


"EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION"
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programma

- (1) Harrison, Michael M.: "East-West and other security perspectives in the Mediterranean"
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INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

INSTITUT D'ETUDES STRATEGIQUES ET INTERNATIONALES

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

June 24-26, 1987

Wednesday, June 24th

- 15.30h **East|West Relations and Security in the Mediterranean** ①
Michaël Harrison
Associate Director, Institut Universitaire
de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Genève
- 17.30h **Italy, NATO, and Security in the Southern Flank** ②
Roberto Aliboni
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma
- 20.30h Dinner (Palácio de Seteais)
Portugal and Europe
Speaker: Dr Victor Constâncio, Secretary-general
of the Socialist Party

Thursday, 25th June

- 09.30h **Security in the Atlantic|Mediterranean Region:** ③
Portugal and Spain
Antonio Marquina, INCI, Madrid
Jaime Gama, IEEI, Lisbon
- 11.30h Discussion
- 13.00h Lunch (Cascais)
Portuguese strategic choices
Speaker: Admiral António de Sousa Leitão
Chief of Staff, Navy
- 15.00h **Internal and External Factors in Portugal's** ④
Foreign and Defence Policies
Álvaro Vasconcelos, Director, and
A. Figueiredo Lopes, IEEI, Lisbon
- 17.30h Discussion
- 20.30h Dinner (Grémio Literário)
The Economic Challenge
Prof. Luís Valente de Oliveira
Cabinet Minister

Friday, 26th June

- 09.30h North|South Relations in the Mediterranean (5)
Domingo del Pino
"Cambio 16", Madrid
- 11.30h The Atlantic Alliance and the Southern Region (6)
John Chipman
Assistant Director, IISS, London
- 13.00h Lunch
Meeting disperses.

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Conference language: English

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EAST-WEST AND OTHER SECURITY PERSPECTIVES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

by

Michael M. Harrison

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Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies

The Graduate Institute of International Studies

Geneva, Switzerland

June, 1987

The Mediterranean and Western Security

The Mediterranean is a region of confrontation, crisis, and sometimes cooperation for the Western allies and the eighteen states (excluding Morocco and Portugal) who find their territory linked to this great enclosed sea. Perhaps the principal feature of the Mediterranean as an issue for Western, or Atlantic, politics is the region's ambivalent relationship to the East-West conflicts at the core of the Atlantic Alliance's security concerns. There is a tendency for conflicts in the Mediterranean to be fragmented, disparate, often irrational or incoherent, and they usually have only a tenuous relationship to the dominant bipolar system that preoccupies the heartland of Europe and is the natural focus of U.S. security and defense policies.

The Mediterranean seldom conforms to an East-West conception of politics and political-military interaction. It is a region where the United States and the Soviet Union have only sporadic and indirect confrontation, even if they constantly check on each others' activities in the area. Above all, the Mediterranean is a region where the multiplicity of specific local conflicts and the distinctive national security interests of local states means that there is no coherent "Mediterranean" security dilemma and, therefore, there can be no coherent "Mediterranean" policy or set of policies on the part of the West, or even on the part of individual Western states.

The East-West Dimension in the Mediterranean

Although always on the fringes of Western allied security concerns, it was of course in the Mediterranean that the communist menace in Greece led to the 1947 Truman Doctrine and eventually the creation of the "Western bloc" and the Atlantic Alliance itself. When the Alliance was negotiated, the U.S. Department of Defense opposed extending the security arrangement to the Mediterranean, but the views of the State Department and countries like France prevailed, so that Italy was belatedly admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations and the Atlantic Alliance found itself with an ambiguously-designated "southern flank," then including the Algerian departments of France. The Alliance expanded its Mediterranean dimension when Greece and Turkey were admitted as members in 1951. From the U.S. point of view, these countries (and Italy) primarily offered sea and air base facilities from which the United States could acquire a dominance in the Mediterranean and over to the Persian Gulf, at the expense of a Soviet Union which had the advantage of a natural geographical presence adjacent to the region.

This was the same reason the United States acquired base rights in Spain under the executive agreement of September, 1953. These bases were linked to U.S./NATO facilities in Italy and Turkey, completing a kind of "Americanization" of the north coast of the Mediterranean Sea, while after the establishment of the Sixth Fleet on June 1, 1948, the Mediterranean indeed became

a kind of "American sea" from the point of view of East-West competition. Until the 1960s, the United States was the dominant military power and political force in the area-- exerting itself, it is true, primarily against allies (such as the Suez crisis, 1956) and otherwise operating as a kind of hegemonic protector of American-defined "Western" interests in the Mediterranean. There really was no prominent, active East-West dimension to the political-military scene in the area during this period. Instead, the United States simply exerted the kind of preeminence over ally and opponent alike that hegemons have traditionally wielded. The United States had, of course, genuine and specific security interests in the region that reinforced its hegemonic impulse--the Mediterranean was the southern flank of Atlantic Alliance, it was the focus of Arab nationalism that met with American sympathy for a time, it was crucial to the security Israel, and it was a strategic and commercial bridge to the oil-rich territories of the southern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

During the 1960s, American hegemonic power over the Mediterranean area began to wane for a number of reasons-- principally, the assertion of national policies, often anti-U.S. in tone and substance, on the part of many riparian states, especially the radical Arabs of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. European states, like France, developed independent, post-colonialist perspectives and policies on Mediterranean

issues that often set them against the United States--a trend that has continued until the present, so that although there is no coherent "European" attitude towards Mediterranean issues, "Europe" is frequently at odds with the United States on these issues. Unlike the 1950s, now the Europeans seem more sophisticated and enlightened on how to deal with problems such as Arab nationalism, terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the United States is increasingly clumsy and unsure of itself on such matters.

From the point of view of American global security and the bipolar rivalry, it has been the growth of a certain Soviet military and (limited) political influence around the Mediterranean that has posed the greatest threat to U.S. and "Western" interests since the 1960s. But how real is this threat and what are Soviet aims in the Mediterranean? There is no doubt that Soviet naval potential in the area has increased since 1962, as a part of the global expansion of Soviet naval power undertaken by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (actually dating from the late 1950s). Until late in the decade, the U.S.S.R. remained clearly inferior to the American strength focused in the Sixth Fleet--inferior in both firepower and flexibility. Now, however, the Soviets have a Mediterranean squadron (Fifth Escadra) drawn from the Black Sea and Northern Fleets that, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, averages forty to forty-five ships in the Mediterranean. This is much smaller than the Black Sea Fleet itself, but there are constant exchanges between the two fleets. This puts the

Soviet and American Mediterranean naval forces on a rough numerical par, although U.S. firepower and air-naval sophistication remains substantially superior. The Soviet advantage is that during a crisis, they could augment their naval forces from the Black Sea and use their superior land and tactical air forces operating from the Balkans to bolster military pressures in the Mediterranean itself. Calculations of the East-West military balance around the Mediterranean should be treated with extreme caution, however, since the West, however fragmented, retains an over-all superiority that has not been undermined by the growth of Soviet naval and air power in the area.

Indeed, from a political point of view, the Soviets remain a relatively minor force in the Mediterranean even if they are stronger than they were in the 1950s--which, after all, is a natural corollary to the U.S.S.R.'s emergence as a full military superpower and one which concentrates the development of its naval forces more in the Pacific than in the Mediterranean theaters. Whereas the United States has developed a network of multilateral and bilateral security interests in the Mediterranean that complement its "natural" tendency towards exerting a political-military hegemony in the region, the principal characteristic of Soviet policy there is its relatively low level of ambition and the essentially defensive, certainly non-hegemonic, nature of its political-military activities.

Focusing their military and political efforts on the European central front, in South Asia, and in the Pacific, the Soviets have mostly pursued an opportunistic policy of ad hoc troublemaking in the Mediterranean, especially since they lost their most important position in Egypt during the Sadat regime. Given the general decline of Soviet and communist influence in much of the third world, it is primarily the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict that grants Moscow some tenuous Mediterranean allies. Since the United States has privileged links with Israel and the moderate Arab states, this leaves the Soviet Union with the rather diffident allies of Syria and Libya on the Mediterranean itself. These states have their own national and regional agendas, so they cannot be considered firm Soviet footholds in the Mediterranean. Indeed, Moscow has wisely kept the bizarre Libyan regime at a distance, eschewing a firm treaty of alliance but placing some two to three thousand military advisers in this country. Even with its Ethiopian and Syrian treaties, Moscow can be called upon only to "consult" in the event of an aggression. Although Syria is a successful military power in the Mediterranean, and is heavily supported by Moscow in material terms, Syrian victories such as the one in Lebanon are not obviously also advances for the Soviet Union and do not fit neatly into an East-West notion of regional conflict.

Apart from the special and somewhat fragile ties to some radical Arab states in the Mediterranean, the Soviets have not

made regional advances in recent years and, instead, appear to have a kind of defensive policy in the area. Indeed, with recent developments such as the outcome of the Malta elections, and Libya's defeat in Chad, the Soviets are not faring well in this part of the world. Apart from exerting a certain political-military presence in the Mediterranean, then, the principal Soviet regional interest seems to be to have a patchwork of anchorages and repair facilities--at Tabruk in Libya, for example--and to ensure that the United States and the West have to take account of this Soviet presence before undertaking actions of their own. Of course, the U.S.S.R. also has a classic interest in maintaining military authority over the Bosphorus entrance to the Black Sea, and to prevent the West from considering any intrusions into this core national security zone. The limited significance of the Mediterranean to the Soviets is confirmed by the fact that the only real East-West crisis in the region in recent years was during the October, 1973 war, when Moscow backed down in the face of an American global alert. Even during ill-considered exertions of U.S. force such as the reckless bombing of Libya in April, 1986, there was no physical Soviet reaction of importance. Comparing U.S. and Soviet behavior in the Mediterranean, some might conclude that Moscow's policy of restraint and "presence" has been wiser than the Reagan approach of military risk and confrontation, which led to the fiascos of the Lebanon and Libyan operations. On the other hand, this U.S. approach--however clumsy and

counterproductive it may be at times--does help affirm the American position as the dominant political-military force in the Mediterranean, a position which has been recovered since the mid-1970s.

The Mediterranean as a Zone of Indigenous Crisis

The Mediterranean is indisputably one of the areas where the United States and the Soviet Union maintain a state of bipolar tension and rivalry, though seldom of actual hostility. Rather than direct East-West and bipolar conflicts predominating in this area, indigenous and to a certain extent autonomous conflicts prevail. One characteristic of these conflicts is that they engage the attention, activities, often the support of both superpowers, so that the East-West rivalry becomes a kind of tool to be manipulated by local forces and rival powers. The Arab-Israeli dispute is certainly the dominant "Mediterranean" conflict, even though in venue and consequences it is not merely a local, regional dispute. It is a conflict that maintains the eastern Mediterranean in a permanent state of turmoil, and is exported to Europe and around the area so that, through terrorism and other vehicles of conflict-extension, this problem is the predominant one for all Mediterranean states. It is not primarily an East-West conflict, since it has various dimensions: north-south, ethnic, ideological, religious, and simple power-politics. The superpowers are aligned with the main antagonists: the

United States supports Israel and the Soviet Union backs Syria. But the United States also plays a kind of broker or mediator role with its privileged contacts with moderate Arab states--so that global and regional alignments are not symmetrical as far as this conflict is concerned.

One feature of the Arab-Israeli issue is the emergence of Israel as an aspiring hegemonic state in the eastern Mediterranean, expanding its zone of political-military oversight not only to occupied Palestinian territory, but far into Lebanon as well. In the Mediterranean basin, Israel is one of the most obvious expansionist and destabilizing states because of its intransigent diplomacy and military arrogance. As a danger to regional stability, Israel easily equals Libya or Syria. Finally, it should be noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict has helped divide the Mediterranean ideologically, so that three great political philosophies or approaches clash in an increasingly irreconcilable way: Western democratic and liberal values, radical Islamic fundamentalism, and expansionist Zionism. Rather than Soviet behavior, much less the pathetic state of "communism" as an ideology today, the extremist versions of Islam and Zionism must be considered the greatest long-term dangers to the West in the Mediterranean region.

Apart from the dominant Arab-Israeli dispute, a number of other conflicts and potential problems in the Mediterranean should be noted. One feature of Mediterranean conflicts not tied to this dominant crisis is that they are focused within the Western

"camp" and tend to weaken the Alliance, or at least divert its attention from the somewhat elusive Soviet threat in the Mediterranean and the more prominent danger posed by the Arab-Israeli dilemma. Two such intra-Western problems can be mentioned here: the Greek-Turkish conflict, and the still ambivalent position of Spain within the Atlantic Alliance.

Perhaps one of the most acute signals of the relative weakness of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and the basic strength of the United States and NATO is the fact that the Western Alliance can tolerate the puerile foreign policy posturing and antics of Andreas Papandrea's Greece and the recurrent clashes of Greece and Turkey without any significant weakening of the Alliance position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek-Turkish conflict is one of those intractable, historically-laden issues involving national identities and interests that may never really be resolved. The cause of current difficulties has been the July, 1974 Turkish occupation of 40% of the territory of Cyprus and a de facto division of the island backed by the proclamation of an independent Turkish Cyprus in November, 1983. The unwise policies of Athens under the colonels was basically responsible for this development, and since 1974 most of the world has come to accept the Turkish-imposed division of the island, so this is now a virtual fait accompli. Greece and Turkey have a number of other specific

quarrels that erupt regularly, such as the status of the Aegean continental shelf, national control over Aegean airspace, Greece's claim for a twelve-mile territorial water regime in the Aegean, and Greece's militarization of islands off the Turkish coast. The United States (and the Soviet Union, for that matter) tend to side with Turkey on most of these issues, exacerbating intra-Alliance tensions that have been fed by the often virulent anti-Americanism of Papandreaou and his Pasok party since they took power in 1981.

Apart from generally foolish Greek pro-Soviet pronouncements on a variety of issues, and an equally foolish radical third world-type posturing by this regime, the most important issue for the United States and the Alliance is the future of the NATO bases on Greek soil. The most important are on Crete and near Athens; the base agreements expire in 1988 and the process of renegotiation is now beginning. Papandreaou, who as usual seems to be retreating from a hard line, irresponsible position on this issue, will probably blackmail the United States and NATO for all he can get and then extend the base agreement. In any event, despite the undeniable importance of these facilities, there are alternatives in Turkey and Italy--so that Greece is not indispensable in this sense. Whatever the outcome of the base issue, the recurring problems engaging Greece, Turkey, and their relations with NATO are indications that intra-Alliance conflicts and crises are a very prominent feature

of Mediterranean politics and probably take up as much time and energy as Soviet pressures in the region, if not more. Finally, it should be added that despite some pro-East bloc positions and anti-Turkish agreements with Balkan communist regimes, Greece does not represent a possible opening for the Soviets in the Mediterranean, but is only a thorn in the side of NATO that is troublesome but not debilitating.

Greece is one Mediterranean country with an often ambivalent position within the Western Alliance. Spain, the most recent NATO member, is at the other end of the Mediterranean and has an equally diffident position within the Alliance. Tainted by its fascist past and essentially isolated as well as isolationist in its foreign policy, Franco's Spain established military ties with the United States after 1953 as part of a quest for respectability. Although it offered the United States important air and naval facilities, Spain nevertheless could not establish broader ties to the West, especially Europe, until the post-Franco era. It was curious and almost an accident that Spain's first major organizational links to the West came by joining the Atlantic Alliance in June, 1982--whereas all during this time membership in the European Community was the principal goal of governments in Madrid. The NATO question was controversial within Spain for a time, but this subsided and the major political forces united to help confirm Spanish membership by a 52.5% majority in the March, 1986 referendum. This was an important development, given that most of the Spanish population and elite were (and probably remain) essentially non-Atlanticist

and somewhat neutralist in terms of political-military orientation.

Although now irreversibly (one presumes) in the Atlantic Alliance, but not in the NATO military organization, Spain's relationship to Alliance security goals in the Mediterranean remain elusive. Given its geographical position and traditional foreign policy perspectives, Spain naturally is not so very concerned with the Soviet threat or East-West conflicts in the Mediterranean. This country's principal national security concerns in the region are to secure the return of Gibraltar from Britain and to protect its enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla across the straits of Morocco. In other words, along with the Canary Islands, Spain's strategic concerns focus in the direction of North Africa and are not concerned with issues that are likely to draw support from the United States and NATO-- although the NATO framework may ultimately help with the inevitable transfer of Gibraltar from British to Spanish control. Given the state of the Spanish military, as well as these rather narrow national security priorities, it is hard to see Spain becoming a key actor on behalf of the West in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, it seems that governments in Madrid are seeking to reduce Spain's active military role in NATO by cutting down on the U.S. presence in the current round of base negotiations, The most important bases involved in these talks are the air-naval facility at Rota, which helps control the Straits of Gibraltar, and the less crucial air facility at Torrejon. The May, 1983 agreement covering

these bases expires in 1988. As noted, Spanish policy is to secure a reduced presence of foreign forces on national soil. Or, as Prime Minister Gonzales has said, he wants a "progressive minor presence of (foreign) forces in our territory and of support installations in accordance with our national interests." If this policy remains constant, Spain's formal membership in the Western security alliance is likely to be diluted from an already weak position. The country would have an even more reduced role in the collective, or at least bilateral (U.S.-Spanish) defense of the Mediterranean and Europe. Indeed, the major question in this regard is whether Spanish membership in the Atlantic Alliance serves much of a purpose. Or, to take a more positive approach: it is clear that Spain and its Western partners have yet to define a Spanish role in the Alliance that would establish a genuine collective political-military engagement and a basis for a common effort.

Conclusion

This selective tour d'horizon of some security perspectives and issues in the Mediterranean has concluded that although it is a natural U.S. priority, the East-West dimension of conflict in this region is not the predominant one. Even for the United States, it can be argued that most of the time the Mediterranean

has essentially served as (1) a general forum for exerting an American hegemony in the region, however cautious and benevolent, (2) as a network of military installations that the United States uses to support and sustain Israel, and (3) as a kind of way station to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, which are areas where military threats to Western security are far greater now than in the Mediterranean.

