

"TURKEY AND THE COMMUNITY"
TEPSA/IEP, Bonn, 28-29/XI/1980

- (1) programma e lista dei partecipanti
- (2) Ali Birand, Mehmet: "The implications of internal Turkish developments on her relations with the West and the EEC"
- (3) Benkert, Anton: "The economic problems of the Turkish relationship with the Communities"
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- (7) Wessels, Wolfgang: "Turkey and European Political Cooperation"
- (8) Missir, Livio: "Association et perspectives"

Turkey and the Community

- November 28 (Friday)
- 14.30 Opening of the conference
Gianni Bonvicini, Secretary General of TEPSA
Wolfgang Wessels, Institut für Europäische Politik
- 14.45 The internal turkish developments - implications for the relationship towards Western Europe and the Community
Introductory statement:
Mehmet Ali Birand, Milliyet, Brussels
Seyfi Taşhan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara
- 16.30 Break
- 16.45 The economic problems of the turkish relationship with the Community
a) for Turkey
Introductory statement:
Gülten Kazgan, Faculty of Economics of the University of Istanbul
b) for the Community
Introductory statement:
Anton Bänkert, Federal Ministry of Economy, Bonn
- 19.30 Dinner - Invitation on behalf of Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs, presided by Dr. Per Fischer, head of the Department for External Economic and Development Policies and European Integration, Hotel Steigenberger, I. Stock, Salon 7/8
- November 29 (Saturday)
- 9.00 The security-dimension
a) for Turkey
Introductory statement:
Maurizio Cremasco, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
b) for Western Europe:
Sir Bernard Burrows, Federal Trust for Education and Research, London
- 11.00 Break
- 11.15 The institutional and political links
a) The association agreement and beyond
Introductory statement:
Livio Missir, EC-Commission, Brussels
b) Political Cooperation and Turkey
Introductory statement:
Wolfgang Wessels, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn

- 13.30 Lunch
- 14.30 Constellations within the Community - views and interests related with Turkey/EC problems
Statements by:
Alberto Aliboni, Istituto Affari Internazionale, Rom, on: The Italian perspective
Sir Bernard Burrows, London, on: The UK perspective
Christian Frank, Louvain, on: The Belgian perspective
Dietrich von Kyaw, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, on: The German perspective
Gérard Moulin, Ministère de l'Economie, Paris, on: The French perspective
Frederic M. de Planque, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Den Haag, on: The Dutch perspective
- 16.30 Break
- 16.45 Options ahead - conclusions for further work
Introductory statement:
Udo Steinbach, Orient-Institut, Hamburg
Wolfgang Wessels, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn
- 18.30 End of the conference
- 20.00 Dinner - Invitation by His Excellency Vahit Halefoglu, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, Gernotstraße 5, Bonn-Bad Godesberg

November 30
(Sunday)

9.00 - 12.00

Meeting of the project group

Place: Bonn 1, Bachstr. 32, Europa-Zentrum, Tel.: 0228/653259

Responsible: Sir Bernard Burrows, Gianni Bonvicini, Udo Steinbach, Wolfgang Wessels

Introductory statements should not be longer than 15 minutes, based on a three-pages-paper.

Working languages: English and French (no translations)

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNAL TURKISH DEVELOPMENTS
ON HER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND THE EEC

by

Mehmet Ali Birand

(European editor of the Turkish
daily "Milliyet" and author of
several books on Turkish foreign
policy)

(Paper for the TEPISA/IEP-conference on:
Turkey and the European Community,
Bonn, 28/29th november 1980)

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNAL TURKISH DEVELOPMENTS
ON HER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND THE EEC

which

Democratic government/is a condition "sine qua non" to membership of the EEC, is temporarily suspended in Turkey. Without going into the well known details of why the coup happened, I will deal with the current situation and the implications to Turkey's relations with the West in general, with the EEC in particular.

For the third time in 20 years, Turkey's military high command has stepped in to heal a country torn by political polarization, economic bankruptcy and social upheaval. This is Turkey's last card. Today's military is condemned to succeed. If General Evren fails, there will probably be a succession of coups, culminating in a bloody civil war worse than before. For there is no fall back position, no strong civilian leader in sight, no parliament to come back to.

The military high command who assumed power has much more difficult, delicate and tough tasks ahead. The internal and external environment make them vulnerable. They have to reach their aims rather quickly. There is always the risk of erosion of the ^{power and the} goodwill which has greeted them today. If they waste their time, if they carry on too long, they might fall into situations or take decisions which they cannot even consider today.

Internally, democracy, human rights, the right to have political convictions and syndical rights are now entrenched beliefs in the daily lives of the Turkish people. They cannot be expected to wait indefinitely without the fundamental rights and freedoms acquired through the years. At the same time, everybody expects the military to solve all long pending problems.

Externally, the Western scene is also highly sensitive to human rights issues and upholding of democratic institutions, practically giving these issues a quasi-religious significance. In this context,

Turkey will be the only militarily bulrd country in Europe.

Therefore Turkey's new rulers will have to perform with great tact, delicacy and considerable speed to solve intriguing problems in a difficult internal and external environment. The aims that the Generals reluctantly set out for themselves can neither be compared to the environment of the 1960 and 1971 military interventions, nor can the conditions be treated as similar.

Today's Generals are much more vulnerable than their predecessors. They will need the support of the public and their Allies, economically and politically than any other previous civilian government. The Western governments, who accepted the military take-over with relative understanding and restraint, have greater responsibilities towards their ally, whom they call "the strategically placed bastion of the West".

TEMPTATIONS...

Dealing with such a vulnerable regime, one can be tempted to ask for concessions which one would not normally ask for or get a positive answer from a democratically elected government. When East-West relations are under a heavy strain and uncertainties of the Middle East are worrying the Occident, one will be tempted to try to put the Southern flank of NATO in order. For the foregoing reasons and to avoid the temptation of trying to take advantage of the situation and the repetition of past mistakes, here are some do's and dont's for the West:

- 1) DONT push Turkey to accept a settlement in the Aegean sea which in the long run will harm her interests after the return of Greece; nor pressure Turkish leaders to sign unrealistic agreements concerning Cyprus, though some circles think that the military might be more amenable to quick solutions.

2) DONT try to make Turkey the "submissive ally" by giving her the role vacated by Iran as "guardian of Western interests" in the Middle East.

3) DONT make Turkey the experiment ground of OECD-IMF technocrats with their harsh and ready-made economic measures which may not necessarily fit Turkish conditions. You will only create the climate of a greater social imbalance.

4) DONT continue fuelling the hopes and aspirations of some groups (internally or externally based) which have long been looking for the opportunity to get even with the Turkish state. ~~which might~~

5) DONT encourage the military to stay in power as long as possible because it suits the strategic interests of the West. Above all, desist from using double standards: condoning them publicly because democracy does not exist, while applauding them in private for their strict and efficient measures.

On the other hand,

1) DO encourage them to restore democracy as soon as possible. The quicker they complete their task and return to their habitual duties, the stronger they will be and the country will be strengthened.

2) DO encourage them to respect fundamental ~~right~~ freedoms and human rights.

THE STAKES ARE HIGH

One should not forget that, ~~there~~ are things that a Turkish leader, civilian or military, can and cannot do.

Depending on the circumstances, non-democratically chosen rulers might be pushed into a corner because of their vulnerabilities. They might be compelled to accept unpalatable policies. But the Turkish public opinion, even if their voices are not heard right away, will not accept any agreement or policy which is contrary to their interests, their character or their mentality. It will backfire in the long run, creating one day a very hostile public opinion. Typical examples of the past were the sudden proliferation of US bases in the 60s and 1971

and of the total ban of poppy cultivation during the 1971 military period which backfired later on and left many bitter traces.

The real interest of the West as well as the delicate balance of power in the Middle East require a democratically run, economically strong and peaceful Turkey i.e., a Turkey which does not necessarily follow "Western interests" in the region, but implements balanced and bridge forming policies. Such a "bridge country" is badly needed by both the East and the West, for one should not forget that Turkey is ^{not only} an European, but also a Middle Eastern country.

