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"Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East: The Arab-Israeli Conflict"

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"Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East:

The Arab-Israeli Conflict"

I

Conflict seems endemic to the Middle East. Over the past forty years, the world has witnessed wars between Israel and varying numbers of Arab states, between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in changing configurations, between Egypt and one or more Gulf, Horn, and North African states, between a shifting coalition of Gulf states, and recently between Iraq and Iran, with mixed involvement of other Middle East countries. Internal conflicts also have taken a stark toll in loss of life and destruction throughout the region. Peace, or at least non-violent confrontation, is the aberration in this important geopolitical, economic, and strategic arena.

The resolution of these disparate conflicts is unlikely given the mix of causes and contributing factors, yet it is evident that the conflict relationships have to be dampened, confined, and controlled, if not prevented. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated modern weapons systems and the further penetration of external actors exacerbates this already tenuous and volatile situation. Peacekeeping and observer missions have had some limited successes on the Arab-Israel fronts, as have arms control understandings between Egypt and Israel since the mid-1970s.[1] What is the potential for confidence building mesures (CBM) in crisis prevention and conflict management in the Middle East? Can

formal arrangements or implicit understandings be achieved that would lessen the likelihood of resorting to military confrontation?

In 1979, in the introduction to an Adelphi Paper on the future of arms control, Jonathan Alford of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, wrote: "Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) can be viewed both as an underpinning for more conventional types of arms-control agreement and as alternatives when traditional types of agreement prove impossible to negotiate or sustain in the face of rapid technological change."[2] This definition is not unreasonable in a climate where there is an explicit acceptance of legitimacy of state sovereignty, authority, and boundary, and hence the acknowledged right to pursue the principle of self-help. In Europe, in spite of recurring tensions over the two Germanys, among other things, the evolution of CBM can build upon decades of diplomatic efforts to seek an explicit operational framework for crisis prevention and conflict management. Although events at times have strained relations between East and West, nevertheless arms control and force reduction efforts have continued. Today it is difficult to imagine what issue or action would provoke a major offensive thrust in the European arena by either NATO or WTO forces. While ambiguity, uncertainty, and worse-case scenario building continue to hinder arms control and force reduction talks, the emergence of CBM as a legitimate broadening of the security

agenda may faciliate positive movement. But all of this is predicated on at least three facts. First, since 1945 inter-bloc Eurobased warfare has not occurred. Second, in spite of occasional rhetoric to the contrary, the central authorities of all the major states accord each other legitimacy of governance. And third, there have developed functional relationships between many of the European countries in trade, finance, and commerce, often transcending membership in either NATO or WTO.

In most other regions of the world, protagonists have not as yet worked out such relationships. The irony of CBM is that the formalization of the idea came from the conflict arena where it may be least needed. While there is no doubt that the East-West axis remains the single most significant arena for the consequences of the mismanagement of politico-military relations, it also is the most stable of all conflict-prone areas. Hence the ability of Alford to identify "rapid technological change" as the basic impediment to progress on arms control rather than the more fundamental concern about a breakdown in, nevermind non-existence of, diplomatic, political, or functional relations. East-West arms control and force reduction talks will wax and wane, but it is extremely unlikely that they will cease. In this situation, confidence-building measures do enhance the agenda. While the elarged menu for negotiation introduced by CBM may slow progress on achieving the more encompassing agreements, the ensuing incrementalism should contribute to

a stable atmosphere of cooperation where give-and-take occurs with less risk of any major setback and where norms of cooperative reciprocity, over the long haul, will contribute to the likelihood of significant arms control and force reduction agreements. While an increase in choice - in degrees of freedom - is not always conducive to negotiation since it enlarges the envelope of uncertainty, when pursued in the context of a reasonably longstanding and stable regime of reciprocity - as exists between East and West - reasonable incrementalism as envisioned through CBM likely will enhance trust and decrease the likelihood of threat and misperception.[3]

The more recent definition of confidence-building measures offered by Johan Holst of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs may be more broadly applicable for those regions where military conflict is active, political legitimacy remains under direct challenge, and explicit arms control arrangements are unlikely. "Confidence-building measures (CBM) may be defined as arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of the states and the facts they create."[4] While arms control and force reductions may be the desired foundation of these arrangements, it is evident that some situations demand the reduction of tensions and the management of the situation so as to reduce the likelihood of the use of the military instrument in spite of the absence of an explicit arms control regime. The reduction of ambiguity and

uncertainty in the facts created by states - the thrust of Holst's definition - must be the focus of CBM in Third World regions of conflict, with or without explicit arms control efforts. The Middle East is the archetype of such a conflict permeated arena and a natural laboratory for the development of creative confidence and security building measures.

II

The literature on CBM is almost entirely devoted to the East-West confrontation where there are "psychological and physical dimensions to the building of mutual confidence between potential adversaries."[5] In the Middle East, the line between the potential and the actualized adversary is neither stable nor consistent. Further, the adversarial threat is perceived by many central authorities to be more than minor, and certainly more than defensive. Not only is nation-building still underway with all the attendant traumas, but empire-building also is a stark reality to some. Pan-Islam, pan-Arabism, Zionism, Islamic fundmentalisms with accomanying intra-Islamic schisms, Ba'thism and other competing forms of Arab socialism and nationalism, and personal leadership consolidation all form aspects of hostile challenges to internationally recognized states, their central authorities, and the established international boundaries. A review of the fluidity of allegiances during intra-Arab conflicts over the past forty years is but one indicator of the volatility within the region.[6] In such an

environment is there a place for confidence and security building measures?

Yair Evron's examination of the Israeli-Egyptian relationship between 1971 and 1978 contends that "without arms-control measures (as the central aspect of CBM) no enduring political settlement in the Middle East can be achieved." His analysis provides a convincing argument that "some tacit, unformalized arms-control measures can be agreed, even in a situation of severe political conflict." However, without concomitant political developments such implicit understandings do not prevent wars but only delay and constrain the use of force.[7] In the Middle East, both politico-diplomatic and military-security issues require parallel development to overcome the zero-sum security dilemma that dominates the vision of most of the region's leaders. Not until President Sadat had shifted Egypt's security calculus with Israel to a positive-sum situation did a political climate emerge upon which arms control, force reduction, and subsidiary CBM could evolve. Although less than a decade old, this new relationship, however incomplete in form and content, has continued in the face of a number of severe challenges, including Sadat's assassination, the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions into Lebanon, and Egypt's partial and temporary ostracization from the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. It has survived primarily because of self-interest, the presence and unique role of the United States, and the enormous potential costs -

political, economic, military - attendant with breakdown. Though the relationship between Israel and Egypt has not moved much beyond a level of diplomatic civility, neither has it deteriorated to military threat and violent confrontation. Consistent monitoring of events and constant personal interaction between public and private elites of the two countries, assisted by the American commitment including regulated arms transfers and active mediation in times of heightened tension, have maintained a stability rarely seen between any two states in the region.

As one would expect, cooperative behaviour in the absence of any overarching central authority normally occurs only when the actors perceive it to be in their self-interest, whether the incentive be positive gain or the removal of something aversive.[8] The critical difficulty, as in the classic prisoner's dilemma game, is for each actor to trust that the other would prefer to cooperate rather than to risk total loss in the pursuit of gains greater than would accrue over a long-term cooperative strategy. If it is a "one-shot" game then risk might be worthwhile, but if there is a history then, as Robert Axelrod's pathbreaking work reveals, the combination of reciprocity ("tit for tat") over time, a changing payoff matrix (costs and benefits accruing to the act), and enlarging the shadow of the future (increasing the severity or importance of future acts and thereby the significance of history) motivates an actor to move toward a cooperative strategy.[9] Except for the extreme

case where there is perceived to be no option other than total destruction of the enemy, an exceptional case in the real world, Axelrod's rigorous analysis provides strong theoretical support for the utility of CBM for crisis management. Unlike the game of chess in which the strategy is inherently and totally antagonistic without any option since the goal is complete victory, even in the prosecution of a war options remain available concerning such issues as the extent to which suffering and destruction will be inflicted or tolerated, conditions of surrender prior to defeat and short of annihilation, and so forth. In other words, purposeful limited war remains a clear option. Rarely must a situation be defined as truly zero-sum, but how does one promote cooperative, or at least minimal, strategies among antagonists?

Following Axelrod's lead, the central analytic issue is whether cooperation - and thereby the prevention of crises escalating into conflict - can be encouraged by changing the decision rules or strategy of what to do in any specific, especially conflict-prone, stuation.[10] This is particularly acute in the Middle East where the very serious conflicts are operationalized through the use of the most extreme rhetoric and action but where options do exist, at least in principle. Clearly, if the antagonists are willing to concede some of their objectives and interests then conflict might be reduced if not avoided. "It is only because there is a conflict of interest in a given situation, be-

cause each side mobilizes or alerts its forces and makes threatening moves to demonstrate resolution, to deter or to coerce the other side, and because neither side is willing initially to back down that a crisis poses the danger of war."[11] In the Arab-Israeli zone in particular, but also along the borders and in the capitals of most Middle East countries, constant vigilance is maintained in fear of threat of overthrow or invasion. Not that all, or even most, states in the region are at war at any one time, but rather that most governments, and especially those within the confrontation zone around Israel, perceive themselves at risk: Israel from all the Arab states and the PLO; the Arab states from Israel, from other neighbours, from the PLO or other radical movements, and from within. The size and posture of the military throughout the region permits most countries to maintain a constant level of combat preparedness, itself contributing to an atmosphere of tension and expectation.

Contemporary Middle East history supports the rationale for this policy of combat readiness. Unfortunately, it also mitigates against achieving cooperation beyond a tentative "live-and-let-live" scenario, which itself occasionally escalates to more aggressive forms of coercion when either diplomacy or deterrence fail, as occurred between Egypt and Israel in 1967 and 1973 and between Syria and Israel in Lebanon between 1976 and 1982.[12] Unlike the effective "rule of prudence" in Soviet-American relations which operates

under the overarching fear of a thermonuclear holocaust, the Arab-Israeli conflicts in particular, but also the Iran-Iraq war, the Syrian-Egyptian rivalry, and other intra-Arab antagonisms operate under the braking mechanism of superpower constraints.[13] But while the fear of the consequences of escalation obtain here as well, the latitude for conventional operations is substantial, making war both more likely as a policy instrument and more difficult to prevent when the antagonists perceive their interests to be served. In the Middle East, war remains a viable instrument of politics, as exemplified by President Sadat's use of limited war in 1973 and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. In such situations confidence-building measures are unlikely to be significant in preventing war. The utility of going to war remains too high. Until the cost-benefit calculus changes and the options broaden, in the prevention of calculated purposeful military conflict CBM will remain marginal except insofar as they decrease casualties and increase effective defence due to the early warning received by the abrogation of explicit or implicit passive CBM or by the superior knowledge of the enemy accumulated through active CBM.

III

CBM were operating between Israel and Egypt already prior to President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem signalling Egypt's recognition of Israel as a sovereign, independent state with legitimate security concerns. Implicit arms control understandings and explicit force deployment

agreements, the placement of a peacekeeping force and observers between the belligerent armies, demilitarized zones, and regular consultations through the use of intermediaries were employed in an effort to reduce the likelihood of unintended military conflict. Sadat's trip in the winter of 1977 changed the strategy, the decision rules, from the post-1973 tentative "live-and-let-live" system to the explicit pursuit of mutually enhanced security. The issue became how to establish normal diplomatic relations between states whose governments wished to reduce the utility of the military instrument as the primary means to achieve contentious political objectives. Sadat changed few of his objectives or long-range goals other than the basic issue of Israel, and in this he altered his strategy from that of a game of chess to the prisoner's dilemma, from total victory to gaining the maximum amount under conditions of mutual survival and constraint. This one defection from precedent opened an entirely new and much broader menu of options. The results are well known. The role of CBM since 1977 have been critical to the pursuit of the goals set forth in the September 1978 Camp David Accords and March 1979 peace treaty. Fundamental to success has been the norm of reciprocity, whether in the exchange of diplomatic representatives, the Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory in Sinai and the formal Egyptian compliance with trade, educational, and cultural interchange, the presence of the American-sponsored Sinai Multinational Force and Observers,

and the understanding concerning the limitations of force deployments in the Sinai. Each side is seen as having defected from the understood strategy in some way, as Israel with Lebanon and, more generally, with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Egypt with its failure to engage in a real open-border policy with Israel and its unwillingness to sponsor further Arab moves towards accepting Israel as a member within the community of nations. Yet, at least so far, defections have not been seen as warranting a return to the prior adversarial strategy.

The situation between Israel and each of its other bordering states is not so clear, and certainly not so formal. In each case Israel maintains ground-based early warning systems (EWS), both manned and electronic, as well as surveillance from air and sea. It is likely that Syria is similarly equipped, or at least receives sophisticated information from its Soviet advisors. Israel's substantial investment in EWS and counter-measures, as well as its policy of constant deployment and rapid mobilization, is seen as a necessary measure due not only to contiguous adversaries but to its extremely vulnerable geographic situation. Estimates of Israel's warning time against enemy aircraft from airfields in Syria or Jordan run between 3 and 5 minutes; tanks could take less than 6 hours to reach the Mediterranean coast from the Jordan River. From the Israeli perspective, without a Sadat-like change of strategy among the other governments, Israeli force deployments and

continued development of military and intelligence systems is required, regardless of the provocative interpretation that might occur in the Arab capitals. Furthermore, without a shift in Arab intent there is little external reason (i.e., in distinction from the internal demographic and political factors) for Israel to relinquish any of the territories it still occupies as a result of the 1967 and 1973 wars, especially given Arab treatment of its Jewish populations.

Views which emanate from the Arab capitals seem no more sanguine.[14] Although regimes, intra-Arab allegiances, and particular policies change, the Arab fear of Israeli expansionism and aggression remains relatively fixed, exacerbated (or proven) by the series of wars, incursions, and invasions, the retention of conquered territories, and the reported civil domination of Israeli Jew over Arab. From this perspective, Israeli control over the Golan Heights poses a direct and intimidating threat to Damascus and unfettered Syrian access to Lebanon, rather than as a means to enhance Israeli security. Similarly, Israel's involvements in Lebanon have been viewed not as a state's response to external aggression and to the dangerous destabilization of a former pro-Western neighbour, but rather as direct interference in the domestic politics of an Arab state, an affront to Arab integrity by a Western proxy, a challenge to Syrian hegemony, and an effort to expand Israel's effective borders north to the Litani River. As John Mroz noted in his study of Arab and Israeli perceptions, Israel's articulated

primary concern with secure and defensible borders is viewed by most Arabs as a "cover-up for real Israeli intentions to continue Israeli expansion and annexation of Arab lands in accordance with long-stated Zionist goals." The Israeli-Egyptian agreements are seen as an effort to further divide the Arab world, permitting consolidation of Israeli power, its control over occupied territories, and the undermining of Palestinian goals, and it is in this context that Sadat is often accused of being a traitor to the Arab world.[15]

Surely the constancy and stridency of these mutually antagonistic perceptions should result in an enhanced certainty concerning the intent behind "the facts" created by the protagonists. If the worse case scenario is the basis of evaluating military, diplomatic, and politico-economic activity, the envelope of uncertainty is severely reduced as is the menu of options from which to select the appropriate response. So long as each state prepares for and maintains sufficient defensive capability to feel secure then adherence to a deterrence doctrine would seem to be a workable strategy to follow, effectively eliminating hot wars. In such an environment, CBM have a confirmatory supporting role.

However, the behaviour of Arab and Israeli actors has departed from this norm. The military imbalance along with the geographic, demographic, economic, and political asymmetries and perceived aggressive intent encourage very different politico-military strategy and tactics among the

actors.[16] These differences in methods and objectives, as well as ultimate goals, reflecting the fundamental structural asymmetries underlying the entire region, prevent the emergence of a stable non-war regime based on mutually accepted rules of deterrence. Because the ability to punish the enemy for a defection from the deterrence norm has not been sufficient to prevent such defection, when combined with the intervening interests of extra-regional powers the certainty of a constant worse-case scenario becomes eroded. Although on average this may seem to constrain the use of the military instrument it also exacerbates the ability to guage accurately the enemy's intent and to send clear signals that provocative behaviour will incur severe costs.[17] Perhaps more basic has been the inability to identify or define "unacceptable cost" short of total annihilation, and this extreme has little current credibility due to the American and Soviet presence and the asymmetry in local military capability.

The fact that at least two actors - Israel and the PLO - define their goals in maximal terms which are almost mutually exclusive and that one, the PLO, has explicit support from a host of proximate states, prevents the establishment of an effective deterrence system. So long as the Arab world supports the maximalist position of the PLO and are joined by other states in providing the PLO with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, war will remain viable because no Israeli threat or exercise of punishment, short

of a devastating Israeli thrust into the Arab heartland linked explicitly to a final resolution of PLO demands, will be severe enough to invoke an emergent cooperative (albeit not friendly) strategy of "live-and-let-live." Similarly, so long as Israel maintains its position in the occupied territories, then there is no obvious incentive for the PLO to alter its decision rules. To break this mutually harmful strategy, one of the three actors - Israel, the PLO, or one or more of the singularly significant Arab states - must defect. It is here that CBM could be most useful and innovative.

IV

To defect from the protracted conundrum of mutual hostility and active conflict requires the willingness and capacity to face and withstand significant risk. For Israel, defection would be at least a partial withdrawal from all occupied territories; the immediate risk would be increased military vulnerability to a Soviet supported PLO state, and over the long term, having to deal with a radicalized and dissatisfied population on its borders. For the PLO, defection would mean a change in the Palestinian National Covenant, acknowledging Israel's legitimacy and security within reasonably defensible boundaries; the risk to the PLO would be the further fractioning of the Palestinian movement and its takeover either by minimalists or by proxies of other states, whether Arab or Soviet. For significant Arab states, defection would mean moving from

explicitly recognizing Israel and its security needs all the way to following Egypt's lead in establishing formal relations with Israel, including the signing of a peace treaty; the accompanying risks could range from ostracization to regime overthrow. In any case, defection from the current strategy necessitates a perceived change in the expected outcome matrix. In Axelrod's terms, one has to enlarge the shadow of the future (i.e., markedly increase the potential benefits of defection and the real costs of non-defection) to promote a new cooperative strategy of conflict management, especially since attendant security risks remain high even with cooperation. CBM are critical in this context.

The range of options are substantial if one assumes that maximalist positions are not fixed and that extremism does not carry an automatic veto. While this is not the place to discuss the options, in order to explore the potential for CBM let us assume an Israeli defection from its prior strategy - a move towards substantial withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza - as an effort to encourage a positive response from the Arab world.[19] Although one can readily imagine variants of cooperative behaviour forthcoming, the antagonisms likely would remain for generations, especially given the continued presence of extremists who call either for a "Greater Israel" or an "Islamic Empire." The loss of territory - not totally unlike the return of the Sinai to Egypt - would result in increased Israeli vulnerability to ground, air, and terrorist attacks.[20]

Israeli fears, in spite of their current military superiority, would be exacerbated by the uncertainty of what form, structure, policies, and allegiances a Palestinian entity would have. Coupled with the improved sophistication of the weapons systems employed by the contiguous Arab states, it is likely that Israeli withdrawal would, for all parties, increase vigilance while reducing the ability to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty. Given the reduced warning time available, it is likely that Israel would upgrade still further its level of permanently mobilized units. For these reasons, CBM such as early warning stations and satellite reconnaisance while necessary would be insufficient. Even if we assumed that the West Bank and Gaza areas remained demilitarized except for a civil police force, the heightened tension resulting from national efforts to reduce uncertainty would require independent observers and, more importantly, direct contact between senior members of opposing governments. Furthermore, as Evron has argued, the probability of successful conflict management would be improved significantly by the development of arms control agreements. While the Soviet-American arms race could be considered a proxy for direct combat, throughout the Middle East the "law of the instrument" obtains: weapons present will be weapons used. While force deployment agreements would certainly assist predictability, the long reach of modern weapons systems, combined with the very short distances between protagonists, overrides the issue. From an

Israeli viewpoint, a Palestinian entity would do little to alleviate this overarching situation while actually creating one more potential external problem. Unless the creation of such a unit - whether independent state or in federation with Jordan - were accompanied by an equivalent fundamental change in Arab and Islamic ideology leading to recognition and acceptance of Israel, arms control agreements would be the only viable CBM, along with superpower guarantees, to promote effective reductions in hostilities.[21] And even then, the pragmatic strategist would remain cautious in the light of history, recent experience, and the art of political duplicity.[22]

The complex web of simultaneous antagonisms in a region of dramatic disparities and conflicting ideologies does not lead to an optimistic assessment of the potential for the emergence of cooperative non-war behaviour. Yet these asymmetries demand the incremental development of CBM as part of the overall efforts to reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. However, so long as war is perceived to bring benefit - whether territory, status, or domestic control - to the regimes in power, CBM will remain a very marginal component of conflict management efforts, perhaps delaying war or reducing the damage inflicted, but not preventing its occurrence.

Notes

1. Yair Evron, "Arms Control in the Middle East: some Proposals and their Confidence-Building Roles," Adelphi Papers 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979); "The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East," Adelphi Papers 138 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977). See also Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 29-45.

