, let us take a look at the following demands and the distribution of the answers:

**Tables 4: Demands of the peace movements**

Table 4.1: "The peace movement should mobilize as many peaple as possible"

| | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | FRG | USA |
| INCLUDE MANY totally agree Count Percent | 95.9% | 81.0% |
| agree Count Percent | 2.0% | 10.3% |
| in between Count Percent | | 5.2% |
| disagree Count Percent | 2.0% | 1.7% |
| totally disagree Count Percent | | 1.7% |

Table 4.2: "Within the unions and at work, the peace work should be intensified"

| | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | FRG | USA |
| MORE AT WORK totally agree Count Percent | 77.6% | 52.6% |
| agree Count Percent | 12.2% | 31.6% |
| in between Count Percent | 10.2% | 12.3% |
| disagree Count Percent | | 3.5% |

Table 4.3: "The peace movement should strive for cooperation with all political groupings which consider themselves as part of the movement"

|  | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | FRG | USA |
| COOP ALL POLIT<br>totally agree<br>  Count Percent | 67.3% | 55.4% |
| agree<br>  Count Percent | 24.5% | 14.3% |
| in between<br>  Count Percent | 6.1% | 12.5% |
| disagree<br>  Count Percent |  | 7.1% |
| totally disagree<br>  Count Percent | 2.0% | 10.7% |

The peace movements tend to take the same point of view. Although there is also some difference, this type of demands is likely to be part of the programmes of both peace movements. The claim to reach as many people as possible tends to be shared to a greater extend than the claim to extend peace work within the unions. The demand for cooperation with all political groupings of the movement finds less support in both countries. It is nonetheless noteworthy that the U.S. peace movement displays a more differentiated viewpoint and does not voice demands as strongly as the West German. Maybe this is a further indication of the professionalized character of the U.S. peace movement ?
At last, let us examine wether peace groups perceive their work to be succesfull. Without question, succes consists of many elements and is not restricted to the political goals disarmament and peace politics. Perception of succes was measured along various dimensions.

**Tables 5: Perceptions of succes**

Table 5.1: "The peace movement has been very succesfull so far"

| | Country | |
|---|---|---|
| | FRG | USA |
| SUCCES | | |
| totally agree | | |
| Count Percent | 27.1% | 1.7% |
| agree | | |
| Count Percent | 43.8% | 12.1% |
| in between | | |
| Count Percent | 25.0% | 48.3% |
| disagree | | |
| Count Percent | 2.1% | 34.5% |
| totally disagree | | |
| Count Percent | 2.1% | 3.4% |

Table 5.2: "Arms issues, which used to be discussed and decided upon almost exclusively by experts such as politicians and the military, have now entered the consciousness of the broad population"

| | Country | |
|---|---|---|
| | FRG | USA |
| BROAD POPULATION | | |
| totally agree | | |
| Count Percent | 34.7% | 29.3% |
| agree | | |
| Count Percent | 49.0% | 32.8% |
| in between | | |
| Count Percent | 12.2% | 25.9% |
| disagree | | |
| Count Percent | 4.1% | 10.3% |
| totally disagree | | |
| Count Percent | | 1.7% |

Table 5.3: "A broad coalition has developed: within the framework of the peace movement, groups holding different attitudes and ideologies have joined together"

| | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | FRG | USA |
| COALITION<br>totally agree<br>  Count Percent | 28.6% | 12.1% |
| agree<br>  Count Percent | 57.1% | 29.3% |
| in between<br>  Count Percent | 14.3% | 39.7% |
| disagree<br>  Count Percent | | 17.2% |
| totally disagree<br>  Count Percent | | 1.7% |

Table 5.4: "The peace movement has remained independent from political parties"

| | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | FRG | USA |
| INDEPENDENT<br>totally agree<br>  Count Percent | 36.0% | 8.6% |
| agree<br>  Count Percent | 42.0% | 41.4% |
| in between<br>  Count Percent | 20.0% | 27.6% |
| disagree<br>  Count Percent | 2.0% | 17.2% |
| totally disagree<br>  Count Percent | | 5.2% |

It is obvious that there is a clear difference with respect to

the assessment of succes. First of all, the U.S. peace movement displays the same tendency that has discussed above: it shows a more differentiated assessment. Furthermore, the U.S. peace movement perceives its succes to be considerably lower than the West German. Both the assessment of the single dimensions and the attitude towards overall succes are significantly lower. This certainly does not have that much to do with the achievement of political goals, rather it seems to reflect the character of the West German peace movement as an institution of mental support which also serves to evaluate the idea of peace. The answer to the following question also reflects the more optimistic attitude of the West German peace movement:

Table 6: "It is possible to convince the majority of the population of the peace movement's views"

| | Country | |
|---|---|---|
| | FRG | USA |
| CONVINCE MAJORITY totally agree Count Percent | 32.7% | 25.9% |
| agree Count Percent | 40.8% | 25.9% |
| in between Count Percent | 18.4% | 27.6% |
| disagree Count Percent | 8.2% | 19.0% |
| totally disagree Count Percent | | 1.7% |

The reaction of the West German peace movement is significantly more optimistic. This finding clearly contrasts with the answer to the question wether activities should be temporarily stopped now in favor of increased discussion:

12

Table 7: "At this point, the peace movement should emphasize discussion rather than activities"

|  | Country | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | FRG | USA |
| MORE DISCUSSION<br>totally agree<br>Count Percent | 4.3% | 3.5% |
| agree<br>Count Percent | 27.7% | 3.5% |
| in between<br>Count Percent | 17.0% | 12.3% |
| disagree<br>Count Percent | 27.7% | 36.8% |
| totally disagree<br>Count Percent | 23.4% | 43.9% |

In spite of the noticeable more optimistic evaluation of its work, the West German peace movement states significantly more often that this change of course should be adopted. The question is wether this reflects a national characteristic - Germany being the country of poets and great thinkers - as opposed to being a nation of activists ? Or can this finding be accounted for by structural conditions of peace work in the FRG ? Maybe it also indicates that the work done by the West German peace movement is not so much aimed at political as it is at mental elements.

# Understanding the new peace movement and its conception of political commitment

paper presented at the Conference on the study of Peace Movements, International Peace Research Association:
"Towards a comparative analysis of peace movements"

University of Lund, LUPRI, 17th – 20th august 1987

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The aim of this paper is to give a look on the new peace movement which, as far as I can see, has not yet been given in the existing literature.[1] The specificity of this look is due to my double education as a political and as an adult educational scientist. Therefore, my approach can be qualified as the one of a political psychologist. It is an approach of someone who tries to understand how, why and what for people do personnally and politically commit themselves in the new peace movement.

Of course, this research interest cannot be isolated from more theoretical and philosophical questions which I also follow up. Those are the questions of the type and the nature of future political commitment within highly industrialized societies.

My personal commitment is another reason why I want to better understand the type and the nature of modern political commitment.

In a first chapter I will summarize the most important findings of a research I have conducted for at least four years now, and in which I have tried to make explicit how people understand their own personal/political commitemnt within the new peace movement.

In a second chapter I will try to assess the position of the new peace movement concerning two questions, i.e. the question of the Euromissiles and the question of fear and anxiety. This assessment is to my opinion necessary in order to better understand the very nature of the new peace movement.

In a third conclusive chapter I will then put this understanding into relation with the more general question of political commitment within highly industrialized societies.

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[1] When I talk about the "literature on the new peace movement" I exclusively refer to books and to some articles which's object is the new peace movement as one whole coherent phenomenon (see bibliography). This excludes in particular the huge amount of articles and papers dealing with a limited aspect of the new peace movement.

## 1. Ten argumentations why to engage for peace

The empirical basis of this chapter is the above mentioned long term research which has recently lead to a PhD in political science.[2] One of its aims was to identify and to make explicit the main argumentations (why one should commit oneself for peace) which the new peace movement had used between 1980 and 1984 in Europe and the United States. Methodologically I have exclusively worked on leaflets, texts, papers, books, etc. which the new peace movement has produced himself during its main activity years.

Knowldege about the new peace movement (its history, its structure, its importance within a country, its impact on public opinion, etc.) was only used to assess the relative importance and weight of the different actors (which have produced the argumentations).
Concretely, I first isolated the main critics and the main claimings and then tried to identify the argumentations which went along with them. I implied that these argumentations at the same time tell why and what for one commits oneself in the new peace movement.

Before presenting a certain amount of these argumentations, let me make some general observation pertaining to the identity of the new peace movement: this movement is not only heterogeneous in what concern♥ its member organizations or its member groups, but also in what concerns its way of looking at the problem. In fact, within the same movement, at least ten different, sometimes even contradictory argumentations do (pacifically?) coexist. Nine out of ten argumentations are completely international, and it is intersting to observe that the main distinction must be made between the United States on the one hand and Europe – East and West – on the other.
Furthermore, none of the argumentations is specific to a structure, to an institution or to an organization. They are rather specific to different ways of approaching the peace issue; in this sense we can talk of a feminist approach, of a leftist and trade-unionist approach, of a christian approach, of an approach of ecologists, as well as of an approach of high ranked ex-NATO generals. In other words, argumentations are not produced by institutions, but by persons and social groups.
Out of these ten argumentations only one directly continues the traditional pacifist approach to peace and disarmament. The anti-nuclear argumentation instead, born with Hiroshima, is generally integrated.
Let me now briefly summarize each of these ten main argumentations:

2 Matthias FINGER, L'émergence du nouveau mouvement pour la paix. Compréhension et étude comparée de l'engagement politique dans les pays industriels avancés, Université de Genève, Département de Science politique, 1987

## First argumentation: power relations

This first argumentation does not focus on the dangers of the nuclear arms race, but on the decision taken by a national government (in particular Italy) to implant the Euromissiles on its ground.

This decision – which is considered of capital importance for the future of Italy, of Europe and of the whole humankind – has been taken without consulting the concerned populations. As far as the government is involved in this decision, it is considered to have acted in a anti-democratic manner. As far as the implantation has been imposed to a national government by the United States, these latter are considered as being imperialists.

Anti-democratism and imperialism are seen linked, so that the new peace movement considers that its role is to restore democracy within the nation, as well as to restore national sovereignty. The most adequate means to do this consists in mobilizing a maximum number of persons, be it through big demonstrations or through votes (referendum). The conception of political commitment is the one of challenging the government, i.e. the one of a power relation between on the one side those who decide (or who have already decided) about the question of life and death, and on the other side those who are suffering from these decisions.

## Second argumentation: peace through development and cooperation

Also this second argumentation has mainly been found in Italy, but also among the west-german trade-union DGB. It is argued that war is the opposition not of peace but of development, whereas peace is essentially seen as the absence of war; and this absence of war is a necessary condition for development. On the other hand, development is considered as the main driving force behind peace. Consequently, war is considered being the result of social but even more economic injustice, an injustice which it in turn still furthers. The main injustice happens between the North and the South (overdevelopment versus underdevelopment), whereas the conflict between the East and the West is seen as the cause of this injustice.

In other words, relations of cooperation and dialogue between East and West will help to bring about developement and more justice into the relations between the North and the South. Therefore, to oppose the arms race is a means to commit oneself to fight poverty and injustice of the Third World. This argumentation, though marginal in the new peace movement, assigns a specific role to Europe; Europe is in the center of this argumentation, since it is Europe which has to deconnect from the other two superpowers (and from their blocs), and to link itself with the developing countries.

This "emancipation of Europe" from the superpowers will go together with its commitment for peace and justice.

This argumentation actually is strictly limited to the level of international relations, so that in fact it does not consider other political actions than appeals to governments in order that they dialogue and cooperate among themselves. It is but a new version of the traditional pacifist argumentation.

### Third argumentation: the logic of deterrence

This is one of the most used argumentations within the new peace movement. It has its roots in the critic of the "equilibrium of deterrence" prevailing among the two superpowers. In reality, it is not so much the critic of the actual situation of deterrence, which puts the world into a state of terror, than rather the critic of the underlying logic of deterrence. This logic pretends that the permanent threat of war is an absolutely necessary condition for the maintainance of peace. And this logic of deterrence is so to say an institutionalized version of the distrust between the two superpowers, as well as of modern nuclear technologies. It is thereofore this logic of deterrence which is considered being responsable for the nuclear arms race, as it is going on since the second World War.

In oposition to most of the other argumentations, this one sees the Euromissiles and their implantation as being a logical continuation, rather than a rupture, of this logic of deterrence. Therefore the aim of the new peace movement is to disrupt the logic of deterrence.                              *un ville  therefores*

On a technological and domestic level this could be done through putting up a non-aggressive defense (which can range from a non-defensive military technology (swiss model) to social defense). On a political and international level this breaking down of the logic of deterrence can best be achieved through diplomacy. In fact, enhancing a climate of confidence is seen as being a first and necessary step towards the disruption of the logic of deterrence. Like the previous argumentation, this one also sees its main action on the level of the international political climate; here too, the political commitment mainly takes the form of pressure put on the two superpowers, and mostly on NATO, in order that they dialogue in a climate of mutual confidence (for example through declarations and unilateral actions like: "No first use", stopping nuclear testing, non-implantation of Euromissiles, etc.).

### Fourth argumentation: Europe as the future battlefield of the two superpowers

I have found this forth argumentation mainly in West Germany, in the Netherlands, as well as among the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament". It's main point is the critics of the Reagan administration, which is accused of preparing a nuclear first strike againts the Soviet Union. On the technological level, this preparation takes the form of a "first strike capability", whereas on

the strategic-doctrinal level it takes the form of the idea of "decapitation" of the USSR. This strategic doctrine actually means a rupture with the traditional logic of deterrence.

Moreover, this argumentation pretends that the United States do prepare a limited nuclear war which is planned to take place on european ground; in other words, Europe would become the battlefield of the two superpowers. This also means that Europe can no longer be considered as being protected by the USA and by the NATO, since it is used by the latter as an (american) nuclear platform in order to threaten and to attack the USSR. To be available for this aim, the United States not only have to hide their plans from the europeans (citizens and governments), but they have to undertake a vast public relations campaign, in order to manipulate the european public opinion (so that the europeans accept to be the future victims of a nuclear war).

It is precisely at this level that the new peace movement sees its main task: it feels that it has to inform the population and the governments of Europe, so that they become conscious of what is really at stake (preparation of a limited nuclear war in Europe), and that they become conscious of the real dangers of the Euromissile-implantation ("to die for the United States").

In other words, the new peace movement sees its role as the one of a counter-expert; this means counter-expertise to the population so that, on the basis of solid information, it can put pressure on the european governements, but it also means counter-expertise  to the governments themselves. After having become conscious of the dangers and the stakes of the Euromissile-implantation, the europeans of the West, governments and citizens, should do everything to extract themselves from the american strategy of decapitation.

Fifth argumentation: "Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen"
("To further peace without arms")

I reduce here this fifth argumentation to its basic "skeleton", as I have mainly identified it in Western Germany. But as such it can also be found more generally within christian. grassroots movements, within non-violent movements, as well as with the "Women for Peace". This argumentation takes its point of departure from the assertions that the actual situation is extremely dangerous, that a limited or global nuclear war is inevitable in the long term and that the individual and collective death (due to a nuclear war) is (almost) certain. In fact, these assertions are neither the result of evaluation of the state of international relations, nor the result of an analysis of the strategical doctrines, nor the result of a thorough study of modern military technology. The basis of this argumentation is instead the legitimate fear of the individuals for their own survival and for the survival of Humanity. Considering that the continuation of the actual arms race leads, according to this argumentation, directly to suicide, only a radical unilateral step towards disarmament might eventually be an outcome.

The argumentation which is used here is neither technical, nor political, but purely moral, religious or ethical, since even the slightest chance for survival (through unilateral disarmament) is to prefer to a death which is certain. For the biggest part of the supporters of this argumentation, governments and politicians are part of this dangerous arms race, so that they and their commitment for disarmament cannot be trusted in.

It is therefore considered that each individual which is conscious of the dangers, has to take responsibility and to act consequently. In other words, the taking in charge of unilateral disarmament by everyone is a question of survival. This argumentation then leads to a "grass-roots" type of political commitment (blocades, occupations, local nuclear free zones, etc.).

## Sixth argumentation: "Ausbruch aus dem Irrenhaus"
("Escape from the mental hospital")

This sixth argumentation cannot really be considered as being an autonomous one, since it is a combination of the fourth argumentation ("Europe as the future battlefield of the superpowers"), the fifth argumentation ("Further peace without arms") and the eighth argumentation ("European Nuclear Disarmament").

This original combination allows it to specify the critic of the governments and the political system, as well as the concrete claimings, i.e. a denuclearized and more generally demilitariazed unified Europe (East and West) on the basis of individual concern and personal/political commitment.

## Seventh argumentation: Exterminism and popular sovereignty

This seventh argumentation was mainly identified in Great Britain around the CND; it can be linked to the critics formulated in the third ("Logic of deterrence") and the fourth argumentation ("Europe as the future battlefield of the superpowers").

Compared to the two latter ones, this argumentation deepens the analysis of the arms race, which is no more seen as the cause of the problem, but rather as a symptom of a more generally "sick" society. E.P. Thompson has coined the concept of "exterminism" to describe the inevitable process towards extermination which the industrial civilization is engaged in. This is a process on which politics do no longer have any control, since they are themselves part of the problem. On can therefore talk of an "erosion of politics", which is parallel to the progression of exterminism.

Like the fifth argumentation ("Further peace without arms"), this argumentation leads to the conclusion that politics have to be reconquered by the person and by its own responsibilization (popular sovereignty). It considers that the

political commitment has to start on a local level and - like the fifth and sixth argumentation - through personal consciousness rising, as well as through other educational processes.


## Eighth argumentation: "European Nuclear Disarmament" (END)

This eighth argumentation, which is certainly among the most spread in western and eastern Europe, can be found explicitly in the first phase (until 1983) of the END-campaign (which has been perverted afterwards). It takes its start in the statement that Europe is destined to become the future battlefield of the two superpowers (fourth argumentation). But compared to the previous seventh argumentation, this is not the result of an inevitable exterminist process, but rather the consequence of the logic of deterrence, of the Cold War and of the existence of the two military blocs (third argumentation). According to this argumentation, the arms race which will lead to a nuclear war in Europe, exclusively happens between the two superpowers and Europe is so to say its victim. Stopping the arms race certainly means a rupture of the logic of deterrence, but furthermore also an overcoming of the separation of Europe into two blocs. This idea of Europe as a third force or a third way was already found in the second argumentation; but in opposition to this one, the eighth argumentation does not think of an Europe of Nation-States and governments, since they actually owe their existence to the two superpowers and since they are therefore completely submissive to them. Instead, this "United Europe" should be built by the european people from the East and the West, which are united and joint in their geography, their history and their common culture. Like in the seventh argumentation, the commitment for peace has therefore to come from the people at the grass-roots level, through autonomous movements within each european country ("Détente from below").

Nevertheless, this conception of political commitment is less anti-institutional, than it is the case of the fifth, the sixth and the seventh argumentation. One can say that this eighth argumentation, more than any other one, joins together a certain amount of different argumentations, which, in part, explains its popularity.


## Ninth argumentation: "Freeze!"

I have analyzed the US Freeze campaign as being first of all a movement, and only in the second place an appeal to freeze the nuclear arms race. As a movement, it represents the convergence of a multitude of mainly grass-roots groups which act essentially on a local level. Progressively "Freeze" has been taken in charge by american political personalities; it then concentrated on a precise claiming, i.e. the freeze of testing, producing and deploying nuclear arms. The point of departure of the american Freeze is nevertheless the same as is the case in Europe, which is the reaction against a new stept in the nuclear arms race. It is a step which is mainly marked by the appearance of a new

military technology, allowing a first strike and therefore inciting a strategy of attack or decapitation. Freeze considers that it is this new step of the arms race (and not for example the arms race's exterminist drive) which is particularly dangerous, and which will lead quasi inevitably to a nuclear catastrophy.

Confronted to the choice of life and death, no political nor ideological consideration is no longer valuable: to commit oneself for a Freeze becomes an ethical and moral obligation. In opposition to the fifth argumentation ("Further peace without arms"), which from the point of view of the type of commitment is certainly closest to it, Freeze only considers this last stage of the nuclear arms race as being dangerous; that's why it "only" claims a nuclear freeze and not a unilateral and total disarmament. In other words, traditional deterrence is considered as having worked, and it has therefore to be maintained, if not restored. As said before, the conception of political commitment which goes along with this argumentation is neither openly anti-institutional, nor a simple appeal to the governments. It is particular to this american conception of democracy where politicians are seen as human persons with ethical and moral judgments. In this conception of democracy, non-violent resistance and civil disobedience are not considered in contradiction with the more traditional political commitment of voting and electing.

Tenth argumentation: anti-nuclear

This is the only argumentation which explicitly links the new peace movement to the anti-nuclear movements of the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties. I have in particular identified this argumentation among the "Physicians for Social Responsability", but it can also be found among a certain number of other "concerned" scientists, who are personnally committed to peace and disarmament.

In this argumentation, the point of departure is not the one of observing a new stage of the nuclear arms race, but the scientific analysis (since the fifties) and the more and more solid scientific evidence of the consequences of nuclear energy (civil and military).

It is argued that in the least case of nuclear conflict or accident, modern medicine will not be able to help the population. And it is on the basis of this statement – and on the basis of an ethical choice in favor of life –, and not on the basis of a rational argumentation, that the opposition to the nuclear arms race is justified. This tenth argumentation also pretends that the truth about the dangers of nuclear energy is deliberately hidden from the public by the governments; it is therefore the task of the scientists to inform the population and to figure as counter-experts. At the same time, the scientists and in particular the medical profession should become more independent from the governments, since the medical or scientific point of view is not anymore the same as the political one. This is, to my opinion, another version of the same

anti-institutional conception of political commitment as it can be found in the fifth, the sixth and the seventh argumentation.


## 2. Understanding the new peace movement?


In what concerns research on the new peace movement, I am of the opinion that it is necessary to go beyond the simple description of specific groups committed to peace and the description of their structure or their functioning. It is also necessary to find a deeper understanding of the new peace movement than it can be obtained when one sticks to the study of its impact on public opinion, on political parties or on national governments. Actual writings on the new peace movement unfortunately remain either highly descriptive or extremely ideological, which is of course linked to the passionate nature of the issue.
It is nevertheless to be hoped that research on the new peace movement will lead to a more analytical understanding of the very nature of the new peace movement.

*bisherige =Ober- flãd- lid- keit*

In this chapter I want to show how my approach of the new peace movement's main argumentations can at least be a first step towards such a understanding. Let me concentrate on two aspects which to my opinion are particularly  helpfull in understanding the new peace movement, i.e. the aspect of the Euromissiles on the one hand and the aspect of fear and anxiety on the other.


## 2.1. Opposing the Euromissiles

*Unt-bugphirts*

The fact that the new peace movement is born at the same time as the implantation of the Euromissiles took place in Europe has brought some researchers, some writers and many journalists to state that it exclusively is an opposition movement to Euromissiles, which it of course also is. Nevertheless, one can oppose the same Euromissiles for many very different reasons. Despite its psycho-political obviousness, the people who have studied the new peace movement, once they had identified its main claimings or slogans, remained stuck to this reality.
If they were sympathetic to the movement, they then tried to identify the concrete proposals or alternatives, they tried to assess the seriousness or the feasability of these proposals or they tried to estimate the efficiency or the chances of success of these proposals. Others concentrated on the rationality of the protest or tried to make it more rational.
If the people who studied the new peace movement were rather hostile to it, then they for example tried to point out whether the claimings or the proposals were realistic. Others wanted to assess the implications of the new peace movement's protest on the planned deployment schedule, on the Atlantic Alliance, on the defense of Europe or simply on the security of the United States. Very probably, the aim of most of the studies concerning the impact of the new peace movement on public opinion was only to assess its eventual impact in the deployment schedule.

Most of the studies written about the new peace movement, including the main slogans of the new peace movement itself, give the impression that this movement was only interested in fighting the Euromissiles. I will challenge this assertion on the basis of the argumentations I have identified within the new peace movement. If one looks at these argumentations, one can see that the Euromissiles do not actually occupy the place which is generally attributed to them. This can be explained through the fact that, even if the new peace movement has been set in motion by the Euromissiles, it has, during its commitment, undergone a process of "consciousness rising", or rather a process of formation of its argumentations. At least for some argumentations this is some kind of educational or formative process, within which the new peace movement has elaborated its specific argumentations by integrating the question of the Euromissiles into a more general scheme of comprehension.

The ten argumentations are then but ten different ways to integrate the Euromissile-question into such a more general scheme of comprehension; it is this mechanism of integration which explains why, in each of these argumentations, the Euromissiles do not appear anymore as being an isolated problem.

I do not want to go systematically over all the ten argumentations; I will just summarize here the four main different (stakes as they exist within the new peace movement), as well as their relation to the Euromissiles.

The first stake is the one of the Reagan adiministration in particular and of the United States in general; they are said to prepare, through NATO, a nuclear first strike or attack against the USSR, which's battlefield will be Europe. What is at stake here are politicians and political administrations. The Euromissiles and their implantation is not a problem in itself, but part of a more general problem of irresponsible political leaders and extremely dangerous strategic doctrines.

The second stake is the one of international relations, i.e. more concretely the stake of conflictual relations between the United States and the USSR. These conflictual relations, due to distrust and deterrence (which are mutually reinforcing) strengthen the logic of the two blocs and therefore accelerate the arms race. Here the Euromissiless are not a problem in themselves either, but they are part of a more general problem of (conflictual) relations among nation-states.

The third stake is pertaining to nuclear energy (civil and military) which is seen as being a problem in itself. Here, the specificity of the Euromissiles disappears, since they are just one more (quantitative) step towards nuclear catastrophy. The only qualitative change stems back to Hiroshima and the invention of the atomic bomb. In other words, the Euromissiles are just another occasion to bring the same (old) nuclear issue on the table.

The fourth stake is the one of the dynamics of militarization and exterminism, which will inevitably lead to a catstrophy. The Euromissiles do not qualitatively change neither the nature of militarization nor the exterminist process; they are just one milestone more on the already very marked "road to Armaggedon". In other words, like above the Euromissile-debate is just another occasion to remind the people of the exterminist dynamics the industrialized civilization is engaged in. The nuclear issue mentioned above can be considered as being one single aspect of this exterminist process.

On the basis of these four stakes one can distinguish between two different roles the Euromissiles are playing within the argumentations of the new peace movement.

Within the two first stakes the Euromissiles do have a certain role to play since their non-implantation would have a certain effect on the stakes in question: it would either mean a sign of goodwill towards the USSR (which in turn probably would improve the relations between the USA and the USSR), or a first step away from aggressive strategic doctrines (which also can improve the relations between the USA and the USSR), or both. In other words, the effects of the non-implantation are seen as purely political; here the Euromissiles-debate becomes a political one. The problems - as they are defined by the corresponding argumentations - can and must be solved on a political level (negociations, elections of new politicians, confidence building measures, etc.). Those two stakes also see the problem in a very limited and particularly time-limited manner. One has to ask whether the new peace movement really had the capacity to play a certain role on this political level within such a short time; this might be somehow in contradiction with the way these argumentations of the new peace movement conceive the problem.

In the last two stakes, the Euromissiles do not play a significant role at all; they are in fact an "excuse" to bring up more fundamental and more dynamic questions, such as nuclearization, militarization, exterminism, etc. Compared to the last two stakes, these are not primarily political questions, since they are pertaining to the process of industrial civilization, of which politics is only an element. In other words, these stakes and the problems which go along with them cannot be solved on a purely political level; to my opinion, this is rather a cultural issue. At least a part of the new peace movement, which has defined the stakes in this manner has also elaborated some adequate ways of (cultural) action, such as local nuclear free zones or other kinds of educational activities.

Summing up, one can say that within the same new peace movement there are those for whom the Euromissiles play a certain role; they define the problem as being political in the traditional sense and they see their action as having to be a political one; at the same time, they probably didn't have the means to tackle with such a highly political problem.
On the other hand there are those whose problem is the dynamics and the exterminist drive of a civilization; for them the Euromissiles are hardly more than an occasion to remind one of the existence of this drive. They define the

problem as being a cultural one, (western industrialzed culture), and that's why the Euromissile-debate – which through the media has become a political debate – does not completely fit into their scheme of looking at the problem.

It would be interesting to push this internal contradiction within the same new peace movement further; one could for example explore the hypothesis of holding this contradiction at least partly responsible for a certain "failure" of the new peace movement, since this is, to my opinion, a contradiction between two radically different ways of looking at the problem, which in turn determine two different types of political commitment.[3]

## 2.2. What mobilized the new peace movement?

*ich behaupte immer noch das Gegenteil !*

If it is not in priority the Euromissiles, what then has mobilized the new peace movement? What are the psycho-political forces which have made it one of the strongest movements since the Second World War?

It is interesting to go back to the debates which were taking place between 1981 and 1983; at that time almost every writer who was hostile to the new peace movement had reproached its way of mobilizing people through anxiety and fear.[4] Unfortunately, noone who was sympathetic to the movement, and in particular no peace researcher, has taken the time to seriously discuss this assertion. The fact that research on the new peace movement has, as far as now, not wanted to open this debate, is to my opinion an interesting observation in itself. And this is even more astonishing, knowing that a part of the new peace movement (in particular the fifth and sixth argumentation) explicitly talks of fear: people supporting these argumentations say to be afraid of a future nuclear war, and that for them this fear is already in itself a sufficient reason to oppose Euromissiles and the nuclear arms race. In other argumentations, this same idea is more implicit.

Let me now try to see from the way the new peace movement argues what role it actually assigns to anxiety and to fear.          *Lit in verallgemeinert*

Therefore I have to go back to the ten argumentations the new peace movement uses in order to justify to itself and to explain to others how, why and what for it acts as it does. Within these ten argumentations, we can again identify four ways of argueing, corresponding to the fours stakes mentioned above.

The first stake was the one of president Reagan and its administration, but more generally the one of the politicians. The new peace movement reproaches to them not to be reasonable (although they might be rational), and wants reason to return to politics. The type of argumentation used is some kind of commen

3 This conflict between two different conceptions of political commitment and political action was verified in many european countries (in particular in West Germany and in Italy) between the supporters of grass-roots actions and those who were in favor of more centralized political actions (big manifestations).

4 The french writers – seeing themselves as the watchdogs of rationalism – were particularly eager in this field, as this is shown by the huge amount of french literature which tries to prove that the new (for them mainly german) peace movement is from the emotional point of view comparable to the emergence of nazism.

sense, stating that in the modern world the capitalist and the communist world view have to coexist, and that it is therefore more reasonable to have peaceful relations with the USSR.

The second stake was the one of the international order and the bloc logic. Here the new peace movement argues in a highly rational way, stating that international relations based on deterrence and mutual distrust not only are unreasonable, but that they are also irrational. It sees this irrationality for example in the economic and social costs of the arms race within one country, but also in the growing gap between overdevelopped and underdevelopped nations. In other words, this type of argumentation not only wants reason but also rationality to turn back to politics.

The third stake is the nuclear one, i.e., as we said, one aspect of the exterminist drive. Those who concentrate on this stake argue that even if, in the short term, nuclear arms may be politically et strategically rational, it is ethically and morally reprovable to go on with nuclear energy (civil and military). Even though the argumentation on this issue has become more and more rational in the last years, it is nevertheless based, in the last analysis, on a (personal) moral and/or ethical choice for life.

The last stake is the arms race's dynamics or exterminist drive, which, as a drive, will lead to a catastrophy. Here it is argued that this drive makes one afraid, and that this fear is fully legitimate. Rational arguments or reasonable discourses are assimilated by this type of argumentation to the political system, which is itself seen as a part of the exterminist dynamics. Those who call upon this type of argumentation use other arguments than rational or reasonable ones in order to justify their commitment for peace: professionals (like physicians or physicists) invoke for example the ethics of their profession (the ethics of life), whereas others (for example grass-root christians or "Women for Peace") invoke some kind of moral decision or moral choice ("Status confessionis") which's roots are beyond rationality or reason.

On this question of anxiety or fear, we can now distinguish two types of argumentations why to mobilize for peace:
On the one hand there are those who are mobilized by the fear of some kind of irrational or irresponsble political actor or action; their argumentation is rational and reasonable, without often asking themselves, whether the political system they adress is able to hear this argumentation. They are actually afraid of the absence of reason and want enlightment (i.e. the project of modernity) to be (finally) realized in politics. For them, the only guarantee for survival is more rationality and more reason.

On the other hand there are those who are mobilized by fear because of fear; they hold rationality responsible for the exterminist dynamics and are precisely afraid that this type of rationality will continue. Their type of argumentation and their commitment are rooted in moral or ethical choices, which do not have to be rationally or reasonably argued. In other words, they call in their

commitment upon a spiritual and/or religious dimension; therefore, more reason and more rationality will not automatically make them feel more safe.[5] Very probably, these people do not want the process of enlightment (nor the corresponding project of modernity) to continue, but they would prefer other values than rationality and reason to (re)orientate the future of our societies.

The persons who wrote about the new peace movement and who were hostile to it, have always behaved as if this movement was only composed of supporters who refer to this second type of argumentation. On the other hand, those who were sympathetic to the new peace movement, were always behaving as if this movement was only composed of people using the first type of rational argumentations.

Let me now sum up this second chapter: within the same new peace movement there do exist two main tendencies, for which the stakes, the types of argumentation and the social basis from which they recruit are different.

For the first tendency the stakes are of political (domestic and international) nature and the argumentations used always refer to rationality and reason. People who belong to this tendency usually come from or do sympathize with political parties (mainly from the left) and/or trade-unions; but they may also be military men (NATO generals), scientists or traditional pacifists.

For the second tendency the stakes refer to the question of life and death (in particular to the question of the "second death" of Jonathan Schell) and the type of "argumentation" used refers to ethical, to moral and therefore to spiritual and/or religious dimensions. The supporters of this second tendency may belong to the "Women for Peace", to christian and green grass-roots movements, but they may also be scientists who are invoking the ethical dimension of their profession.

Referring to the famous distinction within the West German Green Party, one could call the first tendency the realist one, whereas the second tendency would be the fundamentalist one. It is generally known that these two tendencies have a very conflictual relation; and this can be verified within the new peace movement in a certain amount of debates which have been taking place.

On the basis of this analysis of the new peace movement's argumentations one could be tempted to forecast its future: unless there is a new concrete problem coming up and which can be translated into a political debate (like it was the case of the implantation of the Euromissiles, and like it might be the case of SDI), the realist tendency of the new peace movement will either fall asleep or disappear. The fundamentalist tendency instead is and will not be negatively affected by the implantation of the Euromissiles or other events of this type.

5 It would be very interestintg to develop this point, since this shows to my opinion a link between a certain analysis of highly industrialized societies' dynamics on the one hand and the reemergence of spiritualism and religions on the other.

This prediction is confirmed by recent observation of the growth of grass-roots movements and grass-roots actions; "Women for Peace", christian grass-roots groups or groups of scientist groups have been growing ever since the implantation of the Euromissiles.

Let me now, in a conclusive chapter, try to assess the consequences of what has been said as far as now onto the future of politics and of political commitment in highly industrialzed societies.

## 3. Conclusion: the future of politics in highly industrialized societies

It is true that the distinction between a realist and a fundementalist type of political commitment have appeared with the green movement and not with the new peace movement. But this distinction has never been empirically assessed and theoretically reflected. This study of how, why and what for people commit themselves in the new peace movement might advance us also on this theoretical level.

Concretely, I will take the two main tendencies of the new peace movement as I have identified them before and then show how they relate to politicas.

It appears that the first, realist, tendency has a traditional conception of politics: politics are the one and only means of solving the problems this tendency has identified itself, i.e. the problems of politicians, of political priorities (policies), of conflict resolutions between nation-states, etc. The relation to politics is therefore a traditional one too: people supporting this tendency believe in the political system and in political institutions (for example in parties, in administrations, in courts, etc.), as well as in their capacities to solve the identified problems. The way to commit oneself personally for peace consequently passes through traditional political institutions and procedures, like voting, electing, collecting signatures, informing the public, putting pressure on politicians, counter-expertising, negociating, etc. Summing up, one can say that this realist tendency of the new peace movement has a highly coherent conception: the stakes it has identified were of political nature and specific to the Euromissile-debate. The answers to these questions are also seen in traditional political means. One can ask here whether traditional politics is an adequate means to tackle with problems such as Euromissiles (not to talk about the arms race).

The second, fundamentalist, tendency within the new peace movement is just the opposite: it uses the Euromissile-debate to bring up stakes which are not at all specific to this debate, and it recurs, in order to do so, on a completely new way of political commitment. This new way is the result of a new conception of "politics", which can be caracterized as follows: first, politics is responsible for the actual situation, as well as for the exterminist dynamics the industrial civilization is engaged in; it is therefore part of the problem and not part of the solution. Second, being part of the problem, politics is declared unable to find

solutions; in other words, traditional politics is unable to act in favor of peace
and disarmament. Consequently, the power of politics and politicians shall not be
increased but reduced. Fundamentalists actually do not believe anymore in
politics, political institutions and politicians to find a solution to the arms race
and to exterminism. Their concrete commitment is based on the following three
premises:
- The worsening of the situation, which will lead to nuclear annihilation, seems
to them inevitable; their commitment is therefore based on despair.
- It is today impossible to find a ready-made solution to the fundamental
problem of exterminism; the required change has to be radical and fundamental,
and it has therefore to start with each person.
- Since politics is part of the problem, fundamentalists refuse to take power at
any level, and this is certainly one of the most radical transformations in
western history.

The "political" commitment of fundamentalists is therefore personal, pragmatic,
local and human. One can give as examples local blocades, the creation of local
nuclear free zones, peace camps, but also all kind of community educational
activities happening in small groups and on a local level. The main aim of this
type of commitment is the (trans-)formation of the person according to the
Green-CND slogan: "The personal is political!"

Not only does the fundamentalist tendency of the new peace movement have
nothing to do anymore with party politics, but considering the current theories
on social and political movements, it is to my opinion not even sure anymore
whether it still can be called a "movement". In fact, the main actually existing
theories of social or political movements (Touraine, Habermas, Inglehart) do not
foresee a movement which refuses to believe in traditional politics and political
solutions.

For me as a peace researcher there remains one big question which the
fundamentalist tendency of the new peace movement intuitively already has
answered: "Can the goals of peace be advanced by active participation in
electoral campaigns?"[6]
Unable to have an answer at this stage of my research, I must nevertheless
point out that people behave and will behave politically and more generally in a
way which is coherent with their analysis and their argumentation: if they do
not believe in politics and political solutions, they try to elaborate new ways of
"political" commitment and "political" actions. That's why the aim of my paper
was to understand and to make explicit how people committed in the new peace
movement understand and analyze the actual situation.
Let me conclude that - unless there's a radical change in the dynamics of our
highly industrialized societies - the fundamentalist understanding of the problem
and therefore the fundamentalist "political" commitment will very probably but
increase. In other words and to my opinion, the so. called "failure" of the new

6 This question is translated by analogy from the green movement, where this
debate has already been going on for a longer time. See: Martin BRIAN,
"Environmentalism and electoralism", in The Ecologist, Vol.14., No.3, 1984,
pp.110-118

peace movement, not being able to prevent the implantation of the Euromissiles, has actually furthered fundamentalism within and outside the new peace movement.

*wo nicht er das ¡belegen !*

① gut, daß Psychologie und Sozialpsychologie mit-berücksichtigt werden

② dein Ansatz, die Inhalte und Forderungen von Tßen anzuschauen, finde ich sehr interessant

③ Kategorisierungen bleiben anzweifelbar

④ mein Eindruck: auch hier noch Überbewertung vorhanden, weil die 10 atales nur sehr unterschiedlich dann von Tßen verarbeitet werden konnten, Mathien diese aber zum Teil als zu zentral erachtet

⑤ Struht. Het. doch unwenig berücksichtigt, weil oft nur zweidimensionale Gegenüberstellungen

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*Ausführen ? Dependenz ⊕ Interdependenz von FBen*

**THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW PEACE MOVEMENT***

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* This is a think-piece written by someone who has been an observer and participant in peace movements over nearly 30 years, but who has not done any systematic research on peace movements. Apologies to those who have.

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## 1. Rise and fall?

By now it should be obvious to dispassionate as well as passionate observers that the 'new' peace movement which arose in Western Europe in the late 1970s is declining, or even dying.

In the heyday of the movement hundreds of thousands of demonstrators could be called into the streets in opposition to the neutron bomb or NATO's double-track decision of 1979. Today, the demonstrations are fewer, and smaller.

The situation is quite parallel to what happened in the 1960s: The late 1950s and early 1960s was a very active period of nuclear protest, particularly on the issue of radio-active fall-out. By the mid-1960s this campaign was dead, or reduced to a fraction of its original size.

The nuclear activism around 1960 seemed to end in a victory: the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. We know **now** that the PTB was an early sign of political detente and an important environmental measure, but that it had little direct impact on the arms race. But this was not obvious at the time. The nuclear activism of the late 1970s and early 1980s ended in apparent defeat: the Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and the Pershing II were deployed, and this did intensify, at least for a while, the race in intermediate-range nuclear delivery vehicles. In retrospect, the defeat of 1983 may be as unreal as the victory of 1963: it is questionable whether the progress in the disarmament negotiations in 1986-87 would have occurred without the widespread moral revulsion against the nuclear arms race championed primarily by the 'new' peace movement. In a sense, the movement has won the war, even if it seemed to lose all the major battles.

I will argue that the question of victory or defeat makes little difference, and that this type of social movement is bound to be cyclical. Those who think that the effects of peace movements are largely beneficial, might profitably devote some thought to how the peaks of the protest can be used to strengthen the influence of the movement's ideas.

## 2. The peace movement as a protest movement

A protest movement is an ad hoc movement organised against some social ill or government policy which the members oppose. Such movement may develop a very broad political platform, as did the labor movement, and may even form the basis of a political party. This gives a permanence to the movement, but it also undermines the clarity and simplicity of its message. If the party is to gain political influence, it must be willing to compromise. Virtually no political position can be sacred. For a protest movement, on the other hand, certain principles can never be compromised, because they form the essence of the organization.

If the social ill is present on a long-term basis and impinges on people's daily life, a more or less permanent existence may be possible for the protest movement, too. Alcoholism, drug abuse, discrimination against women or racial minorities, are such issues in the West. The daily work of alleviating the consequences of the social ills, and converting the individual, makes participation in such a movement meaningful, even in the absence of major political breakthroughs.

War is obviously a major social ill. From time to time it will impinge on people's daily life, when a war takes place on one's own territory - or when large numbers of soldiers are sent to Vietnam or Afghanistan and thousands get killed or wounded.

While wars may generate opposition, they tend more frequently to arouse patriotism. Peace movements have therefore generally declined, or even evaporated, in the escalation to war. World War I is a classic example, the Falklands war a more recent one. The

more serious a war, the stronger the pressure for conformity. The emergence of a strong peace movement is more likely to be triggered by intervention in some remote area, where defeat would not threaten the mother country. When such interventions become protracted, peace sentiments may gain temporary allies among those who would primarily have favored a quick and easy military victory. A costly Vietnam or Afghanistan campaign is a better target for a peace movement than a Grenada or Czechoslovakia-type invasion.

The arms race is also a social ill. It impinges on daily life in the sense that the resources consumed by arms could have been put to other, more constructive uses. 'One tank equals x hospital beds' is a well-known slogan. However, in peacetime few countries spend so much on the armed forces that it becomes a major social problem. In Western Europe, this may have been the case during the rapid military build-up after the outbreak of the Korean war, but a great deal of this build-up was financed by the US, directly or indirectly. Today, most NATO countries spend around 3% of the Gross Domestic Product on arms, a figure which is not increasing. Military spending as a share of total public expenditure is in decline. A lot could be done with the military spending if diverted to health programs or education. But the military establishment does not get the 'lion's share', and there is no obvious linkage to any particular cause if the money was released through disarmament. Hence, a moderate arms race as such provides a poor target for a long-term social movement.

The threat of nuclear extinction is obviously the major social ill in the nuclear arms race. But this threat is both too vast and too distant to inspire action. The incentive for denying the threat is considerable. And if the threat is not denied, it is more likely to cause psychic numbing than political action. On this basis, psychiatrists as well as activist researchers (Martin, 19..) have argued that the peace movement should avoid identifying itself with the doomsday theory of nuclear war or at least refrain from making this the central theme of its campaign.

The issue that gives rise to the most permanent organizational structure within the peace movement is conscription. Military service has a direct and obvious impact on the life of young

males, even in the absence of war, and forces reflective persons to take personal stand. Conscientious objection serves the peace movement with a regular supply of fresh blood. Organizations based largely on COs, such as many national branches of the War Resisters' International, have shown considerable durability. However, basing recruitment to an organization on conscientious objection, means leaving out women, which are generally more peace-minded. A high turnover of members and activists may also be a problem.

On the whole, it seems unlikely that peace movements will be able to recruit mass membership for long periods of time under the conditions which currently prevail in Western Europe and North America. Indeed, several authors have made a point of listing reasons why peace movements fail (e.g. Clotfelter 1986). Perhaps we should turn the question around: why do peace movements exist?

## 3. Why peace movements exist

### 3.1 Issues

Peace movements exist because there is not peace. Thus far the answer is obvious. The problem is that the strength of the movement is not clearly related to the amount of un-peace. In the West, military expenditure rose most rapidly after the Korean war, and so did international tension - but this was not a peak period for peace movement activity. If we look at anti-nuclear movements specifically, the nuclear arms race between the superpowers accelerated (particularly in terms of deliverable warheads) after the PTB of 1963, while the anti-nuclear movement declined. The issues which gave birth to the 'new' peace movement in 1978-79 are particularly interesting in this regard. The neutron bomb was a particular phenomenon in a much larger development: the specialization of nuclear weapons effects. The enhanced radiation (and thus killing effect against human beings) and the lower blast effect led to a good slogan: 'the bomb that kills people and leaves the buildings standing'. But it is questionable whether this particular warhead warranted the enormous amount of attention, to the exclusion of other nuclear developments. In particular, the implications of the neutron bomb for nuclear war

in Europe are much smaller than what was believed initially, by proponents as well as critics. - The GLCMs and the Pershing II missiles were a much more serious matter, in terms of arguments in favor as well as against. The arguments about 'linkage' between US strategic weapons and conventional weapons in Europe, about substitute nuclear warfare on European soil, about the use of extremely accurate ballistic missiles in decapitation strategies (hitting control centers) and cruise missiles in protracted nuclear war, etc. etc. - these were (and remain) genuinely important nuclear issues. Yet, even in this case West Europeans have the devoted excessive attention to these 572 nuclear warheads in contrast to the modernization of other tools on the nuclear battlefield. In particular, it is hard to understand the relative lack of popular interest in the many thousands of air and sea-based cruise missiles, which will probably have at least as much escalatory potential as the GLCMs. The tendency to concentrate on the GLCMs and ignore the ALCMs and the SLCMs was evident not only in the peace movement in the countries directly affected (UK, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) but also in other West European countries, such as Norway.

Such examples make it hard to believe in any simple and direct relationship between the emergence of a movement and the issue on which it focuses. It is not the issue which creates the movement, but the movement which selects the issue - out of a vast store of possible issues in the nuclear arms race. The neutron bomb, the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs made their fame because they happened to be around at the right time.

Nevertheless, the initial point obviously stands: without a nuclear arms race, no movement against it.

### 3.2 Opportunity

If the nuclear arms race is the main 'push' factor of nuclear protest, democracatic government is the main 'pull' factor. Critics of the movement are quick to point out that nuclear protest movements protest only the actions of Western governments and thus exert a one-sided influence on the balance of terror. There is something to this, but the criticism must be modified in

have been quite explicit in their condemnation of Soviet as well as Western nuclear weapons, the SS-20s as well as the Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The peace movement in the West still tends to believe that the West is the driving force in the nuclear arms race - mainly because of its qualitative lead - and that Soviet policy is mainly reactive. But the nuclear gap between West and East is no longer so vast as to spare the East the moral condemnation of the non-aligned movements. Soviet-sponsored peace movements still promote a simple one-sided message, but their support within the overall peace movement is negligible compared to the 1950s (Solomon 1985, pp. 105-116).

A second point of modification is that there has been some peace movement activity in Eastern Europe (cf. e.g. Hall, 1986), to a considerable extent inspired by similar ideals as the movement in the West and sometimes even in direct collaboration with it. Furthermore, news stories surface from time to time about official East European reluctance to agree to Soviet nuclear policies. Such hidden nuclear protest is also likely to be stimulated by public nuclear protest in the West.

Nevertheless, it remains true that democratic countries are likely to have more protest movements in any sphere of life, and particularly in a 'sensitive' area like national security. But this is a constant factor and tells us little if anything about the emergence of particular protest movements, such as the 'new' peace movement of the 1980s. These most certainly did not emerge because Western European countries suddenly became more democratic in 1979. Since the Korean war there has been a slow long-term trend in Western countries towards greater openness in national security affairs - ith an important reversal in the US after 1980. Such openness may generate increased opposition, because new targets of protest become visible. But this trend appears to have no relation to the ups and downs of peace movement activity in the past three decades.

If freedom of expression becomes sverely constrained - as it did under the McCarthy period in the US - this may affect negatively people's willingness to participate in movements which may be labelled as 'unpatriotic'. This may help to account for the

lack of peace movement activity during the Korean war - in contrast to the Vietnam war fifteen years later.

### 3.3 Foreign influence

The argument about democracy is used as much as a moral judgement on the peace movement as an explanatory factor. Much the same holds for the 'Soviet influence' factor, or 'Western influence' in the official propaganda from the East.

That major powers attempts to exercise influence - overtly and covertly - in popular movements, cannot be dismissed. The Soviet Union must have pumpted massive amounts into political movements controlled by its ideological allies - as has the US and other Western countries. Such support may be given covertly, as when the CIA sponsored Radio Free Europe, the International Union of Socialist Youth, the International Student Conference, etc. or overtly as when political activists are invited on free trips to the US or the USSR.

Exposures of such support have generally failed to ask what proportion of total funding was involved, whether or not there were implicit or explicit strings involved, and whether or not any lasting ties of loyalty were developed. In the case of the 'new' peace movement, only overt support in very minor amounts (such as free trips to meetings in Moscow) have been demonstrated. Such support is unlikely to have any strong or lasting effect.

In fact, it is remarkable that among the many spies exposed in the West, there is not a single documented case where the peace movement was the spy's primary arena. And the documented efforts of the hundreds of KGB and GRU agents expelled from Western countries in the past decades, also point to a number of targets which apparently have had higher priority than the peace movement, or have more easily yielded success: military institutions, foreign ministries, arms factories, etc. (Engberg 1985). Peace movements are obviously targets for infiltration - they are worth infiltrating precisely because they are not controlled by those same interests - but the peace movements will have to gain

considerably in incluence before they become **major** targets for infiltration.

## 3.4 The anti-establishment factor

Kim Salomon (1985, 1986) has argued that the peace movement can only be properly understood as an anti-establishment movement. Many of the predominantly middle-class, well-educated peace activists reject not only nuclear weapons and the logic of deterrence, but the dominant values of their society. A study of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the early 1960s, for instance, showed that such general anti-establishment traits were a factor in recruitment to the organization (Parkin 1968).

Anti-establishment thinking and action can take several directions - against pollution, against domestic policies like housing or education, or against the arms race. In this perspective, anti-nuclear activism springs from a much more general feeling of dissatisfaction with society and its ruling elite. Anti-nuclear or peace activism is chosen because the issue is there at the right time. When the force of a specific issue is spent, some activists go back to political passivity, others turn to new issues.

Salomon's hypothesis is consistent with much of my previous argument. It does not explain, however, why a particular issue is chosen at a particular time. Solomon puts a great deal of emphasis, probably too much, on NATO's double-track decision (1986, pp. 116ff.) As argued above, there is no obvious relationship between specific issues and nuclear activism. So why did the anti-establishment factor lead to anti-nuclear activism in Western Europe in 1979 and not in 1969 or 1989?

## 3.5 Cycles of protest?

The American historian Paul Boyer (1985) has identified three cycles of nuclear protest since the start of the nuclear age: an initial cycle in 1945-47, a second cycle between 1954 and 1963,

concentrating on the issue of nuclear testing, and a third cycle from 1979. Boyer shows how public concern expressed itself in a variety of ways in these three periods - in culture and art, as well as in political action. Many of the themes from one cycle reoccur in the next, but their durability appears to be limited.

Boyer's periodization (which is not a central issue in his book) is particularly appropriate to the US, but seems to fit Western Europe, too.

The first wave of antinuclear activism gave way to cold war rhetoric rather quickly. The idea of a 'peaceful atom' and belief in the feasibility of civil defense took over from nuclear fear.

The second wave was more durable. Boyer speculates about the reasons for its decline: an illusion of diminished risk after the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, a lack of immediatecy after nuclear testing had gone underground and the milk was no longer poisoned by radioactive fallout, a positive attitude to peaceful nuclear energy, 'the complexity and comfort of deterrence theory', and finally the diverting effect of the anti-Vietnam war. Among these factors, the effect of the PTB would seem to be particularly important.

Instead of looking for particular events, I think we should recognise that movements of this sort are bound to be cyclical. A period of decline is more or less inevitable, and special issues can do little more than hasten or slow the decline.

An important reason for this cyclical phenomenon is the psychological wear and tear on activists grappling with an issue which has no simple solution. Basically, peace movements will only be satisfied with fairly radical solutions. If they win a particular battle, dozens of potential new battles loom ahead. The prospects for a complete victory are extremely remote. Thus, it is tempting to interpret either a victory or a defeat as an end-point. A justification for quitting can be found in either case: victory means that the original goal has been achieved; defeat that it is unachievable.

Anti-establishment protest does not end, but takes new forms. We cannot tell from examining a single movement whether the establishment or anti-establishment forces are gaining. Anti-establishment movements may gain in one area and lose in another. In the early 1980s, for instance, a great of publicity was given to the 'right wing wave' in the party politics of a number of West European countries (and the US). This movement was seen as a backlash against some of the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s, and led to the election of conservative governments in a number of countries, sometimes even very conservative. Yet this 'right-wing wave' coexisted with the emergence of the new anti-nuclear weapons movement.

During the recent decline of the anti-nuclear movement, other radical causes have gained ground. Environmental concern seems to be on the increase again, as is concern with third-world issues, solidarity campaigns with the South African majority, with the Sandinista in Nicaragua, etc. As in the 1960s, attention turned away from the East-West conflict and towards the third world. New movements emerge and the old decline.

Some of the activists no doubt will transfer from one movement to the other. In Norway, for instance, there was a significant overlap in activists in the two largest radical causes: the movement against Common Market membership (1962-63 and 1970-72) and the anti-nuclear protest. (Bjørklund 1982). But many activists also no doubt retire to political passivity.

The change of theme within the anti-establishment movements permits a renewal in personnel within the movements' organizations. This may be sorely needed, because social movements, unlike political parties, tend to have an informal organization and rely heavily on the prestige of their original founders. The Norwegian anti-Common Market movement (Norway's most successful anti-establishment movement in the foreign policy area) was in the paradoxical position of performing a democratic function by giving the majority of the public a political tool - while at the same time being extremely undemocratic in its own organization (Gleditsch & Hellevik 1977; Bjørklund 1982). An ad hoc group can live with this kind of paradox for a few years.

dilemma would have become a big strain in the long run. Other movements have established a system for democratic decision-making. But with low participation these systems have little significance.

### 3.6 Living with cycles

Members of cyclical movements starting to experience a downturn, may react in several different ways. A common reaction in peace movement is to call for involvement in broader issues. After years of failing to abolish nuclear weapons, activists may conclude that nuclear weapons cannot be abolished without breaking with NATO or some other more fundamental change. Such a broadening of the platform may make the program of the organization more consistent and more convincing to the committed, but is also likely to take the organization into an even steeper decline. In Norway, for instance, where over 2/3 support NATO, it would be folly for the anti-nuclear movement to oppose NATO membership, even if this position might be seen as more 'logical' by some activists - and certainly by many opponents.

A variant of the call for a broader program, is the call for a more constructive, more positive program. The widespread interest in 'alternative defense', 'non-provocative defense', etc, is one outgrowth of this. This has become one of the 'growth areas' in peace research (cf. e.g. **Journal of Peace Research** 1984, 1987). While such a development may be very significant for the political influence of the movement, there is no evidence that it will stem the decline of the movement itself. Demonstrations are not organised for positive goals. Any constructive suggestion is potentially divisive.

Violence is another reaction within a movement in decline. The initial justification is usually 'counter-violence'. Peaceful and legal demonstrations are found to be ineffectual, and lose their news value. The movement may start to walk an escalation ladder: civil disobedience, 'non-violent pushing', self-defense against police brutality - and with Baader-Meinhof tactics at the upper rung of the ladder (cf. Young 1977). While elements of the student

following behind at the lower rungs of the ladder, peace movements have generally declined in more graceful ways.

If it is inevitable that peace movements are cyclical, what then can be done by those who have a long-term and more permanent commitment? I cannot develop this theme at length, but two suggestions may be in order: First, in addition to the mass movements, more stable, permanent peace organizations need to be maintained, which can keep the issues alive while the general public has its attention directed elsewhere. Second, peace activists may be active in political parties, which are more suitable arenas for constructive proposals and for horse-trading. They should be under no illusions: the compromises forged in the political arena will be heavily influenced by the perception of the influence of the non-party peace movement. While the movement is at its top, peace activists will be co-opted by the parties. When the movement declines, the peace activists' ideas will face more competition.

It is much too early to assess the historical significance of the third wave of antinuclear activism. I've already indicated that I find it implausible that negotiations towards a ban on medium-range weapons would be so far advanced unless the peace movement had brought this issue into focus. Present-day nuclear activists may also take heart from one of the few published pieces of research on the effectiveness of peace movements: Melvin Small (1987) argues that anti-Vietnam war protests had significant influence on the political leadership in the US and thus, indirectly, on the conduct of the war.

Unless the nuclear arms race is brought under control, there will no doubt be a fourth wave a nuclear protest. Those with a long-term commitment should at least keep ready for the day, and hope that the fourth wave may be the decisive one.

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Peace Movement and Direct Democracy in Switzerland:

New chances, conflicts and possible impulses for new

social movements in Europe *

Paper presented at the international conference on
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ANALYSIS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS "

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## 1. Introduction

In a lot of West-European countries, especially in the FRG,Austria and Italy, different parts of the New Social Movements (NSM) and particularly the peace movements are the pioneers as to supplement the representative ("indirect") democratic system by adding instruments of direct democracy.

Particularly the possibility to laungh popular initiatives for amendments and corrections of the constitution and referendums against parliamentary decided laws to provoce nationwide votations concerning "basic questions of life" are demanded by parts of the nsm.

In Switzerland, however, the NSM and especially the peace movement – the "old" (1955 - 1963) as the "new" one (1984) and the "movement between" with its peace-initiatives in 1972 and 1977 – , made experieces with the popular initiatives and their formal defeats,which produced an at least ambivalent relationship from the activists in the NSM towards the possibilities of direct democracy as it is common in Switzerland.

In this paper I would like to present some of these experiences from the NSM primarly with the initiative as the so called "progressive half" of the popular democratic rights and secondly with the referendum, the half with a "braking" politcal function ,which in the last ten years and their repressive tendencies got more and more an instrument also used by progressive forces (Gross,1987 c).

Especially I would like to show why different coclusions concerning the reformal potentials of the direct democracy were drawn by different parts of the NSM in Switzerland, particularly by different tendencies in the Swiss peace movement.

- Although the peace movement insists on an large distance to the swiss political system as far as the actual outputs are

concerned[1] there are at least certain tendencies within the peace movement and ironically those,who openly are fighting for the most radical reforms like the abolition of the Swiss army and their replacement by a "global peace policy" which take a basically positive approach towards direct democracy.

## 2. Specificies of Swiss direct democracy and the debate on "New forms of democracy"

This is particularly the case for the popular initiative as an instrument for making discussed nationwide unconventional proposals which otherwise wouldn't be discussed by the public, and less to introduce a new article in the federal constitution - which is originally the basic aim of a popular initiative.

This is mainly the argument why the "Group for a Switzerland without an army" (GSoA) which represents the most radical tendency within the Swiss peace movement, founded as a organisation with now 2000 members in autumn 1982, launged its popular initiative in spring 1985, which was deposed with more than 11o.ooo signatures in september 86 (the 100'000 signatures fore a national initiative have to bee collected within 18 month) - a first positive result, which suprised also moderate activists of the peace movement itsself (the nationwide votation about the

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[1]For instance: The official comprehension of the "armed neutrality";the heavily militaristic parxis of national security policies; swiss export industries and bancing system which are dominating the structure of the swiss foreign policies - until details suchs as Liechten- stein, which is treated by the Swiss army,which has a training place near the border to Liechtenstein,like central american states are treated by the USA: All this is producing after nearly 40 years of in Switzerland particularly cold war statements by leading political feagures as "Switzerland has no army, Switzerland is an army" without any other member of the political class protesting against such a militaristic rteduction of society.

abolition of the swiss army will be organised by the
federal goverment in the early Nineties).

In this way the political culture in Switzerland also
shapes and influences the oppositional movements. They
intern reproduce and reflect this "democratic" political
culture sometimes even more or at least  as much as the
dominant parties and organisations.
In the final part of my paper I am going to discuss the
relevance of my theses about the peace movement by means of
examinating other NSMs, especially the anti-nuclear, women-
liberation and ecological movements.

I will finish this presentation by trying to propose some
conclusions from the experiences of the NSM and the peace
movement in Switzerland with the Swiss direct democracy for
other european social movements interested in alternatives
to their representative, indirect democracies more or less
in a legitimatorial crises.

I will do this with a interest in  substancial democratic
reforms for general emanzipation and that people can
influence more effectivley the resolution of those
problems from whom they are existencely concerned.In doing
so I will try to avoid both uncritical admiration of the
Swiss system as well as the total  negation of its possible
alternative potentials.

This attempt ought to  be a contribution to the discusssion
about "New Forms of Democracy" recently developped also
inthe scientifically debate by HELD an others (1986). With
Held I argue, that we shouldn't try to replace institutions
of representative (indirect) democracy but to  complete
them with instruments of direct democracy.

This was already the aim of the democratic movements which
introduced the direct democracy in the swiss cantons and
federal political systems during the second part of the
19th century (GROSS,1983).[2]

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[2]Contrarly to what the dominant historiographical
tendencies of this century ought to make believe and
contrarly to what a lot of people in- and outside of
switzerland believe Switzerland was a the time of its first
constitution 1848 a representative democracy in which the

"How institutions of representative democracy are to be
combined with those of direct democracy ?" This is how
HELD puts the question (1986,p.6) He defines "direct or
participatory democracy" as a "system of decision making
about public affairs in which citizens are directly
involved"(op.cit.p.7) and ,as I would like to add, without
delegation of the citizen decision power to any
representatives.

In this direction I would look for the solution of the
politcal "paradox" KRASNER/PETERSEN (1986,p.155)
formulate,when they point out, that the (danish) peace
movement has to "somehow find a way to work through the
politcal parties" if it wants to "make  anything more than
a moral statement" although parties are loosing more and
more their oppeness and ability to realise those
institutional reforms which are socially necessary.

The possibilities of direct democracy would also decrease
the pression on social movements in only parliamentary
systems to transform themselves into parties (as shown by
the German Greens) iun order to get political power.
A transformation process during which the risks to loose
all the radical power and reform punch by also unconciouss
adaptation - formally and concerning the issues - of the
own movement to the dominant structures is rather big as
one historically can see in quite a lot of exemples
(NARR,1980).

ROCHON (1982)is arguing that  national political units "are

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only reminder of the so called democratic traditions in the
prerevolutionary "alp-republics" was the national
votation,in which every amendment to the constitution by
the majorities of the two chambers of the parliament has to
be aproved by the majority of the voters and the cantons
("Obligatory constitutional referendum").
The theoretical bases of the democratic movement in the
swiss cantons - the first oppositional movement against the
founders mainly formed by farmers,small commerciants and
the precurssors of the labor movement (similar to the
social bases of the populist movement in the USA in the
1890es) - are more to be found in the french revolution
than in the associative tradition of the aristocratical
alp-"republics" of Old-Switzerland during the Middle Ages.

less able to cope with direct citizen participation".He
looks for "the ideal of a form of government in which all
citizens would have a chance to directly express their
views" in smaller "action groups".
But his study of action groups in the Netherlands shows
that they "do not fulfill the  democratic potential" ROCHON
theoretically claimed for them. although smaller groups
allow more participation for citizens as highly
institutionalised bodies and they can get around the
"monopoly on agenda setting and policy formation held by
large organisations in representative democracies". ROCHON
analysis "the inability of action groups to influence
national politics".
 ROCHON's study shows  that bulding up smaller action
groups is not enough to enter "the locus of power in
advanced industrial societies" which at least needs also
institutional reforms to break not only the agenda setting
monopole of parliament and parties but their decision
making monopole.

Of course also the direct political democracy has it's
"form"-limits (NARR,1980 and 1982),but they are not as
restrict as the ones of indirect democrarcy and offers a
larger field of  possibilities to influence the decision
making process  to less organised actors as the social
movements are[3].

Nevertheless Swiss democracy too is in a sort of crises.One
can argue in this sense in two ways.

First the popularity of partisan political engagement is
very low . A particular but not new sign for the
legitimatory problems of the swiss politcal system is the
decrease of voters participation at local,regional and
federal votations,in general held  once in a quarter of an
year.As consequence of this decrease of institutional
participation a liberal editor argued, that it wouldn't be

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[3]In this paper I can't realise this intention
satisfactionarly .I will try this later after my Ph D-work
on the "switzerland without an army - initiative" and the
politcal culture in Switzerland during the 1980es , which I
ouht to finish next spring. I nevertheless developped this
intention here to show my interest in this work and to
stimulate discussions about it.

certain, that direct democracy will survive the end of this
century in switzerland (TA, 31st of july 1987).

A particular crises'symbole of the traditional
institutional ways of participation is the increase of
unconventionall activities in the last 20 years
(KRIESI,1981 and LEVY/DUVANEL,1984).Also conservative
newspapers as the NZZ are anlysising "as a challenge to the
governemental parties the side by side ofapathy and
activism" in Swiss politics (NZZ,31st of July 1987).

Secondly one could argue with Sir Karl Popper that Swiss
democracy isn't democratic at all. POPPER  recently defined
as democratic only those political systems in which the
people can get rid of their government without bloodshed
("Zur Theorie der Demokratie" in DER SPIEGEL (Hamburg),3d
of august 1987).

But in Switzerland allthough it is seen as a motherland of
democracy in general people can't recall to their
government because it is elected by the parliament only.And
it has paradoxely been one of the consequences of the swiss
democracy that with the increasing degree of organized
capitalism in Switzerland grew up a kind of "democratic
corporatism whose political symbol is the big coalition in
office in the federal government since 1959 in the same
partisan composition.[4]

It is hardly imaginable that results of national elections
as those which Switzerland is looking for in autumne could
influence the composition of the government.Even when the
quite moderate Swiss Green Party would mobilize more
electors as the conservative agrarian party, the greens

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[4]The seven seats of the Swiss federal governmtn
(Bundesrat) are occupied since 1960 corresponding to the
"great magic formula" by 2 freedemocrats (the historically
leading swiss bourgeois party),2 christiandemocrats (the
first, conservative federal opposition),2 socialdemocrats
(as representatives of the labour movement as the second
federal oppositional movement) and one of the agrarian
"people-party". They all after 1891 entered the federal
governmtn until then monopolised by the freedemocrats
corresponding their ability to organise referendums and
popular initiatives successfully.(BRASSEL et al,1984)

could hardly enter the government even if they want to.
Neither a minister would resign if his party has lost the
election.So Sir POPPER's restrict definition of democracy
is hardly to be used for Switzerland.


## 2. Switzerland: An Eldorado for the NSM?

According to Brand's (1985) theses about the social
conditions allowing the NSM to prosper and develop
Switzerland should be an especially fertile ground for
them.

 For instance, "the significance an mobilizing power of the
traditional lines of conflict, especially the left-right
axis" is indeed remarkably small. The Communist Party has
been of some importance only for a short period after World
War II. For 50 years the Trade Unions have been prefering
collective bargaining and collective agreements to strikes
and similarly spectacular forms of conflict-solving. Since
1948 they have - by a special amendment to the Swiss
Constitution - been integrated into "democratic
corporatism" (Katzenstein, 1984, presented by Kriesi,
1986c) and so have come to play a certain role within the
pre-legislative deciscion-making process. However, its
limits become obvious if we compare the extent of the Swiss
welfare-system to that in other countries such as the
Netherlands, England, Germany, and Sweden. Especially in
areas like worker's participation, collective health
insurances, the tenant's rights and job-security.

The unions have repeatedly tried to improve the social
security system by means of popular initiatives, but as a
rule weren't successful due to the lack of organisation and
mobilization power. This weakness is one of the
consequences of institutional role ensuing passiveness of
the union-members and other workers mentioned above (cf.
W.D. Narr 1980 concerning "politics and the question of
form").

Concerning the situation in Switzerland I would therefore
like to modify Brand's description of the "conflict
pacifying effects of welfare system". What we have in

Switzerland instead is a conflict-pacifying, even conflict-suppressing effect of corporatist structures. These effects infact enhance those conflicts produced by the political culture, such as denying the existence of political and social conflicts or the marginalisation of reform movements, which manifests itself in open and hidden repression against reformers.

A certain conservative immobility and aversion against political renewal, which is a typical feature of Swiss political culture, is the result of the historical developpments of the last 140 years.

Moreover this "democratic corporatism" finds a parallel on the level of party and government politics in the specific Swiss "Konkordanz"-system (Brassel et al, 1984). A short time after the unions were "appeased" (1937) the Socialdemocrats were integrated into the federal government (1943). Since 1959 infact the three largest bourgeois parties have formed a "big coalition" known as the "Zauberformel" (magic formula) with the Socialdemocratic Party.

This big coalition still exists today, inspite of repeated tensions which were the result of the socialdemocratics becoming more radical after 1968, the economic crisis of the mid-seventies, the subsequent limitation of public spending and the consequences of the ecological crisis; a phenomena which caused important segments of the socialdemocratic party to sypathise more and more with atleast some of the demands expressed by the NSM.

This specifically Swiss form of government is a historical consequence of the basically open and accessible Swiss political system, which can be caracterised by a weak central power and by a pronounced federalism.

The Swiss states, the so called Kantone, have a large political autonomy, which nowadays seems to be somewhat decreasing however. The french political scientists Badie/Birnbaum (1979,S.234ff) go so far as to say that "in Switzerland there is neither a real center nor a real state-power".

The reasons for this fact are again to be found in history. After what was a regular civil war, the economically

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prospering liberal bourgeoisie in 1848 created a minimum
state-power with insufficient administrative instruments,
in order to establish a home market. Inspite of ever
increasing state interference (Linder, 1983) the Swiss
economy has retained to this day a high degree of autonomy
compared to other Westerneuropean countries.

From the assertion made by the German political scientist
Jaenike (1986) that the parliament can only be as powerfull
as the statepower, we can derive a similar conclusion to
the effect that popular rights in Switzerland can only be
as powerfull as statepower.

Formative elements for the openness of the Swiss political
system are above all the popular rights of initiative and
referendum, which were gained by the first oppositional
movement, the Democrats, in the second half of the 19.
century first on cantonal and later on the federal level
(Gross, 1983). Add to this the introduction of the
proportional polling system for the federal parliament,
which became a reality after the success of the third
popular initiative in this matter. By the way this was in
the days of the first and last General Strike in
Switzerland (in November 1918) and the last success with
the means of a popular initiative by the Swiss labour
movement.

These elements produced on the one hand the already
mentioned "democratic corporatism". On the other it led to
the gradual integration of all parties capable of using the
instruments of initiative and referendum with success. This
happend to the loosers of the civil war at the end of the
last century (the catholic-conservatives), as well as to
the farmer-party in the 1920's and on the banner of
national reconciliation in the face of facisme and war to
the Socialdemocratic Party (1943).

What we have here is a specifically Swiss dialectics of
"barring through opening" of the political system. This
aspect is emphazised, furthermore, by the geographical
smallness of Switzerland and the cumulation of roles
resulting in the concentration of the economic, political
and military subsystems ("Milizsystem").

Kriesi is right then, when he says, that:
Direct democracy in Switzerland principally offers new
protest groups institutionalised chances of access, which
are not available in other countries. In so far there is
infact a tendency in Switzerland to utter a moderate and
specific protest. The institutionally garanteed opening of
the system through the possibility of a plebiscite does not
yet ensure practically a real access to political power."
(1986,S.342)

Apart from the limited action-competences (in the sense of
Hannah Arendt's notion, 1981) following the socialisation
and life as a salaried worker in a capitalist society
mechanisms of domination have come into being in
Switzerland as well; mechanisms which are limiting more and
more the reform potentials especially of the popular
initiative. The instruments of the direct democracy have
got indeed even more blunt then they already have been
before.

This was perceived by parts of the peace movement only in
the second half of the 1970's and has entered the
collective consciousness of the NSM only after the defeats
of the year 1984.

The consequence was, that those who have had exaggerated
hopes have been deeply disappointed and now tend to holy
decry the instruments of direct democracy as futil work
therapy. A more thoroughly reflected attitude and other
consequences of the defeats of the NSM in popular votation
I am going to developp later on.

## 5. The NSM and the Swiss Direct Democracy 1942 - 1986

### 5.1 New Social Mouvements and Popular Initiatives

Table 1: The Representatives of Swiss Popular Initiatives
in the Period 1942 - 1986

|  | Phase I 1942-50 | Phase II 1951-59 | Phase III 1960-68 | Phase IV 1969-77 | Phase V 1978-86 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parties | 40 | 46 | 44 | 41 | 30 |
| Permanent Organisations | 40 | 9 | 33 | 22 | 30 |
| Committees | 20 | 18 | 22 | 11 | 25 |
| Popular Initiative Movement (Part of NSM) | -- | 27 | -- | 27 | 15 |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| (n) | (10) | (22) | (9) | (37) | (40) |

This table shows two characteristics of direct democracy in Switzerland:

1.  Generally the popular initiative isn't used "spontaneously by the population" but by highly organised bodies like parties and associations. So far as parties are concerned they generally belong to the left, but for the last 30 years their quota is decreasing. As a matter of fact this developement is nationwide not as pronounced as on the level of the city of Zurich (Gross, 1987).

2. The frequency of the use of the popular initiative
   corresponds to cycles of activation and protest in
   Switzerland (Kriesi et al, 1981). Corresponding peaks
   can be located in the 70's joining the awaking after
   1968 and less evident in the 80's and 50's. Especially
   in these periods many movements launching popular
   initiatives emerged from the NSM (for the difference
   between a movement for a popular initiative and the
   NSM see Epple, 1986b,p.150ff).

Without complying with the difference between the "old
social movements" and the now existing NSM (Epple, 1986a)
precursors of the new peace - and ecological movement
already organised four, respective two popular
initiatives.The issues of the peace movement initiatives
have been the halfing of the military budget in favour of
social investments (1955/1956) and the prevention of the
supply of the Swiss Army with nuclear arms.

The issue of the popular initiatives of the ecological
movement was the protection of a riverside and the
prevention of the construction of a hydraulic power plant.
Three of these five initiatives came to the vote and have
been rejected by the voters.

There were no such social movements in the 60's. They
reached their peak only in the 70's. It has to be pointed
out that the actors used the whole spectrum of
possibilities for political activation, from conventional
"old" to unconventional "new" forms (Kriesi et al, 1981;
Ruegg/Nuessli, 1985;SCHMITT,1987,p.122). Although the
initiative is one of the old political rights it offers
great participation possibilities and as a consequence the
initiative is attractive also for the NSM. Insofar the NSM
set up a link between "old" and "new" politics, but it's of
utmost importance to distinguish precisely the two kinds of
handling the popular initiative (Gruner/Hertig, 1983).

Following initiatives of the 70's and 80's can be connected
more or less with the NSM:
   1. The peace movement took part in five initiatives: once
      against exportation of arms (1972), twice for the
      institution of a civil service (1977, 1984) and lately
      against an installation of a military camp in a
      beautiful countryside and for the abolition of the
      Swiss Army.

2. The woman liberation movement tryed to introduce the equality of rights of the sexes in the Federal Constitution          and succeded only partly; in vain they tried to liberalise abortion twice and to establish a mother insurance once.

3. The anti-nuclear and the ecological movement launched three initiatives against the construction of further nuclear power plants and initiatives to limit pollution by automobil traffic, respectively for democratic participation in the construction of motorways.

4. The movement for solidarity with foreigners in Switzerland and abroad used the instruments of direct democracy a couple of times already: once directly with an initiative for a more solidarical politic towards immigrants; twice they launched referendums against a controversial developpement credit in favour of an affiliated company of the World Bank  and against an aggravation of the law dealing with refugees.

These movements for solidarity can be seen as part of a more universal civil rights movement, which already launched successfully referendums against a federal police and against aggravation of penal law. These referendums against laws voted for by a neo-conservative majority in the Parliament are the expression of a new type of understanding of referendums that can also offer the left the instrument to prevent further reduction of civil rights.

Finally we have to add that parts of the NSM a couple of times directly or indirectly took part in campains for initiatives especially of the Socialdemocratic Party and the small Progressive Party. This was the case in the socialdemocratic initiative for a more responsible attitude of Swiss Banks towards the Third World.

I despense myself of trying to mesure the "success" of these initiatives more or less supported by the NSM's. Werder (1978) strikes a quite a positive balance for the postwar period, Epple's (1986b) estimation concerning especially the initiatives of the peace movement in the last 40 years is _rather_ negative. None of these initiatives

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was successfull in votation (only two of the total of 113 popular initiatives since World War II have been accepted by a mayority of voters; as a matter of fact more than half of these 113 initiatives have been withdrawn after smaller or bigger concessions made by the Parliament).

6.2. The NSM and the new use of the referendum

Table 2: The Autors of Swiss federal referendums against laws in the period of 1942 - 1986

|  | Phase I 1942-50 | Phase II 1951-59 | Phase III 1960-68 | Phase IV 1969-77 | Phase V 1978-86 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parties | – | 33 | 25 | 55 | 13 |
| permanent organisat. | 50 | 33 | 38 | 36 | 40 |
| non permanent committees | 50 | 27 | 38 | – | 20 |
| part of social movements | – | 7 | – | 9 | 27 |
| total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| (n) | (6) | (11) | (7) | (11) | (15) |

This table confirms the analysis made for the popular initiatives as far as the frequency of their use-intensivation during the last ten years and the organisational needs fortheir use are concerned.

But it is also an expression for a new political use of the referendum.

Until 1970 the referendum was only seen as a brake in the legislation process and as an instrument particularly in favour of the big conservative associations on the preeparliamentary level (NEIDHART, 1970). Only exceptionally it was used by the left or progressive movements. Until then it was seen as an instrument to prevent politcal progress.

In the Seventies and the Eighties, with the ideological, economical and ecoligical crises and the new social movements not represented in the preparliamental level expressing them the referendum's political identity was enlarged.

In other words: Progress has become an ambivalent issue. It didn t loose at all its traditional sense: For instance in the eighties the legislatory reforms in favour of sexual equality were refused by the conservative association of the right by a referendum but supported by the majority of the voters.

But it got a new dimension of a kind of "overtechnicsation" (Nuclear power plants) and "state-repressniveness" against which the new social movementents mostly together with the left[5] launghed referendums - in most of the cases with one exception without formal succes but with a positive view in

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[5]In Switzerland the Socialdemocratic Party (SPS), which in the same time is part of the nearly "eternal" big coalition-government mentioned above as the party itself also sees her as the main oppositional power in the country - another paradox which is specific to Swiss national politics, and the three smaller left wing parties, the orthodox communist one,which hasn't yet made up its decline during the Cold War, the trotzkist one of the 4.International and a after-68-unorthodoxe party (Progressive Organisations, POCH), the latter two very affiliated to the nsm and using a lot of times in the last 20 years local and regional as federal instruments of the direct democracy as a efficient method for making public their own partisan positions - initiatives as referendums have also a identity-making-function (WERDER, 1978).

the eyes of the referendum-makers (because of their
possibility of agenda setting,making public positions,
which in the parliament only have a marginal position).

They got also a majority of the voters, when they
succeded in building up a "value-conerving-voters
majority", which was the case in 1978 concerning new
federal police forces. They failed in this sense recently
with a referendum against a more repressiv law against
refugees, which was approved by a majority of the voters in
spring 1987.There the nsm have buildt up a kind of "civil
right coalition movement" defending liberal positions in
the Swiss asyl-politics, which is an other expression of
how the Swiss ruling class politics don't reflect the
humanistic visite-card-image of Switzerland abroad.

But although referendums against more repressive laws
concerning refugees or penal-code (1982) or favouring the
building of new neuclear powerplants (1979) were lost by
the coalition of the new and old progressive movements in
Switzerland in a numeric sense (the majority of the voters
voted in favour of the government-positions) they succeded
in two ways: By these referendums it was proved that
outside of the parliament the liberal opposition against a
harder position of the ruling classes was larger than
inside the perliament and the big mass medias and the
agenda setting of federal politics didn t follow only the
interests of the majorities in government and parliament.

If these positiv effects could have been reeched otherwise
with less efforts than the referendums needed is another
question.At least the legitimation effect is higher when
the oppositional movements also - not necessaryly only -
use the institutional instruments of the popular rights
beside the other, even more extraparliamentary ways of
opposition until "direct action", which in Switzerland is
less part of the "politcal culture" than elswhere.


## 5. General characterstics of the Swiss Peace Movement


As already mentioned above the Swiss society is less
peaceful - at least when we use a notion of peace ,which
is larger tan the absence of war and is more than the

existence of an armistice (NARR, 1987) - and much more militarised than people from abroad would think.

Switzerland is like Sweden a "neutral and militaristic country" and for Switzerland I would underline, what Inga THORSSON at the final press conference of the 6.END-Convention in Coventry said for Sweden:"We are militarised because we are neutral".

Nevertheless the Swiss peace movement has a rather other history which much less progressive characteristics than the peace movement in the scandinavian countries in general or Sweden in particular (For the latter I base myself upon the articles of HANSEN,1985, and KRASNER/PETERSEN,1986).

In its general upanddowns it follows the periodisation of YOUNG 1986 and 1987).It has a strong tradition at the beginning of this cenntury and after the first World War during the Twenties (BEIN/EPPLE, 1987 and GROSS, 1986 b). Contrarly to EPPLE (1986, b) Swiss society hasn't a tradition of militarisation stable over centuries. Of course the milice-forcies and the tradition of shooting-associations with their great impact during the bourgeois revolution in the first half of the 19 th century produced a particular near relationship between patriotisme, democracy , the people , the army and the state.Nevertheless I would argue that their has been and their still is a strong civil society in Switzerland which shouldn't be to fastly identified with the state and the army. [6]

The identification - braking up in the 70es and the 80es - between army, state and civil society was the effect of the anti-fashist-coalition of the 30es, which produced a real "national consiliation" before and in the first years of the second World War and which after it got first glorified and secondly was reproduced by the anti-communist-coalition during the Cold War. This is my thesis for the historical reasons of the militarisation of the Swiss society as a essentially a product of the 20th century and not an older

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[6] Unfortunately their are until now no special studies on civil society in Switzerland either actual noch histroical.

one.

Consequently the old and the new peacemovement couldn't
identify its aims with the policy of the main parties and
the goverment like in Scandinavia (HANSEN ,1985).The Swiss
peace organisation defended all over the time since second
World war a less ambivalous notion of neutrality with a
more solidarical sense in favour of the south . Highlights
of this camapign have been the anti-nuclear-initiatives of
the late 50es and the early 60es - their effect in
providing the Swiss army without nuclear power is
contested,because the initiatives failed but the civil
industry was interested in the Swiss signatur under the
non-nuclear-proliferation-threaty - and the anti-arms-
export-initaitive of 1972 which was the biggest success of
an popular initiative launghed by a social movement since
1919 - it failed only by some thousands of votes.

The Swiss political culture of isolation and self-
orientation ("Sonderfall-Denken","Igelmentalität") which
has finds its special expression 1986 in the no of the
majority of the Swiss voters against the UN (SCHOENI,1987)
also marked the Swiss peace movement. Although it's
organisational opportunity structures (National
coordination by the independant Swiss Peace Council since
1945) were excellent it could turn over the european
sensibilisation of the eighties in general. Also in Bern
their have been two national demonstrations in winter 1981
and autumn 1983 - with the largest crowed demonstrating
ever seen in the last decades in the Swiss capital - but
the social , organised bases of the Swiss peace movement
still remained weak and very fragmentated.
This is one of the great differencies between the peace
movements of the Netherlands and Switzerland although their
are also similaryties in both countries like the relative
easy access of new demands to the political agenda
(KRIESI/PRAAG,1987).

The decline of the Swiss Peace Movement at 1983/1984 was
enlarged not only by the employment of the nato-missils but
also by the lost of the latest "moderate" popular
initiative for the creation of a civil service as a
alternative to the military service in early 1984, quite in
general a fateful year in the relations between Swiss
democracy and the nsm.

# 6. 1984 The Fateful Year

As usually four weekends in 1984 have been votation-weekends. In every of these four votations the voters had to give their opinion to initiatives, in which the NSM had been taken part and therefore were of great importance for them:

1. In February 1984 52% of the citizens entitled to vote took part of the votation about the proposal to establish a civil service in Switzerland. A 64% mayority refused the proposal. During the zenit of the Swiss peace movement - in December 1983 the Swiss capital Berne saw 50'000 persons taking part in a big demonstration for peace - quite a lot of these demonstrators had been in vain very hopefull for the success of this small reform.

2. In Mai 1984 the Swiss people voted with 73% against the initiative concerning the Banks, after a campaign led by the banks with millions of Francs.

3. In September 1984 followed the two most important votations of the year for the future without nuclear power plants in Switzerland. The initiatives had been rejected only by 55% of the voters. Again the electricity companies had spent millions of Francs for a campaign using primitive arguments like "No wages without electricity" against the anti-nuclear-movement.

4. Finally in December 1984 the initiative for a mother-Insurance launched by the womans liberation movement was rejected. With one of the worst results in the history of direct democracy (16%). The effect was not as contraproductive as suspected in these cases; because lately parliament voted in favor of similar insurance against which the ultra-conservative association of commerciants organised referendum.

The womans liberation movement isn't descouraged at all and decided recently to launch the third initiative within 20 years for the liberalisation of the abortion legislation next spring after the Parliament had produced an noll-zero-game during the last 8 years.

After this disasterous year of fate for the five
initiatives supported by the NSM a lot of young people
didn't see any sense any more in the use of the popular
initiative.

This mainly became obvious in the peace movement. Because
in 1984 already a radical and for  many people utopian
project for a new initiative was discussed, the abolition
of the Swiss Army by the GSoA-Initiative already mentioned
above.

The GSoA tried to developp a new use of the popular
initiative by the left or the nsm: No more tactically try
to enter a moderate reform into the constitution but try to
provoce a national debate over a tabu. In doing so the GSoA
intensified the tendency of the peace movement to  be a
"Anti-Establishement-Movement" (SALOMON,1986,p.117) and the
peace movement in Switzerland got more and more a "movement
reflecting a general critical attitude to established
social values."(SALOMON,1986).
For the GSoA war isn't a political possibility any more in
Europe because the  escalation towards a nuclear war has to
be analysied as a nearly "automatical" process. In this
sense preparing a survive of such a war $^h$y an army makes no
sense (any more) and this illusion should be replaced by
the challenge to prevent war by investing for instance the
money used for the army in a positive peace policy. In this
new thinking smaller countries in Europe perhaps have more
opportunities to overcome a anachronistic national
attitude,an hypothesis which isn't only defended by the
GSoA but also the indipendent peace movement in Hungary
(EHRING/HUECKING,1983,p.329) and some organisations in the
Netherlands,Danemark,Austria and France.

In the Swiss debate the sense or futility of the popular
initiative had been implicitely or explicitely more
discussed than the above mentioned new idea for a non
militarian foreign policy

Three examples of quotation from those who had worked a lot
for the civil-service-initiative shall illustrate the
widely-held convictions about the potentials of the
initiative for the NSM.

A young woman, who then had made her first political
experiences, said "initiatives are no instruments any more

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to evoke any change in this country". One of the
secretaries of the movement for a civil service said: "The
popular initiative isn't a popular instrument any more".
And one of his comrades wrote: "To me it seems today, that
basic preconditions for direct democracy do not exist
anymore". (All quotations, Gross 1984)

Expert political observers took similar conclusions. A
socialdemocratic editor wrote:

"Initiatives of the left have no chance under present
conditions. As long as the bourgeois parties can spend an
average of three times more money in the pre-votation
campaign as the left, the plebiscitarian democracy is only
a coat wrapping a veil of legitimation around really
existing capitalism."

Also exponents of ecological associations who had worked
hard for initiatives against nuclear power plants point out
that: "environment protection policies are no longer
possible with only the democratic instruments undermined by
the ideologues of economic growth."

Some of the exponents of the council of peace which is one
of the important organising centers of the Swiss peace
movement wrote, that the instrument of the popular
initiative is questionable anyway.

they developped their critics already in the end of the
seventies. then - six years after women had gotten the
right to vote and the number of people entitled to vote had
doubled thereway - efforts were made to double the number
of signatures necessary for an initiative. In the mid 7o's
a lot of initiatives had been launched and bourgoies
politicians used to call it a "flood" of initiatives.

So in referendum votation the number of signatures for an
initiative was doubled 1977 (From 5o'ooo to 1oo'ooo) and a
time-limit of 18 months for their collection was set up.

Intellectuals with a similar affiliation to the peace
movement are defending following theses:
"The future of the Swiss peace movement will depend on the
question, if it continues to march on the beaten path of
initiatives, or if it goes on the 'new' way , which has
been developped particularly in the years from 1981 until

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1984 while searching for new issues, actions- and organisation-forms.''(Bein/Epple,1986,p.119)

But more sophisticated attitudes have been developped since by the NSM. On the one hand by the anti-nuclear movement, that launched two initiatives after the Tschernobyl catastrophy, on the other hand by the ecological movement that organised four initiatives against the construction of further motorways in Switzerland, which has already a dense motorway-net.