This argument about the low relevance of the East-West dimension does not imply that the Mediterranean is not an extremely volatile and potentially dangerous region, which it obviously is. But threats such as the Arab-Israeli one do not fit neatly into the Atlantic Alliance's scheme of things, a problem traditionally defined as the "out of area" problem. Indeed, NATO and U.S.-defined NATO concerns in the Mediterranean do not seem to coincide with Greek or Spanish priorities, for example. And, it should be noted that the NATO member that currently shows the most concern for "Mediterranean" security per se is Italy--which has redirected its national defense efforts towards the south in recent years, largely because of dissatisfaction with NATO policies in the region. I leave this topic to another paper scheduled for this conference, but want to stress that Italy's enhanced attention to Mediterranean defense is undoubtedly one of the most important Western moves in the region in recent years. It indicates both that NATO has

not been able to cope with major Mediterranean security dilemmas because they go beyond the East-West dimension, and that national European interests are being reasserted in the region as well. It is, after, all, primarily the Europeans in the Alliance who have the greatest stake in ensuring stability and security in the Mediterranean. !

Whether and how they do this after years of relative indifference is a major question to be pondered, as is the issues of how U.S. and West European interests are likely to converge or diverge in the Mediterranean in the future. Perhaps the Mediterranean should become less of a kind of "American sea" and more the responsibility of powers who actually live around it and both suffer and benefit from the interactions of Mediterranean civilizations. But this would require a kind of European cooperation, or even a Mediterranean-wide interaction, which seems improbable now. The natural conclusion, then, is that the Mediterranean will continue to be plagued by its crises, incoherence, and the interventions of outside powers who largely determine the state of affairs in this unsettled part of the world.

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ITALY, NATO AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK

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of the International Institute for Strategic Studies

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Crises are as numerous as ever in the Mediterranean. Even more so, however, if one considers the area which stretches from the Northern Atlantic shores of Morocco to Central Asia, pushing southward as far as the Horn of Africa. This area is much larger than the Mediterranean. However, crises arising in this wider area are closely intertwined by ideological, ethnic and political factors, such as islamism, assertive nationalism, inter-Arab rivalries, Arab-African disputes and by the fact that boundaries of poorly constituted new States often cut across established ethnic and religious solidarities. For these reasons, when considering Mediterranean security, one cannot help identifying the Mediterranean with the wider "arc of crises" professor Brzezinski used to talk about. Twenty years ago the many different regions included in this "arc of crises" were strategically separated and Nato was essentially preoccupied with the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. Today these different regions have merged and the Mediterranean, more or less consciously, has become short hand for a "Southern Flank" which has expanded tremendously.

The reasons this environment is dangerous are not fundamentally different from those Western countries used to identify ten or twenty years ago: continued instability in the area could only too easily combine with the important Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and in the Caucanus - and today in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as well. This situation makes both the defense of the Central European Front and access to South-west Asia more difficult for the Western powers.

However, relative to even only ten years ago, important circumstances have changed. As I have just said, the theatre has expanded to include more crises. These crises are interrelated and this fact constitutes a crucial factor in making crises intractable. The most evident case in point is the war between Iran and Iraq. Thanks to a number of ideological and political factors (Iranian involvement in the Palestinian issue via anti-imperialism, its alliance with Syria, etc.), Iran has come to be a factor in inter-Arab politics, to the point that the war can be considered de facto as the first great inter-Arab war in contemporary history. This entanglement has confronted external powers with thorny trade-offs. Similar problems, though on a lesser scale, led to complications in other cases as well. Furthermore, the tendency

of regional crises to get entangled is emphasized by the emergence of new transnational factors, such as fundamentalism and terrorism as well as a fresh anti-Western impetus. These new factors add crucial new dimensions to old crises and make them more numerous and complicated.

These events have made the issue of the allied presence out of the Nato area more and more urgent. The Usa has encouraged the European allies to operate direct interventions or to intervene side by side with them. Otherwise the European allies have been asked to increase their own capabilities on the European Front to allow American forces to move out of the Nato area. More or less the Europeans have responded. If one has to appreciate prospects, in relation to the fact that instability in the Southern Flank is likely to continue unabated, a balance sheet is in order. This balance sheet doesn't seem very positive. There are basic dissensions between the Usa and Western Europe, as well as among European countries themselves, regarding how to manage crises, their origins and cures. Moreover, the absolute pragmatism and unevenness which govern allied cooperation in the Southern Flank, in the absence of even a modicum of institutionalization and fairness (that is, sticking to the rules of the game), is detrimental to the effectiveness of allied policies in the area, not to speak about inter-allied relations.

Dissensions and ineffectiveness are due to a number of elements which it may be worth noting here. First, while the Europeans are convinced that local security perceptions are the starting point to come to manage or to solve crises, the Usa is looking at the region from an exclusively East-West angle. The tendency of the American administration is to cash in the "American option" taken by an important group of Arab countries - the so called "moderate" countries - as an asset on East-West ground. At the same time it doesn't take any interest in assuring its consistency with local security perceptions. In the eyes of Arab opinion this means that the "American option" is not paying. As a consequence it isolates governments and their policy of staying allied with the West. It emphasizes anti-Western feelings, reinforces Islamic opposition domestically and exposes Arab allied countries to "more principled" regimes - like Damascus - and anti-imperialist countries - like Iran. As a result pro-Western alignments weaken and their weakness is certainly among the causes for the clear shifts underway in the region as far as the East-West balance of power is concerned. Moreover, in the eyes of local allied powers - as in the case of the Arab Gulf countries - this American attitude is turning Western countries from security guarantors into factors of insecurity.

Second, American and European attitudes regarding the possibility of inviting responsible cooperation from the Soviet Union are also different. Apart from a number of propagandistic moves, like the recurrent proposal to withdraw the respective fleets from the Mediterranean, prospects for an International Conference on the Middle East and more generally, for the participation of the Ussr into the peace process are more or less regarded positively by the Europeans. So were, quite recently, prospects for a Us-Ussr cooperation in the Gulf to protect navigation. In European quarters this was also considered an opportunity to test the likeliness of a more responsible and reliable Soviet attitude toward the region. On the contrary, the fundamental American attitude, after the very short-lived attempt included in the Joint Declaration of 1977, is simply to keep the Ussr out of the region. More or less

consciously, the Europeans do not consider this option consistent with their security, especially in the very moment East-West summitry is managing to reduce tensions inside Europe, while leaving them intact in the Southern Flank.

Third, there are dissensions on the evolution of terrorism. The Usa look at terrorism as at a global factor. As a matter of fact, events in Iran, Lebanon and among Palestinians have radicalized existing crises by emphasizing on both an ideological and a political level, their anti-imperialist (therefore anti-Western and anti-Usa) character of a struggle for liberation from colonial rule. It has been chiefly Iran's role and initiative to project this struggle internationally by means of terrorism, as a new form of war, against the Usa and other Western targets. Iranian initiative has brought about a more general radicalization of other crises and has encouraged and revived the use of terrorism from other quarters as well. At least under regional eyes, this war waged against the Usa is successful and it is certainly true that the Usa did not manage to counter it either in Lebanon (wherfrom they withdrew under a succession of blows) or elsewhere. This actually amounts to a threat to their international status of superpower which cannot be easily tolerated. Though indirectly, it is also true that it plays into the hands of the Ussr. In this sense, terrorism is a global factor. Still -so European argument runs- bombing over Beirut and Tripoli are useless because Western countries are here again confronted with a new manifestation of old regional factors, that require political as well as military responses. Military responses alone may be counterproductive.

Who is right? Comparing two cases of Western intervention in regional conflicts, the French combination of military presence with subtle intra-Chad and inter-African diplomacy appears to have been much more successful than the presence of the Western Multinational Force in Lebanon, that acted on the basis of different political approaches to the problem and a Us policy that proved mistaken. Actually, while the Italians were there to "protect Palestinians" -according to the terms of reference given by their Parliament-, French intervention was motivated by their supposed "national" interests. On the other hand, the Americans supported a Lebanese national unity based on the Israeli policy of Maronite dominance and a separate peace of Lebanon with Israel. Quite obviously this policy provoked national disunity and the upheaval of the Shi'ites against Israel (and the Usa) in South Lebanon, a problem which previously didn't exist.

These arguments may only be polemic. The real issue lies elsewhere, specifically in the general rationale of the Mediterranean policies more or less consciously carried out by the Usa, the Northern and Central European countries and those in Southern Europe.

As pointed out by Stefano Silvestri (1), there are two ways of looking at the Southern Flank of Nato. There is a "safety belt" approach, based on the assumption that this region is crisis prone and basically unmanageable without the direct intervention of the Superpowers. Western focus in the area should therefore be on "damage limitation" and the principle instrument would be military policy and the capacity to enforce external will on local powers. A second approach, aiming at "overall stability", is based on the idea that

Mediterranean instability can be cured because there is in the area a growing awareness of the existence of very important shared interests between Mediterranean and European countries. The instruments of such policy would be more of an economic and political, rather than military, nature.

Of course this is only a first intellectual framework of analysis. As a matter of fact, one has to remember that it was the Federal Republic of Germany to contribute decisive support to Portugal and Spain at the moment they got rid of their old totalitarian regimes. This policy fit very well with the "overall stability" approach despite the fact it was carried out by a Central European country. In any case, this difference exists, and particularly in the more recent years it separates Southern European from other European countries and especially the Usa. No one of course would willingly resort to force when other ways are readily available. Still, there is a great difference between a policy of "consensus gathering" and a policy of "decision sharing". The first is in search of clients, the second of allies.

Today, Southern European countries -as well as moderate Arab allies- which are expected to be on the forefront of the out-of-the-area cooperation policy find themselves subjected to a Us "consensus gathering" approach rather than to one of "decision sharing". The absence of a multilateral institutional framework similar to that of Nato with the aim of sharing analyses and decisions, however, may be detrimental to the success of such cooperation. Bilateral cooperation between the Usa and the different Mediterranean countries will create only tensions and contradictions. Some institutionalization is badly needed both among Atlantic Allies and among the latter and the Arab allies. In the same sense, poor institutionalization is a problem which affects the Europeans as well. European cooperation could provide strong support for Southern European countries at the very moment they cooperate (or quarrel) with the Usa over crises management in the Southern Flank. Present European Political Cooperation, however, is helpful but totally insufficient. As a consequence Southern European countries remain isolated, faced with crises which are of concern to everybody but involve them more immediately. Furthermore, while their initiatives are stimulated, the absence of an appropriate institutional environment may turn such initiatives into sources of tension with the Usa.

Clearly Italy is for many reasons deeply involved in the issues I have just discussed. As a matter of fact Italy is participating in Unifil and the Mfos; has participated in the successive Multinational Interposition Forces in Lebanon and in the Red Sea minesweeping operations; has extended a guarantee to Malta's neutrality. Despite a number of reservations and conditions, these missions have been approved by the opposition as well. Perhaps the most important trend amidst this Mediterranean reorientation is the debate about reshaping the Italian military model, to date almost entirely directed toward the defense of Nato's South-eastern Front (i. e. the North-eastern boundary of the Peninsula). In 1985 the Defence White Paper clearly identified a number of new missions in the Southern Flank and gave guidelines for re-organizing forces and adopting necessary weapons systems. More or less this transformation of the Italian military instrument has started and, if it will be pursued, it will

become an important factor in the debate on the Italian Mediterranean role. At the same time the Italian government, particularly under Mr. Craxi's guidance, has engaged in an active diplomacy directed toward support for the moderate Arab countries and their efforts to involve the Plo's mainstream in peace negotiations.

Whit these Mediterranean debates and initiatives underway, in 1985 and 1986 Italy has been affected by two serious crises: first, the "Achille Lauro" liner hijacking followed by events at the Sigonella military base, after the Americans had diverted and forced to land the Egyptian aircraft carrying the authors of the "Achille Lauro" hijacking and their bosses; second, the succession of American clashes with Libya and the Libyan attempt to bomb the American guarded Loran station on the islet of Lampedusa with two missiles.

The "Achille Lauro-Sigonella" crisis shed a vivid light on the existing differences of opinion between Southern European countries -Italy in the event- and the Usa. The entire sequence was managed by the Italian government with two main priorities in mind: first, the aim of saving Mr. Arafat as the essential partner in the Jordanian-Palestinian process; second, and perhaps most important, the aim of protecting Egyptian role and credibility in the inter-Arab arena. The Italian government's decision to allow Mr. Abul Abbas to leave despite American pressures has proved carefully justified on legal grounds. However, that decision was taken essentially for political reasons. The nature of that decision underscores the emergence of the kind of dissensions I have described above: the Usa wanted to give priority to terrorism as a global factor, while Italy has given priority to regional factors.

As a consequence of the "Achille Lauro"-Sigonella crisis, the governmental coalition split and this split caused the first governmental crisis Italy has suffered since the second World War as a result of foreign and security policies. The split occurred between those who were willing to maintain Italian political options in the Mediterranean and those who suggested that these options were untenable in view of the tensions they were causing in Italy's relationship with its major ally. Originally a regional affair, the "Achille Lauro"-Sigonella crisis evolved into a major crisis between Italy and the United States. At the end the governmental crisis was overcome by a shared decision of the coalition to get closer to the American notion of terrorism by downgrading the Italian Mediterranean policy profile.

The incidents in the Gulf of Sidra and the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in the first months of 1986, after Libya had been identified by Washington as the sponsor of the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 and other terrorist acts in the following months, led to similar consequences in the relationship between Italy and the Usa. Again, Italy corrected its Mediterranean policy amidst furious domestic wrangles.

Many lessons were taught by these events. The Italian opposition has complained about the role of Nato, but problems arose precisely because Nato was not there to regulate relations among the allies. The absence of institutions in the Southern Flank has left Italy isolated in its bilateral relationship with its major ally. Corrections made by the Italian government to its Mediterranean policy are a good example of "consensus gathering" vs.

"decision sharing". This absence of institutions must be also noted on the European side. In order to counter American pressures, Italy tried to rely on the European Political Cooperation framework. However, Epc's weakness prevented European countries from producing firm decisions and, most of all, prevented Epc from offsetting the Atlantic institutional vacuum. Again, Italy remained isolated.

As I have already noted, because of the absence of a multilateral procedure, security in the Southern Flank suffers from contradictions. The Usa wants the allies to take initiatives but is not ready to accept their initiatives. When dissent erupts, the only procedure left to reconcile policies is that of bilateral relations. But bilateralism between individual allies and the guide of the Alliance is not a healthy procedure. It brings about tension and frustration and discourages precisely the aim of the out of the Nato area cooperation, that is allied initiative and contribution.

Isolation is a more important point than generally believed when discussing Italy's contribution to the Southern Flank security is concerned. The Italian tendency to remain isolated on this issue is both subjective and objective. From an objective point of view, Italy is within the Mediterranean the only country fully and stably integrated into the Alliance and its military organization. From a subjective point of view, one must note that the domestic debate on Italy's presence in the Southern Flank is proceeding as if Italy would be expected act alone. Military and political factors are not envisioned in a strategy with the aim of balancing weapons acquisition and firm political alliances. The new military model is designed as if Italy had to implement a complete defense on multiple fronts.---

As for the first point, Nato's actual position today in the Southern Flank leaves Italy in a position of singularity. To begin with, Portugal only very formally can be considered a Mediterranean country. History, economy and politics set the identity and the interests of this country definitely elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine Portugal as a country more actively interested in Eastern Mediterranean than, say, Denmark. France and Spain, definitely members of the Alliance, do not belong to its military organization and, while France does not have any bilateral military agreement with the Usa, Spain is reducing its military bilateral relationship with Washington. As for Greece and Turkey, their attitudes toward Nato are very different. However the real point is that their dispute is creating increasing reservations regarding their actual participation into the life of the Alliance (ex.: military exercises). As a consequence of this situation, Italy may be faced by more security demands from Nato and the Usa than it can actually meet. This question is not only a military one. It is chiefly political. Different degrees of integration into the Alliance coupled with a very poor institutional environment once again may easily leave Italy isolated in its bilateral relationship with the Usa. At the same time, it may well create expectations which in the end will never be shared and/or supported either by Northern European or by Southern European allies.

From a subjective point of view, isolation comes from the tendency to develop a military Mediterranean role more rapidly and organically than its

political counterpart. Despite explicit warnings on the part of the 1985 White Paper, the debate on the new military model is going on as though Italy could assemble a full collection of weapons systems in order to accomplish all the necessary missions. It is clear that there are limits and that the upgrading of the international profile of the country requires a sensible and feasible mix of weapons, economic ties and alliances. A secure Mediterranean environment depends first of all on the capacity to create a firm and stable network of consensus, economic links and political alliances. Military quarters tend to underestimate this point. After the Libyan attempt to bomb Lampedusa, the three armed forces have stressed the necessity to strengthen Italian security by shopping lists as exaggerated as to lose any credibility. On the other hand, the government, as we saw when discussing the "Achille Lauro"-Sigonella crisis, attaches a decisive importance to alliances in the Mediterranean. However, its initiative has not been steady, rather somewhat uneven, and it seems more focussed on the Middle East than on the overall Southern Flank. Its major weakness lies with its limited attention to the strong links any Italian policy must maintain with the allies. At the same time the institutional point I have raised here seems alien to Italian vision. The consequence is, somewhat ironically, a risk of self-isolation.

The overall environment of Southern Flank security is a problem for both Italy and the Alliance. If Italy's isolation can not be overcome, its contribution to the security of the area will bring about tension. This tension could convince it to withdraw its contribution. It could also damage Italy's overall political equilibrium, domestically and internationally. This in turn would be damaging to Alliance interests as well as to security prospects in the region.

The Italian government seems aware of this position of isolation and singularity. To deal with it, it has generally tried to develop political and diplomatic relations with both the European and the Arab countries of the Mediterranean. Beyond bilateral relations it has also tried to develop forms of collective understanding. At the time it decided to extend a neutrality guarantee, it asked a number of other Mediterranean states to participate in this guarantee. More recently, in 1986, Mr. Craxi championed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean "support group", which was expected to involve three Nato countries (Italy, France and Spain) and three non-aligned countries (Yugoslavia, Egypt and Algeria). None of these initiatives has succeeded. The relevant point, however, is that, even if such initiatives had had the chance to succeed, still they would have required the support of the Alliance to become effective. It may be that the reason they did not succeed is that this support was missing. In any case, without this support, any initiative by Italy or another group of countries would create tension within the Alliance and in the end this tension would not allow any initiative to work.

As I have already noted, the coalition led by Mr. Craxi has initiated a number of policies related to the Southern Flank. However, these policies have been carried out as part of the Italian domestic decision process and not as part of a collective European or Atlantic understanding. It is true that in carrying out its policies, Italy has kept duly in touch with the European-Atlantic network, but policies have been implemented on an independent

basis. For example, at the end of 1985, when Italy was about to assume the European presidency, it requested its European partners to endorse its policy of explicit support for Arafat and the Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations. Italy failed to obtain their support and nevertheless maintained its independent policy. This procedure is definitely mistaken. Italy should submit proposals within existing allied institutions, seek consensus and joint action in the Mediterranean by clauses of non-singularity. Its diplomacy must apply first to allied institutions.