2. Jonathan Alford, "Introduction," Adelphi Papers 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 1.

3. For a discussion of problems associated with uncertainty, see L. M. Ward, D. B. Dewitt, et.al. "World Modeling: Some Critical Foundations," Behavioural Science 23 (1978): 135-47.

4. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," Survival 25:1 (January/February 1983):2.

5. Alford, op.cit., p. 1; emphasis added. See F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, Confidence-Building Measures in Europe (New York: Insitute for East-West Security Studies, 1983). This emphasis remains even for the United Nations CBM Study A/36/474 of October 1981; see Falk Bomsdorf, "The Confidence Building Offensive in the United Nations," Aussenpolitik (November 1982).

6. For a now classic statement on the Middle East as a distinct region or subsystem within the contemporary international community see Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics (April 1958). For discussions concerning factors that, at one and the same time, induce intra-regional conflict yet also provide definition to the region, see among others Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), William R. Polk, The Arab World, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), and Fouad Ajami, "The Middle East: Important for the Wrong Reasons," Journal of International Affairs 29:1 (Spring 1975). A new work likely to be acknowledged as a seminal statement is L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

7. Evron, "Arms Control in the Middle East," pp. 30-31.

8. For a brilliant examination of the conditions under which cooperation will emerge "in a world of egoists without central authority," see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

9. Ibid., ch. 7.

10. Ibid., p. 14.

11. Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: Lessons from Past U.S.-Soviet Crises," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 24-29 May 1984, New York, p. 1.

12. Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon: 1970-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

13. George, op.cit, pp. 2 and 11. See also his now classic study with Hall and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), especially ch. 1 and 5, and Evron, "Arms Control in the Middle East," where he notes on p. 30: "...not least because all states have to some extent been cushioned against the worst consequences of failure in the military field by the certainty of great-power intervention."

14. In addition to those works already cited, a useful analytic overview and introduction to the complexity of the conflict is Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1984). For an examination of research exploring the perspectives of the protagonists, much of which informs this discussion, see John Edwin Mroz, Beyond Security: Private Perceptions among Arabs and Israelis (New York: International Peace Academy, 1980), Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977), and Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979). Additional insights can be gained, of course, from the memoirs and autobiographies of key individuals involved in the events.

15. Mroz, ibid., pp. 113-14.

16. For instance, if one considers only the years since 1969-70, it is evident that Israel pursues the doctrine of preemptive warfare, retaliatory strikes, and penetration of the enemy's border to inflict punishment, to remove threat, and to make further enemy acts more difficult and more costly. On the otherhand, Egyptian doctrine has dictated attrition and limited war not out of fear of costs from all-out war but from an

assessment of the possible benefits accruing to the act of challenging the dominant and alien regional power. In this case the objective is not defence or security through expansion, but rather the ability to regain lost territory, to enhance prestige, and hence assert an independent stature which permits a change in strategy as a result of a new reality and in search of new benefits. The PLO, desiring the complete destruction of Israel and, where possible, the radicalization of conservative Arab regimes, combines guerrilla and conventional warafare with anomic violence and terror. Unlike Egypt, the PLO goals are defined in maximal terms. The goals of most of the other Arab actors are less clear, although pragmatism supports incremental objectives. Israel's goal is also maximal, although definition of parameters is in dispute.

17 Certainly the progress of the 1967 and 1973 wars and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon can be attributed at least partially to these factors of superpower involvement interfering with Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli behaviour, including the perception (or misperception) of signals, the content and timing of responses and initiatives, and the ensuing receptivity to external influence. See, for example, William B, Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), John W. Amos, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation. (New York: Pergamon, 1979), Michael Brecher, with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis (Lost Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), Michael I. Handel, "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," International Studies Quarterly 21 (September 1977): 461-502, Safran, op. cit., Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," World Politics 28 (April 1976): 348-80, Janice G. Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), John J. Marsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 134-64.

18. Most notable among these states are Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Algeria, all of whom support the call for the destruction of Israel and the elimination of a non-Muslim, non-Arab state in the region, although none necessarily desires the emergence of an independent, radical, and potentially powerful Palestinian state.

19. I will not repeat the excellent analysis of arms control agreements presented in Evron, op.cit. or the nuances of particular plans put forth by such Israeli

leaders as the late Moshe Dayan and the late Yigal Allon. For an excellent discussion of these plans and other options see Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). For a leading Palestinian Arab viewpont see Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Times Books, 1979).

20. For why the issue of terrorism must not be allowed to hinder efforts at resolving the conflict through territorial compromise, see David B. Dewitt, "Israel, the West Bank, and the Palestinian Community: Co-existence or Non-existence?" Middle East Focus 2:6 (March 1980).

21. Arms control agreements in the Middle East are extremely difficult to conceptualize due to the complex web of antagonisms. Unlike the Israeli-Egyptian case explored by Evron, op.cit., other bilateral situations are not so accessible. For instance, while Israeli-Syrian force deployment understandings at times have worked with regards to Lebanon and its own heartland, Syria must consider its borders with Iraq and Jordan and its capacity to project its power and influence in other parts of the Arab world. This severely hampers the presentation of arms control incentives. Similarly for Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Morrocco, although bilateral agreements of course are always possible and to be encouraged.

22. Along with Heller, op.cit., I would argue that in spite of the substantial costs which likely will occur as a result of Israel's perceived need to increase its standing forces, these and other even more substantial risks are far outweighed by the benefits forthcoming from even a partial withdrawal from the occupied territories. Israeli military re-occupation of the territories would remain an option at a later date were the experiment seem to be a serious hindrance to Israeli security. For a view of Middle East history which does not bode well for future Jewish-Muslim relations, see Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). What may be necessary in the early stages is the establishment of functional committees of senior government representatives dealing with policies of a day-to-day nature, such as water management, grazing areas on border lands, agricultural land management, etc. The establishment of regularized patterns of co-operative behaviour in these issue areas could contribute to the development of a more mutually satisfactory psychological environment.

(2)

Confidence Building Measures in the 80's:

Prospects and Options

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European Security and the Role of CBMs

Bo Huldt
Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Introduction: "A Story Goes with It"

Our present concern with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) could be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the rise to prominence of the CSBMs bears witness to an evolution of declining expectations: from hopes about general disarmament we have by way of arms control ultimately reached the supposedly more modest level of C(S)BMs. On the other hand, one might argue that with the focus on confidence- and security-building we have finally begun to grapple with the real problem - international trust and, in the terminology of the Palme Commission's Report, "common security."

Whichever of these perspectives one chooses it is obvious that the present discussion of CSBMs in Europe must be put into a historical perspective - in Damon Runyon's wording, "a story goes with it." In a short term perspective, the present discussion about CSBMs is a product of the political detente process in Europe initiated in the early 1970's - the result of a particular historical "accident." In this context, CSBMs have a history of their own within the Helsinki framework - from the accords reached in 1975 via the Belgrade follow-up meeting in 1977 to Madrid in 1981-83 and, finally, to the Stockholm conference specifically dedicated to CSBMs.

We are, I think, all aware of the fact that the very process leading up to the Helsinki accords has if not terminated at least slowed down very considerably and that CSBMs here to many seem to hold out what hopes presently remain for detente. In that historical context, the Stockholm conference has become the focus of hopes and expectations that go far beyond the range of the proposals presently discussed. In the present frosty international climate, CSBMs have thus acquired somewhat of a survivor status from times more prosperous - the CSMB-history just outlined paralleling the declining fortunes of arms control in negotiations on SALT, IMF, MBFR and START. Frequently, the Stockholm conference

is thus referred to as "the only show in town" - the only East-West dialogue presently working. With that particular perspective, the present CSBM debate tends to oscillate between hope and despair with great risks of overloading the agenda of the Stockholm conference - as well as over-estimating the ability of the negotiators to produce the spectacular.

In a different historical perspective - going back far beyond the 1975 or even 1945 date line - CSBMs acquire a much more general meaning. Recent analysis by Lewis & Lorell has here suggested a wealth of European experience to draw from pointing, i.a., to the wide array of C(S)BM tactics employed by the diplomats of the 1890-1914 period.[1] Analysts of the historical European balance of power-system may thus unearth unexpected treasures of C(S)BMs from a past that might give us greater reason for confidence in the future than is suggested by the ignominous failure of all the efforts of European statesmanship in 1914.

One might now expect a growing interest from historians and international relations experts in theories of confidence- and security-building serving us subtleties and paradoxes parallel to those produced by the theoreticians of nuclear deterrence. In the meanwhile, however, we have to handle - in a more ad-hoc-ish fashion - the problems of confidence and security-building in Europe.[2]

The Present Agenda: A Smorgasbord Somewhat Narrow - and Efforts to Enlarge It

The Stockholm conference has now run through three negotiating phases since January 1984.[3] These phases have produced four sets of proposals: The NATO-version, which concentrates exclusively on the further development of very specific provisions on transparency, the providing of information on military activities (maneuvers, "out of garrison-activities"

etc.) and the deployment of observers, issues of verification etc.; the Romanian proposal, which deals with information but also mentions constraints on the movements and deployment of various forces within the European theater, brings up nuclear weapons and agreements on the non-use of force; the proposals made at the end of the first session by the neutral and non-aligned countries, which appear to aim at an integration of military and political aspects suggesting a higher level of ambition as to information as well as specified constraints on military activities; and, finally, the Soviet proposal submitted at the beginning of the second session and divided into six sections, where only the last one corresponds to the NATO-proposals while sections 1 through 5 deal with nuclear non-first use, non-use of military force, the banning of chemical weapons, the freezing of defense budgets and the creation of non-nuclear zones - an ambitious package of ideas without any real counterpart in the proposals made by the West.

Put differently, the Stockholm conference has produced, on the one hand, suggestions about how to improve and make more concrete the specifics about notification of maneuvers, the use of observers etc. initiately found in the so called first basket of the Helsinki Final Act, on the other, new ideas about how to widen the scope for confidence-building through far-reaching declarations and commitments. In that sense the conference - and the whole CSBM-discussion - shows signs both of pressure to be more specific, more concrete, and to expand the range of subjects and solutions under consideration.

The original widening of the framework, from confidence-building measures to confidence- and security-building measures, was the result of the initiatives taken by the neutral and nonaligned states in the drafting of the final document at the Madrid meeting in March 1981 -ultimately the basis for the final Madrid "settlement" in September 1983. As already suggested, the stalling and breakdown of

ongoing negotiations in conventional and nuclear fields have subsequently tended to make for a meeting of a great many concerns within the CSCE-framework and by the Stockholm conference table. With arms control negotiations at a standstill - and unilateral actions being the only serious proposition offered presently even by serious analysts [4] - the confidence and security-formula has its obvious attraction.

So far, the Stockholm conference has presented us with a confrontation between two widely differing views of the CSBM-problem: on the one hand, what might be called the "strictly constitutionalist" position interpreting CSBMs basically in terms of transparency, information sharing and verification, and focusing specifically on concrete military measures.

"Strict constitutionalism" may not in itself be all that strict; the "narrow" interpretation of CSBMs is essentially the NATO-position but also within that position proposals concerning "operational constraints" are being considered - i.a. as to forward deployment of tanks, bridgeing material etc.[5] but these ideas still basically focus upon one very specific "threat": The conventional surprise attack, the coup de main undertaken by Warsaw Pact forces against NATO on the Central Front in Europe.

On the Soviet side, there is an equivalent concern with "threats" from NATO loosely pertaining to nuclear forces - forward based systems, cruise-missiles - but the Soviet response to these (and other) "threats" to confidence and security are sought within a wider framework of political rather than strictly military (or "technical") solutions. The Soviet position, which might be referred to as a "liberal interpretation" of the CSBM-issue, thus puts premium on the very measures regarded as "declaratory" by the West: Non-use of force, non-first-use of nuclear weapons etc.).

Two very different views here confront one another - with the neutral and nonaligned states trying to establish what might be a contractual zone with a little bit of both views included but also looking for ways of redefining the problems within a new context. Here one encounters genuine difficulties in breaking out of a framework preset. No doubt, there is a genuine need for innovation and creative ideas. 6)

At rock bottom, the positions of both sides - the NATO "strictly constitutionalist" one as well as the Soviet "liberal interpretation" - are, of course, "self-serving" in the sense that they constitute responses to what either side sees as threats to its own security. At the same time the meeting of the views in Stockholm should have brought home the very basic understanding that CSBMs, if they are going to improve climate and security - the assumption about <u>good faith</u> is after all a prerequisite for discussing CSBMs [7] - will call for very substantial give and take. This means that the "strictly constitutionalist" position will have to be modified <u>and</u> that this concession to the East will have to be paid for in terms of greater concreteness as to the transparency, notification and verification provisions insisted upon by the West. That would, in essence, seem a rather surprise-free projection of how the negotiations will develop - still assuming that a deal is the aim of all parties involved.

The neutral - and nonaligned position - between NATO emphasis on what the East refers to as "military technicalities" and Soviet insistence upon "political" and what NATO calls "declaratory" measures has been to emphasize both and to try to ensure that the organization of the work of the conference provides for a reasonably fair treatment of both sets of views. Concessions made by the West towards the end of the second phase of the Stockholm Conference (ending on July 6 this year) indicates a Western willingness to accept - as a matter of principle - such a "both-and" perspective.

The Real Issues: European Security at the Cross-Roads

Much in the set-up of today's situation does recall previous experiences of the interwar negotiations with the League Disarmament Conference trying to handle a very wide array of issues within a framework for general and universal disarmament and - when faced by unsurmountable political hindrances making all the careful definitions of aggressive and non-aggressive arms, manpower strengths look like academic exercises - ultimately falling back upon issues of information and transparency. The publishing of figures on defense budgets and on arms transfers were among the last items that the negotiators in Geneva gave up trying to save from the debacle. By that time it had also become obvious that such efforts at "political" CSBMs as the Kellogg Pact - as explicit and supposedly binding a declaration on the non-use of military force as there ever was - had failed.

Historical parallels could, no doubt, both mislead and instruct. Such parallels, however, might help us realize that we are involved in a historical process, facing a continuing transformation of the international environment and that there are similarities in the structure and the "dialectics" of the very situation that we face and the challenges once faced by our predecessors. During the first half of the 20th century the European powers were trying to handle a shifting balance or - in Marxist-Leninist terminology - a changing correlation of world forces. As diplomacy (and CBMs in Lewis' & Lorell's terminology) failed, the adjustment became extremely painful.

We are now facing a new situation with similar structural characteristics. The "structure" emerging in 1945 is now in jeopardy. Alliances and relationships of dependence are, if not eroding, at least in a state of transformation and in Europe - as well as globally - this implies challenges to existing "regimes," whether we talk about international

political or economic relations. Europe in the 1980´s is very different from Europe of the 1950´s. With this wider historical perspective in mind my argument would be that we will have to develop a concept of "CSBMs" that can meet not only the requirements of the "strictly constitutionalist" school but which can play a role in the restructuring of intra-European relations, the relations between the superpower in Europe and between the superpowers and Europe.

Some Europeans - a bit carried away, perhaps, by their own visions - now discuss an imminent "Europeanization of Europe," [8] while spokesmen for the existing order, much like Prince Metternich, that "rock of stability and order, firm among the breakers of upheaval," refer to the (post-1945) status quo as once and forever. It is in this state of change - with self-proclaimed opponents and defenders of the Yalta inheritance confronting one another - that CSBMs of a new order of magnitude will be needed to maintain stability and (common) security while the political (and economic) relations remain in flux. Seen in such a wider historical context, the Soviet spokesmen are also undoubtedly right in pursuing their "liberal interpretation" of what CSBMs should imply in Europe - although those speaking for the "new" European movement might maintain that Moscow holds the right views for the wrong reasons.

With the old order in Europe under increasing strain - facing what we might refer to as a growing need for "political mondernization" - we will thus be heading for an increasingly dangerous and politically complicated situation in the 1980´s and 90´s. The German question - and German-German relations - seem very much at the center of all this. This political dimension gives added urgency to the military one. It now appears obvious that NATO is facing a re-evaluation of its conventional posture in Europe with three options open:

1) to continue with very much the same mixture of defensive and (limited) offensive capabilities;

2) to opt for an "offensive" solution -along the lines suggested by the much debated "Air-Land Battle" concept, implying deep interdiction and a "forward" strategy using "emerging technologies";

3) to switch to an all-out defensive strategy aiming at a watertight conventional defense of Western Europe, making any kind of conventional Warsaw Pact attack unfeasible.

What evidence there is suggests very limited concern in the East about option 1, but very considerably worries about number 2 and no enthusiasm at all about option 3. (For those European analysts placing great hope in ideas about "non-provocative" defense the lack of Soviet interest in the third option is no doubt depressing: If the Warsaw Pact will not regard a territorial, conventional and explicitly defensive posture as an acceptable option, Western efforts to construct non-provocative schemes appear intellectual energies badly spent - and serious doubts may also arise over Soviet aims in Europe.)

There is thus a possibility of Europe facing a new cycle of military "modernization" comparable to previous cycles when innovative military technology provoked political panics and a stepped up arms race. We are presently witnessing the consequences of such a process initiated in the 1970´s - the theater nuclear modernization programs of the two pacts with Pershing IIs and cruise missiles now facing SS-20s and with growing arsenals of new types of missiles mushrooming in Eastern Europe.

This will make for a situation requiring confidence and security buidling on a level that was never envisaged at Helsinki. The 1975 Final Act was the result of a detente process including considerable successes in the arms control field - now we are confronted by a complex political and military situation in Europe in a very different climate and with arms control negotiations in deadlock and disrepute. The

very deterioration in climate will now make it necessary to achieve some measure of success in upgrading military effectiveness within the CSBM framework. The "political" proposals embodied in sections 1 - 5 of the Soviet proposal to the Stockholm Conference will not work as a substitute for very concrete measures connected with the actual deployment and composition of armed forces in Europe. The fears fostered by the "New Cold War" has given an additional edge to "security" a fact that neither side can escape. The Madrid document has also set the stage: The participating states have committed themselves to a set of C(S)BMs that are "binding, verifiable and militarily significant."

A traditional way to handle the unmanageable difficulties is through institutional reshuffles, i.e. "reorganization." Higher levels of ambition - from CBMs to CSBMs - highlight the interconnection between discussions of intermediate nuclear weapons (IMF) and conventional force levels (MBFR) with the Stockholm conference. The Soviet proposal on the banning of chemical weapons from Europe also connects the CSCE-process with CD-negotiations in Geneva. The realization that everything depends on everything else is an inescapable consequence of the widening of the CSMB-concept but from the point of view of effectiveness and division of labor between various international fora, raising the stakes in CDE/CSCE may produce additional confusion in a field that is already more than complicated enough. One might thus expect pressure to build for the 1986 Vienna review meeting of the CSCE to come to grips with the problems of coordinating activities carried out (one may hope) over a wide field in separate but connected negotiations.

CSBMs and the Building of Security Communities

There seems a possible risk thet the CSBMs could be both oversold and overbought as a new panacea and popular catchword. It should be obvious that "CSBMs" still very much remain a set of terms in search of their contents. We must also try to find some consensus about what we relly want to achieve. "Confidence-building" was thought to facilitate communication and understanding, to prevent misconceptions about intentions and aims - but CBMs were never thought of as a means through which the very conflicts themselves could be solved. The meaning was to gain time, to make it possible to hold on while we were waiting for the real and final solutions to materialize in some rather unspecified way, presumably through arms control and political negotiations.

With the combination of confidence and security-building a measure of mystification may also have entered the picture - the aim now being much more far reaching. In the terminology of some, CSBMs could now be intended to shore up deterrence - to make it hold also "at the time of maximum terror, even in the midst of actual conflict... when the stakes on the table may already be immense..".[9] To others CSBMs would aid in the very build-down and demise of deterrence - perhaps even in the construction of what Karl Deutsch and associates have labelled a "security-community" between East and West on the pattern of what has happened in post-1945 Western Europe.[10] Here one almost senses the physical presence of a benevolent force on par with that of "integration," the creation of that web of interdependence that the funtionalist theoreticians spoke of in the 1940's and 50's.[11]

However, the historical evidence accumulated by Lewis & Lorell does not suggest that CBMs would work in an acute international crisis when key national interests are at stake - they even suggest that the deployment of such measures might be counterproductive.[12] If our hope now is

to weave such a web of interdependence through effectual and mutual constraints (something that neither of the two superpowers so far has shown much interest in) that Mars, bound hand and foot, shall threaten Europe's peace no more, we will certainly have to work harder than we have done before - and perform much better than anyone may have thought possible at Helsinki.

With the Stockholm conference soon entering its fourth phase there are still great uncertainties as to the true scope and range of various CSBMs now under consideration. The definition of "Europe" itself may also be open to doubts - surrounding waters and air space are still the subjects of contention. We have previously commented on the difference between a "strictly constitutionalist" approach and a more "liberal interpretation" and we have also touched upon the "real" issues: The cycles of so-called military modernization and the overarching problems of political change - the preservation of a divided "center" of Europe, i.e. Germany in parts, in all likelyhood one of the most important of all conceivable CSBMs from Moscow's horizon - and perhaps also from some other observation points as well.