One of the secretarys of the association carrying the anti-motorway-initiatives, who has been one of the promotors of the civil-service-initiative wrote about his view of those initiatives:

"If the elected political representatives of the people in the federal and cantonal parliaments are obviously unable to react efficiently and quickly in this ecological situation, it's up to the people itsself to react with the classical instrument of the popular initiative." (VCS-journal, 2/87)

And the manager of WWF-Switzerland wants to use the initiative differently in the future.For example he finds its usefull as an impuls to fundamental debats on urgent problems.(TA,27.9.86)

With this opinion he joins the radical part of the peace movement, which is organised in the "Group for a Switzerland Without an Army" (GSoA), that collected 111'300 signatures for their initiative "For a Switzerland Without an Army and for an Universal Politic for Peace". Quite a lot of people even within the NSM had been surprised by the successfull campaign for the collection of these signatures.

Among the members of the GSoA a majority doesn't believe in a successfull votation on this issue in a quantitative sense. For them the importance lies within the fact, that a question presently more repressed than discussed becomes a nationwide issue (Epple, 1986a). Because every change is a result of an evolution which starts with an other way of thinking this would mean an important step towards the aim of coexistence without armys.

The most important point concerning the radical use of the
initiative as the GSoA sees it is to look upon initiatives
no longer as a vehicule to renovate directly the
constitution by finding a mayority of voters, but to use it
as an instrument to force public discussions about urgent
proposals, which are usually repressed.

Until the 80's the Swiss Army was nearly a "holy cow" and a
taboo. There are signs for change in this sense and already
for a certain success of the work of the GSoA. An indicator
for this is the result of the latest initiative of the
Socialdemocratic Party for the introduction of the right to
launch referendums against arms credits voted in the
Parliament. Nobody has foreseen a 40% approval to this
initiative. This is particularly astonishing because the
opponents to this new democratic right as usual tried to
blow it up to a plebiscite for or against the army and
tried to discredit the supporters of the initiative as
public enemies.

Of course one has again and again to reflect upon the
limits of the reform potential of initiatives and not to
get fixed on them as the only instrument for social change.

Because on the other hand the above already mentioned
dialectics of the Swiss political system was recently again
expressed by a liberal editor:
"The less possibilities for legal change there are in the
established order, the more the disposition to revolte,
violence and revolution grows. The more there are
possibilities for participation and collective influence,
the more identification and integration are increasing."
(Blum, TA 1. 4. 87)

The task of NSM should be, to try to provoke a sociale
change with revolutionary effects by using the popular and
ather rights without viole
nce in a democratic way. This would allow us the extension
of our life possibilities without integration in an unhuman
system.

Andreas Gross, August, 15th 1987

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GLENN D. Hook

The Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan:
Implications for Praxis

## Introduction

The anti-nuclear movement in Japan, like movements elsewhere, has
gone through periods of activity and dormancy. The signature
campaign for SSDI in 1977-1978, which collected over 20 million
signatures, the signature campaign for SSDII in 1981-1982, which
collected nearly 90 million signatures (although only 29 million
were valid), and a signature campaign started by the communist-
affiliated Gensuikyo in 1985, which had by the summer of 1986
already collected over 20 million signatures, are the most recent
examples of noteworthy anti-nuclear activity. As, in addition to
the signature campaign, the activities of the anti-nuclear
movement in 1981-82 included the organization of mass rallies in
Hiroshima and Tokyo, which respectively drew 186,000 (94,500
according to Police sources) and 406,000 (186,000 according to
police sources), and the promulgation of a number of influential
anti-nuclear statements, this period is most important to our
discussion. One statement, in particular, was especially
influential: The Statement by Writers to Appeal against the
Crisis of Nuclear War (1). Here we will discuss the implications
of this statement for the growth of the anti-nuclear movement in
Japan. This should help to shed light on the relationship between
the anti-nuclear discourse and praxis.

## The Writers' Statement

The anti-nuclear movement in Europe, which had become
particularly active at the beginning of the 1980s, was
instrumental in encouraging Japanese writers to issue an anti-
nuclear statement. Specifically, the German writer Hans Peter
Breuer, who visited Japan in November 1981, asked Japanese
writers to cooperate with their German colleagues by signing a
statement opposing nuclear weapons in Europe, which had been
adopted by the League of German Writers in Spring 1981. A similar
appeal was issued by Soviet writers at the seventh Soviet Writers
Conference. After a meeting with Breuer about a dozen Japanese
writers met to discuss the idea of independently issuing an
anti-nuclear statement (2). In this way, the catalyst for the
anti-nuclear statement by Japanese writers came from Europe.

The Japanese writers were themselves concerned about the growing
threat of nuclear war, particularly the threat arising from plans
to produce or deploy weapons such as the cruise missile and the
neutron bomb (3). They thus determined to issue an anti-nuclear
statement, even though they were uncertain Japan's other men and
women of letters--novelists, writers, critics, poets--would be
prepared to join them in this protest. Despite these initial
misgivings, the number of those who did sign was beyond
expectation, reaching 287 at the time the statement was issued in

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January 1982 (4), and 534 by April 1 when it was handed to the then Prime Minister, Suzuki Zenko (5).

The statement reads as follows (6):

Enough nuclear weapons are presently stockpiled on the earth to massacre all living creatures many times over. If nuclear war once breaks out, it will not anymore be limited to the destruction of a single country, region or continent, but will mean the destruction of the earth itself. Despite this, the frightening idea that a limited nuclear war is possible has recently been publicly announced and is being put into practice through the development of the neutron bomb, new types of rockets, cruise missiles, and so on.

We oppose these ideas and developments. A limited war with nuclear weapons is impossible. It is perfectly clear that, if nuclear weapons are once used, the war will quickly escalate and develop into an all-out nuclear war, and lead to the destruction of the whole world.

For the survival of the human race we aim at the abolition of nuclear weapons, rising above all differences between states, race and social systems as well as all differences in thought and belief, and demand that the leaders and responsible officials of all countries immediately put a stop to this new arms race. At the same time, we demand that the Japanese government strictly adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

We, who have experienced Hiroshima and Nagasaki, consider that our duty to the human race is to make every effort in order to prevent the earth from once again becoming a new, morever the final battlefield for nuclear war. We appeal to all the people on earth to immediately act for peace. Never giving up, and making all out effort.

The importance of the statement can be understood from the following. First, commentators pointed to the "epoch making" nature of the statement, the first one of its kind to be issued by the Japanese literary world (7). It was thus given prominent coverage by the Japanese media. For instance, one of Japan's leading newspapers, the Asahi Shimbun, gave front-page coverage to the statement in the 21 January 1982 edition, commenting: "This is the first time so many writers have voluntarily joined together, rising above differences in organization or political opinion, in order to oppose nuclear [war]." Such coverage by the media was important in helping to spread anti-nuclear activities throughout the nation and among different sectors of society, for it wiped out the image that anti-nuclear activities are partisan activities of "communists" or "socialists" (8).

Second, the writers' statement, and its coverage by the media, helped to legitimize anti-nuclear activities (9). By issuing an anti-nuclear statement, Japanese writers demonstrated that they shared a common sense of crisis and fear of nuclear war. The fact

that they were able to overcome political differences was proof of their deep sense of crisis. By taking the lead in issuing a statement the writers thereby contributed to the spread of the anti-nuclear movement.

Third, the statement was influential in encouraging other occupational groups and citizens' groups to issue anti-nuclear statements. Representative groups, which were formed at the time, are the Japanese Musicians Against Nuclear Weapons (February 1982), Cameramen's Movement Against Nuclear Weapons (February 1982), Japanese Actors' Appeal for Peace (March 1982), Association of Doctors and Dentists against Nuclear War (April 1982), Architects Association Demanding Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (May 1982), Association of Movie Directors Demanding the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Now (May 1982), and Poets Aiming at the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons from the World (June 1982). The wide variety of groups formed at the time shows the catalytic role the writers' statement played in encouraging other occupational groups to issue anti-nuclear statements and participate in anti-nuclear activities.

Fourth, the statement was given a specifically political meaning by being sent to the leaders of the nuclear power states as well as by being personally delivered to the Japanese prime minister. A reply was received from Brezhnev. This was the first time a former Soviet head of state had replied directly to an appeal on the popular level (10). The reply, which was given front-page coverage in the 2 March 1982 edition of the _Asahi_, states: "In order to avoid the destruction of the world, we respect the voices of all the peace-loving forces. We are prepared to enter into discussions with Japan regarding the problem of the non-use of nuclear weapons." The statement, the signatures and accompanying opinions by Japanese writers, Brezhnev's reply, a reply from the Chinese embassy, and the "Appeal from Hiroshima," a popular appeal scheduled to be delivered to United Nations Headquarters at the time of SSDII, were presented to Prime Minister Suzuki on April 1 (11).

Finally, a number of Japanese writers attended the International Pen Club meeting in London in March 1982 and asked the representative of national pen club associations to support the Japanese statement. Support was given by representatives from the United Kingdom, United States, France, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on (the USSR is not a member of the International Pen Club) (12). In this way, the statement was given international significance.

## Criticism of the Statement

The above discussion should nonetheless not to be taken to mean all of Japan's writers supported the statement. In particular, strong opposition was voiced by Yoshimoto Takaaki, a well known writer, and others, who penned a number of critical articles and made statements in leading magazines to try to undermine anti-nuclear activities. The criticism took three forms: (1) criticism

of the motiviation for issuing the statement, (2) criticism of
the act of issuing the statement, (3) criticism of the content of
the statement.

(1) The motivation of the writers was impugned by questioning
whether they in fact issued the statement out of concern for the
"survival of the human race" (13). This criticism implied that,
far from being concerned with the "survival of the human race,"
the writers were simply following the lead of writers overseas,
especially Soviet writers, who had earlier issued a similar
statement (14).

(2) The statement, as with anti-nuclear statements and activities
in Europe, directs attention away from the suppression of
Solidarity in Poland (15). This criticism implied that, even
though this may not be the motivation for issuing the statement,
the act of issuing a statement itself can influence the
information agenda, moving the spotlight of concern away from
Soviet and Polish government pressure on Solidarity.

(3) There were two main criticisms of the content. (a) The
statement creates the impression that only America is to blame
for the arms race as it makes no mention of Soviet deployment of
nuclear weapons against Europe, such as the SS20 (16). Thus, even
though the statement makes no direct mention of the United
States, as it omits any mention of Soviet weapons, the impression
is create that it is not so much an anti-nuclear statement so
much as an anti-American one. This leads to the criticism that
the Japanese movement is "Soviet made" (17).

(b) Expressions such as "enough nuclear weapons are stockpiled on
the earth at present to massacre all living creatures many times
over," or "if nuclear war once breaks out, it will...mean the
destruction of the earth," sound like "science fiction" (18).
This criticism implies that the writers exaggerated the damage
likely to arise from a nuclear war.

Evaluation of the Statement

Given the importance of the statement in helping to galvanise the
anti-nuclear movement in Japan, the criticism of the statement by
other writers, and the overall decline of the movement after the
end of UN SSDII, how should we evaluate the statement,
particularly in terms of its content? The following five points
are germane to the discussion.

First, the statement starts out by stressing that present
stockpiles of nuclear weapons can "massacre all living creatures
many times over." In an accompanying commentary the writer mainly
responsible for drafting the statement, Nakano Takatsugu, states
that presently stockpiled nuclear weapons can "massacre the whole
human race seven times over" (19). We have already noted that
Yoshimoto criticised this aspect of the statement as being like
"science fiction." In a thought provoking article Brian Martin
has also commented on how the peace movement and its allies

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exaggerate the damage to be expected in a nuclear war (20). This suggests that, as in Japan, anti-nuclear statements in Europe and North America stress the threat to existence posed by nuclear weapons.

In regard to the idea of "overkill" Martin suggests, after discussing the lack of scientific evidence to support the idea that nuclear war would actually mean the death of most or all of the world's population, that "...the idea of 'overkill' if taken to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading" (21). He expands on why this should be so in a note, explaining that linear extrapolations from the number of dead in Hiroshima can not be applied to future nuclear war, for to do so is analogous to saying "there is enough water in the ocean to drown everyone on earth 12 times" (22). He offers a number of reasons why those taking an anti-nuclear stance may exaggerate the damage arising from nuclear war--to justify inaction, to stimulate action, through fear of death, to justify concern, and so on (23). In the case of the Japanese writers, starting out the statement by mentioning nuclear stockpiles can massacre living creatures "many times over" was undoubtedly meant to stimulate action, although Martin stresses "what is needed is not an expansion of the threat but rather some avenue which allows and encourages people to take action to challenge the threat" (24).

Second, the statement suggests that a nuclear war cannot be limited and will lead to the "destruction of the earth itself." Martin sketches three scenarios where the use of nuclear weapons might not "quickly escalate and develop into an all-out nuclear war, and lead to the destruction of the whole world" (25). First, as a result of a limited nuclear war in the periphery, such as the Middle East, a state of emergency is declared in the US and allied countries and democratic freedoms are greatly curtailed. Second, a limited nuclear war occurs between the US and USSR, with the loss of say 5 to 10 million lives, and again a state of emergency is declared, with a concomitant massive mobilisation of political and military resources in preparation for the next war. Third, in the aftermath of a global nuclear war, in which hundreds of millions are killed in the US, USSR and Europe, brutal policies are implemented in order to push ahead with recovery, and authoritarian or military regimes spring up in the areas not directly affected by the war.

These three scenarios suggest that nuclear war might not lead to the "destruction of the earth itself." In other words, as American strategists' "worst case" scenario gives an exaggerated picture of Soviet aggressiveness, so the writers' "worst case" scenario gives an exaggerated picture of the destruction likely in a nuclear war. Pointing this out does not mean we follow Yoshimoto in concluding such talk is like "science fiction." The point is different: those who issue or support anti-nuclear statements and actions lack political preparedness in regard to what individuals should do to stop a limited nuclear war, what they should do after the start of such a war, or indeed what they should concretely do to promote disarmament (26). Perhaps it is

a lack of creative ideas on how to tackle these problems that leads to a stress on the "destruction of the earth itself" in nuclear war. At least those who believe in the "destruction of the earth" are not taking political action in preparation for what to do after nuclear weapons are used.

Third, by focussing on weapon developments associated with the United States, the statement implies that, as suggested by Yoshimoto, the United States bears responsibility for the arms race and the increasing danger of nuclear war. Thus, the statement may be taken to be anti-American rather than anti-nuclear, and thus a product of Soviet design.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss either of the superpower's responsibility for the arms race or the increasing danger of nuclear war. Suffice it to say that, as a result of only concretely mentioning weapons associated with the United States, the statement loses legitimacy in the eyes of those who are prepared to be "anti-nuclear" but not "anti-American." The "anti-American" nuance of the statement suggests to some a pro Soviet stance. As one writer commented: "I do not fall behind others in my hatred of war and my love of peace. However...the nuclear weapons referred to in the statement are only the neutron bomb, cruise missile, and other American weapons. The SS20, Backfire bombers and other Soviet weapons are not touched on. By just looking at this one fact, it is clear that the movement this time is a result of the maneuvering of the Soviet Union, which is trying to freeze the handicap of the United States, which is behind in nuclear deployments" (27). The strong support the statement received from writers and its impact on the growth of the movement clearly shows this response to be an aberration. Neverthless, in order to avoid criticism of just being "anti-American," the statement could have been more clearly universalistic in orientation: mention could have been made of weapons associated with the Soviet Union as well as the United States, or concrete details of the weapons could have been avoided.

Fourth, the statement does make a universalistic appeal in suggesting everyone should rise above the differences between states, race, social system or differences in thought and belief, suggesting the statement was not a result of "Soviet maneuvering." This type of universalistic orientation is particularly important in Japan, where the anti-nuclear movement has been split between rival groups, most prominently the communist-dominated Gensuikyo and the socialist-dominated Gensuikin, leading many citizens to be wary of involvement in the anti-nuclear movement. The non-partisan stand taken by the writers was instrumental in drawing together members of the literary world of all political and ideological persuasions. Other occupational and citizens groups formed thereafter also stressed their non-partisan nature. This facilitated wide-scale participation in the anti-nuclear movement.

At the same time, however, a universalistic appeal to one

humanity, undivided as a result of differences, may not be an effective way to influence policy, even though it may effectively mobilize the masses (28). Invoking the threat of an enemy of this universalism is one way to undermine the universalistic discourse. As one opponent of the statement phrased it: "It is the inevitable fate of the peace movement in the liberal states to be used by totalitarian states. This is the first thing that must be understood...There are quite a few examples in history where, as a result of naive, emotional pacifism being used by totalitarian states, the effect [of the peace movement] was the opposite of that intended" (29). In this way, the anti-nuclear movement can be characterised as well meaning, but unaware of the stern realities of the political world, where "the statements of intellectuals and the anti-nuclear movement have always been used for the political purposes of either the eastern or western camp..." (30).

Finally, in order to achieve their goal, the abolition of nuclear weapons, the writers directed their demand specifically to the "leaders and responsible officials" of all countries, including Japan, and more generally to people around the world, who are asked to "act for peace." On the one hand, the statement appeals concretely to those who have a vested interest in the maintenance of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, it appeals abstractly to people everywhere to act for peace, without hinting at how this is related to the abolition of nuclear weapons by leaders and responsible officials. In short, the statement suggests an uncalled for trust in the ability or will of political leaders to carry out disarmament, and makes no mention of how people can oppose nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war in their everyday life.

In the case of Japan, moreover, strictly abiding by the "three non-nuclear principles" (not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons) would mean calling into question the US-Japan security treaty, which is explicitly "anti-American." One writer suggests how linking the two would affect him: "I am quite simply against nuclear war and so I was fully in favor of the statement. However, if in the future being against nuclear weapons is linked to the Security Treaty and such like, then I will immediately withdraw" (31). This suggests the difficulty of proposing concrete agendas likely to gain the support of a majority of Japanese people, who support the US-Japan Security Treaty at the same time that they oppose nuclear weapons (32). In short, even pressuring the government into abiding by declaratory policy, not to mention the idea of pressuring it to pursue an alternative security policy, such as the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Asia-Pacific region, is particularly difficult, especially as American bases and communication facilities integrate Japan into US global nuclear strategy.

Conclusion: Implications for Praxis

The above discussion of the anti-nuclear statement issued by Japanese writers seems to suggest a number of points to bear in

mind when discussing the implications of the anti-nuclear discourse for praxis.

First, the Japanese writers, like others issuing anti-nuclear statements, were taking a stand against a war before its outbreak. As such, they were immediately faced with the task of legitimizing their statement at that particular point in time. This was done by pointing to something new in the arms race, for if nothing new could be pointed to, then there would be no particular reason to issue the statement at that time. This means that those issuing anti-nuclear statements may tend to stress or exaggerate the danger of nuclear war arising out of changes in the situation at the time of the statement, otherwise the raison d'etre for its promulgation will be undermined. As we have seen, they may also create the impression that the action is partisan: the Soviet SS20s were nothing new to the European situation as were the cruise and Pershing deployments. Although such statements may be effective in the short term for galvanizing the movement, the long term consequence may be a decline in the effectiveness of anti-nuclear appeals: the anti-nuclear movement may come to be thought of as the little boy who cried wolf.

Second, this suggests that the danger of nuclear war should not be exaggerated. There seems to be no evidence suggesting the political efficacy of the anti-nuclear movement is enhanced by exaggerating the danger of nuclear war (33). My own research on the anti-nuclear movement in Japan tentatively suggests that it is when people feel a direct threat to their own lives that they are likely to act with political efficacy, as occured in Japan at the time of the 1954 Bikini incident, when a nation-wide movement arose in protest against the "death ash" resulting from an American hydrogen bomb test (34). Thereafter, the anti-nuclear movement in Japan was institutionalised, and the annual meetings to oppose nuclear weapons started to be held in Hiroshima, thereby internationalising the Japanese movement.

Third, the catalytic role the writers' statement played in galvanizing the anti-nuclear movement suggests the importance of identifying those agents most effective in promoting anti-nuclear activities. Heretofore the atomic-bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have effectively issued anti-nuclear statements, precisely because they speak of nuclear war from the perspective of the victim (35). The agents most effective in promoting anti-nuclear activities no doubt differ in each society. For instance, in the United States the medical doctors, the Catholic bishops, and old cold-war warriors such as George Kennan seem to have been successful in challenging the strategists' discourse, thereby providing new space for anti-nuclear voices to be raised.

Fourth, the importance of taking a non-partisan stand, as seen in the case of the writers' and other statements in 1982, was mentioned above. Events in the interim suggest a non-partisan stand is also important in order to gain coverage by the media. This has been amply demonstrated in the attitude the media has taken towards the signature campaign now underway by the

communist-affiliated Gensuikyo. The campaign has been virtually ignored except for newspapers or magazines associated with the Japan Communist Party.

Finally, the question of the political efficacy of anti-nuclear statements needs to be asked. By their very nature such statements are issued in consideration of the need to make an appeal general enough to promote anti-nuclear activities on a wide scale, but specific enough to promote concrete action towards the desired goal. Of course, issuing an anti-nuclear statement aiming at disarmament is a concrete action towards the desired goal; however, unless future concrete actions can be rooted in everyday activities meant to realize more immediate goals, then the political efficacy of the statement is bound to be limited. Herein lies the importance of investigating the relationship between the anti-nuclear discourse and praxis.

Notes

1.    For    convenience    I    have    translated    the    Japanese    word
bungakusha, "men and women of letters," as writers.

2. Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1982.

3.    Hankaku--Watakushitachi    wa    yomiuttaeru,    (Iwanami    booklet),
Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1982, p. 4. This is a booklet including
the statement and comments by writers. Referred to as Hankaku
below.

4.    Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1982.

5.    Hankaku, p. 63.

6. Hankaku, p.2-3.

7.    See,    for instance, Asao Tadao, "Hankaku Undo to Bungakusha--
Han Hankakuron to 'tandoku'sha no Ronri," Minshubungaku, no..219,
1984, p. 109.

8.    Ohnishi    Hitoshi,    "Nihon no Hankaku Undo--1982 nen zenpan no
SSDII    Kokumin Undo Suishin Renryakukaigi no Undo o Chushin  ni,"
Hogaku, (Tohoku Daigaku), vol. 49, no. 2, 1985, p. 26.

9.    The    prominent coverage of the anti-nuclear movement  by  the
Asahi    Shimbun    and    other    newspapers led to    charges    that    the
newspapers "created" the movement. See Takane Masaaki,  "Shimbun
ga Tsukuru Hankaku Undo," Shokun, vol. 14, no. 7, 1982, pp. 48-60.

10. Asahi Shimbun, 2 March 1982.

11. Hankaku, p. 63.

12.  ibid., p. 62.

13.  Yoshimoto Takaaki, 'Hankaku' Iron, Shinyasosho, Tokyo, 1982,
p. 10.

14.  ibid.,    p. 35.  Also  see  "Bungakusha  no  Hankakuseimei--
Watakushi wa ko Kangaeru," Subaru, May 1982, pp. 24, 40. Referred
to as Subaru below.

15. Takaaki, ibid., pp. 32-37.

16. ibid., p. 43. Also see Subaru, pp.17, 40.

17. Takaaki, ibid, p. 27. Also see Subaru, p. 40.

18. Takaaki, ibid., pp. 27-28.

19. Hankaku, p. 4.

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20. Brian Martin, "Critique of Nuclear Extinction," _Journal of Peace Research_, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 287-300.

21. _ibid._, p. 289.

22. _ibid._, p. 298.

23. _ibid._, pp. 290-295.

24. _ibid._, p. 291.

25. _ibid._, p. 287.

26. See Martin, _ibid._, for a discussion of appropriate action.

27. _Subaru_, p. 17.

28. R. B. J. Walker, "Contemporary Militarism and the Discourse of Dissent," in R. B. J. Walker, _Culture, Ideology and World Order_, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, pp. 304-305.

29. _Subaru_, p. 24.

30. _Subaru_, p. 22.

31. _Subaru_, p. 9.

32. A survey reported in the _Asahi Shimbun_, 13 April 1982, showed 58% of Japanese compared with 14% of Americans were against using nuclear weapons. A 1984 survey by the Prime Minister's Office showed 72% of Japanese think the US-Japan Security Treaty is of use to Japan.

33. Martin, _op. cit._.

34. See my, "Evolution of the Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan," _Current Research on Peace and Violence_, vol. 10, no. 1, 1987, pp. 32-43.

35. _ibid._.

A PAPER TITLED "POLITICAL PARTIES AND PEACE MOVEMENTS"

PRESENTED AT THE IPRA STUDY GROUP ON PEACE RESEARCH AND

PEACE MOVEMENT AT FROSTAVALLEN HOOR (NEAR LUND) SWEDEN
BY O. KALU

In presenting this paper, my discourse is divided into four parts:

1. Attributes which make political parties credible and vice versa.

2. The significance of Peace Movements in Promotion of Peace.

3. Relationship between political parties and the Peace Movements.

4. Conclusion.

Part I: Attributes which make political parties credible and vice versa:

The world has been in crisis and in almost all part of the world, people are in perpetual agony. Added to this, is the fear of nuclear explosion, deliberate or accidental, resulting in mass killings. Hostilities abound, for instance between the 12 months from May 1979 to April 1980., "almost half the countries of the world were believed holding people in prison because of their political or religious beliefs. Many of these prisoners were detained without charge or trial and tortured. Others were executed after unfair trials or assasinated by death squards," So reported the Amnesty International in 1980.

It is assumed, however, that the people, especially politicians should learn and benefit from knowledge and experience to create for fellow citizens stable and peaceful atmosphere in which they can live happily and in prosperity. Whether in the government or in opposition, politicians are entrusted with the destiny of their nations and so have influence on decisions affecting every facet of their nation-states.

Our world is in crisis and the remedy lies largely on political leaders and their political parties more than other groups of people. They should bear this in mind, reflect on what goes wrong in their countries, learn from past mistakes, look and work hopefully to the future. The primary objective should be unity and stability. And to achieve this, politicians should observe all those virtues for which men are esteemed - fidelity, friendship, humanity and religion.

Except when the Military intervene by organized coups
in which civilian governments are ousted and replaced by the
Military Administrations as has been the case in most African
countries and in Latin America, governments of national-states
are run by civilian-political parties. Military Administrations
are undemocratic and unpopular.

A political party, therefore, is an organized and
registered body of civilians with eyes on running the government
of a state if given the mandate to do so by the electorate.
The mandate is sought at the polls through elections through
elections properly scheduled and conducted in accordance with
the constitution of the country. Each state is free to allow
any number of political parties it wishes to contend at any
given time. In the United Kingdom for example, are two major
political parties - the Conservative and the Labour Parties.
In Norway, ten major political parties exist, namely:

1.      The Labour Party

2.      The Conservative Party

3.      Christian People's Party

4.      The Centre Party

5.      The Socialist Party

6.      The Liberal Party

7.      The Progressive Party

8.      The New Liberal Party

9.      Workers' Communist Party, and

10.     The Communist Party.

Unlike Democratic type of government, a Socialist System
is synonimous with its political party, rooted in rigidity
and always at a lert to obey the master's voice.

In Democracy, political parties wishing to contest
elections publish their manifestoes to highlight what they
hope to achieve if given themandate by the electorate to
govern. The manifestoes form the bases for political
campaigns by which the parties ideologies are brought down
to the grass root. As political parties seek offices, they
make lofty promises which they say they will fulfill if
elected. Such lofty promises are chosen because the politicians
think they are likely to appeal to the widest possible
number of electors. But, as has often been the case, when
faced with the problems of office, such lofty promises are
usually forgotten, and government is carried on in response
to day-to-day pressure of circumstances.

It     is the duty of every political party which wins
at the election to form the government. It provides good
government and promotes the welfare of the people without
discrimination. In the art of governance the party follows

the principles of freedom, equity and justice to consolidate
the unity of the citizens. This is as far as the domestic
and the internal affairs of a state is concerned. But
activities of a state is not limited to itself. It extends
beyond its regional boundaries. "Although each state is
sovereign if cannot realistically ignore the existence of
other states. A nation-state cannever afford or forget that
the actions of other states may decicively influence its own
destinies". Each nation state therefore ought to be dedicated
to the promotion of international cooperation, world peace
and understanding. These, among others are what political
parties are expected to do in its domestic and foreign policies.

But experience shows that political parties have been
known to circumvent the truth and have recourse to the use
of force to attend to their political ambitions different
from what they preached at party campaign rallies before the
election which bring them into power. These deviations are
backed up by all sorts of cruelty, torture, detention and
imprisonment. In the international sphere, instead of working
for international harmony, peace and cooperation, nation-
states whip up sentiments in order to ferment crisis. The
interventions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and that
of the United States in Latin America are living examples.
About the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
"the Soviet Union wants nothing less than to transform the
Social and political structure, the culture and the beliefs
against the will of the Afghan people". "In addition to their
brutal measures to maintain military control over Afghanistan,
the Soviet planners and their Afghan proxies are busily at
work laying the foundations for a new Afghanistan modelled
on Soviet Central Asian Republic".

The intervention policy of the United States in Latin
America on the other hand has been due to the desire for
economic expansion and the Monroe Doctrine.

The two super-powers are noted for military interventions
which they try to defend. Their defence, though unacceptable
ranges from their interest being either in danger or under
actual attack; if the interest is not directly theirs, it
shall be that of their allies; or perhaps, the intervention
is necessary where national honour has been insulted. And
such reasons are always coated with legalities. The ultimate
goal of intervention is invasion by the use of direct military
force. This is preceeded by military aid as baits to govern-
ments or factions chosen for support as was the case during
the Nigerian Biafra war of 1967 - 1970. Economic intervention
is another type of intervention. It takes the form of boycott,
either by refusing to buy the export crop of a country, as
was the case when the United States refused Cuban Sugar and
Nicaraguan coffee; or to stop supply of commodities, e.g.
American wheat deliveries to Nicaragua. Added to the list is
Development Aid. It is also an important instrument of
intervention.

The apartheid regime in South Africa oppresses the Africans beyond description. And although South Africa is highly industrialized, and "endowed with natural resources, the majority of the people - the indigenous inhabitants of the country live in abject poverty, without political and basic human rights". There are little or no employment opportunities, no social amenities, even the basic necessities of life are denied Africans, for, it is the policy of the regime to keep the area occupied by Africans perpetually under-developed. Those who are fortunate to get employment work under very trying conditions. Racial discrimination is rife.

The apartheid government is regimental in character since there is dominance of military influence in the decision making process of the government to supress popular demands for reforms.

The Democratic Republics of Angola and Mozambique which support the Liberation Movements in South Africa and Namibia are enemies of the Racial South Africa. Consequently, South Africa has been making efforts to change the governments of the countries by force and install their puppets there.

The combined economic, military and colonial activities of the United States, Britain, France, Japan, New Zealand and Australia towards the island dwellers of the Pacific Ocean cause much distress, disgust and despair. On account of these, the Pacific Conference of Churches in the islands in 1968 protested to Britain and the United States against bomb tests. That, not withstanding, France tested immediately after in Tahiti and New Caledonia. The people of New Caledonia and Tahiti are still under the French colonial administration. West Papua, handed over to Indonesia has no political destiny, development or improvement of standard of living as Human Rights are often violeted. The same conditions prevail in the Loyalty Islands and Polynesia which are still also under the French government. The economy of these islands are exploited by the activities of foreign over-lords.

Activities of governments have been sampled. It should be noted that activities of governments are the activities of the political parties which control them. The party men form the cabinet and share political offices. Peace has so far eluded the world because politicians do not acquire and keep the qualities which men are esteemed - are not merciful, faithful, humane, upright and religious.

Often people associate politics with power, hence the phrase, 'power politics'. This to certain extent makes politicians possess the hearts of iron, and act without reflection. The word, 'power', associated with politics is not absolute. In the words of E.H. Carr, "the power politics is often used in an invidious sense, as if the element of power or self-assertion in politics were something abnormal and susceptible of elimination from a healthy political life. Conversely, there is a disposition even among some writers who are not strictly speaking, realists, to treat politics

as the science of power and self-assertion and exclude
from it, by definition, actions inspired by moral consciousness..
... Such terminological implications are misleading.
Politics cannot be divorced from power. But the 'homo
politicus' who pursues nothing but power is as unreal a
myth as the 'homo economicus' who pursues nothing but gain.
Political action must be based on a co-ordination of morality
and power".

2.   The Significance of Peace Movements in the Promotion
     of Peace:

Traditionally, the word 'peace' means the opposite of
war. "War is characterised by physical harm and overt
hostilities among nations, and, peace, the lack of them".
But a new school of thought speak of peace as the opposite
of violence "because, violence can include the less tangible
form of personal and societal injury". Peace means main-
tenance of domestic transquility, reduction of international
tensions, absence of war and the maintenance of social order
where basic human needs - such as food, housing, medical
care, and education are met and certain basic decencies -
such as the right against torture, unjust arrest and deten-
tion, genocide and extrajudicial execution are respected
in actual practice." Associations to cover the concept of
peace, therefore, are many, and the numbers are still on the
increase.

The current world Directory of Peace Research Institutions,
published by the United Nation Educational, Scientfic and Cultural
organization(UNESCO) No.55 (Fifth Edition Revised) contains 313
such institutions scattered over 45 countries. Activities
covered by most of the Peace Associations include research,
publication, training, documentation, research promotion,
conference organization, financing, policy-making, data
collection, among others.

It is difficult to state with any amount of certainty
the origin of Peace Movements. One-thing is certain, that
is, from the beginning of history, people have been gathering
voluntarily or by commissions to sue for peace where peace is
threatened or is absent. Such gatherings, in case they are
allowed to function for any reasonble length of time are
recognized as Peace Associations within the society. Among
the Ibos of Nigeria, communities in the rural areas organize
members of certain age grades to keep the peace of their
respective communities for definite periods of years,say
three or seven years. During the Peace-keeping periods,
the age grades settle disputes of civil nature and see that
no effort is spared to take care of peace within the period.
Either could have been the origin of Peace associations.

Tracing the history of the International Fellowship
of Reconciliation, Janneke Postma quoted a Dutch Peace Worker
as saying, "We are neither the first nor the last. History
has started before us and it will continue after we are gone".
"Peace workers don't look back a lot, absorbed as they are
in their stuggle for Peace in their own time. And yet it

can be encouraging to realize there were people before us,
a cloud of witness linked with us as we are with those who
come after us".

Before the advent of the Fellowship of Reconciliation
in 1914, the movement known as the Peace Society existed.
The aim of the group was the abolition of war and the establi-
shment of a just peace. Members were fearless in speaking
against the injustices of the time. Religious sects, have
been known to preach peace also.

Activities of individuals and groups to speak and preach
peace were intensified after the Napoleonic war in 1815.
Among such people was an American Philosopher, Herry David
Thorean who emphasized on the importance of Peace Movements.
Christians, especially from Britain, Germany and the United
States intensified preachings for peace and exchange of visits.
Notable among the groups were Kees Boeke, a Dutch Quaker and
his wife and Betty Cadbury the British Quaker who centred
their activities in London. Their preaching about non-violence
and peace aroused the enthusiasm of many around Europe to
join the group. Kees Boeke was expelled from England.
Later in 1919, in a house called Betty Cadbury and Kees Boeke's
Friendship House in Bilthoven in 1919 an important meeting
on non-violence and peace was held by the group. That meeting
is believed in some quarters to-day as the formal inaugumation
of International Fellowship of Reconciliation. IFoR, as it
is popularly called has branches scattered all-over the world.
Branches cover most of Western European countries, Japan,
China, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and Latin America.
Its activities include research, training, documentation,
research promotion, education, conference, financing and
support of non-violent movements for social justice and re-
conciliation.

Efforts to organize the Association now called the
International Peace Research Association (IPRA) started in
the 1950s through contacts of scholars from Western Europe
and North America. From its inception, the aim has been
mainly 'Peace Research'. But the concept of Peace Research
has been changing since the sixties of this century.

The International Peace Research Association was
established in 1964. Since then its secretariat has been
located in Groningen, the Netherlands, in Oslo (Norway); in
Tampere (Sweden) and in Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A. Now in Rio Janerio
Brazil"it organizes and holds General Conferences every two years.
The Executive body of the Association, the IPRA Council has
members drawn from Latin America, Asia, Africa, North America,
Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

Activities include conferences, seminars, promotion of
study groups, transnational and international collaborations
and researches.

The International Peace Research Association has as its

main disciplines political science, sociology, economics,
law, education and history.

Its purpose has been to advance interdisciplinary
research on the conditions of peace and the causes of war.
At regional levels, it has the Asian Council of Peace
Research Association and the Latin American Council of Peace
Research.

Sources of of revenue: The Association gets its revenue
from Inter-governmental Organizations (UNESCO and FAO),
Private and Public Foundations and individual contributors.

Each Peace Movement has its own history to tell and,
history does not merit much consideration in this paper.
Therefore the brief historical narratives of IFOR and IPRA
Surfice.

Peace Movement has so far contributed much to the
promotion of world peace.  It accelerates transnational
organizations in the field of peace and conflict research
and attends specially to the promotion of interregional Co-
operation.

Awareness has been created on the need for mutual co-
operation between the developed and developing countries
through organized conferences, seminars and workshops by
Peace Movements at national and international levels.

Through the interventions of peace Associations such
as the Amnesty International and the International Peace
Brigade,  People wh  are detained or imprisoned are known
to be released.  In addition, Peace Movements concern themselves
with the welfare of the refugees and take steps to see about
their humane treatment in their host countries as well as
alerting the United Nations Commission on Refugees about them.
Peace Movements constitute data banks for information about
maladministration, injustice, military conscriptions, nuclear-
arms race, nuclear-weapons manufacturing and stock-pilling,
colonization, bomb tests, economic deprivation and exploita-
tion, racial discrimination, torture and war.

Peace Movement meetings are occasions for people of
different races, different fields of specialisation, different
religions sects and political ideologies to meet and discuss
on Peace.

Like any other human organizations problems are bound
to be noticed in Peace Movements.

1.    East-West Conflict: It is very unfortunate that cold
war exists in Peace Movements.  This is an out come of
political bias going on between the East and the West
European Countries.  It is rooted in ideological differences
which give rise to suspicion, distrust and unnecessary
fears.  This ugly situation showed up at the Third Convention
of the European Nuclear Disarmament which took place in the

month of July, 1984 at Perugia. As a result, the deliberation
at the convention was almost marred as delegates from the
East and West European countries exhibited national sympathy
towards home governments.

2. <u>Discrimination:</u> In peace movements are sex discrimina-
tions as activities are men-centred and therefore become
men-dominated. Not only that women are less heard, key
posts are held by men Group or committees for specific
assignments have men controlling the activities or the
assignments in accordance with the powers or regulations
setting up the committees or the groups. Peacemovements
are not fit for sex discriminations because no peace can be
founded on discrimination. Peace Movements need take steps
not only to attract women members into their folds but also
to give them responsible key positions. In this way, women
feel confident and appreciative of their role in the movements.
There is also the self-righteous attitude between the Church
and the Peace Groups at meetings, which attitude is not to
the best interest of Peace Movements. This confrontational
self-righteous attitude was shown at the meeting of the Third
Convention of the European Nuclear Disarmament at Perugia
in July, 1984. At the Convention, Stephen Junnicliffe,
editor of the Churches Register attributed the failures of
Peace Movements at dialogues to political motiff, and ended
up by stating, "the moral issue passed by the arms race,
with its potential to destroy all life, very often is given
a lower priority than advocating various political freedoms,
and we can end up, oddly enough, playing our part in the
cold war for fear of being called soft on the reds". Deli-
berations at the convention were near impossible due to
discriminatory prejudices that a Catholic delegate from Poland
admitted his disappointment and doubted if he could ever
attend the next European Nuclear Disarmament Convention.

<u>Inability of Peace Workers to Live Peace:</u> The reason why
peace still eludes societies and the world at large is that
members of Peace Movements fail to live peace. Consequently
peace fails to make any impact among the people. A peaceman
loves, no matter the unjust and violent actions of enemies.
Things are still what they are peacewise despite the length
of time efforts had been directed to the achievement of world
peace. The reason is that human beings attentions are mis-
directed. Attentions are focussed on institutions which
have no minds and do not think for themselves instead on
haman beings themselves because they have minds and can think
and reflect over actions. What is the sum total of people's
decisions shape institutions and make them what they appear
to be Daily events in the world to-day as we see them in the
televisions, hear them over the radio and read them in news-
papers - wars hyjackings, kidnappings, murder, manufacturing,
modernizing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons reveal the
trend of people's mind. Since the beginning of time, different
religious groups have been preaching for world peace to no
avail because emphasis has been on "religion to change"
instead of the members of religious sects to reform themselves
and live by example. In a similar view, it is only when we,

members of Peace Movements discover ourselves that decent
life counts and start to re-orient our life-style that
society, after some time, can change for good.  Then it
becomes possible for peace of mind to radiate within the
families, compounds, communities and work-places.

## Part 3: Relationship Between Political Parties and Peace Movements:

A Regional Peace Association scheduled its meeting in
December 1986 in a country in the Third World.  A member
in the host country wrote to the secretary in confidence,
"our country doesn't favour organizations or individuals
who supervise Human Rights.  You could speak of Religious
Dimensions".  From the political party angle, the quotation
is pregnant with meanings.  It illustrates what political
parties (governments) think of Peace Movements.  Why do
political parties have such an impression about Peace Move-
ments?  Political Parties have poor impression of Peace
Movements as organizations opposed to their policies; organi-
zations very critical of states activities; intruders which
must be eliminated or tamed to submission.  With these in
the back of their minds, they set to get hold of members
of Peace Movements and make them suffer humiliations, detentions,
imprisonment or death and if possible outlaw the organizations.

Examples abound about people of peace who suffered
persecution in the hands of cruel governments.  During the
reign of terror in Germany under the Nazy Government,
attrocities escolated.  In Austria, a leader of the League
of the White Cross, Max Josef Metzger a member of Fellowship
of Reconciliation was beheaded by the order of the Government
on account of his active involvement in Peace and nonviolent
campaigns.  Another Austrian, too, named Franz Jagerstatter,
a devout christian and father of three refused to do military
service even though he was promised noncombatant service.
He refused to have anything to do with army uniform.  The
Nazi Regime, on August 9, 1943 condemned him to death and
beheaded him.  Of him it was written, "his sacrifice was
beyond measures; he loved life, his family, his ~~field~~ friends, his
neighbours.  Yet he felt bound to refuse compromises which
would have saved his life".

In June 1982, 23 leaders of the Turkish Peace Association
(TPA) were imprisoned for subversive activities as a result
of their active disarmament campaigns.  The prison terms
ranged from 8 years and over.  They appealled against the
judgement, and although the prosecutor recommended acquital,
the judges refused.  The Turkish Authority refused their
release despite wide spread protests.  They were jailed.

Mr. Sulak Sivaraksa, a renown Buddist Scholar and Social
activist from Taiwan was arrested in August 5, 1984 in Bangkok
"for offending the Thai monarchy".  The accusation was that
he commented in an interview discussion on Thai Education
system.  Sivaraksa, a founding member of the Co-ordinating

Group for Religion in Society and an active advocate for nonviolent means for solving problems was refused bail until August 20, 1984 when his case was transferred to be tried in a military court.

The end is not yet in sight of the governments' persecution of members of the Peace Movements. This sterms from wrong perception of political parties towards the Peace Movements. Government Security Agencies are used by Governments to destroy Peace Movements.

Peace Movements are organizations whose members voluntarily joined together for social development based on peace and justice. Contrary to political parties' views, Peace Movements see governments as political authorities on which proper administration of a nation-state depends. What the Peace Movements expect from the governments is to take care of the welfare of the citizens. Disagreements arise when the governments do not take proper care of the citizens or pursue policies inimical to human personality. It is on record that Peace Movements give praises to governments when they deliver the goods. For instance, a Catholic delegate from Poland at the Third Convertion of the European Nuclear Disarmament in 1984 confessed that "without peace-work within polish Society there would not have been the two major amnesties that the government had recently granted."

The Cold War in Peace Movement has generated hatred instead of love in the Movement. In confirmation, a delegate of the Third Convention of the European Nuclear Disarmament in 1984 Commented, "the nuclear holocaust, if occurs, will in large part be the result of decades of Christian anti-communism. We have legitimated hatred, even when speaking of love. We turn to each other and not on each other". Again at the Theology of Peace Seminar in Budapest, Joe Peacock wrote, "one condition of this new opening for the church is that it stay out of politics and concerns itself only with personal and spiritual concerns except, whenever possible, to support government policy on peace questions".

Peace Movements cooperate with governments when they (governments) deliver the goods and present constructive criticisms when they present obnoxious policies. But government attitudes towards the Peace Movements are hostile and domineering.

Part 4 Conclusion:

Peace is necessary in a society. Without Peace there is no development. According to Adam Curle, "Peace is a condition from which the individuals or groups concern gain more advantage than disadvantage". It is only in atmosphere of peace that an ideal government can emerge and execute development programmes and raise the standard of living of the people. In other to achieve this, political parties and peace Movements should see each other as a

partner in progress and cooperate.

Peace Movements should intensify peace education among members and non-members in order to make citizens who are potential members know about peace movement.

Efforts should be mounted to increase membership of Peace Movements by the introducing the policy of 5% Adult population coverage every year. By this method, peace movements win 5% of the adult population of a country annually and within some time membership of peace movements will grow. This means converting the entire electorate to the way of peace.

To make the necessary impressions in the society, members of peace movements should present peace attitudes. Of all professions, peace is the most difficult. All others are mono-basic while peace is multi-basic in the sense that a peace practitioner is judged by his attitutes to every situation in any enviroment. It is therefore funda- mental that a peace practitioner should be both conscious and cautious of any steps he takes, any statements he makes (oral or written); the calibre of people he associates with and even his eating or drinking habits. A peace practioner sees through the superficialities of daily events, recognizes limitations on activities and has a deep intuitive grasp on realities of actions. Peace makers should learn about the living legends on peace like Gandhi, Dr. Martin Luther King and Olof Palme.

_individuals_ The most coverteous prize is peace. Peace should be sought by induals as well as groups or societies, for, with- out peace life itself is meaningless. In his commencement address at the American University, Washington D.C. in June 10, 1963, the former president of the United States, John F. Kennedy, said "I have chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived - and that is the most important topic on earth: Peace. The kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living - and the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children".

Like Kennedy, it will pay dividends if political parties and the Peace Movements regard 'Peace discussion' as most important and take steps to agree not to disagree on matters that will foster cooperation between the two bodies and make for lasting peace. Peace Movements should influence other important organizations with a view to injecting peace attitudes on them and their members. Associations like the Peace Movement, the Rotary International, Women Organizations, Students' Bodies and the Red Cross that have international reputation and recognition should be linked with the Peace Movements. The Cooperative Movement has taken steps in the

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right direction by making the necessary linkage to Peace Movement. At the Congress of the International Cooperative Alliance in Warsaw in 1972 and the Central Committee in Budapest in 1973 it adopted two Famous Resolutions "to work for the establishment of lasting peace and security".

Before the formal adoption of the 1972 Resolution, the President of the International Cooperative Alliance, Dr.Mauritz Bonow drew the participants' attention to the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Assembly Resolution Concerned were far from universal implementation. He reminded them too of the crisis and conflicts going on in parts of the world and concluded by emphasising, "in view of all these adious acts of violence, we cannot adopt a defeatist attitude. We must protest against such evil deeds nationally and internationally. The voice of the Cooperative Movement against such inhuman outrages should be heard". Like the Co-operative Movement, let other organisations join hands with the Peace Movements and raise their voices also against such inhuman outrages. Peace Movements should initiate actions to make the realization possible within reasonable time.

In order to avoid conflicts, and to properly co-ordinate activities, possibility should be sought for the registered Peace Research Institutions by the United Nation Educational" and cultural organization" (UNESCO) to meet occasionally and have joint deliberations on Peace. It is in such a forum that an emphasis should be laid on the proposed 5% Adult population coverage, review joint proposals and set targets.

People, the world over are members of the human family. Love and kindness should exist in the family to attract peace and keep peace. Wherever a person is born, and under whatever system, the person still shares with us our common humanity. Peace of the human race should be the prime concern of every peaceman and every politician. Let there be peace.

The grave danger which now threatens the whole human
race is the accumulative effect of mistrust, suspicion and
fear between the governing and the governed. The result
is the wide gulf between the exploiter and the exploited; the
aristocrat and the commoner, the privileged and the under-
privileged. This difference is the source of resentment,
struggle, discontent and revolts. In the world scenes today,
are series of revolutions - governmental, group and personal
to strike the balance between the haves and have-nots; the
contented and the discontented. The situation is worsening
as the governments, groups and individuals for fear and
mistrust seek for an unholy alliance and stock-piles of deadly
weapons.

This situation can only change by improving the relation-
ship between the political parties and the Peace Movements.
It is only that improved relationship that can bring the needed
realization and sanity and so replaces hate with love. In
the words of Leo and Walter Russell, "The present State of
civilisation is a world revolution against peace, happiness
and love, even to the destruction of the God of peace, and
love and beauty. It can end only in the bloodiest and most
costly war in human history unless the cause of this division
of the contented and discontented is removed and the human race
united for the common good of all men".

Peace Movements should accelerate Peace Education to the
General public with emphasis on non-violence as the strongest
weapon for peace restoration and preservation. The mother
earth is the same for all humans. Therefore men and women
ought to regard themslves members of the same family despite
differences in race, culture and language. Members of a
family do things together and shun conflicts though retaining
their individual identities. The family ties bind them
together through effective communication. Peace Movements
can initiate actions which bring political parties and the
Peace Movements, closer to reflect on 'peace' using non-
inflammatory language. The objective is to win political
parties to the way of peace. Once political parties appreciate
the value of 'peace' and apply the principles of peace in
National-governments, economic growth and development will
follow. Economic intercourse will develop between states.
Such collaborations in solving economic problems would minimise
distrust, fear and hostilities and develop mutual interest
and cooperation.

We as humans should reflect on the dangers that confront us
in this nuclear world, "and to remind us of the new world
that is now within our reach if we could move beyond our
present fears and entagonisms".

Therefore members of Peace Movements should give great
concern at the present situation in the world at this nuclear
age. They should bear in mind the words of Walter Rodney,
"History will not forgive those men and women who knowing what

to do but decided to fold their arms and stand by while
forces of iniquities and degradations prevail" or as Edmund
Burk, the French philosopher opined, "Evils can only
triumph where wisemen refuse to act". Members of Peace
Movements are both "the men and women who knowing what to do",
and the, "wisemen", in the two above – questions. Peace
Movements therefore should initiate reforms that will
improve the relationship between political parties and the
Peace Movements. In this connection, Peace Movements
should encourage members to seek reconciliations with
political parties by applying the following principles to
every area of life:

1.  Work to abolish violence and create a community of
    concern transcending national boundaries and selfish
    interests.

2.  Work to build a social order that will utilize the
    resources of human ingenuity and wisdom for the
    benefit of all.

3.  Work to show reverence for personality-in the home, work
    places, schools with persons of other racial, sexual,
    creedal or national back-ground.

4.  Work to avoid bitterness and contention in dealing with
    controversy, and to maintain the spirit of self-giving
    love while engaging in the efforts to achieve these
    purposes.

I joined David Langville in his paper, "The Peace
Movement, Parties and Political Power" to state "that
Peace Movement activists must join other progressive social
forces in a counter-hegemonic bloc committed to ideological
struggle. By gaining control over the local state they can
gradually extend the sphere of democracy and non-violence."

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# RED VS. GREEN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON PEACE MOVEMENTS IN JAPAN, DENMARK, AND FINLAND

to be presented at Lund Conference on Peace Movements

held by IPRA Study Group on Peace Movements and LUPRI

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(not to be quoted)

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## 1) INTRODUCTION:

This paper touches upon sensitive parts of peace movements-inner conflicts among peace movements. It is, in my opinion, worthwhile to analyze the conflicts not only for academic development but also for peace movements themselves in a long run. The paper intends to analyze the inner conflicts of peace movements and attempts to make clear problems involved in the conflicts, although it leaves any concrete conclusions for the further research.

By including many types of movements which advocate 'peace' in a single category, peace movement(s), we tend to have a misguided image that all the peace movements share the same, or at least similar character(s) and goal(s). Consequently, it is believed that there is (or should be) a harmonious consensus among them. This popular picture, however, is far from reality. There are many types of peace movements with different goals, characters, methods, etc. In fact, some movements are so different that it is difficult to find elements in common among them except a name shared under peace movement(s). What is more, there are some cases that peace movements conflict with each other. In some countries, the world of peace movements is by no means peaceful. It is, in my opinion, of great significance to be aware of the diversities and differentiations among peace movements.

In respect of conflicts among peace movements, I think it useful to make a distinction between red-type peace movement and green-type peace movement. Red-type peace movement is

the one which has its ideological basis on communism and is in many cases initiated and supported by communist party. The main target of the criticism of red-type peace movement is imperialistic militarism and consequently weaponry system of US and Western Europe. On the other hand, the main target of green-type peace movement is both imperialistic militarism and hegemonic militarism, and consequently weaponry systems of both US and Soviet Union. Green-type peace movement has grass-root and decentralized character. New peace movements in the beginning of 1980's were dominated by this type of peace movement in many countries of West Europe. This is a brief picture of red-type peace movement and green-type peace movement, although this picture can not escape from criticism for its over simplification.

Differences of character as well as political orientation have led conflicts between red-type peace movement and green-type peace movement in some countries. You will find such conflicts in Japan, Denmark and Finland. Concretely speaking, conflicts have broken out between Gensui-kyo (Councils against A-H Bombs) and Gensui-kin (Congress against A-H Bombs) in Japan, Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security (Cooperation Committee, for short) and No to Nuclear Weapons in Denmark, and Peace Committee and Peace Union in Finland. In spite of some big differences of political environments and political culture of these countries, the conflicts are of similar character and invite a comparative analysis. This paper is based on several interviews with leaders of the peace organizations and a few studies previously done by other scholars as well as my personal experiences.

## 2) BACKGROUND:

### A) JAPAN:

In 1954, crewmen of the Japanese fishing vessel were radiated by the Hydrogen bomb test at Bikini atoll. This Bikini incident shocked the Japanese public and inflamed sentiment against nuclear weapons. In response of overswell of public concern and activity, the First World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb was held in Hiroshima on 6th, August 1955. This conference gave birth to Gensui-kyo (Japan Council against A-H Bombs).

In 1964, Gensui-kyo split into two organizations. Some members left Gensui-kyo and formed a new peace organization, Gensui-kin (Japan Congress against A-H Bombs). The immediate cause of this split was different stances over whether nuclear test by any countries, capitalist or socialist, should be opposed, and over how to evaluate the Limited Nuclear Test-ban Treaty. Gensui-kin, allied with the Socialist Party (Nihon Shakai-to), insisted that nuclear test by any countries should be opposed to and support the Limited Nuclear

Test-ban Treaty as a step for total prohibition of nuclear tests. On the other hand, Gensui-kyo, allied with the Japan Communist Party(Nihon Kyosan-to), took the position that nuclear nuclear weapons in socialist countries were for world peace and should not be opposed to and that the Limited Nuclear Test-ban Treaty would not change the situation of nuclear armament and therefore should be opposed to.

Since then, these two major peace organizations have been conflicting each other over a few issues, which will later be discussed in details. The split and the conflicts among peace movements have no doubt damaged the image of peace movement. Many citizens including hibakusha(survivors of atomic bomb) lost their zeal for anti-nuclear movements and left there, although we also recognize the existence of some persistent activists. For around 10 years, peace movements in Japan had been stagnated partly because of the split and conflicts among peace movements.

In 1977, the **joint** World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima by both Gensui-kyo and Gensui-kin as well as other citizens' organizations. After over 10 years' splits, these organizations could finally take joint activities which attracted a wide range of people from all over Japan. This joint conference had been held every summer for until 1985.

However, it took only a few years for this honeymoon period to come to a period. Already in 1980, these two organizations came to quarrel each other over the issues of nuclear energy, Soviet nuclear tests and participation of the radicals well-known in the movement against Tokyo International Airport to the joint conference. The heating conflict between Socialist party and Communist party has worsened the situation. They could co-organize the conference until the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, but in 1986 the relationship between Gensui-kyo and Gensui-kin deteriorated so badly that they found it impossible to organize the joint conference. It seems extremely unlikely that the joint conference will be organized in near future.

### B) DENMARK:

Although the history of Danish peace movements is an old one, the two peace organizations to be discussed in this paper are relatively new.

The Cooperation Committee for Peace and Security was founded in 1974, shortly after the 1973 World Peace Council congress in Moscow in which about thirty Danes participated. This starting has given the organization strong leanings toward the Communist party, although the committee claims that it is an independent organization from any political parties and aims to cut across party lines. The Cooperation Commit-

tee has been an umbrella organization of peace groups, labour unions, occupational groups, and individuals. Its organizational structure is hierarchical. Members are dedicated ones and have high discipline.

The first issue that they tackled was over the Danish purchase of the F-16 aircraft. In 1977-78, it organized a very successful campaign against the neutron bomb. It received nation-wide support and enjoyed a rapid growth of the organization with many new local groups. This neutron bomb controversy gave a kind of legitimacy to the Cooperation Committee. It made a further growth after the NATO double-track decision on the deployment of nuclear missiles in 1979.

Because of its pro-Soviet orientation, however, the image of the Cooperation Committee harshly deteriorated by the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the establishment of martial law in Poland and the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles, SS-20.

Partly encouraged by the development of the new peace movements such as 'the Interchurch Peace Council' in the Netherlands, 'Green Party' in West-Germany, and 'No to Nuclear Weapons' in Norway, some independent-minded people who could not stand the Cooperation Committee's pro-Soviet orientation formed a new peace organization, No to Nuclear Weapons (NtA).

The foundation of the No to Nuclear Weapons was a quick response to NATO's decision in December 1979, concerning deployment of nuclear missiles. As early as November 1979, a small group of individuals published an appeal to the public and received a positive response. The group set up a peace seminar in January, 1980, which resulted in the foundation of No to Nuclear Weapons in Denmark.

The No to Nuclear Weapons has had a grass-root character and de-centralized structure from the beginning. There is no formal leadership and even no individual membership. A number of local groups as well as other groups are, in structure, loosely affiliated to the organization. To estimate the number of members is, therefore, not an easy work. Roughly 10 000 individuals are on the mailing list, and around 100 local groups and other groups are at present affiliated.

In the beginning, it cooperated with the Cooperation Committee to organize Easter marches and October demonstrations, though with some difficulties. 1982-83 were the years of biggest peace demonstrations in many countries of Western Europe. Denmark was not an exception. October demonstration in Copenhagen in '83 recorded 150 000 participations. This is considered one of the biggest demonstrations in Europe, if the size of country and the number of population are taken into consideration. One of the reasons for this large

number of participation is that in '82 and '83, practically all the peace movements, groups and organizations worked together.

Since around 1984, the relations between the Cooperation Committee and the No to Nuclear Weapons have become worse. In preparation of peace demonstrations, the two organizations were engaged in long and energy-consuming negotiations, which in many cases produced no results.

October demonstration in 1985 raised a question whether the No to Nuclear Weapons would be allowed to invite a German poet, an exile from East-Germany. After a long debate, the No to Nuclear Weapons was allowed to invite him and the demonstration was co-organized.

At Easter march, 1986, they split. The No to Nuclear Weapons wanted to invite Polish theater group from Krakow, which had keen interests in peace issues, to the Easter demonstration. Their performance was concerned with democracy of Poland as well as East-West questions. The Cooperation Committee refused to have their performance at the demonstration. In consequence, the march was organized separately.

October demonstration, 1986 was very complicated. The World Peace Council congress was held in Copenhagen. The discussion of the demonstration was almost completely covered by a question whether the demonstration should take part in the congress. The demonstration committee had discussion after discussion and spent more than half a year to make a decision. They at last ended up in some kind of compromise. The No to Nuclear Weapons agreed to join the congress on condition that it was allowed to include delegations from non-official peace movements in Eastern block.

At '87 Easter demonstration, the No to Nuclear Weapons was not active in preparation at all. Only one representative went to committee for the demonstration, who preferred to do nothing and say nothing. This seems to be an attempt to avoid _formal_ split, and at the same time long heated discussion which could bring no fruits.

## C) FINLAND:

The two large peace organizations in Finland have a longer history than those in Japan and Denmark. The Finnish Peace Union was founded in 1920 after World War I. Before World War II, the Peace Union was the best know peace organization, largely due to its long time chairman Felix Iversen, who gave considerable influence to the development of the Peace Union as well as the Finnish Peace Committee.

The Peace Union has had pacifist orientation since its foundation. It is a confederation of many peace organizations,

such as Committee of 100, Finnish section of War Resisters International, Conscientious Objectors' group and Teachers for Peace. Among them, Committee of 100 has been the most influential group to the character of Peace Union. The Peace Union also has some one hundred local associations of its own as well as individual associations. The number of individual memberships is around 5 000.

Many of the local groups are situated in the Swedish-speaking areas, and therefore majority of members of Peace Union are Swedish-speaking people. The situation provides an advantage to the cooperation among Nordic peace organizations.

As a politically and religiously nonaligned, the Peace Union gives special emphasis on scientific peace research. The Peace Union is a member of the International Peace Bureau.

The Finnish Peace Committee was founded in 1949. It has approximately 30 000 individual membership, 16 district organizations, and some hundred local peace groups, as well as 84 national member organizations. Among national member organizations are some trade unions and most of the political parties. It has political and national broadness in its memberships of both individuals and organizations affiliated.

The Finnish Peace Committee has also solidarity committee inside its framework, such as Finnish-African Committee, and are in close cooperation with some solidarity organizations like Finnish-Arab People's Friendship Society. Finnish Peace Committee is working not only as anti-war, disarmament organization, but also as an umbrella organization for solidarity organizations.

Although Peace Committee has broad political relations, it is obvious that Communist Party in Finland has influenced quite strongly to Peace Committee. It has favourable stance and good relations to policies of Soviet Union and East-European countries. The Finnish Peace Committee has been affiliated to International Peace Bureau.

Both Peace Union and Peace Committee are participating in END conventions. But the delegates of Peace Committee has been frustrated with the views of many peace organizations there on unofficial peace activities(independent peace movements/dissidents movements) in Eastern Europe.

In 1979 when United Nations declared the disarmament week, Peace Committee organized a peace demonstration. After some years, the UN disarmament week demonstration developed to be an annual event with broad cooperation of many different organizations, including Peace Union.

In 1983, they could organize a biggest demonstration during UN disarmament week, in which 230 000 people participated at

106 different places in Finnish at the same time. 230 000 people means as much as 5% of whole population in Finland. This figure is extremely big from West-European standards.

In the process of joint events such as UN disarmament demonstration, some small conflicts between Peace Committee and Peace Union have been recorded. At one demonstration, for example, some members of Peace Union wanted to have a banner, 'Ban the nuclear missiles both from East and West', near the Soviet Embassy. This attempt met opposition from Peace Committee and could not be carried out. They have had disagreements on the evaluation of official foreign policy of Finland as well as the evaluation of unofficial peace activities in Eastern-Europe.

Peace Union used to be a membership organization of Peace Committee, but a few years ago Peace Union formally left there to clear the relationships between the two organizations. Now they stopped to co-organize large demonstrations.

The relation between the two organizations, however, is not as bad as the ones in Japan and Denmark. Their different approaches to different subjects have produced so called 'unstated labour of division' in peace movements. Both organizations try not to compete but to compensate each other. They still exchange the information on peace issues and invite each other to seminars, at least officially.

### 3) SOURCES OF DISPUTES:

The two types of peace movements have disagreements on the several issues. There are of course special circumstances of each of the three countries to be taken into considerations. Let me briefly go over them according to issues in question.

### A) EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES:

On this issue, you can sketch similar pictures in all the three countries. Namely, 'red' type of peace movements are less critical to Soviet nuclear missiles, saying that they are basically of defensive character, while 'green' type of peace movements are critical to Soviet nuclear missiles as strongly as to American ones.

In Japan this was in fact a main issue of disagreement which split one national peace organization into two in 1964. Some activists were frustrated with the favorable attitudes towards Soviet missiles of the mainstream of Gensui-kyo, and left there. They organized a new peace organization, Gensui-kin, under the slogan of 'We Cry Against Any Nuclear Weapons Of Any Country, Socialist or Capitalist'. This slogan, which is not acceptable to Gensui-kyo, is still be one of the main sources of disputes.

In my interview, a representative of Hiroshima <u>Gensui-kyo</u> criticized the slogan by saying, 'the slogan looks fine on the surface, but if you study even a bit on the differences of social and political systems between socialist countries and capitalist countries, you soon recognize how frivolous it is. <u>Gensui-kin</u> people do not have any ability to recognize this simple fact'. Of course criticism comes from the other side, too. A representative of Hiroshima <u>Gensui-kin</u> said, 'This slogan is a basis of our peace movements. As long as they don't accept the slogan, it is extremely difficult to cooperate with them. I think that their one-sided movement is seriously harming the image of peace movement in general'.

The situation is similar in Denmark and Finland. No to Nuclear Weapons in Denmark and Finnish Peace Union are quite critical to the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles, SS-20. On the other hand, the Cooperation Committee in Denmark and the Finnish Peace Committee concentrate their criticism and attention on the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Europe. They give countenance to Soviet Union by stressing Soviet peace actions/proposals, such as moratorium on nuclear explosions, pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons and Soviet proposal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999, and by doing so, they show that USA is responsible for the nuclear arms race and Soviet missiles are necessary evils to defend the Eastern block from aggressive American imperialism.

Both 'red' type of peace organizations and 'green' type of organizations agree that they are opposed to American nuclear missiles and that ban of nuclear weapons is urgently needed. But they disagree on the evaluation over Soviet missiles specifically. This has been one of the major sources of conflicts between the two types of peace movements.

**B)EVALUATION OF UNOFFICIAL PEACE ACTIVITIES IN SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE:**

Since the beginning of '80s, a few attempts to establish independent unofficial peace groups have been recorded in Eastern block. Listed are, for example, 'Moscow Trust Group' in Soviet Union, 'Peace Group for Dialogue' in Hungary and 'Church Peace Movements' in GDR. These attempts have been well covered by the magazines and newsletters of West-European peace movements, e.g. Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament. These attempts of unofficial peace activities have invited very hot debates, and often serious conflicts among peace movements in the West.

In Japan, these attempts are not well-known, and therefore this issue is hardly a source of conflicts between the two peace organizations. This is more European issue.

In Denmark and Finland, this is one of the most disputable issues. The two types of peace movements even do not agree on the names to call these unofficial peace groups in the Eastern block. No to Nuclear Weapons in Denmark and the Finnish Peace Union call them 'independent peace movements' or 'independent peace initiatives', while Cooperation Committee in Denmark and the Finnish Peace Committee call them 'dissidents' movements'. This difference of the naming express the different value-judgments of the respective peace organizations on unofficial peace groups.

Both No to Nuclear Weapons and the Finnish Peace Union have very close relationships with these 'independent peace movements' and regard them as real peace movements and real voices of East-European people. They think the relations essential for a real dialogue, between East and West. The Cooperation Committee in Denmark and Finnish Peace Committee think differently. According to them, (official) peace organizations in Soviet Union and other Socialist countries are not only sectors or sections of foreign offices of these countries, but also original mass movements of these countries. They regard unofficial peace groups as 'dissidents' groups' with distorted visions of peace, which are far from real representative of people there.

The hot debates can lead to be serious conflicts when they are followed by real actions. Especially in Denmark, as we have already seen, No to Nuclear Weapons have attempted to invite some activists from unofficial peace groups in East-European countries to demonstrations and conferences organized together with Cooperation Committee. These attempts have created nearly endless discussions at the preparatory meetings for joint-events as well as conflicts between the two organizations involved.

## C)EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS:

In Japan, this has been a source of conflicts. Gensui-kin has been unconditionally opposed to all nuclear power plants except the ones for experimental use. In fact, some groups affiliated to Gensui-kin specifically advocate abolition of nuclear power plants. They are quite radical and often use non-violent direct actions, such as lying down on the road to prevent transportation of uranium. Because of this critical attitudes to nuclear power plants, Gensui-kin has succeeded to have strong solidarity relations with the movements in the Pacific islands which are opposed to dumping of nuclear waste of Japan in the Pacific Ocean.

The attitudes of Gensui-kyo on nuclear power plants have been more ambiguous. In the beginning, it supported nuclear power plants, saying that military use of nuclear energy would be changed to peaceful use of nuclear energy. It demanded strict control and regulations to limit the use to

only _peaceful_ one, but it showed basically favorable attitudes to nuclear power plants.

As the time passed, however, it gradually changed the attitudes. It now says that it can not support nuclear power plants under today's level of technology and under today's world situation in which it is almost impossible to limit the use to peaceful one, although it does not deny the possibility of nuclear power plants in future. The reasons for this change are the happenings of some accidents like Three Mile Island's accident, the arising of dumping problem of nuclear waste in the Pacific Oceans, and the last, not the least, realization of difficulties in developing solidarity relations with 'new' peace movements in West Europe and movements in the Pacific islands.

It seems, however, that there are still some discords on this issue inside _Gensui-kyo_. It is still much less critical to nuclear power plants than _Gensui-kin_ and tries to avoid the issue as an issue to harm 'unification' of movements, especially at joint-events.

Conflicts caused by the different attitudes on this issue have been recorded at some joint events. 'Hiroshima Action for Peace, 1982', for example, created some conflicts afterwards in spite of unprecedented success in attracting nearly 200 000 participants from all over Japan. _Gensui-kyo_ demanded not to touch on provocative issues, including the abolition of nuclear power plants, at the assembly. The committee of the Action for Peace, of which both _Gensui-kyo_ and _Gensui-kin_ are key-members, decided to exclude the opposition of nuclear power plants from the slogans of the Action for Peace, as _Gensui-kyo_ demanded. At Hiroshima Memorial Park where the Action was carried out, however, some groups of _Gensui-kin_ made demonstrations against nuclear power plants. _Gensui-kyo_ criticized the demonstrations, while _Gensui-kin_ commented such criticism for depriving freedom of expressions and actions.

In Denmark and in Finland, the issue of nuclear power plants is not on the main agenda of peace organizations. Any of the four main peace organizations in these countries do not have formal policies concerning nuclear power plants. According to the estimation of key-persons of these peace organizations, however, there seems to be difference in general opinion of members between the two types of organizations. Most members of No to Nuclear Weapons in Denmark and the Finnish Peace Union are against nuclear power plants, while the opinion on the issue is divided in Cooperation Committee in Denmark and the Finnish Peace Committee. But this difference is hardly a source of conflicts in the two countries.

## D)AFFILIATION TO POLITICAL PARTY(IES):

Affiliation or close relationships to specific political party(ies) of peace organizations can be a source of conflicts. Although none of the six peace organizations in examination have formal affiliation to any specific political party(ies), some informal affiliation and close relations to specific political party(ies) are recognizable.

Japan is an extreme case. In spite of the official statements, affiliations of the peace organizations to specific political parties are almost taken for granted. Gensui-kyo has strong relations to Japan Communist party, while Gensui-kin has relations to Japan Socialist party, though to a lesser degree. The different affiliation itself is one of the sources of serious conflicts, especially when the two political parties involved are in antagonistic relations.

At present Japan Socialist party is in a process of departing from Marxist ideology and strengthening cooperation with so called middle of the roaders. This process is at the same time the one to disengage itself from Communist party. As a result, hot conflicts have started between Socialist party and Communist party in Japan. While Communist party severely criticizes Socialist party for its conversion, Socialist party level caustic criticism at the other for its 'unrealistic' 'self-righteous' way of thinking. The conflicts have been brought into the world of peace movements.

In Denmark, No to Nuclear Weapons has good contacts with Social Democratic party, Socialist People's party, Christian party, and Radical Left party. However, the contact is made on more personal level and No to Nuclear Weapons as an organization can be said to be fairly independent organization from any specific political parties. Cooperation Committee, on the other hand, is more closely connected with a specific political party, Communist party. Therefore, it receives some criticism for being 'a tool of Communist party'. This criticism can be a cause of conflicts between peace organizations, but the problem of affiliation to political party is much less serious one in Denmark than in Japan.

In Finland, both Peace Committee and Peace Union have broad and flexible relations with political parties. Though Peace Committee has had strong influence from Communist party, it has also strong ties with other political parties. Communist party, Central party, Rural party, students' organization of conservative parties, and political youth organization of Social Democratic party are the formal member organizations of the Finnish Peace Committee. Peace Union does not have such formal contacts with political parties. But it has had good contacts with Social Democratic party, Communist party, Swedish People's party, and recently Green party and the youth of conservative parties. It seems that affiliation to political parties is not a source of conflict in Finland,

since both peace organizations have broad relations with po-
litical parties.

## 4)DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATIONAL WAY:

It is of sociological interests that the two types of peace
organizations have different organizational ways. It seems
that 'green' type of peace organizations attempt to go in
the direction of de-centralization, while 'red' type of
peace organizations have solid systematization and central-
ization. This difference in organizational ways can be an
element to promote conflicts, although it is not a source of
conflict by itself.

In Japan, Gensui-kyo is much more solidly organized and sys-
tematized than Gensui-kin. While Gensui-kyo has high degree
of unity and uniformity, Gensui-kin is more like confedera-
tion of many trade unions and citizens' groups with differ-
ent characteristics.

Both organizations have different interpretations on
'democracy'. According to Gensui-kyo, it implies 'democratic
centralization', while it is 'democratic decentralization'
for Gensui-kin. This difference can be clearly seen in case
of conflict a 'Hiroshima Action for Peace' in 1982. There,
Gensui-kyo expected Gensui-kin to follow the decision of
central committee of the 'Action' to limit the appeals to
peace and disarmament and to exclude other appeals such as
abolition of nuclear power plants from the appeals. For Gen-
sui-kyo, to follow the decision of central committee is the
basic rule of **democracy**. But some groups of Gensui-kin did
not follow the decision and advocated abolition of nuclear
power plants, at the 'Action'.

There are two reasons for demonsstrating the abolition of
the nuclear power plants at the 'Action' against the deci-
sion of central committee, practical one and theoretical
one, though they are closely interrelated. Practical reason
is that because of decentralized structure of Gensui-kin,
committee of Gensui-kin could not stop the affiliated groups
to break the decision. The other reason is that Gensui-kin,
at least some of the core members, regarded that the deci-
sion of central committee of the 'Action' to control the ap-
peals and activities of participants is itself against the
basic rules of **democracy**. The differences in organizational
ways and ideas on organizational ways are making the con-
flicts more complicated in Japan.

In Denmark, too, you can find clear difference in organiza-
tional ways of the two organizations. No to Nuclear Weapons
has extremely decentralized structure. It has neither indi-
vidual memberships, nor formal leaders. It has only an of-
fice, one or two workers at the office, and loosely affili-
ated local chapters and some other groups. On the other

hand, Cooperation Committee is much more centralized and systematized. This explains the superiority of Cooperation Committee over No to Nuclear Weapons in efficiency, continuity, and finance.

Because of the decentralized structure of No to Nuclear Weapons, it is difficult to know who are representing it, and how much. Discussions between formal representatives of Cooperation Committee and informal representatives, more or less individual activists of No to Nuclear Weapons are not easy ones. The difference of the structure of the two organizations is an element to further the conflicts in Denmark.

There is also difference in organizational ways of the two organizations in Finland, though to a lesser degree than in Denmark. The Finnish Peace Committee has more solid systematization and centralization than the Finnish Peace Union. Group members as well as individual members are more loosely affiliated to Finnish Peace Union. It seems, however, that this difference has almost nothing to do with conflicts between two organizations.

## 5) SOME SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS:

### A) THE CLOSER IN SIZE AND POWER THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE, THE MORE INTENSE THE CONFLICTS ARE:

It is clear that the conflict between peace movements in Japan is the most intense, then less in Denmark, and further less in Finland. A crucial question here is why so.

One possible explanation is that the closer in size and power the two organizations are, the more intense the competition is. The two organizations in Japan have more or less same capacity of memberships as well as influential power. Both attempt to occupy the representative position of Japanese peace movements. Competition for having initiative is in many occasions very hot. Such hot competition is more likely to occur under the existence of more or less equally powerful organizations.

In Denmark, No to Nuclear Weapons _may_ attract far bigger number of people at peace march, but Cooperation Committee has more devoted and efficient activists. Depending on what measures used, the size and power of the two organizations differ. But if you take several elements into one consideration, it can be said that the two organizations have similar degree of power.

In Finland, it is clear that Finnish Peace Committee is far bigger and stronger than Finnish Peace Union. Peace Committee has around 30 000 individual memberships, while Peace Union has only some 5 000 individual memberships. The scale of finance is also quite different. It seems that this dif-

ference of size and power has made easier for the two organizations to make 'unstated division of labor' in peace movement, in stead of competing for initiatives over the same activities.

## B) THE SIMILAR THE ADVOCATIONS OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE, THE MORE INTENSE THE CONFLICTS ARE:

It may sound paradoxical, but this is how things are at least among the three countries in examination. If the two organizations share many of the advocations, (but not all), the two organizations are more likely to conflict each other intensely. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that in such situation as the advocations of the two organizations are similar, each organization must show clearly its uniqueness as well as rightness of their assertions, in comparison with those of the opposite organization. In many cases, this is done by harsh criticism to the other organization, which can lead to intense conflicts between the two organizations. Second reason is that the organizations with similar advocations are more likely to compete each other for attracting the similar category of people and groups. Therefore, it is more difficult for them to make 'division of labor in peace movements'.

In Japan, where the conflicts are the most intense, the two organizations share many advocations, in spite of the different stances over the evaluation of Soviet nuclear missiles, nuclear power plants and a few others. For both Gensui-kyo and Gensui-kin, 'Atomic Bomb Victims Relief Law' has been one of the greatest concerns. A popular slogan, 'No More Hiroshimas, No More Nagasakis, No More Hibakusha', has been shared by both organizations. They have similar appeals to the public and the government by similar ways. It seems that this similarity of the advocations of the two organizations is making the conflict intense.

In Finland, where the conflicts are the least intense, the situation is different. While the Finnish Peace Committee is more concerned with solidarity of the developing countries peace through friendships, the Finnish Peace Union is more concerned with conscription, militarization of women, and non-violent civilian defense. There are also apparent differences in the ways of activities. The Peace Committee is rather an organization of actions such as demonstrations than of research, while the Peace Union is rather an organization of study and research. These differences make it easier for the two organizations to get along with each other by making 'unstated division of labor in peace movements'.

## C) THE STRONGER THE AFFILIATION TO A SPECIFIC POLITICAL PARTY IS, THE MORE INTENSE THE CONFLICTS ARE:

It is not easy to assess comparatively the influence of the affiliation of peace organizations to political parties on intensity of conflicts, partly because of the differences in political environments of the three countries.

In Japan, each peace organization is affiliated to a specific political party. Gensui-kyo is in a close relationship with Japan Communist party and Gensui-kin is linked, (though not officially), with Japan Socialist party. The conflicts of political parties can easily be brought into the world of peace movements. Especially when the two political parties have disagreements, the relations of the peace organizations can not help deteriorating. As we have already seen at the sources of conflict, the affiliation to political party(ies) itself can be a source of conflict. In this respect, to have affiliation to a specific political party can make the conflicts between the peace organizations more likely, and when conflicts happen, more intense.

In Denmark, only Cooperation Committee has similar affiliation to a specific political party, Communist party. No to Nuclear Weapons also has contacts with some political parties, but their relationships are more on personal level than on official level. The lacking of its affiliation to specific political parties seems to be one of the elements of making the conflicts between the peace organizations less intense than that in Japan.

In Finland, the situation is different. The Peace Committee has a close relationship with Communist party, but at the same time a few other political parties are formal members of their organizations. The Peace Union does not have any formal memberships of political parties, and have close contacts with several political parties, among which are Social Democratic party, Communists Party, and Swedish People's party. Both peace organizations have relations with multiple political parties, and this seems to be contributing to the smoother relations between the two organizations.

## D) EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS:

There are different degree and different kinds of effects on different category of people. Let me examine the effects of conflicts on non-activists, rank-and-files of peace organizations, and leaders/ardent activists.

ON NON-ACTIVISTS: It can be safely said that non-activists tend to receive bad images on peace movements in general from the conflicts between peace organizations. If the conflicts continue long as in case of Japan, it becomes difficult for peace organizations in conflict to recruit new members.

ON RANK AND FILES: You can find the polarization among the rank and files. Recognizable number of rank and files usually lose their enthusiasm due to the conflicts between peace organizations, and they quite from there. But at the same time, some of the rank and files become more devoted to the peace activities as the struggles go on. They are asked to justify their actions, thoughts and affiliations when they are engaged in conflicts with other organizations. Conflict is a most important agent for the establishment of full ego identity and autonomy, i.e., for full differentiation of the personality from the outside world. Once they can justify their actions and thoughts, and develop their identity, they are likely to be more ardent and devoted peace activists.

There seems to be difference of the proportion of this polarization, between 'red' and 'green' type of peace organizations. In 'red' type of organizations, which has solid structure, many of the rank and files tend to be able to defend and develop their identity in face of conflicts between peace organizations. In 'green' type of organizations, however, many of the rank and files tend to fail to develop the identity and lose enthusiasm in peace movements in general. Due to loose affiliation of rank and files to 'green' type of peace organizations, many of them choose to be away from the conflicts, rather than to justify their actions and ideas, and to become ardent activists. In my observation, 'green' type of organizations are more seriously damaged by the conflicts between peace organizations than 'red' type of peace organizations.

ON LEADERS: Most of the leaders are able to, and are forced to, confirm their rightness in their actions and ideas. Conflicts with other peace organizations even discipline the leaders. Leaders of the organizations in conflict are required to devote themselves to their organizations more ardently.

To sum up, peace movements are likely to be isolated from the public, radicalized, refined and disciplined as the conflicts between peace organizations go on. In my opinion, this is what is happening in Japan and to a lesser degree in Denmark.

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# ALTERNATIVE SECURITY AND PEACE MOVEMENTS
## ———IN THE CASE OF JAPAN  (ABSTRACTS).

Ohtori KURINO

For most of the peace movements in Japan in the post-war period, the cause, basic principle or motivation has been very clear.  The Constitution of Japan of 1947 has been  understood as offering it; or, as all of the Japanese scholars of constitutional law say, the said Constitution contains, as one of the three principal norms or principles, the principle on peace. Article 9 of the Constitution is widely known for its provisions which renounce war and war potential.  But, in my view, some sentences in Preamble should be understood as such norms or principles that form basic criteria to be applied in interpreting the provisions of Article 9. I may further state that the norms or principles contained in the said article and Preamble as a whole will constitute a complex of norms and principles, which I may call "the Peace Principle" of the Constitution of Japan.

It will sound strange if I consider the above-mentioned Peace Principle as an alternative, or as the cause and guideline for an alternative security.  An alternative will normally mean what does not exist at present but be pursued and realized in future; while in Japan most of the peace movements have considered the peace principles of the Constitution as existing or having been given, and they will not, or should not, pursue any alternative. But, what has happened in Japan since about 1950, a few years after the Constitution came into force, has almost been contrary to these norms or principles, and especially to the Peace Principle. If we look at the actual features in Japan regarding peace and security, we must admit that Japan is not different from some of the NATO member states in that regard.  Japan now possesses the armed forces ranking at number one in Asia and spending annually for the military expenditures the amount of the budget, which will be no less than that of the NATO member state except the USA. With the USA, one of the super-powers, Japan has been the partner. of a military alliance, and it seems from the recent moves and events concerning the military affairs, that Japan is ready to implement the joint military operation plans already concluded between Japan and the US, either in East Asia or in West Pacific, even in such a case that war will break out between the super-powers, regardless of whether Japan itself is not the target of military attacks in the early stage of the war.

The above-mentioned discrepancies between the norms or Peace Principle of the Constitution and the realities will disclose the facts that most of the peace movements in Japan have not been successful in their efforts, and have failed in achieving their objectives, during the period of about 40 years since 1947. I feel that such evaluations may not be unfair for the peace movements in Japan, although I have stronger sentiments critical to those powers which have brought such situations.  In any case, it should be necessary to analyze the main reasons for such failures on the part of the peace movements in Japan.  I may try this in the present paper.

Then, I may propose that the Peace Principle will be taken up again by the peace movements in Japan, this time as an  alternative or the cause and guideline for an alternative security.  I feel, by doing so the peace movements in Japan may place themselves in more objective positions and take better advantage of the Peace Principle itself.

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY AND PEACE MOVEMENTS —— IN THE CASE OF JAPAN

Ohtori KURINO

Reference: Excerpts from the Constitution of Japan
(came into force on 3 May 1947)

Preamble

..... ..... .....

(The second paragraph)

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

(The third paragraph)

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, nut that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

(The fourth paragraph)

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.


Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.


Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.
The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

1.  The Peace Principle
     The Constitution of Japan of 1947 is often called "peace
constitution" and all the Japanese scholars of constitutional law
maintain that in the Constitution of Japan there are three most
important principles of democracy (the sovereign power of the
people), respect of human rights, and peace.  As a matter of
course these  three principles will fundamentally inter-related.
But, I will take up only the principle concerning peace.  The
sentences and provisions of the Constitution of Japan, which will
concern peace and the related matters are as follows.
In Preamble, the second paragraph will read:
     "We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are
deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship,
and we have determined to preserve our security and existence,
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of
the world.  We desire to occupy an honored place in an international
society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment
of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time
from the earth.  We recognize that all peoples of the world have
the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."
"Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as
a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes.
     In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained.  The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized."
     I may call the whole of the above principles and norms "the
Peace Principle' (of the Constitution of Japan), as it is understood
that they constitute a system or complex.  At the bottom, there
is the universal recognition of the "right to live on peace, free
from fear and want."  This right has been recognized by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, in one of its resolutions, in 1979.
In the  onstitution of Japan it was recoknized more than 30 years
before that.  It may be pointed out that the similar concept was
expressed by the leaders of the Allied Powers in 1941, for example
in Atlantic Charter:"(Sixth) After the final destruction of the
Nazi tyra..ny, they (Churchill and Roosevelt) hope to see established
a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance
that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in
freedom from fear and want."
     At the top of the said complex of peace principles there may
be placed  the consciousness of "the high ideals controlling human
relationship" which will allow such understandings that these
ideals may contain whatever norms that the world religions and
sages have given to the humanity.  Then, on the basis of the
recognition of the right to live in peace, and under such ideals,
there is the expression of the desire for peace for all times
and the determination to preserve the security and existence of
the Japanese people, trusting in the justice and faith of the
peace-loving peoples of the world.  and, futher, there is the desire
to occupy an honored place in an international society striving
for the preservation of peace and other virtues or values.
     It is stressed that the said principles and norms will directly
relate to the Japanese peoples who have the sovereign power or
right.  Then, it must be only natural that both the Japanese people
and the state of Japan should be bound by these norms.  The uniqueness
of the Peace Principle of the Constitution of Japan may be found in

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the point as stated above. It is also very important to interpret
the provision of Article 9 within the light of these norms which
are expressed in the second paragraph of Preamble.

As to the provisions of Article 9, the most controversial part
has been whether the state of Japan should have the right of
self-defense or not. In the initial interpretation given by the
government of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, during the sessions
of the parliament, in June 1946, which made deliberations on the
draft constitution, the state was not allowed to have such right.
Prime Minister Yoshida clearly rejected the traditional idea that
states should have the right of self-defense. Then, the second
paragraph of Article 9, concerning "land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential" were also interpreted as they were.
In other words, under the initial interpretations given by the
Japanese government, and in the present interpretations given by
most of the Japanese scholars of constitutional law, Japan should
keep the basic policies of "no war (non-belligerency), no arms, and
non-alignment." The expression "non-alignment" had not been used
by the scholars until the 1960s when the ideas and movements of
the "non-aligned" group appeared. Before that, most of the scholars
used "neutrality." But, now that the ideas and movements of the
non-alignment have been maintained by nearly 100 nations in the
international society, it will be more correct to describe the
Peace Principle by such words as "no war, no arms, and non-alignment."
Besides, the present neutral states are maintaining armaments or
war potential, in order to carry out self-defense, if necessary,
under the obligations of the neutrality or otherwise. In any case,
neutrality will be assuming that war may take place among the
states around the neutral state, while the Peace Principle will
direct the government and people of Japan to such efforts that
war should not take place among the states around Japan. If
the Peace Principle should be taken in the most positive sense,
the government and people of Japan should try to eliminate any war
from the earth, as all peoples of the world should become the peace-
loving peoples and their right to live in peace free from fear
and want should be "recognized." Here the recognition should not
remain as an intellectual attitude or act but imply some deeds to
assure such a right.

There are a few points to be added here, just for reference.
One is that the provisions on the renouncement of war had to be
included in the new Japanese constitution as a means for avoiding
such situation that the Emperor should be indicted by the Allied
Powers as to his responsibilities for waging the war. This has
been cited by those who had access to behind-the-scenes events
between the GHQ, SCAP and the Japanese government during the
crucial period immediately after the end of the war. Another
point is that the said provisions or depriving Japan of its war
potentials might be one of important schemes of the US in view
of the strategies for the post-war period in the long range,
mostly in order to assure the security for the US in the Pacific.
But, now that in the provisions of the Constitution of Japan the
Emperor is given the status as "the symbol of the State and of
the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of
the people with whom resides sovereign power" (Article 1), the
validity of the provisions of Article 9 should not be affected
even by the above-mentioned history regarding their birth; and
the second point has been almost denied by the facts and events
concerning the security or defense of Japan, as described in the
following chapter.

2.  "Amendments by interpretations"

The Constitution of Japan was accepted by most of the Japanese
people who were feeling that war should not be waged by themselves
in future, that Japan should not try to become again a power by
means of military forces, and that in view of such weapons of mass
destruction as atomic bombs which they experienced in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, there should not occur any more war in the world.
But, the international situation outside Japan was turning toward
"cold war" and such changes were affecting the policies of the
occupation authorities about almost all affairs in Japan.  As
early as the beginning of 1950 General MacArthur, as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, expressed that Japan as a state
should have the right of self-defense.  It was a token of the
reversal of the major occupation policies of Japan, from the
policies of demilitarization and democratization to those of
remilitarization and regimentation of Japan into so-called Free
camp.

