NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF
## European American Institute for security research
Napoli, 21-23/IX/1981

21 Sept 81

Agenda

Workshop on
"NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
THE PERSIAN GULF"
NATO Headquarters
Naples, Italy
21-23 September 1981

9:00 a.m. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

    Session Chairman: Kenneth Hunt

1. Admiral William J. Crowe

    Welcome

2. Albert Wohlstetter

    On the Nature of the Workshop

3. The Honorable Rolf F. Pauls

    (1) "The Underestimated Threat: A Few Theses for Discussion"

4. P. J. Vatikiotis

    (2) "Remarks on the Politics of the Region: The Changing
    Balance in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East"

12:30 p.m. - LUNCH - ALLIED OFFICERS CLUB

2:00 p.m. - Second Session Chairman: Fred S. Hoffman

1. Albert Wohlstetter

    (3) "Ambiguous Threats to NATO and the Multiple Use of
    NATO's Southern Flank"

2. Maurizio Cremasco

    (4) "Military Options for the Security of the Southern Flank" |A|

Background Papers for Day One:(5)Seyfi Tashan, "Persian Gulf Security:
                              A Turkish View"
                      (6)Maurizio Cremasco, "Alliance Options for|A|
                        Persian Gulf Security"
             (7)Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat
             in the Persian Gulf"

5:00 p.m. - ADJOURNMENT

6:30 p.m. - NATO BUS RETURNS FOR TRANSPORTATION TO 7:00 reception
        at Italian Air Force Academy

Agenda

9:00 a.m.   TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22

Morning Session Chairman: James Digby

1. Brigadier General Thomas Kelly

    "NATO: The View from Naples"

2. Erik Klippenberg:

    "NATO's Southern Region, the Mediterranean and the
    Persian Gulf: Problems of Command and Control"

12:00 p.m. - LUNCH - ALLIED OFFICERS CLUB

1:30 p.m. - Second Session Chairman:- Jean-Marie Guehenno

1. Ali Karaosmanoglu

    "Turkey's Role in NATO"

2. Paul Olsen

    "Some Considerations in Designing a Strategy for NATO's
    Southeastern Flank"

3. Panel Discussion.

    "NATO's Policy in the Southern Flank"

    Panelists: Wolfgang Altenburg
                 Tønne Huitfeldt
                 Kenneth Hunt
                 Albert Wohlstetter

Background Papers for Day Two: William R. Graham, "Reducing the
                                 Vulnerability of Retaliatory Forces
                                 and Command, Control and Communi-
                                 cations: A Question of Balance:

5:00 p.m. - ADJOURNMENT

**7:30 p.m. - NATO BUS RETURNS FOR TRANSPORTATION TO 8:00 p.m.
reception at Villa Nike**

Agenda

9:00 a.m.   WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23

      Session Chairman: Albert Wohlstetter

(13) 1. Roberto Aliboni

      "On Dealing with Libya" lA\

(14) 2. Paul Henze

      "Goal: Destabilization -- Soviet Agitational Propaganda,
      Instability and Terrorism in NATO South"

12:00 p.m. - WORKSHOP ADJOURNS

12:15 p.m. - LUNCH - ALLIED OFFICERS CLUB   (tentative)

Final Participant List

Workshop on
"NATO's Southern Flank, the Mediterranean and
the Persian Gulf"
NATO Headquarters
Naples, Italy
21-23 September 1981

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*After 1 October 1981: Director of International Military Staff (IMS)
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THE UNDERESTIMATED THREAT:
A Few Theses for Discussion

Rolf Friedemann Pauls

August 1981

1. THE NATO AREA

During the seventies, the security situation of the NATO area worsened and has continued to do so up to the present time. The policy of détente has been unable to make peace more secure because the Soviet Union has made use of this period for carrying out a crash program of nuclear and conventional armaments on the ground, at sea and in the air. As a result, the military balance has continually worsened, to the detriment of the West.

Nevertheless, security along NATO's front can be ensured in the future if the allies implement the assurances given by them in the Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP), especially Part X, which deals with nuclear matters. The status of implementation of the LTDP is known. Security can be maintained if the allied governments show solidarity in the policies pursued by them, thus depriving the Soviet Union of the hope of being able to split the Alliance. On 12 December 1979, the Alliance showed verbal solidarity in taking its basic decision; it has been less than united as far as the operational part of that decision is concerned, i.e. actual deployment. There has been no improvement since then.

Security can be ensured if the United States remains present in Europe because what the Soviet Union fears most is a direct collision with the United States. This has been true to this day. Over the medium and long term, continued American presence in Europe is inseparably linked with the Alliance solidarity shown by the European members of NATO. In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany has a key role to play.

Western security would be put at its greatest risk if the willingness for voluntary capitulation, which carries the title of "peace movement",

should become a decisive political decision-making factor in the European countries.

No American president would be able to keep forces stationed in Western Europe if the latter creates the impression of having given itself up. Europe is seriously threatened by its own wishful thinking, which is being propagated even by politicians who want to be taken seriously.

A direct Soviet military attack on Western Europe is not very probable either today or in the foreseeable future because the political and military risks which the Soviet Union would run are still too great. However, if the disintegration of the Alliance should go on, there will be a growing danger of attempts at political blackmail by means of military threats-- not against NATO as a whole, but against individual members of it. This danger may be further increased by internal turbulences in the Soviet bloc, for example in connection with the question of succession to the present generation of leaders. Most European governments and parliaments do not convey the impression that they are sufficiently aware of these risks.

2. THREATS FROM OUTSIDE

As serious as the security situation of the direct East-West confrontation may be, the greater danger to Western security emanates from regions far away from the Alliance area. Wherever unstable conditions make expansion possible, the Soviets pursue an expansionist policy. The Soviet Union fears encirclement by NATO and by American cooperation with China and Japan. She is trying to break out of this encirclement--or what she regards as such--or to flank it out. Whether or not she has a master plan, the systematic exploitation of opportunities as they offer themselves also

represents a kind of master plan.

Thus, she has gained a foothold in southern Africa, in east Africa—first with Somalia against Ethiopia, then with Ethiopia against Somalia—and in South Yemen in the Arab Peninsula, which may be the Soviet position which is the most dangerous one for the West. In addition, she is present in Vietnam and Cambodia. She invaded and occupied Afghanistan. These strategic gains and the build-up of a strong navy capable of operating on the high seas increasingly threaten Western access to the sources of raw material which are vital to Western survival.

A. The Conflict in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia

Soviet policy in these two regions serves the purpose of exerting an influence on the Israeli-Arab conflict by giving support to the militant Arab forces, and of exerting north-south pressure in the direction of the Indian Ocean. The major part of the Arab world regards Israel as the main enemy, not the Soviet Union. The Israeli threat is felt to be more acute. Kabul has not been able to replace Jerusalem in the order of priorities of Arab policy. The Israeli government is doing a lot to confirm this impression. It should be an urgent Western interest to bring about a change by exerting a corresponding Western influence on Israel and on those Arab countries which may be receptive to it. However, this will be impossible as long as there is no concerted Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian policy of the Western governments.

The Middle Eastern conflict cannot be solved in the foreseeable future. Solutions of this kind can only be attempted by a consistent continuation of the process started by Camp David. This requires a

common policy between the United States and Western Europe—which does not exist. The Europeans leave the Americans in the lurch—they even interfere with their efforts, being ignorant of what is necessary. The Western industrialized nations have a two-fold interest in this region:

(a) They need broadly-based industrial, technological and financial cooperation with the Arab oil-producing countries, which cannot be achieved in the absence of a solid political basis. For this purpose, the Middle Eastern conflict must at least be brought under control, which in turn requires Israeli restraint. This would serve Israel's security interests better than the present actionism. Israel's security situation has been greatly improved by Camp David, but Egypt will not be able to maintain this policy for an unlimited period unless further convincing progress is made in this way.

(b) The West needs a sufficiently strong Israel which pursues a policy of self-restraint. Even hostility towards Israel has been unable to unify the Arabs. Let us imagine for a moment that there would be a power vacuum instead of Israel and its corrective function— internecine warfare between Arabs would be inevitable. The so-called progressive Arabs would attack the so-called conservative ones. Perhaps some progressive ones would even attack other progressive Arabs, because deeply-rooted animosities exist among them as well. The whole Middle East and its adjacent regions would be precipitated into chaos, would go up in flames like Abadan and Khorramshar, with all its catastrophic consequences for us.

B. Afghanistan-Iran

The Soviet Union would not have invaded Afghanistan had not Iran
first been lost as a factor of power and had American attention on the
Middle East not been absorbed by the Tehran hostage affair--an instructive
example of the danger of allowing a power vacuum to develop! After her
invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has moved 400 miles closer to
the Persian Gulf, can exercise a pincer movement around Iran also from
the east, has gained bases south of the Hindikush and is expanding them,
and is now only 300 miles away from the Strait of Hormuz, the nerve center
for Western oil supplies. The most important need at the present time
is effective logistical support of the Afghan freedom fighters. As long
as the Soviets are tied down by having to fight in Afghanistan, this
reduces the danger of their further advance in the direction of the Persian
Gulf. Once they are able to settle down peacefully in Afghanistan, this
danger will rapidly increase, probably by exploiting the irredentist
movement of the Baluchis in the Afghan-Iran-Pakistani triangle.

The central parts of Iran are inhabited by Iranians, while its
border regions are populated by a variety of ethnic groups, such as the
Kurds, Armenians and Azerbeidjanis in the northwest, Turkomans in the
northeast, Baluchis in the southeast and Arabs in the southwest. Attempts
at secession are underway. If present developments should go on, the
state of Iran will be increasingly threatened by disintegration. This
would offer the Soviet Union a wide field for its operations. Moscow
would not fail to seek its advantages in such a situation.

However, it appears unlikely that the Soviet Union will try to
carry out a military thrust from north to south so as to reach the Persian

Gulf. Long supply routes, the dangerously exposed western flank towards Turkey and Iraq, and the need to occupy Tehran would make such an operation too risky. We have seen time and again that the Soviet leadership is very cautious in its operational concepts and plans.

C. Turkey

Since the first hours of consultations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--the first four-power talks in London--NATO has made the serious mistake of not involving Turkey fully in its deliberations. On the one hand, this ally, the only Islamic country of the Alliance, possesses inestimable experience and highly valuable contacts in this region. On the other hand, such treatment is bound to lower its importance in the eyes of the other Middle Eastern governments, which should be avoided. It violates Turkey's justified national pride--which is even worse--and estranges it from the Alliance.

The more confused the situation in Iran becomes and the more dangerous the situation in the Persian Gulf is threatening to be, the more important it is to support Turkey politically and militarily by all available means, and to help her, irrespective of the regime which is in power in Ankara. By taking over power in the country in 1980, the Turkish Generals did not destroy a functioning democratic system, but saved their country from complete anarchy and chaos after hesitating for almost too long. They deserve support which the West should make available in the interest of self-preservation. The more active economic help is given to Turkey--even if the results, for reasons beyond the scope of this text, remain modest--the more effectively the equipment and armament of the

Turkish forces is modernized, the more readily the Turkish leadership is involved in the political planning of the Western Middle Eastern policy--if we can speak of one--the more unlikely will Soviet adventures in the Middle East become. The opposite is, of course, also true. Turkey has a key role to play.

D. Arab Peninsula

The Arab Peninsula, and this is essentially Saudi Arabia, is menaced in two respects:

    (a)   internally by the questionable stability of its regimes, and

    (b)   externally by the Soviet positions in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

Whether or not these regimes are semi-feudal is not a matter for us to decide. The situation is too serious for any missionary zeal. The internal situation of all countries of the peninsula is dramatically endangered by the overriding role played by the Palestinians and their administrative and managerial intelligence and by the large number of foreign workers in their producing industries and the building trade. Whatever Western countries can do to help these governments in accordance with the wishes expressed by them and to enable them to help themselves should be done in our own interest, such as building up and training local police forces.

If the internal situation of these countries does not--in their own assessment--allow the stationing of foreign forces, this intention should be dropped, as desirable as such a step may appear from a purely military point of view. The internal Arab risks involved would be greater than the military advantages.

Saudi Arabia should be given every support in order to be able
to create, equip and train operational forces. This would not constitute
a threat to Israel. Saudi forces have not taken part in any of the
Middle Eastern wars. At best, they carried out some demonstrative moves
along their northwestern frontier. If the Saudis had such military units,
they would do everything but send them on long-distance expeditions to
the north. They would use them for protecting their frontier with Yemen,
and would deploy them around their major cities and for the protection of
their oilfields in the northeastern parts of the country, where they are
urgently needed.

E. Pakistan-India

When people in Pakistan woke up on the morning of 27 December 1979,
they found that they had overnight been blessed with a 1,000-mile long
military frontier with the Soviet Union, with which Pakistan had until
then no common frontier at all. True, this frontier runs for the most
part through inaccessible mountain areas. However, where it touches the
restless Pakistani province of Baluchistan, where the Pakistani central
government has never exercised full authority, this frontier runs through
a mostly level steppe.

What would happen if the Soviets, trying to suppress the Afghani
resistance once and for all, were to attack their operational bases
located on Pakistani territory and would even occupy Peshawar? The vast
majority of the Pakistani forces are at present deployed along the frontier
with India. Since 27 December 1979, the Western governments should have
taken coordinated diplomatic action to try to persuade India and Pakistan

to arrive at a relaxation of their mutal tension and to produce a basis

for a rapprochement. In view of the quality of Indian-American relations,

the Europeans have a particular task to solve.

The Indians, while not exactly restrained in their power politics,

will be too cautious to upgrade their common interest with the Soviet

Union in the further dismantling of Pakistan to an operational plot. But

what would happen if the Soviets got into an open conflict with Pakistan

over Afghanistan and if they indicated to New Delhi that they would resign

themselves to a solution of the Cashmir question by force, in the Indian

sense? It requires extraordinary skill to avoid this. If developments

should be allowed to run thus far, it would be too late.

F. China

Even if China can go on developing herself without a renewed inter-

ruption, she will need many more decades until she attains the rank of

the other two great powers in terms of her political, economic and mili-

tary freedom of action. The Sino-Soviet conflict is insoluble because

it is a power-political struggle for supremacy on the Asian continent.

and within the international communist movement, unless one of the two

conflicting parties voluntarily backs down, which neither of them is pre-

pared to do. Both are mutually hypnotized by the other.

China was unable to help her Pakistani friend in the Bengla Desh

war. Since then, she has constructed the Karakorum Highway, thus creating

a direct road link via northern Cashmir to Pakistan. Her 250-mile long

direct frontier with Afghanistan runs across 12,000-foot high mountains

without any passes or other possibility of communication. China is

highly interested in removing the Russians from Afghanistan and in pro-
viding support to Pakistan. No alliance treaties are required to be able
to cooperate closely with China.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In history, there are periods of rapid build-up and gain. We have
gone through such a period, coming from the catastrophe of the Second
World War, and have been able to shape it and organize it. And there are
periods in which what has been achieved has to be safeguarded and protected
unless we want to see it decay and fall to pieces. We are at present going
through such a period. If we realize this and do what is necessary, we
shall have clear sailing. If we neglect what is necessary, it may easily
happen that our claims are written into the winds of history--the old
claims as well as the new ones. The Russians will continue their expan-
sionist policy, Afghanistan will repeat itself, and our peace in freedom
will become less safe unless the continuation of this policy is made
risky for the Soviet Union herself.

Deterrence is in most cases seen in too military a light. The most
advanced front line of deterrence is practical political solidarity on
the part of the allies. This applies to the deterrent effect from West
to East for the protection of the Alliance area, and it must apply to the
defense against any outside danger to collective and individual security.

The Americans under President Reagan have understood this and are
drawing the necessary conclusions. The Europeans are having great diffi-
culty understanding this. It is, of course, extremely problematic to try
to adjust the political awareness of a population which is used to seeing

all its claims fulfilled to a situation fraught with danger. Because

this is so difficult and because there is widespread opposition to the

idea of making the required sacrifices, there is also a widespread lack

of courage to do what is necessary with consistency. Incidentally, I

personally believe that the politicians are underestimating the common

sense and the intelligence of their voters.

The Europeans must understand that, if they believe that they can

leave the Americans in the lurch in the defense against dangers threatening

from outside, the Alliance will lose its substance and meaning, with all

the catastrophic consequences, especially for Europe. As far as the

Europeans themselves are concerned, there is much more at stake--at least

with respect to the safeguarding of oil supplies--than for the United

States.

The overriding demand to be addressed to the allied governments

therefore has to be: political consultations are no longer sufficient.

Allied policies have to be coordinated vis-à-vis the countries of the

region concerned in the fields of general foreign and security policy,

economic and financial policy. This should be done by applying the

principle of division of labor because not everybody can do everything.

This does not require any new agreements or treaties. Since it cannot

be expected that all governments will meet this requirement, those among

them who are most able to act should start this cooperation at once,

pragmatically and in an "open-ended" way, the aim being to arrive at a

broadly-based political and economic cooperation with the threatened

countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, thus contributing to

their stability.

This would be a first step, but it is not sufficient to induce the Soviets to show restraint. This requires military arrangements. By maintaining their presence in the adjacent sea area of the Indian Ocean and by setting up the Mobile Deployment Force, the United States is on the right way, but it should not be left alone. European contributions in one form or the other are so important because they strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, because they show the Soviet Union and the countries of the region that we can act in concert with one another, and because they demonstrate to the American political public that the Europeans are determined to help their American ally to do what is necessary in the interest of us all.

We should keep our hands away from any attempt to modify the North Atlantic Treaty. The result of such an attempt would be catastrophic. Not all allies would be prepared to show solidarity in such a case. It is therefore once again up to those who are best able to act to make a beginning. The creation of a Mobile Force has the result that forces which have so far been assigned to the European theater will no longer be available for this purpose. Closing this gap should be a matter for all allies. For it would be a cardinal mistake to weaken NATO's European front in order to be stronger somewhere else. Europe has been safe because deterrence and defensive capability have been great enough to cause any potential aggressor to show abstinence. Weakening the defensive capability of the NATO area would lead to unacceptable risks.

The West does not have a choice between being ready inside or outside NATO. If the West wants to remain secure, it must do both.

This requires great efforts, and I know that raising these demands leads to despair of their realization. But it must be done to get as close as possible to this aim, and a start should be made now.

The more actively such military arrangements can be made and presented to the outside world, the less likely will further Soviet attacks become. The more disunited and disintegrated we show ourselves, the more we will encourage and provoke Soviet expansionism.

REMARKS ON THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN REGION

P. J. Vatikiotis
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What follows are alternative outlines for a consideration of the politics of the Middle Eastern region, on the basis of developments in the last ten years. Either could serve as a basis for discussion. The remarks contained in these outlines are intended to highlight general trends and developments. Moreover, they emphasize the regional and, only in passing, the international perspective and dimension. They do not constitute what one calls a paper; I believe enough papers have and are being written about the politics of the region. Ten years ago, I ventured a longer statement on the nature of conflict and changing balance in the region in my book Conflict in the Middle East (1971). In that, as well as in a lengthy piece, "Inter-Arab Relations," (in A.L. Udovitch, editor, The Middle East: Oil, Conflict and Hope, 1976), and subsequently in a short essay, "Regional Politics," (in G.S. Wise and C. Issawi, eds., Middle East Perspectives: the next twenty years, 1981), I hazarded certain projections which, even if I say so myself, are relevant today. I therefore refrain from composing yet another lengthy paper, since I have nothing novel or more exciting to say.

With these reservations, I offer for discussion my own view of the kind of challenge the Middle East region constitutes for NATO. Most of my remarks in outline form are confined to or focussed upon the complex problems that beset the region.

I propose five groups or categories of general considerations which I consider crucial to an understanding of the changing balance in the politics of the Middle East region:

1. The continued instability of regimes due to indigenous causes, shifting alignments and the greater involvement of the superpowers. This instability to a greater or lesser degree plagues practically all the states in the region; even Israel may not be immune from it. Thus at the beginning of this decade Lebanon had disintegrated, the Shah in Iran had been overthrown by an Islamic revolt, Turkey had been destabilized to the point that it elicited yet again the intervention of the military establishment. The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel sent the Arab states into further disarray, and allowed the further penetration of superpower influence in the region. Southwest Asia became a more prominent crisis area as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which also threatens security in the Gulf and the safety of oil supplies to the West. The Nixon Doctrine regarding the region died, and the subsequent Carter Doctrine was rendered inadequate.

2. The trends which now dominate the perceptions of regional politics are briefly: militant Islam, events in Iran, the widespread fear of further Soviet incursions in to the region, the Egypt-Israel treaty and its corollary of the Palestinian problem, or the Arab-Israel conflict; and the growth of US military presence or potential presence in certain parts of the region.

3. The more indigenous sources of potentially useful change or political disaster are, on the surface, of an economic and social nature: vast demographic change (rapid rates of population increase, including massive internal migration from country to town and labour migration to the rich oil-producing countries); rapid undigestible economic development in hopelessly undeveloped societies with dire social and political consequences; regional economic development (including problems of integration and disintegration) and its latent conflict-generating dichotomy of rich versus poor states; militant Islam and its corollary of sectarian-communal conflict as the problem of minorities acquires a momentum reminiscent of an earlier period in this century.

4. Border disputes, leadership and ideological rivalries constitute the basis of on-going regional conflicts over the Gulf (Iraq-Iran war), over the Fertile Crescent (Lebanon and the West Bank), over the Western Sahara (Polisario), over Northeast Africa (Libya versus Egypt and the Sudan; Eritrea); over South Arabia (South versus North Yemen with Saudi Arabia involved and a possible superpower confrontation); and the unresolved Arab-Israel conflict.

5. An unabated arms race which now carries the danger of regional nuclear proliferation.

The alternative outline, though similar in essence, comprises a somewhat different enumeration of considerations:

1. The salient feature of politics in the Middle East so far has been its endemic instability generated by local, regional and international conflict. The use of violence in the resolution of conflict has been a recurrent phenomenon. Despite efforts at modernization over several decades, the expected peaceful conduct of public affairs has not materialized. Recent rapid economic change has led to vast social dislocation and more violence. The most glaring example has been Iran. Other examples may soon follow.

2. Disputes over territory, as in the Arab-Israel conflict since 1947, or the civil war in Lebanon, or the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran have occasioned widespread violence and instability in the region. These in turn have affected the economic and political relations between states in the region and between them and other states in the world, especially over oil supplies, international trade and financial investments, ideological orientations and political alignments. But they have also brought to the fore new or old, though recurrent, sources of conflict which directly challenge legitimate rule, the presently constituted state structures and their institutions, in fact, the map of the region itself. Such are the sharpened

divisions of national identity and political loyalty
among ethnic, religious and sectarian communities in
several parts of the region--Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran
and even Egypt and Israel. These are exacerbated further
by the wave of militant Islamic revivalist movements.
The more active and forceful the latter become, the more
determined the search for autonomy by disaffected, terrified
minorities, and the more real the threat to the integrity
of existing states. Stated differently, autocratic regimes
which rely for their survival on sectional or communal
interests have enhanced the alienation of other groups,
leading them to sedition and conspiracy and, more recently,
to consider challenging the state and seeking their own
territorial autonomy. Among the means they resort to is
the organisation of communal paramilitary forces. Even
the militarily most successful state in the region, Israel,
seems to be succumbing to the dangerously fissiparious
effects of recurrent violent conflict. Such conflicts
tend to spill over state boundaries, divide and factionalize
national communities, and threaten to change the map of
some areas in the region. Thus Israel has been engaged in
map-changing since 1948; Syria and Israel, as well as other
interested parties, have been similarly engaged in the
Lebanon. Iraq has, unsuccessfully so far, attempted to do
the same at the head of the Gulf. Libya may be aspiring
to do the same in northeast Africa.

3. Money from oil, disparities in income and rates of
economic development, disagreement between states over
policy regarding local conflicts, regional alliances
and international alignments and preferences of ideological
orientation are all creating several regional loci of power
which generate further conflict.

4. The changes produced by the impact of oil wealth in
inter-Arab relations:
    a) an altered balance of power in favour of oil-rich
       states, the leading example being Saudi Arabia;
    b) oil wealth exercising a moderating influence on Arab
       ideological differences, emphasising interest in the
       relations between Arab states;
    c) oil wealth making the region more susceptible to
       foreign penetration since the region contains vast
       reserves of the most important strategic commodity
       of the century. The struggle for it in the eighties
       is already reflected in the Afghanistan episode and
       the turmoil in the Gulf
    d) geopolitical priorities have changed: the centre of
       political gravity has moved from the traditional sites
       in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt to the Arabian
       Peninsula, the Gulf and southwest Asia. The concern
       now is over energy supplies, and the safety of trans-
       port routes.
    Alas the balance of power is in favour of terribly rich
states which are however hopelessly weak in every other
respect.
    e) the Arab consensus of the fifties and sixties over
       a core of minimum panarab concerns, such as Arab unity
       and the Palestine Question, is now gone. Egypt is
       no longer the leader of the Arab world, and another

credible leader has yet to emerge. It is not
unlikely, of course, for Egypt to re-emerge in
the future as that leader again.
Much of this change is due to the 1967 and 1973
Arab-Israel wars, which devalued radical Arab
nationalism (Arabism) and socialism in favour of
state interest as the basis of cooperation and
solidarity among the Arab states. The Arab Cold
War of the fifties and early sixties is no more
and as a result regimes, albeit unstable, have
greater longevity. But, to borrow a colleague's
phrase, they are "fortress type regimes", in which
the system of power is based on family-kinship
solidarity (Syria, Iraq, Libya; or Saudi Arabia
and Jordan, which another colleague described as
trade unions of royal families)The old issues of
Arab unity and Israel are used as pretexts rather
than causes in their rivalry games.
Yet the moderation of ideological differences has
led paradoxically to radical stands by conservative
regimes. The best example is the Saudi dilemma.
Furthermore, the problem of inter-Arab irredentism
remains as alive as ever: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
Libya are three examples.
And all this at a time when inter-Arab relations
now, more than ever, have a dangerous global context.

f. The new disarray of the Arab states is reflected in
    shifting alignments and alliances as a result of
    the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and events in Iran,
    including the Iraq-Iran Gulf War, and over the
    crisis in Lebanon which entails an internal
    sectarian struggle, the Palestinians and the Arab-
    Israel conflict, and wider regional and international
    factors--a sort of battleground for the Arab states
    and a war by surrogates. Territory, national
    identity and autonomy are all involved. As
    regards the Gulf War the disarray is glaring:
    Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia support Iraq; Syria,
    Libya, South Yemen and the PLO support Iran;
    Algeriasits on the fence, Saudi Arabia is apprehensive
    with its high-wire act, and the Gulf states are
    petrified. More generally, Egypt clings to the
    Sudan and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are in
    a temporary, uncomfortable embrace.

5. Political Islam now overshadows Arabism, with a new
    power map that is blurred: the leadership vacuum
    left by Egypt and mentioned above has not been filled,
    and it is doubtful whether Iraq or Saudi Arabia can
    fill it. There has been a temporary non-Arab influence
    nurturв̆ed in inter-Arab politics as in the case of
    Egypt with Israel and the PLO with Iran.
    A more active and open challenge of state structures
    and regimes by rather inchoate social forces, led
    by a variety of militant religious groups and amidst
    the intensification of ethnic, sectarian and territorial
    disputes in the region.

The growing penetration of the superpowers
in the region and the growing dependence of
several Middle Eastern states on the West
is occurring at a time when political Islam
seeks cultural and spiritual reassertion of
the Muslim community by the vehement rejection
of all alien power and influence: a dichotomous
and therefore revolutionary situation that is
potentially explosive.

6. Intensification of superpower rivalry, prompted in part
by the disengagement of Egypt from active military role
in the Arab-Israel conflict and the fall of the Shah in
Iran. The rivalry will intensify further over southwest
Asia, the Gulf, South Arabia, the Horn of Africa and the
Red Sea. It is moreover highlighted by the American
search for military facilities in the region. Having
lost its influence in Egypt and even Iraq, the Soviet
Union has turned its attention to the Gulf and peripheries
of the core Middle East: Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South
Yemen, Libya --and Syria?

The Arab states in the region at the moment are divided
into three main camps: Egypt representing Western
influence, Iraq-Jordan (with the qualified support of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states) in the middle, and
Syria-Libya (backed by the USSR) at the other extreme.
However, none of these alignments possesses any quality
of permanence.

7. Economic differences and disparities in the region acquire
a greater and more threatening significance. With the
exception of the oil-rich states in the region, most of
the others face difficult economic problems and will
continue to depend on massive assistance either from
their neighbours or the outside world or both. Whether
one considers the agricultural or industrial sector of
their economies, the problems of feeding their rapidly
increasing populations and generating enough foreign
exchange with which to buy essential commodities and
goods remain. Despite the proliferation of inter-Arab
economic and financial institutions and the availability
of huge surpluses of capital from oil, there is no
evidence, so far, that a rational scheme of their
utilization for a balanced regional development has
been or is likely to be devised in the near future.
On the contrary, the oil-rich states seem bent (with
foreign encouragement, I dare say) on schemes of rapid
and massive development within their own respective
borders even when most of them lack the human resources
and social conditions for their lasting success. Thus
trade between states in the region remains minimal,
attempts at a "common market" in the past fifteen years
have been unsuccessful, and continuing political divisions
preclude further advance in regional economic development.
The danger in all of this is that the poorer states will
sink further into debt trying to feed their populations
and struggling to increase their domestic output, and
the rich states will be stuck with mammoth industrial

and other installations, operated by imported
skills and technology which, if these stop for
any reason, they would decay into heaps of rubble
once the "black gold" is depleted. In the mean-
time, disparities in income between the countries
of the region, between individuals and groups
within each country, the new strata or classes
of society and the huge, monstrous bureaucracies
which result from poor management and the unequal
distribution of income, will all contribute to
the further exacerbation of social and political
conflict in the region.
Even if the haves, with their astronomical surpluses
of capital, were to share their good fortune with
the have-nots of the region in a rational scheme
of regional development this presupposes certain
minimal--if not ideal--political conditions. One
of these is stability in the sense that several
outstanding conflicts in the region are settled,
namely, the Arab-Israeli, the Lebanese, the Iraqi-
Iranian over the Gulf, and further afield the
Algerian-Moroccan, the Libyan-Egyptian and the
Greco-Turkish. Such settlement of conflicts will
relieve many of these countries of the burden of
spending some twenty per cent of their GNP on
defence. But this applies only to regional and
international stability. Another kind of stability
that is required will be domestic, that is, that
of regimes.
Another essential requirement is the attempt to
reduce the rate of population growth, one of the
highest in the world outside Latin America. No
less important is the improvement of economic
and social management in agriculture, industry,
social and educational services.
Any attempt to meet all of these conditions could
be undermined in the meantime if external powers,
such as the Soviet Union, were to make further
incursions into the region, or if in the event
of some regional or international conflict the
sources of immense wealth--the oilfields--their
infrastructure and supply routes were destroyed.