CSBMs must be binding and restraining in a symmetric fashion if they are to be respected and adhered to by all parties involved. Here one must expect CSBMs to be able to transcend the basic lack of symmetry in force postures, alliance structurs, lines of communication, territorial "depth," etc. between the two pacts in Europe. Substantial difficulties involving assymetry are also apparent in the discussions about various zonal arrangements - however attractive the idea may appear of a non-nuclear buffer (or "cordon sanitaire") from the North Cape to the Bosporus. (One might also have serious doubts whether such a dividing zone will facilitate the eventual emergence of an integrated Europe, i.e. "Tota Europa.") The most important aspect of the CSBM-issue remains the fact that it constitutes a continuing process, an ongoing concern which certainly needs concrete results to show but where the real dynamics may be in the

Notes

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1. Ken Lewis & Mark A. Lorell, "Confidence-Building and Crisis Resolution: A Historical Perspective" (Orbis, Summer 1984).

2. Some pointers are suggested in Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980's" (Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982); see also Confidence-Building and East-West Relations (Ed. Karl E. Birnbaum; Laxenburg Papers Published by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs; Braumüller, Vienna 1983), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe (Eds. Stephen Larrabee & Dietrich Stobbe; East-West Monograph Number One; Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York 1983) and The Future of Arms Control: Part III. Confidence-Building Measures (Adelphi Paper 149; ed. Jonathan Alford; IISS, London 1979).

3. The first session lasted from January 17 till March 16, the second from May 8 till July 6, and the third from September 11 till October 12. A fourth session is scheduled to begin on November 6 - lasting till December 14.

4. See, i.a., Christoph Bertram, "The Future of Arms Control" (Arms Control, forthcoming 1984).

5. See The Future of Arms Control: Part III. Confidence-Building Measures, spec. the paper by Alford ("Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspect"). See also Richard Betts, Surprise Attack (Brookings, Washington 1982). - The use here of the term "strictly constitutionalist" is in no sense derogatory. The transparency and information providing aspects are at the heart of the CSBM-issue, although it is also quite clear that there is an element of contradiction between confidence and transparency (for a discussion see, i.a., the contribution by Benoit d'Aboville in Confidence-Building Measures in Europe). In the history of international relations and organization - and practicing CSBMs could be seen as a process of "international organization" - there is at least one instance of dramatic success and consequence concerning transparency. The very limited mandate to gather (and later to publish) information on conditions in the colonies given to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories by the UN Charter (paragraph 73 E) constituted the very slender base upon which rested the spectacular UN involvement in the decolonization process. Of course no direct parallels should be drawn from this but just as the League efforts to promote transparency may appear depressing through their ultimate failures, the UN case might appear encouraging.

6. The report of the Palme Commission constituted one such effort; other, perhaps more innovative notions, have been introduced by predictably original thinkers such as Johan Galtung, who once proposed to mobilize Third World countries in peace-keeping and -observing missions on the Central Front in Europe.

7. CSBMs are not likely to be able to guarantee that an aggressor does not do his "damndest" if he has set his mind to do it. CSBMs might not stop a Hitler but could restrain (and re-assure) those who play the game.
- Assertions in the present negotiations by the Soviets that transparency is but a cover for Western spying, or by US representatives that the Soviets only aim for propaganda gains, are really not very helpful. If good faith is not assumed to exist - or to emerge eventually - there is little point in discussing CSBMs. Which both parties, of course, know very well.

8. This view has its proponents i.a. within the peace-movement; see also Peter Bender, Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalter. Die Europäisierung Europas (Severin und Siedler, Berlin 1981). Compare also Eberhard Schulz, "Unfinished business: the German national question and the future of Europe" (International Affairs/London, Summer 1984). For a healthy reminder of some basic facts sometimes forgotten by the "new" Europeans, see Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier" (Foreign Policy, Spring 1984).

9. Quoted from a speech on deterrence at Georgetown University in 1982 by former US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig.

10. See Karl Deutsch e.a., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princetown Univ. Press, Princeton 1957).

11. See, i.a., Davit Mitrany, A Working Peace System. (Quadrangle, Chicago 1966).

12. Lewis & Lorell, op. cit., p. 305.

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The Superpowers and Confidence-Building.

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I. The Role of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

Most of the literature on confidence-building measures (CBMs) has focused on CBMs in a European context.[1] Little attention has been paid to their role in US-Soviet relations. Yet CBMs could play a useful role, especially at a time when relations are tense. CBMs cannot change the nature of the relationship. This is likely to remain conflictual for the foreseeable future. CBMs can, however, reduce the degree of conflict by (1) minimizing uncertainty and suspicion; (2) increasing predictability ; and (3) reducing the possibility of miscalculation. Country A's actions and weapons programs are influenced by what it perceives as B's capabilities and intentions. Ignorance may exacerbate fears of technological surprise and lead to inflation of an adversary's capabilities and intentions.

The history of US-Soviet relations in replete with such examples, the best known, perhaps, being the "missile gap" in the late 1950s. US exaggeration of Soviet capabilities — and Soviet efforts to exploit this for political gain — led to unfounded fears that the US was falling behind in the development of ICBMs, and stimulated a major American nuclear build-up under the Kennedy Administration. When the results of the analysis of the actual situation were finally completed, however, it was found that the feared gap did not exist and that in fact the US was considerably ahead of the Soviet Union. The US build-up — a supposed response to the non-existent missile gap — in turn stimulated the Soviets to engage in a major build-up of their own.

This is not to subscribe to a pure action-reaction model as the cause of the arms race. The situation is obviously more complex. It is at least possible, however,

that better information exchange and a willingness to engage in a dialogue over force structures and deployments could at least have helped to moderate some of the worst fears about the other side's capabilities, and prevented an over-reaction.

Some may argue that at a time when US-Soviet relations are so bad, CBMs are unlikely to have much effect . The opposite case, however, seems more persuasive: CBMs are all the more necessary in periods of tension. It is precisely during such periods that the dangers of miscalculation are the greatest. Under such circumstances CBMs may help to reduce exaggerated fears of the other side's intentions. Moreover, greater certainty about the other side's intentions may contribute to a small but not unimportant improvement in the general atmosphere. This in turn may lay the groundwork for progress on more central issues.

There are other important reasons for looking at US-Soviet CBMs more carefully. One of the main problems in US-Soviet relations in the 1970s was the tendency to make SALT the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship. As a result, arms control was forced to bear an unfair share of the burden of the relationship and unduly suffered when political relations deteriorated. By relying less on formal arms control treaties and complementing them with other less formal measures such as CBMs, some of these problems may be avoided.[2]

Second, with arms control negotiations currently stalled, CBMs may provide a means for rebuilding some modicum of confidence and lay the groundwork for more comprehensive arms reductions later on. They are a vehicle for maintaining the dialogue on the periphery, while both sides try to grapple with re-thinking the more central issues. They also provide an important forum for discussion and floating new ideas, which may feed back into the arms control process and give it new momentum.

Third, CBMs can perform an educative function by enhancing communication and transparency. By exploring certain types of CBMs, the superpowers may gain a better understanding of the other side's concerns and perceptions. This knowledge in turn may help them address these concerns more adequately in formulating their arms control positions, thus enhancing the prospects for achieving a mutually beneficial agreement.

While CBMs can under certain circumstances play a useful role in reducing tensions between the superpowers, one should be realistic about what they can and cannot achieve. They cannot change the basic nature of the superpower relationship, which is likely to remain conflictual for the foreseeable future. Nor are they a substitute for arms control. They do not address the central issues. Rather they are aimed primarily at improving the psychological atmosphere and building a sense of enhanced confidence. This in turn may make resolution of the central issues easier.

Many may argue—quite justifiably —that confidence-building measures and arms control generally are likely to have little effect without a change in the overall political atmosphere. The question, however, is how to rebuild the political atmosphere so that arms control has a chance of success. Here CBMs can play a small but useful role. In and of themselves they are not likely to change the atmosphere. But, taken in conjunction with other measures, they may contribute to such a change. In short, CBMs should not be seen as a substitute for arms control or traditional diplomacy but as a complement to it. What we need, as Robert O'Neill has pointed out, [3] is a parallel effort on several fronts: (1) in CBMs; (2) in arms control; and (3) on the political level through traditional diplomatic means. It is within this framework that CBMs may be able to contribute to stabilizing US Soviet relations and enhancing the dialogue between the two superpowers.

II. U.S.-Soviet CBMs in Historical Perspective.

The idea of U.S.-Soviet CBMs is not as novel as it may seem at first glance. There are, in fact, a number of instances of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the past, both formal and informal, which broadly fall into the category of Confidence-Building Measures.

(A) Military-technical CBMs.

- **Open Skies Proposal**—The "Open Skies" proposal, put forward by the Eisenhower Administration during the July 1955 Geneva summit conference, sought to lay the groundwork for both effective arms control measures and greater cconfidence in the stability of Soviet-American relations through mutual aerial inspection of Soviet and American territory by each other's aircraft. (4) Soviet rejection of the idea—why trade a marginal gain for a truly qualitative leap in U.S. knowledge of Soviet capabilities?--led the United States to implement the idea unilaterally by launching a series of highly successful, and ultimately "stabilizing", U-2 flights over Soviet territory during the next several years. (5) Even so, the "Open Skies" proposal indicated at least an American willingness to consider collaborative measures toward providing for a more stable superpower strategic relationship.

- **1958 Soviet Exchange of Observers Proposal**—In 1958 Nikita Khrushchev proposed the exchange of military observers at key points within NATO and Warsaw Pact territory in order to verify compliance with agreements to limit the armed forces of the powers in Europe. Though not followed up on, the idea, in another arms control context, might eventually prove a useful complement to a reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

- **1958-1961 Nuclear Test Moratorium**— Between 1958-1961 the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain observed a tacit moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere as an earnest effort toward achievement of a formal test-ban treaty. Within the negotiations themselves, a good deal of progres had been made on the type and frequency of inspection arrangements necessary to supervise such a ban when tensions over Berlin led to Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing in the late summer of 1961.

- **1963 Hotline Accord**—The "Hotline" agreement of 1963, establishing telecommunications links between Washington and Moscow (and recently updated, in July 1984) is a key example of this. The accord, however, goes considerably beyond a simple crisis control procedure, in that it at the same time indicates the desire of each side to put the nuclear genie under some sort of control, that they recognize their community of interest in this field.

- **1963 Unilateral Declaration of C3 Procedures**—President Kennedy's effort in 1963 to convey to the USSR certain command and control systems perfected in the U.S. follows along the same lines: it showed a desire not merely to reduce to the minimum the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launch, on both sides (though that is important enough), but to assure the Soviets that the U.S. shared its concerns about the horrors of nuclear war.

(B) SALT-Related CBMs.

The general thaw that set in on East-West relations after 1968 made it easier to approach confidence-building measures in a more systematic fashion. Nuclear issues began to be approached with the explicit aim of underlining the mutual interest of the superpowers in nuclear stability. This had been presaged by Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara's effort at Glassboro in June 1967 to explain to Kosygin the evils of strategic defensive systems and convert him to the mysteries of the theory of mutual assured detsruction. One of the U.S. hopes behind engaging the Soviet Union in the SALT arms control process was a desire to encourage a convergence of U.S. and Soviet perspectives on the function of nuclear weapons and the consequences of nuclear war. Though this effort was only partly successful, SALT did serve as a useful means of gaining a better understanding of each side's doctrine and force planning. It also introduced a certain degree of predictability into the force planning process, which itself constituted a confidence-building measure of sorts.

As part of the SALT process, a number of agreements were signed and measures agreed upon which can broadly be construed as confidence-building measures. The most important of these, classified by function, include:

Risk Reduction Measures—These include the September 1971 Soviet-American Agreement on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War, which is in many ways a logical follow-up to the Hotline Accord, and the June 1973 agreement on avoiding "Incidents at Sea" between the Soviet and American navies. In the first agreement, the superpowers pledged to take measures to perfect their command and control systems so as to avoid unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to communicate with each other in the event of accidental launches or other ambiguous situations. The Incidents at Sea Agreement provided for detailed "rules of the road" when Soviet and American naval vessels are sailing near each other. These may be seen as efforts to prevent "acts of God" from spilling over into a potentially uncontrollable crisis. These treaties have generally been quite effective in keeping unwanted incidents from complicating relations between the two countries.

Information-type Measures—These encompass the provision in the SALT I Treaty prohibiting interference with "national-technical means" of verification (i.e., spy satellites) necessary for monitoring compliance with the Treaty as well as later Soviet

agreement under SALT II to provide for the first time its own data base on its strategic forces. Both of these measures highlight the recognition by each country of the importance for each of the other's ability to verify a critical treaty and of the value of the arms control process itself. The Soviet decision to provide their own figures on Soviet forces represented an imporant precedent and departure from traditional Russian and Soviet behavior and thereby constituted an important commitment to the strategic arms control process. (Previously, the two sides had relied exclusively upon American supplied data as ther basis of negotiations.)

Notification-Measures—These include the provisions in the SALT II Treaty concerning notification of certain tests and prohibition of relevant "telemetric encryption", i.e,.encoding of missile flight data. In making this commitment, both sides indicated their desire to minimize any ambiguities concerning the intention of missile launches and the characteristics of the missiles themselves—otherwise, neither could be confident that the other was respecting the qualitative restraints of the Treaty.

Other SALT-Related CBMs—Two other kinds of measures belong to none of the above categories yet contributed decisively to the level of confidence which both the U.S. and USSR could repose in the other's commitment to the strategic arms control process. The first is the establishment and operation of the Standing Consultative Commission, charged with airing and resolving questions concerning the implementation of the SALT treaties. As Thomas Wolfe notes in his 1979 review of the SALT experience, every problem brought before the SCC was ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. (6) In effect, the SCC constitutes a kind of built-in CBM in the Soviet-American strategic relationship. The second is the series of U.S. and Soviet pledges, first in 1977 to continue observing the expired SALT I Treaty as long as the other did so, and then the U.S. pledge in 1981 to continue observing the unratified SALT II Treaty

as long as the USSR did so. The public declaration of each side that they would conditionally continue to observe the provisions of the SALT treaties lent a certain degree of predictability, and stability to the Soviet-American strategic relationship at a difficult time in superpower relations.

(C) Political-Diplomatic Signalling and the Reduction of Risk.

In a number of East-West cold war crises both the Soviet Union and the United States exerted themselves through more traditional diplomatic channels and means to assure the other of its intentions and thereby reduce the risk of a Soviet-American confrontation. Though the course and outcome of these crises cannot be said to have contributed to an increase in trust between the two superpowers, they did demonstrate to each other, and to the world, their mutual interests in collaborative efforts to avoid a direct confrontation that might lead to nuclear war. During the Hungarian revolt in 1956, for instance, President Eisenhower personally informed the Soviet leadership of the U.S. intention to abstain from any military intervention in Hungary. (7) In retrospect this Presidential assurance constituted a CBM designed to keep a crisis under control and reduce the risk of unwanted confrontation. This underscored that, even in conditions of intense cold war, both superpowers have an interest in regularizing their relations and making their interaction more predictable.

Similarly, in the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, which culminated in the Soviet invasion of August 21, both superpowers undertook actions designed to assure that the crisis would not get out of control. President Johnson, following Eisenhower's example twelve years earlier, explicitly declared to the Soviet leadership that the U.S. would not intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia. In addition, NATO countries withdrew many of their forces about 100 kilometers from their positions along the Czech frontier, attempting thus to avoid the slightest pretext for an actual Soviet invasion of the countrya and to lend credence to President Johnson's verbal assurances to the USSR.

The Soviets,for their part, informed the Americans that they had no intention of sending Warsaw Pact forces beyond Czechoslovakia. (8)

Finally, during the outbreak of the Polish crisis in September 1980, President Carter used the hotline to communicate to the Soviet leadership first, U.S. opposition to Soviet military intervention in Poland; and second, that the United States had no interest in exploiting the situation in Poland for its own political gain.

The critical element in all these crises is the effort by each superpower to demonstrate plausibly to the other its interest in avoiding a confrontation that might lead to nuclear war. In the process, each has sought to distinguish between its own vital and secondary interests and those of its adversary. (9) At the same time, each involved a degree of implicit collaboration and adherence to certain (admittedly undefined) "rules of the game" governing the conduct of the superpowers in crisis situations.

III. Areas of Future US-Soviet CBMs

The above examples underscore that the idea of U.S.-Soviet CBMs is hardly new and that there already exist a number of important precedents. The task now is to build upon these precedents and examine ways in which additional CBMs might help to stabilize superpower relations, particularly in the nuclear area. As in the European theater, one of the prime goals of U.S.-Soviet strategic CBMs should be to reduce the dangers of surprise attack and encourage greater transparency. This would help reduce the potential for miscalculation leading to an unwanted confrontation and possible nuclear war.

Here, two types of CBMs will be examined; (1) information-type CBMs; and (2) constraints. In the first category several CBMs could play a useful role:(a) Pre-notification of missile launches. For some years the US and Soviet Union have been obliged to give notice of missile-flight tests whose trajectories take them beyond the

national territory of the launching state To prevent misinterpretation it might be useful to requires pre-notification of all flight tests of long-range missiles, whether or not they extend beyond national territory. As Alton Frye has noted, this would facilitate monitoring by national technical means and increase the relative transparency of the two sides development programs without requiring intrusive methods. (10) In fact, such a CBM already was a subject of discussion in the CBM working group set up within the framework of the START talks. As both sides have put forward such a proposal, there may be some prospect of achieving positive results if and when the START negotiations are resumed.

(b) A Ban on Encryption of Telemetry. This could increase confidence regarding the number and type of reentry vehicle carried by a particular booster. Such information is important for knowing the numbers and sizes of deployed warheads, and in turn for making decisions about counter-voling deployments. In short, a ban on telemetric encryption would enhance openness and reduce the tendency toward worst case assessments which in turn prompt the other side to hedge high.

(c) Regular and periodic Exchanges between High-level Military Personnel. These exchanges could focus on issues such as doctrine, force structure and other military-related activities. The purpose of these exchanges would be similar to the Johan Holst's proposal for a "Seminar on Strategy." (11) They would be aimed not at negotiating constraints but narrowing the perceptual gap and reducing the dangers of misperception and misrepresentation of the other sides actions and decisions. In particular they would explore the relationships between doctrine and force planning and seek do clarify the linkages between the two. They could also focus on issues such as the impact of technology and its implications for force structuring on both sides. A third goal could be to examine ways in which force structures might be changed to enhance stability. Such information-type CBMs could be complemented by exchanges in other areas where the two Superpowers have mutual interests such as: (1) Non-proliferation; and (2)

terrorism. Both are areas in which US and Soviet interests overlap and are complimentary. Hence Moscow might show some interest in such exchanges.

B. Constraints.

While such information-type CBMS would be useful, confidence would be enhanced considerably if they were complimented by actual constraints. Alton Frye has suggested two important types of constraints in this regard:

1 Restrictions on the total number of test launches. Restricting tests to a dozen or so a year would be enough to maintain confidence in the deployed force but too few to permit major refinements in accuracy.

2. A ban on exercises involving the integrated launch of several missiles interacting with defensive systems in a very brief time. Firing several missiles at the same time is provocative and could suggest a first strike scenario. Such destabilizing gestures heighten pressures on both sides to undertake hair trigger responses, thus eroding stability. Banning such exercises would reduce these pressures and enhance stability.

IV. Confidence, Compliance and Verification

Just as certain measure can create confidence, others can destroy it. If a nation makes a commitment, it is important that it abides by it. Otherwise the very confidence it is trying to create may be undermined. Indeed, in some cases it may be better to have no agreement than one which is not lived up to. For example, the Soviet Union's failure to notify the "Soyuz 81" maneuver in March/April 1981 and its incomplete notification of the large combined arms maneuver "Zapad-81" in September 1981 did much to undermine confidence in the West that Moscow would live up to commitments under the Helsinki-Accords or any more stringent CBM regime worked out at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm.

Confidence, however, can also be undermined by other means than non-compliance. An effort to exploit ambiguities or a failure to provide adequate information, for instance, can also erode confidence. The mere unwillingness to provide information is itself often enough to destroy confidence. It gives the impression that a nation is trying to hide or cover up something.

The mysterious outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 provides an important example in this regard. The Soviet Union's unwillingness to provide adequate information or allow a team of international inspectors to visit the area where the outbreak occurred raised considerable doubt in the eyes of many whether Moscow was violating the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. These doubts undermined confidence not only regarding Soviet Union's willingness to honor its commitments in this specific instance, but more generally as well.

Similar questions have been raised about Moscow's willingness to live up to the SALT II agreement. While some of the charges are clearly exaggerated or false, others, such as the charge that the Soviets are building a large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk, deserve to be taken more seriously,. Again the issue is not simply whether the Soviets are or are not violating the agreement, but that ambiguities are bound to create, or reinforce, suspicions and undermine confidence. Until these ambiguities are cleared up, doubts are likely to persist and confidence will be affected.

The problem is that such incidents have a ripple effect and tend to spill over into other areas. A lack of confidence about a state's ability or willingness to live up to it commitments in one area has effect on perceptions about its willingness to adhere to agreements in other areas. Opponents of SALT II , for instance, have used the alleged violations of SALT II, especially the radar at Krasnoyarsk, as "proof" that it is dangerous to conclude arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, thereby undermining support not only for SALT/START but arms control generally. The best

way to rebut such arguments is to remove the ambiguities or not allow them to arise in the first place.