During the sessions of the parliament which gave deliberations
on the draft Constitution of Japan, some amendments were made to
the provisions of Article 9.  The phrase "aspiring sincerely to
an international peace based on justice and order" and "in order
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" were added to
the first and the second paragraph, respectively.  The latter
phrase was understood just as one to make the meanings of the
second paragraph clearer.  But, after above-mentioned statement
by General MacArthur, some politicians started to use the phrase
"in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" as
a sort of proviso in the second paragraph of Article 9.  That
amendment was called "Ashida amendment", as it was proposed by
Hitoshi Ashida who later became Prime Minister.  It was not certain
if he had the intention to use that phrase for such purpose or not,
when he proposed it.  But, he and other politicians maintained
afterwards that the said amendment was to limit the war to be
renounced, in order to let the state of Japan preserve the right
to wage war of self-defense.  In their interpretations the provisions
of Article 9 should mean that war is renounced as means of settling
international disputes, and this should be the "aim" of the first
paragraph, while war of self-defense is excempted and therefore the
meanings of the second paragraph should also be limited.  They say,
under the provisions of Article 9, Japan can maintain the forces
to be used for self-defense.

Of course most of the Japanese scholars of constitutional law
did not agree to such interpretations of Article 9, in which Japan
as a state should not be recognized the right of belligerency.
But, soon after the breakout of the Korean War in June 1950, the
Japanese government set up "the National Police Reserve" upon the
order of the GHQ, SCAP, in order to fill the vacuum created by the
deployment of the US Forces stationing in Japan to Korea.  The
NPR's functions were those of police forces or to be ready to
the situation necessary for maintaining internal security of Japan.
But, after Japan regained independence on 28 April 1952, and
under the US-Japan Security Treaty which came into force at the
same time, the Japanese government decided to create military
forces "for self-defense."  The NPR was renamed as "the Security
Forces" and then as "the Self Defense Forces" in 1952 and in 1954,
respectively.

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The Self Defense Forces have been gradually strengthened since the middle of the 1950s, but its main cause has not been the pressure of the conservative or reactionary power in Japan, but come from the external pressure, that of the US side. The US military has utilized the US-Japan Security Treaty as the lever, as the Japanese government was obliged to do so, under the Treaty. In such demands of the US side there have always been strong intention or plans to let the Japanese side purchase as many as possible weapons made in USA. Apparently, the wishes of the military-industrial complex of the US were behind it.

But, towards the 1960s, among the Japanese politicians there were the factions having much nationalistic tendencies who disliked the characteristics of the US-Japan Security Treaty not putting both partners on the equal footing. Under the Treaty the US side had the rights to station their forces and use the military bases in Japan, but had no obligations to defend Japan. Those politicians wanted to amend the Treaty to become more reciprocal and equally binding. The US side first rejected such request, but became to accept it, upon the new policy of putting Japan in the position more responsible in its defense and in cooperating the US strategies in East Asia and the Pacific. From 1959 the negotiations were carried out between the two governments, while the considerable numbers of the Japanese people began to oppose Japan's being aligned with the US by such a military treaty. From 1959 to the first half of 1960 the anti-"Ampo" (US-Japan Security Treaty) movements spread almost nationwide. But, the strategies of the opposition parties and political groups were not harmonized and the targets of the movements shifted during the short period of several months in 1960. The government headed by Nobusuke Kishi, who was arrested by the GHQ, SCAP, as a war criminal suspect but acquitted, took the steps in the National Diet, which seemed undemocratic, but succeeded in ratification of the draft of the revised Treaty. The strength of the anti-"Ampo" movements was enough to let Kishi quit the post of Prime Minister, but could not stop the adoption and ratification of the Treaty. The reason for Kishi's resignation was that he had to request President Eisenhawer to cancel the planned visit to Japan, due to the situation in Japan that was chaotic and unsafe for such a visit.

The main points contained in the revised Treaty were that the US had the obligation to defend Japan, Japan had the obligation to defend the US forces within the Japanese territories, Japan's obligation to strengthen the Self Defense Forces became clearer, both sides should consult when a threat to security in the Far East should be felt, both sides would have the consultations in advance about major changes in deployment of the US forces and few other cases, and the term of the treaty was for 10 years, but it could be extended unless either party request for its abolition. The clause for the US involvement in internal disturbances in Japan was deleted, but there remained such clause that the US forces can stay and use the military facilities and bases in Japan "for assuring security in Japan and the Far East." Although Okinawa or the Ryukyu Islands had been kept under the US rule and occupation, Eisaku Sato, then Prime Minister from 1965, started the negotiations for achieving the return of Okinawa and succeeded in it in 1971. Under the agreement between Japan and the US, nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Okinawa, and Okinawa was given the same treatment with mainland Japan with respect to all the affairs, but the military bases in Okinawa

were not reduced.  In achieving the return of Okinawa, "without
nuclear weapons and in equal status with mainland Japan" was the
slogan summrizing the major policies.  But, it has been suspected
by many Japanese intellectuals and others that mainland Japan
became Okinawanized, or brought into the same status with Okinawa,
so far as nuclear weapons and strategies were concerned.  This
suspicion related to the problem of Three Non-nuclear Principles
and the system of prior consultations.  The Three Non-nuclear
Principles mean that Japan will not possess, produce, nor permit
the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territories.  But,
the third principle has been made the object of arguments in the
non-governmental circles in Japan, as it has been disclosed by
Professor E. W. Reishauer, former US Ambassador to Japan, that
there were secret agreements between the two governments as to
"introduction" into Japan of the nuclear weapons, to the effect
that "introduction" should not include "transit" cases of the US
warships and war planes carrying nuclear weapons to Japanese ports
and air bases.  Further, it was disclosed that the system of prior
consultation was not reciprocal, namely that the Japanese side
could not request the US side to have prior consultations.  Thus,
the US has been able to let its warships and war planes visit
Japanese ports and air bases carrying nuclear weapons, but without
making it clear to the public, nor making prior consultations with
the Japanese government.  On the other hand, the Japanese government
has been taking such attitude that it should believe there should
be no breach of the Three Non-nuclear Principles, even if the US
warships and war planes usually supposed to carry nuclear weapons
would visit Japanese ports and air bases, as it had not been
consulted in advance by the US side.  In short, the system of
prior consultation has been used as the means for allowing such
a loophole in the US-Japan Security Treaty.
    More serious, perhaps for the security of Japan, will be the
de facto amendments of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which have
been given since the latter half of the 1970s.  During Vietnam War,
it was felt that the interpretation of the Article of the US-Japan
Security Treaty concerning the scope of the Far East was extended
to cover areas beyond the Far East, or the scope was deliberately
made vague and unclear, so that it could cover Vietnam.  Further,
the Japanese "defense" authorities started the studies on the
emergency cases in the Far East, while they changed the formula of
programming the budget and plans of defense.  In 1976, the
government of Prime Minister Takeo Miki decided so-called 1 percent
ceiling of the defense budget (in GNP), along with the first
programme of defense.  On 27 November 1978, "Security Consultation
Committee", the highest organ under the US-Japan Security Treay
for making consultations between the two governments, was held and
it adopted the "Guidelines" for sharing the defense between the
US and Japan.  These "Guidelines" include such points that in case
Japan should become the target of direct invasion of another country,
the Self Defense Forces would make deployment for defense in the
Japanese territories on land, sea and air, the US would support
these operations and make offensive and controlling operations against
the aggressive country, and, in order to carry out effectively these
operations, if necessary, "command adjustment organ" should be set up.
Also in case there should be a situation gravely influencing the
security of Japan, in the Far East, both sides should make positive
consultations.  In 1980, after the military interference into
Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979, the military cooperation between the
US and Japan have become much bolder and closer.

In January 1981 the US-Japan Security Committee decided to start the studies on the measures in case a situation gravely affecting security of Japan outside of Japan, in the Far East areas. In the sub-committee of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Committee, in March 1983, the actual framework for 1,000 Sea Lanes defense was reconfirmed and concrete studies started. Then, toward the end of 1984, the two governments signed the joint operation plans. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone assumed the said post in 1982 and immediately began to strengthen the military cooperation with the US. He declared that Japan should become a sort of carrier unsinkable, and be ready to close the sea straits around Japan, in order to contain Soviet warships in the Sea of Japan. In 1987 the 1 percent ceiling of the defense budget was broken, as Nakasone expected from the earlier years.

The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 has thus been changed in substance, even if it was not revised in letters. The present situation has also been quite different from that in the 1960s, under the changed Treaty, so far as the Japanese "defense" position, cooperation between the Self Defense Forces and the US Forces, and Japan's alignment with the US global strategies should be concerned. This alignment is going to expand even to the cooperation with the US strategies in outer space under SDI.

But, I must add further explanations about the present states of affairs in and around Japan regarding the matter of security, defense forces and other aspects related. As is already recognized by most of political and strategic experts in the world, Japan now possesses the military strength evaluated as number one in Asia, and number three or four in so-called Free World, with the annual budget allocations at the higher level than the NATO members, due to the rising value of yen. In its fundamental strategic stand Japan has been a partner to the military alliance with one of the super-powers, its defense forces have been taking part in the joint military exercises with that power, and it is almost certain in being ready for engaging in war in East Asia or the Western Pacific, between the super-powers, with the joint operation plans which have already been completed between Japan and the US. This is not denying that, for example the provisions of Article 9, which will renounce war and war potential, in the said constitution, have totally lost their normative effects. But, it must be admitted that these effects have become very limited, perhaps the only remaining aspect will be whether Japanese defense forces can engage in war as an implementation of the collective self defense in such an area outside of East Asia or West Pacific, although the demarkation lines of these areas have already been obscured deliberately in the recent years since the Japanese government has committed to the defense of so-called 1,000 miles sea lanes, between Japan and the sea areas in the West Pacific.

Generally speaking the normative effects of the provisions of the Constitution, which will concern problems of peace, have worked as the restraining power against the remilitarization of Japan, as a matter of fact. But, these effects and power have gradually been reduced, mostly by the pressures from the US and partly by the manoevres carried out by the internal political elements favoring or even taking adnantage of such pressures. The whole history of the Constitution of Japan in the post-WW II years may be described as a sort of tag of war between the power te achieve the remilitarization of Japan basing upon the US-Japan Security Treaty and the power resisting to it, which has been based upon the pacifist principles of the Constitution.

## 3. Peace movements in Japan

During the period from the start of the modernization of Japan to the middle of the 1940s, or the final stage of the World War II, it is doubtful if there existed in Japan peace movements in the sense that the citizens had spontaneously organized some movements with the aims of preserving, restoring or creating peace in any part of the world. Indeed, in the said period, in Japan there were some thinkers or men of religious faith and those of literature, who advocated pacifism and policies for peace, and some of them tried to organize the masses. But, they had to find themselves being isolated from the masses, only small groups of intellectuals having supported them, but not having been able to give any effect or influence to the trend of time, especially in actual states of affairs of politics, economy or society. During that period, it must be noticed that such political parties as the communists' and the socialists' in the true sense had been prohibited. In the 1920s the universal suffrage was introduced, but it was accompanied by a new, very severe law for "maintaining public order." This law and the special department of the police, which was called "TOKKO" (the special secret service police) had been very effective in suppressing not only social movements but also most of the movements aiming at peace. Since Japan started invasion into "Manchuria" or North-eastern region of China, in 1931, "peace" became a taboo.

As to the main reason for the abovementioned situation in Japan in that period, it must be pointed out that the modernization of Japan had not been accompanied by the growth of citizens or bourgeoisie. The modernization had to some extent meant the growth of capitalism and the related institutions. But, every thing was given "from the above." In Japan in the said period there were observed distinctive socio-economic classes. The ruling class was composed of the Emperor and members of the imperial family, the peerage, a few "senior statesmen", big landlords and bourgeoisie or capitalists, high government officials and the top echelon of the military. Then, among the ruled, more than two thirds were tenant farmers, employed fishermen and other workers in the rural areas, who composed the low class and the lower or poorer. The conspicuous point was that there was a so-called middle class, but its size was very small and it was composed of varieties of people, petite bourgeoisie, white colors, intellectuals, etc. They were citizens in the ordinary meaning of the word, but such category of persons did not have much significance in Japan.

After the end of the World War II, and under the occupation, Japan had experienced unprecedented changes in political, economic, social and ideological aspects, or it may be said that the changes reached even the basic parts of the Japanese society and the hidden, unconscious area of the Japanese mentality. But, still these changes could not bring a sort of revolution to both the society and the mentality of the Japanese people, although they left some foundations upon which gradual transformations can be expected. Indeed, the old ruling class had to resolve into more modern socio-economic classes, and the lower classes too. If I take into considerations the rapid economic recovery and the succeeding growth in the 1950s and 60s, the general class-formation of Japan has become rather ambiguous. In fact, according to some public-opinion surveys, more than 80 percent of the total Japanese population are feeling that they belong to the middle, or the upper-middle, class, although the word "class" here does not exactly mean a socio-economic class, but may mean something between the upper and the lower in the social status.

Thus, in the post-war Japan the majority of people are a mixture of persons who formerly belonged to various classes. They are not regarded as citizens in the Western sense, but still possess some elements of such citizens, both in their socio-economic positions and in their mentality. If I look at the general features and trends of the peace movements in Japan in the said period, I notice that the above-mentioned character of those who have been engaging in the movements is reflected in their behaviors and relations with the movements.

Of course in the post-war Japan, under the new Constitution and the guidance of the occupation authorities, Japan has become a fully modernized state, not much different from the states in the West, in political, legal, institutional, administrative, socio-economic and to some extent cultural aspects. There are the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and "the Democratice Socialist" Party, besides others. There are labor unions and their movements. The politico-social movements have been carried out by the said parties, and sometimes peace movements. But, these peace movements had not been similar to those in the West. Until very recently, most of the peace movements had been planned, guided or led by political parties, usually socialists and/or communists. Then, in many cases, the movements had to suffer from the rivalry of the socialists and the communists, in addition to overt or covert hindrances from the sides of the conservatives and the government authorities, often being supported by the rightists' manoeuvres.

Only very recently, in various fields and areas in Japan, there have been emerging a number of grass-root movements. In the field of peace, or as to the problems concerning peace, such movements have also grown, although their numbers and sizes are not yet great. Most of the participants are citizens, in the sense that their motivation is mainly their own judgements, not being influenced by political parties or labor unions. The interesting phenomenon at present is that the political parties are trying hard to gain these citizens to their respective sides. Of course it may not be necessary or wise to exclude the relations with political parties, nor possible to avoid completely the influences from them. But, the important point must be that the participants of peace movements should maintain their own identity and integrity as the citizens in the best meaning of the word. If I use another expression, they should act as those who believe in the Peace Principle of the Constitution of Japan. In fact some such persons are using the expression "KEMPO-JIN" which will mean "constitution-men."

At the same time, I feel that the popular peace movements in Japan should not under-estimate another handicap with respect to the thought, way of thinking, mentality, or intellectuality that has been special to the Japanese people in the period since the beginning of the modernization even till present. The handicap has been that Japan has imported a lot of schools of the Western thought and ideologies, not in accordance with their developments, but almost at the same time and in the mixed features. It was done once in the early period of the modernization, and again in the period after the end of the WW II, and even during the interim periods, almost similar manner had been usual. In a sense this might have been a merit or advantageous thing, as comparison was easier. But, its demerits were greater. The Japanese people could not have enough time to digest and live on each of the imported thought and ideologies. They could not expect natural growth of these thought and ideologies.

It must be pointed out that the draft Constitution of Japan was prepared by the GHQ, SCAP and the Japanese government had to accept most of it including the provisions of Article 9. But, the officers of the GHQ, SCAP had received some other drafts from among the Japanese citizens, and at least some points were included the GHQ draft. Further, most of the Japanese people positively accepted the draft Constitution. Still there has remained such important problem that the Constitution was what was "given" from outside or above, the Japanese people having no primary initiative in creating most parts of it, particularly the provisions of Article 9, even though they were upon the suggestion of Mr. Kijuro Shidehara, Prime Minister at that time.

Almost all through the peace movements in the post-war Japan, one of their weaknesses has been that they could not take advantage of the Peace Principle of the Constitution, although they have had always cited some provisions of it and most of them believed in the values of the peace principles or provisions in it. The mere fact that there are in the letters of the Constitution such principles cannot become the factor or force that will affect the states of affairs concerning the peace problems in Japan. If the leaders of the peace movements in Japan had depended mainly on the said fact, they should not be able to utilize the principles contained in the Constitution. Their opponents could easily outsmart them, just as those high officials of the government and conservative politicians have done in resorting to "amendments by interpretations."

The similar phenomena had been observed in the past, for example, when Japan imported the Buddhism since the 6th century, and when Japan opened the country to the modern powers and tried to modernize itself by importing almost all thought and ideas of Europe in the 19th century. In the case of the Buddhism, after several centuries, it could strongly hold its roots on the Japanese soils or in the mids of Japanese believers. But, in the case of some of the modern thought and ideas imported from Europe, it seems, the re-planting has not been successful to the extent that we can safely justify it. For example, the human rights had not been recognized by ordinary Japanese until the post- WW II period or after the Constitution of Japan started to give effects in that regard. The determination to renounce war and war potential is much newer than the case of human rights, where it is true that even in the period before the end of the said war in Japan there had been at least some awakened persons and the influences of foreign personalities who advocated the respect of human rights. Indeed, the Japanese people had not been bellicose, except few extraordinary cases or under extreme situations. But, it is not true that during the period of Tokugawa Shogunate Japanese totally abandoned guns, as an American wrote in his book some years ago. The fact was that the centralized security system under the Shogunate was very effective and the prohibition of possessing guns was very strict for the warlords, while warlords too could enjoy peaceful years for about two centuries and felt no need for guns. The warriors, the highest among the feudal classes in Japan, had been always keeping their swards and continued trainings in using them. Perhaps the case of the people of Okinawa which had been subordinate state under both Japan and China, can be cited as a fine example of a nation totally unarmed. This is the main reason why they invented "Karate" to safeguard themselves. But, the Japanese people had no such tradition as a nation, nor any experience of totally unarmed basing upon the determination not to wage war.

4. Alternative security in line with the Peace Principle

An alternative or alternatives will mean what does not exist at present but is sought for. "Alternative security" will be, for example, what is described in "Introduction" of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSD I) of 1978: "The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whatever they could count on appropriate means of defense. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future."

Another example of alternative or alternative security is found in the Final Document of the World Congress on Disarmament Education held by UNESCO in June 1980. The World Congress was not an inter-governmental conference but that of the representatives of so-called disarmament NGOs . This nature of the conference could contribute to produce "Ten Principles for Disarmament Education" which might not be possible for inter-governmental conferences. The second of "Ten Principles" is "definition of disarmament" which includes, as the latter half, such unique and significant "definition" as follows: "It may also be understood as a process aimed at transforming the current system of armed nation states into a new world order of planned unarmed peace in which war is no longer an instrument of national policy and peoples determine thrir own future and live in security based on justice and solidality."

If I venture to imagine an alternative security in line with what is presented in the above-mentioned documents, I may state as the following. There could be such a nation-state  that its government and people are determined to pursue, in their external relations, the following policies: (1)  the said state will aim at obtaining security, primarily by means of positive activities other than resorting to threat or use of force, (2)  it will not maintain any war potential, nor claim the right of belligerency, and (3) it will keep the position of non-alignment and strive for achieving the international society and the world in which the general and complete disarmament is realized and peace is prevailing. In other words, the said state will be carrying out positive peace diplomacy and keeping the position of "no war, no arms, and non-alignment", on the government level, being fully supported by its people who are also exerting their utmost efforts for achieving the transformation of the present world to the human community. If such a state can be regarded as one of the powers of the world, not for its military strength but for its economic and technological capability, the chances of its succeeding in realizing the said alternative security, or at least contributing to it, can be greater.  Of course I am having in my mind Japan as a candidate for such a state.

But, I must state in a hurry, it should basically depend upon the attitude, and especially the determination, of those Japanese people who engage in popular peace movements, if the Peace Principle of the Constitution of Japan can be taken up as an alternative, and new policies and measures in line with it can be pursued as an alternative security for Japan. As to this point, in view of the past records and inclinations of those engaged in the movements, I cannot be so optimistic. There should be something new and decisive enough to bring forth them towards keener awareness and profounder resolution with respect to the Peace Principle. It may be said that most of those who have engaged in the popular peace movements in Japan have had somewhat superficial understandings of the Peace Principle or the Constitution itself. Now it must be time for them to change such understandings. I feel, if they take up the Peace Principle newly as an alternative or the norms for an alternative security, they could obtain profounder understandings and then reach keener awareness and stronger determination. By considering what they should, or could do, with such an alternative as the new objective, it is expected that they could look at the provisions of the Constitution and the Peace Principle, as well as their relations with the peace movements in Japan, much objectively and in the new light. The mere fact that such and such principles are written in the Constitution may not render any strength to the movements. It is necessary to give strength to the Peace Principle, from the side of the popular peace movements, or to create new strength through utilizing the Constitution, and especially the Peace Principle, upon the initiatives on the part of the people or individuals who engage in popular peace movements.

If I may mention in this regard some of the factors that can contribute to the revitalization of the popular peace movements in Japan newly attempting to realize such an alternative security, I may pick up the following two. First, the Japanese scholars of constitutional law should try to make their theories on the Peace Principle much clearer, and especially to be clearer as to the problem of the state's right of self-defense. In my view, the provisions of Article 9 will be interpreted as not recognizing such right to the state.

The second point is that those who engage in the similar peace movements in other countries can encourage the Japanese movements, by clarifying their opinions and evaluations on the Peace Principle of the Constitution of Japan, and perhaps on the roles which Japan and the Japanese people can play in furthering peace and security of the world. Of course, especially in the cases of the peace movements in the countries in the South, before giving such encouragements, or along with it, there may be other points which should be taken up, not necessarily about peace but about such affairs as Japan's economic presense and behaviors of some Japanese visiting these countries.

## Conclusion

All through its long history Japan has never experienced a revolution in the sense that will mean fundamental change in the social structure. Perhaps in the future too, the Japanese people will do without it, unless the main characteristics of them as a nation drastically change, and especially their basic inclination towards compromising or harmonious mutual relations. This will not be a point which will be taken up as a discouraging factor, even as to the future of peace movements. Any violence, either "direct" or "structural", had not better play important roles in transforming a state or society, as a general rule. But, as to the peace movements in Japan, and perhaps in other countries, I find some more positive reasons. First of all, in the peace movements both the objectives and the means should be of peaceful nature, especially if they will have as their cause and guideline the Peace Principle as I explained above. Secondly, at the bottom of the Peace Principle there will be the recognition of the universal right to live in peace free from fear and want, which will warrant the movements to be of peaceful nature. Thirdly, so far as the peace movements will be guided by reasonable persons who will be motivated by the Peace Principle, the movements as a whole can be imbued with creative mood and basic optimism, all the participants being convinced of their ultimate success. Fourthly and finally, at this conference of those who are engaging in peace research and especially on peace movements I can feel an undeniable force of the world, which will be working in the course of the human acts towards the world worthy of being called "the human community."

DECLINE AND PERSISTENCE

IN THE CONTEMPORARY DANISH AND BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENTS;

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS*

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## Introduction

This paper proceeds from the observation that the Western peace movements generally and the British and Danish movements in particular have not experienced the nearly complete demobilization in the period 1983-86 that occurred in the antinuclear peace movement two decades earlier. Membership and some kinds of activity have undoubtedly declined, but only in relative terms. Active participants are fewer than in 1982, but much greater than in 1978. Large scale public demonstrations are fewer and smaller, but by no means extinct.

This pattern of persistence with only limited decline contradicts not only the experience of the 1960s, but also predictions from social science theory. In one version--the cycle of protest model--the peace movement would be considered part of a larger periodic phenomenon in which challenges to the status quo arise and decline together. (Tarrow, 1983) Such cycles may be held to be governed by personal factors such as the duration of individual willingness to devote time and energy to the cause, by boredom, fatigue and depression, or by the responses of the system such as repression and coöptation, or some combination of these.

Whatever the conceptual approach the conclusion has been that social movements have a "natural life span" that does not exceed a few years. At the end of this period, some elements may be coöpted, others institutionalized, but the great mass of the movement simply dissipates.

Other theorists warn of the twin dangers of success and failure. (Zald and Ash, 1966:333) A movement which achieves an important goal may be undermined by the feeling that no further action is needed. The antinuclear movement in the 1960s suffered just such an effect after the ratifcation of the partial test ban treaty. On the other hand, failure to achieve important goals can also devestate a movement as members become discouraged, cynical, or involved with more propitious issues. The British movement in the 1960s which failed to make any progress toward its goal of unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, and the contemporaneous movement in Germany against involvement with nuclear weapons, both declined in consequence of futility.

movement in the 1960s which failed to make any progress toward its goal of unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, and the contemporaneous movement in Germany against involvement with nuclear weapons, both declined in consequence of futility.
The analogy for the 1980s is the failure to stop the NATO deployment of the 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles which began in 1983. But the movements which began in 1979, and which were highly concerned with this deployment, have not withered in its aftermath. Nor has their persistence been based upon coöptation or institutionalization. At least, the movements do not seem to be sharply more bureaucratic than they were at their heights, nor have their leaders been awarded government positions. Instead, the movements have for the most part retained the forms and processes with which they began. In a related departure from past patterns and predictions (Young, 1986:211) the British movement has not split despite its failure to prevent the deployment of Cruise and the start up of the Trident program.

From these observations arise the questions of how and why the movements have persisted, and in the British case, maintained unity. The analysis which follows attempts to answer these questions by examining comparatively three levels -- the individual, the local group, and the national movement. The paper also attempts to assess the two movements political strengths and weaknesses. For the British case, the analysis is based upon interviews with national leaders and staff, with local participants in London and two other cities, and a review of movement publications, newspaper articles, etc. In the Danish case, much more detailed information has been gathered. through telephone interviews conducted in Danish by Danish research assistants with representatives of over 40 local groups. These interviews, completed in the summer of 1986, focussed on the history of local groups and the experience of the individuals being interviewed.

In order to put the recent developments in context, brief histories of the two movements preceed the analytical sections. Because the British movement is generally better known and in order to adhere to space limitations, the history of the Danish movement is presented in greater detail. There follows a section elaborating the information on the Danish movement at the individual and group levels, and a section comparing the British movement at the same levels. The final part of the paper concerns the roles played by the two movements in national politics, and attempts to review comprehensively the factors which shape these relations, including international position, national history and political culture, and party systems.

## Background

In both countries the peace movement has had a long and often influential history. In Denmark the dominant themes of

foreign policy in the early twentieth century were those of liberal, pacifist internationalism. The swiftly achieved and deeply hated Nazi occupation brought this era to an end; Denmark joined NATO at its outset in 1949. In this situation leadership of the peace movement shifted to more radical groups such as the pacifist, Aldrig Mere Krig, and to communist influenced groups such as the Partisans of Peace which was dissolved in 1959.

The British tradition needs little elaboration here, except to note that the growth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in the late 1950s served as an inspiration to a similarly oriented Danish movement called the Campaign against Nuclear Weapons which was organized in 1960. The movement in Denmark suffered from a lack of focus since its main policy proposal, no nuclear weapons on Danish soil, was nearly identical to that of the dominant parties.

The Danish movement, notable for its grass roots structure which anticipated the movements of the 1980s, disappeared in the 1960s. During the same period, the CND, having won and lost the support of the Labor Party for its main policy proposal of unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, and having seen its ranks split by a conflict between advocates of direct action and advocates of conventional lobbying, dwindled to the status of "prophetic minority."

Recent History
NATO's double track decision which combined the deployment of 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles with renewed efforts to bargain with the Soviet Union on the issue of internmediate range nuclear forces revived the movdements in both countries. In Denmark the politics were complicated by the creation 1974 of the Coöperation Committee for Peace and Security, an organization formed by the Danish delegation to the World Peace Council congress in Moscow in 1973. This group gained some credibility by its role in the anti-neutron bomb campaign in 1977-79, but lost ground when it failed to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles.

In Great Britain, the CND quickly emerged as the central organization in the resurgent movement, although some activists assert that there was an early period of uncertainty, during which it appeared that European Nuclear Disarmament might emerge as the main arm of the British movement. The CND's national membership--the number of people who formally join the national organiation by paying dues--rose very sharply in the early 1980s reaching a peak of over 100,000 in 1983. At the same time many other people chose to participate through local peace groups or other entities such as the Greenham Common peace camp, without

affiliating themselves formally with CND. Most observers estimate
that about 250,000 people were active members of the movement
at its height.

In Denmark the Coöperation Committee was joined by two
new groups, <u>Nej til Atomvaben</u> (No to Nuclear WEapons) and
<u>Kvinder for Fred</u> (Women for Peace). No to Nuclear Weapons (NtA)
began at the time of the Danish parliament's ratification of
the double track decision, and was initiated by veterans of
the Danish campaign against the War in Vietnam and some from
the old Campaign against Nuclear Weapons. They self consciously

sought an alternative to the Cooperation Committee and opted
for a radically decentralized grass roots structure and for
a policy stance which closely resembles that of END.

At about the same time Women for Peace (KfF) developed
out of a women's petition drive aimed at the United Nations
Woemn's Conference held in Copenhagen in 1980. The Danish organizers
sponsored a newspaper advertisement calling for the establishment
of a women's peace group and lent their support to local initiatives.
The women also opted for a radically decentralized grass roots
structure without formal leaders or membership or national organ-
ization.

Their ideology stresses moral values such as using money
now spent on weapons for food for the third world. They often
oppose the idea of studying or debating the details of nuclear
strategy or the strategic balance, choosing instead to reject
the entire intellectual mode associated with the Cold War.

By contrast, NtA stressed an intellectual approach, putting
considerable time and energy into the analysis of nuclear strategy
and considerable emphasis on the development and defense of
a correct political line. Their commitment to an analysis which
condemned both the Soveit Union and the Western Alliance and
their support for the freedom of peace workers in Eastern Europe
broght them into sharp, chronic conflict with the Coöperation
Committee.

Thus the Danish peace movement's recent past has been charac-
terized by the divergence between two "new social movement"
groups on one side and the traditionally organized Cooperation
Committee on the other. The Coöperation Committee's tightly
organized, hierarchical structure and its superior material
resources and dedicated cadres have given it an advantage in
the creation of broad umbrella groups, large conferences, and
demonstrations. On the other side, NtA's chief resources are
its independent political stance and superior analytical abiltiies.

Because of its extreme decentralization and apolitical appraoch Women for Peace is not a competitor for intellectual or organizational leadership.

As noted previously the Afghanistan invasion and the failure of the Soviet Union to suspend deployment of the SS-20 missile seriously undermined the credibility of the Coöperation Committee at the time that the new peace movmeents were forming. The Committtee remained fairly well isolated during the period from 1980 to 1982. Since then they have reasserted themselves and achieved greater credibility. A national conference which they organized in the fall of 1982 attracted a fairly side range of organizations and produced the Landskampagnen "Stop Atomraketterne" (The National Campaign to Stop Nuclear Missiles). This broad umbrella style organization was eschewed by NtA but attracted quite a braod range of organizations such as labor unions and youth organizations and of prominent individuals including the Lutheran bishop of Aalborg and the captain of the Danish handball team. It concentrated on immediate, lowest-common-denominator issues using rallies and demonstrations as well as large scale lbobying campaigns. The latter enabled it to establish some contact with the Social Democrats, Denmark's largest single party, but one which has never commanded a majority in parliament.

Despite their strong ideological differences, the Danish peace movement organizations have usually managed to unite for the purposes of conducting large actions such as the annual EAter peace marches. Negotiations to set the terms for such actions have consistently been arduous and time consuming with disagreements centering on the issues of specific condemnation of Soviet action, on the link between peace and freedom, and on methods of diplomacy. The Coöperation Committee favors a return to détente while NtA argues for a more fundamental change in the form of the dissolution of the blocs through détente from below.

In national politics both NtA and the Committee have concentrated lobbying efforts on the Social Democrats and both claim to have gained good access to them. In this competion organizational style is a factor along with ideology. Some Social Democrats who might otherwise be attracted to NtA's analysis and policy stands are put off by its lack of organization. They may have preferred to work with the Coöperation Committee or the Landskampagnen for the sake of having clear lines of communication and reponsib8ility. The reverse also holds true. Some people may simply prefer to work with a more open, less dogmatic organization, and certainly some have preferred to avoid any association with the Danish Communist Party.

Current situation

## Current situation

The following descriptions are based on telephone interviews conducted in Danish with representatives of local groups in the spring and summer of 1986. The interviews averaged about 45 minutes, but were sometimes as brief as twenty minutes or as long as two hours. In two cases the representatives telephoned after the initial interview to add information. Representatives were asked to report their impressions of rates of participation and other subjects. The data are therefore very "soft" and unsuitable for elaborate statistical manipulation and interpretation. On the other hand, they do represent a more nearly comprehensive portrait of the history of peace movement activity at the local level than has usually been available for analysis. Moreover since people were being asked to report on events with which they were familiar at first hand, the results are likely to be reliable.

Representatives from thirteen Women for Peace groups were interviewed; all the interviews are included in this analysis. Twenty-three No to Nuclear Weapons groups were contacted of which nineteen interviews have been analyzed and included. About a dozen interviews with independent groups remain to be coded. Only two local groups associated with the Coöperation Committee were contacted, mainly because the national leadership refused to coöperate with the study, despite repeated assurances that they would. The discussion here will therefore focus on the two parts of the movement for which detailed information is available.

## General pattern

In both movements the general pattern is for local groups to begin in the period 1979 to 1981, to peak two to four years later and to decline since that time. Still most of the groups have continued to function at lower levels of mobilization. In both, young people tended to drop out more as the local groups declined. Eleven of the thirty-two groups analyzed have ceased to function. Eight of these were affiliated with NtA and three with Women for Peace. Groups affiliated with No to Nuclear weapons also experienced a sharper drop in active members and supporters. The following sections present the findings in greater detail.

## Women for Peace:   Individuals

To guage the level of involvement, the survey asked how many people were informed of the group's meetings and how many people were active in the group. Summing the figures given

for the beginnings of all the groups, we find some 215 people informed and 120 active. At the peak 431 people received notices and 248 were deemed active. At the time of the survey, spring of 1986, 369 people are informed and 133 are considered to be active members.

In attempting to assess the reasons for individual persistence and withdrawal, we asked the representatives to give their own reasons for remaining active in the movement. Among the women surveyed, seven provided answers to the this question which included reasons of conscience, satisfaction with results, and social reasons. Four cited reasons of conscience or lifestyle, two of them saying by way of emphasis, "I have four kids." Another said, "For me the peace question is always burning."

One person noted results at the local level, saying that prominent people had joined the peace committee which would not have happened two or three years previously. Another emphasized the importance of finding new ways to deal with the issue such as people to people exhchanges with Eastern Europe.

One said that she, "could not do without the other women."

Reasons for withdrawal are discussed in the following section.


## Local Groups

Twelve of the thirteen groups contacted have fewer active members and inform fewer people of meetings than they did at their peaks. Eleven of the thirteen report a decline in both numbers and activities. However, only three of the thirteen groups may be described as inactive. The rest hold meetings either once or twice a month.

The overall pattern indicates that Women For Peace grew from the time of its inception to the early 1980s with variations among the local groups in time of founding and time of peaking. Three of the groups seem to have declined steadily, that is, they peaked at their beginnings. Eight groups peaked after about three years, and one has maintained a high level of involvement.

We asked the representatives why their groups had declined. Some cited outside pressures such as being called a communist or opposition from husbands, or the difficulty of persisting in a conservative area. Some noted simple fatigue and boredom with doing the same things. Others noted the appeal of different issues or organizations such as Greenpeace. In some cases weak

recruitment and practical problems such as the departure of key leaders were cited.

In an effort to assess the effects of the deployment, we asked directly how the deployment had affected the members of the group. Nearly all the respondents said they had been disappointed, but many added, that they had not expected to win, or that they felt compelled to keep protesting. Still the prevalence of disappointment and the fact that the missiles ranked as one of the four most important issues addressed by these groups suggests that there was some impact.

## Deviant case

One group which defied the general pattern of decline provides interesting indications of the sources of persistence. The group is relatively small, consisting of ten active members, and is located in a small town in a rural area close to a medium sized city. Although one member was forced to drop out because of conflicts with her husband about her activity, the rest have maintained their involvement since the group began in 1981. In responding the questions about the causes for the group's strength the representative noted that the group was small and that agreeement was therefore easier. She stressed the virtues of an all womens group saying that women are taught patience and that women are the problem solvers in the family. She also stressed that the group engaged in a lot of social activities inviting each other to birthday parties, arranging theater parties, etc. She further stated that the psychological development of individual members had been a prominent feature of the group's history.

## Persistence

This pattern and related comments from individuals in other groups lend strong support to Nigel Young's argument that the strength of peace groups relates to the sense of community within the groups. Among the other comments, made in response to the question,"What keeps you in the movement?" was the statement, "I can't do without the other women."

The point here, of course, is that the same forces which made the deviant group defy the general pattern are at work to a lesser extent in the other groups, which have for the most part maintained themselves, albeit at diminished levels.
Additional factors which seem to have sustained the Women for Peace groups include the satisfactions gained from activities which emphasize the direct expression of moral values and the

fact that most groups dealt with several issues rather than concentrating on one, such as the NATO missiles.

## NTA patterns

Most groups began in the period 1980 to 1981 and reached their peaks two to three years later. Summing the data from the nineteen questionnaires thus far analyzed produces the following figures. When the groups began 196 people were informed of meetiong sand about 135 were active. At their peaks the groups had 445 people on their mailing lists and about 280 active members. In 1986 when the questionnaires were completed, there were 175 people on the mailing lists and about 100 were active.

Eight of the ninteeen groups have gone out of business. Queried as to the reasons for their demise, the representatives cited a number of different factors includeing life cycle issues, boredom, a failure to gain public support, and a lack of active members. The most often named factors were conflicts with the Cooperation Committee and Disappointment at the deployment of the missiles. In four of the eight groups this seems to have been the major factor causing the decline, a finding consistent with the greater emphasis placed on this issue. The importance of conflicts with the Coöperation Committee reflects the greater emphasis on political issues and the difficulty of dealing with an extremely persistent, well organized adversary. In a couple of cases the representatives of the defunct NTA groups spoke with great feeling of the weariness and frustration produced by having to argue the same issues over and over again at seemingly endless meetings.

## Deviant Cases

Three local groups broke the pattern of decline. In two cases avoiding the split with the Coöperation Committee played a crucial part. One involves a relatively new group (begun in 1984) in the Copenhagen area which was formed specifically to escape the influence of the Committee. The representative interviewed said that the members of the group enjoyed socializing together and added that the newness of the association helped keep people interested. In a second case the local group had tried to avoid a split by formally associating itself with both the Coöperation Committee and No to Nuclear Weapons. The group was described as homogeneous and as having enjoyed social events such as parties. Its strategy was to devote itself to "general peace work," avoiding a focus on one issue. The third deviant case appears to be the result of a particularly favorable situation involving a traditionally pacifist area and a teachers college one of whose faculty has been the group's leader since its inception. The group draws heavily on the students and faculty of the college,

The group draws heavily on the students and faculty of the college, and has received assistance from national foundations and other institutions.

## Individuals

In order to assess in greater detail the causes of withdrawal we conducted eleven interviews with individuals who had dropped out of ten different local groups and compared their responses and backgrounds with those of the local representatives we interviewed. One interesting result is that perceptions of success and failure do not seem to be decisive influences on participation in the Danish situation. Four of the dropouts reported dissatisfaction with results, but the majority felt the peace movement had made at least some progress. More important to them were conflicts within the movement, which they often experienced as profoundly discouraging, and dissatisfaction with the "flat" structure of No to Nuclear Weapons. The other factor most often cited was a change in life situation turned their energies in other directions.

Those who remained active had similar opinions about the impact of the movement, but seemed to have defined their involvement either as a matter of duty or an element in their lifestyle. That is, working for peace was an existential choice, less influenced by outcomes and perhaps more thoroughly integrated into their lives.

## Summary

As noted above, the groups affiliated with the Cooperation Committee did not coöperate with the study. Impressions of activists and the testimony of one Cooperation Committee leader pointed to a pattern of relative stability, of less decline in numbers and activities than for the other two elements of the Danish peace movement. The Samarbejdskomiteen had continued to stress "traditional" activities such as demonstrations. While the numbers involved had certainly declined, the number of active members seemed to have declined less than for the other groups. Observers suggested that this was due in part to the stronger ideological commitment of members, many of whom are also members of the Danish communist party, and in part to the appeal of action. In other words, the Coöperation Committee would continue to attract those people who wanted to do something about the issue regardless of the current political situation.

For No to Nuclear Weapons and Women for Peace the clear pattern is one of growth and decline over the six to seven year period since their inception. With the exceptions noted, such

a pattern probably reflects three factors: disappointment at the deployment of the NATO missiles which served as a major focus for the new groups, conflict with the Coöperation Committee, and the problems endemic to any movement--boredom, fatigue, shifting political concerns, and changes in the status of members, eg. from student to worker.

Persistence at the personal level is perhaps more difficult to explain. As will be suggested in greater detail below, activities which provide direct satisfaction are a major factor. For some active members for whom the representatives serve as a sort of nonrandom sampling, the issue seems to have been ingrained as part of a more general life style. The source of this attitude is obscure; our questions did not probe this issue. Some may have been committed in this way before they joined the movement. For others the experience of involvement may have produced the attitude. As will be noted below, interviews with activists in the British movement illustrate the latter possibility.

At the group level, persistence seems to be associated with several factors. The stronger staying power of the Women's groups suggests that the opportunity to express deeply held, and perhaps rather simply conceived sentiments and values creates a satisfaction that helps to sustain groups. A connected factor in the Danish situation is that such an approach avoids debilitating, discouraging political conflicts. The price to be paid is the inability to address political issues, and therefore to articulate and seek to advance a political position.

A related point is that groups which deal directly with the social dimensions of organizing and which enjoy the advantages of homogeneity sustain their level of membership and activities better than groups which don't. As noted above, this finding supports Nigel Young's conclusion as to theimportance of a supportive community in sustaining peace movements, the difference being that in this case the community is largely self created. The dimension of personal development emphasized by one respondent is consistent with the theory of democratic political movements enunciated by Lawrence Goodwyn (1978) and also with the traditional theorists of participatory democracy such as Rousseau.

The pattern that internecine conflict diminishes activity and may eventually contribute to disintegration also supports a proposition drawn from the literature. (Dwyer, 1983) The debilitating effects of the defeat on deployment confirm the idea that groups which diversify their issues and which provide members with a variety of means of participating are also more likely to persist than those which focus on one issue and one or two modes of action.

## Individuals and Local Groups Within the British Movement

In part because of the enormously greater size and complexity of the British movement, in part because of a lack of resources, this part of the analysis rests on impressions gained from interviews with various national officers and staff of the CND and other British peace organizations and interviews with activists in a few local groups. Various documents including the regular publications of the national CND and newsletters of local groupshave also been reviewed, along with secondary sources.

The first part of the general pattern, revival of the movement in 1979-80, and an upsurge of activity focussed on the Cruise and Pershing II deployment, is similar to the pattern in Denmark. After deployment, the movement, like the movement in Denmark, lost focus to some extent. National membership dropped from a peak of over 100,00 to around 85,000. Most participants felt that activities at the local level had fallen off.

However, the post deployment pattern also differs sharply from the Danish experience. First and foremost, resistance has played a much greater role in the British movement. Even before the deployment the Greenham Common Women's peace camp played a major mobilizing role, not only in Britain, but throughout the world. Since the deployment and the intensified official harassment of the womens camp, the focus of resistance activity has shifted to Cruisewatch, the group, begun as a support group to the Greenham Common Women, which monitors, follows, and harasses Cruise deployment exercizes, sometimes gaining substantial publicity.

In Denmark, resistance has never been more than a minor part of the movement, for the simple reason that there are by official policy, no nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime. There have been a few acts of civil disobedience and a womens peace camp, but none of these has had the central significance of the Greenham Common encampment or Cruisewatch.

Resistance demands an intense commitment because it carries the risk of injury, imprisonment and fines, and the certainty of inconvenience and sacrifice of time, and in the case of Cruise-watch, sleep. People in Cruisewatch may also make considerable material contributions, lending their vehicles, spending their own money for gasoline, etc. Resistance attracts and provides an opportunity for those feeling a strong commitment to do something, especially something in public, to express their views. Partici-pation in civil disobedience, particularly in civil disobedience

organized through affinity groups, may provide the experience of democratic participation through which a lifelong commitment develops. A number of participants in the British movement made this point during interviews, saying that the participation in affinity groups had given them a chance for individual development. Often, they emphasized the newly discovered connection between their own lives, the form of their participation, and the larger issue for which they demonstrated. Cruisewatch members often related their powerful reactions to seeing the weapons at close range, an experience which intensified their commitments at least for the short term.

The absence of a strong civil disobedience faction in a movement may deny a place to those with an urgent desire to make a public stand. It also eliminates one form of small group participation through which individuals may refine and strengthen their commitments.

On the other side civil disobedience can encourage a kind of self righteousness which denigrates any other form of action. Such an attitude played a part in the well known split between advocates of direct action and others in the CND in the 1960s. In addition to fomenting divisions, a sone sided committment to civil disobedience can complicate attempts to make political gains. One considerable accomplishment of the contemporary British movement has been to hold together those advocating civil disobedience as a main strategy and those advocating persuasion. This is not to say that the relationship has always been smooth, but to emphasize that there has been no serious fracture of the movement along this line.

Another difficulty is that the intense commitment associated with resistance "burns out" participants. There are a number of such cases in the Greenham Common situation, and no doubt there will be in Cruisewatch as its history moves beyond the first few years. Those who stay for the long run may represent a minority lifestyle which alienates rather than appealing. Such a situation also provides considerable ammunition for hostile media.

Any attempt to assess the overall effects of civil disobedience on individual and group persistence in the British movement must reflect these mixed effects, and the absence of any statistical information. I would argue that resistance has provided an important focus for groups and individuals in the post deployment period. The courage and persistence displayed in Cruisewatch and in other actions such as the Molesworth blockade of February 1986 seems to have impressed and inspired many within the movement. This is reflected in the generally closer relations between nvda advocates and the CND leadership, including support for

Cruisewatch, and the backing of the Molesworth blockade. It
may also be signficant that the current chairperson, a comparative
outsider, won election after a speech which emphasized dramatically
his participation in civil disobedience.

Of course, other factors, notably the events at Chernobyl
and the attack on Libya by British based American warplans,
and the prospect of an election victory, also contributed to
sustaining the movement. But I would not underestimate the
sustaining contribution of non violent direct action, which
serves both to keep the spotlight on the threat and to provide
the opportunity for public action. Thus is created the sense
of engaging the opponent, of moving on the issue, which is
the essence of a movement, (hence the word, "movement") and
which is, I think, the most powerful incentive to join one.

For the Danish movement, a functional equivalent may be
the efforts at "detente from below" which range from simply
taking one´s vacation in Eastern Europe to organizing exchanges,
creating "sister city" relationships, and making contact with
the unofficial peace movements. Such activities may provide
a strong personal experience, which Danes often express in terms
of breaking down the "enemy pictures" of the Eastern Europeans,
and learning to see them as people like oneself. The common
element is the satisfaction gained from the activity itself;
the potential common drawback is the lack of a connection to
a political program.

## National politics

The radically decentralized structure of the Danish movement
has been both a help and a hindrance to the movement at the
national level. By providing individual members with a wide
range of choices as to modes of action, and a vitually open
oportunity to participate, the movement´s structure has helped
to attract and maintain a base of committed, often creative
members. On the other hand decentralization has made it very
difficulty to mobilize a unified constitutncy behind a clear
program.

Thus, the peace movement´s relation to national politics
has been rather ambiguous. It has been difficult for the peace
movement to claim credit for the changes in Danish official
policy, despite the fact that the changes favored the peace
movement´s position. As argued above, it has tended to function
more as a catalyst and legitimator. Thus some of the activists
interviewed felt satisfaction at the changes wrought in Danish
policy, but few seemed greatly heartened by it. The sense of
a changed atmosphere and of possibilities opening both as to
participation in the policy process and as to the substance

of the policy were probably much more important in sustaining
the movement.

As noted, one important change has been the increased involve-
ment of peace activists with the political parties ranging from
the Social Democrats leftward. This change was based precisely
on the idea that the time was ripe, that the parties might change.

In Britain, the CND has emerged as partially centralized,
partially bureaucratized organization which includes a paid
staff of forty, a sophisticated lobbying opperation in parliament,
which attempts to function as a broadly based pressure groups
working with all parties, but which in practice allies itself
to the Labour Party, and the rather small Liberal Party. The
CND's greatest political accomplishment has been that the Labour
Party's, through its annual conference, has adopted an official
position favoring unilateral nuclear disarmament (but not withdrawal
from Nato) for Britian. Yet, this very accomplishment suggests
the CND's weakness, for the Conservatives and the Social Democrats
have leapt gleefully on this issue in electoral campaigns, and
Labour itself has sometimes split sometimes waffled on the com-
mitment.

## Analytical Framework

The pattern just described seems consistent with an analytical
framework which suggests that by a national peace movement will
be influenced by the international position of its country,
the country's political culture, and the party system. More
specifically, the more closely is the country allied to one
of the superpowers, the greater the difficulty of the peace
·movement, especially at the level of influencing policy. The
greater the tradition of pacifism or neutralism, the easier
the tasks of the peace movement.

In both dimensions Denmark is much more fertile territory,
being a relatively minor member of the Nato alliance and having
a very strong internationalist, neutralist tradition, embodied
in the Social Liberal Party, and probably contributing heavily
to what Nikloaj Petersen calls "the peace mood" in Denmark,
that is, a receptivity to proposals which reflect this tradition,
and a skepticism about the efficacy of policy based on force,
especially on nuclear weapons.

At the level of the party system, the analyis borrows from
the framework elaborated by Hanspeter Kriesi and Philip van
Praag, jr. (1986). Their formulation suggests three factors
which influence the chances of peace movements: the intensity
of class conflict, the patterns of intermediation in the welfare
state, and a catch all category including factors such as the

electoral system, the degree of centralization etc.

The first two factors generally work togehter. The more intense the class conflict and the more it dominates the institutions of mediation, the less likely it is that the demands of the peace movement will be taken up. On the other hand, the more the traditional left right conflict has been "pacified by the consolidation of the welfare state" as for example in Sweden, the more open are the existing institutions, especially, left wing parties to the demands of the peace movement.

In Britian class conflict has recently been much more intense than in Denmark. Further, the welfare state has been much more extensively institutionalized in Denmark than in Britain. There is a much stronger system of bureaucratized compromise in Denmark, as system that has been sustained during the present conservative government. Mrs. Thatcher on the other hand has not been nearly so inhibited in her assault on the welfare state. The prediction then is that the parties will be much more closed to the peace movement in Britain than in Denmark. At first glance, the Labour Party's commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain seems to falsify the prediction.

However, one could point out that the official policy of Denmark has actually changed to oppose the double track decision, and therefore argue that the influence of the peace movmeent on the existing parties has been greater in Denmark. One should also note that the issue of unilateralism has ben highly controversial within the Labour Party, helping to produce the defection of the Social Democrats in 1981, splitting the party in during the general election campaign of 1983, and creating some difficulties even in 1987 when Neil Kinnock felt compelled to hedge the commitment to unilateralism during the general election campaign.

Even so, there is something anomalous in the British situation. One would not expect that in a major superpower ally with a party system dominated by two parties, relatively intense class conflict, a relatively weak welfare state and without proportional representation, that the peace movement would gain such strong influence over one party.

In elaborating the third category, I would give particular emphasis to the presenceor absence of proportional representation in the electoral system. In general, proportional representation serves to open the political system to the influence of the peace movement. This may happen in two ways. Proportional representation may contribute to the success of small parties to the left of the social democrats, parties that espouse positions

similar to the peace movements, and which act as the political representative s of the movement. Such has been the case in Denmark, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands. Alternately, proportional representation may open the way for new parties, based in part on the peace movement to organize and to enter the system. This has been the case in West Germany.

The absence of proportional representation inhibits the growth of smaller left wing parties, leaving the peace movement at the mercy of the established center left party or parties, and throwing the analysis back to the first two factors. Thus, in England, the single member district, first-past-the post electoral system has helped to prevent the growth of parties to the left of the labour party, such as the Greens. The result is that the peace movement, given the rigid opposition of the Conservatives, (nd its own rigidity, discused below) had no serious alternative to concentrating on the Labour Party. This meant that the chances of a split in that party were increased because there was a direct contest within it. By contrast in Denmark, the conflict within the social democrats was muted because the peace movement had already established relations with the two parties to the left of. the social democrats. It was not concentrating so much on capturing the Social Democrats as on influencing them.

Putting the matter slightly differently: In Britain the natural alliance and natural overlap were between the left wing of the Labour Party and the political elements of the peace movement. In Denmark the initial natural alliance and overlap occurred among the Socialist Peoples Party, the Left Socialists and the peace movement. Gradually a relationship developed between the movement and the left wing of the Social Democrats. The result was that the sd had the opportunity and the incentive to shift its own position without perciptiating a split in its ranks.

In Britain from the beginning the struggle has taken place within the Labour Party. In the 1960s the issue provoked the famous struggle between Hugh Gaitskill, the party leader and the left wing, a struggle won by Gaitskill. In the early 1980s the issue also contributed to the split in the Labour Party in which four ex-cabinet ministers left Labour to form the Social Democrats.

Of course, the posture of the movements has also affected their relations to the political system. In Britian the unilateralist position adopted by CND has proved a major stumbling block to easy relations with the parties, contributing to the split just mentioned and helping to cripple the Labour campaign in the general election of 1983. Again in 1987 the issue, although

handled much more smoothly by the Labour leadership, was a problem
for the Party. The extent of fundamentalism within the movement
is indicated by the consistent refusal of large majorities at
annual conferences to change the wording of the Constitution
from, say, "unilateral nuclear disarmament" to "independent
nuclear disarmament," or to otherwise soften the form of the
commitment.

In Denmark by contrast the peace movement has never defined
a clear position, in part because it has been split, in part
because of the decentralization of two of its components. There
has, of course, been agreement on opposition to the NATO missiles,
and on a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free zone, but there has never
been anything like the alternative foreign and military policy
implied by the unilateralist position of the CND. The result
is that the parties, especially the Social Democrats, have much
greater freedom of maneuver. They can adopt the parts of the
peace movement position which are most generally acceptable,
avoding those which are politically most dangerous, such as
unilateralism.

The peace movement, or the more politically oriented elements
in it, also gain freedom to maneuver, selecting and promoting
those policies which they think will create the strongest pressure
on the parties. In Denmark, the proposal for a Nordic Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone, created and promoted by No to Nuclear Weapons
in collaboration with the independent peace movements of the
other Nordic countries, would seem to be precisely such an issue.
It appeals strongly to public opinion on the grounds of self
interest and also appeals strongly to traditional internation-
alism.

The peace movement, in Britain, or at least the leadership
of the CND, attempts to gain similar room to maneuver by stressing
the most publically palatable issues such as opposition to Cruise
and downplaying the more controversial such as unilateral nuclear
disarmament for Britain. Their efforts have been reasonably
successful within the movement and spectacularly unsuccessful
without. The combination of Conservative Party propaganda,
skillfully orchestrated by Michael Heseltine during his tenure
as Defense Minister, and a hostile media, have created great
public awareness of and opposition to unilateralism, perhaps
in part because the public perceives unilateralism as a generally
defeatist position, rather than a limited unilateral initiative.

Thus both national movements may be seen to have the defects
of their virtues. The British movement has undoubtedly gained
and held supporters because of its strong moral commitment.
It has been able to articulate a clear stance on important issues.
However, this clear moral stance has damaged its ability to

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operate in the political system, and has worked to the disadvantage of its principal political ally, the Labour Party.


     The Danish movement, divided from its inception, and lacking the coherence to frame clear policy alternatives, has nonetheless been able to influence the parties.  The absence of a clear position has enable both the movement and the parties to maneuver on security policy issues, promoting a shift in the direction of the peace movement's position.  How sincere, solid and how lasting the new positions are cannot be known until such time as the Social Democrats regain power.


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Mobilization Peaks and Declines of the Swedish Peace Movement

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## THE PEACE MOVEMENT AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Most social movements consist of several organizations which
try to mobilize people and other resources. Growth as well
as decline of a social movement can be very uneven distri-
buted among the variety of organizations within a social
movement. In periods of growth it is maybe the new organi-
zations that are growing more than the traditional organiza-
tions within the movement. In periods of decline maybe not
all organizations are declining, even if the movement as a
whole is declining. Quite often it seems to be the new
organizations that are declining in periods of decline, yet
the traditional organizations can keep their positions and
even grow.

The history of a social movement and its organizations is
determined by several factors. The character of the adver-
sary; the balance of power between the movement and the
adversary, strategy and tactics of the movement and its
adversary; the policy of the government in the issues of the
movement, governmental policy towards the movement: support,
repression, integration; external and internal, national and
international events relating to the movement; the organiza-
tional structure of the movement, competition between
different organizations of the movement; ideology and policy
of the movement; all of them examples of such factors.

### Swedish social movements by the end of the 19th century

The three large Swedish popular movements of the 19th
century are the revivalist and/or the free church movement,
the temperance movement and the labour movement, which at
the beginning of the 20th century engaged about one third of
the Swedish population. The temperance movement had most
members, then came the revivalist movement, and the labour
movement was quite small at this time. Its peak came in the
1930s, when the temperance and free church movements were on
the decline. The first movement that appeared was the free
church movement, the second was the temperance movement, and
the third was the labour movement. Several minor social
movements have its origin in the 1880s and 1890s, such as
the universal suffrage movement, the peace movement, and the
feminist movement. Even the Swedish environmental movement
has its roots in the late 19th century.

The three large social movements of the 19th century have
been crucial elements in the change of the Swedish society.
All three movements were related to migration. Their strong-
holds were the towns, where people came to work in industry.
For the revival and the temperance movement the countryside
was also essential, and especially where the land was owned
by the big forest companies the new movements were success-
ful. More women than men engaged in the revival movement as
well in the temperance movement, but the opposite was the
case in the labour movement.

In agricultural parishes with peasant proprietors there was
a resistance to the new movements. The farmers had an
interest in vertical, patriarchal loyalities. The congre-
gation, the lodge and the trade union were a threat to such
relations. The industrial development and the relative
change of political and economic power from the countryside
to the towns was not in their interests. They saw the vicar,
the dean and Luther as a garantee for vertical social
relations. They had economic interests in the brewery
industry and the consumption of alcohol. They fought against
the farm workers´ trade union organizations. They did not
want a change in the rules for suffrage which were in favour
of the farmers as proprietors.


## Social movements and political parties

The relation between the social movements and the political
parties was quite clear. The connection between the indu-
strial workers, the labour movement and the social democra-
tic party was evident. The party was the political branch of
the labour movement. The labour movement was established
like a concern with a systematic division of labour between
different organizations; organizations that today are
working in most sectors of the society. In the beginning the
political competition within the labour movement came from
anarchists. They were prevented by active social control
efforts as well as other parties which tried to mobilize
industrial workers. The temperance and revival movements
were connected to the Liberal Party, but there was (and is)
a competition between social democrats and liberals in the
temperence movement. Most organizations of the revival move-
ment were connected to the liberals if any political orga-
nization. The temperance and the revival movements could
cooperate in different ways, especially in the political
arena. They tried to get members of the parliament connected
to their movements, and they were successful.

There were two other influential parties, the Farmer´s Party
and the Conservative Party. The Conservatives gathered the
aristocracy, the state officials, large scale manufacturers
and to some extent farmers. The Farmer´s Party had a break
down in the 1900s because of the social changes and the new
political organizational structure. The party did not manage
to create a national party organization in stead of the old
parliamentary organization. The conservatives and the
liberals began to compete in the countryside. In this race
the liberals became more conservative (and the conservatives
more radical), which in turn was used by the social demo-
crats to attack the liberals from the left.


## The adversaries of the social movements

Who was the adversary of the three large popular movements?
The answer was quite easy for the revival movement. It was
the State Church and what it represented as a monopoly of

religious and certain social activities. Luther, the vi-
car/dean, the State Church buildings and estates were
replaced by the Bible solely. You must obey God and His Word
in the Bible more than the State Church.

To identify the adversary was more complicated for the
labour movement. The extension of the ruling class(es) could
be defined somewhat different, and the enemy could be
defined more abstract like the capitalist system, but large
scale manufacturers, the military men, the king, the con-
servative government, and the aristocracy were easy to
identify. But what about small scale manufacturers, farmers,
the "black-coats", teachers, small state officials, intel-
lectuals? This was an object of several disputes within the
labour movement.

The temperance movement had a more difficult problem,
because identifying the enemy was a matter of contradiction
within the movement. Different parts of the movement pointed
at the alcohol in itself, at the social conditions (from the
capitalist system to working place and general living
conditions), at the moral of men, at the brewery industry
(and the farmers behind), the large revenues to the state,
the county councils, the county agricultural societies and
the local authorities.

The revival and the temperance movement were indeed no
revolutionary movements. They believed in the force of the
argument. Through dialogue, information and education
instead of confrontation they could obtain results and gain
respect for their views. By peaceful, non-violent means it
was possible to change society in the direction of the
movement. Initially the labour movement was critical to the
idea of non-violent means. Maybe it was possible for reli-
gious and moral change, but not for social and economic
change. The experience of several organizational campaigns
and strike movements was that a dialogue was not possible.
But with the growth of the labour movement organizations and
the major failure of the general strike in 1909 and the
conservative reaction in the 1910s, as well as the revolu-
tionary movement in 1917-18 which shaken the establishment,
the idea of a non-violent course and a dialogue became
essential for the labour movement as well as the manufac-
turers.


The peace movement by the end of the 19th century

After this little introduction to Swedish social movement
history, where is the peace movement to be placed? Who was
the enemy of the peace movement? It was a subject of dispute
within the peace movement, and it still is. The military (as
a monopolist of violence), the king (as a monopolist of
foreign policy), weapons, the war, the nation state, the
arms industry, the defence spenders in the parliament, the
capitalist and the feudal system. Here are some parallels to
the temperance and the revival movements: the church - the
king as a monopolist of foreign policy and the military as a

monopolist of organized external (and with the police forces
- the internal) violence, alcohol - weapons, drinking - war,
the brewery industry - the arms industry, etc. The peace
movement had (and has) another adversary related to defence
policy, but not to foreign policy, namely the (voluntary)
defence movement as a popular social movement. The situation
was similar to the revival movement; also the state church
had a strong popular support. The temperance movement and
the labour movement had no competing popular movement
supported by the establishment.

War was defined by the professor of state law in Uppsala,
Herman Rydin, as a useful drain of the nation and a neces-
sary form of justice between nations, and this had for
quite a long time been the official philosophy. From the
beginning the peace movement stressed arbitration as the
necessary form of justice between the nations instead of
war. The second point was neutrality instead of alliances.

In 1883 the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association (SFSF)
was founded. In the middle of the 1880s the SFSF had 7-8000
members. The idea of neutrality was a neutrality which
should be garanteed by other states as was the fact in
Switzerland since 1815, in Belgium since 1839, and in
Luxemburg since 1867. If Scandinavia could become a neu-
tralized area the defence spending could be kept down. These
ideas awakened interest within the temperance movement and
the Farmer's Party. Several MPs (about 70) of the Farmer's
Party as well as the Liberal Party joined the SFSF. As
mentioned above the large social movements had had little
access to the farmers because of their interests. But they
had a social and economic interest in the ideas of the peace
movement, especially because of the organization of the
Swedish military system. The farmers financed a military man
in groups of ten farmers. They experienced this system as
unfair, when the town population did not pay so much for the
defence. Therefore they were interested in neutralization as
a mean to reduce the defence expenditures.

When the system was changed into compulsory military service
the farmers' interest of the peace movement declined, and
the peace movement also declined. In the 1890s the peace
ideas were declared as a feminist issue and the Swedish
Female Peace Organization was established in 1898. The
establishment of compulsory military service caused a
reaction among young industrial workers. Anarchists and
young-socialists could mobilize on the ideas of anti-mi-
litarism. This development caused a diffusion of ideas
within the peace movement. The leading peace organization,
SFSF, concentrated on arbitration and neutrality, but the
young labour movement comprehended these ideas if not
bourgeois, then at least less relevant as an abstract
foreign policy, only possible to realize when the kingdom
and the military establishment were abolished.

# THE HISTORY OF MOBILIZATION PEAKS AND DECLINES

## First mobilization peak 1883-88

The first mobilization peak in the 1880s comprised an
anti-military expenditure movement. The decline after 1887
was not only caused by the changing distribution of military
burdens. There was also an organizational factor. The
leadership of the SFSF was not eager to constitute a lot of
local groups. On the contrary, the leaders tried to prevent
the formation of local organizations. However, K P Arnold-
son, leader of the SFSF, went to England, where he learnt to
"handle local organizations in such a fashion that they
believe that they are independent". But the SFSF was much
more active in influencing MPs and other important persons
of the establishment than forming a mass movement. This
meant a decreasing interest from the popular members of the
SFSF, and when the Farmer's party had realized its aims of
defence policy, they were less interested in the peace
movement. But other social movements - the temperance
movement, the free church movement, the feminist movement,
and the lebour movement, became interested in the peace
question as a moral issue, a religious issue, a feminist
issue or an issue of the young industrial worker.

## Second mobilization peak 1895-1905

The crises of the union between Sweden and Norway became
strained in 1895. The Norwegians wanted to extend indepence
also in foreign policy issues. But militarist and conser-
vative circles in Sweden agitated for military intervention
in Norway. This was a signal for mobilization of popular
movements in Sweden, notably the labour movement and the
peace movement. The peace movements of Norway and Sweden
established close cooperation, not only on leadership level,
but also through peace tourism, pen-friend-clubs and other
grass-root activities.

The union crisis of 1895 was something of a rehearsal for
the events of 1905. The Norwegian parliament declared in
June 1905 that it did not accept Swedish royal power. The
Swedish labour and peace movements supported the Norwegian
actions. The Swedish government mobilized its military
forces against Norway. However, the crisis led to arbitra-
tion and the union was abolished without violence.

The peace movement declined after this sucessful mobili-
zation against war with Norway. Because of these events the
peace movement was radicalized in an anti-militarist fa-
shion. At the same time the liberals became more conser-
vative when they competed with the conservatives about
countryside voters after the breakdown of the Farmer's
Party. Some prominent liberals engaged in the peace movement
moved from the Liberal Party to the Social Democratic Party
(SAP), and anti-militarism was accepted along with the
campaign for arbitration and neutrality. The peace movement
ideas on foreign policy became widely respected in Sweden,

even by the king, who invited the participants of the 1910
world peace congress in Stockholm to a garden party at his
residence. At the same time the defence movement mobilized
successfully for a stronger military defence, and it also
depicted a Russian threat especially in support for Finland.
Some prominent peace movement personalities responded that
Sweden should became a part of Russia. Then the superior
(and peaceful) Swedish civilization could get a mission in
changing the Czar and barbarian Russia into a democratic,
liberal, and civilized nation state.

The peace movement and the labour movement cooperated closer
with each other during the period of the union crisis. But
there were also elements of confrontation. The peace move-
ment gave priority to foreign policy and suggested some kind
of internationally garanteed law and order. Its anti-mili-
tarism was foremost a matter of defence spending. For the
labour movement the question of peace was less a problem of
relations between states, and more a question of class
struggle. Peace was not only a state of non-war, but also a
change of the capitalist mode of production and the ruling
means of violence. At the international socialist congress
in Bruxelles 1891 it was declared that the Second Inter-
national and its parties were "the only true peace party"
and other contexts that socialism was the peace movement.
The Swedish leader of the labour movement, Hjalmar Branting,
declared in 1907 that the (non-socialist) peace movement was
utopian when it believed it possible to fight wars "without
any changes in societal power relations". Other sectors of
the labour movement accepted the peace movement as a move-
ment working in the same direction as the labour movement,
but also declared that the labour movement was the vanguard
of the peace movement. A third standpoint within the labour
movement was hostile to the peace movement as an anti-mi-
litarist movement and suggested the combination of neutra-
lity and a strong military defence.

The peace movement was quite suspicious about the labour
movement interest in peace question. It, of course, did not
like the declarations of the labour movement and interpreted
it as a threat to its independence. The labour movement
interest was sometimes also understood as purely tactical.

The other two large popular movements as well as the femi-
nist movement comprehended the peace movement in a very
positive fashion and cooperated with the peace movement in
several ways. The feminist movement comprehended the peace
question as an important feminist question, the temperence
movement viewed the peace question as an important moral
question and the revival movement as an important religious
question. These movements had peace on its program (with
reservations for some organizations of the revival movement)
and engaged peace movement personalities in their activiti-
es.

The general strike in 1909 was a serious setback for the
Swedish labour movement. This weakening of the labour
movement also meant a setback for other radical popular

movements. The peace movement acted for arbitration in the
conflict between labour and capital. It was rejected by both
and the peace movement lost some of its prestige in this
sharpened class struggle.

### Third mobilization peak 1912-18

Before the First World War, there was a hard struggle
between Left and Right on the issue of national defence with
a democratic and republican camp, and a monarchical and
conservative camp, where the peace movement supported the
former and the defence movement the latter camp. The "crisis
of the palace courtyard" of 1914 led to a reinforced monar-
chy and the establishment of a constitutional dictatorship,
the Hammarskjöld government.

The SFSF became radicalized, which was expressed in its
programme of 1910. The ideas of arbitration and neutrality
were as before. But it also explicitly expressed anti-capi-
talism, anti-imperialism, anti-monarchism, anti-militarism
and anti-christianism (the state church as a tool for
militarism and capitalism), but it refused socialism. In
this context the radical pacifist christians became very
active within and outside the SFSF. The "white general", the
baptist pastor Albert Wickman, started an anti-war movement
in 1912. He wore a white uniform (and a big white fur coat),
he had a big white car, women in white clothes, he called
himself and his most committed adherent the white army, and
he was the leader of this white army. He accused the SFSF
for not enough radicalism (that is not for conscientious
objection) and he was extremely active in his meetings, and
speaches all over the country. However, he was imprisoned
several times after the war outbreak.

This radicalism of the SFSF in 1910 led to a new peace
organization, the Swedish Peace Association. The feminist
peace organization merged with this organization and its
programme was held in a more moderate style. However, when
the SFSF rised its membership from 3000 to more than 20.000
during the war, the Swedish Peace Association lost members
and consisted of just a few hundred.

During the war the international labour movement supported
its national regimes. Several national labour movements,
notably the the German, but also prominent personalities
within the Swedish labour movement, had made an exception
from Russia. If there was a war with Russia, the labour
movement would support its national government, which became
the case in Germany. The labour movement was divided and the
peace movement was disappointed. The socialist International
held four different meetings in 1915. Socialists of neutral
countries congressed in Copenhagen in January, socialists of
the entènte in London in February, socialists of the central
powers in Vienna in April, and the socialist opposition in
Zimmerwald in September. There were several contacts and.

personal connections between the Zimmerwalder Bewegung and the peace movement, but also with the labour movements of the neutral countries.

The SAP was divided in February 1917. The Socialist Left Party was constituted on the ideas of the left opposition period of 1911-17. After the October Revolution, the party was divided into three parts: humanists (where some prominent peace movement personalities were involved), left socialists, and communists. Humanists and left socialists later joined the SAP, while the communists formed its own party in 1921. For the communists the war should be developed into an internal war, and therefore they rejected the peace movement as a non-proletarian movement. They also were against the Ligue of Nations together with the Conservatives.

The peace movement was disappointed with the bolshevik development in Russia. In 1919 the SFSF declared that the Russian (October) revolution had brought nothing but a spirit of terrorism, death, decay, starvation, murder, civil war and lawlessness.

Fourth mobilization peak

After the war the peace movement declined. The SFSF decreased from 20.000 in 1918 to 3.000 in 1921. At the same time several new organizations were founded: four christian peace organizations, one feminist, and one occupational peace organization (female teachers), but they were no large organizations. However, each of them had not more than a few hundred members, with the exception of the WILPF section, which increased from 939 in 1920 to 1623 in 1922.

During the 1920s several peace movement ideas were realized. The religiously motivated conscientious objector got better conditions, the education of history was reformed (the history of peaceful progress was also given some space), the role of the military decreased, and the Swedish neutrality was stabilized.

In 1922 the white general put on his white equipment again and began a mobilization campaign that resulted in a SFSF-membership figure of 50.000 and 1.400 local organizations in 1930. This was a figure that the SFSF has never reached again. Also the religious organizations increased from a few hundred members to some thousand in most cases.

The white general campaigned for peace, against war preparations, and a possible second world war. In 1930 the white general was accused for embezzlement. It is not known if it was correct, but if it was it could not have been especially much. The white general held thousands of meetings all over the country, and his accounts were never in order. It became known to the public that he was accused for embezzlement, and the peace movement was heavily attacked. It is difficult to know if the white general was the victim of a conspiracy;

anyhow, the traditional peace leaders never liked his religious faith, his leadership style, and his success. The white general was eliminated as a leading personality, he was degraded and they offered him to stick down envelopes.

In the 1930s the peace movement struggled against the arms build-up, arms trade, arms industry, militarism, and war preparations as well as for a total and unilateral disarmament. Its new 1933 programme was anti-militarist, but the other antis of the 1910 programme were abolished. It also contained a lot of religious stuff, because the leadership of SFSF wanted to keep the new members which the white general had mobilized. The Machtübernahme in Germany made the Swedish peace movement pessimistic, the movement declined, and its activities were characterized by retirement and despair by the late 1930s. The peace movement became a part of the anti-fascist movement in the struggle against nazism and fascism, and its activities became foremost humanitarian. The disaster for the peace movement came when Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1939 and Germany attacked Denmark/Norway in 1940. The peace movement lost all prestige and was especially during the Soviet-Finnish war accused for treason by the Swedish mass media. During the war the SFSF-membership again decreased to a few thousand members.

The relation between the peace movement and the labour movement became strained during the activities of the white general. The labour movement was not very happy about his activities. But even when he was eliminated, the relations were not very good. Against the background of such events as Ådalen 1931, where five workers were killed by military troops, the Machtübernahme, the struggle between the labour movement and the military in Vienna, the fall of the Spanish republic, the nazification of the Swedish military were important for the Swedish labour movement's standpoint on military affairs. The standpoint of neutrality and a strong military defence became dominating within the labour movement. The model of parliamentary control over the military as in Germany had not succeeded. The model of a party militia as in Austria had also failed. The Swedish social democratic idea of integration between democratic forces and military institutions was formulated by the chairman of the Swedish social democratic youth organization, Torsten Nilsson.

The labour movement formed an organization to unite people and defence, "People and Defence". It was a popular movement strategy instead of the strategy of party militia and the strategy of parliamentary control. New voluntary defence organizations were formed, organizations where the labour movement had a decisive role. Torsten Nilsson meant that the defence must be integrated into the democratic life of the Swedish society. It was a matter of contact, communication, and integration between civilian and military institutions under democratic forms and control. The military establishment was entusiastic. The change in social democratic attitude was said to be a "miracle". Especially after the German attack on Denmark/Norway April 9th, 1940, the forma-

tion of new popular defence organizations increased. The labour movement started several activities of basic democracy in the barracks, which was not opposed by the officers.

The peace movement was disappointed. The integration of people and defence was interpreted as a militarization of the labour movement: the military had conquested the party. The peace movement became isolated from other popular movement by the end of the 1930s. The free church movement was quite divided about the peace movement, but serveral personalities and organizations changed to an almost extreme militarism. Some of the leading peace personalities of the socialist left became prominent campaigners for stronger Swedish military committment in Finland and/or Denmark/Norway. The temperance movement was on decline, but it also followed the signals of national unity. But in one way the peace movement succeeded: Sweden was kept out of the war.

## The fifth mobilization peak 1950-56

Two new peace organizations emerged in the post-war world: the World Federalists and the World Peace Movement. The idea of world federation had been discussed during several decades within the peace movement, and it had been a peace movement dream: a united world with a world parliament. The traditional peace organizations increased a little immediately after the war, but stagnated by the end of the 1940s.

The World Federalists and the World Citizen Movement started 1949 and became quite popular in the early 1950s. The World Peace Movement was quite strong in the early 1950s, after the presentation of the Stockholm Appeal. Stockholm became the headquarter of the World Peace Movement. The Swedish Communist Party, which had decreased to 4% of the votes from around 12% in the middle of the 1940s, concentrated its work on peace campaigns to strengthen its prestige in Sweden. The traditional peace movement was criticized for elitism and bourgeois pacifism. The anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism of the SFSF in 1910 disappeared in 1933, and now the Peace Committees took over these ideas. Also the World Federalists criticized the traditional peace movement for its relatively nationalist orientation.

The non-communist peace movement as a "third force" had very little access to the Swedish opinion, where peace and communism became connected during the Cold War period. The non-communist peace organizations as well as the social democratic labour movement rejected the Stockholm Appeal, and competed with peace appeals of their own. The non-communist peace organizations called themselves "the democratic peace movement" and the Peace Committees were called "the communist (or even the stalinist) peace movement". The Peace Committees called themselves "the popular peace movement" and the non-communist peace movement "the bourgeois peace movement". In the non-socialist political camp a "third standpoint" was said to be impossible; it was the same as communism. This Cold War period made it impossible for the

SFSF to mobilize on a third standpoint. Furthermore, the Swedish WILPF section, the feminist peace organization, was divided on this question. The majority of the board of the IKFF did not accept the idea of a third standpoint, which was what the WILPF worked for. This was interpreted as communist infiltration, and the majority of the board of the Swedish WILPF section left the organization.

However, the Peace Committees lost most of its prestige when the Soviet Union intervened in Hungary in 1956. The World Federalists lost their prestige a bit later when they supported the Swedish atomic bomb. They claimed that the anti-nuclear movement was a too narrow organization. Some prominent world federalists supported the idea of nuclear weapons as the sole defence system, because it would abolish the military. The military would lose control over this mean of destruction to scientists. These ideas almost wiped out the world federalists from the map of peace organizations in Sweden, and they have never been able to come back.


## The sixth mobilization peak: 1958-63

In the middle of the 1950s it was declared that it was possible to produce a Swedish atomic bomb. Then the military produce several arguments for the necessity of a Swedish atomic bomb. This, in turn, led to an independent anti-nuclear-weapons organisation, AMSA (The Action Group against a Swedish Atomic Bomb). It was organized by about 20 intellectuals, many of them were authors, journalists and artists, who arranged rallies, debates, demonstrations, easter marches and other activities. It was an organization whose aim was formulated in two points: against Swedish nuclear weapons and to provide a debate about the possibility of a conversion of military resources for constructive aims (for instance development aid).

The activists of the anti-nuclear movement were losely organized, very young, and had no connections to the traditional peace movement. The movement was not popular among the existing peace organizations. One exception was the Peace Committees, but the anti-nuclear movement tried to keep them out of the activities. Some persons voluntarily left the AMSA so that it could not be accused for communism. The anti-nuclear movement of this period was very isolated, but it succeeded in breaking the isolation and to stop a Swedish atomic bomb.

The movement was heavily attacked by the SAP. Social democratic newspapers attacked pacifism as an idea as well as the unilateralists and pacifists within the party. The SAP was divided on the question of an atomic bomb. The party wanted to stop the opposition against the Swedish defence. There was a political unity between the SAP and the non-socialist parties about defence policy, which the SAP did not want to break. The party could not stop the opposition against an atomic bomb. Also the liberals and the agrarians

became divided on the issue of an atomic bomb. The change of
attitude was essential during the period 1957-61 as showed
in table 1.

Table 1. Attitude to a Swedish Atomic Bomb, %

|            | For | Against | Don't know |
|------------|-----|---------|------------|
| June  1957 | 40  | 36      | 24 .       |
| Oct   1959 | 29  | 51      | 20         |
| March 1961 | 21  | 56      | 23         |

Swedish nuclear weapons were not produced. The SAP could
save the policy of armed neutrality without an atomic bomb.
The SFSF was able to integrate some activists of the an-
ti-nuclear movement in its ranks. One of the initiators of
the AMSA became chairman of the SFSF in 1963, the famous
author P A Fogelström. However, after the Partial Test Ban
Treaty in 1963 the anti-nuclear movement disappeared in the
autumn 1963 as sudden as it had arised in 1958.


### The seventh mobilization peak 1965-75

After 1963 the peace movement was heavily engaged in Third
World issues: starvation, development aid, and then in the
Vietnam war. Some peace organizations condemned both parties
of the war, some supported guerilla pacification efforts,
and the SFSF as well as some other organization favoured the
slogan "Peace in Vietnam". The SFSF meant that the US should
have some time for negotiations and retirement. Parts of the
traditional peace organizations condemned the FNL as a
violent communist revolutionary movement.

However, the major part of the Vietnam movement, the Swedish
FNL-organization, eventually took over the initiative and
held it for a decade. The FNL-organization never declared
itself as a peace movement, but it was an anti-imperialist
war movement. It supported people's war, it was against
capitalist militarism and favoured a Swedish guerilla
defence. The movement was heavily connected to the New Left
movement, notably the maoists, and several leaders came
from the anti-nuclear movement 1958-63.

By the end of the 1960s the New Left movement was divided in
to two parts, one communist party building and one anti-au-
thoritarian movement. The first movement consisted of 5-10
organizations trying to build the true communist party in a
complicated pattern of competition and cooperation with each
other. The other movement became an important base for
several social movements in the 1970s. The Swedish FNL-or-
ganization was a field of struggle between the different old
and new left organizations.

The fall of Saigon in 1975 also wiped out the Swedish FNL
movement, which in turn diminished the party building part
of the New Left movement. The anti-authoritarian movement

formed a pattern of organizations over the whole field of
societal activities. But after 1975 much of the anti-autho-
ritarian movement engaged in the environmental and anti-nu-
clear plant movement, which had a tremendous upsurge 1975-
80. After the referendum in 1980, where the environmental
movement as well as the Christian Democratic Party, The Left
Party, and the Centre Party represented alternative 3, the
external activities of the movement almost completely dis-
appeared. It was evident that much of the mobilized people
changed its anti-object from nuclear plants to nuclear
weapons after 1980.


### The eighth mobilization peak: 1979-84

The "new" peace movement was mobilized by some new organiza-
tions like Women for Peace, the END in Sweden as well as
some 20 new occupational peace organizations, but the old
SFSF became anyhow the dominating organization; in fact its
leadership had changed to very young persons mobilized by
the latest events in armaments development, while the
leadership of most other new organizations had its base in a
middle-aged generation with its roots in previous radical
movements. The most concrete demand of the new movement was
a nuclear free zone in the Nordic countries. And already in
1981 all Swedish political parties declared themselves in
favour of a NWFZ. Demonstrations could engage up to 100.000
participants in 1982, and in June 1982 750.000 signatures
were collected for a NWFZ. The Swedish peace movement have
above that supported the Swedish governments in its foreign
policy and its disarmament initiatives. The Swedish peace
movement has not been struggling against its government in
most international issues.

The "Swedish model" in these respects could be described as
a model which includes neutrality, non-alignment, non-im-
perialism, and non-nuclear. Most peace movements in Europe
struggles for these goals, and the Swedish peace movement
are guarding them and supporting the peace movement acti-
vities in the European scene. But at the same time it is
difficult for the Swedish peace movement to act for concrete
demands on the Swedish security policy arena.

The SFSF has campaigned against Swedish weapons export, the
JAS aeroplane, the conventional defence system, and other
defence policy issues, but they have not gained much support
from other peace organizations, especially not from the
"new" peace organizations. As to defence policy the SFSF has
only been supported by the communist and the environmenta-
list party. All other political parties have been against
the SFSF. It has not been able for the SFSF to mobilize on
these questions to the same degree as international disar-
mament questions. The SFSF campaigned for a unilateral
Swedish disarmament: "Sweden can begin" as an intermediate
demand following the demand of a NWFZ, but gained very
little support. The argument for Swedish unilateralism was
that Sweden is a vanguard country of peace, and therefore it
should take the first step. The neutrality need not be

armed, but garanteed by its neighbours. Then, according some
kind of domino theory, the rest of the countries of the
world would follow. This campaign failed completely; it
foremost was met by silence.

Now the Swedish peace movement is on decline. All organiza-
tions that increased during the period 1980-84, have de-
creased since then, but evidently the new organizations of
this mobilization peak has been stroke more than the tradi-
tional peace organizations.

The reasons for this decline are not internal; there has
never been such a good cooperation between Swedish peace
movements, and its organizational competence has maybe never
been as good as today. The reasons are to be found in
external events as the security policy of the US, especially
the SDI and its consequences for the freeze movement; the
failure to stop the deployment of new nuclear weapons in
Europe. The Swedish peace movement has, of course, had no
say at all in these events, but as it in this mobilization
period has been so linked to the global peace movement, it
has also been stroke by the setbacks of other peace move-
ments. There has maybe also been some expectations that have
not been redeemed. For example, one of the leaders of Women
for Peace declared officially that the world would not exist
in 1985, if the new nuclear weapons were deployed in 1983.
Now we have 1987, and unfortunately, the world still exists.
Above these factors there are the competition between the
peace movement and the defence movement; the (Soviet)
submarines mobilized the defence movement as never before.
The defence policy of the peace organizations (those who
have one) has not been met with any positive response in the
Swedish society, where the (heavily) armed neutrality has
a strong support.

The relations between the peace movement and other social
movements

Since the people and defence strategy of the Swedish labour
movement there has been something of a triangle drama
between the labour movement, the peace movement, and the
defence movement. The Swedish (voluntary) defence movement
is much stronger than the peace movement. After the sub-
marine mobilization peak it counted more than 700.000
members. Only the Swedish Women's Army Auxiliary Corps has
about 55.000 members, which could be compared with the pure
peace organizations and its 25.000 members. The defence
movement has a much more regular activity, not only as
propaganda organizations, but also as organizations which
contribute to the defence, often connected to army organi-
zations.

In terms of social class, the defence movement mobilizes
entrepreneurs, farmers, the conservative middle class, and
the working class. The peace movement mobilization is
limited to the middle class with radical, political, social,
and cultural traditions. The peace movement has serious

problems when it tries to mobilize the working class. The
working class is in fact engaged in defence contributing
organizations such as the National Home Guard.

The labour movement has a divide and rule position visavi
the peace and the defence movement. It is keeping the peace
movement out of the domestic defence policy and channelling
its efforts into the international arena. It is keeping the
defence movement out of foreign policy and channelling its
efforts into the domestic arena. If there are some clash
between the two movements in defence policy, the labour
movement will support the defence movement. A consensus on
the defence issues and labour movement influence over the
defence movement have been important features of labour
movement policy. The peace movement demands for Swedish
disarmament has always been rejected. It is difficult to see
why the labour movement would change this dominating posi-
tion visavi the peace and defence movements.

To generalize, the labour movement has been quite negative
to the peace movement in periods of mobilization. The labour
movement seems to be afraid of campaigns about Swedish
defence policy. In the anti-nuclear mobilization period
1958-63 the labour movement evidently overreacted. When the
peace movement tries to take the step from international
engagement to engagement in domestic defence policy, the
labour movement will counteract the peace movement. The
labour movement seem to be more positive to the peace
movement when it is on decline. Maybe it wants to have a
better balance against the defence movement, but it is also
quite evident that the peace movement in decline has been
more dependent on the labour movement.

The temperance movement and the feminist movement have been
positive to the peace movement in periods of mobilization,
but indifferent when the peace movement has been on decline.
Yet they has been more positive to international oriented
and more vague peace demands, and indifferent when it is
about defence questions. The relationship between the free
church movement as well as the church movement and the peace
movement is complicated, and need an elaborated study of the
different churchly organizations as to peace issues.

There is no scientific study on the Swedish defence move-
ment, but my impression is that all peace movement mobili-
zations have been followed by defence movement mobiliza-
tions, which have been far more successful than the peace
movement mobilizations.[1] Within the Swedish peace movement
it has been said that it is dangerous to mobilize a mass
movement, because the reaction of the defence movement will
be far more greater.

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[1]With the exception of the mobilization of the Vietnam
movement, but it was also very internationally oriented.
Then there has been defence movement mobilizations not
related to the peace movement, but to governmental defence
policies.

## The achievments of the Swedish peace movement

The peace movement has claimed that is has had a crucial impact on the events of its mobilization peaks: the defence expenditure pattern in the 1880s, the union crisis in 1905, the Swedish neutrality of the First World War, Swedish disarmament in the 1920s, the rejection of the atomic bomb in the late 1950s, and the positive attitude to a NWFZ in the 1980s. The peace movement also claims that it has been crucial for the spread of ideas of arbitration, neutrality, peace, and international solidarity in Sweden. However, there are several other candidates that claim their impact on these matters. To argue against the peace movement claims it could be said that the Farmer´s party was more decisive for the defence expenditure pattern in the 1880s. The liberal and the labour movement claim the same thing as the peace movement in the dispute between Norway and Sweden, the First World War, the disarmament in the 1920s. The social democratic women´s association claim their crucial role in the actions against the atomic bomb.[2] The same is the case about arbitration, neutrality, and international solidarity. And there are also conservative and communist voices as well as some other which wants to share the honour of some of the above mentioned achievements.

These achievments could also be explained in terms of different structures instead of actors. The old defence system in the 1880s had to be modernized in spite of the actions of different organizations. The Swedish neutrality in the First World War could be seen as a compromise in ruling circles. The liberal branch of the ruling class was oriented to Britain, and the conservative was oriented to Germany. The compromise became neutrality. The Swedish disarmament in the 1920s was a disarmament from a position of strength. Sweden was a strong military power in northern Europe after the First World War. Swedish disarmament policy tried to freeze the armament situation in northern Europe.

But it is quite obvious that the peace movement played a crucial role as an actor in the union crisis in 1905 and in the atomic bomb issue in the late 1950s. Even if it is difficult to measure, it could also be said that some original peace movement ideas like neutrality and arbitration have had at least some importance for the realization of neutrality and disarmament. Anyhow, if the peace movement has palyed an important role or not, the objectives it has set up have often been achieved in one way or another.

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[2] It is for exemple declared that prominent women convinced important social democratic leaders that the Bomb was not necessary.

The mobilization and decline pattern of the Swedish peace movement

In tables 2,3, and 4 I have identifyed the relationship between mobilization peaks and dominating peace movement ideologies (2), between mobilization peaks and dominating organization (3) and organization increace when the peace movement is on decline (4). It is obvious that the SFSF, a multi-ideological organization, has been able to keep control and dominate the peace movement arena in Sweden.