A very delicate period is ahead for all of us. Success will depend not only on the military rulers but also on a sound and honest approach by East and West, since there should be no plausible alternative to success because the stakes are so high. Owing to her geostrategic position, her land mass, her predominately Moslem population and her unique position in this region of the world, a succession of unrest or repetitions of military interventions would inevitably lead to serious tremors to be felt not only in the region but even on a greater scale throughout the world scene.

THE EEC'S REACTIONS

The Council of Ministers and the Commission of the EEC have adopted a very cautious attitude, but privately expressed satisfaction with recent developments. The military take-over has solved two main preoccupations of the Communities:

- 1) Eventual application for full membership
- 2) Free movement of labour which was due to start in 1986.

The suspension of democratic activities has put a stop ^{to} the one, the imposition of the visa has put a stop to the other.

It is evident that in the near future, the EEC and the West on one hand, and Turkey on the other, should decide on a major policy:

Is Western Europe willing to consider Turkey as a full partner with all the consequences which it involves, i.e. economic, political, cultural, military, social and religious? Or will Europe consider

this country as a buffer zone between herself and the rest of the world?

Is Turkey economically, culturally, socially and politically ready and willing to adhere completely to Western Europe? What about her predominately Moslem population? (45 million)

The time has come to draw a line, leave aside past hypocrisies and decide what kind of sound . . . relationship we can establish between Turkey and the West in general and with the EEC in particular.

The Economic Problems of the Turkish Relationship with the Communities

by

Anton Benkert

Presented at the TEPSA/IEP conference on "Turkey and the Community"
Bonn, 28-29 November, 1980

The Economic Problems of the Turkish Relationship with the CommunitiesI. General Observations

The relations between the European Communities and Turkey within the framework of the Ankara Agreement (1963) look back on an eventful history. Initial enthusiasm was replaced by mutual doubts as to the appropriateness of the chosen path. Part of the seventies was characterized by disillusionment and potential tension.

There are many reasons for this. Brought down to a common denominator they are to be found in the fact that the given economic data does not by far correspond to the political expectation of being able to integrate Turkey into the Common Market by the end of 1986.

The decisions of the Association Council in June, 1980 have put an end to a period of stagnation of several years and have - as is to be hoped - initiated a phase of realistic cooperation.

II. Customs Union - Aim and Reality

The Agreement of Association has set itself an ambitious target, which has been underlined in the Additional Protocol of 1970, namely to achieve a customs union as well as the harmonization of the agricultural policy in accordance with an exact timetable within a period of 22 years. This desired similarity to the Athens Agreement is obvious. A fairly cautious approach merely becomes visible during the preparatory phase - during this period the Turkish economy was to consolidate itself in order to be able to deal with the challenges and opportunities arising from the process of integration.

1. It is not possible to draw unequivocal conclusions as to the integrational effects from the trend of Turkish foreign trade during the past 15 years. Imports and exports from or to the EC respectively traditionally amount to between 35 % and 45 % of the total imports and exports. Spectacular growth rates could not be expected at this high relative level in spite of a constant expansion of foreign trade. Nevertheless, there are reasons for the assumption that the preferential tariff advantages have stabilized the EC share of Turkish exports at the higher level whereas the trend in the EC share of the imports has moved downwards during the last years.

2. The demand on the Turkish part for an elimination of the remaining EC customs duties in the industrial sector and for additional preferential tariff advantages in the agricultural sector is understandable. However, whether this would give rise to notable new impulses is open to question. The still existing customs duties on cotton textiles are probably more of a psychological protection for EC competitors than a real import barrier. Just as in the industrial sector, agricultural exports are concentrated on a few products, which are exempt from customs duties or at least receive preferential treatment.

Whereas the EC effectively has no or only little remaining scope for liberalization, Turkey was not able to advance beyond modest initial steps because of continuingly high deficits in the balances of trade and payments. Turkey will have to make use of the safeguarded clause in the next few years as well. It is not at all possible to speak of a harmonization of the agricultural policy.

There is a wide gap between aim and reality. Some reasons for this may be found in the oil crisis. That this is so can only be surprising to those who ignore a basic fact, namely that the gap between the level of development of the Turkish economy and that of the EC cannot be reduced according to timetable. This gap remained too wide for it to be possible that the dynamic effects of a customs union develop to the benefit of both parties.

III. Accompanying Measures

Two fields were the central object of cooperation right from the start of the transitional phase, although they were only meant to support the process of development towards a customs union. These were financial aid and the free movement of labour.

1. Because of the need for immense capital expenditure the three Financial Protocols with a volume of approximately 700 million EUA only constitute a modest contribution towards the required

structural and diversification measures of the Turkish economy. It is not surprising that difficult negotiations were necessary to reach agreement in each case as there was an obvious disparity between the Turkish wishes and the possibilities open to the EC. This is also valid for especially the new 4th Protocol to the order of 600 million EUA and for the non-recurrent special aid amounting to 75 million EUA provided for in accordance with the decisions of June, 1980.

2. The step-by-step reduction of barriers relating to the free movement of Turkish labour, which is of paramount importance for Turkey, is highly controversial. It is aimed at two targets simultaneously, namely at reducing the dangerously high level of unemployment on the Turkish domestic labour market and at improving the balance of payments by means of the remittances of migrant workers. On the other hand there is the rising unemployment in the EC. To date it has only been possible to reconcile these differing views with great difficulty. No solution has as yet been found.

The contributions of the Communities and their Member States account for approximately 50 % of the financing of crisis management in Turkey. The Member States bear most of the costs. In accordance with the nature and scope of the individual measures, the set of instruments available to the EC as a whole can only continue to support the normal process of development.

Whether this will in future also be valid for the freedom of movement is open to question. The freedom of movement of labour is not one of the characteristics of a customs union, but goes very much further. If the EC had been aware of this fact during the period of permanent economic growth, it would not be necessary today to discuss the implications of the term freedom of movement.

IV. Perspectives

The most important task must be seen in overcoming the acute Turkish economic and financial crisis. This demands that internal reforms be implemented resolutely and that these be externally secured

by the IMF and by the club of Western donor countries. The EC cannot provide foreign exchange loans nor insure export and financial credits. The EC can only continue with its investment aids which are effective in the medium and long term and must - above all - keep their markets open to Turkish products and give even wider access to their markets. The step-by-step elimination of the remaining customs duties on agricultural exports by January 1, 1987 on the basis of the June decisions is an important step in this direction.

The next task must be to establish the prerequisites for making use of the open EC market. One of these is an export-oriented strategy of diversification and industrialization for the Turkish economy. Seeing that this is scarcely possible without the participation of foreign capital, appropriately favourable framework conditions must be established, of which there was a lack in the past.

Finally, there is a little reason for precipitant pessimism regarding the implications of Turkey's accession to the EC as there is for artificial optimism. Where critical surplus products of the Mediterranean region are concerned, Turkey does not play a role regarding either wine or fresh fruit and vegetables. The question as to which arrangements will be found for olive oil is completely open with regard to the accession of Spain to the EC. In the industrial sector all parties concerned must take the required structural adjustment into account by making use of their respective cost advantages. Turkey has the advantage of having a large domestic market capable of development, and of being fairly certain that it will not have to dismantle its protective measures against imports in calendar steps nor - in terms of a customs union - considerably reduce them externally. On the other hand new markets with a so-far high external tariff protection will be opened to Turkey.

The more realistic the aims, the greater the chances for a real revitalization of the association between the EC and Turkey.

The security dimension for Western Europe

by

Sir Bernard Burrows

Presented at the TEPSA/IEP conference on "Turkey and the Community"
Bonn, 28-29 November, 1980

SEMINAR ON TURKEY AND THE COMMUNITY

The security dimension for Western Europe

A first idea of Turkey's strategic importance to Western Europe can be obtained by considering the opposite. Supposing Turkey was a part of Eastern Europe, what strategic advantages would this have for the Warsaw Pact? A few of the more obvious ones are immediately apparent: free and uncontrolled passage of Soviet ships between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; a series of harbours and potential naval bases on the Mediterranean shores; open air and land passage to the Arab world over Turkey's frontiers with Syria and Iraq; an important additional threat to Greece over the Turkish-Greek frontier; naval, air and political facilities in Turkish Cyprus; denial of Western monitoring facilities in the last state directly contiguous to Russia where they now exist.

