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
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"CHALLENGES TO MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN THE LATE 80S"
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Economic Challenges to the Mediterranean
Countries & The Egyptian Experience

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Economic Challenges to the Mediterranean Countries & the Egyptian Experience

1

In an increasingly interdependent world, medium size countries - like Egypt - confront two kinds of challenges caused by the rapid transformations of both the domestic structure and the international system. In order to examine the economic challenges facing the Mediterranean countries, I propose to outline the major trends in the international economic environment with special relevance to the developing countries and then to examine the Egyptian responses to these trends and Egyptian experience in managing the economic problem particularly the debt problem. Finally I would relate Egypt's experience to the need for more cooperation and coordination among the Mediterranean countries as a case study of the North-South cooperation.

11

The decline of the oil prices had a multi-dimensional impact on the economies of the southern Mediterranean countries. For the oil producers the decline in revenues led to slowing down both investment and consumption. In Algeria, Libya and Egypt several sectors were adversely affected and the burden of debts escalated. The non-oil producers though benefiting from cheap oil supplies were affected on two accounts. The first was the decline of the demand for skilled and unskilled labour, which led to decline of the revenues from the remittances of workers abroad. The second was the impact of the deflationary policies in these countries on the international financial markets.

Both oil producers and non-oil producers were influenced by the following developments in the international monetary and financial relations resulting from the unprecedented application of economic policy in western industrialized countries for controlling inflation. The anti-inflation policies made the application of traditional policy options, involving fiscal and monetary tools, difficult for policy-makers in both developed and developing countries. This required a policy combination involving fiscal measures to reduce government expenditures and monetary restraint to lower growth in money supply. However, this was not possible in most developing countries because many of the fiscal programmes had strong social and political implications.

The reliance on restrictive monetary policy by industrial countries and the economic consequences for the global economy brought into sharp focus a fundamental and disturbing asymmetry in their trade relations with the developing countries. No country has escaped the consequences of the anti-inflation policies of the industrial countries.

One of the major developments in the international financial system has been the tight monetary policy introduced by the United States in the early 1980s. Because of the important position of the United States dollar in the world economic system, its policies influenced the level of interest rates in the international financial markets and the exchange rates of the major traded currencies.

The recession in the industrial countries of the early 1980s affected both oil and non oil-exporting countries by weakening the demand for exports from the developing countries which consist of mainly primary commodities including oil itself. The result of weakened demand was a sizeable decline in the prices of primary commodities which, in turn, reduced the level of foreign exchange earnings.

Another development of significance was the unprecedented rise in international interest rates during the period 1979-1983 which increased the cost of external finance. The increase in interest rate aggravated the already burdensome external debt service payments. The high interest rates affected especially those countries with large debts owed to private creditors and contracted on variable interest rates.

Fluctuations in the exchange rates of the major world currencies represented another major development which adversely affected the economic and social situation in the developing countries. Since Decemt 1985, the exchange rates of the major world currencies particularly those of the big five have been controlled by deliberate policy of intervention. U.S. authorities decided that the value of the US dollar should be reduced against the Japanese Yen, Pound sterling, French franc and Deutsche mark. As a result of that decision, the US dollar has depreciated by as much as 25 per cent against the other major world currencies. This in turn resulted in the misalignment of the exchange rates of many developing countries pegged to these world currencies.

III

It was in Cairo, as early as 1962, that the developing countries succeeded at the Conference on " Problems of Economic Development " in having a joint " Southern " policy vis a vis the developed countries.

Their goal was securing more balanced international economic relations, particularly in the areas of international trade and primary commodities.

Over the years, the cause of development attained major advances through the establishment of UNCTAD and the Group of 77, as well as through the persistent efforts by developing countries on national, regional and international levels, to pursue their national development programmes and plans. However, it took over a decade, when the developing countries met at the 1973 Algiers Non-aligned Summit, to realise clearly that the existing international economic order is an obstacle to their efforts for development. The need was felt that structural changes in the global economy should take place. The developing countries were able to concretize their demands for these changes in their quest for the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). This meant that the world's economy was integrated and that the interests of the developed and developing countries are intertwined and that unless measures are taken to offset the structural bias in the world economy against the developing countries, not only the developing countries but also the world economy as a whole would have to pay the price of the crisis. Therefore, the dialogue should continue between the developed North and the developing South to demonstrate the fundamental inter-relationship and mutual dependency between them.

But this line of cooperation between North and South should only take place alongside a " Southern " policy of joint cooperation based on shared skills and resources regardless of divergence of political ideologies or economic and social systems. It is rather the diversity of endowments with respect to human and national resources that widen the scope for mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

At this point, we should refer to the experience of the Non-Aligned Movement in which Egypt has always stood in the fore-front. Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries has been adequately brought with the Movement in its appropriate perspective. The broad lines of the concept of collective self-reliance, upon which Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries is based, essentially calls for strengthening economic and technical cooperation among developing countries in order to build up a less dependent pattern of development in the Third World and improve their position in the system of international economic relations. This concept has evolved through the different series of meeting of Non-Aligned countries from ideas to reality and has been translated into precise objectives and detailed programs.

One meeting that should be relevant to the purpose of our symposium - which deals with cooperation among Mediterranean Countries - is the forthcoming meeting of Non-Aligned countries of the Mediterranean which will be held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, after two days. Such meeting is hoped to provide the economic cooperation within this group of Mediterranean Countries with fresh impetus and new dynamism and effectiveness. It should also provide our meeting here with the right inspiration for economic cooperation based on the one hand on collective self reliance, and on the other hand on a meaningful and mutually beneficial dialogue between the more and the less developed countries of the Mediterranean.

IV

Now, if we turn to the experience of Egypt and its response to the economic challenges, we will find that in the last decade, the process of economic and social transformation in Egypt was constrained by three major elements:

First, the increasing imbalance between population and economic resources. Population rate of increase amounted to more than one million a year.

Second, the government commitment to a social welfare program that subsidises the basic requirements for low-income groups.

Third, the continuing deterioration of the world economic situation facing the developing countries, with regard to the decline of the prices of raw materials-including oil- and the increasing prices of manufactured goods and the high cost of technology transfer.

The year 1986 has been for Egypt a year of change, of problems and possible initial steps in new policy directions. It was a year in which Egypt faced a difficult economic situation. Falling oil prices, tourist earnings, and expatriate remittances have reduced foreign exchange revenues which in turn has precipitated a major review of economic policies. Four problems were to be addressed: (1) the budget deficit; (2) balance of payments situation; (3) restoring the economy to growth; and (4) reaching a standby agreement with the IMF which would allow rescheduling of Egypt's external debt; and reaching sectoral agreements with the World Bank which may result in a resumption of World Bank lending.

As Egypt entered 1987, the Egyptian economy has been suffering from economic distortions, and was not poised to resume growth without economic reforms. The cost of subsidized food, energy, transportation, utilities, financial services, and public sector companies has outstripped the revenue available to the Egyptian government, and has caused serious distortion in the economy. Other economic policies inherited from the past hindered investment, export growth, adequate new housing construction, development of the private sector, and long overdue structural adjustment. Farm policies aimed at self-sufficiency rather than comparative economic advantage increase the food deficit every year.

To meet this challenge, the Egyptian government has been discussing with the IMF and the World Bank a program of economic reform that includes (1) decreased expenditures and increased revenues; (2) an exchange rate unification; (3) a reform of interest rate structure; (4) energy price increases; (5) reduction of government control in the agricultural sector including increasing farmgate prices; and (6) an adjustment of industrial policy during the next five year plan.

In response to the economic problem facing Egypt, the government has embarked on a reform program which includes structural adjustment, a medium-term program for increasing exports and reducing imports and a long-term program aiming at population control and regaining balance between population growth and economic resources.

In the short-term, structural adjustment is pursued through restructuring the exchange rate policy. The liberalization of the exchange rate will be achieved gradually by eliminating controls every six months so that complete liberalization will be realized through a program of eighteen months.

The free-market exchange rate is now applied to expatriate remittances, tourism revenues and some private sector exports.

The Egyptian government is also trying to relieve inflationary pressures by restoring the balance between demand and supply through maintaining or increasing the ratio of savings to gross domestic product. Another means of restoring such a balance is expanding domestic revenue and through tax reform, reducing government expenditure by strengthening administration expenditure controls.

The reform program also emphasizes fiscal policy measures. Such measures emphasize the expansion of revenues and the reduction of both expenditures, and the expansionary trend of the domestic credit. A more restrained fiscal policy would allow the monetary authorities to follow a more flexible credit policy toward the private sector and help promote economic growth. A reexamination of the rate of interest policy is another aspect of the reform program. The increase of the interest rate will help increase domestic and foreign savings.

In the medium term, the government aims at expanding exports and minimizing imports, especially of luxury goods. As for the long term, the expansion of the agricultural sector is a primary aim in order to reduce imports and to restore the balance between population growth and agricultural production.

Finally, Egypt reached an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank which will allow a grace period of five years and will facilitate the implementation of the economic reform program.

Egypt's economic problems were a result of three decades of the continuing Middle East conflict. Middle East wars took a heavy toll of all concerned parties. It was in this context that Egyptians realized that peace and economic prosperity are two sides of the same coin. Further-

became active as the vanguard of peace in the East Mediterranean by signing the first peace treaty with Israel, laying down the foundation for a wider and more comprehensive peace in the region. And this is why Egypt continues to pursue tirelessly its efforts to enlarge the scope of peace by convening an International Conference which would include all the parties of the Middle East conflict and through which a just and durable peace could be reached.

Egypt was not an advocate of peace for development within its region alone. Along with other developing countries she raised the banner of peace. Hence, peace and development has become, and should continue to be one of the main themes pursued by the developing countries in different international fora. It was heartening therefore that efforts by developing countries were successful in the United Nations to launch the year 1986 as year of International Peace, thus echoing their need and quest for spreading peace all over the world.

Statistics can provide facts that can speak for themselves. Global military outlays run at US \$ 2 million per minute. For every 100,000 persons in the world there are 556 soldiers, but only 85 doctors. For every soldier the average world expenditure is US \$ 20,000, while for every school age child the average public education expenditure is as partly US \$ 380. Developed countries spend twenty times on military production as they do on economic aid. Only one-fifth of arms expenditure in just one year, could wipe out the world hunger by the year 2000. Once more, facts and figures are self illustrative of the misuse and abuse of scarce resources in the midst of poverty, hunger and suffering. This situation poses on the developing countries a fundamental political task by adopting and insisting relentlessly in all fora on disarmament and settlement of conflicts by peaceful means, as the basic precondition

for reorienting the huge resources and capacities of the world economy from production for war to production for the advancement of mankind.

VI

In the Mediteranean, Peace assumes greater importance as one of the major challenges to cooperation and security. Speakers before me pointed out many danger spots along the Mediteranean and we can refer to many other situations full of the potentiality of explosion and still more others loaded with frightful possibilities of confrontation and war. But I would like to confine myself, in the context of this presentation, to the situation in the Middle East where the Arab-Israeli conflict on one hand, and the Iraq-Iran war on the other, threaten not only regional stability but also its continuation and the possibility of escalation threatens the world peace and stability. The loss of lives and the wast of resources are of such magnitude that is matched only by the aggravatin economic and social difficulties which the people of our area are sufferi because of these wars. Their tragic repercussions on national and region development are beyond any retreive. Yet in both these two instances there is a serious opportunity for a settlement.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the idea of an international conferenc is now catching momentum and there is a chance that a solution could be reached allowing for just and comprehensive peace in the area, based on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories and the fulfilment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians including their right t self-determination and the mutual acceptance of all the parties to each other's right to live in secure and recognized boundaries. This is an opportunity that should be seized, because if it is wasted both Arabs and Israelis will be equally losing a precious chance.

The Iran-Iraq war has recently escalated to such a dangerous level which not only threatened the oil routes and the extension of hostilities to a wider area in the Gulf but also confronted the two super-powers with the risk of direct involvement which might bring about a new realization that international pressure should be brought to bear on both parties to bring an end to this wretched and seemingly endless war.

Both parties to this conflict are staggering with weariness after nearly seven years of ferocious fighting and economic devastation. Both Iran and Iraq face immense economic problems and the strain on both countries are severe. The recent escalation does not only cause more damage to the two combatants who have oil-based economies dependent on ships that must run the gantlet of the Gulf, but the attack on maritime targets would also block the transportation of oil to consumer markets, extend the war to other countries of the Gulf, endanger international shipping including the vessels of the super-powers and create a growing awareness that the war is indeed a threat to international peace which warrants some international move to break the vicious circle and to set in motion a process of mobilizing a concerted effort of multinational diplomacy.

In conclusion, let me again emphasize the major points which I tried to examine;

First, that, the international economic environment confronting the developing countries has been deteriorating, the relations between the industrialized and the developing countries were strained. Regional Cooperation which includes a group of industrialized and developing countries like the Mediterranean group can be an important element in minimizing these strains and overcoming the problems facing North-South cooperation.

Second, Egypt's response to the economic challenge of 1980s was constrained by the rapid transformation of the international economy and the increasing burden of debts that confronted most of the developing countries. In spite of all internal and external obstacles, the Egyptian economy survived the critical stage of transformation in early 1980s and has now embarked on a long term reform program.

Third, Economic prosperity and political stability are inseparable. That is why the search for world peace through disarmaments and for Middle East peace through continuing negotiation are pre-requisites for a prosperous and stable Mediterranean community and for world peace.

Thank you.

~~Ce n'est assurément pas l'avis d'un certain professeur émérite, d'une certaine université pour qui nous sommes - je cite ... "un petit monde de marginaux outrancièrement engagé" ... et je vous épargne le reste ... car il n'hésite pas à personnaliser ses attaques. Avouez que voilà vraiment un homme de dialogue ! Que répondre à cela sinon que tout choix de personnalités n'est finalement qu'un choix (La Palisse en aurait dit autant) mais, et voici ma réponse : à force de choisir, d'en savoir assez pour agir en toute lumière, on se condamne à l'inaction, ... alors, oui, nous avons foncé, choisi, et décidé. Ce sera finalement à vous, amies et amis ici réunis de nous critiquer ou de nous approuver ... en fin de cession.~~

~~Ceci m'amène à redire, ce que j'ai d'ailleurs écrit à tous nos orateurs que le but essentiel de cette rencontre est d'informer en toute conscience.~~


~~Informer signifie avant tout être honnête avec soi-même. Chacun des orateurs a donc le droit d'exprimer son opinion dans le respect de celle de l'autre. De toute façon vous aurez remarqué qu'il sera loisible à un chacun de poser par écrit des questions aux orateurs.~~

~~Je suis convaincu que réunis ici, en toute liberté, nous vivrons des heures de fraternité et d'amitiés.~~

~~C'est ce que je souhaite de tout coeur, convaincu d'ailleurs que notre modérateur, le Professeur GABUS, de la Faculté Universitaire de Théologie Protestante à Bruxelles, sera cet élément impondérable qui fera que ce Week-End se déroulera dans une parfaite harmonie et cela au bénéfice de chacun des participants et à la confusion des "bileux" qui nous ont prédit une empoignade idéologique.~~

Merci et bon Week-End !

Et. C.



Il est difficile d'écrire sur les problèmes du Proche-Orient en général, de la situation d'Israël face aux Palestiniens plus spécifiquement, tant il a été publié sur cette question, la plus gros des opinions exprimées est fonction des idéologies, des modes intellectuelles, des partis-pris changeants du moment, de l'événement du jour dans une situation particulièrement fluide.

Lorsqu'il m'arrive, devant un auditoire jeune, de rappeler quelques vérités élémentaires sur la naissance de l'Etat d'Israël, généralement, il ne comprend pas ce dont je parle. Est-il encore possible de rappeler que l'ennemi principal d'Israël dans les années 40 était l'Angleterre, qu'un de ses principaux soutiens était l'Union Soviétique (et que c'est notamment la Tchécoslovaquie qui fut le principal pourvoyeur d'armes de la lutte sioniste), que, outre l'Union Soviétique, les premiers Etats à reconnaître en 1948

Israël furent ceux que avant la lettre, on pouvait considérer comme relevant du Tiers-monde révolutionnaire : Guatémala (à l'époque d'Arbenz), Ceylan, Birmanie, Ethiopie? Inversément, le monde arabe passait pour constituer une vaste masse réactionnaire qu'essaient de manipuler des forces conservatrices, le Colonial Office Britannique, les grands trusts pétroliers américains, quand ce n'étaient pas des forces fascistes anciennes ou nouvelles comme cela avait été le cas pour le grand Mufti de Jérusalem, animateur de la révolte arabe des années 1935, ou comme ce le sera largement dans le cas de Nasser : nombre de nazis, et parmi les pires, avaient en effet pris pied au Caire ! Tout cela évidemment est oublié ! Et c'est une évaluation contraire qui a prévalu : Israël, pure création du colonialisme anglais, devenu l'instrument le plus diabolique de l'impérialisme américain, le monde arabe animé par la grande volonté de lutte anti-coloniale, avec comme avant-garde, l'incomparable, l'héroïque O.L.P.

Tout cela nous montre combien les relations interna-

tionales, les grands affrontements dans le monde présent sont matière difficile à aborder. On y projette ses passions du moment (à une époque où elles changent du jour au lendemain, où l'on devient soudain réaganien alors qu'on était maoïste la veille, des vues intellectuelles simplistes, basées sur une conception dichotomique et souvent manichéenne du monde. Cela joue pour la gauche comme pour la droite.

Il a été courant, il y a dix ans, à gauche, de considérer qu'il y avait un seul grand affrontement entre l'impérialisme américain qui soutenait toutes les forces de réaction dans le monde, et d'autre part, les forces d'émancipation de l'humanité. Le Vietnam annonçait une guerre globale qui devait prendre à la gorge ce monstrueux impérialisme. "Vietnam-Palestine, même combat", pouvait-on lire abondamment sur les murs, - combat auquel devaient se joindre la Bolivie, l'Angola, les Tupamaros en Uruguay, les Monteneros en Argentine, l'E.T.A., l'I.R.A., quand ce n'était pas les Brigades rouges ...

Mais, à droite, on se contentait d'inverser les signes de valeur, tout en pensant largement de la même façon. C'était le grand complot, mené par un chef d'orchestre à Moscou, contre "le monde libre". Et l'on a vu, ces dernières années, nombre de penseurs parisiens maintenir le même schéma intellectuel des deux camps, mais se faire aussi éperdument défenseurs de l'ordre occidental qu'ils avaient été frénétiques combattants de l'anti-impérialisme la veille.

C'est tout ce schéma qui est radicalement faux ! Car enfin, quand on s'interroge sur les situations particulières, on ne sait plus qui est dans l'un ou l'autre camp : la Chine qui avait suscité tant de fantasmes, que beaucoup croyaient à la tête de la grande œuvre de subversion mondiale (les uns pour s'en exalter, les autres pour s'en épouvanter), qu'est-elle aujourd'hui d'autre que simplement la Chine ? La presse parle étonnamment peu de la guerre la plus terrible d'aujourd'hui, celle qui oppose l'Irak à l'Iran, car on ne sait pas très bien dans quel camp mettre l'un et

l'autre. Tous les deux se présentent, à leur façon, comme les plus radicaux parmi les combattants de la grande lutte révolutionnaire.

Lorsqu'on aborde le problème d'Israël et des Palestiniens, il convient d'abandonner les schémas et les fantasmes. Ni les uns, ni les autres ne sont animés par les merveilleuses vertus ou les monstrueux désseins qu'on leur a abondamment prêtés.

Oui, il y a eu, au lendemain de la guerre, à gauche surtout, une sympathie réelle pour le sionisme et c'était quand même assez normal après les horreurs sans nom subies par les Juifs. Et c'est vrai, que, pour la grande masse des Juifs, le Sionisme devenait la grande cause émancipatrice. - Quoi de plus naturel lorsqu'on sait qu'ils avaient subi le génocide le plus atroce de tous les temps et dont personne ne pouvait se dire innocent ?

Assurément les arguments constitutifs de l'idéologie sioniste ne sont pas très convaincants dans leur aspect théologique ou en tant que philosophie de l'histoire.

Dans la mesure où je suis capable de penser théologiquement, je crois que tout Etat national est une création humaine, souvent trop tristement humaine. Il est douteux que la création de l'Etat juif sur la terre d'Israël ait constitué le sens et la finalité du destin juif. Et d'ailleurs, il apparaît clairement aujourd'hui qu'au moins dans le monde occidental, fort peu de Juifs songent à "monter" en Israël. Mais ce qui n'était pas douteux, c'est qu'il s'était créé pour l'ensemble du Judaïsme une situation dramatique, à des degrés divers selon les pays, mais partout existante, dans les années 1930 et 1940

Qui n'a pas vécu personnellement cette situation, peut difficilement s'imaginer ce que l'antisémitisme a représenté !

Très ouvertement, les gouvernements polonais, hongrois ou roumain visaient à rendre intenable la situation de leurs Juifs !