The decline after 1887 was caused by decreasing interest of the farmers in the SFSF as well as the organizational structure of the movement. The peace movement almost ceased to exist. The decline after the successful solution of the union crisis was not that dramatic, but was rather a stagnation, whose reason might have been the confrontation with the defence movement and a certain competition as well as some confrontations with the labour movement. The third decline after the First World War was more dramatic. All new members during the war were lost. One reason was the radicalization of the left socialist movement and the confrontation with the communists. Several objectives had been achieved, and the SAP was acting for most of the peace movement objectives. Maybe this was another reason. But on the other hand it is not a satisfying explanation, because the period immediately after the war could have been a period of mobilization for positive objectives. Anyhow, such a period followed a bit later, but, the real peak was reached in the years of 1928-30, years of crisis and unrest, especially abroad.

The decline after 1930 was not dramatic, as caused by the elimination of the white general and the external campaign against the peace movement. It also was met by repression acitivities by the defence movement as well as certain fascist groups. The external events of the Machtübernahme, the civil war in Spain also contributed in the peace movement decline, but the disaster came with the Soviet attack on Finland and the German attack on Denmark/Norway. The peace movement was back to the position immediately after the First World War. The decline of the Peace Committes was also caused by an external event: the Soviet intervention in Hngary 1956. The World Federalist Movement decline was caused by the inopportunity of its own standpoints to nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear movement decline in 1963 was caused by success; after the partial test ban treaty the movement disappeared. The disappearance of the Vietnam movement was also caused by success; it disappeared with the fall of Saigon in 1975. The decline of the peace movement in the 1980s has been caused by several factors: international events of governmental security policy as well as failures of the international peace movement, the strength of the adversary, the partial success and the partial failure of the peace movement policy.

It is often said that the peace movement in Europe has
failed and therefore it has declined. It has failed to
achieve immediate objectives as well as more long term
objectives. But decline can be caused by several factors,
which I have mentioned on p 2. Both success and failure
could be causes for decline. The Swedish peace movement has
obviously succeeded and therefore it has declined. It has
succeeded in achieving its immediate objectives as well as
some more long term objectives. The problem of Swedish peace
movement is that it is successful in achieving its immediate
objectives. After that it is difficult to mobilize support
for objectives of the intermediate future. The main reason
for that is the relation to the labour movement. Without the
support and the initiative of the labour movement it is not
possible for the peace movement to take the next step to the
intermediate future. And there is the dilemma of the Swedish
peace movement. The next step will be a change in Swedish
defence policy, and it would be a break with the doctrine of
the armed neutrality, a step that the labour movement will
not be prepared to take of several reasons; the strength of
the defence movement; the strong opinion for the doctrine;
the power position of the labour movement visavi the peace
and defence movements; the political and social base of the
peace and defence movement in relation to the party; the
consensus of defence policy. This situation will not be
changed by pure argument, propaganda and peace movement
mobilization. Rather the peace movement has been and will be
met by control efforts and repression. The doctrine and
reality of armed neutrality will probably not be changed
without some major change in world politics.


Table 2. Mobilization peaks and dominating peace movement
ideologies

| First | 1883-87 | Liberal |
|---|---|---|
| Second | 1895-05 | Liberal, socialist and feminist anti-militarism |
| Third | 1912-18 | As in second + religious pacifism |
| Fourth | 1923-30 | As in third |
| Fifth | 1950-56 | Communist anti-militarism and anti-nuclear, wolrd federalism |
| Sixth | 1958-63 | Anti-nuclear |
| Seventh | 1965-75 | Anti-war, anti-imperialist |
| Eighth | 1979-84 | Anti-nuclear, alternativism |

Table 3. Mobilization peaks and dominating mobilizing
organization within the peace movement.

| First | 1883-87 | SFSF |
| Second | 1895-05 | SFSF |
| Third | 1912-18 | SFSF |
| Fourth | 1923-30 | SFSF |
| Fifth | 1950-56 | World Peace Movement and World Federalist Movement |
| Sixth | 1958-63 | AMSA (Action Group against a Swedish Atomic Bomb), later the SFSF |
| Seventh | 1965-75 | The Swedish FNL movement, |
| Eighth | 1979-84 | SFSF |

Table 4. Movement on decline, organization increase within
the peace movement

| First | 1888 | None |
| Second | 1906 | Anti-militarist organizations of the labour movement |
| Third | 1918 | Feminist peace organizations, religious organizations |
| Fourth | 1931 | (Anti-fascist organizations) |
| Fifth | 1956 | Anti-nuclear organizations |
| Sixth | 1963 | (Anti-imperialist organizations) |
| Seventh | 1975 | None |
| Eighth | 1985 | The Swedish WILPF section |

Table 5

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                                                                                    │ CCIVS CO-ORDINATING     │
                                                                                    │ COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIO-│
                                                                                    │ NAL VOLUNTARY SERVICE   │
                                                                                    └─────────────────────────┘
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| | WPC WORLD PEACE COUNCIL | ISMUN INTERNATIONAL YOUTH AND STUDENT MOVEMENT FOR UNITED NATIONS | FRIENDS WORLD COMMITTEE FOR CONSULTATION | WAWF WORLD ASSOCIATION OF WORLD FEDERALISTS |
| INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS | WOMEN'S DEMOCRATIC WORLD FEDERATION | IPB INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUREAU | IFOR INTERNATIONAL FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION | WILPF WOMEN INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM |

**SWEDISH PEACE COUNCIL**

| | SWEDISH PEACE COMMITTEE | SPAS SWEDISH PEACE AND ARBITRATION SOCIETY | CPM CHRISTIAN PEACE MOVEMENT | WILPF SWEDISH SECTION |
| SWEDISH ORGANIZATIONS | SWEDISH WOMENS LEFT ASSOCIATION | FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION UN-FEDERATION | FEDERATION FOR CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND SOCIAL LIFE | SWEDISH WORLD FEDERALISTS |
| | SWEDISH WORKERS CENTRAL ORGANIZATION (SYNDICALIST) | WFP WOMEN FOR PEACE | FRIENDS COMMUNION IN SWEDEN | SWEDISH SECTION OF SERVICE CIVIL INTERNATIONAL (SCI) |

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│ CULTURE     │
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Prof. Frank Rupprecht

## Peace movement in history and at present

The tasks of peace research involve the clarification

and modernization of such terms as "peace movement",

"peace consciousness" and "peace motive". In this con-

nection, it is not a matter of defining these terms ab-
stractly,
objectively, in general, applicable to any case. The point

is to clarify their content most closely connected with

the real social phenomena reflected by them and with

the practical task to intensify the efficiency of

peace movement, peace consciousness and the concrete mo-

tives for actions for peace under most differing social

and political conditions.

The history of the conception of that what is peace move-

ment reflects the history of this movement and its vary-

ing composition itself. At the same time, the various de-

finitions show the ideological viewpoint of those who

are trying to define the character of peace movement,its

objects and methods. Let me demonstrate this, first of

all, by an old pacifist definition. In the "Handbuch der

Friedensbewegung" (Peace movement manual) edited by Al-

fred H. Fried in 1911 it says:

"The peace movement wants to bring back the knowledge of

an organizational process of society conditioned by na-

tural laws to support mankind in reaching the highest

possible results in its work, as fast as possible, by

influencing consciously the development to proceed in

its natural direction." (page 4) And continuing: "For mo-

dern peace movement war is a symptom, the result of a deeper cause. It emanates from the relations between states which are not yet completely arranged, not yet completely organized, from the intergovernmental anarchy still prevailing."(page 8).

This view of Fried containing some aspects which are of interest still today, basically dating back to the pacifist position held by Bertha von Suttner which was influenced by Darwin, Spencer and others and which she substantiated in detail in her various publications. The view held by Suttner and Fried was behind the scientific view of the revolutionary social democracy on an antimilitaristic and antiimperialistic peace movement substantiated by political economy. Yet, in reality the practice of the struggle of bourgeois humanist circles against militarism and war was more advanced than may be presumed from the definition mentioned. The growing danger of war and the increasing suppression of pacifism by militaristic circles made also pacifism to ever better understand the conditions of an efficient struggle for peace. In her ripe years of struggle Bertha von Suttner herself showed a growing sympathy for the anti-imperialistic struggle of working class movement.

After the First World War, with the danger of fascism rising, the awareness of the necessity to concentrate peace movement on the establishment of a broad alliance of all opponents of war has been ever more pervading the

the goals of peace movement. In the 30-ies and during the Second World War peace movement develops into the antifascist and anti-Hitler movement. The fight for exposing the demagogic use of the peace movement term has been already intensified before the Second World War, too.

In the 50-ies and 60-ies various sides equated "peace movement" with the movement represented by the World Council of Peace which was directed against remilitarization in the FRG, against atomic armament and to other peaceful aims, though there were also peace movements acting more or less independently. The various peace movements were in loose contact with each other. Yet, undoubtedly the peace movement represented at that time by the World Council of Peace was an effective mass movement standing up for the prevention of a third world war and for terminating local wars.

Today quite a few peace researchers are trying to determine more exactly the "new peace movement" emerging since the late seventies and the early eighties. Thus, e.g. Dieter S. Lutz from the Institute of peace research of the Hamburg University says:

"What is "peace movement"? By the comprehensive term "peace movement" we understand a number of persons, groups and organizations standing up for peace. Their status is an autonomous and independent one, their col-

lective attitude is moulded by critics and protest,
their engagement - though proceeding from various
motives - aims at forming public consciousness with
regard to problems of peace or activities in dealing
with problems of peace." Lutz is writing about the
difference between the present peace movement and
that of the fifties and sixties: "The present move-
ment is comparatively much broader comprising all
strata of society, reaching up to the organizational
structures of parties, trade unions, churches, par-
liaments, armed forces etc. handed down. Yet, it does
not depend on any of these political and social struc-
tures and organizations and is not bound to them, re-
spectively, but "moves" on an own widely branching net-
work of initiatives and groups loosely interconnected
and united in voluntary, independent coordinating bo-
dies." (In: editor: Klaus Gerosa:Große Schritte wagen.
Über die Zukunft der Friedensbewegung (Taking big steps.
On the future of peace movement. Munich 1984, page 75/
76).

I would like to call this definition basically a gene-
ral sociological definition of peace movement. Yet, it
renounces the inclusion of the objects of peace move-
ment as notably the elimination of means of mass de-
struction. The definition of Lutz holds absolutely true
as a sociological description of the present peace move-
ment. Also marxist-leninists underline the class over-

lapping comprehensive character of peace movement, its social, political and ideological manifoldness. It unites people of the most varying positions and ideological views, as regards their efforts made to ensure the survival of mankind and its cultures, to prevent a nuclear inferno, to create a world of secure peace.

From the viewpoint of marxist-leninist philosophy it is, however, necessary to add essential dialectical aspects, i.e. particularly of the theory of contradiction, to the sociological definition of peace movement. This involves first-ly that the decisive contradiction underlying today's world-wide movement for safeguarding peace should be defined. Today the life interests of peoples and states, on the one hand, are in contradiction with the aims of a small stratum of especially aggressive and reactionary forces of imperialism, on the other hand, directed to confrontation, arms build-up and world supremacy. This contradiction adopted a global and ontic character. No other contradiction existing in our epoch, not that between socialism and capitalism either, can be analyzed without taking its connection with this contradiction and its decisive influcence on all social problems into account. Secondly marxist philosophy defines as the positive side of the contradiction between war and peace the interest of mankind in the survival of its genus, the general human interest in peace and in solving the problems connected with it as, in particular, disarmament and preventing outer space from being militarized. It

is pointed to the fact that it concerns a new category
of world policy forcing objectively all classes and so-
cial strata to respond to the question how their inte-
rests are related with the interest of mankind in pre-
serving peace. The principle that the interests of
workers' class movement are not in contradiction with
the interest in peace but correspond to it basically
holds true for the workers' movement guided by marxism-
leninism. Safeguarding peace should be the priority of
the society forming power of the working class. At the
same time, the revolutionary workers'movement continues
to fight for the implementation of specific social
ideals not shared by other forces, proceeding on the
basis and on condition that world peace has to be pre-
served.

Thirdly marxism stresses and underlines - and this is
what is linking the philosophical definition of peace
movement with the sociological definition of Dieter S.
Lutz - that all governmental, non-governmental, all
social class, political, demographic, ideological and
religious forces and groups interested in peace and
disarmament, the use of means released thereby,should
be integrated into the broad basic trend to preserve
peace in the world, being the reason for a cautious,
sober optimism as regards the problem of peace.

Fourthly marxism, marxist philosophy emphasizes the de-
mocratic and active character of the conflicts with

the striving for world supremacy and military superiori-
ty, with the policy of confrontation and arms build-up,
with denying peaceful coexistence as the only reasonable
alternative to sliding into a nuclear inferno.

Fifthly it is of decisive importance for marxism that
it regards socialism, socialist society as a whole, as
an inseparable and solidary, active participant of the
world-wide peace movement. It gives continuously impul-
ses to establishing a world-wide coalition of common
sense, realism and goodwill, making peace securer. The
striving of socialism for peace comes from its socio-
economic character and the goals arising from it. In
socialism there is no class and stratum interested in
armament, preparing a war and war.

Thus, I am coming to a second important term the "peace
consciousness" term. Peace consciousness involves, first
of all and elementarily, the views, goals and ideals of
the mass of people and peoples of all continents as a
whole reflecting their right to a life in peace being
the first human right and their interest in safeguarding
peace being the prerequisite and fundamental condition
for pursuing their social aims. Secondly peace conscious-
ness is the reflection of the production relations and
the social structures based on them, not rousing an in-
terest in solving the contradictions and conflicts of
our time by means of war. These are production relations
not allowing to make money on armament production, but,
in their innermost nature, directed to the growing sa-

tisfaction of the material and intellectual necessities
of life of the people and to the development of personali-
ty. This refers to the socialist production relations.
Given today's conditions, however, also the economic
conditions prevailing in the Third World, non-aligned and
neutral countries in the west, despite all their incon-
sistency, arouse, to a growing extent, objective inte-
rests in safeguarding peace, and, on its basis, the will
of the mass of people for peace and the struggle for dis-
armament, against imperialist arms build-up is emerging.
This fact expresses itself in the policy pursued. Thus,
the well-known peace initiative launched by the six states
from four continents should be judged notably in this sense,
as an expression of objective economic interests of broa-
dest strata of these peoples including capitalist circles.
The fact that peace consciousness has an objective foun-
dation in the economic interests of broadest strata of
the population and of big parts of the bourgeoisie applies
to developed capitalist countries as well. Notably the in-
terests of the military industrial complex counteract it.
Its economic foundations and reproduction conditions con-
tradict the vital interests of mankind.

As any other consciousness, peace consciousness is struc-
tured by something in itself. It does not disprove the fact
that the various classes and strata develop their class-re-
lated views on the causes of wars and the conditions of
peace. It involves the marxist-leninist philosophy of peace

and many variants of the non-marxist ideas of peace, i.e. ideologically differing components which may not be intermixed. In this respect, the will, the responsibility, the insight that peace and conditions for development should be preserved for mankind are overlapping. Yet, this is absolutely based on various class ideologies without blurring the differences. "New thinking", as regards the problems of peace and security, "uprising of the world conscience", "coalition of common sense and realism", "security partnership" are perhaps terms aiming at developing and consolidating peace consciousness all over the world, from various sides and under differing aspects. In the socialist society, the peace consciousness of working class, the philosophy of peace and progress based on marxism-leninism are prevailing. Here, peace became the general standard of social consciousness. In general, this standard becomes practically effective in law, science, culture and education. It pervaded the mass consciousness.

What does now mean keeping peace consciousness at the level of time ?

Firstly it is a matter of further extending the knowledge of the dangers of arms build-up including the dangers of militarization of outer space, and at the same time, of deepening the knowledge about the possibilities and chances which exist for freeing the world from atomic weapons up to the year 2000. At least in this way a break-through

would be possible, thus giving new impetus to gradually
reaching this aim, i.e. the awareness of the dangers
should be connected with the realization of chances and
directed to practical activities in supporting the sig-
nificant socialist peace initiatives. Secondly it would
be necessary to combine the long-term orientation more
closely with that what has to be done as the next step
on the way to a world without means of mass destruction.
Thirdly the point is to further develop and deepen the
discernment of people as to the attitude of the politi-
cal forces towards the problems of security and disarma-
ment. The cause of the tense situation are not the wea-
pons themselves, is not system neutral, is no obscure
mechanism. Mankind is uniformly threatend by the danger
of destructing everything, yet only a certain part which
is not yet sufficient stands up for the removal of this
danger. The socialist countries, the majority of the non-
aligned and neutral countries, broadest social circles
are on the side of peace. Ruling circles in NATO coun-
tries in Western Europe feel increasingly uncomfortable
in view of the American course to continue arms build-up
and militarization of outer space. Fourthly the point is
to maintain the unity of common sense and emotion, word
and deed in the struggle for peace to oppose symptoms
of fatigue, to make the struggle for peace, participating
in it, the life maxim of each conscious personality. The
point is to include any knowledge, also technical know-
ledge in the propaganda for peace and to demonstrate and

confirm over and over again the will for peace by showing a civic engagement in practice.

In the actions of people the question of peace consciousness is put into concrete terms to become a question for the personal peace motive. As shown by sociological investigations carried through in the GDR the peace motive in socialism is playing a growing role for the professional and civic engagement of working people. It is one of the most important motives in the ensemble of the ideological driving forces of socialism. It becomes effective, depending indirectly as well as directly on a series of conditions and on the concrete reference system. In the peace motive the longing for peace and concrete knowledge are intensified in a way as to become a motive of action in one's own sphere of work in support of the socialist peace proposals.

In this way, the peace motive, on its turn, is becoming again a driving force to

a) grasp new knowledge of scientists and politicians on the prevention of war and safeguarding peace and to extend the own knowledge and realization of problems in many connections;

b) deepen the knowledge of foreign policy and the content of the policy of dialogue of the own socialist state directed to peace;

c) show a civic and social engagement;

d) intensify the own performance, in conformity with
   the requirements of the peaceful economic and
   cultural development of one's country;

e) disassociate oneself in public from the forces of
   war, their fatal ideological and political dis-
   paraging remarks. This does not least concern the
   thinking in irrational images of the enemy endan-
   gering peace.

This multifarious effect of the peace motive is, of
course, dependent on the quality of the actions under-
taken by peace movement, the level of clearing up the
complicated complex of political, military, scienti-
fic and sociological questions of safeguarding peace
on international scale. We peace researchers contribute
to this, too.

In conclusion, I would like to inform you that we
shall be organizing an Olof-Palme march in demonstra-
tion for peace from 1 - 19 September in the GDR, at
the same time as that organized in Czechoslovakia and
the FRG. Thus, we would like to support the proposal
to create in Central Europe a nuclear-weapon-free cor-
ridor. In the framework of this event, scientific events
on peace research will be organized as well.

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# Principles of a new attitude towards international affairs

At the end of the Second World War a revolutionizing scientific-technical development also of weapons set in. Clearly visible for all, through Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind entered the nuclear age. Since the late fifties, with the start of the first sputnik, we can speak of the nuclear-cosmic age. Mankind should become fully aware of the consequences to be drawn from that.

The nuclear-cosmic age has brought about new technical possibilities for peace and progress but also serious dangers for mankind. Non of these dangers is bigger than that of a thermonuclear war which would lead to the extinction of mankind. Mankind is faced with a new dimension of the war-peace problem.

What does this principally new dimension of the question war or peace, which many responsible scientists and politicians are speaking so insistently about, consist in ?

1. Mankind has not only entered a nuclear-cosmic age but has thus a difficult choice to make. It will slip into a nuclear abyss or it will recollect itself, make all efforts required to prepare the way into a secure future. Notably the accumulation of huge quantities of means of mass destruction has brought about an ontic situation for all human beings. What has been foreseen by individual scientists as Albert Einstein in the fourties and has been prognosticated by many people

already in the fifties has become a real possibility to-
day: Mankind can extinct itself unless it will not learn
instantly to secure surviving, going practically over to
it. There is no historical parallel to this situation.

2. Today science supplies us with comprehensive knowledge,
particularly of the consequences of a thermonuclear war
at all, which should be taken absolutely serious. We are
forced to acquire these findings and to make them the
starting point in considering the solution of interna-
tional issues. Firstly. Already according to cautious
estimates of the use of nuclear weapons, approximately
20 per cent of the weapons available, would be sufficient
to kill more than a billion of people and to injure mor-
tally a further hundred millions of them. Secondly. Re-
sponsible physicians from nearly all countries on earth
declare that after thermonuclear weapons were used any
organized and efficient medical assistance would break
down. Thirdly. Physicists and meteorologists have come
to the conclusion that, apart from the immense explosive
and radiation effects atomic weapons have, a meteorolo-
gical effect, so far largely underestimated, will be
added, which is to be classified as "nuclear winter".
In this connection it applies that even if only the
lowest estimates of a temporary decline in average tem-
peratures made by responsible scientists will come true
this will have disastrous effects on the food, heat
supply of the survivors, and also, in one word, a ther-

monuclear war would bring forth the trend of destroying
everything.

3. The constantly rising level of military confrontation,
the creation of ever new highly intensive military tech-
nologies lead to a growing insecurity, starting with dan-
gerously destabilizing the international situation, which
is closely linked with the danger of loosing control of
the functions of up-to-date means of military technology.

4. Arm race growing ever further increases immensely wasting
of economic resources of mankind, burdening world economy
as well as nature to an irreparable extent. Such problems
as famine, poverty, diseases, homelessness, unemployment,
dependence ,due to debts,are aggravated, causing further
heavy burdens.

5. Peace has become the basic prerequisite of the further de-
velopment of all peoples on earth. Maintaining it should
be the foremost aim of the foreign policy of any country.
All systems of value, developing under various historical,
social and spiritual conditions in the world and its re-
gions have to accept that today world peace is the greatest
good, the most important value for mankind.

The necessity of developing a new political thinking, taking
the pressure of being threatened by extermination from mankind
and paving the way to a secure future is derived from the new
dimension of the question of peace or war, from the situation
when mankind has to make the decision on its future, the lives

of the generations to come.

How can the landmarks of this new political thinking
and activities be outlined ?

1. A nuclear war is no rational means for reaching poli-
   tical aims. The means applied would not allow to reach
   any aim, besides self-destruction. Such a war would
   not know neither victors nor vanquished. It could not
   be limited but would be started "on a limited scale",
   escalating unavoidably, deteriorating into a world-
   wide inferno. The vanquished would be always the whole
   mankind, all peoples.

2. Today solving the peace and security question would
   not be possible by means of military-technological
   or technological solutions. Any attempt to obtain se-
   curity by further turning the armament spiral is
   doomed to failure, leading to an immediate retighten-
   ing in this or that way, and thus to a further, still
   more dangerous increase of nuclear confrontation.
   There is only one reliable political solution of the
   peace and security problem, guided by the joint con-
   cern and responsibility for peace.

3. Today security can be ensured only by making joint
   efforts. It may not be ensured by strength. It requires
   maintaining the military-strategic balance while simul-
   taneously lowering its level. Today security should
   be brought about primarily by a comprehensive system
   of international security. Striving for national securi-

ty is justified, however should not be tried to be
reached at the expense of the security of others.
Security should not involve insecurity of others. In
this case, security would be just a ficticious securi-
ty. This is the logic conclusion from the prerequisite
of mutual security.

4. The socio-economic and ideological antagonisms    of
our epoch are a product of history and the unavoidable
reality of the epoch. One should finally learn to live
peacefully with them. As it were suicide to settle
these antagonisms    by force, there remains only the
way to find , elaborate and practise principles and
forms to move the contradictions of the social systems,
excluding the danger of exterminating mankind once and
for all.

5. The consequence consists primarily in the fact that the
madness of armament must be stopped. Relating to this,
the most important requirements are to prevent arms
race in space as a principally new and extremely un-
stable dimension of danger and its termination on
earth. Renouncing the preparation of a star war should
be sealed by concluding a star peace treaty. Further-
more the basic security measures involve: a nuclear
test stop agreement, reducing and withdrawing rockets
from certain regions of earth, notably from the over-
loaded region of Europe and creating zones free of
atomic and chemical weapons. These measures could in-

volve a series of further measures contributing to guaranteeing a secure world peace. The aim is and will remain to create a world free of means of mass destruction and ultimately of weapons.

Yet, the implementation of such a vital new way of thinking and of reasonable demands corresponding to it meets a violent resistance.

Where does the "war spirit" of our time consist in, how are we confronted with it, what are its suppositions and ideas dangerous to mankind ?

This is firstly that the qualitatively new character war has adopted in the nuclear-cosmic age is denied, its consequences are more or less clearly minimized. This involves secondly denying peace as the greatest good of mankind. It is claimed that there are higher goods and it could and might be fought for them applying force. This involves thirdly the dangerous illusion that it were possible to win arms race and trying to reach strategic superiority should be continued. Fourthly, the aggressive "deterrent doctrine" is maintained and the "right" to a nuclear first strike is pleaded for. This is also practically prepared by building up a first-strike capacity and notably by militarizing space. Fifthly, war spirit finds expression in the irrational and adventurous speculations that it is possible to limit, wage, control and win a thermonuclear war.

To sum it up, the war spirit of today is declining

peaceful coexistence in favour of and for the purpose

of a military conflict between the two world systems

of our time. It is a dangerous illusion to assume

that there were an alternative to peaceful coexistence.

This is tried by distorting the essence of peaceful co-

existence. To clear up the essence of peaceful coexi-

stence is therefore a prerequisite of the intellectual

fight for peace and security.

In reality, there is no reasonable alternative to the

peaceful coexistenee of states of various orders and,

after all, the two social systems of our epoch. Peace-

ful coexistence does not eliminate the contradiction

between the two social systems, it is its very own pro-

duct. It does not change the legal relationship con-

cerning property, the character of the state and the

ideologies prevailing and spread in the systems. Yet,

it excludes war as a means for solving issues arising

between the states, creating the prerequisite and the

framework for the mutually beneficial competition bet-

ween the systems in economy, science and culture as

well as for cooperation in solving problems of mutual

interest.Peaceful coexistence does not mean a one-way

street, a tactics, disguised revolutionary strategy,

deceit of the opponent, veil or network to catch gullible

persons. It is simply and clearly to interpret: firstly,

peaceful coexistence is a principle of establishing re-

lations between states of various orders. It is second-
ly a concrete policy involving peaceful rivalty and co-
operation in solving important global international
problems. As a result of such a policy, it is thirdly
a sustained peaceful state for peoples. Philosophically
speaking, it is the only potential human form of moving
the basic contradiction between socialism and capitalism
setting the character of our epoch.

Coexistence between two different social systems does
not eliminate ideological antagonisms. It has been re-
peatedly claimed that the ideological antagonism bet-
ween the two so basically differing systems of our epoch
or even - fairly unilaterally - solely marxims-leninism,
were an obstacle in establishing lasting peace, fully im-
plementing peaceful coexistence and security partnership.

Why is that wrong and a misleading assertion ?

1. First of all, ideologies are a necessary mental ex-
   pression of the interests of social groups, classes and
   socio-economic systems. They serve to substantiate and
   justify the activity of social subjects and forces, iden-
   tify and delimitate classes and strata and their members
   from other classes, to "localize" them in history etc.

2. Though in history ideologies helped prepare wars and
   justified them they do not cause wars. Conversely, so
   far the "coexistence" of ideologies concealing differen-

ces or antagonisms between them has nowhere safe-
guarded peace in history.

3. Ideological antagonisms as an expression of the an-
tagonism between social systems and class interests
cannot be simply eliminated. In this field compro-
mises are virtually neither possible nor necessary.
They would be just fictitious compromises and even
detrimental,blurring the positions of the forces
acting in politics, irrespective of the fact if
they were allies, partners or opponents,preventing
the solution of problems, reaching genuine and ho-
nest political compromises as required.

4. Various ideologies can be challenged by the same or
similar objective tasks (safeguarding peace, global
problems, ecology, scientific-technical progress).
It is free to any ideology to give a specific ans-
wer to it. At the same time,it is possible to deve-
lop concurring principles and maximes of action for
solving problems of mutual interest.

5. The commanding necessity to safeguard world peace
challenges today all ideologies, ideological con-
victions, religious confessions etc., irrespective
of their differences in contributing to overcoming
war doctrines and theories, justifying arms build-
up and militarization of space , directed against
practical steps towards disarmament and freeing the

world from the danger of a nuclear inferno.

Solving the problem of peace and security requires to establish a world-wide coalition of reason and good-will . Its fundamental task would be to materialize the human interest in a lasting peace through disarmament ensuring joint security, through peaceful co-existence. It is necessary to make all sources accessible for such a coalition of reason. Our paper is to just deal with its intellectual foundations and sources in greater detail, the most important of which are:

1. Recognition and respect of science. Today peace policy should proceed from absolutely respecting the findings of modern sciences. This refers notably to the findings of natural sciences on the consequences of a thermonuclear war. This involves the firm will to draw all moral conclusions from the findings of the natural scientists on the dimensions of the destructive forces of modern means of mass destruction endangering mankind, their immediate and late consequences. Hence follows that such a war is absolutely inadmissible.

2. Recognition of reason as a decisive means of politics, as the basis of forming the political will in bringing about the solution of conflicts and problems. It refers to a maximum of rationality, an attitude free of prejudices, irrational fears and abnormal mistrust. Reason should be notably applied in assessing war. In

the nuclear-cosmic age war should be no longer a political means, neither can it be a political means as no objects are to be obtained rationally, as there would be neither victors nor vanquished, but all peoples on earth would loose through it. The thesis of Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics proves to be out-of-date, invalid as regards sense, purpose and calculability of the nuclear war. Yet, as to its origin, war is, where it breaks out, the continuation of a policy directed towards starting it. That is why Clausewitz teaches us indirectly that it is the task of the peoples to arrange politics in a way as to not allow a war to be unleashed by it. This requires to renounce any striving for superiority and to energetically stand up for reducing and eliminating the means which allow a policy of force endangering mankind to be pursued.

3. Remembering humanism, genic problems of mankind. Humanism requires always to refer to mankind as a whole, and to the single human beings, to the individual with its unique chance to live. Humanism is connected with a specific system of values. In history there was much quarrelled about which is the highest value for man. In view of the danger of a nuclear inferno this quarrel should be regarded as settled. Today peace is the highest value, the greatest good, because it is the first human right, the right to live. Only peace allows living and only in peace life can be organized worth living, and various sys-

tems of value can be implemented.

4. We have to accept the world as it is, if we would like to maintain and improve it. Therefore, realism is an unrenouncable principle of a policy directed to peace. Each generation "inherits" the world anew. No generation can choose it. It is the product of preceding developments and disputes. For now approximately 70 years the existence of antagonistic socio-economic and political systems, with various forms of property and ideologies prevailing, has been reality in the world of today. These systems have to get along with each other, and they can get along with each other.

The antagonism does not exclude the competition, but challenges it. Only in peaceful competition the social systems can measure their achievements with each other, increase them and exchange an appropriate part of them or use them jointly. Reason demands to investigate the antagonism of the systems with regard to its driving force, rate it not only as regards its "detrimentalness", but also its "usefulness".

5. The historical attitude towards conflicts, problems and their solutions. Also a certain historism. In the century nearing now the end mankind has gone through the biggest process of learning in history so far. It has paid dearly the lessons drawn, as it has been proved by the two world wars and their victims and other facts. Yet, the defeat of fascism and the victory of

the Anti-Hitler coalition, eliminating of the colonial
system, driving back cold war and the process of detent
which was so successful in the seventies are a basic
and new enrichment of the historical experiences made
by mankind. They should be regarded in this way and as
the ability of living with each other already proved
form the basis for planning future.

6. Finally a sober optimism is concerned either. This is no
embellishment, no cheap hoping and waiting. Today opti-
mism is a serious task. Life forces us to seek solutions
also for the most complicated problems. This involves
not least a certain pragmatic attitude, the will to
make up one's mind with the next few steps. In this sense
pragmatism is no opportunism, not giving up one's own
higher values, no abandonment of bigger improvements
for the sake of shabby modest aims, but it is the begin-
ning of solving the fundamental problems depressing us
today.

The German Democratic Republic forms also part of the forces
standing up today for a world-wide coalition of reason. It
proceeds on the fact that, apart from the exceedingly high
responsibility which the two big nuclear powers USA and
USSR hold for safeguarding peace, the two German states
hold a special responsibility - the responsibility for pre-
venting any war to start again from German soil, but peace.

How can this maxim corresponding to the longing of the people of the two German states for peace be implemented ?

1. The question of peace should be and remain the decisive question in the relations between the GDR and the FRG.

2. The two German states have to prove their responsibility for peace by actively standing up for the continuation of the process of detente in Europe.

3. In this respect the most important means is the constructive political dialogue to which there is no alternative.

4. Special attention should be paid to the fact that no additional burden on Europe will emanate from the relations between the two German states but, on the contrary, impulses for improving the relations between the European peoples.

5. The relations between the two German states should be insistently developed on the basis of international law. Observing the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR and the arrangements and agreements concluded so far provide good prerequisites of it.

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Peace Movement as a Party's Tool
The Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic


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## 1. Political and Historical Background

The Second World War was not over yet when the rivalry between the still allied United States and Soviet Union showed up already. The following years put forward an ever increasing tension between what we call the East and the West. But this is not the place to describe the development and to discuss who was guilty having triggered off what was and is called the "Cold War".

The last hopes that there might be a chance to revive the wartimes cooperation dissolved after the United States annnounced the European Recovery Program ("Marshall Plan") in June 1947 and the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) was founded in Poland in September 1947. The world became divided into the "Free World" and the "Communist Oppressed Peoples behind the Iron Curtain" as Western politicians and media called it. In the East the situation was seen in the opposite way. Shdanov created a world of the two camps: the "peace-loving socialist camp" and the "camp of imperialist warmongers". The last bridges between the former allies were torn down, any constructive dialogue or cooperation ceased to exist.

·This was the time when the first initiatives to build a World Peace Movement were taken up. Initially it was not the idea of the Soviet Union or the COMINFORM to create a tool to overthrow the Western democracies as it is still seen today. In the contrary, it was a trial of the Polish Communist Party together with French Communists to have at least one forum to bridge the gap between East and West. The Soviet Union under Stalin accepted the project on the first view but did not support the original intension of the initiators. The reason for that was very simple: an independent forum between the blocks did not fit into the ideology of the two camps.

After the World Peace Congresses in 1948 in Wroclaw/Poland
and in 1949 in Paris/France and Prague/Czechoslovakia the COM-
INFORM recognized the potentials that were connected with the que-
stion of peace and war. It decided to take over the peace en-
terprise.[1] From now on it became "the pivot of the work" of
all Communist parties as well as Communist-dominated or strong-
ly influenced organisations and movements like the World Peace
Movement led by the World Committee of the Peace Fighters or
the World Federation of Trade Unions. The main task of the
movement at that time was to propagate the foreign policy of
the Soviet Union as a policy of peace. And this was the time
when in all East European countries - the so-called People's
Democracies - a National Peace Council or Committee was found-
ed.[2] Their main objectives were to ask for the prohibiton of
nuclear weapons, to protest against the formation of military
blocks and against any "preparation of a new war" by the Unit-
ed States of America. Their petitions, resolutions, and signa-
ture campaigns were addressed to the World Public or to the
"Standing Committee" of the World Peace Movement based at Pa-
ris at that time.

Already in late November 1949 the focus of their activities
became reoriented. After the last formal COMINFORM-Meeting in
November 1949 in Hungary the peace question was closely con-
nected with inner-movement and domestic issues. The Yugoslav
Communist Party under Tito was dispelled from the COMINFORM
and the fight against what was called "Titoism" became iden-
tical with the fight for peace and vice versa. The foreign po-
licy purposes stepped back behind Stalin's interest to calm
down and pacify militant currents in the Western Communist
parties, especially in the CPI and the CPF on the one hand.
On the other hand it served as an instrument for the follow-
ing very rigid Stalinization campaign in the "People's Demo-
cracies". Picking up the old slogan of the identy of peace
and socialism, i. e. only after imperialism has been destroyed

and socialism has taken over the rule over all people we shall
have peace. Everybody who did not join the new movement and
their respective national peace council could be accused of
being an enemy of peace and a supporter of the imperialist or
even worse the Titoist warmongers with all consequences for
career, family and his own health and life.

At this point I shall finish this short historical and politic-
al survey on the background of the beginning of the political
existence of the Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic.

## 2. The Peace Council as a "transmission belt" of the Party for domestic policy issues

Almost immediately after the First World Peace Congress in Pa-
ris and Prague the "German Committee of Fighters for Peace"
(Deutsches Komitee der Kämpfer für den Frieden) was founded
in Berlin, May 10, 1949. Founding members among others were:
the writers Bert Brecht, Johannes R. Becher (later minister
of cultural affairs and member of the Central Committee of
the SED), Anna Seghers and Arnold Zweig; scientists like Pro-
fessor Dr. Walter Friedrich, President of the Academy of Scien-
ces, and Professor Dr. Jürgen Kuczynski; among the political
figures one should mention Otto Nuschke (President of the
East-CDU and later vice minister president of the GDR),
Erich Honecker (than head of the youth organization FDJ) and
Franz Dahlem (member of the Polit-Bureau and Secretary of the
Central Committee of the SED for Cadre Questions) who trans-
ferred the directions from the SED to the Peace Committee.
The new Committee was not thought for personal or even mass
membership but it was a committee of organizations which sent
a fixed number of representatives. All member organizations of
the National Front were represented. The Committee as such
again was member of the National Front.

In the very beginning no distinctive political line existed
where to go and what to do. The Committee followed the direc-
tions that were given by the "World Committee of Fighters for
Peace": to further the foreign policy objectives of the USSR.
At that time the GDR itself was not yet existing and one can
assume that foreign policy and peace issues were not the major
points on the agenda of the political leadership of the "East
Zone". This did not change till the beginning of the Stalini-
zation campaign and the signature campaign for the famous
"Stockholm Appeal" in April 1950.

Already after the constitution of the GDR in October 1949 and
the last COMINFORM meeting in November 1949 the Committee was
directly linked to the Politbureau of the SED (Sozialistische
Einheitspartei Deutschlands = Socialist Unity Party of Germany).
In April 1950 Walter Ulbricht, Secretary General of the SED,
ordered to take all necessary organizational means to guaran-
tee a success of the "Appeal" and he concluded: "It is the
future task of the Party to organize Peace Committees on the
level of the states, districts, towns and factories. The lea-
dership of the SED has to be secured."[3]  For this purpose, the
work of the Committee was more or less fully financed by the
government "because our government has the greatest interest
that the citizens of our republic engage themselves actively
for peace".[4]

The organizational work was successful. In September 1950 a
web of 27.708 Peace Committees existed in the GDR according
to an official report.[5] They collected signatures for the
"Stockholm Appeal", provided the population with information
about the peaceful policy of State Government and the USSR
as well as the war-triggering policy of the West, especially,
and this points out the special situation in Germany, of the
Adenauer government in the FRG.  A very important task was
to be fullfilled in the moment when the discussion about the

rearming of (West-)Germany began. The German Peace Committee,
as it was renamed in December 1950, had to agitate on the one
hand against a West-German army as an alleged instrument to
wage war against the Socialist peace-loving camp. On the other
hand it had to raise support for the respective plans of its
government. It tried to gain consent for this project of an
"anti-imperialist and anti-militarist" army inside the World
Peace Movement (with little success!) but also inside the popu-
lation of the GDR itself. Therefore the German peace movement
had "to teach the people not only about the dangers of war but
also the relevance of the Five-Years Plan and the National De-
fense for Peace."[6] Nevertheless it remained a very difficult
task to explain the difference between a "good" Eastern and
a "bad" Western army.

Besides the propaganda and agitation towards and against West
Germany the most important task of the Peace Committee was
domestic as we could see already. As we know the Socialist
Germany was not incepted because of a revolution or a majority
vote but by the tanks of the Soviet Army. There was no high
identification of the ordinary German people with this system.
This was the point around the domestic work of the Peace Commit-
tee evolved. The argument was: Because we have a Socialist
state, all its policy is peace policy per se. Everything that
is done to strengthen Socialism and that meant the GDR, helps
to strengthen the peace forces and finally helps to secure
peace. Consequently working more and better, producing higher
qualities and larger quantities was and still is part of the
"battle for peace". As Anna Seghers, the famous GDR writer, de-
scribed blatantly in a speech before steelworkers: "Each ton
of steel is a blow in the face of the warmongers!" and later
she added: "But we, in the German Democratic Republic, we know
that we safeguard peace when we follow this slogan: The one
who helps building up his homecountry, helps to build world
peace."[7]

To explain this policy axiom of socialism to the very last ci-
tizen of the country thousands of peace committees worked,
tenthousands of meetings and discussions were organized. Nobo-
dy was even allowed to sign the Stockholm Appeal without having
listened to the reasons given by the agitators.[8] But there
was one important group of the population that kept up at
least a passive resistance: the Christians and especially the
clergymen. The situation was very clearly discribed on the
Second German Peace Congress 1951: "In Thuringia among 800
priests we are all together 14 peace-supporters."[9] The in-
fluence of the priests of all churches was seen relevant
enough to make them to primary targets for political agita-
tion by the Peace Council - without too much of success.

To demonstrate the peaceful implications of a socialist system
as it was going to be build in the GDR in contrary of that of
capitalism ever so often it was pointed at the different situa-
tions of the "peace-fighters" in the two parts of Germany. In
the GDR the peace movement earnt all possible support of the
government and the large organizations while in the FRG those
who engaged themselves in peace work were persecuted and
jailed. Very typical for that argument is the following
citation:

> "In the capitalist countries the peace-fighters are forced
> to do their honest work only under the persecution by the
> official administrations. (...) In the Soviet Union and the
> people's democracies peace-fighters may act in the open and
> they enjoy the fullest sympathy and support of their go-
> vernments." (10)

In pretending to fulfill a demand of the World Peace Congress in
Warsaw in November 1950 the GDR parliament had passed a "Law in
Defense of Peace"[11] in December 1950 that is still valid today.
Its alleged function was to support the initiatives of the peace
movement to safeguard peace and to have a legal instrument to
fight war propaganda. But in fact it was especially thought for
propaganda purposes in the above described sense but also as a

legalized basis to opress all opposition inside the country.
Because opposition against the socialist government was by
definition necessarily opposition against peace and therefore
promotion of imperialism and war that had to be fought. But
despite of all efforts the leadership was not very satisfied
with the results of the work because already in late 1951 the
central Secretariat ordered that each local peace committee
had to organize one public meeting per month. If unable to
do so they had to get reorganized by the peace council on the
next higher (= district) level instantly.

To summarize the very first period of the existence of the
German Committee of Peace Fighters (i. e. 1949-1952): the
main function was domestic and to a certain degree inner-Ger-
man. It was the time where loyalty towards the system of the
Stalinist People's Democracies had to be produced, even with
force. The peace issue was one of the party's tools. For the
same purpose we can interprete the activities towards West
Germany. Accusing the Adenauer government as bellicose and
warmongering, one could describe oneself even better as peace-
loving.

## 3. The Re-Organization of the German Peace Council

Despite all the organizational and financial efforts the re-
sult of the work could hardly be called successful. Neither
a higher identification and loyalty with the political system
in the GDR nor any important influence on the decision-making
process of the Government or the peace movement in the FRG
could be presented to the party. Even worse the term "peace"
in connection with the SED and the Peace Council became dis-
credited. More or less this is true till today.

After the XIXth Party Convention of the CPSU in October 1952
on which Stalin called for the Unity Front instead further
confrontation the Peace Committee followed the line instant-
ly. In January 1953 it changed its name again. Now it called
itself "German Peace Council". It opened the ranks of the or-
ganization for a broader political representation and gave
up its strict cadre-structure. The presidium was broadened to
25 persons including all parties, mass organisations and also
non-organized people. The direct link to the SED leadership
was again guaranteed by Franz Dahlem. President of the German
Peace Council remained Prof. Dr. Walter Friedrich.[12]

The local and regional peace councils should reorganize them-
selves accordingly. They should try to involve into their
peace work those citizens who could not be reached by other
mass organizations especially medical doctors and still and
again the clergymen. All the efforts focussed on two subjects:
Firstly the East-German people should be convinced, "that the
German Question can only be solved peacefully by negotiations
and agreements", i. e. international acceptance of two equal
German states. And secondly, the peace councils had to explain
the "consequent peace policy of the USSR" and the government
of the GDR to its own population. For that purpose a new in-
strument was developed, the "Forum of Peace". These were mee-
tings were the participants did not stay with peace questions
only but had the chance to talk about day-to-day problems.
During a "Forum of Peace" representatives of the local party
and state administration took part and had to answer the que-
stions. The Journal of the Cominform explained the purpose
of this enterprise. The "Forum of Peace" "helps to explain
the policy of the government of the German Democratic Repu-
blic, enhances the responsibility of the government functio-
naries and contributes to an active engagement of the popu-
lation to solve the most important political and economical
tasks".[13] In the same way the Peace Council had to contri-

bute to the preparations of elections. Again it should ad-
dress itself to those people in the GDR who could not be rea-
ched by other organizations but possibly by the peace theme.
It should be demonstrated how the proposals of the Volkskam-
mer (= parliament) and the policy of the government of the
GDR contributed and supported the efforts of the peace-lov-
ing people in the whole world. Because of that it should be
made clear to everybody in the country that "the aims of the
peace movement are identical with those of the state leader-
ship".[14] The political function of the Peace Council remained
very much domestic-oriented. Only the tactics had been changed.

Despite all efforts the results were still not satisfying. One
reason was seen in the fact that the peace councils had lost
their own specific political and organizational profile and
could hardly be distinguished from any other member organiza-
tion of the National Front. Also tendencies were criticized
that not too seldom the work and policy of local organizations
became too dogmatic, too close to the party line. The conse-
quence was that even the number of working peace councils di-
minished.[15] This points at a serious dilemma all the peace coun-
cils in Socialist countries were and still are confronted with.
They have to propagate the government's policies without any
doubt and hesitation. While they also have to keep up the im-
pression that they are totally independent from any government
or party directives. Nobody believes this the least the knowing
functionaries and therefore the acceptance of the peace council
among non-party affiliates remains very low. But there is no
chance to overcome this dilemma as long as there is no possi-
bility of building-up a real critical distance between offi-
cial policy and the policy of the peace council.

## 4. More Re-Organizations

In the mid-fifties the easiest way to go seemed to leave the
domestic propaganda to a large extent to the other member or-
ganizations of the National Front. The Peace Council turned
very much towards the West-propaganda especially towards the
FRG. It is true that West-Germany was in the focus of the
Council's work since ever but till then it never was really
intensive.

Not before 1955 the main attention of the work was directed
towards West-Germany. It was the time of new Soviet proposals
for the solution of the German question, the time of follow-up
discussions of the Paris and London treaties, the NATO member-
ship of the FRG and the beginning of a new wave of peace acti-
vities in West Germany because of plans to arm the FRG army
(Bundeswehr) with tactical nuclear weapons. The GDR-Peace Figh-
ters were ordered to mobilize all their forces to raise sup-
port for "our brothers and sisters in West Germany"[16] in their
fight against the military West ingegration. To help the new
political thrust the propaganda slogans of the identiy of peace
and socialism were no longer valid at least temporarily.[17] The
"German Congress for Security and Peace" in April 1955 gave
the new orientation of the work: Fight against the nuclear ar-
maments, for the German reunification after the international
acknowledgement of the GDR as an independent state. Again this
program also should help to activate the Christians in the
GDR for the work of the Peace Council, i.e. to integrate them
into the political system. All peace-loving people of the GDR
should help to bring "enlightment about the dangerous situation
to West-Germany" and to help to enforce the peace movement in
the other German state.

The German members in the World Peace Council also tried to
convince the majority inside the organization to support the

Soviet and East-German initiatives to solve the German que-
stion. But neither in the World Peace Movement nor in West-
Germany they did succeed with their efforts. And on top of
that the work inside the GDR developed to the worse. Even a
new organizational reform could not stop this process.[18] The
situation was rendered even more difficult because of a new
shift of the official policy. About two years after the
domestic orientation had to step back it became pulled to the
forefront again. And also it was decided to stress the identi-
ty of the policy of the government with that of the peace move-
ment again. The rank and file of the organization became even
critisized of not being tough enough on the bourgeouis strata
of the GDR population. But this was not the worsed yet. Besides
not having had any success inside its own population there
were even voices in the Peace Council itself that had given
up the demanded loyalty towards the GDR-government and start-
ed critisizing its policy.[19] Therefore the order of the day
became again that of before yesterday: Fight for Socialism,
work hard on the development of the GDR and its economy, each
product that was produced extra to the plan would help to se-
cure peace in the world, because peace and Socialism are iden-
tical.[20] The reason for this development did, of course, not
origine inside the Peace Council but in the fact that the Vth
Party Convention of the SED was forthcoming. The 35th Meeting
of the Central Committee of the SED in February 1958 had decid-
ed to concentrate its efforts on the strengthening of the na-
tional economy. The new aim of the whole society became defin-
ed: The GDR would have to pass the FRG economicalwise within
the next few years. That meant to activate all organizational
and political ressources, one of it was the Peace Council.

Today we know it did not help very much. But the reason for
that was not so much the little engagement of the "Peace Figh-
ters".

So again in late 1958 a re-thinking of the policy and especially
the organizational capacities and capabilities of the peace move-
ment began. A strict reorganization took place. The importance
of the Peace Council for the party leadership was proven again.
After Paul Wandel had lost his function as Secretary of the
Central Committee of the SED Alfred Norden, the Secretary for
Agitation, became the new responsible for the peace movement.
He engaged himself very heavily in the peace movement na-
tional and international-wise. He was appointed member of the
Presidium of the German Peace Council as well as of the Bureau,
the most important decision-making body of the World Peace
Council.[21] At the same time the Presidium of the GDR Peace
Council was remodeled. Besides the representatives of the par-
ties and the mass organizations mainly intellectuals, small
private owners and Christians were elected into this body.[22]

In the following months the whole structure of organization
and propaganda was reorganized. The grass-root level of the
Peace Council became more or less dissolved and the county
and district offices strenghthened instead. Also the relation-
ship with the National Front became intensified to prevent
double work. But still the main dilemma between domestic and
foreign orientation of the work was and could not be solved.

## 5. The Coming-About

Finally the Gordian Knot was cut with the decision of the Pre-
sidium in May 1959. The published communiqué declared as highest
priority the strengthening of the West-German peace movement
and the development of friendly relations to all other nation-
al peace movements. Parallel to that the image of the peace-
loving GDR had to be enforced contrasting to that of the "mi-
litarists" in Bonn.[23]

The "coming-about" in the work of the Peace Council became
especially clear in three areas:

- the "All-German Communication" received higher attention;
- the GDR peace movement should try to organize contacts to
  organizations and movements in those countries with which
  no official governmental relations existed yet to improve
  the image of the GDR, i. e. information and propaganda
  abroad;
- no longer the Peace Council was responsible to organize
  major activities directed at a broader public inside the
  country itself. The National Front had to take over this
  task from now on.[24]

The German Peace Council took over the function of a foreign
relation "Public Relations Agency" to promote the policy objec-
tives of its government. In addition after the foundation of
a national branch of the Christian Peace Conference in 1959
the Peace Council had lost its last unique domestic domaine.
Therefore, it could be called obsolete for any major activi-
ties inside the GDR.

Consequently the Peace Council reduced its societal activities
more and more. And after the construction of the Berlin Wall
there was no longer a necessity for the Peace Council in the
country. The flight-wave of hundreds of thousands GDR citizens
had been stopped and the political and economical situation
became more or less stabilized. For producing loyalty in the
country the Peace Council was finally replaced by the mass
organizations and the "National Front" itself. The alleged
still 20.000 local peace councils were transmitted to the re-
spective organizational level of the National Front in April
1962.[25] Although they kept their name there was no longer any
responsibility for their work by the central Peace Council.
Instead they received the directives from the National Front.
It took still more than another ten years till the decision

was made to dissolve the formally kept grassroot organization-
al structures in the mid-seventies. Since then the Peace Coun-
cil consisted only of a single central office with a profes-
sional staff based in Berlin.

In 1962 the Presidium of the Peace Council described its new
task as entirely directed at the international scene. With its
already existing international connections to other peace move-
ments it should help to discharge the negative West German pro-
paganda against the GDR and its international isolation (Hall-
stein doctrine). Also it should show that there is a total
identity between the peace policy of the GDR government and
"the fight of the peace-loving peoples for a world without
imperialist wars and a truly humanistic world order".[26] All
activities should be focussed to demonstrate that the GDR is
a valuable member of the world community.

Another programmatic step to show the new political dimension
of its works and the grown self-consciousness of the GDR took
place in June 1963. The "German Peace Council" changed its
name into "Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic".[27]
Till 1962, when the last World Peace Congress took place in
Moscow it had been the policy of having an "All"-German orien-
tation. The delegations from the GDR and the FRG were always
melted into a single one for the time of the conference. In
this way the identity of their interests and views was tried
to show. After 1963 we should not only have two separate Ger-
man delegations but also a third German delegation coming from
the "Special Political Unity of West-Berlin".[28]

## 6. The New International Orientation of the GDR Peace Council

During the sixties the Peace Council followed closely the for-
eign policy of its government. This policy was very much deter-
mined by the difficult relationship with the FRG. The "Neue
Ostpolitik" of the FRG government since 1966 showed that there
might be a development against the interests of the GDR. Con-
sequently the GDR started its own offensive for a solution
of the German Question in its sense. The Peace Council was
one of the media to transmit it internationally. During the
plenary session of the World Peace Council in Geneva in June
1966 Alfred Norden presented what was called a "Magna Charta
of European Security".[29] He tried to bind the WPC to this po-
licy in the interest of the GDR. This had the consequence that
there could not be any political development towards a system
of European security without a diplomatic acceptance of the
GDR as a fully sovereign state besides the FRG. Against the
reluctance of Western delegates and peace committees which
preferred a policy for Europe more independently from the in-
terests of the GDR the delegates of the GDR Peace Council suc-
ceeded. After a one year discussion the Presidium of the WPC
decided on a policy-line for Europe that followed that of
the GDR. It demanded: "The FRG government (...) has to reco-
gnize the German Democratic Republic".[30] Till late 1970 the
Peace Council could keep the WPC to this extreme position even
against heavy opposition by West-German, West-European and
also some Polish and Hungarian members.

We can say that the WPC was the forum for propaganda and the
main place for activities of the Peace Council of the GDR till
1973. In 1969 not yet a year after the military occupation
of the CSSR by the Warsaw Pact countries had happened the Peace
Council organized a new World Peace Congress for the WPC in
Berlin. It was seen as a good chance to present the policy
objectives of the GDR leadership to an international audito-

rium. It also showed the grown self-consciousness of the GDR
leadership to present themselves to the expectable criticism
of the CSSR policy by a number of Western pacifists and auto-
nomous peaceniks. The high value of the Peace Council for the
tactical moves of the SED was demonstrated by the fact that
hardly any international meeting of the WPC took place without
the participation of Alfred Norden, member of the SED Polit-
Bureau who was also member of the Presidium of the Peace Coun-
cil. Ever so often participating at WPC meetings all over the
world, especially in Africa, GDR delegations took the chance
to combine their stay in the respective countries with visits,
talks and meetings with local governmental and party politi-
cians.

This is the function of the Peace Council ever since. After
Walter Ulbricht had been replaced by Erich Honecker as First
Secretary of the SED and Head of the State Council it continu-
ed in the same way. It only changed its policy according to
that of the new leadership.

The WPC lost its importance as an international stage for the
promotion of the GDR interests after 1973 when the GDR had
become member of the United Nations. The relevance of the WPC
was further diminished after it had reoriented its main thrust
towards the new independent states of the Third World. The
Peace Council of the GDR developed its own foreign relations.
It even started critisizing the WPC as a collection of mere
"travellers in peace" or in the connection with the Prague
Peace Assembly in 1983 the WPC became criticized as too bureau-
cratic to be a useful instrument to influence the new peace
movement in the West.

Of course, the Peace Council participated in the large World
Peace Congresses and the international campaigns like e. g.
the "Second Stockholm Appeal" in 1975[31], the anti-neutron bomb
campaign after 1977 or in the last years the campaign against

the deployment of the cruise missiles and Pershing 2 in West
Europe and the FRG.

But already on behalf of the mentioned last two campaigns the
Peace Council did not trust only on the capability of the WPC
to mobilize the masses. It worked more or less on its own paral-
lel to the World Peace Council. For example it gave the catch-
words for a large signature campaign inside the GDR in autumn
1979 against the forthcoming NATO double-track decision to
demonstrate to the world the yearning for peace by the GDR
population. A mass campaign rolled through the country, per-
formed by the parties and mass organizations, and in a few
weeks more than 14 miillion signatures were collected against
the NATO plans.[32]


## 7. The Peace Council Today

In 1982, after Alfred Norden had stepped out of politics, Her-
mann Axen, member of the SED Polit-Bureau and Secretary of the
Central Committee for International Affairs, became responsible
for the guidance and control of the activities of the Peace
Council. Axen as well as Manfred Feist, member of the Central
Committee and Head of its International Propaganda Department,
became member of the Presidium of the Peace Council. Feist
was appointed member of the Presidium of the WPC also.[33]

In fact we can say the Peace Council today is as much part
of the foreign policy and propaganda apparatus of the SED as
it was for domestic propaganda in the fifties. It maintains
manifold contacts with more than 300 organizations, movements
and institution in more than 130 countries in the world. In
1982 e. g. about 90 international delegations were received
by representatives of the Peace Council in the GDR and not sel-
dom Peace Council delegations took part in international con-

ferences and meetings. Always it is tried to build up contacts
with non-Communist parties and organizations to open up new
channels of communication that could not be reached on the
direct party line.[34] But this must be kept in mind: Any deci-
sion on policy or activity of the Peace Council is directed
in one way or another by the bureau of Hermann Axen along the
line of Manfred Feist.

There is no chance and even no intention to develop a policy
or activities which are not totally conform with the Party
line. The explanation for that is the same as ever: There is
an undivisible identity of the peace policy of the GDR govern-
ment with the aims of the GDR peace movement. It does not exist
the necessity to critisize or not to support the activities
of the government. In the contrary, there is a large unity
of the people, the peace movement and the government of the
GDR in the question of the defense of peace. Therefore is does
not surprise that on the propaganda level of rhetorics the same
slogans can be found as in the 1950s.[35]

And in the same strong propaganda sound we can hear it today
when Prof. Günther Drefahl, president of the Peace Council,
states: "The engagement for peace by all working people of
the GDR is carried out in manifold activities in fulfilling
the decisions of the XIth Party Convention of the SED day-by-
day ."[36] And the best and most important action for peace a
citizen of the GDR can deliver is condensed in the following
slogan: "My working place is my battlefield for peace!" Accord-
ing to that all the working people try to produce the highest
quality and largest quantity everyday because a strong and
productive GDR in connection with the USSR, the other Socia-
list countries and all the peace-loving people in the world
is the best guarantee for world peace.

Finally we want to give a few information about the organiza-
tional structure and the actual functions of the Peace Council.

This organization is no mass organization. It is based on about
300 selected members who represent all the parties (SED, Na-
tional Democratic Party of Germany = NDPD, Liberal Democratic Party
of Germany = LDPD, Democratic Farmers of Germany = DBD, Chri-
stian Democratic Union = CDU), the mass organizations (e. g.
Free Democratic Youth = FDJ, Democratic Women's Association
of Germany = DFD, Free German Trade Unions Association = FDGB)
or themselves as individuals, as cultural worker, writer and
artist, as clergyman, scientist or medical doctor. The Peace
Council sees itself in some ways as an alliance of all different
political and social forces in the GDR. The Plenary Session
of the 300 elects the president (Prof. Dr. Günther Drefahl since
1969), the First Vice President and Secretary General (Werner
Rümpel since 1966), the other nine Vice Presidents and the
additional more than 50 members of the Presidium.[37]

Besides the policy-bodies there is the Secretariate with an
unknown number of professional secretaries whose responsibili-
ties range from covering geographical areas (e.g. FRG, West-
Europe and North America, the Socialist countries, the Third
World), contacts to international organizations (e.g. UNO and
UNESCO) and organizational questions as finances and contacts
to the National Front or the educational organization of the
GDR (URANIA). The latter is used as the instrument for domestic
propaganda which cannot be performed by the Peace Council it-
self because of the lack of the grassroot organizational level.

There are three special commissions handling questions of dis-
armament, outerspace and the prohibition of chemical weapons.
Each is headed by a famous scientist of the country. The com-
missions discuss problems and formulate proposals in accor-
dance to the party policy and represent the GDR on national
and international meetings on these subjects.

The activities allegedly are financed by contributions of the
member organizations and voluntary donations by the people.
Nothing could be found on the total of finances that are spent
by the organization. The Peace Council does not have a large
variety of specific publications. Today there is only the month-
ly newsletter "Informationen" printed in German, English, French,
Italian and Spanish that is distributed free of charge. Aside
that there are non-frequent publications that are produced
and become distributed by the GDR International News Agency
"Panorama". Non of the publications are forums for discussions
and controversies on peace issues. They are more propaganda
materials, not very convincing but boring.

## 8. Some Final Conclusions

The Peace Council sees itself independent from any political
body but always underlines the unity of its political views
with those of the SED. This identity is not on behalf of any
directive from above but it is due to the fact that the party
performs the one and only right peace policy. In consequence:
any demand for transferring the activities or the policy of
Western peace movements which are normally in opposition to
their government is rejected. It is decribed as maybe well-
meant but it shows a lack of understanding of the totally dif-
ferent situation in a Socialist society. Therefore the Peace
Council in connection with the Socialist state organs is fight-
ing as allegedly dangerous to peace any initiative inside the
country itself that formulates an independent view of the po-
litical situation or poses autonomous demands like e. g. con-
scientious objection as a human right and an individual con-
tribution to disarm military power.

This might change in the next time with the developing "pere-
stroika" in the Socialist countries. But - this as some final

remarks - we do not see many chances that there might be a
fundamental or merely a technocratical reform in the GDR
Peace Council in the moment. Till today it is the only peace
council in the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe besides
Rumania and Bulgaria that still has the same structure, poli-
cy-making bodies, behaviour, slogans and even the same leading
functionaries as in the beginnings of the seventies. The In-
terpretation of Kurt Hager, Secretary of the Central Committee
of the SED for Questions of Ideology, is in force also for the
Peace Council. He stated that it is not at all necessary to
remodel one's own flat only because this is performed by some
neighbours.[38] The consequence for the Peace Council is not dif-
ficult: business as usual. No alliance is possible yet with
the independent peace initiatives inside and also outside
the Protestant church of the GDR. They are not accepted by
the Peace Council as partners or fellow-peaceworkers but are
accused as being agents of imperialism. Still today! Instead
of talking with these people or at least tolerating them they
become criminalized or even deported to the FRG.

As a reflex on the development of the huge international new
peace movements and the ever increasing engagement of young
people in the small but active autonomous peace initiatives.
in the GDR the domestic-orientated peace activities of the
Peace Council became revived in 1982/83. Its task was obvious
immediately. The former peace activities had been performed bu-
reaucratically. They did not show any enthusiasm to identify
with and did not offer any attractive platform for action to
many people who were motivated to do something for peace by
the activities of the Western peace movements and the fear
of a new round in the arms race. The new orientation of the
Peace Council should integrate these energies in controllable
ways in the same as they should be used for demonstrative sup-
port of the party peace policy. Therefore, large campaigns
were initiated by the Peace Council and organized by the mass

organizations under slogans like "Peace must be armed!" or
instead of the Pacifist motto "Create Peace Without Weapons!"
(Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen!) it was formulated "Create Peace
against NATO Weapons" (Frieden schaffen gegen NATO- Waffen!).
The biblical phrase "Make swords into ploughshares!" is still
prohibited to wear written on opinion stickers. By the way,
it was the Soviet Union that presented a monument to the United
Nations labeled with this phrase - it still can be seen in
New York. But in the GDR this slogan became declared illegal.

As a final conclusion: we remain very sceptical in the poten-
tials of an overall East-West alliance of peace movements in-
cluding the Peace Council of the GDR. The Peace Council still
has to be seen as a party's tool, as a part of the whole party
propaganda mechanism without any important autonomous contribu-
tion for the solution of the dangerous confrontation between
East and West. It never was nor will be able to present inde-
pendent ideas to the international Peace Movement. If we for-
mulate in a provocative way: The Peace Council of the GDR -
in the condition as it is today - it should be neglected by
independent peace movements. Instead they should talk to the
party itself without any detour if they believe in adressing
themselves to traditional policy-making bodies.

Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian (members of parliament Die Grü-
nen) showed that this strategy might be successful in the ear-
ly eighties. They organized their own demonstration in East-
Berlin, addressed their questions and demands directly at Erich
Honecker and became invited to discuss their ideas with him.
Well, it did not change anything. But how much is changed by
talks with the GDR Peace Council?

Less provocative and directed more by a sense of "Realpolitik":
We have to take into account that the Peace Council is the
official body in the GDR for international contacts on the

level of peace movements . Therefore, we cannot avoid any con-
tact with it in total. But the peace movement's arguments should
be as clear and direct as they are used to do in their own
countries. Diplomatic politeness should be left to the diplo-
mats. As long as the representatives of the Peace Council fore-
most are loyal to their government, as long as they accept
military deterrence and the balance of powers as means to se-
cure peace they are not the "born partners" of Western indepen-
dent movements. We must know they always shall try to use the
Western peace movements for their own political purposes as
they did till late 1983. This must be accepted as legitimate.
But on the other side it should be clear that by talking to
the Peace Council peace movements shall try to intervene into
the GDR decision-making process to promote their own objecti-
ves. Of course this will be rejected instantly as an illegiti-
mate intervention into the inner affairs of the GDR. But this
should be no reason to step back because autonomous peace mo-
vements do not have any loyalty to any government. Only among
themselves in East and West.

Footnotes

1 Cf. Rüdiger Schlaga, Geschichte und Politik des Weltfrie-
densrates im Verhältnis zur Außenpolitik der Sowjetunion
(forthcoming)

2 The founding dates of the East-European Peace Committees
were: March 24, 1949: Polish Committee of Peace Suppor-
ters; March 29-31, 1949: Rumanian Committee in Defence of
Peace; April 3, 1949: The Bulgarian Committee in Defence
of Peace; May 10, 1949: The German Committee of the Figh-
ters for Peace; June 17-18, 1949, Hungarian Council of the
Movement in Defence of Peace; August 25-27, 1949: Soviet
Committee in Defence of Peace; September 10, 1949: National
Committee of Yugoslavia for the Defence of Peace.

3 Heinz Stern-Astor, former Secretary General of the German
Peace Committee, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, June 28, 1952;
also: Die Krallen der Friedenstaube, in: Aktion, Frank-
furt, No. 18, 1952, pp. 40-45.

4 Heinz Willmann, Secretary General of the German Peace Coun-
cil, in: Stimme des Friedens/Berlin, No. 5/1955, p. 19;
in 1950 the Peace Committee received 2.872 Million Marks
by the government, cf. Otto Nuschke, in: "Kämpfer für den
Frieden", No. 19, (2nd November issue), 1950, pp. 4-5.

5 Le Congrès des Comités de Lutte pour la Paix de la Répu-
blique Populaire Roumaine, Bucarest, 9-12 Septembre 1950,
edité par le Comité Permanent pour la Défense de la Paix
de la R.P.R., (Bukarest 1950), p. 129.

6 Walter Lehweß-Litzmann, "An einen Friedenskämpfer", in:
Die Weltbühne, Berlin, September 10, 1952.

7 Cf. Anna Seghers, Frieden der Welt, Berlin 1953, pp.
148-156.

8 One example: After the Second German Peace Congress in
March 1951 2.600 meetings with 660.000 participants were
organized in four weeks; cf. Informationen des Deutschen
Friedenskomitees, No. 15, April 1, 1951, p. 16.

9 Ibid., No. 13, April 4, 1951, p. 22.

10 "In den ersten Reihen der Friedenskämpfer", in: Neue Zeit,
Moscow, No. 41, November 14, 1951, pp. 1-3.

11 Cf. the text in: Die revolutionäre Arbeiterbewegung im Kampf
um den Frieden, Berlin 1964, pp. 153-156. The same kind of
"Laws in Defence of Peace" were passed in all other "People's

Democracies" in the next few weeks e.g. CSSR, December
12, 1950; Bulgaria, December 25, 1959; Poland, December
29, 1959; Albania, January 10, 1951; USSR, March 15, 1951.

12 Cf. "Richtlinien des Deutschen Friedensrates für die Arbeit
der Friedensbewegung in der DDR - 1st Quarter 1953", in:
Forum des Friedens - Informationen des Deutschen Friedens-
rates, No. 2, January 15, 1953, pp. 11-12.

13 Für dauerhaften Frieden, für Volksdemokratie, June 5-11,
1953, quoted in: Dokumentation zur Zeit, Berlin, No. 49,
July 1, 1953, columns 2645-2647. In the district of Leipzig
between April and June 1953 more than 3.300 forums of peace
with about 700.000 participants were organized.

14 "Politische Wahlen und Kampf für den Frieden", in: Stimme
des Friedens, Berlin, No. 10 (September/October) 1954,
p. 5.

15 Cf. "Zu Organisationsfragen der deutschen Friedensbewegung",
in: Probleme der Friedensbewegung - Fragen - Antworten,
Berlin, No. 1/1955.

16 "Dresden ruft", in: Stimme des Friedens, Berlin, No. 2/1955,
p. 5

17 Cf. the speeches of Otto Nuschke, Deputy Minister Presi-
dent, and Heinz Willmann, Secretary General of the Peace
Council, in: ibid. No. 5/1955, pp. 8-13 and 15-21.

18 "Ziel unserer Reorganisation: Lebendige und erfolgreiche
Arbeit!", in: ibid., No. 12/1956, p. 8.

19 Cf. "Worauf es jetzt ankommt", in: ibid., No. 10/1957,
pp. 4-5, and "Wo steht die deutsche Friedensbewegung?",
in: ibid., No. 12/1957, pp. 5-6.

20 Cf. Paul Wandel, "Muß ein Friedenskämpfer Sozialist sein?",
in: ibid., No. 2/1958, p. 9.

21 Cf. Hans W. Aust, "Stockholm 1958", in: Deutsche Außen-
politik, Berlin, No. 8/1958, pp. 856-857.

22 Member of the Presidium became also Werner Eggerath, State
Secretary for the Relations with Churches, memberlist in:
Stimme des Friedens, Berlin, No. 7/1958, p. 6

23 Cf. ibid., No. 6/1959, p. 13.

24 Cf. "Mit frischen Kräften. Zur Wende in der Arbeit der Frie-
densräte", in: ibid., p. 14; on the question of propaganda
approach cf. "Zu einigen Fragen der Überzeugungs- und In-
formationsarbeit der Friedensräte", in: ibid., No. 8/1959,
p. 7-9.

25  Cf. Communiqué of the XXIIth Plenary Session of the German Peace Council of Februar 23, 1962, in: Berliner Brief, No. 5/1962, p. 5; also Henrik Bischof, Die Apparatur der DDR für die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und Aktivität im Ausland, Bonn 1971, p. 59.

26  Berliner Brief, ibid., pp. 4-5

27  Cf. DDR-Handbuch, Bonn 1985, p. 481.

28  Since 1959 when the "West-German Peace Committee" was prohibited by the Federal Government no autonomous peace council in the FRG did ever exist. Today the "Komitee für Frieden, Abrüstung und Zusammenarbeit", founded in 1974, comes close to be a national branch of the World Peace Council. Many of its members belong to the World Peace Council.

29  Cf. Berliner Brief No. 15/1966, pp. 6-11

30  "Erklärung über die Sicherheit in Europa", in: Dokumente der Weltfriedensbewegung, October 1962-December 1974. Ed. by Friedensrat der DDR, Berlin 1976, p. 87.

31  Cf. Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the SED, gives its signature to the "Appeal" in: Informationen, ed. by the Peace Council of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin, No. 12/1976, p. 1.

32  Cf. Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Berlin 1986, p. 42.

33  Franz Loeser, Die unglaubwürdige Gesellschaft. Quo vadis, DDR?, Köln 1984, pp. 136-137; World Peace Council, List of Members 1983-1986, Helsinki 1983, p. 18.

34  Cf. Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Berlin 1986, p. 38.

35  Günther Drefahl declares during a reception with Erich Honecker: "The consequences of our historical experiences are: the stronger socialism is the safer is peace!", in: Informationen, ed. by the Peace Council of the GDR, No. 12/1976, p. 3.

36  Ibid., No. 4/1987, p. 2.

37  Cf. Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Berlin 1986, pp. 9-11, the exact number of the members of the Presidium is not given.

38  Interview with Kurt Hager on "perestroika" and "glasnost" in the USSR and its consequences for the policy of the GDR. Cf. stern, Hamburg, No. 16, April 4, 1987.

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIROSHIMA AND

THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT


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I. Sociological Implications of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Most people know what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 41 years ago, but not many have considered its implications for sociology and sociologists. In my opinion, the sociological implications of the nuclear destruction of the two cities can be summarized as follows:


1. Complete Destruction of a Society

I do not set out in detail the number of people massacred by those two atomic bombs, but more than 200,000 had died by the end of that year, 1945, and the greater part of the total society of both cities was completely destroyed; homes, workplaces, markets, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, temples, churches, the very community itself. The total milieus for sustaining human life, including the regional community and support systems, were totally demolished.[1] It was a crime not only of massive

genocide but also sociocide and vandalism. The society itself,
as an object of sociological research was destroyed, and
sociologists, themselves actors in sociological study, were wiped
out. As one of the important concepts of sociology, we think of
"social disorganization" or "social disintegration." Both these
terms give the general conception of socio-pathological
phenomena. About twenty years ago I had an opportunity to do
some sociological research about how U.S. military forces
deliberately forced "social disorganization" on Vietnamese
society.[2] It was one of the most brutal forms of "social
disorganization" in history. The nuclear destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as another form of this, should still
today be carefully studied, because it is not merely an event of
the past but a present possibility. One of the most urgent tasks
of sociologists in this nuclear age is to study the sociological
aspects of nuclear disorganization, viz., sociocide.

In connection with this thesis, I think all will agree that
the study of crime has played an important role in the
development of sociology. The following sociologists are found
among famous scholars engaged in criminal studies: J.G. Tarde,
E. Durkheim, W.I. Thomas, F.T. Tönnies, A.H. Cantril, F.H.
Sutherland and others. If a small crime or small criminal group
is a subject of such important studies for sociology, how could
it be that the more, nay, the most evil war and genocidal crimes
and the greatest violence of groups such as nuclear-armed forces

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are not a subject for sociology? Already we can cite E.A. Cohen's Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp (1953) as a study of Nazi crimes of genocide, and C.W. Mills' Power Elite (1956) and Listen, Yankee (1960) as sociological analyses of U.S. crimes of aggression. Two decades ago I also proposed a sociology of war crimes, applying it to the U.S. war crimes in Vietnam.[3] As already suggested, the war crimes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki included all kinds of killing: homicide, infanticide, matricide, patricide, genocide, biocide, ecocide and so on. With a deep understanding of such a completely new aspect of the nuclear age, Prof. John Somerville, one of the really pioneering anti-nuclear sociologists and philosophers, proposed the new word, "omnicide".[4] I agree fully with him and would like to propose a new genre of sociology, that is, a sociology of omnicide, which could be the most appropriate sociological expression of nuclear destruction.

## 2. Sociological Implications and Studies of Hibakusha

The atomic bomb exterminated not only several "societies" and "communities", but was an instrument of "delayed genocide" of the atomic bombed, as well as "futurocide", if I may coin a word for it, inflicting suffering upon generations to follow. By the end of 1984, i.e., 39 years after the first nuclear omnicide, a total of 367,344 persons had been granted hibakusha (atomic survivors) certificates. (Since some have not received

certificates because of possible discrimination in marriage and employment, the actual number of hibakusha should be considered higher than that. It should also be noted that the concept, "hibakusha" consists of three genres as follows: (a) the directly atomic bombed, (b) the indirectly atomic bombed who suffered radiation from the radioactive black rain, entering both cities within a short time after the bombing, helping the directly atomic bombed and cremating the dead, and (c) those who were children in the wombs of atomic bomb victim mothers.

Many of the hibakusha have lost members of their families through injuries or sickness caused directly or indirectly by the bombing, and have suffered the most serious difficulties in earning a livelihood. In addition, most of the hibakusha who miraculously survived the nuclear hell, suffered the most serious mental shock and its after-effects. They have also suffered from discrimination in employment and marriage, and have prematurely aged. Their offspring, children and grandchildren, have never been free of the fear of genetic effects and sudden onset of illness. For many hibakusha, the implications of life seemed then and still seem to have been lost. Most of them would say they even envy those who died. There are several reports about the higher rate of hibakusha suicides. (In this meaning, nuclear omnicide includes delayed forced suicides also.) The human damage caused by the atomic bombing was not limited to the immediate postwar years. It has continued and expanded as time

has passed.  _It knows no limits of time or space._[5)]

Such problems of hibakusha raise some new tasks of research for sociologists, such as the following:  How a sociological survey about social, health and mental conditions of hibakusha can be made?  Is it possible to make surveys in which attention is paid to personal life history and spiritual history of the hibakusha?  Naturally, such surveys have been impossible without the cooperation of the hibakusha themselves, and studies such as these were initiated by sociologists at Hiroshima University and later carried out by researchers in sociology, social policy, and social medicine at many universities, in combination with the hibakusha movement; the studies contributed very much to the appeal to the public about the serious damages suffered by hibakusha, thereby strengthening the movements for the denunciation of nuclear omnicide as well as for the demand for enactment of a "law for assistance and protection of hibakusha", although this is still ignored by the Japanese government.

## 3. Sociological Implications of Expanded Genres of Hibakusha

The damage suffered by citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has not been limited to themselves alone.  The first "damage" of the atomic bombing of Japan was totally unnecessary from the military and political standpoints.  Japan was then at the point of surrender.  Seen from the position of international law, it was a totally unjustifiable act of war and crime of genocide.

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The purposes were (1) to test the destructive power of atomic

bombs on living human bodies, and (2) to initiate a blackmail

policy against the Soviet Union[6] and other peoples. In this

context, those two first atomic bombings had the inevitable

result of setting going the on-going nuclear arms race. One year

or several months before it happened Drs. Niels Bohr, Leo

Szilard, James Franck and other top level nucler scientists, with

deep insight into this inevitability, made desperate efforts to

urge high U.S. officials to refrain from using the bombs, but in

vain.[7] As a result, humanity is now in the position these men

had foreseen. The nuclear omnicide of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

gave impetus to the never-ending series of nuclear tests and the

arms race, as well as the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle,

producing new genres of hibakusha all over the world. As I see

it, the genres of hibakusha can be classified as follows:

    i. Hibakusha (Atomic Bombed)

        (a) Dead victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

        (b) Living victims who survived the nuclear hell

        (c) Hibakusha of the 2nd and 3rd generations

   ii. Hibakusha (Atomic Radiated)

        (a) U.S. and British soldiers who were ordered into

            Hiroshima and Nagasaki to dispose of nuclear

            waste, and later were found to be suffering atomic

            diseases

        (b) Atomic citizens - Japanese fishermen as well as

Pacific and American residents directly affected by the nuclear tests. There must also be such hibakusha in the Soviet Union, China and other nuclear power countries

(c) Atomic soldiers who participated in nuclear tests. In the U.S. the number of such hibakusha is estimated at somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000.[8] There must also be such hibakusha in the Soviet Union, China and other nuclear states

(d) Atomic workers exposed to radiation in the nuclear fuel cycle, which starts from uranium mining, through refining uranium and plutonium as well as manufacturing nuclear warheads and working in nuclear power plants, and in dealing with nuclear waste[9]

(e) Stillborn atomic babies who have died because of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests and plants[10]

iii. Hibakusha (Atomic Threatened)

(a) All human beings who have been forced to absorb into their bodies, more or less, the nuclear ashes of death produced and diffused by nuclear tests and the nuclear fuel cycle

(b) All human beings who have been and are threatened by nuclear blackmail and possible nuclear omnicide.

In summary, all members of human society are now hibakusha. Day and night, all are threatened with nuclear omnicide. It

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would be no exaggeration to say that all sociologists and all schools of sociology have never in their history faced such a great danger.

II. Sociological Implications of the Anti-nuclear Movement

1. Historical Outline of the Anti-nuclear Movement in Japan

In the context of the sociological implications of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as outlined above, we can well understand the social and historical background of the rise of the anti-nuclear movement all over the world since around the year 1978, when the first Special Session on Disarmament (SSDI) of the UNO was held. History since Hiroshima and Nagasaki has seen the significance of nuclear omnicide being recognized. In Japan, the anti-nuclear movement was initiated by surviving hibakusha who had experienced nuclear omnicide. They witnessed and documented that nuclear hell, defying the U.S. occupation forces, which refused to permit publication of any evidence or reports recorded by the hibakusha, threatening them with trial by a military tribunal and imprisonment. It was not until 1952 that the Japanese could openly publish documents setting out the facts without fear of suppression.

Over the past 41 years there have been five high tides of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan, which I set out below:

1. 1950: Campaign in support of the "Stockholm Appea with some 6,450,000 signatures

2. 1954-55: Massive protest meetings against U.S. nuclear tests at the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific as well as the first World Conference against A & H Bombs and the formation of Gensuikyo (Japan Council against A & H Bombs) with 30,404,980 signatures of protest

3. 1977-78: Temporary Unification of the anti-nuclear movement and the campaign for anti-nuclear signatures, with 20,178,453 submitted to SSDI of the UNO

4. 1982: Mass meetings in Tokyo, Hiroshima and other places as well as the campaign for anti-nuclear signatures totaling more than 29,000,000 on the occasion of SSDII

5. 1985-86: Campaign for anti-nuclear signatures supporting "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" with 20,486,534 signatures by the end of June 1986, as well as a campaign for nuclear-free declarations by local self-governing bodies. 1,023 of the total of 3,323 such communities had declared themselves "nuclear-free" by the end of June.

2. <u>Sociological Aspects of the Anti-nuclear Movement</u>

As the above shows, the anti-nuclear movement has its o

social and political background. With this as a precondition, it seems to me that the sociological implications of this movement can be outlined in the following way:

First, it is not a social movement that originates from immediate economic need and demand. In this sense, it is different from economic movements such as the labor movement for wage increases or employment.

Second, it is a political movement, but a political movement that does not represent the interests of any special political party or organization. The actors in it belong to all social groups, including hibakusha, workers, farmers, self-employed, intellectuals, religionists, men and women, youth and aged, boys and girls, and even soldiers, officers, capitalists and monopoly capitalists, but not of course the nuclear military-industrial-complex and its supporters. It can also embrace all kinds of organizations: anti-nuclear organizations, political parties, trade unions, farmers' co-operatives, organizations of professionals, intellectuals, religionists, the youth and the aged, boys and girls, soldiers and officers, capitalists and even monopoly capitalists, except those of the nuclear military-industrial-complex and its accomplices. It is a most universal and supra-class political movement.

Third, it is a social movement to replace the old way of thinking among people and political leaders, with what Einstein called "a completely new way of thinking". In this sense, we can

say that it is a cultural, ethical and philosophical movement of
humankind who want to survive the most serious danger in human
history. It cannot exist and function without the creation and
diffusion of an anti-nuclear culture, nor without untiring
efforts at anti-nuclear education. I would add that it is a
social movement to appeal to common sense, reason, feeling and
human imagination for survival.

Fourth, it cannot but be national as well as international,
because without national consensus and international agreement
there can be no perspective for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Fifth, it is a historical movement to resist any exterminist
attempt to put an end to history itself. The task is urgent, but
at this present time, there is no certainty that history will not
be ended by nuclear omnicide. It will take many years for
humankind to be completely free from this danger, and I fear that
the task of the anti-nuclear movement, that is, to ensure human
survival, will not soon be accomplished.

Sixth, it is therefore expected that the anti-nuclear
movement must create the most massive, popular, enduring and
varied forms. It seems that it is not by chance that in Japan
the main forms of the movement have been the campaigns for
collecting signatures to be submitted to self-governing
communities, the government and the UN.

## 3. Sociological Considerations on the Campaigns

### for Anti-nuclear Signatures

As I have said, one of the high tides of the campaign for anti-nuclear signatures in Japan was from November 1977 through May 1978. On this campaign, Chifuren (National Federation of Local Ass'ns of Women) collected 5,323,352 signatures, 26.4% of the total of 20,178,453. In 1979, I made a sociological survey about how the local association of women organized the campaign at the level of the local community in Hiroshima city.[11] Chifuren is considered to be the biggest independent and neutral women's organization in this country. We found that most of its grass-roots leaders were conservative, and the campaign was mainly organized by women of influence in each neighborhood, and reportedly was encouraged by the mass media.

In contrast to the campaign in 1977-78, the campaign of 1985-86 has been independently initiated and organized by Gensuikyo, which is considered to be Communist-oriented. This campaign has almost been ignored by other anti-nuclear organizations like the Socialist-oriented Gensuikin as well as neutral organizations like Chifuren. (The political background to this might be explained by a change of policy of the Socialist Party, which, from 1980, formed an anti-communist agreement with the Komei Party.) The campaign has also been ignored by the mass media other than the organs of the Communist Party and Gensuikyo affiliated organizations.

The campaign was not a spontaneous move, but was purposefully organized. Gensuikyo set for itself the goal of collecting the signatures of half of the total population, nationally and locally. By the end of June 1986, the number of signatures collected amounted to 20,486,534, 34.3% of the target figure. It is noteworthy that such a number of signatures has never before been collected by only one anti-nuclear organization. At prefectural level, the highest rate (75.4% of half the population) has been accomplished in Kyoto Prefecture. The second (74.1%) in Wakayama Prefecture. At the level of cities, towns and villages, the highest rate (83.0% of the whole population) has been achieved in Kumanogawa town, Wakayama Prefecture and Chino city, Nagano Prefecture. I made a study of the local communities where the campaign has been organized. The sociological and organizational aspects of them can be outlined as follows:

First, Gensuikyo and its branches at prefectural and local levels set up independent committees for the signature campaign, which comprised leading personalities of trade unions, organizations of farmers, intellectuals, professionals, women and youth and other societies. The committee immediately asked men and women of influence, including a mayor or town headman, to endorse the campaign. It then sponsored and held many meetings showing anti-nuclear films or videos at grass-roots level. In this organizational work, members of trade unions affiliated with

Toitsurousokon (Communist-oriented Federation of Trade Unions for Promotion of a United Front) played a leading role.

Second, after such preparatory organizational work, each committee began the collection of signatures. The campaign was first organized <u>vertically</u> through the affiliated organizations of the committee. Then, committees for the campaign were set up by school districts, the smallest unit of a local community. Its leading personalities became activists in the campaign. In cooperation with them, activists of trade unions and other affiliated organizations were allotted some sections of each district. The campaign was then organized <u>horizontally</u>, and the day of united action set. On this day, the activists, following the map of resident registration, visited each home one by one. Some new ideas were created in order to achieve the goal. For example, a copy of the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" was delivered to each home the day before the united actions day. By this means, the residents were given time to carefully read the text beforehand and discuss its implications with family members. Absent families were asked to make use of the copy by way of a folding letter addressed to the committee. Through such an expanded network of the committees at various levels, the campaign was carried out <u>vertically</u> and <u>horizontally</u>.

Third, a decisive factor for the campaign was in asking leading personalities of local communities, especially a mayor, a headman of town or a village chief to become an endorser, which

of course made it necessary for activists of the campaign to redouble their efforts to persuade them to become endorsers. But success in this gave the campaign prestige at grass-roots levels, and made it easier to expand the organizational work. In many local communities, the administration itself provided for the activists the facilities of its own broadcasting system as well as public halls and other buildings. The signature campaign necessarily led to asking a local assembly to declare itself "nuclear free", a declaration that in return directly encouraged and promoted the signature campaign. In so far as the government of a local community abides by such a resolution, it cannot but play a support role politically and financially for the anti-nuclear signature campaign.

Fourth, Gensuikyo has its own staff of full time officers as well as its building. Most of its prefectural branches also have full time officers and offices. Without such a basis, it would have been impossible to conduct such a campaign, showing how important it is for the campaign to finance full-time officers and even to increase them.

Fifth, for Gensuikyo and its branches to wage this campaign, it has always been necessary to organize a system of reciprocal communications, top to bottom and vice versa. To do this, it was necessary to equip the movement with many electronic equipments, including computers, facsimile, Xerox, printers, word-processors and so on. The process of the organization itself had to be

planned and scheduled, and activists are expected to observe the scheduled plan and discipline. It can be recalled in this connection that Lenin emphasized the necessity for the revolutionary movement to free itself of amateurishness and rebuild the organizational work on the principle of a great industry.[12] To me this Lenin thesis still seems valid today for all kinds of democratic social movements, including the anti-nuclear movement.

## III. Toward a Scientific Theory of Social Movement

For many years, the social movement has been one of the most important subjects of sociology. The history of sociology could even be described as the history of theories of the social movement.

One of the main trends in these theories might be called an irrationalist approach which stresses the emotional aspects of the mass and explains the social movement as a mob movement.[13] Another is the Marxist approach which understands social movements as forms of the class struggle, which is said to be finally explained by contradictions between productive forces and production relations. It is true that Marx, in "Capital", made clear the economic laws of capitalist society and in this way made economics a science. His contributions cannot easily be overestimated. However, can we say that the theory of social

movement has already become a science even from a Marxist standpoint?  Are there any sociological surveys about the real organizational conditions and process of social movements of political parties, trade unions, peace campaigns and so on from the point of view of Marxism?  Certainly, there are many discussions about "what is to be done", but, as far as I know, very few about "what it is".  First of all, sociological surveys should be conducted, and then, based on them, we would be able to make the theory of the social movement more scientific.

With the above thesis as my premise, I would like to suggest some theoretical theses,[14] which might be considered in our efforts to form a scientific theory of the social movement.

In the first place, such a theory will have to include a theory of the development process of mass groups.  Generally speaking, this process consists of three stages:  (a) a spontaneous un-organized and inner-oriented group or a group of itself (an sich, to use Hegel's terminology), (b) an organized but other-oriented group or a group for itself (für sich) and (c) the most organized, self-oriented and independent group or a group of and for itself (an und für sich).  Most mass groups forming the social movement for democratic goals develop themselves, starting from stage (a), through stage (b), to reach stage (c).  A leading group, already established as stage (c), organizes and leads a stage (a) group into stage (b), and with the help of a group at stage (b), seeks to organize the last into

stage (c). To do this, a leading group is always responsible to educate and raise the groups at the lower stages to the higher levels. A leading group can be such and expand its social movement only by being like a self-multiplying organism. Any democratic social movement can develop if it is organized and led by a leadership which always tries to aufheben, to use again Hegel's terminology, to raise itself.