All these strategic threats to the West are denied by Turkey's membership of NATO. If the advantages were wholly negative - the denial of facilities to the potential enemy - the question could be asked whether the same result could not be achieved if Turkey were neutral or non-aligned. The fate of Afghanistan provides a ready answer, and in that case the strategic advantages to the Soviet Union were comparatively small. The Truman doctrine had to be invented in 1947 to deter Soviet encroachment on Turkey (and Greece), years before Turkey was a member of NATO. There is no reason for confidence that if Turkey ceased to be a member of the western alliance Soviet claims to freedom of movement through the straits, or even physical control of them, and to frontier changes in the east would not be revived.

Moreover the advantages for the West are not only negative. Even with a purely defensive posture on the part of Turkey as a member of NATO important Soviet military resources must be drawn away from the central front to the Caucasus frontier. Access to the Black Sea is available to Western navies as much as access to the Mediterranean for the Russians. Southern Russia and the Black Sea ports are vulnerable to conventional air attack. If local difficulties can be overcome, Turkish and Greek forces can be mutually supportive in Thrace and the security of Cyprus can be guaranteed.

In sum, there are very important diversionary possibilities.

More relevant to the theme of this discussion is the question whether in order to

insure the retention of these strategic advantages to the West it is not enough for Turkey to remain a member of NATO, without necessarily joining the European Community, which after all, has at present no defence responsibility. Until recently the European members of NATO had done little to support directly the Turkish defence capability, which depended very largely on American military aid, American equipment and the supporting presence of the US 6th Fleet. The embargo on the supply of American equipment as a result of the Turkish action in Cyprus therefore hit Turkey particularly hard, and gave new urgency to the question whether western Europe could supply any alternative support. Germany has responded significantly so far as the supply of equipment is concerned. Some of the other West European countries have continued to give evidence of readiness and ability to send modest supporting forces to Turkey by taking part in NATO exercises designed to test this possibility (with the remarkable exception of Belgium which withdrew its contingent from a recent exercise in Turkey as a symbol of its disapproval of recent political events in that country).

But the main question under this heading is political. If Turkey enhances its Western orientation by seeking to join the European Community and if the Community member-states were negative or dilatory in their reply to a Turkish candidature, would such a rebuff lead Turkey to alter its alignment altogether? Even after the suppression of the extremist parties in Turkey the pro-western political current cannot be guaranteed a clear run free of obstacles and opposition. If it is to succeed it will need to show results. If it is stopped by a European refusal the change could be far-reaching. Western Europe may have to contribute to the strength of the alliance on which its own security depends by making more effort to accept Turkey as a member of the western European Community than the strict logic of economics might otherwise seem to justify.

Bernard Burrows

Some Thoughts on Turkey's Security Problems

by

Dr. Maurizio Cremasco

Presented at the TEPSA Conference on "Turkey and the Community",
Bonn, 28-29 November, 1980.

Draft Paper

Do not quote

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1. Turkey's security problems are essentially a function of four factors. These are: (a) the geographical location and topographic features of Turkish territory; (b) external "threats" as they are perceived, evaluated, and prioritized by the Turkish government (with an order of priorities that may differ from that of the United States or Europe); (c) domestic questions, some exclusively military in nature, having to do with the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces, and others political, deriving from the nation's economic and social situation; (d) potential repercussions of extra-regional events on Turkish security.

2. Geographically, Turkey occupies a key position, that of suture or transit bridge between Europe and Asia. It is at the crossroads of East-West and North-South arteries in the Middle East and Gulf region. It forms a barrier against easy Soviet access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a feature enhanced by Turkish control of the Straits, the Soviet Union's only naval outlet from the Black Sea.

As a member of NATO, Turkey has about 1000 kilometers of land border with Warsaw Pact nations (the Soviet Union and Bulgaria), in addition to its 1600 kilometers of Black Sea coast, and it is the most important link in the Atlantic Alliance's southern flank.

From a geo-strategic point of view, Turkey's geographic situation is a source of both advantages and weaknesses in terms of security. Its proximity to the militarily important regions of the Crimea and the Caucasus makes it an invaluable listening post for surveillance and intelligence data collection on Soviet armed forces' activity (including missile test launches in the missile ranges of southern Russia). And this gives Turkey the capability to provide

early warning in case of preparations for an attack and at the onset of the attack itself. Furthermore, in case of conflict Turkish air defenses could play an especially important role as a screening barrier against Soviet bombers (Badger and Backfire) headed for the Mediterranean. The significance of this potential role is evident when one considers that those aircraft, armed with air-to-surface missiles, constitute the most serious potential threat for maritime traffic and NATO naval forces operating in the Mediterranean.

Defense and force deployment problems are complicated by the length of Turkey's borders, also because the internal road and rail communications network is utterly inadequate. Still, very few Black Sea beaches are suitable for large-scale amphibious operations, and the lines of advance inland are interrupted by the Pontic mountains. The eastern border with the Soviet Union is characterized by very rough terrain, with only a single readily negotiable pass, towards Erzurum. In the south, the border with Syria in the Iskenderun region is even more difficult. The sole connection between Tiflis and the middle Tigris threads through a tortuous pass in Iran's Zagros Range.

The weakest and most dangerous zone is Thrace, on the Bulgarian border, with easy invasion routes through the Vardar Valley, the Struma Gap and the open plain that leads directly to the Aegean and the Straits. This area, particularly well suited for armor and mechanized operations, lacks sufficient depth to permit a manoeuvrable defense.

The Aegean Sea, stretching from the Straits to Crete, is dotted with over 3000 islands, which would facilitate an effort to blockade it. No ship, whether alone or in convoy, could pass without having to fight.

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3. As regards the "external" threat, Turkey has always been fearful first of all, of Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean, a constant feature of Moscow's foreign policy from Tsarist days down to the Brezhnev era. The decision to join NATO was dictated primarily by the need to defend against that Soviet threat. In recent years, partly in response to the détente process, Turkey has re-examined its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There was a political rapprochement, increased trade and closer economic ties, with contributions toward Turkish industrial development, long-term loans, and so on. This rapprochement became more pronounced in the mid-1970's after the sharp deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations, and Turkey's relations with the U.S. following the Cyprus crisis.

The events of 1979-80 - the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran - have spurred renewed attention on the part of Turkey's leaders to Soviet foreign policy objectives and to the dangers of the Middle East situation. Hence, Turkey has given a low profile to the problems of its relations with Greece, even though the Aegean Sea issues still remain open (sovereignty over the continental shelf, oil exploration, exploitation of the seabed, etc.). But though Turkey has removed its veto, permitting Greek reintegration into NATO's military structure, that does not imply that Turkey has crossed Greece off the list of potential "threats".

Of course, militarily, the most direct and imposing threat comes from the Soviet Union. There are 27 divisions (of which 22 mechanized) deployed in the three Military Districts of Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. The majority of these divisions are not combat-ready, since they need to be reinforced with men and equipment before being employed. There are, however, two Category I

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divisions and these are, significantly, airborne divisions, which would play a very important role in the seizure of the Straits area. In the air, the threat comes from more than 650 combat aircraft, including Naval Air Aviation bombers, while the Black Sea Fleet numbers 85 major combat ships and 25 submarines.

The Bulgarian armed forces have been strengthened, starting in 1974, by transfers of Soviet weapons previously reserved for Warsaw Pact countries on the central-north front. They can count on eight motor rifle divisions and five tank brigades. Bulgarian air strength consists of some 210 combat aircraft, including about 20 modern MIG-23s.

Turkey is well aware that it is in no position to counter this threat on its own. Most of Turkey's divisions are infantry, while the majority of the Warsaw Pact forces is armor or mechanized. It is practically impossible that Italian forces could be engaged in Turkey (aside from Italy's Ace Mobile Force contingent) or that Greek troops would support Turkish defensive operations in Thrace.

West of the Bosphorus, precisely where the terrain permits very effective use of armored divisions, the Turkish forces deployed do not seem capable of repulsing or stopping a consistent thrust unless they receive adequate reinforcements.

Outside reinforcements, in practice, could be provided only by the United States. But the problem is how long would it take them to intervene. For air forces, this interval would be in the order of one week, but for ground forces (apart from the Marine battalions of the TF 69 already stationed in the Mediterranean) some 30 days would be required. Furthermore, support transport would have to navigate the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Soviets enjoy greater flexibility in the use of their forces - air strength in particular - since the region is relatively near Soviet bases in Southern Russia and the Crimea.