8. Implications of all the above for the USA and the West:

   a) The Nixon Doctrine died with the fall of the Shah.
   The surrogate policeman of the Gulf has disappeared,
   and there is now a contest for the post between Iraq
   and dishevelled Iran. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States
   are keenly aware of the security problem in the Gulf
   for the transport of their oil exports. Their own
   notions of local regional security arrangements do
   not inspire confidence without a clear, strong link
   with an outside power; and this constitutes their
   dilemma.

   b) The security of oil supplies for Europe now more
   crucial than ever in the face of the Soviet military
   presence so close to the Gulf. This Soviet presence
   is perceived by practically all the regional states
   as constituting a real threat, their public declarations
   to the contrary notwithstanding.

c) The West lost political control of the Middle
East after Suez, which also marks the dawn of
the oil age and the economic boom in the region.
Until the 1990s, the West will certainly remain
heavily dependent on Middle East oil, ie, dependent
on a group of states that are underdeveloped in a
paradoxical way: they have too much money, and their
wealth leads to instability. The absence of financial
limitations encourages bad development. The conundrum
of the revolutionary trap in which countries like
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are caught is one
of too much or too little economic progress, of too
much or too little cultural innovation.

d) Islamic resurgence and radical nationalism create
problems for the superpowers. Neither fundamentalist
Islamic nor radical revolutionary regimes in the
oil-bearing regions makes the West or the Soviet
Union happy. The turmoil and regional fractiousness
that these movements generate could, at some point,
tempt one or the other or both superpowers to
intervene directly in the region. The question is,
would such intervention be done in collision with
each other, to the exclusion of, or by the other, or
in collusion with each other? One could make a
good case for the second and third instances; the
first is too daunting to contemplate. One must also
consider the fact that the Soviet Union is in closer
proximity to the region; in fact, it is in it,
whereas the US is not, and currently is trying to
come in. The US and the West suffer further disabi-
lities: the traditional ties of Arab and/or Middle
Eastern states with them have been loosened, firstly,
because the West lost political will and military
power, secondly, because they are identified with
Israel. To this extent, the resolution of the Arab-
Israel conflict has a long-term significance. It
is thus clear that the strategic situation in the
region remains precarious, even after the Egypt-
Israel treaty. And it will remain so unless other
Arab states, Jordan and Syria especially, are pre-
pared to negotiate on the basis of the Camp David
peace process, and the Israelis are prepared to
compromise over the West Bank. The disengagement
agreements between Egypt and Israel in Sinai and
Israel and Syria in the Golan negotiated between
1973 and 1976 suggested at the time--though as it
turned out prematurely--that the US at last had a
clear Middle Eastern policy. These were followed
by the Camp David accords in 1978 and the Egypt-
Israel peace treaty in 1979. Yet despite these
real achievements the policy remained piecemeal
and the Arab-Israel conflict is still very much with
us. Israeli policy over the West Bank, together
with the continuing turmoil in Lebanon augur ill
for a speedy settlement of that conflict. The
intermittent war of attrition in 1981 between Israel
and the PLO across the boundaries of a disembowelled
Lebanon; the year-old war between Iraq and Iran,

and the overweening ambitions of Colonel Kadhafi in Africa suggest that the time may yet come for the Great Powers to dominate the area as in the time of the Ottomans?

e) Another imponderable derives from the oscillation of political orientation in the region. Thus during the period from 1956 to 1967, there was a phase of radicalization to the Left which polarized the politics of the region between the local states and in respect of their relations with external powers. In the last decade a new phase of political orientation has been inaugurated, characterized by a swing to the Right throughout the region. Its main features are religious militancy: Islamic, Jewish in Israel, and sectarian in several states; the impact of oil money on the region and the world economic order, and the stubborn recession in the industrial states of the West; local wars--the civil wars in Lebanon and Iran and the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. It is these developments which lead one to suggest the revival of older problems, such as that of state boundaries, the integrity of states, the minorities, reminiscent of the immediate post-Great War period.

f) Because of the change in the strategic map of confrontation between the superpower blocs, one suspects the extension of NATO functions (in fact, it is implied in this very meeting), in tandem with an already apparent more direct involvement of the US and the Soviet Union in the region. Thus the new American power arrangement in the core area of Egypt and Israel --though it may go sour-- is, at least in the view of states in the region, an indication of a more aggressive, direct US policy in the Middle East. This, not to mention other military arrangements in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Such changes and recent developments however have generated their own difficulties and problems within the Western Alliance, the most immediate of which arises from the divergent perceptions of the Middle Eastern region held by America's European allies. This could be a serious problem in any contemplated extension of NATOs activities and responsibilities.

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PERSIAN GULF SECURITY:

A TURKISH VIEW

Seyfi Taşhan

Background Paper

27 May 1981

Turkey is aware of the dangers facing the Persian Gulf probably more than any other Western power. She will be the one to suffer most from a halt in the supply of oil through the Persian Gulf, even though only about 20 percent of her oil imports originate there. At the moment Turkey pays about 4.5 billion dollars annually for her oil imports. (Total imports for 1980 were about 7 billion dollars and total exports 2.7 billion dollars.) If the Persian Gulf oil supply is stopped for a lengthy period, the oil prices in the world market may go up, according to an earlier study by Henry Rowen, to around 200 dollars per barrel. This five-fold increase in price will theoretically mean an oil bill of slightly under 20 billion dollars. This is more than twice the collapse point of the Turkish economy and means that Turkey, already suffering from an acute foreign exchange shortage, will have to reduce its oil imports by four-fifths--an impossible situation for survival. In other words, Turkey may be choked not because of lack of oil, as it may be assumed that Iraq and Libya will continue to supply oil to Turkey, but because of high price. However, this also depends on the type of scenario leading to the oil cutoff from the Gulf. Economic threat aside, an invasion of Iran and the Persian Gulf by forces hostile to Turkey will also create the encircle-ment of the Southern Flank of NATO.

Turkish considerations for the security of the Gulf are an amal-gamate of its relations with the Western powers, Middle Eastern countries, and Turkey's own domestic political and ideological attitudes. Therefore, in this paper an attempt will be made to review these factors and an assessment will be provided on the possible and feasible Turkish contribu-tion to Gulf security.

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A unique act of aggression to capture the country from within has taken place in Turkey in recent years. This activity, which was conducted by a variety of extreme left organizations with some response from the extreme right, intended to arm a large number of people, capture control of local government organizations, terrorize people into cooperation and to create an unofficial state while the official one became paralyzed. To give an idea of the number of illegal weapons captured by the authorities, I mention the figures as of May 5, 1981: 395,195 pistols; 52,299 rifles; 4,323,453 rounds of ammunition. The illegal weapons captured include rockets and even howitzers. Such a level of weaponry would be adequate for any European army.

Terrorism has penetrated into all levels of the society. The Turkish Security Forces, since the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces on September 12, 1980, are trying to cope with this widespread urban and rural terrorism. 42,517 proceedings have been initiated and 22,892 people have been brought to trial. The number of casualties due to terrorism has fallen from a daily average of 20 to less than one, signifying that since September 12 about 5,000 innocent lives have been saved.

Terrorist activities in Turkey may be considered a demonstration of new methods of aggression being developed by international communism. The use of dialectics in developing existing chisms in the society has been extremely effective and thesis and antithesis have been developed in many sectors of the society. Separatism in the East, Sunnite-Shiate cleavage in central Turkey, and rich and poor differentiation throughout the country are some of the areas where communism has dominated one of the conflicting groups. The cleavages have, in past years, been brought

into the conflict stage through effective use of terrorist methods. The
presence of the National Action Party in the conflict has provided an
antithesis for effective anti-Fascist propaganda and terrorism.

The intervention of the Turkish military establishment, the primary
purpose of which was to save the country from this new form of communist
aggression, has once again demonstrated Turkey's attachment to Western
democratic ideals, systems of government and values. Because of the
anarchy and communist indoctrination at school levels that has prevailed,
the elites in Turkey have assumed an identity crisis afflicted the people.
The September 12 operation seems to have put an end, at least temporarily,
to this search of identity and has reaffirmed Turkey's place among Western
countries. However, while on the Turkish side there is no need to await
the establishment of the next parliament to reconfirm Turkey's attachment
to Western alliance, ideologies, concepts and traditions, the period of
indecision that prevailed in Turkey, as well as several extraneous factors
in the past years, seem to have caused an attitudinal change in the West
towards Turkey. This change is very distinct among the European left,
and has found its reflections in the European Parliament and in the Council
of Europe.

Turkey's attitudes toward the West are influenced by a set of
factors ranging from security considerations to ideology. It is needless
to expound why Turkey needs Western support and cooperation for her secur-
ity, obvious in the face of its common border with the Soviet superpower.
However, ideological aspects are equally important, as demonstrated by
the anarchy of recent years. I believe some explanation is needed re-
garding the relevance of ideology to Turkey's relations with her allies.

When the Turkish Republic was established by Atatürk, he did not want to commit the error of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. While he was fighting with the West he said: "The fall of the Ottoman State began when, too proud of its victories in Europe, it severed its ties with the West. We will not commit this error. Is there a country in the world which aspired to become civilized and did not orient itself towards the West?" Atatürk in reality wanted to turn Turkey from being an extension of the Islamic world into Europe, into an extension of Europe into the Middle East. By firmly establishing laicism in Turkey which in practice became religious reform, if one considers that Islamic religion is also a law of the state, he proved his opposition to all dogmas taking a share in the rule of the country whether they originated from Mohammed or Marx. Coming out of the inferno of terrorism that tried to pull the Turkish society to rightist and leftist dogmas, there now seems to be a renewed confidence in Turkey that the majority of people have regained their subdued European orientation.

There also seems to be, however, some well-placed doubts in Turkey regarding the motives guiding Western policies towards our country. It is understood that primary Western concern for Turkey is security-based. Turkey is regarded as a valuable piece of territory that should be kept and used for Western security purposes. This basic assumption, it is argued, lies at the base of all Western attitudes towards Turkey. Turkey is neglected and even scorned at when there is detente with the Soviet Union, to be remembered when a revolution in Iran or an invasion of Afghanistan brings security considerations to the forefront. Those in present-day Europe who have a better perception of Western security

interests seem to appreciate the role of Turkey and of the Turkish people in defending the Western security interests. Those who are after detente at any cost can cause the European Parliament to suspend relations with Turkey. This is only one of the recent year's developments in Western Europe which shows the Turks that they are not a welcome partner in the European Community of nations, and that they should continue to sit on the fence and be satisfied with whatever economic and military assistance can be spared for her.

I do not intend to discuss at length the recent efforts to ease Turkey out of the European integration movements, but Turkey's position within NATO strategies seems relevant to Turkey's place in assuring Persian Gulf security:

- Turkey, as a full and active member of the Atlantic Alliance, enjoys whatever guarantees are provided in that Treaty. The confidence in the spirit of the Alliance is firm and unchanged in spite of hostile propaganda waged against Turkey's NATO membership by the extreme left and by radical Muslims. The fact that Soviet threats against Turkey were publicly rescinded following Turkey's membership in the Alliance, and that the Soviets have been very careful to avoid overt and direct involvement in Turkey, must be considered as a tribute to the effectiveness of the Alliance.

  However, the strategies adopted by NATO fall far short of responding to the military threat facing Turkey. In this context, reference must be made to several specific shortcomings:

- When the "flexible response" strategy was adopted, much was said about its harmful effects for the defense of Turkey's long frontiers, and doubts were expressed about the adequacy of possible and feasible response. A certain amount of relief was felt when this strategy was coupled with the forward defense concept, albeit temporarily. It was soon discovered that an effective forward defense was contemplated only for the Central Front, and unless the force corelation in Turkey was remedied, forward defense would not be possible, particularly in eastern Turkey. It was assumed that the equipment shortages of the Turkish forces in eastern Turkey would be compensated by unfavorable terrain conditions in the east. As the wars of 1878 and 1914 demonstrated, this was not true. The arms embargo of 1974 and the failure of Western Europe, with the exception of Germany, to contribute to the defense of Turkey have only exacerbated the equipment crisis of the Turkish armed forces. Turkey is trying to offset the equipment shortages by keeping more men armed. But, unfortunately, this is neither an economic nor a very efficient alternative. To put it briefly, in the conventional sense "the forward defense" may have some meaning in the Central Front, even though there too the situation is rapidly changing; it does not seem to have a relevance for the land frontiers of Turkey with the Warsaw Pact.

- This, of course, brings up the question of the nuclear umbrella. The need for TNF modernization in Europe arose because the parity in strategic systems made their use less probable, and

the doubt in this respect had led France and Britain to develop their own nuclear systems. For Turkey, the nuclear umbrella was in reality taken away in 1962, when the United States withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey after the Cuban crisis. Whatever the explanation, their evacuation from Turkey had the effect that a nuclear or non-nuclear attack on Turkey would not operate a tripwire system. TNF modernization via the introduction of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe seems to be intended to do what Jupiters were expected to do in Turkey until 1962. The SS-20s and the Backfires (75 of which are said to be based in Crimea) pose an equal threat to Turkey and Western Europe, even more so for the former. Yet it occurred to no one to ask Turkey to consider TNF modernization, although she was asked to provide facilities for U-2 flights. Since it would be difficult to provide a TNF umbrella for Turkey from systems based in Italy, are we to assume that Turkey is excluded from whatever nuclear strategy NATO has? If this were so, even to a certain degree, the credibility of deterrence would have been shaken substantially. I do not wish to appear as an advocate of deploying, in Turkey, successors of Jupiter missiles, but I feel that the disparity in this respect too must somehow be addressed if Turkey is to benefit from the deterrent value of integrated NATO defense strategies.

- Another shortcoming is the weakness created in the Southeast Flank of NATO due to significant differences and lack of cooperation between Greece and Turkey, as an outcome of the 1974

Cyprus crisis. The arming of the Aegean Islands in the proximity

of Turkey, in violation of treaty requirements, and constant

cries of war heard in Athens are creating a zero sum situation

in the Aegean for the common defense of the two countries. The

problems involved in the Aegean for Turkey and Greece are not

easy to solve. Even though the governments in both countries

are determined to maintain a dialogue, command situation in the

Aegean is not made easy by intransigent attitudes. The West

European countries have maintained an attitude of equality for

Turkey and Greece, particularly in respect to their relations

with the European Community. However, the membership of Greece

in the European Community, and its political consultation system,

have terminated this attitude. This new West European attitude

is not conducive to creating a more favorable public opinion in

Turkey for increased NATO roles, let alone additional roles for

the security of the Persian Gulf.

Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries make her in-

volvement in Middle Eastern security questions--as an ally of the West--

more delicate than all of the Western countries.

Historic attitudes that developed in Turkey over the centuries to-

wards the Arabs under the common Ottoman rule were extremely benign in the

earliest stages, but developed into unfriendliness when Western powers ex-

ploited Arab nationalism to establish their hegemony in the area. Turkey

had accepted being cut off from the Arab world when Britain and France

became Turkey's neighbors as mandatory powers for Syria and Iraq after

World War I. It was after the mid-1960s that a serious attempt began to

restore Turkey's relations with the Arabs. A distinction must be made, however, between the Arabs of Maghreb and Mashrek. Turkey's relations with Maghreb states have never been marred because of historical reasons. With Iraq and Syria we have had typical problems of neighbors which share lengthy frontiers, waters of two rivers, and a lack of appreciation of each other's problems. The recent oil wealth in some of the Arab countries, and Turkey's need for oil, have led Turkey to increase its economic relations with the Islamic neighbors. While Turkey is a member of the Islamic Conference and wishes to play a greater political role in the area, it is careful not to allow a development of its relations in the Islamic world to affect its relations with the West and vice versa. Today, Turkey obtains nearly fifty percent of its oil imports from Iraq, about 25 percent from Libya and 20 percent from Iran. Turkey is involved in several important construction projects in Islamic countries, and thousands of Turkish workers who no longer can find jobs in Western Europe find work in developing oil countries. The Turkish food stuff exports to Iran and Iraq have doubled in the course of last year and the trade opportunities in these countries are immense.

In the past, Turkey tried to be involved in security arrangements in the Middle East but this has contributed to nothing but irritation among those who stayed out. The Baghdad Pact became a clear example of how not to approach the security problems in the area.

Turkey feels that the Arab countries lack an appreciation of the defense shield which Turkey provides between the Soviet Union and the Arab world. She resents suggestions by radical Arabs that her interests would be better preserved outside NATO, and by conservative Arabs that

she should turn more towards the Middle East and leave the idea of becoming a part of Christian Europe (even though the Conservative Arabs are quite happy with Turkey's place in the North Atlantic).

The haunting accusations that the Ottoman Empire prevented Arabs from establishing more contact with Europe and forced their structures to remain archaic is still prevalent among Nationalist Arab circles which are always suspicious of a resurrection of irridentism in Turkey. Conservative Arabs, on their part, welcome a revival of a Turkish role in the Middle East. They remember yearningly the merits of Pax Ottomanna which insured peace and harmony for their lands. Yet their precepts of Sharia, the Khoranic law and the secularism and democracy of modern Turkey do not really fit together.

Since it is not possible to establish closer institutional links between the majority of Arab states and Turkey, and due to Turkey's specific economic and strategical reasons for maintaining good relations with all Arabs (radical and conservative alike), Turkey serves her interests by remaining neutral and even passive in inter-Arab quarrels and by attempting to develop relations with them on a bilateral basis. This policy has its collateral in giving political support to the Arab cause. Therefore, Turkey should not be expected to give support to Sadat, or criticize Qaddafi, or deny representation to the PLO. On the other hand, the Arabs must accept Turkey's Western links and the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel, even though on a low level.

The "terrorism" of recent years which sought to create an ethnical separation in eastern Turkey to set up a Marxist Kurdish state, and the international terrorism conducted by the Marxist Armenian Liberation Army

to set up an Armenian state, all seem to have a common purpose: to create first an upheaval and then a Marxist state or states in eastern Turkey. There is no doubt that the preservation of eastern Turkey is of vital importance to the security of the Alliance and of the Persian Gulf. We in Turkey wonder about the purpose of some influential circles in Europe who give support and asylum to terrorists and encouragement to separatists whose fundamental aim is to make a present of eastern Turkey to Soviet expansionism.

A similar danger exists in Iran that might result in the division of that country among various ethnic groups if the central authority disintegrates. Such a danger is more relevant than an overt invasion by Soviet forces, which could come at a later stage. The war between Iraq and Iran does not help the situation in either country, but no end can be foreseen.

From the Turkish viewpoint, it is essential that a double-tonged approach be used: one would be to help ensure political and social stability and the other to increase military strength. In view of the dangers facing neighboring Iran, a sufficiently strong and credible military deterrent in Turkey becomes essential.

Furthermore, as Albert Wohlstetter has pointed out for several years, Turkey, because of its unique geographic position, may be considered as the only integral part of NATO which could play a deterrent role in the defense of the upper Persian Gulf.

To approach the problem from a realistic Western viewpoint, several objections may be raised to creating a strong military capability in Turkey. The first objection comes from Greece, which insists on a sort of

balance of forces between the two countries. The Greek lobbies in Europe and America try to stop military aid to Turkey, and when they fail to do so they want it to balance with aid to themselves. In doing so, they ignore several facts: Turkey has never cherished aggressive intentions against Greece, nor has it committed any such act, although the opposite has been a recurring fact. This does not mean, of course, that Turkey should surrender its rights in the Aegean Sea. Throughout history there has been an imbalance of the forces of Turkey and Greece. Turkey's population is 45 million and Greece's only nine million; Turkey's land is also proportionately much larger. If Turkey is taken over by communism there is nothing to prevent it from spreading over to Greece. Greece cannot defend by itself its northern frontiers and Turkey is the closest ally it can count on. We are happy to see that a certain degree of common sense prevails in the present government of Greece, but the situation will not become clear until the next elections in Greece on November 15, 1981.

There are also some doubts that a strong military establishment in a country where stability is lacking may prove to be disastrous, as in Iran. This argument is not applicable in the case of Turkey, whose attachment to the Western world with all its democratic institutions cannot be questioned. Stability in Turkey, and also in the countries around her, can best be served if she is militarily and economically strong and is made a real part of Western European institutions.

There seems to be a preference in several Western countries, particularly in the United States, to consider the military and economic aid given to Turkey as a price to pay for the use of military facilities in

Turkey. If we consider historical experience and domestic and regional attitudes, such an approach is not acceptable to the Turkish people. Turkish armed forces are the only NATO forces to be called to duty in the area. This is the main reason for Turkey to put all the bases in Turkey within a NATO context.

Consequently, the basic forces to be developed on the Turkish mainland to respond to any contingency must be Turkish ones. The buildup of Turkish forces, which are the largest within NATO outside the United States, both in air, and on sea and land, will not only mean a direct contribution to the defense of the Southern Flank, but will also play a multiple deterrent role for any contingency involving the Persian Gulf.

Another point to be kept in mind is the deployment of foreign forces in the countries of the region. Although primary attention must be given to strengthening the armed forces of regional states, these may not be adequate in the face of the growing dangers. However, deployment of foreign forces requires great care and attention so as not to cause social problems which might prove to be counterproductive. This point becomes additionally important in countries of the region adjacent to the Soviet Union, since it may contribute to an increase in subversion and even lead to overt action.

One more point to be remembered in deployment and use of foreign troops in the area is that the whole Atlantic Alliance is involved in the security of the Gulf and the Middle East. Consequently, measures to be taken in the area must not be left to a single country but must be jointly supported by NATO. Admittedly, under the present conditions prevailing in Western Europe, it may prove to be difficult to obtain the joint support required for this purpose. But as and when risks become more apparent,

a change may be expected in West European perceptions. After all, NATO's crisis management system may be the most appropriate channel through which to operate, and planning may be conducted on the basis of existing NATO mechanisms.

Political action in the region must be concerted by all the allies. Rivalry among Western powers for political favor among regional countries is definitely counterindicated. We must not forget that more real danger in the area is caused by subversion, enough evidence and results of which have been seen clearly in recent years. Therefore, political action to win the support of people and public opinion in favor of the West is as necessary as military measures. Resolution of the Palestine problem, ensuring an end to the occupation of Afghanistan, respect to sovereign rights and integrity of nations in the area, termination of the Iran-Iraq war and supporting Iran against separatism and foreign intervention are some of the issues which are of vital consequence for the security of the Gulf and for the normal supply of oil.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the risks facing the Persian Gulf are varied and their consequences will be extremely grave, not only for the supply of oil, but also for the entirety of the Atlantic Alliance.

Turkey is the only allied country with a military presence in the area. The increased military strength of Turkey will be a direct contribution both to the deterrent value of the Alliance itself and to project this deterrence to the region around her, which also encompasses the Gulf.

The basic question, therefore, lies in how to create this military strength in Turkey and to ensure economic and social stability on a continuing basis. There is no doubt that neither military aid with high interest carrying FMS credits is a solution, nor are contributions of the German military establishment adequate. Real military aid in a measure that can be assimilated safely by the Turkish armed forces is one of the prerequisites of creating such a deterrence. Secondly, economic aid by our allies, and by Japan, must be increased until Turkey by her own efforts may earn adequate foreign exchange. It should not be forgotten that running expenses of an effective army are very dear, although Turkish soldiers are the lowest paid in Europe. Thirdly, Turkey should not remain European only by her choice and orientation, but Europe should accept Turkey as an organic part of its structures. The evidence of this may be given by the European Community, who should announce their preparedness to accept Turkey's full membership application when Turkey is in a position to present it.

NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
THE PERSIAN GULF: PROBLEMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The importance of effective command and control for handling crises and, if necessary, defence against an attack is obvious. Development and maintenance of an effective and alert C^2 system for national forces is a demanding task. The problems of C^2 for the forces of a democratic alliance of sovereign states are even more demanding. In NATO, the problems of developing politically acceptable, yet militarily effective C^2 of the forces of the Alliance are probably most difficult in the Southern Region.

Each region of Allied Command Europe presents its own characteristic C^2 problems. In the Southern Region these are especially pronounced by the large geographic area, the geographic separation of the key areas, the political complexity of the region, the very different national languages and the general deficiences in the defences of various areas. The Southern Region also differs from the other regions of ACE in the sense that it may have to deal with threats originating from non-Warsaw Pact areas.

Following a brief review of the characteristics of the Southern Region from a C^2 perspective, the paper examines in more detail the various sub-systems of C^2: the early warning and alert system; air and maritime surveillance; communications; and command and control information systems.

NATO's early warning and alert system has problems due to the nature of Alliance decision-making and to the difficulties associated with the collection, distribution, and interpretation of intelligence information. Because only a few NATO nations maintain extensive and sophisticated means of intelligence collection, the Alliance as a whole is dependent on these nations to distribute relevent intelligence in a timely manner and at an appropriate level of detail. The interpretation of intelligence data will be subjected to conflicting views over its specific relevance. Thus it is necessary to establish as much as possible, common ground between the nations both on the interpretation of intelligence, and the level of detail required for shared data that will be consistent with effective decision-making in the Alliance.

Beyond the issue of improved sharing of intelligence data the focus of attention ought to be placed on NATO's complex Alert System. Here the procedures for identification of and response to a threat are part of an untested system. That NATO has never exercised its Alert System need not be of special concern. But problems that appear inherent to the system should it ever be implemented are troublesome enough to warrant attention.

These problems are characteristic of a democratic alliance where member nations maintain their own terms and conditions under which they may agree to transfer allocated and earmarked national forces to NATO command. In order to overcome well-recognised problems in this area the Alliance has tended to depend upon the use of bilateral political agreements between the strong and weak nations and on the perceived existence of back-channels to assist critical decision-making.

However, the system was originally designed (and has been largely adapted) for meeting large-scale threats to central Europe. The probability that the Alliance will increasingly face indirect threats to its vital interests outside the formal treaty area, and that these threats may present only ambiguous warning indicators is of special concern. Thus improvements in intelligence sharing and in the capacity of the Alert System to meet the requirements for ambiguous warning of indirect threats is especially important.

Surveillance of the Southern Region air space is accomplished by a network of national and NATO radars and airborne early warning aircraft. The ground based radars provide quite good coverage at 20,000 feet but gaps exist at lower altitudes. Also the vulnerability of these radars to ECM or jamming represents an additional problem. If the interception of aircraft were to depend on detection by these radars alone the first line of intercept would fall at best on the edge of NATO territory but more probably well inside it.

The Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft provide the possibility of detection at better distances but in order to achieve this the AEW would be required to operate within range of Warsaw Pact ground controlled

interceptors, so that in a period of tension or crisis and during a conflict, the AEW might operate at safer distances effectively reducing their forward coverage. An additional problem is that the demand for the number of aircraft required to maintain effective coverage may well exceed the number available.

The implementation of an Air Command and Control System (ACCS) would be likely to considerably improve the performance of the air surveillance system. But current plans are only for a limited implementation of ACCS in the near term. A more extensive system would probably be too costly and would not likely be accommodated in NATO infrastructure for many years.

Maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean is carried out by patrol aircraft and through sightings of naval traffic through straights connecting the Mediterranean with adjacent seas. But there are significant limitations on the number of patrol aircraft available and the priority for these aircraft is in any case given to ASW. In view of these constraints inputs from national intelligence systems (such as that available from satellite reconnaissance) becomes important.

Because of the limited number of naval vessels fitted with satellite communication equipment the command and control of naval forces will continue to depend primarily on HF though it should be assumed that NATO is considering extending satellite communication facilities with naval forces.

The media for communications in the Southern Region are comprised of leased PTT (Post, Telegraph, Telephone) circuits carried primarily

by line of sight links, the ACE High troposcatter system, satellite links, and HF. This is comparable to the rest of ACE except that the network becomes less dense as it extends eastward from Italy.

Under ideal conditions the interconnection of the various communications options would result in quite good capacity being available. But in crisis and war each system has weaknesses that will reduce considerably the capacity of the system.

NATO's Integrated Communications System is intended to answer these problems by arranging for several interconnections between the various systems throughout ACE. Although the technology is available for relatively straightforward implementation of these desirable improvements, budget constraints could considerably delay the implement-ation process. Perhaps the key to the solution of the communication problem in crises and war is to be found in the development in peace of C^2 procedures and practices that are compatible with the communication capacity likely to be available in crises and war.

Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS) though widely considered the key to the effective management of forces have only been considered to a limited degree in the Southern Region. As the familiarity with the uses of data processing and information systems increases it is considered that transitions will be made towards the more advanced systems being implemented elsewhere in ACE. But the costs of these systems will be very high and limitations on the infrastructure budget will probably delay the implementation of the full CCIS for many years.

The slower start in adoption of CCIS in the Southern Region
may have provided the opportunity for an alternative approach. If
crisis and war-time needs are given priority CCIS would most likely
place reduced demands on communication capacity as well as generating
more disciplined and limited information storage and handling require-
ments. This could lead to a system that might be both more effective
in war and whose costs ought to be more appropriate given current
budgetary constraints.

The problems and concerns in the development of C^2 in the
Southern Region seem to reside in the following points:

- Although NATO plans improvements to the Southern Region
  C^2 (as it plans elsewhere in ACE), these plans may be
  unrealistic in terms of costs and the date by which
  the plans might be fully implemented may be too far
  in the future.

- Should the C^2 system in the Southern Region and for
  that matter the whole of ACE be primarily designed to
  meet crisis and war-time requirements and the
  capacity for normal periods in peace be adjusted to
  meet these more stringent constraints?

- Can the characteristic political problems of the
  region be overcome sufficiently to allow the implement-
  ation of a C^2 structure consistent with effective
  crisis and war-time management?

- Technological advance should be applied to providing
  reliable and survivable C^2 rather than on increased
  capacity and sophistication.

NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND

THE PERSIAN GULF: PROBLEMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

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Contents

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THE PERSIAN GULF: PROBLEMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

1.   Introduction

Buzz-words, jargon and acronyms envelope the subject of command,
control and communications (C^3). This inevitably presents difficulties
for non-specialists to fully appreciate the scope of problems that are
encountered in the design, development and operation of C^3 systems.
Even so, it is accepted that effective command and control (C^2) and the
communications that must support it, are vital to the successful
management of the Alliance in peace, crisis and war. This importance
makes C^2 an asset which creates high priority targets for an adversary,
and modern weapons technology has become increasingly effective against
such targets. As a consequence of its importance and vulnerability to
attack,command and control systems have justifiably been at the focus
of political, military and technical attention. They have also placed
a significant burden on the demand for allocation of defence expenditures.

Although there can be no doubt over the significant contributions
modern technology can make towards improving C^2 the results of the
attention and money the area has received so far have not been as rewarding
as it might have been hoped. As a result we must face up to the question
of whether we are on the right course in our application of technology to
C^2 in NATO and in the Southern Region of Allied Command Europe (ACE) in
particular. Part of the difficulty in evaluating relative merit of
differing approaches to the C^2 problem is the lack of an acceptable method
by which improvements in C^2 can be quantitatively measured as a contribution

to increased force effectivensss. Within the Alliance additional problems
are created by competing national interests in the implementation of
common-funded large-scale infrastructure projects.

There is an increasing awareness amongst NATO nations that in the
1980s the Alliance will also face significant indirect threats from
contingencies arising in the non-Warsaw Pact countries bordering ACE
(especially in the Southern Region), and from areas beyond NATO's
traditional sector of responsibility such as the Persian Gulf, which are
vital to western interests. These concerns place a new sense of urgency
and the need for a broader perspective in addressing future C^2 require-
ments for NATO.

Following a brief review of the key characteristics of NATO's
Southern Region, this paper will attempt to assess the status of C^2
from the highest levels of Alliance decision-making down to the boundary
between the allied and national commands in the Southern Region. This
status assessment will address problems of command structure; strategic
early warning; surveillance; communications; and Command and Control
Information Systems (CCIS). As some of the issues are common to all
regions of ACE they are discussed in an ACE rather than a specific Southern
Region context. In conclusion, the paper suggests alternative approaches
towards effective C^2 in NATO and especially those issues pertinent to the
Southern Region.

2. C^2 Problems in the Southern Region

Before we examine detailed problems of Southern Region C^2 it is
worth outlining some general characteristics of the area. The region
is primarily characterised by its geographical size. The fact that the
Federal Republic of Germany covers an area roughly the same size and
shape as the Aegean Sea serves to place the geographic magnitude of the
Southern Region in perspective. Related characteristics are the
geographic breadth and distance between the four areas of traditional
military interest within Alliance planning: Northern Italy, Thrace,
Eastern Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, these key
areas can be considered as operationally separate theatres even though
they are strategically interlinked.

But this inherent military linkage is often overcast by national
economic and political problems, and by bilateral disputes. The differing
historical and cultural traditions do not naturally contribute towards a
common approach to the problems of defence in the region. Additionally,
language difficulties in the Southern Region are far more serious than
in any other part of ACE, with such different languages as Turkish, Greek,
Italian, French and English and a very limited capability within national
forces to handle a foreign language. The complexity of the command
structure in the region reflects these characteristics. No other region
of ACE has such a multiplicity of HQs at various levels. At both the
Principal Subordinate Command and subordinate levels there are both
functional and area commands (see Fig. 1). The location of the HQs is
spread out over the entire Mediterranean area and separated by considerable
stretches of water (see Fig. 2). Except for the U.S. carrier task group

FIGURE I

MSC

PSC

SOC

AFSOUTH

STRIKFOR SOUTH

NAVSOUTH

LAND SOUTH

? LANDEAST

LAND SOUTHEAST

AIRSOUTH

MARAIR MED

GIBMED

MEDEAST

HF ARMY HQ

1,2 & 3 TU ARMY

SUBMED

MEDOC

MED SOUEAST

3,4 & 5 IT CORPS

MEDCENT

MED NOREAST

5 ATAF

? ATAF

6 ATAF

ALLIED IN PEACE AND WAR

NATIONAL IN PEACE, ALLIED IN WAR

J-453-MAN

MEDITERRANEAN-AREA COMMANDS

FIGURE II

STRIKFORSOUTH, whose HQ will be afloat in war, the other commands in the Southern Region relocate to static underground HQs in the vicinity of the peacetime HQs. Most of the war HQs into which the allied HQs are expected to move in a crisis, are national HQs already performing national functions.

The problem of developing an effective C^2 system in the region is thus a demanding task where national sensitivities may be just as much of a problem as the huge geographical separation between HQs and the ever-increasing gap between the costs of planned C^2 systems and available budgets.

3. Means for C^2 in the Southern Region

3.1 Early Warning and Alert System

History has shown time and again that nations have great difficulty in deciding how to react in a crisis affecting their security. In such crises it is difficult to create the necessary degree of consensus even amongst those who need to be involved in the decision-making process. Different people interpret indicators in a given situation quite differently. Most of us have a tendency to see in a new situation a confirmation of our expectations rather than uncomfortable new realities. This problem seems to be significantly reduced once war is a fact. Yet decisions and actions in a crisis will be much more important for maintaining effective deterrence.