Further, any social movement develops when such an organizational process goes from top to grass-roots, and from national to local level. Perspectives through all vertical and horizontal levels should be provided. The conditions and demands of the people at grass-roots are important. All social movements, basing themselves only on the grass-roots people, can successfully develop. But this does not mean that the grass-roots mass can consistently organize themselves and develop the social movement. They cannot get the perspective. Rather, the initiative, the approach and the perspective given by the leadership are the decisive points.

Moreover, this developmental process of groups is at the same time the process of development of individual personalities that make up the groups. Individual personalities are not developed at stage (a). Generally speaking, they are egocentric, apolitical and apathetic to most social and political problems. At stage (b), they cannot but pay attention to the destiny of others, and become more or less organized and find it necessary

to observe the principles of the group.  At stage (c), the members of the group seek to develop their individuality and to harmonize their individuality with the common interest of their group.  They cannot but educate themselves to become all-round developed persons.

It seems to me that we can see such a process taking place in the anti-nuclear movement in Japan, especially in areas where the signature campaign has been successfully organized.  The urgent task of the abolition of nuclear weapons surely requires such a process to be further developed and accelerated.

It would be no exaggeration to say that all schools of sociology now need to study the sociological and organizational aspects of the anti-nuclear movement, thereby contributing to the survival of society and humankind, including sociologists and their schools.

Notes:

1) A Call from Hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Proceedings
   of International Symposium on Damage and After-Effects of
   Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Asahi Evening News,
   Tokyo, 1978; the Committee for Compilation of Materials on
   Damage caused by Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
   Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social
   Effects of the Atomic Bombing, Basic Books, New York, 1981.

2) S. Shibata, Lessons of the Vietnam War, Grüner, Amsterdam,
   1973.

3) Ibid., especially Chapter II. "The Vietnam War and the Tasks
   of Social Science"

4) J. Somerville, Philosophy and Ethics in the Nuclear Age,
   Japanese version, Tokyo, 1980; "Nuclear 'War' Is Omnicide",
   Nuclear War, ed. by M.A. Fox and L. Groarke, Peter Lang,
   N.Y., 1985.

5) See books cited in note 1).

6) G. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, Simon & Shuster, N.Y.,
   1985, enlarged new edition.

7) M.J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed, A.A. Knopf, N.Y., 1973.

8) H.L. Rosenberg, Atomic Soldiers, Beacon Press, Boston, 1980;
   L.J. Freeman, Nuclear Witnesses, N.Y., 1981; T.H. Saffer and
   W.S. Kelly, Countdown Zero, N.Y., 1982 and H. Wasserman and
   others, Killing Our Own, N.Y., 1982.

9) See books cited in note 8).

10) E.J. Sternglass, _Low-level Radiation_, N.Y., 1972;

H. Caldicott, _Nuclear Madness_, Brookline, 1978.

11) S. Shibata and K. Kimoto, "Sociological Study of the Movement for Prohibition of Nuclear Weaponry", _Yearbook of Social Scientific Studies_, No. 6, in Japanese, Tokyo, 1982.

12) V.I. Lenin, _What Is to Be Done?_, 1902.

13) For example, see G. Le Bon, _Psychologie des foules_, 1895; K. Young, _Handbook of Social Psychology_, London, 1946.

14) My organizational theory of the social movement is described in detail in my book, _Theory of Human Nature and Personality_, in Japanese, Tokyo, 1961. I was helped much by the works of A. Gramsci and A.S. Makarenko.

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# BELGIAN PEACE MOVEMENT POLLED

A Review of Public Opinion Poll Results on the Issues of
War & Peace, Security & Defense, Armament and Disarmament,
in Belgium, between 1979 and 1985.

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## INTRODUCTION

The last decennium has witnessed a peacetime security debate in the northern hemisphere and the Western world, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people to action and to the streets, demonstrating their concern about peace. Belgium was no exception to this. The issue in Belgium was apparently the escalation of the arms race with the introduction of new nuclear missiles with longer range in Europe. Belgium, a partner in the NATO-alliance, was also meant do deploy a share of these missiles, starting 1985.

The nuclear debate in Belgium started rather late. In fact parliament was holding its first major debate on whether the country should or should not participate in the deployment of these new weapons while, at NATO-Headquarters, a couple of kilometers to the East, its ministers decided in principle to do so. It was December 12, 1979. Only that very autumn had Belgian public opinion ever heard of LRTNF, SS-20, cruise or Pershing missiles. The extent of the resistance against the government decision came as a surprise. Not only to the government who has suspended its final decision on the missiles until 5 years later. But also to the traditional peace organizations who had only very late grasped the signs of the times.

Less, and later perhaps than in other countries, has Belgium been polled on these security issues. In this paper we would like to review the results of these polls. Our contribution is first of all aimed at bringing the available material over the 1979-1985 period together. We are not aware that this has been done before elsewhere. We are certain we have not achieved the comprehensiveness we started out for but on the basis of what could be traced some rather interesting conclusions can be drawn.

It is important to note that Belgium, as a state, is composed of two different people, with a different language, with very often different approaches and attitudes to common problems. This is also the case in this debate. We therefore shall often search for the differences and the similarities between the Flemish and the Walloons. We will also mark Brussels' individual responses.

The ground we will cover consists of the perceptions of war, its threat, where the threat is located and how acute it is felt to be. We will look into some enemy-images related to the risks of war. We will then see how Belgians feel about military defense and how confident they feel about NATO and their American guarantor. We will search for some building blocks of that confidence (perception of military balance, nuclear weapons, the will to militarily resist an assailant) before we enter the cruise debate. We also attempt to portrait the regional differences on these matters using the results of a poll taken in 1982. Then our attention goes to the cruise missile debate where we register pro and con and look into the variables that may play a role in the attitude formation of the opponents of the cruise missiles. What would make them change their mind? We find mere negotiations could perhaps do so. We also touch on such aspects as punishment and reward for political parties involved in the issue. We conclude with some results on how public opinion perceives the peace organizations, commonly known as the peace movement itself, and leave the question whether Flanders is less violence prone than Wallonia or Brussels open for further investigation.

@ LPI                                                    INTRODUCTION

## THREAT PERCEPTION

### THREAT OF WORLD WAR

The EC has repeatedly polled its member's public opinion on their perception of threat and fear of war. It appears that during the seventies the Belgians gradually assessed the chances of a world war breaking out in the next decade much higher than the West-Germans, the Italians, the Danes or even the Dutch did. The shift in Belgian public opinion was not only greater. It seems it also occured earlier than in the other EC-countries.

Table 1.

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#### HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE CHANCES OF A WORLD WAR
#### BREAKING OUT IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS? (BELGIUM)

|  | July 1971 | October 1977 | April 1980 |
|---|---|---|---|
| war certain or more than 50-50 chance | 8 | 21 | 33 |
| 50-50 chance | 9 | 13 | 16 |
| less than 50-50 chance or no risk | 83 | 66 | 51 |

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EEC, Euro-barometre. Cited by Connie De Boer, The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III, in Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1981, 131.

Six months deep in the INF-missile debate the assessment of the risk of a world war had dramatically increased to the point that only one Belgian out of two thought there to be less than a 50-50 chance that the world would escape another total war. Belgians will recall their country was part in both world wars. It would be safe to assume that their notion of a "third world war" would imply some sort of armed conflict in Belgium and for most respondents it would thus also imply their personal involvement.

### THREATENED BY ANY WAR

Not only a world war but almost "any" regional sort of war seems to have become more likely in the public eye during the latter half of the 70ies. In the minds of the Belgians the probability of an armed conflict between East and West in general and NATO and the Warsawpact in particular during this decade had more than doubled (from 18% to 53% and from 20 to 56% respectively), between the US and the USSR it had nearly tripled (from 24% to 67%). In 1976 some 4% of the respondents thought an armed conflict between the USA and the USSR to be "very probable". In 1980 their number had increased fivefold, to 21%. [LEVY, P.M.G., L'opinion publique Belge, la defense et son adequation a la menace, INUSOP, DSC-KHID, Brussels, December 18-19, 1980, 53.]

Still, the same survey in September 1980 indicated that one out of 5 respondents doesn't believe Belgium to be threatened militarily at all. One out of two believes the major threats to be

economical. But here again each listed economic threat was con-
sidered to be more serious than in 1976, especially those cate-
gories which included an explicit reference to the USSR. They
showed a mean increase of 22% (other categories 12%). Only two
out of five believe the threat is above all military. Neverthe-
less 62% of the population believe Belgium "could" be threatened
militarily (Flanders 66%, Wallonia and Brussels 60%).


WHO THREATENS WHO MILITARILY

The most often cited source of such "military" threat in 1980 is
- is it any surprise? - the USSR (46%) followed by the East ex-
cluding the USSR (28%). 5% of the respondents indicated the USA
as the source of military threat. A surprisingly high of 8% in
Flanders would point to the USA as the threat, twice as much as
in Wallonia or even Brussels. [Levy, 48]

How acute is this military threat? Polled in February 1982 on the
probability of the USSR actually "attacking" Western Europe in
the 5 years to come, Belgium scores rather high. A regional
breakdown though indicates quite some difference. Flanders seems
to be more in line with the other countries polled. Still one
should consider the almost 30% of non-response.

Table 2.

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**HOW PROBABLE, ACCORDING TO YOU, ARE THE CHANCES OF RUSSIA
ATTACKING WESTERN EUROPE IN THE COMING FIVE YEARS?**

|                 | Flanders | Wallonia | Brussels | Belgium | FRG | UK |
|-----------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| probable/very   | 16       | 29.9     | 30.2     | 22.5    | 15  | 21 |
| not/not at all  | 54.7     | 41.2     | 48.1     | 52.7    | 81  | 72 |
| don't know/n.a. | 29.2     | 18.8     | 21.7     | 24.7    | 4   | 7  |

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[Belgen fluiten Amerikanen wel eens uit, De Standaard, March 8,
1982]


Higher non-responses are harvested (higher in Flanders than in
the FRG, Switserland, Denmark, UK, France or even Italy) when
asked about their general opinion of the USA and of the USSR but
there doesn't seem to be overlap between the sympathies or dis-
like and the perception of accuteness of a Soviet attack.

Table 3.

## WHAT IS YOUR GENERAL OPINION OF THE USA? AND OF THE USSR?

| | Flanders | | Wallonia | | Brussels | | Belgium | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | USA | USSR | USA | USSR | USA | USSR | USA 82 83* | | USSR 82 83* | |
| ++ and + | 45 | 13 | 51 | 9 | 62 | 8 | 49 35 | | 11 4 | |
| − and −− | 23 | 56 | 22 | 66 | 15 | 67 | 22 12 | | 61 40 | |
| ? and n.a. | 32 | 31 | 27 | 25 | 23 | 25 | 29 53 | | 28 56 | |

[De Standaard, March 8, 1982]
* The 1983 columns mark the results to a similar question from a
IMR-poll published in Panorama, September 20, 1983. The question:
What is your opinion on the Americans/the Russians? The category
"? and n.a." is to be read as "neutral" for the * columns.

When asked one year later, in June 1983, to indicate "which of
the two", whether the USA or the USSR, poses a greater "threat of
war" the Belgians seem to have made up their mind. Regional dif-
ferences, between the North and the South, remain pronounced, but
the non-response/don't know category has faded. Another year la-
ter though public opinion in the North and that in the South of
the country tends to meet.

Table 4.

## WHO IS THE GREATEST WAR THREAT, DO YOU THINK?

| | North | | South | | Belgium | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 8306 | 8407 | 8306 | 8407 | 83 | 84 |
| USSR AND ITS ALLIES | 56 | 66 | 72 | 70 | 64 | 67 |
| USA AND ITS ALLIED | 41 | 26 | 22 | 15 | 32 | 22 |
| don't know/n.a. | 3 | 8 | 6 | 15 | 4 | 11 |

[Hoe staat de Belg t.o.v. het plaatsen van kernraketten?,
CEGOS-MAKROTEST (for Panorama), August 1984.]

A rather strange shift took place, it would seem. Firstly, by mid
1983 the flemish population is split in two almost equal groups.
One still believing the USSR to be the major threat (56%). The
other has come to believe the USA is the major threat to peace
(41%). The french-speaking population stood to its view of a
Soviet threat (72%). One year later, in 1984, significantly more
flemish had began to see a threat in the USSR, or is it that they
see a lesser threat in the USA? In any case, there is slightly
more confusion, more non-response in both regions, strangely
enough more so in the frenchspeaking part of the country. At the
national level this results in but a little more recognition of
the Soviet threat versus a 10% decrease in the perception of a US
threat and almost tripling the non-respondents. [It should be
noted that this question immediately followed a "key question" in

the poll, namely "whether one was pro or con the deployment of nuclear missiles in Belgium." Could respondents have understood the question to refer to the nation which is most successful in "deterrence" ?] If there is a relation to the INF-issue at all it would seem that the introduction since November 1983 of American INF-missiles in NATO's arsenals doesn't positively affect the respondents view of a threat of war emanating from the USA. Quite to the contrary, the USA seems to be considered a lesser threat since these initial deployments. It is the USSR which is feared again. For its possible reaction to Pershing II deployments ?

A USIS-poll in May 1984 indicates that 33% of respondents think the USSR may attack Western Europe in the next five years. Up from 22,5% in 1982... Is this an illustration of how an increase in ones so-called defenses backfires and, because of the need for justification, sets the perception of threat at a level corresponding to ones own arsenals? Would respondents, merely anticipating deployments, also feel the urge for justification through threat-creation?

Ten months earlier an international poll taken in 6 Western European countries, shortly after the KAL 007-incident (September 1983) and in the last months leading up to the first deployments in the FRG of Pershing II missiles, indicated that the Belgians, much more than any of the other "deployment countries", thought that "Soviet military power is or will be a (great) threat to Western Europe."

Table 5.

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### HOW MUCH OF A THREAT DO YOU THINK THAT SOVIET MILITARY POWER REPRESENTS TO WESTERN EUROPE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE?.

| | Some or a great threat | little, or no threat |
|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 84% | 15% |
| Britain | 76% | 14% |
| Italy | 72% | 22% |
| FRG | 69% | 14% |
| (France | 61% | 16%) |
| Netherlands | 58% | 38% |

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["What the people want", in *Time*, October 31, 1983, 32.]

On the other hand the same poll indicated that Belgians, again more than the others, held the "policies" of "both" superpowers at fault for threatening the peace and stability in their country and in Western Europe (44% blaming both, 42% blaming the Soviets and 13% the USA). Rather than having to decide on a dilemma, Belgians prefer to indicate that there is a dilemma when they are given the opportunity to do so. Or is this just a more elegant way out of the "I don't know" shame? It's hard to tell when looking at their opinion on the policies of each of the superpowers.

Table 6.

HAVE (X) POLICIES OF THE LAST YEAR PROMOTED PEACE OR INCREASED
THE RISK OF WAR ? (Dimarso-Gallup, May 1984)

|  | Increased risk of war | promoted peace | don't know |
|---|---|---|---|
| X = USA | 40% | 31% | 29% |
| X = USSR | 55% | 16% | 29% |

[Sondage confidentiel US..., Le Soir, 19 september 1984.]

THE LOOKS OF THE THREAT ARE THE LOOKS OF WAR

The source of the threat (USSR), its general character (military) and its likelihood (soon) being outlined it is about time one tried to identify the subject(s) threatened and whether there would be any reason to believe in such threat at all. In contrast with e.g. the Netherlands nothing much seems to have been done at this level in Belgium.

The 1980 CRESUP-INUSOP poll of mid-1980 had a timid go at the problem. The respondent could choose from a closed list what one thought would be threatened the most, in case of a "military threat by a country from the East actually occurring in Belgium". Regional differences are pronounced.

Table 7.

WHAT, ACCORDING TO YOU, WOULD BE MOST THREATENED IF A MILITARY
MENACE BY A COUNTRY OF THE EAST CAME TO MATERIALIZE IN
BELGIUM ? (1980)

|  | Flanders | Wallonia | Brussels | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| life | 37 | 34 | 25 | 35 |
| independence | 7 | 14 | 17 | 10 |
| standard of living | 13 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
| rights and liberties | 30 | 40 | 39 | 34 |
| don't know | 13 | 7 | 9 | 11 |

[LEVY, p.47]

Especially the elderly fear for their life while the younger fear for their rights and liberties. Flanders absolutely doesn't bother about the independence category at all. It is life itself which is threatened for the most. Then comes liberties and rights. Wallonia fears less for life and Brussels fears are much more balanced. It would seem the inhabitants of the capital don't believe in a very destructive war.

Asked about the likelihood of a **nuclear war in Europe** the french-speaking Belgians in October 1982 in majority denied it (67% to 30), as they denied the likelihood of nuclear world war (31% yes, 66% no). A larger number agreed that such war would occur in Europe and within the decade (40%). About as many respondents (39%) thought a nuclear world war, if it occured at all, should be expected within a 50 year period. [INUSOP, October 1983]
When polled at the end of the summer of 1985 by INUSOP similar regional difference would reappear.

Table 8.

DO YOU BELIEVE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE?
(summer 1985)

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES | 50 | 40 | 43 | 46 |
| NO | 50 | 60 | 57 | 54 |

[INUSOP/UNIOP, nd,]

Have arms control initiatives contributed to the lessening of the chances of nuclear war? Responses to this question, explicitly asked in February 1986 in a Dimarso-Gallup poll, would indicate that people don't perceive these negotiations to harm the peace - only 7% indicated that they had increased the chances of nuclear war. Respondents however, were split over whether the talks had contributed to decreasing the chances of war or actually made any difference at all. Respondents were quite confident that their opinion reflected the general opinion in the country be it that some thought themselves to be somewhat more optimistic or "believing" than their countrymen.

DO YOU THINK SUCH ARMS CONTROL TALKS BETWEEN THE US AND THE SU
HAVE INCREASED OR DECREASED THE CHANCE OF A NUCLEAR WAR?
OR DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?

NOT COUNTING YOUR OWN IDEAS ABOUT THIS, DO YOU THINK THAT MOST
PEOPLE IN OUR COUNTRY FEEL THAT THE CHANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS
INCREASED, DECREASED OR HAS REMAINED THE SAME AS A CONSEQUENCE
OF THESE ARMS CONTROL TALKS? (February 1986)

|  | increased | decreased | no difference | don't know |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. | 7% | 42% | 37% | 15% |
| B. | 13% | 35% | 37% | 15% |

[DIMARSO-GALLUP, February 1986]

On the basis of the Eurobarometer results over the 1980-1986
period following scales can be drawn for the decrease in
assessment of a world war in the next decennium.

Tables 10 & 11

## A WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS
### TELL ME HOW YOU ASSESS THE CHANCE OF



(MEAN SCORE ON A SCALE FROM 1 TO 10)

# A WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS
## TELL ME HOW YOU ASSESS THE CHANCE OF



SOURCE: EUROBAROMETER (1987)

| | A | | B | | C | | D | | E | | F | | G | | H | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | WOULD YOU, WITH THIS CARD, | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | TELL ME HOW YOU ASSESS THE CHANCE OF | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 | A WORLD WAR IN THE NEXT 10 YEARS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | (MEAN SCORE ON A SCALE FROM 1 TO 10) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 | SOURCE: EUROBAROMETER (1987) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | | BELGIUM | GERMANY | ITALY | | HOLLAND | UNITED KINGDOM | | | | EC (10) | | | | | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 | 1980 | 4.24 | 3.75 | 3.98 | | 3.66 | 4.48 | | | | 4.2 | | | | | |
| 10 | 1981 | 4 | 4.11 | 3.11 | | 3.65 | 3.27 | | | | 3.54 | | | | | |
| 11 | 1982 | 3.23 | 3.21 | 2.68 | | 3.43 | 2.73 | | | | 3.01 | | | | | |
| 12 | 1983 | 2.78 | 2.99 | 3.03 | | 2.91 | 3.15 | | | | 3.15 | | | | | |
| 13 | 1984 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.37 | | 2.67 | 2.39 | | | | 2.53 | | | | | |
| 14 | 1985 | 2.1 | 2.48 | 2.2 | | 2.43 | 1.98 | | | | 2.26 | | | | | |
| 15 | 1986 | 2.63 | 2.2 | 2.42 | | 2.03 | 2.12 | | | | 2.32 | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 17 | AVERAGE | 3.111429 | 3.034286 | 2.827143 | 2.968571 | 2.874286 | | | | | 3.001429 | | | | | |

## THE FRAMEWORK OF DEFENSE

Once the USSR has been identified as the main military threat the classic "Red or dead" question doesn't come as a surprise. It has been put several times and in different phraseology. It would appear that the North and the South of the country react differently to it as they have done so on the threat issue. This chapter will inquire not only into the expressed willingness to defend ones country militarily. Elsewhere we will see whether or not and if so to which extent the respondents feel involved in the (military) defense policy of the country. Can the country be defended by military means at all? Most of the times the polls would not venture that far along the line and rather stick to questions such as whether the respondent feels enough money is spent on defense or not.

Prof. LEVY made a most interesting report that covered a lot of this ground in 1980. He also found rather important regional differences on the issue.

Table 12.

ACCORDING TO YOU, WHAT IS DONE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY
SEEMS TO BE... (June 1980)

| | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| USEFUL | 29% | 30% | 34% | 30% |
| but insufficient | 18% | 19% | 26% | 19% |
| sufficient | 9% | 9% | 8% | 9% |
| but excessive | 2% | 2% | 0% | 2% |
| USELESS | 36% | 44% | 49% | 41% |
| to be abandonned | 16% | 15% | 23% | 17% |
| inevitable | 20% | 29% | 26% | 24% |
| without opinion | 35% | 26% | 17% | 29% |

[LEVY]

It would seem that Belgiums defense efforts are supported by a strange coalition in which a majority in all regions feel these efforts are useless but inevitable and a minority professing they are useful but insufficient. Levy registered some 5% of Brussels respondents who thought the defenses useless but without checking the follow-up questions. They were added to the non-opinion category. "Brussels" nevertheless seems pretty much to have made up its mind, one way or the other, while Flanders is still very much in doubt. LEVY found that the group "useful but insufficient" was the largest amongst the "political floaters", those who had not yet decided on which party to vote for at the next elections - was he implicitly submitting a political forecast?

The more scholing one had enjoyed the lesser doubt there was and the more one was convinced of the uselessness of it all. These responses seem generally compatible when confronted with those to an earlier question, thus relating the defense effort to the perceived military threat.

Table 13.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEFEND BELGIUM AGAINST SUCH A MILITARY THREAT?
(SUCH defined by the respondent himself. LEVY 1980)

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| POSSIBLE | 17 | 21 | 21 | 19 |
| IMPOSSIBLE | 60 | 60 | 64 | 61 |
| DON'T KNOW | 23 | 19 | 15 | 20 |

[LEVY]

Responses to both questions do not however imply that people feel completely helpless. Centers of "alternatives" in public opinion just seem to be waiting for the right questions to be formulated. We will develop this further later on. First we shall explore the opinions of the "Belgians" on the framework in which their (military defense) evolves.

NATO FOR LACK OF ALTERNATIVE

In the June 1980 poll by LEVY, having the choice between a pure national, an exclusively Western European, a Western European framework but within NATO or the current NATO structure, respondents barred the purely national framework and went for the NATO structure as it stands and in second instance for the blended format (Western European pendant in NATO). Only as a last resort a Western European defense was chosen. A quarter of the national population wavered its answer.

The Gallup-Dimarso poll, February 1982, added some clarifying language and two possibilities more (withdraw the troops from NATO and quit the military NATO-structure but remain in NATO e.g. politically, lesser stress on military defense and invest more in cooperation with the Soviet Union). Keeping in mind we're dealing with non-identical questions nevertheless quite some developments seem to have taken place during that year and a half. The most spectacular development is the overall increase (with a third) of non-response. Flanders keeps the lead. All earlier alternatives to NATO had lost attraction in all regions – a spectacular drop is seen in the support for a Western European role in the Alliance except in the capital. At the same time only in Flanders the support for continued participation in NATO's military alliance drops with a third. It would appear that the earlier support for NATO should be differentiated, at least in Flanders, into a military support on the one hand and eventually an exclusive political support on the other. This however should not yet be considered to imply any support for still another military defense framework. NATO in 1982, in one way or the other, still appeals to 51% of respondents, just as many as in 1980.

B LPI                                                                    DEFENSE

Table 14

|  | FLANDERS | | WALLONIA | | BRUSSELS | | BELGIUM | | |
|--|----------|--|----------|--|----------|--|---------|--|--|
|  | 80 | 82 | 80 | 82 | 80 | 82 | 80 | 82 | 83 |
| national | 6 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 4 |
| Western Europe | 10 | 6 | 23 | 8 | 22 | 4 | 16 | 7 | 13 |
| W.Eur. in NATO | 24 | 16 | 21 | 18 | 25 | 31 | 23 | 18 | - |
| NATO | 31 | 21 | 24 | 30 | 27 | 27 | 28 | 25 | 53 |
| quit NATO | - | 10 | - | 5 | - | 1 | - | 8 | - |
| dismantle NATO | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 |
| USSR | - | 2 | - | 2 | - | 3 | - | 2 | - |
| dnk/na | 29 | 39 | 22 | 32 | 21 | 33 | 26 | 36 | 23 |

The national figures for 1983 come from responses to a "similar" question in the PANORAMA-IMR poll taken in june 1983. The three polls refer to the wishes or dreamland of the respondents given the restrictions of a "military" defense framework and a limited set of alternatives. However, when one turns to an evaluation of real-time NATO a larger majority will agree that NATO-membership has more advantages than disadvantages, is good or even essential for Belgian security.

Table 15.

DO YOU THINK NATO MEMBERSHIP IS MORE OR LESS ADVANTAGEOUS FOR BELGIUM ? (June 1980)

|  | FLANDERS 1980 | WALLONIA 1980 | BRUSSELS 1980 | BELGIUM 1976 | 1980 |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|------|
| MORE ADVANTAGEOUS | 38 | 32 | 40 | 38% | 36% |
| LESS ADVANTAGEOUS | 21 | 32 | 32 | 19% | 26% |
| DON'T KNOW | 41 | 36 | 28 | 43% | 38% |

[LEVY]

Table 16.

DO YOU THINK NATO IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE SECURITY OF BELGIUM ?

|  | Flanders 1985 | Wallonia 1985 | Brussels 1985 | Belgium 1984 | 1985 |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|------|
| YES | 58 | 72 | 66 | 68 | 64 |
| NO | 21 | 13 | 21 | 20 | 18 |
| DnK | 21 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 18 |

[1984 figures are from the Dimarso-USIS poll taken mid-May 1984. 1985 figures are from the Dimarso-Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek poll taken in february-march 1985, just before initial cruise deployments in Belgium]

Taken in a different way and also attempting to classify the non-responding or doubters category INUSOP inquired whether NATO was positively related to Belgians security.

Table 17.

DO YOU THINK IT IS GOOD FOR BELGIUMS SECURITY TO BE PART OF NATO?

|  | FLANDERS 85 | WALLONIA 85 | BRUSSELS 85 | FRANCOPHONIA 83(*) | BELGIUM 85 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CERTAINLY YES | 47 | 57 | 45 | 53 | 50 |
| PERHAPS YES | 37 | 31 | 32 | 29 | 35 |
| PERHAPS NOT | 5 | 6 | 16 | 8 | 6 |
| CERTAINLY NOT | 11 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 9 |

(*) Recalculated to total 100%. Originally only 4% non-response. [1983 figures from INUSOP, poll taken in the first part of October 1983 only involving french-speaking in Belgium. The 1985 figures are also from INUSOP, poll taken November 1985].

Francophonia has shifted to a more positive view on NATO by 1985. It should be noted, though, that Brussels' uncertainty (perhaps yes + perhaps not) is remarkably unusual. So is the fact that Brussels sees lesser advantage in NATO than the other regions.

Most respondents would tend to positively relate the notion of NATO with that of security. The security NATO provides however remains a quite abstract concept. What if it is peeled down to more concrete components, such as its deterrent power, its defensive capabilities, trust in US determination to keep up the "security" umbrella ?

In 1984 53% of respondents thought NATO to be able to "prevent" an attack on Western Europe, while 34% didn't and only 13% expressed no opinion. [Dimarso-USIS] It seems a slight majority trusts NATO's security policies. They should be aware that (nuclear) deterrence has always been and still is an important component of that policy. But what if this policy, and its deterrence fails?

Table 18.

HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU IN NATO'S POSSIBILITIES TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE IN CASE OF ATTACK? (1982)

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A LOT | 7.6 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 7.3 |
| REASONABLY | 38.3 | 33.2 | 34.0 | 36.0 |
| NOT MUCH | 21.3 | 27.0 | 24.5 | 23.7 |
| NOT AT ALL | 5.4 | 15.3 | 10.4 | 9.4 |
| DON'T KNOW | 27.4 | 17.4 | 24.5 | 23.6 |

[DIMARSO-GALLUP poll, Februari 1982, De Standaard, 8 March 1982]

Brought down to black and white figures the responses to a similar question in May 1984 (DIMARSO-USIS) indicated 47% think NATO can defend Western Europe in case deterrence fails, 37% don't en 16% don't know.

How is that? What is the key to the defense of Western Europe? What inspires that confidence in NATO, both to prevent attack and to defend against attack? Are there objective, material arguments one could refer to? The perception of a military lead or even a balance could be such a base. But even imbalances could be outweighed by certain political guarantees? e.g. Trust in the US nuclear umbrella. Lets weigh this first.

THE US GUARANTEE TO GET INVOLVED

Table 19.

IF BELGIAN SECURITY WERE TO BE THREATENED WITH A RUSSIAN ATTACK, HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE US WOULD UNDERTAKE NECESSARY ACTION TO DEFEND BELGIUM, EVEN IF THIS WOULD IMPLY THE RISK OF A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST THE US ? (1982)

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VERY MUCH | 8.7 | 17.2 | 7.5 | 11.6 |
| CONFIDENT | 32.7 | 33.0 | 39.6 | 33.5 |
| LITTLE | 23.5 | 20.4 | 24.5 | 22.5 |
| NONE AT ALL | 8.3 | 13.1 | 7.5 | 9.9 |
| DnK/NA | 26.9 | 16.3 | 20.8 | 22.5 |

[De Standaard, March 8th, 1982]

All regions are confident the US will take risks for the defense of Belgium (between 65% and 72%). Confidence is evenly present in all age groups. Right (55%) and Left (45%) differ only with 10%. Flanders is only slightly less confident here than the others, but then again with a larger pool of non-response. In Wallonia you would find both most confidence alongside the highest non--confidence score. Two years later (1984) you would still count 46% respondents who believe the "US would use nuclear weapons to defend Belgium, even if that means inviting the risk that American cities are destroyed". [DIMARSO-USIS, 1984]

This "confidence" in the United States being as it is, and, it would appear remaining so, may well be ambiguous. For some it could function as a pacifier - they would feel more at ease, more secure with than without it. Others could be most distressed by these US guarantees and risk-taking. They would fear for the "con-sequences" of being defended by the US. Because they believe the US willing to defend Belgium - perhaps even to the last Belgian? - they would rather not run such risk. Would they rather accept Soviet/Russian occupation than resist and fight? The classical "red or dead" question. Before getting into that however, we should continue our search for the components inspiring such trust in the defense of the West.

## MILITARY BALANCE

Do Belgians perceive a Western lead over the East? Would they rather perceive a balance or would they feel the "others" hold the advantage? The question doesn't seem to be asked often. We found something like it in the IMR-poll of June 1983. Rather vague concepts were used, not exclusively referring to military potential. Note the high level of non-response. Slightly more would perceive a balance.

Table 20.

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### DO YOU FEEL THAT A BALANCE OF POWER OR AN IMBALANCE OF POWER EXISTS BETWEEN BOTH POWER BLOCKS RIGHT NOW? (June 1983)

| | |
|---|---|
| BALANCE | 36,5% |
| IMBALANCE | 32% |
| DNK/NA | 32% |

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[Belgen voor een keer eensgezind, in *Panorama*, 13 September 1983.

Those perceiving an imbalance were asked who held the advantage. The USSR and its allies register 63.7% of the answers while the other third (31.8%) believes the US and their allies have a lead. It is the Walloons who believe in the superiority of the East (74.6%) rather than the Flemish (57.2%). The higher social classes would also tend to give the East the advantage (43.8%) while half of the labour class believes NATO is ahead.

In October '83 the Belgian francophonia was asked by UNIOP-INUSOP who of the US or the USSR deployed more *missiles* in Europe. The concept of the missiles was not defined any further, and it was also the first time it was cited in the questionnaire. One could imagine the question meant to refer to the so-called "Euro-missiles", but then again... A fifth (20%) of the respondents gave no answer, a tenth (10%) replied both had deployed the same number, 15% list the USA, a majority (54%) refers to the USSR. Although more specific a question, its vagueness nevertheless seems to have thrown many back to familiar ground, their "usual" view of balance or imbalance?

Only in February-March 1985 the Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek of Leuven orders a poll containing a double question on the balance of forces in Europe.

Table 21.

1.DO YOU THINK THAT IN EUROPE, CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF A
SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE,   [answer required before continuing]

2. AND IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, DO YOU THINK... (February 1985)

|  | 1. | 2 |
|---|---|---|
| THE WARSAWPACT HAS AN ADVANTAGE | 12% | 14% |
| NATO HAS AN ADVANTAGE | 9% | 7% |
| A BALANCE EXISTS BETWEEN THE WARSCHAUPACT AND NATO | 25% | 23% |
| DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER | 53% | 56% |

[REYCHLER]

Looking through the different categories of respondents the uni-
formity of response is surprising. The only exception is to be
found in the category "political party" (last election vote).
We'll come back to that in more detail. All other categories have
a non-response score that runs from 37% to 69% for the first ques-
tion and from 44% to 70% for the second. In both cases the high-
est non-response comes from the lower schooled and the lowest non-
response from the higher schooled. Each of the categories (sex,
age, education, profession, parenthood, region) would secondly
score more on the "balance"-option and in third instance most
categories see the USSR having the advantage. However, women,
those with a higher education and those without a job would
indicate NATO as having a lead in the nuclear weapons. Lets take
a look at the regional response and at the party divisions. 42%
of the population refuses to indicate which party it voted for or
just doesn't remember.

Table 22.

1.WHO DO YOU THINK HAS THE ADVANTAGE IN SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE?

2.      AND IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES? (February 1985)

POLITICAL PARTY (last election vote)

|  | CVP * | | PSC * | | PVV * | | PRL * | | SP | | PS | | VU | | Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| WTO | 11 | 14 | 13 | 28 | 24 | 22 | 47 | 40 | 10 | 11 | 4 | 13 | 7 | 4 | 14 | 17 |
| NATO | 9 | 8 | 13 | 9 | 20 | 5 | 11 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 28 | 13 | 13 | 9 |
| BALANCE | 28 | 24 | 38 | 28 | 24 | 29 | 19 | 32 | 26 | 23 | 31 | 18 | 17 | 26 | 21 | 20 |
| DnK/NA | 52 | 54 | 36 | 35 | 32 | 44 | 22 | 22 | 54 | 56 | 57 | 63 | 43 | 57 | 52 | 54 |

* party in government
Non-response for the 4 options was 10/10, 7/5, 23/22, 60/63.

_____Table 23.

|         | FLANDERS | | WALLONIA | | BRUSSELS | | BELGIUM | |
|---------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|         | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  |
| WTO     | 10 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 12 | 14 |
| NATO    | 10 | 7  | 8  | 7  | 8  | 6  | 9  | 7  |
| BALANCE | 22 | 20 | 28 | 26 | 31 | 28 | 25 | 23 |
| Dnk/NA  | 58 | 61 | 50 | 51 | 43 | 47 | 54 | 56 |

[L.Reychler, _Opiniepeiling over defensiebeleid, Studierapport_, DIMARSO-GALLUP-Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek, April 1985.]

Remarkably high non-responses for both socialist parties in opposition, the SP and the PS in particular. While voters for all parties, except for the PRL (french radical liberals), will opt for a non-response and only then for a balance in both cases, the voters of the parties actually in government will then consider the Warsaw Treaty to have more nuclear missiles. Voters for the parties in opposition will rather see NATO leading in the nuclear weapons. A similar pattern can be found on the conventional forces except that all opposition parties will eventually see the USSR leading there, too. One exception for the VU (Volksunie, flemish nationalists).

_____

   _It would seem that the perception of balance or imbalance in power and force relations is ultimately linked to political party preferences and views._

_____

HOW WELL DO WE KNOW ABOUT BALANCES... IF WE KNOW AT ALL

REYCHLER also asked whether one thought to be informed enough on the military power of the Soviet Union and whether one had more or less information on the military power and security policy of NATO. Only 19% of the population thought it was informed well enough "to be able to express a reasonable judgement on the military power and security policy of the Soviet Union." (69% did not and 17% didn't know). In other words, a majority, never falling under 54.3%, and straight through all categories, unmistakenly considers itself "unfit" to give a "reasonable judgement" on the Soviet end of a possible military balance. The older one gets and the higher the education the more one would consider oneself to be informed. Again though the french liberals and the flemish nationalists consider themselves rather well informed. Respectively 37.5% and 28.3% versus CVP only 12.2%. Most respondents would indicate they have about as much information on the US and NATO policies. Especially the voters of the two liberal parties, PVV and PRL, seem to be confident to know as much or more on NATO and US security policy as they know on that of the USSR (PRL 86%, PVV 78%). Most non-response is on the side of CVP-voters (27.1%), PS- (17.7%) and PVV-voters (17.1%).

Table 24.

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1. **DO YOU THINK YOU ARE INFORMED WELL ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO REASON ABLY JUDGE OF THE MILITARY POWER EN THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION ?** (February 1985)

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES | 14.4 | 23.5 | 24.3 | 18.7 |
| NO | 67.2 | 54.4 | 74.1 | 63.8 |
| DON'T KNOW | 18.4 | 22.1 | 1.6 | 17.5 |

2. **DO YOU POSSESS LESS/AS MUCH/MORE/MUCH MORE INFORMATION CONCER- NING THE MILITARY POWER AND THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ?**

|  | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LESS | 7.1 | 9.6 | 16.4 | 9.1 |
| AS MUCH | 40.2 | 45.6 | 43.9 | 42.5 |
| MORE | 26.6 | 20.3 | 28.0 | 24.7 |
| MUCH MORE | 2.6 | 1.4 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| DON'T KNOW | 23.5 | 23.1 | 7.9 | 21.4 |

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[REYCHLER.]

It doesn't look like a burst of confidence here. But then again the question doesn't seem to have been to investigate whether or not there existed a knowledgeable "defense community or public opinion" but whether or not the perception of a balance or imbalance between the West/USA/NATO and the East/USSR/WTO had any influence on the "matter of the day", the deployment of the new nuclear missiles in Belgium. More in particular one explored whether the perception of a militarily more powerful Soviet Union could persuade the opponents of cruise deployments in Belgium to change their mind. The results show that 2/3 of all cruise- -opponents (67%) remain opposed, 20% changes its mind and 13% doesn't know any more. There were other, more convincing and recuperating arguments than the military balance, though. It would be safe to conclude here that at this point the military balance had relatively little bearing on the matter... but leaves room to move.

## NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear weapons have played an important role in the post war balance in Europe. Whether people liked it or not these weapons also played an important role in the minds of people. How much do people like nuclear weapons or not? Do they prefer conventional weapons? Or is a mixture more to the liking? The answers to the enquiry by LEVY, held in June-July 1980, show no enthusiasm for nuclear weapons alone. The (responding) population was divided in two equal groups over whether or not one should return to only conventional weapons or whether one should hold on to the combination of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Remark here that all opponents of a military defense had already been filtered away, reducing the population to less than half its original size (from 1785 down to 845). Nevertheless, non-response to this question was as high as 55% in Flanders, 52% in Wallonia and 48% of the Brussels sample.

Table 25.

### SHOULD THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY BE GUARANTEED WITH:
(June-July 1980) [(N=848) LEVY]

|                       | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY  | 8%       | 4%       | 4%       | 6%      |
| CONVENTIONAL ONLY     | 46%      | 42%      | 41%      | 43%     |
| BOTH                  | 46%      | 54%      | 55%      | 51%     |

Why these large numbers of non-respondents and surprisingly low supporters of nuclear weapons as such? Why do people feel uncomfortable about it? Do they think that the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Western Europe increases the odds of being attacked? Remark that Belgium has had American nuclear weapons on its territory for years now.

Table 26.

1. DO YOU THINK THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE INCREASES THE ODDS OF AN ATTACK AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES OR DOES THE DEPLOYMENT PROVIDE MORE SECURITY AGAINST SUCH AN ATTACK, OR DOESN'T THE DEPLOYMENT HAVE ANY EFFECT?
2. DO YOU THINK THAT THE FACT THAT AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN BELGIUM INCREASES THE ODDS OF AN ATTACK AGAINST OUR COUNTRY, OR DOES IT PROVIDE MORE PROTECTION AGAINST SUCH AN ATTACK, OR DOESN'T IT HAVE ANY EFFECT? (February 1982)

|           | FLANDERS |     | WALLONIA |     | BRUSSELS |     | BELGIUM |     |
|-----------|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|
|           | 1.       | 2.  | 1.       | 2.  | 1.       | 2.  | 1.      | 2.  |
| ATTACK    | 23       | 23  | 29       | 21  | 13       | 15  | 24      | 22  |
| SAFER     | 24       | 22  | 22       | 25  | 42       | 41  | 25      | 24  |
| NO EFFECT | 19       | 26  | 22       | 29  | 23       | 27  | 21      | 27  |
| DNK/NA    | 34       | 29  | 27       | 25  | 22       | 17  | 30      | 27  |

Belgen fluiten Amerikanen wel eens uit, De Standaard, 8 March 82.

First of all remark the high non-response and non-effect scores, especially in Flanders. Also remark that the wording of the questions leaves room for interpretation. The first question (on Western Europe) would refer rather to the perceived effect of the "euro-missiles", whereas the second question would refer more to those old nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium already. One could also have understood both questions to refer to the new "euro-missiles".

Only in Wallonia does the difference seem to matter somewhat. Elsewhere it only increases the "no effect" category while decreasing the "real" non-responses. Indeed, people have learned to live with those "old" weapons, so they would "know" that all remains the same as long as no change occurs. Flanders is completely divided on the issue, on whether or not American nuclear arms provide more safety. In Wallonia but a little more respondents think that such deployment does indeed increase the odds of an attack against the country on whose territory the weapons are deployed... except in the case of Belgium. In Brussels about 3 to 1 of those who believe it does make a difference, think it is safer to have the deterrent around.

The SCOPE-TIME poll indicated however that, at least as far as Belgium is concerned, a majority, 55% to 43%, could not agree with the rational for deterrence that "in the hands of responsible governments, nuclear weapons help maintain a balance of power and ensure peace."

Table 27.

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(DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING) IN THE HANDS OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS HELP MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF POWER AND ENSURE PEACE. (September 1983)

| | BELGIUM | FRG | ITALY | UK |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES | 43 | 55 | 42 | 68 |
| NO | 55 | 43 | 55 | 25 |

---

[What the people want, Time, October 31, 1983, pp. 32.]

The same poll also showed "clear majorities" in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy rejecting the idea that "the best insurance against war is for the West to have more and better nuclear weapons". On the other hand, Belgian respondents don't agree (57% to 42%) with unilaterally destroying the nuclear forces of the West "in order to prevent nuclear war at all cost". [SCOPE-TIME]

Nevertheless, for some it could feel safer to have nuclear weapons around. To be able to deter, to punish with their use. They would agree with the "burden-sharing" of deterrence. Others, even while feeling a necessity for mixed conventional nuclear forces, would rather rid Europe from the deterrent.

Table 28.

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### IF YOU EXPECT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD THEY HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED(June-July 1980)

|                                          | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| ONLY IN THE USA                          | 24%      | 14%      | 17%      | 20%     |
| IN THE USA AND EUROPE BUT NOT IN BELGIUM | 21%      | 20%      | 22       | 21      |
| IN THE USA AND EUROPE, INCLUDING BELGIUM | 55%      | 66%      | 61%      | 59%     |

---

[LEVY, p.44. (N=768 down from 1.785, non-response on the issue not given)]

LEVY's sample had dwindled down from 1785 to 768, excluding all opponents of military defense and opponents to nuclear weapons. In Flanders he found most resistance against deployment in Europe, and, in second instance in Belgium. In Wallonia and Brussels resistance against deployment in Belgium would preceed resistance against deployment in Europe.

This type of response is also found 18 months later on the question whether or not the US should withdraw its nuclear weapons and its troops from Western Europe.

Table 29.

---

### DO YOU WISH THE US TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ?  (February 1982)

|            | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | BELGIUM |
|------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| YES        | 41.7     | 43.7     | 19.7     | 39.6    |
| NO         | 39.1     | 48.5     | 78.9     | 47.7    |
| DON'T KNOW | 19.2     | 7.8      | 1.4      | 12.7    |

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[Belgen fluiten amerikanen wel eens uit, De Standaard, March 8, 1982, p.7. (Dimarso-Gallup)]

Flanders is least eager to keep the American troops and their nukes. Only 39% of the Flemish respondents don't want them to leave. Brussels wants them badly to stay on (twice as much as Flanders). For one reason or other this question scored the lowest non-response of the whole series.

It seems clear that a lot of people want the weapons physically removed. That doesn't mean they would necessarily give them up. They trust the USA would intervene and even risk its sanctuary for Western Europe in case it were attacked. The Dimarso-Gallup poll that was leaked to the press in September 1984 counted 46% of respondents in Belgium believing this. What are the scenarios under which they would agree to the use of (US?) nuclear weapons? The question doesn't seem to have been put that often. The same national poll by DIMARSO for USIS counts 35% opposing all use whatever the circumstances. Another third could agree to their use in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. Only 14% could agree to the introduction by NATO of nuclear weapons - a first use - in case its conventional defenses were overrun. No results are available on whether subgroups would favour "an eye for an eye" strategy over "massive retaliation".

It seems safe to say that a vast majority rejects the nuclear deterrent all together. A minority holds on to its deterrent value only but prefer not to have them in as risky a place as the frontline between East and West. Surely they don't consider the bomb a war-fighting weapon. Not in the sense of its possible use under the uncertainties of NATO's flexible response doctrine.

RED OR DEAD

Being a rather supportive member of the NATO-alliance and being rather convinced of the US's risky guarantee how should Belgium respond in the event it were actually attacked? Should one resist militarily? Under any circumstance? Should nuclear weapons be brought into the picture? When? Are there other options than military resistance?

Table 30

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1a. IF BELGIUM WERE ATTACKED WITH CONVENTIONAL - THAT IS NON NUCLEAR WEAPONS - DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT RESIST MILITARILY? (USIA, October 1981)

1b. IF BELGIUM WERE ATTACKED BY THE SU WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD RESIST MILITARILY? (USIA, October 1981)

2.SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT WAR IS NOW SO HORRIBLE THAT IT IS BETTER TO ACCEPT RUSSIAN DOMINATION THAN TO RISK WAR. OTHERS SAY THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FIGHT IN DEFENSE OF BELGIUM THAN TO ACCEPT RUSSIAN DOMINATION. WHICH OPINION IS CLOSER TO YOUR OWN ?

(BETTER TO FIGHT = YES AND ACCEPT RUSSIAM DOMINATION = NO)

| | 1a | 1b | 2 | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | BELGIUM | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS | CH | F | DK | I | FRG |
| YES | 57% | 42% | 45.2 | 33 | 54.8 | 75.5 | 77 | 57 | 51 | 48 | 74 |
| NO | 34% | 45% | 14 | 19.9 | 7.6 | 5.7 | 8 | 13 | 17 | 17 | 19 |
| DNK | 9% | 13% | 40.8 | 47.1 | 37.6 | 18.9 | 15 | 30 | 32 | 35 | 7 |

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[Dimarso-Gallup, February 1982]

In October 1981 it was clear to a majority in Belgium that (undefined, non-nuclear) military aggression should be met with military resistance. Nuclear attack by the Soviet Union however is a different thing altogether, it seems. A slight majority (45% versus 42% and 13% doubters) would not resist militarily. When however the horrors of war - and Belgian citizens have known some - are strung together with the acceptance of Russian domination, and the defense of Belgium... At the national level the number of those willing to put up a fight (45% of the population or 3 out of 4 expressing an opinion) is in line with earlier findings in Belgium, but way at the end of the line compared to the other countries polled. On the other hand, those who would explicitly prefer domination by the Russians number not that much out of tune with the Federal Republic (19%), Denmark (17%), France (13%) or even Great Britain (12%). Only an astonishing 40% doesn't quite know. Again the higher score.

How to explain this pattern of response? The general profile runs
fairly undisturbed through all categories of respondents (age,
sex, political orientation). The largest difference with the
national totals lies with those who have had a personal
experience with war (difference is 9.3%). They remain more
combative (54.5%) than those without (41.1%) and less prone to
submission (10.3% versus 15.8%).

Table 31.

| 2. | Man | Woman | 15-24 | 25-35 | 35-54 | 55+ | Left | N | Right | War | NoWar |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACCEPT | 15 | 13 | 15 | 18 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 16 |
| FIGHT | 49 | 42 | 49 | 45 | 47 | 41 | 51 | 41 | 54 | 55 | 41 |
| DnK/NA | 36 | 45 | 37 | 37 | 40 | 47 | 35 | 44 | 32 | 35 | 43 |

[Dimarso-Gallup, February 1982]

Belgiums bizarre response does mask extreme regional differences.
Francophonia surprises with its almost absolute rejection of
accepting (Russian) domination. Brussels would put up a fight in
the same order as the Swiss or the Germans. Wallonia would
perform not much worse than (nuclear armed) France. Flanders
however reflects a different picture all together. Only a third
off all interviewees (but 2 out of each 3 expressing an opinion)
would consider it a better idea to defend Belgium under the
"horrors of war", while a fifth - as much as in Germany - would
prefer to surrender. Almost half of the Flemish population,
47.1%, has no views to speak of.

Why, these sharp regional differences? Is it a question of
identification with the political entity, Belgium, which appeals
only slightly more to the Flemish than Russian domination is
repellent? None of both alternatives really fit the Flemish frame
of mind? In other words, a "bad" question? Flanders consistently
scores the highest regional "don't know / non-response" through-
out this poll, in the same company as the categories women, those
aged 55+, and those who claim to be politically neutral. (On the
12 questions an average non-response of 33.2% is counted).
Brussels' expressed pugnacity on the other hand, remains rather
cheap, as long as it isn't put to the test. Or are we confronted
here with other fundamentals?

If one cuts away those who will not or can not express an
opinion, in other words sometimes reducing the population to less
than half, some sort of consistency could be distiled of the
particular positions taken by the regions.

## REGIONAL VIEWS

FLANDERS likes the US. It dislikes the USSR more. On the other
hand not 1 in 4 believes a Soviet attack is on hand. If it would
ever come to that however, the Flemish only marginally feel
confident about the US risking their sanctuary for the defense of
(Western) Europe. Nevertheless they are confident, two to one,
that NATO could successfully defend Western Europe in case of an
attack. Under these circumstances Flanders would rather fight
than give in to USSR domination. Only marginally trusting US'
handling of world affairs the Flemish population is split in half
over whether or not the introduction of new American missiles in
Western Europe, be they deployed in Belgium or elsewhere, is
provocative - and may be to the detriment of the security Western
Europe has enjoyed - or actually contributes to its safeguarding.
This is considered to be so vital a matter that half of the
population may think they were better of by sending the Yankees
home, their nukes and troops alike. Naturally one should stick to
the alliance in one form or another.

The WALLOONS and the BRUSSELERS carry the US even closer to the
heart and dislike the Soviet Union proportionately. One in three
fears a Soviet attack in the coming five years and neither the
Walloons nor the Brusselers are really confident that NATO could
stand up to such aggression. It is a very frustrating experience.
It is dealt with in different ways. Vocally: by heralding 9 to 1
they would rather go through the horrors of war than to succumb
under Soviet pressure. Institutionally: in calling for adding a
new (European) defense structure, which not only is expected to
bring a new dynamic, but also would promise more decision-making
power on this side of the Atlantic... They trust US world
politics slightly more than Flanders but only as much as they
believe the US would take risks for Europe. Brussels feels all
the more safe with US troops and new American missiles around but
Wallonia thinks some of these missiles which are to be deployed
in Western Europe could well be too provocative (the Pershings?).
Although the deployment of US nuclear missiles in Belgium is
quite divisive for Wallonia too, a slight majority would feel
safer with than without them. As in Flanders, those opposing the
missiles also waive the troops.

## CRUISE MISSILES

The only question that has been put to the polls more often regards ones opinion on the deployment of new nuclear missiles on Belgian territory. Perhaps it hasn't been submitted as often as this has been the case in other countries. Nevertheless, it is quite a luxury to have the same or a very similar question repeated a dozen times between 1979 and 1985. We have gathered only those questions which, in our opinion, resembled each other close enough. Thus we kept questions such as:

- Do you accept the deployment of American missiles in Belgium?
- Do you favour or oppose having new nuclear missiles that can reach the Soviet Union stationed in Belgium?
- Do you favour or oppose the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belgium?
- Do you favour or oppose the deployment of missiles in Belgium (in Florennes)?
- Are you for or against the deployment of the missiles?

Also we have "simplified" certain questions artificially by reducing qualified answers (e.g. perhaps yes, rather negative) to get at their closest root form (yes or no). We are aware that objections could be made to the selection and certain treatments of the data. Still one should consider that the basic material on Belgium is extremely scarce and that our selection has reduced it still further. e.g. there is no entry for 1982, a crucial year as it lies in the heart of the period reviewed. We are confident nevertheless that some useful conclusions can be drawn from this collection.

Table 32.

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## (ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES)
### (Belgium 1979-1985)

| | 7911 UNIOP | 8009 UNIOP | 8109 IAO | 8110 USICA | 8110 SOB | 8110 IMR | 8306 MU | 8310 USIA | 8405 CEGOS | 8406 CVO | 8502 UNIOP | 8502 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 20.2 | 25.8 | 25.9 | 18.5 | 14 | 8.2 | 16.9 | 24 | 31 | 19.0 | 26.5 | 31 |
| N | 64.1 | 41.7 | 50.2 | 65.9 | 84 | 88.9 | 78.8 | 58 | 59 | 76.1 | 59.6 | 64 |
| ? | 15.8 | 32.5 | 23.9 | 15.6 | 1 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 18 | 10 | 4.9 | 14.0 | 3 |

(Recalculated Pro+Con=100%)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 23.9 | 38.2 | 34.0 | 21.9 | 14.2 | 8.4 | 17.6 | 29.2 | 34.4 | 19.9 | 30.7 | 32.6 |
| N | 76.0 | 61.7 | 65.9 | 78.0 | 85.7 | 91.5 | 82.3 | 70.7 | 65.5 | 80.0 | 69.2 | 67.3 |

(Averaged on calender-year basis)

| | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 23.96 | 38.22 | 19.67 | | 23.46 | 27.21 | 31.7 |
| N | 76.04 | 61.78 | 80.33 | | 76.53 | 72.79 | 68.3 |

Averaging the results of those polls which were held in the same "time-frame" (4 polls in September-October 1981 and 2 in February-March 1985) naturally increases the relative importance of the results of single polls during a whole year.

Some observations on these national results. The proponents of cruise deployment in Belgium never number less than 8.2% and never more than 31% of the total population, respectively 8.4% and 34.4% when recalculated after elimination of non-respondents. (A median of 21.4% and an average figure of 25.47%). The opponents number at least 41.7% and at most 88.9%. (When recalculated respectively 61.8% and 91.6%. A median of 76.7% and an average figure of 74.53%). Non-response runs from 1% (?) to 32% (Median 16.5 and average 12.16%). The lowest number of proponents occurs together with the highest number of opponents, but the lowest number of opponents occurs when non-respondents are the highest. After an initial period of fairly high levels of non-response and proponents of deployment both categories wear down by the autumn of 1981 only for the proponents to gradually climb back up again to their earlier strength and more. Dividing the 1979-1985 period in two, with 1982 as a pivotal year, and averiging out the yearly results, we conclude that the relation between opponents and proponents has remained unchanged. Whatever had happened in the first period, had happened again in the second.

Table 33.

|        | 1979-1981 | 1983-1985 |
|--------|-----------|-----------|
| PRO    | 27.28     | 27.45     |
| CON    | 72.72     | 72.54     |

It means that non-respondents made up their mind (average non-respondents number 15.28% in the first period and 9.03% in the second, a 60% reduction) and joined the ranks of both pro and con according to their relative strength. Whether this is the result of "educational" efforts by different interest groups at different times is difficult to prove. Could one presume that this relationship will remain as it was now that initial deployments have taken place? Or will this especially discourage opponents into non-responsee or even make some join the proponents after all? We could so far not trace any follow-up results that could tell us of the current situation.

CRUISE AND PERSHING IN EUROPE

Sometimes the question on deployment in "Belgium" had been preceded or followed by a similar question on the deployment of these missiles in "Europe". Usually, these questions would lead to very similar results, be it that deployment in Europe would usually encounter somewhat lesser opponents. One example is the SOBEMAP-poll, October 1981.

Table 34.

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1. ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN EUROPE, BOTH
   IN THE EAST AS IN THE WEST?
2. WOULD YOU ALSO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH MISSILES ON
   BELGIAN TERRITORY?   (October 1981)

| PRO DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE BELGIUM | | CONTRA DEPLOYMENT EUROPE BELGIUM | | NON-RESPONSE EUROPE BELGIUM | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10.9 | 8.2 | 87.2 | 88.9 | 1.9 | 2.9 |

---

[Euromissiles: les Belges ..., l'Evenement, December 3, 1981]

The regional differences are considerable. Most proponents of deployment in Europe would be found in Brussels (17.3%). Most proponents of deployment in Belgium are to be found in Wallonia (12.1%). In both cases, least proponents are found in Flanders (respectively 7.0% and 5.5%). When you add threat or balance considerations Brussels and Wallonia would shift place on the following particular questions from the same poll.

Table 35.

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1. IF MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED IN EASTERN EUROPE DO YOU FAVOUR
   EQUIVALENT MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE?
2. DO YOU ALSO FAVOUR DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH MISSILES IN BELGIUM?

| PRO DEPLOYMENT EUROPE BELGIUM | | CON DEPLOYMENT EUROPE BELGIUM | | NON-RESPONSE EUROPE BELGIUM | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | 34.1 | 43.5 | 57.8 | 6.5 | 8.1 |

---

[Euromissiles: les Belges..., l'Evenement, December 3, 1981.]

Brussels and Wallonia appeal for a "tit for tat" on the European level (respectively 59.5% and 60.4%) but are less enthusiast for such approach involving a deployment in Belgium (respectively 46.4% and 41% pro). In Flanders the majority is against in both instances (42% pro against 51% opposed, and only 27% pro in the case of deployment in Belgium).

VARIABLES OR WHY OPPOSE ?

Which were the variables that would seem to influence the respon-
se of the population? In the  above a reference to Eastern Europe
(threat and underlying enemy images) and "equivalence" (appealing
of a sense for military  balance) sharply reduced opposition. The
following  question by SCOPE (September/October  1983)  for  Time
Magazine (October 31, 1983) reduced opponents to 33% while propo-
nents rose to 66%. But what can  be  deduced  from such a complex
statement to which one adheres or not?

"THE  COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND NATO ARE GENERALLY  ON  THE
RIGHT COURSE NOW, TRYING  TO  NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTION IN GENEVA,
BUT  ALSO PLANNING TO DEPLOY PERSHING IIs AND CRUISE MISSILES  IF
THE USSR DOES NOT REDUCE ITS OWN NUCLEAR THREAT."

What  motivates  opponents  in their own view? A majority opposes
any  form  of  nuclear  armament.   (IMR-poll,  June  1983:  81%.
DIMARSO-poll,  May  1984:  82%)  Therefore  opponents  against
deployment of missiles in Belgium  would  also  oppose them being
deployed elsewhere in Europe.  Opposition is less if they were to
be deployed outside Europe. A  majority of opponents believes all
nuclear weapons should be abolished.  But  often  they seem to be
open to discussion in which case their opposition is oriented not
towards all nuclear weapons but only to the new ones. New weapons
are  superfluous since there are too many nuclear bombs  already.
Fear these will escalate the  arms  race  or  provoke  a  limited
nuclear war in Europe also remains an important motivation.

Table 36.

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**WHY DO YOU OPPOSE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES IN BELGIUM?**
(MAY 1984)

| | |
|---|---|
| All nuclear weapons should be abolished | 82% |
| There are already too many nuclear weapons in the world | 57% |
| Deployment will escalate the arms race | 38% |
| Deployment could lead to a nuclear war limited to Europe | 36% |
| Deployment may provoke a Soviet attack | 34% |

---

[DIMARSO-USIS, May 1984.]

The  results  suggest  opposition  could  to  a certain extent be
influenced by e.g. a  time  factor (the non-occurance of a Soviet
attack even after initial deployments), guarantees that a nuclear
war  could  not be limited to Europe, convincing arms  reductions
and even more by credible  nuclear disarmament postures, negotia-
tions, proposals.

However, unilateral nuclear disarmament, a posture not taken by the peace organizations in Belgium, was not favoured. 57% would "jettison" the idea that "nuclear weapons are so dangerous and immoral that the West should unilaterally disarm and destroy all its nuclear forces in order to prevent nuclear war at all cost." (Time, October 31, 1983). The June 1983 IMR-poll found no support for unilateral disarmament whatsoever. Complete disarmament, in order to maintain or regain a balance of power, would be supported by 45% if it were mutual. The creation of a nuclear free zone in Europe gathered as much support as the zero-option (7%). We will return to the zero-option further on.

Reducing the number of missiles to be deployed could have an an important impact on public opinion in Belgium. The Belgian governments position - a wait and see what comes out of the negotiations before we decide on doing less than what we already promised at NATO - had made an explicit reference to a possible "interim solution". The state of negotiations allowing, Belgium could eventually decide not to deploy the whole lot of missiles originally planned (48 cruise missiles). Deploying a third, or two thirds of that number would then suffice. The approach also had the advantage that it was quite compatible with NATO's deployment schedule. Polls would look into public attitudes on such "interim" deployments. It was said that the majority of respondents did not care much about the actual number but rather whether missiles would be deployed or not. (Panorama, September 13, 1983).

Table 37.

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IS SUBSTITUTING THE PLANNED 48 MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 48 IN BELGIUM BY 32 MISSILES AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE? (June 1983)

| | |
|---|---|
| YES | 34% |
| NO | 60% |
| NO ANSWER | 6% |

---

De houding van de Belgische bevolking ten aanzien van de bewapeningswedloop en de plaatsing van kernwapens op Belgisch grondgebied, IMR & Associates, Juni 1983, p.8.

In this poll the "NO's" could also include those who absolutely want the 48, and none less, to be deployed. A rather surprising 34% (a third of the sample) would go for less than 48 missiles. This scenario doubles the number of proponents (they numbered 16.9% in this poll). The question was repeated one year later with a similar result, i.c. a doubling of the (then 19%) number of proponents of deployment. Opposition would not be that much a matter of principles after all?

Table 38

RIGHT NOW THE DEPLOYMENT OF 48 MISSILES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 48
MISSILES IN BELGIUM IS CONSIDERED. IF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WERE
TO SUCCEED IN REDUCING THE NUMBER TO 32 WOULD THAT MEET YOUR
SATISFACTION?   (July 1984)

| | |
|---|---|
| YES | 41.9% |
| NO | 52.9% |
| NO ANSWER | 5.2% |

[Hoe staat de Belg t.o.v. het plaatsen van kernraketten? Omnibus-
onderzoek, CEGOS-MAKROTEST, Augustus 1984.]

Table 39.

WOULD YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND:   (February 1985)

| | YES | NO | DNK/NA |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. If the USSR disposed of stronger military forces in Europe | 20 | 67 | 13 |
| 2. If not the Americans but the Europeans were to deploy these missiles | 16 | 72 | 12 |
| 3. If non-deployment would weaken the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance | 15 | 69 | 16 |
| 4. If deployment would positively influence East-West negotiations | 24 | 59 | 16 |
| 5. If deployment would reduce the risks of war in Europe | 36 | 52 | 12 |
| 6. If Belgium would dispose of submarines and would deploy cruise missiles on submarines instead of on land | 10 | 76 | 14 |

[L.REYCHLER, Opiniepeiling over defensiebeleid, studierapport,
April 1985.]

Opponents were also asked about other conditions that could
convince them to change their mind.  What is the profile of those
willing to change  their mind? Men more often than women agree to
any of these alternatives. A positive relationship exists between
the  (4 given) levels of education and the willingness to support
(any)  of the alternatives. Differences could be very  important.
Up to 50% of higher educated would opt for deployment if it
reduced the risks of war, 44% if the negotiations were better off
with deployment.  Those  least inclined to give up opposition can
be found amongst the lower educated (only alternative #6 disturbs
this).   This   seems confirmed  in  that  of  all  professional
categories  labourers,  usually they have enjoyed less  scholing,
are  indeed  least  inclined  to give up their opposition,  while
employees  are  most  inclined  to  give in. People with children
would  slightly  more  often go for  the  alternative  than  people
without. More often  though  they  would also maintain a stronger
opposition, too. Exception made for alternative #5.

Opposition in Flanders . varies but only once does it fall under
66% (alternative #5: 52%). This poll indicated only 43.5%
opposing deployment in Wallonia to start with. Any alternative,
except the Belgian nuclear submarines! is good enough an argument
to let go and to further disintegrate opposition. It doesn't
raise above 56.2% and falls under 40% for alternative #5. There
is also a lot of hesitation and non-response. The least
hesitation is found in Brussels where both opposition remains
lower than in Flanders though higher than in Wallonia and where
proponents for the given alternatives usually number the most.
The average of the willingness for change (change - yes + dnk) in
Flanders is 28.3%, in Brussels 34.7% and in Wallonia 49.5%.


## NEGOTIATION POWER

The promise of genuine and credible arms reduction negotiations
and disarmament are probably one of the most powerful levers to
be pulled on a "disarmament" movement. In the cruise missile
debate in Belgium it has also been tested on a "non-armament"
movement. Even before the American president had really launched
his zero-option proposal it was sounded out, also in Belgium.

A SOBEMAP-poll in October 1981 gets a reading of 85.9% in favour
of "the complete elimination of these missiles in Europe, both in
the East and in the West, as proposed by the president of the
United States." 10.7% were against and only 3.4% fail an answer.
Unanimous readings in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The simple
message: zero - none appeals to a large majority. But when the
same people were asked whether they thought this proposal was
anything more than simple propaganda it became obvious that it
wasn't all that clear.

Table 40.

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### DO YOU THINK THAT THIS PROPOSAL BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS SIMPLE PROPAGANDA ? (OCTOBER 1981)

|        | BELGIUM | FLANDERS | WALLONIA | BRUSSELS |
|--------|---------|----------|----------|----------|
| YES    | 33.3    | 31.2     | 36.7     | 33.7     |
| NO     | 34.7    | 32.6     | 35.4     | 43.7     |
| DNK/NA | 32.0    | 36.3     | 27.9     | 22.6     |

---

[Euromissiles: les Belges disent oui a Reagan, l'Evenement,
December 3, 1981, 5.]

The zero-option nevertheless continued to attract a lot of suppor-
ters although these related the proposal exclusively to the euro-
missile debate. Indeed, when asked for alternatives to the
current (im)balance of "power", a more general framework, only 7%
mark the zero-option when it is suggested to them. (IMR, June
1983). The zero-option is preferred over the deployment of new
missiles even if three quarters of the respondents don't believe
the Soviets would live up to their part of such a deal. In fact a
majority believes the Soviets simply will refuse to reduce its
SS-20 euro-missiles. (Opinions des francophones a l'egard des
euromissiles en Europe de l'Ouest, UNIOP, October 1983).

In May 1984 some 67% of respondents would not blindly trust the
Soviets to respect possible arms control agreements (Sondage
confidentiel US, in Le Soir, September 19, 1984).

The USIA in February 1985, when US-USSR negotiations took up
again, counted as much respondents who thought the "US was indeed
making a genuine effort to reach a serious arms reduction
agreement with the USSR" as that it counted respondents who
thought it was not the case (41% pro, 42% con, 17% dnk).
Respondents then thought less still of the USSR efforts (23%
genuine, 58% not, 19% dnk). This would now be much less clear it
appears. Two thirds of interested respondents thought the resumed
negotiations were unlikely to result in an agreement to reduce
nuclear weapons. A quarter of the respondents even volunteered to
answer that the US and the USSR would "never" reach such an
agreement. 11% would tended to give the US the blame, 28% the
USSR, but 61% would not know who was to blame if no agreement
could be reached between the two.

The UNIOP-poll in February 1985 showed that "conditional"
opponents of deployment of cruise were reduced to less than two
thirds if only the negotiations "continued". More than two thirds
of "conditional proponents" of deployment would definitely join
proponents ranks if the negotiations would break down. The mere
existence of arms reduction negotiations thus made a difference
of some 20% in the support for missile deployment. Although
conditional respondents were found more amongst the parties in
government, the relative effect of the mere negotiations would be
much larger on the parties in the opposition.

The summit meeting between the president of the US and the
secretary-general of the USSR have attracted wide attention, also
in Belgium. A majority of respondents believes an early arms
control treaty between the superpowers is "very" important, and
although 37% of respondents believe the arms control talks have
made no difference at all on the chances of a nuclear war, 42%
think it has decreased them. [DIMARSO, February 1986]

## THE MISSILES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

The last category to be discussed here is the political party (on the basis of last vote). Lets first see how people respond on the question about their last vote.

Table 41.

### DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES (FEBRUARY 1985)

|     | CVP | PSC | PVV | PRL | CPB | SP | PS | VU | FDF | OTHERS | DNK/NA |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|-----|--------|--------|
| PRO | 17  | 57  | 54  | 64  | 37  | 9  | 38 | 22 | 4   | 23     | 23     |
| CON | 70  | 33  | 46  | 25  | 37  | 80 | 51 | 69 | 87  | 67     | 59     |
| DNK | 13  | 10  | 0   | 11  | 25  | 11 | 10 | 9  | 9   | 10     | 18     |

[L.REYCHLER, Opiniepeiling over defensiebeleid.]

Voters for the christian parties (CVP and PSC) are split on the issue, along regional lines. Consensus in the liberal family is safe. In the opposition consensus is less safe between both socialist parties (SP and PS) although those against deployment hold a majority still. In the regional-nationalist parties, VU and FDF, opposition is clear.

Those amongst the voters for the Flemish christian democrats (CVP) and opposing deployment reach their lowest level (58.1%) for alternative #5. Nevertheless, they then number more than those opposing deployment amongst the voters of the SP (Flemish socialists) or the VU. They even number more than the SP, which is the main party in opposition, or the VU under alternative #4. (negotiations). PVV (Flemish liberals) opposition is surprisingly radical. PRL (french-speaking radical liberals) opposition melts for any alternative which could present itself. PSC opposition less so, but then those voters seem to be less burdened with doubt. Both the PS and FDF gather tough resistance against the alternatives.

Asked whether one would vote for the same party next time if it would agree with a deployment it seems that in general the relative reward is greater than the punishment. But punishment there is. Over 30% of men, active population, employee and those with a higher scholing threaten to change parties. Most reward (voters still vote for the same party even if it agrees with deployment) and least punishment (voters vote for another party) is certain in Wallonia. Reward and punishment break even in Brussels and Flanders with a slight preference for reward in Brussels and the opposite in Flanders.

In order of the "certain punishment" forecasted:
SP, VU, FDF, PS, PSC, CVP, CPB, PVV, PRL.

In order of the "certain reward" forecasted:
PRL, CPB, PVV, PSC, PS, VU, CVP, FDF, SP.

It is clear that the liberals barely suffer. The SP, that had
been the strongest opponent of the missiles, even while in govern-
ment, would suffer at all ends. The CVP suffers less but is the
party with most of its earlier voters undecided. To sum this up:
the only parties which could definitely loose through whatever
hesitation on their part in this matter are those who invested
the most in an opposition against the missiles. The parties to
potentially loose most voters in this matter ARE ALLREADY IN THE
OPPOSITION ! ! !

These general conclusions also seem to be confirmed by the
UNIOP-poll, held in the same period of February-March 1985.

## BELGIAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION

The Belgian peace movement, that is society in general in its
growing awareness, debate of and stand on security and peace
related issues, has been polled and weighed to its political
impact. Much less attention went to how the population viewed the
traditional or even the new peace organisations.

From the June 1983 IMR-poll we learn that the "organized peace
movement", which most will know under the term of "peace
movements" itself, is known by 78% of respondents, which is a
rather high number. Indeed, the MAKROTEST-poll one year later
finds that the peace movements have "slipped away". Only 56% is
still aware of its activities in the spring of 1984. Women less
then men. Higher class more than lower. The peace movements are
also better known in the larger towns and centers than in the
smaller villages and on the countryside.

Table 42.

### TO WHICH EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING:

| | 1983 | 1984 ++/+ | 1-5 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Peace movements are a positive contribution to peace and stability/balance | 63.2 | 46.6 | 3.3 |
| 2. Peace movements play in the hand of those who want to upset the balance or who want to preserve their superiority | 11.5 | 24.7 | 2.7 |
| 3. Peace movements lead to an increasing aware- ness of the population | 43.4 | 51.3 | 3.4 |
| 4. Peace movements have a real influence on the decisions of the (national) government | 11.8 | 20.3 | 2.7 |
| 5. Peace movements have a real influence on power holders at the international level | 14.3 | 18.7 | 2.6 |
| 6. Peace movements can influence the current negotiations | 8.9 | 22.1 | 2.7 |
| 7. Whatever you do the nuclear missiles are sure to come anyway | - | 61 | 3.6 |

[Panorama, September 20, 1983, p.30.]
[Hoe staat de Belg t.o.v. het plaatsen van kernraketten?
Omnibusonderzoek, Cegos-Makrotest & Panorama, August 1984.]

Most respondents (81.6% in 1983) have never participated in any
action of the peace movements. 18% in 1983 says they have. A
UNIOP-poll held in October 1983 amongst french-speaking Belgians
found that although 78% didn't disapprove of the then planned
October rally in Brussels, and 71% thought it a rather good
thing, still 64% thought it not useful. Only 12% planned to
participate in the rally, of which half were really sure. They
didn't come...

Taking a closer look to the above 1984 results one notes a lower-
ing belief in the peace movement with age, only to increase again
with the oldest group (the parents and their children?). This
also goes for those who reject a partiality of the peace movement
in the balance-game. The higher the social class of the
respondent the less uncertainty and the more recognition of the
educational (and polarizing) function of the peace movement.
There is little doubt about the limited influence of the peace
movement. Only some 20% of respondents feel they have influence
to bear at the national level, a third thinks they don't and the
rest doesn't know what to think. The lower middel class sees them
having some impact. Those aged 35-44, the age group counting most
proponents of the cruise deployment, are least impressed by the
alleged influence of the peace movements, but they are also the
category which the least of all denies their influence.
Especially the youngest are most desperate, and if not desperate
the most doubtful, about the influence of the peace movement. The
direct conclusion though should be drawn from the responses to
the last phrase presented. The hopelessness expressed by a large
majority that "whatever one does, the missiles are sure to come
anyway" !!!

The lower the class the more doubt and the less rejection of it.
Rejection of the phrase is thrice the size in the highest versus
the lowest class. Similarily 50% of the highest class believe
that the intervention of smaller countries, such as Belgium (?),
could contribute to non-deployment of nuclear weapons. Only 8 %
of the lowest class would agree to this.

This pattern continues straight through a more mobilising phrase:
"If all opponents of nuclear weapons would campaign this would
influence the negotiations on the nuclear weapons." The phrase
actually reflects the trust in the decisive role of majorities in
the democratic political decision making process, extended to
foreign policy as well. This trust is safe for over three
quarters of respondents agree in one way or another. The trust is
stronger amongst women, highest and lower middle class and
younger generations. It is in the same categories that the
stronger opposition against the deployment of cruise missiles
could be located. They would use the democratic structures to
press their goals. And when they don't succeed there is a fair
chance they will blame it on themselves not being able to have
rallied enough support for the cause. But in fact the fight had
already long been fought since of all categories most involved,
none, but the highest class which is the lowest in number, really
believed their case to meet success in the end.

HOPE STILL

It is interesting, in closing up this paper to return to some
earlier background results. They have to do with the different
attitudes between the Flemish and the french-speaking in the
country. Poll-results throughout these war & peace, security,
defense and disarmament issues seem to have indicated that the
regions in Belgium are going through different phases of aware-
ness on the general peace issue. They seem to imply that the
Flemish would be less predisposed to use of violence. Not only in
their choice of the defensive means for the country in peacetime
but also in the forms of resistance against an occupant

Table 43.

---

1. <u>SHOULD THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY BE SECURED BY MILITARY MEANS
OR SOLELY BY NONVIOLENT MEANS?</u>                    (June-July 1980)

|  | Flanders | Wallonia | Brussels | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MILITARY MEANS | 53% | 55% | 58% | 55% |
| NONVIOLENT MEANS ONLY | 47% | 45% | 42% | 45% |

2. <u>WHATEVER YOUR ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTIONS, WOULD YOU
FAVOUR ARMED RESISTANCE OR A RESISTANCE WITH EXCLUSIVELY NON-
VIOLENT MEANS, IN CASE OF FOREIGN OCCUPATION OF THE COUNTRY?</u>

|  | Flanders | Wallonia | Brussels | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARMED RESISTANCE | 37 | 54 | 54 | 45 |
| NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE | 63 | 46 | 46 | 55 |

---

[LEVY, p.40-41]

A large number of the population opts for the nonviolent alter-
native. It is not clear however if the first question was under-
stood as an inquiry into the "ethical norm" versus a different
material reality. Nor whether the respondents have any further
idea of what "nonviolent means only" could mean. Nevertheless,
LEVY combined the results to both questions and found a correla-
tion between the form of resistance (violent or nonviolent) one
would use against an external enemy and against ann occupant
within the country. He finds Flanders less violence prone,
Brussels most violence prone.

Table 44.

---

| DEFENSE ASSURED BY MEANS OF | RESISTANCE TO A FOREIGN OCCUPATION | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | FLANDERS | | WALLONIA | | BRUSSELS | | BELGIUM | |
|  | VIOL | NONVIOL | VIOL | NONVIOL | VIOL | NONVIOL | VIOL | NONVIOL |
| MILITARY | 31 | 22 | 44 | 11 | 50 | 8 | 38 | 17 |
| NONVIOLENCE | 6 | 41 | 10 | 35 | 4 | 38 | 7 | 38 |

---

What could this possibly mean? Why this attitude? Is it still
there? Is it a one time correlation? How deep does it go? Is it
conditional to other attitudes? To which and to which extent? Can
it be developped? To what?

CONCLUDING REMARKS

OF all security issues in this period the missiles have been the
most divisive one. It would appear as if the discussion which

developed, the debate into which ever more people were drawn and eventually took a stand on, came about in a sort of war-scare and was accompanied by a gradual decrease of the fear that a world war is immanent.

The debate, which perhaps had an educational impact surely had a polarizing effect. It also pacified worst fears. The regional differences in Belgium, which are present in general politics, are also evidenced in these matters. Confidence in NATO's ability to deter aggression or to fend off an attack was not the issue. Nor was it the perception of a military balance which seems to have been linked to ones political party preferences much more than to ones own possible insights. Nuclear weapons are impopular, are not related to balances, more is not better for peace. In the heat of the cruise debate Flanders would have had the American nuclear weapons sent to where they came from and the American troops along with them. Even those in favour of nuclear weapons are quite reluctant to a first-use policy, crossing the nuclear threshold in case the conventional defenses are overrun. Half of the Flemish population doesn't tell whether it would fight or live through foreign domination.

We found that, in the periode we reviewed, the number of non-respondents had diminished to add to the proponents and opponents of deployment, proportionate to the support each of those already enjoyed.

We have searched for the variables that may have played a role in the minds of those opposing the deployment of these weapons and which arguments could have induced them to change their minds. The prospect of further reducing the risk of war and the positive impact of an eventual deployment on what people still perceive as disarmament negotiations could. So could perhaps "time" and Armageddon holding off after all.

We've also looked at how political parties, through their respective voters, had faced up to the ultimate deployment decision of March 1985. We found that, although many opponents of deployment were located in government parties, only the opposition were sure to loose their base if they dared to give in. The relative reward for a deployment decision was larger than that of punishment, at least for those in government at that time.

We have found broad sympathies for the peace movement organizations but limited to mere vocal support, hardly any belief in their influence on decision making and a tragic hopelessness that one could effectively counter the missiles by any action whatsoever.

We dare to end this review calling attention again to the regional differences that could be observed throughout the period covered and would hope this could be investigated further.

# DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN BELGIUM
## (POLL RESULTS 1979–1985)



RECALCULATED AND YEARLY AVERAGED

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            1. Panorama, September 4, 1984
DIMARSO-GALLUP   1. De Standaard, March 8, 1982
            2. USIA  Le Soir,. September 19, 1984
            3. L.REYCHLER, De Standaard, March 22, 1985
            4. - December 1985
            5. DE BOER, June 29, 1986
IAO    Interuniversitair Instituut voor Advies en Opiniepeiling
            1. De Standaard, October 27, 1981.
ICSOP Institut de Conseil Sondages d'Opinion Publique
            1. Pourqoui Pas?, October 19, 1983
IMR Institute for Marketing .Research
            1. Panorama, September 13 and 20, 1983
Marketing Unit
            1. La derniere heure, October 21, 1983
            2. La Libre Belgique, January 12, 1985
            3. La derniere heure, April 9, 1985
SCOPE
            1. Time, October 31, 1983
UNIOP-UNISOP   Interuniversitair Instituut voor Opiniepeiling -
            Institut Interuniversitaire de Sondage d'Opinion
            Publique
            1. De Morgen, December 12, 1979 (Kernkopraketten)
            2. LEVY, see bibliography
            3. L'evenement, October 18, 1980
            4. L'evenement, October 1, 1981
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Some Questions of Peace and War in the Public
Opinion in the CSSR

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One of the tasks of today's sociology is to study relations
between peace movement and "new thinking". We would like to
make some remarks about social and political consequences of
"new thinking" for the peace movement in the socialist countries. 1)
Let us start by remembering the image of peace forces as it
was presented in the socialist countries and often also among
the friendly orientated people in the West for a long time :
in the West peace forces were set equal to peace movement of
plain people against the professional politicians connected
with the military-industrial complex while in the East peace
forces were identified with official government's policy
expressing in general form the will of nations. It could be
the reason why some people in the West judge there is no peace
movement in the socialist countries at all.

According to the "new thinking" it is necessary to change
this image and to activate the masses on both sides. It means
in the West the activation of all groups of population that
have adequate social and political prepositions and whose
interests do not contradict disarmement, including some
capitalists and most of middle-classes. In the East such
activation means to pass from high, but rather passive agreement
with the government's policy to new spontaneous peace activities.
Even this is what           is called           "to overcome the
stereotype of nuclear weapon era". One of  the importatnt tasks

of sociology is to analyse the situation in the society, that
means to analyse the suppositions for such a change of thinking.
That's why we consider it important to reflect not only
objective factors, but also to look after subjective dispositions
in people's thinking. This is important not only because
thinking infuences behavior deeply, but also because social
thinking and social being are not of the same timing.

Such an analysis shouldn't be organised only in one
country or as an independent comparison between two or more
countries. Up to now we can do no more than supplemnt the
situation in public opinion in Czechoslovakia, but we join
the iniciative proposed during "2nd Symposium "Sociology and
Peace "/Linowsee, GDR 1987/ to create an international team
to study cooperatively the opinion in several countries of
both political systems .

It was many times
stressed that research in the field of peace movement
and keeping peace perspectives were one of the most important
tasks of every social science, mainly sociology[2] Our Public
Opinion Research Institue in Prague took this task with all
responsibility. In the two and a half elapsed years we conducted
four surveys concerning the problems of peace and turning off
war. All our results were passed to leading political bodies
in Czechoslovakia. We would like to let you know in short
the main results.

Fundamental importance has the opinion on the danger
of starting off a new world war and of the possibility of
deflecting this danger. Our surveys show that since 1980
the percentage of population who realise this danger grows
slowly from 83 to 90 percent. Dominating among these people
is the belief that war can be turned off - only 8% of

Czechoslovak population say it cannot be deflected. That
means the fatalistic tendencies are rather rare in CSSR,
which can also be demonstrated by another result : only 4%
of the population think there must be a world war between
socialism and capitalism sooner or later. 55% believe in
long peace coexistence and 23% find such a war probable.

Let us say that as to the possible results of the eventual
nuclear world war the public opinion in Czechoslovakia doesn't
differ much from that in the USA and USSR - 83% in both these
countries think there would be no winner and world would be
destroyed. In Czechoslovakia it is 77%. But in our research
we went a little bit further.

We surveyed the opinion on possible
results of an eventual non-nuclear world war. And our results
are highly unpleasant : 69 % of Czechoslovak people think
that non-nuclear world war could be won - 19% think socialist
countries are to win in such a case, 4% named capitalist
countries as a probable winner and 46% expressed the opinion
that both sides have equal chance. We are convinced that the
idea of possible winning a non-nuclear world war is a relict
of the nuclear weapon era too, a very dangerous one, and it
demonstrates from another point of view that the social
thinking is really outstanding. Here we see another area for
cooperation between peace and ecological movements. It's
obvious that most people, at least in Czechoslovakia, do not
realize that today's results of a non-nuclear and even non-
chemical world war would be totally different from those
of World War I and even of World War II. Several catastrophes
of chemical factories such as in Soweto, Union Carbide in
India and of course catastrophes of nuclear power stations

like Tschernobyl or Three Miles Island show that the use
of classical weapons on such objects could have nearly the
same effects as the use of nuclear weapons. Anybody could
imagine the consequences of an effective attac on the system
of dams in Holland, for example.

All this together with ideological reasons underlines
the necessity not to bound our effort on questions of nuclear
disarmament only. That is why we feel the second Schmidt-Schwarz
thesis [3/] refusing principially any kind of war as a way of
solving international conflicts to be central point in the
"new thinking".

Our results show also that Czechoslovak population did
not suffer from the tendencies of the certain temporary crisis
of peace movement, that could be observed in several countries
after the deployment of US Euromissiles. On the other hand
we have to admit that a non-ignorable part of people in the
CSSR - 52% - do believe that the destroying power of nuclear
weapons is a sufficient safeguard against nuclear war. This
is probably another one of the relicts of nuclear weapon era,
which does not correspond to today's reality. In connection
with "perestroyka" of thinking in international relations
it is necessary to show people, including the politicians,
that such opinion is the part of the past. The danger of
starting off a nuclear world war is now too high because of
the growing probability of technical mistakes, people's
failure or even people's misuse with uncontrollable consequences.

But let's come back to the results of our Institute.
Together with the opinion of new world war danger we surveyed
where - according to respondent's opinion - this danger comes
from. Dominating in the CSSR is the opinion that most dangerous
for peace is the actual political orientation of the USA /46%/

or of the USA together with their partners in NATO /18%/.
Relatively often, in 22% of the cases, was in this connection
mentioned the Federal Republic Germany, probably due to the
historic experience of our nations. Remarkably decreased the
anxiousness of China as a possible source of world war danger.
Very low is the percentage of answers indicating USSR as the
most dangerous power - it is less then one in a hundred.
A bit more frequent is the opinion reflecting the theory
of "equal guilt" of both USSR and USA, but even this stays
below 10%. For 1987 we prepare a new survey on these questions
and in connection with the latest Soviet peace iniciatives
we presume a further decrease of opinion that USSR might be
a source of new world war danger.

Prevailing conviction that the policy of USA and NATO
is aggresive could be documentated by the opinion on
deployment of US Euromissiles and on the reaction of the
Warsaw Pact. First we should mention a fact that surprised us
a bit. Already before the deployment of US missiles did the
Czechoslovak people realize their dangerosity in the same
extent as after this deployment and after the deployment of
corresponding Soviet missiles in the CSSR and GDR. Nearly
90% of the people feel Pershing and Cruise in Europe as
dangerous for peace and only 6% express the opposite opinion.
This may be the reason why 75% of our population found the
reaction of the Warsaw Pact, namely the deployment of SS 20
in the CSSR and GDR to be necessary. 6% of our people doubted
whether the USSR missiles in CSSR were necessary and only 4%
refused this "answer" of our government /14% didn't know
or had no opinion/. From the sociological point of view
it is very important that the acceptance of these measures
was higher by both young people and people with high and ∕

higher education /over 80% in both these groups/. Of course
this does not change the fact that the proposal to draw back
the SS 20 from CSSR and GDR together with Pershings and Cruise
from Western Europe was accepted with greater pleasure then
their deployment.

What we stated above about rather broad acceptance of
the necessity of "answer" of the Warsaw Pact to US Euromissiles
should be mentioned in connection with one of the failures of
the psychological war against our country, namely the failure
to create an "independent peace movement"[4] in the CSSR. In
1983 Radio Free Europe claimed "this movement grew so much
that it became truly nation-wide and the regime lost any
control of it". But a defiance refusing deployment of Soviet
middle-range missiles in CSSR have sign/ed/only about 1 000
people since, which can in a 15 million inhabitants country
hardly be the expression of a mass movement against its
government.

Mentioned findings confirm the fact discussed in Linowsee
already in the 1st Symposium in the speech of prof.Kuhrig:
peace movement in the socialist countries does differ from
that in developed capitalist countries.[5] Of course it is not
the difference in strategic aims but undoubtedly in the concrete
objectives, methods and ways of struggle. We are sure that
mainly the latest peace iniciatives of the socialist countries
show clearly that it would be senseless to try to orientate
here masses against their governements. By the way, public
opinion in the CSSR considers the main feature in the foreign
policy of the USSR to be the effort to keep peace and reach
disarmament and 89% of our people think it is important
for Czechoslovakia to support actively Soviet foreign policy.

Nevertheless this doesn't mean that the peace movement in Czechoslovakia couldn't be less official and officious. There should be more spontaneity, more activating actions for young people especially, manifstations, rock-for-peace concerts etc.