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The third potential threat comes from the Middle East and the Gulf. Aside from their differing positions in the international arena, Turkey and its Arab neighbours to the South are not divided by any particular issues or conflicts of interest. But instability in that region could have negative repercussions on Turkish security, especially if broadening Soviet influence should give rise to an attempt at encirclement from the south. Turkey cannot fail to be alarmed by the closer ties between Syria and the Soviet Union instituted by the recent signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, and by the continuing Syrian military build-up, in excess of that country's real defense requirements.

4. Domestic questions of a defense nature arise mainly from the evident incapacity of Turkey's armed forces to meet the possible external threats, whether openly or covertly Soviet. The problems are many and complex. Though very strong in numbers, the army is equipped with weapons and equipment that are technologically and operationally obsolete (the armored troops, for instance, still ride old M-47 and M-48 tanks). In addition, the infantry is only very slightly mechanized and tactical mobility is very poor. As to the air force, attack aircraft are limited in number, and there is only one squadron of all-weather interceptors. There are gaps in the radar defense network, and the system as a whole is not highly reliable. The navy needs to strengthen its anti-ship missile capabilities.

The 1975 U.S. arms embargo has seriously affected the operational and logistics efficiency of the Turkish forces. In addition, the army suffers from an excessive proportion of draftees, due to the country's high birthrate. This raises problems of manpower

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absorption and burdens the defense budget with heavy personnel subsistence costs. Yet defense spending cannot be raised much above the present level without endangering the already precarious economic situation.

The Turkish government recently issued a detailed estimate of its defense needs for 1981-86 to enable the country to meet its NATO commitments and provide for its own defense. Urgent, top-priority needs would amount to \$4.442 billion. The air force needs to spend \$1.146 billion for F-4 and F-104 aircraft, spare parts and ammunition, equipment and material for air defense. The army's requirements would cost \$2.192 billion, to be spent on tanks, anti-tank missiles, communications equipment, and helicopters. The navy will need \$1.105 billion for submarines, FPBs, ASW aircraft, helicopters and anti-ship missiles. Over the same period, the defense budget will provide no more than \$450 million towards meeting these expenses. In addition, the United States has pledged credits for \$1.5 billion and West Germany for \$240 million. This still leaves a gap of over \$2.2 billion, an enormous sum clearly far beyond the means of Turkey and possibly out of reach of the aid resources available from the other NATO partners. The contracts signed with Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands for the purchase, on favourable terms, of those nations' F-104s (as they are replaced by the F-16), like a \$250 million loan from Saudi Arabia for 1980, are measures of limited significance.

Other major "domestic" security problems involve:

- the country's fragile economic and social condition, on the verge of total disintegration before the military's seizure of power; at present, the situation is far from back to normal;

- the latent potential for a widespread acceptance of integralist Islam on the part of the Shi'ite minority (several million strong), which would add a new and highly destabilizing political content to their differences with the Sunni majority;
- the possible exacerbation of the Kurd question; particularly under the influence of events in Iraq and Iran;
- the possible development of a demand for self-determination by the Arab-speaking minorities who live in the South, on the borders of the Arab Middle East;
- a potential growth of pressure for an essentially neutralist and non-aligned posture, on the part of those who repudiate Turkish "Westernization"; such pressures would seek to reject the prospect of Turkey as a lay republic, better integrated with Europe socially and economically through its ties with the EEC.

5. Finally, as to potential repercussions of events outside the region on Turkish security, it is enough to mention the possibility of a conclusion of an East-West agreement in the MBFR talks in Vienna which would not prohibit the re-deployment of Soviet forces from the central European front to the southern flank.

6. Turkish security policy feels the effects of the country's being simultaneously Balkan, European, and Middle Eastern, as well as of its geographical contiguity with the Soviet Union. The deepest concern, though perhaps not the most immediate, concerns the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives and activities in the world and in the regional areas. Crucial is the determination of the Soviet Union's basic policy objectives in the Mediterranean and in relation to the current situation in Afghanistan, the Gulf and the Middle East.

Security in the Balkans (relations with Greece and the possibility of new developments in Yugoslavia) remains important, however, with a number of delicate and complex problems to be settled.

But also the Middle East situation is followed with special attention by Turkish planners, as a variety of plausible scenarios could present problems for Turkish security (strengthening of factors of crisis and instability in the Gulf, widening of the Iraq-Iran conflict, disintegration of Iran marked enough to stimulate foreign intervention, Syrian potential to use its growing arsenal for purposes other than national defense).

Thus the trend for the foreseeable future for Turkey will be towards an omni-directional security and foreign policy, though of course the NATO defense commitment remains the central feature. To this we must add the "internal" projection of security policy, deriving from the armed forces' gradual assumption of broader and broader responsibility for the maintenance of order and now, with the September seizure of power, for the government of the nation.

The available military policy options for meeting security requirements seem to be narrowly limited by domestic problems - social, financial, industrial, and structural.

If Western and NATO nations fail yet again to at least meet Turkey halfway in seeing to its security needs, based on a realistic appraisal of its importance for the Atlantic alliance, Ankara might likely be faced with the necessity of shifting the guidelines of its foreign and defense policy.

6

Turkey and the Community

by

Seyfi Taşchan

Presented at the TEPSA/IEP conference on "Turkey and the Community"
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TURKEY AND THE COMMUNITY (x)

Seyfi TAŞHAN

In this presentation the subject will be analysed from a political perspective under three main themes: Turkey's motives for searching a place within the European Community; Recent Turkish political attitudes towards the Community; and some European attitudes.

I do not think that I need to explain here the history of Turkish endeavours to Europeanize its state structure, society and men for nearly a century and a half. Turkey was the only country among the former members of the Ottoman state to adopt secular republican system of government with a truly democratic constitution, at the end of the First World War. Reforms ranging from the adoption of the Latin alphabet, European laws, and education systems served one specific object, namely to turn Turkey into a secular European country. This may have been a reaction to Turkish destiny under the Ottoman Empire. For a long time Europeanization of the Turkish society was a strong aspiration which almost cut-off young Turks' ties with their history and with their oriental neighbors. Communism at the time tried to make an inroad into the Turkish society but failed because it was inapt and inefficient and because Turks had another ideal to pursue.

Before the beginning of the Second World War Turks had found the opportunity of allying themselves with Great Britain and France which were dominant also in the Middle East and which came near the ideal society that the Turks wanted to turn into.

The end of the Second World War forced Turkey to make a clear choice: Assimilation within the Soviet camp or to join the West. Russian threat on Turkish territorial integrity and independence proved to be a stimulus for the Turks to seek closer alliance and cooperation with the West. The rebellion

in Greece, the Berlin blockade and the creation of the iron curtain brought the Atlantic Alliance into being and Turkey thus became a part of the Western system and accepted to share "common heritage" with the rest of Europe and vice versa. The same participation of heritage and aspirations were dominant in Turkey's becoming earlier a member of the Council of Europe. When the European Economic Community was set up Turkey wanted to take her place in it also. A question may be asked: Is Turkey's drive to become part of Europe motivated basically by security and economic concerns? I think the answer should cover not only security and economy but also national identity, and ideology.

