


"TEN YEARS AFTER HELSINKI. EUROPEAN SECURITY: A BEGINNING?"
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 10-13/VI/1985

- (1) programma e lista dei partecipanti
- (2) Antola, Esko: "The CSCE - the future. Appendix: CSCE events since 1972"
- (3) Antola, Esko: "Models of peaceful change and the future of the European security system"
- (4) Bird, Gerd: "Some aspects of the conditions in Europe for East-West economic relations"
- (5) Borawski, John: "The Stockholm Conference. Current assessment and future directions"
- (6) Holm, Hans-Henrik: "SDI and European security: does dependence assure security?"
- (7) Holma, Juha: "Europe - detente - CSCE 1975-1985"
- (8) Isernia, Pierangelo: "Security in Europe: domestic and international factors of the security issue-area politicization"
- (9) Mates, Leo: "The global perspectives of European security"
- (10) Moreau Defarges, Philippe: "The political role of the European Community"
- (11) Rotfeld, Adam Daniel: "The CSCE and European security"
- (12) Schmidt, Max: "Conditions and requirements for policy of peaceful coexistence in Europe and coalition of common sense"
- (13) Valtonen, Timo: "The CSCE as a European forum for cooperation"
- (14) Nuclear Free Zones and CBMs - a swedish perspective"
- (15) Conclusions and recommendations



The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Ten years after Helsinki
EUROPEAN SECURITY - A NEW BEGINNING
An international round table seminar
Haikko Manor - Helsinki, 10-13 June, 1985

Dagmarinkatu 8 C 40
SF-00100 Helsinki
☎ 98 97-3 ☎ 90-44 11 88

PROGRAMME

Monday, 10 June

- Arrivals at Haikko Manor
17.00 Possibility for sauna bathing for the FIIA guests (contact the reception)
19.30 Welcoming dinner at the main building

Tuesday, 11 June

- 9.30 I session: Military aspects of European security
(Arms control and East-West relations, Regional disarmament.
Disengagement. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.)
- Christian Hacke
- Hans Maretzki
- Lars B. Wallin
- 13 LUNCH
14.45 Departure for Helsinki
15.30 A reception of the Paasikivi Society at hotel Marski.
16.30 A special meeting of the Paasikivi Society on "European Security - Ten years after Helsinki". The speakers: Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland; L.N. Tolkunov, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; and David Emery, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, USA.
19 Buffet dinner hosted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Hotel Kalastajatorppa
Transportation to Haikko Manor

Wednesday, 12 June

- 9 II Session: Political and structural aspects of European security
(The role of the European Community. US-West European relations. Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Neutrality and Non-alignment. European and global dimensions of international security.)
- Philippe Moreau Defarges
- Hans Henrik Holm
- Leo Mates
- 12 LUNCH
- 14 III session: Towards a European security order
(Domestic factors of peace and security. Models of peace policy. Collective security. Common security. Functionalist idea of security. Peaceful change and European security. The CSCE as a model and as a process in European security.)
- Pierangelo Isernia
- Adam Daniel Rotfeld
- Esko Antola
- 17 Conclusion of the seminar
18 Departure for Guest House Sandviken, sauna and dinner hosted by Neste State Oil
Return to Haikko

Thursday, 13 June

- 9 Departure for Helsinki
10 Cruise on M/aux "Fortuna" with lunch
13 Return to harbour, in front of Hotel Palace
Departures

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May 1985

2

THE CSCE - THE FUTURE

Esko Antola

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cipants only.

Esko Antola:

**The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) -
the Future**

When one interprets the CSCE as a number of regimes which emerged during the period of détente, a question that assumes essential importance in relation to its future is that of how these regimes can be kept alive if political détente does not assume the same forms as in the early 1970s. An even more fundamental question that begs an answer is whether the CSCE, which is centred around regimes and other institutionalized forms of co-operation, can have any life of its own without détente in relations between the greatpowers. Aside from détente, another fundamental question concerns the form that relations between different regimes will assume.

Regimes and other institutional forms of interaction are indirectly linked to the European system through détente: détente was a period in the Europeans' international relations that ended when the stage of creating regimes began. The system of institutional interaction in Europe within the CSCE framework has developed without a direct link to détente. It is obvious that détente, as understood in the early 1970s with the emphasis on power relations, can not be as decisively important in the future of the CSCE, which will have to learn to live without the backbone provided by favourable relations between the great powers.

We must also examine the explanatory power of détente theories. It is obvious that the research and theorizing engendered during the period of détente require at least adjustment, and it is probable that we must seek completely new explanation models and theories to replace them. The new theories will have to be able to link the two CSCE levels together by means other than those provided by détente policy. Those levels are the one in which greatpower relations and their management role are expressed and that of the structure of European co-operation as expressed in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

THE CSCE AND THE GREATPOWERS

Even if we accept the premise that the theory of détente between the greatpowers does not provide the conditions essential for the future of the CSCE, we cannot analyze the future of Europe without those greatpowers, which in their international relations in general have a tendency to seek recognition of their role and legitimize their positions. However, their roles also inevitably involve competitiveness, which determines the character of their mutual relations both globally and in relation to the situation in Europe. In other words, the greatpowers influence international relations on two different levels, which are usually difficult to reconcile: by managing their mutual relations and by availing of these in a manner that enables them to give a central direction to the general development of international relations.

Looking at the matter from a European perspective, it is important to recognize that greatpower relations and the ability to manage them are of major importance to our continent. Indeed, the most important measure of these relations throughout the post-war period has been Europe. The direction that they have given to the development of the international system has easily been perceived as European crises. In Europe, détente was a manifestation of a phase in the greatpowers' relations in which it was easy for them to reach agreement on the general trend of this international development. But European crises have also taught us that greatpower theories, in which the greatpowers and their interests are perceived as running parallel to each other and through shared interests, is not the correct way to assess post-war international relations.

Détente must be considered a special and perhaps historically unique phase in greatpower relations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, these relations created the preconditions in which the diplomatic process that preceded Helsinki could be carried

through and the Helsinki Final Act accomplished. However, greatpower relations are formed by so many factors and involve linkages between so many matters that they can not serve as a foundation on which to build the security of Europe. In the long run, the states of Europe must be able to create and sustain international relations of a kind that will function even without greatpower relations like those that détente represented.

The greatpowers and nuclear weapons

The interdependence of the CSCE and greatpower relations is accentuated by two factors. The first - and most important in our time - is that of nuclear weapons. We cannot imagine the European international system without the direct effects of these weapons or of their possession. The very existence of nuclear weapons makes the present European system one in which the concept of order rather than that of a system is more important from the viewpoint of the CSCE. Détente and the Final Act consolidated a certain system of states in Europe by confirming existing borders and recognizing as legitimate the political systems and forms of government that emerged after the war.

By contrast, the military and political order in Europe has been supported by nuclear weapons since the late 1940s and the CSCE has not been able to influence it in any way. The rules and norms of the European international system function to an increasing extent in subordination to the norms of this order; an order founded on nuclear weapons shackles the opportunities that acceptance and adoption of the rules of that order have given Europe. Seen from this perspective, the CSCE process since Helsinki has largely been one of unrealized opportunities; by confirming the system of states that emerged after the Second World War, the Final Act removed many of the obstacles

to co-operation and interaction between the states of Europe, and certainly increased confidence between these countries. However, this confidence has not led to new qualitative steps towards fostering and expanding co-operation. The existing regimes and institutions are prisoners of an order founded on nuclear weapons. This order, in turn, is a reassurance of the greatpowers' role in Europe.

Nuclear weapons and their possession constitute a factor that directly shapes the order in Europe. The greatpowers' other channel of influence is indirect in character. It reaches Europe through alliances. These alliances have been and remain the means of channelling the influence of nuclear weapons into the European order. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, it was through them that greatpower hegemony, the order-maintaining effect of nuclear weapons and closed international relations were mediated to Europe. The bloc-based European order has retained its grip on our continent even after the signing of the Final Act, and institutions built around these blocs are still a braking factor in the development of the continent.

Order and hegemony can be linked together by, to take the example of George Modelski, speaking of an international cycle spanning the period from one war to the next. The essence of Modelski's cyclical dynamics is its intrinsic tension between the degree of order and the amount of esteem accorded it. In Europe, the degree is measured in terms of nuclear weapons, which guarantee the order and the permanence and cohesion of the alliances.

In Modelski's model, however, not even a high degree of order can prevent the amount of esteem accorded it from declining. The legitimacy of the prevailing order is challenged and, the major resources devoted to its maintenance notwithstanding, the hegemonic power system is eroded. What is really pertinent to the future of the CSCE is how the curves describing the degree

of order and the amount of esteem accorded it intersect each other. The real importance of that future is revealed in how well the CSCE can solve the conflict between the European order and the pressures exerted on it.

However, the European order differs so much from the system of international relations that preceded it that Modelski's model can serve only as a general frame of reference when we attempt to pinpoint the pressures for change on the European order. Alone nuclear weapons make that order unique, as does the fact that the power structure is founded on two greatpowers, which have organized powerful and cohesive alliances. Thus changes in the European order occur on at least two levels: within the alliances and in the CSCE system proper. In analyzing changes, it is essential to focus attention not only on the two levels, but also on the agents of change.

The first signs of cracks in the order on the alliance level can be perceived in the debate now going on within the Atlantic Alliance, where a Europeanist security policy option has risen to the level of societal discussion and is challenging the greatpower-emphasizing Atlanticist security policy option. The basic premises in the Europeanist option amount to a demand for disengagement from both nuclear weapons in Europe and great power-centred security thinking. However, what is essential to this debate is that it was initiated by ordinary citizens and not by states. Criticism of a nuclear-weapons-based European order represents a force for change which is difficult to channel into the CSCE system proper. But it is possible that the influence of groups like the European peace movements will become so considerable that it will have a diminishing effect on the role of nuclear weapons in the policies of at least some European governments.

Security

The CSCE has been of only slight significance in disengaging the European order from nuclear weapons. The establishment of a concrete linkage between security policy and the CSCE has begun at the Stockholm conference, but in a way that does not steer the contents of security policy away from nuclear weapons. If the aim were to build the future of the CSCE directly on a change in the military order, the conference would have to move into radically new areas and towards new kinds of institutions. Were that to happen, a model for the CSCE's development would be sought in theories of collective security.

A linkage between the CSCE and theories of collective security would anchor it more deeply in status quo models and idealization of the status of equilibrium. Theories of collective security would presumably also reinforce the greatpowers' central role in the European order. Europe's historical experience of collective security models is not encouraging, either. The greatest problem with these models is that they do not allow change to take place peaceably, but instead equilibrium eventually becomes a virtue of the international order.

On the other hand, the CSCE has become - and was especially in the arguments of the early 1970s - a kind of collective security system. One of its specific aims has been to replace individual security, a situation in which each country bases its security solely on its own resources, with a collective security model, in which co-operation is substituted for absolute sovereignty. In the 1980s, for example, the concept of common security has reflected ideas which are linked to a quest for new forms of collective security.

By contrast, there has been very little active discussion of how another pair of concepts central to collective security, objective and subjective security, could be guaranteed in

Europe. Examined chronologically, thinking in relation to European security seems to have followed a course of development in which objective security elements were emphasized within the "official" CSCE machinery as far back as the early 1970s. According to this argument, interests directly linked to the military security of states have been emphasized in the philosophy of the CSCE. The Stockholm disarmament conference provides an example of a way of thinking in which security is approached through the direct phenomena of perceived military threats. It is specifically the development of objective security that confidence-building measures are believed to promote; states should be assured that their physical security is not unduly threatened nor, possibly, threatened with the purpose of precipitating a crisis. In the 1980s, too, crisis management has been added to the range of instruments for increasing objective security.

However, the possibility of strengthening collective security by developing the elements of subjective security has been less prominently discussed and thinking relating to it has been developed only in recent years. The purpose of this method is to emphasize a common trust in security as well as methods intended to reduce the danger of war through common efforts. What is involved is measures mainly advocated by the European peace movements. Confidence-building measures, for example, should also extend to doctrines of warfare. Making military doctrines less aggressive would create a sense of security that could be expected to find an echo in those states and alliances against which the doctrines have been developed. Theories of defensive deterrence or non-aggressive defence are good examples of these models. However, the problem with them is that they are opposed to the prevailing doctrines of state and do not even fit into the established frameworks approved within the CSCE process.

If the aim is to develop the CSCE into the prevailing mechan-

ism between an order founded on nuclear weapons and pressures for change focused on that order and in such a way that this development could proceed independently of greatpower relations, the other CSCE regimes must be emphasized alongside collective security. Collective security and debate on it will obviously lean towards military security. For historical reasons, one of the elements in it will be détente in the form of a loosely defined ideal model. Alongside this debate, there is a constant need to discuss the development of regimes and institutions that have become part of the CSCE process as well as means of making them more effective. In fact, sectors outside the sphere of military security proper are those that have developed best in the history of the CSCE process.

The progress that has been made in the sphere of regimes, military and political confrontation notwithstanding, reminds one of the traditional functional doctrine as a model for the development of international relations. The premise on which this doctrine is based emphasizes the necessity of co-operation. Institutions or regimes created for international co-operation are born of necessity and acquire forms and contents attributable to necessity. A redevelopment of the functional doctrine might open new panoramas to the CSCE process, enabling it to be sustained irrespective of cyclical political developments.

Examined from the viewpoint of the development of functional co-operation, the European system confirmed in the Final Act creates a good foundation. The central political threats and obstacles to the expansion of pragmatic and fruitful interaction were eliminated by the document, in which the signatory states pledged to respect political systems and national sovereignty. This can also be interpreted to mean that the Final Act removed the political obstacles to functional co-operation between states, i.e. collaboration was depoliticized.


The disengagement of the CSCE process from theories and expectations relating to détente would create an opportunity to develop two dimensions, in which a certain independence and self-reliance would be given recognition, simultaneously within its sphere. A security and security-policy level more closely linked to greatpower relations would presuppose both a reassessment of the theory of collective security applying to the whole of Europe and the development of models associated with it as well as a review of military doctrines and security-policy models within the alliances.

For its part, the functional co-operation level would presuppose the development of collaboration forms transcending the borders between the alliances. The existing CSCE processes (such as environmental protection and cultural co-operation) could follow their own dynamics, which would be clearly and pronouncedly based on the Final Act. This document should be understood as a means of eliminating significant political problems and obstacles connected with the European system, a means that would release functional co-operation from the straitjacket of war and the problems it left in its aftermath. In the sphere of economic co-operation, for example, both the need and opportunities for co-operation are enormous.

Naturally, there should be linkages between the two CSCE levels. However, they should not become so close that a standstill on one would prevent progress on the other. One conceivable solution would be a two-tier model, in which co-operation would proceed in those sectors in which progress is fast and generally possible, whereas progress in the slower sectors could keep to its own pace. One could think of applying the same model on a regional scale in Europe as well. If interaction transcending bloc limits in some geographical areas is making rapid progress and there is a great need for co-operation, these pockets of co-operation could be detached from the CSCE process and allowed to be guided by their own dynamics.

The task of regular follow-up meetings would be to try to record progress and possibly to carry out the necessary co-ordination in the name of the totality.

The Helsinki Consultations
Dipoli 22 Nov 1972-8 Jun 73



Preparatory Mtg
15 Jun - 5 Aug 1977

The Belgrade Follow-up Mtg
4 Oct 1977 - 9 Mar 1978

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Montreaux 31 Oct-11 Dec-78

Mediterranean Co-operation
Valletta 13 Feb-26 Mar 1979

Preparations Bonn
20 Jun - 28 Jul 1978

"Scientific Forum"
Hamburg 18 Feb-3 Mar -80

Preparatory Meeting
9 Sept - 10 Nov 1980

The Madrid Follow-up Mtg
11 Nov 1980 - 9 Sept 1983

Preparatory Mtg Helsinki
25 Oct - 11 Nov 1983

Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe Stockholm 17 Jan 1984 -

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Athens 21 Mar - 30 Apr 1984

Mediterranean Co-operation
Venice 16 - 26 Oct 1984

Preparations
24 Apr - 6 May 1985

Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Ottawa 7 May 1985 -

Commemoration of the tenth
Anniversary of the signature
of the Final Act Helsinki

Preparations Budapest
21 Nov - 4 Dec 1984

"Cultural Forum"
Budapest 15 Oct 1985 -

Preparations
2 Apr 1986

Human Contacts
Bern 15 Apr 1986 -

Preparatory Mtg
23 Sept 1986

The Vienna Follow-up Mtg
4 Nov 1986 -

May 1985

13

MODELS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

Esko Antola

Ten years after Helsinki
EUROPEAN SECURITY - A NEW BEGINNING
Haikko Manor - Helsinki 10-13 June 1985

1. Peaceful Change as a Model

Bringing about changes peacefully in a given international order is undoubtedly one to the most challenging tasks of the present activity towards security in Europe. Scholars have often repeated that in the history of international relations, and in particular in the history of Europe, wars have been major agents of international change. The dynamics of change is seen as a cyclical development of international orders from one war to another.¹

Breaking down this vicious circle poses a major challenge to the current European system. Quite clearly that system is based on the outcome of a major war. The major war established the rules and norms of that order, the power relations therein are based largely on the results of that given war, the Second World War. The great historical difference between the current order and its predecessors is the fact that it relies heavily on nuclear weapons.

Scholarly models on how peaceful change could be promoted date back to the 1930's. The international order then existing was rapidly heading towards a collapse and the academic community wished to develop ideas and concrete models in the interest of preserving peace. The League of Nations' collective security system was, as a result of the First World War, designed to transform the traditional European balance of Power -system into a collective security system. The competing option was, in Martin Wight's terms, "relapse into the more primitive stage of rivalry between two dominant powers out of which it (i.e. the pre-war balance of power system: E.A.) had originally grown".²

The latter option became more evident in the Abyssinian War where the collective security system of the League was almost realized. But only almost and thereafter the course of international relations rapidly took a collision course. Wight later argues:³

"The failure of the League of Nations was the most decisive occurrence in international history since the Peace of Westphalia. It ended the long period in which a degree of international order had been maintained by the rational, intricate and precarious system of the multiple balance of power; and by not carrying the system to a higher level, by failing to transform the quantity of order into confederal quality, it introduced a new chapter in which the ordering of international relations has been less under human direction and control".

In this spirit the international relations studies community debated quite extensively during the latter part of the 1930's on the possibilities to change the collision course and to establish methods how the then existing international order could have been changed peacefully and in the interest of peace.⁴ The academic community was too late and the models developed in the International Studies Conference system were overruled by the outbreak of the Second World War.

My intention is not to argue that we face a similar situation in today's Europe. The situation in the 1930's was very much centered around the conflict between "haves" and "have nots" in E.H. Carr's terms⁵: the existing international order was challenged by dissatisfied powers asking for compensation and rehabilitation as great powers.

The current problem is, however, very much similar to the basic problem of the collective security system of the League in Wight's terms in the above citation: how to "transform the quantity of order into a confederal quality". We may of course replace the word "confederal" with current terms such as "common security" or "peace

structure" or "detente" but the basic problem is the same: how the stability and established norms in the Helsinki Final Act ten years ago could be transformed into a European order which is qualitatively more stable, more egalitarian and less dependent on quantitative order in terms of arms.

The debate of peaceful change in the thirties formulated two conceptions describing the content of the term. The first saw peaceful change as a method of avoiding war while the other stressed it as a procedure of restructuring of the international order. The same distinction was expressed by Carr in his *The Twenty Years' crisis* as a distinction between utopian and realist interpretations. Realist version sees peaceful change as a process of "adjustment to the changed relations of power" while the utopian school aims at eliminating power from international relations and instead hopes to base change "on a common feeling what is just and reasonable".⁶

When the realist interpretation of peaceful change is applied, the maintenance of order and the avoidance of war are stressed as the principal aims of peaceful change. It appears as a substitute of war as a method of international change. A good example of such an argument is C.R.M.F. Cruttwell's definition in 1937. Peaceful change occurs in his mind simply when nations are ready to accept changes in the existing international order without wars. In fact the contingent threat of war is, Cruttwell says, the very reason why nations are ready to accept changes. Peaceful change thus takes place in the face of an ultimate threat of war.⁷

In its narrow meaning peaceful change is not only a substitute to war but also an exception from the rule in itself. Change through war is the major type of change in the international system which only under

some specific conditions and circumstances may assume the form of a non-war change. The realist interpretation rarely shows interest in motivations or matters of legitimacy. Claims for change are legitimate as such once they are made by nations states, the only relevant and important actors of international relations. National interests for instance are legitimate reasons for demanding changes.

The realist interpretation identifies three major types or areas of change where peaceful models could be applied. They are territorial changes, modification of international treaties and the development of a collective security system. Demands for **territorial changes** are associated to sovereignty: states are sovereign within certain territorial limits and accordingly most conflicts of interests touch territorial matters or the status of certain territories.

Territorial changes can be executed peacefully in a number of ways. Alterations to borders, changes in the status of territories or states and demilitarization of certain areas or states are examples falling under the narrow concept of peaceful change. These methods are based mostly on historical case studies and their main theoretical argument is a strong assignment to state sovereignty. A distinction is drawn, for instance, between peaceful change and international organization. A narrow concept of peaceful change often excludes international organizations and regulative conventions and limits it to a system of sovereign states.⁸

A more abstract area of changes is the **international treaty system**. Treaty-making powers are also traditionally seen to be firmly entrenched in the heart of national sovereignty. Nations are the principal subjects of the international legal order. That was nearly an undisputable fact in the 1930s. The basic motivation for changing

international treaties is that international obligations and norms should be brought to reflect the circumstances of change. The idea behind this argument is that a confrontation between norms and obligations, and on the other hand, realities of the international system create pressures in the direction of uncontrolled changes and increase the possibility of violent changes.

The general conditions of the international system call for treaty revisions. For instance, the earlier debate of peaceful change recognized the problems of raw materials and colonial possessions as issues which necessitated some changes in international treaties.⁹ The whole problem of international regimes today belongs to this category. It may be argued that pressures towards change in international treaties represent common interests of the international society to better adjust itself to conditions which threaten or may threaten the existing international order.

The third area where models for peaceful change, in their narrow meaning, were developed in the 1930s was **the idea of collective security**. Peaceful change and collective security were in fact associated in many definitions and were seen primarily in terms of **status quo**. The close relationship between collective security and peaceful change was expressed by C.K. Webster as follows:¹⁰

"Collective security and peaceful change are two aspects of all efforts to produce a more peaceful and ordered world and it may be said that each is impossible without the other".

Collective security rests essentially on the legitimate and natural security interests of states who in principle enjoy full sovereignty but who have for both their common interest and for individual interests of each state, to agree on rules and norms of certain collective arrange-

ments. In normal cases collective security rests on non-binding and non-institutionalized measures, which for their essential parts reflect existing political and military considerations.

Status quo is an ultimate measure of collective security. Hence peaceful change in most cases means changes in the status quo. This is expressed by Frederick **Dunn** as follows:¹¹

"The term 'peaceful change', then, refers simply to the alteration of the status quo by peaceful international procedures rather than by force. The 'status quo' is existing distribution of rights and possessions as established or recognized by the legal system... Any peaceful procedure for altering either the existing territorial distribution or the status of any nation would be regarded as a procedure of peaceful change. In brief, peaceful change is concerned both with changes in the distribution of rights and possessions and changes in the laws which govern the acquisition of rights and possessions".

Dunn's basic argument calls for peaceful change within a certain international order so that existing rights and possessions are respected. Rights and possessions must, however, meet one condition: they must be legally recognized and respected and must be clothed in the form of international treaties.

It is also evident that peaceful change and collective security can be seen as intimately interconnected because of the international crises of the late 1930s. Arnold J. **Toynbee** noted this relationship already during the Abyssinian war by arguing that " ... the association of peaceful change and collective security is a common feature of many different approaches to the international crisis".¹² Peaceful change as a method of changing international relations without war became topical when "normal" means of guiding international relations did not work: peaceful change was invented largely as a last-resort tool in preventing war.

The major problem of the then existing international security system

was seen to be individuality: collective security in fact was not collective but individualistic. Although a certain system of status quo prevailed, it rested on the individual security interests and measures of each participant nation. The result was an increasing destructive power of armies and arms race.¹³

An individualistic security concept by necessity leads to an interpretation of security on the basis of objective factors: a nation can feel secure only when it can count on objective military power which is measurable in quantitative terms. What peaceful change could add to the existing international situation would logically be that international security should be developed more on the lines of collectivism by increasing collaboration and that measurable objective security should be replaced by subjective security elements, i.e. by a common sense of security.

But objective security issues cannot be set aside in international politics. Therefore the prevention of wars is a parallel method in strengthening collective elements of security policy. More abstract principles of collective security are thus supported by concrete measures in preventing wars. Such are, for instance, legal possibilities of preventing intervention and limitation of armaments.¹⁴

Alongside the realist definition, a broader view developed. This implied **a restructuring of the existing international order through a peaceful dissolution of that order.** Trends to see change in this broader framework were gradually developed, but were in a minority position in the thirties.

The broader framework of peaceful change is well illustrated in C.K. Webster's typology. He expands the concept to cover three types of change:¹⁵

1. peaceful change in order to avoid war
2. peaceful change to produce justice or better, to remedy justice
3. peaceful change to produce a world order better adapted to the material and mental processes.

Webster argues that the two first categories are based on the idea that sacrifice must be made by some country or group of countries. The third type of peaceful change stresses the idea of expediency or efficiency because in such a change all can gain materially as well as morally by such a process. In Webster's argumentation **peaceful change in order to avoid war** is a viable method because of the development of armaments. This reasoning is even more valid in the nuclear age than it was during the 1930s. But in any event, peaceful change as avoidance of war easily leads to a very narrow definition of peace as absence of war.

Webster's second argument, **peaceful change to produce justice**, should also be seen as a type of non-war change rather than as change producing positive peace. Webster himself refers to the settlement of the First World War which gave Germany a reason to claim remedy to justice. An international order as a peace order is essentially made by the winners of a war and it therefore always leaves claims for remedy.

Webster's third type of change, i.e. **change to produce a new world order** which reflects the realities of international relations better than the existing one, obviously belongs to the category of peaceful change in its broader meaning. In this view peaceful change must offer a framework of appeasement within which nations can meet their basic security needs without the use or even threat of use of war as an ultimate method of change. Bryce Wood puts this idea as follows:¹⁶

Peace is peaceful change. Otherwise it is not peace since changes can be made in only two ways. In summary then, peaceful change may be defined as a regularized process for effectuating modifications in law and policy of the economic and political relationships between nations, which will be so satisfactory to the dissentient elements that the threat of wars's breaking out through their aggression may be removed, but which will not be so distasteful to the defenders of things as they are that these will make their agreement contingent upon the outcome of a trial by battle.

Wood's main argument is that the establishment and functioning of peaceful change actually is peace: peace is not a state of affairs but a regularized and controlled process of modification of international relations in such a way that wars are prevented and the international order meets in an optimal way the needs of the international community.

Peaceful change as a process of regularized acts of modification of the international order comes close to the philosophical foundations of traditional functionalism. David A. Mitrany bridges the two schools.

As an eminent representative, if not a founding father, of functionalism he defines peaceful change thus:¹⁷

"The important thing is not merely to get a change. The important thing is to get changes through common agreement and to get them in due relation to factors and conditions affecting the life of several peoples, as ascertained impartially and realistically. That, more than pacts and protocols and sanctions will provide a basis for an international society to assure the protection of its members".

Peaceful change in its broader meaning is primarily a model of social progress which must be safeguarded by suitable political arrangements. These arrangements appear as a function of the dynamism of social progress. For the international society to be a "civilized" society, the same general rules are applicable as to other human organizations: "first, to establish the rule of law and then, under its protection, to advance gradually but securely the reign of social justice".¹⁸

In conclusion, three models of peaceful change can be identified in the foregoing discussion. The first one is **the avoidance of war** -type of peaceful change where the sovereign rights of nation states are by no means hurt. Nations may accept methods of peaceful change if they can thereby avoid a war. Sovereignty is also the key concept in applications of the procedures of peaceful change: either through territorial changes or through the international treaty system and in particular through the revision of international treaties. The avoidance of war -type of peaceful change is undoubtedly very much bound to the power structures of the international system: changes are made peacefully as far as they do not threaten the existing balance of power.

The second model of peaceful change consists of the **procedures of collective security**. On foregoing pages references were made to a way of thinking where peaceful change and collective security were seen as parallel concepts. In this view changes are made in the interest of a working international system, legally or at least respecting the treaty system governing international relations. Changes should also have a respect to status quo: they may not threaten the stability of international relations.

The third model is the **restructuring of international relations** peacefully. It deals with deep and qualitative changes which aim at changing also the rules of the game of international relations. The model questions traditional state sovereignties in the long run at least. Fundamental and structural change in the international society challenges traditional loyalties and obligations of citizens as well and will at the end produce changes where traditional power relationships are eroded.

2. Peaceful change in Today's Europe

I put earlier the basic question of the current European order in a following way: how the stability and established norms in Europe could be transformed into a European order which qualitatively is more stable, more egalitarian and less dependent on arms? It is commonly argued that Europe by and large is a stable island in turbulent world and that peace has been maintained here through the traditional methods of the balance of power.

In defining the concept of order, I refer to the classification of international orders by Ian **Clark**. His starting point is that the attitude to force is the main factor explaining the content of order. He constructs a threefold category of types of international orders in the following way:¹⁹

1. order through the recognition of the central role of force creating and maintaining a given international order,
2. order through placing constraints to the use of force and
3. order through the eventual rejection of the special role of force in international relations.

Clark's first type of order is close to what the European order in the post-war period has been. It has been based on the **balance of power**.

That again has two aspects: order means **stability** and **deterrence**. Clark points out in his account that:²⁰

"There is no consciously constructed mechanism that would constrain the use of force. To this extent, nuclear deterrence represents a laissez-faire situation in which order in the last resort depends on the free interplay of competing forces ... There is no constraint of legal, institutional or or physical nature."

The second type of order in Clark's classification is roughly the system of **collective security**. Collective security means that institutional,

physical or legal constraints should be placed on the use of force. Collective security may also be understood as an institutionalized form of a balance of power system which will prevent the emergence of a preponderant power and ensures that violence, if used, is used in a legitimate manner. Arms control is a typical way of placing constraints upon the use of force in an international order of a type of collective security.

Clark's third category consists of attempt to make the international order less-dependent on the use of force. The utmost solution would be a world government but in general the key content of change is **to make force disappear**. Peaceful solution of conflicts, the extension of social contract theories to the international system and the establishment of common authorities are the principal methods of an international order of this type.

My classification of models of peaceful change and Clark's typology of international orders are overlapping. An international order based on the recognition of the role of force as a concept seems to suggest that avoiding war as a method of peaceful change is closely associated with it. In a similar way constraining force as a basic organizing principle of an international order comes very close to the category of peaceful change as a system of collective security. Finally the rejection of force could be understood as an organizing principle for an order which is open to peaceful change in the sense of restructuring the existing international order. The next question obviously is, how these models and conceptualizations of order could be applied to the European security system.

I suggest the following table in which the European security dimension is added to the previous argumentation.

Table 1: The relationship between the principles of orders, models of peaceful change and European security orders

Organizing principles of order	Methods of peaceful change	European security orders
Recognition of force	Avoiding war	Alliance systems
Constraining force	Collective security	CSCE -system
Making force disappear	Restructuring of order	Functional security systems

It is quite obvious that the European security system has developed so that a peaceful change from the phase of the pure recognition of force during the immediate post-war years has transformed into an order where states are ready to put constraints to the use of military force. The method of avoiding war in its rude meaning has been passed and elements of collective security system are emerging. As a security order, Europe is still relying heavily on the alliance system. The CSCE -type of an order has not been able to override existing alliances: the European security order is still very much a block-based system where most of cooperation takes place inside blocks. Obviously neutrals have avoided the block division but have not been able to change the rules of the European order.

The overcoming of the alliance system is a crucial moment in changing the European order peacefully. If we come back to Clark's argument concerning the essence of order based on force, he names the balance of power, stability and deterrence as its key elements. The alliance system is the framework in which those elements work. Alliances, in particular military alliances, take care of the quantity of order in

Europe. Nuclear weapons, as well as the doctrines associated to them and making them effective in political terms, are outstanding examples of the bases of the European security order.

By using terms applied in the foregoing discussion concerning the nature of collective security one could argue that the current security system is still from its major parts based on **individual and objective elements of security**. From the point of view of peaceful change, the key problem thus is, how **collective and subjective elements could be strengthened**. I believe that in this the CSCE -process has been a valuable experiment.

In creating collective security in Europe naturally the mere establishment of the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act was an important step. Equally natural is that this is not enough. The CSCE has not contributed really very much to the establishment of collective and subjective security elements. One step to this direction obviously was the mandate of Madrid Follow-Up meeting concerning the opening of the process of Confidence and Security Building Measures, now proceeding in Stockholm. It is undoubtedly a modest contribution which primarily is based on the philosophy of avoiding wars. But it may prove to be also more valuable effort.

There are also processes outside the CSCE which contribute to the emergence of the idea of collective security. Peace movements have been active in developing their models of European security, intra-alliance discussions point to these problems (e.g. so called non-aggressive defence postures) and Socialist countries in Europe have been active in proposing ideas of declaratory statements strengthening the subjective elements of security. Proposals of regional security arrangements in different parts of Europe point to the same direction, towards the

idea of "Common Security".²¹ A special emphasis should be given also to the special meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Athens in 1984.

IN spite of unfavourable great power relations since the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE -process has kept alive and even developed ideas which might be included to the model of collective security in terms of peaceful change. But the limits of the process are quite obvious. There is no basic agreement on the elements of a future collective security system except on a very general level. The concepts of security differ very much and the process is very much bound to state sovereignty. One could also ask whether the loading of the CSCE -process with these sensitive problems of military security actually prevent progress in less-sensitive areas.

I have argued that there are tendencies in the European security system which suggest that constraints to the use of force have been developed and that the CSCE -process to some extent has propensities which furnish the idea of collective security model of peaceful change. But I do not wish to suggest that we are now heading towards a new security system in the sense of qualitative transformation. Therefore the model of restructuring the existing order is even more remote as an ideal situation.

For the sake of the future of the CSCE -progress the model of restructuring should draw our special attention. If we accept Martin Wight's idea of a transformation from the quantity of order to the quality of order (as I have done in this paper), this model is the only really relevant one. It is associated to an idea of order where the role of force is disappeared. Obviously this can take place only gradually and by strengthening structures and processes which do not

lean on the use of force or on the threat of force.

An appropriate theoretical framework for this type of development is **classical functionalism** or **Mitranian functionalism**. Its major theoretical contributions were made to sketch the new European order in the post-war period. Mitranian ideas did not survive the results of the war but as ideas they still have relevance. Part of them have been realized in functionalist integration although practical results have been less-favourable for the all-European security. We may regard the European Community as a security community between its members but for outsiders it has remained as a closed block.²²

The basic idea of the classical Mitranian functionalism is that international cooperation should be based on needs: once there are obvious needs for cooperation, they should be fulfilled and necessary institutions should be established to make these processes workable. Mitranian himself was very much bound to welfare issues: welfare is the motive why nations are ready to give up their sovereign rights in a long run and engage into cooperative efforts.

Says Mitranian:²³

"The real sense of peaceful change, therefore, can only be so to facilitate the necessary changes in economic, social and cultural relations by timely and continuous adjustments that the need and desire for political-territorial changes shall dwindle and vanish. A frontier is obnoxious in social life because it is a frontier and it does not become less obnoxious because it is moved ten or a hundred miles one way or another".

It is obvious that the Mitranian definition of functionalism in its basic meaning is not very accurate as a part of the CSCE -process. The basic problem in Europe is not how to bring about welfare through all-European cooperation but how to transform the military confrontation into a collective security along the lines which were established in the Final Act. The principles of cooperation for

instance stress the sovereign rights of the participant nations while functionalism basically sees state sovereignty working against the welfare interests of population.

Although we cannot apply classical functionalism as such to the future development of the European security order, its basic logic is helpful. Its logic can be described, in Chadwick Alger's way²⁴, as a process where learning and institutionalization go hand in hand. The first task is to identify the areas of cooperation which should be as much free from high politics as possible: then establish permanent procedures in these areas, wait for favourable results which demonstrate the fruitfulness of the strategy adopted and finally, if the model creates new functionalist processes in other issues, create methods and institutions to concrete functional cooperation schemes.

What Wight called the transformation from the quantity of order to the quality of order is very close to what Mitrany said about collective international security arrangements in 1944:²⁵

"All talk about a new organization for security 'with teeth in it' is futile unless we follow one of the two possible lines of action. We might set up an autonomous international authority with power and means to keep the peace. Or we might develop joint economic arrangements sufficiently comprehensive and far-reaching to prevent a split between the participating Powers".

Mitrany's idea simply is that instead of concentrating on establishing international security institutions with autonomous powers, the emphasis should be put to the create cooperative efforts in economic matters in order to increase interdependence and joint efforts between the powers concerned

For the future development of the European security system this model is workable and worth of interest. No doubt such elements can be seen in

the CSCE -process. But at least up to now functionalist cooperation measures have not developed to the extent that they add new blood to the security concepts which prevail in Europe. Functional cooperation in an ideal mitranian sense could increase security in constraining force because of economic and cultural interdependencies and in demonstrating succes in areas where they have been applied, it may have a model-effect.

If we study the CSCE -process since the Helsinki Final Act from a functionalist perspective, we see astonishingly little achievements. Cooperation in trade for instance is almost non-existing: only some 4 per cent of the foreign trade of the EC takes place with the CMEA countries.²⁶ In fact East-West economic relations have been subordinated to crude cold war policies of the Reagan Administration. Among the forums of the CSCE -process only environment is typically a functional attempt. Functional cooperation could, however, in an important way strengthen subjective elements in the emerging collective security system.

I defined the main problem of this paper in the following way: how the stability and established norms in the Helsinki Final Act could be transformed into a European order which is qualitatively more stable, more egalitarian and less dependent on the quantitative order in terms of arms. I would answer to that question by arguing that perhaps a two-tier system should be developed where the core of security issues, i.e. the questions of military security, should let to live its own dynamics and functionalist cooperation should have more emphasis in the future of the CSCE -process.

The reason for this is twofold. For the first, military security is so much dependent on the still superior role of the Great Powers in Europe that developments in that sector cannot be very much affected by the

CSCE. I think that the CSCE should on the contrary be more disconnected from the Great Power confrontation and be directed more towards purely European problems. The other reason for this type of disengagement is that in any way progress in Stockholm can only marginally affect the central balance between the Great Powers. They may increase the stability in Europe but hardly contribute to real disarmament. On the contrary they add more emphasis to models of crisis management which may even add military consideration and military logic to the security policies of nations by convincing that the constraining force could be done technically and on a level of high military capability.

Instead, I believe, we should strengthen the elements of the qualitative order by setting constraints not only to the use of force but to the role of force in security models and security thinking. Creating functional interdependencies would at the same time add constraints to the use of force and contribute new positive essence to the European system. The major principle should be that the future development of functionalist cooperation should start from areas where high politics is as much absent as possible: therefore trade and regional measures should have the priority. One should also carefully consider the possibility to strengthen co-operative trends with necessary and appropriate institutional measures and international treaties.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONDITIONS IN EUROPE
FOR EAST - WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONDITIONS IN EUROPE FOR EAST-
WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

by Dr. Gerd BIRÓ

When appraising the present political situation in the world, it is useful to start out from the assumption that both the conflicts of interests in the relations between the two world powers and to a smaller extent the common interests and anxieties are present simultaneously, which is one of the main causes of the fluctuations in those relations.

Soviet-American relations continue to be determinant, particularly in the strategic and military domain, but in the 1950s, and even in the 60s, it would have been impossible for the relations between the small and medium-sized European powers to differ from the former. Today, on the basis of the strategic and military bipolarity, there is a marked trend towards diversification of power and re-evaluation of the importance of economic strength. This trend must be taken increasingly into account.

At present the relatively deep roots struck by détente in Europe also show up in the fact that East-West relations on this continent have not fully conformed to Soviet-US relations. Besides being a

positive factor in the region itself, this circumstance has to some extent exerted an influence in turn on Soviet-American relations, particularly in the most recent period.

Far more is involved than exploitation by the European countries of their scope for manoeuvre the elbow-room available to them. Stabilization of the international situation is not merely in Europe's interest, and the stance the European countries have taken may in the long run make a contribution to improving relations between the world powers themselves, or at least halting the deterioration of them. Moreover, the maintenance of dialogue may in the short term make it easier to eliminate misunderstandings and avert or resolve local conflicts.

During the era of relative international political détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was no fundamental difference in the way the United States and its western European allies appraised East-West trade, but from the end of the 1970s, long before the conflict over Afghanistan, the weakening of the trend towards détente in the United States led to a situation in which military and security considerations gained priority, whereas the western European members of Nato have retained a better

balance between security matters and economic considerations.

The indications in this field are that despite the recommencement of Soviet-American dialogue, in late 1984 in Washington and in early 1985 in Geneva, this is not a factor with a temporary influence. The trend is linked closely to far-reaching structural changes, which in turn are inseparably bound up with President Reagan's re-election for a second term.

Consequences of the growing importance of the Pacific region

A primary consideration is that the industrial capacity and population growth of the United States shows a southward and westward shift, so that the elections of 1982 gave these states a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives for the first time in American history.

In the economic sphere this process has been accelerated because the southern and western states of the United States are the centre of the gravity for modern fast-growth industries /and the concomitant scientific research capacity/ as electronics and aerospace. Meanwhile industries like steel, which has been especially hard hit by the world economic

c and grows fairly slowly even in times of economic boom and the car industry, which has likewise had to combat many problems, remain concentrated in the eastern states.

Thinking in these western and southern states, which have a younger than average population, tends strongly towards the economic policy of winding down welfare and social Darwinist social policy. Consequently, the trade unions are less influential, which in turn weakens the Democratic Party. To some extent, America's present foreign policy is an international aspect or reflection of this ideology.

In this context one must also consider that the western and southern states are less tied to Europe, in mentality and economically, than are the eastern states. Incidentally, the top three American trading partners are already Canada, Japan and Mexico. West Germany only comes fourth, Britain fifth, and France seventh. In total too, the United States' trade with the Pacific in the past decade has exceeded its trade with western Europe, and that will clearly have growing, long-term political repercussions. Obviously the direction of American foreign policy depends only in part on which party is in a majority. More important than that are the

specific economic interests represented by the administration and by certain representatives and senators in Congress.

In recent years this tendency has grown stronger, along with the increase in the power of Congress itself, which has allowed congressmen to represent these interests more effectively than was the case a few years ago. So specific economic interests have joined general ones in exerting an increasing influence on US foreign policy.

Representatives of venture capital and risk capital and those who are trying to exploit the economic potential of the fast-growing Pacific region have great weight in the business community of the West Coast. This highly influential group principally supports a foreign policy that will further their ventures and in doing so relies where necessary on military power.

Incidentally, the outlines of a Pacific grouping of countries in the world economy are increasingly clear. The highly industrialized countries that belong to it are the United States, Canada /whose economy, if on a different scale, has undergone a similar shift to the American one/, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. A contributing factor

was Britain's accession to the Common Market, which has gravely affected Australia and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Canada, causing them to turn to a greater extent towards the Pacific region. Among the other countries in the grouping are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and also China. In the last case this is still indirect and partial, but the degree to which it forms part of the grouping is growing. Of course, this process in the world economy has consequences in world politics. In particular, the process is one factor causing the diversification of power centres that is increasingly perceptible in Europe as well.

To take one example, Leopold Gratz, who is Foreign Minister of Austria, a neutral country, emphasized in an interview with the Viennese daily "Die Presse" that Austria would in future take as the fixed points in its foreign policy orientation, the group of states important to that small country, not just the four great powers that signed the Austrian state treaty /the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France/ but the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. By that he also sought to express that he considered the post-war

situation already part of history, as the following sentence of his shows: "When Switzerland talks of its neutrality today, it does not refer to the final declaration of the Congress of Vienna."^{1/}

Defining the extent to which the Pacific region's economic weight in the world is growing, French prime minister Laurent Fabius, who was minister for industry and research at the time, said, "The present electronic revolution is the first technological revolution which originated not from Europe but from the Pacific region. Our countries separately are too small to provide the financial cover for the investments necessary to finance the gigantic research projects involved."^{2/}

Incidentally, the Pacific shift of the dynamism of world economic growth asserts itself more widely than has so far been indicated. While the movement of the economic growth focuses towards the Pacific shores and the south-western areas of the United States and Canada is in part a long-term historic process, the focus of dynamic growth in the Soviet Union is increasingly shifting towards Siberia.

Clearly the Pacific region is the meeting point of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China and the other states mentioned earlier which

belong to the category known as threshold countries, and that adds greatly to the importance of the Pacific region in political terms. At the same time this dissolves to some extent the earlier ties of international relations to the European region.

This trend, which still only in its first stage at present, has obviously contributed to ensuring that no country in western Europe is seriously considering freezing East-West relations. On the contrary, the development of East-West relations enjoys broader support in western Europe now than at any other time in the four decades since the end of the Second World War.

Growing diversification of power

In this broader support a role is also played by the European experience gathered in this period. As Bruno Kreisky remarked in a lecture delivered in Geneva in March 1984, "Détente has brought about in Europe a process with huge consequences. As a head of the government of Austria, who fulfilled that position for over 13 years, I can guarantee that not a single economic and political success in that period would have been possible without détente. If the cold war had continued, capital and industry would have fled from our countries, and we should

never have reached the state of well-being which today is so obvious in the streets of Vienna, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Berlin."^{3/}

An important component in the western European stance is the weakening of the political structure of bipolarity caused by the existence of regional groupings of states. This is a trend which has led to substantial changes in the present world order based upon strategic and military bipolarity.

An increasing diversification of power is involved, the factors in which include, mainly in Europe, the limits upon the use of military means and the constraints on economic growth. As a consequence, European countries are increasingly interested in developing the international division of labour further, promoting economic growth, and improving competitiveness. This phenomenon was described in an article by Dr Péter Várkonyi, Hungary's Foreign Minister, as follows: "Two things can already be established. One is that the most reactionary forces, as hitherto, will not be in a position to risk unleashing a new world war in the foreseeable future." He went on to say: "Another finding is that even in the most disquieting stages at which tensions have been roused the possibility

remained, and still remains, of returning to the détente process."^{4/}

Acknowledging that the application of economic power is decided to a decisive extent in the micro-sphere of companies, countries and their governments have increasingly supported the external economic strategy of the large corporations using the means available in their international policy and economic diplomacy. Consequently the mutual relations of the macro and micro spheres have increased with growing speeds.

The enhanced importance of economic matters played a decisive part in western European countries recently distancing themselves on certain matters from American foreign policy. Dr Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic members in the West German Bundestag put it like this: "The narrowing down of security policy to its military aspects is considered erroneous /in Western Europe/, and attempts to gain military supremacy as the source of a new arms race and consequently of new uncertainties." He went on to explain, "Owing to this situation, one cannot be surprised that the evaluation of Europe has diminished in American thinking in the course of the arguments within the /Atlantic/

alliance."^{5/}

Business Week, the premier US business weekly, already noted this process in late 1981, when it remarked that redefinition of US national defence interests, including the Persian Gulf and other regions, had caused the importance of Nato to diminish."^{6/}

Clearly the diagnosis on both sides of the Atlantic is similar, although the approach, of course, differs. This difference in approach has recently asserted itself more strongly in the external economic and foreign policy lines taken by the western European countries, and one may expect it to exert a certain influence on positions taken up by the EEC as well. In this respect too, an interaction of economic and political factors must sooner or later become manifest. However, this tendency for this to happen has been hampered by the European Commission in Brussels, because the economic interests of the various member states are not asserted directly in Common Market policy. The stand taken by the Commission is greatly affected by the numerous economic and political factors that create a far-reaching differentiation among European countries in this sphere as well.