If this is a problem within a single nation, it is much more so in a democratic alliance of sovereign states with their own history and cultural ties, with different responsibilities and interests, differing perceptions of the actual situation, and with differing assessments of the risks for their own security and of the options available. The problem is complicated by the fact that there are considerable differences in each nation's access to and interpretation of relevant information about the world situation and threatening developments. Yet, in a developing crisis no significant steps can be taken by the Alliance without the explicit agreement of the member nations. The NATO commands have little authority until the nations have agreed to a given response, though a consensus is not absolutely necessary.

NATO's formal alert system presents a perplexing picture of the process by which the Alliance first recognises a prospective threat to its security, and then systematically follows a formal set of procedures by which national allocated forces are transferred to NATO command. This

process involves a graduated series of alert measures prior to the initiation of hostilities for an anticipated threat and a more compressed series for meeting surprise attacks. The stages of alert measures do not necessarily require sequential implementation. Rather, any appropriate level of alert may be generated given a collective agreement on the nature of the threat.

As the Alliance has no intelligence collection system of its own except for the limited capability to monitor air movement through the NADGE system, the Alliance's capacity to recognise the character and extent of potential threats is dependent upon intelligence inputs from national security agencies and predominantly those from the nations with extensive and sophisticated intelligence networks. National intelligence data is fed to SHAPE as an input to an indicators and warning system. Should the set of indicators accumulate to levels requiring activation of a stage of alert, consultation is required between SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council/ Defence Planning Committee. This political consultation and approval is required for all declarations of alert beyond that of the lowest level.

Each of the Alliance's member nations maintains its own terms and conditions by which its decision to transfer allocated and earmarked forces to NATO commands will be made. These terms relate to the individual national responses to the sets of intelligence indicators and are regularly reviewed. The national positions while agreed, are subject to change by the nations in their individual interests or for the collective interest of the Alliance. Thus the prospective response of the Alliance to warning indicators of a threat, is a fluid and changeable system that is maintained through a constant review process between the nations on

their agreed responses to a broad range of indicators.

The result of this Alert System is a set of complex procedures whereby national forces may be transferred to NATO commands in a some-what uneven and unpredictable manner. It is especially subjected to the vagaries of collective political consultation which is time-consuming, and this at periods when the timing of potential responses will be of critical importance. In a democratic Alliance there is perhaps no alternative method, but it does leave an impression of military inadequacy that should be addressed.

The problem of persuading an Alliance of nations with differing perceptions of the threat to adopt measures whose implementation logically leads towards war is not one for which there will be mechanistic solutions. But an Alert System which appears to develop problems as the potential threat increases in seriousness will serve to undermine the credibility of deterrence and be politically divisive.

It would appear that the Alliance has historically dealt with this problem by providing options to SACEUR as an American Commander, to generate US forces according to presidential authorisation independent of, but parallel to, the NATO system.[*] Naturally, this option to independently generate forces is available to all member nations. This implies that the stronger NATO nations and especially those with the best national intelligence agencies have an obligation to first convince NATO

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[*] *Since NATO's Alert System has never been put to the test it should be recognised that it is the perception of the options available to SACEUR that is of interest here. It is evident that European perception of SACEUR's relative political authority to independently generate forces (with presidential approval) has waned since the time of Eisenhower. Some aspects of SACEUR's authority in this respect are discussed in "Crisis Management: The New Diplomacy", Alastair Buchan, The Atlantic Papers, April 1966, pp 45-55.*

of the developing threat and then to lead the Alliance as a whole through the alert process when the relevant indicators would warrant it. The present Alert System and NATO Flexible Response policy is sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate this approach.

However, there is a growing need for consultation across the Atlantic as European and American perceptions of security issues become marked with differences of view that can act to strain the cohesion of the Alliance. It is therefore necessary to consider in more detail the methods by which intelligence data are disseminated within the Alliance and in the ways that this can be improved to help build confidence between member nations in assessing threats to their collective security. This confidence would in turn provide the basis for coordinated and timely collective responses should the Alert System have to be exercised.

Perhaps the crucial problem is to provide an appropriate basis for national decision-making in response to ambiguous warning of threats to the Alliance's collective security. Given the scope of factors that may cause nations to assess a specific situation differently, it must be important that each nation has as much as possible, the same access to basic facts about a given situation. Certainly, there do exist bilateral arrangements between nations for exchange of intelligence, but these arrangements may be less than satisfactory from the point of view of the many NATO nations who do not possess extensive and sophisticated means for intelligence collection. Thus the recipient of intelligence information could view processed intelligence information as being linked to some political objective on the part of the nation that released it, and this would precondition their willingness to accept it without question.

From the point of view of nations who depend on intelligence inputs
from more powerful allies, a lot could probably be gained if appropriate
information about a given situation could be made available as a matter
of routine rather than limited to crisis situations. All the better if
this information could be made available as raw data or partially processed
to protect sources but prior to analysis by the collecting nations. Of
concern here is that all nations are familiarised with the nature of
intelligence that can be expected in a crisis, and that military and
political authorities develop the necessary skills and the sense of con-
sensus required in interpreting the information, so they are able to view
the conclusions and recommendations as drawn in the collective interest
and not merely by one or a few nations, albeit close allies.

Of course there would be understandable concerns from the intelligence
community over protection of their sources and there are valid political
obstacles. But the question remains: have we found the optimum balance
between protection of intelligence sources and making it possible for the
Alliance to take its most crucial decisions collectively?

In addition to the issue of sharing intelligence information more
fully the Alliance faces a series of problems with warning and response
procedures. These problems arise mainly from the uncertainty associated
with the implementation of the Alert System which has never been activated
(even partially) throughout NATO's history. The critical factors here are
that the Alliance operates an indicator and warning system which receives
data that nations report according to their own priorities and criteria.
Because the significance of these data will vary for different regions of ACE
(Soviet naval activity in the Eastern Mediterranean for example, will not
necessarily have high priority on a Norwegian indicator and warning list), the

means of translating these data into collective responses by the Alliance is highly constrained. Thus without extensive consultation (which is time-consuming), or the use of political and military back-channels no significant response to the indicator and warning data would seem likely. This emphasis on consultation and national political control carries through to the transfer of allocated national forces to NATO commands.

Given that the Alliance plans primarily for the threat of a massive Warsaw Pact attack against ACE the priority placed on a collective response to a direct threat is understandable. But it remains necessary to develop an indicator and warnings list that takes into account both issues specific to individual regions of ACE as well as those relating to a larger threat to the Alliance as a whole. Within this context it is necessary to evolve procedures whereby the transfer of command of national forces to NATO is accomplished in a smooth reliable manner where delays due to inadequate dissemination or interpretation of intelligence are minimised.

These technical difficulties are especially important obstacles that have to be overcome if NATO ever has to respond to ambiguous warning indicators of an indirect threat. Such ambiguous warning will require timely decision-making from the North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Committee and a systematic, efficient means of collectively assessing indicator and warning data.

The effective utilisation of these procedures to assist in the identification of and response to warning indicators will require a much higher degree of coordination of intelligence data together with a more efficient distribution of this information to the relevant authorities.

3.2 Surveillance of the Air Space

As in the rest of NATO the surveillance of air space in the Southern Region is performed by a combination of NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment) and national radars with roughly a dozen in Italy, Greece and Turkey respectively. With all stations operating and no ECM (Electronic Counter Measures), cover at 20,000 feet is quite good. But gaps exist at lower altitudes where terrain masking is a problem and the forward cover is limited. Assuming that these coverages of the air space are used to initiate interception of slightly sub-sonic aircraft the first lines of intercept fall at best on the border of NATO territory but frequently well into NATO air space.

All the radars are soft targets and must be considered vulnerable even to aircraft with unguided weapons, let alone precision guided munitions. Roughly half-a-dozen radars at a time would need to be knocked out to establish fairly wide unsurveyed corridors at lower altitudes providing access to the Eastern Mediterranean from approaches extending from the Balkans to the Trans-Caucasus. Similar corridors at higher altitudes would require the elimination of a comparably small number of radars.

Vulnerability to ECM or jamming represents an additional problem. As most of the radars in the region have been in service for several years, they are probably vulnerable to determined jamming efforts, i.e. their effective coverage could be reduced and confusion and time delays may occur. Another matter for concern is the adequacy of system and operator training with electronic warfare (EW).

SCHEMATIC RADAR COVERAGE

81670-NU-A4

NATO is now in the process of acquiring 18 NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft very similar to the US E-3A. The 11 British NIMROD AEW aircraft will also form part of the NATO AEW force, but the UK view is that these be deployed over the seas around the UK. The first NAEW aircraft should be operational in 1982 and the first NIMRODs in 1983.

From an operational altitude of about 30,000 feet and with their very good radars, the AEW aircraft should in principle offer a much better radar coverage, particularly at the medium and lower altitudes, than ground radars. In peace NAEW aircraft should be free to fly anywhere over NATO territory and in the Mediterranean outside the territorial waters of non-NATO nations. This should give a considerable coverage over non-NATO territory. If these aircraft fly at about 30,000 feet, the radar horizon will allow them to see even low-flying targets at a range of about 400 km. In a crisis and war on the other hand, NAEW aircraft may have to operate further back so as to be outside the cover of the Warsaw Pact GCI system and beyond the horizon for powerful ground based jammers. This would virtually eliminate NAEW cover over Warsaw Pact territory. If the Warsaw Pact were to operate ships with powerful jammers in the Black Sea, and were permitted to do so, or if the Warsaw Pact were able to exploit Yugoslavian and Albanian territory, the NAEW would have to operate even further back and the coverage would be reduced accordingly.

NAEW aircraft operating freely over NATO territory and international waters should in peace and crises be able to provide good intelligence about Warsaw Pact air status and operations, and in war substantially increase the effectiveness of NATO air defences, particularly interceptors, aircraft, in the forward areas along NATO borders. If, on the other hand, the NAEW aircraft for reasons discussed above were forced in war to operate

so far back that their radar cover had to be confined largely to NATO territory, their main effect would probably be increased effectiveness of NATO air defences over bases and lines of communications deeper into NATO territory.

Assuming that NAEW aircraft at 30,000 feet are able to detect and track aircraft out to the horizon, the instantaneous coverage would be an impressive circle of 400 km radius. But compared with the size of the Southern Region, this area is relatively small. If one had to rely on NAEW only for detecting Warsaw Pact aircraft penetrating from the north into the Mediterranean, several stations would have to be manned. With 18 NAEW aircraft for all of ACE, except UKAIR, and assuming that on the average a force of 4 or 5 is required to keep one aircraft continuously on station, the actual NAEW coverage at any one time will be quite limited. Damage to one or more of the few NAEW forward operating bases in the Southern Region would reduce the number of stations that would be manned.

All of the above considerations for AEW deployment in the Southern Region can be seen to be relevant for operational requirements for AEW either in Saudi Arabia as it being considered, or from other areas in South West Asia to meet Persian Gulf contingencies. There would naturally be some synergistic effect of a linked use of AEW aircraft covering the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf but there are some limiting factors that would be of concern to NATO.

Clearly, the demand for the numbers of aircraft which could be needed to maintain effective coverage, exceeds their likely availability in the Southern Region. The demands on US AWACs elsewhere in ACE and for South West Asia deployment will place a further constraint on the overall numbers that might be available to allocate to the Southern Region.

Late in 1979, the DPC in Ministerial Session approved in principle the Air Defence Planning Group's proposal for a future Air Command and Control System (ACCS) for ACE to be completed in 1995. In addition to continuing the air defence functions of NADGE, the ACCS would also support planning and control of all other types of air operations. Implementation of ACCS would probably mean replacement of most of the present radars with radars of better accuracy and capability against ECM and internetting of these radars where cover is overlapping. Coastal radars, air traffic control radars, etc. could be netted into the same system if such integration would materially improve the wartime performance of the air surveillance system. ACCS would also add some Command Centres in hardened sites.

ACCS would undoubtedly improve the performance of the air surveillance system against EW. But the individual radars will remain physically vulnerable. A combination of redundancy in the number of radars, mobility and use of unconventional radars (radar receivers at locations different from that of the transmitter) and passive detection and location systems should permit adequate survivability. But the costs for such a system would be very high and could probably not be accommodated in NATO infrastructure years for many years to come.

3.3   Maritime Surveillance and C^2 Issues

The command and control of NATO's naval forces in the Mediterranean requires the effective collection of data relating to maritime activity and in particular to the operation of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet and the communication of this information to the Alliance's naval forces comprised of the three regional nations, the US Sixth Fleet, a UK naval squadron, and possibly the cooperative participation of the French and Spanish navies. The division of the Mediterranean into sectors of responsibility for the respective naval commands places an additional importance on effective communications and cooperative planning for effective use of the deployed naval assets.

NATO maritime surveillance depends on sightings of traffic through the straights connecting the Mediterranean with adjacent seas, and on maritime air patrols. The latter are, however, constrained by the limited availability of aircraft and the priority given to ASW operations. National intelligence systems must also be expected to contribute to the surveillance of the Mediterranean.

The radar range of the new NAEW aircraft will of course allow them to survey surface traffic in areas like the Eastern Mediterranean quite effectively if the object merely is to establish the presence or absence of surface ships. But if identification is required, which it would be in surveillance of potentially hostile ships, the NAEW aircraft are perhaps not too well suited.

It must be assumed that NATO is considering satellite communications for the Southern Region. At present only US, UK and French navies have a significant number of vessels with terminals for communications via satellite.

Thus the prospect remains that the bulk of common fleet communications with naval commands will depend on high frequency (HF) radio.

Many of the surveillance and communications problems for the Southern Region naval forces could probably be overcome if US intelligence and communication satellite systems were exploited to disseminate appropriate information to NATO naval commands in the Southern Region through AFSOUTH/NAVSOUTH.

Another important aspect of this problem is that some Southern Region nations may be reluctant to participate in measures that involve surveillance of the Soviet fleet throughout the Mediterranean rather than in areas merely adjacent to territorial waters or during legitimate transit through them. However, the surveillance requirements that are needed for addressing problems posed by Soviet naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean (as they might impinge on Persian Gulf/South West Asia security issues) are likely to demand resources that will be unavailable to the Southern Region and possibly carry political difficulties for the involvement of Greece and Turkey. So that this last requirement might be more appropriately met by bilateral agreements with the US.

3.4   Communications

As in the other regions of ACE the media for strategic level communications in the Southern Region consist of leased PTT (Post, Telegraph, Telephone) circuits carried primarily by LOS (Line of Sight) links, the troposcatter system ACE High,satellite links and HF. In addition to the interconnection of Turkey, Greece and Italy via ACE High and satellite links, several submarine cables interconnect the PTT networks. The US has its own troposcatter and SATCOM (Satellite Communications) system in the Southern Region, and here, as in the rest of ACE there are several additional media belonging to the lower levels of command and forming (particularly in Italy) quite dense networks.

If all these communication options could be interconnected and were likely to be available in an emergency, the communication capacity would be quite good. But in crisis or war each system has its clear weaknesses, and suitable interfaces and appropriate agreements with authorities would be required to allow ACE effective use of the aggregation of systems in the Southern Region. It is worth noting that the negotiation and agreement procedures are perhaps not the least of the difficulties.

The PTT systems could be vulnerable to sabotage and damage because all the major switching points are in cities, the link stations are largely unprotected and the submarine cables could possibly be dredged. And re-routing of rented PTT circuits in case of damage to parts of the system would probably take some time. Leasing of PTT circuits is expensive and available budgets tend to limit the use of these quite extensive systems.

Both the ACE High troposcatter and NATO SATCOM are systems of considerable capacity. But from a military point of view, in the Southern Region they both have the disadvantage of a layout with some critical communication links through which the traffic has to pass. Neither system is invulnerable to jamming or sabotage which if successful would reduce traffic capacity significantly and even disrupt traffic. Determined action against these critical links could thus seriously degrade the performance of either system.

The obvious answer to these problems must be to arrange for several interconnections between the various systems running from one end to the other of the Southern Region. If such interconnections between the PTT systems, ACE High and NATO SATCOM were made at a sufficient number of points the result would be a grid network which would allow quick re-routing and by-passing of communication links which have had their capacity reduced or have been disrupted as a consequence of enemy action. At the same time, reasonable efforts should be made to reduce the vulnerability of the individual links and nodes. Indeed, NATO has plans under way to this effect. The NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) is to become a NATO common user system with these highly desirable characteristics. NICS will make use of ACE High, NATO SATCOM and rented PTT circuits as transmission media and provide possibilities for inter-connections and flexible re-routing of traffic and also the reduction of link and node vulnerabilities. Although technology is available for relatively straightforward implementation of these highly desirable improvements, budget constraints could delay the implementation process considerably.

Over the last 10 - 20 years conventional high frequency and low frequency radio communication have tended to fall under the shadow of new developments such as SATCOM and troposcatter communications. With the growing awareness that these modern means of communication are vulnerable and may experience considerably reduced traffic capacity due to enemy action, interest in conventional radio communication is increasing. Sensible application of new technology should offer considerable scope for improvement of the reliability of HF and LF radio communication and may well lead to HF and LF playing an important role in future crises and war. But the traffic capacity will, of course, be limited. Perhaps the key to the solution of the communication problem in crises and war is to be found in the development in peace of command and control procedures and practices which are compatible with the communication capacity likely to be available in crises and war.

3.5   Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS)

Computer assisted command and control information systems are seen in many quarters as the key to effective management of forces in modern warfare. Although more limited than the other regions of ACE, efforts have been initiated to introduce CCIS in the Southern Region. The first systems of this nature were components of the data-processing systems in NADGE implemented during the 1960s. The role of the data-processing equipment in NADGE is to assist in tracking targets, maintaining files of unidentified, hostile and friendly target tracks, exchange of tracks between control centres and support for the control of interceptors. However, it should be noted that the NADGE was implemented according to a fairly consistent plan for the whole of ACE.

Later efforts to introduce CCIS in the Southern Region have, as in the other regions of ACE, been largely independent efforts by individual nations or commands to solve their particular problems. Whereas considerable progress has been made in the Central Region, Northern Region and UK AIR, the Southern Region is only at the beginning of getting acquainted with the possibilities, and limitations of CCIS technology.

AFSOUTH is hoping to get NATO funds for a system for access, distribution and display of stored information. The General Staffs in some of the regional nations seem to be pursuing similar concepts and to be at comparable stages of implementation. The collocated commands, LANDSOUTHEAST/6 ATAF, and LANDSOUTH/5 ATAF are approaching implementation of a system on the land side for accessing and displaying stored force status and logistics information, and on the air side a system for ADP supported planning, tasking, resource management and message handling.

When these systems become operational, they should help to expedite and increase effectiveness in staff work. But, perhaps equally important, they will provide a possibility for the various HQs to gain experience and develop a basis for further planning of CCIS support.

In the other regions of ACE there has been considerably more activity to bring in CCIS and quite ambitious systems are already in operation or about to be implemented. In an effort to ensure inter-operability and contain costs, particularly for software development, SHAPE has under way a study to develop an ACE CCIS concept. The concept now apparently approved by SHAPE is based on operational require-ments developed through a method of asking staff at the approximately 30 international HQs in ACE of their needs. The concept consequently should cater also for most of the peacetime and crisis management require-ments. As a result of this, coupled with current command succession policies the concept would result in a very expensive system. With the current size of the Infrastructure budgets, it would take many years to implement the CCIS part of the system. In addition the system would call for communications which would put additional demands on NICS and possibly increase the cost of that system also.

4. <u>Problems and concerns in the development of C^2 in the</u>
    <u>Southern Region</u>

In the preceding sections of this paper we have discussed the various sub-systems making up the C^2 system in the Southern Region. For all the sub-systems the point has been made that although significant efforts have been made and considerable hardware is already available, improvements are highly desirable, in the Southern Region perhaps more so than in the other regions of ACE. And NATO is indeed pursuing plans to accomplish such improvements.

However, unless care is exercised the very process of arranging for much needed improvements could land NATO in the very uncomfortable situation of having launched several very ambitious and, for that matter, desirable improvement projects, but at costs which could considerably exceed the funds likely to become available. Present plans seem to add up to a total investment cost of several billion US$. As the costs for such systems in NATO traditionally are covered by the NATO Infrastructure budget which averages about 1 billion US$ a year and of which only a fraction can normally be allocated to C^2 systems, it could take many years before the systems were fully implemented and available for operational use. Meanwhile, the systems would be rather unbalanced and probably not very credible as means for exercising C^2 in crises and war. It is difficult to see how NATO and in particular the Southern Region can afford to wait that long for desirable improvements to its C^2. Even if the systems were fully implemented, they would require considerable numbers of skilled manpower for operation and maintenance. Could this manpower be made available in the Southern Region?

NATO infrastructure projects in the C^2 area tend to be quite advanced technologically and therefore attractive to nations as a means of promoting the general technological level nationally. Not only the nations in the Southern Region are therefore anxious to see C^2 infrastructure projects implemented on their soil. These concerns should, however, not be allowed to dominate over sober assessments of what is required to develop the best possible balanced overall defence within the budgets likely to become available.

A fundamental issue seems to be whether the C^2 system in the Southern Region, and for that matter in the whole of ACE, should be primarily designed for peace or war. Several of the crucial C^2 systems and projects appear to be dominated by peacetime concerns at the expense of wartime performance. If this is correct, it is for several reasons not really surprising. The accountability of commanders and staff to superiors is different in peace and war. The consequences of and therefore willingness to take even small risks of not being dead right is different. The tendency in peace to gather more and more detailed information by higher HQs is stimulated by the necessary political control of any military action which might escalate a crisis together with the propensity of the media to publicise minor incidents in sensational terms.

But the consequence is creation of capacity requirements for systems for storage, handling and display of information which results in communication systems which one cannot afford to make sufficiently reliable and survivable, and HQs which become so large and dependent on CCIS and communications that it is difficult to see how command in crisis and war could be effectively transferred to a much smaller and sufficiently survivable HQ. Instead of exploiting the impressive potential

of modern technology for more reliable systems easier to maintain and operate, this approach leads to unnecessary complexity and sophistication.

For a C^2 system to be credible, it has to function in war; thus the wartime requirements must be the primary basis. Since communications are the most vulnerable part of C^2, they must be reduced to the minimum essential. This means reassessment of the minimum essential functions to be performed at each command and the essential information required to exercise these functions. Attempts to build a staff system or data banks with detailed information to cope with action which is not essential must not be allowed. But informal communications links should be available to assist in dealing with unexpected events and to enable high level commanders to focus attention on low level units as necessary and particularly in times of a local crisis short of war. The principle of maximum delegation should apply equally to support functions as to operations. Highly centralised control of support functions while making for efficient peacetime management, is vulnerable in war. The concept of command and control in war should, as far as possible, be applied in peace. If not, it is difficult to see how the C^2 could quickly and successfully make the transition from peace to war. Any additional reporting or accounting required in peace should be separately annotated and not form part of the operational procedures. This is not to say that peace and crisis requirements are not important, they are. But the priorities must be right.

In the Southern Region, more so than in any other NATO region, credible C^2 requires consideration of other and perhaps more important issues.

Each of NATO's regional commands has unique political, economic, demographic and geopolitical factors which are of primary importance in establishing its security requirements. Historically, the need for a cohesive western alliance composed of a war-torn Europe and an economically powerful America reinforced the need for a command structure for NATO's military forces that was integrated into a monolithic organisation. The tendency to over-simplify the complexities of political and military details was perhaps helpful in asserting US leadership and in building confidence in the utility of the Alliance.

While changing economic and political circumstances over the past 30 years have been by and large well accommodated in the Northern and Central Regions of ACE, the political and economic frailty of nations comprising the Southern Flank and the problems encountered in attempts to stablise and develop these nations, has tended to pre-caution any prospective re-examination of whether the military command structure for the Southern Region is still best suited to meet military needs on the one hand and differing regional/national perceptions of security requirements on the other. Other regions have been able to strike relatively easy compromises in adopting command structures that are politically acceptable in peace and likely to be effective in war, whereas comparatively straightforward solutions have not been available in the Southern Region.

Although it can be rationalized as necessary for collective planning the NATO planning process is accountable for some of these difficulties. The Alliance's official threat perceptions of the Southern Region assume a large scale attack against all regions and as such are exaggerated in terms of individual national views of security requirements.

Both the large geographical area, especially the fact that it is not contiguous, and the widely differing problems of domestic and foreign policy in the Southern Region nations have tended to fragment the command structure. That this structure has been able to adapt the requirements for Greek re-integration in NATO (with the creation of two new subordinate commands) is a credit to its general flexibility. But the fact remains that the command structure in the Southern Region is comparatively complex with its many HQs and a mixture of area and functional commands.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion the present state of the C^2 system in the Southern Region is far from adequate for the requirements of crisis and war. Of equal concern is that the resources likely to become available will be insufficient to remove the serious shortcomings if the C^2 system is developed according to the present guidelines.

Because the Southern Region differs in many respects from the other regions of ACE, the special characteristics of the region must be the basis for the development of a sound C^2 system. Solutions to the C^2 problem should be derived from a detailed examination of whether the present command structure is appropriate for meeting the regions security requirements, and from the implementation of a system meeting the minimum essential requirements in war. Here it will be necessary to apply as far as possible, the same concepts of command and control in war as in peace. This ought to lead to a less complex and more affordable system. Exploitation of the potentials of modern technology will be essential, but emphasis should be placed upon reliability and survivability rather than capacity and sophistication.

REINFORCING NATO's MILITARY POSTURE
AND THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES

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For over three decades NATO has been successful to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe and the Southern Flank. During this period, however, the military thinking of the Alliance focused on the Central Front as the main area of threat. The priority given to the Center underlay NATO's and the United States' strategic calculations and elaborations. This is well illustrated, for instance, by the US Annual Defense Department Report in 1977:

"Since the centerpiece of our strategic concept is to have the ability, in conjunction with our allies, to manage one major contingency, we believe that the most prudent way to arrive at the specific requirement for general purpose forces is to consider what we would need to establish and maintain a forward defense in Centrel Europe."(1)

This approach had of course its rationale which was stemming first of all from the importance of Western Europe (especially of Germany) in Alliance and US interests, considering the Federal Republic's industrial capacity and population density. Secondly, there was (and there is still in a growing proportion) a concrete military threat in the region.

The Soviets' conventional and tactical nuclear power concen-
tration in the East European countries combined with the
tragic fate of these nations are reasonably the factors
justifying such a threat perception. Finally, there was in
the United States the belief that the American military power
would be sufficient and adequate for more than one contingency
at the same time (at least one major and one minor contin-
gency)(2).

The radical change in politico-military circumstances
is inducing us to question the validity of these considera-
tions. It would certainly be irrational and irrealistic to
reject them completely. But the foregoing considerations may
and should be revised and adapted to changing conditions on
the basis of a new strategic concept which is derived from
the principles of the indivisibility of fronts and the inter-
dependence of different types of confrontation.

In addition to its inherent geopolitical significance,
the Southern Flank (especially its southeastern part and Tur-
key) has assumed in recent years a new importance in terms of
the global strategic balance. This part of the Alliance is
integrally related to the Middle East/Persian gulf area. Any
operations in or towards this area will certainly have impli-
cations on the Southern Flank in general and on Turkey in
particular. Furthermore, such operations would be vitally
affected by Turkish behavior. Even if the Turkish barrier
is bypassed by the Soviet Union, Turkey might still have a
very important role in the defense of the Middle East/Persian
Gulf area by providing a "springboard" to hit the Soviet
forces deployed in the area and their logistic lines between
the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

The defense of the Center of NATO is closely linked to

that of the Southestern Flank. With a weak and destabilized
Southeastern Flank, NATO posture on the Central Front cannot
have a credible deterrent value. There is an inverse correla-
tion between the strength of the Southeastern Flank and the
degree of the Soviet pressure applied to Western Europe. If
this flank is neutralized, or weakened, by political or mili-
tary action, the Warsaw Pact can concentrate more massively
against the Center. Moreover, the neutralization of Turkey,
and then of Greece, would shift NATO's defensive line in the
Mediterranean back to Italy and to the line from Sicily to
Cape Bon, complicating further the Western defense posture in
Europe(3). Within this context, Turkey's armed forces, one
of the largest in NATO and second to those of the United Sta-
tes, contribute not only to the defense of their own country
but also to that of Western Europe.

Another importance of the Southeastern Flank is related
to the Straits and to the control of these narrow waterways
by a NATO ally. This has some important implications as regards
the defense of Greece and the Mediterranean as a whole. In
time of war, or when Turkey considers herself to be threatened
with an imminent danger of war, the Soviets must assume that
passage through the straits will be denied to them unless
they are able to occupy the area of the Straits, free the
Straits from mines, and control the airspace above. And this
cannot be assured without successfully invading Turkey. If
they are not able to achieve this, then the Soviets could
not rely on their major naval facilities in the Black Sea.
Turkey's control of the straits would also impede the Soviets'
sea lines of communication in support of their attacking
forces, and would render the Soviet naval force in the Medi-
terranean more vulnerable to NATO naval and air forces. The
Soviet squadron would consequently be more easily prevented
from interdicting NATO's SLOC in the Mediterranean(4).

It should also be noted that Turkey's direct contact position with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria may affect Soviet perception of security. The Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union have been interested not only in extending their territories and projecting their power beyond their borders, but naturally, also in protecting their frontiers from invaders. Russians have always perceived Turkey not only as a gateway to the marginal seas and to the "Outer Crescent", but also as a possible invasion route to Russia. Thus, Turkey as a NATO ally complicates Soviet defenses and strategy by exposing some large and important regions in the USSR and the Balkans to Western monitoring in peace and to Western arms in war(5). Even if the Warsaw Pact forces are successful in the West European theater, an unoccupied Turkey would serve as an excellent base to hit the logistic lines and industrial centers of Russia.

Turkey's geopolitical significance is indirectly but profoundly affected by a cultural-ethnic factor which is seldom mentioned(6). The Soviet provinces in the Caucasus and Central Asia are inhabited by some forty million people (Azeri, Khirghiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tatar, and Chechen) whose language and religion are common to those in Turkey. Their numbers are increasing rapidly, while the Russian share of the Soviet population has been declining since the 1959 census(7). As the only surviving independent state in the Turkic world, which extends from the Aegean to the Far East, Turkey has certainly a geopolitical, and probably an increasingly geopolitical, significance.

For all these reasons, the Soviet political and military leaders have always regarded the region in general and Turkey in particular as something far more than a secondary flank. The Soviet Union has a strong incentive in time of tension or actual conflict, and independently of the outbreak

of fighting on the Central Front, to take an offensive action against the Southeastern Flank. It should also be noted that the development of friendly relations with a Turkey continuing to be a member of NATO do not provide permanent guarantees for the Soviet Union. The Soviet interests in Turkey are so great that they call for definitive solutions such as the establishment of a pro-Soviet communist regime in Turkey.

The threat facing the Southern Flank of the Alliance has grown steadily in recent years. Today the Flank is vulnerable and exposed to an unprecedented degree not only because of the constant geographic disadvantages, but also because of the recent changes in the global and regional balances. The strategic environment in the region has been influenced by a number of politico-military factors resulting from the Soviet military buildup and advances, and from some serious NATO weaknesses.

The modification of the strategic nuclear balance in favor of the Soviet Union is a serious negative factor which is susceptible to affect the regional environment encourageing the Soviet Union to be more assertive on the conventional level.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the destabilized political situation in Iran have made the pressure of the Soviet power heavier than ever especially for Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries.

The Soviet-Syrian alliance is a worrisome development for NATO and the Turkish strategic planners. The prepositioning in Syria by the Soviets of heavy sophisticated weaponry and the existence in this country of thousands of Soviet technicians increase the vulnerability of southern Turkey and add to the probability of a multiple-front offensive.

THe Soviets have considerably improved their naval
presence in the Mediterranean both quantitatively and quali-
tatively. Their largest regular naval deployments take place
in that sea(8). Moreover, the threat to NATO carriers and
other vital surface ships has increased in recent years be-
cause of the growth of Soviet anti-ship fire power capabili-
ties. The range and payload of Soviet land-based aircraft
were increased. There are at present about seventy-five TU-26s
(Backfires) based in Crimea. All the targets in the Mediter-
ranean are easily within their combat radius. In addition to
the Soviet naval presence in the area, they increase the
threat to the survival of the Sixth Fleet and of the NATO
shipping in time of war. Another worrying factor is un-
doubtedly the stockpile of Soviet-made weapons in Libya,
which could be utilized to hinder Western operations in the
Mediterranean.