Naturally, Turkey believes that her security can best be provided within the Atlantic Alliance, this is not disputed. Turkey believes that it has a useful role to play within Europe and its membership in the Council of Europe is not disputed. Nearly 50% of Turkey's foreign trade is with the members of the European Community and the existence of interdependence in trade is not disputed either. Turkey made its choice in 1963 to become an associate member of the European Community with ultimate aim of becoming a full member after the preparatory and transition periods envisaged. What has changed since 1963 that caused dissatisfaction and led possibly to a search of new options in some of the member countries and in certain sectors of the Turkish political establishment? I think in assessing the present attitudes of the Community and Turkey towards each other several developments that took place must be looked at: Détente process which really started in mid-sixties and accelerated in the seventies reduced European perception of Soviet threat and helped to turn détente into an institution by itself. Paramount security considerations which from the European point of view had made Turkey a necessary partner in the European structure as a whole were now looked at more critically, and were held at par if not subordinate to economic and social considerations. Turkey's relations with Greece began to deteriorate first over the question of Cyprus and in seventies over the Aegean. The West which had treated Turkey and Greece equally and jointly for inclusion in the Council of Europe, NATO and

associate membership of the EEC, began to differentiate between the two. President Johnson's ultimatum to Turkey in 1964, reduction of military and economic aid as of mid-sixties, led eventually within ten years to an arms embargo with undeclared economic sanctions following Turkey's legal intervention in Cyprus. While Greece eventually succeeded in joining the Community, Turkey's relations deteriorated until 1979. An unprecedented number of Turkish emigrants began to fill European labour markets reaching a figure nearly over two million in 1979. The arrival of these Turkish immigrants while filling an important gap in the European labour market may have led due to social reasons to second-thoughts on the free circulation of Turkish workers envisaged in the Turkey-EEC agreements. These second-thoughts became much more vocal because of the oil crisis and subsequent recessive economic policies followed by the EEC countries. While some Community members became completely disinterested towards Turkey, some others felt as if Turkey was a burden thrust on their shoulders. These developments had corresponding impacts on Turkey too. However, for the large majority in Turkey the 1963 Ankara Treaty and rights under the Rome Treaty and Turkey's orientation towards joining the Community remained valid. The main discussion has been over the methods and instrument leading towards full membership. (Whether Turkey's transition to community conditions should take place before or after the full membership.)

Towards the end of the seventies several developments brought Turkey's value from the strategical view point to the fore-front and reasserted the vital role of Turkey for the defence of Western interests. These events were the downfall of Shah in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan. These developments showed that Turkey's place within the Alliance was vital and necessary not only for the Middle East which had become another center of Western security concern.

This new development has certainly led to a need for a reappraisal of Western attitudes towards Turkey.

Now, I want to turn to the influence of recent political developments in Turkey on their relations with the Community. As a whole these developments should not lead to a pessimism on the grounds

that parliamentary system has been temporarily suspended in Turkey.

What was the picture before the military intervention on 12th September 1980? It would be useful to recall the political stalemate and even the anarchy and to compare the political attitudes prevailing then and now.

The principal characteristic of the Turkish political life since 1971 has been the exaggerated role played by numerically small minority groups in the conduct of the government affairs because of the lack of clear parliamentary majorities. For example, in 1974 Mr. Ecevit could not carry out RPP programs because he had to depend on the National Salvation Party as a coalition partner; in 1975-76 and 77 Mr. Demirel could not carry out Justice Party platforms because he had as coalition partners National Salvation Party and National Action Party and for a while National Reliance Party. In 1978 and 1979 Mr. Ecevit could not carry out his party programs because the existence of his government depended on eleven Ministers he had transferred from the Justice Party. In 1980 Justice Party minority government could not carry out its basic program because it could only stay in power with the support of National Action Party and National Salvation Party. The Parliament itself remained during the entire period incapable of passing laws on disputed issues and came to an almost standstill in 1980. What was the influence of this picture on Turkey's relations with the European Community? The two principal parties namely the RPP and JP were unable to take courageous steps for improving Turkey's relations with the Community and for transforming Turkey's economy into an outward oriented one. Their principal handicap for these policies were NSP cooperations and support that they needed politically when they were in power, and in the case of the RPP, the role of the left-wing of the party, reticent if not hostile to the Community and to the conditions of market economy, prevented the RPP from assuming a clear cut position vis à vis the Community. Mr. Ecevit's proposal in 1978 to delay fulfillment of Turkey's obligations towards the Community for a period of five years was at best a compromise reached

between the pro-marketeers and anti-marketeers within his party and bureaucracy. This move too was interpreted in Europe as a "freeze" in Turkey-EEC relations. However, as an official policy the RPP has never abandoned full membership as an eventual aim in Turkey's relations with the Community. Its difficulty came mainly from exaggerated autarchic policies, it encouraged domestically which ran contrary to the principles of free circulation of goods and capital within the Common Market also constituting one of the main reasons of economic bottlenecks. Since these contradictions could not be eliminated a strange compromise was discussed for a while in the press: "Political consultation with the Community without integration". This found its reflection in the RPP period of government when various alternative solutions were sought whereby Turkey could maintain its security under the NATO umbrella but search a place within the Third World and NIEO (the new international economic order) with greater emphasis on trade with socialist and Arab countries. The paradoxical attitudes that prevailed within the party and the government of the RPP and independents that remained in power in 1978 and the greater part of 1979 were not conducive to increasing and improving Turkey's relations with the Community and the West in general. On the other hand, the Justice Party minority government which came into power at the end of 1979 and remained there until September 12, had clear views on harmonizing Turkey's economy and policy with those of the West. Turkish business and industrial community had reached as early as 1978 to a consensus that Turkey should seek to become a member of the European Community without delay. Such a decision if accepted and executed would have several advantages both politically and economically and would be in keeping with the recent trend which ^{was} accepted as in the case of Greece to have the membership first and complete the transition afterwards. Justice Party minority government was in favour of both early application to Community membership and for the introduction of economic measures encouraging market economy and outward orientation. While it could put into execution the latter measures, it was unable to make the membership application, even though its Foreign Minister

announced their determination to present the application before the end of 1980. It was clear that such an application could not be presented so long as the Justice Party needed the votes of the NSP which was against anything that had to do with Europe and the West. The Justice Party hoped that they would be able to force early elections in 1980 and obtain majority mandate to enable them to present the application. However, not because of its economic policies and attitudes towards the Community, the military intervention toppled the Justice Party, as well as the entire parliament. The military National Security Council soon after its formation expressed its intention to improve its relations with the Community and the program of Bülent Ulusu Government states: "...our relations with the European Economic Community will be aimed at the objective of ultimately having Turkey take its place within the Community as has been envisaged in the Ankara Treaty." The new government has expressed its determination for continuing the economic policies initiated under the Justice Party by Mr. Üzal, by making him Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs.

I think at this point other policies of the present government must also be considered to determine whether the main course of events lead Turkey towards Community and the West, or if they are of a nature to drive Turkey away from Europe.

First of all, the present government is determined to uphold Turkey's place in and support for the Atlantic Alliance and has given a proof of this by facilitating the return of Greece to the military structure of NATO.

The Islamic revivalism extreme nationalism and Marxist orientation have become so much discredited that they are not likely to return to positions of influence in the Turkish political life in the foreseeable future. Free debate has been encouraged as much as possible under the grave conditions of public order. Pledges have been made to return to democratic regime as soon as adequate measures are accomplished to prevent the recurrence of the conditions of anarchy that prevailed in the months and years preceeding the military intervention.

It appears to be the intention of the Turkish government to strengthen the contacts and cooperation with the Community under the existing arrangements within the institutions foreseen with a view to facilitating Turkey's eventual membership.

It seems, however, there is a lack of appreciation and understanding in Europe of the conditions that forced the generals in Turkey to embark on a course correction operation. I believe it should be the task of our Western partners to encourage and support Turkey in passing through this troubled period. This support cannot be given by imposing compulsory visas on Turkish citizens, treating them like "the Floatsomen" described by Eric Maria Remarque so many years ago, and by delaying the discussion of the topic in the specific Community organs with the Turks. In spite of the vital and emotional protest raised in Turkey about the visa obligation imposed, the Turkish Government has been calm in its reaction and has imposed travel restrictions to eliminate any excuse for the application of compulsory visas. There is also a "wait and see" approach in many European quarters about Turkey as far as social, economic, and cultural cooperation and integration with Turkey are concerned not to mention "disinterest" that prevails in many others.

There seems to be dichotomy in Western European attitude towards Turkey and the Turks: Turkey should be present and cooperate within the Western defence organisations, but Turks while providing manpower when needed should be kept outside the integration process that is taking place in Europe. At least this is the impression in Turkey and the same impression has led extremists of the right and left to exploit this dichotomy. Turkey would obviously defend, as a guardian in its geographical location Western interests so long as they are also Turkey's joint interests. But if in social and economic fields Turkey is led to an alienation there will be fewer joint interests to defend together. In other words, the dichotomy I mentioned cannot be maintained indefinitely. It should be remembered that when the present expansion process of the Community is completed Turkey will be the only European country of NATO to be kept outside

the Community, Norway's and Iceland's cases being different.