A great contribution to the effectiveness of the Common Market in the world, both politically and economically is made by the foreign policy support member states give to economic growth and expansion, and conversely, the economic successes provide opportunities in foreign policy. This trend again reflects the increasing interaction between economic and political factors in European relations.

One component in the process is the technical- and scientific revolution which affects all areas of life and is connected in turn with internationalization of the economy. One might say that every problem states and groups of states encounter these days affects both economic and political interests to an increasing extent, so that a strategy which takes these interconnections into consideration is demanded. Thus the Common Market countries can be expected to exert their economic potential and their international economic ties more directly and more consciously than hitherto, in order to advance their foreign policy objectives.

As a result one can envisage in the latter half of the 1980s that, foreign policy and external economic constellations representing a further

distancing from the United States will become possible on the basis of western Europe's own economic and political interests. Such a development would, in the long run, place pan-European cooperation back on the agenda, in other words bring about an international division of labour in production and infrastructure that would promote growth in the countries of Europe and allow a strategy for meeting the challenge of the dynamically growing Pacific region to be worked out and applied.

In the medium term, however, it may be that regional cooperation aimed at economic and infrastructural development among European countries with differing social systems or between their provinces bordering upon one another will be realized faster than pan-European economic cooperation.

This seems the more justified alternative from the economic angle, since utilizing the additional benefits that can be derived from regional cooperation may increase the economic efficiency and competitiveness of small and medium-size European countries considerably.

Obviously what is involved is merely the possibility of a long-term trend, but gradual assertion of it may be furthered by the fact that it would be

in the mutual interest of European countries with differing social systems. A new factor, if only a future possibility, is that the political conditions for continued development of East-West economic relations have recently improved in Europe to a certain extent, despite efforts made against it by the United States. In this respect, the embargo proclaimed against participation in constructing the gas pipeline from the Soviet Union, boomeranged to some extent on the United States itself, and at the same time made apparent the current political and economic limits within which American policy could be asserted.

Gyula Horn, head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, described this extremely noteworthy new phenomenon in international affairs in a study he wrote for the periodical Külpolitika: "When one projects the new features in the economy onto the socio-political arena, one witnesses a new phenomenon. Essentially, this consists of a certain interaction that is developing between European countries with differing social systems; their immunity to processes occurring in the countries on the other side is disappearing. The socialist countries are

affected by negative tendencies appearing in the capitalist world economy - the disturbances in production, distribution and finances - and vice versa: the domestic economic problems here and also the economic reforms, exert an influence on the pan-European situation and relations between the states of the continent. Beyond the economic sphere, this also applies in the domain of inter-state political relations. The lessons of the Polish events in 1980 provide one good example for the new situation. The attitude of realistically minded leading political circles in western European countries at that time differed substantially from the reactions made to the events in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Their attitude to the Polish crisis was different from the attitudes shown earlier in that it was basically marked by a desire not to heighten the tensions in and around Poland, and sporadically even to cooperate in normalizing the situation."

"By contrast, the United States' attitude from the outset was marked by the use of every means that might conceivably force a turn of events in the Polish crisis that would favour the United States. The difference in attitude was particularly conspicuous when the emergency was introduced in

December 1981. All over Europe, the protests lacked the nature of a confrontation, whereas the United States instituted drastic economic and political reprisals that gravely impeded the process of normalization in Poland in the long run as well. The majority of western European governments, on the other hand, recognized Europe's interest in the existence of a stable Poland and the impossibility of altering the existing social, political and military status quo by force. In broader terms, the interests of all Europe have been served and a beneficial contribution to stabilizing peaceful coexistence between the peoples of Europe has been made by the settled domestic conditions in the socialist countries, the continued development of socialist democracy, and the modernization of the system of policy instruments."^{7/}

A favourable development for the stabilization of the European situation came in 1984, particularly in the second half of the year, when some Nato member countries gradually restored their political relations with Poland. Again this indicates how the political stand every state affected by East-West relations takes has a determining function, and that all states concerned share in the development

of East-West relations.

Here in particular the interaction between economic and political factors asserts itself. It is obvious that this political stand taken by European states has both economic causes and effects.

A further factor in these relations is that East-West trade today has an interest and effect that is far from confined to business circles. To an extent greater than ever before it has become an instrument in the political struggle.

If one looks back on the embargoes applied to East-West trade, one notes a first stage dating back to the end of the 1940s, when the political and security factors directly regulated, i.e. restricted, East-West economic relations, which were still on an extremely low level. This situation was institutionalized in 1949 by the establishment in Paris of an organization called Cocom, under Nato auspices. In the 1960s the mutual benefits from the development of East-West economic relations were recognized by widening circles, and in this period numerous long-term bilateral inter-governmental agreements covering industry, technology and science were concluded. Meanwhile the area of embargo was reduced considerably, one sign of which

was that Cocom in 1963 denied export permits to only \$5 million worth of goods.

Simultaneously the terms of the Berne Union of 1958 were relaxed. Hitherto the signatories had undertaken not to grant member countries of the COMECON /Comecon/ credits with terms longer than five years, and detailed regulations had governed the conditions under which credits could be granted to socialist countries at all.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the United States made increasing efforts to revive these restrictions. At a summit conference in Ottawa in Spring 1981, which the major western industrialized countries attended, the United States endeavored to dissuade its western European partners from concluding natural gas agreements with the Soviet Union. It is well-known that what was involved were gas deliveries to numerous western European countries through a 5,000 km pipeline from Siberia. Intending to prevent construction of the line, President Reagan announced economic sanctions on participating companies at the end of 1981.

Plainly, the Soviet Union disposes of the largest known deposits of coal and natural gas in the world, and exploitation of the gas fields has

a priority role in the comprehensive developmental programme for Siberia, which in turn is designed to stimulate the growth of the whole Soviet economy. Obviously the embargo declared by the United States was designed to weaken the Soviet Union by impeding the realization of this important project.

But the western European allies of the United States took a united and determined stand against the pipeline embargo, and that led Washington to recognize the usefulness of adjusting its tactics.

From the western European point of view it was not merely or even primarily a question of economic relations with the socialist countries to some furthering the future exploitation of certain production capacities and so mitigating the problems of employment in the process. Primarily it was that East-West economic relations formed an integral part of their room for foreign political and external economic manoeuvre which had expanded considerably during the period of détente. Thus the pipeline affair was just the tip of the iceberg, and beneath were concealed not merely East-West economic and political relations but the internal power relations of Nato itself.

In the United States it is reckoned that the increase in armaments not only modifies East-West power relations, but at the same time provides a motive force for technical progress, so helping the United States to shorten the lead established in some domains by Japan and western Europe, and primarily buttress the supremacy it has established in the most modern and research-intensive sectors. In this context, the question of limiting the advanced technologies that can be sold to CMEA member countries represents another US weapon for reining in its western European and Japanese corporate rivals.

This too plays a part in the continuous American endeavour to extend the scope of Cocom. Cocom, which operates on the premises of the US Embassy in Paris, already has a prohibition list of goods that may not be exported to socialist countries. Since this list is shorter than the American prohibition list, the United States has recently pressed more strongly for extension of the Cocom list.

At least legally, these endeavours are impeded to some extent by the lack of any international agreement on how Cocom should operate.

Cocom was originally based on a verbal accord, so that legally at least, there is no way of applying sanctions against those who contravene the Cocom resolutions. Incidentally, in connection with the activation of Cocom, the US government also exerts export prohibitions on certain items including advanced technology under the framework of the OECD, which is likewise domiciled in Paris but includes some neutral European countries among its members.

In 1984, an American initiative led four organizations - Nato, the OECD, the International Energy Agency /IEA/, and Cocom - to conduct various studies and surveys on technology transfer within East-West economic relations, and to apply an embargo that would impede or slow down such transfers.

In all four organizations considerable differences continued to exist between the American and the western European view. While the socialist countries are relatively insignificant economically from the United States' point of view, so that the US approach is overwhelmingly determined by political factors, "every member state of the Common Market considers East-West trade a desirable aspect of international trade and of its relations maintained with the Soviet Union".^{8/}

It is further obvious that the CMEA is not only a good market for the western European steel and machine-tool industries. "Energy imports from the Soviet Union have demonstrably contributed to the strengthening of western European security, by reducing dependence on unreliable Opec countries and allowing diversification of the supplier countries."^{9/}

Since the OECD also includes the neutral European countries among its members, the arguments here have tended to centre on credit terms instead. The signs so far are that the United States has not succeeded in asserting its stand concerning subsidized credits within the OECD.

Although the International Energy Agency warned western Europe against becoming overly dependent on Soviet gas deliveries, it concluded that this threshold had not yet been reached and that at present there was an oversupply of gas in Europe. Incidentally, alternatives to Soviet natural gas were also discussed in the IEA but it was found they would probably be more expensive.

In view of the radical difference at present between the American and western European approaches to East-West economic relations, it seems unlikely

that these views will converge in the foreseeable future. That means the United States would be able to change the situation only by applying extremely great pressure, and not even then would it be assured of success, as the pipeline case showed.

For the time being Cocom can be expected to be the primary forum for further American efforts to extend the prohibition lists. Here the United States recently succeeded in adding numerous new commodity groups to the lists of embargoed goods.

At the same time, the United States strives increasingly to militarize American commercial policy. In May 1984, under pressure from President Reagan, the Departments of Commerce and Defence signed a declaration of principle which gave the Pentagon unheard-of powers of licencing exports of modern technologies that might be qualified as militarily sensitive.

Interdependence as a new European trend

A new feature has appeared: earlier the Pentagon only interfered with the licencing of technology exports to the socialist countries, but its competency has now been extended to western Europe, so that it now plays a certain part in formulating American commercial policy as well. As a consequence it has

become increasingly characteristic for European subsidiaries of American firms or for western European firms using American licences only to be permitted to export technology to the socialist countries if the deal has been permitted by the US administration.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition in western Europe that the embargo policy of the 1950s caused damage so grave that it has yet to be completely made good. In this context it should be pointed out that to some extent the embargo was also responsible for the economic self-sufficiency which was asserted in the CMEA countries in the 1950s, both in theory and in practice. So there is some cause to argue that the barriers to the international division of labour date back to this period. In the subsequent period of more than three decades it has only been possible in part to overcome these problems by mutual efforts.

But one can also attribute to these partial successes that East-West economic relations have proved the most stable element in East-West relations as a whole in the early 1980s. This indicates that East-West economic relations clearly correspond with the needs of both sides, which was a factor in their survival in the face of the political pressure that

was brought to bear against them.

One must add that East-West economic relations are not yet of sufficient weight and do not yet involve a degree of interdependence sufficient to provide a substantial impulse to the development of political relations.

Yet this statement is not entirely or globally valid, since there are very substantial regional differences in the degree to which it applies. In the United States there is not at present any important industrial interest group to provide impulses for the development of political relations, and the farming lobby there /which has managed to assert its interests/ is primarily concerned with grain exports to the Soviet Union, the situation is very different indeed in certain western European countries.

The factor involved is not solely or even primarily the greater importance that exports to the CMEA countries have for industry in western Europe than they do for industry in the United States. In western Europe the economic and political interests increasingly coincide, because the development of East-West trade expresses both their external economic and their foreign policy interests.

Another factor is that economic questions at present play an increasing role in the making of political decisions in western Europe. This at the same time represents rising expectations of economic and foreign policy, which may contribute to the elimination of the so-called dependences as well, among other ways by diversification of the various countries' international economic relations. This is one of the major differences by comparison with the period of international tensions in the 1950s.

This policy is asserted in different ways in the various western European countries, West Germany's Ostpolitik already has long traditions, and has formed a constant element in the policy of governments formed by various parties.

In France there are signs of a revival, if only in part and in a weaker form, of the policy towards the East that was initiated by President De Gaulle and formed an integral part of French foreign policy under his successor, before becoming eclipsed and in many respects even reversed in more recent years. In this revival a role is obviously played by the economic factor that in the formulation of the strategies of the state-owned companies

which have recently been playing a leading role in France, company interests are bound up to a greater extent than before with France's external economic and foreign policy ambitions. Additionally, there is the political factor that the French government expects to strengthen its international position again by reviving its policy towards the East, since the years in which it departed from the policy of "European Europe", its position in the world economy and in world politics was weakened.

A more active policy towards the East by Britain is a new foreign policy tendency. As early as April 1983, the British Secretary for Trade took a firm stand against the pipeline embargo and recently the British Prime Minister has repeatedly spoken in favour of developing dialogue and East-West relations.

So the European forces supporting East-West economic relations have expanded considerably. It is especially noteworthy that changes of government in western Europe in recent years have hardly affected the tendency to discuss the development of economic relations with the socialist countries more intensively and frequently. Everywhere the national interest speaks against freezing them.

The points of departure for Hungarian foreign policy

Another noteworthy new trend in Europe is towards a change in the stand taken by the small countries, and this applies not only to the small neutral European countries, but also to some small member countries of Nato. Some part is played by the feeling of being under threat experienced by the small states of Europe when international tension increased considerably. In addition, these countries are more dependent on the international division of labour than are medium-sized and large countries, so that the tendency towards interdependence exerts itself to a greater extent.

The increasing weight of world economic problems in determining political decisions shows up more intensively still in the policy positions of the small European countries.

There has recently been some increase in the political role played by the small neutral countries in Europe, bolstered by their active, and for the most part constructive role in various international forums. Essentially, the diplomacy of some small neutral European countries has been an endeavour to make use of the available opportunities to

bring about partial international compromises, by strengthening the multipolar factor in the diversification of power.

However, these opportunities are strongly limited by the fact that the main line of force in European politics is formed by the states that belong to the two alliances. Consequently, there has been an increase recently in the diplomatic opportunities and tasks of European states which conduct a dialogue as firm and loyal members of their alliance and seek opportunities for a modus vivendi. The weight and diplomatic elbow-room of these countries is enhanced precisely by their loyalty to their alliance.

János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee mentioned this in Paris on October 16, 1984, at a press conference he gave jointly with President François Mitterrand of France in the Élysée Palace:

"The determining factor in this policy is that the Hungarian People's Republic is a trustworthy, responsible member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the same time we consider it necessary and important to sustain the widest system of relations with the various countries, including states which have a

social system different from our own."^{10/}

Of course Hungary, as a Warsaw Treaty country, substantially reconciles its foreign policy line with those of the other Warsaw Treaty countries, but that does not mean it is a good idea to handle each and every question and case in full conformity.

In this context, dr. Mátyás Szűrös, a secretary of the CC of the HSWP, had this, among other things, to say in one of his studies: "Historical traditions and contemporary endowments can allow the relations between certain socialist or capitalist countries to develop even when the general trend is towards a deterioration and narrowing down of East-West relations. Every socialist country must take use of such special opportunities to assert simultaneously its own national interests and the interests of all."^{11/}

Here Hungarian foreign policy sets out from the premise both Hungary's interest and the cause of peace and security are indeed served by developing political, economic, cultural, scientific and tourist ties with the western European countries, and more widely, with the developed market-economy countries as a whole.

Since it is one of the basic tenets of Hungarian foreign policy that a deterioration of relations between the two great powers does not automatically affect Hungary's international relations, it is Hungary's task in external economic and political relations, to

make optimum use of the scope for developing inter-governmental relations. On this matter our national interest fully coincides with the interest of her allies, particularly because the maintenance and broadening of dialogue can help to prevent a further heightening of the rhetorical war of words, and may conceivably, in the longer term, promote a convergence of views on some questions.

It is particularly important to restrain any further advance by elements of rhetoric, since these have an unfavourable influence on public opinion, so that a government may later find itself the prisoner of a self-created unfavourable atmosphere, even after certain compromise solutions have become possible. At the moment this danger exists mainly in the United States, but with western European countries too, one of the purposes of dialogue is to encourage a climate of public opinion conducive to a stabilization of East-West relations.

Moreover, a rhetorical atmosphere may detrimentally influence government decision-making, since it fosters a schematic approach to problems. Again the greatest danger of this has arisen in the United States. Clearly a schematic approach

can produce situations of confrontation, whereas a balanced, differentiated approach often reveals how a weakening of the position of one great power in a particular area does not necessarily imply that the position of the other great power has strengthened. That shows up clearly at the moment in the Middle East situation.

The mark of the new state of affairs in western Europe is that the common platform of American and western European interests which arose in the late 1940s not least as a result of the Marshall Plan has been considerably narrowed down, one considerable contributing factor being the effect on Europe of American interest rate policy. It is increasingly realized in western Europe that the structural changes sometimes referred to in the press as the Californianization of America may cause Europe to become a peripheral sphere, unless appropriate measures are taken to prevent that happening.

We are involved, of course, with the initial stages of a trend and not with a completed process. The community of US and western European interests may have been whittled down considerably, but it still exists, not only politically and militarily

but economically. One must also consider the means available to a world power for exerting a degree of pressure on its allies, although the embargo issue shows these means are limited when they clash to any great extent with national interests.

The advance of realism in Europe

The United States continues to occupy a key political and economic position in the world, but it no longer has the might in all cases to fashion world economic conditions without regard for its partners' interests. In this new situation the circle which has a stake in seeing a growth of East-West economic relations extends far beyond the economic sectors and companies directly affected because these relations increase the scope for manoeuvre and may also provide impetus for higher economic growth rates.

Thus for western Europe the old dogmatic formula that an economic benefit for the East means a military disadvantage for the West becomes increasingly outdated. The position is quite the reverse, because one can experience a growing interest and stake on both sides in developing the international division of labour, which also entails a growing interest in seeing that the partners to

it succeed economically. Thus western Europe at present is setting out on the path of reformulating East-West interdependence.

In this area an important role will certainly be played by the perceptible encouragement to realism and even to a certain wisdom given by the experience of Europe following two world wars. In recent years this has been apparent, for instance, in the restoration of bourgeois democracy without bloodshed in Portugal, Spain and Greece, in the positive and constructive foreign policy role of the European neutral states, and in the marked improvement in inter-German and in Austro-Hungarian relations, the latter being seen amidst the overall world political situation as a model of relations between countries with differing social systems.

This realism and wisdom asserted itself in the European socialist countries, for instance, when they refrained from abandoning their earlier policy during the period of great tensions in the early 1980s, a circumstance which also supports the contention that they are reliable partners.

From Hungary's point of view this was expressed in an address to the jubilee session of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences by János Berecz,

who edits the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party daily, Népszabadság: "It is a modest but telling factor in peaceful international relations that Hungary has maintained its solvency on the international money markets despite extremely difficult circumstances, defended its positions in the international, economic division of labour, and adhered to its previous line of domestic policy. The substantial steps by which we continue to develop the economic reform and enrich socialist democracy are proof of this country's interest in maintaining the achievements of détente and promoting favourable processes in international politics."^{12/}

A further opportunity and at the same time a further requirement of the present situation in Europe is to rethink the role and function of the European Economic Community within the framework of East-West interdependence.

Integration and interdependence

The Common Market that came into being with the signing of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 sought to consolidate and dynamize the economy of western Europe through integration. The attempt began at a time when interest rates were extremely low in the United States but high in

Europe.

The result was a flight of capital from America and an investment boom in western Europe, even though the original desire of the Common Market countries had been to hold investment down by keeping interest rates high. The United States managed an annual average growth rate between 1955 and 1960 of a mere 2.6 %, one of the lowest for any of the industrialized countries.^{13/}

Another encouragement to US investment in the EEC was a faster than average rise in productivity, achieved through economies of scale and specialization.

These turned the EEC into one of the major factors in the world economy and a serious competitor with the United States. But in the early 1980s the scope for integration narrowed and there was a considerable fall in the growth rate. By March 1984 the Common Market countries had 12.8 million unemployed, while the annually increasing EEC budget deficits left less and less leeway for mutual concessions and compromise between the member countries. Aggravating these problems was an extremely high interest rate in the United States, which turned western Europe into an exporter of

capital, causing in turn still slower growth and a deterioration in western Europe's competitive position in the world.

In this altered situation, a rethinking of the EEC's international relations, including its relations to the socialist countries, may become a factor in enhancing competitiveness on both sides. Clearly, development of pan-European economic cooperation would offer comparative advantages to all concerned, and increase efficiency and competitiveness considerably.

The EEC at present is the most important partner for the Third World, and it might, for example, enhance its competitiveness through cooperation with the socialist countries on the third markets, which would allow the socialist countries to expand their exports for convertible currency more dynamically than hitherto.

The starting point for an assessment of Hungary's relations with the Common Market is that Hungary has been a member of GATT since 1973. In some matters of detail such as steel and textile exports, Hungary already has agreements with the EEC.

Hungary's view on how to develop these relations further was put clearly by Deputy Foreign

Trade Minister Dr Tibor Melega in a lecture he gave to the Hungarian Economic Society, which was reprinted in the journal Statisztikai Szemle /Statistical Review/: "I wish to emphasize that Hungary does not exclude the possibility of a future agreement with the European Economic Community. But this will only make sense if the agreement takes two considerations into account:

"First, the European Economic Community must recognize Hungary as an equal partner in the international division of labour and international trade. We cannot renounce from this demand, because we would otherwise have to operate on international markets in the long term under burdens so great that they would hinder the exploitation of the possible benefits."

"The other consideration which must apply is that the agreement should materially assist in resolving, or at least mitigating the problems with the Common Market in the areas of protectionism and tariff barriers in agriculture. One should note recent observations from the part of the Common Market that an agreement with Hungary would be desirable. Unfortunately, no substantial positive declaration has so far been made on the two

considerations mentioned. If such a declaration were made, it would not be lost on us."^{14/}

Through cooperation with the EEC, the wide utilization of the international division of labour and the opportunities for economic cooperation would considerably increase the effective purchasing power of the socialist countries, which in turn would allow the western European economies to expand and diversify their markets.

Obviously what we are considering here is a long-term cooperation, and it is vital that the international division of labour should be insulated from the daily ups and downs of politics. If that would be done, this policy could help considerably to make the economic and social policy objectives of the various European countries achievable.

There exists on the part of the European socialist countries a readiness to build up the international division of labour, since to do so would contribute politically to stabilizing the world political situation, and economically to improving the efficiency and competitiveness upon which the economic policy objectives of the European CMEA countries are increasingly centred.

It is also clear that the CMEA countries will be able to realize their economic policy objectives faster and more efficiently if they join more intensively in the international division of labour. This by no means contradicts the division of labour and integration within the CMEA itself. On the contrary, successful realization of it may render the European socialist countries more interesting and attractive partners than they would otherwise have been. In this context it is useful to point out that once the Complex Program of the CMEA had been adopted, the member countries' economic relations with the countries of western Europe expanded considerably.

Research into integration has in general arrived at the conclusion that after an initial "running-in" period, the orientation of the countries integrated again turns outwards to external partners.

The declaration adopted at the Moscow summit conference of the CMEA countries again emphasized the endeavour of the CMEA member countries to develop "commercial, economic, scientific and technical relations with all countries of the world based on mutual advantage, equality, non-interference in

each other's internal affairs and respect for international obligations undertaken".

The declaration also states in this context: "In the area of international economic relations, life demands the mutually advantageous and equal participation by all countries. Without this, the durable material foundation for stabilizing and intensifying détente cannot be established".^{15/}

Some have expressed the view that economic cooperation within the CMEA limits the capacity and ability of member countries for economic cooperation with outside countries. It is useful to point out, however, that the proportion of "hard" goods, readily saleable on convertible-currency markets is higher among Soviet exports to other CMEA countries, than among the exports of the small CMEA countries to the Soviet Union, a considerable proportion of which could only be sold outside the CMEA with difficulty and on unfavourable terms.

The view that imports from other CMEA countries exclude imports from outside cannot be sustained either. In this context one must consider that the smaller CMEA countries can only consider genuine alternatives for action, so that they often have to reckon that for the foreseeable future they

will be unable to raise their imports from within the CMEA. Since it looks unlikely that this problem can be resolved to any significant extent in the next few years by, the only solution is to cover import requirements from outside the CMEA by raising convertible-currency exports.

This means that the maintenance and increase of convertible currency imports is to a certain extent inevitable in the smaller CMEA countries, even though the pattern may vary from country to country. Here one comes up against the most important economic problem of the CMEA countries, which is the weakness of the commodity cover for competitive exports. This is a serious challenge to the smaller CMEA countries, and can only be solved in a socially acceptable way by increasing competitive exports, because further intensification of import restrictions would only aggravate the existing problems.

So there appears a growing prominence in the economic policies of the smaller CMEA countries of measures aimed at increasing international competitiveness. Among these have been Hungary's accession to the financial agencies of the United Nations, and the development of inter-German economic relations, which include cooperation and specialization. As a

result, elaboration of development concepts for the latter half of the 1980s involves the CMEA countries considering to a greater or lesser extent the significant link between their economic growth and their ability to stand their ground on world markets and take part intensively in the international division of labour.

The documents of the Moscow summit conference of the CMEA also point out, "The participants at the conference reconfirm their firm intention of developing fruitful commercial, economic, scientific and technical relations with all socialist, developing and developed capitalist countries prepared to do so. They consider it useful for these relations to expand primarily on the basis of long-term programmes and agreements, and for the various mutually advantageous forms of cooperation to be applied, including cooperation on technically equipping and establishing projects, industrial cooperation, joint solution of scientific and technical problems, etc."^{16/}

From the Hungarian point of view, economic growth at present depends primarily on the extent to which the Hungarian economy is able to raise its degree of adaptability to international requirements and the volume and economic efficiency of its

exports. So at the present stage it must conduct a production policy in which adjustments to external market requirements determine the size, composition and changes of output. Any return /even a partial one/ to the ill-fated isolationism of the 1950s, to autarky, would lead to recession and for an indefinite period preclude the attainment of international competitiveness.

Here one must also take into consideration that the Hungarian economy has not fully been able to overcome the consequences of the autarky practised in the 1950s even over a period of 30 years. Production capacity was established in numerous industries which were totally uneconomic under Hungarian conditions. Moreover these resources, which were tied down in oversized or superfluous investments, affected the standard of living and thus social stability for a long time.

For Hungary's part it is at present useful in relation to the international division of labour to set out from the circumstance that a number of comparative advantages, such as the endowments stemming from Hungary's economic geography and the comparatively low costs of highly qualified labour, can primarily be asserted in full on the markets of

the OECD countries. At the same time, a demand for products whose price covers the additional costs caused by the individual nature, special finish and modern design of industrial products, also exists primarily in the industrialized countries. So an improvement in the efficiency of the Hungarian manufacturing industries is also linked to a large extent with the achievement of export expansion on the demanding markets of the industrialized countries, which possess the producing power to pay for such products.

High-level economic diplomacy can play a big role in supporting this policy, which is assisted in turn by the rising international respect for Hungary and foreign interest in the country. At the same time, the contradiction between Hungary's open-economy and the seclusion of the companies' micro-sphere continues. To carry out export expansion, it is vital to develop marketing activities further, and this can mainly be realized through joint ventures with foreign firms.

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THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE
CURRENT ASSESSMENT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

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Remarks prepared for the seminar "Ten Years After Helsinki: European Security--A New Beginning?," Haikko Manor, June 10-13, 1985, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland.

A signal milestone in the CSCE process launched ten years ago concerns the convening in January 1984 of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Its inauguration afforded expression to the general awareness of the shortcomings in both the scope of and compliance with the modest Final Act CBMs, and of the desirability of adopting new, concrete, militarily significant, politically binding, and verifiable CSBMs applicable to the whole of Europe. Although the Stockholm Conference has not generated the same level of publicity attendant upon other East-West arms control fora, its significance remains second to none. Because of its unique focus on addressing the proximate paths to and causes of war, so as to reduce the risks of crisis and conflict arising from accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and to diminish the opportunities for surprise attack and political intimidation, the CDE represents both a new approach to arms control and a vital dimension of European security discourse.

Although the first year of this historic meeting was largely confined to general exchanges of views and attempts by some delegations to revise the carefully constructed CDE mandate and steer the work of the Conference away from serious negotiation, it is encouraging to note, as Ambassador Goodby observed at the close of Round V, that the CDE "seems at least to have taken the road towards genuine negotiations."¹ Specifically, broad convergence appears to have emerged on the usefulness of incorporating in a CSBM regime the elements of information exchange,

1. Plenary statement, March 22, 1985, p. 1.

enhanced notification, meaningful observation, adequate verification, and rapid communications. During the next rounds, the United States hopes that discussions can be further intensified on a series of issues including: (1) the types of military activities to be notified; (2) the threshold and unit of account for notifiable activities; (3) the use of observers; and (4) verification. Although the precise content of a concluding document cannot be predicted at this point, for much work remains in the months remaining before the November 1986 Vienna CSCE review conference, a CSBM regime that comprised these types of measures, coupled with a recommitment to the general principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, would seem to provide a satisfactory first stage agreement.

Certainly, it is in the interests of all participating nations that in the next several rounds in Stockholm all delegations will be firmly guided by the conviction, as expressed by Mr. Klaus Törnudd, the Finnish Undersecretary of State, "that it will be possible, within this new dimension of the CSCE, to reach significant results serving the security of all participants and the security of [the] continent as a whole."²

Although there is a great deal to be said in connection with the status of the five CSBM proposals currently under discussion in Stockholm, the purpose here is to identify some potential future directions for CSBMs. Some of these suggestions could be taken up in future CDE phases, whereas others might be judged acceptable for negotiation in the nearer term. Specifically, four areas deserve

2. Plenary statement, March 15, 1985, p. 1.

special attention: verification; operational constraints; a consultative commission; and air and naval CSBMs. In addition, another area that might be considered as a separate agreement emerging from the Stockholm Conference concerns an accord on accidental or unauthorized military intrusions in Europe.

Verification

The CSBMs to be agreed upon must prove objectively verifiable. They must be by their nature intrinsically verifiable, and they must be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content. The only CSBM proposal that addresses the verification requirement is SC.1. The keys to the verification process in SC.1 concern measure 1--information exchange--and measure 5--noninterference with national technical means and on-site inspection of suspected activities.

Unfortunately, these measures have encountered resistance by way of rather nonsensical charges of unfairness, despite their applicability to all CDE participating states in the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, because it may not prove possible at this time to reach agreement on a truly effective verification regime that fully incorporates these measures (which are in themselves rather limited), thought might be given to supplementing a CSBM regime with a measure already accepted in principle at the MBFR negotiations: declared exit/entry points with permanent observers to monitor the exit and entry of ground and air force personnel into or out of the territory of another European CDE participating state, when, of course, such movements affect security in Europe and are integrally related to a notifiable activity. Such a measure would not supplant measures 1 and 5, but could provide an extra degree of reassurance

concerning adversary intentions and build additional deterrence against aggression and coercion.

Another dimension of confidence and security building that should be studied carefully in the future concerns the implications of emerging technologies for CSBM warning and verification functions. The observer posts mentioned above, for example, could take advantage of the evolution in all-weather, real-time surveillance technology being developed for NATO's new sub-concept of operations termed Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA), e.g., video, infrared, laser, millimeter radar, and electromagnetic devices. The same systems that can help keep the order of battle at the central front manageable in the event of war can also help make tactical and strategic ^{impossible} impossible, and allow for verification of more sophisticated CSBMs.

Operational Constraints

Another area of concern involves operational constraints. The NATO proposal does not call for constraints, but several delegations, including some NATO European countries, have expressed interest in these measures for inclusion in a Stockholm concluding document or in a follow-on agreement.

In approaching the constraint issue, the assumption here is that geographic constraints, such as on forward-basing, and measures involving nuclear weapons do not satisfy the CDE mandate and would, moreover, prove unacceptable to NATO in terms of forward defense and other well known concerns. In addition, constraints must be fashioned so that they do not interfere with training exercises, allow freedom of reaction to ambiguous warning, send a clear warning signal if violated, not prove unilaterally politically obstructive in crisis, and significantly complicate aggressive preparations. This is no easy task, but one which, nevertheless, commands

more serious study because of the potentially extremely significant contribution constraints could have in terms of both crisis prevention and crisis management and defusion.

Although NATO has thus far not been able to formulate a constraint measure that affords equal security to all parties, one conceivable point of departure would be to expand, say, SC.1 measure 3 (45 days advance notification) whereby the staging of notifiable activities would be prohibited above the thresholds required for notification, but whereby temporary exceptions would be allowed to take into account activities such as Autumn Forge provided they are notified in the annual calendar (measure 2). Alerts would be exempt, but might be subject to a special inspection regime to be agreed upon beyond that currently envisaged for CSBM verification. A few years experience with such a constraint measure could provide a reasonable foundation from which to examine measures of greater constraining effect.

A European Security Commission

Another area of growing interest involves institutionalizing the CSCE process. One such idea calls for a European Security Commission to supervise CBMs/CSBMs. It could comprise several subsidiary bodies and be vested with varying degrees of authority. For example, a fourfold structure might encompass the following bodies:

- A Technical Secretariat to receive, record, and distribute the flow of information required by agreed CSBMs (an information "clearinghouse," as it were).
- A terminal for a multinational dedicated communication link for urgent matters, should such a link prove desirable.

- A Compliance Board, to which any participating State may resort for purposes of resolving CSBM implementation questions. The Board would lend its good offices to assist in resolving such matters, and might even be empowered to order penalties for violations. Such penalties might be relatively mild, e.g., foregoing the right to conduct inspections for a given time for failure to comply with another CSBM, but might exert an extra degree of deterrence against violation as well as compensate to some degree for the lack of a legal imprimatur upon the CSBMs to be agreed.
- Most ambitiously, a European Security Council might be created empowered to authorize measures of a much greater scope than penalties. For instance, in a crisis it could order strict adherence to constraints without exceptions, or conduct inspections of a more intrusive nature than those currently contained in SC.1. Failure by any participating State to comply with an order of the Council would constitute material "breach" and would suspend the obligations of the other parties under the agreement.

Annex A contains a diagram of how the European Security Commission might function in terms of crisis management.

Air and Naval CSBMs

A continuing area of disagreement in Stockholm involves the geographic and functional parameters of a CSBM regime. Although the NATO position, which allows notification of naval and air activities only if they occur

in the adjoining sea and air space, constitute a part of a notifiable land activity, and affect security in Europe, is not illogical, arguments that it is perhaps too narrow are not completely without merit. Although some types of naval exercises that could give rise to misinterpretation might be captured as CBMs under a strategic arms reduction regime, such as the March-April 1984 Soviet SSBN flush into the Norwegian sea, from the perspective of preventing surprise attack in Europe such activities should also be captured by a CSBM regime. For instance, as Captain William K. Sullivan has observed: "While a surprise attack against the Central Front...could be launched with little warning, prudence would dictate that such a move be accompanied by a massive movement of Soviet naval forces to open seas, and particularly into the mid-Atlantic Ocean, 9-10 days in advance of the ground thrust," perhaps under the guise of a massive Northern/Baltic fleet exercise.³ Because both side's air and naval activities in preparation for war will hardly be confined to immediately adjacent "ship-to-shore" gunnery and the like, attention should be given to defining acceptable air and naval CSBMs that would capture the leading indicators of impending aggression.

An Agreement On Accidental Military Intrusions

Naval intrusions by submarines and stray cruise missiles under and over sovereign territory are obviously a legitimate concern and one within the scope of the CDE. As Swedish Coalition Party spokesman Carl Bildt stated on May 7, 1984: "such violations...fundamentally conflict with the

3. "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," Naval War College Review (June-July 1979), p. 33. Emphasis added.

very foundation of the Stockholm Conference's work."⁴ The impact of such incidents, especially during a period of tension, is rather self-evident. Hence, to highlight the seriousness of such incidents in terms of both avoiding political intimidation and misinterpretation, contained in Annex B is a draft agreement on accidental and unauthorized military intrusions in Europe. Such an accord should prove negotiable in the near term, and would have as its precedents the 1971 U.S.-Soviet Accidents Measures Agreement and the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea accord.

Prognosis

Hopefully, whatever Stockholm Conference concluding document may emerge will contain meaningful CSBMs rather than cosmetic extensions of the Final Act CBMs, and that successor agreements will build on that foundation in concrete ways. The work of this seminar, and others like it, can significantly contribute towards intensifying the intellectual effort to frame useable policy.

Even if, however, by the time of the Vienna review conference a meaningful CSBM agreement is not at hand, the CDE process is likely to endure. Perpetuation of the process itself would prove useful, even if results may prove slow in emerging, in that for the first time security negotiations will be institutionalized on a pan-European basis. Moreover, as Nicole Gnesotto has observed, the fact that the CDE is taking place "is unquestionably an important diplomatic victory for Europe" as well as "first and foremost an opportunity for cohesion and solidarity in Europe."⁵

4. Quoted in the Arms Control Reporter 1984, p. 402.B.60.


5. "Conference on Disarmament in Europe Opens in Stockholm," NATO Review (No. 6 1983), p. 4.

Although the Stockholm Conference can go one of two ways--serious negotiations or dilatory exercise, it at the very least presents an opportunity for 35 diverse NATO, Warsaw Pact, and NNA states with sometimes quite conflicting visions of European security to negotiate functional arms control in a forum of broad possibilities. The CDE can provide an active channel of East-West communication, foster greater openness to enhance the predictability of military activities, reduce the impact of the military factor on interstate relations, help reduce the threat of crisis or conflict by addressing some of the precipitating causes, provide a model for CSBM application to regions outside Europe, shed light on how the future European security order will emerge, and lay the groundwork for efforts to scope out and shape more ambitious security arrangements in the years and decades ahead.


Annex A

EUROPEAN CRISIS CONTROL SYSTEM

BILATERAL U.S.-
SOVIET MEASURES



CDE PROCEDURES*



* Reference is to SC.1 CSBMs

Annex B

AGREEMENT ON ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED
MILITARY INTRUSIONS IN EUROPE

The participating States of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Parties;

Taking into account the risks of unintentional confrontation posed by unexplained military incidents, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risks of inadvertent conflict, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized military acts that violate or threaten to violate sovereignty;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Reaffirming the inviolability of all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States;

Guided by the principles and rules of international law;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against accidental or unauthorized military intrusions upon each other's sovereign land, sea- and airspace.

ARTICLE 2

In any such situation involving a possible military intrusion, the Parties agree to provide such information and undertake other appropriate measures as may be warranted by the interests of averting violations against sovereign territory.

ARTICLE 3

For transmission of information, the Parties may use any communications facilities, including the offices of their military attaches.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties shall meet () a year to review implementation of this Agreement, as well as to discuss amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this Agreement.

6

SDI and European Security: Does Dependence Assure Security?

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Paper presented at seminar on "European Security - A New Beginning?", Haikko Manor, Helsinki, Finland, June 1985.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has presented the Europeans with yet another US initiative that they have to react on. In the paper the SDI is analysed in terms of the goals of the programme and the European reaction to it. The potential consequences of the eventual deployment of the SDI are discussed, and the initiative is claimed to involve increased European dependence on the US security policy and security interests. The notion that Europe may solve its security problem this way is critically examined.

Is independence of the superpowers the way in which Europe can achieve security? Does the political quest for European security have any prospect of success or is European security tied to and dependent upon the respective superpowers?

European security has since the conclusion of the Second World War in many respects been a mere function of the relationship between East and West. To some the European problem is in itself a contributory cause of the adverse relationship between East and West. The Second World War, whether by design or by default, created a Europe divided between East and West, and in Germany created a symbol of the new division. In this context European security was nothing but reflections of policy and perceptions on either side of the superpower divide.

To the individual European states, security policy was based on a choice between a non-aligned stance and superpower alignment. Non-alignment was chosen by the non-combatants in World War II (Sweden, Switzerland) or by the countries neutralised by the superpowers (Finland, Austria and to some extent Yugoslavia). To the great majority of the European countries, superpower dependence was the way to achieve security. In Western Europe massive arms aid and the creation of the NATO alliance instituted this dependence. In the East, ideological control secured the same objectives and later resulted in the creation of mirror image institutions (Warsaw Pact, Comecon).

European security could not be achieved in isolation and the security policy of the individual states revolved around the ensuing dilemma: How do you reduce dependence (and increase your freedom of action and self-determination in security policy) without jeopardising your security? The true irony of the situation is that

the same situation exists for the superpowers. The institution of the East-West conflict in Europe meant that the superpowers became hostages to their own clients. Confrontations and differences between European countries in East and West immediately became objects of superpower conflict, and this automatic escalation in itself endangered superpower security.¹

Some fundamental questions arise from this dilemma and they appear in many of the debates on changes in security policy. The latest example is the proposal for a fundamental change of strategy as envisaged by President Ronald Reagan in the Strategic Defense Initiative or otherwise known as 'Star Wars'. The proposal to create a defensive system has once again brought up the issue of Europe's role in the East-West relations and posed the question to European governments and publics: Does dependence assure security?

1. THE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

How may the European states (East and West) individually and collectively provide their own security? Around this fundamental question a number of security policy debates have revolved since the institution of the fundamental division of Europe between East and West.

Though many shades can be found in this debate, it is obvious that there are two fundamentally different positions confronting each other: Some argue that Europe needs the superpower commitment - European security is the superpower guarantee. The security policy of the aligned states must try to uphold and strengthen that commitment in the face of the other superpower's attempt to break it down and in the face of centrifugal factors created by the economic, technological and political development within the countries.² Others (the independence movement) argue that the superpowers no longer provide security for

the European countries. On the contrary, they inject instability into the European system. The superpowers are the ones that prevent East-West trade from developing its natural course. They are the ones clamping down on internal movements towards reforms that could produce tension-reducing changes in the individual countries. And they are the ones to introduce new weapons into the already overarmed Europe.

The fundamental threat to European security, it is argued, emanates from the superpowers and their conflict. Europe must achieve independence in order to increase its own security.³ These two views are so fundamental that they merit a closer look.

European security is the superpower guarantee

This school of thought argues that without the security guarantee from the USA and from the USSR, both Eastern and Western Europe would exist under the constant threat of blackmail, intimidation and even invasion from the other superpower. The US nuclear umbrella and its extension over the NATO members of Western Europe is seen as a cornerstone in the security policy both of the Western European countries and of the US. This 'coupling' between the USA and Western Europe has consequently been a fundamental problem for the security policy relationship between these countries.⁴

The nuclear guarantee fundamentally rests on the willingness of the US to initiate a nuclear war with the Soviet Union over the defence of Western Europe. This commitment obviously is a worrisome policy both to the Europeans and to the Americans. To the Americans it means, first, that the United States may be drawn into a conflict with the Soviet Union that is not of its own making, and, second, that the US puts its own population at risk in order to couple its security to that of the NATO countries. To the Europeans it is a worrisome policy in that it has required the introduction of US nuclear weapons on European soil. Coupling

requires the European countries to tie their security policy in with that of the US, and consequently reduces their freedom of action.

The limitations have been accepted due to the perceived beneficial effects for the European countries. The nuclear guarantee has introduced an element of stability into the post-war world, and has helped reduce the internal disagreements between the various Western European countries by moving fundamental security policy decisions out of Europe. The problem of German rearmament, for instance, would have been a major conflict, had it not been for the US presence and influence. European security dependence has also reduced the pressure for conventional armaments and made it possible for some of the NATO countries to keep the superpowers' arms race at arm's length.⁵

The European policy choice to base security on the US nuclear guarantee, however, has not been the result of a weighing of advantages and disadvantages of coupling, but rather the result of a perceived lack of alternatives. In the face of an aggressive and powerful Soviet Union, the Western European nations have not considered themselves capable of providing their own defence. In the immediate postwar years the American guarantee was needed to counter the powerful Red Army, which never demobilised to the same extent as it was done in the West. Following the development of the Soviet nuclear capabilities, the nuclear guarantee was needed to prevent the Soviet Union from using their power to put pressure on the Western European countries. With the advent of nuclear parity between the superpowers, new nuclear weapons are perceived to be needed in Europe. The new INF-weapons threaten the Soviet Union directly from European soil. Thus the Soviet Union is prevented from driving a wedge between the US and her Western allies due to the reduced credibility of the US-based strategic forces. In this argument for coupling between the US and Western Europe lies the rationale of introducing the new INF systems into Europe: the Pershing II and the GLCM.⁶

The fundamental political rationale of introducing these weapons was based on the necessity of providing a coupling between the strategic American forces and the European theatre. To the proponents of the INF decision, that is also what has been achieved. The alliance is now **claimed to be** in better shape than ever, and the INF decision and its implementation are seen as contributing to the present favourable state of affairs within the alliance.⁷

This school of thought argues that to Western Europe there is no viable alternative to the dependence on the US nuclear guarantee, and despite the costs associated with this guarantee, coupling is necessary and provides Western Europe with a security that it would be difficult, costly and maybe even impossible to achieve in any other way. These arguments have increasingly been challenged by the movement for a more independent Europe.

European security: The independence movement

Concurrently with the development of the NATO alliance and the reinforcement of the US commitment to Europe, the inherent tensions and costs associated with being dependent on US security policy and interests created the motivation for the growth of support for a more independent European security policy. Moreover, the existence of the non-aligned Europe (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) meant that an independent security policy was present as an alternative. To a number of the European countries, the choice was between alliance with the US and some sort of independence, either alone or together with others. The negotiations over a Scandinavian defence pact in 1948-49 is a case in point. But even after the individual European countries made their choice of alignment (our discussion is limited to Western Europe - the situation of the Eastern European countries is quite different and will not be discussed here), the impetus was present for a more independent European role in providing for their own security.

The construction of the Brussels treaty (and the subsequent transformation of it into the Western European Union (WEU)) was to some of the participating

countries one of the first vehicles for the expression of an independent European security policy. The plans for a European Defence Community (EDC) (1951-54) were ambitious attempts to create an independent security forum corresponding to the economic forum created through the European Coal and Steel Union. However, the plans for the EDC fell, first and foremost because of the reluctance of the major European countries to relinquish national control (especially France, but also Great Britain). Later attempts to reinvigorate the security cooperation within Europe proved no more successful than the failed EDC.⁸

None of these policy attempts had much success in creating independent European security policies until the advent and consolidation of détente strengthened the Europeans' feeling of increased freedom of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the US. Détente, US involvement in Vietnam, Watergate and US economic decline reduced the US hegemony and allowed the growth of an independent European security policy in embryo. The breakdown of détente from the end of the 1970s increased the pressure for an independently formulated European policy. The US demands for alliance solidarity clashed with the interest created in Europe during détente for a more peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The foreign policy differences over Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Poland occurred together with the difficulties created by the INF decision and created strong and consistent demands from both left and right of the European political spectrum for an independent European security policy. The political consultations under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) were used by the European countries as a mechanism for voicing their collective concern with developments in US policy deemed detrimental to European interests. The revival of the WEU and increased bilateral contacts between West Germany and France are current examples of this tendency. Finally the growth of the peace movements in many of the Western European countries, and the involvement of new groups in the security

debate meant that an independent European security policy was a constant and major demand in the re-vitalised national security debate.