Here verification plays an important role. As Jonathon Alford has pointed out, any future CBM regime must march in step with the ability of signatory powers to verify its provisions. (12) A state must have confidence that certain notified activities are or are not taking place. In some instances this may be possible by National Technical means (NTM), but in other cases, such as chemical production it may not. The only way to adequately verify whether chemical weapons are being produced is for inspectors to verify the production facilities. The Soviet Union has traditionally been resistent to on-site inspection, seeing it as an "intrusive" attempt to gather military intelligence. However, in recent years its attitude has begun to change. At the Second Special Session on Disarmament, for instance, it announced a willingness to open its civil nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. It also has shown a readiness to allow inspection teams to verify troop withdrawals in MBFR and to verify destruction of chemical stocks in CW talks in Geneva. While such steps are to be welcomed, in many cases, they do not go far enough. In the case of CW, for instance, it is not enough to know that stocks are being destroyed; we also need to know what is being produced in order to have confidence regarding compliance. A major step toward enhancing confidence between the US and the Soviet Union therefore would be for Moscow to release detailed information about the location and volume of its stocks and to allow international teams of inspectors to verify the data by on-site inspection of production facilities.

The problem is that the introduction of new technologies is likely to make verification more difficult in the future. Cruise missiles and mobile missiles will complicate the problem of verification. However, the arms control process—and confidence generally—cannot be sustained over the long run unless motions can be sure that weapons restricted by agreements are indeed not being deployed. This highlights the need to work out adequate standards of verification and to constrain certain

technologies before they are deployed; otherwise the prospects for enhancing confidence in the future are likely to erode.

V. The Political Context

Confidence is not just a question of military activity; it has an important political dimension. Indeed, the history of arms control has shown that arms control cannot succeed in a political vacuum. Its prospects for success are directly related to the state of political relations. Thus, as noted earlier, CBMs and arms control must be pursued in tandem with more traditional diplomatic efforts to improve political relations.

One of the main problems has been that both Superpowers have undertaken actions that have badly damaged the political framework within which arms control negotiations take place. This is neither the time nor the place to rehash the rationale and justification for certain Soviet actions in the Third World since the mid 1970s. However, if the two Superpowers are to begin to rebuild their relationship, the Soviet leadership needs to recognize the degree to which some of its actions in the Third World — particularly the invasion of Afghanistan — eroded confidence in the United States regarding the Soviet Union's willingness to live up to the spirit, if not the letter of the Declaration of Basic Principles signed by the two Superpowers in 1972. These actions had a major impact on public perceptions in the United States and eroded U.S. domestic support for ratification of SALT II and arms control generally.

This is not an argument for "linkage." However, whether the superpowers will it or not, linkage exists: it is a fact of political life. In looking to the future, the Soviet leadership needs to understand that its political actions will inevitably have a domestic impact in the United States and affect public support for arms control, regardless of whether any US government tries to link them or not. In short, whether explicitly linked or not, political restraint is an important confidence building measure and a pre-condition for a long-term stable relationship.

On the US side there is a greater need to recognize this linkage between the political and arms control dimension as well. The last four years have underscored that arms control cannot be pursued in a vacuum; there needs to be a political framework. US political rhetoric cannot run at cross purposes with its espoused arms control aims. In other words, the US cannot engage in a vituperative campaign of namecalling and invective and still expect to pursue constructive arms control negotiations. Such rhetoric inevitably calls into question the basic aims and motives of US policy and creates an atmosphere of mistrust, thereby reducing the prospects for effective and verifiable arms control agreements.

Similarly, confidence is eroded when agreements worked out through several Administrations fail to be ratified by the Congress and when every new Administration trys to reinvent the wheel in its arms control policy and casts aside the labors of the previous administration. Of course, every Administration has the right to put its own stamp on its arms control policy. Furthermore, Congress should have the right to review agreements to ensure they are in the national interest. But there is a need for greater reliability and consistency on the part of the United States if relations with Moscow are to be rebuilt on a firmer and more stable basis.

The basic point is that politics and arms control cannot be neatly separated. Nor can they work at cross purposes with each other. At the moment there is an urgent need to rebuild political confidence. Confidence-building measures in the military field can play a role in this regard, but they are not enough. They must be complimented by more general political measures to restore a political framework in which constructive arms control negotiations have some prospect for success.

Here several measures would be helpful. The first would be:

Annual and regular high-level meetings: These meetings should include not only the President, but also his principal Cabinet members and their counterparts, especially the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Such meetings in and of themselves

would not resolve the basic problems between the two Superpowers. But they would provide an institutionalized mechanism for discussing key issues and give on-going negotiations important political impetus. Moreover, regular meetings would help avoid the necessity of always showing tangible results immediately, such as the signing of an agreement, in order to justify the meeting.

Such meetings could be complimented by regular exchanges between high-level military personnel. As noted earlier, these exchanges could focus on issues as doctrines, force structure and military-related activities. Their purpose would be to try to narrow the perceptual gap and reduce the danger of misperception and miscalculation.

A third level would be meetings between experts to resolve a variety of outstanding problems such as the territorial boundary line in the Bering Sea, cultural and scientific exchanges and fishing quotas. Again, these issues are of relatively minor significance, but their resolution could help to "clear the air" and create a better political climate for the resolution of the larger issues.

None of these measures is likely to transform the Soviet-American relationship. Nor, as noted earlier, are they a substitute for arms control. But taken in conjunction with other measures they could contribute to stabilizing relations between the superpowers and crerating a better political climate in which arms control can take place. In short, one has to begin to rebuild the superpower relationship by moving forward on a variety of levels. In this process confidence-building masures can play a limited but nevertheless helpful role.

Citations.

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(4)

Confidence Building Measures

A Conceptual Exploration[1]

by

James Macintosh

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, convened in Stockholm in January of 1984, thrust the little-known notion of Confidence Building into unaccustomed prominence. The fact that the Stockholm talks were among the very few ongoing discussions of any note between the United States and the Soviet Union (virtually all arms control negotiations and other bilateral and multilateral discussions were by then suspended) further enhanced its importance. The increasingly worrisome possibility that major conventional arms control efforts such as SALT/START, INF, and MBFR may have reached a point where no meaningful progress is possible adds extra lustre and importance to the idea of Confidence Building as an arms control substitute. Despite this sudden prominence, however, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the more general Confidence Building process remain poorly understood. It is worth recalling that with the exception of the original Helsinki Final Act's provisions for very limited Confidence Building Measures and the current Stockholm talks, Confidence Building has not played an explicit role in international discussions and has attracted little formal interest on the part of either policy makers or policy analysts until quite recently. Because it is both important and poorly understood, the notion of Confidence Building warrants far more careful examination than it has thus far received.

What I would like to do in this paper is explore the concept of Confidence Building, particularly as it has been developed in the growing Confidence Building literature but also in the larger context of "practical" Confidence Building thinking. No short discussion can hope to cover every view and every facet of the Confidence Building idea, of course, but I have attempted to isolate what I think are basic and important difficulties with our current thinking. In particular, I have concentrated on three distinctive conceptual problems that seriouly impair our thinking about Confidence Building.[2] These fundamental conceptual problems are:

(1) great definitional imprecision and variation in delimiting what Confidence Building is - i.e., on the basis of both common use and formal definition, it is very difficult to establish what can "count" as an example of Confidence Building and what the appropriate bounds of the concept are. The central tendency is to rely upon understandings that are either too narrow or too broad, as well as being too substantively oriented on particular proposals;

(2) the failure to employ an understanding of the conventional military balance in Europe that can accommodate the full range of plausible interpretations of Soviet and Western military behaviour - i.e., the literature tends to rely upon a rather uncritical and "optimistic" assessment of Soviet as well as American military developments;

(3) a consistent failure to provide a plausible psychological explanation of how the Confidence Building process actually works - i.e., beyond assuming (usually implicitly) that the Confidence Building process is rationally-guided and intuitively straightforward, virtually no thought is given to how that process operates to overcome the fundamentally non-rational and heavily cognitive phenomena of misperception, mistrust and fear.

These three basic problems or conceptual difficulties combine to produce an understanding of Confidence Building that is vague and confused, an understanding

that is weak both analytically and substantively. Although these problems are typical of the (predominantly Western) Confidence Building literature, they also reflect conceptual shortcomings that appear to plague (if to a less severe extent) the thinking of policy makers. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an introductory examination of these three generic problems and some corrective observations.

The Problem of Definitions

The most immediate conceptual difficulty interfering with the serious discussion of Confidence Building and Confidence Building Measures is that of definition - what exactly is meant by the term "Confidence Building?" It is a particular flaw of the CBM literature (and, more generally, CBM thinking) that it lacks the most rudimentary conceptual precision: it is rarely clear what people mean when they use the term and the term itself has consequently acquired a dangerous elasticity. Very often, people mean nothing more than some variation on the very restrictive theme found in the Helsinki Final Act's Confidence Building Measures. Other "definitions" in the CBM literature tend toward lengthy descriptions of what CBMs "ought" to do and/or speculative ruminations on how confidence can be "built" and/or collections of specific substantive proposals. This is inadequate, as it fails to provide any common, workable understanding of what people mean by "Confidence Building" and no sense of how it "works." Not coincidentally, this imprecision contributes to a failure to appreciate the role of Confidence Building in the past (many international agreements appear to have performed the function of Confidence Building Measures but are rarely considered to be CBMs). It also provides little help in designing constructive future applications.

Given this (often unrecognized) "definitional confusion," the first thing we must do is be sure we know what we mean by "Confidence Building." Although it is a bit cumbersome, the most effective way of both demonstrating the existing confusion and generating a more effective understanding is to look at the concept from the perspective of a number of different applications: (1) potential historical examples; (2) the Confidence Building Measures from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Helsinki Final Act; (3) the proposed Associated Measures from The Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe; (4) specific definitions and sets of categories from the Confidence Building literature; and (5), actual CBM proposals. In the process of doing this, we will see just how great a variety of understandings there are. "Confidence Building" is a significantly more variegated concept than is commonly supposed

Before going any further, it might be useful to stop and pose a question about the necessity - even the wisdom - of pursuing "definitional precision." My presumption is that definitional vagueness is a handicap to clear thinking and good policy. Perhaps this view is wrong. Perhaps the serious lack of consensus on boundaries and definitional precision serves a constructive purpose - if not in analytic work, then at least in international negotiations. It could be argued that CBM thinking has to be fuzzy to tolerate the participation of different perspectives and needs - i.e., to facilitate diplomatic negotiations by allowing negotiators greater interpretational latitude? The disappointing recent arms control record and the role played in it by faulty understandings engendered by imprecision suggests that this reasoning is simply wrong. There is also very little evidence that policy makers pay much attention to the variety of definitions and conceptualizations

worked out by academics and policy analysts. Thus, that justification is probably insupportable as well. Ultimately, there are limits to the degree of plain, unpremeditated, definitional anarchy that good analysis can tolerate. In the absence of a strong argument to the contrary, I think that current Confidence Building thinking must be regarded as needlessly unfocused and vague. The following exploration of different approaches to explaining what Confidence Building is and involves should illustrate this point quite clearly.

Rather than turn directly to a consideration of contending "definitions," it might be more illuminating to look first at a number of historical and contemporary international agreements, to see whether any of them appear to perform the function of Confidence Building Measures. On superficial examination, it seems that a great many either contain or are themselves CBMs despite the fact that many discussions of Confidence Building fail to consider this possibility. This is particularly evident if we use a deliberately general (but still restrictive) definition of the CBM concept as the basis for deciding whether or not an agreement is a CBM. For instance, if we say that a Confidence Building Measure is a bilateral or multilateral undertaking (perhaps as formal as a treaty, perhaps quite informal) intended to clarify a potential adversary's military intentions, to reduce uncertainties about hostile intent, and/or to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack[3] then many of the arrangements commonly considered to be arms control agreements as well as a number of other international treaties are CBMs. This is certainly true of all the so-called "Hot Line" agreements (the American, British and French arrangements with the Soviet Union). It is obviously the case for the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (the United

States and the Soviet Union) as well as agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war (both the French and British agreements with the Soviet Union). A number of naval arms control agreements are CBMs (for instance, the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the Chilean-Argentine treaty, the Greco-Turkish treaty, 1936 London Naval Treaty and at least several Black Sea agreements reached by Russia and Turkey). The 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Accord on the Sinai contains a number of very specific - one could even say classic - conventional military Confidence Building Measures. The Spitsbergen and the Aaland Island non-fortification agreements are certainly good examples, as well. The ABM Treaty is clearly an example (it is an excellent illustration of a measure designed to clarify intentions and reduce uncertainty about the surprise attack intentions and capabilities of a potential adversary) as is the associated memorandum of understanding establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. The agreement not to interfere with national technical means of verification (in the SALT I Interim Agreement) is undeniably a Confidence Building Measure. A reasonable (if not wholely persuasive) argument can also be made for the consideration of all denuclearization and demilitarization treaties and for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We could also include proposals that, while never actually adopted, still constitute legitimate examples of CBMs. The 1930 Draft Convention of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the 1955 "Open Skies" proposal, schemes mentioned at the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference and the Rapacki Plans all contain clear-cut CBMs. Without using deliberately restrictive criteria, all of these undertakings appear to qualify as reasonable CBM examples. It is noteworthy that these applications cover strategic nuclear and naval arms control issues as well as land-based, conventional military arrangements.

Despite the fact that these examples appear to match the function of a

Confidence Building Measure, at least on the basis of our first-cut composite definition, some analysts might complain that this is too broad and inclusive an understanding of the CBM concept. For instance, if all of these agreements are CBMs, then the presumed and often stated distinction between CBMs and arms control agreements would appear unwarranted and insupportable. Without making any final judgement about the appropriate limits for Confidence Building "membership," we can nevertheless note that the preceding understanding of what counts as a CBM certainly seems broad when contrasted with the specific measures of the Helsinki CBMs. The 1975 Final Act of the CSCE specified a very precise (and restricted) collection of measures which many people still tend to associate exclusively with the term CBM. This understanding, in contrast to the previous one, is too narrow, however, and reasonably can embrace only a small subset of possible Confidence Building Measures. The Helsinki CBMs are voluntary, very modest in scope and constitute but two, restrictive applications:

Helsinki Final Act CBMs

(1) 21 days prior notification (if possible) of and basic information about major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops;

(2) Prior notification of other military manoeuvres (purely voluntary);

(3) Exchange of observers for manoeuvres (very loosely worded);

(4) Prior notification (again, purely voluntary) of military movements.

Although most analysts and practitioners recognize that these are but tentative, initial steps, the tendency is still to associate the CBM concept exclusively with the Helsinki application. This association is definitely too narrow with present practice

clearly encompassing a wider range of Confidence Building Measures and a broader conception of Confidence Building.

The "Associated Measures" outlined in the 1979 NATO proposal at the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (commonly referred to as MBFR in the West) also suggest a relatively restrictive set of potential Confidence Building Measures. The "Associated Measures" embraced the following proposals:

M(B)FR Associated Measures

(1) The US, SU, UK and Canada must give prior notification of the movement of their ground forces in the area of reductions;

(2) All must give prior notification of any "out-of-garrison" activities within the reduction zone;

(3) Ground force units (and equipment) must enter and leave the area of reductions only through designated entry and exit points;

(4) Each side would have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry and exit points;

(5) Each side would have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspections in area of reductions;

(6) Periodic exchange of military data;

(7) Non-interference with NTM agreement;

(8) The creation of a Standing Consultative Commission-type body.[4]

Although this set of measures is considerably more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs, it still does not support a generalized and coherent conception of "Confidence Building" nor can it, as a consequence, accommodate comfortably the list of historical and contemporary arms control agreements discussed earlier as

functional CBMs.[5] This is due primarily to the Associated Measures' composite construction: they are a combination of (1) pre-notification measures (similar to but more extensive than the Helsinki CBMs), (2) problem-solving and verification-enhancing measures and (3) inspection measures. This combination of proposed measures is the result of an effort to address a number of discrete conventional force problems and concerns specific to the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Central Europe. The binding together of disparate solutions to discrete, almost idiosyncratic problems in a CBM package inevitably results in an unfocused organizing concept. Such an approach is certainly inadequate for developing a more general definition and understanding of Confidence Building. Thus, although the Associated Measures provide a useful illustration of types of CBMs, they cannot generate a broad-based, coherent conception of Confidence Building per se.

Another approach that can be used in attempting to understand CBMs is to examine the definitions developed by analysts working in the area. On the face of it, this is the most obvious way of discovering what Confidence Building is "all about." Unfortunately, everyone seems to have his own story to tell and the discussions are often too descriptive. Nevertheless, these accounts are worth examining. A good place to start is with the classic definition of Johan Holst and Karen Melander:

> confidence building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats. Since modern technological means of surveillance have long since penetrated the shells of secrecy traditionally surrounding the military preparations of the nation state, CBM can be but a minor supplement to the various means of intelligence collection. Nevertheless, they are of political and psychological importance, because they can only be implemented on the express wishes of the states whose military activity is notified or observed. ... A major objective of CBM ... is to provide reassurance ... by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity.[6]

A much more recent article written by Holst contains a revised appreciation of what a CBM is. He states (somewhat cryptically) that CBMs are

> measures for inducing an assurance of mind and firm beliefs in the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of other states in respect of their security policies, and the facts with regard to military activities and capabilities which are designed to further the objectives of a nation's security policy. The objectives can be furthered by increased predictability. Hence, CBM could be designed to facilitate recognition of the "normal" pattern of military activities and thereby make it easier for states to discern significant deviations which may indicate a possible threat. ...
>
> Confidence may be enhanced also by reassurance about intentions, through opportunities to ascertain important information relating to military activities. Hence, an important purpose of CBM will be to enable states to demonstrate and confirm the absence of feared threats.[7]

Another of the classic discussions of Confidence Building states that they

> operate on the perceptions of those in confrontation (and particularly on their perceptions of intentions). ... CBM can by-pass assessments of capabilities (and hence many of the problems associated with verification and accuracy of assessments) and go straight to intentions. Two rather different but mutually reinforcing kinds of reassurance are sought through CBM. The first is essentially continuous and related to the willingness of potential adversaries to demonstrate their non-aggressive postures and generally defensive concerns by opening their internal affairs to examination either by the other or by independent observers. ... The second is designed to operate primarily in times of crisis. As a result of measures agreed between the parties, both should know that they are less vulnerable to the dangers of a surprise attack because they are assured of warning.[8]

Writing in another article, Alford makes some further points about CBM, continuing to argue that their most important attribute is that they clarify military intentions. He says that CBM are

> measures that tend to make military intentions explicit. ... [CBM should] permit both sides to differentiate clearly between actions intended to be seen as hostile and those that are not. ... They are intended to help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of continuous military activity. ... [T]he degree of

> confidence primarily depends on the degree of openness and transparency with which states are prepared to conduct their political and military affairs.[9]

Adam-Daniel Rotfeld was sensitive to matters of perception when he wrote that the

> intrinsic object of CBMs is the correct interpretation of the intentions of partners in the system of international relations. ... [T]he aim was to eliminate subjective factors and evaluations which are often due to prejudice and faulty understanding. ...
>
> [T]he operation of CBMs boils down to eliminating the chance and dangers arising from inaccurate information as well as to removing the causes of rivalry in the development of military capabilities that spring from a sense of insecurity. ...
>
> Thus the object of CBMs is to alter perspectives and ensure the perception of partners' aims in a more or less correct rather than imaginary light.[10]

Lynn Hansen, in quite sharp contrast, is critical of an undue fascination with the psychological character of CBMs. He claims that a number of analysts

> who have attempted to address the question of the conceptual underpinnings of confidence building have begun with the psychological phenomena of what constitutes trust. But this is approaching the problem backwards. Confidence building in Europe cannot aim at creating a warm and fuzzy feeling to fulfill a psychological need. In the first instance, confidence is (and always will be) directly related to the condition of one's own security. The path to confidence building most frequently chosen by states is the unilateral one, i.e., the guaranteeing of one's own security through the acquisition of additional military prowess. But confidence building need not be a unilateral process.
>
> If states would undertake reciprocal measures that would lessen the opportunity to actually utilize military force as an instrument to pursue aggressive political objectives, one could begin to speak of the kind of confidence building that would be conducive to arms reductions.[11]

In sharp contrast to this "Western" conception of Confidence-Building is the other basic approach to Confidence Building, an approach that is frequently

associated with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Here, the tendency is to equate the term Confidence-Building Measures with any gesture or undertaking that

> in any way tends to promote mutual understanding between countries. Thus any treaty signed, any negotiations, any talks, any encounter and any exchange of whatever kind between states is frequently understood as part of the confidence-building process and thus as part of a confidence-building measure. ... confidence-building measures are not, by this token, limited to the politico-military sector; they may also ... apply to the economic, scientific and technological, cultural and other sectors. Last but not least, declarations of political intent are also viewed as confidence-building measures ... .[12]

Pavel Podlesnyi's characterization of CBMs illustrates this point.

> Soviet researchers distinguish between "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) in the military field and those in economic, political and scientific spheres, which may widen and consolidate the material bases for positive interstate relations. These latter CBMs may be very effective and may not be inferior to CBMs in the military field, such as the notification of military manoeuvres or the invitation of military observers. Soviet specialists also start from the assumption that, while no opportunity to promote confidence in the military sphere must be disregarded, such steps should not be undertaken instead or at the expense of measures aimed at curbing the arms race and furthering disarmament[13]

The examination of a more extensive list of definitions would permit us to say that most conceptions of Confidence Building appear to treat it (usually implicitly) as a psychological phenomenon, one that involves communication, perception and intentions. According to the majority of discussions, Confidence Building addresses military concerns, particularly fear about conventional surprise attack. This focus is probably a residual feature of the Central European birthplace of the CBM idea. Many descriptions reveal a particular concern with rendering intentions somehow "transparent" so that potential adversaries will not misperceive (and hence not over-react to) legitimate, non-aggressive military behaviour. Most descriptions

imply or state explicitly that CBMs are not a type of arms control although the authors probably mean that CBMs do not (should not) deal with actual force reductions.