I think with the revival of Atatürk's principles and his ideology in Turkey, Turkish people will be more prepared and united for integration with Europe. But Turkey's attitude in this regard must be reciprocated.

Although Turkey's eventual membership should not be a matter of dispute or discussion because Turkey and the community had signed the Ankara Treaty way back in 1963, we have in recent years observed tendencies also in Europe to consider other options for Turkey. Options for pushing Turkey out of the Western world seem to be dead and buried because of Western need of Turkey as an asset of defense. But there are other options now being discussed or quietly put into practice. One of these is to encourage relations with Turkey to develop on a bi-lateral bases by some Western countries because of the special relationships that exist. While development of bi-lateral relations is commendable and even sine qua non, they should not be allowed to substitute for Turkey's eventual institutional participation in the European integration process. There are also those who would like to see Turkey's special developing relations with the United States as substitute for its European vocation. This alternative too is not reasonable because Europe and Turkey need each other as much as their mutually need for cooperation with the United States. Consequently, special relations or "division^{of} labour" as far as relations with Turkey are concerned, should not be considered as alternatives to Turkey's integration with the Community.

The history and national interests have made Turkey a part of Western Europe. With nearly two million Turks now living in Western Europe, the intermingling of our populations in a certain measure seems to be inevitable, and integration of our economic, social and other institutions as foreseen in the Treaty of Rome also seem to be inevitable even if in the long run. We should join hands in a rational effort to facilitate

this process. As Talleyrand said: "The art of statemanship is to foresee the inevitable and expedite its occurrence."

I would, therefore, consider this preparatory conference and the joint study project as a necessary and auspicious step.

Turkey and European Political Cooperation

some considerations

by

Wolfgang Wessels

Presented at the TEPSA/IEP conference on "Turkey and the Community"

Bonn, 28-29 November, 1980

Draft Paper

Do not quote

1. European Political Cooperation (EPC)

has been established in the early seventies by the member governments of the European Community to

- exchange information and thus ensure better mutual understanding on international affairs
- to harmonize views and coordinate positions and where, it appears possible and desirable
- pursue common actions.

The performance of the quite complex (sometimes byzantinistic looking EPC machinery indicates that the Nine have increasingly developed a "concertation reflex" on nearly all political problems of the international system and issued common declarations on many of them (ranging from Southern Africa and South East Asia via Afghanistan and Iran to Cyprus and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Common diplomatic and even economic actions were also taken in several cases whereby different instruments and procedures were developed. EPC has become an important complement (not an substitution or alternative to the Community and its external relations). For the member states EPC is an privileged, however, not exclusive structure to influence international developments.

2. For the international policies of the Nine (or soon ten member countries) pursued within and by the EPC, Turkey's importance has considerably increased. The initiatives taken by the Nine on the Middle East, the crises in and around Afghanistan and Iran, the problems of detente and the relationship between Europe and the US as well as the Greek membership will put Turkey more and more (and with a higher priority) on the agenda of EPC.

For Turkey the cooperation with the Ten will be a major possibility to be part of a "coalition" in the international arena. The Nato (even less the Council of Europe) framework does not sufficiently provide a platform by which Turkey could influence global problems. After the southern enlargement Turkey and Norway (where the relative "isolation" is already discussed) would be the only European Nato countries outside the EPC framework.

3. A (full) membership of Turkey in the Community would automatically imply a complete and equal participation of Turkey in the EPC.

For the EPC consequences of a Turkish membership are:

- closer links to the conflict areas in the whole Middle East and Balcan,
- an internalization of the Greek-Turkish conflicts which might block the intra-EPC decision-making also in other areas than the bilateral Greek-Turkish conflicts,
- the organization of all European Nato countries (except Norway)
- an increase in organisational burdens and in the need to include another participant with special interests and conceptions.

As the voting behaviour of Turkey in the UN General Assembly indicates (see annex 1) the international positions of Turkey (like those of the three applicant countries) diverge from those of the EPC though Turkey might not be the most problematic case.

4. For Turkey a full membership implies:

- an equal status to Greece within EPC,
- a complementary (or even alternative (?)) ally to the American connection ,
- an additional and most welcome coalition for regional and world-wide problems which could increase the role of Turkey as a "bridge" ,
- less autonomy in the foreign policy-making (see voting behaviour in the UN) ,
- organizational adaptations .

5. A complete and equal participation of Turkey in the EPC without a (full) membership in the Community (as was proposed in the second half of the seventies for the three applicant countries) seems to create major problems:

- the political coherence of Political Cooperation and its coordination with Community policies (which shows already deficits) would suffer immensely ,
- the use of Community instruments for EPC purposes would create legal problems ,
- Turkey would - often quite rightly - demand more influence on Community policies directly or indirectly linked with EPC positions.

Turkey would thus become either a second class member of EPC - left out from major decisions taken in the EC framework - or a de facto member of the Community influencing common policies without being a legal member. This solution should therefore be excluded.

6. Even without (full) EC membership special links between EPC and Turkey should be developed (the consultations between Turkey and the Nine on these matters have already been started some years ago). Following options should be discussed:

- a) an extensive use of the "Gymnich formula" by which consultations with "allied and friendly states" can be pursued by the Presidency in individual cases when all Nine agree. This formula has mainly been developed under pressure from the U.S. who - despite of its influence - complains about its ineffectiveness.
- b) a formal agreement on consultations about issues of special importance for Turkey (including the eastern Mediterranean) after EPC deliberations. The restriction to certain areas would not fulfill Turkey's interest in being member of a coalition for all international questions. Together with a post facto information Turkey would be more an object of EPC than a partner.
- c) an agreement to have consultations by the Presidency before positions are taken by the Nine on all matters of mutual interest. This formula will increase the role especially when looking at the time factor and the issues. With this kind of formula Turkey could ask for consultations on all international problems and its position could be taken into account during the deliberations of the Nine. A regular exchange (once per month or so) with the presidency could be institutionalized. As the presidency would play a major role for mutual consultations it is politically advisable to use the "Troika" formula as to prevent that a Greek Presidency might be the EPC interpreter and interlocuteur.
- d) an "association" agreement by which the Turkish government:
 - would automatically be informed on all debates and steps (perhaps even become part of the Coreu system),
 - ask for considerations of certain points,
 - could submit their positions directly EPC bodies,
 - be associated to common declarations and actions.

7. Assessing these options we have to take into account:

- a) institutional links with governments outside the EPC "club" are difficult to keep. The Presidency is already overburdened with the internal coordination processes. Especially smaller member states as Presidencies have problems to look after international contacts on a permanent basis. Other third countries (like Norway, Canada and Japan) are also asking for closer and permanent links.

b) Turkey should and could be a special case for Political Cooperation. The claim that "special relationships" might also be asked for by other third countries (especially Norway) should be denied by referring to the association agreement with the full membership clause.

c) New organisational developments within the EPC (like a permanent secretariat) might help to establish the permanent links.

d) Political Cooperation is a subtle and complex diplomatic process which is sometimes difficult to grasp for third governments.

The Turkish diplomacy will have to give special attention to this process - not only vis-à-vis the presidency but also in the capitals of the Ten. Also at international organisations and in third countries the Turkish diplomacy should get involved in some way or other in the "collective diplomacy network". The EPC structure is thus a challenge for all day-to-day work at different places.

The Foreign Office itself in Ankara has to take account of this.

8. As conclusion: considering the links between EPC and Turkey there is a broad field for manoeuvring between full membership in the Community and the position of an estranged neighbour. This should be elaborated in institutional terms (as has been indicated in this paper) and from the perspective of policy substance (as is dealt with in other sessions of our conference).