Military trends on the southeastern edge of NATO have
been dangerously unfavorable to the Alliance. The Soviet/Pact
theater air and land combat forces in the region not only
outnumber those of NATO, but are qualitatively superior. The
Soviets have recently increased the number of their divisions
in the Caucasus area from 21 to 27, and they have signifi-
cantly upgraded them, further improving their combined-arms
capability. For instance, in the tank divisions, manpower has
increased from 9.000 in 1968 to 10.000 in 1980, and the number
of towed artillery pieces from 36 in 1968 to 72 in 1980. Si-
milar improvements have taken place in the motorized rifle
divisions, where manpower has increased from 11.000 (1968) to
13.000 (1980), the number of tanks from 175 to 215, and the
number of artillery pieces from 105 to 126(9). These efforts
are supported by improvements in the areas of multiple rocket
launchers, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.
Meanwhile a new main battle tank, the T-72, which is far
superior to the former T-62, has come into service. In addi-

tion to upgrading the ground forces, the Soviet Union has
been carrying out a tactical aviation modernization program
since 1970. The introduction of new planes has tripled combat
radius and payload of fighter and ground attack aircraft.

The vital character of the Soviet and Western interests
in the region coupled with the deterioration of NATO's defense
posture on the Southeastern Flank invalidate the traditional
strategic concept derived from the priority of the Central
Front. Instead of confronting NATO directly in the Center,
and so risking a strong conventional, and probably even nuc-
lear, response by the West, the Soviets might prefer to adopt
a more indirect action presenting the Alliance with a fait
accompli in the Southeastern Flank. Such a strategy might
appear to the Soviet Union far less risky and of higher
"payoff" than a direct assault on the Center.

There are two urgent requirements to revitalize NATO's
military posture on the Southeastern Flank. One requirement
is to enhance reinforcement and supply capability of NATO,
from America to Europe and from Europe to the Southeastern
Flank. Within this context, it is required to strengthen the
Sixth Fleet, the tactical air power in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, and to increase airlift capability. It is also neces-
sary to undertake efforts to improve reception facilities in
Turkey and to reduce the vulnerability of airfields and ports
by improving Turkey's air defense capability. In order to
increase the reinforcement and supply capability of the
Alliance, the prestocking of fuel and ammunition and even the
prepositioning of some heavy NATO equipment may be required.
Moreover, it should be considered to improve the AMF as a
crisis management tool by giving it the ability to deal with
more than one contingency at the same time.

The most urgent requirement to reinvigorate NATO's

defenses on the Southeastern Flank is certainly the moderni-
zation of Turkey's armed forces. The Turkish Armed Forces are
still in an equipment crisis. Much of the weaponry with which
they are expected to fight is out of date or deteriorating.
Because of the US arms embargo and the economic crisis,
Turkey's arms imports dropped enormously, and by the late
1970s, she was able to import only less than one-third of its
minimal arms needs. Although there are today some allied
efforts to upgrade the Turkish forces, they are far from
being adequate.

The Turkish Land Forces are still mostly infantry(10).
They face the Soviet/Pact armored and mechanized divisions
which heavily outnumber them(11), and whose operational
doctrine emphasizes the primacy of offensive action based on
a high-speed maneuver strategy and a combined-arms concept(12).
Operationally, the tank and armored vehicles form the core of
the attacking Soviet/Pact units. But they act in close coope-
ration with infantry, artillery, helicopters, and aviation.
Their objective would be to liquidate strong points and to
arrive at the strategic targets (such as the Straits) and
seize them as soon as possible. The rolling formland of
Turkish Trace is ideal for such an operation. A Warsaw Pact
offensive action in Trace would most probably be supported by
amphibious operations near the Straits area. The lack of
territorial depth in the region would not allow the defending
Turkish forces to trade space for time with Warsaw Pact
forces. Thus, it would be essential for NATO to meet the
enemy offensive as early as possible and to deprive advancing
forces of their momentum. In order to achieve this, it is
crucial to provide the Turkish forces with the necessary
firepower that can be utilized against the enemy in the early
stages of the conflict.

In Eastern Turkey, NATO shares a common border of 610

kilometers long with the Soviet Union. The region lies at the extreme end of NATO's long logistic line. On the other hand, it is on the Soviet access routes to Africa and the rich oil resources of the Middle East. Although history shows that this mountainous area is far from constituting a formidable barrier against Russian invasion, its rugged terrain would compel armored and mechanized units to concentrate and take a limited number of routes and of mountain passes. New technology weapons and precision guided munitions could greatly augment the NATO posture in a theater of operation such as this which topographically affords advantage to defensive forces. Moreover, the characteristics of the region would provide the defensive side with the advantage of force economy, if it is adequately equipped with modern anti-tank weapons, winter battle equipment, and all the necessary fire support systems.

As it has been pointed out earlier, the southern front is becoming more and more vulnerable because of the Soviet-Syrian alliance and the prepositioned Soviet material in Syria. It is to be noted that the region is more convenient for a tank attack than Eastern Anatolia.

For effective operations on these three fronts, the Turkish Land Forces need:

- Modern armored vehicles;
- Modern tanks and the modernization of the existing ones;
- Modernization of artillery;
- Target acquisition devices;
- Low-level anti-aircraft defense systems;
- Modern anti-tank weapons;
- Modern communication devices;
- Improvement of the electronic warfare capability;
- Night vision devices, etc.

It is well known that the Soviet Union has developed, standardized and stockpiled highly toxic chemical (and biological) weapons. In order to complement the employment of conventional firepower and to maintain the momentum of their attacking units, the Soviet/Pact forces might use such agents in an anti-personnel role against defensive operations of the Turkish forces. Their use could be decisive against unprepared and poorly protected defensive units(13). So the Turkish Armed Forces should also be provided with specialized defensive equipment required for sustained chemical warfare (They include protective garments, respirators, and detection, monitoring and decontamination equipment).

There can be little doubt that a Soviet/Pact ground offensive will be complemented by tactical air operations on the basis of a combined-arms concept(14). The Soviet/Pact tactical airpower is suitable for nuclear and conventional combat. It has as its primary objectives: to clear air space over areas of ground operation; the elimination of the principal defensive combat forces and their command and control; the isolation of front-line forces; to deny opposing ground divisions an orderly withdrawal; to hit logistic lines and communication networks; and the destruction of NATO's tactical nuclear forces(15). The development of a new generation of Soviet low-flying aircraft with greater payload, range capabilities increases prospects for surprise attack and successful land-oriented operations. Furthermore, the Soviet electronic warfare capability has improved considerably over the last decade. This factor coupled with the deployment of low-flying aircraft complicates Turkey's problems of detection and decreases warning-time.

The situation implies the following requirements of primary importance:

- Improvement of Turkey's ECM and ECCM capabilities;

- Deployment in Turkey of modern low-level tactical
  surveillance radars and battlefield air defense
  systems;

- Establishment in Turkey of an AWACS system.

The tasks of the Turkish Air Force, independently or
within the framework of NATO command, are to provide air de-
fense, to support operations of the land and naval forces,
and to destroy enemy's logistic and frontal combat targets.
If the Turkish Air Force were sufficient in numbers and
adequately modernized, it would also play a valuable role in
interdicting Soviet/Pact attacks against NATO's SLOC in the
Mediterranean.

The Turkish Air Force has been most seriously affected
by the arms embargo, and it was estimated by NATO in early
1978 that its combat effectiveness had been cut by 50 %(16).
Despite the substantial modernization efforts since 1979, the
airpower is still in equipment crisis. A considerable number
of combat aircraft, except F/RF-4 Es and F-104 Ss, are over-
age, and need to be replaced urgently by modern aircraft.

In time of peace, the Turkish Naval Forces have a
balance of power and deterrence function. On the other hand,
their wartime mission would primarily be to maintain the
control of the Straits especially by preventing the Soviet/
Pact amphibious operations against that area. Small but ef-
fective combat groupings of the Turkish Navy would harass the
larger and stronger enemy units by employing hit-and-run
tactics. Moreover, they would attack enemy's SLOC. The Turkish
Naval Forces are also in an equipment crisis. They face tre-
mendous maintenance problems. A considerable number of their
weapon systems are inadequate, and far from being able to

perform above-mentioned mission against the qualitatively and quantitatively superior Soviet/Pact maritime and air forces. The increasing naval capabilities of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea emphasize the urgent requirement of improving the Turkish naval capabilities.

In order to increase their survivability and their peacetime and wartime capabilities, the Turkish Naval Forces need:

- To improve the air defense capability of their surface units;

- To improve point defense capabilities in the Straits area, and the surface-to-surface guided missiles (in order to support naval operations);

- Frigates and Fast attack craft equipped with guided missiles;

- To furnish destroyers with surface-to-surface guided missiles and electronic warfare capabilities;

- Modern high-speed submarines;

- To equip helicopters with air-to-surface guided missiles and modern communication and electronic warfare devices;

- Adequate mine stocks, modern minelayers and mine-sweepers; and

- Patrol aircraft, etc.

There are three principal categories of sources contributing to the improvement of Turkey's military posture: NATO funds; bilateral cooperation with the United States and some West European allies, especially Germany; and finally Turkey's domestic arms industry(17).

Although, after the Soviet/Pact invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968, NATO had carried out research on force postures
in its area, and developed projects to reinforce its military
posture on the Southeastern Flank, non of these projects
yielded substantial result. Nevertheless, NATO infrastructure
funds have greatly contributed to the development of the
Turkish military infrastructure. At present, within the frame-
work of NATO programs, efforts are being made to improve
Turkey's early warning systems (especially, low-altitute
radar coverage), reception and ground support facilities.

On the bilateral basis, the United States has been the
most important source of military assistance to Turkey. In
recent years, Germany (together with some other West European
states) has become a second major source of military help(18).
The bilateral defense cooperation is, however, suffering from
some major defects. The United States arms embargo and the
attitude of some West European allies in more recent years
have shown the precarious and unreliable character of this
source. The adequate functioning of this source depends on
domestic politics of the allied nations which, mostly, are
highly diversified political societies. Secondly, most of the
weapon systems obtained through bilateral arrangements are
used and over-age. Finally, some military assistance proce-
dures such as the Foreign Military Sales credit system of the
United States tend to become more and more of a financial
burden for the receiver because of the high interest rates.

The military aid which Turkey is getting at present
consists of short-term measures aiming to stop the state of
preparedness of its armed forces from getting worse. In our
view, a long-term modernization program should be considered
along with the development of Turkey's domestic war industry.
Turkey possesses to a considerable extent the necessary in-
dustrial base and technical skills to create and support a

full-fledged arms industry. The share of the private enter-
prise in arms industry is today minimal. The existing plants
are owned and run by the armed forces and the MKEK (the
Machinery and Chemicals Industries Institution) which is a
state enterprise. Factories of the MKEK produce a range of
weapons and ammunition, including machine guns, mortars,
howitzers, and rockets. An electronics factory has recently
entered service. Turkey has been building naval vessels since
the mid-1960s. Studies are in progress to build a factory in
Turkey to manufacture combat aircraft. The armed forces have
also considerable maintenance and overhaul capabilities, in-
cluding the Arifiye and Kayseri plants established for the
modernization of M-47 and M-48 tanks. Beside the capital and
foreign-currency shortage the lack of advanced technology
constitute the most serious barrier. The technology transfer
is particularly required in the fields of aircraft, electro-
nics, and rocket industries. General Tahsin Şahinkaya, Com-
mander-in-chief of the Turkish Air Forces, explains this
basic requirement in the following terms: "Aviation techno-
logy, which is improving very rapidly, has at the present
time entered a phase where modernization of weapon systems is
brought within such short periods that these may be expressed
in years and even in months. Therefore, it is a plain fact
that establishing and improving the Turkish Aircraft Industry
needs the support of the allied nations."(19).

The upgrading of the Turkish Armed Forces and the
existence of an effective reinforcement capability would
serve to heighten deterrence against potential attack, and
would unavoidably affect the regional balance in the Middle
East/Persian Gulf area in favor of the West, though the area
still remains beyond NATO's zone of responsibility. Moreover,
the revitalization of NATO's defense posture would undoubtedly
help prevent any political influence, arising out of a percep-
tion of overwhelming Soviet superiority in the region.

We, however, believe that the credibility of an alliance as a deterrent depends not only on its military strength and arms production capabilities in general, but also on a more or less even distribution of this strength and of these capabilities among its components. Consequently, it is necessary for NATO and for the technologically advanced members of the Alliance to pay due attention not only to short-term measures of military assistance, but perhaps more to supporting the development of national arms industries in the less developed parts of the Alliance.

NOTES

(1) Quoted in <u>Planning US General Purpose Forces: Overview,</u>
    <u>Budget Issue Paper</u>, Congressional Budget Office, January
    1977, p.8.

(2) <u>Ibid</u>., pp.9-11.

(3) See İhsan Gürkan, <u>NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank:</u>
    <u>A Mideastern Perspective</u>, National Strategy Information
    Center, 1980, pp.9-10.

(4) For the strategic importance of Turkey, see Albert
    Wohlstetter, "The Strategic Importance of Turkey and the
    Arms Embargo", in <u>NATO and US Interests</u>, American Foreign
    Policy Institute, 1978, pp.38-39.

(5) The traditional Russian fear of "encirclement" has served
    as a basis for a great deal of apologetic thinking in
    the leftist circles in Turkey and abroad, trying to
    justify Soviet pressures and even the actual Soviet
    military actions against the Northern Tier countries.

(6) See Kemal H.Karpat, "Turkish Soviet Relations", in Kemal
    H.Karpat (ed.), <u>Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition</u>
    <u>1950-1974</u>, Leiden: Brill, 1975, p.77; and Bernard Lewis,
    "Turkey-A Loyal US and NATO Ally", in <u>NATO and US In-</u>
    <u>terests</u>, <u>op.cit</u>., p.27.

(7) See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Nationalities Ques-
    tion", in Robert Wesson·(ed.), The Soviet Union: Looking
    to the 1980s, Hoover Institution Press, 1980, pp.138 and
    152.

(8) Paul H.Nitze and Leonard Sullivan,Jr., Securing the
    Seas - The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance
    Options (An Atlantic Council Policy Study), Boulder,
    Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, p.142.

(9) The figures are the latest estimates which the author
    obtained during various interviews at NATO Headquarters,
    Brussels, August 1981.

(10) They consist of 14 infantry divisions, only two mecha-
     nized infantry divisions, and a single tank division.
     See The Military Balance 1980-1981, p.31.

(11) There are today about 66 Warsaw Pact divisions facing
     NATO's Southern Flank. 13 of them are tank divisions and
     the rest are motor rifle divisions. Warsaw Pact forces
     are in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Soviet divisions,
     included in the total, are in Hungary and southwestern
     military districts (Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, Trans-
     caucasus and part of Turkistan). See John M.Collins,
     US-Soviet Military Balance 1960-1980, New York: McGraw-
     Hill, 1980, pp.552-553. Our figures contain the 3 re-
     cently introduced Soviet divisions in the Caucasus.

(12) See Jacquelyn K.Davis and Robert L.Pfaltzgraff, Soviet
     Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO, US Strategic
     Institute Report, 1978, pp.9-10.

(13) See J.K.Davies and R.L.Pfaltzgraff, op.cit., pp.21-22.

(14) See John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined-Arms Concept", <u>Strategic Review</u>, Winter 1977, p.42.

(15) See J.K.Davis and R.L.Pfaltzgraff, <u>op.cit</u>., p.18; and John M.Collins, <u>op.cit</u>., p.225.

(16) See John Keegan, <u>World Armies</u>, New York (Facts on File), 1979, p.723.

(17) For some of Turkey's defense cooperation and weapons procurement problems, see Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, <u>Turkey's Security Policies</u>, Adelphi Paper, (164), 1981, pp.22-28.

(18) Weapon systems such as MBTs, ATGWs, Armoured recovery vehicles, attack and general purpose helicopters, fighter/trainers, F-104 G fighters and ship-to-ship missiles are either on order or delivered from the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. See <u>SIPRI Yearbook 1981</u>, pp.213-214.

(19) General Tahsin Şahinkaya, "The Turkish Air Force and its Progress", <u>NATO's Fifteen Nations</u>, Special Issue No.2/ 1979, p.79.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING

A STRATEGY FOR NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING

A STRATEGY FOR NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK

The Southern Region of Allied Command Europe would be
strategically significant even if there were no oil in the
Persian Gulf Region. It is an integral part of the arc that
contains the Russian Empire. The term "containment" has become
unfashionable, but the fact remains that Russia's power has
been, if not contained, at least constrained by an arc of un-
friendly countries bordering its empire to the west, south and
east. In 1973 the Soviet Union might have believed that if it
struck first, it could win an eyeball-to-eyeball naval confronta-
tion in the eastern Mediterranean, but it had less reason to
believe that it could secure its own lines of communications in
order to make good its threat to establish a combat force in Egypt.
By constraining Soviet projection of power into North Africa and
Southwest Asia, the Southern Region makes it riskier for nations
in these areas to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a crisis,
safer for them to resist Soviet pressure, and easier for them to
cooperate with the NATO nations in peace and war.

Of course, this view of the world tacitly assumes that
the Soviet Union must be contained, that it is not simply a
defensive-minded developing country that will become a peaceful
neighbour and a good trading partner if the NATO nations alleviate

its economic problems. It is true that the Soviet Union has
been cautious not to exert its power more freely than the
correlation of forces permitted, but it did not grow from the
grand dutchy of Moscow into the master of most of Europe and
half of Asia through a fortress mentality.

While the Southern Region is intrinsically significant as
one sector of the containment arc, it can potentially play a
key role in shoring up the adjoining sector of the arc in
Southwest Asia. Its connection with Southwest Asia (which over-
laps it) can be seen first of all in terms of the subtle influence
that its alignment with the rest of NATO can have on the policies
of Southwest Asian and North African states. This alignment is
political and economic, as well as military, and its influence
needs to be viewed in political and economic terms, as well as
military. (In the same vein, the Region's unity, political
stability, and economic strength are valuable in themselves,
and should not be valued solely for their long-term contribution
to its military strength.) This paper focuses, nevertheless, on
military considerations - particularly on the military connection
between the Southern Region and Southwest Asia. This focus is
not meant to imply that the situation on NATO's southeastern
flank is entirely a military problem; its purpose is to emphasize
the military realities that need to be considered in designing a
strategy.

The paper makes the military connection in the context of aggression by the Soviet Union or a client state in Southwest Asia. One or more NATO nations are assumed to respond by deploying forces there. Greece, Italy, and Turkey can become involved by deciding to participate directly in meeting the threat in Southwest Asia - providing forces or bases for combat operations. Or involvement can be thrust upon them by a Soviet decision to extend combat operations into the Southern Region. The remaining possibility is that the Southern Region nations decide not to get involved in combat and the Soviet Union decides not to involve the Region in combat. In this case, the Southern Region still plays a role - serving as a conduit for forces and materiel and perhaps contributing some materiel of its own.

Sections 1 and 2 discuss two aspects of the Southern Region's potential importance in a Southwest Asia contingency:

(i)   the use of combat forces, support forces, materiel, or bases in Allied Command Europe for operations in Southwest Asia;

(ii) the use of the air and sea lines of communications leading from Allied Command Europe and North America through the Mediterranean to Southwest Asia.

The natural implication, noted in Section 3, is that the Soviet Union might conduct attacks in the Southern Region to support an operation in Southwest Asia. It would be especially tempted to do so if deficiencies in NATO's force capabilities in the Region or weak Alliance cohesion made the perceived risks small in relation to the rewards.

The remaining sections reveal some aspects of the correlation of forces. Section 4 considers the Warsaw Pact threat to the Mediterranean lines of communications. It suggests that NATO should exploit its advantages in terms of geography, infrastructure, and merchant shipping to achieve a favourable correlation of forces. In effect, it outlines the essential elements of a strategy and the force capabilities to go with it. The foundation of the strategy is the Italy-Greece-Turkey barrier, which serves to restrict access to the Mediterranean by Warsaw Pact air and naval forces. If the Soviet Union gets behind the barrier by establishing a strong-hold on the Mediterranean littoral, the strategy is undermined. Section 5 gives two examples, but it goes on to suggest that the barrier's very existence makes it hard for the Soviet Union to enlist a wartime ally on the Mediterranean littoral. The final section considers the problem of maintaining the barrier's integrity against a massive ground attack and against erosion.

1. Forces, Materiel, and Bases in Allied Command Europe

For reinforcement and resupply of Southwest Asia, the
Southern Region's basic advantage is proximity: to illustrate,
the air route from Rome to Dhahran is 70% shorter than the
route from Kansas City, and 15% shorter than the route from
Diego Garcia. In addition to military forces, equipment, and
consumables in Allied Command Europe, certain civilian resources
could be valuable. Civilian fuel and water trucks, in particular,
could supplement the austere resources of division slices designed
primarily for combat in the Central Region of Europe. Of course,
to make it prudent to move resources from Allied Command Europe
to Southwest Asia in a contingency, certain resources in Europe
may have to be augmented in peacetime. Stockpiling in ACE -
particularly the Southern Region - should be considered along-
side alternatives for stockpiling in the Indian Ocean area.

At the operational level, bases in eastern Turkey might
support air interdiction and unconventional warfare operations
against Soviet land lines of communications through western Iran.
The road net there is sparse, and it includes numerous bridges
and passes. The Soviet Union's only direct rail link with Iran
is a single line running within 120 km of the Turkish border;
the line depends on several bridges and a tunnel, and the trains
themselves would be vulnerable at the Soviet-Iranian border,
where the gauge changes.

For blocking a Soviet airlift to the Persian Gulf littoral, the usefulness of airbases in eastern Turkey is problematical. If the Soviet aircraft stayed to the eastern side of the Caspian Sea (or flew from the Turkestan Military District of Afghanistan), fighters on the ground in eastern Turkey would not get enough warning from ground radars or AWACS to intercept. A combat air patrol barrier could be strung across western Iran, but patrol stations as far east as the Caspian Sea would be hard to support: even with F-15C's and tankers it would take several fighters on the ground to have one continuously on station.

Whereas interdicting a Soviet airlift in the air may be too elusive a prospect to justify planning for it, the lift aircraft's vulnerability at congested ports of debarkation could be easier to exploit. The Soviet Union might try to establish airheads at the major airfields north of the Zagros mountains and on the upper Gulf - before its opponents did. Long-range attack aircraft in eastern Turkey, if already in place, could forestall the airheads' establishment.

2. The Mediterranean Lines of Communications in a
    Southwest Asia Contingency

The most productive air line of communications (ALOC) from the continental United States to the Persian Gulf runs across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean. Routing through

tropical Africa is severely constrained by the throughput
capacity of the possible refueling stops there, not to mention
the political uncertainties in a crisis. The routes across the
Pacific are twice as long, and they depend on being able to
refuel in Southeast Asia. Among the Southeast Asian countries,
only Singapore has airfields that can sustain a high throughput
of military and civilian cargo aircraft and that lie close enough
to Southwest Asia to avoid severe payload degradations. Thus, the
only serious alternative to the Mediterranean ALOC depends heavily
on the cooperation of a city state located less than 900 nm from
the Soviet bases in Vietnam. Even if Singapore accommodated the
entire flow, there would be some payload degradation on flights
as far as Dhahran (without overflying India): the C-141B's
average payload would be cut by 25%, and the B-747's and DC-10's
by 15-20%. Use of Diego Garcia and aerial refueling could not
compensate fully.[1]

The most productive sea line of communications (SLOC) from
the continental United States to the Persian Gulf runs across the
Atlantic to the Mediterranean and then through the Suez Canal. The
Pacific route is about 35% longer, and the route around the Cape
of Good Hope is about 50% longer. Moreover, the Atlantic route
potentially could achieve a bigger early surge of shipping due
to the higher density of US shipping there in peacetime.

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[1]Competing military aircraft requirements are expected to
limit strategic airlift missions through Diego Garcia to
a maximum of 36 per day. Aerial refueling is not possible
for civilian aircraft.

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
THE INTER-THEATER SURFACE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

Thanks to the recent widening and deepening, the Suez Canal can now accommodate any dry cargo ship, 40% of the non-Communist world's tanker capacity (fully laden), and any naval ship. (The US aircraft carrier Independence made the transit in May 1981.) Whether the Suez Canal could fulfill its potential in a Southwest Asia contingency is harder to predict than the conventional wisdom acknowledges. In a period of tension, measures could be taken in cooperation with Egypt to reduce the risk of ships being sunk in the Canal. The Egyptian and Israeli air forces and the surface-to-air missiles along the Canal could discourage air attacks. French minesweepers are stationed at Djibouti, and US mine-countermeasures helicopter detachments could arrive on C-5s. With prudent peacetime preparations, the Canal can at least be made one of the major uncertainties that will complicate enemy plans.

The utility of the Mediterranean sea lines of communications in a Southwest Asia contingency does not, however, depend entirely on the Suez Canal. Ship cargoes could, for example, be off-loaded at Alexandria or Port Said and transferred by rail to Suez. Or they could be off-loaded at Haifa and moved by rail or road to Jordan and then by road through Saudi Arabia. Or they could be off-loaded at Mersin or Iskenderun, moved by rail through Turkey, and then moved by road into Iraq, by road or rail into Iran, or by road or rail into the Soviet Union.

The land routes toward the Persian Gulf from Turkey and Israel, and also the land routes from Jidda, should be viewed as potentially important complements to the sea route through the Strait of Hormuz. The land routes are formidably long (roughly as long as the ones from the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to the head of the Gulf). But to ignore them and rely entirely on a frontal assault through the Strait of Hormuz would make our strategy dangerously predictable and tenuous.

3. The Requirement for Protecting the Mediterranean
    Lines of Communications

The Mediterranean LOCs are the most productive way for the United States and its NATO allies to reinforce and resupply Southwest Asia. If the Soviet Union contemplates aggression in Southwest Asia, it must consider trying to interdict the Mediterranean LOCs.

First, suppose the Soviet Union contemplates aggression in Southwest Asia in the context of a general NATO-WP war. Its decision to conduct a supporting operation in the Southern Region depends strongly on how much return it can earn on the forces it must invest.

Second, suppose the Soviet Union contemplates aggression in Southwest Asia as a limited war. Doing anything in the Mediterranean that risks a confrontation there seems thematically

inconsistent, but it cannot be ruled out for that reason alone.
If the Soviet Union thinks it can threaten the interests of
NATO in Southwest Asia without precipitating a NATO-WP war,
maybe it thinks it can threaten the interests of part of NATO
in the Mediterranean without provoking the entire Alliance to
war. Perhaps it judges that the incremental risk of precipitating
general war is small compared with the benefits it gains. If it
successfully interdicts the Mediterranean LOCs, it substantially
increases its chances in Southwest Asia, and it puts Greece and
Turkey in a precarious position. (Yugoslavia is unlikely to
offer to transship military cargo for NATO under these conditions.)
Instead of merely pushing a salient into Southwest Asia, the
Soviet Union undermines the opposing defences along its whole
southern front.

The point is simply that Western defence planners should
not take the Southern Region for granted. They should not take
it for granted that the Soviet Union will leave the Region alone,
and they should not take it for granted that the West will enjoy
the unhindered use of the Mediterranean LOCs.

The next section discusses the problem of protecting the
Mediterranean LOCs from the Warsaw Pact. It interweaves an
outline of a strategy for protecting the LOCs with an outline
of the force capabilities needed to implement the strategy.
The section following it discusses threats to the Southern Region

from the Mediterranean littoral. The final two sections discuss

direct threats that the Warsaw Pact might pose to Greece, Italy,

and Turkey in order to increase its pressure on the Mediterranean

LOCs or Southwest Asia.

Only non-nuclear threats are considered. This reflects more

a limitation of the analysis behind the paper than an actual limita-

tion on Soviet behaviour. It is unclear whether the Soviet Union

would benefit militarily from escalating to nuclear weapons in a

Southwest Asia or Southern Region operation. Although it would

have an easier time degrading the throughput of its opponents' LOCs

(mainly by hitting the ports of debarkation), what its opponents

still could deliver might constitute a more effective force than

if the war stayed conventional. Crudely put, although the tonnage

delivered would be less, the aggregate firepower delivered could be

greater due to nuclear munitions' higher firepower per ton.

4. Protecting the Mediterranean LOCs from the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact has little capability to cut the Mediterranean

ALOC by intercepting strategic lift aircraft in flight. Its inter-

ceptors lack the endurance and long-range radar to search autonomously

for targets deep in the Mediterranean. Its radar coverage of strategic

lift aircraft at cruising altitude does not extend beyond the Adriatic,

Ionian, and Aegean Seas. To extend the coverage area enough to permit

timely detections and continuous tracking, the Soviet Union could put

airborne or shipborne radars between Sicily and Crete. (Ships could

even shoot down aircraft that wandered into their surface-to-air
missile envelopes, but NATO could avoid that with adequate maritime
surveillance and re-routing in flight.) The obvious difficulty for
the Soviets is their platforms' vulnerability as they loiter outside
fighter cover, close to NATO airbases, broadcasting their locations
with their radars.

The Warsaw Pact might do better trying to attack strategic lift
aircraft on the ground than trying to intercept them in the air.
The congestion would be greatest at the ports of debarkation,
but enroute refueling stops in the eastern Mediterranean area could
also be lucrative targets. The porosity of the Southern Region air
defences is a key issue. It is also a key issue in protection of
the SLOC; it is taken up below in that context.

In comparison with the threat to the ALOC, the threat to the
SLOC is less confined and more challenging. Pre-deployed ships of
the Black Sea Fleet could range throughout the Mediterranean, and
some quickly refitted merchant vessels could carry mines. Soviet
submarines, deployed from the Northern Fleet before the start of
hostilities, could lurk practically anywhere. Flying a high
altitude profile, the Badgers assigned to the Soviet Black Sea
Fleet could cover all of the eastern Mediterranean, and the Back-
fires could cover the entire Mediterranean. Thus, there is little
question that the Warsaw Pact could cut the Mediterranean SLOC if
NATO neglected to take appropriate countermeasures.

NATO's fundamental advantage in developing countermeasures is the Mediterranean Region's geography. It gives NATO excellent opportunities to restrict access by Warsaw Pact naval and air forces, while NATO's dense base structure in the Region supports attacks on Warsaw Pact forces already present. (All of the Mediterranean Sea lies within about 400 nm of a NATO naval base and airfield.)

The first step in dealing with the surface and subsurface threats to the Mediterranean SLOC is to enforce the Warsaw Pact ships' isolation. Being able to do so discourages their pre-deployment into the Mediterranean in the first place, and it places a ceiling on the damage they can do once they are there: the sustainability of Soviet surface action groups is notoriously low, in terms of fuel, munitions, and repair, and submarines are, of course, limited by their torpedo or missile loads. Although the ceiling is uncomfortably high, it is not necessarily catastrophic compared with the large number of merchant ships owned by NATO nations.

Countermeasures against the Soviet surface threat in the Mediterranean are, at least in principle, the easiest to develop. Without aircraft carriers, surface action groups formed from the Black Sea Fleet are highly vulnerable outside their land-based air umbrella. A P-3, for example, could acquire a ship from outside the ship's surface-to-air missile envelope, approach low, and launch a Harpoon from over the horizon. Augmenting the surface action group

with a Kiev-class ship would not be enough; the Kiev's low-performance aircraft might ward off P-3s, but they could not cope with an air threat that was dense or sophisticated. Soviet surface ships might seek refuge in the Aegean Sea (after accomplishing or abandoning their missions deeper in the Mediterranean). There they could expect some air cover out of Bulgaria, but they would be subject to attacks by aircraft flying at low altitude from nearby NATO bases, by submarines, and by some of the more than 20 Greek and Turkish missile patrol boats. The Gulf of Sidra would at least be more remote from NATO's land-based aircraft, patrol boats, and diesel submarines; however its usefulness as a haven would depend on active, effective Libyan cooperation.

There are usually about a dozen Soviet attack submarines in the Mediterranean, mostly Foxtrot-class diesels. On 31 Oct 73, there were 23. Although the diesel is commonly tagged with the pejorative "floating mine", it can be highly effective. Six Foxtrots spread across the Sicily Strait, for example, would have something like a fifty-fifty chance of getting a firing solution on a typical unprotected merchant ship passing through.[1]

The central problem in defeating the submarine threat is, of course, detection, and that applies to the diesel subs as well as to the nuclear subs. The Mediterranean is an extraordinarily difficult acoustic environment: ambient noise is high due to the

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[1] This estimate is given only to indicate the magnitude of the threat (50% rather than 5%). It is derived from unclassified data, and ignores several critical parameters, including the acoustic properties of the Sicily Strait.

reverberations from many ships in a closed area, thermoclines (layering of the water) persist for nearly half the year, and the shallow bottom limits convergence zones. Barriers and area patrols can be effective in restricted areas where subs are likely to transit or congregate, but otherwise, the surest means of detection is provided by a sub itself when it torpedoes a ship. That ugly fact was behind the successful convoy policies of World Wars I and II. With more than 1500 general cargo ships potentially at their disposal, the NATO nations can afford to lose a substantial number, provided the losses are spread over time and space. To turn the campaign in NATO's favour, losses of merchant ships must be converted into kills of submarines. NATO's dense base structure in the Mediterranean makes it far easier than in the Atlantic to keep anti-submarine warfare platforms close to clusters of NATO shipping. The required commitment of platforms depends mainly on how many clusters need to be at sea simultaneously. Five clusters rotating from Portugal through Italy, Greece, and Turkey would permit a delivery about every four days.