Another important topic of the surveys of our Institute is a question aiming at what ways the socialist countries should use to turn off the danger of a new world war. Many theories and practical measures are known : an idea proposed by the military-industrial complex that the most reliable defence against war are still more accomplished and more effective weapons, equilibrium conceptions with gradual lowering of the quantity of weapons, and somewhat irealistic notion of the possibilities of a single-side disarmament. The survey showed that 70% od the Czechoslovak people hold for the right way stepwise disarmament with military equilibrium at any stage of this process, that means they support the way proposed by socialist countries. 14% think it would be possible to start disarmament by destroying all weapons on our side first. Other opinions are very rare, for example 2% of our people said it would be correct in an appropriate moment to destroy the enemy - this we consider as an expression of militeristic way of thinking, another relict of the past. But the low frequency of this opinion shows it is not so bad with people in Czechoslovakia.

Even this shows that the attempts to constitue an "Opposite peace movement" in Czechoslovakia are entirely senseless. Such a movement could hardly find a social foundation in our country, too. Even the leading religious personalities acknowledge and support the peaceful orientation of the foreign policy of our governement. Soon after the World

Assembly for Peace, against Nuclear War, Prague 1983
declared a summit of dignitaries, clericals and theologians
of all religions in Czechoslovakia : "We support our government
that expresses the will of our people and in foreign policy
pleads for peaceful common life of countries"*6/.*

No important response awaked among Czechoslovak people
the campaign orientated ageginst "raising military expenditures
in socialist countries", that should, according to some
people in the West, prepare the ground for effective
functioning of the conceptions of economic exhaustion.
Psychological war is in this part based explicitly on the
secret directive No. 75 of Ronald Reagan,1984, where the
following aim was formulated :" ... to support from abroad
the population in raising still greater requirements in
standard of living", so that socialist countries could spend
more money on defence "only at the price of mass dissatisfaction
of the population ".

We do not want to say that the inhabitants of the CSSR
welcome the forced raising of military expenses by clapping
hands, but a 1985-survey showed, that about two third of
our population agree with the idea that it is necessary to
secure the defence of Czechoslovakia even at higher expenditures,
only 25% have the opposite opinion. People find economic growth
to be one of the most important ways to defend our republic.
After all, when we asked respondents whether and how they
contribute to keeping peace, 95% answered :"I do it by my
good work". In this place we should mention that in the
discussions in the 1st Symposium in Linowsee,1984, it was
often stressed that the substantial difference between the ways
of existence of peace movement in the socialist and capitalist

countries is into what extent and in what manner it includes
work as creation of material values on one hand and political
manifestation - both supportive and protesting - on the other
hand.

Some different aspects as to how the people can fight
for peace in well developed socialist and capitalist countries
can admit only that man, who does not in advance and in spite
of any argumentation see in the socialist countries "the empire
of evil", who is prepared to accept the fact, that socialist
countries want peace and fight for it. The people in CSSR
are persuaded that it is the case - only 1% of them believe
that socialism could grow even if peace is not kept.

The supports of foreign policy of socialist countries
is reflected also in the opinion on the role of major pacts -
Warsaw pact and NATO. Of several possibilites of answers in
our survey 73% of respondents choose that one expressing
that the activity of Warsaw Pact contributes to keeping peace
and that of NATO does not. Only 6% judge that none of these
two organisations contributes to keeping peace, *10% that both are keeping peace and 1% says "War" no, NATO "yes".*

At the same time steadily grows the percentage of people
realizing the existing strategic equilibrium between Warsaw
Pact and NATO /from 48% in 1965 to 57% in 1985/ and lowers
the percentage of the opinion that socialist countries have
more weapons and soldiers /from 29% in 1965 to 11% in 1985/. *x)*

Graph 1        Development of opinion *on relation* of military power
               between socialist and capitalist countries

               /Czechoslovak population 15 years and older in %/

1965   1979   1980   1981   1985

Capitalist countries
have more military
power

There is an equi-
librium

Socialist countries
have more military
power

Don`t
know

1965          1979          1980          1981          1985



Capitalist countries          There is an equi-          Socialist          Don't know
have more military            librium                    countries
power                                                    have more
                                                         military
                                                         power

57% of the Czechoslovak population express the opinion
that there exist an equilibrium. This fact has been supported
also by some studies of several research institues from both
Western and Eastern countries. The results of our surveys
show that in our country have doubt about the equilibrium
mostly people with the lowest grade of education, which is
probably the case in other countries,too.

But what we want is not an equilibrium - we want no war
and no weapons in the future. This tendency forms the foundation
of the Soviet peace iniciatives of the latest years and we
think that any man in Czechoslovakia would say he accepts it.
If the peace movement succeeds to force also the governments
in the West-European countries and USA to judge in a similarly
reasonable way, we could really live to substantial changes,

more quiet and security within a measurable space of time.
But it is necessary to convince each other still more thoroughly
of the mass character of willing peace, of its reality,
to convince each other that what one says are not only
sayings and slogans. So to say, it is necessary to reach
junction of peace movements in separate countries into a really
world-wide movement. The task is to persuade people i Federal
Republic of Germany, for instance, that Czech and Slovak people
do not intend to assault them and at the same time to convince
the people in Czechoslovakia that peace movement in the West
shall never allow anybody of the hawks to press the very
button.

It is important to support so called "citizen diplomacy"
more then ever before - contacts not only of officials, but
contacts of ordinary people, mainly youth. We mean
the real knowledge of life and thinking of a Czech Novék
family, English Smiths, French family of Dubois or Blot,
Otto Normalverbraucher´s family, Soviet family Ivanovych.
At present, we try to support in Czechoslovakia the idea that
for such learning the few-day trips are insufficient. Young
people should learn each other in common work, visit the
families, learn the life conditions and objectives, systems
of values and aspirations. Viewing shop windows, sightseeing
and visiting entertainments could be at the first sight most
attractive, but also highly misleading.

We think this does apply for young people from the
whole world, not only for the youngsters from the East.
According to our experience the same problem of the misleading
character of too short turistic trips does apply for the
young people from the West.

Should sociology say a word to this problem ? We think
it should, we think there are even new possibilities for
sociology to contribute to the struggle for peace, possibilities
closely connected with the struggle against social pessimism,
against doubting the possibility of disarmament.

Sociology should support the exchange of information
about the life in other countries, supplement these information
with the scientific facts about traditions, actual conditions
of life, about the way of thinking, aims, wishes and hopes.
But we would like to stress and underline the words "objective
scientific information". We are not talking about the exchange
of information adjusted for propaganda, adjusted to the wished
"picture of enemy". This task is a very difficult one for
sociology and sociologists from both sides, as there are
systems of propaganda functioning in a traditional manner
and a system of psychological war against socialist countries
which tries to misuse sociological objective-like information.

Yet we see this task - to support and supplement the exchange
of objective information about real life of plain people as
a very important one. It is one of the ways the "new thinking"
could became a real force.

Remarks

1/ Gromyko,A - Lomejkin,V : Novoye mysleniye v yadernoy ere
   / New thinking in nuclear weapon era/ Nauka, Moscow 1985

2/ See e.g. Weidig,R.- Winkler,G.: Soziologie und Frieden .
   In: Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1986
   Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1986

3/ Schmidt,M.-Schwarz,W: Frieden und Sicherheit im nuclear-
   kosmischen Zeitalter
   IPW Berichte, 9/1986 S.1-12. 10/1986 S. 1-9

4/ In the terminology of psychological war the meaning of
   the word "independent" in this connection is identified
   with "Aanti-governmental"

5/ Kuhrig,H.: Zum sozialen Profil der Friedensbewegung.
   In: Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1986
   Akaderie-Verlag Berlin 1986

6/ Černý,P , ed.: Válka, mír a náboženství
   / War, peace and religion/
   Horizont, Prague 1986

7/ Compare to : The military balance 1982-1983
   London 1983

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Finland

FINNISH PUBLIC OPINION AND PEACE MOVEMENT

> A paper to be presented in the conference
> on the study of peace movement, organized
> by IPRA Study Group on peace movement &
> Lund University Peace Research Institute,
>
> at Hotel Sparta, Lund, Sweden,
> 17-20, August 1987

## 1. What is 'peace movement'

It seems that most often the term 'peace movement', whether
referring to the old or new one, is used to refer to various
salient activities intended to promote peace or some related
cause, against nuclear weapons, atomic tests, wars, interventions,
etc. The rises and falls of 'peace movements' then often seem
to reflect the developments of international atmosphere;
when there are some alarming tendencies (Vietnam war, neutron
bomb, double-track decision), peace movements rise, mass
demonstrations  mobilize people and peace organizations get
new members, etc. When the critical situation is over, peace
movements seem to lose their momentum, participants, members, etc.
This wave-like motion of mobilization and demobilization  is
considered to be the 'peace movement' both by mass media and by
researchers. I would prefer to call that phenomenon as a
situationally conditioned or oriented peace movement. It is
important that such mobilization takes place at critical times,
because then peace movement can really exert pressure on decision-
makers on the particular issues. However, there is another layer
in peace movement which one might call structurally oriented.
Its activities may not be as salient as marches and demonstrations,
but there are actions going on all time and taking various forms and
the participants feel that their action promotes peace, inter-
national understanding, etc. Some part of this permanent activity
takes place in the peace organizations proper, but also elsewhere.
And this kind of peace actions are needed as long as there are
wars, oppression and wrongs in the world, as Bertrand Russell
stated.

And finally there is a third layer, also part of peace movement, although on many occasions latent, and that is the general over-all will for peace. This is, I believe in most societies wide-spread though often ambiguous, but it creates the basis for the mobilization of public opinion in critical situations. From this perspective, peace movement should not be equated with organizations or the most salient manifestations, but rather - as a Finnish activist Ilkka Taipale often says - peace movement should be seen as 'a movement of consciousness'. It is channelled through very many organizations and forms of actions. Perhaps this conceptualization of 'peace movement' could be visualized by the following scheme:

situationally
mobilized

structurally oriented
movement, core activists

will   for peace,
latent support,
sympathy, etc.

## 2.   Finnish data

Two years ago TAPRI carried out a nation-wide survey by mail, exploring the peace thinking of Finns, through a representative sample of the population. One section dealt with values, wishes and fears, one with peace conceptions mainly with the same questions that were used in the Images of the world in the year 2000 study fifteen years ago, one with attitudes towards peace movement and finally one section with information related to peace issues. Finnish public opinion is mainly described here with these data. There is not much time-series data available, except on some single aspects.

The starting point is that 'peace' ranks highest among hopes
concerning the world  measured with an open-ended question)
and among personal values (measured with structured question,
providing twelve values in alphabetical order). The distance
to the second hope and value is considerable. (See Tables 1 and 2).
On the other hand, among the factors threatening the future of
mankind, war, armaments and nuclear weapons particularly were
considered as the most serious riks, again the second danger
(pollution) mentioned in an open-ended  question less than half
as often.(Table 3). The probability of nuclear war by the year
2000 was considered _ ·'more than fifty-fifty by a notable part
of population (Table 4) and the possibility of Finland remaining
outside of a great power war as non-existent by the majority
(Table 5).

This badground of a will for peace, and fear of war then creates
background for the question, explicitly put in the survey, how
the respondents feel the security of citizens can best be improved..
Twelve proposals    picked from public discussion were given
in alphabetical order, each with four alternatives. Table 6
gives the results, the proposals ranked according to their
popularity. It is significant that immediately after 'active
foreign policy' (state level behaviour) come activities in the
friendship associations and citizens peace action (i.e. level
of popular, non-governmental, individual). Civilian-type alter-
natives enjoy wide-spread support, whereas militarily-flavoured
activities  are fairly unpopular as means of improving security.

In another survey, conducted in Helsinki last year, there was
a question as to what degree various organizations promote peace;
ten alternatives were given. Red Cross, friendship associations,
Amnesty International and peace organizations - in this order -
enjoyed greatest support, political parties the least. Very
clearly, Finns do think that peace is promoted by a variety of
different organizations and activities, and not only by the
peace organizations in the narrow sense. (Table 7)

The overall peace thinking of Finns, analyzed by the same 25
question battery as in the Images of the year 2000, plus three
new ones (the influence of neutral and non-aligned countries
to be increased; more peace research; demonstrations against
arms race) is given in Tables 8.1-8.30, but not analyzed here
in detail. The new proposals rank all fairly high: peace research
as the eight, neutrality and non-alignment as the eleventh and
demonstrations as the fourteenth  (Table 8.29), peace research
being regarded by six per cent as the most important single
proposal (Table 8.30). A notable feature is - although the
populations studied were not directly comparable as the Image
2000 data (collected in 1968) consisted only of those aged 15-40 -
the unchangeability of the rank of popularity of peace proposals
(Spearmans rank correlation 0.89, when proposals ranked according
to share of 'agree'-answers).

As comes to public opinion about the peace demonstrations,
about a tenth of respondents tell they have participated themselves
and a third that they are ready to participate in principle.The
most common attitude seems to be some kind of benevolent indiffer-
ence (may be necessary, but not willing to participate oneself),
whereas an openly negative attitude is rather low - but for men,
double the share of those who have participated. (Table 9.1).
Most Finns believe that it is possible to influence by peace
marches and demonstrations on arms reductions: one out of ten
considers the potential influence as significant, but about
two out of three are less optimistic,     yet positive (Table 9.2).

A series of questions (five negatively, five positively formulated
statements) were  given and the respondents were asked to
express either their agreement or disagreement with the statements.
Very briefly summarized I think the distributions of answers
reflect a fairly positive attitude towards peace movement. The
openly negative evaluations are shared by a very clear minority,
but there are still manifestations of scepticism in some issues.
(Tables 10.1.-10.10.)

As sources of information about peace issues and peace movement,
TV and newspapers are mentioned most frequently (and their

performance has in other studies pointed out to be less than satisfactory). Yet, people seem to have received quite a lot of information quite recently and they also say to have thought and discussed these issued quite often (though there are lots of those who do not say to have discussed them at all). It is remarkable that there are      more of those who never discuss peace activities than those who never discuss the possibility of war. (Tables 11.1-11.5.)

3.   Conclusions

According to this survey there is a strong popular will for peace in Finland, a fairly positive attitude towards peace movement, quite a lot of readiness to participate in its activities, but some scepticism and negative opinions as well. In principle, one could say there is much potential for peace mobilization, but at the same time one should note that Finns do consider very many different types of organizations and activities as peace-promoting (and that they undoubtedly also participate in these) so all of the potential energy is not and will not be channelled through the 'peace organizations proper' only.

APPENDICES

Table 1.   What kind of a world ten years from now. Hopes by
           sex (open ended question)

|  | Women | Men | All | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| peace, no war | 78 | 73 | 76 | (713) |
| no hunger | 37 | 25 | 32 | (297) |
| equality, just distribution of income, no underdevelopment | 23 | 21 | 22 | (207) |
| states in friendship and in co-operation | 16 | 17 | 16 | (154) |
| no pollution | 15 | 11 | 13 | (126) |
| disarmament, no nuclear weapons, less armaments | 10 | 10 | 10 | (97) |
| more love, understanding, trust, friendship between human beings | 9 | 5 | 8 | (71) |
| general welfare | 7 | 7 | 7 | (64) |
| no unemployment | 8 | 4 | 6 | (57) |
| a general wish concerning political affairs in the world | 3 | 5 | 4 | (35) |
| population problem solved | 2 | 2 | 2 | (20) |
| illnesses overcome | 2 | 2 | 2 | (20) |
| no social problems (drugs, crime, violence, terrorism) | 2 | 1 | 2 | (18) |
| a wish related to technology/ science | 2 | 2 | 2 | (17) |
| sufficient energy resources | 1 | 1 | 1 | (8) |
| a wish related to culture/arts | 1 | 1 | 1 | (7) |
| | N = 529 | 409 | 938 | |

Table 2.      The most important and the least important values

| Value | | The most important value | | | The least important value | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Women % | Men % | All % | Women % | Men % | All % |
| 7. | Peace | 38 | 30 | 34 | – | 0 | 0 |
| 10. | Health | 18 | 24 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 5. | Independence of our country | 10 | 16 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8. | Saving one's soul | 12 | 6 | 9 | 26 | 37 | 31 |
| 3. | Positive human relations | 5 | 6 | 5 | – | 0 | 0 |
| 6. | Abolishing hunger from the world | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2. | Good standard of living | 3 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 7 |
| 4. | Unpolluted nature | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 12. | Freedom | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 11. | Full employment | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 9. | Equality between all human beings | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| 1. | To accomplish something significant | 1 | 1 | 1 | 58 | 46 | 53 |

|                        | 100          | 100          |
|                        | N = 1079     | N = 1008     |

Table 3.        Factors threatening the future of mankind

|  | Women | Men | All | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| war, armaments, nuclear weapons | 84 | 73 | 79 | (815) |
| pollution | 39 | 34 | 37 | (379) |
| international conflicts, great power relations | 11 | 18 | 14 | (143) |
| problems of the developing countries, hunger poverty | 11 | 10 | 11 | (111) |
| human characteristics (jealousy, greed, immorality) | 11 | 9 | 10 | (106) |
| end of natural resources | 6 | 5 | 6 | (57) |
| the qualities of leaders (lust for power, bad politicians) | 5 | 6 | 5 | (56) |
| overpopulation | 4 | 4 | 4 | (41) |
| oppression, exploitation, imperialism, inequality | 3 | 3 | 3 | (32) |
| problems of modern society | 3 | 2 | 3 | (29) |
| social problems | 2 | 1 | 2 | (19) |
| socialism | 0 | 3 | 2 | (19) |
| unempoloyment | 1 | 2 | 2 | (16) |
| diseases | 2 | – | 1 | (12) |
| capitalism | 1 | 1 | 1 | (10) |
|  | N = 572 | 461 | 1033 | |

Table 4: The probability of nuclear war by the year 2000.

|                  | Women | Men | All |
|------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| quite improbable | 10    | 16  | 12  |
| rather improbable| 42    | 48  | 45  |
| fifty-fifty      | 34    | 21  | 28  |
| rather probable  | 14    | 14  | 14  |
| certain          | 1     | 1   | 1   |
|                  | 100   | 100 | 100 |
|                  | N = 590 | 478 | 1068 |

|                  | 15 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 39 | 40 - 49 | 50 - 59 | 60 - 69 | 70 - 74 | All |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|
| quite improbable | 9    | 5    | 6    | 15   | 20   | 18   | 24   | 12  |
| rather improbable| 40   | 40   | 52   | 46   | 41   | 48   | 40   | 44  |
| fifty-fifty      | 34   | 37   | 30   | 23   | 23   | 19   | 21   | 28  |
| rather probable  | 16   | 15   | 11   | 16   | 15   | 13   | 9    | 14  |
| certain          | -    | 2    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    | 6    | 1   |
|                  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100 |
|                  | N = 122 | 213  | 203  | 163  | 168  | 134  | 63   | 1066 |

|                  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|------------------|-----------|--------|--------|-----|
| quite improbable | 13        | 12     | 12     | 12  |
| rather improbable| 38        | 45     | 52     | 45  |
| fifty-fifty      | 31        | 27     | 24     | 28  |
| rather probable  | 16        | 14     | 11     | 14  |
| certain          | 2         | 1      | 1      | 1   |
|                  | 100       | 100    | 100    | 100 |
|                  | N = 309   | 579    | 180    | 1068 |

Table 5. Is it possible for Finland to remain outside of a great power war

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| no | 51 | 53 | 52 |
| yes | 23 | 30 | 26 |
| VK | 26 | 17 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 599 | 485 | 1084 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| no | 63 | 61 | 58 | 52 | 41 | 36 | 37 | 52 |
| yes | 17 | 17 | 23 | 30 | 36 | 30 | 36 | 26 |
| VK | 20 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 23 | 34 | 27 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 122 | 214 | 207 | 164 | 172 | 139 | 64 | 1082 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| no | 43 | 55 | 56 | 52 |
| yes | 27 | 25 | 28 | 26 |
| VK | 29 | 20 | 17 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 317 | 586 | 181 | 1084 |

Table 6.        How to improve citizens' security

|  | very much | some-what | not at all | rather the opposite way |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active foreign policy | 63 | 33 | 3 | 1 |
| Friendship societies | 40 | 48 | 11 | 1 |
| Peace action of citizens | 36 | 50 | 13 | 1 |
| Increase women's share in decisionmaking | 33 | 47 | 18 | 2 |
| Improve civil defence | 35 | 45 | 17 | 3 |
| Start disarmament | 44 | 28 | 17 | 11 |
| Activity of the reservists | 10 | 41 | 41 | 8 |
| Increase defence spending | 11 | 33 | 41 | 15 |
| To put more emphasis on non-military resistance | 9 | 28 | 51 | 12 |
| To lengthen conscripts service time | 5 | 19 | 66 | 10 |
| Womens conscription | 2 | 13 | 64 | 21 |
| To join a military alliance | 2 | 9 | 41 | 48 |

Table 7.    The impact of some organizations, associations and groupings on peace promotion (Helsinki 1986) (%)

| | Impact on peace promotion | | | | | $\bar{x}$ (1-4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | DK, | |
| | Harmful | No impact | Promotes to some degree | Promotes very much | no answer | |
| Red Cross | - | 5 | 39 | 56 | - | 3.51 |
| Friendship associations | - | 5 | 41 | 51 | 3 | 3.48 |
| Amnesty International | - | 3 | 43 | 46 | 7 | 3.45 |
| Peace organizations | - | 5 | 44 | 49 | 2 | 3.44 |
| Defence organizations | 5 | 18 | 49 | 23 | 5 | 2.93 |
| Church and religious groupings | 4 | 20 | 57 | 16 | 2 | 2.87 |
| Ecological organizations | - | 26 | 54 | 12 | 7 | 2.84 |
| Trade union movement | 1 | 31 | 53 | 10 | 5 | 2.75 |
| So-called %-movement | - | 28 | 43 | 8 | 21 | 2.75 |
| Parties | 6 | 44 | 36 | 7 | 7 | 2.49 |

N = 248

Table 8.1.       People should become more religious all over the world

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree |     | N    |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|
| SEX    | Women     | 26    | 27        | 47       | 100 | 561  |
|        | Men       | 17    | 25        | 58       | 100 | 470  |
|        | 15-19     | 8     | 28        | 64       | 100 | 121  |
|        | 20-29     | 10    | 27        | 63       | 100 | 210  |
|        | 30-39     | 8     | 27        | 65       | 100 | 200  |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 25    | 24        | 51       | 100 | 160  |
|        | 50-59     | 37    | 21        | 42       | 100 | 164  |
|        | 60-69     | 38    | 35        | 27       | 100 | 123  |
|        | 70-74     | 55    | 18        | 27       | 100 | 51   |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 34 | 30 | 36 | 100 | 288 |
|        | middle    | 19    | 26        | 55       | 100 | 564  |
|        | center    | 10    | 22        | 68       | 100 | 179  |
|        | All       | 22    | 26        | 52       | 100 | 1031 |

Table 8.2.       Start with the individual and make him less aggressive

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree |     | N    |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|
| SEX    | Women     | 71    | 18        | 11       | 100 | 555  |
|        | Men       | 66    | 22        | 12       | 100 | 462  |
|        | 15-19     | 45    | 33        | 22       | 100 | 121  |
|        | 20-29     | 63    | 21        | 15       | 100 | 210  |
|        | 30-39     | 67    | 17        | 17       | 100 | 199  |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 78    | 15        | 8        | 100 | 157  |
|        | 50-59     | 76    | 18        | 6        | 100 | 158  |
|        | 60-69     | 76    | 20        | 4        | 100 | 122  |
|        | 70-74     | 88    | 10        | 2        | 100 | 48   |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 67 | 21 | 12 | 100 | 277 |
|        | middle    | 69    | 19        | 11       | 100 | 562  |
|        | center    | 70    | 17        | 12       | 100 | 178  |
|        | All       | 69    | 19        | 12       | 100 | 1017 |

| Table 8.3. | | Create more peaceful relations in the family, at school and at work | | | | |
|------------|----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|
| SEX | Women | 90 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 568 |
| | Men | 84 | 11 | 5 | 100 | 467 |
| | 15-19 | 76 | 17 | 7 | 100 | 120 |
| | 20-29 | 88 | 9 | 3 | 100 | 212 |
| | 30-39 | 86 | 9 | 5 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 89 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 161 |
| | 50-59 | 89 | 8 | 3 | 100 | 158 |
| | 60-69 | 92 | 7 | 1 | 100 | 131 |
| | 70-74 | 96 | 2 | 2 | 100 | 52 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 89 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 289 |
| | middle | 88 | 9 | 3 | 100 | 568 |
| | center | 83 | 12 | 5 | 100 | 178 |
| | All | 88 | 9 | 3 | 100 | 1035 |

| Table 8.4. | | The colonial system should be abolished all over the world | | | | |
|------------|----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|
| SEX | Women | 49 | 44 | 7 | 100 | 537 |
| | Men | 57 | 32 | 10 | 100 | 457 |
| | 15-19 | 42 | 50 | 8 | 100 | 118 |
| | 20-29 | 47 | 42 | 11 | 100 | 203 |
| | 30-39 | 53 | 38 | 9 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 57 | 36 | 7 | 100 | 155 |
| | 50-59 | 59 | 34 | 7 | 100 | 155 |
| | 60-69 | 63 | 31 | 6 | 100 | 119 |
| | 70-74 | 56 | 35 | 9 | 100 | 43 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 48 | 46 | 6 | 100 | 268 |
| | middle | 53 | 38 | 8 | 100 | 549 |
| | center | 60 | 28 | 12 | 100 | 177 |
| | All | 53 | 38 | 9 | 100 | 994 |

Table 8.5.      Hunger and poverty should be abolished all over the world

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|------|------|
| SEX    | Women     | 83    | 13        | 4        | 100  | 556  |
|        | Men       | 80    | 15        | 5        | 100  | 466  |
|        | 15-19     | 81    | 9         | 10       | 100  | 120  |
|        | 20-29     | 79    | 15        | 6        | 100  | 209  |
|        | 30-39     | 83    | 14        | 3        | 100  | 200  |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 83    | 12        | 5        | 100  | 157  |
|        | 50-59     | 83    | 15        | 2        | 100  | 159  |
|        | 60-69     | 84    | 14        | 2        | 100  | 126  |
|        | 70-74     | 82    | 16        | 2        | 100  | 49   |
| SOCIAL | periphery | 84    | 12        | 4        | 100  | 284  |
|        | middle    | 82    | 14        | 4        | 100  | 562  |
| POSITION | center  | 79    | 14        | 7        | 100  | 176  |
|        | All       | 82    | 13        | 5        | 100  | 1022 |

Table 8.6.      It should be possible for people freely to choose their governments all over the world

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|------|------|
| SEX    | Women     | 75    | 20        | 5        | 100  | 556  |
|        | Men       | 84    | 13        | 3        | 100  | 472  |
|        | 15-19     | 64    | 27        | 9        | 100  | 119  |
|        | 20-29     | 76    | 20        | 4        | 100  | 210  |
|        | 30-39     | 82    | 15        | 3        | 100  | 200  |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 82    | 14        | 4        | 100  | 158  |
|        | 50-59     | 83    | 15        | 2        | 100  | 162  |
|        | 60-69     | 86    | 12        | 2        | 100  | 129  |
|        | 70-74     | 77    | 23        | -        | 100  | 48   |
| SOCIAL | periphery | 73    | 22        | 5        | 100  | 283  |
|        | middle    | 82    | 15        | 3        | 100  | 566  |
| POSITION | center  | 79    | 16        | 5        | 100  | 179  |
|        | All       | 79    | 17        | 4        | 100  | 1028 |

Table 8.7.    All countries should stop completely intervening in the internal affairs of other countries

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 84 | 12 | 4 | 100 | 568 |
| | Men | 86 | 9 | 5 | 100 | 473 |
| | 15-19 | 74 | 19 | 7 | 100 | 121 |
| | 20-29 | 80 | 11 | 9 | 100 | 210 |
| | 30-39 | 83 | 11 | 6 | 100 | 201 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 87 | 12 | 1 | 100 | 159 |
| | 50-59 | 90 | 7 | 3 | 100 | 163 |
| | 60-69 | 95 | 5 | – | 100 | 132 |
| | 70-74 | 94 | 2 | 4 | 100 | 53 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 86 | 10 | 4 | 100 | 289 |
| | middle | 84 | 11 | 5 | 100 | 574 |
| | center | 86 | 10 | 4 | 100 | 178 |
| | All | 85 | 10 | 5 | 100 | 1041 |

Table 8.8.    Countries should politically, economically and socially be more similar to each other than today

| | | agree | uncertain | disargree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 26 | 35 | 39 | 100 | 542 |
| | Men | 30 | 31 | 39 | 100 | 459 |
| | 15-19 | 19 | 36 | 45 | 100 | 121 |
| | 20-29 | 22 | 37 | 41 | 100 | 206 |
| | 30-39 | 26 | 28 | 46 | 100 | 200 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 30 | 28 | 42 | 100 | 156 |
| | 50-59 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 100 | 156 |
| | 60-69 | 38 | 38 | 24 | 100 | 114 |
| | 70-74 | 37 | 41 | 22 | 100 | 46 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 30 | 39 | 31 | 100 | 268 |
| | middle | 28 | 33 | 39 | 100 | 557 |
| | center | 24 | 24 | 52 | 100 | 176 |
| | All | 28 | 33 | 39 | 100 | 1001 |

Table 8.9.    An economy based mainly on private ownership should be introduced all over the world

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 23 | 41 | 36 | 100 | 543 |
| | Men | 29 | 36 | 35 | 100 | 462 |
| | 15-19 | 16 | 45 | 39 | 100 | 117 |
| | 20-29 | 21 | 40 | 39 | 100 | 208 |
| | 30-39 | 19 | 37 | 44 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 25 | 39 | 36 | 100 | 154 |
| | 50-59 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 100 | 157 |
| | 60-69 | 35 | 42 | 23 | 100 | 119 |
| | 70-74 | 43 | 33 | 24 | 100 | 49 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 33 | 36 | 31 | 100 | 273 |
| | middle | 23 | 41 | 36 | 100 | 555 |
| | center | 23 | 34 | 43 | 100 | 177 |
| | All | 25 | 39 | 36 | 100 | 1005 |

Table 8.10.    Developed countries should give more technical assistance to developing countries than they do today

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 80 | 16 | 4 | 100 | 552 |
| | Men | 81 | 15 | 4 | 100 | 471 |
| | 15-19 | 78 | 15 | 7 | 100 | 120 |
| | 20-29 | 76 | 18 | 6 | 100 | 209 |
| | 30-39 | 80 | 16 | 4 | 100 | 202 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 85 | 10 | 5 | 100 | 156 |
| | 50-59 | 80 | 18 | 2 | 100 | 160 |
| | 60-69 | 81 | 18 | 1 | 100 | 123 |
| | 70-74 | 88 | 8 | 4 | 100 | 51 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 84 | 14 | 2 | 100 | 284 |
| | middle | 79 | 16 | 5 | 100 | 560 |
| | center | 80 | 17 | 3 | 100 | 179 |
| | All | 80 | 16 | 4 | 100 | 1023 |

Table 8.11. An economy based mainly public ownership should be introduced all over the world

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 12 | 38 | 50 | 100 | 543 |
|  | Men | 16 | 33 | 51 | 100 | 452 |
|  | 15-19 | 16 | 45 | 39 | 100 | 118 |
|  | 20-29 | 11 | 34 | 55 | 100 | 204 |
|  | 30-39 | 9 | 27 | 64 | 100 | 200 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 10 | 38 | 52 | 100 | 154 |
|  | 50-59 | 16 | 43 | 41 | 100 | 153 |
|  | 60-69 | 23 | 39 | 38 | 100 | 118 |
|  | 70-74 | 22 | 28 | 50 | 100 | 46 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 21 | 39 | 40 | 100 | 271 |
|  | middle | 13 | 37 | 50 | 100 | 547 |
|  | center | 6 | 29 | 65 | 100 | 177 |
|  | All | 14 | 36 | 50 | 100 | 995 |

Table 8.12. The gap between poor and rich countries should disappear

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 79 | 18 | 3 | 100 | 545 |
|  | Men | 74 | 20 | 6 | 100 | 460 |
|  | 15-19 | 80 | 11 | 9 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 78 | 18 | 4 | 100 | 208 |
|  | 30-39 | 78 | 18 | 4 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 75 | 21 | 4 | 100 | 158 |
|  | 50-59 | 76 | 21 | 3 | 100 | 155 |
|  | 60-69 | 76 | 22 | 2 | 100 | 118 |
|  | 70-74 | 70 | 25 | 5 | 100 | 44 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 76 | 21 | 3 | 100 | 276 |
|  | middle | 79 | 17 | 4 | 100 | 554 |
|  | center | 72 | 22 | 6 | 100 | 175 |
|  | All | 77 | 19 | 4 | 100 | 1005 |

Table 8.13.     An economy based on a mixture of private and public ownership
                should be introduced all over the world

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|-----|
| SEX    | Women     | 37    | 44        | 19       | 100 | 533 |
|        | Men       | 38    | 40        | 22       | 100 | 451 |
|        | 15-19     | 35    | 47        | 18 ·     | 100 | 117 |
|        | 20-29     | 33    | 47        | 20       | 100 | 204 |
|        | 30-39     | 32    | 43        | 25       | 100 | 199 |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 37    | 42        | 21       | 100 | 151 |
|        | 50-59     | 38    | 40        | 22       | 100 | 150 |
|        | 60-69     | 46    | 41        | 13       | 100 | 118 |
|        | 70-74     | 58    | 21        | 21       | 100 | 43  |
|        | periphery | 41    | 43        | 16       | 100 | 268 |
| SOCIAL | middle    | 35    | 44        | 21       | 100 | 541 |
| POSITION | center  | 38    | 39        | 23       | 100 | 175 |
|        | All       | 37    | 43        | 20       | 100 | 984 |

Table 8.14.     Countries should be members of military alliances so that no
                country or group of countries dare attack others

|        |           | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|--------|-----------|-------|-----------|----------|-----|------|
| SEX    | Women     | 20    | 31        | 49       | 100 | 541  |
|        | Men       | 15    | 19        | 66       | 100 | 459  |
|        | 15-19     | 9     | 23        | 68       | 100 | 118  |
|        | 20-29     | 11    | 26        | 63       | 100 | 205  |
|        | 30-39     | 7     | 23        | 70       | 100 | 199  |
| AGE    | 40-49     | 21    | 21        | 58       | 100 | 155  |
|        | 50-59     | 26    | 29        | 45       | 100 | 154  |
|        | 60-69     | 34    | 34        | 33       | 100 | 122  |
|        | 70-74     | 35    | 27        | 38       | 100 | 45   |
|        | periphery | 26    | 29        | 45       | 100 | 270  |
| SOCIAL | middle    | 16    | 26        | 58       | 100 | 554  |
| POSITION | center  | 10    | 20        | 70       | 100 | 176  |
|        | All       | 18    | 25        | 57       | 100 | 1000 |

Table 8.15.    We should have general and complete disarmament as soon as possible

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 81 | 14 | 5 | 100 | 555 |
|  | Men | 74 | 19 | 7 | 100 | 464 |
|  | 15-19 | 82 | 12 | 6 | 100 | 119 |
|  | 20-29 | 80 | 13 | 7 | 100 | 210 |
|  | 30-39 | 77 | 18 | 5 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 77 | 16 | 7 | 100 | 158 |
|  | 50-59 | 76 | 20 | 4 | 100 | 158 |
|  | 60-69 | 77 | 20 | 3 | 100 | 123 |
|  | 70-74 | 72 | 20 | 8 | 100 | 50 |
|  | periphery | 81 | 15 | 4 | 100 | 282 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 78 | 16 | 6 | 100 | 561 |
| POSITION | center | 73 | 19 | 8 | 100 | 176 |
|  | All | 78 | 16 | 6 | 100 | 1019 |

Table 8.16.    Countries should withdraw from military alliances

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 41 | 47 | 12 | 100 | 529 |
|  | Men | 45 | 39 | 16 | 100 | 453 |
|  | 15-19 | 42 | 40 | 18 | 100 | 120 |
|  | 20-29 | 41 | 41 | 18 | 100 | 205 |
|  | 30-39 | 45 | 42 | 13 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 42 | 44 | 14 | 100 | 154 |
|  | 50-59 | 45 | 46 | 9 | 100 | 147 |
|  | 60-69 | 44 | 49 | 7 | 100 | 110 |
|  | 70-74 | 47 | 40 | 13 | 100 | 45 |
|  | periphery | 39 | 49 | 12 | 100 | 261 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 44 | 42 | 14 | 100 | 548 |
| POSITION | center | 45 | 39 | 16 | 100 | 173 |
|  | All | 43 | 43 | 14 | 100 | 982 |

Table 8.17.    Countries should keep national armies

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 46 | 38 | 16 | 100 | 533 |
|  | Men | 56 | 27 | 17 | 100 | 448 |
| AGE | 15-19 | 43 | 34 | 23 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 37 | 39 | 24 | 100 | 202 |
|  | 30-39 | 50 | 33 | 17 | 100 | 199 |
|  | 40-49 | 53 | 33 | 14 | 100 | 153 |
|  | 50-59 | 64 | 25 | 11 | 100 | 149 |
|  | 60-69 | 57 | 33 | 10 | 100 | 115 |
|  | 70-74 | 65 | 23 | 12 | 100 | 40 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 49 | 37 | 14 | 100 | 266 |
|  | middle | 49 | 33 | 18 | 100 | 541 |
|  | center | 56 | 28 | 16 | 100 | 174 |
|  | All | 50 | 33 | 17 | 100 | 981 |

Table 8.18.    Countries should have less to do with each other and become more self-sufficient

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 10 | 18 | 72 | 100 | 540 |
|  | Men | 9 | 14 | 77 | 100 | 453 |
| AGE | 15-19 | 8 | 15 | 77 | 100 | 119 |
|  | 20-29 | 9 | 14 | 77 | 100 | 207 |
|  | 30-39 | 5 | 14 | 81 | 100 | 200 |
|  | 40-49 | 10 | 13 | 77 | 100 | 155 |
|  | 50-59 | 13 | 19 | 69 | 100 | 150 |
|  | 60-69 | 10 | 24 | 66 | 100 | 115 |
|  | 70-74 | 22 | 22 | 56 | 100 | 45 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 10 | 22 | 68 | 100 | 263 |
|  | middle | 11 | 15 | 74 | 100 | 551 |
|  | center | 4 | 10 | 86 | 100 | 179 |
|  | All | 9 | 16 | 75 | 100 | 993 |

Table 8.19.    We should have increased trade, exchange and cooperation, also between countries that are not on friendly terms

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 88 | 10 | 2 | 100 | 550 |
|  | Men | 89 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 465 |
|  | 15-19 | 82 | 17 | 1 | 100 | 119 |
|  | 20-29 | 89 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 209 |
|  | 30-39 | 91 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 201 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 89 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 50-59 | 87 | 11 | 2 | 100 | 159 |
|  | 60-69 | 89 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 123 |
|  | 70-74 | 91 | 7 | 2 | 100 | 45 |
|  | periphery | 86 | 13 | 1 | 100 | 273 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 89 | 9 | 2 | 100 | 563 |
| POSITION | center | 90 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 179 |
|  | All | 88 | 10 | 2 | 100 | 1015 |

Table 8.20.    Poor countries should unite to obtain a bigger share of the wealth of the world

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 35 | 47 | 18 | 100 | 544 |
|  | Men | 36 | 43 | 21 | 100 | 456 |
|  | 15-19 | 25 | 48 | 27 | 100 | 120 |
|  | 20-29 | 29 | 49 | 22 | 100 | 208 |
|  | 30-39 | 31 | 44 | 25 | 100 | 198 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 33 | 44 | 23 | 100 | 153 |
|  | 50-59 | 48 | 40 | 12 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 60-69 | 44 | 49 | 7 | 100 | 115 |
|  | 70-74 | 53 | 34 | 13 | 100 | 47 |
|  | periphery | 38 | 43 | 19 | 100 | 270 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 37 | 45 | 18 | 100 | 556 |
| POSITION | center | 26 | 47 | 27 | 100 | 174 |
|  | All | 35 | 45 | 20 | 100 | 1000 |

Table 8.21. Small countries all over the world should unite to have more influence on the affairs of the world

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 47 | 37 | 16 | 100 | 541 |
| | Men | 44 | 34 | 22 | 100 | 460 |
| | 15-19 | 27 | 40 | 33 | 100 | 117 |
| | 20-29 | 40 | 40 | 19 | 100 | 208 |
| | 30-39 | 42 | 34 | 24 | 100 | 198 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 47 | 35 | 18 | 100 | 154 |
| | 50-59 | 55 | 33 | 12 | 100 | 157 |
| | 60-69 | 61 | 31 | 8 | 100 | 119 |
| | 70-74 | 54 | 37 | 9 | 100 | 46 |
| | periphery | 45 | 36 | 19 | 100 | 272 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 47 | 36 | 17 | 100 | 552 |
| POSITION | center | 43 | 34 | 23 | 100 | 177 |
| | All | 46 | 36 | 18 | 100 | 1001 |

Table 8.22. We should improve the United Nations so as to make it more efficient than it is todey

| | | agree | uncertain | disagree | | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 557 |
| | Men | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 464 |
| | 15-19 | 85 | 13 | 2 | 100 | 120 |
| | 20-29 | 89 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 209 |
| | 30-39 | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 89 | 8 | 3 | 100 | 156 |
| | 50-59 | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 161 |
| | 60-69 | 94 | 6 | – | 100 | 124 |
| | 70-74 | 90 | 10 | – | 100 | 50 |
| | periphery | 89 | 10 | 1 | 100 | 277 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 564 |
| POSITION | center | 90 | 8 | 2 | 100 | 180 |
| | All | 90 | 9 | 1 | 100 | 1021 |

**Table 8.23.** A world language that can be understood in all countries should be adopted all over the world

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 40 | 31 | 29 | 100 | 547 |
|  | Men | 32 | 30 | 38 | 100 | 459 |
|  | 15-19 | 25 | 26 | 49 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 25 | 32 | 43 | 100 | 206 |
|  | 30-39 | 30 | 32 | 38 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 43 | 28 | 29 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 50-59 | 49 | 27 | 24 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 60-69 | 50 | 36 | 14 | 100 | 115 |
|  | 70-74 | 45 | 39 | 16 | 100 | 49 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 38 | 32 | 30 | 100 | 271 |
|  | middle | 37 | 33 | 30 | 100 | 557 |
|  | center | 32 | 20 | 48 | 100 | 178 |
|  | All | 36 | 31 | 33 | 100 | 1006 |

**Table 8.24.** We should have a strong international peacekeeping force that can stop aggression from any country or group of countries

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 48 | 36 | 16 | 100 | 551 |
|  | Men | 49 | 29 | 22 | 100 | 463 |
|  | 15-19 | 45 | 34 | 21 | 100 | 119 |
|  | 20-29 | 44 | 34 | 22 | 100 | 207 |
|  | 30-39 | 42 | 35 | 23 | 100 | 199 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 46 | 35 | 19 | 100 | 156 |
|  | 50-59 | 56 | 27 | 17 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 60-69 | 54 | 36 | 10 | 100 | 123 |
|  | 70-74 | 69 | 21 | 10 | 100 | 51 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 54 | 31 | 15 | 100 | 278 |
|  | middle | 48 | 33 | 19 | 100 | 558 |
|  | center | 41 | 35 | 24 | 100 | 178 |
|  | All | 48 | 33 | 19 | 100 | 1014 |

Table 8.25.    The influence of neutral and non-aligned countries on world affairs should be increased

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 70 | 26 | 4 | 100 | 550 |
|  | Men | 75 | 21 | 4 | 100 | 470 |
|  | 15-19 | 61 | 30 | 9 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 67 | 27 | 6 | 100 | 207 |
|  | 30-39 | 75 | 21 | 4 | 100 | 201 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 75 | 19 | 6 | 100 | 158 |
|  | 50-59 | 70 | 29 | 1 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 60-69 | 78 | 21 | 1 | 100 | 125 |
|  | 70-74 | 90 | 10 | - | 100 | 49 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 70 | 26 | 4 | 100 | 278 |
|  | middle | 71 | 25 | 4 | 100 | 564 |
|  | center | 78 | 18 | 4 | 100 | 178 |
|  | All | 72 | 24 | 4 | 100 | 1020 |

Table 8.26.    We should have a world state with disappearance of national borders and with an efficient world government

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 8 | 31 | 61 | 100 | 547 |
|  | Men | 9 | 27 | 64 | 100 | 458 |
|  | 15-19 | 11 | 30 | 59 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 8 | 29 | 63 | 100 | 207 |
|  | 30-39 | 4 | 24 | 72 | 100 | 201 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 9 | 24 | 67 | 100 | 157 |
|  | 50-59 | 5 | 32 | 63 | 100 | 155 |
|  | 60-69 | 12 | 37 | 51 | 100 | 116 |
|  | 70-74 | 15 | 35 | 50 | 100 | 46 |
| SOCIAL POSITION | periphery | 11 | 36 | 53 | 100 | 273 |
|  | middle | 9 | 28 | 63 | 100 | 553 |
|  | centre | 1 | 21 | 78 | 100 | 179 |
|  | All | 8 | 29 | 63 | 100 | 1005 |

Table 8.27.    There should be more peace research all over the world

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 79 | 17 | 4 | 100 | 547 |
|  | Men | 77 | 17 | 6 | 100 | 470 |
|  | 15-19 | 73 | 16 | 11 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 78 | 17 | 5 | 100 | 209 |
|  | 30-39 | 78 | 16 | 6 | 100 | 203 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 78 | 18 | 4 | 100 | 156 |
|  | 50-59 | 76 | 19 | 5 | 100 | 159 |
|  | 60-69 | 83 | 15 | 2 | 100 | 119 |
|  | 70-74 | 85 | 15 | – | 100 | 48 |
|  | periphery | 82 | 13 | 5 | 100 | 276 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 77 | 18 | 4 | 100 | 561 |
| POSITION | center | 75 | 18 | 7 | 100 | 180 |
|  | All | 78 | 17 | 5 | 100 | 1017 |

Table 8.28.    People over the world should participate in demonstrations against arms race

|  |  | agree | uncertain | disagree |  | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEX | Women | 54 | 29 | 17 | 100 | 550 |
|  | Men | 50 | 26 | 24 | 100 | 464 |
|  | 15-19 | 47 | 26 | 26 | 100 | 121 |
|  | 20-29 | 51 | 24 | 25 | 100 | 209 |
|  | 30-39 | 48 | 31 | 21 | 100 | 201 |
| AGE | 40-49 | 55 | 28 | 17 | 100 | 156 |
|  | 50-59 | 57 | 27 | 16 | 100 | 158 |
|  | 60-69 | 53 | 32 | 15 | 100 | 123 |
|  | 70-74 | 55 | 25 | 20 | 100 | 44 |
|  | periphery | 54 | 28 | 18 | 100 | 276 |
| SOCIAL | middle | 52 | 27 | 21 | 100 | 560 |
| POSITION | center | 49 | 28 | 23 | 100 | 178 |
|  | All | 52 | 28 | 20 | 100 | 1014 |

**Table 8.29.**        Ranking of peace proposals according to their popularity

|     |                                    | agree | net support |
|-----|------------------------------------|-------|-------------|
| 1.  | Improve United Nations             | +90   | +89         |
| 2.  | Increased international interaction | +88   | +87         |
| 3.  | Peace in family, school, work      | +87   | +84         |
| 4.  | Non-intervention                   | +85   | +80         |
| 5.  | Abolish hunger and poverty         | +82   | +77         |
| 6.  | More development aid               | +80   | +76         |
| 7.  | Free choice of government          | +79   | +75         |
| 8.  | More peace research                | +78   | +73         |
| 9.  | General and complete disarmament   | +78   | +72         |
| 10. | Reduce poor-rich gap               | +77   | +73         |
| 11. | Neutral and non-aligned            | +72   | +68         |
| 12. | Less aggressive individuals        | +69   | +57         |
| 13. | Abolish colonialism                | +53   | +45         |
| 14. | Peace demonstrations               | +52   | +32         |
| 15. | Keep national armies               | +50   | +33         |
| 16. | Internat. peace-keeping force      | +48   | +29         |
| 17. | Small countries, unite             | +46   | +28         |
| 18. | With draw from mil. alliances      | +43   | +30         |
| 19. | Private and public ownership       | +37   | +17         |
| 20. | World language                     | +36   | +3          |
| 21  | Poor countries, unite              | +35   | +15         |
| 22. | Nations more similar               | +28   | -11         |
| 23. | Private ownership                  | +26   | -10         |
| 24. | More religious                     | +22   | -30         |
| 25. | Military alliances                 | +18   | -39         |
| 26. | Public ownership                   | +14   | -36         |
| 27. | Countries self-sufficient          | +9    | -65         |
| 28. | World government                   | +8    | -55         |

Table 8.30.          Proposals considered to be the most important

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | General and complete disarmament | 25 % |
| 2. | Non-intervention | 14 % |
| 3. | Less aggressive individuals | 8 % |
| 4. | Improve United Nations | 7 % |
| 5. | Neutrals' and non-aligned influence | 6 % |
| 6. | More peace research | 6 % |

N = 916

Table 9.1.    Readiness to participate in and attitude towards
              peace marches and demonstrations

|                                          | Women | Men | All |
|------------------------------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| has participated                         | 14    | 8   | 11  |
| ready to participate in principle        | 33    | 34  | 34  |
| may be necessary, but not willing to participate | 43 | 41 | 42 |
| negative opinion                         | 10    | 17  | 13  |

|                | Women | Men | All |
|----------------|-------|-----|------|
|                | 100   | 100 | 100  |
| N=             | 586   | 474 | 1060 |

|                                          | 15-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60-69 | 70-74 | All |
|------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| has participated                         | 13    | 19    | 11    | 8     | 9     | 8     | 3     | 11  |
| ready to participate in principle        | 45    | 35    | 40    | 36    | 32    | 22    | 12    | 34  |
| may be necessary, but not willing to participate | 36 | 35 | 37 | 43 | 42 | 54 | 65 | 42 |
| negative opinion                         | 6     | 11    | 13    | 13    | 17    | 16    | 20    | 13  |

|     | 15-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60-69 | 70-74 | All |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
|     | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100   | 100  |
| N=  | 121   | 209   | 206   | 165   | 168   | 129   | 60    | 1058 |

|                                          | periphery | middle | center | all |
|------------------------------------------|-----------|--------|--------|-----|
| has participated                         | 9         | 12     | 11     | 11  |
| ready to participate in principle        | 30        | 35     | 33     | 34  |
| may be necessary, but not willing to participate | 50 | 40   | 36     | 42  |
| negative opinion                         | 10        | 13     | 20     | 13  |

|     | periphery | middle | center | all  |
|-----|-----------|--------|--------|------|
|     | 100       | 100    | 100    | 100  |
| N=  | 302       | 578    | 180    | 1060 |

Table 9.2.    Is it possible to exert influence through peace
             marches and demonstrations for arms reductions

|                  | Women | Men | All |
|------------------|-------|-----|-----|
| significantly    | 8     | 10  | 9   |
| to some degree   | 65    | 58  | 62  |
| not at all       | 7     | 32  | 29  |
|                  | 100   | 100 | 100 |
|                  | N = 580 | 480 | 1060 |

|                  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----|
| significantly    | 6       | 4       | 7       | 10      | 13      | 14      | 7       | 9   |
| to some degree   | 69      | 71      | 66      | 61      | 56      | 50      | 47      | 62  |
| not at all       | 25      | 24      | 27      | 29      | 31      | 36      | 46      | 29  |
|                  | 100     | 100     | 100     | 100     | 100     | 100     | 100     | 100 |
|                  | N = 119 | 211     | 207     | 163     | 167     | 132     | 59      | 1058 |

|                  | peri-phery | middle | center | All |
|------------------|------------|--------|--------|-----|
| significantly    | 6          | 10     | 8      | 9   |
| to some degree   | 65         | 61     | 59     | 62  |
| not at all       | 29         | 28     | 33     | 29  |
|                  | 100        | 100    | 100    | 100 |
|                  | N = 303    | 577    | 180    | 1060 |

Table 10.1.

"Peace movement decreases the possibility of war"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 27 | 25 | 26 |
| somewhat | 57 | 55 | 56 |
| not at all | 16 | 20 | 18 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 501 | 444 | 945 |

|  | 15 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 39 | 40 - 49 | 50 - 59 | 60 - 69 | 70 - 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 21 | 15 | 21 | 33 | 34 | 37 | 42 | 26 |
| somewhat | 59 | 70 | 60 | 47 | 52 | 46 | 44 | 56 |
| not at all | 19 | 15 | 19 | 22 | 14 | 17 | 13 | 18 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 116 | 195 | 194 | 148 | 142 | 103 | 45 | 943 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 28 | 27 | 20 | 26 |
| somewhat | 56 | 56 | 57 | 56 |
| not at all | 15 | 17 | 23 | 18 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 249 | 524 | 172 | 945 |

Table 10.2.

"Peace movement increases discord among population"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 5 | 8 | 7 |
| somewhat | 37 | 41 | 39 |
| not at all | 58 | 51 | 55 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 475 | 417 | 892 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 6 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 14 | 7 |
| somewhat | 40 | 41 | 33 | 34 | 43 | 41 | 43 | 39 |
| not at all | 54 | 52 | 62 | 56 | 52 | 52 | 43 | 55 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 115 | 188 | 190 | 140 | 128 | 95 | 35 | 891 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| somewhat | 36 | 39 | 40 | 39 |
| not at all | 57 | 54 | 53 | 55 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 230 | 492 | 170 | 892 |

Table 10.3.

"Peace movement brings nations closer to each other"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 46 | 33 | 40 |
| somewhat | 49 | 54 | 51 |
| not at all | 6 | 12 | 9 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 500 | 435 | 935 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 39 | 33 | 35 | 42 | 48 | 44 | 49 | 40 |
| somewhat | 51 | 59 | 57 | 52 | 44 | 41 | 39 | 51 |
| not at all | 9 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 8 | 14 | 12 | 9 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 117 | 195 | 192 | 145 | 139 | 104 | 41 | 933 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 42 | 41 | 34 | 40 |
| somewhat | 48 | 51 | 57 | 51 |
| not at all | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 246 | 516 | 173 | 935 |

Table 10.4.

"Peace movement represents a small minority"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 30 | 32 | 31 |
| somewhat | 47 | 43 | 45 |
| not at all | 23 | 24 | 24 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 468 | 412 | 880 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 22 | 27 | 28 | 34 | 39 | 38 | 39 | 31 |
| somewhat | 53 | 43 | 45 | 43 | 44 | 42 | 42 | 45 |
| not at all | 25 | 29 | 26 | 23 | 17 | 20 | 18 | 24 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 113 | 187 | 183 | 136 | 134 | 92 | 33 | 878 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 28 | 32 | 32 | 31 |
| somewhat | 48 | 42 | 48 | 45 |
| not at all | 23 | 25 | 20 | 24 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N  231 | 487 | 162 | 880 |

Table 10.5.

"Peace movement encourages governments to peaceful deeds"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 32 | 27 | 30 |
| somewhat | 57 | 57 | 57 |
| not at all | 11 | 16 | 13 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 485 | 430 | 915 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 36 | 27 | 20 | 32 | 35 | 36 | 35 | 30 |
| somewhat | 58 | 61 | 63 | 54 | 53 | 49 | 55 | 57 |
| not at all | 6 | 12 | 17 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 10 | 13 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 115 | 194 | 189 | 141 | 133 | 101 | 40 | 913 |

|  | peri-phery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 32 | 33 | 18 | 30 |
| somewhat | 59 | 54 | 62 | 57 |
| not at all | 9 | 13 | 20 | 13 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 244 | 503 | 168 | 915 |

Table 10.6.

"Peace movement misleads people"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 6 | 9 | 7 |
| somewhat | 21 | 32 | 26 |
| not at all | 73 | 60 | 67 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 466 | 420 | 886 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 22 | 7 |
| somewhat | 22 | 29 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 31 | 22 | 26 |
| not at all | 73 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 67 | 61 | 56 | 67 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 115 | 189 | 185 | 138 | 135 | 90 | 32 | 884 |

|  | peri-phery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| somewhat | 21 | 26 | 32 | 26 |
| not at all | 70 | 67 | 62 | 67 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 228 | 492 | 166 | 886 |

## Table 10.7.

"Peace movement unites various groups in society"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 45 | 34 | 40 |
| somewhat | 47 | 54 | 50 |
| not at all | 8 | 12 | 10 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 483 | 431 | 914 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 41 | 3 | 36 | 45 | 44 | 38 | 35 | 40 |
| somewhat | 48 | 54 | 53 | 47 | 44 | 51 | 51 | 50 |
| not at all | 10 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 10 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 116 | 190 | 188 | 143 | 137 | 101 | 37 | 912 |

|  | peri-phery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 42 | 40 | 37 | 40 |
| somewhat | 47 | 51 | 51 | 50 |
| not at all | 11 | 9 | 11 | 10 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 238 | 505 | 171 | 914 |

Table 10.8.

"Peace movement is in conflict with national defence"

|  | Women | Men | All. |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 12 | 19 | 16 |
| somewhat | 43 | 41 | 42 |
| not at all | 45 | 40 | 42 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 463 | 426 | 889 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 18 | 20 | 11 | 10 | 15 | 13 | 41 | 16 |
| somewhat | 53 | 44 | 48 | 41 | 40 | 41 | 29 | 42 |
| not at all | 29 | 36 | 51 | 49 | 45 | 45 | 29 | 42 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 113 | 183 | 188 | 141 | 132 | 97 | 34 | 888 |

|  | peri-phery | middle- | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 15 | 16 | 14 | 16 |
| somewhat | 46 | 41 | 39 | 42 |
| not at all | 40 | 42 | 47 | 42 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 230 | 491 | 168 | 889 |

Table 10.9.

"Peace movement supports peaceful foreign policy"

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 53 | 44 | 49 |
| somewhat | 41 | 45 | 43 |
| not at all | 6 | 11 | 8 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 494 | 438 | 932 |

|  | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 50 | 49 | 42 | 45 | 54 | 54 | 52 | 49 |
| somewhat | 46 | 43 | 47 | 46 | 39 | 37 | 32 | 43 |
| not at all | 3 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 15 | 8 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 114 | 195 | 192 | 146 | 140 | 103 | 40 | 930 |

|  | peri-<br>phery | middle- | center | All. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very much | 50 | 50 | 41 | 49 |
| somewhat | 44 | 42 | 44 | 43 |
| not at all | 6 | 8 | 14 | 8 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 246 | 515 | 171 | 932 |

Table 10.10.

"Peace movement increases    conflicts between states"

|              | Women | Men | All |
|--------------|-------|-----|-----|
| very much    | 3     | 4   | 3   |
| somewhat     | 19    | 30  | 24  |
| not at all   | 77    | 66  | 72  |
|              | 100   | 100 | 100 |
|              | N = 476 | 427 | 903 |

|              | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|
| very much    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 7    | 4    | 6    | 3   |
| somewhat     | 27   | 23   | 23   | 20   | 24   | 27   | 46   | 24  |
| not at all   | 70   | 75   | 75   | 78   | 68   | 68   | 49   | 72  |
|              | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100  | 100 |
|              | N = 115 | 191 | 186 | 147 | 135 | 92 | 35 | 901 |

|              | peri-phery | middle | center | All |
|--------------|------------|--------|--------|-----|
| very much    | 3          | 3      | 5      | 3   |
| somewhat     | 25         | 24     | 25     | 24  |
| not at all   | 71         | 73     | 70     | 72  |
|              | 100        | 100    | 100    | 100 |
|              | N = 235    | 496    | 172    | 903 |

Table 11.1 .    Received information about peace movements

| | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| a few days ago | 31 | 35 | 32 |
| one-two weeks ago | 26 | 26 | 26 |
| about a month ago | 15 | 12 | 13 |
| a few months ago | 9 | 7 | 8 |
| half a year ago | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 509 | 437 | 946 |

| | 15 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 39 | 40 - 49 | 50 - 59 | 60 - 69 | 70 - 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 18 | 18 | 19 | 16 | 16 | 20 | 10 | 17 |
| a few days ago | 34 | 33 | 30 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 42 | 32 |
| one-two weeks ago | 27 | 28 | 28 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 22 | 26 |
| about a month ago | 11 | 11 | 15 | 16 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 14 |
| a few months ago | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 8 |
| more than half a year ago | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | - | 2 | 2 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 113 | 198 | 188 | 155 | 140 | 110 | 40 | 944 |

| | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 13 | 17 | 25 | 17 |
| a few days ago | 35 | 31 | 33 | 32 |
| one-two weeks ago | 24 | 28 | 21 | 26 |
| about a month ago | 16 | 13 | 10 | 13 |
| a few months ago | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| more than half a year ago | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | 100 | 100 | 00 | 100 |
| N = | 247 | 526 | 173 | 946 |

**Table II. 2.**    Source where received information about peace movement

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| TV | 54 | 52 | 53 |
| newspaper | 36 | 39 | 37 |
| radio | 20 | 18 | 19 |
| public meeting | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| book, magazine | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| job/school | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| source not mentioned | 6 | 7 | 6 |

N = 946

| | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TV | 50 | 42 | 56 | 60 | 60 | 51 | 57 | 53 |
| newspaper | 33 | 40 | 43 | 41 | 31 | 34 | 32 | 37 |
| radio | 16 | 13 | 17 | 19 | 26 | 25 | 22 | 19 |
| public meeting | 4 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 12 | 10 | 6 |
| book, magazine | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | – | – | 1 |
| job/school | 3 | 1 | 2 | – | – | – | – | 1 |
| source not mentioned | 7 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 14 | 7 | 7 |

N = 944

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TV | 49 | 55 | 53 | 53 |
| newspaper | 28 | 38 | 48 | 37 |
| radio |  |  |  |  |
| public meeting | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| book, magazine | – | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| job/school | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| source not mentioned | 8 | 6 | 5 | 6 |

N = 946

Table 11.3.    How often one thinks of war

| | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| almost every day | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| one-two times a week | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| one-two times a mooth | 21 | 19 | 20 |
| more rarely | 45 | 46 | 45 |
| never | 7 | 9 | 8 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | N = 583 | 483 | 1066 |

| | 15 – 19 | 20 – 29 | 30 – 39 | 40 – 49 | 50 – 59 | 60 – 69 | 70 – 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| almost every day | 5 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 13 | 22 | 22 | 12 |
| one-two times a week | 19 | 19 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 15 |
| one-two times a month | 26 | 24 | 25 | 18 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 20 |
| more rarely | 44 | 51 | 45 | 49 | 43 | 27 | 45 | |
| never | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 22 | 8 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | N = 121 | 210 | 207 | 165 | 169 | 133 | 59 | 1064 |

| | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| almost every day | 15 | 12 | 5 | 12 |
| one-two times a week | 16 | 15 | 13 | 15 |
| one-two times a month | 16 | 21 | 22 | 20 |
| more rarely | 44 | 53 | 45 | |
| never | 9 | 8 | 7 | 8 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | N = 303 | 581 | 182 | 1066 |

Table 1.1.4.    Discussed the risk of war with friends or neighbours

|  | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| a few days ago | 16 | 19 | 17 |
| one-two weeks ago | 15 | 18 | 16 |
| about a month ago | 10 | 15 | 12 |
| more than month ago | 30 | 22 | 26 |
| not at all | 23 | 22 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 583 | 481 | 1064 |

|  | 15 –19 | 20 –29 | 30 –39 | 40 –49 | 50 –59 | 60 –69 | 70 –74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 3 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 5 |
| a few days ago | 16 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 21 | 17 |
| one-two weeks ago | 26 | 16 | 19 | 15 | 11 | 14 | 9 | 16 |
| about a month ago | 9 | 14 | 11 | 15 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 12 |
| more than month ago | 26 | 28 | 33 | 29 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 26 |
| not at all | 19 | 18 | 16 | 19 | 30 | 29 | 40 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 121 | 212 | 206 | 164 | 169 | 132 | 58 | 1062 |

|  | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 7 | 4 | 7 | 5 |
| a few days ago | 14 | 19 | 16 | 17 |
| one-two weeks ago | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 |
| about a month ago | 11 | 13 | 12 | 12 |
| more than month ago | 23 | 26 | 32 | 26 |
| not at all | 28 | 22 | 16 | 22 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | N = 304 | 578 | 182 | 1064 |

Table 11.5. Discussed action needed to maintain peace, with friends or neighbours

| | Women | Men | All |
|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 7 | 4 | 6 |
| a few days ago | 13 | 15 | 14 |
| one-two weeks ago | 11 | 16 | 13 |
| about a month ago | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| more than a month ago | 20 | 15 | 17 |
| not at all | 41 | 40 | 41 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 576 | 473 | 1049 |

| | 15 - 19 | 20 - 29 | 30 - 39 | 40 - 49 | 50 - 59 | 60 - 69 | 70 - 74 | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| a few days ago | 9 | 11 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 10 | 18 | 14 |
| one-two weeks ago | 16 | 16 | 16 | 11 | 8 | 16 | 9 | 13 |
| about a month ago | 7 | 9 | 6 | 13 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 9 |
| more than a month ago | 23 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 17 |
| not at all | 39 | 42 | 40 | 37 | 42 | 44 | 42 | 41 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 120 | 211 | 205 | 162 | 168 | 126 | 55 | 1047 |

| | periphery | middle | center | All |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| today or yesterday | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| a few days ago | 9 | 16 | 14 | 14 |
| one-two weeks ago | 13 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| about a month ago | 10 | 8 | 11 | 9 |
| more than a month ago | 17 | 19 | 12 | 17 |
| not at all | 45 | 38 | 42 | 41 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N = | 294 | 577 | 178 | 1049 |

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Paper for the conference "Towards a
Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements"
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## POLITICS OF MOVEMENT
## A Contribution to Political Theory on and in Peace Movements

Ole Wæver

> Because of its inherent worldlessness,
> love can only become false and perverted
> when it is used for political purposes
> such as the change or salvation of the world.
> Hannah Arendt

> But it cannot be called true prowess to
> murder one's fellow-citizens, betray
> one's friends, and to live without faith,
> pity or religion. Such methods may gain power,
> but can never win glory.
> Machiavelli <1

Definitely
only a draft!

# POLITICS OF MOVEMENT
## A Contribution to Political Theory on and in Peace Movements

## 1. Introduction. Political Theories.

This paper will ponder a number of fundamental--some might say shopworn--questions relating to the notion of politics. This is done with a double aim. First to locate some important questions to ask when investigating peace movements--some questions about their self-image, image of others, their approach to politics, their political location. Secondly this clarification might serve as a criticism of some views widely held in at least several of the peace movements I am familiar with. This could contribute to a probably already ongoing process of rethinking and refashioning of reality in the movements.

Though some of the issues will be highly general, the focussed discussions of peace movements will almost exclusively deal with Western, industrialized, capitalist, more or less democratic societies. (Chapter 3.)

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It is important to take a non-institutional and non-reductionist view of politics. Politics has a lot to do with influencing and settling authoritative decisions in and for a society. However, an institutional understanding of politics misses the crucial questions related to the character of political relations, processes and dynamics. In a context as the present it is of particular importance to avoid reducing politics simply to "ruling" or "administration". Politics implies a certain necessity of unity but built on the state as essentially a plurality. <2> Politics is thus situated in this space where the gap between the dispersed individuals is constantly (attempted) bridged for limited questions or periods--a constant process of forming and grouping of people oriented towards consequences at the general level of the political unit in case. Politics is _among_ people, it is in a way _between_ people.<3> This in-between is essentially an open space: the public realm. It is this in-between which makes it possible for individuals and groups to act, to get involved with other people, to engage in practices changing the situation. Precisely this openness is given by the nature of the political space; and thereby is created a tension between this openness and all the given structures of social life, including the given structures of political insititutions, languages, etc.

Hence "political" questions are not necessarily questions for direct, collective decision or involved with processes of decisions. They are however, embedded in the broader, societal processes of setting equivalences and differences, of giving meaning to the social.<4> And this includes constitution of the identities themselves. Thus, politics is neither synonymous with the mere aggregation of given individual preferences, nor is it the expression of general dynamics through the individuals.<5> Political activities are practices which partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of differences. In this way politics consist of temporary structurings of social practices. And politics--and the adjective "political"--relates not only to decisions as such. The whole process of setting and struggling over goals is just as much a part of it as deciding on--and struggling over--the means of achieving the goals.

Politics, of course, cannot be studied in isolation, since it is embedded in the broader processes of society. However, the political cannot be deduced from these processes. And the definite form of the impact from outside is decided in the political sphere.

This was a short summary of the conception of politics involved in this paper. A few, even more captious distinctions are still needed. To make it short it will done with explicit reference to a few theoreticians, who will be followed quite closely. Then any unclear, unsatisfactorily short sections can easily be clarified by reference to the mentioned works. (Busy readers can immediately proceed to chapter 3 where the peace movements enter.)

**2. The Moment of Politics. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Laclau and Mouffe, but mainly Arendt.**

In The Human Condition Hannah Arendt attempts to save action, speech and politics from their devaluation in relation to contemplation on the one side and work (Homo Faber) on the other side. This is done mainly be taking the terms and their relationships back to their Aristotelian--and on core questions: pre-Socratic--and sometimes Roman meaning. If this might sound idealistic and irrelevant the book proves--at least to me--something else. The discussion with its carefull distinctions and apt formulations are highly inspiring. In general it gives a broadly covering description of "the Human Condition" without falling into arguments about "human nature". (The theme of the book is "to think what we are doing"(!) - p.5.) Specifically it follows the twists and turns through European thinking of the

meaning of private/public, of work and action, etc. Thereby
it establishes the conditions for a functioning public realm
and thereby characterizes the nature of politics.

The first distinction is between labor, work and action
relating each to one of the basic conditions of life on
earth. Labor corrresponds to the biological process of the
human body ("the human condition of labor is life itself";
work to the "unnaturalness", the provision of the
"artificial" world of things inside which each individual
life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast
and transcend these lives (so that the human condition of
work is worldliness); and action which goes on directly
between men "corresponds to the human condition of plurality"
(p.7). Plurality means "we are all the same, that is human,
in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who
has ever lived, lives, or will live".

When a large part of philososphy has taken mortality as a
central condition of human life, Hannah Arendt considers the
specific consequences of natality as well (p.9f and 177ff).
Every birth is a new beginning "because the newcomer
possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is,
of acting."

Hannah Arendt notes how, beginning with Plato and
Aristotle--for specific reasons--and continuing through the
Middle Ages there has been a downgrading of action in
relation to contemplation. Action was originally seen as not
belonging to the necessities of life, and therefore placed
(as Vita Activa) above labor and work. Gradually Vita Activa
came to denote all three activities--and all three were
placed below contemplation.

Originally politics--or action--was the sphere for "the doer
of great deeds and the speaker of great words"(Homer - cf.
p.25). The political sphere is radically different from the
natural association of household life (p.27, 30, etc.). The
driving force of the household sphere was life itself--wants
and needs, necessity. "The realm of the Polis on the
contrary, was the sphere of freedom." Ruling belonged to the
private sphere, the polis knew only equals. What is at the
core of politics in original Greek thinking, in Machiavelli
and in Arendt is the virtue of courage as an elemental
political attitude leading one from the sheltered life in the
household to "the merciless exposure of the polis (p.35). The
polis was created (p.197 f) as a sphere for the unfolding and
recording (remembrance) of attempts (in the Homerian spirit)
to show unique deeds or achievements, to enable the
indviduals to distinguish themselves--the "place where men
could show who they really and inexchangeably were" (p.41).

Excellence (arete, virtus) belongs to the public realm. And it is by appearing in the public that something becomes reality to us,<6> and the individual can here disclose itself. The public realm is the common meeting ground where we all still have different locations: "Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position" (p.57).

This political realm has been swallowed by the social realm by the gradual destruction of the dinstinction between the public and the private realm (p.28ff). And the tension came to be between an all-embracing "society" and privacy in the modern form of "intimacy" (Rousseau). In modern mass society behavior has replaced action (p.47), and rare deeds and events retire leaving history to the laws of statistics.

Through speech and action "men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct" (p.176). Thereby life is "lived among men", thereby it is human. The specific argument can not be explained here, but Hannah Arendt argues--convincingly--the need for a public realm as the sphere where the human potential for initiative (the principle of beginning) can unfold itself and where each can disclose himself in deed and word, willing to risk the disclosure. This implies togetherness, it can not be done purely for all men ("the doer of good works, who must be without self and preserve complete anonymity"), nor against all men ("the criminal who must hide himself from others") (p.180). In warfare where "action" serve only to achive certain objectives for ones own side, and speech become "mere talk", there is no disclosure of the agent and mere productive activity is no more transcended.

The meaning of politics is not to be found in some external aims which it serve; "politics is never for the sake of life" (p.37). Politics in not legislative: in classical Greece the law is not the content of political action but its precondition having its roots elsewhere (p.63, 194f). The public realm is the in-between which gather together, which relates and seperates.

Action relates to the "web" of human relationships.

> "The disclosure of the "who" through speech, and
> the setting of a new beginning through action,
> always fall into an already esisting web where
> their immediate consequences can be felt. Together
> they start a new process which eventually emerges
> as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting
> uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he
> comes into contact. It is because of this already

> existing web of human relationships, with its
> innumerable , conflicting wills and intentions,
> that action almost never achieves its purpose; but
> it is also because of this medium, in which action
> alone is real, that it "produces" stories with or
> without intention as naturally as fabrication
> produces tangible things." (p.184)

Accordingly history is not "made" by men. They act into the
world, and thereby they create unpredictable consequences and
the story-teller can afterwards establish the full meaning of
an action (p.192).

As men are not "making" history it is a misleading thought
figure that has taken hold of political thinking, the one
that think in "ruling", where the beginning is made by a
single individual and many join by finishing the enterprise
(p.189). This isolated ruler is in conflict with the reality
of an open field of human acts influencing each other in
unpredictable and indecisive ways. Action is boundless in
the sense that every reaction becomes a chain reaction:
"Since action acts on beings who are capable of their own
actions, reactions, apart from being a response, is always a
new action that strikes out on its own and affects others."
Therefore, one of the political virtues par excellence is the
old virtue of <u>moderation</u>! And the political temptation par
excellence is <u>hubris</u>.

Following this understanding of processes created by action
as necessarily an interplay of many we come to focus on the
ability to act in the condition of plurality in stead of the
traditional figure of getting "to the power" and then "making
history". "Power" in Hannah Arendt is understood as what
keeps the public realm--always close at falling apart if not
used (properly)--in existence (p.200).

"Strength" can be accumulated by the individual (or the
group) in isolation (188f and 200ff), "Power springs up
between men when they act together and vanishes the moment
they disperse. <u>Violence</u> can destroy power but not become a
substitute for it, whereas strength can cope with
violence--for instance by withdrawal from the world.<7> This
is mainly to be seen in contrast to the widespread view where
making is substituted for acting, and the concept of <u>rule</u>
takes the central place. In a way this can be seen as the
constant attempt of political philosophy of escaping politics
altogether (p.222).. There the essence of politics is how to
rule. In her attempt at avoiding this conclusion Arendt
emphasizes strongly that action are not judged according to
moral standards but only by the criterion of <u>greatness</u>,
"because it is in its nature to break thorugh the common

·place accepted and into the extraordinary" (p.205). The meaning lies in the performance and neither in its motivation or its achievements. She wants to exclude totally the category of means and ends. The problems hereby created I will return to below.

Shortly I want to end this presentation by the concept of politics in Hannah Arendt with the specific faculties (very far from core-concepts in traditional theories of politics) she points to in her action-oriented understanding of politics: the faculty of forgiving and the faculty to make and keep promises.

The irreversinbility and unpredictability of the process started by acting makes these remedies necessary. And their roots are in plurality itself, they depend on no new spheres or factors but still on the presence and acting of others, so we avoid the continuing displacement which happened from the problems of labor to the solutions of work and the problems of work to the solutions of action. Being forgiven is the only way of avoiding the dominance of our lives by the first deed which in principle will have ongoing, unwanted effects. Binding ourselves to the fullfillment of promises helps to keep our own identities.

It seems to be a problem that she carries the argument about ends and means so far as she does. She insists on the meaning of politics as purely performative in a way which makes quite a lot of political questions incomprehensible. The most common criticism of Hannah Arendt is exactly this. In a paradoxical way her theory ends up as curiously un-political, as aesthetic or something else. But politics is really about nothing in her theory. <8>

In our lives we all have a disposition to look for meaning. The question might be absurd. And it might be interesting (for French Philosophers) to track it in various contexts and show how it lie hidden deep in theories, works of art, etc--and how it from its position in there structures a universe and thereby keep it bound to "the Western Metaphysics" (Derrida). Meaning, presence, identity, logos--these ever returning themes might prevent a lot of thinkers from openly accepting différAnce and nothing more, just a track of setting-differences. Still, when the question keeps doing so it is important to include this highly effecient--probably absurd--question in a theory of human action, like for instance a political theory.

In the political theory of Hermann Broch a crucial point is the human drive towards consistent understandings of the world. This drive is at the same time recognized--even

shared--by Broch <u>and</u> it is seen as the dangerous source of the closed systems, hypertrophy, mass aberration.

So in the present political theory politics is a specific sphere, not following from human nature as such but introduced in one historical and cultural tradition, the European one, by the specific Greek experience, entering into interaction with some questions and problems raised in human mental history. Some questions of <u>meaning</u>--meaning of personal life, meaning of social life--have shown an adhesiveness that makes it reasonable to conclude today, that they will remain real and relevant dynamics whatever happens to society and the forms of the political sphere. People have individual motives for entering the political sphere, but in this sphere there will be some common aims and references. These are not standards in the sense that they can speak on their own an judge anything. They just give a form for at type of questions which then take on historically specific forms at different times. What is good and right and just has changed a lot. But some kind of legitimation of political activity by the case of "the good society" (and the good life) has been relatively constant. And the political battle--whatever might be the individual motives, whatever might be the mean techniques employed--is fought in the name of these questions. The fight takes on the form of struggling over a hierarchy of ends and means (cf Aristotle<9>). This dimension has consequences for the forms the political processes can take. It is necessary to take into consideration when trying to understand the specific dynamics <u>in</u> the political sphere.

(On this essential point I do not follow Hannah Arendt. Here I am even more idealistic and more Aristotelian than she is! -By the way, even she has some scattered formulations around "The Human Condition" and especially "The Origins of Totalitarianism" indicating this more "moral" meaning of politics".<10>)

The political is a specific sphere where human activities to a large extent is motivated by personal attempts at distinguishing oneself, at inserting oneself in the unfolding of history, at doing great deeds (partly as a compnsation for the disapperance of war from everyday experience) and at the same time it is the sphere for a collective attempt at finding or creating meaning in the social, in making the <u>right</u> policy.

What is then happening in this field? What is the mechanisms? First it should be restated that even if politics is here attempted freed from its confines in anti-political political philosophy it is not--neither by

Arendt nor me--seen as isolated from other spheres. Arendt stresses politics as constantly <u>conditioned</u> by all the other dimensions of the human world. Never totally conditioned, nor totally unaffected.

If Aristotle could sometimes make a slightly naive impression of the strivings of people in the good state for the good life this is obviously corrected by <u>Machiavelli</u> pointing to the power-logics of politics forcing upon the actors a reversal of the relationship between morality and technique.<11>

Where Hobbes attempts to construct a political <u>Science</u> inspired by the natural sciences and believes he can <u>solve</u> the problem of "the commonwealth" that way, Machiavelli is much more like acting into a continuing process of unpredictable politics. In <u>Leviathan</u> it seems to be the idea that <u>if</u> people understand this theory--and thereby the necessity of obediance--we will have order and centralized power, and then the unpredictability will be gone.

Hobbes is just as cynical as Machiavelli in donouncing the possiblity of abstract morality outside the framework of a specific power relationship.<12> Law or morality is rather "empirical". But this is here turned into the foundations of an exact science leading to a solution of the problem of politics. Power can be centralized enough to solve the problem. In a way it is right the contrary with Machiavelli. Partly because Machiavelli links national and international politics as essentially one field, there are never any final solutions. You can never accumulate enough power to be secure. There will always be someone trying something against yoy--either from within or from the outside--or most likely or most dangerously as a combination. <13>

In matters of power there is accordingly no bottom line. You can never "have" it and then be safe (as it seems to be the case in Hobbes). You will have to keep manoevring, because there will always e enough potentialities inside as well as outside your state--and especially if they combine--to detronize you. <14> In a way he then reintroduces an Aristotelian--or even pre-Socratic--theme in political philosophy. Power is located <u>in</u> the social, in the human in-between, inthe way people relate to each other. There is no chance of just "making" the world from the priviliged position. You will have to keep taking the others into account. And with the marked inter-connection made by Machiavelli of national and international politics it is extra obvious that power is something floating around in quite unpredictable ways. (This theme ought to be expanded by a discussion of the concept of "Fortuna" in Machiavelli.)

Shortly mentioning some other types of conditioning:

International politics have--according to the traditional, realist theories--a certain logic of its own which is not easily dispensed with.<15> This might give certain external and relatively absolute claims on the security policy of a state. <16> Though of major importance in relation to peace movements, this aspect will not be dealt with hear.

People have (been) demobilized in contrast to the Arendt ideal of the polis--and of the Revolution and the Soviets or "Councils".

Capitalism as a socio-economic system has a tendency to allocate specific functions to the state to fulfill. And it defines certain limits for what the state should not see as its field. This has been investigated most carefully by several variations of marxist "state-theories". <17> Even if these theories have serious weaknesses as political philosophy they have pointed out numerous strong implications for political processes stemming from the "economic" sphere in its broad sense.

Politics is influenced by several dynamics other than what here is presented as its "core" or "origin". In what sense do I imply that this original, Aristotelian meaning of politics still has a role to play today? Because a specific sphere has been opened up (in Greek antiquity) and some very fundamenmtal understandings of rights and possibilities have installed themselves as ideological realities.

A search for the good life has been introduced into European culture as a question that keeps reintroducing itself. In a way this is fundamentally the question of meaning as it operates on the individual level. It is a reality also in the social. Therefore this potential field between people will be recreated again and again, and in it people will act and interact in the way we know as politics. Though politics as such are these actions, they will take the form of a struggle about setting aims and defining means for the collective. Accordingly, the interpretations of the social and its meaning will be at the centre. So the field has been opened and it will constantly be filled with a hierarchy of questions from the most philosophical (teoria) to mere technical questions of "how". Thus politics is defined neither by a given substance nor given institutions. The starting point is a field (a space, a sphere). The level of organization defining the institutions is then an open

question, most often highly influenced by other--not strictly
political--structurings of the social. The specific
questions are also decided by the people acting into this
sphere. In their praxis they define the meaning of the
social and thereby also the questions deemed relevant. But
somehow the political discourse is forced into talking about
"the common good". Irrespective of the "real" interest
behind any action it will have to deliver some simple formula
explaining why there has to be unity domestically, what is
the meaning of the game among states, and what is the meaning
of the present activities in the political sphere. In a way
politics in Aristotle is stretched between nature and God,
between oikos and the discourse of the philosophers.<18> The
latter part has--as it is often said--been taken over by the
psychological dynamics of the quest for subjectivity and by
the impossible, existential questions of human life. That
surely does not make for the disappearence of this pole of
the tension defining the political.

Several transformations have happened since the Greek polis.
Politics have been loaded with other dynamics: the interplay
of power-strategies, economic dynamics of society, the
dynamics of international politics, etc. Still it has at its
core a specific type of sphere and a specific form of
discourse. So far so good; but what is it then that goes on
in this sphere? What are the mechanisms, what are the form
of the processes. It is important--yet, impossible for this
paper--to develop a theory to understand political moves, the
acts of politics. These acts are what have an impact on ones
own group, on others, and the sturcture of the relationship,
sometimes fundamentally changing the landscape.

The specific moves are exactly what has been excluded by all
the theories trying to get rid of politics. These theories
have linked the political inputs and output to other spheres
(or to highly abstact categories) and thereby defined their
way through the strictly political relations. To catch the
micro-dynamics of politics it is necessary to include some
element of "political psychology" or "political
sociology".<19> (This is found in the mentioned theories
dealing with Masse (Canetti and Broch)<20> but also in
Machiavelli, a political psychology being the essential
dynamic in large parts of "The Prince".) But important
elements can also be found in theories dealing exclusively
with strategies and counter-strategies without reference to
any deciding factors from outside this game. This does not
have to involve psychology or sociology, there is also an
element of game as such--of strategic moves against strategic
moves in a super-rational sense. <21>

Even when politics as such can not be understood only on the

personal level, since the state has a logic of its own, the logic of these moves often build on fundamental human acts or faculties. As Hannah Arendt rightly notes, "It has been in the nature of our tradition of political thought (...) to be highly selective and to exclude from articulate conceptualization a great variety of authentic political experiences, among which we need not be surprised to find some of an even elementary nature".<22> Concepts and gestures that have their origin in for instance the religious sphere or the economic sphere might have been overlooked even if they are important shifters in current political processes.

I can not develop such a theory here, but in the next (and last) chapter, some elements will--in a somewhat speculative form--be formulated in relation to the political activities of peace movements. At this place I will just present some general concepts and theoretical elements to this understanding of the logic of current politics by referring to the important book by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, London 1985).

The main reason--which will in this paper be the minor theme--for the importance of this book is its convincing way of arguing the relationship (or in fact the fundamental "autonomy") of the political sphere from all kinds of social structures which might contain large political potentials but never carry automatic politcal implications independent of the way they are articulated in the discourses. They conceptualize this fundamental nature of the social as discoursively constituted in a way which live up to on the one hand the humanist and socialist tradition of action and responsibility and on the other hand the post-structuralist ("french") development of an awareness of the decisive importance of language, the non-necessary relationship to "reality", etc. This carefull balance is extremely important in light of the overwhelming danger of the first tradition falling into naiveté and the second into passivity.<23>

The specific conceptualizations of political dynamics focus on the role of equivalence which constitutes antagonisms (by so to speak lining up several elements as the same, focussing all tensions into one point) and difference which construct "positivity" ("differentiated objectivity"), that is complex meaning. <24> The latter tends in the direction of constructing "society" as the total building where all subjects and all issues have their specific location, meaning and relation to other questions (pp.129ff, 137, etc). That however remains an illusion as there is

"no single underlying principle finxing--and hence

constituing--the whole field of differences. The irresoluble interiority/exteriority tension is the condition of any social practice : necessity only exists as a partial limitaiton of the field of contingency. It is in this terrain, where neither a total interiroity nor a total exteriority is possible, that the social is constituted. For the same reason that the social cannot be reduced to the interiority of a fixed system of differences, pure exteriority is also impossible. In order to be _totally_ external to each other, the entities would have to be totally internal with regard to themselves: that is to have a fully constituted identity which is not subverted by any exterior. But this is precisely what we have just rejected. This _field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed, is the field of overdetermination_." (p.111)

In relation to any discourse (as a system of meaning, of differential entities), there will always be a "surplus of meaning" which subverts it. This' exactly constitutes the open nature of the process, the possiblity of _moves_. There is a general field of discoursivity where different discourses attempt to dominate the field, "to arrest the flow of differences" (p.112). The central concept is "articulation", the process inserting different "elements" as "moments" in a signifying chain, a discourse. However the elements are "floating signifiers" incapable of being wholly articulated to a discoursive chain. The different issues have no necessary relationship to different actors or programmes, they can be inserted in the general sphere of meaning in different ways, and this process will never be definitive--there will always remain the possibility for new attempts at partial fixations of meaning. The discourses constantly overflow each other. One can never completely achieve "suture", which means something like finishing the picture. (The theory surely is more complex than this and several core-concepts have not been introduced, but this may suffice to give an impression of this kind of understanding of politics.)

More specifically the theory of political processes is constructed in relation to the concepts of equivalence, difference, antagonism<25>, and hegemony.

Hegemony means the operation where one uses this openness. One has--acording to Laclau and Mouffe--to use the logic of equivalence to construct a formation shaped as a totality which necessitates a border, thus equivalence (antagonism). But to be a hegemonic articulation and not just any

antagonism it has to display "a continuous redefinition of the social and political spaces and (...) constant processes of displacment of the limits constructing social division" (p.144). Thus it is a process of making more theoretical elements and more people join a social struggle.

Essential is the argument distinguishing Laclau and Mouffe from the original marxist concept of hegemony: in this process the articualting force is changed itself. Thus, we can not think in terms of a clever group, tactically mobilizing other social groups or other cases around itself manæuvring other groups towards its hidden aims. In the end the intitator is itself produced by its chosen theme (pp.7-92 and 139). This brings us back to the underlining by Broch and Arendt of the concrete and direct nature of politics. There are definite limits to big tactics in politics. To a large extent it _is_ what one is doing--especially doing with words.<26>

However, it should be noted how Laclau and Mouffe link hegemonic politics to the logic of antagonism. Equivalence tends to destabilize "society" by signifying the limit of the social, by deconstructing the positional space created by the distinctions of difference. Equivalence constructs antagonism and pictures the social in two camps. This is in their theory seen as a necessary part of the logic of hegemony as argued above.

They stress the need to "decouple" the different struggles, because the total equivalence is impossible--there is not one natural socialist case--with a core actor--unifying all social struggles. However, they keep the necessity of antagonism for political (hegemonic) action. This is a consequence of the kind of politics they are interested in. Politics to Laclau and Mouffe has to do with the big system-like questions of general principles and relations of dominance in society. All the minor questions which take the central place for instance in the theory of Hannah Arendt, is not really politics in the view of Laclau and Mouffe. These "daily" questions are seen as operating insinde the "differences" and thereby simply as part of the stabilizing of a pseudo-harmonious "society". This seem to be one marxist adjorned game they have not taken up.<27>

In a way the book is to be seen as a further development of the progress achieved by Gramsci when he achieved a certain "demilitarization of war" by pointing to the distinction between "war of manoevre" and "war of position". "War of manoevre" is simple military thinking applied to politics--a fight between two political armies. "'War of position' involves the progressive disaggregation of a civilization and

the constitution of another around a new class core" (p.70).
It thinks the frontier as internal to the social. Moves can
be made on the ambiguities of the social whereas war of
manoevre is build on a concept of the social as clearly
divided into two fixed camps.

I would add that this thinking--and of course the terms--need
not only to be partly demilitarized, there is also a need for
a repolitization in the form of a distinct "politics of
movement".