En Occident, en principe, la situation était peut-être moins dramatique, mais les préventions n'en étaient pas moins profondes. L'antisémitisme était jugé parfaitement admissible et tolérable à l'époque, et en France, par exemple, nombre d'écrivains (Celine, Jouhandeau, Léautaud) en avaient fait le thème favori de leurs exercices littéraires.

Si le monde occidental avait simplement ouvert ses portes, des centaines de milliers, des millions peut-être de Juifs eussent été sauvés. Et pendant la guerre même, son souci dominant était que personne ne pût croire que la guerre avait été déclenchée au profit des Juifs. D'où silence à la B.B.C. sur le génocide, surtout dans les émissions à destination allemande.

Que devant le sentiment d'un monde entier complice, ne serait-ce que par omission, du plus monstrueusement gratuit des massacres, l'idée sioniste ait acquis une importance qu'elle n'avait pas au départ, qui peut s'en étonner ?

Et qui peut s'indigner que les Juifs qui représentent historiquement le moins violent de tous les groupes humains, qui jamais n'avaient eu recours aux armes et avaient pris l'habitude de plier la tête devant l'adversité, aient soudain cru, eux aussi, que "le pouvoir était au bout du fusil", qui pourrait le leur reprocher ? Tant de pays se targuent de s'être constitués par le fer et le sang !

Evidemment, cela signifie qu'Israël ne s'est pas fait innocemment, que la "montée" s'est faite au milieu de populations assurément innocentes et dont la réaction fut des plus négatives.

Que cela pose un problème moral dont les Juifs n'ont pas toujours pris la juste mesure, c'est certain. Mais politiquement, le réflexe arabe a été et (même si certains commencent à le comprendre) est resté si totalement aberrant, qu'il n'a cessé de faire moralement et matériellement le jeu de leurs adversaires..

Le monde arabe n'a pas compris ce qu'avait d'irrépressible dans le contexte de l'après-guerre, le besoin d'un Etat Juif, ne serait-ce que dans une partie de la terre de Palestine. Bien sûr, il aurait fallu que cette colonisation fût le moins pénible possible pour la population arabe, qu'elle restât limitée géographiquement, que les droits humains fussent respectés en tout état de cause, qu'un Etat palestinien fût créé à côté de l'Etat juif.

Il faut malheureusement convenir que le refus fut si total dans l'ensemble de la classe politique arabe que c'est finalement la force qui a tranché. Que cette force ait été, dès le départ, du côté sioniste, que les Juifs pour la première fois depuis l'époque de la Diaspora aient développé un savoir-faire militaire, cela ne me comble pas de fierté.

Mais ce qui s'est passé là a-t-il été pire que ce qui s'est produit, et à des époques fort récentes, dans la création de tant d'autres Etats ?

Ce n'est que depuis vingt ans que les Américains sont vraiment conscients de la violence énorme qui a marqué la conquête de l'Ouest. L'historiographie soviétique actuelle exalte la conquête de la Sibérie ou de l'Asie Centrale qui a refoulé et culturellement détruit des masses de populations (généralement musulmanes !).

Les Arabes ne semblent pas aujourd'hui en vouloir aux Turcs qui, des siècles durant, les ont si lourdement dominés et qui n'ont pu se créer un Etat national homogène qu'au prix de massacres, d'expulsions et de déculturations massives. Et l'histoire de la conquête arabe a-t-elle été si innocente, et les pays arabes sont-ils un tel modèle de tolérance vis-à-vis des minorités culturelles ou religieuses soumises ? Des injustices réelles ont été commises à l'endroit des Palestiniens, mais sont-elles pires que celles que connaissent les Kurdes, les Erythréens, ou les habitants du Sud-Soudan ?

Si l'on veut résoudre le problème dans le sens de la paix, il faut le ramener à sa dimension locale, le banaliser en quelque sorte, se libérer des mythes et des

passions dans lesquels il a été enrobé.

Israël est loin d'avoir toutes les vertus dont on a eu tendance à le parer au moment de sa création. Il a mal réussi à assimiler les divers groupes dont les niveaux culturels étaient fort différents. Les Juifs dits sépharades, venus souvent des pays arabes, sont devenus majoritaires et les Juifs d'origine européenne ont mal réussi à les intégrer dans le système économique, social, politique, culturel qu'ils avaient établi. C'est paradoxalement la masse des pauvres, des marginaux qui s'est révoltée contre l'establishment socialiste dont pourtant certaines réalisations étaient remarquables, comme les fameux Kibbutzim, mais avaient un caractère trop élitaire, et cette masse d'exclus a trop souvent été gagnée par la démagogie nationaliste et les abus faits de leur foi religieuse.

Heureusement que, malgré tout, ces tendances ont reculé aux dernières élections, sans que les courants vraiment pacifistes aient pu obtenir une vraie majorité.

Nous croyons d'autre part heureux que certains mythes palestinistes se soient dissipés, ce qui permettra de songer, enfin, à l'avenir des Palestiniens en chair et en os ! Car ce qui m'a le plus révolté dans le cas des Palestiniens, c'est l'exploitation éhontée qui a été faite de leurs frustrations et de leurs malheurs. Il est vrai qu'à certaines époques la cause d'Israël apparaissait sacrée et intouchable et que le silence était fait autour du problème palestinien. Mais par un de ces renversements dont l'opinion occidentale est coutumière, on est passé du noir au blanc, comme d'ailleurs du blanc au noir dans le cas d'Israël. Il se créait partout des comités de soutien à la cause palestinienne présentée comme l'incarnation de l'émancipation de toute l'humanité opprimée. Ce fut, non seulement absurde, mais abominablement mensonger.


Les Palestiniens ont confondu des triomphes rhétoriques, tel celui d'Arafat à l'ONU avec des victoires sur le terrain. Cela leur a donné des idées radicalement fausses, non seulement sur leur capacité d'action face à

Israël, mais même sur la ferveur ou la solidarité dont ils pouvaient être l'objet dans le monde arabe. Le résultat, ce fut "Septembre noir", "Tal-Al-Zatar" et même "Sabra et Chatila" à propos duquel il ne faut quand même pas oublier que le massacre fut exclusivement le fait de phalangistes libanais, même s'il s'est trouvé quelques dirigeants israéliens pour ne pas les décourager ...

Rarement, il y a eu une discordance aussi radicale entre l'image rhétorique qu'une organisation dite de libération a pu donner d'elle-même et ses moyens réels d'action ou les soutiens effectifs dont elle a pu disposer dans le monde.


Israël se porte mal économiquement et a certainement perdu de son prestige dans le monde, surtout occidental. Mais la lutte de libération palestinienne, telle qu'elle a été conçue, a été finalement suicidaire. Si la grande majorité des Juifs défend le droit à l'existence d'Israël dans ses frontières d'avant 1967, elle sent que celui-ci n'a rien à gagner à une annexion directe ou rampante de la Cisjordanie et de Gaza (c'est ce que vient de révéler un récent sondage en Israël). Tous les Palestiniens doués de bon sens (et il y en a beaucoup, mais qui souvent n'osent s'exprimer) sentent que leur cause ne peut être sauvée que s'ils reconnaissent un fait, peut-être pénible, mais devenu irréversible, à savoir qu'Israël peut sans doute infléchir sa politique, mais que son existence est un fait indéfectible.

Cette double prise de conscience doit être le point de départ de ce qui est l'exigence première et fondamentale : LA PAIX, une paix qui préserve ce qu'ont de juste et de raisonnable les exigences des uns et des autres.



les palestiniens

UN PEUPLE DE TROP ?



Afif Safieh

Située stratégiquement au carrefour de trois continents, la Palestine fut convoitée, à travers les âges, par des puissances extérieures. Au XXe siècle, le colonialisme britannique ne fut qu'une transition entre la domination ottomane (turque) et la pénétration sioniste.

(3)

Soviet Policy in the Middle East

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I General remarks

The Soviet Union, bordering three Middle Eastern countries and the Black Sea, has always understood itself as a power with "legitimate rights" in the vast area stretching from the straits of Gibraltar to the straits of Hormus. If there has ever been a "Russian masterplan" for reaching the "warm waters", as the British claimed in the late 19th century, is questionable. Nevertheless, the geographical proximity is an undisputable fact, and one which influences the politics of Middle Eastern countries as well as of other world powers.

Geography, however, is only one element in foreign policy. Ideology has often been considered an important factor in Soviet behaviour, although in the Arab-Muslim world communism does not have much attraction. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership is facing already the contradictions between socialist ideology and Islam within its own borders (especially amongst the 50 million inhabitants of the three southern republics Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

Finally, the presence and intentions of other world powers have always been an important determinant of Soviet policy. One should analyse therefore not only intentions and capabilities, but also constraints.

There has always been the myth that foreign policy takes priority to internal factors and considerations. The Soviet leadership, lacking democratic legitimacy and any constitutional rules how to get into power, how to preserve it, and

how to find a successor, has always sought to avoid intolerable risks in foreign policy - well aware, that failure abroad might lead to an overthrow at home. (Nikita S. Khrushchev's fate after the Cuban missile crisis is a case in point.)

The stagnation of Soviet policy in the early 80s - internally as well as in the international arena - must be seen as a direct consequence of the three ailing Secretary Generals, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Jurij V. Andropov, and Konstantin U. Chernenko. The new "young" and dynamic leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has yet to pass the test of whether he is able to push a bold foreign policy decision through his Politbureau.

In general, the period since Andropov/Gorbachev is essentially marked by the desire to reconstruct and modernize Soviet society and economy. Foreign policy has more than ever taken on the primary function of enhancing internal progress by diminishing outside threats and burdens. (This is in marked contrast to the "expansive period" under Brezhnev in the 70s and reminds one of the first years of the Soviet Union under Lenin.)

Soviet policy in the "Third World" has shown a remarkable restraint since "Afghanistan". The Politbureau today is obviously quite aware of the fact that it was relatively easy to gain quick successes, such as in Angola and Ethiopia, but very burdensome to preserve Soviet predominance. Moreover, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been a watershed in U.S. policy: it convinced the American presidents that it was

Since the slow decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has remained, cum grano salis, a "no man's land". No single power, be it from in- or outside, managed to gain absolute predominance by squeezing out its rivals. In terms of the East-West-conflict there has never been any clear demarcation of "spheres of influence". Only Turkey and Israel (as well as Iran under the Shah's rule) - distinct outsiders in the Arab-Muslim world - have become close allies of the United States. The rest of the region remained what it had been for two or three centuries: an area for the opportunist to gain presence and influence.

The Soviet Union engaged in Middle Eastern developments as a function of its imperial rivalry with Western powers, at the same time tending to misunderstand the significance of the intra-regional developments. This long-range strategy did not fit well with the "rules" of the Middle East:

- Political actions in this region are short-ranged, quite often aiming at a "fait accompli".
- For lack of a longer perspective, "counterpunching" is preferred.
- Third parties and mediators are preferred to conduct delicate political operations.
- The mentality of "zero-sum-game" prevails, confirming thereby the status quo.

Under these conditions politics in the Middle East is a seemingly endless competition of different regional powers in shifting alliances to decide one or the other of the several endemic conflicts:

- the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli confrontation
- religious-ethnic and border controversies (such as the Lebanese crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdish rebellion, and many others).

These conflicts have always provided the gateway for outside powers. The irony of the "Middle Eastern game", however, is that world powers - claiming the arbiter's role and their desire to "bring peace to the area" - nilly-willy became - and to some extent inseparably - involved in that "game". Thus, with time it became difficult to decide whether a respective power was exerting influence or was in fact being used by its Middle Eastern partner. One could give several examples of this complicated relationship, such as France and the Lebanese Christians, the United States and Israel, or the Soviet Union and Egypt.

Since 1955, when Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser started dealing with the Soviet Union, there was no lack of "invitations" to Moscow to play a role in Middle Eastern affairs. Moscow had each time the difficult decision which ally would better serve Soviet interests: the Arab neighbours of Israel or the Zionist state; Somalia or Ethiopia; Iraq or Iran; Syria or the PLO; the PR Yemen or Oman a.s.o. As there were, with only few exceptions, no influential communist parties, the ideological factor did not rank high. Under Middle Eastern circumstances Soviet policy was more an exercise of trial and error, as several shifting relationships well demonstrate.

Seen from Moscow's point of view, the significance of the Middle East was basically twofold:

1. The immediate neighbours Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan enjoyed always high priority. Already in the 20s the young Soviet regime, still fighting a civil war, brought about "friendly relations of good neighbourhood" (as the Soviet slogan always has been) by actively supporting Turkish and Persian nationalism and developing economic cooperation with all three countries.

However, this tradition did not hinder Josip V. Stalin after WW II to demand considerable territorial or economic concessions from his southern neighbours. (The consequence, however, was the first U.S. containment of Soviet power in the region, following the Truman doctrine.)

2. For a long time the Soviet Union had had only minor contacts with the Arab world. In favouring the United Nations' partition plan of 1947, which preceded the proclamation of Israel, Moscow played the same game as the former colonial powers of "divide et impera". However, as Soviet expectations of a close relationship with a "socialist Israel" did not materialize, Moscow regarded Arab nationalism as the best partner to counter the increasing U.S. presence in the region.

The basis of the Soviet-Arab "marriage of convenience", however, was small and unstable. Whereas Nasser and the leaders of Syria and Iraq pressed for Soviet weapons and nuclear deterrence to be able to destroy Israel, Moscow tried to use the cooperation to weaken Western influence and at the same

time to expand socialism by nurturing local communist parties or other pro-Soviet groups (e.g. in the military establishment of the countries concerned). The expectations of both sides failed: Moscow did not enable the Arab nationalists to destroy the Zionist state, because it still favoured Israel's existence. (This attitude was determined mainly by two considerations: the three million Jews living in the Soviet Union, and the "Jewish connection" via Israel to the United States' policy. Thus, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has been considered by Moscow as an useful "bargaining chip", primarily for influencing the superpowers' relationship.) Moreover, the Soviet Union was not ready to risk an overall confrontation with Israel's major ally, the United States.

On the other hand, Nasser and the other Arab leaders, in suppressing local communist groups, made very clear that they sought Soviet weapons and economic aid but no ideology which might threaten their own rule. It was therefore not by chance that the Soviet Union had to face serious setbacks, e.g. in Sudan (1971) and Iraq (in the late 70s), and a humiliating repulsion from Egypt under Anwar as-Sadat (1972/1976).

There is a third basic aspect of the Soviet involvement in the Middle East which has nothing to do with the regional problems as such but rather with the superpowers' relationship. As the Soviet leadership sees itself in a historic competition with "imperialism" and U.S. power, a certain military presence of the Soviet Union has always been regarded as a necessity. The dominating American profile in the Mediterranean obviously

promoted Moscow to look for partners in the Arab world, willing to grant any military facilities (ports, airfields etc.). The Soviet problem was always that its partners, having fought Western colonialism, jealously guarded their sovereignty and were unwilling to leave military facilities free of charge. Moscow, too, was not willing to identify completely with its regional partner's interests because it then risked confronting other countries in the area. Consequently, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Egypt did not provide the Soviet military with permanent bases but with certain privileges, always subject to their approval. South Yemen, isolated and very much dependent on Soviet aid, may be seen as the only exception where Moscow managed to obtain a relatively free hand.

III Soviet policy today

The year 1982 may be regarded as a watershed in Middle Eastern affairs for several reasons.

In April, Israel, fulfilling the peace treaty with Egypt, withdrew from the Sinai. Having consolidated peace with the mightiest Arab country, the government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon directed its efforts to the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and invaded Lebanon in order to destroy the PLO. Despite heavy losses and a final retreat from most parts of Lebanon, Israel succeeded in weakening the PLO considerably.

Despite the new Israeli-Arab military confrontation, no third "oil crisis" occurred. On the contrary: the situation on the

oil market, with a surplus of oil and declining prices had changed completely, putting a stop to the use of this raw material as a "political weapon". Although this situation will not be permanent, the Western governments for the time being saw no necessity for a comprehensive peace effort: the Western multinational Peacekeeping Force was withdrawn from Beirut in 1984 and, despite several declarations (such as President Reagan's of 1 September 1982), there was no further serious effort in solving the Palestinian problem.

Thirdly, in 1982 Iraq's offensive had lost all momentum and Iran was gradually getting an upper hand in the battlefield of the "Gulf War". The Arab world became more preoccupied with the threat stemming from the Islamic revolution than with any other problem.

Compared to the Middle Eastern crises of the 60s and 70s, the Soviet Union showed a remarkable restraint in all these cases. The Israeli-Syrian confrontation was contained without direct interference of the superpowers. In the intensifying confrontation between the United States and Muammar al-Qadhafis Libya, Moscow carefully avoided any clash with the Americans. In the "Gulf War" both superpowers obviously tried to avoid any direct confrontation and seemed to favour an outcome without any decisive victor.

Of course, during all this time, Moscow was trying hard to suppress the Mujahedins' resistance in Afghanistan and to press for a settlement of the crisis in and around Afghanistan, which would serve basic Soviet interests: a "friendly"

government in Kabul and the hindrance of any influential foreign power in that country.

Today, none of these crises have been settled. As there are no large-scale Soviet initiatives in the Middle East, one has to search for nuances to discover any significant trends in Moscow's policy. Some recent activities have been interesting indeed.

As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the most important fact is not the continuing cooperation with Syria and the PLO (which has not always been easy, regarding the conflict between President Hafiz al-Assad and Chairman Yassir Arafat) - it is Moscow's new contacts with Israel and Egypt. Having experienced that Arab radicalism, disunity, and impotence do not favour Soviet interests, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have obviously invested some capital in restoring relations with Israel. Serving as an outrider, Poland has already re-established official relations (if only on a modest level). Increasing contacts between Soviet and Israeli officials indicate that under favourable conditions something similar might occur between Moscow and Jerusalem.

Using the renewed talks about an international peace conference as a pretext, which serves very well as a shield against any Arab criticism, Moscow tries to employ the "Jewish factor" again in dealing with Israel and the United States. Secondly, if an international peace conference actually should take place, which is not very probable because any substantial compromise seems to be lacking, Moscow would have regained a

position it had lost in 1967 and could not grasp again after the October war of 1973: relations with all relevant political actors in the Middle East. This would mean "equality" with the United States, and perhaps even some advantage over Washington, because American policy in the Arab world has obviously suffered from its unconditional support of Israel and other activities (such as the secret weapons to Ayatollah Khomeiny's Iran).

To be sure: the Soviet Union seems well aware of the fact that any real and lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is not at stake at the moment. The international conference seems to be more an opportune vehicle for a cheap come-back in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

The recent improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations (the agreement on the liquidation of Egyptian debts and the Soviet readiness to deliver military spareparts) fits perfectly in this picture. Moscow skilfully used Egypt's disillusionment with the United States, who wanted to apply stricter terms on its economic aid to Cairo, and is on the way of restoring the relationship which had been almost broken since the mid 70s. To be sure, in the foreseeable future no dramatic Egyptian "shift in alliances" seems to be probable. It is only the old "Middle Eastern game" that Cairo and Moscow are trying to play at the moment.

In the Lebanese crisis since 1982 Moscow has pursued several aims. First of all, it tried to frustrate the American-led peace-keeping operation because, in Soviet eyes, it meant a

new "imperialistic military foothold" in the Middle East. This had to be achieved without directly confronting the Americans. Given Syria's staunch resistance against any Western-dominated pacification of Lebanon, it was enough for the Soviet Union to compensate the Syrians for their military losses against Israel and to back their intransigence. On the other hand, Moscow was not willing to leave Syria's president Asad a completely free hand in Lebanon. After the Western peace-keeping force's retreat, Soviet diplomats displayed some activity in Beirut. Yet, this was no easy undertaking, as the kidnapping and killing of Soviet diplomats - obviously by one of the militant Islamic groups - demonstrated.

Moscow and Damascus also did not agree in their policy towards the PLO. Whereas Asad worked hard to deprive Arafat of his chairmanship, the Soviet leaders tried to preserve a united political organization of the Palestinians. Their support of Arafat was not undivided, however, because they had suspicions that he might join the American-Jordanian (and Israel's Labour party's) project to bring considerable parts of the occupied territories back under Hashemite rule. And, as the various talks and the agreement (valid only for some time) between chairman Arafat and King Husain of Jordan proved, they had some reason for their mistrust.

Lebanon remained an unpleasant terrain for every outside power. Facing the eventuality of a second "Islamic Republic", as Shiite groups (Hezbollah and others) claimed, Moscow obviously regarded the Syrian domination as a lesser evil and

endorsed the advance of the Syrian army to Beirut in late February 1987.

The growing radicalization of Lebanon's Shiites was only one indication what might happen in the Middle East if the war between Iran and Iraq continued and if the Islamic Republic would get an upper hand. Although the Soviet leadership, for obvious reasons, had welcomed the expulsion of the Americans from Iran, it feared that the United States could use the continuing war to expand its military presence in the Gulf. (The intensive military cooperation between the United States and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, was regarded as clear evidence.) Moreover, the "Gulf war" created a dilemma for Soviet policy: although linked to Iraq by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, Moscow had not been able to prevent Iraq's leader, Saddam Husain, from launching the massive attack against Iran in September 1980. (There have been certain indications that other states, Saudi Arabia and France in particular, knew much better about Iraqi intentions and did not try to hold back the Iraqi leader.) Consequently, as long as Iraq was in the offensive, the Soviet Union discontinued its military supply.

The other reason for the certain tilt in favour of Iran was that Moscow, taking advantage of the international isolation of the Islamic Republic, tried hard in establishing close relations with Teheran. Quite obviously, the Soviet leadership was hoping at that time to be able to influence the further development of the revolution with the eventuality that a

"second stage" could bring the communist Tudeh party into power.

However, Khomeiny managed to consolidate his power by suppressing his internal rivals, including the Tudeh party, and by starting a counteroffensive against Iraq. The Soviet Union, trying to keep the military balance and to sustain Iraqi morale, resumed its arms deliveries to Iraq as from autumn 1981 and was ready to deliver large amounts of rather modern weapon systems. On the other hand, Moscow quite obviously "tolerated" the arms deliveries of its allies and partners (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and especially North Corea) to Iran. Since autumn 1986 some diplomatic activities have indicated an improvement of Soviet-Iranian relations, though on a rather modest level. New tensions between Moscow and Teheran will be unavoidable, however, if the latest news proves to be correct that the Soviet tanker "Ivan Koroteev", transporting oil for Kuwait, has been attacked by the Iranian armed forces.

The Soviet Union can tolerate the Iran-Iraq conflict as long as it does not spill over; quite probably it would prefer an outcome confirming the status quo and allowing the maintenance of good or even privileged relations with both states. As immediate neighbour and most potent country in the Gulf region, Iran probably ranks higher. On the other hand, the relationship with Iraq is one important element of Soviet influence in the Arab world.

In this respect it is interesting that Soviet diplomacy has worked hard during the conflict to further closer contact with

the oil-rich Arab countries of the Gulf. Although a re-establishment of Soviet-Saudi Arabian relations has not taken place because of Riad's refusal, Moscow has made some progress. For the first time, Kuwait has granted a 150-Million-Dollar-loan to the Soviet Union in February 1987. In April this year the same country quite clearly expressed its desire to obtain protection for its oil-tankers in the Gulf, also from the Soviet Union, to which Moscow - eager not to offend Iran - only cautiously submitted.

IV Conclusions

Soviet policy in the Middle East today takes place under several priorities. Firstly, Secretary General Gorbachev's resolution to modernize Soviet society and economy is prior to any foreign policy consideration. The success or failure of this reform will be decisive for the future stature of the Soviet Union as a world power. This means that wherever possible, outside threats and burdens should be minimized.

Secondly, Afghanistan, the "bleeding wound" (as Gorbachev has called it) is still the main problem of Soviet policy in the Muslim world.

Thirdly, the relationship with the United States takes priority also in the Middle East. Therefore, Moscow nowadays tries to use the "Jewish factor" again to create a more favourable climate in American public opinion and in Congress for reaching an arms control agreement with President Reagan and his successor. Avoiding any military confrontation with the

United States also in "Third World" areas remains therefore important.

Fourthly, the most suitable instrument for a low-cost Soviet policy in the Middle East is diplomacy. As no decisive breakthrough in any of the endemic conflicts of the region seems probable, the best Moscow can hope for is to improve its political standing, which means especially:

- resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia
- further improvement of relations with Egypt
- better relations with both Iran and Iraq.

Considering the controversies between these countries, this is no easy task. Taking into account the various predicaments of the United States in the region today (its partiality for Israel, its problems with the Arab world and the secret weapons deliveries to Iran), Moscow, however, is not in the worst position.

Under foreseeable conditions, the Soviet challenge in the Middle East is definitely not a military breakthrough to the Persian Gulf or any other large-scale military operation. The real challenge is that Soviet policy, despite all its own constraints, is playing the "Middle Eastern game" better than others, demonstrating tactical flexibility in dealing with the various regional actors without onesided over-commitments.

It should be Western Europe's role to play this "game" better than the others, thereby depriving the Soviet Union of easy opportunities for gaining additional political influence in the Middle East.

(4)

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CHALLENGES TO MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION AND SECURITY
IN THE LATE 80'S

Community Financial Flows to Mediterranean Countries

Dr. P.C. Ioakimidis

1. Financial flows from the Community to the Mediterranean countries (whether member states or not) take two basic forms: budgetary transfers made either by means of policy operations (member states) or by means of financial protocols (non member states), and special loans provided by the European Investment Bank (E.I.B) on the basis of projects submitted by the countries concerned.

2. EEC financial flows to Mediterranean countries can, on the basis of their destination, be grouped into three main categories:

(a) flows to Mediterranean community member states (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece),

(b) flows to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM - Marroco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel) associated with the Community with cooperation or trade agreements,

(c) flows to four countries of special nature - Cyprus, Malta, Yugoslavia, Turkey.

Only in the case of the second category a uniform pattern of treatment can be discerned though with important variations.

3. As regards the member states, the net financial flows from the Community's budget are shown in table 1. One should distinguish however between the less prosperous Mediterranean member states (Greece, Spain, Portugal) with per capita income well below the Community's average and the more prosperous ones (France and Italy). Of the former category, only Greece has been a member of the Community for a considerable period of time and the table 1 shows she has received quite substantial flows of budgetary sources from the Community. With respect to Portugal and Spain, their

first year of accession shows mixed results: Portugal has made a net benefit out of the Community's budget (almost exclusively from the Social Fund) while Spain a net contribution. Both countries have drawn however substantial resources from the E.I.B.

As to the real economic impact of these transfers on the economies of the member states, it is difficult to provide any assessment. It is important to note however that developmental disparities between the less and more prosperous member states have increased over the past years. Greece's per capita GNP for instance fell from 59% of the Community's average in 1980 to 57% in 1985.

4. For the non-member states of the Mediterranean basin as a whole, the Community's budget devotes annually resources not exceeding 0,6% of its total expenditure. As regards the SEM countries and as table 2 shows, the Community is committed to provide financial assistance totally 3.302 MECUS of which 1337 from the Community's budget and 1965 mecus from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The first financial protocols (1978-1981) amounted to 669 mecus, the second ones (1981-1986) to 1.015 mecus and the third ones, which were only recently approved, to 1.618 mecus. (Loans from the EIB are made for durations ranging from 12 to 20 years at subsidised interest rates. The interest subsidy amounts to 2 percentage points or 3 percentage points and is financed by the budget resources committed in the protocols).

5. The Community net public flows to SEM countries represent for the period 1979-1983 2% of the total net public flows received by these countries. The net public flows of the Community together with those of its member states represent 14% compared with 31% of the USA and 39% of the Arab countries members of the OPEC. The Community's public development aid (which is defined as public flows which contain at least 25% of grant element and is aimed at development) represents 60% of its public flows to SEM countries compared with 92% for USA, 100% for OPEC and 72% for the Community's member states (tables 3,4,5).

6. The Community's flows (2nd protocols) to the SEM countries are allocated

14% of the budget resources to agriculture

22% to the infrastructure

18% to the training and education

(the rest to other economic and social activities)

The agriculture's share (44%) in the second protocols is substantially higher than in the first protocols (12,5%). This represents an attempt by the Community and the recipient member states to develop agriculture and increase the self sufficiency of the countries in food products.

7. The four special cases:

Cyprus: the first financial protocol (1978-1983) provided for 30 mecus (20 mecus from the EIB, 10 mecus from the budget). The second protocol currently in force provides for 44 mecus (28 from the E.I.B., 16 from the budget).

Malta: the first financial protocol (1976-1985) provided for 26 mecus, 16 mecus in the form of loans from the EIB and 10 mecus from the budget. The second financial protocol (1985-1988) provides for the granting of 16 mecus in the form of loans from the EIB and 13.500 mecus from the budget for grants and loans on special terms.

Yugoslavia: the first financial protocol provided for 50 mecus in the form of loans from the E.I.B. The second financial protocol of a total amount of 550 mecus from the EIB's resources is in the process of negotiation. If approved, this amount would be spent on projects of transport infrastructure of mutual interest.

Turkey: the third financial protocol which has been totally committed provided for 310 mecus (90 mecus from the EIB and 220 mecus from the budget). The fourth financial protocol of 600 mecus (225 mecus from EIB, 375 from the budget) was initialised in 1981 but, for political reasons, it has never been concluded. The Community has also provided to Turkey "special aid" of 75 mecus.

8. Financial flows from the Community to the Mediterranean countries, whether members of the EEC or not, depend on the overall volume of the Community's budget. The prospects for the budget are however very bleak indeed. The more prosperous member states appear extremely reluctant to transfer new resources to the Community not even for financing the development of internal Community policies, let alone for making financial transfers to non member states. The budget for the current year is in serious deficit while it seems certain that the budget for 1988 will not be financed at an adequate level owing to the depletion of the existing community's resources.

The European Commission has proposed the increase of the Community's resources from roughly 1% of the combined Community's GDP to 1,4% of the GNP by 1992. This represents an increase of approximately 40 per cent of the budget.

The Commission has also proposed the doubling of the resources of the Structural Funds (FEDER, SF, EAGGF-Guidance) by 1992 with the aim of implementing a more effective policy of economic convergence ("strengthening economic and social cohesion as the Single European Act provides for"). This policy would mainly be addressed to the economic modernization of the less prosperous member states of the Mediterranean basin (Portugal, Spain, Greece, some regions of France and Italy and Ireland). The development of such a policy is judged to be an absolutely essential element for the future development of the Community especially in view of widening developmental disparities and the establishment of internal market with the complete removal of all obstacles to freedom of goods, services, capital, and persons. As a number of studies have demonstrated, the completion of the internal market is bound to sharpen disparities and produce destabilizing effects for the weaker economies especially of the Mediterranean region (i.e. Padoa-Schioppa report).

Nevertheless the Commission's proposals are encountering stiff resistance in the Council of Ministers, from the richer

member states and they seem to be doomed to rejection or drastic dilution . Thus, the prospects for increasing financial flows to the Mediterranean countries appear to be very limited.

The difficulties for increasing community financial flows to mediterranean countries were highlighted in the negotiations for the third financial protocol with the SEM countries. The original increase of the ammount of these protocols by 70,8% was reduced to 59% with reduction of the budget element (from 79 mecus to 615 mecus). Taken into consideration enlargement and inflation rates, the increase decided hardly represents an impovement in real terms on the previous situation. The same difficulties affect the negotiation for the second financial protocol with Yugoslavia which have been going on since 1984.

Table: 1 EEC Net Transfers to its Mediterranean Member States (1981-1986)

(MECUS)

Member States	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ⁽¹⁾	Total
<u>Greece</u>							
Budget	175	685	996	973	1.309	1.318	5.456
E.I.B./NIC	159	458	449	344	423	253	2.086
<u>Italy</u>							
Budget	788	1.616	1.240	1.508	1.047	186	6.385
E.I.B./NIC	1.699	2.038	2.611	3.035	2.978	3.024	15.385
<u>France</u>							
Budget	576	-19	-210	-642	-89	-4	-388
E.I.B./NIC	267	461	894	1.200	1.247	623	4.692
<u>Spain</u>							
Budget	-	-	-	-	-	-113	-113
E.I.B./NIC	-	-	-	-	-	409	409
<u>Portugal</u>							
Budget	-	-	-	-	-	182	182
E.I.B./NIC	-	-	-	-	-	190	190

Source: EEC Commission/EIB

(1) Preliminary data

Table 1: EEC Financial Protocols with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEM)

Countries	1st financial Protocols (MECU) 1978 - 1981			2nd Financial Protocols (MECU) 1982 -1986			% Increase			3rd Financial Protocols (MECU) 1986 - 1991			% Increase		
	Budget	EIB	Total	Budget	EIB	Total	Budget	EIB	Total	Budget	EIB	Total	Budget	EIB	Total
MOROCCO	74	56	130	109	90	199	47,3	60,7	53,1	173	151	324	58,7	67,77	+62,81
ALGERIA	44	70	114	44	107	151	-	52,9	32,5	56	183	238	27	71	+58
TUNISIA	54	41	95	61	78	139	13,0	90,2	46,3	93	131	224	52,45	67,9	+61,15
EGYPT	77	93	170	126	150	276	63,6	61,3	62,4	200	249	449	58,7	66	+62,63
JORDAN	22	18	40	26	37	63	18,2	105,6	57,5	37	63	100	42,3	70,27	+58,73
LEBANON	10	20	30	16	34	50	60,0	70,0	66,7	20	53	73	25	55,8	+46
(SYRIA)	26	34	60	33	64	97	26,9	88,2	61,7	36	110	147	9	71,8	+50,5
ISRAEL	-	30	30	-	40	40	-	33,3	33,3	-	63	63	-	57,5	+57,5
TOTAL	307	362	669	415	600	1.015	35,0	65,7	51,7	615	1.003	1.618	48	67	+59

Table 3 : Net Public Flows to SEM Countries (1979-1983) (in million US \$)

Donors	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Syria	Israel	Jordan	Total
CEC + Member states	923	879	760	1.265	183	179	419	235	4.843
of which CEC	149	29	105	243	68	18	12	54	678
USA	202	445	114	4.248	42	161	4.922	455	10.589
Other OECD	117	883	185	923	71	26	74	80	2.359
Countries of OPEC	1.417	92	187	111	709	6.331	-	4.401	13.248
Other multilateral	748	198	347	1.555	60	301	- 32	251	3.428
TOTAL	3.407	2.497	1.593	8.102	1.065	6.998	5.383	5.422	34.467

Source : OECD, Development aid committee

Table 4 : Net Public Flows of the Community Compared to those of the Other Donors (1979 to 1983)

(in %)

	MOROCCO	ALGERIA	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	SYRIA	ISRAEL	JORDAN.	TOTAL
EEC/total of flows received by	4,5	1,2	6,6	3,0	6,5	0,3	0,2	1	2
EEC+M.S./total of flows	27,1	35,2	47,6	16,0	17,2	2,6	7,8	4,3	14
USA/total of flows	6	18	7	52	4	2	91	8	31
Arab countries of OPEC/ total of flows	42	4	12	1,4	66	90	-	81	39

Source : OECD, Development aid committee

Table 5 : Net Public Flows to the SEM on the Basis of Yearly Averages for the Periods of
1974-1976 and 1981-1983

Donors	Amount (Mio US \$)		Share of SEM in the whole of aid to LDC (in %)	
	1974-1976	1981-1983	1974-1976	1981-1983
EEC	27	173	4,1	11,6
Member States	542	881	11,4	8,2
EEC + Member States	569	1.055	10,5	8,6
Other OECD	806	2.736	12,8	23
of which USA	689	2.157	18,9	37,2
Countries of OPEC	-	2.102	-	36
Other multilateral	317	689	7	6

Source : Eurostat /OCDE

(5)

S O U S D E V E L O P P E M E N T

E T D E M O G R A P H I E :

FACTEURS DE L'INSECURITE

EN MEDITERRANEE

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L'espace méditerranéen est aux marges du monde industrialisé mais il ne participe pas réellement de sa richesse. Même les pays riverains du Nord souffrent de cette marginalisation soit qu'ils apparaissent comme les plus mal lotis parmi les riches, soit parce que leurs régions littorales sont les plus défavorisées. Les difficultés essentielles du monde sous développé se retrouvent donc en Méditerranée. Elles y revêtent des traits spécifiques mais surtout elles intéressent avec une égale intensité non seulement le secteur économique et social mais aussi les fondements culturels de la société. Les effets subversifs du sous-développement sont déjà à l'œuvre et de nouvelles légitimités appellent la révolte des pauvres contre les ordres établis.

1. Les problèmes de sous-développement

Naguère prospère, l'économie des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée se détériore rapidement et sa dégradation est d'ores et déjà devenue, dans certains cas, dramatique. Dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur la menace, cette évolution est préoccupante à un double titre. D'une part en raison des tensions que les écarts de développement provoquent entre régions et entre groupes sociaux. D'autre part à cause des situations de dépendance qu'elle engendre.

1.1. L'inégalité.

Comme tout espace sous développé, le bassin méditerranéen est caractérisé par une répartition inégalitaire des résultats de la croissance. Ce phénomène se manifeste tout d'abord entre la sphère de prospérité que constituent les pays européens industrialisés et la zone de moindre développement du Sud et du

bassin oriental. La Communauté européenne en s'élargissant sur sa façade méditerranéenne, d'abord à la Grèce puis maintenant à l'Espagne et au Portugal, renforce le décalage existant et accroît à terme les frustrations qui en découlent. Ainsi, les pays qui se sont tournés vers elle et qu'elle maintient à sa lisière risquent, plus que tout autre, de se sentir exclus d'une croissance qui se fait parfois à leur détriment. C'est précisément le cas de la Turquie et du Maroc qui sont les arc boutants stratégiques du flanc Sud et constituent en même temps des ponts indispensables et convoités vers l'Asie et l'Afrique. Les maladresses répétées dont ils sont l'objet de la part de l'Europe pourraient gravement affaiblir des situations qu'une politique économique et commerciale avisée devrait au contraire consolider.

Les écarts de développement se retrouvent aussi entre les pays riverains. S'ils sont encore réels au Nord, le système d'harmonisation économique et social que représente la Communauté Européenne tend à les resserrer dans une fourchette acceptable. Même si le Portugal, avec un revenu par tête d'habitant de 2230 \$ est loin derrière la France, la R.F.A. ou le Danemark avec plus de 10 000 \$, une dynamique du rapprochement est à l'œuvre et les procédures de négociation permanente mises en place permettent de canaliser des revendications que le compromis final prend toujours au moins partiellement en compte.

Il n'en va pas de même dans le Sud où les ressources énergétiques ont provoqué des enrichissements aussi soudains que considérables pour les mieux dotés par la nature, tandis que la hausse des prix de l'énergie entraînait un appauvrissement correlatif des mal lotis. Les écarts que révèle la comparaison des

indicateurs de base montrent que le développement inégalitaire de la zone Sud aggrave les divergences traditionnelles et participe ainsi au renforcement des tensions de voisinage. L'affectation toujours croissante des richesses accumulées à la constitution d'arsenaux démesurés est évidemment un facteur déterminant de l'augmentation des risques de conflit.

Le développement anarchique est enfin à la source d'inégalités internes qui nourrissent les instabilités sociales et politiques.

Les riverains du Nord souffrent, malgré leur prospérité d'ensemble, d'un sous-développement chronique de leur façade méditerranéenne. Les écarts sont de l'ordre de 1 à 2 entre le mezzogiorno et l'Italie industrielle du Nord (même de 1 à 3 entre la Calabre et la Vallée d'Aoste) et le luxe des stations méditerranéennes françaises dissimule une structure économique typiquement sous développée, principalement monoprotective, axée sur les services et victime privilégiée du chômage. Mais là encore, les mécanismes nationaux et plus encore communautaires contribuent à une régulation des tensions découlant de cette situation. La politique régionale de la Communauté Européenne a avant tout bénéficié aux régions du sud, et la mise en place récente des programmes intégrés méditerranéens (PIM) sera avec 6,6 milliards d'Ecus sur 7 ans, le moyen d'une nouvelle impulsion.

Ce phénomène se retrouve dans les pays du Sud où il revêt une physionomie particulière liée aux spécificités historiques, sociales et géographiques.

PNB par habitant et croissance comparée des principaux pays de référence
(Méditerranée et Communauté Européenne).

	PNB/habitant (\$) 1983	Croissance 1965-1983
Maroc	760	2,9
Algérie	2320	3,6
Tunisie	1290	5
Libye	8480	- 0,9
Egypte	700	4,2
Israël	5370	2,9
Syrie	1760	4,9
Jordanie	1640	6,9
Soudan	400	1,3
Turquie	1240	3
Yougoslavie	2570	4,7
Portugal	2230	3,7
Espagne	4780	3
France	10500	3,1
Italie	6400	2,8
Grèce	3920	4
R.F.A.	11430	2,8
Pays-Bas	9890	2,3
Danemark	11570	1,9
Belgique	9150	3,1

(Source : Banque Mondiale - rapport 1985)

Les écarts de développement se traduisent tout d'abord, et de la manière la plus classique sur le plan social où ils dressent des masses urbaines déracinées et prolétarisées contre des élites technocratiques, alors même que les populations rurales sont de plus en plus menacées par une transformation de l'agriculture dévoyée de sa fonction vivrière. Mais on les retrouve également sur le plan géographique selon un modèle opposé à celui des pays du Nord.

En effet, le plus souvent, la bande littorale, bénéficiant d'un climat plus favorable et de débouchés maritimes, est la plus développée. La croissance urbaine qui s'y effectue contribue au déséquilibre avec l'arrière pays. Les autorités ne disposent guère des moyens nécessaires à une politique de développement régional harmonisé et en sont réduites à des mesures de contrainte, comme en Algérie ou en Tunisie, où l'administration choisit de reconduire en camion les ex paysans dans leur douars d'origine. La Libye -mais parce qu'elle en a les moyens- tranche sur ce tableau préoccupant. La concentration urbaine à Tripoli et Benghazi, la contamination des valeurs traditionnelles par le modèle occidental de consommation que favorise dans ces centres le contact avec les occidentaux et les visions politiques du Colonel Khadafi, ont conduit ce dernier à mettre en œuvre le gigantesque projet de la grande rivière artificielle. Longue de 4000 km, elle servira à amener l'eau du Sud vers le nord et aura la configuration, une fois le projet entièrement réalisé, de deux bras parallèles. Prélevée sur les nappes souterraines, l'eau ainsi canalisée alimentera les villes et villages inscrits sur son passage et irriguera 180 000 ha de terres jusque là infécondes. Les villes côtières bénéficieront également d'un approvisionnement en eau par ce moyen.

Une fois réalisé, ce "man-made river" contribuera à l'objectif d'autosuffisance alimentaire en favorisant la production agricole, en particulier de céréales, pour un volume nettement supérieur à la demande libyenne. On parlera alors d'exportations agricoles, mais il permettra aussi de fixer les populations rurales, de favoriser la création de centres de production industrielle et agricole dispersés afin de réduire l'influence du modèle urbain et, ainsi, d'assurer une répartition plus équilibrée, socialement et géographiquement, des fruits de la croissance. Il reste évidemment à savoir si l'effondrement de la rente pétrolière libyenne n'empêchera pas la poursuite d'une entreprise dont seule la première tranche est aujourd'hui engagée au prix du sacrifice d'autres projets et d'une taxation renforcée de la population.

1.2. La dépendance est devenue aujourd'hui le trait majeur, et le plus inquiétant, des pays du Sud méditerranéen. On la retrouve principalement dans trois domaines.

La dépendance alimentaire affecte désormais la quasi totalité des pays de la région. Le tableau ci-dessous est révélateur de sa gravité. Alors que l'autosuffisance était naguère la règle, la déstructuration de l'économie consécutive à des entreprises d'industrialisation inconsidérées et aux nécessités de développer une agriculture d'exportation ont réduit la part des cultures vivrières. Dans le même temps se sont instaurées de nouvelles habitudes de consommation ne correspondant pas aux capacités traditionnelles de l'agriculture et nécessitant le recours aux produits

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importés. La conjugaison de ces différents facteurs aboutit ainsi à une dépendance généralisée vis à vis des marchés internationaux.

Dans ce contexte, il est dès lors impératif de maintenir et de renforcer les capacités d'exportation. Ainsi, les exportations de la Libye (composées à 98 % par les hydrocarbures) représentent 50 % de son PNB. Celles de l'Algérie en représentent 35 % et celles de la Tunisie 20 % avec respectivement 85 % et 63 % d'exportations pétrolières. La dépendance qui en découle est, par exemple, pour les pays du Maghreb principalement marquée à l'endroit de la Communauté Européenne.

Le commerce actuel entre le Maghreb et la C.E.E. représente une part considérable des flux commerciaux de ces Etats. Le Maroc réalise 44 % de son commerce total avec la CEE, l'Algérie 51 %, la Tunisie 60 %. Ils exportent vers la Communauté 3/4 de leur production agricole. Par ailleurs, l'Europe est le principal fournisseur du Maghreb avec 60 % pour l'Algérie, 50 % pour la Tunisie et 44 % pour le Maroc. Mais le débouché sud-Méditerranéen ne représente en 1984 que 7,3 % de ses exportations totales. Il y a donc un décalage entre l'intérêt offert par le Maghreb pour la C.E.E. et celui offert par la C.E.E. pour le Maghreb.

Dans ce contexte, la France représente pour l'Algérie 23 % des importations de cette dernière et 19 % de ses exportations ; pour le Maroc, 24 et 25 % ; pour la Tunisie, 25 et 19 %. Avec 6 et 4 %, la Libye n'est pour la France qu'un partenaire commercial secondaire, plus tourné

vers l'Italie, qui représente 30 % de ses importations totales et 20 % de ses exportations. La Tunisie tend, comme son voisin Libyen, à s'ouvrir aussi de plus en plus aux échanges avec l'Italie (les exportations italiennes vers la Tunisie ont augmenté de 41 % de 1983 à 1984 et représentent aujourd'hui 14 % des importations tunisiennes).

Il s'en suit, pour les pays du Sud, une particulière vulnérabilité puisque leurs capacités exportatrices reposent essentiellement sur un seul produit. Ainsi, le Maroc a-t-il vu sa situation se dégrader gravement du fait de la chute des cours des phosphates. Mais c'est un phénomène d'une tout autre ampleur que dessine déjà et dans le moyen terme la diminution de la demande énergétique future. Ses conséquences, déjà ressenties depuis 1984, ont été dramatiquement aggravées par l'effondrement récent des cours du pétrole qui a conduit en décembre 1985 à la dislocation de l'OPEP. La chute des revenus pétroliers vient frapper de plein fouet des économies qui, en 10 ans, s'étaient structurées en fonction d'une rente nouvelle et considérable, se mettant inconsidérément dans un état d'extrême dépendance vis-à-vis d'un marché international rendu à merci. Le redéploiement des consommateurs montre les limites d'une stratégie euphorique qui soumet les économies des exportateurs à un choc en retour dont les effets ne peuvent être encore évalués. Un fait est toutefois certain : si la perte des revenus énergétiques devait se confirmer dans les proportions aujourd'hui

prévisibles, les soubresauts qui s'en suivraient pourraient prendre la dimension d'un véritable séisme. C'est ce que laissait déjà entendre la Conférence arabe de l'énergie tenue à Alger en Mai 1985 dans un rapport de l'Oxford Institute Energy établi avant les développements de l'hiver 1985-86 qui ont affecté le prix du brut.

"La "crise de la demande pétrolière" a également de plus vastes répercussions économiques et politiques. Une crise grave et prolongée risque de réduire à néant la solidarité des pays de l'OPEP et d'affaiblir son emprise sur la fixation du prix du pétrole. Si cela arrivait, les pertes de revenus pourraient être plus élevées que prévues ici et les conséquences plus graves.

La crise de la demande pétrolière risque également d'affaiblir le monde arabe sur la scène politique internationale. Le pétrole n'est pas uniquement une source de revenus, il est aussi un facteur d'influence sur la vie politique internationale. L'affaiblissement des pays de l'OPEP risque de diminuer le pouvoir de négociation des pays arabes sur le forum politique, en particulier vis-à-vis des pays occidentaux...

Etant donné la dépendance, unique en son genre, de l'économie arabe à l'égard du pétrole, l'impact d'un cycle aux phases aussi heurtées et aussi longues peut entraîner des perturbations extrêmement graves".

Le Poids de la Dette

	DETTE PUBLIQUE		DETTE PUBL.		SERVICE DE		SERVICE DE	
	EXTERIEURE		EXTERIEURE		LA DETTE		LA DETTE	
	(millions de \$)	(% du PNB)	(% du PNB)	(% du PNB)	(% export.)			
	1970	1983	1970	1983	1970	1983	1970	1983
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Maroc	711	9 445	18	69.6	1.5	8.3	8.4	38.2
Algérie	937	12 942	19.3	28	0.9	9.8	3.8	33.1
Tunisie	541	3 427	38.2	42.4	4.5	7.4	19	22.3
Libye	---	---	--	--	--	--	--	--
Egypte	1 750	15 229	23.2	49.4	4.6	6.5	36.4	27.5
Israël	2 274	15 149	41.3	70.4	0.7	9.1	2.7	19.6
Liban	64	(82)182	4.2	--	0.2	--	--	--
Syrie	232	2 305	10.6	13.7	1.6	1.8	11	11.2
Jordanie	118	1 940	23.5	47.9	0.9	5.2	3.6	11.3
Turquie	1 854	15 396	14.4	30.2	1.3	4.6	22	28.9
Yougoslavie	1 198	9 077	8.8	19.9	1.8	2.2	9.7	7.6
Soudan	306	5 726	15.2	77.8	1.7	1.2	10.7	11.2

Source : Banque Mondiale - Rapport Annuel 1985

La dette extérieure constitue le troisième facteur de dépendance. Le tableau ci-dessous donne la mesure de l'évolution de la situation au cours des 15 dernières années et montre la corrélation existant entre le service de la dette et les capacités d'exportation. L'affaiblissement de ces derniers risque de mettre les pays les plus endettés en état de cessation de paiements. Encore convient-il de considérer avec prudence les chiffres officiels concernant des pays dont l'appareil statistique reste encore rudimentaire. Ainsi, pour l'Egypte, les informations financières les plus récentes font-elles état d'une dette globale de 37-38 milliards de dollars en juin 1985, soit plus du double de l'évaluation officielle de la BIRD. A la même époque, le ratio dette publique extérieure / PNB grimpait à 50 % pour la Tunisie, tandis qu'en 1985 le service de la dette représentait 120 % des exportations du Soudan !. Enfin, la Libye, même si elle n'est pas "fichée" dans les statistiques internationales, ne peut dissimuler une situation des plus inquiétantes. Tripoli doit quelque 4 milliards de dollars aux entreprises et sociétés étrangères ayant signé des contrats avec la Libye. Les plus gros créanciers sont les Italiens avec 1 MD devant les Turcs (500 mns), les Sud Coréens (400 ms), la R.F.A. (300 mns), le Japon (250 mns), la France (120 mns), l'Espagne (100 mns) et la Grèce (40 mns). La dette extérieure se situerait aux alentours de 9 milliards de dollars, ce chiffre incluant la dette militaire à l'URSS (4 à 5 mds).

Cette situation générale crée évidemment une dépendance difficilement supportable à l'égard des créanciers, des bailleurs de fonds et des institutions ou gouvernements appelés à faire les fins de mois. En termes de sécurité, elle présente un double tranchant. C'est sans doute un moyen de pression susceptible de calmer des vélléités de turbulence de la part des gouvernements. Mais c'est aussi pour l'opinion publique un facteur d'exaspération et un prétexte à révolte lorsque les mêmes gouvernements sont conduits à prendre des mesures d'austérité exigées par les partenaires financiers au nom d'un nécessaire redressement. Les émeutes du pain au Maroc et en Tunisie sont aussi des émeutes FMI.

2. Les problèmes de population créent d'ores et déjà, dans le bassin méditerranéen, des déséquilibres grandissants qui libèrent progressivement des forces de moins en moins contrôlables. Les tensions démographiques et les flux migratoires qui en dérivent sont annonciateurs de conflits aussi bien internes qu'internationaux, de plus en plus difficiles à maîtriser.

2.1. Les déséquilibres démographiques.

Ramenés à l'essentiel, ils s'expriment dans une décélération rapide de la démographie des pays du Nord et une accélération exponentielle de celle des pays du Sud. L'examen des tableaux suivants permet de mettre en évidence les traits essentiels du phénomène.

- Entre 1950 et 2025, la part des pays européens dans la population méditerranéenne sera à peu près exactement inversée par rapport à celle des pays de la rive africaine et asiatique passant de 70 à 30 % du total. La pression venue du Sud s'annonce donc d'autant plus forte que la part des jeunes est beaucoup plus élevée dans les pays du Sud que dans ceux du Nord même si, contrairement à une idée reçue, elle tend à se réduire dans les premiers et à se stabiliser dans les seconds.
- Les forces démographiques qui s'accumulent vont être sources de tensions renouvelées. On peut tout d'abord s'interroger sur l'aptitude des systèmes économiques, sociaux et politiques nationaux à absorber une telle montée en puissance. Les risques de destabilisation interne qui s'annoncent pour les pays les plus touchés sont à la mesure de la fragilité chronique de leurs structures. Par ailleurs, les termes des conflits ouverts ou potentiels existants devraient être affectés par la nouvelle répartition des masses qui se profile et qui dessine des rapports de forces différents. Ainsi, la masse de 100 millions de turcs est de nature à inquiéter les 10 millions de grecs. La Tunisie et la Libye pèsent d'un poids modeste entre 95 millions d'Egyptiens et 60 millions d'Algériens. Les tensions seront alourdis et les rivalités avivées entre Algérie et Maroc forts l'un et l'autre de 60 millions d'habitants.

2.2. Les mouvements migratoires qui accompagnent la poussée démographique sont d'ores et déjà la cause de tensions graves. La situation actuelle en Méditerranée est caractérisée par la superposition de deux phénomènes distincts qui correspondent à deux vagues migratoires successives dont seule le première est

ressentie par les européens. Amorcée au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, elle s'est déployée principalement pendant la période de forte croissance 1960-75. Elle est orientée Sud-Nord et a drainé vers le centre de l'Europe industrielle des travailleurs provenant de la périphérie (Italie, Grèce, Espagne, Portugal, Turquie) et des anciens pays colonisés (Maghreb, Afrique occidentale). Elle a concerné environ 8 millions de migrants et a été stoppée (si on fait abstraction de l'immigration clandestine et des regroupements familiaux) par la crise, le chômage et l'accession de certains pays en développement au statut de pays en voie d'industrialisation.

C'est alors que s'est déroulée une deuxième vague de tout autre nature mais qui a également intéressé les pays du bassin méditerranéen. Elle est caractérisée par des flux Sud-Sud en direction des pays producteurs de pétrole (Arabie Saoudite, Koweit, Emirats, Qatar, Bahreïn, Oman, Iraq, Libye) en provenance des autres pays arabes (Egypte, Jordanie, Syrie, Liban, Yemen, Tunisie). En 20 ans, elle a touché environ 6 millions de migrants de toutes catégories, du manœuvre au chef d'entreprise.

De l'ensemble de ce phénomène, on retiendra tout d'abord les effets controversés qu'il entraîne dans les pays d'accueil et principalement la France qui, avec une immigration d'origine méditerranéenne de plus de 4 millions de travailleurs, est le pays le plus affecté de la région. En l'absence d'études crédibles, on en est réduit aux conjectures sur les conséquences qu'il peut avoir dans le domaine de la sécurité. Source de tensions politiques internes, il pourrait de surcroît affaiblir la capacité de résistance d'une communauté nationale soumise à une injection

trop brutale d'un corps étranger important. Les foyers d'agitation que peuvent constituer des communautés d'immigrés mal intégrés et qui, comme les maghrébins, résistent à l'assimilation du fait de différences culturelles trop marquées, sont sans doute une menace potentielle qui appelle une vigilance lucide (Cf 4 infra).

Par contre, une estimation des risques de destabilisation que représente l'immigration pour les pays d'émission peut s'appuyer sur des données plus objectives. Si les pays d'émission de la zone Nord disposent de mécanismes régulateurs satisfaisants du fait de leur proximité culturelle et, désormais leur adhésion à la Communauté Européenne, il n'en va pas de même pour ceux de la zone Sud.

Pour ces derniers, l'immigration est facteur de destabilisation pour les principales raisons suivantes :

- Economiquement, les effets des remises, c'est-à-dire de l'envoi de fonds vers le pays d'origine, sont controversés. Elles assurent sans doute des transferts considérables qui, au début des années 80, étaient évalués à 25 milliards de dollars pour l'ensemble des pays en développement, mais l'usage qui en est fait, orienté non sur des investissements productifs mais sur l'achat de biens de consommation le plus souvent importé, contribue à déprimer l'économie locale et à réduire ses capacités de développement autonome.
- Socialement, si la première vague d'émigration Sud-Nord a contribué à détendre l'offre de main d'œuvre sur des marchés nationaux incapables de l'absorber, la deuxième vague Sud-Sud a eu, pour les pays exportateurs, des conséquences totalement

différentes. En effet, les Etats pétroliers sont parvenus à attirer du personnel qualifié qui faisait déjà défaut dans leur propre pays d'origine : professeurs, médecins, artisans, ingénieurs. De nombreux enseignants ont quitté l'Egypte où pourtant le nombre des illettrés augmente. En Jordanie, les deux tiers des ingénieurs, le tiers des médecins, la moitié des infirmières ont quitté le pays, attirés par les rémunérations substantielles que leur offre des économies artificielles sans main d'œuvre ou cadres nationaux.

- Politiquement enfin, les pays exportateurs de main d'œuvre apparaissent aujourd'hui comme les otages des nouveaux pays d'accueil qui se préoccupent fort peu des conséquences néfastes de leur politique migratoire s'ils n'en font pas même un instrument de pression politique. A cet égard, les pays les plus menacés du bassin méditerranéen sont la Tunisie et surtout l'Egypte comme l'a montré pendant l'été 1985 la décision libyenne d'expulser environ 50 000 de ses ressortissants. Cependant, c'est l'ensemble du monde arabe qui est menacé de tensions supplémentaires si la conjoncture confirme le mouvement qui se dessine.

En effet, la crise du marché de l'énergie entraîne un renversement de tendances pour les économies pétrolières qui ne peuvent plus soutenir le rythme de croissance qui avait initialement justifié l'appel à la main d'œuvre étrangère. Dès janvier 1985, l'Arabie Saoudite envisageait le retrait de 500 à 600 000 travailleurs étrangers et, selon une étude de la CIA, un million et demi d'émigrés dans les pays arabes devont rentrer chez eux d'ici fin 1986. Cette perspective a vivement alerté les autorités américaines préoccupées des risques de destabilisation

et d'utilisation par l'intégrisme musulman qu'elle pourrait représenter pour leurs alliés de la région : Egypte, Jordanie, Soudan.

Il est en tout cas certain que la récession a maintenant retourné la tendance et que des retours massifs sont à prévoir en direction des pays arabes exportateurs de main d'œuvre dans la mouvance de la zone méditerranéenne. Ce mouvement sera de surcroît accéléré par le recours de plus en plus important à une main d'œuvre de remplacement d'origine asiatique dont la productivité est meilleure et la discipline exemplaire.

Le caractère préoccupant de cette évolution prend toute sa dimension dans le cas de l'Egypte. L'émigration égyptienne dans le Golfe est évaluée entre 1,5 et 2 millions de travailleurs. En 1984, ils ont transféré vers leur patrie près de 7 milliards de dollars de remise. Quels que soient les jugements portés sur les effets à long terme de ces flux financiers, ils sont perçus dans l'immédiat comme positifs au même titre que la détente sur l'emploi que représente cette émigration pour un pays qui devrait créer, chaque année, de 350 à 400 000 emplois nouveaux uniquement pour absorber les jeunes arrivant sur le marché du travail. Or, selon les experts, les retours dans les cinq prochaines années devraient se situer entre 1 et 1,5 millions de personnes. Comme le note Gilbert Beaugé, chercheur au Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur l'Orient Arabe contemporain :

"On voit mal comment les autorités pourront faire face à cette vague sans avoir à affronter de graves tensions sociales. D'ores et déjà, le gouvernement a promulgué de nouvelles lois concernant le travail des étrangers en Egypte : il a demandé aux Etats-Unis une aide accrue susceptible de compenser le manque à gagner et il a fait de l'emploi l'une des priorités de son action pour les années à venir. De surcroît, ces retours s'annoncent au moment même où la situation démographique du Caire paraît avoir atteint un seuil de saturation, tant que le "retour à la terre" apparaîsse comme une alternative probable ; au contraire, les émigrés ont massivement contribué par leurs envois d'argent à disqualifier les modes de vie ruraux, à susciter de nouveaux modes de consommation accordant la préférence aux produits importés, et à placer, parfois, la vie de villages entiers dans la dépendance de l'émigration. Il n'est pas rare que, dans un village, plus de la moitié des hommes en âge de travailler se soient expatriés, tandis que les investissements agricole provenant de l'émigration demeurent l'exception".

LA REPARTITION DE LA MAIN D'OEUVRE ETRANGERE
1981 - 1983, en milliers, estimations

PAYS D'ORIGINE	ARABIE	IRAK	LIBYE	KOWEIT	OMAN	EMIRATS ARABES UNIS	BAHREIN	QATAR	TOTAL
EGYPTE	500	800	180	80	6	20	5	5	1396
YEMEN (Rép. arabe)	300	50	5	--	30	10	10	10	415
JORDANO- Palestiniens	200	20	2	200	25	10	5	1	463
SOUUDAN	40	5	5	--	--	--	--	--	50
LIBAN	40	5	--	2	1	3	1	1	53
AUTRES PAYS arabes	100	150	105	5	3	15	3	5	285
PAKISTAN	608	60	--	30	50	358	10	30	1146
COREE DU SUD	80	5	5	30	--	5	5	100	
PHILIPPINES	253	14	11	14	3	13	7	8	323
INDE	250	--	--	15	80	20	4	25	394
AUTRES PAYS d'Asie	30	5	--	5	10	--	--	5	55
DIVERS	50	25	60	5	4	5	1	--	150
TOTAL	1 451	939	373	386	212	484	51	95	4 991

EVOLUTION DEMOGRAPHIQUE DES PAYS DU BASSIN MEDITERRANEEN
1950 - 2025

PAYS	POPULATION (en millions d'habitants)			
	1950	1980	2000	2025
Portugal	8 405	9 836	11 154	12 262
Espagne	27 868	37 378	43 362	40 310
France	41 736	53 508	56 252	57 106
Italie	46 769	56 940	59 108	57 003
Yougoslavie	16 346	22 328	25 168	26 289
Albanie	1 230	2 732	3 885	5 004
Grèce	7 566	9 329	10 395	11 234
Malte	312	343	390	418
EUROPE	150 232	192 394	209 714	217 625
Turquie	20 809	45 254	69 991	100 361
Syrie	3 495	8 977	18 677	32 685
Liban	1 443	2 658	3 992	5 601
Israël	1 258	3 937	5 619	7 510
Cypre	494	620	682	777
ASIE	27 499	61 446	98 961	146 934
Egypte	20 461	41 963	64 421	94 935
Libye	1 029	2 978	6 077	10 934
Tunisie	3 530	6 354	9 556	13 072
Algérie	8 753	18 919	37 041	62 880
Maroc	8 953	20 296	36 509	59 297
AFRIQUE	42 726	90 510	153 604	241 118
T O T A L	220 457	344 350	462 279	605 677

SOURCE : Doc. original, Prof. Raimondo CAGIANO de AZEVEDO, Université de Rome.

POPULATION ET POURCENTAGE (en ordre décroissant) DES PAYS DU
BASSIN MÉDITERRANÉEN (1950 - 2025)

	1950			1980	
	1000	%		1000	%
Italie	46 769	21.21	Italie	56 940	16.54
France	41 736	18.93	France	53 508	15.54
Espagne	27 868	12.64	Turquie	45 254	13.14
Turquie	20 809	9.44	Egypte	41 963	12.19
Egypte	20 461	9.28	Espagne	37 378	10.85
Yougoslavie	16 346	7.41	Yougoslavie	22 328	6.48
Maroc	8 953	4.06	Maroc	20 296	5.89
Algérie	8 753	3.97	Algérie	18 919	5.49
Portugal	8 405	3.81	Portugal	9 836	2.86
Grèce	7 566	3.43	Grèce	9 329	2.71
Tunisie	3 530	1.60	Syrie	8 977	2.61
Syrie	3 495	1.59	Tunisie	6 354	1.85
Liban	1 443	0.65	Israël	3 937	1.14
Israël	1 258	0.57	Libye	2 978	0.86
Albanie	1 230	0.56	Albanie	2 732	0.79
Libye	1 029	0.47	Liban	2 658	0.77
Chypre	494	0.22	Chypre	620	0.18
Malte	312	0.14	Malte	343	0.10

SOURCE Doc original Prof. Raimondo CAGIANO de AZEVEDO, Université de Rome

	2000			2025	
	1000	%		1000	%
Turquie	69 991	15.14	Turquie	100 361	16.57
Egypte	64 412	13.94	Egypte	94 935	15.67
Italie	59 108	12.79	Algérie	62 880	10.38
France	56 252	12.17	Maroc	59 297	9.79
Espagne	43 362	9.38	France	57 106	9.43
Algérie	37 041	8.01	Italie	57 003	9.41
Maroc	36 509	7.90	Espagne	48 310	7.98
Yougoslavie	25 168	5.44	Syrie	32 685	5.40
Syrie	18 677	4.04	Yougoslavie	26 289	4.34
Portugal	11 154	2.41	Tunisie	13 072	2.16
Grèce	10 395	2.25	Portugal	12 261	2.02
Tunisie	9 556	2.07	Grèce	11 234	1.85
Libye	6 077	1.31	Libye	10 934	1.81
Israël	5 619	1.22	Israël	7 510	1.24
Liban	5 992	0.86	Liban	5 601	0.92
Albanie	5 885	0.84	Albanie	5 004	0.83
Chypre	682	0.15	Chypre	777	0.13
Malte	390	0.08	Malte	418	0.07

SOURCE Doc original Prof. Raimondo CAGIANO de AZEVEDO, Université de Rome

POPULATION DES MOINS DE 15 ANS ET
POURCENTAGE DE LA POPULATION TOTALE
DANS LES PAYS DU BASSIN MEDITERRANEEN (1950 - 2025)

PAYS	Population de moins de 15 ans				% de la population totale			
	1950	1980	2000	2025	1950	1980	2000	2025
Portugal	2 477	2 562	2 463	2 320	29.5	26.0	22.1	18.9
Espagne	7 549	9 695	9 514	9 569	27.1	25.9	21.9	19.8
France	9 477	11 896	10 740	10 493	22.7	22.2	19.1	18.4
Italie	12 309	12 381	10 274	9 387	26.3	21.7	17.4	16.5
Yougoslavie	5 086	5 451	4 996	4 733	31.1	24.4	19.9	18.0
Albanie	479	1 019	1 075	1 115	38.9	37.3	27.7	22.3
Grèce	2 168	2 129	2 230	2 269	28.7	22.8	21.5	20.2
Malte	109	78	79	76	34.9	22.7	20.3	18.2
EUROPE	39 654	45 211	41 371	39 962	26.4	23.5	19.7	18.4
Turquie	7 976	17 469	23 455	26 008	38.3	38.6	33.5	25.9
Syrie	1 448	4 264	8 425	9 734	41.4	47.5	45.1	29.8
Liban	494	1 039	1 288	1 376	34.2	39.1	32.3	24.6
Israël	398	1 315	1 588	1 837	31.6	33.4	28.3	24.5
Cypre	170	151	152	164	34.4	24.4	22.3	21.1
ASIE	10 486	24 238	34 908	39 119	38.1	39.4	35.4	26.6
Egypte	8 528	16 668	21 933	25 028	41.7	39.7	34.0	26.4
Libye	431	1 390	2 704	3 446	41.9	46.7	44.5	31.5
Tunisie	1 372	2 627	3 059	3 969	38.9	41.3	32.0	23.5
Algérie	3 513	8 942	16 398	19 394	40.1	47.3	44.3	29.3
Maroc	3 974	9 329	14 675	16 771	44.4	46.0	40.2	28.3
AFRIQUE	17 818	38 956	58 769	66 798	41.7	43.0	38.3	27.7
T O T A L	67 958	108 405	135 048	145 789	30.8	31.5	29.2	24.1

SOURCE Doc original Prof. Raimondo CAGIANO de AZEVEDO, Université de Rome

QUELQUES COMMUNAUTES ETRANGERES MEDITERRANEENNES EN PAYS MEDITERRANEEN - 1983

ACCUEIL 1983 ORIGINE	CHYPRE	GRECE	ITALIE	PORTUGAL	ESPAGNE	TURQUIE	ALGERIE	Egypte	TUNISIE	TOTAL			
	FRANCE												
PORTUGAL	866.595	176	3.912	—	24.156	2	—	200	—	40	895.081		
ESPAGNE	395.364	466	11.471	7.300	—	120	150	10.000	—	190	425.061		
FRANCE	27	—	3.749	20.941	4.220	15.349	727	700	35.000	26.500	11.000	123.213	
ITALIE	143	605.333	5.319	—	1.887	25.530	2.707	235	5.000	2.623	4.577	656.355	
YUGOSLA.	1	68.316	—	13.149	3	107	620	—	—	35	—	82.231	
ALBANIE	—	175	—	515	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	702	
GRECE	362	8.697	—	29.263	45	451	1.205	—	—	250	5.500	45.783	
MALTE	2	228	—	779	—	—	7	—	—	—	100	1.116	
TURQUIE	1	135.049	2.171	2.347	—	168	—	200	—	20	—	139.976	
SYRIE	15	4.990	—	2.241	—	993	150	—	—	26	—	8.415	
LIBAN	96	13.527	—	3.144	—	693	310	—	—	45	—	17.825	
ISRAEL	357	4.072	—	4.815	10	290	501	—	—	—	—	10.045	
CHYPRE	—	834	104	737	—	—	2.110	—	—	—	—	3.785	
EGYPTE	67	5.285	—	6.235	—	—	—	15.000	80	—	10	26.677	
LIBYE	10	840	—	293	3	—	2.110	—	—	45	—	3.701	
TUNISIE	—	121.909	—	3.350	—	—	72	—	—	90	—	216.421	
ALGERIE	2	805.355	—	1.165	—	—	—	—	6.000	—	12.600	825.122	
MAROC	2	492.669	—	1.822	25	3.765	10	—	—	—	1.200	499.493	
TOTAL	1.085	3.620.238	11.985	106.179	13.493	71.502	10.663	1.285	55.000	45.915	15.077	28.580	3.981.002
TOTAL	2.102	4.175.878	83.052	383.764	63.342	214.186	39.607	1.285	55.000	56.460	15.077	31.780	5.121.533

Sources : Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rome, 1985

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EUROPE, THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN THE SECURITY DIMENSION

by Stefano Silvestri

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PAPER PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON "CHALLENGES TO
MEDITERRANEAN

COOPERATION AND SECURITY", SPESES ISLAND, GREECE, 28-31 MAY 1987

There are two ways of looking at the Southern Flank of NATO, from the perspective of the main Western European countries. One is the "safety belt" approach. The other is the "overall stability" approach. Both recognize the great importance of the Mediterranean region for European security. The first one however is based on the assumption that this region is "crisis prone", basically unmanageable without the direct intervention of the Superpowers, too risky and volatile for long-term policy commitments: the main objective of Europe therefore should be a "damage limitation" operation. The principle instrument of Mediterranean policy would be military force and the capacity to enforce an external will on the local powers.

The second one, on the contrary, is based on the idea that the basic instability of the Mediterranean region can be cured, that there is enough good will and political capacity inside the region to establish long-lasting and peaceful relationships, that a policy of stability can be based on the growing awareness of the existence of very important common interests between Mediterranean and European countries. The instruments of such policy would be more of an economic and political, rather than military, nature.

Not surprisingly, the first point of view is more common in Northern and Central Europe, while the second one is more or less shared by the Southern European countries.

The problem is that in order to try to implement their favourite strategy,

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the Southern countries need the cooperation of their allies, while the first strategy can be pursued, at least for a while (under some circumstances, for a very long while), disregarding the wishes of the Mediterranean countries.

No one of course would willingly choose the use of force when other ways are readily available. Still, there is a great difference between a policy of "consensus gathering" and a policy of "decision sharing". The first is in search of clients, the second of allies.

The Mediterranean is torn in between. Some countries, like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, are formally integrated within the Western system, from the Atlantic Alliance to the EEC, but their participation is frequently under scrutiny and criticism, while their influence and effectiveness is limited.

The policies of the Western Powers towards the Mediterranean are similarly divided and contradictory, soins in either direction according to the prevailing mood and expediencies.

The net result is a situation of growing confusion and instability. The question asked in this paper is if there is a chance for an initiative coming from the South, aimed at establishing a stable and positive relationship of security and stability between the Mediterranean and Europe.

The political diversity

The Mediterranean area cannot be considered a unitarian region. In the Mediterranean different political, religious, military and economic realities meet, sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in conflict. No single Mediterranean Power is capable of imposing its will on the entire area, by the use of military force or otherwise. On the contrary, each Mediterranean country is a somewhat "junior" partner, in alliance with stronger powers. Local conflicts therefore are intertwined and mixed up with other international conflicts, larger and more important. The Mediterranean countries moreover are frequently interested in utilizing their alliances in order to strengthen their stance, to avoid any important concessions and to protract the local conflicts, until their freezing and their internationalization. All this creates a balance of mutual impotence.

No attempt to impose an external order on the Mediterranean is likely to succeed. Neither of the Superpowers, in the last forty years, has given the Mediterranean enough importance and priority and has invested enough resources to become its master! The problem of course is that the conflicts interesting the Mediterranean can only rarely be circumscribed to the riparian countries alone. On the contrary, they are generally bound to involve other countries and regions, to establish a kind of "domino escalation", practically impossible to fully control.

The division and confrontation between East and West has effectively frozen and put out of the political picture the traditional infra-European conflicts. No such result has been achieved in the Mediterranean, where the borders

between the two "blocs" are muddled and dubious, while the alliances are frail and changeable.

This situation favours the growing impact of multiple threats, affecting both the Mediterranean and the European countries. Between them, international terrorism is now preeminent, but more traditional military, social and economic threats are also present.

Attempts have been made in the east, and still are being made to deal with this problem in a multilateral and peaceful way. None of these attempts however has fully succeeded yet. The most successful one was probably the so-called Camp David Process, in bringing peace between Israel and Egypt, with the help of the United States and the military guarantee of the Multilateral Force in the Sinai. This same approach however has dramatically failed in Lebanon, and did not expand to embrace the other Arab countries bordering with Israel.

No success whatsoever was possible for the interesting idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, modelled on the experience of the CSCE. Even the limited Mediterranean participation in the CSCE process has been characterized by a number of failures, or at best by irrelevance. There is now the idea, championed by the Italian Government, of the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean "support group", involving at least three NATO countries (Italy, France and Spain) and three non-aligned countries (Yugoslavia, Egypt and Algeria), all interested in strengthening the chances of peace and stability in the Mediterranean. But it is easy to foresee the important limits and weaknesses of such a project, should it be implemented. Political differences between its members, their relative impotence vis-à-vis the major powers present in the Mediterranean, the absence of important countries (such as Greece and Turkey, by the way, but also Morocco or Saudi Arabia), the vagueness of the political aims, are themselves enough to increase scepticism.

What is happening, on the contrary, is the creation of new linkages between "moderate" countries of the Arab world and European countries, on matters such as anti-terrorism cooperation, while some more "radical" countries are driven away from Europe and the West. This is not the result of a conscious "bloc policy" of the European powers, as the logical consequence of the aggravation of the Mediterranean conflicts and of the limited measures taken until now to circumscribe them.

The linkages created so far however are not strong enough to establish a new pattern of alliances and guarantees between European and Mediterranean countries. The diversities existing among Europeans, and with the United States, on the best way to fight instability and counter the threats coming from the Mediterranean, are weakening the present relationship. Even the European Community, the biggest economic power of the area and the main partner of all the Mediterranean countries, was unable to produce a coherent and effective policy towards these regions, in order to bring about at least a modicum of economic development and prosperity.

This is not to say that the Community's Mediterranean policy has been totally ineffective, but that its successes seems to be a thing of the past. The establishment of strong association ties with almost all the Mediterranean countries is of course an important accomplishment. The substantial help given

to the democratic political forces in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, is still the greatest achievement of Western Europe in the last years. But the practical failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, and the inability to envisage and implement a common security and foreign policy in the Mediterranean, are not likely to be overcome in the near future.

The military diversity

In the east, the military threat against Nato's southern flank has been largely an indirect threat. Soviet troop deployments and readiness levels have all pointed toward an attack in the central European region. No Soviet divisions have stood ready for short warning attacks against Italy, Greece or Turkey.

Under the "flexible response" strategy, Nato has declared that it will meet any attack with whatever level of force is necessary, including nuclear weapons. The intent has been to deter war by posing a grave risk of nuclear escalation. And the same risk would ensure that any war would be quickly ended through negotiations or exhaustion.

For the southern region, "flexible response" has meant a minimum role. If Nato held in the center with conventional forces, or if necessary, nuclear weapons, peace would soon come, with little action on the flanks. If Nato were defeated in the center, the flanks would have little choice but to accommodate to Soviet desires. Thus, southern flank countries have had a vital stake in the success or failure of Nato defenses, but have had little effect on the outcome.

The situation has changed in the '80s. The growing nuclear capabilities of both sides have culminated in a fundamental change in both Nato and Soviet perceptions. Both appear to recognize that the only way to achieve a reasonably satisfactory outcome would be to limit any conflict to conventional means. The arms control negotiations under way between the USA and the USSR, are reinforcing this trend, proposing the progressive elimination of theatre nuclear weapons from Europe. Nato, therefore, is striving to increase its defense budgets so that nuclear weapons will not have to be used at an early stage. On the Soviet side, there is continued growth in numbers of divisions and conventional weapons of all types.

It remains true, however, that both sides have interests so vital that nuclear war at some level could appear preferable to abandoning them. For Nato, these interests are located in the central region of Europe; avoiding catastrophic defeat on flanks also would be a vital Nato interest and could trigger nuclear defenses; but the fact is that there is more room for maneuver (either political or military, or both). If the Soviets choose to launch a military attack against Nato as a means toward limited gains, therefore, they will have to do so without total victory over Nato forces and without seeking to capture West Germany. Consequently, a war for limited gains would make the southern region of Nato as attractive a target for the Soviets as the center region (and a less risky target).

The southern flank of Nato, moreover, is not merely a regional defense line. It is also the guarantee of a Western strong presence in the oil-rich Middle East, and the strategic cover of the Western dominance of the entire

Mediterranean region. Thus, in the event of a Warsaw Pact-Nato conflict, the Soviets might well turn to the southern flank of Nato as an opportunity for important military and political success, in Europe, in the Middle East, in North Africa and in the entire Mediterranean.

The increasing conflictuality of the Mediterranean region, the "sabre rattles" coming from many local powers and little wars, the direct and indirect threats stemming from "low level conflicts" (such as international terrorism, civil wars etc.), the Arab-Israeli and the Iraq-Iran wars, could easily become the focus of international conflicts and the occasion for Soviet military operations against the West, even avoiding a direct Nato-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

The conventionalization of war in Europe (and in the southern flank in particular) is bringing to the forefront the inadequacies and the problems of the conventional forces of the southern European states. The geostrategic and military strengths and weaknesses of the countries of the southern region are as follows:

a. Italy

Geographically, Italy has the advantage of bordering two neutral countries, Austria and Yugoslavia, ready to fight to safeguard their territorial integrity and unwilling to open their frontiers for the passage of Warsaw Pact divisions in case of an East-West crisis in Europe. Furthermore, Italy has the geostrategic advantage of presenting a single, limited avenue of ground invasion at its north-eastern border, characterized by mountainous, rugged terrain for most of its extension. Except for the narrow Gorizia gap, mass armor operations would not be possible. The terrain is well suited for dug-in, fortified defenses. The employment of remotely deliverable mines - antitank and antipersonnel of the types indicated in Paragraph 2b - seems particularly attractive to block roads and passes. Their dissemination along valley roads would retard and impede movements of armored and mechanized units, providing for an increase of fixed, lucrative targets.

Furthermore, Italy's unique geostrategic position protruding in the Mediterranean Sea, accentuated by Sardinia, Sicily and the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, constitutes both an element of defensive liability and of operational advantage and opportunity.

On the one hand, Italy's extensive coastline makes surveillance more difficult, while its Mediterranean projection makes it more vulnerable to any southern threat and to submarine launched cruise missiles (10). On the other hand, that same Mediterranean projection and the islands allow for greater air and sea coverage of the Mediterranean, enhancing the role of ground-based air power.

In addition, the relative width of the Sicily Channel allows for easy monitoring, control and filtering, if necessary, of maritime surface and submarine traffic in case of conflict.

New technology can help the Italian defensive posture by offering more sophisticated sensor and weapons systems (torpedos, mines, depth charges) for

the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and very precise air-to-surface and surface-to-surface antiship missiles with longer standoff ranges and better resistance to deceptive measures.

A new element of vulnerability is represented by the new Soviet SS-12 mod. and SS-23 SSMs. The 900 km range SS-12 mod. from Czechoslovakia can cover the Italian territory up to Naples and Taranto, while the 500 km range SS-23 from Hungary can hit targets in the northern battle area up to Verona. This threat would increase in quantitative and geographical terms if SS-23s would be deployed in some North African countries.

The present technology does not offer a reliable, effective anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system. However, research and development is being conducted in the United States and in Europe to field an ATBM architecture complementing the long-range and short-range air defense missile system.

b. Greece

Greece's most evident geostrategic disadvantage is the short distance between the Greek-Bulgarian border and the Aegean Sea coastline. It would be impossible to trade space for time. There is no alternative to forward defense. New technologies can help to defend at the border. As in the case of the Italian north-east border, active defense can be coupled with fortified interlocking bases, remotely fired gun and mortar positions, hardened and concealed electronic jammers, smoke and chaff generators, etc., exploiting the characteristics of the terrain to their maximum.

Another defense liability is the limited size of Greek territory. While the airbases are within range of the Soviet bombers and Su-24 type fighter bombers - some also of the Bulgarian MiG-23BM aircraft - there are not enough of them for the redeployment and dispersal of vital air assets.

New technologies can provide for effective air defense systems, in particular surface-to-air missiles with shorter reaction times, stronger resistance to countermeasures, higher lethality warheads. Even recent developments in AA guns appear as attractive solutions for point defense problems against the Warsaw Pact air threat.

On the other hand, Greece, with its more than 3,000 islands, can utilize new technologies for the control of the Aegean Sea. Long-range stand-off air-to-surface missiles can provide a significant capability for a thorough sea denial role. Passage through the Aegean Sea of Soviet Black Sea Fleet naval forces, in case of Soviet control of the Turkish Straits, can be denied by the employment of missile-armed fast patrol craft, easily dispersed among the island ports and attacking with wolf-pack technique, by aircraft armed with sea-skimming ASM, and by mobile ground-launched SSM deployed on the islands controlling the most important sea passages and choke points.

Finally, new technology sensors and mines are other assets that can turn the tide in favour of NATO forces in the anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare operations in the Aegean Sea.

The SSM threat will significantly increase when Bulgaria replaces its 40 FROGs and 36 SCUDs with the new SS-21 and SS-23 missiles. The 120 km SS-21s will be capable of covering the entire Thrace area, while the SS-23s the majority of the Greek territory. The SS-23s could be employed for a conventional pre-emptive strike against the airbases and other key military targets.

c. Turkey

Turkey's geographic position, which is at the root of its strategic importance for NATO defense, is also at the root of the complexity and difficulty of Turkey's defense problems.

A geostrategic analysis reveals a number of negative elements in terms of defense. In the event of an East-West conflict, the Turkish armed forces would find themselves engaged on three separate fronts: the Turkish Thrace, the Straits and the Black Sea coast, and the Eastern Turkish-Soviet border. Moreover, it is not to be excluded - though the hypothesis seems very unlikely - that Turkey might also be engaged on the southern front if Syria decided to side with Moscow.

There are, however, few beaches on the Turkish Black Sea coast that are suitable for massive amphibious operations - and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet amphibious force counts only 25 ships and 12 craft - while advances towards the interior are made difficult by the Pontus mountain range. The terrain on the Turkish eastern border is largely inaccessible, unsuitable for armored or mechanized units operations, and with few practicable passes. The terrain bordering on Syria is also particularly rough and mountainous, especially near Tskenderum.

The weakest and most vulnerable area is the Thrace, along the border with Bulgaria, where there are easy lines of attack through the Vardar Valley, the Struma Pass and the plains that lead directly to the Aegean Sea and the Straits. The terrain is suited for the use of armored divisions, while the shallow depth prevents the adoption of defense manouevring and makes forward defense a necessity.

As far as the Turkish-Soviet border is concerned, the characteristics of the terrain should be used to its own advantage, with active and passive defense measures, as in the cases of Italy and Greece.

The Straits can easily be closed to maritime traffic, and in this case the new technologies can surely provide more sophisticated and effective means of doing that.

For the defense of the Black Sea coast new technologies can provide a vast array of new sensors to monitor, pick up, and discriminate any surface or submarine threat. This early warning and control system can be integrated by mobile surface-to-surface missiles for the actual defense. The new mines can also be used for the purpose of interdicting the easiest approaches to the Turkish beaches.

The defense of the Thrace area can be improved not only with those physical "barriers" which can be erected, according to the features of the terrain, to constrain, impede, slow down, re-direct the forward thrust of the armored units, but also equipping the ground forces with new technology antitank missiles and the airforce with the most sophisticated distributed munitions and area coverage weapons systems.

The replacement of FROG, SCUD, and SS-12 missiles with the new SS-21, SS-23 and SS-12 mod. missiles in the Soviet forces deployed in the Odessa Military District and in the southern TVD, which will be presumably completed in the next ten-year period, will increase the conventional SSM threat.

While the threat of the SS-12 mod. missiles will not change, since the new models have the same range as the missiles they replace, the upgrade from the SCUDs to the SS-23s would permit the Soviets to target the northern part of the Turkish territory from the Crimea Peninsula and from the Krasnodar area, and the eastern part from the Georsian and Armenian regions.

The Soviet Union could reach even deeper into central and southern Turkey if SS-12 mod. missiles were deployed into Bulgaria, in the same way that they were deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1984.

A Problem of Western Policies in the Middle East

New threats are emerging within the region. What is new in these threats is the fact that they seem to act independently from any East-West background and at the same time appear to be consciously directed against the West. There are forces and powers in the Eastern Mediterranean which appear willing to have a direct confrontation with the Western countries. Furthermore, they are apparently looking for such a confrontation because of autonomous motives of hostility and not because they would like to take advantage of the Superpowers' competition. Quite reasonably, this is considered by the Western Powers as a threat which may be more or less effective but which, in any case, is new and adds to the old, traditional Soviet and/or East-West threats.

Second, these new threats against the Western countries are also directed against their allies in the region, that is the moderate Arab States. The assassination of Sadat, although committed by a national opponent, was correctly perceived as a blow to the Western coalition in its widest expression, that is including the Third World's allies to the West. Consequently, the new threat which is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a threat to the West in its most comprehensive notion, must be considered as an enlarged threat, not different in its nature from the Soviet one, though certainly much less effective than the latter.

Third, despite the fact that in principle this enlarged threat is not linked to the USSR and the East-West dimension, it could easily combine with both of them and become more dangerous than the well known alignments of Third World countries with the Soviet Union and its allies in order to make their national goals more attainable.

In a parallel move the threat perception of the moderate Arab countries of the region has also undergone a change. This change has presumably been even

more sweeping than that of the Western countries. Here again one can point out three motives for this change.

First, the Iranian revolution, besides the role it has assumed internationally, has emerged as a fearful threat to the stability of almost all the Arab regimes. To put it very briefly, this is due to the fact that the brand of nationalism adopted by Iran's shi'ite revolution is radically different from other forms of nationalism in the region. Despite the secular or religious character of their constitutions, and regardless of the competitive or cooperative attitude they may adopt towards Western countries, modern states in the Eastern Mediterranean take part into the international system with the aim of becoming integrated in it. They try to assert themselves as nations, but they do so by adopting Western success indicators. As assertive as any other brand of nationalism, Islamic or Shi'ite nationalism is by contrast entirely antasonistic towards the West and towards the leadership the latter maintains on the international system. It is because of this basically antasonistic character that Islamic nationalism constitutes the core of the new kind of threat the Western countries are perceiving in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, because of its antasonistic character, it is considered by the West to be a more eversive threat than that coming from traditional Middle Eastern nationalism. Finally, its basic hostility to the Western culture involves in its deadly hostility, all secular as well as religious regimes of the region so long as these regimes are committed to modernization along Western paths.

This Islamic antasonism is active in its character. As is well known, an important segment of the Iranian revolutionary leadership is convinced that to export Islamic nationalism is part of the revolutionary duties and acts accordingly. As a matter of fact, Iran is less effectively equipped to export its revolution than is usually believed. However, the important point is that, even if Iran were not willing nor sufficiently equipped to export revolution, the people in the region are in any case ready to receive its revolutionary message and it is here that the threat to regimes' stability principally lies. In many Eastern Mediterranean countries, regimes have often failed to deliver true modernization, political democracy, international prestige and more acceptable conditions of life. For this reason people are getting frustrated, rebuffing Westernization and looking towards Islam as the sound basis for implementing their expectations. Islamic nationalism as an ideology is no less dangerous to the stability of the Arab allies than a real war.

Second, as a consequence of the spreading of Islamic nationalism in the region, Arab regimes' perceptions of security in relation to their alliances with Western countries have also changed. Since Islamic nationalism deadly opposes Arab regimes on the grounds of their "unfaithful" alliance with the West, a condition for their security and stability presently lies in keeping more or less aloof from Western alliances. This has not brought about a break with Western alliances, but in many cases, especially with the Arab Gulf countries, they have been downgraded. In conclusion, after being a factor of security for many Eastern Mediterranean countries Western alliances are becoming more and more a factor of insecurity.

Thirdly, it must be pointed out that the rearrangement of security priorities has gone even beyond that. Islamic nationalism has also changed security perceptions related to Israel and the East-West dimension. Today, these threats are much less important for the Eastern Mediterranean countries

than Islamic nationalism itself. By the way this has also contributed to the downgrading of Western alliances. In particular, Western and Arab patterns of security perceptions in relation to the Soviet Union seem to diverge seriously.

In the Western countries this new set of security perceptions related to the regions ranging from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia and different African areas (more or less what Brzezinski had named "arc of crises"), has given rise to the debate on the Out-of-NATO area operations and to a number of multilateral and bilateral interventions, such as that of the two Interposition Forces in Lebanon, the French presence in Chad, the mission of the mine-sweepers in the Red Sea, etc. Perhaps more intensely, it has given rise to the Western debate on what has been called "international" terrorism and to a considerable body of policies and inter-State security cooperation agreements destined to counter terrorist operations and their networks. These policies have proved far from being successful. The most important operation, the one in Lebanon, failed ignominiously, not only because the Western allied forces were obliged to withdraw under the pressure of the Islamic nationalists but also because at the end of the mission nobody could explain its rationale and its goals on the grounds of a consistent Middle Eastern Policy. Today, while the Palestinian issue remains unsolved despite the emergence of favourable conditions during 1985, both Arab and European allies are subjected to terrorism and in the Eastern Mediterranean countries, instability and violence continue to prevail hopelessly. One has to argue that Western policies are somewhat mistaken.

The sequence of policies pursued by the Western countries, particularly by the United States, can be described as follows. First, the combination of events in Afghanistan and Iran, within the debate on the decline of the American power which characterized Carter's presidency, was interpreted in the United States as a new threat to the East-West dimension. As a consequence the United States were driven to emphasize global security requirements in the area, to call for the ranks of the existing alliances against Soviet penetration to be closed and to urge for the enhancement of their direct military presence. Second, while the Americans were calling for a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean allies were moving in the opposite direction because of the priority they assigned to emerging regional threats. After the confused and contradictory interlude of the "Reagan Plan" and the intervention in Lebanon, the third stage is represented by the emphasis suddenly placed on "international" terrorism and the role of Libya. It is not very clear whether the American Administration identifies terrorism as a global or regional threat. Generally speaking, the United States conclusion seems to be that terrorism is putting its international presence in danger. In this sense terrorism is seen as a factor having an impact on the global level and hence requiring global rather than regional responses. In other words, despite the fact that in the Eastern Mediterranean one can note a shift in the American threat perception from the USSR to "international terrorism", the fact remains that the region is subjected to global threats.

There are two main errors in this set of policies. First, the Western countries cannot continue to neglect the fundamental divergence in threat perceptions between themselves and their regional allies. Too close a relationship with the West and its strategic interests has the effect of exposing moderate Arab regimes to Islamic nationalism, domestically and abroad.

Insisting on giving our Arab allies what they are obliged to consider today as "deadly kisses" is a policy of destabilization.

Second, the Western countries must give a more realistic analysis of terrorism. Identifying terrorism as a global threat and qualifying it as an "international" factor is an arbitrary intellectual unification of events that are similar in their outward manifestation but prompted by very different causes. It amounts to defining terrorism as an actor, more or less like the USSR or Communism, whereas it is a state of affairs. Such a simplification prevents Western countries from becoming aware of causes and intervening on them with adequate policies. What is important today is the consciousness that the crucial source of terrorism is to be found in the spreading of Islamic nationalism from Teheran. Despite the existence of more or less old varieties of terrorism related to different political crises and entities, it is the resurgence of Islamism and its brand of nationalism which is fuelling terrorism today, domestically and internationally. The core of present terrorism, wherever it comes from, lies within the powerful ideological frame provided by Teheran. This is not to say that Teheran is directly responsible for all the acts of terrorism around the Mediterranean. However, the Islamic nationalism preached by Teheran is the factor which catalyses regional frustration and translates it into action. In this sense, Islamic nationalism is the factor which unifies events as different as the Palestinian struggle, state incentives to terrorism and Hezbollah's terrorism in Lebanon. As a consequence, the threat should be linked rather to Islamic nationalism than to terrorism.

In conclusion, there are political roots to terrorism and this is the issue that the West must address. Islamic nationalism is today the most important political factor for the continued unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, though poor economic management and absence of democracies are certainly no less responsible for what is happening there. What is needed is a regional policy towards Trans-Islamic nationalism and the Middle East with its diverse crises, with the aim of dealing with the political roots of terrorism, unrest and frustration. Western countries are simply lacking this policy.

Some final considerations

There is no easy solution for the problems outlined above. What is clear is that the southern flank of Nato has its greatest weakness in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is particularly worrying for Italy. This country fears the possibility of becoming a "border country" between East and West. During a crisis the Mediterranean could easily be divided in two: the Western part, solidly controlled by the Atlantic Alliance, and the Eastern part, where such a control would be very uncertain and weak. Such a situation should worry first of all Greece and Turkey. These two countries risk isolation during the crisis, and cannot be certain that help from their allies will be prompt, important enough and unwavering.

To modify this situation, however, it would be necessary to substantially increase the integration and presence of the Western forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until today such a choice meant the increase of the American military presence in the Allied countries. Such a solution creates difficult internal political problems in all the European countries of the Southern Flank. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the United States themselves would

agree to such a policy. The American Superpower has constantly diminished its permanent military presence in the Mediterranean during the last decade. The only increases made were temporary and motivated by the national American urgency to act in non-European crises, such as the defense of Israel or the "Punishment" of Libya.

No military solution can be found without an improvement of the international political presence of the West in the Mediterranean. NATO and the USA are not up to the task: a European initiative is therefore needed.

The European Community is directly related to many of these problems. The European Single Act, moreover, giving to the European Political Cooperation the authority for taking all security problems, has open the door to a wider Mediterranean policy of the EC. And anyway, many new developments are obliging the EC has to rapidly define its policy towards the Mediterranean region: there is the Turkish demand of accession to the EC, the increasing likelihood of similar demands coming from Malta and eventually Cyprus, the need to confront the Yugoslav economic and political crisis, the urgency of finding a coherent approach towards some key moderate arab states, such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, and towards Israel, in order to strengthen their resistance against Islamic fundamentalism and turmoil, etc.

The European Community should logically expand toward Turkey and Cyprus, both European Associates of the EEC. This is a political necessity for the Mediterranean and a good thing for the overall stability of the continent. This enlargement will be practically impossible, however, should we not be able to manage the present situation of crisis between Greece and Turkey.

That is not to say that Greece has a veto power on the problem of Turkish entry into the EEC, or that Turkey can play on the European and American desire to strengthen its posture in order to dismiss any attempt to solve the Cyprus question. That is simply to say that any future solution will certainly require a big change of the agenda of the negotiations. Cyprus should become the logical and important appendix of a larger agreement on common interests and joint actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, agreed upon between all the local actors. No solution can be found in "zero-sum" diplomatic or military games.

The EEC, and the involvement of the other Western European countries, can make the difference and change the sum for the necessary amount. No engagement from outside will be possible or forthcoming, however, without an initiative coming from the Mediterranean, particularly from the Eastern Mediterranean, and from our countries. Only these countries can underline the urgency of a common policy for the Eastern Mediterranean in the economic and security spheres, based on the European Community, the European political cooperation and, of course, a common European position inside the Atlantic Alliance. Such a policy could very well proliferate and contribute to the strengthening of the present "Mediterranean network" between Europeans and moderate Arabs, while maintaining a sufficient modicum of necessary relations with the remaining "less moderate" states. But the first move will have to come from the South-Eastern tier of Western Europe with the help of their European allies.

The Eastern Mediterranean has clearly established its "nuisance value", as far as the West is concerned. This situation cannot be protracted without risks. It is easy to identify the policy initiatives that could transform the present "nuisance" (and risk) in a new "asset".

- the establishment of a better Mediterranean Policy of the EEC, integrating both the Greeks and the Turks inside the European Community;
- a gradual solution to the Cyprus problem, through the integration of this country in a larger European context, where both Greeks and Turks can be regarded as a "minority", and through "objective" international guarantees to both Communities;
- the possibility of a stronger common European Policy towards the Middle East, profiting from the geostrategic location of these countries and from their relationships with the area;
- the establishment of a better common system of Air Defence for the Southern Flank, the creation of a secure environment for the operations of the maritime forces of Nato, and the organization of a joint system of military back-up of the many weak spots of the South Eastern theatre.

These policies should be based both on the initiatives of the parties concerned and on the assistance and help from the outside. The United States however are no more interested in playing a very prominent role in the area. On the contrary, their present policy, sooner or later, could result in the creation of a real "vacuum" of political and military power. Initiatives of this kind could strongly influence Western perceptions of the Mediterranean, increasing the chances of the "overall stability" approach, and of filling the "vacuum". They need therefore courage and political decisions on the part of the EEC (and Nato) at least as much as on the part of Greece and Turkey themselves.

(7)

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS GREECE AND TURKEY:A GREEK VIEWPOINT

Charalambos.G.Tsardanidis

In the last few decades, there have been significant changes in the perceptions of bilateral and regional interests of, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and on the other Greece and Turkey. Truman extended military assistance to Turkey and Greece forty years ago to bolster both countries against the influence of Soviet Union.

In the past three decades, the Soviets have attached the highest priority to achieving of strategic parity and regional military preponderance. At the expense of other sectors of national development, they have successfully emerged from a position of global military inferiority and have compelled the West to accept their terms for cooperation and participation in the international system. Peaceful coexistence has superceded containment as the universal rules of the game in Great Power behavior. The Soviets have leap-frogged the containment barrier, represented by the South-East flank of NATO, and have injected their presence and influence, and that of their proxies, into radical Arab and African states. On balance, the Soviets' success in influencing competition in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and Southwest Asia has been mixed, but the three remaining years of the 1980's will probably experience a more cautious, deliberate, sophisticated and capable Soviet policy in these regions than in the 1950's-1960's or the 1970's.

This paper deals with the policy of the Soviet Union towards Greece and Turkey and attempts to explain the factors which influence Moscow's strategy .

Greek -Soviet relations

Greek-Soviet relations had been cool and not very friendly for the whole post-war period. Only in the mid-1960's was there an improvement particularly in commercial,economic and cultural relations.The trend was delayed somewhat during the dictatorship but since 1974 and more particularly since 1977,when the conservative New Democracy party signed a long-term trade agreement ,the Greek-Soviet relationship has entered a new phase.Athens having in mind the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations as well as its problems with NATO,has sought a way out of the impasse of more than half a century with the Soviet Union.Contacts were initially established in such fields as industry,shipping,tourism and sports. In January 1977 a long -term trade accord was concluded and two years later Greece secured the supply of 1.2. milion tons of Soviet oil.Greek Foreign Minister Rallis visited Moscow in 1978 and an agreement was signed establishing consulates in Thessaloniki and Odessa respectively ,with the intention of facilitating mercantile marine cooperation between the two countries.[1]

In 1979,an agreement to provide Soviet commercial vessels with shipment services on the island of Syros provoked some controversy in Greek relations with Washington[2].The dispute resulted in practise,in Greece after 1981,preventing the use of the repair services by auxiliary units of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet.After the advent of PASOK,however,the firm was allowed to proceed with the original

agreement but the new Greek government pointed out that meanwhile the Soviet repair orders rejected by the Greek firm had been placed with French shipyards.

As far the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish dispute were concerned the Soviet Union had as one observer pointed out, adopted an opportunistic policy[3]. Although more or less championing Cypriot integrity throughout the sixties, the Soviets remained passive during the 1974 invasion. The Soviets were fearful that any change in the status of Cyprus might lead to a change in its non aligned policy, and felt that it would be in their interests to denounce any partition attempts. After strongly opposing the Greek military regime's coup against Makarios, Moscow quietly acquiesced to the fact of the Turkish invasion.[4]. It seems the Soviet hope was that the Turkish invasion would lead to the return to the island of Makarios, whom they supported. However, the second Turkish invasion created, from the Soviet standpoint, the possibility of a de facto partition of the island.[5]. Due to this factor the Soviets began to shift their support for the "internationalization" of the settlement process in accordance with United Nations resolutions (which among other things called for the removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus)

On 21 January 1985 the Soviet Union renewed its 1974 proposals for a solution of the Cyprus problem. According to the Soviet proposals "a real way to secure a cardinal settlement of the international aspects of the Cyprus problem is the convocation within the framework of the United Nations of the representative international conference on Cyprus.....

The participants to the conference could include the Republic of Cyprus (with the representatives of both communities), Greece, Turkey, all

member-states of the Security Council. It is also possible to engage other countries, particularly non-aligned, to participate in the conference"^[6]. The Greek and Cypriot response was positive but the Turkish government rejected the Soviet proposals.

On the other hand the Soviet policy toward the Greco-Turkish problems was not perceived by Athens as very satisfactory. Soviet policy was also the object of criticism by PASOK, although in a more qualified manner than that directed at the U.S. and NATO. The Soviet attitude in the Aegean dispute was less pro-Greek and more pro-Turkish. The Soviets assisted Turkey financially, urged negotiations on the Greco-Turkish dispute and opposed the extension s of the Greek territorial waters to twelve miles.^[7] If Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles (from the present six), the Soviet Union would be deprived of the anchorages of the 5th Eskadra's which are just outside Greek territorial watersThree of these anchorages are around Crete in areas where the 6th fleet confronted major Soviet naval concentrations during recent crises in the Middle East. Nevertheless the state visit of Greek Premier Karamanlis to Moscow in October 1979 did produce a considerable relaxation of tensions between the two countries.

In early 1982 the Soviet press began more favorable coverage of Greece, which some analysts believed was due to the renewal of the base talks with the United States. A series of agreements on economic, industrial, scientific and technological matters were signed when Soviet Premier Tikhonov visited Athens in February 1983, provoking the European Community to ask for clarifications because it had received no prior notification of the Greek government's intentions. Plans for an increase in Greek-Soviet trade and for bilateral co-operation over

several economic projects were finalised during Greek Premier Papadreou's visit to Moscow in February 1985. Moscow also seems to have adopted a more positive and flexible attitude towards the issues of the Aegean dispute, including the extension of the Greek territorial waters.

The choice of the Greek Socialist government since 1981 to differ with its allies on a variety of issues at several NATO summits and on the other occasions, for example by refusing to condemn the Soviet practises in Afghanistan and Poland and the enthusiastic endorsement of an old Romanian plan for the establishment of a Balkan nuclear free zone, were well received by Moscow ,despite the fact that Greece is still a full member of NATO and a host to United States bases.[8]. But most observers conclude that Papandreu's avowed neutralist attitudes and positions which are sometimes viewed as anti-Western do not indicate any inclination to move into a position where greater Soviet influence could be imposed on Greek policies.

Turkish-Soviet relations

Turkey's geostrategic location between Europe, Asia, and Africa, its economic potential, and its adherence to the Western alliance systems have been major concerns and constraints for the Kremlin.

On the other hand Turkey's foreign policy dilemma can be summarized as follows: Whether to play an active and constructive role within the Western Alliance and to contribute to the strengthening of allied deterrence capacity, but without challenging vital Soviet security interests and without reawakening the suspicions of Moscow or to improve relations with the Soviet Union without raising American and West

European fears of a neutralist foreign policy shift. Given this dilemma Soviet-Turkish relations have been subject to a number of fluctuations, ranging from friendship to hostility during the period after the end of the Second World war and again to attempts to reach a certain kind of rapprochement and good-neighbourliness. Confronted by Stalin's demands for territorial concessions and a new status for the Turkish straits, during the first postwar years, it was relatively easy for Ankara to define the priorities and goals of Turkish foreign policy. Quite clearly, the first and foremost priority lay in finding an effective deterrent against the Soviet threat, especially in view of the conflictual history of Turkish-Russian relations and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. USSR-Turkish relations improved in the later 1960's and the 1970's. This improvement was not motivated by any ideological sympathy but was due to a number of internal and external factors. Detente between the USSR and USA had served to lessen the tension in many areas of the world. Turkey seemed to be influenced in this by de Gaulle's independent policy vis-a-vis the Great Powers and the Soviet Union in particular. In Turkey the belief was hardened that, even if only to strengthen its position in the West, it had to improve relations with the East. This, along with the fact that Moscow had stopped threatening Turkey, paved the way for better relations. It was also generally believed that the Western Alliance was no longer capable of safeguarding Turkey's national security, as the arms embargo issue had revealed, let alone guarantee Turkey's interests elsewhere, especially in Cyprus. Turkey also feared that the United States might in its own interests sacrifice those of Turkey. Soon after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the United States had decided to remove the Jupiter missile

sites from Turkey. Ankara also needed trade, investment credits and economic assistance. Moscow's blend of chequebook and olive branch had conveyed an overall reasonableness, easing the way for an accommodation.[9]. All this combined with the rise of a highly vocal opposition at home, critical of a pro-West foreign policy, and the growth of a strong leftist movement, convinced the Turkish statesmen that it would be in Turkey's national interest to switch to a more neutral policy[10].

Thus Turkey began to establish an economic cooperation with the USSR, which both sides found to be advantageous. The policy of rapprochement initiated by Ankara and Moscow led to a visit to Moscow by Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in December 1967.[11] After that visit relations between the two countries steadily improved, particularly in the economic field, and the Soviets became the major supplier of project credit to Turkey.[12]. A major current project between Turkey and the Soviet Union is the natural gas pipe-line which will transport 750 million cubic meters of Siberian natural gas to Turkey each year. This amount will increase to more than 6 billion cubic meters per year in the 1990's. An agreement for this joint project was signed in Ankara in February 1986

The creation of closer economic and commercial ties, however, cannot be considered without its political effects. Thus, the 1978 Turkish-Soviet agreement entitled "The Principles of Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Relations" which seemed to anticipate, in the context of Turkey's "new concept of defense", the birth of a policy toward the East very different from the past,[13] did state that neither nation would allow the use of its territory for the commission of aggressive or subversive actions

against the other state. But this agreement was clearly far from being a non-aggression pact. It confined itself to reiterating the principles of the final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and concluded by stating that it did not affect the rights and obligations of the parties under other agreements.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also reaping some rewards. This became evident in 1976 when the aircraft carrier Kiev, which is forbidden transit under the Montreux Convention of 1936, was permitted transit through the Straits. The issue of access will soon obtain new dimensions as the Kremlin-type aircraft carrier enters the service. Also to the chagrin and embarrassment of the U.S., Turkey reportedly insisted that Moscow be consulted regarding a U.S. request that U-2 flights over Turkey be permitted as part of the verification process of the SALI II agreement[14]. Finally Turkey has imposed strict restrictions since 1982 on the flights of American planes which proceed to the Turkish-Soviet border.

Recent Soviet relations with Turkey reflect classical axioms of Tsarist foreign policy: manoeuvre diplomatically to prevent isolation and block the formation of hostile coalitions, while utilising Russia's centristic position to exploit opportunities to expand influence by pressing advantages until risks or resistance exceed potential gains on a rotating basis from East to West and from North to South.

But, to date, Moscow has avoided linking economic aid to specific political demands. Thus the Soviet Union, though not abandoning attempts to break Turkey away from the West, seems to accept the limits set by Ankara. And, significantly, it tends to adjust and its policy to the state of relations between Turkey and the United States, logically stepping up

its efforts when these relations are deteriorating. Nevertheless several of Moscow's short-term objectives have been achieved. Turkey is no longer a possible launching base for strategic weapons, an element of the utmost importance for Soviet security and a prerequisite for Soviet confidence in Turkey. Twenty and more years of official contacts, technical assistance and the absence of intimidation led the then Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to declare that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Turkey. Elaborating his statement later, he explained that the Soviet Union had not shown any aggressive behaviour towards Turkey for years, which therefore resulted in the emergence of mutual confidence between the two countries.^[15] Thus the basic consideration underlying Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union has been the need to maintain, as far as possible, adequate working relations with Moscow, while at the same time remaining a loyal member of NATO. What is certain as one observer has noticed is that no Turkish government will ever gratuitously provoke its giant neighbour to the North and so provide the Soviet Union with a pretext for direct intervention in its affairs.^[16]

Concluding the presentation of this paper let me say that if one accepts the thesis that the Soviet Union is reasonably secure on its Western flank in Europe and is now facing South, then Turkey and Greece are the first echelon in the Southern Front for the following reasons.

Firstly, because Greece and Turkey constitute the "barrier" without which the Soviet Union would be unable to project its influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This vital geographical position of Greece and Turkey can be better appreciated if considered in the light of two particular circumstances: as a direct air route from the

Soviet Union to the Middle East and African countries, and as the only maritime route between the Black sea and the Mediterranean. The straits on the one hand and the 3000 Greek islands of the Aegean on the other, the latter providing strategic depth, could impede Soviet shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the passage of hostile forces through the archipelago.

Secondly, from the perspective of the traditional fear of "encirclement" of the Soviet Union, the defence of the Black Sea and the Caucasus because these areas are one of the most important industrial bases of the country. Therefore, the Turkish straits and Greek islands are important not only for the deployment of the Soviet Black Sea into the Mediterranean, but also and probably more vitally for the Soviet Union's own defence.

Thirdly, because of its geographic location, the Eastern Mediterranean has become vital in the East-West confrontation and has become the operational bridge that links the security of Western Europe with the defence of the countries of the Persian Gulf from external threats. [17]

FOOTNOTES

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12. In 1979 a new protocol agreement was signed to carry out some twenty industrial projects at a total of about eight billion dollars.

13. For Turkey's new national security concept see B. ECEVIT, "Turkey's security policies" in J. ALFORD(ed), Greece and Turkey Adversity in Alliance, op.cit. pp. 136-140, M. BOLL, "Turkey's new national security concept", Orbis, Fall 1979, pp. 609-631.
14. Christian Science Monitor 13-9-1979.
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(8)

CHALLENGES TO MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION & SECURITY
IN THE LATE 80s

International Symposium
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La Turquie, la Grèce et les Etats-Unis

Semih Vaner

Centre d'études et de recherches
internationales
(Paris)

DRAFT: NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION

Il serait beaucoup trop facile et manichéen d'imputer à l'une ou à l'autre des grandes puissances - ou aux deux à la fois - la responsabilité de la tension dangereuse créée en Méditerranée orientale par le différend gréco-turc. C'est là cependant un exercice auquel se livrent certains observateurs des relations internationales. Sans minimiser le rôle que jouent ces puissances dans l'exploitation du contentieux gréco-turc ni perdre de vue les inconvénients qui en résultent surtout pour l'une d'entre elles, il importe de s'interroger sur la nature des liens tissés par la Turquie d'une part, la Grèce de l'autre, avec les deux grandes puissances, notamment depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale et sur la place que le contentieux occupe dans les politiques étrangères de ces deux pays - surtout dans l'utilisation qui en est faite - vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis comme de l'Union soviétique. Dans le cadre de ce dernier facteur, une place devra être accordée à la perception par la Grèce et la Turquie des grandes puissances et vice-versa, en tenant compte des clivages des sociétés politiques et globales dans les pays respectifs. Une telle approche nécessite par conséquent la prise en compte d'éléments extérieurs au cadre étroit des rapports diplomatiques, comme nous y invitent les travaux récents de relations internationales (1). Il s'agirait notamment de tenter de cerner le rôle des acteurs non-étatiques en Grèce et en Turquie - en les situant dans l'espace qui leur est cédé (ou qui a été accaparé par eux-mêmes) par leurs Etats et dont il faut bien dire d'emblée qu'il est fort réduit, sans compter que ces mêmes acteurs se mettent souvent par inhibition, zèle ou conviction, au service de ceux-ci - dans la production et la diffusion de cette (ces) image(s) (2) à laquelle (ou auxquelles) oeuvrent aussi les diasporas turque et notamment grecque - puisque cette dernière est numériquement et politiquement beaucoup plus importante que la première - aux Etats-Unis. Il va sans dire que ce bref article ne peut prétendre à l'exhaustivité en la matière ; chacun des points que nous venons d'énumérer exige, en fait, des monographies minutieuses.

Temps long et péripéties : anti-occidentalisme et "occidentalisation"

Des deux pays, c'est indubitablement en Grèce que l'influence étrangère, sans parler de la domination turque, fut traditionnellement et historiquement la plus forte. La Grèce peut constituer un prototype introuvable pour les tenants des thèses dépendantistes. Le "facteur étranger" fait depuis fort longtemps, partie de la réalité mais aussi du vocabulaire politique grecs. "Tout effort pour comprendre le comportement politique grec" écrivent des analystes perspicaces de l'évolution politique hellénique "doit inclure une analyse (des) puissances qui, en de nombreuses occasions, ont avec succès protégé, influencé, contrôlé ou sauvé, bref patronné la Grèce" (3). Si certaines des initiatives et prises de position, impulsives ou calculées, cohérentes ou contradictoires d'Andréas Papandréou, en matière de relations internationales, irritent ou déconcertent aujourd'hui

non seulement la Turquie mais aussi les pays alliés de la Grèce ou un Occident habitué à se faire obéir, il importe d'y chercher, au delà du verbalisme et à côté des motivations purement internes, une fuite en avant plutôt qu'une volonté rigoureuse de délimitation du territoire, une réaction à la "xénocratie" voire une volonté rétroactive de revanche (la revanche de la "puce" ?) sur l'histoire passée ou présente, cette ingérence étant toujours prête à s'exercer. (Après avoir lourdement insulté le parlement et le gouvernement grecs, "l'Amérique est un éléphant, la Grèce une puce", s'était écrié, dans un accès de fureur le Président Johnson à l'ambassadeur grec à Washington). (4)

L'interférence étrangère en Grèce a été d'abord britannique : elle a été accueillie avec faveur car elle contribuait à l'affranchissement de la tutelle ottomane, lors de la guerre contre l'Empire, en 1821. Elle s'est perpétuée jusqu'en 1947 en s'affaiblissant entre 1923 et 1939 (5) mais en pesant souvent très lourdement sur l'orientation politique interne et externe de ce petit pays, soit directement en prenant la forme d'intervention militaire, de participation aux campagnes électorales, de la manipulation de la formation des gouvernements (6) soit indirectement, surtout dans le domaine économique qui présentait une structure très dépendante des grandes puissances. Un des exemples les plus flagrants de cette influence imposée ou intériorisée, était le fait que les premiers "partis" grecs avaient été surnommés "anglais", "français" et "russe" et leurs sièges étaient des chancelleries mêmes des Etats-protecteurs. Au moment de la guerre civile, chacun des camps avait sollicité l'intervention directe ou indirecte d'une puissance étrangère : les nationalistes celle de la Grande-Bretagne puis des Etats-Unis, les communistes celle de l'Union soviétique et de ses satellites balkaniques.(7)

Paradoxalement ce sont les motivations ayant tout d'ordre politique qui ont facilité l'implantation étrangère manifeste ou diffuse, lorsque celle-ci n'a pas été imposée par la force, en Grèce, alors que dans le cas de la Turquie qui appartient pourtant, à maints égards, à un autre univers culturel que l'occidental, ce sont les considérations idéologiques qui ont favorisé une telle pénétration. En effet, l'anti-occidentalisme (8) et une tendance tenace et bien ancrée dans la mémoire collective et le comportement grecs ; il a des racines qui vont au-delà des événements politiques de ces vingt dernières années et remonte probablement au schisme qui sépara, en 1054, Rome et Constantinople. Bien des croisades sanglantes détournées vers cette dernière, n'ont effacé le conflit entre "papistes" et orthodoxes, ni servi à la réunification des deux Eglises ; au contraire elles contribuèrent à aiguiser la haine entre les deux. "Plutôt le turban turc que la mitre romaine" disait-on à Constantinople, avant qu'elle ne tombe, en 1453, aux mains des Ottomans. L'ingérence des puissances occidentales dans la vie politique grecque d'après l'indépendance, n'a fait qu'exacerber cet anti-occidentalisme qui perdure dans ce pays, en dépit de

l'adhésion - il est vrai quelque peu à contrecœur - à la Communauté Européenne, a des ramifications dans la société civile ; il fournit aujourd'hui une base idéologique au programme nationaliste du PASOK.

Dans l'Empire Ottoman, au contraire, et surtout dans la période de décadence, l'Occident fut, aux yeux de ses élites dirigeantes, un modèle à suivre. La modernisation posée la plupart du temps en termes d'occidentalisation mimétique fut menée autoritairement, par le haut, souvent au mépris des traditions locales, dans l'indifférence, la résignation ou la colère des masses populaires, notamment à partir du Tanzimat au XIXe siècle. Elle a alors ouvert la voie à la pénétration de l'Occident et de ses normes, sur tous les plans, économique, politique et culturel. Les distorsions créées par ce mouvement, dans le sillage duquel s'inscrit, en dernière instance, le régime kényaniste qu'il serait pourtant abusif d'assimiler, n'en déplaise à ses détracteurs, à une quelconque dictature anti-populaire, puisqu'elle trouva sa légitimité dans une guerre de libération, dans la quête de l'indépendance et de la modernité (celle-ci n'étant pas toujours forcément la modernité du béton sans âme et du clinquant qu'illustrent les statues du Ghazi et le sérail de Dolmabahçe), dans son aspiration à une forme de démocratie politique, constituent un formidable dilemme que la Turquie contemporaine est loin d'avoir résolu.

Une situation commune de clientèle par rapport aux Etats-Unis

Au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale qui trouva une Grèce ruinée par l'occupation nazie et par une guerre civile dévastatrice et une Turquie qui avait conservé sa neutralité mais qui était menacée par des revendications territoriales de Staline et dont la situation économique était plus que chancelante, la proposition américaine d'assistance économique et militaire a été accueillie par les deux Etats comme une bouffée d'oxygène. La doctrine Truman, formulée en 1947 se proposait de "fournir une aide aux peuples qui luttent contre les pressions étrangères et contre les minorités qui tentent de s'imposer par la force" ; elle était particulièrement destinée à la Grèce et à la Turquie. Ces deux dernières en envoyant des corps expéditionnaires, et en payant de leur chair en Corée, en adhérant (l'une après l'autre, l'une parce que l'autre) au Pacte Atlantique en 1952, s'alignaient sur le camp occidental et s'engageaient dans une voie quasiment identique. L'attitude des Etats-Unis, illustrée par la doctrine Truman au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale, semble avoir été dictée plus par un calcul stratégique froid que par une défense de la démocratie (9). Le "succès" de "l'expérience grecque" ou plus exactement la perception de celle-ci comme tel par l'administration américaine a favorisé, aux dires de nombreux observateurs de la politique extérieure américaine, l'engagement ultérieur des Etats-Unis, en Corée, au Vietnam et au Cambodge.

Le Plan Marshall et le Programme de reconstruction européenne (European Recovery Program) ont été utilisés, par la Turquie, essentiellement pour l'importation d'équipements agricoles, par la Grèce, pour la constitution d'une flotte marchande ; ils ont contribué surtout à la création d'une classe d'affaires ou si l'on préfère d'une bourgeoisie locale, et à légitimer au plan idéologique et par le biais du "keynésianisme international", l'hégémonie américaine. (10)

La référence libérale était manifeste en Turquie comme en Grèce, surtout à partir des années 50 : faire de ces pays "de petites Amériques" était le but des classes dirigeantes ; l'un des objectifs clamés tout haut par A. Menderes était de "créer un millionnaire dans chaque quartier". Ce projet libéral approximatif, économique plus que politique (le libéralisme politique n'a jamais véritablement pris dans aucun des deux pays sans compter les intermèdes franchement autoritaires ou dictatoriaux) était lui aussi adapté aux conditions locales : en Turquie, par exemple, il a du mal à se défaire de l'étatisme, héritage kémaliste. Dans ces sociétés comme dans d'autres, les discours enflammés et les promesses généreuses tiennent lieu de programmes électoraux ; "Petite Amérique" ou "Grande Turquie" (au sens économique du terme), ce dernier slogan de S. Demirel qui faisait volontiers diffuser des photographies où on l'apercevait en compagnie du Président Johnson, ne pouvait pas ne pas avoir une certaine résonance auprès de la population ; il fut repris plus tard implicitement par T. Ozal, avec d'énormes moyens médiatiques et publicitaires et avec l'assistance de conseillers venus expressément d'Outre-Atlantique, pour la campagne électorale. Serait-il exagéré d'avancer qu'il s'agit, en l'espèce, d'une forme de réappropriation voire d'instrumentalisation du projet libéral occidental, de facture essentiellement anglo-saxonne, pour asseoir un pouvoir fortement clientéliste ? L'idéologie légitimante de croissance n'est certainement pas étrangère aux succès électoraux des divers partis de droite en Grèce et en Turquie depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale.

En même temps, l'identification des couches citadines turques et grecques, à celles des Etats-Unis prenait parfois des dimensions affectives cocasses : symbole révélateur, l'assassinat du Président Kennedy a fait verser autant de larmes à Istanbul et à Athènes qu'à San Francisco. D'un excès à l'autre : l'anti-américanisme qui a éclaté en Turquie, au moment de la crise chypriote de 1963, lorsque le président Johnson avait interdit aux dirigeants turcs d'utiliser les armes de provenance américaine, pour un éventuel débarquement dans l'île, et en Grèce, toujours au moment du rebondissement de l'affaire chypriote, cette fois-ci en 1974, devant la passivité américaine, était à la mesure du pro-américanisme qui avait prévalu auparavant. L'attitude de Washington était interprétée de part et

d'autre de l'Egée en terme de "trahison". Les approches dépendantistes sont d'autant plus appauvrissantes pour l'analyse qu'elles s'en tiennent souvent à la dimension économique de la dépendance et négligent l'aspect émotif et affectif du phénomène.

Il est certain que dans le domaine économique, les relations sont caractérisées par une asymétrie profonde au détriment des deux pays méditerranéens. De plus, leurs économies sont obérées par d'importantes dépenses militaires : la part de la défense nationale dans les budgets des Etats turc et hellénique oscille, autour des 20 %, pour atteindre certaines années, les 25 %. (11) A ce propos, il est permis de penser au regard de la politique de clientèle qu'elle mène dans cette partie du monde, que Washington ait quelque peu "entretenu", à un niveau tolérable, la tension locale entre la Grèce et la Turquie, afin de mieux écouler ses ventes d'armes, lesquelles armes ne suffisent d'ailleurs pas, selon les stratégies occidentaux, à sauver les deux armées, d'une obsolescence qu'ils jugent inquiétante (12). Tout au moins, une telle tension, même si elle n'a pas été créée artificiellement par Washington, ne fut pas sans servir ses intérêts économiques.

Certes l'armement des deux pays et essentiellement de la Turquie, clé de voute du flanc sud de l'OTAN et qui entretient la plus grande armée de l'organisation atlantique après celle des Etats-Unis, est d'une importance primordiale pour Washington. Dans les conditions qui étaient celles des années 50, la Turquie joua un rôle essentiel dans la stratégie américaine de containment (utilisation de ses aérodromes par les bombardiers chargés d'éventuelles "représailles massives", bases pour les fusées de portée intermédiaires). C'est de l'une de ces bases, celle d'Incirlik, que s'envola, fin avril 1960, l'avion militaire "U-2" qui franchit la frontière soviétique et pénétra de plus de 2000 km en URSS avant d'être abattu. Tout aussi grave que l'affaire d'U-2, était la crise de Cuba d'octobre 1962, au cours de laquelle la Turquie a servi de carte de marchandise et qui mettait en évidence à quel point ce pays était à la portée de ce que les stratégies du Pentagone appellent un "aventurisme à petite échelle" (small-scall adventurism) (13). Aujourd'hui, notamment après l'effondrement de la monarchie iranienne et l'invasion soviétique de l'Afghanistan, l'administration Reagan, à l'instar de ses prédécesseurs, considère la Turquie, comme un des éléments essentiels de sa stratégie pour contenir la poussée soviétique au Moyen-Orient, ce Moyen-Orient dont il est inutile de démontrer qu'elle est parmi les régions du monde dit "périmérique" celle qui est la plus étroitement connectée à la politique mondiale.

Du bon usage des Etats-Unis et de l'Alliance atlantique : autonomies vraies et illusoires

L'époque de l'après-guerre où, selon la boutade de Georges Papandréou, la Grèce respirait "avec deux poumons, l'un anglais, l'autre américain" est vite révolue. En fait, même au temps des colonels qui sont pourtant présentés comme des archétypes de marionnettes, la dépendance ne fut jamais totale. L'attitude récalcitrante du gouvernement hellénique face aux exigences américaines pendant la guerre israélo-arabe de 1967 (au sujet de l'utilisation de leurs bases afin de ravitailler Israël), la politique de dégagement sur le plan international du premier ministre Markézinis, le revirement (bien que superficiel) de la politique chypriote d'Athènes en faveur du président Makarios, et aux dépêns du général Grivas avaient entraîné une révision de l'appui accordé par les Etats-Unis à Papadopoulos (14) et contribué à sa chute et à son remplacement par un groupe de militaires inféodés aux Américains (ce qui démontre, si besoin en est, une fois de plus l'état de la dépendance) mais aussi à l'évolution ultérieure que l'on connaît et qui n'était peut-être pas tout-à-fait conforme aux plans et souhaits de Washington.

Dans son analyse de "la montée en puissance" du Brésil, A.C. Peixoto évoque "les stratégies qui visent à maximiser les ressources nationales" (15). Les politiques étrangères de la Turquie et de la Grèce ont été conçues, dès la fin du second conflit mondial et plus particulièrement, à partir de la décennie 1970-1980, comme des stratégies de maximisation des ressources nationales. Après une période de relation mono-axiale avec les Etats-Unis (16) la diversification sans précédent de leurs relations internationales notamment au cours des périodes 1963-1971, 1974-1980 pour la Turquie, 1974-1985 pour la Grèce découlait, en fait, de ces stratégies. Les promoteurs les plus actifs de ces redéploiements furent, B. Ecevit et A. Papandréou dans un contexte de personnalisation du pouvoir et de minimisation (surtout dans le cas grec) du rôle traditionnellement négligeable du Parlement voire du gouvernement dans les questions de politique extérieure, en dépit d'un intérêt accru manifesté par l'opinion publique pour ces dernières. Quoique d'une ampleur différente selon les conjonctures et les contraintes régionales, la diversification et le recentrage des relations extérieures de la Turquie et de la Grèce, expriment leur volonté d'acquérir une autonomie accrue par rapport au bloc auquel elles appartiennent ; elles n'ont pas pour autant remis en cause la nature de leurs politiques étrangères, structurées fondamentalement autour de leur appartenance au bloc occidental.

L'importance géo-stratégique de la Turquie mais aussi de la Grèce se passe de commentaires. Ce facteur est sans doute l'atout majeur dont disposent les deux pays dans leur stratégie d'autonomisation. Quoique différents dans leur philosophie, "le concept national de sécurité" (ulusal güvenlik kavramı) de B. Ecevit et "la nouvelle doctrine de défense" d'A. Papandréou ont certains points en commun. Le premier forgé en 1978 par le Parti républicain du peuple mais insuffisamment développé notamment après la démission du gouvernement Ecevit de H. E. Işık, ministre de la Défense et qui s'opposait à l'idée de l'installation en Turquie de rampes de lancement de missiles proposée par les Américains (17) supposait un renforcement militaire et un développement économique mené sur des bases nationales. Toutefois, la difficile conjoncture politique et économique interne et la brièveté des passages au gouvernement du P.R.P. rendait ce concept malaisé à appliquer. La "nouvelle doctrine de défense" du PASOK approuvée en 1985, implique le réalignement des forces grecques, la "menace" provenant de la Turquie étant supposée plus grande que celle que fait peser le pacte de Varsovie (18). Ces deux conceptions semblent découler d'une logique comparable : l'affirmation d'une volonté de distanciation par rapport à l'Etat protecteur et d'autonomie dans le domaine militaire.

Autre évolution perceptible aussi bien en Grèce qu'en Turquie fut, notamment à partir de la décennie 70 : la diversification des sources d'achats d'armes et surtout les efforts de création d'une industrie nationale aéronautique et d'armement, l'embargo américain ayant joué un rôle d'incitation dans ce sens, dans le cas de la Turquie. Pour Ankara, l'opération sera coûteuse au départ, mais elle devrait créer de nouveaux emplois (19). De son côté, la Grèce s'est vu proposer par un consortium de sociétés européennes, un imposant programme de compensation pour l'achat d'avions qui se traduirait par la fabrication et le montage de certaines composantes de l'appareil : un transfert de capacités de production d'avionique, de mines et d'armes antichars au profit de l'industrie hellène ; un transfert de technologies solaires et éoliennes ; l'installation de gazoducs, l'amélioration des installations de pisciculture (20). Indépendances illusoires peut-être ou troc d'une forme de dépendance contre une autre, technologique celle-là, puisque tout comme dans les cas de l'Egypte voire d'Israël, les industries militaires turque et grecque ne peuvent être que tributaires des importations de technologies, de matériels et de licences et contraintes d'avoir recours à la collaboration d'experts occidentaux.

En fait, la question de l'achat d'armes est à l'origine des déboires qu'a connus l'alliance turco-américaine après l'intervention turque à Chypre. En dépit de sa politique d'anti-internationalisation de la question chypriote qui rejoint celle d'Ankara, Washington avait décrété l'embargo sur les livraisons d'armes à la Turquie, laquelle avait riposté en plaçant sous son commandement

les bases américaines situées sur son territoire. La reprise des ventes d'armes, en 1978, provoqua de vives réactions grecques. Un statut temporaire fut accordé aux bases américaines, statut rendu définitif par l'accord américano-turc du 9 janvier 1980. D'une manière générale un certain virage entrepris par la politique extérieure turque durant les deux dernières décennies est intervenu dans un contexte spécifique lié aux mutations sociales et intellectuelles de la société turque. L'opinion publique se sentant concernée par la politique extérieure s'élargit de plus en plus. Sortant des cadres restreints des groupes politiques considérés jusque-là, elle s'est étendue à d'autres couches de la population, en tête desquelles viennent l'intelligentsia et la jeunesse étudiante.

Vu de Grèce, "le sentiment d'infériorité sur les plans économique et militaire et de supériorité dans le domaine intellectuel suscite une sorte d'attraction-répulsion vis-à-vis des Américains" constate un spécialiste des affaires grecques. "Mais les rapports entre les deux relèvent désormais de ce "syndrome conjugal" qui porte les époux à se quereller, alors qu'ils savent pertinemment qu'aucun d'entre eux ne prendra le large" (21). Or "les Grecs ne se sont jamais mieux affirmés par eux-mêmes que quand ils se laissèrent convoiter par le grand large" écrit joliment K. Zouraris (22).

En rejetant "le rattachement du pays au convoi de l'une ou l'autre des deux super-puissances" qui serait "une position dénuée d'historicité et aventuriste", le PASOK entend pratiquer "la valorisation avancée et audacieuse de l'ensemble du réseau des contradictions dans le cadre d'une politique extérieure polydynamique et pluri-dimensionnelle sans préjugés" qui est "la seule issue viable, radicale et réaliste" (23). D'après ce mouvement et son leader qui jugent les rapports de force en termes d'impérialisme/anti-impérialisme et de centre/périphérie, la Grèce est un pays à la périphérie du capitalisme, condamné à être l'objet de l'exploitation des Etats capitalistes établis (24). Washington est qualifiée de "métropole de l'impérialisme", la Turquie, objet d'ostracisme, étant "sous-impérialiste" (25).

L'épouvantail brandi par la Grèce de la "menace turque" n'est probablement pas l'indice d'une turcophobie paranoïaque (si c'en est une, encore faudrait-il expliquer le pourquoi), à moins qu'on ne soupçonne irrévérencieusement de larges franges de la société grecque d'être atteintes du même mal, tant cette crainte semble répondre à un consensus généralisé. Toutefois, il n'est pas interdit de penser que la supposée "menace" est utilisée, plus ou moins sciemment, par la classe politique grecque comme une ressource de maximisation de l'autonomie, comme un instrument afin de

se dégager de la tutelle pesante des Etats-Unis et de l'OTAN, et de la justification de "rapprochement" avec l'Est, le "nationalisme bien pensant" (ethnikophron) (26) du PASOK venant conforter voire légitimer cette stratégie, la Turquie servant, en l'occurrence et si l'on peut dire de ... Tête de Turc. Un plus grand désengagement de la Grèce par rapport aux Etats-Unis ne va d'ailleurs pas sans risques, aussi bien pour Athènes que pour Ankara, pour la simple raison qu'il impliquerait forcément un plus grand rapprochement des Etats-Unis et de la Turquie. "Cette quadrature de cercle" constate à ce propos un commentateur "rend d'autant plus nécessaires les compensations symboliques, la fuite en avant rhétorique dans l'anti-américanisme et la dramatisation de tout incident ou pseudo-incident avec la Turquie" (27). La place plutôt défavorable de ce dernier pays dans l'imagerie occidentale (pays musulman, héritière d'un Empire qui harcelait l'Occident et qui le maintenait sur sa défensive, son apparence plus ou moins justifiée d'autoritarisme, etc.) semble fournir à la stratégie d'Athènes une certaine base vis-à-vis de l'Occident. Il importe de ne pas oublier enfin que certains milieux turcs islamistes prêts à lever l'étandard du djihad ou ultra-nationalistes - bien que minoritaires -, estiment que la Turquie a "bradé" les îles égéennes à la Grèce. Cela n'est pas de nature à apaiser les inquiétudes helléniques. Les Turcs ne manquent d'ailleurs pas de rétorquer que la Megali Idea, ayant à leurs yeux des adeptes auprès des Grecs irrédentistes, y compris dans certains secteurs de l'armée, (mais dont il faut souligner qu'elle est moins vivace chez la jeune génération grecque), vise toujours à "reconquérir Constantinople" et la côte égéenne de l'Anatolie.

Dans la lutte pour l'affirmation d'une autonomie, la marge de manœuvre est généralement étroite et si le double voire les multiples langages d'A. Papandréou (vers les Etats-Unis, la Communauté Européenne, l'Est, le Tiers-Monde, l'opinion publique grecque, l'appareil du PASOK) qui nécessitent un décryptage attentif, ont le mérite de dérouter les adversaires ou alliés, ils n'obtiennent pas toujours les résultats escomptés. (On voulait les Etats-Unis aux géométries, mais on signe avec eux un nouvel accord sur les bases ... dont les deux versions, en anglais et en grec, seraient différentes (28), et sur lequel plane une ambiguïté : l'accord sera dénoncé en 1988 selon les Grecs, il est reconductible selon les Américains).

Du côté turc, le double code existe assurément, surtout chez S. Demirel, mais un certain sang-froid et habileté diplomatique hérités de l'Empire, contrastent singulièrement avec ce qu'on a appelé la "diplomatie du mégaphone" du voisin. Le silence semble être parfois le langage diplomatique préféré d'Ankara dans ses rapports avec la Grèce, les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique.

Last but not least, la présence aux Etats-Unis d'une diaspora de près de deux millions de Grecs (29) devenus citoyens américains - 450 000 dans la seule ville de New York (30) - et qui sont en liaison constante avec leurs familles demeurées dans la mère patrie, fournit à Athènes un moyen d'influencer le processus décisionnel politique américain. L'imbroglie chypriote et les difficultés internes de la Turquie procurent aux puissants "lobbies" gréco-américains d'excellents arguments quant au débat sur la nécessité d'une aide militaire et financière à Ankara. Il est à noter toutefois que la diaspora grecque aux Etats-Unis n'est pas totalement monolithique : la rencontre à Washington en mars 1985 entre T. Ozal et Mgr Iakovos, le chef spirituel de l'Eglise orthodoxe grecque des Etats-Unis (qui entretient forcément des liens avec le patriarchat d'Istanbul) et certains Grecs américains influents (notamment des responsables de l'organisation AHOPA) (31) démontre assez qu'une partie de cette diaspora n'est pas complètement imperméable aux thèses d'Ankara.

Les rapports de la Turquie et de la Grèce avec les Etats-Unis - dont on ne peut nier le caractère asymétrique - et l'URSS et l'usage qu'elles font de leur contentieux, dans leurs politiques aussi bien américaine que soviétique, confirment l'idée suivant laquelle les déterminations internationales n'agissent pas seulement comme des contraintes mais également quelques fois comme des ressources. Soucieux d'atténuer leur position plus ou moins subordonnée dans le système international et de négocier au plus haut prix leur lien avec les Etats-Unis et leur appartenance à l'Alliance Atlantique, la Turquie et la Grèce s'efforcent notamment depuis le choc chypriote de secouer le carcan de la dépendance. En effet, la crise chypriote a eu un rôle catalyseur : elle est à l'origine de la restructuration par la Grèce et par la Turquie de leurs rapports avec les Etats-Unis et avec l'URSS.

Enfin, le facteur "turc" dans la politique étrangère de la Grèce et plus particulièrement dans sa politique envers les deux Grands occupe incontestablement une place plus importante que le facteur "grec" dans la politique d'Ankara vis-à-vis des mêmes Grands. Les redéploiements subséquents à l'affaire chypriote une fois la part de la rhétorique faite, et les efforts des deux pays afin de neutraliser l'URSS voire de recourir plus ou moins explicitement à son arbitrage politique, ne remettent pas en cause l'appartenance au camp occidental de la Turquie et de la Grèce qui ont, toutes deux besoin de parapluie américain pour assurer leur sécurité. La place des deux pays dans les méga-systèmes que sont les politiques extérieures des deux super-puissances est, somme toute, comparable, en dépit des préférences qui peuvent être marquées vers l'un d'entre eux.

NOTE S

Mme Yvette Benusiglio a eu l'amabilité de lire ce texte et de faire des suggestions.

- (1) Voir entre autres Z. Laïdi (sous la direction de), L'URSS vue du Tiers-Monde, Paris, Karthala, 1984; J.L. Domenach et Z. Laïdi, "Les relations cardinales : Réflexions sur le marché idéologique international", Esprit, novembre 1985, pp. 55-64 ; divers travaux présentés aux journées d'études des 28 et 29 avril 1986, du Centre d'études et de recherches internationales sur les "relations cardinales" ; le numéro de Relations internationales (n° 41, printemps 1955) consacré aux "vingt ans d'histoire des relations internationales" et plus particulièrement l'article de P. Milza, "Mentalités collectives et relations internationales" (p. 93-109) ; A. R. Zolberg, "L'influence des facteurs 'externes' sur l'ordre politique interne" in J. Leca et M. Grawitz (sous la direction de), Traité de science politique, Paris, P.U.F., 1985, p. 567-598.
- (2) Voir à propos de l'image et plus particulièrement de celle de l'URSS en Amérique latine, l'effort de systématisation d'A.C. Peixoto qui dégage quatre éléments constitutifs ; à savoir l'objectivité (historicité des rapports, proximité géographique, courants migratoires, rapports diplomatiques), l'intensité (qui nécessite la prise en compte d'un nombre accru de variables), la qualité (système politique, performances économiques, position dans le système international) et la stabilité (les changements dans l'environnement régional ou global de même que les mutations politiques économiques ou stratégiques intervenues dans un pays donné), "L'image de l'URSS en Amérique latine". Le cas du Brésil et de l'Argentine" in Z. Laïdi (sous la direction de), L'URSS vue du Tiers-Monde, op. cit., p. 171-185.
- (3) T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropoulos, M.J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek politics : an historical perspective, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1976, p. 9, cité par P.E. Dimitras, "La Grèce en quête d'une politique indépendante", Revue française de science politique, février 1983, p. 110.
- (4) Rapporté par L.S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 307.
- (5) Cf. P. Dimitras, art. cité., p. 110 qui cite T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropoulos, H.J. Psomiades, op. cit., p. 148-151.
- (6) Cf. T.A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey. The Troubled Triangle, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983, p. 18.

- (7) Cf. P.E. Dimitras, art. cité., p. 114.
- (8) Voir à un propos, P. Dimitras, "L'anti-occidentalisme grec", Esprit, juin 1984, p. 123-130 et J.C. Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Hiver 1984/85, passim.
- (9) Cf. L.S. Wittner, op. cit., p. 136 et P. Nikiphorou, "Trente ans de politique américaine en Grèce", Le Monde diplomatique, mai 1974.
- (10) Cf. Ç. Keyder, "The American Recovery of Southern Europe : Aid and Hegemony", Rapport présenté au colloque sur "The Political Economy of Southern Europe", Paris, 7-8 juin 1983, miméo.
- (11) La Turquie et la Grèce figurent aux premiers rangs des meilleurs acheteurs du matériel militaire américain. Voir The New York Times, 12 octobre et 18 novembre 1984 ; The Washington Post, 15 novembre 1984 et Aviation week and Space Technology, 14 mai 1984, p. 26. Cité par M. T. Klare, "Reprise des ventes d'armes aux pays du Tiers-Monde", Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 1985.
- (12) Voir J. Chipman, "Flanc sud de l'OTAN : sur-exposé et sous-protégé", Politique internationale, n° 30, hiver 1985-1986, p. 285-296.
- (13) B.J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, Trading the Jupiters in Turkey ?" Political Science Quarterly, vol. 95, n° 1, printemps 1980, p. 101.
- (14) Cf. P. Nikiphorou, art. cité.
- (15) "La montée en puissance du Brésil : concepts et réalités", Revue française de science politique, 30(2), avril 1980, p. 329-330. A ce propos, voir sur la Turquie l'article de J.F. Bayart, "La politique extérieure de la Turquie : les espérances déçues", Revue française de science politique, 31(5-6), octobre-décembre 1981, p. 861-889.
- (16) Cf. C. Rozakis, "La politique étrangère grecque - 1974-1985. Modernisation et rôle international d'un petit Etat", Les Temps modernes (La Grèce en mouvement), décembre 1985, n° 473, p. 865.
- (17) Cf. Le Monde, 17 janvier 1979.
- (18) Cf. Rapport intérimaire de la sous-commission sur la région Sud (par T. Frinking), Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord, Commission politique, octobre 1985, miméo , p. 9.

- (19) Cf. Le Monde, 9 septembre 1983.
- (20) Voir G. Aronson, "Quand le Tiers-Monde devient partie prenante dans la fabrication et le commerce des armements", Le Monde diplomatique, mars 1985, p. 11.
- (21) M. Marceau, "Athènes : scènes de ménage sans vrai désir de divorce", Le Monde, 24-25 juillet 1983.
- (22) "De la farce ataraxique", Les Temps modernes, (La Grèce en mouvement), décembre 1985, n° 473, p. 1011.
- (23) "Larges extraits de l'allocution prononcée par le premier ministre et président du PASOK au 1er Congrès du PASOK", Athens News Agency, 10 mai 1984, p. 5.
- (24) Cf. C. Rozakis, art. cité., p. 875.
- (25) Cf. T. A. Couloumbis et J.O. Iatrides, Greek American Relations. A critical Review, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1980, p. 37.
- (26) P. Linardos, "Vers une relève politique en Grèce", Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 1981.
- (27) C. Tréan, "Le socialisme grec à l'épreuve : les Etats-Unis, alliés nécessaires et maudits", Le Monde, 9 mai 1984.
- (28) Voir Le Monde, 28 octobre 1985.
- (29) T. A. Couloumbis cite les chiffres de 1,25 millions pour les Grecs et de 54 000 pour les Turcs. The United States, Greece and Turkey, op. cit., p. 108.
- (30) International Herald Tribune, 16 mars 1984.
- (31) Voir Le Monde, 29 mars 1985 et la presse turque de l'époque.