Nevertheless, the problem of American unilateral initiatives remains. Nato can endorse Mediterranean initiatives to a very limited extent only. European Political Cooperation is closer to such a competence, but it is in itself very weak. As a consequence, out-of-area operations and policies are dominated and fundamentally directed by the bilateral relationship between single Mediterranean countries and the Usa. I have already argued that bilateralism and the absence of a multilateral institutional framework seems to me detrimental to both inter-allied relationship and to Southern Flank security effectiveness. The need for some form of institutionalization of security relations in the Southern Flank remains perhaps the most important problem at stake.

(1) Political Factors Affecting Cooperation between Italy, Greece and Turkey, paper presented at the International Seminar organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali, the Panteios School of Political Science and the Foreign Policy Institute on "Prospects and problems of Cooperation between Greece, Italy and Turkey", Castelgandolfo (Rome), 20-22 December 1986.



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SECURITY IN THE ATLANTIC / MEDITERRANEAN REGION:

Portugal and Spain

Dr. Antonio MARQUINA

At the present time, the security policy of the two nations of the Iberian Peninsula is fully integrated in the context of European and Western defence. Portugal has been a member of NATO since 1949 and Spain joined in 1982. In the sixties, Portugal redirected its security policy because it considered its African provinces to be more important than the metropolitan territory in Europe. As a result, in order to deal with the resolutions of the UN and the new situation of international interventionism, through liberation movements and guerilla warfare, the cream of the Portuguese army and military equipment was transferred to Africa. Portugal gradually divested itself of its military obligations in Europe. The division which had been assigned to NATO with twenty-four thousand men, comprising three brigades with engineering, artillery and service support, disappeared as part of a complete restructuring of the army, designed to adapt it to the new kind of warfare. The basic units would be light-armed. Courses and training were to be centred on guerilla warfare rather than conventional warfare and NATO training.

It was the April revolution that gradually changed once again the role of the Portuguese armed forces, giving them a new mission, following the selective and rapid decolonization of the African provinces. In this way, after the failed coup by the communists, the Portuguese armed forces reverted to their proper mission of national defence, renouncing an inappropriate political rôle. NATO was the framework that made this reorganization possible.

As for Spain, after the signing of the agreements with the United States in 1955 and the tripartite talks between the General Staffs of Spain, Portugal and the United States, in 1956, the link with European and Western security was forged. The lack of political approval for the Franco régime meant that the link with NATO was an indirect and humiliating one, of a quasi-colonial nature. It is this situation that it is now a question of organizing in terms of equality, in spite of the serious political errors that have been made, due to ignorance of Spain's rôle in the defence of the Western world.

The two peninsular nations share quite similar security interests. Portugal has a pronounced interest in the Atlantic, owing to the fact that the shores of its metropolitan territory are washed by this ocean and also because of the territories of the Azores archipelago and the islands of Madeira. The Azores are undoubtedly the territory with the best geostrategic position, and this is the reason for the keen interest that the United States has taken in obtaining facilities there.

Spain has interests both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which give it a special position as regards Portugal. However, it should be emphasized that the Iberian Peninsula is a strategic unit, for if this aspect is forgotten or ignored, it could lead to an artificial approach on the part of the two peninsular nations.

The Western nations need to maintain their defence system vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. To put it in more concrete terms, Europe cannot decline to maintain its positions on the southern front. It is in this perspective that we must view the security policy that Spain pursues and must further deploy in the area, taking into account at the same time its own peculiar features and perceptions.

Security in the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is a complex area in European security. It marks the convergence of the area covered by NATO and the territorial waters of the North African States from the Maghreb to the Machrek. All the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are or consider themselves to be non-aligned countries; they are also Arab and Muslim countries with political, cultural, social and religious characteristics appreciably different from those of Europe. The Mediterranean marks the intersection of two important axes, the East-West axis of deterrence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the North-South dividing line between developed and less developed countries.

From a purely strategic point of view, it must be stressed that there is no strategic unit in the Mediterranean, although it does itself constitute a strategic entity. There is no one dominant power in the region. The Sixth Fleet confers a certain degree of unity on NATO's

southern flank. Since the Mediterranean, thanks to its straits, is a privileged channel of communication between East and West, the naval factor is fundamental. The Mediterranean provides room for manoeuvre and for stationing forces, and enables vigilance to be exercised and forces deployed, precisely because it is also a border area and buffer region between three continents.

Confining ourselves to the Western Mediterranean, we shall now try to expand on some of these ideas.

The view of security policy held by the countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Maghreb countries in the strict sense, is different from that of the Western/^{NATO}countries of the northern shores, i.e. Spain, France and Italy.

Morocco is an Atlantic and Mediterranean country, although the Atlantic dimension takes precedence over the Mediterranean. It occupies a singularly important geostrategic position, and together with Spain is responsible for the Straits of Gibraltar, that unavoidable passage on the sea routes between West and East, between Europe and Africa. But Morocco regards itself at the same time as Arab and African. This explains why its policy has veered towards non-alignment. Nevertheless, there are a few qualifications to be made. Algeria too has considered itself ever since independence as an Arab, African and non-aligned country. Yet Algeria has never granted facilities or bases to foreign countries, not even to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that most of its war material is of Soviet origin. Morocco has not advocated the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases from the Mediterranean as Algeria has so clearly done, although it takes a negative view of the accumulation of forces and destructive weapons systems in this sea, condemns the policy of blocs and disapproves of the way the great powers look upon the southern shores of the Mediterranean from the standpoint of their strategic value. We may also add that there is in Morocco a certain dichotomy between the popular base and the more nationalist political parties on the one hand, and the policy advocated by the king on the other. The king seeks to link his kingdom to the European countries and NATO, using the geostrategic value of his country

as a lever. It can be stated that a large proportion of the popular base has a deep-rooted proclivity towards non-alignment. This is an element which is frequently forgotten in many analyses and which can set limits on the Palace's freedom of movement and explain the surprising changes of attitude towards certain countries that have occasionally taken place. Something similar could be said of Tunisia, in spite of its considerable difference as regards political development. Tunisia view the Mediterranean as a sea for co-operation between Africa and Europe.

In this context, it must be pointed out that Spain's policy, until a few months before the holding of the referendum on whether or not the country should stay in NATO, was broadly in harmony with that of the Maghreb countries. Spain was seeking a certain degree of autonomy, criticized the then fashionable "militarization of political thought", considered it necessary to reduce the role of the non-Mediterranean powers in the area, calling for the withdrawal of foreign fleets, and did not even regard collaboration with Italy in a very favourable light, since it was a country fully integrated into the Atlantic Alliance. Fortunately, the clarification of Spain's position in the Western defence structure brought with it a re-shaping of this policy framed by Minister Fernando Morán. At the present time, Spain has regular institutionalized meetings both with France and ^{Italy}, where possible collaboration in the Mediterranean area is discussed.

This quest for a certain degree of autonomy underlies the type of security policy outlined in the Prime Minister's "ten-point declaration" made to the Spanish parliament on 23 October 1984.

The following points should be brought out:

1. - Spain would remain within NATO, but not in the integrated military structure.
- 2.- There would be a readjustment in the bilateral defence relations with the United States, in an attempt to secure a reduced presence of forces and support facilities in Spain.
- 3.- No nuclear weapons in Spain.
- 4.- Restoration of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty.

5.- Conclusion of defence cooperation agreements with other Western European countries.

This does not mean that the Spanish Government does not clearly perceive the existence of threats in the western Mediterranean from the Warsaw Pact. The general national defence plan was approved by the Government on 31 July 1985, and three months later the Joint Strategic Plan was also passed. This latter plan sets out the main strategic objectives of the Armed Forces, the threats in existence, courses of action to counter them and the aim of the joint Force. The chief threat was defined as coming from the Warsaw Pact and the traditional "threat from the south" lost its previous importance. This aspect is very significant since it entails an important change. As a result of the conflicts and wars which took place between Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco after decolonization (we may recall Ifni or the Western Sahara), and the Moroccan claim to Ceuta, Melilla and the Rocks, Spain gradually became accustomed to thinking in terms of a potential threat from the south. This was the context of the requests for arms and the preparatory negotiations with the United States for the renewal of the agreements on bases and facilities after 1963. Later came the impression of a possible threat from Algeria because of its general policy, and also because of the Soviet instructors and material it had received. In this way the threat in the western Mediterranean was characterized at the end of the sixties not only by Moroccan irredentism but also by the deployment of the Soviet Fleet and by fear of forces controlled by proxy coming from Algeria. There was talk of a possible limited attack and of guerilla warfare in the area of South-East Spain and the Straits of Gibraltar.

This perception of possible threats became consolidated and it can be said that it was not until a few years ago that an in-depth review was carried out, reconsidering the Algerian position, in view of the new approaches adopted by President Chadli Benyedid, and assessing the possibilities of Moroccan irredentism. In this context, the closer relations with Algeria and Morocco, including military co-operation, (a process that has gone much further with Morocco than it has with

Algeria), have made it possible to re-assess the perception of threats. Still pending is the problem posed by Morocco's claim to the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Meillia, the Rocks and the Chafarinas Islands, and this is a question on which the Spanish Government does not intend to embark on a negotiating process, unless events were to occur which changed the essential features of the situation, such as, for example, a change in the percentage composition of the population of the cities. Spain considers the stability of the Maghreb countries to be a positive factor for the security of the Mediterranean and seeks in conjunction with other countries to contribute to this stability, which is not merely political but also economic, and to the solving of certain conflicts, such as that of the Western Sahara, on solid foundations that will enable a lasting settlement to be reached. It should be pointed out that the outbreak of crises and limited conflicts in the Mediterranean, including the strains imposed by terrorist attacks, provide the Soviet Union with considerable room for manoeuvre through indirect strategy. This is an aspect which must not be neglected.

In view of the foregoing considerations, it can be understood that the central axis of deterrence and defence for Spain/should have its centre of gravity in the Straits of Gibraltar. Although the Soviet naval presence in the western Mediterranean is not very large (approximately one fifth of the 50 warships that are present on average in the Mediterranean), Spain helps, or can help even more closely, through a strategy of co-operation, to raise the level of forces and of strategic and logistical power of the Western countries within the NATO framework. Spain helps to hold back Soviet penetration and to protect the sea traffic from the Atlantic - roughly two hundred ships a day - which enters the western Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar.

Nevertheless, it is as well to underline the fact that, for the time being, Spain cannot by itself control with full guarantees the Straits and the access routes to them, and this is the reason why at the present time Spain does not call in question the American presence in Rota, in spite of the talks on the reduction in forces.

Spain's possible contribution is not restricted solely to the aeronaval domain in the Mediterranean area. The Army can also make an important contribution by increasing the mobility of some of its units and setting up a rapid deployment force for the southern front, a task which has been under study in recent years.

In any case, any possible Spanish missions in the western Mediterranean will depend on the cooperation agreements with NATO which are being negotiated at the present time. It should also be emphasized that the Spanish proposals for a reduction in the American military presence basically affect the tactical air wing 401, which is entrusted with tactical nuclear missions on the southern Mediterranean front in cases of crisis or conflict. On this point the Spanish argument is that the incorporation of Spain into NATO is a much greater contribution to western defence than whatever significance might be attached to the Spanish bases where the Americans have back-up facilities and authorizations to make use of them. However, it is not readily understandable why the Spanish Government believes that it is possible to dispense with this air wing 401 of F-16 aircraft, "maintaining the overall defence capacity", without the Spanish armed forces having to take on "certain responsibilities and missions currently carried out by the armed forces of the United States in Spain."

Security in the Atlantic region

In this field close collaboration between Spain and Portugal is imperative, though each country must attend to its own special features.

Much of the Spanish coastline is washed by the Atlantic Ocean. The Canary archipelago occupies a position of great importance on the sea lanes which cross the Atlantic from the Persian Gulf or South America.

As already indicated, the Spanish Joint Strategic Plan establishes as a priority item the development of an adequate deterrent capability for the effective aeronaval control of the Straits of Gibraltar and

their access routes. The Canary archipelago and the Balearic archipelago in the Mediterranean make it possible to flank the southern area of the Peninsula. This is the reason for the formation of the "Balearics-Peninsula-Canaries" Axis as a crucial zone for the defence of Spain. This Axis also has a political implication, namely the linking of the Canary archipelago with the peninsular territory, to counter the pretensions of third parties who have been trying to foster independence movements and neutralization. It should however be pointed out - and this is generally recognized in Spain - that the use of the word "Peninsula" is not really very suitable in that it covers two different nations: Spain and Portugal. The only purpose in using it is to modify the underlying conception in the long-standing denomination "Balearics-Straits-Canaries Axis", which did not include the projection of land and air power over the sea.

Nevertheless, the maritime area off the Cantabrian coast should not be forgotten as a "projection zone" towards the North Atlantic.

Portugal's perception of possible threats on the Atlantic access routes to the Straits of Gibraltar is fully shared by Spain. In this area, the principal threat to sea communications comes from submarines and the deployment of mines. The capacity of the Spanish and Portuguese naval forces, including the Spanish combat group, does not provide full control of the Atlantic access routes nor does it permit other operations to be carried out, such as support for a land campaign, except in very hypothetical localized conflicts on the African Atlantic coast. These are for the time being unlikely, although it must be remembered that Madeira and above all the Canary Islands are two excellent springboards for aeronaval deployment in the area.

Collaboration in this region of the Atlantic is not at the present time obstructed by any kind of dispute over the command structure, and Portugal, because of its experience in IBERLANT and also WESTLANT could be extremely useful to Spain in the new stage that is beginning with the negotiation of the collaboration agreements with NATO.

However, there are certain reservations to be made about approaches

which are still commonly seen in lectures and publications, both in Spain and in Portugal. Although the protection of convoys is still NATO doctrine, this doctrine can no longer be interpreted in the same way as it was in the forties and fifties. It is necessary to go beyond the sea lanes of the Canaries-Peninsula-Balearics Axis in order to gain effective control of the lines of communication, in the face of the threat posed by a ship or submarine armed with cruise missiles. In short, the defence of this area cannot be restricted to a point or a line, nor does it offer the same aeronaval protection possibilities as the Mediterranean does, despite the fact that there have been writers who have referred to the area bounded by the Peninsula, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands as a "second Mediterranean".

We have deliberately left out of consideration the issue of the Gibraltar dispute between Spain and the United Kingdom. Gibraltar occupies a very sensitive position on the Spanish Canaries-Peninsula-Balearics Axis and is perhaps the most important obstacle to the full military integration of Spain in NATO.



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Portuguese Security Options
Internal and External Factors

Alvaro Vasconcelos

Geographically located in a zone of transition between Europe and Africa, between Europe and the Americas, Portugal with its Atlantic archipelagos of Madeira and in particular the Açores, is part of an area of great importance in the strategy of the Western alliance.

A historian of the beginning of the twenty-first century will be able perhaps to contend that for Portugal the third millenium started when, after two years of turmoil, following the 25 April 1974, the democratic parties were able to opt for European integration and the Atlantic Alliance as top priorities of Portuguese foreign and defence policy. The European option was consolidated with membership of the European Community as from 1st January 1986.

Portuguese security priorities have been dominated in the twentieth century by the need to maintain a large colonial empire, from Macau, Goa, Damão and Diu, ^{and Timor} in Asia, to Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, S. Tomé e Príncipe and Cape Verde, in Africa. Following the end of the last of the old European empires, Portuguese foreign and security policies have been re-shaped along Euro-Atlantic guidelines, thus becoming more similar to those of most members of the Western alliance. These are likely to remain the dominant Portuguese security concerns over the last two decades of the twentieth century.

I. The shaping of a democratic consensus in favour of NATO

If one tries to look upon Portuguese security concerns and defence policy in the turning of the century, one must bear in mind what has until now shaped the international posture of Portugal, and try to see how it may develop in the future.

Prior to 1974, Portuguese defence policy was determined by the geostrategic position of the country, the preservation of the empire and the dominant anti-Communist ideology.

Geographically situated in the South Western periphery of Europe, with two Atlantic archipelagos - Madeira, nearer to the African continent than to Europe, and the Azores, on the Atlantic Ridge, lying approximately 2,300 miles from the United States and close to 1,000 miles from the mainland - Portugal was clearly significant to the strategists who shaped the configuration of an American-European alliance meant to contain the Soviet challenge in Central Europe; all the more so if we take into consideration that Spain could not be invited to join, due to Franco's involvement with the Axis, and that in the end of the forties it was the conventional dimension of deterrence that was stressed, and therefore the reinforcement from the United States was vital. The Azores were seen as part of the Atlantic strategic border of the United States, in a symmetrical position to that of Hawaii, as an important refuelling stop for the reinforcement of Europe as the Berlin supply operation of 1948-49 had already shown, providing an ideal base for the surveillance of the North Atlantic and a centre for anti-submarine warfare.

Salazar's understanding of the importance of being a member of an alliance of democratic countries for his own political survival, viewed as a way of gaining international and domestic support, was enhanced by the fact that this alliance was created to face what was seen as a Soviet military threat to Western Europe a purpose well in accordance with Salazar's anti-Communist crusade.

From 1961 onwards, when the war in Angola began, to 1974, the main and almost exclusive foreign and security policy concern of the Portuguese regime lay in Africa. In 1974, more than 150,000 soldiers were fighting in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. The participation in the Alliance and in particular the bilateral agreements with the United States, dating back to 1951, were also seen as a bargaining stance to try to reduce allied opposition to the African policy. That was clearly the case during the Kennedy administration and afterwards, in 1973, in the wake of the Yom Kippur war, when premier Marcelo Caetano (who was Salazar's successor following his illness and subsequent death in 1968) tried with a certain degree of success to convince Nixon and Kissinger to find a way around the obstacle raised by the Congress in the form of an arms sales embargo.

When, on the 25th of April 1974 the military, seeking a negotiated solution for the African wars, overthrew the regime and the democratic transition began, part of the former political and security concerns disappeared or would disappear with the forthcoming independence of the African colonies.

The Communist Party, clandestine for more than forty years, was for a short while regarded as an ally of the democratic parties. The Socialist Party (PS) had been

founded in 1973 and in 1974, after the coup, the other two major parties emerged, the Popular Democratic Party, PPD, later re-named Social-Democratic Party, PSD, and the Party of the Democratic and Social Centre, CDS, the Portuguese Christian Democrats. In 1985, a new political party, Party of Democratic Renewal, PRD, was founded by general Eanes, former President of the Republic; this party tries to pass as successor to the democratic military left within the Movement of the Armed Forces.