As an instrument of sea denial, the bomber arm of the Black Sea Fleet is a more acute threat in the eastern Mediterranean than surface action groups or submarines. Its single-sortie air-to-surface missile capacity exceeds the surface-to-surface missile capacity of the Black Sea Fleet's ocean-going surface ships. It can concentrate better in time and space than the submarines.

The basic strategy for dealing with the air threat should be the same: make the enemy play the shell game by concealing high-value cargoes among a large number of ships, and make him pay a significant price every time he plays. However, rounding up merchant ships from all over the world takes time, and Soviet naval aviation would be strongest at the start of hostilities. Unless the NATO nations make timely decisions to mobilize merchant shipping, the price that the Southern Region's air defence system can impose may be too low for NATO to win the game.

The air defence barrier formed by Italy, Greece, and Turkey restricts Warsaw Pact aircraft's access to the Mediterranean. Therefore, in addition to protecting the countries directly, it helps protect ships at sea; the seaports of the entire Mediterranean littoral; the Suez Canal; and the airfields in Greece, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel that might be critical refueling stops for strategic airlift. Thus, it is worthwhile to explore the capabilities of the Southern Region air defence system.

The Warsaw Pact has a big advantage in combat jet aircraft in the Region. How big depends on how its aircraft are counted (whether, for example, PVO Strany and Romanian aircraft are included). From the IISS Military Balance, one might estimate a numerical advantage of 2:1. This number, although of little analytical utility, is of rhetorical utility if it suggests that the Warsaw Pact could enjoy considerable freedom of action. For attacks on the SLOC, the Pact

could use its advantage to escort bombers into the Mediterranean or simply to keep NATO's land-based fighters busy defending targets on land.

Greece, Italy, and Turkey cannot afford to expand their air forces enough in the next few years to achieve parity with the Warsaw Pact. They will continue to depend on reinforcement from outside (principally the United States) to maintain the air barrier's integrity against intense Warsaw Pact pressure. This dependence makes it in their interest to participate in programs to improve the survivability of the Mediterranean LOCs. Equally important, the dependence implies that diverting tactical aircraft from the Southern Region to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force increases the RDJTF's vulnerability during deployment through the Mediterranean to Southwest Asia.

Even if reinforcement tripled the number of interceptors, the Warsaw Pact would have systematic opportunities for lightly opposed penetration. Due to the sparseness of NATO's ground radar network, NADGE, in the Southern Region, enemy aircraft could escape detection in some areas by flying low. The enemy could create blind spots at higher altitudes by destroying sites or jamming them. The problem is not just knowing that a raid is coming but maintaining a track long enough to vector interceptors. Without accurate vectoring, the low endurance and poor autonomous search capability of the Region's fighters make it hard for them to intercept a raid. The air defence

problem is compounded because the Region does not have nearly enough surface-to-air missile batteries to form a continuous belt or to defend all the important targets locally.

One implication of the discontinuous low-altitude radar coverage is that aircraft like the F-15 - with its long-range, jam resistant, look-down radar - would be especially valuable as reinforcements, but it is unrealistic to plan on wall-to-wall F-15s.

AWACs is the obvious high technology solution. It is less restricted by terrain-masking than ground-located radars, it may well be less vulnerable than fixed radars (provided it stays far enough from enemy territory), and it is resistant to jamming. However, its detection of low-flying aircraft is still constrained by the radar horizon to about 200 nm, which implies that four AWACS orbits could be needed to cover an arc from northern Italy to eastern Turkey. Keeping four orbits continuously manned from one central base could take about 20 E-3A's. To put this number in perspective, note that NATO is buying 18 for the whole of ACE except UK AIR. Although the number needed to cover the Southern Region could be reduced by using forward operating locations and tankers, the total cost would still be large in relation to what the Alliance is prepared to spend for air defence command and control.

The obvious direct solution to NADGE's sparseness is to build more sites. But if the goal is practically complete low-altitude coverage, then just as with AWACS, the solution gets out of hand.

The difficulty is that the number of ground radars needed to cover a given area is inversely proportional to the target's height above the ground. For practically continuous coverage against targets at 1000 ft, one might estimate a requirement for at least 50% or more sites for the Italian mainland and at least 100% more for the combined area of the Greek mainland, the Aegean Sea, and Turkey. (This estimate is only indicative, reflecting only theoretical radar horizon considerations and not a terrain analysis.)

It should not be surprising that defence resources in the Southern Region are spread thin. After all, Turkish Thrace and the Aegean Sea together are nearly as big as the whole Central Region of Allied Command Europe. Refusing to face the limitations imposed by money and geography will result in programs too costly to complete. The end result will be an unbalanced force structure and a sense of despair.

A more realistic goal is to assure that NADGE can withstand attack and jamming well enough to fulfill its design criterion of reliable tracking at 10,000 feet above sea level. If Southern Region air defences can force Warsaw Pact raids low, they can severely restrict the raids' depth of penetration and payload.

Shallow targets must be protected from low altitude attack by combat air patrols (CAP) or surface-to-air missiles. That would be true even with an AWACs in the sector: unless the AWACS orbited uncomfortably close to enemy territory, there would generally not be enough time to scramble interceptors. Deep targets not under the watchful

eye of an AWACS must be protected by CAP or SAMs. It is unrealistic to expect to defend every target against low-altitude attack; trying to do so simply dissipates scarce resources. The highest priority targets should be identified, and selected for local defences.

The deepest targets are ships in blue water. Few types of Soviet aircraft can reach them in a low profile. Still, if any type of aircraft can reach them with little risk of being engaged by the land-based area defences, they should have a local defence. SAM escort ships can help defend against attacks by aircraft that lack long-range stand-off weapons. The principal threat, however, is bombers with AS-4 and AS-6 missiles, which can be launched from outside the effective range of present-day NATO shipboard SAMs. The SAMs could shoot down a fraction of the air-to-surface missiles, but unless the Warsaw Pact is short on air-to-surface missiles, some attrition must be inflicted on the raid aircraft themselves to make the shell game unprofitable for the Pact. This implies a need for CAP from land bases or aircraft carriers.

The efficiency of CAP, particularly over deep targets, benefits substantially if enough warning is provided so that the density can be regulated according to the threat. NADGE can contribute even if it cannot maintain a track long enough to vector interceptors from the ground. All-source intelligence can contribute heavily, especially against big raids.

5. Securing the Southern Region's Rear

The essence of the preceding concept for SLOC protection is to deny the Warsaw Pact access to the Mediterranean Sea and to isolate its pre-deployed naval forces there from resupply. The elaboration of the concept into a workable strategy involves the use of Southern Region territory as a barrier to Warsaw Pact naval and air penetrations into the Mediterranean Sea. If the Warsaw Pact establishes a stronghold on the Mediterranean littoral, the barrier is circumvented and the strategy fails. The Pact could then resupply its pre-deployed naval forces during a war. It could, perhaps, preserve them in a haven from which they would venture later in the war, after NATO's sea control forces had been weakened, to assert control over the Mediterranean. Being able to recover in the south, aircraft flying from bases in Pact territory could range deeper into NATO territory and the Mediterranean. Air attacks launched from the south would infiltrate the Southern Region air defence system from behind, where it is thinnest.

Libya receives the most attention as a possible Warsaw Pact ally in a conflict. From the Soviets' perspective, it occupies a strategic position opposite Bulgaria. From airfields in Bulgaria and eastern Libya, the longer-ranged Soviet fighters could patrol the axis between the two countries. Some elements of Libyan forces could pose a significant threat themselves, without major augmentation by Soviet personnel or equipment. Libya has some 200 combat aircraft

with a long enough combat radius to reach the Sicily and Messina
Straits and the island chains in the southern Aegean. Although
the Libyan Air Force's actual effectiveness may be severely
constrained by readiness and training deficiencies, the mere
threat of attack can compel a carrier task force in the area to
spread its early warning and combat air patrol aircraft more thinly,
making it more vulnerable to attack from the north. Finally,
Libya's programmed force of six Foxtrot submarines could pose a
significant threat to the SLOC and to carrier battle groups, both
absolutely and relative to the Soviet submarine force.

In comparison with Libya, Syria is poorly positioned to
influence the battle for the Mediterranean. In the context of a
Southwest Asia contingency, however, it would be valuable as a
base from which to threaten the SLOCs going through the Suez Canal
or terminating at seaports in Egypt, Israel, and southeastern Turkey.
The two major seaports in southern Turkey lie within 150 nm of
Syrian airfields. Syria could stretch the ground forces in eastern
Turkey thin by forcing them to defend a 650 km southern front as
well as a 350 km northern front. It could undermine the ground
and air forces in northeastern Turkey by threatening their lines
of supply: the fuel pipeline that supplies them originates only
50 km from Syria, and the two rail lines that supply them lie within
200 nm of Syrian airfields. One of the Turkish airfields that would
be most useful in connection with Southwest Asia, Diyarbakir, lies
100 km from the Syrian border across an open plateau.

Libya and Syria are discussed here only to illustrate a couple of the many eventualities that NATO strategy must respect, not because it it assumed that they would cooperate with the Warsaw Pact in a NATO-WP confrontation. They are, it is true, manifestly hostile to some (but not all) NATO nations and friendly with the Soviet Union, but this has little to do with their calculations of how the Battle of the Mediterranean would go.

In a period of increased tension, when the prospect of NATO-WP military confrontation seemed far greater than today, calculations of who would win would have far greater influence on national policies. As long as the barrier formed by Italy, Greece, and Turkey remained intact, alignment with the Warsaw Pact in a war would seem very risky to countries like Libya and Syria that depend on Mediterranean commerce for their survival. They might believe Soviet claims that the Soviet Union would protect them from NATO aircraft carriers, but the Soviet Union could not protect them from starvation unless it could link up with them by sea or (in the case of Syria) by land. An air bridge could not deliver enough to sustain them.

Secondarily, NATO should have offensive possibilities sufficient to undermine Soviet claims of being able to protect any of its potential Mediterranean allies. Every one of them has conspicuous vulnerabilities. The flexibility and sophistication of carrier air wings figure here.

6. Protecting the Southern Region Barrier

The preceding two sections discuss Warsaw Pact infiltration
and circumvention of the Italy-Greece-Turkey barrier: overflight
by attack aircraft, pre-deployment of naval forces, and enlistment
of Mediterranean littoral countries as allies. Might the Warsaw
Pact smash the barrier with a ground offensive, supported by
tactical air power?

If the Warsaw Pact seized northern Italy and established
airbases there, it would still have difficulty dominating the
central Mediterranean air and sea LOCs as long as NATO had the
use of airbases in southern Italy, southern France, and the islands
bordering the Tyrrhenian Sea. Seizing the Turkish Straits would not
significantly extend the Warsaw Pact's air cover and would not give
it naval access to the Mediterranean - not as long as NATO controlled
the Aegean island chains and the airbases on both sides of the Aegean.
Thus, a Warsaw Pact ground offensive to get more leverage over the
Mediterranean LOCs entails a deep advance and possibly conquest of
several islands. Smashing the eastern end of the barrier (with the
aim of securing a land route to Syria or Iraq) entails advancing
100 km over a sparse road and rail net through mostly mountainous
terrain. With such deep objectives, the Soviet Union might calculate
that it would need a large force advantage to maintain momentum.

Against the existing Southern Region forces, the Warsaw Pact could give its ground forces the advantage of local air superiority. The weaknesses of the Regional air defences in terms of air surveillance, tactical aircraft numbers, and SAMs are adduced above in the discussion of SLOC protection; they are equally relevant to the protection of ground forces and rear area installations.

The table below compares the Southern Region ground forces with what the Warsaw Pact might bring to bear in a full-scale offensive. (Also see the accompanying map.) The table measures the forces in Soviet motorized rifle division equivalents, counting every infantry division as one-half and a Romanian or Bulgarian motorized rifle division as three-fourths. The weighting is intended to make some allowance for differences in conventional combat potential among various types of units, reflecting mainly differences in heavy weapon densities. Although a bit arbitrary, the result is probably more indicative of the ground balance than simple division counts.

The conventional ground combat potentials displayed in the table do not take into account readiness, sustainability, unit mobility, or air defence, and they do not reveal how much of a force's potential derives from anti-personnel as opposed to anti-armour weapons. Hence, certain deficiencies in the Regional forces, especially those of Greece and Turkey, go unmeasured. The table is useful, nevertheless, as an indication of the foundation on which NATO can build: the combat potential can be interpreted as a measure

of the conventional combat power a force theoretically could exercise once its unmeasured deficiencies were corrected.

REGIONAL GROUND FORCES*

*Regular army divisions and separate brigades, counted in Soviet motorized rifle division equivalents. Unit counts taken from IISS, The Military Balance 1980-81.

CONVENTIONAL GROUND COMBAT POTENTIALS

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The table implies an overall WP:NATO force ratio of 2.1:1.
The Warsaw Pact's only corridor into Italy that gives scope to
armour goes through Yugoslavia, and its best axes of advance into
Greece (the ones Germany used in World War II) go through Yugoslavia.
If Yugoslavia can absorb a Warsaw Pact force equal just to its own
regular forces, ignoring territorials, the WP:NATO ratio drops to
1.8:1. If, in addition, Romania does not participate, the ratio
drops to 1.5:1. To get this ratio, the Soviet Union must commit
all its forces from the Caucasus (which it might want to use in
Iran) and all its forces from the Kiev and Odessa Military
Districts (which it might want to use as a follow-on echelon for
Southwest Asia or as a strategic reserve for its western front).

To improve its odds, the Soviet Union could concentrate against
one of the defensive sectors - Italy, Greece, western Turkey or
eastern Turkey. Due to the distances involved, the process would
be time-consuming and conspicuous. Given that a large ground
force had assembled in one of the sectors, not all of it could
fight at once. In Italy, the corridor between the Alps and the
coast could accommodate only about 6 motorized rifle divisions
shoulder to shoulder. In northern Greece, at most 5-10 divisions
could fit on the front line, depending on its location. In Turkish
Thrace, as many as 20 divisions could fit on the longest line from
the Black Sea to the Aegean, but as they advanced further toward
Istanbul and Gelibolu (Gallipoli), that number could shrink to about
6. In eastern Turkey, roughly 5 divisions might deploy laterally

in the valleys. In the cases of Greece and eastern Turkey,
these estimates of shoulder space do not adequately express
the opportunities for a well-prepared defence to delay the enemy
in the mountain passes.

The overall force ratios, the distances that Warsaw Pact
forces would have to move in order to mass, and the shoulder-
space constraints should give the Soviets some doubts about
whether they could break through quickly in any of the four
sectors. Divisions redeployed from one Southern Region country
to another could begin arriving two or three weeks after the
decision to reinforce.[1] Divisions from CONUS could begin arriving
by sea within three or four weeks after the decision to reinforce.
That is not a great deal of time for the Warsaw Pact to assemble
its first and second echelons, break through the forward defence,
and reach objectives several hundred kilometers deep. It is fair
to say that NATO has the makings of a sound deterrent posture with
respect to a massive Warsaw Pact invasion aimed at smashing the
Italy-Greece-Turkey barrier.

That is not, however, the only threat facing Italy, Greece,
and Turkey that NATO must be prepared to meet. If smashing the

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[1]Redeployment of forces within the Southern Region has the obvious
advantage that, provided they are ready to deploy, they can arrive
by sea a week or two earlier than forces from CONUS. In principle,
they can also be sustained more easily since they are closer to
their national sources of supply and maintenance depots. Italy's
mechanized forces could make a disproportionately great contribu-
tion in Greece or Turkey due to their anti-armour capabilities.

barrier is too difficult, the Soviet Union is induced to seek ways of eroding it - making it more porous for Soviet naval and air forces. Ideally, the Soviet Union would like a commitment from Turkey not to enforce the Montreux Convention's prior notification provision and not to mine the Straits; a commitment from Greece not to interfere with Soviet ships in the Aegean Sea; commitments from Turkey, Greece, and Italy not to interfere with Warsaw Pact aircraft passing through their airspace; and commitments from all three nations not to permit their bases to be used for operations against Soviet forces outside the North Atlantic Treaty area in Southwest Asia.

During a period of tension or a Soviet-US confrontation in Southwest Asia, the Soviet Union might try to exact such commitments of non-involvement by threatening Southern Region nations militarily. To take some crude examples, it might threaten a ground attack aimed at Istanbul, an air offensive against Athens or an air offensive against northeastern Italy. None of these is a direct threat to NATO's control of the Mediterranean, but from the perspective of Turkey, Greece, or Italy, such a "limited" threat is of strategic proportions.

The fact that something can be a vital interest to one member of an alliance and inconsequential to another is a constant source of strain in an alliance of truly sovereign states. To prevent a potential enemy from driving a wedge between its members, the Alliance as a whole must accommodate to each member's perception of its vital interests.

Despite the well known differences, Greece, Italy, and
Turkey share some overarching interests with each other and the
rest of NATO. For example:

- For every nation in the Southern Region and nearly
  every nation in NATO, a prolonged cut-off of Persian
  Gulf oil would be an economic Pearl Harbor.

- The Mediterranean lines of communications are important
  for reinforcement and resupply of Southwest Asia and
  Italy and vital for reinforcement and resupply of
  Greece and Turkey.

- The Southern Region navies (and supporting aircraft)
  help protect the Mediterranean sea lines of communications.

- The Southern Region air defences help protect the
  Mediterranean air and sea lines of communications
  and Southern Region territory.

- The Southern Region ground forces help block a Warsaw
  Pact push toward blue water and help protect Greece,
  Italy, and Turkey from Soviet extortion.

These common interests are a basis for common action to strengthen the Italy-Greece-Turkey barrier.

Although the notion of a barrier derives from geography, geography alone is not sufficient to ensure that Italy, Greece, and Turkey can function effectively together as a barrier to the Soviet Union. There must be capable air, ground, and naval forces to oppose Soviet efforts to penetrate. Equally important, there must be a unity of purpose in the Southern Region and the whole Alliance - an understanding of each member's responsibilities and confidence in mutual support - to resist both an assault on the barrier and infiltration through it.

REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES AND COMMAND, CONTROL

AND COMMUNICATIONS: A QUESTION OF BALANCE

William R. Graham

Background Paper

March 1981

REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS: A QUESTION OF BALANCE

by

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In the 1981 U.S. Military Posture Statement, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, reported a situation that has concerned thoughtful members of the national security community for more than a decade:

> Combat forces are ineffective without the support of reliable, survivable, and enduring C^3 systems. Current deficiencies in strategic, tactical, and defense-wide C^3 are matters of pressing concern. Improvements are continuing, but progress is hampered both by the difficulty of defining overall C^3 requirements and by the fact that C^3 competes for resources with other priority needs as an entity rather than as part of the systems they support....

> Information systems used for planning and force direction depend largely upon Automatic Data Processing (ADP) systems. Many current systems are housed in fixed facilities that are vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attack.and some are vulnerable to sabotage. Some information systems lack redundancy or alternate means of access,....

> C^3 systems to support timely intelligence, selection of options, and force direction are all key to the successful employment of U.S. general purpose forces. They are an important technical means of overcoming a numerically superior enemy.

> U.S. and allied tactical systems should be survivable, endurable, jam-resistant, and secure. However, current C^3 systems have limited survivability. Improvements are needed especially to enhance command and control of tactical nuclear weapons. Shortfalls in air-transportable, secure tactical C^3 systems constitute another deficiency that undercuts the effectiveness of in theater C^3 systems. Additional C^3 assets are required to restore communications and to extend communications to crisis areas.[1]

Throughout most of history, it was possible to transmit information only slightly faster than the speed at which commanders could move their military forces. With such slow communications, it is not surprising that battles were lost for lack of timely and accurate information. However, since the widespread use of radio for military communications began in the 1930s, military signals have been transmitted at the speed of light, reducing the time needed to reach the most distant point on earth to less than 1/10 of a second. The speed at which signals travel is no longer a limiting factor in military operations.

Why then is there still significant concern over U.S. and allied communication capabilities? Part of the answer is that military command and control capabilities have not kept pace with the speed and sophistication of communications, and part lies in the fact that modern communication systems, while technically elegant, tend to be fragile and difficult to protect.

A modern example of the continuing problems in command and control of military forces is provided by the case of the Liberty. The Liberty was a World War II liberty ship that had been recommissioned and extensively outfitted with modern electronic communication and sensing equipment. Its primary mission was to patrol international waters off the coast of critical areas of the world to intercept foreign radio transmission that might not otherwise be available to the United States. In 1967, at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, the unarmed Liberty was directed to proceed alone into international waters off the coast of Israel and Egypt, and there to patrol within sight of the hostilities. As the ship was arriving on station, a decision was made in the Pentagon to withdraw

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the _Liberty_ to safer waters. A message instructing the _Liberty_ to with-
draw was drafted and delivered to the Pentagon communication center,
where it remained for fourteen hours before it was transmitted. Un-
fortunately, the message was then misrouted to the Philippines rather than
the Mediterranean. After considerable delay, another message was sent
from the Pentagon to the _Liberty_. This time the message was misrouted
to the Philippines, sent back to the Pentagon, and then misrouted to Ft.
Meade, Maryland, where it was filed in error without action.

A withdrawal message eventually did reach the Mediterranean theater,
only to become bogged down in a backlog of communications traffic at
the Naval Communication Station in Morocco. Several hours more passed
before the message was transmitted to the _Liberty_. While the message
was waiting for its turn at the Mediterranean communication facilities,
Israel began a determined air and sea attack on the _Liberty_ intended
either to sink the ship or to force it to withdraw. By the time the
message was transmitted to the _Liberty_, more than 20 of its crew were
dead, and the ship had been reduced to scrap.

One of the most ironic aspects of the _Liberty_ fiasco was that at
the time of the attack, the ship had been testing a new high data rate
communication system. The system allowed the _Liberty_ to bounce radio
signals off the moon for reception at military facilities on the East
Coast of the U.S. Unfortunately, the orders to withdraw had not been
transmitted over the moon bounce system. That system became one of the
first casualties of the Israeli air attack, illustrating not only the
command and control problems of modern military operations, but also the
fragility of some communications systems used in military missions.[2]

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Vital wartime operations of our military forces depend upon a chain of command, control, and communications activities that must function rapidly and accurately if our force capabilities are not to be degraded. These functions begin with the sensing and collecting of intelligence information, which then must be correlated and digested in a process called fusion. The digested intelligence information and the status of U.S. forces is then reviewed at the command level, often through the conferencing of widely separated command elements. Decisions are made, orders to the forces are drafted, and these orders are transmitted through the chain of command to the fighting units affected. If errors, delays, or blockages occur at any step in this process, the effectiveness of the fighting forces is compromised and may even be destroyed as thoroughly as if the force itself were obliterated.

A typical case of the dependence of our forces upon the rapid and accurate operation of C^3 systems involves our tactical aircraft. Since December 7, 1941, the canonical plan for the start of hostilities has involved a surprise attack designed to destroy the opponent's aircraft and other military equipment before it can be dispersed and prepared to fight back.

In the European theater, many of our tactical aircraft are only a few minutes of missile flight time from Soviet batteries. Only a fraction of our tactical aircraft are on alert; the rest would have no chance of escaping a surprise Soviet missile attack that involved the use of nuclear warheads against our theater airbases. For even those aircraft on alert to escape such an attack, the attack must be sensed, the tenuous information must be digested, and a decision on whether or

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not to flush the alert aircraft must be made in light of many concerns, including safety, degradation of the forces, and serious political ramifications. Once the decision is made to flush the alert aircraft, that information must be transmitted to forces to be implemented.

Since U.S. tactical aircraft are based within a few minutes missile time-of-flight from Soviet missile deployments, the entire chain of action described above must be executed faultlessly in a time interval of no more than a few minutes. Yet if the C^3 and warning systems in the European theater do not perform in this manner, much of the military air capability that the U.S. provides to NATO could be lost before it ever leaves the ground.

There are many cases in the military forces today such as the one illustrated above in which the potential performance of military forces is not supported by the performance of the associated C^3 systems. The concerns that General Jones expressed in his 1981 posture statement have been chronic problems for more than a decade. These problems have been studied so many times that listing the titles of analyses alone would require several pages. Why then are improvments difficult to perceive not only year by year but decade by decade?

The problems encountered in developing effective C^3 arise from a confluence of circumstances that affect both the architects and the operators of U.S. military forces. Many defense planners believe that deterrence is based not upon actual U.S. military strength and capability, but upon an illusion of strength and capability that somehow is more convincing to the Soviet Union and other hostile nations than it is to the U.S. This view is exemplified in the Department of Defense Annual

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Report for Fiscal Year 1981. After describing the growing vulnerability

of the U.S. land-based strategic missile force, Secretary Brown states:

> To say this is not to imply that the probability of a Soviet
> surprise attack will increase as this hypothetical vulnerability
> grows greater. Prudent Soviet leaders would not be certain of
> obtaining the necessary performance from or coordination in
> their forces to make such an attack effective. Nor could they
> be sure that we would not launch our ICBMs on warning or under
> attack (as we would by no means wish to rely on having to do
> so)....[3]

One of the major obstacles in developing adequate military C^3 capa-

bilities is the perspective that the national security establishment

acquires as it develops, deploys, trains, and operates its C^3 in the

peacetime environment. The peacetime problems of operating a large

and widely deployed military establishment constantly intrude and

appear to be more immediate and pressing than do the problems of

fighting a hypothetical war that may in fact never take place.

Such a perspective has led to the extensive use of commercial

communication facilities to fulfill important military functions.

Commercial facilities are excellent for peacetime operation because

they provide a large communication capacity that is both reliable

and inexpensive. Furthermore, that capacity is already in place so

that a minimum of time is needed to begin operation. But often little

thought is given to the performance of the commercial communication

facilities in the wartime threat environment such as those discussed

below, even though it is during wartime situations that U.S. and

NATO security are most dependent upon reliable, survivable C^3.

Another reason that C^3 tends to be neglected by the U.S. national

security establishment is that C^3 is not an apparent form of strength.

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C^3 is not normally included in the static indicators of the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. C^3 is discussed somewhat vaguely as a U.S. "force multiplier" but little specificity is given to this assertion. Unlike major weapon systems, C^3 does not easily impress the people who pay for it: the U.S. taxpayer. The result is that while C^3 occasionally is given high priority in defense rhetoric, it always is given low priority in defense funding.

Before the technical problems of developing adequate C^3 can be overcome, the management problems that have evolved along with existing U.S. C^3 must be rectified. In the past, major U.S. military systems were conceived and developed with no more than cursory regard for the communications needed for the system to perform adequately. The juxta-position of military system capabilities and C^3 capabilities occurred only at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. At those high levels of management, the insight into the detailed issues that affected system and C^3 performance was not always sufficient to put those capabilities into balance. In the absence of such a balance, far more money was often spent on military system hardware than was spent on the necessary C^3 capabilities, resulting in the potential for an Achilles heel to develop through the vulnerability of the C^3 system.

The management responsibility of balancing the C^3 capability to the capabilities of the military forces must be done at a sufficiently low level of management that the overall system plus C^3 performance supports the requirements that initiated the system development. This balance must then be reviewed at successively higher levels of management to assure that the requirements transmitted to the system developer are being understood and met.

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Tentative explorations of such an approach are being undertaken today in a few major system acquisition programs. Protection, nurture, and encouragement are needed if the approach is to become well established.

To design systems and C^3 that are in balance in their capabilities and in their survivability, the designer must have a clear understanding of the possible threats that the C^3 systems must face. First, consider the elements of command. The command structure begins with the President of the United States acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As such, he represents the most valuable single point target in the entire U.S. C^3 structure. While strenuous efforts should be made to protect the President, preplanning should be done on the assumption that he may not survive a very determined attack. Such preplanning must deal thoughtfully with the devolution of command of the military forces. While that devolution is now specified by law as going from the President to the Vice President to leaders of Congress and then to the members of the Cabinet, it is far from clear that this is the best order of succession for a country under military assault. The devolution issue warrants further consideration.

Care must be taken all along the chain of command to assure that no single point is critical to the operation of any vital military function. Single points tend to be far too vulnerable to allow them to be essential-- such points are jackpot targets to the attacker. As a part of assuring that no single point is critical to the operation of U.S. military forces, it would also be prudent to incorporate a sufficient degree of review and control into the command chain that major errors in judgement or perception will not be propagated without being challenged.

Present and foreseeable communication channels make use of varying combinations of land, sea, air, and space-based resources. All of these communication resources must face a wide range of potential threats to their operation. The following categories of threats must be considered by the system designer to determine if he has a viable concept for military communications uses in a hostile environment.

Jamming

Jamming is the process of introducing spurious signals into the communication channel so that information cannot be forwarded reliably. Jamming is often considered in the context of a radio carrier system, where it can be introduced by radio transmitters under hostile control; however, jamming may also be used against other types of systems.

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

ELINT takes several forms, including traffic analysis, in which message sources are identified but the messages themselves are not read, and decryption of messages, such as the Allies were able to accomplish against the Axis powers during World War II.

Spoofing

This is a process in which false information is injected into a communication channel in such a manner that it replaces the desired information without the replacement being detected. The use of false messages long predates the advent of electronic communications; however, radio and other tenuous means of communications add new possibilities to this old art, and the advent of computers

widely emplaced at the end of communication channels opens still further possibilities for this art.

Sabotage

Sabotage of communication channels for military purposes seldom occurs in peacetime. Over the years, the absence of sabotage tends to create the illusion that somehow sabotage will not occur in a wartime situation. Nothing could be further from the truth. Because communication systems are necessarily configured as nodes of equipment connected by long, unprotected communication links, it can be very difficult to provide sufficient physical security to the system to prevent the communication channel from being severed. Great care must be taken in the design of a communication system if it is to be able to survive even modest sabotage attacks.

Conventional Attack

Airplanes, missiles, long-range artillery, and (in the case of communication satellites) nonnuclear anti-satellite systems are all able to attack communication assets well inside friendly territory. The more valuable the communication asset, the more likely it is to be attacked. Since the introduction of precision-guided munitions, fixed, unhardened facilities have become particularly vulnerable to conventional attack.

Nuclear Attack

The high degree of accuracy of modern nuclear systems makes it impractical to protect fixed facilities by hardening alone. In addition to direct nuclear attack, nuclear weapons can also be used

to produce very widespread phenomena that are potential threats to communication systems. Of particular concern are the effects of exoatmospheric nuclear explosions, which can disrupt and damage satellites by radiation-induced effects, will affect the ionosphere and produce "blackout", thereby disrupting electromagnetic propagation on both ground-satellite links and on ground-to-ground links that use radio skywave modes of propagation, and will produce an intense electromagnetic pulse, or "EMP", that can disrupt electronics equipment anywhere within line of sight of the nuclear explosion. These nuclear effects are not encountered in peacetime, but could have a profound effect on system operation in a wartime nuclear environment.

The electronic threats of jamming, ELINT, and spoofing can be dealt with largely by electronic means. The physical threats of sabotage, conventional attack, and nuclear attack must be dealt with by a combination of approaches, including defense, concealment, deception, dispersal, mobility, redundancy, rapid replacement, and hardness. The following three examples will illustrate how these approaches can be used in combination to develop communication systems that could have a degree of survivability commensurate with the forces that they could control.

Satellite Communication Systems

Satellite-based systems provide very economical and powerful means of communication--in peacetime. However, space is neither a sanctuary nor a protective medium in wartime. The Soviets have had the ability to attack satellites with nuclear weapons since they first deployed

ICBMs, and they have now developed a nonnuclear anti-satellite weapon as well. By using either or both of the capabilities, the Soviets could disable U.S. satellite systems at the start of hostilities. Therefore, it would be very imprudent to depend upon satellite-based systems for either transattack communications or other transattack activities.

On the other hand, satellites could prove to be quite useful in communication and in other roles after a nuclear battle. If that battle degraded Soviet capabilities to attack satellites, then replacement satellites might be able to endure longer than peacetime satellites before being attacked. To be available for launch after a nuclear battle, replacement satellites would have to be based in a survivable manner so that they would not be destroyed during the attack.

The most survivable basing for satellite launchers would be the same basing that is used for the U.S. strategic missile forces. Such basing would include the use of SSBN submarine missile tubes for satellite launchers, and the eventual use of whatever basing system ultimately replaces the now-vulnerable Minuteman missile silos. Since the strategic forces as well as the tactical forces could use the replacement satellites for military communications, there is ample incentive for developing such a survivable satellite launch capability.