No. der Resolution	Datum Resolution	Titel der Resolution	BR Deutschland	Frankreich	Großbritannien	Italien	Dänemark	Irland	Belgien	Niederlande	Luxemburg	insgesamt	Portugal	Griechenland	Spanien	Türkei
31/77	13. 12. 1976	Implementation of the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (vote: 113+/1-/14●)	●	●	●	●	+	+	●	●	●	2+ 0- 7●	+	+	+	+
31/124	16. 12. 1976	Protection of human rights in Chile (vote: 95+/12-/25●)	●	●	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	7+ 0- 2●	+	+	●	+
31/128	16. 12. 1976	Human rights and scientific and technological developments (vote: 126+/0-/8●)	●	+	●	●	+	+	+	●	●	4+ 0- 5●	+	+	+	+
31/36	30. 11. 1976	Question of the establishment, in accordance with the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, of a body to which persons claiming the benefit of the Convention may apply (117+/9-/8●)	+	●	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	8+ 0- 1●	(keine Angabe)			
31/38	30. 11. 1976	National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress (vote: 125+/0-/9●)	●	●	●	●	+	+	●	+	●	3+ 0- 6●	(keine Angabe)			
<i>Resolutionen aufgrund der Berichte des Vierten Hauptausschusses (Entkolonisierungsfragen)</i>																
31/7	5. 11. 1976	Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa (vote: 93+/9-/19●)	-	-	-	-	●	●	-	-	-	0+ 7- 2●	●	+	●	+

31/29	29. 11. 1976	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations (vote: 124+/0-/3●)	+	●	●	+	+	+	+	+	7+ 0- 2●	+	+	+	+
31/30	29. 11. 1976	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations (vote: 120+/0-/5●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	+	+	6+ 0- 3●	+	+	+	+
31/49	1. 12. 1976	Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) (vote: 102+/1-/32●)	●	●	-	●	●	●	●	●	0+ 1- 8●	●	+	+	+
31/146	20. 12. 1976	Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa (vote: 107+/6-/12●)	-	-	-	●	●	-	●	-	0+ 5- 4●	+	+	●	+
31/147	20. 12. 1976	Programme of work of the United Nations Council for Namibia (vote: 119+/0-/4●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	+	+	6+ 0- 3●	+	+	+	+
31/148	20. 12. 1976	Intensification and co-ordination of United Nations action in support of Namibia (vote: 118+/0-/7●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	●	+	4+ 0- 5●	+	+	+	+
31/149	20. 12. 1976	Action by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with respect to Namibia (vote: 120+/0-/7●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	●	●	3+ 0- 6●	+	+	+	+
31/150	20. 12. 1976	Dissemination of information on Namibia (vote: 123+/0-/4●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	+	+	6+ 0- 3●	+	+	+	+
31/154B	20. 12. 1976	Question of Southern Rhodesia (vote: 124+/0-/7●)	●	●	●	+	+	+	●	+	5+ 0- 4●	+	+	+	+
<i>Resolutionen aufgrund der Berichte des Fünften Hauptausschusses (Administrative und Budgetfragen)</i>															
31/93	14. 12. 1976	Medium-term plan (Abstimmung über den operativen Paragraphen 12, vote: 81+/21-/22●; Gesamtresolution im Konsens)	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	5+ 4- 0●	(keine Angabe)			

ASSOCIATION ET PERSPECTIVES

par Livio Missir

1. Je reconnais qu'il est difficile de parler d'une manière objective de l'association. Trop d'éléments s'y mêlent. Une réalité actuelle, certainement différente de celle d'il y a vingt ans, des éléments passionnels dictés par des options et des évaluations différentes et, enfin, une certaine technicité que les efforts d'information les plus poussés n'ont pas pu vaincre.

2. Vers la fin des années cinquante la CEE était à ses débuts; elle symbolisait un monde nouveau issu de la seconde guerre mondiale; la Turquie, qui n'avait pas participé à cette guerre, entendait parfaire son "occidentalisation".

Des instruments furent forgés conformément à ce que pouvaient être les prévisions d'une période désormais lointaine. Aujourd'hui nous sommes confrontés à une nouvelle situation internationale -conditionnée par une nébulosité particulière de l'avenir-, sans que les instruments imaginés au début de l'association ait été entièrement, ou partiellement, utilisés.

3. Certains se sont même interrogés -ou s'interrogent encore- sur le fait de savoir si l'association de la Turquie à la CEE n'est pas un renouvellement, sui generis, de l'accord turco-anglais de 1838 avec tout ce que cela comporte de souvenirs et je dirais même de psychose anti-capitulaire. Mais, s'est-on jamais demandé à quel accord ou à quelles capitulations pourrait s'apparenter le Traité de Rome?

4. J'ai fait allusion, enfin, à la difficulté de l'information, à la technicité et à la complexité de textes juridiques, à la nouveauté de notions par rapport à la terminologie juridique et politique traditionnelle: droit communautaire différent du droit international public (sinon opposé à ce dernier), droit de l'association situé entre le droit communautaire et le droit international public traditionnel, association différente de

l'adhésion, accords d'association, protocoles additionnels, accords intermédiaires, protocoles complémentaires, phases préparatoires, phases transitoires (normales ou allongées), phases définitives, etc. le tout dans un processus d'unions douanières comportant des libres circulations de marchandises, de personnes et de services ainsi qu'adoption d'actions dites "communes" en vue, entre autres, de "rapprocher" des législations et des politiques économiques, de "renforcer" la coordination des politiques commerciales ou d'assurer "l'adaptation" d'une politique déterminée.

Ce à quoi s'ajoutent des difficultés d'ordre linguistique non négligeables, les langues officielles elles-mêmes, de la Communauté actuelle, paraissant hésiter, dans certains cas, entre "Mitgliedschaft" et "Vollmitgliedschaft", entre "adhésion" tout court et "adhésion à part entière", ce qui donne, en turc, "Üyelik" probablement opposé à son synonyme "tam Üyelik", et pousse certains à s'interroger sur le rapport exact existant entre ces deux termes d'une part, et le terme d'"ortaklik", d'autre part.

5. A noter que, malgré tout ce qui précède, toute action "commune" est prise, ou doit être prise, dans le respect le plus strict des souverainetés nationales respectives, sous l'oeil vigilant d'une Commission parlementaire mixte qui examine attentivement, chaque année, le rapport annuel d'activité élaboré par l'organe moteur de l'association, le "Conseil d'association", assisté d'un "Comité d'association" (le dernier rapport paru porte le no. 14 et se réfère à l'année 1978).

6. Si l'automatisme était suffisant pour la réussite des choses humaines, ou tout au moins pour leur bonne conduite, il serait étonnant qu'une construction aussi circonstanciée que celle des textes de l'association CEE-Turquie, constituant apparemment un mini-Traité de Rome, n'ait pas déjà conduit à la pleine réalisation de leurs objectifs.

On oublie cependant que l'accord d'association n'est au fond qu'un accord cadre, qu'il se situe dans les limites juridiques, économiques et politiques d'un autre accord -le Traité de Rome- et que sa réussite dépend de l'ampleur de la mobilisation des ressources économiques visées, de la vigilance avec laquelle chacune des parties suit l'évolution de l'autre, ainsi que de la poursuite /ininterrompue d'une négociation appropriée, habile, constamment renouvelée et argumentée des diverses initiatives communes prévues ou tout simplement inspirées par les accords existants.

7. Le malaise qui, à un certain moment de la vie de l'Association - vers la moitié de la décennie dont nous vivons les derniers instants- a caractérisé les relations entre la CEE et la Turquie, a-t-il été dû à la faute ou à la négligence de l'une ou de l'autre partie, à l'évolution de la situation internationale en général ou des relations extérieures (notamment méditerranéennes) de la CEE en particulier, à une mauvaise information réciproque, à un manque de connaissance mutuelle, ~~xx~~ à une certaine incompréhension, à des hésitations plus ou moins motivées, ou à tous ces éléments réunis?

Le fait est qu'à un certain moment de la vie de cette Association il a manqué une âme, il a manqué cette volonté de poursuite en commun des objectifs non seulement par l'adoption de mesures concrètes, mais aussi par la recherche de telles mesures, fruit à la fois de l'imagination créative et de l'amour; le mécanisme institutionnel lui-même a commencé à grincer et certaines dispositions se sont trouvées lettre morte ou ont été carrément suspendues. Certains ont été jusqu'à employer l'affreux terme de "gel".

8. Etait-ce économiquement justifié? Il serait difficile de répondre en isolant les aspects économiques des aspects politiques de telles décisions ce qui, malheureusement, ne relève pas de mes compétences.