In the post-revolutionary period emerged the notion, among the military leaders but also among the political leaderships and certainly in the public opinion, that Portugal had no enemies and could afford a more neutral position in East-West relations. The question was never if Portugal should opt out of the Atlantic Alliance - not even the Communist Party has ever suggested that possibility. But from that period was left in the Portuguese Constitution the idea that Portugal should seek the elimination of both military alliances - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We all know what such a situation would mean: in the East, it would bring no change to the grip of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe; in the West, it would bring the drifting between Europe and the United States. But the Portuguese posture subsequent to the 1974 coup has to do with the sentiment that there was no need for a strong commitment to the Alliance any longer since their 'supportive neutrality' in relation to Portuguese African involvement was no longer required and since there was no clear perception of an external military threat to Portugal, a country far from the European front, a region of submarine and antisubmarine warfare in NATO terms (and submarines are by definition invisible to the eye).

It was the evolution of the democratic political struggle in Portugal that has shaped the present strong and ideological commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. In those years of 1974 and 1975, when they were fighting for freedom and for democracy, the democratic parties were compelled to overcome their differences and unite, to align with those sectors of the armed forces that opposed a Communist takeover, and to seek support in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Portugal was divided between the pro-Western and pro-European forces and the Communist Party and its allies within the armed forces with a clear support of the Soviet Union. It is still a matter of debate whether the Communist Party and the Soviet Union actually did want to seize power in Portugal ^{or if they} ~~were~~ were destabilizing the country in order to be able to ~~to~~ ~~gain~~ gain greater influence over the independence process of the African colonies. But the fact remains that they were gaining control of the economy, state bureaucracy and the media. As a result of the 1974-75 experience, the Portuguese have clearly taken sides. But the dictat of geography and threat perception was responsible for the neutralistic attitude still present and with a great deal of influence in the general approach to defence issues.

2. A Euro-Atlantic defence policy

The role of Portugal is likely to play in the Western security system will be shaped not only by security concerns but also and especially by domestic factors, including the success of European integration. It will of course depend upon the development of East-West relations; in any case, the current evolution of both NATO and US strategy, the crisis in nuclear deterrence, the emphasis on the conventional deterrent, the

arguments on the present level of US forces in Europe, all these factors convey a greater need for reinforcement from the United States. Consequently, those factors contribute to the United States being more demanding over access to air and naval facilities in Portugal, in particular in the Atlantic-

Mediterranean direction, all the more since a decline of US military presence in Spain is to be expected, as the current US-Spanish negotiations seem to indicate. The Portuguese attitude is likely to depend as much on the evolution of Portuguese party politics and the results of US "best efforts" in support of the re-equipment of Portuguese armed forces as on the degree in which Portugal will think it possible to circumscribe the use of those facilities mainly to the European theatre. A major problem for Portuguese-US relations in the years to come may arise from misunderstandings regarding the use of Portuguese bases for possible US involvements in the Middle East.

It was the US need of facilities for out of NATO area conflicts, specially the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, that was at the centre of the Portuguese-US negotiations for the renewal of the defence agreement signed on 13 December, 1983. Portugal then made it clear that "under no circumstances can clearance for the use of the Lajes base in the Azores be considered as automatic outside the NATO area".¹

In the present situation, the disproportion between the importance of facilities granted to NATO allies and the means of the armed forces is considerable, and unanimously recognised by civilian and military experts. This situation is not commensurate with the needs of the country's national defence nor with those of the Alliance; the 'void' of military power creates the perception in Portugal that, in a situation

of crisis, other forces than Portuguese forces would be called upon to act. And here again we find another source of difficulties in the relations with the allies. It is thought that 'In spite of the country's small physical dimensions, Portugal cannot, due to her past, due to her historical wealth, due to her self-consciousness as a nation, accommodate herself to a situation that could be defined as similar to that of Iceland.'²

It is not foreseeable that in the near future Portugal will be in a position to increase military expenditure significantly. On the contrary, the military budget has decreased in real terms over the last ten years, and in 1984 it represented 2.45 percent of the country's GDP. Although some degree of rationalisation may be introduced, it will not be possible to modernise and re-equip the Portuguese armed forces without significant allied aid.

The willingness to contribute forces to the allied security system is clearly shown with the fact that the 1st Mixed Brigade is earmarked for Northern Italy and that the modernisation programme clearly is designed to meet national as well as NATO requirements. This is the reason for the priority given to frigates and aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and to the implementation of air defence systems and other naval and air equipments for the protection of sea lanes and Portuguese harbours and airfields.

The present air-naval orientation of Portuguese strategy is stressed in the existing strategic concept documents due to "the fundamental strategic importance of the maritime and air border and of the interterritorial space"³, that is, the Atlantic waters in-between the different components of the territory of Portugal, the so-called 'strategic triangle'

(mainland, Madeira and the Azores). The definition of the role of the army is limited by the fears politicians still harbour against possibly remaining political temptations. The thorough 'normalization' of politico-military relations in the future will result in a reinforcement of the role of government and parliament in the defence decision making process.

At the regional level, it will be necessary to manage in the next decade the sensitive process of Spanish integration into NATO. Portugal will oppose any solution that would entrust Spain with a role of military co-ordination in the area and certainly veto a unified military command for both countries. The Portuguese will undoubtedly favour a two-command solution, which would reinforce Portuguese contribution under SACLANT. One of the subordinate commands to SACLANT, IBERLANT, for some years under the command of a Portuguese admiral, has always been located in Oeiras, near Lisbon.

If it is more or less clear what the Portuguese contribution to Western security in a East-West scenario would be, it is less clear what role Portugal will be called upon to play in North-South military co-operation. As we have stressed, there is a close geographic proximity to Africa: the Algarve in Southern Portugal is but 220 Km from the Moroccan coasts, and Madeira is the most southern position of the NATO command structure. The political, economic and demographic developments in North Africa, tensions within the Mahghreb, the fight for hegemony among Algeria, Morocco and Libya, of which the conflict in the Western Sahara is the most spectacular illustration, are factors that must be taken into consideration by Portuguese security policy. Portugal sooner or later will need to improve naval and air co-oper-

ation with Morocco.

More to the south are situated the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Military co-operation with them will be a task that Portugal will have to be able to envisage and to perform, if it wants to play any significant part in the Euro-African dialogue. That would of course depend, specially in what concerns Angola and Mozambique, on the situation in those countries, torn apart by civil wars that divide also the Portuguese and make it difficult to respond to their military demands.

3. Economic development and security concerns

In the years to come, it is possible to forecast that the main concern of Portuguese foreign policy will be the management of European economic integration. At the same time, Portugal will seek a greater participation in the ongoing process of reinforcing the European political and military co-operation, as the application for membership of the Western European Union would seem to indicate. But the main concern would appear to be how to succeed in economic integration within Europe, how to turn Portugal into a modern country where living standards can compare with those of other European partners. The first indication of this new mood was the accession to the leadership of the two major parties, the PS and the PSD, of two well known economists, Cavado Silva and Vítor Constâncio. This new trend, together with the fact that the memories of the 1974-75 crisis are fading away and even if the Communists still carry significant weight (15 percent of the votes in the October 1985 general election), can shape a more pragmatic and less ideological approach to foreign policy.

At the turning of the century more than 200 million Portuguese-speaking people, in Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, S. Tomé, Cape Verde, and in Portugal, will place the relationships among these countries as a major priority of their foreign and security policies. That will in turn ~~strengthen the role of~~ Portugal within the Euro-Atlantic relationship.

Economic development can have a positive effect on the understanding among the political leaderships of the need for a more dynamic external role in the East-West but also in the North-South direction, and the importance for having modern armed forces in that regard.

The success of European integration would create favourable conditions to this approach. If it does not succeed, however Portugal can enter into a difficult process that could threaten the existing pro-Euro-Atlantic consensus. All the domestic and external conditions exist, however, to prevent that from happening.

NOTES

¹ José Calvet de Magalhães, chief of the Portuguese delegation to the Portuguese-US negotiations, interview with, Diário de Notícias, January 1984.

² General José Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, "Alguns Apontamentos sobre Defesa Militar Portuguesa no Contexto OTAN", speech at the Lisbon American Club, March 1985.

³ Strategic Concept of National Defence, Major Options of the Strategic Concept of National Defence, and Strategic Military Concept, December 1985.

Table I - SHARE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE
IN TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
(1910-1986)





GRAFICO DE LIMITES



NORTH SOUTH RELATIONS IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Towards the biggest break of the economic and political order of the last century?

By Domingo del Pino

"Theories are the nests we need to catch this thing that we have called the World", wrote Karl Popper (1). I am glad, however, to be here as a journalist and consequently not supposed to produce any theory. I deal with facts and although I admit that a little theory is necessary to put facts together, I prefer a more skeptical approach of the subjects. Andre Malraux said once: "The West doesn't stop talking about the values it defends, but what are those values?". Western countries are certainly defending some values in the Mediterranean, but what are they really defending and how are they defending it?

In 1979 I was in Teheran just a few days before the Shah's fall. That was my first trip to Iran. I talked to as many people as possible. What the iranians said, and what the europeans said, was considerably different. Finally I went to see a friend who at the time was the head of the iranian branch of a well known spanish bank, and I explained him what I had been told. "Don't let them fool you", he said to me, "Nothing will happen here. The Shah will take the tanks out to the streets. Ten thousands people will die; one hundred thousands people will die, but nothing will change here". The Shah is of course gone, and the war in the Gulf is there to prove, ten years later, the vitality of the iranian revolution. Diplomats are today everywhere to assess the mounting islamic roar of the South world, but wherever they are, Westeners, as my friend, keep saying: "Nothing will change here".

Disregarding the fact that the concepts of North-South (2) are not very precise in what concerns the Western Mediterranean countries, I will deal here with "North-South tensions", "South-South tensions", "Tensions outside the Western mediterranean" but affecting directly the region, and some "Prospects for the future".

THE SOUTH: LAND AND MEN

As in the past, the most important of the South countries, in economy and population is, and lives, in the coastal fringe. Except for mining and oil whenever they have it, the rest of the territories are underdevelopped and partially neglected. In spite of the independences obtained in the Fifties, those that have governed in the last thirty years -in fact only five men, King Mohamed V, King Hassan II, Presidents Houari Boumedienne and Chadly Benyedid, and the *Supreme Fighter* Habib Bourguiba- have not succeeded in ending the big regional disparities that all of them found when their

countries became independent. In the three cases (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) the economical disparities, coincide with the natural regions and different ethnic groups. Some abandoned rural zones of the moroccan Rif live exclusively from the bank transfers by the moroccan inmigrants in Europe. The Great Kabilia in Algeria is the center of the berber resurgence.

Fertility index in the three countries are threefold or fourfold the index in countries of the North. In Algeria the fertility is 7.4 child per woman; in Morocco is 6.6 child per woman, and in Tunisia 5.4 child per woman. Traditions and culture made of it a tendency very difficult to change. Tunisia introduced some years ago family planning techniques but the results have been dissapointing so far and, in any case, are in open regression.

Demographic explosion is a fact to be considered and a reality. A moroccan economist has put it abruptly as follows: "For us it is not any more a matter of vote but a matter of eating". Eating is precisely the most difficult thing. While the population growths in a geometrical progression, the production of food in those three countries has relatively diminished. The three of them use to produce at the time of the independence enough food to satisfy their needs. Today the foods shortness vary from 30 to 50 percent of the needs in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS

The third extension of the EEC to twelve members (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986) and the possible consequences for the South mediterranean countries is, by far, the most important new element in this geographical area after the independences of the Fifties. Depending of the manner in which the EEC will approach the problem, this is going to introduce at medium or long term the breakdown in the North-South relations in the area. Consequently the traditional political, social, cultural, and economic order that had prevailed in the North-South relations in the Western Mediterranean in the last one hundred years will be modified. The political, human and economic consequences are very difficult to evaluate at present, but they range, symbolically, from the request of King Hassan II that Morocco be admitted as a member to the Treaty of Rome, to the declaration of the islamist leader Abdessalam Yassine that "the Iranian revolution is an example of the need to return to the original islam, to the message of the Quran, to find the arab muslims roots, far away from the vicious consumerism and search of material welfare of the West, and away from the national and artificial borders introduced in the muslim world as a result of the Western influence".

The whole North of Africa, and the mediterranean Asia is arab-muslim, and in those countries, where illiteracy reaches very high percentages, the Quran is the only cultural-political common denominator. The fate of the three millions inmigrants from the Moghreb countries that live inside the EEC is presently aggravated by the extension of the EEC to twelve, but is not directly and exclusively a consequence of it. The necessity to limit the immigration of Moghreb workers started to be felt just after the 1973 oil crisis. Some countries like France, which is the one with the largest inmigrants community inside its borders, incentivated the return to their countries of even those who have acquired permanent residence rights.

This is a problem for the South countries. It furthermore coincides with the major economic crisis in all of them derived from the breakdown of what they call the "postcolonial pact", that is, the privileged economic relations between the former colonial powers and their ancient colonies. Just after the independences of Morocco and Tunisia -Algeria is a special case- from the French (and Spanish) Protectorate, France maintained and even developed the traditional flux of trade with them, increasing the dependence of those countries from the French markets.

a)The 1969 "Association Agreements".

After the first extension, the EEC started to raise protectionists barriers against Third World agricultural products. A new phase in the North-South relations was initiated in 1969 by the signing of the so called "Association Agreements". France, to protect its interests, managed to introduce in the Treaty of Rome some clauses recognizing the specificity of its relations with its ancients colonies, and the EEC accepted the maintenance during a transitional period of these specific relations. Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerians products (before the algerian independence), were automatically considered as french products. The Association Agreements were however the first official regulation of the North-South economic relations. Most of the agricultural products of the South countries were allowed to enter the EEC with important reductions of the customs rights, while some other were exempted. Although the tendency to autarchy was reinforced in the EEC with the Politique Agricole Commune (PAC), preferential agreements were signed with many countries. In particular the EEC signed the Lome Convention with the 45 ACP (Asian, Caribbean and Pacific) countries in replacement of the Yaounde Convention. For most Moghreb economist this led to a stronger geographical concentration of their countries commercial relations with

the EEC.

b) The 1976 "Cooperation Agreements".

From 1969 to 1976 the European Community confirmed the economic solidarity among its members. The "Green Europe" was reinforced towards agricultural selfsufficiency. The monetary mechanisms were harmonised. Between 1969 and 1976 the Preferential Agreements were extended to Spain and Israel, direct competitors of the agricultural exports of the Moghreb countries. For the first time negotiations with the South Mediterranean countries were global and included finance, technical cooperation and handlabour discussions. Limitations against South exports were introduced in exchange of financial compensations that Morocco and Tunisia considered insufficient. According to Moghreb economist these Cooperation Agreements resulted in the *freezing* of their traditional exports and disturbed the incipient industrialization because it was made dependent of conjonctural considerations and sectorial reestructuration of European economies. The immigration flux was stopped, and many workers were expelled. That had negative effect on the economies of the three countries, all of them with excedent handlabour and unemployed. Furthermore, in the three cases (in lesser extent in the case of Algeria), the bank transfers of the inmigrant workers in the EEC had started to fulfill an structural function for their economies. In the case of Morocco, particularly, the transfers of the Moroccan workers have already by far exceeded the hard currency income derived from the phosphate exports (80 percent of the whole exports)(3).

THE SECOND EXTENSION OF THE EEC TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The second extension of the EEC in January 1986, came in very unfavourable circumstances for the South mediterranean countries. The most characteristics facts in those societies are: low economic growth, high percentage of unemployment, inflation, dependence of exports. The new EEC members are their direct competitors in all the line. The admission of Spain is the most feared because of its agricultural potential and its geographical proximity to EEC markets. The moroccans, the most effected by it, consider that it will have "devastating effects" on their economy. With Greece, Spain and Portugal, the EEC will be, by the way, agriculturally selfsufficient and in some case (wine and potatoes, for instance) will even have excedents. Furthermore, the three have too, like their South mediterranean counterparts, high rate of unemployment and

consequently the extension will furthermore limit the possibilities to find jobs for North African workers. The 1976 Cooperation Agreements came to an end and their renegotiation is still pending in the three cases. In november 1985 the EEC Council gave instructions to the Commission to discuss protocols of agreement with the three Moghreb countries as a result of the EEC extension to Spain and Portugal. The negotiations with Morocco, by far the most difficult, are blocked at present because Morocco considers "absolutely insufficient" the compensations offered by the EEC. The Protocols with Algeria and Tunisia have been completed in June 1987 and are ready to be signed. How did we arrive to such a serious situation? I will recall briefly the history.

1) The case of Algeria.

At the independence in 1962 Algeria exported to France citrus, fruits, wine, phosphates, minerals, and oil. The algerian territory was very unequally developed. The coastal and subcoastal fringe was relatively rich, but the Aures and Titteri regions appeared abandoned. The World recession of the Thirties and the Second World War resulted in the orientation of the agriculture by the french settlers in Algeria, just like in Morocco and Tunisia, towards the french market. Most of the agricultural land was in the hands of french settlers. After the independence the algerians abruptly nationalized the land. This process of nationalisation was favoured by the massive departure of the french. Between 1962 and 1963, in less than one year of independence, the algerian government had taken over 2.500.000 hectares (4).

But the french left a society and an economy heavily dependent of the french society and the french economy. The restrictions imposed by France to algerian agricultural products since the beginning, as a retaliation, brought to the algerians the same problems that the moroccans and tunisians will confront now because of this structural dependence. The algerians solved it in an abrupt manner. In spite of the high social cost, President Houari Boumedienne ordered the complete rooting out of the vineyards.

But agriculture was not the only conflict between France and Algeria. In 1962 there were 350.000 algerian inmigrants in France. By 1975 this figure had doubled and ten years later it had tripled. Today there is what is called "the second generation" of algerians born in France that are the cornerstone of the controversy between Algeria and the French government on this subject.

The Evian Agreements, which led the pace to independence, had resulted in the maintaining of France jurisdiction over the algerians oilfields. After the independence the algerian FLN moved gradually to get hold of this important sector of the economy. The 24 February 1971 president Boumedienne announced the nationalisation of the oil. French companies boycotted algerian oil for a while but finally reached some agreements with the algerian government.