Because existing definitions and descriptions seem too cryptic or particularistic, too tied to specific existing agreements, too narrow or too general, and too detailed but nevertheless imprecise, it is worth attempting to construct a more serviceable definition, one composed at a relatively high level of generality and one capable of responsibly embracing the full range of potential Confidence Building Measures. The following interpretation is derived from existing views but has a character of its own.

CBM Definition

(1) CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing[14]

(2) state actions

(3) that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral

(4) that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)[15]

(5) by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless

(6) often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive

(7) and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve

(8) and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

This composite definition appears to accommodate the full range of applications discussed above without resorting to excessive detail. Although it is (hopefully) a useful theoretical construction - one that can briefly characterize what Confidence Building is - it only captures a part of our understanding of Confidence Building. Another, more substantive way of organizing one's thinking about Confidence Building Measures is to use a set of categories that summarize the different types of existing and proposed Confidence Building Measures. When this approach is combined with the listing of the approximately 100 distinct CBM proposals, we wind up with something like this:

CBM Categories and Proposals

A - Information and Communication CBMs

Information Measures

- publish technical information on force composition
- publish and discuss defence industry data
- publish regularized data on defence budgets
- publish arms control impact studies
- conduct "seminars on strategy"
- establish a "Standing Consultative Commission to deal with questions of treaty compliance
- conduct military personnel exchanges

Communication Measures

- establish, extend and refine "Hot Lines"
- establish "Joint Crisis Control Centres"

Notification Measures

- notification of single manoeuvres involving personnel levels exceeding set floors of (variously) 25,000, 20,000, 18,000, 15,000, or 10,000 men
- notification of military manoeuvres (variously) 21, 30, 40 or 60 days prior to commencement
- include detailed information about personnel and equipment to be used during manoeuvres in the notification (unit composition, exercise purpose, location of exercise)
- notification of "aggregate manoeuvres" involving smaller manoeuvres conducted concurrently or in close succession (aggregate totals of from 10,000 to 25,000)
- notification of naval manoeuvres conducted within a specified distance of (for instance) the European landmass involving specified types and/or numbers of naval vessels and personnel
- notification of air force manoeuvres involving types and/or numbers of aircraft beyond specified limits
- notification of military "movements" and "out-of-garrison" activities involving personnel and equipment beyond a specified level and/or in specified (sensitive) regions
- include detailed information about the nature, composition, direction, duration and location of military movements and other "out-of-garrison" activities
- mobilization exercise notification, including details about the character, duration and dimension of the mobilization exercise(s)
- notification of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle tests

Manoeuvre Observer Conduct Measures

- mandatory invitations to a representative group of states to send observers to military manoeuvres
- a "code of conduct" for the provision of adequate opportunities to observe, adequate facilities and equipment with which to observe and adequate information outlining the nature of the observed manoeuvre

B - Constraint or Surprise Attack CBMs

Inspection Measures

- provision for observers during "out-of-garrison" activities, including:
  - manoeuvres in sensitive areas
  - movements in sensitive areas
  - troop rotations through designated areas

  these observers could be:
  - permanent, human
  - temporary, human
  - observers with manoeuvring units
  - permanent, electromechanical
  - temporary, electromechanical
  - feasible combinations of above
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) at "constrained facilities" (tank parks, airports)
- observers (human and/or electromechanical) in "sensitive areas" (border zones, ICBM fields)
- mobile inspection teams

Non-Interference Measures

- agreements not to interfere with the use of National Technical Means of verification for confirming compliance with various treaties and undertakings

Behavioural Measures

- measures designed to constrain the risks of war produced by needlessly aggressive or provocative, small-scale aggravating or "testing" behaviour (best illustration is the "Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas")

Constraint Measures

- personnel constraint measures (manpower freezes and reductions)
- manoeuvre and movement constraints limiting or forbidding the exercising or large-scale movement of military forces
  - within sensitive regions

    - with certain types of restricted equipment
    - in excess of certain, specified manpower ceilings
    - in excess of certain, specified numbers of total exercises or movements per year
- limitations or bans on specified threatening types of weapon tests (multiple ICBM test launches, large scale bomber exercises, MaRV test flights)
- equipment constraints limiting or prohibiting the placement of specified types and/or numbers of (often) "offensive" equipment such as bridging equipment and attack aircraft
- nuclear free zones where no nuclear delivery vehicles are permitted

C - Declaratory Measures

- a controversial category which, if counted in this general analysis of CBMs, would include "no first use" declarations and other statements of benign intent which, by their nature, are impossible to verify or otherwise confirm (short of their non-occurrence)

The preceding definition and its associated set of categories can be regarded as evolutionary refinements, based more-or-less on the existing Confidence Building literature and Confidence Building thinking. If generally agreeable, they can bring some order to a confusing array of definitions and proposals. There are, however, more fundamental and far less apparent problems impairing Confidence Building thinking that are not so easily dealt with. The best that we can do in their case is note their nature and suggest some corrective ideas.

Viewed from a deliberately critical perspective, the Confidence Building literature as a whole, its specific Eurocentric CBM proposals and the derivative concept of Confidence Building exhibit collectively a number of serious generic conceptual problems. Although there are partial exceptions to these observations, the CBM literature and the more general habits of thought that produce it are surprisingly consistent in exhibiting these generic flaws. If we are to understand

the potential of Confidence Building in contemporary arms control, we must be aware of these "built-in" limitations and idiosyncracies. The most significant of them appear to be:

(1) an indifference to - or an unwillingness to address - the complex, idiosyncratic and apparently very offensive substance of Soviet defence policy, military doctrine, and conventional military capabilities;

(2) a frequent failure to understand or appreciate what the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies consider to be genuine military threats and "legitimate" concerns;[16]

(3) a frequent failure to perform, rely upon, include or even refer to detailed critical analyses of the actual character of the NATO-WTO military balance, its dynamics and the sorts of threats that each side poses - actually as well as potentially - for the other and for third parties;

(4) an insensitivity to the various factors - domestic and external, unilateral and interactive - that shape military policy, define its historical context, explain its contemporary character and determine its susceptibility to change;

(5) a consistent failure to explicitly discuss the actual psychological processes that are assumed to (a) mediate or facilitate the creation of "confidence" and (b) overcome the "misperception" of intentions and ambiguous actions;

(6) a general failure to appreciate the ramifications of the fact that Confidence Building is an intrinsically psychological process (i.e., there is a stunning disregard for the intellectual and emotional distortions that cognitive processes can wreak on perceptions of "trust," "predictability," "confidence," and "certainty" - all vital features of meaningful Confidence Building);

(7) a general interest in somehow rendering intentions "transparent" but no concrete, realistic explanation of just how this can be achieved nor any serious theoretical discussion of why it ought to be attempted;

(8) a general tendency to assume that increased amounts of accurate information will lead to a better grasp of adversary intentions and, as a consequence, relaxed anxieties;

(9) a marked indifference to the bureaucratic and organizational realities that necessarily restrict the scope for change in any state's national security policy.

This is obviously an overwhelming collection of analytic complaints, one that no paper this size could hope to deal with. It is possible, however, to simplify this collection substantially by constructing more general characterizations capable of subsuming the larger list. Indeed, the second and third "conceptual problems" noted in the introduction were developed in just this way. Those two fundamental conceptual problems were:

(2) the failure to employ an understanding of the conventional military balance in Europe that can accommodate the full range of plausible interpretations of Soviet and Western military behaviour - i.e., the literature tends to rely upon a rather uncritical and "optimistic" assessment of Soviet as well as American military developments; and

(3) a consistent failure to provide a plausible psychological explanation of <u>how</u> the Confidence Building process actually works - i.e., beyond assuming (usually implicitly) that the Confidence Building process is rationally-guided and intuitively straightforward, virtually no thought is given to how that process operates to overcome the fundamentally non-rational and heavily cognitive phenomena of misperception, mistrust and fear.

They capture the essence of the nine more detailed complaints. The remainder of this paper addresses these two generalized conceptual problems.

Conceptions of Soviet Military Power

The failure to employ an understanding of the conventional military balance in Europe that can accommodate the full range of plausible interpretations of Soviet and Western military behaviour is best illustrated by the way in which the predominantly Western literature deals with Soviet conventional military power. Virtually all Western Confidence Building thinking appears to be animated, in the first place, by concerns about Soviet and WTO conventional military power (as well as by associated concerns about accidental war growing out of a crisis or misunderstanding). Beyond this very general animating concern, however, there is seldom any additional reference to the specifics of the "Soviet threat."

Outside the framework of Confidence Building thinking, the perceived fact of increasingly offensive and potent Soviet conventional military capabilities (relative to NATO forces) is a matter of serious concern to many Western analysts and policy makers. This perception is an inescapable fact of life virtually independent of the objective determination that Soviet and WTO forces do or do not constitute a significant conventional military threat. As a consequence of this "reality," no discussion of Confidence Building Measures ought simply to begin with the apparent assumption that Soviet military intentions are essentially benign and misunderstood and then suggest ways in which presumably unwarranted concerns about the character of Soviet policy and capabilities can be addressed through the use of CBMs. Whether or not Soviet policy and capabilities are essentially benign, non-threatening and misunderstood is a matter that ought to be established - or at least discussed critically - within the Confidence Building literature. Because there are equally plausible "benign" and "malevolent" models of Soviet military capabilities

and intentions with more than adequate evidence to fuel both, the "benign view" should not be the only one to animate discussions of Eurocentric Confidence Building Measures. Eastern European analysts might very well express similar concern about the virtually automatic assumption that NATO could constitute no threat to the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Thus, this fundamental conceptual problem (at least from the Western standpoint) is centrally concerned with the potential disjunctions amongst: broad foreign policy problems (the Soviet conventional military "threat"); narrow policy objectives (negotiating effective and visible CSBMs at Stockholm); and a diverse body of CBM "theory" whose benign "operating assumptions" are generally contrary to the corresponding "facts" of the broad policy perspective where the Soviet "threat" is seen to be real and serious. Reflecting these disjunctions, the Confidence Building literature (and much Confidence Building thinking) simply seems to bypass consideration of a crucial and exceedingly relevant question: are Soviet military intentions fundamentally benign, fundamentally malign, or something more complex, variable and difficult to understand? The need for and the limits upon Confidence Building obviously change radically depending upon the answer to this question.

An associated analytic failure is the apparent absence within Confidence Building thinking of any sophisticated model of WTO-NATO policy interaction. There is rarely any sense of how the complex policies of the two alliances interact with each other in causal terms. Sometimes there appears to be a vaguely discernable underlying assumption that some kind of action-reaction interaction, aggravated by "worst-case" planning, drives the two alliances into a progressively

more alienated and antagonistic relationship. At other times, there appears to be no interest in nor awareness of the importance of understanding the WTO-NATO relationship and its role in defining the limits of and need for Confidence Building Measures. If the dynamics of that relationship are largely autonomous and intra-national, for instance, the possibility of using CBMs to control or otherwise influence the military and political relationship will be seriously impaired. Although they might well be crucial to any understanding of Confidence Building Measures in Europe, these notions are seldom examined and virtually never made a central feature of analysis.

There is also a very troubling and related failure to place questions about Soviet military policy and the "threat" it actually poses in the larger context of what "causes" or determines that policy (i.e., to what degree Soviet military doctrine and capabilities are the product of interactive and reactive influences - such as the nature of NATO doctrine and capabilities - and to what degree they are the product of unilateral or purely intra-national factors). It makes little sense to advance ideas about Eurocentric Confidence Building Measures when the basic nature of Soviet and NATO military postures and policies and the degree to which they actually interact with each other are so poorly grasped. To divorce considerations of Confidence Building Measures from attempts to understand the dynamics and causes of Soviet military policy, particularly when that policy and the capabilities that it animates can be seen to be dangerously offensive, is intellectually irresponsible and practically very unwise.

To illustrate these complaints - if only in a very superficial and tentative way - consider the following four "images" of the Soviet "conventional military reality."

Each of these distinctive "images" depends upon a particular interpretation of three basic image components: (1) the Soviet and Western perception (as well as the objective reality) of the conventional military balance; (2) the Soviet and Western perception (and the objective reality) of adversary military and foreign policy intentions and plans; and (3) the actual susceptibility to influence and capacity for change of (in this case Soviet) military posture, doctrine and overall national security policy.[17] Each image is a plausible representation of the objective Soviet reality but each has different implications for Confidence Building. Of particular importance, only one of these images corresponds even loosely with the assumptions about Soviet capabilities and intentions typically employed (or implied) in the Confidence Building literature.

Image One

(1) the Soviet Union enjoys a clear and massive conventional military superiority over NATO in Europe and both the Soviet Union and NATO know it;

(2) the Soviet Union does not particularly fear NATO's military policies and intends, at the first suitable opportunity, to employ its massive conventional superiority (in combination, perhaps, with nuclear superiority) to demonstrate its dominance over Europe, either through coercive blackmail or outright attack;

(3) Soviet national security policy, the structure of its military forces and the content of its doctrines are the unique product of unilateral (i.e., internal to the Soviet Union's national security community) causes and are immune to significant influence (either internally or externally directed) or sudden change.

This interpretation of circumstances rarely figures in discussions of Eurocentric Confidence Building although a case can be made for its accuracy. Obviously, in a

situation of malign Soviet intentions and significant conventional superiority, the opportunities for meaningful Confidence Building do not exist. A malign interpretation of Soviet perceptions and intentions is not, however, the only image that can be constructed. In fact, we can generate a completely different image. Instead of an implacable, powerful and aggressive foe, we can speculate that:

Image Two

(1) the Soviet Union and WTO possess very uneven conventional military capabilities which, in their view, are less impressive than those of NATO. To the alarm of Soviet political and military decision makers, however, NATO leaders publicly state and appear to believe that the WTO enjoys major advantages, advantages that need to be countered with increased Western effort;

(2) Soviet decision makers have no aggressive intentions towards Europe but genuinely believe that the West (especially the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States) is an implacable, unpredictable, and dangerous foe with aggressive designs of its own;

(3) The Soviet Union is fast approaching a unique point in its history where many policies - domestic and international - will come under critical review by new leadership groups, thus making Soviet foreign and defence policy unusually susceptible to constructive external influence through new negotiating positions.

This image is superficially encouraging given the relative advantages of NATO. In many ways, however, it is similar (in reverse fashion) to the first image. In this case, the Soviets would be reluctant to negotiate Confidence Building Measures because of the grave imbalance in NATO's favour and the aggressive (from the Soviet point of view) intentions of the West. The Soviets would be no more willing

than the Americans to negotiate significant CBMs from a "position of weakness."

A third image is also quite plausible. This image is relatively moderate in its basic features and suggests a situation where Confidence Building Measures might achieve some genuine progress. Here:

Image Three

(1) The Soviet Union and its principal NATO adversaries possess (and are seen by each other to possess) conventional military forces that, while different in many respects, enjoy no significant (i.e., "war-winning") advantages over each other;[18]

(2) Decision makers in the Soviet Union have an unnecessarily elevated fear of the West but do not believe (a) that an attack from the West is imminent nor (b) that an attack against the West in Europe would succeed;

(3) The Soviet national security policy process is primarily driven by incrementalism and a distinctly "Russian" "strategic culture" which makes it (like virtually all national security policy processes) respond to internal rather than international forces. Nevertheless, the strain and dangers of competing so vigorously, in combination with the emergence of new leadership groups, make the Soviet Union willing to consider major arms control initiatives - including CBMs.

A fourth image of at least equal analytic interest can be constructed from plausible evaluations of Soviet capabilities, intentions and concerns. It is similar to the third image in most respects but it depicts a Soviet Union (and Warsaw Treaty Organization) that possesses significantly greater conventional military power than does NATO. As in image three, however, the Soviet Union has no real intention of attacking NATO. It is difficult to evaluate the opportunity for Confidence Building in image four due to the presumed reluctance of the Soviets to compromise, in any

meaningful way, the offensively-configured, powerful "edge" that in essence "guarantees" successful deterrence, Soviet style. In this image:

Image Four

(1) The Soviet Union and its WTO allies possess significant advantages in a number of conventional military categories, realize this fact and are seen to enjoy these significant advantages by NATO. The advantages, although "significant," do not (and are not seen to) confer an obvious "war winning" capability on the WTO;

(2) Decision makers in the Soviet Union have an unnecessarily elevated fear of the West but do not believe (a) that an attack from the West is imminent nor (b) that an attack against the West in Europe would enjoy a reasonable chance of success. Soviet leaders, however, do expect a measure of diplomatic "respect" commensurate with their recognized military strength;

(3) The Soviet national security policy process is primarily driven by incrementalism and a distinctly "Russian" "strategic culture" which makes it (like virtually all national security policy processes) respond largely to internal rather than international forces and concerns. Because the Soviet Union has created its impressive conventional military capabilities primarily through unilateral efforts and at great sacrifice, it is unlikely to consider major arms control initiatives (including Eurocentric Confidence Building Measures) unless they yield advantages to the Soviet Union that would otherwise be more difficult to obtain. Western concerns about "stability," particularly conceptions of cooperative mutual stability are not shared by Soviet political and military decision makers. In Soviet eyes, "defence" is primarily the product and responsibility of unilateral effort.

The point in sketching out these "alternative images" - four simplified models of the East-West conventional military relationship seen largely from the Soviet perspective - is fairly straightforward. Confidence Building as a process and, more

specifically, Confidence Building Measures, have differential possibilities for success depending upon the "true" nature of Soviet military doctrine, capabilities and a host of other elements having to do with Soviet foreign and domestic policies.

The nature of these different "images" of Soviet "reality" is influenced in important, even crucial ways by the Soviet perception (correct or not) of NATO capabilities, doctrines and intentions; by NATO perceptions (correct or not) of Soviet capabilities, doctrines and intentions; and by WTO and NATO perceptions of their own and each other's relative strength. This complex dynamic feature is too often absent from analyses of Soviet policy and Confidence Building Measures. It is particularly important to recall, as well, that compelling evidence exists to support each of these images or models. However, only one of the four alternative images discussed above appears to be favourable for the implementation of significant Confidence Building Measures. If we looked at the full range of plausible images in greater detail, we would almost certainly discover a similarly uneven and mostly negative picture.

The basic point here is that realistic and useful evaluations of Eurocentric Confidence Building prospects must depend upon our understanding of (1) what Soviet (and, for that matter, American, German, Polish, French, etc.) conventional military policy (including doctrine) actually entails; (2) why it has developed in the ways it has; (3) the degree to which it is influenced significantly by developments in other states' military policies; (4) the extent to which it is subject to relatively precise control and adjustment; and, (5) what the true (and perceived) military balance is.

The Psychological Dynamics of Confidence Building

The third fundamental conceptual problem impairing Confidence Building thinking concerns the frequent failure to either provide or refer to a satisfactory or even plausible model of the CBM process, particularly one based on contemporary psychology. Most of the Confidence Building literature makes some sort of reference to the ways in which "confidence" can be created or fostered - in fact, there is a bewildering array of casual speculation on this subject - but there is seldom any serious discussion of the dynamic psychological process or processes that would presumably "make" the CBMs work.

Although there is a good deal of interest in formulating successful Confidence Building Measures, there is rarely much interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups are affected positively by the particular goals or mechanisms of those Confidence Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the CBM literature seems to, that knowing "all about" or a "lot more about" an adversary's forces and policies will "somehow" reduce or control "unwarranted" suspicion. There is no convincing reference to how or why this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive assumption that knowing more about a potential adversary will reduce misperception and groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence Building dynamics are and how they work. This type of thinking ignores a great deal of research on the operation of perception, information processing and decisionmaking, subjects that appear to be very important to an understanding of the Confidence Building process. The failure to employ psychological and cognitive scientific findings to understand these dynamics is a

crucial theoretical and empirical oversight.[19]

In addition to these psychologically-oriented problems associated directly with explaining how Confidence Building Measures work, there is virtually no consideration of the associated and very complex processes that animate the whole problem of misperception, suspicion, faulty inferences and, more generally, the inability to see and understand complex phenomena in an objective manner. Most CBM analyses begin with the proposition that the misperception and the mistrust and the lack of confidence already exist and that "something" ought to be done about them. The origins and the mechanisms of misperception and the broader array of cognitive processes that structure the basic problems in the first place are frequently ignored. If Confidence Building Measures to counter these mechanisms and processes are to be constructed and negotiated successfully, surely the mechanisms and processes themselves must be understood first?

Although it is true that there is no explicit model of a Confidence Building process in the literature, it is still possible to see in most Confidence Building thinking the indirect influence of operating assumptions very similar to those found in social science's dominant decision making paradigm - the "Rational Actor Model of Decision." This is most evident in the assumption that increased information and reduced uncertainty can yield improved understanding of and control over events. This facilitates "optimal" choices in decision theory and yields reduced chances of misperception, distrust and unintended conflict in Confidence Building. It is no distortion to view the Confidence Building process as a rational effort to control misperception and uncertainty.