Fearful of this new tendency, the European governments in the allied countries have made demands for increased consultation between the US and her European allies, for increased participation of the European defence industries in NATO procurement, and for an independent European voice in dealings with the Soviet Union. Despite agreement on this, the difficulty in achieving European agreement on matters of substance means that a European security policy is still a dream. Nevertheless European security independence is a powerful dream, and the political forces supporting policies aimed at making the dream come true seem to be growing in strength.

There are several different versions of independence within what I have here labelled 'the independence movement'. Independence in the least radical form is to see Europe as unified within an Atlantic framework. Europe has to be one pillar of the alliance, and the USA the other. In order to achieve true interdependence between Europe and the USA, Europe needs to be more unified than it is today. This conception of independence is one that conforms easily to American plans of reducing European reliance on the US, thus alleviating some of the burden that the USA is carrying today.

The other version is to see an independent Europe as a counter to superpower control and dominance. This version has been a long concern of the French, and also a driving force behind many European integrationists.

Finally some regard an independent Europe as a delinked, all-European system where Western Europe is detached from NATO and Eastern Europe from the USSR. This Europe has been enjoying widespread support among the peace movements, and among politicians, but has had less support on the state level.

In terms of the debate on single issues like the debate on the SDI, these different versions of independence become mixed. Here I shall concentrate mostly

on the state, as the SDI debate is a debate on the policies of the various European states, either one by one or coordinated in common policies.

Central to many of the proposals aired for an independent European security policy, is the notion of Europe as a Third Force in the antagonistic relationship between the USA and the USSR. Europe has to play the role as a balancer that can reduce the antagonism between East and West and create an all European security system.⁹

According to some, Europe has become a battlefield of the hegemonial conflicts of the superpowers. Consequently the allies have to reconsider their policy of 'subordination to American supremacy'. This subordination no longer guarantees European security, either to the allies or to the non-aligned. Western Europe has to play the role of the mediator, both in political terms and in developing a different defence posture in Europe through a non-provocative conventional defence. The goal is an all European security system based on cooperation and mutual acceptance of the adversaries' right to exist.¹⁰

A number of institutional suggestions and proposals have been aired. Some argue for the reconstitution of the EPC and others think that the WEU is the best forum. Finally, some regard the German-French cooperation as the best possibility of increased European cooperation.

In all of the issues that form the substance of the present security debate in Europe, the parameters of the debate are determined by the discussion between the proponents of relying on the guarantee of the superpowers and the independence movement. The differing views on the Geneva arms control negotiations, on the CSCE negotiations and even on trade and technology policy are reflections of the different views on how European security is best achieved. This debate takes place between the different states in Europe, but, perhaps more importantly, within the various states. This internal and external debate over the costs and benefits associated with dependence and independence in the European context is very

clearly visible in the debate over the proposed new Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This new programme will fundamentally affect the debate on the costs and benefits associated with European security dependence. Two questions need to be raised here: How does the SDI affect the European security dependence, and does the SDI enhance or reduce European security?

2. SDI: WHAT IS IT?

President Reagan's speech on defence spending and defensive technology of 23 March 1983, introduced a new initiative into the strategic discussion. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has since then grown in importance both in the priorities of the Reagan administration itself and consequently also in the international security debate.

When the SDI was introduced it was as much of a surprise as the feared 'bolt from the blue'. Very few in the administration was aware of the initiative before they saw the President on TV, and experts, allies and adversaries alike were taken by surprise.¹²

Certainly the SDI had antecedents, but they were of little importance and virtually unnoticed both by the strategic community and by the public at large. Research into Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology had been going on in the US for quite some time. In the Joint Chief of Staff's United States Military Posture for FY 1983, the ASAT (Antisatellite) programme was described as 'vigorously pursued'. The Ballistic Missile Defense was described as heading toward a decision on providing options for the defence of ICBMs through "Low Altitude Defence (LoAD), future systems and overlay defence". The research was claimed to be conducted within existing treaties and purported to be a hedge against Soviet

treaty abrogation and as a counter to specific Soviet threats (e.g. against US-satellites).¹³

Lobby groups existed who tried to argue for an increased use of space and high-energy technology to create a 'High Frontier' that could give the USA a strategic advantage in the competition with the USSR.¹⁴

Very few, however, took any of this seriously. The potential economic and political costs and the technical difficulties associated with the schemes marketed in Washington, together with the failure of the previous ABM scheme (the Safeguard ABM system was dismantled in 1976 due to cost effectiveness considerations) meant that very few anticipated that strategic defense would be the new focus of the strategic debate.

Yet, that is exactly what Ronald Reagan proposed in his March 23 speech. Reagan in his own words "launched an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it".¹⁵

What is it that is to change the course of human history, one may ask. What are the goals of this new initiative and what are the envisaged means to achieve it?

The SDI goals

The goals as they were seen by President Reagan and explained to the public in his March 1983 speech, were all ultimately directed towards rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", and this should be done by "eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles". In his inaugural speech in 1985 he had the further goal of totally eliminating the threat of nuclear war. Considering the important roles played by nuclear weapons, ICBMs and nuclear war planning in present US policy, this certainly is an ambitious goal. However, the mere utterance of long-term goals of this type would probably not in and of itself have produced a major reaction, since it might be regarded as yet another example of political

hyperbole and hypocrisy when at the same time more nuclear weapons were constructed, deployed and used as threats.

But the SDI contained other goals. The goal was also to do away with offensive weapons. As the technology for the new defensive systems is developed and deployed, the offensive nuclear weapons may be dismantled so a stable balance is maintained between offensive and defensive weapons with a final goal of removing all offensive weapons.¹⁶

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was even more explicit and presumed that a move in the direction of defence on the part of the US would create a corresponding move in the USSR: "I would hope and assume that the Soviets with all the work they have done and are doing in this field, would develop a similar defense, which would have the effect of **totally and completely removing these missiles from the face of the earth**".¹⁷

In the later statements on the SDI, the removal of offensive weapons has, however, been stressed less and mentioned only as a result of potential arms control, arms reduction talks between the two superpowers.¹⁸

This reinterpretation of original goals is in the process of radically transforming the SDI from what it was originally conceived as and into something quite different. This is especially evident in the overall goal that the President raised of doing away with deterrence as the basis for US and allied security. The President in his speech stressed that it is necessary to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation. "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?", asked Ronald Reagan, and a number of his senior counsellors and advisers echoed that question in speeches and statements of their own since his speech. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger expressed it very clearly when he said that the SDI ". . . is an attempt to devise a system that protects our people instead of avenging them", (speech to Pittsburg World Affairs Council, October 30th, 1984).

A lot of his advisers, however, have also begun to question this assumption of their President. Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, for example, has asserted that blaming the SDI for overturning the existing policy of strategic nuclear deterrence, is just plain wrong. The SDI would not scrap a policy of deterrence, on the contrary, it would enhance deterrence by making it harder for the Soviet Union to reach its goal. To prevent the split between the different views of the role of deterrence within the SDI, the argument has been developed that by destroying attacking missiles the deterrent (e.g. US' own ICBMs) is protected and at the same time the population is protected because a Soviet first strike becomes impossible. The protection of the US is of course the central goal of the SDI.

Protection is the ultimate goal of the SDI, but also a very elusive goal. What is it that is going to be protected? To the President it is "our own soil and that of our allies". It is the goal of total defence against strategic ballistic missiles, since the removal of fear in the population is the underlying political objective.¹⁹ Technology should be developed that would make it feasible to achieve a high degree of defence against the threat of a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union or anybody else. The ultimate goal, is a 100 per cent effective defence. "The defensive systems the President is talking about are not designed to be partial. What we want to try to get is a system . . . that is thoroughly reliable and total. I don't see any reason why that can't be done", said Casper Weinberger, ((NBC's 'Meet the Press', March 27th, 1983).

Even as a goal this is not realistic. The perfect defence is not possible. Even disregarding the problem of circumvention, the SDI system as presently imagined would not be capable of shooting down all the missiles directed at the West. Director of the SDI office, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson have stated several times that a perfect astrodome defence is "not a realistic thing", (*Science*, August 10th, 1984). But a defence which is less than perfect (e.g. 90 per cent success rate) would all the same be beneficial, it is argued, compared to the

situation that we are in now where there is no defence except through deterrence by the posing of counter-threats. The sheer fact that a 100 per cent population defence is an unrealistic goal, however, distracts considerably from the political benefits associated with the original vision of the President. As critics have pointed out, a system with a 90 per cent success rate would still leave enough missiles coming through to inflict unacceptable damage on the US (e.g. the destruction of the 10 major US cities).²⁰

Consequently, more attention has focussed on the ability of the proposed systems to achieve point defence. The objective here is to defend the US ICBMs or other essential military targets from incoming missiles, and thus it is a continuation of the already ongoing research on BMD. Achieving this goal is technically more realistic, it is argued, and it would restore the credibility of the land-based ICBM-deterrent. Especially it is argued, that it is necessary to protect the Minuteman 3 with the mark 12 A warhead due to its capability of destroying hardened Soviet targets (both missiles and leadership bunkers). Even this goal is probably difficult to achieve due to the foreseen Soviet countermeasure (overwhelming the defence etc.). But, it is argued, the defence will be beneficial anyway by complicating Soviet planning and making a Soviet first strike more difficult to achieve.²¹ The defensive system would 'complicate and frustrate aggression' and would thereby enhance the US deterrent. The "window of vulnerability" would be closed by this combination of offensive and defensive forces.²²

Edward Teller illustrates this argument clearly in outlining the necessity for a combination of offense and defence.

". . . Their (the US and the USSR) armaments at present include only swords. A combination of swords and shields represents a considerable improvement, which would increase with the proliferation of shields. Such a situation does not make it possible to throw away swords, but if shields are much less expensive than swords, peace will tend to become more stable".²³

Disregarding the cost considerations - on which there is considerable uncertainty - this is a far cry from the President's goal of changing the course of human history.

Goals of a less ambitious nature include considerations on creating a thin defence against small attacks. An ABM defence constructed to handle nuclear missiles launched by accident from the USSR or missiles launched by one of the smaller nuclear capable states. The construction of a 'thin' defence either in the terminal or in the boost phase would, however, require the same technology needed to develop a full system and therefore be very cost inefficient. Furthermore, terrorist nuclear attacks through other means of transporting nuclear bombs (suitcases, freightships, etc.) could not be prevented with such a system. The problem of dealing with accidental launching could be solved much simpler in other ways. The goal of a thin defence has, however, not been a central one for the administration even though it does figure in certain arguments advanced for the current research expenditure.²⁴

Apparently, a central goal of the SDI has been to ensure that the allies should also be covered by the new defensive system. The protection should cover also their soil. Even though the concern for the allies was added on in small sentences in the original drafts of the President's speech it does nevertheless figure in there, and a major preoccupation of the administration since the launching of the initiative has been to calm allied fears of this new initiative. The President underlined that: "Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies." The protection envisaged for the allies is based partly on a protective shield and partly on reducing Soviet ability to threaten with the use of nuclear weapons. SDI is supposed to develop a capability to provide a shield against theater weapons like the SS 20.

But more important than the theoretical ability to defend against the SS 20, is the postulated effect the SDI will have on increasing Soviet uncertainties in planning an ICBM attack on the US. If the USSR is no longer certain that it can penetrate US defences, the credibility of the US deterrent force is enhanced. This should then increase the credibility of the extended deterrent. This, it is argued, is in the interest of the allies.²⁵

As the SDI has developed and been elaborated, other goals have evolved, and more are sure to come. Most of these are arguments constructed to support the development of the SDI and are not central goals to the programme. It is argued, for instance, that the advent of the powerful peace movements underlines the need to find an alternative to deterrence. Policy cannot be executed unless there is some element of public support. "Policies have to be in harmony with what is commonly held as proper behavior."²⁶ If nothing is done to ensure greater harmony, unilateral disarmament may present itself as a solution, and that, it is argued, should be avoided. Others have stressed that even though the SDI could not provide a perfect defence, it could ensure that the number of nuclear explosions in a nuclear exchange could be reduced down to a number that would not trigger the climatic catastrophes associated with the so-called nuclear winter. In any case, it is argued, damage limitation is in itself a more moral goal than the threat to retaliate.²⁷

All of the goals of the SDI program are present in the ongoing discussion in a highly confused and mixed manner, and the inherent contradictions between many of these goals are papered over by claims that what appears as contradictions are merely differences between short-range and long-range objectives. By claims that there are multiple objectives, or by saying that so far it is only research and nobody will be able to foresee what is going to be discovered tomorrow, the inconsistencies are disregarded.

The debate over the various goals of the SDI has been going on within the US administration and has created confusion and uncertainty as to what the SDI constitutes. SDI seems to exist in at least four different versions within the administration:

The first stresses that the SDI is only a research programme. The "object is to provide the basis for an informed decision, sometime in the next decade, as to the feasibility of providing for a defense of the United States and our allies against ballistic missile attack.", (Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President, Speech to the IISS, London, March 28th, 1985). According to this view, deterrence is and will continue to be the basis of US-USSR strategic relations for the foreseeable future, and the preservation of the ABM treaty is very important according to this point of view.

The second also underlines that the SDI is a research programme, but here the goal is to create the perfect defence. The Defensive Technology Study under the chairmanship of James Fletcher concluded in their first study that "the scientific community may indeed give the United States 'the means of rendering' the ballistic missile threat 'impotent and obsolete'". Through a 10-20 year research programme with emphasis on detection programmes and boost-phase programmes, the study foresees a final, low-leakage system created.²⁸ This conception of the SDI is supported by i.a. George Keyworth, the President's Science Advisor, and by Ronald Reagan.²⁹ This plan will only involve testing permitted by the ABM treaty, and the decisions on compliance and deployment are pushed into the future. The demonstration test necessary will of course, despite what the advocates of this form of SDI say, subject the ABM regime to severe challenges.

The third type of SDI enjoying support within the present administration places the emphasis on intermediate defences. The idea is that research is conducted on all aspects and that deployment is undertaken as you go along and discover new possibilities in the various phases of defence. The fundamental assumption is that

some defence is better than none. Deployment of an intermediate defensive system is useful because it will solve the security problem while full systems are being developed. This argument is presented in the so-called 'Hoffmann Report on Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security'. This study was undertaken at the request of the President to assess the role of defensive systems in security strategy. It thus complemented the Fletcher report that reviewed the technological feasibility of the SDI programme. The study advocated concentrating on the ABM option, the development of sensors (CONUS) and a limited boost-phase intercept option. These options if chosen and pursued now will "contribute to reducing the prelaunch vulnerability of our offensive forces".³⁰

The final version of the SDI presently discussed sees SDI as a programme to protect missile silos, and reduce the vulnerability of the ICBM. Consequently terminal defences that may intercept incoming warheads should be deployed now. Either under the ABM treaty ceiling of a hundred launchers, or through a reneging on the ABM treaty. Neither Casper Weinberger nor Richard Perle is ABM supporter, and through stressing Soviet non-compliance with the treaty some observers see the administration as gearing up for termination of the ABM regime. "I am sorry to say it (i.e. the ABM treaty) does not expire. That is one of its many defects", (Richard Perle, House Armed Services Committee Hearings, February 23rd, 1982). According to reports, this option of deployment of terminal defences is now supported especially in the US army.³¹

With all of these differing versions of the SDI being advocated by different branches of the administration, the confusion was complete. Everybody had their own favorite version of the SDI, and a need was felt for a central unifying strategic concept that could tie all these many versions together in one formula.

Formulated by Poul H. Nitze, four sentences summarised the common SDI concept:

The Strategic Concept

"During the next ten years, the US objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space.

We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms.

This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive.

A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree."

As a result of this strategic concept, three criteria were developed that have become fundamental criteria for the administration when outlining the case for the SDI. The defensive technologies must be effective, they must be survivable (the Soviets can not easily shoot them down or render them ineffective in some other manner), and finally they must be cost-effective at the margins. As Nitze put it in his speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council: "... that is, it must be cheap enough to add defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defense".³⁷

According to Nitze, these criteria are demanding and deployment is conditioned upon meeting these standards.

SDI: How to do it

The SDI programme is premised on the technological ability to destroy ballistic missiles before they reach their target. The flightpath of the ballistic missiles may be divided into four phases: The boost phase where the first and the second stages of the engines are burning. In the post-boost phase the 'bus' (the projectile of the missile, containing guiding systems, fuel and MRV (individual nuclear warheads

called multiple reentry vehicles (MRV))) has separated from the engines and launches the MRV on their separate flight paths. The midcourse phase describes the now individual flight paths of the warheads. The final phase is the terminal phase where the warheads and decoys along with then reenter the atmosphere.

The SDI is designed to engage missiles in all phases of its flight (a four layer defence). Attacking the missiles in the final phases of the flight involved well-known technology and corresponds to existing ABM technology. The new aspects of the SDI have primarily to do with the capability to hit missiles in the boost and postboost phases. However, technological development have been underway for some time that may enable the development of new systems in all of the phases.³³

The SDI programs require global full-time surveillance (the increased importance of satellites has put ASAT programmes on the SDI agenda) and defensive technologies of its own to prevent the new battle stations from being hit. Furthermore the program also aims for defence against shorter range ballistic missiles whether ground or submarine launched.

The development of a defensive system should produce an incentive for states to do away with nuclear weapons presently in their arsenals. It should also make it possible for arms control to succeed because the threat of destruction is reduced in importance. In presenting this argument (during the election campaign), Ronald Reagan proposed that the US should share the result of the development of these new technologies with the Soviet Union so that they, too, would do away with the offensive weapons.

Obviously, in a situation with no offensive weapons and no threat, there is no need for or basis for a nuclear deterrence policy. However, this situation is certainly not right around the corner, the technology is not even developed yet, the Soviet Union has not accepted the idea and the costs of getting there are unknown.³⁴

The interim period is therefore of more immediate importance. This was also underscored in the President's SDI speech:

"As we proceed we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capacity for flexible response."

This, according to the President, requires continuing modernisation of the present offensive strategic forces, both ballistic missiles and bombers and other missiles. In Europe in particular it requires an increase in conventional armaments. In terms of arms control policy it means that negotiations from a position of strength is still the US favored arms control approach.

Apart from some of the more esoteric technology, the SDI does not in the foreseeable future change the present arms, defence, and strategic policy of the US nor of the alliance. The original version of the President was at best futuristic, and even he saw no change in the short or medium term. The subsequent presentation of the problem underscores that the SDI is more an expanded and updated ABM program than a fundamental revision of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Even in terms of funding, the \$ 26 billion requested for SDI for the period 1985-1989 is only an increase of \$ 9.5 billion of what the outlay for this research would have been anyway, (Report to Congress, 1985, p. 77).

Why then spend so much time discussing the SDI as if it was something totally revolutionary, and why bother with the importance that these changes may have on the US-European relations? The SDI shows the fundamental problem in the security dependence of Western Europe on the US in that the SDI is internally generated, but with strong external effects. The mere fact that the US proposes as system like this has political and strategic effects. It changes the arms control negotiation situation between the US and the USSR and it changes the situation between the US and its Western European allies.

The question is how.

3. SDI AND EUROPE

The presentation of the SDI was certainly also to the allies a bolt from the blue. Nobody had been informed beforehand, they were not even given the usual advance notices that the President was going to present a major new policy. The presentation of the SDI decision was a clear example of what is usually a major gripe from the Europeans: The US does not treat the rest of the NATO alliance as equals. It expects support for US policies, but does not bother to consult with the allies before making major decisions that affect their security. As Helmut Smith expressed it once: A major problem in US-European relations is that the Americans understanding of consultation is to say to the Europeans: "Do as we ask - and please do it within the next two days".³⁵

The President's speech mentioned the need for closer consultation with the allies, but also said that "I am directing an effort ..." This is what the Europeans resent. Asking the Europeans to back something they had not been part of conceiving is to create scepticism and resentment in Europe at the outset. Some argue, as indeed administration officials have done, that this new initiative is 'a generous offer'. The President offered a new programme to achieve the protection of not only the US but also the soil of the allies from London to Tokyo. The research programme is offered with no demands for allied financing and no demands that the allies should do anything active to receive this generous offer from the US. Their safety and ours are one, the President said, and hoped presumably to alleviate any fears that the US was retreating into a fortress America position.³⁶

The way the President presented the SDI created questions and fears among allies that the concern for allied safety was an add-on more than an integral part of the initiative. The President said that he wanted to eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles, thereby excluding tactical, theatre, cruise missiles and bombers. These are the types of weapons which are of primary concern to the Europeans. How is the President going to render nuclear weapons obsolete, if the programme concentrates on the strategic missiles?

In the period following the President's speech, his advisers had tried to explain these contradictions in two ways: One argument is that the SDI system - concentrating on boost-phase defence - would offer global protection against strategic missiles. There is no way to detect the target of a launched missile, and consequently all launched missiles would be shot down. His advisers have further said that in reality the President meant that all ballistic missiles would be covered, and through this, improved air defence and terminal defences in Europe, the SDI could offer protection of European soil too. This is, however, far beyond the scope of the SDI, and would for sure involve huge European costs.

The other main argument used is that if the US ICBM force is protected, deterrence is enhanced because the US threat to use them becomes credible. The reduction of the vulnerability of the land-based leg of the strategic triad will itself increase strategic stability because, the administration argues, the risk of being pushed into a 'lose-them-or-use-them dilemma' is reduced. According to Iklé, SDI 'envisages and would include deterrence against theatre-range missiles targeted on Europe'. Arms control negotiator Max Kampelmann argued that a two-tier strategic defence capability would protect the US missiles, thereby making the US counter-threats more credible to the Soviets. Thus, the credibility of the deterrence would be enhanced, which would be of value to the Europeans.³⁷ Even if we regard the goal of providing population defence both for the US and for the allies as unrealistic, the SDI could, according to administration arguments, increase

the security of Europe by reducing the counter-force threat and by making the US capable of retaliating by protecting their ICBM force from a Soviet first-strike.

An unstated, but it seems increasingly important goal of the SDI vis-à-vis the alliance is to strengthen the alliance by demonstrating unity on the SDI. The 'generous' offer from the President to the allies becomes a symbol of alliance cohesion and solidarity. As the programme matures and develops in the American system the arguments for costsharing, for sharing of responsibility and the sharing of political obligations will undoubtedly be raised on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe by the ones that fear the effects any differences in view between the US and Europe may have on the alliance. In the US demands for solidarity may be raised both by the right wing advocates of strong leadership and strong military, but certainly also by the isolationist liberals that accept commitments unwillingly and have a low tolerance for upholding US commitments and programmes that are unwanted. The Nun, Glen, Roth and Warner amendment to the FY-86 defense bill is a case in point. The amendment provides incentives for cooperative research and development projects between Europe and the US on defence equipment. As part of this incentive, Senator Nun stressed that it is required that "the Europeans are prepared to cooperate with us using their own funds".³⁸

It has been argued that the SDI is being marketed with so much fervour and commitment that it is turning into an implicit alliance-loyalty test. Allied governments are becoming obliged to pledge their support to the initiative since any expression of doubt connotes contempt. Terence A. Todman, U.S. Ambassador to Denmark expressed it in terms of coupling. He referred to the European criticism of the SDI programme for decoupling the US from Europe, and said that when invited to participate in the research some of the European countries refuse. "Noting some of the allied reaction one might ask who is decoupling from whom?".³⁹ The presentation of the SDI, furthermore, came in the midst of the deployment of the INF missiles in Europe. That decision also had turned into a test

of alliance solidarity and mutual purpose. The decision is of course still in the process of being implemented, but the difficulty in getting everyone - or at least almost everyone - in the alliance to back this decision, means that the absorptive capacities within the alliance for disagreement and disunity have been spent to the limit. The US demands for new symbols of solidarity through the SDI present the alliance with new and grave challenges at a time when it is not very well equipped to handle them. European reactions should be seen in this light.

A central argument in presenting the SDI to the Europeans has been that the SDI at its present stage is a guard against Soviet breakout from the provisions in the ABM treaty. The treaty allows (Article VII) modernisation and research on ABM systems, and as such the new US programmes are presented as hedges against sudden Soviet breakthroughs in technology that would present the West with a fait accompli. The SDI is claimed to be consistent with the obligations contained in the ABM treaty, and even though this is disputed by some with reference to violations on both sides, the central problem with the SDI in relation to the ABM treaty is that the envisaged deployments certainly will undermine the ABM regime and possibly create an offensive-defensive race among the superpowers.⁴⁰

It is this possibility that itself is the basis of the other argument that the SDI is useful because it provides the allies with leverage over the USSR in arms control negotiations. The present ABM treaty was not concluded, despite USA offers to negotiate ABM systems in the sixties, before the US started developing its own ABM systems. In the same way, it is argued, is the SDI today a major force behind the Soviet willingness to negotiate in Geneva. The SDI is then presented as a bargaining chip that may eventually be negotiated away in the Geneva talks between USA and USSR. Even though the bargaining chip argument certainly is disputed - among the critics you find Ronald Reagan - it is used especially in the American marketing effort in Europe. The statement that Casper Weinberger made to the Christian Science Monitor, October 29th, 1984, European is illustrative: "It's

not a bargaining chip. If we can get it, we would want to have it, and we're working very hard to get it. It is not a chimerical thing out there on the margins to try to influence them to make reductions in offensive systems". Compare this with the statement made by Abrahamson the same day: "We may even do some trading. We might say, OK, we won't put something up for three years if you take out 500 warheads".⁴¹ European support for the programme is becoming a priority US concern, and consequently the US has offered the Europeans participation in the research programmes under SDI. Cooperation will assume the form of cooperative scientific research and allied bidding on SDI contracts and political consultations through existing mechanisms.⁴²

The SDI would, it is argued by the proponents, increase coupling between the US and Europe. The gradual reduction of American strategic vulnerability would make the US threat of nuclear retaliation more credible, because strategic defence would solve the problem of choosing between Boston and Bonn. The USSR would be deterred from attacking the US by the existence of the defensive systems, and the threat to answer any Soviet attack on Europe with a blow against the USSR would be more credible.

Some have argued that the SDI might eventually require some sort of basing in Europe (Laser ground stations etc.), which would in itself be an expression of commitment to Europe parallel to the basing of intermediate range nuclear offensive systems. To provide the needed protection for Europe, the deployment of a modernised air defence system (the Patriot) to defend missiles stationed in Europe has been mentioned, but the costs and effectiveness of this system is still unknown.⁴³ Stationing of modernised versions of air defence missiles to hit incoming missiles is, however, a likely future prospect. This will reopen the entire debate on Europe's defensive-offensive role and the debate on the coupling between Europe and the US. The SDI proposals have already stirred a controversy both within Europe and between Europe and the US. So much so that an observer has

argued that the political costs associated with getting the SDI accepted and implemented by far would outweigh the military and strategic benefits that it may eventually produce.⁴⁴

The SDI as a new transatlantic strategic concept has created yet another discussion over the relative costs and merits of equating basing NATO policy with US policy and US conception of interests.

The SDI programme may potentially further increase Europe's dependence on US policy. The technology of the programme would have to rely heavily on US developments, and the strategic rationale and even the arms control policy use of this new programme would underline European dependence.

4. EUROPEAN REACTIONS: SHOULD DEPENDENCY BE WELCOMED?

When the Strategic Defense Initiative was presented to the world on March 23, 1983, the initial European reaction was one of disbelief. The traditional US supporters maintained an embarrassed silence and maintained that the SDI was just something for domestic US consumption and had nothing to do with strategy between East and West. The Soviets reacted immediately and denounced the US initiative. Because it would violate the ABM treaty they argued it would lead to a new arms race. It reflected the US ambition to achieve superiority through a first strike capability. The USSR followed on with a series of proposals for bans on weapons in space, and a declaration of no-first-deployment on the part of the USSR. August 18, 1983 Andropov said that the USSR would not place ASAT weapons in outer space before the US did so, and he also proposed a mutual ban on deployment and testing of all space based weapons.⁴⁵

The superpower public negotiation game was regarded as yet another indication that the SDI was a propaganda ploy, and there was no need to take it

seriously. German newspapers called it "Ein Traum - kein wirkliches Programm". Other papers warned that this would complicate the arms control negotiations and make it more difficult to get public support for NATO's ongoing modernisation. Others, however, evaluated the US initiative on its moral goals and expressed approval of the underlying ambition to do away with MAD and the preference for defensive technologies. Furthermore, it was seen as a counter to perceived Soviet dominance in ABM and ASAT research and technology. The first reactions from Europe were in toto based more on pavlovian reactions and there were few that considered it necessary to enter into more reflective analysis of the new proposal.⁴⁶

The US, however, slowly began detailing the program and began pressuring the Europeans for political support. When the NATO nuclear planning group met in Cesme on April 3, 1984, Casper Weinburger asked the Europeans for some sort of political support for the program, but was met with opposition from several countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany. The communique from the meeting registered allied agreement, but later in public both Defence Minister Wörner and Kansler Kohl voiced their opposition. At a series of meetings in 1985, the United States tried to get allied endorsement, but except for the NATO defence minister meeting in Luxembourg in March, common endorsement was forthcoming.

The criticism also came from the German opposition where both the SPD and the Greens voiced strong resistance to the plans. Towards the end of 1984 and in the beginning of 1985 the US launched, as a consequence of this criticism from the allies, a major effort to convince the Europeans about the merits of the US proposal and added a carrot to the package: European participation in the SDI research programme.⁴⁷

The results were increased awareness on the European side of the priority that the US accorded this programme and also that the Europeans began to give their

reluctant support - support that was filled with fine print and double meanings, but these could and were disregarded by the US administration. The SDI programme began acquiring a major role in Western discussions.

The European reaction can be exemplified through an analysis of the four points agreed upon by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at their Camp David meeting in December 1984. The agreed points were:

One: The purpose of the West is to maintain balance. It is not to achieve superiority. Two: The new strategic defences cannot be deployed without negotiation in view of existing treaty obligations (i.a. the ABM treaty). Three: The overall aim is to enhance and not to undermine deterrence. Four: The aim of negotiations between East and West is to reduce the arsenal of offensive arms on both sides.

In presenting the agreement Thatcher stressed that she supported the SDI plan, that is as a research plan and not as a deployment plan, and that it is a long-range programme.⁴⁸ The support is qualified with a lot of fine print, and the four points of 'agreement' reflect some of the fundamental worries that the Western European governments have.

The first point reflects the worry that the US will use the defensive systems to press for superiority as indeed some US commentators have been arguing that the US should.⁴⁹ The SDI as an ABM defense plan to protect the ICBMs will increase the Soviet fears that the US is planning a first strike and therefore induce them to either increase their offensive arms or create their own ABM and we would have a new arms race as a result.⁵⁰

The second point illustrates the fear that the SDI would increase the already existing pressure for abrogating the ABM treaty. The research and the testing will in itself create pressures for Soviet actions that will be taken to constitute violations of the treaty and there will be a race in order to prevent the other part from breaking out.

The third of the agreed points was that the purpose is to enhance deterrence, and the underlining of this reflects the European fear that the research on SDI will destroy deterrence. People will be deluded into believing that we are moving away from MAD and into a situation of MAS (mutual assured security). In the transition period, first strike is a very likely policy - indeed perhaps the only possible one. Furthermore, the French and the British deterrent will be reduced in effectiveness. The flexible response strategy of NATO would be impaired in that the nuclear deterrent would be incredible against a conventional Soviet attack.

Finally, the building up of defence increases the incentive to increase offenses and the fourth point of the agreement, that offensive armaments should be reduced, reflect this. The Soviets have already made clear that they will increase their offensive weapons as a result of the proposed plans. Since no limitations on offensive nuclear arms are in place in Europe they may do so most easily here. Furthermore, the SDI would create a race between creating new space systems and systems to hit these systems, and systems to defend the defensive systems etc., etc.⁵¹

Underlying the presentation of these 'agreed' four points were fears that arms control will be impaired rather than helped by this new plan, and that the economic consequences will be so great that the Europeans will be left in the cold because they cannot afford it. The costs will also increase the already existing domestic pressure in the US to reduce its military presence in Europe.

Behind the agreement between the US and the allies, serious and wide-spread concern about the proposal linger on. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, March 15, 1985 outlined the concerns quite explicitly. He said that the concerns about not fuelling a new arms race should be brought into consideration during the research stage, rather than after. He also voiced concern over the defensability of these new

systems, and the ability of politicians to maintain control over important peace and war decisions.⁵²

Finally, he said, as members of the Atlantic Alliance, we must consider the potential consequences of this unique relationship. "We must be sure that the United States' nuclear guarantee to Europe will indeed be enhanced not at the end of the process, but from its very inception."⁵³

The misgivings and fears presented by the British reflect wide-spread sentiments in Western Europe and are with minor differences also present in France and West Germany. The French have worried in particular over the credibility of their own deterrent, and have been working on the possibility of developing their own space defence. Either developed alone, or in cooperation with other European nations, Mitterand explicitly spoke about a European space community as the best answer to tomorrow's demands and military realities.⁵⁴

The French have reacted negatively to the American SDI proposal. Due to the enticing effect that the promise of participation in a high technology programme might have on the European states, France has proposed a cooperation programme designed to strengthen European technological capability in the areas where SDI will also concentrate. The programme named Eureka (ironically also the motto of California) has met with support both from Britain and from the Federal Republic. Owing to the strong pressures in Europe and especially among the WEU countries for a common European position on the SDI offer, the French proposal has met with general approval. The US has recognised this and is trying to stress the compatibility between the SDI and the Eureka programmes. So far, however, the Eureka proposal seems to be doing what the French intended it to: reinforcing the strong scepticism against the SDI in Europe. The French have been very outspoken in their criticism of the SDI proposal. Defence Minister Charles Hernu called it dangerously destabilising, and France proposed to the Committee on Disarmament that a treaty banning the militarisation of space should be adopted. This should limit ASAT

systems, prevent energy weapons, whether deployed in space or on land, and guarantee that each state may use and orbit satellites without fear of them being taken out.⁵⁵

It could have been expected that the West Germans would react more favourably than Britain and France since they do not have a deterrent of their own to protect. And indeed the Federal Republic has expressed support with the SDI plans on several occasions. Defence Minister Manfred Wörner has said that "Wir unterstützen das SDI-Forschungsprogramm", and Chancellor Kohl has on several occasions expressed support for the SDI programme. He has stressed that Western Europe should not be "technologically decoupled" from the United States. At the same time, reservations are expressed by Hans Dietrich Genscher and his spokesmen. Jürgen Möllemann (State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry) has said that "Die Bundesregierung nimmt eine abwartende Haltung ein".⁵⁶ Despite the obvious differences in view within the present CDU-FDP government, even the CDU has qualified its support for the SDI programme with a number of provisions: SDI research should be seen as an attempt to deter a new research competition between USA and USSR. The research should not replace deterrence. Europe must have full insight and full participation in the programme, and the effects on the ABM treaty must be carefully considered. Given the fact that these considerations come from the CDU caucus, they highlight the widespread scepticism against the SDI in the Federal Republic.⁵⁷ Defence Minister Manfred Wörner said as an early comment to the SDI plan: "Schutzschirm oder Falle für Europa. Das ist das Thema der nächsten Jahre. Dadurch sei eine Destabilisierung des Ost-West-Gleichgewichts, eine Abkopplung Westeuropas von den USA und sogar eine Spaltung der westlichen Allianzen zu befürchten."⁵⁸

Despite the present ideological compatibility between West Germany and the USA, and despite the fact that nobody wants to create another INF-débâcle within the Alliance, the Kohl government has in fact reacted quite reluctantly to all but

the suggestion that mutual research is done. The reluctantly favourable response to the US research proposal may be explained by pointing to the fact that this is the only way to gain some influence over the programme. Since research in itself may create potential benefits for Europe economically or technologically, the Europeans have satisfied the US demands for solidarity by giving a positive response to the research cooperation proposal.⁵⁹

It does not mean, however, that the SDI programme is supported. The West German government fears public reaction to this new proposal, and they fear that detente between East and West will be destroyed as a consequence of this new initiative. It may also lead to decoupling as Wörner pointed out. Both in the sense of the nuclear guarantee but also in the sense that economic and research competition between Europe and the US would be intensified as a result of the SDI.

The European reaction has been critical, and even on the proposals for research cooperation sceptical voices now appear, in part from some of the smaller European countries: Norway, Holland, Denmark, but also from groups within the major European powers. Who is going to cooperate on this new research - corporations, scientists or governments? (The United States rejected an offer from the Soviet Union to have a team of scientists from both countries work out the potential consequences of the new technologies by arguing that such an evaluation had to be done through governmental negotiation.) What sort of influence will the Europeans be accorded if they enter into this research? Does this mean that they will have an independent voice in the determination of strategy?⁶⁰

What will it all cost, and how is it to be financed? If through public financing, is the money going to be diverted from other arms programmes or are additional funds needed? Finally, some Europeans worry whether the cooperation would actually involve any transfer of knowledge. The cooperation between Europe and the US on the Columbus project have lead many to regard US offers about mutual research with a high degree of suspicion.⁶¹ The critical voices have, however, so

far not prevented the Europeans from entering into agreements with the USA on space research projects. The Germans and the Italians have concluded agreements with the US on the Columbus project, and have left the French standing in the cold with their proposal for a common European effort. Some French commentators have speculated that this is a case of the losers of the Second World War trying to gain influence over nuclear weapons through the backdoor and without the participation of France and Great Britain.⁶²

Far-fetched as this may be, it does reflect the divisive influence that the SDI initiative already has had on the Europeans. The differences in relationship of these countries to the US and their differences in national security policy seem to be exacerbated through the SDI proposal and the US research offer.

This in and of itself has made it increasingly difficult to reach the compatibility in goals which is the substance of coupling between the US and Western Europe. The SDI proposal has increased and sharpened the debate in Europe on whether to follow along with the American initiative in order to reduce its negative effect and to ensure political coupling, or to fight the SDI plans since they will endanger European security.

By highlighting the European dependence on the US in the field of security policy, the SDI proposal has strengthened the wish for an independent European policy. Independence as a set-off to increased dependence, as a counter-attempt to reduce the divisive influence that the SDI has on the inter-European relations, as a necessary foundation for a domestic consensus on security policy in Europe, and in order to prevent the SDI from placing further obstacles to the development of a better relationship between East and West.

5. S.D.I.: SECURITY - DEPENDENCE OR INDEPENDENCE?

The SDI fundamentally focuses on defensive weapons. The object of the research programme, the interallied consultations, and the long range vision of the US President: All focus on defensive weapons. Simultaneously the US is modernising its offensive weapons: The MX is, in the President's own words, "a long overdue modernisation. We are sitting here with our land-based missiles out-dated by anything and any comparison with the Soviet Union."

We are in a situation where the US and the Soviet Union are modernising their offensive missiles and other types of offensive weapons (the cruise missiles, the stealth bomber etc.), and a future consisting of a mix between offensive and defensive systems resulting from the new research seem the most likely prospect. Ronald Reagan obviously envisages this situation too. In an interview with Newsweek, March 18, 1985, he was asked:

"Is there anything that suggests to you that the Soviets will not try to build up offensively while we are researching Star Wars, or that they will not try to match the program?"

He answered: "Oh, I think they're trying to match it, and as I say, I think they started ahead of us. If we're right in our suspicions that they are expansionist and they already outnumber us greatly in the offensive weapons, and then they alone developed a defensive weapon before us, then they wouldn't have to worry about our deterrent--a retaliatory strike. Then they could issue the ultimatum to the world. So if there's any thought of that, then it would make it all the more necessary that we have a defensive weapon, too."

Obviously the Soviets will have an identical view of US intentions behind the SDI and consequently we are likely to enter into a defensive - offensive armsrace. What are the consequences for Europe of this situation? What happens if defensive

systems are developed at different paces in the different countries? Four scenarios are imaginable: Defence is developed 1) only in the USA; 2) only in the USA and Europe; 3) only in the superpowers, but not covering either of the allies; 4) only in the USSR.

Defence only in the USA:

Development of the defensive systems to cover the US alone (not giving total security but at least enough to make the leaders feel more confident about the ability to withstand an all-out nuclear attack) is in essence for what the SDI is first and foremost designed, and the political add-ons about extending it to cover Europe and sharing it with the Soviets are political commitments that may change from one situation to the next.

If the defensive systems protected the United States, two situations might occur: One is that the US would decouple itself from the European scene. Their interests, economically, politically and strategically, in preventing others from dominating Europe would naturally be the same as they are today. But with the existence of a defensive shield, the Soviets would have only Europe to direct a retaliatory blow against in a situation of nuclear exchange between the superpowers. However unlikely this situation may seem in military terms, the political realities of foreseeing such a situation are more than enough to produce strategic instability and alliance insecurity. European governments will worry in such a situation that the US may be more prone to reckless behaviour vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, because of its own feeling of security against attack.⁶³

The opposing argument is that since the risk to the US of fighting a war in Europe is reduced as the American homeland is protected, the threat to retaliate with offensive nuclear weapons against the USSR becomes more credible. As a result, deterrence is enhanced. Consequently, one could argue that increased strategic stability will result. This situation, besides assuming perfect defenses and political leaders willing to risk their populations to achieve political ends, also

foresees limiting war to Europe - which, of course, is completely contrary to any definition of European security, and therefore no marketable alternative in Europe.

Defence only in the USA and in Europe:

The SDI initiative contained from the start a stated commitment to extend the 'shield' to cover the allies. In Europe this will involve a combination of boost-phase defenses from the overall systems and a series of terminal defenses based in Europe. The political coupling problem that besets the present relationship between the US and Europe will remain the same. The European reliance on US decisions will even increase. The employment of the defensive systems would involve a US decision, and the US may be reluctant to make this decision in a situation where the attack is directed only against Europe. Furthermore, the European feeling of security under the defensive shield, however unrealistic, may itself create problems in the relations between the US and Europe. The final element keeping European and US security interests on line has been the common threat from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, internal differences within the European countries will resurface, and we are already seeing the beginning of this in the French fears of German and Italian participation in the SDI research.

Defence covering only the superpowers

A scenario that brings out fear, insecurity and political anxiety is the prospect of both of the superpowers having some sort of defensive shield covering themselves but nobody else. In this situation deterrence between the superpowers is devoid of meaning, British and French nuclear deterrence will be useless against the Soviet Union and the demands for conventional deterrence will increase dramatically. Security in Europe will be tied to the possibility of Europe to defend itself against conventional attacks, and it will be impossible to do anything about a nuclear threat. Europe will in this situation become a hostage to the superpowers' differences, and will be the true theatre for confrontation. The superpowers will

feel secure and accordingly play out policy differences openly in the European scene. The situation will be highly unstable and will involve strong pressure towards an independent European security policy and probably European attempts to devise their own defensive systems.

Defence only in the USSR:

Finally, one could imagine the unlikely, but possible situation that only the Soviet Union possessed a defensive system. Obviously this scenario is part of the motivation behind the present American effort. In this situation the relationship between Europe and US will be under strong pressure for change. The present US guarantee and escalation dominance will be reduced, and Europe will have to provide for its security more independently. The situation will be highly unstable. Given the composition of the strategic forces, a Soviet capability to destroy incoming ICBMs would be less of a threat to the US nuclear force than the US threat is to the USSR strategic force. The USSR strategic forces have 70 per cent of their warheads on ICBMs whereas the corresponding US figure is 21 per cent. The possibility of the West placing Eastern Europe at risk and the possibility of circumvention plus the vulnerability of the USSR to embargo means that a Soviet defensive system would not in itself give the security background for achieving political goals through intimidation. The demands for substantial rearmament in Europe would, however, present themselves very strongly. Furthermore, the device effects on the NATO alliance would probably be very serious.

These scenarios are relevant to the present discussion in so far as they explain the fear that motivates discussions between the Europeans and between Europe and the US. A defensive scenario with the continuing existence of offensive weapons is more unstable than any other scenario imaginable including one where offensive weapons are continuously developed and deployed.⁶⁴

Evaluating the effect of the SDI on European security would include an assessment of the effect the SDI proposal has on the present East-West climate.

How does the SDI affect the arms control negotiations and the mutual attitudes between the superpowers? How does the SDI proposal affect the European perceptions of US interests and commitments vis-à-vis Europe, and what is the reaction from the public at large in the face of these prospects?

The research program that is started will have effects on the direction of research. The research funds allocated for other purposes will decrease or other governmental expenditures will suffer. The research program and the discussion of the SDI plans in itself also affects the relationship between different groups internally in the different states. The internal discussion within the US e.g. between the various branches of the armed services over the SDI proposals is a case in point. Similar cleavages will develop in Europe. Finally, the costs of the SDI proposal has already presented itself in terms of putting strain on the domestic consensus that was slowly being rebuilt inside the European countries, and between the US and Europe. The potential benefits are at present more imaginable than real, seen from a European perspective. It is possible that the SDI proposal induced the Soviet Union to return to the negotiation table in Geneva, but it will not induce them to arms control agreement when the SDI is non-negotiable. The political costs of the SDI are clearly seen. The benefits are hard to find. The SDI has already made Europe more dependent on the US and that in and of itself is part of the problem with the proposal.

Is, as many Europeans are now arguing, European independence an alternative to this situation?

It may appear more attractive to opt for European independence than it actually is. In the present situation the possibility for the Europeans to influence the direction of the strategic development between East and West is very small. The increase of European independence may further decrease European possibilities to influence the East-West debate. There is not a third way, and there is no such thing as regional European security in an insecure world.

However labourous and difficult the process may be, the only true solution to the European security problem is through common global security. The only definition of European security interest which will in the end be able to increase European security, is a definition building on global security. Europe can not achieve its security without involving itself directly in the security of other regions and first and foremost in the East-West relationship.

One of the possible ways that Europe may follow is the assertion of pressure that reduces superpower confrontation, and such a possibility may exist in firmly rejecting the SDI offer. The rejection itself will be difficult in that it runs counter to a long tradition. But acceptance will, as pointed out, increase Europe's dependence and increase strategic instability. The offensive-defensive race is not on yet, and may be stopped. Europe has a responsibility to the security of other regions, to the security of the global system to help stop a new arms race. The Nordic countries may be the place to start such an initiative due to the different affiliation of the Nordic countries. Since part of the rejection of the SDI obviously involves refraining the USSR from persuing a similar type of research and development, the Nordic countries may also present a bridge between East and West. The SDI at present is a stumbling block for arms control and confidence-building discussions, and if Europe removed itself from the SDI, the enthusiasm in both of the superpowers for an enormously expensive and probably ineffective space defensive system would probably wane.

What Europe should not do is to choose dependence once again. Dependence does not assure security, but neither does isolated independence in a strategically interdependent world.