Oil gave Algeria the possibility of a strong activism inside the OPEC countries and so was born the idea of a new international economic order strongly advocated by Algeria inside OPEC and the Non Aligned Movement. The peak of this militantism was reached in 1973 when Algeria was elected to the presidency of the Non Aligned Movement. Inside OPEC Algeria is allied with Lybia and Iran, and against Saudi Arabia.

But just as the phosphates gets the moroccans apart from their american competitors and close to the russians, oil brings Algeria close to the Western economic system. The biggest contracts for gas were signed with the United States companies El Paso, Panhandle and others. After a few years of quarrel because of the price, the american companies have started again to withdraw algerian gas. Two of the main algerian projects concerning gas, one submarine gas pipeline linking Algeria through Tunisia and Sicilia with Italy and North Europe, is already achieved and functioning. A second gas pipeline linking Algeria with Spain and the Iberian Peninsula, that was supposed to go through Northern Morocco, has not been started because of the political conflict between Morocco and Algeria. The project has been derided to the Strait of Gibraltar to avoid the moroccan territory.

Western countries are among the most important oil clients of Algeria as well. Hydrocarboons amounts for a 97,6 percent of algerian exports as a whole, and two thirds of them go to EEC countries. Simultaneously Algeria is today the most important mediterranean market for EEC countries. Its foreing debt has attained 17.000 million dollars and in 1985 its service of the debt amounted to 4.200 million dollars, but Algeria has no important problem with the international banks. Algeria is the first Moghreb country that started to introduce young and educated cadres in the main posts of the economy. The different congresses of the party since Boumedienne death concluded in the necessity to slow down the industrialisation and concentrate much more attention in agriculture.. This was finally decided as a policy in the Five Year Plan 1985-1989 that clearly established the need to increase the agricultural production to reduce dependence from food imports. As a paradox to the strong control

by the State of the industrial and oil sector, 62 percent of the cultivated land is already in private hands. Algeria exports very little of its agricultural production and consequently has no important problem with the extension of the EEC to Spain and Portugal.

2) The Moroccan Case.

The base of the modern moroccan economy, just like algerian and tunisian economies, was created during the Protectorate and oriented towards the french markets. Phosphates, mines, sardines, citrus, fruits and vegetables, wine production, were controlled by french settlers. The first moroccan national government of Dr. Abdallah Ibrahim wanted to break this dependence and decided a five year plan (1960-1964) which included nationalisation of the agricultural land and reorientation of the moroccan agriculture towards satisfaction of moroccan food needs. But Ibrahim government was dismissed in may 1960 by King Mohamed V under the pressure of Crown Prince Muley Hassan and France whose interest were threatened by nationalisations, and the agricultural reform could not be implemented. Foreign land in Morocco was not nationalised until 1973. But by that time most of the moroccan agriculture was export-oriented and the trend was continued in spite warnings from economists. Since the Association Agreements through the Cooperation Agreements until the extension of the EEC to Spain and Portugal, the moroccan agriculture suffered from different important droughts, as well as protective measures against their exports to EEC countries. France advocates today exactly the reforms that the moroccan nationalist government wanted to introduce in 1960, that is, diversification of the moroccan markets, and reorientation of cultures to satisfy moroccan food needs.

Parallel to the decline of the traditional flux of agricultural exports to the EEC, Morocco will suffer more than any other country from EEC restrictions against North African workers. The bank transfers of those workers are presently the main source of foreign income for the Moroccan economy. Besides many neglected regions of the country depend only of those transfers for their survival.

The 26 november 1985 the EEC Council instructed the Commission to negotiate with Morocco. The Moroccans argued that it is vital for them to export to the EEC. A proposal was made at the time to Morocco but the moroccan government declared itself deceived by it in spite that it had accepted one of the most important moroccan demands. The EEC had accepted to extend to Morocco in the two phases of the transitional period (1986-1990 and 1990-1995) the automatic

modulation of the entrance prices for Moroccan exports. However after the meeting of the Council of the 22 april 1986 the instructions were changed and the original offer to Morocco was modified in accordance. The "automatic modulation" was changed by the "eventual modulation".

Morocco refused to go on with negotiations, and proclaimed its intentions to discuss globally with the EEC. By that the moroccan government meant that the total of its relations with the EEC, trade deficit, moroccan imports from the EEC, will be put in the same negotiating basket with, for instance, the fishing agreement with Spain and Portugal, that expires next 31st July. For Spain this is an important issue that affects 700 boats fishing in the moroccan waters. A busines that affects 20.000 fishermen directly, and 100.000 families directly or indirectly related with fishing and fishing industries.

The "automatic modulation of the entrance price" in the EEC for the moroccan exports is the core of the problem. If granted, it will place Morocco inside the EEC for the next ten years on the same footing that Spain for agricultural exports. The Spanish authorities have so far refused to admit this concession on the grounds that if it was granted to Morocco, ¿what will be the difference for Spain as a member of the EEC?

3) The Case of Tunisia

Although important for Tunisia, due to the amount of tunisians agricultural exports to the EEC, the case of Tunisia should not represent any unsolvable problem. The history of tunisian agriculture is just the same as the algerian and moroccan. The structural dependence of the french market started during the Protectorate. But the tunisians have relatively diversified their exports. Notwithstanding sixty percent of their commerce exchanges are with the EEC. In any case, their demands to the EEC concern the maintaining of a contingent of 250.000 hectoliters of wine plus 50.000 hectoliters bottled wine, 60.000 tons of fruits and vegetables, and another contingent of 50.000 olive oil. Tunisia started exploratory negotiations with the EEC in 1983 and since then they have modified their agricultural policy with the aim of reducing food imports and attaining selfsufficiency.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There have never been smooth and confident North-South relations. The North African countries are the South partners of the EEC as a whole. But Spain, Greece and Portugal are too the South inside the EEC. The leaders of these three countries have said in different occasions what Prime Minister

Anibal Cavaco Silva told president Francois Mitterrand during his visit to Paris last January 25, 1987: "We are against a two speeds Europe. We want more determination in the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and an increased acces of the less developed countries in South Europe to the community funds".

In the case of the South mediterranean countries, relations with the North are made more difficult because of the colonial past. The way South countries obtained their independences have strongly influenced the present state of their relations with the EEC and their foreing policy. In what concerns Spain the liquidation of their colonial possessions still affects the relations with Morocco mainly because of the Saharan conflict. Furthermore the moroccans claim the "return of Ceuta Melilla and the islands of the Northern coast to moroccan sovereignty", and assimilate this case to a colonial issue.

1) The Saharan conflict

At present this conflict is blocked. The moroccan pretend that they have consolidated their military presence in spite of the important attacks by Polisario front since the beginning of this year in the area of Mahbes and Al Farsya. The construction of a six contention wall, from phosphate areas of Bu-Craa to the coast, and from there to the mauritanian border, is intended to prevent Polisario attacks from the sea. Any further attacks to this region will necessarily implicate the use of the mauritanian territory and consequently draw Mauritania responsibilities for the attacks. The present situation is that the United Nations through last General Asembly Resolution 41/16 have instructed its Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to prospect with the interested and concerned parties the possibility to held a referendum of self-determination in the territory. Resolution 41/16 calls for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front prior to any referendum. Morocco rejects these direct talks.

The conditions of a referendum of selfdetermination were established in different OAU meetings, and adopted by the United Nations. Disregarding the problem of getting moroccans and polisarios to seat at the same table, it seems to me that conditions for the referendum will not be implemented by Morocco in practice. They call for the withdrawal of moroccan troops from the territory, and the replacement of the moroccan administration by an international administration during the referendum operations. To determine who will qualify to vote could be, too, a very time consuming exercise. No fair solution is possible for the time being except if the International Community is prepared to share and adopt

King Hassan II views that this should be a "confirmative referendum".

This problem, as all North/South problems, has been influenced since the beginning by colonial and political considerations. In 1974 and 1975 the United States and France urged the spanish government to give the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. The spanish Foreign Ministry, that did not share the spanish government views on this subject, introduced a formulation of the 14 November 1975 agreement that has been afterwards the cause of many conflicts. It established a distinction between "Administration of the Territory" against "Sovereignty of the territory" and claimed that only the Administration had been transferred to Morocco and Mauritania.

Still today spanish and portuguese fishing agreements with Morocco, presently under discussion by the EEC, could be a subject of controversy. The Polisario front has requested the EEC not to negotiate with Morocco fishing rights over the Saharan waters, arguing that the Madrid Tripartite agreement did not transfer the sovereignty of the territory to Morocco and that besides, when Mauritania abandoned unilaterally the Oued ed Dahab (former spanish Rio de Oro) in August 1979, the territory was immediately annexed by Morocco. The moroccan position on this subject was explained to me a few days ago by the moroccan Secretary of State for the Relations with the EEC, Mohamed Segat. "If the EEC wants to fish in these waters", he said, "it must recognize the moroccan jurisdiction".

In my opinion no solution of the Saharan conflict is possible without a political agreement between Morocco and Algeria (and the Polisario). The most the algerians have offered so far to King Hassan is a personal union between the Western Saharan and Morocco just as the personal union between King Hassan and colonel Ghaddafi in the already buried Arab African Union (UAA). The moroccans refused this offer because they believed it led to the independence of the Western Sahara. The most the moroccans have offered to Algeria and the Polisario is a common exploitation of the iron deposits of Gara Yebilet (in Algerian territory) and a way through the Western Sahara to the sea, and a general amnesty for the Polisario leaders and their integration in the moroccan administration. Both positions are apart enough for the time being to prevent forecasting any agreement. Morocco officially expects a change in the Algerian regime, and the algerians officially expects King Hassan regime to crumble because of economic difficulties. The two meetings already held between King Hassan and President Chadly Benyedid in 1983 and 1987 seems to me the result of miscalculations, any side believing that the other is ripe

enough to accept the other conditions.

This problem will still affect North South relations for quite a while. Algeria and Morocco make relations with foreign partners heavily dependent of their attitudes toward the conflict.

CEUTA, MELILLA AND THE ISLANDS

Until 1985 moroccan official policy on the subject was to link it with the Gibraltar problem between Spain and Great Britain. The admission of Spain in the NATO in 1982 and the admission in the EEC in january 1986, has changed the moroccan approach of the issue. King Hassan stated before the Club de la Presse of Radio Europe 1 in April 1987 in Marrakech : "The problem of Ceuta and Melilla is anachronic and cannot be compared to the Gibraltar problem. Gibraltar is in Europe and is in the hands of an european power allied to Spain inside the NATO and the EEC. This is just a misunderstanding. But Ceuta and Melilla are in Africa, and they are enclaves. For us this is a colonial fact."

Consequently, Morocco does not need to associate the case of Ceuta and Melilla with that of Gibraltar any more. King Hassan proposed in January 1987 to King Juan Carlos the creation a joint Commission to think about the future of Ceuta and Melilla and the islands. The spanish government was not exactly delighted with this proposal and as a reaction to it proposed to discuss the granting of a regional autonomic status for the two towns.

In fact the promulgation in 1985 of a law to regulate the residence in Spain of foreigners, and its indiscriminate application to the muslims in Ceuta and Melilla had caused a serious rift between the spanish government and the more or less 120.000 muslims living in both towns. The lack of sensitivity ~~of~~ of the Spanish government towards the specific problem of this community resulted in a very conflictive situation and jeopardized any possibility of cooperation with the local muslim populations.

How far, how fast, the conflict of Ceuta and Melilla will develop into a major issue between Morocco and Spain depends now on King Hassan. International developments concerning the Western Sahara may certainly influence it. In any case, in my opinion, the spanish-moroccan Commission proposed by king Hassan to study the future of these two towns is the point of departure for the last phase of this conflict.

THE POLITICAL USE OF ISLAM AND THE QURAN

Winston Churchill used to say that the Mediterranean is the low belly of Europe. Between the North and the South of the Mediterranean exists strong political and economic interdependences. Stability and security in the South affects the stability and security in the North. I do not think any one here will doubt the wisdom and validity of this statement.

It is a fact that the arab-muslim society, the society we have as neighbour in the South, is finding difficulty to adapt itself to the present times. The nationalist movements that fought against colonial powers everywhere in the Fifties apparently brought with them this modernity that could have changed the political face of the South. Habib Bourguiba was among those daring to defy publicly the most backwards traditionalism in his country. King Mohamed V did the same in Morocco. To protect their interests the Western powers fought them and welcomed the arrival of more cooperative governments. The most backwards islam has taken now the frontscene in the last ten years. Furthermore, the most radical islam, the iranian promoted and financed islam, is superseding all ancient islamist currents in the Moghreb. The nationalist were left outside by the power monopoly in their countries. Today they are intellectually in retreat vis a vis the new islamist and islamized intelligentsia.

It will take probably very long to explain how did we arrive to this situation. In my opinion two fact were decisive: 1) the adulteration of democracy by the different governments, and 2) the gradual concentration of power in the hands of the Heads of State in these three countries that made superfluous the existence of democratic institutions. Algeria was since the beginning a one party system. But after the Boumedienne era there is a more powersharing among the military elite which, in fact, was always the power behind the power. The Parti Socialiste Destourien, PSD of Tunisia has acted as if it where in a one party system. President Habib Bourguiba accumulated all the decision-making power for decades. His approaching succession, for evident biological reasons, is the cause of great concern now.

The most evident power concentration is probably the case of King Hasan of Morocco. The King is civil and religious chief. Article 24 of the Constitution states that the King appoints the Primer Minister and the Ministers. Article 59 says that the government is responsible before the King and the Parliament. According to Article 25 the King presides over the council of ministers. Article 66 gives him the power to reject any law approved by the Parliamer^t with which he disagrees. Article 35 gives him

the power to proclaim the state of emergency (this has been applied in Morocco from June 1965 to July 1975). The ministry of Interior, the Administration of Defence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, and the Gendarmerie, are considered "exclusive domains of the Crown". The King personally decides the appointment of the 460 higher posts of the Administration.

In spite of the importance of the King official powers, in practice they are always used with an extensive sense. The "Quota System" is a common practice during elections. According to it, the ministry of Interior decides, previous to the elections, the future political map of the country. Politicians have to bargain with the minister of Interior to avoid underevaluation of their parties. Politicians like former Foreign minister Mohamed Boucetta denounced and recognized this practice during the last 1985 elections. The result is a dull political life, an uninterested Parliament, sleepy and headscratching deputies, and a government that does not even respond to the arranged electoral result.

As a consequence islam is in frank expansion in all of these three countries. In the country of The Commander of the Faithful as well. Count Alexandre de Marenches, the former head of the french SDECE has explained (5) how worried he was when the Shah of Iran landed in Morocco after his fall in January 1979. He fled immediately to Morocco and convinced King Hassan not to be the host of the Shah.

Against all the appearances, in Morocco an underground islam has developed in the last decade. More than 2000 clandestine "praying places" exists altogether with the official Mosques. Some twenty different islamist groups organise the believers. Their presence is not more evident because of police control, but they exists. Abdessalam Yassine, one of the admirers of Imom Khomeiny, and one of the most prolific islamic leaders of the Moghreb, has widely elaborated about the islamist idea of the future islamic society (6). The way to arrive to it is: "Return to the original islamic sources, abolition of corruption and other Western vices like alcohol, prostitution, unequal distribution of richness, and social justice". "Our traditional elites have been infiltrated and morally weakened by the generations of intellectuals and cadres formed in the Western way and far from our values. Now in the land of islam new liberation winds blows and the popular underground roar is becoming audible and is manifesting itself with devastating earthquakes. Classes must dissapear and must be substituted by a communitarian and solidariorian society. The method for that is Jihad (religious war) and not Nidal (class war). Our brother fighters are correctly conducting this fight in Iran."

The question is: ¿Is it still time to avoid the complete breakdown between the North and the South? ¿Can North still help the South to look towards the future and not to the past?

THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

Charles De Gaulle was probably the first to promote significantly a Mediterranean free of foreign fleets. The Mediterranean lake of peace was the most common ground of any North-South dialogue in the area. The revolutionarian Algeria repeated it afterwards meaning that russians and americans should go. Moroccans and tunisians have said the same but with the hope that only the russians would leave. Now that in the four countries of the North (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) there are socialist governments or socialists presidents, the idea of a North-South dialogue appeared again. President Francois Mitterrand suggested it during his 1983 visit to Morocco. His proposal was not welcomed at the time. Spain feared that the others will try to force it to discuss the consequences of its admission to the EEC even before it took place. The algerians were afraid that the others would like to seek a compromise over the Saharan conflict detrimental for the Polisario front.

In november 1986 Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi discussed the possibility of a North-South dialogue in the Western mediterranean with President Mitterrand in Paris, and in december 1986 Mitterrand and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez went again over the subject. The idea of the creation of a "contact group" was launched.

Spanish head of the government, Felipe Gonzalez talked about it during his firsts days of January 1987 trip to Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisian Prime Minister Rashid Sfar told him that "Spain, because of its geographical situation, its history, and its human dimension, plays an important role in the security in the Mediterranean". President Gonzalez talked not only about the necessity of a mediterranean dialogue, but even about the necessity of a common European position towards the Middle East conflict. A few days later Bettino Craxi visited Palma de Mallorca and raised the subject again. According to him it was necessary to "stimulate a common policy of the mediterranean countries, to mediate in the conflicts of the region". During his visit to Tunisia Felipe Gonzales met PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the Arab League Secretary General, Chadly Klibi, to whom he said that the arab-dialogue should be revitalised. A trip to Spain by Klibi, that should be followed by a trip of Klibi to the EEC, was arranged. The date was fixed for the 24th June but, unexpectedly, the Arab League Secretary General has postponed the visit sine die. The problems that have so far prevented such dialogue remain today.

Footnotes to North South relations in the Western Mediterranean

(1) Karl Popper: La logique de la decouverte scientifique.

Edit.Payot, Paris, 1978.

(2) I must precise that I when I write here North, I mean France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. South is for me, for the purpose of this article, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

(3) By 1985 the bank transfers amounted to 9.000 millions dirhams, while phosphates exports amounted only to 6.000 millions dirhams.

(4) Tahar Benhouria: L'Economie de l'Algerie.

Francois Maspero, 1980. In Morocco, for instance, the first Dahir (Decree) of nationalisation was approved in 1973, that is 17 years after independence.

(5) Christine Ockrent: Dans le Secret des Princes.

Editions Stock, Paris 1986

(6) For more information about the moroccan islamists see the following Abdessalam Yassine books: The Islam between the Dawa and the State; The Islam tomorrow; The revolution at the time of islam; Theory and practice of the muslim State.