The presumption in most Confidence Building thinking is that no Eastern or

Western state actually intends to begin a conventional war in Europe. The concern is that a war might nevertheless begin (or relations continue to worsen until conflict became inevitable) as a consequence of some sort of miscalculation or basic misunderstanding - either crisis-related or longer-term. Confidence Building Measures are therefore intended to "correct" - or, more realistically, help to correct - the suspicious, ethnocentric, over-reactive, and anxiety-inducing national security thinking of the states trapped in an enduring adversarial relationship. As was noted earlier, the primary concerns of Confidence Building consistently appear to be clarifying and increasing information about potential enemies, reducing the chances of misperceiving non-hostile acts, and, to some extent, constraining deployments and capabilities that could cause "undue" anxiety about "surprise attack." Most Confidence Building Measures, therefore, attempt to improve the quality and/or quantity of information available to senior decision makers in order to aid in the correct interpretation of ambiguous acts and uncertain situations. Reduced to its most fundamental level, then, the logic driving Confidence Building Measures appears to be an uncomfortable combination of the rational and the non-rational. There is a clear rational intention - acquire increased amounts of better, more comprehensive, predictable and systematic knowledge in order to correct and control conflict-inducing misperception - even though the problem addressed by the rational intention (some might say pretension) - the process and consequences of misperception and a host of related cognitive phenomena - is not at all "rational" in nature or operation. Confidence Building, therefore, can be considered to be a consciously rational approach to the "correction" of what is actually a collection of non-rational cognitive phenomena.[20]

One potential source of insight into the very involved cognitive basis of

Confidence Building and its psychological mechanisms may be derived from the apparent similarity of Confidence Building and decision making. Like complex decision making, the Confidence Building process may combine distinctive elements of the rational and the non-rational or cognitive. When it is reduced to its most elementary form, for instance, Confidence Building appears to entail a rational intention and method aimed at penetrating and correcting the destabilizing and corrosive effects of misperception and misunderstanding. However, misperception (viewed generally as a collection of faulty understandings) is a fundamentally non-rational phenomenon and may not lend itself well to "rational" analysis and solutions. Also like decision making, Confidence Building itself may very well be a far less "rational" enterprise than either theorists or policy makers suspect, largely because of the major (but rarely recognized) role played by various sorts of cognitive processes in all human problem-solving endeavours. In short, cognitive processes may be actively involved in both creating the "problem" in the first place - misperception - and in executing - imperfectly - the instrumentally rational problem-solving technique intended to correct it. This potentially antithetical relationship (between rational intention and technique and non-rational problem) built into the casual logic of Confidence Building thinking may help to explain why the existing accounts of how Confidence Building works seem so naive, particularly when contrasted with the findings of contemporary cognitive psychology.

Conclusion

There are several points worth re-iterating by way of a brief conclusion. What I have tried to show in this paper is that the Confidence Building literature and, more generally, Confidence Building thinking have a number of serious conceptual

problems, each of which in its own way impairs the potential value of the Confidence Building idea. These problems -

(1) great definitional imprecision and variation in delimiting what Confidence Building is;

(2) the failure to employ an understanding of the conventional military balance in Europe that can accommodate the full range of plausible interpretations of Soviet and Western military behaviour;

(3) a consistent failure to provide a plausible psychological explanation of how the Confidence Building process actually works

have a profound impact on the potential for Confidence Building to contribute constructively within the larger framework of arms control. Although existing CBM proposals can be pursued to address specific (predominantly Western) policy problems related to (predominantly) surprise attack concerns in Central Europe, the possibility of generating unintended outcomes - or simply failing to produce any real CBMs at all - will remain great as long as the conceptual underpinnings of the concept remain faulty and poorly understood.

The attraction and the promise of Confidence Building are at least partly artifacts of the conceptual problems that undermine our thinking about the substance and process of Confidence Building. Hopefully, this paper will encourage analysts (and, to the degree possible, policy makers) to examine the assumptions that structure - even preconfigure - their thinking about Confidence Building. Only if those limitations are understood and somehow overcome, can the modest but genuine potential of Confidence Building be fulfilled.

NOTES

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1. This paper is based, in part, on research done for the Department of External Affairs, Canada. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of External Affairs.

2. Although I have attempted to present these observations in terms that can fairly accommodate Western, Neutral and Eastern perspectives, there are inevitable limitations. Thus, this analysis (perhaps unavoidably) draws quite heavily on the "Western" literature and, as a consequence, it has a distinctive Western "flavour." Where feasible, however, I have attempted to identify distinctive "Eastern" perspectives on the problems of Confidence Building.

3. This is a "first-cut" composite definition drawn from the basic features mentioned by authors like Alford, Brauch, Holst, and Rotfeld. See Jonathan Alford, "Confidence Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspect" in Alford (ed.) The Future of Arms Control: Part III Confidence-Building Measures. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979; Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs" in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld, (eds.) New Directions in Disarmament. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981; H. G. Brauch, "Confidence Building and Disarmament Supporting Measures," in ibid.; Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures." Survival vol. XXV no. 1 (January/February 1983); Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-Building Measures." Survival vol. XIX no. 4 (July/August 1977); Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "European Security and Confidence-Building: Basic Aims," in Karl Birnbaum (ed.) Confidence Building and East-West Relations Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1982; and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience," in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, (eds.) Confidence-Building Measures in Europe East-West Monograph Number One. New York: Institute for East-West Security Issues, 1983.

4. John Kelliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York: Pergamon Press), p. 135 and Lothar Ruehl, MBFR: Lessons and Problems (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 26.

5. I think that this "test" of being able to accommodate the range of apparently legitimate "international agreement CBMs" is a fair one even if it does raise difficult "chicken and egg" questions about initial definitions and their role in pre-configuring what can and should count as a CBM: i.e., did Helsinki "define" what a CBM was or did it merely begin a process of exploring what the Confidence Building process really could entail. It is clear from discussions of concrete CBM proposals - as we will soon see - that virtually everyone intends the Confidence Building concept to cover a fairly wide range of activities and measures. Asking that a "theoretical" definition acknowledge this reality is not unrealistic and it certainly avoids an unacceptably narrow working definition tied too closely to the Helsinki CBMs.

6. Johan Holst and Karen Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building Measures," Survival vol. XIX, p. 147.

7. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," Survival vol. XXV no. 1, pp. 2-3.

8. Jonathan Alford, "Confidence Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects," in Confidence-Building Measures (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 5.

9. Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), New Directions in Disarmament (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 134-135.

10. Adam Rotfeld, "European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims," in Karl E. Birnbaum (ed.) Confidence Building and East-West Relations (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs - Wilhelm Braumuller, 1982), pp. 106-107.

11. Lynn Hansen, "Confidence Building in Europe: Problems and Perspectives," in Birnbaum, Confidence Building and East-West Relations, p. 53.

12. Bomsdorf, "The Confidence Building Offensive in the United Nations," Aussenpolitik vol. 33, no. 4.

13. Pavel Podlesnyi, "Confidence Building as a Necessary Element of Detente," in Karl Birnbaum, Confidence Building and East-West Relations, pp. 95-96.

14. Many analysts seem to think that this is not so. There are simply no compelling grounds, however, for saying that CBMs are not a type of arms control. A general and widely accepted definition of arms control counts those measures which reduce the chance of war occurring or the severity of war if it should occur. CBMs clearly qualify as measures designed to reduce the chance of war. That CBM do not involve actual force reduction is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the category of arms control measures. Indeed, there is also no obvious reason why measures involving force reductions should be excluded when measures sponsoring obvious equipment and manpower restrictions are counted as CBMs.

15. CBM only deal with correcting misperception in situations where no genuine, premeditated aggressive intent exists. It is the province of other types of arms control or unilateral action to address situations where intentions are genuinely aggressive. This distinction ignores the problem of deliberately using CBM for coercive purposes or to mask preparations for attack.

16. There is a corresponding but less pronounced tendency for East European analysts to misunderstand the nuances of NATO policy and doctrine and to "under-appreciate" the seriousness of Western concerns. They often appear to view NATO (or at least the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany) as being more "offensive" than would Western analysts. Nevertheless, both Western and

Eastern CBM analysts tend to assume generally benign intentions, even if Eastern analysts may not subscribe so fully to this view. It is interesting to speculate whether East European analysts - by dint of physical proximity and political familiarity - have a noticeably better grasp of Soviet policy and its ambiguities than do Western analysts. Furthermore, to the extent that East European analysts must rely upon Western sources to study WTO policies and capabilities, their work will tend to reproduce (with a slight accent) at least some Western errors of interpretation and fact.

17. Obviously, more variables could be used and a greater variety of interpretations for each variable could be included to create a vastly more complex set of images. Casual inspection suggests that over 1290 distinct images could be constructed simply using the three existing rather gross image components.

18. This view tolerates apparent "advantages" for one side or the other up to a certain point but maintains that neither alliance possesses military capabilities sufficient to ensure a reasonable prospect of victory in a purely conventional European war.

19. See, for instance: Robin M. Hogarth Judgement and Choice - The Psychology of Decision. (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1980).

20. This seems inescapably true for Western as well as (related) Neutral and Non-Aligned approaches to the problem of Confidence Building. The Soviet approach, by and large, is not technical, lacks the appearance of such rationalistic concerns and, significantly, has a heavy ideological loading. This "substitution" of one ideology (the contemporary Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism) for another (the belief in the utility of rational - i.e., scientific - inquiry) in the animating logic of Confidence Building may go some distance in explaining the true differences between the Eastern and Western approaches to Confidence Building and CBM negotiations. It also suggests just how difficult it may be for these two fundamentally different perspectives to produce meaningful CBMs.

(5)

"CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN LATIN AMERICA"

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Distinctive regional trends, including differences between the more than two dozen states in and around the Caribbean basin and South America, characterize conflict and conflict resolution and set the context for confidence building measures (CBMs) in Latin America. Such a distinctive context requires tailor-made CBMs at the regional level,[1] subregionally for the Caribbean basin and South America, and for specific conflicts and national situations. The general context for CBMs will be set forth in an introductory section followed by examples of CBMs tailored to the two Latin American subregions (the Caribbean basin and South America) and to some prominent conflicts, and a final section will present some conclusions about confidence building measues in Latin America.

Subregional obstacles to and opportunities for CBMs: The Caribbean Basin and South America

The sustained diplomatic activity of the Contadora group to promote peaceful settlement of the Central American conflicts is noteworthy, especially since mounting militarization has constrained negotiations. Not only did the original four Contadora states (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) bring the Central American states into the discussions, but their initiatives have also garnered broad support throughout Latin America, in international organizations and elsewhere. This concerted peacekeeping effort has been all the more impressive since, in comparison with the major South American states, the key participants in the Caribbean basin area are generally more dependent and foreign influence is more prominent.

The generally larger, more autonomous South American states, while individually often having greater leeway to shape national destinies, jointly have not been able to muster the same degree of sustained, creative diplomatic activity to control conflicts. The nearest South American counterpart initiative is the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho and related follow-up measures, which, in spite of laudable arms control objectives, has not had any significant impact in controlling conflicts or reducing arms. The 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco, while including South American as well as Caribbean basin states, grew primarily out of a Mexican initiative and moreover, of the two major nuclear aspirants, Argentina has not ratified the treaty and Brazil is not yet bound by it.

At the same time, military power influences the course of diplomacy and negotiations, so that the imaginative peacekeeping initiatives of the militarily weak Contadora states have tended to be checked by stronger external states. In addition to the weak US commitment to the Contadora process, some backsliding and disassociation from Contadora goals by Central American states supported by the United States has occurred. As matters stand, the diplomacy of the militarily weak Contadora states, while necessary being limited to persuasion and identification and pursuit of common interests, has still had considerable impact and would constitute an especially promising approach were the negotiating context low-key. However, the increasing militarization of the Central American conflicts has tended to limit the potential of the Contadora process by bringing power politics to the forefront. The United States appears committed to its present course of militarizing the Central American conflicts barring collapse of local allies or repudiation of US policy at home.

In contrast, South American states are better able to bring military power to bear on negotiations because of their own more ample resources and the relatively limited nature of foreign involvement. South American states, in addition to having generally larger, more sophisticated military arsenals, benefit from greater diversification of arms supplies and in several cases from considerable national military production. They are accordingly generally less dependent in the military sphere on foreign states, which for their part are generally less involved in South American strategic affairs.

This distinctive South American geopolitical context is evident even in the case of greatest foreign intrusion in a recent South American conflict, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. The United States was not able to deter the Argentine invasion of 2 April 1982 in spite of a direct appeal from President Reagan to President Galtieri, nor was it able subsequently to contain the conflict through the Haig mediation effort. While British power did prevail militarily, the proximity of considerable Argentine military power has since obliged Britain to adopt a "fortress Falklands" policy as long as it is not willing to negotiate the sovereignty issue. This British military option does not appear viable in the long run, both because of the cost involved and because of the danger of its further militarizing the situation to British disadvantage. A continuing impasse would not only be unproductive, but, according to some Argentine policy-makers, would also trigger Argentine decisions to build nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines. The United States has realized the logic of this situation by subsequently trying to moderate British positions and by supporting United Nations resolutions favoring negotiations.

The apparent regional trend towards democratization constitutes a final example contrasting militarization and conflict resolution in the Caribbean basin and South America. The trend towards democratization in South American has produced some significant examples of military moderation and interest in arms control, although continuing autonomy of national military institutions may limit this impact. For example, the new Alfonsín government in Argentina has shown renewed interest in negotiating a settlement to both the Falklands/Malvinas and Beagle Channel conflicts, as well as in cutting military expenditures. The reemergence of democracy in South America, while precarious, does appear to reflect a widely shared determination to place military affairs under civilian control. For a variety of reasons, the movement towards democratization in Central America is more limited and precarious and less promising for arms control. Besides militarization having reached a more acute stage there and foreign influence being more prominent, the process of democratization has itself relied to a considerable extent on expedient external support. In particular, the US commitment to the promotion of Central American democracy has apparently been conditioned by the hope that this would help build support at home and abroad for a military build-up by local allies. With both the United States and local military establishments favoring a military solution to regional conflicts, a negotiated settlement is not likely to receive high priority by civilian governments even were they so inclined.

South American CBMs

The April 2, 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas, it has been argued convincingly, played a key role in undermining the relative degree of confidence which had existed until then and in creating a context of mistrust among South American states.[2] The 1982 conflict also contributed to on-going militarization of the continent, so that mistrust is being aggravated by increasingly potent military capabilities. South American CBMs, as a first priority preliminary to more ambitious aims, accordingly must attempt to restore the relative prewar degree of confidence.

Since it was Argentina through its invasion that undermined the relative degree of regional confidence which had existed prior to the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands war, examples of CBMs involving Argentina and her neighbors would contribute most directly to reestablishing a South American climate of trust. CBMs involving still other South American areas and conflicts would contribute to the same end of improving the regional climate of trust, but will not be analyzed here because of space constraints.

In the troubled South American environment, words -- in particular CBMs assuming the form of declaratory undertakings or obligations -- can constitute a constructive first step. Declarations may also contain important expressions of goals which structure choices of supportive action and aid in the interpretation of such actions. Such, for example, is the statement signed on January 23, 1984 in Rome between Chile and Argentina, under the auspices of the Vatican mediation, promising that both countries would soon settle peacefully the dispute over the three islands and a strip of South Atlantic waters, which brought both countries to the brink of war in 1978. Or

the statement made by the President of Argentina, Mr. Alfonsín, that he might reestablish diplomatic and commercial relations with Britain and declare an end to hostilities, were the UK to lift its 150-mile exclusion zone around the Falklands/Malvinas, reduce its forces in the islands and open talks on their future relationship to Argentina. Such a declaratory undertaking was well received in London, and in fact the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Michael Heseltine declared during a quick visit to the Falklands that "...we welcome the new government and its approach to the issues and we hope that it would look at things a bit differently." Moreover, the United Kingdom made at the beginning of February 1984, through the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires, a concrete proposal for a resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations.

Unfortunately, the atmosphere of hostility and mistrust has limited the effectiveness of these Falklands/Malvinas CBMs. Preliminary Anglo-Argentine negotiations to reestablish diplomatic relations were abruptly broken off by Argentina in July 1984 when Great Britain refused to discuss the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.

Declaratory undertakings often presuppose specific actions in order to become credible. This, for example, could include the renunciation of particular options with respect to the deployment or employment of armed forces along borders as in the case of Chile/Argentina or the case of the UK military presence in the Falklands/Malvinas. A number of other CBMs to help resolve these two key Southern Cone conflicts may be suggested, although concerted measures would need to be implemented judiciously in order to overcome objections to each that would surely be generated by the atmosphere of political mistrust.

With respect to the Falklands/Malvinas, Great Britain might reinforce its efforts to reinstate bilateral relations by indicating willingness to discuss the status of the islands at some point in the future; it might remove or phase out the 150-mile protection zone around the islands, especially were Argentina to take constructive steps as well; the military build-up on the islands might be slowed, including freezing construction of the expanded airport and naval facilities pending Argentine responses; and restraint could be exercised in arms sales to Chile. Chile, for its part, could document that the Punta Arenas-Port Stanley trade does not include strategic materials and could abstain from any official encouragement of this trade for the immediate future.

On the Argentina side, some flexibility could be evidenced regarding the sovereignty issue by accepting a short-term freeze on discussion of the issue or at least by clarifying what kinds of discussions regarding sovereignty might be acceptable. President Alfonsín's recent proposal to examine a lease-back alternative is a case in point. Other Argentine CBMs might include an unambiguous renunciation of the use of force in the settlement of the dispute as well as announcement and implementation of a policy discouraging and punishing unauthorized incursions by national vessels into British waters around the islands. Such initiatives could be implemented contingent on constructive British responses, such as permission for Argentine vessels to fish in the exclusive economic zone of the Malvinas/Falklands.

The apparent determination of the Alfonsín government to cut back military spending might be linked constructively to confidence building regarding the Falklands/Malvinas issue as well. For example, the conventional

submarine building program might be slowed down and the nuclear submarine program might be frozen pending appropriate British responses, such as a clear policy delaration to withdraw its own nuclear submarines from Falklands/Malvinas waters.

As for the dispute in the Beagle Channel area, during the final stage of the papal negotiation both sides have issued statements involving declaratory CBMs, including determination to emphasize bilateral integration once the dispute is resolved. Implementation of such declarations could constructively begin even prior to formal agreement. Both individually and jointly Argentina and Chile could step up economic exploitation of the Magallanes region through sponsoring incentives for civilian ventures while freezing or even reducing the military presence in the area. In order to benefit from and contribute to the current bilateral détente, talks could be undertaken as well regarding the dispute over the eastern mouth of the Strait of Magellan and other remaining bilateral disputes.

Since the past record of each side is marred, asymmetrical CBMs directed towards specific sources of mistrust on the other side could be undertaken to improve the negotiating climate. Since Argentine support for a negotiated settlement has long been qualified -- expressed most dramatically by its 1978 nullity declaration of an arbitral award regarding the Beagle Channel issue -- an unambiguous commitment could be made to a peaceful settlement regardless of the outcome of the current negotiations. The cuts in military spending by the new democratic government in Argentina already have contributed to the current bilateral détente, which Chile could complement by

commitments to cut its own military spending. And of course a Chilean commitment to accelerate progress towards democratization would help ease tension in the Southern Cone as well.

Brazilian-Argentine relations are as critical for reestablishing a regional atmosphere of trust as are British-Argentine and Chilean-Argentine relations. The traditional bilateral rivalry between Brazil and Argentina is currently muted, but Argentine and Chilean military spending has escalated during the recent period of tension and threatens to draw Brazil further into the process of militarization.

Table 1: Recent South American Military Expenditures[3]

(Figures are in US$ mn, at 1980 prices and exchange-rates)

	1981	1982	1983
Argentina	4 185	8 797	7 262
Brazil	1 354	1 534	1 771
Chile	1 761	2 099	2 196
Total South America (11 states)	10 584	15 745	14 745

Brazil's military spending has been edging upwards in response to tense regional politics, although its burden of military expenditure remains light in relation to that of neighbors. In 1982, for example, Brazilian military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product was only 0.6, while that of Argentina was 6.4 and that of Chile was 8.5.[4]

Continuing Brazilian restraint will be required if relations in the Southern Cone are to normalize. With Argentina and Chile seeking to normalize their relations and Argentina already having committed itself to reducing military expenditures, it would enhance confidence as well were Brazil to commit itself to maintaining relatively low levels of military spending. Unfortunately, the Brazilian armed forces recently announced plans to increase their total manpower from 270,000 to 380,000 by 1993, so a complementary CBM could usefully involve freezing manpower at current levels.

Control of military spending and militarization in South America must encompass national military production as well. For example, a recent study estimated total investment in defense industries in Brazil to exceed $5 billion and more than $3.5 billion for Argentina, and predicted that Argentina and Brazil will each spend upwards of $2 billion during the 1980s to produce military ships in their own shipyards.[5] Through mutual example, both of these major South American arms producers might exercise self-restraint by not moving progressively up the military production ladder to high-performance or provocative weapon systems. Already both Argentina and Brazil are moving into conventional submarine production and both expect to build nuclear-powered submarines and light aircraft carriers or area-control ships. It is accordingly imperative to try to limit military production in at least some areas in the near future before both countries become irrevocably committed to across-the-board military production. Newly-elected President Alfonsín did take the positive step in early 1984 of appointing civilian directors for the military production industry, and civilian influence has already been extensive in the Brazilian weapons manufacturing industry.