And this is the limitation of Laclau and Mouffe. They lack an
understanding of the dynamics of operations mainly involving
competition and interplay of different systems of
difference.

One important component might here be what I have elsewhere
labelled "the Dialectics of Détente",<28> where a dynamic
process is only possible when the actors engage in some
amount of mutual stabilization and reassurance. One has to
stabilize in order to change. (Cf. the logic of German
Ostpolitik!) It is important to affirm central elements of
present reality to ensure an amount of stability and to
remove fear-based blockings in core actors relating to their
main anxieties.

(To a certain extent the reasons for the dialectics of
détente are found in the specific limitiations forced upon
the actors in European Security. However, this seems to be a
radicalization of a general mechanism.) Thinking
consequently about the problem of how to make things <u>move</u>
would force Laclau and Mouffe beyond their rather stereotyped
idea of hegemony.

In a way this whole presentation adds up to an argument, that
one aspect of politics is that it is still a variation on
<u>discussion</u> among people. Then some among the readers of this
paper must now be shouting "Habermas!" and be preparing for
criticism of my view for naive premises of "ideal
speechsituations", "powerfree (or "nondistorted")
communication", etc. But the present theory has avoided any
use of the <u>ideal</u>. It has used something that might sound
ideal to explain the origins of a specific sphere, and it has
shortly mentioned some of its transformations, and it then
tries to understand the logics of <u>moves</u> in this sphere.
These moves are in no way meant as attempt to meet some high
standard for ideal politics. Still the ideal might be
present as an implicit political reality and therefore a real
dynamic in politics.

In the present view of politics discourse is never "free",

motives never pure - individuals always have individual
motives (like honour) for social actions, not purely social,
collective motives.  <29>

Crucial elements collected in this investigation are:  Total
political victory is not possible (Arendt) and not preferable
(Broch).  There are no definitive social categories of
self-evidence--like for instance "the people".  In reality
politics--also of "peace movements"--take place on several
levels: "people" against elite as well as among different
elite groups.

Therefore one should not accept easy identities as given
absolutes.  For instance Werner Kaltefleiter in a (critical)
book on peace movements construct a model for the interaction
of peace movements and environment (society), and write:
"International co-operation seems to be an important variable
for both peace movements and societies.  In the case of
societies, the Western Alliance offers a framework for this
co-operation (...).  In the case of the peace movement
(...)".<30> In this way he installs a fundamental identity
between NATO and Society, as given outside the question of
specific political debates.  Political organizations might
need this technique.  In a way it is what politics is about.
Thus the peace movement will have to operate with figures of
the movement = people versus the state = traditionalism,
etc.  But researchers should not accept these articulations
as absolutes.  We should look carefully into the textual work
by which the meaning is constituted and look out for the
black spots thereby inserted in the different discourses.<31>

Neither the peace movement nor the establishment has a
natural, priviliged relationship to "the people".  No
specific policy is by its origin raison d'etat--nor is any
for this reason peace policy.  Not that one policy might not
have better chances than others of achieving certain aims,
but none of these have an identity per se.  One will have to
watch their specific articulation in a given discourse.  And
the consequences of a policy is never known before it has
been involved with the other actors.  Here is a task for
research on peace movements.  And the peace movements
themselves might be wise keeping some awareness of these
different levels--of the duality of operating for instance in
the figures of people/movement/peace versus state/danger and
at the same time being one political elite group among many
moving in the field of political action.

## 3.Peace Movements. Political Mass Movements?

In the peace movements one often meet something which at
first might look like just what I am here asking for: a

strategy understanding and accepting the necessity of diverse and tendentially contradictory activities on different levels of society and in different political forms, condensed in a formula like "lobbying and mobilizing people!". But let us look more carefully at the terms and what they might mean in a peace movement. (And even if some movements might use other terms I will here claim that the dominating understanding follows the lines here presented. This, however, I have no possibility of substantiating in the present paper. We might here have a theme for comparative use of the different national papers of the conference.)

"Lobbying" equals pressure, influence that relates to specific decisions, which is something altogether different from organic processes involving oneself and the others. "Lobbying" implies an actor carrying a fixed message to another actor supposed to be unable to agree to it--but able to be convinced about the rationality of supporting it right now. This kind of activity is not changing the patterns of thinking or any other more permanent parts of the political structure.

There is no radical (Gandhian) belief in the possibility of the other changing. True non-violence is build on the idea that in the end the other should decide himself for the change, without being forced to it.<32> The attitude to lobbying is mostly far from this level of "optimism".

This at least most often goes for the "leaders" or "intellectuals" of the movements. A majority of the "ordinary" members might think in terms of eye-opening in relation to politicians. The strategists of the movements are more prone to be suspicious about this possibility and in stead think in more narrow "lobbying" meaning manoevring on specific issues trying to operationalize the "strength" of the movement (generated by its mass mobilizations) and to use the skill and knowledge of the leaders in influencing the decision.

"Mobilizing" is to a certain extent the basis for both of these approaches to "political influence". Making the politicians understand either a short term political calculus (lobbying) or the world (eye-opening), both depends in the eyes of its practioners on the strength--or "power"--of the movement. Still these activities are not the only and maybe often not the main motives for "mobilizing" people. Mobilizing is also meant as a way of approaching still more people and thereby mobilizing further. What is really the meaning of this is often somewhat obscure but for some it will open the eyes of the politicians, for other it will force limitations on politicians in specific instances, and

to quite a lot it is supposed to end up as some kind of direct politics--somehow taking over. Inherent in all these variations is an idea of mobilizing strength (or power) around a given core. Strength is generated from inside, so to speak. It is generated by the addition of still more of the same, and it is done basically isolated from the opponent.

An implicit premise for this strategy must be the idea of political processes divided into on the one side power struggles and on the other "ruling" or "executing". That is: politics is supposed to be made by actors who have accumulated sufficient strength or control to be in the position to decide. In the terminology of Hannah Arendt this is mirrored in a confusion of "strength" and "power". "Strength" can be build in isolation, from inside. Power is fundamentally dependent on engagement with the others.

In the "mobilization"-view one is thinking of history as the wanted developments forced through by those who gained access to the cockpit. If one alternatively think of history as the constant interplay where no one is able to get his plan totally carried thorugh, it becomes necessary to think of power as something in the political, in the in-between. Power is consituted by the interplay of the conflicting groups, by their ability to create some common functioning enabling a public realm and some common action.

In the words of Hannah Arendt the fundamental mistake is to think politics in terms of "producing" in stead of "acting", that is as work when it is action.

Thinking of power as located in-between people of diverging opinions and thinking of politics as the always partly unintended outcome of different actions means to put the interplay with other political forces at the centre of ones analysis and strategy. Accordingly one will have to invest ones own position as movable. It is not possible to think in terms of a fixed position, identity and core group of ones own engaging in a process of articulating the floating signifiers of the general political sphere (in an attempt at structuring the meaning of the social for other groups) without changing the understanding and the identity of oneself - this is the core argument of the book by Laclau and Mouffe.

"Mobilizing" means exactly to think of the positions as fixed and only the individuals as floating.<33>

This is the reason for the unremitting endeavours--on the side of especially WPC-oriented peace movements--to establish

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a clearly located and stable core of the problem. In the Danish case (with a relatively strong and intellectually relatively flexible WPC-oriented peace movement) it has been obvious that the most important was not where to locate the problem but to have it located at all. Words like imperialism or even United States have not been decisive needs - certain core reactionary circles in the West can do.<34> Formulations like that ask for broad coalitions against these minor groups. The well known logic of "popular fronts" etc.

This is one--probably the major--reason for the potentially radical importance of the famous E.P.Thompson-essay on "Exterminism".<35> Here the problem is a complex structure with no core, no specific proponents, not totally identifiable with a specific social base today. Exterminism has an origin and a history--but now it is just a reality, it doesn't necessarily have a meaning.<36>

Still the problem according to the theory of exterminism is one and it has a name. It is one and only one--and we know the name and what it belongs to. It is supposed to be relatively easy to decide what (and who) is part of the problem and what (and who) is part of the solution. But the first radical step is taken by cutting the problem loose from a social, economic and personal base and locating it at least partly in the political sphere of complex processes of actions and intereactions generating still new products, more or less wanted and more or less unwanted by the different actors. (Of course it is no aim to forget the relationships with economic and other interests. But it is necessary to understand the dynamic on its own premises.)

The identification of specific social forces and nations with the problem is exactly the logic of equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe)--the logic of antagonism. In a field like peace with its existential potentials such an antagonism necessarily takes on more than a modest mark of totalizing (in difference to the Laclau & Mouffe strategy of partial ("issue-specific") antagonisms.) It will signal the necessity of total victory for our own side (cf the Arendt discussion above) and thereby it posits an existential threat to some other political actors (not only those--if they exist--who really want arms race and tension but those who are deemed so by the peace movements.) And these thereby become rather inflexible in relation to the peace-movement--and no politics can arise.

Does this then lead us back into traditional political activities as the only ones worth analyzing for the researcher and the only ones worth practicing for the critical and involved individual? Does mass manifestations

and "simplistic" slogans have no role to play? Obviously
they have. The universe of European security politics is
radically changed today compared to ten years ago. The peace
movement became an important reality by the mass events of
1982-83 and it is an important reality today constantly
influencing single decisions by its sheer latent activities.
(Cf. for instance the arguments among conservatives in the
Federal Republic of Germany in relation to the double-zero
solution on INF-missiles where it was obvious that some
right-wingers by instinct started to think about new common
upper limits in specific new grey zones implying possible new
deployments of these weapons on the western side. These
people where told by fellow conservatives (like CDU General
Secretary Heiner Geissler) that it was absolutely out of the
question starting to ask for any new deployments of any kind
of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic. <37> The peace
movement was obviously part of the political processes in
this case without "doing" anything.) The peace movements
have had even more fundamental effects than this: the arena
for security policy has changed. It is--relatively
speaking--more open, it has got new actors, new experts,
etc. And some fundamental components of the establishment
understadning has been changed, for instance in relation to
the stability and durability of deterrence, and of the
relationship between Europe, division and confrontation.
These effects can not be seen as simple transferrings of
peace movement understandings to the establishment. Often
the new views are strongly contradictory to the
understandings in the peace movements, but still something
has changed. And this whole process can not be understood
without including the mass events of the early eighties and
the often very problematic arguments about nuclear war around
the corner, about first strike strategy, about the people
raising against the establishments administrating the
collective suicide, etc. It did all have some--often
constructive--effects. What is the logic of this, and **what
is the relationship between the mass events and the different
kinds of more articulated political activities?**

I will here restrict the discussion to the somewhat
simplified scheme--later to be slightly refined--of two types
of peace movement activities: on the one hand the
mobilization and display of the "mass movement" as such,
including relatively simple stereotyped arguments and an
alternative quite impossible to the established political
elite. On the other hand arguments, analyses and actions
operating in a relatively complex universe with partial
overlaps between established views and those articualted by
the spokesmen of the movement.

The function of the mass mobilizations as a partly

self-generating, self-reinforcing dynamic is--besides being its own purpose--to build some kind of equivocal <u>threat</u>. To the established political elites it must be threatening to see growing masses joining around arguments which seem to those spectators irrational and dangerous. There will be some worry about the not likely but still possible option of some kind of more fundamental loss of legitimacy or at least the fear of being put in a position--like it was imagined in Autumn 1983--where all kind of opposition from (the?) people will take dimensions where one is checkmate because the people is not able to detronize the elite, but the elite is not able to carry through the act they want (in case deploying INF) because this would imply destroying by their own acts the legitimacy in the people. This direct use of force from the people is very seldom but its <u>possibility</u> is nevertheless a political reality of some relevance.

These radical perspectives are in one way or the other the starting point for all kinds of more refined political activities by the movements because without the invocation of these perspectives the movements would be politically invisible. In our modern media society the dramatic, the unexpected, the terrifying, the big, etc is what is needed in order to <u>enter the political reality</u> as it is defined. The political parties are defined into it--based on at standard fee called votes. And they share it with some persons and organizations generally accepted as relevant, as part of the public realm as it functions in its present form in the Western societies here dealt with.

New groups are not able to just enter by speaking up. Especially themes that are not accepted as problems make something spectacular necessary in order to change this definition of reality.

What is needed here as the first move when something is totally excluded from the political universe is exactly the opposite of what has been argued above. The comprehensible, the specific restructerings and recombinations involving known components as usually practiced among the competing discourses has no chance of entering from outside, no chance of establishing a new actor as an actor (and more generally no chance of establishing a new discourse as a relevant part of the general political field). It is then necessary to put the wrong questions at the wrong time, to say the incomprehensible and act on the basis of the illegitimate. Ola Tunander has coined the apt term "the Strategy of Madness" for this process where some radical, "unrealistic" views are put forward which at first fall outside "the general opinion" but these views are eventually absorbed and modified by the massmedia--or more generally the political

sphere--"by being woven into the 'generel opinion' as
something normal." The 'general opinion' is thereby
displaced. This is an explanation (build mainly on the
workings of the media system) of how seemingly impossible
opinions become possible. How some political force can
"forward a debate outside the political scale, far beyond any
'realist' alternative'. Madness has been put on the agenda
and gush forth as a cold wind, as something to be reckoned
with." <38> The integrating mechanism stems from the
function of massmedia in our societies as "the father figure
and scientific authority". The media furthers some extreme
positions but on the other hand it tends to integrate them.
And it makes necessary the extreme positions because every
important position in the end has to look like a compromise
and therefore needs something more extreme than itself. Mass
media does not stimulate clearcut polarization--it has a need
to appear as the stabil, unifying core of society. Therefore
there will always be an important "centre" which at the same
time as it legitimizes its own dominating role makes the
extremes tolerable and in doing so: integrated.

The analysis of Laclau and Mouffe is correct in pointing to
the importance of the floating signifiers of different
elements of conflictuality which can be articulated by
different--often antagonistic--discourses. However, this is
only the very abstract form. In our specific media society
this dynamic of extremism, integration and "compromise" is
important to take into account in its specificity.

In this process the central part is played by an interplay
between a force outside the established political universe,
changing the border of the possible (and thereby establishing
new themes), and a more traditional political actor operating
with equivalences and differences in the usual way and
thereby interacting in partly conflicting partly attracting
ways with other political forces. The latter carry the
bruden of partly restructering the meaning of the social
since the first remains incomprehensible though disturbing
and thereby relevant. <39>

Going back to the case of mass demonstrations, they can put
an issue on the agenda but not carry a programme through, not
move anything anywhere. **They can just make the poltical
sphere tremble--not move.** It opens up a possible entrance to
the public realm of some other force articulating the issue
inside "the meaningfull". In case of the peacemovements and
their two sides: the mass events opens up for the entrance of
the movement into the public realm. (In some other cases it
is not at all two forces that closely related who play the
two roles--as in the case of the radical left and the left
social democrats.) Now the peace movement has gained access

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to the public realm--it is understood as relevant. What is it then to do? It is then thorn between the logic of the mass movement and the logic of the political sphere itself. The first would lead it to make its "inside politics" a continuation of the mass movement outside and thereby conducting pure "power politics" in relation to other political forces. The second would lead it to start making its programme more complex absorbing other positions and issues, trying to articulate floating signifiers and change the thinking of others--not necessarily make the others think the same, but still changing it. That is: start the political inter-action.

By the strategy of madness an issue is put on the agenda, but it is not decided how it should be settled. By the strategy of madness developments are not moved in the wanted direction. It has made the whole sphere tremble and that might make some moves possible. But at first the most likely force will be a counter pressure. If a move in the wanted direction should be achieved, it will rely on some "other" political force operating in the new situation inside the existing political universe. But this force will have a complicated relationship to the logic of the movement creating the initial shock. And the politically acting movement will probably waver between pure power politics with a logic of strict antagonism and a strategy of arguments thinking in terms of "alternative security", etc. The conditions leading the movement into this situation is closely related to the modern media society, and exactly this condition opens the possibility for a third (but necessarily secondary) strategy of dropping the right information at the right time as it has recently been practiced quite succesfully by the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, the major Swedish peace movement. Hereby the peace movement is transformed into a "collective journalist".<40>

The justification of resorting to the strategy of madness can be seen as a parallel to the argument for non-violent resistance. In situations where an issue is excluded it can be seen as a necessary step to engage in logics seen by others as threatening.

But the core of the problem is the necessary tension between on one side the logic of mass implying pressure (direct power) built on numbers and the potential ability to block deployments, etc; and on the other side particapation in the public realm. Because ususally you can't participate there if you pose a fundamental threat to someone elses life (or life form). <41> (The public realm is constituted when it is made clear that violent means will not be applied among its members.<42> And an ideology can be in its logic violent

towards others.) At the same time as "outdoor politics" disable well functioning "indoor politics", it enables it as well. First by opening up the entrance and then by (through the logic of the mass media) translating these extreme politics into arguments for its more modest versions (cf. the presentation above of the logic in the strategy of madness). This often functions in the way that the insiders can point to the extremists and use them as an argument for the necessity of some (but moderate) steps in their direction. Sometimes the argument of potential loss of control is even used explicitly by politicians in bargaining with others (and as it is known from Schelling this is the most effecient threat of all since the problem of credibility is solved by the fact that one simply does not have the capacity of control.) For instance in the "Deployment debate" in the West German Bundestag (November 1983), Helmut Schmidt explicitly criticized Kansler Kohl for not using this kind of threats against the Americans in order to influence their position in the negotiations!<43> (Usually this effect is of course not deliberate on the side of "the extreme". But on the other hand, it has been argued above that in a way the ignorance aabout consequnces of ones own actions goes for all political actors.<44>) It should be noted that this illogical constructive connection between the two activities is to a large extent a product of the specific logics of the media system; its soothing dramatization.<45>

The negative effect is clearly seen in some of the countries where "the peace movement" is split--and especially where it is split into two eqully big movements. When split between a WPC and and END like movement they will on different dimensions block each others ability to persue politics of movement. The two fundamentally different logics might make it hard to quiet in others the worries preventing change. The WPC-movement look for power and want to accumulate it in the movement. The END-movement might (as in Denmark) not be willing to--or not good at--accumulating power in the simple sense explained above. And the END-movment can't get things moving because they are blocked by the fears and stereotypes unleashed by the other movement. And on other levels the split in relation to the established political universe does not follow the dividing line between the organizations--or at least not this line. The END-like movement is likely to be the more anti-statist building on an alternativist ideology.

Some readers might wonder why I totally exclude one potential route of influence for the peace movements which have--in the movements--been seen by many as the central one: movement activities influencing "public opinion" and thereby voters, which are then taken into account by the politicians. But even if this played some role in the early eighties I am

quite sure It will be of minor importance in the future, simply because it does not seem to function. People do not translate these issues and opinions into votes. And the whole question of public opinion is—as especially Philip Everts has shown—markedly more complex than implied in this figure.

After having emphazised this essential conflict between the two logics necessary for the movement when operating at the two different levels (and the destructive as well as the constructive effects resulting from this) it should be noted that some activities to a certain extent circumvent this problem. For instance the whole area of détente from below is in a way a call for "do it yourself security". This can be presented in a way where it is higly threatening to established politics, but it can also be presented and practiced as at least partly compatible with the continuation of traditional diplomacy.

(This last question is clearly underresearched as most researchers also choose one "favorite actor"—state or movement—and then see the solution intrinsically connected to this one actor. The possible good and bad interplays between the different levels of diplomacy and détente is therefore surprisingly seldom researched.<46>)

This dilemma I have experienced myself. As some kind of theoretician of the Danish independent peace movement, "No to Nuclear Weapons", I had in the early 1980s participated in developping an intellectually more sustainable understanding of the value of nuclear weapon free zones. I felt we were rather succesfull in transcending the then dominating arguments in favor of such arrangements. But when it came to convincing the social democrats about the value of taking over these views, it was felt as something of a problem that our new, alternative view was essenatially build on a dynamics and a vision where parties where replaced by movements!

It might be possible to overcome this dilemma by thinking about the relationship between relationships and the complex and non-linear effects of movements acting directly out into international politics. (Here we ought to take up James N.Rosenaus theory of "Cascading Interdependence". <47> Thereby one could avoid the simple conflict between state-diplomacy and peoples-diplomacy. After all they do interact in the international reality. And that is not necessarily bad.

Partly related to this one should be aware of the general importance of different levels in society, and their

respective international roles. In reality, in the positive effects of peace movements (but not always adequately reflected in the thinking of the movements), a crucial role is often played by the levels between "people"/movement/local groups and traditional politics. The policy of the movement is often channelled through the diverse world of organizations. It is translated through the interaction between the peace movement and other organizations and through the exchange of persons among these. I am here thinking not only--not even mainly--of political parties but of churches, scouts, peoples-exchange organizations, etc. These play an important role in the relations with the other side in the East-West dialogue (détente from below). To understand these dynamics it is important to remember that the peace movement has a double identity as at one level claiming an identity with "the people", operating at an anti-organization level, and on another level it is exactly one organization among many others. To understand its own functioning in this world of organizational politics the peace movements will need to be able to think outside its own picture of natural identity between the people and the movement.

A few more words on the dynamics involved in the mass movement as such: The Necessity of Mass has as well an inner and an outer dimension. As to the outside it has been argued above that it is necessary in order to gain acces to the public realm independently of whether one wants there to do "power politics" or continuation politics. As to the inside, the logic of mass is necessary to generate the amount of particiapation. This statement is not a tautology since one could think of the possibility of gathering lots of people (literally or just in opinions visible in polls) without employing the specific dynamics of the mass as it is known from Canetti, Broch, Ortega y Gasset and others; and as it is dealt with in theories of social movements under names like "ressource mobilization" and "redemptive organizations". <48>

It is no specific trait in movements that irrational dimensions are involved. That goes for all political activities, as they always have a personal motive and therefore have some relation to the total self including the necessary inrrational dimensions. (It is a common mistake <49> to contrast supposedly purely political organizations--parties for instance--to organizations fullfilling psychological functions to the members. In all organizations one will find both elements. Motivations is inevitably personal, at the same time as the activities of the peace movement are about something (peace)--and one must have some original political idea for choosing this

activity. So the peace movement is of course highly political even if most traditional analysis of it choose to picture the peace movement as psychologically motivated, naiv in fundamental security analysis, and highly skilled in political tactics.) When using high numbers of collectively visible people as entrance fee to the public realm it is necessary to involve some specific irrational dynamics which have to do with "the reversal of the fear of being touched" into a relief in the density of a crowd where everyone feel himself pressed against himself, <50> and with playing on the panic reactions of people on experiences of "ego contraction" leading to disposition toward inclusion in a "mass soul" building on a value system which is "closed". <51> "Man when in twilight state is prepared to submit to mass all the more as his feeling of absolute loneliness drives him toward irrational values as implied in the feeling of mass fellowship." <52>

Involving these dynamics means to involve a certain incompatability with the traditional functioning of the public realm and the political processes as it necessarily leads to an uncompromising and selfsufficient attitude.

(This experience of belonging to some metaphysic community does not necessarily have to be a "rationality loss" (according to Broch). Since the irrational is a necessary part of human life it should in principle be possible to articulate the irrational with the rational in a way which makes them "additional values"--they can be an "irrationality gain", without creating a "rationality loss".<53> However, the dilemma is always close at hand.)

Summing up--and oversimplifying--one aspect of the last part of the paper, it can be seen as a tension between 2 aspects of peace movement: mass with simplicity and participation in the public realm with complexity. (Participation does not equal participation in the formal political system. I talk about the public realm, the common stage, in the specific forms it might take in a given society.) Between the two aspects there are two different and even contradictory relationships: mass undermining--in the public realm--politics of moving social meaning and mass-activities being necessary to awaken the total mass and thereby break into the public realm, where it--because of the crucial role of media--is even possible to a certain extent to operate with the effects of mass.

In a way this is fundamentally a tension between two crowd-logics or two types of masses: 1) the narrowminded, closed system destroying political systems (cf. Broch, Arendt in Origins ..., etc); 2) the implosion of meaning in the

media integrating everything into pseudo-harmonious, non-articulated in-difference, pure surface without any depth--the "atomized, nuclearized, molecularized mass"<54> which reject meaning and opt for fascination instead, thereby "turning the system's logic back on itself by duplicating it, reflecting meaning, as in a mirror, without absorbing it."<55> This latter form is, according to Baudrillard, the only possible resistance strategy of the masses today. However, at the same time it must necessarily be seen as an obstacle by any intitiave following an aim in a more traditional, political sense.

To simplify even further (and to introduce a few more illogical and ugly terms) one could see all this as a conflict between modern, late-modern and post-modern realities (especially in relation to the problem of the mass):


The modern figure (still crucial to the peace movement itself):
  Enlightenment, progress, the people  <---> Tradition,
        MEANING                                          irrationality.

The Late-modern conflict (Elliott, Ortega y Gasett, Canetti, Broc
  The Mass, simplification    <----->    Complex elite-understandings
      (anti-political intimacy)              MEANING

Post-modern tension (Baudrillard):
  Mass: silent indifference    <---->    Elite: FUTILE MEANING and
      fascination and surface                      moralizing.

                              Here the mass-movement--a contra-
                              diction in terms--enters as some
                              kind of media strategy of some
                              part of the elite using it to make
                              some moves in hyper-reality--moves
                              against other elites and with the
                              real masses as spectators and
                              feared but fictive judges.

Modern mass action favours meaning, late-modern mass destructs meaning and in post-modernity some mass activity might be a way of attempting to fix maeaning for a moment by acting though the act should mainly be seen as performance.

As real conclusion I offer a broad and a narrow one. Broadly this paper point to the importance of looking out in any specific, empirical analysis for these diverse dynamics here discussed in a relatively abstract sense. This could be a way of unveiling the politics of a movement and the place of a movement in national and international politics. The more specific core-argument of the paper is to look out for the

definition by the actors in relation to "security" and "peace". The way a specific actor conceptualizes politics in general and the field of prime relevance in particular is a factor--and probably not the least important one--in placing oneself in (or maybe outside) the political landscape in this field. Is the political space dichotomized, and if so who are set as identical with the movement and who as identical with insecurity? If not, how is political space then constructed? By which operations are differences set, and where does that locate the movement itself--and what is then the concept of politics. How is the relationship to other actors pictured: as for or against or with. What is essentially ones own role? As the essense of the people (where all other must feel threatened by being pictured as unnecessary, as misunderstandings) and/or as a part of the political game (at least as one dimension of ones self)? So, my essential argument is, that researchers analyzing peace movements should look at the deep structures of their world view and the implicit operations in their language. By understanding this, one can find out where the movement locates itself in--or outside--the political universe. And this is likely to be decisive for the type of activities, the structure and the fate of the movement in case.

Accordingly, the question might also be of some importance to the movements themselves.

*J bin und bleib Theoretiker.*

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1. The quotations on the frontpage are from <u>The Human Condition</u>, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1958, p.52, and from <u>The Prince</u> - here quoted from <u>The Prince and Other Political Writings</u>, selected and translated by Bruce Pentham, Everyman's Library 1981, p.71.

2. Aristotle, <u>Politics</u>, 1261a19-20.

3. Hannah Arendt, "On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing" (1959), reprinted in: <u>Men in Dark Times</u>, New York 1968, Middlesex 1973 edition, pp.11-38.

4. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, <u>Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics</u>, London 1985.

5. Neither the individuals nor "society" have a given meaning or a fixed identity. Cf. Laclau/Mouffe 1985, pp.104, 111, 192. Cf. also Norbert Elias <u>The Court Society</u>, Oxford 1983, pp.210ff, and Elias, <u>The Civilizing Process</u>, Oxford 1982, i.a. part II, pp.281ff.

6. This understanding which many problably will deem strange is explained in the pages 50ff and 157ff.

7. ibid, p.203, and "Thoughts on Lessing", p.19ff.

8. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power" in Social Research, 1977/1, p. 3-24 - condensated on p 16. Cf. also Dolf Starnberger "The Sunken City. Hannah Arendts Idea of Politics" in Social Research, 1977/1, pp.132-146. On p. 145 he says: "the inherent goal of all political action remains oddly obscure. For that goal is decision. Not consultation and debate, not the battle of words and the exchange of views alone can make out action and "politics" (...). Rather, the decision that is supposed to come out of all this must be thought with it. And one must know the way decisions are reached, and the place from which they ultimately--responsibly--issue." That might lead us back a little to far in the conventional direction, but sure the problem is located in this field.

9. On the ultimate end in politics and political science, see The Nicomechean Ethics, 1094a19ff and 1095b23ff.

10. In the philosophy of Hannah Arendt the question of meaning going beyond the answerable surely has a place; the place is in the category of thinking. The relationship to politics is complicated because thinking fundamentally has to be without an aim, without any function, useless. And still it has consequences and one could even say a utility value. This however has to be irrelevant to thinking as such. This question is rather complex and must here necessarily be left like this.

11. See the clear examples in the chapters 6, 8 and 17 in The Prince. In chapter 15: "For anyone who sets out to play the part of a virtuous man on all occasions is bound to come to grief among so many others who are not virtuous. And so a prince who wants to stay in power must necessarily learn to be other than virtuous, and must make use of his knowledge or not according to circumstances".

12. See for instance Leviathan, Pelican Books, Middlesex 1968, p.188.

13. Machiavellis concept of power doesn't really seem to be objectifiable as something to possess. Power is social and social-psychological. And it is in the complex social figuration of politics, national and international--cf Elias and Foucault!

14. See The Prince, chapters 3, 4, 9, 13, and esecially 19 and 20.

15. A systematic and modernized version of this theory is found in Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Readin, Massachusetts, 1979. A discussion of this book is documented in Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York 1986.

16. Specifically on this aspect of "realism" one should remember the classical discussions in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.

17. A fine presentation of most of these is to be found in Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State, Oxford 1982.

18. This expression I owe to Ole Bernild.

19. What is usually called--and calling itself--"political psychology" or "political sociology" is not of much relevance. It deals mainly with the socialization of the indvidual to the political (=democracy), as such; not with the psychology of the political. Here the terms will be used in their literal meaning: the theories dealing with the psychological and sociological dynamics of politics.

20. See especially "Politik. Ein Kondensat (Fragment)" in Erkennen und Handeln, Gesammelte Werke, Essays Band II, Hrsg. von Hannah Arendt, Rhein-Verlag Zürich, 1955, pp.203-255. Reprinted under the titel "Menschenrecht und Irdisch-Absolutes" in Massenwahntheorie, op.cit., p.456-51.

21. Cf. i.a. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard 1960.

22. Arendt, The Human Condition, p.238f.

23. Cf. i.a. the conclusion reached by Jean Baudrillard on pp.145 and 148 in his article "The Implosion of Meaning in the Media and The Implosion of the Social in the Masses", in Kathleen Woodward (ed), The Myths of Information, London 1980, pp.137-148.

24. This is based on an understanding of language as a system of "values" relative to each other--of structural positions. Language is a system of differences - the value of a term is purely differential (or oppositional). (Saussure)

25. Their clarification of the concpet of antagonism is important but somewhat problematic. This can not be dealt with here.

26.   Basically   this   follow   from   the   principle   of
"overdetermination" and the constant articulation of  moments
into   different   discourses   combined   with   the   mutual
overflowing of discourses into each other.

27. This is somewhat contradictory since  they  introduce  a
distinction   between   "popular   subject   positions"   and
"democratic subject positions", linked  to  respectively  the
logic of equivalence and the logic of difference.   And  they
posit  the  second  as  clearly most attractive  (p.131)  and
explicitly "The  democratic  struggle"  is  "the  fundamental
concept"  (p.137).   Still  they  seem  to  imply  that  only
antagonism and hegemony is really moving. This is an implicit
assumption not discussed but showing itself on the pages 129,
132, 134, 136, 153ff. This ought to be the starting point for
an  important  theoretical discussion.  Somehow they  end  up
picturing their own politics as democratic because it consist
of  numerous  decoupled popular struggles luckily  unable  to
establish  themselves   totally.    The   overall  democrativ
politics is thus made up of "popular" moves  of  equivalence.
This  seems  unsatisfactory.  A real democratic  politics  is
still missing.

28.  Unfortunately  I  have  only developed this  concept  in
Danish  language  articles.   However  the  borader  thinking
around it  can  be  found in Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre and
Ole  Wæver,  European  Security.  Problems  of  Research  on
Non-Military Aspects, Copenhagen  Papers  1,   Centre of Peace
and Conflict Research, August 1987.

29. At least  as  a tendency Habermas conceptualizes politics
as a  field where communicative action compete with strategic
action, and where  the  effect  of establishing communicative
action is to achieve a discourse purely on the matter itself,
trying to "establish legitimate interpersonal  relations"  by
the  serious  investigation  of  the  different   "validity
claims".  The  basis  for  politics  is  thus  some  kind  of
abstract moral consciousness combined with an idea of a  high
level of mutual understanding, common premises, etc.  Cf. for
instance Jürgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics", in
his Communication and the Evolution of Society, Beacon Press,
Boston 1979, pp.1-68.

30.   "Introduction"  in  Werner  Kaltefleiter  and  Robert
L.Pfaltzgraff (eds) The Peace Movements  in  Europe  and  the
United States, Croom Helm, London & Sydney 1985, p.4.

31. This kind of figure-tracking I hvad tried  to  do  on the
different   political   parties   in   the   FRG:   "Vesttysk
Sikkerhedstækning.  Ikke-militære aspekter", paper from  July

1987. Translation is in preperation ("West German Security Thinking. Non-Military Aspects").

32. Cf. Egbert Jahn, "Prospects and Impasses of the New Pece Movement" in Bulletin of Peace Proposals 1984/1, s.47-56.

33. Laclau and Mouffe emphasize how the identity of the social force will be formed by the campaing one is carrying out. More fundamentally this is due to the concpet of overdetermination pointing to the interrelatedness of whole discourses which mean that new issues or new potentialities cannot be articualted with the discourse of a political force without changing the different relations and identities of all other concepts and thereby the discourse itself and eventually the identity of the "subjects". See mainly pp.97ff and 113ff.

34. I am mainly referring to an anlysis/discussion paper from around 1984--which I can't find right now.

35. Edward Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, the last stage of Civilization", New Left Review No.121, June 1980.

36. In Beyond the Cold War, Merlin Press, London 1982, E.P. Thompson argues that "the Cold War" should be seen as "the fruits of fruits, the consequences of consequences"--"the indirect results". "History never happens as the actors plan or expect. It is the record of unintended consequences." (p.10.) "What the is the Cold War, as we enter the 1980s, about? ... The Cold War (...) has broken free from the occasions at its origin, and has acquired an independent inertial thrust of its own. What is the Cold war now about? It is about itself." (p.16f.) "Let us move back to our own time. For I am addressing the question--not what caused the Cold War, but what is it about today? And it is no good trying to answer this by standing at its source and stirring it about with a stick. For a river gathers up many tributaries on its way, and turns into unexpected courses." (p.8f.)

37. Der Spiegel, No.21 1987, p.20f; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 20., 1987.

38. Ola Tunander, "Vansinnets strategi. Eller hur man flyttar 'den allmäna meningen' åt höger" ("The Strategy of Madness. Or how to move 'the general idea' to the right"), in Ord & Bild (Stockholm), 2-3 1981, p.34-36. The term "Strategy of Madness" is developped in an analysis pointing to a conservative use of this strategy by the Swedish Employers' Association in the early 1980s consciously emulating the indirect effects in the 1970s of the radical

left in strengthening left-socialdemocratic politics. Most instances of the dynamic will however be less conscious on the side of the practioners. They will not feel it as madness! The term "Stategy of Madness" is kept here to underline the essential fact that to the established political universe this program is--and must be--madness and "unpolitical".

39. The strategy of madness is per definition unable to frame social meaning. The category of madness is exactly a mechanism for exclusion from the production of discourse. Cf. Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse", in Michael Shapiro (ed), Language and Politics, Oxford 1984, pp.108-138.

40. This argument--and the term--I owe to Ola Tunander, PRIO. Reference: Biking and birdwatching on Iceland, August 1987.

41. Canetti, Crowds and Power, Penguin 1973, p.220ff. (Original German version, "Masse und Macht" is from 1960.)

42. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p.26f. And Elias ...

43. Die Nachrüstungsdebatte in Deutschen Bundestag, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1984, p.107.

44. Arendt, The Human Condition, p.192.

45. See Baudrillard, op.cit.

46. Cf the debate in Die Neue Gesellschaft 1985-1986 betweeen Horst Ehmke (SPD), *** (Solidarnosc) and Mient Jan Faber (IKV). See also Jahn et al, op.cit., chapter 10.

47. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisisted: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence", in International Studies Quarterly 1984/3, pp.245-305.

48. Cf. Michael Krasner, The Political Influence of the new Danish Peace Movement 1979-1986, paper for the IPRA-conference, April 1986; and various articles in the special issue of the Journal of Peace Research 1986/2.

49. See for instance the Kaltefleiter/Pfaltzgraff volume mentioned above.

50. Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, pp.15f.

51. Hermann Broch, Massenwahntheorie,pp. 275ff, and "A Study on Mass Hysteria", pp.264-269.

52. Broch, "A Study on Mass Hysteria", pp.267.

53. <u>Massenwahntheorie</u>, p. 278.

54. Baudrillard, op.cit, p.140.

55. Ibid, p. 148.

Sub-theme : 2 :

RISE AND FALL OF PEACE MOVEMENT

# PEACE ACTIVISM, EDUCATION AND THE CAUSES OF WAR

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# INTRODUCTION

In the World Peace Year , over twenty years after the founding of the International Peace REsearch Association and after over fifty years of peace research activity (from the emergence of Richardson, Sorokin, Wright, Bouthoul and Deutsch) the establishing of a world order capable of preventing war, at any level, was as far away as ever.

Arms races flourish along with the trade they create, wars of all types (as well as new methods) are on the increase, more refugees than ever crowd into camps all over the third world where greater disparities within countries and with the North (or West) become moer evident daily.

In general , despite a few areas such as medical care and emergency relief, the international system appears to be chaotic and war seems out of control.

Western culture and its civilizations are rapidly spreading their influence throughout the world. Not least the long tradition of endemic war has spread, first through colonialization and then in the post-colonial process of secession and , more recently, to small territorial and non territorial groups by terrorism : which in turn threatens to disrupt life in the former colonialist countries as well as in the new countries.

This paper is an attempt to trace the growth and spread of militarism and war frm their animal and primitive human roots , through the European civilizations to the modern global system. It is also an attempt to analyze, by using recent data, as well as earlier findings, the causes and other factors which generate war and violent conflict.

Particular attention has been paid to the <u>value</u> dimension among factors of war, and it is postulated that the examination of this vital dimension has , at a very high cost, been grossly neglected. It is contended that unless researchers find new methods of incorporating value factors, both as instruments of research (consulting OPINIONS of experts in case studies, etc,) and as independent or reciprocal variables in their equations, the science of peace will remain at the pre-take-off level of development.

Finally, attention is given to the viability . of the institutions associated with peace research, education and preservation to point out their ineffectiveness in dealing with their professed basic task. There may well be a tine limit in which these organizations have to wok before the whole process of a stable world order becomes the prerogative of the superpowers , thereby putting an end to the rational process for which we are working. Even in the next decade Superpower military crises may end only by nuclear terrorist fear. Peace researchers and Peace educators must bear some responsibility for this situation, especially for their inability or unwillingness to discriminate between concepts such as 'peace' and 'freedom', and 'justice' and 'order', and for the lack of any scaling of priorities in objectives. In short, there is little to distinguish the process of war from the processses of peace research, peace education and peace movements in our time.

At the present stage in global social structural development Peace Education must be regarded as a political pressure lobby campaigning for stabilizing cultural reforms. Much of what is designated Peace Education is , however, doubtfully stabilizing and therefore it is necessary to re-examine the aims and content of the subject before the costly business of a campaign, university studies, teacher-training and text-book publication is undertaken.

## WAR FACTORS IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL WESTERN CULTURE

Western culture has , from primitive times, been among the most war-like in the world (some African cultures being equally subject to as high a frequency, if not to as high a magnitude).

Whilst the Imperial wars of Ancient Greece and Rome stand out significantly, many attempts at empire-building contributed to length and severity parameters.

Quincy Wright (1942, 1968) lists eight such attempts and successes :  Hellenistic wars (from  4th century BC), Roman imperialism (from c. 300 BC), Attila (4th century AD), Muhammad (after  AD 622),Charlemagne (8th century AD), The Viking invasions (from  erly 9th to mid - 11th centuries,  the Christian Crusades against Islam and Orthodox Byzantine,( AD 1095-121270),England against France (1337-1453),

An analysis of these wars shows that the POLITICAL factor (the will to gain power over others and to acquire territory and prestige for ones domain as well as glory for ones self) was foremost in seven of the eight wars, whilst the LEGAL factor (justification of belligerency in terms of moral,religious or conventional consensus; since no formal international law existed outside bi-lateral treaties) featured in six cases. The IDEOLOGICAL  (religious and nationalistic)  and ECONOMIC factors were present each in five wars. Some PSYCHOLOGICAL motivations were distinguishable in most of the wars, but mainly at the deeper analytical levels political and ideological elements such as  the urges to  dominate, acquire protect, etc. and the need  for prestige, glory, security, justification and honour.

## THE SETTING OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF  THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC FACTORS OF WESTERN WAR

The Rennaissance, stemming from the Turkish capture of Constantinple in 1453 and leading to a revival of classical European learning in the subsequent centuries, was the most important event in Western cultural destiny. Humanism resurged to weaken religious belief and, therefore, to stimulate science, world exploration and new moral and social values, unique to Western europe in the first place, but later to spread througjout Europe and to the greater part of the world.

Natural scientific investigation brought : Explosive weapons (gunpowdwr and metal casings as well as propelling devices) and navigational aids, the Printing press (which , in turn, helped  the development of  study among a wirder public, educational expansion and the spread of non-scriptural knowledge and values . As the new ideas took root  the political power of the  Church dwindled and its spiritual power was weakened by reformism; national and ethnic groups were able to claim status as sovereign territorial states  and, under the influence of the new secular philosophy, military power (not religious sanction) became the basis of political authority.

Between the Reformation in 1520 and 1648 (peace of Westphalia) wars were overreligious and political issues and resulted in the principle  of the Secular state and subsequently in the development of the two basic elements in Western ideology : individual librty (secular rights of persons)  and collective liberty ( rights of equality , etc. of classes, races, sexes and nations) ,the  motives of the American, French and Russian Revolutions.

METHODOLOGICAL CHART OF MAIN WAR-FACTOR AREAS AND TYPES OF VARIABLES INVOLVED

D)  WAR
————

|  | A | B | C | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S) 1 | CONFLICT (N) | ORGANIZED (N) | ARMED (N.) | TERRITORY(N) | SOVEREIGNTY (N) |
| I) 2 | (Macro/Micro) CONTENTION | Parties Decision-making Gov't./Oppos./ Foreign | Weapons | Region Country | External /Internal Devolution |
| 3 | Goal diffs. | Pers./Ethn/Ideol/Relig. | | | Dependency / |
| 4 | | Rhetoric/Propaganda | Manuf/Improv. Capabilities | | Internat Hegenomy law |
| 5 | Goal | Media influence | Arms indust. | | |
| 6 | differences | Pol./ Social/ Econ. distress | Arms Race Indust capac. | Geogr /Geol. climatic | constitut. status |
| 7 | Interest diffs. | Demograph.presss. | GNP /Mil. Exp. | | constit. |
| 8 | Background | | | | history |
| 9 | of conciliation | Govt· system | Milit. history | | |
| 10 | attempts | Historical events | | | |
| 11 | Cultural | Educ. | background   Particular and local psychological traits | | |
| 12 | and Value system | | General anthropologicsl and Psycholgical trats | | |

During the last twenty tears much research has been carried out in the field of War-Causes (referred to here as Belligeretics). Comparatively little reference has, however been made to the 'founding fathers'of Peace and Conflict Research ; Sorokin, Richardson and Weight. Although empirical and methodological progress ha been made during the time since they wrote, there is an.obvious and serious lack of any general theoretical structure in the findings of contemporary researchers. Belligeretics has a key rôle to play in Peace and Conflict Research', since a delineation of 'Peace' depends on what we think and know about war, and not least, what we know abot its causes and escalation.

The above chart is an attempt to sytemetize the methodology and analysis of Belligeretics by locating the different classes of variables and , consequently, the seouence or inter-rel-ationships of the many factors suggested by empirical research. Although this method is far from satisfactory, it has many obvious advantages over the random sand piecemeal aproaches in current use and which have led to little more than bewilderment, frustration, apathy and a resort, in the wider field of Peace Research, to metaphysical, idealistic and speculative theories of war and peace.

The framework for the survey hs been constructed from data gollected from 230 conflicts which were on-going during the last six years, but some of which extend far back into the last century.

War is delineated as ORGANIZED , ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TERRITORY, and then the Sufficient causal variables ( collectively 'S'), each one singly being a Necessary causal variable (N) are arranged so as to optmalize interrelatuionships between the various Independent variables (I) and between the latter and the Dependent variables (D), which are also collectively the Sufficient causal variables. Reciprocity of some Independent variables will reveal new Dependency relationships at later stages of research.

Proximity locations in the chart are indicated by the A-E (latitude) and 1-12 (longitude) on the respective axes or hypothetical continue.

Analysis starts from the top, left (Genus) CONFLICT column and proceeds through the (species) ORGANIZED, ARMED, TERRITORY and SOVEREIGNTY columns down to the various independent variables.

Not all the findings, cited from the literature are significant statistically (at or above r=.3 or explain9% of the variance) at the .05 level, but most are statisticcally interesting (indicated respectively by r and (i)). Lack of Significance, at this stage, is due more to packing too many varibles together or usung long periods rather than to substantive lack of correlation.

## A1 - CONFLICT

Wright (1942) Changes in relationships leading to disequilibrium. Same factor may be a Peacee variable (disarmament, 1945) or a Ear variable (Sept. 1939) at other time.

Ruchardson (1960) Violent conflict between dyads is partly a function of their foregoing interactions. The shorter the period of peace, the greater the possibility of resumed conflict ($r^2$)

Starr (1974)($r$)Enemies in a previos war have a greater possibility of being so in later wars.

East (1972) Systemic Status Inconsistency (rh GNP-Diplomat. staus) generates violence ($r$)

## B1 - ORGANIZED

Singer & Small (1972) Most of the war in the system has been accounted for by a small fraction of nations, most of whish would be found near the top of any hierarchybased on diplomatic status, military-industrial capability or related indicators. (i)

The percentage of nations in any alliance and in defence pacts is correlated with nation months of war in the international system ($r$). Haas (1974) Correlates Multipoles and war.

Wallace (1973) War is more probable both at very low and very high levels of polarization. $r$.

de Mesquita7(1975) Tightnes changes in bi-polar systems prduce high war month rates ($r$).

Coser (1956) Conflict with out-groups increase internal cohesion (i)

Collins (1973) Revolutions correlate with (ext) military violence((r). Domestic suppression correlates with (external) number killed.(r).

## C1 - ARMED (a. Manufactured)

Richardson (1960) Found an association between Defence expeniture (per capita) and War Deaths ($r$)

Stuskey & Singer (1973 ) Correlated (total) national military expenditure with War experiences (war frequence, war dead and months involved) (r).

## D1 - TERRITORY

Richardson (1960) Contiguity..Borders,like other external symbols of identity (ifeology, flags, etc.) establish points of contact with the external environment. Richardson found a high correlation between the number of wars experienced (1820-1945 AD) thirty-three states and then number of bordering foreign states. (r).

Starr & Most (1977) Point to the time-dependent element in contiguity, since borders change their type and significance over time. They found that by examinung post-W.W. 2 colonial border situations a different strength was obtained for yhe correlation corfficient, producing an even clearer association. (r

Wesley (1969) Suggests that 'Geographical Opportunity for war is a more appropriate and accurate measure.: he uses length of fronyir's combined with population .r.

Wright, Q. (1942)   The right to make war, creating discipline within and fear of the enemy
                    without,has been the most important sociological context in which  the le-
                    gal conception of sovereignty has developed · · · ·
Richardso (1960)    The decisions of so-called `free, sovereign and independent' states are
                    statistically independent. (i).

## Summary of the Survey

    Although far from complete ·(only the main , Sufficient cause, categories have been  sup-
plied here).some obvious weaknesses in research methods and theory construction are discerned:
    <u>1</u> The overwhelming research  literature in Caues of War is in English,: mostly  by  Am-
erican students. There is a distinctly Western , especially USA, political assumptions bias.
    <u>2</u> Both theoretical and methodological approaches are dominated by a political science
    frame of reference; ie. Attributes of states, Political power bases. balances,etc.
    <u>3</u> Too little attention is given to the work of  `the foundung fathers' (extra weight
    has been given to them hre) including the non-Ango-saxons. Should be required readung.
    <u>4</u> Study  is spasmodic and influenced by general public assumptions on warimmanence.
    <u>5</u>· Methods of analysis are too restrictive and conservative (scientific status  infer-
    iority complex`?)
            (a) Quantitative Analysis :
                    Necessary (Tests of significance for validation of hypotheses, but in-
            hibiting if used as criteria for excluding soft data factors from  pre-theory.
                    Relationships between variables is often too mehanical (simple) . A
            two-way (reciprocal) relationship should not be ignored (Dep-Indep Dep) nor
            should multi-variate analysis.
            (b) Qualitative Analysis :
                    Above all , there is a great lack of imaginative qualitative work.
            A new science which ignores the search for new categories is doomed to fail-
            ure . Numbers do not prevent bias (which comes in when making choices at vari-
            ous stages , mentioned above) - they simply disguise it.
                    Quantitative methods are no more synonymous with objectivity than are
            qualitative methods.   Indeed, there are many instances of researchers using
            mathematical methods as a cover for their obvious bias in data selection and
            prject choice.This has its parallel in Peace Education, where `research'
            is often associated with strong ideological motives and weak methods.
                    The gretest need is for the identification of potentially peace-rele-
            vamt variables by a systematic process involving both qualitative and quantit-
            ative approaches. <u>The methodology set ot in this paper is an attempt to init-</u>
            <u>iate such a    process</u> .·
    (6) All too often many variables are lumped together, even though they are obviously
            hrterogeneous categories; Different sorts of Dependent variablrs (wars, both
            micro level and macro level, ancient and modern; Indicatorsdo not represent the
            same qualities globally, nor historically and may represent co-responses to a com-
            mon stimulus.
    (7) Generally, the state of Belligeretics is moribund and requires a new start, extend-

ing its resource area both backwards and forward in time; history can teach us much about dynamic processes, futurology can show possible and improbable developments ahead, but above all the discipline needs a less parochial focus (notwithstanding the spread of Westen culture and war mentality to most parts of the modern world).

## TOWARDS A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Present work on a new approach is appended to this paper and it is not yet far advanced, but some new insights gained during the six years of work on the project are not out of place here.

One of the main reasons for the failure of belligeretics , to date, has been the lack of adequate data on contemporary conflicts, especially micro confkicts and macro conflicts (inter-stae wars at lower levels of magnitude,: even methods of producing variance between different levels and types of armed conflict has been inhibited by lack of suuficient case study data and subsequent disability to develop viable conceptual categories for testing.

Most sciences,at take off, acquire what is known as a `critical mass' ,, this is a significant assembly of relevant data activated to produce its own dynamic development by one or severalytic agentsworking toward a breaking up of the basic elements,of a body or mass, allowing for meanigfull reconstitution of the elements in such a way that a new process is facilitated.

A probable catalytic agent in belligeretics would be some kind of medium or method which could facilitate a critical change by identifying human cognitive and volitive processes with dynamic (indrprndent and activeàriables in the formation and escalation of armed conflict. We would need to know how the many correlates of war ; social, cultural, political, economic, juridical and military, etc. became functions of human action and how human thought proceeses interact (stimulate and respond) to roles and institutins correlated with armed conflict.

In short we need to tackle the functioning of our value systems in the war-creating process, in a way which wehave never done before ; it will be necessary to OBJECTIFY what we now regard as SUBJECTUVE values, judjements and attitudes. This is of course what science and new knowledge have been doing all along in other fields (all the local remidies for many common diseases have given way to modern anti epidemic immunization , etc.) Yet, in fields which are considered harmless to culture, society os health a large area of freedom of thought and action remains, and indeed, has been able to expand.

For the Mass itself to be significant we need to :

1 - - Fill in the many glaring gaps in ourempirical data and empirically motivated hypotheses (most of our present hypotheses and anti-theses are motivated by traditional (proverbial) wisdom or by current cultural (or sub-cultural; vogue or fads) . Gaps:

     (a) Hard data gaps : Territorial and Soereignty factors

     (b) `Soft' data : Values and belief systems as dynamic factors.

2 - Systematize and integrate new and old data (as illustrated in schema above)

     In order to activate the mass to a critical take-off stage it will require new, or vastly improved methods of acqiring and processing qualitative data ;

3 - (a) Techniques of interviewing and questionnairing case experts.

     (b) Techniques of computing soft data (ranked, uneven or partly quantifiable).

Once the point of take-off is reached and dynamic variables identified, then intrinsic hypothesizing will be possible and extraneous theories (ideologies, etc.) less influential.

# THEORETICAL CONCLUSUONS

Any serious study of the instrumental and causative róles of individual, social and cultural values has, so far, been grossly neglected in Peace and conflict researc. Yet, nearly all the outstanding researchers have pointed to their causative significance ; Sorokin, ( Norms of civilizations), Benedict War as a culturally selected trait), Wright (spread of ideologies; `national interest´), Richardson ( Religion and war), Galtung,1971 ( Ideationalism and sensatism), Druckman 1973 (broader Issues), Sullivan, 1972, 1976, 1979 (Symbolic commitment), Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977 (Integrative complexity) and Pool, 1970 (Ideological symbols).

It is little surprise that the problem of vaues has been otherwise swept under the carpet, since they are methodologically intangible at present; yet they are theoretically indispesable since the future viability of Peace Research and Peace Education rests upon solving the enigma of war-generating value systems .

War, as we have seen in this paper, is present in most cultures of both animals and men, but it is normally stristly controlled in the stimulus-response sequence of animal socirties and, less successfully, by social custom, habit, etc., in primitive human socirty. In ancient . civilizations wars were periodic and unrest cyclicle, due to significant, and often inbuilt) forces and institutions (decay - revival). Most of these patterns are discernable in modern (industrial) Western culture, but the rate of SOCIAL and CULTURAL CHANGE is the significant characteristic difference in our time ( a fact emphasized by many researchers mentioned above)..

This combination ( or sequence) of CHANGE and VALUE SYSTEMS has resulted in our lossing control over war and violence used for political power. In earlier times this would not have been catastrophic, but the changes have simultaneously given us supreme means of mutual disruction, whilst the problems rexplained above are preventing solutions to the war issue.

If Peace research fails, then it will not be the first science to do so; Phrenology (the science of character typing from hed shape) flourished in the mid- 19th century, but produced no valid methods or theories for prediction,: IT WAS MORIBUND BY TH E EARLY 20th CENTURY.

The continued arms races and increase of war at various levels does put a theoretical time limit on the viability of Peace research. Since the end of détente in the late 1970´s, the number of Orgsnized, Armed Conflicts over the Sovereignty of Territory has been steadily rising : 81 (1979, 97 (1980, 108 (1981), 96 (1982), 115 (1983), 120 (1984) and c. 130 (1985). Of these totals, the proportion of Macro (inter-state) wars has increased over the whole six year period from 10 per cent to 15 per cent.

:Surveys to identify the factors behind the formation and escalation of these conficts (see appendices) show the issues of value ( nationalism, ideology, Party policy, religion ethnic staus and various forms of Rights) dearest to the belligerent groups to be prominent factors, if not interrelated variables. These are among the subjects considered at IPRA conferences, but (especially in PES) these issues have become policy rather than being seen as the pillars of war,they, in effect, are. Since the respective commissins (IPRA), like the U.N. and its charter support national and ethnic struggles , to that extent must they too be perpetuating war,r at least until an adequate system of international law and order emerges. Can Peace Research achieve its goal in these circumstances ? Hardly,: it is moreprob- that only bitter experience (repeated Cuba-type crises and nuclear terrorism) will force a upon the world a new order based upon the hegemony of superpowers rather than on reason.

## THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON GOAL

As the General Structural Framework of research- theory develops an increase in the prac-
tical application (including prediction) of the findings will be possible. In the present,
early stages of general theory  the hypotheses and tentative theorems will have to be test-
ed by experience and, where possible, by experiment. Potential subjects for experimental
treatment are not only the Peace Education and Activist Movements, but also the U.N, its sub-
sidiary bodies and even the conflicting parties themselves. However, the weight of the dis-
cussion in this paper will be directed toward the peace movements; Peace Education will be
here considered as an activist movement since the analysis below will distingish it from
Peace Study in respect of the former's tendency to claim to <u>know</u>  the causes of war or the
conditions (requirements) for peace rather than to be <u>searching</u>  for them or researching them

What is known as the `Peace Movement´ is now composed of a number of organizations with a
an increasingly converging common philosophy of life. Earlier each organization stood for
some particular cause; pacifism, nuclear disarmament, world government, natural-life, femin-
ism, various degrees of socialism or anarchy, etc.  Apart from the givenment supported peace-
organizationa of Eastern Europe and associated countries the contemporary , global movenent
adheres to a socio-political ideology which resembles a slightly deviant sub-culture of West-
ern liberal thought and sentiment; being essentially middle class European in both leader
ship and aspirations, even when practiced or expressed in other parts of the world.

Most of the Movements tenets are derived from the European Romantic and humanitarian Rat-
ionalist philosophies, but also draw from Christiamity  ( maimly Prpotestantism), Hindu-
ism and Buddhim selectively and to a limited extent. Its doctrines tend to be dogmatic rath-
er than empirical, but are held sincerely from a commitment to  thr `right´ of a cause rath-
er than to its efficacy. In this latter respect many of its tennerts may be conpared to
the  `folk- cures´ of historical medicinewhich, though grounded in the best possible exp-
erience of a given time or the availability of medicants in a given place, lack the univ-
ersal potency of researched medicine. Peace Study and Research,  on the  other hand, being
concerned primarily with efficacy of means to peace,will provide, where possible, many alter-
native means to peace from which a  practitioner may choose according to conscience or
circumstance. In addition to yhe choice of the remedy researgh has, more importantly, to
identify the cause of the malady; this means distinguishing the essence or germ of the
disease from the symptons it produces. In respect of diagnosis the Peace Movement (along
with the U.N. and the parties to conflicts) scores even worse than do the folk- cures in
the medicinal world; and with more tragic effect (since much folk medicine is harmless).
Symptoms are easier to perceive than causal  factors ; sometimes symptons are mistaken for
causes, more rarely causes are mistaken for symptons, but  <u>the syndrome of war is concealed</u>
<u>by the enormous legacy of doctrine which has been bequeathed to us from political philo-</u>
<u>sophy, ideology and peace thought .</u>

In the first sections of this paper an attempt was made to delineate the concept of
war, since the concept of `peace´ is the central focus of Prace Movements and the appli-
ers or practitioners of peace research then it will be even more important to delineate
that concept in the subsequent sections.

Concepts of the real woeld are based on our <u>system of values</u> and since these vary in time
and between different cultures , societies and regimes, we nrrd toexamine their character.

# THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF HUMAN VALUE SYSTEMS

In an earlier section we noted that wae was an exclusively human phenomemom and that, whilst being ubiquitous and savage in primitive societies, it was somewhat rarer in, and between those societies which had the simplest divisional and hierarchical structires .

These observations lead us to enquire into the role that society plays in moulding or modifying innate human traits, or what is vaguely conceived of as 'human nature'.

Homo-sapiens (humans) are the single species of the genus 'Homo'. It is open to speculation why humans became the omly survivers of the genus, but examination of the nearest surv-iving genus groups (chimpanzees, apes, etc.) indicate that size and complexity of the brain must have been similar to that of the human brain. Homo sapiens (or 'the wise spe-cies of the genus homo') have the unique characteristics of dexterity and speech; the for-mer allows us to make tools and weapons and the latter facilitates not only communication of abstract concepts (the killer whale can also do this thruough a non- biological language, or dialect), but uniquely, values (selective individual preferences and established or dev-iant patterns of thought and behaviour).

Man's physical characteristics do not present any signs of, or apparent reasons for, his warlike behavioir; his anatomy is non-lethal , his sexual and racial divisions give no nat-ural grounds for eliminative struggle or cmpetition,, indeed such biological mutations , allowing reproductive specialization and climatic adaptability, give greater need for co-operation. Although man's psychological character is determined to some extent by basic bio-chemical processes and such traits as aggressiveness, hatred and prejudice are are prob-ably developed by the inevitable early relations of child with parents or guardians. Later, the child is exposed to the procrss of socialization and has to internalize the norms and values of society. It is at this stage of psycho-social developmemt that we most clearly discern the forming of attitudes, values and reactions in the individual, which prepare him for participation in conflict and war behaviour when social and political conditions are set in a particular pattern of belligerency or contention .

Vaues are, however, not merely rational opinions; (Eysenck, 19₃4, 1955), sometimes they are bound up with feelings and emotions via the reflex conditioning learning pro-cess. Values become rmotive when we learn them by associating them with positive (pleasant) Or negative (disturbing or paiful) stimuli (war = death, poverty = hunger, etc). Other vaues are formed via the instrumental learning process which teaches us value by pumish-ment and reward (IfI vote for party 'A'I will have my tax reduced, etc.) It is the combin-ation of these two learning processec which gives us our range of values and determines whether we react in a hard or mild way (emotionally) or in a radical or conservative way (rational) way to various social and political problems.

Man, being a social animal, needs society; his values must therefore in some way be connec-ted wiyh the norms or standards set by the group in which he lives. Out of the strggle bet-ween the young chid's survival instincts (id, according to Freud) and the parents' ef-forts to tach him simple skills and manners comes theinevitable frustrations and consequ-ent aggressiveness, fear, hatred and prejudices, etc., but as the consciosness develops,the infant is soon aware of his dependency on others and that to obtain what he wants he must behave in certain patterns. By eliciting desired responses from the child( via both learn-ing proccesses) rudimentary social values (those of the parents ) are instilled, but, as

the formation of a conscience (suprt-ego , in Freudian psychology) requires a sense of self-respect, which involves the individual realizing that society expects from him the integrity that he expects of others; it is based more in the associative learning process, with warmth and love as agents,  than in instrumental reward, but usually only matures after puberty and in association with peer and other wider groups. Sometimes, a person's conscience is so wwell developed that it brings him into direct conflict with the values of his society and even at the cost of him suffering negative sanctions.Such a conflict may arise when the person derives some of his values from sources outside his group or society ; for instance from the broader culture  into which he was born.

. Homo-sapienslike some species of animals, isthen a creature of society, but, due to their enbowmrnt with the characteristics of dexterity and eloquence,  they are also creatures of culture; they produce both artifacts and abstract ions. Values, though  essentially cultural, are developed and used in a, usually particular, social context. In the ancient world values spread more sic\.ly than they do today and , therefore culture and society (or civilization) were usually synonymous terms. The relative isolation of each ancient tribe, city or civ ilization allowed each grou; to develop its culture slowly and with little influemce from outside; values tended to remain comparatively stable over time.

Wiyh the development of better means of communication, ideas and values have been able to spread from une culture to another and have influenced  the pattrns of thought and systems of values in each to the extent that changes to social roles and institutions have been brought about and new groupings formed. Through a historic process ov devolution and convolution of social groups, societies have developed  each their own sub-culture and specific set of values within the wider culture. Other socio-cultural groups, which have not been part of any large civilization, have also received  external cultural influences; most significantlyin the past from other religions and in modern times from science and technilogy. These cross-cultural currents have brought about the partial separation of society f om distinctive culture and have brought into existence the multi-cultural society.

Since man is both a social and cultural being, each human grouo must have a minimal system of <u>common</u> values, concepts and aims. <u>Although culture is derived from human society, the complex needs of dexterous, eloquent homo-sapiens are dependent upon it for their survival.</u>

From birth the human being is dependent on society and has therefore, to accept some curtailing of his impulses and desires. The indivudual finds both an identity and  security in his social groups : family, peer, party, sex, race, sect, class, city, nation, empire, etc. have each been at some period social sancturics for the dependent individual  and each group has elicited emotional and rational loyalty from its members. Because of the differences in aptitude, ability and skills of the individual members and since they have often other allegencies than solely that group, the need for leadership arises and an investment of power has to be made. <u>Whatsoever the hierarchical structure of the power investment, it has to be sanctioned and legitimized by its identification with some authority which exceeds that of any individual, section or even sum collectivity (majority, consensus, etc. of the group.</u> Traditionally, this authority would be super-natural (a diety or God) or a totem (animal claimed as ancestral root of clan or individual),  or by allegeance with a magician or with magic itself. With the growth of popular learning, sciemce and humanism the legitimization  authorization) of the power of decision-making and  gwarding group vaìues had to be

invested in more 'rational' authority.: objects, institions, concepts or basic common bas?
values accepted at the time as being paramount or vital to social and cultural survival.

The psychologist C.G. Jung (1921, 1959) suggested that certain unconscious (biological)
experiences 'archetypes' are common inheritence to human-beings (at least within the group
which have shared a common culture for many centuries), and that these products of the 'col-
lective unconscious' mind are sometimes expressed in dreams and in our creative imagination
via symbolic images; water, fish, kings, saviours, magicians and symbols of unity. These
imaces appear to match the kinds of authoriy behind both ancient and modern Western societes
and would account for the strong emotional force behind them, which is am important facto
in eliciting the will to self- sacrifice. Jung's concept of the shadow' which we carry in
our minds from experiences of childhoof guilt supports the evidence that leaders are easily
able to create 'stereotypes ' of potential enrmies (negative) or of desired friends (posit-
ive). Leaders are also able to influence the emotive values of their followers by the use
'scapegoats' which are cosely identified with our infant emotions attached to the blame
we bestow upon our parents when they frustrate our primitive desires: though, in the par-
ental home the frustration is usually tempered by warmth and love, hence. a love- hate situ-
ation, which does not obtain in the world of social and political power struggles.

Some values do , however, appear to have an existence independent of any particular mil
ieu or society; they belong to the broader area of human culture, which we still call
a 'civilization' although it now consists of many different societies. These values are
referred to by anthropologists as 'core norms' meaning that they are the basis of all
other values and the main dynamic forces within the various societies of the civilization.
They appear to originate from re- constituted historical religions and philosophies and
they develop and change very slowly over time. Fundamentally, core norms tend to represent
over time a continuum of stages between the extreme social control (by moality) of the
basic humandrives (moral inhibition) and the mininal moral social control of basic drives
and desires.Our present Western civilization, starting from the early Middle Ages gradually
moved from the core noms of (inhibitive) 'other-worldliness; self-rejection and deference
to authority to the present low inhibitive eore norms of 'maximization of material well-
being' and 'maximization of individual (and group) liberty.'Core norms are · a part of what
may be called our 'super-conscious' mind in that most of us normallytake them for given;
they areseldom identified as entities, yet they are implicit in our hopes, decisions and
actions.

Sorokin (1837) identifies three types of core norms :· 'ideational' (relidion- oriented )
'sensate'(secular, humanistic and materialistically-oriented) and 'idealistic'(intrmediate
brtween ideational and sensate, or mixed). He shows not only how vrious historical sects
and communities adopted and practiced one or other of these sets of norms, but also how
whole cultures and civilizations fluctuate over time between these normative systems. West-
ern culture has shown a steady tendency from Magna Carta (i3th centuryl England) through
the U.S constitution, the post revolutionary French Constitution and the Soviet Constitution
to the U.N. Charter, developed along the imperatives of Sensate core morms.

The particular set ofdynamics which hs been generated by the sensate core norms of West-
ern culture have proved to be exceptionally durable and viable; the growth of science, tech-
nology and,above all, communications has provided the possibility of continuous expansion

of the geographical bounds and, thus the extention of the run of the dynamics themseves. One would otherwise expect these principal dynamics to lose strength , fade away and be replaced by dynamics working in other directions and, ultimately a chan e in core norms. As Western culture spreads its norms throughout the world ; areas of traditional culture(usually with `ideational'or `idealistic'normative systems) become involved in its ways of life, often causing conflict but always causing change. It is therefore necassary for us to examine more closely our Western concepts of peace' and `change:

## THE CONCEPT OF PEACE IN WESTERN CULTURE

AS we have already noted, the basic human need satisfied by society is that of security; this condition is brought about in different ways according to the particular needs of people and the mens available at the time.Needs, in themselves, depend to some extent upon values, so such `needs'as peace, freedom and stability vary with time and place.

In traditional societies stability was identified with `no change'(latin : " stare" = to stand), whilst today it tends to mean balanced change, since we live in a dynamic age.Most ancients felt insecure in the presence of change since their roles and institutions were by tradition and custom. Similarly, freedom' was not bound up with political considerations, but with personal relationships and internal moods of relaxation and exhilaration or spiritual escape from the material bonds. Peace was, for the indivdual, a state of mind noy a mind of State!. For the state itself, peace was simply ' the keeping of the rule of law' (e.g. Pax Romana); the sense in which most leaders see the concept today.

Today, peace and freedom are among the most value- charged words in our vocabulary because of their diverse interpretation and, therefore, (as with `change'in a static society, they arouse strong feelings of insecurity. These divergent concepts of peace and freedom arise from the very fact that our culture is in a rapid state of flux without any adequate stabilizing agents.

The underlying caue of instability in contemporary domestic, .ational and international relations is the rapid cultural , and consequent social, change which is taking place in all areas influenced by the sensate core norms pervading Western cukture. Dynamics, generated by these norms , cause the impact and subsequent effects of chane to vary widely between the different families, social classes, races, nations and areas of the world.

Perhaps the most alarming characyeristic of our present culture is that it lacks viable dynamics which produce stability (balance and order in the process of change). Its core norms of Welfare (maximum possible material well-being, living standard, etc.) and Liberty ( maximum, not optimum, freedom demanded by and often for, each individual and group ; family,community, sect, sex, race, nation and region of the world).  In the pursuit of these implicit vales tjere have arisen explicit goal- oriented Jdeologies: Party (of the politico-economic system), Quai-religion of the socio-cultural s stem, but having strong politico-implications), Nationism ( of the over-riding allegiance of citizens to the sovereign, nation state) and Racism (of the inherent value of a particular biologically, linguistically or ethnically (cultural tradition) determined and exclusively composed group).

In Ideational culture the core norms and their dynamic products found expression through religious insitutions and therigid hierarchies of estates and kingdoms or empires, but infast changing socially and geographically mobie Sensatecultu re the institutions of soc-ial control are often closely associated with the agents of social change, thus, the State

Has its laws and its constitution, but it also has its particular mixture of ideology derived
from the dynamic products of the core norms and some traditional (inertia) remnants of earl-
ier norms and institutions; political parties, pressure lobbies, rlections, etc. In the
lomger run the laws and even the constitution are subject to change because of the dynamic
products of the norms and resulting ideologies. If the former do not change in pace with
dynamic developments, then cataclysmic change may occur, but if they change too rapidly soc-
ial and political unrest are likely to develop

SENSATE CULTURE

CORE NORMS :           Material Welfare                    Liberty

DYNAMICS : Science, Industrialization, Urbanization, class formation, popular awareness.

IDEOLOGICAL TYPES :    Party (Pol-Econ. systems) National    Racial    Quasi-religious

SOCIALINSTITUTIONS : Market organization, Trades Unions, conscription, Education ,Secular.Lit.
                     Pol. parties, pressure gps.  Nat.sovereignty, etnic and sectarian power
                                                                                movements.

Thus, Norms give rise to dymamics and dynamic social movements bring about social ant
economic changes, which, in turn open up new opportunities , but at the szme time create
diversities such as classes, sects,  sex role incompatibilities, racial  and ethnic minority
groupings and sectional interest groups.   This correspondence of opportunities with divers-
iities is the main source of conflict and war in Sensate Western culture, which , by virtue
of their ideologies, must incude societies as divergent from each other as the USSR, the
USA, South Africa, Israel, Egypt, China avd Iran.

Whilst the incidence  and varying magnitude of any given conflict will vary wiyh the
several othr factors mentioned in the earlier sections of this paper, the underlying value
systems provide the basic MOTIVATIONAL CAUSES  of  contemporary conflicts.

It becomes obvious that if ideologies  differ widelt in their conceptions of the peace-
ful society (or world), then diversities arise out of social and political changes, both in
their . societies and in others. According  to opportunity being available, and other factors
supporting, moststates desire to influence others in the way of their own values; much of
the influence goes throigh economic and diplomatic channels, but should influencing involve
violence the leaders invariably appeal to  the need for national security, a value which is
in our culture widely accepted and which is emotionally tied to the basic psychological soc-
ial  need of all human beings.

However, not all individuals and groups in Sensate Western society interprate`security'
in the same way.  Leaders of both state s and insurgent groups are almost exclusively from
the industrial middle-class or have absorbed the values of that class. In general, the basic
core norm .motivating the industrial (dynamic) middle.classes is not  that of Material Wel-
fare, but. due to their relative material satisfaction, that of Liberty . Even though inthe
minority of the total population in most industrialized countries, and in asmaller minority
in less developed countries, this social clas, by virtue of their superior education, skills
and income, form not only the effective leadership, but also the intellectual sub-groups
which produce all the alternative policies and articulate what they believe to be the inter-
ests of the broad mass of the population.

 Evidence of the paramount place the lesers give to the core norm of Liberty (in one or
more of its derivative ideological forms : justice, freedom, Human rights, dignity, liberat.

ioh, national interest, etc. fills the front, editorial and foreign news pages of our news-
papers, where we may also learn of the enormous price in human lives and material deprivation
that the common people pay for their leaders' pursuit of such ideologized values.

Ideology is the secular age's equivalent of God in that it is used to legitimize and give
authority to the leader; firstly to his position of power, but also to legitimize preparat-
ion for war and, when opportune, for legitimizing belligerency ( or, in the case of the reb-
el, insurgency).

A state or a particular party usually takes on a policy derived from several types of ide-
ology; the USA mixes Party (of the individualistic, free enterprise, private capital alterna-
tive,the Nation (patriotism, cultural pride, devotion to own citizens, principle of the
inherent right of the existence of the national, sovereign state) andQuasi-religious ideology
(politicized religious sectarianism), its Racial ideological component has weakened gradually
in favour of the Party ideological type's civil rights content. Im the Ussr the Party type
ideology clearly dominates, since national groups are relatively strong, yet the Russian eth-
no- hegenomy is still dominant, In South Africa Racial ideology is dominant, with, original-
strong support from Quasi-religion, but Party (socio-economic free- enterprise, etc) is in
close support. In Nazi Germany there was a similar ideological pattern, although the partic-
economic circumstances of the time influenced the more centralized control of the economy (in
the Party ideology).

Althoughtheseveral composite ideological systems are dirived l; rg ely from the dominant
core norms of our time, they differ so greatly in selectivity ( leading to diversification)
that the diversity is constantly causing friction as changes generate new c ;o tunities for
some. In some areas of the world ideologies are sufficiently compatible to allow close pol-
itical co-operation, e.g. USA- Westen Europe, and in other cases opp: tunities have led to
political and economic integration (Western Europe and Eastern Europe, respectively). Yet,
closely associated with these respective opportunities are the diversification prcesses
(due largely to new opportunities created in the aftermath of world-war 2) is the cold-war
situation which has dominated world politics for nearly half a century and which has led to
the biggest arms racr the world has ever experienced.

In addition to conflicts between the super-power blocs the increasing instabiliy in rel-
ations brtween the super-power states and smaller adersaries and between the smaller states
themselves, as well as in their internal situations , witness to the domi nant role of ide-
ological values in conflict formation and escalation; territory , once a geographical or
economic concept, has become increasingly endowed with emotionally charged values such as
'motherland' fiome of the free, until it is an is an almost pure ideological entity;—more
recently, ideology has become akind of non-physical territory; ground for which life and
welfare have to be sacrificed.

Behind ideology are the core norms, their dynamics, change in values and institutions
and subsequently new opportunities and divergencies; workers, women's and racial movements
emancipation arise basically from new opportunities (power generated by the incresed econom-
ic and social need for their labour or vote) So ideological influence is only one, allbeit
the most vale charged; product of the norms leading to conflict. In its moral equivalent in
ideational gulture religion was successful in facilitating social control over the less social
instincts and habits, but in our sensate ideologies we have to use economic sanctions or phys-

ir ilt enforced law to maintain order. Where no system of enforceable law exists, as between states in our time then resort to violence is a constant danger. Even within states, where such law exists, difficulties arise out of utside support for rebels and insurgents.

In these circumstances we need to look more closely at the vaues behind our concepts of peace; each ideological system provides , sometimes only by implication, its own concept of peace. So divergent are some concepts that they become the issues of conflicts and , where means of mediation or law exists,end in war.

Most of us would agree that an international system of enforcable law would be an important step on the way to world peaxe , especially if it was effective in preventing help reaching armed insurgents and terrorist, besides preventing war between states. However, since it is inconcevable that enforcement could be totally effective in preventing armed violenc (as it is not totally effective within states which have law systems) the some people advocate measures at other levels of social life; hence we find theories concened with prevematting frustration, persecution and suffering which might lead to aggression and violence.

For some psychologists and pedagogists (Fromm, Milgram, Feiere) believe that if chidren are reare in ways so that they do not experience frustration violence or authoritarian social relations, they will grow up to be peaceful and society would eventually become free from hatred, aggressivenes., selfishness, etc.. For many such thinkers society and culture are where we learn our negative, war producing traits; they usually have a Jacobean (from Rousseau) concept of human natute where we are seen, at birth, to have a blank-slate mind on which all our characteristics of behaviour, learnt from society, are later impressed,. Some thinkers would go eurther and claim we were born only with `positive´traits, but they would reach the same conclusions that ' man is basically peaceful´ therefore the less interference from society , the better for peace. ·

On the other hand, some thinkers like the English philosopher Hobbes, believe man is basically competitive treagherous and aggressive, therefore needs to be subjected to constant restraints and pressires, hence a peaceful society is one having strict surveillance, harsh laws and effective punishment and sanctions. The latter would seem to describe the more general concept of peace accepted today, but in any case, in the dynanic context of our sensate cultural norms, the propositions are academic, only. We know that Rousseau:´s philosophical writings were swiftly followed by the revolutions in .America and France and that the constitutions of thoe countries andnow, of the U.N. contain much about the Jacobian idea of the need for man to be free, but Rousseau was just as much a part of the dynamic forces already in our culture as are those constitutions and the Hunan Rights treaties of today. Maexist ideas of peace are also a part of the same dynanic cultural change, its philosophical base differd from those of the other philosophies of change in that it referred to the freedom of a particular group,: the working- class of the industrial era. Its impact on has since been modified by the particular historical and geographical location (Russia) of its application. All these have developed into ideologies with different concepts of peace rmd. in turn influence not omly the respective leaders and policies of government, but also determine opposituon movement and concepts of peace supported by unattached movements. In so much as the varios concepts of peace contain elements of the ideologies, they must be considered as potential agents of war in the absence of any factors limiting value- conflict escalation.

## THE FATAL GAPS

It is obvious that , in our time, the general public, the press, media anf leaders hold widely disprate concepts of peaceaccording to the particular ideology under whosw influence they are.All the the various regions of the workd are, to some extent, now receiving some inf luence from Western norms, but aven in the geographical West itself, sub-cultural ideologies are to be found with cross cultural norms (ie. holding elements of ideational cultural norms or weker ideological convictions.

Whilst menbers of the Peace Movements and the PeaceResearch community often regard themselves as separate from the forces driving towards war, or the first citizens of a peaceful global society, they are unwittingly often contributing to conflict and violence. True, some of the traditional goals and neans of the prace movement; non-violence, universalism, brotherhood, tolerence, asceticism, charitable love, rtc. were from other (ideational and ide alistical) norms, but most of contenporary peaceniks are basically sensate in their norms, although mixing or trunkating ideology.

Current theories in Peace REsearch and education give witness to this sensate conviction: concern with varios sorts of freedom, emancipation, national liberation, devolution of power, ecological balance, economic and social development, etc. With the possible exceptions of economic welfare andecology the concern is motivated by the powerful core norm of Liberty, which, as nited earlier, is clcsely associated with the middle-classes ; even ecology is a libertarian norm off-shoot despite its association with naterial phenomena and welfare.

As mentioned in an earlier section, due to the rather piecemeal andvalue -loaded development of peace Research, some very serious gaps of knowledge (including data, merhos and theory). By far the most inhibiting gap is the lack of method and empirical data on the role of human motivating values in the formation of conflicts and escalation to various levels of war.

Other gaps of a methodological character concern multiple ralationships between variabies especially involving continui and variance between war and non-war situations, however in segtion interest will be concentrated on gaps involving the role of values.

One of the most typical theories of Peace Reswarch is that of STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, (Galtung, J., J.P.R., 1968 No. 3); it has proved to be extremely popular bot within the Peace movement and in the wider sphere of international, social relations; it has had a great influence on the concepts of peace and war in our time, however, it is a potentilly dangerous theory in that it tends to further the very norms, dynamics and ifeological contention described in this paper. Although a logical construct, not based on empirical data, it is quite convincing, especially to those in the sub-cultyral groups mentioned above.

The concepts of Peace and Yiolence are extended thus:

<div align="center">

violence

direct             indirect (structural)

no direct viol.          no structural viol
= NEGATIVE PEACE (Disociative) = POSITIVE PEACE (Associative)

</div>

Structural violence is injustice created in the context of either a state system or in le context of multinational economic systems.; it is calculated by tge measure of life-years lost by comparing actual death-rates with those expected from (What are assumed to be) norm- al life expectangy figures .

These hypothetical deaths are claimed to compare badly with wae deaths in revolutions , etc in the same region and, presumably, for the cause of ending the injustice which caused the high death rates.

Apart from the methodological and data collecting problems., the danger of using such vaue-loaded concepts as Structural violence and Negative Peace is obvious. They both broaden their respective common usages rather than delimiting them, as is usual in scientific analysis.

Furthermore, `justice´ (which alredy , except in concrete legal contexts) is an emotive wordlike `peace´meaning all things to all mem, and some things to some women; it is in instance, as in many others, juxtopposed to absence of direct violence, which is really a very low level of conflict when compered to most wars. The potentially most fatal gap here is the implicit dichotomy between Positive Peace and Negative Peace; we need to know much more about what happens in between . i continuum as below helps to solve the problem ,

POS. PEACE / social improv./econ. improv./ external Devpt aid/ Restriction of ext. exploitation (by multinationals / relaxat. of debt charges / Ext appeals for limited changes/NEG.P. A similar continuum is also necessary to cover stages of conflict higer than Negative Peace, between states.

A very serios danger with both the demand for ending structural violence and demands for Rights is that these demands may, and certainly.do, sometimes transfer desires and other sensate cultural elememts from the industrial West to cultures not alredy inclined to such values.We need to examine much closer the relationship between Human Rights and other ideological rhetoric and the inciddence. and esgalation of tension, ams races and war.

Galtung's 'associative/disociative' development concept dichotomizes that process,too. ' Human Rights,' even shed of their recent power-political rhetoric; are essentially Western; sensate; middle-class values; not meeting themore economic needs of the overwhelming majority of the world' s population. As power-political issues the "blanket" (complete packet) demands foe universal enforcement ) are certainly conflict-provoking. The diverging ideologies of West, East; North and South assure differeces in interpretation and priorities of Rights; piecemeal; selective application of the principles would help reduce the ieological gaps and related tension.

Conceptual gaps exist between "development" as perceived by Northern, developed countries and leaders of developing states in respect to the asymetric economic terms of trade and finance , whilst between the leaders and masses of the developing

tensions arise because of unfulfilled promises of higher living-standards after liberation or independence; the U.N.'s aspiration to create self-determination for all national groups did not account for the a symmetric global conditions (climatic,geographic, demographic and economic, etc), which produce great instability. The number of armed conflicts has risen, duding the lastforty years, in proportion to new states formed.

Other dichotemic illusions ,befogging peace vaurs and concepts are: National sovereignty- (regionalism/federalism)- World authority and Marxism-(postindustrialsm)-Capital.

·This paper has stressed the importance of human values, especially highly emotive ones;
the study of war and peace, but values ned vehicles or carriers;; leaders at all levels
are potent carriers of values, but in there positions of power, they also exploit them. In
sensate societies  there is more licence for the biological drives to exercise themselves;
in the absence of over-riding laws or sanctions power and freedom often give   opportunity
for envy, competition possessiveness  to  break out in conflict. Almost all major conflicts
and wars have a power struggle at the crucial point of formation.  Yet, the leaders' conce-
pts of power are-themselves derived from values; their basic social function is to give sec-
urity to their followers, but often they misuse their authority.  In an age of infinite
destructive power  and relatively high licentiousness , we need to be assured that whatever
decisions are taken .are  the ones which will produce  the most security.  · -

Peace Researchers and Educators at the present time are not in any valid position to
advise or resreain or encourage decision-makers. Authority to advise must rest on the viab-
ility of their theories, such viability demands success in applying their work. At pres-
ent such theories are sketchy or non-existent because there is lack of. a sense of direction
due to their goal Peace' being a diffuse concept. Basically, we need to prioritize our
goals. In this paper stress has been put on values as <u>causative</u> factors in peace and war;
we must decide whether such interests as justice, in ts legal meaning, is prior to Human-
rights or vice-versa, whether  women's emancipation and rights are more important goals and
means than disarmament at various levels, and what place ecology has in a peaceful world or
ending war, <u>above all we must decide whether and which elements of 'peace' are necessary to
achieve which level of conflict resolution.</u> Unless we can clarify these questions and .
give some satisfactory answers, we will remain impotent in the face of increasing war.

Some broad criteria are suggested here :

· <u>a</u>    Priority to search for  solutions to <u>most threatening conflicts in global terms.</u>
             (1) East-West conflict: results in Nuclear arms-race
                                  : affects North's relations with South

         (2) Unconnected regional or local wars having probability of spreading


    (b) Urgency ;Conflicts requiring  immediate attention because of available opportunity.

    {c} Measures  that will  secure a visible degree of stability

       (d) Long term peace-building measures :
                     (1) . permanent security system  U. N.)
                     (2) .Reduction of states' right to belligerency and sovereignty (UN,)
                     {3} .Reduce idrological rhetoric ( UN, Churches, monitoring orgs.

                     (4). STudy relation of Rights and Justice to conflict and war
                     (5) Relationship of biology and early care to aggressiveness and war
            <u>N.B.</u> Measures D1 - D4 will necessitate replacing arbitrary action by world law.

            Although priority, here is given to <u>symptomatic</u> conditions of conflict,a study of
       the underlying causes of arms build-ups and military blocs will (longitudinally)
       occur simultaneously, whilst conditions less threatening to peace are (lat) excluded.

The prioritized criteria; schematized above, are based on the delineating princip-
les of (a) That the goal 'peace' is a limitable object of study. (b) that some
kind of activity or behaviour constitutes the condition sought. (c) That there are
observable, varying degrees of that behaviour. (d) That the degrees and types of
behaviour are mutually comparable.

Peace is limited to 'no violent conflict' (thereby excluding Rights, just-
ice and freedom issues not involving violence and also Developmental, ecological
and general conditions causung human suffering and death to the extent that they do
not cause or contribute to physically violent conflict. (Alternatuve concepts;appen 6)

Conflict is observable and measurable to some degree ; therefore, its contribut-
ory factors may be identified by registering the extent of their pesence at the
formation and escalation of conflicts. According to the degree to which a factor's
(variable's) influence on a conflict is measured, the factor is regarded as contri-
butory. These are the basic principles of selecting factors leading to conditions
of various stages of conflict.

The absence of any given factor from a conflict situation does not ; of course,
mean that it is a necessary condition for peace; since a state of peace consists of
countless elements, most of which have no significance at all to the problem of con-
flict or non-conflict. For this reason every claimant '. peace " factor needs to
be verified by factorization analysis. Most of the declared peace aims in both power
political and Peace Movement policoes would not qualify as contributory ingredi-
ents (necessary factors) of peace if tested against present research findings.
Aims such as 'democracy', 'national security', rights'(various); ecology and 'hum-
an dignity', etc. are ideological; and sometimes utopian, aspirations not necessary
factors of peace; they are preferences for a peaceful future; but they can, and often
do... cause conflict and war.This confusion arises through identifying WHAT IS PREF-
ERRED with WHAT IT IS NECESSARY TO AVOID: e.g women's lib. prefer a just future for
women and consequently claim that present injustice by men is part of the war soc-
iety; since the movemrnt have defined 'peace' in terms of equality,etc, irrespect -
ive of any conflict relationship to the aim.

All the major world quarrels contain an element of this falllacy; it is a basic
factor in the ideological gaps and, therefore a key to solving some of the most ser-
ious problems of our time. In Peace research and education it means grading down or
out some of the present aims,such as those mentioned above,The present , indiscrim-
inately broad concept of pece has led to its present deflated value .in terms of en-
hanced value of struggle and conflict, and has also actually increased conflict (see
appendices 1 to 3 for indicators of ideological values in recent conflicts).

By replacing ideological elements and reducing the latitudinal dimensiun of the
concept of peace, we can give more opportunity to the study and development of the
longitudunal dimension and the study in depth of both the more verifiable and the
more directly correlated factors of pece. Disarmament is a central problem; seen
longitudinally we must look at arms races, cold wars, tension reducing. ideological
rhetoric and -mass psychosis; social and biological needs and drives. etc.(append..5)

Contemporary Peace Education has little to do with education in the generally accepted sense and even less to do with peace.

In the Latin source (educere) of the English word `education´ there is the connotation of `bringing up by drawing out´and may European venaculars take the same meaning , but have other words for `LEARNING KNOWLEDGE´, instruction´and training skills´, etc.Even some non-European languages use the connotation `up-bringing´ or `nurturing´ as the general term for education.

In English, the addition of the connotation of `procuring knowledge´ took place during the Enlightenment and the word `training´became current in the early industrial era to describe the teaching of specific skills.

Even if we take the current brod definition of education as : The devrlopment of knowledge, understanding and skills´ ( `development´ implying also`bringing up´ or`nurturimg´ at all ages) we are still faced with the ethical and social problems of - wo is to be tayght about what and by whom - ? It is obvious that the broader the definition of the field of education, the geater significance these value decisions become and the more difficult they are to make.

In order to come to terms with this prblem we will need social functional definition of educ tion which explains why certain facts, ideas and values are included and why othrs are excluded either from all or part of the scheme.