See as well prof. Remy Leveau: Islam officiel et renouveau islamique au Maroc (Editions CNRS, 1979)

(7) for general information:

Actes du Colloque Cooperation CEE-Moghreb, Tunisia 26-30 May 1979.

Le Maroc et le Monde Arabe face a la CEE. Actes du Colloque organisé par l'Association des Economistes marocains 7-9 April 1981.

The Atlantic Alliance and
the Southern Region :
Legacy of Fragmentation

by John Chipman

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not for quotation

ALLIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:

Legacy of Fragmentation

Introduction

Sea powers are naturally drawn to the Mediterranean and traditionally, great powers operating in the Sea have sought to control the local residents. When Britain was weighing up what remained of its status as a great power in 1946, it was deemed essential that a presence in the Mediterranean be maintained so that Britain could influence the countries of Southern Europe. In a memorandum he wrote on 13 March 1946 on defence in the Mediterranean, the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin argued:

..If we move out of the Mediterranean, Russia will move in and the Mediterranean countries, from the point of view of commerce and trade, economy and democracy, will be finished. We have a chance of holding Italy in the Western civilisation, and although Yugoslavia is really under Russian control at the moment, the position there is very uneasy and one wonders how long as a Mediterranean people Yugoslavia will put up with Russian control...It is essential from our point of view that Greece remains with us politically...¹

These assessments did lead to Britain continuing to maintain, for awhile, a military presence in the Mediterranean that served as a unifying factor in the Sea. Now, the British presence is

considerably less (though two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) are maintained in Cyprus, protected by the 4000 strong British Forces Cyprus) and the United States has taken over as the principal external provider of security and unification. But a legacy of fragmentation exists---national policies of all states interested in Mediterranean security are still very strong, and as the NATO Alliance considers the question of regional security in the area, the challenge is how to make the allies work together before they, again, begin to drift apart.

The predominant military power of the United States in the Mediterranean is a result not only of the capacities of the Sixth Fleet but also of the extensive facilities and rights it enjoys in the Mediterranean. In the event of war involving the NATO Alliance, most of these installations would come under the direction and command of NATO authorities. But, in peacetime, these facilities are used by the United States exclusively or in collaboration with the host allied country. The nature of these arrangements has created a close, but often very awkward, relationship between the United States and its allies. Any changes towards a more collective approach to regional defence will have to take place both with the help and the acquiescence of the United States. The United States would have to help, as it has done, in providing some of the means by which these states can better defend themselves and collaborate with their allies. But it might also have to acquiesce, insofar as it may be forced to accept that the increased regional organisation of defence in the South (just as a more efficient European defence generally)

would detract from the special relationship (of different sorts) that the United States maintains with each of its allies in the Southern Region. The extent of the U.S. military presence and the nature of national defence policies are, at present, questions that have to be assessed together so that a politically robust and militarily useful co-operation between the United States and its European Allies can be prepared for the future. Allies in the Mediterranean, as elsewhere, will have to work for a more equal relationship and to do so they must seek to understand the conditions of Mediterranean security.

The difficulty is that to speak of Mediterranean security is to presume a coherent view of what sort of political or military developments are acceptable and of what threats to certain areas would require either individual or collective responses. Leaving aside the specific NATO concerns about a Soviet attack on the Southern Flank---that area in the Eastern Mediterranean for whose defence Turkey, Greece and Italy are primarily responsible---there is no general definition of Mediterranean security that can be satisfactory to all NATO members of the Southern Region, and none, ex hypothesi, to which all littoral states would agree. While the broad aims of NATO in the Central Front are roughly co-extensive with the fears of those NATO powers that lie on the East-West divide (especially West Germany), the security concerns of many states in the Southern Region are perceived as not fully met by NATO. This is so because so many of the threats appear to be "out-of-area" in their origin (even if not in their eventual impact) and for this there is virtually no actual planning. Equally, some of the Southern Region states often

consider certain security concerns of the United States in the area to be irrelevant to their special needs, or even counterproductive to their foreign policies. The NATO states in the Southern Region (and those outside it, like Britain and the United States who maintain influence in it) may not always be very far apart in their views on "the nature of the threat", but the independent expression of their views is manifest. The analysis of security problems in the Southern Region is therefore inseparable from an analysis of the political perspectives of all the countries that have a stake in the Mediterranean.

For NATO, the principal military problem in the Southern Region derives from the fact that because it constitutes neither a geographic nor a political whole it cannot be the subject of a single military strategy. It is barely possible to speak of a strategy for the Southern Flank, which itself is little more than a juxtaposition of at least four operational theatres. If all countries in NATO South felt that they were prospective victims of the same fate that would already be an advance towards easier internal management of NATO affairs in the region--but this is unlikely to be the case for some time, and cannot be the case in certain circumstances. If it is true that the United States and the USSR use the Mediterranean, at least partly, to support and advance their policies elsewhere, it is also true that countries like Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, at different times, in varying degrees, and for a range of motives, also concern themselves with evolving and actual threats in the Third World rather with than those inside NATO's

constitutional area of responsibilities.

Individual v. Collective Defence

The defence of the NATO countries of Southern Europe was not a central concern of Alliance planners who were "present at the creation" even if Portugal and Italy were founder members of the Alliance in 1949. The inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO (1952), symbolised not a shift in emphasis, but a recognition that these states who were vulnerable to communist and specifically Soviet threats would have to be included in the Alliance if the West's interests in the Mediterranean were to be secured. For many, the defence of the Mediterranean was largely conceived of as a necessary condition for the defence of continental Europe. At present, it is no longer correct to think of the Southern Region as an ignored or neglected part of NATO. In the late 1970's and early 1980's numerous high ranking government and NATO officials warned that insufficient attention was being paid to the area. By the mid-1980's this problem was largely solved, as analysts began to devote time to the Southern Region. In 1985, NATO itself formally recognised that the relative weakness of Portugal, Greece and Turkey was one of the "critical deficiencies" that the Alliance had to repair.² It will be long before this has an effect on NATO planning, but at least the problems of the Southern Region are officially on NATO's agenda.

If there is now a widespread view that the Alliance's military weaknesses in the region have to be addressed, there is still an

incomplete understanding of the various historical, political, economic and geopolitical factors that make the broader management of Western security interests more difficult in the South than in other areas of the Alliance. For a coherent defence policy to be established and carried through in the South, at least three conditions must be fulfilled. First, individual states in the region who have initial responsibilities for local defence must be able to co-operate with both regional and extra-regional NATO allies. This depends in part on the resolution of bilateral disputes between NATO allies in the region and also on an increased interest on the part of the United States and other allies in the area's economic and military modernisation. Second, it is important that the Soviet perception of the place of the Southern Region in its own strategy be understood, and that Western policies are elaborated that take full account of the scope of this Soviet perception. This requires that the Alliance improve its capacity to react militarily to possible threats throughout the region, but more broadly that the political effort is made to ensure that the security of the South is firmly coupled with the security of the Central region. Third, the Alliance as a whole must be fully aware of the nature of the other threats that may destabilise the area. To deal with these emerging dangers will require that the allies share information and viewpoints; yet also tolerate divergent opinions and approaches.

The dilemma that runs through these considerations is how to strengthen individual capacities and initiative in the South without sapping the means of collaboration and the sense of "collectivity"

required to run an Alliance. This dilemma is especially acute given four factors that govern the geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean from the perspective of the Atlantic Alliance. First, most of the countries in NATO's Southern Region see their membership in the Alliance in the light of their special relationship with the United States. Little distinction is generally made between NATO policy and policy towards the United States so that public debate often confuses the validity of NATO membership with the state of relations with the United States. Second, the states of the Southern Region who would like to make their security relationship with the United States less exclusive are not yet in a position to take leading roles as European decision-makers for European defence ideas. Thus these states are bound to find themselves negotiating for attention from other powers in a way that may from time to time encourage nationalist sentiments domestically that make the management of collective defence more difficult. Third, the Soviet Union is not uniformly considered the principle source of threat: other threats are widely thought to be quite important. This means that fidelity to the Alliance or to the United States is not in itself thought a full guarantee of security, and that attempts to cater nationally for these other threats may entail policies or actions that are not co-extensive with Alliance needs. Fourth, regional security in what we call the Southern Flank of NATO is difficult because it is not truly a "region", or at least does not present a unified theatre of potential war for which a single strategy can be elaborated. Furthermore, the two major opposing forces in the area, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, have different

perceptions that correspond to their own special interests and that affect how each divides the area operationally. These different perceptions in themselves pose a threat if not properly understood.

From a purely military perspective, it is a truism that during any conflict in Europe or the Middle East, control of the Mediterranean would be a precondition of military success for the NATO or Warsaw Pact powers, a fact recognised by all states concerned: external ones who seek political influence and local ones who understand the value of what they can offer in terms of promises of neutrality or commitments to act. It is impossible, especially in the case of generalised conflict in Europe, that the Southern Region be accorded less priority, to the extent one can speak in these terms given the nature of modern warfare, than the Central Front. The resupply of Western Europe as well as the prevention of certain Soviet gains would depend on an ability successfully to keep open (or to close) the relevant choke points. For the Soviets, it would be very important in war to control the Turkish Straits (which the West would want to prevent); while NATO would be especially concerned to ensure that the straits of Gibraltar would be secure so that necessary reinforcements to Greece, Italy and Turkey would be assured; an objective that the Soviets would wish to make difficult. Of course, it is in the nature of the special rivalry between the superpowers that there are general political advantages to be gained, that are separable from eventual military contingencies, in seeking to win friends and influence others throughout the Mediterranean.

It is this political competition that gives some meaning to the idea of "Western Security" in the Mediterranean, but it is not an idea uniformly or as powerfully shared by all Western countries in the South. While in the Central Front there is an almost perfect identity of interests between the United States and its Western European allies (though not perfect agreement on the methods to defend them), this cannot be the case in the Mediterranean. For both superpowers, their activity in the Mediterranean is related as much to their own individual interests beyond Europe as it may be to the protection of their Alliance partners. Because of this, conflict between the two superpowers in the Mediterranean would probably be related to a political problem to which the member of the two Alliances feel alien.³ It is the awareness of this fact that makes many countries in NATO South assert their own individual and local concerns with particular energy; and the implication of these assertions is often that NATO does not adequately provide for them. There is also a generalised feeling that United States policy in their region is sometimes irrelevant or contrary to their needs. This is not simply out of a fear that they will be dragged into a conflict in which they have no interest, but also, more positively, a desire to show that their own foreign policies need not be subservient to the logic of the East-West competition. Precisely because it is at the Central Front where that competition is most powerfully felt, there is a natural tendency amongst the countries of the Southern Region that surfaces from time to time, to argue that they need not be implicated in all aspects of the East-West struggle. It is perhaps not an historical accident, but a geographical and

political inevitability, that it is in NATO South where ideas of a "Third Force" and national "independence" are often the strongest.

It is also something that is becoming of increasing importance as Western planners are coming to realize the artificiality of separating the flanks from the Central Front and the principal dangers of an East-West conflict. In terms of nuclear war, it is true that there are no military targets in the Mediterranean or nuclear weapons systems (at present) crucial for U.S. strategic capacities in nuclear war (with the exception, perhaps, of cruise missiles stationed in Sicily).⁴ Nevertheless, most Mediterranean countries, because of their location, are certainly of strategic importance in the case of conventional conflict, wherever it might begin, especially given the rising need, owing to the development of new technologies, for appropriate land based forces in sea conflicts.⁵ The possible use by the Soviet Union, in the event of a general East-West conflict, of facilities in that part of the Mediterranean lying outside the NATO area means that just as the distinction between Central Front and Southern Region contingencies is likely to be blurred, so is the separation of NATO and non-NATO problems.

NATO and the Southern Region

For practical purposes, NATO divides the area it has to defend into specific regions. Within Allied Command Europe's (ACE) military areas, the Southern Region is the largest, comprising about four

million square miles. The immediate responsibility for the NATO defence of the area lies at AFSOUTH (Naples), whose wartime mission is to defend Italy, Greece and Turkey as well as the sea lines of communications throughout the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Five Principal Subordinate Commands (two land, two naval and one air), have been established to fulfill this purpose: AIRSOUTH (Naples), LANDSOUTH (Verona), LANDSOUTHEAST (Izmir), NAVSOUTH (Nisida Island, Naples), and STRIKEFORSOUTH (U.S. Sixth Fleet, homeported at Gaeta, Italy).

The duties of each of these commanders are vast. COMAIRSOUTH must defend the airspace along a 3,600 kilometre border stretching from the Italian alps to Eastern Turkey, and does so through the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) at Vicenza, and the 6th ATAF at Izmir, while a 7th ATAF in Greece is still a subject for negotiation. AIRSOUTH is the only command in the Southern Region that has NATO forces under its control perpetually in peacetime. COMLANDSOUTH is responsible for the defence of the western portion of the Southern Flank: the Veneto-Friuli Plain. His wartime mission is to defend the area as far forward as possible (to ensure that the Southern Region does not become "separated" from the Central Front), and most importantly to prevent oncoming forces access to the Po Plain, Italy's most industrialized area. COMLANDSOUTHEAST has the task of protecting the Turkish flank, and particularly the 600 kilometre border with the Soviet Union, which the Soviet Union might decide to cross if ever it wished direct access to Middle East oil supplies. The staff, as in all other AFSOUTH headquarters, is composed of

Turkish, British, Italian and American personnel (LANDSOUTHEAST and 6th ATAF in Izmir are the only AFSOUTH headquarters in which Greek personnel do not also participate). Because of the sometimes extraordinary age of much of Turkey's armaments, LANDSOUTHEAST is most in need of more sophisticated weaponry of almost all types.

COMNAVSOUTH has responsibility for six geographical areas: Gibraltar-Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Northeastern Mediterranean, West Mediterranean, and Southeast Mediterranean. The latter two areas are under his direct command while the other four are under other naval commanders having specific authority over each zone. Among NAVSOUTH's more important tasks is co-ordinating on a 24 hour basis the surveillance of Soviet Bloc maritime forces from its surveillance co-ordination centre in Italy. NAVSOUTH works closely with STRIKEFORSOUTH. COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH is responsible for largely the same area as is COMNAVSOUTH and has the general task of deterring all forms of aggression against the NATO states in the Mediterranean. STRIKEFORSOUTH has three subordinate commands at its disposal: Task Force 502 (Carrier Striking Forces), Task Force 503 (Amphibious Forces) and Task Force 504 (Landing Forces). Though the two naval commands have similar areas of action, in practice, COMNAVSOUTH in wartime would be responsible for the safeguard of supply lines in the Mediterranean while STRIKEFORSOUTH's mission would be directed more towards the projection of power ashore.⁶ In general, NAVSOUTH is geographically orientated: it must assure the security of the Mediterranean through anti-submarine warfare and protection of

convoys, while STRIKEFORSOUTH is functionally orientated: it must be prepared to take measures of various kinds to defeat the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and assist in the land battle in Europe.

Since the late 1970s, AFSOUTH has been concerned about the relatively slow reaction by NATO powers to the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean, both on land and at sea, and by the fact that NATO planners have been almost obsessed by the possibility of a Soviet threat on the Central Front. At the Central Front, the USSR is heavily opposed not only by ground forces, but also by tactical nuclear forces and the strategic deterrents of three NATO powers. A war on the Southern Flank is probably inconceivable outside of the context of a general European contest, but if the USSR merely wanted to test Alliance solidarity it would probably be more profitable to attempt this in the South rather than at the Centre.⁷ Most allies have not been too concerned about the prospect of a threat in the South. Had the United States been truly concerned about this threat it probably would not have instituted an arms embargo against Turkey from 1974-1978 after the latter's invasion of Cyprus. The period of détente, that coincided roughly with this embargo, made it easy to believe that the progressive weakening of Southern Region country defences (through old age, insufficient modernisation, and an increase in enemy capacities), need not be a cause for immediate alarm. Paradoxically, the approximate "end of détente" coincided with the end of Soviet naval (if not land or air) build up in the Mediterranean area. Still, there is a need for NATO powers to

develop their capacities to deter a threat that has increased, if stabilised, in the last decade.

The Evolving Soviet Threat

Traditionally, as strategists have turned their minds to the security situation in the Mediterranean, they have concentrated on its naval aspects. The rise of Soviet naval power in the Sea in the 1970's reinforced the natural and inevitable tendency to see in naval power the barometer of military security and political stability. This increase in Soviet naval power has now levelled off.

For the moment, the Soviet Union has to satisfy itself, in peacetime, with a rather modest level of activity in the Mediterranean. The size of the SOVMEDRON has stabilised to an average of 7 combatants, 6 submarines and 31 auxiliaries (an average of 44) on any given day. Currently the ship/days of the SOVMEDRON have leveled off at approximately 16,000 ship/days per year from a height of 21,000 in 1973. Except in times of crisis this presence is also not very active. In fact, the Mediterranean Squadron spends most of its time at anchor. These anchorages are in protected places in the open sea, off the coasts of various countries, but beyond the limits of the territorial sea. The most important anchorages are in the Gulf of Hammamet off the Tunisian Coast, the Gulf of Sollum off Libya; one to the east of Crete and another off Lemnos Island in the East Aegean. During exercises the SOVMEDRON also uses anchorages off Kithera in southern Greece and south of Cape Passero off Sicily.⁸

Manoeuvres and steaming from one port to another take up less than a quarter of the SOVMEDRON's time,⁹ but Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean (which are becoming increasingly quieter and do not have to snorkle so often) spend about 90 per cent of their time at sea.

Generally, the SOVMEDRON's existence is closely linked to that of the Sixth Fleet's: it was introduced into the Mediterranean to counter American naval activities and ostentatiously to display the USSR's interest in the Mediterranean. Naval presence is a mission like any other. This was the original (and will probably prove to be the most enduring), Soviet purpose in the Mediterranean. In the early years, the Squadron was used in moments of crisis in the Middle East to hinder the Sixth Fleet's capacity to defend American interests and also to support whatever individual initiatives the USSR wished to take in the region. The Squadron continues to exist as a deterrent to U.S. military action and is equipped to strike against U.S. forces in order to contain their capacity to escalate the level of conflict.