- 1) See Michael Smith's excellent overview in his book, Western Europe and the United States, The Uncertain Alliance, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.
- 2) See Andrew J. Pierre, "Can Europe's Security be 'Decoupled' from America?", Foreign Affairs, 1973, pp. 761-777; and Alan Ned Sabrosky, "NATO: A House Divided?", Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, summer 1984, pp. 97-118.
- 3) See for one of many expressions of this Horst Ehmke, "Eine Politik zur Selbstbehauptung Europas", Europa-Archiv, Folge 7, 1984, pp. 195-204.
- 4) See Hans-Henrik Holm, U.S. and European Security: The Troublesome Coupling, mimeo 1984.
- 5) Defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP varies substantially within the NATO alliance. In 1982 Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain spent under 3 per cent of GNP; Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal send between 3 and 4 per cent; France and FRG spent between 4 and 5 per cent; Britain, Greece, Turkey and the USA spent more than 5 per cent of GNP on defence. See The Military Balance 1984-1985, IISS, London, 1984.
- 6) See Hans-Henrik Holm, Nikolaj Petersen (eds.), The European Missiles Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and Security Policy, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1983.
- 7) Secretary of State George Schultz in his speech at a Rand Conference, October 19, 1984 made this point. He said that harmony and confidence has been restored. Increasing consensus and widening agreement is what characterises the alliance today.
- 8) The US provided a strong external pressure for European independence. From the Marshall Aid and through the Atlantic partnership of the Kennedy administration to Kissinger's year of Europe various US administrations have themselves pressed for a united Europe. See Michael Smith, op.cit., pp. 103-116.
- 9) For a list of various of the proposals see Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1984.
- 10) See Peter Schlotter, "Reflections on European Security 2000", loc.cit., pp. 5-6.
- 11) See Horst Ehmke, op.cit., p. 199.
- 12) Laurence I. Barrett gives in Time, March 11, 1985 an account of 'How Reagan

Became a Believer'. According to this story it was the combination of Robert McFarlane and Edward Teller that made Reagan a believer.

- 13) See United States Military Posture for FY 1983, Washington D.C., 1982, p. 77. Accounts of the development of defensive technologies may be found in Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars, New York: Vintage, 1984. And in David Baker, The Shape of Wars to Come, New York: Stein and Day, 1984.
- 14) See Daniel O. Graham, We Must Defend America and Put an End to Madness, Chicago: Conservative Press, 1983.
- 15) President Ronald Reagan's speech on Defense Spending and Defense Technology, March 23, 1983.
- 16) See testimony before Senate subcommittee February 22, by the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, James Abrahamson.
- 17) Casper Weinberger, March 27, 1983. (Emphasis added).
- 18) A good example is the interview with Ronald Reagan published in Newsweek, March 8, 1985.
- 19) Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech.
- 20) See McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control", in Foreign Affairs, winter 1984-85, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 264-278.
- 21) See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow, Max M. Kampelman, "Search for Security: The Case for the Strategic Defense Initiative", International Herald Tribune, January 28, 1985.
- 22) The window of vulnerability debate refers to the critique against the SALT II accord that it gave the Soviets an advantage in landbased-ICBMs. President Reagan started his term by arguing for the necessity to change this. However, the START proposals and the Reagan approval of the Scowcroft commission report closed the window - until it resurfaced in the SDI-debate. See Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, pp. 304-305.
- 23) Edward Teller, "The Role of Space and Defense in the NATO Alliance" in NATO's Sixteen Nations, Nov. 1984, pp. 14-16. Gen. Edward Rowley, American START-negotiator, in his fight against the ABM treaty used the same

metaphor: "Two adversaries arm themselves with shields and spears, then agree to throw away the shields. But if one side starts making more and longer spears, then sooner or later the other side has to think seriously about retrieving its shields". Here quoted from Strobe Talbott, op.cit., p. 319. He points out that the trouble with this analogy is that shields can never deflect nuclear spears, and given the absence of limits on the number of spears the development of shields become fruitless.

The reuse of old analogies reflect that the SDI has turned into a continuation of the old ABM debate.

- 24) See Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment, A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984, pp. 70-72.
- 25) See Lawrence Freedmann, "NATO and the Strategic Defense Initiative", NATO's Sixteen Nations, Nov. 84, pp. 17-20. See also Report to the Congress on the SDI, April 1985, p. A-7.
- 26) See Edward Teller, op.cit.
- 27) See Paine and Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition", Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, pp. 819-42, in particular p. 840.
- 28) See The Strategic Defense Initiative, Defensive Technologies Study, DOD, March 1984.
- 29) See George A. Keyworth, The Case for Strategic Defense: An Option for a World Disarmed, Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 30-44, and Ronald Reagan, Remarks of the President to the National Space Club Luncheon, March 19, 1985.
- 30) Fred S. Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security, FSSS, 1983, quote from p. 3.
- 31) IISS, Strategic Survey, 1984-85, London 1985, p. 14.
- 32) Paul H. Nitze, On the Road to A More Stable Peace, Speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, February 20, 1985.
- 33) See Holger H. Mey, "Technologie der Raketabwehr", Osterr. Milit. Zeitschrift, Heft 6, 1984. See also a series of articles in the International Herald Tribune: Weapons in Space, March 1985.

- 34) For a technical assessment see Sidney Drell et al., op.cit., pp. 39-63. The conclusion of this study as well as that of others like the Scowcroft Commission is that we do not know how to build an effective defense against strategic ballistic missiles, and a truly effective system is not conceivable.
- 35) See Helmut Schmidt, "Saving the Western Alliance", The New York Review of Books, May 31, 1984, pp. 25-27.
- 36) Lawrence Freedman, op.cit.
- 37) See Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., op.cit. The argument that deterrence is also protection and therefore there is no difference between the two views is false. Obviously Ronald Reagan by protection means a protective shield covering the 'soil' not just the weapons.
- 38) The NATO debate is summarised in the following articles: Stanley R. Sloan, "In Search of a New Transatlantic Bargain"; William Wallace, "European Defence Co-Operation: The Reopening Debate" both in Survival, Vol. 26, No. 6, Nov. 1984. And Phil Williams, "The Nun Amendment, Burden Sharing and US Troops in Europe", in Survival, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan. 1985.
- 39) See Joseph Kraft, "Observe the Fine Print in the SDI Support", The International Herald Tribune, Feb. 23-24, 1985. And Terence A. Todman, The Reality Behind "Star Wars", Address to the American Club, Copenhagen, May 8, 1985.
- 40) Arms Control Today, Vol. 14, No. 6, July-August 1984. See also Report to the Congress: S.D.I., 1985, App. B. Here it is stressed that the US may withdraw from the treaty, and that an agreement on offensive arms limitation is a precondition for maintaining the ABM-regime.
- 41) Loc.cit., pp. 8-9.
- 42) See The Economist, Feb. 16, 1985, "Europe is reluctant to reach for the stars". See also Report to Congress: SDI, 1985, op.cit., App. A.
- 43) See the Economist, "A Patriot for Europe", Jan. 12, 1985.
- 44) Lawrence Freedman, op.cit.
- 45) See Keesing Contemporary Archives, 1983.

- 46) See the account in Jürgen Scheffran, "Schutzschirm oder Falle für Europa? Zur Debatte in der NATO über Weltraumrüstung und Raketenabwehr", Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 6, 1984, pp. 657-677.
- 47) The NATO Communique, NPG, April 4, 1984.
- 48) See International Herald Tribune, Feb. 22, 1985.
- 49) Colin Gray, Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible", Foreign Policy, No. 39, 1980, pp. 14-28.
- 50) The defensive system capability obviously increases if command and control facilities and ICBMs are hit in a first strike. This makes the SDI provocative and therefore increases the incentive of the USSR to preempt in a situation where war is likely. See Bernd Greiner, "Zwanzig Argumente gegen den "Krieg der Sterne"", Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, 1985, Nr. 3, p. 275, and Peter A. Clausen, "SDI in Search of a Mission", World Policy Journal, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 249-270.
- 51) See Peter Jenkins, "Star Spangled Banner", Guardian, Feb. 27, 1985.
- 52) The warning time will be so short that the defensive systems will have to be triggered automatically without any political decision-making.
- 53) See The International Herald Tribune, March 16, 1985, and The Guardian, March 16, 1985.
- 54) See Mitterand's speech to the Parliament in the Haag, Feb. 7, 1984. See also Jürgen Scheffran, "Die Europäische Weltraumgemeinschaft - Aufbruch in die Zukunft", Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 2, 1985, pp. 169-185.
- 55) See Politique Etrangère, no. 2, 1984, pp. 377-380.
- 56) See Der Spiegel, Nr. 15, 1985, pp. 21-23.
- 57) See Jonathan Dean, Will NATO survive Ballistic Missile Defense?, mimeo, Washington, March 1985, pp. 13-15.
- 58) See Jürgen Scheffran, op.cit.
- 59) See Kohls statement in his speech to the Annual Congress of the Christian Democratic Party, March 20, 1985.

- 60) See Theo Sommer, "Der Wink mit dem Raketen-Zaunpfahl", Die Zeit, 22. Feb. 1985. See also E.P. Thompson, "The Ideologica Delirium which strikes chords in the worst traditions of American Populism", The Guardian, Feb. 18, 1985.
- 61) See Jürgen Scheffran, "Ist die Militarisierung des Weltraums noch aufzuhalten", Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 10, 1984, pp. 1167-1183. And Der Spiegel, 1985, Nr. 15, p. 21.
- 62) See Pierre Lellouche, "The Star-Crossed Star Wars Plan", in Newsweek, March 4, 1985.
- 63) See Sidney Drell et al., op.cit.
- 64) See Charles Krauthammer, "Will Star Wars Kill Arms Control", New Republic, Jan. 21, 1985, pp. 12-16. In Paul E. Gallis, Mark M. Lowenthal and Marcia S. Smith, The Strategic Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy, CRS report 85-48F, Washington 1985, three different scenarios are discussed: A U.S. lead in SDI, a Soviet lead in SDI, and a close mutual cooperation.

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EUROPE - DÉTENTE - CSCE

1975 - 1985

- points of departure for research

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1 Introduction

Since the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, considerable changes have taken place in the relations between the participating states. The Final Act of the CSCE was signed in an atmosphere in which the high point of détente between the greatpowers had already been passed. A cooling of greatpower relations was already discernible at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977 and was clearly visible after the events in Afghanistan, when the United States refused to ratify the SALT II treaty.

The cooling of greatpower relations has placed the European states in a complicated position. Détente, which opened up new prospects for European security and cooperation, has been sorely tested by the events in Afghanistan and Poland and the deployment of new weapons systems in Europe. Both economic interests and public opinion in many Western European countries call for a continuation of the policy of détente, however. For the European states, the CSCE process has also involved a psychological factor. On the one hand the meagreness of results and dependence on the greatpowers has caused frustration, but on the other hand the CSCE has kept alive hope in the possibility of finding a European security solution.

During the past ten years the CSCE has changed. In the initial phase of the conference, the most important issue for the European states concerned the approval of principles and rules concerning the recognition of the contemporary situation in Europe. The issue of human rights and "human contacts" played a central role at the Belgrade follow-up meeting. At the Madrid meeting the focus appeared to shift once again to "basket 1" matters, but with emphasis being placed on confidence-building measures and disarmament.

This paper attempts to find methodological points of reference for an examination of the entity formed by the states participating in the CSCE, particularly in the field of security. Issues include methods for controlling conflicts and cooperation. Another issue concerns institutions linked to European security in the broad sense and their creation and development during the CSCE process. The paper is more a theoretical and methodological exercise on the basis of existing research than a study based on empirical data.

2 The international system, Europe and détente

2.1 The term system

The term system is part of the standard vocabulary of political research, although its meaning varies from one study to another. Singer distinguishes two predominant approaches to the system concept. One of these Singer calls the "system of action" school and the other the "system of entities" school.¹ In the former case the "social system" is defined on the basis of interaction between the entities (beings) which comprise it, while in the latter case the "social system" is defined on the basis of these entities. In the system of action approach, the units of analysis are action, behaviour, interaction, relation or role. In the system of entities approach, the units are the social beings comprising the system.²

Singer's division can be made clearer by noting that the system of entities comes quite clear to equating the concepts of system and structure. In this case the system equals its structure. The system of action, on the other hand, emphasizes the system's structural properties. Following Giddens's theory of structuration, it can be said that the system of action provides an opportunity to study the structuration of the international system. Attention is drawn to how the international system is created and reproduced in interaction

between states by the application of developing rules and available means in circumstances shaped by unforeseen results. The structure of the international system is not only a barrier to action, but also its outcome and medium.³

In international political research the system of action focuses on interaction between states. Through its modes and means, phenomena linked to the international system and their background causes are studied. Tension reflects the state of affairs based on perceptions which exists between states in the international system. Tension grows out of threat perceptions involving other states' actions, intended actions or goals. Détente and the CSCE as part of this process are studied as a series of events as a result of which states' comprehension of one another's actions weakens as a tension-creating factor. Détente includes a learning process which cannot be directly reduced to the state's capability to promote its interests.⁴ Tension and détente are factors linked to states' actions.

The system of entities focuses research on states' foreign and security policy, studying states' goals and capability to carry out these goals. Research objects include national interest and military, political and economic power.⁵ Tension is a result of different states' contradictory intentions and ends, whose achievement is influenced by available means. Tension arises between states to the extent that they expect conflict behaviour from one another.⁶ Tension is directly proportional to the contradiction between states' goals and power resources. Détente signifies a process which reduces tension. It consists of an adjustment of states' ends and power resources in such a way that expectations concerning the opponent's conflict behaviour are reduced, mistrust involving actions is lessened and predictability is increased.

The division based on the different meaning of the term system concerns the emphasis of research. While the system of action focuses on communication and power relations, the system of entities focuses on goals and power relations. In the system of action the basis for communication and power is the state's power resources. Similarly the system of entities requires communication and interaction for the utilization of power resources to promote goals. Examination of détente from the system of action viewpoint appears fruitful. It points to a change in the international system which is deeper than the change in any single state's goals and power resources. Changes in interaction indicate structural changes in the international system.⁷

2.2 The term power

The definition of power advanced by the realist school leads to an examination of the attributes of power. The basis for power is regarded as being the state's population, natural resources, geographical position, level of development etc. Power is expressed in military, political and economic forms. One of the characteristics of power is its manifestation in different power relations, e.g. in relationships of submission and dependence or in some type of hierarchy.⁸

When the point of departure is the system formed by states' actions, it is not fruitful to examine the basis of power or the power of some particular actor. Instead, the use of power can be viewed as a way in which certain actions direct other actions, which may arise in the present or the future. Power exists only when it is put in action. The relationship of power is not the difference between the power resources of the actors. A relationship of power is a form of action which is not directly aimed at others. Instead it is aimed at others' actions, either presently in progress or liable to occur immediately or in the future.⁹

A relationship of power can be articulated only when two necessary conditions exist: 1) the subject of power is and remains free to act, 2) the field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions remains open.¹⁰ The first condition refers to the experiencing of the use of power as legitimate, which means an acceptance of the relationship of power and submission to it, but not its justification. Military occupation and slavery, for example, do not include a relationship of power; the attitude of the subject of constraint has no significance. The second condition refers to both the legitimacy of the use of power and its generality. Legitimacy requires that the use of power allows the subject opportunities for action. In order for the use of power to direct other actors' actions, it must be generalized, i.e. it cannot be based on the threat of just one type of punishment.¹¹

2.3 Power in the international system

Anarchy in the international system is generally defined as the absence of any dominating power holder among states.¹² Each state is on the basis of sovereignty free to protect its own interests. Sovereignty and anarchy constitute the opposite sides of the same political phenomenon, since each demand for sovereignty expressed by states automatically defines their relations as anarchistic.¹³

According to the realist school, power constitutes an organizing principle in the area of international relations. Power relations determine the state's position in the international system. Power relations are created as a result of states' actions toward one another. The international system involves a decentralized political order in which the actors belonging to the system have little authority. An anarchic system can vary in terms of characteristics from rough and conflicting to developed and stable.¹⁴

In the system of entities the examination of power directs attention to the distribution of power within the system and the dynamics of the system. According to the realist school's definition, the structure of the international system is equal to the distribution of power within the system.¹⁵ The dynamics of relations between states is determined from the point of view of the totality of international relations.¹⁶ The dynamics of relations between states includes, for example, the maintenance of the balance of power.

In the system of action, power relations arising from interaction between states crystallize to form a power structure. All the states in the international system are the subjects of the system in that the system's power structure directs their actions. Within this power structure they nevertheless have different opportunities for action, which can lead to a change in the power structure and the international system.

The examination of power can be linked to three different elements or the network of relations in interaction between states. Firstly, relationships of communication transfer information by means of language or some other symbolic medium. Relationships of communication refer to actors' perceptions concerning their environment, more precisely foreign policy leaders' perceptions concerning the state's operating environment. Secondly, objective capability is associated with real objects such as military and economic potential. Objects influencing the security of the international system include weapons systems, for example. Thirdly, relationships of power represent control through actions aimed at others, by means of inequality or constraint. In the international system, relationships of power are represented by alliance relations and the relationships between alliances, for example. The above-mentioned elements are in practice intermeshed and use each other as methods to achieve ends.¹⁷

The crystallized form of power relations arising from states' interaction, the power structure, contains the international system's means and techniques of control. Military threat and armament to maintain it are the most important techniques for controlling the international system. Weapons ensure the maintenance of order. Different ways of using political and economical rewards and sanctions and even prestige can serve as techniques for controlling the international system.

2.4 Europe and the international system

The point of departure is the international system created after the Second World War with regard to the European states as well as the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada. After the war most of the world's states joined alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Order in the international system was based on military threat and armament. This arrangement was called the bipolar international system. In the case of the European states, the dynamics of the international system has been studied a great deal by examining the tightening of alliance contacts or polarization and the position of neutral states in this framework.¹⁸ This definition in the international system has been regarded not only as a theory, but also as a world view or paradigm whose rise is linked to the Cold War period.¹⁹

After the Second World War the victors determined the rules for forming the international system. The grouping of European states into alliances and neutral and non-aligned countries represented the crystallized power structure of the post-war international system. An essential question for research is whether détente and particularly the CSCE process represent a type of interaction between states leading to a change in the international system. If this is the case, does this change mean only a replacement of a technique of control based on military threat with some other method or does it

also affect the system's units, alliances and states?

The operationalizations required for research can be made with the help of the following questions: In what way are states differentiated in the field of détente and European security? What types of goals have states had with regard to détente and security? What means of producing power relations have states used in connection with détente? What forms of institution- alization have European security questions in the broad sense produced during détente? What is the degree of rationaliza- tion of the manifestations of power relations?

3 Operationalization options

3.1 Modes of differentiation between states

Modes of differentiation between states refer to states' hier- archy in the international system at a given moment. Modes of differentiation describe the power structure and relationships of power which determine the order of importance of issues to be decided. In the case of European security questions, this brings up interaction between states which determines forums and methods of solution. Issue areas under study include political and military détente. Forums in the area of pol- itical détente include negotiations and measures aimed at increasing security. In the field of military détente, forums include arms limitation, arms control and disarmament negotia- tions and efforts to arrange negotiations.

Breslauer has noted that the success of détente was based on the following facts: 1) matters concerning European security were not located in the area of great power rivalry or coopera- tion, 2) Europe and arms control were matters which did not question the greatpowers' equal position, 3) European arms control had high priority, 4) European security and trade had a rather stable framework, 5) the greatpowers' control over

the European states was much greater than monitoring aimed at the Third World, 6) agreements were not as "binding" as Third World conflicts and they focused on the easiest component of matters.²⁰ Breslauer divides states into two groups, with the Soviet Union and the United States in the first group and other states in the second. The power structure of the international system is formed on the basis of the relation between the superpowers. The greatpowers decide methods and forums for solving issues and the order of importance of issues.

3.2 The goals of states' actions

The goals of states' actions can refer to their explicitly stated foreign policy objectives or states' "real" goals as revealed by research. Détente has been studied from both points of view. Frei and Ruloff begin with the assumption that the important thing is what the actors involved think is real. This leads to an examination of states' actions as their leadership sees them without prior theory concerning the goals of states' actions.²¹ Goldmann, on the other hand, examines states' goals as revealed by research. The setting of goals is also influenced by domestic factors on which foreign policy is based.²²

A change in states' "identity" may affect their goals and strategy for achieving them. A changing concept of states' role in international relations leads to changes in foreign affairs. According to Goldmann, domestic factors may act as stabilizers of détente in such cases as the FRG and the Soviet Union. In the United States détente was seen as a stronger negator of fundamental beliefs and values and détente did not achieve an established position.²³ In George's view as well, foreign policy leaders must obtain legitimacy for their actions in order to achieve goals. Policy must be in harmony with citizens' basic values. Leaders must show that they understand the world situation sufficiently well in order to

be able to influence the course of events within the framework of available resources. Legitimacy has both a normative and a cognitive basis. George considers the break-down of détente to be due to a loss of legitimacy as a result of the Soviet Union's actions.²⁴

Research can seek references to changes in states' "identity" from such texts insofar as their existence can be judged from changes in states' actions. In this case it is also possible to clarify the nature of the goals on which these actions are based, i.e. whether actions are based on fundamental goals or goals linked to a desired state of affairs.

3.3 Means of producing power relations

The most typical means of producing power relations is military threat. Manifestations of the existence of military threat include the division of states into alliances, but also alliances' internal division into different types of states with regard to dependency relations. In East-West relations, military threat produces power relations in the form of participation in armament and military cooperation as well as arms control and disarmament. With regard to European security, one can ask what role the new weapons systems deployed in Europe play in the formation of power relations between states. One can also ask whether confidence-building measures influence power relations in a crystallizing manner by making military threat "safer".²⁵

Another means of producing power relations is economic in nature. After the Second World War the European states formed alliances economically as well as politically. The integration race led to institutional forms represented by the EEC and the CMEA.²⁶ With détente, states' contacts in the economic area have changed their form. Both Western European integration and the CMEA countries' desire to increase econ-

omic ties with the West are signs of new interaction between states in the economic field.²⁷ One example of actions crystallizing the power structure is the economic sanctions which the nations of the Western Alliance placed on the Soviet Union after the events in Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland.

Neutral and non-aligned countries have few means of changing power relations. One can nevertheless think that they strive by means of international agreements and multilateral diplomacy to influence power relations. This idea is supported by the observation that the neutral and non-aligned countries' point of view during the CSCE process has strongly emphasized the issues of disarmament, security, conflicts and peace.²⁸

3.4 The institutionalization of power relations

An historical example of the institutionalization of power relations is the United Nations Security Council, in which permanent membership belongs to the former and current great powers with the exception of Germany and Japan. Both military alliances and economic associations represent the institutionalization of power relations. In addition to various types of alliances and organizations, power relations can take the form of law or be manifested in established habits, be crystallized in agreements or organizations or form looser frameworks of action.

The CSCE as an institution constitutes one form of the institutionalization of power relations. Although the era of détente has given way to an era of international tension, the CSCE still goes on. An essential question is whether the CSCE constitutes a code of guiding and directing actions which can be considered an attempt to remodel power relations.²⁹

The concept of a regime is close to a code of guiding and

directing. In American research a regime is defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations".³⁰

Seen from the viewpoint of the system of action, a regime represents one form of the institutionalization of action which includes aspirations with regard to power. One can imagine that the regularity, discipline, authority and purpose signified by a regime are based on something else besides military threat. A regime would thus represent a new method of control in the international system. Furthermore, a regime includes the crystallized power relations resulting from the interaction aimed at forming it. In this respect a regime implies not only voluntary cooperation, but expediency in the maintenance of power relations.

With regard to détente and the CSCE it is of interest whether states' interaction implies the creation of a regime for handling matters related to European security. Are there any apparatuses, forms of cooperation, methods of observation, verification agreements etc. on the basis of which a control system or systems would appear to exist?

3.5 Degrees of rationalization of power relations

Détente is often explained by saying that high-level tension and the Cold War system became irrational for one reason or another. The slipping of the great powers toward nuclear war, the maintenance and development of enormous military potential etc. are often regarded as reasons for the fact that the costs of maintaining the international system in a state of rigid confrontation became excessive for the greatpower blocs. Different explanation models strive to show that détente is advantageous either for the socialist countries or for the Western Alliance nations.³¹

The degree of rationalization of power relations refers to the action necessary to achieve relationships of power. The rationalization of power relations depends on the effectiveness of the means of power and the reliability of the results of action and their relation to possible costs. In brief the rationalization of power relations depends on the relation between the costs of achieving and maintaining power relations and the benefits to be gained from them. From the point of view of research it is of interest whether expectations involved in détente concerning a change in power relations in a more rational direction have proved to be correct.

4 European security: forums and regimes

The following section examines, on the basis of the literature, how the European states differ from one another in certain forums of détente and how the institutional solutions included in détente can be analytically described from the point of view of changes in power relations.

4.1 Europe and forums of détente

As a result of interaction between states, the international power structure and power relations subject to constant change determine states' significance and weight in the international system at any moment. The totality comprising states' foreign and security policies determines each state's position in relation to other actors. The hierarchy of states in the international system thus describes different states' relation to the international system's communication events, its real objects and power relations at a given time.

Action between states includes not only bilateral interaction but also coordinated forms of interaction which are usually called multilateral diplomacy. Multilateral negotiation pro-

cesses developing on the basis of different issues compose forums. Usually forums are seen merely as negotiation processes. On the other hand, forums are both signs of a change in the international system and elements in this change. Forums are more than just negotiation processes. They include forms of social action between states which by regulating communication events, influencing real objects such as weapons systems and being reflecting both within alliances and between them help determine change in the international system.

Forums included in détente, under the concept of security, include the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) negotiations in Vienna and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in its different stages. European security questions are also discussed at regional forums such as talks concerning a Nordic nuclear-free zone and negotiations concerning a Balkan nuclear-free zone.

In individual forums differentiation between states takes place on the basis of 1) the right of participation, 2) the choice of issues to be settled and 3) methods of solution. These can also be examined from the point of view of the intermeshing of forums. Evaluation focuses on a) the order of forums with relation to each other and b) the formation of forums in the areas of political, military and economic détente.

The right of participations not only describe states' legal position in relation to forums, but also determine more broadly states' possibility to participate in interaction shaping the power structure of the international system. In this sense participation rights manifest power relations between states. In the literature participation rights are often studied from this point of view. The basis for talks aimed at limiting and controlling strategic weapons is generally considered the establishment of strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet

Union and the United States in the 1960s. The greatpowers' bilateral SALT talks differentiated the basic dimension of the power structure of this system from other interaction between states. At the same time the greatpowers recognized each other's equality in the area of strategic nuclear weapons.³²

The right to participate in the Mutual Force Reduction talks is based on military presence in Central Europe, i.e. in the area of the Benelux nations and the Federal Republic of Germany among NATO countries and the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia among the countries of the Warsaw Pact. A total of nineteen states have participated in these talks. Participation rights are based on the military power of the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact but are also connected to concepts of security interests within the alliances.³³

The right to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is based on the principle of equality between states. All thirty-five participants were, at least formally, willing to respect the idea of a conference of individual equal states. Within détente the CSCE is an exceptional forum because it offers all European states an opportunity to bring up matters regarding security and cooperation from their own point of view. According to the literature, differentiation between states goes on within the CSCE and is influenced by different issue areas and the way they are treated at different stages of the CSCE process. One might ask in what way the principle of states' equal participation has influenced the shaping of the different stages of the CSCE and the emphasizing of different issue areas at the conference.³⁴

The right to participate in solutions involving nuclear-free zones is regarded as being determined either on the basis of joining the zone or on the basis of repercussions which the zone has on the security interests of other states. The latter approach links the formation of the zone and joining it

with other disarmament, arms limitation and control solutions decided at other forums.³⁵

The selection of issues to be settled and agreement on the way they will be handled includes three elements: A) a communication structure which provides a common language and on this basis an understanding as to the issues to be settled, B) real objects of discussion and associated issues and C) issues to be left out of discussions and associated real objects. These are intermeshed with one another in the political and diplomatic practice associated with the creation of forums.

The choice of issues settled in the CSCE Final Act was guided by the bilateral agreements reflecting the lessening of tension in Europe which preceded it. The choice of issues to be settled was guided by problems inherited from the final solution of the Second World War, the settling of which made it possible to draw up principles guiding relations between states in a final document.³⁶ As far as the CSCE is concerned, it remains to be seen how the participating states will implement the Final Act and what development will take place in the area of confidence-building measures.³⁷ Research findings concerning speeches made during the CSCE process support the idea that relations between states have retained their central role on the conference agenda.³⁸

In contrast with the CSCE, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks emphasize the significance of creating a closed communication structure. The tight isolation of the talks has made flexibility and compromises possible.³⁹ In connection with SALT I the greatpowers' communication contacts were institutionalized by establishing a permanent consultative committee to decide disagreements and seek new means of limiting strategic weapons. The problem of forward based systems (FBS) illustrate the selection of issues to be settled when it comes to objects to be included in and left out of talks.⁴⁰ The question of for-

ward based systems in connection with SALT appears to demonstrate not only the United States' desire to coordinate its negotiation policy with its allies but also its wish to keep power relations within NATO as before.

The deadlocking of the MFR talks over the quantity of forces in Central Europe is seen in the literature as a sign of the difficulty in harmonizing differing concepts of military balance. This is due to the alliances' different deterrence warfare strategy, which is manifested in different military systems.⁴¹

Methods of settling issues link forums to means of producing power relations and the institutionalization of power relations. The view has been presented, for example, that the United States has attempted to tie strategic nuclear armament talks to the Soviet Union's policy in the Third World.⁴² On the other hand the United States is regarded as having striven to abandon institutionalized solutions agreed during the era of détente and revert to control of the international system based on military superiority.⁴³ Both views emphasize the possession of nuclear weapons as a means of producing a power structure in the international system.

In the case of the CSCE solution methods were initially concentrated on determining principles of action between states.⁴⁴ After the Madrid follow-up meeting the CSCE has entered a new phase in which the emphasis has shifted from principles of action to the achievement of gradual change through confidence-building measures and in this way progress toward disarmament in Europe. Both aligned and non-aligned states are participating in the solution of security issues at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), so a larger number of special security policy interests are brought out. The CDE also serves as a forum for discussing national issues within military alliances which could not be brought up in

bilateral contacts.⁴⁵

The right of participating, the choice of issues to be settled and the way in which decisions are made can also be examined from the point of view of links between forums. The point of departure for evaluation is détente as a coherent phenomenon which creates a series of negotiation processes, a kind of network of forums, in which individual forums are related not only to events in international politics but also to one another. The order of forums and its formation illustrate change in power relations between states.

The formation of forums dealing with European security has been affected by the development of weapons systems, e.g. intermediate-range nuclear missiles and the increase in the destructive power of conventional weapons, which for their part are reflected in pressures for change in military doctrines. Discussion has brought out the need to link different forums, such as those involving strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. In addition, proposals for individual political solutions such as refraining from the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons and collective security solutions involving Europe as a whole have been presented.⁴⁶

The examination of the network of forums also draws attention to links between different areas of détente, i.e. political, military and economic détente. One can for example ask whether political détente is a precondition for military détente and whether increased cooperation in the economic area is tied to political and military tension in Europe.

4.2 Regimes as a mode of institutionalizing power relations

The view has been presented that détente reflects both conflict and cooperation between East and West. During the era

of détente a body of rules and principles took shape to guide practical politics. Expectations and disappointments concerning détente are based on the interpretation of these rules and principles in evaluating the actions of other states. The drawing up of norms formulated in different forums and bilateral interaction makes them a measure of states' goals. States' foreign policy leaders evaluated political goals in relation to rules of conduct approved in the international system.⁴⁷

The totality formed by the above-mentioned principles and rules is called a code of conduct in the literature. The rules it contains are political or law-like in nature. The formulation of a code of conduct calls for a consensus between actors. Mutual understanding is based on states' foreign policy leaders' observations concerning the environment. According to this approach, the totality of principles and rules only tells what lines of action the actors have agreed on through negotiations or implicitly. Different action strategies affect the formation of the code more than the structural characteristics of the international system.⁴⁸

The concept of a regime has also been used as an analytical concept for explaining states' actions. A regime is defined as a set of principles and norms from which rules and decision-making procedures can be deduced in certain areas of international relations.⁴⁹ The creation of a regime is linked to actors' observations concerning their environment. The creation of security regimes first of all requires the greatpowers' willingness to form a regime and secondly confidence in common values in the areas of security and cooperation.⁵⁰ The dynamics of regimes is tied to actors' observations concerning the environment, on which mutual understanding concerning goals and means of achieving them are based.⁵¹

According to Keohane, cooperation between states maintains

regimes although their creation may depend on the hegemony of one state in the international system. A change in the structure of the system does not lead to the end of cooperation efforts; instead, states strive to adjust their conflicting interests by means of joint institutions. Regimes are created to overcome the difficulties which otherwise would prevent useful solutions between states. At the same times regimes decrease insecurity and limit asymmetry associated with the availability of information. For this reason regimes are also persistent. States find it worthwhile to reshape existing regimes instead of rejecting unsatisfactory ones.⁵²

From the viewpoint of the power structure of the international system, a regime forms an intermediate concept between decision makers' observations and the systems' structural properties.⁵³ Regimes are man-made arrangements, social institutions, whose purpose is to regulate conflicts in a framework of interdependence. The purpose of regimes is to create orders of rank among actors. The order refers to the benefits which the regime produces. The system is the totality in which action toward order takes place.⁵⁴ One can thus think of regimes as being linked to the power structure of the international system, as being methods and techniques for its control.

The formation of regimes connected with European security can be examined on the basis of two different questions. First of all one can ask whether the era of *détente* produced a set of principles and norms as well as rules and decision-making forms based on them which create one or more regimes. Another question is connected to the relation between efforts to form regimes and the power structure. Do the solutions included in *détente* demonstrate an effort toward new types of methods and techniques of control to ensure the security of the states of Europe?

One can find signs of the development of principles and norms and also rules and decision-making forms in détente between the greatpowers. Among the former is the Basic Principles Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States which was signed in 1972. This agreement does not, however, include rules for its practical implementation.⁵⁵ In practice the SALT I treaty recorded the principle of equality between the greatpowers, since it confirmed the existence of nuclear balance. SALT also included rules concerning verification of nuclear weapons systems covered by the treaty and the interpretation of agreements. On the other hand, SALT left open the question of the continuation of armament qualitatively through the development of weapons systems.⁵⁶

In the Mutual Force Reduction negotiations the original starting point of both alliances was the reduction of forces in Central Europe by maintaining the status quo at the minimum level of military force. The main problem in the negotiations has been a disagreement concerning the definition of military balance.⁵⁷ The dispute concerning the principle of maintaining balance has taken concrete form in the question of the strength of forces in Central Europe. The principle of balance is also connected to disagreement concerning the procedure for monitoring force reductions and movements in the area covered by the negotiations. The development of weapons systems is undermining efforts to define balance in the MFR talks. The introduction of new nuclear weapons systems and the increase in the range and destructive power of conventional weapons change the content of the concept of balance and the military doctrines on the basis of which balance is defined.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is regarded as including a plan concerning how the principle of refraining from the use of force can in practice be changed in international dealings into positive actions and

rules to determine approved constraints.⁵⁸ The three baskets of the Final Act and the principles and recommendations they include are seen as modes of applying the principle of refraining from the use of force. There is little research concerning how the principles of the CSCE and the rules based on them act in relations between states. According to Goldmann, in crisis situations, such as in connection with the events in Poland, it is of consequence whether or not détente has become established in the sides' policies in the same way.⁵⁹ The formation of a regime would thus be linked to the shift from emphasis on military force to political or economic sanctions, for example.

From the point of view of a regime, the evolution of the CSCE includes the question of the European power structure which the signing of the Final Act de facto confirmed and the processes of change which influence European security. The principles of the CSCE Final Act are by nature political and law-like, and monitoring of their implementation takes place at follow-up meetings. On the other hand the confidence-building measures discussed at the European Disarmament Conference (CDE) are to be directly implemented and are binding on the parties. In the case of confidence-building measures the Final Act also includes a so-called evolution clause according to which measures will - voluntarily - be developed and expanded later on. From the point of view of the institutionalization of the solution of European security problems, it is a matter of importance what type of position the disarmament conference receives in the CSCE process and how it is linked to the arms reduction talks in Vienna, for example.⁶⁰

NOTES

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- 4) Fitsch-Bournazel, Renate 1979, 37.
- 5) Concerning the difficulty involved in defining national interest, see Rosenau, James N. 1980, 282-293.
- 6) Goldmann, Kjell 1973, 19.
- 7) Rosenau, James N. 1980, 267-270.
- 8) Goldmann, Kjell 1979, 9-35.
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- 32) Bygov, Oleg 1982, 77-78; Blacker, Coit D. 1983, 122; Nerlich, Uwe 1980, 32-33.
- 33) The Stanford Arms Control Group 1984, 269-299; Ruehl, Lothar 1982, 6-10.
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- 36) Apunen, Osmo 1978, 6.
- 37) Möttölä, Kari 1984, 5-6.
- 38) Frei, Daniel & Ruloff, Dieter *ibid.*
- 39) The Stanford Arms Control Group 1984, 228.
- 40) Nerlich, Uwe 1983, 31-48.
- 41) Ruehl, Lothar 1982, 28-36.
- 42) The Stanford Arms Control Group 1984, 267-276; Apunen, Osmo 1981, 45-46.
- 43) Bygov, Oleg 1982, 87.
- 44) Apunen, Osmo 1978, 5-21.

- 45) Möttölä, Kari 1984, 59.
- 46) Neidle, Alan F. 1982, xiii-xxxiv; Bundy, McGeorge et al. 1982, 753-768; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982, 138-176.
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- 50) Jervis, Robert 1982, 360-362.
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FORUM HUMANUM PROJECT



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SECURITY IN EUROPE:DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
FACTORS OF THE SECURITY ISSUE-AREA POLITICIZATION

Pierangelo Isernia

I. INTRODUCTION

This essay analyzes the international and domestic factors which can explain the growing "politicization" of security and defence issues in Western Europe. Politicization means that an issue or issue-area - in our case western Europe security - gains a primary role on the political agenda of a country or a set of countries, so as to question the border-limits and the rules of the game on which such an issue-area rests. This analysis is conducted within the wider framework of a research project on long-term scenarios of the international political system.

The essay is articulated in four parts. The first part briefly presents the general methodological framework of the research project of which this paper is a product. The second part shows a theoretical model of the international system and of the dynamic between political system and international politics. This model is used, in the third part, to interpret the evolution of western european security matters. The fourth and last part depicts some possible evolutions of this issue-area in light of four alternative scenarios of the international political system.

This research starts from the theoretical perspective of hegemonic stability, enriching it with the analysis of interpenetration between domestic structure and international system. The growing political interdependence has, especially in advanced industrialized countries, lead to a progressive blurring of the two spheres. Therefore the traditional realist paradigm is less and less apt to understand and explain the structural evolution of international relations. First,

because the structural distribution of power and capabilities is not exclusively affected by military considerations but also by so many domestic and international factors, that is impossible to predict the outcomes without taking them into account. Secondly, because it is precisely in matters of military and political security that the blurring distinction between domestic and international politics has its more important consequences.

II. THE RESEARCH'S METHODOLOGY

The Forum Humanum Project's research on "The Factors of Peace in the World Community" aims at building up a spectrum of alternative, long-term, scenarios of the international political system and some specific regional contexts, in order to make some well-grounded policy analysis. Our effort has been to articulate a theoretical model, though still tentative and imperfect, drawing upon the literature existing in those matters, and to utilize it in order to build some alternative scenarios. In other words, we have worked out a model - partially formalized - and utilized it to put forward some "if...then" form reasoned conjectures.

Scenario analysis is a detailed description of a sequence of events pertinent to trend-hypotheses about a given phenomenon, showing the implications of different lines of action. We have utilized two kinds of scenarios:

- extrapolative ones, which attempt to find out the possible and probable trends and consequences of every analyzed dimension;

- project-building ones, which, moving according to an opposite logic, attempt to find the necessary and suitable conditions to realize the desired goals.

The scenarios make easy to articulate several hypotheses, to compare their mutual relationships and to assess their reciprocal internal coherence. In this first effort of research we preferred to address ourselves to deep the validity and mutual coherence of the theoretical hypotheses, in order to set forth some qualified propositions on the evolution of those variables, rather than to focus on the empirical investigation of the model. Therefore, this limit has to be taken into account.

We proceeded in such a way:

- (1) Determining a "cone" of alternative images of the future, through a Matrix of Images.

This Matrix describes a spectrum of alternative images of the international system, logically plausible. It has been construed combining together two different dimensions: Worldviews and Profiles of the Future.

- The Worldviews are different cognitive, evaluative and instrumental structure through which we "look at" international relations
- The Profiles of the future are the key-variables around which each Worldview build up its images of the future.

We have pointed out four main Worldviews on international politics: Geopolitical, Rationalistic-Illuministic, Ecological-Libertarian and Fundamentalist; and two Profiles of the future: conflict and security.

- (2) Working out a Model of the present structure of the international system.

This is the model by which we have built the different scenarios. Our specific interest was to explain the domestic and international factors which produce specific foreign policies for different sets of nations. Our analysis therefore focused on two different level of analysis:

- The systemic level, with particular reference to the hierarchic structure of the system after the Second World War;
- The Domestic structure, paying attention to the determinants of legitimacy and effectiveness in foreign and security matters.

At this second level, a comparative analysis has been conducted on three regional contexts: - Western Europe and USA,
- Eastern Europe and USSR,
- Latin America.

(3) Building up a spectrum of alternative scenarios.

Starting from the theory of hegemonic stability it is possible to distinguish at least three possible trends:

- A decline of hegemonic stability of the two superpowers - US and USSR - up to a total equilibrated system ("egalitarian" in Galtung's words);
- The assertion of supremacy of one of the two superpowers ("feudal" system in Galtung's words). It has to be distinguished the refere between american or soviet supremacy.
- A "muddling-through" evolution, in which the present structure goes almost unalterate, but with two possible evolutions:
 - A "condominium" of the two superpowers, in which their mutual relationships become mre istitutionalized;
 - A "multipolar system" of regional blocs.

To build up the scenario several qualitative and quantitative techniques have been utilized; in particular:

- A mathematical model of the international system of an algebraic type;
- A cross-impact analysis, based on the KSIM technique.

III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

International relations can be interpreted according to two different viewpoints.

The first one sees the international society as an "imperfect" or "primitive" one. It is characterized by anarchy, the continuous struggle for power. Anarchy is a natural offspring of a system in which the main actors - nation-states - are sovereign units, "superiores non recognoscentes", and the use of force is a useful, although costly, instruments for achieving national goals. In such a system all actors - or at least all the "essential" actors - are fundamentally equal in power and capabilities, and unitary in their behavior. Peace is the outcome of free play of social forces, through the mechanism of balance of power. There is a clear-cut division between domestic and foreign policy. The latter is ruled by exigencies of national interest, seen mostly in term of military security, which overrides all other goals.

The second viewpoint sees international society as a "perfect" system, characterized by an order comparable, although less institutionalized, with the domestic one. States are different in

resources and capabilities. Their autonomy depends on the position occupied in the overall structure of power. Stability is guaranteed by hegemonic powers, exerting leadership in international realm. The distinction between domestic and foreign policy is less clear-cut, because of interpenetration among societies and governments. Peace rests on the asymmetrical and hierarchical nature of relationships among strong and weak countries. Therefore, the concept of "structure" of the system has a crucial role in explaining hegemonic stability.

Our model stems from this second perspective, in order to point out domestic and international factors explaining different outputs in foreign policy. Foreign policy can be imagined as the result of two complex and interwoven fields of forces:

- The structure of international system, which sets constraints and limits to every national foreign policy. The autonomy of each country's foreign policy is linked to the specific structural order and is function of the national position in the international stratification system.
- The internal political system, its nature and characteristics, which affect decision-makers' scope and decision latitude.

The international system is a complex field of forces in continuous flux. Its stability rests on the hierarchical structure, its effectiveness and the leadership of hegemonic powers. Peace - and inversely political tension - is guaranteed by the net predominance of one or more nation-states over all the others. Generally, this predominance is the result of a successful war. Hegemonic power(s) sets the political framework in which international relations take place. It has the political ability, the material capabilities and the

ideological authority to exert influence and leadership in the system. Nevertheless this position is eroded. The same forces which make the system work smoothly bring about its decline. Military supremacy and manipulation of asymmetrical interdependence produce stress and strains which affect hegemonic position. The factor explaining this erosion are both domestic and international. Domestic factors include the burdens of maintaining the hierarchical structure and its predominance in it, the capability to secure internal support and international authority for its behavior. International factors are linked to the growing competition of second-rank power, which challenge its leadership. After a certain treshold this dynamic starts a cicle of action and reactions, turning out in instability, frequent conflicts and, at the end, major wars. Wars conclude the cicle and a new one starts. International politics is the product of this interplay between structure and processes. Therefore it is possible to try to distinguish among them.

(1) The Structure of the International System

The structure of the system is the regular pattern of relationships which determines the state or "regime" of the international system. Three variables describe the structure of international system:

- stratification,
- transnationalization,
- hierarchy of relationships.

(a) The system of stratification

Stratification is defined as the degree of rank-concordance of each state of the international system on several different dimensions of rank. Concordance is a measure of hierarchic order in the system. The

dimensions concern both material and subjective aspects.

High concordance implies: first, clear patterns of subordination and overordination; second generalization of ranks, this is a self-reinforcing mechanism, producing coherent patterns of attitudes and behaviors for actors at the different ranks. This means that in a hierachic system there are in-built mechanisms of stability. Discordance, on the other hand, produces instability, conflicts and misperceptions. On the one hand, rank-discordant states try to maximize their total rank position, and this inevitably produces resistances from the status quo states. On the other hand the capacity of high rank states (i.e. hegemonic power) to secure the stability is severely curtailed. The net effect is increasing possibility of misperceptions and mistakes, decreasing legitimacy of the overall structure of power, etc.

(b) Transnationalization

It is the degree of "openess" of international system to transactions at governmental, non governmental and transgovernmental level. In these last years transnationalization has meant essentially three things: growth of trade and foreign investments (expecially Americans) and spread of contacts at national, subnational and transnational levels, in political, cultural, and economics realms.

In opposition to the "liberal view", according to which economy and politics are, and must to be, two different sectors, and maximization of national growth imposes as few institutional constraints as possible, it seems that economic growth requires hegemonic stability and sustains it. There is, in other words, a positive correlation between high rank concordance and economic

growth, openness of trade, investments and interdependence.

(c) Hierarchy

This is the structural variable par excellence. It offers a measure of effectiveness of international order, focusing on nature and characteristics of relationships among actors. The tightness of structure's hierarchy exerts direct influence on foreign policy behaviors.

Four variables define the nature of hierarchy:

- Concentration of power in the overall structure;
- degree of polarization;
- direction of fluxes (trade, communications, etc.);
- consensus on the structure.

The first and second variable define stability of hierarchical order and leadership, the third variable stresses leadership's degree of manipulation of asymmetrical relationships, and the last one is a measure of legitimacy of established order.

(2) Processes in International System

Several processes at systemic level determine the trend of structural stability over time. These processes are a field of different forces. Some of them push toward strengthening of hegemonic stability, whereas others erode it. The former are "brakes" processes and the latter "accelerator" processes. The final value of international tension is determined by the mutual play of these two groups of forces. In principle the "brakes" processes tend to favour a progressive institutionalization of hierarchical order, whereas the "accelerator" processes strains the stability and institutionalization of the system.

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In our formal model four processes have been depicted:

(a) Process of polarization, alliance cohesion and arms race.

This process simulates arms race and military competition among blocs, tracing them back to bipolarity and alliance cohesion. Sharp polarization and strong cohesion of alliances bring about the intensity of arms race. Arms race, in its turn, affects international tension. This is, clearly, a process of acceleration of tension and of eroding hegemonic stability.

(b) Process of Military Research & Development

Military R&D spurs firstly military expenditure, so as to produce an increased international tension. Secondly, and consequentially, produce a sense of distrust, which is, in itself, a cause of increased tension and misperceptions. Thirdly, producing a fast obsolescence of weapon systems, it pushes both military expenditure and arms trade.