Drone Aircraft Communication Relays

In the past, aircraft were limited in their ability to act as airborne communication relays by their limited time on station, usually a few hours, by the limited time that the crew could remain airborne before their performance was degraded by fatigue and by the cost of

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maintaining aircraft aloft. If these limitations could be overcome, aircraft-borne communication relay systems could take advantage of defense, concealment, dispersal, mobility, and possible other attributes to provide an integral part of highly flexible communication systems. If aircraft operating costs could be made sufficiently low, it might even be practical to keep airborne communication relay platforms on station continuously, even during peacetime.

Aircraft technology has made substantial progress in reducing past limitations. Reductions in engine weight and increases in engine efficiency are major contributors, as are structural improvements based on the use of lightweight composite materials. Electronic control and augmented stability have led to additional improvements in aerodynamic efficiency, with the overall result that it is now becoming feasible to design high altitude aircraft that can remain on station for not just several hours but for several tens of hours.

Computers and electronics for the control of the aircraft have advanced to the point that it is feasible to make these aircraft unmanned, provided that the mission is sufficiently simple. Station-keeping for a communications relay aircraft falls into this category, and therefore it is no longer necessary to subject human beings to the stress of several tens of hours of flight per mission. Finally, the ability of such aircraft to fly at very high altitudes places them above normal air traffic and within line of sight of several hundred thousand square miles of the surface of the earth. Such an aircraft is well suited to be an airborne communications relay platform.

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Ground Wave Repeater System

This communication system would use only surface-based facilities. These facilities would be radio transceivers operating in the very low frequency and low frequency radio bands, and would propagate signals from one facility to the next via ground wave modes in order to avoid being dependent upon the ionosphere with its associated vulnerability to nuclear blackout. Each transceiver facility would use commercial technology in its electronics in order to minimize the cost, and would consist of a receiver, a computer, and a transmitter.

The range of each transceiver facility would be several hundred miles in the groundwave mode of propagation, and facilties would be proliferated so that each one could communicate with several neighboring stations as well as more distant stations. Messages would be carried in digital format, and would be broadcast throughout the network using the packet technology protocols that were developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in its ARPANET project a decade ago.

Each facility would be designed to withstand the wide area effects of nuclear explosions, primarily blackout and EMP, but would not be hardened against direct attack. Instead, by keeping each facility as inexpensive as possible, the system would be able to depend upon wide-spread proliferation and dispersal to maintain its survivability.

The system would be designed so that substantial resources would be required of an attacker to degrade the system's performance. To further augment the system, mobile facilities using both air and ground platforms could be developed for rapid reconnection of nodes that were isolated by the attack.

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Such a system could be designed with existing technology to accommodate teletype message data rates, and could later be augmented to voice capability. Little if any R&D would be required before such a system could be constructed. However, early operational experience with such a system carrying critical teletype traffic would be valuable in establishing the traffic control algorithms for the facilities' computers. Such a system could play important roles in both strategic and tactical communications.

The technology exists today to make great improvements in U.S. and NATO military communication capabilities. But before that technology can be converted into useful systems, a sense of purpose and balance must be developed that places C^3 within the context of overall military system requirements and capabilities. Until C^3 is required to be an integral part of the system design and acquisition process, it does not appear likely that the full potential of available technology will be brought to bear in solving chronic C^3 problems.

FOOTNOTES

[1]United States Military Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1981, General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 64-65   (Italics added for emphasis),

[2]James M. Ennes, Jr., Assault on the Liberty (New York: Random House, 1979),pp. 45-48, 56-57, and 111.

[3]Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, by Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, January 29, 1980, p. 86.

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GOAL: DESTABILIZATION

Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and
Terrorism in NATO South

by Paul B. Henze

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This paper is a draft prepared for the European American Institute
for Security Research Workshop devoted to "NATO's Southern Flank,
the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf" to be held in Naples, Italy,
21-23 September 1981. It is subject to revision and extension in
light of the discussions of the Workshop and review by specialists
working on these and related areas.

INTRODUCTION

The three NATO countries with which this paper deals—Greece, Turkey & Italy—occupy an extraordinarily sensitive strategic position. They lie athwart the direct avenues of Soviet expansion into Africa, the Arab world and more distant parts of the Middle East and Indian Ocean area. Italy has a more than casual relationship to Soviet ambitions in Spain, Portugal and Latin America. From the Vatican in Rome the influence of the Catholic Church and its dynamic Polish Pope radiates outward to challenge "scientific socialism" wherever it is practiced or advocated, but nowhere more dangerously for Soviet interests than within the boundaries of the Soviet Empire itself.

Turkey is an obstacle to Soviet ambitions in many ways. A strong, confident, democratic, economically dynamic Turkey becomes a threat to all Soviet pretensions about the superiority of Communist formulas for economic, social and political development of non-European areas, including those inhabited by the rapidly multiplying Muslims of the USSR. Greece, neutralized, would be a broken link, both militarily and psychologically, in the chain that connects Europe to its most important energy sources in the Middle East.

This paper does not debate whether the Kremlin is interested in instability in this region as a means of furthering its own interests. It takes it for granted. The historical record speaks for itself and it goes back very far. Many thorough studies address the issue of Russian/Soviet aspirations in this region. Two recent ones I have found especially enlightening are Vojtech Mastny's Russia's Road to the Cold War (Columbia, 1979) and Bruce Kuniholm's The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, 1980).

The extent to which the Soviets at various times have been involved in actively encouraging, underwriting and instigating destabilization is a more complex question. Debate about this subject is healthy as long as it is realistic. I attempt to offer some evidence, some hypotheses, and to point to aspects of the problem which require further historical research as well as a much higher degree of current alertness. By alertness I mean both increased information collection and

analysis of what is happening now and more purposeful and better co-
ordinated efforts to defend Western interests.

I have not intended anywhere in the discussion which follows to imply
that I believe that all manifestations of instability or political
confusion or even of pro-Soviet attitudes, action and results in these
NATO countries should be ascribed to Soviet initiative. On the other
hand, I believe we are past the point where it serves the interests of
any party except the Soviets to adopt the minimalist, legalistic approach
which argues that if there is no "documentary evidence" or some other
form of incontrovertible proof that the Government of the USSR is behind
something, we must assume that it is not. The curious and equally illo-
gical counterpart to this attitude, so prevalent among journalists and
academics in the past decade, is to treat the US Government in exactly
the opposite fashion: to accept the most vague and circumstantial accu-
sations of nefarious and tendentious American activity and put the bur-
den of proof that they are not valid on the US.

Situations need to be examined on their own merits and on the basis of
all the specific information that can be obtained about them interpre-
ted in the light of relevant broader knowledge. What we know of the
Soviet modus operandi over a period of more than 60 years, attested
time and again by the evidence of documents, defectors and other wit-
nesses, leaves very little reason to expect that a government which
has long used the world's most sophisticated and varied techniques of
subversion in the most unprincipled manner would, at this stage in
history, either forego them or permit its operations to be compromised
by the creation of the kind of evidence which legal purists would find
acceptable.

On the other hand, attributing all persistent negative developments in
Free World societies to Soviet subversion and manipulation is absurd
and self-defeating. Both the causes of instability and the manner in
which instability is exploited by a variety of self-seeking groups--
not only the Soviets--need to be better understood. The excesses
and distortions of counter-insurgency doctrine of the 1960's and the
failures of anti-subversion operations in the past two decades (though
many also succeeded!) brought a reaction that went too far. Concepts

such as political warfare, propaganda, strengthening of internal
security, civic action, psychological operations, etc. have acquired
the taint of indecency or are dismissed as irrelevant or ineffective.
Governments have been apologetic about applying them, or have given
them low priority. As a result, when our interests are jeopardized—
as they have been in the whole Arc of Crisis during the past four
years—and we have been forced to contemplate defending them, we have
been left with few instruments for the exercise of power except the
conventional military ones—and they too had been permitted to atrophy
and become obsolescent. Greatly strengthened military capacity—
which the NATO alliance is still far from possessing—is by itself
inadequate to deal with the challenges we face today in a region
such as the Persian Gulf.

We are moving back toward recognition that defensive or pre-emptive
international security actions must be based on a spectrum of capa-
bilities. Each enhances the other. Military strength is the founda-
tion from which other capabilities draw strength and credibility—
and they in turn help determine the climate within which military
action might take place as well as the nature of the military action
itself. Or they may make military action on a broad front unnecessary.

The Soviets know this. So do we, but we tend periodically to forget
it. While the Soviets exploited "detente" to expand their capacity
to engage in subversive propaganda and destabilization operations,
the West let itself be lulled into letting down its defenses and neg-
lected to maintain its own modest capacity in fields such as broadcast-
ing and information services and in assistance to friendly governments
for intelligence gathering and internal security operations. Some of
these shortcomings are now being rectified—but others are not, or
certainly not as rapidly as they could be. The concluding section of
this paper will discuss some urgent priorities.

Lack of space and time has forced me to omit consideration of two
non-NATO countries—Yugoslavia and Iran—which form a geographic
continuum with the three that are discussed in the sections which
follow. They are an important part of the strategic equation we
are dealing with in considering NATO's requirements and role in the

Mediterranean and Persian Gulf region. It will be surprising, as the current decade unfolds, if the Soviets do not find the temptation irresistible to meddle in both these countries to a much greater extent than they have done recently.

GREECE

At the end of WWII Greece was among the highest priority Soviet targets for guerrilla subversion. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria played a major role in this effort. The defection of Tito and the need to concentrate on consolidation of Soviet control elsewhere in Eastern Europe combined with US determination to defend Greece and Turkey as expressed in the Truman Doctrine and purposefully implemented, dictated a shift to a lower priority for Greece and a much longer-range approach. Two basic purposes have been manifest in Soviet propaganda toward Greece since the 1950's:

    a) the fragmentation and radicalization of Greek society, and

    b) the reduction and disruption of Greek links with the West.

After the defeat of insurgency in Greece and the incorporation of Greece into NATO, the Soviets expended little effort on it until Greek concern about Cyprus and the tension which developed between Greece & Turkey over the island stimulated their imaginations. A Greek-language clandestine radio, "The Voice of Truth", began broadcasting in 1958 from transmitters located in Romania and East Germany.

Continuing tension in, and over, Cyprus which exacerbated relations both between Greece and Turkey and between Turkey and the US gave the Russians rich opportunities to seek propaganda and political gains in the 1960's. In August 1964 the Soviet Government openly declared that it would defend the island's "freedom and independence from a foreign invasion". The Soviets shipped some military equipment to Cyprus. Tilting toward Greece in this period, they appear to have calculated in advance with a strong Turkish reaction, worth accepting in the larger context of encouraging Turkish resentment against the US and other Western admonitions for restraint on Cyprus. The "Johnson Letter", sent to Prime Minister Inönü on 5 June 1964, had caused a sharp reaction in Turkey which the Soviets have ever since found convenient to exploit propagandistically.

Meanwhile Greece descended into political confusion which led to a
military coup in 1967. Highly critical of the junta at first, Soviet
propaganda eventually became more differentiated. The Greek military
leadership became increasingly estranged from its NATO allies. Oppres-
sion of artists and intellectuals and purist social measures (shaving
of beards and cutting of young men's long hair, e.g.) brought the Greek
colonels into such disrepute with not only leftist but also moderate
Western opinion that the Soviet aim of encouraging Greek alienation
from NATO and other Western political ties was greatly facilitated.

During the latter part of the junta period, the Soviets took a number
of steps to establish a closer relationship with the Greek military,
especially after the military mini-intervention in Turkey in March
1971 brought an end to the first period of major terrorist assault
on Turkish stability. Turkey's basic, strong pro-Western orientation
was reaffirmed after this development and prospects for destabilization
looked poor. Greece was a more tempting target for detachment from
the Western alliance. Compared to other areas of Soviet concentration,
however, it still did not receive high priority. There is no signi-
ficant evidence of major Soviet or Soviet-surrogate efforts to organize
terrorism in Greece during this period, when a major investment in
building up a terrorist infrastructure was made in several other key
countries, notably Italy and Turkey. One of the minor benefits Greece
received from the junta, ironically, may have been just this: Soviet
hopes eventually to turn the junta away from the alliance discouraged
an investment in terrorism.

There were, nevertheless, occasional fun and games. The Soviet Ambas-
sador in Ankara in March 1970 informed the Turkish Government that the
Greek junta, acting with US knowledge, was about to mount a coup in
Cyprus and information on the alleged impending coup was leaked to
the Turkish press. It generated considerable excitement. No evidence
of serious coup planning by the junta at that time came to light. The
ploy was a Soviet effort to tilt toward Turkey at a time when leftist
propaganda and terrorism were building up rapidly there.

When the second Greek junta leadership actually mounted its coup in
Cyprus in July 1974, the Soviets gave no warning. The resultant col-

lapse of the junta and return to complete democracy in Greece altered
the situation drastically. In 1975 the "Voice of Truth" went off the
air and has never returned. The political parties which resumed ac-
tivity in Greece include two Communist groupings as well as the more
moderate neutralist/leftist PASOK of Andreas Papandreou. The freed
press bounced into operation with all its characteristic liveliness
and irresponsibility. The KKE organ Rizospastis was available as a
Communist channel for publicizing Soviet views. The KGB expanded opera-
tions rapidly and developed a network of agents among journalists
working for the non-Communist press as well.

It is easy to see how this unexpected opening up of opportunities for
propaganda and political action on the Greek scene could lead to a de-
cision to terminate clandestine broadcasting to Greece. These broad-
casts had never gained a large or influential audience. Greek Commu-
nists did not need to communicate in this roundabout fashion with
their supporters in the country. The broadcasts could be an embarrass-
ment to the already fragmented left in Greece which the Soviet have
always hoped to be able to weld into a more effective political work-
ing alliance by attracting non-Communists.

The Soviets undertook a major review of all clandestine radio broad-
casting during the 1970's and terminated eight of eleven long-standing
operations. Like broadcasts to Greece, "Radio España Independiente",
which had used transmitters in both Romania and the USSR, was also
silenced in 1975. The long familiar "Oggi in Italia" broadcasts had
last been heard in 1971. By the end of the 1970's, all but the two
radios broadcasting to Turkey and the "National Voice of Iran" had
been stopped.

The arms embargo against Turkey which the US Congress enacted in late
1974 resulted in a complex of strains in the US relationship with both
Turkey and Greece and provided lavish propaganda dividends for the
Russians which they could never have generated through their own devices.
The propaganda gains came easily but the political exploitation of them
has taken longer to accomplish. The Soviets may never be able to capi-
talize on them fully. Nevertheless, in both Turkey and Greece the ef-
fects of the arms embargo persisted after it was lifted in the summer

of 1978. They are with us still. Resentments and rancor generated
by the embargo facilitated the growth of both left and right radicalism
and terrorism in Turkey in the late 1970's and weakened moderate pro-
US and pro-NATO opinion. In Greece the effects of the embargo and its
lifting have been even more profound and complex. They have reinforced
a growing sense of alienation and political frustration. The result
is that Greece, historically the cradle of the very concept of Europe,
appears today to be in greater danger of rejecting Europe than Turkey.
Its relationship to NATO in the 1970's was more tenuous than Turkey's
and is now in danger of being reduced or severed. Its continued asso-
ciation with the EEC is problematic if the left actually comes to power.
Historical links with the Middle East and survival of Islam in Turkey
are less a deterrent to full political and psychological commitment
to the Western Alliance and political and economic union with Europe
than the strong currents of neutralism and resentment against the West
which persist in Greece.

The Soviets exerted themselves to foster suspicion and resentment of
the US and NATO in Greece during the latter half of the 1970's. Greece
was a major target for a stepped-up disinformation campaign carried out
through the use of forgeries. In keeping with the Goebbels principle
that a big lie is likely to be more readily believed and harder to deny
than a small one, they produced a bogus USIS press release of an alleged
speech by President Carter in late December 1977 which attributed de-
meaning references to the Greek Government to him and had him taking
the Greeks to task for not living up to their NATO commitments. The
manner in which this release was surfaced conformed to classic Soviet
techniques observed in many other countries. It was mailed anonymously
to several newspapers. The sensationalist To Vima and Communist Rizo-
spastis printed it immediately. They were then used as sources for re-
publication and reference in other countries.

Three months later a grossly altered US State Department telegram
dated September 1976 was surfaced in parliament by Andreas Papandreou.
The purpose was to cast doubt on US intentions toward Greece and demon-
strate that the US was committed to favor Ankara over Athens. A bit
later another similar type document, a genuine DIA requirements form
with a fabricated text, was received by To Vima. The document set out

purported requirements for US intelligence reporting on 43 Greek political parties and organizations. Quick preventive effort by the US Embassy in Athens persuaded To Vima that the document was a forgery and the paper did not print it.

Other forgeries not tailored specifically to Greek circumstances, such as the notorious US Army Field Manual 30-31-B forgery (see Turkey and Italy sections below) were also published and used as pegs for commentary and analysis. Forgeries designed to be publicized are not the only form which Soviet disinformation operations take. Widely publicized forgeries have the advantage of wide impact, even when they are denied and proven false. False intelligence reports delivered in oral or written form to individuals likely to be influenced by them, distorted news dispatches, individually tailored "private" letters and tendentious analyses supplied by agents of influence or even by Soviet diplomats can all serve other equally pernicious purposes. Such activities are much harder to detect and no documented cases have been publicized from Greece during this period. Given the persistent Soviet effort to undermine Greece's relationships with the West and to capitalize on existing tensions and suspicions, such activities are likely to have occurred.

The autumn of 1981 is going to be a particularly sensitive period. National elections which, if they should bring PASOK to power, could result in Greek departure from NATO, offer a tempting target for new forgeries or other forms of disinformation operations. Greeks and the West need to be on the alert.

TURKEY

Soviet concern about Turkey can never be haphazard. There are three reasons: a) the deep historical legacy of Russian Imperial/Ottoman rivalry (13 wars between the two empires 1677-1917); b) the strategic significance of Turkey as guardian of the Straits and the approaches to the Caucasus; c) the fact that the Muslim-colonial peoples of the USSR are overwhelmingly Turkic in speech and culture (37.2 million Turkic out of 43.8 million Soviet Muslims counted in the 1979 census).

If it were possible to calculate total Soviet financial outlays for "cultural exchange", overt propaganda, economic aid and subversion during the past two decades, Turkey would rank very high on a list of major areas of concentration. There are apparent contradictions in the Soviet approach to Turkey. During the 1960's and 1970's, it became a large-scale recipient of Soviet economic aid and benefited from relatively generous trade arrangements; during the same period it became a major target of Soviet propaganda and destabilization efforts. Information on the scope and cost of Turkish terrorism which has been coming to light in recent months may, in fact, justify the conclusion that the Soviet Union has invested more in destabilizing Turkey through terrorism and subversion than it has spent on any other single country since Vietnam.

Soviet-Turkish co-operation in the 1920's is one of the earliest examples of Soviet foreign policy pragmatism. Though Atatürk banned communist activity and persecuted suspected communists, the Kremlin co-operated with Turkey in the military, economic and political fields. The economic aid the Soviets have given Turkey in recent years is in the Soviet context a rational continuation of collaboration in the early Atatürk period. (From the Turkish point of view the aid was up until recently seen as a simple free gain. With greater economic sophistication, the present government realizes what negative effects both Soviet aid and trade have had on the Turkish economy—encouraging the expansion of unprofitable state economic enterprises and encouraging barter trade in poor quality goods that cannot compete in genuinely competitive export markets.)

It has been equally rational, and historically justified, to the Soviet leadership to operate on another track and a very different timetable to encourage revolution in Turkey. For a long time this had low priority. Lenin told the first Soviet ambassador to the Turkish republic (S.I. Aralov) not to dabble with communist party organization—there were too few workers. During the 1920's and 1930's initiative toward organizing a communist movement in Turkey stemmed as much, if not more, from individual Turkish intellectuals acting under European—especially French—inspiration as it did from the Comintern.

Stalin's Georgian prejudices and greed propelled the Soviet Union into
a confrontation with Turkey at the end of WWII which stands as perhaps
the most serious Soviet mistake in dealing with the Middle East before
the invasion of Afghanistan. Molotov, reverting to the propositions
which he had made to Ribbentrop in November 1940, gave a shocked Turkish
ambassador in Moscow (Selim Sarper) on 7 June 1945 the Russian require-
ments for a treaty: cession of Kars and Ardahan; Soviet bases in the
Straits; bilateral Soviet-Turkish agreement on revision of the Montreux
Convention--thus pre-empting Western interests.

A major Soviet propaganda campaign built around demands by the Georgian
and Armenian SSRs for recovery of their "lost territories" was already
getting under way. As early as February 1945 the Soviets commenced
nationalist programs on Radio Erivan. During the summer of 1945 a new
Catholicos of the Armenian Church launched a campaign for repatriation
of Armenians from all over the world to the Soviet Union with the aim of
repopulating the territory which was to be surrendered by Turkey. Armen-
ians in Turkey (totalling approx. 80,000 at the time) were used as a pawn
in Soviet agitational activity which provoked Turkish popular demonstra-
tions against the Armenians in Istanbul at the end of 1945. Meanwhile
Soviet operatives had helped Kurds in Iran set up an "autonomous republic"
of Mahabad whose territory paralleled the Turkish-Iranian border. The
Turks were profoundly alarmed. The story of subsequent developments is
too long to relate here. Suffice it to observe that Soviet demands on
Turkey in respect to eastern territorial issues and the Straits were
not formally abandoned until the Khrushchev era.

It is quite conceivable that a friendly or even a status-quo stance
toward Turkey by the USSR in 1945 would have been successful in keeping
Turkey neutralized in the postwar era. There were strong isolationalist
currents in Turkey during the 1930's and 1940's. The Atatürk slogan
"Peace at home, peace in the world" could easily have been interpreted
to justify a Swiss-type attitude toward alliances. Turkey did not come
into the war on the Allied side until February 1945. The Soviets' brutal
demands were made only after the country had officially become a Soviet
ally! This is a striking measure of the extent to which Russian/Soviet
state/imperial interests took priority over alliance considerations at
a time when the US was still basing its approach to the postwar world
on illusions of great power collaboration.

The Soviets literally drove Turkey into the Western Alliance. They
also drove the United States into support of Turkey. At Yalta Roosevelt
had told Stalin that he hoped the Turco-Soviet frontier might follow
the example of the one between Canada and the US. As late as 21 February
1946 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff still argued:

> ...that the US should avoid a military commitment to American
> interests in the Near East, other than through the United
> Nations, because of geographic distances and the impractica-
> bility of assured lines of communication." (cited in Kuniholm,
> p. 212)

The crucial factor in bringing about a fundamental shift of American
policy was the crisis provoked by Soviet efforts to consolidate a hold
on Iran which was already reaching an acute stage at this time. Soviet
unwillingness to forego expansion in this part of the world except under
concerted international pressure led the US to make the commitments that
became known as the Truman Doctrine the following year. It is in this
framework that the US/NATO relationship with both Turkey and Greece has
developed ever since.

The 1950's were lean years for the Russians in Turkey and a golden era
for US/Turkish/NATO relations. The Russians were slow to seek advantage
from the Cyprus issue and exploited it fully only when it had begun to
poison US/Turkish/Greek relations in the mid-1960's. By this time infra-
structure for propaganda and subversion had been created. "Bizim Radyo"
began broadcasting in 1958. A KGB operative who defected in 1967 reported
that the Soviet Embassy in Ankara had begun in the early 1960's to recruit
agents, train them in the USSR and Syria, and then support them in Turkey
to build subversive networks among intellectuals, students and labor ac-
tivists.

Far from instituting an oppressive regime following its deposition of
Menderes in 1960, the Turkish military leadership created a more liberal
political system and a more open society. Socialism, which had been
officially regarded as tantamount to communism in the 1950's, was now
recognized as a legitimate political philosophy and the leftist Turkish
Labor Party organized and played a major rhetorical (though minor poli-
tical) role on the Turkish scene during the 1960's. The Turkish Communist
Party remained banned. Students and labor organized too, as did many

professional and interest groups. Journalism expanded rapidly. Among
intellectuals leftist ideas became chic. The love affair with the US
died with John Kennedy and soured during the Johnson Administration.
The Turkish economy boomed, urbanization and modernization of the coun-
tryside developed apace. The problem of employment for a burgeoning
labor force was eased by massive migration of Turkish workers to Europe.
For Soviet operatives eager to expand their activities among Turks,
horizons seemed unlimited.

Expanded Soviet propaganda operations peaked in a major forgery in-
tended to capitalize on bitterness generated by the Cyprus problem in
1964-65. In July 1966 a maverick Turkish senator, Haydar Tunçkanat,
surfaced "documents" concocted to demonstrate that the US was plotting
to purge certain Turkish military officers unfriendly to the Justice
Party. The case the "documents" made for outrageous and arrogant US
meddling in Turkish internal affairs fell on receptive ears among Turk-
ish intellectuals, journalists and even some military officers who had
been affected by cumulative strains in the US alliance. Denials by
both the US and Turkish governments did not succeed in fully discredit-
ing Tunçkanat who lent himself to Soviet purposes again in 1969 by pub-
lishing a book entitled "The Inside Story of the Bilateral Agreements"
filled with allegations of US highhandedness and bad intentions in deal-
ing with Turkey. "Bizim Radyo" repeated and embroidered all this mate-
rial and much else besides.

"The Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" began broadcasting from the
DDR in 1968. "Bizim Radyo" purported to speak in behalf of the "broad
masses" of Turks without identifying itself with communism as such.
VOTCP's approach was classic Marxism-Leninism. It was aimed both at
Turks in Europe and Turks at home. Meanwhile the operational advantages
of exploiting Turkish workers in Germany, where they were even more ac-
cessible to Soviet agents than in Turkey itself, were realized by the
Soviets. Organization of a political and operational infrastructure
among Turks in Germany got under way in earnest. This infrastructure
has served ever since as an essential support element for Soviet subver-
sion and terrorism in Turkey: channeling funds, weapons, providing false
documentation, asylum and change of identity.

Turks in Germany—and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Europe—have
created an enormous range of legitimate organizations which serve welfare,
political, educational and religious purposes. An illegal fringe of smug-
glers, drug traffickers and various kinds of politically alienated and
dissident individuals also grew up. Soviet operatives found this a rich
field to cultivate and appear, relatively early, to have developed the
practice of exploiting extremists of the right as well as the left for
their purposes.

From 1968 onward, university campuses in Turkey were disturbed by rightist-
leftist clashes and leftist anti-American demonstrations. While Turkish-
US relations were less strained on the official level than they had been
in the mid-1960's, anti-American propaganda and demonstrations against
American installations increased. There was no political violence result-
ing in deaths in Turkey between 1960 and 1969. At the end of the decade,
political clashes, first developing among students, quickly escalated
into street disorders. The Turkish Labor Party had played an important
developmental and training role among militant groups, but it was not
amenable to the kind of manipulation the Soviets now needed. Worse
still, Mehmet Ali Aybar, its leader, had a mind of his own and took a
strong stand against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
He stepped down the next year when the party suffered a resounding set-
back in parliamentary elections, losing 13 of the 15 seats it had held.
Militants previously working inside the TLP now became independently
active setting up new extremist organizations: DEVGENÇ, the revolutionary
students federation, appeared on the scene, followed quickly by "The
Turkish People's Liberation Army" (TPLA) and the "Turkish People's Libera-
tion Front" (TPLF). Such organizations proliferated. This tendency be-
came especially pronounced during the second terrorist assault wave in
Turkey in the latter part of the 1970's, and parallels what happened in
Italy. While the proliferation of extremist groups seems to have some
real basis in ideological and tactical differences and loyalties to in-
dividual leaders, there is also good reason to regard it as a deliberate
camouflage and confusion device by no means inimical to Soviet tactical
purposes. All these groups acknowledged inspiration from Carlos Mari-
ghella, Che Guevara and other exponents of revolutionary terrorism.
It was difficult, except on the right, to develop a mythology with much
genuine Turkish content.

By 1970 public buildings were being bombed, police posts fired upon
and armed bank robberies were being carried out. In March 1971 five
TPLA members kidnapped four American airmen and demanded ransom. When
the Turkish police accidentally visited the TPLA hiding place on other
business, the terrorists panicked and fled and the kidnapped airmen
walked out unharmed. All the terrorists involved in this incident were
eventually shot resisting arrest or imprisoned, convicted and hanged.
Botched as the kidnapping was—terrorist opera bouffe—it had a pro-
found effect, for it actually marked the beginning of the end of the
first wave of terrorist action in Turkey.

The kidnapping incident provoked the Turkish military leadership on
12 March 1971 to ask Prime Minister Demirel to step aside to make way
for an above-party government that would be better situated to take a
firm grip on the deteriorating situation. Martial law was declared
on 28 April in eleven key provinces (major urban areas plus the Kurdish
region)—but terrorism was not to be that easily brought under control.
The Israeli consul-general in Istanbul was kidnapped by a five-man TPLF
team on 17 May 1971 and five days later killed. This brutal episode—
which provided concrete evidence of Palestinian involvement with Turkish
terrorism—provoked the government to take a wide range of exceptional
measures to bring terrorism to an end.

Prime Minister Nihat Erim's efficient government, with the military leader-
ship standing firmly behind it, moved over the next few months to arrest
over 4000 suspects and interrogate many others. Leftist newspapers were
closed, publishing houses producing Marxist literature deprived of licenses
and some civil liberties suspended. Arrests, investigations, trials and
convictions continued for the next two years. This period of restoration
of order was punctuated in March 1972 by the worst terrorist incident of
the period when one Canadian and two British technicians were kidnapped
from a remote NATO outpost on the Black Sea by a group of TPLA/TPLF prison
escapees. The hostages and nine terrorists were all found dead when com-
mandos attacked the hiding place in a mountain village. There was further
violence, including a plane hijacking to Bulgaria, as TPLA members at-
tempted to free the three kidnappers of the American airmen the previous
year who were hanged on 6 May 1972. A final, unsuccessful hijacking

was attempted by the terrorists in October 1972. With its leaders dead and imprisoned, arms caches confiscated and support structure disrupted, the terrorist movement was no longer able to maintain its momentum.

Interrogation of terrorists and their supporters produced a large body of information on direct Bulgarian, Syrian and Palestinian support for terrorism and more circumstantial evidence of Soviet, East German and other East European involvement. The Erim government deprived universities of autonomy, took the state radio and TV network (set up after 1960 on the BBC model) under direct control and gave itself special powers of detention. Restrictions were directed equally at all forms of extremism, both right and left, but the major impact was on the left because rightist activity, except for some religious revivalism which had no relationship to the larger pattern of destabilization at this period, was of minor consequence.

What, from the viewpoint of those engaging in it and underwriting it had been accomplished by terrorism and subversion in Turkey in the late 1960's and early 1970's? Two major martyrs, Deniz Gesmiş and Mahir Çayan (the former executed after trial in 1972 and the latter killed in connection with the British-Canadian hostage incident the same year), and a couple of dozen lesser ones, had been created to be utilized in subsequent terrorist mythology. The two Soviet-sponsored clandestine radios and various underground and overt publications have exploited this "heroic" period ever since. Terrorism had little impact on the Turkish economy, which continued to expand during this entire period at a real-growth rate of 6-7% per year. Turkey's relations with her NATO allies were probably, on balance, concretely strengthened rather than weakened by terrorism. On a more abstract plane, however, the impression was created that Turkey might be a country so infected by the deadly virus of social and political strain that it would be an unreliable ally in the future. Some Turkish intellectuals lent themselves to spreading this notion, which attained a modest currency among the left in the West and was encouraged by Soviet propaganda during the later 1970's. It provided a backdrop for explaining the more acute second wave of terrorism during the period 1977-80 as essentially a manifestation of the weaknesses and contradictions of Turkish society.

The wide and deep faith of the majority of Turks in democracy, the Ataturk reforms and the Western Alliance was not undermined by terror- ism. The capacity of the military to assert itself in measured fashion as the trustee and guardian of the democratic order was effectively de- monstrated. Mindful of the negative impact of the Greek junta during this period, Turkish military establishment was concerned to avoid excesses.

During the summer of 1973, with effective security restored throughout the country, political parties were permitted to resume activity and elections were held in October. The small leftist parties were not permitted to put up candidates. Absence of the left had no significant effect on the outcome of the elections, but they produced no clear ma- jority. A long period of caretaker government followed before Ecevit was able to form an incongruous coalition in February 1975 by linking his now declaredly pro-socialist RPP with demagogue Erbakan's conserva- tive religious party. This was merely the first of a series of shaky coalitions and minority governments that provided the country with in- adequate leadership over the ensuing 6-1/2 years. The most remarkable fact about Turkey during this period, when one looks back, is that its governmental structure, its economy and its society showed so much resi- dual strength in the face of acute political confusion, incompetence and demagogy (especially in parliament) while the country was subjected to a mounting subversive and terrorist assult. One of the few concrete moves of the Ecevit-Erbakan government before it was overwhelmed by, and eventually fell in the wake of, the Cyprus crisis of 1974, was an amnesty which resulted in release from confinement of practically all the terrorists and their supporters sentenced during the 1970-73 period.