If originally it was largely presumed that many of the ships in the Soviet task force were deployed to shadow American carrier forces and "hamper an American nuclear strike" it is clear that this is no longer either a primary or even an important option. This is so if only because the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron coincides with the declining significance to the United States of that sea as a nuclear launching area. Most of the current seaborne

strike potential of the United States and 90 percent of the submarines that carry nuclear weapons normally lie outside the Mediterranean. Even though the Sixth Fleet still has a nuclear strike role its destruction would hardly materially affect the ability of the United States to devastate the Soviet homeland.¹⁰

While it is probably correct to presume that strategic defence (in this sense, the establishment of a defensive perimeter to the south of the USSR), must be included amongst the Squadron's missions, a number of specific military roles are of importance in the case of crisis or conflict. The minimum Soviet objective would be to prevent the Sixth Fleet from entering the Black Sea. The Squadron is primarily designed therefore for anti-submarine and anti-carrier operations and has an only minimal ability to effect beach landings. However, the naval infantry brigade attached to the Black Sea Fleet based at Sevastopol is trained to seize the straits and prevent Turkey from controlling them in wartime.¹¹ In the early 1980's the Soviets conducted an amphibious assault exercise in Syria with Syrian collaboration, but there is no indication that the Soviets are confident in their naval intervention capacities.

Outside the context of a general war, the role of the SOVMEDRON is to complicate the tasks of the Sixth Fleet. In the conflicts that broke out in the Middle East in the 1970s the Soviets were careful to deploy their ships in such a way so as to make it more difficult for the Sixth Fleet to project power ashore. While during the Yom Kippur war three Alligator tank landing ships with naval infantry were

attached to the SOVMEDRON, actual intervention by the Squadron remained militarily infeasible.¹² The Sixth Fleet was reinforced to challenge Soviet air and sea lines of communication, thus making any Soviet move on land at best costly, at worst disastrous.¹³ The stabilization in the growth of the SOVMEDRON since around the mid 1970s is testimony to the fact that the Soviets are aware of the military limitations to the use of their sea power in the Mediterranean. This said, one must always keep in mind the distinction between the peacetime political effects of the general Soviet presence and the wartime military capacities of the Squadron. It is necessary at least to acknowledge that the Soviet Union has learnt to exert political influence in times of both peace and crisis with forces that would prove militarily inferior in actual war.¹⁴

The Soviet Union's naval strategy in the Mediterranean must therefore be seen as more political than military: its mission is to modify the behaviour of other actors by its mere presence, as much as by any potential combat action. The wartime role of the Squadron would naturally be determined by the circumstance of actual conflict. In the case of a long conventional war, Soviet naval forces would have to ensure the interdiction of NATO's transatlantic lines of communication to prevent the successful reinforcement of forces at the Central Front. In a long war, equally, the Soviets would be burdened with the task of protecting their sea-based nuclear deterrent---insignificant as it may be in comparison to its land based arsenal.¹⁵

In these circumstances, naval forces located in the Mediterranean are not ideal for the performance of either of these missions. The Mediterranean Squadron would be useful in a short war---to knock out U.S. carrier forces---but if a long war were expected the USSR would no doubt prefer to deploy its naval forces in seas other than the Mediterranean (if they could get them there), where they would be both more useful and less vulnerable. Some analysts have even suggested that because Soviet surface ships in the Mediterranean are unlikely to retain combat ability beyond the first few days, and because Soviet undersea forces would have almost no ability to re-arm while deployed, NATO interests would not necessarily be best served by denying the Soviet Navy access to the Mediterranean, as its forces would be more accessible targets there than they would be in the Black Sea.¹⁶ The converse of this argument is contained in the cynical view that a sign of the outbreak of war in the Southern Flank would actually be the withdrawal of SOVMEDRON from the Mediterranean, rather than its reinforcement from the Black Sea. From the Soviet perspective, the dilemma could perhaps be stated as follows: if they withdrew the SOVMEDRON they would limit their options in the Mediterranean and perhaps send a signal that they were abandoning a political presence and this could be misinterpreted; if they were to move in completely they might send a more obviously aggressive signal but would have a serious problem of resupply.

In considering any move on the Southern Flank, Soviet forces would have to take into account not only land forces reinforced by

troops from NATO countries outside of the region but also the special power and position of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean in the past could not go much beyond trying to destroy as much of the Fleet as possible while necessarily sacrificing its own Eskadra. Because of new Soviet land and sea deployments, as well as the U.S. Navy's decision to give more attention than in the past to its squadron in the Indian Ocean (so that often there is only one U.S. carrier group in the Mediterranean), the Sixth Fleet is not as self-subsisting as it once was. The commander of the Sixth Fleet can remain confident about the Fleet's fighting capacity in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in the Western Mediterranean it would, of course, be safer from Soviet aircraft which would have to overfly a number of NATO countries and their air defence systems in order to attack U.S. ships. The West must be careful to ensure that in war, the Sixth Fleet will be able, in collaboration with other NATO navies in the Mediterranean, to maintain a forward posture in the Sea in order to destroy the SOVMEDRON and ensure that the diverse sectors of the Southern Flank are reinforced and resupplied.¹⁷ Certainly if the USSR were ever to get important bases in North Africa from which it could launch air strikes, the Sixth Fleet might have to leave the whole Sea if it wished to be sure of its safety, though, of course, these Soviet bases themselves might be vulnerable to attack, and the Soviet Union could never be certain that they would have unimpeded access to them in times of tension.

The fact remains then that the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean is not in a position to act effectively as an autonomous force. It

can harrass the Sixth Fleet (and other allied naval forces), it can prevent it from being exactly where it would prefer to be, but an attempt to prevail over the Fleet would probably be suicidal. The Fleet still has a powerful advantage over the SOVMEDRON and, in any case, its special configuration makes it especially hard to target. But the Fleet's wartime tasks of battle management and the enhancement of theatre air superiority¹⁸ are threatened by Soviet improvements in its major ground based air assets.

The deployment of Soviet Backfire (TU-26s) and Blinder (TU-22s) bombers in the Crimea is the principal new threat to Western forces in the Mediterranean, particularly to aircraft carriers. The air challenge now posed to AIRSOUTH will require important measures to be taken in order to achieve a greater integration of Southern Region air forces and to plug some of the important gaps and weak points that now exist. COMAIRSOUTH is committed to operate in a multifront theatre and must be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of air warfare---from air defence and defensive counter-air to offensive air support and counter-air interdiction, as well as tactical air support of maritime operations. The command control and communications (C3) challenge to ensure that the land and maritime principal subordinate commanders of AFSOUTH are in proper contact with each other is therefore vast.¹⁹ If the Soviet bombers are the most important actual threat to the Sixth Fleet and other NATO forces, planning in the region is complicated by the fact that the USSR has over the last four or five years added hundreds of heavily armed attack helicopters such as the MI-24 Hind D and MI-8 Hip E to its inventory thus

increasing its advantage at the front line while releasing tactical fighters for deeper interdiction missions.²⁰ It is the growing variety of Soviet air power, as well as its strength and quality, which is likely to make NATO organization in the Southern Region more complicated.

Aside from complicating tasks for the Sixth Fleet, Soviet military options in the Southern Region are various and must be seen fully when considering how to organise Western defence in the region. A victory at sea would be irrelevant if NATO forces could not ensure the defence of continental Europe. Not only is it therefore important to consider the nature of the land threat, but also its likely directions. It has often been suggested, for example, that the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and its access diplomacy in North Africa is directed towards creating the circumstances by which an attack on the soft underbelly of Europe would be possible. The fear is that the Soviet Union might acquire the capability to attack NATO forces in the south from African airfields as well as put at risk transatlantic convoys or reinforcements and supplies.²¹ Such an attack, if successful, would prevent NATO from grouping to attack Warsaw Pact forces at the Central Front and divert important Western forces from other tasks.

Whether the Soviet Union would want to divert its own forces to this end is a subject of dispute. Many of the missions that might be assigned to Soviet aircraft based in Africa could probably now in any case be fulfilled by aircraft located within the Soviet Union. The

fact that there is considerable Soviet airpower concentrated in Libya must be a matter for concern, but whether Libya, or any other country in Africa, would permit the Soviet Union to use national airfields for attacks on Europe is questionable, or at least should not be taken for granted. It is true, however, that if Libyan airfields could be used they would be enormously useful to the Soviet Union for the recovery and turnaround of Soviet aircraft launched from Warsaw Pact bases. An attack on the Southern Region from Africa however, would still pose considerable problems for the Soviet Union. Such a forward area is not a favourable operating environment for the Soviets in a major war. In the specific case of Libya, it is arguable that the USSR may become increasingly reluctant to "pre-position" expensive equipment whose use probably appears wasteful to the Soviets. (In 1987 Libya lost hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Soviet and East European equipment in Chad). Also, the USSR would have to go to elaborate ends to protect its far flung forces, and in so doing would tie up forces potentially more useful elsewhere without causing major problems for NATO. From the few facilities the Soviets might be able to maintain in Africa, they are unlikely to pose a direct threat to the West.²² Soviet naval aviation Backfire bombers operating from airfields in Libya would for example, be more exposed and vulnerable to NATO counterattack than if they flew wartime missions into the Mediterranean from safer havens in the Crimea. If, in a general European war, use of whatever facilities in Africa the USSR controlled is a contingency for which NATO must plan, a Soviet assault on Southern Europe from Africa (unconnected to a more general struggle), seems out of the question. The immediate,

most realistic, aim of the Soviet Union in the Southern Region, is to ensure a capacity to project itself effectively into any crisis that might involve a prime client in the Eastern Mediterranean, the North African littoral, or the Yemeni part of the Arabian Peninsula.²³

The degree of Soviet penetration in some of these littoral countries is a problem Western defence planners must take into account---insofar as since that penetration makes some use of these facilities conceivable at some time, the task of NATO armed forces in the region is made more complicated. Political/military influence in the relevant countries is also an added general challenge to Western predominance in the Mediterranean area.

In the Southern European land theatre other, more direct, options remain which Western countries must take into account as they modernise their forces and capacities. The Warsaw Pact forces are able to deploy some thirty five divisions on the Graeco-Turkish border, while NATO forces (mostly infantry units) number about thirty two divisions. Most Warsaw Pact divisions are mechanized, armoured and could be reinforced by at least two airborne/airmobile divisions.²⁴ These comparisons are not immediately revealing of anything in particular, as the quality of both the available Warsaw Pact and NATO forces varies considerably. More important is the environment in which these forces might have to fight. Turkey's mountaineous and rugged terrain favours its defence, though the inadequacy of Turkish anti-tank weapons, radar, and armoured attack helicopters makes of geographical inaccessibility a necessary virtue

rather than a useful luxury. In the special case of Turkey, NATO is at some advantage in that a defence in depth is both possible and advisable. The main advantage the Warsaw Pact has against Greek and Turkish forces in this area is tactical mobility. Once a Warsaw Pact breakthrough were made, it would be difficult for Greece or Turkey to withdraw and establish new lines of defence. This puts a premium on individual NATO countries in the region increasing their capacities for area defence through the use of light infantry.

The Soviet capacity to launch an attack through the Gorizia Gap, possibly using Hungarian divisions, has always been the traditional fear in the northeast of Italy. But such an attack would depend on the Soviet Union being able to pass through neutral Austria and depend on a passive Yugoslavia. All this would require time and would provide strategic warning for NATO forces to react. The Gap remains the most operationally valid way to invade Italy, and has for long been the focus of Italian defence planning, but few analysts consider that the various improvements that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries have made to their armed forces in recent years has made any qualitative change to the threat in this area.

More concern has surfaced over possible Soviet interests in thrusting southwards towards Iran. The USSR has a history of involvement in Iran which it occupied both in the 1920s and during the Second World War. Iran's northern provinces are ethnically similar to Soviet Azerbaijan and it can be presumed that if Iran were to break up in civil war or if certain Western powers (the United

States in particular) were to establish bases in the country the USSR might consider it necessary to intervene. The USSR has in fact refused to acknowledge Iran's renunciation of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship under whose terms the Soviet Union could occupy Iran if it perceived a security threat.²⁵ Clearly the fact that 60 percent of Soviet troops in the Transcaucasus Military District of the Soviet Union are only Category 3, at present militates against the likelihood of any serious military adventure in the region. Equally given that the United States would consider a Soviet "grab for oil" as a casus belli, restraint will be the operative word in respect of Soviet policy towards the area and especially Iran.²⁶

The facts of geography, as well as information about past Soviet military planning, make it clear that the USSR's possible invasion routes towards Iran would not necessarily include any part of NATO territory. Theoretically, there are routes from either side of the Caspian Sea that would allow the Soviet Union to reach Tehran without having to take Turkey into account.²⁷ However it is probable that the Soviet Union would not wish to leave its border with Eastern Turkey undefended in the event of a move towards Iran and therefore might also seek in such a contingency to conduct a front offensive against Turkey at least to ensure Turkish neutrality. It is therefore conceivable that a conflict with Turkey would not have Ankara as an objective and might take place outside of the context of a general European war.²⁸ The Turkish military seems implicitly to have accepted this possibility as indicated by the fact that their most recent improvements have been in the defence of the East.²⁹ In

any case the fact that the Soviet Union has important interests in Iran and other areas in the Middle East demonstrates the fact that the West should not distinguish too clinically between in-area and out-of-area threats, especially given that in the special case of Turkey, that country can easily become embroiled by conflicts and instability in such areas as the Persian Gulf and Near East. The problem for NATO strategists is to assess the various risks that exist in the Southern Region and establish a military strategy that takes these into account and thus help to reinforce the sense of political solidarity amongst NATO states in the South that is so essential to a general policy of deterrence.

The Role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet

It remains the case that so long as the U.S. Sixth Fleet continues to maintain the rights in the Mediterranean it has acquired over time, it will continue to have an important comparative advantage over the Soviet Union in the area, though for a number of reasons it can no longer consider itself as secure as before. Current Soviet Union military options have to be examined in the context of the Sixth Fleet's changing role.

In the beginning, and at least until the mid 1960s, the Sixth Fleet's position within the Mediterranean was clearly paramount; the only other warships in the Mediterranean being either allied or insignificant³⁰ Until 1963 there were no Soviet warships in the Mediterranean.³¹ Though the Soviet Union did have submarines that

could move into the areas, and possessed Tu-16 naval bombers that were within striking range of U.S. carrier forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, the military threat posed by these instruments was largely discounted owing to the perceived impossibility that they could be used except in the most extreme of political circumstances. Certainly neither Soviet submarines, nor Soviet naval bombers, could be used as forces of political persuasion or blackmail. The Sixth Fleet was therefore able to move within the Mediterranean, and "show the flag" with full confidence that its political weight would be felt by those it wished to influence. Its main advantage was its flexibility. It could control sea lanes, project power ashore, land troops and shell coastal targets. The Soviet Union had only a dramatic option: strategic attack against the United States, or unimpressive ones: anti-shipping tasks against third parties or coastal defense on its own behalf.³²

This advantage of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was one the United States exploited in both overt and subtle ways. When on 20 April 1957 1800 U.S. marines anchored off the coast of Beirut in readiness for a possible intervention in Jordan to support King Hussein, the Sixth Fleet carried out manoeuvres in the Eastern Mediterranean, thus adding credibility to the United States' position. Similarly, in July 1958 the Sixth Fleet supported the landings of almost 15,000 U.S. troops in Beirut to support, in President Eisenhower's words, "the independence and integrity of Lebanon".³³ Both operations were successful. Thereafter, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was understood to be a deterrent force

which had to be taken into account by anyone whose actions might adversely affect U.S. interests in the area; and the nature of U.S. interests as well as the capacities of the Fleet meant that the area in question included the entire Middle East. Also in the late fifties and early sixties, U.S. carrier forces sustained the entire naval contribution to the American strategic deterrent and the Eastern Mediterranean was their most advantageous location.³⁴ By the late sixties and early seventies, much of this had changed. The prospective war time activity of the Sixth Fleet became limited to a number of narrowly defined roles: airpower support to local (Greek and Turkish) troops during the first stages of a defensive battle; air strikes against the southern part of the Soviet Union as part of a counterattack; or direct support for NATO defenders in the Central Front in the event of a Soviet assault there.³⁵

For most of its existence, up until 1979, the Sixth Fleet was composed of about 40 ships including escorts and replacement vessels. The surface forces operated as three distinct groups: 2 carrier battle groups (CVBG) and an amphibious task group. In principle, operations covered the whole Mediterranean, but usually 1 CVBG operated in the central Mediterranean, and the other in the Western Mediterranean.³⁶ After 1979, only 1 CVBG was kept in the Mediterranean, though from time to time there were two as rotations took place. Following events in Afghanistan and Iran, it was decided to deploy more naval forces in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area, and this came largely at the expense of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Since March 1986, there has been a return to the old

policy, with usually two CVBGs in the Mediterranean. Clearly, with two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, the U.S. Sixth Fleet presents a potent force. Over the years the Fleet has learned to operate alongside other Western navies deployed in the Mediterranean and collaboration between these forces is quite good. Yet it is certain that if events in the Gulf region require an increased American naval presence, this might again result in a draw down of Sixth Fleet assets; and, in any case, even with 2 CVBGs, the variety of useful missions related to power projection that the Sixth Fleet could perform is limited.

The realistic military role of the Sixth Fleet for purely intra-Mediterranean contingencies is very different from what it may have been earlier, as countervailing Soviet power based both on land and at sea has made its presence felt. Questions can now reasonably be asked about exactly what role the Sixth Fleet could be expected to play in a generalized European conflict. Would the 100 or so aircraft at the Sixth Fleet's disposal (added to the 4000 land based NATO aircraft that would be expected in the European continent during the war), make any real difference between victory and defeat, especially since most of the Sixth Fleet's aircraft are required for its own defence?³⁷ At least some analysts have argued that if prepositioning and forward defence is an appropriate strategy for a land theatre that lacks geographical depth this is not necessarily the case for naval forces. The paradox of the NATO role of most naval forces is that, in the words of Admiral Bagley, "the innate strategic flexibility of ships in the Mediterranean is exchanged for

the immobility of land based forces in whose stead they serve.³⁸ Is it right for an inherently mobile force to assume a fixed posture similar to that of foot soldiers on the ground in Central Europe? If war did break out in Europe it is likely that the Sixth Fleet would wish to move throughout the Mediterranean and conduct, from wherever it might be located, a perimeter defence in depth coupled with appropriate counterattacks against any enemy forces within its reach. Such action would not necessarily mean defence for the Central Front, or defence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Probably the principal contributions that carrier-based U.S. air power could make to NATO's conventional forces in the Eastern Mediterranean is twofold. First, it could bring to bear extremely sophisticated air defence assets (F-14 and F-18 fighters and E-2C airborne early warning aircraft) to bolster the limited and somewhat obsolescent air defence forces of Greece and Italy. Second, there is some capacity to deploy offensive air support (in the form of A-6 light bombers) that have a large combat radius, a large payload and an all-weather flight capacity. Use of these assets is still very dependent on what is available after the specific defence needs of the Sixth Fleet have been provided for, and as indicated it will be difficult, given the rise of Soviet air power, to release much Sixth Fleet aircraft for offensive purposes. Clearly in its one carrier battle group formation the Sixth Fleet would have more difficulties carrying out its missions in the Eastern Mediterranean than would be the case when two carriers were deployed.³⁹

Despite the Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean, most

naval strategists believe that the Sixth Fleet would carry the day in a strict naval exchange with the Soviet Eskadra. But its capacity to assist in the land battle has certainly decreased and the threat that Soviet land based air power poses for the Fleet is such that its freedom of operating in the Mediterranean is less than it once was. The primary mission of the Sixth Fleet in a NATO/Warsaw Pact contingency might therefore be more orientated towards sea control than towards power projection, unless the Soviet air threat were neutralised, in which case the Sixth Fleet might be able to provide some assistance to the conventional battle in Europe. A nuclearisation of the naval conflict in the Mediterranean would in all likelihood drive the Sixth Fleet and other allied navies outside of the Sea.