(c) Process of Interdependence

Assuming the intercorrelation between transnationalization and interdependence, this process tends to favour a progressive institutionalization of asymmetrical interdependences, and then a peaceful management of crises. This is a "brake" process, although the possibility has to be considered of strains from institutional rigidity, which lead to increasing tensions.

(d) Process of Consensus on Systemic Structure

This is the process which guarantees stable legitimacy to the existing order. This is an aspect strictly related to the dynamics between domestic and international factors. Therefore it will be examined in detail when we will speak about the security issue in western Europe.

IV. THE SECURITY ISSUE IN WESTERN EUROPE

In this paragraph I will try to analyze the domestic and international factors which have affected the security issue area in western Europe since the end of Second World War. In particular we will try to examine the progressive "politicization" of the security issue area in the '80. We will proceed in this way: first, we will examine the characteristics of the security issue-area in advanced industrialized countries, as it has been shaped after 1945; second, the domestic and international factors which have determined a progressive "politicization" of this issue area; third, some possible evolution of the matters, according to the different scenarios briefly outlined in part I.

IV.1. The Security Issue-Area

Western Europe has known 40 years of durable peace, political stability, economic growth and increasing diplomatic and cultural prestige. This has occurred in a context of tight alliance with US and strict economic, commercial and cultural bonds among western countries. In light of the theoretical model outlined in the preceding paragraph the main question to ask is: what factors played a role in shaping the security issue-area in western Europe?

First of all is necessary to define the concept of issue-area, and see how it applies to defence in western Europe.

An issue-area, in the words of Keohane and Nye, is a set of issues, mutually interrelated, about which policy-makers are concerned and

which they believe are relevant to public policy. The issue-area set the boundaries of relevant issue policies. When these limits are put into question, there is a "issue-area politicization". More precisely, we can define issue-area politicization as the process through which values, rules of the game and issue boundaries are increasingly challenged.

The stability of an issue-area, that is the absence of relevant conflicts among the actors on that specific issue-area depends on the following factors:

- A hierarchical structure of power among the countries concerned to that issue-area. A stable bipolar system, in which linkages are established, objectives spelled out and politics conducted in a coherent way.

- A clear institutional framework in which conflicts could be managed, the limits of problems set and the congruence of objectives assured.

In which sense the defence and security of western Europe is, and was, an issue-area? To answer to this question we have to examine how the two characteristics of a stable issue-area have been realized in this case. To do that I have spelled out three elements which, according to me, characterize this area.

(1) The hegemony of US.

US came out from the second world war as the major world power for economic capacity, military asset and political leadership together with Soviet Union. Putting aside the important but thorny problem of origins and rationale of "cold war" international relations after second world war were shaped by the bipolar nature of the

international system. The two hegemonic power therefore organized their relationships with the world according to their specific forms of social, political and economic organization. The integration of western Europe under the american leadership rested on two structural characteristics of the post-war world.

The first one was the economic and social weakness of western Europe; the second one the threat of Soviet aggression. The most important thing, however, is the explicit linkage among this issues established by US to organize the Euro-american relationships. It is difficult to say how much this linkage was an explicit goal. However, its existence has shaped in part the form of relationships between the two areas.

The recovery of international economy under american hegemony passed through the reconstruction of western european economies. The monetary system created at Bretton Woods (gold at the center of the system, dollar' convertibility and pegged exchange rates) and trade liberalization were the two pillars of the economic reconstruction.

The threat of soviet aggression was coped with the extension of nuclear guarantee to Europe.

This double integration was mutual reinforcing in the sense that "Nuclear umbrella", liberalization of trade and investments, stable exchange rates were faces of a same coin: the maintenance of structural stability of the international system under hegemonic leadership of United States in western world. This mutual reinforcing mechanism had however different economic and political costs and benefits for US and Europe. US had to accept trade discrimination, the burdens of maintaining a stable dollar, international liquidity

through budget' deficit and proportionally higher military expenditures, in exchange for political leadership vis-a'-vis Soviet Union and the advantages flowing from being the leader (in particular fixing the political agenda, establishing the linkages among issues, etc.). European countries, in turn, had to accept american investments, commit themselves to support the american economy and foreign policy in exchange of the guarantee of protection from soviet union. The role of force in Euro-american relationships is therefore quite important. Not so much because there has never been a possibility of threatening the use of force from both sides. As a matter of fact, in this sense force plays a really negligible role among western countries. Nevertheless force has also a "latent" role, and this is particularly relevant in euro-american relationships. This is due to the "protective" role of american nuclear forces in Europe. Therefore the fear of withdrawal of such protection plays a role in establishing the structural limits of the political process and can be used usefully in bargaining trade-offs between economic and political issues. Not taking into account also the fact the definition and of scope, limits and characteristics of the defence issue-area can be set expecially from the americans.

The soviet threat plays therefore a crucial role in explaining the congruence of the different perspectives and the prevalence of american overall strategic exigencies. There is a delicate balance of perceptions on the european defense in a nuclear era. In a climate of cold war, in fact, the seriousness of soviet threat has at least two main consequences. First, it limits the political latitude of smaller countries, strengthening alliance cohesion. On the one hand the

hegemonic power is more disposed to tolerate sacrificies (and then free riders) in order to keep the allies united against the opposed bloc. On the other side the relationships are much more asymmetrical and therefore the fear of a withdrawal of nuclear umbrella constraints the willingness of smaller powers to establish linkages among issues, and in conclusion the economic issues are subordinated at the political ones.

Second, in such a climate the credibility of the nuclear commitment is less challenging. The role of "nuclear umbrella" has been aptly called "mythical", because it is hardly credible that US leaders, facing the possibility of being hit by a soviet second strike, will not try to keep the conflict as far as possible from their soil. In this sense, US and Soviet Union share a common interest, be it tacit or explicit. Nevertheless, politically, the credibility of american commitment and therefore of dissuasion by deterrence can survive for a long time, without being seriously questioned, lacking any credible defence alternative with ^{which} to cope with soviet threat.

In a climate of "cold war", which sharpened the sense of political and economic weakness of european elites, as the theory of regime stability would predict, US was in a powerful position to manipulate the asymmetrical relationships in security issues and to manipulate bipolar relationships, affecting the level of political tension, in order to re-establish congruence among issue-area in accordance with the hegemonic position of United States.

(2) The Congruence between Political Elites in Western Europe and US and the support of Public Opinion.

The politico-economic conditions of western Europe immediately

after second world war, a Europe come out from a devastating world war, fought mainly on its soil, shaped the way western leadership perceived reality. The western leadership grew up with the idea that economic instability, the weakness of democracy in front of totalitarian ideology and the absence of a strong political leadership have been the main causes of the war. It was therefore natural that the international economy, the democratic processes, and the american leadership were seen as crucial conditions for a peaceful Europe. Moreover, the internal legitimacy of many western countries, especially the defeated ones, was severely shaken. American support, both political and material, was seen as a essential prerequisite for internal stability. This factors explain, at least partially, the high congruence between american and european elites on a narrow definition of the security issue-area.

A broad consensus was therefore established on the following hierarchy of issues and problems:

- The economic recovery of western Europe and the stability of economic process in advanced industrialized countries are the highest priorities on the agenda of european governments. Their political legitimacy is grounded on the capacity to achieve these goals.
- The essential and paramount condition to achieve this goal is western europe political and military security under the protective role of force.
- The american "nuclear umbrella" is the best (and cheapest) way to realize such a condition.
- then follows than any threat to such a hierarchy of issues and roles has to be avoided.

In the last thirty-five years there has been a striking consensus among political elites and public opinion in western Europe on such a definition of the problem of security in western Europe

In this definition of the issue-area one crucial aspect was the possibility of avoiding the risk of politicization of the issue-area. This meant to keep as far out as possible this definition of the issue-area from the internal political debate. This was possible essentially at three conditions:

- the overall structure hegemony of US, so as to be the only one to establish the useful linkages and trade-offs between security and other issues.

- The maintenance of a congruence between american and european elites on such an issue. This was possible also through the creation of a transgovernmental multibureaucratic structure - highly integrated under american hegemony - the NATO. This network should avoid the politicization of such an issue "from below", through the parliaments and the party system, allowing a bureaucratic management of conflictual issues. This order not excludes, however, the politicization "from above", that is to say, produced by an evolution of the structure of the international system.

- A bipartisan support of public opinion on such a definition of the issue area. This meant essentially the fact that interests and political groups in european countries would not exploit politicization from below in order to advance political proposals relevant to the security issue. In this sense the congruence between public opinion and political elites in western Europe on the definition of the role and priority of security issue was a striking

exigency of political stability of the Alliance.

In such a scheme, therefore, political elites had a crucial role between bureaucratic transgovernmental structures on the one hand and public opinion on the other. This role was essentially to convene and shape the sense of support to NATO policy and the need of sacrifices to guarantee the defense of western Europe vis-a'-vis the Soviet threat. Therefore, public opinion support was assured as far as there was a coherent and unitary perspective about the best way to defend western Europe, in particular, about the linkage between western security, american commitment and european wealth and about the fundamental priority of such an issue on the political agenda of advanced industrialized countries. This definition of the problem, moreover, was in accordance with the fact that public opinion tends to neglect "high politics", unless in period of deep crisis. Therefore the de-politicization (mainly through a multinational bureaucratic structure and the technicalities and complexities of defence and strategic issues) was the best way to avoid any challenge to such a narrow definition of security. It is interesting - Wildenmann has remarked - that even today defence does not figure at all as a policy goal in public opinion agenda. On the contrary it is "peace" - mainly intended as rejection of military defence - to gain public opinion attention.

All together the double congruence - between european elites and public opinion on the one hand and between european and american elites on the other - on the non-salience of this issue, the hierarchical structure of relationships which characterized euro-american relationships, and finally the concrete threat of soviet

aggression explain the tacit consensus on this issue-area.

IV.2. The Politicization of the Security Issue Area

When the limits and scope of an issue-area are put into question we have a "politicization" of the issue-area. More precisely, we define an issue-area as politicized when the values, rules of the game and conceptual boundaries of that issue-area are increasingly challenged and criticized. Three elements characterize such a politicization:

(a) That set of issues raise at the top position of the political agenda of a group, governmental or transgovernmental, of decision-makers; (b) there are contrasting positions about the best way to deal with the problems pertinent to the area; (c) the outcome is shaped by a set of forces different from the traditional one in that issue-area, that is to say that the results are not predictable looking only at the current overall structure. Politicization can occur "from below", when domestic groups or governmental coalitions exploit a theme in order to mobilize public opinion support and then using that resource to better their bargaining position. It can also occur "from above", when the change in the structure of the international system affects the way costs and rewards are distributed on the different national actors, provoking resistance and pressures respectively to reestablish the previous order or to establish a new one.

There are many evidences of such a politicization of the defence and security issue-area in western europe in these last years. First of all there is a growing conflict of interests, on several

dimensions, between western european countries and US. The dollar crisis of 1971, with the american decision to ^{halt} dollar convertibility, the oil crisis, the Eurodollar market's problem and last but not least the problem of defence of western Europe are some of the problems on the agenda of Euro-american relationships. This is linked, according to the theory of hegemonic stability, to the relative decline of hegemonic position of US vis-a'-vis its allied and competitors, namely the USSR, and, on the other side, to the relative growth of economic position of western european countries (and of course Japan). The implications, always according to the theory, are at least twofold. On the one hand, the US is less and less able to manipulate the network of relationships with its allies and the bipolar regime, to assure congruence between its political and economic position. On the other hand western european countries know a growing incongruence of status, especially between their economic and political dimension. The consequence is a minor vulnerability of european countries to the US. Moreover on the other hand there is a increasing diversification of policy goals and assessments about the sense and direction of european foreign policy.

Secondly, and strictly connected with this, is the changing order of priorities both in western european elites and public opinion. The above mentioned congruence between elites and public opinion on the "narrow" definition of the security issue-area in western europe is progressively declining. Public opinion is growingly concerned with security issue, although this does not affect the legitimacy and support for the Atlantic Alliance. Elites, on their part, are split on the matters of what is the best defence for western europe. As to the

first aspect, the linkage, so far perceived, between security and welfare, is increasingly challenged. People is less and less disposed to make sacrifice to support the alliances, or at least, this sacrificies are not perceived as immediately linked to the welfare of european societies and economies. One of the major causes of such a situation is the declining sense of danger coming from the Soviet Union. The risks of aggression, although overstated by official declaration, have less impact on public opinion. Instead, it clearly gains momentum the idea that both public opinion and political leaders are not disposed to engage in a war with Soviet union. The feeling that nuclear war is an irrational act, that could concretely occur has arisen, in these years to high points. In opposition to the situation prior the '80, security is not more seen as a useful and complementary condition of the welfare of western societies, rather it is perceived as an obstacle, and a dangerous one, to the continuous growth of welfare state, of quality of life and so forth. This sense of anguish about ther destiny of western countries is paired to the lack of coherence among the european elites on the best way to manage western defence. The consensus of the '60. has given way to an increased number of proposals and debates on the best way to defend western Europe. The idea of abandoning the nuclear first-use posture is held even by distinguished officials, To a certain extent, this proliferation of proposals and debates is a sign of the declining consensus on the definition and border-line of the issue area.

Public opinion reflect such a situation. The younger generations is the main source of politicization "from below" of the defence issues. As the defence rises as a autonomous and high priority on the european

agenda, it is easier, for domestic or transnational groups, try to politicize such an issue. In other words, politicization "from below" became a real possibility. Moreover forty years of peace in Europe, the settlement of territorial problems, the enormous power, in military terms, of the two superpower, and a declining sense of fear of Soviet intentions has decreased the sense of urgency and of priority of defence goals for the overall maintenance of the welfare goals.

This complex picture reveals many factors which can contribute to explain the growing politicization of security issues and to depict the domestic and international dynamic. We will therefore try to sum them up and then see how they have been connected in reference to the events of these last years.

Two main dimensions of factors can contribute to explain the increasing politicization of such an issue: the evolution in the structural stability of international system and the evolution of interactions between political elites and public opinion, with particular reference to the "legitimacy" (defined as the degree of congruence on foreign policy goals between elites and public opinion) of the security issue-area.

(a) Hegemonic Powers, bipolar system and Incongruence of Status. The overall structural stability of the world order is exposed to increasing pressures coming from two different sources.

- The first one is a process of growing institutionalization of bipolar system, in military terms, around the two superpowers. The decline of the use of force is cause and consequences of this institutionalization. The costs of a nuclear war, even limited, are clearly unbearable. Therefore the use or threat of use of military force has become, especially in the european context, growingly unbelievable. The major consequences of such a situation is the declining efficacy of one of the major instruments at disposal of the hegemonic power to re-establish the rules of the game, assuring the congruence on the hierarchy of issues, through the linkage among issue-areas.

- The second one is a process of increasing incongruence between economic and political rank-dimensions of the european countries. The economic position of western countries, taken separately or collectively (EEC), is impressively ameliorated. Europe has become from recipient of american investments a major investors in US and from a minor trade partner a powerful competitor on the world market.

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At the same time, its political role, even in defence matters, has remained unchanged. The main consequence, in relation to the linkage among issue-areas, is a lack of congruence between european and american elites on the hierarchy of goals and on the agenda priorities.

In terms of the security issue-area this means two main things. On the one hand a declining appeal of Soviet threat for strengthening the cohesion of the NATO alliance. Then, a decreasing credibility of american commitment to defend with nuclear weapons western Europe. Lastly, a much more assertive foreign policy posture of european countries on defence and security matters. The contradictory aspects can be explained referring them to different constituency. We now pass to examine this aspect.

(b) The Congruence between political elites and the problem of consensus.

The change in the overall structure of the bipolar system, and the competing processes of bipolar institutionalization and less asymmetrical relationships among Europe and US explain the declining congruence between the agenda priorities and goals of european and american elites, and in particular the relationship between soviet threat, western security under nuclear umbrella and welfare state.

The declining threat of soviet union, part and parcel of the process of detente and institutional stability of the bipolar system, has two major consequences. The possibility of using the soviet threat as a weapon to rebuild the Alliance cohesion - weakened by the above mentioned incongruence - is less and less credible. Moreover, the

credibility of american willingness to commit itself to defend western Europe with nuclear weapons, even, running the risk of a nuclear retaliation, is increasingly debatable. This are two trend to a certain extent contradictory.

The main consequence is that the growth in wealth and welfare of western europe is no more seen as inevitably linked to the "nuclear umbrella". Even more, the nuclear umbrella risks to link the destiny of Western Europe to the hegemonic position - perhaps a declining one - of US. This has produced different opinion about the best possible strategy toward eastern europe, "detente" and the military defence. This does not mean to put into question the Alliances, but the role of western europe in it.

The proliferation of different perspectives on this matters has produced obviously a less coherent picture of the issue-area in the public opinion, and has offered several domestic groups the opportunity to mobilize public opinion attention in order to gain bargaining positions domestically or at the international level. Of course the degree and scope of this domestic politicization is linked to pre-existing cleavages and coherent foreign policy.

To explain this we have to see at two different aspects. The first one is the lack of congruence between european and american elites on many issues and, at the same time, the more difficult bargaining position of US, that has seen the asymmetrical relationships to became more and more symmetrical. The second one is the evolution of public opinion attitudes and orientations on such matters, and more in general the role of mass action in western societies. We will examine now the first aspect, and the second under item (c).

The first one has to do with at least three aspects. First, the increasing incongruence between economic and political dimension of status determines a disposition to try to maximize the lower dimension, in the case of Europe the political one, in order to rise the overall position of status. This is much more so when the higher dimension is one of capability, as in the case of Europe. Second, the overall position of Europe vis-a'-vis US has arisen and then the relationships are became more symmetrical. This means that american willingness to mainipulate the relationships might decrease in light of the costs that such a manipulation could determine. This mean that Europe could see its objectives to prevail much more frequently than before. At the same time that the linkages became more costly for US, the smaller states have a better bargaining position. This is so because the conflict can concern a issue that has a higher salience for the smaller one than for the stronger and therefore the willingness to resist of the former is more determined than that of the latter. Last but not least, in the case of US, smaller states can play on the multibureaucratic network in order to strenghten their position in the american government and therefore weaken the global political coherence of US government. Nevertheless this situation is more probable to occur in economic matters than on security issues, where the exigencies of bipolar balance can constrain the bargaining position of european allies. At the same time, this can imply that smaller states will try to mobilize domestic mass participation in order to ameliorate their bargaining position. When this occur in societies where mass participation has known profound changes the consequences can be relevant.

(c) Shifting consensus on the security issues.

Public opinion polls reveal that people is growingly concerned about nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear war. Nevertheless people continue to be attached to NATO alliance and deems US-Europe military alliance as the best way to defend the national goals. The fear of a soviet aggression is diminished, although it remains a fundamental distrust about Soviet intentions. Peace is acquiring a high priority among western people goals, especially the younger generations. Even more, the desire and willingness of fighting a war, even to defend its own country, is declined. In other words people see the problem of defence and security as higher on the political agenda than ten or fifteen years ago. This is happening when european elites are less and less coherent and unitary on the defence issues. This imply that on the one hand there exists cleavages among political elites on the defence issues and that public opinion is mobilizable to support this different orientations. In particular a striking linkages could be that between political parties cleavages on defence issues (SPD and CDU in West Germany, PCI and DC-PSI in Italy, Conservative and Labourist in Great Britain) and public opinion. Party position is in fact one major source of orientation on those issues for many people, therefore a conflict between parties on these issue could produce relevant mobilization according to the party cleavages.

At the same time, this cleavages can produce consequences even at the bureaucratic level within NATO. Not so much producing conflicts at this level, rather than limiting the capacity of the multibureaucratic structure to manage the conflicts in a de-politicized way.

Trying to sum up the process, it is going in such a way: structural

evolution of the international system determined increased cleavages and conflicts among european and american elites. This diminishing congruence between elites occurred in a period when public opinion was more and more concerned with these issue. This situations has determined politicization from below, which was used to strengthen and support domestic and international positions.

V. The Possible Evolutions of the Issue-Area

The tentative framework of analysis spelled out in the previous paragraphs should help us to point out the variables on which to focus our attention in order to assess the different proposals on defence in Europe in terms of their feasibility in light of the four alternative scenarios of the international political system.

We have outlined three main set of variables:

- (1) The structural order of the international system with particular reference the hegemonic stability of the bipolar order in western Europe;
- (2) The congruence/incongruence between american and european elites on the scope and definition of the issue-area and therefore on the reciprocal role of their foreign policies.
- (3) The public opinion moods, attitudes and orientations and the congruence between such moods, attitudes and orientations and those of the european elites.

These are, according to the previous analysis, three sets of variables highly relevant for depicting a possible evolution of the

debate on defence in western Europe.

Our 4 scenarios can be imagined as a "cone" of possibilities in which the three different sets of factors acquire different relevance and influence. At the two extremes there are a scenario of declining hegemonic stability in the long term future (50 years) and a scenario of increased stability under the hegemonic supremacy of only one of the two superpowers. In the Kaplan's words, a hierarchical international system. These are two, so called, "contrasted scenarios", at the borders of the "cone". Within the cone it is possible to imagine less dramatic changes in at least two different directions. The first is a steady evolution toward a "condominium" of the two superpowers; the second is a change from a bipolar world up to a completely multipolar system, based on autonomous regional blocs.

Roughly speaking we can imagine that our three sets of variables will dispose themselves on the four scenarios according a continuum in which:

- the more radical the structural change of the international system, the more relevant are the international factors and the problem of a common framework between european and american elites (politicization from "above");
- the more autonomous is the role Europe can play, the more relevant became the orientations of european and american elites on defence problems and the public opinion support for any policy europeans decide to carry on (politicization from "below");
- The less autonomous is the role Europe can play, the more relevant become the multibureaucratic structure in which euro-american relationships take place and the influence of politicization from

below to strengthen bargaining position of smaller states.

This analysis should allow us to say something on the different prospects of the several proposals on western defence, in particular their feasibility within each of the four scenarios and the role played by the three sets of variables in each of them.

This period has seen a staggering flourishing of debates on defence issues. Following the mass mobilization of the last three years, the problem of modernization of theatre nuclear forces and the rising concern on the American commitment in Europe private and public institutions, officials and scholars have put forward many proposals on the best way to cope with western (Europe) defence in the future.

It is not our task to try to summarize these different proposals. We will only discuss their feasibility in the four scenarios. All this different proposals could be tentatively be organized in three main clusters. This classification cannot pretend to exhaust the different positions and it is mainly instrumental to our aim.

(1) Proposals which main aim is to strengthen military and political credibility of western alliances vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union, lessening the rigid and worrisome nuclear posture. In this perspective someone argues for less reliance on nuclear weapons, supporting accordingly a no-first-use policy. Such a policy would have relevant political and military advantages reducing the risks (and the fears) of a nuclear war in Europe. On the other hand there are those which underline the need for a more flexible capacity of response of NATO, resting both on nuclear and conventional weapons. In this line of thought a wider spectrum of responses, both nuclear and conventional, increasing the ambiguity and so the complexities of political

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calculations will strengthen deterrence. This latter position sees military strength and political cohesiveness as instrumental to a stronger bargaining position towards Soviet Union; whereas the former sees its suggestions as a manifestation of goodwill to increase the probability of arms control agreements with the Warsaw Pact.

(2) Proposals which aims at reducing the risks of a nuclear exchange in Europe, for misperceptions, technical mismatches or action-reaction spiralling, and at increasing, at the same time, mutual confidence among blocs. This line of argument stresses the need for arms control negotiations, especially focused on conventional weapons, abandoning reliance on early first-use military postures and agreements for confidence building measures. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe could be a first positive step in the direction of lessening tensions between blocs. It could give way, later on, to concrete and positive arms control and reduction agreements.

(3) The third position could be called "radical", in the sense that sees in the political structure underlying western defence the main cause of tension. In particular, alliances networks and political and military subordination to the hegemonic power are sources of war. According to this line of thought reliance on nuclear weapons must be abandoned, the alliances must dissolve and security will be a consequences of more autonomous and self-reliant military postures. This position underlines unilateral steps as more effective than bilateral negotiations.

Each of these positions can be evaluated in its feasibility and probability in light of the three sets of variables spelled out above. It is obvious that the first group of proposals has the minor

structural implications, although they rise domestic problems in western Europe both in terms of economic capacity and public support. The third group of positions, on the contrary, is, in the present situation the less feasible, rising formidable problems both at a structural and domestic level. The second group rests more or less in the middle. Nevertheless the probability of each of them depends by the evolution of the international system. Taking into account our four different scenarios we can see that their feasibility covary with the change in hegemonic stability. The more is deep and far-reaching the decline in hegemonic stability, the more is probable to have politicization of security issues and increasing relevance of domestic factors. In other words, the probability of occurrence of structural changes is increased in a context of declining hegemony.

At the same time, in scenarios of increased hegemonic stability, or in conditions of stable "condominium", the scope and latitude of western decision-makers will be severely shortened, and the possibility of politicization will decrease. In other words, in these context it would be probable a return to the conditions of consensus and subordination which characterized western european political positions up to the '70s.

In both cases, however, politicization cannot be completely excluded, although the "kind" of politicization will change accordingly. Due to the structural evolution of the system in the sense of increasing transnational and transgovernmental networks, it is probable that politicization will be a permanent variable of the next years. At the same time, the nature of politicization - from "below" or from "above" - will affect the political process and the

scope of the issue-area.

In case of steady decline of hegemonic stability politicization from "above" will be prevalent. The congruence between american and european political elites will be greatly affected by this deterioration. The lack of political leadership, in conditions of growing incongruence of european elites will increase the probability of conflicts on many issue-areas. Given the sensitivity of both parts to the security issues, this will be one of the first area to be put into question. In this case, the level and effects of politicization will depend both from the coherent and unitary posture of european elites and the kind of response of american elites. This response will be shaped, in its turn, both from the perception of the Soviet position vis-a'-vis the US and the pressures of domestic groups for more assertive or passive attitudes in foreign policy. Therefore it will be reasonable to expect stronger resistances from US in case of deep structural overturn of the post-war order than in case a steady trend towards a multipolar world system.

In a scenario in which american leadership regain momentum, or in which a more institutional "condominium" should be established among the two superpowers, politicization from "below" is the most probable event. In this case western european elites, admittedly with different tones, depending on domestic and geostrategical conditions, will try to better ^{their} own bargaining position ... from "below". Mass mobilization, highly committed pressure groups and an upsurge of nationalistic - even "europeistic" - attitudes will arise. Therefore bureaucratic management, through transgovernmental mechanism, will not be able to cope with the rising tides of politicization. New political

and institutional frameworks should be established to deal with these problems. As a secondary consequence, it would be more probable that a politicization from "below" will assume anti-american attitudes than a politicization from "above".

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THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

In this paper we shall present and examine briefly only a few points of the complex problem of linkage between European and world security. In particular we shall examine the following aspects of the problem: 1/ The world-wide significance of European security, 2/ Outside threats to European security, 3/ Nonalignment and European security.

Before passing on to the examination of these specific points, it must be clarified that for the purpose of this examination Europe is understood, or rather European security is understood, including all those countries which participated in the Helsinki Conference which then led to the signing of the Final Act in 1975. At the same time we do not forget that the area on the European continent lying inbetween the two major world powers is a distinct region and represents Europe in the more narrow sense.

Hence we are obliged in examining the issues of security to apply in the same argument both definitions of Europe. This will introduce some complications, but they are unavoidable in the present situation of close links and interdependence in the world as a whole, and in particular in those parts of the world which are closely connected with Europe, as it was known in the last few centuries, that is, as a continent attached to Asia and surrounded by high seas on all other sides.

We must, however, also not forget that Europe was and still is, the centre and birthplace of a civilization which has spread far beyond its boundaries and deeply influenced the rest of the world. This role of Europe appears to be in a deep crisis as well as its security and general role in world politics.

As it was said, we must examine European problems of peace and security in the wider framework of the membership of the Helsinki Conference. This means, including all of the Soviet Union in the East, and North America in the West. The specification in some agreements arrived at during the Helsinki Process, specifying that they apply only to the European parts of the Soviet Union, do not contradict this assumption. In fact it only proves that such limitations were necessary since normally an agreement with a government covers the whole territory of the given country.

The extension of the boundaries of Europe for the purpose of examining and safeguarding its security are the results of the Second World War. The two major world powers gained a so thorough and durable influence over Europe, that it became unthinkable to discuss problems of cooperation and security in Europe without including them in the debate and in the agreements resulting from the debate. We can see without difficulty that by the elimination of either of the two, The United States of America, or the Soviet Union, the equation becomes unbalanced.

The overwhelming military might of these world powers is an essential component of whatever precarious equilibrium is

thinkable in and around Europe. Their presence in Europe is not only a strategic fact, made visible by the presence of their troops in some of the countries of the area lying between them, but they are also linked with key states of Europe by the two alliances. In these alliances, they play the role of leading partners and their military potential exceeds several times the total potential of all the other allies.

On the other hand, by the elimination from the equation of both of them, no balance can be attained either. In Europe, as it stands between the two world powers, the western part is in all respects, superior. This is so, even if we ignore that within Europe in the narrower sense, there are also two nuclear powers, and both in the West. In other words, the western part of Europe is more developed, and has a larger population, and is militarily superior, even if we do not count the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France.

Europe must therefore be regarded, for strategic purposes, as one whole and indivisible area including the North American Continent, and extending in the East to include the Soviet Union. This had been fully recognized when the Helsinki Conference was finally convened. Earlier objections by the Soviet Union to a full participation of the United States and Canada were dropped, and they both became full members of the Helsinki process.

The convening of the Helsinki Conference reflected thus the understanding and general acceptance of two important

foundations of European security. First, the recognition that the wider framework, including both of the major world powers, was the only sound basis for securing a reliable peace within Europe. Secondly, the realization that the destructive power of the nuclear arsenals on both sides could in war lead only to a total devastation and no victory of either power.

The Conference, however, was not only the reflection of the realities in Europe and in the World, but also an attempt of influencing these realities. If a major nuclear military conflict in the future was to be ruled out, there still remained the necessity of organizing peace so as not to produce revivals of tensions that might lead again to the dangerous threshold of war. Hence the main concern was the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe, of course, Europe in the wider framework including all states which participated in the Conference.

1/ The world-wide significance of European security

In the Final Act, in several places, the concern was expressed of applying the principles and agreements agreed in Helsinki also to relations with other countries in the world. The linkage with peace and security outside the enlarged European zone was in the Conference fully understood. This was in those years reflected also in bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Briefly, there was no doubt at the time of the debates in Helsinki and in Geneva, during the drafting stage of the Conference, that stability in Europe should not lead to exporting the rivalry and hostility to other parts of the World.

There were two ways of striving for the main objective of securing peace and cooperation in Europe itself. One was bilateral agreement between the two alliances, or rather the two major world powers. The other, advanced by the Neutrals and the Nonaligned of Europe, was a strictly and fully multilateral approach, a truly collective agreement among all states participating in Helsinki. Formally, the Final Act was conceived as a multilateral document and an understanding reached among all participating states individually.

Under this cover of multilaterality, however, the bipolarity could be clearly seen in a great number of compromise solutions. This character comes out still more clearly in the records of the Geneva phase, where bilateral controversies were dominant, and solutions frequently attained on the basis of compromises between the two sides. In the praxis after the Conference this was still more prominent, both in the treatment of the Conference and the Final Act in the media and in statements of politicians and statesmen on both sides.

The alternative view of the group of the Neutrals and the Nonaligned, was in fact not taken as the basis for security and cooperation, because of the internal divisions in the European security zone. Yet, the increasingly single-handed actions of the major powers, affected gradually also the cohesions within the two alliances, although this process did not develop symmetrically on both sides. The most important consequence was the bilateral treatment of practically all important problems that came up between the two major powers.

The recognition of the dangers of continuing the Cold War, as an unrestrained confrontation, however induced them to seek agreement or moderation in all controversial situations. In Europe the detente was the outcome of this restraint. Europe became thus the most stable region in the world. This stability in the very centre of controversy, where the Cold War originated, did however not prevent aggressive policies in other parts of the world. The fact remains that bilateral agreements regarding other areas were during the Seventies increasingly disregarded. Tensions and clashes in different parts of the world produced retroactively ever more hostile relations between the two major powers and in East-West relations in Europe.

The stabilization in Europe did not lead to the extension of the European detente to areas outside Europe. In fact the European stabilization developed soon into a controversy, restrained only by the fear of a nuclear holocaust, to which might easily develop out of any war between the two sides in Europe.

This same restraint did not work in the Third World, where already in the past numerous wars were fought without the use of nuclear weapons. The stabilization in Europe, based on the fear of a nuclear war, in fact, reinforced the belief that it was likely that nuclear weapons would not be used in a war in the Third World. Hence, the Helsinki Conference, in spite of all efforts made in the formulation of the Final act, did not durably influence conditions in the Third World.

The strategic significance of the area covered by the Helsinki agreement, in particular the overwhelming power of armaments deployed there and the involvement of the two major powers in problems in all regions of the world, give it nevertheless a dominant significance for peace and security. The Helsinki Final Act, by the importance of the contracting parties, the members of the Helsinki Conference, and the continuing follow-up process and negotiations, is still crucially important for peace and security in the world.

It is most likely that in the future also, Helsinki will, as long as the process started there is alive in Europe, play an important role restraining the major powers in all aspects and on all places where they confront one another. The determination to avoid an open breakdown and clash in Europe will continually induce them to refrain from rash actions in other regions. They will, however, hardly discontinue efforts of damaging the positions of the opponent and enhancing their own influence in different parts of the world.

The significance of Helsinki, as much as it may be decisive for the maintenance of peace in Europe and the prevention of a general war, can hardly be expected preventing regional clashes, including those in which states belonging to the Helsinki process participate. Most of all it cannot prevent the urge of major powers to be involved in all critical situations wherever they may develop.

2/ Outside threats to European security

The widening of the boundaries of Europe has tied Europe inseparably with the rest of the world in a way unknown in the earlier European history. Whilst Europe used to be the centre of the world, and the breeding ground of world powers, it became now an object of contention of the two major world powers and greatly dependent on them. Europe in the more narrow sense, became also vulnerable in many respects to developments in the outside world.

We have seen how the area covered by the Helsinki Conference influences conditions in the world. Now we must turn to the reverse flow of influence. Current developments and experience of the past induced the major powers to modify their relations in and outside Europe. The increasingly tense relations produced by conflicts in the Third World, affected negatively also the behaviour of those two powers in Europe. In the first place it destroyed temporarily the dialogue on strategic arms. Then, it affected also other negotiations and contacts between East and West in Europe.

Briefly, the exacerbation of American - Soviet relations in various areas of confrontation in the Third World were gradually transferred into the European region. This became soon visible when the Belgrade follow-up meeting failed to attain any substantial results, and furthermore, when the Madrid meeting hovered for almost two years over the abyss of complete collapse. Yet, the spirit of Helsinki, based on the essential

necessity of preserving peace in Europe, saved the situation from deteriorating beyond control. The result was a continuous conflict between the tendency of abandoning the detente altogether and disregarding the Final Act, and the realization that there was no alternative indeed to the continuation of the debate opened in Helsinki.

The dominant form of confrontation between the two major powers could no longer be directed to the effort of intimidating the rival by the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. This had to be eliminated because of the mutually recognized inability of winning a major nuclear war, but also because of the parity in practically all forms and types of strategic and tactical weapons.

The post-Cold-War and post-Detente form of confrontation between the two major powers turned into attempts of eroding the opponents alliance. The most conspicuous example of this new type of strife is the controversy over the build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. They were presented to the public as military threats, although it is an undeniable fact that the deployments were politically inspired, and that they could not be put into action without causing irreparable and uncontrollable damage to the whole of Europe by direct, and still more by secondary effects of radiation and fall-out.

The deployment on both sides produced instability within the one and the other alliance, moreover serious divisions and strife within individual nations emerged. In the

process the controversy affected negatively also relations between the two major powers and stopped temporarily the process of cooperation and jeopardized security in Europe.

As a matter of fact, negative impulses, introduced into the intra-European process from outside by means of the two major powers, could not destroy the historical significance and the durability of the early period of the detente and of the Helsinki spirit. We are now again witnesses of significant efforts to overcome the damage done during the late Seventies and the early Eighties.

Another way in which European security was and is influenced from outside is the dependence of Europe on supplies from the Third World. In particular on the supplies of crude oil from sources situated in regions rife with conflicts and major power clashes of Europe's economy developed in the past relying greatly on secure supplies from dependencies of European colonial powers. With the loss of the colonies and also loosing the power of influencing events in critical areas, the European countries became dependent on situations and developments which they could not control.

However, irrespective of direct European interests and their direct relations, major power controversies in the Third World affect decisively the stability in Europe in a most immediate way. Both major powers are so deeply and inextricably involved in a series of conflicts and tense situations in various continents, that serious military clashes could break

out at any time involving their military forces. As a matter of fact one-sided direct involvements have already occurred in more than one case, and it is realistically possible to think of direct clashes also.

In the case of a direct involvement of units of both major powers in whatever place in the world, it would still be possible to keep this clash in a regional framework. Nevertheless, the security in Europe would thereby always be affected. Furthermore, developments of this kind are likely to affect internal relations in Europe, as well as inside the two alliances and within individual countries.

Finally, it should be made clear that destabilization within the two alliances, and divisions within individual countries, are not necessarily leading towards a diminishing role of the alliances and a harmonization of relations across the political divide in Europe. In fact, we could observe the contrary in connection with the divisions caused by the deployment of Euro-Missiles, and by other development creating intra-alliance frictions.

3/ Nonalignment and European security

So far, only the aligned countries of Europe were mentioned. Their role regarding problems of security is most important, and they played leading roles in most of the developments after the war. Yet, even in the divided continent of Europe the division is not absolute. Neutral countries of past

conflicts continued their neutralistic policy, and new ones joined them. The real novelty for the European pattern is the formation of a group of nonaligned countries in Europe.

Thus, a zone was formed in Europe which stood outside the great confrontation between the two alliances. It assumed the more structured character of a special group only in connection with the Helsinki Conference. Already in the early stages of the almost two years long debate of the committee phase of the Conference in Geneva, the N-N Group was formed, comprising the Neutrals and the Nonaligned. This group played a rather important role during that long debate and helped substantially the attainment of consensus on the text of the Final Act of Helsinki. They continued to be an important element in all the follow-up meetings and are still functioning as an independent actor producing original ideas and proposals, as well as helping bridging of differences between the two alliances.

The role of those countries should not be underestimated, but they still cannot be taken as a decisive factor of European security. As much as these countries can help to achieve consensus whenever the two opposed sides are ready and willing to do so, they cannot prevent a clash, or even serious tensions, in periods of deteriorating relations between the East and the West. Hence, they are mostly important in periods of detente and efforts to control the conflict.

Fortunately the realization of catastrophic and un-

controllable results of an open conflict within Europe makes the task of the N-N countries easier and more effective. Furthermore, the danger to peace in Europe comes primarily, if not exclusively, from conflicts and clashes in the world outside the European security zone. Hence the role of the non-aligned countries assembled in the Movement of the Nonaligned Countries has also an important role in regard of European security.

A strictly realistic appraisal of the current situation in the world, would indicate that the spreading of regional conflicts to Europe, or their development into world-wide conflicts, is not an immediate threat, but it cannot be excluded either. There have been tense moments during the long conflicts in the Middle East, but at no time did the danger of spreading become really acute. The most tense incident including real danger occurred however in the final stage of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. The United States declared an alert for a large part of its armed forces in reply to certain reported movements of Soviet units which could be brought to the battlefield at the Suez Canal.

Another form of extending war to Europe would be a more or less direct involvement of the two major powers in conflicts or situations in the Third World. There are more examples of extremely dangerous tensions which could have led to serious armed conflicts. Korea, Cuba and Vietnam are only some of the best known instances. Therefore the danger of conflicts originating in the Third World for peace and security in the world,

and that means also in Europe, cannot be taken lightly. Yet, one can assume that the inhibitions referred to earlier would function also in the future.

The main task of this paper is in fact the examination of the real and possible roles of the Nonaligned acting against this threat. Quite obviously, the nonaligned countries in the world outside the European zone do not possess material forces which could restrain or control the activities of major powers if inhibitions against war should fail. It might, therefore, appear that their role could not be more important than the role of the N-N Group within Europe. We shall see that this is partly true, but that there are still important differences between the two cases.

First of all we must define more precisely what is Nonalignment and what is the aim and the methods of acting of the movement of the Nonaligned. Frequently the gathering of the Nonaligned in the Movement is understood as an agreement to conduct certain current foreign policies, such as not joining the one or the other alliance. This is indeed a requirement for admission, although not the most important one and certainly it is not enforced very strictly. Furthermore the laxity in regard of associations of Members with the one or the other major power is not a recent development, as many observers wish us to believe.

Already at the first Summit of the Nonaligned in Belgrade in 1961 Cuba was present, although Havana had then as close relations with Moscow as she has now. On the other hand

we can find among the statesmen assembled in Belgrade in 1961 also some close friends of the United States, for instance the representatives of Saudi Arabia. The records of this first Summit give us a solid basis for the understanding of the aims and intentions of the countries there assembled. This fundamental aims did not change, and efforts made to that effect in Havana in 1979, failed.

In the first place the Movement is an association of the Third World countries. The presence of Yugoslavia is the result of the experience of that country in the early post-war years. Yugoslavia came into a bitter conflict with the Soviet Union and at the same time had very bad relations with the Western powers over the Trieste problem. On a more durable basis, it turned out that Yugoslavia although a socialist country could in principle not accept a close association with the East, and remained unwilling to join the Western associations. The other two nonaligned European countries are Cyprus and Malta. They are also exceptional cases, politically as well as geographically.

The Third World character of Nonalignment should however not be taken as a geographical definition of the Movement. The two essential elements of the platform, on which Nonalignment stands is, first, the striving for a more rapid development of the more or less underdeveloped societies. The other is joining efforts with the aim of changing conditions in the world so as to make it easier to overcome the handicap under which they are labouring on the world scene, to secure

their autonomy and identity as new nations.

Hence a more or less openly expressed and pursued friendship or affinity towards one or the other major powers can be tolerated as long as the country in question remains ready to act jointly with other nonaligned countries towards the attainment of the main aims. The critical moment in Havana, regarding Cuba, was not her closeness to the Soviet Union, important was her readiness at the end of the Conference to accept the final document although it was purged of the pro-Soviet bias included by Cuba in the draft. The acceptance of the final document, re-iterating the main principles and aims of the Movement, was the decisive test.

The main ways and means of the Nonaligned is massive actions in the United Nations and in specialized meetings. The aim is usually the strengthening of the position of Third World countries as a whole or checking actions, interventions or other forms of undue interference from outside with the rights or interests of Third World countries. The main way of acting is moral pressure and influencing public opinion in the world.

All this may sound rather irrelevant in comparison with forceful actions based on military or economic might. However, the moral power of the Third World, incorporated in the Movement, has until now produced quite remarkable results. Let us only mention the fact that in most conflicts of Third World countries with industrialized powers, including wars fought with impressive armed forces and equipment, the Third World

countries have won their goals. The result was the disappearance of colonial empires and the withdrawal of foreign forces which were introduced to impose certain solutions.

These results, one may object, were not the result of specific actions of the Movement of the Nonaligned, and many of them happened even before it came into being. This is, of course, correct. The Movement does not claim to be, nor would it make sense of interpreting it as a separate entity, as an independent actor in current affairs. The Movement has not an autonomous will, it is in fact the expression of the collective will and aspirations of the awakened Third World nations. This explains also its ability to survive setbacks and internal conflicts about current national interests, and even wars between Members.

As can be seen, we do not speak of the Movement preventing this or another violent action or threat to peace and security, but of creating a general atmosphere and conditions which make it more difficult for any power, which might wish to disturb the peace in the world.

In conclusion, we must accept that Europe and its problems do no longer determine the future of the world, but also face the fact that there is an inevitable linkage between European and world security. Europe, although no longer a generator of peace or war in the whole world, is a sensitive region and is in the centre of the major contention between the two most powerful states of the world. It can play a constructive role in world affairs only inasmuch as it can assert its own will and interests, mollifying the rigidity of the controversy of the major powers. Europe can thus lower the ten-

sions in the centre of the field of controversy.

The Nonaligned in the Third World on the other hand have no way of influencing directly relations in Europe, but they can in the long run strengthen peace and security in the Third World. As a matter of fact they did so in the past already. If not by other means, this was done by denying the major powers still more spreading the military alliances in the Third World. A zone of nonalignment covering most of the Third World certainly can be called an important contribution to the control of tensions between the two major powers. Thus, security in Europe had the indirect benefit of the activities of the Nonaligned in the Third World.


May 1985

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THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Dr. Philippe Moreau Defarges

Ten years after Helsinki
EUROPEAN SECURITY - A NEW BEGINNING
Haikko Manor - Helsinki 10-13 June 1985



institut français des relations internationales

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TEN YEARS AFTER HELSINKI EUROPEAN SECURITY

A NEW BEGINNING ?

10-13 June 1985

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Philippe MOREAU DEFARGES

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A the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the European Community was able to assert itself internationally for the first time as a "distinct entity with a common security policy"(1). Both the Economic Community (second basket) and Europe of Nine with its humanitarian goals would it seemed, become a political force which would be able to mediate between East and West. Eight years later, after the meetings in Belgrade (June 1977 - March 1978) and Madrid (November 1980 - September 1983) and before that of Vienna (November 4th, 1986), Europe of Ten seems generally to have lost its particular character. Could it be that the meeting at Helsinki was just an exceptional, limited effort, the result only of special circumstances ?

The change in East/West relations since 1975, the questioning of detente, the 1979-83 crises (Afghanistan, Euromissiles, Poland, the South Korean plane disaster) were very revealing. They pinpointed the Community's weaknesses and its only partial unity, a unity constantly questioned by member states.

THE INITIAL FACTOR : THE EMERGENCE AT HELSINKI OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AS A SEPARATE FORCE (JULY 1973 - AUGUST 1975)

The Helsinki conference came at a specific historical and political time. Detente was at its height, albeit brief and precarious. The US was going through "years of upheaval" as Kissinger put it. The Vietnam war which had finished with the fall of Saigon in the Spring of 1975, the Watergate affair and the resignation of President Nixon (August 8th, 1975) all threw doubt on the ability of the US to lead the Western world. At the same time the EC found itself faced with contradictions. On the one hand, Europe at this time seemed to be a real success, almost a model of its kind. Since 1970, political cooperation - a system of diplomatic consultation - increased and reinforced economic integration, although it was not itself part of this integration. In 1971 and 1972 the first steps were taken towards an economic and monetary union. Finally on January 1st 1973, the Community welcomed into its ranks Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. In short, the Community, the biggest commercial union in the world bringing together three of the oldest nations (France, Germany and Great Britain), might then have been a third force in the world, becoming, in the con-

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frontation between the Super Powers, "a force for peace, reason and freedom" (André Fontaine). In the early 1970's, talks with the Eastern bloc developed and expanded regularly, first through Gaullist diplomacy and then through Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.