CBMs could likewise play a constructive role with respect to South American arms exports. Brazil has become the leading Third World arms exporter, having increased arms sales rapidly from $500 million in 1980 to over $2 billion in 1983, and in at least some areas of production Argentina and Chile may become viable competitors in the arms market. Without export controls or coordination, sales have been made on strictly commercial grounds even to states engaged in conflict or pursuing expansionist policies, with Brazil supplying arms to Iraq and Argentine supplies and military assistance going to Iran. Within the region, Argentina and Brazil have already made some competitive arms sales, and Brazilian arms exports to Chile threaten to aggravate longstanding rivalries.

Just as developed state arms suppliers on occasion have cooperated in exercising some restraint in exporting to areas of conflict, so too potential Third World competitors like Argentina and Brazil could restrain their exports to troubled areas in South America and elsewhere through implicit or explicit agreement. Mutual controls on arms exports could be facilitated by intensifying tentative steps already taken towards joint military production. Joint production of some basic defense items could complement arms control aims if oriented towards lessening the need for local arms industries with small national markets to depend on export-generated growth of ever more sophisticated weaponry. For example, Brazilian-produced patrol boats already have been exported and could constitute one focus for constructive regional military integration -- an alternative to competitive national production and exportation of more costly, destabilizing weaponry.

In early 1984, for the first time Brazil did agree in a Memorandum of Understanding on military-industrial cooperation with the United States to accept controls on its arms exports. However, the arms control impact of this agreement, by encompassing only the area of projected joint production, is likely to be limited. Controls are to be imposed only on Brazilian exports relying on sophisticated U.S. military technology, while Brazilian arms manufacturers have already demonstrated a capability to expand sales rapidly without depending on U.S. military technology. Moreover, the new, jointly manufactured military equipment will be used largely for the modernization of the Brazilian armed forces, and will thereby strengthen the domestic arms industry while proceeding further with militarization.

Coordination and eventual limitation of arms acquisitions, especially in the case of sophisticated weaponry, would reinforce limitations on national military production. Argentine-Brazilian joint naval exercises have already occurred and augur well for other kinds of constructive bilateral military cooperation.

Larger, more sophisticated arms industries have increasingly tended to blur the distinction between conventional military weaponry and nuclear weapons. For example, both Argentina and Brazil recently began production of conventional submarines with foreign assistance as an avowed step towards eventual production of nuclear-power submarines. Such a capability would surely be accompanied by an ability to make nuclear weapons, and could become the basis for a sea-borne nuclear deterrent force. Both Argentina and Brazil already have imported air-borne delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons and they have the potential to develop indigenous aircraft for this purpose as well.

However, the sizable peaceful nuclear energy programs of Argentina and Brazil need not lead necessarily to nuclear weapons production. In fact, in early 1984 Argentina announced that it had mastered the technology for uranium enrichment and that it would make this available to other Latin American states for peaceful purposes. The cooperative dimension of South American nuclear energy affairs would be further strengthened were incipient Argentine-Brazilian collaboration in the area to proceed sufficiently to assure each that the other did not intend preemptively to develop nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the continuing diplomatic impasse over the status of the Falklands has increased pressure in Argentina to enhance its military posture by developing nuclear weapons and building nuclear submarines.

Caribbean Basin CBMs

The situation in Central America is not only one of inter-state conflict and tension, but also of internal conflicts in several countries (most notably El Salvador) combined with external support given to insurgencies in several countries of the area. A first approach to a solution to these problems must be a dialogue, such as is being carried out by the Contadora Group, between the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, as well as between Nicaragua and each of its neighbors, between Cuba and all the countries in Central America, between USA and Cuba, and USA and Nicaragua, respectively. The aim of all these discussions, besides that of exploring whether the vital interests of each party can be safeguarded without continuing war in Central America, would be

to search for ways to create conditions that justify trust and confidence between the parties and thereby lead to the reduction of material, social and economic damage.

Confidence-building measures then offer a promising approach towards resolution of the Central American conflicts, particularly to the extent that they involve actors in the entire Caribbean basin. The members of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) are scattered around the periphery of the basin, Cuba and the United States are physically separate from Central America yet deeply involved in the conflicts there, and the Central American states themselves have affected events far beyond the isthmus because of their varying responses. Since CBMs have been an integral part of the Contadora process and affect actors throughout the Caribbean basin, they are particularly illustrative of the potential and limitations of CBMs in the subregion. CBMs could be applied directly to other subregional contexts than Central America, such as US-Cuban relations, and offer intriguing possibilities but will not be discussed here in detail because of space constraints.

The Contadora Group has, between January 1983 and August 1984, held seven joint meetings between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Contadora Group and the Central American Ministers for Foreign Affairs, aimed at preventing the aggravation of tension and conflict in Central America, creating the necessary conditions for stable peace, and generating a climate of trust and improving prospects for understanding and co-operation among the countries of the region. Under its auspices, the governments of Central America have already agreed on certain documents, in particular that of

September 1983, dealing with objectives and principles for resolving the region's wars.[6] This document of objectives, plus the recent principles for the implementation of its commitments (January 1984), envisage first steps to ease tensions and begin meaningful negotiations.

The purpose of the seventh joint meeting of the Contadora Group and the five Central American nations, held at Panama City from 24 to 28 August 1984, was to ascertain the views of the Central American governments on a revised version of the "Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America" transmitted to the Heads of State on 9 and 10 June 1984. The document (which is confidential in nature) is an international legal instrument, subdivided into 4 parts, one annex and an additional protocol.

The draft agreement (Act...) opens with a preamble which includes the paragraphs elaborated by the commissioners themselves. Part I of the Act contains the legal commitments, both those of a general nature and those pertaining to particular subjects of a political, security, economic and social character. Part II refers to the general and specific recommendations for each of the subjects dealt with. Part III of the Act contains details relating to the verification and control commission for ensuring compliance with the Act. Part IV includes the legal commitments and the formulas for the settlement of disputes. The Annex relates to concepts in security matters which were approved in the work of the Commission on security, and finally the Act contains an additional protocol, which would be open for signature by other states of the international community having ties and interests in the region and through which they would undertake to respect the commitments made by the signatories to the Act.[7]

The Government of Nicaragua was the first country in the region to accept in toto the revised Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America and declared on 22 September 1984 its willingness to sign at once without "modification" the agreement, stressing that the agreement would only be effective if the United States signed and ratified the Additional Protocol and thus ceased its aggression against Nicaragua. Moreover, Nicaragua deems it essential that no new amendment or modification should be introduced to the agreement (Act), since new amendments or modifications to the document would give rise to endless discussions which could only jeopardize the Contadora efforts and thus delay or obstruct the realization of peace in the region.[8] The Governments of Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala have expressed their willingness to sign the Document. Only El Salvador has not yet responded to the proposals.

The Contadora proposals for solving the problems of the troubled Central American isthmus are comprehensive and reasonable. However, prompt and full implementation of these proposals seems unlikely in view of the known position of the United States, one of the main actors in the Central American crisis. This position was reflected in the Kissinger Report and welcomed by the White House. The USA continues to consider the area in question to be of critical importance for its security and has not abandoned plans for restoring the status quo-ante (i.e., before 1979). It is not therefore at all certain that the United States will accept the Sandinista regime, even if legitimized through free elections.

Nonetheless, a series of well-considered confidence-building measures in the military field, some of which were already envisaged by the Contadora Group in the Document of Objectives (to eliminate the traffic in arms, whether

within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the governmens of Central American countries; to establish and co-ordinate direct communications systems with the view to preventing or, where appropriate, settling incidents between states of the region; and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systems) could perhaps help pave the way towards the realization of the Contadora goals. Other CBMs might include limitation of military maneuvers; prohibition of troop concentrations in border areas; the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons; the freezing and consequent reduction of the number of armed forces; the exchange of information on military expenditure, as well as on military manpower and equipment; co-ordination of programs for arms acquisition; the exchange of military missions and observers; the establishement of joint, third-party or international supervision of disputed and troubled areas; and the improvement of direct communication between the governments and military staffs.

CBMs in the military field could provide new practical ways and means to achieve the Contadora goals by increasing trust in the field of political-military relations between the countries in question. CBM techniques need not necessarily rely on qualitative or quantitative restrictions, i.e. restrictions on weapons, maneuvers and the like, but may focus instead on the missions or functions of national armed forces without interfering with the civil government functions--foreign policy, civil rights, investment decisions. This pragmatic, flexible orientation of CBMs may be of critical importance for peaceful resolution of the Central American conflicts, where less provocative military postures may be of mutual interest to

contrasting systems of government insofar as they do not require alteration of the domestic political order.

Some CBMs have already been agreed upon by parties to the conflict, on the initiative of the Contadora Group, such as those envisaged in the text of the Joint Declaration of Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed in Panama City on 15 May 1984.[9] Both countries (Costa Rica and Nicaragua) under the auspices of the Contadora Group agreed to "make the necessary efforts to bring an end to the tension and incidents in the frontier zone and to promote a climate of confidence between the two countries," and as a concrete measure they decided to set up a commission for supervision and prevention. Among the tasks of the commission, consisting of a high representative and an alternative from both countries and a representative from each of the countries of the Contadora Group, the following are directly related to CBMs: (a) on-site inspection and verification of the facts that might give rise to tension or frontier incidents; and (b) establishment of a system of direct telephone and radio communication.

Moreover, both countries undertook measures to provide the Commission with full travel facilities and necessary protection to enable it to perform the assigned duties properly and recommend measures to be taken by both states. It was established that the Commission for Supervision and Prevention should visit the frontier post of Penas Blancas on 26 May 1984, an area of permanent conflict in which both countries had been reporting incidents.

For Costa Rica and Nicaragua, in addition to the practices envisaged above, the following unilateral CBMs could be applied by Nicaragua towards Costa Rica (unilaterally, since Costa Rica is not armed): (a) addition of a

buffer to the demilitarized zone along sensitive border areas; and (b) creation of a depletion zone of defense along the Nicaragua border--the zone would be depleted of offensive military arms but could still contain ample defensive military resources to fight against anti-Sandinista forces, while Costa Rica could maintain an effective civil guard in its zone to impede the presence of rebel forces in their territory.

The same sort of CBM techniques which have been applied between Costa Rica and Nicaragua could be proposed for Nicaragua and Honduras, implemented by those measures mentioned above and complemented by the following: (a) notification of military maneuvers exceeding 1,000 men (with certain procedures and length of advance notice for different types and sizes of maneuvers); (b) notification of naval activities outside of normal areas; (c) notification of aircraft operations and flights near border areas; (d) 21 days prior notification for any maneuver; (e) establishment of a disengagement zone in a continuous strip (50 km wide, i.e., outside missile range) parallel to the entire Honduras-Nicaragua frontier, from which all military/ para-military forces should be removed as well as heavy weapons, such as tanks (which have difficulty operating in this terrain), artillery, medium-range missiles, helicopters and combat aircraft concentrations, currently found in the region/or corridor or planned to be garrisoned in the area. The weapons could be removed to the northwest of Honduras and southeast of Nicaragua. Nothing, however, would prevent the individual aircraft of either side flying over its own zone--up to the interzone border--at any time; (f) notification of major (> 1,500 soldiers) movement or out-of-garrison activities; (g) observers to attend maneuvers; (h) limitation on coded radio traffic; (i) non-interference

with national technical means of verification; (j) prohibition of multinational maneuvers in their territories; (k) prohibition of new military bases; (l) no-first use of military force; (m) freezing or reduction of military budgets; (n) exchange on a quid pro quo basis of new equipment and arms; (o) joint patrols along sensitive border areas; (p) buffer on demilitarized zones along sensitive borders cleared of certain types of weapons with strong offensive capabilities (tanks, artillery, attack aircraft, naval combatants); (q) establishment of hot-line communications between units in contact across a border; and (r) control of the political-military actions of exiles (i.e. closing of political offices belonging to anti-government groups).

In the area of the Fonseca Gulf, a highly sensitive zone for Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador, CBMs could include (a) joint supervision of third-party patrols along the Gulf and (b) no installation of foreign naval bases at any point in the Gulf of Fonesca without the express agreement of the three countries.

Despite the 1980 Peace Treaty between El Salvador and Honduras, the disputes over the "bolsones" (pockets of disputed territory) continue and may flare up again. Therefore, the following CBMs could be envisaged besides those mentioned above: (a) prohibition of the re-establishment of weapons or the introduction of new offensive weapons in the disputed areas; (b) a declaration of no-first-use of force in a conflict situation; and (c) declaration of a non-provocative defensive posture in sensitive border areas.

The techniques of CBMs also have practiced between Nicaragua and the US. During 1984 and up to the 5th of September 1984, both countries have met five times for bilateral talks in Mexico, in search of a direct dialogue

between both countries in order to normalize their relations, halt the spread of hostilities, remove or substantially reduce the traffic in arms from their territories to the territory of a third party, stop subversive activities in the area and establish conditions for a modus-vivendi.

Among measures which could contribute to reducing tension, suspicion, fear and mistrust felt by Cuba towards the US resulting from US policy in the Caribbean area, the following CBMs could be applied: (a) at least 21 days' prior notification of naval and air maneuvers involving the Guantanamo base; (b) improvement of communications between Cuba and the US (c) regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making; (d) limitation on certain military activities and movements beyond Cuban territorial waters by both parties; (e) refraining from inciting or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries of Central America and the Caribbean; and (f) a declaration by the US of no-first-use of force against Cuba, and that it will not threaten the territorial integrity of Cuba.

Cuba, for its part, has declared that it is prepared to support a negotiated solution to the Central American crisis and to reduce or end its substantial military advisory presence in Nicaragua as part of an overall withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Central America. Cuba has also endorsed the Contadora process. Systematic US implementation of CBMs would at least test the sincerity of Cuban and Nicaraguan willingness to resolve the Central American conflicts peacefully.

All the countries of Central America and the Caribbean could agree not to deploy strategic or conventional combat forces anywhere in the region or to install facilities that would pose a threat to other states. Other general

CBM techniques for the whole region could be: (a) the reduction of the capabilities of the armed forces in the region to launch a pre-emptive first strike or a successful surprise attack; (b) prohibition of the introduction of new offensive or destabilizing weapons systems; and (c) a freeze on arms procurement.

CBMs themselves cannot resolve the basic causes of conflicts. In this sense, CBMs could be called instruments of "negative peace" which can only help to prevent a conflict, but do little about the roots of it. Therefore, CBMs should be combined with "positive peace" instruments which would deal with the underlying causes of conflicts: injustice, misery, underdevelopment, insecurity, human rights, refugees, and lack of democracy.

CBMs still do provide an important framework for negotiations and dialogue about concrete measures which could contribute in the short term towards the construction of a more secure political order in Central America and the Caribbean. CBMs do not imply an absence of political conflict or a convergence of political values and perspectives, which in fact make them especially appropriate for the conflict-prone subregion. Consequently, the potential role of CBMs to help defuse nascent crises, to reduce the escalatory risk inherent in crisis situations and to lessen regional tensions in general, could be applied to Central America and Caribbean tensions and could make an important contribution to peace and conflict resolution, if they are used in conjunction with other diplomatic and political approaches.

Conclusions

Latin American CBMs, to be effective, must be adapted to regional, subregional, and national peculiarities. Various levels and kinds of CBMs -- regional, subregional, functional, conflict-specific, declaratory, and action-oriented -- are accordingly required to help contain increasingly conflict-prone environments in both the Caribbean basin and South America. Varieties of CBMs can be targeted for containment of individual conflicts, and strategies linking CBMs can help dampen spill-over of specific conflicts. Otherwise, rising weaponry capabilities and continuing unresolved conflicts in both subregions are likely to make the entire region even more conflict-prone.

An effective CBM approach in Latin America must also take account of the intrusion of extra-regional states in regional conflicts and of increasing linkages between local conflicts. The net of CBMs accordingly must be cast wide in geographical terms in order to include all relevant actors, while at the same time attempting to lessen the involvement of non-contiguous states in local conflicts. The United States was traditionally able to cap or contain local conflicts through forceful policy initiatives, but increasingly complex, interlocking conflicts in both the Caribbean basin and South America have proved beyond the capability of the United States to control solely through unilateral measures. In the new context, it is therefore all the more important for the United States to throw its weight unequivocally behind a multilateral CBM approach in both subregions.

The key to the CBM approach is the verifiable and credible nature of the CBMs as well as the balance and symmetry of the measures taken by each side. Both adversaries must be able to monitor the non-aggressive steps taken by the

other before a further action is taken, particularly in the case of small adversaries with limited capabilities. At any time in the process there must be enough time and space available to permit rapid recovery of an adequate defensive posture if the adversary launches a surprise attack. At the same time, certain risks taken for peace can contribute to the peacekeeping momentum of CBMs. It is particularly incumbent on strong states to undertake unilateral and multilateral CBM initiatives -- that is, unilateral and multilateral concessions for peace, not unilateral imposition of will as before -- and for all states to risk taking some asymmetrical CBMs for the cause of peace.

The shortcomings of traditional, institutionalized conflict resolution techniques are dramatized by the current regional crisis. There is accordingly a pressing need for more informal, imaginative conflict resolution techniques throughout the region, of which CBMs are a prominent, if neglected, example. This is to not disparage traditional conflict resolution methods and institutions, but rather to emphasize the need for new techniques and approaches to complement them. At the same time, this complementary role of CBMs should not be construed narrowly. CBMs should not be regarded solely as instrumentalities for handling contingent military problems, even though they can play a front-line role in helping curb regional militarization. More fundamentally, CBMs should deal as well with the setting of the current regional crisis -- heightened political mistrust and unresolved political conflicts. Mistrust is one of the most powerful driving forces behind the contemporary military build-up, so that rebuilding a general environment of trust in Latin America must precede lasting solutions which deal with

underlying causes of conflicts. Building mutual confidence could substantially improve relations between regional states, thereby promoting peaceful settlement of the conflicts and gradual regional disarmament.

NOTES

1. Morris, Michael A. and Millán, Victor (eds.), Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983). See especially, Approach 3: Controlling Conflict through Confidence-Building Measures, Victor Millán, "Regional Confidence-Building in the Military Field: The Case of Latin America," pp. 89-97; and Approach 10: Controlling Conflicts through Consensus-Building, Michael A. Morris, "Equity and Freedom in U.S.-Latin American Relations," pp. 215-244.

2. Barros, Alexandre de S.C., "Confidence-Building Measures in South America: Some Notes on Opportunities and Needs," in Kaiser, Karl (ed.), Confidence-Building Measures (Forschungsinstitut Der Deutschen Gesellschaft Fur Auswartige Politik E.V., Argeitspapiere Zur Internationalen Politik 28, Bonn, FRG, 1983), pp. 185-200.

3. World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (Taylor and Francis, London, 1984), p. 122.

4. Ibid., p. 130.

5. Ken Nolde, "Arms, Arms Manufacturing, and Arms Limitations in Latin America," a paper presented for the Joint LASA-MALAS meeting, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, October 17-19, 1980, pp. 7-8.

6. UN Security Council S/16041, 18 October 1983.

7. United Nations, Security Council, S/16633 of 26 June 1984.

8. El País, 23 September 1984.

9. United Nations, General Assembly A/39/268 and Security Council S/16577 of 22 May 1984.

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THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

by

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17 September 1984

All statements in this paper are the responsibility of the author only and do not reflect the views or opinions of any other individuals or organizations.

The Impact of the International Environment

On Confidence Building Measures

The term "Confidence Building Measures" can mean many things and therefore what is understood by that phrase for the purposes of this paper should be stated at the outset. It can be argued with justification that measures to exchange scholars, to consult about boundary disputes, to promote trade and a whole host of other topics build confidence among states. The validity of such an argument is accepted without qualification but here the term will be considered exclusively in a military context. Second, it is a fact that confidence building measures can and do exist within other arms control endeavours both independently and as part of verification provisions. Their existence within instruments of arms control is inevitable because in many areas the core of verification is the provision of information by signatories to one another and the corroboration by each of information acquired. And, of course, the essence of many confidence building measures is an undertaking to make known certain military activities. However the remarks which follow are cast in a context of confidence building measures separate from other arms control endeavours because the question to be addressed here concerns the impact of the international environment on those measures rather than its impact on the broader topic of arms control. Finally, and perhaps more contentiously, the approach in this paper is that confidence building measures are essentially a regional matter. Certainly a global agreement among all members of the United Nations to disclose their military expenditures in that forum would be a measure of considerable significance but the interest of states in figures tabled would be selective and more often than not would reflect a regional interest. That observation would probably be valid for any universally agreed confidence building measure. That said, the question of defining a "region" will be unabashedly

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side-stepped. Central America is obviously a region but a good case could be made that another region could extend from the northern tip of the United Kingdom to the southern tip of Argentina. But to attempt a refinement of the term here would be a diversion from the central issue.

What, then, of the impact of the international environment on confidence building measures? In an ideal world government leaders and decision makers would perceive that arms build ups were no longer unqualified rational policy choices in our modern times. All would therefore enter into negotiations in a perfect good faith to limit and reduce armaments of all kinds. In such an ideal world there would be good will on all sides of a negotiating table, the substance of proposals made would reflect a partnership effort, and the desire for mutual benefit from arms reductions would be perceived and acted upon as such by each negotiating party. Confidence building measures would be seen at best as adjuncts to substantive measures; at worst as frivolous diversions from the central issues of serious concern and effort.