9. Ce qui est, en tout cas, remarquable et digne d'être souligné, je dirais presque proclamé, c'est la reprise vigoureuse des liens d'association tels qu'ils résultent des décisions adoptées par le Conseil d'association des 30 juin et 1er juillet 1980, à savoir:

- l'abolition progressive des droits de douane résiduels frappant encore certains ~~produits agricoles turcs~~ parmi les produits agricoles turcs rentrant dans la Communauté, abolition progressive devant aboutir -entre le 1er janvier 1981 et le 1er janvier 1987- à l'élimination totale des droits de douane applicables aux produits agricoles turcs importés dans la Communauté;
- l'établissement, en commun, d'un programme d'examen et d'analyse de la réglementation agricole communautaire ainsi que de l'économie et de la législation agricoles turques, en vue de faciliter conformément à l'article 33 du Protocole Additionnel, l'adaptation de la politique agricole turque à la politique agricole commune et permettre, ainsi, la libre circulation des produits agricoles entre la Turquie et la Communauté;
- la fixation de dispositions applicables pendant trois ans (1981-1983) dans le domaine de la libre circulation des travailleurs par l'amélioration des conditions d'accès à l'emploi du travailleur turc et notamment de ses enfants ayant accompli une formation professionnelle dans le pays d'accueil;
- la création d'un groupe ad hoc chargé de l'application harmonieuse des dispositions précitées en procédant, entre autres, à des échanges de vues périodiques sur la situation économique et sociale, y compris celle du marché de l'emploi et de ses perspectives d'évolution dans la Communauté et en Turquie;
- l'adoption de mesures de promotion socio-culturelle "notamment pour l'alphabétisation et l'apprentissage de la langue du pays d'accueil, pour le maintien des liens avec la culture turque ainsi que pour l'accès à la formation professionnelle";

- la mise en oeuvre d'actions susceptibles de permettre à des jeunes travailleurs, ayant reçu leur formation de base dans leur pays, de participer à des stages de travail, complémentaires de leur formation professionnelle, dans les conditions visées à l'article 40 du Protocole additionnel;
- la totalisation des périodes d'assurances ou d'emploi accomplies dans les différents Etats membres en ce qui concerne les pensions et rentes de vieillesse, de décès et d'invalidité ainsi que les soins de santé du travailleur et de sa famille résidant à l'intérieur de la Communauté ainsi que la possibilité de trouver une solution au problème du calcul des périodes accomplies en Turquie;
- la décision de conclure un quatrième protocole financier, pour la période 1981-1986 comportant un montant global de 600 millions d'UCE ~~répartis~~ dont environ 50 en tant qu'aides non remboursables destinées à financer la coopération économique et technique et 325 en tant que prêts à conditions spéciales (1% d'intérêt, 10 ans de délai de grâce et 40 ans de durée d'amortissement);
- enfin, la création d'un nouveau volet dans les relations turco-communautaires, celui de la coopération économique et technique, consistant, entre autres, à financer - par des aides non remboursables (dont le premier montant a été fixé à 75 millions d'UCE) - des projets dans quatre domaines:
 - L'énergie (recherches et transformation des ressources; joint ventures);
 - l'industrie (commercialisation des produits, turcs, transfert de technologie, assistance technique au PME, joint ventures);
 - l'agriculture (modernisation des structures, des techniques et de la commercialisation agricole; irrigation, standardisation etc.)
 - la main d'oeuvre (création d'un centre pilote de formation multi-disciplinaire, stages etc.)

10. Je pense que si l'on opte pour une certaine formule, il est injuste de la critiquer ou d'en mettre en doute l'efficacité avant d'avoir essayé de l'appliquer et, en cas d'échec, total ou partiel, avant de s'être interrogé sur l'une ou l'autre parmi les multiples raisons qui pourraient l'avoir motivé.

Certaines habitudes mentales, dérivées de la tradition ou de l'histoire, peuvent nous pousser à préjuger de l'efficacité d'une formule avant même qu'on n'ait eu l'occasion de l'expérimenter. De même qu'il serait erroné, en tombant dans l'extrême opposé, de croire qu'une formule politico-économique telle que celle de l'association peut constituer à elle seule un remède unique à tous les maux sans une mobilisation proportionnelle, mais immédiate et soutenue, de toutes les forces économiques disponibles des parties en cause.

Je crains beaucoup les obstacles psychologiques dont l'élimination, apparemment si simple si l'on fait appel à la raison, atteint et parfois même dépasse les plus graves obstacles économiques.

Certaines discussions sur la diversité des cultures et des mœurs, sur l'euro péanité, sur le parallélisme de telle ou telle initiative par rapport à celle de tel ou tel autre pays, ne relèvent-elles pas -plutôt que de la géographie ou de la prétendue histoire- d'une certaine interprétation de l'histoire, donc d'une certaine attitude psychologique?

11. La réalité des intérêts actuels, l'imminence des dangers ou des confrontations qui menacent le monde, ainsi qu'une nouvelle vision de l'histoire faisant abstraction de la parenthèse capitulaire du XIX^e. siècle (qui n'a que trop conditionné les relations entre l'Europe et la Turquie), devraient nous aider à mieux saisir le sens d'une association qui, malgré ses difficultés, représente un lien naturel entre deux portions de l'humanité qui ont été chacune au sommet de la civilisation qu'elles représentaient, et cela surtout à un moment où la Grèce adhère à la CEE et, comme premier pays associé à la Communauté Européenne, laisse présager d'évolutions similaires.

(1)
I - LA CEE et la TURQUIE DANS LES CHIFFRES (arrondis)

Sources: Eurostat, Statistiques générales de la CEE, Bruxelles 1980
 Rapports d'activité du Conseil d'Association, Bruxelles
 OSCE, Numéro spécial 1958-1979

<u>Surface:</u>			<u>T/CEE</u>	
	CEE	1.650.000 km ²		
	T.	800.000 km ²	(1/2)	(1978)

<u>Population:</u>	CEE	260 mio.		
	T.	45 mio.	(1/6)	(1978)

Production agricole:

.Céréales	CEE	100.000.000 to.		
76-78	T.	25.000.000 to.	(1/4)	

.Riz	CEE	950.000 to.		
75-77	T.	300.000 to.	(1/3)	

.Ovins et	CEE	60.000.000		
caprins	T.	60.000.000		
78				

.Vaches à	CEE	25.000.000		
lait	T.	5.000.000	(1/5)	
78				

-Lait	CEE.	100.000.000 to		
78	T.	5.000.000 to	(1/20)	

-Beurre	CEE	2.000.000 to		
78	T.	100.000 to	(1/20)	

-Fromage	CEE	3.500.000 to		
78	T.	100.000 to	(1/30)	

<u>Surface boisée</u> (1977)	CEE	35 millions ha.		
	T.	11 " "	(1/3)	

<u>mais production bois</u>	CEE	100 " m ³		
	T.	23 " "	(1/5)	

Production énergie primaire (1978)

CEE 410 mio. tep
T. 18 mio tep (1/20)

Production de minerais (1978)

.cuivre CEE 7.000 to.
T. 30.000 to.

zinc CEE 400.000 to.
T. 50.000 to. (1/8)

Production de bauxite (1978)

CEE 5 millions de tonnes
T. 500.000 to. (1/10) (toutefois 1/4 avant
l'adhésion de la Grèce)

Indices de la production industrielle (1975 = 100)

CEE 79 = 120
T. 79 = n.d.

Réseau ferroviaire (1978)

CEE 110.000 km
T. 10.000 km (1/10)

Réseau routier (1978)

CEE 2.300.000 km
T. 230.000 km (1/10)

Importations totales (1979)

CEE 450 milliards d'ECU
T. 4 " " dont 1,5 en prov. de la CEE
soit 9% du PNB contre (contre 150 mio \$ en 1964)
25% CEE)

Exportations totales (1979)

CEE 420 " "
T. 2 " " dont 900.000 vers CEE
soit 4% du PNB contre (contre 140 mio \$ en 1964)
25% CEE)

la CEE représentant 40% du commerce mondial et
la T. 0,3%

12% des importations de la CEE viennent du Bassin
Méditerranéen (soit 27 sur 220 milliards d'ECU)
20% des exportations de la CEE vont vers le Bassin
Méditerranéen (soit 37 des 195 milliards d'ECU)

Consommation moyenne agricole par habitant (1978) (Données disponibles)

Viande (25 kg en T. contre 80 CEE);
Oeufs (4 kg en T. contre 14 CEE)