And yet in 1973, a key year in every respect, this unity was in fact flawed. Henry Kissinger, who became Secretary of State on August 22nd 1973, launched his "year of Europe" : "While recognising the structure of Europe, the US does not consider it to be an end in itself but rather a means of strengthening the West as a whole, a basic element in a wider Atlantic association". (speech on December 12th, 1973) In fact Kissinger's vision of a tiered system, encompassing the Community, met with reservations from the French and general indifference from the rest of Europe.

However if Kissinger met with partial failure, Europe itself proved to have neither unity nor willpower. This was clearly revealed during the Yom Kippur war with restrictions in petrol supplies from the Organization of the Arab Oil Exporters. Unity was shattered. France, protected from the worst effects through its Arab policy, was accused of being selfish. But above all, the lack of unity was evident in Washington in front of Kissinger at the Energy Conference (11th - 13th February 1974) when eight member-states of the Community decided to adopt a joint energy policy (the International Energy Agency) with France alone refusing to join.

Even towards the Eastern bloc, in particular the USSR, the EC found itself in a dilemma. The USSR rejected the idea of official contacts with what it considered to be an "imperialist war machine". And yet "both politically and economically the EEC is a major factor in Europe... At the end of the 1970's the European centre of the capitalist nations was becoming increasingly independent of the other centre i.e. the United States" (N.N. Inozemtsev)(2).

The existence of the EEC was at least accepted as a fact and several East European countries - Rumania, Hungary... - set up specific agreements with the Community.

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These political events throw some light on the particular nature of the EC at the time of the Helsinki conference. At Helsinki the discussions were mainly on statements and principles. The interests of the individual nations were not challenged. Similarly vis-à-vis the Israeli-Arab conflict - the second field about which Europe adopted a common political stand in the years 1977-80 -, it was a question of setting up guidelines, of adopting resolutions, and not of negotiating. In the first half of 1970, it seemed that responsibilities were divided in Europe of Nine between bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomacies ; the nations, first Federal Germany, worked out their individual problems with the Eastern bloc, while the EC as such set out general policy.

THE TWO PECULIARITIES OF EUROPE AT THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE

- In fact the Nine were present in two forms. On political questions (first and second baskets), it was the Europe of political co-operation and joint diplomatic action. The EC as an economic organisation was only concerned with the second basket.

- Since the EC was not legally recognised by certain participants (in particular the USSR), its views were put forward through one of the national delegations, that of the Community's president(3). On economic matters the Commission within the president's own national delegation became the spokesman. On political questions the President's national delegation expressed the opinions of the Nine after, of course, having discussed the questions together previously : "The convenient division of subjects within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into political and economic "baskets", each serviced by separate working groups, fitted this organizational division fairly well ; although there were occasions, during the Community's first discussions about contacts with Comecon and a concerted policy towards the East European countries, when Council committees consisting of representatives from national foreign ministries economic directorates came close to conceding points which were being held firm as bargaining counters in Helsinki or Geneva"(4).

.../...

Finally, at Helsinki, since the US was only there as an observer, the Nine emerged as an independent body. There was some friction between the United Kingdom, Federal Germany and France. The last one systematically supported European independence. However, "Instead of dividing the Nine, as some had feared, the CSCE managed to bring them together in one very important area of foreign policy. The signing of the Final Document of the CSCE by the Italian Prime Minister in his role as President of the Council of the European Community must also be considered to be the actual recognition of the Community by the East. Cooperation between the Nine and the USA has considerably revitalized within the West"(5).

This was soon to appear as a rather overoptimistic view.

THE BASIC SITUATION CHANGES COMPLETELY

Unity at Helsinki was in a way overestimated. It had come about through a set of circumstances which, already at the time of the conference, were about to change radically.

Obviously the greatest change was in the disintegration of detente - the arrival of the "cool war" (Breznev) - in the second half of the 70's. The Community room for manoeuvre and self assertion was restricted.

On the one hand, tension between the EC (joined by Greece in 1981) and the United States meant that the European entity hesitated between support for the West and its own desire for independence. The crises in Afghanistan, Iran and Poland showed a US firm in its resolve and a Europe anxious to compromise. The US viewed detente as nothing but a stratagem to the advantage of the USSR whereas Europe wanted to keep alive talks with the Eastern bloc.

In addition, faced with these stumbling blocks to improvement in East/West relations, the European nations reacted nationally. The member nations in their relations with the Communist bloc "opted in varying degrees for bi-lateral competition rather than more effective means of co-operation, or even a delegation of their powers to the Commission. It would appear that whenever governments ha-

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ve to face urgent internal or external problems they have less and less confidence in institutional machinery"(6).

Afghanistan, (Warsaw meeting between BREJNEV and GISCARD d'ESTAING, May 19th 1980), or the question of Euromissiles (Chancellor SCHMIDT's visit to Moscow, July 1980) showed just how deeply the bi-lateral reflex was ingrained. The EC'S ability to mediate through parliamentary-type conferences seems to dissolve in a crisis, especially when crises come in rapid succession.

Finally the growing recognition of the Community which Helsinki seemed to have established did not continue to develop or was indeed perhaps just an illusion. De facto recognition did not translate itself into law.

At the same time, talks parallel to those of the CSCE began between the EEC and the Comecon (CMEA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in August 1973 and became official in 1976 (the Comecon proposed agreement with the EEC on general terms of trade and co-operation)(7). Although the setting up of links between the two economic organisations was the logical outcome of detente between the two sides of Europe and of the CSCE, fundamental differences existed between the two institutions. The EC was the concrete symbol of a Western European force distinct from, and sometimes opposed to, the US and which would become the basis of future confederation, whereas the Comecon, dominated by the USSR, was an integral part of the Eastern bloc.

Furthermore, the commercial and economic integration of the EC was complete and irreversible whereas the Comecon was only reluctantly supported by most of the Eastern European nations (trade is three times as great within the EEC as in the Comecon). So the nature of the EEC/Comecon talks was distorted from the start. The EEC wanted to encourage and support Eastern Europe's hopes for independence whereas the very fact of mutual recognition between the EEC and the Comecon reinforced the idea that there were two separate identities and therefore two separate Europes. There have been occasional talks between the two organisations but as yet there have been no results...(8).

The impossibility of reaching an agreement throws light on the ambiguity which lay at the heart of the EC's action at Helsinki. The objective was the re-

.../...

cognition of Europe as a plurality of nations and the key to this lay with the USSR. The stand taken by Europe as a whole, as well as individual nations, was marked by the tension between the pressures of power politics and the desire to reconstitute a European space of freedom.

As for European political cooperation, the Nine, then the Ten, showed their unity over certain principles concerning Afghanistan and Poland but had to face Moscow's refusal of recognition. The Carrington proposals for a European summit conference on Afghanistan made in the name of the Community in July 1981 were rejected. An attempt to send a European emissary to Poland at the height of tension (the "state of war" proclamation on December 13th 1981) was aborted.

Finally, between Helsinki and Belgrade, then between Belgrade and Madrid, Madrid and Stockholm, the basic situation changed, forcing the European group to reexamine its position. At Helsinki the question of detente and the passive participation of the US aside, questions dealt with the second and the third baskets encouraged European initiatives. The Nine, then the Ten, were united on practical measures concerning individual rights (personal and professional contacts, family visits, etc.). In Belgrade, because of stiffening attitudes, the Mediterranean problem (a subject already raised at Helsinki where several non-European nations, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon were present as observers) was one of the few questions that gave rise to some debate. Only France put forward the idea that there should be a meeting of only those countries bordering the Mediterranean (Mediterranean Working group, November 1977). But more significantly, the question of security in Madrid became so important that it considerably reduced the role of European concertation as distinct from that of the Atlantic nations. In Stockholm (European Disarmament Conference, January 17th 1984), the question of disarmament and its military implications in particular, was left to member states, political cooperation being concerned only with regard to "certain important foreign policy questions relating to aspects of security policies"(9).

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THE ROLE AND CONTRADICTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
IN HELSINKI PROCESS

The deterioration in international relations, the East bloc's recognition de facto but not de jure of the EC and a change in prospects; all altered the EC's position in Helsinki process. Between Helsinki and Belgrade and then between Belgrade and Madrid the Nine then the Ten showed just how weak and incomplete their unity was.

Of course the institutions themselves, the infrastructure of the coordination between the Community matters and Political Cooperation improved and unified between Helsinki and Belgrade. Within the Permanent Representative Committee in Brussels, a CSCE group covering the second basket was set up to prepare the Belgrade meeting. Thanks in particular to the Commission members, links between this group and that of political co-operation were strengthened. But the basic obstacles were not administrative but political. The CSCE process was just one factor in East/West relations. What detente had never dealt with, the renewed tension emphasised this.

The UK continued its close relationship with the US while France considered it essential to maintain and to be seen to maintain its independence. However there was then a change of events : in May 1981 France elected as president, François MITTERRAND who was very concerned with Human Rights and, even more important, gave his support to the installation of US missiles in retaliation to the installation of Russian SS20's. Federal Germany could not consider to withdraw from talks begun with the East, particularly with Democratic Germany. But the changing nature of European unity was most apparent after Greece joined the EEC in 1981 and refused to condemn the USSR (This was very obvious after the South Korean plane was brought down by a Soviet fighter on August 31st 1983)(10). National interests did not disappear despite the links between the Ten ; and the chain of events after 1979 seemed only to harden national attitudes. The crisis management guidelines set up by the London report (October 13th, 1981) made no difference. Following the "State of war" in Poland, several EC nations opposed setting the crisis machinery in action. In Belgrade

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the balance of power had changed. The US through their representative Arthur Goldberg was ready for confrontation. Within the EC, France tried in vain to mediate (on February 17th 1978, the French proposal for a final document was dismissed summarily by the Soviet delegation). Indeed, France's partners preferred to stress solidarity with the US. At Belgrade links were forged between countries of similar culture. Denmark became the intermediary for the EC and Scandinavia and an informal German-speaking group made up of the two Germanies, Austria, Switzerland and Lichtenstein, supervised on documents linguistic exactitude.

In Madrid, although the Ten remained united in their position on Human rights and over what practical measures to adopt, they were separated by changing international events. After the "state of war" in Poland, Italy and the UK together with the US felt that any agreement in Madrid was impossible whereas France and Federal Germany thought negotiations should continue. This is fact what happened. The Ten characteristically compromised, Europe does not know how to say no ! Above all the importance of military questions (the French proposal for a European Disarmament Conference) switched the centre of concerted action to the Atlantic group.

So increasingly it is the neutral and non-aligned nations who play the role of mediator.

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMEMENT IN EUROPE

The Stockholm conference on security and safety measures and European disarmament, which began on January 17th 1984, was the result of a French proposal. At no time it became a proposal made by the Nine. Thus, on November 20th 1979, the Nine gave their support to the guidelines which inspired the proposals made by the French in May 1978 to the 35 signatories of the Helsinki agreement. In Stockholm the generally united approach adopted by the West at the opening of the conference was remarkable. The identity of views held by the Atlantic Alliance seemed complete. After one week's work the 16 NATO member-states put forward an official six point proposal subsequently referred to as a "package deal" in conference jargon(11).

.../...

In the CSCE process as in other areas of diplomacy (the Israeli-Arab conflict, relations with the US), the EC was soon confronted with basic problems. Its aim remains the establishment of a political body. But at present it is still only an association of sovereign nations which changes with every crisis and round of negotiations. Thus it will remain until Europe takes a major step forward which will transform it into a real power.

The ambiguity which appeared between Helsinki and Madrid can only persist. With twelve member states in 1986, there will be even more differences and more contradictions. The Western summit in Bonn (May 2nd - 4th 1985), while emphasising "the CSCE in which so much hope was invested for the improvement of Human Rights, should strengthen mutual trust, co-operation and security in Europe", underlined all the divisions of the Ten when faced with the US (particularly about the opening of the new trade negotiations inside the GATT and the Strategic Defence Initiative).

But, in the eyes of the EC, the CSCE process (even if the number of East/West meetings increases up to the plenary session in Vienna November 4th 1986) is only of secondary importance. The debate on Western Europe/US relations, postponed after the Euromissile crisis, was again renewed over the questions of trade and of starwars. The arrival of Gorbachev and his team at the head of the USSR will also result in some hard thinking within the Ten (then the Twelve) about the Soviet Union and the possibility of a European/Soviet dialogue.

NOTES

- (1) Karl KAISER, Cesare MERLINI, Thierry de MONTBRIAL, William WALLACE, Edmond WELLENSTEIN - "The European Community : Progress or Decline" - Royal Institute of International Affairs, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 1983.
- (2) N.N. INOZEMTSEV - The International Relations in Europe in the 1970's -Europe 1980, Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales de Genève, 1972, page 129.
- (3) First semester 1973 : Belgium,
Second semester 1973 : Denmark,
First semester 1974 : Federal Republic of Germany,
Second semester 1974 : France,
First semester 1975 : Ireland,
Second semester 1975 : Italy,
- (4) William WALLACE - National inputs into European Political Cooperation in "European Political Cooperation", ed. by David ALLEN, Rheinhardt RUMMEL, Wolfgang WESSELS - Butterworths European Studies, 1982, page 47.
- (5) Gotz Von GROLL - "The Nine at the Conference on Security and Coopération in Europe" - quoted in(4), pages 67-68.
- (6) Pierre HASSNER - Les politiques envers l'Est, rivalités et convergences dans "les politiques extérieures européennes dans la crise" (Policies towards Eastern Europe, Unity and Rivalry in "European Foreign Policies during the crisis") -Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1976, page 74.
- (7) As from January 1st 1975, the negotiation and signing of trade agreements comes under the authority of the EEC. However all agreements on co-operation and particularly industrial agreements remain under the control of member states.

.../...

(8) At present only Rumania among the Comecon nations has signed an agreement with the EEC.

(9) Extract from the London report, October 13th 1981.

(10) Similarly after the declaration of "state of war" in Poland on December 13th 1981, the European Council in its déclaration on March 30th 1982 pointed out "that the situation in Poland continues to influence East/West relations and therefore affects the relations of the Ten with Poland and the USSR which is responsible for the situation". In another paragraph of the declaration, "the Hellenic delegation made a reservation concerning that part of the first sentence which states that the relationship between the Ten and the USSR is influenced by events in Poland".

(11) Victor - Yves GHEBALI - The Stockholm Conference - Preliminary Perspectives, Défense Nationale, juin 1984, page 58.

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


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- SDI as a wish
- near-perfect defense
- ICBM defense
- SDI = Enhance deterrence

When you wish upon a star



- European Security



May 1985

(11)

THE CSCE PROCESS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld

- Essence of the CSCE process

Prospects:

no-early-use - prohibit some categories
of arms

+ international research and documentation
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Ten years after Helsinki
EUROPEAN SECURITY - A NEW BEGINNING
Haikko Manor - Helsinki 10 - 13 June 1985

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Adam Daniel Rotfeld

/Polish Institute of International
Affairs - Warsaw/

THE CSCE PROCESS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

I. The Introductory Remarks

Europe is growing more and more aware of the necessity to work out mechanisms of consultation and cooperation to eliminate in practice the possibility of contradictory interests and tensions turning into open hostility and prevent the out break of a nuclear war in Europe.

Meanwhile, East-West relations have for several years been deteriorating and recently entered into the phase of an acute crisis embracing practically all areas of international cooperation and contacts: politics and economics, military and social relations, scientific and cultural cooperation, and even spheres remote from politics, such as sport and tourism.

The causes of this state of affairs are seen differently in the East and in the West. It would however be a gross simplification to believe that appraisals and opinions are determined solely by membership in politico-military groupings or by other ties of alliance of various states. Apart from considerable differentiation of views on the causes of problems and difficulties in East-West relations, there are some common elements in the presented evaluations. No one questions the general thesis that the European reality is determined by both the relations between states as well as relations within individual states and groupings. Nor is the thesis disputed that militarization and ideologization of international relations are the main source of tension and aggravation of the present situation. How

ever, fundamental differences exist in the interpretation of these general theses, in identification of the sources of phenomena, and especially in determining the responsibility for the dangerous development of the situation in Europe.

The state of the relations between the Eastern and Western states which ten years ago participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe distinctly departs from the standards expressed in the form of principles and recommendations in the CSCE Final Act, and in many instances is an outright denial of them. The debates held in Madrid on the question of implementation of the Helsinki decisions as well as the negotiations aimed at agreeing on new recommendations focused on discerning the causes of the alarming deterioration of the situation, that is, on making a correct diagnosis and finding ways of increasing the effectiveness of the CSCE resolutions, so that they exert a tangible positive influence upon the state of East-West relations.

Ten years ago, when the preparations in Helsinki and Geneva for the CSCE Final Act, the work of the Conference was treated as the crowning stone of a whole series of bilateral agreements and relaxation of tension in East-West relations. It was the period of withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. In Europe it was the time of democratic changes in Spain, in Portugal and in Greece. Europe seemed to be entering on a path of construction of a system of security and co-operation. On a path from which there was no point of return.

The development of events questioned, however, the concept of detente developing continuously and along a steadily rising

curve. This reasoning posited a kind of automaticism of détente. There appeared a theory of the cyclical nature of development of international relations. After a phase of détente there came an outbreak of tensions in East-West relations within a few weeks of the historic meeting of the leaders of 35 states in Finlandia Hell. As the month and years passed negotiations and cooperation gave way to increasingly vehement political confrontation, polemics and mutual accusations. The reasons of this state of affairs are complicated. In short: assesment of the CSCE process runs all the way from an unqualified approval to extreme criticism. It has been accompanied both by great hopes and expectations and by dissatisfaction and disillusion.

In this context the following questions deserve being considered:

1. What is the essence of the CSCE process? Is this concept confined to the implementation of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, or does it embrace the whole of the policy of détente between the East and the West?
2. What is the nature of the CSCE provisions and what function do they perform in relations between the CSCE participating states?
3. Do the difficulties that have occurred in East-West relations possess a structural and lasting nature, or do they result from phenomena of a transitional and subjective nature and thus possess a temporary character?
4. What are the prospects for the CSCE process?

II. The Essence of the CSCE process

The multilateral process initiated ten years ago in Helsinki was the most comprehensive and ambitious attempt to harmonize the conflicting interests of States from East and West and to replace the confrontational and hostile posture by a cooperative.

Among the elements constituting the new quality of the process, one should mention:

- first, the setting in motion of the multilateral process; in the process initiated in Helsinki, all states of Europe and North America have participated since the beginning;

- second, the democratic character of this process; in the Final Recommendations from Helsinki, the participants agreed that all states would take part in the CSCE as sovereign and independent and in conditions of full equality; respect for equal rights is guaranteed by the provision that resolutions will be adopted by consensus, construed as lack on the part of any representative the objections which would be treated by him as an obstacle to making a decision in the question under discussion;

- third, the comprehensive character of the principles and decisions of the CSCE, which encompass practically all areas of international life: politics and economy, military affairs, cooperation in the humanitarian field, protection of the environment, exchange in the domain of culture, science, and technology, human contacts, information, and education. This made it possible to harmonize the interests of states in various do-

mains. On this basis, the CSCE Final Act is described as an expression of the equilibrium achieved, which integrally embraces all 'baskets' /concessions in some areas were compensated for in other domains/. Hence, a selective approach to the implementation of the CSCE resolutions, an exaggeration of the significance of some aspects at the expense of other aspects /e.g., evaluating the CSCE process exclusively from the viewpoint of human rights/, leads, in fact, to upsetting the equilibrium and to a deformation of the whole process. The meaning of the compromise accomplished consists not only in adopting definite agreements, but also in respecting in practice the interests of all participants in the CSCE process, interests expressed in concrete provisions of the Helsinki Final Act;

- fourth, ensuring the continuity of the initiated process without creating a new organization. Initially, the idea of calling new institutions into being gained wide popularity¹. It manifested itself in both official proposals of states and model solutions suggested by theorists in both the East² and the West. In time, however, the searches were concentrated on pragmatic solutions. It is worth noting that in the period of preparations for the CSCE, the NATO states were firmly opposed not only to an institutionalization, but also to a continuation of the multilateral process. As the debate on the contents of the principles and provisions of the CSCE Final Act lengthened, one could observe an evolution of standpoints in this question. The socialist states, which were the authors of the idea to set up a permanent organ, insisted on political rather than technical solutions. The point was that the initiated process should not lead to

'multiplying new organizational entities', but should rather serve the strengthening of security and the development of cooperation in Europe. On the other hand, the Western states, during the second stage of the CSCE in Geneva, would not assume 'any obligation for the future'⁴. Their stance resulted from the conviction that an institutionalization of the CSCE process was subordinated to the interests of the Warsaw Treaty countries and would lead to undermining the unity of the Atlantic Alliance⁵. Under the circumstances, neutral and non-aligned countries were the main advocates of ensuring the continuation of the Helsinki process, supported by a group of small and medium-size states of the East and the West, belonging to existing politico-military groupings. In effect, the continuity of the CSCE process /and this is the essence of the compromise in this matter/ consists not only in the decisions to hold multilateral meetings, such as Belgrade-77 or Madrid-80, and meetings of CSCE experts /as in Montreux in 1978, in La Valetta in 1979, in Hamburg in 1980, in Athens 1984, in Ottawa 1985 or in Budapest 1985/, but above all in implementing the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act on a uni-, bi-, and multi-lateral basis. In other words, content and substance rather than form are more important for the continuation of the process.

What is important in the CSCE process is that the participating States have given priority to their common interests over the differences which divide them. The CSCE provisions do not eliminate the sources of differences and controversies but create instruments to resolve conflicts through peaceful means, through negotiations, political consultation and cooperation.

In practice all areas of international activities and mutual relations among CSCE participating States should be adjusted to the set of rules adopted in Helsinki. The entire Final Act and the CSCE principles in particular set up an integral whole⁶. These and other provisions were intentionally included in the Final Act in order to prevent a selective approach of the adopted decisions and to rule out any attempt at over-emphasizing some principles at the expense of others. Officially all the countries in East and West reaffirmed in various ways the fact that - in accordance with the Final Act - each area is of equal importance to security and cooperation in Europe. In practice some NATO States, and in particular the United States, consider only the human rights provisions as the centerpiece and the core of the whole CSCE process⁷. Such a reduction of the practical significance of Helsinki Final Act to certain aspects of human rights /individual vs. collective; political vs. economic/ was persistently pursued at all the stages of the CSCE to the detriment of other provisions, and especially of those regulating the areas of security and economic cooperation. In general, although the aim of the Helsinki Conference was to elaborate the framework of inter-state relations, the main concern of the NATO representatives was: how to replace the role and responsibility of States by the individuals and non-governmental organizations in the process initiated by the CSCE. This approach reflected the political philosophy and ideological values of the Western countries.

The documents adopted in Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid express a compromise. But it would be a crass oversimplification

to say - as it is often presented in some publications⁸ - that "Basket One" /Questions Relating to Security in Europe/ reflected principally the interests of the Socialist countries, whereas "Basket Three" /Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields/ suited the needs and the expectations of the NATO States. One should not imagine the compromise as a simple trade-off; as a "price" which had to be paid by WTO or NATO countries for adopting certain provisions unacceptable to them. The compromise is expressed in an agreement reflecting a balance of interests not only in the entire document, but also in its parts and even in specific, carefully and thoroughly negotiated phrases and wordings of some provisions.

The process of the CSCE was "motivated by the political will in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world."⁹ In other words, it was intended to establish a confidence building system encompassing all the areas of international activities. In order to achieve this aim, the central problem was to find a balance between goals and means. This implies respect for socio-political diversity. On this basis a systematization and codification of principles and norms proved possible, which were to constitute, to the agreed extent, a joint regime for all European and North American states. Specific solutions were to be subordinated to these goals.

III. The Nature of the CSCE Decisions

Exploring the causes of the limited effectiveness of the Helsinki Final Act, some observers express the view that the source of the weakness of the CSCE lies in the moral-political /and not legal/ character of its provisions and in the limitation of the scope of their application to the territories of the signatory states. The character of the CSCE resolutions is the outcome of a definite compromise. Three ways of thinking on this question have emerged which could be characterized briefly as follows:

1. The Final Act is not an agreement in the understanding of the law of treaties and does not give rise to obligations under international law /this way of reasoning is widespread among Western authors/¹⁰.

2. The Final Act contains provisions of a varying legal nature; nonetheless, the CSCE Declaration on Principles is the most significant, its provisions being unreservedly binding in the sphere of international law /this view prevails in the professional literature of the Socialist countries/¹¹.

3. The Final Act systematizes and concretizes norms of a political nature¹²; they possess a varying but essential legal significance, since they reinforce the binding rules of international law or further the development of this law; nonetheless, the sources of the binding force of the CSCE resolutions are of a non-legal nature¹³.

Misunderstandings arising with regard to the politico-legal qualification of the CSCE provisions are connected with a text-

bookish approach to new phenomena and solutions which - satisfying as they do the definite needs of international life - transcend the bounds of the traditional science of law. The opinion is quite widespread among specialists in international law that only legal rules possess a binding force in international relations. Any non-legal, political, moral norms were regarded as not being binding. This is doubtless a correct reasoning as far as international law is concerned. However, the CSCE resolutions are designed as an instrument of action in the sphere of politics, and not in the domain of international law. This distinction is clearly drawn in the text of the Helsinki Final Act. Principle X /Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law/ states, inter alia: "In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their /the participating states - A. D. R./ laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe". In addition, the parties to this document stated that "the text of this Final Act /.../ is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations", which, as a note of the Finnish government to the UN Secretary General explains, would be the case if an international treaty or agreement was involved¹⁴. Under the circumstances, any attempts at imparting a legal character to the Final Act are futile, since it was a clear intention of the parties not to give a legal form to the principles and provisions adopted. Moreover, those authors are right who emphasize that this does

not detract from the significance and effectiveness of the Final Act¹⁵. One can, of course, ponder over the motives which guided the signatories of the document in giving it a form which "goes beyond the known categories of documents containing the results of international conferences"¹⁶. At this point, it seems relevant to remark that the non-legal nature of the CSCE provisions is the outcome, not of an oversight, but of the political will of the states participating in the Conference. Consequently, a legal interpretation can only help to understand the function of this document. For example, the statement that this is not an international agreement or that the document does not create laws and obligations in the sense of hard law, but only in the sense of soft law, does not explain anything, since the intention of the participants in the CSCE was not to make law, but to search for effective political mechanisms to strengthen security and develop cooperation in Europe.

In other words, criteria of political rather than legal evaluation are suitable in an analysis of the accords reached in Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid¹⁷ since the problem lies not in a qualification of the CSCE provisions from the point of view of the theory of international law, but in defining the role and function which these provisions ought to fulfill in the practice of international relations.

Considering the problem in practical categories, one can set forth a thesis that the CSCE provisions had, and have, a dual function to perform. On the one hand, they definitely closed the postwar period in Europe; on the other, they rendered concrete the principles of peaceful coexistence in Europe and defined the

rules of conduct of states in their mutual relations in the future.

The political nature of the obligations undertaken in the Final Act presupposes political responsibility for the fulfillment of these obligations. What decides of the efficacy of international political norms in general, and of the CSCE provisions in particular, are the principles of reciprocity and interdependence. Interestingly enough, the effectiveness of a number of international-legal obligations which states had assumed long before the signature of the CSCE Final Act /e.g., in the International Covenants on Human Rights/ increased only after their inclusion in the provisions of the Final Act. This concerns not only human rights, but also some other generally binding principles of international law which, after their inclusion in the CSCE Declaration on Principles, exert a much stronger influence on the practice of international relations than they did prior to the Helsinki Conference. One could mention here, in particular, references to territorial principles, to the principle of self-determination, and to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Also worth noting is the fact that during the meetings of representatives of the participating states in Belgrade and Madrid, delegations presented in detail and of their own accord, not only the achievements in the realization of the Final Act provisions regarding operative matters /economic cooperation, cooperation in science and technology, the protection of the environment, human contacts, information, culture, and education/, but also in the observance and implementation of the CSCE decalogue of principles. In other words,

the fact that the CSCE process has so far had a rather limited effect on the improvement of relations between the states of Europe does not result from the limited binding force of the decisions of the Helsinki Conference, but from a whole chain of causes beyond the sphere of influence of this process.

IV. The Problems and Difficulties

How did the provisions and the whole mechanism of the CSCE function in practice? The evaluation of this process is not unequivocal even from the point of view of individual states, so a convergence of views is much more difficult to achieve in multilateral documents to be agreed upon by representatives of the 35 states participating in the CSCE /the attempts at formulating, in Madrid, joint opinions on the subject of the implementation of the CSCE provisions encountered insurmountable difficulties/. This is comprehensible if one considers that the Helsinki document was, and still is, treated in practice by all countries as an instrument for the realization of group and national interests. This approach raises no objections if the interests of the individual states or groups of states are not incompatible with common goals and the foundations of the whole process.

Attempts at summing up the implementation of the CSCE provisions were made at various stages, both in socialist countries and in a majority of Western states. Unlike the materials of the US Congress, however, the attention /e.g., in reports worked out in Spain, Denmark, Finland, or Canada/ was as a rule focused on

the foreign policy of the given state in the context of the implementation of the CSCE principles and recommendations. Although a collection of reports of this kind would not provide a sufficient basis for an objective summing-up of the implementation of the Final Act, nonetheless, these reports testify to the need of presenting by the signatory states of their accomplishments in this domain. Interestingly enough, the European surveys on this subject identify the CSCE process with détente in East-West relations. Disturbances in this process are treated as departures from the normal state of international relations, although there exist fundamental divergencies in the evaluation of the sources and causes of difficulties and problems now arising along the East-West line.

During the past years that have elapsed since the signature of the Final Act, a significant evolution has occurred in the Western appraisals of this document: initially criticized as an expression of the West's unilateral concessions toward the Socialist countries, this document today is treated as the basis for relations with the Socialist countries over a historically long period of time.

Practice is the touchstone of the durability and effectiveness of international mechanisms. The positive achievements of the CSCE process should not be limited to maintaining channels of communication and understanding between the East and the West in conditions of a deteriorating international situation. The measure of the effects of this process are not single agreements, facts, and developments, but the sum total of phenomena that have brought about lasting changes in the international system -

changes in the sphere of politics /the state of inter-bloc relations and the equally important changes within the blocs/, of social psychology /overcoming the barriers of hostility and animosity/, of economy /awareness of interdependencies/, of the military aspects of security /awareness of threats and of the need to create new structures for confidence and security/.

A positive aspect of the CSCE process is that Europe has been brought closer to the vision of common security:

- territorial-political stability has been achieved; the problem of frontiers has been removed from the agenda of the international debate;

- tendencies toward emancipation in Western Europe have been strengthened and the foreign policies of the states of that region have been diversified /the European NATO states do not want to subordinate their interests to the US global policy/;

- the CSCE process is clearly shifting to the sphere of military aspects of security /the I Stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in Stockholm/;

- old economic, cultural, and other ties between the East and the West have been restored and new ones established;

- continuation of the détente process in the long run may create for all CSCE participating states optimum external conditions for resolving difficult economic and social problems.

There are negative phenomena as well:

- an "ideologization" of the CSCE process;

- the utilization by some countries of détente and CSCE process as an instrument, in more distant perspective, for a

revitalization of a German problem, which would upset the European equilibrium;

- attempts taken by some NATO states at making Socialist countries economically dependent on the West /inadequate instruments of interdependence/.

Altogether, the process initiated in Helsinki has released immense energy and activated the policies of all participants in the CSCE. Various unilateral actions were undertaken; in many countries changes were introduced in legal regulations; steps were taken to provide material premises for the realization of the adopted decisions. On a bilateral basis, along the East-West line: reviews of bilateral relations are carried out regularly with a view to a more effective implementation of the CSCE resolutions; new agreements are being concluded, which concretise the general principles and recommendations contained in multilateral documents. Finally, on a multilateral basis: dialogue is continuing, the successive stages of which were marked by the CSCE follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid and by the meetings of CSCE experts /in Montreux, La Valetta, in Bonn, Hamburg, and in Athens, Venice, Ottawa and Budapest/.

The question arises in this context: is the process initiated in Helsinki nearing conclusion? Do the possibilities for an improvement of relations and for a further positive influence on shaping the situation in Europe require setting new mechanisms in motion?

V. Prospects for the CSCE Process

The increase of tension in the world necessitates searching for more effective means of surmounting this tension. Should we expect a new conference of the leaders of 35 states of Europe and North America? Such a solution cannot be ruled out. However, the problem must not be limited to holding successive conferences and adopting new declarations and documents, although in critical situations the negotiating process alone contributes to the relaxation of tension and plays the role of a stabilizer of East-West relations. Détente and the CSCE process, which is an institutional continuation of détente, do not function in a vacuum and are not linear phenomena. In the 1970's the framework and rules were defined for rivalry and clashes of conflicting interests in various areas of international life. These contradictions have not evanesced. What is more, in effect of accelerated armaments, the relations in the military field have gravely deteriorated. New threats have been added to the old ones. The question has arisen of extending the CSCE process to the sphere of military relations. This is a new and important dimension which will determine the essence of European security in the 1980's. The possibility is emerging of progress in the questions of the so-called second generation of military confidence-and security-building measures and of including them in the structures shaped in the multilateral CSCE process.

One should not expect that in the future the process of security and cooperation will proceed in conditions of harmonious interests and lack of factors which adversely influence its

development. Politics is an art of feasible things. Although it is obvious that diplomatic transactions are carried out in effect of compromise and mutual concessions, one can at times have the impression that positive results of détente are expected without the readiness to bear the expenses of this policy. Such expectations are illusive and unrealistic. In practice, this means that two parallel political lines will continue to exist in the CSCE process: on the one hand, the striving to strengthen security and develop cooperation, on the other hand, attempts to employ CSCE mechanisms for the purpose of legalization of a policy of interference in the internal affairs of other states. This process will oscillate between security and cooperation, on the one hand, and confrontation and interventionism, on the other¹⁸. External developments and factors independent of the CSCE /political, economic, and military situation, conflicts, etc./ have so far had a stronger effect on the evolution of the process initiated in Helsinki than this process has had on the development of the situation.

In other words, security has its limits. They are determined by the vital interests of external and internal security of individual states and of the two alliances. A subjective approach to these interests and attempts by one side to pursue its own goals without regard to the goals of the partners may, and actually do, create threats to the functioning of the entire international system. An effective and realistic security system in present-day Europe, and, more broadly, in East-West relations, cannot be founded on a concept of domination and submission, that is to say, it cannot be a system of subordination in

the sense that one grouping would recognize the superiority of the other and submit to its will. Adopting as the initial premise the approximate balance of power that exists in East-West relations and the fact that the dividing line runs between the groups of states with different socio-political systems, the security system should perform the functions of coordination and of maintaining the balance of power. Leaving theoretical considerations aside, it is only worth noting that the development of this system in the 1980's will be determined by clashes of different conceptions in conjunction with the concrete military-political situation, and not in accordance with model constructions elaborated by theorists. Instructive in this respect is the experience of the past decade, when there appeared scores of different theoretical propositions which had no visible effect on the adopted solutions. There are chances to restore the practical significance of the CSCE process only if the following requirements are met.

/1/ Respect for the principle of "equal security" and the preservation of military equilibrium. This demands, above all, acceptance of nuclear parity and renunciation by all sides of strivings to secure superiority. It also means refraining from the absolutization of one's own security at the expense of the other side and the treatment of the question of control and verification in a manner adequate to the agreed measures aimed at strengthening security, reducing armaments, and diminishing military activity.

/2/ The effective application of a policy of non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs. This involves the

renunciation of expansionism and arbitrary recognition of various regions of the world as one's own "security zones"; full respect for the inviolability of existing and recognized frontiers /this concerns, above all, the situation in Central Europe/, the questioning of which is a destabilizing factor in the politico-military equilibrium, which constitutes the foundation of regional security.

/3/ The non-use-of-force in international relations. This concerns both relations between states and between systems. This can be achieved in different forms: a treaty, or solemn declaration, or any other political act which would ensure the practical effectiveness of the principle of non-use-of-force.

/4/ Separating the ideological competition from interstate relations. This means refraining from transferring ideological disputes into the sphere of relations between states and from tendencies to impose one's own value system as the only valid model and criterion in evaluating the policies of other states and social movements.

/5/ Joint action aimed at resolving global problems which condition the maintenance of world peace. This concerns, in particular, steps designed to prevent nuclear war and bring about disarmament.

No one should cherish the illusion that system of common security in Europe will be the result of a definite meeting or conference. This is a process with a historical dimension, a process taking place on many planes, complex, and not devoid of internal contradictions, a process of searching for the common denominator for different, at times antagonistic conceptions of

security and confidence. The results of the Helsinki Conference were the first step along this road. The next step was done in Madrid. Some hopes are connected with the Stockholm Conference.

The initiated dialogue may be disturbed or even suspended, but should not be discontinued for good. Security and mutual trust are not, and will not be, a condition achieved once and for all. This is a process of searching for equilibrium and equal security in a world of conflicting interests, tensions, and crises.

What Europe needs is a comprehensive agreement. Such an agreement cannot be worked out by experts or achieved as a result of detailed debates of a technical-military nature. The gravity of the situation demands serious decisions which would diminish distrust and suspicion and increase confidence and the will of cooperation, and which would eliminate more effectively the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe.

Footnotes

¹ The memorandum of ministers of foreign affairs of states parties to the Warsaw Treaty /Budapest, June 22, 1970/ said that it would be useful to hold a series of European conferences and to establish an appropriate organ, with the participation of interested states, to deal with the question of security and cooperation in Europe. The head of the Polish delegation to phase I of the CSCE in Helsinki, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski, said on July 7, 1973: "we think it necessary to set up suitable machinery for multilateral consultations involving all States participating in the Conference. Poland attaches particular importance to the establishment of such a mechanism, perhaps in the shape of a consultative committee". Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Stage I - Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7, 1973, /CSCE/I/PV. 2, p. 37/. An expression of the official standpoint of the Warsaw Treaty states in this matter was the Czechoslovak proposal submitted on July 4, 1973 /Doc. CSCE/I/5/ and the communique of the Consultative Political Committee of States-parties to the Warsaw Treaty /Warsaw, April 18, 1974/.

² One could mention here proposal to set up a Council for European Security, contained in the book of the Soviet author M. N. Minasyan: *Sotsializm i mezhdunarodnoye pravo*. Saratov 1975, p. 236. As regards Polish authors, cf.: A. Towpik: *Ogólnoeuropejski system bezpieczeństwa i współpracy /The European System of Security and Cooperation/*, in: *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 1972, no. 1, p. 13 and A. D. Rotfeld: *Ogólnoeuropejski system*

bezpieczeństwa i współpracy /Prawdopodobieństwo powstania, zarys struktury i funkcji/ /The European System of Security and Cooperation: The Probability of Its Establishment: An Outline of Its Structure and Functions/. in: Studia Nauk Politycznych, 1973, no. 2, pp. 165 ff.

³ A detailed proposal for an East-West Standing Commission - cf.: M. Palmer: The Prospects for a European Security Conference London 1971, p. 50. For more on the subject of Western models of institutional solutions, see: A. D. Rotfeld: Europejski system bezpieczeństwa i współpracy /Zachodnie modele a rzeczywistość/ /The European System of Security and Cooperation /The Western Models and Reality// Warszawa 1973, mimeographed.

⁴ Ph. Devillers: Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe. Revue de Défense Nationale, 1975, no. 31.

⁵ The American authors T. W. Stanley and D. M. Whitt /Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's. New York 1970, pp. 81 ff/ defined nine Soviet policy objectives which the multilateral CSCE process will serve. For a critical analysis of this stance, see: A. D. Rotfeld: The CSCE /Its Conception, Realization and Significance/ in: Polish Western Affairs, 1973, vol. XIII, no. 1, p. 23.

⁶ The final clause of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between CSCE States provides: "All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others."

⁷ One can find in some American writings the following interpretation of the CSCE Final Act: "For the first time in history, human rights were formally recognized in an international agreement as a fundamental principle regulating relations between States." William Korey, *Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord. Focus on U.S. Policy.* /New York, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 264, 1983/, p. 15-17. These types of comments ignore the UN Charter /art. 1, p. 3/ and other documents, such as the Declaration of Human Rights or the Covenants on Human Rights.

⁸ Among the American publications - see: S. J. Flanagan, "The CSCE and the Development of Detente", in *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s*, D. Leebaert, ed. /Lexington, 1979/, p. 190; Korey, *op.cit.*

⁹ "The Preamble of the CSCE Final Act", in *From Helsinki to Madrid. CSCE Documents.* A. D. Rotfeld, ed. Warsaw 1983, p. 111.

¹⁰ Cf. H. S. Russel: *The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?* in: *American Journal of International Law*, 1976, vol. 70; G. von Groll: *Die Schlussakte der KSZE. Aussenpolitik*, 1975, vol. 26; K. Blech: *Die KSZE als Schritt im Entspannungsprozess* in: *Europa Archiv*, 1975, vol. 30.

¹¹ Cf. e.g.: *Vo imia mira. Miezhdunarodnopravniye problemy yevropeiskoi bezopastnosti*, Moskva 1977; S. Bock: *Festigung der Sicherheit in Europa - Kernstück der Schlussakte von Helsinki.* *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, 1975, vol. 20; W. Poeggel: *Kwestia obowiązującego charakteru Aktu Końcowego z Helsinek przy szczególnym uwzględnieniu 10 zasad* /*The Question of the Binding Force*

of the Helsinki Final Act with Special Emphasis on the 10 Principles/ in: Przegląd Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 1976, no. 1.

¹² This standpoint is widely represented in Polish writings. Cf. J. Symonides: Deklaracja zasad stosunków międzypaństwowych KBWE /The CSCE Declaration on Principles of International Relations/ in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 1975, no. 10; A. Klafkowski: Akt Końcowy KBWE - podstawy interpretacji prawnej /The CSCE Final Act: The Basis for Legal Interpretation/ in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 1976, no. 7-8; A. D. Rotfeld: KBWE. Zagadnienia prawne /The CSCE: Legal Questions/ in: Państwo i Prawo, 1976, no. 1-2; K. Skubiszewski: Akt Końcowy KBWE w świetle prawa międzynarodowego /The CSCE Final Act in the Light of International Law/ in: Państwo i prawo, 1976, no. 12; R. Bierzanek: Bezpieczeństwo regionalne w systemie ONZ /Regional Security within the UN System/. Warszawa 1977, ch. VIII.

¹³ Cf. Th. Schweisfurth: Zu der Rechtsnatur, Verbindlichkeit und völkerrechtlichen Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zum Phänomen der ausserrechtlichen /non-legal/ zwischenstaatlichen Abmachung. Zeitschrift für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1976, no. 4.

¹⁴ Cf. UN Office of Public Information, NO/464/ - note of September 19, 1975.

¹⁵ "The fact that the CSCE Final Act is not a treaty, is by no means disadvantageous. And even on the contrary, a treaty could be renounced and then various doubts would arise as to the attitude of the withdrawing state toward European cooperation. The CSCE Final Act is not subject to renunciation because the

law of treaties is not applicable to it". K. Skubiszewski: op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 15.

¹⁷ Cf. J. Gilas: Międzynarodowe normy polityczne /International Political Norms/ in: Przegląd Stosunków Międzynarodowych 1978, no. 3.

¹⁸ Cf. a collective work: Zwischen Intervention und Zusammenarbeit. Interdisziplinäre Arbeitsergebnisse zu Grundfragen der KSZE. Berlin 1979.

Conditions and Requirements for Policy
of Peaceful Coexistence in Europe and
Coalition of Common Sense

(a contribution to the III. session :
Towards a European security order)

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Conditions and Requirements for Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Europe and Coalition of Common Sense

I. Experience of the seventies

Prevention of war along with preservation and consolidation of peace has become the "categorical imperative" of international relations in our time. A solution to political, economic, and social problems by means of military confrontation is less practicable than ever before. In view of the worldwide concentration and massing of destructive capacities, such an approach would lead to disaster. The aggravating danger to the very existence of mankind which would result from a war fought with weapons of mass destruction and associated total irrationality of military war-winning thinking has created a situation in which even preparations for such war are of destabilising impact on international security. Due to the intricate nature of the structure of international relations, even minor hotbeds of tension might touch on security interests of other states and groups of states and, consequently, escalate to global conflict.

Such inescapable pressure towards peaceful arrangement of international relations is likely to entail new demands on the political action of all states, above all those of greater military importance, with the view to finding compromise solutions to disputed problems. A retrospective review of European developments (and their global implications) from the mid-seventies, against the background of the objective need

for peaceful arrangement, may provide some fundamental insights which can be lessons for today. Or, in other words: Continuation on the road to collective security in Europe, as an objective of our efforts, will depend for good success on thorough evaluation of the experience of détente, if the policy of détente is to be revived, continued, and eventually raised to higher levels for the above purpose.

Systematised account of experience

In the first place, evidence has been produced to the effect that in our continent genuine and high-stability security will not be obtainable unless it is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence among states of different social systems. Europe, the continent where states of the two antagonistic systems are facing each other within closest contact distance, has been the first region which showed most clearly that neither side can achieve security at the expense of the other side's insecurity. It has been an irrevocable experience of the Europeans that the policy of cold war, threat of military aggression, economic embargo, and open confrontation did not only fail to weaken the positions of the socialist states but also failed to provide any benefit to its authors. Safeguarding of peace, cooperation, and reduction of tension will not be practicable unless common or parallel interests of all parties involved are accepted as point of departure and are mutually respected and, more important though, are systematically explored and expanded. One tenet was absolutely confirmed, one

which had already been agreed for the 1972 USSR-USA Treaty on Basic Principles of Relations, though repeatedly neglected by the Western side: Never try "directly or indirectly to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side".

In the second place, this experience has been recorded: Acceptance of the view that security from war is the most elementary security interest has added great momentum to the process of détente. It was thus a new experience in the seventies that, for the first time in history, peace appeared to be more than simply absence of war in a vicious circle of war - peace - war again. The nations of Europe discovered that peace and security were possible on the basis of permanent constructive dialogue and development of reciprocally advantageous cooperation among states of different social systems. Hence, evidence was produced to the effect that the conditions of the political framework can be substantially stimulating or inhibiting factors for progress in all-European cooperation at economic, cultural, and humanitarian levels.

In the third place, more armament, confrontation instead of cooperation, retardation of steps to military détente proved to provide less rather than more security for all parties involved. The system of international relations was thus found to be destabilised, with the risk of disastrous war growing.

In the fourth place, the seventies produced clarity on where to find the prime movers and forces for continued political détente and complementary steps towards military détente, on the one hand, and those forces, on the other, that were behind confrontation concepts in European state relations.

History itself has clearly revealed who stayed the course to recovery of the atmosphere in Europe and the world, the socialist nations and states as well as numerous peaceloving, realistic, and negotiation-minded forces in the West. It has also revealed who had left that course, forces working against détente and for military superiority that today have a decisive say above all in US policies.

The approach to European security had all the time been characterised by two trends since the end of World War Two: policies aimed at peaceful cooperation, pursued by the socialist states, progressive forces in all strata in capitalist countries, and realistically thinking bourgeois circles, including circles in government, on the one hand, and policies oriented to prevention and dismantling of international cooperation on an equal footing, on the other, the latter policies being pursued by certain forces in Western countries that tried to obtain "security" by surrender or defeat of socialism.

The problem of European security and cooperation has again been sharpened and its prospects blurred by the policy of the US administration in Ronald Reagan's first term of office. It was a policy of rejection of détente and peaceful coexistence and of anti-socialist rhetoric.

The countries of the socialist community are not willing to use force, pressure or military violence to settle the antagonism between different systems and ideologies. They wish to resort to peaceful means. The inevitable parallelism of socialism and capitalism should and must be characterised by

peaceful coexistence among states of different social systems, for the sake of man's survival. They are working for an expansion of positive approaches to peaceful togetherness of the nations of Europe. The socialist states have neither open nor covert intentions to force the ideas of scientific socialism upon other peoples and states, with military means being absolutely out of question.

At this point, explicit reference should be made to the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty of January 1983 in which the following statement was made:

"Being aware of their responsibility for peace and international security, the socialist countries clearly distinguish their policies regarding ideological issues from issues of inter-state relations, and they pursue their relations with capitalist states on the basis of peaceful coexistence ...".² This attitude differs basically from predominant US policies at present, with efforts being made in the USA to elevate its politico-ideological principle of eradicating the system of socialism to the level of state doctrine and to put that doctrine into reality by all means, including military action. Equality in inter-state relations is being replaced by the concept of hegemony, also over the allies in Western Europe, and disrespect is displayed even for those allies' security interests which would call for peaceful accommodation and coexistence with the socialist states.

In the fifth place, European détente has demonstrated its viability and attractiveness and has left behind ineradicable

traces in politics and economy and in the minds of people, although persistent attempts had been made by its adversaries to bury its once and for ever. Some sort of infrastructure of détente has come into being due to the following developments and should be reactivated and utilised for the purpose of introducing another phase of peaceful coexistence:

- At the level of politics and international law, the Final Act of Helsinki, the CSCE process in general, the Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague treaties (between these three countries, on the one hand, and the FRG, on the other), the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, the Basic Principles Treaty between the GDR and FRG as well as numerous additional bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions;
 - At the level of economy, advancement of trade and industrial cooperation between socialist countries, on the one hand, and market-economy countries, on the other;
 - At the level of cultural activities, growing exchange;
 - At psychological level, rethinking oriented to peaceful relations, progress in cooperation, and military détente.
- Hence, the past one and a half decades have revealed potentials, possible approaches as well as obstacles and problems regarding transition to democratic, peaceful, and cooperative inter-state relations in Europe, and these have been shown to be the very substance of peaceful coexistence and détente under the aspect of international relations.

This has given rise to the following question: Europe is the region in which heavily armed states of both diametrically

opposed systems are facing each other at short distance and where the earliest and clearest evidence has been produced to the effect that neither side can win by trying to inflict destabilisation and other damage upon the other. This very continent had a pacemaker position towards international détente for a long time. Can this Europe restore its pacemaker role or is it doomed to abandon that role and become a hotbed of extreme danger to progress of mankind?

II. Nature, substance, and purpose of a coalition of common sense and realism

While the situation today has become much more complicated due to aggravation of tension, another round of the arms race as well as due to the absence of agreement on arms control and arms reduction or limitation, it is not irreversible. Europe is now passing through one of its most taxing periods since the end of the second world war. It is, therefore, extremely important to realise that there is not only a need but also a possibility for a revival of the process of European security and cooperation and for its continuation under new conditions. A coalition of common sense is required with a clearcut orientation to a condition of peace in Europe in which inter-state cooperation to the benefit of nations rather than confrontation is an accepted standard of conduct.

1. Need for coalition of common sense

The need for a coalition of common sense, realism, and good will has primarily resulted from a substantive danger to human

survival, since the sword of Damocles of nuclear inferno will inevitably hit our planet with smashing impact unless it is halted in time. Shakespeare's famous question "To be or not to be" has ceased to be merely rhetoric in literature; it has become the question of mankind. Only this alternative has been left: coexistence for existence or fall of the world into nuclear maelstrom. It is the compelling logic of the nuclear age which objectively calls for rethinking, new approaches to security policies, and for thorough scrutiny of traditional standards and codes of conduct in international relations. This should be conducive to aspirations as well as to the need and objectives for a coalition of common sense which, after all, is intended to stimulate and implement a security concept in keeping with the realities of the nuclear age. Objective developments and new notions have shown that Einstein's famous statement has long ceased to be valid, when he said that the explosion of the atom bomb had changed everything but thinking. It is thinking which has begun to change, that change being reflected in action. The logic of the nuclear age is a constituting element for structuring the political philosophy of the coalition of common sense. This, first of all, means to understand a number of basic aspects: war can no longer be a rational instrument by which political objectives can be accomplished; more weapons will produce more insecurity rather than security; national security can now be achieved only through international security; security can

be primarily achieved through political approaches, and it also can be achieved only as common security on the basis of equality.

Emergence and consolidation of a coalition of common sense are greatly encouraged and supported by a palpable activation, in recent years, of the international public, its awareness of peace, and its sensitisation for all issues relating to war and peace.

Understanding of the enormous menace to the world and the individual has grown by leaps and bounds, in some cases instinctively and with moral and ethical motivations but in all cases growingly open to logical reasoning. Readiness to think and undertake commitments has positively grown. It means something, indeed, that, for example, towards the end of Ronald Reagan's first term of office the overwhelming majority of the US public has made crystal-clear that they would not recognise nuclear war as a legitimate instrument of politics and that one should not simply stage a show of strength towards the Soviet Union but should rather negotiate.³

Possibilities and points of departure to a coalition of common sense do clearly depend on progress in general perception of security policy. Such progress, by its very substance, is identical with the expansion on the largest possible scale of democratic awareness, as it actually reflects a claim made by an overwhelming majority. In certain countries, this has resulted in situations in which the issues of war and peace

have given rise to constellations of political forces totally different from the usual groupings in parliamentary life.

Inspirations for the establishment of a coalition of common sense and realism may be derived also from historic and contemporary experience obtained from similar alliances of action, which should be particularly remembered at the 40th anniversary of liberation from Hitlerite fascism. The anti-Hitler coalition clearly demonstrated that cooperation in the interest of mankind was possible, despite differentiated socio-economic structures and political orientations of its participants.

Those capable of understanding at least some realities in the world today and in Europe and capable of sober reaction to these realities and those who understand that the risk of military options and policies would be too high and their use inappropriate and those who assume, as McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara did, that with regard to East-West relations "our common interest concerning the problem of nuclear war danger is greater than the totality of all rivalry among us"⁴ they act in a spirit of a coalition of common sense.

2. Nature of coalition of common sense

The choice of wording of coalition of common sense has by no means been accidental. It rather takes us to a characteristic of this phenomenon in present society. Even in the past, for example, in classical philosophy, had "common sense"

been defined as a force capable of inducing fundamental change. The notion of "common sense" has not been abstract and subjectivistic, in that context, but reference was rather made to those reasonable forces capable - translated to contemporary conditions and requirements - of changing international relations to the effect that the danger of nuclear war was checked for good and that people embarked on a road to collective security. It is in this context that common sense can be defined as a driving force. It has something to do with reason, calm consideration, and insight and is often synonymous of these terms. It is primarily related to rational cognition. Common sense, in terms of foreign policy, means to understand and accept reality and to take cautious and wise action according to that reality and its major requirements.

Coalition of common sense, in other words, reflects different partners' mature insight to the effect that there is something absolute good beyond their classes, antagonisms, and rivalries, something worthwhile to cooperate for, namely peace as the desirable principle of inter-state relations. The following point of relevance to this reasoning was made in a pastoral of Catholic bishops in the USA: "There are political philosophies in which moral values are interpreted so differently from our own notions that even negotiations often start from different premises, though one and the same terminology may be used on either side. That is no reason for no negotiations."⁵

The boundaries among adversaries on issues of war and peace are by no means congruent with national, class, party, and ideological boundaries. No emphasis at all is laid on enforcement of specific class and state interests, but all emphasis is exclusively laid on the assurance of political conditions for man's survival. Coalition of common sense means to strive at togetherness and cooperation in inter-state relations and on the issue of ensuring peace. It means that no one must try to enforce upon another party its own position or even philosophy and that acceptance of one's own position or ideology must not be made a condition for cooperation in action for peace. It also means that joint action for peace, security, and international cooperation is not hinged on an abandonment of one's own system or specific class goals. A slogan of relevance to our time has once been coined by the Palme Commission: "Even ideological and political rivals have a common interest in survival."⁶ Anything else must come second, today. Competition between the systems must be carried out in peaceful forms, this is another tenet behind the concept of coalition of common sense.

A coalition of common sense and realism ought to be characterised by democratised dealing with one another, equality and equal rights, and the demand for equal security. Independence and sovereignty of all partners to a coalition is in any case essential. Respect for the other side's motivations and views, patient explanation of one's own positions, persuasion, dialogue, elasticity, readiness to compromise, give and take,

these are the items on the agenda. A search is necessary for contact points of interest, matching positions, and ways to rapprochement, and the realm of divergency ought to be narrowed by discussion on the basis of reciprocal confidence, understanding, and respect for the partner's legitimate interests. Discussion must be oriented to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of peace-making.

3. Substantial foundations for coalition of common sense

With all diversity of views and motivations and, of course, differentiated by the forces involved, a coalition of common sense, realism, and good will should be characterised in all parties involved by the maturation of insights and findings which reflect either identical or similar realistic, war-preventing, and cooperative opinions on major principles of international security policy.

An analysis of statements, concepts, and documents issued by governments, politicians, scholars, peace movements, political parties, clergy, and others which can be considered part of the coalition of common sense, just as the governments and peoples of socialist states, is likely to reveal that there is a number of common views on realistic security policy in our time, although certain gradual differences cannot be concealed, with some of these views being only partially shared by parties involved:

- Top priority is attributed to assurance of peace and, in particular, to the prevention of nuclear war. This actually is

the foremost guideline of action for a coalition of common sense. "To prevent war between East and West is the foremost duty of national leaders on both sides", as pointed out in a report submitted to the Aspen Institute in November 1984 by a group of formerly high-ranking politicians of different party affiliations and regions in the Western world.⁷ This is quoted as a representative example of many similar documents.

- War must no longer be a rational instrument of politics.

Former NATO generals in high positions have published views to the effect that they "have all arrived at the inescapable conclusion that there was obviously no military justification for weapons that would irreparably destroy all the values worthwhile of defence"⁸. There is consensus to the effect that there can be no political objective which would justify to risk the very existence of mankind. Nuclear war is considered as not fightable nor winnable, and the quest for military superiority is rejected as dangerous and destabilising.

- The role of the military factor in international relations should be reduced, and safeguarding of peace should be accomplished without threat of war. The fatal logic of "deterrence", reminding of the ancient Roman saying "Those wishing peace ought to prepare for war", should be overcome. "Deterrence cannot probably function in all eternity, as a nuclear abyss is gaping behind it ... The search should, therefore, continue for positive alternatives to deterrence",

primarily by "reduction of the military balance of forces to the lowest possible level", according to the authors of the above Aspen study.⁹ Military policies and potentials should exclusively serve defensive purposes. War and threat of war should be ruled out as tools to settle disputes. Security should be primarily provided no longer by military means but increasingly by political means and cooperation. One can subscribe to the point made by Karsten Voigt, disarmament expert of SPD in the FRG: "The primacy of politics must be visible also from the instruments of policies. There is no military solution to the peace problems between East and West. This is a fundamental error in the philosophy underlying the Star War speech by President Reagan."¹⁰

- "Common security" should become the predominant principle among states. The following point was made by Mister Vance, ex-Secretary of State, in a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate: "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can obtain security against nuclear holocaust unless they give attention, at the same time, to the other side's security."

The same necessity was formulated as follows by the Palme Commission, an independent commission for disarmament and security: "In the nuclear age, states cannot obtain security by an arms race. They ought to cooperate for the purpose of achieving limitation, reduction, and eventually elimination of weapons. They also ought to find ways for peaceful con-

flict management and should lay political emphasis on steps geared to common security by common effort." A concept of "common security" should "replace the present concept of deterrence by arms buildup. Peace in the world should be based on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutually assured destruction".¹¹

Joint security is a basis of the idea and policy of peaceful coexistence. The socialdemocratic concept of security partnership is based on the same idea and on the understanding that security cannot be unilaterally obtained at the expense of the adversary but only together with the other side and by due consideration of the other's legitimate security interests. It can and must be obtained through cooperation and primarily political means rather than by confrontation and primarily military means.

- Steps to arms limitation and disarmament are indispensable, particularly in the nuclear area. "Cessation of the arms race is absolutely necessary now ... It should be immediately followed by substantial reduction of nuclear potentials, which should lead to complete elimination of nuclear weapons and, eventually, to general and complete disarmament", reads a demand made in the second Declaration of Delhi by the heads of state and government of India, Tanzania, Sweden, Greece, Mexico, and Argentina. There is growing and widening consensus to the effect that more armament would not lead to more security but to more insecurity and to heavier political and economic burdens and that no thorough improvement in the in-

ternational situation was possible without positive steps to military détente.

- International relations must be governed by cooperation rather than confrontation. "Peace cannot be achieved through military confrontation. It is rather necessary to steadily work for peace in an untiring exercise of bargaining, rapprochement, and normalisation, with the view to gradually doing away with mutual mistrust and fear."¹² The member states of the Warsaw Treaty, in their declaration of January 1983, have stated that they made a strict distinction of inter-state relations from ideological differences. Similar views have been heard from a majority of forces of common sense and realism in Western countries. Large groups of the international social-democracy have advocated the opinion that ideological and philosophical contradictions must be no obstacles to joint peace policies and that controversies of that kind must and can be settled peacefully.
- Sizeable degradation of the arms buildup as well as freeze and reduction of arms spending are considered decisive, indispensable conditions for gradual mitigation and solution of the tremendous economic, social, and global problems of mankind. While that would primarily apply to the developing countries, an approach of that nature is considered a major contribution to general progress of civilisation. "Peace and development are inseparably linked to each other ... High-stability development worldwide and a viable international order depend on termination of the arms race, followed by

immediate measures of disarmament, which would set free assets urgently required for development", has been the wording of a demand raised by the non-aligned states.¹³

All these are fundamental principles for a new type of peaceful togetherness truly expressed in the idea, policy, and practice of peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems, the up-to-date approach to preservation and consolidation of peace. However, not merely concepts and principles are required. Coalition of common sense means active commitment and positive intervention in politics.

4. Purpose of coalition of common sense

The specific objectives and steps of large-scale action for peace, international security, and cooperation, just as the fundamental issues, may be derived and defined from an analysis of numerous proposals made by different forces of a coalition of common sense:

- Efforts are primarily concentrated on prevention of militarisation of outer space, as by blocking of that new area of the arms race the road ought to be paved for drastic reduction of nuclear weapons on earth. To prevent the outer space from being militarised today is the key problem of international security. This has been unambiguously confirmed by the worldwide expectations and demands on the Geneva negotiations between the USSR and USA as well as by a vote on a resolution concerning the issue which was 150 to 1 (against the USA) in the UN General Assembly, 1984.

There can be no doubt that the introduction to the outer space of new systems of weaponry would provide more insecurity rather than more security. We would have another phase of the arms race in unprecedented dimensions, that is in space, extremely costly and with grave, destabilising consequences for the international balance of forces.

We would find ourselves trapped in another round of the arms race which could not be stopped, as penetrability of strategic offensive weapons was to be ensured against defence systems. Even quantitative reductions of strategic weapons would be practically ruled out under such conditions.

Conventional arms buildup, finally, would be expanded to cover new areas, types of weapons, and technologies, all of them developed for the purpose of retaining a "capability of action" below the threshold of nuclear arms. It seems to be a good guess at least that the Geneva talks in which all of us place great hopes would be doomed to failure.

An agreement on the prevention of militarisation of the outer space, on the other hand, would make drastic reduction of strategic offensive weapons possible. It might have an additional result, of particular relevance to the Europeans, a halt to the deployment of medium-range systems and their dismantling accompanied or followed by agreements on reduction of theatre nuclear forces.

- Large-scale struggles are being waged for an implementation of demands for freezes of arms development, production, and deployment at various levels, first of all nuclear weapons.

People are raising their sights at a freeze of all nuclear weapons, moratoria for the deployment of nuclear medium-range weapons, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons and space weapons in general as well as at a stop and freeze of conventional weapons and arms spending. This shows how timely and important the USSR initiative has been calling for agreement of the following points for the entire period of negotiations in Geneva: a moratorium on the development and production of cosmic offensive weapons, including testing of such weapons and preparations for deployment; freeze of strategic offensive weapons; stop to the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Europe and, accordingly, termination of expanded countermeasures.

The USSR has unilaterally declared a moratorium on the latter issue, valid until November 1985. This should be interpreted as a stimulating step to encourage wider agreements on the reduction of such systems rather than as a consolidation of existing conditions. It deserves, in this very sense, a constructive response by the USA.

- Great importance in the discussion among forces of common sense has been assumed by the entire complex of confidence-building and security-building measures at political and military levels and in the context of international law. A very particular position is attributed, in this context, to a more accurate formulation and validation in terms of international law of the renunciation of the use of force

under the present conditions. This necessity might best be met by a treaty on non-use of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and other interested states, with the substance of that treaty being geared to renunciation of first use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. That proposition has been increasingly supported by politicians and political parties of West European countries, since more accurate formulation of such renunciation would be in harmony with their own aspirations towards prevention of more militarisation and accomplishment of common security.

The establishment of zones and corridors free from nuclear, chemical, and other weapons as well as advancement of confidence-building measures in the context of military technologies might be additional subjects of such an agreement.

5. Political forces of a coalition of common sense

States and other forces of society, pacifists, cool-minded military, believers of all religions, communists, non-communist shop-floor workers, businessmen, politicians, housewives, intellectuals, adolescents, socialdemocrats, moderate conservatives, unionists, people of middle classes, representatives of big and small states, neutral, non-aligned, socialist, capitalist, nuclear, and non-nuclear countries, people from the South Pacific to the USA, they all work today on the basis of peace-oriented insights and ideas, in order to ensure the survival of mankind.

- The socialist states are prepared to establish a broad coalition of common sense and consider themselves as a major component of such alliance.
- The growing weight of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is becoming visible from the joint action of the forces of common sense, realism, and good will against the danger of war.
- The initiative taken by the heads of state and government of India, Mexico, Argentina, Tanzania, Greece, and Sweden and their second Declaration of Delhi must be interpreted as a new quality of interaction of differently structured states for peace and has been strongly supported in all five continents.
- The impossibility and suicidal risk of trying to take political action by means of nuclear weapons are being understood by reasonably thinking circles in political parties of West European countries who are also getting aware of the dangers likely to emanate from a course heading for fighting and winning of most various kinds of nuclear wars and for unlimited arms race, outer space included. Even governing circles in Western Europe have voiced their misgivings at such aggressive course as is pursued by the Reagan Administration.
- There is a growing awareness also inside the USA that the policy of confrontation and arms buildup may prove to be a life-threatening boomerang. That anxiety has been manifested

in many ways, including voices of former Secretaries of State and Defense, ambassadors, government advisors, negotiators, disarmament envoys as well as of movements of the general public, from Freeze to Roman Catholic bishops.

- Working-class action is increasingly taking shape against the danger of war. It is accompanied by growing commitment of the unions.
- Particular reference should be made to the constructive elements in socialdemocratic peace policy. Larger socialdemocratic circles worldwide, including leaders, have become major forces of a coalition of common sense by joining that mainstream with their largely supported concept of "security partnership".
- The commitment of Christian forces to peace has gained momentum and is increasingly based not only on religious motivations but on political insights and general human postulations.
- The use of military means as tools of politics is rejected by pacifists for ethical and moral responsibility and on the grounds of an elementary aversion to war.
- Scholars, medical doctors, and other professionals, guided by their own scientific findings and their humanist responsibility, have been arriving at joint conclusions regarding the dangers threatening mankind.
- The movement "Generals for Peace", with high-ranking former NATO officers being involved, is a symbol for a coalition of common sense.

- Leading business circles in Western countries have emphasised the peace-supporting value of peaceful trade relations between East and West and have rejected any predominance of military thinking in those relations.

An attempt has been made, in the context of issues relating to European security and cooperation, to substantiate experience obtained from past policy of coexistence and to underline the need for such policy in the future. The boundaries of Europe have been deliberately crossed in the second part of this paper. It is intended to be a contribution to discussion and is based on the insight that in our time political science has to bear great responsibility for the purpose of making a contribution to peace and security in the world.

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THE CSCE A EUROPEAN FORUM FOR COOPERATION

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INTRODUCTION

The starting point for this paper was to produce a broader analysis of the multilateral and intergovernmental cooperation fora between the east and the west which was the basis for a study on the CSCE's significance in this cooperation. The aim was not to create an exhaustive picture of the progress and implementation of the CSCE, but rather to bring up questions and to open new views for a more extensive assessment. Consequently, no detailed analysis of the different fields of cooperation has been conducted. Instead, results, problems and viewpoints are presented, the study of which gives an opportunity to form a picture of the CSCE's role.

The presentation of the questions and viewpoints attempts to give an introduction to an assessment of the CSCE both as a forum by itself and in relation to others. For this purpose, an analysis of the CSCE's formal provisions is included as well, as a basis for the assessment of the activities. The emphasis is on the international system, as part of which the CSCE was intended to function. The attempted assessment which is the basis for this paper, thus becomes crystallized in the question of what the role of the CSCE is in controlling the international system.

I THE CSCE AS A FORUM

1. THE PARTICIPANTS

The fact that two non-European countries, Canada and the United States, besides all European countries, had to be included in the process reflects the dominant role security policy plays in the background of the conference. The participation of these countries was essential for the Western alliance because of their crucial security political significance for NATO. Thus

the setting of the military alliances became inherent in the CSCE which was inevitable for the goals of the conference. The CSCE was, however, specifically arranged outside the military pacts, on the basis of an exceptional recognition of the participants' equal security interests. One of the unique characteristics of the CSCE is, indeed, the completely equal treatment of the participating countries, which allows no discrimination on any criteria. All the 35 countries have been involved ever since the preparatory consultations were held. Only Albania declined the invitation and it has not joined the process at a later phase.

In addition to full participation, countries have an opportunity to participate as observers in the CSCE proceedings. A state can participate in all the working bodies and in all phases of a meeting, but not in the decision-making. An observer state may later accept the decision, but the meeting sets particular conditions for the acceptance. No state so far has requested the observer status, while the opportunity to state a view has been used frequently. At the request of the meeting, outside countries can be asked to state a view on the agenda's issues which gave, at the request of Malta, a limited participation option to the Mediterranean countries.¹ Some of them have repeatedly taken advantage of this option.

2. THE AGENDA

The CSCE's broad agenda was originally based on the proposals put forward by the military pacts, and the final agenda was formed on the basis of their different points of emphasis.² It includes issues important for both sides, which have been balanced to form an integral entity. The result is an exceptionally comprehensive

declaratory program, which includes the promoting of both security and cooperation. The incorporation of these two basic areas, outside the pacts, on the basis of equality of the states is yet another of the unique characteristics of the CSCE. At the same time this is, however, the weakest point of the CSCE because the pacts do not have a shared view on how to implement the kind of cooperation which would promote security.

The inclusion in the first basket of the Final Act of the security measures proposed by both pacts, and the principle of equality which is important for the N+N countries, clearly manifests the military division of Europe. The unifying principle here is the same as on other security fora: to avoid armed confrontations. The II and III baskets define the areas of cooperation, and the disagreements about their significance are greater following the political division. The baskets include governmental, organizational and individual cooperation, which reflects a formal compromise between the political systems. Finding the smallest common denominator on this basis has turned out to be very difficult, in reviewing the Final Act's implementation at a political level.

The inclusion of the Mediterranean region in the agenda, at the request of one state, is a manifestation of the consensus policy which is one of the the CSCE's principal methods. This issue is probably the most controversial since it adds to the CSCE a sub-area which is unclear both geographically and in principle, and it has repeatedly created a peculiar one-against-the-others coalition.

3. THE WORKING METHODS

The CSCE has maintained its confederal character, which means that no permanent working bodies have been established. There is also no standing secretariat, but

respective host countries nominate an executive secretary on an ad hoc basis, whose duty is to select the secretariat. He is authorized to make the selection without any special conditions, including geographical. The conference work is done in various working bodies including committees, sub-committees and working groups nominated by them when needed and these are specifically open to all participating countries to guarantee the consensus principle which is an essential feature of the CSCE. In accordance with this principle, also the chairmanship of the working bodies and plenary assemblies is decided according to a rotation principle as a daily or meeting by meeting rotation.³

According to the Helsinki Final Recommendations and the decisions of the follow-up conferences' preparatory meetings, the highest level, i.e. the committees and the plenaries, were charged with the preparation of the concluding documents. The expert level sub-committees were mainly to have an assisting role in this. In practice, however, the expert bodies have had a rather autonomous role in the preparation of the texts, and only in cases of unsolved arguments the problems have been taken to a higher political level.⁴

The CSCE's decision-making process based on a consensus principle gives special significance to the work of expert bodies. It manifests the principle of equality of the states and the aspiration of the CSCE to produce decisions acceptable to all, whereby the revision of the proposals and conciliation, as well as unofficial contacts, become important working methods in the meetings. A consensus in the CSCE means that none of the participants actively objects to a proposed decision, which gives a participant the option to state a dissenting opinion even though it does not want to prevent the actual decision. A state can express such a dissension by bringing it out separately,

by making a reservation, by giving an interpretative statement, or simply by abstaining from positive approval. These options have, however, seldom been used, because consensus is an integral general principle in the meetings, whereby the states resort to prolonged negotiations to solve disagreements in order to achieve positive support. Because CSCE's resolutions are not binding but recommendatory, their obligation has become strengthened by efforts to reach unanimous support.⁵

II THE CSCE IN THE FIELD OF COOPERATION

1. THE ROLE OF THE CSCE

Most importantly, the CSCE gives an opportunity to review the positions of states and of their alliances on how cooperation covering the whole continent and promoting security should be implemented and how it has been implemented. Within the framework of the meetings, the participants indicate their willingness to cooperate and set their objectives and conditions for that cooperation which can be seen as the CSCE's principal role. The reinforcement of the principles agreed upon in the Final Act, and of the willingness to cooperate is significant in itself, and its significance is further emphasized by the deteriorating international situation and the consequent lack of confidence in the relations between groups of states. On the other hand, the fact that the symbolic nature of the meetings has become emphasized is a sort of a setback in light of the firm pursuit expressed in the the Final Act to increase cooperation and thus strengthen security. Both the alliances and the non-aligned countries had an obvious need to define detente process in detail, to determine their relation to it and to set their own conditions and goals for its implementation. The CSCE process seems to have been imperative for specifying the

rapprochement resulting from detente, particularly in view of the opportunities for cooperation detente created. The recommendations in the second and third baskets of the Final Act clearly reflect the Eastern and Western alliances' different approaches and their different expectations concerning cooperation, while, at the same time their acceptance as an integral entity indicates willingness to cooperate.

Cooperation initiated by the CSCE can be divided into two categories: cooperation facilitated by the CSCE itself and cooperation that directly implements the CSCE's recommendations. Cooperation in the areas of the second and third baskets has taken place in the UN organizations, in the ECE and UNESCO, which were mentioned in the Final Act, and it can be dealt with as a separate entity. The confidence-building measures of the first basket can also be defined although they don't come under the mandate of any specialized forum. The same applies to the provision of the third basket, and their close relation to the implementation of the Final Act is generally stated clearly. However, it is more difficult to review cooperation indirectly facilitated by the CSCE, because of the problems caused by its precise definition and by its separation from the overall impact of detente. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the CSCE was necessary in setting norms and rules of the game, without which the development of cooperation would have been more inconsistent and incoherent.

2. SECURITY POLICY

Increased confidence created by the CSCE in the military dimension of security has gained special significance as the progress in actual disarmament, banning of mass destruction weapons and force reductions have continued to be too slow. As nuclear weapons have

emerged as a mutual threat, in practice, for both alliances, preventing miscalculations and misinterpretations leading to the use of weapons by increasing confidence, has become a shared minimum goal for both military pacts.⁶ Compared to other fora, the CSCE offers a supplementary alternative, where this principal objective is used as a basis for pursuing extensive measures and disarmament. The fact that security policy has assumed a more dominant role within the CSCE than originally, can naturally be seen as a result of increased tension, but, similarly, attention has to be paid to the benefits offered by the CSCE and later by the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), compared to other fora.

The CSCE and the CDE, in particular, can be said to represent the policy of a gradual, controlled progress in regard to the military dimension of security. This approach is epitomized in the confidence-building measures, which, in accordance with the CSCE's consensus principle, are based on the approval of both alliances and are thus more significant than the controversial linkages in the MFR talks. The CDE facilitated continued development of confidence- and security-building measures which NATO considers important, while these measures were combined, as the first phase, to the larger arrangements emphasized by the Warsaw Pact. Dividing the conference into two phases when pursuing disarmament manifests a clear strategy of gradual progress.

The agreement on the continuation of the conference was an achievement in itself, for instance, in view of the fact that both UN Special Sessions on Disarmament failed to create a functioning agenda. In comparison with the UN and with the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, it is advantageous for the CDE that both its participants and its scope of application make it specifically a European forum. Due to this, difficulties of global disarmament

can be set aside and the conference can concentrate on mediating on the problems of European countries, including the non-aligned countries. The absence of non-European states is an advantage also in the sense that it enables the N+N countries to act unanimously and effectively in their role as an mediator, trusted by both pacts. In light of the experiences of the Geneva Conference this is also a significant factor.⁷

3. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

3.1. Assessment grounds

It is fairly easy to define the CSCE's security political role but assessing its significance on the various economic fields where most of the cooperation takes place is more difficult. This is partly due to the fact that, in addition to activities which directly implement the CSCE, cooperation indirectly facilitated by the CSCE takes place mainly on the economic fields; on the other hand, the concrete and compatible nature of the pursued goals has, as such, been an incentive for cooperation, even without the CSCE. In analyzing this cooperation, special attention has to be paid to its formal-official and practical dimensions as two separate aspects. The former becomes obvious in the conditions and goals set for cooperation, for instance in the CSCE, by governments in different systems of society. The official objective is apparent also on specialized fora, such as the IMF and GATT. On the practical level, compromises on these objectives - which in the CSCE are broad and clearly political, and elsewhere more limited - have been possible because the pursued benefits, being concrete, have given sufficient motivation for that.⁸

3.2. Direct and Indirect Impact

Progress has been slow in the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) which directly implements the recommendations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of its follow-up conferences because disagreements between the Western Alliance and the socialist countries on the commission's working procedures and on the interpretation of the CSCE's Final Act⁹ have dominated the Commission's work. Both sides have been very inflexible in their positions which gives the impression that the ECE has been given a stabilized role of a forum for political confrontations where both sides have an opportunity to present their views. This does not directly endanger the benefits emerging from economic relations because, in creating the bilateral agreements between various states and in the intercourse between enterprises, satisfactory solutions for both sides have been reached.

The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which is an organization on a lower level than the ECE, has benefited from the CSCE through increased east-west cooperation on that forum.¹⁰ In the ICC, direct contacts between market economy entrepreneurs and socialist countries' authorities have given an opportunity to combine free business activities and planned economy controls in trade. In fact, this means the implementation of a significant objective reflected in the recommendations of the CSCE's Final Document.

The successful increase in the ICC's activities, on one hand, and strengthening bilateral trade relations between nations, on the other, are an obvious opposite to the difficulties in multilateral cooperation on the governmental level. In this respect, the CSCE's most important role has been its indirect influence, which created the conditions for increased contacts in the era of detente.

3.3. The Significance of the CSCE

In assessing the implementation of the CSCE's second basket provisions, it is notable that the removal of trade barriers and the diversification of the structure of trade recommended in the Final Act have not been implemented. Nevertheless, by the time of the Madrid conference, the second basket issues had clearly become undermined by other areas.¹¹ This prompts the question of whether economic cooperation has taken an established form which sufficiently meets major needs despite its shortfalls. From this angle, the CSCE's real significance seems to be the initiation of rapprochement agreed upon on the highest possible level after which the continuation and formulation of the process separated to a practical level. The problems in the ECE's activities as an opposite to increased trade reinforce this concept.

The differentiation of intergovernmental objectives from practice also becomes apparent through the limited application of linkage politics. Trade blockades were still possible despite the CSCE, in times of increased international tension and ^{the structure of} ~~as~~ trade remained favorable for the Western countries. However, as the West European Nato members were reluctant to link their economic policies tightly to their security policies, the question arises of whether rapprochement brought about by the CSCE had an impact on this. In answering this question, at least the benefits which resulted from business level contacts facilitated by the CSCE must be noted. Experiences derived from them have also shown that these contacts can't be used, to any extent, to apply pressure to change the socialist system because Western businesses have been the most successful in such countries which have, through spontaneous reforms in advance, created the conditions for that.¹² And, on the other hand, when the position of the socialist countries on Western markets is taken into consideration, it seems that economic

cooperation on both sides has been forced to adjust to the conditions established by the systems.

4. Cooperation on Humanitarian Fields

4.1. Levels of Cooperation

In addition to security policy and economic relations, it was natural to include in the CSCE humanitarian fields which diversified cooperation and widened its scope. With the help of the CSCE, the discussions on these issues in UN organizations, too, could be taken to a European and North American regional level, besides a global one, which enabled concentrating on the east-west dimension. UNESCO, the mandate of which directly offered a forum for the implementation of Basket III, initiated regional cooperation, on the basis of the CSCE, which covered all of the CSCE participant. The government level form of activity are ministerial meetings which have been held regularly, although at long intervals. National Commissions for UNESCO which bring together intergovernmental and lower level institutions, also have meetings and contacts, based on the implementation of the CSCE.¹³

Contacts between governmental and non-governmental institutions are, in humanitarian fields, an important aspect. The interaction between these different levels is an interesting issue: for instance, has the international scientific community, in locating problems and their solutions, been able to influence governmental plans? UNESCO's report on the implementation of the CSCE strongly suggests just the opposite, since cooperation has mainly emerged from national objectives, limited by national policies. This trend is further strengthened by the development of the forms of activities towards issue-centered projects with fixed time-limits, instead of

the establishment of new research centers.¹⁴

In scientific cooperation, attention also has to be paid to scientific-technical activities in the field of economics based on bilateral agreements. The increased number of such agreements has contributed to the significance of research activities tied to intergovernmental economic ventures.

4.2. Ideological Problems

The third basket is the part in the Final Document of the CSCE where ideological confrontations are particularly problematic. This is not only due to their principal nature but also to the fact that combining them in pursuing a joint objective is very difficult. Due to the objectives attached to the CSCE by the alliances, the third basket has been seen as containing the West's special goals while the second basket has been seen as playing a similar role for the socialist countries.¹⁵ The difference between them is that in the second basket's areas, concrete benefits can be found which motivate cooperation and make it possible between various level units and units operating on different basis. In the individual level of the third basket, ideological differences, however, cause a collision because it is difficult to find a benefit which would motivate compromises.

Human contacts and human rights enhance the impact of the Final Act to the individual level. In analyzing the CSCE, human contacts together with human rights can be considered as one entity differing from all other fields in the respect that it does not render itself for cooperation as easily. Promoting human rights is, as such, an indisputable objective, but its relationship to the jurisdiction of states over their citizens forms a difficult

ideological problem which has not been solved to everybody's satisfaction in the CSCE.

CONCLUSIONS

During the past decade, the cooperation between the CSCE participants has brought about few solutions compared to the number of opportunities for such solutions. On several fields which are natural areas of cooperation, the most significant multilateral accomplishments have been reached between countries which represent the same system of society. Cooperation efforts have shown that the economic system has a profound impact even on such areas as environmental protection, energy supplies, science and technology. Successful international activities producing concrete results require that the goals be specified in detail and common practices be presented for pursuing them. Since meeting this requirement has been difficult even within economic systems, cooperation crossing the borderlines of different systems has not progressed uniformly. In addition, continuing arms build-up and increased tension after the Helsinki Conference made security issues once again predominant in east-west relations.

The situation is, nevertheless, completely different from the Cold War era as the alliances have, with the help of detente and the CSCE, started a formal cooperation process in order to reduce confrontations. Although surfacing disagreements have been severe, the two different European systems of society have, nevertheless, clearly showed that they can develop side by side without threatening each other's existence. Thus, the division into two separate economic systems does not affect security policy which has facilitated the emergence of the N+N countries in the CSCE, in particular, in the role of a mediator between the military pacts. This is a considerable change compared to the past, but its real impact depends on what the future role of the CSCE will be. Originally, the purpose of the CSCE was not to replace other fora but to

stimulate their activities and to combine their accomplishments into a whole through which mutual security could be enhanced actively.

The outcome of the Madrid Conference brings up the question of whether the role of the CSCE, in relation to other fora, can be seen as changing. The decisions of the CDE and of the meetings of experts in Ottawa and Bern will bring up the issues which are the most difficult in east-west relations and for which solutions have not been found elsewhere. The separation of security policy from other fields has become evident through the paradox of a simultaneous increase in arms build-up and in disarmament which has lead into a situation where it was necessary to deal with military detente as a separate issue. The CDE complements the shortfalls in other disarmament fora and is an alternative approach to the problems. The conferences in Ottawa and Bern, on the other hand, emphasize those fields which originally gave the CSCE its role as a specialized forum reinforcing others. A more detailed human rights debate is important also within the CSCE, too, but, at the same time, it epitomizes, together with other European cultural fora, the special opportunities offered by the CSCE as a forum for humanitarian activities and ideological detente.

The fact that economic issues have remained on the background can be seen as a sign of acceptance of status quo but also as an exhaustion of the CSCE's opportunities - at least temporarily. As a sufficient number of shared goals and needs has been presented, the decisive stimulus for concrete actions must come from within the ECE, EFTA, OECD and CMEA. It is of course possible that economic fields will re-emerge if an acceptable compromise is reached in human rights issues. In such a case, however, the primary forum would be the ECE since it is a specialized organization for the implementation of the

CSCE and since it facilitates contacts between economic organizations which are crucially important.

In the field of security issues, the CDE could be seen as having a similar role as the ECE on the economic field; a forum which discusses issues in detail. Such a direct comparison is not, however, a correct one. The main difference is the fact that the CDE is a new body created by the CSCE and closely tied to it through the definition and implementation of its mandate. The ECE, on the other hand, is forced to act more and more within the limits set by other organizations and the general economic situation. In human rights issues, it seems that the CSCE has, more clearly than before, become a specialized forum with no parallel organizations. It can be claimed that in dealing with security political and ideological clashes, the CSCE's guiding role is the most significant one. The experiences gathered so far suggest that these are the fields where it can offer the most.

NOTES

- 1) Sizoo & Jurrjens 1984, p. 78, 81.
- 2) *ibid.*, p. 65-66.
- 3) *ibid.*, p. 60-61.
- 4) *ibid.*, p. 65-66.
- 5) *ibid.*, p. 60.
- 6) Goodby 1984, p. 9 ; Europa-Archiv 9/1984, D 246-247.
- 7) see Wegener 1984, . 583-584.
- 8) see Wilkinson 1982 ja Kostecki 1979.
- 9) Bailey-Wiebecke 1980.
- 10) Annual review of the ICC 1977, p. 5 ; 1980, p. 38-39.
- 11) Frei & Ruloff 1983, p. 43, 58.
- 12) Levciik & Stankovsky 1978, p. 226.
- 13) UNESCO's contribution to the ...,1980, p. 10-11.
- 14) UNESCO, Science policy studies and documents no. 44,1979, p.117-118.
- 15) See e.g. Sizoo & Jurrjens 1984, p. 27.

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NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AND CBMs - A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE

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My task is to discuss some aspects of European security from the point of view of a European neutral, more specifically prospects for disengagement in Europe. (1) I do not believe that it is possible to give a neutral point of view, if this is taken to imply something which is more or less representative for all European neutrals. Although the neutrals, in many respects, have much in common, and in several cases have been able to act together to help find constructive solutions in international fora, the conditions for and the expressions of their neutrality nevertheless show significant differences. Austrian neutrality became part of the Austrian Constitution in an amendment voted on the day after the signing of the State Treaty which reestablished Austrian independence in 1955. Swiss neutrality has a long history and is part of the Swiss Constitution. It is characterized by a strong defence and a very restrained foreign policy, and supported by a favourable geography. Although both countries are geographically close to the centre of the potential battlefield in a war between the two major power blocs, their strategic situation is rather dissimilar, with Switzerland being, in a way, behind the lines. The main motivations for Ireland's policy of neutrality should probably not be sought in the context of an East-West conflict. Anyway, being practically undefended and Ireland situated very much to the rear of continental NATO, Irish neutrality is very different from the neutrality of the other north European neutrals.

(1) This paper expresses the author's own opinion. It should in no way be regarded as representing the views of the Swedish Government, nor of any of its agencies.

Finland is basing its security policy on a neutrality policy aiming at promoting good relations between the various powers in the region, friendly and neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union as expressed by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and on a military defence which is generally looked upon with great respect. Finland, like Sweden, has traditionally set great store at keeping the northernmost part of Europe an area of low tension. The neutrality of the latter country, finally, is neither prescribed by its Constitution nor guaranteed by any foreign power. While supported by a defence which is strong for a state of its size, foreign policy is given a prominent place in underpinning Swedish neutrality.

To the extent that I am able to give a neutral perspective on disengagement in Europe it will therefore be a Swedish perspective. Furthermore it will not be the Swedish perspective, i e the official view, but a Swedish perspective, i e it must be seen as the views of an individual, albeit heavily influenced by his environment. A few words about the security policy environment of Sweden might thus be appropriate.

One lesson of World War II was the importance of a sufficiently strong defence as a foundation for a policy of neutrality. The task of the military forces is deterrence of attacks on Sweden in case of a war in Europe, and active defence if Sweden nevertheless is attacked. Thanks to circumstances of geography, Sweden has been able to avail itself of an effective defence with a very defensive profile. This is one reason why we often talk about our military defence as a stabilizing factor in the Nordic area. So long as both sides are confident that Sweden will fulfil the obligations of a neutral state, they should be able to keep a low military profile in the North, and the risk of a war starting here as a result of

unforeseen developments in a crisis minimized. The existence of Sweden and Finland between the power blocs is in itself a measure of disengagement.

However, it is clear that, when supreme interests are at stake, as in an armed East-West conflict, whatever the intentions of the belligerents be vis-à-vis a neutral state, the time might come when they would feel compelled to breach its neutrality, defended or not. Modern technology contributes to this, as it probably has made more difficult the geographical limitation of military operations. A nuclear war in Europe virtually ensures that even states which had succeeded in staying out of the war would suffer at least some of its effects on their own territory. And this may still be only a marginal addition to the sufferings both belligerents and non-belligerents would be exposed to as a result of the disastrous break-down of the industrialized societies of Europe, brought about by any large scale war in the area, and particularly by a nuclear war.

Measures and initiatives aiming at alleviating the East-West conflict, preventing its deterioration into armed conflict in or around Europe, and reducing the risk of nuclear war must be important and legitimate parts of the security policies of any European state, aligned or not. Accepting one of the basic assumptions of the Swedish security policy, that a possible armed conflict in Europe most likely would arise out of deteriorations in East-West relations, a corollary to this is that the military and political strategies of the major power blocs in Europe are legitimate concerns also of the European neutrals'. This conviction is certainly an important motive behind various expressions of Swedish foreign policy, and although its implementation could, in some instances, be discussed, the principle itself can hardly be questioned. Traditionally this aspect of

Swedish security and foreign policy has been strongly oriented towards disarmament measures (and measures aiming at bringing about a better international climate), while, it seems to me, problems of crisis management have, in the past, not got the attention they merit. Nevertheless, the three cases which will be discussed here, a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone (NNWFZ), a battlefield nuclear weapons free corridor (BNWFC), and possible CSBMs arising from the CDE conference are all influenced by crisis management and tension reduction considerations.

A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

Several proposals for nuclear free zones in Europe and elsewhere have been made during the past 30 years. (2) A European zone was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1956. In 1957 the Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki suggested a plan for the establishment of a nuclear free zone consisting of East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, a plan which was subsequently revised several times over the following years. From the same year dates a proposal for a Balkan zone, last time revived by Greece in 1984. The Adriatic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and South Asia have also been discussed off and on, but only in the case of Latin America has there been any real progress.

A specifically Nordic zone was suggested for the first time in 1958 in a letter from Soviet Premier Bulganin to the Norwegian and Danish prime ministers. The proposal

(2) A very useful study, unfortunately only available in Swedish, is Johan Tunberger, Norden - en kärnvapenfri zon? Historik och problem, Folk & Försvar, Trosa 1982.

was rejected by both countries, the Norwegian answer interestingly enough drawing attention to the fact that also part of the Soviet Union belongs to Northern Europe. A similar proposal in the following year by Khrushchev (referring to Scandinavia and the Baltic area) was returned by the Swedish foreign minister Östen Undén, who observed that the only power around the Baltic possessing nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union. Undén himself, in 1961, suggested the creation of a "Non-Atom Club", but although the Nordic states certainly were supposed to join it, it had a much wider, both geographical and political scope. The "modern" debate on a Nordic zone stems, as we all know, from a series of initiatives by the former Finnish President, Urho Kekkonen, first in 1963, and lastly in a lecture at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs in 1978. From having been rather much a Finnish monopoly, the debate on a Nordic zone developed explosively in Norway and in Sweden around 1980, and has since become closely associated to Swedish policy.

The Swedish view

The official Swedish position on a NNWFZ has recently been summarized in a Foreign Ministry pamphlet. (3) According to the pamphlet, a NWFZ can be defined as follows:

1. States which are part of a nuclear weapons free zone are not allowed to have, receive, or directly or indirectly gain control over nuclear weapons, nor to

(3) En kärnvapenfri zon i Norden, UD informerar 1984:4, Stockholm 1984.

manufacture or in any other way come into the possession of nuclear weapons.

2. The member states are not allowed to have, or to accept the existence of nuclear weapons on their territories.

3. The nuclear weapons states must respect the nuclear free status of the zone and are not allowed to take measures contrary to this obligation. They must also give assurances not to use or to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against targets on the territories of the member states.

These conditions should be fulfilled in peace, in times of crisis, as well as in war. It is also noted that the Nordic countries fulfil condition 1) by adhering to the Non-proliferation Treaty, condition 2) is fulfilled in peacetime, while condition 3) is not fulfilled. The above definition has been proposed i.a. in the reply by the Swedish Government to an enquiry by the UN Secretary General in 1976. At the same time it was noted that the obligations of the nuclear powers towards a NWFZ being intergral to the concept, the establishment of such a zone is likely to require negotiations with these powers. The reply also suggested that nuclear weapons deployed in the proximity of a NWFZ should be retired, to the extent that they were destined or suitable for use against targets within the zone. That these observations are still valid can be seen from the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme's lecture at the Paasikivi Society two years ago. In his lecture Prime Minister Palme defined the geographical extent of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone as comprising, at a minimum, the territories, including the territorial seas and the air spaces, of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Although the Baltic, being international waters, cannot become part of a zone by a decision of the Nordic states, he nevertheless firmly

stated that a NNWFC must be combined with obligations concerning a nuclear free Baltic.

According to the Swedish view, the fundamental purpose of the NNWFZ is to improve the security of its members (although it is recognized that it is not possible entirely to eliminate the nuclear threat against the Nordic countries). It is also suggested, however, that by the restraint required, as well by its members as by the nuclear powers, for the creation of such a zone, it could constitute an important CBM. It is furthermore suggested that a zone would increase stability in crisis situations and reduce the risk of misjudgements. So far the official view.

Discussion

The following observations are not meant as an exhaustive analysis of the consequences of a NNWFZ. Like all of this paper they are proposed as points of departure for the seminar discussion.

Technically, an obligation not to introduce nuclear weapons on the territories of the Nordic countries, does not seem to imply any significant restraints on military options in the area. An obligation not to use nuclear weapons against targets in the zone would, in theory, be a restraint. Unfortunately, a NWFZ is not likely to be respected in a general nuclear war, particularly if forces of nations engaged in such a war are present on the territory of states belonging to the zone, so the restrictions would mainly apply to first use of nuclear weapons taking place in the Nordic area. However, I find it difficult to believe that this area would be regarded important enough to "merit" escalation to nuclear war.

After all, its importance mainly derives from its role in a long conventional war.

The case of the Baltic is a bit different in that it is used as basing area for some Soviet "eurostrategic" SLBMs. In view of the age of these submarines, and the very large number of land-mobile missiles covering the same targets, the military cost of giving up these old submarines would seem to be very modest, if indeed it should be seen as a cost.

Still, a nuclear free Baltic would pose several difficult problems, for example with respect to verification. A minor matter might be that it would require the nuclear powers to change their policy of neither affirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons aboard their ships. However, it is an open question how long they will be able to maintain this policy anyhow, and for what good.

All difficulties notwithstanding, a nuclear free Baltic would be one of the few tangible gains of a NNWFZ, and, as noted above, has long been and remains a Swedish condition.

Concerning "thinning-out" zones, it appears, as suggested by the Swedish Defence Minister (at the time Undersecretary of Defence), Anders Thunborg, ten years ago in Ulkopoliitikka and by Prime Minister Palme in his Paasikivi speech, that the retirement of weapons suitable (only) for use against targets in the zone is a natural consequence of the establishment of a zone. This ought to be rather straightforward to the east of the zone; in the neighbourhood of Denmark it could be more difficult, however.

The introduction, in a crisis, of nuclear weapons in Norway or Denmark would be a highly escalatory measure and most likely a seriously destabilizing one. A NNWFZ would constitute an obstacle against this. Still, the difference compared with a situation without a zone would probably be marginal, both because the military reasons for introducing nuclear weapons in these countries are probably not very strong and because of the divisive effects this might have on the internal situation. It is not evident that the very existence of a NNWFZ would promote detente. Detente is, after all, something that can only exist in peacetime, and in peacetime the Nordic countries are nuclear free already. The situation could be different, however, with respect to the process of establishing a zone. With the very strong reservations in NATO against a zone, and the essential role the nuclear powers must play in the creation of a zone, it is quite clear that it can only come into being if both blocs, and all nuclear powers with a stake in the area, judge it to be in their interest. It is quite common to assert that a (much) better international climate is a precondition to any substantial East-West agreement. This may well be so, but then the problem is how to create this better climate. Assuming that there is a will to find ways to do it, a process of discussion and negotiation aiming at creating a NNWFZ might be used as a vehicle for confidence building.

A BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR

In its report of April 1982, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues ("Palme-Commission")

proposed the establishment in Central Europe of a corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons.(4) As a follow-up of this proposal, the Swedish Government in December of the same year addressed a note to the member nations of NATO, the Warsaw Pact and a number of European neutral and non-aligned nations, asking for their views on the proposal. Comments were received from all nations which had received the note, with those of the NATO members generally arguing against the proposal, the Warsaw Pact members in favour and suggesting extensions of the proposed corridor, while the replies from the neutral and non-aligned states were, with some notable exception, positive to the idea. A summary of the replies (5) and a commentary (6) has later been made public by the Swedish Government.

The proposal

The Swedish note (which has never been made public by the Swedish Government) did not give a very detailed definition of the proposed corridor. Evidently the respondents were supposed to refer to the Palme Commission report for

(4) Common Security - A Programme for Disarmament, Pan Books, London 1982.

(5) Reactions to the inquiry by the Swedish Government on the proposal by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues regarding battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe, Aide-memoire I 1983-12-09, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(6) Swedish Views on the proposal for a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe, Aide-memoire II, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

this. In fact, a main purpose of the note was to draw attention to the report and act as a catalyst for discussions of its proposals.

Briefly, the corridor should consist of a strip 150 km wide (although the width, like most of its more detailed characteristics, might be subject to negotiation) on each side of the dividing line between the military-political blocs in Central Europe. No nuclear warheads for battlefield weapons systems or exclusive battlefield nuclear weapons were to be allowed within the corridor. The corridor would, however, not affect other kinds of nuclear weapons, nor, it is important to note, would there be any prohibition against using nuclear weapons against targets within the corridor. It would thus not constitute a nuclear free zone.

A BNWFC would, according to the Swedish documents, constitute an important CBM which should contribute towards reduced tensions in Europe and reduce the risk of an immediate recourse to battlefield nuclear weapons were an armed conflict to break out. In fact, reference 5 is somewhat ambiguous, stating that the corridor should mainly be regarded as a measure aiming at the latter goal, and that it should mainly be regarded as a CBM. In the latter connection, it suggests that "a corridor... - with, for instance, verification measures comprising on-site inspection - would by its very existence increase confidence and transparency and, in this way, reduce the risk of a conflict breaking out." This may well be so, such on-site inspections probably having to include not only nuclear storage sites but also nuclear capable (dual capable) weapons systems, e g nuclear capable aircraft and, in particular, artillery pieces of a calibre larger than 15 cm or thereabout. On-site inspections including such weapons systems certainly would have the potential of substantially ~~y~~ increasing transparency. The other side

of the coin is, of course, that such verification measures would be extremely difficult to agree on.

Objections to a BNWFC

Some objections to the idea had the appearance of being based on misunderstandings of the proposal and will not be discussed here.

A political argument against the corridor proposal was that it would not be compatible with the principle of NATO unity - equal protection and equal risk. Strategically it was said to increase the risk of a conflict. By heightening the nuclear threshold, a corridor would weaken deterrence and increase the risk of war (and, thereby, the risk of nuclear war would increase too). Militarily, it would allow the conventionally stronger side to concentrate his forces, allowing him better to exploit his superiority, but it was also claimed that nothing prevented the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into the corridor in a crisis or targeting the corridor from outside its limits. It was also suggested that a debate on a BNWFC would be harmful by diverting attention from (then) current negotiations on intermediate range weapons (INF), and generally complicate such negotiations.

I do not propose to discuss the argument about the unity of NATO. It has a strong flavour of holy writ and its correspondence to reality is not too convincing. It should be sufficient to remind of the Danish and Norwegian base and nuclear policy, and that the most likely battlefield in a conventional or tactical nuclear war (if such a war is conceivable) is Western Germany, while the territories of the USA and Canada are at risk

only if the war were allowed to escalate to intercontinental nuclear war.

Perceptions of the role of battlefield nuclear weapons in a war in Europe are in many ways critical to any evaluation of the objections against a corridor, as well as of the assumptions motivating its proponents. It is difficult to imagine that nuclear weapons can be used as a weapon in the close-in battle or that, for example, the West Germans would accept the conduct of a battlefield nuclear war on their territory. The task of keeping at risk the forces of the other side could presumably be fulfilled by weapons based outside the corridor, e g air delivered weapons, or tactical missiles of longer range. Furthermore, present trends within NATO seem to point towards stressing targets in the deep rear of the Warsaw Pact as the ones most likely to be attacked in a first strike. It seems to me that, whereas short range systems like nuclear artillery and some battlefield missile systems, available on divisional level, would have a place on a hypothetical dynamic nuclear battlefield, they have no obvious place in a deterrence strategy based on an ability to escalate to nuclear use, but with no intention to carry on an extensive nuclear battle.

If I am right in this, there would not seem to be any compelling reason to expect a BNWFC to have much of an impact on the so called nuclear threshold. The contrary assumption is advanced by the corridor proponents, however. One reason for this belief might be the idea that it could be easier to take the political decision to escalate to nuclear use with short range weapons and on one's own territory. As indicated above, I believe that NATO thinking is going in a different direction. Another very common argument, which is mentioned for instance in the Palme Commission report, is the "use-or-lose" argument. In critical situations there might be pressures to auth-

orize use of battlefield weapons, or commanders under heavy strain might use weapons available to them on their own initiative, it is suggested.

I will briefly discuss three possible use-or-lose situations. The first one concerns a low level commander initiating nuclear use on his own initiative when facing the risk of having his unit destroyed. Quite apart from the question of the rationality of such a decision, he would not, if available information on the control of nuclear weapons is correct, be able to do it. The nuclear warheads are not necessarily in the same location as the firing unit, they are guarded by special (American) units and are equipped with locking devices which are supposed to protect against unauthorized use until release has been granted.

A second possibility which, fantastic as it may be, has been suggested, is that rather than losing a number of nuclear weapons to the enemy when nuclear equipped units risk being overrun, authorization would be given to fire the weapons. Why? The Warsaw Pact already has a large number of nuclear weapons and would most likely not be able to use NATO weapons anyhow. Neither would the loss of a fraction of its stockpile put NATO in a position of significant nuclear inferiority, nor prevent it from escalating. Besides, the warheads could fairly easily be moved out of the threatened area.

In fact, closing the battlefield nuclear escalation option to NATO would require eliminating virtually all nuclear capable aircraft and nuclear capable army units. This, on the other hand would require, or be equivalent to, a complete break-down of NATO's defence in Central Europe. A likely cause for nuclear escalation if any, not because of the loss of some nuclear weapons however, but because of NATO being about to lose the war.

If, as I argue, a SNWFC would on the whole be consistent with NATO strategy and have no real impact on the "nuclear treshold", what about its confidence building potential? There might be some similarities to the Nordic situation, in that the easternmost parts of West Germany (on the situation in East Germany I must confess to an even higher degree of ignorance) might be more or less nuclear free in peacetime. The dispersion in a crisis - or the reintroduction in the case of a corridor - of nuclear weapons within the area of the proposed corridor could be a destabilizing measure. On the other hand, it would possibly only be a marginal addition, if any, to the impact of the alerting of other nuclear systems in the region. We are therefore back to the possible CBM value of a negotiation process. While I do not want to exclude all possibility of negotiations aiming at a Nordic NWFZ serving a confidence building purpose, I tend to do so in connection with a BNWFC in Central Europe. This is because such negotiations would be inextricably linked to negotiations on all kinds of nuclear systems and conventional forces, would have to consist of an extremely difficult to manage mixture of inter and intra alliance negotiations, and most important, would force deep going differences of interest and perception of the role of nuclear weapons inside NATO into the open.

This goes, in my opinion, together with an unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of the interests of NN-states in military-political issues in Central Europe, a long way towards explaining the reactions in NATO to the Swedish note.

Lest what is written above gives a wholly negative view on a BNWFC in Central Europe, I ^{should add that I} believe that such a corridor, or rather the elimination or reduction of short range nuclear weapons would be a positive development, and also be in NATO's own interest (that the Warsaw Pact

considers it to be advantageous is evident in the replies to the Swedish note). The battlefield nuclear weapons steal resources from the conventional forces, not only capital, manpower for guarding and handling them as well as training time, but also, and perhaps most importantly, they divert attention from the planning and organizing for conventional battle. Significant gains in conventional capability might result from greater clarity regarding the roles of conventional forces in NATO's strategy.

Despite my pessimism relative to negotiations on a BNWFC, I can still see some cause for optimism. I believe, for example, that we will see some unilateral steps being taken in the direction of reducing battlefield nuclear weapons by NATO. A decision was taken to retire 1000 nuclear warheads in connection with the December 1979 agreement on the eurostrategic weapons, and the retirement of an additional 1400 was agreed on in 1983. The opinion for reducing the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy seems to be gaining in strength, also in policy making circles. In fact, I tend to interpret the insistent demands by General Rogers and others for increased conventional strength, as being motivated not only by a wish to reduce the dependence on the threat of nuclear escalation, but on the realisation that it is unlikely that political authorization to use nuclear weapons will be given.

Clearly visible reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe could have a significant value in improving the East-West climate. It is therefore unfortunate that the Soviet Union appears to have introduced nuclear artillery in Eastern Europe over the past few years, and that it could not resist a politically motivated counter-deployment to NATO's deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe began its work in Stockholm in January 1984, it did so accompanied by much public interest and high hopes for significant disarmament results. The part of the public entertaining such hopes is likely to feel deceived with the results that will have been accomplished by the time the follow-up meeting opens in Vienna in the autumn of 1986.

But if it does not reach an agreement on disarmament measures (which it will not) it may still accomplish valuable results. The CSCE process, of which the Stockholm Conference is an outgrowth, can be seen as a new departure in international security negotiations. Instead of attempting to find solutions to major issues of disarmament, as has been the purpose of many negotiations in the past (some of which are still going on), the CSCE could be seen as an attempt at getting a dynamic process going, by starting with easier problems and trying to get agreements on a step by step basis.

After a long introductory period, during which the two Alliances and the NN-states (as well as Romania and Malta) tabled their proposals, the Conference has now settled down to serious negotiations. I will not discuss the various proposals in any detail. Briefly characterized, the Eastern proposal is strongly flavoured by political-declaratory measures - e g non-use of violence, which is, in fact, already subscribed to in the UN Charter - and proposals which are of a global nature and/or under consideration in other fora, for example related to defence budgets, a complete test ban, a chemical weapons ban, nuclear-free zones etc. It also contains a proposal for limiting the size of military

exercises and the notification of exercises and military movements.

Also the Western proposal contains one measure which might be seen more in a political perspective - information exchange about the organization and location of major formations, but is otherwise giving quite detailed proposals for the notification, observation and inspection of military activities.

The NN proposal has similarities to the Western one. It is less detailed, however, and envisages the possibility of certain geographical limitations and, in particular, constraints on the size of military activities.

With the adoption of a negotiating procedure in December 1984, the conference has entered a phase of highly technical work.

What, then, might be the shape of the agreement which hopefully will be negotiated in time for the Vienna follow-up meeting in November 1986? Clearly, the likelihood of any disarmament measures, zones of disengagement, or any other measures that would appeal to a public anxious for more dramatic signs of reduced military potentials in Europe, is very low. What is being discussed are exchange of annual calendars for military activities, expanding the categories of military activities which should be notified in advance (from only manoeuvres, in the Helsinki Final Act, to movements, redeployment, alert and mobilization activities), lowering the thresholds of notification (25 000 troops in the Final Act), increasing the notification period (21 days in the Final Act), establishing binding rules for invitation of observers and for the procedures and conditions of their participation, measures of verification and inspection, and communications and complaints arrangements.

The principle of non-use of force is likely to figure in some way in an agreement, and the prospects of some measures of constraints being included appear to have increased.

While according to the Madrid Mandate the measures to be negotiated should apply to all of Europe (and adjoining sea and air space), matters of geography and of defence organization, for example, mean that some measures will have different implications for different states or alliances.

Looking at available statistics it is evident that low ceilings on the size of military manoeuvres would be of greater consequence for NATO, with its large multinational exercises concentrated to a few periods of the year, than for the Warsaw Pact. Constraints on military activities have several purposes, of which a general reduction of the level of military activity is one, and the limitation of particularly threatening activities is another. The threatening aspect of an activity has to do, among other things, with its size and with the amount of warning time provided. It might thus be possible to accept a higher ceiling on activities that are announced in an annual calendar than such as are notified perhaps a month or so in advance. Still lower ceilings might be applicable to activities which by their very nature and purpose cannot be notified in advance, such as alert exercises. Low ceilings are desirable also for activities with a potential for rapidly developing into a threatening direction, such as airborne and amphibious exercises.

The provision of adequate verification and inspection procedures obviously becomes more important, the more militarily significant the measures agreed. This is one area where the problems might be particularly difficult for the NN-states. Their national technical means of

verification are much more limited than those belonging to members of the two alliances, but their main problem might lie elsewhere. These states all rely on sensitive mobilization procedures for their military defence, and would therefore have difficulties allowing some forms of observation and inspection.

CSBMs of course become particularly pertinent in crises. Fear that a CSBM regime might be exploited for deceptive purposes, or that it will make timely counter-measures more difficult to decide on, increase the reluctance to accept the inclusion e g of restraints and amplifies the need for efficient consultation and complaints procedures. These must be designed so as not to allow their exploitation neither for delaying tactics nor as a ~~measure~~^{means} of exerting political pressure.

The Stockholm Conference is an important meeting ground for political and military experts from all of Europe and North America. Even if the work of the conference should be aimed at negotiating as militarily significant CSBMs as possible, I believe that its main importance maybe lies in this political function. To some extent it might also contribute to a greater sophistication in the debate on the military balance and military threats in Europe~~s~~, by forcing more attention to factors other than purely numerical comparisons of forces. Should it succeed in reaching agreement on some significant CSBMs too, so much the better. For the NN states, which do not participate in an alliance exchange on security matters or in bloc-to-bloc negotiations in other fora, the work in the CSE has provided new insights in European security problems and has generally stimulated an interest in such matters, this is at least the conclusion I draw from looking at the Swedish experience.

CONCLUSIONS

In one version of the programme of this seminar this paper appears under the title of Prospects of military disengagement in Europe. Neither of the three cases I have discussed above contains any significant measure of military disengagement. I do not see any appreciable prospect of this happening within a timeframe of concern to me.

While I certainly agree that military forces should be reduced and all efforts made to reduce the possibilities of using military power for political gain; it is my opinion that priority must go, in the short run to greatly improving crisis management capabilities, and in the long run to reducing political tensions. It is not obvious to me that efforts to bring about military disengagement promise the highest pay-offs when it comes to our ability to control and prevent crises. Nor do I believe that military disengagement can lead to a reduction of tension. What I do believe is that we must strive for increased contacts in all fields over all of Europe. Negotiations on military and other security issues constitute one such field, and a very important one at that.

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XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Introduction

In the introductory Chapter the basic problem underlying the present study was stated as follows:

What conditions concerning agenda, institutional framework and rules of procedure determined the organization, course and results of the Madrid Meeting and - in view of the aims of the CSCE as laid down in the Helsinki Act - what modifications of these conditions would be acceptable to the 35 participating states in order to increase the efficiency of decision-making at future meetings?

Three basic questions were derived from this statement of the problem: first of all what were the conditions of the Madrid Meeting; secondly, how did these conditions affect the organization, course and results of the Madrid Meeting, and finally how could these conditions be acceptably modified to increase the efficiency of decision-making in the future?

On the basis of findings from the preceding Chapters the answers to these questions will be summarized in the three following sections of this chapter.

2. The Madrid Conditions

a. agenda

The CSCE agenda covers virtually every aspect of security and co-operation in Europe. The fact that there is no theoretical agreement as to whether internal events and circumstances can come under discussion does not limit the scope of the agenda in practice.

The communiqué dialogue conducted between NATO and the WP countries between 1966 and 1972 established that if a CSCE was to be organized it should be able to deal with almost all aspects of security and co-operation in Europe. This broad agenda was first reflected in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (the so-called Blue Book)

and was confirmed in the Final Act. The follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid were therefore entitled to include in their implementation discussions and proposals virtually all issues that they considered important to their mutual relations. Moreover, the fact that new items totally absent from the Final Act were added to the agenda in Madrid, the right to form free trade unions and the protection of visiting sporting and cultural groups are two examples, means that from now on gaps discovered in the Final Act can be filled at follow-up meetings.

In Belgrade interpretation of the Final Act's principle of non-intervention led to discussions that seemed to augur ill for discussions in Madrid: was the CSCE entitled to concern itself with, for example, the implementation of the principle on human rights in other CSCE states, or was this contrary to the Final Act? WP countries held that in the CSCE only bilateral implementation of the Final Act could be discussed and not the circumstances inside any one country. But in Madrid every country maintained its right as sovereign state (and there is no CSCE procedural rule that can deny this right) to bring up for discussion in the Plenary, at any time it wished, any problem that related to the letter or spirit of the Final Act. This meant in practice that the agenda of the follow-up meeting in fact covered all the most important problems troubling the relations between the participating states. This does not mean, however, that a meaningful dialogue on these problems followed or that consensus on their solution was found, for the same rule of consensus limits the possibilities of achieving such results.

b. institutional framework

The CSCE follow-up system projected in the Final Act is envisaged as a framework at a low level of institutionalization. Follow-up meetings are only mandated to take decisions of an informational, rule-supervisory or normative nature.

In spite of suggestions from the academic world and initial attempts by both WP and NNA countries to achieve a permanent organization, preferably linked with the UNO, in the end the Final Act only envisaged a framework at a low level of institutionalization. It was first of all decided that a second follow-up meeting should only take place by a consensus decision of the first follow-up meeting. Then CSCE rules of procedure and working methods were declared valid for all meetings

mutatis mutandis but the date, duration, agenda and other modalities of each follow-up meeting were left to be decided by a preparatory meeting in each case. Finally the Final Act decreed that there should be no permanent secretariat but that an *ad hoc* secretariat with limited competence should be set up for each follow-up meeting.

The Madrid Meeting attempted to raise the level of institutionalization of the CSCE by declaring the agenda, and other procedural modalities laid down in the Purple Book, valid for the Vienna follow-up Meeting as well, even if *mutatis mutandis*.

The Final Act lays only limited tasks on follow-up meetings and it is indeed difficult to widen the functions of such meetings. Consensus on sanctions against alleged non-fulfilment of the Final Act can never be reached because the State involved will always refuse to co-operate. Consensus on rule-creating standards will be equally difficult to reach because states would rather bow to a consensus of a supposedly politically binding nature than to a consensus of a legally binding nature.

c. rules of procedure

CSCE rules of procedure are based on the principle of equality expressed in the consensus procedure for decision-making and in the rule of rotating the chairmanship which applies in every organ of the conference. Notwithstanding the formally prescribed procedure the working method is inductive. The Executive Secretary is charged with technical tasks alone, among which language services are the most labour intensive and hence the most expensive. Rules prescribed for publicity are strict but in practice there is a high degree of openness.

In the very first days of the Helsinki Consultations preceding the CSCE in November 1972 agreement was reached on the most important rules of procedure. The principle of sovereign equality of all 35 states was established then, with the condition furthermore, that the participating states would not take part as members of military alliances. The two most important rules of procedure sprang from the principle of equality: the rule of consensus and rotation of the chairmanship.

Some mitigation of the consensus rule is offered in the Blue Book by its negative formulation on this point: consensus can be achieved "in

the absence of any objection" which means that positive approval of a decision is not required: silence means consensus. Objections to decisions have moreover to be submitted as "constituting an obstacle" to the taking of the decision in question. Finally there are the resources of formal reservations and interpretative statements which can be added to decisions, but little use has ever been made of these in the history of the CSCE.

Mitigation of the consequences of the rule of rotation of the chairmanship and at the same time of the rule that makes it incumbent to sit round the table in alphabetical order, principles that reflected an ideal of equality rather than political reality, was obtained by going over to informal organizational structures as soon as actual drafting of the concluding document had to start. Permanent "co-ordinators" provided by the NNA countries took the chair and the alphabetical arrangement gave way to one in which the main political groups found themselves face-to-face.

As far as working methods are concerned, the formal procedural framework places the Plenary at the centre of the decision-making process with the task of guiding the Subsidiary Working Bodies in their work; Drafting Groups are supposed to assist the Plenary in drafting the concluding document. In practice however, the actual drafting took place in a variety of autonomously operating informal organs which never in fact worked on the basis of guidelines previously received from the Plenary.

One of the points at which the low level of institutionalization appears is in the terms of reference for the Executive Secretary and his secretariat, who are empowered to deal only with technical matters. The major part of the work of the secretariat is the language services it provides since the CSCE recognizes six working languages (English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish).

On paper, CSCE meetings are not entirely public yet in practice the CSCE might be called "an open book". The forum aspect of the CSCE means that all its participants are looking for publicity and therefore openness.

3. The Madrid Experience

a. organization of the meeting

Since 1973 the number of CSCE participants (35) has remained stable and will most probably continue to do so.

Use has never been made of the possibility offered by CSCE rules of procedure of attending the conference as "observer" without participating in the taking of decisions, and this is unlikely to happen in the future. Albania is the only country that might still attend as observer, or as participating state bring the total number of CSCE states to 36, but up to now it has preferred to remain in isolation. In the opposite sense a reduction of the number of participants is equally unlikely. In Madrid, during the Malta phase, the meeting threatened to create a "positive" consensus of 34 because of the lack of a "negative" consensus of 35 on acceptance of the Madrid Concluding Document, but Malta preferred not to be excluded from the CSCE in this way.

The influence of the special category of Participating states known as the "non-participating Mediterranean States", on CSCE decision-making is nil.

Although the Final Act offers an opportunity to non-participating (Mediterranean) states to offer their views on questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, almost all the fully participating states appeared to have no interest at all in these views.

In Madrid, as before in Belgrade and Geneva, the CSCE was a conference of diplomats and government officials. Visiting members of national parliaments and "public members" in delegations had no influence on the decision-making process.

Different delegations included among their numbers, for short periods, members of their parliaments, not as negotiators but as observers. The US delegation sometimes included "public members" who played a modest role in the implementation discussion. Notwithstanding the forum aspect of the CSCE, decision-making was done by diplomats, mostly career diplomats, and other government officials.

The absence in CSCE rules of procedure of any

regulation on the presentation, examination or approval of official letters of credence by representatives of the participating states gave rise to no problems.

CSCE practice is that a diplomatic Note from the embassy in the host country, and later from the delegation to the meeting itself, to the Executive Secretary, giving a list of representatives of that country, is sufficient to give these the right to speak and take part in decisions. Such Notes are accepted as credentials by the Executive Secretary and the other participating delegations without any discussion. The only problem was over Turkey's refusal to recognize the representative of Cyprus and this was easily solved by unilateral declarations on the part of each of these countries.

b. course of the meeting

Provided a consensus could be reached, the Plenary of the Madrid meeting arrogated to itself the right to take any decision it thought fit; in its own opinion the Plenary was all-powerful.

In exceptional cases in Madrid the Plenary reached consensus for a specific interpretation of established rules of procedure. The underlying thought was that as long as consensus was obtained, the Plenary was all-powerful and could take any decision, as it saw fit, as an opportune interpretation of the procedures laid down in the Purple or Blue Books. In December 1981 therefore, the Plenary decided to replace all the Drafting Groups set up according to the Purple Book at the level of experts, by a single Drafting Group at the level of Heads of Delegation. In July 1983 and as a departure from the rule of daily rotation of the chairmanship, the Plenary decided to change to twice-daily rotation during the final ministerial days in September.

Thus the Plenary is all-powerful except in so far as there must be consensus for its decisions so that it is still open to any country to refuse to depart from the established rules of procedure or to interpret these in an exceptional fashion.

Drafting of the concluding document, one of the tasks of the Madrid Meeting, took place outside the formal setting of the meeting.

Just as had been the case in Belgrade and in Geneva, neither the Plenary nor the official Drafting Groups drafted a single sentence for the concluding document in Madrid, with the exception of the official Drafting Group for the Mediterranean where the East-West opposition did not have a dominating role. Drafting took place informally in a variety of circumstances: contact groups, coffee groups, structured informal negotiations, sherry groups and mini-groups, and there were also many informal contacts in coffee-breaks, in the coffee bar and at lunches or even dinners, on occasion, which cleared the way towards the solution of drafting problems. In the end it became necessary to go as far as government-to-government appeals in order to arrive at a final result.

In spite of the official rules of procedure the existence of political groupings of allied nations played a crucial part in the internal decision-making process of the Madrid Meeting.

Although the formal rule is that all states participating in the conference should do so as individual states independent of whatever "military alliance" they may belong to, the caucuses of these political groups formed part and parcel of the Madrid decision-making process and were in fact the most important decision-making organs. As the meeting pursued its lengthy course, spokesmen became less and less reluctant to speak on behalf of their own group and more and more inclined to call a spade a spade. The CSCE, which consists in theory of 35 independent countries, disclosed itself in Madrid as an assembly of political groups reflecting the reality of the political situation. The NNA countries, finding themselves more and more often in a buffer position between two antagonistic blocs, became increasingly prepared to consolidate themselves into a third bloc and to undertake the role of broker in the negotiations.

Application of the consensus rule to matters of procedure had on various occasions dramatic effects on the immediate course of decision-making in Madrid, but not on its results.

There were in Madrid at least three occasions on which the scene might have been described as Kafka-esque.

a) On 11 November 1980 a procedural discussion took place on how to apply

the consensus rule in order to restart the stopped clock so that the Main Meeting, as desired by the West, would be able to begin on that day according to the schedule agreed in Belgrade. The Meeting did indeed begin on that day but it seems likely that it would have done so in any case even if other procedures had been employed.

b) On 9 February 1982 the Polish chairman attempted to use the consensus rule to prevent thirteen speakers from making speeches on the situation in his own country; even if other procedural rules had been in force he would still have made use of them for the same purpose. But political reality cannot be confined in a procedural straitjacket and Western concern about events in Poland did manage to draw worldwide attention through the forum offered by Madrid.

c) In the night of silences, on 5 March 1982, the West used the consensus rule to enforce the initiation of a long summer recess. The object was achieved but would probably also have been achieved if different rules of procedure - for example a voting system - had been in force.

Application of the consensus rule to matters of substance in Madrid meant that in the decision-making process all drafting bodies were open-ended and all participants enjoyed equal rights in decision taking. However, equal rights should not be confused with equal political influence.

Negotiation on the Madrid Concluding Document took place between representatives of the caucuses, in large or small informal groups. However informal the Drafting Groups were, it remained a condition that consensus had to be reached on every word of the document. In theory therefore, and in practice, all these groups continued to be accessible to all delegations in order to allow them the opportunity of exercising their veto if necessary. In very limited sherry- or mini-groups the absence of other delegations was entirely on a voluntary basis and represented an exercise of self-discipline.

The conclusion that an equal right to withhold consensus does not mean an equal right to exert influence, is for example borne out by what happened in the Malta phase. A positive "consensus of 34" would not have been a possibility if the thirty-fifth country had been the US or the SU. Clearly the opinions of these two countries carry more weight than those of, say, Monaco.

c. results of the meeting

The review of implementation of the Final Act occupied not only the first six weeks of the meeting in their entirety, as envisaged in the Purple Book, but also continued to form a major part of the deliberations right up to the last day of the Madrid Meeting, two-and-a-half years later. Whether or not certain topics were considered by some delegations as purely internal affairs, other delegations persisted in talking about them.

The consequence of the principle that each participant had, as sovereign state, the right to speak in the Plenary on any subject it liked, as long as it was connected with the Final Act, was that none of the Western and Neutral countries would give up their right to continue the implementation discussion to the bitter end and to make speeches on what other states considered to be their own internal affairs. The chairman, who is not a single individual but a delegation occupying the chair, cannot be expected to call his fellow delegations to order for he is not allowed to make a chairman's ruling: such a ruling could never be challenged because the chairman's voice itself would be needed to complete the consensus for a challenge.

The Madrid Concluding Document, reflecting the limits of drafting under consensus conditions, catalogues contemporary problems but fails to solve them.

Although the Madrid Meeting finally adopted a so-called "substantial and balanced concluding document" this document betrays every characteristic of the result of a drafting process based on consensus. It exhibits a maximum drafting result on less controversial issues, a minimum result where politically sensitive matters are concerned and ambiguous texts where agreement to disagree was preferred to no text at all.

External rather than internal factors explain the long duration of the Madrid Meeting. Notwithstanding heightened tensions between participating states and also their various political configurations, the CSCE follow-up process stayed alive.

The Madrid Meeting, taking place as it did in a period of heightened East-West conflict, was able to serve as an appropriate forum for discussion of the bones of contention that lay between the participants: the human rights condition, economic boycotts, or the situation in and around Afghanistan and Poland. The pressing need to discuss these problems contributed to the Meeting's long duration; a concluding document would have been agreed much sooner if it had not been for the Polish problem and other East-West tensions. The final outcome of all the conditions governing the Madrid Meeting which have been discussed in this book is that we still have at our disposal a forum in which critical implementation debates can be held. The reverse of the coin is that those same conditions, by producing compromise normative formulations and rule-supervisory promulgations unsupported by sanctions, limited the actual effect of the Madrid follow-up Meeting. Implementation of the Final Act and the Concluding Document of Madrid is a matter of concrete fact which perversely remains outside the conference chamber. However, although compromise formulations of the same kind as dominated Madrid are to be found in the mandates for future meetings announced in the Madrid Concluding Document, the very holding of these meetings will itself constitute a fact in the reality of post-Madrid Europe. With or without détente, the CSCE is here to stay.

4. Recommendations

The conclusions to be drawn from the material described in this book will now be summarized in the form of a series of recommendations each followed by a discussion. The recommendations have been so designed that each one is capable of execution independently of the rest but they should also be regarded as interrelated and together constitute a package.

a. agenda

RECOMMENDATION 1: Participating states should exercise the greatest restraint in putting forward proposals to be approved by the next follow-up meeting: a single political group of countries should contribute not more than one proposal per basket, focussed on the most important problem in the relations between the 35 states.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Neither a substantive concluding document nor any other comprehensive final document should be aimed at: the function of such a document can be performed by a small number of separate chairman's statements.

The Madrid Concluding Document is an extensive document representing nearly three years of negotiation on 87 proposals. The repetition of such an exercise is not to be recommended. Madrid, never again! The provisions contained in the Madrid document vary in importance. The most important Western and East European proposals occupy a disproportionate place. It would seem to be more efficient and less time-consuming if negotiations were concentrated only on proposals that are of essential interest in the relations between the 35 states. Whether such negotiations would be likely to achieve results would depend, as always, on the political climate of the moment, but it would at least become swiftly apparent what the prospects were for a useful outcome.

The Final Act does not require the follow-up meetings to produce a final document at all. Towards the end of the Madrid negotiations the mechanism of the chairman's statement proved to be an effective method of reaching consensus. The less text there is to be agreed the less time consensus takes to reach. On the other hand the consensus rule might still be used to veto one chairman's statement until agreement is reached on a different one; conditional linkages of this sort are unavoidable where the rule of consensus has absolute force. Therefore the pattern of negotiations would remain unchanged. As a result, the "balance" desired by the participating states would grow out of the negotiations themselves.

If follow-up meetings confine themselves in future to the approval of a limited number of chairman's statements, this is not to prevent any future Conference - say once every ten years - from attempting to achieve a balanced and substantive concluding document which might then include the chairman's statements from preceding years or use these statements as a starting point for negotiations.

b. the follow-up system

RECOMMENDATION 3: The Preparatory Meeting in Vienna should take a decision on the duration of the interval between the Vienna Meeting and the fourth Follow-up

Meeting, one of say two years. The main Vienna Meeting should then decide on the periodicity and duration of follow-up meetings in the future (for example, biennial meetings of perhaps six weeks before and six weeks after a Christmas recess). The possibility of interim meetings between regularly scheduled follow-up meetings should be left open.

In Geneva, during negotiations on the Final Act, it was the East European countries that fought for an automatic succession of follow-up meetings; the West preferred to envisage the taking of a specific decision for holding each succeeding follow-up meeting. During the Preparatory Meeting in Madrid positions were reversed because the East European countries were not inclined to take a decision for holding a third follow-up meeting after Madrid, while the West, together with the NNA countries now laid great stress on it. The question of whether there would be a further follow-up meeting at all, a point sometimes hotly discussed in Madrid during the first two years, now appears to have been somewhat academic; which of the 35 participating states can afford, politically, to stop the CSCE follow-up process? The CSCE is here to stay.

There is nothing in the Final Act to prevent strengthening the institutionalization of the CSCE and regulating the follow-up process. Certainty on the question of whether there will be a fourth follow-up meeting after Vienna, would improve the climate of negotiation in Vienna.

The Executive Secretary (see Recommendation 13) should be given the right, during periods between follow-up meetings and at the request of one of the participating states, to call a meeting of CSCE ambassadors which could then decide to convoke an *ad hoc* CSCE meeting at the level of representatives of ministers of foreign affairs. This might be done in the event of sudden crises in relations between the 35 states in consequence of alleged flagrant violation of the letter or spirit of the Final Act. The rule-supervisory function of the CSCE (or, in CSCE shorthand, the implementation discussion) would be strengthened in this way. Even if the meeting of CSCE ambassadors should be unable to decide on calling an *ad hoc* meeting of the normal follow-up type, because of lack of consensus, a rule-supervisory gesture would nevertheless have been made.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Every encouragement should be given to the efforts already begun by the Madrid Meeting to declare the existing rules of procedure, agenda, working programme and other modalities of follow-up meetings valid, *mutatis mutandis*, for future meetings as well. The Blue Book and the Purple Book should be recognized as regulating the conditions of all succeeding follow-up meetings.

The Madrid Concluding Document provides that "the agenda, working programme and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the main Vienna Meeting, unless other decisions on these questions are taken by the preparatory meeting ...". This means that both the Purple Book and the Blue Book have been declared to apply to Vienna unless there is a consensus to depart from them. Thus no further consensus is required in order to formulate new rules of procedure. Recommendation 4 more or less comes down to changing the words in the quotation given above from "the main Vienna meeting" to "all other Follow-up meetings". This would palpably lighten the task of every preparatory meeting preceding a follow-up meeting and so increase the efficiency of preparation. The degree of institutionalization of the CSCE would be raised by this measure.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Executive Secretary from the most recent host country should be held to be responsible for the CSCE secretariat up to the moment at the beginning of the succeeding follow-up meeting when the Executive Secretary from the new host country takes over the responsibility.

This recommendation follows the rule from the Blue Book that the retiring chairman remains responsible until the new session begins. The retiring Executive Secretary should be obliged to bear responsibility for his secretarial tasks up to the moment when he can hand over his responsibility to his successor by means of a symbolic handshake, a gesture that would then serve to underline the continuity of the CSCE.

In the interim period up to this moment the retiring Executive Secretary would carry out the tasks allotted to him in Recommendation 13.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The two jobs of a follow-up meeting, review of implementation of the Final Act and examination of new proposals, should not have to be done at separate times but could from the very beginning of the meeting go on simultaneously.

In Madrid the West wanted to follow the same programme as had been followed in Belgrade, devoting the first weeks of the meeting to discussion of implementation alone and only subsequently going on to examination of new proposals. In fact the implementation discussion continued in Madrid from first to last. Much time would be gained if new proposals were introduced immediately after the meeting's opening and their examination initiated in formal or informal working groups in parallel with the Plenary's discussion of implementation. The Purple Book's timetable would have to be adapted to this purpose, under the *mutatis mutandis* rule.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The trend begun in Madrid to make greater use of the possibility of organizing expert meetings, should be continued. Each succeeding follow-up meeting should pay more attention to the results of such interim meetings.

In Belgrade it was decided to hold one expert meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes, one on co-operation in the Mediterranean and also a Scientific Forum. Three expert meetings were decided on in Madrid together with one forum, one seminar, a commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Final Act and a disarmament conference extending over a long period. This proliferation of expert meetings reinforces the multilateral CSCE follow-up process. Any tendency for such meetings to detract from the importance of the real follow-up meetings will be annulled if the follow-up meetings make fuller use of the results of the expert meetings, both in discussions and in the formulation of the concluding chairman's statements.

RECOMMENDATION 8: However unrealistic organizational links with UNO organs may appear to be, the practice of engaging certain of these organs in the CSCE process should be actively continued.

In the options for an institutional framework for the CSCE suggested by theorists in the early seventies, much attention was paid to the possibility of establishing organizational links with the UNO. Among the suggestions was one for a regional framework with links to the Security Council. The options as a whole are now of little more than academic interest because it is clear that consensus for their adoption will never be achieved in the CSCE, if only for the reason that various

CSCE members, such as Switzerland and the Holy See, are not UN members and have no wish to be connected with it. In the Madrid Concluding Document the CSCE states issued one invitation and six recommendations to the ECE and on one occasion expressed their interest in UNESCO activity. The ECE came in for special mention because it is itself concerned with the same subjects as fall into the second basket of the Final Act, over the same geographical area. On the other hand, non-European members of UNESCO and other UN organs cannot be expected to interest themselves in purely European affairs. Yet where CSCE countries succeed in reaching agreement during follow-up meetings, to delegate certain responsibilities to UN organs, this should be encouraged in the interest of avoiding duplication. It is not the role of the CSCE to duplicate the activities of functional or regional UN organizations.

c. the rules of procedure

RECOMMENDATION 9: In the context of the application of the rule of consensus to both procedural and substantive matters; it would be more effective to attempt to reach an early consensus firstly by abandoning the effort to achieve an extensive concluding document and aiming for a small number of chairman's statements instead; secondly by going over to drafting in informal work groups at an earlier stage, and thirdly by giving the NNA co-ordinators of such work groups the right to frame Informal Single Negotiating Texts.

The desirability of changing the consensus rule with regard to procedural matters may well be open to question but what is certain is that the rule of consensus can only be replaced by consensus and this consensus will never now be achieved. The same is true with regard to whether in the case of substantive matters the consensus rule should be altered to allow some sort of voting procedure: consensus on this is no longer possible.

If the rule of consensus is there to stay in the CSCE, then what must be looked for is how to achieve results more quickly than was the case in Madrid. It is more difficult to get consensus for an extensive concluding document like that of Madrid than for a restricted number of chairman's statements. The lesson of the Madrid experience is that agreement can be reached in a reasonable time on the text of a chairman's statement because it has a concrete content which can be grasped from the

beginning. If, in parallel with official treatment of the agenda, informal negotiation is started at an much earlier stage, considerable time is saved. During the informal negotiations the NNA co-ordinators might make use of Informal Single Negotiating Texts, at an earlier stage, as was the practice in UNCLOS III, in order to put forward their perception of a possible basis for consensus.

RECOMMENDATION 10: More intensive use of formal reservations and interpretative statements should not be encouraged.

Formal reservations and interpretative statements are necessary escape mechanisms which accelerate the decision-making process if adequate use is made of them. The only way of making them more attractive would be to give them a status equivalent to that of the decision to which they refer; this could be done by appending them to the decision itself together with which they would then be published. However, if it were known that such unilateral declarations would receive the same publicity as the final documents, other delegations would feel obliged to state their views on the subject as well. As a maximum result the concluding documents would be accompanied by 35 unilateral declarations.

It would therefore be better to continue the practice followed in Madrid and to regard this escape mechanism as a last resort enabling a delegation to avoid blocking consensus without losing face. An intensive use of unilateral interpretative statements and formal reservations would open the way for each state to dine *à la carte* and, in the end, rob consensus of its meaning as the ideal of the CSCE.

RECOMMENDATION 11: If the change-over to informal negotiation happens at an earlier stage (see Recommendation 9) there will be no need to interfere with the rule of daily rotation of the chairmanship; the provision for departure from this rule in the Blue Book should be used if a formal drafting group itself goes over to actual drafting.

Daily rotation of the chairmanship is an expression of the principle of equality of all the CSCE states which gives it an interest which far outweighs its drawbacks. The drawbacks themselves can be avoided by leaving the actual drafting to informal working bodies. In Madrid the one formal drafting group in which actual drafting was done

was the one on co-operation in the Mediterranean where the East-West conflict had no role to play. In such a situation it is possible to revert to rule 71 (b) of the Blue Book and establish "a basis of rotation in accordance with practical arrangements".

RECOMMENDATION 12: In the absence of an extensive concluding document as an objective, this having been replaced by the ideal of a small number of chairman's statements, the Plenary should fulfil its role as central organ in the formally-prescribed procedure by establishing guidelines at an early stage, which should lay down the number of chairman's statements to be agreed and the areas they should cover, so that the bottom-up approach can function more effectively.

The bottom-up approach would be more efficient if the negotiators in formal or informal work groups had a general principle of reference at their disposal from the beginning. If the Plenary, which, according to the Purple Book, is the main body of the meeting, indicated the number and subject matter of the chairman's statements (for example one per basket) then the structure of the final result would already be established which would prevent a succession of events similar to the Malta phase.

RECOMMENDATION 13: The Executive Secretary for technical matters should be given the following additional responsibilities:

- a) before the Meeting: to formulate and distribute the Purple Book *mutatis mutandis*;
- b) during the Meeting: to report on any complaints about fulfilment of the Final Act received during the interim period; to provide technical support for co-ordinators in arriving at single negotiating texts;
- c) after the Meeting: to provide a clearing house for complaints about violation of the Final Act or the Madrid Concluding Document and to call a meeting of the CSCE ambassadors if requested to do so by a CSCE state.

The last line of the Final Act reads: "The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country". According to the Blue Book the Executive Secretary is to be concerned only with technical matters. Within such limits it is impossible to create an institutionalized permanent, international CSCE secretariat. The recommendations given

above are only intended to increase the permanence and degree of institutionalization of the CSCE to the extent possible within these limits. As, in future, the Purple Book is only to be "adjusted" in order to serve for the next follow-up meeting, and these "adjustments" are considered to be merely of a technical nature, the Executive Secretary and his secretariat may properly frame and circulate a draft for the adjusted Purple Book. During the Meeting the Executive Secretary and his secretariat should be more actively and intensively involved in the NNA co-ordinators' efforts to produce their negotiating texts and made fully responsible, for example, for registration and distribution of proposals, amendments, textual changes and decisions on which agreement has been reached, or in other words given the job of archivist and registrar.

In the interim period, that is, after any one Meeting, the secretariat should act as clearing house for complaints put in by participating states on fulfilment of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document by other CSCE states. These complaints would be published and distributed by the secretariat. If any state so required, the secretariat would call a meeting of CSCE ambassadors, empowered to decide to convoke an *ad hoc* CSCE meeting following a consensus (see Recommendation 3). This new function for the secretariat would lay stress on the importance of the multilateral CSCE follow-up process.

RECOMMENDATION 14: It should not be automatically considered necessary for every document to be translated into all official languages with the least possible delay.

In Madrid the language staff accounted for the largest portion of all costs of the executive secretariat. Yet consensus will never be reached for dropping any one of the six official languages. Costs might rather be reduced by circulating all ephemeral documents in only one working language, the one in which they were originally drafted, leaving it in case of need to the delegations' language experts themselves to translate them. Such an arrangement would mean that secretariat translators would be required only in the last phase of the meeting in order to prepare the various language versions of the texts previously agreed by consensus.

RECOMMENDATION 15: Journals of closed sessions should be produced only if there are decisions, formal reservations or interpretative statements to be registered. The verbatim texts of the opening and closing statements during the open sessions should be published only in the language in which they are delivered.

In Madrid 336 Journals amounting to 803 pages issued in six languages were published and distributed on a wide scale. A small number contain records of consensus on particular decisions or reservations and interpretative statements included at the request of one or more delegations. The rest are of no interest because all they contain is lists of which delegations contributed to the session, without the text of what was said. To carry out empty routines of this sort is totally superfluous.

The verbatim record of statements at the Madrid opening sitting filled 350 pages and of this record 782 copies were distributed, 100 in German, 270 in English, 73 in Spanish, 166 in French, 60 in Italian and 113 in Russian. The closing statements had a similar circulation. Publishing only a single text containing each statement in its original language would mean a significant saving of costs. The states themselves could then make what translations they liked in their own home capitals.

RECOMMENDATION 16: All Plenaries should be open to the public but all meetings of both formal and informal working bodies should remain closed.

Opening all the Plenaries to the public would represent a recognition of the CSCE's character as a forum and would also strengthen its rule-supervisory function. As the fact of the matter is that each delegation at present supplies the press with texts of its own interventions in the Plenary it would seem more efficient simply to allow the press to be present at the sessions.