The second terrorist assault period in Turkey can be interpreted entirely in terms of internal origins and impetus. Conversely it can be inter- preted primarily in terms of external planning, funding and incitement. Those who demand legally valid proofs of outside support and guidance are unlikely ever to be persuaded of the existence of a high degree of external initiative because the more experienced and sophisticated the external support—and the terrorists themselves in utilizing it—the less likely it is to have permitted conclusive proof to be created and/ or preserved. Placing all the blame on external initiative, on the

other hand, absolves domestic leaders and groups of responsibility for
actions of commission and omission which they should bear. Until we
have defectors from the Soviet security services or their surrogates or
agents, it may be impossible to gain firm, comprehensive understanding
of the relationship of the Soviet Union to terrorism in Turkey
during this period. The process of rounding up, interrogating and
trying terrorists and their supporters in which the present Turkish
military government is engaged is producing a more extensive body of
evidence on the origins and interconnections and sources of inspiration,
support and guidance of subversion and terrorism than emerged from the
crack-down of 1971-73. The Turkish government will serve both its own
and wider Free World purposes most effectively if it is prompt and
thorough in publishing this information and in making cooperative and know-
ledgeable former terrorists accessible to serious journalists and scholars.

The terrorist assault of the 1975-80 period was broader and deeper than
that of 1968-72. Above all, terrorism from the right became a major
feature of the situation. Its ideological focus was never entirely
clear—generally xenophobic, pro-Islamic but not particularly pro-reli-
gious, narrowly nationalist and traditionalist, purist/moralist, anti-
Jewish but not markedly so, vaguely anti-Western but not really anti-
modern, not usually convincingly anti-American and anti-NATO. There was
a great deal of difference between Erbakan's religious-revivalist move-
ment—which lost strength steadily during the latter half of the 1970's—
and Türkeş's National Action Party, which gained and seems to have been
the prime mover in rightist terrorism. Rightist-leftist confrontations,
when set in motion in provincial cities, tended to feed on themselves
and escalated rapidly to irrationally disruptive, uncontrollable out-
breaks which confused the police and temporarily paralyzed both officials
and populace. Rightist extremists served as a rallying focus—real or
contrived—for the left. The presence of the right, which had been
largely absent during the first terrorist assault in 1968-72, greatly
enhanced the destabilizing effect of terrorism on society. There is
evidence of outside support of the right from the Palestinians and
Libya, and possibly from obscure Islamic fundamentalist groups in Iran
and the Arab World. There is some evidence of rightist-leftist colla-
boration. If Agca is accepted as a rightist, his assassination of

Abdi Ipekçi in February 1979 and his attempt on Pope John Paul in May 1981 would rank as the most spectacular episodes of rightist terrorism, but there are aspects of the Agca case which seem to bring both the rightist and leftist currents of Turkish terrorism together.

Terrorism can hardly be blamed for the near collapse of the Turkish economy during the late 1970's, but, unlike the earlier period, it contributed to economic decline and, even after a program of fundamental economic reforms was adopted by Prime Minister Demirel in early 1980, rising terrorism threatened their implementation through widespread, irrational strikes and work stoppages and disruption of life in working class districts. Political leftism is still a minority current among the Turkish laboring class. A high degree of disruptive capability was developed through the radical labor federation DISK and groups spawned by it.

Students as such played a minor role in the second terrorist assault and decreased in importance as it gathered momentum. They had been the main action instrument during the first assault. Agca used student "cover" to prepare for both his attacks on Ipekçi and on the Pope but was in no sense actually a student.

Minorities were exploited more systematically during the second terrorist assault. Armenian terrorism against Turkish diplomatic facilities abroad reached a new level of professionalism and effectiveness. Its connections and sources of support were unclear, but the method of operation revealed a high degree of coordination and careful planning. The lack of clear-cut political demands until the last year or two, when demands for restitution of Armenian "territory" in Eastern Turkey have been heard, gave these Armenian attacks a specially sinister quality. Kurds were extensively exploited both outside and inside Turkey. While the most active Kurdish groups were all leftists, the VOTCP has taken a curiously "conservative" position on Kurds, discouraging separatist aspirations.

The two clandestine radios have continued to broadcast. Careful to avoid endorsing specific terrorist acts and sometimes ignoring them totally, their output during the height of the second terrorist assault concentrated on themes designed to persuade Turkish listeners that their

government, a tool of NATO and the US, enjoyed narrow and declining sup-
port among the Turkish people. They were consistently more critical
of Demirel and his JP and of Ecevit and his RPP. The fragmented leftist
parties presented awkward problems for the clandestine radios when they
became active again after 1974. The VOTCP attempted to overcome them by
emphasizing exile activities of the TCP as the natural expression of
Turkish leftist opinion. A completely free Turkish press, including
several small leftist and rightist papers of obscure sponsorship, pro-
vided outlets for every kind of Soviet, leftist, Maoist, nationalist
and other forms of extremist propaganda. Yeni Ortam, a pro-Soviet
"neutralist" paper designed to appeal to intellectuals, experienced a trans-
formation into Bayrak, a radical rightist organ, in the mid-1970's, in
one of the more puzzling episodes in Turkish journalism during the period.
The country was flooded with leftist books, pamphlets and magazines,
usually sold at much lower prices than those which took moderate posi-
tions or represented no partisan viewpoint at all. From some source,
there was obviously a great deal of subsidization of leftist publishing
and distribution, an important field in a country which has become largely
literate and has developed a large reading public.

Turkey was a direct target of one of the most substantial Soviet forgeries
of recent years: the fabricated US Army field manual. It first came to
light in the crypto-communist newspaper Bariş in March 1975. This bogus
version of a genuine field manual, which has subsequently appeared in
more than 20 other countries, bears a remarkable resemblance in themes
to the forged documents and book produced by Turkish senator Tunçkanat
in the late 1960's. The manual is designed to feed and substantiate
suspicions that the US interferes in the internal affairs of allies by
establishing and manipulating extremist organizations, including the
extreme left, to frighten governments into adopting harsher internal
security measures than they would otherwise be inclined to favor and to
discredit politicians who are insufficiently subservient to US and NATO
interests. Allegations of this sort, including reports of US support for
NMP leader Türkeş, as well as leftist groups, circulated continuously
during the latter half of the 1970's and are known to have had some im-
pact on Ecevit and other members of his party. What has come to light
publicly is probably only a small portion of the disinformation that
was actually spread in various forms.

Terrorism increased steadily during Ecevit's second premiership and continued to spread when Demirel again took the helm. Leftist/rightist tensions infected the police, teachers, civil servants and to a limited extent even the military rank and file. There were many tactical reasons why political leaders did not want to extend martial law or suspend civil liberties. Parliament remained deadlocked during 1980 and proved incapable of electing a new President. Even then the military leadership was reluctant to inervene until it was clear that there would be no alternative—and a _prima facie_ case could be made for wide-ranging political reform. When terrorism had brought some sectors of the economy to a near standstill in the summer of 1980 and cities were gripped by fear as killings reached the rate of 28 per day, the military moved. Its assumption of political power on 12 September 1980 was smooth and welcomed by the majority of the population.

In the year which has passed since military takeover, terrorism has been brought under control and order restored throughout the country. An orderly and comprehensive process of basic political reform has been set in motion. Economic recovery has proceeded rapidly. The rounding up of terrorists and their support structures has proceeded systematically. It is too early to declare the job finished. The attempt by convicted/ escaped terrorist Mehmet Ali Agca to assassinate the Pope in May 1981 dramatized, as nothing else could, the nature and perniciousness of the problem with which the Turks have been wrestling.

In June 1981 weapons, mines, bombs and ammunition were still being collected or confiscated at the rate of 5000 items per day. As of that time the Turkish Government estimated the value of weaponry collected to be at least $250 million. From interrogation of nearly 30,000 terrorists and their supporters taken into custody to date, Turkish security authorities have concluded that the materiel which has come to light represents only a fraction of the total expense of terrorism and subversion in the country during the period 1977-80. There are numerous other needs for which funds had to be provided: living expenses and travel costs for tens of thousands of persons; the cost of weapons, ammunition and explosives expended, lost or still secreted; the cost of propaganda operations, bribes, purchase of false documents;

the funds needed to sustain "liberated areas" during the final year
of intense terrorism before military takeover. Bank robberies, drug
trafficking operations and other illegal money making activities can
account for only a minute fraction of the funds required and appear
to have been engaged in primarily to create the impression--perhaps
even among the rank and file of terrorists themselves--that these
were the main sources of financial support. The evidence that the
terrorists were almost always well supplied with money--both leftists
and rightists--is overwhelming and is underscored by what we have
learned from the Agca case. He traveled all over Europe and perhaps
parts of the Middle East as easily as a wealthy Turkish businessman
would be able to do. He took vacations with no evidence of lack of
funds. He registered at universities, paid his fees and never attended
class. He seems never to have left a hotel bill unpaid or to have
needed to beg money from any casual contacts.

Turkish authorities believe that the total cost of terrorism during
the 1977-80 period may have been in the range of $1 billion--the
equivalent of US and other NATO military aid for Turkey during this
period. They have evidence of large shipments of arms from Bulgaria,
Syria and Europe, of a flow of funds from West Germany and other loca-
tions in Europe. Internal sources of funds remain mysterious. Such
financial estimates vastly exceed those Claire Sterling has made in
her consideration of sources of Italian terrorist funding in The Terror
Network (Holt, Rinehart & Winston/Reader's Digest, 1981). The magnitude
of the financial and logistic support that fed Turkish terrorism and
the lack of evidence of large domestic or foreign Turkish sources of
weaponry or patronage (there was no Feltrinelli in Turkey) substantiate
the Turkish conviction that terrorism had to be financed from abroad
or through funds brought into Turkey in the diplomatic pouch and dis-
tributed clandestinely. There is widespread conviction among senior
officials as well as ordinary citizens in Turkey that the ultimate
source was the Soviet Union. Whatever the true nature and full extent
of Soviet support for terrorism, subversion and destabilization in
Turkey, only a naively benign interpretation of the circumstantial
evidence could justify the conclusion that there had been none.

Have we seen the end of it? Unlikely. The two clandestine radios continue broadcasting, though they have been relatively subdued since the military takeover and seem to have found nothing at all to say about the Agca attempt on the Pope. A successful aircraft hijacking to Bulgaria in late May fit an earlier pattern of terrorist action in a period of crackdown and frustration. The hijackers have probably joined a sizable group of hard-core Turkish terrorists said to be enjoying asylum in Sofia. The hijacking, at the very least, proved that all terrorists had not yet surrendered or been caught. Some may be building a deep underground network now. Though some of the terrorists amnestied by Ecevit's government in 1974 did not resume their former activity, a considerable number did and provided a hardened core for the new assault wave at the end of the decade. The Turkish government is now confronted with the problem of finding a solution for 25-30,000 incarcerated men and women, mostly young. Those guilty of killings and similar violent acts will be tried and executed, as some already have been; but this will be only a small portion. A majority of these people may welcome rehabilitation. But in the end, a much larger proportion of those arrested will probably remain in detention for a much longer period of time than after 1971-72.

The military leadership in Ankara and the great majority of Turks throughout the country see basic reform of the political structure as the best guarantee against a repetition of the conditions which permitted terrorism to bring the country to its knees by 1980. Economic reform, which could bring the country into a new period of sustained high-level economic growth, could also contribute to a social climate less conducive to terrorist disruption. Most Turks, however, to a markedly lesser extent than many foreign observers, do not see the kind of destabilization that occurred in Turkey during the past decade as the natural and inevitable result of social and economic tension. The gecekondular are seen as exploitable by elements—domestic and foreign—with nefarious and self-seeking purposes, but not as areas which generate disruptive tendencies in themselves.

More sophisticated internal security is seen as a prerequisite for controling subversion, and more effective coordination on the international

plane. Turks contend that Agca could never have gotten to St. Peter's Square to shoot at the Pope if European security services had acted on the leads they gave them. They have a strong case.

ITALY

Italian President Sandro Pertini hit a tender Soviet nerve when, in an interview over French television in January 1981, he voiced his conviction that the headquarters of the Red Brigades was not in Italy but abroad. As reported in Die Welt of 24 January 1981, Pertini's specific words were:

> "I don't know, I only suspect it, and therefore I can only express my suspicion. How is it that terrorism was un-leashed in Turkey, in a land that has a 1000-km. common border with the Soviet Union? How is it that it is so strong in Italy, which is a democratic bridge between Europe, Africa and the Near East?"

On 23 January Le Figaro reported similar remarks by Pertini in an interview with one of its correspondents, though in this instance the President was not quoted as having mentioned the Soviet Union by name.

A few days later the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Italian Ambassador Walter Maçcotta and lodged a formal protest against Pertini's remarks. Moscow's sensitivity provoked an extensive debate in Italy. The confessions of captured terrorists have shed even more light on the origins and support of extremism and terrorism in Italy as they have become partially available in the press this year.

Claire Sterling analyzed the most significant features of this material in a chilling article in the July 1981 Encounter. She demonstrates that the Red Brigades were far from an accidental development or merely the consequence of the irrationality and contradictions of Italian society. The intellectual formulations that produced them were provided by a celebrated political science professor at the University of Padua, Antonio Negri. In the early stages, until his death in March 1972 in the course of trying to blow up an electric pylon, the famous leftist publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli provided funding, protection and, along with Negri, lent an aura of chic resspectability to what was

in actuality a scheme not only for destroying Italian democracy—
specifically the Christian Democratic regime—but also of trying to
ensure that only the most radical political alternative would be
available. The terrorists aimed to undermine the moderate leadership
of the Italian Communist Party, to prevent Party Secretary Berlinguer
and like-minded associates from accomplishing their goal of participa-
tion as a respectable political force in Italian government. A docu-
ment written by Negri spoke of the need

> "...to destroy democracy and build a dictatorship of the
> proletariat by articulating the program of Autonomy
> toward an irreversible deepening and enormous extension
> of the civil war." (Encounter, July 1981, p. 26)

The elaborate and highly professional structure which was created
to support the Red Brigades—referred to in the inner circle as "The
Organization"—was protected by a vast agglomeration of New Leftists,
trendy intellectuals, counter-culture organizations and institutions
of all kinds—Sterling estimates as many as 200,000 individuals eventu-
ally to have become involved, nearly all of them, of course, unwitting
of the ultimate purpose of the venture they were supporting—which
proved relatively easy to attract and exploit in the anarchic democracy
which has prevailed in Italy for most of the post-WWII era. This pro-
tective matrix for the "Organization" was called the "Autonomous Area".

The "Organization", as such, was brought into being in Rome in September
1971 by a small group attending a congress of Potere Operaio, the fur-
thest left of all the groupings associated with the Italian Communist
Party. Would this have been contrary to the desires of the Soviet Union,
then or later? Did it seem very important at the time? Who could have
foreseen then the stunning success of the Red Brigades later in the decade?

Patrizio Peci, a repentant defector from the Red Brigades who decided
to talk in early 1980, provided information that resulted in the arrest
of more than 400 terrorists. He reported that Red Brigade members con-
tinued to go to Czechoslovakia for training through the 1970's and testi-
fied that they received quantities of Czech weapons shipped via Hungary
and Austria. There is a great deal of other evidence of Italian terror-
ist connections with Czechoslovakia from the late 1960's onward, much

of which is cited in Claire Sterling's Terror Network. As she observes, it takes a great deal of credulousness to maintain that this kind of sustained support and toleration of illicit activity: clandestine travel, use of false documents and aliases, long sojourns for training, transport of weapons and supplies (and money?) could take place to and from a country which after the 1968 invasion was completely under Soviet control without Russian knowledge and/or encouragement. What, after all, in the sullen, demoralized occupation atmosphere that prevailed in Czechoslovakia after the deposing of Dubcek could motivate Czechs and Slovaks on their own initiative to want to make their country a major supporter of terrorism in Italy? The fact that the Italian Communist Party had misgivings about the Soviet invasion of their country?

The evidence which Claire Sterling cites in The Terror Network (esp. pp. 289-91) of Czechoslovak complicity in supporting Italian terrorism is nevertheless remarkable. Large numbers of Czechoslovak "diplomats" who were active in Italy were identified and expelled from 1968 onward. But it is also remarkable that the Italian government gave little or no publicity to these expulsions and took no retaliatory measures of real consequence against Czechoslovakia.

There is also evidence of many kinds of links with Palestinians, South Yemenis, Libyans. In this respect the associations are almost identical with those that existed in Turkey. Czechoslovakia seems to have played the role for Italy that Bulgaria did for Turkey. Italian workers scattered all over Europe may also have played a role similar to that of Turkish workers in Germany, but less seems to be known about this subject. Long a more open society and with far more highly developed international links with other countries in Western Europe, Italy may not have required this kind of support mechanism to the same degree as Turkey did. Financial support of terrorism may have been easier in Italy for several possible reasons, including greater availability of internal sources. It is unclear, however, that bank robberies and other illicit actions actually produced funds in sufficient quantity to cover the enormous costs of terrorism in Italy. Their purpose may also have been essentially cover and to convince the terrorists themselves (all but a small inner core) that funds were coming from internal

sources. It is easy to see that this illusion—if such it is—could be
seen as advantageous in creating greater conviction among terrorists that
they were actually representative of important segments of their own so-
ciety.

As in Turkey, the intensive interrogations of terrorists that have
been taking place in Italy in recent months should eventually produce
a much larger body of concrete information than has been available to
date. Here too, the basic interests of the Free World will be best
served if the Italian authorities make as much of it as possible con-
veniently accessible to serious journalists and scholars.

Actually the leftist violence out of which the Red Brigades appeared
to develop began in Italy in 1968. Until this time violence in Italy
had been much more characteristic of the neo-fascist right and of apo-
litical groups engaged in extortion and racketeering. Student-based
violence broke out in Italy at the same time it did in Turkey and
early patterns were similar. As has already been mentioned, clandes-
tine broadcasting to Italy from Eastern Europe ceased in 1971. "Oggi
in Italia" which in its early period had been closely linked with the
Italian Communist Party, had outlived its usefulness by this time.
The Italian party was rent by factionalism and severe internal debate
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Daily broadcasts simply made it
more difficult to cope with this problem, which was very awkward for
the Russians.

While Turkey experienced a hiatus in terrorism and subversion during
the years which followed the 1971 military mini-intervention, and vio-
lence did not again become a marked feature of the Turkish political
scene until the latter part of the decade, Italy endured a steady es-
calation. By 1975 there were 702 terrorist incidents in a year. The
rate increased steadily until 1980: 1976 - 1198; 1977 - 2124; 1978 -
2365; 1979 - 2750.

Though the Italian Communist leadership was the ultimate target of
Red Brigade activity to at least the same extent as the legitimate
Italian government itself, the Italian Communists were slow to recog-
nize the problem publicly. Until 1977 Communists widely claimed that
the Red Brigades were merely an extension of neo-fascist conspiracy.

This theory fit neatly into that propounded by the fabricated US Army field manual--though there was less emphasis in Italy than in Turkey and Greece on the US as the motive force in a fiendish effort to conceal reaction under leftist labels. During 1978 Italian CP spokesmen began to acknowledge left-wing terrorism for what it really was and admit the threat to their own position, e.g.:

> "For a long time the Red Brigades were thought to be merely
> a disguise for fascist terrorism, perhaps carried on using
> the more traditional technique of infiltration. Today it
> must be admitted that, around 1970, left-wing terrorism
> appeared in Italy." (Rinascita, 20 Jan 78)

In the midst of this process of recognition of reality came the most spectacular Red Brigade strike: the kidnapping of Christian Democrat leader and prestigious Italian statesman Aldo Moro in March 1978. This was no random act. It had immediate political purpose. Moro had formed a government with Communist backing and was on his way to a parliamentary debate preceding a vote of confidence when he was ambushed and captured. When his body was found 55 days later it had been deposited half way between the headquarters of the Communist and Christian Democratic parties! (See The Terror Network, p. 212). Thus this act of terrorism directed against one of Italy's most pre-stigious leaders was in itself a propaganda action of the utmost seriousness--the medium was the message.

denouement of the
Within days of the/Moro kidnapping the Soviet propaganda apparatus had begun suggesting a US link to his murder. The fabricated field manual was cited as authoritative proof that the action conformed to well-known American operational doctrine. Propaganda fabrications were drawn on, according to a long familiar technique, to provide substantiation for new allegations. In December 1978 Problems of Peace and Socialism declared:

> "Let us note what another Italian journal has suggested...
> the suspicion that the Red Brigades or those who manipulate
> them in Italy are pro-fascist organizations skillfully
> camouflaged as reds..."

The article goes on to speculate that the abduction of Aldo Moro and his subsequent murder were masterminded by CIA. Soviet media as well as Soviet-sponsored propaganda outlets abroad have continued ever since to repeat these allegations.

Forgeries specifically tailored to Italian circumstances have also
appeared. Several newspapers in Naples, e.g., received fabricated
letters on US Embassy Rome stationery in April 1979. The letters
denied rumors of 80 infant deaths in Naples allegedly caused by chemi-
cal and bacteriological weapons stored at nearby US bases and went on
to deny further allegations that oyster beds had been destroyed by
spillage from these weapons leaking into the sea. Two papers carried
the story in May. This is a textbook case of routine disinformation,
but carried out with a high degree of technical skill. This action
paralleled the major overt campaign the Soviets were carrying out then
and recently reinvigorated to oppose modernization of NATO weapons in
Europe. It is doubtlessly part of the large and many-faceted effort
to encourage neutralism and pacifism in Europe which has had consi-
derable success, though it has had little impact on southern Europe
and its main target appears to be Scandinavia, the Low Countries,
Germany and the UK.

In Italy Red Brigade activity leveled off during 1980, but still at a
very high level—and the basic pattern remained the same: domestic
violence against symbols of the Italian establishment. Targets included
industrial executives, prominent newspapermen, a prison doctor and many
policemen and civil servants. At the end of the year the kidnapping of
a high magistrate brought more publicity than any event since the action
against Aldo Moro nearly two years before—but this victim was much
luckier; he was ultimately released unharmed.

The most spectacular terrorist episode of 1980 was attributed to a
neofascist group, the Revolutionary Armed Nuclei: the vicious bombing
of the Bologna railway station at the height of the summer holiday sea-
son on 2 August 1980, in which at least 80 people were killed and more
than 200 injured. No specific motive for this attack, other than
terror itself, has been advanced. The neofascist group first claimed
and then denied responsibility. The actual sponsorship of the action
remains obscure.

The Red Brigades have suffered from more efficient police action, from
defections and arrests as a result of identification of individuals
and facilities. The "Organization" shows no sign of lack of funds or

weapons and no decline in sophistication of operational techniques—
false documents, safe houses, good communications and professional
security procedures. It is still able to carry out retribution such
as the killing of Patrizio Peci's brother. Claire Sterling entitled
her recent Encounter article "Life and Death of a Violent Generation"
and concludes that leftist terrorism came close to destroying Italian
democracy—but has not. One hopes that she continues to prove correct.

There must be Italians who long for a Turkish solution to the problem—
but military intervention in Italy seems out of the question. The
political power of the Italian Communist Party prevents formation of
a strong government with the kind of support the Turkish military gov-
ernment enjoys from its people at the present time. In some ways the
Italian Communist party is ideologically as fragmented as Italy itself.
Unlike most Communist Parties, the Italian one has been the subject
of substantial academic survey research. A lengthy scholarly report pub-
lished more than two years ago by two University of Bologna sociologists,
Barbagli & Corbetta, (in Il Mulino, Bologna, Nov-Dec. 1978) revealed
that 10 years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia only a quarter of
the party's membership shared the party's own official view of it.
35% of respondents held that "the USSR did well to suffocate in time
the danger of a division within the socialist world" while another 33%
thought the USSR was wrong to intervene though the Prague Spring was
an "experiment dangerous to socialism". Older members were much more
pro-Soviet than younger members. A more recent survey by another
researcher was confined to party officials, rather than including rank
and file. Among these 69% followed the official PCI position on Afghani-
stan: "It is an invasion for which there is no excuse", while only 2%
took an unconditionally pro-Soviet stand; but 28% saw some degree of
justification for it. Rank and file, if the Czechoslovak example is
any guide (and it must be) are undoubtedly more conservative and pro-
Soviet. The Red Brigades are going to be able to continue to swim in
an ideological sea with a bewildering variety of cross-currents for a
long time to come, even though stringent security measures may reduce
their capacity to do the spectacular damage they have done during the
past decade.

CHTO DELAT'?

Let me venture a few generalized conclusions from the history I have
reviewed in the preceding three country surveys. I apologize if they
seem to restate the obvious, for I learned long ago that to recognize
the obvious is often the most useful thing we can do.

Indulgence has brought no rewards. Governments which were slow to take
strong measures to cope with terrorism were exploited by the terrorists.
In the end they either collapsed or were forced to act more vigorously.
Bulent Ecevit's reward for his amnesty in 1974 was to find himself under
continually heavier terrorist assault during his second period of leader-
ship, 1978-79. He seemed to find it difficult to believe that the ter-
rorists were undermining him the way they were. Terrorists repeatedly
took advantage of leniency on the part of Italian and Turkish authori-
ties to consolidate their capacity to carry out new operations.

Efforts to avoid embarrassing governments believed to be supporting
terrorism have not paid off. They have, in fact, tended to implicate
the governments under terrorist assault in a conspiracy to downplay the
seriousness of the problem and thus invite continued and even more
brazen support from the outside for terrorism. The Italian government
as early as the mid-1970's appears to have been in possession of more
than enough evidence against Czechoslovakia to justify a break in rela-
tions and charges in international bodies. What would it have lost
by taking these actions? In actuality, nothing was done, and nothing
was gained by failure to act. Turkey has been remarkably tolerant of
Bulgarian and Syrian actions. Again, to what lasting benefit is quite
unclear. Tactical political considerations have always been given as
an excuse. The compromises which all three governments—Italian, Greek
and Turkish—have made with Palestinian, Libyan and other radical Arab
groups have brought no lasting dividends for them.

International cooperation in dealing with terrorism and subversion
needs to be improved and sustained. The same is true in respect to
efforts to cope with propaganda . Those who encourage, underwrite
and support these activities have repeatedly been able to take advan-
tage of more lenient circumstances in a neighboring country to work

against the prime target country. The Soviets have long specialized in techniques of working from third countries on prime targets. Compartmentation in Western police, security and intelligence services has worked to the advantage of the Soviets and their surrogates. There is a strong tendency in all security services to be parochial, and often to be suspicious and resentful of allies. These tendencies need to be counteracted by governmental decisions enforcing cooperation at a high level.

The right and the left are not equal and represent very different kinds of dangers. To say this is not to excuse the right for its brutalities and excesses but to recognize the hard facts from more than ten years of terrorist experience. Evidence is incomplete, but not scanty, and sufficient to justify the hypothesis that supporters of leftist terrorism have with a fair degree of consistency abetted, aided and exploited rightists. This has been done for varying reasons—sometimes to camouflage their own activities, sometimes to extend them; sometimes as justification for their militancy—in some instances deliberately misleading their followers; finally there is the simple purpose of raising the level of tension and commotion—setting everyone against everyone else. Only those who have read no history of 19th or early 20th century revolutionary or anarchist movements would find this new. There is, of course, genuine rightist terrorism. It tends to be less operationally sophisticated and benefits from much less coordinated international support than leftist terrorism does. This is what makes the Agca attempt on the Pope unconvincing as a manifestation of rightist initiative, or (even less convincing) religious fanaticism.

Affected governments and security organizations have been reluctant—and when not reluctant, slow—to make comprehensive information on subversion available to the press and scholars. They need to become much more public relations conscious and skillful in providing timely information. They will benefit from it in many ways. Regular provision of such information will aid in establishing a climate of opinion, both domestically and internationally, where stronger legal measures, better international cooperation and greater allocation of resources to combat subversion and terrorism can be achieved.

The habit of thinking about, and budgeting for, national security expenditures in rigid separate categories has been a major obstacle to gaining knowledge of terrorism and subversion during the past decade and to taking countermeasures. In the US, military planning and budgeting has been compartmented from other categories of national security and foreign operations expenditures which, themselves, have also been rigidly compartmented from each other. Overemphasis on the technical aspects of intelligence gathering has resulted in assigning low priority to methods of intelligence collection which are likely to yield important information on subversion and terrorism. The tendency to concentrate on what is technically difficult and glamorous has resulted in neglect of overt sources of information which can be enormously revealing, but will not add to our knowledge—in spite of their ready accessibility—unless they are systematically collected and analyzed. The Shah's regime in Iran had collapsed before the BBC/FBIS monitoring system had pulled itself together to listen in timely fashion to the agitational propaganda and destructive advice the "National Voice of Iran" was broadcasting into that country daily.

While there is increasing public recognition that the problem of security in the Eastern Mediterranean/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean is one that has to be approached on many levels (see, e.g. Christopher Van Hollen: "Don't Engulf the Gulf", in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1981), US Government and Alliance planning processes have not reflected this recognition. National security needs to be redefined as a continuous spectrum of activity ranging from cultural exchange and economic aid to maintenance of the capacity to land troops in threatened areas or launch nuclear weapons from land or sea at strategic targets. In between comes a wide spectrum of political action and communication capabilities, backed by and sustained through intelligence collection and analysis and research activity carried out in accordance with a schedule of rational priorities.

Though the present US Administration has taken commendable initiative to increase the defense budget, priorities are still not clear. Money can be spent productively, but it can also be wasted. Mere expenditure of it guarantees nothing. One of the minor ironies of the present US

Government approach is that meager allocations for information are
actually being reduced during the coming fiscal year rather than in-
creased. What is still called the International Communication Agency
(formerly USIA) is forced to cut back manpower and funds for a wide
range of non-broadcasting operations. Broadcasting is being given only
token increases. The VOA and RFE/RL are still badly underfunded. The
fact that the USSR has severely curtailed its clandestine radio operations
during the past decade does not mean that it has given lower priority to
this field. Except in a few cases, its clandestine broadcasts have
never been as effective as its overt, acknowledged ones. The Soviets
have expanded both their transmitter and programming capabilities during
the past decade at more than double the pace of NATO countries. Their
impact in the Middle East and Africa has increased steadily in recent
years. The US has made belated efforts to catch up since the collapse
of Iran, but has continued to operate within far too limited horizons.
The British Government continues, senselessly, to try to reduce the
uniquely effective BBC overseas service.

The best way to fight terrorism is to combat it directly and vigorously,
dealing sternly with terrorists who are apprehended and with people who
support them. At the same time domestic and foreign sources of funds
and weapons must be exposed and pressed by all means available to cease
support. Free democratic countries can obviously not fight terrorism
with terrorism itself. Propaganda is a different matter. Subversive
propaganda can sometimes be ignored or ridiculed but it more often needs
to be exposed and its sources discredited. Why not periodically accuse
the Soviets and their surrogates of what we have circumstantial evidence
they are doing—even though we lack absolute proof? Why not generate
complaints in international bodies? Democratic governments have been
too gentle, too objective, too concerned with decency and legality in
dealing with Communist lies and mechanisms set up to misrepresent Free
World motives.

The most important thing to do in the propaganda field, however, is to
go on the offensive. This does not mean that the West should concoct
forgeries and spread lies. Truth and free discussion remain our strong-
est weapons. An enormous amount of experience was gained in the field

of information and broadcasting during the 1950's and the 1960's, and the momentum generated then carried us through the 1970's, though rather haltingly. The last ten years have been a time of steady contraction and retrenchment, both relatively and absolutely. No new technology has to be invented, no new approaches developed, to start being dynamic and effective again. There is no aspect of international operations which would require as little cost to expand.

All aspects of the fight against terrorism, subversion and hostile propaganda, and the parallel effort to reassert our Western democratic values and principles, will be more effective if they are coordinated within the Alliance structure and each member, insofar as possible, works to complement what the others are doing.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROLE
OF TURKEY IN DEFENSE OF THE UPPER GULF

Marcy Agmon

Background Paper

14 September 1981

Prepared for the European American Institute for Security Research
Workshop on "NATO's Southern Flank, the Mediterranean, and the Persian
Gulf," September 21-23, 1981, in Naples, Italy.

Introduction

The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in late 1979 rekindled old fears of the direct threat posed by the Soviet Union to the jugular vein of the West, the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Middle East. Not yet sufficiently rekindled is an appreciation of the related importance of strengthening NATO's Southern Flank. More importantly, operational appreciation of the strategic interconnection between the two areas has lain dormant for two decades.