Our contemporary interest in confidence building measures for their own sake is thus a reflection of the world situation as it is: a world in which the intrinsic merit of arms reduction can be acknowledged in the abstract but the realities of international relationships are such that the military alternative either for use or evidence of preparedness to use remains a prime instrument of policy. These observations enable discernment of one distinction between measures of arms control or reduction and measures of confidence building: arms control that enhances security is in and of itself a goal; confidence building measures can also be goals but they can also demonstrate a desire to foster an international climate in such a way

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as to enhance the prospects for other goals. Additionally, they can emerge from a practical need or from a perceived political need, which can be quite apart and distinct from the intrinsic merit of arms control or limitation per se.

To examine the validity of the foregoing assertion it is useful to juxtapose the state of international relations with efforts aimed at the development of confidence building measures and attempt to identify the extent to which a "need" existed or failed to exist. This task can be undertaken both in the abstract and empirically.

Relations among two or more states at any particular moment can be characterized as falling somewhere within a continuum that extends from open warfare to total harmony and the closer states are to the perfect harmony end of the spectrum the less role have confidence building measures to play. It would be absurd for, say, the Netherlands and Belgium to undertake negotiation of a new regime of confidence building measures between themselves. This is not to say, however, that measures negotiated at another time would necessarily be abandoned: the USA and Canada still formally notify one another of naval warships entering the Great Lakes in accordance with the terms of an agreement between them signed in 1817 that ended their war of 1812. That measure might be termed a classic of the same kind as those introduced within the terms of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of March 1979, i.e. measures that were agreed at a time of cessation of hostilities to provide assurance that terms and conditions were being honoured in good faith, to enable an understanding of strategic intentions, and to lessen danger of what has been termed "misescalation".* The reasons why there was

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* See Yair Evron: "Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Proposals and Their Confidence Building Roles"; Adelphi Paper number 138.

a perceived need for such measures at such a time are self-evident.*

But what of the almost infinite range of relationships that can exist among states who have neither just ended hostilities nor are in close harmony with one another? It is evident that states ought to appreciate the usefulness of confidence building measures when friction and tensions exist among them but such a perception of intrinsic merit is often insufficient to become a perceived need to take appropriate action. (As will be mentioned later, however, such restraint may not always be unwise). Perhaps the best way to discern the impact of the international environment and identify any perceived need in this array of circumstances is to select certain case histories and examine them. In the post-World War II period three such cases can be selected: the abortive conference of 1958 to prevent surprise attacks; the nascent but seemingly dormant step that was embodied in the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974; the successful Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Final Act of which was signed in 1975. In addition, some consideration can usefully be given to other events in the CSCE process as well as, briefly, to the recently concluded United States-Soviet Union agreement to modernize their so-called "hot line link".

"The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack" lasted only six weeks, from 10 November to 18 December 1958. It then recessed but has never reconvened. There were ten participating states: five Western powers led by the United States, and five members of the Soviet bloc led by the Soviet Union. It was convened at a time when the East-West dialogue was resuming after having

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* The usefulness of confidence building measures on cessation of hostilities was recognized in the 1981 United Nations study of the subject. Interestingly, that study noted, inter alia, a potential opportunity when peacekeeping forces are introduced into a region. See Report of the Secretary General, document A/36/474 of 6 October 1981, pages 15-16.

come to an abrupt halt in the wake of the invasion of Hungary in November of 1956: small, cautious steps toward cooperation were taken late in 1957 and developed throughout 1958. These began in the fields of trade, science and culture but then moved forward into mutual exploration of security issues, notably the possibility of a German peace treaty and a ban on nuclear weapons tests. It would appear that by tacit agreement adverse events were isolated from the ripening dialogue. To cite but two examples, in June of 1958 former Hungarian leaders were tried and executed and the following month United States troops intervened in the Lebanon crisis of that year. But throughout 1958 there was a generally constructive exchange of correspondence concerning the modalities and agenda of a possible East-West summit meeting to discuss, inter alia, relaxation of tension, and as mentioned another separate exchange on means to halt nuclear testing. The latter resulted in the convening of a conference of experts in July.

The stark reality of the military confrontation in all its dimensions remained, however, and so the adequate - if not quite propitious - political climate enabled a perception of the potential usefulness of holding a conference on measures to diminish the possibility of surprise attack or at least to reduce the element of surprise in such an attack. In the exchange of correspondence that lead up to the conference the sides were able to reach agreement that it would be of a technical nature but agreement ended there. The Soviet Union made it clear that it did not want extensive inspection of its territory because this would diminish its security but that it did want, in addition to surprise attack measures, steps leading to disarmament. The United States demurred on both counts. A few weeks before the agreed starting date each side presented its definition of the purpose of the meeting. These differed significantly, reflecting the earlier disagreement. Then, a few days before convening, each side presented its draft agenda and these, if anything, demonstrated that the gap had widened considerably.

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The conference opened without an agenda and, not surprisingly, it failed to reach any agreement. The six Western papers that were tabled included a caveat that their substance did not constitute a proposal and that they should not be seen as suggesting full implementation of every measure discussed. The essence of the papers was a technical description of a sweeping system of thorough inspection of aircraft and airfields, missile sites and ground forces, the inspections to be carried out from the air and on the ground. The caveat notwithstanding, those papers must surely have alarmed the Soviets. Eastern papers accepted the notion of ground and air inspection as well as the institution of observation posts including some on Soviet territory. Opportunities for inspection would be very much less than those in the Western positions, however, but perhaps even more significantly the Soviet Union also proposed conventional troop reductions in Central Europe and a ban on weapons of mass destruction in the two Germanies.

This description of proceedings at the conference itself can end at this point because there were no further noteworthy developments: no serious attempts were made to bridge the gaps despite the appearance here and there of some discrete areas of possible reconciliation. Those areas might today be seen as singularly important confidence building measures, e.g., even a few jointly manned observation posts or even the most modest measure of inspection. Instead the two sides agreed without rancour to recess the technical conference and report to their respective political authorities with a view towards a further, political effort. No such joint effort was made, at least not directly, but as a footnote it might be observed that this short conference was not entirely without benefit. In addition to the increased understanding each side gained about the preoccupations of the other the East was made to realize that the West would not accept the

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singling out of its German ally for special treatment as a particular zone in Central Europe and that understanding may have contributed to the agreement reached in 1973 concerning the area to be covered by any MBFR regime. For the West the lesson was that sweeping measures of inspection independent of an arms reduction agreement would not be negotiated; that lesson may have been influential when the Western powers formulated their vastly more modest confidence building proposals for the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - the CSCE.

There were no particular international events outside the conference during the few short weeks of its existence that could have had a bearing on its outcome. In a better climate a further effort might have been made or a commitment to reconvene might have been undertaken before the recess. In a worse climate the conference would not have been held at all, in all probability, and this small step toward what eventually emerged as the CSCE would not have been taken. The failure to agree can be ascribed only to a lack of understanding on both sides as to what could be tolerated by the other, a misperception that was evident in the exchanges of correspondence that preceded the convening of the conference and which carried forward into the substance of the dialogue at the negotiating table.

The Declaration of Ayacucho was signed by eight* Latin American states in December 1974. The text of the declaration is quintessentially political but it also contained an undertaking "to create the conditions which will make possible the effective limitation of armaments and an end to their acquisition for offensive purposes, so that all possible resources may be devoted to the economic and social development of every country in Latin America". The first part of this excerpt - to create conditions - was a

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* Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Venezuela

clear call for confidence building measures and the last part of the quotation reflected the motive of the convenor of the conference, Peru, to save money for non-military purposes, having spent heavily on major military equipment acquisitions the previous year. Parenthetically, one might speculate whether that same military build up gave rise to a perceived need to take a balancing political initiative of a peaceful nature to reassure neighbours.

In any case, Ayacucho can be viewed as part of a process in Latin America whose high-water mark came in 1967 in the form of the Treaty of Tlatelolco concerning nuclear weapons in the region. In that same year the Declaration of Punta del Este included a stated multilateral intention to avoid unnecessary military expenditures. Steps toward increased multilateral cooperation, mostly in matters of trade, were taken in 1973 and 1974. These continued after the Declaration of Ayacucho was signed but no formal advances on the military commitment have been taken other than occasional reiterations of intent. Indeed, since Ayacucho the signatories have significantly increased their military expenditures* despite several consultative meetings held for the purpose of translating the political undertaking into concrete measures. Why is this so? It would be diversionary in this paper to deal with discrete circumstances that may exist among particular Ayacucho signatories from time to time but two generalizations can be set out for consideration.

The first, which is admittedly readily apparent, is that the international environment in the region simply has been such that states perceived a greater need for increasing their military preparedness than for the development of confidence building measures. Disputes between Argentina and Chile are but one example. Moreover, in some countries domestic circumstances

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* See "Controlling Latin American Conflicts" edited by Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan; Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado; 1983; pp. 170-172.

have been such that for internal purposes alone governments may well not have wished to enter into any regime that could curtail full freedom of military reaction to events.

The second possible factor is more subtle and, although speculative, it does serve to demonstrate that at certain stages of international relations the formal negotiation of confidence building measures can be considered by some as being potentially counter productive. During the course of preparing this paper I had an opportunity to raise the subject of confidence building measures with a senior official of a prominent country in Africa. In response to my query he expressed skepticism about the usefulness of attempting to develop a system of measures in the region of his country. He observed that trans-border relationships were evolving on a pragmatic basis at the working level between individuals. Examples were members of police forces who were becoming accustomed to cooperating with one another on a day to day basis as were customs officials. Contacts between military persons were also increasing and in his view an attempt to formalize such developing relationships or to advance prematurely into other areas could well impede the evolutionary process. Be that as it may, it is indeed a fact in Latin America that notwithstanding the lack of formal arrangements arising from Ayacucho military activities of a confidence building nature do indeed take place. Joint manoeuvres of forces on land and at sea are held with some frequency, foreign observers have been invited to national exercises, and naval visits are not uncommon.

It is a matter of judgement whether informal evolutionary steps would necessarily be jeopardized by more structured efforts to develop obligations and parameters for the execution of such obligations. It does seem evident, though, that in the absence of any mutually agreed structure informal cooperative activities are much more sensitive to even temporary set backs

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in the climate of relationships between states in a region than would otherwise be the case. The continuing observance of agreed measures between East and West in Europe despite the worsening situation in that area would appear to demonstrate this fact.

As others will be dealing with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at some length I do not wish to go into its substance here. It would be appropriate in this paper, however, to cast the CSCE process against its international backdrop thereby placing the confidence building measures to which it gave birth in their political context and enabling an examination of the impact of the international environment.

The multilateral preliminary talks aimed at convening a Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe opened in Helsinki in November 1972, attended by neutral and non-aligned European states as well as members of the two military alliances. The Soviet Union had issued various calls for an "all European security conference" from the 1950's onward. States belonging to NATO had long been reluctant to venture into a pan-European political dialogue but domestic pressures to reduce troop strengths in Europe slowly increased to a point where there was a perceived need to act and negotiated, mutual reductions as distinct from unilateral steps became highly desirable. The trade-off was apparent and in 1971 the Soviet Union signalled its willingness to consider separate bloc to bloc arms reduction negotiations. Not by accident, then, exploratory talks that led to what we now know as MBFR* opened in Vienna a few weeks after those in Helsinki.

The international environment was certainly propitious as the early

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* For reasons that need not be gone into here the term "MBFR" is in fact a misnomer, being Western shorthand for the agreed official name of the conference, "Mutual Reduction of Forces & Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe".

seventies were marked by a series of positive events in the field of East-West relations. In 1971 the Seabed Treaty was signed, the four power agreement on Berlin was reached, and the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. In 1972 the crowning achievement was SALT I.

The agenda for the CSCE was negotiated during the winter and spring of 1972-73. It constituted a complex and extensive set of topics including those that reflected the goals of the two major political schools of thought that were represented among the participants: internationally accepted humanitarian provisions sought by the West and recognition of post World War II frontiers sought by the East. But a conference in whose very title the word "security" appeared could hardly overlook the military dimension and this need was recognized on all sides. Moreover it was also widely accepted that the CSCE, as a political forum, could not itself negotiate arms reductions particularly in light of the coincident commencement of negotiations between the two major military alliances in Europe aimed at precisely that goal. Confidence building measures therefore had a felicitous place on the agenda. The intrinsic value of such measures would probably not of itself have been sufficient to induce the parties to negotiate them if the more fundamental desiderata just mentioned did not exist, particularly because of the advent of the separate arms reduction negotiations. But the need for some sort of military dimension within the agenda could not be refuted - nor did anyone attempt to do so. And as the climate of detente extended through the 1973-75 negotiating period - notwithstanding a direct United States - Soviet Union confrontation over the Yom Kippur war - an across the board agreement was reached including a modest package of confidence building measures. Significantly, though, that topic was the last item on the agenda to be negotiated to a conclusion.

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The East-West international climate had changed when the signatories met in Belgrade in October, 1977 to review the implementation of the Final Act and to attempt to move the CSCE process forward. True, the United States and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions in 1976 and shortly before the Belgrade meeting the two superpowers had both unilaterally declared their intention to abide by the terms of SALT I even though it formally expired 3 October. But the dominating factor since the Final Act had been signed at summit level in 1975 was the advent of the Carter presidency as a result of the United States elections held in November 1976. The new administration promptly nailed its colours to the mast of human rights and sailed into action. In Belgrade an acrimonious debate about compliance with humanitarian provisions within the Final Act overwhelmed other subjects. An orderly debate about confidence building measures did take place and proposals were tabled to develop existing provisions further, but no agreement was reached on this or any other topic on the agenda other than to meet again in Madrid in 1980. The perceived need to reach agreement extended no further than that. A need to improve the existing measures was certainly made evident in the course of the debate reviewing implementation but in the absence of an overall conference dynamic there was never any real prospect of successful negotiaton.*

The Belgrade meeting ended in March 1978 and in the thirty two months that elapsed before the next meeting of the signatories in Madrid a number of dramatic events took place. Most of those were of a nature to suggest that if there is an impact on negotiations arising from the international environment, then it would be highly unlikely that any advance on existing confidence building measures could be agreed at Madrid. Positive developments such as the Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting in mid 1979 with its attendant

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* An account of the military aspects of the Belgrade Review Meeting may be found in the IISS journal "Survival", Volume XX, Number 4, July/August 1978.

signing of SALT II and the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament the previous year were more than offset by other events: in 1978, dissident trials in the Soviet Union gave rise in the West to the suspension of a range of East-West cooperative arrangements; in 1979 the NATO two-track decision to proceed with INF deployment and negotiation touched off a major propaganda battle and, having by far the greatest effect on the international environment, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan precipitated the breakdown of a number of formal arrangements, not least of which was its contribution to the refusal of the United States to ratify SALT II.

During the course of the 34 month meeting in Madrid the environment was scarcely more propitious. True, negotiations had begun on both intermediate range nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear arms but in almost every other area superpower acrimony increased as did the military build up. Major events such as upheaval in Poland and the stark consequences of the shooting down of the Korean airliner in September 1983 were of a profoundly negative character. In the conference itself the human rights issue was again a bitter topic but the other adverse events just mentioned also found their place in the debate.

How, then, was it possible for all parties to reach agreement on a mandate for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe* charged with undertaking "new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security....."? There is seldom, if ever, a single simple clear explanation for any development of this nature and that observation is particularly valid when the area under discussion is arms control. In this instance one could speculate - but only speculate - on subtle motivations that may have been influential on both sides. In the Soviet case the

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* This is again a misnomer but it is popular usage. The correct name for the CDE is the Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

consistency of a long term and long standing strategy aimed at a pan-European security system probably played a role and perhaps there was a desire to demonstrate that the Brezhnev peace programme remained a cornerstone of foreign policy notwithstanding the stark events of recent times. The United States may have wished to demonstrate that it was indeed possible to do arms control business with the Reagan administration and reach agreements. As will be discussed below the United States may also have been influenced by a desire to accommodate its allies if at all possible.

Such speculations could go on at some length and in considerable depth but it is possible to adduce a more direct and concrete reason only incidentally related to the international environment. That reason is that from the time the conference opened all parties already had a considerable political investment in finding common ground for a CDE mandate. At the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 the French proposed that such a conference be convened. They then skillfully elicited significant support for the initiative among their allies. Similarly, calls had emanated from Eastern Europe states over a number of years for some form of European security conference. Thus within a few weeks of the opening of the Madrid meeting France tabled its proposal with the support of its friends, Poland did the same, and the neutral and non-aligned states, led by Yugoslavia, wisely ensured through the medium of a third proposal that it would be politically difficult for any faction to turn away from the effort to find common ground. Their prescience in this regard was amply demonstrated when the influence of outside events even so jarring as the Korean Airlines tragedy failed to prevent accord being reached. Thus the negative impact of the international environment was seemingly offset by internal dynamics at the meeting itself.

And so the Stockholm conference convened in 1983 and it is of course

too soon to attempt any appraisal of progress. If the notion of perceived need as distinct from intrinsic merit is valid one can search the future to identify a need that could cause the parties to come to an agreement. Any event in the near term such as the USA elections this fall would be too proximate to give negotiators the time needed to hammer out the details of an agreement even if major breakthroughs could be accomplished. If those elections resulted in a change in administration, however, the two superpowers could perceive a mutual interest in changing the present climate and select Stockholm as the locale for doing so. But the availability of other more felicitous venues such as the resumption of bilateral negotiations in any one or more of a range of subject areas makes the CDE an unlikely candidate.

A more probable event is the next CSCE review meeting which will convene in Vienna in late 1986. There the parties will have to report on the Stockholm negotiations and it is reasonable to assume that strenuous efforts will be made in the immediately preceding months to reach some sort of an accord. Up to this point this paper has contemplated how the international environment impacts on confidence building measures but the relationship between the Stockholm negotiations and the Vienna Review Meeting reverses that relationship. The report from Stockholm will probably be the centrepiece in Vienna and a positive report should induce a felicitous political atmosphere that would be reflected in other areas of the meeting's deliberations. The converse is also, unfortunately, true and a negative report could spark off a fault-finding debate that might otherwise have been avoided at least insofar as the military aspect of the agenda is concerned.

As a final illustration of a development in the field of confidence building brief mention should be made of the new hot line modernization agreement that was reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in

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July of this year. As reported in the International Herald Tribune editions of 14-15 July and 18 July a senior administration official characterized that agreement as being "in the area of confidence building measures" and one reporter - Leslie Gelb - asserted that "the Reagan administration will use the increased activity to argue that the Soviet leaders will work with it, contrary to Democratic accusations". Thus it is again demonstrated that confidence building measures can be agreed at a time of remarkably little mutual trust, perhaps as a surrogate for more substantive arms control progress, and that extraneous events such as the Democratic party's accusations during the present election campaign can bring about the perception of need.

It is not an easy task to draw conclusions concerning what impact the international environment has on confidence building measures because the foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the climate of relationships can be a positive influence, a negative influence or can lack sufficient impact to exert a dominant influence. The paradox is intensified by the fact that confidence building measures themselves impact on the international environment, a theme that has been cautiously skirted if not avoided entirely in this paper.

Perhaps the clearest example of positive impact is one mentioned only briefly at the outset of this discussion: the circumstances existing when hostilities are drawn to a close by agreement between adversaries. Another might be the positive impact of the development of a climate of detente as existed in East-West relations in the early 1970's. A negative impact appears to emerge from the discussion of the efforts of the Ayacucho signatories. The desire of at least some of them to retain full freedom for military activities has so far negated the potential to advance the

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Ayacucho process. The state of relationships in that region could hardly be described as severe to the degree that exists in the Middle East, for example, but it has nevertheless been such as to exert a negative influence. A lack of impact one way or another seems to be indicated by the success of the Madrid meeting notwithstanding the adverse climate of relationships. Similarly, the collapse of the Surprise Attack conference can be ascribed more to a conflict between the participants as to what they were to address than to any outside influence.

What seems clear, though, is that there is no apparent place in the continuum of international relationships where one can conveniently plug in confidence building measures: they can be successfully introduced when the climate is felicitous and when it is not, and efforts can fail at any point. Rarely does it seem possible for states to agree to enter into a regime of independent military confidence building measures for their own sake, an observation which, if valid, does not bode well for Stockholm. They are often a tag-along in more broadly based undertakings such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or surrogates for more substantial arms control progress. Successful efforts frequently result from these or other outside stimuli: the perceived need seems rarely to be intrinsic. These observations make it possible to close this discussion by pointing toward a theme for further exploration: are there events in international relations when efforts toward confidence building measures could be artificially stimulated in the sense that was mentioned in the United Nations study footnoted earlier in this paper, that is, to link the introduction of peace-keeping troops to confidence building efforts? When members of regional organizations meet for other purposes is the issuance of the inevitable communiqué an opportunity to introduce a political statement of intention to explore the possibility of developing confidence building measures? The Declaration of Ayacucho could some day be seen as the first

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of further steps toward a regime in Latin America. Confidence building measures already in place in Europe and the Middle East could well emerge elsewhere and if the means of furthering such a development is to link that possibility to other events, then so be it.