Two of the basic social principles of contemporary education are : <u>That the individdual should have the opportunity to realize his/her highest potential personal development</u> and <u>that a minimum standard of social, cultural and economic behaviour and activity be attained in the society as a whole in order that the group shall continue to survive and develop.</u>

Since the role of formal education in modern society is deemed, by rulers and ruled alike, to be of such vital importance to all;the education system is not allowed to be fully autonomous, but is subject to guidance and restriction by central and/or local governments. Normally one of the governing bodies is a national or federal state and its interests are at some point decisive if not paramount. Furthermore, through the mass-madia and intermegiate opinion leaders, the current values of the culture are constantly impinging upon educational institutions and educationists. <u>Yet, the contemporay notion of Peace Education epitomizes all that is anathematic to established authorities, including those of most small states as well as those of the major powers.</u> Disarmament plans either disrupt carefully worked out defence strategies or threaten rms industries, developmentment means either competition for markets and losss of revenue (for eveloped countries) or outside interference (for developing countries), justice, human-ights and national liberation are all viewd differently by every state despite widespread acknowledgement of the principles behind them. Environmental protection and nature-conservation ean higher production costs or increased taxes to many heavy industrial states, policies of quality of opportunity and reduction of poverty (except in very prosperous countries) usually rouse strong political opposition and sanctions from privileged sections, womens´ movements re an embarrassment to most governments (moally, socially, legally and economically. Further-ore, the school reforms demanded by Peace Educators often too radical to be absorbed by thr resent institutions of mass education.

Peace Education,as conceived of in its present form, would not meet the current requirem-… ts of most existing sojcial systems and is to be , at this stage,regarded as a <u>social movemen</u>

However, even as an activist movement, Peace Education has achieved varying degrees of integration in some national systems; Broadly through four strategies :

 1 Assimilation ; where a liberal system accepts many new subjects in difuse array.

 2 Limited cooperation; where only one or two (UNESCO) peace studies/reforms are found.

 3 Partial (localized districts) acceptance with general (central government) taboo.

 4 Para-system activity; where the Movement organizes grass-roots activities; courses.

Only the second strategy is really dynamic in the sense that it is not only practicing P.E(writing out nationalist bias from text books),but it is also a part of a new; global education system. The first strategy (as practiced in Sweden) has the weakness es of being nationalistically value-loaded (pacifism; N.V.etc; are taught in the context of

national-security policy having a particular potential enemy; in Scandinavian countries) and;like strategies three and four; the concept of peace becomes weakened by including various ' rights' demands; women' s subjects;ecology and aspects of development (Third World), which not only reflect Westwrn preoccupation with libertarianism; but are a danger to stability in those countries;

It becomes obvious that the question of values is paramount not only for promoting; making acceptable. and legitimizing P.E.; but also; as with P.R.; for determining what it is all about and clarifying the goals. Hence; the need for delimiting criteria :

A The goal (study objective) is a dynamic need rather than an inert utopian concept. Appendices illustrate provisional data from studies of actual ; contemporary conflict situations;(1;2 and3); whilst appendix 4 illustrates the whole range of claimed ' Peace' goals.; many of an inert (derived from tradition; philosophy; sectarian conviction and other a-priopi sources ) character.

B Urgency and immediacy of situation studied ; Full-scaie war; (ABC weapons); limited; conventional war; conflict situations involving impovised weapons; threat situations with nuclear arms races; conventional arms build up; Unstable " negative" peace; stable " negative" or " minimal" peace situations; grades of " Positive" peace (ending of some Uuman Rights inringements which provoke violence and war; ending of H;R. inringements which generate hatred or frustration; ending of economic exploitation and " structural violence"; especially in the third world ; where great loss of life and health is threatened; etc.

Priority here is according to relationship to to conflict and war rather than to general human concern, since the latter would be a wider category of interest and would involve many mope people institutions; states and resources than are available or manageable in any reasonably defined study of peace.

C Geographical extent and demographic density of problem area ; Global Hemispherical. regional(devse); regional (sparse); Sub-continental (dense) & sparse; nat-' ional(D/S); local (D/S'; interpersonal, personal.

Peace is, then, seen to be a dynamic process; of filling dichotemic gaps by extending continua; not conflict-provoking 'total surrender', blanket 'human rights' damands or complete economic; social and political 'development at one revolutionary sweep.

Peace Education should alsobe viewed as developing multi-dimensional continua :

World Studies (inter+ intra states),Futures (Devpt. rights;environ.), Peace studies P.E.
UNESCO Universities Teacher trng. —>Study Orgs. Higher schools Lower schools

**Column headings (left to right):**

...NATIONALISM · L. 'REALISM' · ...SS STRUGGLE · REVOL ANARCHISM · EUROP. UNITY · ...FEDERALISM · TRANS-NAT COMMUNIC · ECUMENISM · WORLD GOVT. · INTERNAT LAW · SCIENCE OF INT. LAW · SOC. SCIENCES · PEACE EDUC. · FREE TRADE · LIBERALISM · PLURALISM · UTILITARIANISM · RELIG. & POL RIGHTS · RACIAL EQUALITY · WOMEN'S RIGHTS · OP. MOVT · TP: ES UNIONS · LIB. ANARCHISM · PACIFISM & CO-EXISTENCE · HUM. ECOL · JUST WAR

**Timeline (by decade):**

**1860**
Mazzini · Int. Post · Christian Missionary Relief Work · Dunant Geneva Conf. · SCIENCE OF INT. LAW · Tocquoville · Ruskin (Lab Equal) · Chadwick

**1870**
Garibaldi · Bakunin · 1st Soc. International · Union · Int. Telecom. · Int. Sport · (Int. Red Cross) ('Humanization of war') · Bright · (War as becoming ethically/absurd) · Popular Male · E. Haeckel · Publ. Health · Tolstoy

**1880**
Disraeli · Esperanto · A. Nobel (War as becoming logically absurd) · W. James · Suffrage (Eur.) · Wholesale · von. Suther · J. Bright · Swed. Peace/Arb. Soc.

**1890**
2nd International · Olympic Mvt. · Y.W.C.A. · de Bloch · Aeton · Pareto · Co-op. Int. T.U. · Women's Suffrage Movts. (Eur. & USA) · Int. Peace Congress Bureau 1892) · Veg. Movm.

**1900**
Wilhelm II · Nobel Prizes · Foerster · 1st Hague Conf. (1899) Robertson · 2nd Hague Conf. (1907) · Gandhi · B. Russell

**1910**
Kautsky · Lenin · Boy Scout Movt. · P.P. Harris Rotary Club · Freud · E. Durkheim · N. Scheiffen · Wehberg (Science of Pacifism) · Syndicalist Movt. · Einstein

**1920**
Cominern (3rd Int.) · Int. Vol. Serv. · World Alliance · W. Wilson · League of Nations · Fried · Steiner · Dewey · Montessori · M. Weber · Women's League (1915) · Benedict XV · No more War movt. · Mutual Aid · Pius XI · (Facism) · (Falangism) · (Zionism) · Decentralization of power

**1930**
Stalin · Trotsky · World Sport Tournaments · Permanent Court (1922) · Kellog Pact (1926) · Int. Gold. Stand. · Toynbee · Richardson · R. Benedict · Sterling Area · Women's Votes · Syndicalism · Anarchism · Spengler · Schumacher · N. Angell · H. Niemoeller · Schweitzer · Hitler · Collective Secur. · Churchill · Int. Youth Hostels Fed. · H. Rogge · M. Mead · Pacifist Study Gps. · Rostow · T. Parsons

**1940**
Niebuhr · Spykman · Begin · Morgenthau · Wld. Council of churches · Christian Jewish Counc. · Sorokin · Q. Wright · The Just War · Environmentalism · Nuclear Dis. Movt.

**1950**
Kennan · Waltz · NATO · Warsaw Pact · Kissinger · Schelling · Osgood · Brussels Treaty · COMECON · Coal/Steel · WPC Comm. · World Federalists Assoc. (1947) · U.N. SEC. Council Int. · UNESCO F.A.O. · World Bank Hammarskjold · International Court · Int. Law Practice · Preventive Diplomacy · Int. Law Practice · Int. Polite Force · Bouthoul · Polemology · T.F. Lentz · Havana Conf. · GATT · Fromm · Dahrendorf · Anti-Apartheid Movt. · Int. Conf. of Free T.US. · U.S.A. · Women's Equality · Dolci · Nehru (5 points) · Aparth-eid · Comin-form · Mao

**1960**
Morgenstern · Aron · H. Khan · (EEC) EFTA · Rome Trty. · Nordic Council · Federalism · Europ. Unity · Christ Aid Org. · I.M.F. · UNEF · Devpt. Agencies · Free Trade Areas (Eur., Africa) · Boulding · Sharp · Liberal Soc. Reformism · Soc. & Polit. Pluralism · Luther King · Stud. Revolt · Carson · Eisenbart · Freire

**1970**
Marcuse · Guevara · P.Pot. · Red Brigades · Prolet. Internat. · Pop. Lib. Movt. · Amnesty Int. · Computer Codes · MacBride · UNCTAD · G. Myrdal · Islamic resurgence · Sadat · K. Deutsch · Galtung · Kende · Lorenz · Singer Pire · Peace Communic. Peace Education · Free Trade & Mon. Exch. · Peace Modelling · Conflict Theory · Zacharov · Hippies Movt. · Naess · Picht · Civil Right Human Right · Women's Lib · Racial Equality · John XXIII · J. Paul II · Libertarianism · Students Rights · Minority Rights

**1980**
Nat. Autonomy · Race Hegemony · Power Balance · Mut. Deterrence · Nat. Lib. Front · Soc. Primitivism · State Centralism · Helsinki Conf. · W. EUrop. Parlm. · Madrid Conf. Inst. · Intl. Mass-media · Ecumenism · Trans-Nationalism · U.N. Univ. · Devpt. Theory · Econ. Devpt. Theory · U.N. Gen. Assemb. · Sea Law Conf. · Rules of War Conf. · POLEMOLOGY · World Order Theory · Violence Theory · SALT · Pacifist Anarch. Decentralization · Syndicalism Trade-Unionism Co-Op. Movt. · Rad. Pacifism Co-Existence · Ecosophy Hum. Ecol. Nuc. Disarm · End Class War · Abich

**Year markers (left margin):** 1860 · 1870 · 1880 · 1890 · 1900 · 1910 · 1920 · 1930 · 1940 · 1950 · 1960 · 1970 · 1980

**GENERAL UNDERLYING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT**

Sequenced
   longitudinally

Biological factors
Natural environment     Social environment

Core Norms
Dynamics
Rapid  socio-cultural change
Socio-cultiral instability
Techno-economic development   Socio-cultural development
Industrialization  Global trade
Urbanization
Rapid communication    Ideological Systems (Pol-econ., Nationism,Racial,Ouasi-rel
Geo-politics   Techno-politics  Econo-politics  Real-politics  Ideal-politics

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**GENERAL OPERATIVE FACTORS (Longitudinal)**

Biological needs ⟵ Personality differences ( acquisitiveness, greed, dominance/submissiveness, aggressiveness; hate;guil
Human physical differences (race, sexm age)
Geographical differences Econ, Social and political differences
Climatic differences  Cultural differences (ethnic, linguistic, customs; habits; art.instits. relig.
Military technological differences

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**SPECIFIC FACTORS OPERATING IN PEACE AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS**

Longitudinally &,
approximately, Lat-
itudinally sequenced

Basic resources (food, shelter,raw-materials)    Lamd reform
  Hunger., starvation Divis. of labour Exploitation of labour
  Food and shelter    Strict hierarchy    Capital-labour relations
  Agricultural development    Colonialism    Alternative industrial society
Racial types  and groupings   Racial discrimination and segregation   Race relations reform
Demogrgraphic movements /fluctuations Population pressures,cont'guity  Birth control,.family planning
Acquisitiveness, greed    Charisnatic leadership Mass psychosis  Authoritarian /liberal;child-rearing
Flight, migration, refuge
    Inate aggressiveness, dominance/submissiveness  Convolution(devolution of power
Ecological inbalance, erosion  Technological competition Arns industry    Alternative technology
Navigational access    Control of waterways, ports , vantage points Contiguity Racism  Ethnic/Racial equal.
TErrutorial divisions  Economic regions  Sovereign state units  Nationalism   Federal and Global integration
Development Struv. Inter/itra state tens. Ideological rhetoric Arms races Quasi-religion Propag. Ecumenism, ·Humanis
  Areas of contention Incompatibilies Capab. Right of belligerency/self-determination Polarized alliances Comm.De

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**THREE ASSOCIATED CURRICULA AREAS EVOLVING TOWARD PEACE EDUCATION**

(Sectioned latitud-
inally, sequenced
longitudinally)

**PROSPECTIVE PEACE EDUCATION**

| WORLD STUDIES | PEACE STUDIES | ALTERNATIVE FUTURES |
|---|---|---|
| Basic human characteristics | Human nature & Society | Theories of Human Evolution & Devpt. |
| Homo sapiens;tools,weapons | Aggressiveness/Dominance/acquitiv./hatred | Chld psychology and fostering habits |
| Human types & Needs | Physiological Differences, Conflict/Co-op. | Early social life,socializ.internaii |
| Physiological,psycholog. | Geographical & Climatical Sources of Confl. | Archetypes; stereotypes,scapegoat |
| Natural Environment & Needs | Culture, History; Conflict and Cooperation | Education for orderly change(reform] |
| Climate/Geog./Ecology/Ener | Values and definitions of 'War' & 'Peace" | |
| Global Economic Patterns | Norms, Social systems and Goals; Ideology | Family. school and society |
| Prod. Trade,Communic. | Western/Eastern/Northern/Southern Interests | hierarchy. discipline; |
| Human Suffering | Contemporary evidence of the Causes of War | Comparative Normative Systems |
| Natural Disasters | Power; Leadership , Security and Decisions | Historical,regional. changing |
| Man-made Suffering | Predispositions to War (Econ/POl./Demogr/Rel. | Cross-cultural co-operation & peace |
| | Catalysts of War : Rhetoric,threats,Ultimata. | Changing roles; Gender,age, race |
| World Education/Comminic. | Strategic doctrines, Security policies.Neutral. | Minority groups in changing society |
| Internaional Insts. | Conflict management, peacemaking insts; UN etc. | Social control in Dynamic society |
| Underlined items provisional | Peace Research,education and application | Custom;law.duties, justice,rights |
| Peace Educational subjects | (All Peace Studies form Peace Fducation) | Post-industrial society;leisure/work |

## SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF WAR AND PEACE

The concepts included in the continuum thesis of this paper are mutually complementary; they are more or less broader than each other, but mot contradictory as are some of the non-continuum (dichotemic and paradoxical) concepts and theories, whilst they are progressive (toward peace) rather than regressive as are some apocalyptic concepts.

Of the most general concepts, that of the cultural anthropologist R.Benedict is most basic : WAR IS A CULTURALLY SELECTED TRAIT . War is not only 'in the minds of men.' (UNESCO); but also in the institutions of society and in traditions of culture;it is chosen at some point(s) .

Social anthropology gives us the concept of A (macro-social) Fight(not a game, with rules) TO THE DEATH. This implies that the important components of peace are stability, rules and law.

In this present thesis the theoretical goal of research is to determine the necessary means for ENDING VIOLENT CONFLICT; ultimately at all levels, but more immediately at the most threatening (armed) level, hence the need for an empirically operational,delimited, definition of war : ORGANIZED, ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF TERRITORY ( see appendix 3, Ranking).

Thus, the theoretical concept of peace (Absence of violent conflict) is , at present, beyond the scope of the operational concept(Absence of Armed Violence) the actual conditions necessary for a non-violent world are left open to speculation pending the findings of research at the various levels of violent conflict. Peace is,therefore, seen to be a progressive, open-ended continuum moving towards a more stable and less conflict-ridden world ; the actual content of the stability ( the satisfaction of other needs, desires and fears, etc., whilst being a part of the subject matter of the causes of instability, is considered to be both outside of and partly dependent upon the seaarch for less conflicful, less violent and more stable human relations.

Indeed,it is the inclusuon of other gols in concepts of peace which is preventing continuous, linear progress toward stability and is producing the other situations illustrated below:

Figure 1                    CONTINUUM OF LINEAR PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCED CONFLICT LEVELS



Figure 2   LOW STABILITY CULTURAL VALUES
composite of continua,showing :
a Progressive stability
b Regressive stability
c Digressive (milit.) paradox
d Digressive (libertarian) gap



Libertarian Gap
With increased demands for change in liberation, human rights and political development, in the name of peace,the instability-stability gap widens,

Military Paradox
By increasing defence investment,to increase national security, security is diminished by the instability of general arms adjustments.

Any movement away from stability values (toward more free action,, miltary power, fatalism,etc, will tend to swing the continua out of horizontal plane and toward the (regressive) vertical axis. Military strength increase will swing the continuum (c) in the direction of W (instability) by virtue of the 'Paradox' partial dichotomy, whilst the libertarian continuum (d) is moved , by virtue of its gap, in the same direction. Fatalists and apocalyptic fundamentalists represented by (b)may digress to :Comenius (1592) believed the faithful should educate for millennial peace whilst accepting the inevitability of Armageddon.

:OMPARATIVE PEACE PARADIGMS

The paradigm of Linear Peace expressed in this paper is based on the concept of increasing (progressive) stability. Stability is here defined in a dynamic context as ORDERLY CHANGE and is a condition much undervaued in Weste.n Industrial Culture where war is endemic.

War is fundamentally generated by the cultural values held by a society; although most primitive and ancient societies practiced war, the exceptions show us that it is not a nacessary condition of man, but is basically the product of the simple fact that a society (or civiliization) finds , at a given time, the value of the condition of nowar to be less desirable than the condition of war as envisaged at that time. Such conditions considered to be of a highsr value than peace (or an indispensable part of the peace) were in primitive and ancient societies usually associated with supernatural phenomena : magic, totems, dieties, etc., but in contemporary societies philosophical (moral), ideological or political phenomena provide the highest and most dynamic motivation for war (when they are considered threatened in a condition of no-war) . Most contemporary armed conflicts are ostensibly or apparently over territory, ethnicity, race, party, class or sect (religious party), but these entities have no intrinsic value; the value (emotive and cognitive) we attach to them is extrinsically derived from the pervading cultural core norms and their dynamic products. Power struggles over national sovereignty, racial equality, human rights,etc. are often implicit in peace paradigms and therefore such paradigms possess a high destabilizing potential. Furthermore, all peace paradigms are, in practical aplication subject to Lateral Pressures which, being generated by the dynamics of the social structure, account for the discrepencies between the declared aims and the actual manifested policy, actions and consequences of a paradigm. This raises a viability problem.

In order to assess the different stability and viability potential of the various peace paradigms it will be necessary to aply three types (two stages) of logical analysis: (a) Hypotherical Logicity; establishes an associative connection between the main independent variables (causes) and the dependent variable (peace or reduced conflict), (b) Empirical Logicity; dteermines a serirs of factual (experiential) relationships between independent, reciprocal and dependent variables (c) Quantitative (statistical) Logicity: establishes discretely measurable correlations of variables. For our purposes b and c are combined into the analytical category of Minimal Digression from Stability (MD), whilst Hyporhetical Logicity forms Minimal Rggression from Stability (MR) and the normative category of Mininimal Aggression (MA) embraces the Low Emnity Values Accelerator (LEVA) and the Low Unsanctioned Physical Hostility category (LUPH). Identification of Independent/ Dependent variables is coded : I and D. A tentative scale 0-3 (4 points) is used.

CLASSIFICATION OF PEACE PARADIMS ACCORDING TO STABILITY PRODUCING POTENTIAL AND PRACTICAL VIABILITY

| PARADIGM | MAIN VARIABLES | MINIMAL REGRESSION | MINIMAL DIGRESSION | MINIMAL AGGRESSION | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | LEVA | LUPH |
| Linear Peace | D= Progr. stabilty (milit.disengag'mt. Arms reduct. policy compatibility, world law, justice, rights. I= Reduct of Ideolog.rhetoric, propaganda,threats. | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| World Govt. (UN) | D= Prevention of Inter-state war, Global justice I= Maintaining sovereign equality of states, Hum.dignity Providing forum, mediation, policing, monitors | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| World Federalism | D= World Federal State I= Convolution/devolution of Nat. sovereignty/econ. | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Pacifism | D= Abolish war, reduce violence I= War resistance (milt refusal), N.V. action | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Regional Fed'm. | D= Regional federal Union I= Reduct. of Nat sover'gty./trade barriers | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Development (3 Wd) | D= New, equitable world order I= End econ. exploit'n. Aid local enterprise | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Positive Peace | D= No Structural Violence, no Direct Violence I= End endemic exploitation, introd.justice. | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Women's Lib. | D= Peaceful World under Dual-gender gov't. I= Equality of status/opportun. End discrimin. | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Environmentalism | D= Green Peace- Survival of biological world I= Create will to survive, conserve,preserve life | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Human Rights | D= Establishment of global,fundamental justice I= Promoting rughts concepts, monitoring digressions | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Militay Alliance | D= Collective Security against attack I= Combining forces/resources, com.strateg., incr.capab. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| National /Pop.Lib. | D= Global community of self-determined states I= Overthrow of colonial/hegemonic/central power | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Mil. Deterrence | D= Security by maintaining overpowering threat I= Balance of terror, M.A.D., optimum capabilities | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Arms Race | D= Security in overall military superiority I= Maximum military capabilities, incr. arms expend. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Basically, the problem of peace paradigms is that of matching prgressive stability with viability. Here static stability is both undesirable and probably unattainable in dynamic cultural periods, but in this paper some suggestions have been indicated as to which factors may be both stability-promoting and viable. An open-ended paradigm (leaving ultimate values and goals aside of politics and allowing the dynamic products of the dominant norms to take their course) is the most prudent in our age of mass destructive power.

## The Danish Peace Movements and the Political Development

### nationally and internationally.

Judith Winther

Denmark

To understand the peace movements of a certain country and their influence on the political development it is not enough to look at them as national units inside the borders of this country. They are national in so far as they react upon the national aspects of an international problem, but they are international in so far as it is evident that it is only possible to solve this problem internationally. They are national in so far as it is the politicians of their own country whom they try to influence on the assumption that each country can and must make its contribution to the solution, but they are international in so far as they have to admit that even the national effect of the peace movements of a country is based on the simultaneous existance of an internationally expanded peace movement. However strong the peace movement of a certain country may be it is the knowledge of the politicians that it is not only the question of an isolated phenomenon in their own country but that a similar breakthrough in positions of the populations is going on in the neighbouring countries which is decisive.

Each of the national movements therefore plays a dual role. For the politicians of their own country they endow the international movement with the necessary national aspect and for the politicians of the other countries they serve as a proof of the existance of an international movement. Most peace movements in the course of time have been international, but they havn't had the same reciprocal effect between the countries as what we see now. Their start has usually been as an international organization which afterwards has established subsections in different countries. For the "new" peace movement of the eighties (with "new" I mean the broad peace commitment which started in Europe in the end of the 7oes the beginning of the 8oes and which consists of both already existing groups and new ones) it has usually been the opposite way. They have started nationally and then they have found together with groups from other countries in an acknowledgement of the necessity of an international cooperation. The cooperation gives to each movement a better comprehension of the many diverse aspects of the same problem and it can give a broader scope to their own actions.

It may seem unnecessary to emphasize this fact. However, there are too
many instances which show that it hasn't been clearly understood, and it
can therfore not be considered an obisous knowledge. On one hand many
descirptions of the peace movements concentrate on the national movements
as defined units, and if they do get to the subject of the international
aspect they usually treat it merely as a supplement to the national
activity , not as an integrated and indispensable part of the work of the
movements. On the other hand this view results in a much too simplified
search for a direct way of influence from the national ·movements to the
politicians of the country, an influence which of course exists in some
concrete matters, but which usually is insufficiant as an explanation.

There are several descriptions of the peace movements in Denmark, among
others Michael A. Krasner, The Poltical Influence of the New Danish Peace
Movement 1979-1986. 1986.  As a supplement to this I will look at the
international connections which the Danish peace movements enter into.
This viewpoint may also better than their daily work describe the
destinctive character of each movement.

At the same time I will also emphasize another aspect which is chara-
teristic of the peace work of the eighties in many countries. It is true
that since actual peace movements arose in the last half of the 19.
century you could describe the peace work by describing a few big
organizations and their work. But to-day it is important also to consider
the way in which the peace work has been integrated into the daily function
of the society itself by specially professional groups which link the
peace work to their own function in society and which consider the armament
from the special aspect of their professional knowledge.  The peace work thus
becomes a public matter in a quite new way.

Finally I will go through the relation between the "new peace movement"
and the political development and in this cooenction look at the development
which has been going on inside the peace movement and which may point to
future ways of work and influence.

The League of Peace and Freedom was the first Danish peace movement
which was established as the section of an international organization,
WILPF (Womens International League for Peace and Freedom). Danish women
took part in the first conference arranged by women from many countries in
the Hague 1915 in protest against the ongoing war. Already in 1917 the
League in Denmark had more than 1.7oo members. It was, and it is still in
many countries, only for women, and it functions as a NGO by the UN. As a
UN related organization it has stressed the connection between the peace

work and the 3. world problems and at the moment it commits itself among others to the work with refugees. The League has a yearly international executive meeting in which representatives from all member countries take part and several international seminars and conferences.

Aldrig Mere Krig (AMK) started in 1926 as the Danish section of War Resisters International (WRI). AMK is the most pacifist of the Danish peace movements. It considers  military defence  conflict-creating in itself, and it attaches importance to the work with conscientious objection and non-violence. To reach a result it stresses the need of a simultaneous change in many places, and it considers equality, tolerance, cooperation and decentralization as a first condition to avoid conflicts. Besides getting the international newsletter of WRI the Danish AMK is not so active internationally at the moment.

In 1882 the Assiciation for Danish Neutrality/Danish Peace Association was established by a former first lieutenant from the Danish-German war in 1864. The association grew quickly and about the turn of the century more than 1o.ooo people subsribed to its periodical. The Danish Peace Association was a national organization, but the founder of the organization, Frederik Bajer, was one of the originators to the foundation of the World Peace Office in Rome, whose first president he was.

After respectively the 1. and the 2. world war the Association changed first to an association of the League of Nations and then to an association of the United Nations. In 197o it combined with two other associations connected with the UN, Een Verden and Dansk Samråd for FN, thereby affiliating to WAWF, World Association of World Federalist, and WFUNA, World Federation of United Nations Association who both are NGOs. It took the name of the Danish Association of UN. The association is on the financial Budget and with a board where alle poltical parties are represented you can harly call it a popular movement. However, it often works together with other peace movements.

Except a short period about 196o where protests and marches against the nuclear armament took place in many West European countries including Denmark it wasn't before the 197o.es and especially the 198o.es that an actual renewal took place. The old peace groups began to grow and new ones sprang up.

1974 the Liaison Committee (formerly Cooperation Committee) of Peace and Security  was established by delegates to a world peace confernce in Moscou in 1973. The Committee became an umbrella organization of all the existing peace organizations. The Committee has always maintained its

independence og the Moscou oriented World Peace Council, and it is not a member of this Council. It takes however part in its meetings and it is always informed about its plannings. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of martial law in Poland the Danish Association of UN left the formal cooperation, and in 1982 also the International League and the AMK withdr.w. Cooperation between the peace movements about different arrangements however go on. The Committee has replaced the earlier member organizations by local groups and sections of trade unions.

No to Nuclear Weapons and Women for Peace were established in the beginning of 1980. Both started as national movements, and both started on the background of signature campaigns in connection with the double track decision of NATO.

After a period of consolidation No to Nuclear Weapons (Nej til Atomvåben, NTA) found its international affiliation in the END groups, the Westeuropean peace groups independent of both blocs and of political parties. In September 1981 NTA organized a conference in Copenhagen between likeminded peace groups from countries in the Northern part of Western Europe. At this meeting IPCC, International Peace Communication and Coordination Network was established, and gradually similar peace groups from all the Westeuropean countries except Portugal joined it. Its secretariat is by the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) in the Netherlands. The groups from the different countries met several times in the year to exchange informations and to plan future work. The form of this cooperation remained very informal and grassroot-ish without any board or any person who could speak on behalf of all the groups. All groups had to endorse any common statement. By and by this cooperation was also extended to contacts and cooperation with peace and human rights groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a cooperation which became of importance for the peace philosophy of many of the peace groups.

Women for Peace movements exist in several of the Westeuropean countries, and they have been of importance among others in the Netherlands and West Germany. But as the Women for Peace movements themselves are characterized by being the groups with the most loose structure also their international contacts are without any firm structure. There exists cooperation from time to time between women from different countries, as they also sometimes cooperate with the Womens League. During the last time there has been a tendency to engage in the problem of women and the military system. For instance a conference about this topic was arranged in Finland in January

1987, and the conference will be followed up by a similar, but national conference in Copenhagen, October 1987, arranged by the Womens League and the Study Group Women and Militarization who visited the Helsinki congress.

A special group but of importance to the understanding of the international relations of the Danish peace movements is the Copenhagen Foundation against Nuclear Tests. The Foundation is not big, but it has got an extended net of contacts not least in the Pacific, and it has made a great contribution to the knowledge of among others the French tests in Moruroa and of the French imperialism in the area. Thanks to this Foundation the level of information about these matters are great in Denmark as well as in Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. The Foundation was established in 1980.

As mentioned before it is important to include some of the more influential of the many peace groups from different professions or of a special character to understand the extent of the peace work in Denmark. Many of these groups are also part of an international network.

Like NTA Christians for Disarmament started with a signature compaign against the Double Track Decision of NATO in 1979. The signatures were collected in church circles. Through its cooperation with the Danish Ecumenical Council Christians for Disarmament have got contact to the Churches World Peace Council. Besides this they have on the Westeuropean side got contact to the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and on the Easteuropean side their contact is with the Christian Peace Conference, with its headquarters in Prague. The Christian Peace Conference is the Eastern churches' affiliation to the Moscou related World Peace Council. Moreover Christians for Disarmament cooperate with sister organizations in Sweden and West Germany.

Danish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons was established in 1981-82. It is now member of IPPNW, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which has got 60-7o countries as members. IPPNW arranges a yearly conference with delegates from all the member countries.

The Psychological Research Group started as a small working group in 1980, and it is now establishing a broader pshychological peace group. The group has got contact to psychologists working for peace in other countries, but there is no formal cooperation - yet. Through the related International Society of Research in Agression, ISRA, the group takes part in a work about enemy pictures.

Some Danish lawyers have for some time worked with the legal questions

of the nuclear armament, the International Law etc. In September 1986
Laywers against Nuclear Weapons was officially established. The group has
got contact to the Swedish Lawyers against Nuclear Weapons, they have got
a special contact to the Greenlandic peace movement, and they have
appointed a group to establish international contacts and cooperation.

The Peace Group of Teachers of the Senior Schools started in November
1983. It take parts in an international cooperation of Teachers for Peace
about peace education and materials for peace education. They also arrange
exchanges with school classes in countries in the East as they are working
to arrange similar exchanges with 3. world countries. In May 1988 there will
be the second International Teachers for Peace Conference in West Germany.
Besides this group there also exists Teachers for Peace and High School
Teachers for Peace in Denmark.

A special group is the Youth Movement for Peace which was established
by young people from several of other peace organizations during 1983-84.
They have got contacts to similar groups in other countries, but without
any formal cooperation. It was - among others - the Youth Movement for
Peace which started the Next Stop Nevada group which to its visit of protest
in the Nevada desert had participants from several other countries. The
contacts had been  entered into at the World Peace Conference in Copenhagen
1986.

Besides these groups there are several groups who form themselves around
certain topics for a shorter or longer period. They often originate from
some of the existing groups. E.g. Next Stop Nevada  (coming from the Youth
Movement for Peace and Liaison Committeee for Peace and Security), and The
Ravnstrup Women (coming from AMK and Women for Peace) who made a peace
camp by the NATO command bunker in Ravnstrup 1984/85.

The many smaller and bigger groups can give a flickering impression
and make it difficult to estimate the nature and the size of peace move-
ments. It may also help especially smaller political  groups and parties
to attain a disproportionate influence without appearing openly. However,
in the end it will always be a question of who in fact  exploits whom, when
the groups don't identifies themselves.  The amount of groups may be
regarded as a lack of organization, but you may also consider it a sign
of vitality in the population in the question of peace, a commitment which
is carried through and making its influence felt on quite another level
than the big and spectacular demonstrations.

The circumstances about the INF development (or the TNF which was the
name in the start until the associations of the word "theater" became too
loaded and was replaced by the more factual sounding "intermediate range" -
a change which the peace movement unfortunately followed quite orthodoxly
without considering the strength of the words) and the role of the peace
movements has been treated and explored so often that it is well-known
material to anybody. However, there are some aspects which I think it might
be valuable to call the attention to.

The fact that it was the INF question which started the "new" peace
movement has resulted in a tendency to connect the peace movements solely
to the development of the INFquestion both in public opinion and  by peace
researchers. The consequence of this has been that when at least a great part
of the peace movments exceeds the INF discussion and other themes strictly
related to this and have looked for broader views or views alternative
to the pure weapons question and balance discussion, these views have
become almost non-existing in the public attention, so non-existing that
you often may hear complaints of the peace movement being too centered
around the weapons question..

To make this alternative way in the peace movements plain, which I
consider important because it points to future possibilities, I will
shortly describe the relevant period dividing it into a number of phases.
The development is characteristic of movements both in Denmark and in
other West European countries. The political consequences have been some-
what different in Denmark. This I'll mention after this description.

1. phase. 1979/80. The "new" peace movement made a symbol of the 572
intermediate range missiles which NATO planned to deploy in Europe. To
stop this deployment would be, they said, a turning point and it would
start a development of disarmament. The demands which were raised were
general and definite, "Stop the armament", "Remove the Nuclear Weapons
from East and West", "For disarmament and detente" etc. You may object
that slogans at demonstrations and on leaflets necessarily  must be short
and general. You may also say as Sverre Lodgaard at a small internal
meeting in the peace movement in Copenhagen in 1981 "Now we have been
looking for years to find a solution through weapons restrictions in one
way or another, and now the populations come here and raise the old demand
of a complete disarmament. We have to admit that this may be the way out".
(cited after memory).

2. phase. 1980-83. Of course it is not the way to make complete disarmament,

but it is a way to force the starting of a discussion. However, the
reaction from the Defence, the right wing, the majority of the medias and
a great part of the peace researchers was also to claim more knowledge from
the peace movements. How can we take the peace movements seriously when they
don't know the names and the numbers of the weapons, how can you expect
them to understand the technicalities of the negotiations when they don't
know doctrines nor strategies. They talked condenscendingly about the
diffuse anxiety.

And then the peace movements became experts, in Denmark and in other
countries. They enabled themselves to hold their own in writings and in
talks in public meetings, in schools and whereever they were faced with
officials from the defence, politicians and others. They learned to point
out inexactitudes and lacks of logic. With the result that the peace
movements more than ever were linked to "the 572" in public opinion.

But the peace movaments have always stressed that the point was to stop
the armament and to change tension to detente. "The seemingly reasonable
claims of "reciprocity" and "blance" have proved to be inapplicable because
of the differences in weapons systems, the geography and the military
strategies of the super powers. To this comes that the claim of balance is
absurd, both parts having the capability to exterminate each other for a
long time," Nej ti Atomvåben wrote in 1982. "NTA will therefore contribute
to detente by keeping the dialogue across  the East-West border alive and
by cooperating with those forces in East and West who work for the
possibility of the European populations to decide their own future".

Of course, the "numbers game" can be of some meaning in an actual process
of disarmament. But the "numbers game" can also be used to stop any possi-
biliy. Therefore the peace movments linked the demand of disarmament to
the thought of "unilateral steps", which couldn't be especially problematic
considering the existing amount of weaponry. And they raised the demand of
detente. With "dialogue across the borders" and "cooperation between groups
in East and West who work for the same goals" they had already for some
time introduced the notion of "detente from below".

3. phase. 1983. The deployment started, and the peace movements "lost".
They lost an evident and easily mobilizing goal as a starting point. The
same thing happened to the American peace movements, whose mobilizing claim
was a freeze. Here Reagan with his SDI plan succeeded in underminig the
popular support for a freeze.

But at the same time the peace movements had succeeded in drawing the
attention to the lunatic size of the weapons race, in bringing the whole

policy of security up for a discussion, in creating a critical majority
in the populations in most of the West European countries, in changing/
or strengthening the position of many of the political parties to a more
critical and open one, and, not least, in keeping the situation open and
mobile so that even if the atmosphere was detiriorated a new cold war as
in the fifties didn't come through.

4. phase. 1984-86. The "void" after the end of the missile claim made some
people inside the peace movements and most people outside them : expect
that it was necessary to findanother goal you could gather around. Somebody
considered the SDI a suitable successor. But the subject was much too
indefinite. What is the threat of SDI? A real threat the day Reagan's dream
would come through? A fata morgana? Or a new way to hurry up the race in
weapons technology? Presumably the last, which is serious enough, but not
of a sufficiently mobilizing effect. A test stop had some interest. With the
Soviet moratorium a possibility seemd to have arisen. Letters of support
were send to American senators advocating a test ban, and Green Peace and the
Danish Next Stop Nevada made it a subject of their campaigns.

Psychologically it is of course wrong to expect a repetition of what
has happened before. Through demonstrations, signature campaigns, opinion
polls etc. great part of the populations had already emphasized their
position. Only a coincidence of special and urgent circumstances would be
able to create conditions as in the first years of the eighties.

Without being able to demonstrate the same popular backing the peace
movements, who were still more and greater than ever before in history,
continued their work and new groups started. For the independent END
movements it was important to increase the work for detente and East-West
contacts on all levels. E.g. the Helsinki treaty (The final act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki 1975) and the
possibilities in it attracted attention. This interest was a direct result
of promptings from the contacts in Eastern Europe and especially from
Charta 77, Czechoslovakia.

"The demand (in the Helsinki treaty) that the governments must fulfil
all their promises and obligations has not been exploided fully by the
peace movement. Such binding agreements, ratified by international law,
form a framework by which the citizens publicly not only can supervise their
government, but also devise new ways to loosen stagnating attitudes" (The
Prague Appeal, 11. March 1985).

The independent peace movements continued their work for "detente from
below" in two ways. On one hand through contacts, exchanges, attempts of

joint arrangements (The Freedom and Peace movement - Wolnosc i Pokoj - in Poland succeeded in carrying through a seminar in Warsaw the 6.-9. May 1987 in which people from many West European countries, USA and Canada took part as well as a Yugoslavian and a Czeck, member of the Charta 77. There was also a letter from the Moscow Trust Group. Many fruitful and mutual instructive discussions took place) and common statesments as e.g. this statement from 1985 worked out and signed by women from the five European countries where missiles at that time were deployed: Great Britain, GDR, BRD, Italy and Czechoslovakia. "... (we) are united in the firm wish of selfdetermination, of the struggle for peace, against uniforms and violence, against our children being brought up to soldiers and against meaningless waste of ressources. We demand the right of self determination of every single person and of all populations - - (we) choose the way to take initiatives ourselves from below. This way doesn't go via militarization of the society, and we therefore reject any involvement in the preparations of war. Neither goes it via launching pads for missiles or the destruction of nature and the personal communication between people. We neither wish a peace which suppress us or a war which destroys us".

The 4. of November 1986 the peace movements published a memorandum in Vienna drawn up in a cooperation between independent peace and human rights groups from East and West Europe (from Denmark, No to Nuclear Weapons). It says among others: "The Europeans must not any longer restrict themselves to expect that the superpowers - and the bloc-to-bloc negotiations - alone should be able to afford the solution. They must to a higher degree develope their own initiatives and strengthen existing tendencies to a plurality of relations between the countries in East and West".

In stead of the wide popular support behind the mass demonstations in the earlier years the peace movements in many West European countries, and not least in Denmark, now experienced a strong support behind this line of peace work. It turned out that during the last years there has arisen an amazing great interest in the populations to "take the initiative themselves". Schoolclasses, high schools, unions and single persons and families are travelling in "East" and arranging exchanges. It is not the borders people are moving, it is the "wall" between the populations, a clear result of the intense discussion of the ongoing armament and the current peace policy during the early eighties.

On the other hand peace movements also tried to get cantact with the official circles in the Eastern countries, among others the peace committees, to discuss the problems and to present their viewpoints. They have arranged big conferences between the independent peace movements in West and the

peace committees from East plus, at the request of the committees the West European peace committees with which they cooperated. And they have arranged visits between movements and committees from West and East on a bilateral basis. In this way NTA has visited and has had visits from peace committees from DDR, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

What the peace movements wanted to achieve by these meetings was to make the people from East Europe understand that they are against nuclear weapons anywhere, in East as in West, that they saw decisive defects also on the Eastern side, that the Eastern countries with their closed societies supporte the arms race, that they considered the freedom of the people a precondition for obtaining a peaceful relation between the nations (not that it was a claim, but that they considered the freedom the only way to cfeate a lasting peace), and that the persecution of independent popular groups and movements made the statements of wish for peace untrustworthy.

Everything seems to point to the fact that these things which were said to them by people who didn't consider them enemies, and who at the same time opposed the Western armament as stronglyas they did, has had an effect. At these meetings and intercourses one thing became quite clear: the closed societies of the Eastern bloc were a great constraint to their own comprehension of what happened in other parts of the world, and that it therefore was of importance to them that people who were not their enemies neither their parrots talked openly to them.

"We have stressed (for them) the need of changes and we have said, that peace movements must work for social reforms. Now the Soviet leaders say that there is a connection between peace and reforms. - - The political understanding in some parts of the peace movement which argues that we have to behave nicely and decently was not good enough. The Soviet Union and its people are worth better. Everybody has - - the right to see the true face of the persons with whom they speak." (Wim Bartels, IKV, The Netherlands in Information 12.6.1987).

Finally the peace movements have placed "Europe" on the programme. The first somewhat primitive slogan "The superpowers out of Europe - for a united Europe" (END 1982-83) has been substituted by more thorough questions about the possibilities of Europe and about its identity and independent role between the two superpowers. This discussion is a disengagement from the thoughts left behind by the cold war and its simplified explanations, and it makes"peace" something more concrete than an abstract and unpolitical benefit.

5. phase. 1987. The Reykjavik meeting in 1986 created new possibilities
for a nuclear disarmament in Europe, even if it itself ended without results.
The coming time seemed to indicatethat an unsolvable question suddenly
seemed to be solvable, and the proposal of a zero solution was even extended
to a zero zero solution.

We have returned to the starting point. But the situation is turned
upside down. No matter what the motives are it is the superpowers who want
to remove the internediate range missiles from Europe now. It is the West
European conservative politicians who are setting up hindrances. A
development which more than anything shows the necessity of discussing
Europe and its identity.

How does the peace movements react? There have been demonstrations in
most of the deployment countries (when not of the same size and intensity
as in the early eighties) , and the independent peace movements have in
a common statement called upon the governments to carry through the zero
zero solution, to start immediate unilateral steps in both blocs and to
prevent a new arms race. "It is therefore important" they say, "that an
initiative of this kind is followed up by a further demilitarization of
the East-West conflict in Europe and not revive the old debate about
balance and deterrence with new weapons of another character" (8-4-1987).

In Denmark the peace movement is in the particualr situation that the
Danish parliament the 3o. of April 1987 "imposed upon the government to
support in NATO and in other relevant international organizations a Soviet-
American agreement to remove their European intermediate range missiles,
an agreement which moreover will render Europe almost free of nuclear
weapons." The most remarkable for this statement is that a united parliament
stands behind it.

But the Danish solitary approach to the INF question is older, and the
Danish footnote policy is well-known. However, till now there has only
been a narrow majority behind the Danish decisions on security matters.
As the Danish experiences accentuate problems for the peace movements and
for a peace policy in all Western European countries, problems which have
become especially apparent after the latest INF development, I will shortly
outline the main features of the Danish development.

From the start of the INF discussion the Danish government (at that time
a social democratic minority government) has expressed doubts. Foreign
minister Kjeld Olesen asked at the NATO assembly, 12. December 1979, for
a postponement of the decision for half a year in order to try to start

negotiations. This was declined so emphatically and/or Kjeld Olesen didn't insist sufficiently, so the doubt didn't result in a footnote.

It can of course be difficult to give a precise answer to the reason of this social democratic hesitation. At the NATO assembly in the early summer the same year the Danish government had no objections to the deployment plans. In the autumn great signature campaigns against the decision were carried through - NTA e.g. brought two full-page advertisements with names of protesting people in the biggest news papers. However, Lasse Budtz (social democratic spokesman on defence) says "I am the last to underestimate the valuable contribution of the peace movement. But the development in the social democratic party was parallel to the work of the peace movement". (Politiken, 11. June 1987). The question is of no great importance. Whether having exerted influence or support the commitment of the population in this question was of importance, and during the next years the protests, as all know, grew still stronger.

From the time when the social democratic party came into opposition in the late summer 1982 and during the next years the Danish parliament manifested itself with a number of statements expressing from doubts to direct opposition to the deployment. This position was based upon a parliamentary majority against the conservative government, and it was this majority which forced the government to an attitude at the NATO assemblies which resulted in the footnotes.

The reason to this change in the attitude of the parliament was exclusively due to the changed attitude of the social democratic party. None of the other parties, whether they supported or opposed the continued armament, had or has changed their attitude. And the ability of the social democratic party to catch so quickly the groving opposition and translate it into political action is connected with the fact that the party from the time when Denmark first joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has taken care that Denmark (as Norway) to a certain degree has follwed an independent line within NATO. It was a social democratic foreign minister who in 1949 ensured that no foreign bases should be placed in Denmark. In 1952 a social democratic government declined a proposal of deployment of American airplanes in Denmark, and some years later when the thought of nuclear weapons in Europe were brought up it was also the social democratic government who decided that there should be no nuclear weapons on Danish soil "under the present circumstances" that is when it was peace.

The conservative parties protested against each of the decisions, but when
they had been made it became the official policy of the countfy which every-
body could accept. In the 6o.es and the 7o.es the independent Danish line
was to a high degree replaced by a Danish policy (most of the time decided
by social democratic governments) which complied with the NATO decisions.

"The alternative majority" in the Danish parliament in security matters
consists of the social democratic party, the socialist peoples party, the
left socialists and the liberal party "The radical left", and opinion polls
show that this majority will exist also after the election in the autumn
1987. There is a possibility that the social democratic party will come into
power either alone .as a minority government or together with the socialist
peoples party, and it is difficult to say for certain what this will mean
to the alternative majority. There are forces in  the social democratic
party who want to hold on to the present policy, but there are also forces
who are hesitant or directly against it, and it has been seen before that
a party has grown more conservative when in power. This is a serious
challenge to the Danish peace movement.

Another challenge is the fact that even if we have got a clear political
majority for a nuclear disarmament policy this majority hasn't succeeded in
an active political work in international connections for this policy,
neither has it succeeded to alter the Danish defence policy appreciably.
Till now the contribution has been certain restraints in the growth of the
defence spending. The conclusion of this is that a small majority, even if it
is democratically founded, is not sufficient to carry through a really
radical change in a security thinking which has been formed through
centuries.

As said by Pelle Voigt from the socialist peoples party, it is "necessary
to create an extraordinary broad majority for an alternative policy in
security and disarmament matters. It requires that we can gain confidence
in our policy far on the other side of the center. Security policy cannot
in the long run be made with a majority of only 51%". (Information 8-11-1987)

To this you may say that according to the opinion polls the majority for
an alternative security policy is higher than 51%, but in political
connections it doesn't seem to come through. It is in this connection the
Danish experience can serve as an accentuation of the problems in Western
Europe. Here also opinion polls have shown a majority against the current
security policy and the missile deployment. All the same, in political
connections this opinion is far behind a majority.

How is it possible to create a majority strong enough to force the top of the conservative parties to consider changes, to accept wholeheartedly the removal of nuclear weapons and not to contemplate a substitute with more conventional weapons. To be sure that the social democratic parties will keep up their present policy and elaborate their current disarmament intensions it will also be necessary with at least a change in some of the conservative parties.

A precondition for a change in broader population circles is a much broader understanding of the notion "peace". It has often been stressed that "peace is more than the absence of war", a statement most people will agree to. However, the words have been short of being given any real content. In this connection the work of some peace movements is important — to enter into contacts about and to work for the improvement and the extension of the possibilities for an increasing cooperation on the economical, scientific, ecological, juridical levels as well as in respect to the exchange of news and informations, and to let these initiatives not only remain a decision of the State but also to found it on the participation of the civil society in each country.

The future tasks of the peace movements will thus be to work for detente on all possible levels and in a way that measures in one connection will be of support to measures in other connections, and to work for a broader political and civil foundation for this detente and disarmament policy in each country. The work on the first task is already started - and the work of the peace movements goes parallel to initiatives taken by some of the social democratic parties (best known is the proposal of a chemical free zone made by SPD from DBR and SED from GDR). The problem, however, is that even if these initiatives are considered a measure of detente by the parties themselves, they havn't yet succeeded in corporating them into their security policy, it has till now only been activities involving a few persons on top level, and they don't seem to understand the perspective in letting initiatives on the party level and on the civil level support each other. (For instance in Denmark the party cannot see any reasonableness in some public economical support to the rather expensive exchange work - because of the currency difficulties you normally will have to pay the stay and the travelling expences inside the country for your guests from Eastern countries).

The other task perhaps raises more difficulties because there don't exist any traditions to build upon. A way to tackle this task may be to consider the attitude to enemy pictures. The traditional enemy picture of the Soviet Union has been perforated, and this is an important precondition

Soviet threat has left behind a trauma in the mind of the Western populations. This trauma is reflected partly in the way many people prefer not to make any objections at all to the Soviet Union (it might be unclarified remnants of a Soviet fright) and partly - at least in some circles - the upbuilding of an enemy picture of the USA without shades. There has been a tendency to let justified and necessary protests slip into notes of hatred and accusations which in many ways resembles the former enemy pictures against the Soviet Union and which is absolutely unproductive if you want to create reforms. In this way you may say that we havn't yet succeeded in disengaging ourselves from the indoctrination of the cold war.

When an interpretation of the NATO strategy in relation to the Soviet Union says "Contrary to the West the Soviet Union attach great importance to the offensive operations" (my stressing) (Totalforsvar, red. Watt Boolsen, Forsvarets Oplysnings- og Velfærdstjeneste, 1985, p. 31) it is necessary to protest. It is the typical way of making enemy pictures, to forget your own behaviour and only to look at the adversary. Also the NATO defence strategy is offensive. But when the argumentation has been built upon the question of who wants war and who don't want it - as it has been usual in many peace circles and even by some peace researchers  people have dissociated themselves in a catastrophic way from the understanding of own motives of those who support a continued armament, and the possibilities of influence is cut off. Nobody wants war. Everybody want peace. But beside this wish there exist a number of other wishes and interests, which "by accident" might lead to a war. How many of these wishes and interests are  they willing to forego in East and in West?

This must be the most important question of the future. Here it may be possible to raise the understanding in broader parts of the populations that the question of peace and war neither is a question of only weapons nor a question of an unavoidable fate, but a part of our way to live, which it is possible to influence. In this connection it may be possible to peel off the halos of the superpowers and to come to a discussion of realities. It is here that the North-South discussions becomes part of the East-West discussion. And finally, it is here that a detente will have to take place.

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PEACE MOVEMENTS AND PEACE REASEARCH: AN EXCERPT

do that a little longer. Rather it is the conscious creating of a space for emergent relationships that build on what we know is possible in human society and indeed is expressed at other levels than the state.

The study of these possibilities for survival, and survival itself is *plural* – it has competing paradigms and priorities, it draws from different fields and backgrounds, it asks different questions. If a peace organization asks a peace researcher 'do me a study that proves that...' such a request is rejected as a request for propaganda. Contemporary peace theory is less interested in avoiding uncomfortable facts or fudging data. Nevertheless, the role of wish-fulfillment and anxiety-fulfillment is a greater problem when human data of such import are examined: the subject matter often sears the intellect and imagination and the larger the movement the more plagued with radically conflicting views and definitions of peace it may be. A conflict exists in peace-related institutions. The sense of urgency of issue and commitment for problem-solving leads to deep intellectual divisions and heated debate. There is not one prescription on offer; it may lead to some apprehension of problems of internal division.

Peace theory in general *advocates* the analyses of key species problems and discusses prescriptions or possible solutions – and where it reaches tentative conclusions, it may advocate the translation of this knowledge into specific policy recommendations. But the task of translating such findings into · policy is the job of other bodies, institutions, or transnational NGOs (including peace groups). There is always a danger that wishes and anxieties will overwhelm intellectual judgements and block understanding: the peace action movement is often impatient with the peace researcher or educator for not producing the study 'that shows that'... for being too pure, too remote, or for facing the realities that peace movements do fail, that arms control may lead to spiralling

arms races, that (tragically) peace protest may in fact prolong war.

Peace is rightly seen as poised on the horns of the classic dilemma between the 'ethics of responsibility' and the 'ethics of ultimate ends' as the great German social thinker Max Weber outlined them. A single human artifact, the thermonuclear warhead, has altered that division between responsibility and ultimate ends. If politics is the art of the possible, real science may be the art of the impossible, or what has been perceived as impossible. Kenneth Boulding said once that whatever exists or has existed is possible. Empowerment, transnationalism, transdisciplinarity are all related to the attempt to identify those realities and their potentiality.

## 7. Peace movements and the re-possession of history

The concern with peace education in a number of countries has so far produced little of real interest in the revision of teaching away from the assumptions and parameters of militarism and statism. It is true that a more social and historical dimension in teaching has been stressed, but the emphasis on the achievements of military leaders and the overwhelming force of war in history tends to dominate the classroom, especially in more conservative and male oriented contexts. At the level of higher education, historical versions of the evolution of modern society have at least been tempered by 'revisionist' and critical schools of thought which place more emphasis on societal developments (culture, economy, social stratification and social movements) as opposed to the narrow history of elites and political/military events. The arms races of the past century are reflected in the caution with which globalist and radical approaches to peace and disarmament have been viewed. Peace ideas and peace leaders – let alone popular peace efforts – have little or no place in historical accounts. Even disarmament

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talks and treaties are given perfunctory treatment, as is the emergence of international organizations, including the UN.

There is clearly a role for the emergence of new texts and teaching materials from kindergarten to university which can provide alternative theses and priorities. They would present the view of war as barbarous as well as heroic, would stress the role of cooperation as well as conflict in human development, and would counter-pose the role of values such as human solidarity, compassion, altruism and love, alongside force, coercion, violence and domination as factors in society's evolution. A number of renowned educational idealists from Montessori to Illichave implied such reorientation and a number have stressed the role of peace education, but the actual impact on formal educational systems has been slight. The power of local and national prejudices and vested interests makes such changes highly difficult − where changes have come they have come from the pressure of local and popular struggle as much as the enlightenment of educational elites.

The role of armaments and nuclear deterrence has been to narrow the agenda and the concept of security and defence and establish limited parameters of debate (for and against deterrence, the national interest, the threat from outside etc.), rather than placing global peace issues and the interpenetration of war, repression and maldevelopment at the global level. Peace studies in a very real sense have to be global studies which can root themselves in local experience and community. Cultural and educational exchanges with cities and populations targetted by one's own country for destruction clearly have a role in breaking down stereotypes and an unthinking readiness to destroy the outsider.

## 8. Education and the arms race

Formal systems of education have grown up in a world of war and militarism, virulent nationalism and racist creeds, political repression and economic exploitation. But equally, ideals of peace and disarmament, of social justice, equality and human rights have been strong forces inside and outside education.

Towards the end of the 19th century, as the arms race of the industrial countries and the imperial expansion to the South and East gathered momentum, schools and communities in many countries were concerned over how far the education system could inculcate loyalty to the state, national chauvinism (often racist attitudes), the glories of military service, justifications for colonialism, and crude stereotypes of the alien, or more humane, universalistic values proclaimed by some liberal and socialist educators, and also from some religious standpoints. During the Boer War in Britain, a fierce debate raged over whether military drill and other activities should be introduced for children as opposed to physical and moral education.

The current debate over values, or advocacy programmes in education, or the normative character of peace studies and disarmament education, is nothing new therefore. As in the past, those who defend the values will accuse the critics, the innovators of normative bias, of a lack of objectivity. This ideological attack is clearly related to the power structures and their need to defend their authority by both force and fraud − or more kindly − coercion and persuasion. The highly armed modern state needs its captive education system much as mediaeval feudatories needed the church.

But now, as then, the legitimating institutions may not be hermetic or monolithic; both formal and informal education reflects the needs and values of society and community − not just the state. Even the most regimented system of learning stumbles across truths which become bases of reappraisal. Movements of parents, teachers − even students − create dialogue whether the sponsors or paymasters like it or no. In some societies one can

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talk of a new peace education movement, stimulated by public concern over the arms race. Local authorities (like Greater London and Milwaukee) as well as headteachers and educational unions and associations, even government inspectors, have endorsed teaching on disarmament along the lines suggested by UNESCO and other globalist bodies.

Not all this informal peace education is using high technology – the recreation of the art of banner-making especially associated with the women's encampments at missile bases has been a vital symbolic form of cultural statement against the arms race.

## 9. Assessing the new social movements opposing war – future goals and effectiveness

During the past decade peace movements have grown again in many countries – mainly focused on the nuclear arms race. These are recognized by press, politicians and political analysis as a significant social and political factor. Similar movements have arisen in aligned and non-aligned countries, East and West, and significant movements have also arisen in other parts of the world (e.g. North America and Australia). To many observers these appear to be new movements, and the largest of their kind to have ever arisen on the disarmament issue (this assessment *may*, however, be factually wrong given the size of the movements prior to World War I and World War II). They are probably more *extensive* than the nuclear disarmament movements of 1957–63, and comparable with the surge of protests in the USA during the second Indochina Wars 1965–72. Many analysts now predict their decline, as such movements have declined previously, given their failure after seven years achieve certain stated specific objectives. However there is no certain evidence that overall a permanent decline has yet set in, or any guarantee that it will not soon re-

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gain momentum.

What the above statement reveals is the paucity which exists of systematic knowledge and analysis of the peace movement – its history, social character, political strategies and ideologies, and social base. In other words, there is a profound lacuna of social scientific studies on peace and disarmament movements. The only discipline which can claim some adequacy of coverage is history, and even here much is left unstudied, and most of the work so far produced lacks rigorous social and political analysis or the application tools of social theory. This is in part because of a lack of appropriate theory to the study of peace movements such as that developed in social movement theory and political sociology. Even here, however, attempts to apply social stratification theory or theories of sect-development or collective behaviour theory have proved less than successful. In each of these examples there was a failure to compare movements over time and across national boundaries. Clearly there may be a need to apply existing social theories of the rise and decline, the successes and failures of social movements, including peace movements, and also to develop new ones. Even in the realm of peace research there is a little to help here, except in analysing the strategies and goals of peace movements there has been some modest attempt to see peace movements in terms of Marxian and Weberian frameworks – or in the social dynamics model of Sorokin.

Two approaches may have some relevance to the present project. In the first place a model of transnational and communal perspectives in analysing the operation of war resistance (individual resisters and communities of resisters) to the State (in particular to the modern centralized nation-state). However, this model appears less salient to the study of peace movements which contain war resisters as one small (if critical and important) strain within them.

The second approach is typological, attempting to break down the peace movement into its constituent elements which have developed over the past 170 years (and some which proceed the first modern peace movements.). 'Ideal-typical' clusters of ideas and strategies which emerged sequentially with differing goals and methods and varying degrees of salience and influence, both within and beyond the peace movement, can be identified.

Some such traditions or stands would claim to have achieved some of their stated goals, most have not. These traditions which have become crystallized in certain sects or organizational forms, have often worked alone but at certain periods have worked within broad coalitions ('The Peace Movement'), and the traditions have often fused and interpenetrated one another. When the mass-base falls away, however, there is a tendency (Europe in 1914, 1939, 1963, 1970) for sectarianism and fragmentation to occur and the traditions to be maintained by small groups – 'prophetic minorities' until the next surge of mass support. One factor to be born in mind is that the number of these strands has increased since the nineteenth century, adding to the extensiveness of the peace movement's programme and the inner contradictions within its coalitions over strategy, goals and methods.

The peace movement has had two souls since it first developed as a mass response to the scourge of militarism and war in the 19th century. On the one hand a pragmatic, secular and short-term approach has developed in relation to the development of modern states and the inter-nation system. On the other hand – deriving from longer-term, religious roots – a spiritually guided, principled and more visionary approach has characterized the prophetic minorities working within the peace movements, but often outside the state. These two dimensions, not unlike Weber's famous 'ideal types', co-exist in the current debates about strategy, alternative-defence, civil dis-

obedience and various approaches to disarmament. The same division arises in the Gandhian movement. The tension can be creative or destructive. The tension is also between symbolism and actuality; self-interest and altruism; it raises the issue of ethics in socialism; and of conscience in modern liberalism. The nuclear deterrent sharpens the dilemma for the Churches and the politician.

These two sides of the peace movement are reflected in its current character and its six key dimensions: the idea of unilateralism; the principle of direct action; the stress on communalism; the activation of affinities; the stress on autonomism and non-alignment, and finally the emphasis on a transnationalist or globalist approach. They are reflected in a slogan like 'Think globally, act locally'. It is argued that these six dimensions represent a new programmatic morality in the peace movement that transcends its previous theory and action and achieves a new ethical synthesis, and with it a new strategy for societal transformation.

## 10. Why do peace movements fail?

From preliminary work on the sociology and history of peace movements in various countries over time, one can outline a number of general explanations of why social movements *in general* may fail, and a list of independent reasons why peace movements *in particular* fail, given their unique character.

We know that peace movement support has been cyclical – achieving mass following at different times since the 19th century – and then losing it. Even within these cycles there are significant variations in the level of support, and some peace movements which have developed into social change movements (and vice versa). There needs to be some causal explanation for these cycles and trends.

### 10.1. Some explanations

What follows are some reasons drawn from

the sociological literature on social movements:
- The dynamics which create such movements may reverse/be reversed.
- The social constituency from which the movement sprang may disappear.
- The structural context may be such that it objectively prevents success.
- Successes are latent rather than manifest.
- Social movements are based on political generations and as such cannot transcend the limitations of that generational experience.
- The social base of many movements has been too narrow – or it has been individualistic ('petit bourgeois'). It has never involved the 'broad masses' except on issues such as conscription.
- The movement's programme is too broad to appeal to all sections of any society.
- The movement's aims are too narrow to sustain a long term growth or comittment.
- Social movements may be 'expressive' rather than 'instrumental' – they do not fundamentally desire to make political or social change.
- The social movement outside the state may be isolated and repressed, but entry into the state may lead to incorporation, cooptation and the compromise of fundamental goals.
- A movement may become institutionalized when it is more concerned with its survival than with achievement of its goals.
- Broad social coalitions may fall apart in the face of failure and repression; failure to achieve stated goals may lead to a sense of fatalism, impotence and despair.

10.2. *Some reasons that may be specific to peace movements*
- The differing peace traditions carry with them fundamental contradictions about the goals and methods of peace movements and their relations with states and nations and the deployment of violence and war as methods.
- The sectarian character of the prophetic minorities means that those members recruited from outside those traditions, may be alienated – or the peace movement may be seen as internally inconsistent by allies and opponents.
- The peace movements may have largely state-centric and nationally bounded attitudes which contradict global and universalistic goals and strategies.
- Most peace movements have lacked strong sustainable roots in the community (e.g. amongst workers and peasants) at the local level.
- Peace movements have lacked any coherent intellectual analysis and strategy (e.g. in comparison with conservative or socialist/marxist movements),
- Some peace movements have been obsessed with specific wars or weapons and cannot sustain themselves by these targets.
- Peace movements have rarely been able to build effective transnational linkages, and when they have, these have been easily ruptured in wartime.
- National mobilizations for wars of defence have usually gained greater popular support than peace movements who oppose them (this then needs a further analysis of the strength of national allegiances).
- The lack of an alternative political/social programme (e.g. on defence or foreign policy) in comparison with an existing government, represents a weakness.
- Many peace movements have put great faith in a single strategy or tactic (disarmament talks, non-violent direct action, conscientious objection, the international general strike against war, the peaceful programme of a given state or party) to the exclusion of others.

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*10.3. Some tentative hypotheses or questions stated in terms of contradictions*

- Unilateral proposals may be important in creating a basis for peace protest and initiative, but difficult to sustain within a political system or on a mass basis (an inbuilt limitation factor)
- A broad programme may be essential for the long-term growth of peace movements, but in the short term may alienate those concerned only with short-term common denominator aims. Even those who have a 'hidden agenda' may oppose more programmatic visions. Others may leave peace organizations because they lack alternative vision or programme for the long term.
- Realists argue that a peace movement only makes sense if it is directing its pressure within or on a particular state or on a particular party or institution within a state. Others may argue that the peace movement will only succeed as an autonomous force acting beyond parties and national states.
- The ethics of 'responsibility' (preventing World War III) and of 'ultimate ends' (creating a society in which nuclear weapons will not be deployed) may not easily be resolved, or made compatible.
- The moral arguments against war and nuclear weapons do not sit easily with pragmatic arguments about the use of war and weapons or the interim acceptance of arms limitation, 'no first use', stabilized deterrence, 'just war', war of liberation, 'progressive' or people's war, or other policies which accept a limited degree of state violence as inevitable in the foreseeable future.

Some of these contradictions may be translated into questions for peace movements and peace study.

*10.4. Other hypotheses*

- It can be argued that the fall and rise of peace movements is related to internal factors as much as external factors or the shift of public attitudes (i.e. it is to

some extent a process independent of public opinion changes, government policy and international events/development) and this can be shown to some extent by quantitative indicators and chronological sequences.
- If this is the case, effectiveness can be partly measured by public opinion shift, government policy shift as a reaction to the mobilization of public or political pressure by the peace movement(s).
- Those in government are unable to predict with certainty the strength, effectiveness or longevity of protests over specific policies or mobilization on longer term issues. Equally there can be overreaction to insignificant events or organizations.

## 11. *The contemporary context*

Great powers with nuclear weapons and their dominant ideologues seem to fear the ending of a monopoly on truth and imagination; much of the media and the inherited 'value neutral' disciplines mimic them. To bomb a little protest ship and kill an unarmed civilian in the harbour of a small country miles away, as in New Zealand, has been seriously described not as an act of war or terrorism but an act of legitimate national security. Such concepts of security which may lead us to Armageddon, and which peace movements question, demand alternatives.

Barbara Ward once talked of the beauty of planet Earth viewed from space, blue and small; Carl Sagan has given us a different, bleak vision of a planet enshrouded in a post-nuclear winter blanket of dark cloud and dust. The greatest danger in political life or in the academy is self-serving introversion and self-satisfaction; one must work at one's globalism in local, intellectual activity and take that activity to the larger world. The media does not provide us with a ready window on the world; movements have to break that themselves by work and exchanges, courses of study, international NGOs and

international perspectives. Drawing on the experiences of 1958/75, the Western peace movement used media in their existing forms more adroitly in adjusting to the various roles, functions and levels within the communication system, and using the new forms (e.g. video) as well as more traditional methods. In 1968 the media had questioned its loyal role (in the USA on Vietnam). In the 1980's in Britain whilst the media remained 'loyal' on the Falkland issue, they broke with the 'consensus' on nuclear weapons, and on Libya, reflecting a tide of public concern. Within the movement the role of communications was to make more sophisticated connections between the arms race and the global issues of human rights and maldevelopment.

This vision sees the extension of the critical debate itself as part of the peace process; an autonomous Peace Research Institute in Hungary is perhaps the first such institution created in Eastern Europe; it may herald further developments in the future. It is natural that the new ideas of peace are just as delicate and controversial an issue in Socialist states as they are in non-Socialist ones. Reciprocal confidence building, graduated tension reduction, and other models of international de-escalation depend as much or more on transnational/ communal linkages than on the efforts of formal diplomacy, and state negotiations. This clearly has relevance to contemporary policy and the distribution of resources to obtain security from a nuclear war. The new political model suggests that non-governmental inputs have much to enlighten and advance policy formation in every organization (including government).

There is further evidence on global communications since Angell, Alger and Rosenau's work (i.e. empirical evidence gathered in the 1970's) emphasized the increasing role of transnationalism in state policy formation: communal and popular initiatives, non-governmentalism (especially vis-à-vis the UN), cross frontier initiatives of the peace groups are becoming

increasingly significant. Building on previous work on nationalism and transnationalism and on popular responses (especially non-parliamentary) to war mobilization, conscription and recruitment, and on concurrent and continuing study of other aspects of military force and political power, represents an attempt to break new ground in examining the role of non-governmental, transnational initiatives and linkages in breaking the arms spiral and in particular their role (if any) in decreasing tensions which might lead to limited or all-out nuclear war. The political importance, intellectual challenge, policy relevance and indeed moral imperative of such work in the preparation for a life in peace seems self-evident.

To this end it is necessary to develop a refined concept of transnationalism – implying (along the lines of the work of James Rosenau) those linkage relationships between human beings or social groups which transcend or are independent of national, territorial, military or political boundaries or frontiers – and are distinct from inter-national, i.e. relations between national groups or governments; the focus will be on social categories that divide the species by sex, occupation, ethnicity, interest, etc. that are independent of national states: professionals, workers, women, students are such constituencies. Robert Angell questions: 'Are these necessarily a force for peace' or détente? Chadwick Alger's linkages of transnationalism to communalism – i.e. the identification of people with living groups at lesser/smaller levels than that of the state and the linkage between such communities (e.g. twinning, communications, cultural and academic exchange) suggests they are. The problematic relationship of the multi-national corporation or regional integration to such patterns, and to global attitudes, cross-frontier contacts, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) in relation to the United Nations and other world bodies are key issues. So is the role of new media

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technology. But one thing emerges from the peace movement agenda of the 80's. The modern state cannot any longer be regarded as simply a helpful stepping stone to globalism, and indeed the history of states shows that they tend to destroy community life. They create the category (and phenomenon) of 'displaced people'; they make wars and multiply the related pollution; they threaten human rights.

We lack a fully developed theoretical scheme for looking at the evolution from a world system of national states towards a global society of communities. Elements in contemporary society point to the transition from national to transnational *identities* – challenging the idea of a series of progressive stages of which the national states is the 'highest' yet achieved.

Some of the scourges of violence arise from non-governmental action too; it is accepted that a peaceful world society necessitates a strong sense of local or regional community, and communal responsibilities, on the size and type (in terms of authority structure) of communities which are desirable; how decisions would be made in federations of them; and how the economy could be organized, with or without large scale industrial centres.

Kenneth Boulding's optimistic dictum ('what has existed is possible') is relevant on the ground of emotional and political loyalty; it has been possible to be a citizen of Carthage and of the Roman Empire (or the known world) without the need for a 'state' in between, yet there · are doubts whether global loyalty is yet emotionally feasible. What kind of childhood upbringing or education would facilitate this? The importance of fostering cultural differences as a means to integrity was seen to be vital, and it was realized that, for example, black peoples, or industrialists or certain religious communities at present attained their identity as a kind of counterpart to loyalty to the state.

In this connection it was seen that a diminution of national sovereignty could lead to a plurality of allegiances, which implies the overlapping of functional groups and the federation of societies, rather than the notion of world government.

Some of the key questions of the last decade have been: Do transnational relationships increase the liklihood of peace – and are they growing? How can one move from national 'belonging' to global 'belonging'? It is not a question of moving from nationalism to globalism, or from nation state to world state, but linking communalism to globalism. First of all that community has to be strengthened as a source of identity. Transnational links *between* communities have to be fostered. The idea of evolutionary stages and the territorial view of issues and relationships have to be challenged. The state has to be put in its historical place, and cross frontier categories of people re-emphasized, that is our social relations as species beings on a single planet.

Here again, the themes of transnationalism and transdisciplinarity and empowering approaches to problems become fundamental. In the 1980s, Europeans and the USA encounter a sense of how the relations and understandings between those two regions have changed and been distanced over the past two decades. The world is seen differently by both sides than it was even ten years ago. The Europeans feel more caught between two great highly-armed machines – perhaps more menaced by war itself than by either of them and less bound by interest to the perceived interests of the US on the USSR Soviet Union. The need for understanding and contact is greater than ever. This is one of the reasons why, in internationalizing and transnationalizing, we need a greater exchange of professionals, scholars, students and others.

One has to emphasize here the shaping of the European experience of war and peace from the humanism of Erasmus to the memorials to the mass bombing of

Rotterdam; from the Anne Frank House to the peace research institutes in the great German universities; from the mass graves of the Somme or Paschendaele to the Menin Gate, or the Palais des Nations to Checkpoint Charlie; from the Imperial War Museum to the Peace Palace at the Hague. The work of the centres of peace education and study in Europe needs to be synthesized and analyzed. In the 1980s, when public concern about the dangers of nuclear war and the need for peaceful resolutions of conflict is *stronger than ever*, in a number of countries, more resources have become available for peace programme development, e.g. on non-violent sanctions.

## 12. *Peace and the future*

Today one can view the preparation for peace as enjoying a period of renewed synthesis and growth, having survived the period of deep intellectual crisis in the early 1970s. As well as peace groups, more journals, institutes, associations and university peace research programmes and departments exist than ever before, many of them focusing on positive futures, and constructive analysis.

Many 'of the old debates over conflict, peace and violence have been superseded by more refined categories than those of positive or negative peace or direct or mediated violence. The interest in non-violent actions is one such example. The focus on transnationalism and the role of non-governmental contributions in the field of disarmament, development, human rights and conflict is more obvious. Linking North and South, and East/West issues in global perspectives gives peace research a stronger base than previously for its claim to be a major contribution to human knowledge and understanding in the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, peace research has helped contextualize our analysis of *inter*state conflict in terms of the larger 'true worlds' of conflict and cooperation beyond them. Transnational cooperation in peace and conflict

study has flourished in the 1980s with a number of new national and international networks; peace researchers, scholars and institutions around the world aspire to achieve an intellectual synthesis and practical interpenetration of these issues. Peace organizations can respond where governments and traditional university departments have often failed to provide work of relevance.

Peace research in its spread, is marked by its *internationalism*, its *linkage* of key areas, and its *autonomy*. Like other transnational NGOs it stands outside nations/states and governments and attempts to serve the original UN aim of expressing and meeting the needs of 'we the peoples' in a research and policy oriented environment; whilst plural, it is also *engaged* in its orientation.

Alongside the burgeoning peace and anti-nuclear movements of the past years, has emerged another parallel, but distinct movement, less publicized, but perhaps of almost equal significance, and that is the Peace education movement, i.e. teaching for peace, formally and informally, at all levels. As an aspect of preparing the planet for a more peaceful species existence, *Peace education* as a movement spreading globally – at every level – is now a public issue in many countries, e.g., where peace studies have been adopted officially or unofficially (locally, as in Britain or Sweden, or nationally, as in Finland or Greece). Many of the peace research institutions have maintained contact with this educational movement over many years, and have contributed to its debates and with its publications. Peace Education is now on the agenda almost everywhere, and research and dissemination, e.g., through the *Journal of Peace Research* and *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, have played an important role in this and in maintaining the integrity and intellectual standards in the debates of peace educators world wide. Informally, in the arts and media, peace education is developing new forms partly

through the inspiration of peace action.

The work of peace historians has only really developed in earnest again since the 1960s and lacks overall schema and analysis – but there are increasing numbers of monographs, and detailed descriptive studies. What is needed is some attempt to look at the whole picture to gain strength from the knowledge of the variety and richness of the peace movement traditions. Peace research in history has grown as widespread consciousness of the threat of nuclear war and of the destructive recurrence of hundreds of Third World conflicts proliferates. The terrible scourge of conventional war persists outside Europe: estimates of a million casualties in the current Iran-Iraq war alone have been suggested.

For the first time, *the beginnings of a global peace movement* that transcends political frontiers, military boundaries and ideological divides and bloc confrontations, have become a real possibility, both at the governmental and non-governmental level. The 'new peace movement' of the last seven years has thrown up a host of new problems and issues for intellectual inquiry and linking issues that much Peace theory has long seen as inseparable; the relation between the East/West issue and the North/South problem, development and disarmament; the arms trade and military repression; the linkage between the issue of human rights (including conscientious objection), and the right to act for survival (peace rights, as well as the right to organize peace research, peace education and peace movements freely). The role of the new social movements in developing non-violence in the community, in conflict resolution, and in issues other than nuclear weapons, point towards alternative security concepts such as non-military defence of values and communities.

## 13. *Towards a strategy for the new peace movement*

The peace action movement in Europe may have reached a political plateau at present, but it offers new ways at looking at the role of popular, non-governmental initiatives in relation to disarmament, and in the process break down some of the conventional wisdoms of both the researcher and the political disarmer. The reasons for this are the new dimensions added by these ideas and movements, which have contributed much more concretely expressions of transnational linkage, cross-boundary reciprocity, and a strong and communal basis for anti-militarist activity.

The continuation of the global arms races and the failures of the interstate negotiations are part of the reason why the peace movement has needed to translate such activity into regional and local efforts. But there are other reasons: the 'mir' and the 'pueblo' are worlds in microcosm. Ideas of security, equity, identity, and well-being must finally be grounded and defended in the local community and here non-violence and linkage make far more sense than deterrence and conventional military strategy. In other words, alternative security concepts include the peace movement as part of the functional need of communities to discover alternative means to defend people, beliefs, and values.

The other part of the equation is cross border linkage; interdependence with other communities. This is the practical popular expression of 'one worldism' and ecological, nuclear and other pressures for global and local claims against national sovereignty continually reinforce this. One world imageries are strong in the feminist and youth movements as well as the more traditional religious and political imageries. The image of statespersons as self-serving or chauvinistic may be unfair but it runs strong amongst such groups.

Indeed, these are much more than ideas, they have been actualized in specific

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"ON THE FUTURE OF PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ITALY AND WESTERN EUROPE"
Paper prepared for the IPRA Conference 'On the study of peace movements'
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by ROBERTO ZADRA

As I come from Italy, I imagine you are all expecting me to speak on the
founding, development and crisis of the Italian peace movements. This will only
be partially true, since I believe that it is much better to go and read up on
this sort of thing. Printed information enters and remains in our brains much
more easily, whereas conferences and meetings of this kind should be used to
provoke and offer stimuli for further work. I would like to refer here to two
articles that I have written on the subject: one is in Italian and can be found
in issue No. 1/1987 of the Italian journal on international politics _Politica
Internazionale_. The other appeared recently in a West German volume which might
be of interest to all participants here since it is, as far as I know, one of
the few more recent comparative studies on peace movements in Western and
Eastern Europe and the US: Legrand/Janning/Zander: "Friedensbewegungen,
Entwicklung und Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Europa
und den USA", Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1987.

As for the structure of my paper, I would like, on the one hand, to
briefly summarize the results of my research on Italian peace movements in
recent years, and on the other, compare them with other developments in Western
Europe. A few general, and in my opinion generalizable, remarks with regard to
the developments and the possibilities of peace movements and their assessment
by peace research conclude the paper.

## (I) PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ITALY
### (a) Emergence / Height / Crisis / Latest trends

Let's start with a short rundown of the most important events involving
the Italian peace movements. As is well known, in 1979, the NATO double-track
decision provided for the installation of 112 Cruise missiles on Italian soil.
This new military decision was the catalyst for the first Italian mass

mobilizations. Between 1981 and 1983, there were demonstrations and marches all over Italy, culminating in the demonstration in October 1983, which brought around one million people into the streets of Rome to protest against the installation of new missiles and for peace. This first phase of general protest was interrupted in March 1984 by the beginning of the installation of the first Cruise missiles at Comiso (in Sicily). This event dealt a serious blow to the Italian peace movements, as its main demand -namely to prevent the installation of the new missiles- was suddenly swept aside. A new phase of disappointment and frustration, but also of self-analysis and a search for new perspectives set in. Several peace groups continued their work and delved more thoroughly into questions somewhat neglected up to that time such as Italian weapons exports and defense spendings. But this second phase (1984-1985) no longer witnessed the mass mobilizations that had taken place between 1981 and 1983. Finally, the last two years have marked a new third phase in Italian mobilizations for peace, constituting something of a compromise between the first phase, based mainly on quantity (great mass demonstrations), and the second phase, directed mainly at quality (more thorough examination of several subjects). Above all, three occurrences took place in 1986 which characterized this new phase: the US attack on Libya in April was a direct cause for anti-war demonstrations all over Italy; several hundred thousand people protested against the US attack and against Italian military involvement in the conflict. Not much later -in May of the same year- the Chernobyl disaster took place, giving rise to a demonstration in Rome with about 100,000 participants; peace and ecological movements took to the streets together in protest against the military and civilian use of nuclear energy. Lastly, in October, the peace movement mobilized about 400,000 people in Rome in a multiple demonstration against weapon exports, defense spendings, the American SDI project and for a positive conclusion of the arms control talks between the US and the Soviet Union taking place at the same time in Reykjavik.

### (b) Italy's foreign and security policy and the peace movements

Let's stick with analysis of the contents and the aims of the Italian peace movements. The main aim between 1981 and 1983 was to prevent NATO's rearmament, whereas the subjects taken up thereafter (weapon exports, military spendings, nuclear energy, etc.) were not able to draw on the same mass support from the population. The situation becomes even shakier when we consider that national foreign and security policy matters were only partially dealt with by some peace groups, while most of the Italian peace activists remained silent and did not develop its own stance in this respect. Among these priorities, especially in view of Italy's geostrategic position in the Mediterranean, are: Italy's participation in NATO, perceived as militarily threatening by numerous Mediterranean countries; Italy's military peace-keeping endeavours in some crisis regions (Sinai penisula, Lebanon, Suez Canal); the new phenomenon of international terrorism; Italy's relatively ambiguous position with regard to Israel and the Palestinian question, as well as Italy's colonial past, i.e. in Libya and Ethiopia. These and other matters inherent to the Italian situation were practically ignored during the mass demonstrations of the past years and I am rather skeptical that important changes will come out in the near future.

You may ask for the reasons of this skepticism. Well, the developments of the last years have evidenced that peace movements' quantity and quality were

not able to grow reciprocally at the same time and with the same dinamism. With this, I don't want to say that there is an inverse proportionality, in sense that the more quantity a movement has, the less quality it contains, and viceversa. But in my opinion there are limits, beyond them no further growings are possible without losses on the one or the other side. For this reason, I think that several authors emphasizing the movements' lack of contents are illusory, overestimating the relations between public opinion and foreign policy in general and therefore not recognizing the whole dimension of the problem.


### (c) Effects of the Italian peace movements


Let's try to answer the question whether and to what extent the Italian peace demonstrations in recent years achieved something. In this case, I am taking into consideration mainly the anti-rearmament demonstrations, as much general consensus focussed on this one point and brought the largest number of people into the streets. If we ask the question about the direct short-term effects, the answer is devastating. The installation of Cruise missiles in Sicily made it evident that political decision-makers were not impressed enough by mass demonstrations to change their politics.

But skepticism is also recommended in answer to the middle and long-term effects of the mobilizations of those years. Let's take a look at the political situation in Italy at the time. The Italian parliamentary elections held in June 1987 only changed the political balance of power very slightly. The government coalition, which already in 1979 agreed to the NATO double-track decision and declared its readiness to install the new missiles, still holds the reins of power. Thus, continuity in foreign and security policy is ensured for the next few years, while the opposition parties, which opposed rearmament, were not particularly rewarded during the elections. In example Italy's biggest opposition party, the Communist Party, which had been in the forefront of most peace demonstrations, actually suffered a considerable loss percent of its electorate (the Communists lost about 2,5 percent of votes).

In this context, I want to emphasize that we had similar evolutions in several other Western European countries, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Belgium, in the Netherlands and (last but not least?) in Great Britain. Frequently there was a gap between the mass-demonstrations for peace on the one side and the electoral results on the other. Also for this reason, in my opinion peace movements' activities and possible results have been overestimated by several of us.


### (II) PEACE MOVEMENTS IN ITALY AND WESTERN EUROPE
### (a) A comparison of Italian and Western European developments


Let's now come to a comparison of Italian and Western European developments. Here I would like to consider, above all, if there is a North-South fall in Western Europe with regard to start and evolution of peace movements. Certainly, in order to be able to deal with the matter thoroughly, we should examine more closely the various developments in the different

countries and analyze comparable data category by category. Yet, this is very difficult, since, in the publications I am aware of, information about each country is set up in a different way.
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Nevertheless, in order to give a provisional answer to the question, the distinctions in quantity and quality may be of help. In other words, on the one hand we can see how many people could be mobilized for peace demonstrations in several European countries during a specific period of time, and on the other we can look at the platforms and aims of the single Western European peace movements.

Let's start with quantity: the first large demonstrations took place in Italy in September 1981, approximately one month after the Italian government's decision to accept the installation of 112 Cruise missiles in Sicily. In October we had the first of the so-called "hot autumns", both in Italy as in several countries of Western Europe. In Rome, from 300,000 to 500,000 people demonstrated for peace, followed by around 170,000 people in Florence in November and about 200,000 people in Milan in April 1982 (just to mention the most important). Therefore, I would say that as far as mass participation is concerned, the Italian demonstrations were on a par with similar events in other countries. So there was no North-South fall at this level, at least as far as Italy is concerned; unfortunately, I have found little information about these matters for other southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece.

As for quality - besides the common denominator of the protest against rearmament, which was a basis for consensus in all Western European peace movements - the Italian peace movements have given little consideration to the problems of national foreign and security policy. I know that some peace movements in other countries dealt more with these national priorities: for example, in the German Federal Republic, questions of East-West relations were examined more closely; in Austria, there was discussion about Austrian neutrality and the CSCE; Spain's entry into NATO and NATO bases were crucial queries. With respect to contents, Italian peace movements have not developed their independence as much as other countries. Nevertheless, I don't think there's any justification for speaking of a North-South situation. First, because much self-focussed discussion has taken place in some southern European countries and second, because there is still too little data available for an accurate comparison.

## (b) "Structural Heterogeneity"

That brings me to my next point dealing with the problem of making international comparisons. In analyzing a subject, I feel that social research should differentiate before moving on to formulating general conclusions. To that end, the concept of Structural Heterogeneity, conceived within critical development theory discussions at the end of the Seventies and used in different ways by various others since them, seems particularly suitable. Structural Heterogeneity could serve as a theoretical basis for future comparative work on our subject, since it points out both national and international structural differences on the various social interaction axes - "underdogs-underdogs", "underdogs-topdogs" and "topdogs-topdogs" - while taking into consideration quantitative as well as qualitative factors.

Structural Heterogeneity can be found at three levels: the first is concerned mainly with the structural quantitative and qualitative differences within the movements themselves. The second deals with the structural relationship of the peace movements in a country with the existing political and cultural institutions and political decision-makers, while the third refers to the international dimension of peace movements and to their structural differences (see table I, page 7).

(1) The first level highlights the differences between peace movements in a given country. The people who protested for peace after the NATO double-track decision were of mixed social, political and cultural background brought together as individuals belonging to different trade unions, parties, religions, etc.. This mixed composition had a strong impact on the movements' composition and platform.

As far as the heterogeneous composition of the peace movements in any given country are concerned, attempts made at setting up a stable and efficiently coordinating network among the various groups - to improve poorly functioning communication channels and forms of interaction among the often isolated local and regional initiatives - were hindered by technical, organizational and financial difficulties. With reference to the heterogeneous contents, the varied backgrounds of the people active in the peace movements led to different evaluations of single matters, with a minimum common consensus only about the prevention of the installation of missiles. In Italy, for example, Catholic-inspired grass-roots organizations were particularly critical on weapons exports, but were unable to find much support for their stance in many other peace activists, at the same time members of trade unions, which tended to legitimize arms production from an employmental point of view. In the same way, it was difficult to reach common and homogeneous appraisals on the role and function of NATO, on the possibility of unilateral nuclear disarmament as well as on the effectiveness of nuclear and/or conventional defense. Differences in the evaluation of the road to peace as well as in the aims of peace again and again created internal tensions and polemics, which has been evident in the frequent splintering off of several peace-engaged groups and institutions.

(2) The second level deals with the relationship of peace movements to the existing social institutions and political decision-makers in each country. Here again, the fact mentioned above concerning the mixed social, political and cultural background of the people engaged in the peace movements plays an important role. The individual persons, working for peace carried out a double social function, in that they were active not only within the peace movements, but also at the same time participants in various political, social and cultural institutions (as parties, trade unions, churches etc.). This affected the structure and the platform of the peace movements, on the one hand, and parallelly forced the political, social and cultural institutions to take up positions with respect to the peace movements activities.

(3) The third level concerns the structural differences in foreign and security policy among Western European countries and their repercussions on the peace movements' activities. In this context, we can distinguish between form and content.

As far as form is concerned, the national heterogeneities are also

reflected in a comparison at a Western European level. Above and beyond the quantitatively and qualitatively different peace movements, likewise the various social institutions and political decision-makers built up communication channels varying in strength within and between countries. This brings us to the contents. On account of the Western European states' particular geo-strategic location - above and beyond common factors such as NATO, the EEC or the OECD - different stances were worked out in foreign and security policy. Thus, for example, Italy's special role in NATO's southern flank, Austria's guaranteed neutrality and the German Federal Republic's particular relations with the German Democratic Republic, etc., reflect their uniqueness. These different national considerations in foreign and security policy are not only reflected in the platforms and aims of the political decision-makers and other social institutions, but also in the programmes and goals of the existing respective peace movements, albeit to different degrees; some stronger, some weaker (the Italians, as mentioned, weaker).

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize once more that the concept of Structural Heterogeneity can be of use in discovering gaps in research carried out on peace movements during the eighties, and in moving away from superficial generalizations towards more thorough and differentiated analyses. Just as the term 'new peace movement' has been insufficient to accurately describe the mass mobilizations that have taken place, we should start today to realize that it is also not enough to say that the 'new' peace movement has 'aged'.

Relating to peace movements' activities, we had several articles and books published by peace researchers in the last years. But many of them have been too naive, optimistic and superficially, overestimating the new phenomenon of the mass-demonstrations against NATO-rearmament and - beyond this very specific kind of discussion - the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in general, believing in their euphorism that a new and permanent social actor has arised into political life. I don't agree with this point of view, and fortunately there have been also some more realistic and impartial researchers who warned of unnecessary hang-over. I think that we should use our concluding session also for some more self-critical reflections into this direction.

table I :  "STRUCTURAL HETEROGENEITY"

Structural Heterogeneity appears on 3 levels:

(I)  within peace movements:



(II) within single states:



(III) between states: