


"PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE, ITALY AND TURKEY"
IAI, Castelgandolfo, 20-22/XII/1986

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- (3) Coufoudakis, Van/Valinakis, Yannis G.: "The evolution of Greece's defense strategy in relation to NATO contingencies"
- (4) Coulombis, Theodore A./Constas, Dimitris: "Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Italian-Greek-Turkish triangle"
- (5) Cremasco, Maurizio: "Implications of new military technologies and doctrines for the evolution of national defense strategies in relation to NATO"
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- (12) Silvestri, Stefano: "Political factors affecting cooperation between Italy, Greece and Turkey"
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International Seminar

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION
BETWEEN GREECE, ITALY AND TURKEY

Castelgandolfo, 20-22 December 1986

IAFE-ENI - Villa Montecucco
Via Bruno Buozzi 14

PROGRAMME

- Saturday, 20 December Arrival of participants
- 20.00 Dinner
- Sunday, 21 December
- 9.00 Session I
- "Political factors affecting cooperation between
 Greece, Italy and Turkey"
 Papers by: - Stefano Silvestri, IAI
 - Dimitris Conostas, Pantios School of
 Political Sciences and Theodore
 Coulombis, Thessaloniki University
 - Seyfi Tashan, Foreign Policy Institute
- 11.00 Coffee Break
- 11.15 Session II
- "Prospects and problems of economic cooperation
 between Greece, Italy and Turkey"
 Papers by: - Giacomo Luciani, IAI
 - Tugrul Cubukou and Erdal Turkkan,
 Hacettepe University
 - Argiris Fatouros, Thessaloniki Uni-
 versity and Anastasios Yannitsis,
 Athens University
- 13.00 Lunch

- 15.00 Session III
- "National perceptions of changing strategic patterns
in the Eastern Mediterranean"
- Papers by: - Roberto Aliboni, IAI
 - Christos Rozakis, Pantis School of
 Political Sciences and Thanos Veremis,
 Athens University
 - Ali Karaosmanoglu, Foreign Policy
 Institute
- 16.45 Coffee Break
- 17.00 Session IV
- "Implications of new military technologies and
doctrines for the evolution of national defence
strategies in relation to NATO"
- Papers by: - Maurizio Cremasco, IAI
 - Ihsan Gurkan, Istanbul University
 - V. Coufoudakis, Indiana University
 and John Valinakis, Thrace University
- 20.00 Dinner
- Monday, 22 December
- 9.00-11.00 Conclusions.
- 12.00 Lunch

Working language of the seminar is English.

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Roberto ALIBONI	Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Antonio ARMELLINI	Counsellor, International Affairs, Ministry of Transport, Rome
Dimitris CONSTAS	Vice-Rector and Chairman, Department of International Relations, Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens
Van COUFOUDAKIS	Department of Political Science, Indiana University
Theodore COULOUMBIS	Thessaloniki University
Maurizio CREMAŠCO	Senior Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Tugrul CUBUKCU	Hacettepe University, Ankara
Alexander CUDSI	Department of International Relations, Panteios School of Political Sciences, Athens
Anton Giulio DE ROBERTIS	Institute of Modern and Contemporary History, Faculty of Law, University of Bari
Argiris FATOUROS	Thessaloniki University
Ihsan GURKAN	Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University
Carlo JEAN	Brigadier General, Defence General Staff, Rome
Ali KARAOSMANOGLU	Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara
Giacomo LUCIANI	Senior Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Lucio LUSSU	Director, External Relations, ENI, Rome
Cesare MERLINI	President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Osman OKYAR	Hacettepe University
Ersin ONULDURAN	Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University
Huseyin PAZARCI	Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University

Giulio QUERINI	Professor of Economics, University of Cassino
Eberhard RHEIN	Head, Directorate Mediterranean, Near and Middle East, Directorate-General External Relations, EC Commission, Brussels
Natalino RONZITTI	Director, Institute of International Law, University of Pisa
Christos ROZAKIS	Department of International Institutions, Pantios School of Political Sciences, Athens
Robert RUDNEY	Department of Political Sciences, Catholic University of Leuven
Dietrich SCHLEGEL	Chief Editor, South-East European Section, "Deutsche Welle", Cologne
Stefano SILVESTRI	Vice President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Giuseppe STANO	Journalist, Brussels
Udo STEINBACH	Director, Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg
Seyfi TASHAN	Director, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara
Charalambos TSARDARIDIS	Department of International Relations, Pantios School of Political Sciences, Athens
Lucas TSOUKALIS	St. Anthony's College, Oxford University
Ilter TURAN	Istanbul University
Erdal TURKKAN	Hacettepe University, Ankara
Haluk ULMAN	Marmara University, Istanbul
John VALINAKIS	Assistant Professor, University of Thrace
Semih VANER	Centre d'Etude et de Recherche Internationale, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris
Thanos VEREMIS	Department of Political Science, University of Athens
Anastasios YANNITSIS	Assistant Professor, University of Athens
Ciro E. ZOPPO	Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles

Observers:

Gianfranco GIRO	Director, Office for Italy of the EC Commission, Rome
Andrea MANZELLA	Counsellor, Ministry of Defence, Rome
Peter SCHLAFFER	Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Rome
Georges TSOUYOPOULOS	Director, Office of the EC Commission, Athens

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GREECE, ITALY AND TURKEY: FACING NEW THREATS
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

by Roberto ALIBONI

paper presented at the International Seminar
"Prospects and Problems of Cooperation Between
Greece, Italy and Turkey"

Villa Montecucco, Castelgandolfo, 20-22 December 1986

Changes in the Eastern Mediterranean picture

The decline of the Ottoman Empire initiated a period of unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as in other parts of its territory, which since then has never stopped. On the other hand, decolonization in that region did not turn out to be less difficult than elsewhere. Arab nationalism, first, and then the emergence of Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel, after the Second World War, have brought about one of the most complicated and dangerous conflicts of present international relations. After the Second Arab-Israeli War in 1956, the United States has replaced the British and other European powers, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. US security requirements within the frame of East-West confrontation in the Middle Eastern area and the emergence of a special US-Israel relationship coalesced very early in preventing the United States from establishing a policy of steady cooperation with the Arab nations. After the Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967, an important group of Arab States opted for a new strategy of close alliance with the United States, in order to obtain from Israel the settlement which had proved unattainable on the battlefield. This new policy has brought about peace between Israel and Egypt, the most important event in the Middle East since the establishment of the Israeli State. It has failed, however, to provide a solution for the Palestinian issue as well, and this on at least two good occasions: first within the frame of the autonomy negotiations issued from the Camp David Agreements, and secondly when the so called "Reagan Plan" was put forward but never followed up. This failure has prevented peace from becoming a more comprehensive and stable arrangement in the region. Today, many important Arab States are allied with the United States bilaterally and on the whole the United States can be considered the most influential of the two Superpowers in the region. However, the failure of the United States to come to terms with the Palestinian issue and related Arab expectations has been tremendously resented by the Arab people. They often consider the United States as being mainly responsible for their frustrations and lack of success and therefore as their main enemy. This fact has opened the way to the influence of Islamic nationalism blowing from Teheran and is putting the moderate Arab regimes in grave danger. As a

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consequence of these developments the United States and the Western Alliance are dealing with Arab allies that are as numerous as they are weak and with a region which is as strategically important as it is politically unstable.

It must be pointed out, however, that presently the Palestinian issue is playing a role in the region which is not of primary importance, in the sense that its eventual solution would no longer be sufficient to bring stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is because events in the surrounding regions at the end of the seventies have changed security perceptions more than is usually understood.

As is well known, it has been the chain of new crises in Eastern Africa and in Central Asia at the end of the seventies that has caused this change in security perceptions, both from the point of view of the global and regional powers. In Eastern Africa the defeat of the Arab coalition in the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia had strengthened the presence and influence of the Soviet Union in the region. On the other hand, in Central Asia the unexpected collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the violent anti-American and anti-Western attitudes assumed by the Iranian revolutionary regime with the painful sequence of the seizure of the American hostages, all contributed towards ^{The} creation of a deep feeling of insecurity and change in all the actors involved in the Eastern Mediterranean scenario.

The process of change in security perceptions related to the Eastern Mediterranean is probably still in progress. In a number of respects mistaken policies have been drawn from such a process. I will first consider changes in security perceptions and then proceed to evaluate policies.

New security perceptions

From the point of view of the Western countries threat perceptions related to the region have changed mainly for three reasons.

First, new kinds of threats are emerging within the region. What is new in these threats is the fact that they seem to act independently from any East-West background and at the same time appear to be consciously directed against the West. Before the end of the seventies the Eastern Mediterranean countries could threaten the Western countries by supporting the Soviet Union against the Southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. It was therefore only an indirect threat related to the East-West dimension. Today there are forces and powers in the Eastern Mediterranean which appear willing to have a direct confrontation with the Western countries. Furthermore, they are apparently looking for such a confrontation because of autonomous motives of hostility and not because they would like to take advantage of the Superpowers' competition. Quite reasonably, this is considered by the Western powers as a threat which may be more or less effective but which, in any case, is new and adds to the old, traditional Soviet and/or East-West threats.

Second, these new threats against the Western countries are also directed against their allies in the region, that is the moderate Arab States. The assassination of Sadat, although committed by a national opponent, - was correctly perceived as a blow to the Western coalition in its widest

expression, that is including the Third World's allies to the West. Consequently, the new threat which is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a threat to the West in its most comprehensive notion, must be considered as an enlarged threat, not different in its nature from the Soviet one, though certainly much less effective than the latter.

Third, despite the fact that in principle this enlarged threat is not linked to the USSR and the East-West dimension, it could easily combine with both of them and become more dangerous than the well known alignments of Third World countries with the Soviet Union and its allies in order to make their national goals more attainable.

In a parallel move the threat perception of the moderate Arab countries of the region has also undergone a change. This change has presumably been even more sweeping than that of the Western countries. Here again one can point out three motives for this change.

First, the Iranian revolution, besides the role it has assumed internationally, has emerged as a fearful threat to the stability of almost all the Arab regimes. To put it very briefly, this is due to the fact that the brand of nationalism adopted by Iran's shi'ite revolution is radically different from other forms of nationalism in the region. Despite the secular or religious character of their constitutions, and regardless of the competitive or cooperative attitude they may adopt towards Western countries, modern states in the Eastern Mediterranean take part into the international system with the aim of becoming integrated in it. They try to assert themselves as nations, but they do so by adopting Western success indicators. As assertive as any other brand of nationalism, Islamic -or Shi'ite- nationalism is by contrast entirely antagonistic towards the West and towards the leadership the latter maintains on the international system. It is because of this basically antagonistic character that Islamic nationalism constitutes the core of the new kind of threat the Western countries are perceiving in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, because of its antagonistic character, it is considered by the West to be a more evasive threat than that coming from traditional Middle Eastern nationalism. Finally, its basic hostility to the Western culture involves in its deadly hostility, all secular as well as religious regimes of the region so long as these regimes are committed to modernization along Western paths.

This Islamic antagonism is active in its character. As is well known, an important segment of the Iranian revolutionary leadership is convinced that to export Islamic nationalism is part of the revolutionary duties and acts accordingly. As a matter of fact, Iran is less effectively equipped to export its revolution than is usually believed. However, the important point is that, even if Iran were not willing nor sufficiently equipped to export revolution, the people in the region are in any case ready to receive its revolutionary message and it is here that the threat to regimes' stability principally lies. In many Eastern Mediterranean countries, regimes have often failed to deliver true modernization, political democracy, international prestige and more acceptable conditions of life. For this reason people are getting frustrated, rebuffing Westernization and looking towards Islam as the sound basis for implementing their expectations. Islamic nationalism as an ideology is no less dangerous to the stability of the Arab allies than a real war.

Second, as a consequence of the spreading of Islamic nationalism in the region, Arab regimes' perceptions of security in relation to their alliances with Western countries have also changed. Since Islamic nationalism deadly opposes Arab regimes on the grounds of their "unfaithful" alliance with the West, a condition for their security and stability presently lies in keeping more or less aloof from Western alliances. This has not brought about a break with Western alliances, but in many cases, especially with the Arab Gulf countries, they have been downgraded. In conclusion, after being a factor of security for many Eastern Mediterranean countries Western alliances are becoming more and more a factor of insecurity.

Third, it must be pointed out that the rearrangement of security priorities has gone even beyond that. Islamic nationalism has also changed security perceptions related to Israel and the East-West dimension. Today, these threats are much less important for the Eastern Mediterranean countries than Islamic nationalism itself. By the way this has also contributed to the downgrading of Western alliances. Security extended by the alliances with the United States and other Western countries used to be based on two grounds: first, it was a protection against the Israeli threat (in the sense that the United States would never permit Israel to go too far in case of war with the Arab allies); secondly, it was a form of protection against Soviet and related Communist domestic threats. Since today these are no longer the most important threats, Western alliances appear to be less helpful than in the past. More generally, from the point of view of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, there is a bad correlation between threats and the Western attitude to countering them. In particular, Western and Arab patterns of security perceptions in relation to the Soviet Union seem to diverge seriously.

Western policies towards the Eastern Mediterranean

In the Western countries this new set of security perceptions related to the regions ranging from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia and different African areas (more or less what Brzezinski had named "arc of crises"), has given rise to the debate on the Out-of-NATO area operations and to a number of multilateral and bilateral interventions, such as that of the two Interposition Forces in Lebanon, the French presence in Chad, the mission of the mine-sweepers in the Red Sea, etc. Perhaps more intensely, it has given rise to the Western debate on what has been called "international" terrorism and to a considerable body of policies and inter-State security cooperation agreements destined to counter terrorist operations and their networks. These policies have proved far from being successful. The most important operation, the one in Lebanon, failed ignominiously, not only because the Western allied forces were obliged to withdraw under the pressure of the Islamic nationalists but also because at the end of the mission nobody could explain its rationale and its goals on the grounds of a consistent Middle Eastern policy. Today, while the Palestinian issue remains unsolved despite the emergence of favourable conditions during 1985, both Arab and European allies are subjected to terrorism and in the Eastern Mediterranean countries, instability and violence continue to prevail hopelessly. One has to argue that Western policies are somewhat mistaken.

The sequence of policies pursued by the Western countries, particularly by the United States, can be described as follows. First, the combination of events in Afghanistan and Iran, within the debate on the decline of the American power which characterized Carter's presidency, was interpreted in the United States as a new threat to the East-West dimension. As a consequence the United States were driven to emphasize global security requirements in the area, to call for the ranks of the existing alliances against Soviet penetration to be closed and to urge for the enhancement of their direct military presence. Second, while the Americans were calling for a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean allies were moving in the opposite direction because of the priority they assigned to emerging regional threats. After the confused and contradictory interlude of the "Reagan Plan" and the intervention in Lebanon, the (third) stage is represented by the emphasis suddenly placed on "international" terrorism and the role of Libya. It is not very clear whether the American Administration identifies terrorism as a global or regional threat. Generally speaking, the United States conclusion seems to be that terrorism is putting its international presence in danger. In this sense terrorism is seen as a factor having an impact on the global level and hence requiring global rather than regional responses. In other words, despite the fact that in the Eastern Mediterranean one can note a shift in the American threat perception from the USSR to "international terrorism", the fact remains that the region is subjected to global threats.

There are two main errors in this set of policies. First, the Western countries cannot continue to neglect the fundamental divergence in threat preceptions between themselves and their regional allies. Too close a relationship with the West and its strategic interests has the effect of exposing moderate Arab regimes to Islamic nationalism, domestically and abroad. Insisting on giving our Arab allies what they are obliged to consider today as "deadly kisses" is a policy of destabilization.

Second, the Western countries must give a more realistic analysis of terrorism. Identifying terrorism as a global threat and qualifying it as an "international" factor is an arbitrary intellectual unification of events that are similar in their outward manifestation but prompted by very different causes. It amounts to defining terrorism as an actor, more or less like the USSR or Communism, whereas it is a state of affairs. Such a simplification prevents Western countries from becoming aware of causes and intervening on them with adequate policies. What is important today is the consciousness that the crucial source of terrorism is to be found in the spreading of Islamic nationalism from Teheran. Despite the existence of more or less old varieties of terrorism related to different political crises and entities, it is the upsurge of Islamism and its brand of nationalism which is fuelling terrorism today, domestically and internationally. The core of present terrorism, wherever it comes from, lies within the powerful ideological frame provided by Teheran. This is not to say that Teheran is directly responsible for all the acts of terrorism around the Mediterranean. However, the Islamic nationalism preached by Teheran is the factor which catalyses regional frustration and translates it into action. In this sense, Islamic nationalism is the factor which unifies events as different as the Palestinian struggle, state incentives to terrorism and Hezbollah's terrorism in Lebanon. As a consequence, the threat should be linked rather to Islamic nationalism than to terrorism.

In conclusion, the military struggle presently waged by the United States and the Western countries against terrorism, such as that against Libya, is not helpful. Terrorism is the wrong target: it is like the shadow on the wall of the Platonian myth of the cavern. There are political roots to terrorism and this is the issue that the West must address. Islamic nationalism is today the most important political factor for the continued unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, though poor economic management and absence of democracies are certainly no less responsible for what is happening there. What is needed is a regional policy towards Iran, Islamic nationalism and the Middle East with its diverse crises, with the aim of dealing with the political roots of terrorism, unrest and frustration. Western countries are simply lacking this policy.

Greece, Italy and Turkey: contributing to Western interests

However, if one considers Western policies towards Eastern Mediterranean countries more closely, there are differences between the United States and the European countries which cannot go unnoticed. First, European countries are fully aware of the importance of local security perceptions and maybe they realize better than the Americans the links between Islamic nationalism, Arab stability and their domestic Islamic opposition. Second, the European evaluation of terrorism is definitely more cautious and differentiated than that of the United States' Administration.

These different European perceptions have not found their outlet, however. The European allies have responded consistently and substantially to the American call for participation in the Out-of-NATO operations, from Sinai to Lebanon and the Red Sea. Their participation, however, has been politically passive. Influence gained by the Europeans thanks to their participation into Out-of-NATO operations has remained unexploited. Any attempt to present and discuss a European point of view within the Alliance, as different as it may be, is still lacking. This is mainly due to the Europe's inability to get coordinated within their own institutions or "clubs", in the European Communities as well as in the NATO. Criticisms coming up from European different perceptions, as well-founded as they may be, have never been translated into a European posture. The same is true for terrorism. In this case, too, security cooperation has been more or less activated among the various members of the Alliance but almost all the European governments do not share the American analysis of terrorism as an "international" actor. Nevertheless they have given up any attempt to coordinate their point of view within Western institutions and convince the United States to come to terms with Middle Eastern realities, as the Europeans perceive them.

^{within US}
Their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean continues to be of the utmost importance for the Western allies. The dangers of Soviet penetration into the Gulf area and the Eastern Mediterranean feared by the USA and the Western countries after Afghanistan's invasion may have proved exaggerated. The true danger of instability today is the penetration of Islamic nationalism. This instability, however, is also a grave danger for the stability of the East-West relationship and for the interests of the Western countries, particularly the European countries. As a consequence, the stabilization of the moderate Arab regimes and a policy aimed at supporting a moderate evolution inside the Iranian leadership are vital goals and a coordinated European

contribution in this sense appears to be crucial. Europeans cannot keep on complaining about American policies and at the same time abstain from proposing any feasible, coordinated policy of their own.

Greece, Italy and Turkey, as countries which face the Eastern Mediterranean basin, may play a special role within the Alliance in order to contribute to the development of stabilization policies in the Middle East. The three countries are on the way to signing security agreements against terrorism. However, the most important link among them seems to be the fact that their perceptions in the face of the new threats emerging within the region are closer than perceptions prevailing in other European countries. Similarities in analysis and perceptions should favour cooperation between Greece, Italy and Turkey in policy making.

This cooperation should be devoted to preparing and presenting policies in the Western and European institutions. Sometimes the emergence of a Southern European point of view within these institutions has given way to divisions among Western and European partners. This has been particularly true within the European Political Cooperation, where often there is no search for shared policies but crude statements of immutable national postures. In order to become acceptable, Southern European points of view must be prepared as cooperative policies. This requires in turn a special cooperation among Southern European countries and, as far as the Eastern Mediterranean countries are concerned, among Greece, Italy and Turkey.

The three countries may be able to develop a set of cooperative relations in fields as different as culture, trade, security, etc. Their involvement in the European Communities, though presently with different statuses, is definitely an instrument of the utmost importance in order to increase relations with the Eastern Mediterranean countries. What is important is not so much the fact that, because of their geographical proximity and the opportunities offered by the European Communities, these relations will probably be more important than those eventually developed by other countries. The important point is that these relations, as important as they may be, would not have the same destabilizing effect today that the American presence is having on Middle Eastern people under the effect of Islamic pressure. For an irony of our history, between the "great satan" and the "little satan" (- the United States and Israel -) the former colonial powers on the European continent are perhaps somewhat despised for their weakness but more acceptable to former subjected people.

Another important aspect of the cooperation between Greece, Italy and Turkey may be found on military grounds. Exercises such as that of 1979 should become routine cooperation, because if these countries are willing to successfully propose policies of Mediterranean stabilization to their allies, they must be prepared to intervene in Out-of-NATO area operations. It is perhaps more important that their capacity should act as a deterrent and as an assurance in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean countries' different perceptions.

A special problem is Turkey's "front-line" position. This country has multiplied its cultural and economic relations with the Islamic countries in the last years. Greece and Italy have also enlarged their relations with the Arab countries within the Mediterranean. The tightening of relations with the

Islamic world is definitely an important aspect of the stabilization policy which has been advocated in this paper. However, in the case of Turkey, this may pose some problems of domestic stability. The Turkish government is certainly fully able to face any threat coming from Islamic integralism and associated nationalism. However, its continued cooperation with the Western institution and its deeper integration in them may be an important element for a more effective policy towards the stabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean.

THE EVOLUTION OF GREECE'S DEFENSE STRATEGY IN
RELATION TO NATO CONTINGENCIES *

VAN COUFOUDAKIS
Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne

YANNIS G. VALINAKIS
University of Thrace

Greece's role in NATO has evolved in recent years in the context of political changes at the regional level and new military technologies and doctrines.

The Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea, with their long history,¹ have been the object of several studies dealing with their strategic, political, economic, social, and cultural heritage. The task of this article is more modest.² It will examine the importance of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean in the defense of the West, with particular emphasis on the role of Greece in NATO Southern flank defense. Such an analysis must recognize from the start that a country's or a region's strategic significance is not static. It is affected by the evolution of military technology and the impact of such changes on defense doctrine; the constantly changing international, regional and local political environment; how influential states assess a region's strategic value and define policies to account for their strategic interests; and finally, the willingness and ability of the states in that region to utilize their strategic assets to advance their national interests.

Because of its geographic location, the Eastern Mediterranean is the land, sea, and airbridge between three continents.³ Coupled with the economic and strategic significance for the West of the energy sources in the Persian Gulf, the two regions form a common conflict system. The strategic

* paper presented at the International Seminar
"Prospects and Problems of Cooperation Between
Greece, Italy and Turkey"

interdependence of the two basins is also shown by the integration of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Western deterrent system. Thus this region has become vital in the East-West confrontation and has become the operational bridge that links the security of Western Europe with the defense of the countries of the Persian Gulf from external threats. This in the process has raised new concerns about the out-of-area interests of the alliance, which, due to space limitations, cannot be examined here. This then is one dimension of the strategic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean that has obtained particular importance in the aftermath of the energy shortages of the 1970's, the concern about stability in the Gulf region, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A second and relatively new dimension of the region's strategic significance is the Western concern with the problem of terrorism and countries such as Libya, which at times have been linked with such activities. The third and more traditional strategic dimension is the place of the Southern flank countries in the containment of the Soviet Union.⁴

The Evolution of the Balkan Balance

Occupying the part of Europe closest to the Middle East, the Balkans have been throughout history a meeting place of competing nationalities and a path for conquerors. Today, the Balkan peninsula and the surrounding maritime areas constitute the geostrategic link between two of the world's most critical regions--western Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. Moreover, by the early 1980's the once monolithic southern flank of the Eastern bloc (Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria) had evolved into an impressively diverse region.⁵

Romania is a clear example of diversification brought about by increasing stabilization in East-West relations in the Balkans. It is geographically removed from the dividing line of the East-West conflict and is anxious to

demonstrate individuality in its foreign and defense policy. While it remains committed to the Warsaw Treaty and acknowledges a duty to join a bloc response against NATO, its defense doctrine emphasizes Romanian national capacity to counter a conventional attack on its own territory through mass participation, including guerilla warfare.

Yugoslavia has evolved into another special case. Consisting of a mosaic of nationalities and carefully steering between the blocs in times of economic expansion and charismatic leadership, Yugoslavia is now being tested in times of deep recession and rotating leadership.

Albania is another interesting example of uniqueness. Having experienced close alliances with the Soviet Union and China, this least developed European state has decided to adopt a line of equidistance between the superpowers and of rather extreme isolationism.

Bulgaria is perhaps less striking in its security policy, although one could argue that remarkable stability and close alliance with the Soviet Union are rather rare phenomena in an area of such great variety as Southeastern Europe.

From the very first days of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were considered to be and still remain strategically complementary.⁶ Both countries came under the Truman Doctrine in 1947; became members of NATO in 1952; sent troops to Korea; along with Yugoslavia formed the short-lived Balkan Pact of 1954; and signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements with the U.S. providing military facilities on their soil.

Turkey shares nearly 650 km of land frontiers with the USSR, access through which is limited by geographic and climatic conditions. Greece in turn shares approximately 1000km of land frontiers with three communist countries, of which almost 450km are with Bulgaria, the Soviet Union's most faithful ally. Since the early post-WWII period the land mass of Epirus--

Macedonia--Western and Eastern Thrace and the Straits constituted the land barrier against a potential invasion from Warsaw Pact forces, despite its limited depth and the weaknesses in the force structure of the Greek and the Turkish armed forces. From the very first, NATO's central front was the alliance's defensive priority, while the Southern flank was considered an appendage to the central front.⁷ However, this assumption may have lost much of its validity in view of the importance of the Mediterranean in central front defense, the linkage of this region to those of the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, and the growth of Soviet power in the region.

A traditional scenario for Warsaw Pact military action against Greece and Turkey involves land, amphibious, and air operations for the seizure of Northern Greece and the Straits, followed by operations to seize control of Western Turkey and eventually obtain secure Soviet access to the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, such scenarios depend on the nature of the conflict and the priority assigned to this front by Soviet planners in such a contingency. The estimated forces available against Greece and West Turkey are shown in the following table:⁸

Divisions	31-33
Tanks	6900
Artillery	5300 (various types)
Fighter Planes	2100
Missile Launchers	350
Naval Craft	50-60 (all types)

In addition to these forces one must take into account the threat posed to the U.S. Sixth fleet by the Caucasus-based Backfire and Badger Soviet bombers armed with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, which will need to reach their target by flying through Greek and Turkish airspace. Finally, qualitative and quantitative Warsaw pact force improvements, coupled with Soviet attempts to obtain facilities in countries such as Libya, following the

loss of Egyptian facilities in 1972, pose new threats to Southern flank defense and thus to the defense of NATO's central front.

The Importance of the National Factor

Unlike the rest of the NATO area, the national factor is bound to play in the Southern Region an exceptionally important role.

With the withdrawal of British and French forces, the main region-wide actor became the U.S. and the symbol of its presence, the Sixth Fleet. For the Southern Region, even today, "U.S." became synonymous with "NATO." There has never been a unifying concept to bind the area together, just individual nations loosely linked.

Separated land combat areas, in conjunction with the requirement to defend at national frontiers, virtually ensures that, at least initially, battles will be fought by national forces in defense of national soil, a very different situation from Central Europe which so typifies coalition warfare. This situation has a positive impact on morale: Greek, Turkish and Italian soldiers would be fighting to defend their homeland and deterrence would be strengthened since the determination to defend national soil is beyond any doubt.

Greek-Turkish differences being what they are, and the American even-handedness toward both countries questioned, speedy reinforcement in time of crisis is dubious. Greek and Turkish forces have not trained together in the last twelve years and no signs of change can be seen on the horizon. Moreover, the U.S. commitment to the reinforcement of the Southern Region has been adversely affected by frequent redeployments of U.S. carriers from the Mediterranean to the Gulf.

Another element that stresses the importance of the national factor in the Southern Region is the Soviet navy's structure. Western intelligence

sources credit the Soviets with a fleet of very heavily armed ships. On a ship-for-ship basis, the Soviets outgun or out-range with missiles most NATO ships. On the other hand, their ability to carry out sustained operations is limited. During times of tension these capabilities and deficiencies confer crucial advantages to the force that launches the first shot. Estimates are that Soviet forces must win quickly, in the initial stages of a conflict, or else the Alliance will prevail. Thus, speedy reinforcement of Greece, Turkey or Italy is very dubious.

Indeed, the importance of political realities historical rivalries, in short, the importance of the national factor, is reflected in the entire command structure in NATO South. It is not to be forgotten that even the U.S., for its own national reasons, insisted on keeping its principal forces in the area, the Sixth Fleet, under firm national control.

Thus, the somewhat complex command structure in the Southern Region certainly creates some minor integration problems, but reflects nevertheless a series of national sensitivities and regional differences, that NATO will have to live with in the near future. Clearly delimited (national) operational control responsibilities are thus the only politically feasible solution. They have worked well in the past and they can act as deterrents in the future. Again, if deterrence fails and speedy responses are needed, battles will be initially fought by national forces in defense of national soil and its maritime approaches.

Greece in Southern Flank Defense

Since Greek independence, the country's strategic location has been both an asset and a liability, in the latter case frequently becoming a source of domestic friction and external interference in Greek politics. Developments in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, the growth of Soviet naval power, and

new military technologies have all enhanced the country's strategic value.⁹ First, Greece provides continuity to the alliance's Southern region, not only for purposes of military communications, but also in protecting Italy from the East and Turkey from the West. The significance of the latter is clear in view of Turkey's isolation from the rest of the alliance if Greece were to be lost to the West. Since CENTO's dissolution, Turkey's relations with Iran and Iraq have been uncertain and based more on convenience than identity of interests.

In the case of Italy, Greece guards the approaches to the Adriatic, a position of growing significance in view of the instability potential in Albania and Yugoslavia and the interest the USSR may have in such developments. It should be noted that Albania's non-commitment, Yugoslavia's non-alignment and Romania's semi-alignment, play key roles in the present Balkan balance, since they provide the Southern flank countries with considerable strategic warning. However, the greatest Greek strategic asset is its land mass which, along with the nearly 3000 Greek islands of the Aegean, gives strategic depth in alliance defense.¹⁰ The Aegean Sea with its islands, in the new conditions of naval warfare, constitutes a natural extension of the Turkish Straits. Control of the Straits had been a traditional Russian objective. It dominated the diplomacy of the "Eastern Question" in the 19th Century, and became a major Soviet demand in the early post-World War II period. Today, nearly 40% of Soviet exports and 50% of Soviet imports moves through the Straits. Moreover, the expanding Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has raised new and significant questions of access through the Straits under the terms of the Montreux Treaty, which have been loosely interpreted by Turkey in the case of the new generation of Soviet ships such as the Kiev. The issue of access will soon obtain new dimensions as the Kremlin-type aircraft carrier enters the service.

The Straits are certainly important for Western defense, but their strategic significance as a barrier to Soviet naval expansion has considerably diminished.

First, during every Middle East crisis contingency, the Soviet Union has been able to spectacularly increase the size of its fleet. This has been accomplished by a careful management of Montreux Convention declarations through the Straits and by extending deployment periods for ships already in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the control of the Straits by a NATO country has not affected the rapid build-up capability of the Soviet Navy operating in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the most significant shift in the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the Southern Region has come about because of the marked growth of Soviet naval forces.

Second, the Soviet Union has developed a significant airborne and airlift capability for purposes of force projection in the Mediterranean and other theaters.

Moreover, through a significant arms transfers to its Middle East allies (Libya and Syria in particular), Moscow may have created a logistics base for its own use, leapfrogging the Straits barrier.

Third, should the Straits be lost, a defense in depth through the Aegean would impede the passage of hostile forces through the archipelago. In fact, all Soviet naval craft traffic to and from the Straits, and regardless Turkey's enforcement of the Montreux Treaty, must pass through the Aegean before entering in or exiting from the Eastern or Western Mediterranean. The island complex of Kithyra, Crete, Karpathos, and Rhodes provide ideal chokepoints for such enemy shipping.¹¹ Further, the Aegean is a semi-enclosed Sea. Distances are relatively small; the shipping channels are limited and rather narrow; the temperature and depth of the Aegean is ideally suited for submarine operations, while the protected bays in the nearly 3000 Greek

islands provide an ideal terrain for the application of new naval warfare technology. Here, small, highly maneuverable, fast, low radar visibility craft, such as the Greek Navy's Combattante III, armed with precise anti-ship missiles, can play havoc against large enemy units. Supplemented by the integration of defensive minefields into overall battle plans and by the proximity of land air bases, Greek control of the Aegean makes a significant contribution to Southern flank defense. The strategic significance of the Greek islands in the Aegean is enhanced by the presence on them of various military facilities, many of which have been or can be made available to NATO during an alliance contingency. This is of particular importance in the case of the island of Limnos with its proximity to the Straits and Thrace. Despite the political controversy surrounding Limnos' militarization, the action is supported by a 1980 NATO Legal Office opinion,¹² which, even though confidential, has been quoted in the European and American press. The Greek position on militarizing Limnos can easily be argued as being in the best interests of the Alliance as a whole, as well as of Turkey. Limnos' position in relation to the Turkish Straits indicates that, at a minimum, it would be a convenient node in the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) and a good central location for basing air defense fighters.

In the case of the Dodecanese islands, the demilitarization clauses of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty were included under Soviet insistence and did not rule out measures of strictly defensive nature, particularly in the light of the new international environment that has evolved since WWII. Moreover, the militarization possibility of this group of islands for external defense purposes is also backed by a 1948 legal opinion of the U.S. Department of State.¹³ Thus, regardless of whether these islands are demilitarized or not, it is in NATO's interest to see that these islands can contribute to the defense of the alliance in case of war or other major emergency. The

strategic significance of the Aegean and the Greek islands has also been recognized by the USSR. One-third of the 5th Eskadra's anchorages are just outside Greek territorial waters, and three of these anchorages are around Crete in areas where the 6th fleet confronted major Soviet naval concentrations during recent crises in the Middle East. If Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles (from the present six), the Soviet Union would be deprived of these valuable assets, particularly in a period where permanent and comprehensive base rights are not available to its naval forces. Furthermore, it should become clear that the extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean would severely hamper the Soviet freedom of maneuver in this crucial zone, without symmetrically affecting western passage and patrolling in the same area.

Of similar importance is the strategic location of Greece in relation to the shipping lanes of the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and Libya. Here we must stress the significance of the islands of Crete, the fifth largest island of the Mediterranean. Located in the middle of the Mediterranean basin, it is 300 miles from the Straits, 200 miles from the Suez, and 150 miles from the Libyan coast. In view of the importance of Middle East energy supplies, the proximity to the Suez Canal, the growing concern over Libya and the Soviet military presence in the region, the military facilities on Crete make that island a nearly irreplaceable strategic asset in alliance defense planning.

The presence on Greek soil since 1953 of U.S. military facilities, which are supporting the broader interests of the West in the region, as well as the presence of various NATO installations are also important assets. Recent studies by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations characterize the facilities in Greece and Turkey as complementary and interdependent.¹⁴ According to these studies, the Greek facilities offer direct operational

support to the 6th fleet; are vital for Turkey's defense; and make a significant contribution to NATO defense in this area, specially with the addition of new resources as the stationing of an AWACS aircraft in Preveza. These facilities enhance Western control of the Mediterranean and provide crucial strategic warning in the Balkans.

Other important assets include the control of the Greek FIR which is vital for Western as well as Soviet access to the Middle East and North Africa and the human and material contribution of Greece to allied defense, since Greece became a member of NATO. As the 1986 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, issued by U.S. Defense Secretary C. W. Weinberger shows, Greece was ranked first among NATO's sixteen nations in total defense spending as a percentage of GDP. This amounted to 7.2% of the Greek GDP as contrasted to Turkey's 4.4%, 6.5% for the U.S., and 2.7% for Italy. Between 1971 and 1983, Greek defense spending showed a 53.8% increase, while Greece was also ranked first in total active duty military and civilian manpower as a percentage of total population. This amounted to 2.35% for Greece, 1.79% for Turkey, 1.40% for the U.S., and 0.99% for Italy. In view of the limitations of the Greek economy the force modernization undertaken since 1974, as manifested by the latest acquisition of F-16's and Mirage 2000's for the needs of the Greek Air Force, is a good indication of this commitment to allied defense.

Problems and Prospects

Speaking in London in the spring of 1985, Admiral William N. Small, C-in-C Allied Forces Southern Europe, said "I know of no other region where the air, land, and sea campaigns are so mutually dependent."¹⁵ Indeed the Greek strategic assets outlined in the preceding paragraphs point to the significant role of Greece in NATO's Southern flank defense. In order for the

countries of the Southern flank, and Greece in particular, to be able to serve better the alliance security needs in the region, two observations and recommendations are in order. First, the alliance must recognize the importance of its Southern flank. The primacy given to the central front may have been justified in the early post-WWII period, but this is not so any longer in view of the growth of Soviet military power and political influence in countries of the region; the prospects for change in the Balkans; the linkage of the strategic basins of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf; and the growing problems in North Africa as a result of improved military capabilities of area states such as Libya, and their willingness to use various types of force for reasons other than the protection of their national frontiers. The security of the central front then can be affected by the loss of the Southern flank. Because NATO's Southern flank is the alliance's weakest section, it may become a tempting target in a crisis situation. It is imperative, therefore, that the alliance continues to support the force modernization undertaken by countries such as Greece, keeping in mind also the need for military balance among the states of the region. Second: Even though strategic conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean and NATO's Southern flank have been affected by the shifting military balance among the superpowers and the growing Soviet presence in the region, the major problem facing NATO's Southern flank is primarily political and is only indirectly related to the growth of Soviet power.¹⁶ Time has come for the alliance to address some of the political questions affecting the cohesion of the Southern flank. More attention must be paid to the causes of the domestic political erosion the alliance has suffered in Southern flank countries over the last fifteen years. Continued commitment by Greece to the objectives of the alliance, and the alliance's ability to capitalize on the country's strategic assets, require greater awareness of the political sensitivities,

the needs and perceptions of that country. Alliance actions that imply changes in the legal, political, economic, and strategic status quo in the region as established by International Treaties and Conventions must be avoided at all costs. Moreover, NATO must discourage any attempts to change this status quo through alliance procedures. The alliance must display its political will on this point if it is to avoid contradicting basic principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.

It is tempting to retain past assumptions about the primacy of the central front and to attribute the problem of the Southern flank to idiosyncratic state rivalries, their lack of will and the irreversibility of the modernization problems facing these states. Present conditions require vigilance, political sensitivity and willingness to face difficult political choices confronting this community of democratic nations. Only in this manner can NATO successfully face the challenges that lie ahead as the alliance nears forty years of cooperation in the defense of freedom.

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"Prospects for Peace and Cooperation in the
Italian-Greek-Turkish Triangle"

By: Theodore A. Couloumbis and Dimitris Conostas

"When the Italians behave as Italians and not as Romans, when the Greeks behave as Greeks and not as Byzantines, and when the Turks behave as Turks and not as Ottomans... then there is stable peace and cooperation among them".

Given the quasi-anarchic nature of the post-Westphalian international system, conflict, competition and cooperation have been interfacing and alternating concepts characterizing interstate relations. Our three countries, represent national successors to three great empires whose boundaries have been nearly identical in different time periods. Looking back into our troubled history of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, we realize that a major causal factor of our frequent conflicts has been a syndrome of overlapping irredentisms.

It is not our task in this short presentation to recount the integrative processes which led to the formation of Modern Italy during the second half of 19th Century and to the disintegrative processes which led to the disassembling of the Ottoman Empire and the creation out of its various regions of the modern Balkan states including the state of Turkey. Our objective, rather, is to focus on the cluster of Italian-Greek-Turkish relations since World War II.

Viewing the Turkish-Greek-Italian triangle since World War II, we stumble upon a great paradox. Namely, Greece, the country from whose perspective we are speaking, has had its share of troubles with both its neighbors. But, after the end of World War II, Greek-Italian relations have been shaped into a remarka-

ble model of compromise, mutual accommodation and cooperation resulting in reciprocal benefit. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with Greek-Turkish relations. The logical recommendation which flows from the above is that both the Turks and the Greeks can benefit a lot by "italianizing" their troubled and tenuous relationship.

The paradox, indeed, becomes considerably magnified if we bring to mind that in the early 1940s Greece and Italy fought a short but bitter and costly (in blood and treasure) war which was followed by a painful and extractive occupation of Greek territory by German, Italian and Bulgarian forces. Throughout that turbulent period, Turkey had remained scrupulously (even if ambivalently) neutral. Yet, and here is the core of the paradox, there has taken place a remarkable accommodation in the relations of Greece with all three of the World War II occupying states. This accommodation has been based on generally accepted principles of international comity such as respect for the mutual security, territorial integrity and national independence of the states involved. Unfortunately, Greek-Turkish relations, instead of experiencing further improvement, have deteriorated since the mid 1950s into a state of anachronistic geopolitical tension hovering uncomfortably close to a major and disruptive war.

II

Much ink has been spilled outlining the legal, political and economic arguments advanced by Greece and Turkey regarding their disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean.

In a seminar, such as this, dedicated to the search for realistic prospects for future cooperation, we will not indulge in a recapitulation of the merits and demerits of the argumentation advanced by each side. We will only present some general propositions which are designed to place the Greek-Turkish disputes in a perspective that will hopefully open the way for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of a lasting rapprochement between the two countries.

We must state, at the outset, that we are firm supporters of the process of "functionalism"--which is a design for maximization of political cooperation by incremental collective ventures of multi-national activity in economic, technical, cultural and humanitarian areas. Functionalism is, in our view, a rational if not the only viable approach to peace and regional integration. After all, the remarkable experiment of Jean Monnet and his associates which led to the creation of a peaceful and thriving community in Europe represents to us a viable model that can break the dangerous deadlock in Greek-Turkish relations.

However, we should point out that the European integration experiment has proven not easily transferable to other parts of the world. For, as has been demonstrated in West Europe, functionalism can only be built upon strong foundations of good will and political consensus among the concerned governments. Similar theoretical constructs to those used by West Europeans proved relatively unsuccessful when applied to regions such as the Middle East, Sub-saharan Africa, South-East Asia, Central America and elsewhere in the Third World.

To put the matter differently, functional cooperation leading to transnational integration can best proceed among states whose governments have removed so-called territorial disputes from their policy agendas, and have accepted the legitimacy of the sovereign distributive arrangements that were established after World War II. These governments must have, simultaneously, committed themselves to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and must have abandoned the threat of, or the use, of force as an interest-maximization instrument in their intraregional relations. Sadly, Greece and Turkey, since the mid 1950s, have not managed to develop a viable political consensus that would permit the spill-over effects of the process of European integration to flow into the significant Turkish political and economic space.

III

The most difficult and elusive issue separating Turkey from Greece since the mid-1950s has been the Cyprus dispute. The fate of Cyprus, as we know, was not disposed at the grand settlements which followed World Wars I and II because Cyprus had been a part of the British colonial empire. The Cypriot population structure, never a subject of dispute, is 80 per cent Greek-Cypriot and just under 20 per cent Turkish-Cypriot. Shortly after the completion of World War II, the Greek side sought to apply the principle of self-determination to the Cypriot population which would have led, given the preferences of the overwhelming majority of Greek-Cypriots, to ENOSIS (union) of Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, citing its ethnic affinity to the 20 per cent of the Turkish-Cypriot minority community, but-mainly-advancing geopolitical arguments against the contingency of a Greek "strategic encirclement", insisted on the perpetuation of Britain's colonial rule or on the rendering of TAKSIM (partition) of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish portions. Enosis was unacceptable to Turkey, and Taksim was unacceptable to Greece. So a historic compromise, clearly a second best choice for mainland Greeks and Turks (but not necessarily for Greek and Turkish Cypriots), was reached early in 1959. This compromise gave birth a year later to the independent state of Cyprus. Greece and Turkey, together with Great Britain, assumed the collective role of guarantors of Cyprus's independence and constitutional order. Unfortunately, serious inter-communal friction soon developed over the issue of proposed constitutional amendments which were designed by President Makarios to end the unqualified veto rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority community. For ten years following, there ensued a cycle of tension and detente between the two communities bringing mainland Greece and Turkey at the edge of war in 1964 and 1967. Then, in the critical month of July 1974, while the intercommunal talks had reached (with the exception of minor details) a mutual agreement on the contours of

unitary state*, the Greek military Junta bluntly interfered into the internal affairs of Cyprus by mounting a putsch which was designed to unseat Makarios and lead -probably- toward an arrangement of "double enosis", which was a euphemistic term for partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Turkey, in turn, considerably multiplied the disruptive impact by ordering an invasion (not so elegantly referred to as a "peace operation") which was followed by protracted occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and a massive internal refugee problem.

The main thing that should be pointed out here is that the Greek Junta collapsed just eight days after the mindless coup in Cyprus, while the practices and the product of the Turkish invasion continue to the present day. If, indeed, there were any doubt as to the ultimate objective of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, it was erased in November of 1983 when the Turkish-occupied portion of Northern Cyprus declared itself an independent state, and when Turkey (the only state to do so) recognized it immediately. It was, now, quite apparent that Turkey was prepared to use military force in order to impose the partition of Cyprus, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Zurich and London Agreements that had reflected a historic compromise which had ruled out both enosis and taksim.

IV

We have taken some pains to stress the deep and continuing impact of the Cyprus upheaval on the way the Greek side has reacted to Turkish policies (expectations and demands) in the Aegean area since July 20th, 1974. The main issues that divide the two countries (delimitation of continental shelves, width of territorial air and territorial waters, military and civilian command, control, and information regions, rights and protection of minorities) would, normally, have been classified as technical (func-

* A far cry from the much looser bicomunal, bi-regional federation concept now being envisioned.

nal) in nature issues that are of relatively low political salience and, therefore, lend themselves to alternative types of peaceful settlement.

Yet, the "Cyprus example" has been haunting the Greek side since 1974. Will Turkey repeat the Cyprus scenario in the Aegean? Will she try to establish herself as a security partner in the Eastern half of the Aegean, enclaving important Greek territories into a "Turkish zone of responsibility"? Will she then, as she did in Cyprus, seek to create a military fait accompli? Since 1974, our Turkish allies have been proposing what amounts to a fundamental revision of the legal status quo in the Aegean. If their views were to prevail, the result would be the enveloping of Greece's Eastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese into an exclusive (or joint as in Cyprus) Turkish security zone. Following the Turkish prescription, the Greek islands would be considered Greek "exclaves", "growing" upon a Turkish continental shelf. Simultaneously, they would be assigned to become isolated Greek territories under a Turkish Flight Information Region and, for NATO purposes, into a Turkish command and control zone. Finally, to complete the package, they would be required to remain defenseless (demilitarized) according to extremely punitive interpretations of treaty provisions (Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936), Paris (1947)).

§ And the Greek side asks: Given the "Turkish example" in Cyprus, why should one expect a different modus operandi in the Aegean? If the Turks, as their responsible officials often assert, have no territorial ambitions in any part of the Greek Aegean archipelago, why do they strenuously object to Greek defense arrangements in Greek insular territories? Adequately fortified, the Aegean islands and the Dodecanese could be used as a second line of defense against potentially unfriendly naval and air traffic attempting to enter into and exit from the Black Sea. Why is it that the Turks consciously or subconsciously refuse to acknowledge the existence of Greek insular territories which collectively account for a significant proportion of Greece's population

and territory* ?.

Our Turkish friends, and all others interested in conflict resolution in the Aegean, must understand and accept one proposition. Namely, the Greek side will not agree under any circumstances to a regime that enclaves Greek sovereign territories into zones of Turkish military, economic or technical responsibility. Once this is understood as a fundamental precondition to any process leading toward peaceful resolution of differences, the way toward gradual accommodation and even meaningful cooperation will have been opened.

Our Turkish neighbors, we believe, can benefit a lot by emulating the type of relations that Italy and Greece have forged since the early 1950s. It is remarkable, for example, to realize that Italy proceeded to remilitarize territories which were to remain demilitarized according to the Treaty of Paris (1947) by routinely informing its fellow signatories and routinely securing their unqualified approval. Issues of the type that has deeply disturbed Greek-Turkish relations have been reasonably settled by a series of agreements between Greece and Italy based on principles of interdependence, mutual respect and mutual benefit. Agreements regarding the delimitation of Greek/Italian continental shelves (May 1977), Protection of the Ionian Sea's environment (March 1979), Scientific and Technical Cooperation (October 1983) and Cooperation between the two governments in combating terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking of narcotics (September 1986) are typical of the kind of facility with which one can promote economic and technical cooperation on foundations of political consensus.

* It is instructive for instance to read Turkish accounts which routinely refer to Cyprus as an island which lies only 40 miles away from Turkey while being over "500 miles" away from "Greece". The fact is that Cyprus is about 160 miles away from the nearest Greek island and less than 200 miles from Rhodes. Furthermore, the fact that Syria is no further away from Cyprus than is Turkey has not given the latter any basis for claims over Cypriot territory.

V

Moving to a wider, regional scale, we believe that the formula for peace and cooperation between Greece and Turkey will surely have been found by the time Turkey (and why not Cyprus?) enters into the European Community at sometime which, hopefully, will not be in the very distant future. But what needs to be done for Turkey's integration into the European Community to become a reality?

The European Community was built upon the ruins left by the Second World War. It grew gradually but steadily and it eventually established itself as a viable political and economic collectivity because it (the governments of the member states) adopted and faithfully implemented certain general principles:

1. Pluralistic Democracy of the Western Variety, which guarantees and respects the rights of man, is a necessary condition for participation in the Community.

2. Reciprocity of political, economic and social interests among the member-states of the Community is at the center of gravity of its viability.

3. Methods and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes between member-states are employed exclusively within the community. Any resort to armed force for the settlement of intra-community differences is strictly prohibited.

4. The natural outgrowth of the above mentioned principles is the harmonization of the foreign policies of member-states so as to create a joint and representative foreign policy for the European Community as a whole.

Any further enlargement of the Community through the accession of states such as Turkey and Cyprus, involves a clear com-

mitment on the part of aspiring members to respect the above principles in word and deed.

In the case of Turkey, this means that its political system, which at present could be referred to as "guided (by the military) democracy", should be transformed into a genuine democracy of the Western type. Among the conditions for such a transformation one must include the following : The lifting of the prohibition of direct participation in political activities of personalities, such as Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit ; the lifting of martial law in the five provinces where it continues in force ; the implementation of freedom of establishment of political parties representing the full range of interests, principles and ideologies which find their expression in Turkish society ; the restoration of trade union activities and freedoms which have been considerably stifled since September 1980; the abandonment of torture and other inhuman forms of interrogation; full and demonstrated respect for human rights and the cultural identity of all residents of Turkey, including the minority community of the Kurds.

In its foreign relations, in order to conform to the basic principles of the European Community, Turkey must swiftly proceed to the just and peaceful resolution of its differences with the twelve members of the Community, with priority being given to the case of Greece. The repairing of relations between Greece and Turkey requires a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of respect for the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, withdrawal of the occupation forces, and the adoption of a federal, bi-communal and bi-regional but genuinely unified political and economic system. Furthermore, in the case of Greek - Turkish differences on the Aegean, Turkey must abandon its revisionist geopolitical ambitions and adopt strictly peaceful dispute-settlement methods such as good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Resort to third-party resolution mechanisms will follow bi-lateral negotiations in every instan-

ce, going on to the multi-lateral level if and when bilateral negotiations do not produce results within a reasonable time period.

VI

Over and above the problems of Turkey's adaptation to the rules of the Community game, there remains another major structural problem of profound concern to the Twelve. Demographically, the population of Turkey - estimated today at approximately 55 million - is increasing at a very rapid rate. It doubles every 28 years (one of the highest growth rates in the world). Thus in the year 2010, the population of Turkey will be approaching the 110 million mark, while the population of the Twelve will remain static at 320 million. If we were to suppose that Turkey became a member of the EC around the year 2.000, close to 25 per cent of the population of the Community would consist of Turks. It is this structural reality that is at the center of the major problem of movement and subsequent absorption of the large Turkish workforce, a fact that gravely concerns member-states such as Germany, France, Belgium and others. The issue becomes even more acute if one takes into account the pressure of the migration of unemployed Turkish workers coming out of a country where the unemployment rate has been for a number of years in excess of 20%.

The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing argumentation is that virtually all the member states of the EC - not only Greece - have great reservations over the hypothetical Turkish membership in the EC. In our opinion, it would be a serious error for each Community partner to shift the weight of its reservations and objections on to others, or on to one specific member.

VII

What is then to be done? The European Community must, as a body of twelve states, accept and apply the principle of a joint approach to the question of Turkey's accession. This will involve the planning and adoption of a strategy leading to the real - not just verbal or cosmetic - "Europeanization" of Turkey, as a funda-

mental condition for accession to Europe. The dimensions of the issue leave no room for hasty solutions and experiments of the "Let's have Turkey in the EC and then we'll see" type.

Europeanization, in our view, means that the Turkish people will be permitted to choose freely their destiny in the face of a major historic dilemma regarding their future cultural identity. Europeanization means that Turkey will make the great choice between membership in Europe (and the West more generally) and the role of a leading Islamic power in the third-world-oriented Middle East. Europeanization means that, together with the restoration of internal democracy in Turkey, a solution will be found in Cyprus that will safeguard the territorial integrity of the troubled Republic. Finally, Europeanization means, that Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean, which have been mainly disturbed by the post-1974 revisionist proposals of the Turkish government, will be rehabilitated restoring a climate of stable peace in this strategically vital area.

To judge by present rates and styles of activity just across the eastern borders of Greece, one cannot afford to be overly optimistic about the prospects of cooperation between Greece and Turkey. The stakes are quite high, and the two governments have become conditioned to a protracted climate of crisis management. In our opinion, however, the "cold-war" in Greek-Turkish relations is quite dangerous and it could, catastrophically, go out of control through accident, miscalculation, or just faulty policies. We must, therefore, continue the effort toward achieving a precious political accommodation, which our thoughtful forefathers - Venizelos and Ataturk - had the courage to initiate 56 years ago.

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IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES.
AND DOCTRINES FOR THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN RELATION TO NATO

by Maurizio CREMASCO

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INTRODUCTION

NATO has always tended to utilize technology to solve its defence problems.

In the '50s it was nuclear technology. At that time, the Soviet conventional superiority was balanced by the introduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons were considered the easiest way out of the economic and political problems the European countries were faced with in trying to cope with the force goals set by the Atlantic Council in Lisbon in 1952.

In the '60s and '70s the technological edge of the allied weapons systems, coupled with the deterrent effect of American nuclear weapons, was seen as the key qualitative factor capable of offsetting, at least partially, the Soviet quantitative advantage.

Today, emerging technology (ET) is at the center of NATO's attention. Again, technology is seen as the alternative to Europe's unwillingness to increase its conventional forces and is considered "the solution" to defence problems which would require a more articulated approach.

This time it is conventional technology which is supposed to constitute the "fixing" factor of a deteriorated military balance. However, the strategic and tactical framework is radically different from the past. The economic picture is also different. The framework is one of strategic parity between the superpowers and of Soviet nuclear superiority in the European theater. In addition, the adoption of new technology weapons systems will not represent a saving, as was the case when nuclear weapons were introduced in lieu of conventional forces.

The operational framework has also changed. The American propensity towards the eventual regional employment of nuclear weapons has decreased, while the Soviet doctrine has gradually moved towards the recognition of the possibility of a protracted conventional war in Europe.

On 9 November, 1984 NATO's Defence Planning Committee formally approved the long-term planning guidelines for Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA). This mission concept was subsequently included in the NATO Military Committee's May 1985 Conceptual Military Framework for NATO Long Term Defence Planning.

Having adopted this concept, NATO now faces the problem of making it work. The issues were very clearly outlined in the American OTA's report to the Congress of July 1986 (1). Quoting from the report, the issues were outlined as follows:

1. Which concepts for FOFA should be pursued and how should resources be allocated among them?
2. How much capability is needed?
3. Are dedicated forces required, and if so, what?
4. How are competing demands for procuring forces for FOFA to be balanced?
5. What is to be bought? Who will produce it? Who will pay for it?
6. Will the NATO command structure and its operating procedures have to be modified?
7. Will FOFA require changes in national intelligence policies and procedures?
8. What are the implications of possible Warsaw Pact responses to FOFA?

Obviously, this discussion paper does not intend to attempt to answer these very difficult questions. Its scope is simply to identify some of the new ET weapons systems and then try to assess what their introduction in allied forces will mean for the defence of the southern NATO fronts. The paper will not address the issue of the utilization of nuclear weapons, either in a pre-emptive mode on the part of the Soviet Union, or in a selective way by NATO in the context of its flexible response strategy. In other words, the analysis will be restricted to the conventional aspects of the defence of NATO's southern region countries in the face of NATO's present drive towards emerging technology weapons systems.

1. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

It appears evident that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have moved away from the perspective of a war in Europe which entails the use of nuclear weapons in its initial phase.

The possibility of a protracted conventional conflict is gaining credibility, even though NATO has restated the full validity of its doctrine of flexible and graduated response and of first use of nuclear weapons, and even though NATO commanders believe that, due to Soviet conventional power, the Alliance has reverted to a "delayed trip-wire" strategy. In fact, the point is how protracted a conventional war in Europe could be, considering the repeated warnings issued by the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe, Gen. Bernard Rogers, about NATO's conventional inferiority. Gen. Rogers has stressed that "if war broke out today, it would only be a matter of days before I would have to turn to our political authorities and request the initial release of nuclear weapons." (2)

A further point is if and how the ET systems will effectively raise the nuclear threshold improving NATO's capability to defend itself with conventional weapons, or if they would simply protract the conventional phase of the war, simply delaying the still needed use of nuclear weapons as a last, uncertain and risky resort to bring the conflict to a halt and reach a diplomatic solution.

It is likely that the opening days of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe, although conventional, will be marked by a warfighting pace and intensity very different from WWII and even higher than that seen during the Arab-Israeli wars.

The new technology weapons systems tend to increase these characteristics. In fact, they will permit the fighting to go on regardless of whether it is day or night and of weather conditions. Furthermore, the precision with which the weapons can be delivered and the high destructive potential of the new warheads tend to equate the effect of the high technology weapons systems to those of small yield nuclear weapons. The high lethality of today's and tomorrow's highly technological conventional battlefield will result in a killing rate unimaginable in past wars, while the proliferation of area coverage, distributed munitions warheads will dramatically increase the number of wounded for whom treatment will not be possible or available. Another point to be underlined is the substantial and growing difference between early and follow-on war stages (3). The early phases will be characterised by mass attacks along fairly predictable corridors and against known, selected targets with the aim of disrupting NATO defences, opening avenues of penetration, effecting a rapid pace of advance, and provoking the collapse of the whole front under attack. Only if and when this phase is terminated with negative results for the aggressor, will the war be likely to continue with sustained combat by maneuvering units in a way similar to WWII military operations, although with the peculiar features outlined above.

A final point to be taken into consideration is the fact that the aggressor will not only choose the moment and place of the attack but will also maintain the initiative in the early phase of its military operations.

All this means that the defender has at least three imperatives: first, he must capitalise on the warning, no matter how small and imperfect, that the enemy provides in preparing its aggression. No time should be lost. If the multinational decision-making process is too slow, preparatory actions in the framework of the SACEUR Alert System should be implemented on a national basis in order to set up the main elements of defence. Although excessively

belligerent actions should be avoided, the weight given to the political element of "provocation" should not jeopardize the necessary preparation for defence.

Second, the defender must stop the initial attack before it gains momentum. This can be achieved by a series of active military responses - with FOFA being part of them - and by a set of peacetime erected fortifications to impede the rapid advance of armored units.

The political and social problems connected with the fortification of border areas are well recognized. However, even in this field new technologies provide acceptable solutions in terms of low environmental damage, small areas required for the construction, low visibility of the supporting infrastructures, limited militarized zones.

Third, the defence of key assets - in particular air assets in the rear areas - is of paramount importance. This can be carried out with both active and passive defence measures (hardening and dispersion).

One can rightly say that there is nothing really new in these imperatives. What is new, in fact, is the adoption and the application of new technologies either in the form of weapons systems or supporting assets (surveillance, detection and targeting, command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I), electronic warfare, etc).

2. NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Frank Barnaby has recently written that "if technological developments hold sway, the fully automated battlefield will be with us, at least in the industrialized countries, by about the year 2010" (4).

Even without fully endorsing Prof. Barnaby's prediction, it appears evident that technological developments are radically changing the way of waging war. The technological impact is felt on the whole range of military hardware and on its supporting elements. Let us briefly examine some of the fields where changes are more significant.

a. Weapons systems

In the weapons systems field the most striking developments have taken place in the guidance, and hence in the high killing ratio, of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons systems.

The so-called smart weapons are not totally new. They were employed for the first time during the Vietnam war. The traditionally told story about their effectiveness refers to the destruction of the Than Hoa bridge at Hanoi. From 1965 to 1968 the American air force unsuccessfully conducted more than 600 fighter bomber sorties against the bridge, dropping a total of 2000 tons of conventional bombs and suffering the loss of 12 to 30 aircraft. In 1972, using laser guided bombs, 8 sorties were sufficient to drop the bridge during the first mission (5).

Apart from laser, electro-optic and infrared guidance systems, new systems providing very small CEPs are microwave radiometry, radar area correlation (RAC) and Satellite Position Fixing using the data provided by the Global Positioning System. With these guidance systems, CEPs of less than 10 meters are obtainable.

The technological trend points towards the development of air-to-surface weapons with a fully autonomous capacity to search for, recognize and attack the target. This capacity would be provided by the use of sophisticated sensors and artificial intelligence.

Another significant development is taking place in the field of cluster weapons. The aim is to make the submunitions intelligent so as to search out an area with electronic sensors and selectively engage the targets they find. For example, the submunitions would be capable of looking for the most valuable targets, attacking the tanks instead of the armored infantry vehicles or the trucks.

The CEPs of the more sophisticated air-to-surface weapons can be obtained also by the cruise and surface-to-surface missiles. For the cruise, the precision is provided by the TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) system, while for the SSM the small CEP is obtained through the use of manouverable warheads. The American Pershing-2 has been reported to possess a 30-45 meter CEP.

While the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies still assigns a CEP of 300-350 meters to the Soviet SS-21, SS-12 mod. and SS-23 missiles (6), Mr. Richard de Lauer, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in a press interview, credited "the new models of SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles with accuracies making it possible to hit within 30 m. of a target" (7). If this CEP is proved to be true, the threat represented by the Soviet short-range ballistic missiles will significantly increase. Armed with conventional area coverage, distributed munitions or air-field denial warheads, these missiles can dramatically enhance Soviet conventional first strike capacity, in particular against NATO's vital airpower.

The same applies to other types of weapons (anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-aircraft) where sophisticated guidance systems, coupled with very effective warheads, tend to increase the vulnerability of air, naval and ground assets. The future will bring a growing direct correlation between targeting and killing. If the targeting has been positively accomplished, the target will be hit and destroyed unless it is defended by a system with better performances than the attacking weapons. This means, as Daniel Deudney, an American expert in information technology, has lucidly said, that the future will no longer be the traditional confrontation between offensive and defensive systems, but "rather a competition between the visible and the hidden, between transparency and stealth" (8).

b. Mines

In the field of mine warfare, new technology has brought three significant developments. First, the diversification in the methods of disseminating mines. Today, mines can be remotely dispensed from artillery, rockets, or aircraft. Second, the increase in the lethality of mines against armored targets. Third, the smart mines, capable of controlling a wide area (and thus the ability to target what is moving on a road from a concealed position on one side) and to discriminate between tanks and lower value targets. Among the most effective mines presently in production and in development: the USAF GATOR mine, the US Army ADAM and RAM; the German air-delivered MIFF antitank mine and the AT-2 mine to be carried in the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS); and the USAF ERAM (Extended Range Antiarmor Mine) smart mine.

c. Target-acquisition systems

This is another field where developments have been impressive and where research is actively proceeding. Among the systems in production or in the developmental phase the most significant are the following:

The Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN), which will provide the tactical aircraft with a day and night low altitude navigation/precision attack capabilities in all weather conditions.

The Tactical Reconnaissance System, to be flown on the TR-1 aircraft, to pass reconnaissance information to ground stations in near real time.

The Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS-2), a high resolution radar imaging system capable of producing high-quality imagery at long standoff ranges in strip mapping and spotlight modes. The system is also supposed to be installed in the TR-1 aircraft.

The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS), a system capable of detecting, accurately locating, identifying and directing strikes against enemy radar emitters in near real time.

Other systems include the Pave Spike, Pave Penny and Pave Tack pods, normally mounted on fighter-bombers, for the accurate delivery of their ordnance. The Pave Tack System was utilized by the American F-111s during the air strike against Libya last April.

d. Command, control and communications (C3)

The large amount of different information available to the commander and the need to take decisions in a very short time pose problems which can be resolved only with the aid of computers. Automation is gaining ground and computers are not only handling the information process but also increasingly taking over the decision-making process. When the response has to be immediate - for example the defence against short range ballistic missiles with flight times of 2-5 minutes - the tendency is to take the man out of the decision loop. As computers increase their capacity they are being increasingly utilized

by the C3. Eventually, it will be possible to fully computerize all C3 operations. As Frank Barnaby says "computerized C3, together with autonomous weapons, are the essential elements of automated warfare" (9).

In summary, considering in particular those systems which will reach maturity in the next several years and which could have important implications on the application of the FOFA concept, the most significant ET developments are as follows:

- ASARS II (synthetic aperture radar surveillance system);
- PLSS emitter location system;
- Joint STARS (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) moving target radar and weapon control system;
- LANTIRN navigation and targeting system for tactical aircraft;
- Army TACMS (Tactical Missile) ballistic missile;
- Smart antiarmor submunitions such as Skeet and SADARM (Search and Destroy Armor), and the MLRS/TGW (Terminally Guided Warhead for the Multiple Launch Rocket System);
- AGM-130 air-to-surface missile;
- RPV/TADARS, an army reconnaissance and target designation system;
- various electronic warfare capabilities.

In 1984 the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors listed eleven candidate ET projects designed for deployment in the next ten years. Some systems are similar or identical to those being developed in the United States.

- NATO IFF (Identification Friend or Foe);
- Electronic warfare systems for helicopters;
- Electronic jamming systems for tactical aircraft;
- Standoff radar surveillance and target acquisition system (based on, or similar to the JSTARS);
- Ground-based electronic support system to process sensor data;
- Short-range anti-radiation missile (SRAM);
- Low-cost powered dispenser for use against fixed targets;
- Terminally guided warhead (TGW) for the MLRS;
- Medium-range RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicle) for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition;
- Autonomous precision-guided munitions for 155mm artillery;
- Artillery locating system (counterbattery radar).

3. THE ET AND THE DEFENCE OF THE SOUTHERN REGION

To analyze if and how the ET weapons systems could effectively improve the defensive posture of NATO's southern region countries, it is necessary to refer to their geostrategic and military strengths and weaknesses.

a. Italy

Geostrategically, Italy has the advantage of bordering two neutral countries, Austria and Yugoslavia, ready to fight to safeguard their territorial integrity and unwilling to open their frontiers for the passage of

Warsaw Pact divisions in case of an East-West crisis in Europe. Furthermore, Italy has the geostrategic advantage of presenting a single, limited avenue of ground invasion at its north-eastern border, characterized by mountainous, rugged terrain for most of its extension. Except for the narrow Gorizia gap, mass armor operations would not be possible. The terrain is well suited for dug-in, fortified defenses. The employment of remotely deliverable mines - antitank and antipersonnel of the types indicated in paragraph 2b - seems particularly attractive to block roads and passages. Their dissemination along valley roads would retard and impede movements of armored and mechanized units, providing for an increase of fixed, lucrative targets.

Furthermore, Italy's unique geostrategic position protruding in the Mediterranean Sea, accentuated by Sardinia, Sicily and the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, constitutes both an element of defensive liability and of operational advantage and opportunity.

On the one hand, Italy's extensive coastline makes surveillance more difficult, while its Mediterranean projection makes it more vulnerable to any southern threat and to submarine launched cruise missiles (10). On the other hand, that same Mediterranean projection and the islands allow for greater air and sea coverage of the Mediterranean, enhancing the role of ground-based air power.

In addition, the relative width of the Sicily Channel allows for easy monitoring, control and filtering, if necessary, of maritime surface and submarine traffic in case of conflict.

New technology can help the Italian defensive posture by offering more sophisticated sensor and weapons systems (torpedos, mines, depth charges) for the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and very precise air-to-surface and surface-to-surface antiship missiles with longer standoff ranges and better resistance to deceptive measures.

A new element of vulnerability is represented by the new Soviet SS-12 mod. and SS-23 SSMs. The 900 km range SS-12 mod. from Czechoslovakia can cover the Italian territory up to Naples and Taranto, while the 500 km range SS-23 from Hungary can hit targets in the northern battle area up to Verona. This threat would increase in quantitative and geographical terms if SS-23s would be deployed in some North African countries.

The present technology does not offer a reliable, effective anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system. However, research and development is being conducted in the United States and in Europe to field an ATBM architecture complementing the long-range and short-range air defense missile system.

b. Greece

Greece's most evident geostrategic disadvantage is the short distance between the Greek-Bulgarian border and the Aegean Sea coastline. It would be impossible to trade space for time. There is no alternative to forward defense. New technologies can help to defend at the border. As in the case of the Italian north-east border, active defense can be coupled with fortified

interlocking bases, remotely fired gun and mortar positions, hardened and concealed electronic jammers, smoke and chaff generators, etc., exploiting the characteristics of the terrain to their maximum.

Another defense liability is the limited size of Greek territory. While the airbases are within range of the Soviet bombers and Su-24 type fighter bombers - some also of the Bulgarian Mig-23BM aircraft - there are not enough of them for the redeployment and dispersal of vital air assets.

New technologies can provide for effective air defense systems, in particular surface-to-air missiles with shorter reaction times, stronger resistance to countermeasures, higher lethality warheads. Even recent developments in AA guns appear as attractive solutions for point defense problems against the Warsaw Pact air threat.

On the other hand, Greece, with its more than 3,000 islands, can utilize new technologies for the control of the Aegean Sea. Long-range stand-off air-to-surface missiles can provide a significant capability for a thorough sea denial role. Passage through the Aegean Sea of Soviet Black Sea Fleet naval forces, in case of Soviet control of the Turkish Straits, can be denied by the employment of missile-armed fast patrol craft, easily dispersed among the island ports and attacking with wolf-pack technique, by aircraft armed with sea-skimming ASM, and by mobile ground-launched SSM deployed on the islands controlling the most important sea passages and choke points.

Finally, new technology sensors and mines are other assets that can turn the tide in favour of NATO forces in the anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare operations in the Aegean Sea.

The SSM threat will significantly increase when Bulgaria replaces its 40 FRGAs and 36 SCUDs with the new SS-21 and SS-23 missiles. The 120 km SS-21s will be capable of covering the entire Thrace area, while the SS-23s the majority of the Greek territory. The SS-23s could be employed for a conventional pre-emptive strike against the airbases and other key military targets.

c. Turkey

Turkey's geographic position, which is at the root of its strategic importance for NATO defense, is also at the root of the complexity and difficulty of Turkey's defense problems.

A geostrategic analysis reveals a number of negative elements in terms of defense. In the event of an East-West conflict, the Turkish armed forces would find themselves engaged on three separate fronts: the Turkish Thrace, the Straits and the Black Sea coast, and the Eastern Turkish-Soviet border. Moreover, it is not to be excluded - though the hypothesis seems very unlikely - that Turkey might also be engaged on the southern front if Syria decided to side with Moscow.

There are, however, few beaches on the Turkish Black Sea coast that are suitable for massive amphibious operations - and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet amphibious force counts only 25 ships and 12 craft - while advances towards the

interior are made difficult by the Pontus mountain range. The terrain on the Turkish eastern border is largely inaccessible, unsuitable for armored or mechanized units operations, and with few practicable passes. The terrain bordering on Syria is also particularly rough and mountainous, especially near Iskenderum.

The weakest and most vulnerable area is the Thrace, along the border with Bulgaria, where there are easy lines of attack through the Vardar Valley, the Struma Pass and the plains that lead directly to the Aegean Sea and the Straits. The terrain is suited for the use of armored divisions, while the shallow depth prevents the adoption of defense manouvering and makes forward defense a necessity.

As far as the Turkish-Soviet border is concerned, the characteristics of the terrain should be used to its own advantage, with active and passive defense measures, as in the cases of Italy and Greece.

The Straits can easily be closed to maritime traffic, and in this case the new technologies can simply provide more sophisticated and effective means of doing that.

For the defense of the Black Sea coast new technologies can provide a vast array of new sensors to monitor, pick up, and discriminate any surface or submarine threat. This early warning and control system can be integrated by mobile surface-to-surface missiles for the actual defense. The new mines can also be used for the purpose of interdicting the easiest approaches to the Turkish beaches.

The defense of the Thrace area can be improved not only with those physical "barriers" which can be erected, according to the features of the terrain, to constrain, impede, slow down, re-direct the forward thrust of the armored units, but also equipping the ground forces with new technology antitank missiles and the airforce with the most sophisticated distributed munitions and area coverage weapons systems.

The replacement of FROG, SCUD, and SS-12 missiles with the new SS-21, SS-23 and SS-12 mod. missiles in the Soviet forces deployed in the Odessa Military District and in the southern TVD, which will be presumably completed in the next ten-year period, will increase the conventional SSM threat.

While the threat of the SS-12 mod. missiles will not change, since the new models have the same range as the missiles they replace, the upgrade from the SCUDs to the SS-23s would permit the Soviets to target the northern part of the Turkish territory from the Crimea peninsula and from the Krasnodar area, and the eastern part from the Georgian and Armenian regions.

The Soviet Union could reach even deeper into central and southern Turkey if SS-12 mod. missiles were deployed into Bulgaria, in the same way that they were deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1984.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Both within NATO and the Warsaw Pact a tendency has emerged in the last few years to consider the protracted employment of conventional weapons as the likely scenario of a war in Europe.

For NATO, three factors are pushing toward the conventional option: the decreased American propensity to consider the use of nuclear weapons in Europe as a viable defensive option; the drive towards new technologies to enhance NATO deterrence and military posture, and to raise the nuclear threshold; the European political parties' and public opinion's attitude against nuclear weapons. For the Warsaw Pact, the recognition of the fact that nuclear strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, coupled with its superiority in the regional nuclear balance and in the conventional balance, at least in quantitative terms, gives a clear military edge over NATO, making the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary except for retaliatory purposes.

Apart from the questions raised by the adoption of the FOFA concept, it appears evident that the emerging and emerged technologies cannot, by themselves, solve all NATO's defense problems. It seems to me that what is needed are defensive solutions based mainly on ingenuity - in particular if forward defense remains at the base of NATO doctrine - and on new ways of force employment. In 1940 the tank and the fighter bomber were not new technology weapons systems. It was the way they were employed by the Third Reich which represented the winning factor of WWII initial military operations in Europe.

Conventional new technologies are very costly. Furthermore, they also tend to raise the time and cost of training. How many systems would the NATO southern region countries be able to buy, considering the constraints imposed on military budgets? Where should the limit between quantity and quality be set and how should the best mix between old and new weapons systems be decided upon? A major effort by the European countries to share R&D costs and to join in industrial ventures aimed at achieving a deeper interoperability and a better standardization is certainly and badly needed. But this effort would be possible only if narrow nationalist approaches to the European security as a whole were abandoned. The United States can help with a more open attitude towards the European request for a more balanced "two-way street" in transatlantic production and export of ET weapons systems.

It appears that new technologies make defense much more cost-effective than offense. It has often been said that is much cheaper to destroy the "offensive" weapons, than to buy them. In fact, this should not be overstressed, not only because it is impossible to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" systems, but also because technology works on both fronts. In other words, it also works to make "offensive" weapons more cost-effective. It is the traditional struggle between sensors and decoys, between radar and stealth technology, between sonar and quieter submarine engines, between antiradar missiles and high-velocity, frequency-hopping radars.

As mentioned before, it is true that new technologies are increasing the pace of warfare and its destruction potential. However, although the new weapons systems allow to operate day and night, without weather restrictions,

the human element will still impose its biological and psychological rhythms. A war without pauses can be waged only by robots. This is a long-term scenario for a fully automated battlefield in the distant future.

New technologies could arouse the temptation to pre-empt. Very precise SSM with effective conventional warheads, stealth attack aircraft, long-range stand-off missiles, sophisticated ECM systems, are all essential elements of a first strike. These elements, together with the capability of detailed and precise coordination offered by reconnaissance, navigation and C3 satellites, could furnish a strong incentive to pre-empt in a crisis, thus gaining a decisive edge. Deterrence can be maintained only if new defensive technologies are perceived by the adversary as being capable of effectively meeting the threat and blunting any first strike attempt.

There is little doubt that electronic warfare will play a predominant role in any future conflict. Growing automation means growing reliance on computers, electronic sensors, electronic C3 assets, etc. Possessing the capability to confuse, deceive, disrupt, deny the use of the adversary's electronic systems means to have the key of one of the most important winning factors of any future conflict. Would this fact push towards the detonation of low-yield nuclear warheads at such altitudes as to reap the best of the disruptive effects of the EMP, at the same time limiting the other damages provoked by the explosion ?

An ATBM system for Europe will very likely be a development of new technologies in the year 2000. However, the following questions remain open: will the system defend only a few NATO countries - the ones which will have the financial resources to buy it - or, like the AWACS, will it become a NATO system defending all the members of the Alliance ? Would a dedicated system be developed, i.e. against ballistic missiles only, or instead, a system capable of addressing also the threat posed by the Soviet ground-launched cruise missiles which will come into service in the near future? What would be the reaction of the Soviet Union in terms of countermeasures ?

Greece, Italy and Turkey have on order weapons systems which can be considered of "emerged" technology (11). Greece is acquiring improved TOW antitank guided weapons (ATGW), AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters, and Mirage 2000 aircraft. Italy is acquiring Stinger surface-to-air missiles, A-129 Mangusta attack helicopters, Multiple Rocket Launchers, Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and Spada surface-to-air systems. Turkey is acquiring AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters, Rapier surface-to-air missiles, Meko-200 frigates, F-16 aircraft, Maverick air-to-surface missiles and Super Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The most significant developments are the acquisition of attack helicopters, high performance aircraft such as the F-16 and the Mirage 2000 and more effective antitank and anti-aircraft missiles. However, none of these systems is really revolutionary new technology, even though their introduction in the NATO inventory will enhance the southern region countries' conventional deterrence and defense. On the other hand, it should be recognized that technology, except in a very few cases, is evolutionary more than revolutionary, and even improvements in the weapons systems on hand constitute a qualitative jump that should not be underestimated.

The process of technological development is part of the Western way of life, both in the civilian and military sectors. Thus, it is logical that technology is often assumed to be the best solution for NATO defense problems. But technology should not mesmerize our judgment and it should not be seen as the "only" way to solve the contradictions of the Western defense posture.

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4. Frank Barnaby, "The Automated Battlefield", The Free Press, New York, 1986, p. 6.

5. The loss of 30 aircraft is reported by Cecil I. Hudson Jr. and Peter H. Haas, "New Technologies: the Prospects", in Johan Holst and Uwe Nerlich, ed. "Beyond Nuclear Deterrence", New York, 1977, p. 109. The loss of 12 aircraft is reported by Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Precision Guidance for NATO: Justifications and Constraints", Holst and Nerlich, op. cit. p. 207. Norman Augustine talks of 873 sorties. Cited by F. Barnaby, op. cit. p. 15.

6. The Military Balance 1986-1987, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1986, p. 205.

7. The Washington Times, 1 November 1984.

8. Cited by F. Barnaby, op. cit. p. 38.

9. F. Barnaby, op. cit. p. 14.

10. The Soviet Union is developing the SS-N-21 cruise missile that would be carried by the Victor III and modified Yankee class submarines, and by the new Akula, Mike and Sierra class submarines. Due to its small dimensions, the SS-N-21 can be launched from torpedo tubes.

11. The Military Balance 1986-1987, op. cit. pp. 69-72 and pp. 78-79.

6

ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY, GREECE
AND TURKEY

Dr. Tuğrul ÇUBUKÇU - Dr. Erdal TÜRKKAN

ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY

One of the most important factors determining the possibilities of cooperation between two or more countries is, without any doubt, the economic policies applied in those countries. The existence of inward looking policies in any of the partner countries would seriously limit the extent of economic cooperation whatever the potential of each country is. A good example in this point is the economic history of the Ottoman Empire.

In the Ottoman era liberal "open door" policies constituted one of the basic principles of external relations. As long as the Ottoman Empire had the political and military control on the Mediterranean Territory this area had become a flourishing commercial center of the world. We know that the Italian states were among the most important and continuous partners of the Ottomans and the Italian commercial superiority in the Mediterranean region ended with the Ottoman decadency. Likewise, Greeks had also profited from this liberal policy so much so that, after 19th century, Ottoman Greeks had become a threat for the commercial interests of other Ottoman partners. Even at the beginning of the Turkish Republic, Greeks and Italians were continuing to play an important role in the external economic relations of Turkey.

But we know that after 1930's Turkey has changed its liberal open door policies like most of its partners. This general policy change very quickly limited Turkish economic relations with other countries, including Greece and Italy. This situation has continued up to 1950's with some short term interruptions. Following this inward looking economic strategy for a period of nearly 50 years, Turkey has started to experience new economic policies since 1980 which create a new perspective for economic cooperation among our countries. This policy

change is not yet very well known by all our potential partners and has not yet been as much fruitful as we wish. However, we believe that this change will determine the extent and the nature of economic relations between Italy, Greece and Turkey. Therefore, in this paper, we first try to give a brief survey on the essential points of the previous and new economic policies in Turkey with a special reference to the changes observed in the rationality of the Turkish firms. Later on, we analyze some concrete aspects of the economic cooperation between the three countries.

1. General Characteristics of the Turkish Economic Policies Before and After 1980

Before 1980, economic policies under application in Turkey, were representing all characteristics of the typical "Inward Looking Industrialization Policies" or "Import Substitution Policies". Principal characteristics of these policies were as follows:

- Low and sometimes negative interest rate policy.
- Over valuation of Turkish Lira or under valuation of foreign currencies.
- Under valuation of basic goods produced by State Economic Enterprises.
- An excessive protectionism by a system of prohibitions of imports and high custom barriers.
- High and continuous public demand, and so on.

Before 1980, the principal preferences and tendencies of the Turkish firms, were in accordance with these policies.

Briefly, we can enumerate some typical behaviours of the Turkish firms observed in this period, as follows:

- Tendency to neglect external markets and a high preference given to the internal market
- Lack of interest for joint ventures or other forms of cooperation with foreign firms, in internal or external markets.
- Tendency to work independently and lack of interest for any collaboration in the domestic market with other Turkish firms.

- Tendency to neglect specialization and preference given to self sufficiency at firm level.
- Tendency to neglect economies of scale and preference for medium and small size plants, and so on.

These kinds of policies and attitudes were in effect conscientiously and continuously especially after 1960's. They have produced satisfactory, and in some points, spectacular results, up to the second half of 1970's. On the macro-economic level, relatively high growth rates of GNP has been ensured during more than three successive five-years-plan-periods in a relatively stable economic and social environment.

But these attitudes and policies created important bottlenecks and disequilibrium in certain strategic areas of economic activity, namely:

- An important shortage of foreign currency.
- An important shortage of credit.
- An important bottleneck in the field of infrastructure, especially in energy and transport and communication.
- An important bottleneck in the field of basic goods produced by State Economic Enterprises.

These shortages and disequilibriums had aggravated and become a nuisance for the healthy development of the Turkish economy, during the petroleum and world economic crises in the second half of the 1970's.

At the end of the period, inflation was around 100% and the rate of growth of GNP was becoming negative for the first time in recent Turkish economic history.

At the same time, Turkey was passing through very important social and political disturbances with large and long strikes and armed political agitations.

In these conditions, Turkish Government, in accordance with its economic partners, had announced a very comprehensive and pretentious economic stability program, namely, the 24th January 1980 Stability Measures.

The principal aims of these measures were double. The first aim was to set up internal equilibrium between total demand and total supply in goods, services, capital, foreign currency and money markets, ensuring the equilibrium of the balance of payments and amelioration of Turkish credibility in the world credit market. The second principal aim of these measures was to establish a new economic environment, namely, new structures, new institutions, new habits and attitudes and new policies -to prevent the re-appearance of the same disequilibriums in the future and to prepare a new economic structure ensuring a rapid growth in stability.

The principal policy instruments and orientations of the stability program were the following:

- Application of a flexible foreign exchange rate policy.
- Elimination of limitation of the government controls on prices of commodities and services produced by the Private Sector.
- Application of real or positive interest rates for saving deposits and for credits.
- Enlargement of the autonomy of State Economic Enterprises in their decisions on price and production with an ultimate aim of their rationalization.
- Establishment of a comprehensive system of encouragement for exports by means of direct subsidies, tax rebates, tax repayments, duty free import possibilities for exports and so on.
- Gradual liberalization of imports by limitations of import prohibitions and by lowering of the custom barriers.
- Gradual liberalization of exchange regime with an ultimate aim of the convertability of Turkish Lira.
- Gradual elimination of the infrastructural bottlenecks by means of changing priorities in Government spendings in favour of infra-structural projects and by means of establishing non-budgetary special funds which are used for accelerating investments.

- Gradual elimination of State monopolies and privatization of State Economic Enterprises for activating market forces.
- Encouragement of foreign capital, especially by elimination of the bureaucratic, legal and fiscal obstacles and by equalisation of the status of the foreign and local enterprises.
- Modernization of the taxation system, especially by introducing Value Added Taxes.

Most of these measures have started to be applicable at the beginning of 1980's and after the elections in 1983, the new Government has continued in the same direction by introducing specific measures at some particular points. These measures have been applied in stable political and social conditions after the intervention of the Turkish Army on September 12, 1980.

The response of the Turkish firms to the new economic policies was extremely rapid and effective.

First of all, after 1980 we observe a rapid reorientation of activities in favour of external markets in a large part of Turkish Private Sector. Most of the big private firms in manufacturing industry, have established a new export firm or strengthened their existing organizations in marketing.

At the beginning, the preferred external markets for the Turkish firms were Middle East Petroleum countries. But in time, their interest has extended to all other countries.

The internal market continued to have a dominant share in the activities of the majority of the Turkish firms. Most of these firms now, however, base their long term strategy on the development of their exports.

After 1980, the available investment funds were partly used for creating an export surplus by the modernization or enlargement of existing capacities. Nevertheless, at this stage, it is difficult to say

that export oriented policies have yet played an important role in the orientation of investment decisions of the Turkish firms because the entrepreneurs were obliged to limit their investments due to the high cost of credits.

Following the stabilization measures, the traditional tendency to enlarge the production capacity by extensive methods has disappeared and emphasis has been placed on using the idle capacity and increasing productivity to raise production.

In the framework of inward looking industrialization strategy, advanced technology has been used only in some export oriented sectors such as textiles. After 1980 measures although the necessity to use advanced technology in all sectors became much more evident the results were not so far satisfactory due to the insufficiency of the financial resources and transfer of technology. But, we do observe a remarkable change in the attitudes of Turkish firms in the fields of cost minimization, quality control and packaging. This, on the one hand, is related to the growing competition at the international and national levels and on the other hand, to the pressure of rising costs of credits and raw materials.

As a consequence of stabilization measures, attitudes like low sensitivity or interest for joint ventures and other forms of collaborations with foreign firms have also changed. Most of the Turkish firms are now becoming more interested in establishing different kinds of collaborations or associations with foreign firms in Turkey or abroad. At the same time the traditional tendency of independent and isolated action and lack of interest for cooperation with national firms is now becoming less pronounced.

Another important change of mentality has occurred concerning specialization. In the framework of new economic policies the Turkish firms do not insist anymore to produce a large part of their intermediate products or their spare parts themselves. That is because, now, the difficulties related to the imports are eliminated and self-sufficiency on plant level is becoming an extremely costly operation. In the new context, every individual firm has an interest to specialize in some

limited line of production for better minimizing its cost and improving the quality of its product.

The fact is that, adaptation capacity of all Turkish private firms to the new policies and conditions was not the same. A number of private firms and few banks were obliged to go bankrupt at the early stages of this new period for several reasons. A weak financial structure was the cause of most of these bankruptcies.

The majority of the firms have adjusted to the new policies quite well and achieved very satisfactory, sometimes extraordinary results while some of them adjusted only partly or act as before.

Another point which is significant for showing the changing rationality of the Turkish private sector is its attitude vis-a-vis the full membership of Turkey to the European Community.

In fact, before 1980, the Turkish firms were somewhat hesitant for a full membership of Turkey to the European Community. But after the 1980 measures, they became a supporter of a rapid full membership.

In conclusion we can say that after 1980, Turkish firms have found a real occasion for testing its creativity, ingenuity and its power. Today, we can say that they began to trust themselves. This self-confidence constitute, without any doubt, the necessary condition for becoming a serious candidate for any international cooperation.

2. Economic Relations between Turkey, Greece and Italy

The foreign trade of Turkey has recorded a remarkable increase since 1980 due to the above mentioned policies. In line with this trend the trade between Turkey and Italy has shown a steady improvement, but despite some favourable developments the trade between Turkey and Greece has maintained its low scale and unstable feature.

Italy has always been among the first five countries in our foreign trade within the period 1962-1985, except the years 1980-1982. Although

there was a relative decline especially in our imports in these three years the volume of trade in absolute figures has continued to increase. In 1985 our trade volume has reached a level of 1 billion 160 million dollars, of which 658 millions were our imports and 502 millions our exports. In that year 5.8% of our total import came from Italy and 6.3% of our total exports went to that country. Industrial products are the major traded goods between the two countries, comprising 91% of our exports and 97% of the imports. In the last two years the number of items registering a value above 1 million dollar was 68 in our exports and 159 in our imports.

On the other hand, Greece has a very low share in Turkey's foreign trade. In 1985 this country ranks 34th in our imports and 20th in our exports. In that year we exported only 1% of our exports to Greece. There are only 20 imported and 21 exported items registering a value over 1 million dollar in the last two years' trade. If we look at the figures since 1962, we can see that whenever the political relations have deteriorated the trade has shrunk significantly and as the relations are normalized it has resumed the old pattern and revived considerably. Between 1962-1985 we had the lowest export (521 thousand dollars!) to Greece in 1975 right after the Cyprus struggle, and the highest export in 1982 (around 130 million dollars) when the tensions somewhat cooled off. The same swings can be detected in our imports. In 1985 the volume of trade has remained at 123 million dollars, of which 76 million dollars are our exports and 47 million dollars our imports. Industrial products comprise 87% of our exports and virtually all of our imports.

As a matter of fact Turkey's economic relations with both countries are larger than the above figures indicate. Italy carries out many projects in various fields in Turkey, some of them being quite sizeable projects such as Karakaya Dam. If we consider the total value of these projects and the share of value added accrued to Italy, Italy's benefit may well exceed half of its exports to Turkey. In addition to that, Italian firms held the shares of some big industrial and mining corporations in Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey pays large sums of freight money to Greek ships (around 400 million dollars) for the shipment of its imported and exported goods. Maritime transportation is the dominating form of transportation in our foreign trade and only a small part of it is realized by Turkish ships despite the fact that Turkish Maritime fleet has been enlarged tremendously in recent years .

There are some factors that cause an overvaluation of the trade between the three countries. For example, some of our exports to Italy are for the purpose of re-exporting, mainly due to get over the EEC restrictions. As for the exports to Greece, the "dock duty" charged in Turkey depending on the distance of transportation of exported goods is responsible for a serious overvaluation. Hence, even though the exports are actually directed to other countries they are stated to be sent to Greece as the nearest destination in order to pay a lower dock duty. Thus, our exports to Greece are overstated and, according to the experts, this overstatement explains at least half of our exports to Greece.

An important factor constraining the economic relations between Turkey and the two countries is the EEC policies. The protective measures such as quotas, reference prices, some leverages and standards confine the normal trade and prevent its expansion. However, in addition to these common EEC measures, Greece applies other non-tariff barriers, mostly due to political hardship. So far, Turkey has not resorted to retaliation, but of course this behaviour injures the relations.

3. Coordination of Policies and Activities

As we explained at the beginning of our paper Turkey has changed its economic policies to a great extent since 1980. A constituent part of these policies is the liberalization of foreign trade, a greater emphasis on increasing the exports and easing the balance of payments pressures. However, the spreading protectionist movements in the world trade start injecting a new element to the bilateral relations of Turkey with other countries. Turkey is now considering to put some emphasis on balancing the mutual economic benefits in its bilateral relations. Thus, those countries that wish to expand their economic relations with Turkey should take this factor into account.

Actually, despite protectionism and bilateral arrangements, personal and inter-firm contacts still preserve their primacy in the world trade. If the economic policies are suitable and the economic conditions are beneficial for both sides artificial barriers and the political obstacles are usually surmounted and one way or another businessmen who have immigrated from Turkey know about the Turkish firms and the markets very well and they are ready to benefit from the opportunities. Actually, this factor has contributed to the relative improvements in our trade with Greece in the recent years, despite the political obstructions.

But still, a large scale economic relation necessitates a deliberate action and policy coordination in order to create an atmosphere conducive to trade. The economic policies pursued in Turkey in recent years have certainly contributed to this aim to a great extent. We believe that these policies played an important role in the development of Turkish-Italian economic relations. Likewise, if the political barriers are lifted and Greece adopts more liberal economic policies instead of the extensive interventionist policies now applied both countries would benefit from a competitive international trade.

On the other hand, one approach to see the potential areas of cooperation may have been to analyze and compare the sectoral production capacities, the state of technology and the development trends in each sector. For agricultural products, the same analysis could have been carried out by examining the self-sufficiency ratios. Following these analyses, one may think of activating mixed economic commissions to find a solution to the problem of cooperation and allocation of resources. There may be some justifications behind this approach in various sectors and industries. However, we believe that this kind of a mechanism would be very impractical, if it ever works out, and its benefits would be very limited. We think that the most effective cooperation could be carried out by allowing the working of a free market mechanism which would take care of the comparative advantages of each country in the most efficient way. Italy has gone a long way in this respect and Turkey is having an

accumulating experience. There is no doubt that the adoption of a similar policy by Greece will help improve the economic relations.

However, we would like to take one exception to this approach. Because of its unique nature it is our opinion that there is ample space for administrative cooperation in the tourism sector. After losing a long time in debating the subject Turkey has finally understood the importance of this sector. In recent years Turkey has invested in this sector very heavily and extended its capacity to a large extent. Now, Turkey is a major country in the Mediterranean tourism. But there is a certain element of interdependency and complementarity among the Mediterranean countries due to the special nature of tourism activities. While these countries are competitors in the field there is also a potential benefit for all of them without making the others worse off. We think that an administrative cooperation is needed to increase the gains mutually and to ignore this advantage is detrimental to all parties. The potential gain from such a cooperation is especially evident in the case of Turkey and Greece.

4. EEC Relations

Turkey is an associate member and wishes to become a full member of the European Economic Community. At the moment, EEC's view of Turkey's full membership does not seem to be encouraging. Turkey is fully aware of this opinion. However, Turkey has come to the conclusion that its economic and political interests lie in the full membership of the Community. It is expected that Turkey will apply for full membership in the very near future. Since it is well known that full membership is a long and difficult process the dominant view in Turkey is on the side of not to delay the application anymore. We wish and hope that Italy and Greece would support this application.

The product composition of Turkey resembles that of Greece to a certain extent and even between Turkey and Italy, there is some similarity in some sectors in this respect. Therefore, in general, these three countries seem to be competitors in some products. But if we look

at the issue from the point of view of EEC common policies, in case of Turkey's full membership, this similarity will become an advantage rather than a difficulty for Italy and Greece. Because in this situation these three countries may join their forces and act in concert in order to produce those policies which are to their common interests and thus the southern flank, together with Spain and Portugal, would gain weight in the North-South dialogue within the EEC.

Turkey is determined to continue the present outward looking policies to set up a competitive economy either within or outside of the EEC. There is already a significant accumulation of industrial capacity in Turkey. In recent years Turkey has made an extensive investment in infrastructure and this will open up the way for further expansion in every field. With the completion of Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) in the near future the agricultural potential of Turkey will increase enormously. As already mentioned, tourism activities in Turkey are growing very fast in line with a large expansion of accommodation facilities. Several free trade zones are going to start operating in 1987. As the outward looking policies continue and free market economy develops there is every reason to expect a larger inflow of foreign capital. What we mean by all this is that Turkey is going to become a quite powerful country either within or outside of the European Community. Now the question is whether the EEC will keep Turkey outside of the Community and take it as a competitor against itself or benefit from this power by absorbing it as a full member partner. It is up to Europe to turn a disadvantage into an advantage for itself.

TABLE I: TRADE BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITALY

<u>YEARS</u>	<u>IMPORTS</u>			<u>EXPORTS</u>		
	<u>(1000 \$)</u>	<u>%of TOTAL</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>(1000\$)</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL</u>	<u>RANK</u>
1962	33.239	5.4	4	51.510	13.5	3
1963	34.862	5.1	4	43.409	11.8	4
1964	31.950	6.0	4	28.745	7.0	4
1965	36.878	6.5	4	30.454	6.6	4
1966	53.808	7.5	4	31.784	6.5	4
1967	50.020	7.3	4	36.234	6.9	3
1968	67.106	8.8	4	24.194	4.9	6
1969	75.500	9.4	4	42.897	8.0	3
1970	74.136	7.8	4	38.967	6.6	5
1971	120.728	10.3	3	39.411	5.8	6
1972	165.850	10.6	4	53.266	6.0	4
1973	170.205	8.2	4	115.448	8.8	4
1974	270.783	7.2	4	90.332	5.9	5
1975	357.940	7.6	4	82.120	5.9	4
1976	386.119	7.5	5	171.511	8.8	4
1977	454.407	7.8	4	163.286	9.3	2
1978	290.497	6.3	4	175.240	7.7	2
1979	473.233	9.3	3	212.970	9.4	2
1980	299.688	3.8	9	218.448	7.5	2
1981	371.866	4.2	10	246.096	5.2	6
1982	415.002	4.7	8	327.493	5.7	5
1983	510.274	5.5	6	422.758	7.4	3
1984	629.008	5.9	6	501.160	7.0	4
1985	658.176	5.8	5	502.216	6.3	6

TABLE 2: TRADE BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE

YEARS	IMPORTS			EXPORTS		
	(000\$)	% of Total	RANK	(000\$)	% of Total	RANK
1962	2.549	.41	29	3.861	1.01	18
1963	2.780	.40	28	3.358	.91	20
1964	1.099	.20	30	3.837	.93	22
1965	274	.05	40	6.223	1.34	18
1966	217	.03	45	5.733	1.17	19
1967	178	.03	48	2.447	.47	26
1968	861	.11	38	3.653	.74	25
1969	403	.05	44	7.278	1.36	18
1970	180	.02	45	4.041	.69	22
1971	522	.04	43	5.903	.87	22
1972	4.774	.31	29	10.989	1.24	18
1973	7.005	.34	29	19.525	1.48	14
1974	16.197	.43	27	19.842	1.30	15
1975	466	.01	61	521	.04	52
1976	5.692	.11	44	1.798	.09	46
1977	17.252	.30	34	1.572	.09	53
1978	3.095	.07	51	4.885	.21	41
1979	26.300	.52	30	4.662	.21	41
1980	64.672	.82	23	8.873	.30	35
1981	22.368	.25	36	47.398	1.01	21
1982	14.410	.16	37	129.877	2.26	12
1983	20.984	.23	39	57.619	1.01	22
1984	48.492	.45	33	93.686	1.31	20
1985	47.186	.42	34	76.221	.96	20

(7)

SEMINAR ON COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY
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PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Arghyrios A. Fatouros
(Faculty of Law,
University of Thessaloniki)

and Anastasios Yannitsis
(Faculty of Political Science,
University of Athens)

In considering possibilities and prospects for economic cooperation between Italy, Greece and Turkey, we must acknowledge at the outset that there are at this time very few elements which would permit a study of a genuinely trilateral relationship. What exists at present is three bilateral relationships : Italy-Greece, Greece-Turkey, Turkey-Italy. The fact that Italy and Greece currently belong to the European Economic Community while Turkey is only associated with it makes even more difficult any realistic tripartite projection. In what follows, therefore, reference to economic relations between all three of the countries will occur only with regard to possible future developments.

The paper starts with a brief introductory section in which certain necessary general considerations are set out. It then reviews the main areas of actual and possible economic cooperation between the countries concerned. In the last part, relations between these countries, and in particular between Greece and Turkey, in the institutional context of the European Economic Community are considered.

One fundamental point must be stated at the outset. This paper deals with economic issues. It is not intended to address the political dimensions of relations between the three countries. However, while political considerations may be largely disregarded as far as loose economic relationships,

of the "classical" type, are concerned, they become of decisive importance when closer, integrated economic relationships between countries are envisaged. It follows that the continuing controversies, not to say conflicts, between Greece and Turkey cannot be assumed away when studying the prospects for future economic cooperation, especially in the framework of the European Economic Community. Were we to do so, we would be writing fiction.

I

Economic relations between the three countries are determined by four categories of factors : The level of economic development of each country and the particular problems it faces, depending on the phase and features of its developmental evolution; the form of production specialization in each country in conjunction with the kinds of products with which it participates in the international division of labor and the geographical dimension of its links with world trade; the mutual benefits that can be derived from cooperation between the three countries; and the extent to which these countries share certain traits, such as culture, social and political values, international orientations etc.

In economic terms, taking into account such considerations as per capita national income, the level of integration in the world economy, productivity, economic and social infrastructure, etc., a definite hierarchical order may be established, to wit, Italy, Greece, Turkey. This order is founded primarily on technology and the level of technological development in each country, as reflected in the extent of industrialization, the kinds of linkages with the world economy, and the capability for dealing with and incorporation in the processes of the competitive world market. At the same time these countries share a number of common elements: a considerable part of their productive system is mediterranean in character; a large segment of labor in all of them is, by Western European standards, non-specialized and low-paid; each of them, in whole or in part, belongs to the European economic periphery.

To the extent that the three national economies, or particular sectors in them, are heterogeneous they tend to be complementary, that is to say, they function in a non-competing, non-conflictual manner. To the extent that economies and sectors are homogeneous, they tend to be competing in that their respective objectives are similar and success of one of them implies failure for another. In other words, in some cases (with respect to some sectors) the situation is that of a "zero-sum-game", where cooperation is problematic, whereas in others it is a "positive-sum-game", where cooperation is possible, since it leads to benefits on all sides.

In very broad terms, Italy's general economic situation, in particular its level of development, as well as its geographic position places that country in a less conflictual situation with respect to each of the other countries than is the case between Greece and Turkey. In the latter countries' case, their respective levels of development, the particular features of their economies and their sectoral as well as geographic areas of activity tend to limit the possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Finally, three basic features of the Greek economy are important for any consideration of present-day potential for cooperation. First, there is still today a relatively large agricultural sector; it accounts for 17 % of national production, 25 % of employment and 26 % of exports. The agricultural products involved are similar to those of the other two countries, although some areas of specialization in terms of products and forms of production differ in each country, thus allowing considerable scope for commercial exchange between them. Secondly, Greece still has a rather limited industrial base, which is largely concentrated in traditional branches of production (textiles, shoes, furniture, agricultural industry, etc.). Moreover, the industrial sector as a whole is running a deficit in international trade. This element contributes decisively to the deficit of the country's balance of payments, which has kept increasing since 1974 and especially since Greece's accession to the EEC in 1981. This latter event has been at the root of serious adaptation and development problems for Greek industry and for the balance of payments. Thirdly, the situation of the country's balance of payments limits considerably its ability to make any concessions which do not bring immediate benefits, to the extent such concessions may adversely affect the balance of payments.

II

The principal fields of actual and potential economic interaction (and cooperation) between Italy, Greece and Turkey are those of trade, in goods and in services, and investment. They will be reviewed in this section. Problems and possibilities of cooperation in the framework of the European Economic Community are considered in the next section.

1. Trade in Goods

Trade between Greece and Italy is marked, especially after Greece's accession to the EEC (1981), by an increasing deficit on the Greek side. This affects considerably a number of industrial branches in Greece, such as shoes, agricultural machinery etc. Italy's absorptive capacity for Greek industrial products tends to diminish. The Greece-Italy "competitiveness index" $[(X-M) : (X+M)]$ moves from -0,47 in 1980 to -0,60 in 1985 for industrial products and from 0,64 (1980) to 0,32 (1985) for raw materials (BITC, 2-3). For agricultural products it remains stable (0,47 and 0,49 respectively).

Trade between Greece and Turkey is relatively limited in volume and diversity of products (imports and exports around \$ 45 million in 1985). It has however increased considerably in recent years ; from 0,07 % of total Greek trade it has reached 0,30 % in 1985. For the past eight years, Greece has been running a deficit; although there has been recently some improvement in this respect.

Greece and Turkey export largely the same products both to industrial countries in Europe and to mediterranean developing countries. From a total of 69 SITC classes (two-digit level), six products (vegetables and fruit, tobacco, textile fibers, petroleum products, textile yarns etc., and articles of apparel) represented in 1982 82 % of Turkish exports to OECD countries and 68 % of Greek exports to the same countries. Similarly, seven products (cereal products, vegetables and fruit, textile yarns, non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, metal products, electrical machinery) accounted for 52 %

of Turkish exports and 63 % of Greek exports to OPEC countries. It is evident that the international specialization structures of the two countries are rather homogeneous. This also accounts for the limited trade between them, which is basically of an inter-industry, rather than intra-industry character. The homogeneity of export structures places them in conflict with regard to penetration of both the OECD and the OPEC markets. As far the latter is concerned, Turkey appears to be successfully utilizing to its advantage its cultural and religious links to the countries concerned.

On the basis of the above, certain conclusions may be drawn as to trade in goods.

a) With Greece's entry into the Common Market, Italy has succeeded in increasing its penetration of the Greek market. This has led, however, to problems both for the Greek balance of payments and for specific sectors of the Greek economy. In a time of crisis, with continuing deficits and with the Greek economy still adapting to the EEC, such situations create tensions, which it would be desirable to resolve either through systematic action by the two governments or through "compensation" in other sectors (e.g., technology or investment).

b) While there is a high degree of homogeneity in Greek and Turkish export structures, the two economies do have areas of complementarity, where mutually beneficial trade could develop. Turkey's protectionism affects potential trade relations with Greece. Differences between the two countries in their level of development are not as great as those between Turkey and the industrially advanced countries; there is accordingly greater need for mutual concessions if trade or other kinds of economic cooperation are to develop.

Turkey's protectionist policies affect trade relationships with respect to other markets, too, especially that of the EEC. Turkey is a principal supplier of the EEC in some textiles, as to which certain problems

have arisen in some EEC countries, including Greece. Turkish pressures for greater access to the EEC market for these products are not accompanied by any offer of concessions to counterbalance the damage to some Community countries. It is true that Greece has today relatively free access to the EEC market but it has had to adjust to the Community regime and greatly to decrease its measures against imports from other countries, members and non-members of the EEC.

2. Trade in Services

Two major activities are relevant here, tourism and maritime and land transportation.

a) On a bilateral level of tourist exchanges (where detailed data are lacking) Greece seems to be running a surplus with respect to Italy (about 330.000 arrivals of Italians in 1983) and a deficit with respect to Turkey (Greek tourists' expenditures of about \$ 730.000 in Turkey compared to about \$ 180.000 of Turkish tourists in Greece in 1984). The principal factor which accounts for these relationships is the difference in income between the three countries. Infrastructure and cost competitiveness also affect developments in this field. Existing bilateral agreements concerning tourism may offer a basis for future cooperation.

On the other hand, the three countries compete with one another as to tourism from third countries. Geographic contiguity brings competition between Greece and Turkey close to a zero-sum-game. On a long-term basis, it may be possible to develop programs of cooperation on a bilateral or even trilateral basis, with respect to third-country tourism. Considerable research would be needed to determine the modalities which might make such programs beneficial to all concerned. At present, the political situation between Greece and Turkey precludes further developments in this direction.

b) The geographical position of the three countries makes transportation an obvious matter of common concern. Beyond the mutual facilitation of transit through one another's territory, the three countries could profitably cooperate in developing common transport networks with respect

to other markets (e.g. Middle East). While relations in this respect have been developing normally, the possibilities of common action with respect to other markets, with a view to exploiting the three countries' complementary geographic situation, have not been seriously addressed. Once again, political conditions between Greece and Turkey are hardly conducive to common long-term action of this sort.

3. Direct Investment and Technology

The gradations in the levels of economic and technological development between the three countries create favorable conditions for direct investment and transfer of technology.

There has been considerable Italian direct investment in Greece in recent decades. In the mid-seventies, Italian investments accounted for about one-sixth of direct investment from EEC countries. Since that time, however, the progressive opening of the Greek market led Italian enterprises to a strategy of penetration through exports rather than investment. There is thus a tendency among Italian, and other foreign enterprises in the Greek industrial sector, towards disinvestment and increased investment in commercial or service enterprises. Moreover, a number of foreign-controlled enterprises in Greece limit themselves to very low levels of added value, importing from their home country most of the intermediate products.

Such strategies do not contribute to a positive climate for foreign direct investment. The Greek government, on the other hand, has taken a favorable attitude toward foreign direct investment of high or middle technological level, because it considers that, at the present stage of development, the Greek economy would benefit from such investment, which would moreover contribute to improve the balance of payments and to lessen the pressures for adjustment to the EEC. Wholly-owned Italian investment or joint ventures in the industrial sector and Italian participation in large construction projects would be particularly appropriate. Similar considerations apply to technology transfer, whether linked with direct investment or in collaboration with Greek enterprises. European Community projects and programs provide a number of opportunities for cooperation in this regard.

Theoretically, the differences in the level of development and technology between Greece and Turkey could function in a manner similar to that just described with respect to Italy, with Greece playing the role of the investing and technology-exporting country. It is evident, however, that such relationships require a high degree of mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate which would grow with great difficulty in the present political climate of Greek-Turkish relations.

III

When we now attempt to study conflict and cooperation between the three countries in the institutional context of the European Economic Community, we find that our discussion is necessarily focussed primarily on one set of relations, those between Greece and Turkey.

The strictly economic sides of Greek-Italian relations in the context of EEC have already been touched upon and there is little specific to add. Recurrent talk about a Mediterranean or Southern bloc within the EEC has not led until now to much real action. Moreover, were such a bloc to materialize, Italy's position in it is not quite certain, in view of the country's North/South division and the continuing economic predominance of the industrialized North. Recent efforts, however, to promote the convergence of economic structures within the Community present both Greece and Italy with interesting prospects of developments from which both could benefit.

The fundamental problem in the economic relations between Greece and Turkey is the current state of their political relations. Close economic relationships cannot develop between countries when one of them feels threatened in its national integrity and both are unwilling to help strengthen the economy of their rival. We have already seen how these considerations affect prospects of closer cooperation in trade and investment. The difficulty is even more obvious in the case of relations with and within the European Economic Community.

Greece and Turkey became associated with the EEC around the same time : the Athens Agreement was signed in 1962, the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Implementation of the Greek agreement was largely suspended during the military dictatorship in Athens (1967-1974). In 1975, Greece applied for full membership. Turkey saw this move as disturbing the already tense relations between the two countries and opposed action on the Greek application. In this it was unsuccessful, yet met with partial success in its quest for concessions on the part of the EEC, to help restore a balance in the latter's relationship with the two countries. The entry of Greece in the EEC, on January 1, 1981, has undoubtedly upset that balance. Moreover, Turkey has, since 1976, stopped implementation of the Association Agreement provisions concerning the progressive elimination of import duties and charges. The coming to power of the military in Turkey in 1980 led to the "freezing" of most association activities and processes, so that during the first years of Greek membership in the EEC the Turkish presence in it was quite muted. Recently, however, a "normalization" process has been set in motion and, after several years of inaction the Council of Association met, albeit with no visible accomplishment, in September. This has ushered in a new phase in the relations between Turkey, Greece and the EEC.

Current debates focus on two particular sets of issues : Greece's attitude toward Turkey in the context of the latter's Association Agreement with the EEC and possible future problems if and when Turkey applies for accession.

The former issue is a bit complicated. On acceding to the EEC, Greece undertook to accede to all agreements already concluded by the EEC with third countries, including the Ankara Agreement of 1963. (Art. 4, 118 and 120 of the Greek Act of Accession). The usual manner of proceeding in such cases is for the EEC and the associated country to conclude a "Supplementary Protocol" setting forth the amendments to the Association Agreement (and related instruments) which have become necessary because of the new member's accession. Negotiations between Turkey and the EEC on this matter (at an early stage of which Turkey unsuccessfully sought to have included in the Protocol a statement binding Greece not to

oppose future Turkish accession to the EEC) were suspended during the "freeze" of EEC-Turkey relations. When the matter came up eventually, Greece posed two conditions precedent for agreeing to the Protocol. First, that Greece be exempted from the provisions of the Association Agreement on free circulation of workers and second, that Turkey lift a set of discriminatory measures against the real estate holdings of Greek nationals in Turkey.

The rationale of the first condition is evident, given the current state of Greek-Turkish relations, plus the additional fact that Greece is the only EEC member state with a common border with Turkey. This condition has in fact been met for most purposes in the context of recent action by the Council concerning implementation of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol of 1970. The Council's proposal to Turkey, qualifying, and virtually nullifying, provisions for free circulation of Turkish workers in the EEC area starting in December 1986, includes language to the effect that any contracting state can take measures whenever it considers that application of the Council's decision (on circulation of Turkish workers) could cause serious problems unrelated to the labor market. Such measures must be notified to other members of the Council of Association but the latter has no authority to examine them. In addition, a joint statement was included in the minutes to the effect that Greece may invoke the above-mentioned provision in order to deal with situations that could affect its national security.

The second condition refers to a secret order of the Turkish Government, dating from 1964, which "suspends" all transactions involving real estate in Turkey owned by Greek nationals (or persons of Greek ancestry that now have another nationality) and deprives them of any income from real property. Thus, Greeks cannot acquire, dispose of or inherit real property in Turkey. This order was issued in retaliation for alleged mistreatment of Turkish nationals in Greece. (More recently the Cyprus events of 1963 have been invoked). The order was recently reaffirmed by the Turkish Ministry of Justice. Such measures are clearly in violation of the provisions against discrimination on the ground of

nationality in the Association Agreement of 1963 as well as of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights to which both Greece and Turkey are party. While not denying the existence of this secret order, the Turkish Government has expressed no intention to abrogate it, referring instead to possible future negotiations. Among other things, of course, this order makes evident the futility of any serious consideration of economic cooperation between the two countries in the form of investments.

Greece has opposed the "normalization" of EEC-Turkey relations on the grounds that democratic government is far from being fully restored in Turkey and that Turkey's aggressive attitude toward Greece not only precludes any closer cooperation between the two countries but makes Turkey not a fitting associate for the EEC. Turkey's recent action in omitting to communicate to Greece the note sent to all other EEC members requesting the speeding up of the normalization process is indicative of a certain problematic attitude on its part.

Similar considerations would obviously apply with respect to a possible Turkish application for admission to the EEC. Despite recent high-level affirmations of intent to do so in 1987, this is clearly a hypothetical question. Before reaching the issue of the Greek attitude toward it, a number of other considerations would have to be taken into account. A first question would be whether Turkey is in a position to envisage "full acceptance ... of the obligations arising out of the" Treaty of Rome. Both the current state of the Turkish economy and the lack of any preparation to meet such obligations (since Turkey has stopped since 1976 eliminating import duties and charges) are here at issue. It is not at all clear, moreover, whether Turkey's economic orientation is primarily toward Europe and the EEC rather than the countries of the Middle East, the shared traditions and culture with which Turkey is recently consistently emphasizing. The possibility of a Common Moslem Market has even been mentioned. And there remain to be considered the country's level of development, its demographic explosion, its political difficulties over the past decades. It is thus evident that it is not for Greece to raise objections based on its own political difficulties with Turkey before all these other matters, and the EEC's own difficulty in coping with the Turkish economy, have received appropriate consideration.

The unpleasant and indeed reluctant conclusion from consideration of the problems of economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey is that political considerations govern. Any realistic assessment of the current situation cannot fail to accept that an attempt to evade political realities by means of an economic approach, in neofunctionalist style, is bound to fail and to worsen, in the process, an already unsatisfactory situation.

IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES AND DOCTRINES
FOR THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGIES IN RELATION TO NATO ①
A TURKISH VIEW

Ihsan Gürkan

"By failing to take necessary steps to improve our conventional forces, we have mortgaged our defense to the nuclear response." (1972)
"-General Bernard W. Rogers"

Two interacting themes underline the topic "Implications of Emerging Technologies and New Military Doctrines on NATO and National Strategies", and they are: (1) The viability of conventional deterrence and defense, in light of the present balance.

(2) The effects of new military technologies and doctrines on the defense of the Southern Region in general, and of Turkey in particular, with a view to promoting new strategic thought in respect to the present NATO threat perception, and recent developments in Soviet strategic thinking.

In other words, new technologies and doctrines, as they involve NATO and national strategies, should be examined within the framework of mutual evolution of two confronting pacts. This approach is seen preferable, despite the view otherwise which negates "ACTION-REACTION" models on Soviet American dealings, whether in the field of armaments, or in the conduct of diplomacy. ②

First, a word or two on geography of the Southern Region, and threat as perceived in NATO, in general terms.

The southern reaches of NATO is geo-morphologically shaped by three peninsular countries separated by Mediterranean waters, to create problems of mutual support, and in the case of Greece and Turkey, for some time a conflict situation, to cause a condition intolerable in an alliance ③

This geography, and particularly the Turkish Straits, constituting the sole exit to the Soviet military dominated Black Sea, enhance the significance of maritime forces and strategies, as they apply the Southern Region, in the overall defence strategy of NATO, and in the defense of the Southern Region itself. An admiral's position for the command of the Southern Region undoubtedly, is not without reason.

All three peninsular NATO countries, with the exception of Turkish or Eastern Thrace, have in general, a topography of mountainous character. The most exposed, and thus vulnerable, part of the Southern Region is first Turkey, and then Greece. Turkey is the remotest country from the heart

the Alliance. However, her size and thus strategic depth, as indicated by its land area per unit length of her borders and/or of her shorelines; and, its topography, are good assets for defense; whereas the Straits area proper, is rather exposed and difficult to defend against a well coordinated land and amphibious onslaught.

As to Greece, the strategic depth and geographic configuration, as well as a large number of islands and islets, reflect a different measure of defense and strategy. In particular, the Western or Greek Thrace, like an outstretched arm of an human body, is very difficult to defend. This was illustrated lastly in the Second World War, when the German armoured and infantry units were able to chop it off, at the point it joined the continental Greece, in almost two days. The western Thrace is also so shallow in depth that, at one point the Aegean Sea is no more than 20 Miles away from the Bulgarian border. This is probably why General Alexander Haig observed during the US Senate hearings sometime ago that, "As long as Turkey remains fully within the Alliance, any Warsaw Pact attack on Greece would be highly risky adventure."⁴ Long borders and shorelines in disproportion to the land area of the country, the large number of islands notwithstanding, serve to constitute a strategic weakness. The only point of comfort is the fact that, in a Warsaw Pact onslaught, larger forces will have to be assigned to assail the Turkish Thracian Straits area, and thus engaged by the Turks, than the Balkan Peninsula proper. It is worth to note that, the new Greek Defence Concept adopted in 1985 and based on the primacy of threat from the East, over the one from North, will reduce defenses facing North.

Italy is the last Southern Region country examined in this Paper, since France and Spain, presently, are outside the military structure. However, this country is away from the foci of Warsaw Pact threat except when Yugoslavia sides with the Pact from the beginning. Nevertheless, like Greece and Turkey, it is exposed to maritime threat from the Mediterranean.

The overriding point concerning the threat to NATO, which has not changed since the beginning, is that, in all foreseeable phases of conventional warfare, the Pact will enjoy numerical superiority over NATO. In the Southern Region, although figures show a NATO military manpower superiority of 1,020,000 versus 391,000 a closer scrutiny reveals that, in numbers of divisions, tanks, aircraft, etc the Pact enjoys a definite superiority. A few examples are as follows:⁵

	<u>Warsaw Pact</u>	<u>NATO</u>
Tank Divisions	13 (10 Soviet)	2
Motorized [Rifle] Divisions	58 (34 Soviet)	32
Combat Jets	2,435	1,080
Tanks	15,900 (11,000 Soviet)	8,000

(Figures, as of January 1985)

Despite some arguments that the Soviet divisions have only 40% of the strength of a NATO division, it is a fair estimate, many analysts agree, that the fire power and mobility of a Soviet division roughly equals a NATO one.

To overcome this crucial discrepancy, US nuclear deterrent in the form of Massive Retaliation was initially utilized. However, as the Soviet nuclear inventory rapidly caught up, the strategy of Flexible Response, or Flexibility in Response, as former SACEUR, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer preferred, had to be adopted in the 1960s, with deterrence based on US nuclear power plus the US and European improved and augmented conventional forces.

In the meantime, however, the Soviets multiplied their numerical edge in conventional field with increasingly sophisticated weapon systems; with still greater and better mobility and armour protected fire power; and also with more powerful fire support by conventional and unconventional artillery and air power including missiles. They also devised new operations concepts such as deep and rapid penetration and fluid exploitation including the formation and use of operational maneuver group (OMG). The Soviets also developed new organizational changes in the armed forces to exploit the current technological and doctrinal innovations, and to compensate the Western technological advances. They are also known to have acquired the capability to wage a contemporary war in the continental reaches of the Soviet Union and of their allied and client countries, and overseas, under both nuclear and non-nuclear conditions. Secondly, the Soviets prefer, as many analysts argue they do, to accomplish their political objectives without resorting to hot war, and if that is not possible or practicable, to limit the use of nuclear weapons at a minimum scale. It is also suggested in some circles, that the Soviets believe that a Warsaw Pact conventional attack against NATO may remain conventional. Arguments like "No-First-Use"(NFU); or, reaction in Western Europe against nuclear weapons, spearheaded by recent movements like "The Greens" in Germany; and finally, the present quasi-isolationist tendencies in the American public, may have formed a basis for the above mentioned Soviet strategic view.

Having, first of all, the initiative and then the adequate in-place forces, in addition to the local Pact forces, in, say, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and very large reserves in western and southwestern USSR, as well as adequate support in aircraft, missiles, and a preponderance of artillery, the Soviets enjoy the capability to concentrate superior forces in critical areas of decision. They can do that with a high rate of mobility and a very potent fire power with a very large number of formations echeloned in depth,

to ensure rapid penetration and swift exploitation to aim sustained advance toward deep strategic objectives. Improved tanks, infantry armoured fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and both armed and non-armed helicopters will be used profusely. In the field of air operations, electronic warfare will be utilized to support the Soviet air sorties and missile strikes. Very dense conventional and unconventional field artillery concentrations in the points of decision, a trend the Russians stick to very hard, since the days they learned the trade from Napoleon Bonaparte in the previous Century, will also be utilized to affect penetration and to help quicken the pace of exploitation. It is also a fact that, the Soviet Blitzkrieg envisages rapid exploitation speeds after penetration, to the order, or above, 100 Kilometers per Day.

In the sea, the new Soviet modern blue-water navy, to be supported by carrier based and shore based air, and cruise and anti-ship missiles, and in particular, a large and modern submarine force, for sea control, will attempt to intercept NATO sea lines of communications (SLOC), sea movement of troops, logistics, and raw materials including oil; to wage anti-submarine warfare (ASW); to support land operations; to conduct amphibious operations; and, if required, to conduct submarine-launched nuclear strikes on strategic, and even theater, targets. No doubt, missile strikes, by theater and strategic ballistic missiles, in the conventional and nuclear modes, may also be utilized according to the type of warfare that is being waged.

To support the above forecast about the Soviet general threat against NATO, it is well observed that, the relentless growth of the Warsaw Pact forces, has already reached a point where the total stock of the Soviet military hardware alone exceeds, in numbers, the combined total inventories of the US, the rest of NATO, and China, with the exception of surface naval vessels, small arms, and a few lesser items. Secondly, the once qualitative edge of western weaponry over the Soviets', has also diminished except in fighter jets, avionics, and missiles. ⑥ The Soviets, now, enjoy superiority also in the nuclear field, in general, up to the point that, this, along with the extensive superiority they enjoy in the conventional armaments, has been causing concern among NATO international circles, and the military of the allied nations alike. In actual fact, the total number of Soviet and Pact divisions, aircraft, tanks, and missiles in Central-Eastern Europe, and on the so called flanks, render the deployed NATO forces utterly inadequate, and, therefore, make the risk of nuclear escalation unacceptably high. This imbalance also stresses the fact that, NATO

may not be able to underwrite its much confirmed strategy of Flexible Response, Forward Defense, and Controlled Escalation. In other words, the North Atlantic Alliance cannot raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, which has become a crucial necessity since the nuclear parity, and Soviet superiority later on. Consequently, in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack, it is feared, NATO will have to make a choice between surrender and else, resorting to nuclear weapons. It is obvious that, NATO is being forced to renovate its strategy whether still in the purview of the Flexible Response, or as an entirely new one, other than now irrelevant Massive Retaliation. To raise the nuclear threshold obviously means augmenting the conventional resources with a view to achieving a greater NATO conventional capability, and of course a conventional deterrent. This, in turn, means large increases in numbers of divisions, aircraft, tanks, men under arms etc. and/or a significant enhancement of the technological edge of NATO's conventional forces. The first course of action, that is the augmentation of conventional resources ^{is,} under the circumstances, politically unaffordable, despite the extensive overall potential of North America and Western Europe combined. ⑦

In the final analysis, it seems logical that, the solution should be, first to look into the area of emerging technologies, and military doctrines (SOFTWARE); and secondly, to increase the numerical capabilities rationally to make good use of the above mentioned innovations, and to provide substance and flexibility to NATO defense (HARDWARE). In brief, the problem NATO is faced today is to rely initially on the development of emerging technologies and new military doctrines to produce new conventional armaments and to devise new tactical methods and strategies which will provide a deterrent to a non-nuclear Warsaw Pact attack. And secondly, to force, or to strain, country resources to affect a practicable increase in numbers. This is, in a way, to move, doctrinally, and psychologically, if not politically, from defensive to offensive, and thus to improve the effectiveness of the Pact, otherwise basically defensive, as we shall see later on. The US developed "Land-Air Battle Doctrine", or more recently "Army 21"; and, particularly, NATO's "Follow-On-Forces Attack" (FOFA) which is to apply aforementioned technologies and doctrines to extend the battlefield towards the enemy rear in a way both to increase the strategic depth and to make for the shortages in inventories. However, is conventional deterrence a viable strategy? The problem, simply, is the balance, for instance, in terms of tanks (Warsaw Pact 49,000 against 24,000 of NATO) or artillery and mortars (41,000 to 18,000 respectively), so on. To match the Soviets, NATO may be obliged to have to add some 90 more divisions to its present force level. A proportion

ate US contribution would be 18 new divisions to its present force level to cost \$ 4 billion to form and \$ 1.5 billion/Year to maintain. European members of NATO "who flinch at much more modest growth in their defense spending, would, most probably, blanch at their share of that cost".⁹ This seems, simply, not only unaffordable, but also a not wholly effective proposition, as already proved by numerous historical examples. Hitler's reoccupation of Rheinland, in violation of the Versailles Treaty, despite the highly superior conventional forces of France and Britain in 1936. Vietnam is another example. Moreover, the high-tech solution to offset the Soviet and Pact numerical preponderance, too, may be an advantage that may not last long.¹⁰

It is apparent that NATO cannot put aside the nuclear deterrent, at least for the foreseeable future. Therefore, a multiple solution, though still rather expensive, to require a minimum of 4% increase in defense spending as suggested by General Rogers (SACEUR)¹¹ against the present normal requirement of 3%, is the practicable solution.

As to the defense strategy of Turkey in relation to the NATO strategy, it is first of all necessary to note that, this NATO country, because of her geopolitical location, geographic conditions, and in light of the present correlation of forces, is obliged not only to maintain sizable standing forces in potential combat zones in peacetime, but also to develop her mobilization capability, as well as to modernize her forces. However, Turkey under the present process of her socio-economic development, and with her present resource potential, cannot afford the required rate and scope of modernization of her large armed forces, which are at present second in NATO to the US in size. Moreover, entirely unwarranted and irrational problem of Greek-Turkish dispute, mainly in the Aegean Sea area, complicates the distribution of her assets for NATO and national security. Geographically, Turkey, despite being in one of the hottest environments of East-West conflict, is the NATO country farthest away from the areas where NATO resources are concentrated. Consequently, in a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack, a contingency never considered improbable, Turkey, for a certain period initially, will have to fight alone.

For these and other pertinent reasons, the deterrent effect of the Turkish defensive strength constitute one of the significant problems for the Alliance.

It is a fact that, the nuclear and conventional balance, as well as the present East-West strategic confrontation, require NATO to aim to defend the Allied territories as far forward as possible, without ~~resorting~~, again as far as possible, resorting to nuclear weapons. The solution of this problem is dependent on two conditions. The first, a political one, depends

The present correlation of forces, and the multifaceted threat, as far as Turkey is concerned, will normally form the basis of the contingency plans of Turkey. First of all, Soviet-Warsaw Pact superiority in tanks and aircraft makes it obligatory, for Turkey, to improve and expand the anti-aircraft and anti-armour capabilities of the Turkish Armed forces, and to maintain them in highest possible combat readiness. Furthermore, recent information suggest an updating and augmentation of the Soviet and Pact forces that may be deployed against Greece, Turkey, and Iran. This seems to be in line with the possible enhancement of the Middle East-Persian Gulf region in Soviet eyes, also in view of the situation in Afghanistan, thus bringing Turkey and Iran, once again, on to the strategic lime light. No doubt, those forces will include sizable airborne and amphibious troops.

The strong likelihood of the superior Soviet-Pact forces to be deployed in several echelons, in order to achieve rapid penetration and swift exploitation, in their attack of the NATO defenses in depth in conformity with their present known strategic and tactical doctrine, enhances the interdiction of the echelons rear of the attacking troops. This is where FOFA schemes come very beneficial, provided of course it is executed properly with suitable means. However, before going into details, it is worth to state here that, at least two distinct type of interdiction will be involved, in western Turkey, since the attack on the Thrace-Straits area will have to comprise coordinated land and amphibious operations, with different kinds of echelonment. For instance, subsequent amphibious echelons may require to be interdicted while at sea and/or in the western Black Sea ports of embarkation, even while at the staging areas. Concentrated shipping and landing craft are also probable targets of FOFA schemes. On the other hand, defense against ground attacks with very superior modern forces, will have to be normally arranged in depth, with ample, mobile reserves, fire support, and very effective counterattack plans. These will require more troops in place, and also in the pipeline.

Similar measures will be taken in the east. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the now seven year old Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, and particularly explosive situation in other parts of the Middle East-Persian Gulf region, enhanced the strategic importance of eastern Turkey. In eastern Turkey, geographic and topographic features of the region, or more precisely, the outline of the borders and the terrain structure, dictate the utilization of different strategy and tactics for offense and defense, than for instance, in Thrace-Straits area. The strategic axes of operation which are

farther away from the Black Sea shores, as well as the position and character of the coastal mountain ranges, tend to render massive amphibious operations with deep objectives in this area rather impractical, except small scale landings. However, airborne landings are possible and may be utilized rewardingly.

Mountainous and rugged character of the terrain enhances the significance of valleys and mountain passes. Climatic conditions are very unstable throughout the year with particularly abrupt changes in wind velocities, precipitation, and temperature. In the long Winter, deep snow and extremely low temperatures, affect the operations and require special methods and equipment. Windchill factor is crucial. The nature of terrain and weather, according to the above indicators, will facilitate the defence, to enable the assigned forces to conduct active defence in depth with relatively less number of troops. However, as noted elsewhere, special vehicles and equipment are needed to gain required degree of tactical and strategic mobility; and in particular, the requirement for engineer support will be over and above the normal rate. like the Balkan passes in the West In applying the FOFA concept, the Caucasian Mountain passes and centers and bottlenecks of communication beyond the political boundaries will be very significant to interdict the following and rear echelons of attacking and/or advancing aggressor forces. Improved anti-aircraft and anti-armour defense with new and more effective weapon systems to be created by new technologies will be utilized to offset the numerical superiority enjoyed by the enemy.

In such operations, cooperation with the Iranian forces, if possible, should be sought, since, otherwise, the Soviet occupation of northern Iran or Soviet-Iranian cooperation will add much to Turkey's military problems in this theater. However, one has to note a peculiar point here. No doubt, the Iranian-Turkish cooperation will bear on the defensive operations to be conducted in this theater. But, the operational advantage thus gained will not be decisive, since, traditionally the Iranians deploy less number of troops on the northern borders than they deploy to the Iraqi frontier or they keep as strategic reserve. Besides, under the circumstances they have to guard their Afghan border (under the Soviet occupation) as well. All in all, in eastern Turkey, in contrast to the western or Thrace-Strait theater, terrain is more suitable for defense than the offense. However, here again, improvement in firepower and mobility is crucially required. New technologies and interacting military doctrines may certainly help Turkey to solve this problem. As to the new technologies and techniques, it is apparent that in the circumstances they may well be utilized, provided

they can be procured and/or provided. In this context, the recent developments in the fields of electronics and computer technology are definitely involved along with the innovations in the field of armaments and munitions, in the emerging technologies, and in new doctrines to enhance the effects of new weaponry and equipment, such as Air-Land Battle and FOFA and their future variants will be subject of scrutiny. However, even for the more affluent and technologically more advanced members of the Alliance, the majority, if not all, of the weapon systems and other revolutionary instruments of war, are still in the state of development. This point is very significant, since the average "Lead-Time" for the development of new weapons from the perception of the concept to the time the weapon becomes operational is approximately 10 years. Time factor therefore is very critical.

Some systems, which will undoubtedly revolutionize warfare, and form an infrastructure for more to come, will have to be stated.

New technologies in sensors, guidance systems, and microprocessors turn conventional weaponry into those, which can effectively neutralize a fixed point target. Similar technology is used to develop canister dispensed, individually guided submunitions to destroy tanks, as we will discuss later. In the field of air defense and interception, AWACs and other early warning devices with integral computer evaluation and communication systems, digital data links, and improved radars will be utilized. In this context, Remotely piloted Vehicles (Drones) present entirely new vistas. To achieve a cost effective interception, assymetric twinning or "Odd Couple Pairing" of interceptor aircraft may be utilized. For instance, one expensive aircraft with more sophisticated avionics, such as F-15 or F-18 is coupled with one or two less expensive aircraft, such as F-5, to enable the latter benefit from longer radar range, greater computer capacity, and anti-jamming communication capacity of the larger and more expensive aircraft.

Use of medium and short ranged sophisticated missiles against airfields is another possibility. Pershing IIs with conventional warheads are particularly suggested. Four such missiles are estimated to render an airfield unoperable for considerable length of time.

In the field of land warfare, an effective and successful forward defense with ample fire support, is seen possible with new systems, assuming to conduct defense against an aggressor having a numerical superiority of 3 to 1, or even more.

Back in the field of aircraft armaments, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is thought to be the first revolutionary air-to-air missile developed in the last quarter century. This is in terms of speed,

range, and accuracy against very fast moving targets. Four AMRAAM missiles will be carried in place of, for instance, two Sparrows on smaller jet fighters. Larger ones may carry eight.

Another problem area in modern warfare, is the defense against armoured fighting vehicles. An army corps in defense, under current conditions, should block the penetration, regain the position by counter-attack, if penetration occurs; and if the latter fails, should interdict the tank and motorized rifle divisions, OMCs under the new concept, which are moved into area of penetration to exploit the success of forward troops to achieve a breakthrough. In the process, each corps is required to destroy as many as 1000 enemy tanks a day, the majority of which will be accomplished by supporting aircraft, and remainder by other means. The dispenser, or canister delivered Smart munitions are being developed for this purpose. SKEET system is one example. It is estimated that, one aircraft carrying two dispensers among other armaments that are carried aboard, may destroy or incapacitate as many as 30 tanks out of six company size units attacked. In still another system, WASP mini-missiles, after being discharged from their dispensers, at a certain distance from their prospective targets, start seeking and eventually home on individual tanks. One aircraft, carrying two pods of twelve minimissiles each, may destroy or incapacitate as many as 20 to 40 tanks. These are systematic estimations with a high probability of realization. (12)

Those new weapons as mentioned in this Paper will probably reach operational or deployment stage in the next decade. Particularly it is worth to cite Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) and Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS), which are, like others, still in research and development stage. Until that time, there will be no army weapons comparable to the ones being developed, perhaps other than the present Pershings, present radars, and existing communications equipment, with capability of searching, acquiring, and engaging to destroy targets hundreds of kilometers to the rear of the line of contact. Therefore, until such time when the fruits of new technologies are available, air forces will have to carry out that task of interdiction. And they well know this function since the last war. Besides, it is also worth to note that, even when the new systems are fully operable, air force still will be called upon for interdiction sorties, for FOFA as well.

FOFA, will also require more command-control-communication-intelligence (C³I) capability, as the geographical scope and fluid operations, which enhance the time factor involved in the new type of warfare, ask for greater resources in terms of C³I functions. Secondly, the fact that FOFA concept

will encompass the whole of Europe and the western and southern military districts of the Soviet Union, as against the narrower scope of Air-Land Battle or Army-21, it will certainly require a great deal more assets.⁽¹³⁾ This raises a crucial point about the strategy in question that, some NATO member countries, and particularly Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, cannot afford to buy/or produce the new technology weapons. This happens to be the crux of the present problem, other than the practicability of FOFA, Air-Land Battle, or Army-21, in our respective countries. In fact, the geography of both the Thrace-Straits region, and eastern Turkey, with rugged mountain passes, and communication bottlenecks, which constitute suitable targets of interdiction, make concepts like FOFA and others suitable for these theaters as well. The same, undoubtedly applies Greece and Italy.

One of the most compelling matters NATO is faced with today, is to determine the extent of the threat posed by the Soviet short-ranged ballistic missiles (SRBM). Dual capable, that is to say, carrying conventional and nuclear warheads, SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles, with ranges from 90 kilometers up to 500, ~~is being~~ will be deployed in areas facing Greece and Turkey, as well as the large number of aircraft operated by air force and navy. They will certainly constitute a very serious threat. If deployed in required numbers, the Soviet SRBMs will seek to suppress Greek and Turkish air defences, and will enable Soviet/Pact manned aircraft to conduct selective and precision strikes to support and facilitate land operations. Finally, there is also an arms control/disarmament aspect of this problem, and it involves not only the Central, but Northern, and Southern regions as well. It was brought to light once again in the recent Reykjavik summit that, a drastic cut in nuclear ballistic missiles would require, either a proper NATO buildup of conventional power, or conclusion of an arms control agreement to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe. The first option being considered unaffordable, NATO should try to affect practicable increases in defense spending, both to invest in new technologies and to augment the conventional inventories, while at the sametime renegotiating for arms control. In this respect, it is noted that, the MBFR talks in Vienna have been going on since early 1970s, as a very slow, also incremental process.

MBFR was limited to the Central Region. It was mistakenly based on manpower as the main criterium of balance. Therefore, it was not only afflicted with the disadvantage of difficulty of verification, but, because of the geostrategic assymetry involved, it would enable the Soviets to increase

the threat on the flanks using the troops withdrawn from the center, and reintroducing them back to the center as reinforcements rapidly, when they so decided.

It appears that, NATO should now find a way to disengage from the process, and, possibly, using the Warsaw Pact's Budapest proposal of 11th June 1986, which was based on Gorbachev's suggestion to reduce the size of conventional and tactical nuclear forces in Europe, should try to change the approach to introduce more practical and effective criteria. As an example, the criteria such as "offensive force structure, armaments, or a combination of both"; an expanded area of application to include the flanks; and the "expansion of the focus of negotiations to include short-range nuclear and chemical weapons which are purely regional in character" may be introduced. (14)

All in all, the crucial point is that, it is destructive to agree on reducing the nuclear weapons without prior achievement of an optimal balance in conventional power. "Zero-Option" solutions also should be evaluated from this angle. As General Bernard Rogers observed to the meeting of NATO Parliamentarians in Istanbul a few weeks ago, "The so called Zero-Option position adopted by the Alliance in the past and pressed by the US in Reykjavik to eliminate all US nuclear cruise and Pershing missiles and Soviet SS-20s [in exchange] in Europe would leave NATO in a worse position because it would still face Soviet short-range nuclear missiles.". Therefore, it becomes obligatory that conventional threat to Europe, along with that of short-range missiles, be considered in all dealings related to intermediate missiles." (15)

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The Falklands War brought to light, inter alia, two important lessons. The first implies that, a new age of struggle between the missiles and anti-missile weapons in the tactical field, is unfurled. In other words, a new field of competition is added to the already existing fields of struggle between, for instance, aircraft and anti-aircraft weaponry; tanks and anti-tank weapons, etc. It also amounts that, the present stage in this process is one which, for the foreseeable future, tends to strengthen defense against the offense.

2. The basic strategic problem in front of NATO, in very simple terms, is to organize and support a credible forward defense, based more on conventional resources and less on nuclear response. However, in view of the fact that, NATO "High-Tech" solutions providing "Quality-Quantity Trade Offs" are not only invalidated for countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, for technical as well as financial reasons, but it may also not altogether last very long for NATO, as the Soviet/Pact military technology is not very far behind.

Therefore, although there is a definite requirement for NATO to acquire capability to exploit alliancewide the emerging technologies and new doctrines, NATO should also be ready to risk resorting to nuclear weapons selectively when conventional defense cannot prevent a decisive Warsaw Pact breakthrough. A declaratory strategy of Flexible Response without a respectable conventional capability to implement it, is an invitation to faits accomplis as pointed out by General Gallois quite sometime ago.⁽¹⁶⁾ It is also noted that, as long as Flexible Response is in effect and cannot be replaced by another strategy; and, as long as quantity and destructive power of nuclear weapons multiply, the importance of conventional weapons will be enhanced. Consequently, NATO, as a standing policy, "should strengthen its conventional forces sufficiently to ensure that, in the event of a Warsaw Pact incursion into western Europe [and to the Flanks, where there is more possibility of a Soviet venture than the Central Region], it could avoid the unpalatable choice between surrender and potentially suicidal escalation."⁽¹⁷⁾

The early utilization of new military technologies and new doctrines will provide a profitable flexibility in the balance between conventional and nuclear capabilities and also in improving the correlation of forces between the adversaries to the advantage of NATO. Although the Western Europe-North America complex already has incredible resources, it does not seem to be able to mobilize all its assets to match the Warsaw Pact. It has been observed that, even if the Pact does not augment

their armaments, NATO would need ten years to double its tank and armoured vehicle inventories, and thirty years to double its field artillery strengths. This factor alone, if there is not anything else, should warrant that, NATO should devise options such as the widescale utilization of emerging technologies etc. to make for its numerical discrepancies, but also accept the fact that, it may have to use nuclear weapons, even early in the conflict. Therefore, policies such as NFU should be seen a "step in dividing NATO and damaging the bonds of collective security that deter the Warsaw Pact." (18)

3. Emerging military technologies and new military doctrines will suggest changes in NATO and national operational strategies and tactics, within the framework of the political strategy of the triad- Flexible Response, Forward Defense, and Controlled Escalation. FOFA will be utilized. Some variants thereof may even be devised. NATO should examine such variants as the new weapon systems are made operational. The development of active defense in depth, with interdiction of the following echelons of attacking and/or advancing aggressor forces, increasingly to the rear of the line of contact, with the inclusion of more C³I nodes, communication and transportation centers and bottlenecks, major logistic centers etc. as targets, will materialize, as the revolutionary new armaments and equipment are introduced.

4. Despite the development work going on in some countries, there remains the question of funding, and of course the burden sharing, among NATO member countries. The development and production costs are rather high, for the whole program around 30 Bn. Dollars, (19) but the dividends should justify the sacrifices.

5. A final word. The current NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, NATO capabilities and limitations, and current situation in eastern Mediterranean and southwest Asia, all aggregate to warrant an optimal maximization, up to the highest practicable level, of Greek-Turkish cooperation in the defense of southeastern flank and eastern Mediterranean.

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TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGING STRATEGIC PATTERNS
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Foreign Policy Institute
Ankara

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and Turkey", Castelgandolfo, 20-22 December 1986

TURKISH PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGING STRATEGIC PATTERNS
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

The strategic environment of the Eastern Mediterranean has been adversely affected by a number of politico-military developments in recent years. NATO's southern region is confronted ^{with} serious threats to cohesion and strength. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean and the modernization of Warsaw Pact forces in the Caucasus and the Balkans, and the ongoing NATO weaknesses in the military field constitute serious security challenges.

There are also some important problems stemming from the areas south of the allied territories. The growing military strength of some regional states in the areas south of NATO is a new factor of instability and insecurity. Subversive and terrorist activities emanating from the Middle Eastern subsystem, and certain conflicts, disturbances, and socio-political developments in the region may have implications for the southern flank countries' internal and external security. Although none of these problems do not yet constitute immediate and ominous threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of the allied countries, they tend to undermine their security posture in the region. They are susceptible to complicate the Alliance's strategic problems during an East-West crisis or conflict. Challenges originating from the south are diversified and complex. They should be met through adequate means and on their own terms. In many cases the availability of a military force could not do much to alter the situation in favor of the West. Nonetheless, it would be equally imprudent to assume that military balance does not affect political calculations and perceptions of the regional states and non-state entities.

The lack of a sense of strategic partnership has added a new dimension to the problem of growing insecurities. Many Turks have begun to regard Greece's political and military reliability in an East-West crisis as questionable at best. They think that Turkey will have to assume alone the defense responsibility of the south-eastern region of the Alliance in a Warsaw Pact-NATO conflict. What is particularly regrettable is that peace and cooperation seem to be increasingly difficult to attain between Turkey and Greece as the hostile national perceptions are intensified due to the absence of a dialogue and to the rhetorical extremism.

Factors Exacerbating the Greek-Turkish Tension

It is often argued that the PASOK Government has not introduced any new substantial elements into the Greek-Turkish relations. Despite its tone, this argument continues, its policy is merely a continuation of previous policies, and it only seeks to institutionalize changes that had already taken place under the previous governments.

From the Turkish perspective, it is very difficult to share this argument for various reasons. First of all, to ease the tension and to decrease the risk of violence, the Turkish Government has repeatedly made appeals for a meeting with the Greek Government and for an expansion of economic relations. For instance, in a press conference held in Ankara in mid-March 1985, Mr. Özal told the foreign journalists that his government was ready to negotiate with Greece "anywhere, anytime, and at any level they like".

Prime Minister Özal announced on April 3, 1985 that he would be ready to conclude an agreement of "Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, Conciliation and Cooperation" with Greece, which would mutually guarantee the inviolability of the present frontier between the two countries.

On many other occasions, the Turkish Government proposed to discuss with Greece the possibilities of improving economic relations, believing that economic cooperation would create an atmosphere of relative confidence between the two nations, and this would pave the way for negotiation and solution of the political differences.

Turkey has abolished the visa requirement for Greek citizens as a gesture of good-will and in 1985, 200.000 Greeks visited Turkey.

The Turkish Governments have always maintained the belief that Turkey and Greece have interests in each other's welfare and security. In line with this conviction, Turkey has always welcome any improvement in the Greco-Turkish defense cooperation as a contribution to the strengthening of NATO's defense posture in the southern flank. For the same reason, Turkey allowed in 1980 Greece's return to the military organization of the Alliance without any reciprocal assurance that its conditions should be fulfilled by Athens. Moreover, Turkey lifted the "air security line" over the Aegean that it had unilaterally set up during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. This action was taken by Turkey in the way of contributing to the settlement of the airspace issue and without waiting for any good-will gesture on the part of Greece.

All these peace overtures and proposals have been turned down by the Papandreu Government. But what is particularly harmful to the Greek-Turkish relations is Mr.Papandreu's exorbitantly anti-Turkish rhetoric. It encourages nationalist extremism not only in Greece, but also in Turkey. It complicates the solution of problems even further by restricting both governments' freedom of action. The public opinion in Turkey is convinced that the aim of the Greek behavior is to force Turkey to make concessions without negotiations. Many Turks have, therefore, come to the dire conclusion that no improvement can be expected in relation with Greece as long as Pasok stays in power. The opposition parties and the press in Turkey have begun to criticize the Government for being too mild in the face of the bitter tone of Mr.Papandreu. Under the influence of these circumstances the present Turkish Government's tolerant approach to Greek-Turkish affairs tends to disappear.

Second, there is a widespread conviction in Turkey that Greece has become a major supporter of terrorist activities against Turkey. The terrorist organizations such as the Armenian ASALA and the Kurdish PKK are allowed to perform political activities in Greece. The Turkish terrorists who fled from Turkey after 1980 were welcome by the Greek Government, and they continue to enjoy the Greek hospitality whereas an ordinary Turkish citizen would require a visa to enter Greece.

Third, The PASOK Government's pro-Warsaw Pact stance is susceptible to affect Turkey's strategic perceptions and calculations. The Greek Government's actions have in fact gone far beyond its persisting declarations that the threat to Greece comes from Turkey, but not from the Warsaw Pact. Beside the Greek support of the Soviet Union in many East-West issues, Greek shipyards provide repair and maintenance facilities to Soviet navy auxiliary vessels in the Mediterranean. Greece has also obtained orders from the USSR for the construction of replenishment vessels. Moreover the active Greek support given to the idea of a Balkan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in cooperation with the Warsaw Pact countries is hardly in conformity with the NATO strategy in the region.

A new cause of anxiety has been the "Proclamation of Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation" signed between Greece and Bulgaria during Prime Minister Papandreou's visit to Sofia on September 11, 1986. In terms of this agreement, the two countries undertake the obligation not to initiate or encourage any actions directed against each other, and "should a situation be created which in view of both parties concerned may endanger the peace and security of either of the two countries, these two states will immediately get in touch and exchange views for the aversion of the danger". These provisions offer the Soviet Union valuable opportunities to dismantle the Atlantic Alliance in the case of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. The Soviet coalition warfare strategy would certainly take account of this recent politico-military development in the region. To say the least, in the case of a Warsaw Pact

operation in the Thrace-Straits area, Moscow would attempt to exploit this Greek commitment in order to assure Athens' passivity. In this respect, the Greek-Bulgarian "Proclamation", together with the Greek threat perception and the PASOK Governments general pro-Warsaw Pact stance, has introduced a challenge to the very concept of the alliance.

Fourth, In a PASOK meeting on 15 December 1984, Prime Minister Papandreou declared that, in terms of his NEW Defense Doctrine, the Greek armed forces were to be redeployed taking into consideration the "Turkish threat". In fact, the Greek defense policy, as applied before and after 1984, brought about important changes in the actual deployment and operational plans of the Greek armed forces. The major aspect of this policy seems to be a considerable shift in the force concentration to the south comprising especially the Aegean islands. The remilitarization process is progressing rapidly on the islands. New airfields and radar sites are being constructed. Air Force units are being redeployed. Furthermore, the Greek land forces have been heavily redeployed in the East Aegean islands, and a "Militia" has been created for the defense of these islands. All these measures show that the north-south axis in the Aegean has become the main preoccupation of the Greek defense planners. The objective of the New Defense Doctrine seems to provide Greece with a new military force posture which would facilitate the achievement of the ultimate aim of turning the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake through the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 miles. Within this context, the maintenance of the demilitarized status of the islands is not simply a legal issue. It is above all a politico-military question concerning vital security interests of Turkey and the preservation of the status quo in the Aegean.

Greece attempts to persuade the allies that inclusion of the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean, especially Lemnos, in allied plans and exercises would contribute to the defensive posture of

the Alliance. Because Greece has repeatedly claimed, and is still claiming, that the threat to her security comes from Turkey, but not from the Warsaw Pact, it would be naive to believe that Athens really intends to contribute to the establishment of a second line of allied defense in the Aegean by militarizing the islands. Under the present conditions, it would be more realistic to conclude that the Greek Government is trying to achieve its national objectives vis-à-vis Turkey by making use of allied mechanisms.

The avowed Greek intension of extending the present territorial waters limit from 6 to 12 miles is also a major concern for Turkey. Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece possesses approximately 43.68% of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.46%, the remaining 48.85% being the high seas and the continental shelf that is to be delimited between Turkey and Greece. In case of an extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, the Greek share of the Aegean would rise to 71.53% and the Turkish one to only 8.79%. Consequently, the continental shelf problem would be solved automatically in favor of Greece.

Perceptual implications of Athens' diplomatic-strategic behavior for Turkey have been exacerbated on the one hand by the continual Greek reference to the "historical rights of Greece" in the Aegean as the "cradle of Hellenism", on the other, by the history of the Greek expansion in the 19th and 20th centuries, and by the Greek attempt to invade Turkey after World War I.

This has been an attempt to reflect some of the perceptions prevailing today in Turkey. Our purpose is not to assess to what extent these perceptions are warranted or unwarranted. The point is that they are held by all the political parties, the press, and the bureaucratic segments of decision-making. What is particularly disturbing is that, under the influence of the persisting lack of a dialogue, of the dwindling transnationalism, and of the truculent rhetoric, they tend to become increasingly rigid and durable.

because the seabed agreement would imply the Greek acceptance to maintain the present 6-mile limit. Consequently, the feelings of insecurity would be diffused on both sides, and the remilitarization of the islands and the Fourth Turkish Army would cease to constitute any problem at all in the new climate of confidence.

It is often argued that the Greeks somehow view irredentist intentions in Turkey's wish to resume bilateral negotiations to settle the seabed issue. It is impossible to share this view. It is quite natural that Greece and Turkey, as two neighbouring and allied countries, both of them riparian to the Aegean Sea, should undertake negotiations in order to solve their problems about the maritime areas. The concept of the continental shelf and seabed rights have emerged in the very recent decades. There are many cases in which the continental shelf issues have been settled through negotiations between the riparian states. For instance, the Ecevit Government proposed, in 1978, to discuss with the Soviet Union the seabed issue in the Black Sea. An agreement was negotiated and concluded between Ankara and Moscow in the same year, delimiting the continental shelf areas of both countries in the Black Sea. The Soviet Union did not attribute to Turkey irredentist or aggressive intentions when Ankara expressed its wish to settle the seabed issue through bilateral negotiations. It is difficult to see any reason why we should not act in the same way in the Aegean as well. Nevertheless, Turkey should always be ready - indeed, it has always been ready - to give every assurance to Athens that the Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands and their 6-mile territorial waters would not in any way be prejudiced by the negotiations about the seabed and other issues.

On various occasions, the Greek Government argued that the solution of the Cyprus problem was a precondition for the positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations. As a matter of fact, there is a certain interaction between the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, and they should be taken up simultaneously. In general terms, progress

made in one issue area would certainly exert a positive influence on the other issue area. But to set one of them as a precondition for the solution of the other would cause a paralysis in both issue areas. This is precisely what happens today.

The Cyprus conflict is primarily an inter-communal problem, and should be solved through talks between the Greek and Turkish Communities. But it is difficult to overlook the fact that the inter-communal conflict takes place in the larger framework of Greek-Turkish relations. The two Cypriot Communities regard themselves as the "extensions" of the Greek and Turkish nations. Consequently, an easing of the present tension between Turkey and Greece would inevitably affect the attitudes of the Cypriot communities positively. If the dialogue between the two states were resumed, and if a positive development could eventually be achieved, such an improvement in relations between Ankara and Athens would contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence in Cyprus, and would considerably facilitate compromises between the two communities. It should be remembered that if Cyprus could be established as an independent state in 1960, it was mainly due to the good relations and common understanding which existed at the time between Greece and Turkey.

Economic Cooperation

The present Greek Government's habit of using foreign policy problems as diversions from internal difficulties, its overassessment of inconsequential dangers and its excessive counter-measures and rhetorical over-reactions are leading to a security-obsessed society in Greece. The problem, however, is that such obsessions are often contagious, and Turkey, like any other nation, is not immune to them.

For the two nations, the time has come to reconsider their security perspectives vis-à-vis each other. Both Greece and Turkey are situated in a very critical geostrategic area, and their means of protection are limited. They cannot afford to look at their security problems from a purely military point of view. Instead of exhausting their limited means through excessively active security policies against each other, they should try to create a shared security environment in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to realize this objective, they should adopt a broader view of security, encompassing its political and economic dimensions as well.

To this effect, beside the resumption of the diplomatic dialogue, Turkey and Greece should start making every effort to create a system of relationships characterized by cooperative processes. They need to look more towards conditions conducive to the development of interdependencies, especially in the economic field. They should make every effort to revitalize the channels connecting the Greek and Turkish societies, and to create common interests between groups and individuals across boundaries. By increasing awareness of transnational interests, such interrelationships would help decrease the risk of violence and create a durable security environment.

Regional Strategic Consensus

As a result of the Greek-Turkish tension, there is at present a serious weakness in allied defense posture in the southern flank. The tension tends to encourage anti-Western feelings in both countries. Joint training opportunities are wasted. Greece declines to participate in the joint NATO exercises taking place in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The command and control problems persist in the Aegean. Moreover, the tension causes force planning and deployment complications especially in Greece.

It is unfortunate that the strategic gap created by the Greek-Turkish tension coincides with certain new trends emphasizing the critical role of the southern flank in the overall defense of the Alliance. Political and military factors along NATO's southern periphery are susceptible to affect the Alliance with the most complicated security challenges since its founding. Furthermore, certain new developments in East-West relations and NATO strategy, such as the SDI, FOFA and the Reykjavik Summit, have brought to the foreground the balance of conventional military forces. And this is precisely where the southern flank is decrepit. All these factors emphasize that a credible defense posture in the region is needed more than ever.

Under the present circumstances, among NATO's five southern flank states - Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal - only Italy and Turkey seem to be capable of playing a leading role in forging a regional strategic consensus. Spain has a special position in the Alliance, and her armed forces are not integrated into NATO's military organization. Portugal's security policy is traditionally Atlantic-oriented rather than Mediterranean-oriented. Moreover, the modest size of Portugal's armed forces would not allow her to assume further strategic responsibilities. Although the potential Greek role cannot be overlooked, it is not possible to rely on an active Greek contribution as long as the Greek hostility towards Turkey and the Greek dubiousness vis-à-vis NATO remain unchanged.

The gap will continue to exist until there is a dialogue between Turkey and Greece. Elimination of this strategic gap in NATO defense is not dependent on the settlement of all the disputes between the two states. A resumption of the diplomatic dialogue would be sufficient to ease the tension and could soon lead to the formation of a strategic consensus at least on the basis of certain interim arrangements. The dialogue is also indispensable to pave the way for the settlement of the disputes and for seeking

possibilities of cooperation in other fields. In this respect, Italy and the other allies could play a more active role in encouraging the parties to resume negotiations.

We believe that the return of the extremist nationalism in Greek-Turkish relations runs against the flow of history and against the needs of both nations for common security, cooperation, and welfare. Hostility is not a solution. We should not spare our best efforts to substitute negotiation for confrontation.

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Giacomo Luciani

(Director of Studies, IAI, and Visiting Professor of Economics and Political
Science, UCLA)

**On the importance of Economic Cooperation between
Greece, Italy and Turkey.**

A discussion paper submitted to the meeting on Relations between Greece, Italy and
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Political Science, Athens, and the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, and held in
Castelgandolfo, December 20-22, 1986.

1. The significance of geography has seldom been fully recognized in the literature on international economic relations. There is generally a tendency to discuss trade, capital and labor movements as if distance or proximity did not matter, and the regional environment was not in any significant way more important than the international, global environment. In this view, boundaries are solid, and create a sharp distinction between the "domestic" and the "rest of the world"; the latter, however, is extremely flexible or homogeneous, and it is assumed to be basically the same for any country. It is recognised that only certain types of economic relations occur across borders, hence the distinction between "tradables" and "non-tradables".

If this perspective is accepted, today's discussion makes no sense at all: Greece, Italy and Turkey just happen to be physical neighbours, but from an economic point of view what matters is their individual relations with the rest of the world, i.e. their trade and exchange policies taken independently of each other.

The vision of the globe as an homogeneous environment in which proximity does not matter is supported by some well known cases of rapid growth in the post-World War II period. Japan experienced extraordinary growth by following a globally oriented export policy, starting from a situation in which she was very much isolated from her regional context, because of historical reasons and of the reaction to Japanese imperialism. Hong Kong is another striking example of a country totally isolated from her regional context, that succeeded in experiencing very rapid growth. In short, there may be advantages to being enclaves.

Yet, in a majority of cases it is seen that geography matters. The process of European integration has taken place between adjacent countries. The success of the EEC relative to the EFTA is due in part to the political dimension and impact of the former, in part to the fact that the latter was a disparate and geographically dispersed group. The attraction that the EEC exercised on the UK relative to the Commonwealth is also partly due to proximity and what is implied by it: ease and multiplicity of intercourse, mutual influence, common political and security interests.

Of the regions within the EEC that were initially considered to be backward and not sufficiently industrialised, those that lay in the center of Europe (in Belgium, especially) gained most from the process of European integration, and attracted significant investment from abroad. Other regions, that were geographically peripheral, have gained less.

Geographic factors are easily seen to be extremely important also in the North American context, as they affect the economic structure and international economic orientation of Canada and Mexico. In the latter country, the *maquiladora* industries are located in the Northern border towns, that until a few years ago had been a poor and sparsely populated part of the country. The importance of regional and geographic factors is manifested within the United States by the gradual shift of economic activity from the traditional industrial centers of the Northeast and the Central plains to the so-called Sunbelt. In the case of the West coast, rapid growth is at least in part connected to the attraction exercised by the fast development of the Pacific Rim: indeed, even if, as we mentioned, Japan and Hong Kong started off in their industrialisation effort as countries isolated from their regional contexts, the situation is rapidly changing, and regional factors in the Pacific are becoming extremely important in stimulating economic growth in the established industrial producers (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) as well as in the new entrants such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia etc. This is especially the case since China opened up to increased international intercourse, creating a powerful focus of regional attention and opportunity.

2. Is it surprising that regional factors matter? The tendency to disregard distance as an important economic variable is the consequence of prevailing perceptions in the age of mass-produced industrial goods. Distance, or geographic conditions, have always mattered in the production of agricultural goods and primary commodities. Location was also very important in the early days of industrialization, but then conditions were gradually created in which industrial production could be carried out with minimal attention to geographic circumstances. Thus the impression was created that technology would gradually free production from locational constraints. However, more recent trends point to the fact that, quite to the contrary, geographic factors are bound to play an increasing role in the next phase of economic growth and development.

Agricultural production was in the past geographically constrained because of climatic conditions and because of the difficulty of transporting perishable products over long distances. In both respects, technology has introduced extraordinary changes, and the market for agricultural products is effectively becoming globalized. As far as agriculture is concerned, furthermore, it is not clear that proximity favours economic cooperation, because it generally leads to similarity of climate, and therefore to competitive, rather than complementary, production patterns.

The production of primary commodities of mineral origin remains geographically constrained by the availability of deposits. As far as our three countries are concerned, by far the most important consideration is the limited availability of minerals in each of them, coupled with the abundant availability of hydrocarbons in the neighbouring countries of the Middle East. Geographic factors are of minor importance in the case of oil, which is very easily transported. On the contrary, they are very important in the case of natural gas (methane). Indeed, for the latter the cost of transportation is a very significant fraction of the final cost to the consumer, and the cost of transportation increases very rapidly with distance. The latter fact has generally not been recognised, because up to now the tendency prevailed among gas producers to equalize the price of gas to the final consumer independently of distance. This is, however, basically an irrational pricing policy, which we expect will gradually be changed as the market for hydrocarbons becomes more competitive.

The cost of alternative sources of energy may be distance-related as well. Coal is difficult to transport, and there are transmission losses in the long-range transportation of electric energy. The latter imply that certain sources of energy, such as hydroelectric power, have a regional impact and significance.

In the past, the availability of energy constrained the location of industry. Thus in the early days of industrialization, factories were located close to streams that provided power. However the gradual shift to electricity and/or oil, as well as the growing importance of road, as opposed to railroad, transport, greatly freed locational decisions. It is only in a few cases, such as for steel mills or refineries and petrochemical plants, that proximity to transportation infrastructure (essentially, deep water harbors) continued to be important.

To all other industry, man-made environmental conditions became more important. Availability of labour and certain minimal services, particularly financial, were the key to attracting economic activity, and since these environmental conditions were best found in locations in which some industry had already developed, the well known tendency of industrial activity to concentrate geographically ensued. At the same time, from any suitable location - most locations being essentially equivalent to each other - production could be initiated for sale in any market, distant as well as geographically closer to production.

3. In some cases, however, transportation was difficult, or too costly relative to the value added embodied in the product, and production always was carried out close to the market. Hence the

well known distinction between tradables and non-tradables: the latter being, essentially, products that are difficult or altogether impossible to transport.

A prevailing emphasis on international trade and competitiveness led to downplay the importance of the non-tradables sector in development economics. It is, however, a very important sector in any economy indeed. Part of the confusion derives from the terminology itself, which, as we mentioned, is based on the assumption that goods travel freely within a country but absolutely cannot cross her borders. This, of course, is not the case, and one should more meaningfully speak of regionally versus globally traded goods.

A wide range of products is almost exclusively regionally traded. From construction to the food industry, it is the size of the regional market that determines the size of the industry. There are a few well known exceptions: cases in which entire plants have been transported across oceans to be put in operation, "plugged in" as it were, in locations in which construction would have been prohibitively expensive; as well as there are countries that import even UHT milk and cookies from far away because of the (temporary) lack of suitable regional producers. These are, as we just said, exceptions, and only serve to highlight the rule.

Even in cases in which production is carried out by multinational corporations under the same brand name all around the world, it still is normally true that production facilities are located in proximity of major markets. It would make no sense to centralize worldwide production of Ritzes in a single location.

Thus, in this respect what matters is the size of the regional market. In this case, regional must be understood as meaning "easily and inexpensively accessible through existing transportation facilities". Two locations in the same country may not belong to the same regional market if they are separated by great distances or if transportation is difficult. Belonging to a same free trade area is important but it is not the only important factor, indeed in most cases not a crucially important factor. Finally, locations may be geographically close but economically distant, if transportation infrastructure is inadequate.

The importance of the size of the regional market in determining the location of production facilities for regionally traded goods is a simple but nevertheless crucially important argument to underline the importance of transportation infrastructure. The latter has fallen out of fashion a long time ago, because it has always been

recognized that one of the primary tasks of the State is to guarantee adequate transportation infrastructure, and the attention of most economists has been focussed on the effort to argue that it should do more than that. Also, it is difficult to evaluate the demand for transportation infrastructure, and the extent to which the availability of it will create its own demand. It is quite clear that it does so in some cases, but equally clear that it fails in others. The adoption of strict cost-benefit analysis tends to underestimate the importance of infrastructure, and a common mistake in industrializing countries has been to underinvest in this sector. The fact is that industrialized countries continue to attribute importance to transportation infrastructure, especially at the local level, where the perception of the economic impact of access to the neighbouring world is bound to be more acute.

4. The geographic determinants of economic development are bound to become increasingly important as the share of services in GDP increases to the detriment of the share of industry, and, within the latter, the traditional sectors producing low-technology goods for mass consumption are outgrown by the new lines of production, characterized by higher inputs of technology, greater product differentiation, importance of design and style. We should be aware of the fact that we are approaching, or possibly already live in, the post-industrial era.

In many cases, services cannot be transported. Most personal services must be offered at the location where customers are, and this includes public services such as health, education, public transportation. Here, again, there are exceptions: a few may travel to study or obtain medical attention abroad, but it is only a tiny minority that will be able to do so. The same holds for banking and financial services, or insurance.

Some service industries are immobile by definition: such is tourism, a case in which the customer must move.

As the importance of these activities grows as a proportion of income worldwide, economic development will increasingly become a function of the ability to offer such services. And it is a characteristic of these services that they can best be offered in locations that enjoy easy communications with other locations where similar services are also offered. Intensity of communications provides for mutual knowledge and imitation, for competition, for circulation of individuals possessing the skills that are needed to provide such services.

This cumulative locational factor is reinforced by the shift in industrial production, because the new, fast growing lines are very closely connected to these same services. High technological content, differentiation and importance of styling all are related to levels of education, development of the media, development of long-distance communications, availability of financial services etc.

While it is possible for a country to compete on the global market for 'old' industrial products by aggressive export promotion, the socio-economic texture that breeds the newer economic activities can only be created under certain conditions. The key seems to be that the new lines are more complementary than they are competitive. The fact that a multiplicity of sophisticated services and products are manufactured and produced in certain areas seems to induce further and further new entrants, in an endless, self-supporting game. Some people jokingly ask who will produce the goodies while we are all busy cutting each other's hairs, but in fact the advances of automation on the production line have outpaced the creation of new service jobs, thus leading to increasing unemployment, and no danger of insufficient supply of material goods seems imminent.

These new realities create serious dilemmas for peripheral and relatively less advanced countries, such as Southern Italy, Greece and Turkey. Because of their lower per capita income and geographic remoteness, these regions face the risk of being marginalised for good, and excluded from a process of economic development that will tie the major European centers that lie between London to the North and Bologna or Florence to the South in a closer and closer web of mutual intercourse.

5. Responding to the new challenge will be an arduous task in any case, and it is not clear that it will be at all possible within a foreseeable future. If success is at all possible, it requires that the condition of geographic peripheralism of our three countries be overcome.

We can measure the importance of regional factors by looking at the transformation that was brought about by the era of high oil prices. The sudden shift in purchasing power and increased economic weight of the Arab oil producing countries initially had a predominantly negative effect on the economies of our countries, as we faced the costs while other countries reaped the benefits of increased exports to the Arab region. However, with time some necessary adjustments took place, and the importance of Southbound trade has dramatically increased for all three countries.

Luciani: Importance of Economic Cooperation between Greece, Italy, Turkey

Table 1:
Exports of Greece, Italy and Turkey to the Oil Exporting Countries, 1975-81
(per cent share of total exports)

Country / Year	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Greece	12.6	14.0	14.5	14.5	14.7	15.3	18.6
Italy	10.6	11.4	12.9	12.4	10.6	12.5	16.9
Turkey	9.4	6.4	8.5	8.9	9.5	13.2	32.7

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1982.

Table 2:
Exports of Greece, Italy and Turkey to the Middle East, 1979-85
(per cent share of total exports)

Country / Year	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Greece	19.8	20.8	25.8	22.2	20.0	16.6	14.2
Italy	10.5	12.0	16.4	14.7	14.5	12.6	9.9
Turkey	17.3	21.6	39.9	44.0	42.3	38.6	na

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1986

Note: The IMF has changed the definition of areas, obliging to utilise the group of the oil exporting countries for certain years and the Middle East for others. The former group also includes non-Middle Eastern producers, such as Indonesia, Venezuela and Nigeria, which, however, are not very important for the exports of Greece and Turkey (somewhat more important for Italy); at the same time, it excludes Middle East countries that are not oil producers. The trend, however, is clear.

The current extremely low price of oil cannot be extrapolated into the future. If, as all experts seem to agree, the price is bound to increase again to a level of 18 or 20 dollars per barrel, the need to utilize scarce financial resources more efficiently may prompt the Arab countries to pay greater attention to the costs of supplies, and this would benefit regional suppliers. Thus, when consideration is taken of the continuing importance of oil in the global energy balance (a point on which, after Chernobyl, little doubt is left) and of the concentration of oil reserves in the Middle East, we should recognize that the emergence of a pull factor to the South may be of considerable help in overcoming our peripheral position with respect to the rest of the EC.

All the more so if attention is paid specifically to the prospects for greater utilization of natural gas. (In the case of Turkey, the redirection of oil flows from the Gulf to the Mediterranean because of political conditions in the Gulf is also important; however, this factor

does not affect Greece and Italy). As we mentioned already, the cost of transportation is a major obstacle to the development of gas trade. The European market for natural gas is likely to be saturated mostly with supplies from the Soviet Union and Norway that are either in existence or have been contracted for. The full utilisation of the underwater pipeline connecting Algeria and Italy may be jeopardized if gas will not prove to be sufficiently competitive to the final consumer.

A fortiori the very important reserves that have been found in the Gulf face the immediate danger of remaining undeveloped for at least two decades. While this prospect, although not a brilliant one, may still be acceptable to a country such as Qatar (where some very large gas fields are located), it certainly is unacceptable to Iran (which has much larger gas reserves than it has oil reserves) or Iraq (whose gas reserves are a bit of a mystery, but could also be significant). It follows that these countries will need to market their gas very aggressively if they want to compete on the European market, and the best way to do so is to develop a market and transportation infrastructure in the countries that are in-between. Thus, our three countries could bid for competitively priced gas supplies from the Gulf in the context of a drive from those countries to reach the Central European market with their gas.

This could prove an important locational attraction for industrial activity, and a boost to economic activity generally. The realisation of any such project, however, requires close coordination and cooperation between our countries, because alternatives exist. Thus, the gas could be transported in liquefied form (as LNG), or Iran could enter into a swap agreement with the Soviet Union - resuscitating the agreement which had been signed by the Shah and was later rescinded by the ayatollahs. In both cases, all three countries would be entirely bypassed. Alternatively, the gas could still be transported by pipeline, but the latter could cross from Turkey into Bulgaria and connect with the East-West lines that are used to export Soviet gas, bypassing Greece and Italy.

6. A further area where cooperation could be extremely important is tourism. This is a sector which is bound to experience further growth, with continuing or growing affluence in Central and Northern Europe. Our countries can offer some extraordinary historical and natural environments, and governments are increasing realizing the economic importance of these assets, and the need to protect them.

As for other service activities that we mentioned before, the complementary factors in tourist development are likely to overcome

the competitive ones. While, in the end, it is true that each tourist will normally visit either one or the other of the three countries, the total volume of tourist traffic is enhanced by the availability of a variety of potentially attractive destinations in contiguous areas. Tourists will change their destination from one year to the other and visit places that they simply crossed, or will wish to reach the next destination along the road, that they missed this time. As tourists become more sophisticated, the relative importance of strictly resort-related tourism will decrease, and the importance of the availability of tourist services over a broader area will increase.

For these reasons, there is a strong complementarity in developing the kind of infrastructure that will facilitate the channelling of tourist traffic from Central Europe to our countries.

In the longer run, the development of tourism opens the possibility of a gradual shift in the European economic center of gravity towards the Mediterranean. Indeed, this is how a similar process was initiated in the United States, and although conditions in Europe are in many respects different, in the long run life along the Mediterranean is likely to be consistently more pleasant than life in Essen, if personal income is kept constant.

7. When we combine all the considerations that we have been developing insofar (importance of production of regionally traded goods, importance of location-specific services, importance of horizontal communications between urban production and service centers) we come to the conclusion that cooperation between Greece, Italy and Turkey could be crucially important for the further development of each of them (in the case of Italy: of the Southern regions, as the Northern regions are effectively part of the Central European economic system). But what kind of cooperation is needed?

The approach we have taken is a liberal and minimalist one. No great schemes are envisaged: private enterprise is best poised to pursue emerging opportunities and give content to cooperation. Governments should provide transportation infrastructure, and improve on their general services to the public, as this is simply an increasingly important part of a nation's well-being.

Minimal as these indications may appear, they are not trivial. The fact is that horizontal communications between our countries are insufficient to sustain the increased level of economic intercourse which is envisaged here. The ferries linking Italy and Greece mostly operate between Brindisi and Patras; a majority of them also stops in Corfou and Igoumenitsa, but these stops are almost useless to commercial traffic due to the poor conditions of the inland road from

Igoumenitsa. On the Italian side, the loading and unloading arrangements in Brindisi are extremely messy, and commercial traffic is seriously slowed down, while tourists are confused and harassed. On the Greek side, the journey to Patras doubles the time - relative to Igoumenitsa - and tends to channel the traffic towards congested Athens. If an East-West road axis were created, linking Igoumenitsa to Salonika and then on to Turkey, the poorer northern regions of Greece would get a benefit. Finally, road communications between Greece and Turkey have not been upgraded for a long time.

Thus, there is a lot to do with respect to improving transportation infrastructure; at the same time, other conditions must be met to allow the private sector to engage in horizontal economic intercourse. In this respect, however, I shall note that in all three countries there is a tendency to greater liberalization, including opening up to foreign imports and promoting exports, allowing greater freedom to the financial sector, encouraging capital inflows. Obviously, in all three countries a great deal of unnecessary regulations still are in force that hinder private enterprise and harass the individual citizen that engages in activities across borders. One cannot hope that these disappear overnight, but it is certainly necessary, in the long run, that they be phased out if increased intercourse is desired.

It is in this context that the question of membership into regional agreements should be discussed. Greece and Italy are members of the EC, and Turkey is associated to the latter and intends to become a full member. Some present members of the EC object to a full membership for Turkey, and as a consequence the latter result cannot be taken for granted. Is this important to our discussion of horizontal cooperation?

I believe membership in the EC to have a prevalent political meaning. The difficulties that are still met in unifying the European domestic market prove that membership is not *per se* a magic formula to create conditions conducive to economic cooperation. Conversely, the experience of European countries that are not members but maintain very fluid and active intercourse with the rest of Europe, the clearest case being Switzerland, shows that effective cooperation can be achieved in the absence of membership. Indeed, it should never be forgotten that the EC is much more than a mere customs union; it is a political project. Any discussion of membership in the Community that primarily emphasizes economic costs and benefits is silly, because all of the economic benefits of membership can be achieved in the absence of it, and possibly at lower costs. It is the political benefits that matter.

A convenient implication of what we just said is that I may, in this paper, refrain from expressing my view regarding Turkey's membership, and save the space that would be needed to argue for it.

8. A discussion of alternative scenarios of regional aggregation is nevertheless appropriate. We may ask why priority should be given to horizontal cooperation between our countries relative to possible alternatives.

In this respect, let me note, first of all, that the approach that I proposed does not need to be alternative to any other scheme. Indeed, if cooperation is further developed in other directions, and the web of economic interrelations is extended, then the peripheral condition of our three countries is lessened, and the incentive to cooperation between them increased. This is particularly true with respect to cooperation with the Arab countries, which can and should be actively promoted by each of us, independently of each other as well as in cooperative fashion. The same also applies to cooperation with Eastern Europe, which all EC countries are actively seeking.

In this respect, it should be noted that our horizontal cooperation should also include Yugoslavia, although the different economic system existing in that country may be expected to act as a complicating factor in a project which is essentially based on private enterprise.

But let us turn the question around, and ask what alternative each country has in case the envisaged horizontal cooperation does not develop. In this respect, it appears that Turkey is well positioned to improve her regional ties to the rest of the Middle East, while basing her relations with central Europe on classic international trade (and migration). Some regions in the Italian South have benefitted from increased trade with the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, and the long-run commitment of the Italian government to achieve equalisation of economic conditions between North and South may substitute for the insufficiency of spontaneous economic processes in keeping the Southern regions in line with the rest of Europe. Greece, on the other hand, appears to be weakly positioned for the development of regional trade, notwithstanding her position as member of the EC, because of distance and of the nature of economic systems in the countries that share her Northern border. Although, as we just said, there is no reason to downplay the importance of cooperation with the East European countries, there are obviously limitations in the gains that can be achieved. The weakness of Greece's regional position is compounded with the smaller size of her domestic population and adds up to a relatively small incentive for the location of production of regionally traded

goods. Thus, while I think that no policy conclusion ought to be drawn out of this consideration, I also think that it is appropriate to say that Greece is bound to gain most from the proposed horizontal cooperation.

9. It has always been the case, in the history of the Mediterranean, that traders have been the unifying factor while politicians acted as a disgregative force. My argument is a humble plea to let individuals and private entrepreneurs create the basis for cooperation and improved political relations in the future. It is obvious that continuing conflict involves a high cost, but since cooperation was not allowed to develop to begin with, the cost is not borne out by anyone in particular, and consequently there is no lobby to improve relations and overcome conflict. This is an old argument, but still a good one. Also, the proposed cooperation has the advantage of carrying little risk: if needs be, it can be easily undone.

In judging of the importance of cooperation, one should not lose sight of the broader international environment. International competition in manufactured products markets is bound to increase dramatically as an increasing number of countries reach the stage of being able to aggressively promote their exports. While in recent decades most NICs have been relatively small countries, some very large countries such as Brazil, India and China already are or will soon become forces to be reckoned with. The Central European economy will be put under stress by the need to readjust, and will not be able to resist political pressure to reduce protectionist barriers to entry. In short, the extent and meaning of Community preference will inevitably decline.

In the absence of a healthy regional economy, our countries do not stand a chance to resist in the international competitive game. They will be backwaters: possibly pleasant ones, that one visits from time to time in order to enjoy the scenery and experience the suggestion of historical memories, much as one would visit the village of his ancestors. But life and opportunity will not be there.



UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS
FACULTY OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
19 OMIROU STREET - 106 72 ATHENS - GREECE

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National perceptions of changing
strategic patterns in the Eastern
Mediterranean

Christos Rozakis-Thanos
Veremis

DRAFT

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Super^bpower politics determine the margins within which middle^c-rankin and small powers exercise their foreign and defense policies. At a time of international detente such states may drift into regional conflicts which often supersede the defense priorities of power blocs. Thus Greece's differences with Turkey have since 1974 become the focal point of her security concerns, rather than the considerations of the Atlantic Alliance of which she is part. What was perceived as a threat from within the Alliance became the initial cause for a Greek reconsideration of her relationship with the US and NATO. Furthermore, anti-NATO and ^{anti-}American sentiments were generated by a widespread perception among the Greeks of a double injustice inflicted upon them through support of a military dictatorship at home and the mishandling of the Cyprus crisis. This basic perception was shared by conservatives, liberals and left-wingers and formed a consensus on which Greece's defence policy was based.

This problem within the Alliance also constitutes the most serious constraint on Greece's foreign and defense options. Her decision to remain in NATO or leave the organisation, to retain or terminate the presence of US bases on her territory, her choice of military procurement, her policy vis-a-vis her Balkan neighbours, are all influenced ultimately by Turkey's policy in Cyprus and the Aegean. Finally, the Greek economy is heavily burdened by the cost of the arms race between the two NATO allies.

PASOK's turn to the West for solutions to Greece's most urgent problems, although not in keeping with its original non-aligned and third world orientation, also reflects a wider consensus ^{among} in the Greek public towards Western Europe. Most Greeks feel that their country is an integral part of Europe whether its political leadership recognises the fact or disputes it. Greek culture and history testify to this contention, but the ongoing debate on the composite elements of the national identity often rekindles old xenophobic reactions - associated with the West rather than the less familiar East.

In order to render this discussion more specific, let us look at the policy followed by Greece after the fall of the dictatorship in an attempt to strengthen its security and strategic position:

a. As far as its northern neighbours (Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria) are concerned, Greek Governments have attempted to improve relations of 'good-neighbourliness' by the concluding of bilateral agreements and the broadening of political relations. This tendency towards improvement is not based simply on the natural need of states to have ~~AM~~ their borders secured, but on the need which arises from the Greek-Turkish crisis: for Greece it was not feasible to face threats on all fronts at the same time and to have active breeding grounds of crisis everywhere - in Cyprus, in the Aegean and on its northern frontiers.

However, ideological and political differences have imposed limits on the openings of Greece's Balkan policy; the proposals worked out by the governments of Mr Caramanlis on multilateral Balkan co-operation all came up against the distrust which springs from profound differences in political systems, the existence of ~~WAAAAA~~ considerable variation in the way in which each state sees its role in the Balkans and, ^{further,} ~~then~~ the differences which divide certain countries on political and even territorial issues. Thus Greek policy has had to content itself with the most modest achievements in improvement of bilateral relations and the relative stability of the area, which was not endangered, contrary to original fears, by the death of Tito.

In every case Greek policy follows ~~WAAAAA~~ closely developments in the Balkans and particularly the occasional stirring up of territorial claims which could disturb the balance of the region.

b. As ~~WAAAAA~~ concerns its neighbour to the West, Italy, there is not a great deal to say. Relations are entirely

harmonious, with an institutional structure within the framework of the EEC and NATO, while any issues which have arisen have been resolved, up to now, in the spirit of peaceful procedures, as have been all issues pending in Western Europe for the last 40 years.

c. As to the ~~WWWW~~ unique geo-strategic area of the Mediterranean Sea, the PASOK Government has favoured the idea of its 'demilitarisation', in the sense of the withdrawal of foreign fleets and the taking of initiatives by the states which surround it with a view to the transformation of the region into a peace zone. However, over against this general aspiration, which reflects an ideological principle, the Greek Government has recognised, in recent statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the necessary presence of the American factor in the Mediterranean as a counterbalancing element in the maintaining of peace in the region. Indeed, these statements on the part of the Greek Minister have been interpreted in certain Greek journalistic circles as an indication of the position which the Greek Government will take up on the issue of the renewal of the status of the American bases in 1989.

d. ~~WWWWWWWW~~ In the case of its eastern neighbour, Turkey, the Greek understanding of that ~~WW~~ country's expansionist and revisionist role continues to determine its policy towards it. At this point we shall attempt to explain what, in our view, are the reasons for the sense of threat which has been created and reinforced in Greek public opinion and political circles.

First of all there is, of course, the military intervention in Cyprus and the continuing military occupation, which gives Turkey not only ~~WW~~ control of a significant portion of the territory of the Republic of ~~WWWW~~ Cyprus, but also makes a further military operation against the Greek Cypriot population in the south ~~WWWWWWWWWW~~ a possibility of no particular difficulty. Given Greece's solidarity with the population of Cyprus, this threat is a real and vital one.

A second reason is the machinations which Turkey has indulged in to achieve a general revision of the status quo in the Aegean. A careful examination of developments since 1973 suffices to show that Turkey has built up a series of repeated claims and charges against Greece; starting from a simple request for the definition of the continental shelf, it has gone on to raise, in rapid succession, doubts about Greece's national airspace, the Flight Information Region, the right of Greece to extend its territorial waters to 12 sea miles, ~~XXXXXX~~ Greece's treatment of its Muslim minority and the reintroduction of demilitarised status for the islands on Greece's eastern extremities.

This bombardment with claims and accusations, which ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{took} shape by degrees between 1973 and 1978, and which, as far as the claims are concerned, coincided with demands for a change in the status quo in the Aegean, with a view to that Sea being divided down the middle, have been accompanied, from time to time, by the questioning of the sovereignty of Greece over its ~~XXXX~~ islands. Such questioning of Greece's sovereignty over the islands of the eastern Aegean came from the most official quarters - including the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr Demirel.

Another factor which has contributed considerably to Greece's distrust of Turkish aims has been its policy of filibustering on procedural issues; Turkey has not only accumulated problems, it has consistently refused to do ~~XXXXXX~~ anything about solving them. For example, ~~XXXX~~ ^{when} Greece proposed that the continental shelf should be defined by resort to the International Court, Turkey initially (1975) agreed, only to change its mind very rapidly, on the grounds that the dispute was not a legal, but a political one. Thus it reversed its decision on going to the International Court. At the same time, although Turkey itself had chosen the route of bilateral negotiation

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as a means of settling ~~the~~ ⁱ disputes, it lost no time in impeding such negotiations by the introduction of new problems which ~~the~~ further complicated the Greek position and thus made a resolution of the issues which had already been raised more difficult to achieve. At this point it should be ⁿ noted that Turkey also sought to ~~bring~~ bring into the package of the ^{bilateral} negotiations issues which were not, by their very nature, bilateral (the questions of the FIR, NATO's command control) and thus to convert what were international ~~institutional~~ institutional questions into Greek-Turkish ~~differences~~ differences.

Finally, ⁿ it should be said that Turkish tactics include periodic violations and infringements of the Greek and international status quo in the Aegean. This acts as a particular irritant to Greece and endangers, because of the possibility of a sudden flare-up - the peace of the region.

Thus it is that Turkish policy has produced a radical change in Greece's approach to matters of strategy and has shifted crucial priority on to defence against Turkey.

d. The Greek view on developments in the Middle East (the Palestinian problem, Lebanon) is marked by a desire for a peaceful settlement which would ensure balance in the region and make it possible for its peoples to acquire or keep their ~~national~~ ^{land} national ~~territory~~ homeⁿ. In the light of this, the Greek Government supports the demand of the Palestinians for self-determination, but also the independence and integrity of Israel, whilst, within the framework of the European Communities, ~~it~~ it has attempted to encourage a more dynamic intervention of Western Europe in the region. * At the stage of the attempt to normalise the Lebanon situation made by the sending of European military units, Greece declared its willingness to play a part in this. Greece has also attempted ~~to~~

to urge the need to maintain a dialogue between the Europeans and the principal states involved in the area, particularly Syria, which is a key country in these issues. For this reason it maintains that Europe should not cut itself off from the possibility of playing a role in the rapprochement of the parties concerned by measures which would sever links with Syria (cf. the recent decision of Syria of the EEC).

It is precisely current developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf with long-term repercussions in the region that require a reappraisal of relations among riparian countries of the Med.^{iterranean} Superpower politics appear to be entering a period of cautious detente, but a distabilising factor is already in full development in the Islamic world awaiting the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq.

The evolution of the Eastern Med.^{iterranean} into a separate theater^{re} of particular interest to the West has been influenced by efforts to establish alternative routes for the flow of Gulf oil into Western Europe. Besides global factors that affect the security environment of the region, the interdependence between the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Eastern Med.^{iterranean} promised to redefine the strategic significance of the latter.^I The oil from the Gulf states directed through pipelines to Mediterranean ports or tankers in the Red Sea (and from there via Suez to the Med.) required a trouble-free route to its European destination. This imperative that the Eastern Med.^{iterranean} became a sea of cooperation among allies and not an extension of the troubled Gulf is even more relevant today. Although the decline of oil prices has lessened the urgency of its safe transport, the widening of Iranian influence in Lebanon, the axis between Libya, Syria and Iran, the recent disclosures of US arms transfers to Iran and the prospect of an Iranian breakthrough in the war, open a vista of new developments in the region. It is not our task to enter into an analysis of possible developments in the Arab world following a decisive conclusion of the war, but it is important to point out the Islamic factor as a possible disruptive ~~factor~~^{influence} in Western concerns.

I. Roberto Aliboni, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment", an unpublished paper delivered at the European Study Commission meeting in Istanbul. June 13-14, 1985.

With such conditions prevailing in the region, with the possibility, that is, of a disruption of all the delicate balances in the Middle East, the need to strengthen the cohesion of the other Mediterranean states is self-evident. The frictions between Greece and Turkey, which weaken the Western presence in the area and give rise to destabilising conditions, should be reduced; and this means, above all else, a solution to the Cyprus problem, which is of particular importance since the island lies at the very centre of the geo-political area of the Middle East and contributes, as long as the issue remains unsolved, to upheaval there, in such a way as to guarantee the independence, integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and normal coexistence of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A first step in this direction would be to put an end to the military occupation, which currently constitutes the most exacerbating factor in Greek-Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot relations.

In the Aegean what is required is a rapprochement between the two sides, on the basis of the experience acquired from the disputes of the period 1973 - 1986. The experience of the negotiations of 1975 - 1980 could be a valuable guide for the future of the 'dialogue' on Aegean problems between Greece and Turkey.

In the light of this experience we would first like to point out certain procedural errors of the past which should be avoided in the future and then discuss some possible solutions on the merits of the dispute.

a. Perhaps one of the most critical errors committed (insofar as the Aegean issues are concerned) was the fact that Turkey retracted from the decision to resort to the International Court. The ex post facto (after the Brussels communiqué) appeal to the political character of the dispute was totally unfounded, given that the delimitation of the continental shelf is considered as the legal issue par excellence of any difference on the continental shelf. Thus, Turkey's step merely enhanced Greece's reservations as to her real goals and sustained the view about her nurturing an expansionist policy. Furthermore, it indefinitely barred the way to a judicial decision which could lead to a final and obligatory settlement.

b. A second tactical mistake is to be found in the procedure of the negotiations which began in 1975 and lies in the consideration of all Turkish claims as bilateral issues and therefore negotiable. Whereas only the Aegean continental shelf and Turkey's objections to the 12 n.m. were bilateral issues, Greece accepted to put in the basket of the negotiations the FIR issues, the issue of NATO's air control and the demilitarisation. These issues, however, are not bilateral. They fall under the competence of international organisations or institutions (ICAO, NATO, parties to the Montreux Convention) and should have been resolved by them collectively. In this way, the negotiations were *diverted from their main track*.

c. A third tactical mistake was the gradual overloading of the negotiations with secondary matters. The introduction of new subjects such as the minority of Thrace, the demilitarisation, the return to NATO, naturally contributed to the weakening of the Greek position and, at the same time, misled the discussions and led to dead ends. As a result, the sense of a balance and priority in the issues discussed was gradually lost and issues such as the militarisation of Lemnos acquired greater dimensions than the issue of the continental shelf, which happens to be the main issue dividing Greeks and Turks in the Aegean.

How could this negative experience of the past be avoided? Under the condition that Turkey provides some guarantees that it really believes in the need of a settlement of the technical-legal

problems in the Aegean, a certain escalation in approaching the various issues could be worked out, starting with the question of the continental shelf and more particularly with a joint examination of all factors which should determine the delimitation, (including the wealth-producing resources of the Aegean seabed), and continuing with a formulation of the questions and the constitution of an organ of objective settlement of the dispute. This organ could be a Conciliation Commission with special authority to render a binding pronouncement or an Arbitral Tribunal or even the International Court. We should not forget that if the parties agree and conclude a compromis, the Court has the competence to adjudicate on the matter either in a plenary session or in a Chamber which could be named by the interested parties.

On the other hand, the institutional problems (namely FIR, military control and the Lemnos issue) should be referred to the appropriate organs of ICAO and NATO on Turkey's initiative (since it is her who disputes the existing regime). These two organisations should decide whether the Turkish claims are well founded, possibly through the convening of special conferences. Thus, the only question which would remain in the hands of the two countries would be the width of the territorial sea. This question actually depends on the progress made in the settlement of the continental shelf and on the regaining of confidence between the two countries.

Let us now see what could actually be the solutions to the basic Aegean issues, namely the continental shelf, the territorial sea, FIR and military control and, finally, demilitarisation.

The settlement of the issue of the continental shelf presents a number of important difficulties. These are due to the particularities of the Aegean geography as well as to the fact that not only has the law on the continental shelf not been crystallised yet but, on the contrary, it becomes increasingly inconclusive. However, any settlement of the matter based on international law should take into account the following facts:

(a). Both Greece and Turkey have a continental shelf in the Aegean as coastal states. This however does not mean that they are entitled to an equal share of continental shelf. The particular geographical conditions automatically give a greater share to Greece, just as geographic conditions give to some countries greater territori

al seas and to some other countries smaller ones or none whatsoever, as in the case of the land-locked states. As the International Court mentioned in the North Sea cases, delimitation does not raise "any question of completely refashioning nature... Equality is to be reckoned within the same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as these that equity could remedy."

(b) International practice and Court decisions have shown that the most equitable solution of delimitation in the case of opposite States is the one based on the tandem median line-special circumstances. On the other hand, all efforts of delimitation based on geological characteristics have shown that in most cases it is almost impossible to distinguish with precision which part of the seabed corresponds to each of the opposite states on the basis of geological criteria. Usually, there is a coincidence of geological strata.

(c) As a general principle, islands have a continental shelf. In case that there is an uninterrupted continuity between a group of islands and a mainland, the coasts of the outer island or islands ^{should} constitute base lines for the measurement of the continental shelf, provided, of course, that this island or islands are inhabited and have an economic life of their own.

On the basis of the above given facts, it could be maintained that the application of the tandem median line-special circumstances would allocate no continental shelf to either of the two parties in the sea area between the extreme (outer) Greek islands and Turkey's continental territory because that area is covered by the territorial seas of the two states. The western coasts of the extreme Greek islands would have a continental shelf freely extending towards the seabed of the central Aegean. In the areas between the islands, the tandem median line-special circumstances would have to be modified so as to take into account the length of the corresponding coasts, the economic importance of the areas, their dependence on sea resources as well as matters of security and communication.

With respect now to the Turkish claims for a modification of the FIR and of the military zone of NATO in the Aegean, I would like once more to stress that they do not in any way create a Greek-Turkish difference and that the competent international organisations should decide on them. It should furthermore be underlined that these two zones are purely functional (i.e. they are not zones of sovereignty) and that they have been established in order to serve not the interests

of the state which has undertaken the responsibility, but those of the international community (in the case of FIR) and of the Alliance (in the case of air control) in matters of communication, air-navigation and military coordination. Therefore, the functional character of these two zones also determines, in principle, the limits of any initiatives for their modification: they may be modified when the responsible state is not able to serve their goals and when a new regulation seems more functional than the previous one. Let the competent organs decide on that.

With respect to the territorial sea, it should be stated that international practice maintains that the rule of the 12 n.m. is by now a general customary rule. This means that Greece -- and Turkey for that matter -- has the right to apply this regime in the Aegean. For the time being, however, this has not been the case. In our opinion, the issue will be determined by (a) progress in the settlement of the continental shelf and (b) the explicit recognition by Turkey of the 10 n.m. of the national air-space which has undisputedly applied since 1931, *being stipulated by a Greek law*. So long as Turkey insists on what would actually constitute a bi-section of the Aegean, it is only too logical that Greece will insist on excluding such an effort through the legal weapon of an extension of the territorial sea.

Finally, let us come to the problem of Lemnos. Whereas concerning the re-militarisation of all other islands, Greece invokes the right of a preemptive self-defence on a proportionality basis, in the case of the islands Lemnos and Samothraki it invokes the abolition of the demilitarisation which had resulted from the replacement of the Convention of Lausanne by the Convention of Montreux in 1936. The former indeed provided for an obligation of demilitarisation of the Turkish straits and of the Turkish and Greek islands which lied at their entry. This obligation was abolished by the *Convention* of Montreux (Turkey had agreed to this abolition having actually been the one who had incited it), Turkey's argument that the Greek islands are not explicitly mentioned by the Montreux Convention and that, therefore, the obligation of demilitarisation continues to apply to them, amounts to the conclusion that the Montreux Convention had not entirely replaced the Lausanne Convention and that certain stipulations of the latter continued to be unaltered in force.

I will not tire you with references to the relevant legal texts. I will only stress that one way to find an answer to the question of whether the demilitarisation is still binding on Greece,

is to examine the goals which it actually meant to serve when it was instituted. These goals were two: First of all to ensure normal exercise of the freedom of navigation for the ships of the Powers in the straits, by excluding any possible obstacle that could arise by a military intervention of the neighbouring states, coming either from the mainland or the territory of the adjacent islands. Second -- and this involved only the Greek islands-- to protect the demilitarised Turkish areas through the absence of foreign troops in the neighbourhood.

However, these goals lapsed following the replacement of the Convention. The fact that Turkey regained control of the straits and remilitarised them completely, cancelled the spirit that presided over the demilitarisation. The Powers accepted the reversal of the primacy of their role in the straits and the establishment of a new balance in favour of Turkey and the Black Sea states, whereas Turkey regained her right to defend its own territory from any threat. Thus, the ratios of demilitarisation were extinguished by the replacement; and it would be a historical irony if, by accepting Turkey's recent arguments, we admitted that the reinstatement of the right to protect her own territory amounted to the creation of inequality at the expense of Greece, which would thus be deprived of its own right to defend a portion of its territory from the existence of neighbouring foreign troops.

" At any rate, the problem of Lemnos is a genuine legal issue the solution of which depends on a legal interpretation. Therefore, the two countries may resolve it either by referring it to the NATO legal organs -- since it concerns NATO-- or even to a third judicial organ. Moreover, if indeed Turkey's concern is that there should be no army in the area, what would prevent the conclusion of a new agreement of demilitarisation providing for the mutual withdrawal of all troops from that region of the Aegean sea?

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POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING COOPERATION
BETWEEN ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY

by Stefano Silvestri

paper presented at the International Seminar
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Introduction

There are two ways of looking at the Southern Flank of NATO, from the perspective of the main Western European countries. One is the "safety belt" approach. The other is the "overall stability" approach. Both recognize the great importance of the Mediterranean region for European security. The first one however is based on the assumption that this region is "crisis prone", basically unmanageable without the direct intervention of the Superpowers, too risky and volatile for long-term policy commitments: the main objective of Europe therefore should be a "damage limitation" operation. The principle instrument of Mediterranean policy would be military force and the capacity to enforce an external will on the local powers.

The second one, on the contrary, is based on the idea that the basic instability of the Mediterranean region can be cured, that there is enough good will and political capacity inside the region to establish long-lasting and peaceful relationships, that a policy of stability can be based on the growing awareness of the existence of very important common interests between Mediterranean and European countries. The instruments of such policy would be more of an economic and political, rather than military, nature.

Not surprisingly, the first point of view is more common in Northern and Central Europe, while the second one is more or less shared by the Southern European countries.

The problem is that in order to try to implement their favourite strategy, the Southern countries need the cooperation of their allies, while the first strategy can be pursued, at least for a while (under some circumstances, for a very long while), disregarding the wishes of the Mediterranean countries.

No one of course would willingly choose the use of force when other ways are readily available. Still, there is a great difference between a policy of "consensus gathering" and a policy of "decision sharing". The first is in search of clients, the second of allies.

The Mediterranean is torn in between. Some countries, like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, are formally integrated within the Western system, from the Atlantic Alliance to the EEC, but their participation is frequently under scrutiny and criticism, while their influence and effectiveness is limited.

The policies of the Western powers towards the Mediterranean are similarly divided and contradictory, going in either direction according to the prevailing mood and expediencies.

The net result is a situation of growing confusion and instability. The question asked in this paper is if there is a chance for an initiative coming from the South, aimed at establishing a stable and positive relationship of security and stability between the Mediterranean and Europe.

The Problem

The Mediterranean area cannot be considered a unitarian region. In the Mediterranean different political, religious, military and economic realities meet, sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in conflict. No single Mediterranean power is capable of imposing its will on the entire area, by the use of military force or otherwise. On the contrary, each Mediterranean country is a somewhat "junior" partner, in alliance with stronger powers. Local conflicts therefore are intertwined and mixed up with other international conflicts, larger and more important. The Mediterranean countries moreover are frequently interested in utilizing their alliances in order to strenghten their stance, to avoid any important concessions and to protract the local conflicts, until their freezing and their internationalization. All this creates a balance of mutual impotence.

No attempt to impose an external order on the Mediterranean is likely to succeed. Neither of the Superpowers, in the last forty years, has given the Mediterranean enough importance and priority and has invested enough resorces to become its master. The problem of course is that the conflicts interesting the Mediterranean can only rarely be circumscribed to the riparian countries alone. On the contrary, they are generally bound to involve other countries and regions, to establish a kind of "domino escalat:ion", practically impossible to fully control.

The division and confrontation between East and West has effectivly frozen and put out of the political picture the traditional infra-European conflicts. No such result has been achieved in the Mediterranean, where the borders between the two "blocs" are muddled and dubious, while the alliances are frail and changeable.

This situation favours the growing impact of multiple threats, affecting both the Mediterranean and the European countries. Between them, international terrorism is now preeminent, but more traditional military, social and economic threats are also present.

Attempts have been made in the past, and still are being made to deal with this problem in a multilateral and peaceful way. None of these attempts however has fully succeeded yet. The most successful one was probably the so-called Camp David process, in bringing peace between Israel and Egypt, with the help of the United States and the military guarantee of the Multilateral Force in the Sinai. This same approach however has dramatically failed in Lebanon, and did not expand to embrace the other Arab countries bordering with Israel.

No success whatsoever was possible for the interesting idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, modelled on the experience of the CSCE. Even the limited Mediterranean participation in the CSCE process has been characterized by a number of failures, or at best by irrelevance. There is now the idea, championed by the Italian Government, of the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean "support group", involving at least three NATO countries (Italy, France and Spain) and three non-aligned countries (Jugoslavia, Egypt and Algeria), all interested in strengthening the chances of peace and stability in the Mediterranean. But it is easy to foresee the important limits and weaknesses of such a project, should it be implemented. Political differences between its members, their relative impotence vis-à-vis the major powers present in the Mediterranean, the absence of important countries (such as Greece and Turkey, by the way, but also Morocco or Saudi Arabia), the vagueness of the political aims, are themselves enough to increase scepticism.

What is happening, on the contrary, is the creation of new linkages between "moderate" countries of the Arab world and European countries, on matters such as anti-terrorism cooperation, while some more "radical" countries are driven away from Europe and the West. This is not the result of a conscious "bloc policy" of the European powers, as the logical consequence of the aggravation of the Mediterranean conflicts and of the limited measures taken until now to circumscribe them.

The linkages created so far however are not strong enough to establish a new pattern of alliances and guarantees between European and Mediterranean countries. The divergencies existing among Europeans, and with the United States, on the best way to fight instability and counter the threats coming from the Mediterranean, are weakening the present relationship. Even the European Community, the biggest economic power of the area and the main partner of all the Mediterranean countries, was unable to produce a coherent and effective policy towards these regions, in order to bring about at least a modicum of economic development and prosperity.

This is not to say that the Community's Mediterranean policy has been totally ineffective, but that its successes seems to be a thing of the past. The establishment of strong association ties with almost all the Mediterranean countries is of course an important accomplishment. The substantial help given to the democratic political forces in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, is

still the greatest achievement of Western Europe in the last years. But the practical failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, and the inability to envisage and implement a common security and foreign policy in the Mediterranean, are not likely to be overcome in the near future.

A View from South-East

The Southern Flank of NATO has its greatest weakness in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is particularly worrying for Italy. This country fears the possibility of becoming a "border country" between East and West. During a crisis the Mediterranean could easily be divided in two: the Western part, solidly controlled by the Atlantic Alliance, and the Eastern part, where such a control would be very uncertain and weak. Such a situation should worry first of all Greece and Turkey. These two countries risk isolation during the crisis, and cannot be certain that help from their allies will be prompt, important enough and unwavering.

To modify this situation, however, it would be necessary to substantially increase the integration and presence of the Western forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until today such a choice meant the increase of the American military presence in the Allied countries. Such a solution creates difficult internal political problems in all the European countries of the Southern Flank. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the United States themselves would agree to such a policy. The American Superpower has constantly diminished its permanent military presence in the Mediterranean during the last decade. The only increases made were temporary and motivated by the national American urgency to act in non-European crises, such as the defense of Israel or the "punishment" of Libya.

Greece and Turkey, nevertheless, play a key strategic role in the area. They control the major Soviet access routes to the Mediterranean. They are the only Western states present in the Balkans, and their existence and policies allow Yugoslavia, Albania and Rumania a greater freedom of manoeuvre with the Soviet Union. The political and strategic importance of the Balkans cannot be underrated. In order to reinforce those countries, and increase their relationships with the West, great caution is required to avoid negative reactions from the Soviet side. The various attempts by Greece and Turkey to help to establish an area of integration and cooperation in the Balkans have had an important political function. For this policy to succeed, however, it would be necessary to have greater understanding and help from the West (and in particular from the EEC). The present economic and social crises of Yugoslavia, the problems of consolidation of the new leadership in Albania, even the future of the "autonomous foreign policy" of Rumania, require urgent consideration and local initiatives inside the Balkans. The normalization of the state relations between Athens and Tirana are a first positive step in this direction.

Geographically, Greece is well positioned to control the major "choke points" of the Eastern Mediterranean and, politically it maintains good traditional relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries, while being a member of the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC.

Turkey occupies a key position in the Allied crescent around the USSR, and its geo-political location is essential to avoid the strategic welding between the USSR and the Middle East. Its traditional relations with Iran and Iraq moreover, while temporarily reduced in the present circumstances, remain potentially very important for the future stability of the entire area. However, it requires great attention and cooperation from the allies in order to help its government and its democratic political forces to defeat Islamic radical instances and many other internal destabilizing factors.

A closer cooperation between all the countries of the Southern Flank, and in particular between Greece, Italy and Turkey, inside the Alliance and in agreement with a new Mediterranean policy of the EEC, could bring about a significant strengthening of the West, while avoiding the negative effects of an increase of the American presence. To succeed, however, it would be necessary, first of all, to increase the confidence and cooperation between Greece and Turkey.

This is not impossible. It happened in the past, and it will happen again in the future. I would like to recall here a positive experience of 1979, when cooperation between the Defence General Staffs of Greece, Italy and Turkey produced a common understanding and a joint evaluation of the threat in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately the experience was not repeated again, even if the threat did not fade away. On the contrary...

The conflicts between Greece and Turkey are an objective element of weakness and disruption of the entire framework of Mediterranean stability. The simple existence of these conflicts are discouraging other countries and the international organizations from starting new important initiatives and reinforcing the "safety belt" thesis and the "damage limitation" approach. The persistence of a conflictual situation creates the risk of increasing the "marginalization" of both countries. The strong temptation felt in Athens and in Ankara, to take advantage of their strategic importance and their international relationships (especially in the EEC and in NATO), in order to foster their national positions, is gradually estranging the Allies from the Eastern Mediterranean. For a bird in the bush we are losing two in the hand.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is happily fishing in troubled waters. The increasing attention that Moscow is showing towards Cyprus, the friendly hand it extends in turn to Greece and to Turkey, the reinforcement of its military forces in the bordering regions, its growing political and military presence in some riparian countries, are a real threat for the future.

A Difficult Treatment

A good treatment should not kill the patient. A number of the interventions of the past were in fact harmful, damaging the relationship between Allies and complicating the crisis management. The use of force and injunctions has not produced the desired results, and was sometimes counterproductive. The temptation of "quick fixes", be they technological or political, will be equally ineffective. Present technological advances cannot diminish the strategic importance and usefulness of these countries, and a sharp choice in favour of one will bring about the loss of the other, with no advantage whatsoever for the West.

A good treatment therefore should be based directly on the existing antibodies, on the acceptance and understanding of local perceptions, on the objective interests of the local actors. It should be a kind of omeopathic treatment.

We should ask ourselves whether it is right and useful that the United Nations remains today the only international organization trying to reach some compromise and favour a negotiation on Cyprus. The justification of inaction from NATO or the EEC is based on the desire to avoid any explicit choice between the contenders. This absence is a clear indication of crisis. More dignity and courage are needed for the future. The intervention of the UN, by the way, is not a recipe for success: the previous experiences, from Korea to Lebanon, demonstrate their inability to deal with strong nationalistic ideologies, spoked by determined sponsors.

Any longlasting solution is first and foremost a question of choosing the right methodology. The Europeans discovered a good methodology in the creation of supranational multilateral institutions, giving them the direct responsibility of managing both sides of the problem (as between France and West Germany, with the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community). These organizations have been able to overcome nationalistic feelings, or at least to create a common legal and political framework, accepted by all the interested parties. A similar approach could be put at work in the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, the supranational methodology requires the identification of common interests and a significant degree of confidence between parties. No solution in the real world can guarantee the complete success of only one of them. Insofar as the solution allows for modifications and evolutions, guided by the process of law and democracy, many compromises can be accepted that would appear impossible under other circumstances.

The European Community should logically expand toward Turkey and Cyprus, both European Associates of the EEC. This is a political necessity for the Mediterranean and a good thing for the overall stability of the continent. This enlargement will be practically impossible, however, should we not be able to manage the present situation of crisis. The first move cannot come from outside the area: it should come from within.

That is not to say that Greece has a veto power on the problem of Turkish entry into the EEC, or that Turkey can play on the European and American desire to strengthen its posture in order to dismiss any attempt to solve the Cyprus question. That is simply to say that any future solution will certainly require a big change of the agenda of the negotiations. Cyprus should become the logical and important appendix of a larger agreement on common interests and joint actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, agreed upon between all the local actors. No solution can be found in "zero-sum" diplomatic or military games.

The EEC, and the involvement of the other Western European countries, can make the difference and change the sum for the necessary amount. No engagement from outside will be possible or forthcoming, however, without an initiative coming from the Mediterranean, particularly from the Eastern Mediterranean, and from our countries. Only these countries can underline the

urgency of a common policy for the Eastern Mediterranean in the economic and security spheres, based on the European Community, the European political cooperation and, of course, a common European position inside the Atlantic Alliance. Such a policy could very well proliferate, and contribute to the strengthening of the present "Mediterranean network" between Europeans and moderate Arabs, while maintaining a sufficient modicum of necessary relations with the remaining "less moderate" states. But the first move will have to come from the South-Eastern tier of Western Europe (with or without the Italian participation).

Initiatives of this kind could strongly influence Western perceptions of the Mediterranean, increasing the chances of the "overall stability" approach.

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AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
ITALY - GREECE AND TURKEY

Seyfi TAŞHAN - Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN

AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY-GREECE AND TURKEY

Seyfi Tashan-Ersin Onulduran

In this presentation we will attempt to study various factors that influence the relations between these three countries, since it is not possible to discern and isolate such factors as military, cultural, social or economic as separate from politics. Consequently, we will first take up the basic influences which help to unite or disunite our three countries; and then we will look at the current problems and future prospects only in very general terms leaving the details to the discussion period.

Situated as they are in the Central and Eastern parts of Southern Europe, Italy, Greece and Turkey share similar geographical features and anthropological characteristics. Their systems of government are very similar and their democratic development has followed similar patterns. All three are proud of their history as rulers of major empires which have dominated approximately same territories, each for several centuries. All three of them take an active part in the creation of a united Europe, through their activities in the Council of Europe and the European Community, although Turkey's status in the latter is for the time being of an associate member. All are members of the Atlantic Alliance which is expected to ensure the safety of their frontiers against a commonly perceived threat.

There are no territorial disputes between the three countries. The boundaries of Italy were established at the end of the Second World War between Greece and Italy, and between Greece and Turkey by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. It is evident that greater cooperation among the three countries will help the welfare of their peoples and this subject will be discussed separately.

As regards the factors of disunity which seems to exist mainly between Turkey and Greece, we would be tempted to describe them as perceptual since they relate to various myths of national or religious character rather than being substantive issues of major material importance.

These myths could first be described as yearnings for the past glory of the empires to which these three modern nations claim inheritance. If we mention such terms as "mare nostrum", "megali idea" or "Pan Turkism or Pan Islamism" you will understand what we mean, because these utopic aspirations can never be achieved by any of these countries before the destruction of other two. Turks lost their mythical ideology before they were really created in the course of the First World War; Greece's dreams suffered the same fate in 1922 on the Anatolian plateau, and Italy's ill conceived aspiration in the Second World War.

There are no responsible Turks today who cherish irredentism either in the re-creating of the Ottoman Empire, or as Panturkism or Pan-Islamism. One should, therefore, distinguish the motivations of Turkey when she intervened in Cyprus in 1974 irredentist aspirations. In fact, there are today in the world nearly 160 million people who consider themselves as Turks. Scattered over a very large area stretching from Balkans to China, These Turks have been subjected to a variety of influences resulting from their geography and the regimes under which they have had to live. Uniting these Turks under one flag is a dream that will probably be never come true. Furthermore, in the territories which were left outside the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey ethnic Turks which were originally part of the Ottoman state, were left, by one treaty or other, under the sovereignty of other countries. These are the Turks whose safety and well-beings are matters of great concern to the people of Turkey, not because of irredentism but due to the existence of family bonds, kinships and resulting democratic pressures. This is the basic reason why Turkey was compelled to intervene in Cyprus in 1974

and this is the reason why Turkey is raising her voice against the forced Bulgarization of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. We repeat, Turkey's concern for the well-being of its former compatriots and the actions she takes for their security and equal treatment within the framework of existing treaty rights, should in no way be regarded as signs of irredentism or expansionism but human concern for the safety and welfare of brothers or relatives.

One of the fundamental issues that need be clarified, therefore, concern the perceptual differences between Turks and the Greeks regarding each other's aspirations and actions. Rightly or wrongly, Turks believe that Greece's ambition in Cyprus is to ensure a settlement or non-settlement that would keep the way to ENOSIS open by reducing the Turkish Community to a minority status, and do away with them at an opportune time, disregarding the fact the Turks of the island are a community which have equal rights and status with that of the Greek community. Also in the Aegean, Turks consider the Greek actions and expressed intentions as evidences of resurgent Greek expansionism. In the transformation of what remained of Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War and the War of Independence into a national Turkish state, the frontiers of the "motherland" were based on the National Pact of 1919 which was recognized almost in toto by the Treaty of Lausann of 1923 to which Greece and Italy were also parties. It is a shared belief among the Turks that any attempt to change the balance established with the Lausanne Peace Treaty without the consent of Turkey would be tantamount to an infringement of Turkey's national interests or even integrity, as the case might be. Therefore, any unilateral attempt by Greece in the Aegean to expand its domination and rights beyond those foreseen in the Lausanne Peace Treaty without consent of Turkey will be considered a threat to Turkey's vital national interests. Problems regarding air space, the continental shelf, arming of the demilitarized islands, extension of territorial waters are seen as related to the Lausanne balance and could only be settled by the parties concerned namely Greece and Turkey through dialogue, negotiation and agreement.

Let us dwell on these issues briefly because they seem to cause major adverse effects on our relations.

a) Continental Shelf: Turkey believes that the continental shelf is to be delimited between Turkey and Greece and has invited Athens repeatedly to negotiations. In its resolution No.395(1976), the UN Security Council invited Turkey and Greece to settle the question through negotiations. In conformity with the Security Council decision the two countries signed an agreement in Bern on November 11,1976 and decided to enter into negotiations which were began but, unfortunately these were disrupted by the present Greek Government when it came to power in 1981.

b)Air Space: As reflected in the Chicago Convention on civil aviation of 1944, international law stipulates that the breadth of national air space has to correspond to the breadth of territorial sea.Although Greek territorial sea is 6 miles, Greece claims a national airspace of 10 miles. This claim is a source of tension in the Aegean.Greece abuses also its FIR responsibilities. FIR is established to provide technical services for civil aviation and does not in any way imply recognition of sovereignty over the international airspace.

c)Demilitarization of the Aegean islands: Proximity to the Turkish coast and security imperatives of the Anatolian peninsula necessitated the demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean islands under the terms of the decision of 1913 by the six powers, 1923 Lausanne Peace treaty, and 1947 Paris Peace treaty. However, well over the past twenty years Greece has been violating the demilitarized status of these island, needlessly creating tensions in the Aegean.

d)Discriminatory acts against the Moslem Turkish Minority in Western Thrace:The Moslem Turkish minority has been deprived of many of its basic rights, such as purchasing land, education in one's own language, repairing and maintaining their historical and religious buildings and the right to travel.

As stated earlier Turkey is ready to find negotiated solutions to these and other problems but there is no possibility for the Turks to accept imposed solutions, that have not been subject of negotiations and proper agreements.

If we recall how the thorny bi-lateral problems between Turkey and Greece were resolved in 1928, thanks to a certain measure of Italian good offices and culminated in the famous Greek-Turkish Entente Cordiale, which is the masterpiece of statesmanship of late Ataturk and Venizelos, providing friendly relations between the two countries for several decades, there is no reason why we should not expect a similar development now as well. The ingredients necessary for the conclusion of a similar agreement or the reaffirmation of the old ones are at hand. Like in 1930s Turkey is prepared to guarantee the existing frontiers of Greece as established in Lausanne and discuss all or any of the outstanding problems between the two countries with a view to finding durable solutions. But, let us repeat, she is not prepared to accept fait accomplis.

Therefore, allow us to say, that the so-called Turkish "threat" which the Greek government is claiming to exist, is mythical and therefore unfounded. There is no Turkish threat to Greece or Greek interests so long as Greece does not attempt to change unilaterally the status quo of the relations between the two countries in a manner that would upset the Lausanne balance. Since the Turks are convinced that they constitute no threat to Greece or Greek people, they wonder why so much hostility is expressed and aggressive attributions are made to Turkey, and to the intentions of the Turks. As observers of Turkish politics for some considerable years, we would like to assure this audience that the feelings of the Turkish people are of friendship and best wishes for the people of Greece and that new generations in Turkey are being brought up with a sense of belonging to Europe where all citizens of Europe are considered to be our partners. At this point we might raise an issue which has a direct bearing on the social and political factors affecting the Turkish-Greek relations. It is the education of school children and the school texts used. For the past fifty years or so after the Turkish Greek rapprochement in the 1930s school texts in Turkey have referred to the Anatolian campaign of the Greek army in relatively objective terms. For example in history books Greece's name is mentioned very frequently, and more so a

this movement by late Abdi Ipekci, former editor of Milliyet, and the well-known Greek composer Mr. Mikis Theodorakis. At this point we must reaffirm our belief in the sincerity and credibility of the Turkish statements when Turkish statesmen and political leaders of rightist or leftist persuasion say that Turkey has no expansionist aims. Both the political elites and the man-in-the-street have reconciled themselves to the boundaries set down by the peace treaties signed at the end of the War of Independence.

We sincerely hope and believe that Turkish and Greek peoples will in the end find a way of establishing a real dialogue between the two countries and create conditions conducive for the solution of the problems between the two countries.

So far, we dwelled mainly on the relations between Turkey and Greece, simply because there are practically no problems of political nature between Italy and Turkey. We are happy with the constructive role Italy plays for ensuring peace and stability in Eastern Mediterranean.

The economists will refer to economic aspects of Turkey's relations with Italy and Greece. These relations could increase further between our countries when Turkey becomes a full member of the European Community. It would therefore be natural for us to expect Italy, as well as Greece to provide support in accelerating Turkey's full membership in the European Community. When issues of nationalism are involved, human nature may be more influenced by emotions rather than reason. In charting our relations and in studying the problems before us and in searching solutions we need to have our reason dominate our emotions. As far as Turkey is concerned what is desired is to live in peace and achieve her economic development and eventual economic and political integration with Europe. All else is secondary to this goal, and all thought and claims to the contrary are based on misinterpretation and conjecture and have no basis in fact.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION IN NATO'S
SOUTHERN FLANK AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

(c) Ciro Elliott Zoppo

Professor of International Relations
at the
University of California, Los Angeles

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Ciro Elliott Zoppo, an American, is Professor of International Relations at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has a Masters and a Ph.D. from Columbia University, New York. He has been a Research Associate in the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, and a member of the research staff and consultant at The Rand Corporation. Professor Zoppo has also been Executive Director of the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Currently, he is a member of the Steering Committee of the UCLA Center for Strategy and International Affairs, and ^{is a member of} of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Professor Zoppo has published many studies on international security, arms control, and Mediterranean politics, in the United States and Europe. His most recent publication, edited with Charles Zorgbibe, is On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (1985). This work has been published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Dordrecht, The Netherlands), and is part of the ASI series published for NATO.

I. PREMISES AND CONTEXT

The central premise of this analysis is that the security policies of NATO Mediterranean members are primarily concerned with how to maintain and promote deterrence of East-West military conflict in order to prevent a conventional or a nuclear war in Europe. Conventional and nuclear deterrence for the defense of the Atlantic Alliance has been seen, since the founding of NATO, as intimately connected and practically indivisible. What strengthens one strengthens the other. For Mediterranean members of the Alliance, the military contribution they would make has been seen primarily in terms of the conventional forces, and of the bilateral arrangements with the United States, for the common defense.

In fact, NATO doctrine has always assumed the probable initial phase of defense to be conventional. For the same war, experts have frequently assumed that the Warsaw Pact has contingency plans and the forces to wage a conventional attack against Western Europe. But Soviet military doctrine implies that the Soviet Union's plans also include strikes against NATO nuclear forces with conventional weapons.

In a world with nuclear weapons, nothing can insure against a nuclear response to such attacks. The threat of an escalation to nuclear conflict remains, therefore, a constant feature of the East-West security relationship. Consequently, the state of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance, and its relationship to the Eurostrategic and conventional East-West military balance, in Europe, has been for many years the source of West European concern about the strength of the military coupling between U.S. and West European defense.

Specifically, this means the acceptance that militarily there is no Western defense possible without the central role of the United States; achieved most efficiently, at the conventional level of defense, through operational integration in NATO. This requirement is crucial for the Mediterranean members of the Alliance. The political, as well as the military, geography of the Mediterranean makes it virtually impossible, beyond well-meaning political declarations, to operate a joint defense effectively without the United States as the lynchpin uniting the various national defense operations into a coherent joint strategy. One reason is that American bases in Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are all sustained by bilateral agreements between the host country and the United States. All of them, except for those in Spain, are expressly legitimized as NATO facilities for NATO missions. (Any other use of these facilities by the United States is at the discretion of the host government on an ad hoc basis.)

Moreover, except for Italy, most major weapons systems in these countries are American. This gives a degree of military interoperability to the Southern Flank not matched on the Central Front. More important still, the United States, principally through land- and sea-based air power, and U.S. naval forces provides an operationally aggregating role for the Mediterranean countries. Each on his own, because they are either at odds politically, constrained by limited budgets, and isolated by geography--would not be able to maximize their national defenses, except through joint efforts with the United States.

Cooperative and joint security efforts between the United States and Western Europe to maintain the deterrence of war are inevitable

because the ultimate catastrophe for each nation's security--nuclear war--cannot be avoided through political means; regardless of how much distance Europe takes from the United States politically and militarily.

Western countries in Europe and the Mediterranean could not isolate their national destiny through political expedients because of the physical and societal effects of a nuclear war that devastated Europe, East and West. Radioactive fallout knows no political frontiers, and even a partial "nuclear winter" resulting from a nuclear conflict between the Soviet and American superpowers would surely seal the fate of neutral, unaligned and members of alliances alike. Mediterranean countries of the Southern Flank would find it difficult to survive, as viable economic-political units, even in a Europe devastated by a protracted conventional East-West war, without nuclear fire.

The premise that the deterrence of war is the focal role of NATO does not invalidate the primacy of military adequacy at the national level for members of the Alliance. There can be no credible deterrence without a perceivable and appropriate military capability that sustains the political will to defend the motherland. For the countries of the Southern Flank, there are no credible or available options without full political, economic integration into Western Europe and military integration into the Atlantic Alliance.

Politically, this approach would not reduce the options available to Italy, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Spain in regard to non-NATO areas. All members of NATO have pursued foreign policies, in the Third World, more suitable to the particular requirements of their national interests,

often in disagreement with the American policies, without fear of political satellization. In regard to East-West security in Europe, however, it is difficult to envisage contingencies, in the years ahead, that would so fundamentally separate the national interests of the United States and those of her European Mediterranean allies which would justify their military isolation from the Atlantic Alliance. Although the internal politics of Spain and Greece, in particular, could rationalize isolationist foreign policy choices, they would be products of a political ideology or a nationalism that failed to confront the geopolitics of the nuclear era. No Mediterranean vocation can militarily shelter the Mediterranean from the fate of Central Europe. And military outcomes there and in the Mediterranean can ^{not} be considered without the crucial role of the United States.

Because national defense is inextricably related to the national economy, the economics of defense also militate against any but the most intimate relationship of Mediterranean allies with the industrial countries of the West (including Japan). The often intense commercial competition within the Western world, and between the United States and Western Europe and Japan does not challenge the proposition that in matters of the technology and defense there is a single Western international economy, without autonomously independent national efforts for Mediterranean countries especially.

In the Western Mediterranean, where no serious conflicts exist between NATO members, i.e., Spain, Portugal, Italy, military integration within NATO would not only facilitate joint operations but also strengthen

the interface between American and allied missions for the defense of the Mediterranean region. In the Eastern Mediterranean, integration at the operational military level is even more essential. The resolution of the Turkish-Greek conflict should become a high political priority for the other members of the Southern Flank. Their very national security is at stake. One example should suffice to make the point.

Current and foreseeable technologies of war have drastically changed the character of Spanish security, in terms of time as well as space. This means that the defense of Germany and Turkey--because the Central Front could collapse quickly and the Dardanelles be taken swiftly--are as crucial to Spain's security as is the defense of the Straits of Gibraltar. If either were to fall into the hands of the Soviets, no real geopolitical shelters would be available for Spain other than political satellization. On these fronts, little time is available for mobilization to be useful. Forces' in-being will probably define the outcomes of conventional conflict. The rapid pace of modern conflict has been clearly evident in the several India-Pakistan and Arab-Israeli wars, and in the British-Argentine conflict over the Malvinas--even though the last of these wars was fought at distances which in the battle zone were comparable to European continental distances; and for Britain at intercontinental ranges.

II. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Southern Flank countries have displayed a lack of operational integration both within their national boundaries, and as a region,

from the outset of their NATO membership.* Geography and their internal politics furnish a great deal of the explanation. In addition, the geographic and ideological situations of Austria, Yugoslavia, and Albania add their weight.

To begin with, Austria's neutral status, and Yugoslavia's non-alignment have separated the Southern Flank from the Central Front in regard to political geography and military operations. For the Bavarian region of the Central Front this has created the potential for outflanking from the South; although the mountainous terrain would inhibit such a maneuver.

For Italy it has resulted in an operational gap between its own frontline defenses and those of the German Federal Republic. In this case potential outflanking would come from the North. Here again the accidented terrain will be an inhibitor. Although Yugoslavia has provided a spatial and an operational buffer, on its East-West axis, it may, because of the ideology of its regime, also possibly provide a staging area for attack. In addition, even without a change in political orientation, the strong reliance on a territorial defense model by Yugoslavia undercuts that country's posture as a barrier to major operations from the East. In any case, an operational gap has existed that separates, and isolates, the defense of the Central Front from the territorial defense of the Southern Flank.

*The information on force postures, and related matters needed for this analysis, has been drawn principally from the Military Balance (1980-1985), The Strategic Survey, and relevant Adelphi papers of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

The lack of operational contiguity that afflicts NATO defense between the Friuli Venezia Giulia-Veneto Italian front and Bavarian regions of Germany also obtains between Italy and Greece. Again, this has resulted from the combination of physical geography and Albania's political orientation. Although Greek and Turkish NATO defense of Thrace is on contiguous territory, an operational integration of Greek and Turkish defenses did not develop much beyond the common, forward defense NATO strategy, on the ground, and a combined air command of the Aegean region, and has lately practically disappeared altogether, because of the intense disagreements between Greece and Turkey. One of the consequences of the Greek-Turkish conflict on Cyprus in 1974, of operational significance, has been the redeployment of Greek forces to basically wage war with Turkey. To a degree, though not crucially, the deployment of Turkish military forces has also been modified to include Greece as a possible enemy, and to maintain the occupation of the Turkish Cypriote portion of Cyprus.

Thus another operational gap has been added between Greece and Turkey to the one already existing between Italy and Greece and Italy and West Germany. Because of geography, and former internal politics Portugal (with the Azores) and Spain--the latter's recent entry into the political structure of NATO notwithstanding--have traditionally been seen mostly as staging areas and as providers of naval and air facilities for the United States than as integral components of NATO's forward defense strategy. In connection with them too, their geographic location coupled with their politics has isolated them operationally

not only from the Central Front but also from the other members of the Southern Flank.

What all countries of NATO's Southern Flank have had as a common experience has been bilateral mutual security treaties with the United States, and (with Italy's exception), military assistance from the United States. This assistance has been a quid pro quo for American use of bases; a use generally, and at times severely, constrained for out-of-area operations. Consequently, bilateral U.S. and host country political and military agreements have been the lynchpin of the operational foundations for the Southern Flank. The force structures of Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, especially, have been crucially affected by this bilateral relationship with the United States. To a lesser, but nevertheless salient degree, this has also been the case for Italy. In Italy, the basing of the U.S. Sixth Fleet has influenced Italian force structures in less direct ways. But the impact of bilateral relationships, exemplified by the Sixth's basing in Naples has not been negligible. In the interservice rivalry between the Italian Navy and Air Force regarding air power and its service jurisdiction and missions, for example, the presence and role of the Sixth Fleet has figured prominently.

It must be emphasized, therefore, that the geopolitical fragmentation of the Southern Flank, on the one hand, and the pivotal military and political role of the United States, on the other, provide the unavoidable base line for force structure analysis, in the context of Mediterranean security in NATO.

This basic relationship, of long standing, between force structures, with their operational missions, and of U.S. military assistance with the related U.S. operational deployments has been shaped also by the increasingly fast-paced changes in the military technology of the U.S. and the USSR, and the attending steep increases of the costs of weapon systems, for the West.

By now, it is evident that the costs and the character of military technological change crucially defines the limits of force restructuring and of weapons systems re-modernization in the Southern Flank. The sliding in the hardware modernization schedule in Italy, and the substantial amounts of U.S. military assistance required for Turkey's modernization program are examples. Similar situations exist in Portugal, Greece, and Spain.

This condition is aggravated by a local East-West military balance which particularly favors the Pact in armor, air power and logistics, that is likely not to be redressed even if NATO goals are met by the end of the 1980s. In fact, without significant alteration in the force postures and the tactics of ground forces formations in Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and to a lesser degree, Portugal, it is difficult to see how indigenous Southern Flank forces can effectively begin to overcome the combined effects of fiscal constraints, weapons and equipment obsolescence, and Pact superiorities in tanks, aircraft and logistical support.

Developments in the military technology of air power and air-to-surface and surface-to-surface rocketry have reduced the geographic

space of the Mediterranean literally ten-fold, and created additional operational requirements for defense of the Southern Flank. On the other hand, they may also have created opportunities for complementarities in the defense of the air spaces of Mediterranean members of NATO and the French Mediterranean theater. The prospects for options for defense of the air space, in each Mediterranean country of the Alliance could integrate regionally into more than the sum of their parts. Threat definition as it translates into military missions also has peculiarities in the Southern Flank which directly affect force postures in terms of options and the prospects for cooperative efforts in Mediterranean security.

Beneath the general agreement on the potential threat from the Warsaw Pact to the security of the Mediterranean region lie increasingly dynamic national definitions of the security threat by Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain and the other members of NATO's Southern Flank. These changing emphases in threat definition has had, in the case of Greece and Turkey, or could have, in other countries, a direct impact on force posture and missions. One outcome has been some blurring between NATO and out-of-area boundaries.

For example, Spain sees the major threat to its national security coming from the South out of the Maghreb, while Italy, having assumed some responsibility for Malta's security in regard to a potential Libyan threat, is exploring the possibility of redefining its national military mission beyond the traditional coincidence within NATO postures, and missions, on its Northeast frontiers.

This means that in analyzing force structures for the purpose of identifying the unique competences, traditional preferences, and comparative advantages of the countries of the Southern Flank: geographical attributes; evolving technologies; the specific impacts of U.S.-host country military bilateral agreements; and the potential for actual military conflicts within NATO's Southern Flank and along the ill-defined southern boundaries of NATO, are critical benchmarks for the analysis of options and prospects.

For all of these factors have had, and will continue to have, direct bearing on force structure modernization, on deployments, and on the definition of missions. These will not always actually coincide with NATO strategic and tactical rationales, as formal and declaratory policies may maintain. A fortiori, the situation in the Southern Flank in terms of options and prospects for integrated and joint defense in NATO is manifestly quite different from that prevailing on the Central Front and the Northern Flank. It is both more dynamic and more complex. It is also much more constrained in terms of economic resources and political stability.

Specifically, the fragmented geography of the Southern Flank countries, which with the exception of Portugal, frame the north, east, and west Mediterranean, is becoming potentially more integrated geostrategically, in terms of airwar, because of the impact of changing military technologies. In terms of NATO missions as they interface with evolving national defense programs this means that land-based projection of air power is becoming dominant.

The protection of the national airspace of Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, and in its southern theater France as well, could be explicitly coordinated to create complementarities in radar coverage, anti-aircraft defense, interception, and in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, interdiction as well. For example, a greater emphasis in Turkey, on the defense of the airspace with the recently programmed F-16s, together with an enlarged capacity for the defense of the airspace in the southern peninsular and insular regions of Italy, and adjacent territorial waters could be mutually reinforcing. If the political motivations that have led Greece to shift part of its air deployments onto islands off the Turkish coasts could be projected north and southward, and Spain's airspace defense extended eastward, the air defense coverage of the Southern Flank would be enhanced, while the air defense of each NATO country in the Mediterranean would benefit individually. So could the air defense of Allied forces at sea, particularly if each of the national air forces were to specify fleet air defense missions to add to the anti-ship missions now assigned to components of their land-based air.

Similarly, the capacity for regional air defense, and defense forward in the Southern Flank region would be enhanced if, where it makes sense, in Turkey, Italy, and Greece the infrastructure of military, and dual purpose military-civilian airfields, were to be adjusted to include the necessary basing requirements for hosting additional U.S. air reinforcements. These could include U.S. prepositioning of stocks. This could be accomplished through the bilateral U.S. arrangements with Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, or preferably NATO agreements.

Pertinent additional agreements might be inserted for Italy in the existing NATO support understandings. Because of its centrally located geographic situation, southern and insular Italy possesses a comparative advantage useful to the Alliance as a whole.

Because of the geography of the Southern Flank countries, some purely national missions can yield dividends for out-of-area East-West conflict contingencies, in which there is NATO political consensus. For example, a modest expansion of military airfield infrastructures in central and eastern Turkey, coupled with explicit emphasis on missions for the defense of the Turkish airspace would bolster inhibitions against Soviet air penetration of the Middle East and North Africa. This would be a consequence of greater interception capabilities in the Turkish Air Force, and greater capacity to host U.S. combat air power in case of need. The outcome would greatly enhance strictly NATO defensive operations, as well.

Similarly, a bolstered capacity in air defense and in the volume of transit traffic that would be handled in the Canaries would both strengthen the defense of Spanish territory and facilitate inbound U.S. air reinforcement for NATO and out-of-area missions.

Combining two other parameters of the Southern Flank situation--non-NATO, independent national threat definitions and U.S. influence through bilateral military aid--could also yield dividends for NATO. The result would be more potential flexibility and availability of reinforcements for the Central Front from Spain, Italy, possibly Turkey in case of an actual attack there by Pact forces; or, to partially replace U.S. forces depleted from NATO for an out-of-area conflict.

Italy has had, in Lebanon, an intervention contingent--to be sure, one that was constituted, ad hoc, to participate in the multinational force. Spain has been creating its own intervention force for bolstering her defenses in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. The air lift requirement is about 1,500 kilometers. The capability for such air lift could equally put a Spanish brigade in Bavaria. There are in Spain two battalions of marine infantry with amphibious capability but without their own air defense. Turkish forces in Cyprus are a short-legged, not well equipped intervention force. However, some elements, if restructured in advance into light infantry, could be used elsewhere on the Central Front in case of attack.

As of now, political constraints would make it very difficult to pre-assign, officially, missions for these national contingents outside their national territories. Nevertheless, if these forces were developed in each NATO country of the Mediterranean region, for national missions now, they would be viable for projection to NATO defensive missions on other fronts, in case of conflict.

In Italy, the basic rationales for a permanent Italian intervention force are being generated by the debate on a "new model" for national defense. In Spain, the military are already committed to the development of an intervention force. In Turkey, if the issue is broached by West Germany, with an offer of appropriate aid, encouraged and supported by the United States, it would be possibly considered by the Turkish government. This would be a way to operationally link Central Front defense with that of the Southern Flank.

III. IN CONCLUSION

The economic capabilities available for defense, the limitations on industrial capacity that exist for the production of high technology, in various forms and degrees, in the Mediterranean countries of NATO, when coupled with the geography of the region and the changes that have developed in the technology of conventional arms and nuclear systems, must lead to the following conclusions.

- o Mediterranean and European security are inseparable components in the East-West dimensions of European security.
- o Not only for nuclear deterrence but also at the conventional level of deterrence and warfighting, the participation of American air and naval power--to a lesser degree ground forces--is indispensable for Mediterranean security. U.S. facilities in the Mediterranean are, therefore, an essential requirement of defense.
- o No realistic options exist for any individual member of the Alliance in the Mediterranean to assure its national defense autonomously--without explicit coordination of its operational missions and a reliance on the force postures and deployment doctrines of other members of the Southern Flank. This requires much more than the integration of NATO commands. National security, by each Mediterranean member of the Alliance must be seen as being organically tied to that of each other member, and in direct and explicit function with the defense of

the Central Front, and developments in the Northern Flank.

- o In the defense of the air space over the Mediterranean the defense of each member of NATO cannot be assured effectively, if at all, without explicit integration of the air defense missions of each country with those of other NATO members--including U.S. naval and land-based air forces in the Mediterranean region. The air defense of each NATO country there, regardless of geographic location, must begin on the easternmost frontiers of the Atlantic Alliance.
- o The separate national navies of Mediterranean members of NATO cannot defend each alone their national territorial waters against the pressures of the Soviet flotilla, and its land-based air support. Only an integrated naval defense--which included the U.S. Sixth Fleet--can achieve this. The Eastern Mediterranean is the crucial sector in which the naval security of the Mediterranean is likely to be ultimately decided.
- o Spain must seriously consider a contribution to the territorial defense of the Central Front and the gap between it and the defense of northern Italy, and possibly of the Dardanelles. Portugal must also consider how to help in the defense of Italy's northwest frontier. Italy and Turkey should both be seriously

considering what possible forces they could project to the defense of the Central Front. Italy must also consider a possible role in the defense of the Turkish Straits. Greece must redirect its operational deployments to defend northeast military coordination with Turkey.

- o Spanish military integration into NATO would facilitate coordinated, overlapping defense of the Mediterranean, thereby strengthening deterrence of East-West conflict.
- o An integrated air, naval, and ground defense of the Southern Flank and of this flank with the Central Front, can be achieved by relatively modest adjustments in the national defense plans of each Mediterranean member of the Alliance, which could be fungen within currently projected national budgets of defense; and U.S. operations in the region. What is essential is explicit coordination of the national defense plans to generate the definition of complementary missions and deployments, which without violating the particular requirements for the national defense of each nation increase the national defense for all.