What the Sixth Fleet (or STRIKEFORSOUTH) may do in the event of a European war should, in any case, be distinguished from what it can do in peacetime, and from what both allies and potential enemies believe it might do in various other contingencies. Because of the increase in Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, it is true that the general political utility of the Sixth Fleet in time of peace has now been challenged. The Sixth Fleet nevertheless remains the principal symbol of the U.S. guarantee to its Mediterranean allies, just as U.S. troops in West Germany show commitment to the Central Front. To the extent that the Fleet is vulnerable, this vulnerability is a symbol of American willingness to provide a forward naval defence for Europe at risk to American lives. Yet because in peacetime the Sixth Fleet has obvious missions outside of

Europe it is not seen in the same light as U.S. troops in continental Europe. Its role in support of U.S. policy outside the NATO area is a source of friction with Southern Region allies, especially given that there is a general perception throughout the Southern Region that U.S. ground and air forces based in the area are more useful for the defence of what are thought to be particular American interests than they may be for the immediate defence of the Southern Region itself. The air raids launched against Libya in April 1986 reinforced this perception in many sectors of public opinion in the Southern Region.

The Alliance's Mediterranean flank is inevitably the operational bridge between the military security of Western Europe and the defence of the Gulf states, either against Soviet attacks or against local insurgents. Since the United States sees itself responsible for both these missions, and in fact serves as the strategic link between the two areas, its own definition of Southern Region defence is necessarily wider than that of any of the NATO countries that are part of the Region. The need for the United States to defend Israel and the usually very close nature of U.S.-Israeli defence collaboration in the region adds to the variety of purposes for which U.S. naval power in the Mediterranean might be used. The special role of the Sixth Fleet in defence of the United States' Middle Eastern interests makes its NATO role seem ambiguous to many, and it is this which creates special problems between the U.S. and its Mediterranean allies.

Future Course of NATO Strategy

While it is clear that the individual states of NATO South have elaborated defence policies considered by them to be roughly sufficient to deal with the specific threats to their territories, a stronger deterrent in the south would require a more evidently collective effort on the part of Southern Region states. Naturally, there are Alliance-wide plans for the defence of the Southern Region just as there are plans for the Central Front and the North. But these plans do not presume as high a collaborative effort as do those for other Alliance areas, and in some instances, have not been entirely absorbed by national planners. Both these problems now have more severe consequences than before. The more diversified Soviet threat to the region means that Southern Region states need to be able to work together at an early stage, and incorporate reinforcements in a timely fashion. As these states work on their national defence plans in the coming years, it will be necessary to find instances where a joint defence can become truly collective, and for this, various improvements at land, air and sea can be envisaged.

The defence of four separate theatres in Italy, Greece and Western Turkey, Eastern Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea is very difficult. Communications over this area are extremely thin, partly because national systems remain inadequate and partly because those that exist are not perfectly compatible. Geographically, NATO is at a disadvantage in so far as its ability to move ground troops throughout the area is lower than the Warsaw Pact's ability to

present a significant threat to them. Recent Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in 1982 (Shield '82, a field training exercise or FTX) and 1984 (Soyuz '84, a command post exercise or CPX) have shown that Soviet strategy to gain access to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean probably includes plans to overrun the Turkish First Army in Thrace, force the Bosphorus with at least nine divisions supported by air and sea elements and a number of Bulgarian tank regiments staging from Varna and Burgas.⁴⁰ The aim would be to split the Greek and Turkish units in order to leave the defence of the straits and the West coast of the Bosphorus exclusively to Turkish forces.

Any defence in the Southern Region must be aimed at ensuring that the Soviet Union can not realistically believe that it can outflank NATO forces in a drive either to the Middle East, or through the southern area of the Mediterranean to disrupt Allied control of the Sea, and seize assets on the way. Given the divided theatres of possible battle, it is clear that initial defence in the Southern Region must be national. The forces of each country must be able to resist an aggression at least long enough for reinforcements to arrive or for NATO authorities to warn an aggressor that continued aggression could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly the priority must be on improving local defence capacities and the ability to integrate efficiently reinforcements as they arrive.

To counter a possible land attack, the Greek and Turkish armies maintain in peacetime quite large forces, totalling roughly ten divisions stationed in a very narrow area. This represents the

largest concentration of force in any operational sector of NATO's forward defence.⁴¹ However, these forces are mainly traditional infantry, weak in anti-tank equipment and feeble in logistics and infrastructure. Both Greece and Turkey have pledged themselves to the modernisation of their armed forces, but it is clear that as long as they keep large armed forces it will be difficult to afford making the technological improvements that are necessary. A choice is clearly imposed between size and quality, and as long as the former remains a priority, the latter is sacrificed. Since there is in the Southern Flank an especially great need to incorporate reinforcements, these states will have to concentrate not only on the modernisation of equipment, but also on improvements of their host nation military facilities, particularly transportation and communications networks to assist incoming forces and petroleum pipelines to resupply vehicles and aircraft engaged in combat. More effort also has to be put into such areas as air defence and runway repair capacities.

The most important outside instrument of Southern Flank security (that would of course be dependent on its success on such improvements) is to be found in the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) adopted by NATO's Defence Planning Committee in its ministerial session of December 1982. The plan sets down the strategy for the reinforcement of Europe in time of crisis or war. It envisages the involvement of over 2000 U.S. combat aircraft.⁴² Probably up to 700 of these could be made available for a contingency in the Southern Region. Even given significant improvements in base support, airlift

and rapid reinforcement training experience it is expected that it will take several weeks for large reinforcements to arrive. Some of these problems could be solved if there were more prepositioning of equipment in the Southern Flank. For some time the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference (SNLC) at NATO has recommended that a major stockpile of material be built up in the Southern Flank and placed under the control of a NATO command. But this has not yet been decided on and therefore there are considerable local weaknesses that must be repaired. This not only puts a premium on local forces holding out until reinforcements arrive but also on NATO being able appropriately to signal early on in a crisis that there will be a military response to aggression so that conflict might be avoided.

In the case of the flanks, NATO's principal military means of signalling concern lies in the ACE Allied Mobile Force (AMF). Established in 1960, the Force's declared purpose is rapidly to come to the aid of NATO states on the flanks and particularly Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey. The land component comprises infantry, artillery helicopters, armoured reconnaissance, combat support and administrative units from Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, United States and the United Kingdom. Most units are based in their home countries. The Air component comprises squadrons from Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, West Germany, Italy and the United States. The Mobile Force regularly participates in exercises on the flanks. The Force's role is primarily a deterrent one, but if deterrence fails the Force is intended to fight alongside host country troops to help contain any enemy advance. Such participation

by a NATO force in a flank country would help to multilateralize the conflicts and show the enemy that NATO as a whole was concerned about the security of the invaded country.

Unfortunately, the ACE Mobile Force is more symbolic in peacetime as a sign of political will to come to the assistance of a NATO country than as a credible defence force in time of conflict. The AMF is not truly a fighting force: it is intended primarily "to show the flag". It should not be considered a force capable of providing reinforcement, but rather as an immediate reaction unit that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would call on for political reasons, to signal concern. It is not organised or equipped to be one of SACEUR's regional reinforcements and the size and combat capability of the Force is deliberately constrained so as not to be too provocative. But even given its limited mission, the Force has problems which make it less efficient than would be desirable. Turkey's geographic isolation poses serious logistical problems and in any case the Force is too small to make much of a difference.⁴³ While its headquarters are in Heidelberg, few of the troops are permanently on station, and in fact some elements of the Force are not winter equipped. It might be able to deploy rapidly once assembled, but this would take some time. While the air element could go to both flanks, the land element could only go to one or the other. It would certainly be useful if the composition of the land element were increased so that it could simultaneously be deployed to both flanks. This would naturally raise the costs of the Force and would depend on the availability of more transport capacity, but it

would be a useful reassurance to the local states that others were interested in their security.

On the Southern Flank there are additional reasons why the Force has not developed as fast as it should. According to current planning the Force could deploy to five contingency areas: Northern Italy, Northern Greece, Turkish Thrace, Eastern Anatolia and Southern Anatolia. While the AMF has been able to work closely with Italian forces, neither Greece nor Turkey has incorporated the AMF into its general defence plans. If the Force were to deploy to the Southern Flank as a deterrent capacity, it would spread itself out throughout the threatened territory to reassure the local population and signal resistance to the enemy. But if deterrence failed, the Force would have to quickly integrate itself into the national armed forces to participate in national defence until reinforcements arrived. This would not be possible unless the host countries agreed to allow the AMF to exercise according to national defence plans.

Another problem is primarily financial. Countries contributing to the air element of the AMF have committed themselves to transporting both troops and material by air; yet when the AMF is exercised, material arrives by ship. Exercises under more realistic conditions would add to the Force's deterrent value. Given that, if deterrence fails, the Force has a residual combat role, improving the Force's anti-air and anti-armour capabilities, and its command, control and communications (so that it can be in perfect contact with SACEUR) would be highly desirable. But finding money for these sorts

of improvements is difficult, not least because the force requirements of the AMF must be merged with those of the Major NATO Commands and can easily get lost in the process. Some have argued that because of the very special nature of the AMF, its commander should be allowed to negotiate directly with the nations involved to secure needed force improvements. Though it would be unrealistic (and inappropriate) to expect the general composition and dual mission of the AMF to change, improvements can be envisaged that would simultaneously enhance the Force's deterrent and combat capacity.

Given that after any attack to the Southern Flank NATO would need mobile forces more than any other sort of capability, it is unfortunate that little has been done to improve the AMF's in-theatre mobility, currently very limited. This is all the more striking since many individual members of the Alliance have increasingly given attention, in their own armed forces, to rapidly mobile divisions. Aside from the U.S decision to create the Rapid Deployment Force that eventually became a new U.S. Command as CENTCOM, the British sought, especially after the Falklands conflict, to increase the capacity of 5 Airborne Brigade and to add further air transportable elements to their armed forces.⁴⁴ The French in the 1984-1988 Military Programme Law reorganized their paratroop forces and created the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR).⁴⁵ The Italians in the 1985 Defence White Paper argue for the creation of a Forza di Intervento Rapido (FIR) and have since moved to establish a small force.⁴⁶ Many of the smaller members of the Alliance, including Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, have

affirmed their own need to develop forces with a "firefighting" capability that could be used rapidly in times of crisis..

These policies have emerged in recognition of the fact that air or sea transportable armed forces can serve as important, and credible, conventional deterrents. If there is a place where easily mobile, light infantry, is especially necessary, it is the Southern Flank. It is impossible to make great improvements in the AMF without changing the nature of its largely political mission, but unless it is made to look more effective even its role as a symbol might appear illusory. Drawing on the experience of national rapid deployment forces NATO planners should look to strengthen the AMF, if only to remove doubts among some Flank countries about its capacity to fulfill its combat mission. There are already deep suspicions, for a variety of historical and sometimes contradictory reasons amongst the Greeks and the Turks, about the reliance that can be placed on the "West" for their own defence. As noted above, both countries contribute to this by not exercising with the Force in the most efficient way possible and in not distinguishing carefully between the deterrent and combat roles of the Force. Over time these misunderstandings are bound to decrease, but it is clear that if improvement can take place, this will be for nought unless the host nation support (both psychological and logistical) for the Force makes commensurate advances.

Improvements in the capacity to signal concern (through the AMF) or to reinforce the flanks (through the RRP) would be irrelevant if:

there was no advance by NATO in upgrading its air defence capacities in the South. Without effective air and anti-missile defence American and other allied air and naval operations become extremely risky.⁴⁷ Some improvements have taken place, such as the introduction of AWACS at three forward operating bases at Trapani Italy, Preveza, Greece and Konya, Turkey as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) programme.⁴⁸ This upgrading of local air defence will provide over-the-horizon and low level radar coverage beyond the current capabilities of the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE). But it would be useful if more could be done to widen the operational area of air defence forces so that NATO could provide at least a semblance of a true forward defence of its air space. This would require a much higher degree of co-operation amongst individual NATO states and movement towards a true integration of Alliance air force capacities.

Successful air defence also depends on procuring more modern aircraft. Western land based tactical aircraft located in Southeastern Europe, particularly in Greece and Turkey, must be improved, to ensure the protection not only of the Sixth Fleet, but also of land forces.⁴⁹ In fact, almost all NATO aircraft in the region are in serious need of modernization or replacement. The average age of this aircraft is still well over twenty years. Near vintage jets such as the F-48, F-104 and the F-100 are still being maintained and flown. The F-104 is in fact one of the few planes that is common throughout the region and while a new generation of planes is put in service, attention will have to be paid to the need

for improved standardization and interoperability. At the moment there are too many different types of aircraft requiring different sorts of support elements. If interceptor aircraft are an urgent necessity, planning equally must go ahead for the development and purchase of longer range aircraft to attack the Warsaw Pact threat at source. These improvements in air assets are necessary especially to offset the recent gains the Soviet Union has made in equipping their planes with stand off missiles. Reliance on anti-air missiles to counter Soviet air power is no longer sufficient.

At sea, NATO's position is strong. Even if analysts have often concentrated on naval balances, the strictly Soviet naval threat is not of a kind that requires more ships to meet it. The nature of the unique American presence in the form of the Sixth Fleet, however, is such that more allied naval co-operation would be useful, if largely for psychological reasons. Aside from the AMF, NATO's only other immediate reaction force is the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) which provides a deterrent and quick intervention capacity and is comprised of combatant warships of several NATO members; usually Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. When the force is exercised, forces of other NATO states provide support. The force is called together to train twice a year for about thirty days, and responsibility for detailed planning of these exercises rests with COMNAVSOUTH. There have often been appeals to upgrade this to a standing (from an On-Call) force but the disputes between Greece and Turkey---both of whom would naturally have to contribute to such a force---have made it impossible to

create a more multilateral permanent sea presence for NATO in the Mediterranean. This is unfortunate, because a standing force could work more efficiently with elements of the Sixth Fleet and better signal a collective Alliance concern.

The contribution that NATO can make to strengthening the sense of solidarity in the Southern Region is to make more obvious the military commitment to Southern Region defence. At the moment local defence is locally organised, and is the responsibility of the states of the region aided directly by the United States and indirectly by NATO infrastructural support. But there is no strong sense in the Southern Region that NATO will "come to its defence". Nato, as it were, has "prepositioned" in the area, and has promised to reinforce in time of war, yet this is dependent on there being forces available to come to the area. A real capacity to bring substantial conventional power to bear on the Southern Flank in time of crisis would strengthen NATO's capacities for internal management of political relations and would also help deter possible aggression. The local states and NATO as a whole must therefore consider ways to make Western forces in the region (and those that will have to be brought to the area) lighter and more mobile.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the growth of Soviet military power in the Southern Region has been important, but that the Soviet threat specific to it is not unmanageable. Yet if the actual Soviet threat

to the Southern Region itself, is not as high as sometimes feared, it is certainly true that the specific Southern Region deterrent to Soviet aggression is not as high as it should be. The real deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Southern Region remains the general Western deterrent (still mainly nuclear) to Soviet action anywhere in Europe. It is meaningless to speak of the Southern Flank as having been converted, by virtue of Soviet military improvements, into a front, if only because this has always been the case. It is a totally different argument, however, to say that Western defensive capabilities in the Southern Region have been in relative decline. This decline does require remedial action, as suggested, both in terms of local force modernisation, and improvements in the capacity of the Alliance quickly to bring outside force to bear on the region, so that, as elsewhere in the Alliance, a conventional deterrent exists that does not make the nuclear one appear mythical.

Strengthening the conventional deterrent in the Southern Region would ensure what is already a probability: that the Soviet Union would not attempt totally to control the Southern Region except in the circumstances of a direct and European-wide conflict between the two Alliances. At the moment it is unlikely that a conflict could take place in the Mediterranean as the result of an aero-naval confrontation between the forces of the United States and the USSR. War might occur as an extension of military activity in other areas of Europe or as a result of a crisis that is initially external to the two alliances such as a conflict in the Middle East.⁵⁰

Improvements in the deterrent specific to the Southern Region would

help to guard against both possibilities. As long as it is absolutely clear that military activity in the Southern Region by the USSR or by anybody else will be met by Western forces, both European and out-of-area disturbances could be limited in their scope.

All this points to the fact that an improved defence of the Southern Region can only occur if there is a successful balance between national and Alliance-wide approaches to regional security. The paradox of the security situation in the Southern Region is that individual national approaches to defence have been necessary because of the facts of geography: countries may be "left alone" longer in the south than elsewhere and therefore need to be able to hold out. On the other hand, purely national approaches are highly inefficient, particularly, as noted above, in the field of air defence. Furthermore, some of the states in the region may wish to adopt more national approaches to defence to counter those threats that are specific to them, but the domestic consensus needed to support such efforts has to be developed quite differently than does the consensus needed to support Alliance-wide efforts. To do this, the role of the United States is crucial, because as the principal external provider of security to the allies in the Southern Region, it is with the United States that the NATO countries of the Mediterranean must bargain, both to encourage a greater contribution to the area's defence and to allow for more "national" approaches to regional security. In the next five years the form and substance of NATO security in the Mediterranean will be very much dependent on the overall quality of the bargains that are struck.

NOTES

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5. Ibid, 300-301
6. See generally: Colonel Norman L. Dodd, "Allied Forces Southern Europe", The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, vol. 114, no.2, (April 1984): 178-187 and "Allied Command Europe" Nato Information Office. Brussels.
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