Few would argue that the Middle East is of no importance to the West. But there are mixed opinions as to the nature of the most credible threats to that region. For some, including our European allies, the threat is indirect. Friendly oil-producing regimes are most vulnerable to internal and regional subversion, including instabilities generated by the absence of resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. Against threats of this nature, there is little that the West can do militarily. To those who hold these beliefs, it is more important to bolster conventional capabilities to meet threats to NATO's center than to improve capabilitites on the flanks and in the Middle East.

To others, including the current U.S. administration, there exists an immediate threat of direct Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf region. To meet this threat, efforts are being made to improve the U.S. ability to project power (the RDJTF) directly to the region through new local facility agreements. Virtually ignored now, but not in the past, is the possibility of exploiting the strategic interconnections between

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NATO and the Middle East--namely, the Southern Flank of NATO.

In early 1957, Secretary of State John F. Dulles testified before the U.S. Senate that the most credible Soviet threat to Western Europe was control without the risk of open war of Western economies through control of the resources required to fuel them:

> In the first place, there is a threat which, if it led to an international Communist control of this area, would mean that the Communists could win without open war, areas which are endangered, but which probably the Communists or the Soviet Union would not want to risk open war to get.
>
> I refer particularly to Western Europe. They are very eager, of course, to get control of Western Europe. The vast manpower, industry, raw materials, that exist there would, if it fell under their control, decisively alter to their advantage and our disadvantage the balance of power in the world.
>
> Now, there are two ways of getting that control. One is by fighting to get it. The other is to get control of its economy so that it cannot exist except on Soviet Communist terms.
>
> And if international communism gets control of the Middle East, they will be in precisely that position. They can, in effect, have their hand on the throttle which can either give or can cut off what is the lifeblood of Europe.
>
> And I would not expect under those conditions it would be feasible for Europe to stay independent of Soviet Communist control.*

This assessment could be made by a contemporary analyst or policymaker. The stakes for the West have changed only in that they have grown.

Bearing in mind that from the late 1940s until the end of the 1950s Turkey was increasingly the focal point of U.S. operational planning for defense of Western assets and interests in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, it may not be too great an exaggeration to note that by the mid-

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*U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on S.J. Res. 19 and J.H. Res. 117, The President's Proposal on the Middle East, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1957, p. 66.

1950s, Turkey was of critical importance to the Eisenhower Administration's strategy for conventional defense of the West as a whole against the most credible perceived Soviet threat in that period. Turkey was viewed as important not only for NATO defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, but also as a "thorn in the side" of any Soviet plan to invade Iranian Azerbaijan and, later, as an essential site for U.S. prestocking and staging for deployment to the Middle East.

Because so much of the same ground is being covered today in efforts to formulate a sensible strategy for dealing with threats to vital Western interests in Southwest Asia, looking back at the ways in which this problem was studied in the past could be illuminating. In particular, the evolution of Turkey's role in this context deserves some elaboration.*

Post-War Global Containment

The aftermath of World War II was marked by efforts to formulate and coordinate a strategy for defense of the West against Soviet expansionism. The threat to Turkey was viewed as immediate and direct, particularly as a result of the 1946 turn of Soviet forces occupying Iranian Azerbaijan toward the Turkish border. The Truman Administration is often credited as the first to recognize the importance of Turkey to the West. But even with the pronouncement of the geographically unconstrained doctrine of "Containment" in 1947, military defense of the Middle East, including Turkey, was viewed as the obligation of the British. U.S. responsibility covered only economic recovery of the region, including military and economic aid.

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*Most of the memoranda cited in this paper are recently declassified. Secret or Top Secret documents.

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When the British expressed their willingness to commit themselves
only to the defense of the Lebanon-Jordan line (the "Inner Ring"), the U.S.
pressed them to consider a more forward position along southeastern Turkey,
the Iranian Zagros mountains, and the Persian Gulf (the "Outer Ring") as
the basis for medium-term (not near-term) planning. In subsequent years,
however, perceptions of the immediacy of the threat to Iran and Turkey
appeared to recede. Perhaps as a result of the Korean War, the U.S. no
longer expected the Soviets to use their own forces in a military attack
but to act via proxy. In the absence of an alternative to Soviet forces
in the Middle East region, the likelihood of direct attack was viewed as
minimal.* The primary threat was acute instability and the danger of new
Soviet-oriented regimes.**

Defense of Turkey was important to the Truman Administration, impor-
tant enough that it pressed for Turkey's inclusion in NATO. But Truman
did not envision an expanded role for Turkey. He rejected a J.C.S.
recommendation that Turkey be encouraged to assume "primary leadership"
among the Middle Eastern nations.***

Turkey lobbied hard in this period to be admitted to NATO, and then
fought equally as hard to make sure that its structural affiliation to
the organization reflected a recognition on the part of the other members
that Turkey was part of Europe, not of the Middle East. A British proposal
that an Eastern Mediterranean Command (encompassing Greece, Turkey, the

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* CIA, Memorandum for the President, untitled, 27 July 1950, p. 1, Papers
  of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary File, Truman Library.
** Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume IV,
   1950-1952, p. 345, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint
   Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1979.
***Ibid, p. 346

Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East) be established under a British

Supreme Commander was intolerable to Turkey. (It was also opposed by the

U.S., which was not eager to expand the formal NATO defense structure to

include the Middle East.) The Turks claimed that their country was "an

integral and inseparable part of the Europe which is facing Russia," and

insisted that their forces serve under SACEUR.*

It is important to remember that at this time Turkey faced a group

of Northern European countries that was reticent to expand the area of

NATO's defense responsibilities to include Turkey and Greece. It is not

difficult, then, to understand why Turkey resisted with such urgency any

tendency to regard it as a peripheral Middle Eastern member of the Alliance.

Indeed, in subsequent years Turkey played an active and even enthusiastic

role in Baghdad Pact/CENTO operational planning for defense of the Middle

East. A factor which must have contributed significantly to Turkey's

willingness to do so was pronouncements to the effect that defense of

Turkey in a Middle East contingency was a NATO responsibility, not a

Baghdad Pact responsibility.** Knowing that there was a firm allied

commitment to Turkey's defense, even in a "non-NATO" contingency (strictly-

defined), was likely the sine qua non of Turkish participation in Middle

East planning. But in these years (late 1940s and 1950s) the issue does

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* Indeed, so strong was their aversion to being considered a Middle Eastern
  nation that the "Middle East Command" was tentatively retitled the
  "Eastern Mediterranean Command." The History of the Joint Chiefs of
  Staff, op cit.
**"In principle the defense of Turkey is and must remain a NATO responsi-
  bility. No deliniation of responsibilities between NATO and Baghdad Pact
  is considered practicable at this time." (Memo from USCINCEUR, Paris,
  to J.C.S., Subject: "Definitions of Areas of Responsibility of the
  Baghdad Pact, NATO and SEATO," 30 August 1957.

not even appear to have been subject to controversy. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may tentatively be concluded that there was a consensus among the NATO allies on this issue.

A Northern Tier Strategy

The Eisenhower Administration reoriented collective security efforts for the Middle East from Truman's vague general concern for the area toward a specific "Northern Tier" strategy. But the appropriate means to implement this strategy was elusive. As discussed above, Secretary Dulles perceived a direct link between the security of the Middle East and the defense of Western Europe. And Turkey, a member of the Southern flank of NATO, had a significant role to play in maintaining the security of the Middle East. "In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to assure during peacetime for the United States and its allies the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran..."*

The British however, did not seem to agree with the U.S. stress on the Northern Tier. This is significant because their role in the region in these years was more active and direct than that of the U.S. The U.S. restricted its Middle East participation to the provision of defense assistance to the local states and low profile joint operational planning with the British as it endeavored to minimize "identification of the United States with the imperialist policies long followed by the United Kingdom and France."** In discussions

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* Basic National Security Policy, NSC 162/2 (approved by the President), October 30, 1953, p. 37C.
**U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security, A Report to the National Security Council, "Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security," NSC 141, January 19, 1953, p.56.

regarding regional forces to be used for Middle East defense, the British

opposed deployment of Turkish forces (or those of Iran and Pakistan) in

the theater, preferring to consider only the forces of Iraq and Jordan.

According to a J.C.S. memo, they refused also to study "time and space

factors for the movement of units to the Zagros Mountain line."* Documen-

tation is sparse on this issue, but the disagreement could reflect one or

more of the following considerations:

o A difference between U.S. and British perceptions of the

   threat to the region--that is, danger of direct Soviet

   attack versus Nasserite subversion.

o British desire or willingness to be responsible only for

   areas of former colonial interest.

o A realistic British assessment of capabilities based on

   cost constraints.

The U.S. soon began to back away from its own advocacy of inclusion

of Turkish ground forces for regional defense. Concern was expressed by

Admiral Radford (Chairman, J.C.S.), USCINCEUR, and Admiral Burke that

Turkish ground forces required for defense of the Northern Tier (Zagros

line) would have to be subtracted from Turkish forces committed to NATO.

Such a shift was considered unsatisfactory.** Further, a view began to

emerge that reliance on a regional self-defense would be ineffective and,

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*Memorandum from Paul Kearney to Admiral Radford, Subject: "U.S.-U.K.
 Politico-Military Discussions on Middle East Defense," CJCS 381, 3 May 1955.
**Arthur Radford, Chairman, J.C.S., Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
 Subject: "NATO Force Goals for Turkey," J.C.S. 1704/72, 10 June 1955;
 USCINCEUR, COORDINATED CINCEUR-CINCNELM-U.S. ELEMENT SHAPE Message to
 J.C.S., 13 June 1955; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Memorandum for Admiral Radford,
 SER 0001267P60, 27 October 1955.

more important, very expensive.

The Suez Crisis of November 1956 had two important effects on the course of U.S. policy toward the region in subsequent years: First, the U.S. decided that the time had come to declare a direct commitment to the Middle East; second, a decision was made to disassociate the U.S., at least publicly, from the British and French in the region.* It is well known that Secretary Dulles was seriously angered by the independent action taken by the British, French and Israelis in Suez. At a NATO meeting in December 1956, Dulles made clear his view that it was no longer appropriate for the Europeans to behave as global powers in defense of extra-regional interests. He claimed essentially that no member of NATO could be excused for using force as an instrument of national policy--"except possibly the United States, which had global commitments and an acknowledged responsibility for preserving world peace and order."**

The Eisenhower Doctrine of early 1957, committing the U.S. to defense of the Middle East against Communism, was clearly a U.S. effort to shape a unilateral approach to the region and sidestep the European Allies. In the course of U.S. Senate hearings on the Doctrine, Dulles was asked why the British and French were not consulted or asked to participate in this strategy, given his view that the primary goal in the Middle East was the indirect defense of Western Europe. Dulles replied:

> ...if Europe, Western Europe, were...a part of this plan, then
> I can say to you it would be absolutely doomed to failure from
> the beginning...I cannot think of anything which would more surely
> turn the area over to international Communism than for us now to
> try to go in there hand-in-hand with the British and French.***

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* Joint operational planning with the British did, nonetheless, continue, but not publicly.
** Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar, New York: Harper and Row, 1956.
***President's Proposal on the Middle East, pp. 99-100.

Current U.S. policymakers would be quick to agree that these efforts to restrain our Allies succeeded all too well over the long term. Over the near term, the assumption of direct U.S. responsibility for the region led to a shift from a build-up of regional capabilities to handle Soviet and local threats to the concept of a nuclear umbrella as a cost-minimizing solution. But this was the approach of the high policymakers who hoped to cut costs and who were convinced that nuclear weapons could provide a cheap, quick-fix solution. Operational planners continued to study and stress conventional defense.

Recommendations on implementation of the Doctrine were made in various studies conducted from early to mid-1957. These studies shared the assessment that Turkish conventional strength would play an important role in deterring or defending against Soviet aggression in the region. This consideration was noted in a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the J.C.S., and a supplemental aid program for Turkey was recommended.* The Joint Middle East Planning Committee expressed explicit appreciation of the benefits to be derived from forces deployed in Eastern Turkey:

> This force is an effective deterrent to any Soviet plans
> for operations in the Middle East. A force of this magnitude,
> sitting on the flank of any Soviet penetration into Iran and/or
> Iraq via Azerbaijan, would be a constant thorn in the side of
> the aggressor. These particular units are well entrenched in
> defensive positions along the Erzurum-Lake Van line and have
> a limited potential for offensive combat operations.**

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* Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Military Planning Talks with Middle
  Eastern Countries, (Study prepared for the J.C.S.), J.C.S. 1887/347,
  14 March 1957, pp. 2-52-2653.
**The authors of this study also noted the following: "The pertinent
  U.S. military objectives in the Middle East are to secure: The NATO
  right flank, air base sites, the eastern Mediterranean, the Cairo-Suez-
  Aden area, and the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-bearing areas. These

This study, requested by the Secretary of Defense, was to determine whether, in light of the Eisenhower Doctrine, it would be possible to effect reductions in military assistance programs without incurring offsetting increases in U.S. military costs. The study concluded, however, that no reductions should be contemplated and that military assistance to Turkey at the current level would be required.

A third study is of interest because it was proposed by the United Kingdom for NATO Standing Group consideration, informally approved by the French, and submitted to the J.C.S. by the U.S. representative for guidance. The following excerpt, although lengthy, deserves citation, as it provides a succinct evaluation of Turkey's importance for defense of the region.

PART I - THE SOVIET EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT
TO THE MIDDLE EAST

AIM

2. It is considered that in war the Soviet aims in the Middle East would be:

   a. To reduce as far as possible the air threat to the Southern part of the Soviet Union;

   b. To prevent the build-up of Allied Forces, particularly air forces, in the area;

   c. To deny the Middle East oil to the Allies.

STRATEGY

3. Any action by the Soviet Union to try and achieve these aims is likely to be severely limited by the Allied nuclear bombardment. However, it is considered that the Soviet Union will attempt two land campaigns, the one directed on Iran and Iraq and the other on Turkey; both supported by tactical air forces. Simultaneously, they would attempt the immediate neutralization of Allied bomber bases in the area...

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objectives can best be achieved by defending the Elburtz Mountain Line[the mountain range of Northern Iran]." (p. 2754.) Joint Middle East Planning Committee, A Study of the Military Implications of House Joint Resolution 117 for the Middle East Area (Study prepared for the J.C.S.), J.C.S. 1887/363, 29 May 1957, p. 2768.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN AND IRAQ

4. This campaign would attempt to capture the oil resources in Iraq and Iran and to occupy the Tigris-Euphrates Valley as a base for further operations against the oil fields in Kuwait, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia. Later operations might be developed across the desert against Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TURKEY

5. Although this campaign would primarily be directed to neutralize the main Allied air bases and to secure the Black Sea exits, it would also be designed to protect the flank of the campaign against Iran and Iraq. If Turkey were successfully occupied, the Soviet forces would be directed southwards to the Levant.*

Despite the views expressed in the studies discussed above, Admiral Radford (Chairman, J.C.S.) drafted a letter for President Eisenhower to send to General Norstad recommending a _reduction_ of NATO-approved Turkish force goals. This letter highlighted the benefits reaped by Turkey through its association with NATO and through military assistance provided by the U.S., as well as the protection afforded by the "growing U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability." It viewed the increase in Turkey's force goals as "illogical," and stressed the fact that U.S. resources were not unlimited. It concluded that U.S. allies should be persuaded to place more reliance on the U.S. flexible nuclear capability and to try to develop "smaller yet more powerful forces."**

USCINCEUR concurred with Radford's view that Turkey should not be permitted to use its membership in both NATO and the Baghdad Pact to press for higher force goals, but he made no mention of reliance on a

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* Office of the United States Representative, Military Committee Standing Group, NATO, _Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff_, Appendix: _Soviet Military Penetration of the Middle East_, J.C.S. 2073/1413, 21 June 1957, pp. 9345-9346.
**Arthur Radford, Chairman, J.C.S., _Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs_, Subject: _Draft Letter to General Norstad from the President re Turkish Force Goals_, 5 July 1957.

nuclear shield. He rejected apportionment of Turkish forces between

NATO and the Pact, but had no objection to "contingency planning, particularly with regard to the use of Turkish Air Forces in support of Baghdad

Pact plans.*

Plans to cut costs through reliance on a nuclear umbrella worked

well (as do most ill-conceived plans) until put to their first test. The

unfolding of events in 1958 made it clear that efforts to cut force levels

in Turkey had been ill-advised and that nuclear weapons were an inappro-

priate deterrent to low-level or ambiguous threats. Instabilitites in

Lebanon and Jordan in early 1958 aroused fears of spillover to Saudi

Arabia and Iraq. A number of documents from this period focused on the

need to secure prestocking and staging rights in Adana, Turkey, for possible

U.S.-U.K. military action in Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

With respect to Jordan and Lebanon, J.C.S. Chairman Twining informed the

Secretary of Defense in late March that "the distances and routes from

Europe are such that successful execution of the plan is largely depen-

dent upon the utilization of Adana as a staging base.."** The same require-

ment was expressed by CINCSPECOMME, London, for the plan to protect U.S.

nationals and interests in Saudi Arabia, to deter a coup there, to re-

establish authority of the Saudi government, or to maintain order there.***

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* He also reaffirmed NATO responsibility for defense of Turkey. "In
  principle, the defense of Turkey is and must remain a NATO responsi-
  bility. No deliniation of responsibilities between NATO and Baghdad
  Pact is considered practicable at this time." USCINCEUR, Message to
  J.C.S., Subject: "Definitions of Areas of Responsibility of the Baghdad
  Pact, NATO and SEATO," 9 October 1957.
** N.F. Twining, Chairman, J.C.S., Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
  Subject: "Staging and Prestocking Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus,"
  28 March 1958.
***CINCSPECOMME, London, Message to J.C.S., NR: 271831Z, 29 March 1958.

USCINCEUR added his recommendation that Adana be used for staging, noting the additional advantage that "movement to this area would not place forces outside NATO area until tactical commitment."*

Tension in Lebanon reached a peak by July 14 with the Ba'athist coup in Iraq. On July 16, Eisenhower requested that a flash study be prepared on "what the U.S. could do to strengthen the military position of Turkey and Iran. The emphasis would be on achieving a more favorable position in the shortest practicable time. In addition to military aid, the President would not rule out special American manned units if this were advantageous."** This request may have been prompted by prior knowledge of Khruschev's decision, reportedly on the following day (July 17), to stage maneuvers on the Turkish Border.*** The flash study itself, submitted less than a week later, found that the gravity of the situation was sufficient to warrant a waiver of regular MAP restrictions and requirements. It recommended the provision of an increased logistical capability to the Turkish Army, particularly to those units deployed in southeast Turkey.****

Thus, the Eisenhower Administration found that there was no better alternative in time of regional crisis than a conventionally well-equipped Turkey on the Soviets' western flank, coupled with arrangements for pre-stocking and staging of U.S. forces at strategically located Turkish bases. Reliance on the British and on regional defense arrangements would have

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* USCINCEUR, Paris, Message to J.C.S., NR: EC 9-2369, 27 April 1957.
** Reported in Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff for the Chairman, J.C.S., on Possible Action by the U.S. To Strengthen Immediately Military Position of Turkey and Iran, J.C.S. 1887/478, 22 July 1958, p. 3557.
*** Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 243.
****Possible Action by the U.S., p. 3559.

been inadequate in a situation which required a display of U.S. resolve and commitment appropriate to the nature of the threat. The actual employment of nuclear weapons was clearly inappropriate, given the levels of expected violence, and the cost-saving strategy of nuclear deterrence proved irrelevant.

From Cold War to Detente

The most immediate concern during the Kennedy years was the formulation and implementation of a credible strategic doctrine to replace the doctrine of massive retaliation. The concept of flexible response required the deployment of substantial conventional forces capable of dealing with a wide range of lesser forms of political and military aggression and the possession of a range of graduated deterrents. First priority was given to the buildup of conventional forces adequate for defense of NATO--more specifically, for the Central front of NATO. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 focused attention on the urgency of such a buildup. Berlin was viewed as "the most critical problem at issue between East and West in Europe,"* and was considered the most likely flash point for a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in the center. Moreover, McNamara's 1963 Posture Statement asserted that "Berlin has become for us and our allies the test of our resolve to forestall any further encroachment of communism upon the free world."**

There is little evidence in these years of the notion of limited war confined to NATO's flanks or of a limited conflict over Berlin. The 2-1/2

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* Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1964-68 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget, April 24, 1963.
**Ibid.

war strategy of the 1960s envisioned a major war in the center, a second
war in the Pacific, and a minor conflict, say, in the Western Hemisphere.*
Implicit in this strategy, then, was the belief that any NATO contingency
would lead to all-out war in the Center, or at least that a war on the flanks
was a "lesser included case" of the big European war and required no separate
consideration and planning.

The Middle East, in the early 1960s, was relatively free of the
sort of crises which would have made it difficult to ignore the need to
assess capabilitites on the Southern Flank. On the other hand, crises
which demanded immediate attention were brewing not only in Berlin, but
in Cuba, the Congo, Laos and South Vietnam. Vietnam, as is well known, was
to provide a considerable and inordinate distraction in subsequent years.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had a profound impact on U.S. policymakers.
Having reached the brink, the emphasis in its aftermath was on peaceful
coexistence. This state of mind continued through the detente of the late
1960s and 1970s, and led to the virtual neglect of the Soviet threat in
many areas of importance to the West. The Northern Tier of the Middle
East, for example, was no longer perceived to be in immediate danger of
Soviet aggression.

> While some of the nations in this region--Greece, Turkey, and
> Iran--border on the Soviet bloc and are thus directly exposed
> to Communist military power, the more immediate danger to the
> peace and stability of the area is internal, and stems from:
> the deep-seated animosities existing between the Arab countries
> and Israel; the power struggles and rivalries among the Arab
> countries themselves; and the existence of powerful minority
> groups within most of these countries; such as the Kurds in Iraq,
> as well as inequalities which require social and economic reforms.**

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*Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1968, pp.79-80.
**House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military
   Posture and H.R. 4016, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
   February and March 1965.

Moreover, policymaking began to accommodate itself, in many respects to the effort in Vietnam.

By mid-1965, the British had begun to debate the relative importance of maintaining their forces in Europe or East of Suez. In the opinion of McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

> ...we have a stake in the BAOR. If they cut back unilaterally, the Germans will make new demands on us, and certainly will make it hard for us to withdraw U.S. troops by mutual consent. (If British forces remain at present strength, we might be able to negotiate some reduction in the U.S. presence.)*

Presumably, increasing commitments in Vietnam made U.S. force reductions in Europe desirable. Bundy did express concern about the loss of a British presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, but he stressed only the utility of having "their flag, not ours, 'out front'...in areas where they have long historical associations."** A credible defense capability for the region was not discussed.

George Ball, in the following year, suggested that the British be encouraged to "give up the pretentions to a world role" and move decisively toward a role in the leadership of Western Europe. He proposed the relaxation of pressure for a British East of Suez role.***

In subsequent years serious concern was indeed expressed regarding the defense vacuum resulting from the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf--but, curiously, this concern coincided with the large-scale reduction of U.S. forces in Turkey, as well as the elimination of a number of U.S. bases there. Southeast Asia had clearly begun to take priority even over

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* McGeorge Bundy, <u>Memorandum for the President</u>, Subject: "U.S.-U.K. Relations," June 1, 1965, p. 4.
** <u>Ibid</u>, p. 8.
***George W. Ball, <u>Memorandum for the President</u>, Subject: Harold Wilson's Visit--The Opportunity for an Act of Statesmanship," July 22, 1966, pp.16-17.

the European area, especially a peripheral zone like Turkey. The reductions were begun by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford under a program known as Reduction of Cost (and Forces) in Europe (REDCOSTE).* Under the Nixon Administration it was modified and absorbed by the "Nixon Doctrine," which emphasized a lower U.S. overseas military profile, as well as a reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the "twin pillars" of Middle East security.

With the shift in priorities in the early 1960s from the Southern Flanks of NATO to the Center and to Southeast Asia, expenditures in Turkey were increasingly viewed as burdensome, a form of "bakshish" demanded by the Turks for U.S. bases which, it was assumed, could easily be replaced by facilities elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its value as a link to the Persian Gulf region, as has been pointed out, was no longer a consideration. Moreover, the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus became a growing wedge between the U.S. and Turkey. The famous Johnson letter of June 1964 to Prime Minister Inonu qualified the NATO guarantee of Turkish defense against Soviet attack and put into question the value of the NATO allinace and the U.S. military commitment. (It should have come as no surprise, then, that Turkey was unwilling in 1973 to become indirectly involved in a non-NATO U.S. effort to resupply Israel.) Turkey's response was greater receptiveness to friendly overtures from the Soviet Union, following the lead of the European allies, which was further fueled by the U.S. imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey in 1974.

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*Lawrence R. Benson, A Brief History of United States Forces in Turkey, 1949-1978 (U), Chapter I, Headquarters TUSLOG, Ankara, Turkey: U.S. Air Forces in Europe, December 1978 (SECRET/NOFORN).

U.S. policy in the 1970s sustained the trend towards a drawdown of our overseas military commitments. Despite increased Soviet activities in South Arabia (the Yemens), the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Ethiopia), North Africa (Libya), and Southern Africa (Angola), the Soviets were not expected to disturb directly the tranquility of the Middle Eastern states on their southern border. As late as January 1977, the U.S. posture was "planned on the assumption that, in conjunction with our allies, we must be able to respond to one major contingency (with Europe and Korea as the two test cases) preceded by a minor contingency (such as a conflict in the Middle East not involving Soviet forces)."*

The logic of detente had such a firm hold that even the serious deterioration of Southern Flank self-defensive capabilities was not viewed with particular alarm, because "reductions in East-West tensions and the negotiated control of armaments could make deficiencies in the defense efforts of Southern European countries less important in the efforts to maintain the security of the NATO area."** This assessment was published only eight months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stimulated a rethinking of the premises of detente.

Conclusion

The course of U.S. policy toward the Southern Flank of NATO and

* Report of the Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs, January 17, 1977, p. 54. Emphasis added.
**Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1979, p. 47.

toward the Persian Gulf region since the late 1940s illustrates the long-term damage which can be done through well-intentioned wishful thinking. It also points to options available for defense of our Persian Gulf interests that need not require the rapid projection of U.S. forces from CONUS. Such options could exploit the operational synergism of the Southern Flank and Persian Gulf theaters, as was recognized but poorly implemented in the 1950s.

The tendency to assess area-specific force requirements in terms of evaluations of Soviet intentions, as was evident in the 1960s and 1970s, has proven dangerous. The growth of Soviet capability to project power into the Persian Gulf region was virtually ignored, as a consequence of the desire to believe in the momentum of detente, until the invasion of Afghanistan forced believers to revise their perceptions of Soviet intentions. (Many, however, continue to maintain that the most serious threat in the region is not the direct threat of Soviet aggression, but the instabilities generated largely by the Arab-Israel conflict.)

The current U.S. administration recognizes the need to meet the growing Soviet threat in the region, but has chosen a means to that end which appears to have as little chance of success as did the nuclear umbrella of the 1950s. The shadow of the RDJTF is nearly invisible. While the nuclear deterrent offered too much power too early in a conflict to be a credible deterrent, the RDJTF offers too little too late to affect the outcome.

A substantial enhancement of Turkish forces, coupled with the forward deployment of, perhaps, U.S. air forces, could serve many purposes:

(1) It would enhance the security of a stable but currently

vulnerable NATO ally.

(2)   It would give the U.S. a combat presence in the region
      without removing forces from the NATO area.

(3)   It would cast a proximate shadow over any Soviet planned
      operations in the region.

(4)   It would provide the sort of "over-the-horizon" or low-
      profile presence desired by fragile regional allies.

Turkey, needless to say, must be assured that the defense commitment
of NATO against Soviet aggression is unconditional, as it was assured in
the 1950s. And despite the success of U.S. efforts in the past to limit
the horizons of our other NATO allies to the European continent, the U.S.
must be willing to pay the price of acceptance of independent allied action
in return for their greater participation in global defense where vital
NATO interests are involved.

NATO'S CRITICAL SOUTHERN FLANK

William J. Crowe, Jr.

Background Paper

January 1981

NATO's Critical Southern Flank

Europe

by William J. Crowe Jr.

NATO was significantly bolstered last October when an accord was reached to bring Greece back into the alliance's military structure, ending a six-year absence.

Hopefully, Greek re-entry will focus greater attention not only in Washington but throughout Europe on NATO's southern flank, whose critical significance often has been under-recognized.

In particular, the alliance must count on Greece and Turkey to block Warsaw Pact penetration to the Mediterranean, and prevent seizure of the Turkish Straits, which would allow the large Soviet Black Sea Fleet unrestrained access to the Mediterranean. One thousand merchant vessels ply the Mediterranean every day, over a third of them tankers carrying some 40% of Europe's petroleum needs. Soviet dominance of even a part of the Mediterranean would cut this lifeline, and outflank the land forces defending central and southern Europe.

Moreover, the region's strategic importance has been dramatically increased by recent events in the Middle East. In essence Turkey is the one alliance nation in the Middle East and it sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf. Turkey's forces, installations, air space, terrain and political orientation must be a part of any Western or Soviet strategic calculations.

Since the late 1960s the Soviets have constructed a blue water fleet and deployed significant forces in the Mediterranean, forcing major revision of NATO strategies formulated when the alliance's maritime superiority was undisputed. No longer can NATO navies plan to devote their full effort to support of the land battle; sea control must be an initial priority for at least a major portion of their resources. Moreover, in collaboration with land-based aircraft, alliance ships must combat long-range Soviet bombers, which are growing steadily in numbers, proficiency and range.

Simultaneously U.S. Navy resources have steadily dwindled. For the past year Indian Ocean requirements have left only one U.S. carrier deployed in the Mediterranean. This contrasts starkly with earlier decades when as many as four carriers were assigned there. Clearly, NATO could put to good use in the Mediterranean more and newer ships, as well as additional sea-based and land-based aircraft.

Another relatively new burden for NATO planners is the future posture of the non-aligned nations in the region. At present, the Soviets enjoy only limited support around the Mediterranean Basin. But, given the chronic instability of the eastern and southern littorals, and the increasing numbers of modern weapons found there, no NATO planner can ignore the potential dangers from his rear. Libya, for example, possesses a force of Soviet-built aircraft which far exceeds that country's reasonable defense needs.

However, particularly with Greek re-integration progressing, the most pressing point of concern on the southern flank remains Turkey, which, in recent years, has suffered a distressing decline in military, economic and political health.

Turkey's large and well-disciplined army is alarmingly under-equipped. Earlier American aid brought Turkish land armaments up to Korean war standards, but the U.S. arms embargo of the '70s and other constraints have severely restricted further modernization.

In the strategically vital plains of Thrace, the Turks would confront up-to-date Warsaw Pact armor with a far smaller force of aged, under-gunned and relatively outmatched tanks, and with few modern anti-tank weapons. In the air the story is little better: Turkish numbers and quality have fallen far behind the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, Turkey, along with other nations of the region, today suffers an armament imbalance vis-a-vis potential attackers reminiscent of that which 30 years ago inspired the Truman Doctrine infusion of modern equipment.

Economically, Turkey has been plagued for most of the last decade by declining foreign exchange revenues, heavy foreign debt burdens and soaring energy costs. Her imported oil bill for the new year alone may exceed her total export income. Such ills have combined with an explosive population growth and intense urbanization problems to destabilize the young democracy.

In September reluctant military leaders felt compelled to oust the civil leadership and undertook to restore public order and confidence. Thus far, the military government has had dramatic success in suppressing (but not yet eliminating) terrorism, and has pledged to pursue vigorously the stern economic measures launched by the Demirel government. The military leaders acknowledge that freely elected government has become a fact of political life in Turkey and have stated clearly that it is their intention to return to civilian control as soon as possible.

In sum, there is continued cause for concern on NATO's southern flank, which Greek reintegration has only partly alleviated. Some needs can be confronted by the alliance acting jointly, but others might best be addressed by individual NATO nations.

As an example, Italy recently entered an accord to guarantee Maltese neutrality, and thus foreclose Soviet naval use of that strategic island. Similarly, U.S. deployments in the Gulf area and closer bilateral ties with Egypt indirectly benefit NATO by enhancing stability along the oil routes. Also, several Northern European nations are supplying Turkey with older but still potent fighter aircraft, and German military and economic assistance to Turkey is substantial.

However, such efforts are only a harbinger of the commitment and division of labor which the future will require. Over the coming decade a continuing stream of assistance to Turkey, and also to Greece, will be necessary if these two nations are to remain an effective bulwark against Soviet dominance of the Mediterranean Basin. Moreover, the U.S. forces deployed elsewhere will have to be compensated for in some fashion.

In weighing these needs against competing demands the more prosperous members of NATO must bear in mind that the loss to the Soviets of even a portion of the Mediterranean could be a fatal blow to the alliance.

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